[House Hearing, 105 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 1998
_______________________________________________________________________
HEARINGS
BEFORE A
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida, Chairman
JOSEPH M. McDADE, Pennsylvania JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania
BOB LIVINGSTON, Louisiana NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington
JERRY LEWIS, California W. G. (BILL) HEFNER, North Carolina
JOE SKEEN, New Mexico MARTIN OLAV SABO, Minnesota
DAVID L. HOBSON, Ohio JULIAN C. DIXON, California
HENRY BONILLA, Texas PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana
GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, Jr.,
Washington
ERNEST J. ISTOOK, Jr., Oklahoma
RANDY ``DUKE'' CUNNINGHAM,
California
NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Livingston, as Chairman of the Full
Committee, and Mr. Obey, as Ranking Minority Member of the Full
Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees.
Kevin M. Roper, John G. Plashal, David F. Kilian, Alicia Jones, Juliet
Pacquing,P Gregory J. Walters, Patricia Ryan, Doug Gregory, Paul W.
Juola, Tina Jonas, andP Steven D. Nixon, Staff Assistants
Stacy A. Trimble and Jennifer Mummert, Administrative Aides
________
PART 2
Page
Commanders in Chief:
European Command............................................... 1
Atlantic Command............................................... 95
Central Command................................................ 161
Pacific Command and United States Forces, Korea................ 237
Testimony of Members of Congress and Other Interested Individuals
and Organizations................................................. 351
________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations
________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
77-757 WASHINGTON : 2002
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
BOB LIVINGSTON, Louisiana, Chairman
JOSEPH M. McDADE, Pennsylvania DAVID R. OBEY, Wisconsin
C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida SIDNEY R. YATES, Illinois
RALPH REGULA, Ohio LOUIS STOKES, Ohio
JERRY LEWIS, California JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania
JOHN EDWARD PORTER, Illinois NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington
HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky MARTIN OLAV SABO, Minnesota
JOE SKEEN, New Mexico JULIAN C. DIXON, California
FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia VIC FAZIO, California
TOM DeLAY, Texas W. G. (BILL) HEFNER, North Carolina
JIM KOLBE, Arizona STENY H. HOYER, Maryland
RON PACKARD, California ALAN B. MOLLOHAN, West Virginia
SONNY CALLAHAN, Alabama MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio
JAMES T. WALSH, New York DAVID E. SKAGGS, Colorado
CHARLES H. TAYLOR, North Carolina NANCY PELOSI, California
DAVID L. HOBSON, Ohio PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana
ERNEST J. ISTOOK, Jr., Oklahoma THOMAS M. FOGLIETTA, Pennsylvania
HENRY BONILLA, Texas ESTEBAN EDWARD TORRES, California
JOE KNOLLENBERG, Michigan NITA M. LOWEY, New York
DAN MILLER, Florida JOSE E. SERRANO, New York
JAY DICKEY, Arkansas ROSA L. DeLAURO, Connecticut
JACK KINGSTON, Georgia JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia
MIKE PARKER, Mississippi JOHN W. OLVER, Massachusetts
RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey ED PASTOR, Arizona
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi CARRIE P. MEEK, Florida
MICHAEL P. FORBES, New York DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina
GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, Jr., CHET EDWARDS, Texas
Washington
MARK W. NEUMANN, Wisconsin
RANDY ``DUKE'' CUNNINGHAM,
California
TODD TIAHRT, Kansas
ZACH WAMP, Tennessee
TOM LATHAM, Iowa
ANNE M. NORTHUP, Kentucky
ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama
James W. Dyer, Clerk and Staff Director
(ii)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 1998
----------
Thursday, February 27, 1997.
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND
WITNESS
GENERAL GEORGE A. JOULWAN, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES EUROPEAN
COMMAND, U.S. ARMY
Introduction
Mr. Young. Good morning, general. The Committee will come
to order. This morning the Committee is happy to welcome back
General George Joulwan, Commander in Chief, United States
European Command and the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.
General, speaking for the Committee, I want to compliment
you on your tremendous record of leadership. We have been told
that you might be considering retiring later this year.
General Joulwan. Yes.
Mr. Young. That would be the Department of Defense's loss.
You have a tremendous record and we are very, very proud of you
and proud of the record that you have established.
I am also pleased with the way that you have led our
activities in Bosnia. We would like to talk to you about Bosnia
this morning. We have been very, very supportive of all of our
efforts there, although there were some who questioned whether
we should even be there. But once that decision was made, we
have been totally supportive, as I am sure you are well aware.
We are curious about how you see Bosnia today and in the
next few months and the next few years we are concerned also
that, as the Congress has been given proposed dates of exiting
Bosnia, those dates seem to come and go without a lot of
fanfare and U.S. troops are still there.
I would like to hear from you as to what you think might be
the future, what might be an exit strategy, if there is one;
what the effect might be once we are gone. Those are the kinds
of things we are interested in hearing from you today.
You are the first of the four Commanders-in-Chief--CINCS--
who will testify during this appropriation season. And as I
told you earlier, I had been invited to make a visitation with
Secretary Cohen today and tomorrow and I had planned to do that
until I recognized that you were the witness today. I certainly
wanted to be here for your presentation.
Mr. Murtha, do you have any opening comments?
Mr. Murtha. Well, I tell you, we kind of feel you are one
of this Committee, because you have been before the Committee
so many times. But the one thing I have noticed, you get a
bigger staff the longer you are around. It used to be you only
brought one or two people. Now I notice you have got a whole
room full now. Is that because you are doing less work?
General Joulwan. That's right. But they are all in the
back.
Mr. Young. But the room is small. His entourage looks big
because the room is small.
Okay. General, we are very happy to hear from you, sir.
Proceed any way that you like. Your entire statement will be
placed in the record.
Summary Statement of General Joulwan
General Joulwan. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
Representative Murtha, distinguished Members of the National
Security Subcommittee. As always, it is a privilege to appear
before you today to report on the forward deployed and let me
say forward stationed United States European Command--EUCOM--
Forces. And I welcome this opportunity to provide my assessment
of the EUCOM theater of operation, a theater that spans Europe,
the Near East, the northern littoral of Africa and Sub-Saharan
Africa, 83 countries, 13 million square miles and over 1
billion people of different ethnic, religious and economic
conditions.
At the outset, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank this
Committee on behalf of the men and women of EUCOM and their
families for your support of our efforts in Europe and NATO, as
well as in our Areas Of Responsibility--AOR--in Africa and the
Near East.
I have been appearing before this Committee since 1990, and
I am particularly grateful this year for the opportunity to
provide you my assessment of my command, and as you know, Mr.
Chairman, I have a lengthy posture statement which I would like
to enter into the record and then briefly make a few points.
Mr. Young. Yes, sir.
OPERATIONS TEMPO
General Joulwan. The first point, Mr. Chairman, is that
EUCOM continues to experience the highest operations tempo--
OPTEMPO--in its history. U.S. troops are committed to prevent
conflict in the former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia,
enforce a ``No Fly Zone'' against Saddam Hussein in Northern
Iraq and ensure compliance with the Dayton Peace Agreement in
Bosnia.
In the past year, EUCOM has extracted hundreds of civilians
under fire from Liberia, protected Americans in the Central
African Republic and facilitated the return of hundreds of
thousands of refugees in Zaire and Tanzania. Clearly, forward-
deployed and forward-stationed forces give the United States
great flexibility and reach, and EUCOM is demonstrating its
value every day.
Our troops are mission-focused and combat-ready. They are
disciplined forces which have demonstrated the ability to
respond across the entire conflict spectrum. I need your
support in ensuring the contingency supplemental is provided in
time, hopefully by this spring, to maintain EUCOM's high
readiness and standards.
Equally important, Mr. Chairman, is that the forward-
deployed forces engaged in peacetime to shape the environment
and prevent conflict as well as being ready to fight and win.
This proactive conflict prevention strategy includes working
with our allies in NATO, exercising with new partners in the
Partnership for Peace Program and conducting air, land and sea
operations in conjunction with allies and partners as we are
doing in Bosnia. By so doing, we promote trust and confidence,
create stability and prevent crises from developing in the
conflict.
BOSNIA--OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR
The second point, Mr. Chairman, is that Operation JOINT
ENDEAVOR in Bosnia in 1996 exceeded all expectations and laid
the groundwork for lasting peace in Bosnia. Today, Operation
JOINT GUARD, or the Stabilization Force, SFOR, continues to
provide a secure environment for civilian agencies and the
former warring parties to begin the process of reconstruction
and reconciliation. But let me be clear, if I may, to the
members of the National Security Subcommittee.
The NATO-led forces of IFOR and now SFOR can create an
absence of war but cannot establish the peace. Peace depends on
the will of the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina and on the rapid
progress of civilian and nongovernmental organizations. While
some progress has been made, much more needs to be done by the
civilian agencies and the parties themselves in the remaining
16 months of the mandated 18-month SFOR mission.
Again, for clarity, the North Atlantic Council's
instructions to me are for an 18-month mission ending in June
of 1998. But to me it is imperative that we concentrate on what
can be done by many of these civilian agencies in
reconstruction, resettlement, elections, et cetera, in the time
remaining and not just concentrate on what is going to happen
after 18 months.
Let me also point out that the Stabilization Force is truly
a unique force in the annals of military history. SFOR is
multinational with 34 countries making up its force structure
and 25 nations comprising the headquarters. It is the most
multinational headquarters in recent history.
Let me also make clear that U.S. forces in Bosnia are less
than 25 percent of the Stabilization Force. Our NATO allies and
non-NATO nations contribute more than 75 percent of the force,
and I have given you a chart that shows how we are leveraging
our allies and our non-NATO partners in providing forces not
just for Bosnia, but for other contingencies.
Also in Bosnia, we have had great success with intelligence
fusion and intelligence sharing. Information and intelligence
superiority have directly influenced events on the ground and
compliance by the former warring factions. Timely intelligence
is also responsible for force protection of out troops and
rapid response to possible threats.
The third point, Mr. Chairman, is that success in Bosnia is
directly linked to the strategy I discussed with this Committee
in testimony in 1994, the Partnership for Peace Program. I said
then that the intent was to train with former adversaries, and
now new partners to common standards and common procedures in
order to one day conduct missions together. In Bosnia, we have
taken the theory of multinational training and put it into
practice, and it has been successful. And I want to thank you
for your support of this military cooperation program. It truly
works.
Fourth, in Bosnia, the Russian-NATO relationship is still a
good one. Joint U.S. and Russian patrols operate today in the
Brcko area. Recently U.S. Apache gunships were prepared to fire
in defense of Russians who were endangered by one of the former
warring factions.
And in the Brcko arbitration of just two weeks ago, if you
can imagine this, American forces that were maneuvering in
blocking positions were joined by Russian, Turkish, Nordic and
Polish units to prevent conflict and to carry out their
mandate. And as a result, it was a peaceable implementation of
that decision.
And let me just say that from this modest beginning with
Russians in Bosnia, we are creating the trust and confidence so
necessary to build the foundation upon which a future NATO-
Russian and U.S.-Russian security relationship can be built.
As I mentioned last year, I have a three-star Russian
general as a deputy to the Supreme Allied Command to Europe for
Russian forces in Bosnia. He is at my headquarters in Mons,
Belgium, and he has an office in the building that prepared
plans for the contingencies in Berlin during the Cold War.
And you might be interested in that he just returned from
Moscow, where he appeared before the Duma, the Russian
Parliament, for funding and for the extension of the Russian
contingent in Bosnia until June of 1998.
He got both. As you know, this is, indeed, a delicate time
for Russian-NATO relations. Clearly, there are great internal
strains that will take time to work out, but we should not
isolate Russia, but neither should we allow Russia to veto NATO
decisions. But NATO and the United States need to stay engaged
with Russia through this very delicate transition period.
PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE PROGRAMS
The fifth point, Mr. Chairman, is that EUCOM is a total
force command. The Reserve component plays an increasingly
important role in accomplishing EUCOM's diverse missions. It
assists in offsetting the active force in both the operations
tempo, OPTEMPO, and personnel tempo, PERSTEMPO, that we have in
theater. It also provides a tangible example to emerging
democracies in former communist countries of Eastern and
Central Europe with the role of the military in a democratic
political system.
EUCOM is now involved with 21 States of our United States
with 21 emerging democracies in Europe. For example,
Pennsylvania is aligned with Lithuania; California with
Ukraine; Ohio with Hungary; Texas with the Czech Republic;
North Carolina with Moldova, Minnesota with Croatia and Indiana
with Slovakia.
The State Partnership Program is truly low cost and high
payoff and I thank you for your continued support, and I also
thank you for your National Guard and Reserve components who
are doing so well in maintaining this excellent contact.
Likewise, we have a Marshall Center in Germany, which is
another low cost-high payoff initiative. It is now in its third
year and has graduated over 390 mid-level civilian and military
leaders from mainly Eastern and Central European countries. We
already are getting very good returns from the Marshall Center
graduates who are now being appointed to key military and
civilian leadership positions. What the Marshall Center does is
balance what we are doing in exercising on the military side
with education of the role of the military in a democratic
political system.
Also, the IMET Program, the International Military
Education and Training Program, sent 1,200 international
students from the EUCOM theater of operations to the United
States. You should know that the current Chief of Defense, in
other words, General Shalikashvili's equivalent, of the
Hungarian armed forces, is an Army War College graduate from
Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Also the brigade commander of the Czech
rapid reaction brigade, who is now deployed in Bosnia is an
Army War College graduate; and the head of the Hungarian Air
Force is a graduate of the Air Force's Air War College at
Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama. This is a superb program and
I urge and I encourage your continued support.
QUALITY OF LIFE
My last point, Mr. Chairman, is that the quality of life
for our troops and families is an essential part of our
readiness. I am grateful for this Committee's continued support
for a decent quality of life for the forward station force. It
is extremely important, particularly now with our high OPTEMPO,
and the results of this adequate quality of life are evident
not only in mission performance but also in higher reenlistment
rates that we are now experiencing in Europe.
Mr. Chairman, if I sound proud of my troops, I am. We in
Europe have developed a new strategy for a new mission. We have
adapted and adjusted the command and force structure to meet
the challenges of today and tomorrow. NATO, too, has adapted to
the realities of a new Europe and to new risk. Not only is NATO
bringing peace to Bosnia, but NATO is also engaged in this new
relationship with Russia and with 27 different partner nations.
In my opinion, Mr. Chairman, the United States must
continue to stay engaged in Europe politically, economically
and also militarily. We have reduced our force structure in
Europe by over 200,000 personnel and by billions of dollars.
However, the current command and force structure of about
100,000 needs to be maintained in order for continued U.S.
leadership and influence in NATO; to leverage the assets of our
allies and new partners; to promote professionalism within the
militaries of the new democracies emerging in Eastern and
Central Europe; to prevent crises from developing into conflict
and to shape the external environment to promote U.S.
interests, values and ideals.
To do so reduces the danger of war and preserves peace,
freedom and democracy. To do so ensures a better life for our
children and for our grandchildren.
Mr. Chairman, I am excited and optimistic about the future.
We have an historic opportunity and we cannot, and we must not,
and with your support we will not, fail.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I am prepared now to
respond to your questions.
[The statement of General Joulwan follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Young. General, thank you very much for an excellent
statement. The members of this Committee are also extremely
proud of our troops, the way they have carried out their
mission, the way it has been done with very few casualties of
any type. That makes us very proud of them as usual, but we are
also very proud of you and your leadership that organized the
effort and made sure that the mission was carried out properly.
We have a new member of this Committee, Congressman
Cunningham, at the end of the table on that side and
Congressman Visclosky has just returned to the Committee. Duke
Cunningham has been very patient in all of our meetings being
at the end of the table. He is always the last one to be
recognized so at this point I am going to yield the Chairman's
first 5 minutes to Congressman Cunningham for the first round
of questioning.
Mr. Cunningham. I have never had this happen before in my
life. Once in jail, always in jail.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman, but that is not necessary if you
had questions for General Joulwan. I will be happy to wait,
sir.
Mr. Young. Take it while you can. This may not happen again
for a long time.
FISCAL YEAR 1997 EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL
Mr. Cunningham. Usually, you are allowed time to get your
thoughts together. So I will try.
General Joulwan, the supplemental is very important and I
don't think there are many Members that won't support it. But
as you are well aware, the Services have really had to bite the
bullet on coughing up dollars out of their own funds, out of
their budgets. That has really hurt.
The supplemental that you are asking for, I think it is
accurate to see exactly what the total costs are that the
services are having to put forward. Not only that, but the
total cost to this country of what these ``exercises'', I will
use a light term, exercises are doing.
For example, what does it cost to steam the carriers, the
airlifts out of Italy, the total cost, not just what we are
taking out of the Services, because in a budget, when we are
trying to tie in--all of this is tied together in the balanced
budget and you need to know what the real costs are. And it is
my contention, my opinion, that the President is asking for a
$4.8 billion cut in defense, but yet we need a supplement. That
just is not logical.
Secondly, General Shalikashvili, in his memo, stated that
Service Chiefs specified that we needed to go to a $60 billion
modernization budget. In the President's budget, 70 percent of
the cuts come in the outyears and we keep pushing the purchase
of all of our equipment to the right, as well as combat
support. It's that support which you need to do your job, and
its all pushed out into the outyears.
Now, any logical and rational person knows that there is no
way that those that do not support national security over
social programs are going to reduce social programs in the
outyears when 70 percent of the cuts come, and at the same time
increase defense spending.
So I think it is--the reason I am asking the question, I am
trying to get a real handle on what our real costs are, sir.
That is why I would like a complete estimate, not just what it
is costing us on this.
IRANIAN PRESENCE IN BOSNIA
I have read a lot of documents and have had a briefing from
our Intelligence Community. There is a dispute on the number of
Mujahadin and Hamas within Bosnia, but isn't it--even if there
is a lower number than I believe that is actually the case,
isn't there an increased presence from Islamic groups from
Iran, and that their long-term strategy is to wait this out and
build up the Islamic forces around Izetbegovic believing that
the U.S. is going to pull out? Because when I have talked to
some of the Islamic people from that area, they all said that
they expect the U.S. to pull out. And Iran will always be
there. So Iran is attempting to establish a tie and that tie is
going to be a very dangerous tie long-term for us?
General Joulwan. ------. What we want to do, I think, by
our policies and it is really in the political side, is to try
to wean the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government away from Iran and
the dominance of Iran. I think that is much more than just
military. I think it is economic, it is social, it is political
relationships that we need to try to develop.
I would urge continued contact with the Government of
Bosnia-Herzegovina so that it does not go back to Iran. And I
think that takes a comprehensive strategy in order to do that.
That is much more than just military.
Mr. Cunningham. I agree. And I think it is one of our long-
term problems, not only with terrorism in Europe, but in the
United States as well. And I would love to give you a book
written by Bodanski, which is from a Serb perspective. It lists
by names the personnel and position, and also which
humanitarian offices over there they are using.
General Joulwan. Yes.
Mr. Cunningham. These offices are used to cover and hide a
lot of these people. Another tactic is getting them married to
Bosnian women. And I look at our world-wide threat of
terrorism, and I think it is a real problem if we don't do
exactly what you said.
General Joulwan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cunningham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Cunningham.
Let me yield to an old friend of yours that you worked with
for a long time, Mr. Murtha.
TURKEY
Mr. Murtha. General, I am looking at the map in the area of
responsibility that you have, and Turkey seems to be moving in
the wrong direction. Is that just a perception I am getting or
are they moving in the wrong direction?
General Joulwan. We are concerned about Turkey and the
whole Aegean area. And on the positive side, they are very
active, as is Greece, in Bosnia. ------.
ISRAEL
Mr. Murtha. I have always been concerned that this line is
drawn right here right next to Israel. I am talking about the
line that you have responsibility for and don't. Is that the
right place to draw the line? Is that the right delineation of
responsibility there?
General Joulwan. We have discussed this often and, in fact,
I have now established in my EUCOM hat staff talks and next
week, Central Command will be coming to Stuttgart and we are
talking back and forth across that boundary.
When I was in Israel, let me just give you my personal
experience, I asked that question to, at that time, Prime
Minister Peres, and though the threat is from the East, the
values, ideals and their linkage is to the West. And so NATO is
very much looking at a Mediterranean initiative that will
include all of the countries of the Mediterranean. ------. So I
think it is a good one. We are always looking for different
ways, but I think in this case I would leave it as it is.
BOSNIA DEPLOYMENT
Mr. Murtha. I noticed, we extended the time of 13 months--
or 18 months more for Bosnia. Of course, I opposed vigorously
the original deployment until the President made up his mind
and once he made up his mind then I went along with it.
I knew from talking to you over there that there was a good
chance that it was going to be extended. But I got the
impression the fighting may not start--restart in Bosnia, that
they really wanted peace. And what you said, I think, is
absolutely true, that these folks were worn out. The land had
been exchanged and they wanted peace.
Is it absolutely essential that we stay over there for
another 18 months?
General Joulwan. Congressman, what we are about ready to do
now is the most difficult part. We have separated the forces,
as you know, by 4 kilometers. We transferred land. We put the
heavy weapons in the storage areas and there was an election
conducted and they demobilized many of their forces. The
difficult part is now.
Now, what is happening is the return of refugees for
resettlement and this will determine whether Bosnia Herzegovina
becomes a multiethnic, multicultural state again, and this is
the challenge that we are going to face. The secure environment
for that to take place is provided by the Stabilization Force,
SFOR. And it is a stabilization, not an implementation. So I
think there is going to be some need in the next--for the next
16 months now of the 18-month mandated mission for forces to be
there.
Conflict is right beneath the surface, and I--and it is a
very delicate stage of having people return to their homes,
particularly when they go into what we would call minority
areas, where they are the minority, is going to be a great
challenge. And I just visited recently and saw this in
operation, and there is a great deal of tension. And what SFOR
does is provide time for this wound to heal and that is why I
think, in 18 months, we should know where we are--a much better
sense of where we are in that respect.
Mr. Murtha. Well, why is it that the Europeans can't do
this? I know we originally went over there. They said we don't
need your advice; we don't need your help. Then they came to
the conclusion they couldn't do it without the United States.
What is that we bring to the table that--we only have 25
percent of the forces. Why do we have to have 25 percent of the
forces over there?
General Joulwan. I would like to say leadership in what we
are trying to do. There is some of that. But also the
credibility and the weight of the United States of America.
Don't underestimate what that means in terms of trying to
ensure compliance with a treaty or continued progress in the
process in resettlement, reconstruction, elections.
Mr. Murtha. You are being nice, though. Is it that the
Europeans can't deal with each other? Is that what the problem
is? They need leadership? I can't figure this out.
General Joulwan. Well, first of all, the Europeans wanted
NATO to come in, and the United States is a key member of NATO.
For NATO to have a NATO-led force, where they have an American
as the Supreme Allied Commander it would be difficult not to
have forces involved. So for a NATO-led operation, it makes
sense.
In this case, though, I think the key point is, it is only
25 percent. In the past, it might have been 85 percent.
TRAINING BOSNIA MUSLIMS
Mr. Murtha. One last question now. We are training the
Muslims. Europeans don't like us training the Muslims. They
think that there is balance before you start training the
Muslims. A lot of people in this country think we ought to be
training the Muslims. I am not one of them.
Now, what does this do? We have a couple brigades that are
well trained. Is this going to change the balance of power over
there in that area?
General Joulwan. I think it will balance the balance of
power. When we first started all of that--by the way, that is
part of Dayton. It is not something just the U.S. is in.
Mr. Murtha. I understand.
General Joulwan. This is part of Dayton. When we started
it, the preponderance of heavy weapons belonged to the Serbs, I
mean by a factor of--there were 500 tanks on the Serb side to
less than 100 on the other side.
Mr. Murtha. But that is not tank country.
General Joulwan. They did more damage with tanks over there
firing point blank into buildings that had civilians in it than
anything else. Artillery didn't do that much damage. They were
firing from 40 positions around Sarajevo point blank using the
tanks just like you use a rifle.
Mr. Murtha. They used it as artillery, in other words?
General Joulwan. Well, they used it in direct fire in the
buildings. I mean, they would aim right into a building, and it
was very accurate fire.
They pulled out--when we put in the bombing campaign in
September with precision bombing, 250 heavy weapons came out
just from around Sarajevo. So there has to be some balance.
Now, I think the idea is not to overdo it and to make sure
that what you are doing is for defensive purposes. And I must
say, the arm--the training and equip is a program, but I am not
involved in it.
Mr. Murtha. I understand that.
General Joulwan. But I think if you keep it in balance with
the arms control part of annex 1B of the Dayton Treaty, I think
it can work, but it needs to be watched.
And by the way, there are 10 to 15 other countries involved
now, not just the United States, in arm and equip.
Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Murtha.
Mr. McDade, the Vice Chairman of the full Appropriations
Committee.
IDENTIFICATION OF MINES IN BOSNIA
Mr. McDade. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
General, let me extend my personal welcome to you. It is a
privilege to see you here today and to work with you again.
I feel badly that you will be leaving the service, I guess
in the summertime, and I want you to know you carry with you
the best wishes of the Committee. You have done a superb job.
We knew you would with Congressman Murtha as a partner, may I
say to you, but you have really--I remember reading about the
number of mines in Bosnia, there was some fantastic figure, X
number of millions.
General Joulwan. Millions.
Mr. McDade. I forget how many and predictions about the
number of youngsters who were going to be maimed and injured,
killed, because of this proliferation of mines. And I don't
know how you have handled it, but I am sure you have handled
it. How have you handled it?
General Joulwan. Well, first of all, we started a very
intense identification campaign. Where are the mines? And the
best people to get were the parties themselves that laid the
mines. Then we started a very deliberate program of getting
those who laid the mines to remove them.
Now, it started to go fairly well at the beginning. It has
not gone as well in the past I would say, 6 months. Now, what
we have done is restricted the training. In other words, if--
they have to get permission, these former warring factions to
go train. If they don't have a plan to remove mines, we don't
let them out to train. So we put some emphasis in that area.
There are many nongovernmental organizations that are now
involved and there is a mine awareness center in Bosnia that is
trying to catalog all of these mines.
Mr. McDade. Who runs that, General?
General Joulwan. I think it is a U.N. agency, but I will--
it is a private organization.
Mr. McDade. Are they doing a good job?
General Joulwan. They are doing a good job, but we still
have a lot of mines, if I can be very candid, and we must get
rid of them. In terms of the technology we put into space and
elsewhere we haven't put it into mines, but that is coming. It
is going to take a little bit longer, but we are now seeing
some technology come on board.
Mr. McDade. I forget where I picked up a piece of
information that related to percentage of youngsters in Vietnam
who were injured because of mines and body traps and it was
something like 60 percent of the casualties, isn't it?
General Joulwan. A great number. I don't know the
percentage, but a lot.
Mr. McDade. I don't know the exact number either, but it
was astonishing to me so many of our people got injured and
dreadfully injured by those things.
General Joulwan. The other piece that we do, Congressman,
is that in my U.S. hat I make everyone going there to Bosnia go
through a 3-month training program before they go into theater.
And one of the key elements of that is mine awareness. And so
there is a great deal of emphasis. And the discipline--this is
not a peacekeeping operation. This is a peace enforcement. This
is tough business.
You go down there and it is not--particularly out along the
zone of separation, this is tough business. And the troops got
their head in the game. I just came back from Brcko which is
surrounded by mines, by the way.
The other thing which has really helped us, and I must
credit Secretary Perry, when he first visited me a year ago, he
said, ``what do you need?'' And I said, armored humvees. And we
now have humvees that are armored, just about all of our
vehicles that go out on patrols. And just last week, a U.S.
patrol hit a mine, blew the heck out of the armored humvee and
the only damage to the American: he had a little hearing loss
for a few hours.
So our technology and what we are trying to do, training,
discipline of the force and I hope we can keep that going. We
cannot have soldier complacency, and every time we have a
rotation of forces we try to reinforce the importance of mines.
I might say that civilians, however, are getting--are
becoming casualties as more and more return and we are trying
to get smarter in working with the nongovernmental
organizations to--particularly the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, or UNHCR, and warning people coming
back.
Mr. McDade. Do you have any idea what percentages of the
mines remain in place given say the 9 million? Do you have any
idea?
General Joulwan. I would say the vast majority of them.
Mr. McDade. You still have a long way to go?
General Joulwan. A long way to go.
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE (UAV)
Mr. McDade. Let me ask you another question. Your command
was the first to use a new reconnaissance asset in a low-level
intensity conflict and I remember a demonstration that we saw
on one occasion. Evaluate the importance of that for the
Committee, will you?
General Joulwan. If we are talking the UAV and the Airborne
Reconnaissance Low, superb. The UAV, the Predator has really
come into its own. There is still some work we have to do in
getting it into all-weather sort of things, but it really has
helped us.
It is a very good asset.
Mr. McDade. Have you sufficient assets to do the job you
need in that department?
General Joulwan. I believe so, Congressman. What is most
important is we can downlink from the UAV into the battalion
Terminal Access Controller, TAC, into a battalion TAC operation
center. So the battalion commander, lieutenant colonel, can
dynamically task the UAV flying up ahead.
We also have at the Combined Air Operation Center that I
run out of Vicenza, and therefore it is allied supported as
well, we use. When we had Joint Surveillance Target Attack
Radar, Joint STARS there, we had Airborne Warning and Control
System AWACS, the UAV, Airborne RECCE LOW, we put a system of
systems together and so they could cue back and forth. And so
if we saw a violation occurring or we saw a movement occurring,
we could quickly respond and that information dominance in this
sort of operation really helps. And so we are learning every
day.
I am very pleased not only with the platforms themselves,
but how we can get them down to the lowest level, in this case,
a battalion.
Mr. McDade. Thanks for the explanation. My time has
expired. Thank you, General. Nice to see you.
General Joulwan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murtha. I was just asking the Chairman, Commanders--
aren't they saying that there is a problem with this system,
they are not getting the satellite feed the way they are
supposed to?
General Joulwan. It has been working. We have had a problem
with icing during the winter, the cold weather, and we are
trying to work that out.
Mr. Murtha. That is a connection between the satellite and
what--but it is working?
General Joulwan. It is working and we have had good results
with it in being able to cue it.
Mr. Hobson. If the gentleman would yield, when I was there,
they had a couple of them out there but they weren't flying
them because the weather was a problem. They also had some
mechanical problems. They were waiting for the next system that
they thought would really be good, whatever the name of that
one is. I don't know what it is.
General Joulwan. Well, there were two different systems.
One is called Pioneer. The other is called Predator. The
Predator, at least every indication I have, is working
extremely well. We have had some problems with it in weather.
Mr. Murtha. Let us get something on that for the record.
General Joulwan. All right.
[Clerk's note.--The Department did not provide a response
for the record.]
Mr. McDade. Let me just ask one follow-up question since I
raised the issue. You say weather. What we hear, what we know
about Bosnia, is that the weather is always bad. So if the
weather constrains the use of that asset, how good is it?
General Joulwan. Well, we are working on a de-icer. When it
flies and there is no de-icer on-board-capability; it has
difficulties. So when it is icing conditions, it has got
problems.
Mr. McDade. Low visibility isn't bothering it? It can get
down?
General Joulwan. It can get down fairly low.
Mr. Cunningham. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. McDade. Yes.
Mr. Cunningham. I went through the plant this last weekend
and what they are doing is putting it in the leading edge and
then they are leaching out a fluid that de-ices the thing.
Also, with the radar, they can actually see through the clouds
now and find targets and so on. So it is a pretty good system.
Mr. Young. General, our next Member is fresh from the
operating table so go easy on him. We are glad to have Mr.
Obey, the Ranking Member of the full Appropriations Committee.
RUSSIAN REACTION TO NATO EXPANSION
Mr. Obey. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, I would simply like to ask you roughly the same
thing that I asked General Shalikashvili yesterday and the
Secretary of Defense. I have grave misgivings about the
administration's intentions to expand NATO. I am confident they
are going to get a deal with the Russians. I think in the end
Yeltsin will wind up signing on.
But my concern is that while Yeltsin may buy on because we
may give him a little cover, I am afraid that that has the
potential of being greatly exploited by future hard-line
nationalist politicians who in different circumstances,
political or economic, could play a pretty mean card by saying
that they were, quote ``duped by the West.''
I am also concerned about the fact that it may, in fact,
make it more difficult to actually achieve Russian ratification
of arms control treaties that we have signed with them, both
existing treaties and even new treaties, even though we may
offer them some sweetener in terms of further reductions on
conventional arms.
Do you have any concerns at all about the additional
opportunities that might present those who within Russia might
want to resist signing those arms control agreements?
General Joulwan. Congressman, let me answer it this way if
I may: Basically, it is a political question of whether NATO
enlarges from its present 16 members or not. In retrospect, if
you go back in 1951, the North Atlantic Council originally was
12 nations. It enlarged to 16 over the next 30 years. Article X
of the 1949 Washington Treaty that established NATO, Article X
allows for sovereign nations to apply for membership. That,
then, must go through the 16 Parliaments, Congresses, et
cetera.
I think that applying for membership should be--is a
sovereign right of any sovereign nation, so I think applying
for membership is one thing. The impact it would have on
Russia, I think, needs to be closely looked at. From a geo-
strategic point of view I would say that if many of these
nations that we talked about are members, it provides stability
on Russia's western flank, not instability, which is part of
their concern. So I am not so much concerned about Russia's
thinking that somehow they are at a military disadvantage
because of this. It doesn't hold water when you do the
analysis.
Whether the countries that we are talking about for
membership come in or not, again, it is a political decision,
but they are sharing the risk with NATO right now in Bosnia.
They have forces on the ground. They are demonstrating shared
values. Some of these countries have reached out to their
neighbors and now have treaties with their neighbors, are
demonstrating that they really want to create the values and
ideals of the alliance as well. So I would say they ought to at
least be heard.
Whether the political side will accept them, that is
another dimension. But we do have, NATO has, a very active
program now of consultation with Russia. The Secretary General
has just met on Sunday with Primakov in Brussels. The month
before he was in Moscow. There is talk of a Russian NATO
charter that is being looked at.
So I think every attempt is made to reach out to Russia; at
the same time not allowing some sort of Russian veto of what
NATO is trying to do.
I don't see it as a threat. I think in many cases, it can
bring stability to the region.
JOINT NATO-RUSSIAN BRIGADE
Mr. Obey. I guess I would simply say that I think letting
Spain into an organization is somewhat less troubling to Russia
than having countries near their border being new found members
of a Western alliance.
I am also concerned about the fact that if you are
Ukrainian or if you are living in Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania
or any of those areas that, in fact, if we add Poland and some
other first slice countries, that it creates at least the
potential for added Russian pressure on those folks who are not
allowed into NATO at first blush and might, in fact, create
problems for them down the line, but I recognize that is a
political judgment.
Let me ask you this, Secretary Albright just floated this
idea of a joint NATO-Russian brigade as part of the sweeteners
package that I was talking bout. Is that a workable idea? How
much would it cost the U.S.? What kind of capability, in your
best professional judgment, do the Russians have to finance
that given their military problems at the time?
Is NATO liable to wind up being stuck with all of the
costs, except for payment of the troops, the Russian troops,
and were you consulted prior to that announcement?
General Joulwan. The answer is, no, but we are working now
trying to determine what are the limits of this initiative that
we have discussed. We have discussed, as part of this, how to
evolve from what we are doing in Bosnia, which may have led to
this discussion.
What we need to do is build on this, this relationship,
that we have. We have a Russian brigade in Bosnia now, working
within a multinational division, headed by an American major
general division commander. We need to build on that.
I have personally attended lessons-learned seminars in St.
Petersburg and we are going to have one in April at the
Marshall Center in Germany.
So I think we are building on this, and the intent is, can
we work together in a way to be able to respond to similar
crises by developing a unit that can help? But we haven't taken
it to the level of a NATO-Russian brigade, We are just doing
the fundamental work here. The costing has to be done. What
equipment, the interoperability of that equipment, all of that
is yet to be done.
Mr. Obey. I would simply say that in Defense News, there is
an article on this subject which contains the following
paragraphs: Quote, ``What the hell is going on? a military
planner chief told Defense News February 21st. We have already
got a very good model of cooperation with Russia and SFOR, but
the Russians must still learn to walk before they can run, said
the planner. A joint brigade is way beyond what we can offer
right now.'' And it says, ``one U.S. official admitted that
even the issue of financing the joint brigade could be
problematic for the alliance in view of the Russians' military
chronic cash shortage.''
Do you have any----
[The article follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
General Joulwan. I have seen that article. I am trying to
find who said that at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers
Europe, SHAPE.
Mr. Obey. But is he really wrong?
General Joulwan. Well, I think it is an overreaction. I
don't want to belabor the Committee, Mr. Chairman, but I have
spent a lot of time with the Russians trying to get through
this suspicion and fear they have of NATO. And it truly is
something that has been developed over 45 or 50 years or maybe
even longer, and we have got to figure out a way to have this
dialogue And the best thing going for us is what we are doing
with the military--the military cooperation.
We have got to build on that. And if it takes some
initiatives that we are seeing in Bosnia. If we could work this
three-star general I have in Mons, Belgium, trying to work
together, seminars, and at the point, if we ever get to that
point, if we could work out all the details, some way to train
together, I think that, to me, is the way we need to go. But we
are having a heck of a time getting through this suspicion and
fear. And so we need to find ways to do that.
The reaction by this officer at SHAPE, I think, was an
overreaction. I think if you talk to most of the people there,
they are very pleased with the contingent of Russian officers.
I would like to see, for example, NATO send a similar
delegation to Moscow to work in their general staff to start to
build this relationship.
We know how to fight. If you want to come back, I know how
to do that. But what we have to be able to do--how can we
prevent conflict? And that is not a weak way, that is not a
weak response. We have a hundred thousand white crosses that I
am responsible for in 21 cemeteries in Europe that we have
allowed in this century, two World Wars to develop, and I am
trying to figure out how to prevent another one. And the way
you do that is to outreach and try to have some dialogue from a
position of strength. And from our relationship and the United
States' relationship, we have spent 45 years developing this
great thing called NATO. Now is the time--the mission
continues. It doesn't end with the collapse of a Berlin Wall,
and Russia is the key.
If we could somehow reach out to Russia and include them in
what we are doing, not giving them a veto, not running scared
if they say this country or that country can't come in, but
work with them in a way to bring about what I think is going to
be required, that is just trust and confidence, and that may
mean a NATO-Russian brigade at some point, but we are not there
now.
Mr. Young. General, I want to ask you to clarify something.
Mr. Obey asked you two questions and you answered, no, and I
wanted to make sure which question you were answering, no, to.
I think it was the question about whether Secretary Albright
had consulted with you or had anyone consulted with you before
she made the proposal. And you answered, no. Was it, no to that
question?
General Joulwan. On the specific of the NATO-Russian
brigade. we had been talking about how to work together with
their military, but in terms of a NATO-Russian brigade, no.
Mr. Young. Okay. Mr. Lewis.
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING
Mr. Lewis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, General. Blessed are the peacemakers. You know,
often we forget that that is very much what you are about and
you articulated that, I think, very well.
In your statement, you make reference to the International
Military Education and Training, IMET. Often times we hear, get
distorted in the way we review programs like that, I remember
early in my own career here, much of our debate flowed around
Central America and Latin America and IMET kind of got a
negative cast here in the mind's eye of many, and yet the point
that you are making about confidence among Russian military
people and that longstanding lack of confidence in one another,
suspicion of one another, it would seem to me that programs
like IMET affecting those other countries in Eastern Europe,
those that were part of the Soviet Union, allows us, perhaps,
avenues for impact that could be very important. Those
exchanges, it seems to me, should be raised in priority. Could
you just elaborate a bit on that?
General Joulwan. Absolutely, Congressman. In fact, I will
give you a very good example General Vegh, is the Hungarian
Chief of Defense. In one year he has totally transformed the
Hungarian military under his leadership. He is a graduate, as I
said, of the Army War College in Carlisle. He has come to see
me on several occasions. He has appointed an Air Force fellow
from Maxwell, a graduate of Maxwell. He has completely
revolutionized that country's military at a critical time in
their development, and that is all through IMET.
We see this throughout most of these countries of Eastern
and Central Europe. It is a way to instill not just technical
training, but ideals and values that are going to be very
important, I think, for the future. This is a different culture
that they have been under for so many years, and the way you
change it is by using things, initiatives, like IMET. High
payoff, low cost.
EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL
Mr. Lewis. Technically IMET doesn't fall under the
jurisdiction of this subcommittee, but the overlap is obvious.
You mentioned that 25 percent, we have 25 percent of the
forces in Bosnia, yet we have a supplemental up here that
involves $2.5 billion. It is very clear that money is fungible
and that puts pressure on all of the rest of the services. As
we go about responding to the President's request, we are
shrinking the overall budget. Any comment? Ninety percent of
the cost is ours over there anyway, isn't it? Maybe not.
General Joulwan. Well, I would say that what I see of the
multinational force, that we have leveraged it. Many of these
countries are participating at great cost to them, both in
manpower and in dollars or whatever their currency is. This is
a great step forward, and I feel very privileged to be the
overall operational commander, not just for U.S. forces, but
for this multinational force who have put their trust in us
here that we are going to do it right. And they are as
concerned about their young men and women as we are, and they
have put their people and their treasure into this in
comparative numbers given some of these small nations.
It is a very clear statement, I think, that they really
want this to be solved. So I think it could add up to dollar
amounts. I don't think it is 90 percent of the cost. I think it
is much less than that, but the comparative cost by some of
these nations--in fact, I figured it out for Norway. For their
initial contribution, we would have to have over 150,000, in
the comparative sense, given their population.
So these nations have contributed, and that includes,
Russia, the Ukraine, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and
Austria also Finland, Sweden, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, all
have joined us in this endeavor.
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE
Mr. Lewis. In the meantime, we do have real money pressures
here, the request to reduce the budget, et cetera. So we just
need to put all of that in perspective and that is part of what
this exchange is about.
Operationally, I just have a minor problem. Some on the
Committee would suggest that I have heard of UAVs before. But
in Bosnia, there really has been a demonstration project of the
potential of the future there.
For example, we were able through Predator to assess the
bomb damage that took place there. We knew, for example, that
the Serb tanks weren't being withdrawn, et cetera, so in many
occasions it has been very, very valuable. But it was mentioned
that weather is a problem and the wet wings need, in terms of
technological development, is very real.
Currently, you may or may not be sensitive to this, but
currently, the Air Force, who is managing the program, is not
volunteering Predator as often as we used to get its services
and specifically they are resisting testing wet wings in the
Bosnia theater. That frankly, I think, would decelerate how
quickly we can put that technology into place and I would urge
you to focus on that if you haven't had a chance to.
General Joulwan. I will.
Mr. Lewis. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Young. Mr. Skeen.
TERRORISM THREAT
Mr. Skeen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, I want to congratulate you and express my
appreciation for the service that you have given this country
and the intelligence that you have used in trying to come up
with something in a meaningful solution to some of the
worldwide problems. That is a heavy load and I am sure that
your shoulders are going to snap back up in place after you get
that load off of it after a while. I hope that you enjoy your
retirement and whoever your area commander is, they will be
glad to have you there.
I wanted to ask you, one of the major concerns that we have
is the protection of our troops against foreign terrorist
attacks in that theater of operations. What is going on to
assure that we don't have any losses like we did in Saudi?
General Joulwan. We are working that very hard,
Congressman. We are very much involved in on-site inspections.
I have an oversight group that meets at my headquarters in
EUCOM. They watch us very closely, every deployment that we
make.
We are using technology, as was mentioned, to the best of
our ability as well. We have something called a--for want of a
better term--a ``blue dart message.'' I have a Joint Analysis
Center in Molesworth and we have a cell in there that is
concentrated on intelligence and terrorist intelligence that
relates to the troops. And what I found in the past in other
areas that we have been involved in over the past 30 years,
that somehow an analyst gets this good report, but the troops
that need it don't get it in time. So I time them now. They
have minutes to get it down there to the troops and not analyze
it to death. And we run drills on this.
Now, I hate to be that positive because you never know, if
terrorists are determined they really have the advantage. But
we are doing everything we can to try to take that advantage
away from them.
Mr. Skeen. Very typical situation, and I understand that.
That is why I am particularly interested in the response
because it is a huge problem to try to close up all the holes
in the sieve.
General Joulwan. But to me, it is a discipline problem,
mental awareness. That is why we go through this training
program when we go into Bosnia. We have a deployment today
taking forces into Liberia. We put a joint task force together.
They are taking Africans in to control the situation, rather
than Americans. And we went through a force protection drill.
Before they deployed, that risk assessment was done. They
deployed with proper protection and intelligence and so we go
through this for every deployment.
Now, you can't reduce the risk to zero, but you can reduce
the risk and it is the leadership, it is the discipline of the
soldier, it is using technology, and it is getting the mission
right, all of that before you deploy.
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE
Mr. Skeen. I would like to put in a word for the UAVs as
well. Mr. Lewis here on the left, and I have a co-
responsibility. They are producing them in his district, but
they are testing them in ours in a Desert Sands exercise. It
has been phenomenal. I watched the utilization and the
operation, and it is just amazing.
General Joulwan. The key is we are using them now. I used
to command the first of the 26th Infantry many, many, years
ago. I went into their tactical operations center with
Secretary Perry in November. They are set up in the Posavina
corridor in the zone of separation, smack dab in the middle of
it, one operations center better than anything I could ever do.
And one thing that they have the ability to do is to
request and get information at the battalion level. So when he
has a patrol going out, he has a way to either cover it or give
it intelligence. They have a little intelligence fusion center
there. And the UAV gives it a capability that we never had
before.
Now, we have some product improvement as we go along and we
have got to do that. The Airborne RECCE LOW is another platform
that I helped develop when I was in Panama. This you could put
non-U.S. on board. I have tried to take NOFORN away; and
encourage foreign release of certain intelligence.
If we are going to work with these people that contribute
to troops, we have got to figure out a way to share
intelligence. And so I am trying to get a system that we could
put on board. Now, you could put foreigners on board these
planes or allies and they could actually see a digital readout
when they are flying over the zone of separation. Where you
have a problem, you could put three of the warring factions on
there.
So we need systems that give me that capability to dominate
the intelligence and the information that is every bit as
important as having tanks and Bradleys and ships and all of
that on the field. And we are getting much better now. We have
learned a heck of a lot in Bosnia, and I really appreciate the
contribution the UAV is making.
Mr. Young. Mr. Skeen, thank you very much.
Mr. Dicks.
MISSILE DEFENSE
Mr. Dicks. General, I want to compliment you on the great
job you have done. I was interested in your statement today.
One of the things I remember is Congressman Murtha and members
of this Committee who went out to the Gulf War and the
vulnerability that we felt to theater missiles, to the SCUDS,
and you started to think that if the Iraqis possessed accurate
SCUDS with either chemical or biological weapons, nuclear
weapons, they could have done incredible destruction to us.
One, we couldn't target the launch. We couldn't find them.
They used very sophisticated denial and deception techniques,
and number two, we didn't have an adequate system to defend our
troops in the field.
Now, as I read your statement, you say the active defense
portion of this theater missile defense framework must be
capable of providing precision engagement and full dimensional
protection against weapons of mass destruction in support of
out-of-area operations, as well as wide area defense to protect
U.S. and allied interests. Our current capabilities are not
adequate to meet the challenges of the future, particularly in
our southern region along the Mediterranean and in the Middle
East.
Tell me what you think we need to do that we are not doing
and give me your assessment here.
General Joulwan. We need a system of systems, Congressman.
We need to be able to not just look at what I call the boost
phase, the mid-course and terminal phase of an incoming
missile. All of that is important. We have got to also look at
the shooter.
I would like to have systems that give us intelligence of
when we have a missile system coming in, some event or some
other intelligence means and then a means to go after the
shooter and refires before they can come back to us. That's the
first one.
The other thing, the Medium Extended Air Defense System
MEADS, that we have, are not allied. Italy and Germany have
joined us in this endeavor. That is very positive. They are
helping us in the developmental costs and the research and the
procurement of this system. Excellent. We need to do the same
thing in theater missile defense.
Mr. Dicks. This would deploy with our moving forces, right?
General Joulwan. Yes.
Mr. Dicks. And give air defense to the brigade or the
division?
General Joulwan. Yes, exactly.
Mr. Dicks. General Peay tells me over and over again that
this is one thing that he worries about that we are moving to
the right and we are not as aggressive about this as we ought
to be.
General Joulwan. I fought for MEADS. I think it is okay
now. From what I understand, it is on track. Theater high
Altitude Air defense, THAAD, is another piece of that, but you
have to look at the whole system of systems for not only the
terminal and not only the mid-course and the boost, but also
for getting the missile before they shoot. Therefore, the
command and control of this system is very important; that you
have a command and control system that can move quickly,
because, as you know, this can happen within minutes and you
need a command and control system that is responsive. I am
working on something in Ramstein called an Air Operations
Center. I have been working theater missile defense now since
1985.
Mr. Dicks. Right.
General Joulwan. So what we are trying to answer is, how do
you command and control it? And what we are trying to do in the
southern region of NATO that you mentioned--and let me be very
clear, Libya is part of the problem, because with their reach,
they could reach much of NATO in time.
Iraq, when we put the time lines in it, if technology
continues to develop, can reach much of NATO.
Therefore, NATO is looking at theater missile defense as an
alliance system, and I would encourage that.
So there are things that are being developed that are
beyond just the missile, that include command and control that
are every bit as essential to the conduct of an operation as
the missile itself.
Mr. Dicks. All right. Let me just--not to bore my
colleagues, but let me just give you another idea that I have
had on this thing.
When you look back at the Gulf War, one of the true assets
we had was the F-117, stealth aircraft, and if you could have
stealth aircraft with Link 16, the ------?
General Joulwan. That is right.
Mr. Dicks. My view of this is that you can do this with F-
117s and eventually, when we get the weapons on in the block 30
upgrade on the B-2, you have another capability to use this
bomber to come in and attack these targets, to go after the
surface-to-air missiles, say, with Joint Standoff Weapon JSOW,
go after SCUDs with sensor-fused weapon or these 2,000 pound
bombs, to go after relocatables, but it seems to me that that
gives you the offensive side of it. But you still need to
develop this umbrella system, this theater missile defense
system so you can actually defend the fields and defend the
forces. And if you could put those two systems together you
would then be able to have a very dynamic ability to, one,
protect the force, but also attack these targets.
General Joulwan. Exactly right. That is what we are trying
to develop. That is why I called it a system of systems. The
problem is we have talked about an offensive and then another
group has talked about a defense. You have to get them
together.
Mr. Dicks. You have to do both.
General Joulwan. That is what we have done. I have been
trying this since 1985 and we are close. But the
communications, the command-and-control piece, is equally
difficult, because you are talking about offensive and defense,
and you are trying to put them both together. And we now are
experimenting with that at Ramstein AB today.
JSTARS AIRCRAFT
Mr. Dicks. How about JSTARS, how has JSTARS been
performing?
General Joulwan. JSTARS, we just had a deployment in
November and December. JSTARS demonstrated its worth, in my
opinion, in Bosnia. It has put the zone of separation on its
maps and gave us great information back. And it has been used
as a cueing platform that I talked about, and it goes to your
question of theater missile defense.
The other thing I would put into the equation is the UAV.
If you have a region or an area, and you could task a UAV to go
to that area, it could find the target for you and you can cue
shooters in to be able to take it out.
We are on the verge of doing that now out of this Combined
Air Operations Center and we have learned a great deal about
how to put these systems together.
Mr. Dicks. If you would give me one second.
Mr. Young. One more second.
JOINT INTELLIGENCE CENTER
Mr. Dicks. One more comment.
I went to Vicenza to the Joint Intelligence Center, and I
must tell you I thought that was an incredibly successful
operation. And the ability to use all of our national systems,
to use our theater systems, aircraft, UAVs, the whole thing and
fuse it right into one area and then be able to directly
communicate with the battlefield commanding officers in Bosnia,
to me, is another incredible step forward.
What I am asking you, is are we able to do these joint
centers more than just on an ad hoc basis, but to make this
kind of part of each of our CINCs and be able to move it out
there and replicate this in the future?
General Joulwan. I think so, Congressman. We have worked
very hard on it, and I think it has applicability elsewhere in
other theaters as well.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Hobson.
RUSSIAN TROOPS IN BOSNIA
Mr. Hobson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, I think you have done an absolutely amazing job,
much better than most of us expected the success would be in
the theater, especially in Bosnia. I have a couple of questions
about that.
I differ somewhat with Mr. Obey about approaching the
Russians and those countries. I think it is very positive. I
happened to try to go to Latvia to visit one of my constituents
who is there, very active in defense matters--a former U.S. Air
Force Colonel.
A couple of things about Bosnia I would like to ask, and I
will ask them and then you can answer what you want.
I am a little concerned about the morale of the troops in
Taszar and I don't know how many are still there. There were
like 4,500 when I was there. They were all worried about coming
home, because they don't have anything to do until everybody
comes home. Somebody told us they were worried about the water
in the bottle, but it didn't taste that bad to me. That is one
question.
I don't know who the Russian general is now, but General
Nash and the Russian general that I saw there had a great
relationship, and I thought it was wonderful. I think it should
be promoted any way you can, because the understanding of those
people transcends back into the government later on. This guy
was an air trooper. He told me he jumped 30 times a year. I
don't know how he did, but they had a great camaraderie there.
I don't know how it is going with the new guy, but I think that
should be encouraged.
The other thing that concerned me somewhat, when I was
there--I have been there twice--is the nongovernment aid in
Srpska by the outside groups. There was hesitancy by the
other--they were all eager in the Muslim area and Croatian
area, they would go in there and work, but when you got over in
the Srpska area, there was a hesitancy by some of the outside
groups to go in there, maybe for security reasons or a lot of
other reasons. And they weren't received as well, but there was
some tension about that. Has that changed any?
General Joulwan. Let me answer that last question first. It
is difficult because Srpska will not recognize the national
governments, the national institutions that have been voted in
last September, in many respects.
For example, there is some good news on telephone lines. I
forget the number. I think it is like 60 to 70 percent now have
some telephone system. But we can't get it across the Inter-
Entity Boundary Line, IEBL, because Srpska will not agree. We
are trying to open up four airports, to get funds in there to
try to open up airports.
Srpska will not agree to something--similar to our Federal
Aviation Commission? They will not agree to have one that
represents the nation. So it has been very difficult.
I would agree with you that we should try to do more with
Srpska. They need to cooperate with us, and I have said that to
Krajisnik and Madam Plavsic that we need to get some
cooperation from you to get the needed aid that you should
have, and we are working that very hard.
On the Russian relationship between Nash and General
Lenzhov, you are right, that is an excellent relationship, and
we are building on it. The new team in there now of General
Meigs and his Russian counterpart. That is also working well.
The new Russian Commander came in and in 24 hours was in a
situation where he had to call for fire, or just about call for
fire, because his troops were in danger and American troops
were going in to help him, and he passed the test very well. I
visited the Russian forces, walked their perimeter, crawled
into some of their holes that they dug and I must tell you that
I asked the sort of questions that I ask of troops. And they
are very well-trained.
Now, I know what we are hearing about Russian forces and
demoralization of them, and they are not well-trained. But this
group that they are sending there is extremely well-trained, so
I think we need to build on that.
On the morale of our own troops, I must say I also ask a
lot of questions and am sure we have got some shortages
somewhere. But in the main, I have found the morale to be very
high. They are doing a tough mission.
Mr. Hobson. I think that is true inside the perimeter of
Bosnia. They are very motivated, but you have got supply-type
troops sitting around there. They were confined to the base.
They could only take so many off.
General Joulwan. You can blame that on me. I am the guy. I
am the guy that confined them to the base, and they are going
to be very deliberate in what we do. And I am the guy.
But I can tell you that I have called them the best support
troops in the world, and they are. They have done magic in
Bosnia and in Hungary and they have established a base there
that is, again, a model for future involvement of how do we
protect the force and how can I respond quickly if something
goes sour on us?
And I assure you I will respond quickly if something goes
sour, but I need to have the assets to do it, and we have got
them there in Hungary. So I will look into some of their
problems. But in my view the medical unit there is superb.
Mr. Hobson. Everything is fine. It is just that, you know,
they are sitting around. They are the guys who were the first
ones there. They are the last ones out. Like any troops
overseas they want to know when they are coming home because
they don't have the same heightened tension factor that the
troops inside the theater do. It is a tough job. I am not
criticizing.
General Joulwan. It is.
Mr. Hobson. I am just saying it is a tough job. There was a
new general there. I think he was going to try to get after
that situation. But that is just a potential problem. You have
got a lot of potential problems.
General Joulwan. But if you could just visit them, when you
all go there, and I have seen all of you, particularly
Congressman Murtha, they talk to those troops, and just a word
of appreciation from you, I mean, it is worth volumes of what I
could do.
So your interest in those sort of troops, not just in
Bosnia but the support troops, is very much appreciated by me
and I know by the troops.
Mr. Hobson. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Young. Mr. Hefner.
EFFECT OF U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN BOSNIA
Mr. Hefner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, I don't know if this is an appropriate question or
not. On a scale of 1 to 10, how successful would you rate the
Bosnian operation and mission at this point?
General Joulwan. On the military side, I will probably give
us an 8 or 9. On the civilian side, we have work to do. And I
have tried to get a sense of urgency in what needs to be done.
And it is coming, but it is coming very slow.
I would say on the civilian side we are probably down in
the 4 and 5 category, but we need to get a sense of urgency and
organization on that side. We are well organized, and they are
not.
Mr. Hefner. On the other side, you are talking about
investment and rebuilding the infrastructure and things of this
nature?
General Joulwan. It is in reconstruction. It is in the
organization of Security Corporation in Europe, OSCE, which is
responsible for the elections and arms control. It is the
United Nations High Committee for Refugees, UNHCR, for the High
Commission of Refugees. It is the World Bank and what they need
to do in reconstruction. It is the Red Cross and what they have
to do. All of these agencies.
And what I am trying to do behind the scenes is organize to
meet the mission. Because as I said in my statement, we can do
everything right. We can be a 10 on the military side and the
mission in Bosnia will not be successful.
Mr. Hefner. Well, we had a hearing yesterday and it pretty
much hinged on as long as you have got a military presence
there, but if you don't make jobs and repair the country, then
it won't be a lasting peace. Is that a fair statement?
General Joulwan. That is very fair. I might give you some
progress, though. I mean, I couldn't say this last year, but 90
percent of the people now in Bosnia-Herzegovina have potable
water. That is very important. Sixty percent have some degree
of electricity. Two years ago it was 10 percent. And I
mentioned the number now that can make a telephone call. Those
are things we take for granted but in that country, this is a
great improvement. So it is coming, but it is coming awfully
slow.
The key issue in 1997 would be the return of refugees to
their homes, and this will be the important step to say if it
is going to be a multiethnic society, we have to get on with
resettlement and return of refugees to their homes, and there
are a lot of refugees out there.
QUALITY OF LIFE
Mr. Hefner. Over the years on Military Construction, which
I chaired for quite a few years, we had a desire to do more on
the quality of life. We had some young men here at a hearing
that had been in Haiti, some had been in Bosnia, and it was
remarkable to hear them talk about some of the things that had
to do with individuals, they were so proud of the mission that
they were doing, which is a little bit unusual. And they had
mentioned some programs that they were involved in. And it goes
to what Mr. Hobson was talking about, about the morale.
How many Americans have we lost in the Bosnian operation?
General Joulwan. We have lost, I believe it is 1 to a mine,
that was early on. It was a mistake, to be very clear. He was
doing what he shouldn't have been doing. And I believe we lost
one in a traffic accident.
Mr. Hefner. That is remarkable. That is astounding.
General Joulwan. I get nervous every time I mention the low
number of casualties, because it is something we work very
hard, but it is sort of ``good news, bad news,'' Congressman.
Because we have now created a condition that even taking 10
casualties, would be a disaster that would require great
explanation by me, and I am trying to avoid it as much as I
can. But we have taken very few. But that is because we have
clarity of mission, robust rules of engagement, unity of
command and we have trained to mission, and all of those
ingredients are important to get the results that we have had.
Mr. Murtha. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Hefner. Yes.
Mr. Murtha A couple of things that you get blamed for but
it is so imporant, is not drinking, you don't allow them to
drink and you don't allow them to fraternize with the
civilians. Both of them would be volatile situation, and I know
you get blamed and criticized for it, but that has been a key,
an important part of your success.
General Joulwan. We have to learn all of that. I didn't let
them do it when they went to Rwanda or anywhere else. You have
to have discipline of the force. And this is difficult, and it
may have impact on morale. It may be due to some other things,
but I am there to bring them home.
Mr. Dicks. Will the gentleman yield?
ROLE OF GUARD AND RESERVE IN BOSNIA
Mr. Hefner. Let me have one more question here. You said
that the Guard and Reserve were very important in this Bosnian
situation.
General Joulwan. Yes.
Mr. Hefner. That they are essential to the total force.
Could you just give us some examples of what they do and are
there any functions that they do totally, that the Guard and
Reserves do totally there? Be specific, if you would, sir.
General Joulwan. Let me just give you the most important
function that they do totally is in the civil affairs area.
This group is so essential that I am going to put them in for a
special award because they have been the ones that have been
the glue--the link between the military and the civilian
agencies. They have left their businesses. They are lawyers,
economists, teachers, police chiefs, and they come to Bosnia
for 179 days.
For example, I have a criminologist and a chief of police
working with the International Police Task Force. They are the
glue that holds it together.
But, gentlemen, I am very concerned about their jobs, to be
very honest with you. These people have made deployments, many
of them to Saudi Arabia, Haiti and now into Bosnia, so they are
doing wonderful work. That is exclusively a Reserve function
right now, and we couldn't do it without them.
Mr. Hefner. Well, I think that is good to hear you say that
because we are going to be having hearings, some meetings about
their budgets which up to this point haven't been satisfactory
with some of us, but hopefully we can get it on the right
track.
I will yield to the gentleman.
Mr. Young. The gentleman's time has expired.
I would like to recognize Mr. Bonilla.
BOSNIA RECONSTRUCTION
Mr. Bonilla. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, just to follow up briefly on something Mr. Hefner
asked. Theoretically, if we ever got the civilian effort in
Bosnia up to 8 or 9 points on the 10-point scale, and it worked
ideally for a short period of time, do you think that would
last?
General Joulwan. I think so. I think because what has to
happen here is that Bosnia-Herzegovina is going to be a long-
term solution. We need a long-term program here, not a military
program, not military troops in there forever, but you need
civilian agencies that are going to be involved in this
reconstruction and reconciliation for years to come.
So the foundation you lay now will determine the future in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. So what you want to do, while you have the
military there, is get the foundation laid, get the roots
implanted that you can build on. That is what we are trying to
do now.
If we can do that--I'll just tell you a quick story. I was
in Brcko in February, a couple of weeks ago, and if you
understand the zone of separation, it is about 4 kilometers
wide and then there is an Inter-Entity Boundary Line--IEBL in
the middle of it. I mean, it was like being back in a war zone
because there are damaged buildings all around in this zone of
separation.
But on the Serb side of this IEBL, there is a mosque being
repaired by about a dozen Muslims and they were going to have a
service in there and they were getting electricity from Brcko,
from the Serb side. So there are some steps that are being
taken.
If we can just encourage that reconciliation to take place,
if we can allow electricity and water and telephones, the basic
necessities, if we can have a return of refugees, a modest
beginning, I think that will set the stage for long-term
development. You don't need 30,000 troops in order to do that.
We have 16 more months. I think we should be trying to
figure out what we can do in the next 16 months to get the
civilian agencies established. Once jobs start working, once
you have factories opening, I think there will be a momentum
for peace, not to go back to war.
NATO FORCES
Mr. Bonilla. That is encouraging because, frankly, I have
always had doubts whether there can be long-term peace there,
but what you are saying means a lot.
Let me turn now to NATO, General.
In looking at what lies ahead for NATO, and turning from a
pure defensive alliance to a collective security organization.
Do you think that is a good evolution, in your view? Isn't it a
switch from having our folks there as warriors versus police?
General Joulwan. I don't see them as police. We are, I
think, adapting and adjusting in a way to say how do we engage
in peacetime?
I will tell you the work I am doing with the Russians is
not as a police force. We are interacting with them to build
this common procedure and common doctrine, and trust and
confidence, as we are with 27 other nations. We have conducted
130 exercises last year, not police exercises.
How do we get common standards? The problem that United
Nations Protection Forces, UNPROFOR made, they put 30 some
nations on the ground, but they couldn't talk to one another.
They couldn't communicate. They had no common interoperability.
What we are doing, engaging now--it is an engagement
strategy to develop common standards and procedures so 75
percent of the force in Bosnia is other than U.S. and one-third
of the force is other than NATO. And it isn't just saying we
have one-third of the force other than NATO, but are they
trained to the right standards and procedures? Can we operate
together? Can some day we fight together?
So this is not a police function. This is an engagement
strategy that I think is every bit in our interest to do. And
what it does do, it creates trust and confidence, and when a
blip comes along the horizon in one of these countries like
Bulgaria, the military stays out of it and they allow the
transition to democracy to take place. That is every bit in our
interest.
I don't want to call it police actions and I don't want to
call it some sort of nation-building. We are involved in a
strategy that, I think, comes about because of our 48 years of
involvement in NATO. Now we have to go the next step, which is
how do we prevent conflict from occurring again?
Mr. Bonilla. That is encouraging as well, because I would
be very concerned if our mission were evolving into police or
nation-building. I don't think that is the way we ought to go.
If you don't see it that way then----
FULL SPECTRUM FORCE
General Joulwan. If you want my honest opinion for the
future, we need to have what I call a full-spectrum force. And
I will be very candid with this Committee, that I don't think
you can just wait for the big one to occur. You can't sit back
and wait for the war to start. You have to say how can we
influence events to prevent the big one? How can we engage in
peacetime to prevent the train wreck? And that is what I think
we should be about.
Now, that takes a certain form of military involvement, but
also political and economic and diplomacy. It also requires a
military that can engage in a way to bring about the end that
we want. And that is the situation we are in now.
Whether we can carry that off or not, I am not sure. But it
takes a force structure and a command structure and an
educational system in this country. That's what we are finding.
That is the world as it is, not as we hope it is going to be,
and we have to find a way to engage. It was theory when I first
spoke to this Committee 3 years ago, but it is now reality, and
it is working and we have to recognize that.
Mr. Bonilla. Time for another question, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Young. One more question.
MEDIUM EXTENDED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM (MEADS)
Mr. Bonilla. Just a question on the MEADS program in
closing here. You know I represent Fort Bliss and have a deep
interest in all air defense systems, and my question is if you
could briefly comment on the importance of the systems for
protecting our troops and on the impact U.S. withdrawal from
this program would have on our German and Italian allies?
General Joulwan. Let me answer it very quickly. That is
very important for the protection of our force, and it would be
very disappointing to our Italian and German allies if we would
withdraw from this program. They have signed up with us. They
are developing it with us, and I think this is the way to go. I
am trying to also do the same for Joint STARS, by the way, to
get NATO involved in these systems, get allies involved, as we
are doing with AWACS and so we are not trying to do it alone.
Mr. Bonilla. General, you are a very impressive person, and
I wish you also the very best in your retirement.
General Joulwan. Thank you very much.
Mr. Young. Mr. Nethercutt.
COMPUTER SECURITY
Mr. Nethercutt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I join the rest of the Committee, General, in wishing you
well and thanking you for your service to the country. It is
indeed, admirable and remarkable and we thank you very much.
We have had testimony before this subcommittee this year
and we have seen GAO reports with respect to the security of
DoD computer systems, and the number of attempted unauthorized
intrusions into those computer systems. Have you experienced
this in Europe? To what extent do you think it is a serious
concern for our country, and are we doing enough to prevent it?
My worst fear, I am sure yours is also, is that somebody
gets in, fools with our system, shuts down one aspect or
another, and then we are in trouble.
General Joulwan. It is a concern to us. We have looked at
it in Europe. It has not, at least to my knowledge, yet become
a serious problem in Europe. But as we go more and more to
computers in what we are doing, it will continue to be of great
concern to commanders. And we are very concerned about the
security of not only computer systems, but all of our
intelligence systems as well that deal with satellite feeds, et
cetera. So we are looking at that very closely. But right now,
I don't see it as a problem, not in my theater of operation.
FULL SPECTRUM FORCE
Mr. Nethercutt. As I look at the map and listen to you talk
about a full-spectrum force, you know, Africa looms largely.
General Joulwan. Yes.
Mr. Nethercutt. My memory is it was Secretary Christopher
who talked about a U.S.-funded African peace force that would
be undertaken by African forces.
Do you see that as a possibility as we look to this full-
spectrum force that you speak of in your testimony?
General Joulwan. Africa will be an economy of force,
theater for the U.S. It will not be an area that we are going
to be involved with a lot of resources or forces, but Africa
will pose continuing problems that should be solved by Africa.
How we can help, I think, is in what is called the African
Crisis Response Force, which we have been talking about for
some time. We have worked up a strategy in EUCOM to implement
that, so we would be involved not in the actual deployment of
the U.S. forces, but we would do so along with our allies. That
is the great worth of NATO. We can leverage our allies here to
help us, and we are trying to do that now, and that process is
under way.
I really don't have all the results back yet, but it is
looking promising. And the fact that what we are doing now,
airlifting some African forces into Liberia to try to stabilize
that region, is a case in point that I think--of what are some
of the possibilities of how we can assist, what those
possibilities could be.
Mr. Nethercutt. Well, as you look at our force in Europe
and under your command, it has dwindled, it has been reduced.
It seems to me it only makes sense to try to think about
engaging these forces of other countries to take care of
themselves----
General Joulwan. Yes.
Mr. Nethercutt. Rather than have us have to police it.
But I thank you for your service, and I wish you the very
best.
General Joulwan. Thank you very much.
Mr. Nethercutt. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Visclosky.
MINE CLEARING
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, in response to an earlier question by Mr. McDade,
you had mentioned that you didn't think as much progress was
being made in the last 6 months on mines and mine removal. Any
particular reason?
General Joulwan. First of all, the warring factions stopped
doing what we wanted them to do, which was remove them. They
know where they have; they are the maps, et cetera. So we had a
drop-off in there. That is why we put a very heavy hand to say
no training unless you go out and start clearing mines. And
although we had some problems, as the weather gets better, that
they will start doing that.
The other is just the enormity of these minefields, and
some of them are not marked and it is going to take a concerted
effort.
This Mine Awareness Center that we talk about is a step in
the right direction. They are at least in the business now of
not only cataloging where everything is but trying to get
nongovernmental organizations, contract people, to come in, to
try to clear some of these areas that are mined. But it is
going to be years before we solve that problem.
RUSSIAN MILITARY FORCES
Mr. Visclosky. You mentioned that the Russian troops that
you have come into contact with in Bosnia were very well-
trained, highly motivated.
General Joulwan. Yes.
Mr. Visclosky. What about the Russian military in general?
And where are they spending their money? What are their
priority programs?
General Joulwan. Well, it is a sadder story than that one.
I am concerned about the deterioration of the Russian military
because it creates instability and instability creates problems
of its own. And we--you know, though it may, from a threat-
based standpoint, instability creates uncertainty.
My concern is also with their conventional forces on the
ground. They are not paying the troops. Some of their equipment
is not being maintained. Their trucks and their tanks.
Mr. Visclosky. They are not getting paid in some cases?
General Joulwan. They are not getting paid, many, many of
the forces are not getting paid. I have checked on the ones in
Bosnia and they are getting paid a little bit better or more
often, but they also have some problems.
So we have to get through this period.
When I deal with militaries of other nations, you have to
treat them with respect. When they lose their respect, they
become dangerous, and I am concerned about the respect now of
the Russian forces. That is why I am trying to reach out with
this liaison officer I have, with the brigade that we have from
Russia, to build on that and give them their respect back. And
the other area that is of concern to me is in the strategic
nuclear area.
There are still 20,000-plus nuclear warheads now in Russia.
They have taken them out of the Ukraine and put them all in
Russia. So the nuclear warheads are now being maintained by one
nation: Russia.
That is the good news. The other challenge is if there is
instability within Russia: that causes me concern.
So it is a very dangerous situation that we are facing.
Mr. Visclosky. What programs are they placing a priority
on?
General Joulwan. I think primarily they are still
maintaining their strategic nuclear forces and that is of great
concern to us.
Mr. Visclosky. General, thank you very much.
Good luck.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
BOSNIA EXIT STRATEGY
Mr. Young. General, you have done just an outstanding job
in responding to these penetrating questions that the Members
have asked. Your answers have been very thought-provoking, but
we haven't really explored another issue, and that is the exit
strategy for departing in June of 1998. Is there a plan?
Are we just going to pack everybody up on a given day and
move them out? Or are we going to phase them out gradually?
What is the plan for exiting?
General Joulwan. I addressed that in the operations plan
that I wrote, and there are some general conditions that we
would like to see. They included, for example--at the top of
the list no Spring offensive. And I am working this very hard.
The cycle over the years is this when they come out of the
Winter and you have a Spring offensive; so our objective is no
Spring offensive and no hostilities. We have done that now.
Last year, and so far this year, that is on track.
As we go around to 18 months and in the Spring of 1998, I
would hope that would also be a condition that would exist.
The second has to deal with these civilian organizations
that I talk about. I would hope that they would be much more
established and up and operating as we get closer to June of
1998.
The third condition is that we would have elections,
municipal elections, that would be held hopefully this year,
and that those institutions, the national level, which were
held in September, the state level or entity level, which were
held in September and now this year, the municipal elections,
that these political institutions would be in place and
starting to work.
Howver, having said that, even if they are not there, my
instructions are to withdraw the force. And so I have to give
6-month reviews to the North Atlantic Council. The first one is
in June of this year, and I must report on the progress of
where we stand, both in my estimation on the military side, as
well as where we are in working with the civilian agencies.
Much of that will determine the speed of--or the rate of
withdrawal.
But in the end, my instructions are now that the NATO-led
force will be withdrawn by June of 1998, regardless of those
conditions that I talked about for an end date.
Mr. Young. I think one reason that we have this question
about that date is we were given several different dates when
U.S. forces would be out. And I remember Mr. Murtha was told
emphatically that we would be out on December 20th of 1996, and
he questioned that, and we questioned that. And he kept telling
us, well, they told me December 20th, 1996, but here it is 1997
and we are talking about a 1998 withdrawal.
We understand that these things are not specific and you
can't be too certain when you are dealing with a situation as
volatile as this Bosnian operation has been, but how do you
feel in your own mind that June of 1998 is a date we can
accomplish?
General Joulwan. I think if we really put the pressure and
the organizational skill into the civilian organization, that
much can be accomplished. I am not sure you need 30,000 NATO-
led forces. Now, perhaps some other organization or some other
group is going to be needed there.
I mean, it is not as if everything is going to go away. I
think some other organization. But a NATO-led force I am not
sure you need that after June of 1998, and those are my
instructions.
I am more interested in what I can do in the next 16 months
to create the condition so we won't have a force there. That is
why I have been so hard of the other agencies to get their act
together, to get arms control moving, to get the
reconstruction, the rehabilitation, the resettlement, the
elections, all of those things moving.
If we can do all of those--I don't think you need 30,000
NATO-led forces there.
Mr. Young. General, some of our allies have made the point
that when the U.S. leaves, they are leaving. When we leave in
June of 1998, if our allies leave, what kind of a force or--
outside of your civilian lay force, what is there to try to
keep it all together?
General Joulwan. Well, there are 30-some nations there. I
think all of that has to be worked out with the international
community. The U.N. perhaps needs to get involved. There are
other organizations. OSCE is another organization. But do you
need the sort of NATO-led force is what I am talking about,
which is where the U.S. is involved, in there, forever?
I have said that I don't think we should have an open-ended
commitment in Bosnia, and I think that what we need to do is
say how do we create the conditions now so that in June of
1998, that another organization can take over from us? And that
is what I am advocating.
If you can't get the act together in 2.5 years, which is
what we are talking about, then I am not sure that the act can
be gotten together in 10 years.
Mr. Young. General, you are very persuasive, and I am
wondering if you have made this same point up the chain of
command?
General Joulwan. Absolutely.
Mr. Young. Good. I am glad to hear that.
General Joulwan. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. I have some other questions that I would like to
submit becasue we are running out of time, and I would like to
submit them in writing and ask that you respond.
Mr. Cunningham wanted to claim about 20 seconds of his time
back.
Go ahead, Mr. Cunningham.
REMARKS OF MR. CUNNINGHAM
Mr. Cunningham. General, I am not as optimistic and I am
sure that you have a guarded position. I saw a presentation the
other night on TV about Aldrich Ames and Russia under Gorbachev
when they executed 20 of our CIA agents.
They are selling arms and chemical and biological and
nuclear rockets to many of our enemies. They are doing things,
and I do not believe, in my heart, that Russia would be our
ally if they were not in the economic straits that they are
right now.
I look at under the Ural mountains at what they are doing
with their nuclear first strike, and they already have one.
That is the size of inside the beltway.
I look at, you know, Echo Class subs and I look at their
general direction, and when you have got SU-27s better than our
F-14s and F-15s you have A-10 missiles better than our AAMRAM
or Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile and then you have
typhoon subs with the new missiles that are coming out with a
6,000-mile range, I just feel that they are not going back to
where they were, but they are going to go full circle. And it
just scares me when we get too deeply involved with those type
of folks.
When I was a lieutenant, I made a statement that we
shouldn't give F-14s to Iran because the Shah wouldn't be there
every day, and I was slapped about the head and shoulders by my
boss, and told that I shouldn't say that. But I felt like Billy
Mitchell when the Shah fell and we looked at those things.
But, you know, you can take and put a man between a bulldog
and a cat. You remove that man in Bosnia, I don't care how
happy you made that cat or how happy you made that dog, they
are going to kill each other, and there you have a bulldog, a
cat and a mouse. And I just don't think there is any amount
that we can get involved that is going to solve that long-term
problem there.
And I know that--I have got another theory that in June,
you know, we come up for elections. The President does not want
a disaster happening in that particular part of the world
during elections, and I don't think there is any way that they
are going to withdraw those troops.
General Joulwan. Well, if I can respond to the Russian
question first, I have another theory, and that is if you are
unsure of someone or you have an enemy, get him very close to
you so you can look right into his eye and what he is doing.
And I think we have to get very close to the Russians during
this transition period to see which way they are going to go
and see if we can influence it. We may fail.
Mr. Cunningham. I don't disagree with you.
General Joulwan. But I think we need to find a way.
If I could take 30 seconds here, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Cunningham. Please do, General.
General Joulwan. I took Colonel General Shetzhov, who is my
deputy 3-Star for Russian Forces in Bosnia. He came in October
of 1995, and he said--he was a typical Russian. I said, ``What
do you want to see in NATO?''
He said, ``I want to see this combined air operation center
in Vicenza.''
I took him down there. I said to my troops, ``No secrets.''
And he sat there and they put up screen after screen, that
showed the air campaign, and he looked at me. And I said,
``Turn the lights on.''
And I said, ``Introduce yourself.'' This was spontaneous.
And a Frenchman and a Brit and a Canadian and a Dutch all
turned around and introduced themselves.
He couldn't believe it.
I said, ``Where do you want to go now?''
He said, ``I want to see your ACE rapid reaction corps.''
This is headed by a British 3-Star in Germany.
I said, ``Go on down there.'' And he looked at all of that.
This was the corps that went to Bosnia and headed our effort in
Bosnia.
Then he came back. I said, ``Where do you want to go now?''
He said, ``I want to go to your headquarters in Stuttgart,
your U.S. headquarters.''
I said, ``I won't even go with you.'' I sent him down there
and he spent 3 or 4 days down there looking at everything we
are doing.
He came back and he had this long face, very quiet, and he
said he has been lied to for 45 years. He said, what he saw was
absolutely opposite what the Soviets thought our mission over
here was, what we thought you were about. He said, your
openness, I thought it was just you, but I saw it in every
person I met in Stuttgart, they had the same openness.
Now, this Russian Colonel General is giving speeches. He
was the one that just went before the Duma. You saw it with
Lenzhov, who is Nash's counterpart. He is also now giving
positive views on his experiences.
Now, this is a ripple that I hope will continue, but if we
let them go into the modernization of their nuclear force, if
we allow their military to go down the drain on the
conventional side, and if we expect to have a confrontation
then we will.
I say that we can engage now and we can do it in a way that
brings about this trust and confidence.
I think it will pay dividends. Look, I know how to fight
and if we have to, we have a decided advantage, and they know
it. But now we can interact in a way that can bring about
results. And that is what I am advocating here; not naive, not
with rose-colored glasses. Because in the end if we are not
successful they may go back to the old way of doing business.
And I don't think that is--
Mr. Cunningham. Did they offer to let you go anywhere that
you wanted----
General Joulwan. Pardon?
Mr. Cunningham [continuing]. Like under the Ural mountains?
General Joulwan. Well, we are getting there. I went out to
see their airborne troops and I had to stand in minus 20
degrees in low quarters, but we had a good session. We had a
good session.
I am sorry, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. General, I think that is an excellent statement
to close this hearing on, but Mr. Dixon wants to ask you one
more thing.
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Mr. Dixon. You know, one thing that we talked about, the
SCUD problem and weapons of mass destruction, and one of the
things that has worried me, both in the Middle East, and in
Korea in particular, is this notion of whether one of our
enemies would use chemical or biological weapons against
airfields.
General Joulwan. Yes.
Mr. Dixon. Okay. And that much of our strategy depends upon
being able to bring out massive amounts of tactical aircraft. I
think General Peay told me that they have to bring out a
thousand aircraft from the United States or other places, and
move it all out there.
Also, you have got to bring a lot of people from the United
States. So while you talk about the benefit of being forward-
deployed, you still have to get personnel and aircraft into the
actual place where you are going to do the fighting.
Now, is this something that we should be concerned about?
Do we need to rethink our strategy? In other words, are there
other options that we need to think about?
For example, with long-range bombers you don't necessarily
have to be in theater. In other words, if you are going to get
locked out, then you are going to need some other capability to
come in and deal with the threat in the initial stages until
you can actually deploy in theater.
General Joulwan. I think you need a wide range of
capability and I think not just at the action end but also at
the deterrent end. And chemical and biological weapons are
something that we are going to have to face here, I think, more
and more.
How do you not just react to it? How do you deter the use
of chemical and biological weapons?
Allies come into play here. Access to bases comes into
play. Overflight of airspace comes into play. That is why
maintaining alliances with allies, and now partners, is
extremely important.
But I would agree with you. I think we need the full range
of capabilities to include at the higher end.
Mr. Young. General, thank you very much. It has been an
excellent hearing. Before we adjourn, I wanted to thank the
Members for the excellent participation today. The attendance
was outstanding.
The Committee will meet at 1:30 this afternoon to hear from
General John Sheehan, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Atlantic
Command, and we will adjourn as soon as Mr. Lewis has
completed.
Mr. Lewis. Mr. Chairman, the General's closing commentary,
to say the least, is impressive, but just yesterday we
discussed the fact that General Shalikashvili is leaving us,
General Joulwan. To say the least, people of this quality and
depth, in this case, with joint European expertise and
experience, raises major questions for the Committee's
consideration. There are voids there that are very, very
significant beyond just thanking you for your service. It is of
concern.
Mr. Young. One of the many signs of a good leader is to
prepare someone to follow in your place, and I am sure that the
General has been preparing for that eventuality, but you make a
very good point, you are absolutely right.
Mr. Lewis. Mr. Chairman, as you go about that, I presume
that you have laid this foundation, but don't you think we all
should think about the fact that John Plashal one of the
committee staff is going to be leaving us, the person who puts
together these hearings and spends 10 to 15 hours a day doing
so.
Mr. Young. He is an A-number one CODEL organizer, too.
General, thank you very much, and God bless you. Wherever
your future takes you, good luck.
The Committee is adjourned.
General Joulwan. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the
answers thereto follow:]
Airborne Reconnaissance
Question. With airborne reconnaissance assets providing important
intelligence for the many low intensity operations in your command,
please describe, with some specificity, your requirements for such
systems for Bosnia or for smaller operations, such as those in Africa.
Answer. USEUCOM has historically relied heavily on a varied mix of
theater reconnaissance assets to support the numerous peacetime and
contingency operations throughout Europe. Over the past two years
reliance on intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) has
increased by orders of magnitude. In this theater ISR has become as
important as ``bombs and bullets'' in carrying out the USEUCOM mission.
------.
______
Cost of American Presence in Bosnia
Question. I would like a full accounting of the cost associated
with the American presence in the Bosnia. This accounting should
include, but not be limited to, the following:
(1) Operation of CV/CVNs as well as the accompanying battle groups
(O&M costs, supply costs, etc.)
(2) Cost (fuel, maintenance, diminution of useful life, etc.) of
all tactical and non-tactical American aircraft operations over the
Bosnian theater.
(3) Food/supply drop operations and accompanying air cover.
(4) Troops stationed in the region but outside of Bosnia to help
maintain stability.
(5) Any arms or other supplies given to the parties involved in the
region.
(6) Any personnel, training, or equipment costs.
(7) Mine clearing, countermine operations costs.
(8) Weapons systems/equipment lost during operations (to include,
but not limited to Capt. O'Grady's F-16, vehicles lost to mines, and
the Predator UAV)
(9) Any relevant non-military costs such as housing, infrastructure
repair, or so-called ``Nation-building'' activities.
(10) Contractor logistics support.
Answers listed by question above:
(1, 2 and 4) Bosnia operations costs: The incremental costs of DoD
participation in operations in and around the Former Yugoslavia,
predominately Bosnia, are estimated to total $6.5 billion for fiscal
year 1996 through fiscal year 1998 ($2.5 billion in fiscal year 1996,
$2.5 billion in fiscal year 1997, $1.5 billion in fiscal year 1998)
with an operational completion date of June 1998. These costs cover the
preparation, deployment and sustainment of forces for the
Implementation Force (IFOR), the Stabilization Force (SFOR) and the
Deterrence Force (DFOR), as well as the costs associated with enforcing
UN sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, enforcement of the no-fly
zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina, and support of other UN humanitarian/
observer related missions in the AOR.
(3) Humanitarian operations costs: Incremental costs totaling
$347.4 million in fiscal year 1995, $292.0 million in fiscal year 1994,
$138.8 million in fiscal year 1993, and $5.8 million in fiscal year
1992 were incurred by the DoD to support humanitarian related missions
in, and aircraft operations over, the Former Yugoslavia.
(5 and 6) Equipment, services and training costs: The President has
authorized the drawdown of $100 million in DoD equipment and services
to support the Bosnian Federation as part of the ``Equip and Train''
program. As of January 31, 1997 the total value of articles and
services delivered was $78.65 million.
(7) Mine clearing activities costs: Concerning mine clearing
activities in Bosnia, the humanitarian demining program cost the
Department approximately $1.3 million in fiscal year 1996.
(8) Equipment replacement costs: We do not track costs of weapon
systems/equipment lost during operations as they are inventory
investment items whose replacement is considered during normal budget
development.
(9) Nation-building costs: We do not track costs associated with
``Nation-building'' activities. This program falls under the Department
of State.
(10) Contractor Logistics Support: $390 million was provided for
Bosnia in fiscal year 1996 based on nine months of support. An estimate
of $386.9 million has been identified in the fiscal year 1997
Supplemental for twelve months of support including the the phase down
of the Stabilization Force (SFOR). However, OSD(C) has taken the lead
to review the requirements with an emphasis towards minimizing
expenses. If the review results in the identification of savings, the
appropriate congressional committees will be notified by OSD(C).
NATO Expansion
Question. The executive summary of the Secretary of Defense report
on NATO Expansion states that the costs to the U.S. will be
approximately $150 million to $200 million annually for a ten year
period.
What do these costs entail? Is it increased foreign aid to the new
NATO member, military assistance, increased infrastructure costs?
Answer. These costs are direct enlargement expenses, which are
calculated on the assumption that NATO would reach ``initial
capability'' for Article V defense of new members by 2001 and ``mature
capability'' by 2009. ``Initial capability'' includes enhancements in
command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I), and
reinforcement reception facilities, air command and control, and
logistics (e.g., renovation of new members' headquarters to accommodate
a NATO headquarters' elements, training in NATO languages and
procedures, acquisition of an Air Sovereignty Operations Center (ASOC),
and interoperable aircraft avionics). ``Mature capability'' includes
additional direct enlargement enhancements (e.g., command and C3I
improvements, weapons engagement capability added to each ASOC,
exercise enhancements, and improvements to airfields, road and rail
links, ports, etc.).
Question. Which U.S. government agencies would bear the costs of
NATO expansion? What share of costs would be borne by the Defense
Department?
Answer. U.S. funding sources will be the Department of Defense
(Warsaw Initiative and Operations and Maintenance funding) and
Department of State (Security Assistance funds, which include Foreign
Military Financing, Foreign Military Sales, Excess Defense Articles,
and International Military Educational Training). Approximately 40% of
the costs will be borne by the Defense Department.
Question. Secretary Albright was recently in Moscow with a proposal
to reduce conventional weapons levels in Europe. What is the outlook of
this plan?
Answer. The plan has agreed to by all North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) members. It was tabled by NATO to all signatories
of the CFE Treaty in Vienna on 20 February 1997. Subsequently, on 7
March 1997, the NATO proposal was rejected by Russia as a basis for
negotiation. The negotiating group of the Joint Consultative Group in
Vienna met on 11 March 1997 for formal responses to the Russian
rejection. The chairman of the Joint Consultative Group will then draft
a ``food-for-thought'' paper for the following week that will address
areas that need to be worked out before the negotiating group begins
actual negotiations on a draft document.
Question. How significantly would it reduce U.S. arms based in
Europe?
Answer. The objective of all States Parties to the Treaty should be
to achieve overall lower force levels in the area of application. We
will pursue ways by which our equipment ceilings can be lowered, while
preserving our ability to meet our defense requirements. We and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization are prepared to take significant
steps in this regard. Specifically, the total of future aggregate
national ceilings of ground Treaty Limited Equipment of the 16 members
will be significantly less under the adapted Treaty than the current
group ceiling.
Question. Would it lower the size of our forces or would it involve
withdrawing pre-positioned U.S. arms based in Europe?
Answer. We are reviewing our current declared national maximum
levels of holdings to assess whether they reflect current and likely
future requirements. On the basis of that review, we will reach,
through a transparent and cooperative process, final conclusions
regarding the scope for reductions. The resulting national equipment
ceilings would then be codified in the adapted treaty. This process and
its outcome will fully respect and be compatible with relevant
obligations under international agreements, in accordance with
international law.
Question. Has there been any discussion of the time frame for
implementing such a plan if it was to proceed?
Answer. Yes. Negotiations to adapt the Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe Treaty began in February 1997. We estimate completion of these
negotiations will occur in June 1999.
Bosnia--Policy Issues
Question. The deployment of U.S. force to Bosnia continues, with
the Administration plan now to keep our troops there as part of the
international ``Stabilization Force'' (SFOR) until June 1998. The
overall American troop presence has declined, from over 20,000 to about
8,500. When our forces deployed to Bosnia in late 1995, we were told
repeatedly that our troops would stay until ``the military tasks
associated with implementation of the Dayton agreement were completed''
with all troops to be withdrawn after one year--by December 1996. Even
though it seems this original military mission has been fulfilled, the
policy has changed and we are now committed to Bosnia for an additional
18 months.
Are U.S. troops involved in any so-called ``nation building
activities (repairing houses/infrastructure, etc)?
Answer. U.S. forces have, to the extent that it supports primary
military tasks (i.e., freedom of movement), engaged in limited
infrastructure improvement projects, including road, bridge and rail
repair, runway improvements, and restoration of power and potable water
systems. These projects are required to support our troops.
Question. Are there any plans to involve U.S. or allied forces in
the seizure or prosecution of indicted war criminals?
Answer. It is the responsibility of the parties in Bosnia to bring
indicted war criminals to justice. Stabilization Force (SFOR) forces
will not actively hunt indicted war criminals, however, if an indicted
war criminal is encountered during the conduct of operations, they will
be detained if safe to do so.
Bosnia Exit Strategy
Question. When we sent troops to Bosnia, many in Congress asked
whether there was an ``exit strategy.'' Your predecessor and other
senior administration officials basically said we didn't need an exit
strategy because the President had established a date certain for the
withdrawal of troops December 1996. That date has now been extended to
June of 1998. And to all appearances, there is still no ``exit
strategy'' to ensure our Bosnia deployment will not remain open-ended.
Most observers believe there will have to be some type of
international force in Bosnia for several years. Yet the position of
our European allies appears to be that when the U.S. leaves Bosnia,
they will withdraw their forces as well. What is the likelihood of any
major international force being in Bosnia should the U.S. remove its
troops?
Answer. The United States has taken the lead where others failed in
bringing peace to Bosnia. As there has been much progress towards
achieving a lasting peace, the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces will
end in mid-1998. This Secretary of Defense has emphatically stated this
and I have received no contrary guidance.
However, there may be a requirement for continued international
peackeeping presence. At that juncture, I believe European security
organizations such as the WEU or OSCE should be responsible for
continued progress.
Question. Given all these problems, would you care to hazard a
guess as the probability that we will, in fact, withdraw from Bosnia by
the middle of next year?
Answer. During the past 15 months since the signing of the Dayton
Agreement, much has happened. If we remain proactive in addressing the
challenges that lie ahead in achieving a lasting peace, I am confident
that the conditions will be right for a complete withdrawal of U.S.
forces from the country by mid-1998. Furthermore, the Secretary of
Defense has unequivocally stated that U.S. forces will not be extended
past the mid-1998 timeline.
The remaining challenges include:
Complete the transition to a fully functioning state
through the successful completion of municipal elections and the
subsequent transition to effective local government. At the same time,
national-level governing institutions must be put in place.
Repatriation of refugees and displaced persons to Bosnia.
Peaceful implementation of the Brcko arbitration decision.
Regional stabilization through arms control regimes are
well-underway. In any case, it is the responsibility of the parties in
Bosnia to cooperate in the effort to achieve lasting peace. Mid-1998 is
about right for ensuring the civil implementation process has
progressed to the point where the parties can assume responsibility for
maintaining order in Bosnia.
Troop Strength
Question. U.S. forces in Bosnia have scaled back from 25,000 to
8,500. What is the level of ``firepower'' our forces have in Bosnia
now, compared to when we were at 25,000?
Answer. We have proportionately less firepower in Bosnia now than
when the Implementation Force (IFOR) was at full strength. However, the
security situation in Bosnia is now markedly different than during the
IFOR mission. The Former Warring Factions (FWF) combat capability has
significantly decreased, and is not nearly the threat to our forces as
it was previously. Because of this, our combat power remains
significantly superior under the current circumstances, and our ability
to deter large-scale fighting remains high.
Question. Do you have any fear that the size of the U.S. force in
Bosnia may have been scaled back to a point that any units cannot
adequately defend themselves?
Answer. A commander always worries about protection of his forces,
and force protection is my number one priority in Bosnia, however, I
feel that the combat power now in Bosnia provides Stabilization Force
(SFOR) forces with more than adequate capability to defend themselves
against the threat from hostile military forces. To counter the threat
from rogue elements and terrorists, I have taken precautions to
maximize troop protection (patrols traveling with minimum of 4
vehicles, focused intelligence gathering mechanisms, etc.). I also have
a robust theater and strategic reserve force that can be employed
quickly to ensure large-scale force protection.
Question. How will the role of day-to-day tactics of our troops in
Bosnia change in light of the significant scale back of our troops?
Answer. The Stabilization Force (SFOR) is focused on stabilizing
the peace, and ensuring a secure environment exists to allow the civil
implementation process to proceed. In light of a smaller, yet robust
force presence, SFOR is engaged more in patrolling hot-spots than
providing country-wide presence. This is possible because the threat of
large-scale military mobilization of the Former Warring Factions is
diminished.
Question. What is the level of non-U.S. troops--British, French,
etc. currently deployed in Bosnia?
Answer. The approximate size of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) is
31,000 troops from NATO and non-NATO troop contributing nations. Our
allies and non-NATO contributions total approximately 22,500 troops.
Question. Have our allies deployed in Bosnia scaled their military
presence back in that country at roughly the same percentage as the
U.S.?
Answer. In transitioning from the Implementation Force (IFOR) to
the Stabilization Force (SFOR), our allies scaled back their
contributions at roughly proportionate levels.
Bosnia Contractor Logistics Support
Question. To date, Congress has provided over $3 billion for
operations in Bosnia. This amount presumed a deployment of one year,
ending in December 1996. As a result of the Bosnia mission extension,
there is now a requirement for an additional $3.4 billion--a fiscal
year 1997 supplemental of nearly $2 billion, and $1.5 billion in your
fiscal year 1998 budget. Should these estimates hold, the total cost of
the Bosnia deployment would be $6.5 billion.
In reviewing the supplemental request, the Committee is concerned
about several costs which appear excessive. Your supplemental request
includes $390 million for contractor logistics support for the Army.
This is the same amount provided in the last fiscal year (fiscal year
1996). Yet the number of deployed troops has declined by more than 50
percent. Why are logistics support costs so high?
Answer. The estimate of $386.9 million identified in the fiscal
year 1997 Supplemental covers twelve months of Logistic Civilian
Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) support compared to the nine months of
operation in fiscal year 1996. The fiscal year 1997 estimate is based
on our actual experience in fiscal year 1996 when 15 base camps were
supported. IFOR operations remained at full strength at the 15 base
camps through the first quarter of fiscal year 1997 when the phase down
of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) began, with attendant support at
eleven camps. These operational considerations resulted in the LOGCAP
estimate of $386.9 million for fiscal year 1997 for twelve months of
support. However, Office of the Secretary of Defense-Comptroller
(OSD(C)) has taken the lead to review the requirements with an emphasis
towards minimizing expenses. If the review results in the
identification of savings, the appropriate congressional committees
will be notified.
Question. The Air Force's projected flying hours appear excessive,
assuming a high OPTEMPO for F-15 and F-16 fighters. Given that
hostilities have ended, why are you asking for flying hours that appear
to assume that sanctions and a ``no-fly zone'' are still in effect?
Answer. Significant reductions in U.S. contributions to the air
component forces have already been executed over the past several years
as Operation DENY FLIGHT transitioned to Operation DECISIVE EDGE and
now Operation DELIBERATE GUARD. Further reductions are considered
imprudent based upon the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Although the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is relatively stable,
tensions are high in some areas and have the potential to escalate to
violence in the months ahead:
Brcko remains tense during the ongoing arbitration with
all three factions raising the specter of violence if the arbitration
results are unsatisfactory.
Historically, the Spring and Summer months have seen an
increase in military activity by the Former Warring Factions.
Resettlement issues are contentious in a variety of locations.
The situation could deteriorate in association with the
upcoming Municipal Elections which may dominate the political scene in
the Summer and early Autumn months.
Increased involvement by the international community in
apprehending accused war criminals has the potential for increased
threat to ground forces.
To deter potential threats, NATO has established the Air Power
requirements to support Stabilization Force (SFOR) operations. The U.S.
provided assets in support of the Statement of Requirements Nine (SOR
9). The current force has the capability to conduct precision
airstrikes against multiple targets, provide air presence around the
clock and meet the most demanding SFOR ground scenario, simultaneous
close air support in two locations with a four hour time on station
capability. Any cut or change in U.S. force mix will result in loss of
both airpower capability and flexibility.
Though the number of troops on the ground has decreased, the
requirements to maintain force protection from the air by U.S. aircraft
has not decreased. The current mix of aircraft provides the required
capabilities while maintaining a reasonable operations and personnel
tempo. The air assets, as currently deployed, are the minimum required
capability and force mix to provide adequate force protection.
Question. The fiscal year 1998 budget requests $1.5 billion for
Bosnia. What are the assumptions behind this number (number of troops,
duration of deployment, any residual costs following a pullout, etc.)?
Answer. The fiscal year 1998 estimate of $1.5 billion for
operations in Bosnia is based on the extension of operations through
June 1998.
The request will support approximately 8,500 troops with the
ongoing task of monitoring compliance with the Dayton Accord. NATO has
agreed to review the mission at the 6 and 12 month marks with the
intent of reducing force levels to a deterrence sized force at an
unspecified date commensurate with the security situation in the
country to facilitate NATO's departure from Bosnia in June 1998.
Mine Threat to U.S. Troops
Question. How many mines have been removed or neutralized thus far?
Answer. Reports from the Mine Action Center in Zagreb indicate that
approximately ten thousand of the one to three million mines in Bosnia-
Herzegovina have been removed by indigenous and United Nations forces.
Of the known minefields, the percentage of mines removed or neutralized
varies from zero percent to ninety-nine percent. The magnitude of the
problem is best illustrated by a contractor working for the State
Department in Bosnia-Herzegovina who estimates that it would take a
team of one thousand mine-clearers at least thirty-three years to
completely demine Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Question. Are you encountering any problems in detecting and
removing non-metallic mines?
Answer. Yes, both detecting, with our present detection
capabilities, and removing, due to the anti-handling devices, can
create quite a challenge. The plastic mines are impervious to water and
therefore float or sink but do not deteriorate. Previous war debris and
the metallic content of the soil make conventional detection with hand
held mine detectors extremely difficult. However, means of detection
are improving. Thirty-one teams of dogs will be in Bosnia-Herzegovina
sometime in April, 1997. These animals are extremely effective at
picking up the scent of the explosive materials used in landmines.
Also, new mini-flails which are remotely controlled, small robotic
systems similar to the flails employed on the front of the M1 Abrams
Tank, are in place. Training in the employment of these new systems
started during the first week of March, 1997.
Question. What, if any, is the role of U.S. troops in the removal
of land mines?
Answer. Advisory only, U.S. troops are not authorized to remove any
mines with the exception of those found inside their operational areas.
The mines in our operational areas are destroyed in place with
explosives, never deactivated by hand or moved. Mine awareness classes
and training on equipment usage is the extent of U.S. troop
participation with demining. Recently, U.S. Special Forces trained 188
local nationals using ``train the trainer'' style instruction, on these
topics. In addition, the State Department is training approximately 180
local nationals on mine awareness, equipment usage and mine clearing,
again using ``train the trainer'' type instruction.
Role of Guard and Reserve in Bosnia
Question. Are there any Military Occupational Specialities (MOSs)
which are exclusively in the Guard and Reserve which, from your
perspective, should be included in the active force?
Answer. Reserve Component forces provide essential augmentation
that allows, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND to sustain its current Operational
Tempo (OPTEMPO). While many of our High-Demand-Low-Density (HDLD) units
reside in the Reserve Component, there are not specialties (MOSs)
exclusively in the Guard or Reserve that are not also in the active
force.
Progress of Civilian Programs in Bosnia
Question. Making progress in the various civilian assistance
programs in Bosnia is the key to the longer term success in Bosnia.
In the case of refugee resettlement:
How many refugees and displaced persons remained to be
resettled in Bosnia?
How long do you project it will take to resettle them?
What are the major impediments to their resettlement?
Answer. Only about 260,000 of the estimated 2 million refugees and
displaced persons displaced by the four year war have returned to their
homes, leaving nearly 1.75 million people in refugee or displaced
persons status. It is difficult to predict the time it will take to
repatriate those persons still in refugee/displaced persons status
because of the continuing impediments to their return. Impediments to
the repatriation process include:
Continued lack of political will by all the parties to
facilitate the return of refugees and displaced persons.
Ethnic tension, particularly along the inter-entity
boundary, is resulting in confrontations between ethnic groups, thus
slowing the return process.
The combination of the aforementioned impediments, coupled
with lack of progress in the country-wide demining campaign, is
hampering freedom of movement for the civilian population, thus causing
another significant impediment to resettlement.
Question. In the case of reconstruction, what progress is being
made in economic growth and rebuilding the infrastructure?
Answer. Reconstruction progress was slowed in 1996 by the lack of a
functioning central government, inter-entity political differences,
insufficient coordination, a late start, and failure of donor nations
to provide previously promised pledges. That aside, there has been
significant progress in terms of where Bosnia stood at the end of the
war. Specifically:
Over 60% of the population now has electricity, up from
10% in 1995.
Over 90% of the population has potable water, however
sewage systems remain weak.
About 80% of pre-war telecommunications systems have been
restored, but there is still no general inter-entity telecommunications
link.
Industrial production is up 110% from 1995 levels.
Employment is up 30% from last year.
Wages are up 408%.
Question. In the case of War Criminals, how many have been indicted
and arrested? What is the outlook for future indictments and arrest?
Answer. It is the responsibility of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Yugoslavia and the parties to the Dayton Agreement to
monitor, indict, and arrest suspected war criminals. The Stabilization
Force (SFOR) has no mandate to hunt down and arrest indicted persons
suspected of war crimes, however, the SFOR will DETAIN indicted war
crimes suspects if they come in contact with them in the course of
their normal duties, and if the situation permits. Given the data that
I hold, there are 73 persons presently indicted for war crimes. Of
those 73 persons, 52 are ethnic Serbs, 18 are ethnic Croats, and 3 are
Bosnian Muslims. To date, only 6 are in Tribunal custody, 1 is in the
national custody, and only 1 person has been convicted of war crimes.
The future success of the International tribunal in bringing indicted
war crimes suspects to justice is the parties' responsibility, and the
degree of cooperation and vigor of the international community in
apprehending and extraditing indicted persons who have fled Bosnia.
Question. How confident are you that significant progress will be
made in these non-military programs in the next eighteen months?
Answer. Bosnia is still a dangerous place and the peace process
remains fragile and can be undone unless all remain vigilant. However,
in looking back over the past 15 months since the signing of the peace
agreement, we have made much progress. Nevertheless, much remains to be
done, and I am convinced the professionals of the Stabilization Force
(SFOR) will make a significant contribution in meeting the challenges
that lie ahead.
Key to the success of the civil implementation effort is the early
development and implementation of the civil action plan. SFOR is
working closely with the office of the High Representative to provide
planning and other assistance within our capabilities. The same rigor
and discipline is needed with other implementation agencies to give
civil implementation the chance for success. Indeed, the SFOR can
achieve all its tasks and the overall mission can fail if the civilian
agencies do not fulfill their objectives of reconciliation,
resettlement, reconstruction economic development, and restoration of
political institutions and law and order. Eighteen months will go by
quickly and immediate action is now required to move civil
implementations projects forward.
Arms Control in Bosnia
Question. What is the status of the implementation of the arms
control agreement in Bosnia?
Answer. Implementation of the Article II Agreement is proceeding
satisfactorily, article IV implementation, although many armaments have
been destroyed, still has problems to be resolved, primarily with the
Republika Srpska.
The Article II Agreement (Confidence and Security-Building Measures
in Bosnia-Herzegovina) was signed 26 January 1996 in Vienna between the
Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
and the Republika Srpska. It is deemed as successful. Satisfactory
progress has been reported on inspections, military liaison missions,
and information exchanges.
The Article IV Agreement (Measures for Sub-Regional Arms Control)
was signed 14 June 1996 in Florence between the Article II signatories,
Croatia, and Yugoslavia. It is deemed a qualified success. The Parties
have destroyed almost ------.
Question. What is the role of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in
monitoring compliance with the arms control agreement?
Answer. SFOR monitors implementation of the arms control agreements
as only a part of the overall evaluation of the Former Warring Factions
(FWF) compliance with the General Framework Agreement for Peace in
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was
given the arms reduction mandate. This is not an SFOR responsibility.
SFOR enforcement of the arms control agreement could degrade the
perception of evenhandedness. ------.
Question. Various heavy arms have been pulled back to cantonment
areas. What, if any control does the Stabilization Force (SFOR) have
over these cantonment areas? What will happen to these arms when SFOR
leaves?
Answer. The cantonment areas are under the operational control of
the Parties within Bosnia-Herzegovina. SFOR has the right and is
authorized to compel the removal, withdrawal, or relocation of specific
forces and weapons from, and to order the cessation of any activities
in, any location in Bosnia and Herzegovina whenever the SFOR determines
such forces, weapons or activities to constitute a threat or potential
threat to either the SFOR or its mission, or to another Party. There is
cooperation between SFOR and the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), in that SFOR provides cantonment
inspection data to the OSCE.
After SFOR leaves, the arms will remain under the operational
control of the appropriate Party subject to the provisions of the
Article II Agreement, Confidence and Security-Building Measures in
Bosnia-Herzegovina signed 26 January 1996 in Vienna and the Article IV
Agreement, Measures for Sub-Regional Arms Control, signed 14 June 1996
in Florence.
Condition of the Russian Military
Question. What programs have the highest priority within Russia's
defense budget?
Answer. ------.
Question. How prevalent are desertions?
Answer. ------.
Question. What is your assessment of the outlook for Russia's
military during the next five years or so?
Answer. ------.
Unless pay and living conditions are improved
significantly and a career in the military becomes much more
attractive, the quality of the personnel making up the force probably
will not notably improve and Rodionov's objectives will be difficult to
achieve.
A lack of leadership commitment and inadequate funding
make the likelihood of successful military reform poor for the near
term (3 to 5 years) and only slightly improved for the mid-term (5 to
10 years).
Cooperation With Russia
Question. Russian Troops are currently deployed in Bosnia and
conducting operations with U.S. and Allied forces.
How is it working out?
Answer. One of the great accomplishments in the peacekeeping
operation in Bosnia is the successful partnership between NATO and
Russian forces. NATO and Russian forces have operated shoulder to
shoulder in an extremely difficult area of responsibility executing a
common mission with common rules of engagement under my command. An
effective command and control arrangement was created to accommodate
Russia in this NATO-led operation. A three star Russian general has
been assigned to my headquarters in Belgium since Oct. 15, 1995 and
acts as my deputy for Russian forces. This arrangement has led to
unprecedented consultations (over 80 meetings) between NATO and Russian
military officials, expanded communications, and broadened mutual
understanding at the strategic military level. The Russian Brigade has
performed in an exceptional manner, both independently and in
coordinated action with U.S. forces since their deployment to Bosnia in
January 1996. Moreover, we are now taking steps together in Bosnia to
deepen tactical interoperability by conducting joint missions, joint
all arms training, and expanding liaison staffs. This successful
military NATO-Russia partnership is a historic breakthrough that has
the potential to establish a new foundation for institutionalizing a
new era in NATO-Russia military cooperation.
Question. Give us your perspective on the overall future of U.S./
Russian military cooperation.
Answer. The long-term prospects for U.S.-Russian military
cooperation are good providing that Russia remains on its current
reform course. Our ability to conduct combined operations within Bosnia
underscores the potential successes we can achieve when we work towards
a common objective.
In the near-term, Russian preoccupation with NATO enlargement
issues will cause it to be selective in the types of peacetime military
engagement activities in which it chooses to participate with us.
Additionally, a projected reorganization of the Russian military, to
more adequately address the realities of post-Cold War geopolitics and
coupled with pressing budgetary constraints, will undoubtedly impact
its ability to engage us on matters of military cooperation on other
than a moderate scale.
Quality of Military Personnel
Question. General Joulwan, have you noticed any deterioration in
the quality of the new troops entering your theater?
Answer. The quality and motivation of our recruits remains high.
Negative quality indicators, such as involuntary separations, courts
martial, and Articles 15 have shown no negative trends.
Question. What about their physical condition?
Answer. USEUCOM forces are in excellent shape and our components
continue to maintain the high state of wellness that is critical to
supporting our readiness posture and high operations tempo. The recent
emphasis of the Military Health Services System in focusing on
promoting healthy life-styles is helping our forces sustain top
physical condition.
Question. Are the new troops as mentally disciplined as those in
prior years?
Answer. I know of no data to suggest that the troops of today are
any less mentally disciplined than those of prior years. On the
contrary, given the current high operations tempo, increased rate of
deployments, and missions other than war, and the requirement to master
highly sophisticated equipment, our current cadre of troops
consistently demonstrates exceptional mental discipline. Our people are
being asked to leave their families more often and for longer periods
of time, not to fight a ``cold war enemy,'' but rather to assist in
major humanitarian peacekeeping/nation building efforts. In many
respects fulfilling this type of mission requires even more mental
discipline because the mission role is less clearly defined. Given the
success of our troops in meeting this daunting task, the mental
discipline of our new troops is excellent.
Question. Have you found that the new troops have more ``emotional
baggage,'' i.e., personal problems, than those in the past?
Answer. No, I have not. In many respects, the troops of today have
less emotional baggage than those of the past. For example, the drug
abuse rate in Europe has dropped substantially since 1986 (1986 rate/
1000 was 8.58, 1996 rate/1000 is 1.4). The other components show
similar progress. However, warning signs have begun to appear. For
instance, the Army recently had to adjust recruiting standards in light
of manpower shortfalls. As a result, we anticipate that 10% rather than
5% of new Army recruits will enter without a high school diploma.
Although diplomas do not guarantee emotional stability, we recognize
that cognitive abilities are positively correlated with successful
stress management capabilities. Each of the Services must work to
attract future members from this smaller pool and, therefore, face
greater risks for ``emotional baggage.''
Question. How is the morale of your troops in Bosnia and elsewhere
within the European theater?
Answer. Morale within Bosnia and throughout the United States
Forces in Europe remains positive. Our soldiers, sailors, airmen and
Marines know their presence and their mission is critically important
to our national interests. The morale of our troops are continually
assessed through aggressive unit climate assessment programs. The
process entails both a qualitative and quantitative assessment of
various factors which positively or negatively impact morale with the
European command. The assessments are conducted on a routine basis.
Leadership continues to make strides towards improving quality of
life in theater, and particularly for deployed personnel. For example,
at Tent City, located at Aviano Airbase, Italy, six additional morale
phones were added. This made it much easier for residents to keep in
touch with their ``home bases.'' They also added modern aerobics
equipment, a reading room, weekly Bible study classes, and erected a
``fest'' (recreational) tent for members. These initiatives have
provided outlets for members to spend time relaxing, getting/staying
fit, and fulfilling spiritual needs.
Military Health Care
Question. In visiting various stateside bases, members of the
Committee have been hearing complaints about medical care and dental
plans. How satisfied are troops and dependents in your command with the
medical care and dental care for themselves and their dependents?
Answer. Active duty and family member satisfaction has increased
significantly in the last three years with the introduction of the
CHAMPUS Demonstration Project (which eliminated deductibles and cost-
shares for family members who needed health care from host-nation
sources) and the TRICARE Europe Prime benefit--which preserved the
elimination of cost-sharing for all TRICARE Prime enrollees. Further,
access to dental care for family members has improved significantly
with the addition of more than 60 dentists in this theater specifically
for the purpose of seeing family members.
In circumstances in which active duty and family members are
required to use host-nation care, bilingual patient liaisons are
available at virtually all of our hospitals and clinics to facilitate
interaction between the patient and the host-nation providers and
staff. While this program goes a long way to improving satisfaction, it
does not always make the medical experience similar to that in a U.S.
facility. However, feedback from those receiving care in host nation
facilities, as from military treatment facilities, has been
overwhelmingly positive.
There are aspects of both programs that require further attention.
First, greater support and outreach to geographically isolated
communities without a nearby US military medical facility is required.
While these communities clearly benefit from the TRICARE Europe Prime
cost structure, they do not enjoy an increased access to dental care
unless they travel to a U.S. facility. Second, continued support for
the infrastructure improvements in communication systems and telephone
lines will increase their satisfaction with access.
Question. What are the major shortcomings of the medical care in
your command?
Answer. USEUCOM Component medical services have no MAJOR
shortcomings to identify. Each Component Surgeon has identified areas
for improvement, but in general all health services required to support
active duty personnel and their family members is available.
In addition, as TRICARE-Europe implementation continues, more host
nation medical services will be available to U.S. personnel and their
families in the communities where they reside.
Question. How many U.S. military operated hospitals are there in
the European Command?
Answer. There are a total of NINE U.S. military hospitals with
inpatient capabilities:
Air Force: Bitburg (Germany), Lakeheath (United Kingdom) and
Incirlik (Turkey).
Army: Heidelberg (Germany), Wuerzberg (Germany), Wuerzbergy
(Germany) and Landstuhl (Germany).
Navy: Rota (Spain), Naples (Italy) and Sigonella (Italy).
EUCOM Priorities and Deficiencies
Question. What weapon systems currently funded in procurement and
R&D are the highest priority from USEUCOM's perspective?
Answer. Generally, I wouldn't place priorities on specific weapons
systems, I leave the specifics of procurement to the Service Chiefs. I
concern myself with the capabilities I require to carry out my mission.
I identify my requirements in my Theater Integrated Priority List (IPL)
to the Secretary of Defense and The Military Services for inclusion in
their Program Objective Memoranda (POM).
Modernization programs promise to bring important enhancements to
our operational capability. The C-17 was a critical element of our
rapid Implementation Forcer (IFOR) deployment and it demonstrated its
ability to operate in a difficult environment. Future development of
Strategic Sealift capability such as roll-on/roll-off ships and Joint
Logistics Over The Shores (JLOTS) are key to movement of forces into
any area in the USEUCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) JSTARS has also
provided an important intelligence capability and proven itself highly
adaptable to the IFOR requirements. The Precision Guided Munitions we
employed in Operation DELIBERATE FORCE allowed us to accurately target
key nodes with minimal collateral damage. This led directly to the
Dayton Peace Talks. We must also continue to pursue Theater Missile
Defense (TMD) collaborative development efforts through systems such as
Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) System and Medium Extended
Air Defense Systems (MEADS). These programs will provide the capability
to counter what is emerging as one of the significant threats to
American interests.
Question. Have EUCOM's interests been adequately met in the fiscal
year 1998 budget request?
Answer. Yes. I have several opportunities to influence the
development of the Department of Defense budget. I identify my
Integrated Priority List (IPL) to the Secretary of Defense and The
Military Services for inclusion in their Program Objective memoranda
(POM), I provide direct input to the Defense Planning Guidance, I
review the Service POMs, and I participate in the Program Budget
Decision process. I also can address budget issues through the
developing Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and its
influence on the Chairman's Program Assessment and the Chairman's
Program Review.
In summary, thanks to the support of Congress through the
Goldwater-Nichols Act, I have ample opportunity to weigh-in with my
requirements throughout the planning, programming and budgeting cycle.
Furthermore legislative hearings such as these provide another path to
ensure my requirements are given due consideration.
Question. Do you have any shortfalls in training, equipment, and
maintenance?
Answer. The President's budget is sufficient for USEUCOM's
requirements. But there are some issues I would like to highlight.
Above all, we must fully funds training readiness. I believe in
making the scrimmage tougher then the game. The success of the military
operation in Bosnia illustrates the success of past readiness training.
Congress has understood this and made appropriations accordingly. But,
as last year, the timing of Supplemental Appropriation reimbursement is
critical. Without timely passage of the Supplemental Appropriation that
is before Congress, USEUCOM forces may not be able to continue training
after June 97. The bottom line is we really require the Supplemental
Appropriation by April 97 to prevent disruptions of services and
training.
We can also apply additional money against readiness and Quality of
Life projects such as Military Construction, Real Property Maintenance,
Military Family Housing, Unaccompanied Personnel Housing, and Quarters
Furnishings. As a case in point, the appended table quantifies the
extent of our fiscal year 1997 funding shortfalls in repair,
maintenance, and new construction for the Theater's facilities.
FISCAL YEAR 1998 THEATER INFRASTRUCTURE ACCOUNT SHORTFALLS
[In millions of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Army Navy Air Force Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Military construction....................................... 82 0 40 122
Real property maintenance................................... 334 6 91 431
Military family housing (MFH):
Construction............................................ 16 0 8 24
Maintenance and repairs................................. 30 0 14 44
Total................................................. 462 6 153 621
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Africa
Question. Most of the continent of Africa is in your commands' Area
of Responsibility (AOR). How many deployments have you had to this
region in the past year, and, for the record, what were the size of
those deployments?
Answer. As of 27 February 1997, USEUCOM has had ten (10)
operational deployments into Africa since January 1996, these include:
Operational Assured Response, Operation Quick Response, USEUCOM Survey
and Assessment Team (ESAT) to Burundi, ESAT to the Central African
Republic (CAR), Operation Guardian Assistance, Military Liaison Office-
Liberia, Operation Assured Lift, African Crisis Response Force (ACRF)
Pilot Team's deployments to Ethiopia, Uganda, and Senegal, and the
deployment of a Military Representative to CAR.
Operation Assured Response, from 9 Apr--3 Aug 96, was conducted to
evacuate 485 American citizens and 1,959 other noncombatants from
Monrovia, Liberia, following an outbreak of fractional fighting in
Monrovia. There were 4,533 U.S. military personnel, 20 U.S. military
aircraft, and 5 U.S. Navy ships deployed over the course of the
operation to Liberia to support this operation.
Operation Quick Response, from 20 May--1 Aug 96, was conducted to
evacuate 208 American citizens and 240 other noncombatants from Bangui,
Central African Republic, as a result of internal unrest. There were 32
U.S. military personnel and 2 U.S. military aircraft deployed to
support this operation.
Burundi USEUCOM Survey and Assessment Team (ESAT), ------.
Central African Republic (CAR) USEUCOM Survey and Assessment Team
(ESAT), ------.
Military Liaison Office-Liberia, ------.
Also, they are to monitor delivery, maintenance, and accountability
of U.S. equipment, being provided to ECOMOG through Presidential
drawdown authority. This deployment is expected to last 179 days. It
began with four personnel and has downsized to two.
Operation Guardian Assistance, from 13 Nov--27 Dec 96, was
conducted to facilitate humanitarian aid/voluntary repatriation of
refugees in Zaire. Approximately ------ were deployed to Entebbe,
Uganda and Kigali, Rwanda in support of this operation. Over 600,000
refugees were repatriated from Eastern Zaire to Rwanda and assess the
need for a multinational force to militarily intervene.
Operation Assured Lift, from 14 Feb--10 Mar 97, was conducted to
move additional ECOMOG troops and equipment from Mali and Ghana to
Monrovia, Liberia, as a result of Presidential drawdown authority
action. There were ------ deployed from Central Europe to Abidjan, Cote
D'Ivoire, to support this operation. In all, 1160 ECOMOG troops and 452
tons of equipment were moved to Liberia.
USEUCOM has deployed its African Crisis Response Force (ACRF) pilot
team twice since it was formed in Nov 96. This six man team of U.S.
military personnel was first deployed to Ethiopia and Uganda from 8--20
Dec 96. The team deployed to Senegal from 2--6 Feb 97. In each
instance, the purpose of the deployment was for the team to observe,
evaluate, and report on the training and equipment requirements of the
forces offered by Ethiopia, Uganda, and Senegal for the ACRF.
At the request of the U.S. Ambassador to the Central African
Republic (CAR), USEUCOM ------. This officer is assisting and advising
the ambassador on military issues and is serving as a liaison between
the U.S. embassy and the French and CAR militaries and the French-
funded African Peacekeeping Force in CAR. This deployment is for thirty
days and is scheduled to terminate on 7 Apr 97.
Question. Presently, an initiative is underway to develop an
African Crisis Response Force (ACRF). The bulk of this force would
consist of units from the military of the continent of Africa. What
role is the U.S. playing in the development and ultimate implementation
of this initiative?
Answer. USEUCOM, in conjunction with the interagency Task Force, is
actively involved in the military aspects of developing the African
Crisis Response Force initiative.
USEUCOM has participated in the deployments of political-military
teams which have traveled through Europe and Africa soliciting
governmental support for the initiative.
USEUCOM has also deployed pilot (assessment) teams to Ethiopia,
Uganda, and Senegal to assess the capabilities of forces those
governments have offered to the initiative. When the equipment
necessary to support initial training is provided to the Africans,
USEUCOM will deploy personnel to each country to conduct specific
training events. This initial training effort will focus on augmenting
existing individual soldier skills, developing junior leaders and
battalion staff officers, and improving combat support and combat
service support capabilities.
Subsequent training events will focus on multi-echeloned training
at the company/battalion level. This training will include host nation
government, as well as, international relief organizations in order to
conduct a more realistic training environment.
As long as the U.S. government supports its development, USEUCOM
will continue to support the African Crisis Response Force initiative.
Question. What are the probable primary functions of the U.S.
military in this initiative?
Answer. In conjunction with the interagency Task Force, USEUCOM
will continue to assist in the military development of the African
Crisis Response Force initiative.
Assessment, provision of equipment and training, and subsequent
provision of airlift are the current military functions associated with
development of the initiative.
In the developmental stages of the initiative, USEUCOM will provide
assistance in determining the needs of each African force offered to
participate in the initiative. Once training equipment is provided,
USEUCOM will coordinate deployment of mobile training teams to conduct
country-specific training events.
Once established, USEUCOM will coordinate sustainment operations
for the African Crisis Response Force. If committed, USEUCOM may
coordinate additional training, assist with planning, and may provide
strategic/tactical airlift in support of contingency operations.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Young.]
Thursday, February 27, 1997.
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES ATLANTIC COMMAND
WITNESS
GENERAL JOHN J. SHEEHAN, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES ATLANTIC
COMMAND, U.S. MARINE CORPS
Introduction
Mr. Young. The Committee will come to order. This afternoon
the Committee welcomes General John Sheehan, Commander in Chief
of the United States Atlantic Command.
General, we have worked with you before and I appreciate
the fact that you say what is on your mind. This Committee is
very supportive of you and the work that you do. We understand
the tremendous scope of your responsibility, the geographical
size of your theatre of operations, as well as the number of
troops and ships under your command.
We are very proud of the record that you have established
and that the force has established. We look forward to your
testimony today on the state of the Command and we hope that
you will address such issues as the present readiness of your
forces and the challenges and deployments and the OPTEMPO that
you now face.
We would also like to know about your priorities and any
deficiencies in terms of personnel, maintenance, and equipment
that you see as the Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Command.
And, again, I say we are very pleased with your willingness to
speak your mind on whatever the issue might be. We will have
some penetrating questions for you.
At this point, I would like to invite Mr. Murtha for any
opening statement he would like to make. Maybe you ought to
tell us about that ten-dollar transaction
Remarks of Mr. Murtha
Mr. Murtha. I wanted to make sure that I explained that
ten-dollar transaction. I was down to visit General Sheehan and
he challenged me to, when I went around visiting these various
bases, to ask about the staffing and how many people they have
and what their actual Table of Organization (TO) was. And he
predicted that we would find substantial numbers over what
their TO was and that is exactly what we did. And we went to, I
think, six bases and almost every level of command had more.
Now, there were two reasons for it. One was that the TO had
been decreased, which made it look like they had less people
and actually then they had taken people of the command and they
had not only more than they were authorized, but they had
substantially more than I thought they needed.
So I think what it says in this article, and I have seen
your comments before about trying to build our force according
to the threat, is really the key to our success. And getting
some people out of Washington is absolutely essential.
We sure don't need this many people in Washington when we
have so many in the Pentagon and, as you say 150,000 in the
area. And I am delighted that you are and agree with many of
the comments that you have made and look forward to hearing
what your testimony is.
General Sheehan. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Young. I might say to Mr. Murtha that the Speaker has
challenged me to find a way to turn the Pentagon into a
triangle. To me, that indicates a 40 percent cut somewhere and
I am not sure how we are going to do that but it is a challenge
that he has passed on to us.
General, your entire statement will be placed in our record
and you can present that information in the statement as you
wish and when you have completed, we will have some questions
for you.
Summary Statement of General Sheehan
General Sheehan. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Chairman, distinguished Members of the House Appropriations
Subcommittee on National Security. I really do appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you today. And as you mentioned, I
would ask that my formal testimony be submitted for the record.
But I would like to summarize a few brief points for the
Members and these will be very brief statements.
Following our extensive efforts to alleviate the Haitian
and Cuban migrant situation in 1996, we found that it is a much
quieter year in the U.S. Atlantic Command from those two
perspectives.
We still have 484 personnel in Haiti Maintaining U.S.
presence and providing a valuable support for United Nations
nongovernmental organizations and private volunteer
organizations. The illegal migration situation at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, has been reduced to the point that we have less than
100 illegal migrants or asylum seekers at any one time. That is
done from a peak of 46,950, individuals in 1995.
The most challenging element of USACOM's current mission is
the Joint Force Integration Piece, and we try to accomplish
this through a melding of the technology of the future of
battlefield systems and the doctrine to build a quality force.
Our primary means to correct some of the interoperability
problems is through the Advanced Concept and Technology
Demonstration ACTDs program and that is adding value to what we
do.
We are also addressing the challenges in the areas of Joint
Theater Missile Defense and taking the initiative of helping
define that concept and develop the potential of information
operations as a new concept of warfare fighting.
The ultimate goal of USACOM's Joint Force Integration and
Training efforts is to provide mission-ready joint forces to
other combatant CINCs whenever and wherever they are needed
around the world.
On any given day we have over 90 ships, 300 aircraft,
37,000 Active and Reserve component personnel deployed in
support of the geographically unified CINCs, plus within our
own Area of Responsibility (AOR). USACOM has deployed 192 units
consisting of over 9,000 personnel to the U.S. European Command
to support IFOR, an now SFOR, in Bosnia.
Sir, I thank you very much for the opportunity. Now I am
prepared for your questions.
[The statement of General Sheehan follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Young. General, thank you very much. We appreciate that
statement. The staff has gone over your entire statement and
found it to be very thorough.
I would like to begin the questioning by asking you about
the QDR. We were told from time to time that the QDR is a very,
very important review and I am curious as to what role, if any,
the U.S. CINC of the Atlantic Command has played in the QDR
process?
General Sheehan. Sir, as a CINC, I play it through with my
staff and as recently as 3 weeks ago during the CINCs
conference here in Washington, D.C., we spent an entire
afternoon reviewing the QDR with the OSD and the Joint Staff.
That was also the first opportunity for Secretary Cohen,
just having been sworn in as the new Secretary of Defense, to
participate in this discussion. And I am very, very impressed
with the sincerity and the intensity which he is approaching
this QDR.
Mr. Young. I wanted to make sure that I understand that.
You said you spent an afternoon?
General Sheehan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Young. Was that ample time for you to get your thoughts
in place or your thoughts presented to the Review Commission or
the Review Board?
General Sheehan. I would characterize it as basically
briefings where the CINSs were allowed some input. But since
that after noon, Secretary Cohen has gone back and brought all
the committees back in to help them focus their attention on
the QDR.
Mr. Young. Do you think the issues that you are concerned
about are being adequately addressed by the QDR?
General Sheehan. I believe they are, sir, at this time, by
Secretary Cohen.
Mr. Young. You have been, General, very outspoken and I
want to call your attention to some of your public quotes and
see if you feel like these issues are being addressed.
One quote that I think we have all seen is that there are
150,000 DoD military within a 50-mile radius of Washington,
D.C., while there were only 129,000 sailors in the entire
Atlantic fleet. You say that in the DoD there are 199 separate
staffs at the civilian and two-star and above flag officer
level. And you say statistically that the Army has only about
125,000 war fighters supported by 375,000 uniformed personnel
and another 300,000 civilian. That works out only to 16 percent
of the total force.
You have also concluded that if we are not careful we could
become the best trained staff to ever get run off a hill.
General, do you think the QDR is addressing these issues?
General Sheehan. I hope so, sir. I think that the issue is
the correct balance. When I raised this issue to Secretary
Cohen, he thought that the inverted pyramid of what we have is
a correct characterization of where we are today. And I think
he is trying to address this issue through this process.
Mr. Young. I have had an opportunity to talk to the
Secretary several times since he was sworn in and we have
discussed the issues that you have raised. I would agree with
you that he certainly understands the problem that exists or
that could exist, and I get the feeling that he is strongly
committed to trying to bring some rhyme or reason out of this.
In fact, I mentioned to him the same thing that I suggested
here that the Speaker has challenged me to find a way to reduce
the unnecessary personnel at the Pentagon. and I mentioned that
to him, and he said that he thinks that is a good challenge and
that he would be very happy to cooperate and work with us in
that effort.
So may be one of these days we will get more war fighters
than we have on the tail. We will see.
Mr. Murtha.
INFORMATION WARFARE
Mr. Murtha. General, one of the responsibilities you have
is information warfare and defense against information warfare.
General Sheehan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murtha. How vulnerable are we and what are we doing
about it?
General Sheehan. A very complex question, sir, but about 2
years ago in the U.S. Atlantic Command we started to try to
find out really what capability we had and so we undertook an
analysis in a war game, a real war game, ------.
Mr. Murtha. How many countries have the potential of
invading our systems? Which systems would be the most
vulnerable?
[Clerk's note.--Classified discussion was removed.]
Mr. Murtha. Well, one other statement I have to make. You
have four staffers back there. Only anybody that ever came
close to that was General Luck. He had--and I don't know, maybe
a lot of these people over here are your staff.
General Sheehan. Sir, actually, it is three. One guy is
here from the thought police from the Pentagon.
Mr. Murtha. I'll be darned. That is pretty impressive.
Who is that?
General Sheehan. Just kidding, sir.
But General Luck used to say that the only reason he had
such a large staff was to support the one marine that he had on
his staff. That is why I have one Army officer, sir.
QUALITY OF RECRUITS
Mr. Murtha. Okay. But one other thing, we have noticed a
slip in the quality of the people at the recruit depots in the
Army and even a little bit in the Marine Corps. Have you seen
that out in the field yet?
General Sheehan. It hasn't hit the operating forces yet. I
do know that there has been a slight decrease in the recruiting
statistics, but I have not seen it in the operating forces. My
command sergeant major, who just spent 2 days down in Fort
Bragg with the 82nd Airborne, 18th Airborne Corps, he told me
this morning that he is very pleased with what he sees down
there. So I think it is a problem that is coming through the
pipeline, but it is not visible right now.
Mr. Young. Okay. Mr. Murtha, thank you.
Mr. McDade?
JOINT TRAINING
Mr. McDade. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
General, welcome. We are glad to have you here. One of your
major responsibilities is joint training. Is that correct?
General Sheehan. Yes, Sir.
Mr. McDade. Can you tell us if Bosnia is having an impact
on your efforts to do what you think you ought to do in joint
training?
General Sheehan. No, sir. Actually, as a matter of fact, we
train all of the people who leave CONUS to go over to Bosnia.
We did it for IFOR, and we are doing it again for the SFOR
forces, especially in the Reserve and National Guard forces
over there.
Mr. McDade. Not draining your resources.
General Sheehan. Bosnia will be--if the $2 billion
supplemental that Secretary Cohen asked for is not approved, I
will have to shut down a lot of activity by July or August.
Mr. McDade. We understand that. But in the normal course of
your daily events, you don't see any impact?
General Sheehan. No, sir.
Mr. McDade. Are you engaging in new initiatives in joint
training?
General Sheehan. Yes, sir.
Mr. McDade. Tell the Committee how you think we could be
more efficient, will you?
General Sheehan. The issue in joint training has to do with
the use of transportation dollars and using computer simulation
to replicate what we do in the battlefield. We have down at
Norfolk, Virginia, and Chesapeake an organization called Joint
Training Analysis and Simulation Center, JTASC where we train
joint forces to fight on the battlefield. This is with real
world data bases, real world countries.
We use that to substitute for training, training in the
field. We no longer put an army in the field to train a general
or a Navy at sea. We substitute, for example, a training
evolution like ocean venture, whatever have you, that at one
time used to cost us $50 million. We now do that for less than
$5 million through the computer-aided training.
Mr. McDade. It is hard for me to visualize how that kind of
computer activity substitutes for the joint training when you
actually put them out in the field. How are you comfortable
with that?
General Sheehan. Sir, you do it through three phases. The
first phase what you do is you take someone like the 18th
Airborne commander, or the 2nd Fleet or 8th Air Force. You
bring them into a training facility where you teach them joint
doctrine, joint tactics and techniques and procedures. That is
a week-long seminar process.
The second phase, they develop an Opposition Force, OPFOR
against a real world threat, with a real world enemy. We have a
thinking OPFOR, that is human beings that actually operate in
the tactics and techniques and procedures, and all of the
stimulus that comes up from a component and to the staff is a
replication of the battlefield as the joint force commander
understands it. He is forced to deal with very complex issues,
for example, TPFDF, Time Phased Forced Deployment of Forces.
