    [Senate Hearing 105-183]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 105-183

                           CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   BEFORE THE

                         COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                           ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                          APRIL 8, 9, 15 AND 17, 1997

                                   __________

           Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

                         COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                     JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman

    RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana            JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
    PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia              PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
    CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska                CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
    GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon              JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
    CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming                CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
    ROD GRAMS, Minnesota                 RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
    JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri              DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
    BILL FRIST, Tennessee                PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
    SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

                         James W. Nance, Staff Director

                     Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director

                                      (ii)

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                             Tuesday, April 8, 1997
                                  a.m. session

    Rumsfeld, Hon. Donald, former Secretary of Defense...............    13
        Prepared statement...........................................    19
    Schlesinger, Hon. James R., former Secretary of Defense..........     5
        Letter Submitted by Hon. Richard B. Cheney, former Secretary
          of Defense.................................................     5
    Weinberger, Hon. Caspar, former Secretary of Defense.............     9

                                  P.M. SESSION

    Albright, Hon. Madeleine Korbel, Secretary of State..............    61
        Prepared statement...........................................    64

                            Wednesday, April 9, 1997

    Feith, Douglas J., Feith and Zell, P.C., former Deputy Assistant
      Secretary of Defense for Negotiation Policy....................   107
        Prepared statement...........................................   110
    Ikle, Dr. Fred C., former Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
      Agency.........................................................   105
    Kirkpatrick, Dr. Jeane J., former U.S. Permanent Representative
      to the United Nations, Senior Fellow, American Enterprise
      Institute......................................................    91
        Prepared statement...........................................    96
    Perle, Richard N., former Assistant Secretary of Defense for
      International Security Policy..................................    99
    Rowny, Lieutenant General Edward L., U.S. Army (retired),
      International Negotiation Consultant...........................   131
        Prepared statement...........................................   133
    Scowcroft, General Brent, President, Forum for International
      Policy, and former National Security Policy Advisor............   134
    Zumwalt, Admiral E.R., Jr., United States Navy (retired), Member,
      President's Foreign Intelligence Avisory Board.................   124

                            Tuesday, April 15, 1997

    Bailey, Hon. Kathleen C., Senior Fellow, Lawrence Livermore
      National Laboratory............................................   182
        Prepared statement...........................................   185
        Letter Submitted by Paul L. Eisman, Senior Vice President for
          Refining, Ultramar Diamond Shamrock Corporation............   182
        Letter Submitted by Robert W. Roten, President and CEO of
          Sterling Chemicals.........................................   183
    Forbes, Malcolm S., Jr., President and CEO, Forbes, Inc., New
      York, New York.................................................   153
        Prepared statement...........................................   157
    Johnson, Ralph V., Vice President, Environmental Affairs, Dixie
      Chemical Company, Inc., Houston, Texas.........................   180
    Kearns, Kevin L., President, United States Business and
      Industrial Council.............................................   174
        Prepared statement...........................................   176
    Merrifield, Hon. Bruce, former Assistant Secretary of Commerce...   187
    Reinsch, Hon. William A., Under Secretary of Commerce for Export
      Administration.................................................   189
        Prepared statement...........................................   192
    Spears, Wayne, Owner and CEO, Spears Manufacturing, Inc., Sylmar,
      California.....................................................   178
        Prepared statement...........................................   179
    Webber, Frederick, President, Chemical Manufacturers Association,
      Washington, D.C................................................   194
        Prepared statement...........................................   197

                            Thursday, April 17, 1997

    Goss, Hon. Porter J., U.S. Representative in Congress From
      Florida........................................................   219
    Lehman, Hon. Ronald F., former Director, Arms Control and
      Disarmament Agency.............................................   236
    Odom, General William, U.S. Army (retired), former Director,
      National Security Agency.......................................   227
    O'Malley, Edward J., former Assistant Director
      (Counterintelligence), Federal Bureau of Investigation.........   231

                                    Appendix

    Conditions to the Chemical Weapons Convention....................   261
    The Case Against The Chemical Weapons Convention ``Truth or
      Consequences'' [Prepared by The Center for Security Policy]....   276
    Remarks by President Bill Clinton and Others at the White House,
      April 4, 1997..................................................   321
    False Promises, Fatal Flaws: The Chemical Weapons Convention
      [Prepared by Empower America]..................................   326
    Letters and Other Material Submitted in Support of Ratification
      of the Chemical Weapons Convention:
        American Ex-Prisoners of War.................................   329
        Veterans of Foreign Wars of the U.S..........................   329
        Reserve Officers Association of the United States............   329
        Jewish War Veterans of the U.S.A.............................   330
        Prepared Statement of Brad Roberts, Institute for Defense
          Analyses...................................................   331
    Letters Submitted in Opposition to Ratification of the Chemical
      Weapons Convention:
        Sterling Chemicals...........................................   335
        Small Business Survival Committee............................   335
    Statement by Ronald F. Lehman Before the U.S. Senate Foreign
      Relations Committee, June 9, 1994..............................   337

                          CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

                                  ----------

                      TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 1997--A.M. SESSION

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m. in
    room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms
    (chairman of the committee) presiding.
        Present: Senators Helms, Lugar, Hagel, Smith, Thomas,
    Ashcroft, Grams, Brownback, Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd, Kerry, Robb,
    Feingold, Feinstein, and Wellstone.
        The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
        I believe it is customary to wait until there is at least
    one Senator from each party present.
        I would inquire of the minority counsel.
        Can you give us some advice as to whether Senator Biden
    would wish us to proceed?
        I might explain to our distinguished guests this morning--
    and, as a matter of fact, everybody here is a distinguished
    guest as far as I am concerned--as I just said, it is a
    tradition, in this committee, at least, to have at least one
    Senator from each party present before the proceeding begins.
        Senator Biden is on a train coming in from Delaware, and I
    am seeking information as to whether it would be his wish that
    we proceed without him until he gets here.
        I am told that it is satisfactory with Senator Biden that
    we do proceed.
        As is obvious, this morning's hearing is the first of the
    Foreign Relations Committee's final round of testimony on the
    Chemical Weapons Convention, or that's right.
        I think it is fair to say that history is being made here
    this morning and I believe today is the first time that three
    distinguished, former U.S. Secretaries of Defense have ever
    appeared together before a Senate committee to oppose
    ratification of an arms control treaty. And if ever a treaty
    deserved such highly respected opposition, it is the dangerous
    and defective so-called Chemical Weapons Convention.
        This morning's witnesses include Hon. James Schlesinger,
    Secretary of Defense for President Nixon, Hon. Donald Rumsfeld,
    Secretary of Defense for President Ford, and Hon. Caspar
    Weinberger, Secretary of Defense for President Reagan.
        Further, we will have testimony today in the form of a
    letter from Hon. Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense for the
    Bush administration. Secretary Cheney's schedule precluded him
    from being here in person today. But he has asked Secretary
    Schlesinger to read into the record Secretary Cheney's strong
    opposition to Senate ratification of the Chemical Weapons
    Convention.
        So with Secretary Cheney's contribution, this hearing will
    consist of testimony by and from Defense Secretaries of every
    Republican administration since Richard Nixon, testimony that
    will counsel the Senate to decline to ratify this dangerously
    defective treaty.
        These distinguished Americans are by no means alone. More
    than 50--more than 50--generals, admirals, and senior officials
    from previous administrations have joined them in opposing the
    Chemical Weapons Convention, and if that does not send a clear
    signal on just how dangerous this treaty really is, I cannot
    imagine what would.
        So, gentlemen, we welcome you and deeply appreciate your
    being here today to testify. I regret that we cannot offer you
    the pomp and circumstance of the Rose Garden ceremony last
    week, but our invitation to be there got lost in the mail
    somehow.
        Your testimony here today will convey to the American
    people highly respected assessments of this dangerous treaty.
        Now our precise purpose today is to examine the national
    security implications of the CWC which is important because the
    105th Congress has 15 new Senators, including three new and
    able members of this committee who have never heard testimony
    on this treaty.
        The case against the treaty can be summarized quite simply,
    I think. It is not global, it is not verifiable, it is not
    constitutional, and it will not work. Otherwise, it is a fair
    treaty.
        The Chemical Weapons Convention will do absolutely nothing
    to protect the American people from the dangers of chemical
    weapons. What it will do is increase rogue regimes' access to
    dangerous chemical agents and technology while imposing new
    regulations on American businesses, exposing them to increased
    danger of industrial espionage and trampling their
    constitutional rights. Outside of the Beltway, where people do
    not worship at the altar of arms control, that is what we call
    ``A bum deal.''
        We have been hearing a lot of empty rhetoric from the
    proponents of the treaty about ``banning chemical weapons from
    the face of the earth.'' This treaty will do no such thing. No
    supporter of this treaty can tell us with a straight face how
    this treaty will actually accomplish that goal.
        The best argument they have mustered to date is yes, it is
    defective, they say, but it is better than nothing.
        But, in fact, this treaty is worse than nothing for, on top
    of the problems with the CWC's verifiability and
    constitutionality, this treaty gives the American people a
    false sense of security that something is being done to reduce
    the dangers of chemical weaponry when, in fact, nothing--
    nothing--is being done. If anything, this treaty puts the
    American people at greater risk.
        More than 90 percent of the countries possessing chemical
    weaponry have not ratified the CWC, and more than one-third of
    them have not even signed it. This includes almost all of the
    terrorist regimes whose possession of chemical weapons does
    threaten the United States, countries like Libya, Syria, Iraq,
    and North Korea. Not one of them--not one of them--is a
    signatory to this treaty and none of them will be affected by
    it.
        Worse still, this treaty will increase access to dangerous
    chemical agents and technology to rogue states who do sign the
    treaty. Iran, for example, is one of the few nations on this
    earth ever to use chemical weapons. Yet Iran is a signatory of
    the CWC.
        I am going to stop with the rest of my prepared statement
    today so that we can get to our witnesses, which is what you
    are here for.
        But I want to say, once more, that I ask the American
    people not to take my word for anything that I am saying. I ask
    the American people to consider the judgments of these
    distinguished former Secretaries of Defense who oppose the CWC.
        I am looking forward to hearing from them about the
    treaty's scope, verifiability, about its Articles X and XI, and
    the assessment of our distinguished witnesses about the overall
    potential impact of this treaty on America's national security.
        That said, we turn to the witnesses.
        Secretary Schlesinger, we call on you first.

        [The prepared statement of The Chairman follows:]

                      Prepared Statement of Chairman Helms

        This morning's hearing is the first of the Foreign Relations
    Committee's final round of testimony on the Chemical Weapons
    Convention. I think it is fair to say that history is being made this
    morning. I believe today is the first time that three distinguished
    former United States Secretaries of Defense have ever appeared together
    before a Senate committee to oppose ratification of an arms control
    treaty. And if ever a treaty deserved such highly respected opposition,
    it is the dangerous and defective Chemical Weapons Convention.
        This morning's witnesses include the Honorable James Schlesinger,
    Secretary of Defense for President Nixon; the Honorable Donald
    Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense for President Ford; and the Honorable
    Casper Weinberger, Secretary of Defense for President Reagan.
        Further, we will have testimony today, in the form of a letter from
    the Honorable Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense for the Bush
    Administration. Secretary Cheney's schedule precludes him from being
    here in person today, but he has asked Secretary Schlesinger to read
    into the record Secretary Cheney's strong opposition to Senate
    ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
        So with Secretary Cheney's contribution, this hearing will consist
    of testimony by and from defense secretaries of every Republican
    administration since Richard Nixon--testimony that will counsel the
    Senate to decline to ratify this dangerously defective treaty. These
    distinguished Americans are by no means alone. More than 50 generals,
    admirals, and senior officials from previous Administrations have
    joined them in opposing the Chemical Weapons Convention. If that
    doesn't send a clear signal of just how dangerous this treaty really
    is, I can't imagine what would.
        So, gentlemen, we welcome you and deeply appreciate your being here
    today to testify. I regret we cannot offer you the pomp and
    circumstance of a Rose Garden ceremony, but your testimony here today
    will convey to the American people highly respected assessments of this
    dangerous treaty.
        Our precise purpose today is to examine the national security
    implications of the CWC. This is important because the 105th Congress
    has 15 new Senators, including three new and able members of this
    committee, who have never heard testimony on the treaty.
        The case against this treaty can be summarized quite simply: It is
    not global, it is not verifiable, it is not constitutional, and it will
    not work.
        The Chemical Weapons Convention will do nothing to protect the
    American people from the dangers of chemical weapons. What it will in
    fact do is increase rogue regimes' access to dangerous chemical agents
    and technology, while imposing new regulations on American businesses,
    exposing them to increased danger of industrial espionage, and
    trampling their Constitutional rights. Outside the beltway, where
    people don't worship at the altar of arms control, that's what we call
    a bum deal.
        We have been hearing a lot of empty rhetoric from proponents of
    this treaty about ``banning chemical weapons from the face of the
    earth.'' This treaty will do no such thing. No supporter of this treaty
    can tell us, with a straight face, how this treaty will actually
    accomplish that goal.
        The best argument they have mustered to date is: Yes, it is
    defective, but it is better than nothing.
        But in fact, this treaty is much worse than nothing. For, on top of
    the problems with the CWC's verifiability and constitutionality, this
    treaty gives the American people a false sense of security that
    something is being done to reduce the dangers of chemical weapons, when
    in fact nothing is being done. If anything, this treaty puts the
    American people at greater risk.
        More than 90 percent of the countries possessing chemical weapons
    have not ratified the CWC, and more than one third of them have not
    even signed it. That includes almost all of the terrorist regimes whose
    possession of chemical weapons does threaten the United States--
    countries like Libya, Syria, Iraq, and North Korea. Not one of them is
    a signatory to this treaty. And none of them will be affected by it.
        Worse still, this treaty would increase access to dangerous
    chemical agents and technology by rogue states who do sign it. Iran,
    for example, is one of the few nations on the earth ever to use
    chemical weapons. Yet Iran is a signatory to the CWC.
        Why, you may ask, why does Iran support the treaty? Because by
    joining the CWC, Iran can demand access to chemical technology of any
    other signatory nation--including the United States, if the U.S. Senate
    were to make the mistake of ratifying it. In other words, Iran will be
    entitled to chemical defensive gear and dangerous dual-use chemicals
    and technologies that will help them modernize their chemical weapons
    program.
        Giving U.S. assent to legalizing such transfers of chemical agents
    and technology to such rogue nations is pure folly, and will make the
    problem of chemical weapons more difficult to constrain, not less.
        For example, if the U.S. were to protest a planned sale of a
    chemical manufacturing facility by Russia to Iran, under the CWC Russia
    could argue that not only are they permitted to sell such dangerous
    chemical technology to Teheran, but they are obliged to do so--by a
    treaty the U.S. agreed to. Because Iran's terrorist leaders have
    promised to get rid of their chemical weapons.
        Is it possible for the United States to verify whether Iran will be
    complying with its treaty obligations? Of course not. Even the
    administration admits that this chemical weapons treaty is
    unverifiable.
        President Clinton's own Director of Central Intelligence, James
    Woolsey, declared in testimony before this committee on June 23, 1994,
    that, and I quote, ``the chemical weapons problem is so difficult from
    an intelligence perspective, that I cannot state that we have high
    confidence in our ability to detect noncompliance, especially on a
    small scale.
        So in other words, under this treaty, the American people will have
    to take the Ayatollahs' word for it.
        And what about Russia--the country possessing the largest and most
    sophisticated chemical weapons arsenal in the world? Russia has made
    perfectly clear it has no intention of eliminating its chemical weapons
    stockpile. In fact, Russia is already violating its bilateral agreement
    with the U.S. to get rid of these terrible weapons; It has consistently
    refused to come clean about the true size of its chemical weapons
    stockpile; and Russia continues to work on a new generation of nerve
    agents, disguised as everyday commercial or agricultural chemicals,
    specifically designed to circumvent this chemical weapons treaty that
    the Clinton Administration is pulling out all the stops to force the
    Senate to ratify.
        All this, sad to say, is just the tip of the iceberg in terms of
    what's wrong with this treaty. There is a whole array of other problems
    which I hope we can discuss today. But I think it borders on fraudulent
    to mislead the American people, as so many other treaty proponents
    have, into to believing that their lives will somehow be made safer if
    this treaty is ratified--and that their safety is being put at risk if
    the Senate refuses to be stampeded by Rose Garden ceremonies and high-
    pressure tactics.
        But I ask the American people not to take my word for it. I ask all
    Americans to consider the judgments of these distinguished former
    Secretaries of Defense who oppose the CWC. I am looking forward to
    hearing from them about the treaty's scope, verifiability, its Articles
    X and XI, and the assessment of our distinguished witnesses about the
    overall potential impact of this treaty on America's national security.

      STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF
                                DEFENSE

        Dr. Schlesinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        At the outset, I will allow Secretary Cheney to join us
    vicariously. He has sent a letter, as you indicated, and I
    shall read it into the record.
        This letter is dated April 7, from Dallas, Texas.

    Hon. Jesse Helms,
    Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
    U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
        Dear Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your letter inviting me to join
    several other former Secretaries of Defense in testifying in early
    April when the Foreign Relations Committee holds hearings on the
    Chemical Weapons Convention. Regrettably, other commitments will
    preclude me from participation. I hope that this correspondence will be
    sufficient to convey my views on this convention.
        During the years I served as Secretary of Defense, I was deeply
    concerned about the inherent unverifiability, lack of global coverage,
    and unenforceability of a convention that sought to ban production and
    stockpiling of chemical weapons. My misgivings on these scores have
    only intensified during the 4 years since I left the Pentagon.
        The technology to manufacture chemical weapons is simply too
    ubiquitous, covert chemical warfare programs too easily concealed, and
    the international community's record of responding effectively to
    violations of arms control treaties too unsatisfactory to permit
    confidence that such a regime would actually reduce the chemical
    threat.
        Indeed, some aspects of the present convention--notably its
    obligation to share with potential adversaries, like Iran, chemical
    manufacturing technology that can be used for military purposes and
    chemical defensive equipment--threaten to make this accord worse than
    having no treaty at all. In my judgment, the treaty's Articles X and XI
    amount to a formula for greatly accelerating the proliferation of
    chemical warfare capabilities around the globe.
        Those nations most likely to comply with the Chemical Weapons
    Convention are not likely to ever constitute a military threat to the
    United States. The governments we should be concerned about are likely
    to cheat on the CWC even if they do participate.
        In effect, the Senate is being asked to ratify the CWC even though
    it is likely to be ineffective, unverifiable, and unenforceable. Having
    ratified the convention, we will then be told we have ``dealt with the
    problem of chemical weapons'' when, in fact, we have not. But
    ratification of the CWC will lead to a sense of complacency, totally
    unjustified given the flaws in the convention.
        I would urge the Senate to reject the Chemical Weapons Convention.
                Sincerely,
                                           Dick Cheney.

        The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
        Dr. Schlesinger. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I
    thank the committee for its invitation to testify today on the
    ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. I must at the
    outset underscore my belief that the proper criterion for
    judging the convention is whether or not it is in the interest
    of the United States and whether or not it will serve the long-
    run purposes of the American people. It should not be approved
    simply for reasons of diplomatic momentum or a gesture toward
    multilateralism, but as a treaty with which this Nation must
    live.
        Mr. Chairman, I start with the interesting and somewhat
    checkered history of efforts at the control of chemical
    weapons. The introduction of poison gas in World War I and then
    its widespread use in the later stages of that war led to a
    horrified reaction. That reaction, plus the unease concerning
    its subsequent use by colonial powers, led to the Geneva
    Convention in 1925, which forbids the use of poison gas by all
    signatories.
        In the period prior to World War II, the European powers
    carefully prepared for the possible use of poison gas. In the
    actual circumstances of the war, however, the German decision
    to refrain from using poison gas came not for humanitarian
    reasons, not for reasons of the treaty, which German diplomats
    might well have described as ``a scrap of paper,'' but out of
    concern for the threat of devastating retaliation by the
    Western allies.
        Iraq has been and is a signatory to the Geneva Convention.
    In the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980's, Iraq used poison gas as a
    way of stemming the ``human wave'' attacks of the Iranians.
    What was our reaction and the reaction of other Western powers
    at that time? In brief, it was to avert our gaze.
        Later, as the war died down, Saddam Hussein used gas
    against Iraq's Kurds. This time, however, the response was
    slightly more vigorous. An international gathering took place
    in Paris in January 1989. Not only did the international
    community fail to denounce Iraq, most participants were
    reluctant even to name Iraq for using gas. Our own reaction,
    was to say the least, somewhat muted. After all, Iraq provided
    protection in the Gulf against the Ayatollah's Iran. For what
    were regarded as sound geopolitical reasons, we failed to take
    action to sustain the existing prohibition on the use of poison
    gas by a signatory--despite Iraq's blatant violation of the
    Geneva Convention. This manifest failure of the existing arms
    control regime did stimulate renewed efforts on the Chemical
    Weapons Convention that lies before you. Aha! Perhaps if we
    were unwilling to enforce the existing ban on the use of poison
    gas, we might be more willing to take strong actions against
    its manufacture.
        Would we actually do more in enforcement when the evidence
    is far more ambiguous and the menace more distant? The use of
    poison gas is readily detectable; manufacture is not. Tapes and
    photographs were widely available of Kurdish women clutching
    their children to their breasts in the vain attempt to protect
    them against the gas. And yet we did nothing--for then it was
    not regarded as in our interest to intervene.
        By contrast, in the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein did not use
    poison gas against our troops. In the famous letter from
    President Bush to Saddam Hussein in early 1991 in which we
    demanded Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait, we reminded Saddam that
    the United States had nuclear weapons. As Secretary Baker has
    said, we also, ``made it very clear that if Iraq used weapons
    of mass destruction, chemical weapons against U.S. forces, that
    the American people would demand vengeance and that we had the
    means to achieve it.''
        What are the lessons learned from these episodes? Treaties
    alone will do little. To prevent the use or the manufacture of
    chemical weapons requires a structure for deterrence backed by
    real capabilities. Above all, enforcement will depend upon the
    will to take action which, if history is any guide, will in
    turn depend upon a careful geopolitical assessment.
        Mr. Chairman, let me turn from history to specific problems
    in this convention. In this brief statement, I can only deal
    with five problem areas. Nonetheless, I would hope that the
    members of this committee and your colleagues in the Senate
    receive clear reassurance in these areas before you approve the
    convention.
        First is non-lethal chemicals. Non-lethal chemicals are
    necessary for crowd control, for peacekeeping, for rescuing
    downed pilots and the like. In the negotiations on the
    convention, we were pressed to ban non-lethal chemicals along
    with lethal chemicals. President Bush, under pressure from the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff, reiterated prior American policy and
    indicated that use of riot control agents would not be banned.
    The Clinton administration has been far more ambiguous on this
    subject, retreating from President Bush's stated exclusion.
    Sometime it has suggested that such agents could be used in
    peacetime but not in wartime. That raises the question of
    defining when the Nation is at war. Was the Vietnam War a war?
        Just 2 days ago, the New York Times stated that the
    administration ``has also refused to interpret the treaty in a
    way that would allow the use of tear gas for crowd control,
    mainly because the Pentagon has said it has no need to ever use
    non-lethal gases.''
        If the latter is true, it represents a remarkable
    transformation of Pentagon attitudes, and I recommend that you
    check this out. The first part of the quotation reflects the
    continuing ambivalence of the administration on the question of
    non-lethal chemicals. I trust that the Senate will seek
    clarification of the administration's position and indeed
    insist that the use of tear gas will not be banned either in
    peace or war. Otherwise, we may wind up placing ourselves in
    the position of the Chinese Government in dealing with the
    Tiananmen Square uprising in 1989. The failure to use tear gas
    meant that that government only had recourse to the massive use
    of firepower to disperse the crowd.
        Second is sharing CW technology. Article X of the treaty
    requires that signatories have a right to acquire CW defensive
    technologies from other signatories. This may mean that the
    United States is obliged to share such technologies with Iran,
    Cuba, and other such nations that may sign the convention.
    Almost certainly that interpretation will be argued by lawyers
    in the government. But, even if the Senate were able to prevent
    such obligatory transfers, it is plain that Article X
    legitimizes such transfers by other industrial nations which
    will argue they are obliged to do so by the treaty.
        Clearly, that undercuts any sanctions directed against
    rogue nations that happen to sign the convention. And, in any
    event, there are still other states that do not agree with our
    judgments in these matters and will acquire such chemical
    warfare defensive technologies and will share such technologies
    with rogue nations whether signatories or not.
        Third is the defense against chemical weapons. Continued
    and vigorous efforts to develop chemical weapons defenses are
    required. In the years ahead, various groups, inclined to
    fanaticism, are likely to use chemical weapons as instruments
    of sabotage or terrorism. Aum Shin Rikyo, the Japanese
    religious cult, is but a prototype of these other terrorist
    groups. To deal with such prospective attacks, it is essential
    to have continuing efforts on defensive measures to protect our
    civilian population as well as our forces.
        In this connection, two points must be made. First, the
    illusion that this convention will provide protection against
    chemical weapons will tempt us to lower our guard and to reduce
    our efforts on defensive CW measures. Such temptations should
    be formally rejected through safeguards. Second, the sharing of
    technologies required by Article X will provide other nations
    with the information that will help to neutralize our chemical
    weapons defenses and, thus, expose us to greater risk.
        Fourth is industrial espionage. The convention permits or
    encourages challenge inspections against any facility deemed
    capable of producing chemical weapons--indeed against any
    facility. This exposes American companies to a degree to
    industrial espionage never before encountered in this country.
    This implies the possibility of the capture of proprietary
    information or national security information from American
    corporations by present or by prospective commercial rivals. To
    preclude such intrusive inspections requires the vote of three-
    quarters of the Executive Council of the Organization for the
    Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Such super majority votes are
    unlikely to be forthcoming and will grow less so over time.
        The committee may wish to inquire how FBI counter
    intelligence feels about these arrangements.
        Mr. Chairman, I trust that the committee will delve deeply
    into this issue because scuttlebutt has it that the White House
    has indicated to senior FBI officials that they are to say
    nothing against this treaty. Consequently, you may wish to
    examine not only present but former counter intelligence
    officers.
        The Chairman. We will. Thank you.
        Dr. Schlesinger. This convention is sometimes compared to
    the arrangements under the Atoms for Peace Agreement. But it
    should be noted that few of the several mechanisms that provide
    protection in the nuclear area exist under this convention.
        Five is how do we respond to violations. Is the convention
    something more than a feel good treaty? Is it more meaningful
    than the more explicit and more relevant ban on use in the
    Geneva Convention? If so, what is its operational significance?
    Last April, Secretary Perry, reiterating some of the warnings
    of President Bush and Secretary Baker to Saddam Hussein stated,
    ``Anyone who considers using a weapon of mass destruction
    against the United States or its allies must first consider the
    consequences. We would not specify in advance what our response
    would be, but it would be both overwhelming and devastating.''
        Administration officials have more recently reiterated that
    threat. Does this convention oblige us to take actions beyond
    attacks on ourselves or on our allies? Are we prepared to take
    action if Iran attacks Tajikistan or even uses gas against its
    own minorities? If Syria, or Saudi Arabia, or Israel, or South
    Africa manufactures gas, what are we prepared to do? What
    actions would we take if we discover that Russia, or Ukraine,
    or China is engaged clandestinely--or openly--in the
    manufacture of gas?
        As the leading world power and as the initial sponsor of
    this convention, the United States bears a particular
    responsibility for those signatories who have foregone the
    right of direct retaliation and who lack the American capacity
    for a response, both ``overwhelming and devastating.'' The role
    of the United States visibly transcends that of the
    Netherlands, or of Sweden, or of other nations that are
    prepared to sign the convention. I trust, therefore, that this
    committee will press for clear answers regarding how we might
    feel obliged to respond in different hypothetical
    circumstances.
        Mr. Chairman, as this committee proceeds with its
    deliberations, I trust that it will carefully examine some of
    the exaggerated or false claims that have been made on behalf
    of the convention. This treaty will not serve to banish the
    threat of chemical weapons. It will not aid in the fight
    against terrorism. Only effective police work will accomplish
    that.
        As the Japanese cult, Aum Shin Rikyo, has demonstrated, a
    significant volume of lethal nerve gas can be produced in a
    facility as small as 8 feet by 15 feet. Increasingly, are we
    aware how vulnerable this Nation may be to terrorist attacks,
    and this treaty will do little to limit such vulnerability. Nor
    will this treaty ``provide our children broad protection
    against the threat of chemical attacks.'' Such statements
    merely disguise and, thereby, increase our vulnerability to
    terrorist attacks. To the extent that others learn from
    international sharing of information on CW defenses, our
    vulnerability is enhanced rather than diminished.
        Finally, this treaty in no way helps ``shield our soldiers
    from one of battlefield's deadliest killers.'' As indicated
    earlier, only the threat of effective retaliation provides such
    protection. That we would respond in the event of an attack on
    our troops has great credibility and, thus, serves as an
    effective deterrent. The Chemical Weapons Convention adds no
    more to this protection of our troops than did the Geneva
    Convention.
        Mr. Chairman, some treaty proponents, while conceding the
    lack of verifiability, the lack of broad enforceability, and
    the other inherent weaknesses of the convention, suggest that
    it should be ratified because whatever its weaknesses, it
    serves to establish ``international norms.'' If Senators are
    moved by that last ditch defense of the convention, they should
    vote for ratification. I urge, however, that Senators bear in
    mind that most nations do not care a figure for ``international
    norms,'' and we already have the Geneva Convention as a norm,
    regularly violated. And they remain relatively free to violate
    this norm with relative impunity since the treaty is difficult
    to verify and more difficult to enforce.
        Proponents have simply ignored the evidence of the past
    failure to control chemical weapons and have proceeded blithely
    with a renewed effort at control which disregards the ambiguity
    and the ineffectiveness of the control mechanism. In the rather
    forlorn hope to preclude the employment of chemical weapons,
    they have produced an agreement with an illusory goal and a
    rather gargantuan and worrisome enforcement mechanism. The
    manifold weaknesses of the proposed convention deserve careful
    attention from every member of the Senate.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I shall be pleased later to
    respond to any questions the committee may have.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Mr. Weinberger.

       STATEMENT OF HON. CASPAR WEINBERGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF
                                DEFENSE

        Mr. Weinberger. Mr. Chairman and Senators, it is always an
    honor to appear before a committee of the U.S. Senate and I am
    deeply appreciative of that this morning.
        I think that both your Chairman's statement and Secretary
    Schlesinger's very impressive statement also, both together,
    set out the basic reasons why I think all of us on this
    Secretary of Defense panel feel so strongly that this treaty
    should not be ratified.
        I would like to make a couple of points at the beginning
    because it is the common practice now for opponents of anything
    that is desired by the White House to be painted in as
    unenviable a position as possible. I would like to make it
    clear that everybody I know detests chemical weapons,
    particularly soldiers.
        I have some small personal experiences I might share with
    you. They stem mainly from the fact of my extreme age. The fact
    is that, during World War II, I had been assigned to the
    Australian Anti-Gas School. The Australians used very spartan
    methods and very rigorous methods of instructing, and they
    instructed by showing us the actual effects on our own persons
    of mustard gas, a blister agent. They gave us all kinds of
    information with respect to the required defense and defensive
    equipment.
        I was then later appointed one of the gas defense officers
    to the 41st Infantry Division, conducted a lot of training with
    the soldiers in the gas protective equipment which, as anybody
    who served in the armed forces knows, is extremely difficult to
    operate in, and this leads, without any question whatever, to
    this detestation of these weapons.
        So people who oppose this treaty are not people who favor
    poison gas. I think it is important to make that rather obvious
    point at the beginning because we have heard so much about the
    motives of opponents of this treaty. My motive is the security
    of the United States, with which I had the honor to be
    associated for 7 years as Secretary, and which I think, as a
    country, should be maintained, even in the face of very strong
    support of a treaty which purports to outlaw and ban the
    production of these terrible weapons.
        Everybody likes the aims of the treaty. Everybody will
    admit, I think, that it is a well intentioned treaty. Everybody
    that I know including many of the proponents, admit that it is
    a very badly flawed treaty, and it is with those flaws that I
    am concerned today.
        Primarily the flaws, as Secretary Schlesinger just
    mentioned, are that it cannot be verified and it cannot be
    enforced. The enforcement mechanism involves going to the
    United Nations Security Council, of which Russia and China are
    members. It does not require a very big stretch of the
    imagination to indicate that they would probably veto any kind
    of enforcement action proposed against them.
        So you would have not only the lack of verifiability, you
    would have, very much like with the Geneva Convention, a very
    nice statement of the proper intentions of humankind which
    simply cannot be enforced and which basically, sadly,
    accomplish nothing.
        Now there has been a great deal of discussion also about
    the enforcement mechanisms, the international inspectors and
    what they can do and their powers. This is not just academic
    discussion, Mr. Chairman. These inspectors, under this treaty,
    under Articles X and XI, would have powers that basically
    American enforcement agents do not. Even the IRS and even the
    Department of Justice cannot wander around the country without
    search warrants and demand to see anything they want to see in
    thousands of factories. There are varying estimates of the
    number of factories and commercial plants involved, but they
    are all in the thousands. I won't attempt to say which one is
    right or wrong, but they are in the thousands. The treaty gives
    the right to these inspectors to see what they want to do, to
    make analyses and tests, and the other articles of the
    convention require that we share any late technologies we might
    develop--and we should be working on them; I hope we are; we
    always used to--defensive technologies to improve the masks,
    the protective equipment, and all of the other things.
        As we make some progress in this field, that would have to
    be shared and, therefore, would be, consequently, far less
    valuable, to put it mildly, in the event that any of our troops
    should be attacked with a gas attack.
        These inspections are a two-way street in some ways. We
    have the right of inspection under what I consider to be the
    worst appeasement agreement we have signed and that has been
    presented since Munich, and that is the North Korean Agreement
    under which we promised to give them two very large nuclear
    reactors which can produce plutonium--although it is always
    said not to worry, they can't. But, of course, they can. And we
    are permitted also to have all kinds of inspection under that
    appeasement agreement.
        We have not been granted this to the extent that we need
    it. What we are allowed is to go where North Korea wants us to
    go. It's exactly as with the agreement with Iraq that ended
    that war. We are permitted to go where the Iraqis let us go and
    after long delays in which they are given the opportunity to
    remove any incriminating kinds of evidence.
        That is one way that these inspections can work, and those
    would be probably the ways that countries like Iran, that have
    signed the agreement, would interpret it.
        But the permitted inspections and the way we would do it,
    because we carry out our word as a country and we do allow
    these things once we sign an agreement, would be as intrusive
    as anything previously imagined and far more intrusive than our
    own officials are allowed under our own laws to investigate
    violations of American law.
        Jim Schlesinger has covered very adequately and thoroughly
    the industrial espionage problems that are involved in this and
    in the sharing of these not only offensive, but defensive
    technologies that we may be working on. And it is important
    that we work on these defensive technologies because, even if
    all the countries sign this agreement, the possibilities that
    it would be treated as Geneva is always treated are always
    there. Indeed, we know that Iraq is stockpiling this VX nerve
    agent, which is a rather nasty piece of equipment, and Russia
    has been developing the nerve agent A-223, which is purported
    to be something like 7 times as fatal as the VX nerve agent.
    These are things that are going on now, after these treaties
    have been signed and while the whole discussion is there.
        The idea that these countries would give up these newly
    developed agents on which they spent a great deal of money,
    some of it, in Russia's case, our money that we sent over for
    economic development, does not seem to me to be very credible.
        The requirement that we share all of these technologies
    also would remove any kind of deterrent capability that we
    might have if we carry out the treaty in full. And one of the
    deterrent capabilities is retaliation.
        We have had many indications not only in World War II but
    in the Gulf and elsewhere, that the fact that we were spared a
    chemical attack there simply stems from the ability that we
    would have to retaliate. If we give up that retaliatory
    capability, along with all but four or five nations, the four
    or five nations would still not be nearly as worried about
    launching an attack as they were in the case of the Gulf War.
        We already know that there is at least a possibility. We
    don't know it and I would not claim it as a fact, but there is
    at least a possibility that Iraq's storage of these chemical
    weapons is resulting in disease and illness to American forces
    now. People talk about who is to blame and all of that. The
    only important issue, I think, there is that we should
    remember, and I hope we always will, that we have an absolute
    obligation to take care of these people who did fall ill from
    whatever cause in that war for the rest of their lives and take
    care of their families. I hope we are prepared to honor that.
        All of these are things that have happened with nations
    that have either signed or refused to sign the treaty. Iran is
    one that has signed. Iran, therefore, would be able to see and
    inspect any one of several thousand companies. They would have
    to share their technologies and we, as a country, would have to
    share our technologies with Iran.
        Strong supporters of the treaty, including General
    Schwarzkopf, when reminded of the fact, when asked if that is
    what he really wanted, said of course not. He said the worst
    thing in the world would be to share any knowledge with a
    country like Iran in this field.
        So there has been, I think, a lack of understanding, and I
    congratulate the committee on holding these hearings, because I
    hope that we can get a full understanding of how a well
    intentioned treaty, the goals of which everybody of course
    supports, cannot possibly reach those goals if we are going to
    have the kind of provisions that remain in this treaty.
        We also have a situation in which we are repeatedly told
    that the April 29 deadline must be met, otherwise we will have
    no influence in administering the treaty. Mr. Chairman, we are
    going to bear 25 percent of the cost of this treaty, and I
    suspect any 25 percent owner, so to speak, to use corporate
    terms, is going to have a little influence in it. I think that
    it is absurd to say that we must rush to judgment simply
    because April 29 is the deadline.
        There was plenty of opportunity last fall when the treaty
    was before the Senate, and was withdrawn by the administration,
    to have the kind of discussion that we are now having and that
    we should have. If it takes a little past April 29, and if by
    any chance we are able, through reservations or other changes,
    to make any of these things to which we object so strongly
    slightly more acceptable, that would certainly be worth a few
    days or a few months delay.
        The costs involved, of course, are not just the 25 percent
    of the costs of administering the treaty and of all of the
    inspections that we would find so intrusive and so violative of
    what we believe to be our constitutional rules against
    unreasonable search and seizure, seizing property without due
    process, and all the rest. We could add the $70 million that we
    have already given Russia under the so-called ``Bilateral
    Destruction Act'' to start destroying their weapons. And they
    have announced publicly and in writing--I guess it has been
    released; it's been printed all over the country--that they
    will no longer be bound by it, that it no longer serves their
    best interests and, therefore, they are not paying any more
    attention to it.
        They are a signatory of this Chemical Weapons Convention
    and they have been held up as a country that is essential to
    get into the international order and is willing to destroy
    these weapons. But certainly the record thus far is slightly
    less than modest.
        I think it is important that we emphasize again, as I did
    at the beginning, that our opposition to these kinds of weapons
    is well known. We were instrumental in getting the Geneva
    Agreement approved many, many years ago. We have signed the
    Bilateral Destruction Agreement, which had a great deal of hope
    behind it, and practically no realization. And now Russia has
    walked away from it.
        We have showed that we would, of course, not only if we
    sign this convention comply with it, but that we would be a
    leader in financing it. All of that I think is an ample
    demonstration to the world, if any is needed, that we don't
    like these weapons. But we don't have to sign a flawed and an
    ineffective, unenforceable, unverifiable convention to prove
    that; and I don't think that we should worry so much about
    being tarred as being pro chemical weapons that we would
    disregard completely the flaws in this treaty and ratify it
    anyway just to make a statement.
        Mr. Chairman, I appreciate very much having had the
    opportunity to express these views before you and your
    committee, and as Secretary Schlesinger has said, I will be
    glad to try to answer questions at an appropriate time.
        The Chairman. We thank you, sir. Secretary Rumsfeld.

     STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD RUMSFELD, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

        Mr. Rumsfeld. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
    committee. I appreciate the opportunity to express concerns
    about this convention. Rather than read my entire statement, I
    would like to touch on some of the more important points, and I
    ask that my entire statement be included in the record.
        The Chairman. Without objection.
        Mr. Rumsfeld. Certainly, one of the most serious problems
    facing our country and our friends and allies around the world
    is, indeed, the issue of proliferation of weapons of mass
    destruction. The Chemical Weapons Convention before the Senate
    would appear to fit in that category. But in my view, it has
    serious flaws.
        I recognize that there are arguments on both sides of this
    and, indeed, that a number of our friends and associates that
    we have worked with on these problems over the years find
    themselves on opposing sides.
        As a former Member, I also recall the difficulty of finding
    oneself in the position of opposing a position that is strongly
    supported by a President. It is not an attractive position to
    be in or a pleasant one. My inclination was always to try to
    support the President on these matters.
        Certainly in this case, being positioned as appearing to
    favor chemical weapons, is also not an appealing position.
        So let me be very clear: Were there pending before this
    committee a convention that was verifiable and global and that
    would accomplish the elimination of chemical weapons in the
    hands of nations most likely to use them, I would be appearing
    before the committee as a supporter.
        Unfortunately, I do not believe that it meets those tests.
        First, I don't believe that this is verifiable, nor have I
    met a single, knowledgeable person who believes that it is
    verifiable. It might reduce chemical weapons in arsenals in
    some countries, but it is debatable whether the treaty would
    reduce chemical arsenals in any of the nations potentially
    hostile to the United States. Countries identified by the
    United States as possessing chemical weapons that have not
    signed the CWC, let alone ratified it, include Libya, Syria,
    Iraq, and North Korea. Certainly these countries are among the
    most likely to use chemical weapons against our citizens, our
    soldiers, and our allies.
        In addition, there are countries that might sign the
    convention which would not be reliable with respect to
    compliance. Since the convention is not verifiable, that is not
    a trivial problem, it seems to me.
        For example, even if Iran does ratify the agreement, we
    really cannot rely on them to comply with its terms. Also, it
    is my understanding that Russia has yet to fulfill its
    obligations under the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement, as
    Secretary Weinberger pointed out. Also, Washington newspapers
    and Jane's have recently reported that the Russians have
    developed new nerve agents that are designed in a manner that
    would make discovery next to impossible in that they are
    apparently comprised of common commercial chemicals. This
    raises the question as to the likelihood of their complying
    with the convention.
        As a Wall Street Journal article recently put it, under the
    Chemical Weapons Convention, members to the convention could
    look for chemical weapons in New Zealand or the Netherlands but
    not in North Korea, Libya, or Iraq, which are countries that
    could be chemical warfare threats.
        Despite what I believe to be the low possibility that the
    convention would result in real arms control accomplishments,
    nonetheless a case can be made that it is important for the
    world to have standards and values, as Secretary Schlesinger
    mentioned. This is the ``speed limit'' argument.
        My friend, Dr. Kenneth Adelman, a former Director of ACDA,
    recently argued, supporting the agreement, that standards and
    values violated are better than no standards and values at all.
        I personally think that is probably the most persuasive
    case that can be made for the convention. However, I do not
    believe that it is sufficiently persuasive to tip the scales.
        While standards and norms are important, there is a real
    risk that in ratifying the convention and in setting forth high
    standards, the U.S. would be misinforming the world by
    misleading people into believing that we had, in fact, done
    something with respect to the international controls over the
    use of chemical weapons, despite the certainty, in my mind, at
    least, that this convention cannot provide that assurance.
        Furthermore, it is important to consider and weigh not only
    potential benefits of the convention, such as standards and
    norms, but also its burdens and costs.
        It seems to me clear that any advantages of setting forth
    such standards by ratifying the convention are more than offset
    by the disadvantages.
        I note that there would be considerable cost to the
    taxpayers in that the convention provides for the use of a
    U.N.-style funding formula, which calls for the United States
    to pay some 25 percent of the total. In addition, there would
    be costs to private industry, which I do not believe can be
    properly quantified at present in that it is not possible yet
    to know how the mechanisms to police this convention would
    actually work. This is to say nothing of the cost to companies
    of trying to protect proprietary information from compromise.
        These costs would amount, in a real sense, to unfunded
    mandates on American enterprise.
        These were among the concerns that were expressed by a
    number of government, civilian, and military officials in a
    letter sent to Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott late last
    year, which I signed, and I ask that a copy of that letter and
    the signatories be placed in the record at this point.
        The Chairman. Without objection, it is so ordered.

        [The information referred to follows:]

                                                     September 9, 1996.
    Hon. Trent Lott,
    Majority Leader, United States Senate,
    Washington, DC 20510.
        Senator Lott: As you know, the Senate is currently scheduled to
    take final action on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on or before
    September 14th. This Treaty has been presented as a global, effective
    and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. As individuals with
    considerable experience in national security matters, we would all
    support such a ban. We have, however, concluded that the present
    convention is seriously deficient on each of these scores, among
    others.
        The CWC is not global since many dangerous nations (for example,
    Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Libya) have not agreed to join the treaty
    regime. Russia is among those who have signed the Convention, but is
    unlikely to ratify--especially without a commitment of billions in U.S.
    aid to pay for the destruction of Russia's vast arsenal. Even then,
    given our experience with the Kremlin's treaty violations and its
    repeated refusal to implement the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement
    on chemical weapons, future CWC violations must be expected.
        The CWC is not effective because it does not ban or control
    possession of all chemicals that could be used for lethal weapons
    purposes. For example, it does not prohibit two chemical agents that
    were employed with deadly effect in World War I--phosgene and hydrogen
    cyanide. The reason speaks volumes about this treaty's impractical
    nature: they are too widely used for commercial purposes to be banned.
        The CWC is not verifiable as the U.S. intelligence community has
    repeatedly acknowledged in congressional testimony. Authoritarian
    regimes can be confident that their violations will be undetectable.
    Now, some argue that the treaty's intrusive inspections regime will
    help us know more than we would otherwise. The relevant test, however,
    is whether any additional information thus gleaned will translate into
    convincing evidence of cheating and result in the collective imposition
    of sanctions or other enforcement measures. In practice, this test is
    unlikely to be satisfied since governments tend to took the other way
    at evidence of non-compliance rather than jeopardize a treaty regime.
        What the CWC will do, however, is quite troubling: It will create a
    massive new, U.N.-style international inspection bureaucracy (which
    will help the total cost of this treaty to U.S. taxpayers amount to as
    much as $200 million per year). It will jeopardize U.S. citizens'
    constitutional rights by requiring the U.S. government to permit
    searches without either warrants or probable cause. It will impose a
    costly and complex regulatory burden on U.S. industry. As many as 8,000
    companies across the country may be subjected to new reporting
    requirements entailing uncompensated annual costs of between thousands
    to hundreds-of-thousands of dollars per year to comply. Most of these
    American companies have no idea that they will be affected. And perhaps
    worst of all, the CWC will undermine the standard of verifiability that
    has been a key national security principle for the United States.
        Under these circumstances, the national security benefits of the
    Chemical Weapons Convention clearly do not outweigh its considerable
    costs. Consequently, we respectfully urge you to reject ratification of
    the CWC unless and until it is made genuinely global, effective and
    verifiable.

      Signatories on Letter to Senator Trent Lott Regarding the Chemical
                               Weapons Convention

                      As of September 9, 1996; 11:30 a.m.

    Former Cabinet Members:
    Richard B. Cheney, former Secretary of Defense
    William P. Clark, former National Security Advisor to the President
    Alexander M. Haig, Jr., former Secretary of State (signed on September
            10)
    John S. Herrington, former Secretary of Energy (signed on September 9)
    Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
    Edwin Meese III, former U.S. Attorney General
    Donald Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense (signed on September 10)
    Caspar Weinberger, former Secretary of Defense
    Additional Signatories (retired military):
    General John W. Foss, U.S. Army (Retired), former Commanding General,
            Training and Doctrine Command
    Vice Admiral William Houser, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Deputy Chief
            of Naval Operations for Aviation
    General P.X. Kelley, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), former Commandant of
            U.S. Marine Corps (signed on September 9)
    Lieutenant General Thomas Kelly, U.S. Army (Retired), former Director
            for Operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff (signed on September 9)
    Admiral Wesley McDonald, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Supreme Allied
            Commander, Atlantic
    Admiral Kinnaird McKee, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Director, Naval
            Nuclear Propulsion
    General Merrill A. McPeak, U.S. Air Force (Retired), former Chief of
            Staff, U.S. Air Force
    Lieutenant General T.H. Miller, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), former
            Fleet Marine Force Commander/Head, Marine Aviation
    General John. L. Piotrowski, U.S. Air Force (Retired), former Member of
            the Joint Chiefs of Staff as Vice Chief, U.S. Air Force
    General Bernard Schriever, U.S. Air Force (Retired), former Commander,
            Air Research and Development and Air Force Systems Command
    Vice Admiral Jerry Unruh, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Commander 3rd
            Fleet (signed on September 10)
    Lieutenant General James Williams, U.S. Army (Retired), former
            Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
    Additional Signatories (non-military):
    Elliott Abrams, former Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American
            Affairs (signed on September 9)
    Mark Albrecht, former Executive Secretary, National Space Council
    Kathleen Bailey, former Assistant Director of the Arms Control and
            Disarmament Agency
    Robert B. Barker, former Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
            Nuclear and Chemical Weapon Matters
    Angelo Codevilla, former Senior Fellow, Hoover Institute (signed on
            September 10)
    Henry Cooper, former Director, Strategic Defense Initiative
            Organization
    J.D. Crouch, former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
    Midge Decter, former President, Committee for the Free World
    Kenneth deGraffenreid, former Senior Director of Intelligence Programs,
            National Security Council
    Diana Denman, former Co-Chair, U.S. Peace Corps Advisory Council
    Elaine Donnelly, former Commissioner, Presidential Commission on the
            Assignment of Women in the Armed Services
    David M. Evans, former Senior Advisor to the Congressional Commission
            on Security and Cooperation in Europe
    Charles Fairbanks, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
    Douglas J. Feith, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
    Rand H. Fishbein, former Professional Staff member, Senate Defense
            Appropriations Subcommittee
    Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., former Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense
    William R. Graham, former Science Advisor to the President
    E.C. Grayson, former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy
    James T. Hackett, former Acting Director of the Arms Control and
            Disarmament Agency
    Stefan Halper, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (signed on
            September 10)
    Thomas N. Harvey, former National Space Council Staff Officer (signed
            on September 9)
    Charles A. Hamilton, former Deputy Director, Strategic Trade Policy,
            U.S. Department of Defense
    Amoretta M. Hoeber, former Deputy Under Secretary, U.S. Army
    Charles Horner, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Science
            and Technology
    Fred Ikle, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
    Sven F. Kraemer, former Director for Arms Control, National Security
            Council
    Charles M. Kupperman, former Special Assistant to the President
    John Lehman, former Secretary of the Navy
    John Lenczowski, former Director for Soviet Affairs, National Security
            Council
    Bruce Merrifield, former Assistant Secretary for Technology Policy,
            Department of Commerce
    Taffy Gould McCallum, columnist and free-lance writer
    James C. McCrery, former senior member of the Intelligence Community
            and Arms Control Negotiator (Standing Consultative Committee)
    J. William Middendorf II, former Secretary of the Navy (signed on
            September 10)
    Laurie Mylroie, best-selling author and Mideast expert specializing in
            Iraqi affairs
    Richard Perle, former Assistant Secretary of Defense
    Norman Podhoretz, former editor, Commentary Magazine
    Roger W. Robinson, Jr., former Chief Economist, National Security
            Council
    Peter W. Rodman, former Deputy Assistant to the President for National
            Security Affairs and former Director of the Policy Planing
            Staff, Department of State
    Edward Rowny, former Advisor to the President and Secretary of State
            for Arms Control
    Carl M. Smith, former Staff Director, Senate Armed Services Committee
    Jacqueline Tillman, former Staff member, National Security Council
    Michelle Van Cleave, former Associate Director, Office of Science and
            Technology
    William Van Cleave, former Senior Defense Advisor and Defense Policy
            Coordinator to the President
    Malcolm Wallop, former United States Senator
    Deborah L. Wince-Smith, former Assistant Secretary for Technology
            Policy, Department of Commerce
    Curtin Winsor, Jr., former U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica
    Dov S. Zakheim, former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense

        Mr. Rumsfeld. Over the coming days, the members of the
    committee and the Senate will be faced with two important
    questions relating to the convention. First is, can the Senate
    responsibly oppose the President on this important foreign
    policy issue? Second is, what will happen if the Senate does
    reject the treaty and the United States seemingly stands
    essentially alone in the world, ex-
    cept for the rogue states with whom we would be associated as
    non-signatories?
        Let me address those questions in order.
        First is the issue of not supporting the President. As I
    indicated, my inclination has always been to try to do that.
    However, we know the Constitution did not grant sole authority
    to the President of the United States in the area of foreign
    policy. Indeed, it does not provide for a simple majority to
    ratify a treaty but, rather, for a two-thirds vote, so that it
    would have to be almost beyond doubt that a given treaty is in
    our national security interest. So it is certainly within the
    right of the Senate to disagree.
        Also, not surprisingly, there have been a number of
    treaties, conventions, and agreements where the Senate has
    disagreed over our history.
        The second question, as to what might happen if the U.S.
    stands alone, is an important one and one that I suspect will
    be a principal focus of the debate over the coming days.
        One result of the Senate not ratifying the treaty will be,
    admittedly, expressions of concern by some of our friends and
    allies around the world that have. But I suspect there will be
    no smiles from the rogue states. And the world will be spared
    the deception which would follow ratification, because the
    world will not be led to have erroneously believed that the
    threat of chemical weapons has been effectively dealt with. I
    submit that we will be spared the complacency that Secretary
    Schlesinger mentioned, which I think would follow ratification.
        Further, small and medium sized companies will be spared
    the costs and the risks to their proprietary information which
    would result from U.S. participation. You know, big companies
    seem to get along just fine with big government. They get along
    with American government, they get along with foreign
    government, they get along with international organizations.
    They have the staying power, they have the resources to wait
    things out. They have the ability, with all their Washington
    representatives, to deal effectively with bureaucracies.
        Indeed, that talent and skill, that capability on the part
    of big companies actually serves as sort of a barrier to entry
    to small and medium sized companies that lack that capability.
    So I do not suggest for a minute that the large American
    companies are not going to be able to cope with these
    regulations. They are. They will do it a whale of a lot better
    than small and medium sized companies.
        But if you look at that opening round with the Department
    of Commerce's regulations and requirements, and having been a
    regulator in the Federal government at one point in my life, I
    know that if you start with this, you end up with this
    (indicating). It does not take long.
        That problem of regulation on small and medium sized
    companies literally sucks the energy out of those companies.
    They are not capable of waiting and finding out the answers to
    all those things. They are trying to make money. That is the
    area of our society where the energy, the vitality, and the
    creativity is. They are the ones who are creating jobs in our
    country--not the large companies, which have been downsizing
    for the most part.
        So the fact that a number of large companies are not
    concerned about this does not surprise me the all, I must say.
        What would be the result of the U.S. standing alone? Well,
    we did this at our Nation's birth. We did it because we had
    very different views as to what the appropriate relationship
    between the American people and their government ought to be
    than other countries did.
        Would we be abdicating leadership on this issue of chemical
    weapons and the threat by not ratifying, as some have argued? I
    say no. I think not.
        I say this because the threat of chemical weapons will
    remain despite the fact that this agreement gets ratified by a
    number of nations. And the world will--must--look to the United
    States for leadership in dealing with that threat. Because of
    our capacity, our resources, our knowledge, our credibility, we
    will retain a significant leadership role.
        So, despite the argument, the power of the argument, that
    the U.S. would be standing alone, I think the truth is that we
    have done it before and it has worked out rather well. Not
    every country has the ability to stand alone, but the U.S. is
    not just any country.
        With our resources, our weight, our capabilities, we can
    not only afford to provide leadership, but we have a special
    obligation to provide that kind of leadership and not just go
    along with the current diplomatic momentum.
        Because we are the United States, we have a singular
    responsibility to exercise our best judgment on matters such as
    this and then to set about the task of fashioning a better
    solution.
        Other countries look to us for that kind of behavior.
        I hope the Senate will decide to take its time and work to
    achieve the changes necessary to improve this in material ways.
    The proposal introduced by Senator Kyl and others to the reduce
    the chemical and biological weapons threat is a practical place
    to start.
        Mr. Chairman, I commend you and your committee for your
    efforts to give such careful consideration to the matter and I
    appreciate the opportunity of participating.
        Thank you very much.

                     Prepared Statement of Donald Rumsfeld

        Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, good morning.
        Let me say at the outset that I am not an expert on chemicals, nor
    am I a lawyer. I have been in and around the subject of Arms Control
    since my service in the Congress in the 1960s, as U.S. Ambassador to
    NATO during the early 1970s when we were working on MBFR and SALT, as
    well as my service in the Pentagon. So, I am here today not as an
    expert on chemicals or international law, but rather as one with a long
    interest in U.S. national security.
        One of the most serious problems facing the United States, our
    friends and allies, and indeed the world is proliferation of weapons of
    mass destruction. Surely among the most important treaties of the
    decades since World War II are those which effectively enhance U.S.
    national security by addressing this problem. The Chemical Weapons
    Convention now before the Senate would appear to fit in that category,
    but, in my view, it does not.
        I recognize that there are arguments on both sides of this issue.
    Indeed, a number of the people many of us have worked with on these
    subjects over the years and respect, find themselves on opposing sides.
        Furthermore, as a former Member of the Congress, I well understand
    the difficulty in finding oneself in the position of opposing a treaty
    that the President of the United States strongly supports and that has
    such broad appeal. Being posi-
    tioned both as opposing our President and as favoring poison gas, which
    seems to be what happens to those who oppose this convention, is not an
    attractive position.
        Let me be clear. Were there pending before the Senate a convention
    that was verifiable and global and which would accomplish the
    elimination of chemical weapons in the hands of the nations most likely
    to use them, I would be appearing before this committee as a supporter,
    asserting that ratification would be in our national interest.
    Unfortunately, I do not believe this convention meets these tests.
        Interestingly, the preamble of the convention states in the first
    paragraph: ``The states parties to this convention * * *. Determined to
    act with a view to achieving effective progress toward general and
    complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,
    including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of
    mass destruction * * * .''
        That is a goal that can only be described as monumentally
    ambitious. More to the point, it is not clear to me that that is today
    the agreed policy of the U.S. government or even that it is realistic.
    The history of mankind suggests that the achievement of ``complete
    disarmament'' is not a likely prospect, and the idea of ``strict and
    effective international controls'' to assure compliance with ``complete
    disarmament'' is, to put it mildly, a stretch.
        I do not believe that this convention is verifiable. Nor have I met
    or heard a single knowledgeable person who believes it is verifiable.
    The U.S. intelligence community has acknowledged in congressional
    testimony that we cannot have high confidence that violation of the CWC
    will be detected.
        It might reduce chemical weapons in arsenals in some countries. It
    is debatable, however, whether this treaty would reduce the chemical
    arsenals of any of the nations potentially hostile to the United
    States. Countries identified by the United States as possessing
    chemical weapons, that have not signed the CWC let alone ratified it,
    include Libya, Syria, Iraq and North Korea. Certainly, these countries
    are among the most likely to use chemical weapons against our citizens,
    our soldiers and our allies.
        In addition there are countries that might well sign the
    convention, but which would not be reliable with respect to compliance.
    Since the convention is not verifiable, that is not a trivial problem.
    For example, even if Iran does ratify can we really rely on them to
    comply? Also, it is my understanding that Russia has yet to fulfill its
    obligations under the 1990 U.S.-Russian bilateral destruction
    agreement. The Washington Times and Jane's have reported that the
    Russians have developed new nerve agents that are designed in a manner
    which would make discovery next to impossible, in that they are
    comprised of common commercial chemicals. This raises the question as
    to the likelihood of their complying with this convention.
        It appears that this convention is proceeding in a way that it
    could conceivably disarm democratic, friendly, non aggressive nations,
    that either do not have chemical weapons, or if they have them would be
    most unlikely to use them against us, while it will not effectively
    apply to totalitarian, enemy and aggressive nations that would be most
    likely to use them against the U.S. and its allies. As a recent Wall
    Street Journal article put it, under the Chemical Weapons Convention,
    members to the convention could look for chemical weapons in New
    Zealand or the Netherlands, but not in North Korea, Libya or Iraq--
    countries which could be chemical warfare threats.
        Despite what I believe to be the low possibility that the
    convention would result in real arms control accomplishments,
    nonetheless a case can be made that it is important for the world to
    have standards and values. Dr. Kenneth Adelman, former director of
    ACDA, recently argued in supporting the agreement that ``standards and
    values violated are better than no standards or values at all.'' That
    is the most persuasive argument for the convention I have heard.
    However, I do not believe that it is sufficiently persuasive to tip the
    scales.
        While standards are important, there is the real risk that in
    ratifying the convention and setting forth high standards, the U.S.
    would be misinforming the world by misleading people into believing
    that there were reasonable international controls over the use of
    chemical weapons, despite the certainty that this convention cannot
    provide that assurance. The use of various gases during World War I led
    to the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which banned first use of chemical
    weapons in war. Despite that high standard, that ban has not been
    observed, witness Iraq's use of such chemicals.
        Furthermore, it is important to consider and weigh not only any
    potential benefits of the convention, but also its burdens and costs.
    It seems clear that any advantages of setting forth laudable standards
    and values by ratifying the convention are more than offset by the
    disadvantages.
        I note that there would be considerable cost to U.S. taxpayers in
    that the CWC provides for use of a U.N.-style funding formula, which as
    I recall bills the U.S. to pay some 25 percent of all costs.
    Personally, I think that percentage is too high and I cannot see why we
    would wish to extend it to still more international organizations.
        In addition, there would be costs to private industry, which I do
    not believe can be quantified at present, in that it is not possible to
    know yet how the mechanisms to police the convention would work. And
    this is to say nothing of the costs to companies of trying to protect
    proprietary information from compromise.
        These were among the concerns expressed by a number of former U.S.
    government civilian and military officials in a letter sent to Senate
    Majority Leader Trent Lott late last year, which I signed. (I have
    attached a copy of the letter to my remarks, and ask that it be made a
    part of the record at this point.)
        [The letter referred to by Mr. Rumsfeld appears on page 15.]
        Other concerns expressed in the letter included: The risk that the
    convention would lead to the creation of a new U.N.-style international
    inspection bureaucracy at great cost to the American taxpayers; that
    the CWC could undermine the standard of verifiability that had been a
    key national security principle for the U.S.; and that the convention
    could prevent the use of non-lethal riot control agents, to the
    disadvantage of U.S. forces.
        Over the coming days members of the committee and the Senate will
    be faced with two important questions.
        First, can the Senate responsibly oppose the President on this
    important foreign policy issue; and second, what will happen if the
    Senate does reject the treaty, and the U.S. seemingly stands
    essentially alone and apart in the world.
        Let me address those questions in order.
        First, is the issue of not supporting our President on a key
    foreign policy matter. As one, with a background in the executive
    branch, I begin with a strong preference to support the President on
    such matters. Indeed, I felt that pull even as a Member of Congress
    with Presidents of the other party. And I so voted. So that is my
    inclination.
        However, we know the Constitution did not grant the President sole
    responsibility in foreign affairs. Indeed, it provides not for a simple
    majority vote for the Senate to ratify a treaty, but a two-thirds vote,
    so that it would have to be beyond doubt that a given treaty is in the
    U.S. national security interest. So, it is not only well within the
    right of the Senate to disagree with a treaty as its best judgment may
    dictate, but it is its constitutional obligation. In exercising that
    responsibility, there have been a number of treaties, conventions, and
    international agreements that have not been approved by the U.S. Senate
    over our history, and in each case the sun came up the next day and the
    world did not end.
        The second question as to what might happen if the U.S. stands
    apart on this issue, is also an important one, and one which I suspect
    will be a principle focus of the debate over the coming days. One
    result of the Senate not ratifying this treaty will be expressions of
    concern by some of our friends, but there will likely be no smiles from
    the rogue states.
        Next, the world will be spared the deception which would follow
    ratification, because the world will not be led to believe erroneously
    that the threat of chemical weapons had been effectively dealt with,
    and the complacency which would follow.
        Further, small and medium sized U.S. companies will be spared the
    costs and the risks to their proprietary information which would result
    from U.S. participation. Big companies seem to get along well with big
    governments, foreign governments, and international organizations. They
    have the resources, the time, and the Washington representatives to
    work skillfully with governments. These capabilities of larger
    companies serve as an advantage over smaller companies, which lack the
    staying power and resources to cope with national and international
    regulations, inspections and the like.
        Next, U.S. taxpayers will be spared the cost of the convention.
    That is not a reason to reject it alone, but it is a fact. The U.S.
    would be spared the time and effort of implementing, complying with,
    and trying to enforce an agreement which in any event doesn't cover the
    nations most likely to use chemical weapons.
        So what would be the result of the U.S. standing alone? Well, we
    did this at our Nation's birth. We did it because we had very different
    views as to the appropriate relationship between the people and their
    government.
        Also, President Ronald Reagan did it with the Law of the Sea
    Treaty, notwithstanding the fact that most every nation in the world
    had signed that agreement. He did so because he found objectionable
    certain provisions relating to the seabed mining provisions. He refused
    to sign that treaty and asked me to serve as his Special Envoy to alert
    key countries of the dangers of going forward with that portion of the
    treaty.
        Would the U.S. be abdicating its leadership on this issue by not
    ratifying the convention, as some have argued? The answer is no. I say
    that because the problem of chemical weapons will remain despite this
    agreement, and the world will look to the U.S. for leadership in
    dealing with that serious threat.
        So despite the power of the argument that the U.S. would be
    standing alone, the truth is, we have done it before and it has worked
    out rather well. Not every country has the ability to stand alone. But
    the U.S. is not just any country. With our resources, our weight, our
    capabilities and our credibility the United States not only can afford
    to provide leadership, but it has a special obligation and ability to
    not just go along with what seems popular at the moment, but to stand
    up for what is right. Because we are the United States we have a
    singular responsibility to exercise our best judgment on matters such
    as this, and then set about the task of fashioning a better solution.
        I hope that the Senate will decide to take its time and work to
    achieve the changes necessary to improve it in material ways. The
    proposal introduced by Senator Kyl and others to reduce the chemical
    and biological weapons threat is a practical place to start.
        Mr. Chairman I commend you and your committee for your efforts to
    give the most careful consideration to this matter. I appreciate this
    opportunity to express my views and my concerns about the convention.
        Thank you.

        The Chairman. I thank all three of you.
        Senator Biden was necessarily detained because of the train
    this morning, and we were authorized to begin without him. So
    he missed his opportunity, as the ranking member, to make a
    statement.
        I would just say for perhaps his guidance that I took 14
    minutes and he might want to consider that same neighborhood.
        Senator Biden. I will try to do less than that, Mr.
    Chairman. I thank the committee for its indulgence and I would
    like the record to show that, although I am late, it will not
    add to the total time. Had I been here, I would have used the
    time. And the only manifest failure this morning that I have
    observed, to use Secretary Schlesinger's words, is the train
    schedule. That has been my most manifest failure this morning.
    I may reveal others as I speak, though.
        Mr. Chairman, I think this is a defining moment, not only
    for the United States but, quite frankly, for this committee
    and in your significant effort to reestablish this committee
    and its credibility and standing within the Congress. I think
    our failure to act on this treaty would be a reflection on us,
    as well as an extremely negative reflection on the United
    States' role internationally.
        Twelve years ago, the United States made a firm commitment
    to destroy 30,000 tons of poison gas that we had stockpiled. We
    had made that decision because these weapons no longer had any
    military value, according to our leaders.
        President Reagan also initiated an international effort
    aimed at forcing others to do what we already decided to do
    unilaterally. Through two Republican administrations, efforts
    to negotiate a chemical weapons treaty made slow, but steady,
    progress, and I would go back to that in a minute, but that was
    all part of that process.
        The effort gained new urgency after the Gulf War brought
    home the threat of poison and chemical weapons over 4 years
    ago. To set the record straight on that, as my friends I am
    sure know, in terms of the use of chemical weapons in the Gulf
    War, Secretary Weinberger alluded to the exposure of American
    troops to poison gas. That was part of an Iraqi stockpile we
    destroyed after the Gulf War. I am certain he realizes that
    there was nothing illegal under any law about stockpiling or
    producing chemical weapons.
        The Geneva Convention applies only to the use of poison gas
    in international conflict.
        The CWC, on the other hand, bans production and stockpiling
    of poison gas and would give significant justification in the
    eyes of the international community had we again discovered
    another nation was making or storing these weapons or had we
    used whatever force we chose to use against them.
        Second, with regard to the issue of the Gulf War, prior to
    the Gulf War, an example of Saddam Hussein using poison gas
    against the Kurds, which was alluded to here, is another reason
    why the CWC is needed, in my view. There is nothing illegal
    under the Geneva Convention about the use of poison gas in
    internal conflicts.
        The proscription applies only to international armed
    conflict, as I am sure the Secretary knows. So they didn't even
    violate the Geneva Convention. It is also true the
    international community failed to act.
        But you did not fail to act, Mr. Chairman. You led the
    effort here in the U.S. Senate with Senator Pell and we
    received a unanimous vote for a sanctions bill on September
    1988 soon after this came to light.
        Unfortunately, the bill died at the end of the Congress, in
    large measure because of the opposition of the Reagan
    administration. Indeed, the Reagan State Department, then
    deluded into believing the United States could cooperate with
    Saddam Hussein, denounced the Senate bill that you pushed and
    you got through as premature.
        So I say that neither this Senator nor would others stand
    idly by if violations of the Geneva Convention were discovered.
    But I'm sure the Secretary knew that there was no violation of
    the Geneva Convention and the point he made was still a very
    valid one. That is, we did not act.
        We led the world to the altar, you might say, of attempting
    to deal with chemical weapons, and I am confident that we will
    not abandon 160 other nations, for, if we did, it seems to me
    we would send a signal of retreat, forfeit our leadership, and
    cripple our ability to forge coalitions against the gravest
    threats we face as a Nation, as Secretary Rumsfeld referred to.
    This is the proliferation of weapons, all weapons, of mass
    destruction. We have not even talked about biological weapons
    yet.
        I know that the witnesses this morning do not share my view
    that this treaty is in our vital national interest. And I know
    that and we have heard arguments that the treaty is flawed
    because several rogue states have not signed.
        We also heard that verification will be difficult and that
    the CWC will harm U.S. industry and that it will supposedly
    force us to transfer sophisticated chemical equipment and
    defenses to dangerous regimes.
        And, finally, maybe the most strenuous argument we have
    heard today is that we are going to be lulled into a false
    sense of security, that we are going to drop our guard.
        I hope to demonstrate through these hearings today,
    tomorrow, and the next day that those criticisms are incorrect
    and the problems they site will only get worse--get worse--
    without CWC.
        From the military perspective, I believe this convention is
    clearly in our interest. I know that the witnesses do not agree
    with me. However, two other former Secretaries of Defense and
    the present Secretary of Defense, not represented here today,
    do agree with me. Harold Brown, William Perry, and Secretary of
    Defense Cohen all believe it is in our interest.
        There is a draft statement from Brown and Perry. It says,
    ``As former Secretaries of Defense, we would like to join
    former military leaders, including past Chairmen of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff Powell, Vessey, Jones, Crowe, and former Chiefs
    of Staff of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps plus
    combat veterans like Norman Schwarzkopf in offering our strong
    support for ratification of the Chemical Weapons Treaty.''
        I ask unanimous consent that the remainder of their
    statement be placed in the record in the interest of time, Mr.
    Chairman.
        The Chairman. Without objection.
        [The information referred to follows:]

               Draft Statement of Harold Brown and William Perry

        As former Secretaries of Defense, we would like to join former
    military leaders including past chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
    Generals Colin Powell, John Vessey, David Jones, and Admiral William
    Crowe, and former chiefs of staff from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and
    Marine Corps, plus other combat veterans like General Norman
    Schwarzkopf, in offering our strong support for the ratification of the
    Chemical Weapons Convention.
        We firmly believe that U.S. ratification of the CWC will contribute
    significantly to the security interests of the United States and the
    safety of our armed forces. In conjunction with the Department of
    Defense's other efforts against chemical weapons proliferation, a
    robust chemical protection program and maintenance of a range of non-
    chemical response capabilities, the CWC will serve the best interests
    of the United States and the world community. In light of the decision
    under President Reagan to get rid of the vast majority of U.S. chemical
    weapons stockpiles, it is in our interests to require other nations to
    do the same. The access provided for by the treaty will enhance our
    ability to monitor world-wide CW activities.
        We believe the CWC, which was negotiated under Presidents Reagan
    and Bush and completed by President Bush, to be a carefully considered
    treaty that serves our national interests well. Failure to ratify the
    CWC would send a clear signal of U.S. retreat from international
    leadership to both our friends and to our potential adversaries and
    would damage our ability to inhibit the proliferation of chemical
    weapons.

        Senator Biden. As the authors of this statement note, every
    single Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since President
    Carter's administration has endorsed ratification of the
    Chemical Weapons Convention. Last Friday, 17 distinguished
    retired military officers sent a letter to the President in
    which they endorsed ratification of the Chemical Weapons
    Convention. The collection of signatures on this letter is
    quite impressive. If my colleagues will indulge me, let me just
    read a few: General Colin Powell, Norman Schwarzkopf, Admiral
    Stanley Arthur, General Michael Duggan, General Charles Horner,
    General David Jones, General Wesley McDonald, General Meryl
    McPeak, General Carl Mundy, Admiral William Owens, General
    Gordon Sullivan, Vice Admiral Richard Truly, Admiral Stansfield
    Turner, General John Vessey, General Fred Warner, Admiral Elmo
    Zumwalt.
        In this letter they wrote--and I will just read the first
    paragraph--the following. They say, ``As former members of the
    United States Armed Forces, we would like to express our strong
    support for Senate ratification of the Chemical Weapons
    Convention. This landmark treaty serves the national security
    interests of the United States.''
        I will not read the rest of the letter, but I ask unanimous
    consent that it be placed in the record, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Without objection.
        [The information referred to follows:]

                                                         April 3, 1997.
    The Honorable William J. Clinton,
    The White House, Washington, D.C. 20500.
        Dear Mr. President: As former members of the United States Armed
    Forces, we write to express our strong support for Senate ratification
    of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). This landmark treaty serves
    the national security interests of the United States.
        Each of us can point to decades of military experience in command
    positions. We have all trained and commanded troops to prepare for the
    wartime use of chemical weapons and for defenses against them. We all
    recognize the limited military utility of these weapons, and supported
    President Bush's decision to renounce the use of an offensive chemical
    weapons capability and to unilaterally destroy U.S. stockpiles. The CWC
    simply mandates that other countries follow our lead. This is the
    primary contribution of the CWC: to destroy militarily-significant
    stockpiles of chemical weapons around the globe.
        We recognize that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
    including chemical agents, presents a major national security threat to
    the U.S. The CWC cannot eliminate this threat, as terrorists and rogue
    states may still be able to evade the treaty's strict controls.
    However, the treaty does destroy existing stockpiles and improves our
    abilities to gather intelligence on emerging threats. These new
    intelligence tools deserve the Senate's support.
        On its own, the CWC cannot guarantee complete security against
    chemical weapons. We must continue to support robust defense
    capabilities, and remain willing to respond--through the CWC or by
    unilateral action--to violators of the convention. Our focus is not on
    the treaty's limitations, but instead on its many strengths. The CWC
    destroys stockpiles that could threaten our troops; it significantly
    improves our intelligence capabilities; and it creates new
    international sanctions to punish those states who remain outside of
    the treaty. For these reasons, we strongly support the CWC.

    Officers who signed the April 3, 1997 letter to the President
    Admiral Stanley Arthur, USN (Ret.), former Vice Chief of Naval
            Operations
    General Michael Dugan, USAF (Ret.), former Air Force Chief of Staff
    General Charles Homer, USAF (Ret.), former CINC, U.S. Space Command
    General David Jones, USAF (Ret.), former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
            Staff
    Admiral Wesley McDonald, USN (Ret.), former CINC, Atlantic Command
    General Merrill McPeak, USAF (Ret.), former Air Force Chief of Staff
    General Carl Mundy, USMC (Ret.), former Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps
    Admiral William Owens, USN (Ret.), former Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs
            of Staff
    General Colin Powell, USA (Ret.), former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
            Staff
    General Robert RisCassi, USA (Ret.), former CINC, U.S. Forces Korea
    General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USA (Ret.), former CINC, Central Command
    General Gordon Sullivan, USA (Ret.), former Army Chief of Staff
    Admiral Richard Truly, USN (Ret.), former Director, NASA
    Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN (Ret.), former Director of Central
            Intelligence
    General John Vessey, USA (Ret.), former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
    General Frederick Woemer, USA (Ret.), former CINC, Southern Command
    Admiral E.R. Zumwalt, Jr., USN (Ret.), former Chief of Naval Operations

        Senator Biden. Now several of these signatories to the
    letter I have just read were present at a White House event
    early on Friday in which dozens of distinguished Americans from
    many walks of life joined together to call for early
    ratification of the treaty.
        I would like to ask unanimous consent that the text of the
    remarks made at this event be included in the record as well,
    Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Without objection, it is so ordered.
        [The information referred to appears in the Appendix.]
        Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, the convention has won the
    endorsement of several highly respected veterans organizations
    as well. These include the Reserve Officers Association, the
    Vietnam Veterans Association, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the
    Jewish War Veterans of the U.S.A., the American Ex-Prisoners of
    War, and I would ask unanimous consent that the statements by
    these organizations also be placed in the record.
        The Chairman. Without objection.
        [The information referred to appears in the Appendix.]
        Senator Biden. These individuals and organizations, none of
    whom can be characterized as soft headed or soft hearted,
    recognize the benefits of the convention for our front line
    soldiers, who increasingly face the risk of less discriminating
    and more treacherous weapons like poison gas. We should do the
    same.
        I would like to point out that I do not for a moment, nor
    do I know anybody else who does, question the patriotism, the
    integrity, or the distaste for poison gas or chemical weapons
    that is shared by our three most distinguished witnesses today.
    Anyone who would make such a statement is a damn fool.
        But the truth of the matter is we just have, as I say, a
    healthy disagreement among respected women and men about the
    value of this treaty for the United States. I think the value
    for those in favor far outweigh those opposed, but not in terms
    of their intellectual capability but in terms of their number.
        The argument that the treaty will be ineffective because
    several rogue states have not signed is, I find, equally
    perplexing. Today there is absolutely nothing illegal about the
    chemical weapons programs in these rogue states, and that will
    change once the CWC comes into force. At least it will be
    illegal. It will make such programs illegal. It will also
    provide us with a valuable tool--the moral suasion of the
    entire international community--to isolate and target those
    states who violate the norm which my friend, the former
    Secretary and head of more than one agency, believes--his view
    is that norms don't matter in international relations. I would
    like to have a talk with him, if we have more time, about the
    notion of norms and why I think they do matter.
        But at any rate, if you disagree and norms don't matter,
    then it doesn't matter. But most Americans and most people do
    agree that norms do matter. They do have some impact. They may
    not solve it all, but they have an impact.
        As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, who will testify
    this afternoon has noted, to say that we should not try to make
    chemical weapons illegal because there will be cheaters is like
    saying we should not have laws because we know people are going
    to break them.
        Norms are created so that we have standards for civilized
    conduct by which to judge others. Without them, we leave the
    rogue countries to behave as free actors.
        Indeed, by joining the convention, we place the full weight
    of the world community to take whatever actions are necessary
    to respond and to prevent them. I acknowledge that we will
    ultimately take only that action which we view to be in our
    national interest. We will ultimately take only that action we
    view to be in our national interest.
        When my friends were former Secretaries of Defense, they
    did not recommend actions taken when we knew countries were
    acting in ways that were beyond our interests without
    considering the global interest and the interest of the United
    States relative to other considerations.
        So I acknowledge that ultimately we will take action or not
    take action based on whether it is in our interest.
        Equally importantly, we will place our military might
    behind the world's threat to act against violators.
        The argument that U.S. industry will suffer under the
    supposedly onerous burdens of the treaty is particularly
    intriguing to me. You see, I come from Delaware. If there is
    any state in the Union that has a greater interest in the
    chemical industry, I know of none. And I can assure you
    gentlemen, big or small--and they are both big and small--if
    they had a problem, I guarantee you I would hear about it. I
    promise you that I would after 24 years.
        You were a former member, Secretary Rumsfeld. Do you doubt
    that the industry would let me know? Do you doubt for one
    moment?
        I can tell you that not only do they support it--and, by
    the way, this impacts on half of Delaware's industrial output,
    these chemicals. It is one-half. Not only does industry support
    it, they strongly support it.
        And in terms of those small outfits, Secretary Rumsfeld may
    not be aware of this, but Dan Danner of the National Federation
    of Independent Businesses said the CWC will have no impact on
    their members. They are neutral on the treaty.
        Maybe he was unaware of that, but that is their position.
        What I have heard from the chemical industry is if you
    don't ratify this convention, the chemical industry, which is
    the country's largest exporter, stands to lose hundreds of
    millions of dollars in export earnings; because it would be
    subject to trade sanctions that the United States wrote into
    the treaty to target rogue states. We wrote it in.
        Now this will be the irony of all ironies. My State will
    get a kick in the teeth on something we wrote into a treaty,
    because we do not ratify the treaty. And Germany has already
    announced that, come April 29, sanctions are going to apply.
        In fact, we have heard that all non-members will be subject
    to those German sanctions.
        By the way, one of our largest competitors is Germany, as
    you might guess. So there is a little interest there.
        The argument that the convention is unverifiable is a
    classic case of making the perfect the enemy of the good. No
    arms control treaty is perfectly verifiable, and the CWC is no
    exception to the rule. While there are risks that a State party
    will hide some covert chemical weapons stockpiles or illegally
    produce chemical weapons, it will be much more difficult to
    engage in large scale violations that would pose the greatest
    danger to U.S. military forces.
        As one of our witnesses this afternoon, a former colleague
    of yours, Ambassador Kirkpatrick points out--though she did not
    mean to point it out this way--she said you know, don't worry
    about verification. We are going to have to do this
    verification anyway, even if there is no treaty. That is the
    point. That is the point. We have to do it anyway. And we can
    do it less well--less well--without the treaty than with the
    treaty.
        George Tenet, the Acting Director of CIA, said, ``In the
    absence of tools that the convention gives us, it will be much
    harder for us to apprise you, apprise the military and
    policymakers of where we think we are in the world regarding
    these developments.'' The intelligence community sees benefits
    in us ratifying CWC.
        In addition, there may well be occasions in which on-site
    inspection will provide evidence of treaty violations. In other
    words, while we will not catch every violator, we will catch
    some, and that does act as a deterrent. And without CWC, we
    won't catch anybody.
        The allegation that the treaty would lead to the end of
    export controls on dangerous chemicals is based on a poor
    reading of the treaty, with all due respect.
        Article XI of the convention supports the chemical, trade,
    and technology exchange ``for purposes not prohibited under the
    convention.'' It also requires that trade restrictions not be
    ``incompatible with the obligations undertaken under this
    convention.''
        The CWC is completely consistent with continued enforcement
    of the Australia Group controls which member states use to keep
    chemical and biological materials out of the hands of rogue
    states. The executive branch has said this time and again and
    so have our Australia Group allies.
        In fact, as we speak, our allies are in the process of
    repeating these assurances through diplomatic contacts. It is
    the decline and failure of U.S. leadership that would pose the
    gravest threat to the Australia Group, and failure to ratify
    the CWC would be seen by friend and foe alike as a retreat from
    that world leadership.
        Under that circumstance, State and chemical industries
    might indeed conclude that we should go back to helping the
    Iraqis and Libyans of the world to build their suspect chemical
    facilities. If one were to extrapolate the argument treaty
    opponents make, one would have to conclude that no matter what
    we do, the Australia Group is a dead letter because on April
    29, those Australia Group countries that have joined the
    convention will be required to begin trading freely in
    dangerous chemicals, according to the argument made by the
    opponents. Obviously, this is as preposterous as it sounds. But
    it is a logical outgrowth of the allegation made by opponents.
        Finally, I would look forward to engaging the witnesses on
    their claim that the convention will lull us into a false sense
    of security. The Pentagon made it clear on numerous occasions
    that it will maintain a robust chemical capability supported by
    robust intelligence collection. The commitment to protecting
    our forces has the full support of the President and the
    Congress. In addition, I have agreed with Senator Helms,
    assuming this treaty comes up, to a legally binding condition
    of the treaty that requires the Secretary of Defense to insure
    that the U.S. forces are capable of carrying out our military
    missions regardless of any foreign threats or use of chemical
    weapons. Besides, our experience in other arms control
    agreements shows there is little chance of our becoming
    complacent about a chemical weapons threat if the CWC is
    ratified.
        I just would cite the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and
    not much more in the interest of time.
        Article X does not require the CWC defense assistance
    beyond antidotes and medical treatments. Does that really harm
    U.S. security? Isn't it a fair trade for getting those
    countries to forego chemical weapons? If other countries want
    to provide additional CWC defenses, as the Secretary indicates,
    how would the U.S. failure to ratify stop that in any way? You
    made your own argument. You said these guys are going to go out
    and do this anyway.
        Well, that's true. If they're going to do it, they're going
    to do it whether we are a signatory or not. Being a signatory
    in no way enhances that prospect. Industrial espionage is
    another question that I will not get into in the interest of
    time. But I notice that the chemical industry is not making
    that case, Secretary Rumsfeld, and we will have safeguards
    requiring the Secretary of Defense to maintain U.S. military
    capabilities to operate in chemical environments.
        The riot control agents is another subject that I would
    like to speak to, which I think we have taken care of.
        I thank the Chairman for allowing me to make my statement
    late, and I thank you gentlemen for listening. But then, what
    else could you do?
        [The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]

                      Prepared Statement of Senator Biden

        Mr. Chairman, this is a defining moment in our foreign relations.
    In my view, the credibility and continued leadership of the United
    States on arms control and proliferation matters hangs in the balance.
    Twelve years ago the United States made a firm commitment to destroy
    the thirty thousand tons of poison gas that we had stockpiled. We made
    that decision because these weapons no longer had any military value.
        We also initiated a global effort aimed at forcing others to do
    what we had already decided to do unilaterally. Through two Republican
    administrations, efforts to negotiate the Chemical Weapons Treaty made
    slow but steady progress. The effort gained new urgency after the Gulf
    War again awakened us to the threat posed by chemical weapons. Over
    four years ago, Secretary of State Eagelburger signed the Chemical
    Weapons Treaty on behalf of the Bush Administration.
        Having led the world to the altar, I am confident that we will not
    abandon 160 other nations. For if we did, we would send a signal of
    retreat, forfeit our leadership, and cripple our ability to forge
    coalitions against the gravest threat we face as a nation--the
    proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
        I know that the witnesses today do not share my view that this
    treaty is in our vital national interest. I know that we will hear
    arguments that the treaty is flawed because several rogue states have
    not signed. We will hear that verification will be difficult, that the
    CWC will harm U.S. industry, that it will supposedly force us to
    transfer sophisticated chemical equipment and defenses to dangerous
    regimes. Finally, perhaps their most strenuous argument will be that
    this treaty will lull us into a false sense of security and cause us to
    drop our guard.
        I hope to demonstrate today that these claims are incorrect and
    that the problems they cite will only get worse without the CWC. From
    the military perspective, I believe that this convention is clearly in
    our interest. I know that the witnesses may not agree with me in this
    regard. However, two other former Secretaries of Defense not
    represented here today do agree with me. These are Harold Brown,
    Secretary of Defense in the Carter Administration, and William Perry,
    Secretary of Defense in the first Clinton term.
        I ask unanimous consent that their statement be included in the
    record. As they note in their statement, every single Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs of staff since President Carter's Administration has
    endorsed ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
        Last friday, 17 distinguished retired military officers sent a
    letter to the President in which they endorsed ratification of the
    Chemical Weapons Convention. The collection of signatures on this
    letter is quite impressive. I would ask unanimous consent to place the
    text of this letter as well as an opinion piece by Secretary of Defense
    William Cohen in the record.
        Several of these signatories were present at a White House event on
    Friday in which dozens of distinguished Americans from many walks of
    life and both sides of the political fence joined together to call for
    early ratification of this treaty. I would ask unanimous consent that
    the text of the remarks made at this event be included in the record.
        The Convention has won the endorsement of several highly-respected
    veterans and military organizations as well. This list includes the
    Reserve Officers Association, the Vietnam Veterans Association, the
    Veterans of Foreign Wars, the Jewish War Veterans of the U.S.A., and
    The American Ex-prisoners of War. I would ask unanimous consent that
    statements by these organizations be placed in the record.
        These individuals and organizations--none of whom can be
    characterized as soft-headed or soft-hearted--recognize the benefits of
    this Convention for our front-line soldiers, who increasingly face the
    risk of less discriminating and more treacherous weapons like poison
    gas. We should do the same.
        Mr. Chairman, the argument that the treaty will be ineffective
    because several rogue states have not signed is equally perplexing to
    me. Today, there is absolutely nothing illegal under international or
    domestic law about the chemical weapons programs in these rogue states.
    That will change once the CWC enters into force. It will make such
    programs illegal. It will also provide us with a valuable tool--the
    weight of the entire international community to isolate and target
    those states that violate the norm set by this treaty.
        As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, who will testify this
    afternoon, has noted--to say that we shouldn't try to make chemical
    weapons illegal because there will be cheaters, is like saying that we
    shouldn't have laws because people will break them. International norms
    of behavior are created so that we have standards of civilized conduct
    by which to judge others. Without them, we leave the rogue countries to
    behave as free actors.
        Indeed, by joining the convention, we place the full weight of the
    world community to take whatever action is necessary to respond to, or
    prevent an adversary from using chemical weapons. Equally important, we
    will place our military might behind the world's threat to act against
    violators.
        The argument that U.S. industry will suffer under the supposedly
    onerous burdens of the treaty is particularly interesting for me to
    hear. You see, coming from Delaware I know a thing or two about the
    chemical industry--which is the industry that will be most impacted by
    this treaty. The chemical industry accounts for over one-half of
    Delaware's industrial output. If the chemical industry had a problem
    with this treaty, I assure you that I would have been among the first
    to hear about it. Instead, what I have heard is that the chemical
    industry played a key role in negotiating the convention and is among
    its strongest supporters.
        What I have heard is that if we don't ratify this convention, the
    chemical industry, which is this country's largest exporter, stands to
    lose hundreds of millions of dollars in export earnings because it
    would be subject to trade sanctions that the United States wrote into
    the treaty to target rogue states. In fact, we have now heard that
    Germany has announced that it will impose trade restrictions on non-
    members come April 29.
        The argument that the convention is unverifiable is a classic case
    of making the perfect the enemy of the good. No arms control treaty is
    perfectly verifiable. The CWC is no exception to that rule. While there
    are risks that a state party will hide some covert chemical weapons
    stocks or illegally produce chemical weapons, it will be much more
    difficult to engage in large-scale violations that would pose the
    greatest danger to U.S. military forces. This is because of the CWC's
    extensive on-site inspection regime.
        George Tenet, the Acting Director of Central Intelligence,
    testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee that: ``In the
    absence of the tools that the Convention gives to us, it will be much
    harder for us to apprise you, apprise the military and policymakers of
    where we think we are in the world with regards to these
    developments.''
        The intelligence community wants us to ratify CWC because it will
    give them additional tools to detect chemical weapon programs in other
    countries. And that is something we're going to have to do anyway. In
    addition, there may well be some occasions in which on-site inspection
    will produce evidence of treaty violations. In other words, while we
    may not catch every violator, we may well catch some--and that will
    lead to deterrence.
        And without the CWC, we won't catch anybody--because there will be
    no bar on countries producing and stockpiling those weapons. The
    allegation that the treaty would lead to the end of export controls on
    dangerous chemicals is based on a poor reading of the treaty text.
    Article Eleven of the Convention supports chemical trade and technology
    exchange ``for purposes not prohibited under this convention.'' It also
    requires that trade restrictions not be ``incompatible with the
    obligations undertaken under this convention.''
        But the CWC is completely consistent with continued enforcement of
    the Australia group controls, which member states use to keep chemical
    and biological weapons material out of the hands of rogue states. The
    executive branch has said this time and again, and so have our
    Australia group allies.
        In fact, as we speak, our allies are in the process of repeating
    those assurances through diplomatic contacts. It is the decline and
    failure of U.S. leadership that would pose the gravest threat to the
    Australia group. And failure to ratify the CWC would be seen by friend
    and foe alike as a U.S. retreat from world leadership in an area that
    is critical to global security. Under that circumstance, states with
    chemical industries might indeed conclude that they should go back to
    helping the Iraqs and Libyas Of the world to build suspect chemical
    facilities.
        If one were to extrapolate the arguments of treaty opponents, one
    would have to conclude that no matter what we do, the Australia group
    is a dead letter. Because on April 29 those Australia group countries
    that have joined the Convention will be required to begin trading
    freely in dangerous chemicals according to the argument made by
    opponents. Obviously, this argument is as preposterous as it sounds,
    but it is the logical outgrowth of the allegation made by the
    opponents.
        Finally, I look forward to engaging our witnesses on their claim
    that this Convention will lull us into a false sense of security. The
    Pentagon has made it clear on numerous occasions that it will maintain
    a robust chemical defense capability supported by robust intelligence
    collection. The commitment to protecting our forces has the full
    support of the President and the Congress and I believe strongly that
    no future Administration or Congress will abandon our solemn
    responsibility to our troops in this regard.
        In addition, I have agreed with Senator Helms to add a legally
    binding condition to the treaty that requires the Secretary of Defense
    to ensure that U.S. forces are capable of carrying out military
    missions regardless of any foreign threat or use of chemical weapons.
    Besides, our experience with other arms control agreements shows that
    there is little chance of our becoming complacent about the chemical
    weapon threat if the CWC is ratified.
        For example, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty was signed
    twenty-five years ago, yet we are continually vigilant on the threat of
    nuclear proliferation. As for defenses against poison gas--troop
    protection and decontamination training is a function of congressional
    funding. That equipment and that training will not go away unless
    Congress lets it go away. I certainly won't allow it, and I don't think
    my colleagues on the other committees of jurisdiction or on side of
    this issue will either.
        I am concerned that the opponents solution to the perceived problem
    of being lulled to sleep is to allow the threat of chemical weapons to
    grow even worse. Mr. Chairman, I look forward to a frank and open
    exchange with our witnesses. I hope that the hearing today moves us one
    step closer to action on this critical treaty before the impending
    deadline.
        Thank you.