Mr. McDade. What was that again? I didn't get that.
General Sheehan. Time Phased Forced Deployment. It is the
process of moving forces from the continental limits of the
United States to a theater of operations. If he gets that
wrong, he has to fight that fight with the forces that he has.
If he puts in 15 days worth of supplies, that is all he gets.
So he is forced to make tactical decisions about using forces.
He stays at this for one week for 24 hours a day for the
entire week. And the OPPFOR can win. And so by the time the
joint force commander and his staff leaves, they have been
through everything that the battlefield combat training system
could produce.
Mr. McDade. Make a few decisions?
General Sheehan. They made a few bad decisions, too, which
they learned from. I have three mentors who helped the joint
force commander, one of them is Gary Luck. He works for me, is
a senior mentor for the joint force commander. The other is Jim
Lindsey, former Army four-star, and a three-star Air Force
officer, a former Air Force commander. So they assist these
three-star officers on how to become joint force commanders.
INTEROPERABILITY
Mr. McDade. We used to hear inoperability in Desert Storm
as a problem with joint exercises, et cetera.
General Sheehan. Yes, sir.
Mr. McDade. What is your opinion today? Has that gone away
or is that still a problem?
General Sheehan. It is still a complex problem because we
have many legacy systems that are still----
Mr. McDade. Manyt what?
General Sheehan. Legacy systems.
Mr. McDade. Older systems?
General Sheehan. Older systems that were built by Services
that still have what we call translators that allow them to
talk to each other.
We have to go to a concept of what I call a ``born joint''.
We right now spend about $40 billion in C3I, C4I. Those systems
have to start from the conception to be multi-service in
capability. A software program, for example, if you have to
retrofit it to become joint after it has been fielded, it is
400 times its initial cost if you don't get it right the first
time.
Mr. McDade. Well, what is the scope of the problem we are
talking about? Is there any way you can put a dollar figure,
for example, behind what you are talking about to fix that
problem?
General Sheehan. It is a very hard number to calculate, but
it is a problem that you can solve if you focus your energy and
activity on it.
Mr. McDade. Are we doing our best over that?
General Sheehan. I think the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council, JROC process is beginning to get its hand around this
issue. Any new system they bring on-line has to be joint.
Mr. McDade. The only thing that scares me is they are
beginning to. Desert Storm was a long time ago.
General Sheehan. Yes, sir.
Mr. McDade. It sounds like we need to give them some
encouragement.
General Sheehan. Yes, sir.
Mr. McDade. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Obey.
BUDGET INEFFICIENCIES
Mr. Obey. General, as you know, we have tremendous budget
pressures. It is crucial that we not only get the right amount
of dollars for our military operations and everything else, but
that we put those dollars in the right places for the right
things to buttress the right kind of conceptual framework that
will give us the most effective defense.
Where do you think we are most falling short in your best
professional judgment in doing that? Where do we have the most
important duplication that we ought to be dealing with? What
kind of things should we be looking at that we perhaps aren't
right now? In terms of joint operations, aren't there
efficiencies that we ought to be looking at more aggressively--
are there inefficiencies we ought to be looking at more
aggressively than we are?
General Sheehan. I think the issue has to be a strategy of
resource match. I think much of our decision process over the
last couple of years has been decided by programmatics as
opposed to strategy, and I think that is what Secretary Cohen
is focusing his attention on.
Clearly, three weeks ago when we had our discussion with
him he was clearly focused on the strategy piece and what comes
out of that from a force structure. But I think that on a macro
scale, when I look at what we have done to the U.S. forces over
the last couple of years, we have taken 33 percent of its
combat structure out. We have only taken down management
headquarters by 6 percent.
I think if you returned to the 1987 portions of where we
were in our structure, I think there is some potential savings
there. When you look at the enlisted-to-officer ratio, for
example, we are becoming more officer-intensive and we are
losing our enlisted structure. You need to keep young officers.
You need to keep young troops because that is the seed for your
future. So those are areas that I think from a management
perspective you could take a very serious look at it. I hope
the QDR does that, sir.
SHORTFALLS IN JOINT OPERATIONS
Mr. Obey. In terms of the joint operations between
different services or joint training, in your best professional
judgment what are our most serious shortfalls?
General Sheehan. The issue on joint training has to do with
the number of exercises to be conducted on a worldwide basis.
The General Accounting Office did a study a couple of years ago
that basically said 23 percent of the transportation dollars
are being used to pay--are actually used for joint training,
Service training or presence training. That, again, is one of
the issues that we raised with Secretary Cohen and he is trying
to come to grips with; how much presence is enough?
What constitutes presence overseas, whether it is 100,000
in Europe or 100,000 in Japan? What level of exercising is
necessary for confidence building within a coalition process
and then how do you really take disparate elements from
different Services in training what we call joint mission
essential tasks? We have just finished standardizing the joint
mission essential task for Services to perform from a joint war
fighting perspective and hopefully over the next year and a
half or 2 years, we will be able to use those as a standard to
measure the training activity to get the most dollar for our
value. But we are still about a year and a half away from doing
that.
Mr. Obey. Can you give us any examples of insufficient
cooperation between the Services in these areas?
General Sheehan.I think all of the Services because of
Goldwater-Nichols have realized that no Service has the ability
to fight alone in a battlefield, that they need the help from
the other Services. You will always find pockets of resistance
in each Service for whatever reason because they are sponsoring
a certain platform. But at the end of the day, I am very
comfortable that the joint training is coming along. It is much
better than it was in 1983, 1986, much better than it was in
1989. So it is getting better every year.
Mr. Obey. Thank you.
Mr. Young. Mr. Lewis.
Mr. Lewis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Sheehan, it is nice to be with you.
General Sheehan. Thank you, sir.
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
Mr. Lewis. I had recently brought to my attention your work
relative to the tactical control system concept, and its
potential is very impressive. I would like to compliment you on
that work.
As a result of my work on this Committee and a
responsibility in another area that deals with the Intelligence
Committee, I have focused a good deal lately on an item known
as unmanned aerial vehicles, and maybe to the frustration of
some of my colleagues I have been using one of those
procurements as an illustration that takes me to try to probe a
problem that relates very much to jointness, the item that you
just mentioned.
As I understand it, Secretary Perry made USACOM, the
combatant command or the force provider for UAVs, is that
right?
General Sheehan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lewis. Could you tell us exactly what that entails?
General Sheehan. Well, sir, we have one advanced concept
technology demonstration, Predator, that has been tested and
used in Bosnia with a great deal of satisfaction by most of the
users. There were tactical problems that had to do with the
learning curve on icing of the wings and all those kinds of
things, but UAVs offer us a great opportunity to make
commanders more situationally aware.
UAVs, having watched the Israelis use them and visited the
Israeli UAV people, I have great hope that we are able to
manage the data that the UAV is capable of producing. Our
problem is not the platform itself. Our problem is the ground
station and our ability to process through automatic target
recognition what the UAV can show us in the battlefield.
Mr. Lewis. Would you explain what jointness means as it
relates to Predator?
General Sheehan. What it does, it allows us--the Air Force
is a single Service, for example, but the air combat command,
my Air Force component, they provide a squadron capability that
is deployable that works for the ground force commander. It
covers a large area. You can downlink the information to the
joint force commander. You can downlink the information to a
ground station commander, on the ground side. It allows people
to see the battlefield from a common situation awareness. If
you can link the picture, then very frankly it allows you then
to use other weapons systems platforms to destroy targets
without putting people in harm's way. It has great potential.
Mr. Lewis. It is my understanding that you wrote the
Concept of Operations, for the operations of the Predator.
General Sheehan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lewis. Within those concepts you supported the forward
control element?
General Sheehan. Yes.
Mr. Lewis. Essentially, that would say that the Air Force,
if they were the commander, would be able to hand off to a Navy
pilot by way of a submarine, you might very well have an Army
person on the front line who can control this mechanism. So
jointness has a pretty broad definition in that connection.
General Sheehan. Yes, Sir.
Mr. Lewis. Generally speaking, this Committee has supported
that concept and we have had language in our bill of last year
supporting the Forward Control Element.
As of this moment, Air Force, who has command now of this
asset related to UAVs, has refused that forward control
element. I would like to have your reaction or comment.
General Sheehan. I wouldn't say they refused it, sir. This
is a classic debate between the Services about putting small
airplanes in air space. They worry about the safety of flight
for fixed-wing aviation, so as a result, they feel as though
they have positive control. Who drives the airplane around,
this is really an issue of the joint force commander, tells his
air component commander what he wants done. And I don't know of
a joint force commander who, if there is a ground unit in
trouble, who is not going to give him that UAV.
What I need to do is to get to the battalion commander a
ground station that is small enough and has a low enough
footprint that the can see what is over the next hill, and if I
have a component commander that won't give that to an infantry
battalion commander he is not going to be in the battlefield
very long.
Mr. Lewis. Let me be a little more specific. Yesterday this
subject was raised with the Secretary of Defense. Just
following that, the Army sent a message out suggesting that
they ought to have this asset available for joint operations
and training at Fort Irwin. They got a direct message back that
was very short, succinct and threatening saying, not no, but
you can imagine what that is.
General Sheehan. Yes, sir. It is true General Hartzog, who
is the radar commander who wants the UAV for Force 21 for use,
because they understand it would add to the battlefield, and
that is an issue I am going to have to work out with the
Chairman, sir.
Mr. Lewis. I must say that over time, in this subject area,
that is very important in terms of the total battlefield
circumstance. It seems to me there is a pretty fundamental
question here relative to that debate that goes on between
forces. The definition of jointness, we would hope, is broader
than would appear to be the case in this instance. And I would
hope that you would recognize the difficulty of a narrow
interpretation of what jointness means.
General Sheehan. Yes, sir, I do. I say it is a ground
station issue of giving the ground commander the ground
station, and the joint force commander at the end of the day is
the one that decides where those resources are allocated.
Mr. Lewis. You know, you take yourself to the submarine,
for example, and you can see very quickly some limitation there
if there wasn't a broad definition.
General Sheehan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lewis. Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to make sure that at
the highest levels through the forces that you know that
someone is raising these questions and we don't intend to stop
raising the questions
General Sheehan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lewis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Lewis, thank you very much.
Mr. Dicks.
INFORMATION WARFARE
Mr. Dicks. General, I want to welcome you to the Committee.
I enjoyed very much being able to visit you, I guess it was
late last year, and to talk to you about some of the major
issues that we are facing.
I had an opportunity to go out to Mitre, myself, with--
their staff people and former Defense Secretary Schlesinger for
a briefing on information warfare. And as a member of the
Intelligence Committee as well, I have been very concerned
about this issue. And I think you are absolutely right that the
vulnerability here isn't just to U.S. military systems, but to
our entire infrastructure, including, our ability to generate
and wield electric energy. Our ------ is also vulnerable.
There are just a whole series of things that could be done
that would, bring the country literally to a standstill if you
had a dedicated group of hackers who could be, in essence,
hired by a terrorist to try and damage our systems. And I also
understand the exercises that have been done on military
operations have not been very satisfying, either.
So I would just like you to, again, to maybe talk in a
little more depth regarding where our most critical
vulnerabilities are. The President has named a national
commission to look into this, and I had a chance to talk to
Sandy Burger down at the White House on this subject, but
shouldn't this be given a lot more attention than it has been
given up to this juncture? Shouldn't there be a little more
sense of urgency from our top governmental leaders about our
vulnerability?
General Sheehan. Sir, I think there has been. Before
Senator Nunn left the Armed Services Committee, now I know it
because I just spoke to him about 2 weeks ago on this issue. He
is from the commercial side very, very focused on this issue. I
know the money and banking industry is very focused on this
issue.
The biggest single problem we have is getting people to
understand the complexity of the problem. There are many people
that think that you can go out and buy a commercial cellular
phone, for example, and buy an encryption device from the local
AT&T system and use it to talk to somebody and you think you
are encrypted. Those systems are not secure, as you know.
Most people--most civilians in the United States that think
they have commercial encrypted cellular phones, though, you can
break those in less than 2 seconds. And so it is a very serious
problem. But getting people to understand it, and this is
especially a difficult problem because when you are in the
military and you go to a commercial institution and say let me
talk to you about your vulnerabilities, because of ------ a
couple of years ago, people think that this is an intrusion
into their privacy by the military or by the Federal
Government. We have got to get over that. We have got to get
through that process that says, this is about how we live.
We live in an electronic society. Everything we do from
money and banking to checking out of a supermarket is done
electronically. And if that system collapses, there is a large
segment of this population that is going to suffer some degree
of inconvenience. And so I think it is an awareness issue. It
is an issue of understanding how the infrastructure backbone of
the United States is constructed to do that.
You need help from AT&T and other large commercial
organizations. They are reluctant to talk about it. They do
some work themselves. So I am just hopeful that Mr. Marsh and
his panel are able to bring all the people together who are
involved in this issue to raise the awareness from a policy
perspective, because as I said before, at the end of the day,
it is the concept, and the organizational theory and then the
laws that allow you to work in this arena without the
perception that you are violating someone's rights. It is a
very complex problem.
Mr. Dicks. Do you think--should this be handled from the
civilian side of the Defense Department rather than having the
military assume responsibility? Would that help in this case?
General Sheehan. It comes from two different parts. There
was what I call--the information operations consists of two
parts: Information and operations, and a tactical perspective,
the offense piece and the defensive piece, and then there is
compartmented information programs that you use against
adversaries.
Understanding what the defense information structure is
clearly a policy issue that OSD needs to focus on.
It also gets at this whole strategy of how the United
States approaches potential adversaries. I came at this thing
from a perspective that says the real reason you do information
operations is not to go to war, but to deter war, because you
are managing the electronic spectrum. You are managing
perception management.
If you ask me to look at a country and deal with that
country, I am kinetically oriented. You tell me country X and I
will tell you how to bomb it into oblivion. But that is not
what the warfare of tomorrow is about. Tomorrow's warfare is
when you are in a crisis process how do you move the crisis
back to peace? Or if you are in conflict, how do you move it
back to pre-crisis? You do it through the manipulation of the
whole arena in which a country exists. This is the social, the
economic, the political and the military dimensions.
To do that, you have to have a national strategy and
understand what you want as an outcome of dealing with that
nation. There are probably 12 to 15 nations on the face of the
earth that fit into this category of we are either economic
competitors or the military competitors as peer competitors. We
need to come at this thing from the strategy perspective that
says this is country X, this is how we approach them from an
information perspective and the social dimensions, the economic
dimensions, the political dimensions, the military dimensions
and manage that information medium in such a way that you can
manipulate it to your advantage.
That has very, very threatening connotations to some
people. The legal people in OSD are terrified of the concept.
Clearly, the appropriate--as you know, the appropriate
oversight committees in the Congress want to know exactly what
you are talking about, about what do you mean putting embedded
technology into someone's computer system? Who has the
authority to re-call it? What do you do with the information?
What do you do especially if it is financial information? So
there are--there has to be a much more serious dialogue.
I think that the House is going to have an off site, I
believe--sometime over the next couple of weeks we are going to
focus on this issue and they have asked me to come down and
talk about it in a much more closed forum. But I think the
House is in the right direction.
I think John White is trying to focus on this issue. And I
think that in my discussions with Tony Lake, should he be
confirmed, I think he is really trying to focus on this issue
also from a CIA perspective.
NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY
Mr. Dicks. All right. When you talk about our lack of or
the necessity for us to develop a new national military
strategy, I think that is absolutely essential, and then from
the strategy to decide what we need to do in the resource area.
What I have seen over the last few years, frankly, is a
budget-driven strategy, a lack of strategy and just a budgetary
approach to this, where the services each have items that are
their priorities. Frankly, if you ask me, do I think Goldwater-
Nichols is working, I think that it is working at the CINC
level, but I don't think the real hard trade-off decisions with
the limited budget that we have got today are being made at the
highest level.
One area I, frankly, worry about is that we are out there
buying a lot of things, for example, nonstealthy tactical air,
that are going to have a hard time performing in the threat
environment of the future. And yet we are ending programs like
the B-2 where you have a chance to use advanced technology,
with much cheaper weapons, and I think which provides us with a
revolutionary capability to deal with long range power
projection. Yet we can't seem to get the top people in the
Pentagon to focus on these things and make the hard calls. And
it is because, I think, they are all fearful of each of the
services riling one of the others.
Give me your perspective on this. How do you see this?
General Sheehan. I come at it in a parallel path. Wherever
I read Goldwater-Nichols, the thing that strikes me most often
is that the primary purpose of Goldwater-Nichols was to
reinforce surrendering control of the military. When you read
the law, that is what the real issue is. Then down embedded is
this whole issue of creating jointness.
I think the issue of the strategy piece is that we need a
better connection. I think the Office of the Secretary of
Defense clearly needs to influence the process. He does it
through three ways: Through policy, through budget and through
operations.
I think you are right in the sense that the expertise to
get at the strategy piece, then go from strategy to resource
allocation, is the part that we need more effort in. And I am
very, very kind of encouraged by the way that Secretary Cohen
is approaching this thing. I think he clearly understands that
as the Secretary of Defense he comes at this thing from a
policy perspective.
I think much of the activity in OSD is they get confused
between policy and management. They focus on management and not
the policy piece. If you fix the policy piece, the management
piece then follows by subcontracting that to people who have
the authority to do that. And I think then you get at the issue
that you are trying to get your hands on.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Visclosky.
RUSSIAN NAVAL ACTIVITY
Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
General, could you tell me about Russian Naval activity in
your area?
General Sheehan. Sure. Russian Naval activity is
significantly down. Part of it has to do with the miserable
state of the Russian military budget. Large numbers of ships
are tied up at the pier with families living on them because
there is no housing for them. We had two incidents over the
last 6 months where fleet vessels actually sent armed guards to
the power plants to demand power for their ships because the
Navy had not paid for them. And so one--in one sense, their
surface Navy has been significantly degraded.
The other interesting part, though, is that they are
investing in submarine technology. They still are--have a very
quiet submarine, the Akula. They have three submarines out in
the Barents Sea today. They are--if all of the indications are
correct, by the year 2000, 50 percent of their strategic
forces, their strategic nuclear force will be sea-based. It
will be based on the Kola Peninsula.
Mr. Visclosky. Fifty percent.
General Sheehan. Fifty percent. The Chief of Defense at
Finland was just at my headquarters the last two days. He is
concerned about the stability of the Leningrad district, which
is the area he is concerned about. Much of that is easy as he
travels back and forth to the district. The towns up in that
Kola Peninsula are off limits to even him.
So I think that--I am hopeful that the progress towards
democracy in Moscow works, in Russia. I am very, very concerned
about the state of the Russian military. I think Rodionov is
playing to the audience about the security of the nuclear
forces. I am very comfortable that those forces are in good
shape from being paid, but their conventional forces are in
abysmal condition.
DRUG INTERDICTION
Mr. Visclosky. On drug interdiction, my opinion is we
haven't put a dent into the problem. That is my personal
opinion.
From your perspective and the responsibilities you are
charged with, what has worked and what hasn't worked? I
recognize that there are a lot of moving parts to this problem
outside of your control.
General Sheehan. What hasn't worked is a national will to
deal with this problem. We have been at this since 1989 when
the U.S. military first got involved, because we had the
command and control architecture and the intelligence to do
this. And plus we became the synapse that allowed that
organizations who were not accustomed to working with each
other to come to a common room and work in a cooperative basis.
We have become much better since 1989, but there are parts to
the problem. One is the source and transit zone piece and third
is domestic consumption.
For the first couple of years, we kind of focused on the
transit zone, trying to create a barrier and it is amazing the
consistency, that basically we interrupt or disrupt or capture
one-third of the product and we still are talking about 300
tons, in round numbers, coming into the United States. We went
to a source country strategy a couple of years ago built around
Colombia, and I don't have to speak about Samper and Mexico and
the problems of corruption that does the Nation. So the source
country piece, they are working on that very hard. I give Bob
Gilbart and Barry McCaffrey a great deal of credit for the
courage that they have undertaken to hammer guys like Samper
and the Mexicans.
But at the end of the day, if people demand drugs, the drug
dealer is going to find a way to deliver it. So we have to
focus more attention here in the United States on the consumer.
I think the military is an example of where zero tolerance
with drugs is a way that other public institutions, where the
life and safety of individuals associated with it, that you
have to institute various kinds of programs like drug testing.
I think until the American people come to grips with this
issue, I think you are going to continue to see drug barons
produce a product and earn a huge profit by delivering it.
Mr. Visclosky. General, thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
THEATER AND BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
Mr. Young. General, this morning we spent the morning with
General Joulwan and one of the issues that developed was the
issue of theater missile defense.
General Sheehan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Young. And I understand that late last year, some time
in the fall, that the Defense Science Board and the Defense
Policy Board suggested that the U.S. Atlantic Command be put in
charge of the department's Joint Theater Missile Defense
architecture. Has that happened?
General Sheehan. It has and it hasn't. We are doing--the
Theater Missile Defense Program is called cooperative defense.
We are taking Roving Sands, which was an air defense exercise,
and over the last 2 years have moved it towards a Theater
Missile Defense Program.
EUCOM has a unique problem, as does Korea, in the theater
missile defense because what--they are called what I call
linear theaters. So we are working with the Services to produce
a concept of operations that is universally applicable.
Theater missile defense, at the end of the day, is the
absolute joint program. No one Service has the capability to
deal with this issue. So we have a concept of operations that
we are going to test out this spring and summer down in Forth
Bliss, Texas. It will be a mature theater, it will be 45-days
so we will have all the command and control facilities in
place. It is hopeful that out of this process will develop the
tactics and techniques and procedures, in some cases suggest
what we can buy more of or kill a program that doesn't fit.
We are working very closely with the Ballistic Missile
Defense Office to do this. We have the requirement from the
Joint Staff and OSD to write the operational requirements
document for this. So it is that sense we are in charge of it.
And hopefully this summer we will move that step a further
downstream.
Mr. Young. Is this going to create a conflict with BMDO?
General Sheehan. No, sir. Actually, we have an open
dialogue with BMDO. We use their facilities. Many of the
concepts we use, we use their software modeling and simulation.
So it's a very cooperative relationship. We have a--we have a
twice a year meeting with the advisory panel from BMDO and the
BMDO office itself.
Mr. Young. Where are we headed on our ability to
effectively defend against theater missiles?
General Sheehan. I think it will be an operational reality,
probably within 3 years. I think we have got a fair capability
now. I think the problem is once we get to a link 16
capability, we have link 16 across the board in all systems. We
will be able to take the Navy's cooperative engagement
capability, with the Patriot-enhanced systems and the Hawk and
be able to present to shooters a common picture.
So I think that if we do it right and we stay at it and
stay focused, we will have a deployable capability, a real
deployable capability, with a higher probability than we had in
the Persian Gulf to deal with this problem.
Mr. Young. Yesterday Mr. McDade asked several questions of
General Shalikashili about the ground-based laser. As you look
into the future, is that a player?
General Sheehan. Not in the near term, sir. I think right
now we are talking about AEGIS, Patriot type weapons systems.
Right now it is the integration of information management
systems, what we call battlefield C3I; the ability to move data
rapidly around the battlefield, because in a theater missile
defense system you are talking about minutes for a response
time from detect to attack.
The other part that we have--after 2 years of modeling and
simulation is that it is what we call the intelligence
preparation in the battlefield. If you do good intelligence
work, you can do some very good predictive work on where tails
are going to be going. And so then you can attack the talks
before the launch phase starts. So I think what we are focusing
on right now is the battlefield C4I, integration of systems,
link 16 presenting a common battle picture to the theater
commander.
Mr. Young. Mr. Dicks, do you have further questions?
LINK-16
Mr. Dicks. Let me make sure I understand this, link 16, and
I understand it, is the link between the satellite in space and
the cockpit of the airplane?
General Sheehan. It covers all sorts of airplanes from
AWACS, any kind of search radar system that can present you a
battle space picture, AEGIS by radar systems, for example. So
what is--it is a common picture of the battle space.
Mr. Dicks. It shows you where the Scud launches from?
General Sheehan. It shows a radar returned.
Mr. Dicks. Right. So then you have not only the ability
with theater missile defense system to stop the incoming
attack, but also to offensively go out and go after----
General Sheehan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. The Scud launchers are a big problem, as you
well know, in the Gulf War.
General Sheehan. Yes.
Mr. Dicks. We were unable to do it and Saddam used very
sophisticated denial methods regarding where the location was
and moved those around and presented us with a lot of false
decoys, and other things, that caused us a problem. And, again,
my view of this is this is another area where stealth gives you
an advantage in that you don't have to have all of the
supporting aircraft to go in after the launcher.
If you have got the F-117 or the joint strike fighter, when
the Navy finally gets a stealthy airplane, or the B-2, you have
an ability to go in and take those launchers out. Because you
have got the link right from the satellite and you have the
ability to go in and perform that mission. That was something
we couldn't do in the Gulf.
General Sheehan. Absolutely.
NBC WEAPONS
Mr. Dicks. What I worry about is the use of chemical,
biological or nuclear weapons against our airfields that lock
out our TACAIR, lock out our ability to bring the troops into
the theater and then we are going to sit there and say, why
didn't we buy some more bombers, that we could use from the
United States? Now, you have--you have got a reinforce in the
United States, is that right?
General Sheehan. Yes, sir, the 8th Air Force.
Mr. Dicks. Have you seen the new tape on the first dropping
of the GATS/GAM?
General Sheehan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. Forty-one thousand feet, day, night, all
weather. This is why I am so possessed by this issue. I have a
chart here of seven different conventional weapons that you
could drop off the B-2; to go against advancing armor, to go
against fixed targets, to go against relocatables, surface-to-
air missiles and deep underground bunkers.
Now, that, to me, is a tremendous, almost revolutionary
conventional capability that we haven't had before, and the
reason I think it is so important is because you can deploy
this aircraft a third of the way around the earth in 8 hours
from Whitelman, from Guam or Diego Garcia. If we had enough
aircraft to deploy in those three cases, you literally could
cover the world.
And, you know, we don't have all these systems yet. They
are just starting to come into the inventory and you have to do
all the things necessary to get them on the airplane. It isn't
just the B-2s. The B-1s could use some of these on other
platforms.
But to me when you are thinking about this problem with
theater missile defense not having as good a system as I think
we need to protect our kids, you can't just attack the problem
on the side of defending against these weapons. You have got to
also be able to go on the offense. And am I right here? Isn't
stealth a big advantage in attacking these systems?
Mr. Sheehan. The intelligence preparation in the
battlefield and the battlefield location is key to this whole
process. Every single game that we have run in the analysis, if
you can get the tail on the ground before it goes in a recce
phase and launch phase, it makes the battlefield solution that
much better.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Lewis, do you have further questions?
READINESS TRAINING
Mr. Lewis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, yesterday when we spent time with the Secretary
and General Shalikashvili, the first three items in summarizing
their priorities pointed to quality of troops, pointed to
training and pointed to modern procurement.
As a backdrop to all of that, we are faced very shortly
with having to move quickly on a supplemental for Bosnia. The
budget request that is before us goes down and not up, and we
all know that money is fungible.
So in connection with that piece that involves training,
just for your edification, both twenty-nine Palms and the
National Training Center are in my district so I pay a little
bit of attention to training questions. Tell me, do you believe
that the troops under your command are receiving adequate
training? And if they are not, why not?
Mr. Sheehan. I deal with joint training. We have a three-
tiered training program in U.S. Atlantic Command. It is kind of
consistent on a worldwide basis. Tier I is a Service
responsibility. Tier 2 is we train for joint interoperability.
We do that across the United States by scheduling tankers and
airplanes and those things, until you get them joint certified.
And then Tier 3 is what we already talked about, the JTASC.
Twenty-nine Palms and Force 21, for example, at Fort Hood,
Texas, those are Service responsibilities. I visit those
training facilities. I am very satisfied with where we are
right now.
I will tell you, though, that from a distribution of
dollars, with 70 percent being O&M and 30 percent investment,
if we continue this trend and we keep using equipment with old
trucks, et cetera, we are going to wear the stuff out that we
have and you are not going to have the equipment to train in a
couple of years from now.
Mr. Lewis. Going specifically to joint training as it
relates to your command, what joint training exercises will
take place in 1997 in your command and what is the budget for
1998?
Mr. Sheehan. Sir, the big item that we are going to spend
the next couple of months working on is a cooperative defense
which is the theater missile defense roving sands at Fort
Bliss, Texas. We are also going to do what we call a unified
endeavor, that is, the joint JTASC Training Simulation Program.
That will be in the fall of the year.
We will do one Partnership for Peace exercise in the United
States, called Cooperative Osprey, and we are going to take
basically a battalion minors from the 82nd Airborne with the
Central Asian Peacekeeping Battalion, called CENTRASBAT and do
an exercise in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.
In 1998, we are going to focus on combined joint training
with the US and plus the normal activity we in the operations
through the Unified Endeavor Exercise. We do not do large scale
exercises per se, putting 50- or 60,000 people in the field. We
only do that once every 5 years and that is called Purple Star
exercise.
JOINT OPERATIONS
Mr. Lewis. General, in your earlier response to Mr. Obey
and to myself, I kind of--I heard at least you are coming down
on both sides of the answers that might be given relative to
the adequacy of jointness.
I feel very strongly that we need the broadest
interpretation of the values and the impact of joint activity.
The illustration I gave you relative to UAVs and the Air
Force Command would indicate just exactly the opposite to me.
Would you be very clear to me? Do you think we have got major
problems in this area of jointness?
General Sheehan. I think that there are always going to be
problems in this area, because when you are talking about
budget programs and money and Service cultures, roles and
missions, you are always going to have friction. But from
someone that has watched this process evolve, I am more than
comfortable in terms of where we are in our maturity. It takes
time to flesh out of the system people who are single-Service
and parochial. You will always find that. I think that we have
come a long way.
I worked in the Office of the Secretary of Defense when
Goldwater-Nichols was first drafted. I happened to be fortunate
or unfortunate to be in the room when the Service chiefs argued
against Goldwater-Nichols. One of the Service chiefs said that
Goldwater-Nichols was unAmerican, and they fought very hard
against it.
We are a better Service, we are a better military, because
of Goldwater-Nichols. We still have warts. And that is mostly
personality-dependent people who just haven't understood that
the U.S. military fights for this Nation; that it isn't about
being in the Air Force, it isn't about being in the Marine
Corps or the Army, but it is about giving the best possible
product for this Nation.
So we are still a couple of years away from fleshing out
from the system people who haven't got the message. But I am
encouraged by what I see. I see this every single day in joint
training. I am surprised and encouraged by the maturity of some
of the people that you run across in this business.
Mr. Lewis. One of the reasons I have been using the
illustration that I have been using is that among procurement
efforts, new programs, the Predator was one I saw move forward
very quickly. It seemed to break the mold of having to have a
library of information and checks against counterchecks before
you moved forward with procurement. And now that we have gone
through that initial phase, now we--it seems to me that we, by
way of the way--by way of the delegation of authority we have
taken ourselves back to an over standard and it is a reflection
of something less than maturing, and what I am hearing from you
at least is that you are very supportive of more rapid
maturing.
General Sheehan. I think that the decisions to give it to a
single Service was the correct decision. I am very comfortable
that in General George Joulwan's mind, there was no question in
General George Joulwan's mind just who owned the Predator and
who could move it around the battlefield.
Mr. Lewis. I can say that in our session earlier, there was
some question when he heard that wetness was not an addition or
development that would take place in Bosnia, I mean that--it is
just the other side of what you just said.
General Sheehan. But at the end of the day, as the Joint
force commander, he will decide. We face this issue on certain
platforms. I mean, we do--I mean, to give you an example a
couple of years ago in September of 1994, when we put Army
rangers on an aircraft carrier, the Marine Corps had a heart
attack. They got over it. It takes time.
Mr. Lewis. Thank you, General.
Thank you.
Mr. Young. Mr. Visclosky, do you have additional questions?
CUBA
Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Chairman, just if I could, General, what
is your assessment of the political and economic situation in
Cuba today?
General Sheehan. The economic situation is improving,
partially because of tourism, partially because of some foreign
investment. The political situation is stable. Castro clearly
is in charge. I think that--part of that, I think, is because
we have forced the elites of Cuba together because of our
recent decision in Helms-Burton. I think that the Cuban
military clearly understands that regardless of what happens in
the transition in Cuba they are going to be forced to be dealt
with either for the good or for the bad.
My argument has always been that somehow or another, you
either get a line into the Cuban military, not because Raul and
his brother Fidel are good people. It is just that I discount
them. The Cuban military recognizes they are on a downward
spiral. There is no exit; that they are--they don't want to--I
mean, my sense from talking to them is that they don't want to
go out into the streets and kill their own people.
I think the Revolutionary Armed Forces, FAR headquarters
clearly is politically loyal to Castro, but I think the--we
can't treat them as a monolithic organization. I think the
economic peace will stabilize, but eventually deteriorate.
Large segments of the population are on a starvation diet. What
I mean by that is less than 1,700 calories. And I think Castro
is a very shrewd guy.
Mr. Visclosky. General, thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. General, thank you very much for a very thought-
provoking presentation this afternoon. We appreciate that and
we invite you to keep in touch with us. If there are problems
that we ought to be aware of, let us know.
The Committee is adjourned until 10:00 a.m. on Wednesday,
when we will hear testimony from Admiral Preuher, Pacific
Command; and General Tilleli, Commander U.S. Forces, Korea. At
1:30 in the afternoon we will hear from General Peay, Commander
in Chief, U.S. Central Command.
If there is nothing further, the Committee is adjourned.
General Sheehan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the
answers thereto follow:]
Current Operations/Training
Question. Please list for the Committee the major deployments
undertaken by the Atlantic Command in the past fiscal year.
Answer. The following operations have been supported by the U.S.
Atlantic Command during the period October 1995--September 1996.
Operations are listed as operation/contingency name, dates and
description:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONTINGENCY DATES DESCRIPTION
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Global Naval Force Presence Continuous........ ------.
Policy (GNFPP).
Global Naval Force Presence Continuous........ ------.
Policy (GNFPP).
Global Naval Force Presence Continuous........ ------.
Policy (GNFPP).
Global Naval Force Presence Continuous........ ------.
Policy (GNFPP).
Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) in Continuous ------.
support of GNFPP gaps in (between 95-180
CENTCOM. days per year).
Multinational Force and 7/78-Present...... Force provider for
Observers (MFO). United Nations
(UN) peacekeeping
operations to
enforce Camp
David Accords
ending Egyptian-
Israeli October
1973 War in Sinai
Peninsula.
Counterdrug Operations.......... 7/90-Present...... Various
counterdrug
operations in the
Caribbean and
southeast U.S. by
Joint Task Force
(JTF) 4, Joint
interagency Task
Force (JIATF)
EAST, and JTF 6;
conduct detection
and monitoring,
and coordinate
with law
enforcement
agencies (LEAs).
Operation PROVIDE promise....... 7/92-12/95........ Force provider for
UN peacekeeping
operations in
Bosnia.
Operations SHARP GUARD/DECISIVE 7/92-Present...... Force Provider for
ENHANCEMENT. UN embargo in
Adriatic Sea.
Operation SOUTHERN WATCH........ 8/92-Present...... Force provider for
Central Command
to enforce the UN
no-fly zone over
southern Iraq;
increased US
presence with
AEFs to Bahrain
(10/95) and
Jordan (3/96).
Opertions DENY FLIGHT/DECISIVE 4/93-Present...... Force provider
EDGE. support of UN no-
fly zone over
Bosnia-
Herzegovina (B-
H).
Task Force ABLE SENTRY (TFAS)... 6/93-Present...... Force provider
support of UN
military
observers in
Macedonia.
Operation SEA SIGNAL............ 5/94-4/96......... Establish JTF 160
and the Joint
Logistics Support
Group (JLSG) to
support Haitian
and Cuban migrant
operations at
Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba.
Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY...... 9/94-Present...... Establish JTF 180,
JTF 190, United
Nations Mission
in Haiti (UNMIH),
U.S. Support
Group Haiti
(USSPTGPHAITI);
conduct
multinational
operations to
restore
democracy;
continued support
under exercise
FAIRWINDS after 4/
96.
Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR II... 8/95-11/95........ Force provider to
Central Command
to augment forces
in Southwest Asia
(SWA) following
defection of
Hussein's family
members and
Iraq's unstable
government.
Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR/JOINT 12/95-Present..... Force provider in
GUARD. support of
European Command
for the NATO
peace
implementation
force (IFOR) and
stabilization
force (SFOR) in
Bosnia;
established the
Joint Preparation
and Onward
Movement (JPOM)
Center, Fort
Benning to
provide joint
training for IFOR/
SFOR augmentees
assigned to joint
staffs.
Operations SENTINEL LIFEGUARD/ 2/96-3/96......... Designate JIATF
STANDOFF FOUR. EAST as CJTF 4 to
assist U.S. Coast
Guard search and
rescue (SAR)
efforts following
the 24 February
1996 shootdown of
two Brothers to
the Rescue (BTTR)
aircraft;
monitored post
shootdown BTTR
flotilla
activities.
Operation STANDOFF FIVE; CJTF 3/96-Present...... Designate JIATF
110 operations. EAST as CJTF 110
to monitor Cuban
exile flotilla
activity and
subsequent Cuban
military activity
in the Florida
Strait.
Operation VIGILANT SENTINEL..... 4/96.............. Force provider to
Central Command
to augment forces
in southwest Asia
(SWA).
Operation DESERT FOCUS.......... 8/96-Present...... Force provider to
Central Command
to increase
security
following the
terrorist bombing
of a U.S.
compound in Saudi
Arabia (6/96);
force provider to
build a new base
in Saudi Arabia.
Operation DESERT STRIKE......... 9/96.............. Force provider for
air-launched
missile strikes
against Iraqi air
defense targets
to protect
expanded no-fly
zone over
northern Iraq;
completed in
conjunction with
the movement of
Kurdish foreign
service nationals
to Pacific
Command
(Operation
PACIFIC HAVEN).
Exercise INTRINSIC ACTION....... 9/96-Present...... Force provider for
show of force
exercises in
southwest Asia
(SWA).
Panama Canal Treaty............. 3/94-Present...... Force provider to
Southern command
to augment force
structure in
Panama until
redeployment of
U.S. forces
following
turnover of the
Canal Zone to
Panama.
Operation SUSTAIN LIBERTY....... 3/96-Present...... Force provider to
Southern Command
to augment force
structure in
Panama.
JTF BRAVO....................... 3/94-Present...... Force provider to
Southern Command
to support peace
efforts in
Honduras.
Operation SAFE BORDER........... 3/94-Present...... Force provider to
Southern Command
to support peace
efforts along the
Peru-Ecuador
border.
Sensitive Reconnaissance 10/95............. Force provider to
Operations (SRO). European and
Pacific Commands
with RIVET JOINT
aircraft.
11/95-6/96........ Force provider to
Pacific Command
with COBRA BALL
aircraft.
Air Sampling Operations......... 4/96-7/96......... Force provider to
Pacific Command
with air sampling
aircraft.
Unit Deployment Plan (UDP)...... 3/92-Present...... Force provider to
Pacific Command
for the U.S.
Marine Corps unit
rotation plan to
Japan.
Operation ASSURED RESPONSE...... 4/96-8/96......... Force provider to
European Command
in support of non-
combatant
operations (NEO)
in Liberia.
Operation QUICK RESPONSE........ 5/96.............. ..................
Operation MARATHON.............. 10/96............. Designated
Commanding
Officer, Naval
Base Guantanamo
Bay as Commander
Joint Task Force
(CJTF) MARATHON
to support
transfer of 109
rescued Chinese
migrants to Wake
Island (Pacific);
continued in
Pacific Command
as Operation
MARATHON PACIFIC.
African Crisis Response Force 11/96-Present..... Force provider to
(Operation GUARDIAN ASSISTANCE). European Command
in support of
relief and
humanitarian
support to UN
forces in Zaire
and Rwanda.
Hurricane Opal Relief........... 10/95............. Supported Federal
Emergency
Management Agency
(FEMA) relief
operations in
Gulf of Mexico
coast states.
Icelandic avalanche Relief...... 10/95............. Supported
avalanche relief
operations in
Flateyri,
Iceland.
Atlanta Olympic and Paralympic 10/95-8/96........ ..................
games.
Northwest Flood Relief.......... 2/96.............. Supported FEMA
flood relief
efforts in Idaho,
Washington,
Oregon.
Hurricane Bertha Relief......... 7/96.............. Supported FEMA
Bertha relief
operations in
Caribbean
islands.
TWA Flight 800 Salvage.......... 7/96-10/96........ Supported search
and rescue (SAR)
and salvage
operations near
Long Island, New
York.
Wildland Fire Fighting Support.. 8/96-9/96......... Supported FEMA
fire fighting
efforts in the
western U.S.
Hurricane Fran Relief........... 9/96.............. Supported FEMA
Fran relief
operations in the
southeast U.S.
Exercise UNIFIED ENDEAVOR 96-1.. 11/95............. Combined Arms
Exercise (CAX),
joint training of
a Commander Joint
Task Force
(CJTF).
Joint Task Force Exercise 11/96-12/95....... Readiness
(JTFEX) 96-1. certification in
joint operations
for the USS
GEORGE WASHINGTON
CVBG and USS GUAM
ARG.
Exercise FAIRWINDS.............. 4/96-Present...... Conducted
humanitarian
support projects
in Haiti.
Exercise PURPLE STAR 96 (NATO).. 5/96.............. U.S.-United
Kingdom combined
joint task force
military field
exercises at Camp
Lejeune, North
Carolina.
Exercise COOPERATIVE ZENITH 96 5/96.............. Partnership for
(NATO). Peace (PfP)
exercise in
Florida;
conducted search
and rescue
operations with
U.S., NATO, and
PfP countries.
Exercise ROVING SANDS 96........ 6/96.............. Large scale joint
training exercise
in southwestern
U.S.
Exercise UNIFIED ENDEAVOR 96-2.. 6/96-7/96......... Combined Arms
Exercise (CAX),
joint training of
a Commander Joint
Task Force
(CJTF).
JTFEX 96-2...................... 4/96.............. Readiness
certification in
joint operations
for the USS
ENTERPRISE CVBG
and USS SAIPAN
ARG.
Exercise COOPERATIVE OSPREY 96 8/96.............. Partnership for
(NATO). Peace (PfP)
exercise in
Florida;
conducted field
exercises with
U.S., NATO, and
PfP countries.
Exercise TRADEWINDS............. 3/96-4/96......... Special Operations
Forces (SOF)
exercise with
various Caribbean
countries.
Special Operations Forces (SOF) 2/96-7/96......... SOF training
Joint Exercise Training (JCETS) deployments to
Deployments. various Caribbean
island nations.
JTFEX 97-1...................... 10/96............. Readiness
certification in
joint operations
for the USS
THEODORE
ROOSEVELT CVBG
and USS NASSAU
ARG.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. Is the operating tempo (OPTEMPO) of any units under your
command significantly higher than any others? If so, which units?
Answer. Yes, Thresholds have been exceeded in some areas due to
ongoing contingency commitments. The impact is particularly severe on
low density, high demand (LD/HD) specialized forces, which are critical
to our ability to respond to both Operations Other Than War (OOTW)
missions and Major Regional Conflicts ------.
Question. Do you feel that Military Operations Other than War by US
forces has affected the readiness or combat skills of US forces?
Answer. Yes, the number and duration of Military Operations Other
than War degrades the readiness and combat skills of all deployed
military units. The degradation depends on factors such as the duration
of deployment, operation requirements, type of unit, etc. Other
factors, such as the wear and tear on aging equipment and the use of
Operations and Maintenance funds, also affect readiness. It is
difficult to quantify the readiness impact and loss of combat skills
across the board, however, a few examples may help clarify this point.
Even though some training can be accomplished in the field and some
training value is inherent in the operations, training to maintain many
perishable combat skills is not available. Marksmanship, gunnery,
maneuver, low-level navigation, air-to-ground ordnance delivery, air-
to-air combat, and airdrops require maneuver space, artillery and
firing ranges, drop zones, bombing ranges, and low-level routes. These
ranges, zones, and routes are the basic requirements for maintaining
the perishable skills of combat units. Even those units who initially
get good training encounter diminished training opportunities after
they complete their initial tasks and settle into a routine. This is
especially true for engineering units. Once the bridges are in place
and the tent-cities are complete, the mission becomes one of
maintaining, and eventually, the duration of the operation negates the
initial training benefits.
Maintenance can suffer in the field; it is a continuous challenge
and exacerbates the impact of long deployments. There is an increase in
wear and tear and decrease in the available facilities and time to
perform routine and preventive maintenance. Some equipment experiences
extreme wear and may not be serviceable after a long deployment with
constant exposure to the elements. Much of the equipment in bare-base
kits such as Harvest Falcon may have to be replaced after a deployment.
Funding for these operations can have a severe impact on readiness.
Although the $3.3 billion spent on contingency operations in 1996 was
only 1.3 percent of the FY 1966 defense budget, the cost is taken from
Operations and Maintenance funds--the training and readiness funds.
This year, if a supplemental bill is not passed, Forces Command will
have to start shutting down functional operations in the May timeframe.
Question. Are the funds budgeted for the service's fiscal year 1998
request sufficient for your projected training needs?
Answer. Yes, the funding for fiscal year 1998 joint training is
sufficient. However, I believe that funding for service specific
training--training that prepares units for joint training--may be
underfunded in order to pay for contingency operations, especially if
the Bosnia supplemental is not passed.
Question. Has U.S. participation in Operations Other Than War
altered the type of exercises you conduct?
Answer. Yes. Until recently, combatant command staffs concentrated
almost exclusively on deliberate and contingency planning for potential
high end warfighting. Today, a gamut of ``on-the-shelf'' plans exist
that span the Operations Other Than War spectrum ranging from low-end
humanitarian assistance operations through sophisticated peace-
enforcement and noncombatant evacuation operations.
Joint Warfighting and Operations Other Than War missions depend
heavily on multinational coalition integration. As such, it is
important to train and exercise U.S. forces with regional multinational
forces. Command and Control interoperability, logistics integration,
common force protection procedures and rules of engagement compatible
with provisions of international and national law are among the most
crucial elements of these training exercises.
Question. For fiscal year 1997, Congress appropriated $267 million
for JCS exercises. It is the committee's understanding that the
Atlantic Command has the primary responsibility for the execution of
those funds. How has the money been spent to date and what do you see
as the primary benefit of those exercises?
Answer. The $267 million funds only the FY96 airlift portion of the
transportation to and from the exercises (the FY97 airlift funding is
$244 million and the total FY97 JCS Exercise transportation program,
including sealift, port handling, and in-land transportation is $362
million.) The $267 million also doesn't address the Service funded
costs incurred at the exercise location.
The Joint Staff is the agency with primary responsibility for these
funds. Joint Staff allotted approximately $32.4 million (12%) of the
$267 million cited to Atlantic Command. The remainder is distributed to
other CINCs by Joint Staff for their requirements. The USACOM funds
have been budgeted for sealift and airlift requirements identified in
the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) for Atlantic Command
sponsored exercises. These exercises fall into the general categories
of Tier 3 (staff training), Tier 2 (field training), Partnership for
Peace, NATO and Area of Responsibility exercises. The $32.4 million is
committed to currently scheduled exercises. However, we requested $35
million for FY 1997, leaving a $2.6 million shortfall. The primary
benefits of the exercises are:
Ensure U.S. military members/units are acquainted with joint and
combined warfighting tasks prior to in-theater arrival.
Train U.S. military members the way they are expected to fight.
Sustain and build joint readiness.
Provide a vehicle to learn and practice joint doctrine.
Improve warfighting effectiveness of U.S. forces.
Provide for joint and combined multinational interoperability
training for U.S. components.
Establish a cooperative relationship and improved effectiveness
between combined forces of Atlantic Command and NATO/Partner Nations.
Meet treaty obligations and provide assistance to developing
countries in concert with Atlantic Command's theater strategy.
Question. Do you believe that $267 million for JCS exercises is
adequate given the growing importance of joint operations?
Answer. No. Again, the $267 million funds only the FY96 airlift
portion of the transportation to and from the exercises (the FY97
airlift funding is $244 million and the total FY97 JCS Exercise
transportation program, including sealift, port handling, and in-land
transportation is $362 million.) The $267 million also doesn't address
the Service funded costs incurred at the exercise location.
The Joint Staff has primary responsibility for the transportation
funds and the FY98 President's Budget funds Defense Planning Guidance
directed OPTEMPO. In fiscal year 1997 we need $35 million dollars and
have been allocated $32 million dollars, leaving a shortfall of $2.6
million dollars. In fiscal year 1998, our allocated joint
transportation funds are $24.8 million. We require $27.3 million
resulting in a shortfall of $2.5 million. For fiscal year 1999 our
requirements are $22.4 million with $21.4 million dollars allocated
again resulting in a shortfall of $1 million.
The question that needs to be addressed is how to qualitatively
differentiate between joint transportation dollars that are expended
for joint training exercises and those spent for presence and access
exercises. According to the July 1995 General Accounting Office report
on Military Capabilities, Stronger Joint Staff Role Needed to Enhance
Joint Military Training, 73% of surveyed exercises were presence or
access exercises.
Question. The Atlantic Command maintains the Joint Training,
Analysis and Simulation Center (JTASC) in Suffolk, Virginia. It is
reportedly one of the premiere centers of computer modeling and
simulation. Describe to the Committee the purpose of the Unified
Endeavor exercises that are run in the JTASC.
Answer. The Unified Endeavor (UE) exercise series is designed to
train Joint Task Force (JTF) staffs and commanders to meet JTF joint
mission essential task list (JMETL) and joint force integrator (JFI)
standards under established conditions. UE exercises stress combat
decisions and applied doctrine through the use of operational command,
control, computers, and intelligence (C4I) in a high-stress,
operational-like environment. They stress process rather than training
on specific equipment in a home-based environment. UE simulations
employ actual terrain and threat databases and real-time intelligence
assets in areas of potential crises. They are not, however, intended to
validate or exercise specific real-world plans even if they are used as
a basis for exercise design. Troops and other field units are not used
as training aids for a UE exercise.
USACOM has trained the following JTF staffs in UE exercises: XVIII
Airborne Corps, II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), 8th Air Force, and
III Corps. Training is scheduled during the next year for: 2nd Fleet,
II MEF, and III Corps. Training to be conducted by 2nd Fleet and II MEF
will be in conjunction with NATO nations and will involve our first use
of coalition doctrine for a JTF. When other nations are involved with a
UE, they absorb the costs for national participation.
In addition, USACOM has provided UE-type academic training support
to JTFs and other headquarters assigned to other Commanders in Chief
(CINCs) and Military Departments, as well as, NATO. Specifically
training has been provided to 6th Fleet, 8th, 16th, and 17th Air
Forces, I Corps, 3rd Army, Bosian Implementation Force (IFOR), JTF
Panama, US Forces Azores. Training will be provided this year for 3rd
Army, Iceland Defense Force (IDF), US Forces Azores, Southern European
Task Force (SETAF), Marine Corps Command and Control School, Allied
Forces Central Europe (AFCENT), and UK Permanent Joint Headquarters
(PJHQ).
Question. What command field exercises can now be performed at the
JTASC and what annual savings can be realized as a result?
Answer. As a result of the development of the UNIFIED ENDEAVOR
exercise series, training of Joint Task Force Commanders and staffs
without troops in the field, USACOM was able to cancel five field
training events:
Exercise Cost (in millions)
(1) Agile Provider................................................ $9.3
(2) Market Square................................................. 3.9
(3) Mighty Thunder................................................ 0.4
(4) Resolute Response............................................. 4.2
(5) Rendezvous.................................................... 0.5
The cost savings associated with these events was $18.3 million
joint transportation dollars. In addition, the Services now save $40 to
$60 million in operations and maintenance costs associated with putting
troops in the field and ships at sea for large exercises. They also
save in the use of tens of thousands of forces in the field which were
previously required to train general/flag officers and their staffs.
Currently, a single UNIFIED ENDEAVOR exercise which trains a 3 star
Joint Task Force Commander and his staff and the 1 and 2 star component
commanders and their staffs is approximately $600 thousand in joint
transportation costs and $2.3 million in operations and maintenance
costs using 2500 support personnel.
In addition, the initiative to tie all geographic CINCs Joint Task
Force training events to the JTASC is being developed by the Joint
Staff in conjunction with the Joint Warfighting Center and USACOM. Use
of the JTASC would be expanded for use to standardize Joint Task Force
training on a worldwide scale. Although, no dollar figure can be
currently assigned, this alternative could have huge potential cost
savings to all CINCs, and possibly NATO if coalition forces are
considered in the training audience.
Question. Could an over-reliance on simulated exercises as opposed
to actual ones lead to the decreased readiness of those units
participating?
Answer. Yes. From a total force capability perspective, simulations
alone cannot completely replace field training exercises. Our UE
exercises have proven to be an effective vehicle for the training of
three star Joint Task Force Commanders and staffs, and two star
component commanders and staffs.
However, they are not designed to train forces in joint
interoperability tasks. This is conducted within our Tier 2 exercise
program where joint interoperability is achieved through field training
exercises based on critical interoperability tasks from supported
CINCs. The goal is to provide a common level of joint training prior to
deployment and ensure that no US military member or unit is confronted
with a joint warfighting task for the first time after arrival in-
theater. The frequency of events is based upon unit deployment
schedules or as required to support unit readiness. The objective of
the Tier 2 Exercise Program will be joint forces trained to standards,
ready for complex joint operations anywhere throughout the world.
Priorities and Deficiencies
Question. Do you feel the interests and needs of the Atlantic
Command have been adequately addressed in the fiscal year 1998 defense
budget request before the Committee?
Answer. Yes, but there are several areas that cross Service
boundaries that demand close attention from the Congress and DoD
leadership. We must develop and field a joint Combat Identification
system for detection of ``friend-or-foe'' in order to provide for the
safety of our fighting men and women. A command, control,
communications, computer and intelligence (C4I) architecture which
incorporates processing and analysis commonality is vitally needed for
joint task force (JTF) commanders. Finally, a cohesive, integrated
resourcing strategy for reconnaissance/surveillance platforms to
support collection and dissemination requirements, an area now being
addressed by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) for fusion
into a common system, is key to future joint warfighting.
The JROC has evolved as a superb forcing function, ensuring
recognized threats are balanced against existing hardware and future
system developments are considered for joint applicability. The JROC
forces the Services to ask the question--how does this planned weapon
system play in the joint fight and therefore necessitate resource
programming with the resulting answer in mind. This is not to say that
there isn't more work to be done by us all in integrating existing
systems into the joint fight.
Question. What is your assessment of the major shortfalls in:
Personnel, Training, Equipment, and Maintenance for those units under
your day-to-day command as well as those that would be assigned to you
in a war time situation?
Answer. As I stated in my testimony, I firmly believe the men and
women of USACOM are the best equipped, trained and led military in the
world. They are ready to accomplish any of their assigned missions.
However, signs of potential problems in personnel, equipment, and
training are beginning to surface.
Army first-term attrition is up to 37%, versus 31% ten years ago.
This coupled with possible recruiting shortfalls could lead to critical
personnel shortages down the road. Ninety-nine percent of Air Force
accessions in Fiscal Year 97 to date are high school graduates, but
only 79% scored in the top half of the Air Force Qualification Test,
down from 83% in Fiscal Year 96. Critical specialties, such as pilots,
are beginning to show a decline in retention. The Fiscal Year 96 pilot
retention in the 6-11 years range dropped from 86% to 77%. Furthermore,
those pilots taking the Aviator Continuation Pay dropped from 77% to
59%. Whether these retention numbers are directly related to operating
tempo remains to be determined, but they are indications that the
current personnel trends are moving in the wrong direction.
Modernization is a key pillar in the foundation for implementation
of Joint Vision 2010. And although near-term readiness is funded
adequately, modernization for the future remains underfunded. During
the Army downsizing, it reshaped the force while maintaining current
readiness, in some cases, by deferring modernization and redistributing
modernized equipment across the smaller force. With this smaller force,
Forces Command units must be able to execute a full range of
operations. Further deferral of modernization will incur significant
risk to future readiness in Forces Command and Force 21, inhibiting the
ability to execute these full range of operations. The Air Force
backlog of maintenance and repairs continues to grow from $4.4 billion
in fiscal year 1998 to $5 billion in fiscal year 1999. In addition, the
Navy's aircraft fleet continues to age. The average age of the fleet
was 14.5 years in 1991. Even with the introduction of the F/A-18 C&D
model aircraft and the retirement of the A-6, the current age is 14.3
years.
Question. What are the top ten priority items on your most recent
integrated priority list?
Answer. The top ten priorities from integrated priority list fiscal
year 1999-2003 are:
1. Force Readiness:
(A) Establish up-front supplemental appropriations or timely
reimbursement for contingency and operations other than war. These
appropriations should not be sourced or reimbursed from DOD service
accounts.
(B) In view of increasing mission requirements and smaller force
structure, establish a periodic review to validate recurring
deployments and joint/allied/bilateral exercises worldwide.
(C) Active force PERSTEMPO issues can be improved by continued
insistence on increasing Reserve Component (RC) integration.
1--Fully fund RC program accounts to allow execution of added
travel, training and operations without decrementing normal training
funds.
2--Require modernization of relevant RC equipment. Give special
consideration to C41 systems to facilitate seamless RC integration with
active component forces.
(D) Require full funding of steaming days/flying hours/operating
miles.
(E) Strong support for quality of life initiatives to include
adequate compensation, decent housing, rewarding career opportunities
and family support. Prevent pay scales from falling short of
inflationary increases.
(F) Continuous intensive language refresher training is essential
for enhancement and sustainment of perishable foreign language skills.
Review critical language skills worldwide and build a database
accessible by CINCs, services and agencies to support crisis,
contingencies and exercises.
(G) Program adequate funding to prevent maintenance backlogs from
increasing.
2. Combating Terrorism/Force Protection. Funding required to:
(A) Develop standards for pre-deployment anti-terrorism training
for all CONUS-based, DOD forces.
(B) Conduct enhanced anti-terrorism training for combatant command
(COCOM) forces deploying into the USACOM Area of Responsibility (AOR)
and, as necessary, for COCOM forces deploying into other AOR's.
(C) Conduct assessment of force protection status for all DOD
activities within the geographic AOR. This includes contractor support
to and site visits by ACOM force protection assessment team.
(D) Support expanded manpower requirements for counter-
intelligence/anti-terrorism (CI/AT) collection.
(E) Provide security enhancement measures to facilities/units to
include application of both current and emergent technologies.
Technology applications are envisioned in lieu of committing additional
personnel assets to security requirements, and as the most effective
and feasible means of providing force protection to non-hardened sites.
(F) Provide for timely commitment of resources in response to
emergent terrorist threats.
(G) Field a common DOD migration system in support of counter-
intelligence (CI), counter-terrorism (CT), counter-proliferation (CP)
and indications and Warning (I&W) that is interoperable with Global
Command and Control System (GCCS).
3. Joint Logistics:
(A) Correct quantity shortages in both precision and conventional
munitions.
(B) Joint Total Asset Visibility (JTAV) (including in-transit
visibility) must be fully supported and contributing programs must be
compatible.
(C) Upgrade essential log infrastructure. Require improved rail/
port/air facilities, warehouses, containers and container handling
facilities/equipment to support rapid force deployment.
(D) Our ability to execute Joint Logistics Over The Shore (JLOTS)
requires interoperable lighterage/causeways, and sea state two Roll On-
Roll Off Discharge Facility (RRDF) now. Sufficient research and
development funding (only) required for sea state three development.
JLOTS training for AC and RC is vital.
(E) Afloat and ashore prepositioned asset capabilities:
1--Army Prepositioning Afloat (APA) and Marine Corps Enhanced
Maritime Preposition Force (MPF-E) required for rapid strategic
positioning of equipment and materials for MRC-size force buildup and
military operations other than war (MOOTW).
2--Fund additional rapid deployable beddown systems as force
provider and harvest falcon/eagle for prepositioning.
4. Interoperability of C4I systems:
(A) Require commonality in processing and analysis.
1--Accelerate fielding of interoperable J-series family of data
links (link 16 and VMF).
2--Resource development of common management information systems
(MIS), including interoperable hardware and databases to include multi-
level security (MLS) tagging of data elements.
3--Migrate to common imagery ground/surface system.
4--Develop common collection management tool kit and computer
mapping software.
5--Develop integrated broadcast service and migrate to global
broadcast system (GBS).
6--Continue to upgrade warfighter utility of GCCS. Meld fire
support, intelligence, and personnel into a single, full spectrum, C2
support system. Continue development and fielding of deployable GCCS at
tactical level.
5. Fund Joint Training. Require full out-year funding for Joint
Training Analysis and Simulation Center (JTASC) facility/programs to
continue joint training initiatives. This includes a joint intelligence
model as part of the Joint Simulation System (JSIMS) modules for use by
service and joint participants.
6. Countermine Warfare. Require immediate capability to detect and
neutralize mines. Joint countermine Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration (ACTD) and other mine countermeasure programs need
development/rapid fielding, especially for very shallow water (VSW)/
shallow water (SW) environments.
7. Non-lethal Technologies. Fund development of additional non-
lethal technologies to support military, counter-drug and force
protection operations. Recapitalization.
8. Strategic Lift (air and sea). Must achieve the mobility
requirements study bottom up review update (MRS BURU) mandated
strategic airlift and sealift capability. C-17, large medium speed roll
on-roll off (LMSR), and funding of ready reserve force fleet capacity
are critical to meeting this requirement.
9. Tactical Mobility.
(A) Must provide suitable replacement capability for aging
inventory of medium life helos.
(B) Timely recapitalization of aging tactical wheeled vehicle
inventory required.
(C) Require additional small watercraft in support of riverine
operations.
10. Replace airborne Command and Control C2 platforms. Require
airborne C2 platform capable of: initial/sustained command and control
of forces; receipt of all source, real-time indication/warning of
potential battlespace threats; electronically countering hostile C2
assets.
Question. In your view, are present levels of investment funding
contained in the department's future year defense plan sufficient to
address the long term recapitalization requirements of today's forces?
Answer. No. We need approximately $50 billion to modernize and
recapitalize our Bottom-Up-Review forces. If shortfalls continue, DOD
will be on the road to obsolescence. For example, if Navy only buys
four to five ships a year, the fleet will in time dwindle to 200 ships.
The bottom line is programmatics do not fit the concept or vice versa.
Troop Quality, Morale, and Medical Issues
Question. General Sheehan, have you noticed any deterioration in
the quality of the new troops entering your theater? How would you
describe their physical condition? Are the troops as mentally
disciplined as those in prior years?
Answer. No. Even though we are often forced to deploy cross-leveled
units, stretch the limits of our combat service and support force
structure, and respond more frequently with fewer and fewer units, the
men and women of USACOM and the entire U.S. armed forces are the best
equipped, trained and led military in the world. Quality force and
wellness initiatives have taken on new strategic importance in today's
requirement for a ready Continental U.S.-based force to sustain and
support forward commanders in chief (CINCs) and provide domestic
response capability. Generally, the physical condition of our troops in
the field is as good as it has been in past years and is getting even
better. Their leadership training, physical conditioning, and improved
wellness management make them a better and more sustainable warfighting
force than we have fielded before. Increased emphasis on wellness
programs by the Services, improved medical surveillance and health
maintenance programs, and leveraged military medicine techniques and
technology like telemedicine, care-in-the-air aeromedical evacuation,
patient tracking with in-transit visibility, and forward medical
surgical capability ensure constant vigilance over threats to troop
wellness and their ability to mentally and physically sustain high
levels of performance. The troops that we are sending into operational
areas such as Haiti and into harsh overseas environments such as
Iceland are very mission focused. They understand the task at hand and
have the discipline in most cases to get it done. The troops of today
are accustomed to and familiar with the technically advanced tools and
technologies employed on the modern battlefield, and cope better in
many cases than those in prior years. This has allowed us to challenge
them earlier and transition more technically sophisticated
responsibilities to more junior troops than was possible or practical
in earlier years.
However, there are threats to these advances. Today's troops face
not only the stresses associated with deployments away from their
support network, but they also face longer hours on the job at home
maintaining the aging equipment inventory and training for the next
mission. Particular attention should be paid to the continued care and
attention to family support, quality of life during deployment and
periods of non-deployment, and job security issues upon return from
stressful deployments. Finally, recent uncoordinated attempts by the
Navy's Surgeon General to cut the training program at Portsmouth Naval
Hospital, if executed, will have the serious impact on the morale and
readiness of the forces.
Question. Have you found that the new troops enter the field with
more personal problems than those in the past?
Answer. No. While there are the standard personal problems that
will appear with any deployment, my commanders in the field report that
these problems are no different than any other deployments they have
been involved with. The troops we are seeing today are more aware of
the relationship of quality of life to lifestyle management, and more
educated and willing to take personal responsibility for good choices
and good health. Make no mistake, the military lifestyle makes demands
on individuals and families that are not a part of civilian life,
however, I am confident that the support systems which the Services and
the chain of command have put into place in recent years are, at least
in part, responsible for the lack of an increase in personal problems
in our service members.
Question. How is the morale of your troops on deployment in the
theater?
Answer. We currently have troops deployed throughout the USACOM
Area of Responsibility conducting diverse and challenging missions.
These men and women are the best trained and equipped professionals in
the world. The moral of our deployed men and women in the theater
remains high. Morale in the theater is high because the troops remain
focused on the mission at hand which is what they were trained to do.
Most military men and women joined the service to see the world.
Deployments in support of real world missions are a source of pride and
satisfaction for the troops in the theater.
The problem we're having today is when the troops come back to home
station. In many cases they are working just as many hours when they
return. Following a deployment, the actual time spent with families is
usually not the same as the anticipated and deserved time. Morale then,
is not a problem with our forward deployed men and women, but is more
of an issue with troops that are either in support roles or between
deployments back in CONUS. We are often demanding more of our troops at
home who are supporting our deployed troops, intensely training for the
next deployment cycle, or working progressively long hours on aging
equipment. Most units go through a period of degradation after a
deployment in order to beef up other units preparing for the next
deployment. When our troops return from deployment they expect a well
deserved rest, but we find they often put more time on the job and
family time suffers.
Question. In visiting various statewide bases, members of the
Committee have been hearing complaints about medical care and dental
plans. How satisfied are troops and dependents in ACOM with the medical
care, and dental care for themselves and their dependents? What are the
major shortcomings of medical care in your command? How many U.S.
military operated hospitals are there in the Atlantic Command?
Answer. The troops and their dependents are generally satisfied
with the medical and dental care they're provided. This said, I am
still concerned about the diluted Service focus towards continued
professional medical education. Recent uncoordinated attempts by the
Navy's Surgeon General to cut the training program at Portsmouth Naval
Hospital, if executed, will have a serious impact on the morale and
readiness of the forces. Bringing our medical professionals to a level
of expertise, and keeping them there, is critical to ensuring this
country's military men and women are well taken care of and that joint
task force commanders can remain confident that today's force will be
available for tomorrow's fight. Funding decisions made during the
Fiscal Year 1999 Budget Review, shifting focus from medical treatment
facilities towards smaller ``clinics'' with less specialized medical
care, reduce troop and dependent access to more acute medical
treatment. Additionally, pulling trained medical professionals from
these facilities increases the likelihood that physicians will not have
the training and skills necessary when called upon during conflict. In
my Area of Responsibility (AOR) there are three hospitals.
Quadrennial Defense Review and the Future Force Structure
Question. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) will reexamine the
current national security strategy and present force structure of the
armed services. The QDR will purportedly make recommendations as to
what the appropriate mix of forces will look like to meet the strategic
and regional threats of the future. The results are due to be presented
to the Congress in May of this Year.
You have been outspoken in the past on the need to ``be open to the
case for a radical restructuring of our armed forces.'' You have also
noted that the so-called ``tooth-to-tail ratio'', that is the number of
combat forces versus the number of support forces necessary to maintain
them, is severely out of balance. To illustrate your point you have
made the following observations in interviews or addresses:
--That ``There are 150,000 DoD military within a 50 mile radius of
Washington D.C., while there are only 129,000 sailors in the entire
Atlantic Fleet.''
--``In the DoD there are 199 separate staffs at the civilian and
the two-star and above flag officer level.'' And;
--Statistically, that the Army has only about 125,000 ``warfighters
supported by 375,000 uniformed personnel and another 300,000 civilians
. . . that works out to only 16 percent of the total force.''
You have also concluded that ``if we're not careful, we could
become the best trained staff to ever get run off a hill.''
Do you believe that staff cuts alone will free up the necessary
funds to achieve the Department's modernization goals?
Answer. No. Even the most generous estimates of the savings that
could be generated by overhead reductions fall dramatically short of
the amounts needed to achieve DoD modernization goals. But, that should
not deter our efforts to restore the proper balance between combat
forces and support personnel. From the Cold War peak (FY87) to the
present, we have dramatically cut the overall force while making only
token reductions in headquarters staffs. Likewise, the ratios of
enlisted personnel to officers, and junior civilian personnel to senior
personnel, have grown disproportionate. We are compromising
modernization by retaining a disproportionately top-heavy force
structure which is expensive and unnecessary.
Question. Given present resources should we give up the notion of a
force capability to conduct two near simultaneous Major Regional
Conflicts (MRCs)?
Answer. No, we should not give up the force capability to conduct
two near simultaneous MRCs. This capability is a key element supporting
our ``National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement.''
Moreover, it is essential to our role as the remaining superpower with
the responsibility to respond globally with a broad range of
capabilities until ``coalitions of the willing'' are able to react to
the ``hot sports'' of today's world.
Tactical Aircraft Modernization
Question. A recent Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study
estimates that the total cost to develop and acquire all the aircraft
presently envisioned for the F-22, F-18E/F, and Joint Strike Fighter
programs will amount to $350 billion, even without factoring in
inflation. Depending on what funding assumptions you make, these three
programs could consume anywhere from 25 to 50 percent of all defense
department procurement spending in the future.
General Sheehan, you have been quoted as asking the question: ``Why
spend $213 billion (over the next decade) for marginal improvements in
airplanes when we still haven't figured out how to kill tanks?'' Could
you please expand your views to the Committee as to the relative
priority of tactical aircraft modernization versus other Defense
Department weapon requirements?
Answer. Tactical aircraft modernization must be considered as only
one part of a large total force modernization program. As such it must
be conducted with a clear understanding of current and future joint
warfighting requirements. It must recognize that some elements of our
current tactical aircraft force structure are redundant. Moreover,
because the airframes were so expensive, we suboptimized some fixed and
rotary wing aircraft in terms of combat identification and night
capabilities. Friend or foe identification capability must be
incorporated on all attack aircraft. Aggressive, joint sponsorship for
this initiative is required. We must ensure that any modernization that
is conducted is based on joint warfighting requirements and the need
for all elements of a joint force to be interoperable. All too often we
suboptimize weapons programs within a large concept of operations and
then suboptimize the weapons systems themselves such that they are not
fully capable of operating in a complex, joint battlespace.
Question. Given the most likely threats in the most likely
geographic settings of the future, do you believe that 25 to 50 percent
of all DoD procurement funding is warranted just for tactical aircraft
modernization?
Answer. The issue is not whether the threat/geographic combination
warrants expending a significant portion of the DoD procurement budget
for tactical aircraft modernization, but whether the threat/geographic
combination warrants the types of aircraft we are planning to procure
during this modernization. Fighter recapitalization programs are
necessary to ensure essential warfighting capabilities remain available
to support the National Security Strategy. For our continued success as
the world's only military superpower, we need a modern, survivable, and
increasingly lethal fleet of tactical aircraft with their associated
capabilities. Combined with the advanced precision weapon purchases,
these programs may represent a substantial portion of the DoD budget,
but the capability they engender is vital to our 21st century
warfighting needs. Nevertheless, we still must give serious
consideration to the proper mix of tactical aviation assets which are
purchased. In light of predictions that we will face no peer
competitors in the next 10-15 years, we must not purchase airframes
unless they clearly support our national strategy and provide
capabilities vital to executing our military strategy.
Question. General, you have argued recently that ``naval aviation
still does not have a clear concept of where fixed-wing aviation fits
in strike warfare.'' What in your view are the major conceptual issues
that need to be resolved in this mission area as the Navy embarks upon
the acquisition of 1000 F/A-18E/Fs at a total program cost of $67
billion?
Answer. In referring to the Navy's lack of a clear concept of
fixed-wing aviation's place in strike warfare, I see two key issues.
First, the Naval Services (United States Navy and Marine Corps) need to
find an optimum, but affordable balance between fixed wing tactical
aircraft, combat support aircraft (e.g., proper medium lift mix) and
cruise missiles. Prior decisions, given current budgetary constraints,
must be viewed with an eye toward trade-offs that will allow naval
aviation to sufficiently fund airframes to fill deck requirements and
adequately fund Standard Depot Level Maintenance (SDLM) Schedules. Can
Marine Corps fixed-wing aircraft be more aggressively utilized to fill
carrier decks? Can a larger percentage of the tactical aircraft strike
mission (e.g., deep interdiction) be assumed by improved, surface
launched cruise missiles, freeing manned aircraft for close support
missions? Second, naval aviation, along with other joint warfighting
capabilities, have yet to recognize the potential geo-strategic impacts
that world population growth and a shift toward coastal, urbanized
areas will have on our force structure and military missions. Because
of the large investment, fixed-wing tactical aircraft must be relevant
to the entire conflict spectrum, e.g., capable of supporting lower-end
operations in addition to the high-end warfighting tasks.
Atlantic Command Role in Theater Missile Defense
Question. As of last autumn the Defense Science Board and the
Defense Policy Board were urging that the U.S. Atlantic Command be put
in charge of the Department's joint theater missile defense (TMD)
architecture. It has also been reported that USACOM has been given the
sole responsibility for the most basic TMD requirements document.
Why is it appropriate that your command should take the lead in
defining a TMD architecture?
Answer. As the Joint Force Integrator, USACOM is the best command
to deal with the ``quintessential joint program,'' Joint Theater
Missile Defense (JTMD). Because JTMD involves capabilities from all the
Services, a joint headquarters is needed to provide a joint warfighting
focus and to integrate ``stovepiped'' Service programs.
Since USACOM assumed control of the JTMD Initiative in July 1996 we
have embarked on a three-pronged approach. These three areas are:
--Coherent Defense 97. Established to examine and produce potential
resolution to procedural issues between the Army and Air Force, and to
develop a command and control architecture for JTMD.
--Theater Missile Defense Capstone Requirements Document. By
direction of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, USACOM has
taken the lead for updating JTMD requirements in concert with other
warfighting CINC's. USACOM is carrying out this tasking by developing a
Theater Missile Defense Capstone Requirements Document (TMD CRD), which
will be approved by all warfighting CINC's and subsequently the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).
--JTMD-Related Universal Joint Task List Tasks, Conditions and
Standards Development. The identification and further definition of
JTMD-related tasks conditions and standards will improve upon efforts
to train and integrate forces based upon supported command
requirements, further the development of the CJCS Universal Joint Task
List, and advocate the continued adaptation of warfighter requirements
to existing and future joint doctrine.
Subsequent to the commencement of the JTMD Initiative, the Office
of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff have established the Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense
Organization (JTAMDO) to define required system interoperabilities and
operational architectures, and to validate the developing joint theater
air and missile defense capabilities through both simulation and
technology demonstrations.
With JTAMDO focusing on the TMD architecture, USACOM is taking an
active role within the Integrated Product Team structure of JTAMDO to
develop supporting architectures operational concepts.
Question. Will your architecture specify common sensors, supporting
communications systems and data dissemination networks and force the
services to adhere to one set of standards where multiple technology
solutions may already exist?
Answer. Yes. As part of USACOM's TMD Initiative, the Coherent
Defense series of exercises are designed to address operational
architecture issues among the Services for Joint Theater Missile
Defense (JTMD).
The first of the series Coherent Defense 97 is currently ongoing.
It was established to examine and produce potential resolution to
procedural issues between the Army and Air Force, develop a command and
control architecture for JTMD, and to subsequently provide draft
tactics, techniques and procedures documentation to the Joint Staff
that codifies agreed-to procedures for JTMD.
Additionally, by direction of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, USACOM has assumed responsibility for leading the development
of overarching JTMD requirements in concert with other warfighting
CINC's. USACOM is carrying out this tasking by developing a Theater
Missile Defense Capstone Requirements Document (TMD CRD) specifically
addressing a Family of Systems approach to the TMD mission. The TMD CRD
will identify and validate overarching warfighting required
capabilities inclusive of Command, Control, Communications, Computers
and Intelligence (C4I), Passive Defense, Active Defense and Attack
Operations to support JTMD into the next century.
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs)
Question. Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) were
developed to accelerate and facilitate the application of mature
advanced technologies to solve military problems and provide new
operational capabilities to the field sooner than the normal
acquisition process presently allows. ACOM is the most active ACTD user
and sponsor, currently sponsoring 10 ACTDs or seventy percent of total
active ACTDs that ACOM is currently sponsoring. General Sheehan, please
provide a brief overview of the ACTDs that ACOM is currently
sponsoring. Which ones do you believe hold the greatest promise to
deliver near-term operational capability?
Answer. As a point of clarification, USACOM is currently sponsoring
eight ACTDs vice ten as stated in the QFR.
The goal of Synthetic Theater of War (STOW) is to demonstrate the
utility of advanced simulation technologies to directly support joint
training and mission rehearsal. It is a prototype simulation system
which uses entity or platform level simulation to conduct a segment of
operational JTF training with tactical representation. Its objective:
allow the user to preview technology under actual exercise training
conditions to determine which technologies are useful and should
transition to the Joint Simulation System (JSIMS). The initial demo and
two year follow on period is 29 Oct 97 through December 99. The
transition from STOW to JSIMS is being coordinated during this period
and will serve to reduce the risk of JSIMS at its Initial Operations
Capability (IOC) in FY 00/1. STOW is not intended as a stand alone
system and will not become an operational capability. The success of
JSIMS however, is very dependent on the results of the STOW program and
its two year follow on period.
The objective of the Joint CounterMine (JCM) ACTD is to demonstrate
the capability to conduct seamless transition of countermine operations
from sea to land. The ACTD represents twelve Novel systems that will
provide capabilities ranging from clandestine reconnaissance and
surveillance to overt reconnaissance, neutralization, clearing,
breaching and marking. The ACTD also includes a C4I architecture that
will provide a common countermine operational picture. The Modeling and
Simulation capability (Joint CounterMine Operational Simulation (JCOS))
of JCM provides the ability to conduct course of action analysis and
operational concepts, tactics, and doctrine development as well as
training and evaluation. The JCM ACTD has significant potential to
provide the warfighter an enhanced Counter Mine capability particularly
in areas where no capability currently exists. Residuals from most of
the Novel systems will be available next fiscal year.
The Navigation Warfare (NAVWAR) ACTD was initiated as a catalyst
for determining methods of preventing an adversary's use of satellite
navigation information while protecting friendly access to signals from
the precise Global Positioning System (GPS). While the threat from
adversaries is still in a stage of early development, this ACTD is
geared to long-term development of capabilities because growth and
reliance upon precision navigation systems is growing worldwide. Early
prototypes of prevention assets for offensive use against an adversary
have been demonstrated in ongoing field assessments. Enhanced
navigation receivers are still in the developmental stages with the
first being delivered in the summer of 1997.
The High Altitude Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (HAE UAV) ACTD
will provide near real time imagery to the warfighter from two
performance enhanced unmanned aerial vehicles, the Global Hawk (GH) and
the Dark Star (DS). The Global Hawk will provide a long dwell
capability and the Dark Star will provide the assured receipt
capability. Eight GH and six DS vehicles will be produced for the ACTD
with the military assessment demonstrations planned to end in the fall
of 2000. The capability provided by both Global Hawk and Dark Star will
be of enormous benefit to the warfighter.
The Combat Identification (CID) ACTD was developed in response to
the fratricide issues as a result of the Gulf War. The overall
objective of the CID ACTD is to demonstrate and assess technologies
that can enhance the capability of our combat forces to positively
identify friendly, hostile, and neutral platforms during Air-to-Ground
and Ground-to-Ground operations, in order to maximize combat
effectiveness and reduce fratricide due to mis-identification. The ACTD
is a system of systems assessing the military utility of eleven
different technologies. Of the eleven technologies, three have
demonstrated potential for near term operational capability thus far.
The Battlefield Combat ID System (BCIS) is a ground-to-ground point-of-
engagement system that utilizes a millimeter wave interrogator and
transponder to query the suspect target. Situational Awareness Beacon
w/Reply (SABER) is a situational awareness technology solution,
providing identification code, position information and other host
platform data. This information is transmitted via UHF line-of-sight
radios or indirectly via UHF satellite link. In the most deficient CID
mission area (Air-to-Ground), the Situational Awareness Data Link
(SADL), an Air Force Air National Guard/Reserve initiative to install
an Army Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS) radio in F-
16 and A-10 aircraft receives situational awareness (SA) and target ID
information (friendly ground maneuver vehicle locations) from the
ground tactical network.
The objective of the Advanced Joint Planning (AJP) ACTD is to
identify and enhance operational planning capabilities. AJP leverages
software technology to build planning tools or applications that assist
staff planners in deployment and execution planning of joint forces.
The ACTD is divided into three main areas or capabilities. The Joint
Readiness Automated Management System (JRAMS) allows planners to
quickly assess availability and preparedness of forces. Joint Planning
and Execution Toolkit (JPET) is a collaborative planning toolkit for
Crisis Action Planning (CAP). The Map Based Planner (MBP) allows the
planner to visualize Courses of Action as it appears on a map of the
area. Both JRAMS and JPET have demonstrated near term capacity and are
undergoing hardening and evaluation in preparation for migration to the
Global Command and Control System (GCCS).
The Battlefield Awareness and Data Dissemination (BADD) ACTD
integrates information management and broadcast technologies to provide
the Joint Task Force commander the ability to dynamically configure his
communications and information control. It is aimed at providing an
efficient and seamless information management infrastructure for the
warfighter, targeted to achieve total battlefield awareness. It
provides information needed when needed, in the format needed, in a
timely and cost effective manner. The BADD program, working with the
Global Broadcast System (GBS), other advanced communications, and
legacy systems has a reach back capability to Intel data that will get
warfighting information to the tactical level and allow warfighters to
access new and different data sources to create more concise and robust
operational views of the battlespace than ever before. The ability of
the reach back capability to request and provide imagery via the Global
Broadcast system to the BADD work station was demonstrated last fall.
The objective of the Semi-Automated IMINT Processing ACTD is to
significantly improve the Image Analyst's (IA) ability to process the
ever increasing surveillance imagery generated by U-2 aircraft and the
new High Altitude Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. With the
decreasing number of the IAs in the services, this is of particular
interest to USACOM. The ACTD exploits Automatic Target Recognition
(ATR) technology and integrates this with other imagery exploitation
tools to rapidly process large amounts of imagery typically generated
by sensors such as Synthetic Aperture Array Radars (SAR) employed in
wide area search modes of operation. The system is currently operating
with the U-2 aircraft in Operation Desert Capture which is part of the
army Task Force XXI exercises at Fort Irwin, Ca. This particular
exercise is part of the system development and will be used to baseline
the initial system design. The technological risk and military utility
of the system is part of the overall assessment of the ACTD which is
scheduled to complete in FY99.
Question. ACTDs are a relatively new concept which are still
experiencing growing pains as warfighters and service acquisition
organizations try to figure out the most appropriate way to test and
swiftly field systems developed under ACTDs in a manner which ensures
that the systems can be adequately supported once they are delivered to
operating units.
What are your views as to how the present ACTD program is
structured and how it might be improved?
Answer. ACTDs are making significant progress in involving the
warfighter in the development and assessment of these advanced
technologies. As an evolving process there are, however, some areas for
potential improvement. The transition of the ACTD is the least
developed portion and the shortcoming was graphically illustrated when
USACOM tried to transition the Predator ACTD to a receiving service. An
ACTD is initiated with the signing of the Implementation directive. One
of the signatores is a service acquisition executive (SAE). At this
point the ACTD needs to clearly designate a lead service and the
involvement of that service's acquisition agency. The service
acquisition agency should get involved early on to both POM and plan
for the transition of the ACTD so that, if successful, the ACTD can
transition in a timely manner. This would allow the prospective program
manager and his OT&E organization to assist with the transition
planning. Their suggestions of what data or other steps should be taken
within the ACTD to minimize the time and effort needed after the ACTD
ends to achieve a production decision (where that is appropriate) would
be mutually beneficial.
Earlier involvement of the user sponsor in the selection process
for new ACTDs could help the prospective lead service in it's overall
planning process. The joint staff takes into consideration the needs
and prospective roles of the services/CINCs as part of their
determination within the ACTD process. Likewise, an earlier involvement
of the Unified Commands in the selection process for new ACTDs would
lessen the impact on the ACTD caused by the user sponsor as the
Operational Manager becomes more familiar with the program details and
begins to introduce the warfighter view.
Question. Even an ACTD success story such as the Predator unmanned
aerial vehicle has had its difficulties. Initial Predator vehicles
delivered to Bosnia lacked de-icing mechanisms on their wings, causing
extended delays to winter flight operations. Problems such as these may
have been detected by more extended operational testing than that
conducted under the ACTD.
How do you believe a balance can be struck between the need to
swiftly develop and field a capability for the warfighter and the need
to ensure that it is adequately tested before it gets to the field and
an adequate support infrastructure is in place once it gets there?
Answer. In short, earlier designation and aggressive integration of
a Service sponsor is required to ensure an ACTD has optimum military
utility and that the product is sustainable. Additionally, a parallel
reform effort within the traditional Operational Test and Evaluation
(OT&E) and Logistic communities is necessary. These reforms must be
keyed to the ongoing reforms in the acquisition process that are
inherent in the ACTD process, to ensure an expeditious and seamless
transition to the warfighter of the ACTD product or capability.
Specifically, to facilitate adequate testing and evaluation, early
involvement and commitment from sponsoring Services must occur. The
Service should integrate their OT&E organization within the ACTD test
and evaluation program that is managed variably by the Defense
Evaluation Support Agency (DESA) or a confederation of other DOD
organizations. However, while ACTDs are designed to reform and
accelerate the acquisition process, the Service OT&E organizations
still function at the pace of the traditional DOD acquisition timeline.
A parallel reform effort in Service OT&E processes must be adopted.
Predator did involve Service OT&E organizations in the program;
however, their inflexible and highly structured processes were slow and
cumbersome within the ACTD boundaries. Service OT&E is keyed to the DOD
5000 series timelines of 7 or more years. To effectively integrate
Service OT&E into an ACTD, the Services must adopt a separate program
to facilitate rapid demonstration/exercise planning; cheaper, smaller
and more flexible data collection efforts; and expeditious analytical
and reporting capabilities. It would have been impossible to achieve
the milestones within the Predator ACTD if the program was linked to a
Service OT&E organization. USACOM used the Defense Evaluation Support
Agency (DESA) to assist in a rapid planning, testing and evaluation
cycle that was designed specifically for the ACTD process.
In a similar fashion, supportability issues are a valid concern but
may have to remain a tradeoff for the rapid integration of new
technologies into the military. By its very nature, an ACTD does not
provide enough time and resources to collect adequate data on system
vulnerabilities, the Service-life of the system and its components,
identification of critical components, system production and inventory
levels, etc. This problem is harder to solve, but involvement of
Services early in an ACTD can mitigate some of these problems. At a
minimum, with Service involvement, deficiencies can be identified early
in an ACTD. This could stimulate concurrent analyses by the Services to
determine the gaps in information, the vulnerable parts of the program,
and issues for follow-on review once an ACTD enters the transition
phase. Additionally, Service logisticians could alert ACTD managers to
unique requirements for data that may be integrated into other
collection efforts.
The bottomline is the ACTD process is not the panacea for DOD
acquisition, however, it is a very valuable tool for Joint Force
Integration that is necessary to speed the integration of new
capabilities to the warfighter. Clearly, the process is not suited for
all acquisition and development efforts, but makes good sense in the
way it has been employed to date. I wouldn't want to build a major
weapon system, such as a new class aircraft carrier this way, but this
process can effectively, if not perfectly, give the warfighter a ``good
enough'' capability rapidly.
Joint Interoperability/C4I Programs
Question. The principle objective of the Goldwater-Nichols
Department of Defense Reorganization Act was to address the persistent
problems of interservice interoperability, unclear command
relationships and competing doctrine that had hampered joint service
contingency operations in the past. The intent was to make all services
work together as a joint team. Are major procurement decisions made by
the services today on the basis of what a program contributes to the
nation's total defense capability as opposed to the individual
services?
Answer. Most decisions are made based on overarching joint
warfighting requirements. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council
(JROC) has evolved as a superb forcing function, ensuring recognized
threats are balanced against existing hardware and future system
developments are considered for joint applicability. The JROC forces
the Services to ask the question, ``how does this planned weapon system
play in the joint fight and therefore necessitate resource programming
with the resulting answer in mind.'' This is not to say that there
isn't more work to be done by us all in integrating existing systems
into the joint fight. Greater focus on developing one common Combat
Identification system for detection of ``friend-or-foe'' is critical to
the safety of the men and women fighting in all future conflicts. A
Command, Control, Communications, Computer and Intelligence (C4I)
architecture which incorporates processing and analysis commonality is
vitally needed for joint task force (JTF) commanders; and a cohesive,
integrated resourcing strategy of reconnaissance/surveillance platforms
to support increasing collection and dissemination requirements is an
area which although somewhat fractionalized, is now being addressed by
the JROC for fusion into a common system.
Question. By some estimates the Department of Defense spends almost
40 percent of its annual budget on command, control, communication,
computer, and intelligence (C4I) programs. Do you believe that this
level on investment in sensors, communications systems, and data
distribution networks has resulted in increased interoperability among
the services or have unique service information architectures persisted
which inhibit joint operations?
Answer. Architectures remain fragmented between Services, Agencies,
and Unified CINCs, and are further fragmented between the C4 and I
communities. A coherent strategy employing the new Joint Technical
Architecture, including a forcing-function, is needed to consolidate an
architecture that can drive the PPBS process. We must agree on a
definition of a Joint C4I Architecture which will, of course, include
necessary service unique systems, but which will also highlight the
need for a modification of Title 10 provisions. The current provisions
encourage the service needs vice joint interoperability requirements by
denying a mechanism to enforce the use of the joint interoperability
solutions and result in fielding technology latent systems.
C4I is, and must continue to be, a large portion of the DoD budget.
However, our best information indicates the figure to be somewhere
closer to 20 percent based on the President's Fiscal Year 98 budget.
Many of the programs involve very expensive space platforms, and
virtually all the programs/systems require software/hardware
development and cryptologic support. C4I is a critical enabler and
requires a clear linkage to the comprehensive investment strategy.
Without investing in C4I (larger pipes, expanding the C4I grid
structure) now, we reduce our capability to assure the level of
information dominance the warfighter will need to execute missions in
the future.
Question. How should the department and the services seek to
improve this situation in the future?
Answer. A C4I CINC could provide direction, leadership, oversight,
and control in validating mission need statements, development,
acquisition, funding, and fielding of interoperable C4I systems for use
in joint/combined operations.
A process supporting CINC and Service Staff functional involvement
from the beginning of system/program development would lead to
tailoring plans and strategies into an integrated vice functional
perspective. We have made a beginning through the development of the
Advanced Concept and Technology Demonstration (ACTD) program. This
technology insertion program is also a first step in the reform of the
acquisition process. USACOM, as the force trainer and provider, has
fostered development and mandated the use of the Global Command &
Control System (GCCS), and other joint systems in Joint Task Force
(JTF) Exercises to insure that forces are prepared to operate in a
joint environment. Early continuous insight by the CINCs and Services
instead of after-the-fact oversight will lead to issue identification/
resolution and build a team committed to program success. Teamwork
begins at the start--not a critique 4-6 years into the program. The
CINCs would not be faced with integrating the Service systems when a
potential conflict arises somewhere in the world as is the present
situation.
We are making progress with the establishment of the Decision
Support Center, the C4I Integration Support Activity, and the stand-up
of the Joint C4ISR Battle Lab. However, we expect limited success
without Title 10 reform giving the CINCs more input into the
acquisition and fielding process along with a C4I CINC empowered to
enforce Joint Task Force Integration. A C4I CINC could ensure a ``plug-
and-play'' approach with cradle-to-grave management of the right
information to the right warfighter at the right time.
Cuba
Question. How do you rate the present military capabilities of the
Cuban armed forces? What are the Cuban military's near and long-term
force modernization goals? Do you believe Cuba poses any threat to its
neighbors in the region?
Answer. ------ .
Question. What is Cuba's current level of involvement in
international drug trafficking?
Answer. Cuba occupies a key geographic location astride primary air
and maritime trafficking routes. Absence of formal diplomatic relations
with the US makes it difficult to quantify the volume of drugs
transiting through Cuban territory, or qualify the extent of official
involvement.
Intelligence reporting does not indicate official Cuban involvement
in drug trafficking. Cuba has not publicized any drug-related
corruption since the 1989 trial and execution of several top Military/
Ministry of Interior officials.
However, the Cuban government appears to be reaching out in an
effort to work with neighboring countries in counterdrug matters.
Recently, the Cuban government established a relationship with the
Royal Bahamian Police Drug Enforcement Unit in an effort to foster the
flow of information between Cuba and the Bahamas. ------. The freighter
Limerick was sailing from Barranquilla, Colombia, to Freeport in the
Bahamas when it began to founder in international waters approximately
12 miles from the US military base in Guantanamo Bay. A US Coast Guard
vessel patrolling the area received permission to search the vessel,
but decided to abandoned the ship when it began to take on water. After
discovering the cocaine, the Cubans gave the drugs to US authorities,
agreed to testify against the Captain and crew, and continued to search
the vessel finding a hidden compartment filled with contraband.
To date, bilateral US and Cuban drug enforcement remains sporadic
and ad hoc, but professional.
Question. What is the long-term likelihood of renewed mass
migration from Cuba to the United States?
Answer. Currently there are no Indications & Warnings (I&W) of
potential mass migration from Cuba. This information is cooroborated by
the U.S. Interest Section in Havana and the USCG Intelligence
Coordination Center in Washington, D.C. The migration accords signed
between the United States and the Government of Cuba has been very
successful in thwarting migration patterns. Different from previous
migration crises, the lottery system managed by the U.S. Interest
Section in Havana, provides a mechanism for legal migration which was
non-existent prior to the 1995 accords. It also serves as a migration
valve for potential dissidents and the population at large. Indicators
tells us also the Cuban government is complying with the terms of the
accords and has vested political and economic interest in continuing to
do so.
Notwithstanding, we must keep in mind the Castro regime has
historically maintained firm control of emigration through the Interior
Ministry (Border Guard). Mass migration to the United States has always
occurred with the regime's approval when it served the regime's
purpose. In the long term, continued economic hardships could certainly
cause the level of expressed popular discontent to compel the regime to
re-evaluate the accord utility.
Haiti
Question. General Sheehan, what is your current assessment
regarding the outlook for Haiti in terms of Political Stability;
Economic Growth and; the Potential for renewed violence?
Answer. Despite initial concerns over President Preval's ability to
become a proactive and effective president, he has made surprising
strides toward resolving the nagging issues that plague Haiti's
political and social landscape. Challenged by lapses in the security
environment and a beleaguered economy, President Preval has managed to
keep Haiti's head above water. The democratic process continues to
grow, as demonstrated by free and fair elections, and by the
legislature's demonstrated resolve to serve as an independent set of
checks and balances rather than as a rubber stamp for the President.
While the political apparatus in Haiti is viewed as successful, its
ability to maintain an equilibrium between the desires of the
international community and political constituents will be the
governments's greatest challenge as it leads Haiti into the next
millennium.
The government of Haiti must, however, address the growing concerns
of the populace over the lack of economic progress, high cost of
living, and security issues if the country is to continue to mature
favorably. Future economic growth is dependent upon the Government's
ability to ensure security, move towards privatization of state-held
enterprises, and to attract foreign investment. Despite the controversy
surrounding privatization the Government of Haiti is making slow
progress. Crucial legislation addressing this issue has already met
with Parliamentary approval, and more recently government officials
have put forth a comprehensive plan outlining the timetable to
privatize nine parastatals. ------ .
Haiti has a history of both political and criminal violence.
However, the majority of political violence has been dramatically
curtailed since the restoration of democracy in 1994. While there have
been some isolated incidents of politically motivated violence, the
Government of Haiti is committed to the democratic process. ------ .
Drug Interdiction
Question. General Sheehan, your command's area of responsibility
includes the Caribbean basin of the Atlantic Ocean which is both home
to indigenous drug traffickers and a major trade route used by the
illicit drug producing nations of the southern hemisphere. Describe the
present counter-narcotic operations of the Atlantic Command to the
Committee.
Answer. The US Atlantic Command supports two of the five goals in
President's National Drug Control Strategy. These goals are to shield
US frontiers from the threat, and break the drug supply sources.
The US Atlantic Command supports those goals by: conducting
intelligence-cued counterdrug detection and monitoring operations in
support of domestic and international Law Enforcement Agencies, and
providing support to the Interagencies and Host Nations to disrupt and
reduce the flow of drugs throughout the area of responsibility and
Mexico.
We complete this tasking by focusing detection and monitoring
resources on drug trafficker's centers of gravity and optimizing
support to the Drug Law Enforcement Agencies and Host Nations.
Prioritized Support to Mexico and the Southwest border, Puerto Rico and
the US Virgin Islands, and other High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas
is how we have tasked subordinate commands to focus their detection and
monitoring operations. These operations take into account intelligence
cueing, actual high volume trafficking routes, and available resources
to coherently assimilate counterdrug forces.
Specifically, US Atlantic Command forces are conducting a variety
of detection and monitoring tasks including air and maritime detection
and monitoring, training, engineering projects, communications support,
reconnaissance, transportation, information collection and riverine
support. All of these DOD functions are in a support role with no
military forces actually performing interdictions. The interdiction
assets and personnel are coordinated by military forces but the actual
arrests and seizures are conducted by law enforcement agencies such as
the US Coast Guard, Customs, DEA, and FBI.
Question. What are your most useful assets in performing this
mission?
Answer. The most important assets I have in the detection and
monitoring mission are the two counterdrug organizations, Joint
Interagency Task Force East, and Joint Task Force (JTF)-6.
Joint Interagency Task Force, East in Key West, FL, which has on
staff all interagency drug law enforcement as well as British and Dutch
liaison officers, conducts detection and monitoring operations in the
drug transit zone between the source zone in South America, and the US
arrival zone. JTF-6, which is based in El Paso, TX, conducts detection
and monitoring operations in support of domestic law enforcement in the
US, Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands.
These organizations are flexible enough to conduct timely
operations to effectively neutralize the threat. Both organizations use
the available technology (ships and aircraft, relocatable over the
horizon radar, ground based radars, etc.) to effectively monitor the
transit and arrival zones and focus interdiction assets to consummate
the intercept. Also, the two organizations are heavily engaged in
pushing future technologies to better conduct the mission.
The most important part of the drug interdiction mission is Joint
DOD, International and Interagency cooperative engagement and support.
Through this cooperation, we have been able to focus limited resources
from each agency or country into a cohesive detection and monitoring,
and interdiction force. Couple this cooperation with advanced
technology and planning and you have a significant force multiplier. To
single out one specific asset which is the most useful would be very
shortsighted. All of the detection and monitoring assets have relative
strengths and limitations which require teamwork and proper utilization
for mission accomplishment.
Question. Does the performance of this mission detract from the
military readiness of your operating units who engage in it?
Answer. All of the counterdrug missions which DOD forces are
conducting have some applicability to their primary warfighting mission
area. For instance Early Warning aircraft are conducting air
surveillance, Naval Combatant ships are conducting air surface target
tracking, and intercept aircraft are standing alert ready to launch and
identify a potential target of interest. JTF-6 in El Paso, TX, can show
an 85% correlation of the Joint Mission Essential Task List to every
one of its counterdrug missions. My Naval component, US Atlantic Fleet,
has created a Western Hemisphere Group composed of several surface
ships capable of conducting counterdrug operations. This organization
provides the Naval ships for counterdrug operations so the units can
focus their efforts, and the rest of the fleet can focus on Battle
Group training.
However, maintaining the required level of support for counterdrug
operations and still providing the minimum level of stand down time is
becoming increasingly more difficult. For example, the E-2 HAWKEYE
community, by necessity, must support Carrier Battle Group deployments
as well as support counterdrug operations, which require a squadron of
E-2's deployed constantly. Since there are five Carrier Air Wings, and
six Carriers in the Atlantic Fleet, these squadrons are constantly
either on deployment or preparing for deployment. Now add the
additional requirement for a 55 day counterdrug deployment and the
resulting impact on personnel, equipment, and training, is significant.
Any type of surge operation results in shuffling of already heavily
tasked components and units. Recently, we have been asked to support an
18 month surge operation in the Eastern Pacific. This requirement,
although valid for counterdrug operations, may require reducing the
escort ships from Carrier Battle Groups.
Question. What are your views on the use of submarines in the
detecting and tracking of suspected maritime drug traffickers?
Answer. The submarine brings the traditional warfighting dimensions
of identification and early warning, secure surveillance, and covert
detection and monitoring to counterdrug operations. A stealthy and self
sustaining platform, the submarine can loiter in wait for a suspect
vessel for days and then shadow the unsuspecting contact gathering
critical intelligence on trafficker patterns. Then the submarine can
communicate this information to other units and assist them in
interception and boarding. However, submarines are expensive, and with
the downsizing of the force the capabilities that the submarine brings
to the mission must be weighed against the cost of its operation and
non-availability to meet other commitments where the vessel is just as
badly needed.
Submarine employment in counterdrug operations is an evolving
process, both the ship and the tactical commander are refining
operating procedures and doctrine to enhance effectiveness. This
expensive asset has a permanent and important role in completing the
counterdrug mission, and is a significant part of the synergistic asset
management of detection and monitoring.
Dragonfly
Question. In fiscal year 1995, the Committee added funds to
evaluate the Canard Rotor/Wing (CRW) technology concept. CRW is a
stopped rotor, high-speed VTOL air vehicle which performs as a
helicopter for takeoff and landing and as a fixed wing aircraft for
high-speed cruise. The Navy and USMC continue to endorse this
technology for future manned and unmanned aircraft and to pursue its
maturation through a Dragonfly Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD).
The Committee understands that the Dragonfly ATD was strongly
recommended by three CINCs. General Sheehan, how important is Dragonfly
to your warfighting mission and is it still one of your top ATDs?
Answer. DRAGONFLY is an Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD) in
the earliest stages of assessment. Although it is an interesting
technology that appears to have potential, it is far too early to gauge
military utility. USACOM is only involved in Advanced Concept
Technology Demonstrations (ACTD); the evaluation stage encompasses more
mature technologies than ATDs. If the DRAGONFLY technology shows enough
merit to advance to the ACTD level, USACOM could be involved in the
evaluation process, at that point in time, as an operational sponsor.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Young.]
Wednesday, March 5, 1997.
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
WITNESS
GENERAL J.H. BINFORD PEAY, III, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES
CENTRAL COMMAND, U.S. ARMY
Introduction
Mr. Young. The Committee will come to order.
This afternoon the Committee concludes our series of
Commanders in Chief hearings, and we are very happy to welcome
General Peay, III, Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command.
Incidently, this is probably the last hearing John Plashal
will staff for us, because he is going on to bigger and better
things. We are going to miss him. He has done a really good job
for the Committee over the 27 years, I think it has been, John.
We will miss him. John does a good job.
I thought I would mention that John will be leaving. Norm
Dicks is going to organize a big going-away party for him.
Mr. Dicks. If Mr. Murtha were here, he would want to
certainly say a word. John has been terrific, and, as someone
said, one of the best organizers of CODELs in the history of
Congress. I think we should give John a round of applause.
Mr. Young. I think that takes the place of the going-away
party.
General Peay, in your prepared statement you describe
CENTCOM's area of responsibility with this quote. ``By any
measure, this is a dangerous neighborhood.'' I think anyone
that has paid any attention to what has happened there in
recent time would certainly underscore that statement. You are
absolutely correct.
You have had the War in Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq War, the
Persian Gulf War, the Kuwaiti flagging exercise, the Iranian
revolution and a number other lesser crises. The high tempo of
ongoing U.S. operations in the region and the recent terrorist
attack at Khobar Towers are vivid reminders that America does
have vital national security interests in the CENTCOM region,
and that the price of defending those interests is high.
Pursuant to a vote that this Committee took last week, this
hearing is closed, so we will be free to discuss, at whatever
length you would like, matters that might be classified.
We are looking forward to your testimony. Your entire
statement will be placed in the record, feel free to summarize
it in any way you wish. And then following that we will have
some penetrating questions from the Members for you on the
issues involving the CENTCOM area.
We are glad to have you here, sir.
Summary Statement of General Peay
General Peay. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor
to appear before this Committee to represent the men and women
of U.S. Central Command and discuss Central Command's approach
to protecting our Nation's interests in the Central Region.
This morning, around 12,500 American Soldiers, Sailors,
Airmen, and Marines are answering the call to duty in the
Central Region. Members of Joint Task Force Southwest Asia are
flying over Southern Iraq to enforce UN Security Council
resolutions and U.S. warnings designed to prevent Saddam from
attacking Shiites along the Euphrates River and his neighbors
to the south.
Since 1992, our airmen have logged a remarkable 131,000
accident-free sorties, with over 86,000 of these over Iraq; a
great tribute to the professionalism and technical skill of our
pilots and air crews.
Pressure on Iraq is magnified through enforcement of
economic sanctions in the Arabian Gulf. Under the leadership of
U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command, and FIFTH Fleet, this
multinational flotilla has steadfastly enforced UN sanctions
against Iraq since 1990. During this period, it has challenged
23,000 vessels, intercepted more than 13,000, boarded nearly
10,400 and diverted over 600.
These operations are complex and dangerous. Our sailors
have performed brilliantly in preventing incidents from
spiraling out of control and in handling sensitive matters with
great care.
And, even as we undertake these activities, along with
scores of exercises and security assistance programs, we are
engaged in an aggressive program to reconfigure our forces in
the region to contend with the increased terrorist threat.
SAFEGUARDING U.S. INTERESTS AND SECURITY
United States Central Command undertakes these operations
to safeguard our Nation's vital and enduring interests in the
Central Region.
Principal among these are maintaining the flow of oil at
reasonable prices; ensuring freedom of navigation and access to
commercial markets; protecting American citizens and property
abroad; and assuring the security of regional friends in the
context of a comprehensive Middle East peace.
Protecting our interests is a formidable task. The 20
nations comprising our area of responsibility suffer from
historic internal and external conflicts flowing from religious
and tribal strife among the region's 430 million people, and
from border disputes, competition for resources, economic
disparities, and exploding populations.
It is, by every measure, a dangerous neighborhood. I find
it useful to organize these regional threats into five major
groupings:
First, the near-term threat of Iraq. With the largest
regional army, Iraq has proven on several occasions over the
past 3 years that it can mobilize and deploy quickly to
threaten Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
Second, the mid- and long-term threat of Iran. Determined
to dominate the region and lead the Islamic world, Iran has
acquired significant naval resources that endanger the waters
of the Gulf. Even more worrisome is its support for terrorism
and pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, WMD both of which
pose risks to regional states and U.S. interests.
Third, the continuing proliferation of ballistic missiles,
chemical and biological weapons, and nuclear technology
exacerbating existing tensions.
The situation has deteriorated during the past 12 months,
with Iraq, Iran and others in the region aggressively seeking
missile and nuclear technology and advancing their chemical and
biological research and development programs.
Fourth, terrorism. Religious, ethnic and tribal divisions,
along with economic and political disenfranchisement, give rise
to factions embracing violence as their best hope for achieving
political and social change. Older organizations such as Hamas
and Hizballah are now joined by ``transnational'' groups made
up of Islamic extremists who gained military experience and
religious indoctrination fighting in Afghanistan's civil war.
Fifth, and lastly, general regional instability. Enduring
social, economic, and political problems in the region produce
general regional instability. Included are political upheaval,
famine, economic adversity, border disputes, and challenges
arising as aging leaders turn over power to the next
generation, a development that has far-reaching implications
for our country and the world.
Iraq, Iran, proliferation of WMD, terrorism and regional
instability; these are the five major threats with which our
Nation must contend in the Central Region for at least the next
quarter of a century.
USCENTCOM'S FIVE-PILLAR THEATER STRATEGY
United States Central Command's Five-Pillar Theater
Strategy of power projection, forward presence, combined
exercises, security assistance, and readiness to fight
addresses these threats. It organizes forces, emplaces
equipment and supplies, and establishes the relationships that
promote stability, deter conflict, limit the intensity of
conflict should deterrence fail, and facilitate the transition
to war, if required.
A major component of this strategy is forging regional
partnerships and conducting coalition operations. We deem such
relationships essential to achieve long-term U.S. goals in the
region. Establishing them requires the U.S. to assist regional
friends in realizing their legitimate self-defense needs.
This is no easy task. They are in the process of
modernizing their forces and fielding major weapon systems
while simultaneously trying to restructure military
organizations and overcome severe interoperability problems.
Success requires that we be patient and embrace a long-term
perspective. This is a 25-year process.
We accomplish many of our requirements through a relatively
small but lethal mix of Naval, Air, Ground, and Special
Operations Forces operating in the region on a temporary but
recurring basis, augmented by military advisers and trainers
and by prepositioned stocks of equipment and supplies ashore
and afloat.
As defined in the forward presence, combined exercises, and
security assistance pillars, these forces provide a near-
continuous presence in the region. This collage of military
resources capitalizes on the complimentary capabilities of each
service to manage risk and gain maximum flexibility to contend
with the threats. It is an approach that is central to
deterring conflict, enhancing military-to-military relations,
assuring access to facilities, cementing coalitions, and
supporting contingency operations.
Bolstering these forward-positioned assets is America's
military potential as defined in our power projection pillar.
Included are additional aircraft, ships, Marines and Army
Forces deploying from the Continental U.S. and elsewhere around
the world.
Combined, power projection and ``near-continuous presence''
offer a credible deterrent to would-be aggressors while also
providing the ingredients for fighting and winning decisively,
if required.
Our final pillar, readiness to fight, binds the activities
encapsulated in the previous pillars and enhances our ability
to wage high-tempo, joint and multinational operations. We do
this through robust battle staff training and exercises and by
institutionalizing tactics, techniques and procedures.
Readiness to fight also includes the myriad of activities
relating to force protection. Terrorists threatening our forces
are well-trained, well-armed, and well-supported by various
nations and nongovernment agencies. While withdrawing the bulk
of our forces from the region would reduce our vulnerability
significantly, it would pose grave and unacceptable dangers to
American interests. Remaining engaged in the region means
taking appropriate action, in cooperation with regional
friends, to protect our service men and women. We have done
this over the past year by undertaking an extensive Force
Protection Enhancement Program that has included the following:
First, we have relocated personnel to more secure and
defensible sites throughout the Area of Responsibility AOR and,
in particular, in Saudi Arabia.
Second, we have hardened facilities and extended perimeter
standoff.
Third, we have withdrawn most dependents.
Fourth, we have reduced our transportation vulnerability.
Fifth, we have augmented our security forces.
Sixth, we have enhanced counterintelligence activities.
Seventh, and lastly, we have improved antiterrorist
training programs and policies.
These defensive measures mitigate the vulnerability of our
forces to terrorist attack. They do not eliminate the threat. A
determined terrorist retains the advantage of being able to
attack by target, with any means, at any time.
Defensive measures make it more difficult for terrorists to
strike and, hopefully, foil their attempts. Combating these
criminals however, requires more than these passive defensive
measures. We must continue to exercise our inherent right of
self-defense, employing a full array of legal, diplomatic,
psychological, law enforcement and military operations to
defend against terrorists before they can strike, neutralize
them in their sanctuaries, and deter them from conducting
future acts.
Success in these efforts is linked, in turn, to
significantly improving U.S. human intelligence collection,
analysis, and dissemination.
While protecting our service people overseas is a critical
task, we must remain focused on accomplishing our primary
military requirements. This means we must continue to field and
exercise forces skilled in conducting joint and combined
operations during a major regional fight. Such as conflict will
require the capabilities of all of our military forces. To this
end, we must have healthy services with sufficient size and
robustness to perform operational missions, take care of
service members and families, and build and educate for the
future.
Future victory will hinge on the readiness of our tactical
organizations and the skill, courage, and sacrifice of our
fighting men and women. They, in turn, must be led by leaders
who are creative, reason critically, act innovatively, and
operate decisively in the face of ambiguity and uncertainty. We
need leaders who are prepared to take operational risk, leaders
who possess uncompromising character, and leaders who practice
out-front leadership always.
KEY ENABLING REQUIREMENTS
Pivotal to USCENTCOM's ability to fulfill its mission and
confront regional challenges is your continued support for
several programs. Chief among these are: prepositioning of
equipment ashore; theater missile defense; strategic lift; WMD
defense; and theater force protection.
I welcome the opportunity to discuss these and related
issues further during these proceedings.
We should take pride in the enormous progress we have made
over the past decade. In a part of the world of vital
importance to our Nation, we have met serious challenges,
contained enemies, and promoted engagement and enlargement.
Such achievements stem, in large measure, from the first-rate
performances of our service men and women; men and women
equipped with the finest military systems in the world.
We live in decisive times, Promoting our interests requires
patience, consistency, courage, and vision. There are no
shortcuts or cookie-cutter solutions.
We must remain resolute in following the course we have set
for ourselves.
USCENTCOM's Five-Pillar Strategy is a road map for
fulfilling our mission. It accounts for regional conditions,
cultural sensitivities of regional partners, U.S. military
operational tempo, and U.S. budgetary constraints.
To meet competing requirements involved in operating in the
Central Region, we are exploiting the complementary
competencies of each of the services and balancing a near-
continuous presence in the region. We in USCENTCOM look forward
to working with each of the military services, the Department
of Defense, and Members of Congress in the coming months to
promote and protect our Nation's interests in the Central
Region.
[The statement of General Peay follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Young. Thank you very much for an outstanding job in
performing the mission given to Central Command. This Committee
is very much aware of the work that you do and the work your
predecessors have done in a very, very difficult situation, a
difficult part of the world.
I want to apologize. Our attendance is not as good this
afternoon because we are competing with the Intelligence
Committee, which has several voting issues at the same time.
This being the prime subcommittee of the Appropriations
Committee, many of our Members are chairing their own
subcommittees, so we are having a little bit of a problem
there.
Mr. Lewis has to go to the Intelligence Committee shortly,
so I am going to yield to him for the first round of
questioning.
INTELLIGENCE BUDGET
Mr. Lewis. Thank you very much for your courtesy.
General Peay, it is good to be with you. I, too, apologize
for the circumstances. You know this crazy place as well as
most.
I would just ask a couple of general questions in the very
subject area that the Chairman was just touching on.
There is kind of a presumption around this place that as
the world is changing, that clearly one of the areas where we
can reduce spending most easily is in national defense, and you
have seen an awful lot of that over these last several years,
and hand in hand with that is the presumption that as the world
theoretically is safer, there is certainly not much need for
intelligence operations.
With that in mind, I am very much interested in your view
as to the adequacy of funding of intelligence budgets, the
impact that constrained spending is having upon your terrorist
and counterterrorist activities. Begin with that.
General Peay. I think the budgeting is there, sir. I think
the challenge is how quickly we can move a little bit more ----
--. Certainly as we look over Iraq and Iran with regularity
from my headquarters, with all the overhead systems, ------. I
am very impressed with that capability and it has served us
well.
------ is going to take a long time, and it is key to
understanding the terrorist business that is moving with great
speed in a transnational mode today. Organizations that
habitually have not worked together, we now see them merged at
times and then returning to individual operations.
To get inside these transnational actors that are supported
in one country, operate in a third country, their stores are in
a fourth country, they rehearse in a fifth country, they attack
in a sixth country, banking networks that are now economically
spread all around the world, that is going to take ------ if we
are to try to be more precise in understanding where these
attacks are going to occur.
Our challenge this morning, because of these wide diverse
threats, ends up putting our forces, both civilian and
military, on a high level of continuing alert. You simply can't
keep these forces on that kind of alert and retain their
vigilance, day after day, month after month ------. But I want
to be complimentary on the very impressive work that is done
through the other capabilities.
Mr. Lewis. I appreciate that, General.
I must say you are really addressing the need for
consistency in long-term planning, especially when you consider
------ and the assets that need to be developed there. The
Committee knows that the 1998 budget request does not continue
accelerated funding for many of these activities; have adequate
funds been provided in the year 1998, in your judgment, as we
look towards consistency in 1998?
General Peay. I don't have all the details of the Intel
piece, but assuming there has not been a major drop-off on
current operating systems, and if there are replacement systems
in mind in terms of sustainability of the current systems, then
I think we are okay. ------.
Mr. Lewis. There is a very sizeable presence on this
Committee, on our Intelligence Committee, of cross-membership,
and at some appropriate time, we might very well close the door
and discuss this question in other ways. The region you are
dealing with has got to be the highest priority, with regard to
terrorism here, abroad and at home. Maybe talking about that
and doing some serious homework in a nonpartisan way would be
helpful. I don't know if we can do it in this relatively open
environment.
Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Lewis.
Mr. Murtha?
INTERNAL UNREST IN SAUDI ARABIA
Mr. Murtha. General Peay, we took a trip, as you know, not
long ago into Bosnia, Saudi Arabia, and then we went to Israel.
We went only on terrorism. We wanted to see if there was a
thread between what was happening maybe in the Middle East and
what was happening in Bosnia. In Israel we felt Netanyahu had
been so involved in fighting terrorism, he would be able to
give us some advice.
One thread we found in Saudi Arabia was that the middle
class was getting smaller, that the rich were getting richer,
the poor were getting poorer. And the more I listened to it,
the more I heard a situation very similar to Iran 20 years ago.
Then I got the book out that Carter wrote, Keeping Faith,
and in that book the year before the country fell, the CIA said
no problem, the Shah is strong, he has control of the country.
And then later in reading about Iran, much of the problem came
because the United States handled it so poorly.
One thing the embassy did admit, as much as they liked the
troops there, that they were the focus of opposition, and they
caused a lot of problems.
Now, I really don't see any threat from the outside. I
don't see a threat from Iraq, and I don't see Iran hitting us
head-on after the bombing. I see a terrorist threat, where they
can destabilize this country. The smaller our presence is, it
seems to me, the better off we would be.
Is there concern in Saudi Arabia about the size of the
force and the fact that at one time we were kind of flaunting
the fact we were Americans and our traditions are so different
and their fundamentalism is so conservative that it was really
hurting the regime?
General Peay. That is a wide-ranging question, sir. Let me
try to hit about five or six pieces of it.
When you made your visit, I would agree that there was a
tenor at that time that the terrorist focus was on U.S.
military. But I think you have seen in the last 10 days,
radicals such as bin Ladin among other terrorists, very openly,
on purpose, expanded their rhetoric to include civilians. So
today--over there--you will find the embassy, our contractors
and many more Americans, as you know, there are 40,000
Americans alone in Saudi Arabia, you will find they are at a
high level of vigilance. They understand the threat.
I have talked to a lot of senior contractor presidents,
major corporations in the last week; this rhetoric and concern
has spread to a large degree. So it is not now just focused on
the military.
I think one of the reasons for that is we have done a
better job in the last, oh, 120 days of deterring a threat by
hardening of our positions, relocation and so forth. We made
this harder for him. Not that we are not still vulnerable in
certain places. So the terrorist now spread his rhetoric to
include other people.
Let me jump back to the first part of your question.
Certainly you are right that about 50 percent of that
population today is under 17 years of age and it is exploding.
I still, though, don't see it as an Iranian model. It is far
more tribal. ------.
Finally, I have spent a lot of time looking at this
changing Iranian-Iraqi threat in great detail, especially over
the past months, and you may want to get into that in
additional questions. It is very clear to me we have no choice.
------.
IRAQI THREAT
Mr. Murtha. Are you saying there is a legitimate threat,
that this wasn't just posturing, these moves by Iraq?
General Peay. ------. He has total, dominant control over
his population. He is 60 years old today. While he has suffered
some chinks in his armor, he has enormous control because of
his threats to the families of his potential opponents. He has
purged the military. So his new military men come up and simply
respond to this ironclad, brutal, irrational actor on the
world's scene.
He is unopposed. He sits there with 3-to-5 divisions just a
few hours to the north of Kuwaits border, and today Kuwait is
still a fledgling military trying to prove itself. So you have
no choice. ------. Let me tie that into one of these
perceptions. Ironically, I think it worked against us ------.
FORWARD PRESENCE
Mr. Murtha. In that part of the world, perception is as
much as reality. What I worry about is the fact if they
perceive the Saudi kingdom being a tool of America, and if they
find a focus like Iran did of Khomeini, a charismatic leader,
you still say that it is more important, even though their
focus of discontent--it is still important for deterrence
reasons, even though we have learned more from terrorism since
Beirut than we have in the war, you still believe it is
important we have those 12,000 people stationed there?
General Peay. Absolutely. Let me tell you where they are.
On most days, most of them are at sea, in what a lot of people
would describe as Over the Horizon. ------. We have been
talking at CENTCOM the last couple of weeks if we can also try
to use an information operations program to tell the story
differently to offset that threat that you have so
appropriately described, and we will try to do that better. But
this is sophisticated information as you try to tell it. ----
--.
Mr. Murtha. I am glad that we made the move we did. I think
it was exactly right and I know it is going to be an expensive
move. But I think we were too visible where we were, with the
flights taking off and landing right there at the airport, and
too many people in town, probably. So those are all in the
right direction.
I am glad you are watching it so closely, because in that
area of the world, it is so volatile and so difficult to
predict what is going to happen, that it is essential we be
concerned about that.
General Peay. It is very fragile.
Mr. Young. Mr. Nethercutt.
PERSIAN GULF SECURITY
Mr. Nethercutt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, welcome. I want to follow up a little bit on Mr.
Murtha's comments about the potential volatility of the region
over which you have responsibility. During your testimony, I
was looking at this map focusing on the Strait of Hormuz and
the modernization of the Iranian force. They apparently seem to
be focusing on the Straits and their capability of disrupting
traffic through there.
Do you feel confident that our capability is such that we
can meet any challenge they might present to disrupt the
Straits, and to what extent do you see that issue as a serious
threat? I would be interested in your comments.
General Peay. I think any time you deal with these
cultures, one of the things that you learn is to deal through
strength. They respect strength. ------. This is part of our
effort to satisfy OPTEMPO, budget, other kinds of requirements,
but still be able to very smartly keep the pressure on. ------.
These Straits are very narrow. Across that strait on the map
you are talking about 20 nautical miles. The channel itself is
1 to 2 miles that part where you can put the deep-draft ships
through. ------. On these particular islands today, of course,
they have been in dispute for years with the Emirates, you have
a real mixture of forces. ------. But what you don't want to do
is get in a fight. You want to provide stability, deter
conflict, and stay out of that kind of thing.
One of the challenges we have is smuggling, I was up most
of the night last night working this issue. As we do maritime
intercept operations, our young people are out there enforcing
those UN resolutions, face-to-face with these smugglers. There
is an increasing tempo of violations, with the Iranians
becoming more provocative and more bold as they assert
themselves. You may want to get into the smuggling question
later, but that is a very sophisticated operation we've just
uncovered in the last few weeks in the way it is working.
It is all working in very narrow sealanes. So a chance for
having a problem is there every day, as it was last night.
Is that what you wanted?
Mr. Nethercutt. That is very interesting. It sounds to me
that, number 1, you are vigilant; number 2, we would be able to
react appropriately, depending on what the circumstances are,
and I realize there are a whole range of circumstances. But it
sounds to me like there is a high level of vigilance, as I say,
to all of the circumstances that could occur; is that correct?
General Peay. Yes, sir. Sir, we are just really proud of
what they are doing out there. They are on the edge. What we
have to do is try not to over control. You have to decentralize
your operations. There are going to be mistakes made. These are
professionals, but in the larger sense you have to give them
their head. You don't want to ever get this thing so tightly
controlled that they don't act appropriately with confidence.
Now, there is a danger to that. That is the sophistication
and superiority of our young people. That is why you have to
have high-quality people. Because if they were to overreach --
----. I think the commander made the right decision. You have
to know in the longer run it probably makes that kind of a
culture feel more bold. So he takes you on. ------.
So far, I think we have done it appropriately.
TERRORISM
Mr. Nethercutt. Thank you. In the short time I have left,
as I do have to go to another hearing, let me ask a little more
parochial question, if you don't mind? If you can't answer at
this time, maybe I can discuss it with you or your staff later.
One of my own constituents, a gentleman by the name of
Donald Hutchings, was kidnapped in Kashmir in 1995. You may be
familiar with this. Al Faran was the group that is rumored to
have captured him, perhaps with the support of some larger
terrorist group in Pakistan. I am just wondering to what
extent, you may be privy to any intelligence about this
gentleman's condition?
I know his wife has been very active in that part of the
world, going to Pakistan and India and seek her husband's
release, or at least information on whether he is dead or
alive. I knew Don Hutchings, and I hope he is still alive. I
don't know if you know much, but if you do would you comment?
General Peay. I am not current. I will be glad to get with
my staff and provide you what we have.
Mr. Nethercutt. Thank you so much.
[The information follows:]
In July 1995 four western, civilian hikers were kidnapped by Al
Faran, a Kashmiri Separatist/Terrorist Group that is part of the
Harrikat Ul-Ansar (HUA) movement. The group's goal was the release of
21 Kashmiri separatists who were being held by India. ------. The
hostages were one U.S., one British, one German, and one Norwegian. At
this time, Indian security forces started to search for the hostages
and their kidnappers.
In August 1995, the American hostage escaped. In retaliation, and
to show the government of India that they were serious, the kidnappers
killed the Norwegian hostage. Shortly thereafter, they kidnapped
another American and one more British citizen. They now held one U.S.,
two British, and one German hostage.
In December 1995, Indian security forces closed in on the Al Faran
Headquarters in the disputed zone. Several members were killed, and
others fled to Pakistan. Several Al Faran members who were captured by
both Pakistan and India in the wake of the fight stated that the
hostages were killed by their kidnappers prior to the Indian attack. --
----. During 1996, unconfirmed hostage sightings occurred off and on.
No photographs or substantial proof was provided of these alleged
sightings. Ms. Jane Schelly, who is married to the American hostage
Donald Hutchings, and the wife of one of the British hostages, made
several appeals for information in the Pakistani, Indian, and Kashmiri
media with no success.
In January and February of 1997 the U.S. government offered rewards
for information on the hostages with no results. ------. The status of
the hostages is still unknown. They are still missing, with no
conclusive proof as to whether they are alive or dead.
Mr. Nethercutt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Visclosky?
U.S. POLICY REGARDING KURDISH SITUATION
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you.
General, thank you very much for coming today. What is the
status of the Kurds? What is happening with the Kurds, if I
could ask you?
General Peay. I think we hit a period of the winter season
setting in and you had kind of a breaking of contact since the
last push by Saddam's regular forces from the south to the
north. Today I would say it is a stagnant situation. We watch
it nightly.
I think what you are going to have is a continuing civil
war, back and forth, as good weather come in. ------.
Mr. Visclosky. What is our Nation's policy as far as any
offense that the Iraquis can mount against the Kurds?
General Peay. Well, it was the DESERT STRIKE operation that
just took place, the last one, when we fired a very few number
of weapons. We have demarched them and told them not to attack
the Kurds in the north, and that was our response to that.
Certainly the PROVIDE COMFORT Force in Turkey and some of the
other intelligence agencies that were at those bases provided
some additional leverage on Iraq from the northern perspective.
------.
Mr. Visclosky. What happens with the Kurds? Are they just
stuck there?
General Peay. ------.
AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN CONCERNS
Mr. Visclosky. I did want to ask, what concerns do you have
relative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, from your position?
General Peay. Well, I just got back from Pakistan as well,
with talks with all of the senior people there. ------.
Mr. Visclosky. Breakout militarily, or as far as their
influence?
General Peay. Their influence. And as long as you have the
Afghanistan situation and the civil war it is in, back and
forth and back and forth, all of that is fertile ground for
that kind of instability and growth.
Furthermore, those are very, very good trade routes that
economically have implications for Pakistan and other nations
in that region. So the longer that goes on, the economic piece
of all that remains somewhat frozen.
Mr. Visclosky. Are the Kilo subs that Iran has today having
difficulty as far as their operations, and, if so, what are
those?
General Peay. There are three of them. ------.
Mr. Visclosky. General, thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
KHOBAR TOWERS INCIDENT
Mr. Young. General, toward the end of last year you and I
had an opportunity to visit and talk about a number of
different things. One of the things that I found very
interesting was your perspective on the Khobar Towers, not only
the incident itself, but some of the investigation that was
ongong at the time. I assume it is still ongoing.
Give us your thoughts on that?
General Peay. I will tell you first, we have done an awful
lot since that time to try to combat terrorism. I mentioned
some of that in my statement, from relocations to hardening, to
training, our policies, watching our vehicle traffic,
relocating our dependents, substantial engineer construction,
from permanent billets in one location to temporary in another,
and going to permanent billets in the states. An enormous
amount of work with our coalition friends. You would be very
proud of them. ------. It is difficult for me, sir, in a short
period of time to sum up the real answer to your question,
though, and that is my full view on Khobor Towers.
If you will kind of let me go on this a little bit, I will
try to do it as concisely as I can.
First, you know, I would tell you that I am responsible,
that I am accountable. Despite all the business you have heard
here, if I had been at the Saudi Arabia testimony with
Secretary Perry 5 or 6 months ago, when Secretary Perry said he
is responsible, I would say no, I am the senior military
commander in the region, and I am responsible.
Inherent to that requirement of being the Commander in
Chief is that kind of responsibility.
I would say that from a military perspective, through, the
way that we grow up culturally and the way our young people
grow up culturally in our business, that is a far cry from
being culpable or being negligent or being derelict in our
duties. So as I have tried to look down, I have got 20
countries, hundreds and hundreds of installations, as I have
tried to look at that and the chain of command we have
involved, 3 Stars, 2 Stars, 1 Star, on down the chain, and I
spend hours pouring over this in my own personnel critique of
what happened in Central Command, I can't find that dereliction
of duty, that culpability. The terrorists did the attacking.
Our people didn't do the attacking.
Now, that is a snapshot in time. I tell you, you have to go
to the intelligence. ------ all across the region; 20
countries. So we raised our vigilance and we really started
moving in that time. That is what you have heard, and it didn't
adequately cover it, incidently, the 139 initiatives that this
fellow Brigadier General Schwalier and his team down at Khobar
Towers had undertaken. There were hundreds of initiatives he
had undertaken.
I find it very difficult in a snapshot kind of approach,
looking at the intelligence, ------ or something else first?
Again, it gets back to how you command across a complex
region. I think you have to give the young people their heads.
When they ask for help, you get involved ------. We had
commanders conferences at MacDill Air Force Base. Our
commanders up and down the line knew their responsibilities,
there is no question in my mind about that. And I have talked
to them in critiques after all of this, I didn't find any of
this particular indecision.
At the end of the day, the terrorists did the attacking. We
could have fixed all of these kinds of deficient situations,
but against that particular bomb size, ------. I think you
would have had similar kinds of responses.
Now, there has been a lot of comparison to Beirut. This was
not Beirut. Saudi Arbia is not Beirut. In Beirut you had
Marines ashore, you had Naval gunfire from the waters. At the
time of this particular operation, this was the Gulf. The Gulf
was not the Middle East. We had one bombing in the last 35 to
40 years called OPM-SANG. After OPM-SANG, we started all of
this kind of looking at the world differently in terms of our
force protection activities. There is a real psychological
piece of all this.
I mean, Riyadh and Dhahran are safer than Chicago,
Illinois. So there is a mind-set here. At the same time, our
troops are fighting in a number of other operations, and that
is the thing. You don't want to have our people tied down,
hunkered down. If that is what we are going to do, we might as
well not be there.
We have missions we have to do. That is what their focus
has to stay on while they still protect this close battle kind
of operation.
So as I reviewed what the subordinates were doing, were
there some tactical mistakes made? Certainly a few.
Would it have made that much difference? No.
Was the Downing report lacking in terms of the operational
and strategic, the cultural underpinning and setting of this
thing? I think it was. ------. So you can take up our marbles,
disengage and go home, or stay involved at an operational risk.
When you have operational risk you do the very best you can.
Our commanders, I think, were not culpable, not derelict, in
terms of all of that.
So I am a little bit like the Chief of Staff of the Air
Force, that has tried to bring a number of investigations
together. I somewhat fall on his side as I look at these
subordinate commanders and the work they have done. And I look
at Central Command, because I feel I am responsible, and I
don't find this culpability or dereliction. We are responsible
and we don't move from that.
INTELLIGENCE REPORTS
Mr. Young. One of the things that I asked you about, and as
a Member of the Intelligence Committee, I had an opportunity to
inquire into this as well, you do receive numerous hints that
there may be a terrorist attack. You get intelligence. And from
my understanding, if you had investigated every one of those
suggested intelligence sources about something that might
happen in the region, it would take you forever to do that,
because they are enormous. Do you agree with that?
General Peay. ------. How do we keep the people at the
highest level of vigilance and operate? We read those reports
we all do the very best we can, we take operational risk, we
review the intelligence and take prudent steps to protect our
troops. We don't become careless. We run every one of the
intelligence reports down, as best we can. It is sophisticated
work.
Mr. Young. The fact is, you are overloaded with these
intelligence hits.
General Peay. ------. There is another piece that is
interesting that develops and we as a Nation are going to have
to decide how we respond to terrorism. You can't, in open
session, do what we did several months ago--get out there in
open session and talk about this subject, where the terrorists
and where everyone in that region watch the news. For many of
you who visited there, you know that every leader in the region
watches Cable Network News (CNN), 24 hours a day. So there we
are on national television, trying to talk about sensitive
culture issues, criticizing our partners doing exactly what the
extremists want us to do. ------.
So more precise intelligence is central to solving such
problems. When we put these kinds of pressures or second-guess
our commanders, then what you have is increased intelligence
with, everything being reported up. ------.
Now, that is the danger when we discuss issues too publicly
and we focus so strongly on culpability standards. This could
convince our people not to take any risks and in the long run,
we are going to have almost a Russian-centralized approach to
our business, a centralized approach to duty, which harms, in
the long run, our military's approach to the way we do our duty
so efficiently and correctly than decentralization.
That is the way, sir, I see it as a commander. I have dealt
in this for 35 years now, lots of command time. I have got a
lot of time in that region, and that is my perspective on it.
COOPERATION OF SAUDI GOVERNMENT
Mr. Young. I think you have given us a good handle on how
difficult this job is. And I might say that knowing that the
job is so difficult, that is why you were selected to have this
job, because of the confidence that the leadership had in you.
Let me go on this same subject just for a couple of more
minutes. During the investigation, we were told that the Saudi
Government has not been very helpful and not cooperated. I
don't know if that is true or not. From your perspective, have
they cooperated or have they not cooperated?
This hearing is closed.
General Peay. It is--let me give you my view, and I would
ask that you get Director Freeh's and Mr. Tenet, the Acting CIA
Director's views, and I have talked to them at some length here
these past several weeks. I think the general feeling in this
investigation now has gone along three kind of avenues. ------.
Mr. Young. General, thank you very much. We have an awful
lot to think about, about the responsibilities that you have in
that region.
Mr. Murtha.
ACTION AGAINST IRAN
Mr. Murtha It is interesting what you say because after we
left Saudi Arabia we went to Israel. So I talked to Prime
Minister Netanyahu. Now, here is somebody publicly that is
always for retaliation, armed actions. So I asked him, let's
say we find out there is an Iranian connection, what do you do?
Well, he didn't say take armed retaliation. He said do
three things, or you can do any one of three things. You can
have an embargo. You can take economic or diplomatic measures
and, third, you can take military action. He says, but believe
me, if you take military action, there is going to be a strong
response inside the country and outside the country.
I didn't forget that.
What I remember most is how responsible his response was
and how he took--through his vast experience, and if you read
his book on terrorism, of course, this is pretty well what he
said. So I think that the Saudis--the way we leak over here,
and the Pentagon is about as much of a leaker as you possibly
can be, but I am sure you had that problem in your office like
everybody else, I can see that they don't trust us. I mean, I
can understand.
And then the Senate who was criticizing you voted 98 to
nothing to open up Pennsylvania Avenue, where if you had had a
bomb the same size in Pennsylvania Avenue, it would have blown
the whole side of the White House. They voted 98 to nothing.
Two weeks later they had a hearing over there criticizing
the Saudis for not closing down the street quickly. I know you
couldn't say that to those august diplomats over there, but it
is just kind of irritating when they are so sanctimonious and
hypocritical about what action should be taken after it is
over.
But I realize that if we do find out who does it, it is
going to be very difficult. For instance, the embargo obviously
is not working. I mean, why isn't working? Why do the European
Nations ignore something that--I suggested to the President,
Mr. President, before you extend Bosnia, before you extend our
forces and our money in Bosnia, you ought to say to the
Europeans, look, if you want us to extend in Bosnia, then you
have got to support us in Iran, this embargo against Iran. And,
of course, they ignored us completely.
What is it that--is it just pure money, trade? Is it
unrealistic for us to put an embargo on?
General Peay. Well, I think, sir, it goes all the way back
to basic ethics and values. It is economic. I think some of it
is a personal view, and I think some of it is concern for their
own livelihood, because this terrorism piece is going to reach
right into the underbelly of Europe. ------.
This is a strategic hegemony approach by an activist
country today that has ambitious long-range goals. So I think
the Europeans know that have got to live with that and, as you
know, they have an enormous Iranian and other population in
their countries today.
And terrorism President Isaisas in Eritrea, who spent 18
years in the bush, a very articulate man, a young man, 45, 46
years of age, told me, he said, ``you Americans have it all
wrong.'' He said, ``you can withdraw, you can do all this
hardening, but you are going to go bankrupt. There is not
enough money in the world to prepare against this terrorism.
And so your only alternative, then, is to take--is to take an
active kind of an approach in terms of some kind of
counteraction.''
The trouble is, as you suggest, and you are exactly right,
when you take that counteraction, you better be prepared. And
so that is why you better be sure that the story is right, and
you have got to then, in my view, sir, take time out--you don't
have to hurry--go build a coalition, share all the information,
build a coalition, bring the international family together and
then you better be prepared for the long tough fight against a
country that I don't think many people in America even begin to
understand.
CIVILIANS AS TERRORIST TARGETS
Mr. Murtha. Well, the diplomats in Saudi Arabia were scared
to death. The Ambassador was not there at the time. But they
were afraid that the civilians in Saudi Arabia would be the
targets, the American civilians would be the targets.
General Peay. But you are seeing that, as I mentioned,
now--you are exactly right. That was the feeling, and now you
have seen what has happened in the last 10 days. So I guess my
view is that was going to happen anyway. ------.
Mr. Murtha. One thing you have to keep in mind, there is
only one thing worse than keeping our troops there, and that is
being forced out by terrorism, because that sends a signal. It
took us 20 years to get over Vietnam.
Now, I think Vietnam--our effort in Vietnam was a
courageous effort where we were trying to help people who were
being invaded. I have a different view than most people. But
having said that, we lost tremendous prestige when we were
forced out of Vietnam, and people didn't forget that for 20
years, whatever examples you want to use. But the Saudi war put
that to rest.
I remember President Bush really working. People forget how
hard it was for him to put a coalition together. I mean, he was
on the phone personally. He did an absolutely magnificent job
of putting a coalition together to fight a war when people
weren't sure we were going to stay there. And you remember how
difficult it was to get into Saudi and they wanted us out the
minute it was over.
So I just worry that--well, you are on top of it and I know
how important the area is, and I just hope that you are right,
that our presence will not trigger the very thing that we are
worried about and that is increased terrorism and then forcing
us to withdraw the troops.
General Peay. ------.
Mr. Young. Mr. Visclosky.
Mr. Visclosky. I am fine, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very
much.
Mr. Young. General, thanks very much for being with us this
afternoon. We really appreciate your thought-provoking
presentation.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Murtha. Certainly.
READINESS CONCERNS
Mr. Murtha. Are you losing any readiness because of the
money being spent in Bosnia? For instance, is your command
losing any readiness because of money that is not available to
you because it is available someplace else? Or are you the same
priority as Bosnia?
General Peay. Ours is such small numbers and I don't see
that--the CONUS base provides me those forces. These forces
that have come over now in exercises or have come over in this
near continuous presence mode, I think, are basically well-
trained.
What I do see, sir, is units that have had to take
soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines from other organizations to
fill up their holes before they deployed so there is a
turbulence piece to all of that.
Mr. Murtha. Tempo of operations?
General Peay. I see less noncommissioned officers at senior
grades than what you normally would have in these forces. But
the equipment is there. They are well-trained. They are well-
motivated. I don't hear any complaining. There is an increased
OPTEMPO, no question about that, but for these service members
that are in the Gulf, I find them motivated. They know why they
are there and I think they are doing a good job.
Mr. Murtha. Thank you.
Mr. Young. General, again, thank you very much for being
with us this afternoon. We have quite a few other questions
that are more budget-related than some of the ones you were
asked today. But you did give us some very, very important
insights into the region and some of the problems there.
The Committee will be adjourned until 10:00 a.m. tomorrow.
Tomorrow's hearing will be in Room 2212 of the Rayburn
Building. It will be an open hearing on the fiscal year 1998
budget for the Navy and Marine Corps. Witnesses will be the
Secretary of the Navy, the CNO and the Commandant of the Marine
Corps.
Also tomorrow afternoon, there will be an open hearing here
in H-140 at 1:30 p.m. on Navy and Marine Corps acquisition
programs.
If there is nothing further, the Committee is adjourned
until 10:00 a.m. tomorrow.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the
answers thereto follow:]
Priorities and Deficiencies
Question. Do you feel the interests and needs of the Central
command have been adequately addressed in the fiscal year 1998 budget
request?
Answer. In general, the Fiscal Year 1998 budget, as well as the
Future Year Defense Program (FYDP) supports Central Command's
Integrated Priority List (IPL). The Department of Defense and the
Services continue to support our top priorities. However, as
modernization and sustainment acquisitions are delayed, risk to our
forces and mission accomplishment clearly increases.
Question. What is your assessment of the major shortfalls in:
Personnel, training, equipment, and maintenance for those units under
your day-to-day command as well as those that would be assigned to you
in a wartime situation?
Answer. We have few personnel permanently assigned to CENTCOM on a
day to day basis. The services provide forces required to conduct our
operations in an operational or tactical control status in the Central
Region. The quality of personnel that all the services provide remains
high. We have challenges nonetheless; examples of which follow. Due to
some ------ there are limited opportunities for forces supporting ----
-- to conduct all required proficiency training. For example ------.
Units deployed ------ lose their world wide deployment qualifications
due to these training limitations and must redeploy to maintain those
qualifications. As the services reduce end strength, we are seeing more
and more junior officers and noncommissioned officers in more senior
leadership positions, all indicative of the fallout form post-cold war
military restricting. These leaders are doing an excellent job, but
they are not as experienced as before. There are also clear cases where
units, short personnel, have borrowed manpower from sister units to
sustain their deployment.
Question. What are the top ten priority items on your most recent
integrated priority list?
Answer. Central Command's major needs and top priorities, as
identified on our Integrated Priority List, are: ------. The placing of
an Army heavy division ashore in the region increases deterrence,
reduces risk from the near-term threat of Iraq as well as the long-term
threat from Iran, ensures regional access, and brings more Gulf
Cooperative Council (GCC) states into the collective defense. The
deployment of an effective theater missile defensive system will
require a multi-layer approach. Such a system will ensure an effective
flow of information among intelligence assets, decision making
facilities, warning systems, and attack means. In addition, fielding of
a theater missile defense will greatly increase regional stability and
reduce risk in the theater.
Question. In your view, are present levels of investment funding
contained in the department's five year plan sufficient to address the
long term recapitalization requirement of today's forces?
Answer. As the Commander in Chief I do not have full visibility on
the full list of challenges facing the Service Chiefs. Almost all of my
theater requirements are being addresses. It is crucial, however, that
funding of new systems and programs remain on schedule. Any reduction
in procurement, investment, or delays in carrying out programs
increases risk to our service men and women, as well as mission
accomplishment in the long term.
Saudi Arabia
Question. According to the media, the Attorney General and the
Director of the FBI have complained that the Saudi's are not being
cooperative with U.S. authorities in the investigation. Are these
reports accurate? If so, what is the nature and reason for the lack of
cooperation?
Answer. Since we at Central Command (CENTCOM) have not been
directly involved in conducting or overseeing this investigation, I am
unable to provide a complete and accurate assessment of Saudi
cooperation with the U.S. authorities. Consequently, I want to defer to
those officials at the FBI who are running the investigation and are in
a much better position to comment on Saudi cooperation.
Question. Specifically, what adjustments have you made to enhance
the physical security of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia in the wake of the
Khobar bombing? What has the cost been for these security enhancements?
Answer. Since the bombing at Khobar Towers in June 1996 hundreds of
force protection enhancements have been taken throughout the region.
They fall under five major areas: one, ------. We have also formed a
Joint Rear Area Coordinator (JRAC) Directorate in Headquarters, U.S.
Central Command, conducted numerous inspections, and Commanders Calls.
The dollar cost of these enhancements is significant for both the
United States and regional states and will continue to be high.
Question. What is your assessment of the stability of the Saudi
regime?
Answer. The ruling Al-Saud family is presently united in following
established lines of succession. Crown Prince Abdallah, who was named
Regent in January 1996, has the full support of family members. ------.
The near term stability of the regime will be unchanged under current
economic and political trends. ------. The petroleum sector contributes
roughly 75 percent of their annual budget revenues, 35 percent of their
GDP, and nearly 100 percent of export earnings. ------. Reduced oil
revenues from previously weak oil prices and deficit government
spending have resulted in deferred payments from the Saudi Arabian
Government to its suppliers and contractors creating inflationary
pressures within the country. What's more, reduced oil revenues impacts
strongly on the Saudi Arabian government's ability to fund its very
attractive social services and low interest loans to its citizens. This
in turn generates internal tensions and encourages some to be
frustrated with high Saudi Arabian military expenditures and support
for United States policy in the Gulf. ------.
Potential Retaliation for Khobar Bombing
Question. If a link is made connecting Iran with the Khobar towers
bombing and the U.S. conducted a military response against Iran, the
consensus is that Iran's most likely reaction would be a terrorist
attack. Do you agree with that assessment?
Answer. Yes, because terrorism is one of Iran's means to
asymmetrically project influence beyond the region. Terrorism is
difficult to deter and prevent, and direct ties to Tehran are difficult
to establish. Iran provides ------. Implicit terrorist threats against
the United States, Gulf Cooperation Council states, and other targets,
largely in the Gulf region, are aimed at fracturing our ties and
driving the United States from the region. We believe Tehran has ------
as a means of communicating terrorist threats to the United States.
Although terrorism is the most likely response, Tehran has the
capability to respond conventionally with air, naval, or ballistic
missile attacks. Iran has ------. In addition, Iran retains a sizeable
maritime mine delivery capability. Iran's intent would be to use this
capability to undermine United States security guarantees to the Arab
Gulf states.
Question. How vulnerable are U.S. military and commercial interest
in the Middle East to a terrorist attack?
Answer. While U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) supports the effort,
the regional Chiefs of Mission retain primary responsibility for
assessing the vulnerabilities of U.S. commercial interests and securing
the necessary assistance to respond to threats. U.S. military personnel
and the installations they operate from are clearly less vulnerable to
terrorist attack today based upon the extensive security measures and
sound force protection strategy currently in place. Since the bombing
of the Khobar Towers compound on 25 June 1996, Department of Defense
forces with CENTCOM's Area or Responsibility (AOR) have initiated a
complex, thorough, and extensive security program designed to protect
military personnel, civilian employees, family members, facilities and
equipment, in all locations and situations.
This program will be accomplished through planned and integrated
application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations
security, counterintelligence, and other security programs.
At the same time, U.S. military personnel and facilities are not
invulnerable to attack. Our actions have not eliminated terrorist
groups. We also lack the Human Intelligence (HUMINT) required to
respond more precisely to terrorist threats. The terrorist retains the
advantage of choosing the appropriate action to defend ourselves in the
context of political, diplomatic, fiscal, and military constraints.
Question. Is there a high probability that an Iranian terrorist
response could be anywhere in the world as opposed to in the Middle
East?
Answer. There is a high probability an Iranian terrorist response
could occur anywhere in the world. ------ as well as various trans-
national groups. Some of these entities have conducted terrorist
attacks against U.S. interests both in the Middle East and in Western
Europe. Additionally, there is evidence various ------ which would
provide Iran additional avenues from which to conduct attacks against
United States citizens or interests.
Counter-Terrorism
Question. In the fiscal year 1997 Consolidated Omnibus
Appropriations Act, the Congress provided over $231 million for anti-
terrorism, counter-terrorism and security enhancement programs in the
Department of Defense. In addition, the Congress provided Supplemental
fiscal year 1996 funding for force protection totaling $122.6 million.
General Peay, in your view, are DoD force protection, counter-terrorism
and anti-terrorism activities adequately funded in fiscal year 1997?
Answer. Funding for force protection initiatives in the Central
Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR) is adequate for fiscal
year 1997. We have a number of initiatives underway and they are
funded. In some cases, there are projects that we would like to do
sooner or items we would like to purchase now, but they are not ready
yet, either because they are still under development or they cannot be
started before other projects have been completed. In some cases, the
technologies are still being refined or production schedules are fixed.
Examples of these types of ------.
Our force protection, anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism
initiatives are based on a terrorist threat dynamic that is changing
daily; and it is the threat that will drive our force protection
program. With this in mind, changes in the threat will effect future
costs. Finally, the defense is never finished. This will add to ``out
year'' costs.
Question. Describe for the Committee the activities and programs
that have been funded in fiscal year 1997?
Answer. We have been a number of force protection related
activities and programs that have been funded in fiscal year 1997. Our
major program has been and continues to be the relocation of personnel
to more secure locations within our Area of Responsibility (AOR) as a
part of Operation DESERT FOCUS. As of March of this year we have spent
$24 million on transportation of personnel and equipment; $4.8 million
on erecting temporary facilities; and $33 million on force protection
items such as fences, barriers, sensors, and lighting.
In addition to this, the government of Saudi Arabia has paid for
force protection initiatives at the two Security Assistance Offices in
Saudi Arabia, the U.S. Military Training Mission in the amount of $10.2
million and Office of the Program Manager--Saudi Arabian National Guard
in the amount of $11.2 million.
Question. General, the committee notes that the fiscal year 1998
budget request does not continue with accelerated funding of these
activities. Have adequate funds been provided in fiscal year 1998 for
force protection, counter-terrorism, and anti-terrorism?
Answer. The funding for U.S. Central Command's Force Protection
initiatives have been included in the fiscal year 1998 budget
submission. What is important to understand is that these initiatives
are based on a snap shot of the threat at this time, or at the time the
budget was formulated. As the terrorist threat evolves and his
capabilities change, we will be forced to change to the new threat.
This could cause new force protection initiatives with new resource
requirements.
Question. Does the apparent reduction in funding in fiscal year
1998 indicate that DoD has done all that it can in these programs?
Answer. U.S. Central Command's force protection efforts target
short and mid-term solutions for protecting and securing Department of
Defense personnel and their families in our Area of Responsibility. Our
requirements provide an equal level of protection for both combatant
and non-combatant units. The programs that we've asked the Department
of Defense to fund in fiscal year 1998 have been requested in the
department's budget submission.
Iraq
Question. What is the outlook for Saddam Hussein remaining in
power? How seriously have purges affected the morale and
professionalism of the Iraqi Officer corps?
Answer. Saddam Hussein's overall hold on power has ------ despite
continuing and unpredictable threats to the security of his regime. He
will likely remain in power through 1997. Hussein inflicted a serious
of crushing blows to the Iraqi opposition during the summer of 1996:
The Iraqi Sunni Muslim opposition groups, already weak and divisive,
were decimated by security sweeps in June and July 1996; mass arrests
eliminated a significant base of in-country opposition. Until the Irbil
crisis in August and September 1996, Kurdish groups had been the
strongest and most visible challenge to the regime. Saddam's actions in
northern Iraq divided the Kurds, weakened the faction that posed the
strongest opposition to Saddam, and denied the use of northern Iraq to
Sunni groups.
Although security threats from ------. Saddam relies on his
internal security forces to maintain his hold on power and they will
continue to play a critical role in the future. Saddam's ruthlessness
and brutality has effectively crippled his opponents and represses the
general population.
The effect of purges on the morale and professionalism of Iraq's
officer corps remains difficult to ascertain. Purges in Iraq do not
appear to be the wholesale bloodlettings seen in the Stalinst purges.
Rather, Saddam acts in accordance with specific events, such as the
Kamel defection or the Dulaymi uprising, and targets the appropriate
group; for example the tribe, family, or branch of military service.
However, there are ------. Besides the obvious loss of key senior
operational leaders, the most significant aspect of such ------. This
climate of fear detracts from effective military planning and
operations.
Question. What is the impact of the oil for food and medicine
agreement (UN Resolution 986) on the economic situation in Iraq? What
percentage of the proceeds from the allowed Iraqi oil sale are being
paid as war retribution? To what extent is smuggling taking place to
circumvent the UN blockade?
Answer. Food and medicine distribution allowed under UN Security
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 986 has been significantly delayed. These
supplies are only now arriving in Iraq, and they have had little impact
on the internal situation there. Iraq's international market is
rallying in anticipation of a strong recovery. ------. This activity
will test the limits of the UNSCR 661 sanctions committee.
UNSCR 986 may not provide the relief expected by most Iraqis. The
populace faces a lack of money, not food. The vagueness of the language
in 986 may allow Iraq to stop its own contributions of food and replace
it with 986 food, allowing the government to save money or hoard food
for distribution to Saddam's loyalists.
Proceeds from the sale of oil under UNSCR 986 are being allocated
as follows: 30 percent for the Kuwaiti war compensation fund, 45
percent for humanitarian aid to non-Kurds, 15 percent to Kurds, 10
percent to pay for UN operations related to Iraq.
In regards to smuggling operations, with the exception of UNSCR 986
authorized deliveries, the vast majority of maritime shipping to and
from Iraq probably smuggles embargoed goods. ------. To a lesser
extent, goods are also smuggled overland via Jordan and Turkey. Jordan
remains the overland conduit of choice for sanctions violators. Jordan
is Iraq's main source of financial, banking, and transportation
services, and many of its officials involved in monitoring trade with
Iraq remain susceptible to bribery. Jordan has taken steps to improve
enforcement, but industrial goods, computers, electronics, and probably
military spare parts and other military related items continue to be
financed and shipped through Jordan on a routine basis.
Question. What is Iraq's current policy toward UN weapons
inspectors?
Answer. Request for compliance from the United Nations Special
Commission and International Atomic Energy Agency are frequently met
with reluctance, denial, or outright obstruction. Iraqi compliance
usually comes only when Baghdad is faced with undeniable proof it is
misleading inspectors or is threatened with an overwhelming response
from Security Council members. The value Baghdad places on weapons of
mass destruction is best reflected in its willingness to sacrifice
billions in annual oil revenues while it ``waits out'' the inspections
process.
Question. What evidence do you have of any ongoing Iraqi efforts to
develop chemical, biological or nuclear weapons?
Answer. We believe Iraq retains a ------ the United Nations
economic embargo is lifted. Despite ``outward'' cooperation with United
Nations inspectors, Iraq is still ------.
Many scientists and engineers, such as a group formerly associated
with the nuclear weaponization project, continue working together as
cohesive teams. This is apparently to enable ------. We believe Baghdad
has no nuclear weapons, but could indigenously develop such a
capability within five to seven years if they receive significant
foreign assistance and they are not restricted by UN controls. However,
Iraq could develop a nuclear weapon within months if key fissile
materials are purchased outright. Baghdad admitted to producing,
weaponizing, and deploying biological and advanced chemical munitions;
but has not validated its claims that these weapons were unilaterally
destroyed. ------.
Enforcing No Fly Zone Over Iraq
Question. What is the scope and frequency of U.S. flights for
enforcing the no-fly zone over southern Iraq (Enhanced Southern Watch)?
Answer. Operation SOUTHERN WATCH began flight operations on 27
August 1992 to enforce the Iraqi No Fly Zone south of 32 degrees North
Latitude. This was amended to 33 degrees North by United Nations
demarche in September 1996.
A typical Air Order of Battle, including both fixed and rotary wing
aircraft, is ------ aircraft. This number ------.
Question. What countries other than the U.S. are participating in
enforcing the no-fly zone?
Answer. Two countries other than the United States provide aircraft
and crews to Operation Southern Watch. The British provide ------.
Question. Is it necessary to continue to conduct these no-fly zone
operations at the current pace? Do you believe that scaling back on the
frequency of the flights would tempt Saddam Hussein to exploit the
situation?
Answer. Yes. Without a doubt, if we cut back the frequency of our
flights, Saddam would respond by increasing his activities. Scaling
back on the frequency of flights would eventually be perceived as a
softening of the no-fly and no-drive zone patrols. While some no-fly
zone violations may be ------ eventually, they would become more
frequent and the violations would become deeper. This could invite an
incident. Deterrence is maintained by the current frequency of flight
operations. In the past year we have utilized surge periods to change-
up the frequency, reduced flying at times, and increase security.
What's more, maintaining Operation Southern Watch enhances regional
stability by denying Saddam the ability to mount a no-notice massive
assault on Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Our nation's support for the
mission reassures all our Gulf partners. This in turn offers numerous
direct and indirect benefits to America diplomatically and
economically.
Question. After the Khobar bombing, the U.S. Air Force flight
operations for enforcing the no-fly zone in southern Iraq were moved to
other bases in Saudi Arabia. What is the impact of this change on the
no-flight operations? What is the flight distance from these bases to
the no-fly zone compared to when the operation was based in Dhahran?
What are the living conditions at the bases being used now? What is the
impact of this location change on the morale of the U.S. forces?
Answer. Following the June 1996 bombing, both U.S. and coalition
aircraft operating from Dhahran Air Base and Riyadh Military airfield
relocated to Prince Sultan Air Base (PSAB). This move has had no impact
on the No Fly Zone operation. The number of sorties flown during the
move was never decreased. Flying from Riyadh to the No Fly Zone is 270
nautical miles, from Dhahran is 260 nautical miles, and from PSAB is
320 nautical miles.
At Riyadh and Dhahran, personnel were living in apartment/villa
style accommodations. At Prince Sultan Air Base all facilities, to
include showers, toilets, and living quarters are contained in Harvest
Falcon sets, which are air conditioned tents. In the future, they will
be housed in more permanent facilities currently under construction by
the Saudi Arabians. The morale of the personnel is good.
Question. Costs have grown for Enhanced Southern Watch by over $200
million in FY 1997 compared to FY 1996. In part, this increase is
justified because of an increase in the zone to be patrolled. The zone
has been extended from the 32nd to the 33rd parallel. General Peay,
what measures are you taking that have increased the cost of this
mission? Has the threat posed by Iraq changed in a way that requires an
increased allocations of resources?
Answer. The threat from Iraq remains. The blatant refusal of Iraq
to comply with United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) and
their determination to maintain and build military forces requires that
Coalition forces remain vigilant and prepared to execute operations on
short notice. Saddam continues to threaten his neighbors in the region;
be it ground force movements towards Kuwait, oppression of Kurds in the
north as in Desert Strike, or his continued pursuit of Weapons of Mass
Destruction.
While the threat from Iraq remains unchanged, the threat to our
land-based, deployed forces posed by terrorist organizations has
resulted in new resource requirements. In addition to ------.
The U.S. paid $144 million for Phase I relocations; the Saudi
Arabian government will spend $300 million towards Phase II relocation
costs which are more permanent in nature (includes our security
assistance organizations in Saudi Arabia.)
Question. The Committee understands that the Department will change
the way it characterizes Operation Enhanced Southern Watch. This
Operation will no longer be considered a contingency, and will stead be
considered a recurring part of DoD operations. Does this change in
policy signal a change in the DoD commitment to this area? Do you
expect that the level of DoD resources will change as a result of the
change in Policy?
Answer. Your information on Operation Southern Watch being declared
as something other than a contingency operation is incorrect. Any
change to funding of operations by DoD in Central Command's (CENTCOM)
Area of Responsibility (AOR) will not change our regional strategy
towards Saddam Hussein and his regime in Iraq. We remain committed to
deterring aggressive moves by the current Iraqi regime against our
coalition partners in the region. We also remain committed to ensuring
that Saddam Hussein complies with all applicable UN Security Council
Resolutions (UNSCR) directed towards his government.
We do not anticipate any change in the level of resources available
to us to carry out Southern Watch unless there is a change in policy or
change in mission. The current combination of airpower capabilities
present in Joint Task Force--Southwest Asia (JTF-SWA), a deployed
carrier battle group, an Army battalion task force in Kuwait that is
paid for by the Kuwaiti government, and the ability to augment this
power on short notice with an Air Expeditionary Force serve as a
visible deterrent to any Iraqi aggression. We continue to evaluate our
strategy and threat. In the near term it is important to evaluate our
strategy and threat. In the near term it is important that the visible
deterrent value of Operation Southern Watch remain at its current
level.
Question. Is the cost for this operation fully funded in the fiscal
year 1998 budget submission?
Answer. The cost of enforcing the No Fly Zone, known as Operation
Southern Watch, is fully budgeted in the Fiscal Year 1998 budget given
the best planning figures available at the time the budget was
formulated. Any increased response to provocation's by Iraq, such as we
saw in August and September 1996 during Operation Desert Strike, could
cause a funding shortfall. In addition, any reduction in Host Nation
Support would cause a funding deficit as well.
Air Expeditionary Forces
Question. The fiscal year 1997 Supplemental request includes $59.6
million to deploy Air Force Air Expeditionary Forces (AEFs). The AEFs
are complete strike packages (``mini'' wings) maintained in the U.S.
for the purpose of rapid deployment. The Air Expeditionary Forces are
being deployed to enhance U.S. capabilities in the region, and to ----
-- of the AOR. General Peay, what events in the region warrant
deployment of the Air Expeditionary Forces (AEFs)?
Answer. The deployment of Air Expeditionary Forces (AEF) is our
primary tool to quickly respond to increased tensions and to ------. It
is a key part of U.S. Central Command's ``near continuous presence'' in
the region, as defined in the command's Five Pillar Theater Strategy.
With the Global Naval Force Presence Policy in effect for Fiscal Year
1997, there will be severe ------ at a time. The presence of an
aircraft carrier is a necessary and visible deterrent. The presence of
an AEF is needed ------ in theater. In addition, restrictions by Saudi
Arabia and other countries in the region on ------.
In addition, Saudi Arabia will not allow land-based aircraft to
cross its borders to support Maritime Interception Operations (MIO) and
required Propositioned ship protection. Without a carrier air wing on
station, the Air Expeditionary Force becomes the primary support for
these ongoing operations.
Question. Do you anticipate gaps in carrier coverage that will
require additional Air Force capabilities?
Answer. The ------. Historically, this particular time of year has
been active for Iraqi operations in Southwest Asia (Desert Shield/
Storm--August 1990; Operation Southern Watch--August/September 1992;
Vigilant Warrior--September/October 1994; Vigilant Sentinel--August/
September 1995; Desert Strike--September 1996). Additionally, there are
demands on the carrier battle groups outside of Central Command's
(CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR) that could result in unforeseen
carrier gaps. In the last fiscal year, CENTCOM has experienced
unscheduled gaps for carriers that have had to depart early to support
contingency operations in the ------.
Question. Will deployment of the AEFs result in an increase in the
number of sorties generated to patrol the no-fly zone?
Answer. The deployment of an Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) does not
necessarily result in an increase in the number of sorties flown.
Operation Southern Watch's mission is to ------. The actual number of
sorties flown ------. With the deployment of an AEF we have the
capability to provide a high number of sustained sorties, or surge, if
the operational situation requires. It is this potential to increase
sorties in defense of our national interests that contributes to
regional stability and provides deterrence.
Question. Why does the U.S. require the capability to increase the
number of sorties that it can generate?
Answer. Deterrence and security. We know from experience that our
adversaries in the region, Iran and Iraq, are deterred by visible
demonstrations of U.S. strength and resolve. Credible deterrence hinges
on retaining viable military capabilities to respond to aggression.
With this in mind, U.S. Central Command employs a theater strategy that
emphasizes the ``near continuous'' presence of relatively small
packages of lethal, joint forces, reinforced by our nation's power
projection capabilities. If these forces do not deter aggression, they
are postured to ------. During contingencies such as Vigilant Warrior,
Vigilant Sentinel, and Desert Strike; the ability to provide a
formidable air force capability deterred further aggression. Should
deterrence fail, the ability to provide surge sorties is part of the
Operation Southern Watch mission to provide ------. Maintaining the
current package of air forces, complemented by Army, Navy, Marine, and
Special Operations Forces is an economical method for securing our
vital interests in the region.
Iran
Question. Describe to the Committee the level of Iran's effort to
develop weapons of mass destruction--chemical, biological and nuclear?
Answer. Iran is aggressively pursuing a nuclear weapons capability,
has one of the largest chemical weapons programs in the Third World,
and is developing biological weapons. ------.
Question. What is Iran's level of state support for terrorism?
Answer. Iran continues to be the leading state sponsor of
international terrorist organizations and continues to use terrorism,
including assassinations of dissidents, as a foreign policy tool. Iran
and Iranian-backed groups have established a significant trans-national
terrorist capability. Iran provides ------. Some of these entities have
conducted terrorist attacks against U.S. interests, both in the Middle
East and Western Europe. Successful operations by these groups have
included bombings, aircraft hijackings, and kidnappings.
Question. What action is Iran taking to foster instability in the
region?
Answer. Iran has been attempting to project its influence through a
number of unconventional or asymmetrical methods, several of which have
fostered instability in neighboring countries and the region as a
whole. These methods have included ------. Iran has also amassed the
largest regional navy, capable of laying maritime mines and threatening
the sea lanes in the Gulf. Taken together, terrorism, ballistic
missiles, weapons of mass destruction, and naval forces, provide Iran
an effective mechanism for intimidating neighbors and challenging U.S.
vital interests.
Question. What is the position of our Allies regarding the U.S.
attempt to impose trade sanctions against Iran?
Answer. Neither the European Union nor, as far as we know, any
memberstate has any sanctions in place against Iran. This is also true
for our allies around the globe. The European Union has elected to
continue a ``critical dialogue'' with Iran. Senior officials in allied
governments have described the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act as
``counter-productive''. Many allies do not prohibit trade with Iran
but, instead, enact regulations or restrict trade based on applicable
United National Security Council Resolutions or because of membership
in trade control regimes such as the Australia Group, Missile
Technology Control Regime, Wassenaar Agreement, and the Nuclear
Suppliers Group. The lack of international support for U.S. policy
clearly weakens our efforts and encourages Iranian hard-liners.
Kuwait
Question. To what extent have the Kuwaiti forces upgraded since the
end of the Gulf War?
Answer. The government of Kuwait has upgraded its military hardware
significantly since the end of the Gulf War. Kuwait has invested
heavily in the procurement and modernization of its Army, Air Force and
Navy.
Specifically, they have spent $7.8 billion on U.S. military
systems. These major acquisitions include: 318 M1A2 Abrams Main Battle
Tanks, 40 F/A-18 Hornets, and 5 batteries of Patriot Air Defense
missile systems. The Kuwaiti military uses these systems in their
exercises with us. During the Intrinsic Action and Eager Mace rotations
the Kuwaitis exercise alongside U.S. Army and Marine units. The
Kuwaitis have also purchased foreign systems. These include: the
Warrior Infantry Fighting Vehicle from Britain, the Smerch Multiple
Rocket Launcher and BMP-3 Infantry Fighting Vehicle from Russia, and
Fast Patrol Boats from France.
Question. What is the size, readiness and quality of the Kuwaiti
forces?
Answer. Kuwaiti Armed Forces are currently number approximately
23,000 personnel. Their land forces are organized around 4 brigades, 3
armored and 1 mechanized, for a total of 9,500 personnel. While
currently ------ they are improving. The Kuwaiti Air Force, their most
capable service, has 40 F/A-18 Hornets as their primary combat
aircraft, ------. They have the best pilots in the Gulf Cooperative
Counsel (GCC), but are not as food as U.S. aviators. Kuwaiti Naval
Forces are limited to small coastal operation, using patrol craft
purchased from France. They are ------. Their primary mission is, along
with the Kuwaiti Coast Guard, fighting smuggling and illegal
immigration. In summary, Kuwait has spent significant amounts of money
in modern military equipment, but their ------.
Question. How extensive is the U.S. involved in training and
conducting exercises with the Kuwaiti Forces?
Answer. The U.S. Central Command's (CENTCOM) exercise program with
Kuwait is the bulwark of our Joint/Combined Exercise Program;
accounting for approximately 11 percent of the exercises conducted in
our Area of Responsibility (AOR). This program has undergone frequent
and significant changes as it provided the basis for operational
responses during OPERATIONS VIGILANT WARRIOR, VIGILANT SENTINEL, and
DESERT STRIKE.
The objectives of the CENTCOM exercise program are: to deter
potential adversaries by maintaining forward presence and demonstrating
U.S. strategic mobility; to demonstrate mutual commitment to regional
security; to maintain access to Kuwait and the central region; to
assist the Kuwaiti Armed Forces to achieve a self-defense capability;
to enhance military-to-military relationships, refine complementary
warfighting capabilities, and exercise combined command, control, and
communications interoperability. Accomplishing these objectives will
provide U.S. and Kuwaiti forces the opportunity to refine national
defense and contingency plans as well as sustaining the capability for
coalition warfare.
The specific elements of our present exercise program with Kuwait
include: ground, special operations, naval, and air pieces. An armored
task force rotates three times each year into Kuwait for a 120 day
exercise. These exercises are the cornerstone of our efforts to provide
near continuous ground force presence in Kuwait and are paid for by the
Kuwaiti government. Three 90-day Special Operations Force exercises are
conducted each year in Kuwait. In these exercises, Coalition Support
Teams exercise with the Kuwait Armed Forces to improve their defense
capabilities and provide a close air support capability. A Joint/
Combined Naval Amphibious Force field training exercise designed to
integrate the Kuwait Armed Forces with U.S. Naval Amphibious Unit
capabilities in combined arms operations is conducted annually. U.S.
Naval forces in the region conduct a Combined Naval Surface exercise in
the waters of Kuwait annually. This exercise develops the proficiency
of the Kuwaiti Naval Force while also improving interoperability
between our two countries. Additionally a Combined Air exercise between
shore-based U.S. Naval aircraft and the Kuwaiti Air Force is conducted
annually which develops pilots of both air forces while improving our
interoperability with Coalition Air Forces.
Kuwait remains committed to a diverse joint and combined exercise
program. Continuation of this relationship with Kuwait is central to
strengthening U.S.-Kuwait military connectivity and to improving our
regional command and control capabilities.
Bahrain
Question. The U.S. Navy has been based at Bahrain since the late
1940's, and that country provides a key location for U.S. military
presence in the Persian Gulf. What has been the level of political
discord and strife in Bahrain in the past year?
Answer. ------.
Question. What is the nature of any threat to the incumbent
government? What is the position of the government's opponents
regarding the presence of U.S. naval assets in Bahrain?
Answer. The primary threat to the government of Bahrain is the ----
--.
Iran is the main external threat. Iran asserts a claim to Bahrain
based on the Persian origins of Bahrain's majority Shia community. The
Bahraini government has implicated Iran in fomenting the unrest in
Bahrain. Bahrain's security forces have been successful in containing
the violence and maintaining the security of the government. The
Bahraini government is working through the newly appointed consultative
council, and other cooperative elements of society, to overcome
economic and social issues at the root of the unrest. To date, the U.S.
naval presence has not been an issue with the Shia opposition. Civil
unrest has been present on the island since the charity marathon race
demonstration on 25 November 1994. No violence has been purposely
directed towards U.S. interests or personnel. Opposition groups target
third country nationals (Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Sri Lankan), who they
believe are taking jobs from Shia Bahrainis. Violence against U.S.
citizens has been rare and unintentional. Although some graffiti
referring to America has been seen, opposition speeches have not
carried an anti-American theme.
Continued efforts by naval commanders to foster good relations in
local communities has been successful thus far.
Question. How reliant are we on Bahrain for meeting our national
security objectives in the Persian Gulf region?
Answer. We have a long-standing cooperative military-to-military
relationship with Bahrain. Bahrain provides a home for U.S. Navy
Central Command (NAVCENT), our only component command permanently
located in this critical region, and has supported our regional
initiatives. In addition, Bahrain has been supportive in allowing us to
position an Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) in Bahrain and ------. This
continued support is very important to meeting our national security
objectives in the region.
Theater Missile Defense
Question. How high of a priority is the Theater Missile Defense
program from your perspective?
Answer. The development, production, and fielding of a Theater
Missile Defense (TMD) is one of our highest priorities in Central
Command (CENTCOM). In fact, it is my ------.
Any TMD program should consist of a multi-layered defensive system
tied together with an effective Command, Control, Communications,
Computer, and Intelligence (C4I) architecture. In this way, it should
have the capability to handle lower and upper tier requirements on land
and at sea; as well as have the mobility necessary to cover fast moving
Army and Marine ground forces.
Question. Your prepared statement reads in part, ``We need to field
a highly mobile missile defense to be positioned well forward to
protect dispersed, rapidly moving Army and Marine ground forces. This
system must also be able to defend against cruise and short range
tactical ballistic missiles. To tie these various systems together, we
need to improve our theater missile defense (TMD) fused awareness.''
How much of a technological challenge is it to tie together these
various systems? Provide for the record the time frame required to
provide ``fused awareness'' for Theater Missile Defense assuming an
optimal funding profile.
Answer. Linking these various systems together presents significant
challenges. The Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization
(JTAMDO) and the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) are
currently conducting the Joint Composite Tracking Network Study to
develop executable timelines for this task. Until this study is
completed, I am unable to provide a firm date for when ``fused
awareness'' will be available to commanders; however, we believe it
will be prior to the year 2010.
Question. Do you think that the FY 1998 budget for the Theater
Missile Defense program is adequate?
Answer. The Department of Defense's Fiscal Year 1998 budget request
would allocate $1.285 billion to specifically develop Theater Missile
Defense (TMD) weapon systems, and roughly another $500 million under
the Joint Theater Missile Defense program element to ensure that this
``family of systems'' approach is fully interoperable. The Department
is also requesting roughly $390 million in procurement funds for TMD
systems in Fiscal Year 1998.
I believe the Department of Defense understands our requirements
and has factored them into the equation as they allocate resources,
given other pressing military needs, to ensure that required TMD
systems can be fielded at the earliest possible time. I understand that
both the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) and Navy Area Defense
systems are proceeding as quickly as possible. We must recognize that
extending the time to deliver and field a multi-layered TMD system
increases risk to our forces.
Prepositioned Assets in Middle East
Question. How extensive are the prepositioned assets of the US in
the Middle East region?
Answer. Prepositioning is a vital facet of overseas presence and
demonstrates U.S. commitment to our allies in the Central Command
(CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR). Prepositioning figures
prominently in the strategic mobility equation allowing the U.S. to
respond more quickly to a developing crisis and enhancing our ability
to deter war.
U.S. CENTCOM goal is for a prepositioned Heavy Division, consisting
of three heavy brigade sets and a division base in the AOR. The first
set is located at Camp Doha, Kuwait. We are working with the Kuwaiti
Government for them to construct new prepositioning facilities in
Southern Kuwait. The Army is prepositioning a second brigade set with a
division base in Qatar. In January 1996, the first battalion task force
of this brigade set was fielded. The next set of ------. The facilities
for these sets are being constructed with U.S. Military Construction
funds. The first two phases of this three phase program were approved
by Congress and construction is underway. The final phase is in this
year's Presidential budget submission. Positioning of the third brigade
set is currently being worked through the Joint Requirements Oversight
Committee process with a decision on the mode/location expected this
cycle. CENTCOM has recommended the set be placed afloat in the near
term, and ashore once final locations are negotiated with host
governments.
The Air Force has prepositioned bare base support, vehicles,
medical, fuels support equipment, and munitions ashore in Southwest
Asia. The Harvest Falcon bare base assets in war reserve support 50,600
personnel and 750 aircraft at 14 locations. There are over ------. In
addition to ashore assets, the Air Force has ------.
Critical elements of our prepositioning strategy in the region are
the Marine Corps' Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons 1 and 2 and the
Army Prepositioning Afloat program. Both afloat prepositioned forces
are usually stationed in the Pacific ------.
Question. Have you attained your goals for prepositioning military
equipment in the Middle East? If not, what deficiencies remain?
Answer. Prepositioning remains one of our highest priorities in
Central Command (CENTCOM). Through our prepositioning program, we not
only remain engaged in this critical region, but we show any potential
adversaries that we are committed to regional stability. We continue to
make progress on our prepositioning goals; but we have not yet attained
them.
Two key issues we are currently working to attain our goal of a
Army Heavy Armored Division equipment set ashore are: one, Military
Construction (MILCON) funding to support the third year and final phase
of Army prepositioning facilities in Qatar; and two, a Joint
Requirements Oversight Committee (JROC) decision on the mode and or
location for the Army's eighth prepositioning brigade set. Funding for
the facilities in Qatar are included in this year's Presidential Budget
submission. Support for this project is essential to the stability of
the region and to show the countries in the gulf region that we are
there for the long term. The eighth brigade equipment set decision is
currently being worked through the JROC process with a decision on the
mode/location expected during the current Chairman's Program Assessment
(CPA) cycle.
We continue to add facilities to enhance Air Force propositioning
in our Area of Responsibility (AOR). Medical storage, maintenance
facilities, warehouses, and munitions storage bunkers are currently
under construction in Qatar that will provide adequate facilities for
repositioned assets. Support is required to complete an additional
warehouse and a communications maintenance facility at a cost of $2.9
million dollars in the current Presidential budget. Out year
requirements, in the years FY 199-2000, include minimal funding to
complete these facilities.
The Navy continues to work requirements for five Forward Logistics
Site sets to enhance naval operations at selected ports in the AOR. A
War Reserve Project has been identified and funding priorities continue
to be adjusted to support these requirements.
Oil Exports
Question. What is the current level of oil exported from countries
within USCENTCOM's Area of Responsibility (AOR)?
Answer. Within Central Command's 20-country Are of Responsibility,
only 10 export domestically produced crude oil. The following is a by-
country breakdown:
Iran exports 2.5 million barrels per day.
Iraq exports 0.7 million barrels per day.
Saudi Arabia exports 7.8 million barrels per day.
United Arab Emirates exports 2.2 million barrels per day.
Bahrain exports 0.1 million barrels per day.
Qatar exports 0.5 million barrels per day.
Kuwait exports 2.1 million barrels per day.
Egypt exports 525,000 barrels per day.
Yemen exports 250,000 barrels per day.
Oman exports 815,000 barrels per day.
Emerging as a significant trend in the world oil market is the
growing centralization of world oil production in the Arabian Gulf. The
area's share of the world supply is projected to increase from one-
fourth today to about one-third by the turn of the century. Adding
significance to the level of Arabian Gulf oil production is the
expected decline in oil production elsewhere.
Oil will remain the world's primary source of energy for the
foreseeable future. Reinforced by projections of increased demand from
industrialized countries as well as emerging third world nations, the
importance of oil and its availability will be a principal concern for
global economies well into the coming century.
The outlook for increasing oil demand, combined with the fact that
over 60 percent of the world's oil reserves reside in the Arabian Gulf,
further highlights the importance of Middle Eastern oil supplies.
Additionally, the low cost of Arabian Gulf oil will add to the growing
dependence by countries around the world.
Question. How reliant is the U.S. on this oil?
Answer. U.S. net oil imports from the Arabian Gulf are forecast to
increase from the current 19 percent to approximately 22 percent of
total oil imports by the year 2000. By the year 2010, the U.S. is
expected to import roughly 25.5 percent of its total oil imports from
the Arabian Gulf. This increase is largely due to a combination of two
factors:
First, U.S. oil demand is expected to increase from the current
18.1 million barrels per day to 19.4 million barrels per day by the
year 2000; and 21.6 million barrels per day by the year 2010. Total
U.S. oil imports for 1996 were estimated at approximately 8.4 million
barrels per day and that is expected to climb to approximately 19.4 and
21.6 million barrels per day for the years 2000 and 2010, respectively.
The majority of this will come from the Arabian Gulf given the
stagnant, and in some cases declining, production outside of the Gulf.
Secondly, falling U.S. oil production will exacerbate dependency on
foreign oil. In 1996, U.S. oil production was estimated to be 6.5
million barrels per day. By the years 2000 and 2010, respectively, U.S.
oil production is forecast to drop to 5.9 and 5.4 million barrels per
day.
Question. How reliant is Europe on this oil?
Answer. In 1996, Europe imported roughly 45.1 percent of its total
oil imports from the Arabian Gulf. In the years 2000 and 2010, Europe's
share of total foreign oil imports coming from the Gulf are expected to
reach 45.7 and 47.9 percent respectively. Given the fungible nature of
oil on the world market; all countries, including those in Europe, rely
on uninterrupted oil supplies from the Arabian Gulf. Any disruption in
the flow of oil would drive up oil prices and negatively impact the
global economy.
Question. What percentage of the oil exported from the Middle East
is shipped through the Straits of Hormuz?
Answer. Approximately 87.5 percent of Middle East (Arabian Gulf)
oil (14 million barrels per day) is shipped through the Strait of
Hormuz.
Question. How wide is the shipping channel at the Strait of Hormuz?
Answer. The shipping Channel of the Strait of Hormuz is
approximately 80 kilometers wide and nearly 180 kilometers long. Most
oceangoing shipping through the Strait of Hormuz passes through two
established traffic lanes within Oman's 12 nautical mile territorial
Sea. One lane is inward and one is for outward traffic. Traffic lanes
are two miles wide and are separated by a two mile buffer lane. Depths
in the lanes range from 45 to 80 meters.
Question. What percentage of Iran's oil exports flow through the
Strait of Hormuz?
Answer. Iran exports all its oil (2.5 million barrels per day)
through the Strait of Hormuz.
Question. How easy would it be for Iran to shut down the Strait of
Hormuz?
Answer. Iran possesses the military capability to close the Strait
of Hormuz through the use of mines, ship and land based anti-ship
cruise missiles, air attacks by helicopters and fighter aircraft, the
use of naval forces and small boats with guns and rocket launchers, and
possibly the use of weapons of mass destruction including ballistic
missiles.------.
Role of Guard and Reserve Personnel
Question. Are there any ongoing operations in CENTCOM's Area of
Responsibility that are totally reliant on Guard and Reserve personnel?
Answer. At this time, there are no operations in the Central
Command's Area of Responsibility totally dependent on Reserve Component
forces. Our Service Components however, sometimes opt to relieve Active
Component Operations Tempo (OPSTEMPO)/Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO)
requirements by deploying into the theater Reserve Component forces.
These rotations occur at both the individual and the unit level. Some
examples of these rotations are the Navy's use of Reserve Component
personnel in port operations and cargo handling facilities, as well as
primary fill options for Joint Task Force Southwest Asia. The Air Force
has sent Air National Guard Wings and A-10 rotations to support
Operation Southern Watch as well as Combat Search and Rescue airlift 90
days each year. The Army Reserve provides augmentees assisting in
material management control in Kuwait and personnel supporting
communications operations in Saudi Arabia.
Question. How long is the typical tour of duty of Guard and Reserve
personnel deployed to the Middle East?
Answer. There is no typical tour of duty for Guard and Reserve
personnel deployed to the Central Region. We depend on the Reserve
Components to provide Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO) flexibility and a
surge capability to react to emergent requirements. A tour can be
anywhere from 19 days to 179 days per fiscal year, dependent on funding
and volunteer availability. Units generally deploy for a 30, 90, or 120
day commitment. Individual tours are dictated by mission needs.
Normally Guard and Reserve personnel are not utilized for more than 179
days due to Service interpretations of Title 10.
Quality and Morale
Question. General, when you visit troops deployed in the Middle
East area, have you noticed any deterioration in the quality of our
troops? What about their physical condition? Are the new troops as
mentally disciplined as those in prior years? Have you found that the
new troops have more ``emotional baggage'' i.e., personal problems,
than those in the past?
Answer. Although many of the Services are facing recruiting and
retention challenges today, we have not noticed any degradation in the
quality or performance of our troops. I am concerned that we are
beginning to see more junior officers and non-commissioned officers
serving in positions that formerly were manned by more senior leaders.
As a result, where we used to have four field grade officers on the
staff of an Army brigade, you may have two today. Where previously we
had four captains on a battalion staff, we now have two. Where we used
to have an E-7, Sergeant First Class, platoon sergeant, we now have an
E-6. And this is true, to some extent, in all the services. Similarly,
I am concerned that our units are having to borrow individuals from
different units to fill out their organizations. In this context, an
Army brigade commander must get personnel from his other subordinate
battalions to fill a single battalion. All of these realities stem from
the post Cold War military restructuring. At the same time, we do not
want to exaggerate the negative effects of this dynamic. Services
continue to provide Central Command (CENTCOM) with dedicated and
trained service professionals. Our service men and women remain
physically fit and mentally tough and are flexible enough to deal with
the rapidly changing situations commonplace in our Area of
Responsibility (AOR). Continued funding and support for Morale,
Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) and Quality of Life (QOL) programs are
essential toward the retention of our highly qualified service
professionals.
Question. How is the morale of the troops deployed in CENTCOM's
Area of Responsibility (AOR)?
Answer. During my discussions with the Component Commanders and
personal visits in the AOR, I find the morale and retention throughout
the force is high. Recognizing the challenges all of the Sevices are
encountering handling global missions and training requirements, U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM) has taken action to address Operational Tempo
(OPTEMPO) concerns. We have eliminated or reorganized exercises and we
have maintained forward positions in the region at minimal levels. In
cooperation with the Services, we have worked on the optimizing tour
lengths for the various forces, but have taken action to have longer
tours where possible, to minimize personnel turbulence.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Young.]
Wednesday, March 5, 1997.
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND AND COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES FORCES, KOREA
WITNESSES
ADMIRAL JOSEPH W. PRUEHER, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES PACIFIC
COMMAND, U.S. NAVY
GENERAL JOHN H. TILELLI, JR., COMMANDER, UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA,
U.S. ARMY
Introduction
Mr. Young. The hearing will come to order.
Pursuant to a vote taken last week, this hearing is closed
so we might be free to discuss classified information.
This morning the Committee is very happy to welcome Admiral
Joseph Prueher, Commander in Chief, United States Pacific
Command, and General John Tilelli, Commander in Chief, United
Nations Command/Combined Forces and Commander, United States
Forces Korea. That is a long title, General.
The United States Pacific Command's area of responsibility
is immense, covering 50 percent of the earth's surface and 60
percent of the world's population found in over 40 countries
and 20 territories and possessions. Admiral, that is a big job.
We are proud of the achievements of the troops under your
command who support the forward-deployed presence of this
country in the vital Pacific Rim and guarantee the security of
the Korean Peninsula.
We look forward to your testimony on the state of your
respective commands, and hope to address such key issues as the
present readiness of your assigned military forces; the
challenges of the deployments and OPTEMPO you now face; the
present security situation in Korea; and your priorities and
deficiencies in terms of personnel, maintenance and equipment.
Admiral and General, again, welcome. We are very happy to
have you here. We look forward to your presentation. Your
statements in full will be placed in the record, and you feel
free to summarize in any way you would like.
Summary Statement of Admiral Prueher
Admiral Prueher. All right, sir. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
We both are very pleased to be here and present the posture
of our commands. It has been a busy year with a lot of
opportunities and a lot of challenges, and an opportunity for
me to meet both U.S. and foreign military and civilians as well
as servicemen and their families in our Area of Responsibility,
AOR.
The last time and my first time to appear before your
Committee was last year, and I had been about 3 weeks on the
job. I know more than I did then and know more of what I don't
know, too. So it is interesting in that regard.
One aspect in our theater, what is going on with working
issues together with the State Department and the ambassadors
in the area and the military security policy. Something I think
would please you is the concerted effort that goes on together.
I think the Congress and the public should be proud.
I do have a written statement that is in the record, and I
will summarize my thoughts now, sir.
Mr. Young. Yes, sir.
PACIFIC COMMAND STRATEGY
Admiral Prueher. Our region, as you pointed out, is very
large. It is an economic center of gravity, probably the
economic center of gravity for our country and the world. The
forecast is in 2020, that 80 percent of the world's largest
economies will be in the Asia-Pacific Region.
It is a region we are pleased to report, unlike some other
CINCs, which is largely at peace. It is not conflict free, but
it is at peace. This is due in a large measure to the U.S.
presence and engagement that has ensued since the Second World
War, and certainly since the Korean War in conjunction with our
allies and our friends there.
Almost all of the Asia-Pacific leaders, the political, the
diplomatic and the military leaders, not only concede, but
advertise the fact that the U.S. presence there brings the
security to the Asia-Pacific Region. This security brokers the
stable conditions which yield the economic prosperity, which is
good not only for the Asia-Pacific Region, but for the entire
global community, and certainly for the U.S. as well, and
creates a lot of jobs in the United States.
I mentioned a little bit earlier, the security issues, the
diplomatic issues, and the economic issues in the Asia-Pacific
Region are so intertwined and depend so much on each other that
none of them can be advanced separately. We don't work any one
of those without impacting the other. This gives our framework
for promoting peace and stability in the area and protecting
the U.S. interest.
It yields what is the Pacific Command Strategy, which is
what we call sort of benignly Cooperative Engagement. But
Cooperative Engagement has 3 parts to it: One is peacetime
engagement. Dr. Perry wrote a piece in the Foreign Affairs
Journal called Preventive Defense. This is what peacetime
engagement is. It is exercising, it is working with the senior
people in the area, it is our coordination as we work in the
peacetime to try to maintain stability, build contacts, and
avoid conflicts that get out of hand.
The second part is crisis response, the ability to respond
quickly to crisis and to resolve them before they get big. An
example of this is the China-Taiwan crisis that occurred about
this time last year, a couple of weeks away from this time last
year.
And the third part of this strategy is the ability to fight
and win, to go into a major conflict and hopefully
multilaterally, but perhaps unilaterally, to fight and win a
major conflict.
So in a circular way, our ability to do this third piece of
fight and win in a major conflict with the forces we have,
enables us to work in the peacetime environment, which has been
a successful strategy, and it is one which we use.
COUNTRY ASSESSMENTS
I would like to now go briefly country by country, just for
a quick talk about our view of the security issues in the major
countries in the AOR. I will not go through all 44 of them. The
first is Japan.
JAPAN
As we talk a lot about China, and we talk a lot about
Korea, General Tilelli's focus of interest, we must not forget
that Japan is our pivotal security relationship in the Asia-
Pacific Region. We have just last April reexamined and resigned
our security relationship with Japan which talked about four
things: One is our 100,000 troops being our commitment to the
Asia-Pacific Region; it talked about maintaining our current
force levels in the Asia-Pacific Region; it talked about the
host nation support to which Japan gives greater than $5
billion to our troops annually, and it talked about a renewal
of the 1978 defense guidelines.
Japan will continue to be the cornerstone of our security
relationships in the Asia-Pacific, not just for Japan but for
stability in the region over all of the Korean Peninsula, which
I will address very briefly, because General Tilelli is the
expert on that.
NORTH KOREA
The trend in North Korea, of course, is downward. The
situation there is dire. there will be--forecasting is a risky
business--probably some change, if my information yields
correct, within the next 1 to 10 years, but there are a variety
of guesses on that, and I try to open the spectrum.
Our big issue in supporting General Tilelli is to stay the
course to make sure that North Korea does not get in a
situation where they would use their residual military
capability, which is impressive, to lash out.
This is a work in progress. There are a lot of initiatives
going on. In fact, this week in New York, the North Koreans
have come to the table. I think I could talk more about that,
but, again, General Tilelli is the expert, and I know he will
address that in detail.
CHINA
China: We read a lot about China. They expect in the year
2015 to have 1.6 billion people. Right now they have about 1.2
billion people. They grow at the rate of the population of the
United States every decade.
The regional leaders in Asia and in the Asia-Pacific
Region, including India, are very concerned about China. They
are concerned about their military modernization. They had a
12.7 percent increase in their stated defense budget, but it is
very hard to figure out exactly what they do spend on defense.
But they are modernizing and they have the intent to modernize.
It is my estimate that it will be about a decade and a half
before China has a force projection capability which could make
them a major projector of power.
Our military to military relationships with China are
increasing, but they are increasing from a low level. About a
year ago at this time we didn't have any, other than force to
force, but they are important in the view of transparency so we
can know what each other are up to, and it is also our ability
to influence China to bring them as a responsible actor in the
world.
Hong Kong: On 30 June, Hong Kong will revert, of course, to
China. That is a harbinger of how China will be able to handle
entry, economically and somewhat democratically, into the
modern world.
The Taiwan issue is better off now than it was a year ago,
but we expect perturbations with Taiwan and China. We are
committed to our one-China policy. A peaceful resolution, to
which the U.S. is committed by the Taiwan Relations Act, is in
the interest of all. It is in the interest of China and the
interest of Taiwan, and of all thinking people, and in the
interest of the United States. It is all our interests not to
bring the China-Taiwan crisis to a head. That is part of our
strategy while maintaining our principles and being firm.
I am optimistic that China can be, and will, emerge in the
world as a prosperous and a responsible player, but we have a
lot of long, steady work ahead now; 50 years worth of work is
ahead. I hope the trend line will be up, but there will be a
lot of ups and downs on that trend line in our dealings with
China. Our policy, our PACOM policy and national policy must be
one of strength, to deal from a position of strength with
resolve and firmness, but also with an eye and a respect for
what China's interests are.
INDIA
A couple of others, India. India, we think in population
will surpass China by the middle of the next century. Their
economy also is growing in the 5 to 7 percent rate, like a lot
of the other Asian nations. In the United States we usually
talk about India and Pakistan in the same breath. It is a near-
term worry of India. The long-term issue with India is as they
look to the East, they look to China as their main security
problem, but they also look to the East to Southeast-Asia for
their economic expansion. India will be a major player in the
next century and a half.
RUSSIA
Russia: Mostly we talk about Russia, again, in the Western
part of Russia, the European part of Russia, but they also have
an Asia-Pacific presence to which they are looking with an
increasing amount. Right now, owing to their economic
conditions, Russia is neither a beneficiary nor a participant
in either the economic or the security issues in the Asia-
Pacific.
Our hope is we continue to deal with Russia. We think they
will be back some time: and Russia has all the ingredients of a
great power. They are going through a rough time, but will
bring themselves back on line as a player and a responsible
player in the Asia-Pacific.
SOUTH ASIA
The South-Asian nations, which we tend to lump together:
They range from Singapore, with 3 million people, with whom we
do the same amount of trade that we do with France, up to
Indonesia, with 200 million people, the fourth largest nation
in the world. We lump them together, but there is a lot of
diversity there. They have burgeoning economies, growing at a
rate of 7 to 9 percent.
The Southeast-Asian nations are working with a lot of
vision and sophistication and long-range planning on their
future, and they are doing very well.
Indonesia, for example, they are trying to work very
responsibly with a very tough security situation in Indonesia.
It is hard to govern.
Australia: We talked a little bit about that, Congressman
Dicks is recently back from there. They are a staunch and
friendly ally. They are easy for us to get along with, and we
work well together.
We nurture this relationship. Right now we have TANDEM
THRUST 97, a major exercise going on with Australia with our
Navy, Air Force, Marines and some Army units. We have 22,000
people involved in this exercise from the U.S., which exceeds
one-third of the total Australian defense forces.
The essence of all of this is that engagement and our
presence in the area are working for stability and working in
the interests of the United States. They are the right
solutions to cope with this uncertain world, I think, and our
combat capable forces, plus our national will, enable our
policy there to work.
BALANCING RESOURCES FOR OUR STRATEGY
Sun-Tzu, about 2,500 years ago, said, the great General is
the one who achieves objectives without fighting. I think that
that is true for our Nation as well. But it requires capable
forces in the right place to do that.
For our resources in support of these national goals, one,
we thank this Committee very much for the resources that you
have helped provide to us. We are trying to use them
responsibly. They are ready, capable, and well-positioned
forces. 100,000 is a number, but it is a metric, and what it
really represents is the capability of the SEVENTH Fleet, of
the 5th and 7th Air Force, of the 2nd Infantry Division, and of
the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force. What it really represents
is the capabilities. The 100,000 is just the metric for that.
But it is the regional metric to which the nations look, and
that is the expression of our commitment to the Asia-Pacific.
IMET, the International Military Exchange and Training: Our
total PACOM budget is about $6 million, just a decimal point or
two over $6 million. It is the best money we spend almost. It
is highly leveraged. It provides education for the leaders of
other nations.
Right now there are four major leaders in Asia who had IMET
training in years ranging from 1965 up through 1984. They are
the heads and ministers of the defense of their services. This
money is very well spent. I support not restricting this money.
It should be unrestricted in its use. It is a high payoff.
The Asia-Pacific Center, I hope that you all get a chance
to visit it when you come to Honolulu. It is a center that has
started in the last 2 or 3 years. It promotes classes, about
12-week classes, as well as conferences for military leaders,
political leaders and economic leaders and academics from the
area.
There is a tremendous interplay for working in Asia, and
they work together. One of the comments from one of the Indian
participants in the first class said: ``Only the U.S. could do
this. The time is right. It is critically important.''
I think this is, again, money that is well-spent and highly
leveraged.
Stewardship of the assets that the CINCs are given. As I
mentioned before, we very much appreciate both the dollar
resources and the lives of the young men and women that are
entrusted to us. It is important for all of the CINCs to take
the long view, not just take the short view of readiness.
We have to take the long view, particularly when
modernization equals total future readiness. So we must take
the long view and not ask for more than we need. We need to
consider prudent risk in what we do as we take on projects.
This long view and the stewardship issue are something that I
think the CINCs are getting increasingly responsible for, and
we have to do that.
SUMMARY
In conclusion, the CINCs, the regional CINCs and certainly
ours, have been full participants in all the processes going
on. Our forces, your forces, are working very hard, they are
doing a great deal. We are working to scrub the activities, to
make sure that we have a high payoff on the things we do--and
we are not always perfect in that--but that we are using our
forces effectively and efficiently. Our assets and our
readiness are adequate, but they are stretched.
We thank you very much for what you have provided us. It is
adequate to the need and we are working hard to do well with
it, to keep the U.S. as a player and a partner and a
beneficiary in the Asia-Pacific Region.
Thank you, sir.
[The statement of Admiral Prueher and the ``U.S. Pacific
Command at a Glance'' booklet follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Young. Admiral, thank you very much. We will have a lot
of questions for you shortly.
First, I would like to recognize General Tilelli for his
statement, and then we will be back to both of you with our
questions.
Summary Statement of General Tilelli
General Tilelli. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, distinguished Committee Members, thanks for
the opportunity to be here.
I consider myself lucky to be serving with the men and
women in the Republic of Korea. It is an honor for me to
discuss with you the current security situation within the
Republic of Korea and the theater of operations.
Before I do so, I want to thank you all and the Committee
Members for your continued support of our forces in Korea, both
past and present. It is very important to them and it is
important to me.
I am going to center my opening comments around three
issues: One, the readiness of my command; two, the uncertainty
of the threat that these men and women face every day; and last
but not least, the quality of life afforded to all the U.S. men
and women stationed and living in Korea, a faraway place from
home.
READINESS OF FORCES
The ROK-U.S. security alliance is strong, very strong. It
has been in the past, is presently and must remain so in the
future. It is the key mechanism for maintaining peninsula and
regional peace and stability in a current environment where we
are still in a truce environment rather than at peace.
As the defenders of the ROK-United States Alliance, the
Combined Forces Command, the United Nations Command, and U.S.
Forces Korea are highly capable and well-trained. This force
has secured peace for the last 43 years. The peace and
stability have not only survived on the Korean Peninsula, but
the fact is it will help secure peace in the region, an area
described by Admiral Prueher as vital to the interests of the
United States of America.
These 43 years of peace did not happen by mistake or
accident, but by design. At the center of that design is a
constantly maintained strength and vigilance which equal
readiness that has protected and will continue to protect the
combined national interests of the United States of America and
the Republic of Korea.
Our combined forces readiness and capability are critical
not for generic reasons, but because there is still a very
powerful threat posed by an unstable North Korea to the
Republic of Korea is specifically, and to stability within the
Northeast-Asia Region.
Events such as the North Korean submarine incursion, the
defection of 9 North Korean senior ideologue and the tensions
that accompanied these events demonstrate how precarious
stability really is. It also highlights the uncertainty we
face. Compounding these tensions is the reality that North
Korea can initiate an attack from a standing start. Yet the
most compelling element of the threat is its uncertainty, and
it is this uncertainty, in my mind's-eye, that increases
danger.
So no matter what the scenario, our readiness must focus on
security of this peninsula and the regional interests that
Admiral Prueher has enunciated.
QUALITY OF LIFE OF PERSONNEL
Finally, the quality of life of our soldiers, sailors,
airmen and Marines within the United States Forces Korea and
their families is important to me and it is important to my
component commanders. Quality of life and morale are readiness
multipliers. Although when we talk about readiness, we
generally don't consider that very much.
The men and women on the ground do influence the situation.
They are a visible deterrent, and shape the environment for the
future. Fighting men and women win wars, not equipment or
machines.
Our troops are forward-deployed and carrying out the
command's mission every day--deterrence, and clearly if
deterrence fails, to fight and win. And that is the charter I
am given and that is the charter I think about every day.
Serving away from home, the personnel tempo of these men
and women is high. They serve selflessly away from home 365
days with high morale and pride, and just as you and I would
want them to do. In this tense and austere environment, our
service members deserve an adequate quality of life.
However, we are in a catch-up position in the area of
quality of life as it applies to the condition of our barracks,
dormitories, and family housing. Therefore, the MILCON
appropriations for fiscal year 1995 through 1997, are greatly
appreciated. Yet much remains to be done before the problem is
fixed.
SUMMARY
These issues, Mr. Chairman, are important to me as
commander. Again, we in Korea must work hard every day at being
ready in the face of very dangerous uncertainty in North Korea.
If we are not prepared properly the price is obvious.
Lastly, we are hopeful that the joint briefings in New York
will lead to a substantive discussion in the Four-party talks.
I have provided a more detailed statement for the record.
I thank you very much. I am prepared to answer your
questions.
[The statement of General Tilelli follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
QUALITY OF LIFE OF PERSONNEL
Mr. Young. General, thank you very much.
I wanted to ask you about quality of life with your forces.
That is a big issue for the Members of this Committee, and I
got the feeling from the way you presented the quality-of-life
issue that maybe there are some things lacking, recognizing
that you are in an austere condition.
What is lacking in quality-of-life issues for your forces
in Korea?
General Tilelli. Mr. Chairman, as you know, there was a 5-
year MILCON hiatis in Korea. That was restarted in fiscal year
1995, where we gratefully received MILCON appropriations. So we
are in a catch-up mode. And in the real sense, if I had to
describe to you from the perspective of the soldiers, sailors,
airmen and Marines, what is the greatest quality-of-life issue
within, it is the barracks and dormitories and housing.
So consequently, that is where we are in the catch-up mode.
At the same time, I would be remiss if I didn't say, and we
give very little thought to it, the infrastructure on most of
our installations in Korea is old and in need of repair, when
we think about electrical, water, sewage, et cetera. But the
primary issue with the men and women who serve there are the
barracks and dormitories from the quality-of-life standpoint.
Admiral Prueher. Mr. Chairman, if I might add, those in
Korea have the least good barracks and dormitories in the whole
AOR.
Mr. Young. You mentioned military construction. Of course,
we don't have that jurisdiction. But is it new construction
that you are requiring, or do you need some real property
maintenance as well as the new construction?
General Tilelli. Mr. Chairman, as we think about this
quality-of-life issue as it applies to a backlog of maintenance
repair, new construction and repair of infrastructure, it
really is a patchwork quilt, where all of those issues must be,
if you will, focused upon in order to provide the quality of
life that I think we think is adequate for our men and women
who serve there.
From my perspective, it is not only the MILCON that is a
piece of it. It is the piece that gets us out of some Korean
War vintage living conditions. But it is also the RPMA where
you can do some of our own work to upgrade, and also the
infrastructure dollars that do the below groundwork that no one
likes to focus much on.
Mr. Young. Well, believe me, we are concerned about the
issue of the lifestyle that your forces have. We will spend
considerable time on dealing with that as we prepare our
legislation.
General Tilelli. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
COUNTRY RELATIONS
Mr. Young. You mentioned our relationship with the various
other countries in the region. You didn't mention New Zealand.
Where do we stand with New Zealand today?
Admiral Prueher. We stand in a very friendly way. The
Defense Minister from New Zealand was visiting us in Honolulu
just a little bit ago. He is the Defense Minister and Attorney
General there. The New Zealand Armed Forces total 8,000 people.
As you remember, the Lange government in 1986 terminated
our ships coming into New Zealand, and that position has not
changed. As a result of that, we do not do exercises with New
Zealand, but we do have interplay with them. They are good
global citizens. New Zealand has a ship in the Arabian Gulf
doing Middle East force work. They participate in UN things.
We participate with them in the ASEAN Regional Forum, but
we do not have military exercises with them, only dialogue.
This issue is complicated slightly, it is difficult for me
anyway to talk about New Zealand without including Australia.
Australia would like to see us do a little more with New
Zealand because New Zealand is spending only 1.2 percent of
their budget on defense. So they are not doing a lot.
Australia is concerned that New Zealand will cease to be
able to be a player, so they encourage us to do more with New
Zealand as well.
Right now, it is at a flat spot. We don't do anything. We
would like to. We will continue to work with them where we can,
but right now we do not exercise with New Zealand.
CHINESE FORCE MODERNIZATION
Mr. Young. As we talk about defense budgets, it was
revealed in the news this morning that China has announced that
it will increase its defense budget by 12 to 15 percent. Is
that significant to you? Do you have any concern about that? Do
you have any indication as to whether that might be an increase
in the size of their force or modernization of their force?
Admiral Prueher. Yes, sir, we do. The modernization of 12
to 15 percent, one, it is very difficult, that is their
announced budget, which gets their total defense budget into
the low billions, 9.7 according to China's official budget.
There is a lot more that goes into the defense owing to the way
the PLA is organized.
But that increase is in support of a stated objective of
China to modernize, and that does concern me. As I mentioned, I
think if they did everything right, it would be about 15 years
before they could modernize where they had a good force
projection capability.
I worry about over answering your questions here, but I
think most of us look at defense and measure other people's
defense justifies by looking at things, ships, airplane, tanks,
number of people. But the training of people, the conscription
and the training system and the tactics that people use, are
also very important in looking at the effectiveness of a
military.
China can buy from Russia SU-27's and they are buying 250
or so of those, and they will do that with that defense budget.
But to grow someone that is the equivalent of one of our Non-
Commissioned Officers or Chief Petty Officers with 15 or 20
years, that takes 15 to 20 years to get the people that can
work that advanced equipment. So that is something, they are
going to have to change their conscription system, their
retention system and their training system, all of which will
take time before they can really be a modern, effective power.
So I am concerned about it, but I don't lose sleep over the
fact they have increased their defense budget 12-7 percent.
Mr. Young. Since we have a pretty good attendance today, we
are going to have to go by the 5-minute rule. I am going to
keep my other questions for both of you until I get a second
chance.
Mr. Murtha?
Admiral Prueher. I will give shorter answers.
Mr. Young. That is okay, we like your answers to be as
thorough as possible.
ASSISTANCE TO NORTH KOREA
Mr. Murtha. On the food negotiation going on right now in
New York, does this help their military? If we give them food,
is that food diverted to their military?
For instance, are these negotiations talking to you folks
at all about the impact of what would happen if we were to give
them humanitarian assistance?
General Tilelli. Mr. Murtha, let me answer that question in
two ways. One, the briefing in New York, today is the joint
briefing to the North Koreans, that will discuss the Four-party
talks. In my view, I think that this is a very positive move
and unprecedented and may lead to future Four-party talks, and
secondarily, potentially lasting peace on the peninsula.
To get to the nub of your question on, one, do we discuss
with those who are involved in the humanitarian assistance to
the North the implications as they apply to the military; and
secondarily, do we in fact see that food being diverted? I
think the answer to your first question is yes, we are
consulted and we do discuss with those involved the
implications of humanitarian support.
Secondarily, I think our safeguards are adequate, and when
I say adequate, that does not mean leakproof, there are
adequate checks and balances to ensure that the humanitarian
support which is provided by a host of countries, not only in
the region but external to the region, that it is going to the
right people, and that meaning the population.
Mr. Murtha. The reason I asked the question is I understand
even their troops are having trouble getting food now. I am
just wondering if it is not counterproductive if we start going
in there, so we give food to the civilians, that just means
they divert food to the military. I don't know whether that is
counterproductive or not. You seem to feel this is the right
direction, that it is actually better even it they don't get
the food.
General Tilelli. Mr. Murtha, I would say two things. One is
the military in North Korea still retains a higher priority of
distribution of constrained resources as they have in the past.
So, therefore, while the rest of the population may be
suffering, they are suffering least as far as malnutrition.
Secondary, I think food engenders, when we think about the
population, a certain amount of stability, and stability and
trying to remove the clouds of uncertainty I think are
important as we think about a country that is in every metric
that we can think about, in downward slide, maybe a death
spiral.
CHINA'S POWER PROJECTION CAPABILITIES
Mr. Murtha. Going back to Formosa and a year ago the
activity there, could they have invaded Taiwan?
Admiral Prueher. No, sir. The People's Republic of China,
PRC does not have the amphibious lift capability to do an
invasion of Taiwan.
Mr. Murtha. When you said a decade to decade-and-a-half,
you are talking about before they would have that capability?
Admiral Prueher. Yes, sir. They would have to make right
decisions along the way to get there. If they focused all their
effort just on that, they could probably do that faster, but it
is unlikely they will focus on their effort there.
U.S. PARTNERSHIP WITH JAPAN
Mr. Murtha. Okinawa, I keep reading things that worry me.
When I was Cochairman of the Election Delegation to the
Philippines, all the top officials except the Speaker of the
House of the Philippines told me we were going to be there
forever. But there seemed like an awful lot of things going on
in Okinawa which are similar to what happened in the
Philippines. Is there any chance we will lose access to
Okinawa?
Admiral Prueher. Well, sir, phrased that way, any chance, I
am sure there is. With the Hashimoto government and with the
people of Okinawa, the businessmen that I talk to coming back
say that there is about 80 to 90 percent support amongst people
of Okinawa for U.S. presence there, our total military
presence, Air Force and Marine.
Mr. Murtha. This is in the business community?
Admiral Prueher. No, this is a gross sampling of the
people, and probably not very accurate, but roughly right.
But Governor Ota and the perfectures down there are
committed to all of the U.S. forces being gone. I believe we
will be working this for a long time. I think it is Japan, the
Government of Japan sees it very much in their interest that we
be there, and the trends are in the right direction, but we are
going to have a lot of publicity and a lot of discussion over
the downsizing of Okinawa.
QUALITY OF RECRUITS
Mr. Murtha. I have been to a number of recruit depots
talking to recruits drills sergeants, and instructors,
depending whether it was a Marine or Army base, telling me the
people coming in, the quality is slowing down. I haven't seen
this in the field. Have either of you seen a decrease in the
quality of people coming from the recruit depots to the field?
Admiral Prueher. I will say from the commanders reporting
to me, their basic answer to that is there is not a degradation
in the quality of the people coming in. I know statistically
the number of high school graduates is a couple of percentage
points lower.
I think what we do see, and I know John will want to
address this as well, but what we do see is the recruits coming
in. We need to spend time at the access points for our recruits
on training in different types of things than we have
traditionally done, because they come in with certainly a
different mind-set than what we grew up with. So we are
spending more time, and, as a result, it tags a bigger chunk of
time in the training to work that.
These issues are manifest in a lot of things we deal with.
But I think the services are coming to grips with that amount
of training, for our recruits. We are still getting a good
quality of recruits.
John, do you want to add?
General Tilelli. Sir, let me address the baseline question
in the field. We are seeing no degradation in the quality of
the men and women who come to us from the training bases. They
are highly motivated, they are well-trained, they selflessly
serve, and they act just the way you and I would want them to
do. We are very pleased with the product in all of the United
States Forces, of the men and women who come to us to serve on
the peninsula.
Mr. Young. Mr. Hobson.
REMARKS OF MR. HOBSON
Mr. Hobson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have 5 minutes, I am going to ask a bunch of questions
and you answer them however you want.
You know, one of the things I just learned in another
Committee I just attended is there are 90,000 people that are
going to be recruited by the Army this year. That is a lot of
people, when we are doing about 65,000, I think, a year ago or
so. I don't know if that number is right, but that is what I
was told.
There are five projects in Korea. Korea is apparently a
place you don't want to go to live with a family, and I think
one of the problems of all this is retention. There are five
projects for $76 million. I would like some explanation of
that.
I would also like to talk about F-16's, sales of F-16's to
Indonesia. I assume that is in your area. I would like some
comment about that. I have had some people come up to me that
are concerned about that. I am concerned about China, like
everybody else is. I see the number of aircraft and things they
are doing. I am sorry I didn't hear all of your presentation on
that.
But how many troops are permanently stationed in Hong Kong,
or do they move in and out? Did we make a deal? What is going
to happen from your perspective in Hong Kong?
It used to be a nice place to visit. I don't know what is
going to happen in the future. So those are the things I
particularly would be concerned about right now.
I am particularly concerned about Korea, because I sit on
another Committee that has that. The overall thing of so many
new troops, when you have new troops, you are putting them in
with people maybe who aren't as experienced, and you have to go
to war, or you get in an intense situation and you have a lot
of new people, that is tough. I suspect that is tough.
General Tilelli. Sir, let me address that, and I will
briefly address it, because truly it is not within my purview,
but I understand it, I think. On the recruitment of 90,000, I
think what you are seeing is that the drawdown essentially has
reached the point where we are now at a stable force of 495,000
in the Army. That drawdown--and I think it is not only this
year, but if you project it out in the future, will require as
a function of soldiers who are terminating their service, it
will require somewhere in the vicinity of 85,000 to 90,000 each
year. So I think that number, although it seems high, is a
function of stabilization rather than increased turnover.
Secondary, as you know, sir, the force in Korea is a
turbulent force, turbulent in that the preponderance of the
forces are not command-sponsored. So about 90-plus percent each
year rotate back to the United States of America to camps
around the world.
That dictates to me that we must have a very vibrant
training program, which we do, that, one, integrates those men
and women into their units, and then trains them in their
readiness for their armistice and wartime mission. I think we
do that very well. So consequently I do not get the feeling
that this turbulence causes me unreadiness to perform my
mission of deterrence in fighting and winning if all else
fails.
Lastly, I would say to you, and I did mention it when asked
the question on quality. The quality of the men and women that
are coming in, these are dedicated young men and women who
serve very well and are very satisfied with not only the
mission, but also job satisfaction when they are integrated.
Admiral Prueher. A brief one on the numbers of new people
is that all of the services are completing their drawdown, so
we have harvested----
Mr. Hobson. I think I get the Navy tomorrow. I have the
Army today.
Admiral Prueher. We have harvested the capital that existed
in that drawdown, and as it flattens out, I think we are going
to have to increase our numbers, all the services will have to
increase their numbers to stay steady.
One other point on new people is that traditionally the
services and units have about a one-third turnover every year,
so there is a constant flow of people. We are reasonably
accustomed to dealing with it.
F-16 SALES TO INDONESIA
F-16's to Indonesia is a complex topic. From a security
point of view, the Indonesia military is, I think, working in a
very responsible way. They need some aircraft. I was just in
Indonesia a couple of weeks ago, maybe 3 weeks ago now. No one
from the Vice President on down talked to me about the F-16's.
They are not pressing hard for it.
I think from a security point of view, I would support the
F-16's going to Indonesia. They are a force for stability in
the Asia-Pacific Region, and again a very large and influential
force in Southeast-Asia. All the other leaders ask ``What does
Feisal Tanjung think,'' he is the head of their defense forces.
And also I might add, an IMET beneficiary in 1981. He is a
force for stability in the area.
So from a security point of view, I would support it. There
are some other issues which are not in my kit that impinge on
that decision.
Mr. Hobson. Thank you.
HONG KONG REVERSION
Admiral Prueher. Hong Kong. We don't have troops in Hong
Kong, and we haven't had. We have a couple of handfuls of
people that are attached to the consulate there that deal with
ship visits and deal with coordination of supplies and things
like that, but we don't have a troop placement that are not
attached to the embassy there. The British have a garrison
there that will move out.
So that part is not a big issue, though it is a subset, if
do we maintain a consulate in Hong Kong after reversion, and
then do we have a couple of handfuls of military people
attached to it? It is in that context.
The Hong Kong reversion is one in which I think the Chinese
are eager to do it well. Their stated objective to us is have
it the same as before, only a change in sovereignty.
Well, the type, as I mentioned before, of security and
diplomatic and economic issues is so intertwined, I am not
confident that the Chinese know how to absorb that great
laissez-faire community and let it go on as before.
So I am hopeful that it will work, but I think we are going
to see some turbulence.
Our consul, Richard Boucher, was just through Honolulu and
we were in Hong Kong a little bit ago. It still is a pretty
good place to visit, and I recommend it. But the businessmen
there----
Mr. Hobson. Been there, done that.
CHINA AND THE PACIFIC REGION
Admiral Prueher. The businessmen are optimistic that things
will work well, but they are also prepared to batten down the
hatches for a while for some turbulence as they go through a
stage working with china.
I don't know the real answer. I think it is going to be
turbulent, but again I stay optimistic, as do the people in
Hong Kong.
China, a huge topic that we talked at some length about
before. But basically China is a major backdrop against which
all the security and some of the economic decisions in the
Asia-Pacific Region are made. China, a large country, is
growing economically, but it is not homogeneous throughout, but
they are growing at 7 to 9 percent a year.
They are modernizing their military, but they have a long
way to go to get to a modern military. Their missiles fit into
a little bit of a different category because with their missile
modernization, they can put other places at risk, like Taiwan.
So that is a separate concern.
But overall, we need to deal with China, not be too ardent
about China. But I don't see, my opinion is that we will never
be just close friends where the United States and China just
completely embrace each other. There will be individuals that
will do so, of course. But I think we can work with China out
of a position of mutual respect and strength for the long haul.
Again, I mentioned earlier, long haul is real long haul by
our standards. We aren't going to sign a contract and have it
done. It is going to be working in perpetuity.
MILITARY CONSTRUCTION IN KOREA
General Tilelli. Let me address very briefly the projects
in Korea that you alluded to. One, the components of projects
provide what I call an adequate quality of life, places where
soldiers, primarily soldiers, live and work. Those projects are
deemed necessary and are a function of the quality of life
that, in my view, is a function of a long hiatus of MILCON and
RPMA, and working on the infrastructure is necessary to bring a
leavening effect, if you will, for our men and women to serve.
Mr. Young. I want to compliment the gentleman on a very
effective way to use his 5 minutes.
Mr. Hobson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Dicks.
QUALITY OF LIFE
Mr. Dicks. I want to welcome the Admiral and General and
appreciate their statements. I am sorry I had to leave in the
middle, but we have complicated schedules here.
I would just point out again that we visited Korea with
Congressman Murtha several times, and the need for that MILCON
is essential. There were many years in which nothing was done,
and especially for the most forward-deployed areas. The housing
was simply unacceptable for U.S. standards.
I am glad we finally got his money in the budget. We needed
to do that.
Now, can you tell us a little bit more, General? Are we
making any progress on those problems?
General Tilelli. Sir, let me address two things. One, I
think we are making progress in improving the quality of life,
and that is seen not only as a function of the construction
dollars that are provided by the Congress, but also what I
would call the burden-sharing dollars on the Korean projects
that assist us in upgrading dormitories and barracks.
The second part of that is we are in a continual upgrade
program where we are upgrading places where we have some of our
key systems employed, where primarily soldiers, because that is
the largest quantity of personnel we have there, and Air Force,
work. For example, a Patriot facility. We deployed a Patriot
battalion there several years ago, and we have upgraded the
facilities so they were in more or less temporary facilities.
Part of the money we are talking about is going to do to that.
We applied Apache helicopters, our highest level of
helicopters to Korea. They have gone into temporary facilities.
We are trying to upgrade the facilities so they not only have a
quality of life where their aviators are living, but also have
good places to maintain the helicopter.
But we are making progress, and the progress, in my view,
can be attributed to the great support that the Congress of the
United States and the American people have given to the U.S.
forces in Korea. My plea to you is that we continue that.
NORTH KOREAN MILITARY CAPABILITIES
Mr. Dicks. Thank you. One of the things I have been worried
about, when I was there we met, General Estes and his air
component commander, and we talked about the potential for the
North Koreans, if they were to attack us, to use chemical and
biological weapons against our airfields and, in essence, be
able to lock out the United States, or anyone, from bringing in
TACAIR and bringing in airlifts in order to reinforce South
Korea.
How big a threat is that? How big a problem is that? Is
that something you worry about and can we even talk about it at
this level of classification?
General Tilelli. Sir, I will talk about it. First, let me
say that when we think of chemical and biological weapons, I
think we all lose sleep over thinking about it and talk about
it a lot. Secondarily, key to our execution of the operation
plan is the maintenance of the airfields and ports.
We, along with--remember that we are along USA links, we
and the ROK are spending a serious amount of time and effort in
determining: one, how do we keep those places open?
Secondarily, what is the truth? And I think we have to take
the concept of reality; what is the true effect of a weapon
that is not very accurate with chemicals on pieces of those
ports and airfields?
Thirdly, and I think most importantly, we are upgrading our
ability to decontaminate areas and equipment in the next
several years, one, through the infusion of equipment, and
secondly, through activation of the chemical battalion in the
Republic of Korea.
Mr. Dicks. Are they getting any more accurate with their
SCUDS? Are there going to be advanced generations of SCUDS or
Cruise Missiles that will be more accurate and more dangerous?
General Tielli. Sir, I will answer that I think the
accuracy of the SCUD is problematic. I think it is an area
rather than a point weapon system. I think it will continue to
remain that way.
The concern, of course is when you volley SCUDS, they cover
a large area.
The second area is the Missile Development Program. We are
concerned about their Missile Development Program. We are also
concerned about whether or not that Missile Development Program
will accelerate their capability to send chemical weapons our
way.
I will just say finally, as it applies to the use of
chemical weapons, I would never discount that the North Koreans
who would attack us would use the systems that they have.
Consequently, it is one of those things that, as you said, I
have to be aware; and two, I have to take those measures to
protect our forces.
THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE
Mr. Dicks. I would assume that Theater Missile Defense, the
ability of the United States to have a high-quality Theater
Missile Defense, has to be one of your highest priorities for
protecting your forces in South Korea.
General Tielli. That is absolutely correct. Theater Missile
Defense is my number one priority, and I think it is a function
of Lower Tier and Upper Tier, multilayer, where you can general
protect the force. Your will never have a leakproof system, but
when you have a two-tiered system, you better protect the
force.
Therefore, in my integrated priority list that I send to my
friend Joe Prueher, Theater Missile Defense is one of those
very high items on my integrated priority list. And,
secondarily, without getting into force flows, in my force
flow, the Theater Missile Defense assets are early in the flow.
Mr. Dicks. Shouldn't they be prepositioned?
General Tielli. I think with the battalion we have now and
the batteries that we have now, that, coupled with the flow, I
think we are all right.
Mr. Young. Mr. Nethercutt?
MORALE AND QUALITY OF LIFE
Mr. Nethercutt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Admiral and
General, welcome to the Committee. Thank you for your
testimony.
General, I just want to follow up on your comment about our
forces in Korea now. Did I hear you correctly to say that their
tour is 365 days?
General Tielli. Sir, let me elaborate on that, if you will.
I think there are three issues. The preponderance of the
force is on a one-year tour, a short tour, so that is a 365-day
tour. Many times when we discuss quality of life and we talk
about personnel turnover, we put it in the context of how many
days you are away from your bed.
In my context, I say the soldiers, sailors, airmen and
Marines stationed in Korea are away from home for 365 days.
Therefore, their personnel tempo is very, very high.
Consequently, it is a short tour, whereby they are gainfully
employed, focused on the war fight every day.
Mr. Nethercutt. Is their morale good? Do people not want to
go there, and if they get there, can they tough it out for the
year? Is their moral, good, or bad, and do you see improvements
needed?
With regard to the housing construction needs we talk
about, will it improve the moral? What else can we do as a
Committee? That is a compound question.
General Tilelli. Sir, it is not. It is an excellent
question. One, their morale is good; two, they are satisfied
for their job; three, when you look at these men and women
while there and then talk to them after they leave, they are
happy to have been there.
The real issue is the responsible of leadership to provide
an adequate quality of life. I feel more bad about it than most
of the men and women who were serving there, because they do
endure and they do well.
So, that is the best answer I can give you.
Mr. Nethercutt. But we will help, I take it, if we can get
the better facilities and so on?
General Tilelli. The thing about these men and women who
serve there, when they see progress, improvement in their
quality of life, it is a beacon for them.
Mr. Nethercutt. They hope.
General Tilelli. That will help and I think will help
immensely.
MOBILE OFFSHORE BASES
Mr. Nethercutt. Thank you. Admiral, I have heard some talk
about the concept of a mobile offshore base, MOB, in terms of
future planning, in your command area. What do you see as the
likelihood of that developing over time? Is it a good thing? Is
it something that is receiving adequate study? What can you
tell the subcommittee about it?
Admiral Prueher. The discussion of a mobile offshore base
is associated with the troop movements in Okinawa, and the
parlance has changed from a mobile offshore base to a sea-based
facility, and it is not an MOB, it is an Sea Bound Faction, FBS
now is under discussion.
It would be something that would be funded by the Japanese
to do, and they will not fund a mobile offshore base. And so
what we are talking about in the formative stages is either
something that is tethered to the shore or landfill that would
be another base off of Okinawa. That is under development in
the Futenima TANDEM Implementation Group. So we will not have a
mobile offshore base in the theater and we are not seeking one.
Mr. Nethercutt. Okay. Do you anticipate any costs to
America in connection with the development or discussion?
Admiral Prueher. In our arrangements with Japan, the
planning costs accrue to the United States and the development
costs and construction costs accrue to Japan. There is
obviously a little merge in the middle and this group that is
just forming up now is discussing this. In fact, Mr. Tanaka
from Japan was just in talking to Dr. Kurt Campbell from OSD
earlier this week and that is one of the discussion topics.
Mr. Nethercutt. I understand. Well, thank you very much.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Nethercutt.
Mr. Cunningham.
TRAINING EXERCISES
Mr. Cunningham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I always said why
let rank lead when ability can do it better, but that is not
the reason I got to move up here because I sat way down there
with my colleagues.
General, George Norwood was a Navy exchange pilot. I
understand he is still in Korea with the Air Force general, I
think, down there on the F-16. If you would, tell him hi for
me. He blew--the very first landing on the carrier he blew both
tires twice, but he is a good guy and a good friend.
Second, I know that the political ramifications, when I
worked for Seventh Fleet staff for Vice Admiral Brown, the CTS
77, we were conducting a TEAM SPIRIT exercise and we used a
combination of Reserves for support. I know politics has played
in that. About 80 percent of my time was spent in country, even
though I worked ULCHI FOCUS LENS and TANGENT FLASH and Yama
Sakura and the other exercises. But we are still doing TEAM
SPIRIT?
And I know the problems of getting the bottoms there from
the amphibs in those exercises. Using the Reserves was very,
very important. And when you are looking at the threat, I can't
think of a better place for Theater High Altitude Air Defense,
THAAD, and upper tier than both Korea and Taiwan because of the
restriction of our troops. And I am glad to see both of you
support that. But are we still working TEAM SPIRIT?
General Tilello. Sir, TEAM SPIRIT has been canceled for the
last several years. However, I will say this, without going
into a large amount of detail, that many of the training
objectives and many of the forces that have been associated
with TEAM SPIRIT have been applied to the three major exercises
that we do year in and year out, and that is ULCHI Focus Lens
which you mentioned, which is a very large exercise, our FOAL
EAGLE exercise, which took many of the elements of TEAM SPIRIT
to include deployment of forces; and thirdly, the Reception and
Staging Onward Movement and Integration of Forces, which is
also a deployment exercise. So the training objectives
associated with TEAM SPIRIT are being accomplished, in my
belief, to the level of training that I need.
As you know, and you so adequately put it, as we think
about the war fight on the peninsula, I am absolutely lashed,
if you will, to the power projection strategy and the flow of
forces, Navy, Marine and Army forces, and Air Force as we look
at the culmination of flight.
So all of those objectives are exercised in the three major
exercises I have.
Mr. Cunningham. Would you want to reestablish TEAM SPIRIT?
Would that be a better way of response?
General Tilelli. At this point, very candidly, I do not see
the necessity at this point to reestablish TEAM SPIRIT in
fiscal year 1997. But let me say, along with that, is I make an
annual assessment, based on a multitude of variables and
determine as to whether or not we should conduct a TEAM SPIRIT
exercise or not. So I need that option. I want that option left
open, where I can make an assessment based on those variables I
see on the peninsula and external to the peninsula to say we
need a TEAM SPIRIT this year.
RESERVIST CONTRIBUTION TO EXERCISES
Mr. Cunningham. Joe?
Admiral Prueher. I take a little bit of the Reserve part of
that. The Reserves continue to be extremely active in the--from
all the Services and especially--well, not especially, but
equally in the Navy with the Seventh Fleet. In fact, that has
been copied in the Sixth Fleet because it was such a good idea,
and the exercise going on right now, the augmentation with
Reserves to those staffs is immense and extremely productive
and it is ingrained in what we do.
Mr. Cunningham. Well, I would agree, because I know the
importance, even when the fleet was there, of the deconfliction
with ROK-AF, Republic of Korea Air Force the real world threat,
plus the exercise threat that they went through. As on aside,
my father-in-law was supply corps officer in Korea and he
almost froze to death, General, and we spent a lot of time
there.
I empathize with the troops and I think the living
conditions which your enlisted troops must endure are the
worst. I mean, they live and work in little boxes--if members
haven't been there, I recommend you go. These troops are in a
cubicle sometimes no bigger than from here to there, to that
wall. I mean, it is pretty remote living, and I would support
that.
General Tilelli. If I can make one comment on the Reserves?
Mr. Cunningham. Sure.
General Tilelli. I want to echo what Admiral Prueher said.
When I think about the war fighting, I don't think about it
from Active over Reserve because to me it is an integrated
process. As I look at the flow of forces, I am looking at the
flow of forces and not looking at the context of whether or not
they are Active or Reserve, and they all are key critical. As
we think about this power projection strategy of ours, they are
key critical in the progression session of our operations plan.
INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS
Mr. Cunningham. Last question. Are you getting enough
intelligence? I know with the SR-71 gone and the ------, are
you using Predator or any other supplement or mostly just
satellite reconnaissance?
General Tilelli. Sir, and I will ask Admiral Prueher to
help me on this, in a real sense, though, we do not have any
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, UAVs, on the peninsula. However, as
we look at the requirement for UAVs to the war fight, they are
a requirement.
I am getting the intelligence indicators and warning and
day-to-day intelligence I need from a combination of systems.
Some are national and some are local. The U-2 is on the
peninsula. I have got the Airborne Reconnaissance Vehicle low.
I have Signals Intelligence, SIGINT, and imagery capability,
both local and national. Plus at a time of crisis or potential
crisis, Admiral Prueher and the Chairman and Joint Chiefs of
Staff focus other Intel means to help me in establishing the
requirements of our mission.
Admiral Prueher. For theater Intel, our most recent real-
time need is General Tilelli's and most of our assets that are
focused there are on a time-sharing basis.
You have had--you have talked to General Joulwan about
Bosnia, I believe, and right now we have a lot of our Nation's
Intel treasure focused there. And so as a result of it being
there, it is not somewhere else. And so there are--we don't
have UAVs in theater right now. UAVs are high on our Integrated
Priority List for the theater and there are many places, Korea
among them--probably foremost among them, to support General
Tilelli--but there are many places where that would be a good
augmentation to our overhead capability.
Mr. Cunningham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Hefner.
MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
Mr. Hefner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief.
I served as Chairman of the MILCON Subcommittee for several
years and I don't remember if it was 1995, Gary Luck, who was a
very good friend, served at Fort Bragg, and he had an immediate
need. He said we have got to have $40 million. That was shortly
after he took command. Of course, we were afraid not to give it
to Gary, as you know. But I am glad to see that we are making
some strides as far as the quality of life in Korea.
There is no way we are doing enough on quality of life, we
know that, but do you feel like we are maybe doing better in
Korea than we have been in the past year?
General Tilelli. Sir, I will say, the answer is, yes. We
have been, since 1995, receiving $30 million in military
construction so that is having an improved--that is having a
beneficial effect on the quality of life in Korea.
At the same time, because of the hiatus that Gary talked to
you about, and he was my boss in Desert Storm, the hiatus that
Gary talked about on military construction we are also in a
catch-up mode. So I keep the pressure going on trying to force
not only the MILCON dollars, but the RPMA dollars and the
infrastructure dollars that will allow me to tie this quilt
together and improve the overall quality of life for our men
and women who serve there.
CHINESE FORCE PROJECTION CAPABILITY
Mr. Hefner. Someone mentioned earlier about the Chinese
capability to support an invasion of the force. Do you see in
your intelligence that they are--we talk about planes, but
being able to move--are they building in that direction of
having an invasion force or occupational force? Does that show
any focus toward that?
Admiral Prueher. I think it is currently in their mind's
eye. They have not procured yet. They have expressed at lot of
interest in landing craft. Right now, the capability that we
assess that China has is the ability to move one division,
which would not be an adequate invasion force. They want to do
it.
Amphibious operations of that nature are certainly among
the most complex operations that anyone could do. They are a
long way from it. I think they aspire to have some sort of
amphibious invasion force, but they don't have it and they are
not very close to it right now, sir.
Mr. Hefner. We can kind of relate to that because we have
had a shortfall on amphibious and I know we were criticized
very soundly a few years ago when we bought some capability for
RO-Ros that we were buying that--the early eighties, I guess it
was.
I just have one other question. We understand that U.S.
forces has an urgent requirement for 62 SEP units and we
appropriated $5 million in 1997 to initiate the production of
this. What is the Army's progress? Could you just give me, what
are we doing and when are we going to do it?
General Tilelli. Sir, I cannot give you a progress
statement on that, but I will provide it for the record. I am
not familiar with where we are as an Army on the SEP program.
Mr. Hefner. Okay.
Admiral Prueher. I can't help with that either, sir.
[Clerk's note.--Classified insert was removed.]
Mr. Hefner. I have no further questions, and if you happen
to see General Luck, he is one of my favorite people, give him
my best.
General Tilelli. I will do that, sir. Thank you.
Mr. Hefner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Skeen.
FOOD SHORTAGES IN NORTH KOREA
Mr. Skeen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral and General, I
apologize for not being here earlier, but we have got all of
these Appropriations Committees going at one time. We are
trying to seal the vault.
I was privileged to have a tour in Korea some years ago
with some other Members under Chairman Murtha, and I was struck
by the fact that one of the primary considerations about the
tenacity of North Korea is their lack of food supply. Has that
changed dramatically here in the last couple of years or is it
still about the same or is it still a factor? How does it play
also with their cooperation with--their cooperation and help
out of China?
I know that is a strange--it is nonmilitary, but it has a
direct bearing.
General Tilelli. Let me answer the first part of the
question and defer the second part to Admiral Prueher.
First, the North Korean armed forces are given higher
priority than the rest of the population. That applies to food
and other training resources.
Secondarily, and I always caution myself when I think about
the effects of malnutrition on--even an American soldier and
try to correlate that to the pugnacity, as you put it, and the
will of the North Korean soldier as was displayed during the
Korean War.
So I think to put that in context, I would say that the
lack of food resources and the lack of resources in general has
had a denigrating effect on their capability. But I would still
say that it is onerous and capable of vast destruction if given
the order.
Mr. Skeen. That is the point, the threat level stays at a
relatively high level because of one of the things is the lack
of food in the nation in its entirety.
Admiral.
Admiral Prueher. On the tie with China, I think China is
interested in not having North Korea fail, and accordingly,
they are also willing and have provided some foodstuffs. So the
Chinese are in the--in that equation, as well, with respect to
food. I don't think--General Tilelli can perhaps address this
more. We know of no plans that China has to militarily support
North Korea.
Mr. Skeen. Well, that was a very interesting part of it. Of
course, I am involved in agriculture and chair that
subcommittee on the appropriations panel and we are seeing more
corn going through the Panama Canal in American bottoms going
to China than at any time in our history and I just wondered if
through a round about way if we weren't supplying some of the
foodstuffs for the North Koreans.
Admiral Prueher. Well you know----
Mr. Skeen. Without benefit of a pact or something.
Admiral Prueher. I think just from our research of the
grain embargo a few years ago, things went in circuitous paths.
So I could not say that we are not. But China's three main
issues that they are trying to face is jobs for 1.25 billion
people; food and rising expectations for them. So I expect it
is actually going to China because they do not have the food
production capability alone now to provide for China; and the
other issue is their energy demands, which are rising
exponentially.
General Tilelli. Also, I believe we also have seen in a
humanitarian way, rather than in a military-to-military way,
foodstuffs being provided from China to the North Koreans.
Mr. Skeen. Thank you. I appreciate that response. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING
Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Skeen.
Admiral, you and I talked about International Military
Education and Training, IMET, several times before, and IMET
tends to get a little controversial on occasion, not in this
Committee, but in the Congress.
General Tilelli. Yes, sir.
Mr. Young. Could you provide us for the record maybe 8 or
10 or a dozen good examples of foreign military officers who
have been through the IMET Program, positions that they might
hold today and how that benefits the United States and benefits
you in performing your duties?
Admiral Prueher. Yes, sir, I will be glad to provide that
for the record. I can also give you--I could provide a little
bit of it now, if you would like.
Mr. Young. Yes, surely.
Admiral Prueher. Well, the IMET Program, we talked before
in my oral statement stands for International Military
Education and Training. It is a highly leveraged amount of
money. Our total U.S. program worldwide is about $43 million,
and the Pacific portion of that is about $6.8 million, about 16
percent.
We have examples. The Minister of Defense in Korea went
through IMET in 1973. Arturo Enrile, the recent head of the
Philippine defense forces, went through in 1965. General Bey,
who is the head of the Singapore defense forces, went through,
in 1982. And Feisal Tanjung, who, as I mentioned is the head of
the Indonesian defense forces, went through in 1981. These are
long-term investments, small dollars which have a big payoff
for us.
What it does is give the opportunity to educate foreign
military people, not only in the U.S. military, but in the U.S.
way of thinking about things, and IMET students have taken
these ideas and influenced their armed forces, so it is a good
deal for us. And when we restrict those funds for whatever
reason, it works to our disadvantage, not necessarily that of
the other nation.
Mr. Young. Thanks very much. If you want to expand on that
for the record, please feel free to do so because it would help
us in our preparation.
Mr. Visclosky.
MILITARY CONSTRUCTION APPROPRIATIONS
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, last year the Committee provided an additional
$600 million to help improve conditions in various related
facilities. Do you know if any of those monies that were added
on by the Committee are currently being used in Korea?
General Tilelli. Yes, sir. We were given dollars for
barracks and dormitory construction and upgrades. I will
provide for the record the exact amount.
Mr. Visclosky. If you could. For the record, also, on your
budget request for fiscal year 1998, was there an increase in
the dollar amount in your budget for barracks and related
facilities for Korea?
General Tilelli. I will provide that for the record.
Mr. Visclosky. If you could. And when you do that for the
record, if it could be in relationship to your business line
from fiscal year 1997 and relative to what the Committee added
on.
[The information follows:]
United States Forces Korea Fiscal Year 97 Military
Construction had not been increased from initial requests of
$30 million for the Army and $9.8 million for the Air Force.
Eighth United States Army did benefit from increases in the
Fiscal Year 98 Military Construction Authority program. These
totaled $46.1 million above the initial request of $30 million.
The Air Force Program remained at the original $22.34 million
request.
It is clear that Congressionally added projects for United
States Forces Korea in fiscal year 1995 and Fiscal Year 1996
restored United States Military Construction support for Korea.
The Fiscal Years 1995-98 Military Construction projects will
have a significant positive impact on the quality of life for
soldiers and airmen in Korea.
QUALITY OF LIFE OF PERSONNEL
Mr. Visclosky. My concern, and a number of our colleagues
have mentioned this, is about the quality of life for our
troops. My experience here on the Committee is every year
without fail, we add on $600 million for 1997, we added on $700
million for various related facilities in 1996. I tried to get
on this Committee for 7 years because we could pass all the
policy in the world, but unless we spend the money or ask for
the money, nothing is going to change as far as the quality of
life for our troops.
My concern is that the Department comes up to the Hill
every year and expects us to do the lifting as far as real
property maintenance and housing and that somehow we will come
up with the dollars. I think the real commitment, as far as
that quality of life, should be in the Department's budget.
So if you could, for the record, I would appreciate seeing
those figures.
[The information follows:]
The only fiscal years 1996 and 1997 Army Family Housing or
Real Property Maintenance plus-ups that I can determine are:
Fiscal year 1996 Real Property Maintenance: $19.7 million
for Bridging the Gap reflected in the funding memorandum,
however, there were corresponding real Property Maintenance
decreases.
Fiscal year 1996 family Housing: $8.5 million from Office
of the Secretary of Defense Quality of Life plus-up.
Fiscal year 1997 Real Property Maintenance: $10 million in
Quality of Life Environment, Defense ($8 million for Army and
$2 million for Air Force).
General Tilelli. I will do that.
STATUS OF RUSSIAN NAVY
Mr. Visclosky. That would be great.
Admiral, could you talk for a minute or two about the state
of the Russian navy in the Pacific and their activities?
Admiral Prueher. Yes, I can. The Russian navy in the
Pacific is not robust, but it is small and of good quality.
They are led by their Pacific fleet commander, who is Admiral
Kurogedov who is very aggressive and good, and interestingly,
the Russian navy in the Pacific, as of about a month and a half
ago, was fully paid in contrast to some other units around, so
that that is not a homogeneous pay problem. But the Russian
navy pays selectively to the units. ------. The surface navy is
less well-maintained that the submarines, both their ballistic
missile submarines and their attack boats. ------. Their
surface ships have a few show ships that get underway; but the
conditions are bad. They are sailing more and more.
VIETNAM/CAMBODIA/LAOS
Mr. Visclosky. In the time remaining, could you comment on
the situation in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos?
Admiral Prueher. Yes. The--in fact, I am going to make a
trip to Vietnam later on this month, and our work with Vietnam
is progressing at the proper rate. It is slow, but it is moving
about as fast as we can--as we need to or they are able to
work. And the economic piece of Vietnam is--there is alot of
potential, but nothing much has come to fruition yet. And
militarily, we do not have any planned exercises with Vietnam.
They are not too eager to have a lot of our uniformed troops on
the ground there just yet.
Mr. Visclosky. Are they active in Cambodia at all or in
Laos?
Admiral Prueher. Are they active in Cambodia?
Mr. Visclosky. Yes, the Vietnamese?
Admiral Prueher. I am sure around the borders they are but
a ------.
Our big efforts there are toward some form of stability.
The Khmer Rouge seem to be on the wane in Cambodia. ------.
That is one of our major activities.
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you very much.
Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Admiral, you mentioned earlier China, Korea,
Russia, and India. Give us a chart for the record or a graph of
some kind that shows the relative size of their various
military services ranking in the order of their size and then
compare it to the U.S. forces.
Admiral Prueher. All right, sir. We have that and we will
provide that for the record.
[Clerk's note.--The classified insert was removed.]
EQUIPMENT PREPOSITIONING IN THE PACIFIC
Mr. Young. Thank you very much, sir. I would like to go to
a budget-related issue, that deals with the question of
prepositioning in the Pacific theater. I am wondering if the
current levels of prepositioned equipment are adequate?
Admiral Prueher. Do you want to take the Army War Reserve,
AWR-4 issue?
General Tilelli. Let me, Mr. Chairman, address the
prepositioning of the equipment in Korea. ------. At the same
time, I am convinced that as we think about power projection
and the movement of the forces from Fort Lewis, Washington,
which is the 3rd brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division, that
this set is critical and I place a lot of importance on meeting
our requirements with that set.
Mr. Young. What about prepositional ships?
Admiral Prueher. The pre-po ships, overall, with the
exception of what John just talked about, the shore-based, our
AWR supplies are adequate. The pre-po ships are adequate for
what we need. ------.
And even without the MRC requirements, which are quite
well-honed, in our theater, because of the time and the
distance, having the number of assets as well as the
distribution, which these ships enable, will be a big help to
us and the LMSRs are vital for that reason, sir.
Mr. Young. They are not in the budget, though, are they?
They are not in the 1998 budget request?
Admiral Prueher. I had thought they were, but let me check,
sir, and I will get back to you.
[The information follows:]
The fiscal year 1998 budget request includes $812.9 million
requested for Large Medium Speed Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR)
acquisition. This dollar figure was allocated for the purchase
of three new acquisition LMSR's at an estimated cost of $200
million per ship and to cover pre-acquisition costs associated
with follow-on ships. Four new acquisition LMSR's are scheduled
for acquisition in fiscal year 1999, with subsequent yearly
acquisitions eventually leading to a total of 19 LMSR's by
fiscal year 2001.
General Tilelli. Certainly, sir, I would again agree with
Admiral Prueher as we think about sea and airlift in our power
projection strategy, the continued procurement of the C-17
aircraft and the large medium speed roll off-roll on ship are
critical. I would agree with the admiral on that.
Mr. Dicks. The prepositioned ships, are they in Guam? Is
that just the Marine Corps?
Admiral Prueher. There is some--Army War Reserve, AWR-3 is
in Guam, that set. There are some in Guam and there is some in
Diego Garcia and then some stay in air and transit, but they
are based in Guam, that one group.
General Tilelli. I think what you are thinking about, Mr.
Dicks, is the Marine Maritime Prepositioned Ships, MPS ships.
Mr. Dicks. Right.
General Tilelli. They are partially in Guam and partially
in Diego Garcia.
Mr. Dicks. Well, the Army now has some ships in Diego
Garcia of its own.
General Tilelli. That is the AWR-3.
Mr. Dicks. We don't have any Army prepositioned ships in
Guam?
Admiral Prueher. There are both U.S. Marine Corps Maritime
Pre-position Ship Squadrons and Army AWR-3 Ships stationed at
Guam and Diego Garcia.
General Tilelli. That is correct.
Mr. Dicks. Should we?
Admiral Prueher. Because of berth and anchorage limitations
we must station these vessels in Guam and Diego Garcia. Both
locations give us the ability to quickly respond to our needs
in Korea as well as Southwest Asia.
Mr. Dicks. Okay.
General Tilelli. As I look at the flow for Korea, the MPS
ships are located in the right place. They are the first ones
that come in and are timed exactly right with the Marines that
come with them. And secondarily, the AWR-3, if it does come to
me, I think it comes in a timely way so I am not as concerned
at this moment about moving the pre-po from where it is.
Mr. Young. The Committee provided funding in the fiscal
year 1997 budget for two additional MPF ships for the Marine
Corps. Where will they be prepositioned?
Admiral Prueher. Sir, I will have to provide that for the
record in the worldwide flow.
[The information follows:]
Of the two additional Maritime Preposition Ships funded in
Fiscal Year 1997 budget for the Marine Corps, one will be
positioned with Maritime Preposition Squadron Two in Diego
Garcia and one will be positioned with Maritime Preposition
Squadron Three in Guam.
Mr. Young. Are you considering other anchorages than the
ones you are presently using for pre-po ships?
Admiral Prueher. Yes, we are. ------. We are looking and
have had a program ongoing to look at the other anchorages.
Mr. Young. What about cargo handling in the various ports
for our equipment? Do we have adequate equipment to handle the
cargo? What is that called, lighterage? Is that what that is?
Admiral Prueher. I don't know who coined the phrase
``lighterage.'' Last year, we had quite a discussion about a
lack of lighterage.
I have--I had not gotten any comments--except pertaining to
Korea, which is a real contingency. We haven't had a awful lot
of problem off-loading. I will provide that for the record on
the quantity of lighterage.
[The information follows:]
Lighterage assigned to each Maritime Prepositioning ships (MPS)
squadron meets the notional equipment load as required by Department of
the Navy and U.S. Marine Corps publication NWP 22-10/FMFM 1-5. The off
loading of required prepositioned equipment into a seaport of
debarkation to support Pacific Command operation plans has been
successfully demonstrated during exercises.
Currently, the lighterage inventory in each Pacific Command MPS
squadron is:
(1) Maritime Preposition Squadron Two based in Diego Garcia:
five side-loadable warping tugs (SLWT), 15 causeway sections--
powered (CSP), 25 causeway sections--non-powered (CSNP), ten
landing craft mechanized (LCM-8);
(2) Maritime Preposition Squadron Three based in Guam: four
SLWT's, 16 CSP's, 30 CSNP's, eight LCM-8's.
There are shortages in Army lighterage requirements. The Army
requires seven Roll-On/Roll-Off (RO/RO) Discharge Facility (RRDF)
systems to offload strategic sealift ships anchored at sea during
logistics-over-the-shore operations. The RRDF provides the essential
interface between Army lighterage and RO/RO ships. Tracked and wheeled
vehicles are driven across the RRDF from the RO/RO ships onto an Army
lighterage moored alongside. The Army program corrects the shortage
with the purchase of three RRDFs in Fiscal Year 1999, three in Fiscal
Year 2001 and one in the outyears for the Reserve Component.
The Army and Navy are undergoing a joint research and development
(R&D) effort to acquire a Sea State Three capable lighter, designated
the Joint Modular Lighterage System. This would enable logistics-over-
the-shore operations in sea states greater than current Sea State Two
or below systems. Continued Congressional support is required to
sustain this important R&D effort.
Materiel Handling Equipment (MHE) is required to transfer cargo to/
from all modes of transportation: air, sea, and land. The types of MHE
vary by type of cargo and mode of transport. We do not have enough MHE
at our airbases for throughput. The availability of wide-body loaders
(WBL) at our ports of debarkation remains one of our logistical
concerns. We require 30 WBLs in our theater and have only 21. New
60,000 pound aircraft loaders are in the budget but are several years
away from worldwide distribution. A modification of some 25,000 pound
loaders is in progress, but is a temporary solution.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much. Mr. Murtha.
BOSNIA FUNDING
Mr. Murtha. Just a couple of things. Are you being
penalized at all because of the money we are spending in
Bosina? Are you lacking funds right now? Have they said to you,
anybody up there said to you, okay, you are going to have to
slow down because we need the money for Bosnia?
General Tilelli. Sir, let me speak from my perspective,
they have not told us to slow down. However, there is always
the--and I will use the term ``possibility'' out there, that if
the supplemental appropriation is not approved for Bosnia, the
pot of money is only one pot of money and it is going to have
to come from somewhere, so there is a possibility that we may
be required to contribute, which will cause a necessary slow
down to pay for that contingency.
Mr. Murtha. But at this point you haven't lost any money--
you have been able to spend your allowance. You haven't lost
any money. Either of you lost any money?
General Tilelli. I have not, sir.
Admiral Prueher. No, sir, we haven't lost any money yet to
Bosnia. We quarrel over distribution of--not quarrel.
Mr. Murtha. True.
Admiral Prueher. Well, distribution of assets.
OKINAWA, JAPAN
Mr. Murtha. Let's go back to Okinawa. Let's say we are
forced--I am sure you are looking at contingencies if we get
forced out of there. Where would we go? I mean, we are talking
about a pretty good distance if we lose that access, aren't we?
Admiral Prueher. Yes, sir. We are always looking at the
efficiencies and effectiveness and looking at contingencies. My
opinion is, the way things are in the world right now, it is
not wise of us to discuss those too much at this time.
Mr. Murtha. All right.
Admiral Prueher. But your point is correct. The number of
choices of places to go are not--there are not a lot of them.
Mr. Murtha. From a strategic standpoint we would be much
worse off if we lose access?
Admiral Prueher. Yes, sir, we would. Yes, sir.
WATER QUALITY IN KOREA
Mr. Murtha. I heard that we don't even have good water in
some of our bases. We are talking about giving the North
Koreans money, yet at some of our bases there is not good water
there for the 2nd Division. Is that accurate? I mean, the water
is not--they can't drink it. Is that right?
General Tilelli. That is correct. There are eight bases
primarily that we have had some water monitoring issues with
and when we see that it is beyond a certain tolerance level, we
go to bottled water. Namely, Kunsan, Chong Ju, Kimhae, Kwang Ju
and Taegu, Rokaos, Niolo Barracks and Camps Gray and Kim, where
the quality of water is not what we want. We are in a
monitoring and repair and replace process right now.
Mr. Murtha. Is it cheaper to go to bottled water than it is
to fix the situation?
General Tilelli. For the long-term, it is cheaper.
Mr. Murtha. What kind of dollars are you talking about to
fix those eight places?
General Tilelli. I can't give you that off the top of my
head. I will provide that for the record, Mr. Murtha.
[The information follows:]
We would have an approximate initial investment of over $4
million with recurring costs of over $400,000 per year.
Mr. Dicks. Should we fix it?
General Tilelli. I believe we should fix it. Our service
members deserve it.
Mr. Murtha. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Dicks. Would you yield on that?
Mr. Murtha. Yes.
Mr. Dicks. Is there a problem with the South Korean
Government?
General Tilelli. There is not a problem with the South
Korean Government. It is a problem--the water quality problem
is one that has arisen after funds were programmed and we are
working with them and also with our own dollars to attempt to
fix that infrastructure issue.
Mr. Murtha. Are you saying that is irresponsibility, the
water?
General Tilelli. No, it is not irresponsibility. It is an
issue that just perked up through our monitoring process and we
monitor all of the water standards throughout the peninsula
because of different requirements and U.S. standards are
somewhat higher. So consequently, this was picked up.
Mr. Murtha. Is it going to be fixed in the next 6 months?
General Tilelli. I can't say it will be fixed in the next 6
months. We will certainly----
Mr. Murtha. Is it lack of money?
General Tilelli. At this point, we are trying to get an
assessment of the costs and then apply the correct resources.
We will not have--we will not have our service members drinking
bad water.
Mr. Murtha. Okay.
Mr. Dicks. Are we using bottled water?
General Tilelli. We are using bottled water for drinking
water at this point.
Mr. Young. Mr. Skeen.
Mr. Skeen. I have no questions.
Mr. Young. Mr. Dicks.
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO NORTH KOREA
Mr. Dicks. I am sorry I missed part of your presentation. I
know this question was asked, but I want to ask it again
because I want to hear your answer.
As I understand it, the U.N. World Food Program, we are
providing a total of $41.6 million in humanitarian assistance
to help with the food shortage in North Korea. How do you feel
about that? I mean, do you think that is the right thing to do?
General Tilelli. Sir, I cannot address the amount of
dollars that we are providing. However, it is my view that the
contributions by many nations in the region contribute to the
stability in the North. So I think it is appropriate that for
humanitarian purposes, we provide food aid. As a matter of
fact, the Republic of Korea, Japan and other countries are also
providing food aid through humanitarian means for the North
Koreans.
Mr. Dicks. So you see it as a stabilizing event?
Genneral Tilelli. I see it as stabilizing.
Mr. Dicks. Anything we can do to prevent them from
imploding or whatever?
General Tilelli. I see it as truly a stabilizing event.
NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM
Mr. Dicks. Okay. How would you rate the nuclear program? We
have had this long complicated arrangement with them to try to
get them not to develop nuclear weapons and weapon-grade
plutonium, for example. How is this program going?
General Tilelli. The nuclear Agreed Framework is proceeding
very well. The canning of the rods is ongoing and the latest I
heard we were about 60 percent complete in canning. The piece
of the nuclear Agreed Framework that didn't work exactly as
everyone through it might work was an acceleration in the
dialogue between the North and the South. I think in the
prevention of a continuation of the nuclear program the North
and in moving towards a light water reactor, I think that that
program, from my view, is on track and I would ask Admiral
Prueher if he would like to comment on that.
Admiral Prueher. The KEDO agreement for the light water
reactor is proceeding slowly. One thing, I support very much
what General Tilelli said about the food to North Korea. I
think trying to not make them feel so cornered that they have
to lash out is important, and also maybe they will have a
little less distance to recover at some point then they
otherwise would.
The nations in Southeast Asia and in Asia in general are
all--not all, but many of them--are participating in the agreed
framework to help support the funding for the light water
reactor. And so it is a coalescing effect. North Korea is a
festering spot, right in the middle of other people who are
prospering. And what we need to do is get them to open up so
that they can join the rest of the world.
POLICY TOWARDS NORTH KOREA
Mr. Dicks. Do you think we need, as a nation, to be doing
more? Should the United States be providing more leadership in
terms of trying to bring help and assistance to the North
Koreans to try to diffuse this situation? I mean, basically I
think our efforts have been pretty meager up to this point.
Admiral Prueher. I will offer my opinion and then defer to
General Tilelli. It is very important for us to stay in concert
with the Republic of Korea.
Mr. Dicks. Not to get divided?
Admiral Prueher. That is right. So I think that affects our
pace, but I think it is important that we stay together, and
that is almost more important than a rapid pace and so I think
that affects what is going on.
Mr. Dicks. Well, how does South Korea feel about this? Are
they in favor of trying to engage the North Koreans on--besides
on the nuclear program, but in the food program and trying to
help, do they concur with this strategy?
Admiral Prueher. I think they would not say they would want
to go slowly, but they are--there are various factions. Some
are more eager than others to move with it. So it is an issue.
Mr. Dicks. How about the government, the current
government?
Admiral Prueher. They talk about--really I am getting into
John's lane, but Kim Young-Sam, the government talks about
North Korea largely as a threat, I think.
General Tilelli. Let me address the three issues you
raised, Mr. Dicks. One, should we be doing more on the
humanitarian side? I think the program is about right, first of
all.
Secondly, I would say that I think Admiral Prueher's
comment is very important in that one of the North Korean
strategies is to drive a wedge between the United States and
the South and we can't let that happen.
Thirdly, in my view, and this is my personal opinion, when
we think about North Korea and we think about providing them
many things, there ought to be a quid in action.
Mr. Dicks. In terms of diffusing?
General Tilelli. In terms of diffusing the tensions. So
consequently, I have not seen that--the quid. The first, and I
think it is somewhat unprecedented, if you will, is the fact
that they are attending the joint briefings today as we sit
here. So this may be--the joint briefings in New York. This may
be the first opening, and I think it is one that we must
leverage for the future.
The second part of your question applies to the South. I
think that the Republic of Korea would certainly like increased
dialogue with the North, to ease tensions and move forward.
However, in a real sense, the North Koreans have been unwilling
to do that and have been unwilling to open the door at all to
the South and are more willing to do bilateral discussions with
the United States.
Mr. Dicks. All right. So I guess there might be an
opportunity here to, as you suggest, to maybe tie future
assistance to their diffusing the military situation of being
right there on the border, et cetera, try to negotiate
something with them?
General Tilelli. I think the opportunity is the joint
briefing and then a follow on four party talks. In my view,
that is the opportunity that is laid before us right now, and I
think the outcome of today's briefing will tell us more as to
whether or not they are going to be amenable to any of that.
Mr. Dicks. My time is up. But one thing I would say, too,
is we ought to follow whether this assistance gets to the
people or does it get to the military, too? That seems to me to
be an important thing.
General Tilelli. The other thing, and I would be remiss if
I didn't say it, and that is while all this discussion is going
on, I, as the commander over there, can't lose sight and focus,
and that is deterrence and preparedness, and I can tell you
that that is continuing to be my focus until something else
occurs.
WATER QUALITY FOR U.S. FORCES IN KOREA
Mr. Dicks. Thank you.
Mr. Young. As we talk about helping the North Koreans with
their food problems and things of that nature, we hear stories
that some of your forces don't even have potable water. More
specifically, the 2nd Division, the Kunsan Airfield. Are those
stories true? Do we have a problem with adequate safe water
there?
General Tilelli. Mr. Chairman, these are eight places that
this year we have found that the content of the water does not
meet U.S. standards. So we have those eight places, Kunsan,
Chong Ju, Kimhae, Kwang Ju, and Taegu, Niblo Barracks and Camps
Gray and Kim, bases that we are working on diligently to fix
the problem. And, secondarily, until we can fix the problem,
through either an upgrade in the infrastructure or a filtration
system, we are providing the soldiers and airmen who live on
those places potable bottled water.
Mr. Young. Okay.
Mr. Murtha. How many people are there? How many people are
at those eight bases?
General Tilelli. I will have to give you the exact number
for the record.
[The information follows:]
It is not a substantial number of the force--far less than one
percent. Out of a total of 67,200 military and civilian employees on
United States Forces Korea installations, less than 50 people live on
Chang Ju and Kwang Ju Air Bases (two of the six installations with non-
potable water systems). We purchase bottled water for these Soldiers,
Sailors, Airmen, Marines and 400 non-residential employees who work at
all six locations. We continue to provide potable tap water at the
remaining United States Forces Korea installations, where 99 percent of
our people work and live.
Mr. Murtha. Is it a substantial number of the force?
General Tilelli. It is not a substantial number of the
force. It is a small portion, very small. I will provide the
number, the exact number for the record.
Mr. Young. We provided all the forces in Desert Storm with
bottled water, so I assume that is something that can be done
without too much trouble.
General Tilelli. Mr. Chairman, that is done--it is not much
trouble to do it, although I find that it is not the preferred
way for our people to live.
Admiral Prueher. For just a bit of perspective, I will
state that in most of our AOR, the State Department and some
30,000 other DoD people that are not directly under our
command, mostly drink bottled water every day, wherever they
live. Most of the cities they live in don't have it, either.
NORTH KOREAN DEFECTORS
Mr. Young. Admiral, in a previous visit I asked about the
North Korean defector who was presently in the embassy in
Beijing. Tell us anything that you can tell us this morning
about whether he will be released and allowed to go to South
Korea or just what the status is.
Admiral Prueher. The latest update I had was yesterday
afternoon, after we talked, and maybe General Tilelli has more,
but that the Chinese had talked to him and that it looked like
he would be released, which is essentially what we said
yesterday, but the timing was something that was uncertain.
Maybe General Tilelli has more later information.
General Tilelli. Well, Mr. Chairman, that is the same
update that I received. Also at issue is whether or not he will
go directly to the Republic or Korea or through a third country
and I think that is all being resolved over a period of time.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much. Mr. Visclosky, do you have
further questions?
WEAPONS MODERNIZATION
Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Chairman, just one, if I could.
Is there an arms race taking place in Southeast Asia and
the Pacific Basin?
Admiral Prueher. That is a frequently asked question, sir,
and some of that is in the eye of the beholder. My answer is
there is not an arms race taking place. Their economies are
booming and they are upgrading and modernizing quite old things
they have in many cases, but there is not an arms race.
The countries are behaving responsibly in that they don't
want to be the first one to introduce a new breakthrough
weapons system, for example, beyond visual range missiles, and
so I think they are behaving responsibly. It is coming in
balance. There is not a race. I would say the nations, none of
them want to be first, which imply race. They also don't want
to be last. So they want to keep the water about level.
I really think it would be wrong to characterize it as an
arms race, sir.
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you.
Mr. Young. Admiral, General, thank you very much for an
excellent presentation.
Mr. Dicks. One last one?
Mr. Young. Okay. Go ahead.
CHINA AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY
Mr. Dicks. One minute. On the China issue, is it correct
that China didn't have landing craft? If they wanted to do
something against Taiwan, they literally could not have moved
forces from the mainland of China?
Admiral Prueher. They have some LST-type Landing Ship, tank
ships. They have the capability to move about one division's
worth. They do not have a capability--amphibious capability--to
invade Taiwan. It would be a long way off.
Mr. Dicks. So they have a lot of manpower, a lot of army,
but their deployability is a major problem, isn't it? I mean,
they are a threat in their area but----
Admiral Prueher. They are not yet a force projector and
they have a long way to go before they will be a projection
force. But they are starting some ship visits around the area,
which is all right. But they don't have a force projection
capability.
Mr. Young. Their ship visits include visits to the United
States.
Admiral Prueher. That is right.
Mr. Young. And to our Western Coast for the first time
ever, right?
Admiral Prueher. That is right, sir. They have two
combatants and an oiler coming to Honolulu early this next week
and then going to San Diego and then to Peru.
Mr. Young. We have some additional questions that we didn't
get to because we are running out of time, but we would like to
submit them in writing and ask that you respond to them, if you
would.
General Tilelli. Yes, sir.
Mr. Young. The Committee will convene at 1:30 this
afternoon and our witness will be General Peay, Commander in
Chief, U.S. Central Command. And at this point thank you,
again, very much, both of you. The Committee is adjourned.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the
answers thereto follow:]
Combat Engineer Vehicle
Question. General, one of the assets which has been available to
you is the Combat Engineering Vehicle (CEV which mounts a 165mm
demolition gun. The committee understands that the CEV is being
withdrawn from service, and that some of the CEV missions may be filled
by the M1 tank. What mission assigned to the CEV could be done by the
M1 tank?
Answer. The M1A1 and M1A2 tank equipped with the 120mm main gun and
firing the M830A1 Multi Purpose Anti-Tank (MPAT) round can conduct the
stand-off point obstacle reduction (i.e. shattering to smaller easily
cleared pieces) portion of the mission performed by the M728 CEV. (M1
tank models previous to the M1A1 cannot fire the M830A1 round because
they have a 105mm main gun, hence they cannot perform that part of the
CEV point obstacle breaching mission.) The M1A1 and M1A2 firing the
M830A1 MPAT round can also demolish bridge piers and penetrate concrete
bunkers up to at least two meters in thickness, as can the CEV. At
present, the M1 tanks, including the M1A1 and M1A2, are not equipped
with bulldozer blade systems so they cannot perform the point obstacle
clearing portion of the CEV mission after the point obstacle has been
reduced. The M1A1 and M1A2 tank gun has a long barrel (unlike the short
165mm demolition gun on the CEV) which hinders the M1A1 or M1A2 tank
from traversing to engage obstacle targets in close quarters as would
be found in military operations in urban terrain (MOUT). The M1 family
of tanks do not have crane booms, so they cannot perform the lifting
mission of the CEV.
Question. Do those missions still exist?
Answer. Yes, the point obstacle breaching mission exists anywhere
the enemy can take advantage of restrictive terrain and place point
obstacles. Point obstacles range from simple wire and timber roadblocks
to concrete filled buses, to the massive rock drop obstacles in the
Korean theater consisting of up to one hundred concrete blocks, each
block approximately two meters in diameter and up to four meters in
depth. When executed, we presume that the enemy has mined the obstacle
to prevent manual demolition. A stand-off reduction capability is
therefore critical in terms of protecting our forces at the breach and
getting the breach opened quickly so we can maintain our momentum.
Point obstacles exist on both sides of the border in Korea. The CEV
right now is the only integrated system that is capable of reducing and
clearing point obstacles. The M1A1 and M1A2 tanks would either require
a bulldozer blade capability or we would have to move slow moving, un-
armored bulldozers (along with their transports and crews) forward to
have a pushing capability sufficient to clear the rubble out of the way
after the M1A1 or M1A2 tank reduced the obstacle with the main gun. In
restrictive terrain like Korea, where it is frequently not possible to
bypass built-up areas, the ability to quickly engage enemy defended
obstacles in urban terrain may mean more than just the life of the
breaching tank crew; rather saving the lives of the friendly forces
behind the breacher.
Question. What testing of 120mm tank ammunition has been done for
those missions, and what were the results?
Answer. Tests were conducted at Aberdeen Proving Grounds from mid-
November 1996 through mid-December 1996 to determine if the M830A1 MPAT
round could reduce scale concrete targets similar in diameter and half
the length of a single individual block of the many blocks that make up
the type 2 and larger type 3 rock drop obstacles in Korea. Published
test results showed that the M830A1 MPAT round, the modified M830A1
MPAT round with a solid nose, and the M123A1 High Explosive Penetrating
round fired at a 100 meter distance to the target were able to reduce
the unreinforced concrete target and the reinforced concrete targets.
An excursion of the test showed that the M865 Kinetic Energy round
fired at a 100 meter distance to the target was able to reduce the
reinforced concrete target. Debris resulting from the MPAT, modified
MPAT, and Kinetic Energy rounds was considerably larger, even after the
second round hit, than the debris resulting from most second round hits
(third in the case of a dud M123A fired against the bridge pier target)
of the M123A1 HEP round for the CEV.
Question. Which 120mm tank round will provide the best capability
for those missions?
Answer. From the test results, the modified M830A1 MPAT round will
provide the best capability for a 120mm round to perform the point
obstacle reduction mission. The concern is the clearing capability of
the M1A1 or M1A2 tank (no bulldozer blade) or the currently fielded M9
Armored Combat Earthmover (ACE) to push the large debris resulting from
the MPAT round out of the way in the breach. The M123A1 HEP (165mm)
round has a massive blast effect that tends to create small sized
rubble and sweeps much of the rubble through the breach.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.
Questions submitted by Mr. Hefner and the answers thereto
follow:]
Shortstop Electronic Protection System (SEPS)
Question. The Committee understands that US Forces Korea has an
urgent requirement for 62 SEPS units. What action is the Army taking to
expeditiously satisfy this requirement?
Answer. The Army is working to provide to US Forces Korea 26
Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) SEPS models that were
in use in Bosnia. Those systems are being returned, and upon their
return, they will undergo a period of maintenance for cleaning and any
needed repairs. That process is estimated to take 45-60 days. Upon
completion of the required maintenance, the systems will be sent to
Korea.
An additional 20 systems for a total of 46 will be bought with the
congressional appropriation of $5 million for fiscal year 1997.
Purchase of the remaining 16 systems will be addressed in an unfinanced
requirement in fiscal year 1998, and if necessary, in the fiscal year
1999-03 mini-POM.
Question. Congress appropriated $5 million in fiscal year 1997 to
initiate the production of SEPS for the urgent requirement in Korea.
What is the Army's progress toward obligating these funds to initiate a
production contract?
Answer. The $5 million congressional appropriation is currently on
OSD withhold. The Army is in the process of requesting that the funds
be released from withhold. The processing time for that request is
estimated to be 5-7 days. When the request is granted and the money is
released, the Army will notify the contractor, Whittaker Electronics
System, and the funds will be executed.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Hefner.
Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the answers thereto
follow:]
Priorities and Deficiencies
Question. Do you feel the interests and needs of the Pacific
Command have been adequately addressed in the fiscal year 1998 budget
request?
Answer. Overall, yes. We have many opportunities for input into the
military budget decision process through the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council, Chairman's Program Recommendations, Chairman's
Program Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense Program and
Budget Reviews, and the Defense Resources Board. In view of the need to
balance the federal budget, Pacific Command's interests and needs are
adequately addressed in the President's Budget.
Question. What is your assessment of the major shortfalls in:
personnel, training, equipment, and maintenance for those units under
your day-to-day command as well as those that would be assigned to you
in a war time situation?
Answer. My assessment is that we are ready to execute our mission.
However, we need to be attentive to indicators which may signal
problems for future readiness.
My biggest concern is our ability to keep quality people in
uniform. Retention rates among many specialties are down in each
Service. We need to provide adequate career progression opportunities,
compensation, and quality of life, especially for our skilled career
personnel. In the Pacific Command, the quality of barracks in Korea is
of special concern.
I am also concerned by problems identified by the Services in
recruitment. The Department of the Army forecasts a recruiting
shortfall of 6,000 through May 1997.