        The Chairman. You didn't take but 18.5 minutes.
        Senator Biden. Well, then I will forego my questions, Mr.
    Chairman.
        The Chairman. Oh, no, no. You are always very impressive, I
    will say, one way or another.
        The Chairman. Since we are playing a name game, Trent Lott
    got a letter the other day, signed by a few military people,
    such as Dick Cheney, Bill Clark, Alexander Haig, John S.
    Herrington, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Edwin Meese, Donald Rumsfeld,
    Caspar Weinberger, General Voss, Vice Admiral William Houser,
    General Kelley of the Marine Corps, General Thomas Kelly of the
    Army, Admiral Wesley McDonald--is that enough?
        Senator Biden. That's pretty good, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. OK. We have about 75 other signatories.
    Without objection, we will put that in the record.
        [The letter referred to by Chairman Helms appears on page
    15.]
        Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, this is not fair to do, but
    two of the guys you named changed their mind and signed a
    letter on April 3 saying that they are for the treaty.
        Oh, they changed their mind after they signed that.
        Oh, gosh, all right.
        There are a lot of guys changing their minds around here
    these days. Maybe we can change your mind, too.
        The Chairman. That will be the day.
        You won't change my mind about this statement made
    repeatedly about the Reagan Administration, which is not for
    this treaty. Think about Weinberger, Kirkpatrick, Bill Clark,
    Ed Meese, Richard Perle, Dick Adams, and on down the list. In
    fact, I know of no one on the Reagan team, as it is known, who
    is in favor of it. Sadly, nobody can ask the President himself,
    President Reagan, how he feels about it.
        I understand that several Senators are going to return so
    that they can have their time. We have agreed that 5 minutes
    for the first round may be the course of wisdom.
        Secretary Rumsfeld, you served for many years as Chairman
    and CEO of G.D. Searle and Company, which is, I believe, a
    large, multilateral pharmaceutical business. You have had quite
    a bit of experience and expertise in dealing with government
    regulations, to which you referred.
        In your expert opinion, why would the Chemical
    Manufacturers Association be so aggressive in supporting the
    treaty when I have this many letters (indicating) from chemical
    companies saying it is a bad treaty and please do not approve
    it?
        Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, I cannot climb into the minds of the
    executives of the Chemical Manufacturers Association, Senator,
    but certainly an industry like that has, as Senator Biden has
    indicated, an opportunity to increase the number of chemicals
    they can export if this treaty is passed. At the present time,
    a number of chemicals are not permitted for export, which would
    be made permissible for export by this convention.
        So it is in their interest to have it passed in that
    regard.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Rumsfeld. Second, I am not an expert on the
    association, but certainly they represent the big companies.
    They don't represent the medium sized and small companies.
        Senator Biden has said he does not doubt that he would be
    hearing from small companies if there were a problem. I suspect
    if this passes he will hear from them. I don't believe that the
    thousands, whatever the number is, of companies across this
    country know about this treaty in any detail, believe that the
    treaty would apply to them, understand that they could be
    subjected to inspections, appreciate the unfunded mandates that
    would be imposed on them in the event this treaty were to be
    ratified.
        I might just point out that the Aerospace Industries
    Association has stated its strong concern about the treaty, and
    I hope that since they have said that they have not changed
    their mind.
        But you never know.
        But they have said it would unnecessarily jeopardize our
    Nation's ability to protect its national security information
    and proprietary technological data.
        I was told yesterday by an individual who is knowledgeable
    that the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, for example, personnel
    from there were involved in one of the mock inspections
    conducted by the U.S. government. They evaluated the inspection
    results and some weeks later, from outside the facility, using
    modern technology, were capable of coming away with classified
    information and proprietary information from the inspection.
        So I don't think that it would be wise for us to
    underestimate the risk that would exist to classified
    information, to a company's proprietary information.
        There is a third problem. Most of us in business are
    engaged with joint ventures and partnerships with companies
    across the globe. We share proprietary information in the same
    facility. Were these inspections imposed, it is entirely
    possible that not only your own proprietary information could
    be compromised but also the proprietary information of joint
    venture partners to whom you have promised not to permit their
    proprietary information to be shared.
        Even cereal companies close their doors and do not allow
    people to walk through the plant. Why? They don't have
    classified information. What they have is process information,
    and the idea of photography or samples leaving their factory
    would unquestionably concern them deeply.
        The Chairman. I thank you. My time is up.
        Without objection, I am going to ask that the letters from
    industry in opposition to treaty ratification be made a part of
    this record.
        [The information referred to appears in the appendix.]
        The Chairman. I don't have but 30 seconds left, so I will
    turn to the distinguished Senator from Delaware.
        I was just handed an interesting little comment that I will
    say to all of you. One of the letters that I have is from the
    company which makes the ink for the dollar bill. They are
    frightened that foreign inspections under the CWC would give
    counterfeiters some advantage.
        Mr. Rumsfeld. They are probably incorporated in Delaware.
        Senator Biden. I hope so. That accounts for the other 50
    percent of our business.
        Actually, that's not true. Chickens are bigger.
        Dr. Schlesinger. They are incorporated in Virginia and the
    letter was sent to Charles Robb.
        Senator Biden. Thank you.
        Gentlemen, obviously because of the time I am not going to
    be able to ask you all that I want to, though I am sure my
    colleagues will do a better job at it than I would.
        Let me ask you about a few things you have mentioned here
    and about conditions that have been tentatively agreed to,
    conditions added to the treaty that have been tentatively
    agreed to by Senator Helms and me--speaking only for me and not
    for any other member of the Democratic Caucus or the Republican
    Caucus. One of the criticisms was that this is unenforceable,
    this treaty. And one of the conditions we have tentatively
    agreed on is that the President would be required to consult
    with the Senate if the treaty is being violated. The President
    would be required to report to us on what was being done by way
    of inspections, diplomacy, and sanctions to respond to the
    violation. And if the violations were to persist for one year,
    the President would have to come back to the Senate and ask the
    Senate to decide if we should continue to adhere to the treaty
    or not. He would have an affirmative obligation.
        My question is, does this condition in any way, do you view
    it as positive, not whether it cures the problems of the
    treaty, but do you consider it a positive condition?
        Dr. Schlesinger. I think it is a positive condition.
        Mr. Weinberger. I would suggest, however, that we might
    want to look very carefully at the content of the report that
    the President makes to the Senate and see if it, in fact, is as
    accurate as it should be.
        Senator Biden. I think that is a valid concern and a valid
    point raised. There is another condition that we have
    tentatively agreed on.
        In response to a piece, an op-ed piece done by you
    distinguished gentlemen, you said, on March 5, that if the
    United States is not a CWC member State, the danger is lessened
    that American intelligence about ongoing chemical weapons
    operations will be ``dumbed down'' or otherwise compromised.
        In order to address that concern, Senator Helms and I have
    agreed to a condition requiring periodic reports and prompt
    notice to the Congress about chemical weapons programs around
    the world and the status of CWC compliance.
        The executive branch would also be required to offer
    briefings on these issues. This condition would give Congress
    an active role in advising the President in regard to insuring
    compliance. The information would be before the Congress and it
    would be incumbent upon us to review it and define, if we
    disagreed, when violations were taking place.
        My question is does this in any way go toward alleviating
    the concern about dumbing down?
        Dr. Schlesinger. Well, it helps in some ways and it adds to
    the problem in others.
        As you know, there is a proclivity of the executive branch,
    when it wants to avoid action, to ignore or to dumb down
    violations by others. There is a long history of this. I need
    not repeat it.
        Senator Biden. I'm aware of that.
        Dr. Schlesinger. You referred to the Iraq case yourself.
        Senator Biden. Now the other question that several of you
    have indicated in written material in the past was without a
    commitment of billions of U.S. aid to pay for destruction of
    Russia's vast arsenal, they will not comply with this treaty.
        Senator Helms and I have agreed to a condition to a
    resolution of ratification in an attempt to address this issue.
    Our condition states: The United States will not accept any
    Russian effort to condition its ratification upon the U.S.
    providing guarantees to pay for implementation.
        Let me ask you this. Does this in any way help in that
    problem, although I find it kind of strange? It's like the
    argument about why the Nunn-Lugar legislation was a bad idea--
    this is not an argu-
    ment on your part, but some here have argued that it was a bad
    idea because we were paying money to the Russians to destroy
    nuclear weapons.
        I always found that an interesting argument, and I don't
    know why it would be such a bad idea to help destroy their
    chemical weapons, either. At any rate, we have a condition that
    says that that can be no condition of ratification.
        Is that a useful or a destructive addition to this treaty?
        Dr. Schlesinger. I think that is useful, Senator. It does,
    however, underscore a fundamental problem that we have in that
    the bilateral destruction agreement was the foundation for the
    Chemical Weapons Convention and that Prime Minister
    Chernomyrdin has now said that agreement has outlived its
    usefulness. That is worrisome.
        Senator Biden. As you will recall--and this will obviously
    be my last comment--as you will recall, the reason for that
    treaty was to prompt this treaty. You will remember that.
    Second, we did not ratify the treaty nor did they ratify the
    treaty.
        Anyway, thank you very much Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen.
        The Chairman. Before I recognize Senator Lugar, let me say
    that the distinguished ranking member, Joe Biden, and I have
    spent several hours together trying to work on details, and we
    have agreed on about 21 relatively minor defects in the treaty.
    There are 5 or 6 major things yet to be considered, and the
    administration up till now--not Joe Biden, but the
    administration--is stonewalling considering even those defects.
        Senator Lugar.
        Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to join you and members of the committee in
    welcoming witnesses this morning who are good public servants
    and personal friends of many of us on this committee. I have
    listened to their testimony and I have studied the op-ed which
    they wrote for the Washington Post last month. I believe their
    contribution was well written, but, at least for me, it was
    unpersuasive.
        Critics of the convention often speak as if the concerns
    they are expressing are being heard almost for the first time
    and that members of the committee have now taken these issues
    into account in developing the resolution of ratification.
        The critics may not be familiar with the resolution of
    ratification that we passed out of this committee by a vote of
    13 to 5 last year or the ongoing negotiations on the
    ratification issue this year which the Chairman just cited.
        The resolution is precisely the vehicle through which these
    matters of interpretation are taken up and conditions added to
    conform to U.S. domestic law. Instead of working these complex
    interpretation issues, many critics are repeating many of the
    same arguments that we have dealt with.
        I would say, for example, that we are treated to the so-
    called complacency argument; that is, United States
    ratification of the CWC will lull the country into a false
    sense of security and a tendency to neglect its defenses. But
    this is surely a matter of political will here at home. It has
    nothing to do with the treaty. There is nothing inevitable
    about arms control agreements contributing to lessening a
    perceived need and, therefore, support for defense against such
    threats.
        But there is something wrong with the notion that by
    allowing our potential adversaries to have a chemical weapon
    situation without norms and international law, that we are sure
    to be reminded to defend ourselves against them. Rather than
    whining about complacency, Congress ought to do its job:
    Authorize and appropriate the funds necessary to provide for a
    robust chemical defense capability.
        In addition, Congress has every ability to add or to shift
    funds to ensure that CWC monitoring remains a priority.
        Second, we are treated again to the so-called poisons for
    peace argument; namely, the CWC will obligate member states to
    facilitate transfers of CWC specific technology, equipment and
    material to member states of the convention. Further, they
    charge the treaty commits new member states not to observe any
    agreements that would obstruct these transfers.
        That is the Iranian interpretation of Article XI. The
    United States and others rejected that argument and maintain
    that interpretation of Article XI did not require them to do
    so, that mechanisms such as the Australian Group are legitimate
    under the CWC, and the work of the Australian Group will
    continue.
        The resolution of ratification clarifies the American
    interpretation. The U.S. preserves the right to maintain or
    impose export controls for foreign policy or national security
    reasons. But nothing in the convention obligates the United
    States to accept any weakening of existing national export
    controls and that the export control and nonproliferation
    measures the Australian Group has undertaken are fully
    consistent with all requirements of the CWC.
        If, as critics state, the CWC would likely leave the United
    States more and not less vulnerable to chemical attack, then
    the blame again resides with political leaders in the United
    States, not with the convention. The treaty in no way
    constrains our ability as a nation to provide for a robust
    defense against chemical weapons or to impose and maintain
    export controls.
        Third, we are told that if the U.S. is a CWC participant,
    American intelligence is in danger of being dumbed down or
    compromised. Again, any dumbing down of intelligence has
    nothing to do with the convention. It has to do, once again,
    with political will.
        We quite predictably get, then, a charge on the
    Constitution made by critics that U.S. participation could
    leave U.S. citizens and companies vulnerable to burdens
    associated with reporting and inspection arrangements and to
    jeopardizing confidential business information.
        The critics pose as protectors of American industry, but
    industry has spoken for itself. U.S. industry would not support
    the CWC if it posed significant risks to confidential business
    information. Specifically, the chemical industry has worked
    intensively to ensure that protections against the loss of
    confidential information are incorporated in the CWC and the
    administration-proposed implementing legislation.
        By the same token, allegations that this will require
    violation of the Constitution are wrong. The proposed
    implementing legislation provides for search warrants if
    routine or challenge inspections are to be carried out without
    consent. The CWC also allows the U.S. to take into account
    constitutional obligations regarding searches and seizures,
    proprietary rights, and providing access through challenge
    inspections.
        Finally, there is the argument that we be in no hurry to
    adhere to the convention and if and when we decide to join
    other signatories will have no choice but to adjust.
    Nevertheless, if we are not a party when it enters into force,
    we will have no role in the governing body and that is
    important.
        The Chairman. Senator Dodd.
        Senator Dodd. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I noted
    when I walked in here the presence of the distinguished
    Admiral, who has rejoined us here.
        It is a pleasure to see you again, Admiral. We are glad to
    have you back with us.
        Today I thank all three of you for being here as witnesses.
    All three of you had distinguished careers, and it is a
    pleasure to see you back before the committee.
        Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding these hearings. I
    respect immensely the concerns that you have raised. You have
    done so in an appropriate fashion over the last number of
    months, and we are going to have a chance, as it appears now,
    in the next few days to actually express our will in the Senate
    on this, which I think is appropriate and proper given the
    April 29 deadline.
        I commend you and Senator Biden for the tremendous effort
    you have both put in, along with your staffs, to try to resolve
    some of the outstanding differences. Senator Lugar as well
    deserves a great deal of credit, having a long-standing
    commitment to this issue.
        So I commend all of you for your work.
        I noted, Mr. Chairman, that you said the Reagan
    administration team was sort of opposed to this. The name game
    is dangerous, but the last time I looked, General Vessey, Jim
    Baker, Ken Adelman, Colin Powell, General Rowny, Paul Nitze and
    the Vice President were part of the Reagan team and they
    support the Chemical Weapons Convention.
        But there is a danger in going back and forth. I think the
    question has to be raised of what is in the interest of our
    country here, whether or not this is going to serve our
    interests in the 21st century.
        I am struck by a couple of observations. One is that we saw
    in the 1970's--in fact, Secretary Schlesinger I think was very
    much involved in this--the Biological Weapons Convention or
    treaty which President Nixon sent up to us here, which was
    strongly supported, as I recall, by both parties, both sides of
    the aisle. It has some 157 signatories, I think. One hundred
    forty countries ratified it. There is no verification, to the
    best of my knowledge, in that particular convention, yet it has
    worked pretty well.
        It has short comings, obviously. There is not universal
    adherence to it, but it has worked fairly well.
        I raise that because this treaty obviously does have
    verification included in it. One would argue that it actually
    does a much better job.
        I am also struck by the fact that in 1985, President Reagan
    signed into law a bill that would eliminate by the year 2004
    the entire existing stockpile of chemical weapons. So we made a
    decision about a decade ago. One could argue, I suppose, the
    merits of it, but we made that decision; and we have been about
    the business not of upgrading or modernizing any of our
    chemical weapons but to unilaterally--to unilaterally--
    eliminate our own stockpiles in chemical weapons.
        I know of nothing that has been said here, nor has anyone
    advocated, at least in the last few years that I have been
    here, that we ought to modernize our stockpiles in chemical
    weapons. No one has made that suggestion that I know of or
    offered legislation in that regard.
        So it seems as a country, in a bipartisan way, going back
    almost 25 years, more than 25 years, that we have taken a
    leadership position, both internationally and unilaterally, on
    the issue of chemical weapons; because we realize the dangers
    involved and associated with these weapons of mass destruction.
        The issue now comes down to whether or not this Nation,
    having authored, championed, and led this effort, whether or
    not we are going to be able to sit on the Executive Council
    which will set the rules of the road.
        We are acting in some way as if, if we don't ratify this,
    it does not happen. It does happen. If we don't ratify this, it
    does happen.
        The issue now becomes whether or not we are going to ratify
    in such a way that the interests of our country and the
    interests which we champion, that is, the abolition of chemical
    weapons and weapons of mass destruction, that we are going to
    be allowed to sit at the very table to decide the rules of the
    road to determine whether or not that is going to work, having
    unilaterally decided that we will take ourselves out of this
    game by the year 2004.
        I just wonder, briefly, if our three witnesses here might,
    in the context of the Biological Weapons Convention of the
    1970's, the general success of that, the decision in 1985 by
    the Reagan administration and Secretary Weinberger to
    unilaterally get out of this business by the year 2004--that
    was a Reagan administration decision--why it is not in the best
    interest of our country to move forward on this convention in
    light of the decisions we have already made.
        The Chairman. We will let you answer that on the next
    round.
        Senator Hagel.
        Senator Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
        I very much appreciate the opportunity to listen and learn
    this morning. Mr. Chairman, as you suggested, there are 15 new
    United States Senators. There are 3 new United States Senators
    on this panel.
        This is one United States Senator who needs to know more
    about what we are doing here, and I very much appreciate you
    and Senator Biden opening the process and giving us a chance to
    learn and listen.
        Just as in life where actions have consequences, treaties
    have consequences. We live with those consequences.
        I, as a supporter of a ballistic missile defense system, am
    somewhat struck that we are still captive to the 1972 ABM
    Treaty in the argument of some why we cannot go forward and
    construct a ballistic missile defense system.
        We are not here to talk about the ABM Treaty, but I am here
    to learn a little bit more about what this chemical treaty is
    about. Understanding, as the distinguished panel has brought
    out in rather poignant terms this morning in the questioning
    and the comments by my distinguished colleagues have added to
    this enlightenment, first, civilized conduct is not predicated
    on treaties and is not governed by treaties. Civilized conduct
    is not anchored by treaties or some esoteric academic kind of
    parchment.
        Civilized conduct is anchored by civilized people. One of
    the concerns I have with this treaty as it is written, not
    unlike what I have heard this morning--and I must say also what
    Secretary Weinberger has said, I do not know of anyone who is
    for chemical weapons or the use of them--and as someone who has
    understood a little bit about combat, as others on this
    committee know and some of the direct personal experiences
    articulated by our panel this morning show they understand a
    little bit about this business, is this; and I guess my
    question comes down to this: Should we have a chemical weapons
    treaty and if we should, what form should it take? I would be
    very interested in our three distinguished panelists, Mr.
    Chairman, answering that question. If not this treaty, should
    we have one? Whatever that answer is leads us obviously to the
    next question, which is what form, if you agree we should have
    a treaty, what form should that treaty take.
        Secretary Weinberger?
        Mr. Weinberger. I think we have to bear in mind the point
    that you made at the beginning, that you don't solve the
    problems of ethics or of use of these weapons by any attempt to
    impose civilized standards on uncivilized government. I don't
    think for a moment, in connection with the statements Senator
    Biden and Senator Dodd made, that it would make the slightest
    difference to Saddam Hussein whether it was legal or illegal
    for him to use poison gas. He did violate that treaty, the
    original agreement in Geneva, when he attacked the Kurds. I
    think any time it suits his interest, he would do so.
        Indeed, the old Soviet definition of truth is whatever
    serves the country. So you have to have in mind that kind of
    attitude.
        Against that background, there is no impropriety in setting
    standards. I think that you can make it clear that the use of
    poison gas is outlawed by public opinion around the world. You
    can get statements to that effect. But when you add to that the
    enormously intrusive processes which require us to share with
    some extremely potentially hostile countries defensive
    mechanisms that we may be, and I hope are, working on to
    improve our capability of defending against this type of
    warfare, then I think you are neglecting the best interests of
    the United States. That is one of the reasons why I think this
    treaty, this convention, should not be ratified.
        There are all kinds of ways of making international
    statements. But when you bind yourselves to the situation of
    preventing the country from having the kind of defensive
    capability it needs in a world like this, then I think you are
    not serving the best interests of the United States. That is
    one of the reasons I think this treaty goes far beyond
    attempting to set just international standards and speed
    limits, and all those other comforting terms, because at the
    same time it requires us to take actions that would weaken us
    very severely and, I think, increase the chances of chemical
    warfare being used by rogue nations who would be told very
    publicly that other nations had no retaliatory capability.
        Senator Hagel. Thank you.
        Secretary Rumsfeld.
        Mr. Rumsfeld. Just very briefly, I won't take much time. I
    see you are on the yellow already.
        First, obviously a great deal of the problem is with
    Articles X and XI.
        Second, the Executive Council is a problem. It is unlike
    the United Nations, where the United States at least has a
    veto. Here, in this instance, as I recall, Asia has 9 members,
    Africa has 9 or 10, Latin America has 7, Eastern Europe has 5,
    Western Europe has 10, and ``other'' is thrown in with Western
    Europe. We don't even have a guaranteed seat.
        So it would be a very different kind of mechanism, even
    different than the International Atomic Energy mechanism, as
    Secretary Schlesinger mentioned.
        So I think those two things stand out by way of problems.
        Senator Hagel. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Senator Kerry.
        Dr. Schlesinger. Might I add just a little bit on that
    point, the last point that Mr. Rumsfeld mentioned?
        The fact is that, under the IAEA, the United States
    provides scrutiny of the budget in a way that this budget will
    not be scrutinized through the internal politics of the IAEA.
    Second, the Western nations have a blocking vote in the Board
    of Governors of the IAEA. It requires a two-thirds vote of the
    IAEA. To prevent intrusions in the United States requires a
    three-quarters adverse vote. And as Mr. Rumsfeld has just
    indicated, under the circumstances, the United States is not
    guaranteed a seat. It is described as ``other.''
        That is, I think, a clarification of the remarks by Senator
    Dodd with regard to our participation in the Executive Council.
    That may be a transitory device. It may be a permanent device.
    But there is no indication of it.
        Finally, there is a facilities agreement under the IAEA so
    that there is no hunting license to go around in the 10,000
    facilities in the United States that are subject to the
    requirements of this agreement.
        The Chairman. Now Senator Kerry.
        Senator Kerry. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        I have a number of questions, and I am sure I will not be
    able to get at them in the short time available. But let me
    begin, if I can.
        Gentlemen, I assume you don't believe that chemical weapons
    manufacturing or chemical weapons threats can be adequately
    monitored by U.S. technical means alone.
        Do you agree with that?
        Mr. Weinberger. That's correct. I agree with that. It
    cannot be.
        Senator Kerry. So you need some kind of protocol, some kind
    of mechanism for the process of adequately providing our
    intelligence community with a capacity to advise our leaders
    adequately.
        Mr. Weinberger. Senator, I see what you are getting at. But
    the fact of the matter is that the treaty that we are
    considering here does not have any kind of guarantees or any
    kind of verifiability that countries that say they are going to
    do one thing are going to do it.
        Just because it has a very intrusive mechanism which allows
    them to go all into these 10,000 or more companies in the
    United States or similar numbers in other countries of the
    world does not mean that there is any guarantee that any of the
    countries that are signatory to it are in effect going to be
    doing what they say they are going to be doing.
        Senator Kerry. By that same logic, there is no absolute
    guarantee for any treaties that we have signed. Isn't that
    accurate?
        Mr. Weinberger. That's one of the reasons I was always
    worried about relying exclusively on an arms control regime, as
    opposed to a military capability regime along with arms control
    for insuring our own security.
        Senator Kerry. If you follow that logic----
        Dr. Schlesinger. Mr. Chairman, could I say something
    without taking away from the Senator's time?
        Senator Kerry [continuing]. Can he do it without taking
    away from my time?
        The Chairman. Oh, certainly.
        Senator Kerry. That is a privilege. Thank you.
        Dr. Schlesinger. Senator, let me try and raise the
    fundamental question here, which is the loss of sources and
    methods.
        When David Kaye was in charge of the inspection in Iraq, he
    discovered to his chagrin that the Iraqis had been able to hide
    from Western intelligence their activities. Why--because the
    Iraqis themselves had been trained by the IAEA in the
    techniques used by Western, specifically American,
    intelligence.
        He had a conversation with an Iraqi official who simply
    stated we have gotten all of this information.
        Now the Executive Council of the Organization for the
    Prohibition of Chemical Weapons is engaged in training people
    from all nations at this juncture.
        What we are doing in the intelligence area is probably
    suffering a net loss. As the Senator indicates, we will have
    greater access and, therefore, we will have increased
    intelligence of one type. But our techniques for intrusion, our
    techniques for interpretation will be compromised.
        This is clearly the case in North Korea, in which the North
    Koreans have wisely discovered through our revelations that the
    IAEA's demand to see their waste dumps will compromise
    information on their production of plutonium.
        So the Senator's question is quite right with regard to
    improved intelligence, but it is offset by the compromise of
    sources and methods.
        Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman, if I could respond, I
    understand your argument, but I think the logic is lost here
    for a number of reasons.
        First of all, Iraq is not a party. So nothing will change
    with respect to Iraq. In fact, none of the rogue states about
    which we have the greatest fears are parties. Therefore,
    nothing with respect to our intelligence gathering or state of
    anxiety should change with respect to those states.
        On the other hand, because you have a regimen with respect
    to everybody else who is trafficking in or legitimately trading
    in the precursor chemicals, we will have a much greater
    ability, in fact, according to our own intelligence personnel,
    to determine the ability of those rogue states to, in fact, get
    a hold of those chemicals, or the ability to manufacture on
    their own.
        What do you say to that? It is interesting that Jim Woolsey
    said this will give the country an additional tool in the box.
    Our current CIA Acting Director, George Tenet, says it will.
    John Deutch said it will. The entire U.S. command structure,
    almost the entire U.S. command structure for the Persian Gulf,
    who faced the threat of chemical weapons, say that this will
    strengthen our hand.
        It is hard for me to understand why you find their
    perception of this as an increased tool and as an important
    protection wanting.
        Dr. Schlesinger. I think that is easily answered, Senator,
    and if I may respectfully suggest, you are on the wrong wicket
    in this regard.
        For a decade DCI's have come to this Senate, to the House,
    and stated that this treaty is unverifiable. Jim Woolsey came
    up and said this treaty is unverifiable. John Deutch, who has
    been cited by the administration as saying that it is
    verifiable has stated, ``I've never said it's verifiable. It's
    clearly unverifiable.'' And in the article with General
    Scowcroft, he indicated it was unverifiable.
        The nonsignatories, such as Syria and Libya, are likely to
    get a little assistance from signatories like Iran and Cuba.
    That will not be difficult to establish.
        Senator Kerry. Can I just interrupt you there on the point
    of verifiability?
        Dr. Schlesinger. Sure.
        Senator Kerry. First of all, no treaty is purely
    verifiable. No treaty.
        Second, none of them said that this treaty is not
    verifiable to some degree. They all said this is verifiable to
    a certain degree. We all understand that.
        The question before us is are we better off without any
    protocol which controls precursor chemicals, are we better off
    being totally outside of the regime that will be set up by the
    control as of the 29th of this month, and are we better off
    without all nations, Russia included, coming in to an agreement
    as to how we will try to track this. Are you better off in
    terms of verifiability?
        Are you better off in terms of verifiability without this?
    That is my question.
        Dr. Schlesinger. We have to look at the----
        Senator Kerry. No. Please answer my question.
        Are we better off without verifiability?
        The Chairman. Just a minute. The Chair is----
        Senator Kerry [continuing]. I'd just like to get my
    question answered, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Well, you can do it with a little more
    discretion than that.
        Now you are talking with a former Director of the Central
    Intelligence Agency. He should know what he is talking about.
    He deserves better than to be----
        Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman, I'm not trying to do anything
    except----
        The Chairman [continuing]. Please, please.
        Dr. Schlesinger. Now you can answer the question, sir.
        Dr. Schlesinger. There will be gains in verifiability and
    losses in verifiability. The fact that our techniques will be
    undermined probably will exceed the gains in verifiability.
    Moreover, we are dealing not only with the verification of
    chemical weapons, we are dealing with the possible industrial
    espionage in the United States. And that industrial espionage
    is going to be a godsend--I repeat, a godsend--to foreign
    intelligence agencies and to the corporations which will feed
    on those foreign intelligence agencies.
        A recent book, ``War by Other Means,'' talks about economic
    espionage in the United States and how vulnerable we are to
    economic espionage. That must be included in the total
    assessment with regard to the performance of the intelligence
    community.
        Mr. Chairman, may I say that I worry deeply about the
    statement that was earlier made by Senator Biden that the
    intelligence community wants us to ratify the treaty. I heard
    that statement--and excuse me, Senator Kerry for drifting off
    your question--I heard that statement, and I am deeply
    concerned that the intelligence community should not be wanting
    a decision on any policy matter. The intelligence community is
    there to provide information, not to provide judgments on
    policy issues.
        I hope that that statement did not reflect either the
    DCI's, the Acting DCI's views or the views of the intelligence
    community.
        Mr. Weinberger. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I might answer
    another of Senator Kerry's questions which is do you think we
    are better off by not signing this protocol. My answer is
    unequivocally yes, we are better off by not signing it because
    this particular protocol not only has all of the faults that we
    pointed out and is not verifiable, but it does require us, and
    we would carry out our obligations, I am confident, because we
    always have, it requires us to share both defensive and
    offensive technological developments that we should be working
    on to protect our troops.
        That I think is a very deep flaw. The Senator, I am sure
    inadvertently, omitted from the list of rogue nations that have
    not joined the fact that Iran has joined and Iraq has not.
        So you would be giving an enormous intelligence advantage
    and an enormous disclosure advantage to a country like Iran.
    When General Schwarzkopf was asked why he supported the treaty
    and if he understood that by supporting the treaty he was
    supporting the sharing of this kind of technical development
    with Iran, he said of course not. He was horrified.
        I think that is a fair description of what he felt when
    this was brought home to him.
        The Chairman. Senator Grams.
        Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Senator Grams.
        Senator Grams. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
    welcome our distinguished panel, and I appreciate your time
    here this morning.
        Some of these you might have already answered. I came in
    late, so I apologize. But I would just like to go over some of
    the basics on this.
        One basic argument, a major argument, that has been made by
    the supporters of the CWC is that, although it may be far from
    perfect, that it is better to have some treaty in force rather
    than none at all; in other words, sign on to be part of this
    board or Executive Council to enact what may be a troubled
    treaty.
        How would you respond to that assertion, that it is better
    to be a part of this treaty than none at all.
        Mr. Rumsfeld, may we start with you?
        Mr. Rumsfeld. I think that when one weighs the advantages
    and disadvantages, it is clear to me, at least, that the
    defects vastly outweigh the advantages of establishing a
    standard or a norm in this instance.
        Further, I think it is perfectly possible to achieve the
    advantages that would accrue from this agreement without having
    to be burdened with the disadvantages.
        Senator Grams. How would you do that, Mr. Rumsfeld?
        Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, one way, as I mentioned, is the
    question of Articles X and XI, which I think should not be in
    there. The way they are written they represent very serious
    problems. The second way I mentioned was the mechanism of
    enforcement. The so-called Executive Council I think is flawed
    and would offer the United States nowhere near the ability to
    affect decisions that we have in the United Nations or that we
    have in the IAEA.
        Senator Grams. Mr. Weinberger?
        Mr. Weinberger. Well, I think the argument that something
    is better than nothing depends upon something not being worse
    than what you have.
        We don't need to sign this treaty to assert our goodwill or
    to assert the fact that we are against chemical weapons. I said
    at the beginning that I have the greatest detestation for these
    weapons, and I am sure every soldier does. Anyone who took part
    in any kind of service understands what they mean and what they
    do.
        But we don't have to sign a flawed treaty to demonstrate to
    the world our rejection of these kinds of weapons. We have many
    times taken actions that indicate that we are opposed to them.
        So I would certainly agree completely with Don Rumsfeld
    that you do have great disadvantages and those disadvantages
    outweigh any possible good that can come from a generalized
    statement that we, too, dislike these weapons and we, too, are
    willing to have them abolished.
        Senator Grams. Mr. Schlesinger?
        Dr. Schlesinger. We have a treaty, we have an agreement, we
    have a convention, the Geneva Convention, which is already in
    force. So it is not a question that something is better than
    nothing because we already have something. That something
    prohibits the use of chemical weapons. It is easier to detect
    the use of chemical weapons than it will ever be to detect the
    manufacture of chemical weapons. Consequently, we are far
    better off not watering down the Geneva Convention in the way
    that this treaty threatens to.
        I note that in Article VII or, thereabouts, it says that no
    way does this current agreement weaken the requirements of the
    Geneva Convention. We should take a firm stand on the use of
    weapons, and we need to have the capacity to enforce it.
        If we look at what will happen after the signing of this
    agreement, if, for example, China signs--and I have been
    described as a friend of China. I don't see any reason for us
    to drift into confrontation with China. But I want to say that
    anybody who believes that the Chinese will give up their
    chemical weapons capability or that they will give up the
    capacity to manufacture must be suffering from hallucinations.
        If we are prepared to do anything about it, that would
    require a greater rigor in dealing with Chinese departures from
    agreed on arms control measures than we have exhibited to this
    point.
        Mr. Rumsfeld. May I add one comment or thought that comes
    to mind?
        Senator Grams. Sure.
        Mr. Rumsfeld. In view of both what you and Senator Kerry
    have asked and discussed, the implication that nothing will
    change with respect to Iraq goes back to my point on Articles X
    and XI. I think it will change, even with respect to Iraq, in
    this sense. Country's that don't sign will be there, and with
    the dramatically increased flow of information which Articles X
    and XI require, and transfer of technology, and availability of
    information, it will get around. There is no question but that
    the information, particularly with respect to the defensive
    side, will be available. It will get out into the marketplace.
        You cannot keep it in. If that many countries have access
    to it, it will not be secret from the rogue nations.
        Senator Grams. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Senator Feingold.
        Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me first take this opportunity to thank you and the
    ranking member, Senator Biden, for the leadership and the
    dedication you have demonstrated on this issue before us this
    morning. I also want to recognize the efforts of the White
    House Working Group and the Lott Task Force to clarify this
    issue. I know that these negotiations are taking a great deal
    of time and involve a tremendous amount of technical detail.
        I want to note that this committee, too, has spent a lot of
    time on this treaty. In the 104th Congress, the distinguished
    Chair held three extensive hearings. I was pleased to be able
    to participate in those hearings, which have given the members
    of this committee an opportunity to closely examine a number of
    issues pertaining to this treaty and the consequences of its
    ratification or of the failure to ratify it.
        We asked some tough and probing questions and I think
    received thoughtful responses from the administration and
    private witnesses who have come before us.
        Despite all of this hard, hard work, we find ourselves at
    the 11th hour without Senate debate on this treaty. Even though
    the United States had the key leadership role throughout
    negotiations over this treaty, and even though 70 countries
    have already ratified it, this institution has not yet had a
    chance to actually consider the ratification of CWC.
        I just would like to reiterate, in the couple of minutes I
    have, what has already been said here this morning. Time is of
    the essence for the full Senate to have this debate. We are all
    well aware of the looming deadline of April 29, exactly 3 weeks
    from today. That is the deadline by which the United States
    must deposit its instrument of ratification of this treaty so
    that we may be a full participant in the Organization for the
    Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, or OPCW, the governing body
    that will have the responsibility for deciding the terms for
    the implementation of CWC.
        In my view, the United States participation in the OPCW is
    fundamental to ensuring that American companies and American
    citizens are treated fairly under the inspection provisions of
    this treaty. It is precisely because some observers think that
    these provisions are faulty that Senate consideration is
    essential. Senators should have the opportunity to debate these
    concerns, and the American people certainly deserve a chance to
    hear them.
        As elected representatives with the constitutional
    responsibility to provide advice and consent to treaties signed
    by the President, I think we are obligated to give full
    consideration to the CWC. With the April 29 deadline looming
    ahead of us, I think we owe it to the people who elected us to
    fulfill that duty to do it in a timely fashion and to do it
    responsibly.
        This treaty was signed by President Bush in January 1993
    and was submitted to the Senate by President Clinton in
    November of that year. Almost 3\1/2\ years later, the Senate is
    now faced with a 3-week deadline. The Chemical Weapons
    Convention is the culmination of a decades-long effort to bring
    these weapons under international control and work toward their
    eventual elimination.
        While I think we would all concede and have said that the
    CWC remains imperfect, I still believe it is the best avenue
    available for beginning down the road to that eventual
    elimination.
        So, Mr. Chairman, I again commend the tremendous interest
    you have taken in this issue, but I hope we can vote on the
    treaty soon.
        Mr. Chairman, I just have a couple of questions for the
    panel.
        First, in your March 5 Washington Post op-ed, the three
    distinguished members of this panel indicated that if the
    United States decides to become a party at a later date to this
    convention, perhaps after improvements are made to enhance the
    treaty's effectiveness, it is hard to believe that its
    preferences regarding implementation arrangements would not be
    given considerable weight.
        I guess I would like to know what improvements you would
    make. If it is in the interest of the United States to make
    these improvements, how would you propose that the United
    States accomplish this if we are not a member of the OPCW?
        Mr. Weinberger. Well, I don't think that the possibility of
    our being disregarded exists, Senator. I think if we are
    expected to pay 25 percent of the costs of this treaty, which
    are very considerable, we are certainly going to be listened
    to.
        As far as changes are concerned, I tried to indicate this
    morning, in a too lengthy statement, perhaps, all of the things
    that I think are wrong with it. Certainly Articles X and XI
    would have to be changed in a major way so that we do not
    preclude ourselves from having the capability of defending
    against rogue states who either signed or didn't sign this
    convention.
        What we have done in those articles, in my opinion, gives
    them all of the opportunity to either weaken or basically
    eliminate any kind of improvements we would make in the
    protective clothing, the masks, the defensive capabilities
    against these terrible weapons. It does not prevent rogue
    states from using them, or from stockpiling them, or from
    manufacturing them.
        Senator Feingold. If I may follow up just for a second on
    that, in effect, then, you are saying that our financial
    leverage would be sufficient to allow us to change it?
        Mr. Weinberger. Oh, I would be extremely disappointed if it
    isn't, Senator. Yes. We have quite a lot of opportunity to
    observe that in a number of other organizations, and if we are
    expected to put up 25 percent--and I would suspect that within
    a couple of years it would be 35 percent--of the cost of this
    treaty, we would certainly, I would hope anybody who was
    President at that time or Secretary of State at that time would
    make it quite clear that we require for our contribution a very
    genuine decisionmaking role.
        Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, and thank you,
    Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Senator Brownback.
        Senator Brownback. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and for holding
    the hearing. I am delighted to be here with these three
    gentlemen who I view as some of the key implementers of our
    strategy to win the cold war. You gentlemen were allegation
    three there and were a key part of that, to which our country
    and my children have an enduring debt to you for doing that.
        I thank you for it, for all you have done.
        I have a couple of questions. I am new to this committee
    and new to the Senate. So this is among the first hearings I
    have had on the Chemical Weapons Convention.
        Secretary Weinberger, Russia, of course, has not signed on
    to the treaty and yet is the world's largest chemical weapons
    possessor. Do you think we at a minimum should require that
    they sign on before we would consider signing on to this
    treaty?
        Mr. Weinberger. Senator, my understanding is that they have
    agreed, or ``signed on,'' so to speak, but they have not
    ratified it yet. Their record is extremely poor in this
    because, as you said, they have a very large stockpile of these
    weapons and they have already stepped out of--which is the kind
    and polite way to phrase it--the Bilateral Destruction
    Agreement, which was widely heralded as one of the great
    saviors of mankind when it was originally submitted. They have
    simply said it has outlived its usefulness.
        So that is a very unfortunate record to have before the
    world.
        They are widely reported to have said that they would only
    sign on if we agreed to pay the full costs of their destruction
    of their weapons. This is a large sum; and if it ever should
    happen, I would very much hope that we would have some ability
    to monitor and follow any money we gave them. We have already
    given them some sort of token or opening demonstration of our
    goodwill, and we don't know what that was used for. And we
    don't know what a lot of the economic aid is used for.
        So all of these are things that I think would certainly
    have to be at least far better understood than they are now. It
    would not bother me at all if Russia were required to have some
    kind of guarantee that they would take care of destruction of
    their own weapons and that we should not make our commitment to
    any kind of agreement to pay for that.
        Senator Brownback. Now as we have both noted, they have not
    ratified. Should we require their ratification before we would
    ratify?
        Mr. Weinberger. Well, it would certainly be a more
    comfortable feeling, but it certainly would not remove, in my
    mind, the objections to the faults and the flaws within the
    treaty itself.
        Senator Brownback. So, even really if they do ratify, you
    would still have the same sort of reservations you do now?
        Mr. Weinberger. As it stands now, yes, sir, I would.
        Senator Brownback. And that would depend upon further
    negotiations with the Russians and their destruction of the
    chemical weapons they have?
        Mr. Weinberger. I would just like to find out what the
    problem is with the Bilateral Destruction Agreement they
    signed. Why has it served its purpose? Why is it no longer
    useful for them to adhere to it?
        Senator Brownback. Secretary Rumsfeld, you had noted that
    the United States has the ability as a nation to stand alone,
    to pull something to be a much better document, a much better
    treaty, than what it is in your testimony. If we did stand out
    on this and we said we're not going to sign the CWC; because it
    is such a flawed agreement, how would we be able to, how do you
    think it would evolve that we would pull that on toward a
    better agreement? How would you see that evolving into the
    future to where it would be something that you would like to
    support?
        As all of you noted, and as all of us have noted, none of
    us wants chemical weapons in this world. We are all opposed to
    those. How would you see that evolve to where we could get a
    better agreement?
        Mr. Rumsfeld. I do think that the United States is among
    the very few countries in this world that do have the ability
    to not be subject to the kind of diplomatic momentum and to
    decide what they believe is right and then set about trying to
    fashion an arrangement whereby what's right can be achieved. If
    we can't, who in the world can do that?
        So the idea that we are going to lose our leadership I
    think is just not true.
        The way to approach it, it seems to me, would be to start
    with what is important and what is realistic. As these
    gentlemen and I have tried to do today, we have pointed out the
    things that are the problems. What one would do would be to try
    to avoid those.
        I must add a comment, however, about the Russians. The fact
    that recently there is information available suggesting that
    they have, using everyday commercial chemicals, developed the
    ability to develop chemical weapons suggests that they or
    anyone else would be able to shift facilities from making
    chemical weapons to making commercial chemicals in a very short
    period of time.
        We were talking about no treaty is verifiable. It is a lot
    easier to verify intercontinental ballistic missiles than it is
    chemicals, commercial chemicals, that can also be used for
    chemical weapons and things that can be made in very small
    spaces.
        So I think even though we have an enormously intrusive
    regime for policing it, as intrusive as it is, it would not be
    able to do the job.
        So I think that we have the cart before the horse in this
    process, and I would like to see us go back and do it right.
        Senator Brownback. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Dr. Schlesinger. Mr. Chairman, you might want to put in the
    record the Reuters report on what the Russians are doing. It is
    interesting that the new development avoids any of the
    precursors that are listed under the existing treaty. So if one
    uses different precursor chemicals, one can avoid the
    restrictions of the treaty.
        The Chairman. Let's go to one more round. I don't want to
    keep you here all day, but this is a fascinating discussion.
    Let me reiterate at mid point that I certainly do appreciate
    your coming here today and cooperating with us.
        We will make this a 3-minute-per-Senator round.
        You said something early in your testimony, Mr. Secretary,
    about people being instructed not to say anything unfavorable
    about this treaty. Well, we have had the same thing in our
    committee among the staff, and I had one report saying that the
    FBI had specifically been instructed to say nothing unfavorable
    about this treaty.
        Now you have been Director of the CIA and I need your help.
    Whom would you recommend, past or present, that we subpoena to
    testify under oath regarding the CWC and the White House
    directions that we have had reported to us?
        Dr. Schlesinger. I will suggest a list to the staff,
    Senator.
        The Chairman. Pardon?
        Dr. Schlesinger. I will suggest a list to the staff----
        The Chairman. Very well.
        Dr. Schlesinger [continuing]. A list of suitable
    witnesses--whether or not the subject of subpoena is a decision
    for the committee and not by me.
        The Chairman. That will be fine, and I thank you.
        Now I think it has not been mentioned, except indirectly,
    about Jim Woolsey's testimony in June 1994, in which he said
    the chemical weapons problem ``is so difficult from an
    intelligence perspective that I cannot state that we have a
    high confidence in our ability to detect noncompliance,
    especially on a small scale.''
        Now, Secretary Rumsfeld, I have a letter from the Aerospace
    Industry Association stating strong concern that the CWC will,
    and I quote the letter, ``unnecessarily jeopardize our Nation's
    ability to protect its national security information and
    proprietary technological data.''
        Now this was fascinating to me because back in early
    January, I think it was, the B-2 was taken to North Carolina,
    to Seymore Johnson Air Force Base, and thousands of people came
    to see it. Everybody was proud of it and marveled at the
    enormity of it, and so forth.
        But then it occurred to me that chemicals are used in the
    manufacture of the B-2.
        Now let me ask you to step back and very quickly say what
    kinds of risks to our companies are posed by letting foreign
    inspectors poke around, interview employees, take photographs,
    and take samples for analysis overseas.
        Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, Mr. Chairman, I must say that I cannot
    answer it authoritatively, and I am struck by the dramatically
    different views on this particular issue by proponents and
    opponents.
        My personal view is anything I have read or seen in this
    document and these materials I cannot see how we could avoid
    allowing classified information to be made available to
    inspection teams.
        I have heard statements by Members of the Senate of:
    ``Don't worry about that, that's not a problem.'' But I have
    not seen anything in the agreements that suggest to me that
    it's not a problem, because modern technology enables people to
    do an enormous amount of analysis some distance in time and
    space from where the materials were located and still come away
    with information that is exceedingly important, classified, and
    proprietary.
        I don't know how it would be avoided.
        The Chairman. Very well.
        Senator Biden.
        Dr. Schlesinger. Mr. Chairman, on that particular point,
    the Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons will
    use as its principal tool the GC/MS, to wit, the gas
    chromatograph mass spectrometer. That is the tool that was used
    by the Livermore Laboratory to procure from outside the gates
    classified information at a missile facility, and that will be
    the tool of choice.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Joe.
        Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, I apologize for having left for a few moments. I
    had to go to another meeting briefly.
        I understand this issue of defensive technologies made
    available to rogue states, states that are parties to the
    convention. I assume we are primarily talking about Iran. We
    could be talking about China, we could be talking about, in
    some people's minds, Russia.
        But paragraph 1 of Article X lists ``medical antidotes and
    treatments'' as a permissible form of defensive assistance.
        Now, again, as Secretary Rumsfeld just pointed out, it is
    amazing how an authoritative and informed people end up on both
    sides of the issue on the same point. So let me ask you this.
        Where do any of you find the requirement that a State
    Party, that is, a signatory to this convention, a ratifier, is
    required to provide anything more than that--medical antidotes
    and treatments?
        Mr. Weinberger. Do you want to look at the third paragraph,
    Senator, of Article X? Each State Party undertakes to
    facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the
    fullest possible exchange of equipment, material, scientific
    and technological information concerning means of protection
    against chemical weapons.
        Senator Biden. Has the right.
        Mr. Weinberger. Yes, the right.
        Senator Biden. So you believe that paragraph says that we
    are required to give them, any State, any technology that we
    have available?
        Mr. Weinberger. Senator, as was said in another connection,
    English is my mother tongue, and I can't read it any other way.
        Senator Biden. Now on Article XI, the chemical trade that
    the CWC would encourage is only that ``for purposes not
    prohibited under the convention.'' And the only prohibited
    trade restrictions are those ``incompatible with the
    obligations undertaken under this convention.''
        Now we don't say we have to undo our trade restrictions and
    neither do the other Australia Group members. So why do we
    accept Iran's interpretation of this article over that of our
    allies and the U.S.?
        Mr. Weinberger. Precisely because it is so fuzzy that you
    have all kinds of interpretations, and you will have a big set
    of arguments as to who is doing what. And any interpretation
    that we may claim can be denied very easily by all other
    countries that don't happen to agree with us or don't want to
    agree with us.
        You have, what you have set up here is an oral battleground
    for varying interpretations. It will allow enemies of the
    United States or potential enemies to make claims that, when we
    are in the position of denying them, will set us up as being
    violators of this treaty.
        Senator Biden. If I can, I would conclude by saying would a
    condition that would be binding, that a legal declaration we'd
    make to not provide rogue states with advanced chemical
    defenses--assurances--would that meet any of your concerns?
        Mr. Weinberger. Well, I would certainly like to see it
    written down, Senator. Yes.
        Senator Biden. OK, thank you.
        Dr. Schlesinger. Well, the provisional body, the
    provisional body states that we are obligated to provide these
    defensive technologies.
        There was an argument in a recent National Public Radio
    broadcast between the general counsel of ACDA and the head of
    the provisional body, Mr. Kenyan, a Brit. He stated and rebuked
    the proposition that the United States might be able to avoid
    providing this kind of technology, that it was required
    underneath the CWC.
        So I think that you have a clear legitimization. Even if
    we, for one reason or another, withhold such information, our
    industrial partners will proceed to provide this because of the
    legitimization provided by this agreement.
        As Senator Biden observed earlier, norms are important, and
    if you provide a norm which allows the Germans or others to
    provide information to Iran, they will accept that norm.
        The Chairman. Senator Hagel.
        Senator Hagel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Weinberger, you obviously were the Secretary of
    Defense during most of the Reagan administration. For the
    record, and for this Senator, much has been made of the fact
    that the CWC was initiated during the Reagan administration.
        Could you provide, at least me, somewhat of an analysis as
    to how it was initiated, why it was initiated, and today why
    most of the Reagan administration officials during that time
    are now opposed to it?
        Mr. Weinberger. Well, I cannot speak for anyone else,
    Senator, and I don't know what the historic origins of it were
    all the way back. But I think that everybody was appalled by
    the use by Iraq of poison gas against the Kurds, and there was
    an attempt to get some kind of international order to try to
    prevent that sort of thing.
        President Reagan is a very compassionate and humane man and
    obviously shared with the world the distaste and the
    detestation of these kinds of weapons.
        I would hesitate very much to say that he had an
    opportunity to see all of the provisions that emerged from the
    very lengthy negotiation. He certainly did not have that
    opportunity. He certainly did not know that four of the
    principal rogue nations of the world would stay outside the
    treaty and, therefore, not be banned from doing anything at all
    and that we would be put in the position of weakening any kind
    of retaliatory capability we might have.
        Those are conditions that changed since the initial
    praiseworthy, humanitarian effort to try to do something about
    the elimination of these weapons.
        As Secretary Schlesinger pointed out, we did that after
    World War I, the Geneva Conference. We did it later on, after
    President Reagan left office, with the Bilateral Destruction
    Agreement, which simply does not work out.
        There are all kinds of reasons why humane and compassionate
    people--and I like occasionally to classify myself in that same
    category--dislike these weapons and would like to do something
    about it.
        But the fact of the matter is that what we have done here
    is not only ineffective, but it is dangerous for the security
    of our troops, in my opinion.
        Dr. Schlesinger. I have two quick points, Senator.
        When George Shultz announced the quest for a chemical
    weapons agreement, he said that it would be a verifiable
    chemical weapons treaty. This is not verifiable.
        Second, the Reagan administration to the very end believed
    that the United States should retain a 500 aging ton level of
    binary chemical weapons and should not surrender that minimum
    capability until such time as other countries came into
    conformity. I think that the argument that this all originated
    with Ronald Reagan is not an accurate argument.
        George Bush was for this treaty, but Ronald Reagan would
    not be if he were able to comment on it.
        The Chairman. Senator Sarbanes.
        Senator Sarbanes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, the first question I want to put to you is that
    the United States is now embarked on a path of unilaterally
    destroying our stockpile of chemical weapons. Do you think we
    should carry through on that?
        Mr. Weinberger. To the extent that Secretary Schlesinger
    indicated, with the reservation that was made during the Reagan
    administration that we should have a minimal deterrent
    capability and that other nations should know that we do have
    that, particu-
    larly rogue nations that are likely to or have indeed used
    chemical weapons.
        Senator Sarbanes. So you would keep some chemical weapons?
        Mr. Weinberger. I think you have to, Senator. Yes.
        Senator Sarbanes. And that's your position, I take it,
    Secretary Schlesinger?
        Dr. Schlesinger. No, sir. The existing stockpile is
    obsolete, and it is more dangerous.
        Mr. Weinberger. Excuse me. It's the binaries we're talking
    about now.
        Dr. Schlesinger. It's obsolete and dangerous, and I think
    we must get rid of it one way or another.
        Mr. Weinberger. The unitary weapons are indeed being
    replaced. It is the binary weapons that we were talking about
    under the Bilateral Destruction Agreement. But everyone said
    that we had to keep some kind of minimal retaliatory capability
    of the binary weapons.
        Senator Sarbanes. What is your position, Secretary
    Rumsfeld?
        Mr. Rumsfeld. I think that we need some to develop the
    defensive capabilities that are necessary, so that we know what
    we are doing.
        Senator Sarbanes. So you would all keep some chemical
    weapons.
        Now the next question I have is what is your position on
    whether the Senate should have an opportunity to vote on this
    treaty. I know how you would encourage members to vote as I
    understand your testimony. But what is your position on whether
    the Senate ought to be able to take this treaty up and consider
    it and vote on it.
        Dr. Schlesinger. The Senate should vote.
        Mr. Weinberger. Yes, certainly. I thought that's what this
    process was, that this was the beginning of the process that
    leads to a Senate vote.
        Senator Sarbanes. Well, it doesn't always lead to a Senate
    vote. No. The question I am putting to you is whether you think
    there should be a Senate vote.
        Mr. Weinberger. I have no problem with that at all.
        Senator Sarbanes. Secretary Rumsfeld?
        Mr. Rumsfeld. I have no problem with it.
        Senator Sarbanes. Now the other question I want to ask you
    is this. You have each raised a number of problems or concerns
    that you have with the treaty. I want to narrow it down and
    isolate it out.
        If the rogue nations do not sign the treaty, is that in and
    of itself, in your view, sufficient grounds not to approve the
    treaty?
        Mr. Weinberger. Speaking for myself, Senator, it would seem
    to me that if you have a ban on the nations that are basically
    in some form of general agreement with us with respect to
    democratic values and all the rest of it, and that they carry
    that out, and that the nations that do not, including
    specifically the rogue nations outside this treaty at the
    moment, you would be offering them an invitation to launch a
    chemical attack. This is because we would have, by a standard
    that we follow, we would carry out our agree-
    ment and we would denude ourselves of any capability of
    retaliating and that is one of the best ways of deterring.
        It is unfortunate that in this kind of world that has to be
    the case, but it is.
        Even the nations, some of the nations that are within the
    treaty, like Iran, you find that----
        Senator Sarbanes. I just want to try to focus this for the
    moment.
        Mr. Weinberger [continuing]. Yes, I understand what you are
    saying, Senator, but I would like to complete the answer. The
    answer basically is that the answer of rogue nations from those
    who sign would be a source of considerable concern.
        It is not the only source of concern because many nations
    which sign----
        Senator Sarbanes. I understand that.
        Mr. Weinberger [continuing]. Would not be able, would not
    keep their word, and we could not verify whether they are doing
    it or not.
        Senator Sarbanes. Is the absence of the rogue nations in
    your view of sufficient concern that you would be against the
    treaty?
        Mr. Weinberger. It is one of the reasons that leads me to
    oppose it, but there are many others.
        Senator Sarbanes. If the others were not present, would
    that in and of itself be enough that you would oppose it?
        Mr. Weinberger. If the others were what?
        Senator Sarbanes. If the other reasons that you have for
    opposing it were not present, were taken care of, would the
    absence of the rogue nations be enough for you to oppose it?
        Mr. Weinberger. Well, as you put the question, if all of
    the things I object to are not in the treaty, then almost by
    definition I wouldn't oppose it.
        Senator Sarbanes. No, no--the rogue nations are not in the
    treaty in the question I'm asking. That's all I'm--I'm just
    trying to determine how critical a factor that is in your
    thinking.
        Mr. Weinberger. Let me say that my opposition is based on a
    large number of reasons and one of them is the absence of the
    rogue nations from any provisions with respect to compliance.
        Senator Sarbanes. Secretary Schlesinger?
        Dr. Schlesinger. No, the absence of the rogue nations in
    and of itself would not lead me to oppose the treaty. I would
    regret that absence. But the other problems are much more
    serious in my view.
        Senator Sarbanes. Secretary Rumsfeld?
        Mr. Rumsfeld. I agree with Secretary Schlesinger.
        The Chairman. Senator Grams.
        Senator Grams. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have
    just a quick, brief question.
        As you know, riot control agents, such as tear gas, have
    also been used by the U.S. military during search and rescue
    missions for downed pilots or to handle situations where
    noncombatants are mixed in with the combatants. My
    understanding is that the Clinton administration's current
    interpretation of the CWC is that it would ban such uses of
    riot control agents by the U.S. military.
        Mr. Weinberger, when the Reagan administration was
    negotiating the CWC, was it ever your understanding that the
    U.S. would have agreed to such a ban or that it was a desired
    result of this treaty at all?
        Mr. Weinberger. No. Those were always to be excluded
    because of their obvious importance and their obvious
    necessity. We understand that the commitment was made that they
    would be excluded from the treaty but that the Clinton
    administration changed its mind in its commitment and now says
    that they would be banned.
        There is now some very technical discussion of whether they
    would be banned in wartime or not; that it might be all right
    to use them in peacetime crowds, but not in wartime. I would
    like to use them to protect our soldiers in wartime or in
    peacetime.
        Senator Grams. Now if this is not a lethal chemical, does
    this give you any concern about the broad scope of agents that
    could be covered under this treaty, which would open the door
    for more inspections?
        Mr. Schlesinger?
        Dr. Schlesinger. I'm not sure I understood the question,
    sir.
        Senator Grams. I mean, if this is a nonlethal chemical and
    this is included, is there a concern that it would be so broad
    that all chemicals or any definition of a chemical could be
    part of the reasons for inspections or to come into plants in
    the U.S.?
        Mr. Rumsfeld. The very reason for an investigation suggests
    that there is a question. So ``investigation'' can run to
    organizations that don't have anything to do with lethal or
    nonlethal chemical weapons--because someone has to look. If
    there is an allegation, a charge, a question, they can go in
    and investigate. That is where you end up with the numbers of
    companies running into the thousands.
        Senator Grams. Mr. Schlesinger, this is the economic
    warfare that you had talked about earlier, possibly?
        Dr. Schlesinger. I'd like to clarify one thing.
        President Ford issued an Executive order which has existed
    and prescribed U.S. policy on riot control issues for the last
    20 years. That has been somewhat obscured now by pressures from
    our allies and equivocation within the administration.
        On the question that you put, indeed, inevitably questions
    will be raised about any chemicals under those circumstances.
        Senator Grams. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Senator Kerry.
        Senator Kerry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        If I could just say with respect to my last round of
    questioning, I want to make it very clear, and I think
    Secretary Schlesinger knows this, that he is a friend and a man
    for whom I have enormous respect. I would in no way try to do
    anything except work this light here, which is our perpetual
    enemy. We try to get answers rapidly and, unfortunately,
    sometimes we get witnesses here who are so good at answering
    only one question.
        Dr. Schlesinger. I fully understood, Senator, and I tried
    to protect your time. I was not successful.
        Senator Kerry. I thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
        If I could just ask you, Secretary Weinberger, I was really
    struck by your statement about deterrence. Is it your position
    that you can only deter chemical weapons use with chemical
    weapons?
        Mr. Weinberger. No. I thought I was quite clear, Senator,
    that it is one of the ways of trying to do it. Arms control is
    another way, and there are probably many more. But it is
    essential, I think, that a country that has already used poison
    gas against some of its own people, as just occurred, it is
    only prudent I think for that country to know that if they
    launch a chemical attack on some other nation or the United
    States that they would be met with a comparable, not a
    proportionate, response in the terms of one of our departments,
    but a massive response and that they should know that. That is
    one of the means of deterring, though it is not the only means.
        Senator Kerry. Wouldn't you say that the Bush
    administration was, in fact, quite effective at making it clear
    to Iraq that the nuclear use was, in fact, available and, to
    the best of our knowledge, there is, as of now, no indication
    that that was not successful?
        Mr. Weinberger. Yes. That is my exact point, that we were
    able to do that. If we denuded ourselves of any capability of
    making that kind of response, I have no doubt that----
        Senator Kerry. But nobody here is talking about that. All
    we are talking about is continuing to pursue what a number of
    administrations have pursued, which is reducing our own
    manufacturing participation in chemical weapons.
        Mr. Weinberger [continuing]. That's fine. But I don't think
    at the same time we ought to take away our capabilities of
    developing new, improved, and better defensive technologies and
    equipment.
        Senator Kerry. Defensive, I agree. And the treaty agrees.
        Mr. Weinberger. No, the treaty doesn't.
        Senator Kerry. Well, the treaty says very clearly that we
    are allowed to defend.
        Mr. Weinberger. That's right, and we have to disclose them
    completely to any other signatory, and that disclosure in
    itself weakens them if it does not destroy their effectiveness.
        Senator Kerry. Well, in point of fact Article I, which you
    have not referred to, addresses the questions of whether or not
    you have to, under any circumstances, assist, encourage, or
    induce in any way anyone to engage in any activity that is
    prohibited by this treaty.
        Now all we are talking about under this treaty is chemical
    weapons. So, therefore, Article I, in fact, most people--see,
    there is that infernal bell, or light. It is hard to have a
    dialog here.
        Most people have argued it supersedes any other clause in
    here, because the basic intent of this treaty is to preclude
    the manufacture by anybody of chemical weapons in a way that
    could be used against another nation.
        Mr. Weinberger. That is the intent. There are nations
    outside it who may be manufacturing them, who may be
    stockpiling, and, in fact, are stockpiling them as we know now.
        What I am troubled by is the fact that if we develop a so-
    called fool proof mask and protective clothing that still
    enables you to take the actions that soldiers have to take in
    defending themselves and their country, you are going to have
    to share that. By sharing it, you eliminate its effectiveness.
    There is a little process called reverse engineering whereby
    all of the processes which you have to produce that have to be
    given to other members, other signatories, and those signatory
    members, as Secretary Rumsfeld suggested, that kind of
    information, distributed on that kind of scale, one way or
    another is bound to get into the hands of potential enemies.
        Senator Kerry. Mr. Secretary, this is a very, very
    important point. In effect, what you are saying is that if you
    were to share it, you would have rendered even more ineffective
    the capacity to use chemical weapons, which is, in effect, the
    very purpose of this treaty.
        Mr. Weinberger. Well, that is not the way I would phrase
    it. No.
        Senator Kerry. Let me just finish my thought.
        Mr. Weinberger. We are talking about defensive equipment
    now.
        Senator Kerry. I understand. But if you can defend against
    something, it has no offensive capacity. If it has no offensive
    capacity, you have taken away its military value. That is
    precisely the purpose of this treaty.
        Mr. Weinberger. You are talking about absolutes, Senator,
    absolute capabilities and all the rest. But what I am talking
    about are improvements in an already imperfect defensive
    capability that we have now.
        Senator Kerry. But if I were a military leader----
        Mr. Weinberger. Sharing those improvements makes them
    relatively--at least we could phrase it this way if you would
    like--makes them relatively less effective than if we didn't
    share them.
        Senator Kerry [continuing]. I agree. But if I were a
    military leader, knowing that we had shared our ability to be
    able to have a foolproof mask, I am not going to use the
    chemical weapon. And if you don't use the chemical weapon
    because you know it is foolproof, you have done exactly what
    you have tried to do with this treaty, which is eliminate the
    potential for chemical weapons to be used.
        Mr. Weinberger. I'm sorry, but I don't follow you. I have
    great respect for you, but I don't follow that.
        Senator Kerry. Well, I don't think it is that hard to
    follow.
        Mr. Rumsfeld. May I respond?
        Senator Kerry. I think----
        The Chairman. Mr. Secretary Rumsfeld.
        Mr. Rumsfeld. I just think that the way you have cast it is
    not correct. First, there is the threat of the use of chemical
    weapons, which is a terror weapon. It affects people, behavior,
    and soldiers. Second is the reality that for every offense
    there is a defense and for every defense there is going to be
    an offense. There is always going to be an evolution in
    technology. So the idea of perfection does not exist in this
    business.
        But let's say that you had reasonably good defensive
    capability. Assume that on the part of the other side. You
    cannot function for long in a chemical environment. You could
    not function with that kind of equipment. The advantage clearly
    is in the hands of the aggressor.
        So I think you are on a track that, to me, does not make
    sense. In my view, sharing technology about how to defend
    against these weapons is not anything other than
    disadvantageous for the defender and advantageous for the
    aggressor.
        The Chairman. That is the last word.
        We have been here for 2 hours and 47 minutes. I have been
    on this committee for quite a while--otherwise I would not be
    sitting in this chair, and I do not recall a more significant
    hearing with more facts and figures being given than you
    gentlemen have provided.
        I want you to know, speaking for myself and I think for all
    of the Senators on this committee, I am enormously grateful for
    your having made the sacrifice to even be here, particularly
    Secretary Rumsfeld. You came quite a distance.
        But I do thank you on behalf of the Senate and the
    committee.
        As we close, let me point out once more, in case somebody
    has forgotten it, that last year this treaty was reported by
    this committee and scheduled for debate in the Senate. And it
    was not dropped by my request. It was dropped by the request of
    the administration, which did some head counting and realized
    they did not have the votes.
        Now I presume in saying that you think the Senate ought to
    vote on this treaty that you mean after the committee has
    performed under the rules and reported it to the Senate with a
    majority vote. Is that what you mean?
        Mr. Weinberger. Of course. Yes.
        Dr. Schlesinger. Yes, it is.
        Mr. Weinberger. As I said, Senator, I thought this was part
    of the process for the Senate.
        Mr. Rumsfeld. It's for this committee to decide that.
        Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, if we were ready last year,
    why aren't we ready this year? Nothing has changed in the
    treaty.
        The Chairman. Well, I don't know about that. I thought you
    and I made some changes in it.
        Senator Biden. Oh, we know we did. But the point is we were
    ready before.
        Dr. Schlesinger. Well, there are two branches of
    government, Senator, at least.
        Senator Kerry. But only one does treaties.
        The Chairman. I'm at a disadvantage with hearing aids, so I
    had better get out of this one.
        There being no further business to come before the
    committee, we stand in recess.
        Thank you again, gentlemen.
        [Whereupon, at 12:49 p.m., the committee recessed, to
    reconvene at 3:30 p.m. the same day]

                          CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

                                  ----------

                      TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 1997--P.M. SESSION

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:30 p.m., in
    room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms
    (chairman of the committee) presiding.
        Present: Senators Helms, Lugar, Coverdell, Hagel, Smith,
    Grams, Brownback, Biden, Sarbanes, Robb, Feinstein, and
    Wellstone.
        The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
        Madam Secretary, I was delighted late yesterday to learn
    that you wanted to appear before this committee today to give
    the benefit of the administration's perspective on the treaty
    again. I think it is clearly a matter of public record that the
    entire Helms family admires you. I think they are going to
    score some points by having you up here this afternoon.
        Now, if Senator Biden will agree, this is the first time
    you have appeared as Secretary of State formally.
        Secretary Albright. That is true.
        The Chairman. And this being such an important issue, I
    know that the Senators will have questions either in writing or
    in person that they want to ask directly of you. I know,
    knowing you, that you will respond to these written questions,
    realizing the Senators have commitments to other places.
        I and the other members of the committee will forego our
    statements, unless Senator Biden wishes to make one.
        Senator Biden. I will be happy to place mine in the record,
    Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]

                      Prepared Statement of Senator Biden

        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank Secretary Albright
    this afternoon for appearing on such very short notice and making time
    in her busy schedule to be with us this afternoon because she
    recognizes the central importance of this issue for our national
    security.
        I appreciate the opportunity to take a few minutes again to address
    perhaps the most important issue to come before the 105th Congress to
    date: The Chemical Weapons Convention.
        This afternoon we will hear more testimony about this treaty and
    what it does and does not do, but the core issue is very simple: This
    treaty outlaws poison gas weapons.
        The Chemical Weapons Convention would make it illegal under
    international and domestic laws for a country to use, develop, produce,
    transfer or stockpile chemical weapons.
        The Chemical Weapons Convention represents a significant step
    forward in our efforts to contend with the greatest immediate threat to
    our national security: The proliferation of weapons of mass
    destruction.
        The CWC will help protect our citizens from the use of poison gas
    weapons by terrorist groups. It will benefit our military by requiring
    other nations to follow our lead and destroy their chemical weapons. It
    will improve the ability of our intelligence agencies to monitor
    chemical weapons threats to our armed forces and our Nation.
        The convention has the strong support of the American chemical
    industry, which was centrally involved in the negotiation of the CWC.
    It also takes into account all of the protections afforded Americans
    under our Constitution.
        The CWC will make pariahs out of states that refuse to abide by its
    provisions. Through the sanctions required by the convention, it will
    make it more difficult for those pariah states to obtain the precursor
    chemicals they need to manufacture poison gas. It will create
    international pressure on these states to sign and ratify the CWC and
    to abide by its provisions.
        The CWC will create a standard for good international citizens to
    meet. It will brand as outlaws those countries that choose to remain
    outside this regime.
        The entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention will mark a
    major milestone in our efforts to enlist greater international support
    for the important american objective of containing and penalizing rogue
    states that seek to acquire or transfer weapons of mass destruction.
        we need to disregard arguments that are superfluous to the core
    reality of what this convention will accomplish: It outlaws poison gas,
    period. The United States is already committed to destroying its
    chemical weapon arsenal. By ratifying the CWC, we can hold other
    countries to the same standard we have set for ourselves.
        In this morning's testimony, we heard three very distinguished
    former Secretaries of Defense tesify on this treaty.
        Among the claims they made about the CWC are that it would force us
    to share our most advanced defensive technology with all states,
    including countries of concern, that have ratified this agreement.
    Another assertion they made is that it requires us to abandon all
    controls we have on the proliferation of sensitive technology through
    mechanisms like the australia group.
        In reviewing the treaty, we find both claims are false.
        With regard to sharing defensive technology, paragraph seven of
    article ten states that: ``Each state party undertakes to provide
    assistance through the organization and to this end to elect to take
    one or more of the following measures.'' Let me emphasize: ``Elect to
    take one or more.''
        Among the options, the option I expect the United States would
    choose, is that we could: ``Declare, not later than 180 days after this
    convention enters into force for [us], the kind of assistance we might
    provide in response to an appeal by the organization.''
        That's right: We would declare what we might provide.
        The Chairman and I are very close to agreement on a condition that
    would require the executive branch not to provide any assistance to a
    rogue state beyond medical antidotes and treatment. And that would be
    fully in keeping with article ten of the CWC.
        As for the argument that we would be forced to abandon our current
    mechanisms to control the proliferation of sensitive technology, the
    CWC explicitly allows us to keep these protections in place.
        Article eleven supports chemical trade and technology exchange
    ``for purposes not prohibited under this convention.'' It also requires
    that trade restrictions not be ``incompatible with the obligations
    undertaken under this convention.''
        But the CWC is completely consistent with continued enforcement of
    the Australia Group controls, which member states use to keep chemical
    and biological weapons material out of the hands of rogue states. The
    executive branch has said this time and again, and so have our
    Australia Group allies.
        I am convinced that the CWC does not require us to share our most
    advanced defensive technology or to abandon existing controls on
    chemical weapons. I will be interested to hear how the officials in the
    administration today view these provisions.
        I understand that Secretary Albright must leave after her statement
    today, and I welcome the opportunity to hear her testimony and the
    statements and responses of all of our witnesses here today.

        The Chairman. And we will print any statement that you wish
    to make for the record, and that will give you an opportunity
    to summarize if you wish. In other words, you are a free agent
    and you are welcome. Madam Secretary, the stage is yours.

    STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE KORBEL ALBRIGHT, SECRETARY OF STATE

        Secretary Albright. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am
    delighted to see you here, as I enjoyed our trip to North
    Carolina.
        The Chairman. We enjoyed it.
        Secretary Albright. I had a good time.
        Senator Biden and Senator Brownback, I am very glad that
    you were able to make time for me to testify on such short
    notice. I am also delighted to note the return of Admiral
    Nance, who just walked through the door. I wish him continued
    recovery, and I say that sincerely on behalf of the entire
    Department and not simply those whose names are scheduled to
    come up before you for confirmation.
        Mr. Chairman, the Chemical Weapons Convention, or CWC, is
    one of the President's top foreign policy priorities and, this
    afternoon, I would like to explain why. I begin with the
    imperative of American leadership. The United States is the
    only nation with the power and respect to forge a strong global
    consensus against the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
        In recent years, we have used our influence wisely to gain
    the removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Belarus and
    Kazakstan. We have led in securing the extension of the Nuclear
    Nonproliferation Treaty. We have frozen North Korea's nuclear
    program. We have maintained sanctions against Iraq. We have
    joined with others in controlling the transfer of dangerous
    conventional arms. In these and other efforts, we have counted
    on the support and counsel of this committee and your Senate
    colleagues.
        American leadership on arms control is not something we do
    as a favor to others. Our goal is to make the world safer for
    Americans and to protect our allies and friends. We have now
    another opportunity to exercise leadership for those ends and,
    once again, we look to this committee for help.
        The CWC will enter into force on April 29th. For reasons I
    will discuss, we believe it is essential to ratify the
    agreement before then, so that America will be an original
    party. Chemical weapons are inhumane. They kill horribly,
    massively, and--once deployed--are no more controllable than
    the wind.
        We decided years ago to renounce the use of these weapons
    and to begin destroying our own chemical weapons stockpiles.
    Thus, the CWC will not deprive us of any military option we
    would ever use against others, but it would help ensure that
    others never use chemical weapons against us.
        In considering the value of this treaty, we must bear in
    mind that today, keeping and producing chemical weapons are
    legal. The gas Saddam Hussein used a decade ago to massacre
    Kurdish villagers was legally produced. In most countries,
    terrorists can buy chemical agents, such as sarin gas, legally.
    Countries such as Iran and Libya can buildup their stockpiles
    of chemical weapons legally.
        If we are ever to rid the world of these horrible weapons,
    we must begin by making not only their use, but also their
    development, production, acquisition, and stockpiling illegal.
    This is fun-
    damental. Making chemical weapons illegal is the purpose of the
    CWC.
        The CWC sets the standard that it is wrong for any nation
    to build or possess a chemical weapon and gives us strong and
    effective tools for enforcing that standard. This will not
    eliminate all danger, but it will make chemical weapons harder
    for terrorists or outlaw states to buy, build, or conceal.
        Under the treaty, parties must give up the chemical weapons
    they have and refrain from developing or acquiring them in the
    future. To enforce these requirements, a comprehensive
    inspection regime will be in place. The treaty will give us the
    tools we need to learn more about chemical weapons programs. It
    will also enable us to act on the information we obtain.
        In the future, countries known to possess chemical weapons
    and who have joined the CWC will be forced to choose between
    compliance and sanctions. Countries outside the CWC will be
    subject to trade restrictions whether or not they are known to
    possess chemical weapons.
        These penalties would not exist without the treaty. They
    will make it more costly for any nation to have chemical
    weapons and more difficult for rogue states or terrorists to
    acquire materials needed to produce them.
        Over time, I believe that if the United States joins the
    CWC, most other countries will, too.
        Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the problem
    states will never accept a prohibition on chemical weapons if
    America stays out, keeps them company, and gives them cover. We
    will not have the standing to mobilize our allies to support
    strong action against violators if we ourselves have refused to
    join the treaty being violated.
        The core question here is, who do we want to set the
    standards? Critics suggest that the CWC is flawed, because we
    cannot assume early ratification and full compliance by the
    outlaw states. To me, that is like saying that because some
    people smuggle drugs, we should enact no law against drug
    smuggling. When it comes to the protection of Americans, the
    lowest common denominator is not good enough. Those who abide
    by the law, not those who break it, must establish the rules by
    which all should be judged.
        Moreover, if we fail to ratify the agreement by the end of
    April, we would forfeit our seat on the treaty's Executive
    Council for at least 1 year, thereby losing the right to help
    draft the rules by which the Convention will be enforced; we
    would lose the right to help administer and conduct
    inspections; and because of the trade restrictions imposed on
    nonmember states, our chemical manufacturers are concerned that
    they would risk serious economic loss.
        Eliminating chemical weapons has long been a bipartisan
    goal. The convention itself is the product of years of effort
    by leaders from both parties. The treaty has strong backing
    from our defense and military leaders.
        I am aware, Mr. Chairman, that the committee heard this
    morning from three former Secretaries of Defense who do not
    favor approval of this convention. Their arguments deserve
    consideration. I would point out, however, that other former
    Secretaries of Defense from both parties support the treaty,
    and that every former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, going back
    to the Carter administration, has endorsed it.
        Just this past week, we received a letter signed by 17
    former four-star generals and admirals, including three of the
    former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs and five former service
    chiefs.
        Let me quote from that letter:

        Each of us can point to decades of military experience in
    command positions. We have all trained and commanded troops to
    prepare for the wartime use of chemical weapons and for defense
    against them.

        The quote continues:

    Our focus is not on the treaty's limitations, but instead on
    its many strengths. The CWC destroys stockpiles that could
    threaten our troops; it significantly improves our intelligence
    capabilities; and it creates new international sanctions to
    punish those states who remain outside the treaty. For these
    reasons, we strongly support the CWC.

        I also note, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
    that your witnesses this morning have not had the benefit of
    the dialog we have been conducting with Senators, including
    yourself, the Ranking Member and other members of this
    committee. We have attempted, in the course of this dialog, to
    address the major issues treaty opponents have raised.
        For example, some believe the CWC will require its members
    to exchange manufacturing technology that could then be used to
    make chemical agents. In fact, the CWC prohibits members from
    providing any assistance that would contribute to chemical
    weapons proliferation.
        There are those who suggest that if we were to ratify the
    CWC, America would then become complacent about the threat that
    chemical weapons pose. This, too, is false, and this body can
    help ensure that it remains false.
        The President has requested an increase of almost $225
    million over 6 years in our already robust program to equip and
    train our troops against chemical and biological attack.
        Some have expressed the view that the inspection
    requirements of the CWC could raise constitutional problems
    here in the United States. However, the CWC provides explicitly
    that inspections will be conducted according to each nation's
    constitutional process.
        Another fear is that the CWC could become a regulatory
    nightmare for small business. But after reviewing the facts,
    the National Federation of Independent Business concluded that
    its members ``will not be affected'' by the treaty.
        Finally, I have heard the argument that the Senate really
    need not act before April 29th. But, as I have said, there are
    real costs attached to any such delay. The treaty has already
    been before the Senate for more than 180 weeks. More than 1,500
    pages of testimony and reports have been provided and hundreds
    of questions have been answered. The Senate is always the
    arbiter of its own pace; but from where I sit, a decision prior
    to April 29 would be very welcome and, Mr. Chairman, I believe
    very much in the best interest of the United States.
        Mr. Chairman, America is the world's leader in building a
    future of greater security and safety for us and for all who
    share our commitment to democracy and peace. The path to that
    future is through the maintenance of American readiness and the
    expansion of the rule of law. We are the center around which
    international consensus forms. We are the builder of
    coalitions, the designer of safeguards, the leader in
    separating acceptable international behavior from that which
    cannot be tolerated.

        This leadership role for America may be viewed as a burden
    by some, but I think, to most of our citizens, it is a source
    of great pride. It is also a source of continuing strength, for
    our influence is essential to protect our interests, which are
    global and increasing. If we turn our backs on the CWC after so
    much effort by leaders from both parties, we will scar America
    with a grievous and self-inflicted wound. We will shed the
    cloak of leadership and leave it on the ground for others to
    pick it up.

        But if we heed the advice of wise diplomats such as James
    Baker and Brent Scowcroft, experienced military leaders such as
    Generals Powell, Mundy and Schwarzkopf, and thoughtful public
    officials such as former Senators Nunn, Boren and Kassebaum-
    Baker, we will reinforce America's role in the world.

        By ratifying the CWC, we will assume the lead in shaping a
    new and effective legal regime. We will be in a position to
    challenge those who refuse to give up those poisonous weapons.
    We will provide an added measure of security for the men and
    women of our armed forces. We will protect American industry
    and American jobs. We will make our citizens safer than they
    would be in a world where chemical arms remain legal.

        This treaty is about other people's weapons, not our own.
    It reflects existing American practices and advances enduring
    American interests. It is right and smart for America. It
    deserves the Senate's support and it deserves that support now.

        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

        [The prepared statement of Secretary Albright follows:]

                  Prepared Statement of Madeleine K. Albright

        Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I appreciate the
    opportunity to testify before you this afternoon. As evidenced by the
    bipartisan show of support at the White House last week, timely
    approval of the Chemical Weapons Convention, or CWC, is one of the
    President's top foreign policy priorities.

        This afternoon, with the help of my colleagues, I would like to
    explain why.

        I begin with the imperative of American leadership. The United
    States is the only nation with the power, influence, and respect to
    forge a strong global consensus against the spread of weapons of mass
    destruction. In recent years, we have used our position wisely to gain
    the removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan. We
    have led in securing the extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation
    Treaty. We have frozen North Korea's nuclear program. We have
    maintained sanctions against Iraq. And we have joined forces with more
    than two dozen other major countries in controlling the transfer of
    dangerous conventional arms and sensitive dual-use goods and
    technologies.

        In these and other efforts, we have counted on the strong support
    and wise counsel of this committee and your Senate colleagues. Your
    consent to ratification of the START II Treaty made possible the
    agreement in Helsinki to seek further significant reductions in cold
    war nuclear arsenals. And the Nunn-Lugar program set the standard for
    forward-looking bipartisan action to promote nuclear security.

        American leadership on arms control is not something we do as a
    favor to others. Our goal is to make the world safer for Americans and
    to protect our allies and friends. We have now another opportunity to
    exercise leadership for those ends. And once again, we look to this
    committee for help.

        The CWC will enter into force on April 29. Our goal is to ratify
    the agreement before then so that America will be an original party. By
    so doing, as the President said last Friday, we ``can help to shield
    our soldiers from one of the battlefield's deadliest killers * * * and
    we can bolster our leadership in the fight against terrorism, and
    proliferation around the world.'' Chemical weapons are inhumane. They
    kill horribly, massively, and--once deployed--are no more controllable
    than the wind. That is why the United States decided--under a law
    signed by President Reagan in 1985--to destroy the vast majority of our
    chemical weapons stockpiles by the year 2004. Thus, the CWC will not
    deprive us of any military option we would ever use against others; but
    it would help ensure that others never use chemical weapons against us.

        In considering the value of this treaty, we must bear in mind that
    today, keeping and producing chemical weapons are legal. The gas Saddam
    Hussein used to massacre Kurdish villagers in 1988 was produced
    legally. In most countries, terrorists can produce or procure chemical
    agents, such as sarin gas, legally. Regimes such as Iran and Libya can
    buildup their stockpiles of chemical weapons legally.

        If we are ever to rid the world of these horrible weapons, we must
    begin by making not only their use, but also their development,
    production, acquisition, and stockpiling illegal. This is fundamental.
    This is especially important now when America's comparative military
    might is so great that an attack by unconventional means may hold for
    some potential adversaries their only perceived hope of success. And
    making chemical weapons illegal is the purpose of the CWC.

        The CWC sets the standard that it is wrong for any nation to build
    or possess a chemical weapon, and gives us strong and effective tools
    for enforcing that standard. This is not a magic wand. It will not
    eliminate all danger. It will not allow us to relax or cease to ensure
    the full preparedness of our armed forces against the threat of
    chemical weapons. What it will do is make chemical weapons harder for
    terrorists or outlaw states to buy, build or conceal.

        Under the treaty, parties will be required to give up the chemical
    weapons they have, and to refrain from developing, producing or
    acquiring such weapons in the future. To enforce these requirements,
    the most comprehensive and intense inspection regime ever negotiated
    will be put in place. Parties will also be obliged to enact and enforce
    laws to punish violators within their jurisdictions.

        Of course, no treaty is 100 percent verifiable, but this treaty
    provides us valuable tools for monitoring chemical weapons
    proliferation worldwide--a task we will have to do with or without the
    CWC.

        CWC inspections and monitoring will help us learn more about
    chemical weapons programs. It will also enable us to act on the
    information we obtain. In the future, countries known to possess
    chemical weapons, and who have joined the CWC, will be forced to choose
    between compliance and sanctions. And countries outside the CWC will be
    subject to trade restrictions whether or not they are known to possess
    chemical arms.

        These penalties would not exist without the treaty. They will make
    it more costly for any nation to have chemical weapons, and more
    difficult for rogue states or terrorists to acquire materials needed to
    produce them.

        Over time, I believe that--if the United States joins the CWC--most
    other countries will, too. Consider that there are now 185 members of
    the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and only five outside. Most
    nations play by the rules and want the respect and benefits the world
    bestows upon those who do.

        But the problem states will never accept a prohibition on chemical
    weapons if America stays out, keeps them company and gives them cover.
    We will not have the standing to mobilize our allies to support strong
    action against violators if we ourselves have refused to join the
    treaty being violated.

        The core question here is who do we want to set the standards?
    Critics suggest that the CWC is flawed because we cannot assume early
    ratification and full compliance by the outlaw states. To me, that is
    like saying that because some people smuggle drugs, we should enact no
    law against drug smuggling. When it comes to the protection of
    Americans, the lowest common denominator is not good enough. Those who
    abide by the law, not those who break it, must establish the rules by
    which all should be judged.

        Moreover, if we fail to ratify the agreement by the end of April:

       We would forfeit our seat on the treaty's Executive Council
            for at least 1 year, thereby costing us the chance to help
            draft the rules by which the convention will be enforced;

       We would not be able to participate in the critical first
            sessions of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
            Weapons, which monitors compliance;

       We would lose the right to help administer and conduct
            inspections; and

       Because of the trade restrictions imposed on nonmember
            states, our chemical manufacturers are concerned that they
            would risk serious economic loss.

        According to a letter signed by the CEOs of more than fifty
    chemical manufacturing companies, the American chemical industry's
    ``status as the world's preferred supplier * * * may be jeopardized if
    * * * the Senate does not vote in favor of the CWC.''

        According to those executives ``we stand to lose hundreds of
    millions of dollars in overseas sales, putting at risk thousands of
    good-paying American jobs.''

        Eliminating chemical weapons has long been a bipartisan goal. The
    convention itself is the product of years of effort by leaders from
    both parties.

        And the treaty has strong backing from our defense and military
    leaders.

        I am aware, Mr. Chairman, that the committee heard this morning
    from three former Secretaries of Defense who do not favor approval of
    this convention. There is no question their arguments are sincerely
    held, and deserve consideration. I would point out, however, that other
    former Secretaries of Defense from both parties are on record in
    support of the treaty, and that every former chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff, going back to the Carter Administration, has endorsed
    it.

        Just this past week, we received a letter of support signed by 17
    former four star generals and admirals, including three of the former
    chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and five former service chiefs.
    In their words:

              Each of us can point to decades of military experience in
            command positions. We have all trained and commanded troops to
            prepare for the wartime use of chemical weapons and for
            defenses against them. Our focus is not on the treaty's
            limitations, but instead on its many strengths. The CWC
            destroys stockpiles that could threaten our troops; it
            significantly improves our intelligence capabilities; and it
            creates new international sanctions to punish those states who
            remain outside of the treaty. For these reasons, we strongly
            support the CWC.

        I also note, Mr. Chairman, that the former officials who testified
    before the committee this morning have not had the benefit of the
    intensive dialog we have been conducting with Members of the Senate
    leadership, including yourself, the ranking Member, and other key
    members of this committee. We have attempted, in the course of this
    dialog, to address the major issues the opponents of the treaty have
    raised, and to provide appropriate assurances in binding conditions to
    accompany the resolution of ratification.

        For example, critics have asserted that the CWC obliges member
    states to exchange manufacturing technology that can be used to make
    chemical agents. This is untrue. The CWC prohibits members from
    providing any assistance that would contribute to chemical weapons
    proliferation.

        Nothing in the CWC requires any weakening of our export controls.
    Further, the United States will continue to work through the Australia
    Group to maintain and make more effective internationally agreed
    controls on chemical and biological weapons technology. And, as I have
    said, the CWC establishes tough restrictions on the transfer of
    precursor chemicals and other materials that might help a nation or
    terrorist group to acquire chemical weapons.

        Opponents also suggest that if we ratify the CWC, we will become
    complacent about the threat that chemical weapons pose. This, too, is
    false--and this body can help ensure it remains false. The President
    has requested an increase of almost $225 million over 5 years in our
    already robust program to equip and train our troops against chemical
    and biological attack. We are also proceeding with theater missile
    defense programs and intelligence efforts against the chemical threat.

        Some critics of the treaty have expressed the fear that its
    inspection requirements could raise constitutional problems here in the
    United States. However, the CWC provides explicitly that inspections
    will be conducted according to each nation's constitutional processes.

        Another issue that arose early in the debate was that the CWC could
    become a regulatory nightmare for small businesses here in the United
    States. But after reviewing the facts, the National Federation of
    Independent Business concluded that its members ``will not be
    affected'' by the treaty.

        Finally, I have heard the argument that the Senate really need not
    act before April 29. But as I have said, there are real costs attached
    to any such delay. The treaty has already been before the Senate for
    more than 180 weeks. More than 1,500 pages of testimony and reports
    have been provided, and hundreds of questions have been answered. The
    Senate is always the arbiter of its own pace. But from where I sit, a
    decision prior to April 29 would be very much in the best interests of
    the United States.

        Mr. Chairman, America is the world's leader in building a future of
    greater security and safety for us and for those who share our
    commitment to democracy and peace. The path to that future is through
    the maintenance of American readiness and the expansion of the rule of
    law. We are the center around which international consensus forms. We
    are the builder of coalitions, the designer of safeguards, the leader
    in separating acceptable international behavior from that which cannot
    be tolerated.

        This leadership role for America may be viewed as a burden by some,
    but I think to most of our citizens, it is a source of great pride. It
    is also a source of continuing strength, for our influence is essential
    to protect our interests, which are global and increasing. If we turn
    our backs on the CWC, after so much effort by leaders from both
    parties, we will scar America with a grievous and self inflicted wound.
    We will shed the cloak of leadership and leave it on the ground for
    others to pick up.

        But if we heed the advice of wise diplomats such as James Baker and
    Brent Scowcroft, experienced military leaders such as Generals Powell,
    Mundy, and Schwartzkopf, and thoughtful public officials such as former
    Senators Nunn, Boren, and Kassebaum-Baker, we will reinforce America's
    role in the world.

        By ratifying the CWC, we will assume the lead in shaping a new and
    effective legal regime. We will be in a position to challenge those who
    refuse to give up these poisonous weapons. We will provide an added
    measure of security for the men and women of our armed forces. We will
    protect American industry and American jobs. And we will make our
    citizens safer than they would be in a world where chemical arms remain
    legal.

        This treaty is about other people's weapons, not our own. It
    reflects existing American practices and advances enduring American
    interests. It is right and smart for America. It deserves the Senate's
    timely support.

        Thank you very much.

        The Chairman. Thank you, Madam Secretary.

        Let us see, we have nine, and you need to leave here by
    about 4:15 or 4:20?

        Secretary Albright. That is correct, sir.

        The Chairman. I think we will have to confine ourselves to
    about 3 minutes per Senator.

        Let me just say to you, as your well-advertised friend,
    that during the 103d Congress, both the Congress and the
    administration were controlled by the political party to which
    you belong and to which I once belonged. The CWC was submitted
    in November 1993 and it lay absolutely fallow for the entire
    remainder of the 103d Congress, with no action even hinted by
    the Senate.

        During the 104th Congress, with the Senate controlled by
    Republicans, we passed the treaty from this committee and were
    prepared to vote for it--or vote on it--on September 14, 1996.
    But, what do you know? On the very day that the vote was
    scheduled, the administration panicked and asked the Senate not
    to vote on the treaty. Now I read in the press that members of
    the administration are either openly stating or insinuating
    that some of us are to be blamed for blocking passage of the
    treaty.

        Now, that kind of thing will not do. I have said
    repeatedly, and I will say it to you again--and as we discussed
    when you were good enough to go to North Carolina--if some in
    the administration will stop stonewalling and let us look at
    some of the important changes that I think need to be made in
    this treaty, I think you might be surprised at the outcome. But
    as long as the administration stonewalls, I can stonewall, too.

        I am going to reserve the balance of my time. I think I
    have about a minute and a half remaining.

        Senator Biden.

        Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I will adopt your practice and
    yield to my colleague from California, since I get to speak to
    the Secretary all the time on this issue.

        Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator.

        Good afternoon, Madam Secretary. I very much appreciated
    your comments.

        Let me ask you a question that is somewhat speculative, but
    I hope you will answer it. I have been really very puzzled. I
    have read all of the analyses, all of the discussions that I
    could find between our Ranking Member and our Chairman over why
    this situation seems to have become so polarized. It is hard
    for me to understand it. I see the argument made on
    verification. It seems to me, though, that we are a step ahead
    whenever we make illegal the manufacture of some of these
    gasses.

        I think the important points you made in your speech were
    that the Iraqi gasses were legally made, and the degree to
    which nations will conform to an international concordat which
    simply states these are illegal and that the verification is
    based on the constitutional methodology of each country, that
    still we accomplish something. Have you been able to pinpoint
    more definitively any of the rationale for the opposition to
    this?

        Secretary Albright. Senator Feinstein, you ask, I think, a
    very important question. Because from the perspective of those
    of us who believe that this Chemical Weapons Convention is a
    tool for those countries, especially the United States, that
    have already given up the use of chemical weapons, to get
    insight and control over what is going on in other countries in
    chemical weapons programs, it seems mighty strange that we
    would want to deprive ourselves of what is clearly a very good
    method for checking up on what others are doing.

        I must say that as I have read testimony by the others or,
    frankly, have listened to my friend, the Chairman, who I think
    is a true patriotic American, there is something that makes one
    wonder what is the problem with this. I think that the issue
    comes down to the fact that we would all very much like to have
    perfect arms control treaties. That is, those that are
    completely and totally verifiable, that limit everybody else
    and leave us some options. This is not possible.

        This treaty does have certain issues raised about
    verification. But our estimation is that the treaty can verify
    and does verify problems where there can be a massive problem
    or a large military problem for the United States. Therefore,
    we can go through other parts, but I think that the reason that
    good Americans are concerned about this is that they want
    perfection, and what we have is a treaty that is excellent and
    very good and a useful tool for the United States.

        I would, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, like to enter
    into the record two letters that I have for you--one from the
    Secretary of Defense and one from the Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs--that really, I believe, address in a very cogent and
    coherent way some of the questions that have been raised. If I
    might just take one more minute and deal with the verification
    issue--and this is in Secretary Cohen's letter. He says:

        Critics have argued that the CWC's verification regime is
    not good enough. While no verification regime is perfect, the
    CWC's comprehensive and extensive regime will improve our
    ability to monitor possible chemical weapons proliferation,
    which we must do with or without the CWC. As you know, the
    military use of any weapon typically requires significant
    testing, equipping, and training of forces. These activities
    would be more difficult to hide in the face of the CWC's
    comprehensive inspection regime that includes a broad-based
    data declaration and both routine and challenge inspection
    rights. Together with our unilateral intelligence efforts, this
    regime should enable us to more readily detect significant
    violations before they become a real problem for U.S. national
    security.

        So the point is the same--that it is impossible to have
    perfection. But with this convention, it is a huge step forward
    for America.

        [The material referred to by Secretary Albright follows:]

                                      The Secretary of Defense,
                                                  Washington, DC 20501.

    The Honorable Jesse Helms,
    Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
    U.S. Senate, Washington, DC 20510.

        Dear Mr. Chairman,

        Thank you for the opportunity to provide the views of the
    Department of Defense on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). I
    sincerely regret that my duties as Secretary of Defense have taken me
    out of the country and thereby, have precluded me from testifying
    before your Committee on this most important national security treaty.

        As you very well know, as we approach the next millennium, we face
    the prospect of regional aggressors and others seeking to use chemical
    weapons to achieve what they cannot achieve through conventional
    military means. Dealing with this threat requires a coherent, multi-
    faceted national response involving: active and passive defenses
    against chemical weapons; strong unilateral and multilateral export
    controls to limit the spread of chemical weapons technology; improved
    intelligence collection and threat analysis; well-coordinated civil
    defense capabilities and an international standard barring the
    production and possession of chemical weapons. The CWC is a necessary
    component of this response. It strengthens our hand in achieving
    effective limits on the spread of technology that could be used against
    us, supports our intelligence and civil defense efforts, and holds
    others to the standard that Presidents Reagan and Bush and previous
    Congresses set for the United States.

        As I have stated before, the United States does not need chemical
    weapons to protect our security interests. Our robust military response
    capabilities and increasingly robust defensive capabilities provide an
    effective deterrent and allow us to inflict an effective, devastating
    and overwhelming response should we be attacked. We have a strong
    national security interest in seeing other nations eliminate their
    chemical weapons stockpiles and capabilities, since that elimination
    will reduce the risk that our troops will face chemical weapons on the
    battlefield.

        Critics of the CWC have made several assertions regarding the
    implications of the CWC for our national security that I urge you to
    reject.

        Chemical Defense: Critics suggest that if the United States
    ratifies the CWC, it will reduce our support for defensive measures.
    Nothing could be further from the truth. DOD not only maintains a
    robust program to equip and train our troops against chemical and
    biological attack, but I have asked Congress to increase our budget for
    chemical and biological defenses by almost $225 million over the next
    six years. Moreover, I place a high priority on our theater missile
    defense programs and intelligence efforts against the chemical threat

        U.S. Response Capability: Critics charge that the CWC, by
    constraining riot control agents, will reduce our options for
    responding to an attack against our troops, including our ability to
    rescue downed pilots. In fact, the Chemical Weapons Convention does not
    limit our options in the situations in which our troops are most likely
    to be engaged and pilots might be downed: peacetime military operations
    within an area of ongoing armed conflict in which the U.S. is not a
    party to the conflict (such as Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda); consensual
    peacetime operations when the receiving state has authorized the use of
    force (including UN Chapter VI operations); and peacekeeping operations
    under the Chapter VII authority of the UN Security Council.

        In all such cases, the CWC's restrictions on the use of RCAs
    against combatants apply only when U.S. forces are engaged in a use of
    force of a scope, duration and intensity which would trigger the laws
    of war. These are situations in which other options normally would be
    used and for which I am accelerating the development and fielding of
    non-chemical, non-lethal alternatives that are consistent with the CWC.

        The CWC also does not limit our options in normal peacekeeping
    operations and other likely scenarios, such as law enforcement
    operations, humanitarian and disaster relief operations,
    counterterrorist and hostage rescue operations and noncombatant rescue
    operations outside of internal or international armed conflict.

        Chemical Weapons Proliferation: Some have argued that by ratifying
    the CWC, we would be contributing to chemical weapons proliferation.
    This is because they believe that the CWC would require us to provide
    to other member states our most advanced defensive equipment and
    manufacturing technologies, which some of these states would then use
    to build up clandestinely their chemical weapons capabilities. In fact.
    nothing in the CWC requires that we share our advanced chemical weapons
    defensive capabilities or chemical manufacturing technologies. Indeed,
    quite the opposite is true. The CWC prohibits any member from providing
    any assistance to anyone if that member believes that doing so would
    contribute to chemical weapons proliferation. Further, it establishes
    strict trade restrictions on precursor chemicals and requires that
    member states ensure that their internal regulations, which would
    include export controls, also are consistent with the object and
    purpose of the CWC. We will continue to work in the Australia Group to
    maintain effective internationally-agreed controls on chemical weapons-
    usable elements and technology.

        Rogue States: While some critics argue that it is meaningless since
    only law-abiding nations will respect it, the reality is that the CWC
    will reduce the chemical weapons problem to a few notorious rogue
    states and impose trade restrictions that will curb their ability to
    obtain the materials to make chemical agents. This is clearly better
    than the status quo.

        Verification: Critics have argued that the CWC's verification
    regime is not good enough. While no verification regime is perfect, the
    CWC's comprehensive and extensive regime will improve our ability to
    monitor possible chemical weapons proliferation--which we must do with
    or without the CWC. As you know, the military use of any weapon
    typically requires significant testing, equipping and training of
    forces. These activities would be more difficult to hide in the face of
    the CWC's comprehensive inspection regime that includes a broad-based
    data declaration and both routine and challenge inspection rights.
    Together with our unilateral intelligence efforts, this regime should
    enable us to more readily detect significant violations before they
    become a real problem for U.S. national security.

        U.S. Industry: Some critics have claimed that the CWC will impose
    costly burdens on U.S. industry that could potentially erode our
    technological edge and, by eroding our edge, affect our national
    security. The reality is that the American chemical companies most
    affected by the CWC view its requirements as reasonable and manageable.
    Small chemical businesses who were initially troubled by critics'
    claims now also agree that abiding by the CWC will be manageable. The
    reality also is that, if the United States fails to ratify the CWC, it
    will be U.S. industry that is penalized with trade restrictions that
    industry estimates could cost hundreds of millions of dollars.

        Mr. Chairman, in the 1980s, I led the Congressional fight to build
    binary chemical weapons to deter Soviet chemical use in Europe. With
    the end of the Cold War, the world has changed. Regional aggressors can
    be deterred by our vow to respond with overwhelming and devastating
    force to a chemical attack. Our military commanders agree that
    threatening a chemical weapons response is not necessary and they
    support the CWC.

        The safety of our troops and the security of our nation will be
    strengthened by the CWC. But, the clock is ticking. So that we can reap
    the full security benefits of the CWC, it is imperative that the
    Congress act on this national security treaty before the treaty goes
    into force on April 29. If we ratify in time, the U.S. will have a seat
    at the table during the first critical days of implementation of the
    CWC and be assured that American citizens will be able to ensure the
    fullest and most rigorous compliance with this treaty. I urge your
    Committee to report the Chemical Weapons Convention out favorably to
    the Senate and the Senate to act now to ratify the Convention before it
    enters into force on April 29.

                Sincerely,

                                               William S. Cohen

    cc:

        Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,

        Ranking Member

                         Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
                                           Washington, DC 20510-3301,
                                                          8 April 1997.
    The Honorable Jesse Helms
    Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee,
    United States Senate,
    Washington, D.C. 20510-3301
        Dear Mr. Chairman,
        Thank you for the opportunity to provide you, and through you to
    the United States Senate, my military appraisal of the Chemical Weapons
    Convention.
        Let me state that the accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention
    by as many nations as possible is in the best interest of the Armed
    Forces of the United States. The combination of the nonproliferation
    and disarmament aspects of the Convention greatly reduces the
    likelihood that US Forces may encounter chemical weapons in a regional
    conflict. The protection of the young men and women in our forces,
    should they have to go in harm's way in the future, is strengthened not
    diminished, by the CWC.
        The United States has unilaterally commenced the destruction of its
    chemical weapons stockpile--under the CWC, all other chemical weapons
    capable State Parties incur this same obligation. While no verification
    regime is perfect, the Convention's regime allows for intrusive
    inspections while protecting national security concerns. The CWC
    enjoins the world community to forego these heinous weapons, implements
    a regime of enforcement, and impairs the ability of those outside the
    Convention to obtain the materials to make chemical agents.
        The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combatant Commanders are
    steadfast in support for a strong chemical defense posture. We will
    maintain a robust chemical defensive capability supported by aggressive
    intelligence collection efforts, but will not rely solely an these
    measures. As Secretary Perry testified in March 1996, if any country
    was foolish enough to use chemical against the United States, the
    response will be overwhelming and devastating. We do not need chemical
    weapons to provide an effective deterrent or to deliver an effective
    response.
        It is important to emphasize that the CWC permits the use of riot
    control agents under most scenarios that the United States will likely
    face during future operations. If US Forces are deployed during
    peacetime to intercede in an internal or international armed conflict,
    such as under a UN mandate, the CWC will not affect our use of RCAs
    unless US or UN Forces become engaged in a use of force of a scope,
    duration, and intensity that would trigger the laws of war with respect
    to these forces. Until that time, the United States is not restricted
    by the CWC in its RCA use options, including against combatants who are
    parties to the conflict.
        If we are a party to an international armed conflict, the CWC
    prohibits the use of RCAs only in specific situations where combatants
    are present. In these particular situations, options other than RCA
    exist. As one example, non-lethal alternatives that are consistent with
    the CWC could be employed. The CWC permits RCA use in riot control
    situations under direct and distinct US military control, such as
    controlling rioting prisoners of war, and in rear echelon areas outside
    the zone of immediate combat to protect convoys from civilian
    disturbances, terrorists, and paramilitary organizations. The ability
    of our forces to defend themselves will not be reduced by the Chemical
    Weapons Convention. Nothing will override our commanders' inherent
    authority and obligation to use all legal means available and to take
    all appropriate action, including the use of lethal force, in self
    defense of their units and personnel.
        In my military judgment, we are better served as an original member
    of the Convention. I strongly support this Convention and respectfully
    request the Senate's advice and consent.
                Sincerely,
                                         John M. Shalikashvili,
                                 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

    Copy to:
        The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
        Ranking Member

        The Honorable Strom Thurmond,
        Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee

        The Honorable Carl Levin,
        Ranking Member, Senate Armed Services Committee

        Senator Feinstein. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Senator Lugar.
        Senator Lugar. Madam Secretary, two of the strong points of
    the convention are that our own intelligence will be enhanced--
    namely, we know a lot about chemical weapons, or believe we do
    now; but, given the network of inspections and a network of
    finding out about the shipment of chemicals and their
    precursors, we will have a better lead as to who is active and
    where the materials are going.
        The question that arises, and I suppose arose this morning,
    is: Is there value to us in terms of having international law
    behind us; that is, a norm in which clearly the production of
    chemical weapons is illegal in the world? I just ask you from
    your standpoint of your previous work in the United Nations,
    dealing with other nations. If the charge is made that we might
    let our guard down, would not be active, is it not your
    experience that in fact, if we have international law going for
    us, plus an international set of inspections and intelligence
    collection, we are more likely not only to act, but to act
    effectively, and maybe even, in some cases, unilaterally?
        Specifically, if Libya had a situation that we felt was
    undesirable, we could now, I presume, send aircraft there and
    demolish the facilities before they knew what we were doing?
    Are we more likely, however, as a Nation, to do that if we have
    international law going for us, plus the intelligence apparatus
    of all other nations going for us likewise?
        Secretary Albright. Senator Lugar, I believe that we gain
    greatly by having, first of all, the added intelligence
    capability that comes from having an international regime and,
    second, the force of being part of an international regime.
    Though it is not exactly the same situation, I would say that
    we have multiplied our own effectiveness through something like
    the IAEA--the way to inspect and have safeguards on nuclear
    weapons, by having a regime that puts the force of the entire
    international community behind an inspection or behind a
    determination to take action and provide international
    sanctions.
        So this is a force multiplier for us, the country that no
    longer plans to use chemical weapons ourselves and knows that
    others still have them.
        Senator Lugar. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Senator Biden.
        Senator Biden. Madam Secretary, it seems to me--and I will
    not take the time, in part, because I do not have the time--
    that everything that the critics say is wrong with this treaty
    is worse without the treaty, beginning with verification and I
    think, literally, every major criticism.
        Let me ask you a question. This is a strange-sounding
    question, I guess. But let us assume we either bring this
    treaty up--hopefully, we will have an opportunity to do that by
    April 29th and vote on it--we bring it up and it is defeated or
    we do not bring it up. What do you say? I mean what happens?
    Describe to us what happens when you attend the next meeting of
    your counterparts, where the Secretaries of State, your
    counterparts in France and Germany and Great Britain, et
    cetera--I mean our allies, our friends, the Australia Group--
    not all of whom are European, obviously--what happens at that
    meeting?
        I am not being facetious when I ask the question; I am
    being serious.
        Secretary Albright. I would hope very much that I would
    never have to be in that position; because I truly do think
    that it would be not just a major embarrassment for the leading
    country in the world to be in a position of having decided not
    to become a part of what is now a hugely ratified convention,
    but I think it would also hurt us, Senator, in other ways.
    Because we see ourselves as the leaders of creating
    international norms and regimes.
        I think I have said to some of you that I believe that
    there are four groups of countries in the world, and the
    largest one are those countries of which we are the leader,
    that are basically those countries that abide by international
    norms, that provide--because they establish a better way of
    life for our citizens--rules of the road. It would lessen our
    credibility not only in this obviously important regime but
    across the board if we decide, for some reason, not to become a
    part of what is clearly a step forward in limiting weapons of
    mass destruction.
        I think it would hurt our credibility across the board, and
    not just on this issue, Senator Biden.
        Senator Biden. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, Madam Secretary.
        The Chairman. Senator Coverdell.
        Senator Coverdell. Madam Secretary, I know that there have
    been extensive discussions about conditions between the
    administration, the Chairman, and others. Could you
    characterize your assessment of the progress, your general
    feeling at this hour, as we are embedded in the debate? Is
    there an optimism on your part with regard to this process?
    Have we gone as far as we can and we are down to our
    differences? Do you characterize it as still being a viable
    process that might move to an agreement?
        Secretary Albright. Senator Coverdell, first of all, I
    think that there has been a great deal of goodwill as the
    process has gone forward and through a variety of meetings.
    There has been, I think, considerable movement on dealing with
    a variety of questions that obviously are legitimate, given our
    process of government and the importance of having you all, as
    the representatives of the people, understand more about how
    this treaty is being carried out.
        I do think that I am optimistic, because that is my nature.
    I do think that while there are still a number of points on
    which we disagree, that we are moving forward in a good way.
    What I do think is absolutely important is for the time to come
    for the Senate to vote. There have been, as I have stated--13
    hearings that have been held before this one was, 1,500 pages
    of testimony, lots of back-and-forth, in terms of trying to
    exchange information. I think that if we cannot agree on some
    of the differences within informal groupings, that there must
    be some way that we can vote--you all can vote--on the
    differences that still exist.
        I cannot stress enough the importance of having the vote
    before the time expires to be an original party. I think we are
    definitely cutting off our nose to spite our face if we do not
    ratify before that deadline. Our request to all of you is to
    vote.
        Senator Coverdell. If I have just a second, just as a
    matter for clarification and not necessarily related to the
    overall aspect of our position in the world, but has Israel
    signed this treaty, do you know?
        Secretary Albright. Israel has signed, but not ratified.
        Senator Coverdell. But not ratified?
        Secretary Albright. Right.
        The Chairman. The Senator from Minnesota.
        Senator Wellstone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Madam Secretary, thank you.
        I guess, in the limited amount of time that we have, almost
    more than asking the question, I just would like to amplify or
    build on a point you made about the importance of our hoping to
    have an agreement and moving this forward and having a vote. I
    am on the Veterans' Affairs Committee, and General Schwarzkopf,
    when he testified before our committee dealing with the illness
    of the Gulf veterans, was really poignant in also expressing
    his support for this agreement. Just to quote from not just
    General Schwarzkopf, but any number of other military leaders:
        ``On its own, the CWC cannot guarantee complete security
    against chemical weapons.'' I think that was your point. You
    did not come here to argue it is perfect. We must continue to
    support robust defense capabilities and remain willing to
    respond through the CWC or by unilateral action to violators of
    the convention. Our focus is not on the treaty's limitations
    but, instead, on its many strengths. The CWC destroys
    stockpiles that could threaten our troops, it significantly
    improves our intelligence capabilities, and it creates new
    international sanctions to punish those states who remain
    outside the treaty. For these reasons, we strongly support the
    CWC.
        I hope, Mr. Chairman, that we will be able to have an
    agreement and bring this to the floor. I do believe we owe it
    to people in the country to have an up or down vote, and I hope
    it will be a favorable vote.
        Secretary Albright. I must say that I was very impressed
    with the testimony that General Schwarzkopf gave earlier, in
    which he basically said that, by our not ratifying, we put
    ourself on the side of Iraq and Libya and on a different side
    from our allies.
        I think, when Senator Biden said, how would I feel in
    meetings, I would find it mighty strange to be on the same side
    of the table as Iraq and Libya.
        The Chairman. Senator Hagel.
        Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
        Madam Secretary, always nice to see you.
        Secretary Albright. Thank you.
        Senator Hagel. Since I last saw you, I know you have become
    much more enlightened in many areas. You have played baseball.
    You have gone to North Carolina.
        Secretary Albright. That is true.
        Senator Hagel. I know we can expect even greater things
    from you now.
        Senator Hagel. Madam Secretary, picking up on the Iraq,
    Libya, North Korea, Syria issues, those are the real threats.
    Those countries are the real threats. I do not believe the
    threats of chemical warfare to our troops or civilized nations'
    troops are within the signatory countries of the CWC. So my
    question is: How do we get to the real threat, those countries
    that we fear most, who we either suspect or know now possess
    chemical weapons and are not afraid to use them?
        Secretary Albright. Senator, I think that it is exactly
    because of our concern over the rogue states that we have to
    try to use the tools that the international regime puts before
    us. I think that what happens here is, first of all, that it
    becomes even more clear that the rogue states are isolated
    politically and that they are subject to trade sanctions that
    put pressure on their economies and limit their ability to
    obtain the ingredients for chemical weapons.
        If, for instance, there is also a concern, I think, by some
    that they will sign in a cynical way, well, if they sign up and
    then try to cheat, the rogue states will be subject to the
    CWC's unprecedented verification measures, and they will
    probably get caught. When they are caught, they will be subject
    to international pressure and other CWC sanctions. I think that
    by not putting ourselves in a position of being one of the
    original ratifiers of CWC, we weaken the convention itself, and
    then weaken our own ability and deprive ourselves of this force
    multiplier to try to get at the rogue states.
        This is the single best tool we have to try to get a handle
    on the Iraqs and Libyas, because this will provide an eye into
    their system.
        Senator Hagel. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Senator Smith.
        Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Madam Secretary, thank you for coming. There is an old
    saying in politics that to get a vote, you have got to ask for
    a vote. I appreciate your being here, because no one from the
    administration has ever asked for my vote on this. I have had
    many people from the other side asking me for my vote on this.
        Senator Biden. Ask him, will you, now, quick. Ask him.
        Secretary Albright. Give me a minute. I was going to do it
    with drama.
        Senator Smith. And all I have heard is from the other side.
    So my question, which has already been asked somewhat before,
    is: Is this the best we can do? And Senator Helms' comments
    earlier, which were that there are three points he wants to
    work out. Is it too late to work anything else out in this
    treaty?
        Secretary Albright. Well, first of all, let me say
    officially, openly, publicly, I am asking you for your vote.
        Senator Smith. Thank you.
        Secretary Albright. And let me also say that there are some
    areas, I think, that the Chairman has concern about that I
    think we can still work on. I think there are some where we may
    not be able to work something out. You all will have to vote on
    that.
        Senator Smith. And would that be done in the OPCW
    decisionmaking process, which means the April 29 deadline and
    U.S. participation in the process are important? Is that where
    we address questions like nonlethal chemicals that our police
    may need for riot control and things of that nature?
        Secretary Albright. Well, let us talk specifically about
    the riot control issue. I think that difference, if I may be so
    bold, is based on a misunderstanding about what the treaty
    provides in terms of riot control. If I might just take a
    minute while asking you for your vote to explain fully what
    happens to the riot control agents.
        The CWC does not limit our ability to use RCA's, riot
    control agents, in the situations in which U.S. troops are most
    likely to be involved. I think there is a concern that we are
    robbing ourselves of a tool. What I am going to tell you is how
    we are not doing that.
        The CWC does not limit our options in such likely scenarios
    as law enforcement operations, humanitarian and disaster relief
    operations, counter-terrorist and hostage rescue operations,
    and noncombatant rescue operations outside of armed conflict.
    The CWC also does not limit RCA use under normal peacekeeping
    operations. That includes peacetime operations within an area
    of ongoing conflict, to which the U.S. is not a party, such as
    Somalia, Bosnia or Rwanda, or in consensual peacetime
    operations, when the receiving State has authorized the use of
    force--that is including Chapter 6 operations under the U.N.
    peacekeeping operations under Chapter 7.
        So the CWC restrictions on riot control agents apply only
    when combatants are present and U.S. forces are engaged in the
    use of force of a scope, duration, and intensity that would
    trigger the laws of war.
        Now, the reason I read this to you in such detail is that I
    think this is an example of where we may have a
    misunderstanding of fact and as one of the areas where there
    are still discussions, which we believe could be dealt with. In
    the letter that I introduced into the record, written by
    General Shalikashvili, I think more of this is addressed.
        So I am hoping, in the intervening days we have here, that
    we can address in a factual way some of the problems that still
    exist.
        Senator Smith. Thank you. I hope that we can do that. My
    time is up. We are discharging our constitutional
    responsibility to vote on this treaty. One of my concerns you
    answered earlier in your testimony, which was that we are not
    in fact voting for something that is unconstitutional or
    violates the constitutional rights of Americans.
        Finally, I hope at some point here you can address an
    implication that Secretary Schlesinger made that some in the
    FBI are being muzzled right now, not to speak unfavorably about
    this treaty. I wonder, at some point, if you could comment on
    that.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Senator Grams.
        Senator Grams. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Madam Secretary, a pleasure to see you.
        Just to kind of clarify the last question that Senator
    Smith asked, dealing with riot control chemicals. On February
    2nd, an article in a column by John Deutch, who served as
    Director of Central Intelligence and Deputy Secretary of
    Defense for President Clinton, wrote the following. He said:

        We should reject interpretations of the CWC that prohibit
    the use of tear gas or other nonlethal chemicals so that we do
    not put ourselves in the bizarre position of having no choice
    but to rely on guns and bullets when we face situations like
    driving off noncombatants who might be threatening a downed
    pilot.

        Now, do you agree with that statement? And do you believe
    that is what the CWC is stating clearly?
        Secretary Albright. I think that the CWC does not prohibit
    it. As I said, the restrictions apply only when combatants are
    present and U.S. forces are engaged in the use of force of the
    scope, duration and intensity that would trigger the laws of
    war. I think we would have to see what the situation is. But,
    basically, it is possible for us to use various new kinds of
    chemical agents in order to rescue hostages and to deal with
    isolated issues. We always have a third choice in a war, which
    is to use nonlethal weapons. We are not left only with the
    possibility of using chemical weapons or riot control agents.
        Senator Grams. So, generally then, you would agree with the
    statement that Mr. Deutch made?
        Secretary Albright. Well, I would have to see it within its
    overall context, but I generally agree with the statements that
    he made.
        Senator Grams. And just one other quick question dealing
    with Russia. The recent record on arms control agreements has
    been less than impressive for Russia. It has not implemented
    the Bilateral Destruction Agreement on chemical weapons which
    it signed with the United States several years ago. There have
    been reports that Russia has developed a chemical weapons
    program specifically designed to evade the CWC.
        In addition, Russia has not even ratified the START II
    Treaty on nuclear weapons, which I and many other Senators
    strongly support. So does the administration believe that
    Russia should agree to fully implement the Bilateral
    Destruction Agreement before the U.S. would join the CWC?
        Secretary Albright. Senator, let me just take a little
    minute here to explain something. We just finished our meetings
    in Helsinki with the Russians. We went there with the idea of
    issuing a number of joint communiques. One which had not been
    part of our original intention, because we were dealing with
    Russia--NATO and with START and other issues--but the Russians
    came to us and we then issued a joint U.S.-Russian statement on
    chemical weapons. It was basically done because of President
    Yeltsin's and Foreign Minister Primakov's interest in making
    clear that they wanted to go forward in order to expedite
    ratification.
        So the second paragraph says: The Presidents reaffirm their
    intention to take the steps necessary to expedite ratification
    in each of the two countries.
        President Clinton expressed his determination that the U.S.
    be a party. Then President Yeltsin noted that the convention
    had been submitted to the Duma with his strong recommendation
    for prompt ratification--I am not reading it all. The
    Presidents noted that cooperation between the two countries in
    the prohibition of chemical weapons has enabled both countries
    to enhance openness regarding their military chemical potential
    and to gain experience with procedures and measures for
    verifying compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, et
    cetera.
        So I would say that there is a major push on behalf of
    President Yeltsin, who is going to use this document to make
    sure that they go forward with ratification of the CWC also.
        Senator Grams. How much cost will there be to the U.S. For
    the Russian program to destroy its chemical weapons?
        Secretary Albright. I will have to get that for you for the
    record.
        [The information referred to was unavailable at the time of
    printing.]
        Senator Grams. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Senator Sarbanes.
        Senator Sarbanes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        I think I first ought to give you the opportunity--because
    the question was simply left hanging out there by one of my
    colleagues--that people within the administration were being
    muzzled with respect to commenting on this treaty. I think the
    specific reference was to the FBI. Could you address that?
        Secretary Albright. Senator, I am completely unaware that
    something like that would be taking place. I have heard nothing
    like that. I have no reason to believe that that is true--
    absolutely none.
        Senator Sarbanes. Well, now, the Joint Chiefs are in favor
    of this treaty, are they not?
        Secretary Albright. They are, sir.
        Senator Sarbanes. And I think they have been very clear in
    indicating, not just the chairman, but all the other members of
    the Joint Chiefs, as well, is that correct?
        Secretary Albright. That is correct. Then, earlier, there
    was a letter submitted, or a statement, by 17 other former
    generals and former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs and other
    generals very much in favor of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
        Senator Sarbanes. I do not quite understand--and I
    addressed some questions this morning directed toward it--this
    notion that unless the rogue states sign up, the rest of the
    world should not approve and ratify this treaty and the United
    States ought not to be part of it. Do you understand that
    argument?
        Secretary Albright. I do not, sir, because my own feeling
    is that it is as if we had been provided with a brand-new
    mechanism for looking inside potential violator societies to
    find out what they are doing. We are eschewing that tool mainly
    because the rogues, or those who are not part of the system, do
    not want to sign it.
        As I said in my statement, it is like saying that you are
    not going to have laws against drug smuggling just because all
    the drug smugglers have not signed up to it. What you do is you
    try to develop the best possible regime, and not allow the
    lowest common denominator to determine what the will of the
    international community and the majority of nation-states would
    like to have happen.
        Senator Sarbanes. Would not the convention in fact make it
    possible to put into place a more rigorous regime against the
    rogue states than is possible under the current situation?
        Secretary Albright. Absolutely. What it does is provide a
    system for intrusive inspections into their societies, and then
    a system for also having more stringent sanctions against them,
    with the force of having international law and the
    international community behind them. So, by deciding not to
    take action until they do, I think we are cutting off our nose
    to spite our face.
        The Chairman. Madam Secretary, we are within 2 or 3 minutes
    of fulfilling what I hope was a commitment. Before you leave,
    let me suggest that you mention to the administration that it
    would clear up the whole thing if a statement were issued in
    the name of the President or the administration, saying that
    nobody in the FBI nor anybody else employed by the Federal
    Government must not speak disapprovingly of the treaty. Now,
    that will clear it up.
        Now, there is one other thing. The Chemical Manufacturers'
    Association was claiming that $600 million in sales would be
    lost if this treaty is not ratified. We discussed that when you
    were here. They have since cut that number down by more than
    half, and even their new figures are highly suspect. It was
    said here this morning that the Chemical Manufacturers'
    Association does not represent the small manufacturers--only a
    few big ones.
        During your confirmation hearing, you may recall that I
    asked that you supply the committee with a detailed list of
    chemicals that would be affected if the United States were not
    to ratify the CWC. You told me then, in good faith I am sure,
    that such a list would be forthcoming. It has not come. I
    certainly understand why. Would you tell your people to get
    that list to us?
        Secretary Albright. Yes, absolutely.
        The Chairman. I know you have another meeting. I thank you
    for coming to see us. Do you have further comments to make? I
    see notes being passed around. I figured there is one more
    thing they want you to say.
        Secretary Albright. Yes. Apparently the list has been sent
    to you this morning in response to that question.
        The Chairman. This morning. Very well.
        Secretary Albright. So the check is in the mail.
        The Chairman. If there be no further business to come
    before the committee----
        Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I do not have any further
    business for the Secretary. I want to just publicly thank you.
    I was a bit of a pain in the neck in attempting to see you and
    ask you to accommodate.
        I guess I was a pain in the neck to Secretary Albright, as
    well, to come up here this afternoon. I thought it was
    important.
        With regard to tomorrow's hearing, Mr. Chairman. I realize
    that the committee has a rule that I am just learning. Back in
    the good old days, when my team was in charge and I was
    Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, we used to have a one-to-
    one rule. That is, the minority and majority could have the
    same number of witnesses. I have learned subsequently that is
    not the rule here.
        The Chairman. It never has been.
        Senator Biden. I understand that. But yesterday we were
    going to have--I wanted to have Mr. Scowcroft and Mr. Deutch.
    Mr. Deutch had to go out of town. I said to my staff--there was
    a bit of a misunderstanding--that Scowcroft could come
    tomorrow, along with General Rowny and Admiral Zumwalt. I am
    now told by my staff that they may not be able to appear
    tomorrow because of a rule.
        I would like you to consider accommodating a rookie ranking
    minority member here and allow them, since I have asked them to
    change their schedules, so that I do not find myself--this is
    probably the only thing I have ever agreed with General Rowny
    on and Admiral Zumwalt.
        And I do not want to completely ruin my credibility with
    them. So I would like to publicly ask you to consider allowing
    an exception to the rule. I will give up two future draft
    choices at a later date if you would consider allowing me to
    have them tomorrow, notwithstanding the committee tradition of
    a 2- or 3-to-1 majority. So I am going to publicly ask you if
    you would consider that. I am not asking for an answer now. If
    the answer is no, do not give it to me now.
        If it is yes, I would take it now.
        The Chairman. Well, as Mr. English back in my home town of
    Monroe used to say, I will study about it.
        Senator Biden. All right. Good.
        The Chairman. There being no further business to come
    before the committee, we stand in recess.
        [Whereupon, at 4:23 p.m., the committee adjourned to
    reconvene at 2:11 p.m., April 9, 1997.]

                          CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, APRIL 9, 1997

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:11 p.m., in
    room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms
    (chairman of the committee) presiding.
        Present: Senators Helms, Hagel, Smith, Frist, Biden, Kerry,
    Robb, Feinstein, and Wellstone.
        The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
        We have been delaying a little bit, because one of the four
    witnesses on the first panel has just arrived. We are delighted
    to see you.
        Well, I say to my distinguished colleagues, Mr. Robb and
    Mr. Biden, that today marks the third in this particular round
    of hearings on the Chemical Weapons Convention. This morning's
    first panel of witnesses will include the Hon. Jeane
    Kirkpatrick, known to all of us, former Ambassador to the
    United Nations; the Hon. Richard Perle, former Assistant
    Secretary of Defense; the Hon. Fred Ikle, former Director of
    the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; and Doug Feith, former
    Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense. Former goes before each
    one of those titles.
        There will be a second panel of witnesses in support of the
    Convention.
        We appreciate your appearing here this afternoon as the
    committee undertakes further consideration of the CWC. All four
    of you are distinguished leaders, whose impressive expertise
    makes your insight crucial to the Senate's consideration of
    this matter, which involves, as we all know, the future
    security of the United States. The Senate will benefit greatly
    from your assessment and guidance regarding the wisdom of
    ratifying the treaty in its present form--and I would
    underscore those words.
        Now, I will say we have had many, many compliments by
    telephone, fax and otherwise regarding the testimony of three
    former Secretaries of Defense who were here in person, and one
    of whom read a letter of opposition to the treaty written by
    the previous Secretary of Defense. We look forward to your
    testimony. You are joined in your opposition by a fourth
    Secretary of Defense, Richard Cheney, and more than 50
    generals, admirals and top officials from previous
    administrations.
        I think this ought to be sort of a wake-up call to the
    administration, because the American people, despite efforts to
    the contrary by some in the news media, the American people are
    increasingly aware of the defects in this treaty. Now, I am not
    going to proceed further with my statement, in the interest of
    hearing our witnesses, but I will defer to the distinguished
    Ranking Member.
        If Senator Robb has any comments, since I did not know you
    were here yesterday, we would be glad to hear from you as well.
        Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Let me
    begin by publicly thanking you for allowing the second panel.
    We have a number--seven very distinguished Americans here. I
    think they probably find--they are probably in the position,
    not for the first time, but not as frequently as we are, of
    finding themselves on opposite sides of things they are usually
    in total agreement with their friends on and vice-versa. I mean
    we are accustomed to that. That is part of our stock in trade.
        I appreciate you allowing former National Security Advisor
    Brent Scowcroft--a former general, as well--General Rowny, and
    Admiral Zumwalt to be here. I realize the rule is basically 3-
    to-1, but you were kind enough to us yesterday to allow that. I
    appreciate it.
        I want to take just a few minutes to address a few concerns
    that we raised in yesterday's hearing and that have gone
    unanswered. The reason I bother to do it I am not sure, because
    so much has been going on in terms of the non-public side of
    this process and in terms of negotiations; I am not suggesting
    that any of the things we have tentatively agreed on among
    ourselves on this side of the bench and with the administration
    and Senator Lott and others, that they will satisfy any of the
    witnesses, but there is no reason they would know they existed.
    I will just take just a few minutes--probably about 9 I hope.
        My impression is that one of the reasons you suggested that
    we have an additional set of hearings was that we have a number
    of new Members--a very bright, informed group of people, who
    have taken their jobs on this committee very seriously--and
    that they did not have an opportunity to participate in
    previous hearings. My impression is that these new Members
    truly want to learn about the treaty and base their decision on
    the facts. I hope that these hearings are giving them an
    opportunity to be acquainted with them.
        This afternoon, we are going to hear testimony about the
    treaty and what it does and does not do. But I used to practice
    law with a fellow who was one of the best trial lawyers in the
    State of Delaware, a guy named Sid Bialek. He always used to
    say when he would teach young lawyers like me how to address a
    jury, he would say, when you start off with a jury, tell them:
    Now, jury, keep your eye on the ball. This is not about whether
    or not my client is a nice guy. It is whether he killed Cock
    Robin. Keep your eye on the ball.
        Well, I think one of the things we have to keep our eye on,
    I say to my colleagues--obviously, not to the witnesses--is
    that this is a treaty that outlaws poison gas. It outlaws
    chemical weapons. At least that is its intent. I guess that is
    the essence of the debate here--whether or not it adequately
    does that.
        Entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention will
    mark a major milestone in our effort to enlist greater
    international support for an important American objective of
    containing and penalizing rogue states that seek to acquire or
    transfer weapons of mass destruction. I want to make it clear,
    based on yesterday's panel, the first one--and it was a
    distinguished panel--several said, including one former
    Secretary of Defense, that they were accused of being for
    chemical weapons and for the use of these.
        I just want you to know, I know no one who supports the
    treaty in the Senate who suggests anyone who opposes the treaty
    is someone who is for the active use of chemical weapons. So I
    want to make that clear at the outset. I never heard anybody
    say that, and I am sure the former Secretary would not have
    said it unless someone had mentioned it to him. But no one on
    this committee that I am aware of who is for the treaty thinks
    that.
        Among the claims, though, that were made yesterday about
    the CWC is that it would force us to share our most advanced
    defensive technology with all states, including countries of
    concern that have ratified the agreement. Iran comes to mind
    immediately.
        Another assertion is that it requires us to abandon all
    controls we have on the proliferation of sensitive technology
    through mechanisms like the Australia Group. As I reviewed the
    treaty, I became a little concerned about this initially. With
    regard to sharing the defensive technologies, some general
    provisions appeared to back up their claim. But, on close
    inspection, I believe it reveals that the critics are wrong.
        First, the provisions in Article X, Paragraph 3, are
    deliberately vague. The obligation on a party is to facilitate
    the fullest possible exchange of equipment and information.
    When read in light of the overriding imperative of Article I,
    to not assist any party from engaging in activities prohibited
    by CWC, it seems clear to me and the lawyers that I have
    consulted that we will not be obliged to provide assistance to
    rogue states under this provision.
        Now, just to make sure that I was reading this correctly, I
    asked for some clarification. I spoke to somebody who obviously
    would want to clarify it the way I read it, so take it for what
    it is worth. But the National Security Advisor, Sandy Berger,
    today sent me a letter. In that letter, he states that any
    exchange of equipment and technology under Paragraph 3 of
    Article X, ``is limited to that which we determine would be
    appropriate and permitted under the convention.'' In addition,
    Paragraph 7 of Article X requires no assistance, ``other than
    medical supplies, if we so choose''--if we so choose.
        I ask that this letter from Mr. Berger be inserted in the
    record, Mr. Chairman, so that my colleagues can at least
    understand the position that I hold and that I believe that
    pertains.
        The Chairman. Without objection.
        Senator Biden. Thank you very much.
        [The information referred to follows:]

                                               The White House,
                                         Washington, DC, April 9, 1997.
    Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
    U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C. 20510.
        Dear Senator Biden. In recent days, concerns have been raised about
    the impact of the Chemical Weapons Convention on the ability of rogue
    states to acquire advanced U.S. Chemical defense or chemical
    manufacturing technology. I would like to take this opportunity to set
    the record straight on these matters.
        Specifically, concern has been expressed about Paragraph 3 of
    Article X of the CWC, which states that ``Each Party undertakes to
    facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the fullest
    possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and
    technological information concerning means of protection against chemi-

    cal weapons.'' The inclusion of the words ``facilitate'' and
    ``possible'' underscores that no specific exchange is required and that
    any exchange which does occur is limited to that which we determine
    would be appropriate and permitted under the Convention. Moreover,
    nothing in Paragraph 7 of Article X, which concerns possible responses
    to requests for assistance, requires us to provide anything other than
    medical supplies, if we so choose.
        Concern has also been expressed about whether Article XI of the
    CWC, which relates to cooperation in the field of chemical activities
    for purposes not prohibited under the treaty, might force our chemical
    industry to share dual-use technologies and manufacturing secrets with
    other nations. Let me assure you that Article XI does not require
    private businesses to release such proprietary or otherwise
    confidential business information, nor does it require the U.S.
    Government to force private businesses to undertake such activities.
    Let me further assure you that the export controls that we and other
    Australia Group members have undertaken, as well as our own national
    export controls, are fully consistent with the CWC and serve to further
    its implementation.
        I hope this information facilitates Senate consideration of the
    CWC. I look forward to continuing to work with you and other CWC
    supporters to ensure a successful vote on this vital treaty in the days
    ahead.
                Sincerely,
                                              Samuel R. Berger,
              Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

        Senator Biden. At this point, Mr. Chairman, you and I have
    come close to agreement on a condition that would require the
    executive branch to ensure that countries of concern receive no
    assistance from us beyond medical antidotes and treatment, and
    that we would be fully informed and it would be fully in
    keeping with Article X of the CWC.
        As for the argument that we would be forced to abandon our
    current mechanisms to control the proliferation of sensitive
    technology, the CWC explicitly allows us to keep these
    protections in place. Article 7 supports chemical trade and
    technology exchange ``for purposes not prohibited under this
    convention.'' It also requires that trade restrictions not be,
    quote, incompatible with the obligations undertaken in this
    convention.
        But the CWC is completely consistent with the continued
    enforcement of the Australia Group controls, which member
    states use to keep chemical and biological weapons materiel out
    of the hands of rogue states. The executive branch has said
    this time and again, and so have our friends and allies in the
    Australia Group. That helps explain why 26 of the 29 members of
    the Australia Group have ratified this treaty--everyone except
    Iceland, Luxembourg and the United States.
        Last October, at the most recent meeting of the Australia
    Group, the 29 countries reaffirmed their intention to maintain
    common export controls, while joining the treaty convention. In
    a statement issued at the meeting, the Australia Group said,
    ``the maintenance of effective export controls remain an
    essential, practical means of fulfilling obligations under the
    CWC.''
        I would also ask unanimous consent that that statement be
    inserted in the record, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Without objection.
        [The information referred to follows:]

                                     Australian Embassy, Paris,
                                                      October 17, 1996.

                            Australia Group Meeting

        Australia Group participants held informal consultations in Paris
    between Oct. 14-17, to discuss the continuing problem of chemical and
    biological weapons (CBW) proliferation. Participants at these talks
    were Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech
    Republic, Denmark, the European Commission, Finland, France, Germany,
    Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg,
    Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak
    Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United
    States, with the Republic of Korea taking part for the first time.
        Participants maintain a strong belief that full adherence to the
    Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and to the Biological and Toxin
    Weapons Convention (BTWC) will be the best way to eliminate these types
    of particularly inhumane weapons from the world's arsenals. In this
    context the maintenance of effective export controls will remain an
    essential practical means of fulfilling obligations under the CWC and
    the BTWC.
        All participants at the meeting welcomed the expected entry into
    force of the CWC, noting that this long-awaited step will be an
    important, historic moment in international efforts to prohibit
    chemical weapons. Participants agreed to issue a separate statement on
    this matter, which is attached.
        Participants also welcomed the progress of efforts to strengthen
    the BTWC in the negotiations taking place in the Ad Hoc Group of BTWC
    States Parties in Geneva. All Australia Group participating countries
    are also States Parties to this treaty, and strongly support efforts to
    develop internationally agreed procedures for strengthening
    international confidence in the treaty regime by verifying compliance
    with BTWC obligations.
        Experts from participating countries discussed national export
    licensing systems aimed at preventing inadvertent assistance to the
    production of CBW. They confirmed that participants administered export
    controls in a streamlined and effective manner which allows trade and
    the exchange of technology for peaceful purposes to flourish. They
    agreed to continue working to focus these national measures efficiently
    and solely on preventing any contribution to chemical and biological
    weapons programs. Participants noted that the value of these measures
    in inhibiting CBW proliferation benefited not only the countries
    participating in the Australia Group, but the whole international
    community.
        Participants also agreed to continue a wide range of contacts,
    including a further program of briefings for countries not
    participating in the Paris consultations to further awareness and
    understanding of national policies in this area. Participants endorsed
    in this context the importance of regional seminars as valuable means
    of widening contacts with other countries on these issues. In
    particular, Romania's plans to host a seminar on CBW export controls
    for Central and Eastern European countries and the Commonwealth of
    Independent States in Bucharest on Oct. 21-22 and Japan's plans to host
    a fourth Asian Export Control Seminar in Tokyo in early 1997 were
    warmly welcomed by participants. Argentina will also host a regional
    seminar on non-proliferation matters, in Buenos Aires, in the first
    week of December 1996. France will organize a seminar for French-
    speaking countries on the implementation of the CWC. This will take
    place shortly before entry into force of the Convention.
        The meeting also discussed relevant aspects of terrorist interest
    in CBW and agreed that this serious issue requires continuing
    attention.
        Participants agreed to hold further consultations in October 1997.

                                   __________

     Australia Group Countries Welcome Prospective Entry Into Force of the
                          Chemical Weapons Convention

        The countries participating in the Australia Group warmly welcomed
    the expected entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
    during a meeting of the Group in Paris in October 1996. They noted,
    that the long awaited commencement of the CWC regime, including the
    establishment of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
    Weapons, will be an historic watershed in global efforts to abolish
    chemical weapons for all time. They also noted that all states adhering
    to the CWC are obliged to ensure their national activities support the
    goal of a world free of chemical weapons.
        All of the participating countries reiterated their previous
    statements underlining their intention to be among the original States
    Parties to the CWC. They noted that 24 of the 30 countries
    participating in the Australia Group have already ratified the
    Convention. Representatives also recalled their previous expressions of
    support for the CWC, and reaffirmed these commitments. They restated
    their view that the effective operation and implementation of the CWC
    offers the best means available to the international community to rid
    the world of these weapons for all time. They called on all signatories
    to ratify the CWC as soon as possible, and on the small number of
    countries which have not signed the treaty to join the regime and
    thereby contribute to international efforts to ban these weapons.
        Representatives at the Australia Group meeting recalled that all of
    the participating countries are taking steps at the national level to
    ensure that relevant national regulations promote the object and
    purpose of the CWC and are fully consistent with the Convention's
    provisions when the CWC enters into force for each of these countries.
    They noted that the practical experience each country had obtained in
    operating export licensing systems intended to prevent assistance to
    chemical weapons programs have been especially valuable in each
    country's preparations for implementation of key obligations under the
    CWC. They noted in this context, that these national systems are aimed
    solely at avoiding assistance for activities which are prohibited under
    the Convention, while ensuring they do not restrict or impede trade and
    other exchanges facilitated by the CWC.

        Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I am convinced the CWC does
    not require us to share our most advanced defense technology or
    to abandon existing controls on chemical weapons. Just to make
    certain of that, I asked Sandy Berger to address this point. I
    will, in the interest of time, since I asked you to add
    additional witnesses, ask that the remainder of my statement be
    placed in the record and conclude by saying this treaty enters
    in force on April 29th, and time is running short. Mr.
    Chairman, I hope that we, when we conclude these hearings--as
    long as I do not prolong them--that at some point we might be
    able to reach an agreement on how to proceed on the floor. But
    that is for another time, another moment.
        I thank the witnesses and I thank the chair.
        [The prepared statement and the information referred to by
    Senator Biden follows:]

                      Prepared Statement of Senator Biden

        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to take a few minutes this
    morning to address a few concerns that were raised in yesterday's
    hearing and may have gone unanswered.
        When you called these hearings, you said that it was important that
    the new members of the committee have an opportunity to learn more
    about it. And I am pleased to see that our new colleagues have taken
    your recommendation to heart.
        My impression is that they truly want to learn about this treaty
    and base their decision on the facts--and maybe the request by the
    Secretary of State won't hurt, either.
        This afternoon we will hear more testimony about this treaty and
    what it does and does not do, but the core issue is very simple: this
    treaty outlaws poison gas weapons.
        The entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention will mark a
    major milestone in our efforts to enlist greater international support
    for the important American objective of containing and penalizing rogue
    states that seek to acquire or transfer weapons of mass destruction.
        Yesterday, we heard three very distinguished former Secretaries of
    Defense testify on this treaty.
        Among the claims they made about the CWC are that it would force us
    to share our most advanced defensive technology with all states,
    including countries of concern, that have ratified this agreement.
        Another assertion they made is that it requires us to abandon all
    controls we have on the proliferation of sensitive technology through
    mechanisms like the Australia Group.
        As I reviewed the treaty, I became a little concerned about this.
    With regard to sharing defensive technology, some general provisions
    appeared to back up their claim.
        But close inspection reveals that the critics are wrong.
        First, the provisions of Article Ten, Paragraph Three are
    deliberately vague: the obligation on a party is to ``facilitate'' the
    ``fullest possible exchange'' of equipment and information.
        When read in light of the overriding imperative in Article One to
    not assist any party from engaging in activities prohibited by the CWC,
    it is clear that we will not be obligated to provide assistance to
    rogue states under this provision.
        Now just to make sure that I was reading this correctly, I asked
    the White House to clarify this point for me. Sandy Berger, the
    President's National Security Adviser, today sent me a letter that
    confirms this interpretation.
        In Mr. Berger's letter, he states that any exchange of equipment
    and technology under Paragraph Three of Article Ten ``is limited to
    that which we determine would be appropriate and permitted under the
    convention.'' In addition, Paragraph Seven of Article Ten requires no
    assistance ``other than medical supplies, if we so choose.''
        I ask that this letter from Mr. Berger be inserted into the record,
    so that my colleagues can reassure themselves that this treaty does not
    oblige us to share advanced chemical defense technology with rogue
    states.
        On this point, the Chairman and I are very close to agreement on a
    condition that would require the executive branch to ensure that
    countries of concern receive no assistance from us beyond medical
    antidotes and treatment. And that would be fully in keeping with
    Article Ten of the CWC.
        As for the argument that we would be forced to abandon our current
    mechanisms to control the proliferation of sensitive technology, the
    CWC explicitly allows us to keep these protections in place.
        Article Eleven supports chemical trade and technology exchange
    ``for purposes not prohibited under this convention.'' It also requires
    that trade restrictions not be ``incompatible with the obligations
    undertaken under this convention.''
        But the CWC is completely consistent with continued enforcement of
    the Australia Group controls, which member states use to keep chemical
    and biological weapons material out of the hands of rogue states. The
    executive branch has said this time and again, and so have our friends
    and allies in the Australia Group.
        That helps explain why twenty-six of the twenty-nine members of the
    Australia Group have ratified this treaty--everyone except Iceland,
    Luxembourg and the United States.
        Last October, at the most recent meeting of the Australia Group,
    the twenty-nine countries reaffirmed their intention to maintain common
    export controls while joining the Chemical Weapons Convention.
        In a statement issued at that meeting, the Australia Group said,
    and I quote: ``the maintenance of effective export controls will remain
    an essential practical means of fulfilling obligations under the CWC.''
        I ask consent that this statement be inserted into the record.
        I am convinced that the CWC does not require us to share our most
    advanced defensive technology or to abandon existing controls on
    chemical weapons. And just to make certain of that, I asked Sandy
    Berger to address this point in the letter I referred to.
        So I ask my colleagues to review this section of the treaty and to
    examine Mr. Berger's letter and the Australia Group's statement to
    reassure themselves that the CWC does not obligate us to share advanced
    defensive technology or chemicals or chemical technologies with
    countries like China, Cuba or Iran.
        Turning to another issue, my colleague, Senator Smith, expressed an
    interest yesterday in the constitutional issues that many critics of
    the convention have raised. I want to take this opportunity to set the
    record straight.
        The convention is constitutional. There is nothing in the
    convention that requires searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment,
    takings of property without just compensation, or compelled self-
    incriminatory testimony
        Just this morning we received a letter from twenty-two law
    professors and distinguished attorneys expressing their view that the
    convention is constitutional, including former Attorney General Elliot
    Richardson, former State Department legal adviser and Harvard law
    professor Abram Chayes, Columbia University professor Louis Henkin, and
    Harvard law professor Laurence Tribe. I ask that this letter be placed
    into the record.
        Those who claim that the CWC would permit international inspectors
    to engage in warrantless searches in any business or private home are
    dead wrong and are spreading falsehoods.
        There will be no warrantless searches under the CWC, period. Here
    are the facts:
        There are two types of inspections--routine inspections and
    challenge inspections.
        Routine inspections apply only to declared facilities--that is,
    facilities that produce or use scheduled chemicals. In the unlikely
    event that a declared facility does not consent to be searched, an
    administrative warrant will be sought from a federal judge or
    magistrate judge.
        This is the same procedure that would be used for inspections
    conducted under Federal health, safety, and environmental laws.
        Challenge inspections are conducted at the request of another
    government based on evidence of possible non-compliance. These
    inspections can take place anywhere in the United States.
        The administration has agreed that, absent consent, the U.S.
    Government will have to obtain a criminal search warrant, based on
    probable cause of criminal wrongdoing, to conduct a challenge
    inspection everywhere but declared facilities.
        If a search warrant cannot be obtained for either type of search,
    the inspection will not take place.
        And, since the convention allows the United States Government to
    ``take into account any constitutional obligations it may have with
    regard to searches and seizures'' when granting access to U.S.
    facilities, we will not be in breach of our treaty obligations if a
    challenge inspection is denied due to Fourth Amendment considerations.
        I ask consent that a letter from the Attorney General to Senator
    Lott addressing these very issues be made a part of the record.
        I hope that the Attorney General's assurances, along with the
    statements of other administration officials, have eased the concerns
    of those who, like me, strongly believe in the importance of the Fourth
    Amendment.
        Again, I would like to thank my colleagues and our witnesses for
    their time and attention this morning. I hope that these hearings will
    help to clear up the misconceptions about the Chemical Weapons
    Convention so that we can move expeditiously to bring this treaty
    before the full Senate for a vote on ratification.
        This treaty enters into force on April 29, and time is running
    short.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
                                     ______

                    Letter From Attorney General Janet Reno

                      to Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott

                                Office of the Attorney General,
                                          Washington DC, March 3, 1997.
    Hon. Trent Lott,
    Majority Leader,
    U.S. Senate, Washington, DC 20510.
        Dear Mr. Leader: As the public debate over ratification of the
    Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) grows in intensity, various concerns
    regarding the constitutionality of the CWC have come to my attention.
    Some have suggested that enforcement of the CWC, in order to be
    effective, will necessarily impinge on Fourth Amendment rights.
    Specifically, concerns have been raised that the Convention will
    authorize warrantless, non-consensual searches or that searches will be
    conducted pursuant to warrants that lack probable cause. The CWC and
    the draft implementing legislation contemplate no such circumstances.
    All inspections will be conducted consistent with the requirements of
    the Fourth Amendment.
        Let there be no doubt, the Department of Justice stands fully
    behind both the goals and the specific terms of the CWC. The
    Convention, along with the proposed legislation, strikes the proper
    balance between effective efforts to eliminate the scourge of chemical
    weapons and to preserve our constitutional rights. Over the course of
    the past four years, the Justice Department has closely scrutinized CWC
    and has assisted in the drafting of its implementing legislation. Our
    focus has been consistently on the necessity of adherence to
    constitutional requirements. In testimony given on September 9, 1996,
    before the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on the
    Constitution, Richard Shiffrin, Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
    Office of Legal Counsel, explained how inspections would be conducted
    consistent with the Fourth Amendment. We expect the vast majority of
    routine inspections will be conducted with consent. On the few
    occasions where consent has been withheld, administrative search
    warrants will be sought for routine inspections. In the case of
    challenge inspections, again, we expect consent to be the rule.
    Declared facilities selected for a challenge inspection would be
    subject to inspections in the same manner as provided under the CWC and
    implementing legislation for routine inspections. However, a criminal
    search warrant will be applied for in every case where consent is
    denied to a challenge inspection of undeclared facilities.
        The convention, in Annex 2, pt. X, para. 41, specifically allows
    the U.S. Government, in granting access to facilities identified for
    challenge inspections, to ``take into account any constitutional
    obligations it may have with regard to proprietary rights or searches
    and seizures.'' Hence, in the rare event that the Fourth Amendment
    would pose a bar to a search of premises identified for a challenge
    inspection, the United States would remain in full compliance with its
    obligations under the CWC.
        I realize that many of the detractors of the Convention are
    principled in their opposition. Their constitutional concerns are,
    however, unfounded. The dictates of the Fourth Amendment have been
    scrupulously honored in the drafting and will be rigidly followed in
    the implementation. Finally, no legitimate Fifth Amendment issues are
    raised with respect to the record keeping or disclosure requirements.
    The provisions of the Convention and the draft implementing legislation
    neither require nor contemplate compelling anyone to incriminate
    himself. And, both the CWC and draft legislation in no way authorize
    the taking of private property without compensation.
        It is my hope that the Senate will consider the Convention in an
    expeditious manner and will consent to its ratification.
                Sincerely,
                                            Janet Reno.
                                   __________
                                                         April 9, 1997.
    Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr,
    Minority Leader, Committee on Foreign Relations,
    Washington, DC.
        Dear Senator Biden: The undersigned lawyers, former government
    officials, and professors of constitutional and international law write
    to urge the Senate to give its prompt advice and consent to the
    ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The Senate's
    decision will have profound ramifications for United States leadership
    in controlling the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, the
    Convention will enter into force on April 29 whether or not the United
    States ratifies, but if it does so without U.S. ratification, American
    participation in the staffing of the Organization for the Prohibition
    of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and in the inspector corps will be severely
    reduced. Therefore, prompt action is essential.
        The CWC is a global commitment to eliminate an entire category of
    weapons of mass destruction and to verify their continued absence. The
    treaty's backbone is the most thoroughgoing international law
    enforcement system yet devised, providing for verification of the
    destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles and for monitoring of
    chemical plants to prevent future proliferation. The verification
    system includes declaration of precursor chemicals that could be made
    into chemical weapons, routine inspections at facilities that are
    declared to possess such precursors, and ``challenge'' inspections to
    confirm compliance at any facility or location. President George Bush,
    under whose administration the treaty was completed and signed,
    characterized the Convention as ``an entirely new concept for
    overcoming the great obstacle that has impeded progress in the past
    toward a full chemical weapons ban.''
        We would have thought that U.S. ratification of this Convention was
    a foregone conclusion. Unfortunately, at the last minute, objections
    have been raised concerning the constitutionality of the Convention's
    elaborate verification system under the Fourth Amendment. Treaty
    opponents have circulated the claim that, under the CWC, foreign
    inspectors would be empowered to intrude into the privacy of American
    citizens and businesses in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights.
    Much of this commentary based on a letter from Judge Robert Bork to
    Senator Orrin Hatch stating that ``there are grounds to be concerned''
    about the compatibility of some of the provisions of the Convention
    with the Constitution. Judge Bork's letter concedes that he is ``not
    intimately familiar with the provisions of the Convention,'' an
    acknowledgment that is borne out by the inaccuracy of his description
    of the Convention in the body of his letter.
        The short answer to these contentions is that the Convention itself
    provides that each State Party shall implement its provisions ``in
    accordance with its constitutional processes,'' (Art. VII, par. 1), and
    the challenge inspection provisions further require that inspections
    must be consistent with ``any constitutional obligations * * * with
    regard to * * * searches and seizures.'' (Verification Annex, pt. X,
    par. 41). Thus, Congress, which must pass domestic legislation to
    implement the inspection provisions of the Convention, can do so in a
    manner that fully protects the rights of American citizens under the
    Fourth Amendment without in any way violating the international
    obligations the United States will undertake under the treaty. A vast
    quantity of scholarly and governmental discussion on the subject has
    affirmed virtually unanimously that the CWC fully respects U.S.
    constitutional protections of privacy. Indeed, every scholar willing to
    put his or her opinions on the CWC to the test of detailed public
    review agrees that the treaty manifests extraordinary care in balancing
    the demands of privacy against the requirements for effective
    verification of the Convention.
        If the Senate fails to give its advice and consent to the CWC, an
    extraordinary achievement of over fifteen years of bipartisan effort
    will be frustrated; and a major opportunity to prevent the
    proliferation of chemical weapons will have been lost. If the Senate
    wishes to reject the treaty, that is of course its prerogative. But it
    should not do so on the spurious ground that it conflicts with the
    Constitution.
                Sincerely,
    Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni, DePaul University College of Law
     Professor Richard B. Bilder, Burrus-Bascom Professor, University of
            Wisconsin Law School
     Professor Thomas Buergenthal, Lobingier Professor of Comparative Law &
            Jurisprudence, the George Washington University Law School
     Professor George Bunn, Dean Emeritus, Professor Emeritus, University
            of Wisconsin Law School
    Professor David D. Caron, University of California at Berkeley School
            of Law
    Abram Chayes, Professor of Law, Emeritus Felix Frankfurter Harvard Law
            School
    Professor Lori Fisler Damrosch, Columbia University School of Law
    Professor John Hart Ely, Richard A. Hausler Professor University of
            Miami School of Law
    Phil Fleming, Crowell & Moring
     Professor Thomas M. Franck, Murray and Ida Becker Professor, Director,
            Center for International Studies, New York University School of
            Law
    Professor Michael J. Glennon, University of California at Davis School
            of Law
    Professor Barry Kellman, DePaul University College of Law
    Professor John F. Murphy, Villanova University School of Law
    John B. Rhinelander, Shaw, Pittman
    Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter, J. Sinclair Armstrong Professor of
            International, Comparative and Foreign Law, Harvard Law School
    Professor Laurence H. Tribe, Ralph S. Tyler, Jr. Professor of
            Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School
    Professor Louis Henkin, University Professor Emeritus, Special Service
            Professor, Columbia University School of Law
    Professor David A. Koplow, Director, Center for Applied Legal Studies,
            Georgetown University Law Center
    Professor Peter Raven-Hansen, Associate Dean, Academic Affairs, Glen
            Earl Weston Research Professor, George Washington University
            Law School
    Elliot L. Richardson, Esq., Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy
    Professor Edwin (Rip) Smith, Leon Benwell Professor of Law and
            International Relations, University of Southern California Law
            School
    Professor Burns H. Weston, Bessie Dutton Murray Distinguished
            Professor, Associate Dean, International and Comparative Legal
            Studies, University of Iowa College of Law

        The Chairman. Let us have brief statements by our other
    Senators here, if you wish. Senator Robb.
        Senator Robb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You were kind enough
    to make reference to the fact that I came in just at the
    conclusion of yesterday afternoon's hearing, and you had not
    recognized me as you were banging the gavel. I thank you for
    that acknowledgement.
        I had raced up from an armed services hearing, trying to
    sort out the dangers posed by Russian submarines and other
    submarines, in order to get here. I want to assure you,
    however, that both the portions of yesterday's meeting, in the
    morning that I had to leave and the portion that I missed
    yesterday afternoon, were replayed on C-SPAN, beginning about
    midnight and ending about 2:45 a.m.
        And, Mr. Chairman, to demonstrate my commitment to the
    cause, I want you to know that I stayed up and watched all of
    the hearing that I missed. Regrettably, I am going to have to
    go to an intelligence hearing today, so I will miss more. But I
    am sure that it will be rebroadcast.
        On a more serious vein, I did attend all of the hearings
    last year. I thought they were some of the best and most
    informative. There have been excellent witnesses on both sides
    of the question. I committed myself to the affirmative side. I
    thought that was the more persuasive argument last year. I have
    not changed my position. But I think that the distinguished
    witnesses that we have had for these hearings have done more to
    give the American people, and certainly the members who are
    going to vote on these issues, a better understanding of what
    the treaty does and does not do. For that, I commend you, and I
    thank you.
        The Chairman. Thank you very much. Senator Frist.
        Senator Frist. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to
    congratulate you for bringing forth such outstanding witnesses
    in this series of hearings. I want to thank each of you for
    being with us today.
        I continue to struggle with the issues that we are talking
    about--the verification, the extent of coverage, global
    coverage, enforceability. Part of it is based on my experience
    of being in chemistry labs myself, whether it is organic
    chemistry or inorganic chemistry, which I had to do to become a
    physician, and remembering very vividly people saying, ``right
    in this room, in this little laboratory, we could do such
    destruction if we wanted to.'' Then I come back today, in terms
    of that verification and enforceability, and I look forward to
    hearing from each of our witnesses as we systematically
    continue our addressing these very important issues.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Briefly, please, ma'am, and sir. After you two, if any
    other Senators come in, I am going to not notice their arrival
    either. Senator Feinstein.
        Senator Feinstein. Just very quickly, Mr. Chairman, if I
    might, and to our distinguished witnesses.
        I think the thing that would be most helpful to me, and
    perhaps you can cover this in your testimony, would be if you
    could substantiate your comments on your belief of non-
    verification, why you believe it is better to stay out of this
    kind of a treaty and why you think that, with our staying out
    of it, we would have a better opportunity (a) to make a moral
    commitment and (b) a real commitment and (c) how verification
    would be improved if we are not in the treaty.
        I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. I am sure they will answer that in due time.
        Briefly, please.
        Senator Wellstone. Mr. Chairman, I feel like I am under
    pressure to be brief.
        The Chairman. You are.
        Senator Wellstone. So I will be brief. I know we have got a
    long hearing today, and I am only going to be able to stay for
    the first part. I apologize to the others. So I thank the Chair
    for the hearing and I thank each of you for being here.
        The Chairman. Do you have anything to say, Chuck?
        Senator Hagel. No. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Ambassador Kirkpatrick, you will be the lead-
    off, please.