Joint and Service funding to support our Joint and Combined
Training Program are currently adequate. However, as costs continue to
increase, funding must keep pace. Paying for contingency operations
with training funds will reduce readiness.
Equipment modernization programs present potential long-term
readiness problems. For example, the Marine CH-46 helicopter fleet is
29-years old. The V-22 will not replace the CH-46 as a medium-lift
aircraft until 2014.
The condition of Petroleum Enroute Infrastructure in the Pacific
Command is another important concern. While the Fiscal Year 1998 budget
provides for the most critical infrastructure needs, future program
requirements await the conclusion of the Quadrennial Defense Review.
Some Services are reporting aircraft readiness as a concern, as a
result of age and deferred maintenance. Both the Air Force and Marines
report increasing backlogs in intermediate aircraft maintenance which
as affecting mission capability rates. The Navy estimates the average
age of its aircraft fleet will increase from 14.3 years to 18.4 years
by fiscal year 2003. Deferring depot maintenance for surface combatant
ships is also a potential readiness problem.
Quality people, training, equipment, and maintenance are all
essential elements of readiness. The QDR process is evaluating the
long-term readiness issues, based upon threats, strategy, and fiscal
expectations.
Question. What are the top ten priority items on your most recent
integrated priority list?
Answer. The Integrated Priority List (IPL) provides theater
priorities for program funding to the Secretary of Defense and the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs. The IPL leaves out many essential things, as it
focuses only on identifying the shortfalls and required capabilities
which are most important for accomplishment of Pacific Command's
mission.
In developing the IPL, my top priority is readiness. Ready forces
composed of well trained people equipped with modern, sustainable
technology are the foundation for the Pacific Command's ability to be
an active player in the region.
I consider quality of life and force protection overarching
requirements to the IPL. These issues span all we do. The magnitude of
their impact transcends a rank ordered list of system or program
requirements.
My top ten IPL items are as follows. ------.
Question. In your view, are present levels of investment funding
contained in the department's Future Years Defense Plan sufficient to
address the long term recapitalization requirements of today's forces?
Answer. We share the concerns of the Secretary of Defense and the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, about the annual funding shortfall of
approximately $20 billion in Service modernization accounts for the
Future Years Defense Plan.
Quadrennial Defense Review and Future Force Structure
Question. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) will reexamine the
current national security strategy and present the force structure of
the armed services. The QDR will purportedly make recommendations as to
what the appropriate mix of forces will look like to meet the strategic
and regional threats of the future. The results are due to be presented
to the Congress in May of this year.
What formal role have you played in the QDR process?
Admiral Prueher Answer. Both the Secretary of Defense and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff permitted us to participate
actively in the QDR process. My staff has worked closely with both the
Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) staff. For
example, we commented to the Joint Strategy Review and helped shape the
evolving OSD Defense Strategy. We are participating in the Dynamic
Commitment Wargame series, and reviewing numerous QDR products. We will
also participate in a mid-April executive (CINC-level) review. I am
satisfied that our voice has been heard in the QDR process.
General Tilelli Answer. JCS and OSD are doing a good job of pulling
in the respective CINC's representatives (senior officers and General
officers) into this effort. This is resulting in a good cross
fertilization of the services and CINC's requirements. Also, I and my
staff are full participants in the QDR series of war gaming sessions
(Dynamic Commitment series) and are working the hard questions (with
JCS and OSD staffs) in terms of what our military services need to
carry out the National Security Strategy.
Question. What in your view, are the most important issues that the
QDR should be examining?
Admiral Prueher Answer. The most important issue the QDR should
examine is how to best balance protection of U.S. interests through
commitment of our military forces with modernizing for the future.
Continued engagement of U.S. forces abroad is important, not only to
respond to crises and prepare for war. Military forces also help shape
the strategic environment. The presence of U.S. Pacific Command forces
has underwritten the security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region
since World War II.
A review of our strategy and force structure is the right thing to
do, but the QDR should bear in mind that the pace of change is also
important. We should innovate, but do so carefully, and should accept
some prudent risk. We should not make changes for sake of change, nor
should we fall into the trap of seeing technology as a panacea.
Finally, we have to remain aware of asymmetric challenges that could
confront us now and in the future.
General Tilelli Answer. As you know, OSD and JCS are taking a broad
range review of the current national security strategy and the
strategic context within which we must design our military forces.
Since the QDR process is ongoing, I think that any detailed answer to
this question would be premature. However, three points need to be
stressed from a Korea/NEA perspective. (1) We clearly need to
acknowledge that we are posturing for how we will ``shape'' and engage
NEA in the future. In this regard we need to determine if we want to be
reactive or proactive in this shaping; clearly determining what we want
to shape in the future. (2) The QDR process must fully acknowledge the
``flashpoint'' potential of Korean in the near-mid term. It is very
likely that the Korean peninsula will still be a potential threat to
national security even in 2005 (in terms of a nK regime or ongoing
turbulence caused by massive reconstruction/reunification actions that
could be going on as a result of nK collapse or possible war
scenarios). (3) The QDR process must also acknowledge the ``Dominant
Strategic Contexts'' that will drive stability in NEA and be a priority
for our Nation to address. The ``Dominant Strategic Context'' for NEA
in the mid-long term is clearly China's growth and expected motivation
to exert influence over NEA from a leadership position. The near-mid
term ``Dominant Strategic Context'' is the North/South Korea
contingency. How we handle this near term ``potential flashpoint'' will
set the stage for how we are perceived worldwide and be the framework
for either maintaining US influence in the NEA area to balance the
regional animosities or by which China steps in to establish regional
hegemony.
Question. Do you believe these issues are actually being addressed
by the QDR?
Admiral Prueher Answer. Yes. The QDR process has been open to the
regional combatant commanders. As a result, I believe the QDR is
addressing these issues. The QDR is reviewing the threats with a goal
of recommending an appropriate mix of forward deployed, U.S. based, and
reserve forces.
General Tilelli Answer. Yes, UNC/CFC and PACOM are fully stressing
the importance of these factors My only concern is that we do not
forget the threat of war or severe instability in the near-mid term.
Question. Some have spoken of the need to ``be open to a radical
restructuring of our armed forces.'' Do you agree?
Admiral Prueher Answer. I think that we should be willing to
consider concepts involving a radical restructuring of our armed
forces, but our best analysis shows that this is likely not the right
thing to do. We have an appropriate balance of land, amphibious, naval,
and air forces, with increased effectiveness and efficiencies residing
in improved joint operations and support.
In my judgment, the nature of warfare and of our tasks have not
sufficiently changed to justify the considerable risks and expense
radical restructuring would entail. We should take advantage of new
technologies through pursuing the revolution in military affairs in a
balanced manner. New technologies can enhance our efficiency and
effectiveness in applying force. Excessive dependence on high
technology solutions, though beguiling, will leave us vulnerable to a
foe who applies asymmetric attack such as terrorism, counter-
insurgency, weapons of mass destruction, or information operations.
Balance in leap ahead technology investment should be the watchword, so
we do not abandon needed core competency.
General Tilelli Answer. No. Rather, we need deliberate process by
which we can refine the clearly capable military forces we have now.
Radical approaches are for ``failure'' situations. Our nations military
situation is one of ``success.'' I think the QDR process is approaching
this challenge from this perspective.
Radical restructuring is clearly not the way to go . . . rather, we
need to focus on the expected strategic contexts that will face us in
the near-mid term and long term, then determine the strategy by which
we can clearly shape the international environment to protect and
promote US interests. Once this is done, we then need to address the
military capabilities across the board spectrum which will provide our
Nation the strategic and operational flexibility to deal with the
turbulent 21st century. This then provides a basis for sound force
structure refining and reengineering that allows you to make
``informed'' decisions as to how to refine and develop well balanced
force structures that make sense.
Question. Do you believe that the number of combat forces versus
support forces, the so-called ``tooth to tail ratio'', is out of
balance in the Defense Department today?
Admiral Prueher Answer. Overall, I think that the ``tooth to tail''
ratio is in balance, with the exception of base infrastructure. We
should continue to review our structure and take advantage of economies
which exist.
Sustaining quality forces which employ highly complex equipment
requires extensive support. Further, we expect our military to operate
at great distances over long periods of time with robust logistics and
minimal risk. These goals necessitate a higher percentage of support
forces than other nations. The larger consideration is for the
capability of the force as a whole.
Mission and location also affect the desired ``tooth to tail
ratio'' of combat to support personnel. The ratio is concern for the
Services as they manage their force structures. The Services review the
issue carefully, and acknowledge the need to shed some base
infrastructure.
General Tilelli Answer. There is no simple answer to a question
such as this. As much as we would like to have one, history affords us
to single prescribed ratio of support and combat forces. The ``tooth to
tail ratio'' varies for each of this country's available military
options. In the Korean theater, for example, the available military
options can include one or a combination of the following: civic
action, humanitarian assistance, civil affairs, and other military
activities to develop positive relationships with our Host Nation;
confidence-building and other measures to reduce military tensions;
military presence; armed conflict involving air, land, maritime, and
strategic warfare campaigns and operations in Korea. In each instance,
combat and support forces have a unique combat/support force
apportionment. Are these forces ``out of balance.'' in today's
Department of Defense? Probably not. The bottom-line is that a
Commander-in-Chief of a United States Unified, Multi-national Command
needs the flexibility that only a healthy tooth and a robust tail can
provide. USFK must be able to successfully accomplish its assigned
taks--whatever the mission, whatever the required tooth is tail ratio.
North Korea
Question. Even by North Korean standards, the past month has been
quite eventful. A Senor member of the North Korean government defected
in Beijing, another North Korean defector was shot in Seoul and North
Korean and U.S. officials have agreed to resume talks on achieving a
permanent settlement on the peninsula. As our senior military commander
in the theater and Korea itself, the Committee is very interested in
your assessment of the present military and political situation in
North Korea.
Answer. The situation in North Korea is highlighted by its
worsening economy, especially food shortages. Due to the poor 1996
harvest and limited foreign aid, the food situation will become
critical this spring and early summer. Additionally, coal and
electricity shortages are severely impacting economy and living
conditions. ------.
Stark conditions have kindled a rise in economic crime and in
malnutrition and related diseases, and a worsening of the apathetic
attitude of the population. ------.
Since spring the military has demonstrated its powerful potential.
We have detected the following: a major naval exercise in May; an
impressive road march exercise in 2d and 5th Corps in October; and a
robust winter training cycle from December to March that was
highlighted by high levels of mechanized and artillery training and
featured a major exercise by the 108th Mechanized Corps with air and
naval support in mid-January and an extensive nationwide exercise in
later March.
In international affairs, the North's apology for the submarine
incursion was driven by the North's need for food and a relaxation of
economic sanctions and other restrictions. The North's attendance at
the explanatory briefing for the Four-Party Talks is consistent with
these objectives, but this does not necessarily mean the actual talks
will be realized. Pyongyang is prone to make limited concessions for
short-time tactical gains, but is likely to resist any meaningful
opening or improvement of relations with the ROK because this would
threaten the survival of the Kim regime.
North Korea's economic and other problems stem from their decades-
long efforts to create a military for achieving reunification. They
have, from their perspective, largely achieved this capability and show
no willingness to relinquish it. We must remain alert to the
possibility that the North's leadership may conclude that the military
option is the only way to preserve their privileged status.
Question. What do you rate as the probability of armed conflict on
the Korean peninsula over the next year? Five years?
Answer. ------. We don't want to put a number on such a weighty
judgment. We simply want to say conditions are such that we believe
there's a higher probability than last year or the year before to use
the army before its demise becomes total and final.
Question. Update the Committee as to the current status of the
North Korean military forces. In your answer please address unit
readiness, force modernization, and development of weapons of mass
destruction.
Answer. North Korea maintains the capability to inflict enormous
destruction on the south through large-scale combat operations despite
readiness deficiencies caused by resource shortages. Deficits of food
and other essential commodities have adversely affected the health,
stamina, morale, and discipline and training levels of the soldiers.
Despite these problems, the force worked hard during the recent Winter
Training Cycle to improve readiness. Although overwhelming economic
problems may limit the pace of that improvement, the military is
capable of conducting corps and below movements and operations while
coordinating the integration of air and naval support.
The most significant force modernization trend has been the gradual
shift over the past decade of military combat power towards the forward
area. Of specific concern is the continuing forward deployment of long-
range artillery and MRL systems to underground facilities and hardened
sites within 15 kms of the DMZ. Operational exploitation forces and
front line corps with supporting artillery are positioned so far
forward now that they could launch a no-notice surprise attack. Other
notable activities include development of surface-to-surface missiles
(SSM), construction of underground facilities and wartime relocation
sites for industrial facilities, improvements in operations and
communications security, the build up of the air-cushion landing craft
fleet, submarine fleet enhancements, the forward deployment of fighter
aircraft to airfields within 55 nautical miles of the DMZ, air defense
improvements. ------.
In the event of renewed fighting on the Korean Peninsula, we expect
North Korea to employ chemical and possibly biological weapons. The
North has an active chemical weapons program, which has produced
several different types of chemical agents. ------. We assess that
North Korea could have one, possibly two, nuclear devices with a yield
in the 5-10 kiloton range. We don't believe these devices have been
weaponized.
Question. What are the present capabilities of the North Koreans to
attack and destroy U.S. and South Korean military port facilities in
the opening days of a conflict?
Answer. Long-term support to a ground campaign on the Korean
Peninsula requires port facilities to stay open. We need the ports to
manage both the incoming equipment required for strategic reinforcement
and the thousands of tons of consumable supplies, such as food,
ammunition, and petroleum products, required for military operations.
An airbridge from the United States could not move the required
personnel and materiel to sustain high intensity combat. U.S. and ROK
port facilities on peninsula are highly susceptible to disruption by a
chemical or biological attack because of our need to protect the
civilian stevedore force and to prevent incoming materiel from being
contaminated during transshipment. ------.
Question. Have there been any recent incidents along the DMZ?
Answer. The number of incidents within the DMZ has decreased over
the past several years. The rate of major incidents--intrusions or
weapons firing across the Military Demarcation Line (MDL)--peaked
during the late 1960's when there were numerous clashes in and near the
DMZ. There have been relatively few major incidents in the 1990's. The
most significant incident within the DMZ in 1996 occurred in April when
North Korea conducted reinforcement drills in the Joint Security Area
at Panmunjom. These drills involved the introduction of approximately
200 excess soldiers into the area for several hours on two consecutive
evenings. Another major incident on the peninsula occurred in September
1996 approximately 100 kilometers south of the DMZ when 26 North Korean
soldiers infiltrated ROK territory after their submarine ran aground in
the coastal waters near Kangnung, South Korea. The ensuing manhunt
conducted by South Korean forces resulted in the death of 24 North
Korean infiltrators, eight South Korean soldiers and five South Korean
civilians. Other major violations of the Armistice Agreement within the
DMZ in 1996 involved soldiers intentionally crossing the MDL,
introducing illegal weapons into the DMZ and firing weapons across the
MDL. There were no casualties associated with these violations. The
North Korean military in Panmunjom rejected all United Nations Command
protests regarding these violations of the Armistice Agreement.
Question. It is reported that the United States has a comprehensive
plan to airlift its citizens out of Korea in the event of a conflict.
Japan, however, with the second largest expatriate community in South
Korea, has no such plan. It is also reported that the US has lobbied
the Japanese government in vain to provide airborne assistance in the
event an evacuation becomes necessary. Are these reports accurate? If
so, does this situation concern you?
Answer. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with
HQ Pacific Command and HQ US Forces Korea, has initiated a Trilateral
dialogue with the ROK and Japanese governments to cover a range of
security issues in Northeast Asia. Noncombatant evacuations operations
(NEO) is one of the topics being addressed, and it is a sensitive
domestic political issues in Japan. We are entirely confident that in
the event of a military crisis on the Korean Peninsula, the Japanese
government would cooperate fully in evacuating both its substantial
number of Japanese citizens as well as US citizens. Additionally, the
US has refurbished aggressive programs using its lift assets to support
a NEO contingency. For example, we will use all available airlift and
sealift capabilities to evacuate South Korea.
------. And, likewise, the availability of cleared Sea-Lanes-of-
Communications and ferries will supplement our ability to conduct NEO.
If the American Embassy through the Department of State ------ in the
early stages of a crisis situation, these aircraft will greatly assist
in maximizing the departure of noncombatants. I fully support the
efforts of the American Embassy, in this endeavor. In all of our
exercises, we involve the American Embassy, USTRANSCOM, US Forces
Japan, and the Government of Korea in the coordination and planning to
execute Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.
South Korea
Question. What is your assessment of the present capabilities of
the Republic of Korea's (ROK) armed forces? What is the overall
readiness of the ROK forces?
Answer. The ROK military is best characterized as a capable, well-
equipped, and well-trained force, but one that is out-gunned by a
numerically superior foe. While readiness levels are high, in order to
improve their condition, the ROK JCS has taken positive steps to
resolve 22 specific military requirements identified at the most recent
Military Committee Meeting. Seventeen of the twenty-two have solutions
currently being implemented or programmed for implementation in the ROK
1998-2002 Joint Strategic Objective Plan. These initiatives will
enhance ROK capabilities and readiness into the foreseeable future. As
we think of our alliance, the ROK and US bring different capabilities
to the table; both are needed.
Question. In what mission do you believe the ROK military requires
the greatest modernization?
Answer. Counter Artillery and Rocket fire and Theater Missile
Defense and requirements that the ROK can improve considering the
massive indirect Rocket and Artillery threat from North Korea. However,
this is not to imply that the Republic of Korea is not addressing this
shortfall. South Korea spent $15.9 billion on its armed services,
approximately 3.1 percent of its GDP in 1996. Of this amount, the ROK
purchased five Q-36 and two Q-37 Counter Fire Radars from the United
States to supplement those systems employed by United States Forces
Korea. To improve the combined Theater Missile Defense, South Korea is
now considering purchasing Patriot.
Question. Do you believe the South Korean government is providing
adequate resources to maintain the present effectiveness and ensure the
future modernization of their military?
Answer. The Republic of Korea is improving those areas that we
think should be improved. They are providing adequate resources towards
its defense requirements. In 1996, the ROK defense was approximately
3.1 percent of its GDP, which compares very favorably with the United
States, In addition, the Republic of Korea is increasing the amount
spent toward the common defense of Korea by raising its defense budget
in 1997 by 12.8 percent.
Question. Are you experiencing and difficulties with communications
interoperability between ROK and US forces? Do US and ROK forces
acquire the same types of tactical communications equipment? If not,
why not?
Answer. Communications interoperability between US and ROK forces
is an issue with difficult problems to overcome. We have a command and
control system called TACCIMS which is used by both the ROK and US;
however, it is designed mainly for corps and above. The fielding of new
US communications equipment has improved the capability of US forces
but resulted in an ``interoperability gap'' with ROK forces. While the
ROK is developing their own systems, lack of coordination with US over
common standards in the design phase continues to hinder
interoperability.
There are ROK/US forums in place to provide coordination and we are
addressing to the ROK the importance of interoperability with their
main ally. These forums have improved some areas. For example, the US
is preparing to release the standard for TADIL-J to the ROK.
ROK/US communications interoperability remains the subject to
continued attention yet progress has been slow. For each system
affected we must emphasize to the ROK on the need to invest funds to
assure interoperability. In the endeavor to field new systems on
limited budgets this is difficult.
In regards to the US and ROK acquiring the same types of tactical
communications equipment, the ROK Government has made a conscious
effort to reduce dependence of US or other foreign communications
equipment. Communications is an area is which the ROK is able to
produce indigenous products with state-of-the-art technology. The ROK
wishes to utilize this capability as much as possible. This has
resulted in the fielding of ROK equipment which is not fully
interoperable with US equipment. On the other hand, the US must
consider interoperability on a broader scale then the ROK.
Interoperability with NATO and other allies dictate that we not acquire
equipment that is only compatible with ROK equipment.
We will continue to emphasize to the ROK the importance of
interoperability with the US in its development and acquisition of new
systems.
Question. How confident are you in the ability of US and ROK
intelligence and warning systems to detect a surprise attack from the
north?
Answer. ------. CFC and the national intelligence community monitor
around the clock the hundreds of bases, railheads, and assembly areas
associated with preparations for war. While fully realizing the North
would go to extreme measures to deny us warning, our extensive
collection effort against the North is likely to provide unambiguous
warning of attack at least 12 to 24 hours in advance of the execution
of even the most short-fuzed North Korean attack scenario.
China
Question. Admiral Prueher, can you please discuss the present
capabilities of China's armed forced today? In your answer please
address the present arms modernization program both conventional and
nuclear, and the extent of Russian arms sales to the Chinese.
Answer. The People's Republic or China (PRC) is capable of
defending the mainland against conventional attack and maintaining
internal stability. It possesses a limited ability to attack beyond its
borders, due in large part to obsolescent weapons system and an
inadequate logistics infrastructure.
We share regional leaders' concern about China's military
modernization and lack of transparency on security objectives. China's
modernization program for the last decade has stressed the acquisition
and development of modern weapons systems. It has also focused on
command and control of forces. China has purchased the Russian Su-27/
FLANKER, but the Chinese version lacks aerial refueling capability.
This limits its range. China also acquired the Russian KILO-class
diesel submarine, with two already delivered and an additional two
probably arriving this year or next. China purchased the SA-10/GRUMBLE
air defense missile and deployed it around Beijing. ------.
The Chinese are shifting from a large standing army to one
attempting to incorporate advanced technology in a smaller force. While
their intent to modernize is manifest, they will not have a significant
force projection capability for at least a decade. ------.
Question. What is the current status of the Chinese arms export
program? Who are they exporting weapons to? What types of weapons are
they exporting? Specifically, are they exporting ballistic missiles or
weapons of mass destruction?
Answer. From 1991 to 1995, China was the world's sixth leading arms
supplier, providing low technology systems valued at $2.7 billion to
Third World counties in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Chinese arms
sales have been dropping since the late 1980s; this trend is expected
to continue. China's largest regional market is in neighboring Asian
states, primarily Pakistan, Burma, Thailand, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka.
Although Middle East sales are declining, Iran is China's largest
customer. The African market is small. China continues to seek inroads
into the Latin American arms market with very limited success.
China's most significant arms exports include: ------. China
provided Pakistan with nuclear and missile technologies. Beijing
remains Iran's most important supplier of nuclear technologies,
although so far it has refrained from selling technologies for uranium
enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing, or plutonium production. China
also is the most important supplier of equipment, materials, and
technology for Iran's chemical warfare and missile programs.
Question. Do you foresee any changes in China's top military
leadership in the post-Deng era?
Answer. We watch the structure of the People's Liberation Army
carefully. The only top military leadership changes we anticipate soon
are changes with in China's Central Military Commission. We expect
those changes to occur during the 15th Party Congress scheduled for
October 1997. We expect new appointments will come from among those
military leaders who are familiar to us.
Question. Have you observed anything out of the ordinary in recent
training exercises conducted by the Chinese armed forces?
Answer. With the exception of a naval exercise in October 1996, The
People's Republic of China (PRC) has not conducted any extraordinary
military exercises since March 1996, when the People's Liberation Army
(PLA), Navy, and Air Force conducted a major exercise in the Taiwan
Strait. ------. Training for the rest of 1996 and the beginning of 1997
focused on antisurface and antisubmarine warfare, air defense,
communications, limited combat maneuvers, mobilization, and amphibious
operations. We believe this training constituted building blocks for
force integration and joint operations.
Recent Chinese military exercises have not compared in scope or
size to the March and October 1996 exercises. We expect the norm of
small, relatively uncomplicated exercises will continue through 1997,
as Beijing focuses on the smooth reversion of Hong Kong to Chinese
control and senior leadership visits to other Asian countries and to
the United States.
Fiscal Year 1997 Supplemental Funding
Question. As in the past two fiscal years, the Committee is being
advised that if the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Bill is not
enacted before the end of this month, third and fourth quarter OPTEMPO
funding and training opportunities will be lost.
Do you anticipate any other readiness problems during the course of
Fiscal Year 1997?
Answer. Yes. Without prompt approval of supplemental funding, many
commanders will be forced to make tough decisions reducing training and
maintenance. Timely approval of supplemental funds for unscheduled
contingencies will help prevent these shortfalls.
Joint Operations
Question. The principal objective of the Goldwater-Nichols
Department of Defense Reorganization Act was to address the persistent
problems of interservice interoperability, unclear command
relationships and competing doctrine that had hampered joint service
contingency operations in the past. The intent being to make all
services work together as a joint team.
What progress do you believe has been made in your command and DoD
as a whole in implementing the changes mandated by the Goldwater-
Nichols Act?
Answer. The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act focused attention on joint
manning, education, and operations. It took several years to develop
joint doctrine and officers with joint warfighting skills. We have
achieved this first level of ``jointness.'' We now have the doctrine
and the necessary personnel to effectively conduct joint operations.
Within the last two years in this theater we have made great strides in
extending joint operations to service components. Our exercise program
has helped apply joint doctrine to operational issues. For example,
during the recent TANDEM THRUST exercise in Australia the commander of
7th Fleet was the Joint Task Force commander. He was responsible for
integrating amphibious landings by Marine forces, parachute landings by
Army forces, Air Force bomber operations, as well as function in a
mult-national environment. Because of training exercises such as TANDEM
THRUST and the rest of the U.S. Pacific Command exercise program, our
forces are much better able to operate in a joint environment.
Question. What still needs to be accomplished and how do the
individual Services become more efficient at fighting as a competent
joint force in future contingency operations?
Answer. We need to continue to exercise and strengthen joint
integration among forces. However, most operations we conduct in this
theater also involve other government agencies. The next level of focus
for joint operations is inter-agency. We need to develop programs and
policies which allow us to operate more effectively within the inter-
agency process. Recent training experiences in Humanitarian Assistance
(TEMPO BRAVE) and Consequence Management Operations (ELLIPSE CHARLIE)
highlight this need. We have begun to incorporate the inter-agency
process into our training programs and expect to see near-term
improvements.
Beyond inter-agency cooperation, the next level of joint operations
is multi-national. Cooperative engagement in peacetime promotes multi-
national cooperation in crisis. Continued funding of cooperative
engagement programs is required to sustain multi-national ties.
Component forces bring Service competencies to the joint fight. The
Joint Force Commander is best served when provided trained and ready
forces able to accomplish tasks which support the joint operation.
Services need to focus on core competencies while incorporating
interoperable doctrine, logistics, and communications.
Question. Do you see any of the command relationships in USPACOM as
redundant or unwieldy?
Answer. Command Relationships in the U.S. Pacific Command are
appropriate for the security structure within the theater. The mix of
components and subunified commands is effective and supports efficient
execution of our regional strategy. Subunified commands in Japan,
Korea, and Alaska fulfill essential roles and help to overcome the
tyranny of distance in the Pacific. The unique arrangements in Korea,
while complex, are both proven and well understood.
For contingencies outside Korea, Pacific Command implements command
and control with Joint Task Force commanders reporting directly to the
Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Command.
Question. Do you believe major procurement decisions are made by
the services today on the basis of what a program contributes to the
nation's total defense capability as opposed to the individual
service's?
Answer. Yes. The Joint Requirement Oversight Council, in
consultation with the Commanders-in-Chief, ensures military
procurements are evaluated on the basis of the nation's defense and
fulfill valid military necessities.
Force Levels in the Pacific Theater
Question. About 100,000 United States military members are
currently stationed in the Asia-Pacific region. Admiral Prueher, you
have recently been quoted in reference to the Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR) as saying that ``the fact that we are reviewing our force
structure and posture does not mean that troops will be trimmed in
Asia.'' In addition, several of your component commanders have
expressed the opinion that they expect no significant changes in force
structure or troop numbers (as a result of the QDR).
Do you believe that these thoughts are consistent with Secretary
Cohen's statement that ``everything is on the table'' for the QDR?
Answer. Yes. My thoughts are consistent with Secretary Cohen's
statement. While our entire force structure and posture are ``on the
table'' in the QDR, the national interests which call for forward
deployed forces in Asia are compelling. The administration has recently
reiterated and committed to the need for 100,000 in Asia, and I fully
support this position. For the foreseeable future, the capabilities
represented by 100,000 forward deployed personnel are about right to
shape the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region, respond to
crisis, and prepare for the future.
Question. Does USPACOM intend to make any proposals in terms of
force restructuring for the QDR?
Answer. We do not intend to make any proposal for force
restructuring of USPACOM forces for the QDR. We believe the current
balance of forward deployed, forward based, and continental U.S. based
forces is about right in quality and kind.
For the foreseeable future, military requirements justify the
continued forward deployment of the capabilities of about 100,000
personnel represent in the III Marine Expeditionary Force, Fifth and
Seventh Air Forces, 7th Fleet, and Eighth U.S. Army. We are working
closely with the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense
on the QDR.
Question. Do you believe that the present force level of 100,000
forward-deployed troops in USPACOM's area of responsibility is driven
more by operational requirements or by the need for a politically
significant level of troops in the theater?
Answer. The two are clearly linked--the political significance of
the force stems largely from its operational effectiveness. The United
States military forward-deployed force level of approximately 100,000
in the Asia-Pacific region is driven by operational requirements for
capabilities. It is an essential element of regional security and
America's global military posture. Forward-deployed forces in the
Pacific ensure a rapid and flexible worldwide crisis response and
warfighting capability; discourage the emergence of a regional hegemon;
enhance our ability to influence a wide spectrum of important issues;
overcome the tyranny of distance and demonstrate to our friends,
allies, and potential enemies alike the United States' interest in the
security of the entire region.
While the number 100,000 represents a significant regional metric
of U.S. commitment, we adjust the force based upon changes in
requirements and capabilities. After the Cold War, American military
forces forward deployed in Asia were adjusted. We reduced our forces in
the region from approximately 135,000 in 1990 to approximately 100,000
in 1994.
For the foreseeable future, military requirements justify the
continued forward deployment of the capabilities approximately 100,000
personnel represent.
OPTEMPO/Training
Question. Please list for the Committee the major deployments
undertaken by USPACOM in the past fiscal year.
Answer. We have executed a significant number of major deployments
the past year, encompassing exercises, operational deployments, and
operational missions. Last year we conducted 18 Pacific Command
sponsored exercises throughout the region, involving over 86,000
personnel. We conducted 22 operational deployments, including: 3
Carrier Battle Groups and 3 Amphibious Ready Groups deployed to the
Arabian Gulf; 2 Carrier Battle Groups deployed to the South China Sea
in response to China/Taiwan tensions; over 8,000 U.S. Army soldiers in
10 separate operational deployments; and 650 U.S. Air Force personnel
to Southwest Asia in support of Central Command operations. We also
deployed forces to support 9 operational missions, including over 2000
personnel from all services to support Operation Pacific Haven, the
large scale evacuation of Kurdish refugees to Guam, and over 200 U.S.
Army personnel to execute Operation Marathon Pacific, returning Chinese
migrants to China via Wake Island.
Question. Is the operating tempo of any units under your command
significantly higher than any other? If so, which units?
Answer. (a) Yes. We extensively employ many of the units identified
by the Joint Staff as ``Low Density High Demand'' (LD/HD). Many other
units approach, and in rare cases exceed, their service OPTEMPO
guidelines.
(b) The LD/HD units most in demand in the Pacific Command are the
EA-6B Prowler, U-2, P-3 Reef Point, and Civil Affairs detachments.
Besides LD/HD units, the following units experienced the highest
OPTEMPO within their components:
Pacific Fleet: 5 units exceeded the Chief of Naval Operations'
PERSTEMPO guidelines last year:
--USS Bunker Hill, USS Thach, & USS Rodney M Davis, all homeported
at Yokosuka, Japan.
--SH-60F Squadrons 4 & 8, which deploy with Carrier Battle Groups.
Pacific Air Forces (PACAF): PACAF strives to limit time away to 120
days per year. Support to CENTCOM has driven PACAF to exceed 120 days
for some units:
--The 13th Fighter Squadron spent an average of 116.7 days away
from Misawa, Japan last year. Half the squadron spent 180 days
deployed.
--67th FS personnel were gone 142 days away from Kadena, Japan.
--Co-Pilots in the 909th Air Refuel Squadron averaged 131 days away
from Kadena.
US Army Pacific: Engineer and Military Intelligence specialists
(such as translators) are the busiest soldiers, spending an average of
6 months annually away from home, either deployed or in the field.
Combat arms soldiers are gone only slightly less--usually 5 months
annually.
Marine Forces Pacific: Certain aviation units are the most
deployed, annually spending an average of 8 to 9 months away from home.
F-18 Hornet Squadrons and CH-46 helicopters are in especially high
demand. Marine ground combat units spend at least six months annually
deployed or in the field.
Question. Do you believe that the troops under your command today
are receiving adequate training? If not, why not?
Answer. Yes. The forces within Pacific Command receive adequate
training. We have made joint operations the norm through a series of
exercises (TEMPEST EXPRESS, TEMPI BRAVE, TANDEM THRUST, and COBRA
GOLD). We have used a ``crawl--walk--run'' training model to develop a
joint team.
We begin by using academic instructions and unit level training to
establish the foundation for joint operations. My staff sends out
mobile training teams to component headquarters to provide joint
training and expertise during this initial phase to assist the
components.
We then move to the next stage, the TEMPEST EXPRESS exercise, which
uses table-top simulations to train Joint Task Forces. We stop and
regroup as often as necessary during the training to ensure we reach
our training objectives. This Fiscal Year we will conduct TEMPEST
EXPRESS exercises with five joint Task Forces (7th Fleet, I MEF, I
Corps, ALCOM, and III MEF). We will train 3rd Fleet during the first
quarter of Fiscal Year 1998.
Finally, we exercise Joint Task Forces and the Pacific Command
Headquarters staff during demanding exercises such as TEMPO BRAVE (7th
Fleet last summer; III MEF this fall), TANDEM THRUST (7th Fleet), and
COBRA GOLD (I Corps). In these exercises we include the entire joint
team and carefully analyze our performance in after action reviews to
ensure we capture all lessons learned. We use this feedback to design
future training and to correct doctrinal or organizational
deficiencies.
The keys to successful joint training are well trained and equipped
forces. All Pacific Command components have aggressive training
programs which focus on developing and sustaining the unique skills of
their force. Our success in integrating these forces into successful
joint task forces is indicative of the high level of training of our
component forces.
Question. Do you feel that Military Operations Other than War
(MOOTW) by U.S. forces has affected the readiness or combat skills of
U.S. forces?
Answer. Yes. However, the effects are uneven. Many of the command
and control processes and systems used by U.S. Forces in MOOTW are the
same they would use in combat. Military Operations Other than War
usually involve a combination of air, land, sea, space, and special
operations forces as well as the efforts of governmental agencies and
non-governmental organization in a complementary fashion. Plans for
MOOTW are prepared and executed in a similar manner as plans for war.
The mission analysis and command estimate processes are as critical in
planning for MOOTW as they are in planning for war. The basic planning
process is unchanged, but the planning considerations are different.
Likewise, the logistical systems and command and control systems are
similar. Force projection, sustainment, and the command and control of
these forces is accomplished using the same systems for both MOOTW and
war. Therefore, at the joint force and service component planning
levels, executing MOOTW operations does not significantly degrade
readiness or combat skills.
Individual and collective skills are degraded to some extent among
some tactical units. Training time and money are limiting factors for
all units. If units are diverted from training on combat skills to
support MOOTW operations there is a degradation of combat skills. We
rely on subordinate commanders to assess the readiness of those combat
skills and ensure that the level of training for combat tasks remains
adequate to support combat operations. Units within the Pacific Command
are ready to execute their mission.
Question. What are the major joint training exercises that will be
undertaken by the Pacific Command in fiscal year 1997 and which ones
are budgeted for 1998? Are the funds budgeted for the service's Fiscal
Year 1998 request sufficient for your projected training needs? Has the
U.S. participation in Operations Other than War altered the types of
exercises you conduct?
Answer. There are 24 joint training exercises scheduled for Fiscal
Year 1997. The major exercises are: RECEPTION STAGING ONWARD MOVEMENT
AND INTEGRATION, ULCHI FOCUS LENS, FOAL EAGLE, FREEDOM BANNER, ELLIPSE
CHARLIE, TEMPEST EXPRESS, TANDEM THRUST, COBRA GOLD, KEEN SWORD, and
BALIKATAN. Fiscal Year 1998 has a total of 28 joint training exercises
scheduled. All are provided for within the budget.
Yes. Service budgets are sufficient for Pacific Command to execute
the Fiscal Year 1998 training and exercise programs.
Yes. U.S. participation in Military Operations Other Than War has
increased the training emphasis upon these types of operations during
our Joint Task Force training exercises.
Question. What new systems and methods (i.e. simulation etc.) are
employed by USPACOM to make joint training more effective? Are the
component services under your command adopting these new approaches?
Answer. My guidance is, where sensible, to use simulations instead
of moving people and equipment. We use a robust simulation program at
all levels to develop training programs which are more efficient. We
also leverage information technology so we are able to reach back into
continental U.S. based resources. We strive to be efficient custodians
of our training resources.
Simulations of operations on the Korean peninsula are good examples
of this effort. We blend service component simulations to support joint
exercises using an Aggregate Level Simulation Protocol to employ
component simulations in concert. We tie together the Army's Corps
Battle Simulation, the Navy's Research Evaluation and System Analysis,
the Air Force's Air Warfare Simulation, and the Marine Corps' Marine-
Air Ground Task Force Tactical Warfare Simulation.
We are also incorporating emerging Joint Simulations (JSIMS)
systems into our training and operations. Initial Operational
Capability for JSIMS is scheduled for Fiscal Year 1999, with the focus
on supporting Joint Task Force and unified combatant commands. JSIMS
will integrate existing simulations into a common framework that
includes live, virtual, and constructive modeling and simulation. JSIMS
will also provide a training environment at the operational level of
war that will accommodate requirements at the strategic and tactical
levels including space, transportation, and intelligence. This effort
will reduce overhead and operating costs for training and increase the
overall utility of simulations.
We use our information systems to ``reach back'' to assets in the
continental U.S. We have leveraged facilitates such as Atlantic
Command's Joint Training and Simulations Facility into exercises being
conducted in South East Asia. We have also electronically connected
Joint Exercise Control Groups from places such as the Army War College
in Carlisle, Pennsylvania into exercises being conducted off Indonesia
(TEMPO BRAVE 96). This capability is also used by our components. As
Global Command and Control Systems mature our components' ability to
interact with other headquarters will also continue to improve.
Troop Quality, Morale, and Medical
Question. In visiting various statewide bases, members of the
Committee have been hearing complaints about medical care and dental
plans.
How satisfied are troops in USPACOM with the medical care, and
dental care for themselves and their dependents? What are the major
shortcomings of medical care in your command? How many U.S. military
operated hospitals are there in the Pacific Command?
Answer. According to a Department of Defense survey, most personnel
are satisfied with military health care in the Pacific. The Pacific
region is in transition to a managed care program under TRICARE.
TRICARE Pacific is being implemented in Alaska, Hawaii, and throughout
the Western Pacific, including all remote sites. Once implementation is
completed, TRICARE should maximize the operational readiness of our
active duty military while continuing to provide a high quality of care
for all beneficiaries.
The influx of additional dental officers and support staff has
improved accessibility in general dentistry and increased specialty
care. Overall satisfaction with dental care is good. However, full
service can not be provided to family members in remote locations.
Some individuals perceive TRICARE will reduce benefits and
flexibility. As implementation proceeds, we will monitor patient
satisfaction with quality of care, access, and cost to the individual,
and ask for your continued support to ensure that medical benefits
remain intact.
Geography, culture, and politics are obstacles to accessible,
affordable, quality health care for many active duty personnel and
their family members assigned to remote locations. This compels some
service-members to pay significant out-of-pocket, up-front expenses
when obtaining care on local economies. We could better serve these
beneficiaries with local authority to contract for, and pay directly
some costs, instead of reimbursement to the member. Family members
stationed in locations where there are no U.S. dental facilities also
need additional assistance in obtaining and paying for quality dental
care.
There are ten hospitals and fourteen branch clinics. The hospitals
are in the following areas: Alaska, Hawaii, Okinawa, Guam, Japan, and
Korea.
Strategic Lift/Pre-Positioned Equipment
Question. In the event of hostilities on the Korean peninsula, do
you believe that adequate air and sealift capacity exists to ensure the
rapid reinforcement of troops in theater? Do you have any deficiencies
in terms of cargo handling equipment in the military port facilities on
the peninsula or else where in theater?
Answer. To be completely candid, I consider the available air and
sealift capacity only adequate. To ensure rapid reinforcement of forces
in Korea--or anywhere else, DoD must procure enough Large Medium-Speed
Roll-On/Roll-Off Ships (LMSRs) to overcome the shortfall in sealift for
vehicles. The most recent, fully integrated Time-Phased Force
Deployment Data (TPFDD) for ------.
As for cargo handling equipment, in Korea we are experiencing a
Rough Terrain Container Handler (RTCH) shortfall. This limits our
capability to download or transfer containers in the theater. The
magnitude of the deficiency is not yet quantified; however, the
container handling problem at the sea ports in Korea is currently being
studied by FKJ4. The aerial port material handling equipment in Korea
is being analyzed by Pacific Air Forces (PACAF).
Quality of Life--Housing
Question. The Committee has added substantial amounts over the
budget in the past two years to improve the quality of life for troops.
In part, this funding has been added to improve the condition of
barracks and related facilities. The Congress added $700 million in
fiscal year 1996 and $600 million in FY 1997 for this purpose. The
barracks housing unaccompanied troops in Korea have had perennial
maintenance problems which have been addressed by the Congress on
several occasions. Describe for the Committee the condition of the
barracks and related housing and dining facilities in your command.
Answer. Our largest housing requirement is for unaccompanied
soldiers. Problems throughout Korea include shortages and over
crowding; substandard buildings, such as Quonset huts and H-relocatable
buildings; deteriorated older barracks with gang latrines; and
substandard/non-existent officer and senior enlisted UPH (unaccompanied
personnel housing. Survey results from a recent sexual harassment team
visit pointed out that crowded housing conditions are the top problem
and create an environment conducive to misconduct. We are addressing
the barracks problems with an integrated program consisting of U.S.
funded military construction (MILCON) and host nation funded
construction (HNFC) to alleviate shortage and substandard conditions.
Operations and maintenance funds are used to renovate existing
buildings to current standards. Some service members must reside off
the installations because of shortages. The Army alone spends
approximately $18 million (M) per year to house over 800 unaccompanied
officer and senior enlisted personnel off-post in Korea. Also, many
must live on-post in substandard conditions due to military necessity.
We are investigating alternate construction methods, such as pre-
fabricated housing, to develop an affordable solution. However, it is
unlikely we will be able to correct this problem with operations and
maintenance funding. Major construction funding is needed. Almost 70
percent of our 50 dining facilities are over 20 years old. Only ten of
these facilities have been renovated in the past nine years. We are
using an approach similar to what we are using to solve the housing
problem. The worst facilities are being replaced through U.S. funded
MILCON and HNFC as funding permits.
Question. Have any of the additional funds provided in the fiscal
year 1997 Appropriations Act been directed to improve the facilities
housing your troops?
Answer. $10 million of the new Quality of Life Enhancements,
Defense appropriation has been earmarked to improve our barracks in
Korea, $8 million for the Army and $2 million for the Air Force.
Question. What is the backlog of real property maintenance and
repair work in your AOR? Is this increasing or decreasing?
Answer. Our infrastructure, that is utility systems, are most
effected by limited real property maintenance (RPM) funding. These
systems have deteriorated to where they form the largest component of
our backlog of maintenance and repair work. A recent Architect-Engineer
study identified $659 million of requirements to repair or upgrade
infrastructure on Eighth U.S. Army installations. We estimate our total
infrastructure needs in U.S. Forces Korea to be $750 million. Our most
serious problems resulted from past reductions in MILCON and operations
and maintenance funding. Our unaccompanied housing and base
infrastructure systems have suffered the worst from this lack of
investment. Currently, we must rely exclusively on host nation funded
construction to complete the majority of the infrastructure work. To
support programmed major facility construction, such as new barracks,
Eighth Army needs an additional $10 million in MILCON annually to
rejuvenate deteriorated utility systems. Seventh Air Force requires an
additional $5 million annually to solve similar problems. Otherwise,
backlogs will continue to increase and catastrophic failures of utility
systems will occur.
POW/MIA Status
Question. Admiral Prueher, please describe the current status of
efforts to resolve POW/MIA cases in Vietnam.
Answer. There are 2127 Americans still unaccounted-for in Southeast
Asia. Of this total 1588 were lost in Vietnam. Joint Task Force-Full
Accounting (JTF-FA) is scheduled to conduct five Joint Field Activities
(JFA) in Vietnam during Fiscal Year 1997. Our JTF-FA troops are doing a
superb job. Each JFA lasts approximately 30 days during which JTF-FA
deploys six recovery teams, two investigation teams, and one research
and investigation team (over 100 U.S. personnel). JTF-FA completed five
JFAs in Fiscal Year 1996. The Vietnamese Office for Seeking Missing
Persons continues to provide good support to our operations.
Question. How do you rate the Vietnamese at the present time in
terms of their willingness to cooperate on this issue?
Answer. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) Government
continues to cooperate on the POW/MIA effort and understands, I
believe, that further cooperation is required to satisfactorily resolve
the issue. Vietnamese support to Joint Field Activities remains good.
Trilateral operations between the Vietnamese, Cambodians, and U.S.
began in February 1997. Initial results are promising.
Significant progress has been made on confirming the fates of
individuals on the last known alive list. Of the original 196
individuals, the fate of only 48 individuals is yet to be confirmed.
The SRV Government is also continuing efforts to locate individuals
with valuable first-hand information relating to cases of unaccounted-
for Americans. Vietnamese witnesses provided information which resulted
in recovery of remains in Laos. The SRVE Government also recently
turned over more than 150 documents, and permitted U.S. teams to review
thousands of archival items in museums and other government offices.
These documents and items provided a significant number of
correlations. In response to unilateral case leads we provided to
Vietnam between January and May 1996, the Vietnamese Office for Seeking
Missing Persons has provided written reports on 73 case investigations.
Question. How many cases have been resolved over the past year?
Answer. In 1996, JTF-FA teams in Vietnam recovered and repatriated
21 sets of remains to the Central Identification Laboratory Hawaii
(CILHI) to process for identification. The Armed Forces Identification
Review Board (AFIRB) in 1996 approved the identification of 15 sets of
remains previously repatriated from Vietnam. Thus far in 1997, two sets
of remains have been repatriated from Vietnam.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Young.]
Thursday, April 17, 1997.
TESTIMONY OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AND OTHER INTERESTED INDIVIDUALS AND
ORGANIZATIONS
----------
HMMWV AND OTHER TACTICAL VEHICLES
WITNESS
HON. TIM ROEMER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA
Introduction
Mr. Young. The Committee will come to order.
This morning we are to hear testimony from Members of
Congress and from witnesses outside the Congress. This is the
last scheduled hearing for fiscal year 1998, although there
will be a number of other special hearings on some subjects
that we have to revisit. But we have completed the rest of the
scheduled hearings.
We have had testimony from the new Secretary of Defense,
the chairman of each branch of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
war-fighting CINCs, and many other DOD officials, and now we
want to hear from you today. Your input is always very, very
helpful to the members of this Committee.
Many of you here today have testified before. For those
here for the first time, let me explain something about our
process. Each of your prepared statements will appear in the
published hearing volume, and we ask you to summarize your
actual testimony in 5 minutes. This is consistent with how the
Committee operates under the 5-minute rule. The members of the
Subcommittee only have 5 minutes during the hearing process for
their questions of witnesses.
Unfortunately, many of our members are not here this
morning and will not be here because the other subcommittees
are marking up their titles of the supplemental appropriations,
and they are trying to finalize that today. We finished our
part of it yesterday. All of our members serve on other
Subcommittees as well.
Our first witness this morning is Congressman Tim Roemer of
South Bend, Indiana. Congressman Roemer serves on the Committee
on Education and the Workforce and the Committee on Science. He
is the expert in the Congress on the HMMWV, the principal means
of land transportation for our troops.
Last year, the HMMWV was not adequately funded and we were
able to add $66 million to the budget to provide for unfunded
requirements. It is one of the nonsexy but essential tools for
our troops that we put on our scroll that identifies items like
this that stretches across the room that identify shortages of
equipment and supplies that are necessary to make the military
work. We appreciate your input as it comes to the essential
subject of HMMWVs, trucks, and the ability to move from one
place to another.
We are happy to hear from you at this time, Congressman.
You have the floor.
Statement of Congressman Roemer
Mr. Roemer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me start by just asking unanimous consent that my
entire statement be entered into the record.
Mr. Young. Without objection, that will be done.
Mr. Roemer. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you for your help
in the past.
You mentioned your help to the HMMWV program last year. I
really appreciate that. I appreciate Mr. Bonilla's attendance
here initially and appreciate the help the entire Subcommittee
and Full Committee and their attention to four different
requests that I am going to make this morning.
One is going to be I am requesting a total appropriation of
$156.2 million in the Army procurement funding for the HMMWV. I
am also requesting $65 million in Marine Corps funding
procurement funds for the HMMWV Extended Service program--ESP
program; $40 million in Army procurement for the 2.5 ton truck
ESP; and finally, Mr. Chairman, a fiscal year 1999 issue, it
does not include a funding request on the Vandal program, which
I will explain a little bit about.
Mr. Chairman, you said it eloquently and you said it
articulately in your opening statement. I am here for the
heart, the soul, and the guts of the Army programs. That is the
best built Jeep in the entire world, the 2.5 ton truck, the
kinds of equipment that keeps our young men and women safe when
we put them in harm's way, whether it be in the Persian Gulf or
whether it has to be in two different instances fighting,
whether that be in the Middle East or in the Korean Peninsula
some day in the future.
Let me tell you a quick story about the HMMWV. When we had
to invade, looking for General Noriega in Panama, they dropped
HMMWV out of the sky. One of them came out of the sky and the
parachute half opened and landed off target, which is unusual,
upside down in a swamp. It was a HMMWV. They turned it over,
they started it up, and it went and helped capture Noriega.
In Bosnia, in the peacekeeping mission just recently, an
armored HMMWV struck an antitank mine. It is not supposed to
protect in all instances the personnel in that kind of
situation. The three men in that HMMWV walked away unharmed.
This vehicle works, it is the best in the world, and we
need them to protect our troops. It also has all kinds of
capabilities, fire truck capabilities, Avenger capabilities,
all kinds of things that this can do for a very versatile
mission.
I really implore this Committee to continue to invest in
this Jeep.
Secondly, on the $40 million Army procurement for 2.5 ton
trucks, we take a 25-year-old truck and we make it brand new,
and we make it work better than it did the first time. Often
times these trucks, which are older than the people driving
them, come off the assembly line, they work better with central
inflation on the air tire system, they have a 30 percent better
engine for fuel efficiency, they have better equipment in them.
These things run in a great manner to protect our troops and to
feed and clothe and do everything for our troops on the line to
get armor to them.
This is not, again, a section I investment, it is a much-
needed investment, quite frankly, one that sometimes the Army
does not do a very good job in lobbying for. It doesn't make
for the same kind of section I thing as a roll out of the F-22,
but these 25-year-old trucks are much needed for our personnel.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, on the Vandal program, let me just
say that there are a couple different issues on this program
which I hope that you and your staff will look into. The Vandal
program tests ship defense shipments against high-speed, low
altitude ship missiles and is made by allied signal target
systems.
The Navy has always expressed satisfaction with the
performance of the U.S. contractor on the target missile and
not made clear why they are turning their backs on a U.S.-made
system in favor of a Russian-made MA-31.
I would hope that the Committee, first, is willing to ask
the Navy if they are willing to lose its only U.S. supplier of
supersonic sea skimming missiles, and, second, is all of the
risk associated with purchasing a Russian target fully
understood from both the technical and commercial standpoint?
I have four or five other questions that I hope the
Committee looks into.
Let me just sum up by saying, Mr. Chairman, and joined by
Mr. Hefner, the distinguished gentleman from North Carolina,
thank you again for your support for these much-needed, heart,
soul and guts types of items for our Army and our young people.
Thank you for sending your staff out to the G.M. General plant
last year. We very much look forward to cooperating with your
Committee and answering your questions as you look into these
requests.
Mr. Young. Congressman, thank you very much. We appreciate
the sincerity of your testimony.
I wanted to tell you that I have ridden in a lot of
different versions of the HMMWV, and it is impressive. The
seats are not all that comfortable. We might get a little
softer seat.
Mr. Roemer. For you, Mr. Chairman, we probably have got
one. They have got the private model now that Arnold
Schwarzenegger has a copy of, he calls it the ``Terminator.''
They are selling those with CD players and air conditioners. I
am sure that has a comfortable seat in it.
Mr. Young. I saw Arnold's. It is pretty fancy.
One of the rides I took was on the obstacle course where
they train the soldiers, and I think a good portion of the
time, we were on one wheel. This thing operates in the most
unusual types of terrain. It is unbelievable. You are exactly
right.
Mr. Hefner, do you have any questions?
Mr. Hefner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think where you use to test them is on the roads in
Indiana. Isn't that the obstacle course?
Mr. Roemer. Our potholes aren't that bad, Mr. Hefner.
Mr. Hefner. Just a little aside here, when our good friend
Silvio Conte, who has long since passed, was here, we were
having a debate about HMMWVs a long, long time ago, and Silvio
was one of the big supporters of the HMMWV. He said, you know,
it is one of the greatest pieces of equipment we have ever
produced, and he said, besides that, it is one of the greatest
hunting vehicles in the whole world. So I guess you have to
have your priorities.
We appreciate your testimony and coming before the
Committee.
Mr. Roemer. Thank you, Mr. Hefner. It is a very versatile
program. As I said in my statement, we are now using it not
only to protect troops, we have an up-armored version, we have
an Avenger version, we have a version we hope to be able to
sell to the Immigration and Naturalization Service to help
patrol our borders, to the U.N. to help peacekeeping missions.
This is a great investment for the American people.
Mr. Young. Tim, thank you very much for coming. We
appreciate your testimony.
[The statement of Mr. Roemer follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
TELEMEDICINE TECHNOLOGY
WITNESS
HON. CHARLIE NORWOOD, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF
GEORGIA
Introduction
Mr. Young. Next, we are going to hear from another of our
colleagues, Congressman Charles Norwood, from Evans, Georgia.
He serves on the Committee on Education and the Workforce and
also the Commerce Committee. He knows something about the
military, having served as a captain in the Army, including a
tour in Vietnam.
Congressman, please proceed.
Statement of Congressman Norwood
Mr. Norwood. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for having
this hearing and thanks for giving us this opportunity to
testify before your Subcommittee this morning on appropriations
for telemedicine and teledentistry in the defense appropriation
bill for fiscal year 1998.
Telemedicine has existed in some form for nearly 40 years.
Initially, the expansion of telemedicine was constrained by
cost and technology limitations. However, recent advances in
fiber-optics, satellite communications, and other technologies
have enabled a renewed interest in telemedicine by the private
and public sectors.
Telemedicine is a communication system that connects
primary care physicians, specialists, health care providers,
and patients. It is the use of cutting edge communication
technology to provide increased diagnostic and consultation
services for patients.
Telemedicine allows health care providers to take advantage
of the best specialists to ensure appropriateness of care for
their patient. It enables patients without transportation to
access to consultation services that they need to ensure that
we give them quality care. In rural sections of the United
States, the application of this technology provides patients
specialty consultations at metropolitan medical centers,
university-based clinics, and community hospitals.
The Department of Defense continues to develop applications
for telemedicine. Your Subcommittee has heard the Surgeons
General of the military services testify regarding the
effectiveness of telemedicine at battalion aid stations in
Bosnia and on board ships.
I might mention here that this past Christmas I was in
Bosnia and had the great pleasure of reading x-rays back from
Fort Gordon, Georgia, that is now an Army hospital.
A February 1997 United States General Accounting Office
report stated that the Department of Defense has been
instrumental in developing telemedicine technologies to deliver
medical care to the battlefield or in operations other than
war. Rapid prototyping demonstrations of telemedicine have also
supported military operations in Somalia, Macedonia, and Haiti.
In December 1996, as I mentioned, I traveled to Bosnia and
Hungary where I witnessed deployed telemedicine among our
forces. It is apparent to me that telecommunication links
between field medical sites and specialists at military
hospitals and aboard naval vessels ensure quality medical
support for our service members. The rigorous testing of
telemedicine under these extreme conditions validates this
technology for civilian application.
In 1994, the Secretary of Army established the Center for
Total Access at Fort Gordon, Georgia, as a major initiative of
the Department of Defense telemedicine test-bed. Its location
at Fort Gordon facilitates efforts between U.S. Army Signal
Center and School and Eisenhower Army Medical Center, the
Medical College of Georgia, and Veteran's Affairs Medical
Center in Augusta. The Center for Total Access spent the last 2
years developing a strategic plan for the implementation of
telemedicine in the Army's Southeast Regional Medical Command
and the Department of Defense TRICARE Region 3, which you are
very familiar with.
There are 23 military treatment facilities and 1.1 million
beneficiaries in the region served by the Center for Total
Access. Specific clinical needs at each site have been
identified in which telemedicine will provide a real benefit in
the delivery of health care in our region.
The Center for Total Access seeks to establish a regional
communication network interconnecting with these treatment
facilities, VA hospitals, university-based hospitals and
clinics, and community medical treatment facilities in rural
areas. The appropriate equipment provided to each clinical
service will enable the direct consultation between health care
providers, irrespective of their distance.
Additionally, in May of 1996, the Department of Defense
designated Fort Gordon as a theater medical informatics program
test-bed. The primary purpose of this tri-service test-bed is
to improve patient visibility, minimize evacuations, respond to
trauma, leverage specialty care, and improve command and
control situational awareness.
Funds appropriated for DOD telemedicine projects directly
enhance the capabilities of battlefield medicine and civilian
health care. It is anticipated that operating costs for the
Center for Total Access in fiscal year 1998 will be $5.4
million in Army operations and maintenance funding. This is
essential to allow the center to sustain existing systems and
continue telemedicine initiatives to its fullest extent
possible. Out year funding requirements is approximately $1
million per year.
I believe this investment in military telemedicine
infrastructure and different initiatives will enhance the
battlefield medicine capabilities of our armed forces.
Telemedicine technologies validated in austere military
environment will improve health care in rural America by
ensuring patient access to diagnosis and different medical
services.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you and the members of your
Subcommittee for this opportunity, and I will be very up front
with you. I have a very large bias concerning this subject. I
served in a MASH unit in Vietnam where we had four physicians
and where we had two dentists, and frequently our numbers of
casualties were a great deal more than we could handle. We were
young, we were enthusiastic, which meant we may have not had
all the experience in the world. And I can envision in my mind
so clearly how valuable this would be to our troops in time of
war. I can envision telemedicine packs on the backs of spec 5
medics out in the field that bring to the patient on the ground
in a firefight the needed information to save a life.
Besides the great value I see of it in our armed forces, we
know firsthand in Georgia how valuable it is because our State
I think leads the way in this area in rural areas where we are
connected up--the Medical College of Georgia is connected up
with health clinics in almost all of our rural areas, and I go
by constantly these clinics and see the value of this system.
We hope you will look favorably upon our request.
Mr. Young. Congressman, thank you very much for your very
specific testimony. I think the members of this Subcommittee
have established a very good record in recognizing the needs
that you have identified, and we have, much to the chagrin of
some of those across the river, added considerable funds on
occasion to upgrade our medical capabilities for those in
uniform.
Mr. Norwood. Yes, sir, I know that, and thank you.
Mr. Hefner. No questions.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much again. We appreciate your
being here.
[The statement of Mr. Norwood follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
ROCHESTER INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
WITNESSES
HON. LOUISE SLAUGHTER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF
NEW YORK
JUDITH GUSTINIS, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR INTEGRATED MANUFACTURING STUDIES,
ROCHESTER INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Introduction
Mr. Young. Now I would like to introduce Representative
Louise Slaughter from Fairport, New York, and I understand she
is here to introduce another of our witnesses.
Congresswoman Slaughter is a member of the Rules Committee,
which is an extremely important Committee here in the Congress
which is probably an understatement of the importance of that
committee. We are happy to have you here this morning to
introduce your guests.
Statement of Congresswoman Slaughter
Ms. Slaughter. Thank you, sir. We are a little bit inclined
to overstate it on the Rules Committee as well.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for your time.
Congressman Hefner, it is wonderful to see you this morning. I
thank you both for giving me the opportunity to introduce to
the Subcommittee Judith Gustinis, who is the Director of the
Center of Integrated Manufacturing Studies at the Rochester
Institute of Technology.
Mr. Chairman, I am proud to say that the Rochester
Institute of Technology is one of the Nation's greatest
institutions of higher learning. It is the home of the national
and internationally recognized programs in imaging,
photography, software engineering, microelectronics
engineering, packaging science, printing technology, and
environmental management, and is also the home of the National
Technical Institute for the Defense.
Mr. Chairman, one of its great contributions to Rochester
and the Nation is its effort to keep U.S. manufacturing
industries with their viability and their competitiveness.
Rochester and the Upstate New York area have the greatest
concentration of manufacturers in the country. Assisting the
companies is the main mission of our Center for Integrated
Manufacturing Studies, or CIMS, as it is called.
The CIMS center is designed to be a much-needed bridge
between industry and academia. It allows small, medium, and
even large manufacturing companies to work with the RIT
researchers and students in finding the solutions to pressing
manufacturing problems using the latest technological
innovations.
Judith Gustinis is the Director of the CIMS program and has
an impressive program in industry, government, and academia.
She has an MBA from Fairleigh Dickinson University and worked
as a manufacturing executive for the Westinghouse and Pitney
Bowes Companies. Prior to taking over the leadership of the
CIMS program, Ms. Gustinis was head of the very successful New
York State Manufacturing Extension Partnership. Supported by a
multidisciplinary group from the RIT's Colleges of Engineering
and Applied Science, Technology, Business and Imaging, along
with its major industry partners such as Kodak, Xerox and IBM,
and many small and medium-sized manufacturers, Ms. Gustinis'
program in support of U.S. manufacturing is unique in the
Nation and a major innovation.
Mr. Chairman, Ms. Gustinis is here today to ask the
Subcommittee to support a proposal to ask the Department of
Defense to join CIMS as a supporting partner in a new and
exciting research program that directly supports the
department's own manufacturing technology research mission, the
creation of a National Center for Remanufacturing at RIT CIMS
center.
The Nation's manufacturers, learning the process of
remanufacturing, is an important way for us to regain
competitiveness by increasing profitability and reducing waste.
RIT's remanufacturing research program is currently training
engineers to design products and systems so that they can be
returned to the manufacturer, easily disassembled and
remanufactured in a like-new condition, thereby dramatically
reducing manufacturing and product unit costs.
Mr. Chairman, DOD's MANTECH program exists to help defense
contractors, large and small, improve their manufacturing
processes in order to make their products more affordable. The
program has established a number of Centers of Excellence in
important manufacturing technology areas. RIT believes that its
manufacturing research program can and should become a MANTECH
Center of Excellence. Financial support provided by MANTECH
will allow RIT's program to expand and become a model for the
Nation.
I hope that after you hear from Ms. Gustinis and review the
proposal for a National Center for Remanufacturing that the
Subcommittee will include funding for the initiative in the
fiscal year 1998 national security appropriations bill.
I would like to introduce Ms. Gustinis and give you my
thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much. We are happy to have Ms.
Gustinis here this morning. Your entire statement will be
placed in the record. We would ask that you summarize it now.
Statement of Ms. Gustinis
Ms. Gustinis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me begin by thanking Congresswoman Slaughter for her
very kind introduction, and also her tireless efforts on behalf
of the Rochester Institute of Technology and the Center for
Integrated Manufacturing Studies. Seated with me today is Dr.
Nabeel Nasser, an expert on remanufacturing and a professor
from the RIT College of Engineering. He works with us in the
CIMS center.
Mr. Chairman, I am the director of the very unique
integrated manufacturing center which does work with companies
on issues of affordability and manufacturing competitiveness
for the U.S. The Department of Defense does have a very
comprehensive program known as MANTECH which focuses on many of
the issues that we as well focus on within the Center for
Integrated Manufacturing Studies.
We work with hundreds of manufacturers to help them improve
their processes so that they can get their time to market down
and improve their costs. This is where the concept of
remanufacturing really arose and why we have been so involved
in it over the past years.
Remanufacturing is indeed a process, which Congressman Tim
Roemer was talking about earlier, whereby material comes back
from the field, it is disassembled, it is cleaned, it is
inspected, it is reworked, replaced, reassembled and tested and
out again into service.
The result of this process is twofold: Much is learned
about real wear and design, the effective design, that can go
back into the design process. Second of all, the remanufactured
product, as Congressman Roemer mentioned, is often better than
when new, yet the total cost can be 30 to 50 percent lower. The
reason it is lower is that as much as 85 percent of the
original cost is recaptured in the process, rather than with
recycling, where often it is returned to a raw material state
and the energy and labor are lost. In remanufacturing they are
captured.
Remanufacture has been around for many years and some of
the major companies in the United States, Detroit Diesel,
Xerox, and Kodak being others, have learned if you apply more
scientific process to the process of remover, you cut cost,
time, and become highly competitive.
The Eastman Kodak Company recently announced the
remanufacture of the 100 millionth Fun-Saver Camera, for
example. This, in fact, was designed to be remanufactured, and
as a result, over 1,400 pounds of material is back in the
product as opposed to being in waste, which is what allows it
to be so competitive.
Affordability is the key issue and it spans military
systems and sustainability issues as well. As a result, there
is a current dramatic increase of remanufacturing in the
military. The defense contractors are the largest group of
remanufacturers in the world. A few examples, the Bradley
fighting vehicle, approximately 1,600 existing A-2s will be
remanded to A-3s. In the Army, the medium tactical vehicle,
this 5-ton truck, 8,000 of those are going to be
remanufactured. In the Marine Corps, the AV-8B Harrier is in
the process of remanufacture. In the Navy, the HH-60H and the
SH-60CV helicopters are in a continuous process of
remanufacturing.
Our research indicates that there is no major mandate by
the Congress or within the MANTECH program to take a scientific
research look at this process of remanufacturing. Yet more
scientific and technical approaches to this area will produce
improvements in quality, in availability, and, most of all,
affordability of weapons and other military systems.
Mr. Chairman, we at the Rochester Institute of Technology
at the Center for Integrated Manufacturing Studies would like
to propose consideration of our center as a MANTECH Center of
Excellence to focus on research in the area of remanufacture.
At this center, we will execute a 5-year partnership with the
Department of Defense and with defense contractors and industry
that we work with today to provide scientific and technical
leadership in this area. We will deliver research, training,
tools, technical project work, that will advance design and
remanufacture and affordability for defense-related
requirements.
For this program, we are requesting $4 million for fiscal
year 1998, and this would cover start-up and first year program
costs. Thank you for considering our request, Mr. Chairman. Dr.
Nasser and I would be happy to answer any questions.
Mr. Young. I thank you very much for your excellent
testimony.
As you know, this Committee has been very supportive of the
remanufacturing and MANTECH, and we appreciate your being here
today.
Louise, thank you for bringing her.
Any questions?
Mr. Hefner. Just one question. Is there anyone else that is
in this process? Are you standing alone? I know not in
remanufacturing, but in what you are asking for here?
Ms. Gustinis. To the best of our knowledge, there are some
institutes of higher education looking at policy issues in
remanufacturing, and to some extent at one piece of the
remanufacturing process, known as disassembly. But no program
of the comprehensive nature that we are aware of that we have
at RIT.
Mr. Hefner. You are kind of pioneering this?
Ms. Gustinis. Yes, we are, sir.
Mr. Young. Thank you again. We appreciate your being here
and appreciate your testimony.
Ms. Slaughter. Thank you very much.
[The statement of Ms. Slaughter follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
FORT MONMOUTH, NEW JERSEY
WITNESS
HON. MICHAEL PAPPAS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW
JERSEY
Introduction
Mr. Young. Next we will hear from Congressman Michael
Pappas, from Rocky Hill, New Jersey. Congressman Pappas serves
on the Government Reform and Oversight Committee, the Small
Business Committee, and the National Security Committee.
Congressman Pappas, welcome. We will be happy to hear from
you. Your entire statement will be placed in the record, and
please feel free to summarize it.
Statement of Congressman Pappas
Mr. Pappas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members of
the Committee. Congressman Pallone and I had planned to be here
together and to jointly make several requests, and I expect
that he should be here shortly. But my schedule precludes me
from waiting any longer from this, so I appreciate you taking
me out of order.
I am a freshman and fortunate to serve as a member of the
National Security Committee. Several weeks ago we had jointly
attended a meeting of the Military Construction Subcommittee,
and Mr. Hefner was there, so he probably is going to hear from
me a second time. But two facilities that are mostly in my
district, but the employees and the businesses associated with
these two facilities, they being Fort Monmouth and Earle Naval
Weapons Station, straddle our districts, and many of the people
concerned with the future of those facilities are constituents
of mine and Mr. Pallone's.
Three of the four things I am going to speak about deal
with Fort Monmouth, and one deals with Earle.
Fort Monmouth is the main base of CECOM, and I am sure you
are somewhat familiar with that. There is a request in the
order of $27 million for infrastructure improvements for that.
We believe that it is important that that get very serious
consideration, because more and more--as communications become
more and more important to not just our society, but in
particular our national defense systems, having facilities such
as that that have the tools that they need, I think is
critically important.
There is also a $300,000 request for walkway improvements,
physical improvements, to connect some of the buildings that
are very, very close. Several of these buildings have already
been connected, and this would, we believe, assist the staff
there in being much more efficient.
Lastly, there is a request for $12 million for Fort
Monmouth. There is a relationship which has been developed with
Monmouth University which, from their perspective, they would
be bringing to the table approximately $8 million in private
funds for software engineering projects, and we believe that
deserves consideration.
Lastly, with regard to Earle, there are piers that are
World War II vintage. Later this year there are to be two new
ships that will be berthed there, and we believe to the tune of
about $500,000 that there would be necessary improvements to
electrical systems that are needed to adequately service that
facility.
I would appreciate it if I could include my entire written
statement for the record.
Mr. Young. Congressman, your entire statement will be
included for the record.
We appreciate your calling these items to our attention.
Some of them we are familiar with from last year and the year
before; some of them we tried to work out and were not able to.
We will do the best we can to support your efforts. We
appreciate your being here.
[The statement of Mr. Pappas follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
FORT MONMOUTH, NEW JERSEY
WITNESS
HON. FRANK PALLONE, JR., A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF
NEW JERSEY
Introduction
Mr. Young. Our next witness is Congressman Frank Pallone of
Long Branch, New Jersey. Congressman Pallone has testified
before the Committee before. We are glad to have you back again
this year.
Last year, you presented a very persuasive argument to
cover some of the walkways that Congressman Pappas just
mentioned between the buildings at Fort Monmouth. This is the
type of project that would normally be funded in the military
construction bill. We tried to figure out a way to fund it in
our bill since it was relatively small, but we were just not
able to do that.
So we are happy to hear from you again this year and hope
we can do a better job for you. We understand there are many,
many requirements out there we are not able to fund. We do the
very best we can.
Welcome again. Your entire statement will be placed in the
record, and we would ask you to summarize in about 5 minutes.
Statement of Congressman Pallone
Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good to see you and
my Democratic colleagues.
Since you have already said you are going to try to do
this, maybe I just should leave.
Mr. Young. I think we told you that last year, too.
Mr. Pallone. I am assuming that my colleague from New
Jersey Mr. Pappas probably went through some of the same
things. I am just submitting my statement for the record.
If I could just briefly summarize, basically our requests
are with regard to Fort Monmouth and also Naval Weapons Station
Earle. Both of these happen to basically bridge our
congressional districts. Part of Fort Monmouth and Earle Naval
Station are in my district and Mr. Pappas's district.
With regard to Fort Monmouth, there are three projects. One
is a $27 million telecommunications modernization plan. Fort
Monmouth is the CECOM headquarters, Communications and
Electronics Command for the Army. Much of their
telecommunications and computer infrastructure were installed
between the 1950s and 1970s and, therefore, is out of date.
Basically this upgrading program is to bring them up to the
present day.
It is important because Fort Monmouth, pursuant to the Base
Realignment and Closure--BRAC, was made to consolidate to the
main post. In other words, we didn't lose anything, we actually
gained jobs during the BRAC, but we took on additional
functions with regard to communications and electronics. So we
need to upgrade that basic infrastructure at Fort Monmouth, and
that is our first request.
The second one, of course, are the walkways that were
already mentioned. I actually have been there during the winter
and seen the situation. It may seem like what do they need
walkways for, but it is very disruptive. Essentially what
happened is all the people that work in the command in CECOM
used to be about 2 miles away at a central building. Now they
are in buildings that were refurbished that used to be
barracks. So basically they are walking between these
modernized barracks, and it is very difficult if the weather is
severe. It has an impact on their job.
The third thing is a request for $12 million for the
development of an information resource center to be managed
jointly by Fort Monmouth and nearby Monmouth University. A few
years ago when Congressman Dwyer, one of my predecessors, was
on the Appropriations Committee, he actually received funding
through DOD to build a center for technological development and
transfer at Monmouth University that also dovetailed with Fort
Monmouth. This IRC concept is basically a continuation of that.
Monmouth University is basically the university that trains
people that work in the R&D functions at Fort Monmouth. So in
the same way that the fort has a need to upgrade its
infrastructure, the university has a need to develop and
provide new computers and new centers for electronics and
information and the new Information Age in order to train
people to work at the fort.
So that is basically what this IRC concept is. It is in the
testimony, but it would basically provide video
teleconferencing, library archives, educational video,
recording capabilities, learning facilities, an essential link
between the university's research and that of Fort Monmouth.
I also wanted to mention Naval Weapons Station Earle again
very briefly. We are also fortunate there in, again, we are
taking on more responsibilities. There are two new AOE class
ships now stationed in Norfolk, Virginia--I don't see the
Virginia people here, so I guess I am okay in talking about
this--that are going to be reassigned to Naval Weapons Station
Earle. One is actually going to be moving there this year, and
the other next year. As a result of these ships coming, as well
as others that are anticipated beyond that, there need to be
structural upgrades to Earle's pier complex.
There are really three projects there. Two of them fall
under military construction. The third, for $500,000, is to
refurbish the pier's power distribution center. That falls
within the DOD's Operation and Maintenance--O&M account.
So, again, I don't know that I need to go into the details
of that, but that is another thing we need in order to
accommodate these new ships coming into Earle.
I just wanted to make a couple of other comments. Later
today I understand you are going to be getting proposals from
the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey. One is
with regard to construction of an international center for
public health, and secondly is a proposal to do a series of
studies. I think that Senator Torricelli is a sponsor of this
in the Senate, and Senator Lautenberg has been helpful as well.
They are trying--New Jersey has one of the highest rates, I
think the highest rate, for breast cancer in the country. At
the same time, we have the most Superfund toxic waste sites.
Over the years and over the last 10 or 20 years, there has been
a lot of evidence there is a link between the two. Essentially
what we are trying to do is to get a research grant together
with the University of Medicine And Dentistry and our Cancer
Institute of New Jersey and the National Institute of
Environmental Health Sciences to do a study on the link between
those two.
Again, I am not sure why that is here before your
Subcommittee, but it is my understanding that they are going to
be testifying later today on that proposal. I endorse both of
those proposals. I think they are very important for our State
and ultimately for the country as well.
Thank you.
Mr. Young. Thank you for being here. We will do the very
best we can to work with you on these important issues that are
important to you and the national security agencies.
Thank you again for being here.
----------
Thursday, April 17, 1997.
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
WITNESSES
ELOY SIFUENTES, RECORDING SECRETARY, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES
MARIO VILLARREAL, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
Introduction
Mr. Young. Now I would like to recognize Congressman Henry
Bonilla, who is a very important Member of this Committee.
Congressman Bonilla will be introducing two representatives of
the AFGE from Laughlin Air Force Base. We will be more than
happy to hear from them.
Congressman, you have the Floor.
Statement of Congressman Bonilla
Mr. Bonilla. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am delighted to
have my constituents here today from Del Rio, Texas. They who
have had a fine record of performance, an outstanding record of
performance for their work over the years at Laughlin Air Force
base on engine repair work.
Many of us are troubled about the contract that has been
awarded, the A-76 award for jet engine repair that went to a
private contractor, not because it is a private contractor, but
because it involves a surcharge that created an unfair
opportunity for the contractor to win this bid. We have been
fighting on this issue, and, for the record, I have been
supportive of a more reasonable surcharge of 4 percent. I know
that the members of the Local 1749, American Federation of
Government Employees, feel very strongly about that as well.
This affects their lives directly and their families and
future. And I am delighted that you have an opportunity today
to tell us your story, Mr. Eloy Sifuentes and Mario Villarreal.
They are accompanied in the audience by Mr. Alfredo Garcia and
Hector Guadalarama.
At this time, gentleman, we would be pleased to hear your
testimony.
Statement of Mr. Sifuentes
Mr. Sifuentes. Thank you, Congressman. Like you heard from
the Congressman, we are from AFGE Local 1749 at Laughlin Air
Force Base, Del Rio, Texas. We represent over 900 government
employees.
I appear before this Committee to ask your assistance in
reforming one aspect of the OMB A-76 competitive process.
Specifically I want to address the application of a 12 percent
factor against in-house personnel costs and how the in-house
bid is put at a disadvantage by this 12 percent factor.
I would like to make it clear that our local wholeheartedly
supports the purpose and intent of the A-76 process. We believe
that the A-76 process, its imperfections notwithstanding,
provides a needed procedural framework which ensures through
public-private competition that taxpayers and the Armed Forces
get the most effectiveness, efficiency and reliability for the
tax dollar invested.
We support the stated goals of the circular and its
supplements, which are to balance; provide a level playing
field between the private and public sectors in the bid
process; encourage competition and choice in the management and
performance of commercial activities. However, you will see in
my testimony the 12 percent direct cost difference applied to
the in-house bid does not contribute in any way to these goals.
Let me illustrate this point through our experience with
the process at Laughlin Air Force Base. In December of 1994,
the command announced its intent to examine jet engine
maintenance at Laughlin Air Force Base. Both in-house and
contractor costs were submitted. The most competitive
contractor bid was $31.4 million. $32.3 million is the
management in-house bid. It is our contention the in-house bid
was made uncompetitive because the government is required by
the Supplement to apply an arbitrary 12 percent surtax, a cost
factor applied against the personnel's cost.
It is our contention, based on our discussion with
Laughlin's management and the facts they provided us, that the
12 percent factor is too high. The facts gathered and confirmed
by our management would indicate there is no cost associated
with general and administrative support from internal or
external activities in the case of Laughlin jet engine
maintenance function which was competed for under A-76. The
bottom line, Mr. Chairman, is that our general and
administrative costs should have been zero, not 12 percent of
the total personnel costs as is required by the new Supplement,
a difference of $1.7 million.
Mr. Chairman, if all costs had been correctly calculated,
the most competitive bidder, the Federal employees at Laughlin,
would have won, and the national defense and taxpayer would
have gotten the savings we would have provided. Because of the
12 percent factor rather than the factual data being applied,
the best and cheapest competitor did not win. Consequently, 50
Civil Service jobs were lost, and an additional 150 will be
impacted over the life of the contract.
We are not opposed to competition, but we oppose the
application of a standard 12 percent penalty in this case,
which denies us the opportunity to be competitive and provide
the A-76 competitive analysis accurate data. It is our
contention that the application of a static, across-the-board
percentage fails to achieve cost estimate accuracy or lessen
the controversy surrounding the definition, calculation and
inclusion of overhead costs. The straight-line percentage
concept is too rigid, would be too inaccurate and lead to
overcharges to the government.
This approach fails to take into account the different
commercial activities that may be justified in costing
different overhead considerations. Certainly it is not
appropriate when performance of the function requires extensive
equipment and space.
Agencies, with the participation of labor, should define
what is acceptable overhead cost and how it should be
calculated. The agency as well as the in-house and private-
sector bidders should be held accountable for proper
calculation of the fully allocated costs, and they should be
forced to live with the consequences of the calculation. This
would be in contrast with the current policy which requires the
taxpayer to pay for a bailout every time there is a cost
overrun.
Mr. Chairman, we request you sponsor a General Accounting
Office--GAO study, using the Laughlin jet engine competition as
an example, which examines the justification for using a
straight-line cost factor as opposed to itemized accounting as
was required by past editions of A-76's Supplement. If the
resulting reports support the facts as presented in my
testimony, then I would ask your Committee to assist us in
revising the Supplement to A-76 so that it would more
accurately reflect general and administrative costs.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. Thank you for
allowing me to present this important issue before the
Committee. I stand ready to answer any questions on this
matter.
Mr. Young. I thank you very much.
Did you have a statement also?
Mr. Villarreal. I am here to support him. No, sir.
Mr. Young. I wanted to tell you you are represented here by
a very capable and very effective Member. He has kept the
Members of the Committee fairly well advised on this issue. We
will consider that as we proceed.
Mr. Bonilla. Mr. Chairman, would you yield for one
question?
Gentlemen, one of the most important agencies that could
hear your testimony is the Office of Management and Budget--
OMB. I am wondering if there is anyone from OMB here in the
room today?
It is unfortunate. We will make sure they receive your
testimony, because when decisions like this are made, it is
important to hear how people are actually affected; rather than
just looking at numbers on a page of percentages, the way it
affects you directly is very important.
If I could ask just briefly, tell me how this has affected
families and the morale of the workers at Laughlin Air Force
Base. Maybe Mario would like to address that.
Mr. Villarreal. Mr. Bonilla, we are just a small base in
Texas, you represent our district there, and this is just a
small contract. We were one of the first to go under the study,
this 12 percent overhead, and it drastically affected us. We
submitted a lower bid, a competitive bid, and consequently that
12 percent overhead just threw us out of the playing field.
It is kind of late for the jet engine shop there, but we
need to look at this for the future, because we are a total
Civil Service maintenance there. We are all manned Civil
Service, and we put out quality engines, and the quality is
what we do. We are not against privatization or private
contractors. All we ask is to compete fairly on the bid.
Mr. Bonilla. I appreciate that very much. I can assure you,
as we discussed privately, we are continuing to try to knock
that surcharge down to make it more fair.
I want to thank you all for being here today. I appreciate
your testimony very much.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much.
Mr. Hefner. You have to put it in laymen's terms what this
12 percent is--why it is there and how does it work?
Mr. Sifuentes. It represents general and administrative
costs that are applied to line 1 of the bid, which is personnel
costs. It is a surtax. OMB at this point, other than by the
title being ``administrative overhead costs,'' has not
identified it. Specifically under the current policy of 12
percent, overhead cost is based on personnel cost plus fringe
benefits. The 12 percent overhead cost is based on personnel
costs plus fringe benefits. This is what they applied it
against. Under the previous policy, it was based on
reapplication of managed standards and actual growth
requirements, but that is no longer the case. It is just a
straight across 12 percent applied against that personnel cost.
Mr. Bonilla. Mr. Hefner, I would be happy to sit down with
you and explain this a little more at a later time. In essence,
when a private contractor puts out a bid, the base workers
enter their bid, and have 12 percent charge added because OMB
feels that the full cost of labor is not included in the
original bid and some of the other costs. They say just add
that on, and it makes it more fair, but it is not, because the
workers are already there at the facility and would not have to
be hired in order to do this job.
Mr. Hefner. So what you are saying is that you have got to
add 12 percent in there to offset the people that you are going
to hire to do it for the benefits that they already have?
Mr. Bonilla. The real cost would not be 12 percent more. It
is just an extra percentage----
Mr. Hefner. I understand that, but that is the reason for
it.
Mr. Bonilla. I am not exactly sure what you are saying.
Mr. Hefner. I am saying these guys are already there. They
are doing the job.
Mr. Bonilla. They have been doing years of good work.
Mr. Hefner. If you had it contracted out, the contractor
that makes the bid has to add 12 percent?
Mr. Bonilla. Not the contractor. Only the base.
Mr. Villarreal. Our contention is these are hidden costs,
not attributable to the government side of the bid. Nobody can
account for this 12 percent.
Mr. Bonilla. It is just a figure that is in essence pulled
out of thin air.
Mr. Hefner. I may be dense, but where does the 12 percent
go? It is paid by the taxpayers, isn't it?
Mr. Bonilla. Well, the 12 percent in essence is already
there. They are working there. They are at the base.
Mr. Hefner. I understand that.
Mr. Bonilla. So there is no additional cost--it is almost a
phantom number that is added to what they have to bid.
Mr. Hefner. Okay.
Mr. Visclosky. It is an attributable overhead, I assume.
The theory would be to make sure the bids are fair. They are
attributing overhead to your labor.
Mr. Bonilla. That is the theory.
Mr. Visclosky. The argument is that the attributable
overhead is too high.
Mr. Bonilla. One very important point, the Air Force
believes it is too high.
Mr. Visclosky. Okay.
Mr. Villarreal. We worked closely with management to come
up with this testimony. Their contention is it is not 12
percent. It is not there. We cannot find it, you know. But it
is a fixed rate. It is added onto your personnel costs plus
fringe benefits and actually comes out to--in reality it comes
out closer to 16 percent, because you are adding on 30 percent
of fringe benefits included in the calculation. So we are not
actually looking at 12 percent, but more like 16 percent on the
government's bid, not on the contractor's bid. We cannot
compete competitively.
Mr. Young. Well, thank you very much. Obviously this is a
rather sticky issue and a very important issue. Mr. Bonilla
will lead us through this and find a solution, if there is one.
Thank you all for being here. You stimulated this hearing
this morning.
[The statement of Mr. Sifuentes follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS
WITNESS
HON. MAXINE WATERS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA
Introduction
Mr. Young. Next our witness is Congresswoman Maxine Waters
from Los Angeles, California. Ms. Waters serves on the Banking
and Financial Services Committee and the Judiciary Committee.
She is also chair of the Black Caucus.
We are very happy to have you here this morning. Your
entire statement will be placed in the record, and you can
summarize it any way you like.
Statement of Congresswoman Waters
Ms. Waters. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and Members.
I would like to give you a little bit of background about
why I am here. The Congressional Black Caucus developed its
agenda for the 105th Congress. Our top priority is the
eradication of drugs in our society. We are tired of the
devastation of drugs in our communities and in this country. So
we are trying to pay attention in any number of ways to how we
create some real discussion and some real action on drug
eradication in our work.
I came here today because you fund a number of crucial
programs, or funded in this Subcommittee's jurisdiction, and I
want to focus today on the Central Intelligence Agency--CIA.
I am going to introduce legislation to eliminate the CIA,
and I know that is not going to happen. However, I think it is
extremely important to create some attention and some focus in
an area where I think there is a problem.
I recently got involved as a result of the San Jose Mercury
News series called The Dark Alliance, where after a year of
investigation they discovered that there had been a large drug
ring that operated in the 1980s in south-central Los Angeles,
and they alleged and made a good case for CIA connection.
So I have been working on this, and I have learned more
than I would like to know about our Intelligence Community, and
I am worried. I am worried about it because I do not think that
our Intelligence Community should ever allow, participate in or
turn their backs while there is drug trafficking, no matter
what their goals are. There should be no connection with drugs
by any of our Intelligence Community in an effort to carry out
their work.
I think that this message is very important because I have
been able to identify not only some very, very serious concerns
about the drug ring that was identified by the San Jose
Mercury. For example, if I can just divert here for a minute,
the person who laundered the money for this drug ring, Mr.
Morio, was absolutely identified in the DEA reports, and we
have gotten the information about all the companies that he
organized as he laundered the money, is now back down in
Nicaragua, head of an arm of government that receives foreign
aid, in charge of the privatization efforts creating more
companies supposedly to buy up the government-owned assets for
privatization. And what I am trying to find out is whether or
not our own U.S. foreign aid is in the hands of someone who is
identified as a money launderer for drug traffickers.
I think that is very serious. I will not go into detail. I
will submit this for the record. But let me just point this
out. Earlier this year, General Ramon Guyan Devilla,
Venezuela's former drug czar, was indicted by Federal
prosecutors in Miami for smuggling cocaine into the United
States. According to a New York Times November 20th, 1993,
article, the CIA anti-drug program in Venezuela shipped a ton
of nearly pure cocaine into the United States in 1990. The CIA
has acknowledged that the drugs--that they were involved in the
shipment, and that the drugs were sold on the streets of the
United States. The joint CIA-Venezuelan force was headed by
General Devilla, and the ranking CIA officer was Mark
McFarland, who worked with anti-guerilla forces in El Salvador
in the 1980s. Not one CIA official has ever been indicted or
prosecuted for this abuse of authority.
I could go on and tell you about the involvement in Haiti,
the Los Angeles--L.A. Times reported that Lieutenant Colonel
Francois, one of the CIA's Haitian agents, a former army
officer and key leader in the military regime that ran Haiti
between 1991 and 1994, was indicted in Miami on a charge of
smuggling 33 tons of cocaine into the United States. It goes on
and on and on. But I am submitting this for the record.
I guess what I am saying to you is this: As we look at the
work that we are trying to do with drugs and working with the
President and the drug czar and everybody else, we are looking
at our own Intelligence Community, we are looking at the big
boys, and I am going after Citicorp, who is identified and is
under investigation now for the money laundering with Salinas'
brother out of Mexico, some $200 million that was deposited in
Citicorp, where they wire-transferred this money offshore into
Antigua and the Cayman Islands.
This is serious business, and we as policymakers can do
more than we are doing about it. I know the Intelligence
Community is secret, and we are not supposed to know or ask
questions, but you guys ought to send them a message. You ought
to do at least across-the-board cuts. Cut 10 percent of the
intelligence budget and talk about the development of policy
that will not allow the Intelligence Community to ever be
involved in drug trafficking or know about it, turn their backs
on it, or use it in any way.
We cannot afford to continue to allow the amount of drugs
that come into this country to be dumped on our streets,
poisoning our children and devastating our communities. And it
is time each of us takes some responsibility in this.
I want to tell you that you guys have some power here to do
something about it, and I wish you would help send this message
in some profound way, because I think our greatest threat, the
greatest threat to security, is certainly not the Soviet Union.
The Cold War is over. And I don't think, no matter how much we
dislike or we talk about a threat, nobody really wants to go to
war with us. Our greatest threat is this, drugs being dumped on
our streets, undermining our communities, poisoning our
children, and devastating us in so many ways.
So I have had an opportunity to preach to you, and I
appreciate it. If you have any questions, I will be happy to
answer them.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much. I would just have to say
for the Committee that we share your strong commitment on this
issue. Last year during a major battle over having enough
dollars, we added $165 million over the President's budget for
counter-drug activities. When the Cali warlords were put in
jail, it was the Department of Defense that helped identify and
locate those warlords. So we are all working on that.
I can tell you we are committed and appreciate your
thought-provoking comments this morning. They are not wasted
here. We paid close attention, and I assure you that we are
strongly committed to this same objective.
Are there other Members with questions?
Thank you very much. We really appreciate your being here.
We will stay in touch with you throughout this process.
[The statement of Ms. Waters follows:]
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NAVAL RESERVE ASSOCIATION
WITNESS
REAR ADMIRAL JAMES J. CAREY, USNR (RET.), NATIONAL PRESIDENT, NAVAL
RESERVE ASSOCIATION
Introduction
Mr. Young. Now I would like to welcome Rear Admiral James
J. Carey, president of the Naval Reserve Association. Admiral
Carey presented a list of unfunded Naval Reserve equipment
items last year when he testified, and we were able to provide
$247 million above the President's budget for that equipment
including 36 C-9 replacement aircraft, funds for 10 mobile in-
shore undersea warfare vans, and $72 million dollars for P-3
modifications.
I want to say to you, Admiral, that I took a lengthy flight
in a P-3 not too long ago. The crew was outstanding. The
aircraft could use a little bit of cleaning up, but it is an
old workhorse and does a good job.
We are very pleased to have you here today, sir.
Statement of Admiral Carey
Admiral Carey. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and the
other Members here, for allowing us indeed to present our
testimony again. I would salute this Committee for what you did
for us last year, because it was correcting an incredible
shortfall from the previous year.
Mr. Chairman, when I testified last year, you, in fact,
pointed out that the things I was talking about were not
included. So I and the Naval Reserve Association fully
appreciate what you all did for us.
You also tasked me last year, you said your Committee would
support, but I would have to go out and work with the Senate
and the administration, and we did that, and it worked. So
thank you, thank you, thank you.
By the way, the lady from RIT, my last active-duty job was
over in the Pentagon on the Chief of Naval Operatives--CNO
staff. That program, the similar program came under me. It is a
good program. I would just add that to her testimony.
My main theme today will be that you get 20 percent of the
entire Navy, the entire United States Navy, for 3 percent of
the budget with the Naval Reserve. So your money is really
spent well and stretched. If you forget everything else I say,
that is my key theme: 20 percent of the whole Navy for 3
percent of the budget.
As you indicated, you have my written statement, so I will
try to hit key focus areas as outlined in that paper. One of
the first would be manpower. Several years ago when the cut was
going from 150,000 Naval Reservists down to 100,000 and then
ultimately 96,000, we went along with that because we thought
it was in the best interests of the country and the Navy, and
we felt it could be done. But we stride to draw a line in the
sand and say we cannot go any lower and carry out the missions
that have been assigned to us.
The President's budget this year has a cut below that, to
around 94,000; in fact, possibly even 93,500. I would tell you
gentleman and the other Members of your Committee, that is not
a good idea, and we should stay at the 96,000. We outline that
in our written statement, and I would ask you all to take a
look at that, if you would.
On National Guard and Reserve Equipment--NG&RE equipment,
as I asked you last year and you did, all I am asking for is
our fair share of whatever the ultimate NG&RE budget is, that
we get the Naval Reserve fair share. You did that last year.
Mr. Chairman, as you indicated, you have an unfunded
requirement from the Navy for about $1 billion of Naval Reserve
equipment. I realize that is more than your whole NG&RE budget.
That is why I stress simply our fair share. I would prioritize
that from our side as the C-9 replacements, which we have 100
percent of the whole Navy's logistics arm; the MIUW and costal
warfare stuff, because we have 100 percent of that mission;
and, although you funded some of the vans last year, I don't
know that all of that money has been spent, and I think we have
another 30 that need to be looked at.
Finally, the other priority is SH-60B helicopters, which
are needed on the FFGs that are coming into the Reserve fleet.
The key for us to be able to operate with that fleet is
compatibility with the regular Navy. If we can't talk to them
or have the same equipment, it doesn't work, so we need those
SH-60Bs.
Finally, I would tell you that we also support Senator
McCain's initiative to ultimately--if it can be done--to get
away from NG&RE as a congressional add-on. We support it,
however, only if we can be an equal player at the table, so
when the President's budget, the Navy's budget comes up to you
all, that the Naval Reserve requirements are in that budget.
Until that happens, we desperately need you, however.
I would say that in the bill last year, Senator McCain put
a provision saying the services were supposed to come forth. In
fact I know the Navy CNO ultimately did. We are very supportive
of him for that effort.
Military Construction, MILCON, last year you gave us $38
million. The President's budget has that cut to $14 million
this year. I would simply urge to bring it back to the 38 to 40
million level, because we have buildings falling down around
our people, and it is becoming a safety hazard.
Operations and maintenance last year was $85 million. The
President came in with $50 million less. I would tell you we
need to keep it at the old level. If we are expected to do all
the Operations--OPS, both drug OPS and the humanitarian and
Bosnia's and other things, we have to have the money to do it.
The Reserve Mobilization Insurance Program, I am sure all
of you have heard from your constituents on that. We would
simply urge this Committee to pay the troops that are paid to
be in that program what was promised them if they paid the
fees. I had heard a possible plan of trying to take the money
to fund that thing out of NG&RE. That is absolutely lunacy as
far as we are concerned and not a good idea. It should not come
out of the other Reserve programs.
I did see the DOD came out with an instruction on how they
planned to handle the insurance thing. It is dated 8 April. I
have not read it, but it tells me they have taken a hard look
at it and have a proposal. I would urge each of you to have
your staffs look at that.
On health care, Congressman Moran had put a bill in. We
were initially supportive of that, but yesterday Congressman
J.C. Watts came out with a bill that my staff thinks is better,
because it says if you cannot work out the TRICARE/CHAMPUS
problems, that at least then our military members be allowed as
an option to get into the Federal employees' health benefit
plan so they are treated equally along with the rest of the
Federal employees. So we now support the J.C. Watts bill on
that.
In closing, we have two point papers on a couple of these
issues that I would like to ask if we could give them to the
staffs. You can all see them. I was hoping Congressman Bonilla
would be here, because we have been very supportive of his
efforts in Val Verde County on his efforts for the military's
right to vote where we, the United States Government, send them
and where they live.
With that, I think that is my 5 minutes. You helped us a
lot last year. I am asking you for your help once again this
year. I would ask to be added to your scroll up there on these
things. That completes my statement. I again thank you for all
you have done. I would answer any questions.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much. We appreciate that.
Some of the items on this scroll are items you provided for
us. We are doing the best we can to put a blue line on them,
which means they are done. We are doing the best we can with
very, very limited resources.
Okay, sir, thank you very much. We appreciate your being
here.
[The statement of Admiral Carey follows:]
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RESERVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES
WITNESS
MAJOR GENERAL ROGER W. SANDLER, AUS (RET.), EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, RESERVE
OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES
Introduction
Mr. Young. Our next witness is Major General Roger Sandler,
Executive Director of the Reserve Officers Association.
General Sandler's organization represents all of the
Reserve forces, and, as usual, his prepared statement contains
a detailed list of unfunded equipment requirements, which are
also on our scroll for each of the Reserve components. We are
pleased to have you back before the Committee, and please
proceed with your testimony.
Statement of General Sandler
General Sandler. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is a
pleasure to be back. Again, I thank you, as did Admiral Carey,
regarding what you have done for the Reserve forces in the
past.
We have a significant involvement these days with the
Reserve components in all areas of national defense, and I
think it has become a reality that whenever there is an
emergency, any kind of a contingency, we are calling upon the
Reserve components. They were certainly well-founded in Desert
Storm and they have gone on to perform extremely well in both
Haiti and now in Bosnia. There are continuing rotations in
Bosnia and so forth.
What I wanted to do was really talk to you about three key
issues: personnel, training, and equipment. Some of it will be
overlapped with Jim Carey.
I will not get into a lot of detail on this because you do
have it in my submission for the record. But we are a great
bargain, both for DOD and the country, with our Reserve
components. Inasmuch as Admiral Carey indicated, the very small
portion of the defense budget goes to maintain the Reserve
components in all of the services. Therefore, it is important
that they be maintained to the degree that is necessary to keep
their readiness at a level that is important.
The important thing that I wanted to bring up regarding
personnel is that each of the services are being faced with
personnel cuts. The indication of the Army Reserve, they have
an off-site agreement which is carrying them through fiscal
year 1998 and perhaps into 1999. We fully support that
agreement in the indication of the Army.
We support the Navy's position on maintaining the end
strength at the levels they suggested, the 96,000-plus mark,
the Marine Corps being held steady at the 42,000 end state, and
we would also urge you to consider maintaining the Coast Guard
at a level of 8,000. There has been a suggestion that they
ought to be reduced to 7,600. Coast Guard missions go on
regardless of war or peace, and the Coast Guard is integral,
and we would urge this Committee to fund the 8,000.
In the area of training, we find ourselves in the situation
where many of our Reserve components are finding monies being
diverted from readiness training to other purposes because of
contingencies and so forth that are coming. We need to maintain
a level of readiness training in our Reserve components to
maintain their viability.
In addition to that, schooling has suffered as a result of
the shifting of money and so forth. Schooling is absolutely
vital in the case of the Reserve components for their promotion
and upward mobility. So, again, I would urge this Committee to
continue to fund adequate training for readiness and for
military education.
Finally, let me talk about this Reserve equipment: I think
the NG&RE account has certainly proved itself over the years.
The administration this year has put zero monies against
National Guard and Reserve equipment accounts. We have in our
detailed submission to you a submission of the variety of
equipment that is necessary in each of the services. But I
would like at this point to insert the absolute necessity
predicated on the CINCs request to the commandant of the Coast
Guard to establish and equip three Newport security units. I
would urge this Committee and, Mr. Chairman, I know you have
had some discussions with the commandant, to go ahead and
support those Port Security Units--PSUs, because they are
vitally necessary for the CINCs to carry out their mission.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I know I am ahead of schedule, but
I do want to thank you again for having the Reserve Officers
Association represented here today, and hope that we can
continue to count on this committee to support the vital
involvement of the Reserves.
Mr. Young. General, thank you very much for your testimony.
We appreciate that.
You can count on our continued recognition of the
importance that the Reserve forces play in our overall strategy
and overall force concept. Again, thank you for being here.
[The statement of General Sandler follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR UNIFORMED SERVICES
WITNESS
MAJOR JAMES W. BAPPLE, U.S. ARMY (RETIRED), NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR
UNIFORMED SERVICES
Introduction
Mr. Young. We would like to welcome Major James Bapple of
the National Association for Uniformed Services.
The Major has submitted a very detailed statement on the
medical situation within the Department of Defense. I think
everyone in this room knows we are definitely concerned about
that and we do things about it. We are concerned about the
health care available to our Nation's military personnel and
their families.
Major, I understand you also represent the 14 military and
veterans organizations which make up the National Military and
Veterans Alliance. We appreciate them.
Your statement will be placed in our permanent record. I
understand you have three exhibits that you would like to have
made part of that record, which is fine and will be done.
At this point, please proceed with your testimony.
Statement of Major Bapple
Major Bapple. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We appreciate this
opportunity to speak with you this morning. It is good to see
you again.
Before I begin, let me say we appreciate your hard work and
the hard work of this Committee. We appreciate your continuing
support for the entire military family.
As you correctly said, in addition to the National
Association for Uniformed Services--NAUS--I am speaking on
behalf of the National Military and Veterans Alliance, a group
of 14 associations with a combined membership of 3.5 million
members.
For my 5 minutes, I want to talk about health care, which
is only about 6 percent of the DOD budget, but it is a very
important issue to most of our retirees and to the active duty
population.
Sir, we are very concerned with the medical system that
even when it is fully operational it is only going to care for
4 million of the 8.5 million beneficiaries. The medical system,
of course, is TRICARE, and it is worthwhile to note there is no
other plan at present that is going to take care of the
remaining 4.5 million beneficiaries.
A seasoned and well-respected soldier recently had this to
say. He said ``TRICARE is a reduced version of the medical
benefit that military members, their families and retirees have
treasured for so long. And its primary reason for being is to
save money, not improve service. If that were not the case,
military aid societies would not be seeing increases in the
number of families asking for help paying medical bills and
retirees would not be flocking by the hundreds to join a class
action lawsuit that claims the government is reneging on its
promise of lifelong health care benefits.'' The soldier's name
was General John Shalikashvili, Chairman of our Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
To maintain readiness and preserve the fighting strength of
our men and women in uniform, the military health services
system through our military treatment facilities does a good
job; some would even say, I believe correctly, a world-class
job.
NAUS and the National Military and Veterans Alliance are
enthusiastic supporters of TRICARE, particularly TRICARE-Prime.
We continually see that health care, when it is accessible, is
truly excellent. The key, of course, is accessibility.
My son recently had knee surgery at a military hospital,
and his military orthopedic surgeon remarked to me he and his
wife both had a supplemental insurance policy for themselves
and their families because even doctors within the hospitals
and families could not be guaranteed care.
As many of the members of this Committee know from
firsthand experience, the number of installations and the
number of military treatment facilities continue to decrease.
Even today at least 17 hospitals are being targeted for
downgrading to clinics. Additional closures seem inevitable.
TRICARE-Extra and TRICARE-Standard, which of course, is the
CHAMPUS replacement, are supposed to accommodate those eligible
beneficiaries who cannot receive care through a military
treatment facility. Unfortunately, our members in many regions
throughout the United States are reporting extraordinary
difficulties with industry care, particularly TRICARE.
A retiree in Corpus Christi reported that five of six local
doctors participating in the TRICARE network were breaking
their contracts to leave the network. According to the retiree,
it was because of the very low reimbursement rates and the
extremely slow reimbursement rate.
A young active duty sailor in Philadelphia told us of using
CHAMPUS following the closure of the Naval hospital when he
took his daughter with a broken arm to a civilian doctor and
was subsequently saddled with bills totaling over several
hundred dollars, which CHAMPUS refused to pay.
A retiree in Indiana had his hip replaced. The doctor's
bill was $5,000. The reimburse was $1,700, of which the retiree
had to reimburse 25 percent.
In spite of TRICARE's apparent efforts to reduce costs, and
despite the low reimbursement rates, Richard Davis, the
Director of the National Security Analysis for the GAO, said in
a February 21 report to you, that future defense health program
costs are likely to be greater than DOD has estimated. We are
very concerned.
Administrative costs are rising and more money is required
to finish work on a system that will only take care of 4
million of 8.5 million beneficiaries and a system that will
disenfranchise our medicare-eligible beneficiaries, the only
Federal employees who lose their employer-sponsored medical
benefit when they become eligible for medicare.
Mr. Chairman, yesterday your colleague from Oklahoma, the
Honorable J.C. Watts, introduced a Military Health Care Justice
Act that would offer all military health care beneficiaries a
chance for DOD-sponsored health care. We believe that this bill
will go a long way to fulfilling that promise of lifetime
health care, and we ask for your support and support of this
Committee. It would cost far less than many other options and
would support the continuation of MTS and TRICARE with
improvements as a primary source of care and it would make
FEHBP available as an option. This act has the full support of
the Veterans Alliance.
Sir, that concludes my statement. Do you have any
questions?
Mr. Young. Thank you very much. We appreciate your
statement. We appreciate your interest, and I think you know
the commitment of this Committee is good, not adequate, not
proper, but good medical care for the military and their
families.
We are wrestling with the issue of TRICARE. I am not
exactly sure how that is going it play out, but we are doing
our best to help the authorizers find a solution there.
Again, thank you very much for being here. We appreciate
your testimony.
[The statement of Major Bapple follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
BRAIN INJURY ASSOCIATION, INC.
WITNESS
MARTIN B. FOIL, JR., CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, BRAIN INJURY ASSOCIATION,
INC.
Introduction
Mr. Young. I would like to now yield to Mr. Hefner, a very
distinguished member of this Committee, as well as the
Subcommittee on Military Construction, and he will introduce
Mr. Martin Foil, the volunteer Chairman of the Brain Injury
Association.
Mr. Hefner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, the
members that are here, I would urge you to read the
biographical data on Mr. Foil. It is so lengthy and his
accomplishments are extraordinary, and I will not bother to
read them all.
But I do want to point out that Martin Foil has been a
friend longer than both of us would care to remember, I guess.
But he has been so involved in this particular endeavor. I
would say this before I make my introduction. We have a
sympathetic ear in our Chairman here who long before he was
Chairman, championed the cause for bone marrow transplants and
this sort of thing, and he certainly has been a big asset to us
in this endeavor we are engaged in.
Martin, I don't know, I guess one of your great assets is
your lovely wife, who is not with you today.
Mr. Foil. That is my best asset.
Mr. Hefner. He had a 26-year-old son that unfortunately was
struck with an accident. We were real happy you were able to
come here, and went to the White House, and we had a session
with the President and Senator Hatch and some of the folks that
had supported us in this endeavor. And it is through the
efforts of people like Mr. Foil that we have made tremendous
advances in brain injury trauma.
A lot of folks have said, why are you doing cancer research
and doing bone marrow and head injuries in the defense bill?
But I think it is very appropriate, because all these things we
have to deal with in the military, just like we have to do in
the private sector.
So I want to welcome you to the Committee today. I think
the Chairman would say your entire statement will be a part of
the record, and any statement you would like to make other than
that we would be happy to hear. You have some support folk with
you here.
Mr. Foil. Yes, I do.
Mr. Hefner. I am not the Chairman, but I feel you can go
ahead and introduce them.
Mr. Foil. I will be happy to introduce them. This is Alice
D'Nicholas. Alice is a mother, a prime volunteer, and mover and
shaker in our organization, a mother of a brain injured son,
who also volunteers in our office in Washington, a wonderful
human being. This is Jean Brubay. She is our congressional
liaison on our staff in Washington. She is new with us, but
certainly not new to the Hill. We are just certainly tickled to
death.
Mr. Hefner. Also for the Members, Martin, you sponsor two
fund-raisers in our area, the golf tournament.
Mr. Foil. Coming up August 4th.
Mr. Hefner. And also the big ball out at the Charlotte
Motor Speedway.
Martin, it is a real pleasure to have you.
Mr. Chairman, in your absence, I took the liberty of
putting you on record as being supportive of these issues like
bone marrow and cancer research and head injuries, that we have
a receptive ear, because you have been a leader.
I remember years ago when you were not the Chairman and we
worked together on the bone marrow issue, and we want to thank
you for that, and thank you for letting me introduce my
constituent.
Mr. Young. Mr. Hefner, thank you very much. You and I have
had a good working relationship on these medical issues, and I
am proud of the role you played.
Statement of Mr. Foil
Mr. Foil. Thank you, Chairman Young. It is a pleasure to be
here.
I want to thank my Congressman, Representative Hefner, from
the 8th District of North Carolina, for that kind introduction.
I want to make one more introduction. This is Robert
D'Nicholas. He is a brain injury survivor and a worker in our
office, and we are very pleased to have him here today.
I was thinking as I stood in the hall what a wonderful
country we have, and watching these young people, which is our
future, running up and down the hall, that is what it is all
about. So I am happy to be here, and if we all work to try to
make a difference, we are really trying to make a difference
for those young folks.
My name is Martin Foil, and I come before you today as the
father of a young man named Phillip with severe brain injury.
In my real work, I am the Chairman and Chief Executive Office
of Tuscarora Yarns in Mount Pleasant, and I must state I
receive no compensation from the association for the programs I
am testifying about here today, but I do contribute
considerable sums of my own money to this organization, to the
work which it does, to improve the life of people with brain
injuries. I am here because I really care about the 9 million
Americans who are living with brain injury and their families.
I am going to talk about the Defense and Veterans Head
Injury Project--DVHIP--and the program in the Violence and
Brain Injury Project--VBIP--under the DOD. It is really
critical for improving the lives of people with brain injury
and to the prevention of brain injury in the first place
because you understand, prevention is the only cure.
As you know, this project not only serves all the active
duty military personnel who sustain brain injuries, and, Mr.
Chairman, that is approximately 8,000 a year in peacetime, but
it also serves the veterans and the civilian population as
well. It is truly an exemplary use and case of dual funding.
I am proud to tell you that today this collaborative effort
between the DOD, Veterans Affairs, and the BIA, or the Brain
Injury Association, is continuing to pay off.
What are some of the things we have done with these
programs? We have established a patient registry treatment and
referral network that includes over 20 medical centers, toll-
free help lines for people with brain injury and their care
givers, and a multicenter randomized control clinical outcome
study. This is something, that is a mouthful in the first
place, but it is something that the civilian sector, Mr.
Chairman, has not been able to accomplish and perform.
We have established prevention and educational programs for
people with brain injury, their families, their care givers,
including our BIA, BIA programs and our multimedia interactive
resource center, which is now in place at over 40 civilian and
DVHIP centers. Fifteen of those centers are hospitals for the
veterans.
In addition, the programs further the international brain
injury research effort in collaboration with the World Health
Organization, and we sort of have been adopted by NATO, so-to-
speak.
Brain injury truly is a silent epidemic. It is the single
largest killer and cause of disability among our young people.
We need your support for this $8.5 million in funding so that
at the DVHIP, the VBIP, and the Brain Injury Association, we
can carry on this unique partnership.
Let me just make a couple other statements. It is truly a
unique partnership that has done a lot of good. As you have
seen and read, and I hope you will read in the larger
testimony, some of the stories we have to tell about why it
does work. But more importantly, as we go forward, the World
Health Organization estimates that by the year 2010, 20 percent
of the total cost of all health care problems will be due to
violence. That is very scary. And this is a very important part
of the program that we bring, not only to the military, but to
civilians through this project.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to be
here and all of us. Stand up, Mike.
Mike is a young man from West Point who sustained a brain
injury and is going to go to West Point who will be here before
not too long and testify. Have you already been? You have
already been. We are proud to have him here. I salute you, sir.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much. We appreciate your
testimony.
You know this Committee feels very strongly about the
issue. In fact, we added substantial funds last year for brain
injury research through our university research programs, and
we very strongly support this.
I want to tell you that your concerns are very well
represented here by your Congressman, Mr. Hefner, who will make
sure we don't forget about any of this.
Mr. Foil. I appreciate that.
Mr. Young. Thank you for bringing your guests with you
today.
Mr. Foil. Thank you, Congressman. Thank you, Bill. I
appreciate that.
[The statement of Mr. Foil follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
NAVAL ORDNANCE STATION
WITNESS
HON. ANNE M. NORTHUP, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF
KENTUCKY
Introduction
Mr. Young. The Committee is pleased now to welcome
Congresswoman Northup from Louisville, Kentucky. Congresswoman
Northup is a member of the Appropriations Committee and
actually serves on one of our other subcommittees that several
of us serve on but seldom get to attend because we spend most
of our life in this room. She is on the Subcommittee on Labor-
Health, Human Services and the Education Subcommittee.
We are pleased to have you here this morning and look
forward to your testimony. Your entire statement will be placed
in our record, and you may proceed any way that you wish.
Statement of Congresswoman Northup
Mrs. Northup. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am
delighted to be here and appear for the first time before this
Subcommittee. I will submit my testimony for the record, but
briefly summarize it now.
Mr. Chairman, I am here on behalf of primarily the Naval
Ordnance Station in Louisville, Kentucky. You may remember that
was privatized last year. It has been really a tremendous
opportunity for our armed forces and particularly the Navy to
judge whether privatization is a good deal for the taxpayers
and a good deal for defense.
The truth is, it is a good deal for taxpayers. They are
doing the same work with a 40 percent reduction in space and a
40 percent reduction in personnel. What this means is that the
American's tax dollars that go to defense can accomplish a
great deal more.
First of all, I am here to ask you to make sure that we
keep intact the funding stream that is so essential in these
early years so that naval ordnance can get up and on its feet
and provide the real efficiencies and opportunities. It also
serves as such a great test case for us for future
privatization. So it is very important if we are going to gain
the full benefit of this that we make sure the funding stream
stays in place.
I am sure you know, Mr. Chairman, that there is a great
deal of political interest in bringing projects back to
people's districts, and naval ordnance is no exception. There
are certainly political interests in seeing the business at
naval ordnance gravitate to other Members' districts. It would
be a terrible mistake. It would lose all of the benefits we
stand to gain from this experiment, and it also would be a
terrible time at this time to allow anybody to use the up-
front, start-up costs, and use that as a reason to--as an
operational cost and try to convince the Committee that this
isn't so good for the taxpayers.
Like I said, it is undisputable, for 40 percent less
people, less room, they are accomplishing the same mission. In
addition, Mr. Chairman, it has come to my attention that the
Navy has reassessed the readiness of the guns that are repaired
and updated at the naval ordnance, and has found that they are
below the capacity that they think is so important to defense.
I am going to be submitting an additional plus up for these
guns.
The Navy has asked that they speed up their renovation so
that they can meet their obligations. Naval ordnance is the
only place that this work is being done, and this would help
them reach the capacity that they believe is so important.
Finally, I want to warn you that there are several other
requests that the Navy has made, and we are working with them
to finalize figures in order to reach the capacity that Hughes
needs for the work they also do in Louisville.
Finally, I see in the President's budget that he has
reduced the Kentucky Air National Guard by four airplanes, from
12 to 8. That is a very unfair cut. We rank 23rd in population.
Our Air National Guard is 42nd in population, and we are ranked
as one of the top units in the country. We are at 97 percent
full capacity. We fly 60 percent of our missions in actual
missions in support of defense, and they have asked that that
be retained at 12 planes.
I know we are on a tight schedule. I appreciate your
interest, giving me the opportunity to talk to you about these
very important projects.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much. We certainly share your
concern, and, and your interest in these matters.
As you are well aware, we have budgetary problems with the
President's budget request being much lower than many of us
think that it should be. We do the best we can to find the
adequate resources to guarantee the programs like you have
talked about continue on. We will continue to do that to the
very best of our ability. We thank you for calling attention to
some of these issues.
Mrs. Northup. I look forward to working with this
subcommittee. Thank you very much.
Mr. Young. We invite you to stay in touch as we proceed
through the year.
Mrs. Northup. Thank you.
[The statement of Mrs. Northrup follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
WITNESS
RITA MASON, NATIONAL VICE PRESIDENT, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES
Introduction
Mr. Young. Our next witness is Rita Mason, the National
Vice President of the American Federation of Government
Employees--AFGE. Ms. Mason represents more than 700,000
government workers, including 300,000 employed by the
Department of Defense.
Ms. Mason, your entire statement, including the seven
issues that you feel so strongly about, will be made a part of
the permanent record, and at this time we would ask you to
summarize your statement.
Statement of Ms. Mason
Ms. Mason. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to begin my testimony by thanking the
Committee for this opportunity to testify on the fiscal year
1998 appropriations bill for DOD. We know that you, Mr.
Chairman, and other members of this Committee, share our belief
that the United States must continue to remain ready to meet
any threat to the security of our Nation. While there are many
important issues affecting our Federal work force which this
Committee will consider, I will limit my statement today to the
three issues which are the most important to the American men
and women who do so much to ensure our Nation's defense by
protecting the depots, ensuring a strong public-private
competition, through preservation of A-76, and preventing
arbitrary personnel ceilings from causing wasteful contracting
out.
I fully understand that not all matters I will discuss fall
routinely under this panel's jurisdiction. However, because
they are so important to readiness and our members, I believe
that they are relative to this hearing.
The 60-40 safeguard and the $3 million competition
safeguard plus the core work load safeguards protect our depots
by retaining a federally controlled core work load which is
capable of meeting maintenance needs of our armed forces in
times of war and peace. AFGE strongly recommends that the
Committee continue in the absence of any viable alternative to
strongly support the statutory safeguards which ensure that our
depots are ready when called upon to support our men and women
in uniform.
AFGE also asks this Committee to work to ensure that the
Nation's depots are given maintenance assignments for new
weapons systems.
As Mr. Robert T. Mason, by the way, not a relative, the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Maintenance, Policy
Programs and Resources told the congressional delegation in
early 1996, ``If the depots don't get any new work from new
weapons systems or from closing depots,'' a scenario that at
least some senior officials in the Pentagon would actually like
to bring about, ``they will all be closed in 9 years.''
I would now like to address the issue of contracting out
generally.
For AFGE and its members, the central issue which should
drive the discussion surrounding the outsourcing debate is
readiness, how we can get the most effectiveness, efficiency,
and reliability for the taxpayer dollars invested.
AFGE is not antiprivatization. We are, however,
unreservedly and nonnegotiably pro competition. On this
principle we will not cave or compromise.
It is imperative to remember that the way to generate
efficiencies and savings is not contracting out or outsourcing
or privatizing. Rather, what is key is ensuring real and
genuine competition between the public and private sectors.
AFGE was extensively involved in the 1995-1996 reform of
Office of Managment and Budget--OMB Circular A-76. This effort
resulted in a revised supplement that while permitting more
flexibility to contract out, also enables Federal employees
greater involvement in the competitive process and makes
contracting out a two-way street by permitting work to be
returned back in-house when it is more cost effective to do so.
We have two recommendations to offer, Mr. Chairman,
regarding A-76: One, AFGE urges the Committee to resist any
attempts to exempt the Pentagon from the competitive
requirements of A-76; two, AFGE urges the Committee to deny
appropriations for conversions to contractor performance for
all activities involving 10 or more employees until a
commercial activities performance analysis has been completed
in accordance with A-76.
I would now like to address the serious consequences of
full-time equivalent, FTE, personnel ceilings.
Personnel ceilings are forcing some military bases to lay
off their civilian employees and then to contract out the work
at higher costs.
The problem is especially noticeable at service depots
where Federal employees are getting reduction in force notices
while planes, tanks, and ships await repairs. But don't take
our word for it. The personnel directors of four branches of
the armed forces in testimony before the Congress in 1995
bemoaned the fact that civilian ceilings, not work load costs
or readiness concerns, are forcing them to send work to the
contractors that could have been performed cheaper in-house.
The representatives asserted that their services' depots
must turn away valid, funded work load requirements because of
the FTE ceilings, limiting the flexibility of our depots to
adjust and meet quickly and critical unprogrammed surge
requirements of our operating forces.
In the fiscal year 1996 Defense Appropriations bill, the
Congress instructed DOD to stop managing by FTE ceilings.
However, that mandate has been defied. An example of this
defiance is attached as an exhibit in my testimony.
In a letter a senior Army official explicitly instructed an
installation commander to abide by in-house staffing quotas,
and then contracted out work that may have been performed more
cheaply in-house.
Clearly, the outcome of any competition at Fort Hood or
elsewhere within forces command, for that matter, has already
been decided in advance of the requirements of the A-76 and the
interest of the taxpayers in fair public-private competition
notwithstanding.
I wish that I could say that this is an isolated case.
Unfortunately, while it may be one of the more blatant cases,
it is by no means unique. DOD's own Inspector General--IG
reported 2 years ago that the goal of downsizing the Federal
work force is widely perceived as placing DOD in a position of
having to contract out services regardless of what is more
desirable and cost effective.
AFGE urges the Committee to require DOD to manage by budget
rather than FTE ceilings. AFGE also urges the Committee to ask
the service chiefs to appear before you and acknowledge or deny
that they are managing by FTE ceilings. We also urge you to ask
the General Acconting Office--GAO to determine whether the
Pentagon has complied with the congressional prohibition
against management by FTE ceilings.
That concludes my overview of AFGE's views and concerns,
with respect to the fiscal year 1998 defense appropriations.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much for your testimony.
[The statement of Mr. Harnage follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION
WITNESS
JERRY M. WIENER, M.D., AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION
Introduction
Mr. Young. Our next witness will be Dr. Jerry Wiener of the
American Psychiatric Association, which represents some 42,000
psychiatric physicians.
The association has not been bashful in its opposition to
psychopharmacology demonstration projects, and the
association's objections, contained in your full statement,
will be noted. Your entire statement will be placed in the
record. You may proceed as you wish.
Statement of Dr. Wiener
Dr. Wiener. Thank you very much, Congressman Young. I
appreciate your allowing me to go out of turn, so I have to
leave earlier than I thought I would come on the regular
schedule. So I very much appreciate that.
I am the Past President of the American Psychiatric
Association and Chairman of the Department of Psychiatry at
George Washington University.
I am going to address three issues. The demonstration
project which you just mentioned in the Defense Department,
which is proposed to train psychologists to prescribe
medications for the treatment of mental illness, the American
Psychiatric Association, together with the Defense Department,
are in full agreement with the conclusion of the April 1997
report, ``Given the Defense Department's readiness
requirements, the Psychopharmacology Demonstration Project,
PDP, substantial costs and questionable benefits and the
project's persistent implementation difficulties, we see no
reason to reinstate this demonstration project.''
I will next talk about the coverage and delivery of mental
health service in the military medical system, and third, the
confidentiality of patient records.
First, the PDP and the General Accounting Office report.
When this program was terminated by the Congress, it
required the GAO to evaluate the program and make
recommendations regarding its continuation. This report
entitled, ``Defense Health Care: Need for More Prescribing
Psychologists Is Not Adequately Justified''; this report, it is
attached at the end of my written testimony.
The report documents what the American Psychiatric
Association has consistently maintained, that the program is,
and was from its beginning, a major boondoggle which was never
needed and never requested by the military, but only by one
Senate aide, who happens to be a psychologist and who used his
Senator's control over the military's budget to fund a program
which was of no benefit except to the profession of psychology
and which began without any House or Senate hearings or any
consideration by this Committee or Full Committee.
This program has wasted now $6.1 million taxpayer dollars
and used military personnel and their families as its subjects.
Its original justification was to train psychologists to treat
something called ``battle fatigue.'' When it was pointed out
there was, per se, no such condition, then the rationale was
changed to a shortage of psychiatrists and the cost-benefit of
training psychologists to write prescriptions.
So the GAO report concludes: ``Training psychologists to
prescribe medication is not adequately justified because the
military health services system has no demonstrated need for
them, the cost is substantial, and their benefits uncertain.
The MHSS has more psychiatrists than it needs to meet its
current and upcoming readiness requirements.''
The report goes on to make the following important points,
that even with the training provided psychologists because they
have no medical education, they cannot substitute for
psychiatrists in diagnosis and treatment, and furthermore that
the cost of the program is extremely high for the value of the
product.
$6.1 million has been spent, $610,000 per each graduate
from the program, that has produced 10 prescription-writing
psychologists, the last two of which had to be recruited out of
the Senator's office and appointed to the rank of major in
order to get sufficient students in the class, because there
were no volunteers or insufficient volunteers from the Army.
That cost of $610,000 compares to a cost of about $300,000
in tuition and stipends and costs to produce a fully educated
and trained psychiatrist over an 8-year period of medical
school and residency, compared to the $610,000 for a 2-year
quick course and one year of training, which the DOD's own
oversight committee thought brought these psychologists about
to the level of second year residents.
Under the heading is that no government program is easily
terminated, and despite the GAO report and the statement from
the DOD that it has no plans to extend the program after the
termination date of June 30th, 1997, as each of you may be
aware, a major lobbying campaign has been undertaken to
discredit the GAO report, to influence the Congress to
reinstate this program, which from its inception was only a sad
monument to a psychologist's wish to be a physician.
The GAO report is solid, it is well balanced, and it is
your own. Reinstatement would only tend to support the public's
perception that the Congress sometimes spends millions of
dollars on wasteful and needless programs.
Now, in the delivery and coverage of mental health services
in the military medical system, studies repeatedly document
that mental disorders are as diagnosable, as serious, and as
treatable, certainly as prevalent, and as costly as heart
disease, diabetes, and cancer. There is a move at the present
time to shift the CHAMPUS delivery system for mental health
services into a managed care system, much as many other
services are being shifted.
For many reasons military life is more stressful than
civilian life, especially for children and adolescents. CHAMPUS
has now implemented the TRICARE program which moves CHAMPUS
into the managed care arena. These systems generate savings for
the insurer by limiting access to mental health care. We are
concerned that TRICARE will follow this plan, including special
limits on psychotherapy. These policies may save money in the
short run, money which is converted into managed care profits,
but these measures are more costly in terms of dysfunction,
morale, and long-term costs, and that has been demonstrated
several times over.
Patients should receive the medical care they require, no
more and no less. Our hope is that Congress will expect that
TRICARE will strive to achieve this goal.
Third and last, and very briefly, is the issue of great
importance of confidentiality of patient records. Recently at
Elmendorf Air Force Base in Anchorage, Alaska, the 20-year-old
daughter of a military counterintelligence agent was allegedly
raped by an airman. Her records, when she sought therapy at the
base to deal with this, detailing her sessions with the
psychiatrist, were requested by military lawyers to defend the
airman charged with the rape because the records are considered
government property.
The Supreme Court majority in Jaffee v. Redmond stated that
the balance of interest regarding psychotherapy was clearly on
the side of confidentiality. I will not quote that statement,
but it makes a very strong statement of the importance to the
public and in this case to the military by extension on my part
to the military, that the importance of confidentiality very
much outweighs the evidentiary benefit that would result from
the denial of the privilege.
The Department of Defense's Assistant Secretary for Health
Affairs has recommended that nonactive duty patient/Department
of Defense psychotherapist communication should be privileged,
as it is in the civilian sector.
It is time overdue to take action on this generally agreed
upon position. It is prima facie that confidentiality is
necessary for accurate diagnosis and effective treatment. It is
in the self-interest of the military to afford family members
of active duty personnel the same right and access, and
therefore to effective health care to which they would be
entitled if they were not members of the military family. We
urge you to request the DOD to amend the military rules of
evidence to create this privilege.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Young. Doctor, thank you very much.
[The statement of Dr. Wiener follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION
WITNESS
MORTON ANN GERNSBACHER, Ph.D., AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION
Introduction
Mr. Young. I would like to invite Dr. Morton Ann
Gernsbacher of the American Psychological Association to come
to the table. They have a little different opinion of the PDP.
Dr. Gernsbacher, you are recognized for 5 minutes. Your
entire statement will be placed in the record. Please summarize
as you wish.
Statement of Dr. Gernsbacher
Ms. Gernsbacher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am Dr. Morton Gernsbacher, the Sir Frederick C. Bartlett
Professor of Psychology at the University of Wisconsin in
Madison. So I am here on behalf of American psychologists who
don't necessarily aspire to be physicians.
I am here on behalf of the American Psychological
Association, and I want to make three brief points: The
continuing need to invest in research, including psychological
research at the Department of Defense; the need to sustain
support for the Army Research Institute for the behavioral and
social sciences; and APA's continuing support of the
department's demonstration program that is training
psychologists to prescribe psychotropic medications.
DOD has supported psychological research since World War
II. Today, as our military forces streamline, downsize, and
become more diverse, DOD-funded behavioral research is
revealing ways in which to enhance human performance, train for
complex tasks, and identify and build leadership.
We believe that maintaining DOD's technology base must be
6.1, 6.2, and 6.3A research in these areas. It is important to
recognize that increasingly sophisticated weapons systems place
more, not fewer, demands on human operators and maintainers. We
must ensure that our military personnel are as well prepared as
their machines to meet the challenge. This is not possible
without a sustained investment in human-oriented research.
Our written statement includes specific requests for
research programs in the Navy, Air Force, and Army. But I want
to highlight the need for the Committee to support an increased
budget for the Army Research Institute--ARI.
APA recommends a 1998 funding level of $21.4 million for
ARI, and the allocation of 165 full-time equivalent positions.
This is $3.65 million and 468 positions more than requested,
yet it is lower than the current funding level of $23.7
million.
Funding for ARI has been eroding, despite the strong record
of ARI in sponsoring research that is essential to the training
and performance of Army personnel. It is critical that this
Subcommittee stop the erosion this year.
About half the Army's budget, some $45 billion, is spent on
personnel, but less than $24 million is now spent to make these
personnel more effective. In comparison, $16.2 billion is spent
on material procurement and around $4.3 billion is spent on
research to make the equipment more effective.
ARI works to build the ultimate smart weapon, the American
soldier, and its efforts deserve your support.
The ARI was established to conduct personnel and behavioral
research on such topics as minority and general recruitment,
personnel testing and evaluation, training and retraining, and
leadership. And this is the type of research that I conduct.
Reliable data about these issues is critical, as you know
from today's headlines. While the Army seeks to solve the
problem of sexual harassment within its ranks and establish
workplace ethics and procedures that bring out the best from a
diverse work force, good data collected for the Army from
scientists who understand how the Army works will help the Army
plan and execute reasonable policies.
ARI is the focal point and principal source of expertise
for all the military services for leadership research, an
important area for all the armed services. Research that helps
identify, nurture, and train leaders is critical to their
success. In addition, ARI conducts research on the training and
other demands of the peacekeeping role, a difficult job that
requires different training than the combat role.
APA urges you to support a modest increase for ARI. Its
budget has been reduced well over 50 percent from a high of
around $50 million in 1995. The Army cannot buy this research
more cheaply elsewhere. DOD's investment in ARI's scientific
skills and its honest brokering of essential research will
continue to serve our Nation well.
Finally, I want to remind the Committee that APA remains
very supportive of pharmacology training for psychologists in
the military health services system.
A respected research organization, Vector Research, Inc.,
in a May 1996 report commissioned by the DOD, extensively
analyzed the Psychopharmacology Demonstration Project, PDP.
This is the project within DOD that has trained a small number
of military psychologists to prescribe psychotropic medication
when appropriate. Vector showed the benefits of having
pharmacopsychologists in the military, 10 of whom will have
graduated from the 2-year Fellowship by mid-1997.
I can only briefly summarize the report in my remaining
time, but I refer you to the APA's written statement for a more
complete discussion. The report states that, ``if
pharmacopsychologists are utilized in lieu of some physicians
on deployment, their contribution would be the safe and
effective treatment of service members with psychotropic
medications at a lower cost than could be achieved by utilizing
physicians in that role.''
A recent GAO report unfortunately misses the point,
ignoring the beneficial effect of psychologists prescribing on
the military health system overall. APA has serious concerns
with the methodology used in this study, and with the fact that
GAO ignored its own evidence that contradicted its conclusions.
GAO itself admits that clinical psychologists can be trained to
prescribe, and even admits that by using pharmacopsychologists
DOD can save money.
DOD is running a health care business, and the bottom line
is what skills are needed and which providers can most
efficiently provide those skills. The PDP shows that this type
of training has proved to be a good way to increase access for
military personnel to appropriate, high-quality mental and
behavioral health care.
APA urges Committee members to recognize the value to the
MHSS of psychopharmacological training and to support making
such training a permanent option for psychologists in the
military.
In summary, both psychological research and practice have
and will continue to provide savings from increased efficiency
and enhanced productivity in the armed forces, and we ask again
for your support.
Thank you.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much.
Mr. Young. Mr. Visclosky has some questions on this issue,
and I would like to recognize him at this time.
Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Chairman, if I could direct them to Dr.
Wiener?
Doctor, what would your reaction be to the Vector study?
Dr. Wiener. Well, the Vector study has a number of serious
problems in it. One, of course, is it was an internal study
rather than an external study.
Mr. Visclosky. Internal to the Department of Defense?
Dr. Wiener. Yes. And there are many actual--they made a
number--all of these studies make assumptions, and they start
out if you start with this set of assumptions, you come out
with this set of figures, and if you start with other sets, you
come out with very different figures.
The GAO study, for example, took all of the costs of the
program, including the start-up costs, because there had been
so few people in the program that they justified that, I
thought very rationally so, that you couldn't ignore what the
start-up costs were.
Then they asked Vector to use the same cost basis and see
what would happen. If I remember correctly, in the Vector
study, even on the re-analysis, and this is contained in the
GAO report, you would require that the psychologist prescribe
anywhere from 85 to 110 percent of their time, and nobody is
going to spend 85 percent of their time basically writing
prescriptions or dealing with writing prescriptions. That is
not realistic.
Mr. Visclosky. They are at about 38 percent now, right?
Dr. Wiener. The psychologists, you mean? I think that was
the figure. I don't remember exactly. It is also important to
remember that 38 percent is also still, for each one of them,
under supervision, so there is an additional component of
supervisory time involved in the cost. They have not been able
to yet attain nonsupervised prescription writing privileges or
psychopharmacology privileges. Also, they don't take into
account the fact that particularly severely ill patients, sick
patients, have a number of other illnesses as well, and that
writing only prescriptions for psychoactive drugs without any
realization or training or preparation to understand the other
illnesses and their medications and their interactions is not
really very appropriate.
Mr. Visclosky. You would have us believe that a trained
psychologist would not understand their limitations and would
not therefore, prescribe in that circumstance?
Dr. Wiener. I won't make that assumption.
Mr. Visclosky. Would you presume, then, that psychologists
shouldn't prescribe at all?
Dr. Wiener. Yes. There is no purpose and no value and no
adequate training available for psychologists to write
prescriptions.
Mr. Visclosky. In other fields of medicine you have MDs
anesthetizing patients, and nurses anesthetizing patients as
well.
Dr. Wiener. Wait a minute, did you say MD?
Mr. Visclosky. They are not MDs, nurses who are not MDs
delivering anesthesia. In the field of eye care, you have
ophthalmologists. And I would understand you have both nurse
anesthetists in the military; you have ophthalmologists in the
military; you have nurse practitioners. As you indicated, we
are in health care. We have $15 billion here at stake and we
are looking for cheaper solutions.
I don't have a firm position one way or the other on the
difference between the two of you, but I would suggest we ought
to be looking at competition in the military, to reduce costs.
Dr. Wiener. Well, I think you have looked at it, and I
think the GAO report looked at it.