     STATEMENT OF DR. JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK, FORMER U.S. PERMANENT
     REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, SENIOR FELLOW, AMERICAN
                          ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

        Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you for coming.
        Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
    for inviting me to testify before this distinguished committee
    on this important subject. It is an important subject, and the
    Senate's decision will be more important even.
        I have followed this and some comparable issues with great
    interest since I served as U.S. Permanent Representative to the
    United Nations under Ronald Reagan. At that time, there were
    several such covenants that either had been passed or were
    being considered. It was then that I became aware of some of
    the facts which have ever since caused me to have a lot of
    questions and doubts about such covenants.
        It was then that I first became aware of the fact that the
    Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty was being used to achieve very
    different purposes than those for which it was undoubtedly
    intended. It was then I became aware of the fact that it was
    being used to acquire and spread the technology and products
    needed to produce nuclear weapons rather than to prevent their
    spread.
        It was even then understood among the informed public in
    the United Nations context that a country such as Iraq, by
    signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the NPT, acquired
    a right to share technology which could then be used to produce
    nuclear products. Now, it is generally understood by such
    countries that the shortest route to a nuclear capacity is
    through the NPT, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
        Iran is traveling that road today. We and other signatories
    are helping to finance their development of a nuclear capacity,
    and we know it.
        Secretary of State Christopher made an interesting comment
    on this subject 2 years ago, when he said, in terms of its,
    ``organization, programs, procurement and covered activities,
    Iran is pursuing the classic route to nuclear weapons, which
    has been followed by almost all states that have recently
    sought a nuclear capability.''
        Now, more recently, there have been several public reports
    of U.S. Government efforts to persuade Russia not to assist
    Iran in the development of a nuclear capacity and of
    operational reactors. There have been reminders from Russia
    that Iran is a signatory of the NPT and, as such, has a right
    to assistance in developing a nuclear capacity for peaceful
    use. I believe, Mr. Chairman, that there has been far too
    little attention given to this problem, the principal source of
    nuclear proliferation.
        It was also in my U.N. years that I first became really
    sensitive to the issue of the composition of the governing
    board of the IAEA. Senator Biden may think I am not keeping my
    eye on the ball. But I assure you, Senator Biden, I am.
        As for the composition of the governing board of the IAEA,
    Iraq, as I am sure many of you know, sat on the governing board
    of the IAEA through just exactly that period that it was
    violating its own promises not to undertake development of
    nuclear weapons.
        It also was violating, at that very moment, already
    existing promises not to use poison gases in war. Iran and Iraq
    are two of the countries in the world that have already
    violated the Geneva Protocol against using poison gases. As we
    all understand, I think, there is already an operative treaty
    which forbids the use in war of, ``asphyxiating, poisonous or
    other gases,'' which is the Geneva Protocol of 1925.
        Now, Mr. Chairman, many people speak of the Nuclear
    Nonproliferation Treaty and its verification regime as if it
    had prevented the proliferation of nuclear weapons. If that
    were the case, Mr. Chairman, Iraq, North Korea, India, and
    Pakistan, among others, would not today have either advanced
    programs for producing nuclear weapons or the weapons
    themselves. But, of course, they do.
        There is a kind of strange silence which shrouds the facts
    of nuclear proliferation. Even the U.S. Government has been
    strangely reluctant to face facts about the failure of the
    Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to prevent proliferation. But
    if our government and our allies had faced facts about the
    nuclear proliferation facilitated by the NPT, they would
    presumably not have reproduced Article XI and other key
    loopholes in the Convention on Chemical Weapons which have
    permitted and facilitated proliferation.
        But, of course, in the Convention on Chemical Weapons, they
    have paragraphs which call for sharing technology among the
    signatories and forbid efforts to restrict or impede trade in
    development and promotion of scientific and technological
    knowledge in the field of chemistry--for peaceful purposes, to
    be sure. I think the spirit of the CWC is, ``share now'' the
    treaty counsels, ``verify purposes and intentions later.''
        Mr. Chairman, my years at the United Nations sensitized me
    to the composition of governing boards of the United Nations.
    All too often, the composition of those governing boards simply
    reflect the bloc system and its operation in the U.N.; it
    dominates many processes of the U.N. The bloc system is purely
    geographical and political in character, and takes little or no
    account of technical competence or democratic representation--
    or of who pays the bills, I might add.
        I believe that the Senate should take specific note of the
    composition of all the international boards entrusted to
    enforce international covenants, boards which make important
    decisions affecting our country. The CWC governing board will
    be chosen on a basis that gives little weight to competence,
    because the IAEA's governing board is used as a model. The
    IAEA's verification regime has not been able either to verify
    or to enforce the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
        As we can learn hard lessons about failures of the IAEA
    regime to adequately verify violations of the NPT, so, Mr.
    Chairman, can we learn some hard lessons from the IAEA
    experience, about the non-enforceability of just such treaties.
        What happens when violations of the Nonproliferation Treaty
    are discovered? This is a very important question. There are
    the questions of verifiability and enforceability. What happens
    when a nation which has signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation
    Treaty is discovered to be in violation?
        The answer is: Not much.
        Iraq has suffered some penalties because of its violations
    of the NPT. But it has suffered, because it invaded a
    neighbor--namely, Kuwait--not because it cynically violated the
    NPT norms.
        I believe that the composition of the governing board of
    the Chemical Weapons Convention, the OPCW, guarantees that
    countries with the greatest technical knowledge will be in a
    permanent minority in that decisionmaking group. The important
    decisions will be made by the OPCW; but the United States and
    Western Europe, the most highly industrialized and technically
    sophisticated countries, will be in a permanent minority in
    that group.
        The United States has no guaranteed seat in that governing
    body. Neither the amount of our financial contribution nor our
    technical competence guarantees us a seat. We will compete for
    a seat with the other most highly industrial countries for 10
    of 41 seats. Asia will have nine. There will be one rotating
    seat. Latin America and the Caribbean will have seven. Africa
    will have nine. Eastern Europe will have five. What we in the
    U.N. call WEOG, Western Europe and others group--and we fall in
    that group--will have 10.
        I am not certain, Mr. Chairman, where Russia falls in these
    groups today. Probably in Eastern Europe, but maybe not. There
    would have to be some special provision made. That is
    important, since, if indeed Russia ratifies the treaty, it is
    eligible to sit on the OPCW. It may not. It has signed but not
    yet ratified, of course.
        But the composition of the OPCW explains why its decisions
    are not likely to take account of the best technical
    information available. Not only that, the method of composition
    of that group explains why most efforts by U.N. bodies to
    develop operational groups fail. Because the members of the
    group are chosen on the basis of criteria which are irrelevant
    to their ability to perform, with technical competence, the
    task of the group.
        From experience with the NPT and the IAEA, I believe we
    have had a great deal of opportunity to learn about the
    problems of verification and enforceability. The IAEA's
    verification procedures, of course, require prior notification
    and consent of the party to be inspected including the parties
    inspected, the right to approve or veto the composition of the
    teams of inspectors.
        Now, we all know that Iraq's nuclear projects and its
    progress were discovered only as a consequence of their defeat
    in the Gulf War. Iraq's violations of NPT have been discovered
    again and again, as we keep finding things we did not know and
    new information about aspects of their program that we were
    unaware of by virtue of our access through the armistice and
    their defeat in the Kuwaiti War. It was not the result of IAEA
    inspections. Routine procedures for verification did not reveal
    Iraq's large nuclear project.
        Now, as everyone knows, it is much simpler to develop
    chemical weapons than nuclear weapons. It is much easier to
    procure and hide the components. As everyone knows, the
    technology required in developing nuclear weapons is much more
    complex and esoteric than chemical weapons. Everyone knows that
    chemical weapons rely largely on dual-use substances that are
    common in everyday life. Chemical weapons can be manufactured
    with uncomplicated technology.
        That is, I think, why, in the 1980's, when I was at the
    United Nations, it was commonplace to hear Third World
    spokesmen refer to chemical weapons as the Third World's
    nuclear bombs. Even very technologically underdeveloped
    countries could produce them. It was suggested often that it
    was not quite cricket for the devel-
    oped countries to try to deprive the least developed countries
    of the Third World weapons of mass destruction.
        I do not think any of us need weapons of mass destruction,
    quite frankly, to prove that we can survive in the contemporary
    world.
        Mr. Chairman, I believe that the Senate should face the
    fact that ratifying this treaty will not prevent the
    manufacture or use of chemical weapons. That is precisely the
    point. The Chemical Weapons Convention is neither verifiable
    nor enforceable.
        Proponents sometimes say, so it is not perfect. Is not
    something that is not perfect better than nothing at all?
        I do not think that is necessarily so, particularly since
    the countries that have signed and ratified the Convention are
    countries about which we would never worry about using chemical
    weapons. The countries that have neither signed nor ratified
    are countries that we are most likely to worry about--the so-
    called rogue states or outlaw nations--Syria, Iraq, North
    Korea, Libya. Those are the countries we worry about.
        We do not worry about Britain, France, the WEOG, and the
    Australia Group. I do not worry a bit about the Australia
    Group. Those are our best friends. They do not need to worry
    about us either, I might say.
        The treaty's advocates simply ignore the fact that the
    treaty cannot help us monitor the production of these weapons
    by states most likely to use chemical weapons. Why, then, have
    so many countries signed on to a treaty that can offer so
    little protection?
        I believe, Mr. Chairman, that it is simply wishful
    thinking, frankly. I believe it is hoping and pretending that
    something that you want to be verifiable, enforceable, and
    universal may actually turn out to be that, in spite of the
    fact that, from experience, we know it is not and will not.
        We should also face the fact that signing the treaty will
    not prevent signatories of bad will from breaking their
    promises not to produce noxious gases. We know that Russia has
    in fact already, in its continuing production of noxious gases,
    broken two sets of promises--not the promises of the treaty,
    but bilateral promises to the United States involving the
    production of nerve gases and the failure to destroy gases
    which they had agreed to destroy. Countries do not necessarily
    keep their promises.
        Advocates of the treaty argue it would surely do some good
    and, at the very least, would do no harm.
        Mr. Chairman, I believe that the Chemical Weapons
    Convention will actually make the world more dangerous. That is
    why I came today. I believe the treaty will hasten the spread
    of advanced chemical weapons, as I believe a comparable treaty
    has hastened the spread of the technology for nuclear weapon
    construction--and that is not all.
        Mr. Chairman, I recently asked a French friend, who happens
    to be visiting just now, did the Maginot Line do France any
    harm in World War II?
        Well, I think most French think so. It gave them the
    impression that they had dealt with a dangerous threat--an
    invasion from the east, across their borders--when in fact they
    were in as much danger as before. The Maginot Line created a
    comforting illusion which lulled France into a false sense of
    security.
        I believe the world is probably less dangerous today, Mr.
    Chairman, than at any time in my life--or certainly than in
    most of my life. I cherish this sense of lessened threat. I
    love it. But I believe we are not so safe that we can afford to
    create a false sense of security by pretending that we have
    eliminated chemical weapons.
        President Clinton said in one statement that I read: ``We
    will have banished poison gas from the Earth.'' Well, that is
    poetic license or a politician's license or perhaps a
    President's license, but it surely is not an accurate statement
    about what will be the case. The countries most likely to
    produce and use poison gas are unaffected by this treaty.
        I think the Senate, personally, should reaffirm the U.S.
    sense of responsibility and our commitment to that
    responsibility toward preserving a peaceful world and decline
    to ratify this treaty unless or until progress is made toward
    making it more verifiable, enforceable, and universal. There is
    still a long way to go.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Ambassador Kirkpatrick follows:]

                 Prepared Statement of Dr. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

        Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to testify before this
    distinguished committee today.
        The subject of today's hearing is important. The Senate's decision
    will be more important. I have followed this issue with interest since
    my tenure as U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations under
    Ronald Reagan brought several such proposed covenants to the forefront
    of my attention.
        It was then that I first became aware of the fact that the Nuclear
    Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) was being used to achieve very different
    purposes than those for which it was intended--that it was being used
    to acquire and spread the technology and products needed to produce
    nuclear weapons rather than to prevent their spread.
        It was even then understood among the informed public that by
    signing the treaty a country--such as Iraq--acquired a ``right'' to
    share technology needed to produce nuclear products.
        By now, it is generally understood that the shortest route to a
    nuclear capacity is through the NPT. Iran is traveling that road today.
    We and other signatories are helping finance their development of a
    nuclear capacity. Secretary of State Warren Christopher said on this
    subject, ``Based upon a wide variety of data, we know that since the
    mid-1980's, Iran has had an organized structure dedicated to acquiring
    and developing nuclear weapons.'' He added that in terms of its
    ``organization, programs, procurement, and covert activities, Iran is
    pursuing the classic route to nuclear weapons which has been followed
    by almost all states that have recently sought a nuclear capability.''
    [F.N. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 7/95. Vol. 51, Issue 4, page 23.]
        More recently there have been several public reports of U.S.
    Government efforts that persuade Russia not to assist Iran in the
    development of its nuclear capacity and reminders that Iran--a
    signatory of the NPT--had the right to assistance in developing a
    nuclear capacity for peaceful use. There has been far too little public
    attention to this--the principal source of nuclear proliferation.
        It was also in my U.N. years that I first noticed the composition
    of the governing board of the International Atomic Energy Agency
    (IAEA). Iraq sat on the governing board of the IAEA and were at that
    very time violating promises not to undertake the development of
    nuclear weapons--promises not to use poison gases in war. [Iraq did
    both.] Several of the same countries have already violated commitments
    not to use poison gas in war, for, as we all understand, there is
    already an operative treaty which forbids the use in war of
    ``Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases.'' It is the Geneva Protocol
    of 1925.
        Mr. Chairman, many people speak as if the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
    Treaty and verification regime had prevented proliferation of nuclear
    weapons. If that were the case Iraq, North Korea, India, Pakistan would
    not have either bombs today nor advanced programs for producing them.
    But they do.
        A strange silence shrouds the facts of nuclear proliferation. Even
    the U.S. Government has been strangely reluctant to face the facts
    about the failure of the NPT to prevent proliferation. But it is an
    open secret that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has been a source
    of proliferation of nuclear technology. It is also perfectly clear that
    the CWC will facilitate the spread of chemical weapons through
    provisions in Chapter Eleven of the treaty that call on countries with
    a developed chemical industry to share their advanced technology with
    less developed countries.
        If our government and our allies had faced facts about the nuclear
    proliferation facilitated by the NPT they would presumably not have
    reproduced in Article XI the loopholes that have been permitted and
    facilitated it. But they have in the paragraphs which call for sharing
    technology among the signatories and forbid efforts to ``restrict or
    impede trade and development and promotion of scientific and
    technological knowledge in the field of chemistry * * * '' for peaceful
    purposes to be sure.
        Share now, the treaty counsels, verify purposes and intentions
    later.
        My years at the United Nations also sensitized me to the
    composition of the governing boards of U.N. bodies. All too often the
    composition of governing boards simply reflects the bloc system which
    dominates many processes in the United Nations. The bloc system is
    purely political/geographical in character. It takes little or no
    account of technical competence and standards, of democratic
    representation, or of who pays the bills.
        The Senate should take careful note of the IAEA governing board.
        Iraq served on the governing board of the IAEA the entire time that
    it was working to develop nuclear weapons in violation of its pledge.
    It is not the only known violator to be selected for that board. The
    Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) governing board will be chosen on a
    basis that gives still less weight to competence.
        The IAEA's verification regime often regarded as a model has not
    been able either to verify or to enforce the NPT.
        As we can learn hard lessons about failures of the IAEA regime to
    adequately verify violations of the NPT, so we can learn about the non-
    enforceability of such Treaties. What happens when violations are
    discovered? Not much. Iraq has suffered because it invaded a neighbor,
    not because it cynically violated NPT norms.
        The composition of the governing body of the Organization for the
    Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) guarantees that countries with
    the greatest technical knowledge will be in a permanent minority. There
    are no permanent members on the OPCW and no vetoes.
        The composition of the Executive Council of the OPCW explains why
    the U.N. bodies fail at operational efforts, through their validity as
    representational bodies.
        From experience with the NPT and the IAEA we have had the
    opportunity to learn a good deal about the problems of verification and
    the weaknesses of the verification regime that was developed to prevent
    the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the inadequacy of the IAEA's
    verification procedures that require prior notification of the party to
    be inspected, consent of the inspected party, and a right to approve or
    veto the composition of the team of inspectors.
        Iraq's large, advanced nuclear development project was discovered
    only as a consequence of their defeat in the Gulf War NOT as a result
    of IAEA inspections. Likewise, North Korea's large nuclear development.
        And as everyone knows, it is much simpler to develop chemical than
    nuclear weapons, much easier to procure and to hide the components.
    Nuclear weapons require weapons grade plutonium. The technology
    required in developing nuclear weapons is more complex and esoteric.
    But chemical weapons rely largely on dual use substances common in
    everyday life, small space, and uncomplicated technology. That is why
    in the 80s chemical weapons were sometimes called the ``Third World's
    nuclear bombs.'' Even very technologically underdeveloped countries
    could produce them.
        The Senate should face the fact that ratifying the treaty will not
    prevent the manufacture or use of chemical weapons. The Chemical
    Weapons Convention is neither verifiable nor enforceable. Proponents
    attempt to dismiss the many loopholes in the treaty with the assertion
    that nothing is perfect. But perfection is not the question.
        Proponents seek to minimize the fact that the countries with the
    most highly developed programs either have signed but not ratified the
    treaty--Russia, China, Cuba, Iran, Vietnam--or have not signed at all--
    Syria, Iraq, North Korea, Libya--but signing does not solve the
    problem. Signing will not prevent signatories from breaking their
    promises not to produce noxious gases as Russia has recently broken a
    promise to the United States.
        And the treaty's advocates simply ignore the fact the treaty cannot
    help us monitor the production of the states most likely to use
    chemical warfare.
        Why then have so many countries signed on to a treaty that can
    offer so little protection?
        Only wishful thinking encourages it. It is as if pretending that
    the treaty were verifiable, enforceable, and universal would make it
    so. But it doesn't. It also will not prevent signatories from breaking
    their promises not to produce noxious gases as Russia has recently
    done.
        But surely it would do some good, treaty advocates argue. At the
    very least we can say it would do no harm.
        Mr. Chairman, it is because I believe the CWC would actually make
    the world more dangerous that I am here. I believe the treaty will
    hasten the spread of advanced chemical weapons as it has nuclear
    technology.
        Americans working for ratification of the CWC should take a hard
    look at what happened in the United Nations Human Rights Commission
    meeting in Geneva this week. The United States could not even get a
    discussion of China's human rights violations put on the agenda.
        For the seventh straight year China was able to prevent
    discussion--much less censure--of its deeply shocking treatment of
    Tibet and all manner of dissidents and to do so by a comfortable 27 to
    17 margin (with nine abstentions). China won the vote with strong Third
    World support, including some close U.S. associates such as Egypt,
    India and Indonesia.
        China's chief delegate, Wu Jianmen, explained later the vote showed
    that the Third World ``identified'' with China. He also emphasized the
    failure of some close U.S. allies (France, Germany, Italy, Spain,
    Japan, Greece, Italy, Canada and Australia) to co-sponsor the
    ``Western'' resolution this year, because, he said, they ``want dialog
    and cooperation and not confrontation.'' In truth China won the vote
    because there is weak support for democracy beyond North America,
    Europe, and a few Asian and South American states, and also because
    China mounted a tough worldwide campaign--that included arm-twisting
    and threat of economic consequences. A belated U.S. effort to rally
    support--including personal intervention by Secretary of State
    Madeleine Albright--did not help much.
        This shameful outcome was not a defeat for the United States or the
    countries sponsoring the resolution. It was a defeat for humane values
    and rational discussion of deeply serious moral and political issues.
    It was a defeat for victims of repression and for the very purposes for
    which the United Nations was founded. This outcome in the Human Rights
    Commission is a harsh reminder that the United States often cannot win
    votes for its basic values and interests in U.N. arenas--even when the
    issue is purely symbolic and the U.S., itself, and most of our
    principal allies are present.
        The balance of power would be much less favorable to the United
    States in the governing body that will implement the Chemical Weapons
    Convention.
        In pressing the Senate to ratify the CWC quickly, before the treaty
    enters into effect on April 29, the Clinton administration has argued
    that by getting in on the ground floor the United States will be
    assured of having an important voice in shaping the structure and
    function of the organization. But that is not so. The composition and
    structure of the governing body of the CWC are prescribed in the
    treaty. The treaty, itself, hands us a stacked deck with which to play
    for influence.
        The United States, Great Britain, France, Russia and China (that
    is, the permanent members of the Security Council) are all guaranteed
    seats on the Human Rights Commission but not on the Executive Council
    that will administer the CWC. The 41 members of that Executive Council
    will be designated from the U.N.'s standard geographical groupings and
    elected by all the signatories of the CWC for 2 year terms. There will
    be no permanent members and no vetoes.
        The United States is a member of the WEOG (Western European and
    Other Group) which is allotted 10 seats on the 41 member Executive
    Council that also provides nine seats for Asia, seven for Latin America
    and the Caribbean, nine for Africa, five for Eastern Europe plus one
    rotating seat. To win one of the 10 WEOG seats for a 2-year term, the
    United States will need to compete with the other Western industrial
    democratic nations who altogether will have only 10 of 41 seats (or 15
    of 41 seats if we count Eastern Europe; or 16 of 41 with all of Europe
    plus Japan).
        In this competition our friends in the European Union will have 15
    votes to our one vote. Therefore, the United States would frequently
    fail to gain a voice in the decisions of the Executive Council. Neither
    the amount of our financial contribution nor our technical competence
    would guarantee us a seat.
        The draft of the CWC supported by the Reagan administration guarded
    against this possibility. It provided that permanent members of the
    Security Council would be members of the Executive Council that
    implements the treaty. This would have guaranteed representation of the
    most powerful nations and those with the most highly developed chemical
    industries. The CWC which is now before the Senate operates on the
    basis of one country, one vote.
        The fact that the United States might have no voice in setting
    policy for implementing the CWC but would surely be bound by its
    decisions is one important reason that the U.S. Senate should not
    ratify this treaty.
        There are others.
        Most of the countries in the Human Rights Commission have ratified
    the Declaration on Universal Human Rights.
        Will the United States ratifying the CWC make the world safer?
        Mr. Chairman, did the Maginot Line do any harm to France in World
    War II? Most French think so. It gave them the impression that they had
    taken care of a dangerous threat: an invasion from the East; when in
    fact, they were in as much danger as ever. The Maginot Line created a
    comforting illusion which lulled France into a false sense of security
    and facilitated Hitler's conquest.
        The world is less dangerous today than during most of my lifetime.
    I cherish this sense of lessened threat. But we are not so safe we can
    afford to create a false sense of security by pretending that we have
    eliminated the threat of chemical weapons. President Bill Clinton said,
    ``We will have banished poison gas from the Earth.'' It will not be so.
    We had better do some hard thinking about how to defend ourselves and
    the world against the poison gases that have been and will be produced
    whether or not we ratify.
        I think the Senate should reaffirm the U.S. sense of responsibility
    and commitment to a peaceful world and decline to ratify this treaty
    unless or until it becomes verifiable, enforceable, and universal.
    There is a long way to go.
        Thank you.

        The Chairman. Thank you, Madam Ambassador.
        Let me say to the visitors here today and those who are
    watching on television that I have been to several functions
    that shared the podium with the distinguished Jeane
    Kirkpatrick, who, by the way, is a Senior Fellow of the
    American Enterprise Institute and, as almost everybody knows,
    she is a former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. But
    everywhere I go or have gone, where she has appeared likewise,
    I have sensed that she is one of the most respected women in
    America. We are honored to have you with us today.
        Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Now, we move to Mr. Richard N. Perle, who is
    one of the best informed individuals I know. He is formerly
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
    Policy. I do not know how many times I have called on Richard
    for information and guidance on various issues. We are
    certainly glad to have you here, and you may proceed, sir.
        Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, you do not have any idea how
    many times we have regretted that you called on him, because he
    is so persuasive. I hope you are not so good today, Richard.
        The Chairman. Just watch him.

     STATEMENT OF RICHARD N. PERLE, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
               DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

        Mr. Perle. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for inviting
    me.
        Senator Biden, I can assure you I would not have come today
    if I did not think there was a very strong case to be made. I
    will try to take seriously your injunction to keep my eye on
    the ball.
        In fact, I think my colleague and friend Jeane Kirkpatrick
    clearly identified the ball when she described the way in which
    the Nonproliferation Treaty, without anyone ever having
    intended that it should work this way, had the effect of making
    technology for the production of nuclear material far more
    readily available than it might have been otherwise--a defect
    that unhappily is reproduced like a computer virus in the
    Chemical Weapons Convention.
        Before I get into the key point I want to make today, let
    me say that I have chosen to focus on one issue--one rather
    narrow issue. I think that is in fact the ball that Senator
    Biden has in mind. My colleague Doug Feith, from whom you will
    hear shortly, has prepared a more comprehensive statement that
    deals with other aspects of the treaty in a thoroughly
    convincing and understandable way. I agree entirely with the
    points that Doug will soon be making.
        But I want to restrict myself to one key point. That is, as
    it happens, the point that Sandy Berger was concerned to deal
    with in the letter with which he provided you. I take that
    letter as confirmation of the fact that the National Security
    Adviser, like others, have begun, under the exigency of
    imminent action on this treaty, to understand that there are
    problems in the treaty that need to be addressed. I wish they
    had been addressed at an earlier stage in the proceedings. That
    is to say, while the treaty was under negotiation. Because had
    the ball that Sandy Berger has now found been seen earlier, we
    would have a treaty without Article X in it, and probably
    without Article XI in it.
        Had we been more attentive, had we learned the lesson of
    the Nonproliferation Treaty, had we thought through the means
    by which countries may in future acquire a meaningful military
    chemical weapons capability, I am quite convinced that we would
    not have allowed Article X to become a part of this treaty.
        What Jeane had to say about the Nonproliferation Treaty
    applies to this Convention in spades. The reason why I say in
    spades, Mr. Chairman, is that the production of nuclear
    material clandestinely from facilities that are intended for
    peaceful purposes and that are monitored by the IAEA--not
    perfectly, but monitored--is a very difficult thing to
    accomplish. Building nuclear power plants is not easy.
    Operating them is not easy. Handling nuclear material is not
    easy.
        Chemical weapons, on the other hand, pose an entirely
    different set of issues. The production of lethal chemicals
    which can be used for military purposes is not difficult. Any
    facility capable of producing insecticides, any facility
    capable of producing fertilizer can, with relatively minor
    modifications--well within the capacity of any country that has
    an insecticide or a fertilizer plant--be converted to the
    production of chemicals. Indeed, some of the chemicals of
    concern are not even barred under this treaty, because they are
    already so widely spread around the world.
        So the acquisition of lethal chemicals for military
    purposes is easy. But the possession of lethal chemicals is
    not, by itself, sufficient to constitute a military capability.
    Because in order to use chemical weapons for military purposes,
    you have to be able to protect your own troops. The soldiers
    that go into the field, the pilots that drop canisters, the
    artillerymen that launch chemical shells all need to be
    protected themselves. Otherwise, their missions become
    suicidal. They are difficult enough even if they are protected
    themselves.
        So what is difficult about acquiring a chemical weapons
    capability, a military capability, is not the offense; it is
    the defense. The offense is easy. The defense is very hard.
        Article X of this treaty says that the parties to the
    treaty, the signatories, will be entitled to receive help in
    the development of the hard thing--the defensive capabilities.
    In fact, it requires participants who enter into this in good
    faith to assist them.
        I want to read the exact words of Article X, because I have
    a feeling that, by the time the Senate votes, everyone will
    have understood that this is the ball that we have to keep
    clearly in focus. Paragraph 3 of Article X reads as follows:

        Each state party undertakes--undertakes--to facilitate and
    shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible
    exchange of equipment, material and scientific and
    technological information concerning means of protection
    against chemical weapons. The parties undertake.

        Paragraph 6 of Article X reads:

        Nothing in this convention--nothing in this convention [if
    we had drafted this up here, it would say notwithstanding any
    other provision of law] nothing in this convention shall be
    interpreted--shall be interpreted--as impeding the right of
    states parties to request and provide assistance bilaterally
    and to conclude individual agreements with other states parties
    concerning the emergency procurement of assistance.

        So Article X not only pledges the parties, they undertake
    to share everything that is hard to achieve in a chemical
    weapons capability--the defensive side--but, in fact,
    anticipating the possibility that someone might say, well, we
    interpret this differently, words have specifically been
    included that say nothing in this convention shall be
    interpreted as impeding.
        Now, what are we talking about when we talk about the
    assistance, the fullest possible exchange, and so forth? That
    is defined in Article X. It refers inter alia to detection
    equipment and alarm systems, protective equipment,
    decontamination equipment and decontaminants, medical antidotes
    and treatments, and advice on any of these protective measures.
    In short, everything you need, combined with the offensive
    chemicals themselves, to constitute a militarily effective
    chemical weapons capability.
        Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I am sure Mr. Perle would not
    mind my asking. Can I ask a clarification question?
        Mr. Perle. Sure.
        Senator Biden. What does Paragraph 7 mean?
        Mr. Perle. The paragraph I read to you, nothing in this
    convention shall be----
        Senator Biden. No. Each party undertakes to provide
    assistance through the organization and, to this end, to
    elect--to elect to take one or more of the following measures.
    Does that modify it? That is all I am trying to bring up.
        Mr. Perle [continuing]. No. I do not believe it does.
        It sets up a mechanism, which actually makes matters a
    little bit worse. Because the Secretariat will become a
    repository--not the only repository, because this envisions
    bilateral cooperation, as, for example, between China and Iran
    or China and Pakistan. But the Secretariat will now become a
    repository of information about defensive technology.
        So the span of control of the United States will be
    diluted, to the extent to which the United States does not
    constitute the Secretariat all by itself, which of course it
    will not.
        Senator Biden. I thank you. I have a different view, but I
    will wait until my time for questions.
        Mr. Perle. So I think it is reasonable to speculate that if
    we go ahead and approve this convention as it is now written,
    we will look back 1 day--5 years from now, 7, 10 years from
    now, maybe sooner--and we will unhappily identify states who
    got their chemical weapons capability through the sharing that
    is going to take place pursuant to Article X.
        The administration argues that, well, we are not going to
    do that. Of course, we are not going to give our defensive
    technology to rogue states. You would have to be out of your
    mind to do that. We have no intention of doing that. It is
    certainly the right of the administration to enter into an
    undertaking without any intention of carrying it out, because
    it runs counter to one's common sense. Some people would call
    that bad faith. I think it would be justified bad faith if we
    were unhappily unable to avoid the undertaking in the first
    place, which we are still in a position to avoid.
        But there are a great many other countries that also
    possess defensive capabilities and defensive technology. They
    may not be so willing to act in bad faith. Indeed, they may be
    actually rather eager to find a basis for sharing the kinds of
    defensive technologies, equipment, know-how, and so forth that
    we are talking about here.
        So if, for example, the challenge were to discourage the
    Chinese from assisting the Pakistanis, would not the Chinese
    invoke Article X of the treaty and say, we understand your
    feelings about this, Mr. President, but we undertook to share
    this technology. You are not asking us to violate a solemn
    undertaking, are you?
        I think our capacity to persuade others will be
    significantly diminished by virtue of the undertakings in
    Article X, which we may enter into in bad faith, but others
    will not.
        Let me give you a proliferation scenario just for
    illustrative purposes. Let us take Iran as the example. Iran
    has already signed, and I assume it will ratify the convention.
    I think there is evidence that Iran presently has a chemical
    weapons capability. But let us say that the Iranians, upon
    entering the Chemical Weapons Convention, decide to abandon
    that offensive capability. It is a matter of converting some
    plants that are now producing chemicals to the production of
    insecticide or fertilizer. What can you do from left to right,
    you can do from right to left.
        So Iran now ceases to have an offensive chemical weapons
    production capability. It is, therefore, in strict compliance
    with the terms of this convention. That is what I would do if I
    were Mr. Rafsanjani and wanted a chemical weapons capability.
    Because I do not today have the defensive side of the equation.
        So I would eliminate any violation by ceasing illegal
    activity. Now I would invoke Article X, and I would go to other
    countries and say, ``We have no offensive capability. We are in
    full compliance. You are obliged--you have undertaken to share
    with us the defenses.'' I promise you there will be countries
    that will accommodate them--for a price--maybe even without
    insisting on much of a price. Who could argue against it, since
    they will be, at that point, in full compliance?
        So a period of time elapses, during which the Iranians, who
    were clever, acquire all the defensive technology they need.
    They acquire, in the words of the treaty, detection equipment
    and alarm systems, protective equipment, decontamination
    equipment and decontaminants, medical antidotes and treatments,
    and advice on all of the above.
        Once they have that firmly in hand, once they have the
    difficult part of acquiring a chemical weapons capability, now
    they restart the production of offensive chemicals. But it is
    too late. We will have supplied them the thing that they cannot
    now easily achieve. They will put part A and part B together,
    and they will have a chemical weapons military capability. The
    instrument by which they will have achieved this is the
    convention that we are now talking about ratifying.
        Let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, by saying two other things.
    One about how we could get into this situation. How could we be
    at this stage of the proceedings, with so many countries having
    signed this agreement, with the Senate about to take it up,
    having overlooked--because that is the only fair way to
    describe it--the portentous implications of Article X?
        There is another article, Article XI, which tends very much
    in the same direction, and I think it will have a similar
    result.
        I had occasion to discuss this treaty recently with a
    senior official of this government, a cabinet level official. I
    asked this person about Article X. This person did not know
    about Article X. Now, Article X has become better known in the
    last 72 hours. But a couple of weeks ago, there were an awful
    lot of very senior officials of this government who did not
    know about Article X and did not know about the problem.
        You wonder how this could happen. Well, it happens in the
    following way. The United States makes a decision to propose a
    treaty on chemical weapons and a draft is put together. The
    draft did not have Article X in it. We sent a team of people to
    Geneva, and they come back 10 years later, basically. For 10
    years, they are working away on this convention.
        The people who are receiving their cables in Washington are
    very often people who were in Geneva, because there is a kind
    of rotation. This is how it works in the real world. So you get
    an intellectually incestuous relationship among the Geneva
    people and the Washington people, with almost no adult
    supervision. The individuals involved in this invest a great
    deal of their time, years of their lives, in attempting to
    bring about a treaty.
        Somebody insists on an Article X, or maybe a group of
    countries insist on an Article X. It is 10 years after we got
    started on this, and we want to bring this treaty home. It is
    the experts who are making the decision. No President reads the
    treaty. No Secretary of State reads the treaty. No Under
    Secretary. No Assistant Secretary. I promise you, Mr. Chairman,
    this treaty, 160 pages long, has not been read by anyone who
    was not paid full-time to work on it.
        So terrible mistakes can be made--mistakes in which
    somebody loses sight of the ball along the way. That is what
    comes to the Senate for ratification.
        One last point. Senator Feinstein asked about verification.
    How would verification be improved if the United States
    remained outside the treaty? It is a fair question. The answer
    is counterintuitive. So let me take a quick shot at it.
        I think it would be improved in two ways. First of all, I
    think we would do a better job of keeping to ourselves the
    means by which we detect violations. Jeane Kirkpatrick made
    reference to the fact that Iraq had served on the governing
    board of the IAEA. They were there for a good reason.
        The Iraqi Government did not contribute the full-time
    talent of one of its senior officials for the benefit of the
    IAEA; I promise you that. He was there to learn as much as he
    could learn about how the IAEA went about detecting illegal
    activity. He was an intelligence officer. I promise you that
    the organization responsible for implementing this agreement
    will be full of intelligence officers, including intelligence
    officers from countries who are eager to discover how they
    might be caught if they had a clandestine program.
        So we will end up educating the very people whose programs
    we are trying to stop in how to avoid getting detected in the
    first place. So that is one way in which we will be worse off.
    We do not have to educate them now, but we will then.
        Second, and this is a more subtle point, once activity
    becomes illegal, the way in which information about it is
    collected and analyzed and reported acquires an entirely
    different meaning than when it is simply intelligence about the
    activities of others.
        When we are interested in the capabilities of a Russian
    missile, we employ technicians who look at the test data that
    they are able to acquire, who look at photography, who look at
    all sources of intelligence; and they make a judgment about the
    capability of that missile; and they say how far they think it
    can go; and they say what size warhead they think it can carry.
        They say everything to the best of their ability about that
    missile; and they do not think about the implications of their
    answer, because their job is to unearth the truth about that
    missile.
        But now, suppose there is an arms control regime in which
    that missile, if its range is over 600 kilometers, is a
    violation of a treaty; but if it is only 595 kilometers it is
    not a violation of a treaty, and you are now responsible for
    deciding whether to send to the President a report that says,
    we believe the range of this missile to be 650 kilometers,
    which has very important political implications. At that point,
    an element of political judgment enters into the assessment of
    intelligence.
        I saw this day in and day out as we grappled with the
    question of how to interpret what we were seeing in the old
    Soviet Union in the cold war days, so I believe that the
    objectivity with which we view the evidence becomes inevitably
    colored by political considerations when the issue is not, what
    do we know, but is what we know going to touch off a crisis
    because we have now caught someone violating the treaty; and
    that requires some response on our part.
        So I do not accept the now hourly-passed-off view that we
    are going to do more with this treaty than without it, which is
    the conventional wisdom; but I think it overlooks these two
    very important points.
        I am sorry for going on too long, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
    very much.
        The Chairman. You have not at all, and I thank you very
    much.
        Now we have another long-time friend of all of us, Dr. Fred
    Ikle, former Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament
    Agency. We appreciate you coming, sir. We will be glad to hear
    from you now.

     STATEMENT OF DR. FRED C. IKLE, FORMER DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL
                         AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

        Dr. Ikle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am honored to be
    invited here.
        The previous witnesses, Ambassador Kirkpatrick and Richard
    Perle, made so many of the important points of what effectively
    is a sad story that I can be quite brief. It is a sad story;
    because as witnesses yesterday mentioned, there were good
    intentions behind this treaty, and we all are--the witnesses
    yesterday and today--are horrified by the potential of chemical
    weapons and would like to see them banished from the face of
    the Earth.
        Ambassador Kirkpatrick very tellingly brought back the
    nonproliferation treaty, which of course was preceded by the
    Atoms for Peace program. President Eisenhower with that program
    also had very good intentions. In fact, he got enormous kudos
    in the press when he presented that program. It was one of his
    greatest public affairs successes, and--as it turns out now
    from hindsight--one of the main contributors to nuclear
    proliferation.
        I can add to the telling points Richard Perle made about
    Article X and the related culprit, Article XI about the
    assistance in chemical manufacturing technology. Here, there is
    something a bit startling in the discussion we had. By and
    large the discussion in Congress and in the media has been very
    thoughtful on both sides, serious arguments, honestly felt.
        It is all the more regrettable here that on the question
    relating to Article XI it looks like some misinformation has
    deliberately been infiltrated into our discussion, and that is
    the allegation which a number of people here picked up
    innocently, the allegation that the United States would lose
    seriously in chemical manufacturing exports if we did not
    ratify the treaty.
        For a while, the administration spokespersons mentioned a
    number like $600 million lost per year in U.S. exports,
    legitimate chemical manufacturing exports. When pressed on
    where that number came from, the administration said: ``talk to
    the Chemical Manufacturing Association.'' When the people there
    were asked, they really were unable to give an explanation.
        So we did some further digging into this question; and it
    turns out the only exports that the U.S. could no longer make,
    if it did not become a party to the treaty, to other treaty
    members like Germany, Japan, and the U.K., would be the poison
    gas itself, which of course we do not want to be exporting, and
    the most dangerous ingredients to be used in gas warfare.
        Schedule I type chemicals is poison gas itself. There are
    no exports, obviously, from the United States of any
    importance. Schedule II, that may have some role in pesticides,
    but exports are much more limited than the $600 million figure
    suggested.
        So why has this export damage been so vigorously mentioned,
    particularly by the Chemical Manufacturing Association
    representatives that are urging the Senate to ratify this
    treaty? I think the answer, I believe, is that some people
    there relish the prospect that the Chemical Weapons Convention
    would undo the restrictions of the Australia Group, precisely
    the thing Senator Biden expressed serious concern about, and
    rightly so.
        Now, this is a serious charge to make, and maybe I had
    better have a couple of exhibits for my case. One, I was not
    able to fully nail down. Maybe you could have this done, Mr.
    Chairman. Last fall, in the House of Representatives, a step
    was taken--exactly where it came from I do not know, it would
    seem to have the support of the Chemical Manufacturing
    Association--to lift the licensing requirements for chemical
    weapons exports to the member states of the convention before
    even the United States had ratified the treaty.
        Then, Members--colleagues of yours--I think yourself, Mr.
    Chairman, Senator Pell, Senator Glenn, Senator Kyl in a
    bipartisan effort stopped that premature dismantling of our
    licensing requirements.
        The more definitive exhibit goes further back. In testimony
    before this committee on June 9, 1994, a spokesman conveying
    the support of the Chemical Manufacturing Association said, and
    I quote, ``There are several significant reasons why the
    chemical industry supports the CWC. Those chemical
    manufacturers do not make chemical weapons. Our industry does
    produce commercial chemicals which can be illegally converted
    into weapons. An effective CWC could have the positive effect
    of liberalizing--liberalizing the existing system for export
    controls applicable to our industry's products, technologies,
    and processes.''
        So I think there is at least a partial explanation for the
    enthusiasm of the CMA for this treaty. Now, that is perhaps in
    some ways a serious charge. I think it is.
        Let me add one more point there. To the extent I have been
    able to find out, and I know some other people have confirmed
    this, this is not a charge against the most senior officials of
    the industry who are members of the association. I have talked
    to CEO's of large chemical companies, including in Delaware,
    who have never heard of the treaty while it was in process and
    while the representatives here in town of the CMA have been
    working together with this club in Geneva that Richard Perle
    described, and nourished the support for this treaty.
        So I think we have to first of all get rid of the idea that
    not ratifying the treaty would damage the exports of the United
    States chemical industry, the legitimate, important exports;
    and second I think we have to put a question mark behind the
    support alleged by the CMA of the responsible senior officials
    in the chemical industry.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. I thank you, Dr. Ikle. I think the
    legislation you were talking about was H.R. 364, and that would
    have just devastated the U.S. export controls.
        Now we come to Doug Feith, former Deputy Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Negotiation Policy, and by George, I
    am anxiously awaiting hearing from you. Thank you for coming
    in.

      STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS J. FEITH, FEITH AND ZELL, P.C., FORMER
      DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NEGOTIATION POLICY

        Mr. Feith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
    the opportunity to appear before this committee again on this
    important question. I agree with Dr. Ikle that the debate on
    the Chemical Weapons Convention has been of remarkably high
    quality for a matter so complex. I have a statement that I
    would appreciate the committee admitting for the record, and
    what I would like to do now is just touch on some of the points
    in my written statement, if that is acceptable.
        The Chairman. Very well. Without objection it will be so
    ordered.
        Mr. Feith. Thank you.
        Both sides in this debate have established substantial
    common ground. Both sides agree that the treaty is not
    verifiable, if by verifiable we mean confidence in detection by
    U.S. intelligence of illegal clandestine stockpiling or
    production of chemical weapons. No one in the intelligence
    community has ever said the treaty is verifiable by that
    standard.
        It is worthwhile to stress that the verification problem
    here is not the lack of perfection. The problem is not that we
    would detect cheating only 90 percent or 50 percent of the
    time. The problem is that chemical weapons production is so
    easy to do and to conceal that it is inherently impossible to
    achieve any degree of confidence, let alone high confidence,
    that we could detect it even regarding militarily significant
    quantities of chemical weapons.
        Someone once drove this point home by saying that the
    Chemical Weapons Convention is like an effort to ban
    Hollandaise sauce without banning eggs and butter. Treaty
    critics believe that it would not serve the anti-chemical-
    weapons cause for us to join a ban that we know will be
    ineffective, impossible to monitor properly, and impossible to
    enforce.
        I speak as a lawyer devoted to the principle of law. The
    world would surely be a better place if law in fact played a
    greater role in securing international peace and civilized
    behavior, but we do not move toward this goal by promulgating a
    patently ineffective treaty. A chemical weapons ban that states
    know they can sign cynically and violate without punishment
    will not shore up the international norm against such weapons.
    Creating bad law is not the way to build respect for law. The
    CWC will cheapen the currency of international law.
        The wiser approach, in my opinion, to chemical weapons arms
    control is embodied in the bill S. 495, authored by Senator Kyl
    and cosponsored by Senators Lott, Helms, and others. The United
    States should work to obtain international agreement on
    mechanisms for enforcing the existing treaty that bans
    initiation of chemical warfare. We should put teeth in the 1925
    Geneva Protocol.
        If that treaty were properly enforced, there clearly would
    not be any need for the CWC; and if the Geneva Protocol
    continues to be violated with impunity, then there is no hope
    that the CWC will be respected, for violations of the CWC are
    far less discoverable and provable and far less likely to
    horrify worldwide opinion than violations of the non-use ban.
        What of the point that we might as well ratify the CWC as
    we are destroying the U.S. chemical arsenal anyway? It is
    better, in our view, to destroy our arsenal unilaterally than
    to enter into a treaty that we know will not accomplish its
    purpose. By acting unilaterally, we produce some of the key
    benefits hoped for from the CWC without taking on the treaty's
    undesirable baggage. Our action makes a strong moral statement
    against chemical weapons, but it does not lend our name to the
    dishonest proposition that Iran, China, or others have actually
    abolished their chemical weapons arsenals.
        Which brings us back to the question highlighted by Senator
    Feinstein: Whether we are better off with the inspection and
    information rights that the CWC will provide, or without. On
    balance, we are better off without.
        The CWC's verification regime stands on two legs. The first
    is voluntary disclosure. Most of the regime is based on what
    the parties voluntarily declare about their own holdings of
    chemical weapons, manufacturing facilities and the like.
    Virtually all the CWC's inspections will be at so-called
    declared facilities, that is, locations that each party will
    itself declare to be subject to inspection.
        Nearly all the large budget of the new CWC organization
    based in The Hague will be allocated to inspecting declared
    facilities and processing the parties' voluntary declarations.
    Does anyone expect a country like Iran or China or Russia to
    declare a facility in which it is planning to produce or store
    illegal chemical weapons? The declarations and the inspections
    of declared facilities will yield our government little, if
    anything, of value to augment what we already know from our own
    national intelligence means.
        Looking for chemical weapons at declared facilities brings
    to mind the joke about the drunk who looks for his keys under
    the street lamp rather than some ways off where he dropped
    them, because there is more light under the lamp.
        The verification regime's second leg is challenge
    inspection. That is, inspection of a facility that was not
    declared. This is often talked of as if it were a tool for
    adding to our knowledge, or for finding violations. It is not.
    One cannot spot check a country the size of Iran, much less
    China, by means of challenge inspections.
        The purpose of challenge inspections is to try to embarrass
    a state that one has by other intelligence means caught in a
    violation. So it is incorrect to think that we will learn much
    of substantive value through challenge inspections.
        Moreover, the CWC's challenge inspection provisions were
    watered down in the negotiations to the point where they are
    not even a useful tool for embarrassing cheaters. Parties will
    easily be able, within the treaty's terms, to delay and
    otherwise defeat the purposes of the challenge inspection
    provisions.
        The issue of whether the CWC will produce a net gain for
    our intelligence capabilities must also be considered in light
    of the harm that will result from participation in the
    international inspection program by unreliable states, as
    Ambassador Kirkpatrick and Mr. Perle highlighted, and as
    Secretary Schlesinger highlighted yesterday.
        I would simply emphasize that when rogue states learn how
    to inspect, they learn how to conceal, and in this regard I
    think it should disturb the Senate that the administration has
    taken steps to begin training foreign CWC inspectors even
    before the Senate has acted on this treaty. I understand that
    some government agencies are resisting this effort, and I urge
    this committee to inquire into this.
        Now, Articles X and XI of the CWC have received a great
    deal of attention lately, and these provisions are a major part
    of the reason that the CWC will do more harm than good, as has
    been explained very well.
        I do want to reemphasize in response to the textual
    analysis that Senator Biden mentioned that the argument that
    Article X, paragraph 3, the most troubling provision, is
    overridden by Article I, is, I believe, flatly contradicted by
    what paragraph 6 says, that nothing in this convention shall be
    interpreted as impeding the right of States' Parties to provide
    assistance.
        The people who drafted this provision anticipated precisely
    the argument that Article I might override Article X, paragraph
    3, and they took care of it by nailing it in paragraph 6. This
    is a serious problem.
        As for Article XI, it prohibits, or at least expresses
    disapproval of export restrictions in the chemical field among
    treaty parties.
        Unlike the language of Article X, that of Article XI is not
    completely unqualified, so the administration has been able to
    offer an interpretation that renders this provision
    meaningless, a legal nullity.
        But whether or not the administration's interpretation is
    valid, I would argue that it is beside the point--the real
    issue is not--and I want to emphasize this point. The real
    issue is not what the United States itself will export, but
    what third countries will want to sell to the Irans of this
    world.
        For export controls to be effective they must have
    multilateral support, which is hard to organize. If a German or
    Chinese company arranges to sell an advanced chemical plant to
    Iran, and the U.S. Government protests that this would enhance
    Iran's chemical weapons program, we can expect the German or
    Chinese Government to cite Article XI for the proposition that
    the sale is not only permitted but required by the CWC; for
    Iran will be a party in good standing, or in any event a party
    against whom no violation can be proved.
        Whatever one thinks of the CWC overall, no one can deny
    that it would be a better or less bad treaty if the so-called,
    ``poisons for peace'' provisions were fixed.
        Though I think the Senate should reject the CWC outright,
    some treaty critics would be willing to withdraw their
    opposition if only the Senate would ensure that Articles X and
    XI are properly amended before U.S. ratification. Such critics
    argue that to be minimally acceptable the CWC should at least
    not undermine the very interests--stemming chemical weapons
    proliferation--that it aims to promote.
        Administration officials counter with the argument that it
    would be embarrassing for the United States at this late stage
    to insist that the treaty be amended. They say this would
    destroy our diplomatic credibility.
        While it would to some extent be embarrassing, it is also
    embarrassing to ratify a treaty with provisions as perverse as
    Articles X and XI. As for our diplomats' credibility, the
    effect of forcing amendments of Article X and XI could be
    powerfully positive.
        If the administration's interpretations of those provisions
    are widely held, then the amendment should not be unduly
    difficult to arrange. If they are so difficult, this would
    confirm that the provisions are a problem, and the United
    States should not ratify until the problem is resolved.
        If the administration, as is likely, then succeeds in
    getting the needed amendments, the influence of our diplomats
    would be enhanced. The next time a multilateral forum proposes
    a treaty with a bizarre provision adverse to our interests, our
    negotiators would be able to declare credibly that that
    provision will preclude Senate approval of the treaty. This
    will strengthen our hand.
        A final point regarding deadlines. Many states of concern
    to us--Syria, Libya, Iraq, and North Korea--have not signed the
    CWC. Although some such states, specifically Russia, China,
    Iran, and Cuba, have signed; none of these latter four has yet
    ratified. The administration insists that it is crucial that
    the United States ratify the CWC before April 29, but if we do
    we will be the only state party that actually has a significant
    chemical weapons capability.
        April 29 is an artificial deadline. Any time the United
    States might decide to become a party, it will, because of its
    military and financial status, be afforded an appropriate
    position of influence in the treaty organization if we assert
    ourselves properly.
        This is true because we are to pay 25 percent of the total
    budget of the new organization. It is true also because the
    other major states in this field are waiting for the United
    States before they decide whether to ratify. If the Senate is
    ready to act before April 29, then well and good, but the
    Senate should not, in my opinion, hasten its deliberations
    simply to make a meaningless deadline.
        Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Feith follows:]

                     Prepared Statement of Douglas J. Feith

        Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you again
    on this important question. It was in March 1996 that I last had the
    honor to address this committee on why I think the Senate should not
    consent to ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
    During the Reagan Administration, I served as Deputy Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Negotiations Policy and my responsibilities
    included the chemical weapons treaty negotiations.
        The debate on the CWC has been of remarkably high quality for a
    matter so complex. The sides have engaged each other intelligently and
    generally respectfully and have established substantial common ground.
    They agree that chemical weapons are evil. Specifically, all four of us
    on this panel--Fred Ikle, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Richard Perle and myself--
    agree with the treaty's proponents that it would be desirable to
    eliminate these weapons from the world entirely and that the United
    States should continue to destroy its own chemical weapons, as we are
    already doing, whether or not the United States joins the CWC. We all
    favor the CWC's goal. We all agree that the chemical weapons threat in
    the world is a problem the gravity of which the world should never
    underestimate. In fact, a key reason for opposing the CWC is that it
    will falsely advertise that the chemical weapons threat has been
    mitigated when it has not.
        The debate has also made clear that both CWC proponents and critics
    acknowledge that the treaty has flaws. Both sides agree that the treaty
    will not be global and will not cover a number of the states of
    greatest concern to us.
        Both sides also agree that the treaty is not verifiable, if by
    ``verifiable'' we mean confidence in detection by U.S. Intelligence of
    illegal, clandestine stockpiling or pro-
    duction of chemical weapons. No one in the intelligence community has
    ever said the treaty is verifiable by that standard. It is worthwhile
    to stress that the verification problem here is not the lack of
    perfection. The problem is not that we would detect cheating only 90
    percent or even only 50 percent of the time. The problem is that
    chemical weapons production is so easy to do and to conceal that it is
    inherently impossible to achieve any degree of confidence--let alone
    ``high confidence''--that we could detect it, even regarding militarily
    significant quantities. Someone once drove this point home by saying
    that the CWC is like an effort to ban hollandaise sauce without banning
    eggs and butter.
        In her testimony before this Committee yesterday, Secretary of
    State Albright argued for the CWC by asserting that rogue states would
    be subject to unprecedented verification measures and ``will probably
    be caught'' if they violate the treaty. The Secretary of State was
    incorrect in this assertion and there is no intelligence authority in
    the government that would confirm her claim.
        Both sides in the CWC debate agree that the treaty will not
    actually eliminate chemical weapons from the world. And both sides
    agree that the CWC is in essence a moral statement against chemical
    weapons, a declaration that the civilized nations abhor these weapons
    and think that no one should possess them.
        The debate now has a rather precise focus: Given the importance of
    the chemical weapons problem and given that the CWC has its flaws, is
    the United States better served by ratifying the treaty or not. Treaty
    proponents say that the United States is better off if the world enacts
    this new international law against possession of chemical weapons, even
    if we know that key countries will violate it. They also say that we
    are better off with the inspection and information rights that the CWC
    will provide than without. Treaty critics contend that the treaty will
    not accomplish its purpose and will actually exacerbate the chemical
    weapons problem in the world.
        Treaty critics believe that it would not serve the anti-chemical-
    weapons cause for us to join a ban that we know will be ineffective,
    impossible to monitor properly and impossible to enforce. I speak as a
    lawyer devoted to the principle of law. The world would surely be a
    better place if law in fact played a greater role in securing
    international peace and civilized behavior. But we do not move toward
    this goal by promulgating a patently ineffective new treaty. A chemical
    weapons ban that states know they can sign cynically and violate
    without punishment will not shore up the international norm against
    such weapons. On the contrary, it will damage that norm even more
    severely than it was harmed by the world's failure to uphold the 1925
    Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons when Iraq violated that venerable
    treaty in the late 1980's.
        Creating bad law is not the way to build respect for law. The ill-
    conceived CWC will cheapen the currency of international law. The wiser
    approach to chemical weapons arms control is embodied in the bill, S.
    495, authored by Senator Kyl and cosponsored by Senators Lott, Nickles,
    Mack, Coverdell, Helms, Shelby and Hutchison: The United States should
    work to obtain international agreement on mechanisms for enforcing the
    existing treaty that bans initiation of chemical warfare. In other
    words, we should put teeth in the 1925 Geneva Protocol. If that treaty
    were properly enforced, there would clearly be no need for the CWC. And
    if the Geneva Protocol continues to be violated with impunity, then
    there is no hope that the CWC will be respected, for violations of the
    CWC are far less discoverable and provable and far less likely to
    horrify world opinion than violations of the non-use ban. If one cannot
    get the world excited about disfigured corpses produced by violations
    of the Geneva Protocol, it is unrealistic to expect tough enforcement
    action when U.S. officials allege clandestine storage somewhere of some
    chemical bulk agent.
        What of the point that we might as well ratify the CWC as we are
    destroying the U.S. chemical arsenal anyway? It is better, in my view,
    to destroy our arsenal unilaterally than to enter into a treaty that we
    know will not accomplish its purpose. By acting unilaterally, we
    produce some of the key benefits hoped for from the CWC without taking
    on the treaty's undesirable baggage. Our action makes a strong moral
    statement against chemical weapons. But it does not lend our name to
    the dishonest proposition that Iran, China or others have actually
    abolished their chemical weapons arsenals. The world can verify our
    compliance with our self-imposed ban by reading the Congressional
    Record. We then do not have to participate in a costly, wasteful,
    intrusive but ineffective verification regime that is more likely to
    spread militarily relevant chemical weapons technology than contain it.
        Any other chemical weapons state that wants to follow our lead can
    do so, also unilaterally. Each will have the opportunity to persuade
    the world as best it can that it is doing what it has promised. This
    way, states will not obtain a clean bill of health simply by signing a
    treaty and subjecting themselves to an inspection regime that they know
    is easy to defeat.
        Which brings us back to the question of whether we are better off
    with the inspection and information rights that the CWC will provide or
    without. On balance, we are better off without. Treaty proponents
    stress that the CWC's verification provisions are unprecedented in
    their elaborateness and intrusiveness, which is true. But they will
    contribute little of any importance to what we need to know about the
    chemical weapons threat in the world.
        The CWC's verification regime stands on two legs. The first is
    voluntary disclosure. Most of the regime is based on what the parties
    voluntarily declare about their own holdings of chemical weapons,
    manufacturing facilities, chemical stocks and the like. Virtually all
    the inspections to be conducted under the CWC will be of so-called
    ``declared facilities''--that is, locations that each party will itself
    declare to be subject to inspection. Routine inspections will focus
    exclusively on ``declared facilities.'' Nearly all the large budget of
    the new CWC organization based in the Hague will be allocated to
    inspecting ``declared facilities'' and processing the parties'
    voluntary declarations. Does anyone expect a country like Iran or China
    or Russia to declare a facility at which it is planning to produce or
    store illegal chemical weapons? The declarations and the inspections of
    ``declared facilities'' will yield our government little if anything of
    value to augment what we already know from our own national means of
    intelligence. Looking for chemical weapons at ``declared facilities''
    brings to mind the joke about the drunk who looks for his keys under
    the street lamp rather than some ways off, where he dropped them,
    because there is more light under the lamp.
        The CWC verification regime's second leg is challenge inspection--
    that is, inspection of a facility that was not ``declared.'' This is
    often talked of as if it were a tool for adding to our knowledge or for
    finding violations. It is not. One cannot spot check a country the size
    of Iran, much less China, by means of challenge inspections. The
    purpose of challenge inspections is to try to embarrass a state that
    one has, by other intelligence means, caught in a violation. So it is
    incorrect to think that we will learn much of substantive value through
    challenge inspections. Moreover, the CWC's challenge inspection
    provisions were watered down in the negotiations to the point where
    they are not even a useful tool for embarrassing cheaters. Parties will
    easily be able, within the treaty's terms, to delay and otherwise
    defeat the purposes of the challenge inspection provisions.
        The issue of whether the CWC will produce a net gain for our
    intelligence capabilities must be considered also in light of the harm
    that will result from participation in the international inspection
    program by unreliable states. As Secretary Schlesinger noted before
    this committee yesterday, Iraq in the 1970's and 1980's learned a great
    deal about how to conceal its nuclear weapons program through
    participating in the inspection regime of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
    Treaty. When rogue states learn how to inspect, they learn how to
    conceal. In this regard, I think it should disturb the Senate that the
    Administration has taken steps to begin training CWC inspectors even
    before the Senate has acted on the treaty. I understand that some
    government agencies are resisting this effort. I urge this committee to
    inquire into this.
        Articles X and XI of the CWC have received a great deal of
    attention, including at this committee's hearing yesterday with the
    three former Secretaries of Defense--Rumsfeld, Schlesinger and
    Weinberger--who opposed ratification. These provisions are a major part
    of the reason that the CWC will do more harm than good. These
    provisions will promote the spread of chemical defense and other
    technology that will make it easier for states to develop a chemical
    war fighting capability than if the CWC did not exist.
        Article X obliges the parties to facilitate the exchange with the
    other parties of chemical weapons defense material and technology. To
    have an effective chemical war fighting capability, one must have
    defense material and technology to protect one's own forces. Article X
    will establish the right of Iran, for example, to obtain such items
    from Germany, France, China or some other state. And it will establish
    the right of the would-be sellers to provide such items to Iran. The
    language of Article X is straightforward. Paragraph 3 says:

            Each State Party undertakes to facilitate, and shall have the
            right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of
            equipment, material and scientific and technological
            information concerning means of protection against chemical
            weapons.

        And Paragraph 6 says:

            Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as impeding the
            right of States Parties to * * * provide assistance * * *
            [where ``assistance'' is defined as ``delivery * * * of
            protection against chemical weapons, including * * * detection
            equipment and alarm systems; protective equipment * * *;
            decontamination equipment * * *; medical antidotes * * *; and
            advice on any of these protective measures].

        As Richard Perle has pointed out, the CWC prohibits that part of a
    chemical weapons capability that is easy for states to make for
    themselves: the weapons themselves. The other part of that capability--
    defense material and technology, which is relatively ``high tech'' and
    difficult to acquire--is precisely what the treaty affirmatively
    requires the parties to proliferate.
        Similarly, Article XI prohibits--or at least expresses disapproval
    of--export restrictions in the chemical field among treaty parties.
    Unlike the language of Article X, that of Article XI is not completely
    unqualified, so the Administration has been able to offer an
    ``interpretation'' that renders this provision meaningless, a legal
    nullity. This allows Administration officials to assert that the United
    States will maintain export controls on Iran and others notwithstanding
    Article XI. Whether or not the Administration's interpretation is
    valid, it is beside the point.
        The real issue is not what the United States itself will export,
    but what third countries will want to sell to the Irans of this world.
    For export controls to be effective, they must have multilateral
    support which is hard to organize. To return to the example above: If a
    German or Chinese company will arrange to sell an advanced chemical
    plant to Iran and the U.S. government protests that this would enhance
    Iran's chemical weapons program, we can expect the German or Chinese
    government to cite Article XI for the proposition that the sale is not
    only permitted but required by the CWC, for Iran will be a treaty party
    in good standing (or, in any event, a party against whom no violation
    can be proved). There is precedent for such a colloquy. The Clinton
    Administration protested against a Russian sale of a nuclear reactor to
    Iran. The Russians replied by citing the provisions in the Nuclear Non-
    Proliferation Treaty--the ``atoms for peace'' section--on which CWC
    Articles X and XI are modeled. This is why Fred Ikle has referred to
    Articles X and XI as ``poisons for peace.''
        Whatever one thinks of the CWC overall, no one can deny that it
    would be a better (or less bad) treaty if the ``poisons for peace''
    provisions were fixed. Though I think the Senate should reject the CWC
    outright, some treaty critics would be willing to withdraw their
    opposition if only the Senate would ensure that Articles X and XI are
    properly amended before U.S. ratification. Such critics argue that, to
    be minimally acceptable, the CWC should at least not undermine the very
    interest--stemming chemical weapons proliferation--it aims to promote.
        Administration officials counter with the argument that it would be
    embarrassing for the United States, at this late stage, to insist that
    the treaty be amended. They say this would destroy our diplomatic
    credibility. While it would, to some extent, be embarrassing, it is
    also embarrassing to ratify a treaty with provisions as perverse as
    Articles X and XI. Also, the Clinton Administration could take comfort
    from the fact that the error of agreeing to those provisions was
    committed not by itself but by the Bush Administration.
        As for our diplomats' credibility, the effect of forcing amendments
    of Articles X and XI could be powerfully positive. If the
    Administration's interpretations of those provisions are widely held,
    then the amendments should not be unduly difficult to arrange. If they
    are so difficult, this would confirm that the provisions are a problem
    and the United States should not ratify until the problem is resolved.
    If the Administration, as is likely, then succeeds in getting the
    needed amendments, the influence of our diplomats would be enhanced.
    The next time a multilateral forum proposes a treaty with a bizarre
    provision adverse to our interests, our negotiators would be able to
    declare credibly that that provision will preclude Senate approval of
    the treaty. This will strengthen our hand.
        A final point regarding deadlines. Many states of concern to us--
    Syria, Libya, Iraq and North Korea--have not signed the CWC. Although
    some such states--specifically Russia, China, Iran and Cuba--have
    signed, none of these latter four has yet ratified. The Administration
    insists that it is crucial that the United States ratify the CWC before
    April 29, but if we do, we shall be the only state party that actually
    has a significant chemical weapons capability.
        April 29 is an artificial deadline. Any time the United States
    might decide to become a party, it will, because of its military and
    financial status, be afforded an appropriate position of influence in
    the treaty organization. This is true because we are to pay 25 percent
    of the total budget of this new organization. It is true also because
    the other major states in this field are waiting for the United States
    before they decide whether to ratify. If the Senate is ready to act
    before April 29, then well and good. But the Senate should not, in my
    opinion, hasten its deliberations simply to make a meaningless
    deadline.
        Thank you.

        The Chairman. Thank you, sir. That concludes the testimony.
        Now, we have two or three Senators on this side coming
    back. I think we had better limit ourselves in the first round
    to 5 minutes, if that is satisfactory.
        Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman, is it possible to get a little
    more? Five minutes is really very difficult to develop any
    line.
        The Chairman. Well, it will eat into the time of the
    proponents of the treaty.
        Senator Kerry. We have got all day.
        Senator Biden. Admiral Zumwalt has to leave here at 4:30, I
    am told. Maybe----
        Senator Kerry. Well, I will go along with it, then.
        The Chairman. All right. Let us try 5 minutes.
        Dr. Ikle, I have a letter dated March 13 from the Aerospace
    Industries Association. It states that a strong concern that
    the CWC will, and I quote from the letter, ``unnecessarily
    jeopardize our Nation's ability to protect its national
    security information and proprietary technological data.''
        Now, this treaty, as we know, will permit foreign
    inspectors into thousands of U.S. businesses to poke around,
    interview employees, take photographs, and take samples home
    for analysis there. Now, given your assessment of the foreign
    policy benefits of this treaty, if any, do you think it makes
    sense to subject U.S. companies, private companies, to this
    danger of the theft of millions of dollars in trade secrets?
        Dr. Ikle. I like the way, Mr. Chairman, you put the
    question--``given the benefits of the treaty.''
        If the treaty was of major benefit, clearly verifiable in
    other aspects and it enhanced arms control objectives, maybe
    that was a risk we would want to take, that on occasion some
    very clever disguised intelligence person, disguised as an
    objective inspector, could pick up some valid information.
        But that is not the case. The benefits of the treaty, even
    as seen by the supporters, are not that strong, and from what
    we have heard today, they are a negative. From what we have
    heard so far among the witnesses today, what you can obtain by
    samples that can be analyzed in a national laboratory back home
    by instruments which can be carried with you, brought into the
    places where chemicals are prepared for our sensitive weapons
    systems, could be very, very significant.
        I remember from my days in the Pentagon the briefings that
    I received of analyses that our intelligence organization had
    made in other places, and how much we learned from just
    somebody walking through with the right little instrument in
    his pocket. So that is very serious.
        Incidentally, if I may insert here a further thought, as if
    all of this was not bad enough, some supporters who want to
    hasten the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention
    argue that it should be followed up then by a verification
    scheme for biological weapons.
        As Arms Control Director, I took the biological weapons
    treaty before this committee. Senator Fulbright was sitting in
    the chair at the time, and I explained right away that it was
    not verifiable but it was a useful thing to have as a statement
    of our opposition to biological weapons, and I do not regret
    that. I think it is useful even now in Iraq, because it caught
    Iraq violating the agreement that they had signed.
        But if you want to follow that up with an inspection team
    on biological weapons--many people in the bureaucracy are now
    working on that, in this process that Richard Perle described
    to Geneva and back here without ``adult supervision''--it is
    ten times as dangerous, the things you can then steal from
    these so-called onsite inspections to get really way ahead in
    biological weapons. So it is dangerous here, and if you cannot
    stop the follow on it will be really catastrophic.
        The Chairman. I thank you, sir.
        Ambassador Kirkpatrick, you hear a lot of arguments that
    nonratification of the CWC will mark the forfeiture of U.S.
    leadership in the fight to eliminate chemical weapons from the
    face of the Earth. That is almost a quote-unquote from voice
    after voice after voice orchestrated by the White House. Do you
    agree, or do you believe that the rest of the world will
    continue to look to the United States with or without this
    treaty?
        Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Mr. Chairman, actually I think that
    to the extent that the rest of the world looks to us for
    leadership, and I think we sometimes exaggerate that leadership
    in our own minds, I do not think it will be affected much by
    what we do on this treaty; and I will tell you why.
        The reason is that our reputation for leadership in the
    military, scientific, and technological domain rests not only
    on our clear undoubted excellence and long lead on other
    nations, but also in our willingness to assume responsibility
    for responding to dangerous challenges.
        We have done this again and again, and I think we will
    continue to offer that kind of leadership. Sometimes that
    requires standing alone, or standing nearly alone and saying,
    should we not consider what the implications of this are for
    the spread of chemical weapons in the Middle East, North
    Africa, and Europe?
        I think that those nations that have a high regard for us
    might even have a higher regard for us.
        The Chairman. I think so, too. Senator Biden. My time is
    up.
        Senator Biden. Thank you very much. In the interests of
    time I am going to focus on only one issue, and I think we all
    acknowledge that sometimes the more persuasive we make one of
    our arguments against the treaty, the more irrelevant another
    argument becomes.
        For example, it is kind of interesting that I think
    Ambassador Kirkpatrick and Mr. Perle have made very strong
    arguments against universality of the treaty, because if they
    are correct then the last person you want in this, Mr.
    Chairman, is Korea and the other rogue nations, Iraq and Libya;
    so I think it is a very compelling argument against
    universality.
        Mr. Feith makes a very compelling argument that one of the
    reasons why verification does not work is because the Bush
    administration responded to what Ronald Reagan wanted done, and
    that was he wanted intrusive investigations that were
    inspections that maybe would violate our Fourth Amendment, and
    so we fixed the Fourth Amendment. There is no Fourth Amendment
    problem here, notwithstanding what people assert, and I think
    you would acknowledge that. You may not want to, but as a good
    lawyer I believe you would have to. I know you looked at it.
        So the administration fixed one piece and made the
    inspections, the relevance of inspections that were challenge
    inspections less relevant.
        But let me focus on this notion that paragraph or Article X
    is so bad. Let me tell you folks how I read it, and Mr. Perle,
    I would like to direct this to you, but I will not limit it to
    you, although I would like to get in one other question before
    the light goes out.
        As I read it, and I might point out, Mr. Feith, paragraph 6
    is not affected--does not in any way limit paragraph 1.
    Paragraph 6 refers to bilateral, not international regimes but
    bilateral, and so the issue here is whether or not we are going
    to contribute to, in effect, this fund. We are going to put in
    this information that can be disbursed by this international
    organization.
        All paragraph 6 is about is saying that if we want to keep
    our deal going with NATO, if we want to keep our deal going
    with our allies, we can do that.
        But as I see this, multilateral is the only way to limit
    these chemical weapons, yet paragraph 6 on Article X refers to
    bilateral. Paragraph 1, which defines assistance, I believe
    trumps paragraph 3, but ultimately paragraph 1's definition
    lies in paragraph 7. It defines what international assistance
    is. That is where it is defined.
        Within that, it says that international assistance is the
    following, that you can provide assistance, and to this end
    elect--elect one or more of the following so there is no
    requirement, as I read Article X, and as constitutional
    scholars I have spoken to--and this is not a constitutional
    issue, but legal scholars I have spoken to, there is no
    requirement of the United States to throw anything into the pot
    but what it decides it wishes to throw in, and to that end,
    Senator Helms and I have been negotiating conditions, which
    leads to my question.
        A condition that says--let me get it here--that requires
    the United States--requires the United States not to contribute
    to the voluntary fund for chemical defense assistance anything
    other than certain medical antidotes and treatment, which is
    what is listed in paragraph 1, so if we are not in the treaty,
    the point you made still pertains. If England or if France or
    if anyone else is going to transfer this technology to Iran,
    they are going to do it whether we are in it or not.
        If we are in the treaty, we are not obliged to do that, and
    to clarify that--at least I am, and I assume the Chairman still
    is--willing to attach a condition to the treaty defining our
    interpretation of Article X and limiting what can or cannot be
    transferred to what is mentioned, medical antidotes and
    treatments.
        I am not asking you to accept it. I would just like your
    view, Mr. Perle, whether that would--assume the worst from your
    perspective, that the treaty passes. Is it better to have that,
    and if it is, how much better is it?
        Mr. Perle. I do think, Senator, that paragraph 3, which
    describes the undertaking, is not qualified by the elaboration
    of the various means in paragraph 7. I do not think that was
    ever the intention.
        It will, I am sure, not surprise you to know that in the
    course of negotiation at one time paragraph 3 read, ``each
    State Party guarantees to facilitate.''
        The United States thought that was too much, and maybe
    others did as well, so we ended up compromising on
    ``undertakes,'' as though--the point, in objecting to
    ``guarantee,'' the American representative made it very clear
    that he did not think he could fall back on the interpretation
    you have just offered of paragraph 7 to limit the extent of the
    undertaking.
        Senator Biden. My time is up. I would disagree with that. I
    would argue statutory interpretation, the specific controls the
    general. The specifics in paragraph 7, the legal judgments I
    have gotten comport with this.
        Mr. Perle. Senator, if I could just answer the question
    with a kind of question, if we could fix this treaty, I mean, I
    am sure that you would agree that the cleanest solution would
    be to eliminate the whole of Article X. Why not do that?
        Senator Biden. I think the cleanest solution would be to
    limit our participation in the treaty to define this the way in
    which we intended, or at least we intended here; because I
    think to go back and renegotiate an entire treaty, we are
    another 10 years down the road, but we can fix it by doing this
    in my view.
        Mr. Perle. But if it means what you say it means, and other
    parties to the treaty understand that, then it seems to me it
    would be a breeze to change it.
        The Chairman. Because of this point, I am going to allow
    you about 45 seconds, which I will take off my time.
        Mr. Feith. I appreciate that, Senator. I would just say,
    Senator Biden, if everybody in the Senate devoted the kind of
    meticulous attention to the words that you have done, I am
    confident that there would be a much greater understanding and
    much less support for the treaty.
        I do compliment you on paying close attention. This treaty
    looks worse when you look at it closely, so I very much applaud
    your careful attention.
        Senator Biden. Now, that is a nice smart-ass comment.
        Mr. Feith. When you said that if we are out of the
    agreement we will not be bound, and the Germans or the British
    will be participating under the terms of this article, that is
    true.
        If, on the other hand, the United States made clear that
    the condition for our coming into the treaty is fixing this
    provision, without which, I think we can all agree the treaty
    would be better off--the fact that you have to do so elaborate
    an interpretation makes it clear that we will have difficulties
    when we go to other countries. Even if we could persuade
    ourselves of your interpretation, on which reasonable people
    can differ, when we go to persuade other countries, that is the
    nub of the issue: going to Germany or China or whoever and
    trying to get their cooperation on export controls----
        Senator Biden. No, that is not is how it is happening here.
        Mr. Feith [continuing]. We are going to have great
    difficulty. The treaty would be better off without this
    provision complicating things.
        The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Hagel.
        Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I wish to thank
    the panelists. You have provided an awful lot of very
    significant insight, and I, as well as all of my colleagues, am
    grateful, and thank you.
        I am going to help my friend Senator Biden here, because I
    am going to follow along that path that he has taken. Is this,
    in your opinion--and I would like to hear from each of you--a
    treaty, a convention that is one that you can rehabilitate? Is
    it one that you think we can still work on and, if it is, what
    do we do? Do we eliminate X and XI, amend it? If we were able
    to amend X and XI, would that satisfy the four of you?
        Each of you, I would like to have each of you, if you
    would, respond. Ambassador.
        Ambassador Kirkpatrick. I think it would be very
    significantly improved. I believe that the composition of the
    governing board requires attention as well.
        Senator Hagel. Thank you.
        Mr. Perle. Senator, I could support this treaty without any
    great expectations of its efficacy if we corrected the problem
    in Article X and Article XI, and I think that can be done. It
    took 10 years to produce this treaty with this serious flaw in
    it. I think it would take a great deal less time to eliminate
    the flaw. Nothing else would have to be renegotiated, only this
    one provision.
        Senator Hagel. In your opinion. Thank you. Sir.
        Dr. Ikle. I would agree that it would eliminate the damage
    to the down side. It would not make it into a great
    accomplishment, and it would still have some flaws on the
    intelligence collection; but it would be much less damaging, so
    that on balance maybe it could be passed, if it is really
    amended, Article X.
        Senator Hagel. Thank you.
        Mr. Feith. In my view, the treaty is a net loss from the
    national security point of view, in any event. I believe that
    the country would be better off if the Senate rejected the
    treaty and sent everybody back to the drawing board and did
    something constructive in this field.
        But one of the key questions is: How much of a net loss? I
    agree with all of my colleagues that the treaty would be far
    less bad if Articles X and XI were duly amended.
        Senator Hagel. So there we are, Mr. Chairman. We figured it
    out, and I will yield my time back. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Very good. He is a breath of fresh air in the
    Senate, I will tell you that.
        I am going to suggest that the Senator have 8 minutes to
    sort of compensate for whatever has run over with time.
        Senator Kerry. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. With my
    voice, I may need it.
        Welcome back to the panel. Let me, if I can, follow up on
    the question from Senator Hagel. Mr. Perle, I understand, then,
    from your answer to Senator Hagel that your chief, your
    principal objection to it resides in the transfer of
    technological scientific information, Article X, section 3, and
    then in Article XI, the entire question of technical
    information with respect to chemical, general chemical
    development, is that correct?
        Mr. Perle. Yes, although it is not just section 3 of
    Article X. It is really the whole of Article X.
        Senator Kerry. Well, let me ask you why--and I am having
    difficulty with this, but I am trying to keep open-minded about
    it. Reading Article I, which as you, I am sure, will agree, is
    the heart of this treaty and the overpowering article, it says
    that each party to the convention undertakes never under any
    circumstances--and I presume you will agree that any
    circumstances mean, under any circumstances, so that when you
    go to Article XI, or X, you are clearly defining within the
    context of Article I under any circumstance no party can ever
    transfer directly or indirectly chemical weapons to anyone.
        Therefore, all of Article XI with respect to development of
    any kind of chemical is clearly interpreted by the directly or
    indirectly clause of I.
        Second, it says that you can never undertake under any
    circumstances to develop or produce or otherwise acquire,
    stockpile, retain, to assist, encourage or induce anyone to
    engage in any activity prohibited under this convention.
        Now, I do not think any lawyer sitting here has any problem
    with that language, do we? Is there any confusion as to what is
    prohibited here?
        Mr. Perle. Senator, the problem is that until a State Party
    to the convention is found to have violated the convention by
    engaging in the production of chemical weapons----
        Senator Kerry. Precisely.
        Mr. Perle [continuing]. There is no basis upon which you
    could presume that Article I would permit you to avoid the
    undertaking of Article X or the promise of Article XI.
        Senator Kerry. Now, let us get to that. Now we are sort of
    going down the road.
        So therefore, under any circumstances, the only way we will
    ever be able to do anything about Article I or any of the
    others is to know what is going on.
        Mr. Perle. No, not to know what is going on. There is a
    very big difference between knowing what is going on and
    proving through the mechanisms of the institution that a
    violation has taken place.
        Senator Kerry. Right, but that is ultimately how you know.
    You prove it. You prove it through the challenge process,
    through the inspection process.
        Mr. Perle. No, I do not think you will ever prove anything
    through the inspection process.
        Senator Kerry. So no verification process----
        Mr. Perle. Could I just say one thing?
        Senator Kerry. Let me just ask you, are you saying that no
    verification process whatsoever would therefore be sufficient?
        Mr. Perle. I am saying you cannot verify the production of
    chemical weapons, because any plant that can be used for the
    production of permitted chemicals can also be used for the
    production of chemical weapons. There is a problem here.
        Senator Kerry. I understand that, and that can happen
    today, without the treaty.
        Mr. Perle. In 1997 a country that is not violating the
    agreement, and which is therefore entitled to all the benefits
    of Article X and XI, may exploit those benefits, invite
    international companies in to buildup their chemical industry
    as perfectly proper and perfectly legal, invite, solicit,
    receive cooperation in the development of the full range of
    defensive measures, and then, having accomplished all of that,
    violate Article I and some other point.
        Senator Kerry. But isn't the problem, can't they do that
    now anyway?
        Mr. Perle. Can they induce others to?
        Senator Kerry. They could invite anybody or induce anybody
    or pay anybody to do whatever they want today.
        Mr. Perle. The difference is the following. Let us take
    China and Pakistan as an example. The Germans complain that
    they are too frequently identified in this regard. The German
    industry is very aggressive in this regard, but set that aside,
    and take China and Pakistan.
        If China today engages in the sharing of chemical defensive
    technology with Pakistan, you can be sure that an American
    administration that is doing its job is going to be in Beijing
    remonstrating with the Chinese and saying, we think this is a
    very dangerous thing to do.
        Senator Kerry. But let me stop you there if I can for a
    minute.
        Mr. Perle. But suppose there was a treaty that says they
    must do it?
        Senator Kerry. I understand. Well, no. What it says is,
    they shall have the right to participate in the fullest
    possible exchange.
        Mr. Perle. Right.
        Senator Kerry. Now, possible is what is right and
    appropriate under Article I, which means----
        Mr. Perle. No, no. No, no. But there will have been no
    finding in the case of Pakistan, Senator. Pakistan is a
    legitimate recipient of assistance until Pakistan is found to
    have violated the agreement.
        Senator Kerry. Correct, but it is only as to defense,
    number 1, that they have a right to request anything.
        Mr. Perle. Well, both with respect to defensive, and with
    respect to commerce and chemicals.
        Senator Kerry. Defensive with respect to chemical weapons,
    and generically with respect to the development of a chemical.
        Mr. Perle. But the defense is the tough part. That is what
    is hard to do.
        Senator Kerry. But let me ask you, you were in the
    administration that offered to give the Russians Star Wars once
    we developed it. I mean, you were going to turn over the entire
    defense to them once we put it together. That was your plan.
        Mr. Perle. There is an important difference here.
        Senator Kerry. Which is?
        Mr. Perle. Which is that the defense in this case, the
    ability to operate in the presence of chemical weapons, is what
    makes the offensive capability possible.
        Senator Kerry. But that is exactly the same thing.
        Mr. Perle. No, it is not. The sharing of defenses in the
    earlier context was intended to permit both sides to eliminate
    the offensive capability.
        Senator Kerry. Correct.
        Mr. Perle. Not to make it feasible. It is exactly the
    opposite.
        Senator Kerry. I would disagree. If you are sharing a
    defensive capacity--I mean, Caspar Weinberger yesterday used a
    good example. If you have developed a foolproof gas mask, and
    you transfer the foolproof gas mask to another country, the
    likelihood, if you both have a foolproof gas mask, of either of
    you successfully using chemical weapons against each other is
    zero if it is foolproof, so the likelihood--I mean, you are not
    going to factor it into your military strategy. That was the
    same strategy in Star Wars.
        Mr. Perle. Well, we do not have chemical weapons, Senator,
    and we will not, so a foolproof gas mask--let me just put it
    this way. I would not worry if we had a foolproof gas mask, but
    I would certainly worry if Iran or Iraq or Libya had a
    foolproof gas mask, even if we also had one.
        Senator Kerry. But you see, you have already suggested that
    we are better off getting rid of our chemical weapons
    altogether, without any inspection regimen. Now, that is very
    hard for me to follow.
        Mr. Perle. Because I do not think they are militarily
    useful.
        Senator Kerry. Well, if they are not militarily useful,
    then you do not worry about what they have in terms of
    defensive capacity. You are going to deter it with nuclear
    weapons. We did not have any problem deterring Iraq, did we,
    during that war. It seems to me that there is a cold war
    philosophy going on here that you have got to have a
    technological edge, and you have to keep having the edge rather
    than struggling to go into a state of neutrality.
        Mr. Perle. I take very seriously what Jeane said, that
    chemical weapons are regarded in much of the Third World as the
    poor man's equivalent of nuclear weapons, and there is a lot of
    pressure to acquire these chemicals.
        We want to discourage that, and we want to discourage it in
    every possible way, and one way to discourage it is to make
    sure that the thing that is most difficult for a country
    desiring chemical weapons to accomplish, which is the
    acquisition of a defense, is made more difficult and not less
    difficult, and any treaty that promises to share that
    technology is just headed in the wrong direction. Why don't we
    fix it?
        The Chairman. Senator Feinstein.
        Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
    want to thank the witnesses, because I think their testimony
    has really been very thought-provoking. I have been a proponent
    of the treaty, and I must say you have encouraged me to look at
    it in a very different way.
        I have read and reread Article X now about eight different
    times.
        But Mr. Perle, you make an interesting theorem, and that is
    that the effectiveness of any policy here is the defense, and
    if you can defend against it you create a spiral. I mean, you
    succeed.
        Do you have any information that the administration might
    have agreed to this section on a case-by-case basis?
        Mr. Perle. I am not sure I understand what you mean.
        Senator Feinstein. In other words, that this section would
    only be carried out provided they, the United States, had the
    right to reject a request.
        Mr. Perle. No, I have no information to that effect. I
    think it is our intention not to honor the undertaking. I mean,
    I would prefer that when we undertake to treaties----
        Senator Feinstein. You mean, to guarantee to undertake and
    then not honor--in other words, not carry out that section?
        Mr. Perle. I think we intend not to carry out what is a
    clear obligation.
        Senator Feinstein. That is No. 3.
        Mr. Perle. If we are burdened with this treaty then I, too,
    would be in favor of not honoring that commitment, because it
    would be a foolish thing to do.
        Senator Feinstein. Because I think you made a good
    argument. Why is Article X in there? Obviously, if somebody has
    an offensive use of a chemical weapon against them, I think the
    legitimate nations of this world are going to respond and try
    to be helpful as much as possible. I wonder why it is necessary
    to have this in it at all, in terms of the integrity of the
    treaty.
        Mr. Perle. I believe it is not, and more to the point, if
    you will allow me to say this, I think that if you came to the
    conclusion that it should not be there, and two or three of
    your colleagues joined you, we can get it out of there.
        Senator Feinstein. May I then go on, and thank you very
    much, to what Ambassador Kirkpatrick mentioned on the
    composition of the governing bodies. You mentioned that. That
    was the other concern that you had. What changes do you think
    are merited in the composition?
        Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Senator Feinstein, what concerns me
    with this governing body and comparable ones is the
    preponderance on the governing body of countries lacking in the
    technological sophistication and technological experience to
    make really well-informed judgments about handling these
    materials. That is what concerns me.
        I just do not think that the quality of the decisions will
    be nearly as reliable as they could be. They are dangerous in
    any case. We all agree that this is a dangerous subject, and
    any decisions dealing with it are going to be imperfect and
    leave some danger. But the more the board that makes the
    decisions knows, the more experience they have, the more
    detailed technological sophistication they have, the better
    their decisions will be. That is what concerns me about it.
        Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Chairman, I do not know whether this is possible or
    not, but I would very much like to have an administration
    response to the arguments made on Article X. I think the points
    made here are very good points. I wonder why Article X is
    really necessary.
        Senator Biden. I would be happy to give them to you. They
    have responded officially and on the record. I would be happy
    to make sure you get them.
        Senator Feinstein. All right. That is a major concern to
    me. I just make that point.
        Thank you very much.
        The Chairman. I thank you, Senator Feinstein.
        Lady and gentlemen, thank you so much for coming.
        Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, before you dismiss this panel,
    could I have 30 seconds to try to clarify one point, if I may?
        The Chairman. Thirty seconds.
        Senator Biden. First of all, I think Article X--I disagree
    with the reading, but even if your reading is correct, I think
    it can be cleared up by a condition.
        But, Mr. Perle, you talked about the real world. The real
    world is Saddam Hussein, Qaddafi, or any of the rogue states.
    They are not going to worry about protecting their troops
    before they use chemical weapons. Nothing in their modus
    operandi would suggest that would even be a consideration for
    whether or not they would use chemical weapons, if they were
    going to use it, I would respectfully suggest.
        The Chairman. Very well.
        Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman, could I have 20 seconds? I
    just want to clarify one point with Mr. Perle.
        The Chairman. It is your time, 20 seconds. Go.
        Senator Kerry. Thank you very much, sir.
        I just wanted to clarify with Secretary Perle that it is my
    understanding that nothing in the convention requires the
    finding of a treaty violation before Article I applies to that
    particular country. I think, in your answer to me, you were
    suggesting you had to first find the violation. I do not
    believe you do.
        Mr. Perle. In the illustration that I offered before, where
    the Chinese might be building a facility for Pakistan, I do not
    mean--I just chose Pakistan at random.
        Senator Kerry. I am not even picking those countries. I
    just mean generically.
        Mr. Perle. But any country pair. I do not see on what
    basis, Senator, we could prevail over the words and the
    obligations and the undertakings of the treaty itself if there
    had been no finding of a violation. Otherwise, you are saying,
    anybody can do whatever anybody wishes.
        Senator Kerry. Well, in effect----
        The Chairman. No, wait a minute, 20 seconds.
        Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman, I think this is important to
    note.
        The Chairman. All of them are important, including the next
    panel.
        Senator Kerry. In effect, in this treaty, you can.
        The Chairman. Come on, Senator, I gave you more time than
    anybody else had.
        Senator Kerry. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. But I am
    not trying to abuse it. I just think the record is important
    here.
        Mr. Perle. I will be glad to call you after the hearing.
        Senator Kerry. There is a withdrawal capacity for national
    interest here. Any time we see the national interest, you have
    got 90 days to get out of this.
        Mr. Perle. Oh, yes, we can always get out of this treaty.
    But that is not going to solve any of the problems we are
    concerned about.
        The Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen and lady. We appreciate
    your coming so much.
        Senator Kerry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. The next panel consists of three friends of
    all of us. They have been around this place for a while.
        As I was saying, this panel not only consists of Americans
    who are well known, but they are friends of every one of us on
    the committee. General Scowcroft, I have known him ever since I
    came to this city, and that was a while ago. He is now
    President of the Forum for International Policy. He is former
    National Security Policy Advisor. Admiral Zumwalt is a member
    of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and he
    is former Chief of Naval Operations. Ed Rowny. He is the very
    Hon. Ed Rowny, my neighbor, former Ambassador, and Lieutenant
    General, U.S. Army, retired, International Negotiation
    Consultant, former Chief Negotiator for START I, and Special
    Arms Control Advisor, Washington, D.C.
        Now, I am going to have to depart for another meeting I
    cannot get out of, and Senator Hagel said that he would take
    the gavel for me. I have one question, if I may, out of order.
    That would be for Admiral Zumwalt.
        Sir, Article X has been criticized, because it promotes the
    spread of CW defense technology. Article XI has been
    criticized, because it tends to undermine multilateral export
    controls among treaty parties in the chemical field. Even
    regarding untrustworthy states like Iran, are the concerns
    about Article X and XI sensible? In other words, is it
    sensible, sir, to concern ourselves with whether Iran might
    more easily get CW defense or other technology as a result of
    these Articles? Would the United States of America be better
    off if Articles X and XI are fixed before the CWC is ratified?
    Three questions.
        Admiral Zumwalt. It is a fair question to raise in
    connection with Articles X and XI, in my judgment. The answer,
    in my judgment, is that non-ratification to seek a modification
    at this time would, in essence, delay the participation of the
    United States, in the mechanism that is being set up for a very
    large number of years, and that the organization created by
    those that have ratified it in sufficient numbers would operate
    with all of the advantages and disadvantages the critics on
    either side are citing.
        I believe that we would be better off to ratify the treaty
    and to work from within the system, with the considerable
    powers we bring, both financial and political, to make any
    modifications over time than we would to let this new treaty
    regime operate without the insider influence of the U.S.
    Government.
        The Chairman. Very well.
        Now Senator Hagel is going to take the chair and the gavel.
    Why do not you, since you are under time constraints, go with
    your statement first, sir, followed by Ed Rowny and Mr.
    Scowcroft.
        Senator Biden. Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
    accommodating this panel. I appreciate it.

      STATEMENT OF E.R. ZUMWALT, JR., ADMIRAL, UNITED STATES NAVY
     (RETIRED), MEMBER, PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY
                                 BOARD

        Admiral Zumwalt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Since I was notified, Mr. Chairman and members of the
    committee, just yesterday of the requirement to be here, I
    would submit for the record an article I have written and a
    letter which I co-authored, which state the positions I have
    taken on this treaty. I, of course, recommend that it be
    ratified.
        I found myself disappointed to have to be at crosshairs
    with the distinguished panel that just preceded he me, because
    they are all good friends of mine; but I take issue with a
    number of things that were said.
        First, with regard to the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, I
    was a part of the group that analyzed the capabilities of the
    nations of the world to acquire nuclear weapons before the
    Nuclear Proliferation Treaty was considered. We estimated that
    there were somewhere between 20 and 30 nations, within a period
    of 10 years, that would have the nuclear capability. In my
    judgment, the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty has, without a
    question of a doubt, slowed down the rate of acquisition of
    nuclear weapons.
        It was not a perfect treaty. It could have been made more
    perfect if it could have been negotiated, but it was not
    negotiable in any other form. It has accomplished its mission
    far better than no regime would have permitted it be
    accomplished. I think the same thing can be said with regard to
    this Chemical Weapons Convention.
        We hear that it is a disadvantage that we will not get the
    rogue nations in. The rogue nations will not come in whether or
    not the United States ratifies it. It will make no difference
    whatsoever with regard to the situation in the world whether or
    not we ratify insofar as the rogue nations are concerned. It
    has been said that because they would not come in, the treaty
    is therefore useless.
        In my judgment, the international regime that the treaty
    gives us--the ability to sanction the rogue nations that do not
    come in--is not there without U.S. membership and thus
    effective U.S. influence as it is for those like Iran who do
    come in. But the conventional sanctions that we are capable of
    bringing about in other ways are still there for us to operate.
    In other words, insofar as those who do not come in are
    concerned, I think this treaty, ratification or not, is
    irrelevant.
        With regard to the Article X issue, I think it has been
    quite clear, both based on what lawyers have told us and what
    Mr. Berger for the administration has told us, that the
    undertaking to facilitate does not obligate the United States
    to do more than has been discussed here; namely, to provide, if
    it chooses to do so, the kind of help that would not in any way
    harm us.
        The ability for us to get more access is an important thing
    to me as a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence
    Advisory Board. I have just finished service on a subcommittee
    of that group, which has examined our ability to gain the
    appropriate intelligence in the BW field and the CW field and
    in the nuclear field. I can tell you that we need to improve it
    and that, however less than perfect it might be, the
    opportunity to inspect is going to give us additional
    information which can be cross-compared with what we get
    through other sources in the intelligence community. It will,
    without a doubt, enhance our ability to know more about what is
    going on.
        That, coupled with the fact that we have an international
    regime, if we ratify the treaty, to work within, the fact that
    the treaty will cause, at the very least, the disposition of
    masses of volumes of poisonous substances-- after all the
    nations who are ratifying it will be obligated to eliminate
    their volume--make it less available for the terrorists groups
    and for the rogue nations to get, in one way or another.
        I worry about a decision to reject. I worry about a
    decision to qualify in a way that does not provide formal
    ratification. I think that the logical course for the United
    States, now that we have reached this point, with a treaty that
    is going to come into effect whether or not we ratify it, is
    that we are better off to work within the system, use our
    financial powers and our political powers to seek the
    modifications that are necessary and to pick up the advantages
    that are there.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The information referred to by Admiral Zumwalt follows:]

                                               Washington Post,
                                                       January 6, 1997.

                        A Needless Risk for U.S. Troops

                             [by E. R. Zumwalt Jr.]

        It has been more than 80 years since poison gas was first used in
    modern warfare--in April 1915 during the first year of World War I. It
    is long past time to do something about such weapons.
        I am not a dove. As a young naval officer in 1945, I supported the
    use of nuclear weapons against Japan. As chief of naval operations two
    decades ago, I pressed for substantially higher military spending than
    the nation's political leadership was willing to grant. After retiring
    from the Navy, I helped lead the opposition to the SALT II treaty
    because I was convinced it would give the Soviet Union a strategic
    advantage.
        Now the Senate is considering whether to approve the Chemical
    Weapons Convention. This is a worldwide treaty, negotiated by the
    Reagan administration and signed by the Bush administration. It bans
    the development, production, possession, transfer and use of chemical
    weapons. Senate opposition to ratification is led by some with whom I
    often agree. But in this case, I believe they do a grave disservice to
    America's men and women in uniform.
        To a Third World leader indifferent to the health of his own troops
    and seeking to cause large-scale pain and death for its own sake,
    chemical weapons have a certain attraction. They don't require the
    advanced technology needed to build nuclear weapons. Nor do they
    require the educated populace needed to create a modern conventional
    military. But they cannot give an inferior force a war-winning
    capability. In the Persian Gulf war, the threat of our uncompromising
    retaliation with conventional weapons deterred Saddam Hussein from
    using his chemical arsenal against us.
        Next time, our adversary may be more berserk than Saddam; and
    deterrence may fail. If that happens, our retaliation will be decisive,
    devastating--and no help to the young American men and women coming
    home dead or bearing grievous chemical injuries. What will help is a
    treaty removing huge quantities of chemical weapons that could
    otherwise be used against us.
        Militarily, this treaty will make us stronger. During the Bush
    administration, our nation's military and political leadership decided
    to retire our chemical weapons. This wise move was not made because of
    treaties. Rather, it was based on the fact that chemical weapons are
    not useful for us.
        Politically and diplomatically, the barriers against their use by a
    First World country are massive. Militarily they are risky and
    unpredictable to use, difficult and dangerous to store. They serve no
    purpose that can't be met by our overwhelming conventional forces.
        So the United States has no deployed chemical weapons today and
    will have none in the future. But the same is not true of our potential
    adversaries. More than a score of nations now seek or possess chemical
    weapons. Some are rogue states with which we may someday clash.
        This treaty is entirely about eliminating other people's weapons--
    weapons that may someday be used against Americans. For the American
    military, U.S. ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention is high
    gain and low or no pain. In that light, I find it astonishing that any
    American opposes ratification.
        Opponents argue that the treaty isn't perfect: Verification isn't
    absolute, forms must be filled out, not every nation will join at first
    and so forth. This is unpersuasive. Nothing in the real world is
    perfect. If the U.S. Navy had refused to buy any weapon unless it
    worked perfectly every time, we would have bought nothing and now would
    be disarmed. The question is not how a treaty compares with perfection.
    The question is how U.S. ratification compares with its absence.
        If we refuse to ratify, some governments will use our refusal as an
    excuse to keep their chemical weapons. Worldwide availability of
    chemical weapons will be higher, and we will know less about other
    countries' chemical activities. The diplomatic credibility of our
    threat of retaliation against anyone who uses chemical weapons on our
    troops will be undermined by our lack of ``clean hands.'' At the bottom
    line, our failure to ratify will substantially increase the risk of a
    chemical attack against American service personnel.
        If such an attack occurs, the news reports of its victims in our
    military hospitals will of course produce rapid ratification of the
    treaty and rapid replacement of Senators who enabled the horror by
    opposing ratification. But for the victims it will be too late.
        Every man and woman who puts on a U.S. military uniform faces
    possible injury or death in the national interest. They don't complain;
    risk is part of their job description. But it is part of the job
    description of every U.S. Senator to see that this risk not be
    increased.

        [See page 25 for the letter to which Admiral Zumwalt
    referred.]

        Senator Hagel [presiding]: Admiral Zumwalt, thank you very
    much.
        In the interest of time, what Senator Biden and I have
    agreed to do, if it is OK with your fellow panelists, is get
    the last 15 minutes we have with you, Admiral, with questions.
    So, with that, the Chairman had a question and I would turn to
    Senator Biden.
        Senator Biden. I understand the Admiral has a 4:30 plane,
    if you guys do not mind. I will be very brief.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral, did not the Nonproliferation Treaty regime help us
    mobilize the world reaction to North Korea's violations?
        Admiral Zumwalt. In my judgment, it did; yes, sir.
        Senator Biden. And would we have been able to make a
    credible threat of international sanctions had there been no
    such treaty?
        Admiral Zumwalt. Clearly the regime, the NPT, made that
    more feasible and more effective.
        Senator Biden. And did not that point you are making about
    the CWC, that, at least at a minimum, it establishes a norm
    against which, when violations are clear, we can mobilize world
    opinion and justify actions we would likely take that we might
    not be able to justify in world opinion?
        Admiral Zumwalt. Absolutely. It is a less than perfect
    step, but far better than the present system.
        Senator Biden. In the interest of time, obviously, this is
    going to be somewhat more of a statement than a question. I
    think you have made five very valid points. That is, as I
    translate them, everything the critics say is wrong with this
    treaty would be worse if you did not have the treaty.
    Everything that is wrong with the treaty would be worse if you
    did not have the treaty.
        The last point that you made, which you referenced, is
    political power. As it relates to Article X and Article XI,
    even if my interpretation is wrong, which I believe it is not--
    and most legal scholars do not believe it is either--but even
    if it is wrong, the place in which we are going to be able to
    impact on whether or not another nation transfers technology, a
    defensive technology, to a rogue state will not be through a
    treaty provision, it will be through our economic power. We
    just flat say to Germany and Britain and France and the rest--
    we will either say it or we will not--we will either say, if
    you do, you have got a problem, and here is the problem, let me
    define it for you.
        I know that Brent Scowcroft met with his counterparts in
    Germany, France, England, and Italy, and every other country in
    the world, when they were engaged in things that we might have
    had questions about. So the point you make, I think, should not
    be missed. Our significant political, military, and economic
    power with nations that have the capability of transferring
    technology is what is going to determine whether they transfer
    technology.
        The last point I would make is, the Australia Group, I
    think they all--and there are 26 of them who have ratified--
    they all believe that Article XI in no way, in no way, impedes
    the organizational structure of the Australia Group and the
    commitment they have made to one another.
        Anyway, there is more to say, but I thank you for being
    here, and especially for the notice. I jerked you all around,
    because we were unable to get a commitment as to when. I
    apologize. But I thank you for being here.
        Admiral Zumwalt. Thank you.
        Senator Hagel. Senator Biden, thank you.
        If it is appropriate and OK, what I would like to do, we
    have got 10 minutes left, maybe we could break it down into 3-
    minute pieces. That way we give our three colleagues an
    opportunity to each ask a question.
        Senator Frist.
        Senator Frist. Admiral, thank you for being here today. In
    the interest of time I have just one question regarding the
    countries who have not signed on, the so-called rogue nations,
    whether it be Syria or Iraq or North Korea or Libya. If we did
    not sign on or if we do sign on, either way, how do you see
    this treaty really impacting those particular nations?
        Admiral Zumwalt. I think, with or without the treaty, we
    can continue to impose sanctions on those rogue nations who
    have not come in. With the treaty, we can clearly impose
    sanctions on them if they do not respond to our right to
    inspect. So it seems to me that we lose nothing and gain
    something by the ratification. The fact that that regime exists
    as of April 29th, whether or not we are in it, means that we
    are foregoing a great opportunity to shape for the better a
    regime that does exist. We cannot stop that existence.
        Senator Frist. And by our not participating but still
    having the regime there, say once again how our presence is
    going to affect those nations.
        Admiral Zumwalt. Well, the Chairman of this committee, in
    my judgment, has done a good job of shaping up the United
    Nations by withholding funds. The same thing can be done, or
    the other means of asserting political power can be used,
    working within the organization, while having the influence of
    being a member.
        Senator Frist. Thank you, Admiral.
        Senator Hagel. Senator, thank you.
        Senator Kerry.
        Senator Kerry. Thank you very much.
        Admiral, welcome. What do you think would be the impact
    with respect to Russia and their potential participation if we
    do not ratify?
        Admiral Zumwalt. I believe that Russia is likelier to come
    in if we ratify than if we do not--far likelier. I believe that
    we can continue to use all the same kind of methods that we
    have used to shape up, if I may use that expression, the
    Russians to date, by helping and withholding.
        Senator Kerry. Do you, in reading either Article XI or
    Article X, do you perceive any overt or discernible conflict or
    do you have to search for the conflict that has been described
    with respect to Article X and the rights and fundamental
    obligations of this treaty?
        Admiral Zumwalt. If I understand the points they have made,
    I do not--I think there is a consensus on both sides that we do
    not find ourselves forced, if we ratify, to do anything that is
    harmful to us. The issue is then, what about the other members
    of the regime? I repeat again, they are in that regime whether
    or not we ratify. So that their conduct is something that we
    will have more opportunity to influence from within than from
    without.
        Senator Kerry. Now, Admiral, you were Chief of Naval
    Operations and have had a remarkable career, in charge of our
    young people in harm's way. I think that you--and General
    Scowcroft likewise, and I will come to him later with this
    question--but based on your military career and the
    responsibilities that you have had to exercise, in your
    judgment, are our military forces and our young people in
    uniform better off with this treaty or without?
        Admiral Zumwalt. In my judgment, as I say in the documents
    that I will submit for the record, they are better off with us
    within the treaty than they are without. I believe that it
    would be a disservice to our men and women in uniform if we
    stay outside this regime, which in any event is going to come
    into existence on April 29.
        Senator Kerry. And the principal reason in shorthand for
    that is?
        Admiral Zumwalt. That we have the ability better to
    influence from within than from without. Pluses and minuses
    notwithstanding, the regime exists as of April 29th.
        I might also add, Senator, that you used to take orders a
    lot better than you do now.
        Senator Kerry. Well, I was elected not to take orders.
        Thank you. I share with my colleagues that the Admiral was
    my commanding officer when I was in Vietnam; yes, he was. I had
    the privilege of having him pin my Silver Star on my chest at a
    beach in Vietnam. So it is nice to have him here.
        Admiral Zumwalt. For a very well deserved act of courage.
        Senator Hagel. Senator, for that, you get an extra couple
    of minutes.
        Senator Kerry. For that, I have learned not to take them.
        Senator Hagel. I was going to say, your life is a lot
    easier right now, Senator. Seriously, if you would have any
    questions, we have a little extra time.
        Senator Feinstein.
        Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral, welcome.
        Admiral Zumwalt. Thank you.
        Senator Feinstein. I wanted to go back again to I think the
    central point that Mr. Perle made, which was developing a
    defense against chemical weapons is perhaps the greatest
    incentive to the development of chemical weapons, in the sense
    that if you can defend against them adequately, it creates
    perhaps an incentive to be able to use them--and particularly,
    I guess, with the mentality that might use these horrible
    things. Do you agree with that theory?
        Admiral Zumwalt. The regime makes it possible for defenses
    to be improved. That is unassailable. One has to make a
    judgment about the tradeoff between what that accomplishes for
    the good of the majority of the nations involved, versus what
    opportunities it gives the bad guys to take advantage of it.
        The fact that we have created an international regime that
    gives us at least some opportunity to provide sanctions, some
    opportunity to provide a regime of international law, makes me
    feel that, on balance, we are better off to go ahead and take
    the----
        Senator Feinstein. If you would permit me, the good guys
    really do not need this. Because the good guys are not going to
    use the chemical weapons. The good guys are going to respond to
    a neighbor in need like that and help. It is really the bad
    guys that you have got to deal with. My experience is, with the
    bad guys, they are going to use this kind of thing for every
    conceivable edge they can get. Therefore, why help them?
        Admiral Zumwalt. Well, Senator, let us take Iran as an
    example. I think we both agree that they are a bad guy. Iran is
    going to be within the regime. Based on my experience on the
    President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, I would rather
    get the advantage of being able to demand the inspections that
    we get from this regime than I would to worry about the rather
    exotic strategy that my brilliant friend Richard Perle
    suggested they would follow. I think that the fact that we
    would have the pressure of public opinion, the opportunity to
    use political power, and so forth, would more restrain Iran
    that otherwise would be the case.
        Senator Feinstein. All right. Then take that example. Iran
    has an illegal insecticide plant or any kind of a manufacturing
    plant. Somewhere within this plant there is some capacity to
    make or combine or to produce a chemical weapon in some way.
    That is not necessarily going to be found on an inspection. It
    probably will not be.
        Admiral Zumwalt. There is some probability that it will not
    be found. There is some probability that it will be. Coupled
    with other intelligence capabilities, which are constantly
    improving, I think we can increase that probability over time.
    Therefore, I would rather be within the regime than without. I
    think we gain more than we lose. I do not trust Iran at all,
    but I think that there will be more restraint on them if we are
    within the regime and operating it in a vigorous way.
        Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much.
        Senator Hagel. Senator, thank you.
        Admiral Zumwalt, thank you very, very much for taking the
    time.
        Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Admiral. I appreciate
    it.
        Admiral Zumwalt. Thank you, sir. Thank you for
    accommodating my schedule.
        Senator Hagel. I hope you are on your way to somewhere
    exotic.
        Admiral Zumwalt. I made a promise to a granddaughter.
        Senator Hagel. Oh, wonderful. General Rowny, welcome.

      STATEMENT OF EDWARD L. ROWNY, LIEUTENANT GENERAL, U.S. ARMY
            (RETIRED), INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION CONSULTANT

        Ambassador Rowny. Thank you, sir.
        Before I start, I would like thank the Chairman, Senator
    Helms, who is my neighbor and good friend, who stood by me when
    I resigned from SALT II in protest over that flawed treaty. I
    think we got a good subsequent treaty as a result of turning
    down SALT II. I have him to thank for that.
        I also have tremendous respect for the minority leader
    here, Senator Biden, who attended to our negotiations in
    Geneva. While we did not always agree, he was always thoughtful
    and fair and never ad hominem. We had a great deal of respect
    for him.
        Senator Biden. Thank you, General.
        Ambassador Rowny. Rather than read my prepared statement,
    which I would like to put into the record, perhaps I could save
    some time by just hitting some of the high points.
        I will ad lib however. I would like to have my written
    statement put into the record.
        Senator Hagel. It will be, without objection.
        Ambassador Rowny. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman, initially I was opposed to this treaty. I was
    opposed to it, because I didn't think it was verifiable. I
    didn't like the provisions about the inability to use tear gas
    in combat. I didn't like Article X and particularly paragraph 3
    of Article X. Most importantly, I felt that this treaty might
    lull us into a false sense of security and fail to provide
    protection for our troops.
        But after listening to various debates and following the
    fascinating evolvement of the 30 conditions, 22 of which have
    been agreed upon, I have changed my mind. Now I feel that on
    balance the U.S. Senate should ratify this treaty.
        Let me give you my reasons.
        First, as to verifiability, this treaty is not effectively
    verifiable. I think that is clear, and I think we should not
    kid ourselves that might be.
        Second, as to tear gas, I would hope that one of the
    conditions that is placed on the treaty allows the use of tear
    gas in combat.
        Senator Biden. I think we can do that.
        Ambassador Rowny. I understand that the treaty allows us to
    use tear gas in domestic situations. But, for example, if in
    time of war it is necessary to go after a downed pilot, we
    should be able to use tear gas to do so.
        As for paragraph three of Article X, I think if we could
    interpret this in the U.S. way and not the Iranian way, this
    would be very helpful.
        I want to dwell on this idea of the ability to protect
    against chemical weapons. I was appalled when I spoke to
    several of my friends who were in the Gulf War that we had to
    go to Germany to get protective vehicles, that we had to go to
    Great Britain to get our sniffing devices, and that we had to
    go to the Czech Republic to get contamination equipment. This
    is no way for a great power to operate, to have to rely on its
    allies for essential defensive equipment and detection devices.
        Also, I think that there are more aspects to defense. We
    should help to defend against terrorists in this country, and I
    think the moneys and efforts should be put to that end.
    Furthermore, I believe that ballistic missile defenses should
    be deployed, because I feel that there are several rogue states
    which now have ballistic missiles capable of reaching our
    troops in time of combat with nuclear, biological, and chemical
    warheads. In a few years they will be able to reach the United
    States.
        I think that we should be able to defend not only our
    troops in combat but the United States against an accidental
    launch or limited attack. I am not talking about full scale
    attacks by China or a resurgent Russia but only about limited
    attacks.
        I am encouraged that the administration has now recognized
    our lack of defenses and has said that $225 million will be
    allocated to protect our troops.
         I hope that the Congress will fully support this $225
    million to provide the defenses against chemical attack.
        As for Russia, I have been working for 4 years since I left
    the government to try to get the Russians to ratify START II,
    and I have been finding this increasingly difficult. I think it
    is important, but in connection I think it is also important
    that we get Russia to join the states which would ratify the
    CWC.
        President Yeltsin has already signed the CWC, but the Duma
    is opposing ratification. I think if the U.S. fails to ratify
    the CWC, it will give the Russians an excuse for not ratifying
    it.
        The United States has been in the vanguard, asking
    countries to join this convention. For us to renege and not
    ratify the CWC will tarnish our international prestige.
        A great deal of the world looks up to us as leaders and for
    setting norms and standards. I think, as a minimum, this treaty
    would set norms and standards. I am in favor of that.
        Mr. Chairman, I was in the arms control business for over 2
    decades. I think that there are four criteria for any good
    treaty.
        First is verification. Second is that the treaty should not
    be flawed. Third is that it be enforceable, and fourth is that
    it be in the security interests of the United States.
        I have already said that this treaty is not effectively
    verifiable. On the other hand, if we were to enter into the
    treaty before the 29th of April, we would get a seat within the
    process and we would be able to help get violators exposed. I
    think on balance we gain more from being on the inside than we
    do by being on the outside, especially since this treaty is
    going to come into effect in any case.
        The second criterion is that a treaty not be fatally
    flawed. While the CWC is a flawed treaty, I don't think any of
    the flaws are fatal. The flaws that are there I think are
    fixable. I think the tear gas flaw is fixable. I think that
    paragraph 3 of Article X is fixable. Therefore, I do not think
    that the fatally flawed argument can apply against this treaty.
        As for the third criterion, enforceability, no arms control
    agreement can stand on its own. Even the START I and START II
    treaties, with which I was proud to be associated, can not
    stand on their own. To make a treaty effective you need a good
    defense posture. You have to have a credible way of enforcing
    it. If you don't have that, an arms control treaty is not worth
    the paper it is written on.
        I would hope, again as a matter of emphasis, that we give
    whatever moneys are necessary to defend ourselves against an
    attack in the field, terrorist attacks at home, and ballistic
    missile attacks.
        Finally, the vital fourth criterion of any treaty is that
    it be in the interest of the United States. On weighing the
    pros and cons I have concluded after a lot of thoughtful
    consideration, that the U.S. Senate should ratify this treaty.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of General Rowny follows:]

                 Prepared Statement of General Edward L. Rowny

        Mr. Chairman: It is a privilege for me to testify once again before
    the Foreign Relations Committee.

        Until recently, I was opposed to the ratification of the Chemical
    Weapons Convention (CWC) by the U. S. Senate. My initial reading of the
    CWC led me to believe that it was unverifiable, that it would prevent
    the U.S. from using tear gas in combat, and that it would obligate us
    to provide sensitive chemical technology to signatory rogue states.
    However, my major concern was that the United States might be lulled
    into a false sense of security and fail to provide adequate defenses
    for our men and women in uniform and citizens at home.

        I have now studied the treaty more carefully and have also followed
    the negotiations of the 30 conditions opponents want to attach to the
    convention. I have been impressed with the Administration's willingness
    to negotiate a number of these conditions. Accordingly, I have changed
    my mind, and I now feel that ratification of the CWC would be in the
    best interests of the United States.

        The treaty is clearly not verifiable. However, I believe that we
    can gain from being a member of the inspection framework. it is
    important that the U.S. Senate ratify the CWC before 29 April, 1997 so
    that we may be a party to the verification process and that American
    inspectors, who are among the best trained and experienced in the
    world, can become members of the international inspectorate. It is true
    that there are certain disadvantages to being a party to the inspection
    process. However, I am convinced that we have more to gain by being on
    the inside than on the outside looking in.

        I still have misgivings about the prohibition against the use of
    tear gas during time of war. While I understand that it is not
    prohibited for use in domestic situations, I can visualize many cases
    where non-lethal agents would be beneficial in combat.

        As for the obligation to share defensive technology in all cases, I
    do not subscribe to the Iranian interpretation of Article X. Rather, I
    am convinced that the treaty can be interpreted in a way that protects
    our interests without violating the terms of the CWC.

        When it comes to my major concern, I was appalled to learn from
    several officers that during the Gulf War they had to borrow detection
    equipment from Great Britain, protected vehicles from Germany, and
    decontamination equipment from the Czech Republic. I am encouraged by
    the Administration's recent request for funds which would eliminate or
    mitigate the dangers to our soldiers in combat and our civilian
    populace. This demonstrates an awareness of our inadequate defensive
    posture and progress to correct it. However, it is important that the
    $225 million in requested expenditures be approved by the Congress.

        I believe that it is also important that the Administration pursue
    a vigorous program to provide ballistic missile defenses for our forces
    overseas and for our people at home against accidental launches and
    limited attacks by rogue states. Several of these states now possess
    ballistic missiles equipped with nuclear, biological and chemical
    warheads capable of striking our U.S. troops deployed overseas and will
    soon be capable of striking the United States. Protecting our soldiers
    in combat and our civilians from terrorist activities, accidental
    launches, and rogue state attacks requires not only the request for
    funds by the administration, but the provision of such funds by the
    Congress.

        The CWC will come into effect on 29 April, 1997 whether the U.S.
    Senate ratifies it or not. A failure to ratify the treaty would place
    us outside the world's civilized nations and associate us with the
    pariahs. Additionally, failure of the U.S. Senate to ratify the CWC
    would give the Russian Duma an excuse to discard the treaty. It is
    important that Russia become a party to the treaty so that we can
    inspect their facilities which are reportedly developing new chemical
    agents.

        I am also concerned that our enviable position as leaders of the
    free world would suffer if we fail to ratify a treaty we have convinced
    scores of other nations to join. We are highly respected and admired
    abroad largely because of our leadership in establishing high standards
    and norms of international conduct. At the very least, the CWC will
    establish such norms and standards for others to follow.

        For more than two decades as an arms controller, I have maintained
    that arms control agreements must meet four criteria. First, they must
    be effectively verifiable; second, they must not contain fatal flaws;
    third, they must be enforceable; and fourth, they must serve the
    interests of the United States.

        The CWC does not meet the first criterion; it is not effectively
    verifiable. However, the problem of verifying the production and
    stockpiling of chemicals is more difficult than that of verifying the
    existence and storage of ballistic missiles, bombers, and air delivered
    weapons. I believe that under the CWC we stand to gain more information
    than we might lose.

        As for the second criterion, while the treaty is flawed, none of
    the flaws, in my opinion, is a fatal one. Moreover, I believe that
    continued discussions between the White House and the Senate Foreign
    Relations Committee can remove or mitigate some of the remaining flaws.

        The third criterion is a critical one. No arms control treaty,
    including the START treaties, of which I am proud, can stand alone. The
    CWC by itself will not protect our troops or citizens, but it will be
    useful if--and only if--we spend the funds to protect ourselves and
    have the will to do whatever is necessary to enforce the terms of the
    treaty.

        Finally, we come to the vital fourth criterion, that the treaty be
    in the best interests of the United States. The bottom line must answer
    the question, ``Are we better off with the CWC or without it?'' Careful
    analysis and my considered judgment lead me to conclude that we will be
    better off with it than without it.

        Accordingly, I respectfully urge the United States Senate to ratify
    the Chemical Weapons Convention.

        Thank you Mr. Chairman.

        Senator Hagel. General Rowny, thank you.

        General Scowcroft, welcome.

      STATEMENT OF GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT, PRESIDENT, FORUM FOR
       INTERNATIONAL POLICY, AND FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
                       ADVISOR, WASHINGTON, D.C.

        General Scowcroft. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a great
    pleasure for me to appear before this distinguished committee
    on such an important issue.

        At the outset, I would like to make one thing clear.
    Chairman Helms made some comment about support being
    orchestrated by the White House. I want to make sure everybody
    understands I am not orchestrated by the White House. I am
    orchestrated by my concern for the national interest. It is in
    that capacity that I appear.

        We are talking about how best to deal with one of the
    scourges of modern man, one of the three weapons of mass
    destruction, and in some respects the most distasteful one.

        I am going to be very brief, because I am going to follow
    Senator Biden's prescription to keep my eye on the ball. I
    think a lot of the debate this afternoon has been on
    peripheries.

        We are not starting a treaty here. We are finishing a
    treaty. When you strip where we are now to its basic
    essentials, what is facing us in the Chemical Warfare
    Convention are very narrow and relatively straight-forward
    issues.

        First is: The United States is going out of the chemical
    weapons business. We were forbidden many years ago, quite a few
    years ago, by the Congress to modernize our chemical stocks by
    building the so-called binaries; and subsequent to that we
    agreed legislatively to mandate the unilateral destruction of
    our chemical weapons stocks.

        We are going out of the business. That is the first major
    point.

        The second one is that the Chemical Warfare Convention will
    enter into force whether or not the United States ratifies it.
    We are not dealing with a bunch of putty here that we can mold
    any way we want.

        So the basic question is really a very simple one: Is the
    national interest served better by acceding to the treaty or by
    staying outside the convention? The question is not whether
    this is the perfect treaty.

        As other witnesses today have said, there is no perfect
    treaty for chemical weapons. Their manufacture is a lot like
    insecticides and fertilizers. There is no truly verifiable
    treaty. So that is not the issue before us.

        There is not even a possible treaty written just as the
    United States would like it; because some 160 nations have
    signed this treaty, and any multilateral convention requires
    compromise of one way or another.

        There is only before us this particular treaty. Given the
    real world situation we are in, therefore, I think the answer
    to the question is a resounding yes to ratification of the
    treaty, because it is in the national interest of the United
    States. I want to digress to make just a couple of points about
    some of the earlier questions. First is about the
    Nonproliferation Treaty.

        As Ambassador Kirkpatrick was winding up, I was waiting for
    her real punch line, the logical conclusion to her remarks
    which should be that we would be better off had there been no
    Nonproliferation Treaty. I think General Rowny has clearly
    pointed out, as have you, Senator Biden, that that is not the
    case.

        Is it flawed? Sure. Do I have problems with it? Sure. But I
    think there is no question that the treaty played some kind of
    role in the fact that--I think it was President Kennedy who
    said that there were going to be 25 nuclear powers within the
    next decade, but that has not happened.

        So it is something better than nothing.

        Article X of the CWC has come in for a lot of discussion
    today. As I recall, the purpose for Article X was to help those
    countries who abided by the treaty who might be threatened by
    chemical attack to be able to defend themselves. Now that is a
    pretty logical kind of thing. This is not some nefarious thing
    that the negotiators just cooked up to make a bad treaty. It is
    a very logical course of action.

        Now as to the argument that one would never use chemical
    weapons until one had this perfect defense and, therefore, that
    is the real threat, I think that is not true. Chemical weapons
    are the poor man's nuclear weapons. But chemical weapons have,
    I think, demonstrated that they are not militarily useful
    weapons. There were masses of stocks of chemical weapons in
    World War II, which was certainly a no holds barred war.
    Against an enemy that has defenses, chemical weapons are an
    irritant; they are not overwhelming.

        Chemical weapons are valuable as a terror weapon, and you
    don't need defenses to fire missiles armed with chemical
    weapons, aircraft dropping chemical weapons. Therefore I think
    that is a very important aspect in which Article X needs to be
    looked at.

        As for reporting requirements, one of the things that has
    been overlooked, other than to complain about the
    administration's treaty, is that it does require reporting of
    shipments of chemical materials and so on.

        Right now, it is possible for a country to buy a few pounds
    of a precursor here or a few pounds there, a few pounds
    somewhere else, and to amass an abnormal supply without anybody
    ever noticing it. That won't be possible anymore. Therefore, we
    will have a better idea of what's going on and who the bad guys
    seem to be.

        We should ratify this treaty, recognizing that it is not a
    silver bullet. It is just one weapon--a good one, but just
    one--in our fight against chemical weapons, and we must
    continue to employ every weapon in the U.S. arsenal to fight
    this terror weapon. We cannot sit back and relax.

        I think one of the things this sharp debate has brought to
    the national attention is that this is important and we cannot
    just sign it and forget about it.

        Starting over, as was suggested this afternoon, I think is
    pure fantasy. If we reject this treaty, we will incur the
    bitterness of all of our friends and allies who followed us for
    10 years in putting this thing together. It is not a matter of,
    ``Just well, let's scrap this and let's start over again.'' We
    will throw the whole civilized world into confusion, and the
    idea that we can then lead out again down a different path I
    think is just not in the cards. We have got to deal with the
    situation we face now, not an ideal one out in the future.

        Let me close by saying that I spoke to President Bush this
    morning, and he asked me to state for the record that he is a
    strong and enthusiastic supporter of the Chemical Warfare
    Convention and that it would be a severe blow to the U.S. role
    in the world were we to repudiate it.

        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

        Senator Hagel. General Scowcroft, as always, thank you.

        Again, General Rowny, we are pleased to have you both here.

        In consultation with my colleague, Senator Biden, what we
    will do is go back to the 5 minute rule, if that is
    appropriate.

        Is that OK, Senator Kerry?

        Senator Kerry. (Nods affirmatively)

        Senator Hagel. I will begin. Picking up, General Scowcroft,
    on your last comment about President Bush's continued
    commitment, full support of the CWC, I am intrigued in that
    yesterday we read a letter from former Secretary of Defense
    Cheney. You and Secretary Cheney are both highly respected,
    highly regarded, insightful leaders. You worked closely
    together. You fought a war together.

        My understanding is that President Bush has great
    confidence in each of you. Could you explain to me how the two
    of you have now come at this differently, why Secretary Cheney
    can feel as he does and you feel as you do?

        General Scowcroft. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would be uneasy
    putting words in Secretary Cheney's mouth. He is a dear friend
    of mine. We went through the last 4 years of negotiation of
    this treaty and evolution in what we were going to do, whether
    we were to going retain residuals until so many people
    ratified--the whole gamut of things.

        What I will say is that I think it is a fair statement--I
    don't think Dick would contest this--that Dick Cheney does not
    like arms control. He thinks we ought to do whatever we are
    going to do for our own national defense interest and not do it
    as an attempt to get somebody else to do something.

        That he would not have chosen to have the treaty signed I
    think is a fair statement. He did not resign over it. When
    President Bush decided to sign the CWC, he didn't make any
    comment on it. But I have talked to him, and he speaks for
    himself. But we simply differ on this issue.

        Senator Hagel. I don't know if you have had an opportunity
    to see the letter that he forwarded to us.

        General Scowcroft. I have not seen his letter. I talked to
    him about 3 weeks ago.

        Senator Hagel. If you're interested, we will give you a
    copy of it----

        General Scowcroft. I'd like that.

        Senator Hagel [continuing]. Because he gets into some
    specificity, as much as you can in a one page letter.

        Obviously you had some occasion, as you suggest, to work
    with him a little bit and talk with him about this issue.

        I have another question on Israel. My understanding is that
    they have not ratified this yet. Do you know why that would be?

        General Scowcroft. No, I really don't. As a matter of fact,
    I think I assumed they had ratified it. I am not clear about
    that.

        My guess is that they are waiting for the United States.

        Senator Hagel. General Rowny, would you care to make a
    comment?

        Ambassador Rowny. I subscribe to what Brent Scowcroft said.
    In the first place, I don't know. But I think they are waiting
    for the United States, and they want to follow our lead. I know
    that they were very worried during the Gulf War that they would
    be bombarded and, they were grateful for our help in trying to
    knock down those missiles and so forth. They were very keen on
    relying on our assistance to get a better defensive system, and
    I am sure that goes over into the chemical field as well.

        Senator Hagel. Thank you.

        I would be interested in both of your thoughts on this. I
    think you each were here when the panel before you addressed
    some of the issues. You will recall Ambassador Kirkpatrick,
    Secretary Perle, and yesterday Secretary Schlesinger all talked
    about the IAEA and some of the ramifications in this opinion as
    to what has happened and has occurred. Would either of you like
    to respond to some of what you heard today from some of the two
    panels before you?

        General Scowcroft. Let me just say that the IAEA was put
    together in a way which was not very effective. The terms under
    which it can inspect were not very effective. But we have some
    experience, and now I believe we are undertaking a way to make
    the IAEA very much tougher and to take over responsibilities
    for inspections that are now the responsibility of UNSCOM and
    so on.

        Incidentally, UNSCOM has done a fantastic job. So I think
    IAEA can be made a very effective instrument in nuclear
    nonproliferation. But it could not if we did not have it--if we
    did not have an NPT.

        Again, I would say that what we are really arguing is does
    this treaty help us at all. Since we are out of the chemical
    weapons business, if it gives us some help, we ought to look
    for help and take it anywhere we can find it; and I think we'd
    get some help here.

        Senator Hagel. General, thank you.

        General Rowny, I want to hear your response as well.

        Ambassador Rowny. My response is similar to that of General
    Scowcroft, though I would go a little further.

        The IAEA was initially inexperienced, but they have come a
    long way. That is one of the reasons that I think we ought to
    get in on the ground floor and the initial round of the CWC.
    The United States has the best trained inspectors in the world.

        Also, we have learned a lot about countering the
    restrictions. In the old days, we could not go in unless Iraq
    invited us to do so.

        This treaty has many inspection provisions. There are pages
    and pages of verification protocols which would bind any nation
    trying to get around the CWC.

        On the point that was made that we would train other people
    to be able to circumvent this treaty, I think that is somewhat
    overblown. Even if it is not overblown, I would take that risk.
    I would rather be able to go in and inspect, knowing how to
    inspect and having a lot of rules behind me, even if I knew
    that I might be giving inspection secrets away.

        Accordingly, I believe that this treaty would be more
    easily enforceable than its predecessors.

        Senator Hagel. Thank you.

        Senator Biden.

        Senator Biden. Thank you very much.

        General Scowcroft, the point that you made I think is a
    very important point to make, not merely about Secretary Cheney
    who is a wonderful, fine, bright American. As a matter of fact,
    just as an editorial comment, I thought for sure he was going
    to be your nominee. I mean that sincerely.

        This guy has a presence, an articulation. But I think the
    point you made is an important one to make here generally.

        If you look across the board, the bulk of the problem, the
    bulk of the opposition comes from people who legitimately, and
    truly consistent with their philosophy and intellectual
    predisposition, if you will, do not like arms control.

        One of the things that our distinguished Chairman said when
    he spoke on the floor the first time on this is he quoted what
    has been quoted 50 times by a lot of people. I do not say this
    in a derisive manner. It is: As so and so said, America has
    never lost a war or won a treaty.

        That is doctrine among an awful lot of people. I do not
    belittle it. I just think it is important that we put it in
    focus.

        I mean, we have in here a very bright young guy, Mr.
    Gaffney. In all fairness to Mr. Gaffney, who is sort of the
    intellectual engine on the right on this one right now, has he
    ever seen a treaty he likes? It's kind of like: Do you ever
    take yes for an answer?

        I understand that. But it is really important that we all
    understand it so that we can put into perspective some of the
    criticism.

        The second point I would like to make is, if you look at
    the argumentation against the treaty, it is the ultimate Catch
    22. The criticism my friends make of the treaty in terms of the
    Fourth Amendment: If you want to guarantee there is no
    possibility of ever arguing about it, you have to do something
    they also do not support, which is these onsite inspections
    without notification. If you eliminate those, then you have no
    Fourth Amendment debate. But guess what happens. You eliminate
    the ability for it to be verifiable and you diminish it.

        You can go down every single argument. I think we should
    just make this clear. There is no way to satisfy the critics,
    the strongest and most articulate critics of this treaty, other
    than by solving half of their problem. If you solve half their
    problem, that is the most you can solve. You can't solve it
    all, because it makes the other portions they criticize even
    worse.

        Now, General Rowny, I don't know whether people understand
    something. I have been here 24 years. I don't know whether they
    understand how significant your presence here is. I mean, I
    really don't know whether people fully understand it.

        In my humble opinion, in terms of bringing bona fides to
    this debate, with no disrespect to anyone, from General
    Scowcroft to the President of the United States of America, to
    President Bush or anybody, you are, in my view, the single most
    significant supporter of this treaty. You resigned--you
    resigned--on principle over an arms control agreement you said
    you didn't like. Here you are, a man whose credentials in terms
    of being tough, yet still who believes some treaties are
    useful, here you are supporting the treaty.

        Now I realize there are ad hominem arguments. I realize
    there are appeals to authority. I realize there are logical
    fallacies. But one of the things that, in fact, impacts on this
    debate overall is the vast majority of people do not have the
    time to do what the acting chairman and I are doing or any of
    the members of this committee, or that you all have done. You
    know it, we hopefully know it, but the vast majority of
    Americans do what we do on everything else. They are looking at
    people they respect and are saying well, if it is good enough
    for them, it is good enough for me as I respect them. Or if
    they don't like it, I don't like it.

        That is not an irrational thing to do. So, I want to tell
    you that I think it is very important you are both here.

        I think it is fair to say the three of us, you two and me,
    have been on the opposite sides of more debates than we have
    been on the same side.

        General Scowcroft. I believe so.

        Senator Biden. So I want to thank you for being here. I
    would conclude, Mr. Chairman, since Mr. Kerry is not here quite
    yet----

        Senator Hagel. Just go ahead, Senator Biden.

        Senator Biden [continuing]. By saying one of the things we
    talked about in terms of inspections before. Mr. Perle, who is
    always articulate, Mr. Perle made the point that what is going
    to happen here is we are going to have these rogue nation guys
    on the teams, meaning Iran, coming into the United States,
    inspecting, carrying little gadgets in their pockets and
    learning all there is to know about either trade secrets and/or
    a capacity to make chemical weapons better when they get home.

        On Part II, paragraphs 1 and 4 specify that we can deny
    individual inspectors if we give notice.

        So no Iranian ever has to inspect an American facility if
    that is the decision we make.

        It is not a requirement. The good news about this is you
    may ask well, couldn't they deny us inspection. Yes. Yes, but
    we have allies, like France, Britain, and Germany who are part
    of this operation. We share with them a lot of this, our
    technological capability of detection. So, the fact that we
    would be denied inspection does not hurt us very much, having
    an inspector on a team. But their being denied at least should
    satisfy some of our critics of this treaty as to somehow they
    are all of a sudden going to be able to learn all there is to
    learn.

        I find it interesting that when we thought, as a Nation,
    and other nations thought that chemical weapons were a useful
    tool of war, we did not have a vial of it, we did not have a
    canister of it, we did not have a truck load of it, we did not
    have a warehouse full of it. We had hundreds of tons of it.

        So the idea when people say to me, isn't it true that in a
    chemical plant, or a fertilizer plant, or a pharmaceutical
    plant they could be producing chemical weapons, the answer is
    yes, they could. We might not be able to detect it.

        But let me tell you something. I think the image, General
    Scowcroft, is people are thinking of a Japanese guy with sarin
    gas in the subway taking on the U.S. Army. I really mean that.
    I am not being facetious.

        Listen to the distinguished Senator from California. It is
    a legitimate concern.

        I think we have to kind of remind ourselves. We are not
    seeing the forest from the trees. Cheating will occur. But the
    idea that enough cheating could occur that the U.S. military
    would be in ulti-
    mate jeopardy of losing a war--not a single encounter but a
    war--that we would be prostrate is bizarre. It is absolutely
    bizarre.

        I just think in terms of keeping the focus here, when you
    argue on the other guy's terms, you tend to lose the argument.
    The terms we tend to argue on--at least I do, because I am so
    acquainted with the detail of this thing. I get so into the
    detail of it I argue about the specifics, when you can't lose.

        That is why I conclude by thanking you, General, for your
    overall statement of the generic approach to this thing and why
    this is in our interest. It is in our interest, because the
    idea that somebody can cheat is true. But the idea that
    somebody could cheat enough to become a world power that is
    going to defeat the United States of America, the idea that we
    are going to be in a position where these rogue nations are
    going to gain all our trade secrets and build better Chevettes
    or Corvettes that we build, or our pharmaceutical products, is,
    at best, to use your phrase, General Rowny--and you are always
    a diplomat. You said you think this example is a little
    overdrawn.

        I think that is a mild understatement, a mild
    understatement.

        You will be glad to know that wasn't a question. I just
    cannot tell you how much I appreciate people of your caliber
    being here. I know it is not easy, General, to be here. All
    those guys were here. You sat on the same side of the table
    with them for a long, long time, as have you, General
    Scowcroft. This is an issue on which reasonable and honorable
    men can disagree. But I think the break point basically divides
    generally those who think arms control can be a useful tool for
    national security, who fall on this side (indicating), and
    those who think arms control generally is a bad idea, who fall
    on that side.

        I think if you look down the line, that is the ultimate
    distinguishing feature about where people fall on this treaty.

        Ambassador Rowny. Senator, if I can elaborate on that, I
    agree with you that there are people who believe that all arms
    control treaties are good, and there are some who say all arms
    control treaties are bad. I happen to have been all along for
    good arms control.

        Senator Biden. I know that, General.

        Ambassador Rowny. When I resigned in protest over SALT II,
    it was difficult, because I was drummed out of the Army. But
    later, when we fixed the flaws of SALT II, we got a good
    treaty: START I. START I reduced from 15,000 to 8,000 weapons
    on each side.

        As I said before, you cannot do this in a vacuum. You have
    to always do it with the threat of being able to enforce the
    treaty, and without that, I don't think arms control is useful.

        That is why I would like to see pressure put on Russia now
    to have the Duma ratify START II. I have been working on this
    idea for 3 years, and believe that we should go even further by
    moving to START III.

        Senator Biden. I agree with you, General.

        Ambassador Rowny. The idea is to get good arms control
    agreements and also to have them bolstered with good,
    enforceable methods of carrying them out.

        Senator Biden. I'll make you a bet that I hope I never win.
    If we do not ratify the CWC, the chances of the Duma ratifying
    START II, irrespective of all other questions, I think is
    remote. It is remote at best. It is difficult now and you are
    right.

        The only point I want to make--and, Mr. Chairman, I have
    gone way over my time--is you are a man of principle, General.
    That is the only point I was making or attempting to make. I
    hope I made it clear. You are a man of principle. You gave up a
    lot on a principle, a principle. So, when people suggest--and
    no one here has, friend or foe--when people suggest that people
    are orchestrated to come here, General Scowcroft is a man who
    has taken on me in this committee, and the Democrats time and
    again. He is a guy who in my view educated my best friend, Bill
    Cohen, and that is why he is Secretary of Defense. General
    Rowny is a man of absolute principle who thinks that good arms
    control is as he defined it, and there is good arms control.
    The fact that you both are here I think is a big deal.

        It reinforces my view of this treaty, quite frankly,
    because we all look to the people we admire as to whether or
    not they like it; and it reinforces our sense of the place we
    intellectually arrived at. The fact that you both are there
    quite frankly just reinforces and makes me feel better about my
    decision.

        Senator Hagel. If I could follow up, General Rowny, on
    something you mentioned earlier, you mentioned that you thought
    this was a flawed treaty, like I believe you said most are, but
    fixable. I think you mentioned specifically Paragraph 3 of
    Article X.

        What other areas do you think need to be addressed?

        Ambassador Rowny. Just one other area, Senator. That is the
    one on tear gas. I have never understood this. It has a long
    history. As you know, President Ford issued an executive order.
    Brent Scowcroft played golf with him a good deal, and he might
    be able to understand that executive order at that time. But I
    felt that the idea of prohibiting the use of tear gas in times
    of war, I have always felt that was a mistake. I would like to
    see that one fixed in some way.

        That is the only other flaw that I see in the treaty.

        Senator Hagel. To each of you, Admiral Zumwalt mentioned
    sanctions on those signatories who might violate the
    convention.

        What realistically are we talking about when you say
    sanctions? Iran is a signatory. They violate inspections. If we
    find they have violated the convention, what do we do?

        General Scowcroft. Well, I think sanctions run all the way
    from doing something that makes you feel good when you really
    don't want to take action but you have to do something to what
    I would call sanctions on Iraq right now, which are effective.
    They are good. UNSCOM is over there, they are rooting around,
    and they are finding out all kinds of things. That is the
    ultimate in sanctions.

        Senator Hagel. Would the entire body, as you read this
    treaty, be involved in the sanctioning process of a violating
    nation?

        General Scowcroft. I think in the end, Mr. Chairman,
    sanctions depend on the national interest of the country
    whatever a treaty says. We could have responded when Iraq used
    chemicals against Iran or against its own people. Politically,
    nobody did; and they didn't, because there were other kinds of
    things that militated against it.

        I think you always have to look at sanctions in that light.
    Collective security is a chimera. It is never going to work,
    because when you don't know who the enemy is, then you cannot
    defend against it.

        So every country is going to consult its own national
    interest when it decides whether or not to go with sanctions.
    That is where the United States is so important, because when
    we decide, we can get a lot of people along with us. When we
    sit on the sidelines, there isn't anybody else to pick up the
    ball and carry it.

        Senator Hagel. Thank you.

        General Rowny.

        Ambassador Rowny. I have a less optimistic view about
    sanctions. I think that sanctions can be helpful, but I think
    in the end, you have to use more than sanctions in critical
    cases. So I would say: use sanctions. If they work, fine. If
    they don't, don't hesitate to use your military muscle, and I
    think in some cases you have to.

        The Chemical Weapons Convention is important; but we have a
    more sinister set of circumstances facing us down the road, and
    that is the biological warfare issue. The Biological Weapons
    Treaty does not have any of the verification procedures
    contained in the CWC. As you know, Russia denied developing
    anthrax. Now there are reports that they have developed a new
    biological weapon which is not detectable. There is a vast
    difference between chemical and biological weapons. A chemical
    weapon will disperse and you can protect against it. However,
    biological weapons do not disperse but grow.

        So I would hope as soon as this treaty is ratified that the
    Senate, and this committee in particular, turn their attention
    to the possible dangers of biological warfare, which, in my
    view, are more devastating than chemical weapons.

        In this connection, I would not hesitate to go beyond
    sanctions and use whatever it takes to prevent against this
    great scourge. If what happened with just a few whiffs of sarin
    gas in Japan were to happen in this country, I think we would
    never forgive ourselves.

        Senator Hagel. Thank you.

        Senator Biden.

        Senator Biden. General, you just made, again, the point
    that I think it is important to keep in mind. You heard the
    last panel, all brilliant people, all decent, honorable people.
    This is the dividing line again. They said not only is this
    treaty bad, but if we ever tried to do anything in biological
    weapons, which is less verifiable, it would be a disaster.

        I just want to keep reinforcing the point here. I happen to
    agree with you completely, General. People fall down on most of
    these issues based on which side of this treaty line they fall
    on.

        As you heard spontaneously, three of the four witnesses
    said by the way, this is bad, but if you guys ever start
    looking at biological weapons, that would even be worse.

        Now the question I would like to ask you is--or I guess I
    would make more of a point and would ask you to respond. In my
    view, when you were dealing and this administration was
    dealing, General Scowcroft, with Korea's attempt at, desire to,
    and potentially having achieved a nuclear capacity, nuclear
    weapons, there was a lot of loose talk up here with guys like
    me and others. It got all around. I refer not to you but to us,
    to me.

        We said if they do develop or are on the verge of
    developing that capacity, we may very well have to use
    preemptive military action. That was talked about around the
    world.

        I cannot fathom even being able to raise that issue had we
    not been part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. If there
    were not an international norm established, the idea that in
    capitals--and I was in Europe at the time as well--the idea
    that in capitals of the world there was no commitment to use
    force, but no commitment to rule out the use of force, there is
    no way, in my view, there would have been any--any--ability to
    even contemplate that and to gain anything remotely approaching
    international understanding for the possible need of
    preemptively using force.

        Now I am not suggesting that you suggested that, General. I
    want to make the record clear.

        General Scowcroft. I did.

        Senator Biden. Well, OK. I am not speaking for you now. But
    I was up here, as you will recall, saying the same thing that
    you recommended.

        So, again, I state it to reinforce a point that seems to
    get lost as we focus on these individual trees in this forest.
    This is that national and international norms make a
    difference. They make a difference. They are not dispositive in
    every case, but they make a difference.

        Had we followed Ambassador Kirkpatrick's notion of never
    having gone forward with the Nonproliferation Treaty, the idea
    that we would have had the consensus to consider--and I
    believe, General, your statements and recommendation were part
    of the reason why, ultimately, it did not go to the point we
    worried about it going. Now I am not now here positing where it
    is.

        At any rate, if you would like to comment, fine, but there
    is no need to comment. I just think international norms make a
    big difference.

        General Scowcroft. Well, one of the things that we did not
    really discuss this afternoon and that I thought about putting
    in my remarks, but I did not want to be accused of being
    ``goody-goody'' is that the very fact that you mobilize world
    opinion and say these things are bad, we are going to mobilize
    the international community against them, this does put
    pressure on the hold-outs. If they are doing things wrong, it
    is easier to call attention to it.

        We have no coordinated kind of social, if you will,
    pressure on the rogue states right now in this area.

        Senator Biden. That's right. I agree.

        Senator Hagel. Senator, are there any more questions?

        Senator Biden. No. Again, gentlemen, particularly for the
    way you got bounced around by me in terms of timing on this, I
    just cannot tell you how much I appreciate your being here and
    how important I think it is that you are here.

        Thank you both.

        Senator Hagel. On behalf of the committee, thank you. Just
    as the other panel, you all have brought a tremendous amount of
    experience and insight to this. As you suggested, General
    Scowcroft, this is a critically important issue for this
    country and the world, and we need to spend as much time as we
    have been spending and that we will spend to air it all out.

        So on behalf of all of us, thank you.

        Senator Biden. Thank you.

        Senator Hagel. We are adjourned.

        [Whereupon, at 5:20 p.m. The committee adjourned, to
    reconvene at 2:03 p.m. on Tuesday, April 15, 1997.]

                          CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

                                  ----------

                            TUESDAY, APRIL 15, 1997

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:03 p.m., in
    room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms
    (chairman of the committee) presiding.
        Present: Senators Helms, Hagel, Brownback, Biden, and
    Kerry.
        The Chairman. The Committee will come to order, but we will
    stand relaxed until the staff gets its act together. Both
    parties are represented at another hearing, and it should not
    be very long. [Pause.]
        There is no Senate rule against a chairman doing what they
    do on television when they have got more time left than they
    expected. So they stretch it out.
        Our first witness this afternoon will be a long time friend
    of so many of us in the Senate. We have worked with him in
    various capacities, including broadcasting to foreign
    countries. Malcolm S. Forbes, Jr., or Steve as he is known, is
    one of the most remarkable friends I have ever known; and I am
    going to give you one vignette for the record.
        Some years ago I happened to be on the same campus with him
    where he had spoken to the students, and following all of the
    formal doings there was a reception, and the reception went on
    and on and on, and he was shaking hands and answering of the
    students, and along about 10 or maybe a little bit earlier I
    sent word to Mr. Forbes that I would rescue him and he could go
    out a certain door, get on his airplane, and go back to New
    York. He said oh, no. He said, I have got some more friends I
    wish to talk with.
        Now, he was not a candidate for anything except the Kingdom
    of Heaven, I think, at that time. But I want to say to you,
    sir, that you won the hearts of those young people at that
    university. I still hear about your staying there until 11
    talking with them and answering questions. Maybe another fellow
    would have gotten up and left, but you did not.
        Mr. Biden, the ranking member of the committee, will be
    here momentarily, and we will just bide our time.
        We will have two panels, by the way. Steve Forbes, or
    Malcolm S. Forbes, Jr., will be the first witness and only
    witness on panel one. Panel two will have businessmen: Mr.
    Wayne Spears, President of the Spears Manufacturing Company and
    so forth; Mr. Ralph V. Johnson, Vice President of Environmental
    Affairs at Dixie Chemical Company; Mr. Kevin L. Kearns,
    President of the United States Business and Industrial Council;
    the Honorable Kathleen C. Bailey, Senior Fellow of the Lawrence
    Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California.
        This hearing is the third in the final round of Senate
    Foreign Relations Committee hearings on the dangerously flawed
    Chemical Weapons Convention. Last week the committee heard from
    seven distinguished foreign and defense policy leaders about
    the national security implications of this treaty. This
    afternoon, our purpose is to discuss the destructive effects of
    this treaty, and what those effects will have on the American
    business community, the new regulations will be imposed, the
    intrusive and clearly unconstitutional inspections it will
    authorize, and the potential of abuse of the treaty by our
    foreign business competitors by industrial espionage.
        I can think of no one--no one--who can better speak to
    these issues than our lead witness today, Mr. Forbes. He is
    chairman and CEO of Forbes Magazine. He is a leading voice of
    American business, and in particular a champion of the small
    and medium-sized enterprises that will be disproportionately
    affected by this treaty.
        Last week we heard eloquent testimony from four former
    secretaries of defense of this country urging the Senate to
    reject this flawed treaty, and I want to quote something one of
    those witnesses said that day, because I think it will help us
    frame the discussion this afternoon.
        Let me preface what I am going to read by saying that there
    have been repeated suggestions by the proponents of the treaty
    implying that all businesses support this treaty. Well, this
    simply is not accurate. Don Rumsfeld eloquently reminded us
    last week that many big businesses, and he stressed the word
    big, do support the treaty, but it is not the security of big
    business that we need to worry about in this country, it is the
    smaller businesses.
        Here is what Don Rumsfeld said: Big companies seem to get
    along fine with big government. They get along with American
    government, they get along with foreign governments, they get
    along with international organizations, and they have the
    ability, with all their Washington representatives, to deal
    effectively with bureaucracies. Indeed, Mr. Rumsfeld said, and
    I am quoting him still, indeed, that capability on the part of
    the big companies actually serves as a sort of barrier to entry
    to small and medium-sized companies that lack that capability.
    So I do not suggest, he said, for 1 minute that large American
    companies are not going to be able to cope with the
    regulations. They will do it a whale of a lot better than small
    and medium sized companies, end of quote.
        Mr. Rumsfeld made a vitally important point. It is small
    and medium-sized businesses, the entrepreneurs who are creating
    all of the jobs in our economy today, who will be hurt worse by
    this treaty. It is they who will have trouble coping with all
    of the new regulations and all of the red tape and all of the
    intrusive and unconstitutional inspections and all of the legal
    fees and potential losses of proprietary information.
        The small businesses are the ones whose constitutional
    rights will be trampled because this administration refuses to
    require a criminal search warrant from involuntary challenge
    inspections granted to foreign inspectors. These inspections
    will be granted greater power of search and seizure than those
    granted to U.S. Law enforcement officers. These inspectors are
    the ones who may well confront officials from Iran and China,
    knocking on their doors, demanding the right to rifle their
    records and so forth and so on.
        Speaking of the law enforcement officers, they will
    interrogate the employees and remove chemical samples from
    their facilities, all because this administration has refused
    to ban inspectors from rogue regimes.
        Now, we hear over and over again that the Chemical
    Manufacturer's Association, which has been very active in
    promoting the treaty, we heard that they support the treaty,
    and we have had, certainly, the strong inferences, if not
    declarations. But let me tell you something about this
    association. And I speak as a guy who ran a pretty sizable
    association some years ago. The CMA operates and represents
    just 191 companies--1-9-1--but this treaty, at the
    administration's most conservative estimate, will affect at
    least 3,000 businesses, and may affect as many as 8,000.
        So I hope we can put an end to the notion that the CMA
    represents the interests of the thousands of small- and medium-
    sized companies that will be hurt by this treaty. And as one of
    our witnesses will tell us today, I believe, even within the
    ranks of the CMA companies there is concern about the impact of
    this treaty, including the cost of regulations and the
    potential loss of confidential business information.
        The fact is there are literally thousands of companies
    across this country who do not know about this treaty, who do
    not understand it in any detail, who do not realize that it
    will affect them, who do not understand that they will be
    subjected to inspections, and are not aware what kind of
    unfunded mandates will be imposed on them should this treaty be
    ratified as is.
        Now, I have no doubt that the businessmen affected by the
    CWC are patriotic Americans who love their country and are
    willing to make sacrifices for our national security. And if
    this treaty could actually reduce the danger of chemical
    weapons, I am sure they would be willing to make necessary
    sacrifices to get rid of those terrible weapons. But as we have
    heard from so many experts, it just will not work.
        This treaty will not work. It will do nothing to reduce the
    danger of chemical weapons. If anything, we have learned that
    it will make the problem worse by giving rogue nations even
    greater access to dangerous chemical agents and technology and
    defensive gear. Even the treaty's proponents admit that it will
    not work, but they say we should ratify it anyhow; because it
    is better than nothing; because, they say, it will establish
    ``norms.''
        Well, I do not believe that ratifying the treaty that
    cannot work just to make a statement is good policy; and when
    you take into consideration the fact that it will also create
    massive new burdens on businesses that are struggling to create
    jobs, that it will cost them money, time, and energy while
    trampling on their constitutional rights just to make a
    statement and establish norms, I say that this treaty is worse
    than nothing. The price of that kind of feel-good statement is
    just too high.
        So, Mr. Forbes, if you will take the seat in the middle, we
    thank you for being here, and look forward to your testimony.
    And I note that not only is Steve Forbes testifying today, he
    announced this Sunday on Face the Nation that he will be
    leading a public information campaign to bring the facts about
    the treaty to light. So on behalf of the silent majority of
    American businesses who do not realize what Washington has
    cooked up for them with this dangerous and destructive treaty,
    I thank you, sir, for all that you are doing.
        I have just been handed a note saying that we should wait
    for Senator Biden to come and make his statement. He said he
    would try to be here by 2:15, so I suppose, Mr. Forbes, we can
    just stand at rest and wait for Senator Biden. [Pause.]
        The Senator from Delaware is recognized.
        Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, thank you very, very much, and
    I thank the witnesses. We have, as the Chairman well knows,
    these things every Tuesday called caucuses where every Member
    of each of our parties gets together and we discuss our
    respective agendas. Ironically, I was to make a presentation in
    my caucus today on the Chemical Weapons Convention, and I
    appreciate the Chair doing this.
        Mr. Chairman, I am happy you have called this hearing today
    on the effect that the CWC would have on American business;
    because, as we all know, there has been a great deal of
    discussion pro and con on that very point. The charge, in my
    view, that the CWC will harm American business, I think is dead
    wrong when one considers the fact that the convention was
    negotiated with an unprecedented input from the U.S. chemical
    industry. Thanks to the industry's help, in my view, the
    convention contains thresholds and exemptions that protect
    businesses small and large from bearing an undue burden.
        The American chemical industry has helped develop the
    ground rules under which the inspections that will occur under
    this treaty will happen, including provisions for protecting
    the confidentiality of business information. Chemical
    companies' representatives have also helped in the decision on
    how to design the form, the written form, that represents the
    only reporting obligation for 90 percent of approximately 2,000
    companies that will have an obligation under this convention.
        The U.S. chemical companies recognize that while they
    produce goods intended for peaceful uses, their products and
    inputs could be misused for nefarious purposes. That is why
    they so actively have supported this convention. Their
    involvement in the CWC has been a model, in my view, of good
    corporate citizenship. Unfortunately, we will reward this
    responsible behavior with a slap in the face, in my view, if we
    fail to ratify this convention and subject the U.S. Chemical
    industry to international sanctions, the same sanctions, I
    might add, that we ourselves insisted be placed in this
    convention under both President Reagan and President Bush.
        The CWC was designed with high thresholds for common
    industrial chemicals that ensure that only large producers of
    those chemicals will be subject to reporting and inspection
    requirements. Instead of throwing around old numbers and scare
    tactics, I would like to take a look very quickly at the outset
    here at the real requirements of this treaty.
        Chemicals that are used to make chemical weapons have been
    placed in three schedules. Schedule I chemicals are those that
    are chemical weapons and direct precursors with little or no
    commercial use. Schedule II chemicals are direct precursors
    with limited commercial uses. And Schedule III chemicals are
    indirect precursors with wide commercial use.
        Now, both producers and consumers of chemicals on Schedule
    I and two are subject to CWC reporting and inspection
    requirements. For most Schedule II chemicals, though, there is
    a one-ton threshold. As a result, only 11 American facilities--
    11, 11 American facilities--will be subject to Schedule I
    requirements, and less than 35 will be covered by Schedule II
    requirements.
        Turning to Schedule III chemicals, the rules change a
    little. Only those facilities that produce, import, or export
    more than 30 tons of Schedule III chemicals are covered by
    those requirements--30 tons. That is not a vial of chemicals,
    that is not a barrel, that is a lot of chemicals, and these
    rules apply only to producers. Consumers of these chemicals are
    not covered. As a result, only about 100 facilities face these
    requirements. An even higher threshold applies to producers of
    discrete organic chemicals. Everybody has an acronym in this
    bill, so I will just continue to call them discrete organic
    chemicals, or DOC's.
        Facilities that produce more than 200 tons of discrete
    organic chemicals are subject to reporting requirements, as are
    those that produce 30 tons of chemicals containing phosphorus,
    sulfur, or fluorine. But again, we are talking about producers,
    and only producers of hundreds of tons of these chemicals--no
    soap manufacturers, no cosmetic firms, all the things we keep
    hearing about. You know: ``They are going to go in and find a
    cosmetic firm is doing this or a soap manufacturer.'' We are
    not talking about those companies. They are not producers of
    these chemicals. They are consumers of these chemicals, these
    discrete organic chemicals.
        While reporting requirements for discrete organic chemicals
    will apply to as many as 1,800 U.S. companies, I do not know of
    too many Mom and Pop businesses that produce 200 tons of
    chemicals a year. In addition, several industries have been
    completely exempted from all CWC requirements. These include
    explosives makers, hydrocarbon producers, oil refineries,
    polymer makers, and facilities that make discrete organic
    chemicals through biological processes. What does this mean? It
    means that plastic companies, textile makers, and breweries
    face zero--zero--obligation under the CWC.
        The Commerce Department instructions for the brief data
    declaration says that in black and white. And the Conference of
    State Parties is also set to ratify these exemptions on May the
    6th. So anyone who tells you differently, I would respectfully
    suggest, is dead wrong.
        There is more to say, and I had planned on saying more, but
    I ask unanimous consent that the remainder of my statement be
    placed in my record, Mr. Chairman, and I would conclude with
    one sentence: We are going to hear from four very distinguished
    witnesses, one who believes that--well, I was going to read the
    quote. I will not. Anyway, let me just put my whole statement
    in the record since you were so kind to hold up for me, and I
    will get on with hearing from the witnesses.
        The Chairman. Without objection, it is so ordered.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]

                      Prepared Statement of Senator Biden

        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am happy that we are holding this
    hearing today on the effect the CWC would have on American business,
    because perhaps no single aspect of this debate has seen more
    misinformation.
        The charge that the CWC will harm American business appears
    preposterous when one considers the fact that the convention was
    negotiated with the unprecedented input of the U.S. chemical industry.
        Thanks to the industry's help, the convention contains thresholds
    and exemptions that protect businesses, small and large alike, from
    bearing an undue burden. The American chemical industry helped develop
    the ground rules under which inspections will occur, including
    provisions for protecting confidential business information.
        Chemical company representatives also helped design the brief form
    that represents the only reporting obligation for ninety percent of the
    approximately two thousand companies that will have obligations under
    the CWC.
        U.S. chemical companies recognize that while they produce goods
    intended for peaceful uses, their products and inputs could be misused
    for nefarious purposes. That is why they so actively have supported
    this convention. Their involvement in the CWC has been a model of good
    corporate citizenship.
        Unfortunately, we will reward this responsible behavior with a slap
    in the face if we fail to ratify the CWC and subject the U.S. chemical
    industry to international sanctions--the same international sanctions
    that we ourselves insisted be placed in this treaty to punish countries
    that do not ratify it.
        The CWC was designed with high thresholds for common industrial
    chemicals that ensure that only large producers of these chemicals will
    be subject to reporting and inspection requirements. Instead of
    throwing around old numbers and scare tactics, let's look at what the
    real requirements of this treaty are.
        Chemicals that can be used to make chemical weapons have been
    placed on three schedules. Schedule I chemicals are chemical weapons
    and direct precursors with little or no commercial use. Schedule II
    chemicals are direct precursors with limited commercial uses. Schedule
    III chemicals are indirect precursors with wide commercial use.
        Now, both producers and consumers of chemicals on schedules one and
    two are subject to CWC reporting and inspection requirements. For most
    Schedule II chemicals, though, there is a one ton threshold.
        As a result, only eleven American facilities will be subject to
    Schedule I requirements, and less than thirty-five will be covered by
    Schedule II requirements.
        Turning to Schedule III chemicals, the rules change a little.
        Only those facilities that produce, import or export more than
    thirty tons of Schedule III chemicals are covered by those
    requirements. Thirty tons. That's not a vial, that's not a barrel,
    that's a lot of chemicals. And these rules apply only to producers.
    Consumers of these chemicals will not be covered. As a result, only
    about one hundred facilities face this requirement.
        An even higher threshold applies to producers of discrete organic
    chemicals, or ``docs.''
        Facilities that produce more than two hundred tons of these
    chemicals are subject to reporting requirements, as are those that
    produce thirty tons of a chemical containing phosphorus, sulfur or
    fluorine. But again, we're talking only about producers, and only
    producers of hundreds of tons of these chemicals.
        While the reporting requirements for discrete organic chemicals
    will apply to as many as eighteen hundred U.S. companies, I don't know
    of too many mom-and-pop businesses that produce two hundred tons of
    chemicals every year.
        In addition, several industries have been completely exempted from
    all CWC requirements. These include explosives makers, hydrocarbon
    producers, oil refineries, oligomer and polymer makers, and facilities
    that make discrete organic chemicals through biological processes.
        What does this mean? It means that plastics companies and textile-
    makers and breweries face zero obligation under CWC. The Commerce
    Department instructions for the brief data declaration says that in
    black and white. Some of these exemptions are already in the treaty,
    and the Conference of States Parties is all set to ratify the rest on
    May 6.
        So anyone who tells you that these industries will be hurt by CWC
    is just dead wrong.
        In addition, there will be an exemption for facilities that
    manufacture a product that contains a low concentration of a scheduled
    chemical. The treaty explicitly directs the Conference of States
    Parties to adopt such a rule.
        For Schedule III chemicals, the ones with wide commercial
    applications, the proposed threshold is thirty percent.
        So a plant that makes soap or cosmetics or one that processes food
    would not be subject to CWC requirements.
        I also want to address the charge that the CWC will lead to
    international inspectors rummaging at will through American businesses.
    This too is entirely untrue.
        Only a limited number of facilities will be subject to routine CWC
    inspections, and these are mostly the large chemical manufacturers that
    are supporting the treaty.
        These routine inspections will be conducted on the basis of
    facility agreements negotiated with the full input of the plant
    involved in order to protect trade secrets.
        And there will be no warrantless searches. If a firm does not
    consent to an inspection, an administrative or criminal search warrant
    will have to be obtained before the inspection goes forward.
        Moreover, all challenge inspections will take place under the
    principle of ``managed access,'' where our government negotiates with
    the inspectors over the places, records, and data that may be searched.
    So, all inspections will take place under the supervision of U.S.
    government officials.
        Our exposure to loss of trade secrets due to the CWC is also
    greatly overstated.
        The CWC contains an unprecedented level of protections for
    confidential business information, all of which were negotiated and
    supported by industry.
        The combination of close supervision of confidential business
    information, plus the deterrence of our domestic criminal laws, should
    keep losses of trade secrets to a bare minimum.
        The facts are that American industry and the executive branch have
    worked cooperatively--both in drafting the treaty and in drafting the
    proposed implementing legislation--to minimize the burden on U.S.
    industry.
        The chemical industry is to be commended for the role that it
    played in helping to negotiate this treaty, and I look forward to
    hearing the testimony of our witnesses today.

        The Chairman. Mr. Forbes.

    STATEMENT OF MALCOLM S. FORBES, JR., PRESIDENT AND CEO, FORBES,
                           INC., NEW YORK, NY

        Mr. Forbes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for allowing
    me today to testify before your distinguished committee.
        Senator Biden. Excuse me 1 second, Mr. Chairman. I would
    like to point out one thing: Mr. Forbes won my State. I would
    just like to point out that Delaware in the Republican primary,
    voted for Forbes. So I want the record to note I smiled at him,
    I have been very nice to him, I like him very much. We have
    agreed very heartily. We are together on the radios, right, Mr.
    Forbes? Tell them that, will you please?
        Mr. Forbes. We are together on the radios, but I am keeping
    on my Kevlar for protection.
        There are many compelling reasons, I believe, to oppose
    ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The fact is
    that the Chemical Weapons Convention significantly threatens
    the freedoms we Americans cherish. It significantly diminishes
    America's sovereignty and significantly increases America's
    vulnerability to chemical warfare. It is as though we are being
    asked to endorse a drug that worsens the disease it purports to
    cure, and in addition has some highly dangerous side effects.
        To explain just how dangerous the CWC side effects are,
    just let me ask the distinguished members of this committee a
    very simple question: What is the basis of America's greatness?
    Why is it that although the international arena contains many
    powers today, we are the world's sole superpower? Any adequate
    answer to this ques-
    tion would have to include such factors as the competitive
    nature of our free market system, the unparalleled
    technological sophistication of America's enterprises, but most
    important, our basic freedoms. These are the sinews of our
    power, the basis of our national greatness. It is precisely
    these quintessentially American strengths that the convention
    would undermine.
        Let me begin by talking about America's competitiveness. As
    I have strenuously argued on other occasions, maintaining
    America's competitive edge requires a lessening of the tax and
    regulatory burdens on the American people and on our Nation's
    enterprises. Unfortunately, the CWC will have precisely the
    opposite effect. It will burden up to 8,000 companies across
    the United States. Remember, these are in the hands of an
    international bureaucracy, not what we would like them to be,
    with major new reporting regulatory and inspection requirements
    entailing large and uncompensated compliance costs. These added
    costs constitute an unfunded Federal mandate. Like so many
    unfunded mandates, they are bound to retard our economic growth
    and make our companies less competitive.
        Is it not ironic, Mr. Chairman, meeting here as we are on
    tax day and concerned as we all are with reducing the tax
    burden on the American people, that we should even consider
    ratifying a convention that amounts to a new tax on some of our
    most innovative and productive companies? But it gets worse.
    For in addition to the costs arising from heavy duty reporting,
    the CWC subjects our chemical companies to snap inspections
    that will allow other nations access to our latest chemical
    equipment and information. No longer will violators of
    intellectual property rights in China, Iran, and elsewhere,
    have to go to the trouble of pirating our secrets. Incredibly,
    we ourselves will effectively hand them the stuff on a silver
    platter. No wonder former CIA Director and Defense Secretary
    Jim Schlesinger has called the convention a godsend for foreign
    intelligence services.
        But it gets worse. The CWC also threatens the
    constitutional rights guaranteed Americans under the Fourth
    Amendment. As former Secretaries of Defense Dick Cheney, Don
    Rumsfeld, and Cap Weinberger noted last September in a joint
    letter to Majority Leader Trent Lott, quote: The CWC will
    jeopardize U.S. citizens constitutional rights by requiring the
    U.S. Government to permit searches without either warrants or
    probable cause, end of quote. That is a serious statement from
    these former defense chiefs, jeopardize U.S. citizens
    constitutional rights.
        Think about that, Mr. Chairman. And think about all the
    criminal cases that our courts have summarily dismissed,
    because in their view the defendant's constitutional rights had
    been violated by police searches conducted without probable
    cause. Are American businesses to receive less justice than
    suspected felons? Of course not. The idea is preposterous. And
    yet that is what compliance with the CWC would entail.
        As Department of Justice officials publicly acknowledge in
    testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee on September 9,
    1996, in cases where private facilities do not voluntarily
    permit access to inspection a criminal warrant would be
    required. Obtaining such a warrant from a court, however, would
    require demonstration of probable cause. This will be
    impossible in many cases, be-
    cause under the Chemical Weapons Convention the nation
    requesting an inspection need not cite its reasons for making
    such a request.
        Hence, the treaty poses an insoluble dilemma. Should the
    U.S. Government choose to respect its citizens Fourth Amendment
    rights not to be subjected involuntarily to searches in absence
    of judicial warrants? It will be creating a precedent that
    other countries will assuredly cite to refuse onsite
    inspections in their territories. If we do not do it, do not
    expect them to do it. On the other hand, should the Government
    choose not to respect the Fourth Amendment rights it will be
    acting unconstitutionally.
        But it gets worse, Mr. Chairman, for in addition to
    threatening our Fourth Amendment rights, the convention also
    undercuts our Fifth Amendment rights against having our
    property taken by the Government without just compensation. You
    are familiar with Judge Robert Bork, who noted in a letter to
    Senator Hatch last August, quote, Fifth Amendment problems
    arise from the authority of inspectors to collect data and
    analyze samples. This may constitute an illegal search and an
    illegal seizure, and perhaps constitute the taking of private
    property by the Government without compensation. The foreign
    inspectors will not be subject to punishment for any theft of
    proprietary information.
        Mr. Chairman, these are very grave constitutional issues
    that need to be resolved before the CWC is ratified. To wait
    until after the convention is ratified and its provisions
    become the supreme law of the land would be an act of supreme
    folly.
        Yet there is another pernicious aspect of this convention
    that I would like to touch on, the very different impact it
    would have on large and small companies. As former Secretary of
    Defense Don Rumsfeld noted in testimony before this committee
    last week, big companies are generally better able than small
    companies to withstand additional reporting, regulatory, and/or
    government inspection requirements. Some might even regard such
    burdens as a barrier to entry that can enhance their market
    share at the expense of their smaller competitors.
        Now, large chemical manufacturers are among the most
    pervasively regulated industries in the world. These companies
    can reasonably conclude that the burdens of this convention are
    manageable. The same certainly cannot be said of smaller, less
    regulated companies, many of whom still seem to be unaware that
    this treaty could adversely affect them and their bottom lines.
    The array of American companies that fall into this category is
    simply mind-boggling. They include those in such diverse fields
    as electronics, plastics, automotive, biotech, food processing,
    brewers, distillers, textiles, nonnuclear utility operators,
    detergents and soaps, cosmetics and fragrances, paints, and
    even the manufacture of ball point pen ink. The Senate will be
    ill-advised to ratify a convention that could do harm,
    unintended harm, to so many American enterprises without truly
    compelling reasons to do so.
        But finally, Mr. Chairman, in discussing the harmful side
    effects of the CWC, I would like to draw your committee's
    attention, as many other witnesses have done, to Articles X and
    XI. These provisions, which obligate the signatories to
    facilitate the fullest possible exchange of technology directly
    relevant to chemical war fighting will be cited by other
    governments, and maybe even by some American companies, as
    pretexts for doing business with Iran and Cuba with adverse
    consequences for U.S. National interests.
        These then, Mr. Chairman, are just some of the costs
    associated with ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention. They
    are unacceptably high. Are there any offsetting benefits?
    Unfortunately, the answer is no, there are not. In fact, and
    this is critical, far from protecting us against an outbreak of
    chemical warfare, the convention would increase the likelihood
    of these awful weapons being used.
        As former Defense Secretaries Jim Schlesinger, Cap
    Weinberger, and Don Rumsfeld wrote in last month's Washington
    Post, it was March 5th, quote, the CWC would likely have the
    effect of leaving the United States and its allies more, not
    less, vulnerable to chemical attack. How would the CWC increase
    our vulnerability to chemical attack? By giving rise, and this
    has happened before in our history, to a false sense of
    security and a diminished program for defending our troops and
    our people against the danger of chemical attack by leading the
    American people to believe that with this convention we have
    somehow rid the world of chemical weapons when in fact even the
    CWC's defenders acknowledge that it will be unverifiable,
    unenforceable, and ineffective in globally banning chemical
    weapons.
        Historically, Mr. Chairman, phony arms control treaties
    have invariably translated into reduced efforts by the
    democracies to defend themselves against the predatory
    dictatorships. Sadly, there is no reason to suppose that the
    CWC will prove an exception to this general rule.
        Mr. Chairman, if some of our best defense experts warn us
    that this treaty will harm our vital security interests, if it
    will lead to the creation of a massive intrusive U.N.-style
    bureaucracy costing taxpayers as much as $200 million annually,
    and if on top of all that it will diminish our competitiveness,
    render us more vulnerable to economic espionage, endanger some
    of or constitutional rights, and impose unfunded Federal
    mandates on thousands of American companies, many of whom do
    not even make chemical weapons, why on Earth should the
    convention be ratified? To demonstrate leadership? But surely,
    real leadership requires a willingness to stand alone if
    necessary to defend our vital interests and ultimately the
    interests of freedom-loving people around the world, not to
    sacrifice those interests on the alter of a misguided
    bureaucratic global consensus.
        Unfortunately, that apparently is not the way President
    Clinton understands U.S. leadership. He would have us be a
    leader in implementing a global agenda consisting of
    multinational accords that a majority of the American people
    simply do not support. Like the CWC, these multinational
    accords, whether they relate to the environment, patents,
    property rights, the way we educate our kids, defraying the
    costs of U.N. operations, or protecting our homes, are
    unwelcome intrusions on American sovereignty. The best way to
    resist all of this is simply to stop the present treaty.
        And finally, Mr. Chairman, it speaks volumes about what is
    wrong with the present CWC that its proponents declare that the
    United States might become a pariah nation like Libya, Iraq,
    and North Korea, if we do not ratify it. Surely only hardened
    anti-American propagandists, deluded one worlders, can ever
    entertain the idea that the United States is akin to North
    Korea, Libya, and other pariah states. After all, these pariah
    nations are developing and manufacturing chemical weapons at
    the same time that America is destroying its stockpile of such
    weapons. It is a sign of desperation, as well as an insult to
    all Americans that President Clinton and some of his allies are
    advancing this argument in order to defend a convention that is
    truly indefensible.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes follows:]

                  Prepared Statement of Malcolm S. Forbes, Jr.

        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to testify before this
    distinguished committee today.
        There are many compelling reasons to oppose ratification of the
    Chemical Weapons Convention. The fact is that the Chemical Weapons
    Convention significantly threatens the freedoms we Americans cherish,
    significantly diminishes America's sovereignty, and, significantly
    increases America's vulnerability to chemical warfare. It's as though
    we were being asked to endorse a drug that worsens the disease it
    purports to cure and, in addition, has some highly dangerous side
    effects.
        To explain just how dangerous the CWC's side effects are, let me
    ask the distinguished members of this committee a simple question. What
    is the basis of America's greatness? Why is it that although the
    international arena contains many powers, we are the world's sole
    superpower? Any adequate answer to this question would have to include
    such factors as the competitive nature of our free market system, the
    unparalleled technological sophistication of American enterprises, and,
    most important, our basic freedom. These are the sinews of our power,
    the basis of our national greatness. Yet it is precisely these
    quintessentially American strengths that the Convention would
    undermine.
        Let me begin by talking about American competitiveness. As I have
    strenuously argued on other occasions, maintaining America's
    competitive edge requires a lessening of the tax and regulatory burdens
    on the American people and our Nation's enterprises. Unfortunately, the
    CWC will have precisely the opposite effect. It will burden up to 8,000
    companies across the United States with major new reporting, regulatory
    and inspection requirements entailing large and uncompensated
    compliance costs. These added costs constitute an added federal
    mandate. Like so many unfunded mandates, they are bound to retard our
    economic growth and make our companies less competitive.
        Isn't it ironic, Mr. Chairman, meeting here on Tax Day and
    concerned as we all are with reducing America's tax burden, that we
    should even consider ratifying a Convention that amounts to a new tax
    on some of our most innovative and productive companies?
        But it gets worse. For in addition to the costs arising from heavy-
    duty reporting, the Chemical Weapons Convention subjects our chemical
    companies to snap inspections that will allow other nations access to
    our latest chemical equipment and information. No longer will violators
    of intellectual property rights in China, Iran and elsewhere have to go
    to the trouble of pirating our secrets; incredibly, we ourselves will
    hand them the stuff on a silver platter. No wonder former CIA Director
    and Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, has called the Convention a
    ``godsend'' for foreign intelligence services.
        But it gets worse. The CWC threatens the constitutional rights
    guaranteed Americans under the Fourth Amendment. As former Defense
    Secretaries Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and Caspar Weinberger noted
    last September in a joint letter to Majority Leader Trent Lott, ``the
    CWC will jeopardize U.S. citizens' constitutional rights by requiring
    the U.S. government to permit searches without either warrants or
    probable cause.''
        ``Jeopardize U.S. citizens' constitutional rights''--think about
    that, Mr. Chairman. And think about all the criminal cases that our
    courts have summarily dismissed because, in their view, the defendants'
    constitutional rights had been violated by police searches conducted
    without ``probable cause.'' Are America's businesses to receive less
    justice than suspected felons? Of course not--the very idea is
    preposterous! And yet, that is precisely what compliance with the CWC
    would entail.
        As Department of Justice officials publicly acknowledged in
    testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee on Sept. 9, 1996, in
    cases where private facilities do not voluntarily permit access to
    inspection, a criminal warrant would be required. Obtaining a warrant
    from a court, however, would require demonstration of probable cause.
    This will be impossible in most cases, because under the Chemical
    Weapons Convention, the nation requesting an inspection need not cite
    its reasons for making such a request.
        Hence, the treaty would post an insoluble dilemma. Should the U.S.
    government choose to respect its citizens' Fourth Amendment rights not
    to be subjected involuntarily to searches in the absence of judicial
    warrants, it will be creating a precedent that other countries will
    assuredly cite to refuse on-site inspections in their territories. On
    the other hand, should the government choose not to respect those
    Fourth Amendment rights, it will be acting unconstitutionally.
        But it gets worse. For in addition to threatening our Fourth
    Amendment rights, the Convention also undercuts our Fifth Amendment
    rights against having our property taken by the government without just
    compensation. As Judge Robert Bork noted in a letter to Sen. Orrin
    Hatch last August:

            * * * Fifth Amendment problems arise from the authority of
            inspectors to collect data and analyze samples. This may
            constitute an illegal seizure and, perhaps, constitute the
            taking of private property by the government without
            compensation. The foreign inspectors will not be subject to
            punishment for any theft of proprietary information.

        Mr. Chairman, these are very grave constitutional issues that need
    to be resolved before the CWC is ratified. To wait until after the
    Convention is ratified and its provisions become the ``supreme law of
    the land'' would be an act of supreme folly.
        There is yet another pernicious aspect of this Convention that I
    would like to touch on--the very different impact it would have on
    large and small companies. As former Secretary of Defense Donald
    Rumsfeld noted in testimony before this Committee last week, big
    companies are generally better able than small companies to withstand
    additional reporting, regulatory and/or government inspection
    requirements. Some might even regard such burdens as a barrier to entry
    that can enhance their market-share at the expense of their smaller
    competitors.
        Large chemical manufacturers are among the most pervasively
    regulated industries in the world. These companies can reasonably
    conclude that the burdens of this Convention are manageable.
        The same certainly cannot be said of smaller, less regulated
    companies--many of whom still seem to be unaware that this treaty could
    adversely affect them and their bottom lines. The array of American
    companies that fall into this category is simply mindboggling. They
    include those in such diverse fields as electronics, plastics,
    automotive, biotech, food processing, brewers, distillers, textiles,
    non-nuclear electric utility operators, detergents and soaps, cosmetics
    and fragrances, paints, and even manufacturers of ballpoint pen ink.
    The Senate would be ill-advised to ratify a Convention that could harm
    so many American enterprises without having truly compelling reasons to
    do so.
        Finally, Mr. Chairman, in discussing the harmful side effects of
    the Chemical Weapons Convention, I would like to draw your Committee's
    attention to Articles X and XI. These provisions, which obligate the
    signatories to ``facilitate the fullest possible exchange'' of
    technology directly relevant to chemical war-fighting, will be cited by
    other governments--and, probably, by some American companies--as
    pretexts for doing business with Iran and Cuba, with adverse
    consequences for U.S. national security interests.
        These, then, are some of the costs associated with ratification of
    the Chemical Weapons Convention. They are unacceptably high. Are there
    any offsetting benefits? Unfortunately, the answer is no, there aren't.
    In fact, far from protecting us against an outbreak of chemical
    warfare, the Convention would increase the likelihood of these awful
    weapons being used. As former Defense Secretaries James Schlesinger,
    Caspar Weinberger and Donald Rumsfeld wrote in last month's Washington
    Post (March 5), ``The CWC would likely have the effect of leaving the
    United States and its allies more, not less, vulnerable to chemical
    attack.''
        How would the CWC increase our vulnerability to chemical attack? By
    giving rise to a false sense of security and a diminished program for
    defending our troops and people against the danger of chemical attack.
    By leading the American people to believe that with this Convention we
    have somehow rid the world of chemical weapons when, in fact, even the
    CWC's defenders acknowledge that it will be unverifiable, unenforceable
    and ineffective in globally banning chemical weapons. Historically,
    phony arms control treaties have invariably translated into reduced
    efforts by the democracies to defend themselves against the predatory
    dictatorships. Sadly, there is no reason to suppose that the Chemical
    Weapons Convention will prove an exception to this general rule.
        Mr. Chairman, if some of our best defense experts warn us that this
    treaty will harm our vital security interests? If it will lead to the
    creation of a massive, intrusive, U.N.-style bureaucracy costing
    American taxpayers as much as $200 million annually? And if, on top of
    all that, it will diminish our competitiveness, render us vulnerable to
    economic espionage, endanger our constitutional rights, and impose
    unfunded federal mandates on thousands of American companies, none of
    whom even make chemical weapons, why on earth should the Convention be
    ratified? To demonstrate ``leadership''? But surely, real leadership
    requires a willingness to stand alone, if necessary, to defend our
    vital interests and ultimately the interests of freedom-loving peoples
    around the world--not to sacrifice those interests on the altar of a
    misguided, bureaucratic global consensus.
        Unfortunately, that apparently is not the way President Clinton
    understands U.S. leadership. He would have us to be a ``leader'' in
    implementing a global agenda consisting of multinational accords that a
    majority of the American people simply do not support. Like the
    Chemical Weapons Convention, these multinational accords--whether they
    relate to the environment, patents or other property rights, or to the
    ways in which we educate our children, defray the costs of the U.N.
    operations or protect our homes--are unwelcome intrusions on American
    sovereignty. The best way to resist them is to stop the present treaty.
        Finally, Mr. Chairman, it speaks volumes about what is wrong with
    the present Chemical Weapons Convention that its proponents declare
    that the United States will become a pariah nation like Libya, Iraq and
    North Korea if we do not ratify it. Surely, only hardened anti-American
    propagandists and deluded One-Worlders could ever entertain the idea
    that the United States is akin to North Korea, Libya, etc. After all,
    these pariahs are developing and manufacturing chemical weapons at the
    same time we are destroying ours. It is a sign of desperation, as well
    as an insult to every American, that President Clinton and his friends
    are advancing this argument in order to defend a Convention that is
    truly indefensible.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your gracious attention.

        The Chairman. I suggest, anticipating that additional
    Senators will appear, there are afternoon committee meetings
    going on, as well, in other areas of the Capitol. I suggest
    that we embark on about a 7.5 minute round of questions.
        First of all, I am going to use a few minutes of my time to
    say that my dear friend, the Senator from Delaware, never
    disappoints me. Somehow he always comes up with statistics that
    I do not know where they came from, and I do not know that he
    can explain them, either. But here he did it again today. But I
    am concerned, I must say to my friend, that the administration
    has becoming expert in low-balling the number of businesses
    that will be affected by the chemical weapons treaty, in order,
    I think obviously, to avert concern in the Senate.
        Now, back in 1993 the Congressional Office of Technology
    Assessment reported that the administration believed that over
    11,200 facilities would be subject to this treaty. During the
    past 4 years, that number has gone down like the Titanic. It
    dropped to 6,300 in October 1994, and then to 3,000 in May
    1996. Now, continuing the trend of the CWC's seemingly ever-
    shrinking impact upon business, ACDA is now declaring that only
    2,000 companies will be affected. Lord knows what it is going
    to be tomorrow morning at 10.
        Yet when I review the response codes on ACDA's industry
    data base, it seems to me that the administration has simply
    developed now new information about 5,583 of these facilities
    to confirm or deny--confirm or deny--that they would be
    affected by the CWC. In fact, as of last year only 668
    facilities in the entire country had responded to ACDA in
    recognition of the fact that they would have new regulatory
    obligations under the CWC. This means that even CMA-owned
    facilities have not responded to ACDA's industry survey
    questionnaire.
        Accordingly, I do not think it is appropriate for the
    administration to reduce their estimates when the companies
    themselves have not responded one way or the other, or to
    confirm or deny that they use or produce the chemicals that are
    subject to the treaty. Accordingly, I think there are serious
    problems with the statistics that may have already been
    presented today by my friend, or subsequent to that.
        Now, Mr. Forbes, the CWC will require the Lord knows how
    many American companies to fill out detailed data declarations.
    Some companies have conducted comprehensive internal cost
    reviews of their own, based on the instruction manual and draft
    regulations compiled by the Commerce Department. The cost
    estimates associated with the reporting burden range from
    $1,500 to $2,000 for two small companies producing discrete
    organic chemicals, up to $250,000 estimated by a large
    diversified company.
        Now, my question to you, sir, is do you think the
    advantages of this treaty, if any, are sufficient to warrant
    subjecting American companies to this new regulatory burden?
        Mr. Forbes. Absolutely not. Even putting aside the fact
    that other nations can easily circumvent this treaty, just as
    other nations violated the 1925 accord banning the use of
    poison gases, even if that is true it will impose a burden on
    American companies, and to concentrate on trying to assess what
    that burden is, trying to assess how we might reduce it, it
    lies in the interpretation of a body over which we will have
    little effective control.
        And so I do not see what the advantages are to argue,
    whether it is going to be 100 facilities or 10,000 facilities,
    Mr. Chairman, when you were reciting those numbers I thought
    for a moment you were talking maybe about the stock market
    going down to 2,000.
        But we do not know. It is uncharted territory. We do not
    know what kind of inspections it will go to.
        When the Iranians put in the request that they have spotted
    a challenge inspection somewhere, we do not know. And if we do
    not know, what are we doing it for? And given the history of
    these agreements and given how easy it is to produce deadly
    weapons, I mean, look at Iraq. The most trod on nation in the
    world in terms of inspections. Yet Saddam stays one step ahead
    of those inspectors. If it cannot work in Iraq, why are we
    subjecting ourselves to this in the first place.
        The Chairman. According to the Congressional Office of
    Technology Assessment, to which I referred a minute or so ago,
    the U.S. Chemical industry is one of the top five industries
    targeted by foreign governments, and the problem of industrial
    espionage is growing. Do you agree with that statement?
        Mr. Forbes. Yes, and we have seen an example of it last
    year.
        The Chairman. And because proprietary information is often
    the basis for a chemical company's competitive edge, both
    nationally and internationally, the theft of trade secrets can
    result in major loss of revenue and investment. In fact, the
    theft of trade secrets can cripple even a giant company,
    according to this report, and can be fatal to a small
    enterprise. I suppose that you agree with that assessment by
    this government agency.
        Mr. Forbes. [Nods affirmatively.]
        The Chairman. But in any case, former Secretary of Defense
    and Director of Central Intelligence Jim Schlesinger testified
    last week, sitting almost where you are sitting right now, that
    the CWC would be a godsend, and that is his word, a godsend to
    foreign companies and governments engaged in industrial
    espionage. My question, sir, is do you agree with Jim's
    assessment of that?
        Mr. Forbes. I am afraid so, yes.
        The Chairman. The Chemical Manufacturer's Association,
    which represents the largest--the largest--U.S. Chemical
    companies, supports ratification of this treaty. This past
    week, as you know, former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
    suggested that the reason for CMA's support may be due to the
    fact that the large companies can cope with the new regulatory
    burden and so forth, but these are not surmises, they are the
    result of studies by a number of us. My question is how badly
    do you think this treaty will harm U.S. industry, and why do
    you think the association supports it?
        Mr. Forbes. Well, large companies can cope with regulation.
    In fact, historians of regulation in America point out that
    larger companies often like regulation, often like government
    intruding, because that makes it more difficult for competitors
    to enter the business and compete. When airlines were
    deregulated we got a whole host of new companies coming in.
    When telephones were deregulated a whole host of new companies
    came in. When railroads were deregulated, short lines
    proliferated. So I think he is onto something.
        It seems to be in human nature. They are obviously
    supporting it with the most honorable of motives. They think it
    will be good. But that begs the question. Here we are getting
    into almost how many angels dance on a pin arguments about how
    many facilities, what kind of chemicals, Schedule III, Schedule
    II, which begs the question will this reduce the possibility of
    production of poisonous chemicals around the world by nations
    that wish to do it. The answer is no.
        The Chairman. I thank you.
        Senator Biden.
        Senator Biden. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Forbes and Senator Helms, let me tell you where I got
    my numbers. I got my numbers from an analysis done by the
    Commerce Department, and the way it explains its previously
    higher number--I am reading from a letter signed by former
    Secretary of Commerce Mickey Kantor and Philip Lader,
    Administrator of the Small Business Administration. And I
    quote:

        Previously, the administration had estimated that more
    companies would be required to submit a data declaration.
    However, additional analysis indicated that many did not cross
    the CWC production threshold for reporting. Further,
    administrative exemptions at the Organization for the
    Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) will be crafted to
    exclude entire industries from reporting--biomediated processes
    (such as certain beverages), polymers (such as certain plastics
    used in football helmets),* * *. In addition, plant sites that
    exclusively produce hydrocarbons (e.g., propane and ethylene)
    are completely excluded from reporting requirements.

        That is why the number is different. Number 1.
        Number 2, I might point out that these onerous reporting
    requirements are a total of, for Schedule I, I believe, six
    pages long, for Schedule II I think it is seven, and Schedule
    III it is five. And of Schedule III and the so-called DOC's,
    which total roughly 1,900 of the 2,000 companies we are talking
    about, the total number of inspections under the treaty
    allowed, period, in any 1 year is 20. Let us put this in
    perspective--20.
        Now, it does not go to the sovereignty argument Mr. Forbes
    raised. I understand that. But it goes to the facts--20--t-w-e-
    n-t-y--20. And if there are 1,800 of those 1,900 companies, as
    I am saying, that are in Schedule III and the so-called DOC's,
    if I am right about that, it is 20 out of 1,900. If it is
    10,000 or whatever number my friend uses, or 6,000, it is 20.
    That is Number 1.
        Number 2, on this issue of search warrants, there is a
    section in the treaty now, put in at the insistence, I am told,
    of President Bush, and it deals with covering the Fourth
    Amendment. It is good to see Mr. Gaffney here. Mr. Gaffney, you
    staff more people than I have ever seen. You are a very, very
    ubiquitous fellow. Every witness we have had against, you have
    been staffing, and they are fortunate to have your expertise.
        ``In meeting the requirement to provide access as specified
    in paragraph''--I am reading from the Verification Annex of
    Challenge Inspections. ``In meeting the requirement to provide
    access as specified in paragraph 38, the inspected State Party
    shall be under the obligation to allow the greatest degree of
    access, taking into account any constitutional obligation it
    may have with regard to proprietary rights or searches and
    seizures.'' But assuming that was not sufficient, which it
    clearly is legally, assuming that was not sufficient, we are
    prepared to accept a condition to the treaty requiring search
    warrants for challenge inspections and the establishment of
    probable cause.
        Now, I might also point out there is--this is black letter
    law, what I am referring to now. We are not talking about any
    hyperbole on my part about how search warrants work and do not
    work. The Supreme Court, in Marshal v. Barlow's, Incorporated,
    a decision argued June 9th, 1978, decided May 23rd, 1978, which
    is the prevailing law, talks about administrative warrants,
    criminal warrants, and those inspections where no warrant is
    required. And I might add, Federal law authorizing warrantless
    searches, which I am sure, I suspect Mr. Forbes, you would
    disagree with all these, but in fact I am citing what the law
    is. I am not implying that you agree what the law should be. I
    would imagine you do not think there should be the Federal
    Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act; or the Nursery
    Stock Guarantee Act; or Immigration and Naturalization Act; or
    Toxic Substance Control Act; Consumer Product Safety Act;
    National Forest System Drug Control Act; Bald Eagle Protection
    Act; Migratory Bird Treaty; Skies Act; Fisher and Wildlife Act
    of 1956; Northern Pacific Halibut Act of 1982; Whaling
    Convention of 1949; Tuna Convention of 1950; Eastern Pacific
    Tuna Licensing Act of 1934, Endangered Species Amendments of
    1982, Antarctic Conservation Act of 1978, Antarctic Marine
    Living Resources Convention of 1984, Lacy Act Amendments of
    1981; Food and Drug and Cosmetic Act; Federal Meat Inspection
    Act; Fisherman's Protective Act; Distillery Spirits Act;
    Occupational Health and Safeties Act; Migrant Season
    Agricultural Workers Act; Mine Safety and Health Act; Safe
    Drinking Water Act; Surface Mining Control Act; Clean Water
    Act; Resource Conservation Recovery Act; Clean Air Act;
    Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation Liability
    Act; and Federal Land Policy Management Act. I may have made
    the case why the Government is over-reaching. But I also would
    argue this makes the case that what is suggested in this treaty
    is nothing--nothing--nothing--different than the way in which
    the law has worked so far. None of these requires an act.
        To walk on your estate to find out whether you are shooting
    bald eagles, which I am sure you are not, Mr. Forbes, they are
    allowed to do that without a warrant, old buddy. They are
    allowed to do that. So there are a lot of things you are
    allowed to do without a warrant. But there is a second category
    here. Nothing in here can be done without that kind of warrant
    if, in fact, any business objects.
        There is a second category in the Supreme Court law, and it
    is called an administrative warrant. And it says for purposes
    of administrative search such as this, and I am reading from
    the case and there was an OSHA inspector who wanted to come on,
    probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant may be
    based not only on specific evidence of existing violations, but
    also on showing that reasonable legislative, administrative
    standards for conducting an inspection are satisfied with
    respect to a particular establishment. That is an
    administrative warrant.
        And third, there is a third kind of warrant, and that is a
    criminal warrant.
        So we are willing to add a condition to this treaty
    requiring a criminal warrant in addition to an administrative
    warrant, where I might add under our Constitution and our
    Supreme Court now in similar circumstances--because the Court
    uses all this test on all Fourth Amendment cases--they use this
    notion of whether or not there is reason to believe the party
    involved thought they were protected from this kind of
    intrusion, whatever it is. And they argue that pervasively
    regulated industries start off without the benefit of the
    presumption that they would not be inspected without a warrant.
    That is the basis on which the Supreme Court could uphold all
    of these warrantless inspections or searches.
        We are not talking about that. We are talking about
    criminal warrants in areas where there are challenge
    inspections. And so I hope when you see the condition, which I
    would be happy to show you Mr. Forbes, your concern on at least
    that one issue will be mildly allayed.
        Mr. Forbes. By the way, Senator, I do not shoot bald
    eagles, and I do not shoot Democrats, either.
        Senator Biden. Well, I will tell you what, if anybody could
    shoot Democrats and do it effectively, you are very good at it;
    and I mean that in a complimentary way. The way I saw you take
    my State by storm, I am glad I was not a Republican standing in
    the way of your shots.
        Mr. Forbes. Some of my best friends are Democrats.
        Senator Biden. And mine Republican.
        The Chairman. I have just got one question. Did you
    understand the question?
        Senator Biden. Well, I did not hear the answer, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Mr. Forbes. I am trying to be diplomatic, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Senator Hagel.
        Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
        Welcome, Mr. Forbes. Good to have you with us.
        Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Hagel. As you know, every time I have an
    opportunity to be a part of this committee, it is a rather
    didactic experience, listening to my colleagues.
        I never knew, Senator, that we had that many acts. And the
    way you went right through them was magnificent.
        Let me, before I ask you a question, Mr. Forbes, make this
    observation. I think all my colleagues on this panel and in the
    U.S. Senate are coming at this issue based, first, not on what
    is good for business, what is bad for business, but what is
    good for America, what is in our best security interest.
        Mr. Forbes. Right.
        Senator Hagel. That is the way I am looking at it.
    Obviously we have other elements and dynamics that are involved
    in this discussion. We should debate them. We should hear your
    views, as the next panel's views will be, I suspect, somewhat
    different. But I think it is important that we not lose sight
    here of what we are about. And that is dealing with the reality
    of a very unstable, very dangerous world. And everybody's
    opinion must be heard, but, in the end, it seems to me, and I
    think I can speak generally for my colleagues, that we must do
    what is right for the security interests of this country.
        In particular, the young men and women of our armed forces,
    who may some day be called upon to fight in a theater against a
    nation that is using chemical weapons. And I think the defining
    question for all of us is, does this treaty help them or hurt
    them?
        Now, with that said, I would like for you to delve in a
    little more into Articles X and XI, the transfer of technology,
    the obligations of what we share with our treaty friends and
    allies. That has gotten an awful lot of attention during the
    course of this debate, which I think it should have and is
    appropriate. And I noted you mentioned it in your testimony.
    And I would like for you to define more of that, if you would.
        Mr. Forbes. Well, under Articles X and XI, there is the
    very real possibility that if we, one of our companies, we come
    up with a way of defending against chemical weapons, that that
    technology may end up in the hands of countries around the
    world. Countries who sign on to this convention have the right
    to request that technology. And we may be obliged to provide
    that technology.
        And I think that that is a very real danger. The fact that
    four defense chiefs believe that we may have to give up
    information and technology that could be used for defensive
    purposes and would therefore allow a rogue nation to reverse
    engineer, to figure out how to possibly get around these
    defenses is, I think, a good reason to pause and say, is this
    the best way to protect our people in the future?
        And if you look at the history of treaties, especially in
    the twenties, simply saying you are against poison gases,
    against war, as we did in the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, or
    against armaments, as we did in the Naval Disarmament Treaty of
    1922, guarantees, ultimately, nothing. In the 1980's, for
    example, Iraq used poison gases against Iran. Iraq used poison
    gases against the Kurds. The international community did
    nothing, despite that 1925 Geneva agreement.
        So the possibility that they could get that kind of
    technology and put it to uses to which we do not want it to be
    put to use is something that, as I say, should give us real
    pause.
        Senator Hagel. In your opinion, can this treaty be fixed?
        Mr. Forbes. I think you have to ask a very basic question.
    Given the nature of chemicals, given the fact that you can take
    compounds--what they call precursors or ingredients--that in
    and of themselves are harmless, put them together in a basement
    laboratory and come up with something that is deadly, should
    make us think, is this the best way to protect our people,
    where we are subject to interpretations on inspections, but
    those who want to do it can do it?
        Take Iraq again. They have inspectors on their soil. They
    were humiliated in a war. Yet the head of the agency that is in
    charge of those inspections said recently that the Iraqis have
    more than a handful of missiles, and it looks like they are
    playing games again with biological and chemical weapons. If
    they can do that under that kind of supposedly severe regime,
    who knows what Iran is doing.
        We know what Libya is doing in the areas of biology, thanks
    in no small part to the Germans. So does this treaty make us
    more secure or does it end up being one of those situations
    where, despite its good intentions, it does more harm than
    good?
        I, so far, based on the evidence I have seen as a citizen,
    I think it does more harm than good, especially when you look
    at the treaties of the twenties. What good did they do when
    violators were there?
        Senator Hagel. Should we have a chemical weapons treaty?
    Can, in your opinion, we produce one?
        Mr. Forbes. Well, there is a bill, I understand, Senator
    Kyl and others have been putting together that might do
    something in terms of something substantive. I have not seen
    the bill. So maybe there is a better way to do it. But,
    clearly, this convention is not the way to do it, given the
    flaws that those defense chiefs and others have pointed out.
        Senator Hagel. If I could also refer back to your
    testimony, your point about it giving rise to a false sense of
    security. Which, I think, by the way, has been overlooked in
    some of our deliberations here, and has been easily dismissed,
    because it is one of those intangibles that is easy to dismiss.
    Would you like to elaborate a little bit on your comment about
    a false sense of security?
        Mr. Forbes. Well, the classic case are the three treaties
    of the twenties, the Naval Disarmament Treaty of the early
    twenties, the prohibition against poison gas in the mid-
    twenties, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact in the late-twenties,
    that led the British and the democracies--not so much the
    French, but certainly the British--to believe that they did not
    have to take adequate measures for defense. And once you start
    on that slope, it is very hard to reverse it. Because there are
    always pressing domestic priorities. We see it today.
        We are now downsizing to where our defense spending as a
    proportion of our GDP is getting down to below Pearl Harbor
    levels. But it is very hard to reverse, given the pressures
    that we face each day.
        So, also, too, given some of the treaties we had in the
    sixties and seventies--look at SALT I--that did not prevent the
    Russians from a massive armaments program, which necessitated
    our building up in the 1980's. So it goes right up to modern
    times.
        And also, too, in the early nineties, we did sign an
    agreement with the Russians on chemical weapons. And the
    evidence indicates that they are going ahead and developing and
    producing deadly chemical weapons. They are ignoring what we
    signed 6 or 7 years ago.
        Senator Hagel. Is there a particular way you get at the
    Russian chemical weapons program, in your opinion?
        Mr. Forbes. Well, you publicize it. You make it very clear
    that this is going to affect our bilateral relations. In other
    words--I will give you an example outside of the defense area.
    A little over a year ago we were ready to sign an agreement, a
    worldwide agreement, on telecommunications. To its credit, this
    administration said this is pretty weak stuff, we can do better
    to open up those markets. Everyone said, oh, no, this is going
    to--our international allies will be upset at us. But, to its
    credit, Kantor and others said no, we are going to go for a
    better deal.
        A few months ago they got a better deal. Because we took
    leadership. We had a clear idea on what we wanted. And here are
    two signatories, supposedly, of this convention. And here is
    the headline: China helps Iran--it was just in the paper on
    Sunday--develop chemical arms. The treaty is not worth the
    paper it is written on the way it is now.
        Senator Hagel. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Forbes. Thank you.
        The Chairman. What do you think, about 2 or 3 minutes a
    piece for the next round? You name it.
        Senator Biden. Three. If you give me the choice, I will
    take the higher.
        The Chairman. You go first.
        Senator Biden. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Forbes, it is interesting, you cited these treaties and
    agreements in the twenties as being useless, yet no chemical
    weapons were used in World War II.
        Mr. Forbes. They were not used in World War II, because
    both sides felt it would be counterproductive to their own
    interests.
        Senator Biden. Right.
        Mr. Forbes. Not because of a treaty.
        Senator Biden. Right.
        Mr. Forbes. In the 1980's, when Iraq thought it was in its
    interests to use it, it did. And the international community
    did nothing.
        Senator Biden. Right. Now, you acknowledge that does not
    have anything to do with whether there is a treaty or is not a
    treaty, right?
        Mr. Forbes. I am saying it takes U.S. leadership, in terms
    of national security, to make things happen. Signing a piece of
    paper will not, in and of itself, do it. As you know,
    enforcement is key. But, unfortunately, the history of these
    treaties suggests that in a democracy, where we would rather be
    doing other things, like bettering our lives, than having to
    worry about defense, these treaties do have a lulling effect,
    where we do not take the necessary steps.
        Senator Biden. Well, we did all these arms control treaties
    and the cold war is over. Not because of that, but not in spite
    of that. I mean it is over. You know, all this stuff, these
    horrible treaties we signed and these arms control treaties, it
    is amazing, the Soviet Union is gone, in spite of the fact that
    we lulled ourself to sleep with all those things. It just
    amazes me how that happened.
        Mr. Forbes. No. What happened, as you know, in the late-
    seventies, we were in serious trouble. We were in serious
    trouble here at home. The Soviet Union was on a major arms
    buildup. It gratuitously, because it did not respect our
    leadership, invaded Afghanistan. And that led, as it does in a
    democracy, in the American democracy, to a sense of alarm, a
    sense of renewal. And that is how we got the buildup of the
    eighties. Ronald Reagan stood strong, and we won the cold war.
        If we continued the policies of the seventies, we would
    still have the cold war today.
        Senator Biden. Well, what you are saying is, if we continue
    the policy of being strong and staying vigilant and have arms
    control treaties, they work in tandem. That is what Reagan did,
    did he not? He is the guy that gave us START. He is the guy
    that had this buildup and also got rid of the nuclear weapons,
    right?
        Mr. Forbes. Because he did it--he had credibility to make
    the agreements work.
        Senator Biden. I see. I see.
        Mr. Forbes. And this agreement, even if you have Ronald
    Reagan--he said--Ronald Reagan said ``Trust, but verify.''
        Senator Biden. Right.
        Mr. Forbes. The villains here are not trustworthy.
        Senator Biden. And he drafted the treaty.
        Mr. Forbes. The villains here are not trustworthy, and you
    cannot verify what the North Koreans are doing or even what
    signatories like the Iranians or the Chinese may be doing. So
    this is a treaty, unlike some of the earlier arms agreements,
    this is one where the U.S. leadership is going to be for
    naught. You cannot do it.
        Senator Biden. Have you seen an arms control agreement you
    like?
        Mr. Forbes. The test ban of 1963 was good, sure.
        Senator Biden. How about the one now? How about the Nuclear
    Test Ban Treaty now?
        Mr. Forbes. Fine. Fine. That is where judgment----
        Senator Biden. Mr. Gaffney just blanched. He is going to
    work on you on the way out.
        I expect, by next campaign, you will have a different view.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Why do not you go ahead. I will go last.
        Senator Hagel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Forbes, would you go back and talk a little bit about
    your earlier statements, the effect on smaller, less regulated
    companies, in your opinion, this treaty would have.
        Mr. Forbes. Well, this is, as you can see by the numbers
    that are being bandied about and how you interpret what is in
    the convention and what we promise we might add to the
    convention, makes it a whole murky area. We are on uncharted
    waters. And to say gee, it is going to be simple, the initial
    requirements, given the nature of bureaucracies--we know they
    do not say give us less paper--usually one thing leads to
    another.
        Senator Hagel. Well, I was interested very much in Mr.
    Rumsfeld's comments when he was here last week. What he was
    going beyond getting to was it would have, in his opinion, this
    treaty, a very inhibiting factor on young, small companies. And
    Senator Biden has, I think, addressed some of that. And I guess
    where we all have to come down to is where is the truth here.
    And I had an opportunity to be with Senator Biden last week on
    some of this. But that is a factor that I think is very
    important here. Because these young companies that are the
    engines of our economy should not have to carry a
    disproportionate burden here if we would go forward with this
    treaty or some form of this treaty.
        And if you would like to, especially from your perspective,
    come at this in some way, I would be grateful for any other
    comments you want to make on this.
        Mr. Forbes. Well, as you know, it is conceptual, because we
    do not know how the new body in The Hague is going to--how
    vigorous it is going to be in terms of these intrusive
    inspections. We also do not know about the so-called challenge
    inspections, whether they are going to be used against a
    smaller company, which could put it out of business. This is
    uncharted territory. But history shows that when you have
    regulations, when you have to keep track of things not for a
    business purpose but for a potential inspection or actual
    filings, it does have a cost and an inhibiting effect.
        And you can see the nature of bureaucracies. Look what
    happened to telecommunications. We passed a bill a little over
    a year ago that said it was supposed to remove some of the
    shackles. The way it has been interpreted by the courts and the
    FCC, it is just as regulated as before--almost as regulated as
    before.
        Senator Hagel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Mr. Forbes, what do you think of the drop
    dead date of April 29th? They say that the whole thing will
    collapse and we will be at the mercy of all these rogue nations
    if we do not ratify this treaty by the 29th, but we will have
    to pay one-fourth of the cost nonetheless. Does that make any
    difference to you?
        Mr. Forbes. Yes. And unfortunately, when you urge other
    nations to ratify something in order to trigger a date like
    April 29th, I think that shows a lack of good faith. And this,
    again, gets to leadership. If we were truly interested in
    looking at this in a timely but reasoned way, without an
    artificial deadline, maybe we could strengthen the treaty. I do
    not think so. But to put an arbitrary date and say the world
    will come to an end, when we help engineer that date, I think
    we should say----
        The Chairman. Well, it was clearly put there, do you not
    think, to stampede the Congress, or the Senate, to say that
    boy, we got to do this by the 29th of April or the whole world
    collapses? I have heard it over and over and over again, and it
    does not hold any water at all.
        But let me tell you what has happened. I think that the
    effort by some in the media, the Washington Post and the New
    York Times and some like that, that have advocated this treaty
    to the point of absurdity--there have been other newspapers--
    the Wall Street Journal has done a good job, your magazine has
    done a good job, and some others--but for the most part, the
    American people were not paying any attention to this treaty
    actually. So the result was that they could say 73 or 83
    percent of the people approved the treaty.
        Well, all of a sudden, the worm turned and the contents of
    this treaty were being analyzed in the media, particularly on
    the radio and in television. And I have a poll here that shows
    a total sample, total support as of April the 5th was 31
    percent for the treaty--31 percent of the people support the
    treaty; 60 percent oppose it.
        Now, in my own office they keep track of the calls,
    particularly when I am involved in an issue. And even in my
    home State a lot of people, even though they support me, they
    kept reading in the liberal media that this was such a great
    and grand thing and only idiots would oppose. And so that had
    some effect. It was about 50/50 in my State. Now it is about
    80/20. And in our telephone calls, we had 83 calls yesterday
    relating to this treaty.
        How many do you think supported it?
        Three. Eighty now oppose it. So I think they have
    overplayed their hands.
        I see Senator Kerry is here. And we had agreed on 3 and a
    half minutes. Is that what we said? We are glad to have you,
    sir.
        Senator Kerry. Well, that is time for a good dialog, Mr.
    Chairman. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Forbes, I have been interested to see that the Chemical
    Manufacturers' Association, the Synthetic Organic
    Manufacturers' Association, the Pharmaceutical Research and
    Manufacturers' Association of America, the Biotechnology
    Industry Organization, the American Chemical Society, the
    American Physical Society, the American Institute of Chemical
    Engineers, the Council for Chemical Research, and several other
    chemical trade organizations all strongly support the CWC. And
    they urge us to vote to ratify it. And they all insist that it
    will not pose an undue burden on business.
        The National Federation of Independent Businesses responded
    to treaty opponents' claims that they were opposed by saying
    that those claims were 100 percent incorrect, according to the
    Wall Street Journal, which also quotes an NFIB official as
    predicting its members are not going to be impacted, contrary
    to your statement about small business.
        So I really need your help in understanding what is the
    documentation here. On what do you base this notion? If the
    chemical industry, which is the industry that subjects itself
    to inspections, is for it, and they are threatened by the loss
    of some $600 billion worth of business, why are you so
    convinced they are wrong? And what evidence do you have to
    support that they are wrong and cannot look out for their own
    interests?
        Mr. Forbes. Well, first of all, as a general matter, there
    is no way that--the CWC is unverifiable and unenforceable with
    states like Iran, China, not to mention those that are not
    going to even sign the thing. The question now comes, how
    intrusive will it be on the United States?
        Don Rumsfeld, who had testified here last week, who has
    been in a large business, made the point that historians have
    made. And that is big businesses can cope with regulations
    better than small businesses. As a matter of fact, when you
    have a regulatory regime, it makes it harder for small
    businesses to get in and compete. And they figure that since
    they are heavily regulated anyway, they can put up with this
    kind of regime.
        But the fact of it really is not whether it is good for the
    Chemical Manufacturers' Association, the question is, is it
    enforceable, is it verifiable, is it good for the interests of
    the United States? Because if it is not good for America, then
    we should not do it just because a trade association says it
    might benefit our members. So big companies, as a rule, can
    cope with regulations, but small businesses can less cope with
    regulations. And the real problem is not just routine
    inspections--we can cope with those--but so-called challenge
    inspections. And that is unchartered territory.
        Senator Kerry. Well, the challenge inspections, according
    to every observer, are going to take place primarily at
    military facilities. Nobody anticipates a series of major
    challenges at the commercial facilities.
        Mr. Forbes. Well, given the nature, as you know, of----
        Senator Kerry. And we are not looking at small
    manufacturers here. I mean you are aware, are you not----
        Mr. Forbes [continuing]. Given, Senator, the nature of the
    manufacture of chemical weapons, since it can be done in a
    basement or a bathtub----
        Senator Kerry. Correct.
        Mr. Forbes [continuing]. It may need to be--experts say it
    should not need to go beyond military bases. But with chemical
    weaponry, since you can manufacture it almost anywhere, you may
    need a challenge inspection.
        Senator Kerry. Well, let us follow that through. It can be
    manufactured anywhere, correct? It can be manufactured
    anywhere, even as we sit here today, correct?
        Mr. Forbes. Well, you look at Iraq----
        Senator Kerry. Just follow me through. Just follow the
    thinking.
        Mr. Forbes. Yes, OK.
        Senator Kerry. It can be manufactured anywhere, as we sit
    here today, can it not?
        Mr. Forbes. Yes.
        Senator Kerry. And this regime, this CWC, you are aware, is
    going to take effect no matter what we do; you are aware of
    that?
        Mr. Forbes. Yes.
        Senator Kerry. So as of April 29th, a date that you want to
    discard, something is going to happen, is it not? Correct?
        Mr. Forbes. Not if we take leadership.
        Senator Kerry. No, no matter what we do, something happens.
    You are absolutely incorrect.
        Mr. Forbes. No, Senator----
        Senator Kerry. On April 29th, the group that organizes the
    process of inspections takes its work without the United States
    of America, because we have not ratified it. Only those who
    have ratified are part of that; is that not correct?
        Mr. Forbes. OK.
        Senator Kerry. So, no matter what we do, on April 29th, I
    think it is 70 nations are going to sit down at a table and
    say, OK, how do we go about the business of doing what the
    United States asked us to do, but now does not want to do,
    correct?
        Mr. Forbes. That is one way to put it. There is another way
    to put it.
        Senator Kerry. Is that not accurate?
        Mr. Forbes. What is your question? Because I believe----
        Senator Kerry. My question was very simple. Is not that
    fact going to happen? Are they not going to sit at a table,
    without the United States, if we do not ratify it?
        Mr. Forbes. They may sit at a table, but if the United
    States takes the lead, that treaty can be rewritten. We helped
    trigger that April 29th date by asking other nations to ratify
    that convention, so that trigger date came in. It was a cynical
    ploy by this administration to put the Senate in a box and say,
    if you do not ratify this, you are harming the future by
    allowing chemicals out there. They are using symbol over
    substance. And I think it is a shame that we have been put in
    that box. And we should say no.
        As I pointed out earlier, in a whole other area, in
    telecommunications, for once this administration took a proper
    lead, over a year ago. There was a bad agreement on the table.
    Kantor said we can do better. Our allies said we cannot do
    better. He said we can. We went back to the table. We got a
    better agreement. And it was put on the table again this year
    and everyone praised it as being better than it was for
    American interests a year ago.
        So we put ourselves in the box, and a great nation should
    say, if we put ourselves in a box and it is not good for
    America and not good for the world, we can take ourselves out
    of the box.
        Senator Kerry. Well, let me address that. You are a
    promoter and have been--and I admire what you and your family
    have done to promote capitalism and the notion of
    entrepreneurship. As an entrepreneur, having signed on to this
    treaty--72 nations is the number that have ratified it--they
    will now be in a position where they can engage in a formal
    trade, under Schedule II, chemicals. But any nation that is not
    a participant is not going to be able to engage in that,
    correct?
        Now, as an entrepreneur, if you were part of a nation that
    has signed on to it, you are going to be greatly advantaged.
    Because the United States of America's chemical companies are
    not going to be allowed to engage in the transfer of these
    chemicals under this treaty. So all of the entrepreneurs in
    these other countries are going to be sitting there licking
    their chops and saying, wow, we sure have a great capitalist
    opportunity here to make money at the expense of the United
    States of America.
        That is what all our chemical companies think today.
        Mr. Forbes. Senator, if a treaty is not good for America,
    then we should not ratify it.
        Senator Kerry. Well, what do you think about what I just
    said?
        Mr. Forbes. And if that is blood money, selling chemicals
    to nations that should not have that stuff in the first place,
    like Iran and China and some others, we should not be making
    those sales in the first place. We denied ourselves sales
    during the cold war, hurt our commercial interests, because we
    felt it was in our national interest. We should not hesitate to
    do so again.
        Senator Kerry. But we do not sell to any of those
    countries, because they are all embargoed under trade
    restrictions.
        Mr. Forbes. Yes, but under the----
        Senator Kerry. It is not blood money to us. We do not sell
    to them.
        Mr. Forbes [continuing]. But you just said before we are
    going to lose sales opportunities.
        Senator Kerry. We are going to lose sales opportunities,
    because we are not allowed to trade among the ratified
    countries.
        Mr. Forbes. Iran and China are signing on to this thing
    apparently.
        Senator Kerry. But then they are subject to challenge
    inspection.
        Mr. Forbes. Big deal. Iraq is the most regulated nation in
    the world in terms of inspections and the U.N.--and the chief
    inspector has just told us that Saddam still stays one step
    ahead. He is still making the missiles. He is still making and
    doing biological and chemical research.
        Senator Kerry. We are not talking about Iraq.
        Mr. Forbes. He is even still fooling around with nukes. If
    it can happen in Iraq, it can happen anywhere. I do not care
    how many inspections you have.
        Senator Kerry. We are not talking about Iraq. We are
    talking about Iran.
        Mr. Forbes. No. We are talking about Iraq is the most
    inspected nation on Earth today. And my point is that we have
    more inspections----
        Senator Kerry. And we know exactly what they are doing
    pretty much.
        Mr. Forbes. Yes, right. Exactly.
        Seriously, the head of the agency, Senator, who did the
    inspection, just told us the other day that Saddam is still
    doing stuff he should not be doing.
        Senator Kerry. Correct.
        Mr. Forbes. And they have a hard time keeping up with him.
    If they have a hard time keeping up in Iraq, what of North
    Korea, Iran, Libya?
        Senator Kerry. But, you see, what you seem to--and I think
    many of the critics of the treaty--seem to ignore is the fact
    that we are not going to produce these weapons anyway, Number
    1. We do not sell to these people anyway, Number 2. And we do
    not have a regime today for any kind of inspection of
    accountability on the transfer of the precursor chemicals.
    Therefore, what you gain with this, while not perfection--none
    of us have alleged that any treaty--well, I will not say any
    treaty--that almost any treaty provides you with a foolproof--
    certainly as to chemical weapons and biowarfare weapons, I do
    not think there is any such thing as a verifiable, foolproof
    treaty, because of where you can produce this.
        The question is, are you better off with a structure that
    affords you some mechanism of tracing precursor chemicals, some
    responsibility of companies for reporting, some system of
    accountability through challenge and regular inspection, or
    none at all, as well as being outside of the sales? Now, that
    is really the issue.
        The Chairman. We will let Mr. Forbes answer that without
    interruption, and then we will go to the next panel.
        Mr. Forbes. OK. The ease with which you can make chemical
    weapons today--you can do it in a basement, you can do it in a
    bathtub--the ease with which you can do it makes this treaty
    unverifiable and unenforceable. The danger from doing this
    treaty, especially in a democracy, as we saw in the twenties
    and thirties, it will give us a false sense of security that,
    by golly, we have dealt with it.
        Now, you have said, and I admire your candor, it is not
    perfect. But, yet, the administration goes out there--he did it
    with the newspaper editors and he has done it in speeches,
    making it sound like this is a foolproof protection for our
    kids, we have got to do it or they are all going to be blasted
    away. So a bill of goods is being sold.
        At best, this is a flawed treaty that is going to do little
    or no good. And so, therefore, why lull ourselves with a false
    sense of security? I think we saw in the twenties and thirties
    where that led. We saw it in the seventies, where that led. Why
    repeat history?
        The Chairman. Very well.
        Mr. Forbes. Thank you.
        The Chairman. I thank you so much, Mr. Forbes, for being
    here with us today and for coming. I know it is some
    inconvenience to yourself on short notice.
        Mr. Forbes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
    it.
        The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Biden. See you in Delaware, Mr. Forbes.
        Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Senator.
        The Chairman. Now we will have panel Number 2, consisting
    of seven distinguished ladies and gentlemen. [Pause.]
        Senator Biden. If you all can agree on your seating, I am
    sure then that we can work this treaty out.
        The Chairman. Our second panel consists of friends of all
    of us. Sometimes you have to agree to disagree agreeably, and
    that is the way we will do it. But in Joe's case, in one or two
    instances, he will say huzzah, hooray and so forth.
        The panel, from my left to my right, is Mr. Wayne Spears,
    who is president of the Spears Manufacturing Company at Sylmar,
    California; and Mr. Ralph B. Johnson, vice president of
    Environmental Affairs, Dixie Chemical Company, of Houston; Mr.
    Kevin L. Kearns, president of the United States Business and
    Industrial Council.
        Senator Biden. It is good to see you.
        The Chairman. The Hon. Kathleen C. Bailey--and how you do
    add to the looks of this crowd, I tell you that--senior fellow
    at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore,
    California; the Hon. Bruce Merrifield, former Assistant
    Secretary of Commerce; Fred Webber, whom we have all known,
    president of the Chemical Manufacturers' Association; and the
    Hon. William A. Reinsch, Under Secretary of Commerce for Export
    Administration.
        And Mr. Spears, you may lead off, because that is the order
    they said that I was supposed to follow.
        Senator Biden. Perhaps Mr. Kearns could go first.
        The Chairman. Oh, you want Mr. Kearns. All right. Mr.
    Kearns, we will hear from you. Go right ahead.

    STATEMENT OF KEVIN L. KEARNS, PRESIDENT, UNITED STATES BUSINESS
                         AND INDUSTRIAL COUNCIL

        Mr. Kearns. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be
    back testifying before this committee, where I served as a
    State Department Pierson Fellow on Senator Helms' staff from
    1988 to 1989. When I went back to the State Department, I
    headed an office called the Office of Strategic Trade, and we
    dealt with many of the issues that are before this committee
    today.
        Since I left the State Department, I have been president of
    the U.S. Business and Industrial Council. We represent mainly
    family owned, closely held businesses--what I would call
    medium-sized business. There is not a good definition, really,
    of size below large business. But our employers have between
    100 and 800 employees. They are involved in various fields.
    Some of them are specialty chemical manufacturers, autos, food
    processing, brewing, you name it, USBIC members are in these
    industries. And we have been around since 1933. We do not lobby
    for a specific industry or a company; we are here to give a
    voice to small- and mid-sized businesses in public policy
    debates.
        We take strong exception to the Chemical Weapons
    Convention. We do not believe it is in the best interest of the
    United States or American business. Many of the reasons have
    been discussed by Mr. Forbes and were brought up by the three
    secretaries last week.
        We believe that, first of all, the CWC represents an
    unjustifiable erosion of American sovereignty. It seems, time
    after time, treaty after treaty, decade after decade, the U.S.
    gives up a bit of its sovereignty to one international body or
    another. And the results, generally, I think, are not good for
    the United States. When I look at the world today, it is not a
    hospitable place. And I do not feel comfortable that
    international bureaucrats, drawn from so many of these
    countries where there is strife or repression or many other
    problems, are the best guarantors of American interests.
        At the Business and Industrial Council, we believe that the
    single best guarantor of American interests is American
    strength and power. We have wielded that, for the most part,
    over the centuries well. And we do not place our hopes for the
    future and the future of our kids on supranational
    organizations.
        USBIC members are little guys, compared to perhaps some of
    the members of the Chemical Manufacturers Association or
    others. We have trouble with red tape now, with OSHA, with EPA,
    with the IRS, with State regulatory agencies, in the sense that
    they add a tremendous burden to the costs of our doing
    business, without adding another burden, or other burdens,
    under this treaty.
        The large-sized companies, these large-scale companies, can
    afford big lobbying organizations in Washington. They can
    afford representation before international bodies. They all
    have offices, or many of them do, in Brussels, before the EC,
    et cetera. They have offices in various Asian capitals. They
    have the staff, they have the resources to cope with regulatory
    burdens. Smaller businesses are already drowning in a sea of
    red tape.
        And I might add that the Fortune 500 have not created a
    single net new job in this country in 20 years. It is small
    business and mid-sized business that are creating jobs in this
    country, not these large multinationals, which feel free to
    move their factories around the world, seeking less regulation,
    seeking less bureaucratic red tape, seeking the cheapest labor
    available.
        One element that I would like to address is the National
    Federation of Independent Business, which has come up several
    times in this discussion. To say that NFIB members will not be
    affected by this treaty is a tautology. That is, the vast
    majority of NFIB members are microbusinesses. They are small
    businesses, run out of the home. They are luncheonettes. They
    are insurance agencies, et cetera.
        So I think the fact that people are citing NFIB as a voice
    of American business that says American business is not going
    to be harmed is wrong. No, that segment of very small
    businesses are not going to get challenge inspections--at a
    luncheonette, for example. And, believe me, I am not putting
    down NFIB members. They are the heart and soul of so many of
    our communities, if not all of them. It is just simply
    irrelevant to the discussion of this treaty. They are not
    people that are involved, by and large, in manufacturing. They
    do not handle chemicals. So it is simply irrelevant.
        When we look at these various inspections that may be
    required under this treaty, I think the fact that Senator Biden
    led off with the statistics and how many companies may be
    subject to it and what the effect would be on those companies
    indicates, really, that the average American business, that is,
    a manufacturing business, that is potentially subject to this
    treaty really does not know what is going on. I commend the
    Chairman and this committee for the efforts made previously and
    for these hearings. These businesses really do not understand
    the scope of what is happening.
        We believe that Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights are in
    danger. I do not agree with you, Senator Biden, that the forms
    that the Department of Commerce has put out--yes, actually,
    filling out the form may take only 2.5 hours. It is the hours--
    the hundreds of hours, perhaps, in gathering the information,
    seeing if you are using these chemicals, if somehow they are
    involved in your manufacturing process, either as something
    that you incorporate or that has been incorporated at an
    earlier stage. It is very difficult.
        The fact that a company may be subject to a fine up to
    $50,000 would put many of my members out of business or put
    them in a very difficult situation. So you can be sure they are
    not going to take 2 hours and simply fill out the form as
    quickly as possible. They are going to do their homework. They
    know what it is when there is an unannounced OSHA inspection or
    an EPA inspection, for instance, coming into their plant or
    factory.
        So, to conclude--the time goes very fast, I know--the U.S.
    Business and Industrial Council opposes this treaty. We do not
    think it is in the best interest of the United States, first
    and foremost, before we get to the business issues. And we
    think it places unnecessary and very heavy burdens on small-
    and medium-size business potentially.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Kearns. And if you wish to add
    to your statement for the printed record, please do.
        Mr. Kearns. Yes, I will submit the rest for the record.
    Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Kearns follows:]

                     Prepared Statement of Kevin L. Kearns

        Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee: My name is Kevin L. Kearns
    and I serve as President of two organizations: the United States
    Business and Industrial Council and the Council For Government Reform.
    The first is a business league and the second is a grassroots lobbying
    group. While both groups oppose the Chemical Weapons Convention for the
    same reasons, I would like to highlight the business concerns in my
    testimony.
        First though I would like to thank the Committee for allowing me
    the opportunity to testify against what I believe is an ill-advised
    treaty. I realize that there are many patriotic Americans on both sides
    of this issue, including many distinguished former Cabinet officials
    and high-ranking military officers. And that there are difficult issues
    involved. However, I believe that on balance the treaty will harm U.S.
    interests far more than advance them.
        The US Business and Industrial Council was established in 1933 to
    give a voice in public policy debates to the thoughts of mid-sized,
    family-owned and run American companies. We are an advocacy
    organization that takes a national interest approach to public issues.
    USBIC is not a trade association and we don't have a PAC. We don't
    lobby for an individual company or an industry. We are funded through
    memberships from individuals and American firms representing more than
    1,000 member companies with over 250,000 employees nation wide.
        I believe that USBIC differs from other business organizations
    because of the size and composition of our members. They are primarily
    family-owned or closely-held companies that maintain close ties to
    their community. USBIC members live and work along side their employees
    in the city or town where their company is located and believe that
    there is more to running a company than just the bottom line on a
    balance sheet.
        Mr. Chairman, The United States Business and Industrial Council
    opposes the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) because we believe that
    it is an irreparably flawed treaty. Although we understand that Sen.
    Helms is laboring mightily with Sen. Biden to correct both the excesses
    and deficiencies, we do not believe that process can correct all the
    treaty's problems. First, the CWC represents an unjustifiable erosion
    of American sovereignty. Second, the CWC presents a clear threat to
    national security of the United States since it increases rather than
    decreases the likelihood that chemical weapons will be used effectively
    against Americans. Third, the Chemical Weapons Treaty is unverifiable
    and will not stop outlaw states or others that wish to do so from
    hiding the manufacture and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Fourth, the
    CWC presents a grave challenge to the U.S. Constitution. The CWC's
    inspections will strip American businesses of their Fourth Amendment
    Rights. Fifth, the CWC represents another unfunded mandate from
    Washington placed squarely on the back of those businesses that can
    least afford it. CWC will add to the costs of manufacturing companies
    through new compliance costs. Finally, CWC will allow unparalleled
    opportunities for industrial espionage.
        At the Business and Industrial Council we believe that the only
    certain guarantor of American interests is American wealth and power.
    We do not place our hopes and the future of our children on
    supranational organizations. Thus each new treaty or agreement that
    comes along--whether in the field of disarmament, trade, the
    environment, law of the sea, etc.--whittles away at American
    sovereignty. One wonders why we bother to have a federal government at
    all if international bureaucracies are better suited to represent the
    aspirations of the American people.
        During the Cold War many believed that the only way to achieve
    peace was to lay down our sword. But that notion proved as illusory as
    the CWC is today. The U.S. won the Cold War by relying on our military
    strength and relying on our deterrent capability. Just as arms control
    was not the answer, we believe that the Chemical Weapons Convention is
    not the solution. Our best defense and deterrence to chemical weapons
    are having military capabilities that will allow a swift and sure
    response.
        President Clinton has concluded that this treaty will end the
    threat of chemical weapons worldwide. That is, I am sure, a sincere
    hope but a false one. There is simply no way to eliminate chemical
    weapons in the world. The chemical terrorist incident that recently
    occurred in Japan shows the difficulties in finding covert chemical
    manufacturing operations. Manufacturing facilities are easily concealed
    due to the small area needed for production.
        USBIC believes that the Chemical Weapons Convention represents a
    major infringement of U.S. sovereignty and the proprietary rights of
    manufacturers. The Chemical Weapons Convention clearly strips away our
    members' Fourth Amendment rights by authorizing and enforcing illegal
    search and seizure. CWC empowers a U.N.-style agency that may conduct
    detailed inspections of facilities on both regular and surprise basis.
    They can carry out these inspections without justification of suspected
    illegal activity or even a search warrant.
        America's large multinational chemical companies have endorsed CWC.
    But, if the Senate ratifies CWC, the CWC will create many problems for
    small and medium-sized chemical manufacturers and other non-related
    industries that process chemicals as part of their manufacturing
    operations. Included may be autos, auto parts, brewers and distillers,
    electronics, food processing, pharmaceuticals, paint and tire
    producers, and a host of other manufacturing industries.
        Mr. Chairman, large, multinational companies do not care about the
    CWC's massive regulatory burdens because they have the legal, financial
    and bureaucratic resources to absorb compliance costs. But, small
    companies have neither the resources nor staffs to absorb these costs.
    The Chemical Weapons Convention will force businesses to hire more
    lawyers plus add additional compliance personnel that must specialize
    in new regulation that CWC will present.
        Clearly, the CWC will place these small companies at a competitive
    disadvantage with their larger competitors. This is a key reason large
    companies are for the CWC and the small companies are against it. These
    inspections could cost individual companies anywhere from $10,000 to
    $500,000--a substantial unfunded mandate. CWC inspections could require
    up to eighty-four hours to complete and involve $50,000 fines even if
    inadvertent errors are made.
        There will never be an arrangement in CWC to stop it from
    effectively authorizing industrial espionage. The CWC offers no
    protections for company formulas and other trade secrets that
    inspectors may steal. Moreover, nothing would prevent unscrupulous
    countries from placing intelligence officers on the inspection team.
        The CWC will cost the American government millions simply to join
    up. Companies and the American taxpayers will pay $50 to $200 million
    for the privilege of handing over industrial secrets to competitors
    while not preventing chemical warfare or terrorism. An agreement to
    complete all inspections of chemical samples in the United States is
    not the answer. Corrupt countries will find covert ways to obtain
    chemical samples. Why should American businesses allow international
    inspectors the opportunity to obtain these chemical samples?
        Finally, abroad CWC inspections will not substantially reduce the
    proliferation of chemical weapons around the globe. Russia, with its
    huge stockpile of chemical weapons and massive production capability,
    has not ratified the CWC and will only ratify if American taxpayers
    will pay for it. Also the world's most notorious terrorist nations,
    Syria, North Korea, and Libya, refuse to ratify. China, a proliferator
    of nuclear and missile technologies, has not ratified.
        I think all Americans would support a treaty that ended the threat
    of chemical weapons. That is why we signed the Geneva Convention. USBIC
    believes an effective addition to the Geneva Convention would be the
    Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat Reduction Act of 1997, S. 495,
    sponsored by Senator Kyl (R-AZ). This bill would provide criminal and
    civil penalties for the unlawful acquisition, transfer, or use of any
    chemical or biological weapon.
        Our companies are constantly fighting against overregulation. Mid-
    sized and small American businesses are fed up with the government
    policies that favor multinational corporations. Too often government
    overregulates and makes it harder for smaller companies to survive. For
    example, we have an estate tax so high that too often our members are
    unable to pass their business on to the next generation. The Chemical
    Weapons Convention is a bad treaty that will only add to the heavy
    burden our companies face today.
        On behalf of the 1,000 member companies of the United States
    Business and Industrial Council (USBIC), I strongly urge you to oppose
    ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

        The Chairman. Now, Mr. Wayne Spears is the kind of American
    I admire. He has started at the bottom, as I understand it, and
    heads a substantial company now. How many people do you employ?
        Mr. Spears. One thousand one hundred.
        The Chairman. One thousand one hundred. Well, we are so
    glad you came. And you may proceed.
        Mr. Spears. I will give it a shot.
        The Chairman. I know you will do well.
        Mr. Spears. It was a last-minute deal.
        The Chairman. You just relax and let us hear from you.
        Mr. Spears. I am not a real good spokesman. It is not my
    thing, but I am going to give it a shot.
        The Chairman. Very good. You will do well.