Mr. Visclosky. I would respond as far as Vector, if it is
going to be a permanent program, that the start-up costs that
were factored into the GAO study are a one-time occurrence and
would not be permanent to the program.
Thank you very much, Doctor.
Mr. Young. Doctor, do you have any response to any of those
questions?
Ms. Gernsbacher. No, thank you.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much, both of you, for being
here.
[The statement of Dr. Gernsbacher follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
NON COMMISSIONED OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
WITNESS
SERGEANT MAJOR MICHAEL F. OUELLETTE, U.S. ARMY (RET.), DIRECTOR OF
LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS, NON COMMISSIONED OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Introduction
Mr. Young. I would like to welcome back before the
Committee Sergeant Major Michael Ouellette, the Director of
Legislative Affairs for the Non Commissioned Officers
Association of the United States. The sergeant major and I
spend a lot of time together working on the quality-of-life
issues for our troops and make sure we do the best we can to
provide a good quality of life for them.
I was interested in reading your testimony, Sergeant,
that--I want to quote you--you say, ``Enlisted people indicate
they no longer can afford to shop in the exchange for many
items. In fact, many enlisted members have referred to the K-
Mart, WalMarts and Target Stores in the local communities as
`enlisted exchanges.' ''
You indicate that the solution to the problem would be
lifting exchange restrictions. Tell us more about that as you
proceed with your time.
Statement of Sergeant Major Ouellette
Sergeant Major Ouellette. Fine, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
very much again this year for the invitation to appear before
you to discuss many issues that are very important to enlisted
people currently serving in the Armed Forces and to virtually
everybody serving.
I would like to personally extend to you the thanks of the
Non Commissioned Officers Association and the other members of
the Military Alliance for the outstanding work that you have
done in the past years to provide pay increases that went
beyond those recommended by the administration, to do separate
Basic Allowance for Quarters--BAQ increases, to provide
military construction money for increases. I would really hate
to see what the Armed Forces today would look like from a
quality-of-life standpoint if it had not have been for the
outstanding efforts of this Committee over the past number of
years.
The point that you mentioned in your opening remarks
concerning the exchanges, I have found when I have traveled to
many of the installations, military enlisted people will come
up to me, and I will talk about exchanges. I feel the
importance of exchanges are this: That by encouraging people to
use them, to spend their dollars there, that money then rolls
over into Morale, Welfare and Recreation--MWR programs and goes
back into the installation. That consequently could reduce
taxpayer liability for those programs. It is sort of a self-
supporting issue.
When I talk to enlisted people, many of them say they no
longer use the exchange on post, they are going down downtown
to the WalMarts, the Target Stores, and even go so far as to
refer to them as ``enlisted exchanges.'' And when I question
them on that, it is simply this: They will say the exchanges
tell you they will save you 30 to 40 percent on name brand
merchandise, but if you can save 40 percent on a Tommy Hilfiger
shirt that is sold in the exchange for $65, it really doesn't
do me any good because I can't get there from here anyway.
What we need to do is lift the restrictions. I think a lot
of the lifting of the restrictions are really concerns that
product lines, large top-of-the-line products, big-dollar
products, will be brought in, and I don't think so.
I think the other thing will be that the exchanges are
recognizing the fact that they have pretty much priced enlisted
people out of the market and retirees out of the market, and
hopefully by allowing those stores to remain competitive with
the outside, that we will be able to roll over money, maintain
the money to help ourselves within their military communities,
thereby reducing the appropriations needed to support those
programs.
When I was coming here to testify, I wanted to make a
special note. Most of the statements submitted by military
associations pretty much sang the same songs. We understand the
issues and support the same kind of programs for the most part.
I wanted to not take a whole lot of time, but I called a
constituent of yours, an old retired command sergeant major
named Jim Hare, who lives down in your area, was a great
soldier, served for 35 years, has never worked after
retirement. He does volunteer work, driving senior citizens to
doctors' appointments in the area. He has been sort of slowed a
little bit lately because he has glaucoma.
But I called him, and I said, Jim, I am going to appear
before your Representative, Bill Young. He said, a good man. I
said, what would you want me to tell him? And he said, Mike, he
said, if anything, he said, tell Mr. Young that I need his
Committee to make decisions that support and protect the
institution of the Armed Forces, that take care of the people
that are in the Armed Forces that are currently doing the
things I used to do and the people that worked for me did. But
it is the institution that you really look at, and saving that
in terms of recruiting, retention, you draw money into taking
care of people, thereby maintaining that institution.
He said, the other thing I would say is talk to Mr. Young
about protecting my earned retirement benefits, whether it be
military health care, which I am having a tough time with right
now. I need some options out here. I have got to take care of
my wife. She has got some medical problems. I need some help
here because I don't know where to turn.
We need to protect the commissary as an earned, non-pay
benefit that I served for, that helps me make ends meet. We
need to protect the exchanges and those kind of things.
He was very sincere. He was most appreciative for the work
you have done, particularly in cost-of-living-adjustments--
COLAs. He said that work has allowed him to continue doing what
he has been able to do, because the cost-of-living adjustments,
allowances, that you have provided every year, above and beyond
removing the inequities, have allowed him to continue to pay
the bills and be able to be an important part of the community,
and he was most appreciative to you.
Mr. Chairman, that is about all I have to say right now. If
you have any other questions, I have got a statement that
outlined our issues, and I know you understand them, and the
Committee will work very hard to make life better for the
people who serve this country.
Mr. Young. We appreciate all the time you spend in this
work and the way that you stay in touch with us, and we also
appreciate the aid and assistance you give us on occasion when
there are issues that need to be resolved.
Mr. Young. Peter?
Mr. Visclosky. No, thank you.
Mr. Young. We appreciate your being here. I invite all of
you to stay in touch. The quality of life of the people that
serve our Nation is utmost in our priorities.
Sergeant Major Ouellette. Thank you for the invitation and
allowing the other military associations to bring their issues
to the table. I appreciate it.
[The statement of Sergeant Major Ouellette follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
AIR FORCE SERGEANTS ASSOCIATION
WITNESS
CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT JOSHUA W. KREBS, USAF (RET.); MANAGER,
LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS, AIR FORCE SERGEANTS ASSOCIATION
Introduction
Mr. Young. Next on our agenda is Joshua Krebs of the Air
Force Sergeants Association. When I reviewed the written
statement, I was particularly interested in the discussion of
increasing responsibilities given to enlisted members. You said
the Air Force has converted many jobs from commissioned to
enlisted, greatly raising the level of responsibility of
enlisted members without a commensurate raise in pay.
My son tells me about that, because he is a one-striper at
Sheppard Air Force Base, and he wonders about that same thing.
We would like to hear from you also. Your entire statement will
be placed in the record.
Statement of Chief Master Sergeant Krebs
Sergeant Krebs. Thank you, sir. Understanding that you are
running late, I will, in fact, just go to the issue you just
brought up.
The Air Force in particular has been converting many
positions from officer to enlisted, noncommissioned, and at the
same time the ratio of enlisted pay to officer pay has remained
steady over many years. I did not go into any particular
details of the positions that were converted, but I can tell
you that over 1,000 weapons director positions have been
converted from officer to enlisted. A number of forward air
control positions that used to be fighter pilot have been
converted. Scores of support positions throughout have been
converted.
Just as the military has taken away some of the layers of
responsibility, they have also brought down the levels of
responsibilities, so that the senior commissioned people have
more responsibility than they had.
We believe it is time that somebody takes a hard look at
what was there 10 years ago as far as what enlisted people did
and what is there today, and look at the same time at the
proportionate pays that were given to enlisted people then
versus today, and the officers. I think if we did that and took
an honest look at it, we would find that the enlisted member is
giving more to the military today than what they did 10 years
ago for disproportionately less pay.
That concludes my statement. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Young. My understanding is that the enlisted Air Force
personnel are now operating and flying the Satellite
Constellations. Am I correct in that?
Sergeant Krebs. To the best of my knowledge, yes, sir.
Mr. Young. Well, that is a very interesting point that you
raise. We will take a close look at that. Getting pay increases
is not really easy. We will provide a pay increase this year.
It won't be very much, unfortunately, but there have been times
when we provided pay raises over the objection of the
administration which didn't ask for them. But we understand we
are way behind in pay for the members of the military, and we
are way behind in a lot of the quality-of-life issues. We are
doing the best we can to catch up.
Again this year we will do the very best we can to make
housing better, to make the medical care better, to make their
responsibilities more recognized properly. So we are in this
with you, and we are going to do the best we can. We appreciate
your calling this to our attention.
[The statement of Chief Master Sergeant Krebs follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
FLEET RESERVE ASSOCIATION
WITNESS
CHARLES L. CALKINS, NATIONAL EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, FLEET RESERVE
ASSOCIATION
Introduction
Mr. Young. I would like to welcome back Charles Calkins,
the National Executive Secretary of Fleet Reserve Association.
I think you now have about 162,000 members, and you are
representing active-duty, Reserve and retired U.S. Navy, Marine
Corps and Coast Guard enlisted personnel.
Your prepared statement points out reducing end strength
and increasing deployments place considerable strains on the
service personnel and their families, and you will hear a very
strong amen from the Members of this Committee. We recognize
that, we see what it is doing to our overall readiness, to the
morale of the troops, to the condition of our equipment. We
understand that, believe me. We are happy to hear from you on
the subject. You are recognized.
Statement of Mr. Calkins
Mr. Calkins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You just stole half
of my presentation.
What we want to do is on behalf of the 162,000 members of
the Fleet Reserve Association is to thank you for the watchdog
that you have been, trying to protect those rights and benefits
of the members at sea, to show our appreciation to you and our
Committee.
At the outset, the Fleet Reserve Association, as you said,
directs your attention to the impact of continued high
operational tempo within the uniformed services. End strengths
have been reduced by roughly 25 percent during the drawdown,
yet deployments have increased significantly, resulting in
considerable strain on service personnel.
A little personal note that I might add into that. About 3
weeks ago I was headed up to Groton to do a legislative
briefing to an active-duty group at the sub school, and I
personally know a sailor up there, and I called and said, I am
flying up on Sunday, why don't we get together Sunday afternoon
or evening for lunch or for dinner. My presentation is on
Monday morning, and I have got to fly back Monday evening. And
he said, Dad, I would love to, but I got to work. I said, you
don't have duty. He says, Dad, I haven't had a weekend off for
about 3 or 4 weeks. I said, that is fine. I said, what time do
you get out of work? He said, 5 o'clock. I said, 5 o'clock on a
Sunday? He says, yeah.
So we did eventually get together for dinner. I said, you
know, you need some time off. You look like you are kind of run
down. This young fellow is about 12 years in the Navy, and he
is at a point where he has to make a decision to continue or to
walk, and, of course, being retired Navy myself, I am kind of
hoping he is going to follow my footsteps all the way to 30
years and not stop at 20.
And he said, Dad, I have to really take a hard look at what
is going on. And he said, I look around at the civilians that
come aboard to fix our ship. He says, they have Mondays through
Fridays, they are off for the weekends, they get more pay than
what I get, they get to spend more time with their families
than I do.
That is the real hard issue, and I think that is pretty
well servicewide. I don't want to pick out the Navy
specifically, but it really hits home with me and brings back
some memories. I think we can go from every home port to every
home port, discussion, it is the same issue. I think it is a
very real thing.
Specifically, and we are looking at more downsizing in the
Navy further, 3 or 4 weeks ago there were discussions or rumors
of cutting the Navy about another 11,000 people, and since then
it is going to be cut another 6,000 people by 1999. I am
looking at that and saying that is an awful lot of carriers or
ships to go to sea, and what happens to our defense in the
meantime.
Several issues are out there as it has been indicated in
our statement. The one thing that I think that really should
hit home with the Committee, if I might ask, is the addendum
that we added to my statement referring to the pay raises, a
time lag in the pay raise. The pay raise becomes effective or
is discussed in October. It doesn't become effective for 15
months later. And the pay gap, as the chart shows, prior to the
all-volunteer force, the pay comparability between senior
enlisted personnel and junior enlisted personnel was 4.5 to 1,
and yet senior officers and junior officers was 5.0 to 1. Since
then, 1997, senior enlisted to junior enlisted is 2.6 to 1, and
officers is 4.6 to 1.
We need to take a hard look at that. The people that are
making the Navy, the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard work are
in our senior enlisted category, a group of people, and we
should consider those pay raises.
Mr. Chairman, again, welcome back. I hope you are in good
health. You look good. Your color is back. Keep up the good
work for us. We really appreciate it.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much, sir. We appreciate you
being here, and we appreciate the work you do for those who
serve in our military. I also thank you for your comment. My
health is very good now. I had a few bumps along the way, but I
am back at full force again, and things are well. Again, thank
you very much for being here.
[The statement of Mr. Calkins follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
NATIONAL MILITARY FAMILY ASSOCIATION
WITNESSES
SYDNEY T. HICKEY, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, GOVERNMENT RELATIONS, NATIONAL
MILITARY FAMILY ASSOCIATION
Introduction
Mr. Young. Our next witness is Sydney Hickey, the Associate
Director of Government Relations of the National Military
Family Association. Mrs. Hickey has been a military family
member for most of her life, is a spouse of a retired Naval
officer and has an Air Force daughter. She also puts out one of
the best newsletters in town, and last year I remember telling
you that and asking that we be kept on your mailing list, and I
make that request again. Please keep us on your mailing list,
because we find it very, very informative.
We would like to recognize you now. Your entire statement
will be placed in the record. Please summarize.
Statement of Mrs. Hickey
Ms. Hickey. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I can assure
you you will be the top of our mailing list. The families we
serve remain indebted to you and the Members of the
Subcommittee for your strong support of their quality of life.
This morning I would like to touch briefly on three issues
from our written testimony: compensation, health care and
military communities. I think it is important to note that to
military families, compensation is not only what goes into the
bank account, but what doesn't have to come out of it for the
basics such as food, shelter, clothing and the care of their
children. So if you propose a cut in savings at the
commissaries, or a 20 percent increase in child care costs as
envisioned in the Navy's pilot program to subsidize bases in
the civilian child care centers, if you propose housing
privatization initiatives that may end up costing the members
out of pocket, families view these as compensation cuts.
Obviously depressing active-duty pay raises will continue
to put military families further and further behind their
peers, as will the Department of Defense's proposal to rob
Peter in order to pay Paul a small amount of the basic
allowance for subsistence.
In health care, I think some of the problems of the TRICARE
program have been adequately discussed before, so I would just
like to jump to the fact that NMFA believes the underlying
problem with the health care system is that the benefits
provided, the cost to the beneficiary of those benefits, and
the population covered by those benefits are subject to yearly
budget battles within the Pentagon. We do not believe the
military beneficiaries should be subject to the budget of a
single agency. If, as with the Federal Employees Health
Benefits Program, an economic change becomes necessary for the
fiscal safety or health of the country, then, fine, let's
debate that in the halls of Congress, not the halls of the
Pentagon.
Debate in the halls of the Pentagon has led to our leaving
the age 64 and older population out of the current health care
problem. Debate in the halls of the Pentagon is including
discussions right now of charging even CHAMPUS-eligible
military retirees over $900 just to put their big toe in the
military health care facility. Is it any wonder that military
families, including active-duty, are asking the question who is
next?
In the military community, the military community includes
the installations, the organizations, the institutions and the
people, and it is viewed as home by military families whether
or not they actually live on the installation. Our family
support centers teach skills enabling service members and their
families to cope with the demands of military life, and then
they provide that safety net to assist the families when their
coping skills are not enough.
With the current high personnel and operational tempo and
the long workdays and workweeks even when the service member is
home, the need for the services provided by these family
centers has increased. Privatization and out-sourcing
initiatives, whether for family housing, family support
functions, or child care, have the potential to increase
quality of life and reduce costs. NMFA believes that care
should be taken that such initiatives reinforce the community
and do not, no matter how inadvertent, lead to the destruction
of the community and its support infrastructure.
To conclude, as important as NMFA believes the strong
family support structure is for military families, in the end
nothing can totally stop the negative effects on family life of
frequent separations, including what we call the ``they only
sleep here'' syndrome. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much for being here. We certainly
share your concerns. It will be part of our consideration as we
proceed to provide the funding for fiscal year 1998. We will do
the best we can.
Ms. Hickey. I know you will. Thank you, sir.
[The statement of Ms. Hickey follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
THE AMERICAN LEGION
WITNESS
DENNIS M. DUGGAN, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY-FOREIGN
RELATIONS COMMISSION, THE AMERICAN LEGION
Introduction
Mr. Young. I would now like to now invite Colonel Dennis M.
Duggan of the American Legion to come to the table. In addition
to his post at the American Legion, Colonel Duggan served 25
years in the military, including two tours of duty in Vietnam.
We are always interested in hearing the views of the
American Legion. You have expressed something in your written
statement that is bothering all of us seriously, and that is
the question of the possibility that we are returning to the
days of the hollow forces. There is a lot of reason to believe
that is happening. We would like for you to expand on that
issue.
Your entire statement will be placed in the record. Please
feel free to summarize as you wish.
Statement of Mr. Duggan
Mr. Duggan. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to appear before
you and your distinguished Committee. We have always looked
forward to that. On behalf of the 3 million members of the
American Legion, we are extremely grateful for this
opportunity. We, as in our entire membership, as well as the
members of the Armed Forces, I am sure, owe you a tremendous
debt of gratitude for your continuing efforts to not only
maintain a strong national defense, but to enhance the quality-
of-life features for our men and women who serve in uniform. We
know, we are convinced, that you and your Committee will do
your very, very best for our men and women.
We receive daily letters not only from veterans and
military retirees, but from a number of active-duty people and
their families, and they actually cite, and we know you are
aware of them, the actual and proposed string of broken
promises and the growing list of benefits which apparently seem
to be under attack. Letters daily from medicare-eligible
military beneficiaries who are prohibited from enrolling in the
TRICARE program. We are aware that some 58 military medical
facilities are closed or are closing, and another 17, we
understand, are identified for closure. The Department of
Defense, once again, is proposing the closure of a cost-
effective Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences,
which we strongly support, and the Defense Commissary Agency
may have to close some 37 commissary stores to make up
budgetary shortfalls. And the list goes on.
If we had to prioritize, the Legion's greatest concerns
include, first of all, military quality of life, closely
followed by the readiness--and we realize quality of life is a
form of readiness--and, lastly, modernization. A marked decline
in quality-of-life features for the active force and military
retirees, coupled with heightened operational TEMPOS, we
believe, can only adversely impact on both retention and
recruiting.
As Chairman Floyd Spence noted in his extremely revealing
and great report, there is a widespread perception that not
only is the military having to do more with less, they are also
getting less. Good soldiers, sailors, Marines and airmen are
questioning the desirability of a career in uniform, and
undoubtedly our youth will question the sincerity of a military
service that provides diminishing health care, closing
commissaries, paying less-than-inflation pay raises, living in
substandard housing, and enduring frequent family separations.
Most civilians would not endure a fraction of the sacrifices
that our military and their families undergo.
We also believe that many of our military retirees can no
longer recommend a military career, or, for that matter, even
military service. They themselves are seeing the promise of
lifetime health care being broken.
So we in the Legion support a broad array of options to
help the medicare-eligible military retirees to include
medicare subvention, the option of enrolling in the Federal
Employees Health Benefits Plan regardless of age or health care
status, and, of course, the GI Bill of Health.
We also support the correction of such longtime inequities,
for example of the concurrent receipt, however small, of both
military retired pay and VA disability compensation, and
removing the unfair automatic age 62 social security offset to
the Survivors' Benefit Plan, or SBP.
We have always believed that military service represents
honorable and noble service to the Nation as it represents
fulfillment of American patriotic obligation, but it is also a
privilege and responsibility that has always embodied the
highest form of service to the Nation. It is the only form of
service which may call for paying the ultimate price for the
common defense of the United States. We believe, therefore,
that the beneficiary, the United States Government, continue to
honor its obligations to all service members, all veterans,
military retirees, and their dependents, or else we stand to
lose the finest military in the world.
Thank you, sir. If you have any questions?
Mr. Young. Colonel, thank you very much.
Mr. Young. Peter, do you have any questions?
Mr. Visclosky. No. No, thank you.
Mr. Young. I just want you to know we are committed to
doing the very best we can. You know our resources get more
limited all the time. The OPTEMPO that you mentioned, the
Bosnia operation, which was supposedly going to cost us $1.5
billion, is now over $6 billion. We are wearing out the
equipment, we are wearing out the troops, and we are having to
work with the real world. We are doing the best we can. You can
count on us.
Mr. Duggan. Yes, sir, we will.
[The statement of Mr. Duggan follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
THE MILITARY COALITION
WITNESSES
VIRGINIA TORSCH, CDR, MSC, USNR, THE RETIRED OFFICERS ASSOCIATION
MIKE LORD, CDR, USN (RET.), COMMISSIONED OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF THE
U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, INC.
Introduction
Mr. Young. Next is The Military Coalition, which is
comprised of 23 military and veterans' organizations. The
Coalition stays in touch with us on a regular basis, and we
always appreciate those communications and the views that we
receive.
Representing The Coalition are the cochairs of the Health
Care Committee, Commander Virginia Torsch and Commander Mike
Lord. Your statements will be made a part of the record. It is
my understanding that Commander Torsch will be making the
testimony for both of you.
Mr. Lord. That is correct, sir.
Statement of Ms. Torsch
Ms. Torsch. Thank you very much, sir. In the interest of
time, I only wanted to concentrate on one of our major issues,
although we cover the other two components, the fix in TRICARE
and medicare subvention. The most important one for this
committee is our legislative initiative opening up the Federal
Health Employments Benefits Program to the medicare-eligibles.
I would like to express our very deep appreciation for your
leadership and strong support last year for this initiative.
Although your efforts to work out provisions for a
demonstration fell short of its goal, we did make considerable
progress. Significantly, the fiscal year 1997 defense
appropriations conference agreement directed DOD to submit a
report on the viability of such a demonstration program.
Unfortunately, we understand this report is still in progress
and probably will not arrive in time for the fiscal year 1998
hearing cycle. Given this disappointment, these hearings take
on added significance.
First, it seems DOD will not cooperate in designing and
setting up an FEHBP-65 demonstration program unless directed to
by statute. Second, the TRICARE program is not measuring up to
expectations, and, of course, as I said, our written testimony
detailed many problems with TRICARE that must be worked out to
make this program a more effective health care benefit.
Further, although the Coalition strongly supports medicare
subvention, we recognize there is little likelihood it will
benefit more than 40 percent of the eligible beneficiaries. The
Coalition estimates that even after accounting for those who
may already be enrolled in medicare at-risk HMOs or already
participate in comparable private sector plans, there are still
about 480,000 medicare-eligible beneficiaries who will not have
any access through the government-sponsored health care program
DOD promised them as a part of their lifetime health care
commitment.
Mr. Chairman, military retirees do not understand, and
neither does The Military Coalition, why they should not be
given the opportunity to participate in the health care program
that provides Federal civilians retiree health care that is
second to none. Therefore, The Coalition is seeking your
support to authorize all medicare-eligible uniformed service
beneficiaries to enroll in the Federal Health Employment
Benefits Plan.
Mr. Chairman, although The Military Coalition strongly
endorses implementation of FEHBP-65 nationwide, we recognize
there are still many unanswered questions that need to be
addressed about the initiative. Therefore, The Coalition
strongly urges this committee to spearhead the enactment of an
FEHBP demonstration program. A test would provide concrete
information on the number of uniformed services beneficiaries
who would avail themselves of this option if offered. If the
number of enrollees is less than the 95 participation rate
predicted by the Congressional Budget Office, an estimate we
believe is extremely high, the actual cost of the FEHBP-65
option would be considerably less than current estimates.
Secondly, since a separate risk pool would be established,
there is every likelihood the cost to DOD would be further
reduced. One reason is that the vast majority of military
retirees are covered by medicare, and when you combine medicare
with FEHBP, the health care outlays for FEHBP insurers are only
70 cents for every dollar of premium paid.
The Coalition therefore supports a test of this as a
critical bridge to health care equity and requests the
subcommittee appropriate an amount not to exceed $50 million to
test this program at two sites in fiscal year 1998. Given the
reality that Congress will approve more than $4 billion to
provide FEHBP to Federal civilian retirees, some with as few as
5 years of service, it doesn't seem unreasonable to ask for
this insignificant sum be allocated to those who sacrificed to
keep this Nation free. They did not equivocate then, and this
Nation should not equivocate now.
That concludes my testimony. I would be happy to answer any
questions you have.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much. As you heard throughout the
day, this is an important issue. Last year, unfortunately, we
ran into some jurisdictional issues, and medicare subvention,
for example, died on the vine when the Congress adjourned.
Fortunately, our colleagues recognize the importance of
resolving this problem, and all I can tell you is you have our
assurance we are going to continue to find a way to do this,
and hopefully our authorizers will be able to get together and
at least decide which of the three potential committees will
actually assume jurisdiction.
We appreciate your statement. Thank you for being here.
Thank you.
[The statement of Ms. Torsch follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
ENLISTED ASSOCIATION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD OF THE UNITED STATES
WITNESS
MICHAEL P. CLINE, MASTER SERGEANT (RET.), EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, ENLISTED
ASSOCIATION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD OF THE UNITED STATES
Introduction
Mr. Young. Now I would like to welcome back Master Sergeant
Michael Cline of the Enlisted Association of the National
Guard.
We have again, as in the past, examined your statement as
well as the other statements, and as you point out very, very
accurately, the Guard is being called upon more and more to
provide not only peacetime, but combat-ready support for
contingencies around the world. As the drawdown of the active
force continues, your role becomes that much more important.
Your prepared statement will be included in the record, and
we would like for you to summarize them.
Statement of Master Sergeant Cline
Master Sergeant Cline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would
like to bring greetings from Command Sergeant Major Bill Reed
from the Florida National Guard, and also from your group,
Major General Bob Inslen. They have both inquired about your
health. I will report back to them you look better than ever.
One thing I would like to comment on, Mr. Chairman, your
status on the list of Sydney Hickey. I don't know if I would
want to be on that list, so you may want to take that into deep
concern, because being on Sydney's list is not good.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the subcommittee, we thank you for
giving us the opportunity to present the views of the enlisted
men and women of the National Guard of the United States.
Pursuant to House rules, the Enlisted Association of the
National Guard receives no Federal grants or other public
funds.
What I would like to expand upon is what House National
Security Chairman Floyd Spence wrote about in his April 9th
report on the rhetoric and reality of military readiness.
Although Congressman Spence's report did not address issues of
the National Guard and Reserve components, I did find many
interesting similarities to what the National Guard is faced
with in the administration's fiscal year 1998 budget request.
In his report, the Chairman wrote that more than one
division of the Army's 10 active-duty divisions is hollow and
has no manning. The active Army is confronted with increased
deployments, which is stretching not only the manpower
resources, but also the funds necessary to properly train and
maintain units, and therefore have turned and are relying on
increased participation by the National Guard and its sister
Reserve components to fill the void.
However, the Guard is also faced with similar problems. The
units that are being called upon to either backfill active
component units or for deployment to Bosnia and other
peacekeeping operations around the world will receive only 8
percent of OPTEMPO funds necessary to train with.
It does not take a master's or doctor's degree to figure
out if the Guard units, under tiered readiness, who only train
at a portion of the active components requirements and only are
funded at the 8 percent level of the reduced requirement,
which, by the way, are more than 60 percent of your Army and
National Guard units, will not have sufficient training and
will not be available for the active component to deploy,
because no longer can they maintain many minimal readiness
levels.
Can you imagine, Mr. Chairman, having a professional truck
driver who has a minimum of 23 miles behind the wheel of an
80,000-pound truck to be qualified to run our Nation's
highways, or, better yet, the Beltway or Interstate I-95 at
rush hour? Yet the budget submission will only allow tank crews
to drive and train with a 69-ton tank 23 miles per year. How
will someone tell the families of Guard members that they were
injured or gave their life because there were not sufficient
funds to properly train them?
Chairman Spence wrote about the shortcomings in training
and lack of unit cohesion. The Guard is also faced with the
same problems. More than 60 percent of the Army National Guard
forces have no funds earmarked for schools. This includes 12 of
the 15 enhanced readiness brigades. Individuals will have to
attend what schools they can, using their 15 annual training
days. Units going to annual training will report without
sufficient personnel to do unit-level training, and have the
same unit cohesiveness problems that the Chairman wrote about.
Again, these are the same units that are being called upon to
relieve the active component.
The Chairman wrote about the 30 percent overall failure
rate of new recruits in the Army. The Guard is faced with a
similar problem, and it is because of the budget shortfalls.
Twenty-four out of every 100 new recruits into the National
Guard will not enter into initial entry training.
The Congress has mandated the requirement of prior service
personnel to be recruited into the National Guard. However,
with the budget shortfalls, the strong possibility that the
Guard would have to go below the required end strength levels
agreed to in the off-site agreement, there will be no spaces
for these prior service personnel.
It is ironic, Mr. Chairman, that we, the taxpayer, spend
$70,000 to $80,000 to initially train a new soldier regardless
of whether they are active duty, National Guard, or Reserve.
Then we spend millions of dollars to transition them out of the
service because another study changes something.
Congressman Spence also wrote that there is concern over
the readiness assumptions, and those in charge of conducting
the administration's Quadrennial Defense Review, QDR, that they
will use. Recently Secretary of Defense Cohen stated we need to
modernize and technologically advance the military for the
future. However, the active Army has had to resort to
recruiting CAP-3 recruits to meet recruiting goals.
You would think that we would want the highest and smartest
to be part of America's Army. It takes dedication, education,
and skills to manage and use the new, updated equipment we
already have, yet alone that of the future. Meanwhile, we have
transitioned out of the service those who currently have the
necessary skills and education to meet the needs of today's
modern Army. The money invested into their training and
education is totally lost, and we are not able to maintain them
in the Guard and Reserve because of budget reductions or loss
of positions.
As a father and a husband, I want to know, Mr. Chairman, is
the Congress and the administration going to provide the
required resources so that National Guard can perform the
missions that are requested of them and do it in a manner which
is not only professional, and properly resourced and trained?
Because if that is not going to happen, I don't want my wife
and my two sons who serve in the National Guard to be in harm's
way.
I believe in the saying that the more you sweat in the
classroom, there is less blood that will be spilled on the
battlefield. However, to sweat in a training field or a
classroom, the Guard must be properly resourced and funded.
Mr. Chairman, I want to make it quite clear that our
association actively supports our active-duty brothers and
sisters. We believe they must be funded at 100 percent to be
the first line of defense for our country. But to provide the
necessary relief that they need in peacekeeping operations, and
to relieve the stress on active-duty members and their
families, the National Guard, a parent of America's Army, must
also be properly resourced and trained. Although our Air Force
and Navy can deploy anywhere in the world and literally bomb
the heck out of a potential enemy, it takes trained, well-
disciplined soldier and Marines who occupy the real estate to
say we now have undeniable control.
Mr. Chairman, the Enlisted Association of the National
Guard is proud to be a member of The Military Coalition, and we
fully support and endorse the legislative proposals. Again,
thank you for giving the Enlisted Association of the National
Guard an opportunity to express its views on the fiscal year
1998 defense budget.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much for your views. You know we
place a lot of credibility in the position that you represent.
We appreciate your being here to talk with us about this. As I
have told so many folks earlier today, we are going to do the
best we can, and we do understand the importance of the
National Guard.
[The statement of Master Sergeant Cline follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF NURSE ANESTHETISTS
WITNESS
RONALD L. VAN NEST, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF NURSE ANESTHETISTS
Introduction
Mr. Young. I would like to invite now Ronald Van Nest of
the American Association of Nurse Anesthetists. The association
represents over 26,000 certified registered nurse anesthetists,
including more than 600 in the military.
Mr. Van Nest, your prepared statement will be made a part
of our official record. We ask you to summarize your statement
for us at this time.
Statement of Mr. Van Nest
Mr. Van Nest. Mr. Chairman, I am a certified registered
nurse anesthetist, a CRNA, and I am here to speak to you on
behalf of the American Association of Nurse Anesthetists, the
AANA. I have been a member of the AANA Federal Services Ad Hoc
Committee for 3 years, and I am a recent retiree of the U.S.
Navy Nurse Corps, and the immediate former nurse anesthesia
consultant to the Navy Surgeon General.
The AANA is the professional association that represents
over 26,000 CRNAs, including over 600 CRNAs in the military.
I am here to speak with you about the cost savings of your
continued support of CRNAs in the military. It is important to
note that CRNAs provide the same high-quality care as our
physician counterparts as measured by outcome studies.
Now, how do CRNAs save Americans money? Nurse anesthetists
are less costly to educate and far less expensive to retain on
active duty. The cost of a 30-month nurse anesthesia education
is approximately $29,000, while the cost of a 4-year residency
for physicians is approximately $339,000. On those numbers
alone, more than 10 CRNAs can be created for the cost of one
physician anesthesia provider.
Bonus money is another great savings when using CRNAs. If a
nurse and a physician start anesthesia training at the same
time, in 8 years the nurse anesthetist will have received
$69,000 in special pays, while the anesthesiologist will have
received $253,500, a quarter of a million dollars. In the case
of the physician, all of it was received under payback
obligation for their education.
Now to staffing ratios. DOD can save more money by
utilizing the two anesthesia provider groups in more
appropriate numbers. The CRNA-to-anesthesiologist levels right
now in the services are Army, 2 to 1; Air Force, 1.6 to 1; and
the Navy, 1 to 1.
It is ironic that during World War II when, nurse
anesthesia training was very brief and mostly on-the-job
training, that the ratio was 17 to 1. Yet now, when the
anesthesia is far safer, with sophisticated technology,
computerized monitors and alarms, and nurse anesthesia at the
master's degree level, CRNAs are being supervised at much lower
ratios.
In the invasion of Panama, only CRNAs were assigned to the
deployed combat units. When aircraft carriers deploy now for
extended periods of time, the usual anesthesia provider on
board is a highly qualified CRNA as the sole anesthesia
provider. If such practice models are acceptable for deployed
situations, then they should be acceptable in urban medical
treatment facilities.
I would like to briefly discuss the issue of board
certification pay, BCP. The AANA is highly supportive of the
board certification pay for all advanced practice nurses, yet
many CRNAs do not receive it. This is the result of the
interpretation that a CRNA must hold a master's degree in
clinical anesthesia. Many experienced officers who are CRNAs
have over their military career chosen to broaden their
education by pursuing an advanced degree in fields such as
education and management, but these do not qualify for the BCP.
In the future, this bonus will act as a financial disincentive
for nurse anesthetists to broaden their education.
The AANA encourages DOD and the respective services to
reexamine the issue of awarding board certification pay only to
CRNAs who have clinical master's degrees.
In conclusion, the AANA thanks this committee for its
support of military nurse anesthetists through the incentive
special pay increases and the board certification pay. The AANA
believes that the appropriate utilization of CRNAs in the
military is of critical concern and is an area that DOD could
examine for increased cost savings.
I thank the Committee members for their consideration of
these issues, and I will be happy to answer any questions they
may have.
Mr. Young. Mr. Visclosky?
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you very much for your testimony. I have three
questions, if I could. On the issue of certification, my
understanding is that the current national certification
program does not require a master's degree.
Mr. Van Nest. In 1998, that will be a requirement.
Mr. Visclosky. You will have to have graduated from an
accredited program.
Mr. Van Nest. The Task Force on Accreditation requires by
1998 all nursing anesthetist programs will be at the master's
degree.
Mr. Visclosky. Will it specify what type of master's degree
you will have to have?
Mr. Van Nest. No, sir.
Mr. Visclosky. So you would want essentially DOD's policy
to mirror what the national accreditation standards would be?
Mr. Van Nest. That is correct.
Mr. Visclosky. On the bonus program, you allude to that in
your testimony, you don't have a recommendation. Do you have
one you would be willing to submit to the subcommittee? You
talk about the disparity, the discrepancy between nurse
anesthetists and anesthesiologists.
Mr. Van Nest. I am glad you asked that question. I don't
want to give the committee the impression I came here to
``doc'' bash. It is just that money has been put in this to
these folks at a time that they are already under service
obligation. When the bonuses were awarded to the nurse
anesthetists, that argument that they were already under
contract was used to use it more as an incentive to basically
reenlist, to retain on active duty. My recommendation perhaps
would be, personal recommendation would be, to utilize it more
as a retention tool after service obligation has been paid
back.
Mr. Visclosky. Okay. As far as the ratios, have the ratios
developed near 1-to-1 simply because of hiring practices; that
is, not because of the regulations that have been proposed?
Your testimony relates to the proposals that there be 1-to-1
supervision on many of the bases. Is it just the way hiring has
transpired?
Mr. Van Nest. There are no regulations to that effect.
Mr. Visclosky. You would be concerned about those
occurring?
Mr. Van Nest. Yes, sir, I certainly would. There are no
such regulations. What seems to be going on is there is a glut,
if you will, of anesthesiologists in particular in the civilian
world, and that has created somewhat of a backfill in the
military of people who used to get out and do not now. I think
this has helped raise the issue of supervision as basically a
personal opinion, a means of justifying the continuation of
these billets.
Mr. Visclosky. Getting back to bonuses, I understand you
are not trying to pull anybody down. You are looking at trying
to narrow a discrepancy. You are suggesting instead of using
bonuses to attract enlistment, you are asking that it be used
more as a retention tool?
Mr. Van Nest. That is correct.
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you very much.
Mr. Young. Thank you. Thank you very much, sir, for your
testimony. We appreciate your being here today.
[The statement of Mr. Van Nest follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
NATIONAL GUARD ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES
WITNESS
WILLIAM H. SKIPPER, JR., DIRECTOR, LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITIES, THE NATIONAL
GUARD ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES
Introduction
Mr. Young. Next is Mr. Bill Skipper, Director of
Legislative Activities for the National Guard Association.
In reading your testimony, we see that you raised some of
the same points that Sergeant Cline did, but you even spell out
more shortfalls in the President's budget for the National
Guard and the Air Guard. We appreciate the cost-effectiveness
of the investment that the taxpayer makes in the Army Guard and
the Air Guard, and we would like to hear your testimony. We
will place your entire statement in the record and ask you to
summarize.
Statement of Mr. Skipper
Mr. Skipper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On behalf of the
National Guard Association of the United States and the tens of
thousands of commissioned and warrant officers who constitute
our membership, I thank you for the opportunity to express our
views regarding the National Guard today and its prospects for
the future. I have a prepared statement and ask it be submitted
for the record. I will revise and extend some of those remarks
as we go through. Mr. Chairman, first, I would like to start
off thanking you personally for the hard work and what your
Subcommittee has done for the National Guard. And also I would
like to extend thanks to your staff. You have got a fine staff
that we can always count on to assist us with frank discussion
on the issues.
The continuing support of this Committee for National Guard
and Reserve programs has earned it the gratitude of every
member of this association. Your continued support in the
future will become increasingly important as the Department of
Defense attempts to define the requirements of our national
defense strategy through the ongoing Quadrennial Defense
Review--QDR.
Our association is, though, extremely concerned, however,
about the funding levels requested for the National Guard in
fiscal year 1998, which is not adequate to maintain the
existing force levels, readiness, OPTEMPO or modernization
programs. In other words, Mr. Chairman, we cannot sustain the
Guard as you know it today based on that budget. It is just not
there for us to do that.
We have established three legislative priorities for fiscal
year 1998 that addresses the problem. These priorities are: The
stabilization of the National Guard force structure and end
strength, full resourcing of readiness requirements and a
reduction of the National Guard military construction backlog.
And for brevity sake, I would like to address the major issues
and that will be the funding.
Mr. Chairman, the continuing reductions in the overall
Defense budget have resulted in funding shortfalls in important
National Guard readiness accounts; namely, pay and allowances
and operations and maintenance. Readiness funding shortages are
particularly acute in this year's budget request for the Army
National Guard. For fiscal year 1995, the resources provided to
the National Guard were commensurate with the assigned
missions. The 1998 budget shortfall is $743 million short of
meeting that readiness requirement.
As a result, Mr. Chairman, none of the soldiers in 12 of
the 15 enhanced brigades or eight guard divisions will be able
to attend a military school. Twenty-five percent of the new
recruits will not be able to go to basic training or advanced
individual training. And over 27,000 Army Guard soldiers will
be unable to attend annual training in 1998 based on the
budget.
This 1998 budget request provides operations and readiness
funding for some of our tiered readiness early-deployed units.
Funding is not provided to maintain the minimum levels of
readiness for later deploying units. Base operations and depot
maintenance are also severely underfunded.
Given the increase in OPTEMPO for many of these Guard
units, as I alluded to earlier, any reduction in readiness
could have a long-term impact on the National Guard's
capability and accessibility, and, Mr. Chairman, as you know,
the thousands of guardsmen and women on duty today in support
of State-related missions up and down the Ohio River in North
and South Dakota and deployed throughout the world in support
of the CINCs' missions.
The 1998 budget request proposes a reduction in the number
of aircraft and several airlift units of the Air National
Guard. Last year, thanks to you and to the Congress, you were
able to reverse the proposed reduction of 12 to 10 primary
aircraft units--PAA. The funding provides for only 8 PAA in
those same units that you worked so hard on last year.
These reductions will place an increased burden on the Air
National Guard and its support of the Air Force missions and
commander in chief's requirements.
Mr. Chairman, as you know, modern compatible equipment is
critical to National Guard readiness and the relevance of the
National Guard units. Army National Guard requirements include
a field artillery system such as Paladin and Multiple Launch
Rocket System--MLRS; tracked combat vehicles such as M1A2
Abrams main battle tank, and Bradley fighting vehicle, air
defense systems such as Patriot and Avenger systems; Black Hawk
utility helicopters, training devices and simulators,
communications equipment and the list goes on and on.
The Air National Guard is also in need of equipment
modernization, airlift, refueling fighter and bomb
requirements. The National Guard Association asks you and the
committee, sir, to direct the DOD to fully resource National
Guard readiness requirements and increase funding for National
Guard operations and maintenance, military personnel and
equipment modernization. Fully resourced readiness accounts
will assure a trained and ready National Guard for the conduct
of combat operations peace support and support of our
Governors.
Mr. Chairman, in addition, the National Guard Association
urges the committee to review the total military construction
backlog and direct the Department of Defense to develop
innovative and reasonable solutions to rectify this problem.
In conclusion, the National Guard Association remains
convinced that the Army and Air National Guard represent the
most cost-effective and capable component of the U.S. military,
as you spoke to earlier.
The Army National Guard provides over 50 percent of the
combat forces, 15 percent of the combat support forces and 24
percent of the combat service support forces for the total
Army, while accounting for only 9 percent of the Army's budget.
Also this force is paid for within only 2 percent of the DOD
budget.
The Air Guard provides 30 percent of the general purpose
fighter Air Force, 20 percent of the air support forces and 42
percent of the theater airlift forces with only a 6 percent
share of the Air Force's budget. At a time when reductions in
defense spending appear to be imminent and maintaining a robust
national security posture seems increasingly difficult, the
National Guard should not be viewed as a bill payer, but
represent a solution.
Mr. Chairman, I think we could both agree that the economic
benefit that the Guard provides the national defense is
quantifiable and indisputable.
Mr. Chairman, the National Guard Association appreciates
the past support of this committee and the opportunity to
express our views regarding our national security and the
National Guard, and we appreciate your time, sir.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much and we appreciate your
statement and your statement of support, and we will do the
very best that we can with the limited resources we have. If
you have any influence at the White House, tell them to get
that number a little bit higher when they send the budget over
here.
[The statement of Mr. Skipper follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Thursday, April 17, 1997.
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF TROPICAL MEDICINE AND HYGIENE
WITNESS
ROBERT EDELMAN, MD, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR CHEMICAL RESEARCH CENTER FOR
VACCINE DEVELOPMENT, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND SCHOOL OF MEDICINE
Introduction
Mr. Young. Our next witness is Dr. Robert Edelman of the
University of Maryland School of Medicine, representating the
American Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene. The society
has been supportive of infectious disease and HIV research
programs, as has been this Subcommittee, and, doctor, we
appreciate you being here and we will place your entire
statement in the record and ask that you summarize at this
time.
Statement of Dr. Edelman
Dr. Edelman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to
be here. You have been exposed to the statement for a week now
and I would like to give over to you some personal thoughts.
I have been involved in this field for 30 years. I got--I
cut my teeth in tropical medicine and infectious disease as
part of the Walter Reed Research Team assigned to Bangkok,
Thailand and Vietnam. And I can tell you firsthand, I have been
able to see for 30 years the evolution in the emergence of
these infections which are now beginning to lap at our shores.
There have been focal outbreaks along the Caribbean,
thousands of thousands of cases creeping up through Mexico. I
run--I helped direct a tropical disease traveler's clinic at
the university medical system. We see some of our patients who
go overseas coming back with malaria, dengue fever at a rate
that we have never seen before in the past. I can tell you from
very personal feeling that I am very much concerned about these
developments throughout the world, and I am sure that your
subcommittee and yourself also share that.
Really, the Department of Defense maintains a unique
capability in medical research. It is one of the few government
groups or private groups who are committed for maintaining the
health of our forces overseas, but it also has very important
impacts upon many other segments of our society. An example
would be we send over about 8 million travelers overseas every
year of which 4 million go into the tropics, and many of these
individuals are exposed to the same things that our troops are.
Again, I will repeat that many--we are all seeing an
increased number of these infections breaking out and we are
particularly concerned that there is increasing numbers of
drug-resistant forms of diseases such as malaria and infectious
diseases that affect the bowel causing traveler's diarrhea that
is becoming a tremendous concern not only for the military, but
all segments of our society.
I am also involved as part of one of the largest vaccine
development units in the United States, academic units on the
development of vaccines against dengue and malaria and I have
been involved in working with dengue vaccines with the Walter
Reed Institute of Research and with the malaria vaccines with
the Navy Medical Research Institute.
We are concerned that recently there has been some funds
that have been diverted from the support of these tropical
medicine programs to support the peacekeeping efforts in
Bosnia. For example, some of the research going on at the Navy
in the Navy Research Institute here and overseas has been
curtailed as of last March because of funding decrements as a
result of peacekeeping efforts and to support those efforts in
Bosnia.
The other aspect I would like to touch on is the unique
opportunity that these programs play for training future
physicians and health care providers to protect our troops
overseas and as a result, to help with other segments such as
our enormous numbers of travelers overseas. An example of that,
I am a child of two of those laboratories and I can tell you
that they are really jewels in the crown of the American health
care establishment.
The Society would like very much to encourage your
continued bipartisan support for these laboratories and for the
Walter Reed group and for the Navy Medical Research Program and
for the program of Infectious Disease Institute in Frederick,
Maryland.
We would also like to focus a moment on the importance of
about a $5 million budget to help establish a program for
surveillance of infectious diseases throughout the tropical
areas of the world. We are increasingly seeing, as I mentioned
before, sexually transmitted diseases, malaria, and diarrhea
diseases being increasingly resistant to available antibiotics.
We don't have vaccines as of yet. We have a vigorous
program, and we are trying to explore that avenue, but we need
to have constant surveillance for these infections, and these
overseas laboratories in South America, in Kenya, and in Asia
will provide eyes and ears for the military and for our entire
society for the incursion of these highly resistant pathogens.
As a conclusion, I would like to summarize we are all very
grateful for your support of the military medical infectious
disease efforts. We encourage you to continue that support and
we would like for you to consider the addition of roughly $5
million to help support a plan for putting surveillance in
place for these emerging infections and to become cognizant of
the problem we have with the divertment of funds more recently
away from their intended use by the medical research
establishment toward peacekeeping efforts. Thank you very much.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much, Doctor. We will do the best
we can to continue. You know that we have a sincere interest in
medical care and the prevention of diseases if possible. And as
our troops are deployed around the world, they become more and
more exposed. So thank you very much for calling this to our
attention and we look forward to working with you.
Dr. Edelman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The statement of Dr. Edelman follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
NATIONAL COALITION FOR OSTEOPOROSIS AND RELATED BONE DISEASES
WITNESS
SANDRA C. RAYMOND, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL OSTEO- POROSIS
FOUNDATION
Introduction
Mr. Young. Congressman McDade is one of the very
distinguished members of this Committee and a senior Majority
Member on the overall Appropriations Committee, and I would
like to yield at this time to Congressman McDade to introduce
the next witnesses.
Mr. McDade. Mr. Chairman, I am very, very grateful to you
for letting me sort of break into the program for a minute. I
want to explain to the audience that I am chairing another
Committee which requires my attendance in two places at once.
But I was able to break away and I wanted to come over to
introduce Sandra Raymond, who is the next witness, who is going
to testify. I have known Sandy for a long, long time and she
takes a very deep and active interest in health issues in the
country. I am thrilled to come over and welcome her because,
like so many of you, she has only one ax to grind: The public
health of the people of the United States.
Sandy, won't you please come up and offer your testimony.
Mr. Young. Ms. Raymond, you are recognized.
Statement of Ms. Raymond
Ms. Raymond. Thank you, and I thank Congressman McDade for
being here. He is certainly an advocate for the American people
and I have great admiration and respect for him. I am here
representing the National Coalition for Osteoporosis and
Related Bone Diseases and, I want to thank you and your
Committee for your very generous $10 million appropriation for
bone disease research in the fiscal year 1997 DOD budget.
I want to emphasize just a few points. You have my written
testimony. This is not--the DOD program is not an extension of
the NIH bone disease research program. This is funding that
will carry on a bone disease research program that has specific
relevance to the military age population. The goal of the Bone
Disease Research Program is to enhance military readiness by
reducing the incidence of fracture which spells loss of time
and a lot of money, especially during physically intensive
training, and we think it may have long-lasting effects.
You may know or you may have heard of the word, ``stress
fractures.'' Perhaps somebody in your family has had a stress
fracture. Stress fractures affect 10 to 15 percent of women
recruits during the 8 weeks of basic training, and I am only
speaking about women here, not the male recruits. Most of us
think of stress fractures as ones that sort of heal over time,
and the integrity of the bone is maintained.
But, in fact, untreated and repeated stress fractures which
occur in the same long bone in the leg, for example, or in the
arm, can lead to a complete fracture and this results not only
in pain and disability, and costly surgery at some times, but
also follow-up rehabilitation.
There is a very famous woman marathon runner who ran in the
Boston marathon. I am not going to mention her name. She
suffered stress fractures and she is now foreclosed from ever
running again, ever training again because she is at such risk
for fracture. We have an increasing number of women in the
military, and the bone health of female recruits is a growing
concern for all Americans, and for these Americans, if they are
going to serve at a maximum capacity and strength.
According to the Army itself, the minimum time away from
significant duty for a male or a female soldier who develops a
stress fracture is 6 to 8 weeks. Stress fractures are very slow
to heal. Full recovery takes as long as 12 weeks, and they are
one of the more frequent injuries that affect men and women in
the Army.
In a recent survey, 1,338 stress fractures were diagnosed
in 100,000 undergoing basic training. We need advances. We need
to understand the overall bone health of military men and
women.
Military recruits are at an age where dietary and
environmental factors can still influence the amount of peak
bone mass that they develop. The greater bone mass that we
achieve during the first three decades of life, the stronger
the bones are likely to be throughout life. So to achieve that
peak bone mass and retain that inner structural strength, what
do we need to know in the DOD research program? We need to know
what the relationship is between muscle strength and
development and bone mass. We don't know those answers. We need
to know the impact of physical fitness and diet on peak bone
mass. We have to know what environmental factors are related.
Are carbonated beverages in the diet of our military
recruits doing damage? Is their alcohol intake a factor? Is
their smoking a factor? What are the predictors of risk? Are
there genetic factors that we need to have more information on?
And what are the best preventive, diagnostic and treatment
strategies for the young population? For those we recruit for
military service?
I think that the DOD research program is going to
contribute greatly to bringing bone disease under control not
only in the military, but in the U.S. population as a whole.
Osteoporosis and related bone diseases, the diseases that
we are talking about here, are serious threats to the American
public. To almost 30 million Americans. You know that these
diseases cause loss of independence, death, disability. The
annual cost is about $14 billion, and is rising. Bone diseases
affect women, men and children of all ages. From infancy to the
oldest, these diseases profoundly alter the quality of life for
millions of Americans.
By discovering how we can build bone mass to peak capacity
in young recruits, we are not only building a strong military,
we are building a strong Nation ready to withstand the stresses
of an extended life span. You know, NASA has long recognized
the importance of bone loss in space and how that relates to
their astronauts. It is a key priority for NASA. And equally, I
think, if they do not find the answers about those astronauts,
their missions are subverted. Equally, the mission of DOD
cannot be achieved without this important bone disease
research.
Today, Mr. Chairman, Mr. McDade, Mr. Murtha and others, we
are urging you to consider a very reasonable $20 million in
appropriations for bone disease research in fiscal year 1998.
I want to thank you for this opportunity and thank you
again, Mr. McDade.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much for being here. And I want
you to know that you and your cause are represented by one of
the great Members of Congress.
Ms. Raymond. I know that well. Thank you. Any questions?
Mr. McDade. No questions.
Mr. Young. Thank you again for being here.
[The statement of Ms. Raymond follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF OTOLARYNGOLOGY--HEAD AND NECK SURGERY, INC.
WITNESS
MICHAEL D. MAVES, M.D., MBA, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, AMERICAN ACADEMY
OF OTOLARYNGOLOGY--HEAD AND NECK SURGERY, INC.
Introduction
Mr. Young. Next on our agenda is Dr. Michael Maves,
Executive Director of the American Academy of Otolaryngology-
Head and Neck Surgery, Incorporated. The academy and the
physicians who belong to it are dedicated to the treatment of
patients' diseases of the head and neck.
Thank you for coming today and your entire statement will
be placed in our record, and summarize it as you wish.
Statement of Dr. Maves
Dr. Maves. Thank you. I appreciate the opportunity to be
able to present this testimony on behalf of the roughly 11,000
otolaryngologists in this country. I am Dr. Michael Maves,
Executive Vice President of the American Academy of
Otolaryngology and a practicing otolaryngologist at the
Georgetown University Medical Center.
We have three issues that we would like to bring before you
and, of course, we have testified on this in past years. The
first is the issue of tobacco cessation in the military. The
American Academy of Otolaryngology head and neck surgery has
been opposed to the use of tobacco for many decades. We are the
surgeons who, for the most part, take care of patients who are
afflicted with head and neck cancers and we see firsthand the
effects of tobacco use on our patients every day.
There are increasing news reports of tobacco companies
admitting to the adverse impacts of tobacco on their users. We
also know that there can be significant impacts on individuals
and especially children who are exposed to secondhand smoke and
have to live in households with this.
We were pleased several years ago to see that the
Department of Defense announced a policy banning smoking in all
DOD workplaces. This far-reaching initiative really makes DOD
workplaces free of harmful secondhand smoke and as well will
improve, I believe, the health of our overall military
personnel.
We do know, however, that many in the military have
substituted the use of smokeless tobacco for smoking tobacco to
avoid disciplinary action where smoking itself is prohibited.
As we indicated in our written testimony, we realize that
smokeless tobacco, again, is harmful, is a substance which can
cause cancer of the oral cavity and would like to seek
limitations of its use as well.
Even with all the information that we have about the
harmful effects of tobacco use, we find that it is still
indirectly subsidized by the military through subsidized sale
of tobacco products at military commissaries and PXs where
cigarettes and tobacco products can be bought at a much lower
price than otherwise would be charged.
We, today, as we have in the past have expressed our
concern of the action that the DOD would very likely not ban
tobacco product sales in the commissary system. For that
reason, we support the concept of bringing tobacco prices in
the PX and commissary to at least parity with civilian prices
to help cut down on use.
You know, there have been a number of recent studies which
have shown that cigarette smokers, particularly young people,
are very, very sensitive to the price of cigarettes and so we
feel that this would be an important action. We especially urge
the Department of Defense to promote tobacco cessation programs
with both personnel and their families, but especially in
relationship to mothers and children about the harmful effects
of secondhand smoke as far as tobacco.
The second issue I would like to discuss with you is that
of skin cancer and UV radiation. Last year, the Academy
indicated its strong support of the Environmental Protection
Agency and the National Weather Service and the Centers for
Disease Control and prevention in developing a nationwide UV or
ultraviolet index to alert members of the public to the dangers
of excessive radiation from the sun which can potentially cause
skin cancer.
We understand that one of your Senate colleagues, Senator
Connie Mack of Florida, has begun an effort with the National
Association of Physicians for the Environment to survey
selected Federal agencies to determine the extent of
educational programs regarding skin cancer as affected by
excessive ultraviolet radiation exposure from sunlight. Those
Federal agencies would obviously include those which have
employees, but also ones which have clients such as the
Department of Agriculture where farmers themselves are
routinely exposed to very high sunlight.
Of course, the major agency with such personnel is the
Department of Defense. Millions of our young men and women are
routinely exposed to excessive sunlight for long periods of
time in carrying out their routine duties. Senator Mack has
requested from the DOD a report on its educational activities
and we will follow up as we are sure with recommendations for
necessary actions to be taken.
We would be remiss if we did not report that in this same
vein we are pleased to see that a large number of military
units have been receiving awards from the EPA Stratospheric
Protection Division for their work in reducing the use of CFCs
and other atmospheric ozone depletion chemicals leading to
depletion of the stratospheric ozone protection. This layer
protects us from excessive UV radiation. In this activity, like
many others, the Department of Defense has become a leader, and
as we have seen also in ``greening'' of environmental areas of
departmental facilities.
The last area I would like to speak to you about, Mr.
Chairman, is that of noise reduction. Our Academy, from its
beginning, has been concerned about the effects of excessive
noise on the structures of the ear, particularly those noises
which are extremely excessive. The American Academy of
Otolaryngology, representing the 11,000 otolaryngologists in
this country, also known as ear, nose and throat doctors, are
the primary physicians who take care of patients with hearing
loss. We know that noise is necessarily a part of daily
military life, particularly so in wartime. Nonetheless, we
believe that many of these noise effects on military personnel
can be reduced by the use of appropriate noise-reducing and
prevention activities.
Mr. Chairman, in summary, it is a pleasure to once again
bring these issues up to you this year. We have raised these
before. We have been pleased to see the activities of your
committee and the Department of Defense on these areas and hope
to be able to come back to you again in the future and once
again report on the good progress which the Department of
Defense has made in these areas. Thank you, very much.
Mr. Young. Doctor, thank you very much and we do look
forward to your continued communication with us. As one of the
principal members involved in outlawing smoking on buses,
trains, planes and things of that nature, I am happy to have
your report and your support. Hopefully, we have a better
environment on those public transportation units because of
that.
Dr. Maves. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Thank you, sir.
[The statement of Dr. Maves follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
JOSLIN DIABETES CENTER
WITNESS
KENNETH E. QUICKEL, JR., M.D., PRESIDENT, JOSLIN DIABETES CENTER
Introduction
Mr. Young. Next we will hear from Dr. Kenneth Quickel, the
President of the Joslin Diabetes Center. The annual cost
associated with diabetes is $138 million; more than 15 percent
of health care costs annually in the United States. We would
like to hear more about that and hear from you at this time.
Your entire statement will be placed in the record, and you may
summarize it as you wish.
Statement of Dr. Quickel
Dr. Quickel. Thank you for providing the opportunity to
summarize a program which I think can be of immense value in
helping to control some of that cost which falls on the
Department of Defense.
I am Dr. Ken Quickel and I am the President of the Joslin
Diabetes Center in Boston, which is one of the Harvard
institutions.
Our research and patient care teams who have led the world
in diabetes research for perhaps 100 years now, have now
developed some methods of diabetes care which can produce
improvements in health status and reduce the cost of providing
health care to people with diabetes. And we would like to talk
about those in the context of the department.
Diabetes among civilian and military Department of Defense
personnel will mirror the effects and the costs of diabetes in
the population in general. Among the Department's civilian and
military personnel, there will be about 188,000 people with
diabetes known to have diabetes. There will be an approximately
equal number of individuals who have diabetes, but do not yet
know it.
Four thousand of them will die every year from the
diabetes. Three hundred will develop end-stage kidney failure
from the diabetes. One thousand two hundred will have
nontraumatic amputations due to diabetes, and between 3 and 900
of them will develop blindness from their diabetes every year.
Joslin Diabetes Center in Boston is a comprehensive
resource for diabetes care and research and we would like to
make a proposal to join with the Department of Defense in
endeavoring to address some of these issues. And what we are
proposing is a pilot program that would have three primary
components. The first component would be to endeavor to use up-
to-date technology to detect undetected diabetes in department
personnel.
Recently, our researchers have discovered a method of
shining a little light through the pupil of the eye and then
measuring the scattering of that light from the proteins in the
eye fluids. We know that when the blood sugar is elevated, the
proteins combine with the glucose and that changes the
scattering of the light in a very characteristic and specific
way.
And it allows us, with this very simple technique, which
doesn't involve taking a urine specimen or blood specimen, to
very quickly and rapidly diagnose diabetes.
And we would like to use that technology among Department
of Defense personnel to try to gain early detection and
preventive aspects of that result.
The second piece is a telemedicine strategy, and we are
quite aware of the tremendous advances that the military has
made in telemedicine, and we think that there is an additional
use in application which could be of great benefit. In 1967,
our researchers at Joslin discovered that a laser could be used
to reduce the progress of diabetic eye disease. Subsequently,
the technology has developed to the point where we can now
prevent 98 percent of the blindness due to diabetes by proper
detection and aggressive therapy.
But diabetes remains the leading cause of blindness in
working age Americans despite that and the reason for that is
that many individuals, perhaps most individuals with diabetes,
do not get screened annually for eye disease as they should.
Others are screened by people who do not know what the
therapeutic possibilities are so they don't get into the health
care system effectively.
We have developed--our researchers have developed a thing
they call the Joslin Vision Network, which is a highly
effective method of taking a three-dimensional image of the
back of the eye using a small low-light camera. This form of
digitized image can be transmitted over phone lines, bounced
off satellites, stored on chips, and, in fact, read by experts
some place other than where the image is acquired.
The system has been linked to a medical records system
which automatically grades the eye disease, develops a
treatment plan and communicates with the referring physician or
the health care team on the site about what needs to be done.
And it can be done quite efficiently in terms of cost.
The third piece to address the problem of diabetes has to
do with some new strategies to train individuals with diabetes
in the skills of self-management. We know from a recent large
NIH-funded study that if we can normalize the blood sugar, we
can reduce the costly complications of diabetes by as much as
50 percent. Fifty percent, that is a huge reduction.
We also know that most people with diabetes do not have the
self-management skills that are necessary to implement that
degree of control. And since over 90 percent of the people with
diabetes are cared for by primary care physicians, many of
these physicians simply don't have the tools, the time, the
resources to train their patients in self-management.
We have developed a diabetes outpatient intensive treatment
program. We call it DOIT, which is a 3-day program to
intensively involve all of the physician and nonphysician
personnel, dieticians, exercise physiologists, psychologists,
who are part of the diabetes treatment team and over the past 4
years we have utilized this system for probably 700 patients
now. And we have been able to measure the effectiveness of the
system. We know which patients it works best on and we think
that we could very significantly, in a fixed population of
individuals such as the Department of Defense, significantly
improve health care and reduce costs.
What we are specifically proposing is a pilot program
consisting of the three strategies that I have outlined to
attack the problem of diabetes. And to apply it initially in
two regions; in New England where we have a number of
facilities and in Hawaii, where we have a partner facility at
the Stroub Clinic.
We would propose that this program be funded over a 2-year
trial period at a level of $2.5 million each year and the hope
would be that if we can document the effectiveness of the
program, we could then expand it to other areas in the
department, but also use the now validated methodology to apply
to the population in general through the United States.
We believe that since diabetes is such a major cause of
death and disability and cost, that the program that we are
proposing will pay for itself. And we hope that you will
consider our proposal as we bring it forward and we thank you
for your attention and your offering us an opportunity to
describe our proposal.
Mr. Young. Doctor, thank you very much, and I have one
quick question. Have you spoken to anyone in the Pentagon about
the pilot program that you are suggesting?
Dr. Quickel. We are scheduled to do that. We need to talk
locally also with people both in Hawaii and in the New England
region about this, and we have scheduled the meetings to do
that.
Mr. Young. Well, what I would ask you is that you let us
know after those meetings and let us know how things went and
see where we might be able to play a role in helping you.
Dr. Quickel. We certainly will. Thank you very much.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much, sir.
[The statement of Dr. Quickel follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
NATIONAL BREAST CANCER COALITION
WITNESS
FRANCES M. VISCO, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL BREAST CANCER COALITION
Introduction
Mr. Young. Our next witness is Fran Visco, President of the
National Breast Cancer Coalition. The Coalition represents 400
member organizations and more than 40,000 individual women,
their families and friends.
Fran, your prepared statement urges Congress and the
President to continue support for the DOD peer review research
program. You know where this committee stands on that issue. We
have stood up to the administration on numerous occasions when
they thought we shouldn't use DOD money for that purpose and we
used it anyway. Hopefully, it has been used in an effective
way.
I actually asked the Department of Defense for an audit
trail to make sure where the money went, and if it actually was
used for what we intended it to be used for, so we are happy to
hear from you today. Please understand that your statement will
be printed in the record, and you may summarize it.
Statement of Ms. Visco
Ms. Visco. Thank you very much and thank you, Mr. Chairman,
for your continued support for this program.
You know that it has been an incredible success on all
fronts. One of the reasons I think it has been so successful is
because it really is a collaboration that works.
We hear a lot nowadays about public-private partnerships;
they are the ``in thing,'' but most of them don't work. This
one does. And it has captured the enthusiasm, the enthusiastic
support of the scientific community, of women like me who have
had breast cancer, of our organization, of policymakers
everywhere.
It is being covered more and more by the press. As a matter
of fact, it is the subject of a book that was published over
the past couple of weeks that was very well reviewed in The New
York Times Sunday Book Review last week. It is getting more and
more support, more credibility and more attention.
I think it is important to recognize that this program
continues to foster innovation and, at the same time, keeps the
quality assurance mechanisms that we put in place. And equally
important is the fact that there is no bureaucracy involved
here. The overhead for this program is 10 percent. That is it.
When the Coalition was successful initially, several years
ago, in getting more money for breast cancer research, I
remember meeting with Sam Broder, then the Director of the
National Cancer Institute, and I was complaining to him about
the fact that they weren't looking at the innovation and they
were not changing their strategies, and what he said to me was
the National Cancer Institute is like a huge battleship that
you cannot turn on a dime. And what I said to him was, what we
need is a program that can design a battleship that will turn
on a dime. And that is what we did with this program, and we
did it under the leadership of this subcommittee. It has been
incredible.
We are able every year to respond quickly to what we see in
the scientific community. We can shift our strategies, shift
the funding within the program. It has just been wonderful.
This November we are going to have a conference that is going
to showcase everyone who has been funded through the program.
It is going to be here in Washington, D.C. We expect a thousand
scientists and many consumer activities and we hope, Mr.
Chairman, that you will come and participate in the conference,
and we are going to showcase to the public all of the work that
this program has funded.
In addition, I am very excited to tell you that Canada, the
Government of Canada is coming to be briefed on this program
because they want to replicate it in their country. And I think
a briefing on that is already scheduled. And we have also been
contacted by Great Britain. The United Kingdom wants to come
and do the same thing, so the support and the recognition of
the success of this program is now worldwide.
I wanted to tell you very briefly about the strategy we
adopted last year, and that is to fund those idea grants, the
scientists who have a great idea, but they don't have a lot of
preliminary data. And they are distinguished scientists with
wonderful ideas, but they don't have years of research behind
them and tons of data to bring to the National Institutes of
Health to get funding. They don't have any place to turn for
their funding. They didn't in the past, but now they do; they
have this program.
And we were very excited to see the number of idea grants
and the ideas that this program generated. Unfortunately, we
are only able to fund 9 percent of those idea grants, and we
hope that this year we are going to keep that strategy in
place, and we hope that this year we can see an appropriation
of $175 million for this program so that we continue to fund
those ideas.
You know the statistics about breast cancer. I don't have
to remind you. But I really believe that this program is going
to be one of the key elements in changing those statistics and
eradicating breast cancer. So thank you for your continued
support, and I look forward to ongoing work with you on this
program.
Mr. Young. Well, we look forward to it as well. This is a
terrible, terrible disease, and as you pointed out, we have
worked together very closely to try to make adequate funds
available.
I appreciate you very much for being here and all the work
that you do.
[The statement of Mr. Visco follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
THE UNIVERSITY OF MEDICINE AND DENTISTRY OF NEW JERSEY
WITNESS
RUSS MOLLOY, DIRECTOR OF GOVERNMENT RELATIONS, THE UNIVERSITY OF
MEDICINE AND DENTISTRY OF NEW JERSEY
Introduction
Mr. Young. I would like to invite Mr. Russ Molloy, the
Director of Government Relations on behalf of the University of
Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey. Your statement will be
made a part of the record, and we would ask you to summarize at
this time.
Statement of Mr. Molloy
Mr. Molloy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is
interesting that two previous speakers today have already
talked about elements of what it is that we are seeking before
this subcommittee today. Let me give just a brief background
about the university and touch lightly on those two major
issues.
The University of Medicine and Dentistry is the largest
public health sciences university in the Nation. Its statewide
system is located on four academic campuses statewide,
consisting of three medical schools--schools of dentistry,
nursing, a graduate school of biomedical sciences, health-
related professions. It also has its own acute care hospital,
one of the largest in the State. It has in addition three core
teaching hospitals, a behavioral health establishment statewide
and affiliations with more than 100 health care institutions. I
appreciate this opportunity to make note of our two top
priorities with the university.
Let me begin also echoing the previous speaker to thank
you, Mr. Chairman, as well as Mr. Murtha for your achievements
and your work in the area of breast cancer research and
biomedical needs and funding, because this has been a critical
issue for the country. And one of the issues that we want to
bring before you is the need for us to continue to move forward
together to try to address this terrible issue of breast
cancer.
New Jersey itself has the fourth highest incidence of
breast cancer in the country and ranks second in mortality from
the disease. There is an estimation of some 6,500 new breast
cancer cases in the State of New Jersey alone in the next year
of which 2,000 women will die.
What makes this more ironic and of great concern to the
State of New Jersey and the State university is that the
numbers and statistics demonstrate that the individuals who are
being diagnosed with breast cancer, in fact, far surpass any
national or regional statistics. We are one of the most
affluent States in the Nation, but we are also highly urbanized
and densely populated and we have a unique title as well
because we are the home to, by far, the largest number of
Superfund sites and contaminated waste sites in the entire
country.
As a result, there has been a discussion of a linkage
between the environmental factors that are taking effect and
its linkage directly to breast cancer in the State of New
Jersey. What we need is the Committee and your personal
support, Mr. Chairman, to undertake a multifaceted approach to
actually detect, diagnose and treat breast cancer. We have an
ideal laboratory in the State of New Jersey that allows us this
opportunity to really look at the actual questions about the
causes of breast cancer because we are going to link not only
the lifestyle and the standard information, but we are also
going to focus on the environmental causes of this as well as
genetics.
New Jersey is the site of the National Cancer Institute's
newest designated clinical cancer center. The Cancer Institute
of New Jersey is the first and only such site in the state. It
has established the program focusing on the causes and
prevention of breast cancer that brings together the
oncologists, associate workers, specialty nurses, geneticists,
nutritionists, toxicologists, et cetera, all of whom are staff
members of the University of Medicine and Dentistry.
The Cancer Institute of New Jersey received its key funding
from this Subcommittee in order to allow it to be built, and it
is now serving--it was approximately 2 months ago it was
designated by the NCI as a clinical cancer facility. This was
also one--through the sponsorship and support of both Dean
Gallo and Mr. Bernie Dwyer. They have been the primary movers
behind moving this cancer institute forward. And now we are
taking it to the next level.
New Jersey has an additional linkage with the issue of the
environment because the University of Medicine and Dentistry
also houses one of the 18 National Institutes of Environmental
Health Science Centers, which is a joint venture between us and
Rutgers University. Its researchers are closely affiliated with
the Cancer Institute in a unique relationship that is not found
elsewhere which allows the clinicians, the people that are
actually treating people with cancer, to have direct access to
those researchers that are actually studying the causes, due to
the environment, of cancer.
The center itself also houses one of the leading and
largest academically based exposure assessment research teams
in the country, which is looking at a variety of different
toxic waste sites in developing molecular markers for exposure
and risk, which is now a level of technology which allows us to
really look into breast cancer and its causes due to the
environment.
To accomplish the goal of diminishing this incidence of
this terrible disease, we have proposed to you a project to
focus on the epidemiology, surveillance and prevention, and for
this project, we respectfully request an appropriation of $10.5
million. It will allow us and the Cancer Institute and the
NIEHS Center at the university to serve as the national
demonstration project for this issue into the linkage between
the environment and breast cancer.
The last item is something I don't want to give short
shrift to, but it has already been discussed by Dr. Edelman,
concerning the problem we have with infectious disease. We have
proposed before the Committee a project known as the
International Center for Public Health, to be located in the
City of Newark, to focus on and to bring together two key
current institutes: the Public Health Research Institute, which
is a world-class, well-known nonprofit agency, which focuses on
the basic biology and study of infectious diseases--we are
going to bring them over and put them into University Heights
Science Park in Newark and team them up with our national TB
centers, one of the three model TB centers in the Nation, and
have the two of them focus on dealing with the issues of
infectious disease, which is now becoming, as Dr. Edelman
described, of huge concern to the Department of Defense and
security.
This is now becoming--because of the immense amount of
travel that is taking place among the citizens, it is now
bringing to the United States this whole issue about how
infectious disease is being spread. Our proposal is designed to
address this issue directly at the Gateway for some of the
largest population changes and movements, because of the
location of our eight central seaports and airports in the
State of New Jersey.
I want to thank the Committee and you, particularly, Mr.
Chairman, for all of your efforts and thank you for the
opportunity to address you today.
Mr. Young. Mr. Molloy, thank you very much for an excellent
statement. I would like our record to show that you are
accompanied today by Marilyn Thompson as your backup. We
appreciate her being here, and look forward to working with you
as we proceed through the fiscal year 1998 season.
Mr. Molloy. Thank you very much, sir.
[The statement of Mr. Molloy follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
JOINT POLICY BOARD FOR MATHEMATICS
WITNESS
JOHN GUCKENHEIMER, PROFESSOR OF MATHEMATICS AND MECHANICS, CORNELL
UNIVERSITY
Introduction
Mr. Young. I would like to invite Dr. John Guckenheimer,
professor of math and mechanics at Cornell University, to come
to the table. The doctor is president of the Society for
Industrial and Applied Mathematics, and he is representing the
Joint Policy Board for Mathematics.
Doctor, your statement will be made a part of our record,
and you may summarize in any way that you like.
Statement of Dr. Guckenheimer
Dr. Guckenheimer. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
very much for giving me this opportunity to comment on fiscal
year 1998 appropriations for the Department of Defense. I will
be speaking on behalf of the Joint Policy Board for Mathematics
(JPBM), which represents three associations of mathematical
scientists.
Mr. Chairman, JPBM once again calls on Congress to provide
full support for DOD's investment in bank research, especially
research conducted at universities. The buying power of DOD's
support for research is down 30 percent compared to 30 years
ago and nearly 10 percent since fiscal year 1994. We urge this
subcommittee to stem the erosion in these critical investments
and provide DOD's full fiscal year 1998 funding request for
basic research, 6.1 activities.
We ask this because basic research is essential to
maintaining the technological superiority of our forces. The
origins of many key defense technologies can be traced to DOD's
support for basic research conducted at U.S. academic
institutions. Rigorous decision-making processes within DOD
guide these investments to ensure both scientific excellence
and consistency with DOD's strategic priorities. These
thoughtfully planned investments need stable year-to-year
funding.
Let me describe my own experience with DOD's investment in
basic research. I work on dynamical systems. My goal is to
reveal universal patterns in dynamical processes on phenomena
ranges from neural behavior to fluid flows. Today, I shall
describe research that is leading to new mathematical
technologies for use in the design of jet engines. Designers
attempt to optimize engine performance and fuel efficiency,
thrust, emissions and longevity. High cycle fatigue that leads
to catastrophic failure of engines is the cause of many tragic
accidents.
My research addresses limits on engine performance due to
harmful mechanical oscillations or combustion instabilities.
Computer models are used in engine design. My research produces
tools that automate the analysis of these models. In
particular, I seek faster, more efficient ways to determine
parameter values that lead to stable operation of engines.
Resulting tools greatly reduce the need for time-consuming
simulation and provide a framework for understanding engine
instabilities.
Fifteen years ago, the Air Force Office of Scientific
Research helped stimulate my interest in computation. The
research I described today began after foresighted mathematical
scientists at AFOSR introduced me to a group at United
Technologies' research center. This project and others
sponsored by AFOSR are outstanding examples of how the Federal
Government, universities and industry can work together on
matters of importance to the national defense and economy.
Basic research supported by DOD is making an impact within our
defense industries.
I strongly urge you to contribute your support for DOD's
investment in basic research and the contributions of
university-based researchers. Thank you for this opportunity to
express our views for the record regarding fiscal year 1998
appropriations.
I would be pleased to answer any questions you might have.
Mr. Young. Doctor, I had an opportunity to visit a number
of universities that were doing research on programs through
the Department of Defense, and I have to say that I have been
really impressed with the types of research they have done as
well as the results they are getting. We do have a little
difficulty on occasion. There are those who don't want to
provide any DOD money for university projects, but this
Chairman thinks that they are very productive, at least most of
them. The ones that I have seen are very productive and we
appreciate the work that you are doing. Hopefully, we will be
able to have a good bill for you that will carry on some of
this research.
My question would be, have you looked at the President's
budget and how do you see the university research doing in his
budget?
Dr. Guckenheimer. Well, there is a large coalition of
scientific organizations that have been recommending increases
of approximately 7 percent for basic scientific research across
many agencies, and the targets for DOD research happily are
approaching that level in the President's budget. But we would
certainly propose that increases of that order of magnitude are
needed to restore some of the losses that we have seen in
recent years.
Mr. Young. Well, I think it is a great investment, I have
to tell you. And I think an awful lot of things that the
Department of Defense gets credit for actually came from the
university research programs. So I thank you very much for
being here and being part of our program today, and I invite
you to stay in touch with us.
If you have an opportunity, give us some good examples of
what university research has produced that we can go to our
colleagues with and say, look, here is the money, but here is
what we have gotten for it. Those kinds of things are very
helpful when we get into the debates about whether or not to
fund or increase or reduce the research budget.
Dr. Guckenheimer. Thank you. We will do that. Thank you.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much.
[The statement of Dr. Guckenheimer follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
FEDERATION OF BEHAVIORAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND COGNITIVE SCIENCES
WITNESS
DAVID JOHNSON, Ph.D., EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, FEDERATION OF BEHAVIORAL,
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND COGNITIVE SCIENCES
Introduction
Mr. Young. We now welcome Dr. David Johnson who is the
Executive Director of the Federation of Behavioral,
Psychological and Cognitive Sciences. Your prepared statement
expresses concern about a number of reductions in the
President's budget to research funding. That statement will be
made a part of the record, and we invite you to present your
testimony in any way that you would like.
Statement of Dr. Johnson
Dr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to say
that I appreciate every year that you sit here until the end.
Not every Chairman does that, so I am glad that you do.
I am testifying today primarily on the 6.1 or basic
research budget and particularly on the basic behavioral
research support in that budget.
But basic research begins a process toward application.
Thus, the 6.2 and 6.3a budgets go hand-in-hand with basic
research. Support of the whole research pipeline--research
development, testing and evaluation--is necessary to assure
that basic research contributes optimally to national defense.
So we support the administration's request for a 7.8 percent
increase for 6.1 research. The increase recovers some losses
suffered in the last 2 years, and provides an inflationary
adjustment.
While most of the research budget is consumed by hardware
and electronics development, a small part of the 6.1 budget,
only about $30 million across all the service branches, out of
the $1.164 billion requested for 6.1 research, is devoted to
research aimed at improving human performance. Much mission-
oriented research is supported by that meager allocation.
At the Air Force, behavioral research is determining how
much and what kind of information is needed to assure top
performance of pilots in combat. At the Navy, it is perfecting
systems and techniques for embedded training that will reduce
costs and improve training quality, especially for rare,
demanding tasks like threat recognition and response.
And among other things, the Army is supporting research to
understand the factors leading to sexual harassment in the
military.
We regret that the requests for 6.1 behavioral research at
the Navy and Air Force are zero percent and 3.5 percent, a far
cry from the 7.8 percent increase sought for 6.1 research
overall. Nevertheless, we are relieved that these requests
represent only an inflationary loss for the Navy and a steady-
state budget for the Air Force, rather than actual cuts. Thus,
we ask the subcommittee to support at least the funding levels
requested for behavioral research at the Navy and Air Force.
Those levels are $16 million for the Navy and $9.057 million
for the Air Force.
We are deeply troubled, however, by the requested 25
percent cut in overall research funding and a planned single-
year staff reduction of 53 percent for the Army Research
Institute.
The concept known as reliance is important in downsizing of
military research. The approach designates a lead service as
the provider to all the services for research in a given area.
All research on social and organizational issues is assigned to
the Army Research Institute. The Army is the only service doing
research on leadership, on the integration of recruits from
diverse backgrounds into well-functioning teams, on sexual
harassment, and on the training of troops for peacekeeping
missions.
The cuts proposed for 1998 will cripple ARI; both the
contemplated staffing level and the requested funding level are
well below what ARI needs to fulfill its responsibilities at an
acceptable level of quality. We must plead with this
subcommittee to give ARI the minimum tools it needs to do its
job.
Without your intervention, fiscal 1998 will see a
precipitous and, we believe, ultimately fatal plunge for ARI.
The research request is $17.75 million, with 6.1 receiving 2
million of that total. The current funding level is $23.7
million, with 6.1 receiving 2.9 million.
Its current authorized staffing level is 254 positions. The
planned level for 1998 is 119 positions. We urge the
subcommittee to support a fiscal 1998 funding level of $21.4
million and a staffing level of 165 full-time equivalent
positions. Both represent painful but survivable cuts from
their 1997 levels.
If ARI is crippled or eliminated, not just the Army, but
the Navy and the Air Force as well, will have lost a critically
important tool to address problems that are as current as
tomorrow's headlines.
I thank you for this opportunity to present our views, and
I thank the subcommittee for its continuing leadership in
support of the Nation's defense.
Mr. Young. Doctor, thank you very much and thank you for
being here. I hope you have the feeling that we are pretty much
committed to basic research; I think that it is essential to
keep America's forces equipped with the best technology that is
possible, and the best quality of life.
We will review your written statement. I tried to make some
quick notes as you were talking, but we will review those as we
get ready to do our markup later on in the early summer.
Thank you for coming. We appreciate your interest and your
involvement.
Dr. Johnson. Thank you.
Mr. Young. The Committee is adjourned.
[The statement of Dr. Johnson follows:]
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 1998
----------
Thursday, February 27, 1997.
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND
WITNESS
GENERAL GEORGE A. JOULWAN, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES EUROPEAN
COMMAND, U.S. ARMY
Introduction
Mr. Young. Good morning, general. The Committee will come
to order. This morning the Committee is happy to welcome back
General George Joulwan, Commander in Chief, United States
European Command and the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.
General, speaking for the Committee, I want to compliment
you on your tremendous record of leadership. We have been told
that you might be considering retiring later this year.
General Joulwan. Yes.
Mr. Young. That would be the Department of Defense's loss.
You have a tremendous record and we are very, very proud of you
and proud of the record that you have established.
I am also pleased with the way that you have led our
activities in Bosnia. We would like to talk to you about Bosnia
this morning. We have been very, very supportive of all of our
efforts there, although there were some who questioned whether
we should even be there. But once that decision was made, we
have been totally supportive, as I am sure you are well aware.
We are curious about how you see Bosnia today and in the
next few months and the next few years we are concerned also
that, as the Congress has been given proposed dates of exiting
Bosnia, those dates seem to come and go without a lot of
fanfare and U.S. troops are still there.
I would like to hear from you as to what you think might be
the future, what might be an exit strategy, if there is one;
what the effect might be once we are gone. Those are the kinds
of things we are interested in hearing from you today.
You are the first of the four Commanders-in-Chief--CINCS--
who will testify during this appropriation season. And as I
told you earlier, I had been invited to make a visitation with
Secretary Cohen today and tomorrow and I had planned to do that
until I recognized that you were the witness today. I certainly
wanted to be here for your presentation.
Mr. Murtha, do you have any opening comments?
Mr. Murtha. Well, I tell you, we kind of feel you are one
of this Committee, because you have been before the Committee
so many times. But the one thing I have noticed, you get a
bigger staff the longer you are around. It used to be you only
brought one or two people. Now I notice you have got a whole
room full now. Is that because you are doing less work?
General Joulwan. That's right. But they are all in the
back.
Mr. Young. But the room is small. His entourage looks big
because the room is small.
Okay. General, we are very happy to hear from you, sir.
Proceed any way that you like. Your entire statement will be
placed in the record.
Summary Statement of General Joulwan
General Joulwan. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
Representative Murtha, distinguished Members of the National
Security Subcommittee. As always, it is a privilege to appear
before you today to report on the forward deployed and let me
say forward stationed United States European Command--EUCOM--
Forces. And I welcome this opportunity to provide my assessment
of the EUCOM theater of operation, a theater that spans Europe,
the Near East, the northern littoral of Africa and Sub-Saharan
Africa, 83 countries, 13 million square miles and over 1
billion people of different ethnic, religious and economic
conditions.
At the outset, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank this
Committee on behalf of the men and women of EUCOM and their
families for your support of our efforts in Europe and NATO, as
well as in our Areas Of Responsibility--AOR--in Africa and the
Near East.
I have been appearing before this Committee since 1990, and
I am particularly grateful this year for the opportunity to
provide you my assessment of my command, and as you know, Mr.
Chairman, I have a lengthy posture statement which I would like
to enter into the record and then briefly make a few points.
Mr. Young. Yes, sir.
OPERATIONS TEMPO
General Joulwan. The first point, Mr. Chairman, is that
EUCOM continues to experience the highest operations tempo--
OPTEMPO--in its history. U.S. troops are committed to prevent
conflict in the former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia,
enforce a ``No Fly Zone'' against Saddam Hussein in Northern
Iraq and ensure compliance with the Dayton Peace Agreement in
Bosnia.
In the past year, EUCOM has extracted hundreds of civilians
under fire from Liberia, protected Americans in the Central
African Republic and facilitated the return of hundreds of
thousands of refugees in Zaire and Tanzania. Clearly, forward-
deployed and forward-stationed forces give the United States
great flexibility and reach, and EUCOM is demonstrating its
value every day.
Our troops are mission-focused and combat-ready. They are
disciplined forces which have demonstrated the ability to
respond across the entire conflict spectrum. I need your
support in ensuring the contingency supplemental is provided in
time, hopefully by this spring, to maintain EUCOM's high
readiness and standards.
Equally important, Mr. Chairman, is that the forward-
deployed forces engaged in peacetime to shape the environment
and prevent conflict as well as being ready to fight and win.
This proactive conflict prevention strategy includes working
with our allies in NATO, exercising with new partners in the
Partnership for Peace Program and conducting air, land and sea
operations in conjunction with allies and partners as we are
doing in Bosnia. By so doing, we promote trust and confidence,
create stability and prevent crises from developing in the
conflict.
BOSNIA--OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR
The second point, Mr. Chairman, is that Operation JOINT
ENDEAVOR in Bosnia in 1996 exceeded all expectations and laid
the groundwork for lasting peace in Bosnia. Today, Operation
JOINT GUARD, or the Stabilization Force, SFOR, continues to
provide a secure environment for civilian agencies and the
former warring parties to begin the process of reconstruction
and reconciliation. But let me be clear, if I may, to the
members of the National Security Subcommittee.
The NATO-led forces of IFOR and now SFOR can create an
absence of war but cannot establish the peace. Peace depends on
the will of the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina and on the rapid
progress of civilian and nongovernmental organizations. While
some progress has been made, much more needs to be done by the
civilian agencies and the parties themselves in the remaining
16 months of the mandated 18-month SFOR mission.
Again, for clarity, the North Atlantic Council's
instructions to me are for an 18-month mission ending in June
of 1998. But to me it is imperative that we concentrate on what
can be done by many of these civilian agencies in
reconstruction, resettlement, elections, et cetera, in the time
remaining and not just concentrate on what is going to happen
after 18 months.
Let me also point out that the Stabilization Force is truly
a unique force in the annals of military history. SFOR is
multinational with 34 countries making up its force structure
and 25 nations comprising the headquarters. It is the most
multinational headquarters in recent history.
Let me also make clear that U.S. forces in Bosnia are less
than 25 percent of the Stabilization Force. Our NATO allies and
non-NATO nations contribute more than 75 percent of the force,
and I have given you a chart that shows how we are leveraging
our allies and our non-NATO partners in providing forces not
just for Bosnia, but for other contingencies.
Also in Bosnia, we have had great success with intelligence
fusion and intelligence sharing. Information and intelligence
superiority have directly influenced events on the ground and
compliance by the former warring factions. Timely intelligence
is also responsible for force protection of out troops and
rapid response to possible threats.
The third point, Mr. Chairman, is that success in Bosnia is
directly linked to the strategy I discussed with this Committee
in testimony in 1994, the Partnership for Peace Program. I said
then that the intent was to train with former adversaries, and
now new partners to common standards and common procedures in
order to one day conduct missions together. In Bosnia, we have
taken the theory of multinational training and put it into
practice, and it has been successful. And I want to thank you
for your support of this military cooperation program. It truly
works.
Fourth, in Bosnia, the Russian-NATO relationship is still a
good one. Joint U.S. and Russian patrols operate today in the
Brcko area. Recently U.S. Apache gunships were prepared to fire
in defense of Russians who were endangered by one of the former
warring factions.
And in the Brcko arbitration of just two weeks ago, if you
can imagine this, American forces that were maneuvering in
blocking positions were joined by Russian, Turkish, Nordic and
Polish units to prevent conflict and to carry out their
mandate. And as a result, it was a peaceable implementation of
that decision.
And let me just say that from this modest beginning with
Russians in Bosnia, we are creating the trust and confidence so
necessary to build the foundation upon which a future NATO-
Russian and U.S.-Russian security relationship can be built.
As I mentioned last year, I have a three-star Russian
general as a deputy to the Supreme Allied Command to Europe for
Russian forces in Bosnia. He is at my headquarters in Mons,
Belgium, and he has an office in the building that prepared
plans for the contingencies in Berlin during the Cold War.
And you might be interested in that he just returned from
Moscow, where he appeared before the Duma, the Russian
Parliament, for funding and for the extension of the Russian
contingent in Bosnia until June of 1998.
He got both. As you know, this is, indeed, a delicate time
for Russian-NATO relations. Clearly, there are great internal
strains that will take time to work out, but we should not
isolate Russia, but neither should we allow Russia to veto NATO
decisions. But NATO and the United States need to stay engaged
with Russia through this very delicate transition period.
PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE PROGRAMS
The fifth point, Mr. Chairman, is that EUCOM is a total
force command. The Reserve component plays an increasingly
important role in accomplishing EUCOM's diverse missions. It
assists in offsetting the active force in both the operations
tempo, OPTEMPO, and personnel tempo, PERSTEMPO, that we have in
theater. It also provides a tangible example to emerging
democracies in former communist countries of Eastern and
Central Europe with the role of the military in a democratic
political system.
EUCOM is now involved with 21 States of our United States
with 21 emerging democracies in Europe. For example,
Pennsylvania is aligned with Lithuania; California with
Ukraine; Ohio with Hungary; Texas with the Czech Republic;
North Carolina with Moldova, Minnesota with Croatia and Indiana
with Slovakia.
The State Partnership Program is truly low cost and high
payoff and I thank you for your continued support, and I also
thank you for your National Guard and Reserve components who
are doing so well in maintaining this excellent contact.
Likewise, we have a Marshall Center in Germany, which is
another low cost-high payoff initiative. It is now in its third
year and has graduated over 390 mid-level civilian and military
leaders from mainly Eastern and Central European countries. We
already are getting very good returns from the Marshall Center
graduates who are now being appointed to key military and
civilian leadership positions. What the Marshall Center does is
balance what we are doing in exercising on the military side
with education of the role of the military in a democratic
political system.
Also, the IMET Program, the International Military
Education and Training Program, sent 1,200 international
students from the EUCOM theater of operations to the United
States. You should know that the current Chief of Defense, in
other words, General Shalikashvili's equivalent, of the
Hungarian armed forces, is an Army War College graduate from
Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Also the brigade commander of the Czech
rapid reaction brigade, who is now deployed in Bosnia is an
Army War College graduate; and the head of the Hungarian Air
Force is a graduate of the Air Force's Air War College at
Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama. This is a superb program and
I urge and I encourage your continued support.
QUALITY OF LIFE
My last point, Mr. Chairman, is that the quality of life
for our troops and families is an essential part of our
readiness. I am grateful for this Committee's continued support
for a decent quality of life for the forward station force. It
is extremely important, particularly now with our high OPTEMPO,
and the results of this adequate quality of life are evident
not only in mission performance but also in higher reenlistment
rates that we are now experiencing in Europe.
Mr. Chairman, if I sound proud of my troops, I am. We in
Europe have developed a new strategy for a new mission. We have
adapted and adjusted the command and force structure to meet
the challenges of today and tomorrow. NATO, too, has adapted to
the realities of a new Europe and to new risk. Not only is NATO
bringing peace to Bosnia, but NATO is also engaged in this new
relationship with Russia and with 27 different partner nations.
In my opinion, Mr. Chairman, the United States must
continue to stay engaged in Europe politically, economically
and also militarily. We have reduced our force structure in
Europe by over 200,000 personnel and by billions of dollars.
However, the current command and force structure of about
100,000 needs to be maintained in order for continued U.S.
leadership and influence in NATO; to leverage the assets of our
allies and new partners; to promote professionalism within the
militaries of the new democracies emerging in Eastern and
Central Europe; to prevent crises from developing into conflict
and to shape the external environment to promote U.S.
interests, values and ideals.
To do so reduces the danger of war and preserves peace,
freedom and democracy. To do so ensures a better life for our
children and for our grandchildren.
Mr. Chairman, I am excited and optimistic about the future.
We have an historic opportunity and we cannot, and we must not,
and with your support we will not, fail.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I am prepared now to
respond to your questions.
[The statement of General Joulwan follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Young. General, thank you very much for an excellent
statement. The members of this Committee are also extremely
proud of our troops, the way they have carried out their
mission, the way it has been done with very few casualties of
any type. That makes us very proud of them as usual, but we are
also very proud of you and your leadership that organized the
effort and made sure that the mission was carried out properly.
We have a new member of this Committee, Congressman
Cunningham, at the end of the table on that side and
Congressman Visclosky has just returned to the Committee. Duke
Cunningham has been very patient in all of our meetings being
at the end of the table. He is always the last one to be
recognized so at this point I am going to yield the Chairman's
first 5 minutes to Congressman Cunningham for the first round
of questioning.
Mr. Cunningham. I have never had this happen before in my
life. Once in jail, always in jail.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman, but that is not necessary if you
had questions for General Joulwan. I will be happy to wait,
sir.
Mr. Young. Take it while you can. This may not happen again
for a long time.
FISCAL YEAR 1997 EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL
Mr. Cunningham. Usually, you are allowed time to get your
thoughts together. So I will try.
General Joulwan, the supplemental is very important and I
don't think there are many Members that won't support it. But
as you are well aware, the Services have really had to bite the
bullet on coughing up dollars out of their own funds, out of
their budgets. That has really hurt.
The supplemental that you are asking for, I think it is
accurate to see exactly what the total costs are that the
services are having to put forward. Not only that, but the
total cost to this country of what these ``exercises'', I will
use a light term, exercises are doing.
For example, what does it cost to steam the carriers, the
airlifts out of Italy, the total cost, not just what we are
taking out of the Services, because in a budget, when we are
trying to tie in--all of this is tied together in the balanced
budget and you need to know what the real costs are. And it is
my contention, my opinion, that the President is asking for a
$4.8 billion cut in defense, but yet we need a supplement. That
just is not logical.
Secondly, General Shalikashvili, in his memo, stated that
Service Chiefs specified that we needed to go to a $60 billion
modernization budget. In the President's budget, 70 percent of
the cuts come in the outyears and we keep pushing the purchase
of all of our equipment to the right, as well as combat
support. It's that support which you need to do your job, and
its all pushed out into the outyears.
Now, any logical and rational person knows that there is no
way that those that do not support national security over
social programs are going to reduce social programs in the
outyears when 70 percent of the cuts come, and at the same time
increase defense spending.
So I think it is--the reason I am asking the question, I am
trying to get a real handle on what our real costs are, sir.
That is why I would like a complete estimate, not just what it
is costing us on this.
IRANIAN PRESENCE IN BOSNIA
I have read a lot of documents and have had a briefing from
our Intelligence Community. There is a dispute on the number of
Mujahadin and Hamas within Bosnia, but isn't it--even if there
is a lower number than I believe that is actually the case,
isn't there an increased presence from Islamic groups from
Iran, and that their long-term strategy is to wait this out and
build up the Islamic forces around Izetbegovic believing that
the U.S. is going to pull out? Because when I have talked to
some of the Islamic people from that area, they all said that
they expect the U.S. to pull out. And Iran will always be
there. So Iran is attempting to establish a tie and that tie is
going to be a very dangerous tie long-term for us?
General Joulwan. ------. What we want to do, I think, by
our policies and it is really in the political side, is to try
to wean the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government away from Iran and
the dominance of Iran. I think that is much more than just
military. I think it is economic, it is social, it is political
relationships that we need to try to develop.
I would urge continued contact with the Government of
Bosnia-Herzegovina so that it does not go back to Iran. And I
think that takes a comprehensive strategy in order to do that.
That is much more than just military.
Mr. Cunningham. I agree. And I think it is one of our long-
term problems, not only with terrorism in Europe, but in the
United States as well. And I would love to give you a book
written by Bodanski, which is from a Serb perspective. It lists
by names the personnel and position, and also which
humanitarian offices over there they are using.
General Joulwan. Yes.
Mr. Cunningham. These offices are used to cover and hide a
lot of these people. Another tactic is getting them married to
Bosnian women. And I look at our world-wide threat of
terrorism, and I think it is a real problem if we don't do
exactly what you said.
General Joulwan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cunningham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Cunningham.
Let me yield to an old friend of yours that you worked with
for a long time, Mr. Murtha.
TURKEY
Mr. Murtha. General, I am looking at the map in the area of
responsibility that you have, and Turkey seems to be moving in
the wrong direction. Is that just a perception I am getting or
are they moving in the wrong direction?
General Joulwan. We are concerned about Turkey and the
whole Aegean area. And on the positive side, they are very
active, as is Greece, in Bosnia. ------.
ISRAEL
Mr. Murtha. I have always been concerned that this line is
drawn right here right next to Israel. I am talking about the
line that you have responsibility for and don't. Is that the
right place to draw the line? Is that the right delineation of
responsibility there?
General Joulwan. We have discussed this often and, in fact,
I have now established in my EUCOM hat staff talks and next
week, Central Command will be coming to Stuttgart and we are
talking back and forth across that boundary.
When I was in Israel, let me just give you my personal
experience, I asked that question to, at that time, Prime
Minister Peres, and though the threat is from the East, the
values, ideals and their linkage is to the West. And so NATO is
very much looking at a Mediterranean initiative that will
include all of the countries of the Mediterranean. ------. So I
think it is a good one. We are always looking for different
ways, but I think in this case I would leave it as it is.
BOSNIA DEPLOYMENT
Mr. Murtha. I noticed, we extended the time of 13 months--
or 18 months more for Bosnia. Of course, I opposed vigorously
the original deployment until the President made up his mind
and once he made up his mind then I went along with it.
I knew from talking to you over there that there was a good
chance that it was going to be extended. But I got the
impression the fighting may not start--restart in Bosnia, that
they really wanted peace. And what you said, I think, is
absolutely true, that these folks were worn out. The land had
been exchanged and they wanted peace.
Is it absolutely essential that we stay over there for
another 18 months?
General Joulwan. Congressman, what we are about ready to do
now is the most difficult part. We have separated the forces,
as you know, by 4 kilometers. We transferred land. We put the
heavy weapons in the storage areas and there was an election
conducted and they demobilized many of their forces. The
difficult part is now.
Now, what is happening is the return of refugees for
resettlement and this will determine whether Bosnia Herzegovina
becomes a multiethnic, multicultural state again, and this is
the challenge that we are going to face. The secure environment
for that to take place is provided by the Stabilization Force,
SFOR. And it is a stabilization, not an implementation. So I
think there is going to be some need in the next--for the next
16 months now of the 18-month mandated mission for forces to be
there.
Conflict is right beneath the surface, and I--and it is a
very delicate stage of having people return to their homes,
particularly when they go into what we would call minority
areas, where they are the minority, is going to be a great
challenge. And I just visited recently and saw this in
operation, and there is a great deal of tension. And what SFOR
does is provide time for this wound to heal and that is why I
think, in 18 months, we should know where we are--a much better
sense of where we are in that respect.
Mr. Murtha. Well, why is it that the Europeans can't do
this? I know we originally went over there. They said we don't
need your advice; we don't need your help. Then they came to
the conclusion they couldn't do it without the United States.
What is that we bring to the table that--we only have 25
percent of the forces. Why do we have to have 25 percent of the
forces over there?
General Joulwan. I would like to say leadership in what we
are trying to do. There is some of that. But also the
credibility and the weight of the United States of America.
Don't underestimate what that means in terms of trying to
ensure compliance with a treaty or continued progress in the
process in resettlement, reconstruction, elections.
Mr. Murtha. You are being nice, though. Is it that the
Europeans can't deal with each other? Is that what the problem
is? They need leadership? I can't figure this out.
General Joulwan. Well, first of all, the Europeans wanted
NATO to come in, and the United States is a key member of NATO.
For NATO to have a NATO-led force, where they have an American
as the Supreme Allied Commander it would be difficult not to
have forces involved. So for a NATO-led operation, it makes
sense.
In this case, though, I think the key point is, it is only
25 percent. In the past, it might have been 85 percent.
TRAINING BOSNIA MUSLIMS
Mr. Murtha. One last question now. We are training the
Muslims. Europeans don't like us training the Muslims. They
think that there is balance before you start training the
Muslims. A lot of people in this country think we ought to be
training the Muslims. I am not one of them.
Now, what does this do? We have a couple brigades that are
well trained. Is this going to change the balance of power over
there in that area?
General Joulwan. I think it will balance the balance of
power. When we first started all of that--by the way, that is
part of Dayton. It is not something just the U.S. is in.
Mr. Murtha. I understand.
General Joulwan. This is part of Dayton. When we started
it, the preponderance of heavy weapons belonged to the Serbs, I
mean by a factor of--there were 500 tanks on the Serb side to
less than 100 on the other side.
Mr. Murtha. But that is not tank country.
General Joulwan. They did more damage with tanks over there
firing point blank into buildings that had civilians in it than
anything else. Artillery didn't do that much damage. They were
firing from 40 positions around Sarajevo point blank using the
tanks just like you use a rifle.
Mr. Murtha. They used it as artillery, in other words?
General Joulwan. Well, they used it in direct fire in the
buildings. I mean, they would aim right into a building, and it
was very accurate fire.
They pulled out--when we put in the bombing campaign in
September with precision bombing, 250 heavy weapons came out
just from around Sarajevo. So there has to be some balance.
Now, I think the idea is not to overdo it and to make sure
that what you are doing is for defensive purposes. And I must
say, the arm--the training and equip is a program, but I am not
involved in it.
Mr. Murtha. I understand that.
General Joulwan. But I think if you keep it in balance with
the arms control part of annex 1B of the Dayton Treaty, I think
it can work, but it needs to be watched.
And by the way, there are 10 to 15 other countries involved
now, not just the United States, in arm and equip.
Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Murtha.
Mr. McDade, the Vice Chairman of the full Appropriations
Committee.
IDENTIFICATION OF MINES IN BOSNIA
Mr. McDade. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
General, let me extend my personal welcome to you. It is a
privilege to see you here today and to work with you again.
I feel badly that you will be leaving the service, I guess
in the summertime, and I want you to know you carry with you
the best wishes of the Committee. You have done a superb job.
We knew you would with Congressman Murtha as a partner, may I
say to you, but you have really--I remember reading about the
number of mines in Bosnia, there was some fantastic figure, X
number of millions.
General Joulwan. Millions.
Mr. McDade. I forget how many and predictions about the
number of youngsters who were going to be maimed and injured,
killed, because of this proliferation of mines. And I don't
know how you have handled it, but I am sure you have handled
it. How have you handled it?
General Joulwan. Well, first of all, we started a very
intense identification campaign. Where are the mines? And the
best people to get were the parties themselves that laid the
mines. Then we started a very deliberate program of getting
those who laid the mines to remove them.
Now, it started to go fairly well at the beginning. It has
not gone as well in the past I would say, 6 months. Now, what
we have done is restricted the training. In other words, if--
they have to get permission, these former warring factions to
go train. If they don't have a plan to remove mines, we don't
let them out to train. So we put some emphasis in that area.
There are many nongovernmental organizations that are now
involved and there is a mine awareness center in Bosnia that is
trying to catalog all of these mines.
Mr. McDade. Who runs that, General?
General Joulwan. I think it is a U.N. agency, but I will--
it is a private organization.
Mr. McDade. Are they doing a good job?
General Joulwan. They are doing a good job, but we still
have a lot of mines, if I can be very candid, and we must get
rid of them. In terms of the technology we put into space and
elsewhere we haven't put it into mines, but that is coming. It
is going to take a little bit longer, but we are now seeing
some technology come on board.
Mr. McDade. I forget where I picked up a piece of
information that related to percentage of youngsters in Vietnam
who were injured because of mines and body traps and it was
something like 60 percent of the casualties, isn't it?
General Joulwan. A great number. I don't know the
percentage, but a lot.
Mr. McDade. I don't know the exact number either, but it
was astonishing to me so many of our people got injured and
dreadfully injured by those things.
General Joulwan. The other piece that we do, Congressman,
is that in my U.S. hat I make everyone going there to Bosnia go
through a 3-month training program before they go into theater.
And one of the key elements of that is mine awareness. And so
there is a great deal of emphasis. And the discipline--this is
not a peacekeeping operation. This is a peace enforcement. This
is tough business.
You go down there and it is not--particularly out along the
zone of separation, this is tough business. And the troops got
their head in the game. I just came back from Brcko which is
surrounded by mines, by the way.
The other thing which has really helped us, and I must
credit Secretary Perry, when he first visited me a year ago, he
said, ``what do you need?'' And I said, armored humvees. And we
now have humvees that are armored, just about all of our
vehicles that go out on patrols. And just last week, a U.S.
patrol hit a mine, blew the heck out of the armored humvee and
the only damage to the American: he had a little hearing loss
for a few hours.
So our technology and what we are trying to do, training,
discipline of the force and I hope we can keep that going. We
cannot have soldier complacency, and every time we have a
rotation of forces we try to reinforce the importance of mines.
I might say that civilians, however, are getting--are
becoming casualties as more and more return and we are trying
to get smarter in working with the nongovernmental
organizations to--particularly the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, or UNHCR, and warning people coming
back.
Mr. McDade. Do you have any idea what percentages of the
mines remain in place given say the 9 million? Do you have any
idea?
General Joulwan. I would say the vast majority of them.
Mr. McDade. You still have a long way to go?
General Joulwan. A long way to go.
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE (UAV)
Mr. McDade. Let me ask you another question. Your command
was the first to use a new reconnaissance asset in a low-level
intensity conflict and I remember a demonstration that we saw
on one occasion. Evaluate the importance of that for the
Committee, will you?
General Joulwan. If we are talking the UAV and the Airborne
Reconnaissance Low, superb. The UAV, the Predator has really
come into its own. There is still some work we have to do in
getting it into all-weather sort of things, but it really has
helped us.
It is a very good asset.
Mr. McDade. Have you sufficient assets to do the job you
need in that department?
General Joulwan. I believe so, Congressman. What is most
important is we can downlink from the UAV into the battalion
Terminal Access Controller, TAC, into a battalion TAC operation
center. So the battalion commander, lieutenant colonel, can
dynamically task the UAV flying up ahead.
We also have at the Combined Air Operation Center that I
run out of Vicenza, and therefore it is allied supported as
well, we use. When we had Joint Surveillance Target Attack
Radar, Joint STARS there, we had Airborne Warning and Control
System AWACS, the UAV, Airborne RECCE LOW, we put a system of
systems together and so they could cue back and forth. And so
if we saw a violation occurring or we saw a movement occurring,
we could quickly respond and that information dominance in this
sort of operation really helps. And so we are learning every
day.
I am very pleased not only with the platforms themselves,
but how we can get them down to the lowest level, in this case,
a battalion.
Mr. McDade. Thanks for the explanation. My time has
expired. Thank you, General. Nice to see you.
General Joulwan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murtha. I was just asking the Chairman, Commanders--
aren't they saying that there is a problem with this system,
they are not getting the satellite feed the way they are
supposed to?
General Joulwan. It has been working. We have had a problem
with icing during the winter, the cold weather, and we are
trying to work that out.
Mr. Murtha. That is a connection between the satellite and
what--but it is working?
General Joulwan. It is working and we have had good results
with it in being able to cue it.
Mr. Hobson. If the gentleman would yield, when I was there,
they had a couple of them out there but they weren't flying
them because the weather was a problem. They also had some
mechanical problems. They were waiting for the next system that
they thought would really be good, whatever the name of that
one is. I don't know what it is.
General Joulwan. Well, there were two different systems.
One is called Pioneer. The other is called Predator. The
Predator, at least every indication I have, is working
extremely well. We have had some problems with it in weather.
Mr. Murtha. Let us get something on that for the record.
General Joulwan. All right.
[Clerk's note.--The Department did not provide a response
for the record.]
Mr. McDade. Let me just ask one follow-up question since I
raised the issue. You say weather. What we hear, what we know
about Bosnia, is that the weather is always bad. So if the
weather constrains the use of that asset, how good is it?
General Joulwan. Well, we are working on a de-icer. When it
flies and there is no de-icer on-board-capability; it has
difficulties. So when it is icing conditions, it has got
problems.
Mr. McDade. Low visibility isn't bothering it? It can get
down?
General Joulwan. It can get down fairly low.
Mr. Cunningham. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. McDade. Yes.
Mr. Cunningham. I went through the plant this last weekend
and what they are doing is putting it in the leading edge and
then they are leaching out a fluid that de-ices the thing.
Also, with the radar, they can actually see through the clouds
now and find targets and so on. So it is a pretty good system.
Mr. Young. General, our next Member is fresh from the
operating table so go easy on him. We are glad to have Mr.
Obey, the Ranking Member of the full Appropriations Committee.
RUSSIAN REACTION TO NATO EXPANSION
Mr. Obey. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, I would simply like to ask you roughly the same
thing that I asked General Shalikashvili yesterday and the
Secretary of Defense. I have grave misgivings about the
administration's intentions to expand NATO. I am confident they
are going to get a deal with the Russians. I think in the end
Yeltsin will wind up signing on.
But my concern is that while Yeltsin may buy on because we
may give him a little cover, I am afraid that that has the
potential of being greatly exploited by future hard-line
nationalist politicians who in different circumstances,
political or economic, could play a pretty mean card by saying
that they were, quote ``duped by the West.''
I am also concerned about the fact that it may, in fact,
make it more difficult to actually achieve Russian ratification
of arms control treaties that we have signed with them, both
existing treaties and even new treaties, even though we may
offer them some sweetener in terms of further reductions on
conventional arms.
Do you have any concerns at all about the additional
opportunities that might present those who within Russia might
want to resist signing those arms control agreements?
General Joulwan. Congressman, let me answer it this way if
I may: Basically, it is a political question of whether NATO
enlarges from its present 16 members or not. In retrospect, if
you go back in 1951, the North Atlantic Council originally was
12 nations. It enlarged to 16 over the next 30 years. Article X
of the 1949 Washington Treaty that established NATO, Article X
allows for sovereign nations to apply for membership. That,
then, must go through the 16 Parliaments, Congresses, et
cetera.
I think that applying for membership should be--is a
sovereign right of any sovereign nation, so I think applying
for membership is one thing. The impact it would have on
Russia, I think, needs to be closely looked at. From a geo-
strategic point of view I would say that if many of these
nations that we talked about are members, it provides stability
on Russia's western flank, not instability, which is part of
their concern. So I am not so much concerned about Russia's
thinking that somehow they are at a military disadvantage
because of this. It doesn't hold water when you do the
analysis.
Whether the countries that we are talking about for
membership come in or not, again, it is a political decision,
but they are sharing the risk with NATO right now in Bosnia.
They have forces on the ground. They are demonstrating shared
values. Some of these countries have reached out to their
neighbors and now have treaties with their neighbors, are
demonstrating that they really want to create the values and
ideals of the alliance as well. So I would say they ought to at
least be heard.
Whether the political side will accept them, that is
another dimension. But we do have, NATO has, a very active
program now of consultation with Russia. The Secretary General
has just met on Sunday with Primakov in Brussels. The month
before he was in Moscow. There is talk of a Russian NATO
charter that is being looked at.
So I think every attempt is made to reach out to Russia; at
the same time not allowing some sort of Russian veto of what
NATO is trying to do.
I don't see it as a threat. I think in many cases, it can
bring stability to the region.
JOINT NATO-RUSSIAN BRIGADE
Mr. Obey. I guess I would simply say that I think letting
Spain into an organization is somewhat less troubling to Russia
than having countries near their border being new found members
of a Western alliance.
I am also concerned about the fact that if you are
Ukrainian or if you are living in Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania
or any of those areas that, in fact, if we add Poland and some
other first slice countries, that it creates at least the
potential for added Russian pressure on those folks who are not
allowed into NATO at first blush and might, in fact, create
problems for them down the line, but I recognize that is a
political judgment.
Let me ask you this, Secretary Albright just floated this
idea of a joint NATO-Russian brigade as part of the sweeteners
package that I was talking bout. Is that a workable idea? How
much would it cost the U.S.? What kind of capability, in your
best professional judgment, do the Russians have to finance
that given their military problems at the time?
Is NATO liable to wind up being stuck with all of the
costs, except for payment of the troops, the Russian troops,
and were you consulted prior to that announcement?
General Joulwan. The answer is, no, but we are working now
trying to determine what are the limits of this initiative that
we have discussed. We have discussed, as part of this, how to
evolve from what we are doing in Bosnia, which may have led to
this discussion.
What we need to do is build on this, this relationship,
that we have. We have a Russian brigade in Bosnia now, working
within a multinational division, headed by an American major
general division commander. We need to build on that.
I have personally attended lessons-learned seminars in St.
Petersburg and we are going to have one in April at the
Marshall Center in Germany.
So I think we are building on this, and the intent is, can
we work together in a way to be able to respond to similar
crises by developing a unit that can help? But we haven't taken
it to the level of a NATO-Russian brigade, We are just doing
the fundamental work here. The costing has to be done. What
equipment, the interoperability of that equipment, all of that
is yet to be done.
Mr. Obey. I would simply say that in Defense News, there is
an article on this subject which contains the following
paragraphs: Quote, ``What the hell is going on? a military
planner chief told Defense News February 21st. We have already
got a very good model of cooperation with Russia and SFOR, but
the Russians must still learn to walk before they can run, said
the planner. A joint brigade is way beyond what we can offer
right now.'' And it says, ``one U.S. official admitted that
even the issue of financing the joint brigade could be
problematic for the alliance in view of the Russians' military
chronic cash shortage.''
Do you have any----
[The article follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
General Joulwan. I have seen that article. I am trying to
find who said that at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers
Europe, SHAPE.
Mr. Obey. But is he really wrong?
General Joulwan. Well, I think it is an overreaction. I
don't want to belabor the Committee, Mr. Chairman, but I have
spent a lot of time with the Russians trying to get through
this suspicion and fear they have of NATO. And it truly is
something that has been developed over 45 or 50 years or maybe
even longer, and we have got to figure out a way to have this
dialogue And the best thing going for us is what we are doing
with the military--the military cooperation.
We have got to build on that. And if it takes some
initiatives that we are seeing in Bosnia. If we could work this
three-star general I have in Mons, Belgium, trying to work
together, seminars, and at the point, if we ever get to that
point, if we could work out all the details, some way to train
together, I think that, to me, is the way we need to go. But we
are having a heck of a time getting through this suspicion and
fear. And so we need to find ways to do that.
The reaction by this officer at SHAPE, I think, was an
overreaction. I think if you talk to most of the people there,
they are very pleased with the contingent of Russian officers.
I would like to see, for example, NATO send a similar
delegation to Moscow to work in their general staff to start to
build this relationship.
We know how to fight. If you want to come back, I know how
to do that. But what we have to be able to do--how can we
prevent conflict? And that is not a weak way, that is not a
weak response. We have a hundred thousand white crosses that I
am responsible for in 21 cemeteries in Europe that we have
allowed in this century, two World Wars to develop, and I am
trying to figure out how to prevent another one. And the way
you do that is to outreach and try to have some dialogue from a
position of strength. And from our relationship and the United
States' relationship, we have spent 45 years developing this
great thing called NATO. Now is the time--the mission
continues. It doesn't end with the collapse of a Berlin Wall,
and Russia is the key.
If we could somehow reach out to Russia and include them in
what we are doing, not giving them a veto, not running scared
if they say this country or that country can't come in, but
work with them in a way to bring about what I think is going to
be required, that is just trust and confidence, and that may
mean a NATO-Russian brigade at some point, but we are not there
now.
Mr. Young. General, I want to ask you to clarify something.
Mr. Obey asked you two questions and you answered, no, and I
wanted to make sure which question you were answering, no, to.
I think it was the question about whether Secretary Albright
had consulted with you or had anyone consulted with you before
she made the proposal. And you answered, no. Was it, no to that
question?
General Joulwan. On the specific of the NATO-Russian
brigade. we had been talking about how to work together with
their military, but in terms of a NATO-Russian brigade, no.
Mr. Young. Okay. Mr. Lewis.
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING
Mr. Lewis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, General. Blessed are the peacemakers. You know,
often we forget that that is very much what you are about and
you articulated that, I think, very well.
In your statement, you make reference to the International
Military Education and Training, IMET. Often times we hear, get
distorted in the way we review programs like that, I remember
early in my own career here, much of our debate flowed around
Central America and Latin America and IMET kind of got a
negative cast here in the mind's eye of many, and yet the point
that you are making about confidence among Russian military
people and that longstanding lack of confidence in one another,
suspicion of one another, it would seem to me that programs
like IMET affecting those other countries in Eastern Europe,
those that were part of the Soviet Union, allows us, perhaps,
avenues for impact that could be very important. Those
exchanges, it seems to me, should be raised in priority. Could
you just elaborate a bit on that?
General Joulwan. Absolutely, Congressman. In fact, I will
give you a very good example General Vegh, is the Hungarian
Chief of Defense. In one year he has totally transformed the
Hungarian military under his leadership. He is a graduate, as I
said, of the Army War College in Carlisle. He has come to see
me on several occasions. He has appointed an Air Force fellow
from Maxwell, a graduate of Maxwell. He has completely
revolutionized that country's military at a critical time in
their development, and that is all through IMET.
We see this throughout most of these countries of Eastern
and Central Europe. It is a way to instill not just technical
training, but ideals and values that are going to be very
important, I think, for the future. This is a different culture
that they have been under for so many years, and the way you
change it is by using things, initiatives, like IMET. High
payoff, low cost.
EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL
Mr. Lewis. Technically IMET doesn't fall under the
jurisdiction of this subcommittee, but the overlap is obvious.
You mentioned that 25 percent, we have 25 percent of the
forces in Bosnia, yet we have a supplemental up here that
involves $2.5 billion. It is very clear that money is fungible
and that puts pressure on all of the rest of the services. As
we go about responding to the President's request, we are
shrinking the overall budget. Any comment? Ninety percent of
the cost is ours over there anyway, isn't it? Maybe not.
General Joulwan. Well, I would say that what I see of the
multinational force, that we have leveraged it. Many of these
countries are participating at great cost to them, both in
manpower and in dollars or whatever their currency is. This is
a great step forward, and I feel very privileged to be the
overall operational commander, not just for U.S. forces, but
for this multinational force who have put their trust in us
here that we are going to do it right. And they are as
concerned about their young men and women as we are, and they
have put their people and their treasure into this in
comparative numbers given some of these small nations.
It is a very clear statement, I think, that they really
want this to be solved. So I think it could add up to dollar
amounts. I don't think it is 90 percent of the cost. I think it
is much less than that, but the comparative cost by some of
these nations--in fact, I figured it out for Norway. For their
initial contribution, we would have to have over 150,000, in
the comparative sense, given their population.
So these nations have contributed, and that includes,
Russia, the Ukraine, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and
Austria also Finland, Sweden, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, all
have joined us in this endeavor.
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE
Mr. Lewis. In the meantime, we do have real money pressures
here, the request to reduce the budget, et cetera. So we just
need to put all of that in perspective and that is part of what
this exchange is about.
Operationally, I just have a minor problem. Some on the
Committee would suggest that I have heard of UAVs before. But
in Bosnia, there really has been a demonstration project of the
potential of the future there.
For example, we were able through Predator to assess the
bomb damage that took place there. We knew, for example, that
the Serb tanks weren't being withdrawn, et cetera, so in many
occasions it has been very, very valuable. But it was mentioned
that weather is a problem and the wet wings need, in terms of
technological development, is very real.
Currently, you may or may not be sensitive to this, but
currently, the Air Force, who is managing the program, is not
volunteering Predator as often as we used to get its services
and specifically they are resisting testing wet wings in the
Bosnia theater. That frankly, I think, would decelerate how
quickly we can put that technology into place and I would urge
you to focus on that if you haven't had a chance to.
General Joulwan. I will.
Mr. Lewis. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Young. Mr. Skeen.
TERRORISM THREAT
Mr. Skeen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, I want to congratulate you and express my
appreciation for the service that you have given this country
and the intelligence that you have used in trying to come up
with something in a meaningful solution to some of the
worldwide problems. That is a heavy load and I am sure that
your shoulders are going to snap back up in place after you get
that load off of it after a while. I hope that you enjoy your
retirement and whoever your area commander is, they will be
glad to have you there.
I wanted to ask you, one of the major concerns that we have
is the protection of our troops against foreign terrorist
attacks in that theater of operations. What is going on to
assure that we don't have any losses like we did in Saudi?
General Joulwan. We are working that very hard,
Congressman. We are very much involved in on-site inspections.
I have an oversight group that meets at my headquarters in
EUCOM. They watch us very closely, every deployment that we
make.
We are using technology, as was mentioned, to the best of
our ability as well. We have something called a--for want of a
better term--a ``blue dart message.'' I have a Joint Analysis
Center in Molesworth and we have a cell in there that is
concentrated on intelligence and terrorist intelligence that
relates to the troops. And what I found in the past in other
areas that we have been involved in over the past 30 years,
that somehow an analyst gets this good report, but the troops
that need it don't get it in time. So I time them now. They
have minutes to get it down there to the troops and not analyze
it to death. And we run drills on this.
Now, I hate to be that positive because you never know, if
terrorists are determined they really have the advantage. But
we are doing everything we can to try to take that advantage
away from them.
Mr. Skeen. Very typical situation, and I understand that.
That is why I am particularly interested in the response
because it is a huge problem to try to close up all the holes
in the sieve.
General Joulwan. But to me, it is a discipline problem,
mental awareness. That is why we go through this training
program when we go into Bosnia. We have a deployment today
taking forces into Liberia. We put a joint task force together.
They are taking Africans in to control the situation, rather
than Americans. And we went through a force protection drill.
Before they deployed, that risk assessment was done. They
deployed with proper protection and intelligence and so we go
through this for every deployment.
Now, you can't reduce the risk to zero, but you can reduce
the risk and it is the leadership, it is the discipline of the
soldier, it is using technology, and it is getting the mission
right, all of that before you deploy.
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE
Mr. Skeen. I would like to put in a word for the UAVs as
well. Mr. Lewis here on the left, and I have a co-
responsibility. They are producing them in his district, but
they are testing them in ours in a Desert Sands exercise. It
has been phenomenal. I watched the utilization and the
operation, and it is just amazing.
General Joulwan. The key is we are using them now. I used
to command the first of the 26th Infantry many, many, years
ago. I went into their tactical operations center with
Secretary Perry in November. They are set up in the Posavina
corridor in the zone of separation, smack dab in the middle of
it, one operations center better than anything I could ever do.
And one thing that they have the ability to do is to
request and get information at the battalion level. So when he
has a patrol going out, he has a way to either cover it or give
it intelligence. They have a little intelligence fusion center
there. And the UAV gives it a capability that we never had
before.
Now, we have some product improvement as we go along and we
have got to do that. The Airborne RECCE LOW is another platform
that I helped develop when I was in Panama. This you could put
non-U.S. on board. I have tried to take NOFORN away; and
encourage foreign release of certain intelligence.
If we are going to work with these people that contribute
to troops, we have got to figure out a way to share
intelligence. And so I am trying to get a system that we could
put on board. Now, you could put foreigners on board these
planes or allies and they could actually see a digital readout
when they are flying over the zone of separation. Where you
have a problem, you could put three of the warring factions on
there.
So we need systems that give me that capability to dominate
the intelligence and the information that is every bit as
important as having tanks and Bradleys and ships and all of
that on the field. And we are getting much better now. We have
learned a heck of a lot in Bosnia, and I really appreciate the
contribution the UAV is making.
Mr. Young. Mr. Skeen, thank you very much.
Mr. Dicks.
MISSILE DEFENSE
Mr. Dicks. General, I want to compliment you on the great
job you have done. I was interested in your statement today.
One of the things I remember is Congressman Murtha and members
of this Committee who went out to the Gulf War and the
vulnerability that we felt to theater missiles, to the SCUDS,
and you started to think that if the Iraqis possessed accurate
SCUDS with either chemical or biological weapons, nuclear
weapons, they could have done incredible destruction to us.
One, we couldn't target the launch. We couldn't find them.
They used very sophisticated denial and deception techniques,
and number two, we didn't have an adequate system to defend our
troops in the field.
Now, as I read your statement, you say the active defense
portion of this theater missile defense framework must be
capable of providing precision engagement and full dimensional
protection against weapons of mass destruction in support of
out-of-area operations, as well as wide area defense to protect
U.S. and allied interests. Our current capabilities are not
adequate to meet the challenges of the future, particularly in
our southern region along the Mediterranean and in the Middle
East.
Tell me what you think we need to do that we are not doing
and give me your assessment here.
General Joulwan. We need a system of systems, Congressman.
We need to be able to not just look at what I call the boost
phase, the mid-course and terminal phase of an incoming
missile. All of that is important. We have got to also look at
the shooter.
I would like to have systems that give us intelligence of
when we have a missile system coming in, some event or some
other intelligence means and then a means to go after the
shooter and refires before they can come back to us. That's the
first one.
The other thing, the Medium Extended Air Defense System
MEADS, that we have, are not allied. Italy and Germany have
joined us in this endeavor. That is very positive. They are
helping us in the developmental costs and the research and the
procurement of this system. Excellent. We need to do the same
thing in theater missile defense.
Mr. Dicks. This would deploy with our moving forces, right?
General Joulwan. Yes.
Mr. Dicks. And give air defense to the brigade or the
division?
General Joulwan. Yes, exactly.
Mr. Dicks. General Peay tells me over and over again that
this is one thing that he worries about that we are moving to
the right and we are not as aggressive about this as we ought
to be.
General Joulwan. I fought for MEADS. I think it is okay
now. From what I understand, it is on track. Theater high
Altitude Air defense, THAAD, is another piece of that, but you
have to look at the whole system of systems for not only the
terminal and not only the mid-course and the boost, but also
for getting the missile before they shoot. Therefore, the
command and control of this system is very important; that you
have a command and control system that can move quickly,
because, as you know, this can happen within minutes and you
need a command and control system that is responsive. I am
working on something in Ramstein called an Air Operations
Center. I have been working theater missile defense now since
1985.
Mr. Dicks. Right.
General Joulwan. So what we are trying to answer is, how do
you command and control it? And what we are trying to do in the
southern region of NATO that you mentioned--and let me be very
clear, Libya is part of the problem, because with their reach,
they could reach much of NATO in time.
Iraq, when we put the time lines in it, if technology
continues to develop, can reach much of NATO.
Therefore, NATO is looking at theater missile defense as an
alliance system, and I would encourage that.
So there are things that are being developed that are
beyond just the missile, that include command and control that
are every bit as essential to the conduct of an operation as
the missile itself.
Mr. Dicks. All right. Let me just--not to bore my
colleagues, but let me just give you another idea that I have
had on this thing.
When you look back at the Gulf War, one of the true assets
we had was the F-117, stealth aircraft, and if you could have
stealth aircraft with Link 16, the ------?
General Joulwan. That is right.
Mr. Dicks. My view of this is that you can do this with F-
117s and eventually, when we get the weapons on in the block 30
upgrade on the B-2, you have another capability to use this
bomber to come in and attack these targets, to go after the
surface-to-air missiles, say, with Joint Standoff Weapon JSOW,
go after SCUDs with sensor-fused weapon or these 2,000 pound
bombs, to go after relocatables, but it seems to me that that
gives you the offensive side of it. But you still need to
develop this umbrella system, this theater missile defense
system so you can actually defend the fields and defend the
forces. And if you could put those two systems together you
would then be able to have a very dynamic ability to, one,
protect the force, but also attack these targets.
General Joulwan. Exactly right. That is what we are trying
to develop. That is why I called it a system of systems. The
problem is we have talked about an offensive and then another
group has talked about a defense. You have to get them
together.
Mr. Dicks. You have to do both.
General Joulwan. That is what we have done. I have been
trying this since 1985 and we are close. But the
communications, the command-and-control piece, is equally
difficult, because you are talking about offensive and defense,
and you are trying to put them both together. And we now are
experimenting with that at Ramstein AB today.
JSTARS AIRCRAFT
Mr. Dicks. How about JSTARS, how has JSTARS been
performing?
General Joulwan. JSTARS, we just had a deployment in
November and December. JSTARS demonstrated its worth, in my
opinion, in Bosnia. It has put the zone of separation on its
maps and gave us great information back. And it has been used
as a cueing platform that I talked about, and it goes to your
question of theater missile defense.
The other thing I would put into the equation is the UAV.
If you have a region or an area, and you could task a UAV to go
to that area, it could find the target for you and you can cue
shooters in to be able to take it out.
We are on the verge of doing that now out of this Combined
Air Operations Center and we have learned a great deal about
how to put these systems together.
Mr. Dicks. If you would give me one second.
Mr. Young. One more second.
JOINT INTELLIGENCE CENTER
Mr. Dicks. One more comment.
I went to Vicenza to the Joint Intelligence Center, and I
must tell you I thought that was an incredibly successful
operation. And the ability to use all of our national systems,
to use our theater systems, aircraft, UAVs, the whole thing and
fuse it right into one area and then be able to directly
communicate with the battlefield commanding officers in Bosnia,
to me, is another incredible step forward.
What I am asking you, is are we able to do these joint
centers more than just on an ad hoc basis, but to make this
kind of part of each of our CINCs and be able to move it out
there and replicate this in the future?
General Joulwan. I think so, Congressman. We have worked
very hard on it, and I think it has applicability elsewhere in
other theaters as well.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Hobson.
RUSSIAN TROOPS IN BOSNIA
Mr. Hobson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, I think you have done an absolutely amazing job,
much better than most of us expected the success would be in
the theater, especially in Bosnia. I have a couple of questions
about that.
I differ somewhat with Mr. Obey about approaching the
Russians and those countries. I think it is very positive. I
happened to try to go to Latvia to visit one of my constituents
who is there, very active in defense matters--a former U.S. Air
Force Colonel.
A couple of things about Bosnia I would like to ask, and I
will ask them and then you can answer what you want.
I am a little concerned about the morale of the troops in
Taszar and I don't know how many are still there. There were
like 4,500 when I was there. They were all worried about coming
home, because they don't have anything to do until everybody
comes home. Somebody told us they were worried about the water
in the bottle, but it didn't taste that bad to me. That is one
question.
I don't know who the Russian general is now, but General
Nash and the Russian general that I saw there had a great
relationship, and I thought it was wonderful. I think it should
be promoted any way you can, because the understanding of those
people transcends back into the government later on. This guy
was an air trooper. He told me he jumped 30 times a year. I
don't know how he did, but they had a great camaraderie there.
I don't know how it is going with the new guy, but I think that
should be encouraged.
The other thing that concerned me somewhat, when I was
there--I have been there twice--is the nongovernment aid in
Srpska by the outside groups. There was hesitancy by the
other--they were all eager in the Muslim area and Croatian
area, they would go in there and work, but when you got over in
the Srpska area, there was a hesitancy by some of the outside
groups to go in there, maybe for security reasons or a lot of
other reasons. And they weren't received as well, but there was
some tension about that. Has that changed any?
General Joulwan. Let me answer that last question first. It
is difficult because Srpska will not recognize the national
governments, the national institutions that have been voted in
last September, in many respects.
For example, there is some good news on telephone lines. I
forget the number. I think it is like 60 to 70 percent now have
some telephone system. But we can't get it across the Inter-
Entity Boundary Line, IEBL, because Srpska will not agree. We
are trying to open up four airports, to get funds in there to
try to open up airports.
Srpska will not agree to something--similar to our Federal
Aviation Commission? They will not agree to have one that
represents the nation. So it has been very difficult.
I would agree with you that we should try to do more with
Srpska. They need to cooperate with us, and I have said that to
Krajisnik and Madam Plavsic that we need to get some
cooperation from you to get the needed aid that you should
have, and we are working that very hard.
On the Russian relationship between Nash and General
Lenzhov, you are right, that is an excellent relationship, and
we are building on it. The new team in there now of General
Meigs and his Russian counterpart. That is also working well.
The new Russian Commander came in and in 24 hours was in a
situation where he had to call for fire, or just about call for
fire, because his troops were in danger and American troops
were going in to help him, and he passed the test very well. I
visited the Russian forces, walked their perimeter, crawled
into some of their holes that they dug and I must tell you that
I asked the sort of questions that I ask of troops. And they
are very well-trained.
Now, I know what we are hearing about Russian forces and
demoralization of them, and they are not well-trained. But this
group that they are sending there is extremely well-trained, so
I think we need to build on that.
On the morale of our own troops, I must say I also ask a
lot of questions and am sure we have got some shortages
somewhere. But in the main, I have found the morale to be very
high. They are doing a tough mission.
Mr. Hobson. I think that is true inside the perimeter of
Bosnia. They are very motivated, but you have got supply-type
troops sitting around there. They were confined to the base.
They could only take so many off.
General Joulwan. You can blame that on me. I am the guy. I
am the guy that confined them to the base, and they are going
to be very deliberate in what we do. And I am the guy.
But I can tell you that I have called them the best support
troops in the world, and they are. They have done magic in
Bosnia and in Hungary and they have established a base there
that is, again, a model for future involvement of how do we
protect the force and how can I respond quickly if something
goes sour on us?
And I assure you I will respond quickly if something goes
sour, but I need to have the assets to do it, and we have got
them there in Hungary. So I will look into some of their
problems. But in my view the medical unit there is superb.
Mr. Hobson. Everything is fine. It is just that, you know,
they are sitting around. They are the guys who were the first
ones there. They are the last ones out. Like any troops
overseas they want to know when they are coming home because
they don't have the same heightened tension factor that the
troops inside the theater do. It is a tough job. I am not
criticizing.
General Joulwan. It is.
Mr. Hobson. I am just saying it is a tough job. There was a
new general there. I think he was going to try to get after
that situation. But that is just a potential problem. You have
got a lot of potential problems.
General Joulwan. But if you could just visit them, when you
all go there, and I have seen all of you, particularly
Congressman Murtha, they talk to those troops, and just a word
of appreciation from you, I mean, it is worth volumes of what I
could do.