    STATEMENT OF WAYNE SPEARS, OWNER AND CEO, SPEARS MANUFACTURING,
                        INC., SYLMAR, CALIFORNIA

        Mr. Spears. Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit a
    statement.
        The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.
        Mr. Spears. Mr. Chairman, I want to compliment the
    committee for having this hearing on the many ways in which the
    Chemical Convention threatens to affect American business. I
    especially appreciate the opportunity you have given me to
    describe how it looks from the perspective of one of the
    companies that may be harmed by this treaty.
        My wife and I started Spears Manufacturing in 1969, in a
    2,000-square-foot little building in Burbank, California. Today
    we employ over 1,000 people--1,100. We have over a million
    square feet of manufacturing space, 400,000 square feet of
    warehouse space in 10 States, Washington, Utah, California,
    Colorado, Texas, Georgia, Florida, Kansas, Illinois, Idaho, and
    Pennsylvania. And we started out in California. We are moving
    out of California as quickly as we can because of the
    regulations. The State is so tough. I mean, just to get a sewer
    permit takes forever.
        In regulations, what all of us are afraid of is what the
    gentleman just brought up. We manufacture plastic pipe fittings
    and valves for use in everything from agriculture--we even make
    plastic pipe fittings that are suitable for fire sprinkler
    fittings, for silicon chips and for industrial. And we
    manufacture in size from one-eighth-of-an-inch fitting up to a
    32-inch-diameter fitting--huge things.
        We do use some chemicals. We use acetones, and we use some
    vinyl ester resins. We do not know what we will have to report
    or what is going to be reported. And, to add to that, we plan
    on putting in another half-million square feet of manufacturing
    space. And we have been sort of kicking it around, to try to
    get it done this year, to employ a couple of hundred more
    people. Not with the uncertainties of this treaty--we will not
    do that. That would be foolish on my part to do that.
        I solely own the company. I do not know what is going to
    happen. I do not trust what has happened. I do not trust this
    administration and what burdens they are apt to put on me. And
    I think that there is a lot of small business and medium-sized
    businesses like myself that just never gets around--we are so
    busy trying to run our business, we do not have time to pay
    attention to these things. And this thing was brought to my
    attention by one of my Senators from Idaho, who says that you
    better look into this; this may affect you. That is how I got
    involved.
        I did everything in the world to keep from coming here.
        Although I feel very honored. I feel very honored by all of
    you. I really do.
        Senator Biden. As Lincoln said, but for the honor----
        Mr. Spears. I am just a poor, old Okie boy. In all honesty,
    I hitch-hiked from Oklahoma to California. I did not have
    anything. I did well. I want to try to give some of that back
    to the American people. And I am going to. I have wrote over
    10,000 letters against this--over 1,000 to my employees. I have
    over 8,000 customers worldwide. And we do do business
    worldwide. We actually compete with the Taiwanese and all those
    kind of people. And, might I add, we do a very good job.
        We do some very unique things, because I love mechanical
    things. And we have been able to be very competitive. We
    actually sell--trademark things and put it on for other
    manufacturers. You may see our fittings around that have other
    people's names on them. We do such a good job that they cannot
    compete with us in Europe. We do it.
        And there is no way I want some guy coming into my plant,
    seeing what we do--one of these surprise inspections. I just do
    not want it. I do not even want to take a chance on it. Why
    would we, the American people, ever allow that to happen or
    even take a chance on it happening? We are the strongest
    country in the world. Let us not tear it down.
        As Mr. Forbes said, let us do it for America.
        That is about all I have got to say. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Well, you said it very eloquently, too, sir.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Spears follows:]

                       Prepared Statement of Wayne Spears

        Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the Committee for having this
    hearing into the many ways in which the Chemical Weapons Convention
    threatens to affect American businesses. I especially appreciate the
    opportunity you have given me to describe how it looks from the
    perspective of one of the companies that may be harmed by this treaty.
        My wife and I started Spears Manufacturing in 1969 in a 2,000
    square foot space in Burbank, California. Today, we have over 1 million
    square feet of manufacturing space and about 400,000 square feet of
    warehouses in 10 states--Washington, Utah, California, Colorado, Texas,
    Georgia, Florida, Kansas, Illinois, Idaho and Pennsylvania. We employ
    more than 1,000 people.
        Our principal products are plastic pipe fittings and valves used
    for everything from agriculture to fire sprinklers to silicon chip-
    manufacturing to industrial applications. The sizes range from one-
    eighth-of-an-inch to 32-inches in diameter.
        We have established a unique niche in the world market with high
    quality, low-cost products that simply cannot be matched by any of our
    competitors, foreign or domestic. Naturally, we want to keep it that
    way, but others don't.
        We take very seriously the dangers posed by commercial espionage
    and other means of jeopardizing our proprietary technological edge. And
    because of our advanced technology and competitive position we have
    reason to believe we are at real risk of being targeted for these
    purposes.
        Let me say right up front that, as a businessman, I want less
    regulation, less red tape and less interference in my company's affairs
    from government bureaucrats. The way many of these folks are doing
    their jobs has the effect of making it a lot harder for me--and
    countless other American entrepreneurs--to bring good products to
    market at competitive prices and as efficiently as possible.
        For what it is worth, I believe the commitment the Republican Party
    has made to these principles has been a key ingredient in its success
    in achieving--and maintaining--control of the Congress.
        Therefore, I have been amazed to discover that a Republican Senate
    might actually consider approving a treaty that would add to the
    burdens imposed on thousands of American businesses by our own
    government. This Chemical Weapons Convention would also give foreign
    bureaucrats new powers that will add to the costs for companies like
    mine.
        There are others on this panel far better equipped to discuss all
    the fine points of this Convention. I look forward to learning more
    from them about this treaty and exactly how it will affect companies
    like mine--a subject that is creating great uncertainty at the moment.
        This is particularly important to me since I currently have plans
    to expand my operations by another half-a-million square feet,
    employing another 200-300 people in good-paying manufacturing jobs
    across the nation. It would be irresponsible for me to proceed with
    those plans without knowing if the CWC will jeopardize my company's
    competitive edge.
        Especially worrisome is the prospect that foreign inspectors could
    demand entry into my plants, gaining access to my records, procedures,
    inventory and customers data. These involve proprietary information
    that could, if stolen, cause my company real harm. And, from what I
    understand, there is every reason to believe that this could happen.
        The challenge inspections authorized by the CWC would be very
    different from the sorts of site-visits conducted periodically by U.S.
    government agencies assigned to monitor our compliance with
    environmental and health and safety regulations. Those American
    inspectors do not concern themselves with our sensitive manufacturing
    technology, just our employees' safety and our emissions.
        The CWC will put us in a position of having to open our doors to
    people well versed in our manufacturing techniques, who want our
    advanced technology and who are trained to collect this sort of
    information. We are so concerned about this problem that we do not even
    permit the suppliers of our manufacturing equipment to come into our
    plants.
        Even if my company's facilities are not challenge-inspected, the
    burdensome reports we might have to provide could be enough to tell
    foreign competitors a lot about how we do what we do.
        Mr. Chairman, I am sure I speak for many of my colleagues in
    American industry when I say that if this Chemical Weapons Convention
    really did get rid of chemical weapons, it would be worth it to us to
    accept some additional costs and risks associated with implementing
    such a treaty. As long as this Convention's defects make it unlikely to
    reduce the chemical warfare problem in any significant way, I find it
    unacceptable to impose these very high costs and risks on our
    businesses.
        I hope that instead of forcing this treaty on the American people
    and--on thousands of companies that have little knowledge about the
    implications of this deal--the Congress will approve S. 495, a bill
    cosponsored by you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Jon Kyl and most of the
    Republican leadership. This legislation seems to me to offer a valuable
    alternative to the CWC. It does practical things, like making it a
    crime for private U.S. citizens to make poison gas, while avoiding
    totally impractical actions like the Convention's verification regime
    which will hurt our business interests--but be ineffective in catching
    nations that cheat on their international commitments.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you for your brave leadership on this treaty. I
    very much hope that my testimony--and that of others who are critical
    of the CWC--will be useful to you in preventing this defective
    Convention from binding the United States at the expense of so many
    American businesses, their stockholders and their employees.

        The Chairman. Mr. Johnson.

     STATEMENT OF RALPH V. JOHNSON, VICE PRESIDENT, ENVIRONMENTAL
         AFFAIRS, DIXIE CHEMICAL COMPANY, INC., HOUSTON, TEXAS

        Mr. Johnson. Good afternoon.
        The Chairman. Good afternoon.
        Senator Biden. Good afternoon.
        Mr. Johnson. My name is Ralph Johnson. I am vice president
    of Environmental Affairs for Dixie Chemical Company. Dixie
    Chemical is a small, privately held chemical company, with its
    general offices in Houston, Texas, and its manufacturing plant
    is located in Pasadena, Texas. Dixie Chemical engages primarily
    in the manufacture of specialty organic chemicals, and we
    employ about 200 people.
        Dixie Chemical fully supports the intent of the Chemical
    Weapons Convention treaty. It is difficult to imagine how
    anyone would not support the removal of chemical weapons as a
    threat to mankind. At Dixie, we have expertise in the
    manufacture of specialty organic chemicals and the regulations
    associated with this manufacture. We have no expertise in
    foreign policy. Whether this treaty is a viable vehicle to
    eliminate chemical weapons is a question for this committee and
    for the Senate of the United States.
        As you Senators on this committee weigh the effectiveness
    of this treaty, you will need to be aware that this treaty
    presents some potentially serious problems to Dixie Chemical.
    At Dixie Chemical, we produce no chemical weapon chemicals, nor
    any precursor chemicals. We do not produce any Schedule I, II,
    or III chemicals. However, at Dixie, we would be required to
    submit a declaration that we produce discrete organic
    chemicals.
        Discrete organic chemicals is a category of lower-concern
    chemicals, and it encompasses virtually the entire universe of
    organic chemicals. This declaration would require some
    additional time on our part, but is not unduly burdensome.
        However, once we are declared as a discrete manufacturing
    chemical organic site, we then become subject to foreign
    inspections. If we use EPA inspections as an example, these
    foreign Chemical Weapon Convention inspections could cost up to
    maybe $50,000 per site. That is not a perfect number, but that
    is not a total guess either. These inspections would be very
    costly and burdensome.
        The biggest problem with these inspections, however, is not
    their cost but rather our highly probable loss of confidential
    business information. An inspector observing one of our
    reactors would know, for the product being observed, our
    operating pressures, temperatures, catalysts, reaction time,
    ingredients, purification methods, pollution abatement methods.
    We would no longer have any confidential technology,
    methodology, or know-how relative to this product. It would be
    gone forever.
        Specialty chemical manufacture is vastly different from
    that of large volume commodity chemicals, which are produced in
    continuous dedicated single product units operated by major
    chemical companies. Operating conditions and know-how for these
    commodity chemicals such as ethylene, propylene, high density
    polyethylene, can be licensed and/or purchased from
    manufacturers and engineering companies, both domestic and
    foreign.
        These operating conditions can also be found in the
    literature. Since the technology for commodity chemicals is
    widely available, competitive success usually depends on world-
    scale plants, percent of volume utilization, location to
    markets, and cost to feed stocks. Therefore, inspections would
    not necessarily result in any probable loss of confidential
    information, nor change the commodity producer's competitive
    position.
        On the other hand, specialty organic chemicals are made in
    low volume batch operations where the expertise and process
    know-how lies solely within the realm of the individual
    producer. Production volumes typically range from a few
    thousand pounds a year to a few million pounds. Several
    specialty organic products are usually made intermittently on a
    campaign basis in nondedicated multipurpose operating units.
        The process technology for these products has been
    internally developed by the individual producer, and it is the
    core of his competitive position. His technology is not
    licensable or purchasable unless he plans to go out of business
    on that specific chemical.
        Therefore, maintaining the confidentiality of this
    expertise is of paramount importance, and is the heart of the
    continuing existence of specialty organic chemical manufacture.
        Thank you for this opportunity to comment on this vital and
    perplexing problem.
        The Chairman. We thank you very much, sir. All right. I am
    advised a little bit belatedly that the Hon. Kathleen C. Bailey
    is going to read a couple of letters before she begins her
    testimony, so hold the light.

     STATEMENT OF HON. KATHLEEN C. BAILEY, SENIOR FELLOW, LAWRENCE
                     LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY

        Ms. Bailey. Yes, sir.
        This is the testimony of Paul L. Eisman, senior vice
    president for refining of Ultramar Diamond Shamrock
    Corporation, hereinafter called UDS Corporation.

    Mr. Chairman: UDS is pleased to offer the following comments on the
    proposed Chemical Weapons Convention, or CWC treaty, which is being
    considered for ratification by this committee.
        Although UDS agrees that the production of chemical weapons should
    be halted, we think that this treaty as presently crafted provides
    little, if any, protection from the devastating impacts of chemical
    warfare.
        We find it ironic that this proposed treaty places a significantly
    greater regulatory burden on legitimate business operations that are in
    no way related to the production of chemical weapons, while not
    imposing similar requirements on countries such as Libya, Iraq, Syria,
    and North Korea, some of the very countries about which we should be
    most concerned.
        Our concerns relate to two specific issues, the increased paperwork
    and compliance costs created by the reporting requirement, and the
    significant risk of industrial espionage resulting from the presence of
    international inspection teams in our facilities.
        Increased paperwork is an enormous concern for UDS. In just the
    manufacturing portion of our business, over which I have direct
    responsibility, our production costs have increased significantly over
    the past few years to satisfy the recordkeeping and reporting
    requirements of new regulatory programs. This cost ultimately is passed
    on to our customers.
        A petroleum refinery uses many different chemicals in the
    production of gasoline and diesel. Based just on a cursory review of
    the treaty requirements, UDS would have to report the following
    chemicals at a minimum: chlorine, sulfur, hydrogen, hydrogen chloride,
    sulfuric acid, ammonia, and sodium hydroxide. Many of these chemicals
    are crucial for making gasoline and diesel to comply with existing U.S.
    and California reformulated fuel requirements.
        UDS cannot comply with the proposed reporting requirements with our
    current staff. We estimate it could cost as much as $500,000 per year
    to comply at all three of our U.S. refineries. We expect that these
    costs will be reflected in the higher prices at the pump.
        In addition, the reporting requirements will greatly reduce our
    operating flexibility because of the 5-day advance notification
    requirement for changing processes in which reportable chemical
    processes are used. Many factors often outside our control influence
    how our refinery operates from day to day.
        The advance notice requirement means that a change in our crude
    slate or in the availability of feed stocks, or even an equipment
    malfunction, could put our operations in violation of the reporting
    requirements and subject us to a $5,000 fine. Such a burden on business
    is untenable, particularly given the ubiquitous nature of the chemicals
    included on the reportable list.
        UDS is not prepared nor do we want to receive an international
    inspection team in our facilities. We understand that the Congressional
    Office of Technology Assessment estimates that these inspections could
    cost $10,000 to $50,000 per visit. It should be noted that these costs
    are in addition to the estimated yearly costs of compliance. Given the
    complexity of a modern refinery, we think that those costs are
    extremely optimistic.
        Moreover, there are no safeguards to ensure that the inspection
    teams will not gain access to unrelated or propriety information, nor
    are there any sanctions provided for inappropriate use of information
    thus gathered. All of the trade protections that we now receive under
    U.S. Law would thus be placed in jeopardy. This is an unacceptable
    security risk to place on U.S. Industry, especially when the most
    egregious users of chemical weapons will likely not even be covered by
    the treaty.
        UDS does not have a thorough understanding of the provisions of the
    CWC. However, what we do understand causes us grave concern. For the
    reasons cited above, enforcement and verification will be a nearly
    impossible task even in those countries with a strong compliance
    commitment, but if such countries as Libya, Iraq, Syria, and North
    Korea are refusing to be a party to this treaty, the likelihood of
    eliminating chemical warfare are slim indeed.
        The unacceptably high cost of business, coupled with the extremely
    low probability of success, leads us to conclude that this proposed
    treaty is bad for U.S. Economic and security interests. We urge you to
    reject this treaty unless and until the serious costs, security and
    enforcement problems it creates can be resolved.
                Sincerely,
                                        Paul L. Eisman,
                            Senior Vice President for Refining,
                                 Ultramar Diamond Shamrock Corporation.

        Ms. Bailey. the next letter I have is from Sterling
    Chemicals, to the Hon. Jesse Helms, Chairman, Senate Foreign
    Relations Committee. It is dated April 15.

    Dear Mr. Chairman: Sterling Chemicals, Incorporated strongly supports a
    worldwide ban on the production, possession, and use of chemical
    weapons, but we are concerned about the mechanics and cost impacts
    associated with the proposed CWC. We had made our concerns known to the
    Hon. Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison last August. Highlights of our
    concerns are:
        1. We have serious misgivings about the ability to protect
    confidential business information. Having a foreign inspection team
    inside our facility with almost unlimited access to process knowledge
    and data is not acceptable to Sterling.
        2. Cost impact will be significant. We project costs just to
    prepare for managing and completing an inspection to be at least
    $200,000 to $300,000. This does not include performing duplicate
    sampling and analysis as well as calibration and verification of
    process instrumentation.
        3. We cannot comply with the threat provisions within our current
    annual budget and head count. Sterling has reduced head count to
    maintain our competitiveness. We are doing more with less. We believe
    the additional datakeeping, recordkeeping and paperwork burden
    associated with this treaty cannot be managed with existing resources.
        4. The EPA and OSHA, while participating as part of the inspection
    team, may become overzealous with their enforcement philosophy and
    begin citing violations as part of their own agenda while they are
    supposed to be monitoring the inspection team.
        Sterling Chemicals is not a foreign policy expert, yet we have
    serious misgivings about the foreign policy implications of the
    proposed CWC. For example, how will chemical weapon control be enforced
    in other countries such as Mexico, Colombia, North Korea, Iran, Iraq,
    Jordan, Libya, Croatia, et cetera? Since they probably will not
    cooperate, how does this treaty produce a worldwide ban?
        How will international security and foreign policy issues related
    to protection of trade secrets be handled?
        Will the cost and implementation of the treaty put American
    industry at a competitive disadvantage with foreign industry, whose
    compliance is less regulated?
        Sterling emphasizes its desire to see a worldwide ban on chemical
    weapons. We hope this submittal provides the information you seek for
    an informed decision which is best for America.
                Sincerely,
                                               Robert W. Roten,
                               President and CEO of Sterling Chemicals.

        Ms. Bailey. And now, Mr. Chairman, may I proceed with my
    own testimony?
        The Chairman. Yes, ma'am.
        Ms. Bailey. I am Kathleen Bailey from Lawrence Livermore
    National Laboratory. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I
    am pleased to appear before you today to address the
    ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, CWC. I have
    studied this treaty for some years, first as Assistant Director
    of the Arms Control Agency and then as principal author of a
    major technical study sponsored by the U.S. Defense Nuclear
    Agency on the issue of how nations might cheat under the CWC.
        I am currently a senior fellow at my laboratory, but the
    views I express today are my own and not necessarily those of
    the University of California, my laboratory, or any other
    institution.
        Today, I will focus my remarks briefly on the impact of CWC
    challenge inspections on U.S. companies and on U.S. national
    security facilities. My bottom line is that the use of treaty
    inspections for espionage is easy, effective, and all but
    impossible to detect.
        The U.S. intelligence community officials have advocated
    ratification of the CWC, arguing that it would be ``another
    tool in the tool box'' for intelligence collection. Rarely, if
    ever, is it mentioned that the tool is every bit as effective
    in the hands of foreign intelligence services.
        One could argue that, indeed, the advantage is to foreign
    nations and to foreign companies, because it is the United
    States that has the most to lose in terms of classified
    national security information and confidential business
    information.
        Challenge inspections will rely on collection and analysis
    of samples to determine the presence or absence of key chemical
    compounds. A principal tool for analysis is the gas
    chromatograph mass spectrometer, or GC/MS for short, an
    instrument which can identify chemical compounds.
        This information can be used to determine not only what
    chemicals are in use at a particular site but also what
    processes are being employed. Such data is useful for
    determining whether a facility might be making chemical
    weapons, but it is also useful for gleaning confidential
    business information as well as classified national security
    data.
        I would like to quote now from a paper prepared by Dr. Ray
    McGuire, a chemist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,
    on the results of mock inspections conducted by the U.S.
    Government. In my written testimony I quote from this at
    length, and would like to submit it for the record.
        But briefly let me say that a mock inspection was held at a
    propellant production facility. Samples were taken outside of
    that facility and later analyzed using a variety of means, and
    the results did reveal classified data not only about the
    composition of the pro-
    pellant, such as oxidizers, binders, and burn rate modifiers,
    but also process information.
        Furthermore, a mock inspection was conducted at two
    industrial chemical plants using GC/MS technology. Batch
    production of a certain chemical could be detected at least 3
    weeks after the production ended. Furthermore, other
    confidential business information was revealed. While this
    information may not be considered to be of much commercial
    value, it could be in cases where a foreign national is
    attempting to analyze and obtain confidential business
    information.
        I will submit my written statement for the record. It
    contains additional information on the Fourth Amendment issue,
    but I will close now given my time is short.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Bailey follows:]

                    Prepared Statement of Kathleen C. Bailey

    Introduction
        Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I am very pleased to appear
    before you today to address the issue of ratifying the Chemical Weapons
    Convention (CWC). I have studied this treaty for some years, first as
    Assistant Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and then
    as principal author of a major technical study sponsored by the U.S.
    Defense Nuclear Agency on the means by which nations might cheat under
    the CWC. I am currently a Senior Fellow at Lawrence Livermore National
    Laboratory, but the views I express today are my own and not
    necessarily those of the University of California or any other
    institution.
        Today, I will focus my remarks on the impact of CWC challenge
    inspections on U.S. companies and on U.S. national security facilities.
    My bottom line is that use of treaty inspections for espionage is easy,
    effective, and all-but-impossible to detect.
    The Threat of Espionage
        US intelligence community officials have advocated ratification of
    the CWC, arguing that it will be ``another tool in the tool box'' for
    intelligence collection. Rarely, if ever, is it mentioned that the tool
    is every bit as effective in the hands of foreign intelligence
    services. One could argue that indeed the advantage is to foreign
    nations and companies, because it is the United States that has the
    most to lose in terms of classified national security information and
    confidential business information.
        CWC challenge inspections will rely on collection and analysis of
    samples to determine the presence or absence of key chemical compounds.
    A principal tool for analysis is the gas chromatograph/mass
    spectrometer (GC/MS) an instrument which can identify chemical
    compounds. This information can be used to determine not only what
    chemicals are in use at a particular site, but also what processes are
    employed. Such data is useful for determining whether a facility might
    be making chemical weapons agents, but it is also useful for gleaning
    confidential business information as well as classified national
    security information. I would like to quote from a paper prepared by
    Dr. Ray McGuire of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory on the
    results of mock inspections conducted by the U.S. Government:

              In one of the early experiments, soil and water samples were
            collected in the near vicinity (a few feet to a few meters) of
            rocket propellant production buildings. No samples were
            collected from the inside of the buildings. These samples were
            analyzed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory for both
            organic and inorganic constituents.
              * * * While it was not possible to reproduce exact
            formulations from the results of this work, a significant and,
            in some cases, alarming amount of information could be
            extracted. The nature of the facilities--rocket propellant
            production--was easily determined. The general type of
            propellant being produced, strategic vs. tactical, could be
            defined in most instances. Certain key ingredients of some
            classified formulations, such as oxidizers, energetic binders
            and burn rate modifiers, were determinable.
              In three additional collections (involving wipe samples from
            building interiors and machinery in one case, and soil and
            waste water samples from just outside buildings in the others),
            the analytical techniques cited above were used with the
            addition of gamma ray spectroscopy for determining radioactive
            materials. In both these instances, it was possible to
            determine the materials being processed in the facilities
            examined and some, but not all, details of the processes
            themselves. In all of these cases, major portions of the
            information are classified for security reasons.
              In all of the cases cited above, classified data were
            disclosed. It was necessary in all cases to combine a series of
            analytical methods in order to obtain the sensitive results.
            Many of the techniques used would not be germane to CWC
            inspections.
              However, it was not necessary to employ a variety of
            sophisticated analytical tools to acquire sensitive information
            in exercises carried out at two industrial chemical plants. In
            one case, the batch production of a certain chemical could be
            detected at least three weeks after the production ended.
            While this information might not be considered to be of much
            commercial value, the results of the second ``inspection''
            were. In this instance, not only was the product of the
            operation determined, but certain process details such as
            intermediates, reducing agents, were also detectable. This
            information was gathered from soil and water samples collected
            exterior to the buildings and used on GC/MS for analysis.
            [emphases added]

        CWC negotiators were aware that sample analysis could reveal
    sensitive information and sought to limit the potential for abuse by
    limiting the ``library'' of compounds for which inspections could look,
    and by assuring that samples would not be taken off-site unless it were
    necessary to resolve questions that on-site analysis could not answer.
    Despite these precautions, it is quite easy to acquire samples for
    later analysis. One means is analysis of residue remaining in the GC/MS
    equipment. Research conducted at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory proved
    that even thorough decontamination does not remove all residue. To
    prevent subsequent analysis off-site of that residue, the company or
    facility concerned would have to purchase and retain all of the GC/MS
    components that were exposed to the sample. This would cost
    approximately $15,000 per inspection.
        A more likely scenario for espionage would be clandestine sampling.
    Sample collection could be as simple as taking swipes with a
    ``handkerchief'' or collecting air in a vial disguised, for example, as
    a ballpoint pen. It would be all-but-impossible to detect, let alone
    halt, such secret sampling.
        Although I have emphasized sampling and analysis, it is also
    possible to use inspections for espionage in other ways. A
    knowledgeable inspector can learn much by observing the way a facility
    is configured, how operations are performed, temperatures, and other
    features. Equally important may be the opportunity to ask questions of
    facility employees and to review records and data. The fact that
    inspectors will have the opportunity to take pictures adds to the risk
    that secrets will be compromised.
        It is worth noting that some treaty proponents dismiss these
    concerns, saying that if there were a genuine risk, companies and
    facilities with something to lose would have objected. There are ready
    answers why they have not. First, there is ample evidence that most
    companies which will be directly affected have either not heard of the
    treaty, or not focused on it. Second, there is a pervasive belief that
    inspections--even challenge inspections--will apply only to companies
    that manufacture chemicals. When I told a Bay Area biotechnology firm
    that it could be challenge inspected, the attorney for the firm
    replied, ``No one would want to inspect us. We don't manufacture
    chemicals.'' When I explained that challenge inspection could be of any
    site, regardless of its activity, the attorney replied, ``The
    Constitution protects us against things like that.''
    The Fourth Amendment Issue
        The company representative whom I quote is probably right. The
    fourth amendment guarantees against warrantless searches and seizures
    and requires that probable cause be demonstrated prior to issuance of a
    criminal warrant. A private citizen or U.S. company may chose to
    decline a request for a CWC challenge inspection, thus requiring a
    criminal warrant for the inspection to proceed. Probable cause must be
    demonstrated before proper authorities can issue a criminal warrant. In
    the case of CWC inspections, this raises a problem because the country
    making a challenge inspection request is not required to provide
    evidence that would fit the requirements for probable cause--it may
    simply assert wrongdoing without providing substantiation. The
    requesting country does not have to identify the name or exact location
    of the company to be inspected until 12 hours before international
    inspectors are due to arrive at the port of entry. Thus, without the
    proper information to demonstrate probable cause to a U.S. judicial
    official, it will be extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, to
    gain a timely criminal warrant for a challenge inspection.
        A related question is that it is unclear whether a criminal warrant
    may be administered in effect by foreign nationals. Can OPCW officials
    substitute for U.S. officials in a search?
        If indeed challenge inspections can be rejected under the U.S.
    Constitution, there will be negative repercussions not only for the
    CWC, but for the future of arms control. The CWC verification regime,
    which will cost the taxpayers greatly, will not be implemented in any
    meaningful way. More importantly, such a scenario would surely cloud
    the future of arms control. Other nations would follow the example of
    the United States in rejecting challenge inspections as well as any
    treaties which are based on the CWC model.
    The Issue of Preparing National Security Facilities
        In closing, I would like to raise an issue to the Committee which I
    feel is important, but which has not been considered as yet--the need
    to assess the costs of preparing U.S. national security facilities for
    CWC challenge inspections. This preparation must take place well before
    any potential inspections, and requires a substantial budget.
        Last year, preparation of Savannah River Plant for a Russian visit
    cost approximately $400,000. Estimates of cost requirements to prepare
    a facility within Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory for a CWC
    inspection are $250,000. The Department of Defense facilities are
    expected to require between $200,000-$500,000 each. Of course, some of
    these costs are non-recurring, but some will arise any time an
    inspection is to occur.
        Mr. Chairman, if there is confidential or classified data that can
    be lost through use of GC/MS equipment, from observation, or from
    interviews, preparation may be futile in the event that a determined
    spy poses as an inspector. However, to minimize losses and to protect
    the data that is protectable, U.S. national security facilities must be
    prepared. Preparation will require substantial effort and resources.
        Thank you.

        The Chairman. Thank you, ma'am. I know the answer to the
    question, but I want it for the record. Have you served in any
    administration under any President?
        Ms. Bailey. Yes, sir. I served as Assistant Director for
    the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency under President Reagan.
        The Chairman. Do you know whether President Reagan ever
    endorsed a treaty of this sort?
        Ms. Bailey. Not to my knowledge and, sir, I would add that
    this treaty as it ultimately ended up is not at all as Reagan
    officials, at least as far as I knew, envisioned it.
        The Chairman. Well, I have had several people prominent in
    the Reagan administration say that they never saw it in this
    form. They never approved it, and they are confident that
    Ronald Reagan himself never approved a treaty like this. Mr.
    Merrifield.

    STATEMENT OF HON. BRUCE MERRIFIELD, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY
                              OF COMMERCE

        Dr. Merrifield. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My doctorate is in
    physical organic chemistry, and I have been in the chemical
    industry most of my life, starting with Monsanto and ending up
    as vice president of Continental Group, the Continental Can
    Company.
        I came to the Commerce Department to head up the technology
    function there during the Reagan administration, and I was also
    Under Secretary of Economic Affairs for a time. Since then I
    have had an endowed chair at the Wharton Business School, as
    professor of entrepreneurial management; but I have also
    started a company, a high tech company, which is a major
    breakthrough in electrical energy storage, and it has a lot of
    process technology which is highly proprietary.
        But my mission at Commerce, of course, was to try to renew
    the industrial competitiveness of the United States, since we
    were not competitive at that time. The Japanese were putting
    together vertically integrated consortia, and we could not even
    talk to each other. They were capturing all of the consumer
    electronics and mass memory business in semiconductors and so
    forth.
        So a critical problem then was, first, to get the antitrust
    laws changed, those 100-year-old laws. President Reagan, when I
    first met him said, Bruce, why don't you change the antitrust
    laws.
        Well, it took about 4 years. Subsequently, I started
    hundreds of consortia while I was at Commerce, including
    SEMATECH and a lot of others. My office also put through the
    tech transfer acts of 1984 and 1986, which cut the Government
    out of owning its technology and made billions of dollars
    available of R&D to the private sector.
        The Baldrige Award, the technology medal, the process
    patent technology which strengthens our process patents were
    enacted. Process technology was very critical at that time,
    because anybody operating outside this country could operate
    under our process patents and then export to the United States.
    We got that changed. The patent extension act was another
    success. We did a lot of good things, increasing at least the
    environment for industrial competitiveness here; and as a
    result we are now the most competitive country in the world,
    and that is very important.
        This law would mitigate that capability, that competency,
    very significantly. Through industrial espionage somewhere
    between $25 billion and $100 billion is lost each year. It is
    important now, in that this CWC law would open the floodgates
    of espionage to our proprietary technology, which is the heart
    of our competitiveness.
        Technology is the engine of competitiveness, and it is
    important that we maintain it. We have an incredible thing
    going here in this country. We currently spend about $25
    billion a year in basic research, much more than any other
    country in the world can spend or has the capability to spend
    or match in any reasonable time. As a result, we get most of
    the Nobel prizes. We make most of the seminal discoveries.
        It is that basic technology that is the heart of our
    competitive advantage in this country, and it is terribly
    important that we protect that. It is awfully important that we
    not allow it to slip away with these challenge investigations
    that give you 12 hours' notice, with people showing up at your
    door without you even knowing they are going to be there.
        Basically this all started with Vanover Bush back in 1945.
    We made thousands of liberty ships and advanced aircraft and
    the Norton bomb site and radar, and we detonated the atomic
    bomb, which absolutely stunned the scientific community. As a
    result, Vanover Bush captured the euphoria of the moment in a
    report to the President calling research the endless frontier.
        As a result of that, we started the National Science
    Foundation. Since then, we have pumped about $1 trillion into
    our academic community, our universities and our government
    labs. That is the capability that is unique in this country. It
    is our competitive advantage. We need to protect it. Those are
    our crown jewels, and it is awfully important that we not let
    that slip away.
        Competitive advantage, industrial competitiveness, is the
    primary concern of America, and this convention certainly is
    not going to help that at all. It is going to mitigate that
    capability.
        Let us not forget for a minute that we have this incredible
    capability. We have 15 million companies in this country that
    can translate new discoveries into useful things. No other
    nation has that. We have this entrepreneurial culture which has
    permission to try and fail and try again until we succeed
    without fear of personal loss or penalty.
        We have the most flexible capital development capability.
    We have the world's largest market. We have one common
    language. We have everything in spades. We need to protect and
    nurture it, and it is important that we not allow it to be
    mitigated by some naive, well-intentioned law such as this one.
        Thank you.
        The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much. Has
    anybody called you that lately?
        Dr. Merrifield. I'm sorry?
        The Chairman. I said, ``Mr. Secretary, thank you very
    much.'' Has anybody called you ``Mr. Secretary'' lately?
        Dr. Merrifield. Not lately.
        The Chairman. Sir, please pronounce your name for me
    correctly.
        Mr. Reinsch. It's ``Reinsch.''
        The Chairman. Thank you. You are recognized, sir. Thank you
    for coming.

       STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM A. REINSCH, UNDER SECRETARY OF
                   COMMERCE FOR EXPORT ADMINISTRATION

        Mr. Reinsch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to
    be here to talk a little bit about the Commerce Department's
    prospective role in the implementation of this convention if it
    is ratified.
        We expect to have a key role for industry liaison, and I
    want to assure you from the beginning that, taking into account
    the need for full and effective implementation of the
    convention's verification regime, we are committed to
    minimizing costs to the industry and to maximizing the
    protections of company confidential information in the two
    major areas which will affect the U.S. commercial sector, which
    are data declarations and inspections. I would like to speak
    briefly about each of those, if I may.
        Commerce has developed user friendly draft data declaration
    forms and instructions to complete them. No information is
    requested that is not specifically required by the CWC.
        These materials have been field tested and refined based on
    comments from industry, including the Chemical Manufacturers
    Association. We have also provided copies of these forms to the
    committee's staff. I am pleased to note that we have
    consistently received positive feedback from those who have
    reviewed them.
        The administration estimates that about 2,000 plant sites
    will be required to file data declarations. Of those 2,000, we
    estimate that over 90 percent belong to a category called
    unscheduled discreet organic chemicals, or DOC's, as the
    gentleman from Dixie Chemical referred to them.
        The DOC data declaration is a very simple form that asks
    the company to specify the location of the plant site and its
    general range of production--e.g., this plant site produced
    over 10,000 metric tons of DOC's last year, or whatever it was.
        Mr. Chairman, I brought one along to demonstrate for you
    how simple I think it is. It consists of three pages. Page one
    is essentially name, address, type of declaration, with a
    couple of boxes to check. Page two is location of the facility
    and point of contact there, with a box or two to check. Page
    three, which is about a half page, consists essentially of
    checking the box as to what your level of production is. This
    is not a complicated form. It is not a complicated process, and
    it is not a complicated set of instructions.
        Now, to ensure that the treaty remains focused on the most
    relevant industries, certain other industries have been
    exempted from the CWC data declaration process. For example,
    these exemptions apply to plant sites that produce explosives
    exclusively, produce hydrocarbons exclusively, refine sulfur
    containing crude oil, produce oligimers and polymers, such as
    plastics and synthetic fibers, and produce unscheduled
    chemicals via a biological or a biomediated process, such as
    beer and wine, which I know will be of great comfort to many
    people.
        About 10 percent of the data declarations focus on the
    CWC's scheduled chemicals. These declarations are more
    involved, but still do not constitute a heavy and complicated
    reporting burden for the 140 or so firms that will be asked to
    comply. Most of these are larger companies and members of CMA,
    who are likely to have accumulated much of the needed
    information for other purposes.
        In any event, I want to assure you that Commerce will
    provide substantial assistance to industry in the data
    declaration process if it turns out to be needed. We will help
    firms determine if they have a reporting requirement. We will
    develop a commodity classification program similar to the one
    we have for export licensing.
        If a company does not know if its chemicals are covered, it
    can ask us for a determination. If firms do have a reporting
    requirement, our technical staff will assist them in filing
    their declarations.
        We will also seek to put in place a system that enables
    firms to complete and file these forms electronically. This is
    a system that we already have in place for our export licenses.
        Firms also want this data to be fully protected from
    unauthorized disclosure. We fully understand that concern and
    have substantial experience through our export licensing system
    in protecting company confidential information as part of our
    current responsibilities. Our CWC information management system
    will be in a secure location and will be only accessible to and
    operated by staff with appropriate clearances.
        Now with respect to inspections, we will be charged with
    managing the CWC process inspections for U.S. commercial
    facilities. That applies to both routine and challenge
    inspections. We will identify firms that are likely to be
    subject to routine inspection and work with them to develop
    draft facility agreements that will protect company
    confidential information.
        These agreements will set forth the site specific ground
    rules for the conduct of inspections. We estimate that about 40
    U.S. com-
    mercial plant sites each year will be subject to routine
    inspections. Our objective is to develop draft facility
    agreements before these inspections take place in order to give
    firms an opportunity to identify their confidential information
    and processes.
        In this regard, we will work with firms to determine what
    constitutes company confidential information and will protect
    U.S. firms against any unwarranted request by international
    inspectors.
        We anticipate very few challenge inspections. In the event
    there is one of a non-defense commercial facility, we would
    have the lead role managing access to ensure that the
    international inspectors obtain, by the least intrusive means
    possible, only the information and data that are relevant to
    specified noncompliance concerns. Firms would be under no
    obligations to answer questions unrelated to a possible
    violation of the CWC.
        As with routine inspections, we will work closely with
    firms to determine what constitutes company confidential
    information, and we will protect firms against unwarranted
    requests that may be made by international inspectors.
        Mr. Chairman, I can stop now or I can keep going for about
    1\1/2\ more minutes, whatever you prefer.
        Senator Biden. I'm not the chairman but I would hope he
    would let you go for 1\1/2\ minutes since Ms. Bailey got to
    read 2 letters.
        Senator Hagel (presiding): I guess I am the only Republican
    here. It's great the way it works around here.
        Senator Biden. Let's vote.
        Senator Hagel. I'm the Chairman. Do you want to get it over
    with, Joe?
        Senator Biden. Yes.
        Senator Hagel. Please continue.
        Mr. Reinsch. I will talk fast, Senator. Thank you.
        Senator Hagel. Take your time.
        Mr. Reinsch. Let me make a brief comment about the
    Australia Group and about export controls, since that is part
    of my responsibility.
        Some critics have expressed concern that the treaty will
    undermine the existing chemical nonproliferation export
    controls that have been developed by the Australia Group. I
    want to assure you that that is not the case.
        Article I of the CWC commits States Parties to refrain from
    assisting any chemical weapon program in any way. The Australia
    Group's regime of export controls is end user/end use driven
    and is fully consistent with our obligations under Article I.
    It is not a regime of trade restrictions aimed at impeding any
    country's economic development. Rather, the Australia Group's
    controls focus exclusively on restricting transfers to end
    users of concern.
        Accordingly, we will continue to strongly support the
    Australia Group after the CWC enters into force. We will not be
    required by the CWC to liberalize nonproliferation export
    controls to rogue nations, such as Iran and Libya, even if they
    ratify the CWC.
        However, when considering export controls, it is important
    to note that the CWC mandates trade restrictions that affect
    countries who do not ratify. Senator Kerry made this point in
    his dialog with Mr. Forbes.
        The real concern regarding export controls is that our
    allies and friends who have ratified the CWC will be required
    to impose controls on us that will have an adverse impact on
    U.S. industry if we do not ratify. Further, if we fail to join
    the CWC as part of the responsible family of nations, our
    overall leadership role within the nonproliferation community
    will be severely eroded and our ability to maintain a strong
    presence within the Australia Group will be lost.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think I will stop now and ask
    you to put the full statement in the record.
        Senator Hagel. Without objection, yes.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Reinsch follows:]

                    Prepared Statement of William A. Reinsch

        Good Morning Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I am
    pleased to be here today to discuss the Commerce Department's
    prospective role in the implementation of the Chemical Weapons
    Convention (CWC). The Bureau of Export Administration (BXA) is expected
    to have a key role for industry liaison, and I am here to assure you,
    that taking into account the need for full and effective implementation
    of the convention's verification regime, we are committed to minimizing
    costs to industry and to maximizing protections of company confidential
    information in the two major areas that will affect the U.S. commercial
    sector--data declarations and inspections.
    Data Declarations
        Commerce has developed user-friendly draft data declaration forms
    and instructions to complete them. No information is requested that is
    not specifically required by the CWC. These materials have been field
    tested and refined based on comments from industry, including the
    Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA). Copies of these forms have
    also been provided to the committee's staff. I am pleased to note that
    we have consistently received positive feedback from those who have
    reviewed the forms and their instructions.
        The administration estimates that about 2,000 plant sites will be
    required to file data declarations. Of these 2,000, we estimate that
    over 90% belong to a category called ``Unscheduled Discrete Organic
    Chemicals'' (DOCs). The DOC data declaration is a very simple form that
    asks the company to specify the location of the plant site and its
    general range of production (e.g., this plant site produced over 10,000
    metric tons of DOCs last year). No specific chemical identification,
    product mix or other substantive information is requested, and the
    declaration can therefore be completed quickly and without revealing
    sensitive data. I want to stress that the DOC declaration does not ask
    for any information on acquisition, processing, imports, or exports.
        To ensure that the treaty remains focused on the most relevant
    industries, certain other industries have been exempted from the CWC
    data declaration process. For example, these exemptions apply to plant
    sites that produce explosives exclusively, produce hydrocarbons
    exclusively, refine sulphur-containing crude oil, produce oligimers (o
    lig i mers) and polymers (such as plastics and synthetic fibers) and
    produce unscheduled chemicals via a biological or bio-mediated process
    (such as beer and wine).
        About 10% of the data declarations focus on the CWC's scheduled
    chemicals. These declarations are more involved but still do not
    constitute a heavy and complicated reporting burden for the 140 or so
    firms that will be asked to comply. Most of these are larger companies
    and members of CMA who are likely to have accumulated much of the
    needed information for other purposes.
        In any event, I want to assure you that Commerce will provide
    substantial assistance to industry in the data declaration process if
    it turns out to be needed. We will help firms determine if they have a
    reporting requirement. We will develop a commodity classification
    program similar to the one we have for export licensing. If a company
    doesn't know if its chemicals are covered by the CWC, it can ask
    Commerce for a determination. If firms do have a reporting requirement,
    Commerce technical staff will assist them in filing their declarations.
    In short, we do not believe that firms will be required to hire outside
    consultants to complete the CWC forms. We will also seek to put in
    place a system that enables firms to complete and file data
    declarations electronically.
        Firms also want this data to be fully protected from unauthorized
    disclosure. We fully understand that concern and have substantial
    experience in protecting company confidential information as part of
    our current export licensing responsibilities. I want to assure you
    that our CWC Information Management System will be in a secure location
    and will be only accessible to and operated by staff with appropriate
    clearances. I also want to stress that the administration's draft CWC
    implementing legislation provides strong protections for company
    confidential information, and I hope this legislation will be taken up
    as soon as possible after the Senate's vote on ratification.
    Inspections
        The Commerce Department will be charged with managing the CWC
    inspection process of U.S. commercial facilities. There will be two
    types of inspections--routine and challenge.
        Routine inspections are conducted to confirm the validity of data
    declarations and the absence of Schedule I chemicals. They are not
    based on any suspicion or allegation of non-compliance with the CWC.
    Inspectors will not be permitted unrestricted access to U.S. facilities
    under this regime, because the inspection may not exceed the limited
    purpose for which it is authorized. I can assure you that no ``fishing
    expeditions'' will be permitted as part of the CWC inspection process,
    because the Commerce Department will not permit it to happen.
        Commerce will identify firms that are likely to be subject to
    routine inspection and work with them to develop draft ``Facility
    Agreements'' that will protect company confidential information. These
    Facility Agreements, which must be concluded between the U.S. and the
    Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, will set forth
    the site-specific ground rules for the conduct of inspections. We
    estimate that about 40 U.S. commercial plant sites each year will be
    subject to routine inspections. Commerce's objective is to develop
    draft Facility Agreements before inspections take place in order to
    give firms an opportunity to identify their confidential information
    and processes. In this regard, we will work with firms to determine
    what constitutes company confidential information and will protect U.S.
    firms against any unwarranted requests by international inspectors.
    Under the implementing legislation, firms will participate in the
    preparations for the negotiation of Facility Agreements and the right
    to be present when the negotiations take place. This is yet another
    reason why Congress should take up the implementing legislation as soon
    as possible after passage of the Resolution of Ratification.
        Challenge inspections are conducted based on an allegation of
    noncompliance. These inspections may only be requested by a State Party
    to the CWC and can be directed at declared and undeclared facilities.
    We anticipate few challenge inspections. In the event that there is a
    challenge inspection of a non-defense U.S. commercial facility,
    Commerce would have the lead role ``managing access'' to ensure that
    the international inspectors obtain by the least intrusive means
    possible only the information and data that are relevant to the
    specified noncompliance concerns. Firms would be under no obligation to
    answer questions unrelated to a possible violation of the Chemical
    Weapons Convention.
        As with routine inspections, Commerce will work closely with firms
    to determine what constitutes company confidential information and will
    protect U.S. firms against any unwarranted requests that may be made by
    international inspectors. Since Commerce will be responsible for
    ``managing access,'' we will abide no administrative harassment of U.S.
    companies or ask them to reply to any questions not directly related to
    CWC compliance.
        Mr. Chairman, I also want to stress that the CWC gives us the right
    to screen the list of inspectors before any foreign national is
    permitted to conduct verification activities on our soil. We certainly
    intend to exercise our right to screen that list and to disapprove any
    individuals we find unsuitable.
        With regard to the overall CWC inspection process, I understand
    there have been concerns raised about Constitutional protections
    regarding unreasonable search and seizure. No treaty that is
    inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution has U.S. legal effect, and the
    CWC involves no such inconsistency. We anticipate that most firms will
    permit CWC inspections on a voluntary basis, but in cases where access
    is not granted voluntarily, the U.S. Government would always obtain a
    search warrant before proceeding.
    Australia Group and Export Controls
        Mr. Chairman, some critics have expressed concern that the treaty
    will undermine the existing chemical non-proliferation export controls
    that have been developed by the ``Australia Group.'' As head of the
    agency that administers dual-use export controls, I want to assure you
    that this is not the case. Article I of the CWC commits States Parties
    to refrain from assisting any chemical weapon program in any way. The
    Australia Group's regime of export controls is end-user/end-use driven
    and is fully consistent with our obligations under Article I of the
    CWC. It is not a regime of trade restrictions aimed at impeding any
    country's economic development. Rather, the Australia Group's controls
    focus exclusively on restricting transfers to end-users of concern.
    Accordingly, we will continue to strongly support the Australia Group
    after the CWC enters into force, and we will not be required by the CWC
    to liberalize non-proliferation export controls to rogue nations such
    as Iran and Libya--even if they ratify the CWC.
        However, when considering export controls, it is important to note
    that the CWC mandates trade restrictions that affect countries who do
    not ratify. Therefore, the real concern regarding export controls is
    that our allies and friends who have ratified the CWC will be required
    to impose controls on us that will have an adverse impact on U.S.
    industry if we do not ratify. Further, if we fail to join the CWC as
    part of the responsible family of nations, our overall leadership role
    within the nonproliferation community will be severely eroded and our
    ability to maintain a strong presence within the Australia Group will
    be lost.
    Conclusion
        Mr. Chairman, the time has come for us to join the growing
    consensus to ratify the treaty that we have promoted for so many years
    under both Republican and Democratic administrations. I believe that we
    are far better off with the CWC than without it. The United States has
    always been the world leader in fighting the proliferation of weapons
    of mass destruction and we must not shrink from that challenge at this
    critical juncture. Further, we must not abandon the American chemical
    industry who worked with us for so many years to develop this treaty
    and who would be disadvantaged in world markets if we fail to act
    responsibly. In short, the CWC will not impose unreasonable burdens on
    U.S. industry, but failure to ratify the CWC will certainly damage our
    overall international economic and non-proliferation interests.

        Senator Hagel. Mr. Webber, you are no stranger around here.
    It is good to have you.

          STATEMENT OF FREDERICK WEBBER, PRESIDENT, CHEMICAL
              MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.

        Mr. Webber. Thank you, Senator. First of all, I want to
    reassure you that you are not the only Republican in the room.
        Second, being an old Marine, I am used to being
    outnumbered, and I see that we are very much outnumbered here
    today. But I sort of like those odds.
        My name is Fred Webber, and I am president of the Chemical
    Manufacturers Association. I would like to enter into the
    record a letter that my board signed yesterday. We had our
    spring board meeting. It is a letter endorsing the Chemical
    Weapons Convention. There are 50 men on my board representing
    America's chemical companies of all sizes. And, by the way, a
    third of our membership, which is almost 200 chemical
    companies, is made up of companies with sales less of less than
    $100 million. So, indeed, we consider those to be small
    businesses.
        Senator Hagel. Without objection.
        [The information referred to follows:]

                                                        April 15, 1997.
    Hon. Trent Lott,
    Senate Majority Leader,
    United States Senate, Washington, DC 20510.
        Dear Senator Lott: We, the undersigned members of the Chemical
    Manufacturers Association's Board of Directors, are writing to ask you
    to support the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
        We believe the Convention is a fair and effective international
    response to the international threat of chemical weapons proliferation.
    Ratifying the CWC is in the national interest.
        The CWC is a natural extension of existing U.S. policy. In 1985,
    Congress voted to end production of chemical weapons by the military
    and to begin destroying existing stockpiles.
        For years, the United States has imposed the world's strongest
    controls on exports of weapons-making ingredients. Our nation is the
    standard bearer in preventing the spread of chemical weapons.
        The CWC requires other nations to do what the United States is
    already doing. That's why President Reagan proposed the treaty to the
    United Nations in 1984. It's why President Bush signed the treaty in
    Paris in 1993. And it's why President Clinton is asking the Senate to
    ratify it.
        The chemical industry has thoroughly examined the CWC. We have
    tested the treaty's record-keeping and inspection provisions. And we
    have concluded that the benefits of the CWC far outweigh the costs.
        Ratifying the CWC is the right thing to do. We urge you to vote for
    the Convention.
                Sincerely,
    Frederick L. Webber, President & CEO, Chemical Manufacturers
            Association
    J. Lawrence Wilson, Chairman & CEO, Rohm and Haas Company; Chairman,
            Board of Directors, Chemical Manufacturers Association
    John E. Akitt, Executive Vice President, Exxon Chemical Company
    Phillip D. Ashkettle, President and CEO, Reichhold Chemicals, Inc.
    Bernard Azoulay, President and CEO, Elf Atochem North America
    William G. Bares, Chairman and CEO, The Lubrizol Corporation
    Jerald A. Blumberg, Executive Vice President, DuPont; Chairman, DuPont
            Europe
    Michael R. Boyce, CEO & President, Harris Chemical Group
    Vincent A. Calarco, Chairman, President & CEO, Crompton & Knowles
            Corporation
    William R. Cook, Chairman, President and CEO, BetzDearborn Inc.
    Albert J. Costello, Chairman, President & CEO, W.R. Grace & Co.
    Davis J. D'Antoni, President, Ashland Chemical Company
    John R. Danzeisen, Chairman, ICI Americas Inc.
    Earnest W. Deavenport, Jr., Chairman of the Board and CEO, Eastman
            Chemical Company
    R. Keith Elliott, Chairman, President & CEO, Hercules Incorporated
    Darryl D. Fry, Chairman, President and CEO, Cytec Industries Inc
    Michael C. Harnetty, Division Vice President, 3M
    Richard A. Hazleton, Chairman & CEO, Dow Corning Corporation
    Alan R. Hirsig, President & CEO, ARCO Chemical Company
    Gerald L. Hoerig, President, Syntex Chemicals, Inc.
    Jack L. Howe, Jr., President, Phillips Chemical Company
    Jon M. Huntsman, Jr., Vice Chairman, Huntsman Corporation
    Donald M. James, President & CEO, Vulcan Materials Company
    Dale R. Laurance, President and Sr. Operating Officer, Occidental
            Petroleum Corporation
    Raymond W. LeBoeuf, President & CEO, PPG Industries, Inc.
    James A. Mack, President & CEO, Cambrex Corporation
    Hans C. Noetzli, President & CEO, Lonza, Inc.
    Robert G. Potter, Executive Vice President Monsanto Company
    Arthur R. Sigel, President & CEO, Velsicol Chemical Corporation
    Enrique J. Sosa, Executive Vice President, Chemicals Sector, Amoco
            Corporation
    William Stavropoulos, President & CEO, The Dow Chemical Corporation
    F. Quinn Stepan, Chairman & President, Stepan Company
    S. Jay Stewart, Chairman and CEO, Morton International, Inc.
    Robert O. Swanson, Executive Vice President, Mobil Corporation
    Rudy van der Meer, Member, Board of Management, Akzo Nobel nv
    Jeroen van der Veer, President & CEO, Shell Chemical Company
    George A. Vincent, Chairman, President & CEO, The C.P. Hall Company
    J. Virgil Waggoner, President & CEO, Sterling Chemicals, Inc.
    H.A. Wagner, Chairman & CEO, Air Products & Chemicals, Inc.
    Helge H. Wehmeier, President & CEO, Bayer Corporation
    Ronald H. Yocum, President & CEO, Millennium Petrochemical Company

        Mr. Webber. I might also add, Mr. Chairman, that Virgil
    Wagner, Vice Chairman of Sterling Chemical Company and a member
    of our board signed that letter yesterday afternoon at 11:00--
    excuse me, yesterday morning--and that, second, Mr. Robert
    Potter, Chairman and President of the new Monsanto Company--
    your old company, sir--firmly endorsed that letter. Monsanto
    has always been on record supporting the Chemical Weapons
    Convention. So I was rather surprised today to hear about that
    letter and the concern.
        The industry I represent is America's largest export
    industry. We sell over $365 billion worth of chemicals. We
    export over $60 billion of those. We employ about 1.1 million
    people in what I would call well-paying jobs.
        As you know, we have been a firm and frequent advocate of
    this convention. We have appeared before this committee on four
    separate occasions. We have the major voice of the regulated
    business community on the convention. We have 20 years of
    experience working closely with Republican and Democratic
    administrations. We know how this treaty indeed affects our
    commercial interests.
        Our long-standing support for the convention is rooted in
    the belief that the treaty is the right thing to do, and it is
    the right way to control the spread of chemical weapons.
        The chemical industry does not produce chemical weapons. We
    do, however, make products used in medicine, crop protection,
    and fire prevention, which can be converted into weapons
    agents. The industry has a special responsibility to prevent
    illegal diversions of our products. We take that responsibility
    very, very seriously.
        That is why, frankly, I am outraged by the remarks made
    before this committee about the U.S. Chemical industry, remarks
    that strongly suggest that our support for the Chemical Weapons
    Convention is motivated by a desire to supply dangerous
    chemicals for rogue nations. I am very disappointed in Mr.
    Forbes' comments about blood money. I thought they were very,
    very unfortunate.
        Remarks that also suggest that we are trying to gut the
    U.S. export control regime and dismantle multilateral control
    organizations, like the Australia Group, frankly, again, deeply
    offend us. The chemical industry is proud of its record of
    support for U.S. antiproliferation efforts. We have long
    supported this Nation's tough export control laws, the toughest
    export control laws in the world; as they are necessary
    measures to assure that commercial interests do not contribute
    to the spread of chemical weapons.
        No one has done more than the U.S. chemical industry to
    make the Export Administration Act an effective control system.
    No one has done more to build and support multilateral control
    organizations like the Australia Group. The charges made here
    last week against our industry are shameful and, frankly, they
    bring dishonor and discredit to those who make them.
        We support the convention because it is a logical extension
    of U.S. policy. It will make our Nation's antiproliferation
    objectives more reachable by applying our high standards to
    other nations.
        The treaty simply forces other nations to do what we are
    already doing--destroying our chemical weapons stocks. We have
    been committed to the success of the CWC for over 20 years.
    Indeed, one of the great leaders was a man by the name of Will
    Carpenter, again of Monsanto Corporation. We have been a true
    partner of the U.S. Government in negotiating this treaty.
        We began with many of the same concerns about the treaty
    that have been voiced here. We have worked hard to protect U.S.
    industrial interests, especially proprietary information. We
    helped to de-
    velop the protocols guiding the treaty's inspection and
    recordkeeping requirements, and we put those protocols to live
    fire tests over and over again.
        Protecting confidential business information was our
    industry's top priority. We think we achieved our goal in the
    treaty text and the inspection procedures developed to
    implement the treaty. In addition, we field tested the
    declaration formats and concluded that the requirements are
    reasonable and manageable.
        Some claim that the CWC will impose a massive regulatory
    burden on companies. That is not true.
        I have about 1 minute to go, sir, if I may.
        Senator Hagel. Mr. Webber, go right ahead. Take your time.
        Mr. Webber. Thank you.
        The treaty was specifically drawn to focus attention on a
    relatively narrow segment of the chemical industry. Only some
    200 facilities have both reporting and inspection obligations
    under the treaty. Most of these are member companies of CMA.
        Our involvement in preparing this treaty has made it a
    measurably better product than it would have been otherwise.
        As I said, our board yesterday reaffirmed its strong
    support for the convention. In summary, we believe the treaty
    is not a threat to U.S. business. This treaty passes muster.
    The chemical industry supports it.
        Again, we think the treaty is the right thing to do and we
    thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Webber follows:]

                   Prepared Statement of Frederick L. Webber

        Good afternoon. My name is Fred Webber, and I am President and
    Chief Executive Officer of the Chemical Manufacturers Association.
        The industry I represent is America's largest export industry, with
    over 1 million American jobs.
        As you well know, CMA has been a frequent and vocal advocate for
    the Chemical Weapons Convention. We have appeared before this Committee
    on four separate occasions to testify on why the U.S. chemical industry
    believes this treaty is in the national interest.
        We are the major voice of the regulated business community on the
    Convention. We have 20 years of experience working closely with
    Republican and Democratic Administrations. We know how this treaty
    affects our commercial interests.
        Our long-standing support for the CWC is rooted in the belief that
    the treaty is the right thing to do. It is the right way to control the
    spread of chemical weapons.
        The chemical industry does not produce chemical weapons. We do,
    however, make products used in medicine, crop protection, and fire
    prevention, which can be converted into weapons agents.
        The chemical industry has a special responsibility to prevent
    illegal diversions of our products. We take that responsibility very,
    very seriously.
        That is why I am outraged by remarks made before this committee
    about the U.S. chemical industry--remarks that strongly suggest that
    our support for CWC is motivated by a desire to supply ``dangerous
    chemicals'' to rogue nations.
        Remarks that also suggest that we are trying to gut the U.S. export
    control regime and dismantle multilateral control organizations like
    the Australia Group deeply offend us.
        The chemical industry is proud of its record of support for U.S.
    anti-proliferation efforts.
        We have long supported this Nation's tough export control laws--the
    toughest export control laws in the world--as necessary measures to
    assure that commercial interests do not contribute to the spread of
    chemical weapons.
        No one has done more than the U.S. chemical industry to make the
    Export Administration Act an effective control system. No one has done
    more to build and support multilateral control organizations like the
    Australia Group.
        The charges made here last week against my industry are shameful
    and bring dishonor and discredit to those who make them.
        We support the CWC because it is a logical extension of U.S.
    policy. It will make our Nation's anti-proliferation objectives more
    reachable by applying our high standards to other nations.
        The treaty simply forces other nations to do what we are already
    doing, destroying our chemical weapons stocks.
        CMA has been committed to the success of the CWC for close to 20
    years. We have been a true partner of the U.S. Government in
    negotiating this treaty.
        We began with many of the same concerns about the treaty that have
    been voiced here. We worked hard to protect U.S. industrial interests,
    especially proprietary information. We helped to develop the protocols
    guiding the treaty's inspection and recordkeeping requirements, and we
    put those protocols to live-fire tests over and over again.
        Protecting confidential business information was our industry's top
    priority. We achieved our goal in the treaty text and the inspection
    procedures developed to implement it. In addition, we field tested the
    declaration formats, and concluded that the requirements are reasonable
    and manageable.
        Some claim that the CWC will impose a massive regulatory burden on
    companies. That's not true. The treaty was specifically drawn to focus
    attention on a relatively narrow segment of the chemical industry. Only
    some 200 facilities have both reporting and inspection obligations
    under the CWC. Most of these are members of CMA.
        Our involvement in preparing this treaty has made it a measurably
    better product than it would otherwise have been.
        CMA's Board of Directors yesterday reaffirmed their strong support
    for the Chemical Weapons Convention. A copy of the CMA Board letter
    will be submitted for the Committee's record.
        In summary, we believe the treaty is not a threat to U.S.
    businesses. This treaty passes muster. The chemical industry supports
    it. The CWC is the right thing to do.

        Senator Hagel. Mr. Webber, thank you. Thank you all for
    your time and your contributions.
        Senator Biden, I think Senator Helms wanted to stay with
    the 7.5 minute questioning, if that is agreeable to you. Why
    don't you start and I will follow up.
        Senator Biden. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Webber, thank you. You would expect me to thank you and
    others would expect me to thank you. But thank you for such a
    clear, absolutely precise statement. I began to wonder. I say
    this again. You know, chemicals in my state are not a small
    operation. They are 51 percent of the manufacturing base of my
    state.
        I have not heard anybody in my state out there who
    manufactures chemicals coming to me and saying this is a bad
    idea, and I think almost all of them belong to your
    organization. I may be mistaken. Maybe somebody does not, but I
    think they all do.
        Mr. Webber. I believe they do.
        Senator Biden. Ms. Bailey, I don't expect you to answer
    this, but the Diamond Shamrock example, Ultramar, the letter
    read, if they produce any of the chemicals mentioned in the
    letter--and I don't know if they produce them or use them--but
    if they produce them, they will, in fact, come under an
    inspection regime--if they produce at least 30 tons for some or
    200 tons for others, which are still not subject to routine
    inspections. Still, out of the whole mess there are only 20 a
    year that can occur. That's Number 1.
        Number 2, I am going to write the president of the company,
    too, to assure him he need not be as concerned as you are. And
    if they do not produce those chemicals, they don't have any
    requirement. If they use them or if they purchase them, there's
    no requirement--no requirement.
        So I would have to find out, and it is hard to tell from
    the testimony, whether they produce the chemicals listed or
    whether they only consume them and do not produce them.
        I would like to ask a question of Mr. Reinsch. I assume in
    your testimony, when you were talking about you, the Commerce
    Department, being required, being involved under the regime of
    how these inspections will take place, any inspection, when it
    takes place, is as a consequence of the language in the
    convention. The Confidentiality Annex, subsection (c) says:
    Measures to protect sensitive installations to prevent
    disclosure of confidential data--et cetera. It talks in there
    about how inspection teams will be guided and the requirement
    that there be facility agreements, that there be arrangements.
        Translated into every day English, that means there has to
    be a deal that you sign off on, on how an inspection team is
    able to, under what circumstances, what part of the facility
    they can go into, when they can go in, how many people they can
    go in with, what they can look at, whether the system has to be
    turned on or off--all of those things. Right?
        Mr. Reinsch. That's correct.
        Senator Biden. I think that is a very important thing,
    because part of the problem I find here is this. Just as
    somebody said, I believe it was Mr. Kearns--and, by the way,
    you did a heck of a job when you were on this committee. You
    did a really fine job. You and I were on the same side then on
    the fighter. We are on a different side now.
        But as he points out, a lot of people, including individual
    companies, do not know a lot about this treaty, any more than I
    suspect any of your members would know about the treaty if we
    sent them a poll. This is complicated stuff.
        But what I find is the more we talk about it, the more we
    explain the mechanics of it, the lot less onerous it appears,
    even to people who are opposed to it. That is the reason I
    bother to mention that section of the treaty.
        Now, one of the things that I am concerned about is this.
    And by the way, Mr. Johnson, I like witnesses like you. I mean
    this sincerely. You are the kind of person I like testifying.
    You don't mince any words. You go to the heart of what you
    think is wrong with whatever is being discussed and what you
    think is OK.
        Your concern, I think were I you, is a legitimate one, and
    that is whether or not the processes your particular company
    uses would be able, in effect, to be pirated just by the mere
    fact someone can see how you line up the line, or what
    temperatures you run at, and so on and so forth.
        Mr. Johnson. That is correct.
        Senator Biden. I think were I you, I would be concerned
    about that, too. But I also appreciate your putting to rest, at
    least to some degree, how onerous the paperwork is and how
    onerous the inspections are--all the stuff we are hearing from
    the opponents. You do not say that. But you are worried, and
    with good reason, I think, if I were you sitting there.
        That is where the Commerce Department comes in. Now, how
    would you take care of a fellow like Mr. Johnson who, in all
    likelihood, will have about as much chance of being inspected
    as win-
    ning the lottery, because we are talking about how there are
    only going to be 20 inspections in the whole year that could
    take place. There are a couple of thousand outfits it could
    take place in--well, maybe he has a little better chance than
    winning the lottery, but it's not likely.
        Mr. Johnson. I will buy my lottery ticket, Senator.
        Senator Biden. You will buy your lottery ticket. Good
    point. Touche.
        How would you deal with this. Let's say the treaty passes,
    as I hope, and I would hope, Mr. Johnson, that the first thing
    he would do is come to you and say OK, guys, if we get an
    inspection, how are we going to do this. Can we for the hour it
    takes place, or 20 minutes, or 5 hours, shut down a particular
    process so that they can't see what temperature we are doing
    this at?
        Will you actually facilitate that kind of thing? Will it be
    that specific?
        Mr. Reinsch. Well, if it came to that, Senator Biden. In
    the first instance, this is Dixie.
        Senator Biden. Yes.
        Mr. Reinsch. These are discreet organic chemicals. In the
    first instance, he is not going to have any inspections, at
    least for the first 3 years.
        Senator Biden. I didn't want to mention that. Yes.
        Mr. Reinsch. Beyond that, it would be up to the
    international body to ultimately decide if there were going to
    be any inspections.
        Senator Biden. And if it had any inspections, it would only
    be 1 of 20.
        Mr. Reinsch. Correct. So this is way down the road. But
    let's assume the worst case for the moment and that in the
    fourth or fifth year he is going to have an inspection.
        What we would do in that case, as part of trying to create
    a facility agreement with him, is to come in, meet with him,
    talk to him about his confidential business information, his
    proprietary information, and try to set up a structure in which
    he would tell us what he does not want anybody to see, what
    parts of the plant he does not want them to go into, what kind
    of procedures he does not want them to observe, and we would
    construct an agreement that precludes the inspection of those.
        Senator Biden. The bottom line in the treaty, all that it
    requires is that you supply sufficient proof that you are not
    supplying, or producing----
        Mr. Reinsch. You are not producing a Schedule I chemical.
        Senator Biden.--Schedule I stuff.
        Mr. Reinsch. That's correct.
        Senator Biden. So it is not something that is an automatic
    thing. I just want to establish--and my time is about to be
    up--I just want to establish that, even if an inspection took
    place in such a circumstance, it is not willy nilly unlock the
    doors, open the books, here they come, and the Iranian team is
    coming in to figure out how to transport all of this stuff to
    Iran. Right?
        Isn't that a fair statement?
        Mr. Reinsch. That's correct, Senator. That is exactly
    correct.
        Senator Biden. Last point--and Mr. Spears is gone. I've got
    good news for him. He will not be inspected at all. He is not
    even in the game. So someone ought to write him a letter--I
    will write him a letter--based on what he told us. He is not
    even subject to any inspection at all. That is really good news
    to him.
        Maybe I should give it to Mr. Gaffney and he can give it to
    him. There is no need. He is not even in the game.
        That does not mean that he shouldn't be opposed to the
    treaty. He made other, larger, objections to it, which I
    respect. But he does not have to worry about his pipe company.
        The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you.
        Senator Hagel.
        Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Again, thanks to
    all of you for coming today.
        I apologize that we all had to jump out and vote. But I
    would like to get back, Ms. Bailey, to your testimony, and I
    left right at the beginning.
        I would like, if you would, for you to expand a little bit
    on one of your subheadings in your testimony, the threat of
    espionage. Would you talk a little bit about where you see this
    treaty? And maybe you do not. I have not read what you said.
    But that has been brought up by former Secretary Schlesinger
    and others, that this is a treaty that is on some pretty thin
    ice when it comes to opening up our facilities to foreign
    espionage.
        Ms. Bailey. Yes, sir. The greatest threat in terms of
    espionage to U.S. companies and U.S. national facilities, such
    as my own laboratory, comes from challenge inspections which
    might be used specifically for the purposes of espionage.
        Hypothetically, an inspector could either be an
    intelligence official assigned to be an inspector or could
    later sell information to a company or country abroad that
    reveals either classified or CBI, confidential business
    information, that they might have gleaned through the process
    of gathering samples and analyzing them.
        I described in my testimony the GC/MS, the gas
    chromatograph/mass spectrometer, which can reveal not only what
    chemicals are being used at a site but also the processes being
    used. And in the case of the propellant production facility
    that was the subject of a mock inspection, we were able to
    analyze samples taken from that facility and determine not only
    what kind of chemicals, which chemicals were in the rocket
    propellant, but also a lot of process information. All of this
    was classified data.
        This mock inspection, sponsored by the U.S. Government,
    proved the point that somebody can come in and use the very
    tools that will be used by inspectors in the challenge
    inspection regimes to look at classified information.
        The counter argument to this is that they are only going to
    be looking for a specific library of types of information, such
    as the scheduled chemicals. The problem is you cannot limit it
    to that.
        Our laboratory did a project last year for the Department
    of the Army which determined that samples an be acquired even
    from the GC/MS after it has been decontaminated and can reveal
    the same classified information.
        We have also done research that indicates that an inspector
    could come in with a ball point pen that is really a sampling
    device, suck some air up in it, or water, or whatever, and take
    it away, analyze it, and get the same type of information.
        Mr. Reinsch. May I comment on that, Senator?
        Senator Hagel. Yes.
        Mr. Reinsch. I have two quick points, if I may.
        With respect to the GC/MS, I am advised by the Defense
    Department's Onsite Inspection Authority that they have studied
    this kind of equipment and have developed procedures for its
    use by escorts during the inspections to ensure that only
    appropriate information is provided to the inspector.
        Now beyond that, I will leave it to the engineers and the
    chemists to argue about that. But that is what I am advised.
        The only other point I would make is Ms. Bailey has not
    mentioned the issue of managed access. What we would do in a
    challenge inspection is go in and consult with the company
    about where their intellectual property is, what it is that
    they are trying to protect from the very thing she is concerned
    about, and devise a plan for the inspectors' access that would
    prevent them from seeing those items.
        Senator Hagel. Is that now part of the convention, that
    wording?
        Senator Biden. That's what I was talking about. Yes.
        Ms. Bailey. Neither of those points are relevant, however.
    The first one, the idea that they are only going to look for
    specific kind of chemicals is this ``library of chemicals''
    argument I was using.
        Mr. Reinsch. That is not the point I made.
        Ms. Bailey. It doesn't matter, because you can
    clandestinely take samples and get the same data offsite. It
    just doesn't matter.
        Mr. Reinsch. We would manage access to protect intellectual
    property.
        Senator Hagel. I think she is kind of over that point.
        Ms. Bailey. In the mock inspection which I cited, the
    samples were taken outside of the propellant facility building.
    So you didn't even have to go into the building to get it.
        So the whole idea that managed access is somehow going to
    prevent the acquisition of classified or confidential
    information is not legitimate.
        Senator Hagel. Thank you.
        Mr. Secretary, I am on a timeframe, and if one of the other
    Senators wants to come back, or I can come back to this again.
    But I want first to get to Mr. Webber on this point.
        Mr. Webber, what is your understanding of the inspection
    process? Are you concerned at all for your companies that the
    Iranians might come in or somebody would come in and what Ms.
    Bailey is talking about gets underneath some of the corporate
    issues, the national security issues? I mean, do you think you
    and your companies, Mr. Webber, have a good understanding of
    the process?
        Mr. Webber. Certainly we were concerned early on. That is
    why we got deeply involved in the deliberations and, frankly,
    in the drafting sessions of this treaty, hoping that we could
    clear up some of these problems.
        Under the procedures we helped negotiate on the CWC, our
    companies, frankly, have significant protections today against
    an inspection team knowingly or inadvertently disclosing
    proprietary information. First, the convention gives our
    companies, subject to routine onsite inspections, the right, as
    was mentioned earlier, to negotiate a facility agreement. That
    agreement will govern the in-
    spection process and provide a means of assuring that trade
    secrets will not be routinely made available to the inspectors.
        Second, the inspectors will be subject to personal
    liability and sanctions for wrongful disclosure of information.
        Again, we were concerned about the possibility. We think
    the treaty tackles that problem head-on. We helped draft the
    verification procedures; and, again, we just think the benefits
    far outweigh the costs.
        Senator Hagel. So that is no longer a concern of you, your
    people, or your companies?
        Mr. Webber. We think the language in that convention gives
    us the protections we need.
        Senator Hagel. Thank you.
        Does anybody else want to respond?
        Ms. Bailey. Mr. Webber is referring essentially to routine
    inspections, whereas the inspections I was talking about are
    challenge inspections. Those are the ones that are likely to
    target, for example, a biotechnology firm, a pharmaceutical
    company, any company that might have confidential business
    information to lose or facilities such as my laboratory, where
    there are national security data.
        We won't be subject to routine inspections. We would be
    subject to challenge inspections.
        Senator Hagel. I think that is part of the issue that we
    are trying to get at here; at least that is most important in
    my mind. I am not diminishing the importance of commerce here.
    But, again, I go back to my opening statement. I will vote on
    this treaty based on the national interests of this country.
    Everything else is important, but not nearly as important in my
    mind as what is most important in the national security
    interests of this country.
        I suppose I am about out of time, Mr. Chairman, so I will
    defer to whoever is up next. Thank you.
        The Chairman. I am not going to call you ``Mr. Webber.'' I
    am going to call you ``Fred,'' because we have been on the same
    side many times.
        Mr. Webber. For a long time, sir.
        The Chairman. I welcome you as I do all of our
    distinguished witnesses today.
        I want to know if you or any other CMA representative has
    stated in the past that no companies which manufacture what
    they call ``discreet organic chemicals'' will be subject to
    foreign inspections.
        Mr. Webber. First of all, as was pointed out just a few
    minutes ago, not within the first 3 years. They will not be
    inspected within the first 3 years.
        As you know, again----
        The Chairman. I'm sorry. Please repeat that. You're a
    little far away from the microphone.
        Mr. Webber [continuing]. I'm sorry. Not within the first 3
    years. They are not going to be inspected. And, indeed, if they
    are to be challenge inspected later on, I think the odds,
    again, are what--20 out of--what is the rule? It is going to be
    a very low percentage if there is, indeed, to be a challenge
    inspection. A challenge inspection relies on an allegation. So
    we feel fairly comfortable that the protections that I just
    described earlier will indeed apply to manufacturers of
    discreet organic chemicals.
        The Chairman. Have you read the committee, part 2 of the
    Verification Annex, paragraphs 9-21 lately? Are you familiar
    with it?
        Mr. Webber. If I read it, sir, it was a long time ago, and
    I can't quote it now.
        The Chairman. It says nothing about any 3 years. And yes,
    they will be inspected.
        Now I just want to be sure here.
        You are talking about challenge inspections and we are
    talking about challenge inspections. What is your answer to my
    question based on that?
        Mr. Webber. Well, sir, I think the International Inspecting
    Authority, if I read the convention correctly, has to make the
    decision early on as to what the time schedule will be to
    indeed, first of all, inspect those 200 facilities that will
    naturally come out of the convention mandate and then decide
    what to do with those discreet organic chemical manufacturers.
    And if, indeed, they decide to allow challenges early on, sure
    they will be subject to the treaty if there is a challenge to a
    company like Dixie.
        The Chairman. Well, this has not changed, and your
    predecessor, a distinguished gentleman named Dr. Will
    Carpenter, supplied for the record a copy of his remarks before
    the American Association for the Advancement of Science on
    January 16, admitted in 1989, in which he noted, ``Those of us
    who manufacture chemicals that are only a step or two away from
    chemical weapons, and that means a large number of us in the
    CMA, have already accepted the reality that a good treaty means
    significant losses of information that we consider
    confidential.''
        Is that still your position?
        Mr. Webber. It is not our position today. Again, that
    statement, indeed, was made by Dr. Carpenter of Monsanto in
    1989. But he has been a forceful presence and a strong
    supporter of the convention.
        The Chairman. Did he speak in error when he said that? Was
    he wrong when he said that?
        Mr. Webber. Today he would tell you, sir, that the industry
    has pressure tested the treaty and he feels very comfortable
    now that the needed protections are there.
        So I think he would testify right along those lines. That
    is an 8 year old statement, when we were still working on the
    treaty, working with the government to make sure that those
    problems would be corrected.
        The Chairman. But what was true in 1989, unless it has been
    changed, would be true today. So you are saying he was wrong in
    1989?
        Mr. Webber. Sir, we were in the midst of negotiating on
    that treaty. There were a lot of open-ended issues. A lot of
    progress has been made since then.
        I have met personally with Dr. Carpenter in the last 6
    months. He is a strong advocate of the treaty who feels today,
    as it is presently written, that it provides us with the
    protection we need.
        The Chairman. So you are saying here that it is a good
    treaty?
        Mr. Webber. Oh, yes, sir. We strongly support the treaty.
        The Chairman. Are you mystified by the number of your
    members who are rejecting your appraisal of this treaty?
        Mr. Webber. There are always, in any organization, say of
    200 companies, you will find a few.
        The Chairman. But you had said in the past that you were
    representing all of the chemical companies.
        Mr. Webber. We represent 192--92--today to be exact. We
    have one at the table that has concerns. They have not said
    that the treaty ought to be defeated. They are concerned about
    confidential business information and the cost of inspections.
        The Chairman. We have heard some say definitely that it
    ought to be defeated.
        Mr. Webber. Well, I just heard a letter read into the
    record from Sterling Chemical expressing concerns. And yet,
    their vice chairman yesterday, along with the CMA board, signed
    that letter endorsing the treaty, and that letter is going to
    Senator Trent Lott today. And, by the way, Mr. Chairman, we
    enter that for the record.
        [The letter from Sterling Chemical was read into the record
    by Kathleen Bailey and appears on page 183; the letter to
    Senator Lott appears on page 194.]
        The Chairman. Well, not so long ago, less than a year ago,
    on November 26 of 1996, you made the claim that the U.S.
    Chemical manufacturers will ``lose''--and these are indicated
    as your words--``as much as $600 million a year in export
    sales'' if the CWC is not ratified.
        Then, on March 10 of this year, you revised your estimate
    to say that the upper bound of lost sales would be $227
    million. So you have come down. And also I have a list provided
    to the committee and the Majority Leader's Office by CMA which
    makes clear that the amount of sales of Schedule II chemicals
    will total less than half of what you have previously claimed.
        Now that ball is bouncing crazily around the lot. What do
    you do, just reach out, get a figure, and say whatever is
    likely to excite the people?
        Mr. Webber. Oh, Mr. Chairman, you know I wouldn't do that.
    We have known each other for too long.
        The Chairman. Oh, I'm not sure. A lot of things are being
    said about this treaty that are simply not so, and the people
    who are saying them know that they are not so.
        Now I want to know whether you are revising your figures
    and where are the figures now?
        Mr. Webber. I appreciate the opportunity to correct the
    record and, indeed, it needs correction.
        In September 1996, we estimated that the potential impact
    of the ban on trade in Schedule II chemicals would, if applied
    against the United States, impact some $600 million in
    exports--in exports. Since that time, CMA carefully reviewed
    the data available from the government and industry sources.
    Our conservative estimates today are that $500 million to $600
    million in two-way trade--and here we stand corrected, but it
    is two-way trade, both exports and imports--will be affected by
    the Schedule II ban.
        These numbers are the best estimates that we have been able
    to get throughout the debate.
        By the way, Mr. Chairman, we feel that this is the tip of
    the iceberg. But these numbers we are prepared to stand behind.
    But it is two-way trade, not one-way trade, not just exports.
        The Chairman. Well, let's see how well they will stand,
    Fred, and I say this as a friend.
        Mr. Webber. Yes, sir.
        The Chairman. Exports of Amiton, a pesticide--is that the
    way you pronounce that--A-M-I-T-O-N?
        Mr. Webber. Yes. Yes, sir.
        The Chairman. That is a pesticide. I am advised, quite
    reliably, that the U.S. exports of Amiton total more than half
    of your new figure. And yet, the United States sells this
    pesticide largely to countries that have not ratified the
    treaty and are not going to participate in it.
        Am I wrong about that?
        Mr. Webber. I'm not sure, Senator. I would have to look at
    the numbers. But the fact of the matter is all of our major
    trading partners, all of the major trading partners in the U.S.
    chemical industry, are signatories already to this convention.
    I don't know how else to approach the answer.
        We could dig into the numbers, but I am trying to question
    the relevancy of it and the sale of it. It goes to our trading
    partners, and those trading partners have signed the
    convention.
        The Chairman. Well, half of what you say that they will
    lose involves one chemical, Amiton--and I hope I am pronouncing
    that right.
        Mr. Webber. Yes, you are, sir.
        The Chairman. And yet, the United States sells this
    pesticide almost entirely to countries that have not ratified
    the treaty.
        I have just been handed, as your man is handing you
    information I am being handed information, too, and what the
    hell would we do without our staff. Western companies cannot
    use this chemical, can they? You tell him.
        Mr. Webber. If we understand correctly, U.S. law does not
    prohibit production of this chemical, this pesticide, for
    export purposes.
        The Chairman. I understand that. But that is not what I
    asked you, though.
        I asked you if you didn't send it to companies that are not
    participating. It is not a U.S. law. It is a European law that
    you are talking about in the first place. But environmental
    regulations are prohibiting the use of Amiton in Europe and
    elsewhere. Is that not correct?
        Mr. Webber. I am at a disadvantage. I don't have the
    information or the numbers on that specific chemical. I would
    be delighted to work with your staff to dig into that to really
    see not only what is happening but what the significance of it
    is.
        The Chairman. Well, let me tell you what bothers me about
    the proponents of this treaty.
        I have caught them in so many misstatements of fact, and
    for a while, you know, I said we all make mistakes. But I have
    almost reached the conclusion that most--not all, but most--of
    the loud advocates of the treaty--and I am including the
    editorial writers--they don't know what they're talking about
    and they don't care. They just get a statement out of thin air,
    throw it out there, and then the rest of us have to chase it
    down to see whether it is accurate. And nine times out of ten
    we find out it is not accurate.
        That is the reason I have made the conclusion that we ought
    to defeat this treaty unless it is substantially modified and
    we go ahead and do it right. I am just exactly like Steve
    Forbes on this treaty. I thought he made good sense, as he does
    always.
        Well, my time is up.
        What shall we do about another round? Would you like
    another round?
        Senator Biden. Well, since we have so many witnesses here--
    we really have two panels in one--I would like to have another
    round, if that is OK with you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. OK. How many minutes per Senator?
        Senator Biden. Do you mind if we have, if we could have one
    more round of 7.5 minutes, I think that will end it. At least I
    have about that much to ask.
        Do you mind?
        The Chairman. Not at all. I think it is a good idea.
        Senator Biden. OK.
        You know, I understand the Chairman's frustration. I am
    going to ask Mr. Webber to comment. I want to pursue that again
    in a moment.
        But, you know, it is so easy. This is such a complicated
    issue. It is so easy to scare the living daylights out of
    proponents and opponents of this treaty by taking things,
    taking the worst case scenarios that have probabilities that
    are incredibly low.
        For example, what Ms. Bailey was talking about is these
    challenge inspections, these challenge inspections of outfits
    that are the small outfits, the biochemical firms, the biotech
    firms, the pharmaceutical firms, who, I might add, signed on to
    these treaties, both their organizations.
        Let's review what the treaty calls for if there is a
    challenge inspection.
        If there is a challenge inspection, first of all a country
    has to, say Iran--we're all talking about Iran. We assume the
    French are not going to do this bad thing to us, or the
    Germans, the Brits, or whatever. We usually use Iran as the
    worst case.
        Say an Iranian says I want to find out what that biotech
    firm is doing. I want to find out what that pharmaceutical firm
    has out there, because I want to steal their secrets, or I want
    to steal weapons-grade capability from someone.
        So they say, ``we think Company X, Diamond Shamrock''--
    assuming they were in the deal, and I'm not sure they are--``We
    want a challenge inspection.'' What happens mechanically?
    Mechanically, that request goes to the Director General of this
    outfit. The Director General then takes a look at it after
    looking at the evidence presented by the country asking for the
    challenge inspection. They just can't say, you know, I kind of
    think they make a lot of money over there at Diamond Shamrock,
    and I would kind of like to find out how they do it. I want to
    challenge. You know, like a kid in a pick-up game, ``I
    challenge.''
        You can't do that. You have to supply a rationale. You have
    to say why you think they are violating this treaty.
        Then the Director General takes it. He looks at it. Then he
    has to take it to the Executive Council. And if the Executive
    Council believes that the allegations offered, allegations of
    cheating under the treaty, have no merit, they have to have a
    super majority to say no inspection. They have to have, say,
    three-quarters. It's three-quarters.
        And, by the way, if it turns out it is an abusive request,
    like abusing the courts with frivolous lawsuits, that kind of
    thing, they also then have to pay a penalty, ``they'' the
    country making these frivolous requests.
        But even after that, let's assume it goes through the
    sieve, Iran says I want to know what's happening up at duPont-
    Merck. I think they have a deal there, and I would like to
    figure out how it works. No inspector from that country is
    allowed on the team. So the Iranians have to have somebody
    else. They have to go to Country Y and say here is a deal we
    will make together. You send your inspector in with this little
    thing he is going to put in his pocket to find out all this
    information and then, when you get it, you give it to us. This
    is because you can't send an inspector in.
        OK. Assume they go through all of that. Then they get to
    the end of the day, they come to the United States, they go to
    duPont-Merck or some small outfit. Guess what? In a challenge
    inspection, they need a search warrant under the Fourth
    Amendment, and they must establish before a court of law
    probable cause to determine that the company is violating the
    Chemical Weapons Convention--in a Federal court. It's just like
    you have to have probable cause now for a search warrant.
        Now, Mr. Johnson, if your company is worried about that
    part of the process, or anybody else who actually runs a
    company, you either don't have very good lawyers who work for
    you now to be able to explain this to you or you are one of
    those people who assumes you are going to get struck by
    lightning on those days when there is lightning out there.
        It could happen. I acknowledge it could happen. Iran could
    make a deal with China--and, by the way, neither one is in the
    treaty yet, and if they are not in the treaty, they don't get
    to have an inspector; they don't get to be involved. They'd
    have to make a deal. There has to be collusion. They have to
    agree to share the information. They then have to go in with
    another inspector not from their team, but they have to get by
    the Director General, and the Director General then has to get
    by the Executive Council. And the Executive Council is probably
    not real crazy about Iran, either.
        Then, even if they do that, they have to get by a Federal
    judge.
        Now it can happen. It can happen. A good friend of mine,
    Billy Haggerty, got struck by lightning the other day in a
    park. It happens. Now I walk in the same park, in the same
    lightning storm--and I'm not joking, he really did get struck
    by lightening. But that's about what we are talking about here.
        With regard to this issue, Mr. Webber, I assume the point
    of the question was--though I may be mistaken about this
    particular chemical--is that you really are not going to suffer
    a penalty, the industry, if you already trade it to a country
    not covered by the treaty. This is because the only penalties
    would be import sanctions that would be imposed upon us, or
    exports, which are imports to that country. A country could say
    you can't sell your chemical in our country. We're a member of
    the treaty and you are violating the treaty or you are not in
    the treaty. You're not in.
        I assume the Senator's point was this stuff is sold to
    countries that are not in the treaty, therefore you would
    suffer no loss if we were not part of the treaty.
        Mr. Webber. If they are otherwise not controlled by the
    Export Control Act.
        Senator Biden. Right.
        Mr. Webber. That's correct.
        Senator Biden. Otherwise not controlled by the Export
    Control Act, which is a separate piece of legislation.
        Mr. Webber. Correct.
        Senator Biden. Can you supply for the committee an analysis
    of this particular matter?
        Mr. Webber. Yes.
        Senator Biden. I see my train just left.
        You know I care about this treaty, Jesse, if I miss the 5
    train and there are no votes.
        The Chairman. I wish you had gone home.
        Senator Biden. Did you hear what he said, he wished I'd
    gone home.
        I don't blame him.
        Can you supply for the record a more detailed response
    based on your analysis to the Senator's question about 50
    percent of the loss is attributed to one chemical and a
    significant portion of that chemical sale goes to countries not
    covered?
        Mr. Webber. Yes. Your clarification is very helpful.
        I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman, I didn't clearly understand the
    question. We would be delighted to supply for the record that
    analysis.
        [The information referred to was unavailable at the time of
    printing.]
        Senator Biden. Well, I'll stop. I have so many more
    questions that I don't want to get started.
        I appreciate it, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. I can have somebody drive you to the station.
        Senator Biden. The train has already gone. I am here for
    another hour, unless you can call Amtrak. After 24 years, I
    have never been able to hold an Amtrak train, so you know I
    don't have a whole lot of power.
        Ms. Bailey. Senator Biden, you made so many statements that
    I think can be challenged.
        Senator Biden. Well, please do challenge them. I'd love to
    hear it.
        Ms. Bailey. I know your time is out.
        Senator Biden. Oh, no. I have another minute. Then I can
    respond to you.
        Ms. Bailey. Starting with the frivolity question, in other
    words, if an inspection request comes in from a country----
        Senator Biden. A challenge inspection.
        Ms. Bailey [continuing]. A challenge inspection request
    comes in from a country, and they want to go to a
    pharmaceutical firm in the U.S.; they don't have to specify the
    name of the company. They don't have to say the exact site.
    They don't have to give information which would qualify as
    being substantial for demonstrating probable cause.
        Senator Biden. No. I didn't say they have to establish
    probable cause. They have to give a reason.
        Ms. Bailey. I'm just saying the information they give is
    not sufficient to establish probable cause.
        Senator Biden. I agree with that.
        Ms. Bailey. They don't even have to say the name of the
    site that they are going to until 12 hours before the
    inspectors arrive at the port of entry.
        Senator Biden. But then they have to say it.
        Ms. Bailey. So this whole charade about frivolity being
    questioned by the Executive Council is----
        Senator Biden. Are they allowed to have an inspector?
        Ms. Bailey. Sorry?
        Senator Biden. Is the country asking for the challenge
    allowed to have an inspector on the team?
        Ms. Bailey. No. That's not the issue. The issue is you
    cannot determine frivolity in advance, because you may not even
    know what site they are asking to go to. That is the first
    point.
        Senator Biden. I don't think it is frivolity. I thought it
    was a trick and a device to find out how to get information. I
    thought that was your point.
        Ms. Bailey. It is my point. I am just trying to argue that
    your case that there is this Executive Council that is going to
    sit there and look at a challenge inspection request and render
    a judgment as to whether it is frivolous or abusive is not
    going to save U.S. companies. It is not going to save them,
    because there will be insufficient data for that Executive
    Council to reach a reasonable decision until 12 hours before
    they enter.
        Now I would like to agree with you--it's so rare--I would
    like to agree with you that it is quite possible that a company
    that does not want to have a challenge inspection request can
    say, ``no way; you get a criminal warrant.'' All right.
        Senator Biden. Correct.
        Ms. Bailey. Fine. Let's imagine a hypothetical situation in
    which there were credible evidence presented that substantiates
    the criminal warrant. The company, meanwhile, suffers
    tremendously because of the negative press it will get.
        Senator Biden. The same way criminals do. The same way
    people accused wrongly of crimes do. You've got it. If there is
    probable cause, under our Constitution, if there is probable
    cause a crime has been committed, and then it turns out you are
    innocent, you suffer.
        Ms. Bailey. There was a real case I would like to tell you
    about.
        Senator Biden. Sure.
        Ms. Bailey. The United States and Russia exchanged
    reciprocal visits to pharmaceutical facilities. We went over
    there and said, ``you know, there are real problems here. It
    looks to us like you are producing biological weapons, or
    either have been, are going to, or just were yesterday.'' Then
    the Russians came over to the United States and went to a
    pharmaceutical firm here. The Russians walked out the front
    door and, in Russian, thankfully, gave a press briefing in
    which they said this pharmaceutical company is involved in
    biological weapons production.
        It was not picked up by the press here.
        Senator Biden. That's why it can't be bilateral. That's why
    this treaty cannot be bilateral. That's why it's multilateral.
        Ms. Bailey. The point I am trying to make is that U.S.
    firms can be accused of nefarious actions by these foreign
    inspectors with no basis.
        Senator Biden. Can I stop you there for just a second and
    take that example?
        The inspection team is going to be made up of a number of
    people. Unless you assume the whole world conspires against us,
    the team is not going to walk out and say, tit for tat. Now if
    you assume that, and I can understand that you might, if you
    assume that the entire inspection team is going to do exactly
    that--we know how the Russians work. Whenever you expose them
    of something, accuse them of something, or prove something,
    they come back and say double on you, your mother wears combat
    boots, so do you. We know how they deal.
        But you have to assume the entire regime, all these members
    of this treaty, whatever group of inspectors--they are not just
    going to be Russians or one or two people; they are going to be
    a group. You're going to have to assume that all of them are
    going to be as venal as the Russian example you gave me. That's
    a heck of an assumption.
        Ms. Bailey. No, I don't think so.
        Senator Biden. No?
        Ms. Bailey. You see, my argument is that the company that
    is being challenge inspected will be so worried about negative
    press that there will be pressure on them to succumb and not
    stand up for their constitutional rights under the Fourth
    Amendment to say no foreigners are going to come in here and
    look at my process data or look at the way I have my company
    set up.
        Senator Biden. No, that's not what they're going to say.
    That's not what they are allowed to say. They may want to say
    that and they won't. You're right. What they'll say is there is
    no evidence, credible evidence, to suggest that we, in fact,
    are doing anything wrong. Therefore, you cannot come in. That's
    what they're going to say.
        Ms. Bailey. And then the President will have a----
        Senator Biden. You see, I practiced law, you practice
    inspections. I represented people like this where, in fact, the
    government came and said we want to do something. We want to
    search your home, your business, or you. I know how it works. I
    represented them. I know how they think--not all of them. But I
    have as much experience as you do in that regard.
        I see no reason to believe your scenario. But the bottom
    line is this, and I will stop, Mr. Chairman.
        You have to assume in your scenario that the entire
    inspection team is going to be venal.
        Ms. Bailey. That's not true.
        Senator Biden. Sure it is. Look, the Russian walks out and
    says you know, they are making chemical weapons in there.
        Ms. Bailey. It only takes one person to make that
    accusation.
        Senator Biden. No, it doesn't, because then what happens is
    you've got the other five people there, or three people, or
    seven people.
        Ms. Bailey. This is all prior to an inspection taking place
    at this facility.
        The Chairman. Joe, you are out-shouting the lady. Give her
    a chance to answer you.
        Senator Biden. I'm sorry. You're right and I beg your
    pardon.
        The Chairman. You rest your tonsils just a little bit.
        Not one iota of evidence is required by the CWC to start a
    challenge inspection. Is that correct--not one iota?
        Ms. Bailey. That's correct. No data.
        The Chairman. And it's impossible to stop----
        Senator Biden. No ``data.'' There's a distinction.
        Ms. Bailey. The Senator is correct--no data, no evidence.
        The Chairman. What's the difference?
        Senator Biden. Well, there's a difference between ``data''
    and an ``assertion.''
        Ms. Bailey. No data or evidence.
        The Chairman. Anything else?
        Senator Biden. No.
        The Chairman. OK.
        It's impossible to stop an inspection once it's started, is
    that correct?
        Ms. Bailey. Yes.
        The Chairman. You have to get 31 of 41 diplomats to vote
    against the inspection within 12 hours to stop it.
        Ms. Bailey. Three-quarters of 41. Yes.
        The Chairman. Yes. Now all you have to do to start an
    inspection is to say where you want to go. You don't have to
    have any evidence, is that correct?
        Ms. Bailey. You do not have to have any evidence.
        The Chairman. Nowhere in the treaty, nowhere in the treaty
    does it say you have to say why you want an inspection. Is that
    correct?
        Ms. Bailey. All that is required is that a country say that
    they suspect that there is a violation of the Chemical Weapons
    Convention.
        The Chairman. All right.
        Now you already addressed this earlier on, so I won't get
    into that.
        I think we have gone about as far as we can go, Senator.
        Senator Biden. I have one last question, and I won't even
    comment. I'll just ask the last question.
        The Chairman. Ask it, then.
        Senator Biden. OK.
        Madam, at the end of the day, if the facility for which a
    challenge inspection is sought, 1 second before they cross the
    threshold says you cannot come in, you do not have a search
    warrant, is it not true that they will be required to go to a
    Federal judge and establish probable cause? You and I should
    not guess their motivation. If they do, if they say you cannot
    cross the threshold, is it not true that you have to go to a
    Federal judge and establish probable cause as to why there is a
    violation? Is that correct?
        Ms. Bailey. Do you want to limit me to a yes/no? Could I
    say ``yes'' and then comment?
        It is true. But I have two comments. The first one is why
    would we want to sign an arms control treaty which we know we
    are not going to apply ourselves in terms of challenge
    inspections in the future? In other words, any company that
    says no, or private individual that says no, can say no----
        Senator Biden. Can I answer your question?
        Ms. Bailey [continuing]. That's the first part. Do you want
    both parts now?
        Senator Biden. Do you want me to answer your question?
        Ms. Bailey. Yes, but both parts first?
        Senator Biden. OK. I'll do it either way you want.
        The Chairman. Let her make her case.
        Ms. Bailey. That's the first one. The second one is that if
    it is a U.S. national security facility, meaning a place like
    my laboratory, they will not be able to say no and foreigners
    can come in and use these GC/MS and other techniques to gather,
    to glean national security data. And that is something that is
    not covered by what we talked about so far.
        But I think it is a terribly important issue worthy of your
    attention.
        Senator Biden. Can I answer your question?
        Ms. Bailey. Sure.
        Senator Biden. The answer to your question as to why we
    would be part of such a regime that would allow our Fourth
    Amendment to work is because the underlying philosophy of the
    treaty is challenge inspections are not intended to be
    frivolous. That is the underlying assumption.
        Therefore, we are totally consistent with the spirit of the
    treaty when we say if you want to challenge us, you have to
    give us some good reason under our Constitution why you are
    saying that. That's why we should want to be a part of a treaty
    and want to enforce our Constitution. That's why.
        Ms. Bailey. Do you think Iran will want to amend its
    constitution----
        The Chairman. Exactly.
        Ms. Bailey [continuing]. To add Fourth Amendment rights----
        The Chairman. Or Russia, for that matter.
        Ms. Bailey [continuing]. Once they see us using them as a
    means of avoiding inspections?
        Senator Biden. The answer is that may very well be. But it
    is kind of interesting how those of you who oppose the treaty,
    there is a weakness you see in the treaty and any correction of
    that weakness makes another part of your criticism worse. For
    example, if we did not have the Fourth Amendment guarantees
    built in here, you'd be saying it is a violation of the
    American Constitution, therefore we should not be part of the
    treaty. Right?
        Ms. Bailey. Right.
        Senator Biden. Now that we have Fourth Amendment
    guarantees, then you say we don't want to do that, because it
    renders the treaty less likely to be efficacious against other
    countries. Right?
        Ms. Bailey. They're both true.
        Senator Biden. Right. And you have used them skillfully. I
    think you are a lawyer.
        The Chairman. Anything else to come before the committee?
        Mr. Johnson. I would like to bring up one point.
        The Chairman. Sure.
        Mr. Johnson. Senator Biden, in part 9----
        Senator Biden. Pardon me?
        Mr. Johnson [continuing]. In part 9 of the treaty, they get
    into a discussion of the number of discreet organic chemical
    inspections that can happen in a year. In the third year, as I
    read it, in the third year they are limited to 5 percent of the
    facilities available, plus 3, or 20 whichever is the smallest
    number.
        Senator Biden. Right.
        Mr. Johnson. In our case, in the United States, that
    undoubtedly will be 20.
        Now in that third year or fourth year, I am not sure which,
    this issue of number of inspections on discreet organic
    chemicals will again be addressed. You know, that could cut
    either way. We could maintain the number of 20, or it could
    become less, or it could become more. That is a little bit of a
    concern.
        Senator Biden. If I may respond, sir, that is a good point
    that you make. My understanding is--I will withhold my
    understanding until I have staff check to see if I am right
    about whether or not the 20 could be changed--if it is a
    fundamental change, if it is a change in the treaty, to go from
    20, say, to 30, 50, 100, 1,000 or whatever it is, it is an
    amendment to the treaty. Under a condition that we are going to
    add to this ratification--and there's no way you'd know this--
    we are going to add to this that it would have to come back to
    the Senate for ratification if they were going to change that.
        So that would change the whole ballgame and it would change
    the requirement. They could not do that, could not bind us
    unless we ratify it as an amendment to the treaty.
        But the second point is this. My understanding--and I would
    stand to be corrected, because I am not certain--hold on for
    just 1 second.
        My understanding is--and I will check this for the record
    because I had not approached this before and it is a good point
    you raise, separate and apart from the requirement that we
    would have to get the Senate to sign off on it with a super
    majority vote again--my understanding of Section 9, relating to
    the companies you are talking about, which would fall into the
    category of being 1 of the 20 inspections, is that the 3-year
    period does not go to whether or not that can be upped from 20
    to any other number. It goes to whether or not there will be
    any inspections--any inspections. There are no inspections now.
    So it will go to whether or not there will be any inspections.
        Now because you have been so straight with me, with us, I
    promise you I will for the record--and I am sure the Senator
    and the staff will remind me--I will go back and give you a
    written analysis of my view. I may be wrong, but I will send
    you a copy of that. But my understanding is the 3 year period
    means for now there can be no inspections for the next 3 years
    and at the end of 3 years they are going to decide whether
    there will be any for the covered category--not that there can
    be 20 of the covered category now and it may be amended to be
    30, 40, or 50.
        But even if that is true, such an amendment would have to
    come back to the United States Congress--the Senate, to be
    precise, not the Congress--and be ratified by the Senate before
    it would be binding on the United States of America, before it
    could be binding on the United States of America. But you raise
    a good point. I will check it out.
        I always learn something at these hearings, and I now have
    to go back and find out whether my analysis, which I just told
    you, is absolutely accurate. I think it is. But I am not
    positive.
        I am positive about the treaty part. I am not positive
    about the 20.
        [The information referred to follows:]

                                                          May 21, 1997.
    Mr. Ralph Johnson,
    Vice President, Dixie Chemical Company, Inc.,
    Houston, TX 77219.
        Dear Mr. Johnson: Thank you for taking time on April 15 to testify
    before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Chemical Weapons
    Convention. I appreciate your concern about how our country is
    governed. As you know, the Senate ratified the Chemical Weapons
    Convention on April 24 by a 74-26 vote, and the treaty entered into
    force on April 29.
        During last month's hearing, you inquired as to whether the
    treaty's limitation on inspections in the United States could be
    revised upward after the treaty enters into force. As you are aware, no
    more than twenty American producers of Schedule III and unscheduled
    discrete organic chemicals can be subjected to routine inspection in
    any one year.
        The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) has informed me that
    while this limit, in theory, could be revised upward with the support
    of the countries that have ratified the treaty, such a change is highly
    unlikely and would be strongly opposed by the United States Government.
    The Secretary General of the Organization for the Prohibition of
    Chemical Weapons could seek approval from the Executive Council to
    revise this limit. While the mechanism by which the Executive Council
    would rule on such a request has yet to be determined (whether by
    consensus or super majority), the United States will have a seat on the
    Council and would be in a strong position to oppose such a proposal.
        More important, ACDA assures me that it is highly unlikely that
    such a proposal would ever be made. Because the purpose of routine
    inspections is to verify the declarations made by each country that has
    signed the treaty, the Organization is unlikely to focus as many as
    twenty inspections on any one country. Because the number of inspectors
    is limited, it is more likely that inspections will be conducted in as
    many countries as possible to determine the compliance of different
    nations.
        I hope that this information answers any concerns you had about how
    the Chemical Weapons Convention might affect your business. If you have
    any further questions about the Chemical Weapons Convention and its
    effect on industry, please contact me or John Lis of my staff at (202)
    224-5042.
                Sincerely,
                                          Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
                                               Ranking Minority Member.

        Mr. Johnson. OK. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Whoever has something he wants to say, please
    do. I have one more question and then we will sing the doxology
    and depart.
        Mr. Webber. Thank you, sir.
        I want to elaborate on the $600 million figure.
        Mr. Chairman, I said earlier that this could be the tip of
    the iceberg. As you know, Germany, the U.K., Japan, and other
    major trading countries have already signed the convention. Our
    greatest fear is that if we are a non-party, a non-signatory,
    we are going to see some trade barriers being erected that will
    impact a good part of our $61 billion in exports that we
    produce annually.
        For example, Germany has already announced that it is going
    to impose new restrictions on trade with nonmember nations
    commencing 29 April. That, in part, is what drives us. We want
    to be reliable trading partners. We have been up to this point.
        Today, as we sit across the table, they are looking at us
    with a jaundiced eye wondering why this treaty has not been
    ratified and wondering what actions they ought to take
    commencing 29 April. And we have already seen, and it has been
    in the newspapers, the action that Germany plans to take. They
    are going to take a look at all of our chemical trade, and we
    have no idea what kind of nontariff barriers are going to be
    erected. But we know it is going to be very, very difficult
    down the road to continue to trade in chemicals with this very
    large trading country.
        The Chairman. How many of your member companies are owned
    by Europeans? Glaxo is one of them.
        Mr. Webber. I think a little under 30 percent of our entire
    membership is represented by foreign owners.
        The Chairman. Do you mean the Europeans are going to put up
    trade barriers against their own companies in the United
    States?
        Mr. Webber. Sir, we are unbelievably competitive on a
    global basis, and that signal that we got from Germany is very,
    very serious, indeed. We feel we have legitimate concerns here.
        The Chairman. My last question, and I will let anybody
    answer this, though perhaps it is best directed to you, Fred,
    or Mr. Webber, is this. During these hearings, the committee
    has heard testimony from a number of foreign policy experts who
    are very concerned that Article XI of the treaty will be used
    by nations to pressure the United States to lower its export
    controls and to eliminate the Australia Group. Have you heard
    that?
        Mr. Webber. Yes, sir, I have. In your absence, I tried to
    respond to that in my testimony.
        The Chairman. OK. Let me get through this.
        Now the administration has promoted the CWC as an arms
    control treaty, but some clearly view the CWC as a treaty
    designed to facilitate trade in chemicals and in technology.
        Mr. Carpenter, in testimony before this committee, stated
    that one of the reasons for the Chemical Manufacturers
    Association's support of the CWC was the anticipation that, and
    I'm quoting him, ``An effective CWC could have the positive
    effect of liberalizing the existing system of export controls
    applicable to our industry's products, technologies, and
    processes.''
        Now my question to you is did your association write a
    letter of support for H.R. 361, which allowed for the licensing
    of free trade in chemicals among the CWC members, and does CMA
    continue to favor the reduction of U.S. export controls on the
    dual use chemicals controlled by the CWC?
        Mr. Webber. Let me take a stab at what I think Mr.
    Carpenter meant when he said we want to see trade liberalized,
    if you will.
        As I said in my formal testimony, we have a long history of
    support for U.S. export control law, and the Australia Group,
    and limited multilateral control regimes like the Australia
    Group.
        We think the CWC is a logical extension of those control
    systems. It broadens the scope, makes more nations live up to
    the high standards set by our own country, the U.S.
        So we don't think CWC will replace existing U.S. export
    controls or the Australia Group. Both will be around, as you
    know, sir, for a long time.
        As confidence in the treaty grows, we think it will
    eventually be possible to create a single, integrated export
    control regime under the banner of CWC. But, of course, that is
    down the road. But that's what we mean when we say
    ``liberalizing trade,'' and I think that is what Dr. Carpenter
    meant.
        The Chairman. Well, did you or did your association not, or
    did it, write in support of H.R. 361?
        Mr. Webber. I have been advised that we were part of a
    coalition that indeed supported that bill. But we did not
    specifically focus on any particular provision of the bill. But
    we gave general endorsement.
        The Chairman. So you didn't write a letter? You were just
    among those present?
        Mr. Webber. No, we wrote a letter in support, as part of
    the coalition in support.
        The Chairman. What I needed there was just a yes or no.
        Mr. Webber. Yes.
        The Chairman. Now you understand that that bill proposed to
    reduce U.S. export controls. Is that not correct?
        Mr. Webber. Yes.
        The Chairman. And, too, it offered to license free trade,
    did it not?
        Mr. Webber. Yes.
        The Chairman. And you still favored it?
        Mr. Webber. We have not supported any elimination of export
    controls over precursor chemicals, and I think that is the key
    statement that we would stand by.
        The Chairman. Please repeat that?
        Mr. Webber. We would not advocate the elimination of any
    export controls having to do with precursor chemicals.
        The Chairman. Well, didn't you do that when you advocated
    this bill?
        Mr. Webber. We don't think so, sir.
        The Chairman. You don't?
        Mr. Webber. No.
        The Chairman. I might want to put that letter into the
    testimony here.
        Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, before you strike the gavel,
    I'm not going to ask a question. I just want to make an
    admission.
        Mr. Johnson may be right, because Part 10 is part of the
    Annex, Mr. Johnson, and the Annex means that it may not be
    covered by a requirement to have the U.S. Senate ratify any
    change. But I will still get you the full answer. I just wanted
    to make sure that I tell you my staff points out it is the
    Annex, not the body of the treaty. So you may be right. Let me
    check it out.
        Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Senator.
        The Chairman. The skies are going to fall.
        No, he has admitted he has made a mistake--in 1987.
        Senator Biden. No, in 1972, when I ran.
        The Chairman. We enjoy each other; and I respect Joe, and
    he knows that.
        Senator Biden. As I do you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Lady and gentlemen, thank you very much for
    spending this afternoon with us. I did not intend for it to go
    so long. But you have made a substantial record, and I
    appreciate your going through the trouble of being here and
    testifying as you have.
        If there be no further business to come before the
    committee, we stand in recess.
        Senator Biden. Thanks, Jesse.
        The Chairman. Yes, sir.
        [Whereupon, at 5:25 p.m. the committee adjourned, to
    reconvene at 10:07 a.m., Tuesday, April 17, 1997.]

                          CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, APRIL 17, 1997

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in
    room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Chuck Hagel,
    presiding.
        Present: Senators Hagel, Biden and Kerry.
        Senator Hagel. The committee will come to order.
        Congressman Goss, thank you, and welcome. You probably were
    expecting Chairman Helms. I am sorry to disappoint you and the
    other members of the second panel. Chairman Helms had a couple
    of responsibilities to attend to this morning and has asked me
    to fill in, and I am privileged to do so.
        As a 4-month United States Senator, Congressman, we make
    progress quickly over here, as you can see. So, if you work
    hard and do the right thing, you are Chairman of the Foreign
    Relations Committee after 4 months. That is the way it works.
        So we are very, very pleased to have you, as well as our
    distinguished panel who follow you, Congressman. And I will
    just briefly acknowledge our panel, and then I know you may
    have a vote coming up soon, so we would get right to business.
    The opportunity to have you over here, Congressman, is
    significant, because we all know you chair the House Permanent
    Select Committee on Intelligence. Your observations, insights
    and contributions will be important to this body, in helping us
    make a very difficult decision.
        Then, after you are completed with your testimony--I
    understand you will have to leave immediately after that--we
    will have a panel following you, consisting of General Bill
    Odom, former Director of the National Security Agency; Mr. Ed
    O'Malley, former Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation and head of the FBI's Foreign Counterintelligence
    Operations; and the Hon. Ronald Lehman, former Director of the
    Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. So we are very privileged
    to have all of you.
        And, again, Mr. Chairman, welcome, and we look forward to
    your testimony.

      STATEMENT OF HON. PORTER J. GOSS, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM
                                FLORIDA

        Mr. Goss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I congratulate
    you on your meteoric rise and wish you continuing success in
    your endeavors, and I hope you will give my compliments to the
    Chairman when he is back.
        I also compliment you on the quality of your second panel.
    It is obviously made up of folks who know a good deal about
    this subject as well. And I greatly appreciate the opportunity
    to be here this morning.
        Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, you have clearly
    an awesome responsibility in deciding whether to ratify the
    Chemical Weapons Convention. As a Member of the House, who does
    not have a vote on this matter at this threshold, I am very
    especially honored that you have asked for my views as you
    pursue your advice and consent obligation.
        My testimony today is generally based on my knowledge and
    experience, including of course committee assignments on the
    House International Relations and the Intelligence Committees.
    But I also come as a Member of Congress, charged with
    representing views of the good people of Southwest Florida,
    views I consider a very rich slice of America.
        We all understand that the stakes are extremely high in
    what is about here today. No margin for error. Chemical weapons
    are so dangerous, so frightening and so difficult to control
    that is only natural and proper that the global community seeks
    to contain and eradicate them. The question is how to do it
    effectively.
        I know that those of us charged with our Nation's security
    have given this matter very much thought and carefully reviewed
    the commentary of many distinguished former leaders, public
    servants who have come down on opposite sides of this issue. I
    remain deeply troubled about the CWC's ability to meet the
    promise of its title and of its proponents. Given my review and
    my concerns, Mr. Chairman, in general, I conclude that I cannot
    support this treaty. Primarily and specifically, effective and
    balanced verification is too doubtful.
        My comments today focus on the critical issue of
    verification, and then seek to broaden the debate somewhat with
    a discussion of how the control of chemical agents and weapons
    fits into the overall strategy we all seek to ensure protection
    for the American people, for American interests, and for
    American allies.
        Finally, I want to briefly discuss a very real and
    practical aspect of CWC that has great significance to all of
    us as we embark on our annual budget process that will not be
    news to anybody here--the cost of implementation.
        Going to verification, first, Mr. Chairman, let me discuss
    this. At the outset, I want to state that I am not an
    individual who believes that arms control is a worthless
    endeavor. Mr. Lehman, I am sure, will agree with that. We have
    talked about this subject many times. On the contrary, I
    believe that our arms control efforts during the cold war were
    a critical component of a strategy that resulted in the end of
    the cold war and, subsequently, the collapse of the Soviet
    Union.
        Arms control truly has its place in our foreign policy and
    national security objectives. The process of arms control and
    the treaties that result can build a level of trust between
    signatories, and it can provide a measure of insight and
    information that is useful to the Nation. Obviously, if this
    were the only yardstick needed to measure the worthiness of the
    treaty, then CWC would be an undeniably valuable and worthwhile
    endeavor.
        Certainly, through the provisions found in CWC, some
    information would be available, and cooperation among most
    signatories could likely benefit our Nation to a degree. In
    fact, the acting Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. George
    Tenet, rightly stated to the Senate Intelligence Committee that
    there are some tools in the CWC--namely, inspections and data
    exchange--that, as an intelligence professional, he would find
    beneficial. And I certainly concur with that.
        For the intelligence community, it is clearly true that
    more information and insight is beneficial to analysis.
    However, the decision to ratify a treaty is not based on
    whether the intelligence community can get more data, but, in
    part, on whether we can monitor the provisions of the treaty
    and whether we, as a government, can verify that these
    provisions have been met or are being broken.
        And here, Mr. Tenet confirms what his predecessors have
    already stated and what I, too, believe. Monitoring compliance
    with CWC provisions will be very difficult. As you have heard,
    former DCI Woolsey, who negotiated the CFE treaty, an
    understands the complexity and importance of being able to
    monitor the provisions of a multinational treaty, stated that,
    quote, the chemical weapons problem is so difficult from an
    intelligence perspective that I cannot state that we have high
    confidence in our ability to detect noncompliance, especially
    on a small scale, unquote.
        Mr. Tenet, more recently, confirmed that assessment when he
    told the Senate Intelligence Committee--again, I will quote--I
    will say that our ability to monitor the CWC provisions
    probably is still not very good, unquote.
        Mr. Chairman, I must say that given the statements of those
    who have been in the position of managing intelligence
    resources and understanding their capabilities, combined with
    my own experience as an intelligence professional--a long time
    ago, I would add--and as a member and now chairman of the House
    Intelligence Committee, I believe that our ability to monitor
    the CWC is very questionable.
        I believe that is certainly true if you consider the more
    traditional and accepted definition of, quote, effectively
    verifiable, unquote. That is, the effectively verifiable means
    having a high level of assurance in the intelligence
    community's ability to reliably detect a militarily significant
    violation in a timely fashion. I do not believe we have those
    assurances.
        But even if you consider the much more watered down
    definition that has been promoted by the current
    administration, our capabilities are called into question--and
    I am not sure we can fulfill even that mandate. Former DCI John
    Deutch, when he was the Deputy Secretary of Defense, stated to
    the Senate Armed Services Committee that a CWC verification
    regime, quote, should prove reasonably effective, unquote, over
    time.
        As this committee has heard several times, the language of
    the classified National Intelligence Estimate from August 1993
    looms very large. And again, I will quote from it. The
    capability of the intelligence community to monitor compliance
    with the Chemical Weapons Convention is severely limited and
    likely to remain so for the rest of the decade. The key
    provision of the monitoring regime, challenge inspections at
    undeclared sites, can be thwarted by a na-
    tion determined to preserve a small, secret program, using the
    delays and managed access rules allowed by the convention,
    unquote.
        I think that Chairman Helms had some interesting comments
    on industrial espionage as well, which he put in the record
    back--I think it was--on the 19th of March, which fall
    generally into this area.
        Moving from verification to a broader perspective, Mr.
    Chairman, I think that in viewing the CWC, one must put into
    perspective what we need do regarding the spread and potential
    use of chemical weapons in terms of our own national security.
    And I am not discounting our allies or other interests, but
    national security comes first.
        Put simply, what is the threat and what do we do about it?
        I would argue that the threat has continued to evolve over
    the past 4 years, since CWC was signed. Among obvious evidence
    of the types of new challenges we face was the incident in
    1995, when the Aum Shinrikyo cult clandestinely produced sarin
    gas and deployed it into a Japanese subway. Although some may
    argue that this was simply an act of religious fervor, I fear
    that this is precisely the type of MO that terrorist groups may
    employ in the future.
        The transnational issues of proliferation--and here I refer
    specifically to the production and proliferation of chemical
    weapons and terrorism, whether state-sponsored or not--directly
    affect our Nation's security, perhaps almost as dramatically as
    the threat introduced by the incorporation of nuclear weapons
    into the inventories of the Soviet Union that we all remember.
        But the thought of small-scale production and employment of
    chemical weapons by a terrorist organization is one that should
    frighten anyone knowledgeable of the ease with which such
    weapons of terror can in fact be made. This type of threat must
    get special focus from our intelligence community--focus that
    could be drawn away by the need to monitor the CWC. It would be
    sad, indeed, if while creating a false sense of security by
    attempting to monitor this treaty, we found that we had
    diminished capacity to attack these transnational threats
    specifically.
        Then, Mr. Chairman, there is the larger issue of state-
    sponsored chemical weapons programs. Some would argue that an
    advantage of CWC is the overall pressure that it would place on
    states that are not part of the agreement to do the right
    thing. Although this may have been true during the cold war at
    some time, I am not as confident that it is true today, or will
    be tomorrow, for those countries that concern us most. After
    all, we call these countries ``rogue'' for very good reasons--
    they do not conform and do not care about international norms,
    nor accepted behavior.
        Let me use the first START treaty to illustrate my point on
    what could be the likely effects of CWC on some of these
    nations. START is a treaty that has proven to be very effective
    and extremely valuable to our national security. Because of the
    treaty provisions that can be monitored by the intelligence
    community and verified by our government, we have reduced the
    threat that once had many of us learning how to take shelter
    under our desks at school. Thank heavens those days are gone.
        One of the noted values of START was the example it set for
    others, by saying that nuclear weapons were bad and that even
    the superpowers understood that we needed to walk back from
    that brink. However, it is clear that the START treaty did not
    set an example that was so dramatic that it prevented other
    rogue countries from pursuing their own nuclear weapons
    programs, as we all know.
        In some cases, these are the same states as those we are
    now worried about regarding chemical weapons programs and
    whether they might adhere to CWC. Having witnessed the types of
    actions and activities of these countries during this decade,
    it is hard to believe that they will somehow now cave to the
    threat of international reason promoted in the CWC.
        The fact is that reasonable nations will abide by
    international norms. Efforts like the Australia Group regime
    can be effective with reasonable nations. They are good
    efforts. The same is probably true for the CWC. But our
    greatest concern, certainly from an intelligence perspective,
    is not states that we term ``reasonable.'' If everyone were
    reasonable, would we be here discussing this today?
        Another question is the wherewithal of our signatories to
    enforce treaty provisions substantially and to engage actively
    non-signatories in adopting CWC principles. I noted with
    interest the recent statement by James Schlesinger, former DCI,
    regarding the world's incredibly mild reaction to the use of
    chemical weapons by the Iraqis, in clear and unambiguous
    violation of the Geneva Convention. I have little doubt that
    CWC could well suffer the same fate, coming under the same
    geopolitical yoke that often tempers the need for forceful,
    direct international actions.
        And at this point, I am going to insert some recent
    history. I must say that I have reservations about our own
    government's seriousness in this regard. Just this morning I
    learned that this administration made yet another attempt to
    sidestep direct action regarding chemical weapons
    proliferation. In this case, I understand that the State
    Department has attempted to modify its statements to the
    Senate, taking a more relaxed approach to the transfers of
    dual-use chemicals to Iran. This was recently reported in the
    Washington Times, and I am relieved to see that there is
    bipartisan outrage to this.
        This is not the first time that this administration has
    attempted to downplay China's activities in order to protect
    China from necessary, lawful sanctions. Many members of the
    House Intelligence Committee, on both sides of the aisle--and I
    stress that--are increasingly questioning this administration's
    response--or, more appropriately, their lack of response--to
    blatant proliferation of ballistic missiles and chemical agents
    or weapons, as has been reported in the press.
        I think Senator Stevens had it right when he indicated that
    this administration is so narrowly interpreting our laws that
    we will be unable to do anything about the proliferation
    problem. And that concerns me. I am very concerned that in
    continued attempts to protect policy, the administration
    appears willing to ignore the spirit and possibly the letter of
    the law. With this in mind, I wonder what hope we have of
    implementing the CWC accords in a way that will really be
    effective.
        Mr. Chairman, regarding the task ahead with those countries
    that we know are the bad actors, I point to the hurdles that we
    have encountered related to the United Nations inspections in
    Iraq. In what many would term a more robust inspection regime
    than CWC, proof of a chemical weapons program was concealed
    from U.N. inspectors for a great deal of time, and the full
    extent of such a program is likely still unknown. This is, in
    part, a factor of the ease with which chemical weapons can be
    concealed.
        I am afraid, however, that some of this probably has to do
    with the fact that today much more is known about our national
    technical means and other techniques of information collection
    and analysis than at any other time in our history. Some of
    this has to do with the fact that the technological explosion
    that we have witnessed over this decade has made people and
    countries generally more knowledgeable. We have lost some of
    our edge. Denial and deception is an unresolved challenge that
    leaves unacceptable gaps in verifiability.
        Unfortunately, another aspect is that we have made our own
    job harder. Mr. Chairman, it saddens me to say that I have just
    received a highly classified document in my office that relates
    to the damage to the effectiveness of some of our sensitive
    sources and methods. It appears this damage may have been the
    result of a very cavalier--or at least misguided--attitude
    toward declassification of information within the Department of
    Defense and the intelligence community, apparently in order to
    pacify political pressures from senior leaders in the
    government. And that is not a good reason.
        Obviously, I cannot go into any detail here on this issue,
    but I assure you that my colleagues and I on the Intelligence
    Committee, and I am sure our counterparts on the Senate side,
    will be examining this problem in detail over the next few
    weeks and months. Suffice it to say, however, that if
    interpreted correctly, the bad actors could well have a leg up
    on their ability to conceal activity and our ability to detect
    that they did not have previously.
        The final area I would like to briefly address for you to
    consider, Mr. Chairman, is that of the implementation costs
    associated with monitoring CWC provisions. I know that you have
    received reports on the overall costs associated with
    implementation, and that the United States may pay up to 25
    percent of those overall costs. I would like to highlight the
    possible effects on the intelligence community.
        Often, because monitoring of our agreements and treaties
    with other nations is a matter of great importance to us,
    obviously, the priority placed on such activity is high in
    terms of our requirements, and the costs and the allocation of
    our resources are commensurate. I think that this is generally
    the right approach. Sometimes, however, this can lead to
    intelligence programs and a collection and analytical emphasis
    that can place greater priority on monitoring specific
    technical aspects of a treaty than on filling in the
    intelligence gaps. This is not a complaint of the intelligence
    community; it is merely an observation.
        My concern about this issue stems from the fact that
    dollars for intelligence and defense are at risk in the current
    budget environment--and we all know that. Yet, even though the
    intelligence community is significantly smaller, the demands
    for intelligence have significantly increased. Consequently,
    budget decisions within the community and within the
    intelligence committees of Congress become more and more
    problematic. And that is probably an understatement.
        At the end of the day, I must wonder whether intelligence
    dollars will be better spent on trying to effectively monitor
    CWC provisions that may in fact be unverifiable or focusing on
    comprehensive efforts against transnational threats. I use that
    term to refer to the proliferation of weapons of mass
    destruction, including chemical weapons, terrorism, narcotics
    trafficking, and of course international organized crime.
        As the Intelligence Committee reviews this year's budget
    submission, the potential tradeoffs between monitoring the CWC
    and focusing on other measures against the transnational
    threats could be a risky proposition.
        Mr. Chairman, I have no doubt that the CWC can be
    important. And I know that the motives of those supporting it
    are certainly very well intentioned, and I take nothing away
    from that effort. But the threat of the so-called transnational
    issues is so great that I must wonder to what degree the CWC
    helps us meet those challenges ahead. We need your support to
    make sure that we have a robust, flexible intelligence
    community in the future that can take on all of the challenges
    that we have. Unfortunately, when I look at the tradeoffs, the
    CWC comes up somewhat short of that mark.
        I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to insert
    my views.
        Senator Hagel. Chairman Goss, thank you.
        I have been joined here by my distinguished colleague from
    Delaware, Senator Biden, who is the ranking minority member of
    the Foreign Relations Committee. Welcome.
        Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to have you
    here. I served on the Intelligence Committee for 10 years, but
    you have served in the intelligence community. You are one of
    the only folks here that has that hands-on experience.
        I must say, I apologize for not being here for your whole
    testimony; the Judiciary Committee is meeting, as well. I know
    you know the problem. But I will read your whole statement and
    take what you have to say seriously.
        The one thing you have said that I do agree with, and I am
    not sure how much more relative to CWC, is the need for us to
    have a robust intelligence capability unrelated to CWC. I was
    one of those guys, back when we had this--when we started the
    committee you now chair, that came out of the--that is how
    old--that is how long I have been here--it came out of the
    Church committee. And I was one of the so-called charter
    members. And I remember how upset everyone was in my party and
    my part of the party, because I kept proposing spending more
    money on the agency.
        And I would just say--and I realize it is slightly
    extraneous--but it seems to me, at a time when the wall is
    down, when other armies are weaker, when we have an
    overwhelming predominance of military capability, when we are
    cutting our military, this is the time to expand our capacity
    and not diminish our capacity relative to two things. One, the
    intelligence community and the other, the Foreign Service. This
    is a time to move out, not pull in. And so I agree with your
    overall admonition to be careful about what we are not doing
    for the community.
        I think we have a little disagreement on--I know we have a
    little disagreement on the efficacy of the CWC, but I will not
    engage you in that now. I am told you are off. I know how busy
    you are. I appreciate you, as they say, making that long walk
    to the other body. It is a long way over here, I know that.
        Mr. Goss. Thank you, Senator. I want to congratulate you
    for your vision in setting up the oversight committee. It has
    proved to be a totally appropriate and worthwhile enterprise.
        Senator Biden. I cannot take credit for setting it up. That
    was Senator Church. I just got put on it. I was just one of the
    first ones put on the committee.
        Mr. Goss. Well, if you were there, your fingerprints are on
    it, and you will have to accept the praise.
        Senator Biden. I am afraid they are.
        Mr. Goss. I also want to commend very much the comments you
    made last evening. They were very informative to me, and I
    think will be very informative in this process. And I was
    extremely impressed with your leadership on that point.
        Senator Biden. Well, you are very gracious. Thank you very
    much, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Goss. Thank you, sir.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Hagel. Senator, thank you.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
        If we could now have the second panel come to the witness
    table. Thank you. [Pause.]
        Senator Hagel. Gentlemen, thank you.
        I have introduced all three of you, and unless my
    colleague, Senator Biden has any opening statements, why do not
    we get right to it. And we will just go, at least from Senator
    Biden and my perspective, we will go left to right, and we will
    start with you, Mr. Lehman.
        Senator Biden. Does it matter if we let the General go
    first.
        Senator Hagel. No. That is fine with me. If you would
    prefer to have General Odom go first.
        Mr. Lehman. I never made general, so I think it is a
    protocol question.
        Senator Hagel. Well, I am a former sergeant, so I always
    put the generals at the back.
        Senator Biden. General, were you ever a sergeant?
        General Odom. No, I was not, unfortunately.
        Senator Biden. Well, then, he outranks you in this man's
    army.
        Senator Hagel. I am glad we got that straight.
        General, let me just reintroduce you, so that everyone
    knows, here in the hearing room, who you are and the expertise
    that you bring. You are the former Director of the National
    Security Agency. You spent a lifetime in the military. You come
    to this panel this morning with considerable experience and
    expertise. So, we are grateful. Thank you.