So your interest in those sort of troops, not just in
Bosnia but the support troops, is very much appreciated by me
and I know by the troops.
Mr. Hobson. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Young. Mr. Hefner.
EFFECT OF U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN BOSNIA
Mr. Hefner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, I don't know if this is an appropriate question or
not. On a scale of 1 to 10, how successful would you rate the
Bosnian operation and mission at this point?
General Joulwan. On the military side, I will probably give
us an 8 or 9. On the civilian side, we have work to do. And I
have tried to get a sense of urgency in what needs to be done.
And it is coming, but it is coming very slow.
I would say on the civilian side we are probably down in
the 4 and 5 category, but we need to get a sense of urgency and
organization on that side. We are well organized, and they are
not.
Mr. Hefner. On the other side, you are talking about
investment and rebuilding the infrastructure and things of this
nature?
General Joulwan. It is in reconstruction. It is in the
organization of Security Corporation in Europe, OSCE, which is
responsible for the elections and arms control. It is the
United Nations High Committee for Refugees, UNHCR, for the High
Commission of Refugees. It is the World Bank and what they need
to do in reconstruction. It is the Red Cross and what they have
to do. All of these agencies.
And what I am trying to do behind the scenes is organize to
meet the mission. Because as I said in my statement, we can do
everything right. We can be a 10 on the military side and the
mission in Bosnia will not be successful.
Mr. Hefner. Well, we had a hearing yesterday and it pretty
much hinged on as long as you have got a military presence
there, but if you don't make jobs and repair the country, then
it won't be a lasting peace. Is that a fair statement?
General Joulwan. That is very fair. I might give you some
progress, though. I mean, I couldn't say this last year, but 90
percent of the people now in Bosnia-Herzegovina have potable
water. That is very important. Sixty percent have some degree
of electricity. Two years ago it was 10 percent. And I
mentioned the number now that can make a telephone call. Those
are things we take for granted but in that country, this is a
great improvement. So it is coming, but it is coming awfully
slow.
The key issue in 1997 would be the return of refugees to
their homes, and this will be the important step to say if it
is going to be a multiethnic society, we have to get on with
resettlement and return of refugees to their homes, and there
are a lot of refugees out there.
QUALITY OF LIFE
Mr. Hefner. Over the years on Military Construction, which
I chaired for quite a few years, we had a desire to do more on
the quality of life. We had some young men here at a hearing
that had been in Haiti, some had been in Bosnia, and it was
remarkable to hear them talk about some of the things that had
to do with individuals, they were so proud of the mission that
they were doing, which is a little bit unusual. And they had
mentioned some programs that they were involved in. And it goes
to what Mr. Hobson was talking about, about the morale.
How many Americans have we lost in the Bosnian operation?
General Joulwan. We have lost, I believe it is 1 to a mine,
that was early on. It was a mistake, to be very clear. He was
doing what he shouldn't have been doing. And I believe we lost
one in a traffic accident.
Mr. Hefner. That is remarkable. That is astounding.
General Joulwan. I get nervous every time I mention the low
number of casualties, because it is something we work very
hard, but it is sort of ``good news, bad news,'' Congressman.
Because we have now created a condition that even taking 10
casualties, would be a disaster that would require great
explanation by me, and I am trying to avoid it as much as I
can. But we have taken very few. But that is because we have
clarity of mission, robust rules of engagement, unity of
command and we have trained to mission, and all of those
ingredients are important to get the results that we have had.
Mr. Murtha. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Hefner. Yes.
Mr. Murtha A couple of things that you get blamed for but
it is so imporant, is not drinking, you don't allow them to
drink and you don't allow them to fraternize with the
civilians. Both of them would be volatile situation, and I know
you get blamed and criticized for it, but that has been a key,
an important part of your success.
General Joulwan. We have to learn all of that. I didn't let
them do it when they went to Rwanda or anywhere else. You have
to have discipline of the force. And this is difficult, and it
may have impact on morale. It may be due to some other things,
but I am there to bring them home.
Mr. Dicks. Will the gentleman yield?
ROLE OF GUARD AND RESERVE IN BOSNIA
Mr. Hefner. Let me have one more question here. You said
that the Guard and Reserve were very important in this Bosnian
situation.
General Joulwan. Yes.
Mr. Hefner. That they are essential to the total force.
Could you just give us some examples of what they do and are
there any functions that they do totally, that the Guard and
Reserves do totally there? Be specific, if you would, sir.
General Joulwan. Let me just give you the most important
function that they do totally is in the civil affairs area.
This group is so essential that I am going to put them in for a
special award because they have been the ones that have been
the glue--the link between the military and the civilian
agencies. They have left their businesses. They are lawyers,
economists, teachers, police chiefs, and they come to Bosnia
for 179 days.
For example, I have a criminologist and a chief of police
working with the International Police Task Force. They are the
glue that holds it together.
But, gentlemen, I am very concerned about their jobs, to be
very honest with you. These people have made deployments, many
of them to Saudi Arabia, Haiti and now into Bosnia, so they are
doing wonderful work. That is exclusively a Reserve function
right now, and we couldn't do it without them.
Mr. Hefner. Well, I think that is good to hear you say that
because we are going to be having hearings, some meetings about
their budgets which up to this point haven't been satisfactory
with some of us, but hopefully we can get it on the right
track.
I will yield to the gentleman.
Mr. Young. The gentleman's time has expired.
I would like to recognize Mr. Bonilla.
BOSNIA RECONSTRUCTION
Mr. Bonilla. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, just to follow up briefly on something Mr. Hefner
asked. Theoretically, if we ever got the civilian effort in
Bosnia up to 8 or 9 points on the 10-point scale, and it worked
ideally for a short period of time, do you think that would
last?
General Joulwan. I think so. I think because what has to
happen here is that Bosnia-Herzegovina is going to be a long-
term solution. We need a long-term program here, not a military
program, not military troops in there forever, but you need
civilian agencies that are going to be involved in this
reconstruction and reconciliation for years to come.
So the foundation you lay now will determine the future in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. So what you want to do, while you have the
military there, is get the foundation laid, get the roots
implanted that you can build on. That is what we are trying to
do now.
If we can do that--I'll just tell you a quick story. I was
in Brcko in February, a couple of weeks ago, and if you
understand the zone of separation, it is about 4 kilometers
wide and then there is an Inter-Entity Boundary Line--IEBL in
the middle of it. I mean, it was like being back in a war zone
because there are damaged buildings all around in this zone of
separation.
But on the Serb side of this IEBL, there is a mosque being
repaired by about a dozen Muslims and they were going to have a
service in there and they were getting electricity from Brcko,
from the Serb side. So there are some steps that are being
taken.
If we can just encourage that reconciliation to take place,
if we can allow electricity and water and telephones, the basic
necessities, if we can have a return of refugees, a modest
beginning, I think that will set the stage for long-term
development. You don't need 30,000 troops in order to do that.
We have 16 more months. I think we should be trying to
figure out what we can do in the next 16 months to get the
civilian agencies established. Once jobs start working, once
you have factories opening, I think there will be a momentum
for peace, not to go back to war.
NATO FORCES
Mr. Bonilla. That is encouraging because, frankly, I have
always had doubts whether there can be long-term peace there,
but what you are saying means a lot.
Let me turn now to NATO, General.
In looking at what lies ahead for NATO, and turning from a
pure defensive alliance to a collective security organization.
Do you think that is a good evolution, in your view? Isn't it a
switch from having our folks there as warriors versus police?
General Joulwan. I don't see them as police. We are, I
think, adapting and adjusting in a way to say how do we engage
in peacetime?
I will tell you the work I am doing with the Russians is
not as a police force. We are interacting with them to build
this common procedure and common doctrine, and trust and
confidence, as we are with 27 other nations. We have conducted
130 exercises last year, not police exercises.
How do we get common standards? The problem that United
Nations Protection Forces, UNPROFOR made, they put 30 some
nations on the ground, but they couldn't talk to one another.
They couldn't communicate. They had no common interoperability.
What we are doing, engaging now--it is an engagement
strategy to develop common standards and procedures so 75
percent of the force in Bosnia is other than U.S. and one-third
of the force is other than NATO. And it isn't just saying we
have one-third of the force other than NATO, but are they
trained to the right standards and procedures? Can we operate
together? Can some day we fight together?
So this is not a police function. This is an engagement
strategy that I think is every bit in our interest to do. And
what it does do, it creates trust and confidence, and when a
blip comes along the horizon in one of these countries like
Bulgaria, the military stays out of it and they allow the
transition to democracy to take place. That is every bit in our
interest.
I don't want to call it police actions and I don't want to
call it some sort of nation-building. We are involved in a
strategy that, I think, comes about because of our 48 years of
involvement in NATO. Now we have to go the next step, which is
how do we prevent conflict from occurring again?
Mr. Bonilla. That is encouraging as well, because I would
be very concerned if our mission were evolving into police or
nation-building. I don't think that is the way we ought to go.
If you don't see it that way then----
FULL SPECTRUM FORCE
General Joulwan. If you want my honest opinion for the
future, we need to have what I call a full-spectrum force. And
I will be very candid with this Committee, that I don't think
you can just wait for the big one to occur. You can't sit back
and wait for the war to start. You have to say how can we
influence events to prevent the big one? How can we engage in
peacetime to prevent the train wreck? And that is what I think
we should be about.
Now, that takes a certain form of military involvement, but
also political and economic and diplomacy. It also requires a
military that can engage in a way to bring about the end that
we want. And that is the situation we are in now.
Whether we can carry that off or not, I am not sure. But it
takes a force structure and a command structure and an
educational system in this country. That's what we are finding.
That is the world as it is, not as we hope it is going to be,
and we have to find a way to engage. It was theory when I first
spoke to this Committee 3 years ago, but it is now reality, and
it is working and we have to recognize that.
Mr. Bonilla. Time for another question, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Young. One more question.
MEDIUM EXTENDED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM (MEADS)
Mr. Bonilla. Just a question on the MEADS program in
closing here. You know I represent Fort Bliss and have a deep
interest in all air defense systems, and my question is if you
could briefly comment on the importance of the systems for
protecting our troops and on the impact U.S. withdrawal from
this program would have on our German and Italian allies?
General Joulwan. Let me answer it very quickly. That is
very important for the protection of our force, and it would be
very disappointing to our Italian and German allies if we would
withdraw from this program. They have signed up with us. They
are developing it with us, and I think this is the way to go. I
am trying to also do the same for Joint STARS, by the way, to
get NATO involved in these systems, get allies involved, as we
are doing with AWACS and so we are not trying to do it alone.
Mr. Bonilla. General, you are a very impressive person, and
I wish you also the very best in your retirement.
General Joulwan. Thank you very much.
Mr. Young. Mr. Nethercutt.
COMPUTER SECURITY
Mr. Nethercutt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I join the rest of the Committee, General, in wishing you
well and thanking you for your service to the country. It is
indeed, admirable and remarkable and we thank you very much.
We have had testimony before this subcommittee this year
and we have seen GAO reports with respect to the security of
DoD computer systems, and the number of attempted unauthorized
intrusions into those computer systems. Have you experienced
this in Europe? To what extent do you think it is a serious
concern for our country, and are we doing enough to prevent it?
My worst fear, I am sure yours is also, is that somebody
gets in, fools with our system, shuts down one aspect or
another, and then we are in trouble.
General Joulwan. It is a concern to us. We have looked at
it in Europe. It has not, at least to my knowledge, yet become
a serious problem in Europe. But as we go more and more to
computers in what we are doing, it will continue to be of great
concern to commanders. And we are very concerned about the
security of not only computer systems, but all of our
intelligence systems as well that deal with satellite feeds, et
cetera. So we are looking at that very closely. But right now,
I don't see it as a problem, not in my theater of operation.
FULL SPECTRUM FORCE
Mr. Nethercutt. As I look at the map and listen to you talk
about a full-spectrum force, you know, Africa looms largely.
General Joulwan. Yes.
Mr. Nethercutt. My memory is it was Secretary Christopher
who talked about a U.S.-funded African peace force that would
be undertaken by African forces.
Do you see that as a possibility as we look to this full-
spectrum force that you speak of in your testimony?
General Joulwan. Africa will be an economy of force,
theater for the U.S. It will not be an area that we are going
to be involved with a lot of resources or forces, but Africa
will pose continuing problems that should be solved by Africa.
How we can help, I think, is in what is called the African
Crisis Response Force, which we have been talking about for
some time. We have worked up a strategy in EUCOM to implement
that, so we would be involved not in the actual deployment of
the U.S. forces, but we would do so along with our allies. That
is the great worth of NATO. We can leverage our allies here to
help us, and we are trying to do that now, and that process is
under way.
I really don't have all the results back yet, but it is
looking promising. And the fact that what we are doing now,
airlifting some African forces into Liberia to try to stabilize
that region, is a case in point that I think--of what are some
of the possibilities of how we can assist, what those
possibilities could be.
Mr. Nethercutt. Well, as you look at our force in Europe
and under your command, it has dwindled, it has been reduced.
It seems to me it only makes sense to try to think about
engaging these forces of other countries to take care of
themselves----
General Joulwan. Yes.
Mr. Nethercutt. Rather than have us have to police it.
But I thank you for your service, and I wish you the very
best.
General Joulwan. Thank you very much.
Mr. Nethercutt. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Visclosky.
MINE CLEARING
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, in response to an earlier question by Mr. McDade,
you had mentioned that you didn't think as much progress was
being made in the last 6 months on mines and mine removal. Any
particular reason?
General Joulwan. First of all, the warring factions stopped
doing what we wanted them to do, which was remove them. They
know where they have; they are the maps, et cetera. So we had a
drop-off in there. That is why we put a very heavy hand to say
no training unless you go out and start clearing mines. And
although we had some problems, as the weather gets better, that
they will start doing that.
The other is just the enormity of these minefields, and
some of them are not marked and it is going to take a concerted
effort.
This Mine Awareness Center that we talk about is a step in
the right direction. They are at least in the business now of
not only cataloging where everything is but trying to get
nongovernmental organizations, contract people, to come in, to
try to clear some of these areas that are mined. But it is
going to be years before we solve that problem.
RUSSIAN MILITARY FORCES
Mr. Visclosky. You mentioned that the Russian troops that
you have come into contact with in Bosnia were very well-
trained, highly motivated.
General Joulwan. Yes.
Mr. Visclosky. What about the Russian military in general?
And where are they spending their money? What are their
priority programs?
General Joulwan. Well, it is a sadder story than that one.
I am concerned about the deterioration of the Russian military
because it creates instability and instability creates problems
of its own. And we--you know, though it may, from a threat-
based standpoint, instability creates uncertainty.
My concern is also with their conventional forces on the
ground. They are not paying the troops. Some of their equipment
is not being maintained. Their trucks and their tanks.
Mr. Visclosky. They are not getting paid in some cases?
General Joulwan. They are not getting paid, many, many of
the forces are not getting paid. I have checked on the ones in
Bosnia and they are getting paid a little bit better or more
often, but they also have some problems.
So we have to get through this period.
When I deal with militaries of other nations, you have to
treat them with respect. When they lose their respect, they
become dangerous, and I am concerned about the respect now of
the Russian forces. That is why I am trying to reach out with
this liaison officer I have, with the brigade that we have from
Russia, to build on that and give them their respect back. And
the other area that is of concern to me is in the strategic
nuclear area.
There are still 20,000-plus nuclear warheads now in Russia.
They have taken them out of the Ukraine and put them all in
Russia. So the nuclear warheads are now being maintained by one
nation: Russia.
That is the good news. The other challenge is if there is
instability within Russia: that causes me concern.
So it is a very dangerous situation that we are facing.
Mr. Visclosky. What programs are they placing a priority
on?
General Joulwan. I think primarily they are still
maintaining their strategic nuclear forces and that is of great
concern to us.
Mr. Visclosky. General, thank you very much.
Good luck.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
BOSNIA EXIT STRATEGY
Mr. Young. General, you have done just an outstanding job
in responding to these penetrating questions that the Members
have asked. Your answers have been very thought-provoking, but
we haven't really explored another issue, and that is the exit
strategy for departing in June of 1998. Is there a plan?
Are we just going to pack everybody up on a given day and
move them out? Or are we going to phase them out gradually?
What is the plan for exiting?
General Joulwan. I addressed that in the operations plan
that I wrote, and there are some general conditions that we
would like to see. They included, for example--at the top of
the list no Spring offensive. And I am working this very hard.
The cycle over the years is this when they come out of the
Winter and you have a Spring offensive; so our objective is no
Spring offensive and no hostilities. We have done that now.
Last year, and so far this year, that is on track.
As we go around to 18 months and in the Spring of 1998, I
would hope that would also be a condition that would exist.
The second has to deal with these civilian organizations
that I talk about. I would hope that they would be much more
established and up and operating as we get closer to June of
1998.
The third condition is that we would have elections,
municipal elections, that would be held hopefully this year,
and that those institutions, the national level, which were
held in September, the state level or entity level, which were
held in September and now this year, the municipal elections,
that these political institutions would be in place and
starting to work.
Howver, having said that, even if they are not there, my
instructions are to withdraw the force. And so I have to give
6-month reviews to the North Atlantic Council. The first one is
in June of this year, and I must report on the progress of
where we stand, both in my estimation on the military side, as
well as where we are in working with the civilian agencies.
Much of that will determine the speed of--or the rate of
withdrawal.
But in the end, my instructions are now that the NATO-led
force will be withdrawn by June of 1998, regardless of those
conditions that I talked about for an end date.
Mr. Young. I think one reason that we have this question
about that date is we were given several different dates when
U.S. forces would be out. And I remember Mr. Murtha was told
emphatically that we would be out on December 20th of 1996, and
he questioned that, and we questioned that. And he kept telling
us, well, they told me December 20th, 1996, but here it is 1997
and we are talking about a 1998 withdrawal.
We understand that these things are not specific and you
can't be too certain when you are dealing with a situation as
volatile as this Bosnian operation has been, but how do you
feel in your own mind that June of 1998 is a date we can
accomplish?
General Joulwan. I think if we really put the pressure and
the organizational skill into the civilian organization, that
much can be accomplished. I am not sure you need 30,000 NATO-
led forces. Now, perhaps some other organization or some other
group is going to be needed there.
I mean, it is not as if everything is going to go away. I
think some other organization. But a NATO-led force I am not
sure you need that after June of 1998, and those are my
instructions.
I am more interested in what I can do in the next 16 months
to create the condition so we won't have a force there. That is
why I have been so hard of the other agencies to get their act
together, to get arms control moving, to get the
reconstruction, the rehabilitation, the resettlement, the
elections, all of those things moving.
If we can do all of those--I don't think you need 30,000
NATO-led forces there.
Mr. Young. General, some of our allies have made the point
that when the U.S. leaves, they are leaving. When we leave in
June of 1998, if our allies leave, what kind of a force or--
outside of your civilian lay force, what is there to try to
keep it all together?
General Joulwan. Well, there are 30-some nations there. I
think all of that has to be worked out with the international
community. The U.N. perhaps needs to get involved. There are
other organizations. OSCE is another organization. But do you
need the sort of NATO-led force is what I am talking about,
which is where the U.S. is involved, in there, forever?
I have said that I don't think we should have an open-ended
commitment in Bosnia, and I think that what we need to do is
say how do we create the conditions now so that in June of
1998, that another organization can take over from us? And that
is what I am advocating.
If you can't get the act together in 2.5 years, which is
what we are talking about, then I am not sure that the act can
be gotten together in 10 years.
Mr. Young. General, you are very persuasive, and I am
wondering if you have made this same point up the chain of
command?
General Joulwan. Absolutely.
Mr. Young. Good. I am glad to hear that.
General Joulwan. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. I have some other questions that I would like to
submit becasue we are running out of time, and I would like to
submit them in writing and ask that you respond.
Mr. Cunningham wanted to claim about 20 seconds of his time
back.
Go ahead, Mr. Cunningham.
REMARKS OF MR. CUNNINGHAM
Mr. Cunningham. General, I am not as optimistic and I am
sure that you have a guarded position. I saw a presentation the
other night on TV about Aldrich Ames and Russia under Gorbachev
when they executed 20 of our CIA agents.
They are selling arms and chemical and biological and
nuclear rockets to many of our enemies. They are doing things,
and I do not believe, in my heart, that Russia would be our
ally if they were not in the economic straits that they are
right now.
I look at under the Ural mountains at what they are doing
with their nuclear first strike, and they already have one.
That is the size of inside the beltway.
I look at, you know, Echo Class subs and I look at their
general direction, and when you have got SU-27s better than our
F-14s and F-15s you have A-10 missiles better than our AAMRAM
or Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile and then you have
typhoon subs with the new missiles that are coming out with a
6,000-mile range, I just feel that they are not going back to
where they were, but they are going to go full circle. And it
just scares me when we get too deeply involved with those type
of folks.
When I was a lieutenant, I made a statement that we
shouldn't give F-14s to Iran because the Shah wouldn't be there
every day, and I was slapped about the head and shoulders by my
boss, and told that I shouldn't say that. But I felt like Billy
Mitchell when the Shah fell and we looked at those things.
But, you know, you can take and put a man between a bulldog
and a cat. You remove that man in Bosnia, I don't care how
happy you made that cat or how happy you made that dog, they
are going to kill each other, and there you have a bulldog, a
cat and a mouse. And I just don't think there is any amount
that we can get involved that is going to solve that long-term
problem there.
And I know that--I have got another theory that in June,
you know, we come up for elections. The President does not want
a disaster happening in that particular part of the world
during elections, and I don't think there is any way that they
are going to withdraw those troops.
General Joulwan. Well, if I can respond to the Russian
question first, I have another theory, and that is if you are
unsure of someone or you have an enemy, get him very close to
you so you can look right into his eye and what he is doing.
And I think we have to get very close to the Russians during
this transition period to see which way they are going to go
and see if we can influence it. We may fail.
Mr. Cunningham. I don't disagree with you.
General Joulwan. But I think we need to find a way.
If I could take 30 seconds here, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Cunningham. Please do, General.
General Joulwan. I took Colonel General Shetzhov, who is my
deputy 3-Star for Russian Forces in Bosnia. He came in October
of 1995, and he said--he was a typical Russian. I said, ``What
do you want to see in NATO?''
He said, ``I want to see this combined air operation center
in Vicenza.''
I took him down there. I said to my troops, ``No secrets.''
And he sat there and they put up screen after screen, that
showed the air campaign, and he looked at me. And I said,
``Turn the lights on.''
And I said, ``Introduce yourself.'' This was spontaneous.
And a Frenchman and a Brit and a Canadian and a Dutch all
turned around and introduced themselves.
He couldn't believe it.
I said, ``Where do you want to go now?''
He said, ``I want to see your ACE rapid reaction corps.''
This is headed by a British 3-Star in Germany.
I said, ``Go on down there.'' And he looked at all of that.
This was the corps that went to Bosnia and headed our effort in
Bosnia.
Then he came back. I said, ``Where do you want to go now?''
He said, ``I want to go to your headquarters in Stuttgart,
your U.S. headquarters.''
I said, ``I won't even go with you.'' I sent him down there
and he spent 3 or 4 days down there looking at everything we
are doing.
He came back and he had this long face, very quiet, and he
said he has been lied to for 45 years. He said, what he saw was
absolutely opposite what the Soviets thought our mission over
here was, what we thought you were about. He said, your
openness, I thought it was just you, but I saw it in every
person I met in Stuttgart, they had the same openness.
Now, this Russian Colonel General is giving speeches. He
was the one that just went before the Duma. You saw it with
Lenzhov, who is Nash's counterpart. He is also now giving
positive views on his experiences.
Now, this is a ripple that I hope will continue, but if we
let them go into the modernization of their nuclear force, if
we allow their military to go down the drain on the
conventional side, and if we expect to have a confrontation
then we will.
I say that we can engage now and we can do it in a way that
brings about this trust and confidence.
I think it will pay dividends. Look, I know how to fight
and if we have to, we have a decided advantage, and they know
it. But now we can interact in a way that can bring about
results. And that is what I am advocating here; not naive, not
with rose-colored glasses. Because in the end if we are not
successful they may go back to the old way of doing business.
And I don't think that is--
Mr. Cunningham. Did they offer to let you go anywhere that
you wanted----
General Joulwan. Pardon?
Mr. Cunningham [continuing]. Like under the Ural mountains?
General Joulwan. Well, we are getting there. I went out to
see their airborne troops and I had to stand in minus 20
degrees in low quarters, but we had a good session. We had a
good session.
I am sorry, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. General, I think that is an excellent statement
to close this hearing on, but Mr. Dixon wants to ask you one
more thing.
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Mr. Dixon. You know, one thing that we talked about, the
SCUD problem and weapons of mass destruction, and one of the
things that has worried me, both in the Middle East, and in
Korea in particular, is this notion of whether one of our
enemies would use chemical or biological weapons against
airfields.
General Joulwan. Yes.
Mr. Dixon. Okay. And that much of our strategy depends upon
being able to bring out massive amounts of tactical aircraft. I
think General Peay told me that they have to bring out a
thousand aircraft from the United States or other places, and
move it all out there.
Also, you have got to bring a lot of people from the United
States. So while you talk about the benefit of being forward-
deployed, you still have to get personnel and aircraft into the
actual place where you are going to do the fighting.
Now, is this something that we should be concerned about?
Do we need to rethink our strategy? In other words, are there
other options that we need to think about?
For example, with long-range bombers you don't necessarily
have to be in theater. In other words, if you are going to get
locked out, then you are going to need some other capability to
come in and deal with the threat in the initial stages until
you can actually deploy in theater.
General Joulwan. I think you need a wide range of
capability and I think not just at the action end but also at
the deterrent end. And chemical and biological weapons are
something that we are going to have to face here, I think, more
and more.
How do you not just react to it? How do you deter the use
of chemical and biological weapons?
Allies come into play here. Access to bases comes into
play. Overflight of airspace comes into play. That is why
maintaining alliances with allies, and now partners, is
extremely important.
But I would agree with you. I think we need the full range
of capabilities to include at the higher end.
Mr. Young. General, thank you very much. It has been an
excellent hearing. Before we adjourn, I wanted to thank the
Members for the excellent participation today. The attendance
was outstanding.
The Committee will meet at 1:30 this afternoon to hear from
General John Sheehan, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Atlantic
Command, and we will adjourn as soon as Mr. Lewis has
completed.
Mr. Lewis. Mr. Chairman, the General's closing commentary,
to say the least, is impressive, but just yesterday we
discussed the fact that General Shalikashvili is leaving us,
General Joulwan. To say the least, people of this quality and
depth, in this case, with joint European expertise and
experience, raises major questions for the Committee's
consideration. There are voids there that are very, very
significant beyond just thanking you for your service. It is of
concern.
Mr. Young. One of the many signs of a good leader is to
prepare someone to follow in your place, and I am sure that the
General has been preparing for that eventuality, but you make a
very good point, you are absolutely right.
Mr. Lewis. Mr. Chairman, as you go about that, I presume
that you have laid this foundation, but don't you think we all
should think about the fact that John Plashal one of the
committee staff is going to be leaving us, the person who puts
together these hearings and spends 10 to 15 hours a day doing
so.
Mr. Young. He is an A-number one CODEL organizer, too.
General, thank you very much, and God bless you. Wherever
your future takes you, good luck.
The Committee is adjourned.
General Joulwan. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the
answers thereto follow:]
Airborne Reconnaissance
Question. With airborne reconnaissance assets providing important
intelligence for the many low intensity operations in your command,
please describe, with some specificity, your requirements for such
systems for Bosnia or for smaller operations, such as those in Africa.
Answer. USEUCOM has historically relied heavily on a varied mix of
theater reconnaissance assets to support the numerous peacetime and
contingency operations throughout Europe. Over the past two years
reliance on intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) has
increased by orders of magnitude. In this theater ISR has become as
important as ``bombs and bullets'' in carrying out the USEUCOM mission.
------.
______
Cost of American Presence in Bosnia
Question. I would like a full accounting of the cost associated
with the American presence in the Bosnia. This accounting should
include, but not be limited to, the following:
(1) Operation of CV/CVNs as well as the accompanying battle groups
(O&M costs, supply costs, etc.)
(2) Cost (fuel, maintenance, diminution of useful life, etc.) of
all tactical and non-tactical American aircraft operations over the
Bosnian theater.
(3) Food/supply drop operations and accompanying air cover.
(4) Troops stationed in the region but outside of Bosnia to help
maintain stability.
(5) Any arms or other supplies given to the parties involved in the
region.
(6) Any personnel, training, or equipment costs.
(7) Mine clearing, countermine operations costs.
(8) Weapons systems/equipment lost during operations (to include,
but not limited to Capt. O'Grady's F-16, vehicles lost to mines, and
the Predator UAV)
(9) Any relevant non-military costs such as housing, infrastructure
repair, or so-called ``Nation-building'' activities.
(10) Contractor logistics support.
Answers listed by question above:
(1, 2 and 4) Bosnia operations costs: The incremental costs of DoD
participation in operations in and around the Former Yugoslavia,
predominately Bosnia, are estimated to total $6.5 billion for fiscal
year 1996 through fiscal year 1998 ($2.5 billion in fiscal year 1996,
$2.5 billion in fiscal year 1997, $1.5 billion in fiscal year 1998)
with an operational completion date of June 1998. These costs cover the
preparation, deployment and sustainment of forces for the
Implementation Force (IFOR), the Stabilization Force (SFOR) and the
Deterrence Force (DFOR), as well as the costs associated with enforcing
UN sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, enforcement of the no-fly
zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina, and support of other UN humanitarian/
observer related missions in the AOR.
(3) Humanitarian operations costs: Incremental costs totaling
$347.4 million in fiscal year 1995, $292.0 million in fiscal year 1994,
$138.8 million in fiscal year 1993, and $5.8 million in fiscal year
1992 were incurred by the DoD to support humanitarian related missions
in, and aircraft operations over, the Former Yugoslavia.
(5 and 6) Equipment, services and training costs: The President has
authorized the drawdown of $100 million in DoD equipment and services
to support the Bosnian Federation as part of the ``Equip and Train''
program. As of January 31, 1997 the total value of articles and
services delivered was $78.65 million.
(7) Mine clearing activities costs: Concerning mine clearing
activities in Bosnia, the humanitarian demining program cost the
Department approximately $1.3 million in fiscal year 1996.
(8) Equipment replacement costs: We do not track costs of weapon
systems/equipment lost during operations as they are inventory
investment items whose replacement is considered during normal budget
development.
(9) Nation-building costs: We do not track costs associated with
``Nation-building'' activities. This program falls under the Department
of State.
(10) Contractor Logistics Support: $390 million was provided for
Bosnia in fiscal year 1996 based on nine months of support. An estimate
of $386.9 million has been identified in the fiscal year 1997
Supplemental for twelve months of support including the the phase down
of the Stabilization Force (SFOR). However, OSD(C) has taken the lead
to review the requirements with an emphasis towards minimizing
expenses. If the review results in the identification of savings, the
appropriate congressional committees will be notified by OSD(C).
NATO Expansion
Question. The executive summary of the Secretary of Defense report
on NATO Expansion states that the costs to the U.S. will be
approximately $150 million to $200 million annually for a ten year
period.
What do these costs entail? Is it increased foreign aid to the new
NATO member, military assistance, increased infrastructure costs?
Answer. These costs are direct enlargement expenses, which are
calculated on the assumption that NATO would reach ``initial
capability'' for Article V defense of new members by 2001 and ``mature
capability'' by 2009. ``Initial capability'' includes enhancements in
command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I), and
reinforcement reception facilities, air command and control, and
logistics (e.g., renovation of new members' headquarters to accommodate
a NATO headquarters' elements, training in NATO languages and
procedures, acquisition of an Air Sovereignty Operations Center (ASOC),
and interoperable aircraft avionics). ``Mature capability'' includes
additional direct enlargement enhancements (e.g., command and C3I
improvements, weapons engagement capability added to each ASOC,
exercise enhancements, and improvements to airfields, road and rail
links, ports, etc.).
Question. Which U.S. government agencies would bear the costs of
NATO expansion? What share of costs would be borne by the Defense
Department?
Answer. U.S. funding sources will be the Department of Defense
(Warsaw Initiative and Operations and Maintenance funding) and
Department of State (Security Assistance funds, which include Foreign
Military Financing, Foreign Military Sales, Excess Defense Articles,
and International Military Educational Training). Approximately 40% of
the costs will be borne by the Defense Department.
Question. Secretary Albright was recently in Moscow with a proposal
to reduce conventional weapons levels in Europe. What is the outlook of
this plan?
Answer. The plan has agreed to by all North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) members. It was tabled by NATO to all signatories
of the CFE Treaty in Vienna on 20 February 1997. Subsequently, on 7
March 1997, the NATO proposal was rejected by Russia as a basis for
negotiation. The negotiating group of the Joint Consultative Group in
Vienna met on 11 March 1997 for formal responses to the Russian
rejection. The chairman of the Joint Consultative Group will then draft
a ``food-for-thought'' paper for the following week that will address
areas that need to be worked out before the negotiating group begins
actual negotiations on a draft document.
Question. How significantly would it reduce U.S. arms based in
Europe?
Answer. The objective of all States Parties to the Treaty should be
to achieve overall lower force levels in the area of application. We
will pursue ways by which our equipment ceilings can be lowered, while
preserving our ability to meet our defense requirements. We and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization are prepared to take significant
steps in this regard. Specifically, the total of future aggregate
national ceilings of ground Treaty Limited Equipment of the 16 members
will be significantly less under the adapted Treaty than the current
group ceiling.
Question. Would it lower the size of our forces or would it involve
withdrawing pre-positioned U.S. arms based in Europe?
Answer. We are reviewing our current declared national maximum
levels of holdings to assess whether they reflect current and likely
future requirements. On the basis of that review, we will reach,
through a transparent and cooperative process, final conclusions
regarding the scope for reductions. The resulting national equipment
ceilings would then be codified in the adapted treaty. This process and
its outcome will fully respect and be compatible with relevant
obligations under international agreements, in accordance with
international law.
Question. Has there been any discussion of the time frame for
implementing such a plan if it was to proceed?
Answer. Yes. Negotiations to adapt the Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe Treaty began in February 1997. We estimate completion of these
negotiations will occur in June 1999.
Bosnia--Policy Issues
Question. The deployment of U.S. force to Bosnia continues, with
the Administration plan now to keep our troops there as part of the
international ``Stabilization Force'' (SFOR) until June 1998. The
overall American troop presence has declined, from over 20,000 to about
8,500. When our forces deployed to Bosnia in late 1995, we were told
repeatedly that our troops would stay until ``the military tasks
associated with implementation of the Dayton agreement were completed''
with all troops to be withdrawn after one year--by December 1996. Even
though it seems this original military mission has been fulfilled, the
policy has changed and we are now committed to Bosnia for an additional
18 months.
Are U.S. troops involved in any so-called ``nation building
activities (repairing houses/infrastructure, etc)?
Answer. U.S. forces have, to the extent that it supports primary
military tasks (i.e., freedom of movement), engaged in limited
infrastructure improvement projects, including road, bridge and rail
repair, runway improvements, and restoration of power and potable water
systems. These projects are required to support our troops.
Question. Are there any plans to involve U.S. or allied forces in
the seizure or prosecution of indicted war criminals?
Answer. It is the responsibility of the parties in Bosnia to bring
indicted war criminals to justice. Stabilization Force (SFOR) forces
will not actively hunt indicted war criminals, however, if an indicted
war criminal is encountered during the conduct of operations, they will
be detained if safe to do so.
Bosnia Exit Strategy
Question. When we sent troops to Bosnia, many in Congress asked
whether there was an ``exit strategy.'' Your predecessor and other
senior administration officials basically said we didn't need an exit
strategy because the President had established a date certain for the
withdrawal of troops December 1996. That date has now been extended to
June of 1998. And to all appearances, there is still no ``exit
strategy'' to ensure our Bosnia deployment will not remain open-ended.
Most observers believe there will have to be some type of
international force in Bosnia for several years. Yet the position of
our European allies appears to be that when the U.S. leaves Bosnia,
they will withdraw their forces as well. What is the likelihood of any
major international force being in Bosnia should the U.S. remove its
troops?
Answer. The United States has taken the lead where others failed in
bringing peace to Bosnia. As there has been much progress towards
achieving a lasting peace, the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces will
end in mid-1998. This Secretary of Defense has emphatically stated this
and I have received no contrary guidance.
However, there may be a requirement for continued international
peackeeping presence. At that juncture, I believe European security
organizations such as the WEU or OSCE should be responsible for
continued progress.
Question. Given all these problems, would you care to hazard a
guess as the probability that we will, in fact, withdraw from Bosnia by
the middle of next year?
Answer. During the past 15 months since the signing of the Dayton
Agreement, much has happened. If we remain proactive in addressing the
challenges that lie ahead in achieving a lasting peace, I am confident
that the conditions will be right for a complete withdrawal of U.S.
forces from the country by mid-1998. Furthermore, the Secretary of
Defense has unequivocally stated that U.S. forces will not be extended
past the mid-1998 timeline.
The remaining challenges include:
Complete the transition to a fully functioning state
through the successful completion of municipal elections and the
subsequent transition to effective local government. At the same time,
national-level governing institutions must be put in place.
Repatriation of refugees and displaced persons to Bosnia.
Peaceful implementation of the Brcko arbitration decision.
Regional stabilization through arms control regimes are
well-underway. In any case, it is the responsibility of the parties in
Bosnia to cooperate in the effort to achieve lasting peace. Mid-1998 is
about right for ensuring the civil implementation process has
progressed to the point where the parties can assume responsibility for
maintaining order in Bosnia.
Troop Strength
Question. U.S. forces in Bosnia have scaled back from 25,000 to
8,500. What is the level of ``firepower'' our forces have in Bosnia
now, compared to when we were at 25,000?
Answer. We have proportionately less firepower in Bosnia now than
when the Implementation Force (IFOR) was at full strength. However, the
security situation in Bosnia is now markedly different than during the
IFOR mission. The Former Warring Factions (FWF) combat capability has
significantly decreased, and is not nearly the threat to our forces as
it was previously. Because of this, our combat power remains
significantly superior under the current circumstances, and our ability
to deter large-scale fighting remains high.
Question. Do you have any fear that the size of the U.S. force in
Bosnia may have been scaled back to a point that any units cannot
adequately defend themselves?
Answer. A commander always worries about protection of his forces,
and force protection is my number one priority in Bosnia, however, I
feel that the combat power now in Bosnia provides Stabilization Force
(SFOR) forces with more than adequate capability to defend themselves
against the threat from hostile military forces. To counter the threat
from rogue elements and terrorists, I have taken precautions to
maximize troop protection (patrols traveling with minimum of 4
vehicles, focused intelligence gathering mechanisms, etc.). I also have
a robust theater and strategic reserve force that can be employed
quickly to ensure large-scale force protection.
Question. How will the role of day-to-day tactics of our troops in
Bosnia change in light of the significant scale back of our troops?
Answer. The Stabilization Force (SFOR) is focused on stabilizing
the peace, and ensuring a secure environment exists to allow the civil
implementation process to proceed. In light of a smaller, yet robust
force presence, SFOR is engaged more in patrolling hot-spots than
providing country-wide presence. This is possible because the threat of
large-scale military mobilization of the Former Warring Factions is
diminished.
Question. What is the level of non-U.S. troops--British, French,
etc. currently deployed in Bosnia?
Answer. The approximate size of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) is
31,000 troops from NATO and non-NATO troop contributing nations. Our
allies and non-NATO contributions total approximately 22,500 troops.
Question. Have our allies deployed in Bosnia scaled their military
presence back in that country at roughly the same percentage as the
U.S.?
Answer. In transitioning from the Implementation Force (IFOR) to
the Stabilization Force (SFOR), our allies scaled back their
contributions at roughly proportionate levels.
Bosnia Contractor Logistics Support
Question. To date, Congress has provided over $3 billion for
operations in Bosnia. This amount presumed a deployment of one year,
ending in December 1996. As a result of the Bosnia mission extension,
there is now a requirement for an additional $3.4 billion--a fiscal
year 1997 supplemental of nearly $2 billion, and $1.5 billion in your
fiscal year 1998 budget. Should these estimates hold, the total cost of
the Bosnia deployment would be $6.5 billion.
In reviewing the supplemental request, the Committee is concerned
about several costs which appear excessive. Your supplemental request
includes $390 million for contractor logistics support for the Army.
This is the same amount provided in the last fiscal year (fiscal year
1996). Yet the number of deployed troops has declined by more than 50
percent. Why are logistics support costs so high?
Answer. The estimate of $386.9 million identified in the fiscal
year 1997 Supplemental covers twelve months of Logistic Civilian
Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) support compared to the nine months of
operation in fiscal year 1996. The fiscal year 1997 estimate is based
on our actual experience in fiscal year 1996 when 15 base camps were
supported. IFOR operations remained at full strength at the 15 base
camps through the first quarter of fiscal year 1997 when the phase down
of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) began, with attendant support at
eleven camps. These operational considerations resulted in the LOGCAP
estimate of $386.9 million for fiscal year 1997 for twelve months of
support. However, Office of the Secretary of Defense-Comptroller
(OSD(C)) has taken the lead to review the requirements with an emphasis
towards minimizing expenses. If the review results in the
identification of savings, the appropriate congressional committees
will be notified.
Question. The Air Force's projected flying hours appear excessive,
assuming a high OPTEMPO for F-15 and F-16 fighters. Given that
hostilities have ended, why are you asking for flying hours that appear
to assume that sanctions and a ``no-fly zone'' are still in effect?
Answer. Significant reductions in U.S. contributions to the air
component forces have already been executed over the past several years
as Operation DENY FLIGHT transitioned to Operation DECISIVE EDGE and
now Operation DELIBERATE GUARD. Further reductions are considered
imprudent based upon the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Although the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is relatively stable,
tensions are high in some areas and have the potential to escalate to
violence in the months ahead:
Brcko remains tense during the ongoing arbitration with
all three factions raising the specter of violence if the arbitration
results are unsatisfactory.
Historically, the Spring and Summer months have seen an
increase in military activity by the Former Warring Factions.
Resettlement issues are contentious in a variety of locations.
The situation could deteriorate in association with the
upcoming Municipal Elections which may dominate the political scene in
the Summer and early Autumn months.
Increased involvement by the international community in
apprehending accused war criminals has the potential for increased
threat to ground forces.
To deter potential threats, NATO has established the Air Power
requirements to support Stabilization Force (SFOR) operations. The U.S.
provided assets in support of the Statement of Requirements Nine (SOR
9). The current force has the capability to conduct precision
airstrikes against multiple targets, provide air presence around the
clock and meet the most demanding SFOR ground scenario, simultaneous
close air support in two locations with a four hour time on station
capability. Any cut or change in U.S. force mix will result in loss of
both airpower capability and flexibility.
Though the number of troops on the ground has decreased, the
requirements to maintain force protection from the air by U.S. aircraft
has not decreased. The current mix of aircraft provides the required
capabilities while maintaining a reasonable operations and personnel
tempo. The air assets, as currently deployed, are the minimum required
capability and force mix to provide adequate force protection.
Question. The fiscal year 1998 budget requests $1.5 billion for
Bosnia. What are the assumptions behind this number (number of troops,
duration of deployment, any residual costs following a pullout, etc.)?
Answer. The fiscal year 1998 estimate of $1.5 billion for
operations in Bosnia is based on the extension of operations through
June 1998.
The request will support approximately 8,500 troops with the
ongoing task of monitoring compliance with the Dayton Accord. NATO has
agreed to review the mission at the 6 and 12 month marks with the
intent of reducing force levels to a deterrence sized force at an
unspecified date commensurate with the security situation in the
country to facilitate NATO's departure from Bosnia in June 1998.
Mine Threat to U.S. Troops
Question. How many mines have been removed or neutralized thus far?
Answer. Reports from the Mine Action Center in Zagreb indicate that
approximately ten thousand of the one to three million mines in Bosnia-
Herzegovina have been removed by indigenous and United Nations forces.
Of the known minefields, the percentage of mines removed or neutralized
varies from zero percent to ninety-nine percent. The magnitude of the
problem is best illustrated by a contractor working for the State
Department in Bosnia-Herzegovina who estimates that it would take a
team of one thousand mine-clearers at least thirty-three years to
completely demine Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Question. Are you encountering any problems in detecting and
removing non-metallic mines?
Answer. Yes, both detecting, with our present detection
capabilities, and removing, due to the anti-handling devices, can
create quite a challenge. The plastic mines are impervious to water and
therefore float or sink but do not deteriorate. Previous war debris and
the metallic content of the soil make conventional detection with hand
held mine detectors extremely difficult. However, means of detection
are improving. Thirty-one teams of dogs will be in Bosnia-Herzegovina
sometime in April, 1997. These animals are extremely effective at
picking up the scent of the explosive materials used in landmines.
Also, new mini-flails which are remotely controlled, small robotic
systems similar to the flails employed on the front of the M1 Abrams
Tank, are in place. Training in the employment of these new systems
started during the first week of March, 1997.
Question. What, if any, is the role of U.S. troops in the removal
of land mines?
Answer. Advisory only, U.S. troops are not authorized to remove any
mines with the exception of those found inside their operational areas.
The mines in our operational areas are destroyed in place with
explosives, never deactivated by hand or moved. Mine awareness classes
and training on equipment usage is the extent of U.S. troop
participation with demining. Recently, U.S. Special Forces trained 188
local nationals using ``train the trainer'' style instruction, on these
topics. In addition, the State Department is training approximately 180
local nationals on mine awareness, equipment usage and mine clearing,
again using ``train the trainer'' type instruction.
Role of Guard and Reserve in Bosnia
Question. Are there any Military Occupational Specialities (MOSs)
which are exclusively in the Guard and Reserve which, from your
perspective, should be included in the active force?
Answer. Reserve Component forces provide essential augmentation
that allows, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND to sustain its current Operational
Tempo (OPTEMPO). While many of our High-Demand-Low-Density (HDLD) units
reside in the Reserve Component, there are not specialties (MOSs)
exclusively in the Guard or Reserve that are not also in the active
force.
Progress of Civilian Programs in Bosnia
Question. Making progress in the various civilian assistance
programs in Bosnia is the key to the longer term success in Bosnia.
In the case of refugee resettlement:
How many refugees and displaced persons remained to be
resettled in Bosnia?
How long do you project it will take to resettle them?
What are the major impediments to their resettlement?
Answer. Only about 260,000 of the estimated 2 million refugees and
displaced persons displaced by the four year war have returned to their
homes, leaving nearly 1.75 million people in refugee or displaced
persons status. It is difficult to predict the time it will take to
repatriate those persons still in refugee/displaced persons status
because of the continuing impediments to their return. Impediments to
the repatriation process include:
Continued lack of political will by all the parties to
facilitate the return of refugees and displaced persons.
Ethnic tension, particularly along the inter-entity
boundary, is resulting in confrontations between ethnic groups, thus
slowing the return process.
The combination of the aforementioned impediments, coupled
with lack of progress in the country-wide demining campaign, is
hampering freedom of movement for the civilian population, thus causing
another significant impediment to resettlement.
Question. In the case of reconstruction, what progress is being
made in economic growth and rebuilding the infrastructure?
Answer. Reconstruction progress was slowed in 1996 by the lack of a
functioning central government, inter-entity political differences,
insufficient coordination, a late start, and failure of donor nations
to provide previously promised pledges. That aside, there has been
significant progress in terms of where Bosnia stood at the end of the
war. Specifically:
Over 60% of the population now has electricity, up from
10% in 1995.
Over 90% of the population has potable water, however
sewage systems remain weak.
About 80% of pre-war telecommunications systems have been
restored, but there is still no general inter-entity telecommunications
link.
Industrial production is up 110% from 1995 levels.
Employment is up 30% from last year.
Wages are up 408%.
Question. In the case of War Criminals, how many have been indicted
and arrested? What is the outlook for future indictments and arrest?
Answer. It is the responsibility of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Yugoslavia and the parties to the Dayton Agreement to
monitor, indict, and arrest suspected war criminals. The Stabilization
Force (SFOR) has no mandate to hunt down and arrest indicted persons
suspected of war crimes, however, the SFOR will DETAIN indicted war
crimes suspects if they come in contact with them in the course of
their normal duties, and if the situation permits. Given the data that
I hold, there are 73 persons presently indicted for war crimes. Of
those 73 persons, 52 are ethnic Serbs, 18 are ethnic Croats, and 3 are
Bosnian Muslims. To date, only 6 are in Tribunal custody, 1 is in the
national custody, and only 1 person has been convicted of war crimes.
The future success of the International tribunal in bringing indicted
war crimes suspects to justice is the parties' responsibility, and the
degree of cooperation and vigor of the international community in
apprehending and extraditing indicted persons who have fled Bosnia.
Question. How confident are you that significant progress will be
made in these non-military programs in the next eighteen months?
Answer. Bosnia is still a dangerous place and the peace process
remains fragile and can be undone unless all remain vigilant. However,
in looking back over the past 15 months since the signing of the peace
agreement, we have made much progress. Nevertheless, much remains to be
done, and I am convinced the professionals of the Stabilization Force
(SFOR) will make a significant contribution in meeting the challenges
that lie ahead.
Key to the success of the civil implementation effort is the early
development and implementation of the civil action plan. SFOR is
working closely with the office of the High Representative to provide
planning and other assistance within our capabilities. The same rigor
and discipline is needed with other implementation agencies to give
civil implementation the chance for success. Indeed, the SFOR can
achieve all its tasks and the overall mission can fail if the civilian
agencies do not fulfill their objectives of reconciliation,
resettlement, reconstruction economic development, and restoration of
political institutions and law and order. Eighteen months will go by
quickly and immediate action is now required to move civil
implementations projects forward.
Arms Control in Bosnia
Question. What is the status of the implementation of the arms
control agreement in Bosnia?
Answer. Implementation of the Article II Agreement is proceeding
satisfactorily, article IV implementation, although many armaments have
been destroyed, still has problems to be resolved, primarily with the
Republika Srpska.
The Article II Agreement (Confidence and Security-Building Measures
in Bosnia-Herzegovina) was signed 26 January 1996 in Vienna between the
Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
and the Republika Srpska. It is deemed as successful. Satisfactory
progress has been reported on inspections, military liaison missions,
and information exchanges.
The Article IV Agreement (Measures for Sub-Regional Arms Control)
was signed 14 June 1996 in Florence between the Article II signatories,
Croatia, and Yugoslavia. It is deemed a qualified success. The Parties
have destroyed almost ------.
Question. What is the role of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in
monitoring compliance with the arms control agreement?
Answer. SFOR monitors implementation of the arms control agreements
as only a part of the overall evaluation of the Former Warring Factions
(FWF) compliance with the General Framework Agreement for Peace in
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was
given the arms reduction mandate. This is not an SFOR responsibility.
SFOR enforcement of the arms control agreement could degrade the
perception of evenhandedness. ------.
Question. Various heavy arms have been pulled back to cantonment
areas. What, if any control does the Stabilization Force (SFOR) have
over these cantonment areas? What will happen to these arms when SFOR
leaves?
Answer. The cantonment areas are under the operational control of
the Parties within Bosnia-Herzegovina. SFOR has the right and is
authorized to compel the removal, withdrawal, or relocation of specific
forces and weapons from, and to order the cessation of any activities
in, any location in Bosnia and Herzegovina whenever the SFOR determines
such forces, weapons or activities to constitute a threat or potential
threat to either the SFOR or its mission, or to another Party. There is
cooperation between SFOR and the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), in that SFOR provides cantonment
inspection data to the OSCE.
After SFOR leaves, the arms will remain under the operational
control of the appropriate Party subject to the provisions of the
Article II Agreement, Confidence and Security-Building Measures in
Bosnia-Herzegovina signed 26 January 1996 in Vienna and the Article IV
Agreement, Measures for Sub-Regional Arms Control, signed 14 June 1996
in Florence.
Condition of the Russian Military
Question. What programs have the highest priority within Russia's
defense budget?
Answer. ------.
Question. How prevalent are desertions?
Answer. ------.
Question. What is your assessment of the outlook for Russia's
military during the next five years or so?
Answer. ------.
Unless pay and living conditions are improved
significantly and a career in the military becomes much more
attractive, the quality of the personnel making up the force probably
will not notably improve and Rodionov's objectives will be difficult to
achieve.
A lack of leadership commitment and inadequate funding
make the likelihood of successful military reform poor for the near
term (3 to 5 years) and only slightly improved for the mid-term (5 to
10 years).
Cooperation With Russia
Question. Russian Troops are currently deployed in Bosnia and
conducting operations with U.S. and Allied forces.
How is it working out?
Answer. One of the great accomplishments in the peacekeeping
operation in Bosnia is the successful partnership between NATO and
Russian forces. NATO and Russian forces have operated shoulder to
shoulder in an extremely difficult area of responsibility executing a
common mission with common rules of engagement under my command. An
effective command and control arrangement was created to accommodate
Russia in this NATO-led operation. A three star Russian general has
been assigned to my headquarters in Belgium since Oct. 15, 1995 and
acts as my deputy for Russian forces. This arrangement has led to
unprecedented consultations (over 80 meetings) between NATO and Russian
military officials, expanded communications, and broadened mutual
understanding at the strategic military level. The Russian Brigade has
performed in an exceptional manner, both independently and in
coordinated action with U.S. forces since their deployment to Bosnia in
January 1996. Moreover, we are now taking steps together in Bosnia to
deepen tactical interoperability by conducting joint missions, joint
all arms training, and expanding liaison staffs. This successful
military NATO-Russia partnership is a historic breakthrough that has
the potential to establish a new foundation for institutionalizing a
new era in NATO-Russia military cooperation.
Question. Give us your perspective on the overall future of U.S./
Russian military cooperation.
Answer. The long-term prospects for U.S.-Russian military
cooperation are good providing that Russia remains on its current
reform course. Our ability to conduct combined operations within Bosnia
underscores the potential successes we can achieve when we work towards
a common objective.
In the near-term, Russian preoccupation with NATO enlargement
issues will cause it to be selective in the types of peacetime military
engagement activities in which it chooses to participate with us.
Additionally, a projected reorganization of the Russian military, to
more adequately address the realities of post-Cold War geopolitics and
coupled with pressing budgetary constraints, will undoubtedly impact
its ability to engage us on matters of military cooperation on other
than a moderate scale.
Quality of Military Personnel
Question. General Joulwan, have you noticed any deterioration in
the quality of the new troops entering your theater?
Answer. The quality and motivation of our recruits remains high.
Negative quality indicators, such as involuntary separations, courts
martial, and Articles 15 have shown no negative trends.
Question. What about their physical condition?
Answer. USEUCOM forces are in excellent shape and our components
continue to maintain the high state of wellness that is critical to
supporting our readiness posture and high operations tempo. The recent
emphasis of the Military Health Services System in focusing on
promoting healthy life-styles is helping our forces sustain top
physical condition.
Question. Are the new troops as mentally disciplined as those in
prior years?
Answer. I know of no data to suggest that the troops of today are
any less mentally disciplined than those of prior years. On the
contrary, given the current high operations tempo, increased rate of
deployments, and missions other than war, and the requirement to master
highly sophisticated equipment, our current cadre of troops
consistently demonstrates exceptional mental discipline. Our people are
being asked to leave their families more often and for longer periods
of time, not to fight a ``cold war enemy,'' but rather to assist in
major humanitarian peacekeeping/nation building efforts. In many
respects fulfilling this type of mission requires even more mental
discipline because the mission role is less clearly defined. Given the
success of our troops in meeting this daunting task, the mental
discipline of our new troops is excellent.
Question. Have you found that the new troops have more ``emotional
baggage,'' i.e., personal problems, than those in the past?
Answer. No, I have not. In many respects, the troops of today have
less emotional baggage than those of the past. For example, the drug
abuse rate in Europe has dropped substantially since 1986 (1986 rate/
1000 was 8.58, 1996 rate/1000 is 1.4). The other components show
similar progress. However, warning signs have begun to appear. For
instance, the Army recently had to adjust recruiting standards in light
of manpower shortfalls. As a result, we anticipate that 10% rather than
5% of new Army recruits will enter without a high school diploma.
Although diplomas do not guarantee emotional stability, we recognize
that cognitive abilities are positively correlated with successful
stress management capabilities. Each of the Services must work to
attract future members from this smaller pool and, therefore, face
greater risks for ``emotional baggage.''
Question. How is the morale of your troops in Bosnia and elsewhere
within the European theater?
Answer. Morale within Bosnia and throughout the United States
Forces in Europe remains positive. Our soldiers, sailors, airmen and
Marines know their presence and their mission is critically important
to our national interests. The morale of our troops are continually
assessed through aggressive unit climate assessment programs. The
process entails both a qualitative and quantitative assessment of
various factors which positively or negatively impact morale with the
European command. The assessments are conducted on a routine basis.
Leadership continues to make strides towards improving quality of
life in theater, and particularly for deployed personnel. For example,
at Tent City, located at Aviano Airbase, Italy, six additional morale
phones were added. This made it much easier for residents to keep in
touch with their ``home bases.'' They also added modern aerobics
equipment, a reading room, weekly Bible study classes, and erected a
``fest'' (recreational) tent for members. These initiatives have
provided outlets for members to spend time relaxing, getting/staying
fit, and fulfilling spiritual needs.
Military Health Care
Question. In visiting various stateside bases, members of the
Committee have been hearing complaints about medical care and dental
plans. How satisfied are troops and dependents in your command with the
medical care and dental care for themselves and their dependents?
Answer. Active duty and family member satisfaction has increased
significantly in the last three years with the introduction of the
CHAMPUS Demonstration Project (which eliminated deductibles and cost-
shares for family members who needed health care from host-nation
sources) and the TRICARE Europe Prime benefit--which preserved the
elimination of cost-sharing for all TRICARE Prime enrollees. Further,
access to dental care for family members has improved significantly
with the addition of more than 60 dentists in this theater specifically
for the purpose of seeing family members.
In circumstances in which active duty and family members are
required to use host-nation care, bilingual patient liaisons are
available at virtually all of our hospitals and clinics to facilitate
interaction between the patient and the host-nation providers and
staff. While this program goes a long way to improving satisfaction, it
does not always make the medical experience similar to that in a U.S.
facility. However, feedback from those receiving care in host nation
facilities, as from military treatment facilities, has been
overwhelmingly positive.
There are aspects of both programs that require further attention.
First, greater support and outreach to geographically isolated
communities without a nearby US military medical facility is required.
While these communities clearly benefit from the TRICARE Europe Prime
cost structure, they do not enjoy an increased access to dental care
unless they travel to a U.S. facility. Second, continued support for
the infrastructure improvements in communication systems and telephone
lines will increase their satisfaction with access.
Question. What are the major shortcomings of the medical care in
your command?
Answer. USEUCOM Component medical services have no MAJOR
shortcomings to identify. Each Component Surgeon has identified areas
for improvement, but in general all health services required to support
active duty personnel and their family members is available.
In addition, as TRICARE-Europe implementation continues, more host
nation medical services will be available to U.S. personnel and their
families in the communities where they reside.
Question. How many U.S. military operated hospitals are there in
the European Command?
Answer. There are a total of NINE U.S. military hospitals with
inpatient capabilities:
Air Force: Bitburg (Germany), Lakeheath (United Kingdom) and
Incirlik (Turkey).
Army: Heidelberg (Germany), Wuerzberg (Germany), Wuerzbergy
(Germany) and Landstuhl (Germany).
Navy: Rota (Spain), Naples (Italy) and Sigonella (Italy).
EUCOM Priorities and Deficiencies
Question. What weapon systems currently funded in procurement and
R&D are the highest priority from USEUCOM's perspective?
Answer. Generally, I wouldn't place priorities on specific weapons
systems, I leave the specifics of procurement to the Service Chiefs. I
concern myself with the capabilities I require to carry out my mission.
I identify my requirements in my Theater Integrated Priority List (IPL)
to the Secretary of Defense and The Military Services for inclusion in
their Program Objective Memoranda (POM).
Modernization programs promise to bring important enhancements to
our operational capability. The C-17 was a critical element of our
rapid Implementation Forcer (IFOR) deployment and it demonstrated its
ability to operate in a difficult environment. Future development of
Strategic Sealift capability such as roll-on/roll-off ships and Joint
Logistics Over The Shores (JLOTS) are key to movement of forces into
any area in the USEUCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) JSTARS has also
provided an important intelligence capability and proven itself highly
adaptable to the IFOR requirements. The Precision Guided Munitions we
employed in Operation DELIBERATE FORCE allowed us to accurately target
key nodes with minimal collateral damage. This led directly to the
Dayton Peace Talks. We must also continue to pursue Theater Missile
Defense (TMD) collaborative development efforts through systems such as
Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) System and Medium Extended
Air Defense Systems (MEADS). These programs will provide the capability
to counter what is emerging as one of the significant threats to
American interests.
Question. Have EUCOM's interests been adequately met in the fiscal
year 1998 budget request?
Answer. Yes. I have several opportunities to influence the
development of the Department of Defense budget. I identify my
Integrated Priority List (IPL) to the Secretary of Defense and The
Military Services for inclusion in their Program Objective memoranda
(POM), I provide direct input to the Defense Planning Guidance, I
review the Service POMs, and I participate in the Program Budget
Decision process. I also can address budget issues through the
developing Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and its
influence on the Chairman's Program Assessment and the Chairman's
Program Review.
In summary, thanks to the support of Congress through the
Goldwater-Nichols Act, I have ample opportunity to weigh-in with my
requirements throughout the planning, programming and budgeting cycle.
Furthermore legislative hearings such as these provide another path to
ensure my requirements are given due consideration.
Question. Do you have any shortfalls in training, equipment, and
maintenance?
Answer. The President's budget is sufficient for USEUCOM's
requirements. But there are some issues I would like to highlight.
Above all, we must fully funds training readiness. I believe in
making the scrimmage tougher then the game. The success of the military
operation in Bosnia illustrates the success of past readiness training.
Congress has understood this and made appropriations accordingly. But,
as last year, the timing of Supplemental Appropriation reimbursement is
critical. Without timely passage of the Supplemental Appropriation that
is before Congress, USEUCOM forces may not be able to continue training
after June 97. The bottom line is we really require the Supplemental
Appropriation by April 97 to prevent disruptions of services and
training.
We can also apply additional money against readiness and Quality of
Life projects such as Military Construction, Real Property Maintenance,
Military Family Housing, Unaccompanied Personnel Housing, and Quarters
Furnishings. As a case in point, the appended table quantifies the
extent of our fiscal year 1997 funding shortfalls in repair,
maintenance, and new construction for the Theater's facilities.
FISCAL YEAR 1998 THEATER INFRASTRUCTURE ACCOUNT SHORTFALLS
[In millions of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Army Navy Air Force Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Military construction....................................... 82 0 40 122
Real property maintenance................................... 334 6 91 431
Military family housing (MFH):
Construction............................................ 16 0 8 24
Maintenance and repairs................................. 30 0 14 44
Total................................................. 462 6 153 621
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Africa
Question. Most of the continent of Africa is in your commands' Area
of Responsibility (AOR). How many deployments have you had to this
region in the past year, and, for the record, what were the size of
those deployments?
Answer. As of 27 February 1997, USEUCOM has had ten (10)
operational deployments into Africa since January 1996, these include:
Operational Assured Response, Operation Quick Response, USEUCOM Survey
and Assessment Team (ESAT) to Burundi, ESAT to the Central African
Republic (CAR), Operation Guardian Assistance, Military Liaison Office-
Liberia, Operation Assured Lift, African Crisis Response Force (ACRF)
Pilot Team's deployments to Ethiopia, Uganda, and Senegal, and the
deployment of a Military Representative to CAR.
Operation Assured Response, from 9 Apr--3 Aug 96, was conducted to
evacuate 485 American citizens and 1,959 other noncombatants from
Monrovia, Liberia, following an outbreak of fractional fighting in
Monrovia. There were 4,533 U.S. military personnel, 20 U.S. military
aircraft, and 5 U.S. Navy ships deployed over the course of the
operation to Liberia to support this operation.
Operation Quick Response, from 20 May--1 Aug 96, was conducted to
evacuate 208 American citizens and 240 other noncombatants from Bangui,
Central African Republic, as a result of internal unrest. There were 32
U.S. military personnel and 2 U.S. military aircraft deployed to
support this operation.
Burundi USEUCOM Survey and Assessment Team (ESAT), ------.
Central African Republic (CAR) USEUCOM Survey and Assessment Team
(ESAT), ------.
Military Liaison Office-Liberia, ------.
Also, they are to monitor delivery, maintenance, and accountability
of U.S. equipment, being provided to ECOMOG through Presidential
drawdown authority. This deployment is expected to last 179 days. It
began with four personnel and has downsized to two.
Operation Guardian Assistance, from 13 Nov--27 Dec 96, was
conducted to facilitate humanitarian aid/voluntary repatriation of
refugees in Zaire. Approximately ------ were deployed to Entebbe,
Uganda and Kigali, Rwanda in support of this operation. Over 600,000
refugees were repatriated from Eastern Zaire to Rwanda and assess the
need for a multinational force to militarily intervene.
Operation Assured Lift, from 14 Feb--10 Mar 97, was conducted to
move additional ECOMOG troops and equipment from Mali and Ghana to
Monrovia, Liberia, as a result of Presidential drawdown authority
action. There were ------ deployed from Central Europe to Abidjan, Cote
D'Ivoire, to support this operation. In all, 1160 ECOMOG troops and 452
tons of equipment were moved to Liberia.
USEUCOM has deployed its African Crisis Response Force (ACRF) pilot
team twice since it was formed in Nov 96. This six man team of U.S.
military personnel was first deployed to Ethiopia and Uganda from 8--20
Dec 96. The team deployed to Senegal from 2--6 Feb 97. In each
instance, the purpose of the deployment was for the team to observe,
evaluate, and report on the training and equipment requirements of the
forces offered by Ethiopia, Uganda, and Senegal for the ACRF.
At the request of the U.S. Ambassador to the Central African
Republic (CAR), USEUCOM ------. This officer is assisting and advising
the ambassador on military issues and is serving as a liaison between
the U.S. embassy and the French and CAR militaries and the French-
funded African Peacekeeping Force in CAR. This deployment is for thirty
days and is scheduled to terminate on 7 Apr 97.
Question. Presently, an initiative is underway to develop an
African Crisis Response Force (ACRF). The bulk of this force would
consist of units from the military of the continent of Africa. What
role is the U.S. playing in the development and ultimate implementation
of this initiative?
Answer. USEUCOM, in conjunction with the interagency Task Force, is
actively involved in the military aspects of developing the African
Crisis Response Force initiative.
USEUCOM has participated in the deployments of political-military
teams which have traveled through Europe and Africa soliciting
governmental support for the initiative.
USEUCOM has also deployed pilot (assessment) teams to Ethiopia,
Uganda, and Senegal to assess the capabilities of forces those
governments have offered to the initiative. When the equipment
necessary to support initial training is provided to the Africans,
USEUCOM will deploy personnel to each country to conduct specific
training events. This initial training effort will focus on augmenting
existing individual soldier skills, developing junior leaders and
battalion staff officers, and improving combat support and combat
service support capabilities.
Subsequent training events will focus on multi-echeloned training
at the company/battalion level. This training will include host nation
government, as well as, international relief organizations in order to
conduct a more realistic training environment.
As long as the U.S. government supports its development, USEUCOM
will continue to support the African Crisis Response Force initiative.
Question. What are the probable primary functions of the U.S.
military in this initiative?
Answer. In conjunction with the interagency Task Force, USEUCOM
will continue to assist in the military development of the African
Crisis Response Force initiative.
Assessment, provision of equipment and training, and subsequent
provision of airlift are the current military functions associated with
development of the initiative.
In the developmental stages of the initiative, USEUCOM will provide
assistance in determining the needs of each African force offered to
participate in the initiative. Once training equipment is provided,
USEUCOM will coordinate deployment of mobile training teams to conduct
country-specific training events.
Once established, USEUCOM will coordinate sustainment operations
for the African Crisis Response Force. If committed, USEUCOM may
coordinate additional training, assist with planning, and may provide
strategic/tactical airlift in support of contingency operations.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Young.]
Thursday, February 27, 1997.
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES ATLANTIC COMMAND
WITNESS
GENERAL JOHN J. SHEEHAN, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES ATLANTIC
COMMAND, U.S. MARINE CORPS
Introduction
Mr. Young. The Committee will come to order. This afternoon
the Committee welcomes General John Sheehan, Commander in Chief
of the United States Atlantic Command.
General, we have worked with you before and I appreciate
the fact that you say what is on your mind. This Committee is
very supportive of you and the work that you do. We understand
the tremendous scope of your responsibility, the geographical
size of your theatre of operations, as well as the number of
troops and ships under your command.
We are very proud of the record that you have established
and that the force has established. We look forward to your
testimony today on the state of the Command and we hope that
you will address such issues as the present readiness of your
forces and the challenges and deployments and the OPTEMPO that
you now face.
We would also like to know about your priorities and any
deficiencies in terms of personnel, maintenance, and equipment
that you see as the Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Command.
And, again, I say we are very pleased with your willingness to
speak your mind on whatever the issue might be. We will have
some penetrating questions for you.
At this point, I would like to invite Mr. Murtha for any
opening statement he would like to make. Maybe you ought to
tell us about that ten-dollar transaction
Remarks of Mr. Murtha
Mr. Murtha. I wanted to make sure that I explained that
ten-dollar transaction. I was down to visit General Sheehan and
he challenged me to, when I went around visiting these various
bases, to ask about the staffing and how many people they have
and what their actual Table of Organization (TO) was. And he
predicted that we would find substantial numbers over what
their TO was and that is exactly what we did. And we went to, I
think, six bases and almost every level of command had more.
Now, there were two reasons for it. One was that the TO had
been decreased, which made it look like they had less people
and actually then they had taken people of the command and they
had not only more than they were authorized, but they had
substantially more than I thought they needed.
So I think what it says in this article, and I have seen
your comments before about trying to build our force according
to the threat, is really the key to our success. And getting
some people out of Washington is absolutely essential.
We sure don't need this many people in Washington when we
have so many in the Pentagon and, as you say 150,000 in the
area. And I am delighted that you are and agree with many of
the comments that you have made and look forward to hearing
what your testimony is.
General Sheehan. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Young. I might say to Mr. Murtha that the Speaker has
challenged me to find a way to turn the Pentagon into a
triangle. To me, that indicates a 40 percent cut somewhere and
I am not sure how we are going to do that but it is a challenge
that he has passed on to us.
General, your entire statement will be placed in our record
and you can present that information in the statement as you
wish and when you have completed, we will have some questions
for you.
Summary Statement of General Sheehan
General Sheehan. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Chairman, distinguished Members of the House Appropriations
Subcommittee on National Security. I really do appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you today. And as you mentioned, I
would ask that my formal testimony be submitted for the record.
But I would like to summarize a few brief points for the
Members and these will be very brief statements.
Following our extensive efforts to alleviate the Haitian
and Cuban migrant situation in 1996, we found that it is a much
quieter year in the U.S. Atlantic Command from those two
perspectives.
We still have 484 personnel in Haiti Maintaining U.S.
presence and providing a valuable support for United Nations
nongovernmental organizations and private volunteer
organizations. The illegal migration situation at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, has been reduced to the point that we have less than
100 illegal migrants or asylum seekers at any one time. That is
done from a peak of 46,950, individuals in 1995.
The most challenging element of USACOM's current mission is
the Joint Force Integration Piece, and we try to accomplish
this through a melding of the technology of the future of
battlefield systems and the doctrine to build a quality force.
Our primary means to correct some of the interoperability
problems is through the Advanced Concept and Technology
Demonstration ACTDs program and that is adding value to what we
do.
We are also addressing the challenges in the areas of Joint
Theater Missile Defense and taking the initiative of helping
define that concept and develop the potential of information
operations as a new concept of warfare fighting.
The ultimate goal of USACOM's Joint Force Integration and
Training efforts is to provide mission-ready joint forces to
other combatant CINCs whenever and wherever they are needed
around the world.
On any given day we have over 90 ships, 300 aircraft,
37,000 Active and Reserve component personnel deployed in
support of the geographically unified CINCs, plus within our
own Area of Responsibility (AOR). USACOM has deployed 192 units
consisting of over 9,000 personnel to the U.S. European Command
to support IFOR, an now SFOR, in Bosnia.
Sir, I thank you very much for the opportunity. Now I am
prepared for your questions.
[The statement of General Sheehan follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Young. General, thank you very much. We appreciate that
statement. The staff has gone over your entire statement and
found it to be very thorough.
I would like to begin the questioning by asking you about
the QDR. We were told from time to time that the QDR is a very,
very important review and I am curious as to what role, if any,
the U.S. CINC of the Atlantic Command has played in the QDR
process?
General Sheehan. Sir, as a CINC, I play it through with my
staff and as recently as 3 weeks ago during the CINCs
conference here in Washington, D.C., we spent an entire
afternoon reviewing the QDR with the OSD and the Joint Staff.
That was also the first opportunity for Secretary Cohen,
just having been sworn in as the new Secretary of Defense, to
participate in this discussion. And I am very, very impressed
with the sincerity and the intensity which he is approaching
this QDR.
Mr. Young. I wanted to make sure that I understand that.
You said you spent an afternoon?
General Sheehan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Young. Was that ample time for you to get your thoughts
in place or your thoughts presented to the Review Commission or
the Review Board?
General Sheehan. I would characterize it as basically
briefings where the CINSs were allowed some input. But since
that after noon, Secretary Cohen has gone back and brought all
the committees back in to help them focus their attention on
the QDR.
Mr. Young. Do you think the issues that you are concerned
about are being adequately addressed by the QDR?
General Sheehan. I believe they are, sir, at this time, by
Secretary Cohen.
Mr. Young. You have been, General, very outspoken and I
want to call your attention to some of your public quotes and
see if you feel like these issues are being addressed.
One quote that I think we have all seen is that there are
150,000 DoD military within a 50-mile radius of Washington,
D.C., while there were only 129,000 sailors in the entire
Atlantic fleet. You say that in the DoD there are 199 separate
staffs at the civilian and two-star and above flag officer
level. And you say statistically that the Army has only about
125,000 war fighters supported by 375,000 uniformed personnel
and another 300,000 civilian. That works out only to 16 percent
of the total force.
You have also concluded that if we are not careful we could
become the best trained staff to ever get run off a hill.
General, do you think the QDR is addressing these issues?
General Sheehan. I hope so, sir. I think that the issue is
the correct balance. When I raised this issue to Secretary
Cohen, he thought that the inverted pyramid of what we have is
a correct characterization of where we are today. And I think
he is trying to address this issue through this process.
Mr. Young. I have had an opportunity to talk to the
Secretary several times since he was sworn in and we have
discussed the issues that you have raised. I would agree with
you that he certainly understands the problem that exists or
that could exist, and I get the feeling that he is strongly
committed to trying to bring some rhyme or reason out of this.
In fact, I mentioned to him the same thing that I suggested
here that the Speaker has challenged me to find a way to reduce
the unnecessary personnel at the Pentagon. and I mentioned that
to him, and he said that he thinks that is a good challenge and
that he would be very happy to cooperate and work with us in
that effort.
So may be one of these days we will get more war fighters
than we have on the tail. We will see.
Mr. Murtha.
INFORMATION WARFARE
Mr. Murtha. General, one of the responsibilities you have
is information warfare and defense against information warfare.
General Sheehan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murtha. How vulnerable are we and what are we doing
about it?
General Sheehan. A very complex question, sir, but about 2
years ago in the U.S. Atlantic Command we started to try to
find out really what capability we had and so we undertook an
analysis in a war game, a real war game, ------.
Mr. Murtha. How many countries have the potential of
invading our systems? Which systems would be the most
vulnerable?
[Clerk's note.--Classified discussion was removed.]
Mr. Murtha. Well, one other statement I have to make. You
have four staffers back there. Only anybody that ever came
close to that was General Luck. He had--and I don't know, maybe
a lot of these people over here are your staff.
General Sheehan. Sir, actually, it is three. One guy is
here from the thought police from the Pentagon.
Mr. Murtha. I'll be darned. That is pretty impressive.
Who is that?
General Sheehan. Just kidding, sir.
But General Luck used to say that the only reason he had
such a large staff was to support the one marine that he had on
his staff. That is why I have one Army officer, sir.
QUALITY OF RECRUITS
Mr. Murtha. Okay. But one other thing, we have noticed a
slip in the quality of the people at the recruit depots in the
Army and even a little bit in the Marine Corps. Have you seen
that out in the field yet?
General Sheehan. It hasn't hit the operating forces yet. I
do know that there has been a slight decrease in the recruiting
statistics, but I have not seen it in the operating forces. My
command sergeant major, who just spent 2 days down in Fort
Bragg with the 82nd Airborne, 18th Airborne Corps, he told me
this morning that he is very pleased with what he sees down
there. So I think it is a problem that is coming through the
pipeline, but it is not visible right now.
Mr. Young. Okay. Mr. Murtha, thank you.
Mr. McDade?
JOINT TRAINING
Mr. McDade. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
General, welcome. We are glad to have you here. One of your
major responsibilities is joint training. Is that correct?
General Sheehan. Yes, Sir.
Mr. McDade. Can you tell us if Bosnia is having an impact
on your efforts to do what you think you ought to do in joint
training?
General Sheehan. No, sir. Actually, as a matter of fact, we
train all of the people who leave CONUS to go over to Bosnia.
We did it for IFOR, and we are doing it again for the SFOR
forces, especially in the Reserve and National Guard forces
over there.
Mr. McDade. Not draining your resources.
General Sheehan. Bosnia will be--if the $2 billion
supplemental that Secretary Cohen asked for is not approved, I
will have to shut down a lot of activity by July or August.
Mr. McDade. We understand that. But in the normal course of
your daily events, you don't see any impact?
General Sheehan. No, sir.
Mr. McDade. Are you engaging in new initiatives in joint
training?
General Sheehan. Yes, sir.
Mr. McDade. Tell the Committee how you think we could be
more efficient, will you?
General Sheehan. The issue in joint training has to do with
the use of transportation dollars and using computer simulation
to replicate what we do in the battlefield. We have down at
Norfolk, Virginia, and Chesapeake an organization called Joint
Training Analysis and Simulation Center, JTASC where we train
joint forces to fight on the battlefield. This is with real
world data bases, real world countries.
We use that to substitute for training, training in the
field. We no longer put an army in the field to train a general
or a Navy at sea. We substitute, for example, a training
evolution like ocean venture, whatever have you, that at one
time used to cost us $50 million. We now do that for less than
$5 million through the computer-aided training.
Mr. McDade. It is hard for me to visualize how that kind of
computer activity substitutes for the joint training when you
actually put them out in the field. How are you comfortable
with that?
General Sheehan. Sir, you do it through three phases. The
first phase what you do is you take someone like the 18th
Airborne commander, or the 2nd Fleet or 8th Air Force. You
bring them into a training facility where you teach them joint
doctrine, joint tactics and techniques and procedures. That is
a week-long seminar process.
The second phase, they develop an Opposition Force, OPFOR
against a real world threat, with a real world enemy. We have a
thinking OPFOR, that is human beings that actually operate in
the tactics and techniques and procedures, and all of the
stimulus that comes up from a component and to the staff is a
replication of the battlefield as the joint force commander
understands it. He is forced to deal with very complex issues,
for example, TPFDF, Time Phased Forced Deployment of Forces.
Mr. McDade. What was that again? I didn't get that.
General Sheehan. Time Phased Forced Deployment. It is the
process of moving forces from the continental limits of the
United States to a theater of operations. If he gets that
wrong, he has to fight that fight with the forces that he has.
If he puts in 15 days worth of supplies, that is all he gets.
So he is forced to make tactical decisions about using forces.
He stays at this for one week for 24 hours a day for the
entire week. And the OPPFOR can win. And so by the time the
joint force commander and his staff leaves, they have been
through everything that the battlefield combat training system
could produce.
Mr. McDade. Make a few decisions?
General Sheehan. They made a few bad decisions, too, which
they learned from. I have three mentors who helped the joint
force commander, one of them is Gary Luck. He works for me, is
a senior mentor for the joint force commander. The other is Jim
Lindsey, former Army four-star, and a three-star Air Force
officer, a former Air Force commander. So they assist these
three-star officers on how to become joint force commanders.
INTEROPERABILITY
Mr. McDade. We used to hear inoperability in Desert Storm
as a problem with joint exercises, et cetera.
General Sheehan. Yes, sir.
Mr. McDade. What is your opinion today? Has that gone away
or is that still a problem?
General Sheehan. It is still a complex problem because we
have many legacy systems that are still----
Mr. McDade. Manyt what?
General Sheehan. Legacy systems.
Mr. McDade. Older systems?
General Sheehan. Older systems that were built by Services
that still have what we call translators that allow them to
talk to each other.
We have to go to a concept of what I call a ``born joint''.
We right now spend about $40 billion in C3I, C4I. Those systems
have to start from the conception to be multi-service in
capability. A software program, for example, if you have to
retrofit it to become joint after it has been fielded, it is
400 times its initial cost if you don't get it right the first
time.
Mr. McDade. Well, what is the scope of the problem we are
talking about? Is there any way you can put a dollar figure,
for example, behind what you are talking about to fix that
problem?
General Sheehan. It is a very hard number to calculate, but
it is a problem that you can solve if you focus your energy and
activity on it.
Mr. McDade. Are we doing our best over that?
General Sheehan. I think the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council, JROC process is beginning to get its hand around this
issue. Any new system they bring on-line has to be joint.
Mr. McDade. The only thing that scares me is they are
beginning to. Desert Storm was a long time ago.
General Sheehan. Yes, sir.
Mr. McDade. It sounds like we need to give them some
encouragement.
General Sheehan. Yes, sir.
Mr. McDade. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Obey.
BUDGET INEFFICIENCIES
Mr. Obey. General, as you know, we have tremendous budget
pressures. It is crucial that we not only get the right amount
of dollars for our military operations and everything else, but
that we put those dollars in the right places for the right
things to buttress the right kind of conceptual framework that
will give us the most effective defense.
Where do you think we are most falling short in your best
professional judgment in doing that? Where do we have the most
important duplication that we ought to be dealing with? What
kind of things should we be looking at that we perhaps aren't
right now? In terms of joint operations, aren't there
efficiencies that we ought to be looking at more aggressively--
are there inefficiencies we ought to be looking at more
aggressively than we are?
General Sheehan. I think the issue has to be a strategy of
resource match. I think much of our decision process over the
last couple of years has been decided by programmatics as
opposed to strategy, and I think that is what Secretary Cohen
is focusing his attention on.
Clearly, three weeks ago when we had our discussion with
him he was clearly focused on the strategy piece and what comes
out of that from a force structure. But I think that on a macro
scale, when I look at what we have done to the U.S. forces over
the last couple of years, we have taken 33 percent of its
combat structure out. We have only taken down management
headquarters by 6 percent.
I think if you returned to the 1987 portions of where we
were in our structure, I think there is some potential savings
there. When you look at the enlisted-to-officer ratio, for
example, we are becoming more officer-intensive and we are
losing our enlisted structure. You need to keep young officers.
You need to keep young troops because that is the seed for your
future. So those are areas that I think from a management
perspective you could take a very serious look at it. I hope
the QDR does that, sir.
SHORTFALLS IN JOINT OPERATIONS
Mr. Obey. In terms of the joint operations between
different services or joint training, in your best professional
judgment what are our most serious shortfalls?
General Sheehan. The issue on joint training has to do with
the number of exercises to be conducted on a worldwide basis.
The General Accounting Office did a study a couple of years ago
that basically said 23 percent of the transportation dollars
are being used to pay--are actually used for joint training,
Service training or presence training. That, again, is one of
the issues that we raised with Secretary Cohen and he is trying
to come to grips with; how much presence is enough?
What constitutes presence overseas, whether it is 100,000
in Europe or 100,000 in Japan? What level of exercising is
necessary for confidence building within a coalition process
and then how do you really take disparate elements from
different Services in training what we call joint mission
essential tasks? We have just finished standardizing the joint
mission essential task for Services to perform from a joint war
fighting perspective and hopefully over the next year and a
half or 2 years, we will be able to use those as a standard to
measure the training activity to get the most dollar for our
value. But we are still about a year and a half away from doing
that.
Mr. Obey. Can you give us any examples of insufficient
cooperation between the Services in these areas?
General Sheehan.I think all of the Services because of
Goldwater-Nichols have realized that no Service has the ability
to fight alone in a battlefield, that they need the help from
the other Services. You will always find pockets of resistance
in each Service for whatever reason because they are sponsoring
a certain platform. But at the end of the day, I am very
comfortable that the joint training is coming along. It is much
better than it was in 1983, 1986, much better than it was in
1989. So it is getting better every year.
Mr. Obey. Thank you.
Mr. Young. Mr. Lewis.
Mr. Lewis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Sheehan, it is nice to be with you.
General Sheehan. Thank you, sir.
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
Mr. Lewis. I had recently brought to my attention your work
relative to the tactical control system concept, and its
potential is very impressive. I would like to compliment you on
that work.
As a result of my work on this Committee and a
responsibility in another area that deals with the Intelligence
Committee, I have focused a good deal lately on an item known
as unmanned aerial vehicles, and maybe to the frustration of
some of my colleagues I have been using one of those
procurements as an illustration that takes me to try to probe a
problem that relates very much to jointness, the item that you
just mentioned.
As I understand it, Secretary Perry made USACOM, the
combatant command or the force provider for UAVs, is that
right?
General Sheehan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lewis. Could you tell us exactly what that entails?
General Sheehan. Well, sir, we have one advanced concept
technology demonstration, Predator, that has been tested and
used in Bosnia with a great deal of satisfaction by most of the
users. There were tactical problems that had to do with the
learning curve on icing of the wings and all those kinds of
things, but UAVs offer us a great opportunity to make
commanders more situationally aware.
UAVs, having watched the Israelis use them and visited the
Israeli UAV people, I have great hope that we are able to
manage the data that the UAV is capable of producing. Our
problem is not the platform itself. Our problem is the ground
station and our ability to process through automatic target
recognition what the UAV can show us in the battlefield.
Mr. Lewis. Would you explain what jointness means as it
relates to Predator?
General Sheehan. What it does, it allows us--the Air Force
is a single Service, for example, but the air combat command,
my Air Force component, they provide a squadron capability that
is deployable that works for the ground force commander. It
covers a large area. You can downlink the information to the
joint force commander. You can downlink the information to a
ground station commander, on the ground side. It allows people
to see the battlefield from a common situation awareness. If
you can link the picture, then very frankly it allows you then
to use other weapons systems platforms to destroy targets
without putting people in harm's way. It has great potential.
Mr. Lewis. It is my understanding that you wrote the
Concept of Operations, for the operations of the Predator.
General Sheehan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lewis. Within those concepts you supported the forward
control element?
General Sheehan. Yes.
Mr. Lewis. Essentially, that would say that the Air Force,
if they were the commander, would be able to hand off to a Navy
pilot by way of a submarine, you might very well have an Army
person on the front line who can control this mechanism. So
jointness has a pretty broad definition in that connection.
General Sheehan. Yes, Sir.
Mr. Lewis. Generally speaking, this Committee has supported
that concept and we have had language in our bill of last year
supporting the Forward Control Element.
As of this moment, Air Force, who has command now of this
asset related to UAVs, has refused that forward control
element. I would like to have your reaction or comment.
General Sheehan. I wouldn't say they refused it, sir. This
is a classic debate between the Services about putting small
airplanes in air space. They worry about the safety of flight
for fixed-wing aviation, so as a result, they feel as though
they have positive control. Who drives the airplane around,
this is really an issue of the joint force commander, tells his
air component commander what he wants done. And I don't know of
a joint force commander who, if there is a ground unit in
trouble, who is not going to give him that UAV.
What I need to do is to get to the battalion commander a
ground station that is small enough and has a low enough
footprint that the can see what is over the next hill, and if I
have a component commander that won't give that to an infantry
battalion commander he is not going to be in the battlefield
very long.
Mr. Lewis. Let me be a little more specific. Yesterday this
subject was raised with the Secretary of Defense. Just
following that, the Army sent a message out suggesting that
they ought to have this asset available for joint operations
and training at Fort Irwin. They got a direct message back that
was very short, succinct and threatening saying, not no, but
you can imagine what that is.
General Sheehan. Yes, sir. It is true General Hartzog, who
is the radar commander who wants the UAV for Force 21 for use,
because they understand it would add to the battlefield, and
that is an issue I am going to have to work out with the
Chairman, sir.
Mr. Lewis. I must say that over time, in this subject area,
that is very important in terms of the total battlefield
circumstance. It seems to me there is a pretty fundamental
question here relative to that debate that goes on between
forces. The definition of jointness, we would hope, is broader
than would appear to be the case in this instance. And I would
hope that you would recognize the difficulty of a narrow
interpretation of what jointness means.
General Sheehan. Yes, sir, I do. I say it is a ground
station issue of giving the ground commander the ground
station, and the joint force commander at the end of the day is
the one that decides where those resources are allocated.
Mr. Lewis. You know, you take yourself to the submarine,
for example, and you can see very quickly some limitation there
if there wasn't a broad definition.
General Sheehan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lewis. Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to make sure that at
the highest levels through the forces that you know that
someone is raising these questions and we don't intend to stop
raising the questions
General Sheehan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lewis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Lewis, thank you very much.
Mr. Dicks.
INFORMATION WARFARE
Mr. Dicks. General, I want to welcome you to the Committee.
I enjoyed very much being able to visit you, I guess it was
late last year, and to talk to you about some of the major
issues that we are facing.
I had an opportunity to go out to Mitre, myself, with--
their staff people and former Defense Secretary Schlesinger for
a briefing on information warfare. And as a member of the
Intelligence Committee as well, I have been very concerned
about this issue. And I think you are absolutely right that the
vulnerability here isn't just to U.S. military systems, but to
our entire infrastructure, including, our ability to generate
and wield electric energy. Our ------ is also vulnerable.
There are just a whole series of things that could be done
that would, bring the country literally to a standstill if you
had a dedicated group of hackers who could be, in essence,
hired by a terrorist to try and damage our systems. And I also
understand the exercises that have been done on military
operations have not been very satisfying, either.
So I would just like you to, again, to maybe talk in a
little more depth regarding where our most critical
vulnerabilities are. The President has named a national
commission to look into this, and I had a chance to talk to
Sandy Burger down at the White House on this subject, but
shouldn't this be given a lot more attention than it has been
given up to this juncture? Shouldn't there be a little more
sense of urgency from our top governmental leaders about our
vulnerability?
General Sheehan. Sir, I think there has been. Before
Senator Nunn left the Armed Services Committee, now I know it
because I just spoke to him about 2 weeks ago on this issue. He
is from the commercial side very, very focused on this issue. I
know the money and banking industry is very focused on this
issue.
The biggest single problem we have is getting people to
understand the complexity of the problem. There are many people
that think that you can go out and buy a commercial cellular
phone, for example, and buy an encryption device from the local
AT&T system and use it to talk to somebody and you think you
are encrypted. Those systems are not secure, as you know.
Most people--most civilians in the United States that think
they have commercial encrypted cellular phones, though, you can
break those in less than 2 seconds. And so it is a very serious
problem. But getting people to understand it, and this is
especially a difficult problem because when you are in the
military and you go to a commercial institution and say let me
talk to you about your vulnerabilities, because of ------ a
couple of years ago, people think that this is an intrusion
into their privacy by the military or by the Federal
Government. We have got to get over that. We have got to get
through that process that says, this is about how we live.
We live in an electronic society. Everything we do from
money and banking to checking out of a supermarket is done
electronically. And if that system collapses, there is a large
segment of this population that is going to suffer some degree
of inconvenience. And so I think it is an awareness issue. It
is an issue of understanding how the infrastructure backbone of
the United States is constructed to do that.
You need help from AT&T and other large commercial
organizations. They are reluctant to talk about it. They do
some work themselves. So I am just hopeful that Mr. Marsh and
his panel are able to bring all the people together who are
involved in this issue to raise the awareness from a policy
perspective, because as I said before, at the end of the day,
it is the concept, and the organizational theory and then the
laws that allow you to work in this arena without the
perception that you are violating someone's rights. It is a
very complex problem.
Mr. Dicks. Do you think--should this be handled from the
civilian side of the Defense Department rather than having the
military assume responsibility? Would that help in this case?
General Sheehan. It comes from two different parts. There
was what I call--the information operations consists of two
parts: Information and operations, and a tactical perspective,
the offense piece and the defensive piece, and then there is
compartmented information programs that you use against
adversaries.
Understanding what the defense information structure is
clearly a policy issue that OSD needs to focus on.
It also gets at this whole strategy of how the United
States approaches potential adversaries. I came at this thing
from a perspective that says the real reason you do information
operations is not to go to war, but to deter war, because you
are managing the electronic spectrum. You are managing
perception management.
If you ask me to look at a country and deal with that
country, I am kinetically oriented. You tell me country X and I
will tell you how to bomb it into oblivion. But that is not
what the warfare of tomorrow is about. Tomorrow's warfare is
when you are in a crisis process how do you move the crisis
back to peace? Or if you are in conflict, how do you move it
back to pre-crisis? You do it through the manipulation of the
whole arena in which a country exists. This is the social, the
economic, the political and the military dimensions.
To do that, you have to have a national strategy and
understand what you want as an outcome of dealing with that
nation. There are probably 12 to 15 nations on the face of the
earth that fit into this category of we are either economic
competitors or the military competitors as peer competitors. We
need to come at this thing from the strategy perspective that
says this is country X, this is how we approach them from an
information perspective and the social dimensions, the economic
dimensions, the political dimensions, the military dimensions
and manage that information medium in such a way that you can
manipulate it to your advantage.
That has very, very threatening connotations to some
people. The legal people in OSD are terrified of the concept.
Clearly, the appropriate--as you know, the appropriate
oversight committees in the Congress want to know exactly what
you are talking about, about what do you mean putting embedded
technology into someone's computer system? Who has the
authority to re-call it? What do you do with the information?
What do you do especially if it is financial information? So
there are--there has to be a much more serious dialogue.
I think that the House is going to have an off site, I
believe--sometime over the next couple of weeks we are going to
focus on this issue and they have asked me to come down and
talk about it in a much more closed forum. But I think the
House is in the right direction.
I think John White is trying to focus on this issue. And I
think that in my discussions with Tony Lake, should he be
confirmed, I think he is really trying to focus on this issue
also from a CIA perspective.
NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY
Mr. Dicks. All right. When you talk about our lack of or
the necessity for us to develop a new national military
strategy, I think that is absolutely essential, and then from
the strategy to decide what we need to do in the resource area.
What I have seen over the last few years, frankly, is a
budget-driven strategy, a lack of strategy and just a budgetary
approach to this, where the services each have items that are
their priorities. Frankly, if you ask me, do I think Goldwater-
Nichols is working, I think that it is working at the CINC
level, but I don't think the real hard trade-off decisions with
the limited budget that we have got today are being made at the
highest level.
One area I, frankly, worry about is that we are out there
buying a lot of things, for example, nonstealthy tactical air,
that are going to have a hard time performing in the threat
environment of the future. And yet we are ending programs like
the B-2 where you have a chance to use advanced technology,
with much cheaper weapons, and I think which provides us with a
revolutionary capability to deal with long range power
projection. Yet we can't seem to get the top people in the
Pentagon to focus on these things and make the hard calls. And
it is because, I think, they are all fearful of each of the
services riling one of the others.
Give me your perspective on this. How do you see this?
General Sheehan. I come at it in a parallel path. Wherever
I read Goldwater-Nichols, the thing that strikes me most often
is that the primary purpose of Goldwater-Nichols was to
reinforce surrendering control of the military. When you read
the law, that is what the real issue is. Then down embedded is
this whole issue of creating jointness.
I think the issue of the strategy piece is that we need a
better connection. I think the Office of the Secretary of
Defense clearly needs to influence the process. He does it
through three ways: Through policy, through budget and through
operations.
I think you are right in the sense that the expertise to
get at the strategy piece, then go from strategy to resource
allocation, is the part that we need more effort in. And I am
very, very kind of encouraged by the way that Secretary Cohen
is approaching this thing. I think he clearly understands that
as the Secretary of Defense he comes at this thing from a
policy perspective.
I think much of the activity in OSD is they get confused
between policy and management. They focus on management and not
the policy piece. If you fix the policy piece, the management
piece then follows by subcontracting that to people who have
the authority to do that. And I think then you get at the issue
that you are trying to get your hands on.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Visclosky.
RUSSIAN NAVAL ACTIVITY
Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
General, could you tell me about Russian Naval activity in
your area?
General Sheehan. Sure. Russian Naval activity is
significantly down. Part of it has to do with the miserable
state of the Russian military budget. Large numbers of ships
are tied up at the pier with families living on them because
there is no housing for them. We had two incidents over the
last 6 months where fleet vessels actually sent armed guards to
the power plants to demand power for their ships because the
Navy had not paid for them. And so one--in one sense, their
surface Navy has been significantly degraded.
The other interesting part, though, is that they are
investing in submarine technology. They still are--have a very
quiet submarine, the Akula. They have three submarines out in
the Barents Sea today. They are--if all of the indications are
correct, by the year 2000, 50 percent of their strategic
forces, their strategic nuclear force will be sea-based. It
will be based on the Kola Peninsula.
Mr. Visclosky. Fifty percent.
General Sheehan. Fifty percent. The Chief of Defense at
Finland was just at my headquarters the last two days. He is
concerned about the stability of the Leningrad district, which
is the area he is concerned about. Much of that is easy as he
travels back and forth to the district. The towns up in that
Kola Peninsula are off limits to even him.
So I think that--I am hopeful that the progress towards
democracy in Moscow works, in Russia. I am very, very concerned
about the state of the Russian military. I think Rodionov is
playing to the audience about the security of the nuclear
forces. I am very comfortable that those forces are in good
shape from being paid, but their conventional forces are in
abysmal condition.
DRUG INTERDICTION
Mr. Visclosky. On drug interdiction, my opinion is we
haven't put a dent into the problem. That is my personal
opinion.
From your perspective and the responsibilities you are
charged with, what has worked and what hasn't worked? I
recognize that there are a lot of moving parts to this problem
outside of your control.
General Sheehan. What hasn't worked is a national will to
deal with this problem. We have been at this since 1989 when
the U.S. military first got involved, because we had the
command and control architecture and the intelligence to do
this. And plus we became the synapse that allowed that
organizations who were not accustomed to working with each
other to come to a common room and work in a cooperative basis.
We have become much better since 1989, but there are parts to
the problem. One is the source and transit zone piece and third
is domestic consumption.
For the first couple of years, we kind of focused on the
transit zone, trying to create a barrier and it is amazing the
consistency, that basically we interrupt or disrupt or capture
one-third of the product and we still are talking about 300
tons, in round numbers, coming into the United States. We went
to a source country strategy a couple of years ago built around
Colombia, and I don't have to speak about Samper and Mexico and
the problems of corruption that does the Nation. So the source
country piece, they are working on that very hard. I give Bob
Gilbart and Barry McCaffrey a great deal of credit for the
courage that they have undertaken to hammer guys like Samper
and the Mexicans.
But at the end of the day, if people demand drugs, the drug
dealer is going to find a way to deliver it. So we have to
focus more attention here in the United States on the consumer.
I think the military is an example of where zero tolerance
with drugs is a way that other public institutions, where the
life and safety of individuals associated with it, that you
have to institute various kinds of programs like drug testing.
I think until the American people come to grips with this
issue, I think you are going to continue to see drug barons
produce a product and earn a huge profit by delivering it.
Mr. Visclosky. General, thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
THEATER AND BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
Mr. Young. General, this morning we spent the morning with
General Joulwan and one of the issues that developed was the
issue of theater missile defense.
General Sheehan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Young. And I understand that late last year, some time
in the fall, that the Defense Science Board and the Defense
Policy Board suggested that the U.S. Atlantic Command be put in
charge of the department's Joint Theater Missile Defense
architecture. Has that happened?
General Sheehan. It has and it hasn't. We are doing--the
Theater Missile Defense Program is called cooperative defense.
We are taking Roving Sands, which was an air defense exercise,
and over the last 2 years have moved it towards a Theater
Missile Defense Program.
EUCOM has a unique problem, as does Korea, in the theater
missile defense because what--they are called what I call
linear theaters. So we are working with the Services to produce
a concept of operations that is universally applicable.
Theater missile defense, at the end of the day, is the
absolute joint program. No one Service has the capability to
deal with this issue. So we have a concept of operations that
we are going to test out this spring and summer down in Forth
Bliss, Texas. It will be a mature theater, it will be 45-days
so we will have all the command and control facilities in
place. It is hopeful that out of this process will develop the
tactics and techniques and procedures, in some cases suggest
what we can buy more of or kill a program that doesn't fit.
We are working very closely with the Ballistic Missile
Defense Office to do this. We have the requirement from the
Joint Staff and OSD to write the operational requirements
document for this. So it is that sense we are in charge of it.
And hopefully this summer we will move that step a further
downstream.
Mr. Young. Is this going to create a conflict with BMDO?
General Sheehan. No, sir. Actually, we have an open
dialogue with BMDO. We use their facilities. Many of the
concepts we use, we use their software modeling and simulation.
So it's a very cooperative relationship. We have a--we have a
twice a year meeting with the advisory panel from BMDO and the
BMDO office itself.
Mr. Young. Where are we headed on our ability to
effectively defend against theater missiles?
General Sheehan. I think it will be an operational reality,
probably within 3 years. I think we have got a fair capability
now. I think the problem is once we get to a link 16
capability, we have link 16 across the board in all systems. We
will be able to take the Navy's cooperative engagement
capability, with the Patriot-enhanced systems and the Hawk and
be able to present to shooters a common picture.
So I think that if we do it right and we stay at it and
stay focused, we will have a deployable capability, a real
deployable capability, with a higher probability than we had in
the Persian Gulf to deal with this problem.
Mr. Young. Yesterday Mr. McDade asked several questions of
General Shalikashili about the ground-based laser. As you look
into the future, is that a player?
General Sheehan. Not in the near term, sir. I think right
now we are talking about AEGIS, Patriot type weapons systems.
Right now it is the integration of information management
systems, what we call battlefield C3I; the ability to move data
rapidly around the battlefield, because in a theater missile
defense system you are talking about minutes for a response
time from detect to attack.
The other part that we have--after 2 years of modeling and
simulation is that it is what we call the intelligence
preparation in the battlefield. If you do good intelligence
work, you can do some very good predictive work on where tails
are going to be going. And so then you can attack the talks
before the launch phase starts. So I think what we are focusing
on right now is the battlefield C4I, integration of systems,
link 16 presenting a common battle picture to the theater
commander.
Mr. Young. Mr. Dicks, do you have further questions?
LINK-16
Mr. Dicks. Let me make sure I understand this, link 16, and
I understand it, is the link between the satellite in space and
the cockpit of the airplane?
General Sheehan. It covers all sorts of airplanes from
AWACS, any kind of search radar system that can present you a
battle space picture, AEGIS by radar systems, for example. So
what is--it is a common picture of the battle space.
Mr. Dicks. It shows you where the Scud launches from?
General Sheehan. It shows a radar returned.
Mr. Dicks. Right. So then you have not only the ability
with theater missile defense system to stop the incoming
attack, but also to offensively go out and go after----
General Sheehan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. The Scud launchers are a big problem, as you
well know, in the Gulf War.
General Sheehan. Yes.
Mr. Dicks. We were unable to do it and Saddam used very
sophisticated denial methods regarding where the location was
and moved those around and presented us with a lot of false
decoys, and other things, that caused us a problem. And, again,
my view of this is this is another area where stealth gives you
an advantage in that you don't have to have all of the
supporting aircraft to go in after the launcher.
If you have got the F-117 or the joint strike fighter, when
the Navy finally gets a stealthy airplane, or the B-2, you have
an ability to go in and take those launchers out. Because you
have got the link right from the satellite and you have the
ability to go in and perform that mission. That was something
we couldn't do in the Gulf.
General Sheehan. Absolutely.
NBC WEAPONS
Mr. Dicks. What I worry about is the use of chemical,
biological or nuclear weapons against our airfields that lock
out our TACAIR, lock out our ability to bring the troops into
the theater and then we are going to sit there and say, why
didn't we buy some more bombers, that we could use from the
United States? Now, you have--you have got a reinforce in the
United States, is that right?
General Sheehan. Yes, sir, the 8th Air Force.
Mr. Dicks. Have you seen the new tape on the first dropping
of the GATS/GAM?
General Sheehan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. Forty-one thousand feet, day, night, all
weather. This is why I am so possessed by this issue. I have a
chart here of seven different conventional weapons that you
could drop off the B-2; to go against advancing armor, to go
against fixed targets, to go against relocatables, surface-to-
air missiles and deep underground bunkers.
Now, that, to me, is a tremendous, almost revolutionary
conventional capability that we haven't had before, and the
reason I think it is so important is because you can deploy
this aircraft a third of the way around the earth in 8 hours
from Whitelman, from Guam or Diego Garcia. If we had enough
aircraft to deploy in those three cases, you literally could
cover the world.
And, you know, we don't have all these systems yet. They
are just starting to come into the inventory and you have to do
all the things necessary to get them on the airplane. It isn't
just the B-2s. The B-1s could use some of these on other
platforms.
But to me when you are thinking about this problem with
theater missile defense not having as good a system as I think
we need to protect our kids, you can't just attack the problem
on the side of defending against these weapons. You have got to
also be able to go on the offense. And am I right here? Isn't
stealth a big advantage in attacking these systems?
Mr. Sheehan. The intelligence preparation in the
battlefield and the battlefield location is key to this whole
process. Every single game that we have run in the analysis, if
you can get the tail on the ground before it goes in a recce
phase and launch phase, it makes the battlefield solution that
much better.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Lewis, do you have further questions?
READINESS TRAINING
Mr. Lewis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, yesterday when we spent time with the Secretary
and General Shalikashvili, the first three items in summarizing
their priorities pointed to quality of troops, pointed to
training and pointed to modern procurement.
As a backdrop to all of that, we are faced very shortly
with having to move quickly on a supplemental for Bosnia. The
budget request that is before us goes down and not up, and we
all know that money is fungible.
So in connection with that piece that involves training,
just for your edification, both twenty-nine Palms and the
National Training Center are in my district so I pay a little
bit of attention to training questions. Tell me, do you believe
that the troops under your command are receiving adequate
training? And if they are not, why not?
Mr. Sheehan. I deal with joint training. We have a three-
tiered training program in U.S. Atlantic Command. It is kind of
consistent on a worldwide basis. Tier I is a Service
responsibility. Tier 2 is we train for joint interoperability.
We do that across the United States by scheduling tankers and
airplanes and those things, until you get them joint certified.
And then Tier 3 is what we already talked about, the JTASC.
Twenty-nine Palms and Force 21, for example, at Fort Hood,
Texas, those are Service responsibilities. I visit those
training facilities. I am very satisfied with where we are
right now.
I will tell you, though, that from a distribution of
dollars, with 70 percent being O&M and 30 percent investment,
if we continue this trend and we keep using equipment with old
trucks, et cetera, we are going to wear the stuff out that we
have and you are not going to have the equipment to train in a
couple of years from now.
Mr. Lewis. Going specifically to joint training as it
relates to your command, what joint training exercises will
take place in 1997 in your command and what is the budget for
1998?
Mr. Sheehan. Sir, the big item that we are going to spend
the next couple of months working on is a cooperative defense
which is the theater missile defense roving sands at Fort
Bliss, Texas. We are also going to do what we call a unified
endeavor, that is, the joint JTASC Training Simulation Program.
That will be in the fall of the year.
We will do one Partnership for Peace exercise in the United
States, called Cooperative Osprey, and we are going to take
basically a battalion minors from the 82nd Airborne with the
Central Asian Peacekeeping Battalion, called CENTRASBAT and do
an exercise in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.
In 1998, we are going to focus on combined joint training
with the US and plus the normal activity we in the operations
through the Unified Endeavor Exercise. We do not do large scale
exercises per se, putting 50- or 60,000 people in the field. We
only do that once every 5 years and that is called Purple Star
exercise.
JOINT OPERATIONS
Mr. Lewis. General, in your earlier response to Mr. Obey
and to myself, I kind of--I heard at least you are coming down
on both sides of the answers that might be given relative to
the adequacy of jointness.
I feel very strongly that we need the broadest
interpretation of the values and the impact of joint activity.
The illustration I gave you relative to UAVs and the Air
Force Command would indicate just exactly the opposite to me.
Would you be very clear to me? Do you think we have got major
problems in this area of jointness?
General Sheehan. I think that there are always going to be
problems in this area, because when you are talking about
budget programs and money and Service cultures, roles and
missions, you are always going to have friction. But from
someone that has watched this process evolve, I am more than
comfortable in terms of where we are in our maturity. It takes
time to flesh out of the system people who are single-Service
and parochial. You will always find that. I think that we have
come a long way.
I worked in the Office of the Secretary of Defense when
Goldwater-Nichols was first drafted. I happened to be fortunate
or unfortunate to be in the room when the Service chiefs argued
against Goldwater-Nichols. One of the Service chiefs said that
Goldwater-Nichols was unAmerican, and they fought very hard
against it.
We are a better Service, we are a better military, because
of Goldwater-Nichols. We still have warts. And that is mostly
personality-dependent people who just haven't understood that
the U.S. military fights for this Nation; that it isn't about
being in the Air Force, it isn't about being in the Marine
Corps or the Army, but it is about giving the best possible
product for this Nation.
So we are still a couple of years away from fleshing out
from the system people who haven't got the message. But I am
encouraged by what I see. I see this every single day in joint
training. I am surprised and encouraged by the maturity of some
of the people that you run across in this business.
Mr. Lewis. One of the reasons I have been using the
illustration that I have been using is that among procurement
efforts, new programs, the Predator was one I saw move forward
very quickly. It seemed to break the mold of having to have a
library of information and checks against counterchecks before
you moved forward with procurement. And now that we have gone
through that initial phase, now we--it seems to me that we, by
way of the way--by way of the delegation of authority we have
taken ourselves back to an over standard and it is a reflection
of something less than maturing, and what I am hearing from you
at least is that you are very supportive of more rapid
maturing.
General Sheehan. I think that the decisions to give it to a
single Service was the correct decision. I am very comfortable
that in General George Joulwan's mind, there was no question in
General George Joulwan's mind just who owned the Predator and
who could move it around the battlefield.
Mr. Lewis. I can say that in our session earlier, there was
some question when he heard that wetness was not an addition or
development that would take place in Bosnia, I mean that--it is
just the other side of what you just said.
General Sheehan. But at the end of the day, as the Joint
force commander, he will decide. We face this issue on certain
platforms. I mean, we do--I mean, to give you an example a
couple of years ago in September of 1994, when we put Army
rangers on an aircraft carrier, the Marine Corps had a heart
attack. They got over it. It takes time.
Mr. Lewis. Thank you, General.
Thank you.
Mr. Young. Mr. Visclosky, do you have additional questions?
CUBA
Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Chairman, just if I could, General, what
is your assessment of the political and economic situation in
Cuba today?
General Sheehan. The economic situation is improving,
partially because of tourism, partially because of some foreign
investment. The political situation is stable. Castro clearly
is in charge. I think that--part of that, I think, is because
we have forced the elites of Cuba together because of our
recent decision in Helms-Burton. I think that the Cuban
military clearly understands that regardless of what happens in
the transition in Cuba they are going to be forced to be dealt
with either for the good or for the bad.
My argument has always been that somehow or another, you
either get a line into the Cuban military, not because Raul and
his brother Fidel are good people. It is just that I discount
them. The Cuban military recognizes they are on a downward
spiral. There is no exit; that they are--they don't want to--I
mean, my sense from talking to them is that they don't want to
go out into the streets and kill their own people.
I think the Revolutionary Armed Forces, FAR headquarters
clearly is politically loyal to Castro, but I think the--we
can't treat them as a monolithic organization. I think the
economic peace will stabilize, but eventually deteriorate.
Large segments of the population are on a starvation diet. What
I mean by that is less than 1,700 calories. And I think Castro
is a very shrewd guy.
Mr. Visclosky. General, thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. General, thank you very much for a very thought-
provoking presentation this afternoon. We appreciate that and
we invite you to keep in touch with us. If there are problems
that we ought to be aware of, let us know.
The Committee is adjourned until 10:00 a.m. on Wednesday,
when we will hear testimony from Admiral Preuher, Pacific
Command; and General Tilleli, Commander U.S. Forces, Korea. At
1:30 in the afternoon we will hear from General Peay, Commander
in Chief, U.S. Central Command.
If there is nothing further, the Committee is adjourned.
General Sheehan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the
answers thereto follow:]
Current Operations/Training
Question. Please list for the Committee the major deployments
undertaken by the Atlantic Command in the past fiscal year.
Answer. The following operations have been supported by the U.S.
Atlantic Command during the period October 1995--September 1996.
Operations are listed as operation/contingency name, dates and
description:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONTINGENCY DATES DESCRIPTION
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Global Naval Force Presence Continuous........ ------.
Policy (GNFPP).
Global Naval Force Presence Continuous........ ------.
Policy (GNFPP).
Global Naval Force Presence Continuous........ ------.
Policy (GNFPP).
Global Naval Force Presence Continuous........ ------.
Policy (GNFPP).
Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) in Continuous ------.
support of GNFPP gaps in (between 95-180
CENTCOM. days per year).
Multinational Force and 7/78-Present...... Force provider for
Observers (MFO). United Nations
(UN) peacekeeping
operations to
enforce Camp
David Accords
ending Egyptian-
Israeli October
1973 War in Sinai
Peninsula.
Counterdrug Operations.......... 7/90-Present...... Various
counterdrug
operations in the
Caribbean and
southeast U.S. by
Joint Task Force
(JTF) 4, Joint
interagency Task
Force (JIATF)
EAST, and JTF 6;
conduct detection
and monitoring,
and coordinate
with law
enforcement
agencies (LEAs).
Operation PROVIDE promise....... 7/92-12/95........ Force provider for
UN peacekeeping
operations in
Bosnia.
Operations SHARP GUARD/DECISIVE 7/92-Present...... Force Provider for
ENHANCEMENT. UN embargo in
Adriatic Sea.
Operation SOUTHERN WATCH........ 8/92-Present...... Force provider for
Central Command
to enforce the UN
no-fly zone over
southern Iraq;
increased US
presence with
AEFs to Bahrain
(10/95) and
Jordan (3/96).
Opertions DENY FLIGHT/DECISIVE 4/93-Present...... Force provider
EDGE. support of UN no-
fly zone over
Bosnia-
Herzegovina (B-
H).
Task Force ABLE SENTRY (TFAS)... 6/93-Present...... Force provider
support of UN
military
observers in
Macedonia.
Operation SEA SIGNAL............ 5/94-4/96......... Establish JTF 160
and the Joint
Logistics Support
Group (JLSG) to
support Haitian
and Cuban migrant
operations at
Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba.
Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY...... 9/94-Present...... Establish JTF 180,
JTF 190, United
Nations Mission
in Haiti (UNMIH),
U.S. Support
Group Haiti
(USSPTGPHAITI);
conduct
multinational
operations to
restore
democracy;
continued support
under exercise
FAIRWINDS after 4/
96.
Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR II... 8/95-11/95........ Force provider to
Central Command
to augment forces
in Southwest Asia
(SWA) following
defection of
Hussein's family
members and
Iraq's unstable
government.
Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR/JOINT 12/95-Present..... Force provider in
GUARD. support of
European Command
for the NATO
peace
implementation
force (IFOR) and
stabilization
force (SFOR) in
Bosnia;
established the
Joint Preparation
and Onward
Movement (JPOM)
Center, Fort
Benning to
provide joint
training for IFOR/
SFOR augmentees
assigned to joint
staffs.
Operations SENTINEL LIFEGUARD/ 2/96-3/96......... Designate JIATF
STANDOFF FOUR. EAST as CJTF 4 to
assist U.S. Coast
Guard search and
rescue (SAR)
efforts following
the 24 February
1996 shootdown of
two Brothers to
the Rescue (BTTR)
aircraft;
monitored post
shootdown BTTR
flotilla
activities.
Operation STANDOFF FIVE; CJTF 3/96-Present...... Designate JIATF
110 operations. EAST as CJTF 110
to monitor Cuban
exile flotilla
activity and
subsequent Cuban
military activity
in the Florida
Strait.
Operation VIGILANT SENTINEL..... 4/96.............. Force provider to
Central Command
to augment forces
in southwest Asia
(SWA).
Operation DESERT FOCUS.......... 8/96-Present...... Force provider to
Central Command
to increase
security
following the
terrorist bombing
of a U.S.
compound in Saudi
Arabia (6/96);
force provider to
build a new base
in Saudi Arabia.
Operation DESERT STRIKE......... 9/96.............. Force provider for
air-launched
missile strikes
against Iraqi air
defense targets
to protect
expanded no-fly
zone over
northern Iraq;
completed in
conjunction with
the movement of
Kurdish foreign
service nationals
to Pacific
Command
(Operation
PACIFIC HAVEN).
Exercise INTRINSIC ACTION....... 9/96-Present...... Force provider for
show of force
exercises in
southwest Asia
(SWA).
Panama Canal Treaty............. 3/94-Present...... Force provider to
Southern command
to augment force
structure in
Panama until
redeployment of
U.S. forces
following
turnover of the
Canal Zone to
Panama.
Operation SUSTAIN LIBERTY....... 3/96-Present...... Force provider to
Southern Command
to augment force
structure in
Panama.
JTF BRAVO....................... 3/94-Present...... Force provider to
Southern Command
to support peace
efforts in
Honduras.
Operation SAFE BORDER........... 3/94-Present...... Force provider to
Southern Command
to support peace
efforts along the
Peru-Ecuador
border.
Sensitive Reconnaissance 10/95............. Force provider to
Operations (SRO). European and
Pacific Commands
with RIVET JOINT
aircraft.
11/95-6/96........ Force provider to
Pacific Command
with COBRA BALL
aircraft.
Air Sampling Operations......... 4/96-7/96......... Force provider to
Pacific Command
with air sampling
aircraft.
Unit Deployment Plan (UDP)...... 3/92-Present...... Force provider to
Pacific Command
for the U.S.
Marine Corps unit
rotation plan to
Japan.
Operation ASSURED RESPONSE...... 4/96-8/96......... Force provider to
European Command
in support of non-
combatant
operations (NEO)
in Liberia.
Operation QUICK RESPONSE........ 5/96.............. ..................
Operation MARATHON.............. 10/96............. Designated
Commanding
Officer, Naval
Base Guantanamo
Bay as Commander
Joint Task Force
(CJTF) MARATHON
to support
transfer of 109
rescued Chinese
migrants to Wake
Island (Pacific);
continued in
Pacific Command
as Operation
MARATHON PACIFIC.
African Crisis Response Force 11/96-Present..... Force provider to
(Operation GUARDIAN ASSISTANCE). European Command
in support of
relief and
humanitarian
support to UN
forces in Zaire
and Rwanda.
Hurricane Opal Relief........... 10/95............. Supported Federal
Emergency
Management Agency
(FEMA) relief
operations in
Gulf of Mexico
coast states.
Icelandic avalanche Relief...... 10/95............. Supported
avalanche relief
operations in
Flateyri,
Iceland.
Atlanta Olympic and Paralympic 10/95-8/96........ ..................
games.
Northwest Flood Relief.......... 2/96.............. Supported FEMA
flood relief
efforts in Idaho,
Washington,
Oregon.
Hurricane Bertha Relief......... 7/96.............. Supported FEMA
Bertha relief
operations in
Caribbean
islands.
TWA Flight 800 Salvage.......... 7/96-10/96........ Supported search
and rescue (SAR)
and salvage
operations near
Long Island, New
York.
Wildland Fire Fighting Support.. 8/96-9/96......... Supported FEMA
fire fighting
efforts in the
western U.S.
Hurricane Fran Relief........... 9/96.............. Supported FEMA
Fran relief
operations in the
southeast U.S.
Exercise UNIFIED ENDEAVOR 96-1.. 11/95............. Combined Arms
Exercise (CAX),
joint training of
a Commander Joint
Task Force
(CJTF).
Joint Task Force Exercise 11/96-12/95....... Readiness
(JTFEX) 96-1. certification in
joint operations
for the USS
GEORGE WASHINGTON
CVBG and USS GUAM
ARG.
Exercise FAIRWINDS.............. 4/96-Present...... Conducted
humanitarian
support projects
in Haiti.
Exercise PURPLE STAR 96 (NATO).. 5/96.............. U.S.-United
Kingdom combined
joint task force
military field
exercises at Camp
Lejeune, North
Carolina.
Exercise COOPERATIVE ZENITH 96 5/96.............. Partnership for
(NATO). Peace (PfP)
exercise in
Florida;
conducted search
and rescue
operations with
U.S., NATO, and
PfP countries.
Exercise ROVING SANDS 96........ 6/96.............. Large scale joint
training exercise
in southwestern
U.S.
Exercise UNIFIED ENDEAVOR 96-2.. 6/96-7/96......... Combined Arms
Exercise (CAX),
joint training of
a Commander Joint
Task Force
(CJTF).
JTFEX 96-2...................... 4/96.............. Readiness
certification in
joint operations
for the USS
ENTERPRISE CVBG
and USS SAIPAN
ARG.
Exercise COOPERATIVE OSPREY 96 8/96.............. Partnership for
(NATO). Peace (PfP)
exercise in
Florida;
conducted field
exercises with
U.S., NATO, and
PfP countries.
Exercise TRADEWINDS............. 3/96-4/96......... Special Operations
Forces (SOF)
exercise with
various Caribbean
countries.
Special Operations Forces (SOF) 2/96-7/96......... SOF training
Joint Exercise Training (JCETS) deployments to
Deployments. various Caribbean
island nations.
JTFEX 97-1...................... 10/96............. Readiness
certification in
joint operations
for the USS
THEODORE
ROOSEVELT CVBG
and USS NASSAU
ARG.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. Is the operating tempo (OPTEMPO) of any units under your
command significantly higher than any others? If so, which units?
Answer. Yes, Thresholds have been exceeded in some areas due to
ongoing contingency commitments. The impact is particularly severe on
low density, high demand (LD/HD) specialized forces, which are critical
to our ability to respond to both Operations Other Than War (OOTW)
missions and Major Regional Conflicts ------.
Question. Do you feel that Military Operations Other than War by US
forces has affected the readiness or combat skills of US forces?
Answer. Yes, the number and duration of Military Operations Other
than War degrades the readiness and combat skills of all deployed
military units. The degradation depends on factors such as the duration
of deployment, operation requirements, type of unit, etc. Other
factors, such as the wear and tear on aging equipment and the use of
Operations and Maintenance funds, also affect readiness. It is
difficult to quantify the readiness impact and loss of combat skills
across the board, however, a few examples may help clarify this point.
Even though some training can be accomplished in the field and some
training value is inherent in the operations, training to maintain many
perishable combat skills is not available. Marksmanship, gunnery,
maneuver, low-level navigation, air-to-ground ordnance delivery, air-
to-air combat, and airdrops require maneuver space, artillery and
firing ranges, drop zones, bombing ranges, and low-level routes. These
ranges, zones, and routes are the basic requirements for maintaining
the perishable skills of combat units. Even those units who initially
get good training encounter diminished training opportunities after
they complete their initial tasks and settle into a routine. This is
especially true for engineering units. Once the bridges are in place
and the tent-cities are complete, the mission becomes one of
maintaining, and eventually, the duration of the operation negates the
initial training benefits.
Maintenance can suffer in the field; it is a continuous challenge
and exacerbates the impact of long deployments. There is an increase in
wear and tear and decrease in the available facilities and time to
perform routine and preventive maintenance. Some equipment experiences
extreme wear and may not be serviceable after a long deployment with
constant exposure to the elements. Much of the equipment in bare-base
kits such as Harvest Falcon may have to be replaced after a deployment.
Funding for these operations can have a severe impact on readiness.
Although the $3.3 billion spent on contingency operations in 1996 was
only 1.3 percent of the FY 1966 defense budget, the cost is taken from
Operations and Maintenance funds--the training and readiness funds.
This year, if a supplemental bill is not passed, Forces Command will
have to start shutting down functional operations in the May timeframe.
Question. Are the funds budgeted for the service's fiscal year 1998
request sufficient for your projected training needs?
Answer. Yes, the funding for fiscal year 1998 joint training is
sufficient. However, I believe that funding for service specific
training--training that prepares units for joint training--may be
underfunded in order to pay for contingency operations, especially if
the Bosnia supplemental is not passed.
Question. Has U.S. participation in Operations Other Than War
altered the type of exercises you conduct?
Answer. Yes. Until recently, combatant command staffs concentrated
almost exclusively on deliberate and contingency planning for potential
high end warfighting. Today, a gamut of ``on-the-shelf'' plans exist
that span the Operations Other Than War spectrum ranging from low-end
humanitarian assistance operations through sophisticated peace-
enforcement and noncombatant evacuation operations.
Joint Warfighting and Operations Other Than War missions depend
heavily on multinational coalition integration. As such, it is
important to train and exercise U.S. forces with regional multinational
forces. Command and Control interoperability, logistics integration,
common force protection procedures and rules of engagement compatible
with provisions of international and national law are among the most
crucial elements of these training exercises.
Question. For fiscal year 1997, Congress appropriated $267 million
for JCS exercises. It is the committee's understanding that the
Atlantic Command has the primary responsibility for the execution of
those funds. How has the money been spent to date and what do you see
as the primary benefit of those exercises?
Answer. The $267 million funds only the FY96 airlift portion of the
transportation to and from the exercises (the FY97 airlift funding is
$244 million and the total FY97 JCS Exercise transportation program,
including sealift, port handling, and in-land transportation is $362
million.) The $267 million also doesn't address the Service funded
costs incurred at the exercise location.
The Joint Staff is the agency with primary responsibility for these
funds. Joint Staff allotted approximately $32.4 million (12%) of the
$267 million cited to Atlantic Command. The remainder is distributed to
other CINCs by Joint Staff for their requirements. The USACOM funds
have been budgeted for sealift and airlift requirements identified in
the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) for Atlantic Command
sponsored exercises. These exercises fall into the general categories
of Tier 3 (staff training), Tier 2 (field training), Partnership for
Peace, NATO and Area of Responsibility exercises. The $32.4 million is
committed to currently scheduled exercises. However, we requested $35
million for FY 1997, leaving a $2.6 million shortfall. The primary
benefits of the exercises are:
Ensure U.S. military members/units are acquainted with joint and
combined warfighting tasks prior to in-theater arrival.
Train U.S. military members the way they are expected to fight.
Sustain and build joint readiness.
Provide a vehicle to learn and practice joint doctrine.
Improve warfighting effectiveness of U.S. forces.
Provide for joint and combined multinational interoperability
training for U.S. components.
Establish a cooperative relationship and improved effectiveness
between combined forces of Atlantic Command and NATO/Partner Nations.
Meet treaty obligations and provide assistance to developing
countries in concert with Atlantic Command's theater strategy.
Question. Do you believe that $267 million for JCS exercises is
adequate given the growing importance of joint operations?
Answer. No. Again, the $267 million funds only the FY96 airlift
portion of the transportation to and from the exercises (the FY97
airlift funding is $244 million and the total FY97 JCS Exercise
transportation program, including sealift, port handling, and in-land
transportation is $362 million.) The $267 million also doesn't address
the Service funded costs incurred at the exercise location.
The Joint Staff has primary responsibility for the transportation
funds and the FY98 President's Budget funds Defense Planning Guidance
directed OPTEMPO. In fiscal year 1997 we need $35 million dollars and
have been allocated $32 million dollars, leaving a shortfall of $2.6
million dollars. In fiscal year 1998, our allocated joint
transportation funds are $24.8 million. We require $27.3 million
resulting in a shortfall of $2.5 million. For fiscal year 1999 our
requirements are $22.4 million with $21.4 million dollars allocated
again resulting in a shortfall of $1 million.
The question that needs to be addressed is how to qualitatively
differentiate between joint transportation dollars that are expended
for joint training exercises and those spent for presence and access
exercises. According to the July 1995 General Accounting Office report
on Military Capabilities, Stronger Joint Staff Role Needed to Enhance
Joint Military Training, 73% of surveyed exercises were presence or
access exercises.
Question. The Atlantic Command maintains the Joint Training,
Analysis and Simulation Center (JTASC) in Suffolk, Virginia. It is
reportedly one of the premiere centers of computer modeling and
simulation. Describe to the Committee the purpose of the Unified
Endeavor exercises that are run in the JTASC.
Answer. The Unified Endeavor (UE) exercise series is designed to
train Joint Task Force (JTF) staffs and commanders to meet JTF joint
mission essential task list (JMETL) and joint force integrator (JFI)
standards under established conditions. UE exercises stress combat
decisions and applied doctrine through the use of operational command,
control, computers, and intelligence (C4I) in a high-stress,
operational-like environment. They stress process rather than training
on specific equipment in a home-based environment. UE simulations
employ actual terrain and threat databases and real-time intelligence
assets in areas of potential crises. They are not, however, intended to
validate or exercise specific real-world plans even if they are used as
a basis for exercise design. Troops and other field units are not used
as training aids for a UE exercise.
USACOM has trained the following JTF staffs in UE exercises: XVIII
Airborne Corps, II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), 8th Air Force, and
III Corps. Training is scheduled during the next year for: 2nd Fleet,
II MEF, and III Corps. Training to be conducted by 2nd Fleet and II MEF
will be in conjunction with NATO nations and will involve our first use
of coalition doctrine for a JTF. When other nations are involved with a
UE, they absorb the costs for national participation.
In addition, USACOM has provided UE-type academic training support
to JTFs and other headquarters assigned to other Commanders in Chief
(CINCs) and Military Departments, as well as, NATO. Specifically
training has been provided to 6th Fleet, 8th, 16th, and 17th Air
Forces, I Corps, 3rd Army, Bosian Implementation Force (IFOR), JTF
Panama, US Forces Azores. Training will be provided this year for 3rd
Army, Iceland Defense Force (IDF), US Forces Azores, Southern European
Task Force (SETAF), Marine Corps Command and Control School, Allied
Forces Central Europe (AFCENT), and UK Permanent Joint Headquarters
(PJHQ).
Question. What command field exercises can now be performed at the
JTASC and what annual savings can be realized as a result?
Answer. As a result of the development of the UNIFIED ENDEAVOR
exercise series, training of Joint Task Force Commanders and staffs
without troops in the field, USACOM was able to cancel five field
training events:
Exercise Cost (in millions)
(1) Agile Provider................................................ $9.3
(2) Market Square................................................. 3.9
(3) Mighty Thunder................................................ 0.4
(4) Resolute Response............................................. 4.2
(5) Rendezvous.................................................... 0.5
The cost savings associated with these events was $18.3 million
joint transportation dollars. In addition, the Services now save $40 to
$60 million in operations and maintenance costs associated with putting
troops in the field and ships at sea for large exercises. They also
save in the use of tens of thousands of forces in the field which were
previously required to train general/flag officers and their staffs.
Currently, a single UNIFIED ENDEAVOR exercise which trains a 3 star
Joint Task Force Commander and his staff and the 1 and 2 star component
commanders and their staffs is approximately $600 thousand in joint
transportation costs and $2.3 million in operations and maintenance
costs using 2500 support personnel.
In addition, the initiative to tie all geographic CINCs Joint Task
Force training events to the JTASC is being developed by the Joint
Staff in conjunction with the Joint Warfighting Center and USACOM. Use
of the JTASC would be expanded for use to standardize Joint Task Force
training on a worldwide scale. Although, no dollar figure can be
currently assigned, this alternative could have huge potential cost
savings to all CINCs, and possibly NATO if coalition forces are
considered in the training audience.
Question. Could an over-reliance on simulated exercises as opposed
to actual ones lead to the decreased readiness of those units
participating?
Answer. Yes. From a total force capability perspective, simulations
alone cannot completely replace field training exercises. Our UE
exercises have proven to be an effective vehicle for the training of
three star Joint Task Force Commanders and staffs, and two star
component commanders and staffs.
However, they are not designed to train forces in joint
interoperability tasks. This is conducted within our Tier 2 exercise
program where joint interoperability is achieved through field training
exercises based on critical interoperability tasks from supported
CINCs. The goal is to provide a common level of joint training prior to
deployment and ensure that no US military member or unit is confronted
with a joint warfighting task for the first time after arrival in-
theater. The frequency of events is based upon unit deployment
schedules or as required to support unit readiness. The objective of
the Tier 2 Exercise Program will be joint forces trained to standards,
ready for complex joint operations anywhere throughout the world.
Priorities and Deficiencies
Question. Do you feel the interests and needs of the Atlantic
Command have been adequately addressed in the fiscal year 1998 defense
budget request before the Committee?
Answer. Yes, but there are several areas that cross Service
boundaries that demand close attention from the Congress and DoD
leadership. We must develop and field a joint Combat Identification
system for detection of ``friend-or-foe'' in order to provide for the
safety of our fighting men and women. A command, control,
communications, computer and intelligence (C4I) architecture which
incorporates processing and analysis commonality is vitally needed for
joint task force (JTF) commanders. Finally, a cohesive, integrated
resourcing strategy for reconnaissance/surveillance platforms to
support collection and dissemination requirements, an area now being
addressed by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) for fusion
into a common system, is key to future joint warfighting.
The JROC has evolved as a superb forcing function, ensuring
recognized threats are balanced against existing hardware and future
system developments are considered for joint applicability. The JROC
forces the Services to ask the question--how does this planned weapon
system play in the joint fight and therefore necessitate resource
programming with the resulting answer in mind. This is not to say that
there isn't more work to be done by us all in integrating existing
systems into the joint fight.
Question. What is your assessment of the major shortfalls in:
Personnel, Training, Equipment, and Maintenance for those units under
your day-to-day command as well as those that would be assigned to you
in a war time situation?
Answer. As I stated in my testimony, I firmly believe the men and
women of USACOM are the best equipped, trained and led military in the
world. They are ready to accomplish any of their assigned missions.
However, signs of potential problems in personnel, equipment, and
training are beginning to surface.
Army first-term attrition is up to 37%, versus 31% ten years ago.
This coupled with possible recruiting shortfalls could lead to critical
personnel shortages down the road. Ninety-nine percent of Air Force
accessions in Fiscal Year 97 to date are high school graduates, but
only 79% scored in the top half of the Air Force Qualification Test,
down from 83% in Fiscal Year 96. Critical specialties, such as pilots,
are beginning to show a decline in retention. The Fiscal Year 96 pilot
retention in the 6-11 years range dropped from 86% to 77%. Furthermore,
those pilots taking the Aviator Continuation Pay dropped from 77% to
59%. Whether these retention numbers are directly related to operating
tempo remains to be determined, but they are indications that the
current personnel trends are moving in the wrong direction.
Modernization is a key pillar in the foundation for implementation
of Joint Vision 2010. And although near-term readiness is funded
adequately, modernization for the future remains underfunded. During
the Army downsizing, it reshaped the force while maintaining current
readiness, in some cases, by deferring modernization and redistributing
modernized equipment across the smaller force. With this smaller force,
Forces Command units must be able to execute a full range of
operations. Further deferral of modernization will incur significant
risk to future readiness in Forces Command and Force 21, inhibiting the
ability to execute these full range of operations. The Air Force
backlog of maintenance and repairs continues to grow from $4.4 billion
in fiscal year 1998 to $5 billion in fiscal year 1999. In addition, the
Navy's aircraft fleet continues to age. The average age of the fleet
was 14.5 years in 1991. Even with the introduction of the F/A-18 C&D
model aircraft and the retirement of the A-6, the current age is 14.3
years.
Question. What are the top ten priority items on your most recent
integrated priority list?
Answer. The top ten priorities from integrated priority list fiscal
year 1999-2003 are:
1. Force Readiness:
(A) Establish up-front supplemental appropriations or timely
reimbursement for contingency and operations other than war. These
appropriations should not be sourced or reimbursed from DOD service
accounts.