    STATEMENT OF WILLIAM ODOM, GENERAL, U.S. ARMY (RETIRED), FORMER
                   DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

        General Odom. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and
    Senator Biden, minority ranking member. It is a pleasure and an
    honor to testify before you today. You have asked me to express
    judgments on the verifiability and the verification regime of
    the Chemical Weapons Convention.
        Now, initially, I considered the Convention rather benign,
    a treaty that would probably not prevent any determined state
    from violating it secretly, but probably having some marginal
    deterrent effect and, therefore, favorably.
        In general, I think the public--certainly, the media and a
    lot of opinion-makers and Washington political leaders--tend to
    favor arms control treaties, not because these treaties
    necessarily control arms, but because the sentiments and the
    intentions are noble. And to oppose them in this climate is to
    appear to be against virtue and for sin.
        Unfortunately, I think the record of arms control
    agreements is not objectively tracked and audited. And if it
    were, and widely published, I think the image of virtue would
    become seriously tarnished in several cases. But such a record
    is not kept to moderate these illusions and, therefore,
    whenever the potential damage for an arms control treaty is not
    very great and it may have some marginal advantage or gains,
    prudence allows us to support them responsibly, lining up with
    public virtue against sin.
        Now, upon a little examination of the verification regime,
    I began to realize it was not as benign as I had assumed. The
    length of the treaty itself immediately raised my suspicion.
    Now, one need go no further than the definitions of the terms
    at the beginning of the text to see the possibilities for
    dangerous ambiguities. This is not to suggest that the
    definitions have not been set forth with great care and
    thought. It is merely to underscore that some aspects of the
    definition task inherently must include ambiguities.
        For example, toxic chemicals and precursors, as clear
    categories, begin to be vitiated when purposes not prohibited
    by this convention are enumerated, especially where they
    concern international trade in chemicals. For another example,
    production capacity, is not easy to define in all cases with
    great certainty. The surge capacity of production facilities is
    often deceptive.
        Now, moving to the guidelines for schedules of chemicals,
    one has to wonder if in the context of rapid technological
    change in chemistry, whether or not these schedules can be kept
    updated in a practical way. For example, in the early 1980's,
    when I was Chief of Army Intelligence, we were concerned with
    the possible Soviet production of mycotoxins, substances that
    rest ambiguously on the boundary between chemical and organic
    substances. A research chemist and a molecular biologist could
    debate that, and they could probably provide you numerous other
    such ambiguous examples that we will have to deal with if this
    treaty goes into effect.
        The drafters of the text have probably done about as well
    as is possible in these circumstances. That is the point. The
    circumstances are not very amenable to arms control treaties.
    As a result, the length and the complexity of the treaty is
    such that very few people have the depth of expertise--
    scientific, technical, legal, military, and intelligence--to
    say with even low confidence what the likely consequences of
    the treaty would be if implemented.
        I am surprised, therefore, that senior officials in the
    administration assert their support for it in such an
    unqualified manner. And I seriously doubt that any but staff
    specialists have read it carefully. And if they have, I doubt
    that they fully understood it.
        I am not surprised, however, to learn that the acting
    Director of Central Intelligence has reconfirmed the
    community's position that the treaty cannot be verified today,
    nor does he see prospects that it can be in the future.
        Now, looking at the verification regime as a former
    official of the intelligence community, I am disturbed by it,
    not just because it is impossible to verify with a high degree
    of confidence, but because it also complicates our security
    problems. Take, for example, the U.N.-like organization set up
    to make inspections. All of the appointed members may have no
    intelligence links whatsoever initially. As they find that they
    can tramp around in all kinds of U.S. production facilities,
    however, foreign intelligence services are likely to offer to
    supplement their wages for a little technology collection
    activity on the side. And they will probably provide truly
    sophisticated covert technical means to facilitate these
    efforts.
        Over time, therefore, it is only prudent to assume that a
    few members of this group will not be entirely trustworthy. If
    the KGB could penetrate the CIA, it and other intelligence
    services are likely to be able to penetrate this U.N.-like CWC
    inspection agency.
        Now, I understand that other witnesses have already raised
    questions about Article X and Article XI, which give all
    signatories the right to participate in the fullest exchange of
    information concerning the means of protection against chemical
    weapons. Such information inevitably includes knowledge of
    offensive means. Because, without it, one cannot know how to
    defend against them.
        It seems, from the treaty language, that each signatory is
    left to judge what information is to be included in sharing.
    And that implies as many interpretations as their are
    signatories. If all such information is available, then every
    signatory's interpretation governs its further distribution.
        Now, the incentive to exploit this ambiguity will only be
    great where the most innovative and effective offensive
    chemical means are concerned. That is, the very ones one would
    hope the treaty would be most effective in restricting.
    Pondering the implications, I am forced to conclude that the
    treaty could become the mechanism for proliferating the most
    dangerous offensive CW means, while becoming reasonable
    effective against the far less offensive means.
        This highly perverse and probable consequence of the treaty
    gives me pause, to say the least.
        Another aspect of the treaty puzzles me deeply. This thick
    document is entitled ``Instructions to Industry: Chemical
    Weapons Convention Data Reporting Requirements,'' which was
    drafted by the Commerce Department. It defines a very complex,
    tedious reporting system. Unless I am mistaken, one of the
    major concerns of the Congress in the last few years has been
    to reduce costly and burdensome regulations on U.S. business.
        Now, this document, required for the verification regime,
    looks like a costly and troublesome stack of regulations. My
    discovery of it made me highly suspicious of the convention
    itself. Do all of the affected U.S. firms know that they are
    about to face these instructions? Do they really know what the
    data reporting will cost? Do they know the costs of an
    intrusive inspection, even an occasional one, not just in
    direct monetary costs, which they must bear, but also the
    inherent costs of shutting down production during an
    inspection?
        Now, when I ask congressional staffers why the business
    community was not up in arms about this aspect of the treaty, I
    learned that several large chemical companies actually support
    this and agree to accept the costs. I also learned that not all
    businesses to be affected are aware that they will have to bear
    these costs. And, recently, it seems that some such firms,
    those in the aerospace industry, for example, have awakened to
    the implications and do not like them.
        And when I asked why the large chemical firms so happily
    accept the idea of paying hundreds of thousands of dollars to
    carry the regulatory burden of the convention I got no good
    answers. The answers were no more satisfying to my questions
    about whether all the firms which will be affected actually
    know that they will be, and have considered the cost and the
    inconveniences.
        Now, today, I pose another kind of question. The red tape
    morass, this kind of red tape morass, required by the
    verification regime--and even if the U.S. is willing to accept
    its costs and impose it on U.S. industry--what are the
    prospects that other countries will take equally comprehensive
    steps to monitor their own relevant industrial firms? As one
    who has devoted more than a little time to studying the nature
    of foreign domestic governments and political systems, I doubt
    that more than a few dozen have the administrative capacity to
    do so. And when the matter of costs is added, their incentives
    for making such a system effective will be negative, not
    positive.
        Now, I am inclined to believe, therefore, that if the
    United States ratifies the convention, only it and a few other
    states--none of which really needs the treaty to restrain them
    from developing and using chemical weapons--will be tying
    themselves up in a tangle of red tape while the rest of the
    world largely ignores these requirements, even if they promise
    to abide by them. And those states posing the biggest problems
    for verification will not cooperate in any case.
        Now, if one thinks through the implications of these
    regulations, therefore, one is encouraged to conclude that a
    few countries who do not need to be tied down by the convention
    will be engaged in the costly activity of checking one another
    while most states in the world go about their business ignoring
    the whole affair. Where states sign and ratify the convention
    and then are found by inspectors not to have regulations, what
    do we do then?
        What do we say when they complain that they cannot afford
    them? Do we then finance them from our own budget, as we are
    doing in Russia in connection with other arms control
    agreements? Even if we agreed to do that, whatever the cost, it
    would not work; because lack of administrative capacity, not
    shortage of funds, is the critical problem in most of these
    states.
        These are some of my reactions to learning more about the
    convention.
        As I considered the additional concerns expressed by
    several former Secretaries of Defense, I found them also very
    compelling. For those who were not persuaded by their
    arguments, however, and who approach the convention looking for
    reasons to support it, willing to accept only marginal
    advantages as sufficient for justifying the ratification, I
    strongly advise against following that inclination. The best
    intentions can sometimes produce highly undesirable outcomes. I
    see more than sufficient evidence to convince me that the CWC
    is clearly such a case.
        It is not enough to resort to detailed technical arguments
    to score debating points against some of the objections I have
    raised. The treaty is so complex that it is possible to isolate
    a particular concern and to find arguments that seem to allay
    the fear. Within an hour of further examination, however, one
    can find yet another concern and another, almost endlessly.
        This assessment does not mean the drafters and negotiators
    did a sloppy job. On the contrary, it means they were asked to
    apply an arms control solution to a problem that essentially
    defies its very nature. Common sense tells us this unhappy
    truth.
        It is also implicit, I think, in acting Director George
    Tenet's rather candid letter to Senator Kyl about the
    intelligence community's own view of its present and future
    capacity to verify the treaty.
        Now, I think to push ahead in such circumstances strikes me
    as imprudent, not a modest step toward controlling chemical
    weapons. Rather, it is an effort to use a hopelessly complex
    treaty to escape political and military responsibilities that
    we will eventually have to face. The several editorials in the
    Washington Post on the CWC show this tendency--a growing
    recognition that the complexities really are beyond the reach
    of treaty drafters, but not yet willing to accept the
    implications.
        The most recent one today comes remarkably close to
    admitting the treaty's perversity, its enormous potential for
    very bad outcomes, hidden in its complicated verification
    regime, and wrapped in deceptive appeals to our best instincts.
        Now, if we deceive ourselves for a number of years by the
    illusion that we have escaped these responsibilities, the price
    will be higher than had we faced up to them all along.
    Ratifying the convention, therefore, strikes me as
    unambiguously imprudent, not a close call, by no means a risk
    worth taking, certainly not a harmless step that puts us on the
    side of righteousness.
        Thank you.
        Senator Hagel. General Odom, thank you very much.
        Let me now introduce Mr. Edward J. O'Malley. Mr. O'Malley
    is the former Assistant Director for Counterintelligence,
    Federal Bureau of Investigation. Mr. O'Malley, thank you.

      STATEMENT OF EDWARD J. O'MALLEY, FORMER ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
         (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE), FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

        Mr. O'Malley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning,
    Senator Biden. Something you just said reminded me of an
    incident that happened many years ago.
        Judge Webster, then director of the FBI, and I were
    testifying on the FBI's foreign counterintelligence budget
    before one of the two intelligence committees--I do not recall
    which one--and he was asked the question whether he thought he
    was really asking for enough money for the Bureau's foreign
    counterintelligence program, that the committee was quite
    willing to give him more.
        I have never heard such a question before or since, but
    something you just said reminded me of that.
        Yes, I did head the FBI's foreign counterintelligence
    program. After I retired, I have been employed for about 10
    years in private industry, including with IBM, where I worked
    out of the Office of General Counsel and was involved in
    countering on IBM's behalf those who would steal IBM's trade
    secrets, including, I might add, the Japanese and the French.
        Alvin Toffler, the futurist, has stated, the 21st Century
    will be marked by information wars and increased economic and
    financial espionage. The race for information of all kinds will
    be motivated not only by a desire to lead, but will be required
    to avoid obsolescence.
        The energy released in competition for market share has
    significantly replaced but has not eliminated the energy that
    once drove the cold war military strategies of the West and its
    adversaries. The shift from acquisition of global power by
    force to one of acquisition by competitive strategy marks what
    promises to be a remarkable revolution, remarkable not only in
    the sense of its relevance to national power, but also in a
    sense of the increasingly disparate nature of the competitors,
    which run the gamut from many of the traditional cold war
    adversaries to traditional friends and allies.
        In terms of a traditional classical espionage threat vis-a-
    vis hostile intelligence operations in the United States,
    intelligence services of the former Warsaw Pact, the People's
    Republic of China, Cuba, North Vietnam, and North Korea, were
    of major concern from a counterintelligence standpoint.
        The activities of the former Soviet Union and others are as
    aggressive as ever, and remain a major threat. What is new,
    however, is the increased importance given by them to the
    collection of American corporate proprietary information.
    Another change in terms of the foreign threat is that it now
    includes not only a nation's intelligence services, but also
    other governmental ministries and/or corporations.
        Chief among their strategies is the acquisition, licit or
    otherwise, of the battlefield's strategic targets, a
    corporation's sensitive business information and intellectual
    property. I think it is clear to anybody that the lifeblood of
    any corporation rests on intellectual property, and I might say
    the same thing, in my opinion, applies to the lifeblood of a
    country.
        All of this has not gone unnoticed by our intelligence
    community and the Congress, both of which have been very much
    engaged in addressing espionage concerns of whatever variety
    such as was done in the 1970's. My testimony today will focus
    on what was done by both--that is, the Congress and the
    community--in the 1970's to address the threat as it existed
    then, and what has been done in the 1990's to meet an ever-
    increasing and complex intelligence threat.
        I will also comment on the concerns I have with the
    Chemical Weapons Convention as it relates to certain
    counterintelligence initiatives, and also to the extent that
    its ratification will result in mixed signals from the Congress
    to the counterintelligence community.
        I am not arguing that the ratification of the CWC should
    succeed or fall because of counterintelligence concerns. What I
    am suggesting is that those involved in the strategic
    decisionmaking process ought to consider these current concerns
    along with many others, such as recently expressed by General
    Odom.
        Historically, whatever other benefits may have resulted
    from the period of detente, there was no corresponding
    diminution of intelligence activities in the United States by
    the former Soviet Union or, for that matter, its Warsaw Pact
    allies. In fact, analysis by the American counterintelligence
    community in the 1970's documented a substantial increase in
    such activities undertaken with the hope that they would be
    overlook because of detente-generated goodwill.
        These hostile intelligence services and their counterparts
    in other areas of the world used every means at their disposal
    to enhance their intelligence collection in the United States,
    including the use of their diplomatic establishments, the
    United Nations Secretariat, commercial and trade delegations,
    students, ``illegals,'' third country operations, false flag
    operations, recruitment of third country nationals, and active
    major operations. No stone was left unturned in their efforts
    to obtain classified American political, scientific, and
    military information.
        Although all had sophisticated human intelligence
    recruitment techniques to recruit their intelligence targets,
    it must be stated that volunteers also did a substantial amount
    of harm.
        The common thread and the most important motivation of
    those who betrayed their country was money. This should not be
    forgotten in terms of today's threat, and I will comment a bit
    later on that point.
        Having done its homework in terms of the seriousness of the
    intelligence threat, the counterintelligence community made its
    case to Congress in the seventies in terms of resources needed
    to meet the threat. Congress responded and approved the
    resources, enabling the enhancement of the quality and quantity
    of people involved, the equipment, analysis, and training.
        The many counterintelligence successes of the 1980's were
    not accidental. They were the result of close cooperation
    between Congress and the counterintelligence community. Let me
    now switch to the nineties and the post cold war developments
    which are taking place.
        During the early 1990's, the United States became
    increasingly aware of the economic espionage threat to its
    interests on several occasions, the last occurring in February
    1995. The White House published national security strategies
    which focused on economic security as crucial not only to U.S.
    interests but to U.S. national security.
        This was further delineated by testimony of Secretary of
    State Christopher before the U.S. Senate on November 4, 1993,
    when he stated that in the post cold war world our national
    security is inseparable from our economic security, emphasizing
    the ``new centrality'' of economic policy in our foreign
    policy.
        To be sure, the intelligence services of Russia, the
    People's Republic of China and others remain a very significant
    force to be contended with vis-a-vis classical espionage. For
    example, the Russian SVR, the successor to KGB, and the Russian
    military intelligence service, the GRU, have sustained their
    activities aimed at the collection of national defense
    information; but they have also begun to pay added attention to
    American economic, scientific, and technological information.
        President Boris Yeltsin made this perfectly clear in a
    policy statement dated February 7, 1996. It was seconded by
    Ifgani Primakov, the former head of KGB. I think we ought to
    listen to these gentlemen.
        It should be recognized that the economic espionage against
    the United States should not be considered only in the
    abstract, as something which should be only of concern at some
    ill-defined time in the future. Know this future is now, and
    there is more than ample evidence not only of the threat, but
    of the implementation of the threat by human and technical
    intelligence as well as significant resulting damages.
        Again, it became clear to the counterintelligence community
    in 1990 that our counterintelligence policy had to be changed
    not only to meet classical espionage threat but also to mirror
    more closely the total spectrum of today's economic
    intelligence threats to the U.S. and corporations. The
    allocation of a large percentage of its counterintelligence
    resources to the former Soviet camp and the People's Republic
    of China had left it somewhat blind as to whether intelligence
    activities were occurring in the United States.
        As in the seventies, it was realized that something had to
    be done. That something was a new counterintelligence policy
    approved by the Attorney General in 1992 known as the national
    security threat list, which provides a road map for the
    redirection of FBI counterintelligence resources.
        The national security threat list contains two elements, an
    issue threat list and a country threat list. The latter is
    classified. I would like to concentrate, if I may, on the issue
    threat list.
        Two of the issues significantly involve countering by the
    FBI of foreign intelligence activities aimed at illicitly
    collecting information regarding weapons of mass destruction,
    including chemical weapons. The second issue involves
    countering attempts by foreign services to collect proprietary
    information of U.S. corporations.
        Given the importance of these two issues to U.S. national
    interests, the FBI will provide counterintelligence coverage
    irrespective of the country involved. A bit more on chemical
    weapons later.
        In 1994, the FBI initiated an economic espionage
    counterintelligence program. In 1 year's time the number of
    cases doubled from 400 to 800. In 1995, the Attorney General
    revamped the national security threat list to give greater
    emphasis to countering foreign economic espionage.
        The Director of the FBI testified publicly before Congress
    in February 1996 regarding economic espionage, calling it
    ``devastatingly harmful'' in terms of billions of dollars of
    losses and hundreds of thousands of jobs lost. He focused on
    economic espionage by some foreign governments which steal U.S.
    technology and proprietary information to provide their own
    industrial sectors with a competitive advantage.
        Economic intelligence collection operations come in various
    guises and under different sponsors. There have been
    Government-sponsored operations such as France's Direction
    Generale de la Securite Exterior, the DGSE, the French
    counterpart of CIA, with which I have some familiarity, which
    not long ago prioritized a collection effort aimed primarily at
    U.S. aerospace and defense industries.
        Other operations have been sponsored and run by foreign
    competitor firms without the assistance of their government,
    and there are examples of operations which combine foreign
    governments and industry.
        In the late 1980's, IBM learned that IBM France was
    penetrated by the DGSE through the recruitment of French
    nationals within the company. The information acquired by DGSE
    was passed to French companies, including Companie de Machine
    Bull, the IBM of France, which was then owned by the French
    Government.
        There is current information that France has been
    developing in the last 2 years a substantial economic espionage
    capability involving its business community, the French
    commercial attaches, and other. Its principal target is
    purportedly the United States.
        Despite all the efforts by the FBI and other governmental
    agencies, despite all the public and in camera testimony before
    Congress, and despite all the recognition on the part of the
    White House, the Department of State and others regarding the
    relevance of economic security to national security, Director
    Freeh and others recognize that in the final analysis there was
    little chance in stopping foreign economic espionage because
    Federal statutes simply did not allow the government to counter
    or deter this activity in any way remotely commensurate with
    the damage it was inflicting on the U.S. economy.
        As in the 1970's, the Department of Justice and the FBI
    again made their case to Congress, this time that a new law was
    needed to facilitate the stopping of foreign economic
    espionage. Once again, the Congress responded and passed the
    Economic Espionage Act of 1996.
        The EEA was passed with two goals in mind. First, to thwart
    attempts by foreign entities to steal trade secrets of American
    corporations. The more severe penalties of the act reflect this
    overriding concern regarding a foreign threat.
        Second, to allow the Federal Government to investigate,
    which had not been done before, at least in the sophisticated
    sense, to investigate and prosecute those engaged in economic
    espionage. Importantly, section 1839 of the Economic Espionage
    Act precludes--precludes--any Federal prosecution for trade
    secret theft unless its owner ``has taken reasonable measures
    to keep such information secret.''
        Let me now conclude by commenting on my counterintelligence
    concerns with the Chemical Weapons Convention as it relates to
    what I have said and what is going on now.
        While the national security threat list, supra, directs the
    FBI to focus its counterintelligence resources to prevent the
    illicit acquisition of chemical weapons information, the CWC
    would appear to facilitate the acquisition of such data through
    its challenge inspections. There is not an unrealistic
    possibility that these inspections could facilitate collection
    of the very kind of chemical weapons information that the FBI
    is charged to protect under the national security threat list.
        If I were a foreign intelligence officer and my country
    needed offensive or defensive information regarding chemical
    weapons, I would focus on a group of inspectors to be stationed
    at The Hague.
        As I indicated previously, there can be no Federal
    prosecutions under the Economic Espionage Act unless the owner
    of the trade secret has taken measures to keep it secret. This
    is standard trade secret law.
        The list of chemicals covered by the CWC is huge and open-
    ended, and will encompass companies beyond chemical companies
    such as pharmaceutical companies, computer companies, and
    others with no relationship to chemical weapons or the CWC
    except the manufacture of chemicals covered by the convention.
        One of the greatest concerns of companies that I have read
    about, and I have read a number of letters from major companies
    and major associations of companies, all of which--the common
    thread running through all of them is their concern that the
    CWC will open them up to economic espionage. I think their
    concerns are well-justified.
        One of the greatest concerns of the companies I have read
    about, as indicated, concerns the loss of trade secrets through
    inspections, including dual use technologies to foreign
    competitors. There seems to be mixed signals to the corporate
    world in that the Economic Espionage Act requires them to
    protect trade secrets, while the CWC requires them to hand over
    to inspectors what they may regard as trade secrets, and which
    they otherwise would have treated as such. This confusion in my
    opinion ought to be cleared up.
        I might add, there was one more issue on that national
    security threat list, and that was entitled, national critical
    technologies. Again, like proprietary information, the Bureau
    was charged with doing what it can from a counterintelligence
    perspective to protect against the illicit acquisition of these
    national critical technologies, which was decided by a panel at
    the White House. In other words, the panel said that these
    technologies are crucial to a superior military posture and
    also to a strong national economy.
        If you read these lists of national critical technologies,
    and it is unclassified, materials synthesis processing,
    electronic photonic materials, ceramics, composites, a flexible
    computer-integrated manufacturing, software, biotechnology,
    aeronautics, et cetera, et cetera, you can see that there is a
    nexus between some of the chemicals which are mentioned in CWC
    and those which are involved with these technologies.
        So again, you have somewhat of an inconsistency in terms of
    charging the FBI to protect these critical technologies on the
    one hand and CWC in effect possibly opening them up to
    compromise on the other hand.
        Again putting myself in the shoes of a foreign intelligence
    officer, I would not bother to go through all the complicated
    recruitment efforts to recruit someone within XYZ company. I
    would simply recruit an inspector who would be able to
    interview XYZ's employees, inspect documentation and records,
    have photographs taken, and take samples. I would achieve the
    same end, but would be doing so in a way sanctioned by the CWC.
        The acquisition of American trade secrets has become a high
    stakes business involving billions and billions of dollars, and
    I would be able to pay an agent handsomely to acquire such
    information.
        Thank you.
        Senator Hagel. Mr. O'Malley, thank you. We appreciate your
    testimony.
        Ronald F. Lehman, former Director, Arms Control and
    Disarmament Agency. Ron, welcome.

       STATEMENT OF HON. RONALD F. LEHMAN, FORMER DIRECTOR, ARMS
                     CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

        Mr. Lehman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin with a
    bit of a personal note. I was in California 2 days ago when the
    staff called and asked if I would come and testify, and of
    course I said I would.
        I did so in part because of the friendships and the
    relationships I have had with this committee over the years,
    but there actually is another part of it that I think is a
    principled thing, and that is that this is a great deliberative
    body, and we need a marketplace of ideas, and we need to work
    together to get the facts out, and we need to do that
    throughout the negotiating process and beyond that into the
    implementing process; and so I will help as best I can.
        The second thing is, as I think most of the Members here
    who have known me know, I believe that the United States ought
    to be the real leader of the world, and I believe that our
    military power ought to be unequaled. I am a hawk, and the
    Constitution gives me one very powerful tool, especially in the
    arms control business, and that is that a third of the Senate
    plus one can block a treaty.
        You are my ally. I do not need all of you on my side. I
    need a third plus one on my side, and I have got a hell of a
    lot of leverage. Let me give you just one example. Back in the
    Wyoming Ministerial in 1989, we were trying to finish up the
    verification protocol on the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, and we
    had concluded pretty much most of the technical details that
    remained, and we had met all of the concerns of the
    intelligence community, all of the concerns of the JCS and the
    Defense Department writ large.
        Everybody was happy, except I was not happy because I had
    not met Senator Helms' standards, so the negotiator and I got
    together, and we developed an approach to strengthen that
    protocol just a little bit more, and that protocol in the
    treaty which--the treaty had been sitting around since 1974--
    passed the Senate 98 to noth-
    ing. I think that working together with the Senate strengthens
    the United States.
        The marketplace for ideas gives us better ideas. I had
    hoped that it would also improve understanding. I am a little
    puzzled that we have a treaty that we concluded 4 years ago
    that is very similar to the treaty we tabled 10 years before
    that, and negotiated over 10 years, in which essentially all
    the issues that were out there today were present throughout
    that whole process, but that is why I am here.
        Now, I am a straight shooter. I think Senator Biden will
    tell you that many times I have told him I have disagreed with
    him.
        Senator Biden. If I could interrupt you, Mr. Secretary--if
    I could interrupt you for just a second, while you were sitting
    there I leaned over and I said to my new colleague, and I said,
    Lehman, he and I have been on opposite sides of the table. You
    find out one thing about him. He is a straight shooter. I used
    the exact words you just used.
        Senator Hagel. I think he was a little more graphic than
    that.
        Senator Biden. But I did use the words, straight shooter.
    They were modified. There were adjectives attached to it, but
    you are a straight shooter.
        Mr. Lehman. Let the record show I respect your views toward
    me, and your right to have them.
        The point I want to make is basically this. I am here, I
    represent myself. I am going to give you my views. These are my
    personal views. They are not the views of any organization I am
    associated with now or in the past or in the future,
    necessarily; but I am going to give you my best estimate of
    where we are, and let me try to give at least something of a
    summary, and then I am yours.
        You have asked me to comment on the Chemical Weapons
    Convention and on the verification issue. Although the issues
    are complex, my advice is straightforward. Ratification of this
    convention is essential to American leadership against the
    proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; but ratification
    alone is not enough. Strong followup involving all branches of
    government will be vital.
        This hearing should not signal the end of your deliberative
    process, but rather the beginning. You must hold the executive
    branch's feet to the fire, and you must hold your own feet to
    the fire as well, and you must use your powers of oversight and
    the purse to bring about the most effective use of the tools
    that will be made possible by this treaty.
        In the case of the Chemical Weapons Convention, its
    contribution to our security will be determined more by what we
    do in the future than what we have done in the past. The past,
    however, has given us some important lessons, and the CWC was
    designed to take advantage of that learning process.
        The CWC offers us important tools which give us more data,
    greater access, and more leverage. The chemical weapons threat
    is serious, and will grow worse without the CWC. Even with the
    CWC, we will never be able to let up on our defenses; but with
    the CWC we will have more tools, more allies, and more options.
    The United States will be in the lead.
        If we now walk away from the CWC, which was carefully
    crafted over many years to serve American security interests,
    we may try to lead, but few will follow.
        I support your giving consent to ratification, because it
    is time to take that lead and to get on with the job. The time
    has come to stop giving lip service to nonproliferation, and in
    this regard I share many of the views of my friend Bill Odom,
    and to get on with the hard work.
        I am more than aware that the CWC is not a perfect treaty.
    No treaty can be perfect, but the challenges facing a treaty
    trying to ban chemical weapons are among the most daunting. We
    knew that from the beginning. What is more surprising is that
    we made as much progress as we did.
        The treaty we negotiated is stronger overall than the
    treaty we first tabled, and our ability to implement it has
    been strengthened in many ways. That was made possible by a
    number of factors, some of which I would like to enumerate
    briefly today.
        First, we did not rush into this treaty. We engaged in a
    10-year process of deep and careful study with the widest range
    of concerns reflected in the analysis and decisions.
        Second, we were able to build upon lessons learned from
    both the successes and the disappointments of earlier arms
    control experience.
        Third, the end of the cold war as we knew it improved some
    security considerations, such as reducing the possibility of a
    large land war in Western Europe.
        Fourth, the collapse of the eastern bloc brought greater
    access to what were once incredibly closed regimes, and reduced
    the necessity for such heavy reliance, often solely, on
    national technical means of verification. Indeed, political
    change has given us new sources of information which often
    multiply the value of our National Technical Means (NTM).
        Fifth, the threat of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction in
    the Gulf War generated greater support for a hard-nosed
    approach to nonproliferation here and abroad.
        Sixth, the conjunction of the collapse of the Soviet Union
    and the defeat of Saddam Hussein created, at least for awhile,
    much stronger international support for American leadership and
    the American view of how to proceed. It was in that period that
    we concluded the Chemical Weapons Convention.
        Seventh, we could build upon and learn from the experience
    of the U.N. special committee and the enhanced IAEA challenge
    inspections in Iraq.
        Eighth, although no technological silver bullet permits us
    to monitor all chemical weapons activity with confidence, some
    improvements, including new forensic techniques, continue to
    appear.
        And ninth, and I hope Senator Biden understands this, we
    really were prepared to walk away from this treaty if we didn't
    get what we wanted.
        Senator Biden. I never had a doubt about that, Mr. Lehman.
        Mr. Lehman. This negotiating from strength was very helpful
    in getting the provisions we wanted, including in the area of
    verification. The real problem initially was to know exactly
    what we wanted.
        Early on, it became clear that NTM alone could not do the
    job. At the same time, even as political pressure built upon
    all nations to accept the traditional U.S. approach of more
    intrusive onsite inspection, our studies indicated that
    inspections were not magic, either. Worse, existence of
    inspection regimes could raise false expectations of the
    effectiveness of constraints and, if improperly done, the
    inspections themselves could produce false positive or negative
    results while endangering proprietary and national security
    information.
        Many of us who raised these concerns throughout the
    negotiating process, or the specific concerns we raised, are
    often cited in opposition to the convention. What is important
    to understand, however, is how we address the problems, and why
    we can support the convention on its merits.
        Again, we begin with the understanding that monitoring most
    CWC activity is a major challenge. In the past, we relied upon
    a comprehensive deterrence strategy which included as one
    element the ability to respond in kind with chemical weapons.
        That element is no longer realistically available to us,
    not because of the treaty, but because the United States, both
    Congress and the executive branch, including the military, no
    longer desire to keep its offensive chemical weapons
    capability. Thus, unlike so many other arms control agreements
    such as INF, START, or CFE, we are not directly constraining a
    military capability we would otherwise retain.
        This is an important part of the verification
    consideration. Let me explain. Verification has always involved
    more than estimates of the likelihood that a specific,
    prohibited act could be monitored by NTM. The intelligence
    community likes to remind you that they do not make
    verification judgments. They make monitoring judgments. They
    take great professional pride in that point. It involves a
    calculation of risks and benefits.
        At the beginning of the administration of President Ronald
    Reagan a review was conducted of how we should approach arms
    control, including verification. A view had emerged among many
    in the arms control community that verification of a nuclear
    treaty would be sufficient if the overall military balance
    could not be altered by cheating.
        The problem was that some of these same people expressed
    the view that no amount of inequality or cheating could upset
    the nuclear balance. The implication of this, thus, was that no
    treaty could be insufficiently verifiable, except, said some,
    perhaps at or near zero.
        President Reagan, who recognized that absolute verification
    was not possible, wanted a different approach which would serve
    better the national security of the United States and his
    strategy for countering totalitarian regimes. The new, stricter
    approach to verification took into account a far wider range of
    considerations than just the state of the overall military
    balance.
        Military significance remained at the core of this
    approach, but more based upon standards of equality, stability,
    and specific benefits and risks. More attention was to be given
    to details, including insistence on detailed verification
    provisions actually within the treaties. Emphasis was placed
    also on the interaction of restraints, and the clarity of
    draftsmanship.
        An analysis looked at the incentives to cheat, the
    alternatives available to us and to the cheater, and the prices
    paid or the gains made, including those associated with greater
    access on both sides.
        It stressed that intelligence estimates should not be
    politicized, and that we should be honest about monitoring
    confidence of specific provisions of the treaty. It also took
    into account the important questions of deterrence of cheating
    by generating the fear of discovery, deterrence of any attack
    through strong military forces, the existence of defensive
    measures, and the enhancement of compliance enforcement when
    you find a violation.
        What does this mean for the CWC? Clearly, it meant that the
    CWC was going to take a long time to complete, and it did.
    Certainly it meant that we would have to develop an approach
    which was intrusive and aggressive to take into account the
    monitoring challenge. Above all, it required that we do more
    than strengthen the international norm. We had to have the
    tools and the mandate to put together the support to do
    whatever we needed to do, including the use of military force
    in coalition or unilaterally to deal with violations.
        To the soldier who is wounded by it, every bullet is
    militarily significant. The same is true of the use of gas
    against our forces, even if it does not deny us victory. A
    violation is a violation to be punished and corrected. The CWC
    was designed to get more of our allies and other nations to
    join with us and to support us. That is, to build upon and go
    beyond the experience with Iraq.
        With this background in mind, those who oppose U.S.
    ratification of the treaty need to address some important
    questions. Why should we make it easier for others to use
    chemical weapons against us? With the inherent difficulties in
    monitoring chemical weapons activities we need all the help we
    can get.
        We do not have the highest confidence that we will detect
    cheating, but the cheater must still worry that we might.
    Should we deny ourselves the strategic warning that comes from
    the detection of indications of chemical weapons activity, even
    if there is not complete proof?
        And then, why should we let it be legal for rogue states to
    accumulate CW which, if discovered, is then not considered the
    basis for tough action because it is legal?
        These are some of the many questions which must be
    considered.
        Mr. Chairman, in my previous statement to the committee,
    which I have again made available, I discussed the work we did
    in dealing with the balance between intrusive inspections to
    deter cheating and the measures necessary to protect sensitive
    information.
        Today, I would simply like to add that the tradeoffs
    between the two are not a zero-sum game. We discovered in our
    many studies and trial inspections that, although there will
    always be some tension between the two, we could find measures
    which would enhance one without too much cost to the other.
        Also, I would like to add that our experience with Iraq
    continues to point the way to better ways to implement
    inspections. It is a contest between skills and tools on the
    part of the inspectors, and in evasion techniques by the
    proliferators.
        What we have learned is that as we gain experience, and as
    we learn more and more about legitimate activities for
    comparisons, we have gotten better and better at ferreting out
    the discrepancies, the inconsistencies, and the outright lies
    of those concealing a program. As technology improves, we may
    get additional help.
        Having Americans involved in the experience was essential.
    With respect to the CWC, we need to continue to take the lead
    in strengthening enforcement. The time has come to give us the
    tools and let us get on with the job.
        [Mr. Lehman's 1994 statement appears in the appendix.]
        Senator Hagel. Mr. Lehman, thank you, and to all our
    panelists we are grateful for your time this morning, your
    insights, and your willingness to stay a little longer for
    questions. Since it is just my colleague, Senator Biden, and I,
    we have agreed that we will just enter into somewhat of a
    colloquy here back and forth, and we will handle it that way.
        I will begin. General Odom, would you go back into your
    testimony and elaborate more on some of the specifics of
    Articles X and XI that you referred to?
        We have heard an awful lot about that over the last month
    in testimony, and I know you would probably have more to say
    about it; but there is a legitimate concern about transfer of
    technology and what exactly does X and XI say and mean, and
    whose interpretation, and I would be interested in your
    clarification of those areas, since you brought it up in your
    testimony.
        Specifically, we have heard a lot about reverse engineering
    and that transfer. How deep does that transfer go, in your
    opinion?
        General Odom. Let me just say first, I do not claim to be
    the great expert in this, but I have read it and took it for
    what it seemed to mean, and I began to conclude fairly quickly
    that, as I said in my testimony, that if you are required to
    share all the information, information concerning means of
    protection against chemical weapons, part of the means of
    protection against chemical weapons requires knowledge of what
    they are.
        When I was Chief of Army Intelligence, one of the major
    concerns in collecting information for our defensive
    production, production of defensive equipment such as MOP
    suits, gas masks, et cetera, was to know what the agents were
    and to understand the chemistry of the agents; and, therefore,
    if you are going to develop effective defensive means, it
    requires the leading edge knowledge of offensive means or you
    cannot produce them.
        Therefore, it would seem to me that were I a signatory
    under this I could share knowledge of the leading edge
    technologies in offensive weapons with anybody, even to the
    degree I am obliged to do so.
        And then when that crossed my mind I said, well, who makes
    the judgment; and it appears in the treaty that it is up to the
    signatories, so any signatory can decide with whom he shares
    what information, as long as he can make the argument that it
    is in the spirit of information concerning the means of
    protection against chemical weapons. It would be hard to take
    issue with him.
        And as I said in my testimony, the kinds of information
    that you will be most concerned about from a defensive point of
    view are the most vicious and threatening offensive things.
    Therefore, the incentives would seem to be to cause the spread
    of knowledge about those most advanced and threatening
    offensive means and to pay less attention to the less
    threatening ones.
        From that, it seems to me, as very often is the case in
    public policy, the intended consequences turn out not to be
    those we anticipated; but we end up getting a very perverse
    consequence that was almost impossible to foresee.
        Senator Biden. Can I ask a clarification?
        Senator Hagel. Senator Biden.
        Senator Biden. General, assuming you are correct on that,
    if we are not a signatory to the treaty, the same thing
    happens.
        General Odom. Absolutely.
        Senator Biden. I mean, whether or not we are signatory of
    that treaty is not--and what you are talking about here is the
    motivation of the countries in question who are in the treaty
    and we have to assume, in order to reach the conclusion that
    you have reached, that the countries that have this advanced
    technology, most of whom are our allies, are going to want to
    spread this technology around that we do not want spread,
    right?
        General Odom. And I assume that, and I also assume that our
    chemical companies are going to want to do that; and I suspect,
    I do not know, that may be why they are for the ratification of
    this, so that I think if you are talking about other hidden
    land mines of unintended consequences, this brings us right to
    that one.
        Senator Biden. Well, General, it says the States Parties.
    It does not say XYZ company. We are attaching a condition that
    everyone is at a disadvantage in this regard.
        Senator Helms and I have been negotiating, our staffs for
    the last couple of months, and one of the conditions is going
    to be, if and when this treaty gets to the floor, will be that
    the United States will declare up front that it will only
    transfer--it will only--it reads, the paragraphs in question,
    as saying that it can choose what to transfer, and it will, if
    it transfers anything, only transfer that which has some
    medical--what is the exact term of art?--antidotes and medical
    treatments capability, so that no American company is going to
    be able to go and transfer that material.
        I understand your concern, but I think it is one that it
    seems as though the negotiators took into consideration when
    they were drafting the treaty, but I may be mistaken about
    that. I do not know.
        General Odom. Senator, let me respond to that. As I said in
    my testimony, I think you can take each one of these issues out
    and make very good arguments that seem to allay the fears, and
    as you have allayed the fear on a particular one out of
    context, you can easily--if I want to go down the list I can
    bring up others, and we get into sort of an infinite regress
    here.
        As I said, I came to this thing saying basically it is all
    right. I would even say today that I would not get upset if
    this treaty would go into effect with no verification regime.
        You know, I just do not see why we should have this, when
    we know--when you and I are agreeing that it is going to have a
    triv-
    ial or maybe even perverse effect; and I would be willing to
    stand up with those who are against chemical weapons.
        So, I have said earlier, I think this is a misconceptual
    approach. We have asked the negotiators to do a task that
    cannot be done. It is sort of like asking somebody to reach the
    wall by going half the remaining distance. By definition, you
    never get there.
        Therefore, I think we are applying an arms control solution
    where it simply is not conceptually appropriate. It makes us
    feel good. It is hard to be against it in spirit, but when I
    work my way into it I am inclined to say this really is not
    very compelling.
        Senator Biden. General, as usual your integrity and
    intellectual rigor are always apparent. It seems to me this is
    the division, the dividing line, between those who support the
    treaty and those who do not, and that is not so much whether
    any of these provisions are as dangerous or as bad as critics
    say. But it seems to me as I look down the dividing line it is
    people who say: Look, bottom line is you cannot have a treaty
    relating to chemical weapons or biological weapons, ergo I am
    against the treaty, notwithstanding the fact you can give me an
    argument on each of my criticisms.
        I think that is a legitimate, intellectually defensible
    position, one with which I disagree; and it comes down to where
    we are better off.
        But I think when you cut through it, when you and I cut
    through it all, in my view most of the criticisms, specific
    criticisms of the treaty, have specific answers that are
    specifically--I am not saying you agree with this--in my view--
    but the bottom line that separates 95 percent of those who fall
    on for or against is this issue of, it starts with--and it is
    not your view or my view; it is my understanding--that we have
    never lost a war or won a treaty.
        I might add, by the way, you laid waste to that old saying
    when you did START; because if we did not win that treaty I do
    not know what in God's name anybody would consider not having
    won.
        Then it goes from there, I think, General, to people who
    say: Look, you just cannot deal with chemical weapons, period.
    And if you adopt that view--and I respect it; I disagree with
    it, but I respect it--then all these other things kind of
    become irrelevant, and you kind of fall from one side or the
    other of that spectrum, it seems to me.
        General Odom. Can I add one more point on the logic of
    this? And I do not mean to be just scoring debating points, but
    I am sure you are very familiar with the Luddite movement of
    the 1830's.
        Senator Biden. Yes, smash the machinery.
        General Odom. Right, stop technology, put the lid on it.
    One of the things that struck me--I have a colleague at Yale
    today who has just done a little paper, Martin Shubick, showing
    that the price of killing people is going down. He has done
    some calculations, and it happens to be in the BW and CW area
    that this calculation turns out to have great effect.
        This whole technology area is not standing still. It is in
    a state of rapid change.
        Senator Biden. See, that is why guys like me and guys like
    Lehman would argue you have got to get in it. That is the very
    argument why we have got to get in it.
        General Odom. Well, but to get in like Ned Ludd is not the
    way to get in. We need to get in in a way to recognize that it
    is dynamic and that we are probably not by statutory means or
    by international agreements going to be able to contain it.
        I am not saying we ought not to do something about it, and
    I have said I am prepared to sign a treaty, support a treaty
    that puts us on the right hand of God in this regard. But when
    you get into the details of whether this really delivers
    anything you promised, it is hard to be convinced.
        Senator Biden. I thank you, General.
        I am sorry.
        Senator Hagel. No, I think when we have got just a couple
    of us we can jump in and do this.
        Senator Biden. Mr. Lehman wanted to say something.
        Mr. Lehman. Mr. Chairman, if I could just make a point
    here. I agree with Bill Odom that we have got to watch the
    implementation of each and every provision. I am not privy to
    what the negotiations are on these various conditions and
    understandings, but anything you can do to reinforce where we
    were going with this treaty we would certainly appreciate.
        But I would like to make a comment about the Article X,
    Article XI situation, just some general remarks; because it is
    an important question of subsequent practice, what do we do.
        Senator Hagel. I would say incidentally, Mr. Secretary,
    that this is one of the key elements of the discussion of the
    convention in question, and my guess is if that is not resolved
    in some way here this convention is not going to be passed.
        Mr. Lehman. Well, I hope you can resolve it. I like to
    think we resolved it in the negotiations, and let me explain
    why. The issue of assistance--both these issues are not new--
    they came up fairly early. In fact, assistance was, I think, in
    the initial draft that we tabled back in 1984. So these were
    not new issues.
        We made it very clear throughout the negotiations that all
    of this was subject to Article I, which is the fundamental
    obligation not to assist. So we reiterated that again and again
    and again.
        But the most important, I think, telling factoid in support
    of the U.S. interpretation is the fact that after the
    convention was done so many of the usual list of suspects were
    so unhappy that they did not get what they wanted in these
    provisions. That is why I wish the critics would be a little
    more careful about asserting that they did get what they
    wanted, because they did not.
        Now, if you can further strengthen that, then God bless
    you.
        Senator Hagel. Thank you.
        I would like to stay with you, Secretary Lehman, on another
    issue. We heard an awful lot of conversation last month, and
    appropriately so, about how do you really deal with the
    uncivilized nations that we refer to as the rogue nations,
    those who are most unlikely to sign this--North Korea, Syria,
    Iraq, Libya.
        Does that give us, if we would ratify this convention, a
    leg up, a moral high ground? I mean, does it give us more
    ability, better ability to deal with those nations? I mean, we
    know from 1925 on we have had the Geneva Convention and other
    treaties, conventions, agreements. But when you are dealing
    with uncivilized nations, they will resort to uncivilized
    means.
        I think that is an important part of the dialog here.
    Incidentally, I appreciate very much your opening comments
    about information, because that is what this should be about.
    This should not be about Republican-Democrat, conservative-
    liberal. This should be about doing the right thing for this
    country. So I appreciate very much your thoughts.
        Mr. Lehman. Well, I will tell you, on rogue states we have
    such a record of successes and failures that I can package them
    any way you want. But I will tell you what I personally think,
    which is there comes a time when you simply must not tolerate
    this sort of thing and you must take action. And if other
    nations will join you, as they did in the case of driving
    Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait, then that is what you have to do.
    If you have to act alone, as we did in the case of Libya, you
    do it.
        You have got to make sure that the rogue states understand
    that there are severe consequences of their actions.
        Again, let me echo Bill. I was in the Pentagon when, in the
    very last month of the Reagan Administration, we had the CW use
    conference in Paris. Our position was--you name Iraq--but you
    know, the foreign policy people were all divided over that, the
    allies were divided over that. We did not name Iraq.
        My view was that was a big mistake. My administration made
    it. I was a part of that administration. I opposed it, but we
    did it. OK, we are guilty, too.
        There is a consequence to that, and the consequence was
    that this policy of sort of constructive engagement with Iraq
    because Iraq is this viable Arab country of the future led us
    to too often keep a low profile on the enforcement question. As
    a result of that, we ended up having a war in which we could
    have faced these weapons, and there is still some debate of
    what the consequences of the weapons existence was.
        I think you have to take a strong stand. I will tell you
    right now, Bill alluded, I think, to Korea.
        General Odom. No.
        Mr. Lehman. I thought I heard you say Korea. But anyway, I
    have got Korea on the brain, I guess.
        General Odom. Assume I did. It is all right.
        Mr. Lehman. Maybe I read something you said some time back
    on Korea. But in any case, I will not attribute anything to
    Bill any more.
        In the early days of this administration, they did in
    essence what we did at the Paris CW use conference, on not
    supporting the IAEA suspect site inspections on Korea. Indeed,
    we had people backgrounding that--what a terrible thing it
    would be if North Korea were to withdraw from the NPT--and
    therefore we could not do anything to rock the boat.
        What we were sending was the signal that we would rather
    have a violator stay in the treaty than hold them accountable
    for their violations. It was a terrible thing to say. It has
    continued to complicate our nonproliferation policy. I am
    hoping that the administration has moved beyond that. Things
    are developing in North Korea. Some things are not under our
    control. Maybe it will all work out fine.
        But I think we made some mistakes. We can learn from those
    mistakes, though, and move on, and that is what we ought to be
    doing.
        I think in the CWC have got additional tools and we ought
    to use them.
        Senator Hagel. Thank you.
        We have been joined by our colleague Senator Kerry from
    Massachusetts. What I think I will do is go back to a 7\1/2\
    minute time level so that everybody gets a fair shot at this,
    and I do not know who else may come.
        Would you defer to Senator Kerry?
        Senator Biden. I interrupted him in asking a question.
        Senator Hagel. Senator Kerry.
        Senator Kerry. Thank you, thank you. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Welcome, gentlemen. Thank you for taking time to join us
    today.
        It is my understanding, Mr. O'Malley--correct me if I am
    wrong, because this is just a staff summary, and I was not able
    to hear you. But your principal objection I understand is on
    the issue of corporate secrets, trade secrets, intrusive
    inspection; is that correct?
        Mr. O'Malley. Yes.
        Senator Kerry. Help me, if you would, to understand that. I
    mean, we have got an industry that obviously has a lot at
    stake, the chemical industry, correct?
        Mr. O'Malley. Yes.
        Senator Kerry. The chemical industry itself supports this
    treaty. These are the people that are going to be inspected.
    The Synthetic-Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association, the
    Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Association of
    America, the Biotechnology Industry Organization, the American
    Chemical Society, the American Physical Society, the American
    Institute of Chemical Engineers, the Council for Chemical
    Research, they all support it.
        They even went to the extent of creating seven test
    inspections to determine how it really worked and what the
    threat to them might be. In addition to that, they have the
    right to object to any particular inspector coming in that they
    suspect of espionage or have reason to believe might spy.
        What is it that you know that they do not know?
        Mr. O'Malley. Well, I am not sure what I know that they do
    not know. In my opinion, though, the kinds of companies that
    might be affected by this convention transcend the chemical
    companies that you just spoke about. I have an equal number of
    letters from different kinds of associations, the aerospace
    industry and others, which express serious concerns about the
    Chemical Weapons Convention as it relates to industrial
    espionage.
        Senator Kerry. Well, are they going to be inspected?
        General Odom. Yes.
        Mr. O'Malley. Yes.
        Senator Kerry. By virtue of a challenge, conceivably,
    correct?
        Mr. O'Malley. Conceivably.
        Senator Kerry. But the challenge requires an appropriate
    showing. First of all, there is going to be a guarantee,
    because we are going to even--I think, with Senator Biden's
    leadership--go further on the search and seizure to guarantee
    our constitutional rights. Is that correct, Senator Biden?
        Senator Biden. That is correct, we are going to have a
    provision requiring probable cause be established before a
    Federal judge to get a search warrant.
        Senator Kerry. Would that change your feeling about it a
    little bit?
        Mr. O'Malley. It would be helpful, but I am not sure that
    that would be totally significant in terms of protecting the
    intellectual property.
        Senator Kerry. Well now, you know that there is a
    compartmentalization capacity with respect to inspections. The
    only thing that is available to be inspected are those things
    that are directly shown to be with respect to possible
    production of chemical weaponry.
        In fact, you are allowed to set up a procedure where you
    actually close off or avoid any penetration of those other
    areas where you may be doing something that is not involved at
    all with chemicals.
        Mr. O'Malley. Hopefully those procedures would work and
    would be effective.
        Senator Kerry. But is it not significant that the industry
    itself believes they will work and supports the treaty? Is that
    not significant?
        Mr. O'Malley. Well, again, I do not know what the
    motivation of the chemical industry is in this regard. I can
    only speak of industry representatives that I have spoken to in
    connection with the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, and they
    have severe concerns about their inability to protect their
    secrets, security or not, against professional foreign
    intelligence services.
        I mentioned earlier this list of national critical
    technologies which the FBI is charged to protect, and it is
    very, very broad. I think if you read this list and compare it
    with the chemicals identified in the convention you will see a
    nexus between those chemicals and the companies involved in
    these technologies.
        Senator Kerry. Well, let us try to go again to the reality
    of this. Are you aware of the limitations on challenge
    inspections that could be conducted in any 1 year in this
    treaty?
        Mr. O'Malley. Yes. If I may, though, you mentioned earlier
    that the United States or whatever country is involved in terms
    of inspection could object to the presence of an inspector
    which they had reason to believe might be an intelligence
    officer.
        Senator Kerry. Right.
        Mr. O'Malley. Well, that is much easier said than done. It
    is not all that easy--it might be easy to identify an
    intelligence officer, but it is significantly more difficult to
    identify an agent of that officer. In other words, if I were an
    intelligence officer I would try to recruit a chemical engineer
    who might be appointed to be a member of this inspection team.
        Senator Kerry. But the point is if you do not have
    confidence in the person coming in you can peremptorily just
    not let him in. You are only going to let people in you have
    confidence in, number one.
        Number two, under the budget, under the budget when this is
    running at full tilt in 3 or 4 years, it is anticipated that
    the most you would be able to have is conceivably two challenge
    inspections per month, approximately 20 to 25 globally,
    globally. Will you explain to me what the potential threat
    ultimately to the United States is of that kind of rate of
    challenge?
        Mr. O'Malley. Well, you have got the challenge inspections
    and you have got the routine inspections. I would not
    distinguish between the two of them in terms of the ability to
    collect proprietary information.
        Senator Kerry. But the routine are as to a more limited
    kind of grouping of entities.
        Mr. O'Malley. Exactly.
        Senator Kerry. More clearly defined.
        Mr. O'Malley. What I am suggesting is an inspector does not
    have to go into a company and get the total take as to what
    that trade secret might be that would be helpful to the person
    who had recruited him. There are bits and pieces of information
    that can be acquired over a period of time that might add up to
    a significant whole at some point in time.
        Senator Kerry. So in essence--OK, I follow you. In
    essence--I need to cut you off there simply because I
    understand what you are saying. I want to be able to ask
    General Odom something. But I sense--in essence, I mean, to
    sort of reduce it to its lowest common denominator--you are
    seeing the potential for some goblins and in effect others
    directly involved are not concerned about it. And we just have
    to weigh, is your sighting of this potential goblin weighty
    enough to reject the treaty or is the sanguinity, if you will,
    of the industry itself and those who will be inspected to be
    taken at greater value? And I think that is the issue we have
    to measure.
        Mr. O'Malley. Two points. Number one, I would not label
    them goblins. We are talking about the real world here, and to
    label them goblins seems to diminish the seriousness of the
    threat.
        Senator Kerry. I believe in goblins.
        Mr. O'Malley. Well, I do not.
        Second, I mentioned earlier in my testimony that those who
    are charged with making the strategic decisions regarding this
    particular treaty ought to make that decision with a full deck
    of cards, that it ought not rise or fall on any
    counterintelligence concerns expressed by me or anybody else,
    but they ought to be considered in the total context of all the
    problems that are being considered by the policymakers.
        Senator Kerry. Sure. I respect that. And when I say I
    believe in goblins, I believe there are nefarious types out
    there clearly who want to try to push the envelope. You have to
    be on guard about it. But I suspect we would be.
        Senator Hagel. Senator Biden.
        Senator Biden. Mr. Lehman, comment on what Mr. O'Malley had
    said, please.
        Mr. Lehman. I agree with him that these are not goblins.
    There is a real problem. But it is hard to imagine any issue we
    spent more time on than this question of how do you balance
    intrusive inspection with the risks of losing national security
    or proprietary information.
        A lot has been said on it. A lot has been said before. But
    let me try to bring maybe some new twists or perspectives on
    it, just taking into account what has been said. First is, we
    ultimately came to the conclusion that there was a risk with
    the inspectors, but it was not the biggest risk. So I guess
    there I have not seen any study that says that is the big risk.
        In fact, what I think we have gotten from industry is, and
    of course what the national security community has found, is
    that turncoats in your own system can do a tremendous amount of
    damage. An inspector who comes in, who is escorted, who has got
    rules, people are watching him, yes, he is bright; if he is
    recruited, he can do some harm. But at least you have got a
    feel for the problem.
        If you have got a turncoat inside your system, be it
    business or the intelligence community or in the military, you
    have got a real problem.
        Senator Biden. By the way, when I speak to these guys who
    run these companies that is what they say. They would much
    rather have the guy coming in in a team, as part of a team,
    with the ability to have these management agreements and
    facility agreements before they come in. If they were given a
    choice of that or somebody coming in, either literally breaking
    in, nefariously getting in, or be a turncoat within, there is
    no question which side of that equation they would pick taking
    their chances on.
        You know it, because it is your business. That is how you
    make your living, helping these guys prevent against the last
    two categories. They would much rather have this than that.
        Mr. Lehman. I said ``turncoat,'' but it is even a worse
    problem than that. It is not even the question of the person
    who is completely dishonest. It blurs into this whole question
    of loyalty to your company, when do you change jobs, what
    information do you take with you. It is a very complex area.
        I share the analysis on the importance of proprietary
    information to our leadership in technology. What I am saying
    is this is not the big problem. We think we know how to handle
    this. There are risks, but we think we worked that.
        The other point I want to make is this. When we first
    started getting involved, first with the national security
    community and then with the national security community, on
    this question of intrusive inspections, some strange things
    happened. For example, they would say: We think it would be
    dangerous to have an inspector come to a certain place. OK,
    why? Well, they could learn all of this. OK, what keeps a spy
    from coming to that place right now? You would be amazed the
    number of times the answer was: Nothing. That in fact the
    interaction between the negotiating process having to do with
    these inspections and their intrusiveness helped the
    counterintelligence community in some cases and helped industry
    begin to understand that they had some problems that they
    needed to deal with--with or without the CWC. They still need
    to do a lot of work.
        Whatever you decide to do in the Senate on the CWC, you
    need to keep that process going of having the government
    experts, including the intelligence community, find some way to
    work with industry on this problem; because it is a serious
    problem.
        Senator Biden. Mr. Secretary, the irony is that the
    corollary to ``this will lull us to sleep,'' which is a
    concern--I think it is the most legitimate argument against
    this treaty in my view, is we will get lulled to sleep and not
    have to expend the dollars, the effort, in implementing and/or
    in continuing our efforts on countermeasures to deal with
    chemical weapons use.
        They are the two greatest--I think they are the two from my
    perspective most legitimate objections to this treaty. The
    corollary to that is, or the irony is, were it not for this
    treaty, were it not for this debate, companies would not be
    doing 80 percent of what they are doing now. All of a sudden
    everybody is figuring out: Whoa, wait a minute, this
    spectrometer guy who walks in, that guy does not have to be
    part of a team. He can stand outside that company gate right
    now.
        All of a sudden what has happened is this has sort of
    awakened, in my view, the outfits I am familiar with--the
    chemical companies, the biotech companies, the pharmaceutical
    companies. My colleagues know a lot about what their
    constituencies do, because we have to learn. After 24 years, I
    have learned about those companies. They are waking up. It has
    been a wake-up call to them unrelated to the treaty.
        One of the issues, though, that is raised and in the
    remaining time I would like to get to, my remaining few minutes
    here, is this issue people do think is very significant, and
    that relates to the intelligence capacity of the United States
    to detect cheating or anyone to detect cheating, and what
    constitutes militarily significant.
        If I am not mistaken, I remember it was during--I suspect
    you may be responsible for it, although I do not know that for
    certain. We went from the notion in the Carter administration
    of ``adequately verifiable'' to ``effectively verifiable.'' The
    terminology changed and so this debate about ``effectively
    verifiable,'' what constitutes effective verifiability.
        One of the things--and the intelligence community and two
    members of our CIA are here today if we need them for any
    input, are in the audience, who deal with this issue. The Joint
    Chiefs have testified on this. So you are going to hear a lot
    of debate, as I need not tell you or you, General Odom, about
    this issue of what is effectively verifiable.
        But it is a big deal what we determine. What we think is
    effective, each of us individually determines whether or not we
    think this is a verifiable treaty or whether we should vote for
    it, at least as it relates to verifiability.
        I want to talk about this notion of military significance.
    By the way, Shalikashvili said one ton. What he was talking
    about with one ton, he was talking about political impact and
    terror capability, not militarily significant. Everybody talks
    about the Joint Chiefs saying they have established that one
    ton, if you cannot detect one ton, up to one ton, then this is
    not effectively verifiable. The Chiefs never said that, but we
    will have to deal with that on the floor. I know you both know
    that.
        One of the things that I get, I think we get confused about
    and what confuses the public--and I am diverting slightly here
    to make a larger point, trying to make a larger point or get to
    a larger issue--is you asked the rhetorical question, Mr.
    Secretary, why after all these years do so many people know so
    little about this treaty? I think it is for two reasons.
        One, those who are for it basically assume there is
    inevitability. This is going to pass, because hard-nosed
    administrations had ne-
    gotiated this thing. Therefore there was sort of a credibility
    given. I mean this sincerely. I think this is why. I think this
    is the answer.
        Second, those who are against it are usually those against
    any treaties. Therefore, it is just kind of like there is
    inevitability.
        Well, everybody has forgotten, there is no inevitability to
    this thing passing, so now people are focusing for the first
    time, and our colleagues understandably do not know a lot about
    it, because they have not, other than those who are involved in
    it, they have not focused on it a lot.
        Now, if I may, can I ask the question? I appreciate the
    time.
        So we get down to this verifiability issue and what
    constitutes effective verification, and we hear talk from our
    witnesses, not today, not from the General, but from many
    witnesses we have had, and people use phrases like: well, one
    vial, one vial of chemical weapons, and so on, and one ton. And
    one ton sounds--God almighty, one ton of a chemical weapon
    obviously can win a war, they think.
        What I want to talk about is the distinction between a
    tactical advantage that could be gained by the use of an agent
    and a strategic advantage that could be gained by, say, the use
    of up to one ton of an agent. Here is what I want you to talk--
    I want you both, General Odom first and then Secretary Lehman.
        If you think about the actual use of these weapons, in the
    Iran-Iraqi War each side used tons and tons of this. They used
    tens of tons of these weapons. And it did not give either the
    capacity strategically to save the day.
        Now, I think it is bad to use in any event. I am just
    trying to get at this part about what constitutes a threat to
    U.S. security if we do not detect it.
        I would also point out that we have hundreds of thousands
    of tons, we and the Russians. Now, the reason why our military
    felt there was a need to have more than a ton, or 10 or a 1,000
    or 10,000 tons, is because I assume we concluded that one ton
    or anything that we possessed did not have the capacity.
        One--one--missile, one nuclear warhead on top of a
    Peacekeeper missile can ruin somebody's day. It can really
    change the dynamic of everything. One ton of chemical weapons--
    as the intelligence community tells me, the rule of thumb,
    General, is you are about one ton, one square mile, and it
    dissipates.
        Now, as you said, General, for those troops who are within
    that square mile this is militarily significant. It is big
    deal. And if you have everybody gathered in a soccer stadium,
    it is a big deal. And it is a big deal terror capacity.
        But is it militarily significant in a strategic sense, in a
    sense that our national security or a major portion of our
    capacity in any conflict could be jeopardized by ``a ton''? And
    I realize this is a bit artificial, to be using the ton. But it
    has become almost a mantra among people who are concerned about
    verifiability.
        Can you talk a little bit about the significance of it in
    that sense, General? Assume we could not detect up to a ton.
    And some will argue we could not detect more than a ton. But
    let us just artificially, just for the sake of discussion,
    assume we could not detect up to a ton and countries, rogue or
    otherwise, members of this or-
    ganization who signed the treaty, could develop up to a ton and
    use it. What consequence for you as a military planner does
    knowing the other team had a ton of chemical agents available
    to them?
        General Odom. Well, Senator, you have made in my view one
    of the strongest arguments against the treaty, for making it
    largely irrelevant.
        Senator Biden. That may be. That is why I want you to talk
    about it.
        General Odom. It is sort of in line with my argument here
    earlier. I do not think--if you look at the record, when one
    side has chemicals and the other does not, the probability of
    it being used seems to be much higher. When both sides have it,
    chemical weapons do not seem to be used.
        Senator Biden. How do you explain Iran and Iraq, then?
        General Odom. Well, they did not both have it at first.
        Senator Biden. But they both ended up having it.
        General Odom. Well, but when the Iraqis started out using
    it the Iraqis were in trouble.
        My own experience in learning to use, target chemical
    weapons back when we had them, I was a young armor officer in
    Fort Leavenworth doing map exercises. I became very unimpressed
    with chemical weapons. You do not like them. They are
    unpredictable. There are other ways to blow people away, and
    you would rather have something that is easier to control. So I
    think the more professionally trained military officers are
    likely to be very much against these things.
        When it comes to a ton or even 200 or 300 or 400 tons, I
    think we have certain capabilities. The prospects of keeping
    them from being used in a conflict are very high. And I do not
    see that this treaty is going to affect this much one way or
    another. It does not seem to bear on it. The people who really
    want these weapons are going to get them anyway, and the ones
    right now who are troublesome states are clearly not going to
    be caught up in this.
        Now let me make another point about that there is another
    way to look at this. It is hard to weaponeer these new weapons,
    but there is a lot of new technology emerging. I do not know
    how to judge that. I mentioned Martin Shubick's piece earlier
    that the price of killing people is going down because of
    technological change in this regard.
        It is easy to do that in sort of theoretical calculations.
    Whether or not these new technologies can be weaponeered and
    brought into the battlefield even for terrorist use is an open
    question. So as I said earlier, we are in a period of dynamic
    change and that makes me nervous that anybody can write any
    kind of regime that is going to catch these kind of things.
        That is why I say the spirit of the treaty I have no
    trouble supporting. I just do not understand why one would want
    to strap themselves to this regulatory system and pay the price
    when the probable outcomes of it are trivial.
        Senator Biden. Thank you.
        Mr. Lehman?
        Mr. Lehman. Senator, you often hear people say chemical
    weapons have no military utility. I do not believe that. I
    think they can. During the mid-eighties when we faced the
    Warsaw Pact at the Fulda Gap, I thought it was important to
    maintain a continuum of deterrent capabilities and that a
    modernized chemical weapons component with the binaries was an
    important part of that.
        The world has changed since then. We have alternative
    weapons, advanced conventional munitions. What you saw in the
    Gulf War was that clearly when you ask people who have to deal
    with the logistics of warfare, what is it you need on station
    ready to go, they wanted weapons they knew they were going to
    have to use and they wanted them in large quantities, and they
    did not want to waste space with having a chemical deterrent
    there.
        I remember going through the chemical training facility
    down at Fort McClellan, putting on a suit and decontaminating
    equipment with live nerve agent. I realized I did not want to
    go to war wearing that suit.
        In Vietnam I used to carry my gas mask with me on a lot of
    the types of operations that we went on, and I hated having to
    carry that.
        One of the things I learned out of that experience to me
    was that in today's world it is much more important--it is less
    important that we have chemical weapons than that we do
    everything we can to not have them used against our troops and
    reduce the chances they will be used. But we also have to make
    sure we maintain our defenses.
        On the military significance question, I very much fall in
    the category of those who say, you know, the bullet that wounds
    you is militarily significant. Therefore, we need to have the
    tools that deter the use, and we need to have the will to
    enforce compliance.
        But when you say your example of a ton, what does a ton
    mean? Well, in certain types of scenarios a ton can be very
    important. But remember, we are the United States. It ought to
    make us awfully damn angry, and with the CWC it ought to mean
    everybody ought to support us and we go in and we solve the
    problem.
        Senator Biden. Well, here is the point----
        Senator Hagel. Senator Biden, let me ask this. I want to
    stay on time here, and I am going to ask a question. I am not
    going to take my full 7\1/2\ minutes. I know Senator Kerry
    wants to get back to it. I will get back to you as well.
        What I want to do is go back to you, Mr. O'Malley, and I
    would like you to develop more of your counterintelligence
    insight, background, experience, as to how it relates to this
    treaty. Where are the real vulnerabilities coming at it from
    your years of working in the counterintelligence business?
        Mr. O'Malley. I think, again, the concern that I have,
    shared by certain elements of industry, is in the illicit
    acquisition that this would facilitate, this convention,
    illicit acquisition of proprietary information that this would
    facilitate. It is not the only means, by any stretch of the
    imagination, of acquiring American proprietary information. It
    can be done in other ways, including technical means and the
    Internet and so forth.
        What this does, though, it would give those who are
    desirous of collecting such information another avenue of
    approach. I mentioned earlier this list of critical
    technologies that the Bureau is charged with protecting. I
    might also add that this also could con-
    stitute essential elements of information, i.e., what the other
    side is seeking.
        So there is no doubt at all in terms of what Senator Biden
    mentioned earlier, that any corporation would prefer to have
    someone coming in rather than a recruited agent inside. I mean,
    that is somewhat of a false choice in my opinion. That
    recruited agent inside ultimately happens as a result of people
    coming in and getting to know and have access.
        I am not at all convinced that whatever security measures
    are present in this Chemical Weapons Convention are adequate.
    The primary mission of counterintelligence is to identify,
    penetrate, and neutralize such systems. I can give you a
    specific concrete example of such an instance.
        I formerly represented the U.S. at something called the
    NATO Special Committee, which consists of the
    counterintelligence chiefs of the NATO member nations. We met
    twice a year in Brussels. Security, as you might well imagine,
    was extremely tight. They had all the usual bells and whistles.
    Everyone was vetted as they should be. And we would meet in
    camera and discuss sensitive information.
        Lo and behold, one of our discussions ended up in a
    Bulgarian newspaper. So something was wrong. The secretariat of
    the NATO Special Committee asked for an FBI counterintelligence
    officer. We assigned one to the committee and, lo and behold,
    the secretary to the head of the secretariat was an East German
    agent. None of these security measures were able to identify
    this particular woman, who was a British national.
        So I am not at all convinced that these security procedures
    will be adequate. But if they are, if the government believes
    that these security measures are adequate and in a sense acts
    as a guarantor of these security measures. And if a company
    does lose a trade secret as a result of these kinds of
    inspections, then it seems to me it ought to be fair on the
    part of the government to reimburse that company for the value
    of that trade secret.
        Senator Hagel. Mr. O'Malley, thank you.
        What I am going to do for my colleagues, if this is
    agreeable, I have just been given a note indicating that some
    of our witnesses have some pressing time problems. So what I
    would recommend that we do 5 more minutes each and then allow
    our panel to leave. Senator Kerry, is that fine? We are going
    to do 5 minutes each, and that way the panel can get to their
    other business.
        Senator Kerry. That is fine, absolutely. I have got to go
    to another meeting, too, so I appreciate it, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, I have been struggling with this since one of
    our earlier hearings, when I went back and read a little of the
    history of the negotiations on this. We had Secretary Richard
    Perle here, former Secretary Perle here. And when Ronald Reagan
    and the administration first proposed this treaty--and they
    were the first ones to propose it--they came up with a concept
    called--you know, they wanted total verification, correct,
    General? I mean, that was the great goal, being really
    intrusive in our verifications.
        So they came up with something called ``anywhere, any
    time.'' We are going to go anywhere, any time. We are going to
    be able to challenge anywhere, any time. That is the only way
    we can be safe.
        Then, whoops, all of a sudden people here said: Un-uh, we
    do not want that. Correct?
        General Odom. Exactly right.
        Senator Kerry. Anywhere, any time? Oh my God, they could
    come into one of our places and look anywhere any time. And so
    we have got to be a little bit smarter about how we come at
    this.
        So the negotiators went to work and did a heck of a job, I
    think, over a period of time. General Scowcroft, whom I have
    great respect for, and General Powell, who this morning was
    before the Veterans Affairs Committee testifying in favor of
    this treaty, many other players of enormous military
    background, intelligence background, national security
    background, clearly with the United States of America's
    security interests at the forefront of their thinking, said: We
    are going to come up with a different scheme. And they did, to
    protect our sort of black institutions, as we call them, from
    being intruded, but to provide sufficient intrusiveness to be
    able to do something effectively with this treaty.
        Now, I sort of see the two of you setting up what I have
    seen my colleagues on the other side of the aisle setting up
    over the last few weeks, which is this Catch 22 situation. You
    come in here, General, and you say: It is not verifiable, it is
    not verifiable enough. We have got to have more intrusive
    verification. But then on the other side, a whole bunch of
    other people are sitting there saying: It is too verifiable; we
    cannot have this, because you are going to get our secrets.
        General Odom. I did not take that position.
        Senator Kerry. I beg your pardon?
        General Odom. I did not take that position.
        Senator Kerry. You do not believe--you think the
    verification is strong enough?
        General Odom. I would vote for the treaty without
    verification. I do not want to vote for the treaty with
    verification. I think the verification is the big flaw in it
    and that you have got a huge regulatory cost you are about to
    strap on American industry. Most of them do not even know it is
    coming. The ones who are in favor of it clearly want some other
    payoff in terms of----
        Senator Kerry. OK, fine, I accept that. It is even easier
    to deal with, frankly, from my point of view. I am happier to
    accept that.
        But you are aware of people saying it cannot be verified
    and that has been a major argument, correct?
        General Odom. That is true.
        Senator Kerry. So is there not a Catch 22 in that? I mean,
    you just go around and around in a circle.
        General Odom. My conclusion is that we should not bother to
    negotiate the treaty. I said in my testimony I think it is a
    misconceptual approach. The poor negotiators have been told to
    take on a problem that defies being managed with this approach.
        You know, I just do not think you can get there from here
    with this kind of treaty. And as I made the point in my
    testimony, I originally came to it believing that it was a
    fairly benign thing and why not support it, it is on the side
    of virtue and why should I stand up in favor of sin? But when
    you get into it you begin to real-
    ize that it has some costs. It probably creates some illusions
    and, it just very well could produce a lot of unintended
    consequences that we cannot fathom at all.
        The length of the treaty was the first thing that raised my
    suspicions. I have sort of a little rule: The length of the
    treaty is related, inversely related, to its effectiveness.
        Senator Kerry. You do not believe that that spells out the
    obligations and crosses the t's and dots the i's so that people
    really are held accountable?
        My light is going to go off in a minute. I want to ask you
    a comparative question here.
        General Odom. Also, back on the early one when you talked
    about the mutual intrusiveness during the Reagan
    administration, I saw that coming and could not understand why
    they wanted to go anywhere any time.
        Senator Kerry. Well, let me ask. I wanted to ask Secretary
    Lehman to respond to what I just asked the two of you and
    simultaneously to answer this question if you would, because we
    keep missing this point. Assuming that the treaty were either
    rejected--Mr. Secretary, if you would answer, I want you to
    answer the specific issue I just raised; but also add to that,
    would you please, what are the implications for the United
    States at this moment in time, where we now have 74 nations
    that have ratified it--it is up--where we now have 160 or so
    have signed it, we can anticipate that if we and Russia come on
    board a whole lot of other people are going to, what are the
    implications with respect to any possibilities of renegotiating
    it, changing it, going back and fixing it in terms of other
    countries, given the date and given the momentum of what will
    take place here? If you could comment on both.
        Mr. Lehman. I would be pleased to. Let me pick up a bit on
    what Bill has said about any time anywhere and the Catch 22
    aspect of that. There is a lot of--you know, we all look for
    slogans to describe what we are doing, and ``any time,
    anywhere'' was our way of trying to summarize what we were
    trying to do.
        But clearly, Ronald Reagan's policy was not to go back to
    the old Biological Weapons Convention approach, where you ban
    something and God knows what you do about it, you do your best.
    But rather, he wanted to have treaties that were well crafted,
    that had verification provisions, that gave us some tools.
        I am sympathetic with Bill that I wish the treaty were not
    so long. I am seeing right here in the debate in the Senate one
    of the disadvantages of having long treaties is that you have
    got to read the whole thing over a thousand times, and then you
    have got to debate it, and then you may not yet have gotten it
    right. So for that I apologize.
        But what we discovered was in some cases it was very
    dangerous not to have a longer treaty. You had to lay out
    things. I can give you a lot of examples, but let me go to your
    question and use that to sort of find an example, the question
    of access and intrusiveness in inspection. When Bill says he
    was concerned about this ``any time, anywhere,'' well, he was
    not the only one. Ronald Reagan was, too. So the NSDD that was
    drafted that implemented this said: Any time, anywhere, but by
    the way you have got to protect national security information
    and proprietary information; go figure out how, with some
    general guidelines.
        This notion of managed access was inherent. We did not
    invent the phrase until later to bring some people together,
    but it was clear from the beginning you were going to have to
    balance these factors.
        Also, take the question ``any time.'' What we really wanted
    was to get to a site quickly. The more we did studies, the more
    we discovered several things. One is some things that they hide
    at a site, you cannot get there fast enough; it is going to be
    gone. It will be gone in seconds or minutes or hours, but
    certainly before your plane gets there.
        On the other hand, there were other things it might take
    months to get rid of, or maybe never, at least not in any human
    lifetime. So we had to balance all of that.
        Then there was this question of intrusiveness. I think we
    could have simplified that, but we did not. The reason we did
    not is that the intelligence community and the defense
    community wanted more details spelled out in the treaty to give
    them specific hooks and rights. And since I did not think we
    could get this treaty through the Senate without making sure
    that it met their standards, we negotiated to get what they
    wanted into that treaty.
        So a lot of that length is what the intelligence community
    and the defense community wanted to protect themselves. That is
    why all of that is in there.
        Now, the implications of what happens if you do not ratify.
    Well, you heard a lot of discussion of what it will mean for
    nonproliferation. I think that is the important thing. We are
    going to lose a lot of leadership.
        There are some issues that will undoubtedly occur that
    people will mention that I think are important, but we ought to
    know them for what they are. A lot of people out there, the
    rogue states, the usual list of suspects, will use this as an
    excuse to do what they want to do anyway and we will just make
    it easier for them. But I do not think we ought to excuse it,
    no matter what we do.
        Businesses will sit there and realize that if you try to
    renegotiate you are probably going to see a number of our good
    friends who are these very economic competitors decide they do
    not want to negotiate; because, frankly they do not care if we
    are in the treaty, because if that means more production goes
    overseas to their countries and out--hey, you want to
    negotiate, fine. But I do not think they are going to want to
    fix this quickly.
        Senator Kerry. That is because they have an advantage
    written into the treaty.
        Mr. Lehman. See, the problem is that, because the U.S.
    wanted to try to promote universality, you have this provision
    that limits certain types of trade. You can look at the near-
    term costs, and you can dispute how much are direct and
    indirect costs, and it all gets kind of subjective perhaps. But
    the real reality is there, is that a lot of sharp-pencilled
    businessmen are going to understand that they start moving
    production around to take advantage of this treaty.
        There are a lot of factors like that. But I will tell you
    what my concern is. I am a national security person. My point
    is this treaty gives us a lot of useful tools. John Deutch says
    it, Jim Woolsey said it, George Tenet says it. We know that. I
    think what we got out of the treaty was these very important
    tools, and we want to use them.
        If you follow Bill's logic, which I can respect, which is
    basically the bad guys are going to try anyway and you are not
    going to guarantee you are going to be able to stop them; his
    real argument then is he says: I would go with the treaty, but
    without the verification.
        So what is the real issue? The real issue is are these
    tools worth the costs? And I think that is a legitimate
    question, and I think people can come out, reasonable people
    can come out on a different point. What I am finding
    fascinating is, though, that this is not a new issue. We
    thought we had addressed those costs. We thought we had driven
    up the benefits and driven down the risks and costs, and
    sometimes it sounds like nobody heard us.
        Senator Hagel. Secretary Lehman, thank you.
        Senator Kerry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Hagel. Yes, sir.
        Senator Biden.
        Senator Biden. I have a number of questions, but I do not
    know how I could, quite frankly, better summarize where we are.
    You have just said better than I have attempted to say it. This
    really gets down to that fundamental question. I mean, when all
    is said and done, all the talk about verification, all the talk
    about the threat to individual companies through espionage, all
    of that--I am not suggesting people who make those arguments
    are not sincere--but the truth of the matter is it really is
    not about that. It really does not get to that.
        It gets to what General Odom is talking about, just are the
    tools worth the cost? And some believe the costs are much
    heavier, some believe they are onerous, and some believe they
    are insignificant; or in relative terms clearly the benefits
    outweigh the costs, the tools available outweigh the costs we
    have to pay.
        And from my standpoint, when I take a look at all of these
    different scenarios of what it takes for the worst case to
    happen, the worst case on the military side is we are in this
    treaty, we are lulled asleep, one of the signatories, the 74
    nations, is able to amass a significant chemical capability
    with emerging technology in such a way that it allows them on a
    battlefield and/or in an open conflict with the United States
    or one of our allies to prevail or enhance their probability of
    prevailing.
        Well, the truth of the matter is an awful hell of a lot of
    things have to happen for that to happen. It is not merely that
    we do not detect one ton or two tons or twenty tons; we do not
    detect the reorganization of their military apparatus; we do
    not detect the fact of how they maneuver; we do not detect that
    they are using protective gear in a different way than they did
    before; we do not detect.
        We would have to not detect a whole hell of a lot of things
    unrelated to whether or not they are making chemicals, in order
    to get into a position where our military circumstance changes.
        With regard to the issue that Mr. O'Malley raises, we would
    have to--one of the reasons, one of the things everybody
    misses, Mr. Secretary, is what you did on this managed access
    piece. Everybody misses that. Everybody misses that this is not
    a matter of being able to come in with 2, or 2 to 15--I met
    with the Intelligence, we all did, with the Intelligence
    Committee last night for 3 or 4 hours, and we went over this
    piece about managed access on these inspections.
        It can be a team of from 2 to 15 people. You have to run up
    a hell of a scenario to figure out other than how accidentally
    some company, who by the way companies now are going to have
    the Commerce Department, with the help of the intelligence
    agencies, teaching them how they would deal with inspections so
    there is transparency with regard to chemical production, but
    not transparency with regard to trade secrets or unrelated
    activities taking place.
        That is a technology, if you will, that will emerge. So you
    have got to come up with an incredible scenario other than pure
    luck to figure out how such a team is going to either cause
    great damage, as was suggested yesterday, by coming out and
    implying the Dupont company is making chemical weapons. You
    have got to have a lot of collusion for that to happen. You
    have got to have a whole lot of things happen of not knowing
    how to manage the access.
        I mean, they are real stretches. They can be done. They can
    be done. It can happen. It can happen. So for me to get to the
    end, I get to where you are. If you look at the tools available
    to us versus the risk we take, I do not even think it is a
    close call.
        Yet I do not, General, sit here and say: You know, this
    treaty is the be all to end all. You know where I end up, Mr.
    Lehman? I end up with your statement from 1994, which I would
    like to ask permission to be placed in the record if I may.
        Senator Hagel. Without objection.
        Senator Biden. I end up at a place where the biggest
    benefit from this treaty and us being in it will be the way we
    will be able to impact on behavioral patterns of other
    countries, behavioral patterns. That is, how it will impact
    on--this new regime will not solve the end of chemical weapons,
    will not prevent clandestine production of them. It will not.
    But it takes a hell of a conspiratorial scenario and a lot of
    luck for it to do any damage in my view, any real damage. And
    on the other hand, it will modify behavior.
        It is a little like what happens--if you want to be part of
    the community of nations that are viewed as civilized and have
    access to a thousand other benefits when you are in that
    economically, you are going to change your thinking. This helps
    change the thinking.
        I will not take the time now to go back and recount your
    statement, but you--actually, do you have that one paragraph--
    where you ended your statement by talking about how the mind
    set had begun to change. I will put it in the record, but it
    goes to this larger issue. You say:

        For my part, I believe arms control and nonproliferation
    tools can be used to promote the national security and we must
    ensure that they do. The Chemical Weapons Convention is clearly
    a tool which can enhance our national security. I believe that
    unsuccessful conclusion of arms control agreements need not
    result in the neglect of our defenses, but it often has.
        In giving consent to the ratification of the CWC convention
    without reservation, the Senate should take real steps to
    support implementation of the treaty, fund strong defense
    programs, promote balanced national security strategy, and
    recognize the United States must be a leader in a very
    dangerous world. This world has undergone dramatic change and
    arms controls have been rushing by. In such a world, if we do
    not shape the arms control process to serve our interests we
    can be certain that some nations will be pressing in the
    directions that are not in our interest. The Chemical Weapons
    Convention before this committee is in our interests. Again----

        This is not the quote I wanted to read, but thank you.
        Senator Hagel. Well, it was very eloquent.
        Senator Biden. It was. You did very well. It is still
    relevant. It is not the quote I am looking for. I will put it
    in the record without holding us up.
        [The material referred to follows:]

        One can see this, in one small example, even in the way our
    pursuit of a ban on chemical weapons reinforced our commitment
    to the spread of democracy. We sought intrusive verification
    measures so that we might reduce the threat posed by the Warsaw
    Pact, but also because we knew that totalitarian regimes cannot
    long survive when their citizens are exposed to contradictory
    information. The requirement for detailed information on
    chemical weapons stocks and facilities before reaching
    agreement, at the time an innovative negotiating step which led
    to the December 1989 U.S./Soviet Phase I data exchange and the
    recent Phase II exchange, sparked a controversy which continues
    in Russia even today over the history of the Soviet chemical
    and biological weapons programs.
        Our demand for trial inspections prior to completion of
    negotiations aided in crafting a better treaty, but it also
    caused Soviet citizens to ask why they themselves could not see
    what Americans were allowed to see. Our insistence, first in
    the U.S./Soviet Bilateral Destruction Agreement (BDA) of 1990
    and later in the CWC that destruction of chemical weapons
    stocks be done in a safe and environmentally sound manner has
    created a grassroots political process of ``NIMBY''--not in my
    backyard--which has complicated agreement on a chemical weapons
    destruction plan but also complicates a return of the old
    system. One should not exaggerate the role that arms control
    has played in promoting our national agenda, but one should not
    ignore it either.

        Senator Hagel. Senator Biden, thank you.
        General Odom, did you want to respond?
        General Odom. I just wanted to say, you made my objections
    seem far less than they are, and you have made this sound much
    more benign. I hope you do realize that I have said that the
    very things that you are saying we are going to set in motion
    here are likely to produce very serious adverse consequences,
    not trivial consequences.
        Senator Biden. Well, I did not mean to suggest you thought
    they were trivial, General. If I did, I did not mean that. I am
    just pointing out that I think that it takes a hell of a lot to
    get to the worst case scenario that I think you are most
    worried about.
        Senator Hagel. Senator Biden, thank you.
        Senator Biden. Thank you.
        Senator Hagel. Gentlemen, thank you. We are grateful, as
    always. If there is anything additional that you want to add
    for the record, we would be very pleased to receive that.
        The committee is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 12:21 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

                                A P P E N D I X

                                  ----------

                 Conditions to the Chemical Weapons Convention

                           (1) Effect of Article XXII

    Summary:
        The Senate reserves the right to add reservations to the resolution
    of ratification, despite the ban (in Article XXII of the Convention) on
    reservations to the Convention. This condition asserts the Senate's
    right under the U.S. Constitution, but does not exercise it.

    Text:
    (1) Effect of Article XXII.
        Upon the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification.
    The President shall certify to the Congress that the United States has
    informed all other States Parties to the Convention that the Senate
    reserves the right, pursuant to the Constitution, to offer advice and
    consent to ratification of the Convention subject to reservations,
    notwithstanding Article XXII of the Convention.

                     (2) Financial Contributions (Helms #3)

    Summary:
        Requires statutory authorization and appropriation for payments or
    assistance to the Organization.

    Text:
    (2) Financial Contributions.
        (A) Notwithstanding any provision of the Convention, no funds may
    be drawn from the Treasury of the United States for payments or
    assistance (including the transfer of in-kind items) under paragraph 16
    of Article IV, paragraph 19 of Article V, paragraph 7 of Article VIII,
    paragraph 23 of Article IX, Article X, or any other provision of the
    Convention, without statutory authorization and appropriation.

    (3) Establishment of an Internal Oversight Office (Helms #4)

    Summary:

        Requires the equivalent of an independent OPCW Inspector General's
    Office by late December 1997; withholds 50 percent of regular U.S.
    contributions to the OPCW, beginning April 29, 1998, if the required
    independent oversight office has not been established.

    Text:

    (3) Establishment of an Internal Oversight Office.
        (A) No later than 240 days after the deposit of the instrument of
    ratification of the United States to the Convention (in this resolution
    referred to as the ``United States instrument of ratification''), the
    President shall certify to the Congress that the current internal audit
    office of the Preparatory Commission has been expanded into an
    independent internal oversight office whose functions will be
    transferred to the Organization upon its establishment. The independent
    internal oversight office shall be obligated to protect confidential
    information pursuant to the obligations of the Confidentiality Annex.
    The independent internal oversight office shall--
      (i) make investigations and reports relating to all programs of the
            Organization;
      (ii) undertake both management and financial audits, including--
        (I) an annual assessment verifying that classified and confidential
                information is stored and handled securely pursuant to the
                general obligations set forth in Article VIII and in
                accordance with all provisions of the Annex on the
                Protection of Confidential Information; and
        (II) an annual assessment of laboratories established pursuant to
                Paragraph 55 of Part II of the Verification Annex to ensure
                the Director General is carrying out his functions pursuant
                to Paragraph 56 of Part II of the Verification Annex;
      (iii) undertake performance evaluations annually to ensure the
            Organization has complied to the extent practicable with the
            recommendations of the independent internal oversight office;
      (iv) have access to all records relating to the programs and
            operations of the Organization;
      (v) have direct and prompt access to any official of the
            Organization; and
      (vi) be required to protect the identity of, and prevent reprisals
            against, all complainants.
        (B) The Organization shall ensure, to the extent practicable,
    compliance with recommendations of the independent internal oversight
    office, and shall ensure that annual and other relevant reports by the
    independent internal oversight office are made available to all member
    states pursuant to the requirements established in the Confidentiality
    Annex.
        (C) Until a certification is made under subsection (A), 50 percent
    of the amount for United States contributions to the regular budget of
    the Organization assessed pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article VIII shall
    be withheld, in addition to any other amounts required to withheld by
    any other provision of law.
        (D) Notwithstanding the requirements of this paragraph, for the
    first year of the Organization's operation, ending on April 29, 1998,
    the United States shall make its full contribution to the regular
    budget of the Organization assessed pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article
    VIII.
        (E) For purposes of this paragraph, the term ``internal oversight
    office'' means the head of an independent office (or other independent
    entity) established by the Organization to conduct and supervise
    objective audits, inspections, and investigations relating to the
    programs and operations of the Organization.

                    (4) Cost-Sharing Arrangements (Helms #5)

    Summary:

        Requires cost-sharing for ``any new research or development
    expenditures for the primary purpose of refining or improving the
    Organization's regime for verification of compliance under the
    Convention, including the training of inspectors and the provision of
    detection equipment and on-site analysis sampling and analysis
    techniques.'' Permits programs to improve U.S. monitoring without cost-
    sharing.
        We would not want the United States to do all the expensive
    research and development needed to maximize verification of compliance
    with the CWC, and not be reimbursed by other countries for such
    efforts. It will still be possible for U.S. agencies to pursue R&D
    programs so as to improve U.S. monitoring of chemical weapons, however,
    and cost-sharing arrangements need not be in place unless and until the
    United States wants to share the results with the OPCW.

    Text:
    (4) Cost-Sharing Arrangements.

       (A) Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of
    ratification, and annually thereafter, the President shall submit a
    report to Congress identifying all cost-sharing arrangements with the
    Organization.
        (B) The United States shall not undertake any new research or
    development expenditures for the primary purpose of refining or
    improving the Organization's regime for verification of compliance
    under the Convention, including the training of inspectors and the
    provision of detection equipment and on-site analysis sampling and
    analysis techniques, or share the articles, items, or services
    resulting from any research and development undertaken previously,
    without first having concluded and submitted to the Congress a cost-
    sharing arrangement with the Organization.
        (C) Nothing in this paragraph may be construed as limiting or
    constricting in any way the ability of the United States to pursue
    unilaterally any project undertaken solely to increase the capability
    of United States means for monitoring compliance with the Convention.

               (5) Intelligence Sharing and Safeguards (Helms #6)

    Summary:
        Requires interagency Intelligence Community approval and
    sanitization of intelligence information before release to the OPCW,
    such that there would be only minimal damage from unauthorized
    disclosure. The Director of Central Intelligence may waive these
    requirements on a case-by-case basis, with notice to appropriate com-
    mittees of Congress. Any unauthorized disclosure by the OPCW must be
    reported to Congress within 15 days of after the executive branch
    learns of it.

    Text:
    (5) Intelligence Sharing and Safeguards.--
        (A) Provision of Intelligence Information to the Organization.--
      (i) In General.--No United States intelligence information may be
            provided to the Organization or any organization affiliated
            with the Organization, or to any officials or employees
            thereof, unless the President certifies to the appropriate
            committees of Congress that the Director of Central
            Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of State and
            the Secretary of Defense, has established and implemented
            procedures, and has worked with the Organization to ensure
            implementation of procedures, for protecting from unauthorized
            disclosure United States intelligence sources and methods
            connected to such information. These procedures shall include,
            but not be limited to--
        (I) offering and provision of advice and assistance to the
                Organization in establishing and maintaining the necessary
                measures to ensure that inspectors and other staff members
                of the Technical Secretariat meet the highest standards of
                efficiency, competence, and integrity, pursuant to
                subparagraph l(b) of the Confidentiality Annex, and in
                establishing and maintaining a stringent regime governing
                the handling of confidential information by the Technical
                Secretariat, pursuant to paragraph 2 of the Confidentiality
                Annex;
        (II) explicit recognition, in each case in which intelligence
                information is to be provided to the Organization or any
                organization affiliated with the Organization, or to any
                officials or employees thereof, of the risks of
                unauthorized disclosure of the U.S. information to be
                provided to the Organization, and determination that such
                disclosure would result in no more than minimal damage to
                national security;
        (III) sanitization of intelligence information that is to be
                provided to the Organization or any organization affiliated
                with the Organization, or to any officials or employees
                thereof, to remove all information that could betray
                intelligence sources and methods; and
        (IV) interagency United States Intelligence Community approval for
                any release of intelligence information to the Organization
                or any organization affiliated with the Organization, or to
                any officials or employees thereof, no matter how
                thoroughly it has been sanitized.
      (ii) Waiver Authority.--
        (I) In General.--The Director of Central Intelligence may waive the
                application of clause (i) if the Director of Central
                Intelligence certifies in writing to the appropriate
                committees of Congress that providing such information to
                the Organization or an organization affiliated with the
                Organization, or to any official or employee thereof, is in
                the vital national security interests of the United States
                and that all possible measures to protect such information
                have been taken, except that such waiver must be made for
                each instance such information is provided, or for each
                such document provided. In the event that multiple waivers
                are issued within a single week, a single certification to
                the appropriate committees of Congress may be submitted,
                specifying each waiver issued during that week.
        (II) Delegation of Duties.--The Director of Central Intelligence
                may not delegate any duty of the Director of Central
                Intelligence under this subsection.
        (B) Periodic and Special Reports.--
      (i) Periodic Reports.--
        (I) In General.--The President shall report periodically, but not
                less frequently than semiannually, to the Select Committee
                on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select
                Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives
                on the types and volume of intelligence information
                provided to the Organization or any organization affiliated
                with the Organization, or to any officials or employees
                thereof, and the purposes for which it was provided during
                the period covered by the report.
        (II) Exemption.--For purposes of subclause (i), intelligence
                information provided to the Organization or any
                organization affiliated with the Organization, or to any
                officials or employees thereof, does not cover information
                that is provided only to, and only for the use of,
                appropriately cleared United States Government personnel
                serving with the Organization or any organization
                affiliated with the Organization.
      (ii) Special Reports.--
        (I) Report on Procedures.--Accompanying the certification provided
                pursuant to subparagraph (A)(i), the President shall
                provide a detailed report to the Select Committee on
                Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select
                Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives
                identifying the procedures established for protecting
                intelligence sources and methods when sanitized
                intelligence information is provided pursuant to this
                section.
        (II) Reports on Unauthorized Disclosures.--The President shall
                report to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
                Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
                of the House of Representatives, within 15 days after it
                has become known to the U.S. Government, regarding any
                unauthorized disclosure of intelligence information
                provided by the United States to the Organization.
        (C) Delegation of Duties.--The President may not delegate or assign
    the duties of the President under this section.
        (D) Relationship to Existing Law.--Nothing in this paragraph may he
    construed to--
      (i) impair or otherwise affect the authority of the Director of
            Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and
            methods from unauthorized disclosure pursuant to section
            103(c)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-
            3(c)(5)); or
      (ii) supersede or otherwise affect the provisions of title V of the
            National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.).
        (E) Definitions.--In this section:
      (i) Appropriate Committees of Congress.--The term ``appropriate
            committees of Congress'' means the Committee on Foreign
            Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
            Senate and the Committee on International Relations and the
            Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
            Representatives.
      (ii) Organization.--The term ``Organization'' means the Organization
            for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons established under the
            Convention and includes any organ of that Organization and any
            board or working group, such as the Scientific Advisory Board,
            that may be established by it.
      (iii) Organization Affiliated with the Organization.--The term
            ``organization affiliated with the Organization'' includes, but
            is not limited to, the Provisional Technical Secretariat under
            the Convention and any laboratory certified by the Director-
            General of the Organization as designated to perform analytical
            or other functions.

                  (6) Amendments to the Convention (Helms #7)

    Summary:
        Requires the United States to vote on all proposed amendments and
    requires the executive branch to submit all amendments to the Senate
    for its advice and consent.

    Text:
    (6) Amendments to the Convention.
        (A) A United States representative will be present at all Amendment
    Conferences and will cast a vote, either affirmative or negative, on
    all proposed amendments made at such conferences.
        (B) The President shall submit to the Senate for its advice and
    consent to ratification under Article 11, Section 2, Clause 2 of the
    Constitution of the United States any amendment to the Convention
    adopted by an Amendment Conference.

      (7) Continuing Vitality of the Australia Group and National Export
                              Controls (Helms #11)

    Summary:
        Requires the President to certify, before depositing instruments of
    ratification, that the CWC will in no way weaken the Australia Group,
    and that each member of the Group agrees there is no CWC requirement to
    weaken their export controls.
        Requires annual certification that Australia Group controls have
    not been weakened and remain effective or, if this cannot be certified,
    consultation with the Senate on a resolution of continued adherence to
    the CWC.
        Requires the President to block any attempt within the Australia
    Group to change the Group's view of its obligations under the CWC.

    Text:
    (7) Continuing Vitality of the Australia Group and National Export
            Controls.
        (A) The Senate declares that the collapse of the informal forum of
    states known as the ``Australia Group,'' either though changes in
    membership or lack of compliance with common export controls, or the
    substantial weakening of common Aus-
    tralia Group export controls and non-proliferation measures in force on
    the date of United States ratification of the Convention, would
    constitute a fundamental change in circumstances to United States
    ratification of the Convention.
        (B) Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of
    ratification, the President shall certify to Congress that--
      (i) nothing in the Convention obligates the United States to accept
            any modification, change in scope, or weakening of its national
            export controls. The United States understands that the
            maintenance of national restrictions on trade in chemicals and
            chemical production technology is fully compatible with the
            provisions of the Convention, including Article XI(2), and
            solely within the sovereign jurisdiction of the United States;
      (ii) the Convention preserves the right of State Parties,
            unilaterally or collectively, to maintain or impose export
            controls on chemicals and related chemical production
            technology for foreign policy or national security reasons,
            notwithstanding Article XI(2); and
      (iii) each Member-State of the Australia Group, at the highest
            diplomatic levels, has officially communicated to the U.S.
            Government its understanding and agreement that export control
            and nonproliferation measures which the Australia Group has
            undertaken are fully compatible with the provisions of the
            Convention, including Article XI(2), and its commitment to
            maintain in the future such export controls and
            nonproliferation measures against non-Australia Group members.
        (C) (i) The President shall certify to Congress on an annual basis
    that--
      (a) Australia Group members continue to maintain an equally effective
            or more comprehensive control over the export of toxic
            chemicals and their precursors, dual-use processing equipment,
            human, animal and plant pathogens and toxins with potential
            biological weapons application, and dual-use biological
            equipment, as that afforded by the Australia Group as of the
            date of ratification of this Convention by the United States;
            and
      (b) the Australia group remains a viable mechanism for limiting the
            spread of chemical and biological weapons-related materials and
            technology, and that the effectiveness of the Australia Group
            has not been undermined by changes in membership, lack of
            compliance with common export controls and nonproliferation
            measures, or weakening of common controls and nonproliferation
            measures in force as of the date of ratification of this
            Convention by the United States.
        (ii) In the event that the President is, at any time, unable to
    make the certifications described in subparagraph (C)(i), the President
    shall consult with the Senate for the purposes of obtaining a
    resolution of continued adherence to the Convention, notwithstanding
    the fundamental change in circumstance.
        (D) The President shall consult periodically, but not less
    frequently than twice a year, with the Committee on Foreign Relations
    of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations of the House
    of Representatives, on Australia Group export control and
    nonproliferation measures. If any Australia Group member adopts a
    position at variance with the certifications and understandings
    provided under subparagraph (B), or should seek to gain Australia Group
    acquiescence or approval for an interpretation that various provisions
    of the Convention require it to remove chemical-weapons related export
    controls against any State Party to the Convention, the President shall
    block any effort by that Australia Group member to secure Australia
    Group approval of such a position or interpretation.
        (E) For the purposes of this paragraph--
      (i) ``Australia Group'' means the informal forum of states, chaired
            by Australia, whose goal is to discourage and impede chemical
            and biological weapons proliferation by harmonizing national
            export controls, chemical weapons precursor chemicals,
            biological weapons pathogens, and dual-use production
            equipment, and through other measures: and
      (ii) ``Highest diplomatic levels'' means at the level of a senior
            official with the power to authoritatively represent their
            government, and does not mean a diplomatic representative of
            that government to the United States.

                  (8) Negative Security Assurances (Helms #12)

    Summary:
        Requires a classified Presidential report regarding the impact of
    CWC on U.S. options for responding to chemical or biological attacks,
    and on the assurances we offer to other countries that foreswear the
    use of nuclear weapons.
        Some Members are concerned because ratification of the CWC will
    leave the United States unable to threaten retaliatory use of chemical
    weapons against a state that used chemical weapons on U.S. or allied
    forces. The United States has no in-
    tention of using chemical weapons, however, even in response to a
    foreign chemical weapon attack. Even before the CWC was negotiated, the
    United States committed itself to the destruction of nearly all U.S.
    chemical weapons.
        This condition requires the President to submit a classified report
    on the impact of CWC upon U.S. ``negative security assurances'' to
    other countries. Such assurances are the ``umbrella'' that we offer to
    countries that agree to forego weapons of mass destruction.

    Text:
    (8) Negative Security Assurances.
        (A) In forswearing the possession of chemical weapons retaliatory
    capability under the Convention, the Senate understands that deterrence
    of attack by chemical weapons requires a reevaluation of the negative
    security assurances extended to non-nuclear-weapon states.
        (B) Accordingly, 180 days after the deposit of the United States
    instrument of ratification, the President shall submit to the Congress
    a classified report setting forth the findings of a detailed review of
    United States policy on negative security assurances, including a
    determination of the appropriate responses to the use of chemical or
    biological weapons against the United States military, United States
    citizens, allies, and third parties.

              (9) Protection of Advanced Biotechnology (Helms #13)

    Summary:
        Requires the President to certify, prior to the deposit of the
    United States instrument of ratification and annually thereafter, that
    the legitimate commercial activities and interests of U.S. chemical,
    biotechnology, and pharmaceutical firms are not being significantly
    harmed by the Convention.
        The Administration is prepared to certify, both now and annually,
    that the CWC's limits on the production and use of the most toxic
    chemical weapons and their precursors are not significantly harming the
    legitimate commercial activities and interests of U.S. chemical,
    biotechnology, and pharmaceutical firms.
        Most of those firms played a major role in the negotiation of this
    Convention, of course, so they have long since signed up to any
    sacrifices that U.S. firms may have to make in order to limit the
    ability of rogue states to obtain and use chemical weapons. And the
    Reagan, Bush and Clinton Administrations have all taken extraordinary
    measures to limit the impact of the CWC upon U.S. businesses.

    Text:
    (9) Protection of Advanced Biotechnology.
        Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of
    ratification, and on January 1 of every year thereafter, the President
    shall certify to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Speaker of
    the House of Representatives that the legitimate commercial activities
    and interests of the chemical, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical firms
    in the United States are not being significantly harmed by the
    limitations of the Convention on access to, and production of, those
    chemicals and toxins listed in Schedule 1 contained in the Annex on
    Chemicals of the Convention.

           (10) Monitoring and Verification of Compliance (Helms #14)

    Summary:
        Requires detailed annual country-by-country reports on chemical
    weapons developments and U.S. intelligence coverage, as well as at
    least quarterly briefings on U.S. actions to pursue CWC compliance
    issues.
        We all know that monitoring and verification of some aspects of CWC
    compliance will be difficult. This fact of life has prompted
    understandable concern on the part of some Members, and the
    administration is prepared to accept a condition that requires both
    periodic reports and prompt notice regarding world chemical weapons
    programs and the status of CWC compliance. The executive branch would
    also offer briefings on current compliance issues, including issues to
    be raised in OPCW meetings and the results of those meetings.

    Text:
    (10) Monitoring and Verification of Compliance.
        (A) The Senate declares that--
      (i) the Convention is in the interests of the United States only if
            all parties to the Convention are in strict compliance with the
            terms of the Convention as submitted to the Senate for its
            advice and consent to ratification, such compli-
      ance being measured by performance and not by efforts, intentions, or
    commitments to comply; and
      (ii) the Senate expects all parties to the Convention to be in strict
            compliance with their obligations under the terms of the
            Convention, as submitted to the Senate for its advice and
            consent to ratification;
        (B) Given its concern about the intelligence community's low level
    of confidence in its ability to monitor compliance with the Convention,
    the Senate expects the executive branch of Government to offer regular
    briefings, not less than four times a year, to the Committee on Foreign
    Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations of
    the House of Representatives on compliance issues related to the
    Convention. Such briefings shall include a description of all United
    States efforts in bilateral and multilateral diplomatic channels and
    forums to resolve compliance issues and shall include a complete
    description of--
      (i) any compliance issues the United States plans to raise at
            meetings of the Organization, in advance of such meetings;
      (ii) any compliance issues raised at meetings of the Organization,
            within 30 days of each such meeting;
      (iii) any determination by the President that a party is in
            noncompliance with or is otherwise acting in a manner
            inconsistent with the object or purpose of the Convention,
            within 30 days of such a determination.
        (C) The President shall submit annually on January 1 to the
    Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
    International Relations of the House of Representatives a full and
    complete classified and unclassified report setting forth--
      (i) a certification of those priority countries included in the
            Intelligence Community's Monitoring Strategy, as defined by the
            Director of Central Intelligence's Arms Control Intelligence
            Staff and the National Intelligence Council, deter-mined to be
            in compliance with the Convention, on a country-by-country
            basis;
      (ii) for those countries not certified pursuant to clause (i), an
            identification and assessment of all compliance issues arising
            with regard to the adherence of the country to its obligations
            under the Convention;
      (iii) the steps the United States has taken, either unilaterally or
            in conjunction with another State Party--
        (I) to initiate challenge inspections of the noncompliant party
                with the objective of demonstrating to the international
                community the act of noncompliance;
        (II) to call attention publicly to the activity in question; and
        (III) to seek on an urgent basis a meeting at the highest
                diplomatic level with the noncompliant party with the
                objective of bringing the noncompliant party into
                compliance.
      (iv) a determination of the military significance and broader
            security risks arising from any compliance issue identified
            pursuant to clause (ii); and
      (v) a detailed assessment of the responses of the noncompliant party
            in question to actions undertaken by the United States
            described in the report submitted pursuant to clause (iii).
        (D) On January 1, 1998, and annually thereafter, the Director of
    Central Intelligence shall submit to the Committees on Foreign
    Relations, Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of
    the Senate and to the Committees on International Relations, National
    Security, and Permanent Select Committee of the House of
    Representatives, a full and complete classified and unclassified report
    regarding--
      (i) the status of chemical weapons development, production,
            stockpiling, and use, within the meanings of the Convention, on
            a country-by-country basis;
      (ii) any information made available to the U.S. Government concerning
            the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling,
            retention, use, or direct or indirect transfer of novel agents,
            including any unitary or binary chemical weapon comprised of
            chemical components not identified on the schedules of the
            Annex on Chemicals, by any country;
      (iii) the extent of trade in chemicals potentially relevant to
            chemical weapons programs, including all Australia Group
            chemicals and chemicals identified on the schedules of the
            Annex on Chemicals, on a country-by-country basis;
      (iv) the monitoring responsibilities, practices, and strategies of
            the intelligence community and a determination of the level of
            confidence of the intelligence community (as defined in section
            3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947) with respect to each
            specific monitoring task undertaken, including an assessment by
            the intelligence community of the national aggregate data
            provided by parties to the Organization, on a country-by-
            country basis;
      (v) an identification of how U.S. national intelligence means,
            including national technical means and human intelligence, is
            being marshaled together with the Convention's verification
            provisions to monitor compliance with the Convention; and
      (vi) the identification of chemical weapons development, production,
            stockpiling, or use, within the meanings of the Convention, by
            subnational groups, including terrorist and paramilitary
            organizations.
        (E) The report required under subparagraph (D) shall include a full
    and complete classified annex submitted solely to the Select Committee
    on Intelligence of the Senate and to the Permanent Select Committee of
    the House of Representatives regarding--
      (i) a detailed and specific identification of all United States
            resources devoted to monitoring the Convention, including
            information on all expenditures associated with the monitoring
            of the Convention; and
      (ii) an identification of the priorities of the executive branch of
            Government for the development of new resources relating to
            detection and monitoring capabilities with respect to chemical
            and biological weapons, including a description of the steps
            being taken and resources being devoted to strengthening U.S.
            monitoring capabilities.

      (11) Enhancements to Robust Chemical and Biological Defenses (Helms
                                      #15)

    Summary:
        Requires the Secretary of Defense to ensure that U.S. forces are
    capable of carrying out required military missions in U.S. regional
    contingency plans, regardless of any foreign threat or use of chemical
    weapons, and that the U.S. Army Chemical School remains under the
    supervision of an Army general.
        Former Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger and others have
    asserted that ratifying CWC could lead to complacency regarding the
    need for chemical weapons defenses. This concern is frankly a bit
    mystifying. The fear of complacency persists, however, so the
    administration has agreed to a condition requiring the Secretary of
    Defense to ensure that U.S. forces are capable of carrying out required
    military missions in U.S. regional contingency plans, regardless of any
    foreign threat or use of chemical weapons. This means not only
    improving the defensive capabilities of U.S. forces, but also
    initiating discussions on chemical weapons defense with likely
    coalition partners and countries whose civilian personnel would support
    U.S. forces in a conflict.
        The Administration has also agreed to assure that the U.S. Army
    Chemical School remains under the supervision of an Army general.

    Text:
    (11) Enhancements to Robust Chemical and Biological Defenses.
        (A) It is the sense of the Senate that--
      (1) chemical and biological threats to deployed U.S. Armed Forces
            will continue to grow in regions of concern around the world,
            and pose serious threats to U.S. power projection and forward
            deployment strategies;
      (2) chemical weapons or biological weapons use is a potential
            condition of future conflicts in regions of concern;
      (3) it is essential for the United States and key regional allies to
            preserve and further develop robust chemical and biological
            defenses;
      (4) the United States Armed Forces are inadequately equipped,
            organized, trained and exercised for chemical and biological
            defense against current and expected threats, and that too much
            reliance is placed on non-active duty forces, which receive
            less training and less modern equipment, for critical chemical
            and biological defense capabilities;
      (5) the lack of readiness stems from a de-emphasis of chemical and
            biological defenses within the executive branch of Government
            and the United States Armed Forces;
      (6) the armed forces of key regional allies and likely coalition
            partners, as well as civilians necessary to support U.S.
            military operations, are inadequately prepared and equipped to
            carry out essential missions in chemically and biologically
            contaminated environments;
      (7) congressional direction contained in the Defense Against Weapons
            of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 should lead to enhanced
            domestic preparedness to protect against chemical and
            biological weapons threats; and
      (8) the U.S. Armed Forces should place increased emphasis on
            potential threats to deployed U.S. Armed Forces and, in
            particular, make countering chemical and biological weapons use
            an organizing principle for U.S. defense strategy and
            development of force structure, doctrine, planning, training,
            and exercising policies of the U.S. Armed Forces.
        (B) The Secretary of Defense shall take those actions necessary to
    ensure that U.S. Armed Forces are capable of carrying out required
    military missions in U.S. regional contingency plans, despite the
    threat or use of chemical or biological weapons. In particular, the
    Secretary of Defense shall ensure that U.S. Armed Forces are
    effectively equipped, organized, trained and exercised (including at
    the large unit and theater level) to conduct operations in a chemically
    or biologically contaminated environment that are critical to the
    success of U.S. military plans in regional conflicts, including--
      (1) deployment, logistics and reinforcement operations at key ports
            and airfields;
      (2) sustained combat aircraft sortie generation at critical regional
            airbases; and
      (3) ground force maneuvers of large units and divisions.
        (C) The Secretaries of Defense and State shall, as a priority
    matter, initiate discussions with key regional allies and likely
    regional coalition partners, including those countries where the U.S.
    currently deploys forces, where U.S. forces would likely operate during
    regional conflicts, or which would provide civilians necessary to
    support U.S. military operations, to determine what steps are necessary
    to ensure that Allied and coalition forces and other critical civilians
    are adequately equipped and prepared to operate in chemically- and
    biologically-contaminated environments. No later than one year after
    deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the
    Secretaries of Defense and State shall provide a report to the
    Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services of the Senate and to
    the Speaker of the House on the results of these discussions, plans for
    future discussions, measures agreed to improve the preparedness of
    foreign forces and civilians, and proposals for increased military
    assistance, including through the Foreign Military Sales, Foreign
    Military Financing and the International Military Education and
    Training programs pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
        (D) The Secretary of Defense shall take those actions necessary to
    ensure that the United States Army Chemical School remains under the
    oversight of a general officer of the United States Army.
        (E) Given its concerns about the present state of chemical and
    biological defense readiness and training, it is the sense of the
    Senate that--
      (1) the transfer, consolidation, and reorganization of the United
            States Army Chemical School, the Army should not disrupt or
            diminish the training and readiness of the United States Armed
            Forces to fight in a chemical-biological warfare environment;
      (2) the Army should continue to operate the Chemical Defense Training
            Facility at Fort McClellan until such time as the replacement
            training facility at Fort Leonard Wood is functional.
        (F) On January 1, 1998, and annually thereafter, the President
    shall submit a report to the Committees on Foreign Relations,
    Appropriations, and Armed Services and the Committees on International
    Relations, National Security, Appropriations, and Speaker of the House
    on previous, current, and planned chemical and biological weapons
    defense activities. The report shall include the following information
    for the previous fiscal year and for the next three fiscal years--
      (1) Proposed solutions to each of the deficiencies in chemical and
            biological warfare defenses identified in the March 1996
            General Accounting Office Report, titled ``Chemical and
            Biological Defense: Emphasis Remains Insufficient to Resolve
            Continuing Problems,'' and steps being taken pursuant to
            paragraph (B) of this section to ensure that the U.S. Armed
            Forces are capable of conducting required military operations
            to ensure the success of U.S. regional contingency plans
            despite the threat or use of chemical or biological weapons;
      (2) An identification of priorities of the executive branch of
            Government in the development of both active and passive
            chemical and biological defenses;
      (3) A detailed summary of all budget activities associated with the
            research, development, testing, and evaluation of chemical and
            biological defense programs;
      (4) A detailed summary of expenditures on research, development,
            testing, and evaluation, and procurement of chemical and
            biological defenses by fiscal years defense programs,
            department, and agency;
      (5) A detailed assessment of current and projected vaccine production
            capabilities and vaccine stocks, including progress in
            researching and developing a multivalent vaccine;
      (6) A detailed assessment of procedures and capabilities necessary to
            protect and decontaminate infrastructure to reinforce United
            States power-projection forces, including progress in
            developing a nonaqueous chemical decontamination capability;
      (7) The progress made in procuring light-weight personal protective
            gear and steps being taken to ensure that programmed
            procurement quantities are suffi-
      cient to replace expiring battle-dress overgarments and chemical
    protective overgarments to maintain required wartime inventory levels;
      (8) The progress in developing long-range standoff detection and
            identification capabilities and other battlefield surveillance
            capabilities for biological and chemical weapons, including
            progress on developing a multi-chemical agent detector,
            unmanned aerial vehicles, and unmanned ground sensors;
      (9) Progress in developing and deploying layered theater missile
            defenses for deployed U.S. Armed Forces which will provide
            greater geographic coverage against current and expected
            ballistic missile threats and will help mitigate chemical and
            biological contamination through higher altitude intercepts and
            boost-phase intercepts;
      (10) An assessment of the training and readiness of the United States
            Armed Forces to operate in a chemically or biologically
            contaminated environment and actions taken to sustain training
            and readiness, including at national combat training centers;
      (11) The progress in incorporating chemical and biological
            considerations into service and Joint exercises as well as
            simulations, models, and wargames and the conclusions drawn
            from these efforts about the U.S. capability to carry out
            required missions, including with coalition partners, in
            military contingencies;
      (12) The progress in developing and implementing service and joint
            doctrine for combat and non-combat operations involving
            adversaries armed with chemical or biological weapons,
            including efforts to update the range of service and joint
            doctrine to better address the wide range of military
            activities, including deployment, reinforcement and logistics
            operations in support of combat operations, and for the conduct
            of such operations in concert with coalition forces; and
      (13) The progress in resolving issues relating to the protection of
            United States population centers from chemical and biological
            attack, including plans for inoculation of populations,
            consequence management, and progress made in developing and
            deploying effective cruise missile defenses and a national
            ballistic missile defense.

                         (12) Noncompliance (Helms #16)

    Summary:
        In the event of noncompliance by a State Party, requires the
    President to inform and consult with the Senate and to take a series of
    actions designed to expose noncompliance and to force compliance. These
    actions include making effective use of CWC provisions for challenge
    inspections, high-level diplomacy and U.N. sanctions.
        The President must also implement any sanctions required by U.S.
    law. If the noncompliance should persist for a year, the President must
    consult with the Senate regarding continued adherence to the
    Convention.

    Text:
    (12) Noncompliance.
        (A) If the President determines that persuasive information exists
    that a party to the Convention is maintaining a chemical weapons
    production or production mobilization capability, is developing new
    chemical agents, or is in violation of the Convention in any other
    manner so as to threaten the national security interests of the United
    States. Then the President shall--
      (1) consult with, and promptly submit to, the Senate a report
            detailing the effect of such actions,
      (2) seek on an urgent basis a challenge inspection of the facilities
            of the relevant party in accordance with the provisions of the
            Convention with the objective of demonstrating to the
            international community the act of noncompliance;
      (3) seek, or encourage, on an urgent basis a meeting at the highest
            diplomatic level with the relevant party with the objective of
            bringing the noncompliant party into compliance,
      (4) implement prohibitions and sanctions against the relevant party
            as required by law;
      (5) if noncompliance has been determined, seek on an urgent basis
            within the Security Council of the United Nations a
            multilateral imposition of sanctions against the noncompliant
            party for the purposes of bringing the noncompliant party into
            compliance; and
      (6) in the event that noncompliance persists for a period of longer
            than 1 year after the date of determination made pursuant to
            subparagraph (A), promptly consult with the Senate for the
            purposes of obtaining a resolution of support of continued
            adherence to the Convention, notwithstanding the changed
            circumstances affecting the object and purpose of the
            Convention.
        (B) Nothing in this section may be construed to impair or otherwise
    affect the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence to protect
    intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure pursuant
    to section 103(c)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
    403-3(c)(5)).
        (C) If the President determines that an action otherwise required
    under paragraph (A) would impair or otherwise affect the authority of
    the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources
    and methods from unauthorized disclosure, he shall report that
    determination, together with a detailed written explanation of the
    basis for that determination, to the Chairmen of the Senate Select
    Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on
    Intelligence no later than 15 days after making such determination.

           (13) Primacy of the United States Constitution (Helms #17)

    Summary:
        Makes clear that the CWC does not contradict the U.S. Constitution.
        Some CWC opponents have said that on-site inspections would be
    conducted in violation of the U.S. Constitution. This is simply not the
    case. No administration would agree to a treaty that violated the
    Constitution, no treaty ever takes precedence over the Constitution,
    and only the United States interprets our Constitution.
        This condition states those facts.

    Text:
    (13) Primacy of the United States Constitution.
        Nothing in the Convention requires or authorizes legislation, or
    other action, by the United States prohibited by the Constitution of
    the United States, as interpreted by the United States.

               (14) Financing Russian Implementation (Helms #18)

    Summary:
        Requires the United States not to accept any effort by Russia to
    make Russia's CWC ratification contingent upon U.S. financial
    guarantees to cover Russian destruction costs.
        None of us would want the United States to be stuck with the bill
    for Russian destruction of their vast chemical weapons stockpile. So
    there is agreement on a condition that the United States shall not
    accept any Russian effort to condition its ratification of CWC upon the
    United States providing guarantees to pay for Russian implementation of
    CWC or of the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement.

    Text:
    (14) Financing Russian Implementation.
        The United States understands that in order to be assured of the
    Russian commitment to a reduction in chemical weapons stockpiles,
    Russia must maintain a substantial stake in financing the
    implementation of both the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement, and
    the Convention. The United States shall not accept any effort by Russia
    to make deposit of Russia's instrument of ratification contingent upon
    the United States providing financial guarantees to pay for
    implementation of commitments by Russia under the 1990 Bilateral
    Destruction Agreement or the Convention.

                  (15) Assistance Under Article X (Helms #19)

    Summary:
        Requires the United States not to contribute to the voluntary fund
    for chemical weapons defense assistance to other States Parties, and
    limits U.S. assistance to certain states to medical antidotes and
    treatments.
        Opponents of CWC assert that Article X would require the United
    States to provide assistance and equipment to countries like Cuba to
    improve their chemical weapons defense capabilities. This is a
    misconception of paragraph 7 of Article X, which says: ``Each State
    Party undertakes to provide assistance through the Organization.''
    Assistance may include ``detection equipment and alarm systems,
    protective equipment; decontamination equipment and decontaminants;
    medical antidotes and treatments; and advice on any of these protective
    measures.''
        The rest of paragraph 7 of Article X makes clear that a State Party
    may simply declare what assistance it might provide in response to an
    appeal by the OPCW. CWC does not compel the United States to give any
    country, let alone an enemy like Cuba, anything more than medical
    assistance or advice.

    Text:
    (15) Assistance Under Article X.
        (A) Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of
    ratification, the President shall certify to the Congress that the
    United States shall not provide assistance under paragraph 7(a) of
    Article X.
        (B) Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of
    ratification, the President shall certify to the Congress that for any
    States Party the government of which is not eligible for assistance
    under chapter 2 of Part II or chapter 4 of Part II of the Foreign
    Assistance Act of 1961--
      (i) no assistance under paragraph 7(b) of Article X will be provided
            to the States Party; and
      (ii) no assistance under paragraph 7(c) of Article X other than
            medical antidotes and treatment will be provided to the States
            Party.

                  (16) Constitutional Prerogatives (Helms #22)

    Summary:
        Sense of the Senate that U.S. negotiators should not agree to
    treaties that bar reservations and that the Senate should not consent
    to ratification of any such future treaties. (See also #1.)
        Article XXII of the CWC states: ``The Articles of this Convention
    shall not be subject to reservations. The Annexes of this Convention
    shall not be subject to reservations incompatible with its object and
    purpose.'' Senator Helms rightly notes that although the United States
    has ratified other treaties with similar provisions, the Senate Foreign
    Relations Committee has maintained that ``the President's agreement to
    such a prohibition can not constrain the Senate's constitutional right
    and obligation to give its advice and consent to a treaty subject to
    any reservation it might determine is required by the national
    interest.''
        The U.S. Constitution vests in the Senate the power to give its
    advice and consent subject to reservations. So I am happy to support
    this condition that reminds the executive branch of the Senate's role.

    Text:
    (16) Constitutional Prerogatives.
        (A) The Senate makes the following findings:
      (1) The Constitution states that the President ``shall have Power, by
            and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
            Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur.''
      (2) At the turn of the century, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge took the
            position that the giving of advice and consent to treaties
            constitutes a stage in negotiation on the treaties and that
            Senate amendments or reservations to a treaty are propositions
            ``offered at a later stage of the negotiation by the other part
            of the American treatymaking power in the only manner in which
            they could then be offered.''
      (3) The executive branch has begun a practice of negotiating and
            submitting to the Senate treaties which include a provision
            which has the purported effect of inhibiting the Senate from
            attaching reservations which the Senate considers necessary in
            the national interest or of preventing the Senate from
            exercising its constitutional duty to give its advice and
            consent to treaty commitments before ratification.
      (4) During the 85th Congress, and again during the 102d Congress, the
            Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate made its position
            on this issue clear when stating that ``the President's
            agreement to such a prohibition can not constrain the Senate's
            constitutional right and obligation to give its advice and
            consent to a treaty subject to any reservation it might
            determine is required by the national interest.''
        (B) Sense of the Senate.
        It is the sense of the Senate that--
      (1) the past ratification by the Senate of treaties containing
            provisions which prohibit amendments or reservations should not
            be construed as a precedent for such clauses in future
            agreements with other nations which require the advice and
            consent of the Senate;
      (2) United States negotiators to a treaty should not agree to any
            provision which has the effect of inhibiting the Senate from
            attaching reservations or offering amendments to the treaty;
            and
      (3) the Senate should not consent in the future to any treaty article
            or provision which would prohibit the Senate from giving its
            advice and consent to the treaty subject to amendment or
            reservation.

         (17) Additions to the Annex on Chemicals (Replaces Helms #25)

    Summary:
        There may well be occasions where it is in our national security
    interest to add new chemicals to the list of restricted and prohibited
    chemicals when it becomes clear that they have chemical weapon uses.
        However, some have expressed a concern that the addition of certain
    chemicals to the annex on chemicals might introduce new burdens on U.S.
    industry.
        This condition requires that the executive branch inform Congress
    when a chemical is proposed for addition to the Schedules.
        Consultation with Congress at that stage would enable the United
    States to object to routine adoption of a change that might have
    serious impact upon U.S. companies. Such an objection would force the
    OPCW to seek a two-thirds vote in the Conference of States Parties.

    Text:
    (17) Additions to the Annex on Chemicals.
        (A) Presidential Notification.--Not later than ten days after the
    Director-General communicates information to all States Parties,
    pursuant to Article XV(5)(a) of the Convention, of a proposal for the
    addition of a chemical or biological substance to a schedule of the
    Annex on Chemicals, the President shall notify the Committee on Foreign
    Relations of the U.S. Senate of the proposed addition.
        (B) Presidential Report.--Not later than 60 days after the
    Director-General communicates information of such a proposal pursuant
    to Article XV(5)(a) or not later than 30 days after a positive
    recommendation by the Executive Council pursuant to Article XV(5)(c) of
    the Convention, whichever is sooner, the President shall transmit to
    the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate a report, in
    classified and unclassified form, detailing the likely impact of the
    proposed addition to the Annex on Chemicals. Such report shall include,
    but not be limited to--
      (i) an assessment of the likely impact on U.S. industry of the
            proposed addition of the chemical or biological substance to
            the Annex on Chemicals;
      (ii) a description of the likely costs and benefits, if any, to U.S.
            national security of the proposed addition of such chemical or
            biological substance to the Annex on Chemicals; and
      (iii) a detailed assessment of the effect of the proposed addition on
            U.S. obligations under the Verification Annex;
        (C) Presidential Consultation.--The President shall, after the
    submission of the notification required under subparagraph (A) and
    prior to any action on the proposal by the Executive Council under
    Article XV(5)(c), consult promptly with the Senate as to whether the
    United States should object to the proposed addition of a chemical or
    biological substance pursuant to Article XV(5)(c).

                      (18) Effect on Terrorism (Helms #27)

    Summary:
        Senator Helms and you have agreed to a condition by which the
    Senate will find that the CWC would not have stopped the Aum Shinrikyo
    group in Japan and that future terrorist groups will likely seek
    chemical weapons.
        Both of these statements are probably quite accurate, and no harm
    is done by attaching them to the resolution of ratification.

    Text:
    (18) Effect on Terrorism.
        The Senate finds that--
        (A) Irrespective of whether the Convention enters into force,
    terrorists will likely look upon chemical weapons as a means to gain
    greater publicity and instill widespread fear; and
        (B) the March 1995 Tokyo subway attack by the Aum Shinrikyo would
    not have been prevented by the Convention.

              (19) Constitutional Separation of Powers (Helms #30)

    Summary:
        This condition recognizes the Constitutional responsibility of the
    Congress to pay the debts of the United States. It also declares the
    Senate's view that the appropriation of funds for financial
    contributions to the OPCW are beyond the control of the executive
    branch, and that the United States should not be denied its vote in the
    OPCW for failing to pay in full its assessed financial contribution.

    Text:
    (19) Constitutional Separation of Powers.
        Article VIII, paragraph 8 of the Convention allows States Parties
    to vote in the Organization if that member is in arrears in the payment
    of financial contributions provided that the Organization is satisfied
    that such non-payment is due to conditions beyond the control of that
    member. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution vests in Congress the
    exclusive authority to ``pay the Debts'' of the United States.
    Financial contributions to the Organization for the Prohibition of
    Chemical Weapons may be appropriated only by the Congress and thus the
    Senate declares that they are, for the purposes of Article VIII,
    paragraph 8, beyond the control of the executive branch of the U.S.
    Government. Therefore, the United States vote in the Organization
    should not be denied in the event the Congress does not appropriate
    fully funds for its assessed financial contribution.

                       (20) The On-Site Inspection Agency

    Summary:
        In 1994, the Select Committee on Intelligence recommended that
    Congress authorize the DoD On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) to assist
    private facilities in the escorting of CWC inspectors. OSIA has done a
    fine job over the years in escorting arms control inspectors at U.S.
    Government and defense contractor facilities, making sure that treaty
    obligations are met with minimal risk to sensitive information.
        OSIA's charter restricts it to DoD and contractor sites, so new
    legislation will be needed--probably in the CWC implementing
    legislation. (Note: The Armed Services Committee will support this so
    long as the assistance is provided on a reimbursable basis, but may
    object if DoD funds are to be used to help U.S. industry.)

    Text:
    (20) The On-Site Inspection Agency.
        It is the sense of the Senate that--
        In advance of any inspection, the On-Site Inspection Agency of the
    Department of Defense should be authorized to provide assistance to
    United States facilities subject to routine inspections under the
    Convention or to any facility which is the object of a challenge
    inspection initiated pursuant to Article IX, provided that the consent
    of the owner or operator of such facility has first been obtained.

                    (21) Further Arms Reduction Obligations

    Summary:
        This declaration builds upon Section 33(b) of the Arms Control and
    Disarmament Act of 1961, which was originally intended to ensure that
    the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency would be
    prohibited from taking any actions in furtherance of arms control
    objectives that affect the armed forces of the United States without
    the approval of either a two-thirds vote of the Senate or a majority of
    both Houses.
        This provision, which has been attached to major arms control
    treaties in recent years, sets forth the Senate position that any
    international agreement that would obligate the United States to limit
    its forces in a militarily significant way will only be considered by
    the Senate pursuant to Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the
    Constitution.

    Text:
    (21) Further Arms Reduction Obligations.
        The Senate declares its intention to consider for approval
    international agreements that would obligate the United States to
    reduce or limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States in a
    militarily significant manner only pursuant to the treaty power as set
    forth in Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution.

                           (22) Treaty Interpretation

    Summary:
        This provision, commonly referred to as the ``Biden Condition,''
    has been attached to all major treaties since the INF Treaty. It states
    the Constitutionally based principle that the shared understanding that
    exists between the Executive branch and the Senate at the time the
    Senate gives advice and consent to ratification can only be altered
    subject to the Senate's advice and consent to a subsequent treaty or
    protocol, or the enactment of a statute.

    Text:
    (22) Treaty Interpretation.
        The Senate affirms the applicability to all treaties of the
    Constitutionally based principles of treaty interpretation set forth in
    Condition (1) of the resolution of ratification with respect to the INF
    Treaty. For purposes of this declaration, the term ``INF Treaty,''
    refers to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union
    of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-
    Range and Shorter Range Missiles, together with the related memorandum
    of understanding and protocols, approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988.

                       (23) Chemical Weapons Destruction

    Summary:
        This condition requires the President to explore alternative
    technologies for the destruction of the U.S. chemical weapons
    stockpile. It recognizes that the deadline set in the Convention for
    the completion of stockpile destruction, 2007, supersedes the 2004 date
    established in an earlier law. It also reassures us that the
    requirement under the Convention to submit a plan on the method of
    destruction does not preclude the later use of alternative
    technologies. Finally, should a safer and more environmentally friendly
    alternative technology be discovered, but its employment circumscribed
    by the 2007 deadline, the President would need to consult with the
    Congress to determine whether the United States should exercise its
    rights under the Convention and request a brief extension of the
    destruction deadline.

    Text:
    (23) Chemical Weapons Destruction.
        Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of
    ratification of the Convention, the President shall certify to the
    Congress that all of the following conditions are satisfied:
      (A) Exploration of Alternative Technologies.--The President has
            agreed to explore alternative technologies for the destruction
            of the United States stockpile of chemical weapons in order to
            ensure that the United States has the safest, most effective
            and environmentally sound plans and programs for meeting its
            obligations under the Convention for the destruction of
            chemical weapons.
      (B) Convention Extends Destruction Deadline.--The requirement in
            Section 1412 of Public Law 99-145 (50 U.S.C. 1521) for
            completion of the destruction of the United States stockpile of
            chemical weapons by December 31, 2004 will be superseded upon
            the date the Convention enters into force with respect to the
            United States by the deadline required by the Convention of
            April 29, 2007.
      (C) Authority to Employ a Different Destruction Technology.--The
            requirement under Article III(l)(a)(v) of the Convention for a
            declaration by each state party to the Convention, not later
            than 30 days after the date the Convention enters into force
            with respect to that party, on general plans of the State Party
            for destruction of its chemical weapons does not preclude the
            United States from deciding in the future to employ a
            technology for the destruction of chemical weapons different
            than that declared under that Article.
      (D) Procedures for Extension of Deadline.--The President will consult
            with Congress on whether to submit a request to the Executive
            Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
            Weapons for an extension of the deadline for the destruction of
            chemical weapons under the Convention, as provided under Part
            IV(A) of the Annex on Implementation and Verification to the
            Convention if, as a result of the program of alternative
            technologies for the destruction of chemical weapons carried
            out under Section 8065 of the Department of Defense
            Appropriations Act, 1997 (as contained in Public Law 104-208),
            the President determines that alternatives to the incineration
            of chemical weapons are available that are safer and more
            environmentally sound but whose use would preclude the United
            States from meeting the deadlines of the Convention.

                                   __________
          The Case Against The Chemical Weapons Convention ``Truth or
                                 Consequences''

                   Prepared by The Center for Security Policy

                                  introduction
        As the Senate resumes formal consideration of the controversial
    Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)--following the Clinton
    Administration's decision last fall to withdraw it in the face of
    certain defeat--the Center for Security Policy has undertaken to
    provide detailed analyses of many of the issues in dispute.
        These papers, most of which have been previously issued as part of
    the Center's Truth or Consequences series, have been compiled and
    organized to maximize their usefulness to those who will be
    participating in the coming debate. They address in particular claims
    being made by the proponents that appear ill-informed, at best, and
    highly misleading, at worst.
        The Center for Security Policy, whose mission is to stimulate and
    inform debate on vital defense and foreign policy matters, is gratified
    by the level of attention now being focused on the problematic Chemical
    Weapons Convention. Such attention--if informed and sustained--is
    essential to the proper functioning of the deliberative process of a
    democracy like ours.
        Rarely is that deliberative process more important than with
    respect to decisionmaking on a treaty such as the CWC, with its ominous
    implications for U.S. national security, proprietary business
    information and constitutional rights. For these reasons, efforts now
    being made to circumscribe, foreshorten or otherwise attenuate the CWC
    debate are to be strenuously resisted.
        The Center hopes that the following pages will prove helpful to
    those interested in determining the fate of the Chemical Weapons
    Convention on its merits. For additional background on the treaty and
    future analyses by the Center, please consult our site on the World
    Wide Web--www.security-policy.org.

        Frank J. Gaffney, Jr.,
        Director, 8 April 1997
                                   __________

          ``Truth or Consequences:'' Center Analyses on the CWC Debate

                               Table of Contents

    Issues Relating to the Senate's Role In Treaty-Making
        Truth or Consequences #10: Clinton's White House Snow Job Cannot
    Conceal The Chemical Weapon's Convention's Defects (No. 97-D 49, 4
    April 1997)

        Republicans' Senate Leadership Offers Constructive Alternative To
    Fatally Flawed Chemical Weapons Convention (No. 97-D 43, 21 March 1997)

        A Place To Start On Campaign Finance Reform: CMA Should Refrain
    From Putting Senators In Compromising Positions On The Chemical Weapons
    Convention (No. 97-D 34, 26 February 1997)

        Truth or Consequences #2: Senate Does Not Need To Sacrifice
    Sensible Scrutiny Of CWC To Meet An Artificial Deadline (No. 97-D 18,
    31 January 1997)

        Clinton's Chemical Power Play: Bad For The Senate, Bad For The
    National Interest (No. 97-D 7, 13 January 1997)

        Here We Go Again: Clinton Presses Anew For Senate Approval of
    Flawed, Unverifiable, Ineffective Chemical Weapons Treaty (No. 97-T 5,
    8 January 1997)
    The CWC's Impact on the U.S. Military and National Security:
        Just Which Chemical Weapons Convention Is Colin Powell Supporting--
    And Does He Know The Difference? (No. 97-D 48, 3 April 1997)

        Truth or Consequences #7: Schlesinger, Rumsfeld And Weinberger
    Rebut Scowcroft And Deutch On The CWC (No. 97-D 37, 5 March 1997)

        Gen. Schwartzkopf Tells Senate He Shares Critics' Concerns About
    Details Of The Chemical Weapons Convention (No. 97-D 35, 27 February
    1997)

        Truth or Consequences #3: Clinton `Makes A Mistake About It' In
    Arguing The CWC Will Protect U.S. Troops (No. 97-D 21, 6 February 1997)
    The CWC's Impact on U.S. Intelligence:
        Russia's Covert Chemical Weapons Program Vindicates Jesse Helms'
    Continuing Opposition To Phony CW Arms Control (No. 97-D 19, 4 February
    1997)
    The CWC's Impact on U.S. Business:
        Truth or Consequences #5: The CWC Will Not Be Good For Business--To
    Say Nothing Of The National Interest (No. 97-D 27, 17 February 1997)
    The CWC's Impact on the U.S. Constitution:
        Truth or Consequences #1: Center Challenges Administration Efforts
    To Distort, Suppress Debate On CWC--Dangers To Americans'
    Constitutional Rights (No. 97-D 14, 28 January 1997)
    The CWC's Impact on International Terrorism:
        Truth or Consequences #6: The CWC Will Not Prevent Chemical
    Terrorism Against The U.S. Or Its Interests (No. 97-D 30, 22 February
    1997)
    The CWC's Impact on Chemical Weapons Proliferation:
        Truth or Consequences #8: The CWC Will Exacerbate The Proliferation
    Of Chemical Warfare Capabilities (No. 97-D 38, 6 March 1997)
    Miscellaneous Issues Pertaining to the CWC:
        New National Poll Shows Overwhelming Public Opposition to a Flawed
    Chemical Weapons Convention (No. 97-P 50, 10 April 1997)

        Truth or Consequences #9: CWC Proponents Dissemble About Treaty
    Arrangements Likely To Disserve U.S. Interests (No. 97-D 46, 27 March
    1997)

        The Weekly Standard Weighs In On the CWC: `Just Say No To A Bad
    Treaty' (No. 97-P 40, 17 March 1997)

        Truth or Consequences #4: No DNA Tests Needed To Show That Claims
    About Republican Paternity Of CWC Are Overblown (No. 97-D 24, 16
    February 1997)

                                   __________
                                                            No. 97-D 49
                                                           4 April 1997

       Truth or Consequences #10: Clinton's White House Snow Job Cannot
               Conceal the Chemical Weapons Convention's Defects

        (Washington, D.C.): The latest installment in the Clinton
    Administration's campaign to browbeat the U.S. Senate into ratifying a
    fatally flawed Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) failed to live up to
    its advance billing--in more ways than one. Despite repeated press
    reports to the effect that former President George Bush and General
    Colin Powell were to play active roles in an ``event'' on the South
    Lawn of the White House, the former was nowhere to be seen and the
    latter had a letter he signed acknowledged by the President, but was
    otherwise scarcely in evidence. (The Center for Security Policy would
    like to think that the force of its argument in a paper released last
    night \1\ encouraged these two influential figures to reconsider the
    active role as flacks that the Clintonistas have in mind for them.)
    Please
        Even more disappointing was the case the President made for this
    treaty. On issue after issue, he persisted in grossly overselling the
    benefits of this Convention, misrepresenting its terms and/or
    understating its costs. Consider the following:
       Item: The CWC Will Not `Banish Poison Gas'
        The President declared that by ratifying the CWC, the United States
    has ``an opportunity now to forge a widening international commitment
    to banish poison gas from the earth in the 21st Century.'' This is the
    sort of wish-masquerading-as-fact that has been much in evidence in
    Presidential statements to the effect that ``there are no Russian
    missiles pointed at our children.''
        The truth--as even more-honest CWC advocates acknowledge--is that
    not a single country of concern, or for that matter any sub-national
    terrorist group, that wishes to maintain a covert chemical weapons
    program will be prevented from doing so by this treaty. Neither are
    they likely to be caught at it if they do. And even if they are, there
    is a negligible chance the ``international community'' will be willing
    to punish them for doing so. This is hardly the stuff of which
    effective banishment is made.
       Item: `Poisons for Peace'
        The President claimed that: ``The Convention requires other nations
    to follow our lead, to eliminate their arsenals of poison gas and to
    give up developing, producing and acquiring such weapons in the
    future.'' There is clearly no such requirement on the rogue states that
    decline to participate in this treaty (e.g., Iraq, Syria, Libya, Sudan
    and North Korea).
        What is more, the Convention's Articles X and XI may well
    accelerate the proliferation of chemical weapon technology. This is
    because these provisions obligate parties to ``facilitate the fullest
    possible'' transfers of technology directly relevant to the manufacture
    of chemical weapons and those used to defend against chemical attack--a
    highly desirable capability for people interested in waging chemical
    wars. \2\
       Item: The CWC Will Not `Help Shield Our Soldiers'
        President Clinton repeated a grievous misrepresentation featured in
    his State of the Union address: On the South Lawn he declared, that
    ``by ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention ... we can help shield
    our soldiers from one of the battlefield's deadliest killers.'' As
    noted above, the CWC may actually make our soldiers more vulnerable to
    one of the battlefield's deadliest killers--not least as a result of
    the insights shared defensive technology will afford potential
    adversaries about how to reverse-engineer Western protective equipment,
    the better to exploit its vulnerabilities.
       Item: The CWC Will Not Protect Our Children
        President Clinton shamelessly claimed that ``We can give our
    children something our parents and grandparents never had--broad
    protection against the threat of chemical attack.'' Just how
    irresponsible this statement is can be seen from a cover article
    published last month by Washington City Paper. The report disclosed
    that the people of the Washington, D.C. area and, indeed, the rest of
    the Nation are sitting ducks for chemical attacks. \3\ This problem,
    which arises from a systematic failure to apply resources to civil
    defense that are even remotely commensurate with the danger, will only
    grow as people like the President compound the CWC's placebo effect of
    this treaty by exaggerating its benefits.
       Item: The CWC Will Not Help in the Fight Against Terrorism
        While the President proclaimed that ratifying the CWC will
    ``bolster our leadership in the fight against terrorism,'' the reality
    is that this treaty may actually facilitate terrorism. This could come
    about as a result not only of the dispersion of chemical warfare
    relevant technology and the placebo effect but also by dint of the
    sensitive information the Convention expects the United States to share
    with foreign nationals. At least some of these folks will be working
    for potentially hostile intelligence services--including those of
    states, like Iran, known to sponsor terrorism. Compromising what U.S.
    intelligence knows about international terrorists and their sponsors
    will only intensify the danger posed by such actors. \4\
       Item: Flogging a Phony Deadline
        The President further claimed that ``America needs to ratify the
    Chemical Weapons Convention and we must do it before it takes effect on
    April 29th.'' While the treaty will enter into force on that date, with
    or without the U.S. as a party, the dire consequences that are
    endlessly predicted if America is not in are being wildly exaggerated.
    Anytime the United States joins, the 25 percent of the tab that it is
    supposed to pick up will give Washington considerable influence in the
    new U.N. bureaucracy set up to implement the CWC.
        The Clinton Administration's real--but largely unacknowledged
    concern--is that this arms control house-of-cards may collapse if the
    United States does not ratify the treaty. After all, in its absence,
    not one party to the Convention is likely to be an acknowledged
    chemical weapons state. The unfunded costs, combined with the inability
    to inspect American companies while possibly exposing their own to
    undesired inspections, will almost certainly prompt most states parties
    to think better of the whole idea. \5\
       Item: The CWC Will Harm American Business Interests
        President Clinton further claimed that, ``If we are outside this
    agreement rather than inside, it is our chemical companies, our leading
    exporters, which will face mandatory trade restrictions that could cost
    them hundreds of millions of dollars in sales.'' The truth is that no
    one has yet been able to document the $600 million cost the Chemical
    Manufacturers Association incessantly claims will arise from trade
    restrictions on U.S. industry if America is not a treaty party.
        What is more, the actual cost (probably closer to $30 million)
    arising from such restrictions will be insignificant compared to the
    additional costs treaty participation will impose on taxpayers and
    private companies (conservatively estimated to be in the billions of
    dollars). \6\
       Jane's Underscores the Irresponsible Nature of the Clinton
            Snow-Job
        Today's CWC photo opportunity at the White House seems all the more
    ignominious against the backdrop of a news item carried in this
    morning's Washington Post. It seems that the forward to Jane's Air
    Defense 1997-98, a highly respected London-based defense publication,
    confirms that Russia has developed a new variant of the lethal anthrax
    toxin that is totally resistant to antibiotics''--in flagrant violation
    of an earlier ``international norm'' governing biological weapons
    activities.
        More to the present point, Jane's notes that the Russians have also
    developed three nerve agents ``that could be made without using any of
    the precursor chemicals, which are banned under the 1993 Chemical
    Weapons Convention.'' It added that ``two of the new nerve agents are
    eight times as deadly as the VX nerve agent that Iraq has acknowledged
    stockpiling, while the other is as deadly as VX.'' (Emphasis added.)
        Unfortunately, this information is but the latest indication of bad
    faith on the part of the Russian government of Boris Yeltsin. One would
    have thought, for example, that the Kremlin's complete reneging on the
    Wyoming Memorandum and the Bilateral Destruction Agreement would have
    shamed their co-author, former Secretary of State James Baker, into
    staying away from the White House fandango for a CWC that was supposed
    to have been critically underpinned by these earlier agreements. \7\
    The Bottom Line
        The Center for Security Policy believes that it is becoming
    increasingly clear why the Clinton Administration and its allies on the
    Chemical Weapons Convention are relying on razzle-dazzle powerplays
    like today's--and eschewing opportunities for a real debate: The CWC is
    unlikely to be approved if its fate is determined on the merits.
        By contrast, critics of the CWC are committed to fostering a real,
    thorough and informed debate. Toward that end, it looks forward to the
    start of hearings next week in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
    led off by three of this century's most distinguished American public
    servants: Former Secretaries of Defense James Schlesinger, \8\ Donald
    Rumsfeld and Caspar Weinberger. Let the debate begin!

    notes:
        \1\ See Just Which Chemical Weapons Convention Is Colin Powell
    Supporting--And Does He Know The Difference? (No. 97-D 48, 3 April
    1997).
        \2\ For more on the absurd `Poisons for Peace' aspect of the CWC,
    see Truth or Consequences #8: The CWC Will Exacerbate The Proliferation
    Of Chemical Warfare Capabilities (No. 97-D 38, 6 March 1997).
        \3\ See ``Margin of Terror: In the two years since the Tokyo subway
    incident, local and Federal officials have had a chance to prepare
    Washington for a devastating chemical or biological attack. So why
    haven't they?'' by John Cloud in the 14 March 1997 issue of the
    Washington City Paper.
        \4\ For more on the threat of chemical weapons, see Truth or
    Consequences #6: The CWC Will Not Prevent Chemical Terrorism Against
    the U.S. or its Interests (No. 97-D 30, 22 February 1997).
        \5\ For more on this fraudulent timeline, see the Center's Decision
    Brief entitled Truth or Consequences #2: Senate Does Not Need To
    Sacrifice Sensible Study of CWC to Meet an Artificial Deadline (No. 97-
    D 18, 31 January 1997). For more on the non-declaration problem, see
    Truth or Consequences #9: CWC Proponents Dissemble About Treaty
    Arrangements Likely To Disserve U.S. Interests (No. 97-D 46, 27 March
    1997).
        \6\ For more on the costs--both direct and indirect to American
    firms--see the Center's Decision Brief entitled Truth or Consequences
    #5. The CWC Will Not Be Good for Business--To Say Nothing of The
    National Interest (No. 97-D 27, 17 February 1997).
        \7\ For more on Russia's chemical weapons programs, its behavior on
    the Bilateral Destruction Agreement and their implications, for the
    Chemical Weapons Convention, see the Center's Decision Brief entitled
    Russia's Covert Chemical Weapons Program Vindicates Jesse Helms'
    Continuing Opposition to Phony CW Arms Control (No. 97-D 19, 4 February
    1997).
        \8\ While all three of these gentlemen have held other,
    distinguished positions, it is noteworthy in the present context that
    Secretary Schlesinger also served as a Director of Central Intelligence
    in the Nixon Administration and as a Secretary of Energy for President
    Jimmy Carter, a Democrat.

                                   __________
                                                            No. 97-D 43
                                                          21 March 1997

       Republicans' Senate Leadership Offers Constructive Alternative To
                   Fatally Flawed Chemical Weapons Convention

        (Washington, D.C.): The Senate Republican leadership (i.e.,
    Majority Leader Trent Lott, Majority Whip Don Nickles, Republican
    Conference Committee Chairman Connie Mack and Conference Secretary Paul
    Coverdell) has joined the chairmen of the Senate Foreign Relations and
    Intelligence Committees (Sens. Jesse Helms and Richard Shelby,
    respectively) as sponsors of critically important legislation
    introduced yesterday by Sen. Jon Kyl (R-AZ). This bill, known as the
    ``Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat Reduction Act of 1997'' (S.
    495) makes it clear that the debate over the Chemical Weapons
    Convention (CWC) is not, as some treaty proponents contend, a dispute
    between those who are opposed to chemical weapons and those who favor
    poison gas.
        S. 495 establishes, instead, that the Senate has a real choice--
    between a Republican leadership approach toward dealing with the threat
    of chemical weapons that is operationally oriented, practical,
    enforceable and relatively inexpensive and the CWC approach that is
    declaratory, ineffective, unenforceable and costly. This should not be
    a hard choice for any thoughtful legislator.
        Highlights of the CBW Threat Reduction Act include the following:
       Creating civil and criminal penalties for the acquisition,
            possession, transfer or use of chemical and biological weapons.
       Lays out a range of sanctions to be imposed upon any country
            that uses CBW against another country or against its own
            nationals. These include suspending: U.S. foreign assistance,
            arms sales and the associated financing, multilateral trade
            credits, aviation rights and/or diplomatic relations.
       Calls for adding enforcement mechanisms to the existing,
            multilateral Conventions concerning chemical and biological
            weapons.
       Establishes as U.S. policy the goal of preserving existing
            national and multilateral restrictions on chemical and
            biological trade. These arrangements are at direct risk from
            the CWC's Article XI.
       Affirms existing U.S. policy governing the right to use Riot
            Control Agents (RCAs) in both peacetime and wartime. This would
            countermand President Clinton's plan to deny American
            servicemen and women the ability to use tear gas and other RCAs
            during wartime search-and-rescue operations and when combatants
            and non-combatants are intermingled.
        S. 495 makes clear the United States' intention to dismantle its
    existing stockpile of chemical weapons and to participate in sensible,
    effective non-proliferation efforts. It is a valuable contribution to
    the debate on curbing the threat posed by chemical weapons--a debate
    that is expected to become much more intense as the Clinton
    Administration tries to coerce the Senate into rubber-stamping the
    Chemical Weapons Convention by the middle of April.

                                   __________
                                                            No. 97-D 34
                                                       26 February 1997

    A Place To Start on Campaign Finance Reform: C.M.A. Should Refrain From
      Putting Senators in Compromising Positions On the Chemical Weapons
                                   Convention

        (Washington, D.C.): Last night, the Chemical Manufacturers
    Association (CMA), an organization representing some 190 large American
    and multinational chemical producers, held a Washington fund-raiser for
    the Senate Majority Leader, Sen. Trent Lott (R-MS). This event
    presumably will help the distinguished Republican leader prepare his
    war chest for future electoral campaigns. It seems inconceivable,
    however, that this event could have the effect CMA probably hoped for--
    namely, inducing Senator Lott to disregard the serious concerns he has
    expressed about the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and to secure the
    treaty's prompt ratification.
        After all, such an initiative occurs at the very moment that Bill
    Clinton's presidency is undergoing a Chinese water-torture (pun
    intended) of daily revelations about fund-raisers buying access,
    influence and policy changes. This event, and other Capitol Hill
    occasions like it sponsored by interested parties such as CMA, can only
    complicate the position of Senators obliged to act on the controversial
    CWC.
        The CMA is, nonetheless, reportedly investing millions of dollars
    in its campaign for CWC ratification--a campaign being carefully
    coordinated with the Clinton Ad-
    ministration and others. As the Center has documented in recent weeks
    in its Truth or Consequences series of Decision Briefs, \1\ this effort
    appears intended to obscure the key problems with this convention that
    have been identified by an array of knowledgeable experts--problems
    called to the attention of the Senate a few months ago by no less a
    figure than Senator Lott.
    Senator Lott, On the Record
        In fact, on 9 September 1996--shortly before the administration
    realized that it did not have the votes to approve the Chemical Weapons
    Convention and asked that it be withdrawn from consideration--Senator
    Lott made an important floor speech concerning the CWC's myriad flaws.
    Highlights of his remarks included the following:
              ``...As we near consideration of [the CWC], I wanted to share
            with my colleagues some of the correspondence that I have
            recently received. Late on Friday of last week, I received a
            letter of opposition to the Convention signed by more than 50
            defense and foreign policy experts, including two former
            Secretaries of Defense, former members of the Joint Chiefs of
            Staff, and many others.
              ``The letter made four fundamental points: The Chemical
            Weapons Convention is not global, it is not effective, and is
            not verifiable, but it will have significant costs to American
            security. Their letter concludes by stating that, `The national
            security benefits of the Chemical Weapons Convention clearly do
            not outweigh its considerable costs. Consequently, we
            respectfully urge you to reject ratification of the CWC unless
            and until it is made genuinely global, effective, and
            verifiable.'
              ``This is not my judgment. It is the judgment, however, of
            Caspar Weinberger, William Clark, Dr. Jeane Kirkpatrick, Ed
            Meese, Dick Cheney, and many others who served with distinction
            under Presidents Reagan and Bush. I think their views deserve
            serious consideration from every Member.
              ``As you will note, two of those names that I read are former
            Secretaries of Defense and certainly highly respected. Our
            colleague from the House of Representatives, Dick Cheney, is
            one that I really had not known exactly what his position was,
            so it was of great interest to me to see what his thoughts
            might be.
              ``I have two other letters that I encourage Members to
            review. First, the National Federation of Independent Business
            wrote to me today expressing serious concern about the impact
            of the CWC on the more than 600,000 members of the NFIB. The
            letter notes that under the CWC, for the first time small
            businesses would be subject to a foreign entity inspecting
            their businesses. The concerns that are expressed concerning
            increased regulatory burden of the Chemical Weapons Convention
            on American small business I think should be weighed very
            carefully before coming to a decision about his or her attitude
            and what the position would be of that Senator on the
            convention. I know my colleagues do not want to vote first and
            ask questions later when it comes to small business, which
            already bears a disproportionate share of the regulatory burden
            from the Federal Government.
              ``I also received a letter today from retired Gen. James A.
            Williams, former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency with
            almost four decades of experience in intelligence. General
            Williams raises very serious concerns over the potential of CWC
            being used to gain proprietary information from American
            business. He concludes that `there is potential for the loss of
            untold billions of dollars of trade secrets which can be used
            to gain competitive advantage, to shorten R&D cycles, and to
            steal U.S. market share.' Many businesses have contacted my
            office and the offices of other Senators expressing these and
            similar concerns about Senate action on this convention. ...
              ``I wanted to call to the Senate's attention this
            correspondence that I have outlined because it is very
            important that a range of views be made available to all
            Senators. The administration has been making its case for quite
            some time, but opponents of the convention have just begun the
            serious examination the convention really deserves. ...
              ``My own personal greatest concern is the question of
            verification. What do we do about Iraq? If we pass a convention
            like this, that would be applicable to us, sort of the law-
            abiding citizens of the world, how do we make sure what is
            happening in Iraq, North Korea, and Libya, the renegade
            countries of the world? Is this going to be a situation where
            we go forward with this convention, this Chemical Weapons
            Convention, yet those who are the real threat do not
            participate, or deny that they are involved, or we are not in a
            position where we can verify what they are actually doing?''
    The Bottom Line
        As the foregoing remarks indicate, Senator Lott has approached the
    controversial Chemical Weapons Convention in a fair, reasonable and
    statesmanlike fashion. He has been responsive to the Clinton
    Administration's insistence that the treaty be scheduled for a vote
    last fall, its request on 12 September 1996 that the order for a vote
    be vitiated (in the face of certain defeat) and its demands this year
    for negotiations aimed at reviving the CWC's prospects and/or fixing
    the accord's shortcomings. At the same time, he has striven to ensure
    that the concerns of his colleagues and others opposed to this treaty
    are not given short shrift.
        It would be a grave disservice to the Majority Leader, to the
    institution he manages so ably and to the Nation if the appearance that
    strings were attached to the Chemical Manufacturers Association's
    largess were to sully Senator Lott's future stewardship of the top CMA
    legislative agenda item--the CWC. The Center for Security Policy calls
    on CMA to refrain from using its deep-pocketed Political Action
    Committee in ways that could compromise the integrity of the debate on
    the Chemical Weapons Convention and put key participants in that debate
    in compromising positions.

    notes:
        \1\ These papers--dealing with issues like the Convention's impact
    on the U.S. military, on American businesses, on citizens'
    Constitutional rights, etc.--can be accessed via the Center's site on
    the World Wide Web (www.security-policy.org) or by contacting the
    Center.

                                   __________
                                                            No. 97-D 18
                                                        31 January 1997

     Truth or Consequences #2: Senate Does Not Need To Sacrifice Sensible
                 Scrutiny of CWC To Meet an Artificial Deadline

        (Washington, D.C.): A centerpiece of the Clinton Administration's
    campaign to obtain expedited Senate action on the controversial
    Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is the argument that something
    terrible will happen if the treaty is not ratified by April 29th.
    Precisely what the terrible something is--and what its implications for
    U.S. interests will be--has proved to be a little hard to pin down. The
    reason for this is because there will be no significant harm if the
    Senate declines to rubber-stamp this ill-conceived Convention in
    response to what amounts to a wholly artificial deadline.
    The CWC Is Incomplete
        Clinton Administration officials claim that if the United States
    doesn't ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention before 29 April, it will
    be unable to participate in deliberations at the Organization for the
    Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) which will ``flesh out'' some
    critical issues. The Administration thus admits that the treaty
    awaiting the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate is not a finished
    document.
        In the Bush Administration's haste to have a Convention ready for
    signature prior to its departure from office, a number of details--for
    example, particulars concerning the conduct of on-site inspections--
    were left unresolved. They were to be finalized by a preparatory
    commission prior to entry-into-force. Such details can have important
    consequences.
        CWC advocates point to this reality as a compelling reason for
    getting the United States to ratify the treaty before April 29th (the
    date on which the Convention is supposed to enter into force). But they
    cannot have it both ways: If the details yet to be worked out may
    materially affect the acceptability of the treaty, the Senate is being
    asked to sign on to a work-in-progress--or perhaps a pig-in-a-poke
    since the negotiations may or may not come out acceptably. On the other
    hand, if the treaty is ripe for Senate approval, the details that
    remain to be sorted out should not be so important. In that case, the
    argument that the United States must participate in their negotiation
    as a state party is not compelling.
    The United States is Already Involved in the Ongoing Negotiations
        The truth is that the United States is already participating in the
    preparatory commission's negotiations on the CWC's outstanding details,
    even before the Senate gives its advice and consent. As a result, the
    administration is being represented, notwithstanding the fact that the
    U.S. has yet to become a state party.
    Russia Is Not a State Party, Either
        Another nation has to have a keen interest in the outcome of these
    negotiations: Russia. In fact, the Kremlin has already served notice
    that if the OPCW proceeds to finalize the CWC's implementation and
    other outstanding particulars in ways unsatisfactory to Russia's
    interests, Moscow will never agree to ratify.
        European and other states parties appear to have taken this Russian
    threat seriously and seem increasingly disinclined to complete work on
    the treaty's details pending Russia's ratification. \1\ If so, the
    United States should feel no undue pressure to complete its own
    ratification debate. In any event, it is far from clear why the U.S.
    should feel compelled to ratify the treaty before Russia does. After
    all, Russia has the world's largest arsenal of chemical weapons,
    continues to produce new and more dangerous chemical arms and is widely
    expected to continue to do so even if Russia becomes a state party.
    The United States Will Have Considerable Influence Irrespective of When
            It Joins the CWC
        By virtue of the immense size, technological advantages and
    valuable products of the U.S. commercial chemical industry, the United
    States will inevitably be the ``600-pound gorilla'' in the OPCW if and
    when it decides to become a state party. The contention that the
    preferences of the United States will be ignored in the implementation
    of the CWC is, consequently, implausible.
        This is particularly true since Washington will be expected to pay
    25 percent of the OPCW's operating costs--a substantially larger
    portion of the organization's budget than will be borne by any other
    nation. Even if, as the Clinton Administration claims, this tithe will
    amount to no more than $25 million annually, \2\ such a sum represents
    an obvious source of leverage should the United States need to exercise
    it to protect its interests in OPCW deliberations.
    The United States Will Have Standing Irrespective of When It Ratifies
            the CWC
        CWC proponents suggest that, if the United States does not ratify
    the treaty by 29 April, it will not be an original state party--
    condemning it to second-class status with adverse implications for its
    ability to have its personnel participate in on-site inspections. In
    fact, by virtue of its being among the first nations to sign this
    Convention, the United States will in accordance with standard
    diplomatic practice be considered to be an original state party
    whenever it chooses to join the treaty regime.
        While it is true that, until that time, the United States will not
    be able to have its personnel conduct on-site inspections, this may
    well prove to be the case even if the U.S. does ratify the CWC! In
    fact, countries being subjected to challenge inspections have the right
    to deny individual inspectors entry. Those nations unfriendly to the
    United States and, presumably, of greatest concern from a compliance
    point of view, are likely to exercise this right to preclude U.S.
    monitors. After all, if there is any prospect that an on-site inspector
    will be able to detect an illegal, covert chemical weapons program,
    chances are that it will be an American that does it.
        (Unfortunately, those chances are likely to be reduced dramatically
    should the Clinton Administration succeed in an initiative now being
    discussed in the interagency process, one that would start sharing with
    the OPCW sensitive U.S. methods for detecting clandestine programs.
    Similar training given to the International Atomic Energy Agency gave
    representatives of Saddam Hussein's government and other rogue states
    invaluable lessons in how to defeat international monitoring and on-
    site inspection regimes.)
        For its part, however, the United States will find it difficult--if
    not impossible as a practical matter--to object to all of the foreign
    inspectors whose participation in challenge inspections in this country
    will be of concern. Needless to say, this will not be because of any
    danger that a covert American CW program will be detected since the
    U.S. will have no such program. Rather, it will be because such
    individuals will assuredly try to expropriate confidential business
    information (CBI) or other sensitive data from the targeted U.S.
    facilities.
    The Bottom Line
        In short, the April 29th deadline is an artificial one, promoted
    principally so as to try to force the U.S. Senate to complete action on
    the Chemical Weapons Convention without further, substantive
    consideration of this accord's myriad shortcomings. So artificial is
    this deadline that the Clinton Administration bears considerable
    responsibility for creating it. After all, the administration last
    October vigorously encouraged Hungary to become the 65th nation to
    deposit its instruments of ratification, thereby starting the clock on
    the 6-month run-up to entry-into-force. Its trans-
    parent purpose in doing so was to intensify pressure on the Senate to
    provide its uninformed advice and consent.
        If anything, the Administration's efforts to try to foreshorten or
    confuse the debate about the Chemical Weapons Convention suggest that
    the Senate would be well advised to defer U.S. ratification until after
    the treaty enters into force. Doing so would afford an opportunity to
    validate--or disprove--the various concerns being expressed by this
    treaty's knowledgeable critics. It may, in fact, be the only way such
    concerns can be fully and authoritatively addressed without grave risk
    to American security, commercial and taxpayer interests.
        Last but not least, it must be said that a treaty not worth
    ratifying is assuredly not worth ratifying quickly. For reasons
    described at length elsewhere, \3\ it would be unsafe to ratify the CWC
    at any speed.

    notes:
        \1\ There are as-yet-unsubstantiated rumors circulating in The
    Hague (where the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
    or OPCW is located) that the date of entry into force may be postponed,
    rather than have the CWC come into effect without the participation of
    nations such as Russia and possibly China (which has yet to deposit the
    instruments of ratification).
        \2\ The truth is, however, that the OPCW is constantly revising its
    budget estimates in an upwards direction. A more realistic estimate--
    derived from actual experience with another U.N. bureaucracy--the
    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)--suggests that the budget is
    more likely to be on the order of $266 million, which would translate
    into a U.S. share of at least $66 million per year.
        \3\ See, for example, Truth or Consequences #1: Center Challenges
    Administration Efforts to Distort, Suppress Debate on CWC (No. 97-D 14,
    28 January 1997). Other products detailing the CWC's fatal flaws can be
    obtained via the Center's site on the World Wide Web (www.security-
    policy.org).

                                   __________
                                                             No. 97-D 7
                                                        13 January 1997

    Clinton's Chemical Power Play: Bad For The Senate, Bad For The National
                                    Interest

        (Washington, D.C.): The Clinton Administration is mounting a
    campaign against the leadership of the U.S. Senate that has all the
    subtlety of a Mafia hit. The immediate object of its intimidation is
    Senator Trent Lott (R-MS), whose knees are at risk of being broken
    (presumably, figuratively) unless he bends to the President's will. To
    do so, however, the Majority Leader will, in turn, have to ``take out''
    the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Jesse
    Helms (R-NC)--and with him, the Senate's rules concerning the
    consideration of treaties and that institution's way of doing business
    more generally.
        The Administration is resorting to such tactics for a very simple
    reason: Senator Helms is in a position indefinitely to bottle up a
    highly controversial treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
    Incredible though it may seem Secretary of State-designate Madeleine
    Albright declared last week that ratification of this Convention was
    the Clinton team's top, near-term foreign policy priority.
    Unfortunately for them--and happily for the national interest--Senate
    procedures permit Chairman Helms permanently to pocket veto this treaty
    by declining to bring it up for a vote in his Committee.
    Jesse Helms--Horatius at the Bridge
        This is fortuitous for the national interest because, to his
    lasting credit, Senator Helms correctly concluded in the course of
    intensive Senate consideration of the Chemical Weapons Convention last
    fall that this treaty was fatally flawed. Since a sufficient number of
    Senators agreed with him in September 1996 to defeat the CWC, the
    Administration decided to withdraw it--hoping it would meet a different
    fate if presented later. Apparently, such is the Clinton team's
    contempt for members of the Senate--which is exceeded only by its
    disdain for their constitutional role in treaty-making \1\--that it
    thinks legislators either have forgotten what is wrong with this
    Convention or can be euchred into agreeing to it, if only enough
    coercive pressure is brought to bear.
        Thanks to Chairman Helms and thoughtful colleagues like Senator Jon
    Kyl (R-AZ), though, the Senate will be reminded of the overarching
    reason for opposing the Chemical Weapons Convention: It is likely to
    contribute to the proliferation of chemical weapons, not eliminate it.
        Not Global: After all, the Convention will not impose a global ban
    on chemical weapons, let alone rid them from the world, as its
    proponents often claim. In fact, it will not apply to every country
    that has chemical weapons. A number of the most dangerous rogue
    states--including North Korea, Syria and Iraq--have announced that they
    will not become parties to the CWC. Such nations tend cynically to see
    such ``international norms'' not as an impediment to pursuing
    prohibited activities but as an invitation to do so.
        Not Verifiable: What is more, thanks to the inherent
    unverifiability of the Chemical Weapons Convention, even some of those
    who do join the regime will retain covert chemical stockpiles. The
    unalterable fact of life is that chemical weapons can be easily
    produced. By using facilities that are designed, for example, to
    manufacture fertilizers, pesticides or pharmaceuticals, they can be
    produced in considerable (even ``militarily significant'') quantities
    in relatively short periods of time. This is an objective reality that
    means the CWC is not simply ``less than perfect''; it is an exercise in
    futility.
        Indeed, Saddam Hussein has demonstrated that on-site inspections
    far more intrusive and timely than those provided for by the CWC cannot
    confidently monitor the covert weapons programs of totalitarian regimes
    governing closed societies. Consequently, few competent experts believe
    that industrialized states like Russia and China will actually get rid
    of their existing arsenals, let alone forego future production--
    notwithstanding their status as signatories to the CWC.
        `Poisons for Peace': Third, the CWC obliges the United States to
    help other states parties--including countries like Iran and Cuba--to
    gain state-of-the-art manufacturing capabilities that can readily be
    used to produce chemical weapons. Unilateral trade embargoes and
    multilateral technology control arrangements against such parties to
    the CWC would be prohibited. This obligation is a recipe for rampant
    chemical weapons proliferation. The prospect that it provides for
    expanded overseas sales by U.S. chemical manufacturers, however, is a
    principal reason why their powerful lobby is helping the Clinton
    Administration make offers to Senators ``they can't refuse.''
        Other Fatal Flaws: Opponents of the Chemical Weapons Convention
    recognize that it will have other undesirable repercussions, as well.
    For one, it will likely create a false sense of security that the
    burgeoning problem of chemical weapons proliferation has been
    meaningfully addressed. This placebo effect will almost exacerbate the
    dangers of chemical attacks by reducing our preparedness to deal with
    them. For another, the CWC--as interpreted by the Clinton
    Administration--will have the absurd effect of denying our military the
    right to use chemical-based Riot Control Agents like tear gas to
    protect themselves in situations where the use of lethal force can, and
    should, be avoided. Finally, the CWC will grant a U.N. agency the right
    to inspect anyplace in America--private or public, factories,
    facilities, even homes--on short notice, without a warrant, and without
    compensation for the associated costs, including for any proprietary
    information that might thus be lost.
    The Bottom Line
        Today, on the fourth anniversary of the signing of the Chemical
    Weapons Convention, President Clinton issued a statement that declared
    disingenuously: ``Early CWC ratification by the United States is
    extraordinarily important. The security of our soldiers and citizens is
    at stake, as is the economic well-being of our chemical industry.'' He
    concluded by saying: ``I look forward to working with the Senate
    leadership to get the job [of ratifying the Convention] done.''
        Notice is thus served. Using such presidential statements and phone
    calls, a drumbeat of sympathetic editorials and op.eds. And other
    pressure tactics, the Administration hopes to squeeze Senator Lott to
    break the CWC loose. It has even asked him to remove the Chemical
    Weapons Convention from the jurisdiction of Senator Helms' committee.
    Were Sen. Lott to agree, he would be creating a precedent that would
    wreak havoc on Senate operations. Fortunately, while the Majority
    Leader is committed to cooperate with the President where possible, he
    is unlikely to accommodate an Administration power play where
    cooperation is neither in the interest of the Senate as an institution
    nor the Nation as a whole.

    notes:
        \1\ See the Center's Press Release entitled Will the Senate Let
    Clinton Rewrite the C.F.E. Treaty Without Its Advice and Consent? (No.
    96-P 86, 18 September 1996).

                                   __________
                                                             No. 97-T 5
                                                         8 January 1997

     Here We Go Again: Clinton Presses Anew For Senate Approval Of Flawed,
               Unverifiable, Ineffective Chemical Weapons Treaty

        (Washington, D.C.): In recent days, the Clinton Administration has
    launched a new campaign to secure Senate advice and consent to
    ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Such a campaign
    was made necessary by its decision last September to withdraw the
    treaty from scheduled Senate consideration, rather than risk its
    certain defeat.
        Now, sympathetic columnists like the Washington Post's Mary McGrory
    have been enlisted to hammer Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS)
    to bring the CWC back to the Senate floor. Retired flag officers like
    Admiral Elmo Zumwalt are being trotted out to declare that the military
    strongly supports this Convention. And just yesterday, the President
    used the occasion of the receipt of the interim report of his
    commission on Gulf War syndrome--which may be related to widespread
    exposure of U.S. servicemen and women to Iraqi chemical weapons--to
    imply that ratification of the CWC would ``protect the soldiers of the
    United States and our allies in the future'' by ``mak[ing] it harder
    for rogue states to acquire chemical weapons in the future.''
        Senator Lott has responded to such pressure by announcing yesterday
    that he would ask the ``appropriate committee members and chairmen'' to
    reopen hearings on the treaty early in this session with a view to
    seeing what can be done to address the scourge of chemical weapons and
    the threat they pose to world peace. That decision puts the ball
    squarely back, first and foremost, in the court of Foreign Relations
    Committee chairman Jesse Helms (R-NC), whose opposition to the CWC was
    critical to the treaty's withdrawal from consideration last fall.
    Let the Debate Begin, Again
        The Center for Security Policy welcomes the prospect of new
    hearings into the Chemical Weapons Convention, presumably before not
    only Sen. Helms' panel but also before the Armed Services, Intelligence
    (under new management) and perhaps other committees. With the
    installation yesterday of new Members comprising nearly one-fifth of
    the Senate, there is clearly a need to review the gravity of the
    problem posed by the proliferation of chemical weapons and the
    regrettable fact that this convention will not only prove no real
    impediment to such proliferation--it will probably serve actually to
    exacerbate the problem.
        The Center looks forward to continuing during such a review the
    educational role it performed last year. As part of that function, it
    is attaching for the information of all Senators--and in response to
    Adm. Zumwalt's op.ed. In Monday's Washington Post--a letter sent to
    Senator Lott on 6 September 1996 by 68 distinguished former senior
    civilian and military officials, including notably former Bush
    Administration Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney. They conclude
    authoritatively that the CWC should be rejected in its present form
    since it will not be global in its scope, verifiable or effective. The
    Center is confident that sufficient Senators will reach a similar
    conclusion should the Foreign Relations Committee decide to report the
    treaty out for action by the full Senate.

                                                     September 9, 1996.
    Hon. Trent Lott,
    Majority Leader, United States Senate,
    Washington, DC 20510.
        Senator Lott: As you know, the Senate is currently scheduled to
    take final action on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on or before
    September 14th. This Treaty has been presented as a global, effective
    and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. As individuals with
    considerable experience in national security matters, we would all
    support such a ban. We have, however, concluded that the present
    convention is seriously deficient on each of these scores, among
    others.
        The CWC is not global since many dangerous nations (for example,
    Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Libya) have not agreed to join the treaty
    regime. Russia is among those who have signed the Convention, but is
    unlikely to ratify--especially without a commitment of billions in U.S.
    aid to pay for the destruction of Russia's vast arsenal. Even then,
    given our experience with the Kremlin's treaty violations and its
    repeated refusal to implement the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement
    on chemical weapons, future CWC violations must be expected.
        The CWC is not effective because it does not ban or control
    possession of all chemicals that could be used for lethal weapons
    purposes. For example, it does not prohibit two chemical agents that
    were employed with deadly effect in World War I--phosgene and hydrogen
    cyanide. The reason speaks volumes about this treaty's impractical
    nature: they are too widely used for commercial purposes to be banned.
        The CWC is not verifiable as the U.S. intelligence community has
    repeatedly acknowledged in congressional testimony. Authoritarian
    regimes can be confident that their violations will be undetectable.
    Now, some argue that the treaty's intrusive inspections regime will
    help us know more than we would otherwise. The relevant test, however,
    is whether any additional information thus gleaned will translate into
    convincing evidence of cheating and result in the collective imposition
    of sanctions or other enforcement measures. In practice, this test is
    unlikely to be satisfied since governments tend to took the other way
    at evidence of non-compliance rather than jeopardize a treaty regime.
        What the CWC will do, however, is quite troubling: It will create a
    massive new, U.N.-style international inspection bureaucracy (which
    will help the total cost of this treaty to U.S. taxpayers amount to as
    much as $200 million per year). It will jeopardize U.S. citizens'
    constitutional rights by requiring the U.S. government to permit
    searches without either warrants or probable cause. It will impose a
    costly and complex regulatory burden on U.S. industry. As many as 8,000
    companies across the country may be subjected to new reporting
    requirements entailing uncompensated annual costs of between thousands
    to hundreds-of-thousands of dollars per year to comply. Most of these
    American companies have no idea that they will be affected. And perhaps
    worst of all, the CWC will undermine the standard of verifiability that
    has been a key national security principle for the United States.
        Under these circumstances, the national security benefits of the
    Chemical Weapons Convention clearly do not outweigh its considerable
    costs. Consequently, we respectfully urge you to reject ratification of
    the CWC unless and until it is made genuinely global, effective and
    verifiable.

      Signatories on Letter to Senator Trent Lott Regarding the Chemical
                               Weapons Convention

                      As of September 9, 1996; 11:30 a.m.

    Former Cabinet Members:
    Richard B. Cheney, former Secretary of Defense

    William P. Clark, former National Security Advisor to the President
    Alexander M. Haig, Jr., former Secretary of State (signed on September
            10)

    John S. Herrington, former Secretary of Energy (signed on September 9)

    Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations

    Edwin Meese III, former U.S. Attorney General

    Donald Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense (signed on September 10)

    Caspar Weinberger, former Secretary of Defense
    Additional Signatories (retired military):

    General John W. Foss, U.S. Army (Retired), former Commanding General,
            Training and Doctrine Command

    Vice Admiral William Houser, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Deputy Chief
            of Naval Operations for Aviation

    General P.X. Kelley, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), former Commandant of
            U.S. Marine Corps (signed on September 9)

    Lieutenant General Thomas Kelly, U.S. Army (Retired), former Director
            for Operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff (signed on September 9)

    Admiral Wesley McDonald, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Supreme Allied
            Commander, Atlantic

    Admiral Kinnaird McKee, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Director, Naval
            Nuclear Propulsion

    General Merrill A. McPeak, U.S. Air Force (Retired), former Chief of
            Staff, U.S. Air Force

    Lieutenant General T.H. Miller, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), former
            Fleet Marine Force Commander/Head, Marine Aviation

    General John. L. Piotrowski, U.S. Air Force (Retired), former Member of
            the Joint Chiefs of Staff as Vice Chief, U.S. Air Force

    General Bernard Schriever, U.S. Air Force (Retired), former Commander,
            Air Research and Development and Air Force Systems Command

    Vice Admiral Jerry Unruh, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Commander 3rd
            Fleet (signed on September 10)

    Lieutenant General James Williams, U.S. Army (Retired), former
            Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
    Additional Signatories (non-military):
    Elliott Abrams, former Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American
            Affairs (signed on September 9)

    Mark Albrecht, former Executive Secretary, National Space Council

    Kathleen Bailey, former Assistant Director of the Arms Control and
            Disarmament Agency

    Robert B. Barker, former Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
            Nuclear and Chemical Weapon Matters

    Angelo Codevilla, former Senior Fellow, Hoover Institute (signed on
            September 10)

    Henry Cooper, former Director, Strategic Defense Initiative
            Organization

    J.D. Crouch, former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

    Midge Decter, former President, Committee for the Free World

    Kenneth deGraffenreid, former Senior Director of Intelligence Programs,
            National Security Council

    Diana Denman, former Co-Chair, U.S. Peace Corps Advisory Council

    Elaine Donnelly, former Commissioner, Presidential Commission on the
            Assignment of Women in the Armed Services

    David M. Evans, former Senior Advisor to the Congressional Commission
            on Security and Cooperation in Europe

    Charles Fairbanks, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

    Douglas J. Feith, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

    Rand H. Fishbein, former Professional Staff member, Senate Defense
            Appropriations Subcommittee

    Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., former Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense

    William R. Graham, former Science Advisor to the President

    E.C. Grayson, former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy

    James T. Hackett, former Acting Director of the Arms Control and
            Disarmament Agency

    Stefan Halper, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (signed on
            September 10)

    Thomas N. Harvey, former National Space Council Staff Officer (signed
            on September 9)

    Charles A. Hamilton, former Deputy Director, Strategic Trade Policy,
            U.S. Department of Defense

    Amoretta M. Hoeber, former Deputy Under Secretary, U.S. Army

    Charles Horner, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Science
            and Technology

    Fred Ikle, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

    Sven F. Kraemer, former Director for Arms Control, National Security
            Council

    Charles M. Kupperman, former Special Assistant to the President

    John Lehman, former Secretary of the Navy

    John Lenczowski, former Director for Soviet Affairs, National Security
            Council

    Bruce Merrifield, former Assistant Secretary for Technology Policy,
            Department of Commerce

    Taffy Gould McCallum, columnist and free-lance writer

    James C. McCrery, former senior member of the Intelligence Community
            and Arms Control Negotiator (Standing Consultative Committee)

    J. William Middendorf II, former Secretary of the Navy (signed on
            September 10)

    Laurie Mylroie, best-selling author and Mideast expert specializing in
            Iraqi affairs

    Richard Perle, former Assistant Secretary of Defense

    Norman Podhoretz, former editor, Commentary Magazine

    Roger W. Robinson, Jr., former Chief Economist, National Security
            Council

    Peter W. Rodman, former Deputy Assistant to the President for National
            Security Affairs and former Director of the Policy Planing
            Staff, Department of State

    Edward Rowny, former Advisor to the President and Secretary of State
            for Arms Control

    Carl M. Smith, former Staff Director, Senate Armed Services Committee

    Jacqueline Tillman, former Staff member, National Security Council

    Michelle Van Cleave, former Associate Director, Office of Science and
            Technology

    William Van Cleave, former Senior Defense Advisor and Defense Policy
            Coordinator to the President

    Malcolm Wallop, former United States Senator

    Deborah L. Wince-Smith, former Assistant Secretary for Technology
            Policy, Department of Commerce

    Curtin Winsor, Jr., former U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica

    Dov S. Zakheim, former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense

                                   __________
                                                            No. 97-D 48
                                                           3 April 1997

    Just Which Chemical Weapons Convention Is Colin Powell Supporting--And
                          Does He Know The Difference?

        (Washington, D.C.): Starting tomorrow, the Clinton Administration
    intends to make General Colin Powell--the former Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff--its Poster Child for the campaign to gain Senate
    approval of the controversial Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
    According to the Associated Press, this campaign will be kicked off at
    a ``highpowered, bipartisan gathering of treaty supporters ...
    featuring Congressmen, veterans' group leaders, arms experts, religious
    organization heads and military leaders, past and present,'' including
    Army Gen. Colin Powell.
    Does Powell Know What He Is Endorsing?
        A warning to General Powell is in order, however: The Senate was
    recently treated to the spectacle of another accomplished retired flag
    officer, General Norman Schwarzkopf, who had to acknowledge that--while
    he is on record as supporting the CWC--he is not familiar with its
    details. For example, under questioning by Sen. Jim Inhofe (R-OK),
    chairman of the Armed Services Committee's Readiness Subcommittee, the
    following exchange occurred:
              Sen. Inhofe: ``Do you think it wise to share with countries
            like Iran our most advanced chemical defensive equipment and
            technologies?''
              Gen. Schwartzkopf: ``Our defensive capabilities?''
              Sen. Inhofe: ``Yes.''
              Gen. Schwartzkopf: ``Absolutely not.''
              Sen. Inhofe: ``Well, I'm talking about sharing our advanced
            chemical defensive equipment and technologies, which I believe
            under Article X [they] would be allow[ed] to [get]. Do you
            disagree?''
              Gen. Schwartzkopf: ``As I said Senator, I'm not familiar with
            all the details--I--you know, a country, particularly like
            Iran, I think we should share as little as possible with them
            in the way of our military capabilities.''
    Beware the `Bait and Switch'
        General Powell and others who served under President Bush should
    also be aware that there have been--as the Center noted on 10 February
    1997 \1\--significant changes in a number of the assumptions,
    conditions and circumstances that underpinned the Bush Administration's
    judgment that the Chemical Weapons Convention was in the national
    interest. These changes have prompted several of General Powell's
    former colleagues--including Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, Air
    Force Chief of Staff Merrill McPeak, Assistant Arms Control and
    Disarmament Agency Director Kathleen Bailey, Assistant to the Secretary
    for Atomic Energy Robert Barker and Principal Deputy Assistant
    Secretary of Defense J.D. Crouch--to urge that the present treaty be
    rejected by the Senate.\2\
        A sample of the changes that have materially altered the
    acceptability, if not strictly speaking the terms, of the Chemical
    Weapons Convention include the following:
       Item: Russia's Evisceration of the Bilateral Destruction
            Agreement
        The Bush Administration anticipated that a Bilateral Destruction
    Agreement (BDA) forged by Secretary of State James Baker and his Soviet
    counterpart, Eduard Shevardnadze in 1990, would critically underpin the
    Chemical Weapons Convention. As the Center for Security Policy observed
    in early February,\3\ this agreement obliged Moscow to provide a full
    and accurate accounting and eliminate most of its vast chemical
    arsenal. The BDA was also expected to afford the U.S. inspection rights
    that would significantly enhance the more limited arrangements provided
    for by the CWC.
        These assumptions about the BDA have, regrettably, not been
    fulfilled. To the contrary, Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin
    declared last year that the Bilateral Destruction Agreement has
    ``outlived its usefulness'' for Russia. What is more, it is now public
    knowledge that Russia is continuing to produce extremely lethal binary
    munitions--weapons that have been specifically designed to circumvent
    the limits and defeat the inspection regime of the Chemical Weapons
    Convention.\4\
       Item: On-Site Inspections Won't Prevent Cheating
        When the Bush Administration finalized the CWC, there was
    considerable hope that intrusive on-site inspections would meaningfully
    contribute to the detection and proof of violations, and therefore to
    deterring them. Five years of experience with the U.N. inspections in
    Iraq--inspections that were allowed to be far more thorough, timely and
    intrusive than those permitted under this Convention--have established
    that totalitarian rulers of a closed society can successfully defeat
    such monitoring efforts.
        In a 4 February 1997 letter to National Security Advisor Samuel
    Berger, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms noted
    that:
              ``Unclassified portions of the National Intelligence Estimate
            on U.S. Monitoring Capabilities [prepared after Mr. Bush left
            office] indicate that it is unlikely that the U.S. will be able
            to detect or address violations in a timely fashion, if at all,
            when they occur on a small scale. And yet, even small-scale
            diversions of chemicals to chemical weapons production are
            capable, over time, of yielding a stockpile far in excess of a
            single ton [which General Shalikashvili described in
            congressional testimony on 11 August 1994 is a level which
            could, `in certain limited circumstances ... have a military
            impact.'] Moreover, few countries, if any, are engaging in much
            more than small-scale production of chemical agent. For
            example, according to [the 4 February 1997] Washington Times,
            Russia may produce its new nerve agents at a `pilot plant' in
            quantities of only `55 to 110 tons annually.' ''
       Item: Facilitating Proliferation: `Poisons for Peace'
        In the years since the Bush Administration signed the Chemical
    Weapons Convention, it has become increasingly clear that sharing
    nuclear weapons-relevant technology with would-be proliferators simply
    because they promise not to pursue nuclear weapons programs is folly.
    Indeed, countries like North Korea, Iran, Iraq, India, Pakistan,
    Argentina, Brazil and Algeria have abused this ``Atoms for Peace''
    bargain by diverting equipment and know-how provided under the Nuclear
    Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to prohibited weapons purposes.
        Unfortunately, commercial chemical manufacturing technology can, if
    anything, be diverted even more easily to weapons purposes than can
    nuclear research and power reactors. For this reason, recent experience
    with the NPT suggests that the Chemical Weapons Convention's Article
    XI--an article dubbed the ``Poisons for Peace'' provision--is
    insupportable. It stipulates that the Parties shall:
            ``Not maintain among themselves any restrictions, including
            those in any international agreements, incompatible with the
            obligations undertaken under this Convention, which would
            restrict or impede trade and the development and promotion of
            scientific and technological knowledge in the field of
            chemistry for industrial, agricultural, research, medical,
            pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes.''
        Such an obligation must now be judged a recipe for accelerating
    proliferation of chemical weapons, not restricting it. Even if the
    United States were to become a party to the CWC and choose to ignore
    this treaty commitment, other advanced industrialized countries will
    certainly not refrain from selling dual-use chemical manufacturing
    technology if it means making a lucrative sale.
       Item: U.S. Chemical Defenses Will be Degraded
        When the Bush Administration signed the CWC, proponents offered
    assurances that the treaty would not diminish U.S. investment in
    chemical defenses. Such assurances were called into question, however,
    by an initiative unveiled in 1995 by the then-Vice Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William Owens. He suggested cutting $805
    million from counter-proliferation support and chemical and biological
    defense programs through Fiscal Year 2001.
        This was followed by a recommendation from JCS Chairman General
    John Shalikashvili in February 1996--a few weeks before he told the
    Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Department of Defense is
    committed to a ``robust'' chemical defense program. He sought to slash
    chemical/biological defense activities and investment by over $1.5
    billion through 2003.
        The rationale for both these gambits? Thanks to a perceived
    reduction in the chemical warfare threat to be brought about by the
    CWC, investments in countering that threat could safely enjoy lower
    priority. Such reductions would have deferred, if not seriously
    disrupted, important chemical and biological research and develop-
    ment efforts, and delayed the procurement of proven technologies. While
    the Owens and Shalikashvili initiatives were ultimately rejected, they
    are a foretaste of the sort of reduced budgetary priority this account
    will surely face if the CWC is approved.
        Changes in the military postures of key U.S. allies since the end
    of the Bush Administration raise a related point: Even if the United
    States manages to resist the sirens' song to reduce chemical defenses
    in the wake of the CWC, it is predictable that the already generally
    deplorable readiness of most allied forces to deal with chemical
    threats will only worsen. To the extent that the U.S. is obliged in the
    future to fight coalition wars, this vulnerability could prove
    catastrophic to American forces engaged with a common enemy.
       Item: Clinton Repudiates Bush Commitment to the JCS on
            R.C.A.s
        At the insistence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1992, President
    Bush signed an executive order that explicitly allowed Riot Control
    Agents (for example, tear gas) to be used in rescuing downed aircrews
    and in dispersing hostile forces using civilians to screen their
    movements against U.S. positions. The Clinton Administration initially
    indicated that it intended to rescind this executive order outright
    once the CWC is ratified. The result of doing so would have been to
    compel U.S. personnel to choose between using lethal force where RCAs
    would suffice or suffering otherwise avoidable casualties.
        In the face of Senate opposition to such a rescission, Mr. Clinton
    has apparently decided to allow tear gas and other RCAs to be used in
    these selected circumstances, but only in peacetime. In wartime,
    however, such use would be considered a breach of the treaty. The
    Administration has yet to clarify under what circumstances the Nation
    will be considered to be ``at war'' since there has been no declaration
    of that state of belligerency in any of the conflicts in which the U.S.
    has engaged since 1945.
        What is particularly troublesome is the prospect that the Clinton
    reversal of the Bush Administration position on RCAs will impinge upon
    promising new defense technologies--involving chemical-based, non-
    lethal weapons (for example, immobilizing agents). If so, U.S. forces
    may be denied highly effective means of prevailing in future conflicts
    with minimal loss of life on either side.
    Other,  No  Less  Distinguished,  National  Security  Experts  Disagree
             with  General  Powell
        In a letter sent to Senator Trent Lott last fall, when the Chemical
    Weapons Convention was last under consideration by the Senate, a host
    of former top civilian and military officials expressed their
    opposition to this treaty in its present form. Among the distinguished
    retired flag officers were:
        General John W. Foss, U.S. Army (Retired), former Commanding
    General, Training and Doctrine Command; Vice Admiral William Houser,
    U.S. Navy (Retired), former Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
    Aviation; General P.X. Kelley, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), former
    Commandant of U.S. Marine Corps; Lieutenant General Thomas Kelly, U.S.
    Army (Retired), former Director for Operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff;
    Admiral Wesley McDonald, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Supreme Allied
    Commander, Atlantic; Admiral Kinnaird McKee, U.S. Navy (Retired),
    former Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion; General Merrill A. McPeak,
    U.S. Air Force (Retired), former Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force;
    Lieutenant General T.H. Miller, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), former
    Fleet Marine Force Commander/Head, Marine Aviation; General John. L.
    Piotrowski, U.S. Air Force (Retired), former Member of the Joint Chiefs
    of Staff as Vice Chief, U.S. Air Force; General Bernard Schriever, U.S.
    Air Force (Retired), former Commander, Air Research and Development and
    Air Force Systems Command; Vice Admiral Jerry Unruh, U.S. Navy
    (Retired), former Commander 3rd Fleet; and Lieutenant General James
    Williams, U.S. Army (Retired), former Director, Defense Intelligence
    Agency.
        Among the civilian leaders who signed the open letter to Sen. Lott
    were: Richard B. Cheney, former Secretary of Defense; William P. Clark,
    former National Security Advisor to the President; Alexander M. Haig,
    Jr., former Secretary of State; John S. Herrington, former Secretary of
    Energy; Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, former U.S. Ambassador to the United
    Nations; Edwin Meese III, former U.S. Attorney General; Donald
    Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense; and one of General Powell's past
    bosses, Caspar Weinberger, former Secretary of Defense.
    The Bottom Line
        The Center regrets General Powell's decision to lend his authority
    to a treaty that even he has freely acknowledged is completely
    unverifiable. It fears that he may also come to regret it. In any
    event, the Nation surely will, if the Clinton-Powell razzle-dazzle
    campaign induces the Senate to take its eyes off the ball--namely, the
    fatal flaws that make the Chemical Weapons Convention unworthy of that
    institution's advice and consent.

    notes:
        \1\ See the Center's Decision Brief entitled Truth or Consequences
    #4. No D.N.A. Tests Needed To Show That Claims About Republican
    Paternity of CWC Are Overblown (No. 97-D 24, 10 February 1997).
        \2\ See the Center's Transition Brief entitled Here We Go Again:
    Clinton Presses Anew For Senate Approval of Flawed, Unverifiable,
    Ineffective Chemical Weapons Treaty (No. 97-T 5, 8 January 1997).
        \3\ See the Center's Decision Brief entitled Truth or Consequences
    #3: Clinton `Makes a Mistake About It' in Arguing the CWC Will Protect
    U.S. Troops (No. 97-D 21, 6 February 1997).
        \4\ See the Center's Decision Brief entitled Russia's Covert
    Chemical Weapons Program Vindicates Jesse Helms' Continuing Opposition
    to Phony CW Arms Control (No. 97-D 19, 4 February 1997).

                                   __________
                                                            No. 97-D 37
                                                           5 March 1997

     Truth or Consequences #7: Schlesinger, Rumsfeld and Weinberger Rebut
                        Scowcroft and Deutch on the CWC

        (Washington, D.C.): Today's Washington Post featured an op.ed.
    article by three of the most distinguished public servants of the
    latter Twentieth Century--James Schlesinger, Donald Rumsfeld and Caspar
    Weinberger--concerning the reasons for opposing the present Chemical
    Weapons Convention (CWC). Written in response to an earlier op.ed.
    favoring this treaty which was authored by former National Security
    Advisor Brent Scowcroft and former Director of Central Intelligence
    John Deutch, the Schlesinger-Rumsfeld-Weinberger essay (a copy of which
    is attached) should be required reading for every Senator and American
    citizen following and/or participating in the debate on the CWC.
        That should be the case in part simply because of the stature of
    the signatories. Dr. Schlesinger, Mr. Rumsfeld and Mr. Weinberger all
    served with distinction in the position of Secretary of Defense,
    respectively for Presidents Nixon and Ford, Ford and Reagan. It also is
    relevant to the present deliberations that Dr. Schlesinger's views are
    informed by his service as Director of Central Intelligence under
    President Nixon and Secretary of Energy under President Carter.
        The joint op.ed. should also command careful attention because of
    the clear and persuasive way it, first, applauds Messrs. Scowcroft and
    Deutch's admissions about the CWC's flaws (notably, with respect to the
    Convention's unverifiability and the treaty's lack of global coverage)
    and, second, underscores their warnings about the dangers inherent in
    the accord's ratification (notably, with respect to inspiring a false
    sense of security, reduced investment in defensive technologies,
    transferring chemical weapons-relevant production and defensive
    technology to countries of concern and limitations on the use of
    chemical-based non-lethal technologies, such as tear gas).
        Finally, the Schlesinger-Rumsfeld-Weinberger essay is of singular
    importance by virtue of the powerful rebuttal it offers to the
    Scowcroft-Deutch argument that the CWC is ``better than nothing.'' The
    three Secretaries conclude to the contrary that--due to the combination
    of these defects and dangers inherent in the treaty, combined with its
    unacceptably high costs for American businesses and taxpayers--the U.S.
    would be better off not being a party than becoming one.
    The Bottom Line
        The Center for Security Policy commends former Secretaries
    Schlesinger, Rumsfeld and Weinberger for this latest in a long line of
    real contributions to the national security and commends their article
    to all those who will be affected by or responsible for this fatally
    flawed accord.

                         No to the Chemical Arms Treaty

         [by James Schlesinger, Caspar Weinberger, and Donald Rumsfeld]

        The Washington Post/March 5, 1997.--The phrase ``damning with faint
    praise'' is given new meaning by the op-ed by Brent Scowcroft and John
    Deutch on the Chemical Convention [``End the Chemical Weapons
    Business,'' Feb. 11]. In it, the authors concede virtually every
    criticism made by those who oppose this controversial treaty in its
    present form.
        They acknowledge the legitimacy of key concerns about the
    Convention: its essential unverifiability; its lack of global coverage;
    the prospect that it will inhibit non-lethal use of chemicals,
    including tear gas; and its mandating the transfer of militarily
    relevant chemical offensive and defensive technology to untrustworthy
    countries that become parties. It is our view that these problems are
    inherent in the present treaty.
        Take, for example, Scowcroft and Deutch's warning against cutting
    investment in chemical defensive measures. Unfortunately, treaties such
    as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)--which promise to reduce the
    menace posed by weapons of mass destruction but which cannot do so--
    inevitably tend to diminish the perceived need and therefore the
    support for defenses against such threats.
        In fact, in December 1995, the then-vice chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff recommended a reduction of more than $800 million in
    investment on chemical defenses in anticipation of the Convention's
    coming into force. If past experience is a guide, there might also be a
    reduction in the priority accorded to monitoring emerging chemical
    weapons threats, notwithstanding Scowcroft and Deutch's call for
    improvements in our ability to track chemical weapons developments.
        Scowcroft and Deutch correctly warn that the ``CWC [must] not [be]
    exploited to facilitate the diffusion of CWC-specific technology,
    equipment and material--even to signatory states.'' The trouble is that
    the Chemical Weapons Convention explicitly obligates member states to
    facilitate such transfers, even though these items are readily
    exploitable for military purposes. What is more, the treaty commits
    member states not to observe any agreements, whether multilateral or
    unilateral, that would restrict these transfers.
        In short, we believe that the problems with the Chemical Weapons
    Convention in these and other areas that have been identified by Brent
    Scowcroft and John Deutch clearly demonstrate that this treaty would be
    contrary to U.S. security interests. Moreover, in our view these
    serious problems undercut the argument that the CWC's ``imperfect
    constraints'' are better than no constraints at all.
        The CWC would likely have the effect of leaving the United States
    and its allies more, not less, vulnerable to chemical attack. It could
    well serve to increase, not reduce, the spread of chemical weapons
    manufacturing capabilities. Thus we would be better off not to be party
    to it.
        Notably, if the United States is not a CWC member state, the danger
    is lessened that American intelligence about ongoing foreign chemical
    weapons programs will be dumbed down or otherwise compromised. This has
    happened in the past when enforcement of a violated agreement was held
    to be a greater threat to an arms control regime than was noncompliance
    by another party. The United States and the international community
    have been unwilling to enforce the far more easily verified 1925 Geneva
    Convention banning the use of chemical weapons--even in the face of
    repeated and well-documented violations by Saddam Hussein. What
    likelihood is there that we would be any more insistent when it comes
    to far less verifiable bans on production and stockpiling of such
    weapons?
        As a non-party, the United States would also remain free to oppose
    dangerous ideas such as providing state-of-the-art chemical
    manufacturing facilities and defensive equipment to international
    pariahs such as Iran and Cuba. And the United States would be less
    likely to reduce investment in chemical protective capabilities, out of
    a false sense of security arising from participation in the CWC.
        In addition, if the United States is not a CWC party, American
    taxpayers will not be asked to bear the substantial annual costs of our
    participating in a multilateral regime that will not ``end the chemical
    weapons business'' in countries of concern. (By some estimates, these
    costs could be over $200 million per year.) Similarly, U.S. citizens
    and companies will be spared the burdens associated with reporting and
    inspection arrangements that might involve unreasonable searches and
    seizures, could jeopardize confidential business information and yet
    could not ensure that other nations--and especially rogue states--no
    longer have chemical weapons programs.
        Against these advantages of nonparticipation, the purported down-
    sides seem relatively inconsequential. First, whether Russia actually
    eliminates its immense chemical arsenal is unlikely to hinge upon our
    participating in the CWC. Indeed. Moscow is now actively creating new
    chemical agents that would circumvent and effectively defeat the
    treaty's constraints.
        Second, the preponderance of trade in chemicals would be unaffected
    by the CWC's limitations, making the impact of remaining outside the
    treaty regime, if any, fairly modest on American manufacturers.
        Finally, if the United States declines to join the present Chemical
    Weapons Convention, it is academic whether implementing arrangements
    are drawn up by others or not. In the event the United States does
    decide to become a party at a later date--perhaps after improvements
    are made to enhance the treaty's effectiveness--it is hard to believe
    that its preferences regarding implementing arrangements would not be
    given considerable weight. This is particularly true since the United
    States would then be asked to bear 25 percent of the implementing
    organization's budget.
        There is no way to ``end the chemical weapons business'' by fiat.
    The price of attempting to do so with the present treaty is
    unacceptably high, and the cost of the illusion it creates might be
    higher still.

        James Schlesinger was secretary of defense under Presidents Nixon
    and Ford, Donald Rumsfeld and Caspar Weinberger held the same post
    under Presidents Ford and Reagan, respectively.

                                   __________
                                                            No. 97-D 35
                                                       27 February 1997

       Gen. Schwartzkopf Tells Senate He Shares Critics' Concerns About
                   Details of the Chemical Weapons Convention

        (Washington, D.C.): Under questioning before the Senate Armed
    Services Committee today, General Norman Schwartzkopf--commander of the
    allied forces in Operation Desert Shield/Storm--acknowledged that he
    was ``unfamiliar with all the details'' of the Chemical Weapons
    Convention and shared some of the concerns expressed by those who
    oppose it in its present form. This is a signal development insofar as
    the treaty's advocates had made much of the General's recent
    endorsement of the CWC during previous testimony on Gulf War Syndrome.
    Q. & A.
        General Schwarzkopf was questioned by one of the Senate's most
    steadfast leaders on national security matters and a courageous critic
    of the Chemical Weapons Convention--the new chairman of the Armed
    Services Committee's Readiness Subcommittee, Sen. Jim Inhofe (R-OK)--
    about several of the CWC's more troubling aspects as seen from a
    military standpoint. Among the most noteworthy aspects of their
    exchange (and a brief intervention by Deputy Secretary of Defense John
    White, who also participated in the hearing) were the following points:
              Sen. Inhofe: ``If the Chemical Weapons Convention were in
            effect, would we still face a danger of chemical attack from
            such places as Iraq [which has not signed the CWC]--or Iran
            [which] actually signed onto it?''
              Gen. Schwartzkopf: ``Senator, I think that the answer is
            probably yes. But, I think the chances of that happening could
            be diminished by the treaty only because it would then be these
            people clearly standing up and thumbing their noses at
            international law--and it would also help us build coalitions
            against them, if that were to happen.''
              Sen. Inhofe: ``Aren't they still thumbing their noses right
            now in Iraq?''
              Gen. Schwartzkopf: ``There's no question about it, Senator--I
            mean the fact that they used it in the first place against
            their own people but, I still feel--we have renounced the use
            of them and I am very uncomfortable placing ourselves in the
            company with Iraq and Libya and countries such as ... North
            Korea that have refused to sign that Convention. The problem
            with those kinds of things is that verification is very
            difficult and enforcement is very difficult.
              Sen. Inhofe: ``... General Shali[kashvili] I think in August
            1994 ... said that `even one ton of chemical agent may have a
            military impact.' I would ask the question: Do you believe that
            an intrusive, on-site inspection--as would be allowed by the
            Chemical Weapons Convention would be able to detect a single
            ton or could tell us conclusively that there isn't a single
            ton?''
              Gen. Schwartzkopf: ``No, no as I said earlier, we can't
            possibly know what's happening on every single inch of every
            single territory out there where this would apply.''
              Sen. Inhofe: ``And as far as terrorists are concerned, they
            would not be under this?''
              Gen. Schwartzkopf: ``Of course not.''
              Sen. Inhofe: ``Like any treaty, we have to give some things
            up, and in this case, of course we do ... and there are a
            couple of things that I'd like to [explore] ... the
            interpretation from the White House changed ... they said that
            if the Chemical Weapons Convention were agreed to, that it
            would affect such things as riot control agents like tear gas
            in search-and-rescue operations and circumstances like we faced
            in Somalia--where they were using women and children at that
            time as shields. Do you agree that we should be restricted from
            using such things as tear gas?''
              Gen. Schwartzkopf: ``I don't believe that is the case but I
            will confess to you that I have not read every single detail of
            that Convention so, therefore, I really can't give you an
            expert opinion. I think you could get a better opinion here.''
              Secretary White: ``I am going to hesitate to give a
            definitive answer because there has been, in the
            administration, a very precise and careful discussion about
            what exactly, and in what situations, this would apply and when
            this wouldn't apply. ...
              Sen. Inhofe: ``Do you think it wise to share with countries
            like Iran our most advanced chemical defensive equipment and
            technologies?''
              Gen. Schwartzkopf: ``Our defensive capabilities?''
              Sen. Inhofe: ``Yes.''
              Gen. Schwartzkopf: ``Absolutely not.''
              Sen. Inhofe: ``Well, I'm talking about sharing our advanced
            chemical defensive equipment and technologies, which I believe
            under Article X [they] would be allow[ed] to [get]. Do you
            disagree?''
              Gen. Schwartzkopf: ``As I said Senator, I'm not familiar with
            all the details--I--you know, a country, particularly like
            Iran, I think we should share as little as possible with them
            in the way of our military capabilities.''
    The Bottom Line
        After this morning's hearing, Senator Inhofe announced:
              ``It is clear to me that the Clinton Administration's full
            court press to secure ratification of the Chemical Weapons
            treaty ought to be slowed down until the American people are
            fully apprised of what this agreement entails. I oppose this
            treaty because I have examined it closely and believe there are
            serious problems contained in its fine print.
              ``Before Senators vote to ratify this Treaty, it is
            absolutely vital that they be `familiar with all the details.'
            The American people should expect no less of their elected
            representatives. All of us want to protect America from the
            dangers of chemical weapons. But we have no business blindly
            endorsing a treaty of nearly 200 pages without carefully
            evaluating all of its provisions on their own merits.''
        To this the Center for Security Policy can only add, ``Amen.''

                                   __________
                                                            No. 97-D 21
                                                        6 February 1997

    Truth or Consequences #3: Clinton `Makes a Mistake About It' in Arguing
                        the CWC Will Protect U.S. Troops

        (Washington, D.C.): President Clinton used his State of the Union
    address Tuesday night to launch his Administration's latest and highest
    profile salvo on behalf of ratification of the Chemical Weapons
    Convention (CWC). Unfortunately, as with other aspects of this campaign
    to induce the Senate to advise and consent to a fatally flawed arms
    control treaty, Mr. Clinton made statements that simply do not stand up
    to scrutiny. One of the most troubling of these was his declaration:
    ``Make no mistake about it, [the CWC] will make our troops safer from
    chemical attack ... We have no more important obligations, especially
    in the wake of what we now know about the Gulf War.'' \1\
        Far from reducing the risks that American military personnel will
    be exposed to chemical weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention is
    likely to exacerbate them. This reality has become increasingly evident
    subsequent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsement of the CWC as
    originally negotiated by the Bush Administration. For the following
    reasons, it would actually be a great disservice to the U.S. armed
    forces--and to the national interests they protect--were the Senate to
    lend its support to the present convention:
    Russia Remains a Chemical Threat
        The cornerstone for the Chemical Weapons Convention was supposed to
    be a Bilateral Destruction Agreement (BDA) with Russia. Pursuant to
    this agreement, Moscow promised to provide a full and accurate
    accounting and eliminate most of its chemical arsenal--the world's
    largest and arguably the one that poses the most serious menace to the
    U.S. military. The BDA was also expected to afford the U.S. inspection
    rights that would significantly enhance the more limited arrangements
    provided for by the CWC.
        Regrettably, Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin declared
    last year that the Bilateral Destruction Agreement has ``outlived its
    usefulness'' for Russia. He has also announced that the tab for Russia
    to implement the Convention's demilitarization arrangements
    (conservatively estimated to be at least $3 billion) would have to be
    paid for by the West. Under these circumstances, even if the U.S.
    agreed to shell out vast sums, chances are that Russia would retain a
    sizable, covert chemical stockpile.
        As the Center for Security Policy noted earlier this week,\2\ it is
    now public knowledge that such a Russian stockpile will probably
    include extremely lethal binary munitions--weapons that have been
    specifically designed to circumvent the limits and defeat the
    inspection regime of the Chemical Weapons Convention. There is reason
    to believe that such weapons may also have been engineered to defeat
    Western chemical defensive gear. This material danger to U.S. forces
    can only grow if, pursuant to the CWC's Article X, the United States
    winds up transferring chemical protective technology or equipment to
    those inclined to reverse engineer and overcome it.
    Other Nations Will Also Have Militarily Significant CW Arsenals
        Russia is hardly the only nation likely to pose a chemical threat
    to U.S. personnel in ``a world with the CWC.'' Some, like Iraq, Syria,
    North Korea and Libya, will refuse to become states parties. Others
    will do so, secure in the knowledge that the treaty's inherent
    unverifiability will allow them to escape detection.
        When the CWC was negotiated there was considerable hope that
    intrusive on-site inspections would meaningfully contribute to the
    detection and proof of violations, and therefore to deterring them.
    Experience, however, with the U.N. inspections in Iraq--an operation
    allowed to conduct far more thorough, timely and intrusive inspections
    than will be permitted under this Convention--has established that
    totalitarian rulers of a closed society can successfully defeat such
    inspections.
        This reality applies, as Senator Helms noted in a letter to
    National Security Advisor Samuel Berger on 4 February, even to
    militarily significant stockpiles of chemical weapons:
              ``General Shalikashvili testified on 11 August 1994 that `In
            certain limited circumstances, even one ton of chemical agent
            may have a military impact. ... With such variables in scale of
            target and impact of chemical weapons, the United States should
            be resolute that the one-ton limit set by the Convention will
            be our guide.' ''
              ``Unclassified portions of the [National Intelligence
            Estimate] on U.S. Monitoring Capabilities indicate that it is
            unlikely that the U.S. will be able to detect or address
            violations in a timely fashion, if at all, when they occur on a
            small scale. And yet, even small-scale diversions of chemicals
            to chemical weapons production are capable, over time, of
            yielding a stockpile far in excess of a single ton. Moreover,
            few countries, if any, are engaging in much more than small-
            scale production of chemical agent. For example, according to
            [the 4 February 1997] Washington Times, Russia may produce its
            new nerve agents at a `pilot plant' in quantities of only `55
            to 110 tons annually' ''
    Facilitating Proliferation: `Poisons for Peace'
        The Chemical Weapons Convention may actually contribute to the
    spread of militarily relevant chemical technology. This could be the
    result of a provision (Article XI) modeled after the ``Atoms for
    Peace'' provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty--which
    promised to share dual-use technology with those who might abuse it if
    only they promise not to do so. Article XI would oblige the United
    States to share inherently militarily useful chemical manufacturing
    technology and materials with countries like Iran and Cuba, if only
    they become states parties. This is a formula for expanding the threat
    to ``our troops'' posed by chemical proliferation, not effective
    chemical arms control.
    The CWC Will Encourage the Military to Lower Its Guard
        A March 1996 study by the General Accounting Office (GAO)
    determined that some elements of the U.S. military appear to be
    inadequately prepared, trained, or equipped to operate in areas
    contaminated by chemical or biological agents. A particularly troubling
    finding was the fact that none of the Army's five active divisions
    which make up the Nation's crisis response force and none of the
    reserve units that are designated to be deployed early in crises (such
    as Operation Desert Shield) were properly equipped to deal with a
    chemical or biological threat.
        In fact, these units were significantly unprepared in a number of
    areas. According to the GAO, three of the ``front-line'' divisions had
    fifty percent or greater shortages of protective clothing with
    shortfalls in other critical gear running as high as eighty-four
    percent. Training was also determined to be deficient in a number of
    respects. This is not entirely surprising given that, in its first 4
    years in office, the Clinton Administration decreased funding for
    chemical and biological defensive purposes by some thirty percent, from
    $750 million in Fiscal Year 1992 to $504 million in Fiscal Year 1995.
        Unfortunately, past experience suggests that matters will only be
    made worse by an arms control treaty like the Chemical Weapons
    Convention that purports to impose a global prohibition on chemical
    weapons, seemingly making such defenses less necessary. For example,
    after ratification of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), U.S.
    investment in relevant defensive technology, vaccines, detection
    equipment, etc. declined precipitously. As a result of years of
    inadequate attention to this threat, the United States found itself
    extremely ill-prepared to deal with a potential BW threat posed by
    Saddam Hussein's Iraq. (In fact, the U.S. may only have detected the
    use of biological weapons against our forces after they started dying
    en masse.)
        That such a fate awaits U.S. chemical defensive efforts in the wake
    of a CWC ratification was brought home by a 1995 initiative proposed by
    the then-Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William
    Owens. He suggested cutting a further $805 million from counter-
    proliferation support and chemical and biological defense programs
    through Fiscal Year 2001. This reduction would have deferred, if not
    seriously disrupted, important chemical and biological research and
    development efforts, and delayed the procurement of proven
    technologies. His rationale: Thanks to a lowering in the chemical
    warfare threat brought about by the CWC, investments in countering it
    could safely enjoy lower priority. While the Owens gambit was
    ultimately defeated, similar initiatives must be expected in the future
    if the CWC is approved--resulting in increased vulnerability, not
    improved safety, for ``our troops.''
        Even if the United States manages to resist the siren's song to
    reduce chemical defenses in the wake of the CWC, it is predictable that
    the already generally deplorable readiness of most allied forces to
    deal with chemical threats will only worsen. To the extent that the
    U.S. is obliged in the future to fight coalition wars, this
    vulnerability could prove catastrophic to American forces engaged with
    a common enemy.
    Prohibitions on Tear Gas, Other Non-Lethal Technologies
        The Clinton Administration has made clear that it intends to
    reverse a Bush executive order issued at the insistence of the Joint
    Chiefs in 1992--an order that explicitly allowed Riot Control Agents
    (for example, tear gas) to be used in rescuing downed aircrews and
    dispersing hostile forces using civilians to screen their movements
    against U.S. positions. The result could be to force our troops to use
    lethal force where it is not necessary or to suffer otherwise avoidable
    casualties.
        Worse yet, one of the most promising new defense technologies--
    involving chemical-based, non-lethal weapons (for example, immobilizing
    agents)--may be restricted or prohibited by this Convention. The CWC
    defines chemical weapons as ``toxic chemicals and their precursors,
    except where intended for purposes not prohibited under this
    Convention, as long as the types and quantities are consistent with
    such purposes.'' It goes on to define a toxic chemical as ``any
    chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause
    death, temporary incapacitation, or permanent harm to humans or
    animals.'' As a result of the CWC, ``our troops'' may be denied highly
    effective means of prevailing in future conflicts with minimal loss of
    life on either side.
    The Bottom Line
        In its present form, the Chemical Weapons Convention cannot be
    justified by the contribution it will make to the safety of our men and
    women in uniform. If anything, the ``contribution'' that will be made
    will be a negative one for ``our troops.''
        A question that may not be as easily dispensed of is: Precisely
    what did President Clinton mean when he said ``in the wake of what we
    now know about the Gulf War''? Is that an acknowledgment that chemical
    weapons were used against U.S. forces there, after all? Does it mean
    that the President is now convinced that American forces were
    inadvertently exposed to chemical agents in the process of destroying
    Iraqi bunkers--accounting for Gulf War Syndrome? Or is he simply
    acknowledging that U.S. chemical defenses are already inadequate and
    that ``our troops'' will likely be exposed to chemical threats--even if
    the enemy does not initiate their use--with or without the Chemical
    Weapons Convention?

    notes:
        \1\ The fallaciousness of another Presidential declaration--``if we
    do not act by April the 29th when this Convention goes into force--with
    or without us--we will lose the chance to have Americans leading and
    enforcing this effort''--was addressed last week in the second paper in
    this ``Truth or Consequences'' series on the Chemical Weapons
    Convention, entitled Truth or Consequences #2: Senate Does Not Need to
    Sacrifice Sensible Scrutiny of CWC to Meet an Artificial Deadline (No.
    97-D 18, 31 January 1997). A third erroneous claim concerning the CWC's
    value in fighting terrorism will be the subject of a forthcoming
    Decision Brief.
        \2\ See the Center's Decision Brief from earlier this week,
    Russia's Covert Chemical Weapons Program Vindicates Jesse Helms'
    Continuing Opposition to Phony C.W. Arms Control (No. 97-D 19, 4
    February 1997).

                                   __________
                                                            No. 97-D 19
                                                        4 February 1997

       Russia's Covert Chemical Weapons Program Vindicates Jesse Helms'
                Continuing Opposition to Phony C.W. Arms Control

        (Washington, D.C.): The Clinton Administration's campaign to
    railroad Senators into approving the fatally flawed Chemical Weapons
    Convention (CWC) ran into a major new obstacle today: The Washington
    Times disclosed that a report published recently in the classified
    Military Intelligence Digest confirms that ``Russia is producing a new
    generation of deadly chemical weapons using materials, methods and
    technology that circumvent the terms of [that] treaty it signed
    outlawing such weapons.''
        Word of this frightening development was originally leaked by a
    Russian scientist, Vil Mirzayanov, who had been involved in the
    Kremlin's covert development of a new class of chemical arms. In an
    article he courageously published in the Wall Street Journal on 25 May
    1994, Mr. Mirzayanov wrote about a new Russian binary weapon [i.e., one
    which uses two relatively harmless chemicals to form a toxic agent
    after the weapon is launched]:
              ``This new weapon, part of the ultra-lethal Novichok [Russian
            for ``Newcomer''] class, provides an opportunity for the
            [Russian] military establishment to disguise production of
            components of binary weapons as common agricultural chemicals
            because the West does not know the formula and its inspectors
            cannot identify the compounds.'' \1\
    Now, More Details About Moscow's Ongoing CW Program
        Excerpts of the secret intelligence report that appear in today's
    Washington Times provide considerable detail about Russia's efforts to
    maintain a deadly chemical arsenal, irrespective of its treaty
    obligations. According to the Times, these include the following
    (emphasis added throughout):
       ``Under a program code-named `Foliant,' a Russian scientific
            research organization has created a highly lethal nerve agent
            called A-232, large quantities of which could be made `within
            weeks' through covert production facilities. ...''
       ``A-232 is made from industrial and agricultural chemicals
            that are not lethal until mixed and that never had been used
            for poison gas.''
       `` `These new agents are as toxic as VX [a persistent nerve
            agent], as resistant to treatment as Soman [a non-persistent
            but deadly poison gas] and more difficult to detect and easier
            to manufacture than VX.' ''
       ``The report says A-232 and its delivery means have `passed
            Moscow's rigorous military acceptance testing and can be
            quickly fielded in unitary or binary form.' ''
       ``Russia's State Scientific Research Institute of Organic
            Chemistry and Technology created the agents and novel ways of
            making them to avoid detection by international inspectors. `By
            using chemicals not specified in the CWC schedules, the
            Russians can produce A-232 and its ethyl analog A-234, in
            unitary and binary forms within several chemical complexes.' ''
       ``The Russians can make the binary, or two part, version of
            the nerve agent using a common industrial solvent acetonitrile
            and an organic phosphate compound `that can be disguised as a
            pesticide precursor.' In another version, soldiers need only
            add alcohol to form the agent, the report says.''
       `` `These various routes offer flexibility for the agent to
            be produced in different types of facilities, depending on the
            raw material and equipment available there. They also add
            complexity to the already formidable challenge of detecting
            covert production activities.' ''
       ``The Russians can produce the new nerve agent in `pilot
            plant' quantities of 55 to 110 tons annually,' the report says.
            Several Russian plants are capable of producing the chemicals
            used in making A-232. One factory in Novocherboksarsk `is
            capable of manufacturing 2,000-2,500 metric tons of A-232
            yearly.' ''
       ``Several pesticide plants `offer easy potential for covert
            production,' the report says. `For example, substituting amines
            for ammonia and making other slight modifications in the
            process would result in new agents instead of pesticide. The
            similarity in the chemistry of these compounds would make
            treaty monitoring, inspection and verification difficult.' ''
    The Administration's Unconvincing Response: The CWC Will Solve the
            Problem
        The Clinton Administration's pollyannish response to these
    revelations ought to be instructive to Senators weighing the Chemical
    Weapons Convention. Although the Russians are violating their present
    obligation not to produce chemical weapons and are doing so in ways
    designed to circumvent the CWC's limitations and to defeat even on-site
    inspection regimes, an Administration spokesman told the Washington
    Times that ``the treaty would make it easier to investigate such
    problems'' since ``agents and components can be added to the treaty's
    schedule of banned chemicals.'' The National Security Council's David
    Johnson is quoted as saying: ``Without the CWC and the verification
    tools it provides, you don't have the means to get at problems like
    this. With CWC, you do.''
        Such a statement is, at best, wishful thinking. At worst, it is
    highly misleading since, for reasons outlined above, the Russian
    Novichok weapons (and counterpart efforts likely being pursued by other
    chemical weapons states) are specifically designed to thwart the CWC's
    ``verification tools.''
        A variation on this disingenuous theme is being circulated in
    graphic form by proponents of the Chemical Weapons Convention. They
    offer two world maps, one under the heading ``The World Without the
    CWC,'' the other ``The World With the CWC.'' The former shows large
    areas of the world--notably Russia, China, Iran, India and Pakistan--
    with declared or suspected chemical arsenals. The latter, though, shows
    the entire world except for Libya, Egypt, Syria, Iraq and North Korea
    as being without either declared or suspected chemical stockpiles.
        It is deceptive to suggest that the Chemical Weapons Convention
    will ensure that Russia, China, Iran, India or Pakistan will actually
    eliminate their chemical weapons programs thanks to the CWC. In fact,
    any country that is wishes to retain even militarily significant
    chemical stockpiles and is willing to flout international law to do so
    can be confident of its ability to escape detection and sanction. To
    his credit, one of the Convention's preeminent champions and
    distributors of these maps--retired Lieutenant General Tom McInerney--
    responded, when asked whether he really believed that Russia and China
    would give up their chemical arms if they became parties to the CWC--by
    saying: ``Of course not.''
    Enter Chairman Helms
        As it happens, front-page treatment was also given today to another
    aspect of the Chemical Weapons Convention drama. A 29 January 1997
    letter from Senator Jesse Helms to Majority Leader Trent Lott
    expressing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman's strong
    opposition to the present CWC was featured ``above the fold'' by the
    Washington Post. In this letter, Senator Helms declares: ``I am
    convinced that the CWC, as it now stands, is fraught with deficiencies
    totally inimical to the national security interests of the United
    States.''
        Chairman Helms goes on to enumerate in an attached memorandum
    specific conditions that ``are essential to ensuring that the Chemical
    Weapons Convention enhances, rather than reduces, our national
    security.'' In particular, he says preconditions are needed to address
    six concerns which ``are best expressed in the letter [Senator Lott]
    received on 9 September 1996 from Richard Cheney, William Clark, Jeane
    Kirkpatrick, Alexander Haig, John Herrington, Edwin Meese, Donald
    Rumsfeld, Caspar Weinberger, 12 Generals and Admirals and 47 [other]
    officials from the Reagan and Bush Administrations'': \2\
       Russian elimination of chemical weapons and implementation
            of the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement (BDA);
       Inclusion of countries other than Russia believed to have
            chemical weapons;
       Certification by the U.S. intelligence community that
            compliance with the treaty can be monitored with high
            confidence;
       Specification of the actions that will be taken by the
            United States in the event of non-compliance;
       Establishing the primacy of the U.S. Constitution over all
            provisions of the CWC; and
       Protection of U.S. confidential business information (CBI).
    Sen. Helms Rebuts the Administration's CWC Point Person
        In addition, Senator Helms today sent National Security Advisor
    Samuel ``Sandy'' Berger a strongly worded letter concerning
    correspondence written by Dr. Lori Esposito Murray--the Special Advisor
    to the President and ACDA Director for the Chemical Weapons
    Convention--to members of the Senate in response to the Cheney et al.
    missive. Calling the Murray correspondence ``offensive,'' the Chairman
    of-
    fers his own, detailed rebuttal of her claim that there were
    ``significant misinformation'' and ``misstatements'' in the letter sent
    last fall by Secretary Cheney and his colleagues.
        Specifically, Senator Helms affirms that:
       ``The CWC does not--in fact--effectively cover the types of
            chemicals used to manufacture chemical weapons. Everything from
            Sarin and Soman to VX can be manufactured using a variety of
            chemicals which are not identified by the Schedules for the
            application of the verification regime.''
       ``... The CWC will not do one thing to reduce the chemical
            weapons arsenals of terrorist countries and other nations
            hostile to the United States. ... Not one country of concern to
            the United States has ratified this convention.''
       ``... The CWC is not `effectively verifiable' and Dr. Murray
            should not have made representations to the contrary. ...
            Declassified portions from [a] August 1993 National
            Intelligence Estimate note:
              `` `The capability of the intelligence community to monitor
            compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention is severely
            limited and likely to remain so for the rest of the decade. The
            key provision of the monitoring regime--challenge inspection at
            declared sites--can be thwarted by a nation determined to
            preserve a small, secret program using the delays and managed
            access rules allowed by the Convention.' ''
    The Bottom Line
        The Center for Security Policy commends Senator Helms for his
    leadership in insisting that the Chemical Weapons Convention's myriad,
    serious defects be addressed and corrected before the Senate is once
    again asked to give its advice and consent to this treaty. It looks
    forward to working with him, Senator Lott and all others who share
    Chairman Helms' determination to ensure that the CWC is only ratified
    if it ``enhances, rather than reduces'' U.S. national security.

    notes:
        \1\ See in this regard Not `Good Enough for Government Work:'
    Senate Needs to Hear About Russian Chemical Weapons From Russian
    Experts (No. 94-D 100, 5 October 1994).
        \2\ Copies of this letter, which was originally circulated by the
    Center for Security Policy last fall, may be obtained by contacting the
    Center.

                                   __________
                                                            No. 97-D 27
                                                       17 February 1997

    Truth or Consequences #5: The CWC Will Not Be Good for Business--To Say
                        Nothing of The National Interest

        (Washington, D.C.): Proponents of the Chemical Weapons Convention
    (CWC) now awaiting consideration by the U.S. Senate often declare that
    industry supports this controversial treaty. That claim requires
    careful consideration since, on its face, this arms control treaty will
    have myriad, and possibly quite adverse, implications for many American
    businesses. Such implications arise from the reporting, regulatory and
    inspection requirements generated by the treaty's verification regime.
    Who Will Be Affected?
        A common misconception is that only chemical manufacturing
    businesses will be covered by these requirements. To be sure, such
    pervasively regulated companies will face additional reporting
    requirements and be subjected to routine inspections by foreign
    nationals. A trade association representing some of these companies--
    the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA)--has judged the impacts of
    the CWC on its member companies to be acceptable, however.
    (Interestingly, some CMA companies--for example, Dixie Chemicals and
    Sterling Chemicals--have expressed opposition to the treaty on the
    grounds that the costs entailed in further reporting requirements,
    additional regulatory burdens and intrusive on-site inspections will be
    unacceptable.)
        In fact, thousands of companies that do not produce but simply use
    a wide variety of chemicals or chemical compounds--notably, Discrete
    Organic Chemicals (DOCs) \1\--will also be burdened with new and
    potentially onerous responsibilities under the CWC. While the CWC's
    proponents frequently claim that many of these companies will be able
    to get away with filling out a simple, short form, there is reason to
    believe otherwise.
        For a good many of the affected companies, the CWC's reporting
    requirements will entail a time-consuming, and assuredly expensive,
    process of producing declara-
    tions, filing reports and complying with new regulations. These
    industries may also face challenge as well as routine inspections.
    Challenge inspections permit the use of sampling procedures--for
    example the use of mass spectrometers--that go beyond those to which
    companies facing only routine inspections are exposed and that have
    considerable potential for the loss of Confidential Business
    Information (see below).
        Among the industries facing such prospects are: automotive, food
    processing, biotech, distillers and brewers, electronics, soap and
    detergents, cosmetics and fragrances, paints, textiles, non-nuclear
    electric utility operators and even ball-point pen ink manufacturers.
    The following well-known U.S. companies--none of which has anything to
    do with the manufacture of chemical weapons--have been identified by
    the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency as subject to the CWC's terms:
    Sherwin-Williams, Nutrasweet, Jim Beam, Archer Daniels Midland, Lever
    Brothers, Kaiser Aluminum, Goodyear Tire and Rubber, Xerox, Raytheon
    and Conoco.
        Last but hardly least, in addition to the obligations befalling the
    foregoing industries, the Chemical Weapons Convention would allow any
    site in the United States to be subjected to intrusive challenge
    inspections. While proponents downplay the danger that such an
    arrangement might be abused by foreign governments, there are no
    guarantees that such abuses will not occur.
    Who Speaks for All the Affected Industries?
        While the Chemical Manufacturers Association has been the most
    vocal industry advocate of the Chemical Weapons Convention, it
    represents only some 190 of the companies expected to be covered by the
    treaty. It has aggressively lobbied Senators and other trade
    organizations on behalf of the treaty, evidently persuaded not only
    that the CWC will not hurt its businesses but will actually benefit
    them. Notably, CMA believes this accord's Article XI will clear the way
    for a substantial increase in U.S. exports of chemical manufacturing
    equipment and materials.
        Since the bulk of this prospective increase may involve markets not
    currently open to American chemical concerns--presumably, including
    pariah states like Iran and Cuba--it is unclear just how willing
    responsible companies and/or the U.S. Government will be to engage in
    this sort of trade.\2\ Such exports are currently proscribed by the
    supplier-control arrangement known as the Australia Group. If, as seems
    likely, the CWC has the effect of vitiating the Australia Group
    mechanism, CW-relevant exports may be permitted even to dubious
    customers--but it will be hard to contend that the effect on curbing
    proliferation of chemical weapons will be a positive one.
        The truth of the matter is that no one can say for sure how many
    companies will be caught up in the CWC's reporting, regulatory and
    inspection regime. It is safe to say, however, that there will be
    thousands affected (according to official U.S. Government estimates as
    many as 3,000-8,000.) Even if one counts facilities, as few as two-
    fifths of those affected are owned by CMA member companies. Indeed, as
    Dr. Will Carpenter, formerly Vice President for Technology at the
    Monsanto Agriculture Company and a CMA representative, noted in an
    article in Ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention:
              ``The leaders of the chemical industry, through the board of
            directors of the CMA have always emphasized support of the
            convention. There are, however, another 60 to 80 trade
            associations whose members will also be regulated by the
            National Authority [set up to implement the CWC]. ... An
            overwhelming number of these companies are not aware of the
            implications of the Chemical Weapons Convention despite a
            continuing effort by ACDA, the CMA and other organizations to
            get the word out.''
    How Will American Businesses Be Affected?
        The impact of the Chemical Weapons Convention on American companies
    will occur through two avenues:
        (1) Impacts Due to New Reporting and Regulatory Requirements: The
    data required by the treaty's verification regime differs in both
    quantitative and qualitative respects from that already collected for
    other regulatory purposes. For example, current environmental
    regulations do not cover all of the chemicals relevant to the CWC.
    Moreover, of those that are covered, the production thresholds
    triggering current reporting requirements are set much higher than
    would be the case under the CWC. In addition, some existing regulations
    require reports concerning future actions (whereas the treaty imposes
    obligations for considerable retroactive reporting). Some of these
    current regulations apply to chemical producers, but not to industrial
    processors or consumers of chemicals. And deadlines for reports
    required by the CWC will be shorter, and necessitate more frequent
    updating, than those presently demanded, for instance, by the
    Environmental Protection Agency. For all these rea-
    sons, new reporting requirements will have to be levied by the U.S.
    government in the implementing legislation for the Convention.
        These new requirements may prove to be viewed by large concerns as
    simply a marginal additional cost of doing business. Smaller companies,
    however, may find these additional requirements to be considerably more
    burdensome. This is particularly true since some companies will be
    obliged to file detailed declarations for the first time. Such reports
    will also have to be updated on an annual basis. The associated costs
    for preparing these reports are likely to run to the thousands--and
    perhaps hundreds of thousands--of dollars per company.
        What is more, the new U.S. bureaucracy dubbed the ``National
    Authority'' to whom these reports will be sent, must be notified of
    changes in declared activities 5 days before they occur. Complying with
    this requirement is likely to prove problematic for companies unable to
    predict their activities; it certainly will be burdensome. A failure to
    comply with this reporting regime could result in civil and perhaps
    even criminal penalties.
        (2) Impacts Arising from On-Site Inspections: Any company that
    provides declarations to the ``National Authority'' should prepare to
    be inspected. Once the U.S. National Authority turns the information
    thus supplied over to the new international bureaucracy created under
    this Convention--the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
    Weapons (OPCW) the OPCW's Technical Secretariat will have the authority
    to conduct on-site inspections (both routine and challenge inspections)
    to verify the data thus supplied.
        Depending on the sorts of chemicals declared and the nature of the
    inspections, the amount of notice, duration and degree of intrusiveness
    of the inspection can vary. For example, advance notice can be as
    little as twenty-four hours; the duration can extend to 96 continuous
    hours; and the international inspectors can in some instances demand to
    examine any data, files, processes, equipment, structures or vehicles
    deemed pertinent to their search for illegal chemical manufacturing
    activities.
    What Will Be At Risk?
        It is a virtual certainty that, in the course of at least some such
    inspections, confidential business information (CBI) will be put at
    risk. In 1993, the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment
    identified examples of proprietary information that could be
    compromised:
       The formula of a new drug or specialty chemical
       A synthetic route that requires the fewest steps or the
            cheapest raw materials
       The form, source, composition and purity of raw materials or
            solvents
       Subtle changes in pressure or temperature at key steps in a
            process
       Expansion and marketing plans
       Raw materials and suppliers
       Manufacturing costs
       Prices and sales figures
       Names of technical personnel working on a particular project
       Customer lists
        According to the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), the means
    by which the foregoing and other sensitive business information could
    be acquired by foreign inspectors (at least some of whom may be agents
    of their governments' intelligence services and specialists in the
    conduct of commercial espionage) include via the following:
       manifests and container labels that disclose the nature/
            purity of the feedstock and the identity of the supplier
       instrument panels [e.g., networked computer monitors]
            revealing precise temperature and pressure settings for a
            production process
       chemical analysis of residues taken from a valve or seal on
            the production line
       visual inspection of piping configurations and
            instrumentation diagrams could allow an inspector to deduce
            flow and process parameters
       audits of plant records
        A loss of confidential business information either through a
    challenge inspection, or through sample analysis, could be particularly
    troubling for those in the chemical, pharmaceutical and biotechnology
    industries. Many companies have not sought patents for such proprietary
    information lest they be compromised by Freedom of Information Act
    (FOIA) requests, to which patents are subject. Even so, in August 1993,
    the OTA estimated that the U.S. chemical industry loses approximately
    $3-6 billion per year in counterfeited chemicals and chemical products.
        If proprietary formulas are compromised by commercial espionage,
    the cost can be very great. For example, it takes an average of 10
    years and an investment of $25 million to perfect a new pesticide. U.S.
    pharmaceutical companies must invest an average of 12 years and on the
    order of $350 million in research and development to bring a
    breakthrough drug to market.
        Clearly, while it is difficult to assess the potential dollar
    losses that may be associated with the compromise of proprietary
    business data, information gleaned from inspections and data
    declarations literally could be worth millions of dollars to foreign
    competitors. A small company whose profitability (and economic
    survival) derives from a narrow but critical competitive advantage will
    be particularly vulnerable to industrial espionage. The OTA notes that
    for a small company, ``even visual inspection alone might reveal a
    unique process configuration that could be of great value to a
    competitor.''
    The Risk is Real
        Unfortunately, these are not hypothetical or ``worst case''
    scenarios. In preparation for the CWC, the U.S. has conducted mock
    inspections at seven government and private sector industrial sites.
    The results validate fears that even routine access by the OPCW's
    international inspectors could result in the loss of commercial and/or
    national security secrets. This would certainly be true of the access
    allowed under more intrusive challenge inspection provisions.
        These conclusions are evident, for example, in a report submitted
    by the U.S. government to the Conference on Disarmament concerning the
    third of these so-called National Trial Inspections. It was conducted
    by U.S. experts at the Monsanto Agricultural Company's Luling,
    Louisiana plant in August, 1991. The report said, in part:
              ``The Monsanto representative who was on the inspection team
            to determine the extent of CBI he could obtain, determined
            there would be a loss of such information. He stated he was
            able to obtain enough information about the glyphosate
            intermediate process merely by equipment inspection to save a
            potential competitor considerable process development, time and
            dollars. He said a knowledgeable inspector could compromise
            Monsanto's proprietary business interests with no access to
            their records beyond the quantity of phosphorous trichloride
            consumed.'' (Emphasis added.)
        Even Exterior Sampling Can Put CBI At Risk: Another mock inspection
    revealed that soil and water samples taken even from the exterior of
    buildings at a chemical plant three weeks after a production run
    revealed the product of the operation and process details. This is
    especially worrisome in terms of the implications for confidential
    business information since the CWC's Verification Annex (Part II
    paragraph (E)(55)) explicitly affords an inspection team the right to
    take samples on-site using highly invasive mass spectrometers and, ``if
    it deems necessary,'' to transfer samples for analysis off-site at
    laboratories designated by the OPCW. And, as Dr. Kathleen Bailey of the
    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory told the Senate Foreign
    Relations Committee on 21 March 1996:
              ``Experts in my laboratory recently conducted experiments to
            determine whether or not there would be a remainder inside of
            the equipment that is used for sample analysis on-site. They
            found out that, indeed, there is residue remaining. And if the
            equipment were taken off-site, off of the Lawrence Livermore
            Laboratory site, or off of the site of a biotechnology firm,
            for example, and further analysis were done on those residues,
            you would be able to get classified and/or proprietary
            information.''
        Matters are made worse by the prospect that the OPCW is likely to
    allow a number of states parties' laboratories to conduct sample
    analysis. Among the nations that have expressed an interest in
    providing such laboratory services are several with dubious records
    concerning non-proliferation and/or a record of using multilateral
    organizations--among other devices--for intelligence collection
    (including commercial espionage).
    Conclusion
        The Chemical Weapons Convention will entail real, if as yet
    unquantifiable, costs for thousands of U.S. industries having nothing
    to do with the manufacture of chemical weapons. Such costs might be
    justifiable if the treaty were likely to be effective in ridding the
    world of chemical weapons--or even in appreciably reducing the
    likelihood of chemical warfare. Unfortunately, while the CWC's
    verification regime will be sufficiently intrusive to jeopardize U.S.
    proprietary interests, it is woefully inadequate to detect and prove
    non-compliance by closed societies determined to maintain covert
    chemical weapons capabilities notwithstanding their treaty
    obligations.\3\ As a result, the burdens that American private
    industries will be asked to bear--largely without their knowledge--
    simply cannot be justified on national security or any other grounds.

    notes:
        \1\ The CWC defines DOCs only in the following, expansive terms:
    ``Any chemical belonging to the class of chemical compounds consisting
    of all compounds of carbon except for its oxides, sulfides and metal
    carbonates.''
        \2\ In fact, ACDA Director John Holum has indicated that the United
    States' obligations under the CWC would not be allowed to compel it to
    sell CW-relevant technology to proliferating states. Even if that
    position were actually adopted by the U.S. government after treaty
    ratification, Article XI would still provide political cover for other
    nations feeling no such compunction and deny Washington grounds for
    objecting.
        \3\ N.B. The UN's on-site inspection effort in Iraq (UNSCOM) has
    been unable to ascertain the true status of Saddam Hussein's weapons of
    mass destruction programs despite five years of challenge inspections
    under a regime providing for far more intrusive, timely and
    comprehensive inspections than those authorized by the CWC.