(B) In view of increasing mission requirements and smaller force
structure, establish a periodic review to validate recurring
deployments and joint/allied/bilateral exercises worldwide.
(C) Active force PERSTEMPO issues can be improved by continued
insistence on increasing Reserve Component (RC) integration.
1--Fully fund RC program accounts to allow execution of added
travel, training and operations without decrementing normal training
funds.
2--Require modernization of relevant RC equipment. Give special
consideration to C41 systems to facilitate seamless RC integration with
active component forces.
(D) Require full funding of steaming days/flying hours/operating
miles.
(E) Strong support for quality of life initiatives to include
adequate compensation, decent housing, rewarding career opportunities
and family support. Prevent pay scales from falling short of
inflationary increases.
(F) Continuous intensive language refresher training is essential
for enhancement and sustainment of perishable foreign language skills.
Review critical language skills worldwide and build a database
accessible by CINCs, services and agencies to support crisis,
contingencies and exercises.
(G) Program adequate funding to prevent maintenance backlogs from
increasing.
2. Combating Terrorism/Force Protection. Funding required to:
(A) Develop standards for pre-deployment anti-terrorism training
for all CONUS-based, DOD forces.
(B) Conduct enhanced anti-terrorism training for combatant command
(COCOM) forces deploying into the USACOM Area of Responsibility (AOR)
and, as necessary, for COCOM forces deploying into other AOR's.
(C) Conduct assessment of force protection status for all DOD
activities within the geographic AOR. This includes contractor support
to and site visits by ACOM force protection assessment team.
(D) Support expanded manpower requirements for counter-
intelligence/anti-terrorism (CI/AT) collection.
(E) Provide security enhancement measures to facilities/units to
include application of both current and emergent technologies.
Technology applications are envisioned in lieu of committing additional
personnel assets to security requirements, and as the most effective
and feasible means of providing force protection to non-hardened sites.
(F) Provide for timely commitment of resources in response to
emergent terrorist threats.
(G) Field a common DOD migration system in support of counter-
intelligence (CI), counter-terrorism (CT), counter-proliferation (CP)
and indications and Warning (I&W) that is interoperable with Global
Command and Control System (GCCS).
3. Joint Logistics:
(A) Correct quantity shortages in both precision and conventional
munitions.
(B) Joint Total Asset Visibility (JTAV) (including in-transit
visibility) must be fully supported and contributing programs must be
compatible.
(C) Upgrade essential log infrastructure. Require improved rail/
port/air facilities, warehouses, containers and container handling
facilities/equipment to support rapid force deployment.
(D) Our ability to execute Joint Logistics Over The Shore (JLOTS)
requires interoperable lighterage/causeways, and sea state two Roll On-
Roll Off Discharge Facility (RRDF) now. Sufficient research and
development funding (only) required for sea state three development.
JLOTS training for AC and RC is vital.
(E) Afloat and ashore prepositioned asset capabilities:
1--Army Prepositioning Afloat (APA) and Marine Corps Enhanced
Maritime Preposition Force (MPF-E) required for rapid strategic
positioning of equipment and materials for MRC-size force buildup and
military operations other than war (MOOTW).
2--Fund additional rapid deployable beddown systems as force
provider and harvest falcon/eagle for prepositioning.
4. Interoperability of C4I systems:
(A) Require commonality in processing and analysis.
1--Accelerate fielding of interoperable J-series family of data
links (link 16 and VMF).
2--Resource development of common management information systems
(MIS), including interoperable hardware and databases to include multi-
level security (MLS) tagging of data elements.
3--Migrate to common imagery ground/surface system.
4--Develop common collection management tool kit and computer
mapping software.
5--Develop integrated broadcast service and migrate to global
broadcast system (GBS).
6--Continue to upgrade warfighter utility of GCCS. Meld fire
support, intelligence, and personnel into a single, full spectrum, C2
support system. Continue development and fielding of deployable GCCS at
tactical level.
5. Fund Joint Training. Require full out-year funding for Joint
Training Analysis and Simulation Center (JTASC) facility/programs to
continue joint training initiatives. This includes a joint intelligence
model as part of the Joint Simulation System (JSIMS) modules for use by
service and joint participants.
6. Countermine Warfare. Require immediate capability to detect and
neutralize mines. Joint countermine Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration (ACTD) and other mine countermeasure programs need
development/rapid fielding, especially for very shallow water (VSW)/
shallow water (SW) environments.
7. Non-lethal Technologies. Fund development of additional non-
lethal technologies to support military, counter-drug and force
protection operations. Recapitalization.
8. Strategic Lift (air and sea). Must achieve the mobility
requirements study bottom up review update (MRS BURU) mandated
strategic airlift and sealift capability. C-17, large medium speed roll
on-roll off (LMSR), and funding of ready reserve force fleet capacity
are critical to meeting this requirement.
9. Tactical Mobility.
(A) Must provide suitable replacement capability for aging
inventory of medium life helos.
(B) Timely recapitalization of aging tactical wheeled vehicle
inventory required.
(C) Require additional small watercraft in support of riverine
operations.
10. Replace airborne Command and Control C2 platforms. Require
airborne C2 platform capable of: initial/sustained command and control
of forces; receipt of all source, real-time indication/warning of
potential battlespace threats; electronically countering hostile C2
assets.
Question. In your view, are present levels of investment funding
contained in the department's future year defense plan sufficient to
address the long term recapitalization requirements of today's forces?
Answer. No. We need approximately $50 billion to modernize and
recapitalize our Bottom-Up-Review forces. If shortfalls continue, DOD
will be on the road to obsolescence. For example, if Navy only buys
four to five ships a year, the fleet will in time dwindle to 200 ships.
The bottom line is programmatics do not fit the concept or vice versa.
Troop Quality, Morale, and Medical Issues
Question. General Sheehan, have you noticed any deterioration in
the quality of the new troops entering your theater? How would you
describe their physical condition? Are the troops as mentally
disciplined as those in prior years?
Answer. No. Even though we are often forced to deploy cross-leveled
units, stretch the limits of our combat service and support force
structure, and respond more frequently with fewer and fewer units, the
men and women of USACOM and the entire U.S. armed forces are the best
equipped, trained and led military in the world. Quality force and
wellness initiatives have taken on new strategic importance in today's
requirement for a ready Continental U.S.-based force to sustain and
support forward commanders in chief (CINCs) and provide domestic
response capability. Generally, the physical condition of our troops in
the field is as good as it has been in past years and is getting even
better. Their leadership training, physical conditioning, and improved
wellness management make them a better and more sustainable warfighting
force than we have fielded before. Increased emphasis on wellness
programs by the Services, improved medical surveillance and health
maintenance programs, and leveraged military medicine techniques and
technology like telemedicine, care-in-the-air aeromedical evacuation,
patient tracking with in-transit visibility, and forward medical
surgical capability ensure constant vigilance over threats to troop
wellness and their ability to mentally and physically sustain high
levels of performance. The troops that we are sending into operational
areas such as Haiti and into harsh overseas environments such as
Iceland are very mission focused. They understand the task at hand and
have the discipline in most cases to get it done. The troops of today
are accustomed to and familiar with the technically advanced tools and
technologies employed on the modern battlefield, and cope better in
many cases than those in prior years. This has allowed us to challenge
them earlier and transition more technically sophisticated
responsibilities to more junior troops than was possible or practical
in earlier years.
However, there are threats to these advances. Today's troops face
not only the stresses associated with deployments away from their
support network, but they also face longer hours on the job at home
maintaining the aging equipment inventory and training for the next
mission. Particular attention should be paid to the continued care and
attention to family support, quality of life during deployment and
periods of non-deployment, and job security issues upon return from
stressful deployments. Finally, recent uncoordinated attempts by the
Navy's Surgeon General to cut the training program at Portsmouth Naval
Hospital, if executed, will have the serious impact on the morale and
readiness of the forces.
Question. Have you found that the new troops enter the field with
more personal problems than those in the past?
Answer. No. While there are the standard personal problems that
will appear with any deployment, my commanders in the field report that
these problems are no different than any other deployments they have
been involved with. The troops we are seeing today are more aware of
the relationship of quality of life to lifestyle management, and more
educated and willing to take personal responsibility for good choices
and good health. Make no mistake, the military lifestyle makes demands
on individuals and families that are not a part of civilian life,
however, I am confident that the support systems which the Services and
the chain of command have put into place in recent years are, at least
in part, responsible for the lack of an increase in personal problems
in our service members.
Question. How is the morale of your troops on deployment in the
theater?
Answer. We currently have troops deployed throughout the USACOM
Area of Responsibility conducting diverse and challenging missions.
These men and women are the best trained and equipped professionals in
the world. The moral of our deployed men and women in the theater
remains high. Morale in the theater is high because the troops remain
focused on the mission at hand which is what they were trained to do.
Most military men and women joined the service to see the world.
Deployments in support of real world missions are a source of pride and
satisfaction for the troops in the theater.
The problem we're having today is when the troops come back to home
station. In many cases they are working just as many hours when they
return. Following a deployment, the actual time spent with families is
usually not the same as the anticipated and deserved time. Morale then,
is not a problem with our forward deployed men and women, but is more
of an issue with troops that are either in support roles or between
deployments back in CONUS. We are often demanding more of our troops at
home who are supporting our deployed troops, intensely training for the
next deployment cycle, or working progressively long hours on aging
equipment. Most units go through a period of degradation after a
deployment in order to beef up other units preparing for the next
deployment. When our troops return from deployment they expect a well
deserved rest, but we find they often put more time on the job and
family time suffers.
Question. In visiting various statewide bases, members of the
Committee have been hearing complaints about medical care and dental
plans. How satisfied are troops and dependents in ACOM with the medical
care, and dental care for themselves and their dependents? What are the
major shortcomings of medical care in your command? How many U.S.
military operated hospitals are there in the Atlantic Command?
Answer. The troops and their dependents are generally satisfied
with the medical and dental care they're provided. This said, I am
still concerned about the diluted Service focus towards continued
professional medical education. Recent uncoordinated attempts by the
Navy's Surgeon General to cut the training program at Portsmouth Naval
Hospital, if executed, will have a serious impact on the morale and
readiness of the forces. Bringing our medical professionals to a level
of expertise, and keeping them there, is critical to ensuring this
country's military men and women are well taken care of and that joint
task force commanders can remain confident that today's force will be
available for tomorrow's fight. Funding decisions made during the
Fiscal Year 1999 Budget Review, shifting focus from medical treatment
facilities towards smaller ``clinics'' with less specialized medical
care, reduce troop and dependent access to more acute medical
treatment. Additionally, pulling trained medical professionals from
these facilities increases the likelihood that physicians will not have
the training and skills necessary when called upon during conflict. In
my Area of Responsibility (AOR) there are three hospitals.
Quadrennial Defense Review and the Future Force Structure
Question. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) will reexamine the
current national security strategy and present force structure of the
armed services. The QDR will purportedly make recommendations as to
what the appropriate mix of forces will look like to meet the strategic
and regional threats of the future. The results are due to be presented
to the Congress in May of this Year.
You have been outspoken in the past on the need to ``be open to the
case for a radical restructuring of our armed forces.'' You have also
noted that the so-called ``tooth-to-tail ratio'', that is the number of
combat forces versus the number of support forces necessary to maintain
them, is severely out of balance. To illustrate your point you have
made the following observations in interviews or addresses:
--That ``There are 150,000 DoD military within a 50 mile radius of
Washington D.C., while there are only 129,000 sailors in the entire
Atlantic Fleet.''
--``In the DoD there are 199 separate staffs at the civilian and
the two-star and above flag officer level.'' And;
--Statistically, that the Army has only about 125,000 ``warfighters
supported by 375,000 uniformed personnel and another 300,000 civilians
. . . that works out to only 16 percent of the total force.''
You have also concluded that ``if we're not careful, we could
become the best trained staff to ever get run off a hill.''
Do you believe that staff cuts alone will free up the necessary
funds to achieve the Department's modernization goals?
Answer. No. Even the most generous estimates of the savings that
could be generated by overhead reductions fall dramatically short of
the amounts needed to achieve DoD modernization goals. But, that should
not deter our efforts to restore the proper balance between combat
forces and support personnel. From the Cold War peak (FY87) to the
present, we have dramatically cut the overall force while making only
token reductions in headquarters staffs. Likewise, the ratios of
enlisted personnel to officers, and junior civilian personnel to senior
personnel, have grown disproportionate. We are compromising
modernization by retaining a disproportionately top-heavy force
structure which is expensive and unnecessary.
Question. Given present resources should we give up the notion of a
force capability to conduct two near simultaneous Major Regional
Conflicts (MRCs)?
Answer. No, we should not give up the force capability to conduct
two near simultaneous MRCs. This capability is a key element supporting
our ``National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement.''
Moreover, it is essential to our role as the remaining superpower with
the responsibility to respond globally with a broad range of
capabilities until ``coalitions of the willing'' are able to react to
the ``hot sports'' of today's world.
Tactical Aircraft Modernization
Question. A recent Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study
estimates that the total cost to develop and acquire all the aircraft
presently envisioned for the F-22, F-18E/F, and Joint Strike Fighter
programs will amount to $350 billion, even without factoring in
inflation. Depending on what funding assumptions you make, these three
programs could consume anywhere from 25 to 50 percent of all defense
department procurement spending in the future.
General Sheehan, you have been quoted as asking the question: ``Why
spend $213 billion (over the next decade) for marginal improvements in
airplanes when we still haven't figured out how to kill tanks?'' Could
you please expand your views to the Committee as to the relative
priority of tactical aircraft modernization versus other Defense
Department weapon requirements?
Answer. Tactical aircraft modernization must be considered as only
one part of a large total force modernization program. As such it must
be conducted with a clear understanding of current and future joint
warfighting requirements. It must recognize that some elements of our
current tactical aircraft force structure are redundant. Moreover,
because the airframes were so expensive, we suboptimized some fixed and
rotary wing aircraft in terms of combat identification and night
capabilities. Friend or foe identification capability must be
incorporated on all attack aircraft. Aggressive, joint sponsorship for
this initiative is required. We must ensure that any modernization that
is conducted is based on joint warfighting requirements and the need
for all elements of a joint force to be interoperable. All too often we
suboptimize weapons programs within a large concept of operations and
then suboptimize the weapons systems themselves such that they are not
fully capable of operating in a complex, joint battlespace.
Question. Given the most likely threats in the most likely
geographic settings of the future, do you believe that 25 to 50 percent
of all DoD procurement funding is warranted just for tactical aircraft
modernization?
Answer. The issue is not whether the threat/geographic combination
warrants expending a significant portion of the DoD procurement budget
for tactical aircraft modernization, but whether the threat/geographic
combination warrants the types of aircraft we are planning to procure
during this modernization. Fighter recapitalization programs are
necessary to ensure essential warfighting capabilities remain available
to support the National Security Strategy. For our continued success as
the world's only military superpower, we need a modern, survivable, and
increasingly lethal fleet of tactical aircraft with their associated
capabilities. Combined with the advanced precision weapon purchases,
these programs may represent a substantial portion of the DoD budget,
but the capability they engender is vital to our 21st century
warfighting needs. Nevertheless, we still must give serious
consideration to the proper mix of tactical aviation assets which are
purchased. In light of predictions that we will face no peer
competitors in the next 10-15 years, we must not purchase airframes
unless they clearly support our national strategy and provide
capabilities vital to executing our military strategy.
Question. General, you have argued recently that ``naval aviation
still does not have a clear concept of where fixed-wing aviation fits
in strike warfare.'' What in your view are the major conceptual issues
that need to be resolved in this mission area as the Navy embarks upon
the acquisition of 1000 F/A-18E/Fs at a total program cost of $67
billion?
Answer. In referring to the Navy's lack of a clear concept of
fixed-wing aviation's place in strike warfare, I see two key issues.
First, the Naval Services (United States Navy and Marine Corps) need to
find an optimum, but affordable balance between fixed wing tactical
aircraft, combat support aircraft (e.g., proper medium lift mix) and
cruise missiles. Prior decisions, given current budgetary constraints,
must be viewed with an eye toward trade-offs that will allow naval
aviation to sufficiently fund airframes to fill deck requirements and
adequately fund Standard Depot Level Maintenance (SDLM) Schedules. Can
Marine Corps fixed-wing aircraft be more aggressively utilized to fill
carrier decks? Can a larger percentage of the tactical aircraft strike
mission (e.g., deep interdiction) be assumed by improved, surface
launched cruise missiles, freeing manned aircraft for close support
missions? Second, naval aviation, along with other joint warfighting
capabilities, have yet to recognize the potential geo-strategic impacts
that world population growth and a shift toward coastal, urbanized
areas will have on our force structure and military missions. Because
of the large investment, fixed-wing tactical aircraft must be relevant
to the entire conflict spectrum, e.g., capable of supporting lower-end
operations in addition to the high-end warfighting tasks.
Atlantic Command Role in Theater Missile Defense
Question. As of last autumn the Defense Science Board and the
Defense Policy Board were urging that the U.S. Atlantic Command be put
in charge of the Department's joint theater missile defense (TMD)
architecture. It has also been reported that USACOM has been given the
sole responsibility for the most basic TMD requirements document.
Why is it appropriate that your command should take the lead in
defining a TMD architecture?
Answer. As the Joint Force Integrator, USACOM is the best command
to deal with the ``quintessential joint program,'' Joint Theater
Missile Defense (JTMD). Because JTMD involves capabilities from all the
Services, a joint headquarters is needed to provide a joint warfighting
focus and to integrate ``stovepiped'' Service programs.
Since USACOM assumed control of the JTMD Initiative in July 1996 we
have embarked on a three-pronged approach. These three areas are:
--Coherent Defense 97. Established to examine and produce potential
resolution to procedural issues between the Army and Air Force, and to
develop a command and control architecture for JTMD.
--Theater Missile Defense Capstone Requirements Document. By
direction of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, USACOM has
taken the lead for updating JTMD requirements in concert with other
warfighting CINC's. USACOM is carrying out this tasking by developing a
Theater Missile Defense Capstone Requirements Document (TMD CRD), which
will be approved by all warfighting CINC's and subsequently the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).
--JTMD-Related Universal Joint Task List Tasks, Conditions and
Standards Development. The identification and further definition of
JTMD-related tasks conditions and standards will improve upon efforts
to train and integrate forces based upon supported command
requirements, further the development of the CJCS Universal Joint Task
List, and advocate the continued adaptation of warfighter requirements
to existing and future joint doctrine.
Subsequent to the commencement of the JTMD Initiative, the Office
of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff have established the Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense
Organization (JTAMDO) to define required system interoperabilities and
operational architectures, and to validate the developing joint theater
air and missile defense capabilities through both simulation and
technology demonstrations.
With JTAMDO focusing on the TMD architecture, USACOM is taking an
active role within the Integrated Product Team structure of JTAMDO to
develop supporting architectures operational concepts.
Question. Will your architecture specify common sensors, supporting
communications systems and data dissemination networks and force the
services to adhere to one set of standards where multiple technology
solutions may already exist?
Answer. Yes. As part of USACOM's TMD Initiative, the Coherent
Defense series of exercises are designed to address operational
architecture issues among the Services for Joint Theater Missile
Defense (JTMD).
The first of the series Coherent Defense 97 is currently ongoing.
It was established to examine and produce potential resolution to
procedural issues between the Army and Air Force, develop a command and
control architecture for JTMD, and to subsequently provide draft
tactics, techniques and procedures documentation to the Joint Staff
that codifies agreed-to procedures for JTMD.
Additionally, by direction of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, USACOM has assumed responsibility for leading the development
of overarching JTMD requirements in concert with other warfighting
CINC's. USACOM is carrying out this tasking by developing a Theater
Missile Defense Capstone Requirements Document (TMD CRD) specifically
addressing a Family of Systems approach to the TMD mission. The TMD CRD
will identify and validate overarching warfighting required
capabilities inclusive of Command, Control, Communications, Computers
and Intelligence (C4I), Passive Defense, Active Defense and Attack
Operations to support JTMD into the next century.
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs)
Question. Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) were
developed to accelerate and facilitate the application of mature
advanced technologies to solve military problems and provide new
operational capabilities to the field sooner than the normal
acquisition process presently allows. ACOM is the most active ACTD user
and sponsor, currently sponsoring 10 ACTDs or seventy percent of total
active ACTDs that ACOM is currently sponsoring. General Sheehan, please
provide a brief overview of the ACTDs that ACOM is currently
sponsoring. Which ones do you believe hold the greatest promise to
deliver near-term operational capability?
Answer. As a point of clarification, USACOM is currently sponsoring
eight ACTDs vice ten as stated in the QFR.
The goal of Synthetic Theater of War (STOW) is to demonstrate the
utility of advanced simulation technologies to directly support joint
training and mission rehearsal. It is a prototype simulation system
which uses entity or platform level simulation to conduct a segment of
operational JTF training with tactical representation. Its objective:
allow the user to preview technology under actual exercise training
conditions to determine which technologies are useful and should
transition to the Joint Simulation System (JSIMS). The initial demo and
two year follow on period is 29 Oct 97 through December 99. The
transition from STOW to JSIMS is being coordinated during this period
and will serve to reduce the risk of JSIMS at its Initial Operations
Capability (IOC) in FY 00/1. STOW is not intended as a stand alone
system and will not become an operational capability. The success of
JSIMS however, is very dependent on the results of the STOW program and
its two year follow on period.
The objective of the Joint CounterMine (JCM) ACTD is to demonstrate
the capability to conduct seamless transition of countermine operations
from sea to land. The ACTD represents twelve Novel systems that will
provide capabilities ranging from clandestine reconnaissance and
surveillance to overt reconnaissance, neutralization, clearing,
breaching and marking. The ACTD also includes a C4I architecture that
will provide a common countermine operational picture. The Modeling and
Simulation capability (Joint CounterMine Operational Simulation (JCOS))
of JCM provides the ability to conduct course of action analysis and
operational concepts, tactics, and doctrine development as well as
training and evaluation. The JCM ACTD has significant potential to
provide the warfighter an enhanced Counter Mine capability particularly
in areas where no capability currently exists. Residuals from most of
the Novel systems will be available next fiscal year.
The Navigation Warfare (NAVWAR) ACTD was initiated as a catalyst
for determining methods of preventing an adversary's use of satellite
navigation information while protecting friendly access to signals from
the precise Global Positioning System (GPS). While the threat from
adversaries is still in a stage of early development, this ACTD is
geared to long-term development of capabilities because growth and
reliance upon precision navigation systems is growing worldwide. Early
prototypes of prevention assets for offensive use against an adversary
have been demonstrated in ongoing field assessments. Enhanced
navigation receivers are still in the developmental stages with the
first being delivered in the summer of 1997.
The High Altitude Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (HAE UAV) ACTD
will provide near real time imagery to the warfighter from two
performance enhanced unmanned aerial vehicles, the Global Hawk (GH) and
the Dark Star (DS). The Global Hawk will provide a long dwell
capability and the Dark Star will provide the assured receipt
capability. Eight GH and six DS vehicles will be produced for the ACTD
with the military assessment demonstrations planned to end in the fall
of 2000. The capability provided by both Global Hawk and Dark Star will
be of enormous benefit to the warfighter.
The Combat Identification (CID) ACTD was developed in response to
the fratricide issues as a result of the Gulf War. The overall
objective of the CID ACTD is to demonstrate and assess technologies
that can enhance the capability of our combat forces to positively
identify friendly, hostile, and neutral platforms during Air-to-Ground
and Ground-to-Ground operations, in order to maximize combat
effectiveness and reduce fratricide due to mis-identification. The ACTD
is a system of systems assessing the military utility of eleven
different technologies. Of the eleven technologies, three have
demonstrated potential for near term operational capability thus far.
The Battlefield Combat ID System (BCIS) is a ground-to-ground point-of-
engagement system that utilizes a millimeter wave interrogator and
transponder to query the suspect target. Situational Awareness Beacon
w/Reply (SABER) is a situational awareness technology solution,
providing identification code, position information and other host
platform data. This information is transmitted via UHF line-of-sight
radios or indirectly via UHF satellite link. In the most deficient CID
mission area (Air-to-Ground), the Situational Awareness Data Link
(SADL), an Air Force Air National Guard/Reserve initiative to install
an Army Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS) radio in F-
16 and A-10 aircraft receives situational awareness (SA) and target ID
information (friendly ground maneuver vehicle locations) from the
ground tactical network.
The objective of the Advanced Joint Planning (AJP) ACTD is to
identify and enhance operational planning capabilities. AJP leverages
software technology to build planning tools or applications that assist
staff planners in deployment and execution planning of joint forces.
The ACTD is divided into three main areas or capabilities. The Joint
Readiness Automated Management System (JRAMS) allows planners to
quickly assess availability and preparedness of forces. Joint Planning
and Execution Toolkit (JPET) is a collaborative planning toolkit for
Crisis Action Planning (CAP). The Map Based Planner (MBP) allows the
planner to visualize Courses of Action as it appears on a map of the
area. Both JRAMS and JPET have demonstrated near term capacity and are
undergoing hardening and evaluation in preparation for migration to the
Global Command and Control System (GCCS).
The Battlefield Awareness and Data Dissemination (BADD) ACTD
integrates information management and broadcast technologies to provide
the Joint Task Force commander the ability to dynamically configure his
communications and information control. It is aimed at providing an
efficient and seamless information management infrastructure for the
warfighter, targeted to achieve total battlefield awareness. It
provides information needed when needed, in the format needed, in a
timely and cost effective manner. The BADD program, working with the
Global Broadcast System (GBS), other advanced communications, and
legacy systems has a reach back capability to Intel data that will get
warfighting information to the tactical level and allow warfighters to
access new and different data sources to create more concise and robust
operational views of the battlespace than ever before. The ability of
the reach back capability to request and provide imagery via the Global
Broadcast system to the BADD work station was demonstrated last fall.
The objective of the Semi-Automated IMINT Processing ACTD is to
significantly improve the Image Analyst's (IA) ability to process the
ever increasing surveillance imagery generated by U-2 aircraft and the
new High Altitude Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. With the
decreasing number of the IAs in the services, this is of particular
interest to USACOM. The ACTD exploits Automatic Target Recognition
(ATR) technology and integrates this with other imagery exploitation
tools to rapidly process large amounts of imagery typically generated
by sensors such as Synthetic Aperture Array Radars (SAR) employed in
wide area search modes of operation. The system is currently operating
with the U-2 aircraft in Operation Desert Capture which is part of the
army Task Force XXI exercises at Fort Irwin, Ca. This particular
exercise is part of the system development and will be used to baseline
the initial system design. The technological risk and military utility
of the system is part of the overall assessment of the ACTD which is
scheduled to complete in FY99.
Question. ACTDs are a relatively new concept which are still
experiencing growing pains as warfighters and service acquisition
organizations try to figure out the most appropriate way to test and
swiftly field systems developed under ACTDs in a manner which ensures
that the systems can be adequately supported once they are delivered to
operating units.
What are your views as to how the present ACTD program is
structured and how it might be improved?
Answer. ACTDs are making significant progress in involving the
warfighter in the development and assessment of these advanced
technologies. As an evolving process there are, however, some areas for
potential improvement. The transition of the ACTD is the least
developed portion and the shortcoming was graphically illustrated when
USACOM tried to transition the Predator ACTD to a receiving service. An
ACTD is initiated with the signing of the Implementation directive. One
of the signatores is a service acquisition executive (SAE). At this
point the ACTD needs to clearly designate a lead service and the
involvement of that service's acquisition agency. The service
acquisition agency should get involved early on to both POM and plan
for the transition of the ACTD so that, if successful, the ACTD can
transition in a timely manner. This would allow the prospective program
manager and his OT&E organization to assist with the transition
planning. Their suggestions of what data or other steps should be taken
within the ACTD to minimize the time and effort needed after the ACTD
ends to achieve a production decision (where that is appropriate) would
be mutually beneficial.
Earlier involvement of the user sponsor in the selection process
for new ACTDs could help the prospective lead service in it's overall
planning process. The joint staff takes into consideration the needs
and prospective roles of the services/CINCs as part of their
determination within the ACTD process. Likewise, an earlier involvement
of the Unified Commands in the selection process for new ACTDs would
lessen the impact on the ACTD caused by the user sponsor as the
Operational Manager becomes more familiar with the program details and
begins to introduce the warfighter view.
Question. Even an ACTD success story such as the Predator unmanned
aerial vehicle has had its difficulties. Initial Predator vehicles
delivered to Bosnia lacked de-icing mechanisms on their wings, causing
extended delays to winter flight operations. Problems such as these may
have been detected by more extended operational testing than that
conducted under the ACTD.
How do you believe a balance can be struck between the need to
swiftly develop and field a capability for the warfighter and the need
to ensure that it is adequately tested before it gets to the field and
an adequate support infrastructure is in place once it gets there?
Answer. In short, earlier designation and aggressive integration of
a Service sponsor is required to ensure an ACTD has optimum military
utility and that the product is sustainable. Additionally, a parallel
reform effort within the traditional Operational Test and Evaluation
(OT&E) and Logistic communities is necessary. These reforms must be
keyed to the ongoing reforms in the acquisition process that are
inherent in the ACTD process, to ensure an expeditious and seamless
transition to the warfighter of the ACTD product or capability.
Specifically, to facilitate adequate testing and evaluation, early
involvement and commitment from sponsoring Services must occur. The
Service should integrate their OT&E organization within the ACTD test
and evaluation program that is managed variably by the Defense
Evaluation Support Agency (DESA) or a confederation of other DOD
organizations. However, while ACTDs are designed to reform and
accelerate the acquisition process, the Service OT&E organizations
still function at the pace of the traditional DOD acquisition timeline.
A parallel reform effort in Service OT&E processes must be adopted.
Predator did involve Service OT&E organizations in the program;
however, their inflexible and highly structured processes were slow and
cumbersome within the ACTD boundaries. Service OT&E is keyed to the DOD
5000 series timelines of 7 or more years. To effectively integrate
Service OT&E into an ACTD, the Services must adopt a separate program
to facilitate rapid demonstration/exercise planning; cheaper, smaller
and more flexible data collection efforts; and expeditious analytical
and reporting capabilities. It would have been impossible to achieve
the milestones within the Predator ACTD if the program was linked to a
Service OT&E organization. USACOM used the Defense Evaluation Support
Agency (DESA) to assist in a rapid planning, testing and evaluation
cycle that was designed specifically for the ACTD process.
In a similar fashion, supportability issues are a valid concern but
may have to remain a tradeoff for the rapid integration of new
technologies into the military. By its very nature, an ACTD does not
provide enough time and resources to collect adequate data on system
vulnerabilities, the Service-life of the system and its components,
identification of critical components, system production and inventory
levels, etc. This problem is harder to solve, but involvement of
Services early in an ACTD can mitigate some of these problems. At a
minimum, with Service involvement, deficiencies can be identified early
in an ACTD. This could stimulate concurrent analyses by the Services to
determine the gaps in information, the vulnerable parts of the program,
and issues for follow-on review once an ACTD enters the transition
phase. Additionally, Service logisticians could alert ACTD managers to
unique requirements for data that may be integrated into other
collection efforts.
The bottomline is the ACTD process is not the panacea for DOD
acquisition, however, it is a very valuable tool for Joint Force
Integration that is necessary to speed the integration of new
capabilities to the warfighter. Clearly, the process is not suited for
all acquisition and development efforts, but makes good sense in the
way it has been employed to date. I wouldn't want to build a major
weapon system, such as a new class aircraft carrier this way, but this
process can effectively, if not perfectly, give the warfighter a ``good
enough'' capability rapidly.
Joint Interoperability/C4I Programs
Question. The principle objective of the Goldwater-Nichols
Department of Defense Reorganization Act was to address the persistent
problems of interservice interoperability, unclear command
relationships and competing doctrine that had hampered joint service
contingency operations in the past. The intent was to make all services
work together as a joint team. Are major procurement decisions made by
the services today on the basis of what a program contributes to the
nation's total defense capability as opposed to the individual
services?
Answer. Most decisions are made based on overarching joint
warfighting requirements. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council
(JROC) has evolved as a superb forcing function, ensuring recognized
threats are balanced against existing hardware and future system
developments are considered for joint applicability. The JROC forces
the Services to ask the question, ``how does this planned weapon system
play in the joint fight and therefore necessitate resource programming
with the resulting answer in mind.'' This is not to say that there
isn't more work to be done by us all in integrating existing systems
into the joint fight. Greater focus on developing one common Combat
Identification system for detection of ``friend-or-foe'' is critical to
the safety of the men and women fighting in all future conflicts. A
Command, Control, Communications, Computer and Intelligence (C4I)
architecture which incorporates processing and analysis commonality is
vitally needed for joint task force (JTF) commanders; and a cohesive,
integrated resourcing strategy of reconnaissance/surveillance platforms
to support increasing collection and dissemination requirements is an
area which although somewhat fractionalized, is now being addressed by
the JROC for fusion into a common system.
Question. By some estimates the Department of Defense spends almost
40 percent of its annual budget on command, control, communication,
computer, and intelligence (C4I) programs. Do you believe that this
level on investment in sensors, communications systems, and data
distribution networks has resulted in increased interoperability among
the services or have unique service information architectures persisted
which inhibit joint operations?
Answer. Architectures remain fragmented between Services, Agencies,
and Unified CINCs, and are further fragmented between the C4 and I
communities. A coherent strategy employing the new Joint Technical
Architecture, including a forcing-function, is needed to consolidate an
architecture that can drive the PPBS process. We must agree on a
definition of a Joint C4I Architecture which will, of course, include
necessary service unique systems, but which will also highlight the
need for a modification of Title 10 provisions. The current provisions
encourage the service needs vice joint interoperability requirements by
denying a mechanism to enforce the use of the joint interoperability
solutions and result in fielding technology latent systems.
C4I is, and must continue to be, a large portion of the DoD budget.
However, our best information indicates the figure to be somewhere
closer to 20 percent based on the President's Fiscal Year 98 budget.
Many of the programs involve very expensive space platforms, and
virtually all the programs/systems require software/hardware
development and cryptologic support. C4I is a critical enabler and
requires a clear linkage to the comprehensive investment strategy.
Without investing in C4I (larger pipes, expanding the C4I grid
structure) now, we reduce our capability to assure the level of
information dominance the warfighter will need to execute missions in
the future.
Question. How should the department and the services seek to
improve this situation in the future?
Answer. A C4I CINC could provide direction, leadership, oversight,
and control in validating mission need statements, development,
acquisition, funding, and fielding of interoperable C4I systems for use
in joint/combined operations.
A process supporting CINC and Service Staff functional involvement
from the beginning of system/program development would lead to
tailoring plans and strategies into an integrated vice functional
perspective. We have made a beginning through the development of the
Advanced Concept and Technology Demonstration (ACTD) program. This
technology insertion program is also a first step in the reform of the
acquisition process. USACOM, as the force trainer and provider, has
fostered development and mandated the use of the Global Command &
Control System (GCCS), and other joint systems in Joint Task Force
(JTF) Exercises to insure that forces are prepared to operate in a
joint environment. Early continuous insight by the CINCs and Services
instead of after-the-fact oversight will lead to issue identification/
resolution and build a team committed to program success. Teamwork
begins at the start--not a critique 4-6 years into the program. The
CINCs would not be faced with integrating the Service systems when a
potential conflict arises somewhere in the world as is the present
situation.
We are making progress with the establishment of the Decision
Support Center, the C4I Integration Support Activity, and the stand-up
of the Joint C4ISR Battle Lab. However, we expect limited success
without Title 10 reform giving the CINCs more input into the
acquisition and fielding process along with a C4I CINC empowered to
enforce Joint Task Force Integration. A C4I CINC could ensure a ``plug-
and-play'' approach with cradle-to-grave management of the right
information to the right warfighter at the right time.
Cuba
Question. How do you rate the present military capabilities of the
Cuban armed forces? What are the Cuban military's near and long-term
force modernization goals? Do you believe Cuba poses any threat to its
neighbors in the region?
Answer. ------ .
Question. What is Cuba's current level of involvement in
international drug trafficking?
Answer. Cuba occupies a key geographic location astride primary air
and maritime trafficking routes. Absence of formal diplomatic relations
with the US makes it difficult to quantify the volume of drugs
transiting through Cuban territory, or qualify the extent of official
involvement.
Intelligence reporting does not indicate official Cuban involvement
in drug trafficking. Cuba has not publicized any drug-related
corruption since the 1989 trial and execution of several top Military/
Ministry of Interior officials.
However, the Cuban government appears to be reaching out in an
effort to work with neighboring countries in counterdrug matters.
Recently, the Cuban government established a relationship with the
Royal Bahamian Police Drug Enforcement Unit in an effort to foster the
flow of information between Cuba and the Bahamas. ------. The freighter
Limerick was sailing from Barranquilla, Colombia, to Freeport in the
Bahamas when it began to founder in international waters approximately
12 miles from the US military base in Guantanamo Bay. A US Coast Guard
vessel patrolling the area received permission to search the vessel,
but decided to abandoned the ship when it began to take on water. After
discovering the cocaine, the Cubans gave the drugs to US authorities,
agreed to testify against the Captain and crew, and continued to search
the vessel finding a hidden compartment filled with contraband.
To date, bilateral US and Cuban drug enforcement remains sporadic
and ad hoc, but professional.
Question. What is the long-term likelihood of renewed mass
migration from Cuba to the United States?
Answer. Currently there are no Indications & Warnings (I&W) of
potential mass migration from Cuba. This information is cooroborated by
the U.S. Interest Section in Havana and the USCG Intelligence
Coordination Center in Washington, D.C. The migration accords signed
between the United States and the Government of Cuba has been very
successful in thwarting migration patterns. Different from previous
migration crises, the lottery system managed by the U.S. Interest
Section in Havana, provides a mechanism for legal migration which was
non-existent prior to the 1995 accords. It also serves as a migration
valve for potential dissidents and the population at large. Indicators
tells us also the Cuban government is complying with the terms of the
accords and has vested political and economic interest in continuing to
do so.
Notwithstanding, we must keep in mind the Castro regime has
historically maintained firm control of emigration through the Interior
Ministry (Border Guard). Mass migration to the United States has always
occurred with the regime's approval when it served the regime's
purpose. In the long term, continued economic hardships could certainly
cause the level of expressed popular discontent to compel the regime to
re-evaluate the accord utility.
Haiti
Question. General Sheehan, what is your current assessment
regarding the outlook for Haiti in terms of Political Stability;
Economic Growth and; the Potential for renewed violence?
Answer. Despite initial concerns over President Preval's ability to
become a proactive and effective president, he has made surprising
strides toward resolving the nagging issues that plague Haiti's
political and social landscape. Challenged by lapses in the security
environment and a beleaguered economy, President Preval has managed to
keep Haiti's head above water. The democratic process continues to
grow, as demonstrated by free and fair elections, and by the
legislature's demonstrated resolve to serve as an independent set of
checks and balances rather than as a rubber stamp for the President.
While the political apparatus in Haiti is viewed as successful, its
ability to maintain an equilibrium between the desires of the
international community and political constituents will be the
governments's greatest challenge as it leads Haiti into the next
millennium.
The government of Haiti must, however, address the growing concerns
of the populace over the lack of economic progress, high cost of
living, and security issues if the country is to continue to mature
favorably. Future economic growth is dependent upon the Government's
ability to ensure security, move towards privatization of state-held
enterprises, and to attract foreign investment. Despite the controversy
surrounding privatization the Government of Haiti is making slow
progress. Crucial legislation addressing this issue has already met
with Parliamentary approval, and more recently government officials
have put forth a comprehensive plan outlining the timetable to
privatize nine parastatals. ------ .
Haiti has a history of both political and criminal violence.
However, the majority of political violence has been dramatically
curtailed since the restoration of democracy in 1994. While there have
been some isolated incidents of politically motivated violence, the
Government of Haiti is committed to the democratic process. ------ .
Drug Interdiction
Question. General Sheehan, your command's area of responsibility
includes the Caribbean basin of the Atlantic Ocean which is both home
to indigenous drug traffickers and a major trade route used by the
illicit drug producing nations of the southern hemisphere. Describe the
present counter-narcotic operations of the Atlantic Command to the
Committee.
Answer. The US Atlantic Command supports two of the five goals in
President's National Drug Control Strategy. These goals are to shield
US frontiers from the threat, and break the drug supply sources.
The US Atlantic Command supports those goals by: conducting
intelligence-cued counterdrug detection and monitoring operations in
support of domestic and international Law Enforcement Agencies, and
providing support to the Interagencies and Host Nations to disrupt and
reduce the flow of drugs throughout the area of responsibility and
Mexico.
We complete this tasking by focusing detection and monitoring
resources on drug trafficker's centers of gravity and optimizing
support to the Drug Law Enforcement Agencies and Host Nations.
Prioritized Support to Mexico and the Southwest border, Puerto Rico and
the US Virgin Islands, and other High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas
is how we have tasked subordinate commands to focus their detection and
monitoring operations. These operations take into account intelligence
cueing, actual high volume trafficking routes, and available resources
to coherently assimilate counterdrug forces.
Specifically, US Atlantic Command forces are conducting a variety
of detection and monitoring tasks including air and maritime detection
and monitoring, training, engineering projects, communications support,
reconnaissance, transportation, information collection and riverine
support. All of these DOD functions are in a support role with no
military forces actually performing interdictions. The interdiction
assets and personnel are coordinated by military forces but the actual
arrests and seizures are conducted by law enforcement agencies such as
the US Coast Guard, Customs, DEA, and FBI.
Question. What are your most useful assets in performing this
mission?
Answer. The most important assets I have in the detection and
monitoring mission are the two counterdrug organizations, Joint
Interagency Task Force East, and Joint Task Force (JTF)-6.
Joint Interagency Task Force, East in Key West, FL, which has on
staff all interagency drug law enforcement as well as British and Dutch
liaison officers, conducts detection and monitoring operations in the
drug transit zone between the source zone in South America, and the US
arrival zone. JTF-6, which is based in El Paso, TX, conducts detection
and monitoring operations in support of domestic law enforcement in the
US, Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands.
These organizations are flexible enough to conduct timely
operations to effectively neutralize the threat. Both organizations use
the available technology (ships and aircraft, relocatable over the
horizon radar, ground based radars, etc.) to effectively monitor the
transit and arrival zones and focus interdiction assets to consummate
the intercept. Also, the two organizations are heavily engaged in
pushing future technologies to better conduct the mission.
The most important part of the drug interdiction mission is Joint
DOD, International and Interagency cooperative engagement and support.
Through this cooperation, we have been able to focus limited resources
from each agency or country into a cohesive detection and monitoring,
and interdiction force. Couple this cooperation with advanced
technology and planning and you have a significant force multiplier. To
single out one specific asset which is the most useful would be very
shortsighted. All of the detection and monitoring assets have relative
strengths and limitations which require teamwork and proper utilization
for mission accomplishment.
Question. Does the performance of this mission detract from the
military readiness of your operating units who engage in it?
Answer. All of the counterdrug missions which DOD forces are
conducting have some applicability to their primary warfighting mission
area. For instance Early Warning aircraft are conducting air
surveillance, Naval Combatant ships are conducting air surface target
tracking, and intercept aircraft are standing alert ready to launch and
identify a potential target of interest. JTF-6 in El Paso, TX, can show
an 85% correlation of the Joint Mission Essential Task List to every
one of its counterdrug missions. My Naval component, US Atlantic Fleet,
has created a Western Hemisphere Group composed of several surface
ships capable of conducting counterdrug operations. This organization
provides the Naval ships for counterdrug operations so the units can
focus their efforts, and the rest of the fleet can focus on Battle
Group training.
However, maintaining the required level of support for counterdrug
operations and still providing the minimum level of stand down time is
becoming increasingly more difficult. For example, the E-2 HAWKEYE
community, by necessity, must support Carrier Battle Group deployments
as well as support counterdrug operations, which require a squadron of
E-2's deployed constantly. Since there are five Carrier Air Wings, and
six Carriers in the Atlantic Fleet, these squadrons are constantly
either on deployment or preparing for deployment. Now add the
additional requirement for a 55 day counterdrug deployment and the
resulting impact on personnel, equipment, and training, is significant.
Any type of surge operation results in shuffling of already heavily
tasked components and units. Recently, we have been asked to support an
18 month surge operation in the Eastern Pacific. This requirement,
although valid for counterdrug operations, may require reducing the
escort ships from Carrier Battle Groups.
Question. What are your views on the use of submarines in the
detecting and tracking of suspected maritime drug traffickers?
Answer. The submarine brings the traditional warfighting dimensions
of identification and early warning, secure surveillance, and covert
detection and monitoring to counterdrug operations. A stealthy and self
sustaining platform, the submarine can loiter in wait for a suspect
vessel for days and then shadow the unsuspecting contact gathering
critical intelligence on trafficker patterns. Then the submarine can
communicate this information to other units and assist them in
interception and boarding. However, submarines are expensive, and with
the downsizing of the force the capabilities that the submarine brings
to the mission must be weighed against the cost of its operation and
non-availability to meet other commitments where the vessel is just as
badly needed.
Submarine employment in counterdrug operations is an evolving
process, both the ship and the tactical commander are refining
operating procedures and doctrine to enhance effectiveness. This
expensive asset has a permanent and important role in completing the
counterdrug mission, and is a significant part of the synergistic asset
management of detection and monitoring.
Dragonfly
Question. In fiscal year 1995, the Committee added funds to
evaluate the Canard Rotor/Wing (CRW) technology concept. CRW is a
stopped rotor, high-speed VTOL air vehicle which performs as a
helicopter for takeoff and landing and as a fixed wing aircraft for
high-speed cruise. The Navy and USMC continue to endorse this
technology for future manned and unmanned aircraft and to pursue its
maturation through a Dragonfly Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD).
The Committee understands that the Dragonfly ATD was strongly
recommended by three CINCs. General Sheehan, how important is Dragonfly
to your warfighting mission and is it still one of your top ATDs?
Answer. DRAGONFLY is an Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD) in
the earliest stages of assessment. Although it is an interesting
technology that appears to have potential, it is far too early to gauge
military utility. USACOM is only involved in Advanced Concept
Technology Demonstrations (ACTD); the evaluation stage encompasses more
mature technologies than ATDs. If the DRAGONFLY technology shows enough
merit to advance to the ACTD level, USACOM could be involved in the
evaluation process, at that point in time, as an operational sponsor.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Young.]
Wednesday, March 5, 1997.
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
WITNESS
GENERAL J.H. BINFORD PEAY, III, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES
CENTRAL COMMAND, U.S. ARMY
Introduction
Mr. Young. The Committee will come to order.
This afternoon the Committee concludes our series of
Commanders in Chief hearings, and we are very happy to welcome
General Peay, III, Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command.
Incidently, this is probably the last hearing John Plashal
will staff for us, because he is going on to bigger and better
things. We are going to miss him. He has done a really good job
for the Committee over the 27 years, I think it has been, John.
We will miss him. John does a good job.
I thought I would mention that John will be leaving. Norm
Dicks is going to organize a big going-away party for him.
Mr. Dicks. If Mr. Murtha were here, he would want to
certainly say a word. John has been terrific, and, as someone
said, one of the best organizers of CODELs in the history of
Congress. I think we should give John a round of applause.
Mr. Young. I think that takes the place of the going-away
party.
General Peay, in your prepared statement you describe
CENTCOM's area of responsibility with this quote. ``By any
measure, this is a dangerous neighborhood.'' I think anyone
that has paid any attention to what has happened there in
recent time would certainly underscore that statement. You are
absolutely correct.
You have had the War in Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq War, the
Persian Gulf War, the Kuwaiti flagging exercise, the Iranian
revolution and a number other lesser crises. The high tempo of
ongoing U.S. operations in the region and the recent terrorist
attack at Khobar Towers are vivid reminders that America does
have vital national security interests in the CENTCOM region,
and that the price of defending those interests is high.
Pursuant to a vote that this Committee took last week, this
hearing is closed, so we will be free to discuss, at whatever
length you would like, matters that might be classified.
We are looking forward to your testimony. Your entire
statement will be placed in the record, feel free to summarize
it in any way you wish. And then following that we will have
some penetrating questions from the Members for you on the
issues involving the CENTCOM area.
We are glad to have you here, sir.
Summary Statement of General Peay
General Peay. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor
to appear before this Committee to represent the men and women
of U.S. Central Command and discuss Central Command's approach
to protecting our Nation's interests in the Central Region.
This morning, around 12,500 American Soldiers, Sailors,
Airmen, and Marines are answering the call to duty in the
Central Region. Members of Joint Task Force Southwest Asia are
flying over Southern Iraq to enforce UN Security Council
resolutions and U.S. warnings designed to prevent Saddam from
attacking Shiites along the Euphrates River and his neighbors
to the south.
Since 1992, our airmen have logged a remarkable 131,000
accident-free sorties, with over 86,000 of these over Iraq; a
great tribute to the professionalism and technical skill of our
pilots and air crews.
Pressure on Iraq is magnified through enforcement of
economic sanctions in the Arabian Gulf. Under the leadership of
U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command, and FIFTH Fleet, this
multinational flotilla has steadfastly enforced UN sanctions
against Iraq since 1990. During this period, it has challenged
23,000 vessels, intercepted more than 13,000, boarded nearly
10,400 and diverted over 600.
These operations are complex and dangerous. Our sailors
have performed brilliantly in preventing incidents from
spiraling out of control and in handling sensitive matters with
great care.
And, even as we undertake these activities, along with
scores of exercises and security assistance programs, we are
engaged in an aggressive program to reconfigure our forces in
the region to contend with the increased terrorist threat.
SAFEGUARDING U.S. INTERESTS AND SECURITY
United States Central Command undertakes these operations
to safeguard our Nation's vital and enduring interests in the
Central Region.
Principal among these are maintaining the flow of oil at
reasonable prices; ensuring freedom of navigation and access to
commercial markets; protecting American citizens and property
abroad; and assuring the security of regional friends in the
context of a comprehensive Middle East peace.
Protecting our interests is a formidable task. The 20
nations comprising our area of responsibility suffer from
historic internal and external conflicts flowing from religious
and tribal strife among the region's 430 million people, and
from border disputes, competition for resources, economic
disparities, and exploding populations.
It is, by every measure, a dangerous neighborhood. I find
it useful to organize these regional threats into five major
groupings:
First, the near-term threat of Iraq. With the largest
regional army, Iraq has proven on several occasions over the
past 3 years that it can mobilize and deploy quickly to
threaten Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
Second, the mid- and long-term threat of Iran. Determined
to dominate the region and lead the Islamic world, Iran has
acquired significant naval resources that endanger the waters
of the Gulf. Even more worrisome is its support for terrorism
and pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, WMD both of which
pose risks to regional states and U.S. interests.
Third, the continuing proliferation of ballistic missiles,
chemical and biological weapons, and nuclear technology
exacerbating existing tensions.
The situation has deteriorated during the past 12 months,
with Iraq, Iran and others in the region aggressively seeking
missile and nuclear technology and advancing their chemical and
biological research and development programs.
Fourth, terrorism. Religious, ethnic and tribal divisions,
along with economic and political disenfranchisement, give rise
to factions embracing violence as their best hope for achieving
political and social change. Older organizations such as Hamas
and Hizballah are now joined by ``transnational'' groups made
up of Islamic extremists who gained military experience and
religious indoctrination fighting in Afghanistan's civil war.
Fifth, and lastly, general regional instability. Enduring
social, economic, and political problems in the region produce
general regional instability. Included are political upheaval,
famine, economic adversity, border disputes, and challenges
arising as aging leaders turn over power to the next
generation, a development that has far-reaching implications
for our country and the world.
Iraq, Iran, proliferation of WMD, terrorism and regional
instability; these are the five major threats with which our
Nation must contend in the Central Region for at least the next
quarter of a century.
USCENTCOM'S FIVE-PILLAR THEATER STRATEGY
United States Central Command's Five-Pillar Theater
Strategy of power projection, forward presence, combined
exercises, security assistance, and readiness to fight
addresses these threats. It organizes forces, emplaces
equipment and supplies, and establishes the relationships that
promote stability, deter conflict, limit the intensity of
conflict should deterrence fail, and facilitate the transition
to war, if required.
A major component of this strategy is forging regional
partnerships and conducting coalition operations. We deem such
relationships essential to achieve long-term U.S. goals in the
region. Establishing them requires the U.S. to assist regional
friends in realizing their legitimate self-defense needs.
This is no easy task. They are in the process of
modernizing their forces and fielding major weapon systems
while simultaneously trying to restructure military
organizations and overcome severe interoperability problems.
Success requires that we be patient and embrace a long-term
perspective. This is a 25-year process.
We accomplish many of our requirements through a relatively
small but lethal mix of Naval, Air, Ground, and Special
Operations Forces operating in the region on a temporary but
recurring basis, augmented by military advisers and trainers
and by prepositioned stocks of equipment and supplies ashore
and afloat.
As defined in the forward presence, combined exercises, and
security assistance pillars, these forces provide a near-
continuous presence in the region. This collage of military
resources capitalizes on the complimentary capabilities of each
service to manage risk and gain maximum flexibility to contend
with the threats. It is an approach that is central to
deterring conflict, enhancing military-to-military relations,
assuring access to facilities, cementing coalitions, and
supporting contingency operations.
Bolstering these forward-positioned assets is America's
military potential as defined in our power projection pillar.
Included are additional aircraft, ships, Marines and Army
Forces deploying from the Continental U.S. and elsewhere around
the world.
Combined, power projection and ``near-continuous presence''
offer a credible deterrent to would-be aggressors while also
providing the ingredients for fighting and winning decisively,
if required.
Our final pillar, readiness to fight, binds the activities
encapsulated in the previous pillars and enhances our ability
to wage high-tempo, joint and multinational operations. We do
this through robust battle staff training and exercises and by
institutionalizing tactics, techniques and procedures.
Readiness to fight also includes the myriad of activities
relating to force protection. Terrorists threatening our forces
are well-trained, well-armed, and well-supported by various
nations and nongovernment agencies. While withdrawing the bulk
of our forces from the region would reduce our vulnerability
significantly, it would pose grave and unacceptable dangers to
American interests. Remaining engaged in the region means
taking appropriate action, in cooperation with regional
friends, to protect our service men and women. We have done
this over the past year by undertaking an extensive Force
Protection Enhancement Program that has included the following:
First, we have relocated personnel to more secure and
defensible sites throughout the Area of Responsibility AOR and,
in particular, in Saudi Arabia.
Second, we have hardened facilities and extended perimeter
standoff.
Third, we have withdrawn most dependents.
Fourth, we have reduced our transportation vulnerability.
Fifth, we have augmented our security forces.
Sixth, we have enhanced counterintelligence activities.
Seventh, and lastly, we have improved antiterrorist
training programs and policies.
These defensive measures mitigate the vulnerability of our
forces to terrorist attack. They do not eliminate the threat. A
determined terrorist retains the advantage of being able to
attack by target, with any means, at any time.
Defensive measures make it more difficult for terrorists to
strike and, hopefully, foil their attempts. Combating these
criminals however, requires more than these passive defensive
measures. We must continue to exercise our inherent right of
self-defense, employing a full array of legal, diplomatic,
psychological, law enforcement and military operations to
defend against terrorists before they can strike, neutralize
them in their sanctuaries, and deter them from conducting
future acts.
Success in these efforts is linked, in turn, to
significantly improving U.S. human intelligence collection,
analysis, and dissemination.
While protecting our service people overseas is a critical
task, we must remain focused on accomplishing our primary
military requirements. This means we must continue to field and
exercise forces skilled in conducting joint and combined
operations during a major regional fight. Such as conflict will
require the capabilities of all of our military forces. To this
end, we must have healthy services with sufficient size and
robustness to perform operational missions, take care of
service members and families, and build and educate for the
future.
Future victory will hinge on the readiness of our tactical
organizations and the skill, courage, and sacrifice of our
fighting men and women. They, in turn, must be led by leaders
who are creative, reason critically, act innovatively, and
operate decisively in the face of ambiguity and uncertainty. We
need leaders who are prepared to take operational risk, leaders
who possess uncompromising character, and leaders who practice
out-front leadership always.
KEY ENABLING REQUIREMENTS
Pivotal to USCENTCOM's ability to fulfill its mission and
confront regional challenges is your continued support for
several programs. Chief among these are: prepositioning of
equipment ashore; theater missile defense; strategic lift; WMD
defense; and theater force protection.
I welcome the opportunity to discuss these and related
issues further during these proceedings.
We should take pride in the enormous progress we have made
over the past decade. In a part of the world of vital
importance to our Nation, we have met serious challenges,
contained enemies, and promoted engagement and enlargement.
Such achievements stem, in large measure, from the first-rate
performances of our service men and women; men and women
equipped with the finest military systems in the world.
We live in decisive times, Promoting our interests requires
patience, consistency, courage, and vision. There are no
shortcuts or cookie-cutter solutions.
We must remain resolute in following the course we have set
for ourselves.
USCENTCOM's Five-Pillar Strategy is a road map for
fulfilling our mission. It accounts for regional conditions,
cultural sensitivities of regional partners, U.S. military
operational tempo, and U.S. budgetary constraints.
To meet competing requirements involved in operating in the
Central Region, we are exploiting the complementary
competencies of each of the services and balancing a near-
continuous presence in the region. We in USCENTCOM look forward
to working with each of the military services, the Department
of Defense, and Members of Congress in the coming months to
promote and protect our Nation's interests in the Central
Region.
[The statement of General Peay follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Young. Thank you very much for an outstanding job in
performing the mission given to Central Command. This Committee
is very much aware of the work that you do and the work your
predecessors have done in a very, very difficult situation, a
difficult part of the world.
I want to apologize. Our attendance is not as good this
afternoon because we are competing with the Intelligence
Committee, which has several voting issues at the same time.
This being the prime subcommittee of the Appropriations
Committee, many of our Members are chairing their own
subcommittees, so we are having a little bit of a problem
there.
Mr. Lewis has to go to the Intelligence Committee shortly,
so I am going to yield to him for the first round of
questioning.
INTELLIGENCE BUDGET
Mr. Lewis. Thank you very much for your courtesy.
General Peay, it is good to be with you. I, too, apologize
for the circumstances. You know this crazy place as well as
most.
I would just ask a couple of general questions in the very
subject area that the Chairman was just touching on.
There is kind of a presumption around this place that as
the world is changing, that clearly one of the areas where we
can reduce spending most easily is in national defense, and you
have seen an awful lot of that over these last several years,
and hand in hand with that is the presumption that as the world
theoretically is safer, there is certainly not much need for
intelligence operations.
With that in mind, I am very much interested in your view
as to the adequacy of funding of intelligence budgets, the
impact that constrained spending is having upon your terrorist
and counterterrorist activities. Begin with that.
General Peay. I think the budgeting is there, sir. I think
the challenge is how quickly we can move a little bit more ----
--. Certainly as we look over Iraq and Iran with regularity
from my headquarters, with all the overhead systems, ------. I
am very impressed with that capability and it has served us
well.
------ is going to take a long time, and it is key to
understanding the terrorist business that is moving with great
speed in a transnational mode today. Organizations that
habitually have not worked together, we now see them merged at
times and then returning to individual operations.
To get inside these transnational actors that are supported
in one country, operate in a third country, their stores are in
a fourth country, they rehearse in a fifth country, they attack
in a sixth country, banking networks that are now economically
spread all around the world, that is going to take ------ if we
are to try to be more precise in understanding where these
attacks are going to occur.
Our challenge this morning, because of these wide diverse
threats, ends up putting our forces, both civilian and
military, on a high level of continuing alert. You simply can't
keep these forces on that kind of alert and retain their
vigilance, day after day, month after month ------. But I want
to be complimentary on the very impressive work that is done
through the other capabilities.
Mr. Lewis. I appreciate that, General.
I must say you are really addressing the need for
consistency in long-term planning, especially when you consider
------ and the assets that need to be developed there. The
Committee knows that the 1998 budget request does not continue
accelerated funding for many of these activities; have adequate
funds been provided in the year 1998, in your judgment, as we
look towards consistency in 1998?
General Peay. I don't have all the details of the Intel
piece, but assuming there has not been a major drop-off on
current operating systems, and if there are replacement systems
in mind in terms of sustainability of the current systems, then
I think we are okay. ------.
Mr. Lewis. There is a very sizeable presence on this
Committee, on our Intelligence Committee, of cross-membership,
and at some appropriate time, we might very well close the door
and discuss this question in other ways. The region you are
dealing with has got to be the highest priority, with regard to
terrorism here, abroad and at home. Maybe talking about that
and doing some serious homework in a nonpartisan way would be
helpful. I don't know if we can do it in this relatively open
environment.
Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Lewis.
Mr. Murtha?
INTERNAL UNREST IN SAUDI ARABIA
Mr. Murtha. General Peay, we took a trip, as you know, not
long ago into Bosnia, Saudi Arabia, and then we went to Israel.
We went only on terrorism. We wanted to see if there was a
thread between what was happening maybe in the Middle East and
what was happening in Bosnia. In Israel we felt Netanyahu had
been so involved in fighting terrorism, he would be able to
give us some advice.
One thread we found in Saudi Arabia was that the middle
class was getting smaller, that the rich were getting richer,
the poor were getting poorer. And the more I listened to it,
the more I heard a situation very similar to Iran 20 years ago.
Then I got the book out that Carter wrote, Keeping Faith,
and in that book the year before the country fell, the CIA said
no problem, the Shah is strong, he has control of the country.
And then later in reading about Iran, much of the problem came
because the United States handled it so poorly.
One thing the embassy did admit, as much as they liked the
troops there, that they were the focus of opposition, and they
caused a lot of problems.
Now, I really don't see any threat from the outside. I
don't see a threat from Iraq, and I don't see Iran hitting us
head-on after the bombing. I see a terrorist threat, where they
can destabilize this country. The smaller our presence is, it
seems to me, the better off we would be.
Is there concern in Saudi Arabia about the size of the
force and the fact that at one time we were kind of flaunting
the fact we were Americans and our traditions are so different
and their fundamentalism is so conservative that it was really
hurting the regime?
General Peay. That is a wide-ranging question, sir. Let me
try to hit about five or six pieces of it.
When you made your visit, I would agree that there was a
tenor at that time that the terrorist focus was on U.S.
military. But I think you have seen in the last 10 days,
radicals such as bin Ladin among other terrorists, very openly,
on purpose, expanded their rhetoric to include civilians. So
today--over there--you will find the embassy, our contractors
and many more Americans, as you know, there are 40,000
Americans alone in Saudi Arabia, you will find they are at a
high level of vigilance. They understand the threat.
I have talked to a lot of senior contractor presidents,
major corporations in the last week; this rhetoric and concern
has spread to a large degree. So it is not now just focused on
the military.
I think one of the reasons for that is we have done a
better job in the last, oh, 120 days of deterring a threat by
hardening of our positions, relocation and so forth. We made
this harder for him. Not that we are not still vulnerable in
certain places. So the terrorist now spread his rhetoric to
include other people.
Let me jump back to the first part of your question.
Certainly you are right that about 50 percent of that
population today is under 17 years of age and it is exploding.
I still, though, don't see it as an Iranian model. It is far
more tribal. ------.
Finally, I have spent a lot of time looking at this
changing Iranian-Iraqi threat in great detail, especially over
the past months, and you may want to get into that in
additional questions. It is very clear to me we have no choice.
------.
IRAQI THREAT
Mr. Murtha. Are you saying there is a legitimate threat,
that this wasn't just posturing, these moves by Iraq?
General Peay. ------. He has total, dominant control over
his population. He is 60 years old today. While he has suffered
some chinks in his armor, he has enormous control because of
his threats to the families of his potential opponents. He has
purged the military. So his new military men come up and simply
respond to this ironclad, brutal, irrational actor on the
world's scene.
He is unopposed. He sits there with 3-to-5 divisions just a
few hours to the north of Kuwaits border, and today Kuwait is
still a fledgling military trying to prove itself. So you have
no choice. ------. Let me tie that into one of these
perceptions. Ironically, I think it worked against us ------.
FORWARD PRESENCE
Mr. Murtha. In that part of the world, perception is as
much as reality. What I worry about is the fact if they
perceive the Saudi kingdom being a tool of America, and if they
find a focus like Iran did of Khomeini, a charismatic leader,
you still say that it is more important, even though their
focus of discontent--it is still important for deterrence
reasons, even though we have learned more from terrorism since
Beirut than we have in the war, you still believe it is
important we have those 12,000 people stationed there?
General Peay. Absolutely. Let me tell you where they are.
On most days, most of them are at sea, in what a lot of people
would describe as Over the Horizon. ------. We have been
talking at CENTCOM the last couple of weeks if we can also try
to use an information operations program to tell the story
differently to offset that threat that you have so
appropriately described, and we will try to do that better. But
this is sophisticated information as you try to tell it. ----
--.
Mr. Murtha. I am glad that we made the move we did. I think
it was exactly right and I know it is going to be an expensive
move. But I think we were too visible where we were, with the
flights taking off and landing right there at the airport, and
too many people in town, probably. So those are all in the
right direction.
I am glad you are watching it so closely, because in that
area of the world, it is so volatile and so difficult to
predict what is going to happen, that it is essential we be
concerned about that.
General Peay. It is very fragile.
Mr. Young. Mr. Nethercutt.
PERSIAN GULF SECURITY
Mr. Nethercutt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, welcome. I want to follow up a little bit on Mr.
Murtha's comments about the potential volatility of the region
over which you have responsibility. During your testimony, I
was looking at this map focusing on the Strait of Hormuz and
the modernization of the Iranian force. They apparently seem to
be focusing on the Straits and their capability of disrupting
traffic through there.
Do you feel confident that our capability is such that we
can meet any challenge they might present to disrupt the
Straits, and to what extent do you see that issue as a serious
threat? I would be interested in your comments.
General Peay. I think any time you deal with these
cultures, one of the things that you learn is to deal through
strength. They respect strength. ------. This is part of our
effort to satisfy OPTEMPO, budget, other kinds of requirements,
but still be able to very smartly keep the pressure on. ------.
These Straits are very narrow. Across that strait on the map
you are talking about 20 nautical miles. The channel itself is
1 to 2 miles that part where you can put the deep-draft ships
through. ------. On these particular islands today, of course,
they have been in dispute for years with the Emirates, you have
a real mixture of forces. ------. But what you don't want to do
is get in a fight. You want to provide stability, deter
conflict, and stay out of that kind of thing.
One of the challenges we have is smuggling, I was up most
of the night last night working this issue. As we do maritime
intercept operations, our young people are out there enforcing
those UN resolutions, face-to-face with these smugglers. There
is an increasing tempo of violations, with the Iranians
becoming more provocative and more bold as they assert
themselves. You may want to get into the smuggling question
later, but that is a very sophisticated operation we've just
uncovered in the last few weeks in the way it is working.
It is all working in very narrow sealanes. So a chance for
having a problem is there every day, as it was last night.
Is that what you wanted?
Mr. Nethercutt. That is very interesting. It sounds to me
that, number 1, you are vigilant; number 2, we would be able to
react appropriately, depending on what the circumstances are,
and I realize there are a whole range of circumstances. But it
sounds to me like there is a high level of vigilance, as I say,
to all of the circumstances that could occur; is that correct?
General Peay. Yes, sir. Sir, we are just really proud of
what they are doing out there. They are on the edge. What we
have to do is try not to over control. You have to decentralize
your operations. There are going to be mistakes made. These are
professionals, but in the larger sense you have to give them
their head. You don't want to ever get this thing so tightly
controlled that they don't act appropriately with confidence.
Now, there is a danger to that. That is the sophistication
and superiority of our young people. That is why you have to
have high-quality people. Because if they were to overreach --
----. I think the commander made the right decision. You have
to know in the longer run it probably makes that kind of a
culture feel more bold. So he takes you on. ------.
So far, I think we have done it appropriately.
TERRORISM
Mr. Nethercutt. Thank you. In the short time I have left,
as I do have to go to another hearing, let me ask a little more
parochial question, if you don't mind? If you can't answer at
this time, maybe I can discuss it with you or your staff later.
One of my own constituents, a gentleman by the name of
Donald Hutchings, was kidnapped in Kashmir in 1995. You may be
familiar with this. Al Faran was the group that is rumored to
have captured him, perhaps with the support of some larger
terrorist group in Pakistan. I am just wondering to what
extent, you may be privy to any intelligence about this
gentleman's condition?
I know his wife has been very active in that part of the
world, going to Pakistan and India and seek her husband's
release, or at least information on whether he is dead or
alive. I knew Don Hutchings, and I hope he is still alive. I
don't know if you know much, but if you do would you comment?
General Peay. I am not current. I will be glad to get with
my staff and provide you what we have.
Mr. Nethercutt. Thank you so much.
[The information follows:]
In July 1995 four western, civilian hikers were kidnapped by Al
Faran, a Kashmiri Separatist/Terrorist Group that is part of the
Harrikat Ul-Ansar (HUA) movement. The group's goal was the release of
21 Kashmiri separatists who were being held by India. ------. The
hostages were one U.S., one British, one German, and one Norwegian. At
this time, Indian security forces started to search for the hostages
and their kidnappers.
In August 1995, the American hostage escaped. In retaliation, and
to show the government of India that they were serious, the kidnappers
killed the Norwegian hostage. Shortly thereafter, they kidnapped
another American and one more British citizen. They now held one U.S.,
two British, and one German hostage.
In December 1995, Indian security forces closed in on the Al Faran
Headquarters in the disputed zone. Several members were killed, and
others fled to Pakistan. Several Al Faran members who were captured by
both Pakistan and India in the wake of the fight stated that the
hostages were killed by their kidnappers prior to the Indian attack. --
----. During 1996, unconfirmed hostage sightings occurred off and on.
No photographs or substantial proof was provided of these alleged
sightings. Ms. Jane Schelly, who is married to the American hostage
Donald Hutchings, and the wife of one of the British hostages, made
several appeals for information in the Pakistani, Indian, and Kashmiri
media with no success.
In January and February of 1997 the U.S. government offered rewards
for information on the hostages with no results. ------. The status of
the hostages is still unknown. They are still missing, with no
conclusive proof as to whether they are alive or dead.
Mr. Nethercutt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Visclosky?
U.S. POLICY REGARDING KURDISH SITUATION
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you.
General, thank you very much for coming today. What is the
status of the Kurds? What is happening with the Kurds, if I
could ask you?
General Peay. I think we hit a period of the winter season
setting in and you had kind of a breaking of contact since the
last push by Saddam's regular forces from the south to the
north. Today I would say it is a stagnant situation. We watch
it nightly.
I think what you are going to have is a continuing civil
war, back and forth, as good weather come in. ------.
Mr. Visclosky. What is our Nation's policy as far as any
offense that the Iraquis can mount against the Kurds?
General Peay. Well, it was the DESERT STRIKE operation that
just took place, the last one, when we fired a very few number
of weapons. We have demarched them and told them not to attack
the Kurds in the north, and that was our response to that.
Certainly the PROVIDE COMFORT Force in Turkey and some of the
other intelligence agencies that were at those bases provided
some additional leverage on Iraq from the northern perspective.
------.
Mr. Visclosky. What happens with the Kurds? Are they just
stuck there?
General Peay. ------.
AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN CONCERNS
Mr. Visclosky. I did want to ask, what concerns do you have
relative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, from your position?
General Peay. Well, I just got back from Pakistan as well,
with talks with all of the senior people there. ------.
Mr. Visclosky. Breakout militarily, or as far as their
influence?
General Peay. Their influence. And as long as you have the
Afghanistan situation and the civil war it is in, back and
forth and back and forth, all of that is fertile ground for
that kind of instability and growth.
Furthermore, those are very, very good trade routes that
economically have implications for Pakistan and other nations
in that region. So the longer that goes on, the economic piece
of all that remains somewhat frozen.
Mr. Visclosky. Are the Kilo subs that Iran has today having
difficulty as far as their operations, and, if so, what are
those?
General Peay. There are three of them. ------.
Mr. Visclosky. General, thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
KHOBAR TOWERS INCIDENT
Mr. Young. General, toward the end of last year you and I
had an opportunity to visit and talk about a number of
different things. One of the things that I found very
interesting was your perspective on the Khobar Towers, not only
the incident itself, but some of the investigation that was
ongong at the time. I assume it is still ongoing.
Give us your thoughts on that?
General Peay. I will tell you first, we have done an awful
lot since that time to try to combat terrorism. I mentioned
some of that in my statement, from relocations to hardening, to
training, our policies, watching our vehicle traffic,
relocating our dependents, substantial engineer construction,
from permanent billets in one location to temporary in another,
and going to permanent billets in the states. An enormous
amount of work with our coalition friends. You would be very
proud of them. ------. It is difficult for me, sir, in a short
period of time to sum up the real answer to your question,
though, and that is my full view on Khobor Towers.
If you will kind of let me go on this a little bit, I will
try to do it as concisely as I can.
First, you know, I would tell you that I am responsible,
that I am accountable. Despite all the business you have heard
here, if I had been at the Saudi Arabia testimony with
Secretary Perry 5 or 6 months ago, when Secretary Perry said he
is responsible, I would say no, I am the senior military
commander in the region, and I am responsible.
Inherent to that requirement of being the Commander in
Chief is that kind of responsibility.
I would say that from a military perspective, through, the
way that we grow up culturally and the way our young people
grow up culturally in our business, that is a far cry from
being culpable or being negligent or being derelict in our
duties. So as I have tried to look down, I have got 20
countries, hundreds and hundreds of installations, as I have
tried to look at that and the chain of command we have
involved, 3 Stars, 2 Stars, 1 Star, on down the chain, and I
spend hours pouring over this in my own personnel critique of
what happened in Central Command, I can't find that dereliction
of duty, that culpability. The terrorists did the attacking.
Our people didn't do the attacking.
Now, that is a snapshot in time. I tell you, you have to go
to the intelligence. ------ all across the region; 20
countries. So we raised our vigilance and we really started
moving in that time. That is what you have heard, and it didn't
adequately cover it, incidently, the 139 initiatives that this
fellow Brigadier General Schwalier and his team down at Khobar
Towers had undertaken. There were hundreds of initiatives he
had undertaken.
I find it very difficult in a snapshot kind of approach,
looking at the intelligence, ------ or something else first?
Again, it gets back to how you command across a complex
region. I think you have to give the young people their heads.
When they ask for help, you get involved ------. We had
commanders conferences at MacDill Air Force Base. Our
commanders up and down the line knew their responsibilities,
there is no question in my mind about that. And I have talked
to them in critiques after all of this, I didn't find any of
this particular indecision.
At the end of the day, the terrorists did the attacking. We
could have fixed all of these kinds of deficient situations,
but against that particular bomb size, ------. I think you
would have had similar kinds of responses.
Now, there has been a lot of comparison to Beirut. This was
not Beirut. Saudi Arbia is not Beirut. In Beirut you had
Marines ashore, you had Naval gunfire from the waters. At the
time of this particular operation, this was the Gulf. The Gulf
was not the Middle East. We had one bombing in the last 35 to
40 years called OPM-SANG. After OPM-SANG, we started all of
this kind of looking at the world differently in terms of our
force protection activities. There is a real psychological
piece of all this.
I mean, Riyadh and Dhahran are safer than Chicago,
Illinois. So there is a mind-set here. At the same time, our
troops are fighting in a number of other operations, and that
is the thing. You don't want to have our people tied down,
hunkered down. If that is what we are going to do, we might as
well not be there.
We have missions we have to do. That is what their focus
has to stay on while they still protect this close battle kind
of operation.
So as I reviewed what the subordinates were doing, were
there some tactical mistakes made? Certainly a few.
Would it have made that much difference? No.
Was the Downing report lacking in terms of the operational
and strategic, the cultural underpinning and setting of this
thing? I think it was. ------. So you can take up our marbles,
disengage and go home, or stay involved at an operational risk.
When you have operational risk you do the very best you can.
Our commanders, I think, were not culpable, not derelict, in
terms of all of that.
So I am a little bit like the Chief of Staff of the Air
Force, that has tried to bring a number of investigations
together. I somewhat fall on his side as I look at these
subordinate commanders and the work they have done. And I look
at Central Command, because I feel I am responsible, and I
don't find this culpability or dereliction. We are responsible
and we don't move from that.
INTELLIGENCE REPORTS
Mr. Young. One of the things that I asked you about, and as
a Member of the Intelligence Committee, I had an opportunity to
inquire into this as well, you do receive numerous hints that
there may be a terrorist attack. You get intelligence. And from
my understanding, if you had investigated every one of those
suggested intelligence sources about something that might
happen in the region, it would take you forever to do that,
because they are enormous. Do you agree with that?
General Peay. ------. How do we keep the people at the
highest level of vigilance and operate? We read those reports
we all do the very best we can, we take operational risk, we
review the intelligence and take prudent steps to protect our
troops. We don't become careless. We run every one of the
intelligence reports down, as best we can. It is sophisticated
work.
Mr. Young. The fact is, you are overloaded with these
intelligence hits.
General Peay. ------. There is another piece that is
interesting that develops and we as a Nation are going to have
to decide how we respond to terrorism. You can't, in open
session, do what we did several months ago--get out there in
open session and talk about this subject, where the terrorists
and where everyone in that region watch the news. For many of
you who visited there, you know that every leader in the region
watches Cable Network News (CNN), 24 hours a day. So there we
are on national television, trying to talk about sensitive
culture issues, criticizing our partners doing exactly what the
extremists want us to do. ------.
So more precise intelligence is central to solving such
problems. When we put these kinds of pressures or second-guess
our commanders, then what you have is increased intelligence
with, everything being reported up. ------.
Now, that is the danger when we discuss issues too publicly
and we focus so strongly on culpability standards. This could
convince our people not to take any risks and in the long run,
we are going to have almost a Russian-centralized approach to
our business, a centralized approach to duty, which harms, in
the long run, our military's approach to the way we do our duty
so efficiently and correctly than decentralization.
That is the way, sir, I see it as a commander. I have dealt
in this for 35 years now, lots of command time. I have got a
lot of time in that region, and that is my perspective on it.
COOPERATION OF SAUDI GOVERNMENT
Mr. Young. I think you have given us a good handle on how
difficult this job is. And I might say that knowing that the
job is so difficult, that is why you were selected to have this
job, because of the confidence that the leadership had in you.
Let me go on this same subject just for a couple of more
minutes. During the investigation, we were told that the Saudi
Government has not been very helpful and not cooperated. I
don't know if that is true or not. From your perspective, have
they cooperated or have they not cooperated?
This hearing is closed.
General Peay. It is--let me give you my view, and I would
ask that you get Director Freeh's and Mr. Tenet, the Acting CIA
Director's views, and I have talked to them at some length here
these past several weeks. I think the general feeling in this
investigation now has gone along three kind of avenues. ------.
Mr. Young. General, thank you very much. We have an awful
lot to think about, about the responsibilities that you have in
that region.
Mr. Murtha.
ACTION AGAINST IRAN
Mr. Murtha It is interesting what you say because after we
left Saudi Arabia we went to Israel. So I talked to Prime
Minister Netanyahu. Now, here is somebody publicly that is
always for retaliation, armed actions. So I asked him, let's
say we find out there is an Iranian connection, what do you do?
Well, he didn't say take armed retaliation. He said do
three things, or you can do any one of three things. You can
have an embargo. You can take economic or diplomatic measures
and, third, you can take military action. He says, but believe
me, if you take military action, there is going to be a strong
response inside the country and outside the country.
I didn't forget that.
What I remember most is how responsible his response was
and how he took--through his vast experience, and if you read
his book on terrorism, of course, this is pretty well what he
said. So I think that the Saudis--the way we leak over here,
and the Pentagon is about as much of a leaker as you possibly
can be, but I am sure you had that problem in your office like
everybody else, I can see that they don't trust us. I mean, I
can understand.
And then the Senate who was criticizing you voted 98 to
nothing to open up Pennsylvania Avenue, where if you had had a
bomb the same size in Pennsylvania Avenue, it would have blown
the whole side of the White House. They voted 98 to nothing.
Two weeks later they had a hearing over there criticizing
the Saudis for not closing down the street quickly. I know you
couldn't say that to those august diplomats over there, but it
is just kind of irritating when they are so sanctimonious and
hypocritical about what action should be taken after it is
over.
But I realize that if we do find out who does it, it is
going to be very difficult. For instance, the embargo obviously
is not working. I mean, why isn't working? Why do the European
Nations ignore something that--I suggested to the President,
Mr. President, before you extend Bosnia, before you extend our
forces and our money in Bosnia, you ought to say to the
Europeans, look, if you want us to extend in Bosnia, then you
have got to support us in Iran, this embargo against Iran. And,
of course, they ignored us completely.
What is it that--is it just pure money, trade? Is it
unrealistic for us to put an embargo on?
General Peay. Well, I think, sir, it goes all the way back
to basic ethics and values. It is economic. I think some of it
is a personal view, and I think some of it is concern for their
own livelihood, because this terrorism piece is going to reach
right into the underbelly of Europe. ------.
This is a strategic hegemony approach by an activist
country today that has ambitious long-range goals. So I think
the Europeans know that have got to live with that and, as you
know, they have an enormous Iranian and other population in
their countries today.
And terrorism President Isaisas in Eritrea, who spent 18
years in the bush, a very articulate man, a young man, 45, 46
years of age, told me, he said, ``you Americans have it all
wrong.'' He said, ``you can withdraw, you can do all this
hardening, but you are going to go bankrupt. There is not
enough money in the world to prepare against this terrorism.
And so your only alternative, then, is to take--is to take an
active kind of an approach in terms of some kind of
counteraction.''
The trouble is, as you suggest, and you are exactly right,
when you take that counteraction, you better be prepared. And
so that is why you better be sure that the story is right, and
you have got to then, in my view, sir, take time out--you don't
have to hurry--go build a coalition, share all the information,
build a coalition, bring the international family together and
then you better be prepared for the long tough fight against a
country that I don't think many people in America even begin to
understand.
CIVILIANS AS TERRORIST TARGETS
Mr. Murtha. Well, the diplomats in Saudi Arabia were scared
to death. The Ambassador was not there at the time. But they
were afraid that the civilians in Saudi Arabia would be the
targets, the American civilians would be the targets.
General Peay. But you are seeing that, as I mentioned,
now--you are exactly right. That was the feeling, and now you
have seen what has happened in the last 10 days. So I guess my
view is that was going to happen anyway. ------.
Mr. Murtha. One thing you have to keep in mind, there is
only one thing worse than keeping our troops there, and that is
being forced out by terrorism, because that sends a signal. It
took us 20 years to get over Vietnam.
Now, I think Vietnam--our effort in Vietnam was a
courageous effort where we were trying to help people who were
being invaded. I have a different view than most people. But
having said that, we lost tremendous prestige when we were
forced out of Vietnam, and people didn't forget that for 20
years, whatever examples you want to use. But the Saudi war put
that to rest.
I remember President Bush really working. People forget how
hard it was for him to put a coalition together. I mean, he was
on the phone personally. He did an absolutely magnificent job
of putting a coalition together to fight a war when people
weren't sure we were going to stay there. And you remember how
difficult it was to get into Saudi and they wanted us out the
minute it was over.
So I just worry that--well, you are on top of it and I know
how important the area is, and I just hope that you are right,
that our presence will not trigger the very thing that we are
worried about and that is increased terrorism and then forcing
us to withdraw the troops.
General Peay. ------.
Mr. Young. Mr. Visclosky.
Mr. Visclosky. I am fine, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very
much.
Mr. Young. General, thanks very much for being with us this
afternoon. We really appreciate your thought-provoking
presentation.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Murtha. Certainly.
READINESS CONCERNS
Mr. Murtha. Are you losing any readiness because of the
money being spent in Bosnia? For instance, is your command
losing any readiness because of money that is not available to
you because it is available someplace else? Or are you the same
priority as Bosnia?
General Peay. Ours is such small numbers and I don't see
that--the CONUS base provides me those forces. These forces
that have come over now in exercises or have come over in this
near continuous presence mode, I think, are basically well-
trained.
What I do see, sir, is units that have had to take
soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines from other organizations to
fill up their holes before they deployed so there is a
turbulence piece to all of that.
Mr. Murtha. Tempo of operations?
General Peay. I see less noncommissioned officers at senior
grades than what you normally would have in these forces. But
the equipment is there. They are well-trained. They are well-
motivated. I don't hear any complaining. There is an increased
OPTEMPO, no question about that, but for these service members
that are in the Gulf, I find them motivated. They know why they
are there and I think they are doing a good job.
Mr. Murtha. Thank you.
Mr. Young. General, again, thank you very much for being
with us this afternoon. We have quite a few other questions
that are more budget-related than some of the ones you were
asked today. But you did give us some very, very important
insights into the region and some of the problems there.
The Committee will be adjourned until 10:00 a.m. tomorrow.
Tomorrow's hearing will be in Room 2212 of the Rayburn
Building. It will be an open hearing on the fiscal year 1998
budget for the Navy and Marine Corps. Witnesses will be the
Secretary of the Navy, the CNO and the Commandant of the Marine
Corps.
Also tomorrow afternoon, there will be an open hearing here
in H-140 at 1:30 p.m. on Navy and Marine Corps acquisition
programs.
If there is nothing further, the Committee is adjourned
until 10:00 a.m. tomorrow.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the
answers thereto follow:]
Priorities and Deficiencies
Question. Do you feel the interests and needs of the Central
command have been adequately addressed in the fiscal year 1998 budget
request?
Answer. In general, the Fiscal Year 1998 budget, as well as the
Future Year Defense Program (FYDP) supports Central Command's
Integrated Priority List (IPL). The Department of Defense and the
Services continue to support our top priorities. However, as
modernization and sustainment acquisitions are delayed, risk to our
forces and mission accomplishment clearly increases.
Question. What is your assessment of the major shortfalls in:
Personnel, training, equipment, and maintenance for those units under
your day-to-day command as well as those that would be assigned to you
in a wartime situation?
Answer. We have few personnel permanently assigned to CENTCOM on a
day to day basis. The services provide forces required to conduct our
operations in an operational or tactical control status in the Central
Region. The quality of personnel that all the services provide remains
high. We have challenges nonetheless; examples of which follow. Due to
some ------ there are limited opportunities for forces supporting ----
-- to conduct all required proficiency training. For example ------.
Units deployed ------ lose their world wide deployment qualifications
due to these training limitations and must redeploy to maintain those
qualifications. As the services reduce end strength, we are seeing more
and more junior officers and noncommissioned officers in more senior
leadership positions, all indicative of the fallout form post-cold war
military restricting. These leaders are doing an excellent job, but
they are not as experienced as before. There are also clear cases where
units, short personnel, have borrowed manpower from sister units to
sustain their deployment.
Question. What are the top ten priority items on your most recent
integrated priority list?
Answer. Central Command's major needs and top priorities, as
identified on our Integrated Priority List, are: ------. The placing of
an Army heavy division ashore in the region increases deterrence,
reduces risk from the near-term threat of Iraq as well as the long-term
threat from Iran, ensures regional access, and brings more Gulf
Cooperative Council (GCC) states into the collective defense. The
deployment of an effective theater missile defensive system will
require a multi-layer approach. Such a system will ensure an effective
flow of information among intelligence assets, decision making
facilities, warning systems, and attack means. In addition, fielding of
a theater missile defense will greatly increase regional stability and
reduce risk in the theater.
Question. In your view, are present levels of investment funding
contained in the department's five year plan sufficient to address the
long term recapitalization requirement of today's forces?
Answer. As the Commander in Chief I do not have full visibility on
the full list of challenges facing the Service Chiefs. Almost all of my
theater requirements are being addresses. It is crucial, however, that
funding of new systems and programs remain on schedule. Any reduction
in procurement, investment, or delays in carrying out programs
increases risk to our service men and women, as well as mission
accomplishment in the long term.
Saudi Arabia
Question. According to the media, the Attorney General and the
Director of the FBI have complained that the Saudi's are not being
cooperative with U.S. authorities in the investigation. Are these
reports accurate? If so, what is the nature and reason for the lack of
cooperation?
Answer. Since we at Central Command (CENTCOM) have not been
directly involved in conducting or overseeing this investigation, I am
unable to provide a complete and accurate assessment of Saudi
cooperation with the U.S. authorities. Consequently, I want to defer to
those officials at the FBI who are running the investigation and are in
a much better position to comment on Saudi cooperation.
Question. Specifically, what adjustments have you made to enhance
the physical security of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia in the wake of the
Khobar bombing? What has the cost been for these security enhancements?
Answer. Since the bombing at Khobar Towers in June 1996 hundreds of
force protection enhancements have been taken throughout the region.
They fall under five major areas: one, ------. We have also formed a
Joint Rear Area Coordinator (JRAC) Directorate in Headquarters, U.S.
Central Command, conducted numerous inspections, and Commanders Calls.
The dollar cost of these enhancements is significant for both the
United States and regional states and will continue to be high.
Question. What is your assessment of the stability of the Saudi
regime?
Answer. The ruling Al-Saud family is presently united in following
established lines of succession. Crown Prince Abdallah, who was named
Regent in January 1996, has the full support of family members. ------.
The near term stability of the regime will be unchanged under current
economic and political trends. ------. The petroleum sector contributes
roughly 75 percent of their annual budget revenues, 35 percent of their
GDP, and nearly 100 percent of export earnings. ------. Reduced oil
revenues from previously weak oil prices and deficit government
spending have resulted in deferred payments from the Saudi Arabian
Government to its suppliers and contractors creating inflationary
pressures within the country. What's more, reduced oil revenues impacts
strongly on the Saudi Arabian government's ability to fund its very
attractive social services and low interest loans to its citizens. This
in turn generates internal tensions and encourages some to be
frustrated with high Saudi Arabian military expenditures and support
for United States policy in the Gulf. ------.
Potential Retaliation for Khobar Bombing
Question. If a link is made connecting Iran with the Khobar towers
bombing and the U.S. conducted a military response against Iran, the
consensus is that Iran's most likely reaction would be a terrorist
attack. Do you agree with that assessment?
Answer. Yes, because terrorism is one of Iran's means to
asymmetrically project influence beyond the region. Terrorism is
difficult to deter and prevent, and direct ties to Tehran are difficult
to establish. Iran provides ------. Implicit terrorist threats against
the United States, Gulf Cooperation Council states, and other targets,
largely in the Gulf region, are aimed at fracturing our ties and
driving the United States from the region. We believe Tehran has ------
as a means of communicating terrorist threats to the United States.
Although terrorism is the most likely response, Tehran has the
capability to respond conventionally with air, naval, or ballistic
missile attacks. Iran has ------. In addition, Iran retains a sizeable
maritime mine delivery capability. Iran's intent would be to use this
capability to undermine United States security guarantees to the Arab
Gulf states.
Question. How vulnerable are U.S. military and commercial interest
in the Middle East to a terrorist attack?
Answer. While U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) supports the effort,
the regional Chiefs of Mission retain primary responsibility for
assessing the vulnerabilities of U.S. commercial interests and securing
the necessary assistance to respond to threats. U.S. military personnel
and the installations they operate from are clearly less vulnerable to
terrorist attack today based upon the extensive security measures and
sound force protection strategy currently in place. Since the bombing
of the Khobar Towers compound on 25 June 1996, Department of Defense
forces with CENTCOM's Area or Responsibility (AOR) have initiated a
complex, thorough, and extensive security program designed to protect
military personnel, civilian employees, family members, facilities and
equipment, in all locations and situations.
This program will be accomplished through planned and integrated
application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations
security, counterintelligence, and other security programs.
At the same time, U.S. military personnel and facilities are not
invulnerable to attack. Our actions have not eliminated terrorist
groups. We also lack the Human Intelligence (HUMINT) required to
respond more precisely to terrorist threats. The terrorist retains the
advantage of choosing the appropriate action to defend ourselves in the
context of political, diplomatic, fiscal, and military constraints.
Question. Is there a high probability that an Iranian terrorist
response could be anywhere in the world as opposed to in the Middle
East?
Answer. There is a high probability an Iranian terrorist response
could occur anywhere in the world. ------ as well as various trans-
national groups. Some of these entities have conducted terrorist
attacks against U.S. interests both in the Middle East and in Western
Europe. Additionally, there is evidence various ------ which would
provide Iran additional avenues from which to conduct attacks against
United States citizens or interests.
Counter-Terrorism
Question. In the fiscal year 1997 Consolidated Omnibus
Appropriations Act, the Congress provided over $231 million for anti-
terrorism, counter-terrorism and security enhancement programs in the
Department of Defense. In addition, the Congress provided Supplemental
fiscal year 1996 funding for force protection totaling $122.6 million.
General Peay, in your view, are DoD force protection, counter-terrorism
and anti-terrorism activities adequately funded in fiscal year 1997?
Answer. Funding for force protection initiatives in the Central
Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR) is adequate for fiscal
year 1997. We have a number of initiatives underway and they are
funded. In some cases, there are projects that we would like to do
sooner or items we would like to purchase now, but they are not ready
yet, either because they are still under development or they cannot be
started before other projects have been completed. In some cases, the
technologies are still being refined or production schedules are fixed.
Examples of these types of ------.
Our force protection, anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism
initiatives are based on a terrorist threat dynamic that is changing
daily; and it is the threat that will drive our force protection
program. With this in mind, changes in the threat will effect future
costs. Finally, the defense is never finished. This will add to ``out
year'' costs.
Question. Describe for the Committee the activities and programs
that have been funded in fiscal year 1997?
Answer. We have been a number of force protection related
activities and programs that have been funded in fiscal year 1997. Our
major program has been and continues to be the relocation of personnel
to more secure locations within our Area of Responsibility (AOR) as a
part of Operation DESERT FOCUS. As of March of this year we have spent
$24 million on transportation of personnel and equipment; $4.8 million
on erecting temporary facilities; and $33 million on force protection
items such as fences, barriers, sensors, and lighting.
In addition to this, the government of Saudi Arabia has paid for
force protection initiatives at the two Security Assistance Offices in
Saudi Arabia, the U.S. Military Training Mission in the amount of $10.2
million and Office of the Program Manager--Saudi Arabian National Guard
in the amount of $11.2 million.
Question. General, the committee notes that the fiscal year 1998
budget request does not continue with accelerated funding of these
activities. Have adequate funds been provided in fiscal year 1998 for
force protection, counter-terrorism, and anti-terrorism?
Answer. The funding for U.S. Central Command's Force Protection
initiatives have been included in the fiscal year 1998 budget
submission. What is important to understand is that these initiatives
are based on a snap shot of the threat at this time, or at the time the
budget was formulated. As the terrorist threat evolves and his
capabilities change, we will be forced to change to the new threat.
This could cause new force protection initiatives with new resource
requirements.
Question. Does the apparent reduction in funding in fiscal year
1998 indicate that DoD has done all that it can in these programs?
Answer. U.S. Central Command's force protection efforts target
short and mid-term solutions for protecting and securing Department of
Defense personnel and their families in our Area of Responsibility. Our
requirements provide an equal level of protection for both combatant
and non-combatant units. The programs that we've asked the Department
of Defense to fund in fiscal year 1998 have been requested in the
department's budget submission.
Iraq
Question. What is the outlook for Saddam Hussein remaining in
power? How seriously have purges affected the morale and
professionalism of the Iraqi Officer corps?
Answer. Saddam Hussein's overall hold on power has ------ despite
continuing and unpredictable threats to the security of his regime. He
will likely remain in power through 1997. Hussein inflicted a serious
of crushing blows to the Iraqi opposition during the summer of 1996:
The Iraqi Sunni Muslim opposition groups, already weak and divisive,
were decimated by security sweeps in June and July 1996; mass arrests
eliminated a significant base of in-country opposition. Until the Irbil
crisis in August and September 1996, Kurdish groups had been the
strongest and most visible challenge to the regime. Saddam's actions in
northern Iraq divided the Kurds, weakened the faction that posed the
strongest opposition to Saddam, and denied the use of northern Iraq to
Sunni groups.
Although security threats from ------. Saddam relies on his
internal security forces to maintain his hold on power and they will
continue to play a critical role in the future. Saddam's ruthlessness
and brutality has effectively crippled his opponents and represses the
general population.
The effect of purges on the morale and professionalism of Iraq's
officer corps remains difficult to ascertain. Purges in Iraq do not
appear to be the wholesale bloodlettings seen in the Stalinst purges.
Rather, Saddam acts in accordance with specific events, such as the
Kamel defection or the Dulaymi uprising, and targets the appropriate
group; for example the tribe, family, or branch of military service.
However, there are ------. Besides the obvious loss of key senior
operational leaders, the most significant aspect of such ------. This
climate of fear detracts from effective military planning and
operations.
Question. What is the impact of the oil for food and medicine
agreement (UN Resolution 986) on the economic situation in Iraq? What
percentage of the proceeds from the allowed Iraqi oil sale are being
paid as war retribution? To what extent is smuggling taking place to
circumvent the UN blockade?
Answer. Food and medicine distribution allowed under UN Security
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 986 has been significantly delayed. These
supplies are only now arriving in Iraq, and they have had little impact
on the internal situation there. Iraq's international market is
rallying in anticipation of a strong recovery. ------. This activity
will test the limits of the UNSCR 661 sanctions committee.
UNSCR 986 may not provide the relief expected by most Iraqis. The
populace faces a lack of money, not food. The vagueness of the language
in 986 may allow Iraq to stop its own contributions of food and replace
it with 986 food, allowing the government to save money or hoard food
for distribution to Saddam's loyalists.
Proceeds from the sale of oil under UNSCR 986 are being allocated
as follows: 30 percent for the Kuwaiti war compensation fund, 45
percent for humanitarian aid to non-Kurds, 15 percent to Kurds, 10
percent to pay for UN operations related to Iraq.
In regards to smuggling operations, with the exception of UNSCR 986
authorized deliveries, the vast majority of maritime shipping to and
from Iraq probably smuggles embargoed goods. ------. To a lesser
extent, goods are also smuggled overland via Jordan and Turkey. Jordan
remains the overland conduit of choice for sanctions violators. Jordan
is Iraq's main source of financial, banking, and transportation
services, and many of its officials involved in monitoring trade with
Iraq remain susceptible to bribery. Jordan has taken steps to improve
enforcement, but industrial goods, computers, electronics, and probably
military spare parts and other military related items continue to be
financed and shipped through Jordan on a routine basis.
Question. What is Iraq's current policy toward UN weapons
inspectors?
Answer. Request for compliance from the United Nations Special
Commission and International Atomic Energy Agency are frequently met
with reluctance, denial, or outright obstruction. Iraqi compliance
usually comes only when Baghdad is faced with undeniable proof it is
misleading inspectors or is threatened with an overwhelming response
from Security Council members. The value Baghdad places on weapons of
mass destruction is best reflected in its willingness to sacrifice
billions in annual oil revenues while it ``waits out'' the inspections
process.
Question. What evidence do you have of any ongoing Iraqi efforts to
develop chemical, biological or nuclear weapons?
Answer. We believe Iraq retains a ------ the United Nations
economic embargo is lifted. Despite ``outward'' cooperation with United
Nations inspectors, Iraq is still ------.
Many scientists and engineers, such as a group formerly associated
with the nuclear weaponization project, continue working together as
cohesive teams. This is apparently to enable ------. We believe Baghdad
has no nuclear weapons, but could indigenously develop such a
capability within five to seven years if they receive significant
foreign assistance and they are not restricted by UN controls. However,
Iraq could develop a nuclear weapon within months if key fissile
materials are purchased outright. Baghdad admitted to producing,
weaponizing, and deploying biological and advanced chemical munitions;
but has not validated its claims that these weapons were unilaterally
destroyed. ------.
Enforcing No Fly Zone Over Iraq
Question. What is the scope and frequency of U.S. flights for
enforcing the no-fly zone over southern Iraq (Enhanced Southern Watch)?
Answer. Operation SOUTHERN WATCH began flight operations on 27
August 1992 to enforce the Iraqi No Fly Zone south of 32 degrees North
Latitude. This was amended to 33 degrees North by United Nations
demarche in September 1996.
A typical Air Order of Battle, including both fixed and rotary wing
aircraft, is ------ aircraft. This number ------.
Question. What countries other than the U.S. are participating in
enforcing the no-fly zone?
Answer. Two countries other than the United States provide aircraft
and crews to Operation Southern Watch. The British provide ------.
Question. Is it necessary to continue to conduct these no-fly zone
operations at the current pace? Do you believe that scaling back on the
frequency of the flights would tempt Saddam Hussein to exploit the
situation?
Answer. Yes. Without a doubt, if we cut back the frequency of our
flights, Saddam would respond by increasing his activities. Scaling
back on the frequency of flights would eventually be perceived as a
softening of the no-fly and no-drive zone patrols. While some no-fly
zone violations may be ------ eventually, they would become more
frequent and the violations would become deeper. This could invite an
incident. Deterrence is maintained by the current frequency of flight
operations. In the past year we have utilized surge periods to change-
up the frequency, reduced flying at times, and increase security.
What's more, maintaining Operation Southern Watch enhances regional
stability by denying Saddam the ability to mount a no-notice massive
assault on Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Our nation's support for the
mission reassures all our Gulf partners. This in turn offers numerous
direct and indirect benefits to America diplomatically and
economically.
Question. After the Khobar bombing, the U.S. Air Force flight
operations for enforcing the no-fly zone in southern Iraq were moved to
other bases in Saudi Arabia. What is the impact of this change on the
no-flight operations? What is the flight distance from these bases to
the no-fly zone compared to when the operation was based in Dhahran?
What are the living conditions at the bases being used now? What is the
impact of this location change on the morale of the U.S. forces?
Answer. Following the June 1996 bombing, both U.S. and coalition
aircraft operating from Dhahran Air Base and Riyadh Military airfield
relocated to Prince Sultan Air Base (PSAB). This move has had no impact
on the No Fly Zone operation. The number of sorties flown during the
move was never decreased. Flying from Riyadh to the No Fly Zone is 270
nautical miles, from Dhahran is 260 nautical miles, and from PSAB is
320 nautical miles.
At Riyadh and Dhahran, personnel were living in apartment/villa
style accommodations. At Prince Sultan Air Base all facilities, to
include showers, toilets, and living quarters are contained in Harvest
Falcon sets, which are air conditioned tents. In the future, they will
be housed in more permanent facilities currently under construction by
the Saudi Arabians. The morale of the personnel is good.
Question. Costs have grown for Enhanced Southern Watch by over $200
million in FY 1997 compared to FY 1996. In part, this increase is
justified because of an increase in the zone to be patrolled. The zone
has been extended from the 32nd to the 33rd parallel. General Peay,
what measures are you taking that have increased the cost of this
mission? Has the threat posed by Iraq changed in a way that requires an
increased allocations of resources?
Answer. The threat from Iraq remains. The blatant refusal of Iraq
to comply with United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) and
their determination to maintain and build military forces requires that
Coalition forces remain vigilant and prepared to execute operations on
short notice. Saddam continues to threaten his neighbors in the region;
be it ground force movements towards Kuwait, oppression of Kurds in the
north as in Desert Strike, or his continued pursuit of Weapons of Mass
Destruction.
While the threat from Iraq remains unchanged, the threat to our
land-based, deployed forces posed by terrorist organizations has
resulted in new resource requirements. In addition to ------.
The U.S. paid $144 million for Phase I relocations; the Saudi
Arabian government will spend $300 million towards Phase II relocation
costs which are more permanent in nature (includes our security
assistance organizations in Saudi Arabia.)
Question. The Committee understands that the Department will change
the way it characterizes Operation Enhanced Southern Watch. This
Operation will no longer be considered a contingency, and will stead be
considered a recurring part of DoD operations. Does this change in
policy signal a change in the DoD commitment to this area? Do you
expect that the level of DoD resources will change as a result of the
change in Policy?
Answer. Your information on Operation Southern Watch being declared
as something other than a contingency operation is incorrect. Any
change to funding of operations by DoD in Central Command's (CENTCOM)
Area of Responsibility (AOR) will not change our regional strategy
towards Saddam Hussein and his regime in Iraq. We remain committed to
deterring aggressive moves by the current Iraqi regime against our
coalition partners in the region. We also remain committed to ensuring
that Saddam Hussein complies with all applicable UN Security Council
Resolutions (UNSCR) directed towards his government.
We do not anticipate any change in the level of resources available
to us to carry out Southern Watch unless there is a change in policy or
change in mission. The current combination of airpower capabilities
present in Joint Task Force--Southwest Asia (JTF-SWA), a deployed
carrier battle group, an Army battalion task force in Kuwait that is
paid for by the Kuwaiti government, and the ability to augment this
power on short notice with an Air Expeditionary Force serve as a
visible deterrent to any Iraqi aggression. We continue to evaluate our
strategy and threat. In the near term it is important to evaluate our
strategy and threat. In the near term it is important that the visible
deterrent value of Operation Southern Watch remain at its current
level.
Question. Is the cost for this operation fully funded in the fiscal
year 1998 budget submission?
Answer. The cost of enforcing the No Fly Zone, known as Operation
Southern Watch, is fully budgeted in the Fiscal Year 1998 budget given
the best planning figures available at the time the budget was
formulated. Any increased response to provocation's by Iraq, such as we
saw in August and September 1996 during Operation Desert Strike, could
cause a funding shortfall. In addition, any reduction in Host Nation
Support would cause a funding deficit as well.
Air Expeditionary Forces
Question. The fiscal year 1997 Supplemental request includes $59.6
million to deploy Air Force Air Expeditionary Forces (AEFs). The AEFs
are complete strike packages (``mini'' wings) maintained in the U.S.
for the purpose of rapid deployment. The Air Expeditionary Forces are
being deployed to enhance U.S. capabilities in the region, and to ----
-- of the AOR. General Peay, what events in the region warrant
deployment of the Air Expeditionary Forces (AEFs)?
Answer. The deployment of Air Expeditionary Forces (AEF) is our
primary tool to quickly respond to increased tensions and to ------. It
is a key part of U.S. Central Command's ``near continuous presence'' in
the region, as defined in the command's Five Pillar Theater Strategy.
With the Global Naval Force Presence Policy in effect for Fiscal Year
1997, there will be severe ------ at a time. The presence of an
aircraft carrier is a necessary and visible deterrent. The presence of
an AEF is needed ------ in theater. In addition, restrictions by Saudi
Arabia and other countries in the region on ------.
In addition, Saudi Arabia will not allow land-based aircraft to
cross its borders to support Maritime Interception Operations (MIO) and
required Propositioned ship protection. Without a carrier air wing on
station, the Air Expeditionary Force becomes the primary support for
these ongoing operations.
Question. Do you anticipate gaps in carrier coverage that will
require additional Air Force capabilities?
Answer. The ------. Historically, this particular time of year has
been active for Iraqi operations in Southwest Asia (Desert Shield/
Storm--August 1990; Operation Southern Watch--August/September 1992;
Vigilant Warrior--September/October 1994; Vigilant Sentinel--August/
September 1995; Desert Strike--September 1996). Additionally, there are
demands on the carrier battle groups outside of Central Command's
(CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR) that could result in unforeseen
carrier gaps. In the last fiscal year, CENTCOM has experienced
unscheduled gaps for carriers that have had to depart early to support
contingency operations in the ------.
Question. Will deployment of the AEFs result in an increase in the
number of sorties generated to patrol the no-fly zone?
Answer. The deployment of an Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) does not
necessarily result in an increase in the number of sorties flown.
Operation Southern Watch's mission is to ------. The actual number of
sorties flown ------. With the deployment of an AEF we have the
capability to provide a high number of sustained sorties, or surge, if
the operational situation requires. It is this potential to increase
sorties in defense of our national interests that contributes to
regional stability and provides deterrence.
Question. Why does the U.S. require the capability to increase the
number of sorties that it can generate?
Answer. Deterrence and security. We know from experience that our
adversaries in the region, Iran and Iraq, are deterred by visible
demonstrations of U.S. strength and resolve. Credible deterrence hinges
on retaining viable military capabilities to respond to aggression.
With this in mind, U.S. Central Command employs a theater strategy that
emphasizes the ``near continuous'' presence of relatively small
packages of lethal, joint forces, reinforced by our nation's power
projection capabilities. If these forces do not deter aggression, they
are postured to ------. During contingencies such as Vigilant Warrior,
Vigilant Sentinel, and Desert Strike; the ability to provide a
formidable air force capability deterred further aggression. Should
deterrence fail, the ability to provide surge sorties is part of the
Operation Southern Watch mission to provide ------. Maintaining the
current package of air forces, complemented by Army, Navy, Marine, and
Special Operations Forces is an economical method for securing our
vital interests in the region.
Iran
Question. Describe to the Committee the level of Iran's effort to
develop weapons of mass destruction--chemical, biological and nuclear?
Answer. Iran is aggressively pursuing a nuclear weapons capability,
has one of the largest chemical weapons programs in the Third World,
and is developing biological weapons. ------.
Question. What is Iran's level of state support for terrorism?
Answer. Iran continues to be the leading state sponsor of
international terrorist organizations and continues to use terrorism,
including assassinations of dissidents, as a foreign policy tool. Iran
and Iranian-backed groups have established a significant trans-national
terrorist capability. Iran provides ------. Some of these entities have
conducted terrorist attacks against U.S. interests, both in the Middle
East and Western Europe. Successful operations by these groups have
included bombings, aircraft hijackings, and kidnappings.
Question. What action is Iran taking to foster instability in the
region?
Answer. Iran has been attempting to project its influence through a
number of unconventional or asymmetrical methods, several of which have
fostered instability in neighboring countries and the region as a
whole. These methods have included ------. Iran has also amassed the
largest regional navy, capable of laying maritime mines and threatening
the sea lanes in the Gulf. Taken together, terrorism, ballistic
missiles, weapons of mass destruction, and naval forces, provide Iran
an effective mechanism for intimidating neighbors and challenging U.S.
vital interests.
Question. What is the position of our Allies regarding the U.S.
attempt to impose trade sanctions against Iran?
Answer. Neither the European Union nor, as far as we know, any
memberstate has any sanctions in place against Iran. This is also true
for our allies around the globe. The European Union has elected to
continue a ``critical dialogue'' with Iran. Senior officials in allied
governments have described the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act as
``counter-productive''. Many allies do not prohibit trade with Iran
but, instead, enact regulations or restrict trade based on applicable
United National Security Council Resolutions or because of membership
in trade control regimes such as the Australia Group, Missile
Technology Control Regime, Wassenaar Agreement, and the Nuclear
Suppliers Group. The lack of international support for U.S. policy
clearly weakens our efforts and encourages Iranian hard-liners.
Kuwait
Question. To what extent have the Kuwaiti forces upgraded since the
end of the Gulf War?
Answer. The government of Kuwait has upgraded its military hardware
significantly since the end of the Gulf War. Kuwait has invested
heavily in the procurement and modernization of its Army, Air Force and
Navy.
Specifically, they have spent $7.8 billion on U.S. military
systems. These major acquisitions include: 318 M1A2 Abrams Main Battle
Tanks, 40 F/A-18 Hornets, and 5 batteries of Patriot Air Defense
missile systems. The Kuwaiti military uses these systems in their
exercises with us. During the Intrinsic Action and Eager Mace rotations
the Kuwaitis exercise alongside U.S. Army and Marine units. The
Kuwaitis have also purchased foreign systems. These include: the
Warrior Infantry Fighting Vehicle from Britain, the Smerch Multiple
Rocket Launcher and BMP-3 Infantry Fighting Vehicle from Russia, and
Fast Patrol Boats from France.
Question. What is the size, readiness and quality of the Kuwaiti
forces?
Answer. Kuwaiti Armed Forces are currently number approximately
23,000 personnel. Their land forces are organized around 4 brigades, 3
armored and 1 mechanized, for a total of 9,500 personnel. While
currently ------ they are improving. The Kuwaiti Air Force, their most
capable service, has 40 F/A-18 Hornets as their primary combat
aircraft, ------. They have the best pilots in the Gulf Cooperative
Counsel (GCC), but are not as food as U.S. aviators. Kuwaiti Naval
Forces are limited to small coastal operation, using patrol craft
purchased from France. They are ------. Their primary mission is, along
with the Kuwaiti Coast Guard, fighting smuggling and illegal
immigration. In summary, Kuwait has spent significant amounts of money
in modern military equipment, but their ------.
Question. How extensive is the U.S. involved in training and
conducting exercises with the Kuwaiti Forces?
Answer. The U.S. Central Command's (CENTCOM) exercise program with
Kuwait is the bulwark of our Joint/Combined Exercise Program;
accounting for approximately 11 percent of the exercises conducted in
our Area of Responsibility (AOR). This program has undergone frequent
and significant changes as it provided the basis for operational
responses during OPERATIONS VIGILANT WARRIOR, VIGILANT SENTINEL, and
DESERT STRIKE.
The objectives of the CENTCOM exercise program are: to deter
potential adversaries by maintaining forward presence and demonstrating
U.S. strategic mobility; to demonstrate mutual commitment to regional
security; to maintain access to Kuwait and the central region; to
assist the Kuwaiti Armed Forces to achieve a self-defense capability;
to enhance military-to-military relationships, refine complementary
warfighting capabilities, and exercise combined command, control, and
communications interoperability. Accomplishing these objectives will
provide U.S. and Kuwaiti forces the opportunity to refine national
defense and contingency plans as well as sustaining the capability for
coalition warfare.
The specific elements of our present exercise program with Kuwait
include: ground, special operations, naval, and air pieces. An armored
task force rotates three times each year into Kuwait for a 120 day
exercise. These exercises are the cornerstone of our efforts to provide
near continuous ground force presence in Kuwait and are paid for by the
Kuwaiti government. Three 90-day Special Operations Force exercises are
conducted each year in Kuwait. In these exercises, Coalition Support
Teams exercise with the Kuwait Armed Forces to improve their defense
capabilities and provide a close air support capability. A Joint/
Combined Naval Amphibious Force field training exercise designed to
integrate the Kuwait Armed Forces with U.S. Naval Amphibious Unit
capabilities in combined arms operations is conducted annually. U.S.
Naval forces in the region conduct a Combined Naval Surface exercise in
the waters of Kuwait annually. This exercise develops the proficiency
of the Kuwaiti Naval Force while also improving interoperability
between our two countries. Additionally a Combined Air exercise between
shore-based U.S. Naval aircraft and the Kuwaiti Air Force is conducted
annually which develops pilots of both air forces while improving our
interoperability with Coalition Air Forces.
Kuwait remains committed to a diverse joint and combined exercise
program. Continuation of this relationship with Kuwait is central to
strengthening U.S.-Kuwait military connectivity and to improving our
regional command and control capabilities.
Bahrain
Question. The U.S. Navy has been based at Bahrain since the late
1940's, and that country provides a key location for U.S. military
presence in the Persian Gulf. What has been the level of political
discord and strife in Bahrain in the past year?
Answer. ------.
Question. What is the nature of any threat to the incumbent
government? What is the position of the government's opponents
regarding the presence of U.S. naval assets in Bahrain?
Answer. The primary threat to the government of Bahrain is the ----
--.
Iran is the main external threat. Iran asserts a claim to Bahrain
based on the Persian origins of Bahrain's majority Shia community. The
Bahraini government has implicated Iran in fomenting the unrest in
Bahrain. Bahrain's security forces have been successful in containing
the violence and maintaining the security of the government. The
Bahraini government is working through the newly appointed consultative
council, and other cooperative elements of society, to overcome
economic and social issues at the root of the unrest. To date, the U.S.
naval presence has not been an issue with the Shia opposition. Civil
unrest has been present on the island since the charity marathon race
demonstration on 25 November 1994. No violence has been purposely
directed towards U.S. interests or personnel. Opposition groups target
third country nationals (Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Sri Lankan), who they
believe are taking jobs from Shia Bahrainis. Violence against U.S.
citizens has been rare and unintentional. Although some graffiti
referring to America has been seen, opposition speeches have not
carried an anti-American theme.
Continued efforts by naval commanders to foster good relations in
local communities has been successful thus far.
Question. How reliant are we on Bahrain for meeting our national
security objectives in the Persian Gulf region?
Answer. We have a long-standing cooperative military-to-military
relationship with Bahrain. Bahrain provides a home for U.S. Navy
Central Command (NAVCENT), our only component command permanently
located in this critical region, and has supported our regional
initiatives. In addition, Bahrain has been supportive in allowing us to
position an Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) in Bahrain and ------. This
continued support is very important to meeting our national security
objectives in the region.
Theater Missile Defense
Question. How high of a priority is the Theater Missile Defense
program from your perspective?
Answer. The development, production, and fielding of a Theater
Missile Defense (TMD) is one of our highest priorities in Central
Command (CENTCOM). In fact, it is my ------.
Any TMD program should consist of a multi-layered defensive system
tied together with an effective Command, Control, Communications,
Computer, and Intelligence (C4I) architecture. In this way, it should
have the capability to handle lower and upper tier requirements on land
and at sea; as well as have the mobility necessary to cover fast moving
Army and Marine ground forces.
Question. Your prepared statement reads in part, ``We need to field
a highly mobile missile defense to be positioned well forward to
protect dispersed, rapidly moving Army and Marine ground forces. This
system must also be able to defend against cruise and short range
tactical ballistic missiles. To tie these various systems together, we
need to improve our theater missile defense (TMD) fused awareness.''
How much of a technological challenge is it to tie together these
various systems? Provide for the record the time frame required to
provide ``fused awareness'' for Theater Missile Defense assuming an
optimal funding profile.
Answer. Linking these various systems together presents significant
challenges. The Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization
(JTAMDO) and the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) are
currently conducting the Joint Composite Tracking Network Study to
develop executable timelines for this task. Until this study is
completed, I am unable to provide a firm date for when ``fused
awareness'' will be available to commanders; however, we believe it
will be prior to the year 2010.
Question. Do you think that the FY 1998 budget for the Theater
Missile Defense program is adequate?
Answer. The Department of Defense's Fiscal Year 1998 budget request
would allocate $1.285 billion to specifically develop Theater Missile
Defense (TMD) weapon systems, and roughly another $500 million under
the Joint Theater Missile Defense program element to ensure that this
``family of systems'' approach is fully interoperable. The Department
is also requesting roughly $390 million in procurement funds for TMD
systems in Fiscal Year 1998.
I believe the Department of Defense understands our requirements
and has factored them into the equation as they allocate resources,
given other pressing military needs, to ensure that required TMD
systems can be fielded at the earliest possible time. I understand that
both the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) and Navy Area Defense
systems are proceeding as quickly as possible. We must recognize that
extending the time to deliver and field a multi-layered TMD system
increases risk to our forces.
Prepositioned Assets in Middle East
Question. How extensive are the prepositioned assets of the US in
the Middle East region?
Answer. Prepositioning is a vital facet of overseas presence and
demonstrates U.S. commitment to our allies in the Central Command
(CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR). Prepositioning figures
prominently in the strategic mobility equation allowing the U.S. to
respond more quickly to a developing crisis and enhancing our ability
to deter war.
U.S. CENTCOM goal is for a prepositioned Heavy Division, consisting
of three heavy brigade sets and a division base in the AOR. The first
set is located at Camp Doha, Kuwait. We are working with the Kuwaiti
Government for them to construct new prepositioning facilities in
Southern Kuwait. The Army is prepositioning a second brigade set with a
division base in Qatar. In January 1996, the first battalion task force
of this brigade set was fielded. The next set of ------. The facilities
for these sets are being constructed with U.S. Military Construction
funds. The first two phases of this three phase program were approved
by Congress and construction is underway. The final phase is in this
year's Presidential budget submission. Positioning of the third brigade
set is currently being worked through the Joint Requirements Oversight
Committee process with a decision on the mode/location expected this
cycle. CENTCOM has recommended the set be placed afloat in the near
term, and ashore once final locations are negotiated with host
governments.
The Air Force has prepositioned bare base support, vehicles,
medical, fuels support equipment, and munitions ashore in Southwest
Asia. The Harvest Falcon bare base assets in war reserve support 50,600
personnel and 750 aircraft at 14 locations. There are over ------. In
addition to ashore assets, the Air Force has ------.
Critical elements of our prepositioning strategy in the region are
the Marine Corps' Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons 1 and 2 and the
Army Prepositioning Afloat program. Both afloat prepositioned forces
are usually stationed in the Pacific ------.
Question. Have you attained your goals for prepositioning military
equipment in the Middle East? If not, what deficiencies remain?
Answer. Prepositioning remains one of our highest priorities in
Central Command (CENTCOM). Through our prepositioning program, we not
only remain engaged in this critical region, but we show any potential
adversaries that we are committed to regional stability. We continue to
make progress on our prepositioning goals; but we have not yet attained
them.
Two key issues we are currently working to attain our goal of a
Army Heavy Armored Division equipment set ashore are: one, Military
Construction (MILCON) funding to support the third year and final phase
of Army prepositioning facilities in Qatar; and two, a Joint
Requirements Oversight Committee (JROC) decision on the mode and or
location for the Army's eighth prepositioning brigade set. Funding for
the facilities in Qatar are included in this year's Presidential Budget
submission. Support for this project is essential to the stability of
the region and to show the countries in the gulf region that we are
there for the long term. The eighth brigade equipment set decision is
currently being worked through the JROC process with a decision on the
mode/location expected during the current Chairman's Program Assessment
(CPA) cycle.
We continue to add facilities to enhance Air Force propositioning
in our Area of Responsibility (AOR). Medical storage, maintenance
facilities, warehouses, and munitions storage bunkers are currently
under construction in Qatar that will provide adequate facilities for
repositioned assets. Support is required to complete an additional
warehouse and a communications maintenance facility at a cost of $2.9
million dollars in the current Presidential budget. Out year
requirements, in the years FY 199-2000, include minimal funding to
complete these facilities.
The Navy continues to work requirements for five Forward Logistics
Site sets to enhance naval operations at selected ports in the AOR. A
War Reserve Project has been identified and funding priorities continue
to be adjusted to support these requirements.
Oil Exports
Question. What is the current level of oil exported from countries
within USCENTCOM's Area of Responsibility (AOR)?
Answer. Within Central Command's 20-country Are of Responsibility,
only 10 export domestically produced crude oil. The following is a by-
country breakdown:
Iran exports 2.5 million barrels per day.
Iraq exports 0.7 million barrels per day.
Saudi Arabia exports 7.8 million barrels per day.
United Arab Emirates exports 2.2 million barrels per day.
Bahrain exports 0.1 million barrels per day.
Qatar exports 0.5 million barrels per day.
Kuwait exports 2.1 million barrels per day.
Egypt exports 525,000 barrels per day.
Yemen exports 250,000 barrels per day.
Oman exports 815,000 barrels per day.
Emerging as a significant trend in the world oil market is the
growing centralization of world oil production in the Arabian Gulf. The
area's share of the world supply is projected to increase from one-
fourth today to about one-third by the turn of the century. Adding
significance to the level of Arabian Gulf oil production is the
expected decline in oil production elsewhere.
Oil will remain the world's primary source of energy for the
foreseeable future. Reinforced by projections of increased demand from
industrialized countries as well as emerging third world nations, the
importance of oil and its availability will be a principal concern for
global economies well into the coming century.
The outlook for increasing oil demand, combined with the fact that
over 60 percent of the world's oil reserves reside in the Arabian Gulf,
further highlights the importance of Middle Eastern oil supplies.
Additionally, the low cost of Arabian Gulf oil will add to the growing
dependence by countries around the world.
Question. How reliant is the U.S. on this oil?
Answer. U.S. net oil imports from the Arabian Gulf are forecast to
increase from the current 19 percent to approximately 22 percent of
total oil imports by the year 2000. By the year 2010, the U.S. is
expected to import roughly 25.5 percent of its total oil imports from
the Arabian Gulf. This increase is largely due to a combination of two
factors:
First, U.S. oil demand is expected to increase from the current
18.1 million barrels per day to 19.4 million barrels per day by the
year 2000; and 21.6 million barrels per day by the year 2010. Total
U.S. oil imports for 1996 were estimated at approximately 8.4 million
barrels per day and that is expected to climb to approximately 19.4 and
21.6 million barrels per day for the years 2000 and 2010, respectively.
The majority of this will come from the Arabian Gulf given the
stagnant, and in some cases declining, production outside of the Gulf.
Secondly, falling U.S. oil production will exacerbate dependency on
foreign oil. In 1996, U.S. oil production was estimated to be 6.5
million barrels per day. By the years 2000 and 2010, respectively, U.S.
oil production is forecast to drop to 5.9 and 5.4 million barrels per
day.
Question. How reliant is Europe on this oil?
Answer. In 1996, Europe imported roughly 45.1 percent of its total
oil imports from the Arabian Gulf. In the years 2000 and 2010, Europe's
share of total foreign oil imports coming from the Gulf are expected to
reach 45.7 and 47.9 percent respectively. Given the fungible nature of
oil on the world market; all countries, including those in Europe, rely
on uninterrupted oil supplies from the Arabian Gulf. Any disruption in
the flow of oil would drive up oil prices and negatively impact the
global economy.
Question. What percentage of the oil exported from the Middle East
is shipped through the Straits of Hormuz?
Answer. Approximately 87.5 percent of Middle East (Arabian Gulf)
oil (14 million barrels per day) is shipped through the Strait of
Hormuz.
Question. How wide is the shipping channel at the Strait of Hormuz?
Answer. The shipping Channel of the Strait of Hormuz is
approximately 80 kilometers wide and nearly 180 kilometers long. Most
oceangoing shipping through the Strait of Hormuz passes through two
established traffic lanes within Oman's 12 nautical mile territorial
Sea. One lane is inward and one is for outward traffic. Traffic lanes
are two miles wide and are separated by a two mile buffer lane. Depths
in the lanes range from 45 to 80 meters.
Question. What percentage of Iran's oil exports flow through the
Strait of Hormuz?
Answer. Iran exports all its oil (2.5 million barrels per day)
through the Strait of Hormuz.
Question. How easy would it be for Iran to shut down the Strait of
Hormuz?
Answer. Iran possesses the military capability to close the Strait
of Hormuz through the use of mines, ship and land based anti-ship
cruise missiles, air attacks by helicopters and fighter aircraft, the
use of naval forces and small boats with guns and rocket launchers, and
possibly the use of weapons of mass destruction including ballistic
missiles.------.
Role of Guard and Reserve Personnel
Question. Are there any ongoing operations in CENTCOM's Area of
Responsibility that are totally reliant on Guard and Reserve personnel?
Answer. At this time, there are no operations in the Central
Command's Area of Responsibility totally dependent on Reserve Component
forces. Our Service Components however, sometimes opt to relieve Active
Component Operations Tempo (OPSTEMPO)/Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO)
requirements by deploying into the theater Reserve Component forces.
These rotations occur at both the individual and the unit level. Some
examples of these rotations are the Navy's use of Reserve Component
personnel in port operations and cargo handling facilities, as well as
primary fill options for Joint Task Force Southwest Asia. The Air Force
has sent Air National Guard Wings and A-10 rotations to support
Operation Southern Watch as well as Combat Search and Rescue airlift 90
days each year. The Army Reserve provides augmentees assisting in
material management control in Kuwait and personnel supporting
communications operations in Saudi Arabia.
Question. How long is the typical tour of duty of Guard and Reserve
personnel deployed to the Middle East?
Answer. There is no typical tour of duty for Guard and Reserve
personnel deployed to the Central Region. We depend on the Reserve
Components to provide Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO) flexibility and a
surge capability to react to emergent requirements. A tour can be
anywhere from 19 days to 179 days per fiscal year, dependent on funding
and volunteer availability. Units generally deploy for a 30, 90, or 120
day commitment. Individual tours are dictated by mission needs.
Normally Guard and Reserve personnel are not utilized for more than 179
days due to Service interpretations of Title 10.
Quality and Morale
Question. General, when you visit troops deployed in the Middle
East area, have you noticed any deterioration in the quality of our
troops? What about their physical condition? Are the new troops as
mentally disciplined as those in prior years? Have you found that the
new troops have more ``emotional baggage'' i.e., personal problems,
than those in the past?
Answer. Although many of the Services are facing recruiting and
retention challenges today, we have not noticed any degradation in the
quality or performance of our troops. I am concerned that we are
beginning to see more junior officers and non-commissioned officers
serving in positions that formerly were manned by more senior leaders.
As a result, where we used to have four field grade officers on the
staff of an Army brigade, you may have two today. Where previously we
had four captains on a battalion staff, we now have two. Where we used
to have an E-7, Sergeant First Class, platoon sergeant, we now have an
E-6. And this is true, to some extent, in all the services. Similarly,
I am concerned that our units are having to borrow individuals from
different units to fill out their organizations. In this context, an
Army brigade commander must get personnel from his other subordinate
battalions to fill a single battalion. All of these realities stem from
the post Cold War military restructuring. At the same time, we do not
want to exaggerate the negative effects of this dynamic. Services
continue to provide Central Command (CENTCOM) with dedicated and
trained service professionals. Our service men and women remain
physically fit and mentally tough and are flexible enough to deal with
the rapidly changing situations commonplace in our Area of
Responsibility (AOR). Continued funding and support for Morale,
Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) and Quality of Life (QOL) programs are
essential toward the retention of our highly qualified service
professionals.
Question. How is the morale of the troops deployed in CENTCOM's
Area of Responsibility (AOR)?
Answer. During my discussions with the Component Commanders and
personal visits in the AOR, I find the morale and retention throughout
the force is high. Recognizing the challenges all of the Sevices are
encountering handling global missions and training requirements, U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM) has taken action to address Operational Tempo
(OPTEMPO) concerns. We have eliminated or reorganized exercises and we
have maintained forward positions in the region at minimal levels. In
cooperation with the Services, we have worked on the optimizing tour
lengths for the various forces, but have taken action to have longer
tours where possible, to minimize personnel turbulence.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Young.]
Wednesday, March 5, 1997.
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND AND COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES FORCES, KOREA
WITNESSES
ADMIRAL JOSEPH W. PRUEHER, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES PACIFIC
COMMAND, U.S. NAVY
GENERAL JOHN H. TILELLI, JR., COMMANDER, UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA,
U.S. ARMY
Introduction
Mr. Young. The hearing will come to order.
Pursuant to a vote taken last week, this hearing is closed
so we might be free to discuss classified information.
This morning the Committee is very happy to welcome Admiral
Joseph Prueher, Commander in Chief, United States Pacific
Command, and General John Tilelli, Commander in Chief, United
Nations Command/Combined Forces and Commander, United States
Forces Korea. That is a long title, General.
The United States Pacific Command's area of responsibility
is immense, covering 50 percent of the earth's surface and 60
percent of the world's population found in over 40 countries
and 20 territories and possessions. Admiral, that is a big job.
We are proud of the achievements of the troops under your
command who support the forward-deployed presence of this
country in the vital Pacific Rim and guarantee the security of
the Korean Peninsula.
We look forward to your testimony on the state of your
respective commands, and hope to address such key issues as the
present readiness of your assigned military forces; the
challenges of the deployments and OPTEMPO you now face; the
present security situation in Korea; and your priorities and
deficiencies in terms of personnel, maintenance and equipment.
Admiral and General, again, welcome. We are very happy to
have you here. We look forward to your presentation. Your
statements in full will be placed in the record, and you feel
free to summarize in any way you would like.
Summary Statement of Admiral Prueher
Admiral Prueher. All right, sir. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
We both are very pleased to be here and present the posture
of our commands. It has been a busy year with a lot of
opportunities and a lot of challenges, and an opportunity for
me to meet both U.S. and foreign military and civilians as well
as servicemen and their families in our Area of Responsibility,
AOR.
The last time and my first time to appear before your
Committee was last year, and I had been about 3 weeks on the
job. I know more than I did then and know more of what I don't
know, too. So it is interesting in that regard.
One aspect in our theater, what is going on with working
issues together with the State Department and the ambassadors
in the area and the military security policy. Something I think
would please you is the concerted effort that goes on together.
I think the Congress and the public should be proud.
I do have a written statement that is in the record, and I
will summarize my thoughts now, sir.
Mr. Young. Yes, sir.
PACIFIC COMMAND STRATEGY
Admiral Prueher. Our region, as you pointed out, is very
large. It is an economic center of gravity, probably the
economic center of gravity for our country and the world. The
forecast is in 2020, that 80 percent of the world's largest
economies will be in the Asia-Pacific Region.
It is a region we are pleased to report, unlike some other
CINCs, which is largely at peace. It is not conflict free, but
it is at peace. This is due in a large measure to the U.S.
presence and engagement that has ensued since the Second World
War, and certainly since the Korean War in conjunction with our
allies and our friends there.
Almost all of the Asia-Pacific leaders, the political, the
diplomatic and the military leaders, not only concede, but
advertise the fact that the U.S. presence there brings the
security to the Asia-Pacific Region. This security brokers the
stable conditions which yield the economic prosperity, which is
good not only for the Asia-Pacific Region, but for the entire
global community, and certainly for the U.S. as well, and
creates a lot of jobs in the United States.
I mentioned a little bit earlier, the security issues, the
diplomatic issues, and the economic issues in the Asia-Pacific
Region are so intertwined and depend so much on each other that
none of them can be advanced separately. We don't work any one
of those without impacting the other. This gives our framework
for promoting peace and stability in the area and protecting
the U.S. interest.
It yields what is the Pacific Command Strategy, which is
what we call sort of benignly Cooperative Engagement. But
Cooperative Engagement has 3 parts to it: One is peacetime
engagement. Dr. Perry wrote a piece in the Foreign Affairs
Journal called Preventive Defense. This is what peacetime
engagement is. It is exercising, it is working with the senior
people in the area, it is our coordination as we work in the
peacetime to try to maintain stability, build contacts, and
avoid conflicts that get out of hand.
The second part is crisis response, the ability to respond
quickly to crisis and to resolve them before they get big. An
example of this is the China-Taiwan crisis that occurred about
this time last year, a couple of weeks away from this time last
year.
And the third part of this strategy is the ability to fight
and win, to go into a major conflict and hopefully
multilaterally, but perhaps unilaterally, to fight and win a
major conflict.
So in a circular way, our ability to do this third piece of
fight and win in a major conflict with the forces we have,
enables us to work in the peacetime environment, which has been
a successful strategy, and it is one which we use.
COUNTRY ASSESSMENTS
I would like to now go briefly country by country, just for
a quick talk about our view of the security issues in the major
countries in the AOR. I will not go through all 44 of them. The
first is Japan.
JAPAN
As we talk a lot about China, and we talk a lot about
Korea, General Tilelli's focus of interest, we must not forget
that Japan is our pivotal security relationship in the Asia-
Pacific Region. We have just last April reexamined and resigned
our security relationship with Japan which talked about four
things: One is our 100,000 troops being our commitment to the
Asia-Pacific Region; it talked about maintaining our current
force levels in the Asia-Pacific Region; it talked about the
host nation support to which Japan gives greater than $5
billion to our troops annually, and it talked about a renewal
of the 1978 defense guidelines.
Japan will continue to be the cornerstone of our security
relationships in the Asia-Pacific, not just for Japan but for
stability in the region over all of the Korean Peninsula, which
I will address very briefly, because General Tilelli is the
expert on that.
NORTH KOREA
The trend in North Korea, of course, is downward. The
situation there is dire. there will be--forecasting is a risky
business--probably some change, if my information yields
correct, within the next 1 to 10 years, but there are a variety
of guesses on that, and I try to open the spectrum.
Our big issue in supporting General Tilelli is to stay the
course to make sure that North Korea does not get in a
situation where they would use their residual military
capability, which is impressive, to lash out.
This is a work in progress. There are a lot of initiatives
going on. In fact, this week in New York, the North Koreans
have come to the table. I think I could talk more about that,
but, again, General Tilelli is the expert, and I know he will
address that in detail.
CHINA
China: We read a lot about China. They expect in the year
2015 to have 1.6 billion people. Right now they have about 1.2
billion people. They grow at the rate of the population of the
United States every decade.
The regional leaders in Asia and in the Asia-Pacific
Region, including India, are very concerned about China. They
are concerned about their military modernization. They had a
12.7 percent increase in their stated defense budget, but it is
very hard to figure out exactly what they do spend on defense.
But they are modernizing and they have the intent to modernize.
It is my estimate that it will be about a decade and a half
before China has a force projection capability which could make
them a major projector of power.