                                   __________
                                                            No. 97-D 14
                                                        28 January 1997

     Truth or Consequences #1: Center Challenges Administration Efforts To
                        Distort, Suppress Debate on CWC

                  dangers to americans' constitutional rights
        (Washington, D.C.): Like a saturation bombardment of toxic gas on a
    World War I battlefield, proponents of the Chemical Weapons Convention
    (CWC) have suddenly unleashed a barrage of Cabinet-level public
    statements and op.eds., departmental letters, government fact sheets
    and interest group point papers. The purpose seems to be to asphyxiate
    informed debate about this treaty with billowing clouds of false or
    misleading information, even as the Convention's critics are wrongly
    accused of doing the same thing.
        For example, in a letter written to Senators on 14 January 1997,
    Dr. Lori Esposito Murray--the Special Advisor to the President and ACDA
    Director on the Chemical Weapons Convention--took strong exception to
    correspondence authored by a large and distinguished group of former
    senior civilian and military officials who oppose ratification of the
    CWC in its present form. The latter include: former Secretaries of
    Defense Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and Caspar Weinberger, former U.N.
    Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, former Secretary of State Alexander Haig
    and former National Security Advisor to the President William Clark.
        Dr. Murray declared that the Cheney et al. letter ``contains
    significant misinformation about the Convention.'' She proceeds to cite
    several portions of the letter (which was circulated by the Center for
    Security Policy originally last fall and again earlier this month) \1\
    which she characterizes as ``misstatements.'' In opposition to these
    alleged ``misstatements,'' Dr. Murray offers what she calls ``facts.''
        As a contribution to a real and informed debate about the Chemical
    Weapons Convention, the Center will be issuing a series of Decision
    Briefs in the coming days briefly responding to each of Dr. Murray
    points--and similar arguments on behalf of the treaty made by others--
    that have the effect of confusing or distorting, if not actually
    suppressing, such a debate.
    CWC Will Impinge Upon Americans' Constitutional Rights
        As Secretaries Cheney, Rumsfeld, Weinberger and their colleagues
    noted in the joint letter: ``We are concerned that the CWC will
    jeopardize U.S. citizens' constitutional rights by requiring the U.S.
    government to permit searches without either warrants or probable
    cause.'' Dr. Murray describes this as a ``misstatement'' and declares
    as a ``fact'' that:
              ``The Administration expects that access to private
            facilities will be granted voluntarily for the vast majority of
            inspections under the CWC. If this is not the case, the United
            States Government will obtain a search warrant prior to an
            inspection in order to ensure that there will be no trampling
            of constitutional rights.''
        On 9 September 1996, Department of Justice officials publicly
    acknowledged in testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee that in
    such cases a criminal warrant would be required. The problem is that
    obtaining such a warrant from a court would require demonstration of
    probable cause. This will be impossible in most cases because the
    nation requesting an inspection need not cite its reasons for making
    such a request.
        Hence, the Clinton Administration faces a difficult choice. If the
    U.S. government respects its citizens' rights not to be subjected
    involuntarily to searches in the absence of judicial warrants, it will
    be creating a precedent other countries will assuredly cite to refuse
    on-site inspections on their territories. If it does not respect those
    rights, it will be acting in an unconstitutional manner.
    Judge Bork Is Concerned About the Treaty's Constitutional Impact
        In a letter sent to Judiciary Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch last
    August, a respected constitutional scholar and distinguished Federal
    judge, Robert H. Bork, expressed the view that ``there are grounds to
    be concerned about [CWC provisions'] compatibility with the
    Constitution.'' He wrote:
              ``Fourth and Fifth Amendment concerns are raised by the
            United States' obligation to open to on-site inspections any
            facility, whether in the public sector or privately owned.
            Apparently, no probable cause need be shown. A foreign state
            will have the right to challenge inspection of a U.S. facility
            without the grounds that are essential for a search warrant.
              ``The U.S. is required by the CWC to enforce inspection by an
            international team, even over opposition from the owner. On-
            site personnel can be compelled to answer questions, provide
            data, and permit searches of anything within the premises--
            including records, files, papers, processes, controls,
            structures and vehicles.
              ``Whatever the merits otherwise of the claim that the
            `pervasively regulated industries' exception avoids the Fourth
            Amendment problems, it is my understanding that the majority of
            the 3,000-8,000 companies expected to be covered are not
            pervasively regulated.
              ``Additional Fifth Amendment problems arise from the
            authority of inspectors to collect data and analyze samples.
            This may constitute an illegal seizure and, perhaps, constitute
            the taking of private property by the government without
            compensation. The foreign inspectors will not be subject to
            punishment for any theft of proprietary information.
              ``American citizens will have fewer rights to information
            concerning investigations concerning them or their businesses
            than they would if investigated by a U.S. agency. Freedom of
            Information requests will not be permitted under the proposed
            CWC implementing legislation. ...
              ``... The owner of a facility will [likely] be faced with an
            international inspection team, backed up by the U.S.
            government, demanding access to his property and demanding
            answers and documents from his employees. No one will be shown
            a search warrant and, so far as I can gather, the owner or
            employee must decide on the spot whether he has a
            constitutional right to refuse what is demanded. If he refuses
            and turns out to be wrong, he will face punishment. At least a
            citizen shown a search warrant knows that a judge has deemed
            the search constitutional.
              ``The provision in question speaks of constitutional
            obligations with regard to property rights or searches and
            seizures. That does not cover the Fifth Amendment right not to
            incriminate oneself. Yet self-incrimination is a real danger
            for people required to answer questions, turn over documents
            and other matter.''
    Judiciary Committee Chairman Henry Hyde is Also Concerned
        On 28 August 1996, Chairman Hatch received a letter from his House
    counterpart, Rep. Henry Hyde. It expresses similar misgivings to those
    addressed by Judge Bork. Rep. Hyde asked:
              ``How can we accede to an arrangement that grants an
            international inspection agency the right to demand access to
            thousands of privately owned U.S. facilities without requiring
            the foreign inspectors to demonstrate probable cause necessary
            to secure a judicial warrant--except by compromising the
            American owners' constitutional rights?
              ``Similarly, how can those owners be denied due process--or,
            for that matter, the right to sue for damages in the likely
            event that the foreign inspectors use their eighty-four hours
            of on-site inspection to elicit sensitive proprietary data and
            then that data finds its way into the hands of competitors
            overseas? As you are well aware, there is growing concern about
            illegal commercial espionage. If we are not careful, it would
            appear that we may be creating through the CWC a legal
            opportunity for carrying out such intelligence collection, to
            the severe detriment of America's competitive position.
              A further concern arises from the fact that the new
            Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons will be
            significantly less accountable than U.S. regulatory agencies
            for information collected in the course of international
            inspections of American businesses. I understand that the draft
            implementing leg-
    islation proposes to preclude requests about OPCW inspections that
    might otherwise be made under the Freedom of Information act.
              ``... Whatever one thinks ... about the wisdom of ratifying a
            treaty that is inherently unverifiable, unenforceable and
            inequitable, the likelihood that it will compromise the
            constitutional rights of many thousands of American companies
            and their owners and employees should be sufficient grounds for
            its rejection.''
    The Bottom Line
        Clearly, there are grounds for concern about the constitutional
    impact of the Chemical Weapons Convention. These cannot be dismissed as
    ``misstatements'' or ``myths.'' Neither can consideration of such
    issues be responsibly deferred--as some treaty proponents are arguing--
    until after the CWC is ratified by the United States. At that point,
    the theoretical option of building safeguards into the implementing
    legislation will be a non-starter, at least from a practical point of
    view, to the extent such protections would conflict with ``the supreme
    law of the land,'' i.e., a ratified treaty. Accordingly, the Center for
    Security Policy encourages members of the Senate to examine the
    constitutional and other, serious problems with the Chemical Weapons
    Convention prior to any further consideration of this accord.

    notes:
        \1\ See the Center's Transition Brief entitled Here We Go Again:
    Clinton Presses Anew For Senate Approval of Flawed, Unverifiable,
    Ineffective Chemical Weapons Treaty (No. 97-T 5, 8 January 1997).

                                   __________
                                                            No. 97-D 30
                                                       22 February 1997

     Truth or Consequences #6: The CWC Will Not Prevent Chemical Terrorism
                       Against the U.S. or its Interests

        (Washington, D.C.): In recent weeks, proponents of the Chemical
    Weapons Convention (CWC) have cited the contribution this Convention
    would make to combating terrorists armed with chemical weapons as an
    important justification for the Senate to approve its ratification. In
    President Clinton's State of the Union address, in successive op.ed.
    articles by former Bush Administration officials and in news articles
    and editorials reflecting the administration's pro-treaty line, the
    assertion is made that an admittedly grave problem will be alleviated
    by the CWC's ban on the production, stockpiling or use of chemical
    weapons.
        According to the Wall Street Journal, Senator Richard Lugar--the
    Chemical Weapons Convention's principal champion in the Senate--has
    even taken to darkly warning his colleagues that they better vote for
    the CWC lest there be a chemical terrorist incident in this country
    which might have been prevented if only the Convention had been in
    place.
    The CWC Will Not Impede Terrorists
        Such arguments are highly misleading, possibly dangerously so, for
    two reasons:
        (1) The `Home-Brew' Problem: The ability to produce toxic chemical
    agents is so widespread--and the materials required are so universally
    accessible and ordinary--that a treaty banning chemical weapons will
    have no effect at all on small, non-governmental groups determined to
    manufacture such agents. Lethal chemical substances can be manufactured
    by virtually anyone with a good understanding of chemistry and access
    to commercially available hardware and ingredients.
        In fact, the Japanese cult, Aum Shim Rikyo, produced the toxic
    nerve agent Sarin it used a few years ago in its terrorist attack on
    the subways of Tokyo in just such a fashion--in a room with dimensions
    of eight by fourteen feet. Suggestions that such terrorist incidents
    will be precluded in the future by a prohibition on governmental stocks
    of chemical weapons--a step said to eliminate the danger some chemical
    weapons might be stolen and used in an unauthorized fashion--ignore the
    reality of this ``home-brew'' option. The effect of the CWC on this
    option will be roughly that an international treaty foreswearing bank-
    robbery by governments would have on independent bank-robbers, which is
    to say no beneficial impact whatsoever.
        As a practical matter, neither the limits imposed by the Chemical
    Weapons Convention's three schedules of chemicals nor the intrusive
    inspection regime mandated by the treaty would prevent terrorist groups
    like Aum Shim Rikyo from garnering chemical weapons capabilities. This
    would be true even were they to produce quantities of chemical agents
    deemed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John
    Shalikashvili, sufficient to have a ``militarily impact'' (i.e., one
    agent ton).\1\
        On this point, a declassified Defense Intelligence Agency report of
    February 1996 observed:
              ``Irrespective of whether the CWC enters into force,
            terrorists will likely look upon CW as a means to gain greater
            publicity and instill widespread fear. The March 1995 Tokyo
            subway attack by Aum Shim Rikyo would not have been prevented
            by the CWC.''
        (2) The Problem of State-Support for Chemical Terrorism: A number
    of the leading state-sponsors of terrorism--notably, Libya, Syria, Iraq
    and North Korea--have indicated that they will not become parties to
    this treaty. As a result, at least some of those who provide
    infrastructural support, training and other assistance to terrorists
    will be free to do so in the chemical arena, as well as with respect to
    more traditional tools of the trade (e.g., Semetex plastic explosive,
    fertilizer-based bombs and other high-explosives).
        What is more, since the Chemical Weapons Convention's limitations
    cannot be monitored with confidence, it is possible--perhaps even
    likely--that at least some of the nations known to have supported
    international terrorism who may become parties to the CWC (e.g.,
    Russia, China, Iran and Cuba) will also be able to assist those
    interested in performing acts of chemical terrorism. If the Convention
    cannot ensure that such CWC counties are entirely out of the chemical
    weapons business, it certainly cannot assure that those with whom these
    countries deal covertly are out of that deadly business.
        In the final analysis, of course, state-sponsorship of terrorism is
    itself a violation of international law. The idea that nations that
    routinely flout treaty obligations and international norms will behave
    differently if only a new convention is adopted is absurd. The problem
    is not a lack of laws or the ``tools'' they ostensibly provide to deal
    with such nations and behavior. The problem is, rather, the absence of
    will to use the available laws and tools to penalize state-sponsors of
    terrorism and curb their malevolence.
    The Bottom Line
        The threat posed by chemical terrorism is a real one. Every
    American should be concerned about this danger--and insistent that it
    be seriously addressed by the elected and appointed officials charged
    with providing for the common defense. The predictable effect of the
    Chemical Weapons Convention, however, will be to reduce concern out of
    a mistaken belief that the chemical threat from terrorists and others
    has been appreciably lessened.
        What is needed now is effective action, not placebos like the
    Chemical Weapons Convention. The Antiterrorism Act demonstrates that
    the United States can adopt legislation addressing the threats posed by
    terrorists without being compelled to do so by international treaty.
    That and other antiterrorism statutes can and should be strengthened so
    as to impose severe criminal penalties on those who enable, help or
    execute such attacks.
        The existing, relatively verifiable international ban on use of
    chemical weapons should be given teeth. U.S. intelligence efforts aimed
    at identifying, penetrating and neutralizing groups that might be
    inclined to engage in such activities need to be intensified and given
    substantially greater resources. And a vastly increased effort should
    be made to provide protection against chemical attacks not only to the
    U.S. military but also to the American government and people.
        By contrast, a treaty that will, in all likelihood, have the effect
    of reducing investment in chemical defenses\2\ and possibly diminishing
    valuable chemical-related intelligence collection by diverting efforts
    to the inspection and other activities mandated by the CWC,\3\ may
    actually make the U.S. more susceptible--not less--to terrorists
    wielding CW. That could also be the case thanks to the treaty's
    obligation on states parties to transfer chemical manufacturing
    capabilities and defensive equipment to other member nations.\4\ Should
    this obligation be honored by the U.S. and/or its allies, it will prove
    a recipe for intensified threats emanating from terrorist-sponsoring
    countries.
        Finally, if--as virtually everyone agrees--chemical terrorism is
    likely to occur in the future, Senators would be well advised to think
    about whether they wish to be implicated by having voted for a treaty
    falsely advertised as a means to prevent such incidents, but that will
    be seen in retrospect to have done nothing on that score, and perhaps
    actually served to make them more likely.

    notes:
        \1\ See the Center's Decision Brief entitled Truth or Consequences
    #3: Clinton `Makes a Mistake About It' in Arguing the CWC Will Protect
    U.S. Troops (No. 97-D 21, 6 February 1997).
        \2\ Ibid.
        \3\ Douglas J. Feith, a leading critic of the CWC and founding
    member of the Center for Security Policy's Board of Advisors, has
    likened the Convention's intrusive inspection arrangements to those of
    a drunk looking under a streetlamp for keys lost elsewhere simply
    because the light was better there.
        \4\ See the Center's Decision Brief entitled Truth or Consequences
    #5: The CWC Will Not Be Good For Business, To Say Nothing of the
    National Interest (No. 97-D 27, 17 February 1997).

                                   __________
                                                            No. 97-D 38
                                                           6 March 1997

    Truth or Consequences #8: The CWC Will Exacerbate the Proliferation of
                         Chemical Warfare Capabilities

        (Washington, D.C.): In recent days, proponents of the Chemical
    Weapons Convention (CWC) have taken to dissembling about the clear
    meaning--and certain effect--of the treaty's Article XI. Article XI
    says, in part:
              ``... States parties shall ... undertake to facilitate, and
            have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange
            of chemicals, equipment and scientific and technical
            information relating to the development and application of
            chemistry for purposes not prohibited under this Convention;
        What is more--as noted in the attached article in the current
    edition of the New Republic by Douglas J. Feith, a former Deputy
    Assistant Secretary of Defense responsible for chemical arms control
    during the Reagan Administration and founding member of Center Board of
    Advisors--Article XI goes on to say:
              ``[States parties shall] not maintain among themselves any
            restrictions, including those in any international agreements,
            incompatible with the obligations undertaken under this
            Convention, which would restrict or impede trade and the
            development and promotion of scientific and technological
            knowledge in the field of chemistry for industrial,
            agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other
            peaceful purposes. ...
        In addition, the CWC's Article X declares that ``Every state party
    shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of
    equipment, material and scientific and technological information
    concerning means of protection against chemical weapons.''
    `Poisons for Peace'
        Any reasonable reading of this language shows that these provisions
    would require the United States (in the event it ratifies the
    Convention) to provide other states parties--including in all
    likelihood countries like Iran, Cuba, China and Russia--with state-of-
    the-art manufacturing capabilities and defensive technologies with
    direct relevance to chemical warfare activities.
        After all, advanced facilities designed to manufacture pesticides,
    fertilizers and pharmaceuticals have the inherent capacity to produce
    chemical weapons in substantial quantities. Supplying potential
    adversaries with modern chemical defensive gear could equip them to
    engage in chemical war. It could, in addition, aid in efforts to defeat
    Western protective equipment. As the Center recently reported,\1\
    General Norman Schwartzkopf recently reacted with incredulity and
    horror when advised that the CWC, which he has endorsed, would have
    such effects.
    Will the U.S. Violate the CWC?
        Remarkably, the Clinton Administration and other CWC advocates are
    now claiming that the United States will not be compelled by this
    treaty to transfer to nations like Iran and Cuba chemical technology
    that will lend itself to diversion for military purposes. Presumably,
    they think they will not have to abide by the treaty's ``obligation''
    to provide chemical defensive gear to Teheran or Havana, either. Maybe
    so. Still, it would be helpful to establish in advance--and formally
    codify in any resolution of ratification--precisely which of the CWC's
    provisions the United States will not observe. Such a step would do
    much to protect against the predictable postratification demand from
    Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and State Department lawyers to the
    effect that the United States must faithfully observe all of the
    treaty's articles and obligations.
    Even If We Don't, Who Else Will Observe Export Controls?
        As Mr. Feith observes, even if the United States does selectively
    adhere to the Convention and maintains export controls (not to say
    embargoes) against Iran and Cuba, however, ``Articles X an XI will
    invite other countries to transfer dangerous technology to them.
    Germany can be expected to invoke the treaty against any U.S. official
    who protests a planned sale of a chemical factory to, say, Iran.'' CWC
    advocates' assurances to the contrary notwithstanding, voluntary
    supplier control arrangements like the Australia Group are likely to
    fall victim to the CWC-blessed, trade uber alles appetites of such
    ``friendly'' nations.\2\
        What is more, one can safely predict that the prospect of foreign
    competitors closing such sales will cause would-be American suppliers
    to seize upon these same provisions to argue that Washington has
    neither the right nor an interest in penalizing U.S. firms. This punch
    has been telegraphed by the emphasis the frantically pro-CWC Chemical
    Manufacturers Association has placed on the opportunity the Convention
    will create for increasing exports, presumably to countries where such
    U.S. exports are not currently permitted.
    The Bottom Line
        Douglas Feith's essay in the New Republic and an op.ed. by former
    Secretaries of Defense James Schlesinger, Donald Rumsfeld and Caspar
    Weinberger which appeared in the Washington Post yesterday \3\ make one
    point crystal clear: CWC Articles X and XI are but two of the myriad
    reasons why the United States would be better off not being a party to
    this Convention.
        The Senate would be well-advised to give these arguments careful
    consideration. Indeed, it would make sense to defer action on the
    treaty's ratification until after it had been in force for some period
    so as to evaluate whether these unintended and counterproductive
    effects are as serious in practice as in prospect they would appear
    likely to be. Either way, the Senate should resist the pressure to
    rubber-stamp this accord--pressure that will only intensify as treaty
    advocates realize that time is no more on their side than are the
    merits of the case.

    notes:
        \1\ See the Center's Decision Brief entitled Gen. Schwartzkopf
    Tells Senate He Shares Critics' Concerns About Details of the Chemical
    Weapons Convention (No. 97-D 35, 27 February 1997).
        \2\ For more on German behavior unbecoming an ally, see the
    Center's Watch on the Rhine series, e.g., Watch On The Rhine: German
    Efforts To Extort The Czechs, Forge Relations With Rogue States Are
    Ominous Indicators (No. 96-C 127, 10 December 1996) and Watch On The
    Rhine #2: Germany Proceeds With Bait-And-Switch Encouraging Sudeten
    Claims And Moves To Reschedule Syrian Debt (No. 96-C 131, 19 December
    1996).
        \3\ See the Center's Decision Brief entitled Truth Or Consequences
    #7: Schlesinger, Rumsfeld And Weinberger Rebut Scowcroft And Deutch On
    The CWC (No. 97-D 37, 5 March 1997).

              Chemical Reaction: A Bad Treaty on Chemical Weapons

                             [By Douglas J. Feith]

        It would seem an indisputable good: a treaty to eliminate poison
    gas from Beijing to Buenos Aires. Yet the new Chemical Weapons
    Convention is having trouble in the Senate. And the more the treaty is
    debated, the deeper the trouble. In congressional hearings and public
    forums, even the treaty's champions have been forced to concede our
    severely limited ability to monitor compliance and enforce the ban.
        As a result, the chief pro-treaty argument is no longer that the
    CWC, as the treaty is acronymically known, will abolish chemical
    weapons--for it obviously will not--but that the CWC is better than
    nothing. Administration officials, in their standard pitch to skeptical
    senators, now stress that the treaty is on balance worthwhile, if
    flawed, and rebuke critics for measuring the treaty against an
    unrealistic standard of ``perfection.'' ``The limits imposed by the CWC
    surely are imperfect,'' former National Security Adviser Brent
    Scowcroft and former CIA Director John Deutch contended in a recent
    Washington Post op-ed, ``but ... it is hard to see how its imperfect
    constraints are worse than no constraints at all.''
        The it's-better-than-nothing argument has some potency. After all,
    no decent person wants poison gas to proliferate. Conservatives and
    liberals alike want to continue to destroy the entire U.S. chemical
    arsenal regardless of what happens to the CWC. So even a small step in
    the direction of global abolition would be valuable. But the treaty is
    not such a step. It is not better than nothing. Indeed, it would
    eliminate export controls that now impede rogue states from developing
    their chemical warfare capabilities. And, as many senators have
    discovered after examining the treaty's 186-page text, it would
    exacerbate the problem of poison gas proliferation around the world.
        Article XI, for instance, states that parties to the treaty shall:
              Not maintain among themselves any restrictions, including
            those in any international agreements, incompatible with the
            obligations undertaken under this Convention, which would
            restrict or impede trade and the development and promotion of
            scientific and technological knowledge in the field of
            chemistry for industrial, agricultural, research, medical,
            pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes.
        What this means is that the United States must not restrict
    chemical trade with any other CWC party--even Iran and Cuba, both of
    which are CWC signatories. Similarly, CWC Article X obliges countries
    to share with other parties technology relating to chemical weapons
    defense. ``Each State Party,'' the article says, ``undertakes to
    facilitate, and shall have the right to participate in, the fullest
    possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and
    technological information concerning means of protection against
    chemical weapons.''
        Once Iran and Cuba ratify the treaty, our current export controls
    against them will surely be attacked as impermissible. Furthermore,
    those countries, upon joining the CWC, will claim entitlement to the
    advanced countries' ``scientific and technological information'' on how
    to protect their armed forces against chemical weapons. A crucial
    element of an offensive chemical weapons capability is the means to
    protect one's own forces from the weapons' effects.
        Even if the U.S. government decides to maintain export controls
    against Iran and Cuba, Articles X and XI will invite other countries to
    transfer dangerous technology to them. Germany can be expected to
    invoke the treaty against any U.S. official who protests a planned sale
    of a chemical factory to, say, Iran. Indeed, Bonn could not only argue
    that its firms are allowed to sell chemical technology to Iran, but
    that they are actually obliged to do so, for Iran will have renounced
    chemical weapons by joining the CWC.

        Articles X and XI are modeled on similar provisions in the Nuclear
    Non-Proliferation Treaty, called ``atoms for peace,'' which even
    admirers acknowledge have spread the very nuclear technology the treaty
    was intended to contain. When Iran, Iraq and North Korea became
    signatories, they quickly gained access to this sensitive technology,
    ostensibly ``for peaceful purposes.'' Yet it helped these outlaw states
    to develop their nuclear weapons programs. The CWC encourages the same
    abuse. Even Scowcroft and Deutch acknowledge ``we must ensure that the
    CWC is not exploited to facilitate the diffusion of CWC specific
    technology ... even to signatory states.'' Alas, the perverse product
    of the CWC will be ``poisons for peace.''

        Without the treaty, any country that wants to destroy its chemical
    weapons can do so, as is the United States. But, for the sake of
    declaring an unenforceable ban on chemical weapons possession, the CWC
    will undermine existing export controls that are, in fact, doing some
    good. It is a stunning, though not unprecedented, example of arms
    control diplomacy resulting in the opposite of its intended effect. The
    treaty brings to mind Santayana's definition of a ``fanatic'' as
    someone who redoubles his effort upon losing sight of his goal. As this
    absurdity impresses itself upon the Senate, that body appears intent on
    rejecting the agreement, thereby sending the administration and the
    world a beneficial message: arms control treaties should make us more
    secure, not less.

        Douglas J. Feith oversaw chemical weapons arms control as Deputy
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Negotiations Policy in the Reagan
    administration.

                                   __________
                                                            No. 97-P 50

                                                          10 April 1997

      New National Poll Shows Overwhelming Public Opposition To A Flawed
                          Chemical Weapons Convention

        (Washington, D.C.): On 4-5 April 1997, the Luntz Research Companies
    conducted a national poll of 900 American adults concerning the
    controversial Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). This poll was intended
    to ensure that public sentiments about the present treaty were properly
    understood--an objective made all the more necessary by earlier canvass
    performed by the Wirthlin Group. The Wirthlin poll suggested
    overwhelming support for a treaty that ``would ban the production,
    possession, transfer and use of poison gas.''

    The Luntz Poll

        This poll--which was sponsored by the Center for Security Policy, a
    non-partisan educational organization specializing in national defense
    and foreign policy issues--asked respondents whether they would support
    the CWC if it had certain troubling characteristics and/or
    implications. The text of the questions and the responses follow
    (including a breakout of the views of the respondents who identified
    themselves as having voted Republican in the 1996 congressional
    election, since the treaty's fate will be decided by the Senate's GOP
    members): \1\

              ``President Clinton will ask the U.S. Senate to vote in the
            next few weeks for an arms control treaty called the Chemical
            Weapons Convention. It is supposed to ban the production and
            stockpiling of nerve gas and other chemical weapons worldwide.
            Let me read you two opinions about the treaty [order of
            following two paragraphs reversed in every-other question]:

              ``Treaty supporters point out that more than 160 countries
            have signed the Chemical Weapons Convention and believe it
            would create international pressure to get rid of such
            weapons--and punish those who keep them. They say that, even if
            it does not work perfectly, it will still be better than having
            no treaty at all.

              ``Treaty opponents--including four former Secretaries of
            Defense--believe there are serious problems with this treaty.
            If they are right, it will not rid the world of chemical
            weapons and may, instead, have even more undesirable effects.
            They believe that such problems could make the result of this
            Convention worse than having no treaty at all.

              ``With these views in mind, I would like to ask you whether
            you would strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose
            or strongly oppose the Chemical Weapons Convention if it did
            the following things:

    ``1. If only the United States and its allies wound up obeying it while
            other, potentially hostile countries like Russia, China, Iran,
            Iraq or North Korea keep their chemical weapons?''

                                                                          Poll Results
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                             Total Sample
                                                                                                          Republicans
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    15% Strongly support                                                       13% Strongly Support
    16% Somewhat support                                                       14% Somewhat support
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total Support 31%                                                          Total Support 27%
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    16% Somewhat oppose                                                        16% Somewhat Oppose
    44% Strongly oppose                                                        50% Strongly Oppose
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total Oppose 60%                                                           Total Oppose 66%
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    9% Other (No opinion/Don't know/Refused)
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ``2. If it would result in the transfer of technology that could help
            countries like Iran, Cuba or China increase their ability to
            fight chemical wars?''

                                                                          Poll Results
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                             Total Sample
                                                                                                          Republicans
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    9% Strongly support                                                        7% Strongly support
    10% Somewhat support                                                       10% Somewhat support
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total Support 19%                                                          Total Support 17%
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    17% Somewhat oppose                                                        14% Somewhat oppose
    53% Strongly oppose                                                        62% Strongly oppose
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total Oppose 70%                                                           Total Oppose 76%
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    11% Other (No opinion/Don't know/Refused)
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ``3. If countries that violated its prohibitions went unpunished?''

                                                                          Poll Results
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                             Total Sample
                                                                                                          Republicans
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    7% Strongly support                                                        8% Strongly support
    9% Somewhat support                                                        8% Somewhat support
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total Support 16%                                                          Total Support 16%
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    17% Somewhat oppose                                                        15% Somewhat oppose
    56% Strongly oppose                                                        61% Strongly oppose
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total Oppose 73%                                                           Total Oppose 76%
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    11% Other (No opinion/Don't know/Refused)
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ``4. If it would authorize UN inspectors to go to any site in the
            United States, potentially without legal search warrants and
            potentially risking American business or military secrets?''

                                                                          Poll Results
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                             Total Sample
                                                                                                          Republicans
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    10% Strongly support                                                       6% Strongly support
    12% Somewhat support                                                       8% Somewhat support
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total Support 22%                                                          Total Support 16%
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    19% Somewhat oppose                                                        19% Somewhat oppose
    49% Strongly oppose                                                        57% Strongly oppose
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total Oppose 68%                                                           Total Oppose 76%
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    11% Other (No opinion/Don't know/Refused)
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The CWC Does Have These Flaws
        Thanks to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee under the
    leadership of its chairman, Senator Jesse Helms, there is now little
    doubt that the Chemical Weapons Convention awaiting Senate advice and
    consent is defective in each and every one of these respects. In the
    course of hearings the Committee held this week, an array of
    unimpeachable authorities highlighted the treaty's flaws with respect
    to its ineffectiveness, its technology transfer implications, its
    unenforceability and its ominous implications for American
    constitutional rights and businesses.
        Such points were underscored by four former Secretaries of Defense
    (James Schlesinger, Donald Rumsfeld, Caspar Weinberger and Dick Cheney
    [in the form of a letter]), a former Director of the Arms Control and
    Disarmament Agency (Fred Ilke), a former UN Ambassador (Jeane
    Kirkpatrick) and two other, prominent former Defense Department
    officials (former Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle and
    former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith).
        The Center anticipates with pleasure further hearings next week by
    the Foreign Relations Committee that are expected to address in greater
    detail the business, constitutional, intelligence and military issues
    associated with the Chemical Weapons Convention. It calls upon the
    Senate Armed Services Committee and Intelligence Committees to exercise
    their respective oversight responsibilities as well before the full
    Senate is asked to address this fatally flawed treaty. Such hearings
    can only serve to inform the debate about the CWC and reinforce the
    need for it to be conducted in a rigorous and deliberate manner--not
    the artificially constrained, superficial and disinformed consideration
    the Clinton Administration would prefer from the Senate.

    notes:
        \1\ The Poll has a margin of error of plus or minus 3.3%. Subtotals
    reflect rounding of responses.
                                   __________
                                                            No. 97-D 46
                                                          27 March 1997

        Truth or Consequences #9: CWC Proponents Dissemble About Treaty
                 Arrangements Likely To Disserve U.S. Interests

        (Washington, D.C.): In recent weeks, a number of arguments have
    been advanced by proponents of the controversial Chemical Weapons
    Convention (CWC) to counter concerns expressed by the treaty's critics.
    The more important of these have been rebutted in previous papers in
    this Truth or Consequences series.\1\ Several of the advocates' other
    misrepresentations appear, by comparison, to be relatively
    insignificant at this moment. To the extent that these statements
    encourage Senators to underestimate the problems with this Convention,
    however, it is important that the facts be clearly established with
    regard to these issues, as well.
        Generically, the statements in question fall in the category of
    mechanics and other organizational aspects of the institutional
    arrangements established by the Chemical Weapons Convention. Of
    particular concern are the following points:
    `The Laugh Test'--Ha!
        In response to concerns that foreign governments might abuse the
    CWC's intrusive inspection provisions to acquire proprietary
    information from American companies, treaty advocates have claimed that
    the Convention provides a mechanism for screening out any requests for
    challenge inspections that are frivolous or abusive. Some have called
    this colloquially the ``laugh test'': They note that, as long as three-
    quarters of the Executive Council (excluding the requesting party and
    the party to be inspected) of the Organization for the Prohibition of
    Chemical Weapons (OPCW)--the new UN bureaucracy established in The
    Hague pursuant to this treaty--determine that an inspection is
    frivolous, the inspection can be foreclosed.
        In practice, though, it is hard to see how this ``laugh test'' will
    be able to protect American companies, including many that have nothing
    to do with the manufacture of chemicals--to say nothing of any
    involvement in the production of chemical weapons.\2\ After all, under
    the Chemical Weapons Convention, the following factors will be at work:
        No Timely Basis for Declaring an Inspection Frivolous: According to
    the CWC's Article IX, paragraph 17, the OPCW's Executive Council will
    have just 12 hours after receipt of an inspection request to determine
    whether it is a frivolous or abusive one. Making such a determination
    will be problematic, however, since there is no requirement at that
    juncture for the challenging state party to identify the company or
    site to be inspected.
        The nation requesting the challenge inspection is initially
    required only to identify the country in which the site is located, the
    port of entry to be used by inspectors and the nature of the concern as
    it relates to the treaty (Part X, Section B, paragraph 4). In fact, the
    challenging party does not have to name the exact site to be inspected
    until 12 hours before inspectors are to arrive at the point of entry
    (Part X, Section B, paragraph 6). This will be well after the time by
    which a ruling on frivolity must have been rendered.
        No Opportunity to Object: There will, as a practical matter, be no
    way for a country (or one of its companies) to object that an
    inspection is frivolous. Not only will they not know of the precise
    inspection request in time to appeal to the Executive Council for
    relief but--in the unlikely event that they do learn of the location to
    be inspected prior to the Executive Council's timeframe for acting--the
    party to be inspected is precluded by the treaty from participating in
    Council deliberations on the frivolousness of the request (Article X,
    paragraph 17).
        Little Chance of Prevailing in the Executive Council: Even if the
    United States had the requisite information to argue that a challenge
    inspection would be frivolous or abusive and was in a position to make
    that argument before the Executive Council, the composition of that
    body makes it unlikely that American objections would be respected by
    three-quarters of the members. In standard U.N. style, the 41 seats
    (held for 2-year terms) are apportioned regionally: 9 African nations,
    9 Asian, 7 Latin American and Caribbean, 5 Eastern European, 1 rotating
    between Asian or Latin and Caribbean nations and 10 Western European or
    ``other'' nations (the United States is an ``other'' nation for the
    purposes of the CWC).
        The United States has neither a guaranteed seat on the Council nor
    a veto. If standard U.N. practice applies, Washington will find it hard
    to muster a majority--let alone a super-majority of three-quarters of
    the membership--in support of its positions. What is more, the U.S.
    government will almost certainly be disinclined to object to
    inspections of any but the most patently sensitive government
    installations on the grounds that doing so will create precedents and
    otherwise facilitate foreign efforts to impede valid inspections.
    `No Go' on Adding Chemicals to the Schedules
        In the wake of revelations that Russia has been covertly developing
    new classes of extremely toxic chemical weapons using ingredients
    deliberately left off the CWC's Schedules of Chemicals, treaty
    proponents have claimed that such chemicals could easily be added to
    the list. Unfortunately, such statements ignore two inconvenient facts:
        Revealing Formulas for Chemical Weapons May Do More Harm than Good:
    In the event the United States learns the composition of a novel
    chemical agent--such as the Russian A-232 nerve agent--it is highly
    unlikely that the U.S. would seek to add these chemicals (or their
    precursors) to the Annex on Chemicals. After all, adding these
    compounds to the Annex means making public the chemical structure of
    the agent, thereby undermining efforts to limit the spread of chemical
    weapons expertise and knowledge, especially to rogue states. Since U.S.
    intelligence has low confidence in its ability under the CWC to detect
    illicit Novichok-related activities in Russia (assuming Russia
    ultimately decides to ratify the treaty) the costs of adding A-232 to
    the Annex on Chemicals--measured in terms of abetting chemical weapons
    proliferation--far outweigh any potential benefits.
        Impediments to Adding Chemicals to the CWC's Schedules: Even if the
    United States should wish to add an agent or precursor to the Chemical
    Weapons Convention's schedule, the process is not the simple
    undertaking that proponents have led the public to believe. To the
    contrary, it is a long and complicated one.
        For one thing, modifications to the Annex on Chemicals are not
    treated as formal ``amendments'' to the Convention. ``Changes'' to the
    Annex on Chemicals, including additions of new chemicals to the
    schedules, are treated as administrative or technical in nature.
    Consequently, special provisions and procedures apply (Article XV,
    paragraph 4): Any state party may propose a change to the Annex on
    Chemicals. The proposal is then sent to the Director-General, who
    forwards it to states parties and the Executive Council (Article XV,
    paragraph 5(a)).
        Within 90 days of receipt, the Executive Council makes a
    recommendation to states parties on whether to accept or reject the
    proposal. The decision requires a simple majority of the Executive
    Council (Article XV, paragraph 5(c)). If the Council recommends that
    the proposal be adopted, it shall be considered approved unless a state
    party objects within 90 days, and the changes will enter into force 180
    days after formal notification of its acceptance by State Parties
    (Article XV, paragraph 5(d) & (g)). If a state party objects, a
    decision on the proposal will be taken as ``a matter of substance'' by
    the Conference of State Parties at its next session (Article XV,
    paragraph 5(c)).
        Conferences are only held on an annual basis, however. Even then,
    as the treaty puts it, decisions taken in such Conferences on ``matters
    of substance should be taken as far as possible by consensus.'' If
    consensus is not possible, the Conference shall take a decision by a
    two-thirds majority of members present and voting (Article VIII,
    paragraph 18). Currently, this would entail garnering the support of 51
    out of 70 state parties to the Convention.
        To make this process less abstract, assume that the U.S. government
    (a) knows the composition of a new chemical weapons agent (or
    precursor) and (b) has reached inter-agency agreement to seek inclusion
    of the compounds in the Annex on Chemicals--possibly over the objection
    of the Chemical Manufacturers Association. The following is a scenario
    describing what would be entailed in effecting such a change:
       C-Day: The United States proposes the change to the OPCW's
            Director-General;
       C + 3 months: The Executive Council recommends acceptance of
            the U.S. proposal;
       C + 6 months: Russia, for example, objects.
       C + 6-to-18 months: An annual Conference is held to address,
            among other things, the proposed change. The United States
            musters the two-thirds votes necessary.
       C + 12-to-24 months: Change becomes effective--up to 2 years
            after the initial request.
       Alternatively, if the United States cannot enlist two-thirds
            of the states parties, the change will not be adopted.
        It is important to note that, even if the CWC's proponents were
    correct in their representations that it will be easy to add chemicals
    to the treaty's Schedules, it is not clear that U.S. interests would be
    served by that arrangement, either. After all, addition of chemicals to
    Schedules 1 or 2, or relocation from Schedule 3 to Schedule 2 over
    Washington's objections could impinge significantly on the reporting
    and inspection burden imposed on U.S. companies and on American
    chemical export opportunities. In theory at least, changes in the
    Schedules could broaden the treaty's scope so as to cover hundreds,
    possibly thousands, of additional companies. The Senate would have no
    say over such changes--even if they were to have the effect of
    significantly altering the CWC's costs.
    House of Cards
        The Chemical Weapons Convention requires states parties to declare
    whether they have chemical weapons and where they were produced within
    30 days after the treaty enters into force. Since the preponderance of
    the CWC's reporting, regulatory and inspection arrangements hinge on
    voluntary declarations, unwillingness of parties to provide full and
    accurate reports of their capabilities will significantly diminish even
    the putative value of this Convention.
        Of the countries that have so far ratified the Chemical Weapons
    Convention, not one has publicly affirmed that it has chemical weapons.
    While they will not be obliged to make a formal declaration until May
    29th, the fact that not even India--which is widely believed to have
    chemical warfare capabilities--has intimated that it is a CW state
    bodes ill for the candidness of future disclosures. What is more, there
    is no reason to believe that China, Iran, Pakistan or other states
    judged to have active chemical warfare programs will acknowledge that
    reality. Even Russia, which has, under the now moribund U.S.-Russian
    Bilateral Destruction Agreement, affirmed that it is a chemical weapons
    state, has consistently understated and otherwise misrepresented the
    nature and size of its chemical arsenal.
        It will only be possible to calibrate the gravity of this problem
    thirty-days after entry into force (or after countries like Russia,
    China and Iran) deposit their instruments of ratification. The United
    States would be well-advised to wait until that point to become a state
    party.
    The Bottom Line
        While these issues may appear relatively minor compared with the
    Chemical Weapons Convention's other major defects--notably, the United
    States' inability to monitor compliance with the treaty with even
    moderate confidence; its prospective costs in terms of Americans'
    constitutional rights and their businesses' proprietary information;
    and the danger that the CWC's Articles X and XI will actually
    exacerbate the chemical warfare threat while the treaty's placebo
    effect diminishes U.S. preparedness to deal with that threat. Still,
    the truth about these ``mechanical'' aspects of the treaty once again
    belie assurances provided by the CWC's proponents and further compound
    the down-sides associated with U.S. ratification of the present
    Convention.

    notes:
        \1\ To obtain copies of these papers, please check the Center's
    Website (http://www.security-policy.org) or contact the Center at 202-
    466-0515.
        \2\ See Truth or Consequences #5: The CWC Will Not Be Good for
    Business--To Say Nothing of the National Interest (No. 97-D 27, 17
    February 1997) for more information about the number and kinds of
    companies likely to fall under the purview of the CWC's reporting,
    regulatory and inspection regime.
                                   __________
                                                            No. 97-P 40
                                                          17 March 1997

    The Weekly Standard Weighs in on the CWC: `Just Say No to a Bad Treaty'

        (Washington, D.C.): According to the Washington Post, the debate
    over the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) has become one ``between
    conservatives.'' A variation on this theme is the claim that it is a
    debate ``between internationalists and isolationists''--read, ``good''
    conservatives who appreciate the importance of American power and
    leadership in the world and ``bad'' conservatives who believe the
    United States can safely walk away from international affairs and
    responsibilities.
        Fortunately, the fraudulent nature of such characterizations is
    revealed in the attached editorial which leads the current issue of one
    of American conservatism's most influential periodicals--The Weekly
    Standard. As the Standard puts it:
              ``What we really have here is the continuation of one of this
            century's most enduring disputes. In the first camp are the
            high priests of arms control theology, who have never met an
            international agreement they didn't like. In the second camp
            are those who take a more skeptical view of relying on a piece
            of watermarked, signed parchment for safety in a dangerous
            world. The case for ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention
            is a triumph of hope over experience.''
        The magazine goes on to describe the debate over the CWC as one
    essentially between those who subscribe to ``Reaganite
    internationalism'' on the one hand and ``the more starry-eyed Wilsonian
    version'' on the other--a difference it says is rooted in the principle
    that ``treaties must reflect reality, not hope.'' Perhaps even more
    important is its practical guidance to conservatives who would prefer
    to be in the former camp rather than the latter:
              ``In the Reagan years, the treaty was mostly a sop to
            liberals in Congress, an attempt to pick up some points for an
            arms control measure at a time when Reagan was trying to win on
            more important issues like the defense buildup and the
            Strategic Defense Initiative. And President Bush pushed the
            treaty in no small part because he had disliked having to cast
            a tie-breaking vote in the Senate as Vice President in favor of
            building chemical weapons. Republicans today are under no
            obligation to carry out the mistakes of their predecessors.
              ``In one respect, the debate over the Chemical Weapons
            Convention calls to mind the struggle for the party's soul
            waged in the 1970's between Kissingerian detente-niks on one
            side and the insurgent forces led by Ronald Reagan on the
            other. Back then, conservative Republicans like Senate Majority
            Leader Trent Lott knew without hesitation where they stood.
            They should stand where they stood before, foursquare with the
            ideas that helped win the cold war, and against the Chemical
            Weapons Convention.'' (Emphasis added.)

                          Just Say No To A Bad Treaty

        The Weekly Standard/March 24, 1997.--The United States Senate must
    decide by April 28 whether to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention.
    The press, the pundits, and the Clinton administration have treated the
    debate over the treaty as another in a series of battles between
    ``internationalists'' and ``isolationists'' in the new, post-Cold War
    era.
        It isn't. What we really have here is the continuation of one of
    this century's most enduring disputes. In the first camp are the high
    priests of arms control theology, who have never met an international
    agreement they didn't like. In the second camp are those who take a
    more skeptical view of relying on a piece of watermarked, signed
    parchment for safety in a dangerous world.
        The case for ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention is a triumph
    of hope over experience. It is an attempt to reform the world by
    collecting signatures. Some of the most dangerous nations--Iraq, Syria,
    Libya, and North Korea--have not ratified the convention and, for all
    we know, never will. Some of the nations that are signatories, like
    Russia, China, Iran, and Cuba, are manifestly unreliable and are
    already looking for ways to circumvent the convention's provisions.
        The convention's most prominent American defenders admit that the
    agreement is probably not verifiable. And it isn't. Chemical weapons
    can be produced in small but deadly amounts in tiny makeshift
    laboratories. The nerve gas used by terrorists to poison subway riders
    in Japan in 1995, for instance, was produced in a 14 ft.-by-8 ft. room.
    No one in the American intelligence community believes we would be able
    to monitor compliance with an international chemical weapons regime
    with any reasonable degree of confidence.
         The Washington Post opines that these failings in the convention--
    the very fact ``that the coverage of this treaty falls short and that
    enforcement is uncertain''--are actually arguments for ratifying it.
    Presumably, signature of a flawed treaty will make all of us work
    harder to perfect it.
         Great.
         At the end of the day, the strongest argument proponents of
    ratification can offer is that, whatever a treaty's manifest flaws, it
    is better to have one than not to have one. How could it be bad to have
    a treaty outlawing production of chemical weapons, no matter how full
    of holes it may be?
         Well, actually, such a treaty could be worse than no treaty at
    all. We have pretty good evidence from the bloody history of this
    century that treaties like the Chemical Weapons Convention--treaties
    that are more hortatory than mandatory, that express good intentions
    more than they require any actions to back up those intentions can do
    more harm than good. They are part of a psychological process of
    evasion and avoidance of tough choices. The truth is, the best way of
    controlling chemical weapons proliferation could be for the United
    States to bomb a Libyan chemical weapons factory.
         But that is the kind of difficult decision for an American
    president that the Chemical Weapons Convention does nothing to
    facilitate. Indeed, the existence of a chemical weapons treaty would
    make it less likely that a president would order such strong unilateral
    action, since he would be bound to turn over evidence of a violation to
    the international lawyers and diplomats and wait for their
    investigation and con-
    currence. And as Richard Perle has recently noted, even after Saddam
    Hussein used chemical weapons in flagrant violation of an existing
    prohibition against their use, the international bureaucrats
    responsible for monitoring these matters could not bring themselves to
    denounce Iraq by name. In the end, it would be easier for a president
    to order an airstrike than to get scores of nations to agree on naming
    one of their own an outlaw.
         The Chemical Weapons Convention is what Peter Rodman calls ``junk
    arms control,'' and not the least of its many drawbacks is that it
    gives effective arms control a bad name. Effective treaties codify
    decisions nations have already made: to end a war on certain terms, for
    instance, or to define fishing rights. Because they reflect the will of
    the parties, moreover, the parties themselves don't raise obstacles to
    verification.
         But treaties whose purpose is to rope in rogue nations that have
    not consented, or whose consent is widely understood to be cynical and
    disingenuous, are something else again. They are based on a worldview
    that is at best foolishly optimistic and at worst patronizing and
    deluded.
         One of the important things separating Reaganite internationalism
    from the more starry-eyed Wilsonian version is the understanding that
    treaties must reflect reality, not hope. The Chemical Weapons
    Convention turns the clock back to the kind of Wilsonian thinking
    characteristic of the Carter administration. It is unfortunate that
    among its strongest backers are some prominent Republicans who have
    served in key foreign-policy positions. It is true that the origins of
    the Chemical Weapons Convention date back to the Reagan years, and the
    convention was carried to fruition by the Bush administration. But
    let's be candid. In the Reagan years, the treaty was mostly a sop to
    liberals in Congress, an attempt to pick up some points for an arms
    control measure at a time when Reagan was trying to win on more
    important issues like the defense buildup and the Strategic Defense
    Initiative. And President Bush pushed the treaty in no small part
    because he had disliked having to cast a tiebreaking vote in the Senate
    as vice president in favor of building chemical weapons. Republicans
    today are under no obligation to carry out the mistakes of their
    predecessors.
        In one respect, the debate over the Chemical Weapons Convention
    calls to mind the struggle for the party's soul waged in the 1970s
    between Kissingerian detente-niks on one side and the insurgent forces
    led by Ronald Reagan on the other. Back then, conservative Republicans
    like Senate majority leader Trent Lott knew without hesitation where
    they stood. They should stand where they stood before, foursquare with
    the ideas that helped win the Cold War, and against the Chemical
    Weapons Convention.
                                   __________
                                                            No. 97-D 24
                                                       10 February 1997

     Truth or Consequences #4: No D.N.A. Tests Needed To Show That Claims
                About Republican Paternity Of CWC Are Overblown

        (Washington, D.C.): The Clinton Administration's hole card in its
    bid to persuade a Republican-controlled Senate to agree to ratification
    of the controversial Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) appears to be
    the contention that the fathers of this treaty are Presidents Ronald
    Reagan and George Bush. The most recent and visible manifestation of
    this gambit was Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's visit to Mr.
    Bush in Texas last Saturday to secure a public statement of his support
    for the CWC.
        The Administration's reasoning seems to be that Republican Senators
    will be willing to disregard myriad, serious concerns about the
    substance of this accord and vote for it simply because two Presidents
    of their party were involved in its negotiation. This tactic may be
    explained by the fact that any arms control for which Mr. Clinton is
    seen as principally responsible will be viewed with skepticism by more
    than a third of the Senate--a number sufficient under the Constitution
    to defeat treaties.\1\ Still, the idea that demonstrating Republican
    paternity for a flawed agreement will be sufficient to secure its
    ratification suggests a low regard for GOP Senators and their sense of
    responsibility when it comes to the Senate's constitutional role as
    equal partner with the executive in treaty-making.
    Not So Fast--This is Not Ronald Reagan's Treaty
        This proposition is even more extraordinary since the degree of
    Republican responsibility for the treaty as it now stands is, in
    important ways, less than the Clinton Administration would have
    Senators believe.
        For example, in Sunday's New York Times, a letter signed by a
    number of senior Reagan Administration officials takes strong exception
    to the suggestion that the President they served is implicated in the
    agreement ultimately signed in January 1993. The signatories are the
    following distinguished former office-holders: Secretary of Defense
    Caspar Weinberger, U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, Arms Control and
    Disarmament Agency Director Eugene Rostow, Under Secretary of Defense
    Fred Ikle, Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle and Deputy
    Assistant Secretaries of Defense Douglas Feith and Frank Gaffney.
        This joint letter notes, in part:
              ``It is a distortion of recent history for supporters of the
            controversial new Chemical Weapons Convention to describe it as
            a product of the Reagan Administration, implying that the
            treaty has Ronald Reagan's imprimatur.
              ``The Convention now being debated in the Senate is a very
            different document from the chemical weapons ban the Reagan
            Administration was negotiating. The principal difference is
            that the Chemical Weapons Convention is hopelessly
            unenforceable. Cynical signatories like Iran, China, Russia and
            Cuba know that they could ratify it, make and store nerve gas
            in violation of it, almost certainly escape detection and
            certainly escape serious penalty.
              ``The Clinton Administration has recently told Senate leaders
            in considerable detail that it has no intention of imposing
            meaningful punishment on treaty violators. It has also admitted
            that American intelligence cannot certify confidence in our
            ability to detect illegal production and stockpiling of
            chemical weapons in secretive countries, even in militarily
            significant quantities.
              ``We know that the Chemical Weapons Convention, in its
            current form, would never have been accepted as consistent with
            President Reagan's policies. President Reagan was clearsighted
            and principled in his opposition to arms control treaties that
            could be violated with impunity.'' (Emphasis added.)
    Changed Circumstances Have Significantly Altered President Bush's
            Treaty
        What is more, there have been significant changes in a number of
    the assumptions, conditions and circumstances that underpinned the Bush
    Administration's judgment that the Chemical Weapons Convention was in
    the national interest. These changes have prompted several top Bush
    Administration officials--including Secretary of Defense Richard
    Cheney, Air Force Chief of Staff Merrill McPeak, Assistant Arms Control
    and Disarmament Agency Director Kathleen Bailey, Assistant to the
    Secretary for Atomic Energy Robert Barker and Principal Deputy
    Assistant Secretary of Defense J.D. Crouch--to urge that the present
    treaty be rejected by the Senate.\2\
        An illustrative sample of the changes that have materially altered
    the acceptability, if not strictly speaking the terms, of the Chemical
    Weapons Convention include the following:
       Item: Russia's Evisceration of the Bilateral Destruction
            Agreement
        The Bush Administration anticipated that a Bilateral Destruction
    Agreement (BDA) forged by Secretary of State James Baker and his Soviet
    counterpart, Eduard Shevardnadze in 1990, would critically underpin the
    Chemical Weapons Convention. As the Center for Security Policy observed
    last week,\3\ this agreement obliged Moscow to provide a full and
    accurate accounting and eliminate most of its vast chemical arsenal.
    The BDA was also expected to afford the U.S. inspection rights that
    would significantly enhance the more limited arrangements provided for
    by the CWC.
        These assumptions about the BDA have, regrettably, not been
    fulfilled. To the contrary, Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin
    declared last year that the Bilateral Destruction Agreement has
    ``outlived its usefulness'' for Russia. What is more, it is now public
    knowledge that Russia is continuing to produce extremely lethal binary
    munitions--weapons that have been specifically designed to circumvent
    the limits and defeat the inspection regime of the Chemical Weapons
    Convention. \4\
       Item: On-Site Inspections Won't Prevent Cheating
        When the Bush Administration finalized the CWC, there was
    considerable hope that intrusive on-site inspections would meaningfully
    contribute to the detection and proof of violations, and therefore to
    deterring them. Five years of experience with the U.N. inspections in
    Iraq--inspections that were allowed to be far more thorough, timely and
    intrusive than those permitted under this Convention--have established
    that totalitarian rulers of a closed society can successfully defeat
    such monitoring efforts.
        In a 4 February 1997 letter to National Security Advisor Samuel
    Berger, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms noted
    that:
              ``Unclassified portions of the National Intelligence Estimate
            on U.S. Monitoring Capabilities [prepared after Mr. Bush left
            office] indicate that it is unlikely that the U.S. will be able
            to detect or address violations in a timely fashion, if at all,
            when they occur on a small scale. And yet, even small-scale
            diversions of chemicals to chemical weapons production are
            capable, over time, of yielding a stockpile far in excess of a
            single ton, [which General Shalikashvili described in
            congressional testimony on 11 August 1994 as a level which
            could, `in certain limited circumstances ... have a military
            impact.'] Moreover, few countries, if any, are engaging in much
            more than small-scale production of chemical agent. For
            example, according to [the 4 February 1997] Washington Times,
            Russia may produce its new nerve agents at a `pilot plant' in
            quantities of only `55 to 110 tons annually.' ''
       Item: Facilitating Proliferation: `Poisons for Peace'
        In the years since the Bush Administration signed the Chemical
    Weapons Convention, it has become increasingly clear that sharing
    nuclear weapons-relevant technology simply with would-be proliferators
    simply because they promise not to pursue nuclear weapons programs is
    folly. Indeed, countries like North Korea, Iran, Iraq, India, Pakistan,
    Argentina, Brazil and Algeria have abused this ``Atoms for Peace''
    bargain by diverting equipment and know-how provided under the Nuclear
    NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) to prohibited weapons purposes.
        Unfortunately, commercial chemical manufacturing technology can, if
    anything, be diverted even more easily to weapons purposes than can
    nuclear research and power reactors. For this reason, recent experience
    with the NPT suggests that the Chemical Weapons Convention's Article
    XI--an article dubbed the ``Poisons for Peace'' provision--is
    insupportable. It stipulates that the Parties shall:
              ``Not maintain among themselves any restrictions, including
            those in any international agreements, incompatible with the
            obligations undertaken under this Convention, which would
            restrict or impede trade and the development and promotion of
            scientific and technological knowledge in the field of
            chemistry for industrial, agricultural, research, medical,
            pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes.''
        Such an obligation must now be judged a recipe for accelerating
    proliferation of chemical weapons, not restricting it. Even if the
    United States were to become a party to the CWC and choose to ignore
    this treaty commitment, other advanced industrialized countries will
    certainly not refrain from selling dual-use chemical manufacturing
    technology if it means making a lucrative sale.
       Item: U.S. Chemical Defenses Will be Degraded
        When the Bush Administration signed the CWC, proponents offered
    assurances that the treaty would not diminish U.S. investment in
    chemical defenses. Such assurances were called into question, however,
    by an initiative unveiled in 1995 by the then-Vice Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William Owens. He suggested cutting $805
    million from counter-proliferation support and chemical and biological
    defense programs through Fiscal Year 2001. The rationale: Thanks to a
    perceived reduction in the chemical warfare threat to be brought about
    by the CWC, investments in countering that threat could safely enjoy
    lower priority.
        This reduction would have deferred, if not seriously disrupted,
    important chemical and biological research and development efforts, and
    delayed the procurement of proven technologies. While the Owens
    initiative was ultimately defeated, it is a foretaste of the sort of
    reduced budgetary priority this account will surely face if the CWC is
    approved.
        Changes in the military postures of key U.S. allies since the end
    of the Bush Administration raise a related point: Even if the United
    States manages to resist the sirens' song to reduce chemical defenses
    in the wake of the CWC, it is predictable that the already generally
    deplorable readiness of most allied forces to deal with chemical
    threats will only worsen. To the extent that the U.S. is obliged in the
    future to fight coalition wars, this vulnerability could prove
    catastrophic to American forces engaged with a common enemy.
       Item: Clinton Repudiates Bush Commitment to the JCS on
            R.C.A.s
        At the insistence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1992, President
    Bush signed an executive order that explicitly allowed Riot Control
    Agents (for example, tear gas) to be used in rescuing downed aircrews
    and in dispersing hostile forces using civilians to screen their
    movements against U.S. positions. The Clinton Administration has stated
    its intention to rescind this executive order once the CWC is ratified.
    The result could be to compel U.S. personnel to choose between using
    lethal force where RCAs would suffice or suffering otherwise avoidable
    casualties.
        Worse yet, the Clinton reversal of the Bush Administration position
    on RCAs may mean that promising new defense technologies--involving
    chemical-based, non-lethal weapons (for example, immobilizing agents)--
    may be restricted or prohibited by this Convention. If so, U.S. forces
    may be denied highly effective means of prevailing in future conflicts
    with minimal loss of life on either side.
    The Bottom Line
        The foregoing considerations make clear that Senators should
    consider the Chemical Weapons Convention carefully on its merits. They
    should, in particular, resist the Clinton Administration's pressure to
    ignore this treaty's flaws out of some sense of duty to earlier
    administrations. A treaty that has little in common with Ronald
    Reagan's approach to arms control and that has undergone material
    changes in circumstances since George Bush's presidency must be seen
    for what it is: a defective agreement that is unworthy of the
    intensive--and increasingly misleading--campaign being mounted for its
    ratification by the current resident of the White House and his team.

    notes:
        \1\ Presumably, it is for this reason, that the administration has
    strenuously resisted demands that major changes it has been negotiating
    to the Conventional Forces in Europe and Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
    be submitted for the Senate's advice and consent.
        \2\ See the Center's Transition Brief entitled Here We Go Again:
    Clinton Presses Anew For Senate Approval of Flawed, Unverifiable,
    Ineffective Chemical Weapons Treaty (No. 97-T 5, 8 January 1997).
        \3\ See the Center's Decision Brief entitled Truth or Consequences
    #3: Clinton `Makes a Mistake About It' in Arguing the CWC Will Protect
    U.S. Troops (No. 97-D 21, 6 February 1997).
        \4\ See the Center's Decision Brief entitled Russia's Covert
    Chemical Weapons Program Vindicates Jesse Helms' Continuing Opposition
    to Phony CW Arms Control (No. 97-D 19, 4 February 1997).

                                   __________
     Remarks by President Bill Clinton and Others at White House, April 4,
                     1997 Chemical Weapons Convention Event

      Also Speaking: Vice President Al Gore, Secretary of State Madeleine
    Albright, Secretary of Defense William Cohen, Former Secretary of State
            James Baker, Former Senator Nancy Kassebaum Baker (R-KS)

        Vice President Gore. Please. Be seated, ladies and gentlemen.
        On behalf of the President it is my pleasure to welcome all of you
    on this beautiful spring day to the White House.
        I'm very pleased to be here this morning with a most distinguished
    group of Americans joining the President here today: the Secretary of
    State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of
    Commerce, our U.N. Ambassador, other members of the Cabinet and the
    administration; leaders from the legislative branch, Senators Biden and
    Levin and others; former government officials and current ones,
    Democrats and Republicans; wise patriots like General Colin Powell and
    former Secretary of State Jim Baker; Paul Nitze, other strategists; Ed
    Rowny; leaders in our strategic thinking in America over the years;
    former Senators Warren Rudman and Nancy Kassebaum Baker and David
    Boren; General John Shalikashvili and other military leaders; and, I'm
    sure, a bunch of others that I may have accidentally overlooked, but
    this is quite a distinguished bipartisan gathering--Dick Holbrooke, the
    negotiator of the Bosnia accord, and quite a few others.
        You look at this group, and you go down the list, and you see
    individuals--men and women in different political parties, different
    points on the ideological spectrum--and you think immediately of dozens
    of important issues that have faced America where these individuals
    have argued with one another and been on different sides, passionately.
        But on this issue, every single one of them is in agreement
    because, looking at this from whatever point of view you want to look
    at it, these individuals have concluded this is very definitely in the
    best interest of the United States of America. The time has come to
    ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention.
        From the killing fields of the Ardennes in World War I to those of
    Halabja in Iraq, to Tokyo's subways and beyond, over all that distance,
    chemical weapons have traced an insidious path of unspeakable horror
    through our century. It's been a long time since World War I. Allow me
    to say that the oral history of my own family teaches lessons about
    what happened there. My father's older brother went from the hills of
    middle Tennessee as a teenager to join the Army and served with our
    troops in World War I in Europe. He came home a broken man because he
    had been a victim of poison gas. He lived for a long time--coughing,
    wheezing, limited in his ability to move around. He had one lung
    removed and part of another. And his life--he made a lot of his life,
    but it was very nearly ruined by that experience.
        So many millions of families around the world came into personal
    contact with the horrors of poison gas in World War I that the world
    arrived at a rare moral consensus that chemical weapons ought to be
    forever banned. And it lasted for a while, but then that consensus
    started to erode. And when some started using these terrible weapons
    again, as is always the case when memories had faded, the world said,
    ``Now, wait a minute, how should we react to that?'' Those who focused
    on it clearly spoke up and said, ``We've got to react strongly, this is
    awful, this should be condemned.'' Others were busy with other things,
    and it's a natural process.
        But now the world has focused again. The time has come to
    reestablish that moral consensus. And as always, the world looks to the
    United States of America for leadership, and we provided leadership,
    starting in former President Reagan's administration when this was
    begun. And then it was concluded in the negotiating phase in former
    President Bush's administration. And now, in President Clinton's
    administration, the cup passes to the Congress.
        But our whole country has a chance to say to the Congress: Do the
    right thing. Now is the moment, because now, on the cusp of a new
    century, we can join in common cause to end this scourge. As we've done
    with pride and conviction so many times this past century, we can once
    again here in the United States lead the international community on a
    new path toward safety and security. This is an opportunity to help
    ensure that the 20th century is the first and last century in which our
    soldiers and our citizens will live under the dangerous clouds of the
    threat posed by chemical weapons. This is our chance to act in a manner
    befitting a strong nation and a wise people, so that we can say
    confidently to future generations that here in our time, we came
    together across party lines, and we did everything we could to control
    these weapons of mass and inhumane destruction. On this we must be
    clear, bold, and united.
        Now it is my pleasure to introduce the individual in the
    President's Cabinet who is leading the charge on behalf of the
    President to seek confirmation of this important agreement: our
    Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright.
        Secretary Albright. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice President.
        The presence of so many distinguished backers of the treaty here
    today demonstrates support that is broad, bipartisan, and growing.
        There are some people who say the treaty is flawed because we
    cannot assume early ratification and full compliance by outlaw states.
    This is like saying that we should not pass a law against drug
    smuggling, because we cannot assume full compliance by drug
    traffickers. We cannot allow the rules of the international system to
    be set by the enemies of the international system.
        As Secretary of State and as an American, I'm also concerned about
    our leadership in the fight to stop the spread of weapons of mass
    destruction. If the Senate were to reject the CWC, we would be isolated
    from our allies and on the same side as countries such as Libya and
    Iraq. The problem countries will never accept a prohibition on chemical
    weapons if America stays out and keeps them company and gives them
    cover. We will not have the standing to mobilize our allies to support
    strong action against violators if we ourselves refuse to join the
    treaty being violated.
        The time for Senate action is now. The treaty has been pending in
    the Senate for 180 weeks.
        It's been the subject of more than a dozen hearings and hours of
    briefings. And we have supplied more than 1,500 pages of testimony,
    reports, correspondence and answers for the record concerning it.
        In summary, this treaty is a test of our ability to follow through
    on commitments. It reflects existing American practices, and advances
    enduring American interests. It is right and smart for America, and it
    deserves the Senate's timely support.
        Thank you. (Applause.)
        Secretary Cohen. Thank you very much, Secretary Albright. As we
    have all seen, you continue to throw the ball straight and hard and
    right down the middle. (Laughter.)
        Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, I believe, is
    indeed a critical test of American leadership, but as Secretary of
    Defense, I want to urge the Senate to ratify the treaty for another
    important reason. Quite simply, this treaty is critical to the safety
    of our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines. The Chemical Weapons
    Convention is needed to protect and defend the men and women in uniform
    who protect and defend our country. We live in a world today in which
    we find regional aggressors, third-rate armies, terrorist groups and
    religious cults who may view lethal chemical agents as the cheapest and
    most effective weapon against American troops in the field. Our troops,
    in fact, may be in greater risk of a chemical attack today than in the
    past. Because America's forces are the world's most powerful,
    adversaries are more likely to try to challenge us asymmetrically
    through the use of nonconventional means such as chemical weapons.
        So, to protect against this threat, we've developed an array of
    tools, ranging from protective suits to theater missile defenses. By
    limiting the chemical weapons threat, the CWC strengthens these tools
    and our ability to protect our troops and our nation from chemical
    attack. And that's why our military leaders who stand before us stand
    firmly behind America's ratification of this treaty. They understand
    that we can far better protect our nation working to abolish chemical
    weapons from the world rather than stockpiling and threatening to use
    them. They believe, as I believe that ratification of the CWC is
    critical to America's security. And I am pleased to introduce someone
    who has played a major role in negotiating this vital treaty, former
    Secretary of State Jim Baker. (Applause.)
        Mr. Baker. Mr. President, Mr. Vice President, distinguished guests,
    ladies and gentlemen: As we've heard, the Chemical Weapons Convention
    was negotiated under Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush.
        The argument that some have used against ratification of the CWC is
    that it would somehow undermine our national security. Frankly, the
    suggestion that George Bush and Ronald Reagan would negotiate a treaty
    detrimental to this nation's security is outrageous.
        Ratification of the CWC is at its core really a test of American
    leadership. If we fail to ratify this treaty, we will forego the
    influence we would otherwise have had in the continuing international
    effort against chemical weapons. If we fail to ratify this treaty, we
    will postpone indefinitely any progress on a ban against the equally
    dire threat of biological weapons. And if we fail to ratify, we will
    also isolate ourselves from our friends in the international arena, and
    we will, as the Secretary of State has just told you, throw in our lot
    with the rogue states which oppose this treaty.
        But most importantly of all, my friends, if we fail to ratify the
    CWC, we will be sending a clear signal of retreat from international
    leadership, both to our allies and to our enemies alike. This is a
    message we should never, never send. Instead, we should send another
    message; we should send a message that the United States of America is
    a nation aware of our international responsibilities and a nation
    confident enough to assume them. In a word, we should send a message
    that America is prepared to continue to lead. And that is why all of us
    are here--Republicans and Democrats alike. And that is why the Senate
    should immediately ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention.
        Now its my distinct privilege to introduce to you my kissin'
    cousin, the former Senator from Kansas, Nancy Kassebaum Baker.
    (Laughter, applause.)
        Ms. Baker. Thank you. Mr. President, Mr. Vice President, and to
    distinguished friends who are gathered here today, many of whom played
    a key and important role over the years in the negotiations and debates
    regarding the Chemical Weapons treaty, I'm sure that I would be
    expressing on the part of most of the American people a deep sense of
    appreciation and gratitude for your dedication which has brought us to
    this point today.
        As a former member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for 16
    years who strongly supported President Reagan's efforts to negotiate
    this treaty, President Bush's efforts to complete it, and President
    Clinton's efforts to ratify it, I can attest to the strong bipartisan
    support for this convention over the years.
        Our success in meeting the challenge of stopping the spread of
    chemical weapons will depend on our vigilance. No treaty can have
    perfect verification. No treaty will be 100 percent successful in
    eliminating a threat. But if we hold out for perfection, we will
    squander the opportunity, as has been said by all the speakers, to join
    with a growing number of nations to deal now with this serious
    challenge to our security.
        Over the 4 years that the convention has been before the Senate,
    valid concerns have been raised. There have been 13 hearings to date,
    many questions answered, and numerous reports written. While to a
    foreign observer our internal debate may seem confusing, it is in fact
    the essential ingredient to forging a consensus. Our democratic
    traditions provide the foundation on which U.S. Leadership is built.
        I must commend President Clinton and Senate Majority Leader Trent
    Lott for the intense and productive negotiations which have been
    undertaken to this date to address the concerns that have been raised.
    I'm confident that these efforts will lead to a successful ratification
    of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and continued U.S. Leadership on
    this issue.
        As David Boren, Brent Scowcroft, and myself recently wrote the
    President, and I quote, ``We believe that the real issue at stake is
    American leadership, not only on this critical issue of chemical
    weapons proliferation, but also with ramifications far broader--on a
    far broader array of issues which directly affect our interests.
        It is for these reasons that we urge you, Mr. President, not to
    waiver in your efforts to win ratification in the U.S. Senate.''
        It's now my honor to introduce a colleague who came at the same
    time as I did to the U.S. Senate, in 1978. We've worked together on
    many issues. He now is the president of Oklahoma University. But his
    leadership over the years in the U.S. Senate has been central to our
    efforts to forge bipartisan consensus on such important issues as the
    one before us today. David Boren.
        Mr. Boren (Former U.S. Senator (D-OK)). Thank you very much,
    Senator Kassebaum Baker, and it's a privilege to have another
    opportunity to work with you on an important bipartisan cause for our
    country.
        During the 6 years that I chaired the U.S. Senate Intelligence
    Committee, time and time again our intelligence experts came before our
    committee to warn us that the greatest threat to our national security
    and to the next generation is the spread of weapons of mass
    destruction, including chemical weapons. This threat is intensified as
    these weapons become available to some of the least responsible nations
    in the world and to the terrorist groups which they shelter.
        The decision we must soon make about the ratification of the
    Chemical Weapons Convention is one of those decisions on which history
    will judge us, and I am proud to stand with those gathered today to
    urge its ratification.
        At the end of World War II, America faced a new world situation
    with the beginning of the cold war. We provided as a nation the crucial
    leadership through NATO, the Marshall Plan and other measures which
    helped make this world a safer place for decades. Now, almost exactly
    50 years later, with the end of the cold war, we once again face a
    totally new world situation, with growing fragmentation and the spread
    of dangerous weapons to rogue states. American leaders in the 1940's
    met the test of history. Members of the U.S. Senate in the 1990's must
    not fail it.
        Congress, as has been said, has had 13 major hearings on the
    convention for over 3 years. The issues are clearly understood. It is
    time to act.
        With the treaty due to take effect very soon, the United States
    will make a mistake which we will long regret if we sit on the
    sidelines with states we have criticized as being dangerous and
    irresponsible.
        We will lose our ability to play a major role in assuring
    compliance with the weapons ban. But above all, we will lose the moral
    basis of our leadership on an issue of urgent importance to our
    national security.
        As has been said, this is not a partisan issue. This is a question
    of American leadership, as has been said by Secretary Baker. This is a
    question of meeting our responsibility to the next generation. Earlier
    leaders did not fail our generation, and we must not fail those who
    will follow us.
        And now it is my great privilege to present one who has called us
    as a nation to meet our leadership responsibilities on this vital
    issue. His effort deserves our strong bipartisan support. Ladies and
    gentlemen, the President of the United States. (Applause.)
        President Clinton. Thank you very much. Thank you.
        Thank you very much, Senator Boren, for your words and your
    presence here today. We were laughing before we came out here--Senator
    Boren and I started our careers in politics in 1974 together, but he
    found a presidency that is not term-limited--(laughter)--and I want to
    congratulate him on it.
        Mr. Vice President, Secretary Albright, Secretary Cohen, Secretary
    Baker, Senator Nancy Kassebaum Baker, General Shalikashvili. Let me
    thank all of you who have spoken here today for the words you have
    said, for you have said it all. And let me thank all of you who have
    come here to be a part of this audience today to send a clear,
    unambiguous, united message to America and to our Senate. I thank
    Senator General Colin Powell and Senator Warren Rudman; former arms
    negotiators Paul Nitze, Edward Rowny and Ken Adelman; so many of the
    Congressmen who have supported us, including Senator Biden and Senator
    Levin, who are here; the truly distinguished array of military leaders;
    leaders of businesses, religious organizations, human rights groups;
    scientists and arms control experts.
        Secretary Baker made, I thought, a very telling point, which others
    made as well: This is, in the beginning, a question of whether we will
    continue to make America's leadership strong and sure as we chart our
    course in a new time. We have to do that, and we can only do that if we
    rise to the challenge of ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention.
        We are closing a 20th century which gives us an opportunity now to
    forge a widening international commitment to banish poison gas from the
    Earth in the 21st century. This is a simple issue at bottom, even
    though the details are somewhat complex. Presidents and legislators
    from both parties, military leaders and arms control experts have bound
    together in common cause because this is simply good for the future of
    every American.
        I received two powerful letters recently calling for ratification.
    One has already been mentioned that I received from Senator Nancy
    Kassebaum Baker, Senator Boren, and former national security advisor
    General Brent Scowcroft. The other came from General Powell, General
    Jones, General Vessey, General Schwarzkopf, and more than a dozen other
    retired generals and admirals, all of them saying, as one, America
    needs to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention, and we must do it
    before it takes affect on April 29th.
        Of course, the treaty is not a panacea. No arms control treaty can
    be absolutely perfect, and none can end the need for vigilance. But no
    nation acting alone can protect itself from the threat posed by
    chemical weapons. Trying to stop their spread by ourselves would be
    like trying to stop the wind that helps carry their poison to its
    target.
        We must have an international solution to a global problem.
        The convention provides clear and overwhelming benefits to our
    people. Under a law Congress passed in the 1980's, we are already
    destroying almost all our chemical weapons. The convention requires
    other nations to follow our lead, to eliminate their arsenals of poison
    gas, and to give up developing, producing and acquiring such weapons in
    the future.
        By ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention, as Secretary Cohen
    said, we can help to shield our soldiers from one of the battlefield's
    deadliest killers. We can give our children something our parents never
    had--broad protection against the threat of chemical attack. And we can
    bolster our leadership in the fight against terrorism, of proliferation
    all around the world.
        If the Senate fails to ratify the convention before it enters into
    force, our national security and, I might add, our economic security
    will suffer. We will be denied use of the treaty's tools against rogue
    states and terrorists; we will lose the chance to help to enforce the
    rules we helped to write, or to have American serve as inter-
    national inspectors--something that is especially important for those
    who have raised concerns about inspection provisions of the treaty.
        Ironically, if we are outside this agreement rather than inside, it
    is our chemical companies, our leading exporters, which will face
    mandatory trade restrictions that could cost them hundreds of millions
    of dollars in sales.
        In short order, America will go from leading the world to joining
    the company of pariah nations that the Chemical Weapons Convention
    seeks to isolate. We cannot allow this to happen. The time has come to
    pass this treaty, as 70 other nations already have done.
        Since I sent the Chemical Weapons Convention to the Senate 3\1/2\
    years ago, there have been mom than a dozen hearings, more than 1,500
    pages of testimony and reports. During the last 3 months, we have
    worked very closely with Senate leaders to go the extra mile to resolve
    remaining questions in areas of concern. I want to thank those in the
    Senate who have worked with us for their leadership and for their good-
    faith efforts.
        Ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention, again I say, is
    important both for what it does and for what it says. It says America
    is committed to protecting our troops, to fighting terror, to stopping
    the spread of weapons of mass destruction, to setting and enforcing
    standards for international behavior, and to leading the world in
    meeting the challenges of the 21st century.
        I urge the Senate to act in the highest traditions of
    bipartisanship and in the deepest of our national interests.
        And let me again say, the words that I have spoken today are
    nothing compared to the presence, to the careers, to the experience, to
    the judgment, to the patriotism of Republicans and Democrats alike and
    the military leaders who have gathered here and who all across this
    country have lent their support to this monumentally important effort.
        We must not fail. We have a lot of work to do, but I leave here
    today with renewed confidence that together we can get the job done.
        Thank you. God bless you. And God bless America. (Applause.)

                                   __________
          False Promises, Fatal Flaws: The Chemical Weapons Convention

    Prepared by Empower America as part of its Ideas for the Next Century--
                  International Leadership Series, March 1997

       False Promises, Fatal Flaws: The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

        ``The CWC is not global since many dangerous nations have not
    agreed to join the treaty regime. * * * The CWC is not effective
    because it does not ban or control possession of all chemicals that
    could be used for lethal weapons purposes. * * * The CWC is not
    verifiable as the US intelligence community has repeatedly acknowledged
    in congressional testimony.''
           --From a letter to Senator Trent Lott signed by Former National
    Security Advisor William P. Clark, Former Secretaries of Defense Caspar
    Weinberger and Richard Cheney, and Former US Ambassador to the UN Jeane
                                                                Kirkpatrick

        The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) purports to ban the
    development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons, as
    well as the destruction of existing arsenals and weapons production
    facilities. Various degrees of controls on and prohibitions against
    production of and trade in certain chemicals are to be phased in over
    several years. The alleged benefits of the CWC, however, are illusory
    and obscure serious harm to US strategic, economic, and civil
    interests.
       While claiming to reduce and even eliminate chemical
            arsenals, the CWC actually does nothing to remove such weapons
            from those states most likely to use them--including Iraq,
            Libya, North Korea, and Syria.
       The CWC creates a mechanism that could lead to the
            proliferation of chemical weapons technology among parties and
            their client states.
       The CWC's enforcement provisions would impose serious costs
            and economic risks on US businesses, even those not directly
            involved in defense industries, and pose serious challenges to
            rights protected by the Constitution.

                   The Empty Threat of ``Being Left Behind''

        ``[T]he chemical weapons problem is so difficult from an
    intelligence perspective that I cannot state that we have high
    confidence in our ability to detect non-compliance, especially on a
    small scale.''
                    --Former Director of Central Intelligence James Woolsey

        The CWC is due to enter into force on April 29, 1997. The dire
    warnings of the Clinton Administration and others that failure to
    ratify the Convention before that date will exclude the US from
    involvement in the initial organization of the CWC's institutions and
    subject US companies to trade sanctions are misleading.
       Failure to participate in the organization of an inherently
            ineffective regime is of questionable concern.
       Failure of the US to join the CWC would inhibit trade only
            to a limited degree. Even the administration's estimate of
            potential losses to US companies totals only $600 million
            annually, far less than the cost CWC compliance.

                       Selected Chemical Weapons Programs

        Countries with declared programs: Iraq, Russia, US

        Countries with undeclared programs: China, Egypt, India, Iran,
    Iraq, Israel, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, Syria, Taiwan, Vietnam,
    Ethiopia, Myanmar/Burma

    *NOTE: Countries in bold either have or are developing ballistic
    missiles.

                                 False Promises

        ``The CWC would likely have the effect of leaving the United States
    and its allies more, not less, vulnerable to chemical attack. It could
    well serve to increase, not reduce, the spread of chemical weapons
    manufacturing capabilities. Thus we would be better off not to be party
    to it.''
               --James Schlesinger, Caspar Weinberger, and Donald Rumsfeld,
                                              Former Secretaries of Defense

        The Clinton Administration and other supporters of the CWC
    acknowledge that the Convention is ``no panacea'' in addressing the
    threat of chemical weapons. The truth, however, is that the CWC is far
    more ineffective than supporters contend.
       Several of the states most likely to pose a chemical weapons
            threat, including Iraq, North Korea, Libya, and Syria, have no
            intention of becoming parties to the CWC. Even states that have
            signed the CWC, most notably Russia and China, are unlikely to
            respect its provisions--least of all rid themselves of their
            current arsenals--if they indeed ratify it. Russia alone has
            already developed chemical programs designed to evade
            inspections or utilize agents not addressed by the Convention.
       The CWC does not ban most chemical weapons agents, because
            most agents are used extensively for non-military purposes.
            Indeed, chemical weapons remain the easiest weapons of mass
            destruction to develop and produce in significant quantities
            without detection, largely due to the widespread non-military
            use of their ingredients.
       US intelligence officials have acknowledged that significant
            difficulties exist in detecting covert chemical weapons
            programs. As a National Intelligence Estimate concluded in
            1993, ``The capability of the intelligence community to monitor
            compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention is severely
            limited. * * * The key provision of the monitoring regime--
            challenge inspections at declared sites--can be thwarted by a
            nation determined to preserve a small, secret program using the
            delays and managed access rules allowed by the Convention.''
       Procedures exist for producing ready-to-use chemical agents
            within so short a time that inspections prior to a conflict or
            crisis could be meaningless. A recent Pentagon report details
            Russia's development of chemical agents that could be produced
            in a matter of weeks.
       The CWC's provisions for punishing violators are
            exceptionally vague. The UN Security Council would be charged
            with addressing violations. In addition to the traditional
            ineffectiveness of sanctions and other punitive actions ordered
            by the Security Council, Russia and China could be expected to
            limit or veto outright punishment of their client states and
            allies.
       While the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA) supports
            the CWC, it represents only a small fraction of the companies
            that would be affected by the Convention. Indeed, thousands of
            companies potentially affected are not even aware of their
            exposure to CWC provisions.
       The Chemical Manufacturers Association's support is likely
            based on hopes for increased trade in dangerous chemicals due
            to the elimination of restrictions in accordance with the
            materiel and technology sharing mandated by the Convention.

                                  Fatal Flaws

        ``The United States is abandoning * * * one of the most effective
    deterrents to chemical use against itself and its allies: the right to
    an extant and mature offensive chemical weapons program. * * * [T]he
    Senate should understand that it will contribute to the weakening of
    deterrence, not to its strengthening, by eliminating the ability of the
    United States to respond in kind to chemical attack. A weakening of
    deterrence means * * * that American * * * soldiers are more, not less,
    likely to be attacked with chemical weapons.''
      --J.D. Crouch, Former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

        Beyond the ineffectiveness of the CWC in meeting its purported
    goals, its provisions would actually do great harm to the strategic and
    economic interests of the US.
       The CWC requires materiel and technology sharing with states
            that would otherwise be denied such assistance; the CWC would
            actually spread chemical weapons know-how to parties, such as
            China and Iran, and their client states. Similar arrangements
            regarding nuclear technology have contributed to the
            development of nuclear weapons programs across the globe.
       The CWC would require the US to destroy its entire chemical
            weapons arsenal, while leaving untouched the substantial
            arsenals of rogue states like Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and
            Syria, which are not party to the treaty. Even potential
            parties such as Russia have persistently violated chemical
            weapons reduction requirements of past agreements and are
            already engaged in programs designed to defy and evade the CWC.
       The US relies upon a strategy of retaliation to deter
            chemical attacks. The CWC, however, would limit US options to
            costly conventional operations or a nuclear strike. Contrasted
            with a limited in-kind chemical-for-chemical exchange, these
            two options are politically difficult to pursue and therefore
            not very credible deterrents to a would-be aggressor.
       As interpreted by the Clinton Administration and
            Congressional backers of the Convention, the CWC would prohibit
            the use of non-lethal chemicals such as tear gas, leaving US
            troops with no effective response other than bullets to
            threatening crowds or the use of civilian shields--such as
            occurred in Somalia.
       Almost 8,000 US businesses, even non-defense industries
            utilizing potential chemical agents, would have to shoulder
            significant reporting and other compliance costs and expose
            themselves to the well-precedented risk of industrial espionage
            during inspections. Realistic yearly costs related to CWC
            compliance run as high as $200 million in government
            expenditures and perhaps billions in costs to businesses. In
            addition, Russia has already begun to link its ratification of
            the CWC to billions of dollars in economic assistance, some of
            which would be only tangentially--if at all--connected to
            compliance with the Convention.
       The inspection provisions of the CWC could lead to serious
            violations of the Constitution's protection of due process and
            privacy as international teams attempt to investigate private
            US companies and their employees.
       The well-precedented tendency of governments to ignore or
            downplay violations of arms control agreements so as to
            preserve the overall regimes, as well as the extensive
            political and diplomatic capital that has been invested thus
            far in the CWC, are likely to inhibit enforcement of the
            Convention and the pursuit of more effective initiatives.
                                   __________
    Letters and Other Material Submitted in Support of Ratification of the
                          Chemical Weapons Convention

                          American Ex-Prisoners of War,
                                            Watauga, Tennessee,
                                                     February 20, 1997.
    Hon. Trent Lott,
    Majority Leader, U.S. Senate,
    Washington, DC 20510.
        Dear Senator Lott: As National Commander of the American Ex-
    Prisoners of War, I wish to express my support for the ratification of
    the Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty. This is an important step in
    reducing the price that Americans who serve their country on the field
    of battle must pay in defense of our freedom. Those captured in prior
    wars know all too well the enduring price of those sacrifices even
    without chemical weapons and their life-long disabling consequences.
        While there may, of course, be some risk in adopting this treaty,
    Americans must play a leadership role in international efforts to
    reduce this price to the extent possible. These risks have been
    thoroughly weighed by Presidents Reagan, Bush and Clinton, and the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff, and all have supported this treaty.
                Sincerely,
                              Wm. E. ``Sonny'' Mottern,
                                             National Commander

                                     ______

    News Release,
    Veterans of Foreign Wars of the U.S.,
    Washington, DC 20002.
               for release: vfw supports chemical weapons treaty
        Washington, DC, February 13, 1997.--The Veterans of Foreign Wars
    today announced its support for ratification of the Chemical Weapons
    Convention Treaty which would halt the manufacture, stockpiling and use
    of chemical weapons.
        VFW Commander in Chief James E. Nier, of El Paso, Texas, in calling
    for support for the treaty's ratification said, ``The treaty will
    reduce world stockpiles of such weapons and will hopefully prevent our
    troops from being exposed to poison gases as we believe happened in the
    Gulf War.''
        Noting the support of three Presidents for the treaty--it was
    initiated by President Reagan, negotiated by President Bush, and
    submitted for ratification by President Clinton--and that the treaty is
    supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Nier said the VFW would support
    efforts calling for the treaty' ratification.
        ``There are risks in adopting this treaty. However, the Chairman of
    the Joint Chiefs of Staff believes the advantages outweigh the
    shortcomings and Defense Secretary Cohen has assured me these risks can
    be greatly reduced with the ongoing improvements in the defense posture
    of our troops against chemical warfare,'' Nier said.
        The VFW leader noted that, ``As combat veterans we support this
    treaty, but in the future if we perceive that this treaty puts our
    country and our troops at a disadvantage, we will be out front and lead
    the way in calling for withdrawal from the treaty.''

                                     ______

    Proposed Resolution No. 97-TS4
    Reserve Officers Association of the United States,
    Washington, DC.
                          chemical weapons convention
        WHEREAS, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which would ban the
    development, production, and stockpiling, as well as the use and
    preparation for use of chemical weapons was negotiated by both the
    Reagan and Bush administrations; and
        WHEREAS, 65 countries, including virtually all of our friends and
    allies, have already ratified the CWC; and
        WHEREAS, under a law signed in 1985 by then-President Reagan, all
    U.S. chemical weapons (many of which are nearly 50 years old) are to be
    destroyed by the year 2004; and
        WHEREAS, the Congress has repeatedly refused to authorize the funds
    necessary to modernize our chemical weapons arsenal, leading us to
    abandon that effort in 1991; and
        WHEREAS, the CWC will go into force, with or without United States'
    ratification, on April 29, 1997; and
        WHEREAS, United States' failure to ratify the CWC will place us
    among the great outlaw states of the world, including Libya, Iran, and
    North Korea; and
        WHEREAS, United States' ratification of the CWC will enable us to
    play a major role in the development and implementation of CWC policy,
    as well as providing strong moral leverage to help convince Russia of
    the desirability of ratifying the convention;
        NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that the Reserve Officers
    Association of the United States, chartered by Congress, urges the
    Senate to quickly ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention.

                Attest:
                                      Roger W. Sandler,
                                  Major General, AUS (Retired),
                                            National Executive Director

    Note: This is not an official ROA resolution until adopted by the
    National (Convention/Council).

                                     ______

    News Release,
    Jewish War Veterans of the U.S.A.,
    Washington, DC 20004.
     for immediate release: jwv supports ratification of chemical weapons
                                     treaty
        Washington, DC, February 5, 1997.--The Jewish War Veterans of the
    U.S.A. (JWV) calls for the ratification of the Chemical Weapons
    Convention (CWC) which was signed during the Bush Administration. The
    need for the treaty is more critical today than ever before.
        JWV National Commander Bob Zweiman stated, ``The events related to
    the Gulf War Syndrome revealed that when it comes to chemical warfare,
    there may either be an incapacity to recognize the dangers to our
    troops in the field or, once shown to exist, there can be a penchant to
    cover up the embarrassment for the failure to so recognize. But for the
    actions of the Veterans Administration, our Gulf War veterans would
    have found themselves without any current avenue of possible relief
    and, even now, we must still be concerned with claim time limitations.
        ``While the CWC may not be perfect in all terms, it provides an
    aura of international cooperation into the arsenal of the United States
    protecting our national interests without compromising our freedom of
    action. There are meaningful provisions in the CWC which will afford
    and opportunity to impose economic restrictions and sanctions against
    those who develop chemical weapons or deal with the threat of or use of
    such chemical warfare.
        ``As is readily recognizable from the U.N. monitoring of the Iraqi
    facilities, there can be no assurances for a security or for a real
    defense capability against the use of chemicals by rogue nations or
    terrorists without controls as may additionally be made available to us
    by the CWC. We are honor bound to protect our Nation and our troops by
    minimizing the chances from all obvious or hidden means of chemical
    attack in the future.''
        Founded in 1896, JWV is the oldest, active national veterans'
    organization in America and is known as the ``Patriotic Voice of
    American Jewry.'' JWV is currently celebrating its centennial year
    which included JWV's hosting of Veterans Day ceremonies at Arlington
    Cemetery on November 11, 1998.

                                   __________
       Prepared Statement of Brad Roberts, Institute for Defense Analyses

        In hearings before this committee a year ago, I had the opportunity
    to address a number of specific concerns about the benefits, costs, and
    verifiability of the Chemical Weapons Convention and, in so doing, to
    argue that the U.S. national interest is well served by ratification of
    the Convention and U.S. participation in the new regime. Rather than
    again offer a defense of the Convention, I would like to take the
    opportunity to help to bring into better focus the nation's stake in
    the pending CWC vote. Toward that end, I would like to describe five
    messages that would be sent by your rejection of the CWC.
    The first message would be that America's elected officials remain
            firmly in the grip of the Cold War when it comes to arms
            control
        The current debate about the CWC was in fact scripted in the early
    1980s, when most of the protagonists staked out their positions
    (although at that point the treaty itself was nothing more than a
    glimmer in the eye of negotiators). On the one hand were those who saw
    arms control as a dangerous delusion--a sell-out to the Soviets. On the
    other were those who saw any arms build-up as a dangerous folly--a
    false remedy to Cold War confrontation. For each, the CWC was but one
    front in the larger ideological battle. Today, CWC opponents savage the
    treaty as fatally flawed, while administration supporters defend it as
    useful for ridding the world of evil weapons. Moderates in both
    parties, on the other hand, seem for the most part to have lost
    interest and to have anticipated U.S. ratification as a ``no-brainer.''
        The antipathy to CW arms control in the Cold War had much to do
    with the specific strategic context in Europe. With NATO forces
    overmatched by Warsaw Pact forces, if war came it seemed likely that
    the West would have to rely on early use of its tactical nuclear
    weapons. The Soviets quite possibly could have denied NATO a carefully
    considered and effective use of its nuclear weapons with chemical
    warfare. Sustained chemical attacks on NATO forces without fear of
    reprisal would have enabled the Warsaw Pact to maintain high tempo
    attacks with conventional forces and without themselves suffering the
    consequences of chemical warfare--namely the cumbersome work of
    fighting inside gas masks and chemical protection suits. Hence NATO
    needed some in-kind retaliatory capability for the Soviet chemical
    threat, which was provided by the United States with its chemical
    arsenal. Hence the opposition to a chemical ban because of the belief
    that even small-scale cheating on any such ban could have been sharply
    destabilizing not just in Europe but to the central strategic balance.
        But that strategic landscape is gone. Today, no country of
    proliferation concern has the ability to deliver the quantities of
    chemical agents with precision for days and weeks against U.S. forces
    or to exploit the tactical circumstances created by their use to
    inflict operational or strategic defeat on U.S. military forces. It
    would take a great deal of cheating to create a chemical arsenal with
    potential military significance when used against well-protected U.S.
    forces, a scale of cheating that is beyond the reach of these states so
    long as they must keep the program secret and underground. Even if they
    were somehow able to create a massive chemical arsenal despite
    international inspections, none of these states has the Soviet-vintage
    capacity to overwhelm U.S. forces by conventional means or to escalate
    to tactical and strategic nuclear attack. Their chemical attacks would
    have nuisance value--perhaps high nuisance value--but they do not
    promise to create the strategic predicament created by the Warsaw Pact.
    Thus the United States need not concern itself with detecting any and
    all acts of noncompliance by parties to the CWC, but only with
    militarily significant cheating--so long as it sustains strong
    antichemical defenses. Of course, it will not rely on the CWC to
    understand the CW capabilities of potential enemies--that's why a great
    deal of money is spent on proliferation-related intelligence
    capabilities.
        Moreover, the United States does not need to stoop to chemical
    retaliation to punish the use of chemical weapons against its forces.
    In the current environment, U.S. military interests are best served by
    minimizing the role chemicals might play on the battlefield, so that
    the superior conventional weaponry of the United States can be used to
    best advantage. In fact, the United States has forsworn the right to
    use chemical weapons under any circumstance, even in retaliation, in
    the wake of the Persian Gulf war. Norman Schwartzkopf is only the
    latest of many military commanders to say that the United States does
    not need a chemical deterrent for the chemical threats it faces in the
    proliferation era. This makes it possible for the United States to
    trade its aging stockpile of chemical weapons, the vast majority
    produced in the 1950s and 1960s, for a global ban.
        This points to the conclusion that the critics' case against the
    CWC has been made on the wrong national security criteria. Cold War
    thinking says that only the strictest verification and compliance
    standards are suitable for arms control and that chemical disarmament
    weakens deterrence. Both judgments are wrong for the post-cold war era,
    so long as the arms control in question does not touch on the
    fundamentals of strategic nuclear stability. The CWC is neither panacea
    nor folly. It is not a substitute for all of those other things that
    must be done to meet the proliferation challenge. It does not eliminate
    chemical weapons nor the risks of cheating. But it does meet strict
    national security criteria. And it helps to keep the CW problem
    manageable while adding new political tools to the arsenal of
    political, economic, intelligence, and military measures that must be
    used synergistically if the proliferation threat is to be kept in
    check.
        I for one am grateful that the debate on the CWC has not turned out
    to be a ``no-brainer'', for we now have the chance to rise above the
    tired debate of the past and to think through the larger questions of
    arms control standards, national interests, and U.S. leadership in
    terms suitable for the post-Cold War era. If the administration and the
    Congress cannot come to a clearer agreement on these issues, the
    national interest seems likely to suffer badly. At the very least,
    disagreement will doom the six other arms control measures currently
    awaiting U.S. ratification--and with them, some of the few tools
    available to the United States for building future political
    coalitions.
    A second message is that the United States does not understand what is
            at stake in stopping the proliferation of chemical weapons.
        Chemical weapons proliferated dramatically in the 1980s, to more
    than 20 countries. They have appeared, moreover, in precisely those
    regions where the United States offers security guarantees and in the
    hands of those states that sponsor terrorism. Stemming their
    proliferation is essential to dealing with the more general problem of
    the proliferation of nuclear and biological weapons, missile delivery
    systems, and advanced conventional weaponry. If rogues can use NBC
    weapons as trump cards against U.S. military action, or to conduct
    attacks on American civilians, our world will change fundamentally--and
    for the worse. If the end of the Cold War is what made the CWC
    possible, proliferation is what made it necessary.
        It would be nice if the CWC were to rid the world completely of
    chemical weapons, but it won't (at least, as long as renegade states
    exist). So what other interests might it serve vis-a-vis the
    proliferation problem? The United States has an interest in preventing
    the continued proliferation to ever more states. It has an interest in
    getting out of the chemical warfare business those who are only
    dabbling (intrigued by Iraq's use of chemical weapons in its war
    against Iran). It has an interest in keeping the stockpiles of those
    who remain in the business small and unsophisticated. It has an
    interest in isolating by political and economic means those states that
    remain in the business. And it has an interest in not being isolated
    politically when it comes time to deal militarily with those
    chemically-armed states that pose real and immediate military dangers.
        The CWC will do a good job of safeguarding these interests. Its
    verification provisions are sufficient to deter all but the most
    committed CW producers. The charge that the CWC will be ineffective
    because some important CW possessors are non-signatories misses an
    essential point--by self-selecting out of the regime, these states
    identify themselves as problem cases and make themselves objects of
    suspicion and trade restraints. In each of these ways, the CWC promises
    a tangible benefit to U.S. security (which is an answer to those
    critics who allege that the CWC offers no such benefits for the United
    States).
    A third message of non-ratification is that the United States is going
            to be irrelevant to the international effort to stem CW
            proliferation.
        Treaty opponents have offered up a number of substitutes. One is
    ``reinvigoration'' of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, whose signatories
    agree not to use chemical weapons (although some states have reserved
    the right to use such weapons in retaliation). The Protocol is
    certainly in dire need of help--it was dealt a crippling blow by the
    failure to respond to Saddam Hussein's use of chemical weapons
    throughout the 1980s in his wars against both Iranians and Iraqis.
    Reinvigoration would presumably entail the addition of compliance and
    verification provisions--just like those that turned the Protocol into
    the CWC! Reinvigoration would also presumably entail some renewed
    political commitment to the Protocol. But the United States can hardly
    expect others to line up with it behind the Protocol as an alternative
    to the CWC when even its closest friends and allies are moving on to
    the CWC. Moreover, the United States carries the added burden of
    lingering international resentment over its particular failure to
    uphold the Protocol in the 1980s because of its grievances against
    Iran.
        Their second alternative is to supplement the protocol with a new
    treaty analogous to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The NPT is
    unique in the history of multilateral arms control measures in that it
    grants to a set of states certain rights that are denied to others--in
    this case, the right to possess nuclear weapons. Under the proposed
    chemical parallel, the United States and presumably Russia would be
    allowed to keep their chemical weapons while they try to police other
    states from acquiring their own. But no countries would join with the
    United States in this endeavor--all see U.S. and Russian disarmament as
    essential to the political bargain embodied in the chemical control
    regime. To suggest that a new treaty could be made without this
    cornerstone, or simply imposed, is either naive or disingenuous.
        Their third alternative is reliance on unilateral, domestic
    measures, such as those detailed in SB495. In fact, most if not all of
    those measures would be necessary adjuncts to CWC implementation. But
    as a substitute for the CWC, SB495 leaves much to be desired. One
    noteworthy, example is in the area of export controls: the United
    States can anticipate growing friction with its partners in the
    Australia Group process, most of whom will be among the original states
    parties to the CWC, if it attempts to rely on economic sticks and
    carrots while sitting aside from the CWC. Another example is in the
    area of CWC compliance challenges: by walking away from the CWC, the
    United States leaves its allies and other prospective coalition
    partners to fend for themselves when it comes to dealing with
    noncompliance by states parties to the CWC. The United States may be
    there when the chips are down militarily, but for circumstances short
    of war it will leave its friends and allies to manage largely on their
    own the political and economic instruments of risk management. Despite
    its many merits, SB495 is little more than window dressing on American
    retreat from the CW proliferation problem. Its primary short-term
    benefit would probably be in making some Americans feel good about
    walking away.
        In short, these alternatives are not viable. To reject the CWC is
    to consign the United States to irrelevance to the international effort
    to manage the CW proliferation problem. This is a course of action of
    dubious political merit. The notion that somehow America should sit
    aside while others do the hard work of dealing with proliferation will
    be an insult to many Americans. Americans are not bystanders. But
    rejection of the CWC will marginalize U.S. influence and turn us into
    free-loaders on the efforts of others to implement the CWC despite our
    having walked away. This is an insult to Americans rightly proud of the
    nation's historic role of a power with both military strength and a
    vision of a better world--and the will to lend its political prestige
    to bring it into being. It is also an insult to the integrity of
    American diplomacy--having given our word to participate as a party to
    the convention, in the form of then-Secretary Eagleburger's signature,
    non-ratification will erode the strength of American political promises
    more generally. Others will rightly ask how America can expect to hold
    others to their promises when it breaks its own?
    A fourth message that would be sent by non-ratification is that America
            is going to dish out some vigilante justice when it comes to
            dealing with CW-armed proliferators.
        Whether or not the United States ratifies the CWC, it enters into
    force as international law on April 29. By walking away from the law it
    helped to create, the United States will be relegating itself to the
    role of vigilante whenever it chooses to undertake military actions
    against CW-armed states--as one who professes a commitment to the rule
    of law, but places itself above the law when it comes to dealing with
    outlaws. By working from outside rather than inside the CWC normative
    framework, the United States will turn military acts against
    chemically-armed states into solitary exercises of U.S. military
    prowess, rather than coalition campaigns to punish transgressors. The
    United States will have no one to blame but itself for the political
    isolation it will suffer.
        This too is a course of action of dubious political merit. America
    does not belong above the law--indeed, central to our national
    conception is a belief in the moral basis of our politics and power,
    and our mission to expand the rule of law. In our de facto role as
    ``world's policeman,'' will others think of us as a respectful steward
    of the common weal or an unreliable bully whose lip service to the rule
    of law is cynical and abandoned when it does not suit his needs? To
    reject the CWC is to put us on the wrong side of history, especially
    our own, and on the side with Iraq, Libya, and North Korea.
    A fifth message is that America does not trust itself--more
            specifically, that the Senate does not trust itself to do its
            oversight job.
        One of the arguments used by CWC opponents to persuade freshmen
    Senators to join their cause is the so-called lulling effect of arms
    control. The argument runs as follows: tyrants will get the better of
    arms control with democracies because de-
    mocracies want to believe that others are Good and will go far to
    delude themselves that the tyrant is living up to his promises. This
    delusion paralyzes democracies, which then ignore real military
    vulnerabilities and, by looking duped, embolden the tyrant. By this
    logic, arms control may lead to war.
        This is a view of arms control derived from a rather peculiar
    interpretation of the genesis of fascist aggression in the 1930s, one
    which flies in the face of the experience of the Cold War when
    democracies stood firm against totalitarianism for half a century.
    Anyone who today thinks that chemical arms control will lull a sleepy
    republic must overlook the huge sums of money invested annually in
    chemical preparedness, the existence of an intelligence community
    charged with monitoring arms control compliance, and a host of
    ``friendly critics'' who scrutinize arms control implementation.
        For Senators to align themselves with a point of view that is
    distrustful of democratic process would be especially odd. Should we
    infer that they themselves believed that they are dupes--that they are
    not confident that they can or will perform their oversight
    responsibilities, by asking the right questions at the right times
    about U.S. military readiness and compliance findings by U.S.
    intelligence?
        Like it or not, this is what the Senate will signal to the world--
    and to the American voter--if it rejects the CWC. America as nostalgic
    for the Cold War. America as ignorant of its special stake in stopping
    NBC proliferation. America as free-loader. America as dupe of foreign
    tyrants, timid and unreliable. An America enjoying unparalleled
    military strength, but unable to bank on its strengths to take small
    risks for large payoffs. An America that says no to change, that has
    lost its bearings and its mission to promote the change that makes a
    better world possible.
        In short, the vote on the CWC comes down to a vote about U.S.
    leadership. It presents the Senate with a basic choice. The United
    States can lead, by safeguarding common interests and protecting U.S.
    national interests by exercising a political-military influence
    commensurate with the nation's weight and moral compass. It can follow,
    by freeloading on the efforts of others while pretending that domestic,
    unilateral measures are enough to meet its needs. Or it can get out of
    the way, as a new wave of proliferation occurs and fuels the ambitions
    of those who would try to use their weapons of mass destruction to
    intimidate U.S. allies and to veto the use of U.S. military power to
    honor its security guarantees.
        Many on this panel had the privilege to serve with one of the great
    American leaders of this century. Ronald Reagan's special gifts as a
    leader, it seems to me, were his intuitive understanding of the
    American public myth--our view of ourselves as a people with a certain
    historic mission and a strong moral compass--and his ability to
    translate the decisions of current moment into this larger framework.
    He understood that Americans expect their country to stand tough
    against aggressors--and to know how to safeguard that essential part of
    the nation's political power that flows not from the barrels of
    American guns but from its traditions and values. A vote for the CWC
    would be consistent with this sense of national purpose. A vote against
    would be an insult.
                                     ______

        Brad Roberts is a member of the research staff at the Institute for
    Defense Analyses in Alexandria, Va. The views expressed here are his
    own.
                                   __________
    Letters Submitted in Opposition to Ratification of the Chemical Weapons
                                   Convention

                                            Sterling Chemicals,
                                                        April 15, 1997.
    Hon. Jesse Helms,
    Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee,
    United States Senate, Washington, DC.
        Dear Mr. Chairman: Sterling Chemicals, Inc. strongly supports a
    worldwide ban on the production, possession and use of chemical
    weapons, but we are concerned about the mechanics and cost impacts
    associated with the proposed Chemicals Weapon Convention (CWC). We have
    made our concerns known to the Honorable Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison
    last August. Highlights of our concerns are:
        1. We have serious misgivings about the ability to protect
    confidential business information. Having a foreign inspection team
    inside our facility with almost unlimited access to process knowledge
    and data is not acceptable to Sterling.
        2. Cost impact will be significant! We project the costs just to
    prepare for, manage, conduct and complete an inspection to be at least
    $200,000-$300,000. This doesn't include performing duplicate sampling
    and analysis, as well as calibration and verification of process
    instrumentation.
        3. We cannot comply with the treaty provisions within our current
    annual budget and headcount. Sterling has reduced headcount to maintain
    our competitiveness. We are doing more with less. We believe the
    additional data record-keeping and paperwork burden associated with
    this treaty cannot be managed with existing resources.
        4. The EPA and OSHA, while participating as part of the inspection
    team, may become over zealous with their enforcement philosophy and
    begin citing violations as part of their own agenda--while they're
    supposed to be monitoring the foreign inspection team.
        Sterling Chemicals is not a foreign policy expert, yet we have
    serious misgivings about the foreign policy implications of the
    proposed CWC. For example:
        1. How will chemicals weapon control be enforced in other countries
    (Mexico, Columbia, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Croatia,
    etc.)? Since they probably will not cooperate, how does this treaty
    produce a ``worldwide ban''?
        2. How will international security and foreign policy issues
    related to protection of trade secrets be handled?
        3. Will the cost and implementation of the treaty put American
    industry at a competitive disadvantage with foreign industry whose
    compliance is less regulated?
        Sterling emphasizes its desire to see a worldwide ban on chemical
    weapons. We hope this submittal provides the information you seek for
    an informed decision which is best for America.
                Sincerely,
                                       Robert W. Roten,
                                             President and CEO.
                                     ______

                             Small Business Survival Committee,
                                                        April 14, 1997.
    Hon. Jesse Helms,
    Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee,
    United States Senate, Washington, DC.
        Dear Senator Helms: On behalf of the Small Business Survival
    Committee (SBSC) and its more than 40,000 members across the nation, I
    wish to express our opposition to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
    treaty due to be voted upon soon by the U.S. Senate. Also, I apologize
    for not being able to testify before the Foreign Relations Committee
    due to severe time constraints.
        It seems to us that a wide array of defense and foreign policy
    experts have raised legitimate questions about the CWC, including
    several former U.S. Secretaries of Defense. They see the CWC as non-
    verifiable, non-enforceable and not serving U.S. national interests,
    and SBSC agrees.
        Though the CWC offers nothing in terms of improving U.S. security
    interests, the CWC accomplishes much by way of raising regulatory costs
    on already over-regulated U.S. businesses. For example, the CWC would
    inflict the following on U.S. entrepreneurs and businesses:

       For the first time, U.S. private industry would be subject
            to foreign inspection as a result of a treaty. Inspectors would
            come from a new international agency in the Hague, Netherlands.
       Businesses must prove to the U.S. government and
            international inspectors that they are not producing or
            stockpiling chemical weapons, with noncompliance fines reaching
            as high as $50,000 per incident. Forms would have to be filed
            on chemical types each year and changes in a process using
            certain chemicals would have to be reported five days in
            advance. Noncompliance could result in a $5,000 fine. And of
            course, with government bureaucrats issuing fines, the threat
            that fines shift from a means of deterrence or punishment to a
            source of revenues always looms.
       Firms would be open to a real threat from international
            industrial espionage. The loss of proprietary information could
            seriously weaken international competitiveness. The treaties
            protections are frivolous, and any court challenge likely would
            come after the horse left the barn.
       U.S. firms producing, processing, or consuming a scheduled
            chemical will carry a paperwork/declaration burden. The U.S.
            Department of Commerce estimated that it will take companies 9
            hours to fill out paperwork for every Schedule I chemical, 7.2
            hours for Schedule 2 chemicals, 2.5 hours for Schedule 3
            chemicals, and 5.3 hours for each Discrete Organic Chemical.
            Estimates range from 2,000 to more than 10,000 U.S. companies
            that will be forced to bear these paperwork burdens.
       Congress's Office of Technology Assessment estimated that
            inspections will cost U.S. firms anywhere from $10,000 to
            $500,000 per visit.
       Smaller businesses will be hit hardest by increased
            regulatory burdens. Interestingly, the Chemical Manufacturers
            Association (CMA) supports ratification of the CWC, apparently
            claiming that the new regulations would not be a burden.
            However, the CMA is a group of generally large chemical
            manufacturers, and reportedly more than 60 percent of the
            facilities likely affected by the CWC are not CMA members.
            Large companies possess far greater resources and experience in
            dealing with regulators of all kinds. Indeed, new regulatory
            burdens can perversely give large firms a competitive edge over
            smaller companies due to such resource and experience factors.
            As economist Thomas Hopkins has shown, the per employee cost of
            federal regulation runs almost 50 percent higher for firms with
            fewer than 500 employees vs. companies with more than 500
            employees--$5,400 per employee vs. $3,000 per employee,
            respectively.
       Chemical companies would not be the only types of businesses
            subject to CWC regulations. Firms in the food processing,
            pharmaceutical, paint, petroleum, biotech, electronics,
            textiles, fertilizers, rubber, brewing, and distilling
            industries would be impacted as well.
       Significant legal questions arise for U.S. businesses as
            well. Distinct possibilities exist that rights of due process
            could be violated in relation to warrantless searches and
            personnel being compelled to answer questions, and provide
            information and access; and a ``takings'' could occur when
            government reveals information harming a business.

        There are CWC supporters who would have the public believe that
    treaty supporters do not care about chemical weapons and U.S. security;
    in fact, the exact opposite is true. Anyone who really cares should
    stand up and oppose this deeply flawed, dangerous and costly treaty.
        SBSC believes the Chemical Weapons Convention to be a deeply flawed
    treaty that will do nothing to enhance and may indeed weaken U.S.
    national security, while imposing new regulatory burdens on U.S.
    businesses. The Chemical Weapons Convention should be rejected by the
    U.S. Senate.
                Sincerely,
                                            Raymond J. Keating,
                    Chief Economist, Small Business Survival Committee.

                                   __________
    Statement by Ronald F. Lehman Before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations
                            Committee, June 9, 1994

        Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Members of this Committee: In
    Islamabad, Pakistan, last week, I received your invitation to appear
    before the Committee to discuss ratification of the Chemical Weapons
    Convention. It was an honor to be asked to appear before you once
    again, and I am particularly pleased to join several close and valued
    friends who made major contributions to the revolutionary national
    security and arms control achievements which took place during the
    Reagan and Bush administrations. It is in that same spirit of public
    service that they are here today.
        The best friends of real arms control are those who have demanded
    the highest standards. Better is not really the enemy of the good. In
    particular, the U.S. negotiating position is always strengthened when
    we negotiators are reminded that one-third of the Senate plus one might
    someday decide that the treaty we conclude falls short of their
    expectations for advancing the national interest.

        During the negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, I and
    others consulted regularly with members of the United States Congress
    including the members of this Committee. We sought your advice on how
    to negotiate the best possible treaty. A process of consultation,
    however, must never substitute for a rigorous examination of the final
    product such as is now underway, taking into account the contributions
    of critics as well as proponents.

        For my part, I am a proponent. I speak today as a private citizen;
    the views I express are my own and not necessarily those of any
    institution or administration. Let me make clear up front where I
    stand. I urge the Senate to give its consent to the ratification of the
    Chemical Weapons Convention and to move quickly to complete a process
    of careful deliberation. I say this, not because of my personal
    involvement in its negotiation, but on its merits. I won't repeat the
    many arguments which have already been made on behalf of the treaty,
    but I would like to present a few additional considerations.

        The negotiation and completion of the Chemical Weapons Convention
    in the twilight of the Cold War was a valuable element in a bigger,
    balanced strategy to increase the security of the United States and to
    promote political change around the world. We negotiated from a
    position of economic, political, and military strength. We energized
    our technology and economy, while reducing subsidies to the Communist
    bloc. We recognized the ``evil empire'' for what it was and rejected
    attitudes of ``moral equivalence'', which undermine our resolve and
    strengthen our adversary. We modernized our defenses, including our
    chemical weapons deterrent, even as we made arms control an integral
    part of that overall foreign and national security strategy.

        One can see this, in one small example, even in the way our pursuit
    of a ban on chemical weapons reinforced our commitment to the spread of
    democracy. We sought intensive verification measures so that we might
    reduce the threat posed by the Warsaw Pact, but also because we knew
    that totalitarian regimes cannot long survive when their citizens are
    exposed to contradictory information. The requirement for detailed
    information on chemical weapons stocks and facilities before reaching
    agreement, at the time an innovative negotiating step which led to the
    December 1989 U.S./Soviet Phase I data exchange and the recent Phase II
    exchange, sparked a controversy which continues in Russia even today
    over the history of the Soviet chemical and biological weapons
    programs.

        Our demand for trial inspections prior to completion of
    negotiations aided in crafting a better treaty, but it also caused
    Soviet citizens to ask why they themselves could not see what Americans
    were allowed to see. Our insistence, first in the U.S./Soviet Bilateral
    Destruction Agreement (BDA) of 1990, and later in the CWC, that
    destruction of chemical weapons stocks be done in a safe and
    environmentally sound manner has created a grassroots political process
    of ``NIMBY''--not in my backyard--which has complicated agreement on a
    chemical weapons destruction plan but also complicates a return of the
    old system. One should not exaggerate the role that arms control has
    played in promoting our national agenda, but one should not ignore it
    either.

        Arguably, the CWC is more important in today's violent and changing
    world than it was when it was being negotiated during the Cold War. The
    end of the Warsaw Pact, America's sole superpower status, its changing
    global military missions, and its advanced conventional munitions have
    reduced the circumstances under which the United States would decide to
    deploy chemical weapons into an operational theater as a deterrent.
    Increasingly circumstances are such that it is more important to reduce
    the likelihood that others will use them than that we have them.

        The Chemical Weapons Convention plays an essential role in our
    efforts to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
    their means of delivery. In the long run, our non-proliferation,
    counter-proliferation, or anti-proliferation efforts may be doomed to
    failure if we cannot bring about political change and greater stability
    around the globe. As I have suggested, the CWC continues to be a small,
    but important part of that effort. In the near term, however, the CWC
    may actually play its most important role.

        We will fall dangerously short in our efforts to stop the
    proliferation of more destructive nuclear and biological wcapons if we
    cannot even codify and build upon the international norms which emerged
    in the negotiation of the ban on chemical weapons. At a time when we
    must build support for long term monitoring of Iraq and ``special
    inspections'' by the International Atomic Energy Agency in North Korea
    and elsewhere, entry into force of the CWC will commit ever more of the
    international community to the unprecedented openness increasingly
    necessary if we are to prevent disaster. At a time when the global
    economy reduces trade barriers, but also undermines controls on
    proliferation-related technologies, the CWC codifies the principle that
    no nation should trade in dangerous materials with those who will not
    accept international non-proliferation norms. At a time when threats to
    international security may require military forces of the United States
    to be deployed within range of the weapons of outlaw regimes, the CWC
    can reduce the dangers our troops will face and help provide the basis
    in international law and public opinion for strong measures that we and
    others may be forced to take.

        These are important external effects of the CWC, but what of the
    substantive workings of the Convention itself? They are revolutionary.
    Given the inherent technical difficulty of achieving a meaningful ban
    on chemical weapons, they need to be. The text of the Chemical Weapons
    Convention has pushed the envelope of multilateral arms control far
    beyond what was once believed negotiable. It may be that the special
    circumstances at the end of the Cold War and the Gulf War made it
    possible for a very experienced international and American team to
    achieve what otherwise could never have been done. But more than
    opportunity was involved. Years of careful preparation and experience
    led the way. The former Reagan and Bush officials here today played a
    key role in that process.

        Important lessons learned from the on-going arms control process
    were applied over the course of the negotiation of the Chemical Weapons
    Convention. In negotiation, we were not afraid to ask for far more than
    an acceptable bottom line. Great emphasis was placed on more precise
    draftsmanship, more detailed data exchanges, greater openness and
    interaction, an organization with the power to conduct intrusive
    inspections and recommend sanctions.

        Every effort was made to make cheating by parties less attractive,
    more difficult, more likely to be discovered, and more certain to
    result in a stiff penalty. Nations which refused to become parties to
    this new international norm would also pay a heavy economic and
    political price. Nations which joined could expect reasonable
    assistance if threaten by chemical weapons.

        Although our process was not perfect, careful study came before
    making most decisions. A marketplace of ideas often resulted in
    disagreements, especially when facts were few and concepts vague. In
    the end, however, a vigorous interagency process which ensured that all
    of the relevant information was considered and that senior officials
    were exposed to key technical information and alternative views
    resulted in better decisions. Sometimes a consensus developed,
    sometimes difficult, divisive decisions had to be made.

        Diplomatic and political considerations often influenced fine
    tuning and presentation, but I think the record will show that in the
    CWC, as in the INF treaty, the START I and II treaties, and in the
    Verification Protocol which made possible a 98-0 vote in the Senate for
    consent to ratify the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, national security was
    the overwhelmingly central determinant.

        One example from the Chemical Weapons Convention is that of
    challenge inspections. Everyone knows that no magic telescope exists
    which will tell us where in the world on any given day someone will be
    violating some provision of the CWC. But everyone also knows who are
    the most likely threats and where potential threats to our forces must
    be considered most seriously. Information is gathered, intelligence
    estimates are made, and military precautions taken. In the past, it has
    usually stopped there for lack of more intrusive measures including
    challenge inspections which might provide a basis for international
    action without compromising sensitive sources and methods. A
    verification and enforcement regime for the CWC needed a challenge
    inspection mechanism.

        At the same time, we recognized that challenge inspections were not
    magic either. They may or may not find the evidence you need, depending
    on circumstances, procedures, and skill. Worse, such intrusive
    inspections could be abused or backfire revealing important proprietary
    information or national security secrets. Constitutional questions
    related to property and privacy also needed to be addressed.

        No technical challenge in arms control over the twelve years of the
    Reagan and Bush administrations received more careful consideration at
    all levels than that of implementation of a challenge inspection
    regime. Working with professionals and experts inside and outside of
    government, we sought to find a path which would maximize the
    effectiveness of inspections while minimizing costs including the risk
    to sensitive information.

        We learned much along the way. More often than not, the real
    problems and real solutions were to be found in the field and among the
    operators rather than within the Washington-based bureaucracy. We found
    that different sites and activities posed different problems. We
    discovered that some sensitive information was less vulnerable than we
    had believed, but that some was more vulnerable. We learned that with
    or without a CWC, some security measures should be strengthened. We
    discovered that at many sensitive sites concern about illegal chemical
    activity could be dispelled without much risk. We also feared that at a
    few sites we could offer little meaningful access without great risk.

        Out of this continuous process, we developed an approach which can
    work and which gives us what we need to protect highly sensitive
    information. Conceptually, the approach was simple. Access would be
    granted to any challenged site, but access would be managed at that
    site to protect sensitive information. If, at a particular site,
    timeliness or intrusiveness were not considered sufficient to resolve
    legitimate concerns, then the inspected party had an obligation to
    resolve those concerns by other means.

        To meet diverse concerns, however, the desired U.S. package
    involved some complexity. Moreover, it involved far more intrusiveness
    than some nations desired and more rules for managed access than other
    nations favored. The more nations studied the proposal, the more they
    understood that it could work. To obtain the U.S. position as an
    outcome was made easier because it could be portrayed as a natural
    compromise between opposing views. In the end, however, I had no doubt
    that we would get our position because we had made it clear that we
    would not join consensus on a treaty that did not meet our security
    concerns. Other nations understood that we had done our homework and
    that we meant what we said.

        Still, the conclusion of the CWC does not come without a price, and
    its contributions to our security will not be fully achieved without
    effective implementation not only of the CWC itself but also of a sound
    foreign policy and national security strategy. One of the inherent
    dangers of engaging in arms control negotiations is that success will
    have a soporific effect on the nation's attention to its national
    defense and that of its friends, allies, and interests around the
    world.

        When treaties are seen as solutions to our security challenges
    rather than tools to be used to help address those challenges, danger
    grows. When the Biological Weapons Convention was concluded, too many
    people assumed the threat of biological warfare had been eliminated.
    Research on defenses received inadequate support, and we saw too much
    of the ``Sverdlovsk'' phenomenon--a propensity to explain away what one
    does not want to be so. One hopes that we are not seeing this again
    with respect to North Korea and the NPT.

        Some would argue that this danger that arms control will lull us
    into neglecting our defenses means that we should never negotiate or at
    least never reach agreements. The problem with that conclusion is that
    it assumes we cannot trust our own nation to negotiate in its own
    interest or provide for its own defense. When this becomes a problem,
    it is a problem the American people and its representatives have the
    power to solve. We must make certain they get the facts. Hearings like
    this are an important means for doing that.

        For my part, I believe that the arms control and non-proliferation
    tools can be used to promote our national security, and we must ensure
    that they do. The Chemical Weapons Convention is clearly a tool which
    can enhance our national security. I believe that the successful
    conclusion of arms control agreements need not result in the neglect of
    our defenses, but it often has. In giving its consent to ratification
    of the Chemical Weapons Convention without reservations, the Senate
    should take real steps to support implementation of the treaty, fund a
    strong defense program, and promote a balanced national security
    strategy which recognizes that the United States must be the leader in
    a very dangerous world.

        The world has undergone dramatic change, and arms control trains
    have been rushing by. In such a world, if we do not shape the arms
    control process to serve our interests, we can be certain that some
    nations will be pressing in directions that are not in our interest.
    The Chemical Weapons Convention before this committee is in our
    interest. Again, Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Members of the Committee,
    I believe that the United States Senate should give its consent to
    ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Thank you.