Our military to military relationships with China are
increasing, but they are increasing from a low level. About a
year ago at this time we didn't have any, other than force to
force, but they are important in the view of transparency so we
can know what each other are up to, and it is also our ability
to influence China to bring them as a responsible actor in the
world.
Hong Kong: On 30 June, Hong Kong will revert, of course, to
China. That is a harbinger of how China will be able to handle
entry, economically and somewhat democratically, into the
modern world.
The Taiwan issue is better off now than it was a year ago,
but we expect perturbations with Taiwan and China. We are
committed to our one-China policy. A peaceful resolution, to
which the U.S. is committed by the Taiwan Relations Act, is in
the interest of all. It is in the interest of China and the
interest of Taiwan, and of all thinking people, and in the
interest of the United States. It is all our interests not to
bring the China-Taiwan crisis to a head. That is part of our
strategy while maintaining our principles and being firm.
I am optimistic that China can be, and will, emerge in the
world as a prosperous and a responsible player, but we have a
lot of long, steady work ahead now; 50 years worth of work is
ahead. I hope the trend line will be up, but there will be a
lot of ups and downs on that trend line in our dealings with
China. Our policy, our PACOM policy and national policy must be
one of strength, to deal from a position of strength with
resolve and firmness, but also with an eye and a respect for
what China's interests are.
INDIA
A couple of others, India. India, we think in population
will surpass China by the middle of the next century. Their
economy also is growing in the 5 to 7 percent rate, like a lot
of the other Asian nations. In the United States we usually
talk about India and Pakistan in the same breath. It is a near-
term worry of India. The long-term issue with India is as they
look to the East, they look to China as their main security
problem, but they also look to the East to Southeast-Asia for
their economic expansion. India will be a major player in the
next century and a half.
RUSSIA
Russia: Mostly we talk about Russia, again, in the Western
part of Russia, the European part of Russia, but they also have
an Asia-Pacific presence to which they are looking with an
increasing amount. Right now, owing to their economic
conditions, Russia is neither a beneficiary nor a participant
in either the economic or the security issues in the Asia-
Pacific.
Our hope is we continue to deal with Russia. We think they
will be back some time: and Russia has all the ingredients of a
great power. They are going through a rough time, but will
bring themselves back on line as a player and a responsible
player in the Asia-Pacific.
SOUTH ASIA
The South-Asian nations, which we tend to lump together:
They range from Singapore, with 3 million people, with whom we
do the same amount of trade that we do with France, up to
Indonesia, with 200 million people, the fourth largest nation
in the world. We lump them together, but there is a lot of
diversity there. They have burgeoning economies, growing at a
rate of 7 to 9 percent.
The Southeast-Asian nations are working with a lot of
vision and sophistication and long-range planning on their
future, and they are doing very well.
Indonesia, for example, they are trying to work very
responsibly with a very tough security situation in Indonesia.
It is hard to govern.
Australia: We talked a little bit about that, Congressman
Dicks is recently back from there. They are a staunch and
friendly ally. They are easy for us to get along with, and we
work well together.
We nurture this relationship. Right now we have TANDEM
THRUST 97, a major exercise going on with Australia with our
Navy, Air Force, Marines and some Army units. We have 22,000
people involved in this exercise from the U.S., which exceeds
one-third of the total Australian defense forces.
The essence of all of this is that engagement and our
presence in the area are working for stability and working in
the interests of the United States. They are the right
solutions to cope with this uncertain world, I think, and our
combat capable forces, plus our national will, enable our
policy there to work.
BALANCING RESOURCES FOR OUR STRATEGY
Sun-Tzu, about 2,500 years ago, said, the great General is
the one who achieves objectives without fighting. I think that
that is true for our Nation as well. But it requires capable
forces in the right place to do that.
For our resources in support of these national goals, one,
we thank this Committee very much for the resources that you
have helped provide to us. We are trying to use them
responsibly. They are ready, capable, and well-positioned
forces. 100,000 is a number, but it is a metric, and what it
really represents is the capability of the SEVENTH Fleet, of
the 5th and 7th Air Force, of the 2nd Infantry Division, and of
the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force. What it really represents
is the capabilities. The 100,000 is just the metric for that.
But it is the regional metric to which the nations look, and
that is the expression of our commitment to the Asia-Pacific.
IMET, the International Military Exchange and Training: Our
total PACOM budget is about $6 million, just a decimal point or
two over $6 million. It is the best money we spend almost. It
is highly leveraged. It provides education for the leaders of
other nations.
Right now there are four major leaders in Asia who had IMET
training in years ranging from 1965 up through 1984. They are
the heads and ministers of the defense of their services. This
money is very well spent. I support not restricting this money.
It should be unrestricted in its use. It is a high payoff.
The Asia-Pacific Center, I hope that you all get a chance
to visit it when you come to Honolulu. It is a center that has
started in the last 2 or 3 years. It promotes classes, about
12-week classes, as well as conferences for military leaders,
political leaders and economic leaders and academics from the
area.
There is a tremendous interplay for working in Asia, and
they work together. One of the comments from one of the Indian
participants in the first class said: ``Only the U.S. could do
this. The time is right. It is critically important.''
I think this is, again, money that is well-spent and highly
leveraged.
Stewardship of the assets that the CINCs are given. As I
mentioned before, we very much appreciate both the dollar
resources and the lives of the young men and women that are
entrusted to us. It is important for all of the CINCs to take
the long view, not just take the short view of readiness.
We have to take the long view, particularly when
modernization equals total future readiness. So we must take
the long view and not ask for more than we need. We need to
consider prudent risk in what we do as we take on projects.
This long view and the stewardship issue are something that I
think the CINCs are getting increasingly responsible for, and
we have to do that.
SUMMARY
In conclusion, the CINCs, the regional CINCs and certainly
ours, have been full participants in all the processes going
on. Our forces, your forces, are working very hard, they are
doing a great deal. We are working to scrub the activities, to
make sure that we have a high payoff on the things we do--and
we are not always perfect in that--but that we are using our
forces effectively and efficiently. Our assets and our
readiness are adequate, but they are stretched.
We thank you very much for what you have provided us. It is
adequate to the need and we are working hard to do well with
it, to keep the U.S. as a player and a partner and a
beneficiary in the Asia-Pacific Region.
Thank you, sir.
[The statement of Admiral Prueher and the ``U.S. Pacific
Command at a Glance'' booklet follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Young. Admiral, thank you very much. We will have a lot
of questions for you shortly.
First, I would like to recognize General Tilelli for his
statement, and then we will be back to both of you with our
questions.
Summary Statement of General Tilelli
General Tilelli. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, distinguished Committee Members, thanks for
the opportunity to be here.
I consider myself lucky to be serving with the men and
women in the Republic of Korea. It is an honor for me to
discuss with you the current security situation within the
Republic of Korea and the theater of operations.
Before I do so, I want to thank you all and the Committee
Members for your continued support of our forces in Korea, both
past and present. It is very important to them and it is
important to me.
I am going to center my opening comments around three
issues: One, the readiness of my command; two, the uncertainty
of the threat that these men and women face every day; and last
but not least, the quality of life afforded to all the U.S. men
and women stationed and living in Korea, a faraway place from
home.
READINESS OF FORCES
The ROK-U.S. security alliance is strong, very strong. It
has been in the past, is presently and must remain so in the
future. It is the key mechanism for maintaining peninsula and
regional peace and stability in a current environment where we
are still in a truce environment rather than at peace.
As the defenders of the ROK-United States Alliance, the
Combined Forces Command, the United Nations Command, and U.S.
Forces Korea are highly capable and well-trained. This force
has secured peace for the last 43 years. The peace and
stability have not only survived on the Korean Peninsula, but
the fact is it will help secure peace in the region, an area
described by Admiral Prueher as vital to the interests of the
United States of America.
These 43 years of peace did not happen by mistake or
accident, but by design. At the center of that design is a
constantly maintained strength and vigilance which equal
readiness that has protected and will continue to protect the
combined national interests of the United States of America and
the Republic of Korea.
Our combined forces readiness and capability are critical
not for generic reasons, but because there is still a very
powerful threat posed by an unstable North Korea to the
Republic of Korea is specifically, and to stability within the
Northeast-Asia Region.
Events such as the North Korean submarine incursion, the
defection of 9 North Korean senior ideologue and the tensions
that accompanied these events demonstrate how precarious
stability really is. It also highlights the uncertainty we
face. Compounding these tensions is the reality that North
Korea can initiate an attack from a standing start. Yet the
most compelling element of the threat is its uncertainty, and
it is this uncertainty, in my mind's-eye, that increases
danger.
So no matter what the scenario, our readiness must focus on
security of this peninsula and the regional interests that
Admiral Prueher has enunciated.
QUALITY OF LIFE OF PERSONNEL
Finally, the quality of life of our soldiers, sailors,
airmen and Marines within the United States Forces Korea and
their families is important to me and it is important to my
component commanders. Quality of life and morale are readiness
multipliers. Although when we talk about readiness, we
generally don't consider that very much.
The men and women on the ground do influence the situation.
They are a visible deterrent, and shape the environment for the
future. Fighting men and women win wars, not equipment or
machines.
Our troops are forward-deployed and carrying out the
command's mission every day--deterrence, and clearly if
deterrence fails, to fight and win. And that is the charter I
am given and that is the charter I think about every day.
Serving away from home, the personnel tempo of these men
and women is high. They serve selflessly away from home 365
days with high morale and pride, and just as you and I would
want them to do. In this tense and austere environment, our
service members deserve an adequate quality of life.
However, we are in a catch-up position in the area of
quality of life as it applies to the condition of our barracks,
dormitories, and family housing. Therefore, the MILCON
appropriations for fiscal year 1995 through 1997, are greatly
appreciated. Yet much remains to be done before the problem is
fixed.
SUMMARY
These issues, Mr. Chairman, are important to me as
commander. Again, we in Korea must work hard every day at being
ready in the face of very dangerous uncertainty in North Korea.
If we are not prepared properly the price is obvious.
Lastly, we are hopeful that the joint briefings in New York
will lead to a substantive discussion in the Four-party talks.
I have provided a more detailed statement for the record.
I thank you very much. I am prepared to answer your
questions.
[The statement of General Tilelli follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
QUALITY OF LIFE OF PERSONNEL
Mr. Young. General, thank you very much.
I wanted to ask you about quality of life with your forces.
That is a big issue for the Members of this Committee, and I
got the feeling from the way you presented the quality-of-life
issue that maybe there are some things lacking, recognizing
that you are in an austere condition.
What is lacking in quality-of-life issues for your forces
in Korea?
General Tilelli. Mr. Chairman, as you know, there was a 5-
year MILCON hiatis in Korea. That was restarted in fiscal year
1995, where we gratefully received MILCON appropriations. So we
are in a catch-up mode. And in the real sense, if I had to
describe to you from the perspective of the soldiers, sailors,
airmen and Marines, what is the greatest quality-of-life issue
within, it is the barracks and dormitories and housing.
So consequently, that is where we are in the catch-up mode.
At the same time, I would be remiss if I didn't say, and we
give very little thought to it, the infrastructure on most of
our installations in Korea is old and in need of repair, when
we think about electrical, water, sewage, et cetera. But the
primary issue with the men and women who serve there are the
barracks and dormitories from the quality-of-life standpoint.
Admiral Prueher. Mr. Chairman, if I might add, those in
Korea have the least good barracks and dormitories in the whole
AOR.
Mr. Young. You mentioned military construction. Of course,
we don't have that jurisdiction. But is it new construction
that you are requiring, or do you need some real property
maintenance as well as the new construction?
General Tilelli. Mr. Chairman, as we think about this
quality-of-life issue as it applies to a backlog of maintenance
repair, new construction and repair of infrastructure, it
really is a patchwork quilt, where all of those issues must be,
if you will, focused upon in order to provide the quality of
life that I think we think is adequate for our men and women
who serve there.
From my perspective, it is not only the MILCON that is a
piece of it. It is the piece that gets us out of some Korean
War vintage living conditions. But it is also the RPMA where
you can do some of our own work to upgrade, and also the
infrastructure dollars that do the below groundwork that no one
likes to focus much on.
Mr. Young. Well, believe me, we are concerned about the
issue of the lifestyle that your forces have. We will spend
considerable time on dealing with that as we prepare our
legislation.
General Tilelli. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
COUNTRY RELATIONS
Mr. Young. You mentioned our relationship with the various
other countries in the region. You didn't mention New Zealand.
Where do we stand with New Zealand today?
Admiral Prueher. We stand in a very friendly way. The
Defense Minister from New Zealand was visiting us in Honolulu
just a little bit ago. He is the Defense Minister and Attorney
General there. The New Zealand Armed Forces total 8,000 people.
As you remember, the Lange government in 1986 terminated
our ships coming into New Zealand, and that position has not
changed. As a result of that, we do not do exercises with New
Zealand, but we do have interplay with them. They are good
global citizens. New Zealand has a ship in the Arabian Gulf
doing Middle East force work. They participate in UN things.
We participate with them in the ASEAN Regional Forum, but
we do not have military exercises with them, only dialogue.
This issue is complicated slightly, it is difficult for me
anyway to talk about New Zealand without including Australia.
Australia would like to see us do a little more with New
Zealand because New Zealand is spending only 1.2 percent of
their budget on defense. So they are not doing a lot.
Australia is concerned that New Zealand will cease to be
able to be a player, so they encourage us to do more with New
Zealand as well.
Right now, it is at a flat spot. We don't do anything. We
would like to. We will continue to work with them where we can,
but right now we do not exercise with New Zealand.
CHINESE FORCE MODERNIZATION
Mr. Young. As we talk about defense budgets, it was
revealed in the news this morning that China has announced that
it will increase its defense budget by 12 to 15 percent. Is
that significant to you? Do you have any concern about that? Do
you have any indication as to whether that might be an increase
in the size of their force or modernization of their force?
Admiral Prueher. Yes, sir, we do. The modernization of 12
to 15 percent, one, it is very difficult, that is their
announced budget, which gets their total defense budget into
the low billions, 9.7 according to China's official budget.
There is a lot more that goes into the defense owing to the way
the PLA is organized.
But that increase is in support of a stated objective of
China to modernize, and that does concern me. As I mentioned, I
think if they did everything right, it would be about 15 years
before they could modernize where they had a good force
projection capability.
I worry about over answering your questions here, but I
think most of us look at defense and measure other people's
defense justifies by looking at things, ships, airplane, tanks,
number of people. But the training of people, the conscription
and the training system and the tactics that people use, are
also very important in looking at the effectiveness of a
military.
China can buy from Russia SU-27's and they are buying 250
or so of those, and they will do that with that defense budget.
But to grow someone that is the equivalent of one of our Non-
Commissioned Officers or Chief Petty Officers with 15 or 20
years, that takes 15 to 20 years to get the people that can
work that advanced equipment. So that is something, they are
going to have to change their conscription system, their
retention system and their training system, all of which will
take time before they can really be a modern, effective power.
So I am concerned about it, but I don't lose sleep over the
fact they have increased their defense budget 12-7 percent.
Mr. Young. Since we have a pretty good attendance today, we
are going to have to go by the 5-minute rule. I am going to
keep my other questions for both of you until I get a second
chance.
Mr. Murtha?
Admiral Prueher. I will give shorter answers.
Mr. Young. That is okay, we like your answers to be as
thorough as possible.
ASSISTANCE TO NORTH KOREA
Mr. Murtha. On the food negotiation going on right now in
New York, does this help their military? If we give them food,
is that food diverted to their military?
For instance, are these negotiations talking to you folks
at all about the impact of what would happen if we were to give
them humanitarian assistance?
General Tilelli. Mr. Murtha, let me answer that question in
two ways. One, the briefing in New York, today is the joint
briefing to the North Koreans, that will discuss the Four-party
talks. In my view, I think that this is a very positive move
and unprecedented and may lead to future Four-party talks, and
secondarily, potentially lasting peace on the peninsula.
To get to the nub of your question on, one, do we discuss
with those who are involved in the humanitarian assistance to
the North the implications as they apply to the military; and
secondarily, do we in fact see that food being diverted? I
think the answer to your first question is yes, we are
consulted and we do discuss with those involved the
implications of humanitarian support.
Secondarily, I think our safeguards are adequate, and when
I say adequate, that does not mean leakproof, there are
adequate checks and balances to ensure that the humanitarian
support which is provided by a host of countries, not only in
the region but external to the region, that it is going to the
right people, and that meaning the population.
Mr. Murtha. The reason I asked the question is I understand
even their troops are having trouble getting food now. I am
just wondering if it is not counterproductive if we start going
in there, so we give food to the civilians, that just means
they divert food to the military. I don't know whether that is
counterproductive or not. You seem to feel this is the right
direction, that it is actually better even it they don't get
the food.
General Tilelli. Mr. Murtha, I would say two things. One is
the military in North Korea still retains a higher priority of
distribution of constrained resources as they have in the past.
So, therefore, while the rest of the population may be
suffering, they are suffering least as far as malnutrition.
Secondary, I think food engenders, when we think about the
population, a certain amount of stability, and stability and
trying to remove the clouds of uncertainty I think are
important as we think about a country that is in every metric
that we can think about, in downward slide, maybe a death
spiral.
CHINA'S POWER PROJECTION CAPABILITIES
Mr. Murtha. Going back to Formosa and a year ago the
activity there, could they have invaded Taiwan?
Admiral Prueher. No, sir. The People's Republic of China,
PRC does not have the amphibious lift capability to do an
invasion of Taiwan.
Mr. Murtha. When you said a decade to decade-and-a-half,
you are talking about before they would have that capability?
Admiral Prueher. Yes, sir. They would have to make right
decisions along the way to get there. If they focused all their
effort just on that, they could probably do that faster, but it
is unlikely they will focus on their effort there.
U.S. PARTNERSHIP WITH JAPAN
Mr. Murtha. Okinawa, I keep reading things that worry me.
When I was Cochairman of the Election Delegation to the
Philippines, all the top officials except the Speaker of the
House of the Philippines told me we were going to be there
forever. But there seemed like an awful lot of things going on
in Okinawa which are similar to what happened in the
Philippines. Is there any chance we will lose access to
Okinawa?
Admiral Prueher. Well, sir, phrased that way, any chance, I
am sure there is. With the Hashimoto government and with the
people of Okinawa, the businessmen that I talk to coming back
say that there is about 80 to 90 percent support amongst people
of Okinawa for U.S. presence there, our total military
presence, Air Force and Marine.
Mr. Murtha. This is in the business community?
Admiral Prueher. No, this is a gross sampling of the
people, and probably not very accurate, but roughly right.
But Governor Ota and the perfectures down there are
committed to all of the U.S. forces being gone. I believe we
will be working this for a long time. I think it is Japan, the
Government of Japan sees it very much in their interest that we
be there, and the trends are in the right direction, but we are
going to have a lot of publicity and a lot of discussion over
the downsizing of Okinawa.
QUALITY OF RECRUITS
Mr. Murtha. I have been to a number of recruit depots
talking to recruits drills sergeants, and instructors,
depending whether it was a Marine or Army base, telling me the
people coming in, the quality is slowing down. I haven't seen
this in the field. Have either of you seen a decrease in the
quality of people coming from the recruit depots to the field?
Admiral Prueher. I will say from the commanders reporting
to me, their basic answer to that is there is not a degradation
in the quality of the people coming in. I know statistically
the number of high school graduates is a couple of percentage
points lower.
I think what we do see, and I know John will want to
address this as well, but what we do see is the recruits coming
in. We need to spend time at the access points for our recruits
on training in different types of things than we have
traditionally done, because they come in with certainly a
different mind-set than what we grew up with. So we are
spending more time, and, as a result, it tags a bigger chunk of
time in the training to work that.
These issues are manifest in a lot of things we deal with.
But I think the services are coming to grips with that amount
of training, for our recruits. We are still getting a good
quality of recruits.
John, do you want to add?
General Tilelli. Sir, let me address the baseline question
in the field. We are seeing no degradation in the quality of
the men and women who come to us from the training bases. They
are highly motivated, they are well-trained, they selflessly
serve, and they act just the way you and I would want them to
do. We are very pleased with the product in all of the United
States Forces, of the men and women who come to us to serve on
the peninsula.
Mr. Young. Mr. Hobson.
REMARKS OF MR. HOBSON
Mr. Hobson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have 5 minutes, I am going to ask a bunch of questions
and you answer them however you want.
You know, one of the things I just learned in another
Committee I just attended is there are 90,000 people that are
going to be recruited by the Army this year. That is a lot of
people, when we are doing about 65,000, I think, a year ago or
so. I don't know if that number is right, but that is what I
was told.
There are five projects in Korea. Korea is apparently a
place you don't want to go to live with a family, and I think
one of the problems of all this is retention. There are five
projects for $76 million. I would like some explanation of
that.
I would also like to talk about F-16's, sales of F-16's to
Indonesia. I assume that is in your area. I would like some
comment about that. I have had some people come up to me that
are concerned about that. I am concerned about China, like
everybody else is. I see the number of aircraft and things they
are doing. I am sorry I didn't hear all of your presentation on
that.
But how many troops are permanently stationed in Hong Kong,
or do they move in and out? Did we make a deal? What is going
to happen from your perspective in Hong Kong?
It used to be a nice place to visit. I don't know what is
going to happen in the future. So those are the things I
particularly would be concerned about right now.
I am particularly concerned about Korea, because I sit on
another Committee that has that. The overall thing of so many
new troops, when you have new troops, you are putting them in
with people maybe who aren't as experienced, and you have to go
to war, or you get in an intense situation and you have a lot
of new people, that is tough. I suspect that is tough.
General Tilelli. Sir, let me address that, and I will
briefly address it, because truly it is not within my purview,
but I understand it, I think. On the recruitment of 90,000, I
think what you are seeing is that the drawdown essentially has
reached the point where we are now at a stable force of 495,000
in the Army. That drawdown--and I think it is not only this
year, but if you project it out in the future, will require as
a function of soldiers who are terminating their service, it
will require somewhere in the vicinity of 85,000 to 90,000 each
year. So I think that number, although it seems high, is a
function of stabilization rather than increased turnover.
Secondary, as you know, sir, the force in Korea is a
turbulent force, turbulent in that the preponderance of the
forces are not command-sponsored. So about 90-plus percent each
year rotate back to the United States of America to camps
around the world.
That dictates to me that we must have a very vibrant
training program, which we do, that, one, integrates those men
and women into their units, and then trains them in their
readiness for their armistice and wartime mission. I think we
do that very well. So consequently I do not get the feeling
that this turbulence causes me unreadiness to perform my
mission of deterrence in fighting and winning if all else
fails.
Lastly, I would say to you, and I did mention it when asked
the question on quality. The quality of the men and women that
are coming in, these are dedicated young men and women who
serve very well and are very satisfied with not only the
mission, but also job satisfaction when they are integrated.
Admiral Prueher. A brief one on the numbers of new people
is that all of the services are completing their drawdown, so
we have harvested----
Mr. Hobson. I think I get the Navy tomorrow. I have the
Army today.
Admiral Prueher. We have harvested the capital that existed
in that drawdown, and as it flattens out, I think we are going
to have to increase our numbers, all the services will have to
increase their numbers to stay steady.
One other point on new people is that traditionally the
services and units have about a one-third turnover every year,
so there is a constant flow of people. We are reasonably
accustomed to dealing with it.
F-16 SALES TO INDONESIA
F-16's to Indonesia is a complex topic. From a security
point of view, the Indonesia military is, I think, working in a
very responsible way. They need some aircraft. I was just in
Indonesia a couple of weeks ago, maybe 3 weeks ago now. No one
from the Vice President on down talked to me about the F-16's.
They are not pressing hard for it.
I think from a security point of view, I would support the
F-16's going to Indonesia. They are a force for stability in
the Asia-Pacific Region, and again a very large and influential
force in Southeast-Asia. All the other leaders ask ``What does
Feisal Tanjung think,'' he is the head of their defense forces.
And also I might add, an IMET beneficiary in 1981. He is a
force for stability in the area.
So from a security point of view, I would support it. There
are some other issues which are not in my kit that impinge on
that decision.
Mr. Hobson. Thank you.
HONG KONG REVERSION
Admiral Prueher. Hong Kong. We don't have troops in Hong
Kong, and we haven't had. We have a couple of handfuls of
people that are attached to the consulate there that deal with
ship visits and deal with coordination of supplies and things
like that, but we don't have a troop placement that are not
attached to the embassy there. The British have a garrison
there that will move out.
So that part is not a big issue, though it is a subset, if
do we maintain a consulate in Hong Kong after reversion, and
then do we have a couple of handfuls of military people
attached to it? It is in that context.
The Hong Kong reversion is one in which I think the Chinese
are eager to do it well. Their stated objective to us is have
it the same as before, only a change in sovereignty.
Well, the type, as I mentioned before, of security and
diplomatic and economic issues is so intertwined, I am not
confident that the Chinese know how to absorb that great
laissez-faire community and let it go on as before.
So I am hopeful that it will work, but I think we are going
to see some turbulence.
Our consul, Richard Boucher, was just through Honolulu and
we were in Hong Kong a little bit ago. It still is a pretty
good place to visit, and I recommend it. But the businessmen
there----
Mr. Hobson. Been there, done that.
CHINA AND THE PACIFIC REGION
Admiral Prueher. The businessmen are optimistic that things
will work well, but they are also prepared to batten down the
hatches for a while for some turbulence as they go through a
stage working with china.
I don't know the real answer. I think it is going to be
turbulent, but again I stay optimistic, as do the people in
Hong Kong.
China, a huge topic that we talked at some length about
before. But basically China is a major backdrop against which
all the security and some of the economic decisions in the
Asia-Pacific Region are made. China, a large country, is
growing economically, but it is not homogeneous throughout, but
they are growing at 7 to 9 percent a year.
They are modernizing their military, but they have a long
way to go to get to a modern military. Their missiles fit into
a little bit of a different category because with their missile
modernization, they can put other places at risk, like Taiwan.
So that is a separate concern.
But overall, we need to deal with China, not be too ardent
about China. But I don't see, my opinion is that we will never
be just close friends where the United States and China just
completely embrace each other. There will be individuals that
will do so, of course. But I think we can work with China out
of a position of mutual respect and strength for the long haul.
Again, I mentioned earlier, long haul is real long haul by
our standards. We aren't going to sign a contract and have it
done. It is going to be working in perpetuity.
MILITARY CONSTRUCTION IN KOREA
General Tilelli. Let me address very briefly the projects
in Korea that you alluded to. One, the components of projects
provide what I call an adequate quality of life, places where
soldiers, primarily soldiers, live and work. Those projects are
deemed necessary and are a function of the quality of life
that, in my view, is a function of a long hiatus of MILCON and
RPMA, and working on the infrastructure is necessary to bring a
leavening effect, if you will, for our men and women to serve.
Mr. Young. I want to compliment the gentleman on a very
effective way to use his 5 minutes.
Mr. Hobson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Dicks.
QUALITY OF LIFE
Mr. Dicks. I want to welcome the Admiral and General and
appreciate their statements. I am sorry I had to leave in the
middle, but we have complicated schedules here.
I would just point out again that we visited Korea with
Congressman Murtha several times, and the need for that MILCON
is essential. There were many years in which nothing was done,
and especially for the most forward-deployed areas. The housing
was simply unacceptable for U.S. standards.
I am glad we finally got his money in the budget. We needed
to do that.
Now, can you tell us a little bit more, General? Are we
making any progress on those problems?
General Tilelli. Sir, let me address two things. One, I
think we are making progress in improving the quality of life,
and that is seen not only as a function of the construction
dollars that are provided by the Congress, but also what I
would call the burden-sharing dollars on the Korean projects
that assist us in upgrading dormitories and barracks.
The second part of that is we are in a continual upgrade
program where we are upgrading places where we have some of our
key systems employed, where primarily soldiers, because that is
the largest quantity of personnel we have there, and Air Force,
work. For example, a Patriot facility. We deployed a Patriot
battalion there several years ago, and we have upgraded the
facilities so they were in more or less temporary facilities.
Part of the money we are talking about is going to do to that.
We applied Apache helicopters, our highest level of
helicopters to Korea. They have gone into temporary facilities.
We are trying to upgrade the facilities so they not only have a
quality of life where their aviators are living, but also have
good places to maintain the helicopter.
But we are making progress, and the progress, in my view,
can be attributed to the great support that the Congress of the
United States and the American people have given to the U.S.
forces in Korea. My plea to you is that we continue that.
NORTH KOREAN MILITARY CAPABILITIES
Mr. Dicks. Thank you. One of the things I have been worried
about, when I was there we met, General Estes and his air
component commander, and we talked about the potential for the
North Koreans, if they were to attack us, to use chemical and
biological weapons against our airfields and, in essence, be
able to lock out the United States, or anyone, from bringing in
TACAIR and bringing in airlifts in order to reinforce South
Korea.
How big a threat is that? How big a problem is that? Is
that something you worry about and can we even talk about it at
this level of classification?
General Tilelli. Sir, I will talk about it. First, let me
say that when we think of chemical and biological weapons, I
think we all lose sleep over thinking about it and talk about
it a lot. Secondarily, key to our execution of the operation
plan is the maintenance of the airfields and ports.
We, along with--remember that we are along USA links, we
and the ROK are spending a serious amount of time and effort in
determining: one, how do we keep those places open?
Secondarily, what is the truth? And I think we have to take
the concept of reality; what is the true effect of a weapon
that is not very accurate with chemicals on pieces of those
ports and airfields?
Thirdly, and I think most importantly, we are upgrading our
ability to decontaminate areas and equipment in the next
several years, one, through the infusion of equipment, and
secondly, through activation of the chemical battalion in the
Republic of Korea.
Mr. Dicks. Are they getting any more accurate with their
SCUDS? Are there going to be advanced generations of SCUDS or
Cruise Missiles that will be more accurate and more dangerous?
General Tielli. Sir, I will answer that I think the
accuracy of the SCUD is problematic. I think it is an area
rather than a point weapon system. I think it will continue to
remain that way.
The concern, of course is when you volley SCUDS, they cover
a large area.
The second area is the Missile Development Program. We are
concerned about their Missile Development Program. We are also
concerned about whether or not that Missile Development Program
will accelerate their capability to send chemical weapons our
way.
I will just say finally, as it applies to the use of
chemical weapons, I would never discount that the North Koreans
who would attack us would use the systems that they have.
Consequently, it is one of those things that, as you said, I
have to be aware; and two, I have to take those measures to
protect our forces.
THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE
Mr. Dicks. I would assume that Theater Missile Defense, the
ability of the United States to have a high-quality Theater
Missile Defense, has to be one of your highest priorities for
protecting your forces in South Korea.
General Tielli. That is absolutely correct. Theater Missile
Defense is my number one priority, and I think it is a function
of Lower Tier and Upper Tier, multilayer, where you can general
protect the force. Your will never have a leakproof system, but
when you have a two-tiered system, you better protect the
force.
Therefore, in my integrated priority list that I send to my
friend Joe Prueher, Theater Missile Defense is one of those
very high items on my integrated priority list. And,
secondarily, without getting into force flows, in my force
flow, the Theater Missile Defense assets are early in the flow.
Mr. Dicks. Shouldn't they be prepositioned?
General Tielli. I think with the battalion we have now and
the batteries that we have now, that, coupled with the flow, I
think we are all right.
Mr. Young. Mr. Nethercutt?
MORALE AND QUALITY OF LIFE
Mr. Nethercutt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Admiral and
General, welcome to the Committee. Thank you for your
testimony.
General, I just want to follow up on your comment about our
forces in Korea now. Did I hear you correctly to say that their
tour is 365 days?
General Tielli. Sir, let me elaborate on that, if you will.
I think there are three issues. The preponderance of the
force is on a one-year tour, a short tour, so that is a 365-day
tour. Many times when we discuss quality of life and we talk
about personnel turnover, we put it in the context of how many
days you are away from your bed.
In my context, I say the soldiers, sailors, airmen and
Marines stationed in Korea are away from home for 365 days.
Therefore, their personnel tempo is very, very high.
Consequently, it is a short tour, whereby they are gainfully
employed, focused on the war fight every day.
Mr. Nethercutt. Is their morale good? Do people not want to
go there, and if they get there, can they tough it out for the
year? Is their moral, good, or bad, and do you see improvements
needed?
With regard to the housing construction needs we talk
about, will it improve the moral? What else can we do as a
Committee? That is a compound question.
General Tilelli. Sir, it is not. It is an excellent
question. One, their morale is good; two, they are satisfied
for their job; three, when you look at these men and women
while there and then talk to them after they leave, they are
happy to have been there.
The real issue is the responsible of leadership to provide
an adequate quality of life. I feel more bad about it than most
of the men and women who were serving there, because they do
endure and they do well.
So, that is the best answer I can give you.
Mr. Nethercutt. But we will help, I take it, if we can get
the better facilities and so on?
General Tilelli. The thing about these men and women who
serve there, when they see progress, improvement in their
quality of life, it is a beacon for them.
Mr. Nethercutt. They hope.
General Tilelli. That will help and I think will help
immensely.
MOBILE OFFSHORE BASES
Mr. Nethercutt. Thank you. Admiral, I have heard some talk
about the concept of a mobile offshore base, MOB, in terms of
future planning, in your command area. What do you see as the
likelihood of that developing over time? Is it a good thing? Is
it something that is receiving adequate study? What can you
tell the subcommittee about it?
Admiral Prueher. The discussion of a mobile offshore base
is associated with the troop movements in Okinawa, and the
parlance has changed from a mobile offshore base to a sea-based
facility, and it is not an MOB, it is an Sea Bound Faction, FBS
now is under discussion.
It would be something that would be funded by the Japanese
to do, and they will not fund a mobile offshore base. And so
what we are talking about in the formative stages is either
something that is tethered to the shore or landfill that would
be another base off of Okinawa. That is under development in
the Futenima TANDEM Implementation Group. So we will not have a
mobile offshore base in the theater and we are not seeking one.
Mr. Nethercutt. Okay. Do you anticipate any costs to
America in connection with the development or discussion?
Admiral Prueher. In our arrangements with Japan, the
planning costs accrue to the United States and the development
costs and construction costs accrue to Japan. There is
obviously a little merge in the middle and this group that is
just forming up now is discussing this. In fact, Mr. Tanaka
from Japan was just in talking to Dr. Kurt Campbell from OSD
earlier this week and that is one of the discussion topics.
Mr. Nethercutt. I understand. Well, thank you very much.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Nethercutt.
Mr. Cunningham.
TRAINING EXERCISES
Mr. Cunningham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I always said why
let rank lead when ability can do it better, but that is not
the reason I got to move up here because I sat way down there
with my colleagues.
General, George Norwood was a Navy exchange pilot. I
understand he is still in Korea with the Air Force general, I
think, down there on the F-16. If you would, tell him hi for
me. He blew--the very first landing on the carrier he blew both
tires twice, but he is a good guy and a good friend.
Second, I know that the political ramifications, when I
worked for Seventh Fleet staff for Vice Admiral Brown, the CTS
77, we were conducting a TEAM SPIRIT exercise and we used a
combination of Reserves for support. I know politics has played
in that. About 80 percent of my time was spent in country, even
though I worked ULCHI FOCUS LENS and TANGENT FLASH and Yama
Sakura and the other exercises. But we are still doing TEAM
SPIRIT?
And I know the problems of getting the bottoms there from
the amphibs in those exercises. Using the Reserves was very,
very important. And when you are looking at the threat, I can't
think of a better place for Theater High Altitude Air Defense,
THAAD, and upper tier than both Korea and Taiwan because of the
restriction of our troops. And I am glad to see both of you
support that. But are we still working TEAM SPIRIT?
General Tilello. Sir, TEAM SPIRIT has been canceled for the
last several years. However, I will say this, without going
into a large amount of detail, that many of the training
objectives and many of the forces that have been associated
with TEAM SPIRIT have been applied to the three major exercises
that we do year in and year out, and that is ULCHI Focus Lens
which you mentioned, which is a very large exercise, our FOAL
EAGLE exercise, which took many of the elements of TEAM SPIRIT
to include deployment of forces; and thirdly, the Reception and
Staging Onward Movement and Integration of Forces, which is
also a deployment exercise. So the training objectives
associated with TEAM SPIRIT are being accomplished, in my
belief, to the level of training that I need.
As you know, and you so adequately put it, as we think
about the war fight on the peninsula, I am absolutely lashed,
if you will, to the power projection strategy and the flow of
forces, Navy, Marine and Army forces, and Air Force as we look
at the culmination of flight.
So all of those objectives are exercised in the three major
exercises I have.
Mr. Cunningham. Would you want to reestablish TEAM SPIRIT?
Would that be a better way of response?
General Tilelli. At this point, very candidly, I do not see
the necessity at this point to reestablish TEAM SPIRIT in
fiscal year 1997. But let me say, along with that, is I make an
annual assessment, based on a multitude of variables and
determine as to whether or not we should conduct a TEAM SPIRIT
exercise or not. So I need that option. I want that option left
open, where I can make an assessment based on those variables I
see on the peninsula and external to the peninsula to say we
need a TEAM SPIRIT this year.
RESERVIST CONTRIBUTION TO EXERCISES
Mr. Cunningham. Joe?
Admiral Prueher. I take a little bit of the Reserve part of
that. The Reserves continue to be extremely active in the--from
all the Services and especially--well, not especially, but
equally in the Navy with the Seventh Fleet. In fact, that has
been copied in the Sixth Fleet because it was such a good idea,
and the exercise going on right now, the augmentation with
Reserves to those staffs is immense and extremely productive
and it is ingrained in what we do.
Mr. Cunningham. Well, I would agree, because I know the
importance, even when the fleet was there, of the deconfliction
with ROK-AF, Republic of Korea Air Force the real world threat,
plus the exercise threat that they went through. As on aside,
my father-in-law was supply corps officer in Korea and he
almost froze to death, General, and we spent a lot of time
there.
I empathize with the troops and I think the living
conditions which your enlisted troops must endure are the
worst. I mean, they live and work in little boxes--if members
haven't been there, I recommend you go. These troops are in a
cubicle sometimes no bigger than from here to there, to that
wall. I mean, it is pretty remote living, and I would support
that.
General Tilelli. If I can make one comment on the Reserves?
Mr. Cunningham. Sure.
General Tilelli. I want to echo what Admiral Prueher said.
When I think about the war fighting, I don't think about it
from Active over Reserve because to me it is an integrated
process. As I look at the flow of forces, I am looking at the
flow of forces and not looking at the context of whether or not
they are Active or Reserve, and they all are key critical. As
we think about this power projection strategy of ours, they are
key critical in the progression session of our operations plan.
INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS
Mr. Cunningham. Last question. Are you getting enough
intelligence? I know with the SR-71 gone and the ------, are
you using Predator or any other supplement or mostly just
satellite reconnaissance?
General Tilelli. Sir, and I will ask Admiral Prueher to
help me on this, in a real sense, though, we do not have any
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, UAVs, on the peninsula. However, as
we look at the requirement for UAVs to the war fight, they are
a requirement.
I am getting the intelligence indicators and warning and
day-to-day intelligence I need from a combination of systems.
Some are national and some are local. The U-2 is on the
peninsula. I have got the Airborne Reconnaissance Vehicle low.
I have Signals Intelligence, SIGINT, and imagery capability,
both local and national. Plus at a time of crisis or potential
crisis, Admiral Prueher and the Chairman and Joint Chiefs of
Staff focus other Intel means to help me in establishing the
requirements of our mission.
Admiral Prueher. For theater Intel, our most recent real-
time need is General Tilelli's and most of our assets that are
focused there are on a time-sharing basis.
You have had--you have talked to General Joulwan about
Bosnia, I believe, and right now we have a lot of our Nation's
Intel treasure focused there. And so as a result of it being
there, it is not somewhere else. And so there are--we don't
have UAVs in theater right now. UAVs are high on our Integrated
Priority List for the theater and there are many places, Korea
among them--probably foremost among them, to support General
Tilelli--but there are many places where that would be a good
augmentation to our overhead capability.
Mr. Cunningham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Hefner.
MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
Mr. Hefner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief.
I served as Chairman of the MILCON Subcommittee for several
years and I don't remember if it was 1995, Gary Luck, who was a
very good friend, served at Fort Bragg, and he had an immediate
need. He said we have got to have $40 million. That was shortly
after he took command. Of course, we were afraid not to give it
to Gary, as you know. But I am glad to see that we are making
some strides as far as the quality of life in Korea.
There is no way we are doing enough on quality of life, we
know that, but do you feel like we are maybe doing better in
Korea than we have been in the past year?
General Tilelli. Sir, I will say, the answer is, yes. We
have been, since 1995, receiving $30 million in military
construction so that is having an improved--that is having a
beneficial effect on the quality of life in Korea.
At the same time, because of the hiatus that Gary talked to
you about, and he was my boss in Desert Storm, the hiatus that
Gary talked about on military construction we are also in a
catch-up mode. So I keep the pressure going on trying to force
not only the MILCON dollars, but the RPMA dollars and the
infrastructure dollars that will allow me to tie this quilt
together and improve the overall quality of life for our men
and women who serve there.
CHINESE FORCE PROJECTION CAPABILITY
Mr. Hefner. Someone mentioned earlier about the Chinese
capability to support an invasion of the force. Do you see in
your intelligence that they are--we talk about planes, but
being able to move--are they building in that direction of
having an invasion force or occupational force? Does that show
any focus toward that?
Admiral Prueher. I think it is currently in their mind's
eye. They have not procured yet. They have expressed at lot of
interest in landing craft. Right now, the capability that we
assess that China has is the ability to move one division,
which would not be an adequate invasion force. They want to do
it.
Amphibious operations of that nature are certainly among
the most complex operations that anyone could do. They are a
long way from it. I think they aspire to have some sort of
amphibious invasion force, but they don't have it and they are
not very close to it right now, sir.
Mr. Hefner. We can kind of relate to that because we have
had a shortfall on amphibious and I know we were criticized
very soundly a few years ago when we bought some capability for
RO-Ros that we were buying that--the early eighties, I guess it
was.
I just have one other question. We understand that U.S.
forces has an urgent requirement for 62 SEP units and we
appropriated $5 million in 1997 to initiate the production of
this. What is the Army's progress? Could you just give me, what
are we doing and when are we going to do it?
General Tilelli. Sir, I cannot give you a progress
statement on that, but I will provide it for the record. I am
not familiar with where we are as an Army on the SEP program.
Mr. Hefner. Okay.
Admiral Prueher. I can't help with that either, sir.
[Clerk's note.--Classified insert was removed.]
Mr. Hefner. I have no further questions, and if you happen
to see General Luck, he is one of my favorite people, give him
my best.
General Tilelli. I will do that, sir. Thank you.
Mr. Hefner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Skeen.
FOOD SHORTAGES IN NORTH KOREA
Mr. Skeen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral and General, I
apologize for not being here earlier, but we have got all of
these Appropriations Committees going at one time. We are
trying to seal the vault.
I was privileged to have a tour in Korea some years ago
with some other Members under Chairman Murtha, and I was struck
by the fact that one of the primary considerations about the
tenacity of North Korea is their lack of food supply. Has that
changed dramatically here in the last couple of years or is it
still about the same or is it still a factor? How does it play
also with their cooperation with--their cooperation and help
out of China?
I know that is a strange--it is nonmilitary, but it has a
direct bearing.
General Tilelli. Let me answer the first part of the
question and defer the second part to Admiral Prueher.
First, the North Korean armed forces are given higher
priority than the rest of the population. That applies to food
and other training resources.
Secondarily, and I always caution myself when I think about
the effects of malnutrition on--even an American soldier and
try to correlate that to the pugnacity, as you put it, and the
will of the North Korean soldier as was displayed during the
Korean War.
So I think to put that in context, I would say that the
lack of food resources and the lack of resources in general has
had a denigrating effect on their capability. But I would still
say that it is onerous and capable of vast destruction if given
the order.
Mr. Skeen. That is the point, the threat level stays at a
relatively high level because of one of the things is the lack
of food in the nation in its entirety.
Admiral.
Admiral Prueher. On the tie with China, I think China is
interested in not having North Korea fail, and accordingly,
they are also willing and have provided some foodstuffs. So the
Chinese are in the--in that equation, as well, with respect to
food. I don't think--General Tilelli can perhaps address this
more. We know of no plans that China has to militarily support
North Korea.
Mr. Skeen. Well, that was a very interesting part of it. Of
course, I am involved in agriculture and chair that
subcommittee on the appropriations panel and we are seeing more
corn going through the Panama Canal in American bottoms going
to China than at any time in our history and I just wondered if
through a round about way if we weren't supplying some of the
foodstuffs for the North Koreans.
Admiral Prueher. Well you know----
Mr. Skeen. Without benefit of a pact or something.
Admiral Prueher. I think just from our research of the
grain embargo a few years ago, things went in circuitous paths.
So I could not say that we are not. But China's three main
issues that they are trying to face is jobs for 1.25 billion
people; food and rising expectations for them. So I expect it
is actually going to China because they do not have the food
production capability alone now to provide for China; and the
other issue is their energy demands, which are rising
exponentially.
General Tilelli. Also, I believe we also have seen in a
humanitarian way, rather than in a military-to-military way,
foodstuffs being provided from China to the North Koreans.
Mr. Skeen. Thank you. I appreciate that response. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING
Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Skeen.
Admiral, you and I talked about International Military
Education and Training, IMET, several times before, and IMET
tends to get a little controversial on occasion, not in this
Committee, but in the Congress.
General Tilelli. Yes, sir.
Mr. Young. Could you provide us for the record maybe 8 or
10 or a dozen good examples of foreign military officers who
have been through the IMET Program, positions that they might
hold today and how that benefits the United States and benefits
you in performing your duties?
Admiral Prueher. Yes, sir, I will be glad to provide that
for the record. I can also give you--I could provide a little
bit of it now, if you would like.
Mr. Young. Yes, surely.
Admiral Prueher. Well, the IMET Program, we talked before
in my oral statement stands for International Military
Education and Training. It is a highly leveraged amount of
money. Our total U.S. program worldwide is about $43 million,
and the Pacific portion of that is about $6.8 million, about 16
percent.
We have examples. The Minister of Defense in Korea went
through IMET in 1973. Arturo Enrile, the recent head of the
Philippine defense forces, went through in 1965. General Bey,
who is the head of the Singapore defense forces, went through,
in 1982. And Feisal Tanjung, who, as I mentioned is the head of
the Indonesian defense forces, went through in 1981. These are
long-term investments, small dollars which have a big payoff
for us.
What it does is give the opportunity to educate foreign
military people, not only in the U.S. military, but in the U.S.
way of thinking about things, and IMET students have taken
these ideas and influenced their armed forces, so it is a good
deal for us. And when we restrict those funds for whatever
reason, it works to our disadvantage, not necessarily that of
the other nation.
Mr. Young. Thanks very much. If you want to expand on that
for the record, please feel free to do so because it would help
us in our preparation.
Mr. Visclosky.
MILITARY CONSTRUCTION APPROPRIATIONS
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, last year the Committee provided an additional
$600 million to help improve conditions in various related
facilities. Do you know if any of those monies that were added
on by the Committee are currently being used in Korea?
General Tilelli. Yes, sir. We were given dollars for
barracks and dormitory construction and upgrades. I will
provide for the record the exact amount.
Mr. Visclosky. If you could. For the record, also, on your
budget request for fiscal year 1998, was there an increase in
the dollar amount in your budget for barracks and related
facilities for Korea?
General Tilelli. I will provide that for the record.
Mr. Visclosky. If you could. And when you do that for the
record, if it could be in relationship to your business line
from fiscal year 1997 and relative to what the Committee added
on.
[The information follows:]
United States Forces Korea Fiscal Year 97 Military
Construction had not been increased from initial requests of
$30 million for the Army and $9.8 million for the Air Force.
Eighth United States Army did benefit from increases in the
Fiscal Year 98 Military Construction Authority program. These
totaled $46.1 million above the initial request of $30 million.
The Air Force Program remained at the original $22.34 million
request.
It is clear that Congressionally added projects for United
States Forces Korea in fiscal year 1995 and Fiscal Year 1996
restored United States Military Construction support for Korea.
The Fiscal Years 1995-98 Military Construction projects will
have a significant positive impact on the quality of life for
soldiers and airmen in Korea.
QUALITY OF LIFE OF PERSONNEL
Mr. Visclosky. My concern, and a number of our colleagues
have mentioned this, is about the quality of life for our
troops. My experience here on the Committee is every year
without fail, we add on $600 million for 1997, we added on $700
million for various related facilities in 1996. I tried to get
on this Committee for 7 years because we could pass all the
policy in the world, but unless we spend the money or ask for
the money, nothing is going to change as far as the quality of
life for our troops.
My concern is that the Department comes up to the Hill
every year and expects us to do the lifting as far as real
property maintenance and housing and that somehow we will come
up with the dollars. I think the real commitment, as far as
that quality of life, should be in the Department's budget.
So if you could, for the record, I would appreciate seeing
those figures.
[The information follows:]
The only fiscal years 1996 and 1997 Army Family Housing or
Real Property Maintenance plus-ups that I can determine are:
Fiscal year 1996 Real Property Maintenance: $19.7 million
for Bridging the Gap reflected in the funding memorandum,
however, there were corresponding real Property Maintenance
decreases.
Fiscal year 1996 family Housing: $8.5 million from Office
of the Secretary of Defense Quality of Life plus-up.
Fiscal year 1997 Real Property Maintenance: $10 million in
Quality of Life Environment, Defense ($8 million for Army and
$2 million for Air Force).
General Tilelli. I will do that.
STATUS OF RUSSIAN NAVY
Mr. Visclosky. That would be great.
Admiral, could you talk for a minute or two about the state
of the Russian navy in the Pacific and their activities?
Admiral Prueher. Yes, I can. The Russian navy in the
Pacific is not robust, but it is small and of good quality.
They are led by their Pacific fleet commander, who is Admiral
Kurogedov who is very aggressive and good, and interestingly,
the Russian navy in the Pacific, as of about a month and a half
ago, was fully paid in contrast to some other units around, so
that that is not a homogeneous pay problem. But the Russian
navy pays selectively to the units. ------. The surface navy is
less well-maintained that the submarines, both their ballistic
missile submarines and their attack boats. ------. Their
surface ships have a few show ships that get underway; but the
conditions are bad. They are sailing more and more.
VIETNAM/CAMBODIA/LAOS
Mr. Visclosky. In the time remaining, could you comment on
the situation in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos?
Admiral Prueher. Yes. The--in fact, I am going to make a
trip to Vietnam later on this month, and our work with Vietnam
is progressing at the proper rate. It is slow, but it is moving
about as fast as we can--as we need to or they are able to
work. And the economic piece of Vietnam is--there is alot of
potential, but nothing much has come to fruition yet. And
militarily, we do not have any planned exercises with Vietnam.
They are not too eager to have a lot of our uniformed troops on
the ground there just yet.
Mr. Visclosky. Are they active in Cambodia at all or in
Laos?
Admiral Prueher. Are they active in Cambodia?
Mr. Visclosky. Yes, the Vietnamese?
Admiral Prueher. I am sure around the borders they are but
a ------.
Our big efforts there are toward some form of stability.
The Khmer Rouge seem to be on the wane in Cambodia. ------.
That is one of our major activities.
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you very much.
Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Admiral, you mentioned earlier China, Korea,
Russia, and India. Give us a chart for the record or a graph of
some kind that shows the relative size of their various
military services ranking in the order of their size and then
compare it to the U.S. forces.
Admiral Prueher. All right, sir. We have that and we will
provide that for the record.
[Clerk's note.--The classified insert was removed.]
EQUIPMENT PREPOSITIONING IN THE PACIFIC
Mr. Young. Thank you very much, sir. I would like to go to
a budget-related issue, that deals with the question of
prepositioning in the Pacific theater. I am wondering if the
current levels of prepositioned equipment are adequate?
Admiral Prueher. Do you want to take the Army War Reserve,
AWR-4 issue?
General Tilelli. Let me, Mr. Chairman, address the
prepositioning of the equipment in Korea. ------. At the same
time, I am convinced that as we think about power projection
and the movement of the forces from Fort Lewis, Washington,
which is the 3rd brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division, that
this set is critical and I place a lot of importance on meeting
our requirements with that set.
Mr. Young. What about prepositional ships?
Admiral Prueher. The pre-po ships, overall, with the
exception of what John just talked about, the shore-based, our
AWR supplies are adequate. The pre-po ships are adequate for
what we need. ------.
And even without the MRC requirements, which are quite
well-honed, in our theater, because of the time and the
distance, having the number of assets as well as the
distribution, which these ships enable, will be a big help to
us and the LMSRs are vital for that reason, sir.
Mr. Young. They are not in the budget, though, are they?
They are not in the 1998 budget request?
Admiral Prueher. I had thought they were, but let me check,
sir, and I will get back to you.
[The information follows:]
The fiscal year 1998 budget request includes $812.9 million
requested for Large Medium Speed Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR)
acquisition. This dollar figure was allocated for the purchase
of three new acquisition LMSR's at an estimated cost of $200
million per ship and to cover pre-acquisition costs associated
with follow-on ships. Four new acquisition LMSR's are scheduled
for acquisition in fiscal year 1999, with subsequent yearly
acquisitions eventually leading to a total of 19 LMSR's by
fiscal year 2001.
General Tilelli. Certainly, sir, I would again agree with
Admiral Prueher as we think about sea and airlift in our power
projection strategy, the continued procurement of the C-17
aircraft and the large medium speed roll off-roll on ship are
critical. I would agree with the admiral on that.
Mr. Dicks. The prepositioned ships, are they in Guam? Is
that just the Marine Corps?
Admiral Prueher. There is some--Army War Reserve, AWR-3 is
in Guam, that set. There are some in Guam and there is some in
Diego Garcia and then some stay in air and transit, but they
are based in Guam, that one group.
General Tilelli. I think what you are thinking about, Mr.
Dicks, is the Marine Maritime Prepositioned Ships, MPS ships.
Mr. Dicks. Right.
General Tilelli. They are partially in Guam and partially
in Diego Garcia.
Mr. Dicks. Well, the Army now has some ships in Diego
Garcia of its own.
General Tilelli. That is the AWR-3.
Mr. Dicks. We don't have any Army prepositioned ships in
Guam?
Admiral Prueher. There are both U.S. Marine Corps Maritime
Pre-position Ship Squadrons and Army AWR-3 Ships stationed at
Guam and Diego Garcia.
General Tilelli. That is correct.
Mr. Dicks. Should we?
Admiral Prueher. Because of berth and anchorage limitations
we must station these vessels in Guam and Diego Garcia. Both
locations give us the ability to quickly respond to our needs
in Korea as well as Southwest Asia.
Mr. Dicks. Okay.
General Tilelli. As I look at the flow for Korea, the MPS
ships are located in the right place. They are the first ones
that come in and are timed exactly right with the Marines that
come with them. And secondarily, the AWR-3, if it does come to
me, I think it comes in a timely way so I am not as concerned
at this moment about moving the pre-po from where it is.
Mr. Young. The Committee provided funding in the fiscal
year 1997 budget for two additional MPF ships for the Marine
Corps. Where will they be prepositioned?
Admiral Prueher. Sir, I will have to provide that for the
record in the worldwide flow.
[The information follows:]
Of the two additional Maritime Preposition Ships funded in
Fiscal Year 1997 budget for the Marine Corps, one will be
positioned with Maritime Preposition Squadron Two in Diego
Garcia and one will be positioned with Maritime Preposition
Squadron Three in Guam.
Mr. Young. Are you considering other anchorages than the
ones you are presently using for pre-po ships?
Admiral Prueher. Yes, we are. ------. We are looking and
have had a program ongoing to look at the other anchorages.
Mr. Young. What about cargo handling in the various ports
for our equipment? Do we have adequate equipment to handle the
cargo? What is that called, lighterage? Is that what that is?
Admiral Prueher. I don't know who coined the phrase
``lighterage.'' Last year, we had quite a discussion about a
lack of lighterage.
I have--I had not gotten any comments--except pertaining to
Korea, which is a real contingency. We haven't had a awful lot
of problem off-loading. I will provide that for the record on
the quantity of lighterage.
[The information follows:]
Lighterage assigned to each Maritime Prepositioning ships (MPS)
squadron meets the notional equipment load as required by Department of
the Navy and U.S. Marine Corps publication NWP 22-10/FMFM 1-5. The off
loading of required prepositioned equipment into a seaport of
debarkation to support Pacific Command operation plans has been
successfully demonstrated during exercises.
Currently, the lighterage inventory in each Pacific Command MPS
squadron is:
(1) Maritime Preposition Squadron Two based in Diego Garcia:
five side-loadable warping tugs (SLWT), 15 causeway sections--
powered (CSP), 25 causeway sections--non-powered (CSNP), ten
landing craft mechanized (LCM-8);
(2) Maritime Preposition Squadron Three based in Guam: four
SLWT's, 16 CSP's, 30 CSNP's, eight LCM-8's.
There are shortages in Army lighterage requirements. The Army
requires seven Roll-On/Roll-Off (RO/RO) Discharge Facility (RRDF)
systems to offload strategic sealift ships anchored at sea during
logistics-over-the-shore operations. The RRDF provides the essential
interface between Army lighterage and RO/RO ships. Tracked and wheeled
vehicles are driven across the RRDF from the RO/RO ships onto an Army
lighterage moored alongside. The Army program corrects the shortage
with the purchase of three RRDFs in Fiscal Year 1999, three in Fiscal
Year 2001 and one in the outyears for the Reserve Component.
The Army and Navy are undergoing a joint research and development
(R&D) effort to acquire a Sea State Three capable lighter, designated
the Joint Modular Lighterage System. This would enable logistics-over-
the-shore operations in sea states greater than current Sea State Two
or below systems. Continued Congressional support is required to
sustain this important R&D effort.
Materiel Handling Equipment (MHE) is required to transfer cargo to/
from all modes of transportation: air, sea, and land. The types of MHE
vary by type of cargo and mode of transport. We do not have enough MHE
at our airbases for throughput. The availability of wide-body loaders
(WBL) at our ports of debarkation remains one of our logistical
concerns. We require 30 WBLs in our theater and have only 21. New
60,000 pound aircraft loaders are in the budget but are several years
away from worldwide distribution. A modification of some 25,000 pound
loaders is in progress, but is a temporary solution.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much. Mr. Murtha.
BOSNIA FUNDING
Mr. Murtha. Just a couple of things. Are you being
penalized at all because of the money we are spending in
Bosina? Are you lacking funds right now? Have they said to you,
anybody up there said to you, okay, you are going to have to
slow down because we need the money for Bosnia?
General Tilelli. Sir, let me speak from my perspective,
they have not told us to slow down. However, there is always
the--and I will use the term ``possibility'' out there, that if
the supplemental appropriation is not approved for Bosnia, the
pot of money is only one pot of money and it is going to have
to come from somewhere, so there is a possibility that we may
be required to contribute, which will cause a necessary slow
down to pay for that contingency.
Mr. Murtha. But at this point you haven't lost any money--
you have been able to spend your allowance. You haven't lost
any money. Either of you lost any money?
General Tilelli. I have not, sir.
Admiral Prueher. No, sir, we haven't lost any money yet to
Bosnia. We quarrel over distribution of--not quarrel.
Mr. Murtha. True.
Admiral Prueher. Well, distribution of assets.
OKINAWA, JAPAN
Mr. Murtha. Let's go back to Okinawa. Let's say we are
forced--I am sure you are looking at contingencies if we get
forced out of there. Where would we go? I mean, we are talking
about a pretty good distance if we lose that access, aren't we?
Admiral Prueher. Yes, sir. We are always looking at the
efficiencies and effectiveness and looking at contingencies. My
opinion is, the way things are in the world right now, it is
not wise of us to discuss those too much at this time.
Mr. Murtha. All right.
Admiral Prueher. But your point is correct. The number of
choices of places to go are not--there are not a lot of them.
Mr. Murtha. From a strategic standpoint we would be much
worse off if we lose access?
Admiral Prueher. Yes, sir, we would. Yes, sir.
WATER QUALITY IN KOREA
Mr. Murtha. I heard that we don't even have good water in
some of our bases. We are talking about giving the North
Koreans money, yet at some of our bases there is not good water
there for the 2nd Division. Is that accurate? I mean, the water
is not--they can't drink it. Is that right?
General Tilelli. That is correct. There are eight bases
primarily that we have had some water monitoring issues with
and when we see that it is beyond a certain tolerance level, we
go to bottled water. Namely, Kunsan, Chong Ju, Kimhae, Kwang Ju
and Taegu, Rokaos, Niolo Barracks and Camps Gray and Kim, where
the quality of water is not what we want. We are in a
monitoring and repair and replace process right now.
Mr. Murtha. Is it cheaper to go to bottled water than it is
to fix the situation?
General Tilelli. For the long-term, it is cheaper.
Mr. Murtha. What kind of dollars are you talking about to
fix those eight places?
General Tilelli. I can't give you that off the top of my
head. I will provide that for the record, Mr. Murtha.
[The information follows:]
We would have an approximate initial investment of over $4
million with recurring costs of over $400,000 per year.
Mr. Dicks. Should we fix it?
General Tilelli. I believe we should fix it. Our service
members deserve it.
Mr. Murtha. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Dicks. Would you yield on that?
Mr. Murtha. Yes.
Mr. Dicks. Is there a problem with the South Korean
Government?
General Tilelli. There is not a problem with the South
Korean Government. It is a problem--the water quality problem
is one that has arisen after funds were programmed and we are
working with them and also with our own dollars to attempt to
fix that infrastructure issue.
Mr. Murtha. Are you saying that is irresponsibility, the
water?
General Tilelli. No, it is not irresponsibility. It is an
issue that just perked up through our monitoring process and we
monitor all of the water standards throughout the peninsula
because of different requirements and U.S. standards are
somewhat higher. So consequently, this was picked up.
Mr. Murtha. Is it going to be fixed in the next 6 months?
General Tilelli. I can't say it will be fixed in the next 6
months. We will certainly----
Mr. Murtha. Is it lack of money?
General Tilelli. At this point, we are trying to get an
assessment of the costs and then apply the correct resources.
We will not have--we will not have our service members drinking
bad water.
Mr. Murtha. Okay.
Mr. Dicks. Are we using bottled water?
General Tilelli. We are using bottled water for drinking
water at this point.
Mr. Young. Mr. Skeen.
Mr. Skeen. I have no questions.
Mr. Young. Mr. Dicks.
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO NORTH KOREA
Mr. Dicks. I am sorry I missed part of your presentation. I
know this question was asked, but I want to ask it again
because I want to hear your answer.
As I understand it, the U.N. World Food Program, we are
providing a total of $41.6 million in humanitarian assistance
to help with the food shortage in North Korea. How do you feel
about that? I mean, do you think that is the right thing to do?
General Tilelli. Sir, I cannot address the amount of
dollars that we are providing. However, it is my view that the
contributions by many nations in the region contribute to the
stability in the North. So I think it is appropriate that for
humanitarian purposes, we provide food aid. As a matter of
fact, the Republic of Korea, Japan and other countries are also
providing food aid through humanitarian means for the North
Koreans.
Mr. Dicks. So you see it as a stabilizing event?
Genneral Tilelli. I see it as stabilizing.
Mr. Dicks. Anything we can do to prevent them from
imploding or whatever?
General Tilelli. I see it as truly a stabilizing event.
NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM
Mr. Dicks. Okay. How would you rate the nuclear program? We
have had this long complicated arrangement with them to try to
get them not to develop nuclear weapons and weapon-grade
plutonium, for example. How is this program going?
General Tilelli. The nuclear Agreed Framework is proceeding
very well. The canning of the rods is ongoing and the latest I
heard we were about 60 percent complete in canning. The piece
of the nuclear Agreed Framework that didn't work exactly as
everyone through it might work was an acceleration in the
dialogue between the North and the South. I think in the
prevention of a continuation of the nuclear program the North
and in moving towards a light water reactor, I think that that
program, from my view, is on track and I would ask Admiral
Prueher if he would like to comment on that.
Admiral Prueher. The KEDO agreement for the light water
reactor is proceeding slowly. One thing, I support very much
what General Tilelli said about the food to North Korea. I
think trying to not make them feel so cornered that they have
to lash out is important, and also maybe they will have a
little less distance to recover at some point then they
otherwise would.
The nations in Southeast Asia and in Asia in general are
all--not all, but many of them--are participating in the agreed
framework to help support the funding for the light water
reactor. And so it is a coalescing effect. North Korea is a
festering spot, right in the middle of other people who are
prospering. And what we need to do is get them to open up so
that they can join the rest of the world.
POLICY TOWARDS NORTH KOREA
Mr. Dicks. Do you think we need, as a nation, to be doing
more? Should the United States be providing more leadership in
terms of trying to bring help and assistance to the North
Koreans to try to diffuse this situation? I mean, basically I
think our efforts have been pretty meager up to this point.
Admiral Prueher. I will offer my opinion and then defer to
General Tilelli. It is very important for us to stay in concert
with the Republic of Korea.
Mr. Dicks. Not to get divided?
Admiral Prueher. That is right. So I think that affects our
pace, but I think it is important that we stay together, and
that is almost more important than a rapid pace and so I think
that affects what is going on.
Mr. Dicks. Well, how does South Korea feel about this? Are
they in favor of trying to engage the North Koreans on--besides
on the nuclear program, but in the food program and trying to
help, do they concur with this strategy?
Admiral Prueher. I think they would not say they would want
to go slowly, but they are--there are various factions. Some
are more eager than others to move with it. So it is an issue.
Mr. Dicks. How about the government, the current
government?
Admiral Prueher. They talk about--really I am getting into
John's lane, but Kim Young-Sam, the government talks about
North Korea largely as a threat, I think.
General Tilelli. Let me address the three issues you
raised, Mr. Dicks. One, should we be doing more on the
humanitarian side? I think the program is about right, first of
all.
Secondly, I would say that I think Admiral Prueher's
comment is very important in that one of the North Korean
strategies is to drive a wedge between the United States and
the South and we can't let that happen.
Thirdly, in my view, and this is my personal opinion, when
we think about North Korea and we think about providing them
many things, there ought to be a quid in action.
Mr. Dicks. In terms of diffusing?
General Tilelli. In terms of diffusing the tensions. So
consequently, I have not seen that--the quid. The first, and I
think it is somewhat unprecedented, if you will, is the fact
that they are attending the joint briefings today as we sit
here. So this may be--the joint briefings in New York. This may
be the first opening, and I think it is one that we must
leverage for the future.
The second part of your question applies to the South. I
think that the Republic of Korea would certainly like increased
dialogue with the North, to ease tensions and move forward.
However, in a real sense, the North Koreans have been unwilling
to do that and have been unwilling to open the door at all to
the South and are more willing to do bilateral discussions with
the United States.
Mr. Dicks. All right. So I guess there might be an
opportunity here to, as you suggest, to maybe tie future
assistance to their diffusing the military situation of being
right there on the border, et cetera, try to negotiate
something with them?
General Tilelli. I think the opportunity is the joint
briefing and then a follow on four party talks. In my view,
that is the opportunity that is laid before us right now, and I
think the outcome of today's briefing will tell us more as to
whether or not they are going to be amenable to any of that.
Mr. Dicks. My time is up. But one thing I would say, too,
is we ought to follow whether this assistance gets to the
people or does it get to the military, too? That seems to me to
be an important thing.
General Tilelli. The other thing, and I would be remiss if
I didn't say it, and that is while all this discussion is going
on, I, as the commander over there, can't lose sight and focus,
and that is deterrence and preparedness, and I can tell you
that that is continuing to be my focus until something else
occurs.
WATER QUALITY FOR U.S. FORCES IN KOREA
Mr. Dicks. Thank you.
Mr. Young. As we talk about helping the North Koreans with
their food problems and things of that nature, we hear stories
that some of your forces don't even have potable water. More
specifically, the 2nd Division, the Kunsan Airfield. Are those
stories true? Do we have a problem with adequate safe water
there?
General Tilelli. Mr. Chairman, these are eight places that
this year we have found that the content of the water does not
meet U.S. standards. So we have those eight places, Kunsan,
Chong Ju, Kimhae, Kwang Ju, and Taegu, Niblo Barracks and Camps
Gray and Kim, bases that we are working on diligently to fix
the problem. And, secondarily, until we can fix the problem,
through either an upgrade in the infrastructure or a filtration
system, we are providing the soldiers and airmen who live on
those places potable bottled water.
Mr. Young. Okay.
Mr. Murtha. How many people are there? How many people are
at those eight bases?
General Tilelli. I will have to give you the exact number
for the record.
[The information follows:]
It is not a substantial number of the force--far less than one
percent. Out of a total of 67,200 military and civilian employees on
United States Forces Korea installations, less than 50 people live on
Chang Ju and Kwang Ju Air Bases (two of the six installations with non-
potable water systems). We purchase bottled water for these Soldiers,
Sailors, Airmen, Marines and 400 non-residential employees who work at
all six locations. We continue to provide potable tap water at the
remaining United States Forces Korea installations, where 99 percent of
our people work and live.
Mr. Murtha. Is it a substantial number of the force?
General Tilelli. It is not a substantial number of the
force. It is a small portion, very small. I will provide the
number, the exact number for the record.
Mr. Young. We provided all the forces in Desert Storm with
bottled water, so I assume that is something that can be done
without too much trouble.
General Tilelli. Mr. Chairman, that is done--it is not much
trouble to do it, although I find that it is not the preferred
way for our people to live.
Admiral Prueher. For just a bit of perspective, I will
state that in most of our AOR, the State Department and some
30,000 other DoD people that are not directly under our
command, mostly drink bottled water every day, wherever they
live. Most of the cities they live in don't have it, either.
NORTH KOREAN DEFECTORS
Mr. Young. Admiral, in a previous visit I asked about the
North Korean defector who was presently in the embassy in
Beijing. Tell us anything that you can tell us this morning
about whether he will be released and allowed to go to South
Korea or just what the status is.
Admiral Prueher. The latest update I had was yesterday
afternoon, after we talked, and maybe General Tilelli has more,
but that the Chinese had talked to him and that it looked like
he would be released, which is essentially what we said
yesterday, but the timing was something that was uncertain.
Maybe General Tilelli has more later information.
General Tilelli. Well, Mr. Chairman, that is the same
update that I received. Also at issue is whether or not he will
go directly to the Republic or Korea or through a third country
and I think that is all being resolved over a period of time.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much. Mr. Visclosky, do you have
further questions?
WEAPONS MODERNIZATION
Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Chairman, just one, if I could.
Is there an arms race taking place in Southeast Asia and
the Pacific Basin?
Admiral Prueher. That is a frequently asked question, sir,
and some of that is in the eye of the beholder. My answer is
there is not an arms race taking place. Their economies are
booming and they are upgrading and modernizing quite old things
they have in many cases, but there is not an arms race.
The countries are behaving responsibly in that they don't
want to be the first one to introduce a new breakthrough
weapons system, for example, beyond visual range missiles, and
so I think they are behaving responsibly. It is coming in
balance. There is not a race. I would say the nations, none of
them want to be first, which imply race. They also don't want
to be last. So they want to keep the water about level.
I really think it would be wrong to characterize it as an
arms race, sir.
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you.
Mr. Young. Admiral, General, thank you very much for an
excellent presentation.
Mr. Dicks. One last one?
Mr. Young. Okay. Go ahead.
CHINA AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY
Mr. Dicks. One minute. On the China issue, is it correct
that China didn't have landing craft? If they wanted to do
something against Taiwan, they literally could not have moved
forces from the mainland of China?
Admiral Prueher. They have some LST-type Landing Ship, tank
ships. They have the capability to move about one division's
worth. They do not have a capability--amphibious capability--to
invade Taiwan. It would be a long way off.
Mr. Dicks. So they have a lot of manpower, a lot of army,
but their deployability is a major problem, isn't it? I mean,
they are a threat in their area but----
Admiral Prueher. They are not yet a force projector and
they have a long way to go before they will be a projection
force. But they are starting some ship visits around the area,
which is all right. But they don't have a force projection
capability.
Mr. Young. Their ship visits include visits to the United
States.
Admiral Prueher. That is right.
Mr. Young. And to our Western Coast for the first time
ever, right?
Admiral Prueher. That is right, sir. They have two
combatants and an oiler coming to Honolulu early this next week
and then going to San Diego and then to Peru.
Mr. Young. We have some additional questions that we didn't
get to because we are running out of time, but we would like to
submit them in writing and ask that you respond to them, if you
would.
General Tilelli. Yes, sir.
Mr. Young. The Committee will convene at 1:30 this
afternoon and our witness will be General Peay, Commander in
Chief, U.S. Central Command. And at this point thank you,
again, very much, both of you. The Committee is adjourned.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the
answers thereto follow:]
Combat Engineer Vehicle
Question. General, one of the assets which has been available to
you is the Combat Engineering Vehicle (CEV which mounts a 165mm
demolition gun. The committee understands that the CEV is being
withdrawn from service, and that some of the CEV missions may be filled
by the M1 tank. What mission assigned to the CEV could be done by the
M1 tank?
Answer. The M1A1 and M1A2 tank equipped with the 120mm main gun and
firing the M830A1 Multi Purpose Anti-Tank (MPAT) round can conduct the
stand-off point obstacle reduction (i.e. shattering to smaller easily
cleared pieces) portion of the mission performed by the M728 CEV. (M1
tank models previous to the M1A1 cannot fire the M830A1 round because
they have a 105mm main gun, hence they cannot perform that part of the
CEV point obstacle breaching mission.) The M1A1 and M1A2 firing the
M830A1 MPAT round can also demolish bridge piers and penetrate concrete
bunkers up to at least two meters in thickness, as can the CEV. At
present, the M1 tanks, including the M1A1 and M1A2, are not equipped
with bulldozer blade systems so they cannot perform the point obstacle
clearing portion of the CEV mission after the point obstacle has been
reduced. The M1A1 and M1A2 tank gun has a long barrel (unlike the short
165mm demolition gun on the CEV) which hinders the M1A1 or M1A2 tank
from traversing to engage obstacle targets in close quarters as would
be found in military operations in urban terrain (MOUT). The M1 family
of tanks do not have crane booms, so they cannot perform the lifting
mission of the CEV.
Question. Do those missions still exist?
Answer. Yes, the point obstacle breaching mission exists anywhere
the enemy can take advantage of restrictive terrain and place point
obstacles. Point obstacles range from simple wire and timber roadblocks
to concrete filled buses, to the massive rock drop obstacles in the
Korean theater consisting of up to one hundred concrete blocks, each
block approximately two meters in diameter and up to four meters in
depth. When executed, we presume that the enemy has mined the obstacle
to prevent manual demolition. A stand-off reduction capability is
therefore critical in terms of protecting our forces at the breach and
getting the breach opened quickly so we can maintain our momentum.
Point obstacles exist on both sides of the border in Korea. The CEV
right now is the only integrated system that is capable of reducing and
clearing point obstacles. The M1A1 and M1A2 tanks would either require
a bulldozer blade capability or we would have to move slow moving, un-
armored bulldozers (along with their transports and crews) forward to
have a pushing capability sufficient to clear the rubble out of the way
after the M1A1 or M1A2 tank reduced the obstacle with the main gun. In
restrictive terrain like Korea, where it is frequently not possible to
bypass built-up areas, the ability to quickly engage enemy defended
obstacles in urban terrain may mean more than just the life of the
breaching tank crew; rather saving the lives of the friendly forces
behind the breacher.
Question. What testing of 120mm tank ammunition has been done for
those missions, and what were the results?
Answer. Tests were conducted at Aberdeen Proving Grounds from mid-
November 1996 through mid-December 1996 to determine if the M830A1 MPAT
round could reduce scale concrete targets similar in diameter and half
the length of a single individual block of the many blocks that make up
the type 2 and larger type 3 rock drop obstacles in Korea. Published
test results showed that the M830A1 MPAT round, the modified M830A1
MPAT round with a solid nose, and the M123A1 High Explosive Penetrating
round fired at a 100 meter distance to the target were able to reduce
the unreinforced concrete target and the reinforced concrete targets.
An excursion of the test showed that the M865 Kinetic Energy round
fired at a 100 meter distance to the target was able to reduce the
reinforced concrete target. Debris resulting from the MPAT, modified
MPAT, and Kinetic Energy rounds was considerably larger, even after the
second round hit, than the debris resulting from most second round hits
(third in the case of a dud M123A fired against the bridge pier target)
of the M123A1 HEP round for the CEV.
Question. Which 120mm tank round will provide the best capability
for those missions?
Answer. From the test results, the modified M830A1 MPAT round will
provide the best capability for a 120mm round to perform the point
obstacle reduction mission. The concern is the clearing capability of
the M1A1 or M1A2 tank (no bulldozer blade) or the currently fielded M9
Armored Combat Earthmover (ACE) to push the large debris resulting from
the MPAT round out of the way in the breach. The M123A1 HEP (165mm)
round has a massive blast effect that tends to create small sized
rubble and sweeps much of the rubble through the breach.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.
Questions submitted by Mr. Hefner and the answers thereto
follow:]
Shortstop Electronic Protection System (SEPS)
Question. The Committee understands that US Forces Korea has an
urgent requirement for 62 SEPS units. What action is the Army taking to
expeditiously satisfy this requirement?
Answer. The Army is working to provide to US Forces Korea 26
Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) SEPS models that were
in use in Bosnia. Those systems are being returned, and upon their
return, they will undergo a period of maintenance for cleaning and any
needed repairs. That process is estimated to take 45-60 days. Upon
completion of the required maintenance, the systems will be sent to
Korea.
An additional 20 systems for a total of 46 will be bought with the
congressional appropriation of $5 million for fiscal year 1997.
Purchase of the remaining 16 systems will be addressed in an unfinanced
requirement in fiscal year 1998, and if necessary, in the fiscal year
1999-03 mini-POM.
Question. Congress appropriated $5 million in fiscal year 1997 to
initiate the production of SEPS for the urgent requirement in Korea.
What is the Army's progress toward obligating these funds to initiate a
production contract?
Answer. The $5 million congressional appropriation is currently on
OSD withhold. The Army is in the process of requesting that the funds
be released from withhold. The processing time for that request is
estimated to be 5-7 days. When the request is granted and the money is
released, the Army will notify the contractor, Whittaker Electronics
System, and the funds will be executed.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Hefner.
Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the answers thereto
follow:]
Priorities and Deficiencies
Question. Do you feel the interests and needs of the Pacific
Command have been adequately addressed in the fiscal year 1998 budget
request?
Answer. Overall, yes. We have many opportunities for input into the
military budget decision process through the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council, Chairman's Program Recommendations, Chairman's
Program Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense Program and
Budget Reviews, and the Defense Resources Board. In view of the need to
balance the federal budget, Pacific Command's interests and needs are
adequately addressed in the President's Budget.
Question. What is your assessment of the major shortfalls in:
personnel, training, equipment, and maintenance for those units under
your day-to-day command as well as those that would be assigned to you
in a war time situation?
Answer. My assessment is that we are ready to execute our mission.
However, we need to be attentive to indicators which may signal
problems for future readiness.
My biggest concern is our ability to keep quality people in
uniform. Retention rates among many specialties are down in each
Service. We need to provide adequate career progression opportunities,
compensation, and quality of life, especially for our skilled career
personnel. In the Pacific Command, the quality of barracks in Korea is
of special concern.
I am also concerned by problems identified by the Services in
recruitment. The Department of the Army forecasts a recruiting
shortfall of 6,000 through May 1997.
Joint and Service funding to support our Joint and Combined
Training Program are currently adequate. However, as costs continue to
increase, funding must keep pace. Paying for contingency operations
with training funds will reduce readiness.
Equipment modernization programs present potential long-term
readiness problems. For example, the Marine CH-46 helicopter fleet is
29-years old. The V-22 will not replace the CH-46 as a medium-lift
aircraft until 2014.
The condition of Petroleum Enroute Infrastructure in the Pacific
Command is another important concern. While the Fiscal Year 1998 budget
provides for the most critical infrastructure needs, future program
requirements await the conclusion of the Quadrennial Defense Review.
Some Services are reporting aircraft readiness as a concern, as a
result of age and deferred maintenance. Both the Air Force and Marines
report increasing backlogs in intermediate aircraft maintenance which
as affecting mission capability rates. The Navy estimates the average
age of its aircraft fleet will increase from 14.3 years to 18.4 years
by fiscal year 2003. Deferring depot maintenance for surface combatant
ships is also a potential readiness problem.
Quality people, training, equipment, and maintenance are all
essential elements of readiness. The QDR process is evaluating the
long-term readiness issues, based upon threats, strategy, and fiscal
expectations.
Question. What are the top ten priority items on your most recent
integrated priority list?
Answer. The Integrated Priority List (IPL) provides theater
priorities for program funding to the Secretary of Defense and the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs. The IPL leaves out many essential things, as it
focuses only on identifying the shortfalls and required capabilities
which are most important for accomplishment of Pacific Command's
mission.
In developing the IPL, my top priority is readiness. Ready forces
composed of well trained people equipped with modern, sustainable
technology are the foundation for the Pacific Command's ability to be
an active player in the region.
I consider quality of life and force protection overarching
requirements to the IPL. These issues span all we do. The magnitude of
their impact transcends a rank ordered list of system or program
requirements.
My top ten IPL items are as follows. ------.
Question. In your view, are present levels of investment funding
contained in the department's Future Years Defense Plan sufficient to
address the long term recapitalization requirements of today's forces?
Answer. We share the concerns of the Secretary of Defense and the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, about the annual funding shortfall of
approximately $20 billion in Service modernization accounts for the
Future Years Defense Plan.
Quadrennial Defense Review and Future Force Structure
Question. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) will reexamine the
current national security strategy and present the force structure of
the armed services. The QDR will purportedly make recommendations as to
what the appropriate mix of forces will look like to meet the strategic
and regional threats of the future. The results are due to be presented
to the Congress in May of this year.
What formal role have you played in the QDR process?
Admiral Prueher Answer. Both the Secretary of Defense and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff permitted us to participate
actively in the QDR process. My staff has worked closely with both the
Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) staff. For
example, we commented to the Joint Strategy Review and helped shape the
evolving OSD Defense Strategy. We are participating in the Dynamic
Commitment Wargame series, and reviewing numerous QDR products. We will
also participate in a mid-April executive (CINC-level) review. I am
satisfied that our voice has been heard in the QDR process.
General Tilelli Answer. JCS and OSD are doing a good job of pulling
in the respective CINC's representatives (senior officers and General
officers) into this effort. This is resulting in a good cross
fertilization of the services and CINC's requirements. Also, I and my
staff are full participants in the QDR series of war gaming sessions
(Dynamic Commitment series) and are working the hard questions (with
JCS and OSD staffs) in terms of what our military services need to
carry out the National Security Strategy.
Question. What in your view, are the most important issues that the
QDR should be examining?
Admiral Prueher Answer. The most important issue the QDR should
examine is how to best balance protection of U.S. interests through
commitment of our military forces with modernizing for the future.
Continued engagement of U.S. forces abroad is important, not only to
respond to crises and prepare for war. Military forces also help shape
the strategic environment. The presence of U.S. Pacific Command forces
has underwritten the security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region
since World War II.
A review of our strategy and force structure is the right thing to
do, but the QDR should bear in mind that the pace of change is also
important. We should innovate, but do so carefully, and should accept
some prudent risk. We should not make changes for sake of change, nor
should we fall into the trap of seeing technology as a panacea.
Finally, we have to remain aware of asymmetric challenges that could
confront us now and in the future.
General Tilelli Answer. As you know, OSD and JCS are taking a broad
range review of the current national security strategy and the
strategic context within which we must design our military forces.
Since the QDR process is ongoing, I think that any detailed answer to
this question would be premature. However, three points need to be
stressed from a Korea/NEA perspective. (1) We clearly need to
acknowledge that we are posturing for how we will ``shape'' and engage
NEA in the future. In this regard we need to determine if we want to be
reactive or proactive in this shaping; clearly determining what we want
to shape in the future. (2) The QDR process must fully acknowledge the
``flashpoint'' potential of Korean in the near-mid term. It is very
likely that the Korean peninsula will still be a potential threat to
national security even in 2005 (in terms of a nK regime or ongoing
turbulence caused by massive reconstruction/reunification actions that
could be going on as a result of nK collapse or possible war
scenarios). (3) The QDR process must also acknowledge the ``Dominant
Strategic Contexts'' that will drive stability in NEA and be a priority
for our Nation to address. The ``Dominant Strategic Context'' for NEA
in the mid-long term is clearly China's growth and expected motivation
to exert influence over NEA from a leadership position. The near-mid
term ``Dominant Strategic Context'' is the North/South Korea
contingency. How we handle this near term ``potential flashpoint'' will
set the stage for how we are perceived worldwide and be the framework
for either maintaining US influence in the NEA area to balance the
regional animosities or by which China steps in to establish regional
hegemony.
Question. Do you believe these issues are actually being addressed
by the QDR?
Admiral Prueher Answer. Yes. The QDR process has been open to the
regional combatant commanders. As a result, I believe the QDR is
addressing these issues. The QDR is reviewing the threats with a goal
of recommending an appropriate mix of forward deployed, U.S. based, and
reserve forces.
General Tilelli Answer. Yes, UNC/CFC and PACOM are fully stressing
the importance of these factors My only concern is that we do not
forget the threat of war or severe instability in the near-mid term.
Question. Some have spoken of the need to ``be open to a radical
restructuring of our armed forces.'' Do you agree?
Admiral Prueher Answer. I think that we should be willing to
consider concepts involving a radical restructuring of our armed
forces, but our best analysis shows that this is likely not the right
thing to do. We have an appropriate balance of land, amphibious, naval,
and air forces, with increased effectiveness and efficiencies residing
in improved joint operations and support.
In my judgment, the nature of warfare and of our tasks have not
sufficiently changed to justify the considerable risks and expense
radical restructuring would entail. We should take advantage of new
technologies through pursuing the revolution in military affairs in a
balanced manner. New technologies can enhance our efficiency and
effectiveness in applying force. Excessive dependence on high
technology solutions, though beguiling, will leave us vulnerable to a
foe who applies asymmetric attack such as terrorism, counter-
insurgency, weapons of mass destruction, or information operations.
Balance in leap ahead technology investment should be the watchword, so
we do not abandon needed core competency.
General Tilelli Answer. No. Rather, we need deliberate process by
which we can refine the clearly capable military forces we have now.
Radical approaches are for ``failure'' situations. Our nations military
situation is one of ``success.'' I think the QDR process is approaching
this challenge from this perspective.
Radical restructuring is clearly not the way to go . . . rather, we
need to focus on the expected strategic contexts that will face us in
the near-mid term and long term, then determine the strategy by which
we can clearly shape the international environment to protect and
promote US interests. Once this is done, we then need to address the
military capabilities across the board spectrum which will provide our
Nation the strategic and operational flexibility to deal with the
turbulent 21st century. This then provides a basis for sound force
structure refining and reengineering that allows you to make
``informed'' decisions as to how to refine and develop well balanced
force structures that make sense.
Question. Do you believe that the number of combat forces versus
support forces, the so-called ``tooth to tail ratio'', is out of
balance in the Defense Department today?
Admiral Prueher Answer. Overall, I think that the ``tooth to tail''
ratio is in balance, with the exception of base infrastructure. We
should continue to review our structure and take advantage of economies
which exist.
Sustaining quality forces which employ highly complex equipment
requires extensive support. Further, we expect our military to operate
at great distances over long periods of time with robust logistics and
minimal risk. These goals necessitate a higher percentage of support
forces than other nations. The larger consideration is for the
capability of the force as a whole.
Mission and location also affect the desired ``tooth to tail
ratio'' of combat to support personnel. The ratio is concern for the
Services as they manage their force structures. The Services review the
issue carefully, and acknowledge the need to shed some base
infrastructure.
General Tilelli Answer. There is no simple answer to a question
such as this. As much as we would like to have one, history affords us
to single prescribed ratio of support and combat forces. The ``tooth to
tail ratio'' varies for each of this country's available military
options. In the Korean theater, for example, the available military
options can include one or a combination of the following: civic
action, humanitarian assistance, civil affairs, and other military
activities to develop positive relationships with our Host Nation;
confidence-building and other measures to reduce military tensions;
military presence; armed conflict involving air, land, maritime, and
strategic warfare campaigns and operations in Korea. In each instance,
combat and support forces have a unique combat/support force
apportionment. Are these forces ``out of balance.'' in today's
Department of Defense? Probably not. The bottom-line is that a
Commander-in-Chief of a United States Unified, Multi-national Command
needs the flexibility that only a healthy tooth and a robust tail can
provide. USFK must be able to successfully accomplish its assigned
taks--whatever the mission, whatever the required tooth is tail ratio.
North Korea
Question. Even by North Korean standards, the past month has been
quite eventful. A Senor member of the North Korean government defected
in Beijing, another North Korean defector was shot in Seoul and North
Korean and U.S. officials have agreed to resume talks on achieving a
permanent settlement on the peninsula. As our senior military commander
in the theater and Korea itself, the Committee is very interested in
your assessment of the present military and political situation in
North Korea.
Answer. The situation in North Korea is highlighted by its
worsening economy, especially food shortages. Due to the poor 1996
harvest and limited foreign aid, the food situation will become
critical this spring and early summer. Additionally, coal and
electricity shortages are severely impacting economy and living
conditions. ------.
Stark conditions have kindled a rise in economic crime and in
malnutrition and related diseases, and a worsening of the apathetic
attitude of the population. ------.
Since spring the military has demonstrated its powerful potential.
We have detected the following: a major naval exercise in May; an
impressive road march exercise in 2d and 5th Corps in October; and a
robust winter training cycle from December to March that was
highlighted by high levels of mechanized and artillery training and
featured a major exercise by the 108th Mechanized Corps with air and
naval support in mid-January and an extensive nationwide exercise in
later March.
In international affairs, the North's apology for the submarine
incursion was driven by the North's need for food and a relaxation of
economic sanctions and other restrictions. The North's attendance at
the explanatory briefing for the Four-Party Talks is consistent with
these objectives, but this does not necessarily mean the actual talks
will be realized. Pyongyang is prone to make limited concessions for
short-time tactical gains, but is likely to resist any meaningful
opening or improvement of relations with the ROK because this would
threaten the survival of the Kim regime.
North Korea's economic and other problems stem from their decades-
long efforts to create a military for achieving reunification. They
have, from their perspective, largely achieved this capability and show
no willingness to relinquish it. We must remain alert to the
possibility that the North's leadership may conclude that the military
option is the only way to preserve their privileged status.
Question. What do you rate as the probability of armed conflict on
the Korean peninsula over the next year? Five years?
Answer. ------. We don't want to put a number on such a weighty
judgment. We simply want to say conditions are such that we believe
there's a higher probability than last year or the year before to use
the army before its demise becomes total and final.
Question. Update the Committee as to the current status of the
North Korean military forces. In your answer please address unit
readiness, force modernization, and development of weapons of mass
destruction.
Answer. North Korea maintains the capability to inflict enormous
destruction on the south through large-scale combat operations despite
readiness deficiencies caused by resource shortages. Deficits of food
and other essential commodities have adversely affected the health,
stamina, morale, and discipline and training levels of the soldiers.
Despite these problems, the force worked hard during the recent Winter
Training Cycle to improve readiness. Although overwhelming economic
problems may limit the pace of that improvement, the military is
capable of conducting corps and below movements and operations while
coordinating the integration of air and naval support.
The most significant force modernization trend has been the gradual
shift over the past decade of military combat power towards the forward
area. Of specific concern is the continuing forward deployment of long-
range artillery and MRL systems to underground facilities and hardened
sites within 15 kms of the DMZ. Operational exploitation forces and
front line corps with supporting artillery are positioned so far
forward now that they could launch a no-notice surprise attack. Other
notable activities include development of surface-to-surface missiles
(SSM), construction of underground facilities and wartime relocation
sites for industrial facilities, improvements in operations and
communications security, the build up of the air-cushion landing craft
fleet, submarine fleet enhancements, the forward deployment of fighter
aircraft to airfields within 55 nautical miles of the DMZ, air defense
improvements. ------.
In the event of renewed fighting on the Korean Peninsula, we expect
North Korea to employ chemical and possibly biological weapons. The
North has an active chemical weapons program, which has produced
several different types of chemical agents. ------. We assess that
North Korea could have one, possibly two, nuclear devices with a yield
in the 5-10 kiloton range. We don't believe these devices have been
weaponized.
Question. What are the present capabilities of the North Koreans to
attack and destroy U.S. and South Korean military port facilities in
the opening days of a conflict?
Answer. Long-term support to a ground campaign on the Korean
Peninsula requires port facilities to stay open. We need the ports to
manage both the incoming equipment required for strategic reinforcement
and the thousands of tons of consumable supplies, such as food,
ammunition, and petroleum products, required for military operations.
An airbridge from the United States could not move the required
personnel and materiel to sustain high intensity combat. U.S. and ROK
port facilities on peninsula are highly susceptible to disruption by a
chemical or biological attack because of our need to protect the
civilian stevedore force and to prevent incoming materiel from being
contaminated during transshipment. ------.
Question. Have there been any recent incidents along the DMZ?
Answer. The number of incidents within the DMZ has decreased over
the past several years. The rate of major incidents--intrusions or
weapons firing across the Military Demarcation Line (MDL)--peaked
during the late 1960's when there were numerous clashes in and near the
DMZ. There have been relatively few major incidents in the 1990's. The
most significant incident within the DMZ in 1996 occurred in April when
North Korea conducted reinforcement drills in the Joint Security Area
at Panmunjom. These drills involved the introduction of approximately
200 excess soldiers into the area for several hours on two consecutive
evenings. Another major incident on the peninsula occurred in September
1996 approximately 100 kilometers south of the DMZ when 26 North Korean
soldiers infiltrated ROK territory after their submarine ran aground in
the coastal waters near Kangnung, South Korea. The ensuing manhunt
conducted by South Korean forces resulted in the death of 24 North
Korean infiltrators, eight South Korean soldiers and five South Korean
civilians. Other major violations of the Armistice Agreement within the
DMZ in 1996 involved soldiers intentionally crossing the MDL,
introducing illegal weapons into the DMZ and firing weapons across the
MDL. There were no casualties associated with these violations. The
North Korean military in Panmunjom rejected all United Nations Command
protests regarding these violations of the Armistice Agreement.
Question. It is reported that the United States has a comprehensive
plan to airlift its citizens out of Korea in the event of a conflict.
Japan, however, with the second largest expatriate community in South
Korea, has no such plan. It is also reported that the US has lobbied
the Japanese government in vain to provide airborne assistance in the
event an evacuation becomes necessary. Are these reports accurate? If
so, does this situation concern you?
Answer. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with
HQ Pacific Command and HQ US Forces Korea, has initiated a Trilateral
dialogue with the ROK and Japanese governments to cover a range of
security issues in Northeast Asia. Noncombatant evacuations operations
(NEO) is one of the topics being addressed, and it is a sensitive
domestic political issues in Japan. We are entirely confident that in
the event of a military crisis on the Korean Peninsula, the Japanese
government would cooperate fully in evacuating both its substantial
number of Japanese citizens as well as US citizens. Additionally, the
US has refurbished aggressive programs using its lift assets to support
a NEO contingency. For example, we will use all available airlift and
sealift capabilities to evacuate South Korea.
------. And, likewise, the availability of cleared Sea-Lanes-of-
Communications and ferries will supplement our ability to conduct NEO.
If the American Embassy through the Department of State ------ in the
early stages of a crisis situation, these aircraft will greatly assist
in maximizing the departure of noncombatants. I fully support the
efforts of the American Embassy, in this endeavor. In all of our
exercises, we involve the American Embassy, USTRANSCOM, US Forces
Japan, and the Government of Korea in the coordination and planning to
execute Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.
South Korea
Question. What is your assessment of the present capabilities of
the Republic of Korea's (ROK) armed forces? What is the overall
readiness of the ROK forces?
Answer. The ROK military is best characterized as a capable, well-
equipped, and well-trained force, but one that is out-gunned by a
numerically superior foe. While readiness levels are high, in order to
improve their condition, the ROK JCS has taken positive steps to
resolve 22 specific military requirements identified at the most recent
Military Committee Meeting. Seventeen of the twenty-two have solutions
currently being implemented or programmed for implementation in the ROK
1998-2002 Joint Strategic Objective Plan. These initiatives will
enhance ROK capabilities and readiness into the foreseeable future. As
we think of our alliance, the ROK and US bring different capabilities
to the table; both are needed.
Question. In what mission do you believe the ROK military requires
the greatest modernization?
Answer. Counter Artillery and Rocket fire and Theater Missile
Defense and requirements that the ROK can improve considering the
massive indirect Rocket and Artillery threat from North Korea. However,
this is not to imply that the Republic of Korea is not addressing this
shortfall. South Korea spent $15.9 billion on its armed services,
approximately 3.1 percent of its GDP in 1996. Of this amount, the ROK
purchased five Q-36 and two Q-37 Counter Fire Radars from the United
States to supplement those systems employed by United States Forces
Korea. To improve the combined Theater Missile Defense, South Korea is
now considering purchasing Patriot.
Question. Do you believe the South Korean government is providing
adequate resources to maintain the present effectiveness and ensure the
future modernization of their military?
Answer. The Republic of Korea is improving those areas that we
think should be improved. They are providing adequate resources towards
its defense requirements. In 1996, the ROK defense was approximately
3.1 percent of its GDP, which compares very favorably with the United
States, In addition, the Republic of Korea is increasing the amount
spent toward the common defense of Korea by raising its defense budget
in 1997 by 12.8 percent.
Question. Are you experiencing and difficulties with communications
interoperability between ROK and US forces? Do US and ROK forces
acquire the same types of tactical communications equipment? If not,
why not?
Answer. Communications interoperability between US and ROK forces
is an issue with difficult problems to overcome. We have a command and
control system called TACCIMS which is used by both the ROK and US;
however, it is designed mainly for corps and above. The fielding of new
US communications equipment has improved the capability of US forces
but resulted in an ``interoperability gap'' with ROK forces. While the
ROK is developing their own systems, lack of coordination with US over
common standards in the design phase continues to hinder
interoperability.
There are ROK/US forums in place to provide coordination and we are
addressing to the ROK the importance of interoperability with their
main ally. These forums have improved some areas. For example, the US
is preparing to release the standard for TADIL-J to the ROK.
ROK/US communications interoperability remains the subject to
continued attention yet progress has been slow. For each system
affected we must emphasize to the ROK on the need to invest funds to
assure interoperability. In the endeavor to field new systems on
limited budgets this is difficult.
In regards to the US and ROK acquiring the same types of tactical
communications equipment, the ROK Government has made a conscious
effort to reduce dependence of US or other foreign communications
equipment. Communications is an area is which the ROK is able to
produce indigenous products with state-of-the-art technology. The ROK
wishes to utilize this capability as much as possible. This has
resulted in the fielding of ROK equipment which is not fully
interoperable with US equipment. On the other hand, the US must
consider interoperability on a broader scale then the ROK.
Interoperability with NATO and other allies dictate that we not acquire
equipment that is only compatible with ROK equipment.
We will continue to emphasize to the ROK the importance of
interoperability with the US in its development and acquisition of new
systems.
Question. How confident are you in the ability of US and ROK
intelligence and warning systems to detect a surprise attack from the
north?
Answer. ------. CFC and the national intelligence community monitor
around the clock the hundreds of bases, railheads, and assembly areas
associated with preparations for war. While fully realizing the North
would go to extreme measures to deny us warning, our extensive
collection effort against the North is likely to provide unambiguous
warning of attack at least 12 to 24 hours in advance of the execution
of even the most short-fuzed North Korean attack scenario.
China
Question. Admiral Prueher, can you please discuss the present
capabilities of China's armed forced today? In your answer please
address the present arms modernization program both conventional and
nuclear, and the extent of Russian arms sales to the Chinese.
Answer. The People's Republic or China (PRC) is capable of
defending the mainland against conventional attack and maintaining
internal stability. It possesses a limited ability to attack beyond its
borders, due in large part to obsolescent weapons system and an
inadequate logistics infrastructure.
We share regional leaders' concern about China's military
modernization and lack of transparency on security objectives. China's
modernization program for the last decade has stressed the acquisition
and development of modern weapons systems. It has also focused on
command and control of forces. China has purchased the Russian Su-27/
FLANKER, but the Chinese version lacks aerial refueling capability.
This limits its range. China also acquired the Russian KILO-class
diesel submarine, with two already delivered and an additional two
probably arriving this year or next. China purchased the SA-10/GRUMBLE
air defense missile and deployed it around Beijing. ------.
The Chinese are shifting from a large standing army to one
attempting to incorporate advanced technology in a smaller force. While
their intent to modernize is manifest, they will not have a significant
force projection capability for at least a decade. ------.
Question. What is the current status of the Chinese arms export
program? Who are they exporting weapons to? What types of weapons are
they exporting? Specifically, are they exporting ballistic missiles or
weapons of mass destruction?
Answer. From 1991 to 1995, China was the world's sixth leading arms
supplier, providing low technology systems valued at $2.7 billion to
Third World counties in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Chinese arms
sales have been dropping since the late 1980s; this trend is expected
to continue. China's largest regional market is in neighboring Asian
states, primarily Pakistan, Burma, Thailand, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka.
Although Middle East sales are declining, Iran is China's largest
customer. The African market is small. China continues to seek inroads
into the Latin American arms market with very limited success.
China's most significant arms exports include: ------. China
provided Pakistan with nuclear and missile technologies. Beijing
remains Iran's most important supplier of nuclear technologies,
although so far it has refrained from selling technologies for uranium
enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing, or plutonium production. China
also is the most important supplier of equipment, materials, and
technology for Iran's chemical warfare and missile programs.
Question. Do you foresee any changes in China's top military
leadership in the post-Deng era?
Answer. We watch the structure of the People's Liberation Army
carefully. The only top military leadership changes we anticipate soon
are changes with in China's Central Military Commission. We expect
those changes to occur during the 15th Party Congress scheduled for
October 1997. We expect new appointments will come from among those
military leaders who are familiar to us.
Question. Have you observed anything out of the ordinary in recent
training exercises conducted by the Chinese armed forces?
Answer. With the exception of a naval exercise in October 1996, The
People's Republic of China (PRC) has not conducted any extraordinary
military exercises since March 1996, when the People's Liberation Army
(PLA), Navy, and Air Force conducted a major exercise in the Taiwan
Strait. ------. Training for the rest of 1996 and the beginning of 1997
focused on antisurface and antisubmarine warfare, air defense,
communications, limited combat maneuvers, mobilization, and amphibious
operations. We believe this training constituted building blocks for
force integration and joint operations.
Recent Chinese military exercises have not compared in scope or
size to the March and October 1996 exercises. We expect the norm of
small, relatively uncomplicated exercises will continue through 1997,
as Beijing focuses on the smooth reversion of Hong Kong to Chinese
control and senior leadership visits to other Asian countries and to
the United States.
Fiscal Year 1997 Supplemental Funding
Question. As in the past two fiscal years, the Committee is being
advised that if the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Bill is not
enacted before the end of this month, third and fourth quarter OPTEMPO
funding and training opportunities will be lost.
Do you anticipate any other readiness problems during the course of
Fiscal Year 1997?
Answer. Yes. Without prompt approval of supplemental funding, many
commanders will be forced to make tough decisions reducing training and
maintenance. Timely approval of supplemental funds for unscheduled
contingencies will help prevent these shortfalls.
Joint Operations
Question. The principal objective of the Goldwater-Nichols
Department of Defense Reorganization Act was to address the persistent
problems of interservice interoperability, unclear command
relationships and competing doctrine that had hampered joint service
contingency operations in the past. The intent being to make all
services work together as a joint team.
What progress do you believe has been made in your command and DoD
as a whole in implementing the changes mandated by the Goldwater-
Nichols Act?
Answer. The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act focused attention on joint
manning, education, and operations. It took several years to develop
joint doctrine and officers with joint warfighting skills. We have
achieved this first level of ``jointness.'' We now have the doctrine
and the necessary personnel to effectively conduct joint operations.
Within the last two years in this theater we have made great strides in
extending joint operations to service components. Our exercise program
has helped apply joint doctrine to operational issues. For example,
during the recent TANDEM THRUST exercise in Australia the commander of
7th Fleet was the Joint Task Force commander. He was responsible for
integrating amphibious landings by Marine forces, parachute landings by
Army forces, Air Force bomber operations, as well as function in a
mult-national environment. Because of training exercises such as TANDEM
THRUST and the rest of the U.S. Pacific Command exercise program, our
forces are much better able to operate in a joint environment.
Question. What still needs to be accomplished and how do the
individual Services become more efficient at fighting as a competent
joint force in future contingency operations?
Answer. We need to continue to exercise and strengthen joint
integration among forces. However, most operations we conduct in this
theater also involve other government agencies. The next level of focus
for joint operations is inter-agency. We need to develop programs and
policies which allow us to operate more effectively within the inter-
agency process. Recent training experiences in Humanitarian Assistance
(TEMPO BRAVE) and Consequence Management Operations (ELLIPSE CHARLIE)
highlight this need. We have begun to incorporate the inter-agency
process into our training programs and expect to see near-term
improvements.
Beyond inter-agency cooperation, the next level of joint operations
is multi-national. Cooperative engagement in peacetime promotes multi-
national cooperation in crisis. Continued funding of cooperative
engagement programs is required to sustain multi-national ties.
Component forces bring Service competencies to the joint fight. The
Joint Force Commander is best served when provided trained and ready
forces able to accomplish tasks which support the joint operation.
Services need to focus on core competencies while incorporating
interoperable doctrine, logistics, and communications.
Question. Do you see any of the command relationships in USPACOM as
redundant or unwieldy?
Answer. Command Relationships in the U.S. Pacific Command are
appropriate for the security structure within the theater. The mix of
components and subunified commands is effective and supports efficient
execution of our regional strategy. Subunified commands in Japan,
Korea, and Alaska fulfill essential roles and help to overcome the
tyranny of distance in the Pacific. The unique arrangements in Korea,
while complex, are both proven and well understood.
For contingencies outside Korea, Pacific Command implements command
and control with Joint Task Force commanders reporting directly to the
Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Command.
Question. Do you believe major procurement decisions are made by
the services today on the basis of what a program contributes to the
nation's total defense capability as opposed to the individual
service's?
Answer. Yes. The Joint Requirement Oversight Council, in
consultation with the Commanders-in-Chief, ensures military
procurements are evaluated on the basis of the nation's defense and
fulfill valid military necessities.
Force Levels in the Pacific Theater
Question. About 100,000 United States military members are
currently stationed in the Asia-Pacific region. Admiral Prueher, you
have recently been quoted in reference to the Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR) as saying that ``the fact that we are reviewing our force
structure and posture does not mean that troops will be trimmed in
Asia.'' In addition, several of your component commanders have
expressed the opinion that they expect no significant changes in force
structure or troop numbers (as a result of the QDR).
Do you believe that these thoughts are consistent with Secretary
Cohen's statement that ``everything is on the table'' for the QDR?
Answer. Yes. My thoughts are consistent with Secretary Cohen's
statement. While our entire force structure and posture are ``on the
table'' in the QDR, the national interests which call for forward
deployed forces in Asia are compelling. The administration has recently
reiterated and committed to the need for 100,000 in Asia, and I fully
support this position. For the foreseeable future, the capabilities
represented by 100,000 forward deployed personnel are about right to
shape the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region, respond to
crisis, and prepare for the future.
Question. Does USPACOM intend to make any proposals in terms of
force restructuring for the QDR?
Answer. We do not intend to make any proposal for force
restructuring of USPACOM forces for the QDR. We believe the current
balance of forward deployed, forward based, and continental U.S. based
forces is about right in quality and kind.
For the foreseeable future, military requirements justify the
continued forward deployment of the capabilities of about 100,000
personnel represent in the III Marine Expeditionary Force, Fifth and
Seventh Air Forces, 7th Fleet, and Eighth U.S. Army. We are working
closely with the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense
on the QDR.
Question. Do you believe that the present force level of 100,000
forward-deployed troops in USPACOM's area of responsibility is driven
more by operational requirements or by the need for a politically
significant level of troops in the theater?
Answer. The two are clearly linked--the political significance of
the force stems largely from its operational effectiveness. The United
States military forward-deployed force level of approximately 100,000
in the Asia-Pacific region is driven by operational requirements for
capabilities. It is an essential element of regional security and
America's global military posture. Forward-deployed forces in the
Pacific ensure a rapid and flexible worldwide crisis response and
warfighting capability; discourage the emergence of a regional hegemon;
enhance our ability to influence a wide spectrum of important issues;
overcome the tyranny of distance and demonstrate to our friends,
allies, and potential enemies alike the United States' interest in the
security of the entire region.
While the number 100,000 represents a significant regional metric
of U.S. commitment, we adjust the force based upon changes in
requirements and capabilities. After the Cold War, American military
forces forward deployed in Asia were adjusted. We reduced our forces in
the region from approximately 135,000 in 1990 to approximately 100,000
in 1994.
For the foreseeable future, military requirements justify the
continued forward deployment of the capabilities approximately 100,000
personnel represent.
OPTEMPO/Training
Question. Please list for the Committee the major deployments
undertaken by USPACOM in the past fiscal year.
Answer. We have executed a significant number of major deployments
the past year, encompassing exercises, operational deployments, and
operational missions. Last year we conducted 18 Pacific Command
sponsored exercises throughout the region, involving over 86,000
personnel. We conducted 22 operational deployments, including: 3
Carrier Battle Groups and 3 Amphibious Ready Groups deployed to the
Arabian Gulf; 2 Carrier Battle Groups deployed to the South China Sea
in response to China/Taiwan tensions; over 8,000 U.S. Army soldiers in
10 separate operational deployments; and 650 U.S. Air Force personnel
to Southwest Asia in support of Central Command operations. We also
deployed forces to support 9 operational missions, including over 2000
personnel from all services to support Operation Pacific Haven, the
large scale evacuation of Kurdish refugees to Guam, and over 200 U.S.
Army personnel to execute Operation Marathon Pacific, returning Chinese
migrants to China via Wake Island.
Question. Is the operating tempo of any units under your command
significantly higher than any other? If so, which units?
Answer. (a) Yes. We extensively employ many of the units identified
by the Joint Staff as ``Low Density High Demand'' (LD/HD). Many other
units approach, and in rare cases exceed, their service OPTEMPO
guidelines.
(b) The LD/HD units most in demand in the Pacific Command are the
EA-6B Prowler, U-2, P-3 Reef Point, and Civil Affairs detachments.
Besides LD/HD units, the following units experienced the highest
OPTEMPO within their components:
Pacific Fleet: 5 units exceeded the Chief of Naval Operations'
PERSTEMPO guidelines last year:
--USS Bunker Hill, USS Thach, & USS Rodney M Davis, all homeported
at Yokosuka, Japan.
--SH-60F Squadrons 4 & 8, which deploy with Carrier Battle Groups.
Pacific Air Forces (PACAF): PACAF strives to limit time away to 120
days per year. Support to CENTCOM has driven PACAF to exceed 120 days
for some units:
--The 13th Fighter Squadron spent an average of 116.7 days away
from Misawa, Japan last year. Half the squadron spent 180 days
deployed.
--67th FS personnel were gone 142 days away from Kadena, Japan.
--Co-Pilots in the 909th Air Refuel Squadron averaged 131 days away
from Kadena.
US Army Pacific: Engineer and Military Intelligence specialists
(such as translators) are the busiest soldiers, spending an average of
6 months annually away from home, either deployed or in the field.
Combat arms soldiers are gone only slightly less--usually 5 months
annually.
Marine Forces Pacific: Certain aviation units are the most
deployed, annually spending an average of 8 to 9 months away from home.
F-18 Hornet Squadrons and CH-46 helicopters are in especially high
demand. Marine ground combat units spend at least six months annually
deployed or in the field.
Question. Do you believe that the troops under your command today
are receiving adequate training? If not, why not?
Answer. Yes. The forces within Pacific Command receive adequate
training. We have made joint operations the norm through a series of
exercises (TEMPEST EXPRESS, TEMPI BRAVE, TANDEM THRUST, and COBRA
GOLD). We have used a ``crawl--walk--run'' training model to develop a
joint team.
We begin by using academic instructions and unit level training to
establish the foundation for joint operations. My staff sends out
mobile training teams to component headquarters to provide joint
training and expertise during this initial phase to assist the
components.
We then move to the next stage, the TEMPEST EXPRESS exercise, which
uses table-top simulations to train Joint Task Forces. We stop and
regroup as often as necessary during the training to ensure we reach
our training objectives. This Fiscal Year we will conduct TEMPEST
EXPRESS exercises with five joint Task Forces (7th Fleet, I MEF, I
Corps, ALCOM, and III MEF). We will train 3rd Fleet during the first
quarter of Fiscal Year 1998.
Finally, we exercise Joint Task Forces and the Pacific Command
Headquarters staff during demanding exercises such as TEMPO BRAVE (7th
Fleet last summer; III MEF this fall), TANDEM THRUST (7th Fleet), and
COBRA GOLD (I Corps). In these exercises we include the entire joint
team and carefully analyze our performance in after action reviews to
ensure we capture all lessons learned. We use this feedback to design
future training and to correct doctrinal or organizational
deficiencies.
The keys to successful joint training are well trained and equipped
forces. All Pacific Command components have aggressive training
programs which focus on developing and sustaining the unique skills of
their force. Our success in integrating these forces into successful
joint task forces is indicative of the high level of training of our
component forces.
Question. Do you feel that Military Operations Other than War
(MOOTW) by U.S. forces has affected the readiness or combat skills of
U.S. forces?
Answer. Yes. However, the effects are uneven. Many of the command
and control processes and systems used by U.S. Forces in MOOTW are the
same they would use in combat. Military Operations Other than War
usually involve a combination of air, land, sea, space, and special
operations forces as well as the efforts of governmental agencies and
non-governmental organization in a complementary fashion. Plans for
MOOTW are prepared and executed in a similar manner as plans for war.
The mission analysis and command estimate processes are as critical in
planning for MOOTW as they are in planning for war. The basic planning
process is unchanged, but the planning considerations are different.
Likewise, the logistical systems and command and control systems are
similar. Force projection, sustainment, and the command and control of
these forces is accomplished using the same systems for both MOOTW and
war. Therefore, at the joint force and service component planning
levels, executing MOOTW operations does not significantly degrade
readiness or combat skills.
Individual and collective skills are degraded to some extent among
some tactical units. Training time and money are limiting factors for
all units. If units are diverted from training on combat skills to
support MOOTW operations there is a degradation of combat skills. We
rely on subordinate commanders to assess the readiness of those combat
skills and ensure that the level of training for combat tasks remains
adequate to support combat operations. Units within the Pacific Command
are ready to execute their mission.
Question. What are the major joint training exercises that will be
undertaken by the Pacific Command in fiscal year 1997 and which ones
are budgeted for 1998? Are the funds budgeted for the service's Fiscal
Year 1998 request sufficient for your projected training needs? Has the
U.S. participation in Operations Other than War altered the types of
exercises you conduct?
Answer. There are 24 joint training exercises scheduled for Fiscal
Year 1997. The major exercises are: RECEPTION STAGING ONWARD MOVEMENT
AND INTEGRATION, ULCHI FOCUS LENS, FOAL EAGLE, FREEDOM BANNER, ELLIPSE
CHARLIE, TEMPEST EXPRESS, TANDEM THRUST, COBRA GOLD, KEEN SWORD, and
BALIKATAN. Fiscal Year 1998 has a total of 28 joint training exercises
scheduled. All are provided for within the budget.
Yes. Service budgets are sufficient for Pacific Command to execute
the Fiscal Year 1998 training and exercise programs.
Yes. U.S. participation in Military Operations Other Than War has
increased the training emphasis upon these types of operations during
our Joint Task Force training exercises.
Question. What new systems and methods (i.e. simulation etc.) are
employed by USPACOM to make joint training more effective? Are the
component services under your command adopting these new approaches?
Answer. My guidance is, where sensible, to use simulations instead
of moving people and equipment. We use a robust simulation program at
all levels to develop training programs which are more efficient. We
also leverage information technology so we are able to reach back into
continental U.S. based resources. We strive to be efficient custodians
of our training resources.
Simulations of operations on the Korean peninsula are good examples
of this effort. We blend service component simulations to support joint
exercises using an Aggregate Level Simulation Protocol to employ
component simulations in concert. We tie together the Army's Corps
Battle Simulation, the Navy's Research Evaluation and System Analysis,
the Air Force's Air Warfare Simulation, and the Marine Corps' Marine-
Air Ground Task Force Tactical Warfare Simulation.
We are also incorporating emerging Joint Simulations (JSIMS)
systems into our training and operations. Initial Operational
Capability for JSIMS is scheduled for Fiscal Year 1999, with the focus
on supporting Joint Task Force and unified combatant commands. JSIMS
will integrate existing simulations into a common framework that
includes live, virtual, and constructive modeling and simulation. JSIMS
will also provide a training environment at the operational level of
war that will accommodate requirements at the strategic and tactical
levels including space, transportation, and intelligence. This effort
will reduce overhead and operating costs for training and increase the
overall utility of simulations.
We use our information systems to ``reach back'' to assets in the
continental U.S. We have leveraged facilitates such as Atlantic
Command's Joint Training and Simulations Facility into exercises being
conducted in South East Asia. We have also electronically connected
Joint Exercise Control Groups from places such as the Army War College
in Carlisle, Pennsylvania into exercises being conducted off Indonesia
(TEMPO BRAVE 96). This capability is also used by our components. As
Global Command and Control Systems mature our components' ability to
interact with other headquarters will also continue to improve.
Troop Quality, Morale, and Medical
Question. In visiting various statewide bases, members of the
Committee have been hearing complaints about medical care and dental
plans.
How satisfied are troops in USPACOM with the medical care, and
dental care for themselves and their dependents? What are the major
shortcomings of medical care in your command? How many U.S. military
operated hospitals are there in the Pacific Command?
Answer. According to a Department of Defense survey, most personnel
are satisfied with military health care in the Pacific. The Pacific
region is in transition to a managed care program under TRICARE.
TRICARE Pacific is being implemented in Alaska, Hawaii, and throughout
the Western Pacific, including all remote sites. Once implementation is
completed, TRICARE should maximize the operational readiness of our
active duty military while continuing to provide a high quality of care
for all beneficiaries.
The influx of additional dental officers and support staff has
improved accessibility in general dentistry and increased specialty
care. Overall satisfaction with dental care is good. However, full
service can not be provided to family members in remote locations.
Some individuals perceive TRICARE will reduce benefits and
flexibility. As implementation proceeds, we will monitor patient
satisfaction with quality of care, access, and cost to the individual,
and ask for your continued support to ensure that medical benefits
remain intact.
Geography, culture, and politics are obstacles to accessible,
affordable, quality health care for many active duty personnel and
their family members assigned to remote locations. This compels some
service-members to pay significant out-of-pocket, up-front expenses
when obtaining care on local economies. We could better serve these
beneficiaries with local authority to contract for, and pay directly
some costs, instead of reimbursement to the member. Family members
stationed in locations where there are no U.S. dental facilities also
need additional assistance in obtaining and paying for quality dental
care.
There are ten hospitals and fourteen branch clinics. The hospitals
are in the following areas: Alaska, Hawaii, Okinawa, Guam, Japan, and
Korea.
Strategic Lift/Pre-Positioned Equipment
Question. In the event of hostilities on the Korean peninsula, do
you believe that adequate air and sealift capacity exists to ensure the
rapid reinforcement of troops in theater? Do you have any deficiencies
in terms of cargo handling equipment in the military port facilities on
the peninsula or else where in theater?
Answer. To be completely candid, I consider the available air and
sealift capacity only adequate. To ensure rapid reinforcement of forces
in Korea--or anywhere else, DoD must procure enough Large Medium-Speed
Roll-On/Roll-Off Ships (LMSRs) to overcome the shortfall in sealift for
vehicles. The most recent, fully integrated Time-Phased Force
Deployment Data (TPFDD) for ------.
As for cargo handling equipment, in Korea we are experiencing a
Rough Terrain Container Handler (RTCH) shortfall. This limits our
capability to download or transfer containers in the theater. The
magnitude of the deficiency is not yet quantified; however, the
container handling problem at the sea ports in Korea is currently being
studied by FKJ4. The aerial port material handling equipment in Korea
is being analyzed by Pacific Air Forces (PACAF).
Quality of Life--Housing
Question. The Committee has added substantial amounts over the
budget in the past two years to improve the quality of life for troops.
In part, this funding has been added to improve the condition of
barracks and related facilities. The Congress added $700 million in
fiscal year 1996 and $600 million in FY 1997 for this purpose. The
barracks housing unaccompanied troops in Korea have had perennial
maintenance problems which have been addressed by the Congress on
several occasions. Describe for the Committee the condition of the
barracks and related housing and dining facilities in your command.
Answer. Our largest housing requirement is for unaccompanied
soldiers. Problems throughout Korea include shortages and over
crowding; substandard buildings, such as Quonset huts and H-relocatable
buildings; deteriorated older barracks with gang latrines; and
substandard/non-existent officer and senior enlisted UPH (unaccompanied
personnel housing. Survey results from a recent sexual harassment team
visit pointed out that crowded housing conditions are the top problem
and create an environment conducive to misconduct. We are addressing
the barracks problems with an integrated program consisting of U.S.
funded military construction (MILCON) and host nation funded
construction (HNFC) to alleviate shortage and substandard conditions.
Operations and maintenance funds are used to renovate existing
buildings to current standards. Some service members must reside off
the installations because of shortages. The Army alone spends
approximately $18 million (M) per year to house over 800 unaccompanied
officer and senior enlisted personnel off-post in Korea. Also, many
must live on-post in substandard conditions due to military necessity.
We are investigating alternate construction methods, such as pre-
fabricated housing, to develop an affordable solution. However, it is
unlikely we will be able to correct this problem with operations and
maintenance funding. Major construction funding is needed. Almost 70
percent of our 50 dining facilities are over 20 years old. Only ten of
these facilities have been renovated in the past nine years. We are
using an approach similar to what we are using to solve the housing
problem. The worst facilities are being replaced through U.S. funded
MILCON and HNFC as funding permits.
Question. Have any of the additional funds provided in the fiscal
year 1997 Appropriations Act been directed to improve the facilities
housing your troops?
Answer. $10 million of the new Quality of Life Enhancements,
Defense appropriation has been earmarked to improve our barracks in
Korea, $8 million for the Army and $2 million for the Air Force.
Question. What is the backlog of real property maintenance and
repair work in your AOR? Is this increasing or decreasing?
Answer. Our infrastructure, that is utility systems, are most
effected by limited real property maintenance (RPM) funding. These
systems have deteriorated to where they form the largest component of
our backlog of maintenance and repair work. A recent Architect-Engineer
study identified $659 million of requirements to repair or upgrade
infrastructure on Eighth U.S. Army installations. We estimate our total
infrastructure needs in U.S. Forces Korea to be $750 million. Our most
serious problems resulted from past reductions in MILCON and operations
and maintenance funding. Our unaccompanied housing and base
infrastructure systems have suffered the worst from this lack of
investment. Currently, we must rely exclusively on host nation funded
construction to complete the majority of the infrastructure work. To
support programmed major facility construction, such as new barracks,
Eighth Army needs an additional $10 million in MILCON annually to
rejuvenate deteriorated utility systems. Seventh Air Force requires an
additional $5 million annually to solve similar problems. Otherwise,
backlogs will continue to increase and catastrophic failures of utility
systems will occur.
POW/MIA Status
Question. Admiral Prueher, please describe the current status of
efforts to resolve POW/MIA cases in Vietnam.
Answer. There are 2127 Americans still unaccounted-for in Southeast
Asia. Of this total 1588 were lost in Vietnam. Joint Task Force-Full
Accounting (JTF-FA) is scheduled to conduct five Joint Field Activities
(JFA) in Vietnam during Fiscal Year 1997. Our JTF-FA troops are doing a
superb job. Each JFA lasts approximately 30 days during which JTF-FA
deploys six recovery teams, two investigation teams, and one research
and investigation team (over 100 U.S. personnel). JTF-FA completed five
JFAs in Fiscal Year 1996. The Vietnamese Office for Seeking Missing
Persons continues to provide good support to our operations.
Question. How do you rate the Vietnamese at the present time in
terms of their willingness to cooperate on this issue?
Answer. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) Government
continues to cooperate on the POW/MIA effort and understands, I
believe, that further cooperation is required to satisfactorily resolve
the issue. Vietnamese support to Joint Field Activities remains good.
Trilateral operations between the Vietnamese, Cambodians, and U.S.
began in February 1997. Initial results are promising.
Significant progress has been made on confirming the fates of
individuals on the last known alive list. Of the original 196
individuals, the fate of only 48 individuals is yet to be confirmed.
The SRV Government is also continuing efforts to locate individuals
with valuable first-hand information relating to cases of unaccounted-
for Americans. Vietnamese witnesses provided information which resulted
in recovery of remains in Laos. The SRVE Government also recently
turned over more than 150 documents, and permitted U.S. teams to review
thousands of archival items in museums and other government offices.
These documents and items provided a significant number of
correlations. In response to unilateral case leads we provided to
Vietnam between January and May 1996, the Vietnamese Office for Seeking
Missing Persons has provided written reports on 73 case investigations.
Question. How many cases have been resolved over the past year?
Answer. In 1996, JTF-FA teams in Vietnam recovered and repatriated
21 sets of remains to the Central Identification Laboratory Hawaii
(CILHI) to process for identification. The Armed Forces Identification
Review Board (AFIRB) in 1996 approved the identification of 15 sets of
remains previously repatriated from Vietnam. Thus far in 1997, two sets
of remains have been repatriated from Vietnam.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Young.]
Thursday, April 17, 1997.
TESTIMONY OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AND OTHER INTERESTED INDIVIDUALS AND
ORGANIZATIONS
----------
HMMWV AND OTHER TACTICAL VEHICLES
WITNESS
HON. TIM ROEMER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA
Introduction
Mr. Young. The Committee will come to order.
This morning we are to hear testimony from Members of
Congress and from witnesses outside the Congress. This is the
last scheduled hearing for fiscal year 1998, although there
will be a number of other special hearings on some subjects
that we have to revisit. But we have completed the rest of the
scheduled hearings.
We have had testimony from the new Secretary of Defense,
the chairman of each branch of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
war-fighting CINCs, and many other DOD officials, and now we
want to hear from you today. Your input is always very, very
helpful to the members of this Committee.
Many of you here today have testified before. For those
here for the first time, let me explain something about our
process. Each of your prepared statements will appear in the
published hearing volume, and we ask you to summarize your
actual testimony in 5 minutes. This is consistent with how the
Committee operates under the 5-minute rule. The members of the
Subcommittee only have 5 minutes during the hearing process for
their questions of witnesses.
Unfortunately, many of our members are not here this
morning and will not be here because the other subcommittees
are marking up their titles of the supplemental appropriations,
and they are trying to finalize that today. We finished our
part of it yesterday. All of our members serve on other
Subcommittees as well.
Our first witness this morning is Congressman Tim Roemer of
South Bend, Indiana. Congressman Roemer serves on the Committee
on Education and the Workforce and the Committee on Science. He
is the expert in the Congress on the HMMWV, the principal means
of land transportation for our troops.
Last year, the HMMWV was not adequately funded and we were
able to add $66 million to the budget to provide for unfunded
requirements. It is one of the nonsexy but essential tools for
our troops that we put on our scroll that identifies items like
this that stretches across the room that identify shortages of
equipment and supplies that are necessary to make the military
work. We appreciate your input as it comes to the essential
subject of HMMWVs, trucks, and the ability to move from one
place to another.
We are happy to hear from you at this time, Congressman.
You have the floor.
Statement of Congressman Roemer
Mr. Roemer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me start by just asking unanimous consent that my
entire statement be entered into the record.
Mr. Young. Without objection, that will be done.
Mr. Roemer. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you for your help
in the past.
You mentioned your help to the HMMWV program last year. I
really appreciate that. I appreciate Mr. Bonilla's attendance
here initially and appreciate the help the entire Subcommittee
and Full Committee and their attention to four different
requests that I am going to make this morning.
One is going to be I am requesting a total appropriation of
$156.2 million in the Army procurement funding for the HMMWV. I
am also requesting $65 million in Marine Corps funding
procurement funds for the HMMWV Extended Service program--ESP
program; $40 million in Army procurement for the 2.5 ton truck
ESP; and finally, Mr. Chairman, a fiscal year 1999 issue, it
does not include a funding request on the Vandal program, which
I will explain a little bit about.
Mr. Chairman, you said it eloquently and you said it
articulately in your opening statement. I am here for the
heart, the soul, and the guts of the Army programs. That is the
best built Jeep in the entire world, the 2.5 ton truck, the
kinds of equipment that keeps our young men and women safe when
we put them in harm's way, whether it be in the Persian Gulf or
whether it has to be in two different instances fighting,
whether that be in the Middle East or in the Korean Peninsula
some day in the future.
Let me tell you a quick story about the HMMWV. When we had
to invade, looking for General Noriega in Panama, they dropped
HMMWV out of the sky. One of them came out of the sky and the
parachute half opened and landed off target, which is unusual,
upside down in a swamp. It was a HMMWV. They turned it over,
they started it up, and it went and helped capture Noriega.
In Bosnia, in the peacekeeping mission just recently, an
armored HMMWV struck an antitank mine. It is not supposed to
protect in all instances the personnel in that kind of
situation. The three men in that HMMWV walked away unharmed.
This vehicle works, it is the best in the world, and we
need them to protect our troops. It also has all kinds of
capabilities, fire truck capabilities, Avenger capabilities,
all kinds of things that this can do for a very versatile
mission.
I really implore this Committee to continue to invest in
this Jeep.
Secondly, on the $40 million Army procurement for 2.5 ton
trucks, we take a 25-year-old truck and we make it brand new,
and we make it work better than it did the first time. Often
times these trucks, which are older than the people driving
them, come off the assembly line, they work better with central
inflation on the air tire system, they have a 30 percent better
engine for fuel efficiency, they have better equipment in them.
These things run in a great manner to protect our troops and to
feed and clothe and do everything for our troops on the line to
get armor to them.
This is not, again, a section I investment, it is a much-
needed investment, quite frankly, one that sometimes the Army
does not do a very good job in lobbying for. It doesn't make
for the same kind of section I thing as a roll out of the F-22,
but these 25-year-old trucks are much needed for our personnel.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, on the Vandal program, let me just
say that there are a couple different issues on this program
which I hope that you and your staff will look into. The Vandal
program tests ship defense shipments against high-speed, low
altitude ship missiles and is made by allied signal target
systems.
The Navy has always expressed satisfaction with the
performance of the U.S. contractor on the target missile and
not made clear why they are turning their backs on a U.S.-made
system in favor of a Russian-made MA-31.
I would hope that the Committee, first, is willing to ask
the Navy if they are willing to lose its only U.S. supplier of
supersonic sea skimming missiles, and, second, is all of the
risk associated with purchasing a Russian target fully
understood from both the technical and commercial standpoint?
I have four or five other questions that I hope the
Committee looks into.
Let me just sum up by saying, Mr. Chairman, and joined by
Mr. Hefner, the distinguished gentleman from North Carolina,
thank you again for your support for these much-needed, heart,
soul and guts types of items for our Army and our young people.
Thank you for sending your staff out to the G.M. General plant
last year. We very much look forward to cooperating with your
Committee and answering your questions as you look into these
requests.
Mr. Young. Congressman, thank you very much. We appreciate
the sincerity of your testimony.
I wanted to tell you that I have ridden in a lot of
different versions of the HMMWV, and it is impressive. The
seats are not all that comfortable. We might get a little
softer seat.
Mr. Roemer. For you, Mr. Chairman, we probably have got
one. They have got the private model now that Arnold
Schwarzenegger has a copy of, he calls it the ``Terminator.''
They are selling those with CD players and air conditioners. I
am sure that has a comfortable seat in it.
Mr. Young. I saw Arnold's. It is pretty fancy.
One of the rides I took was on the obstacle course where
they train the soldiers, and I think a good portion of the
time, we were on one wheel. This thing operates in the most
unusual types of terrain. It is unbelievable. You are exactly
right.
Mr. Hefner, do you have any questions?
Mr. Hefner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think where you use to test them is on the roads in
Indiana. Isn't that the obstacle course?
Mr. Roemer. Our potholes aren't that bad, Mr. Hefner.
Mr. Hefner. Just a little aside here, when our good friend
Silvio Conte, who has long since passed, was here, we were
having a debate about HMMWVs a long, long time ago, and Silvio
was one of the big supporters of the HMMWV. He said, you know,
it is one of the greatest pieces of equipment we have ever
produced, and he said, besides that, it is one of the greatest
hunting vehicles in the whole world. So I guess you have to
have your priorities.
We appreciate your testimony and coming before the
Committee.
Mr. Roemer. Thank you, Mr. Hefner. It is a very versatile
program. As I said in my statement, we are now using it not
only to protect troops, we have an up-armored version, we have
an Avenger version, we have a version we hope to be able to
sell to the Immigration and Naturalization Service to help
patrol our borders, to the U.N. to help peacekeeping missions.
This is a great investment for the American people.
Mr. Young. Tim, thank you very much for coming. We
appreciate your testimony.
[The statement of Mr. Roemer follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
TELEMEDICINE TECHNOLOGY
WITNESS
HON. CHARLIE NORWOOD, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF
GEORGIA
Introduction
Mr. Young. Next, we are going to hear from another of our
colleagues, Congressman Charles Norwood, from Evans, Georgia.
He serves on the Committee on Education and the Workforce and
also the Commerce Committee. He knows something about the
military, having served as a captain in the Army, including a
tour in Vietnam.
Congressman, please proceed.
Statement of Congressman Norwood
Mr. Norwood. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for having
this hearing and thanks for giving us this opportunity to
testify before your Subcommittee this morning on appropriations
for telemedicine and teledentistry in the defense appropriation
bill for fiscal year 1998.
Telemedicine has existed in some form for nearly 40 years.
Initially, the expansion of telemedicine was constrained by
cost and technology limitations. However, recent advances in
fiber-optics, satellite communications, and other technologies
have enabled a renewed interest in telemedicine by the private
and public sectors.
Telemedicine is a communication system that connects
primary care physicians, specialists, health care providers,
and patients. It is the use of cutting edge communication
technology to provide increased diagnostic and consultation
services for patients.
Telemedicine allows health care providers to take advantage
of the best specialists to ensure appropriateness of care for
their patient. It enables patients without transportation to
access to consultation services that they need to ensure that
we give them quality care. In rural sections of the United
States, the application of this technology provides patients
specialty consultations at metropolitan medical centers,
university-based clinics, and community hospitals.
The Department of Defense continues to develop applications
for telemedicine. Your Subcommittee has heard the Surgeons
General of the military services testify regarding the
effectiveness of telemedicine at battalion aid stations in
Bosnia and on board ships.
I might mention here that this past Christmas I was in
Bosnia and had the great pleasure of reading x-rays back from
Fort Gordon, Georgia, that is now an Army hospital.
A February 1997 United States General Accounting Office
report stated that the Department of Defense has been
instrumental in developing telemedicine technologies to deliver
medical care to the battlefield or in operations other than
war. Rapid prototyping demonstrations of telemedicine have also
supported military operations in Somalia, Macedonia, and Haiti.
In December 1996, as I mentioned, I traveled to Bosnia and
Hungary where I witnessed deployed telemedicine among our
forces. It is apparent to me that telecommunication links
between field medical sites and specialists at military
hospitals and aboard naval vessels ensure quality medical
support for our service members. The rigorous testing of
telemedicine under these extreme conditions validates this
technology for civilian application.
In 1994, the Secretary of Army established the Center for
Total Access at Fort Gordon, Georgia, as a major initiative of
the Department of Defense telemedicine test-bed. Its location
at Fort Gordon facilitates efforts between U.S. Army Signal
Center and School and Eisenhower Army Medical Center, the
Medical College of Georgia, and Veteran's Affairs Medical
Center in Augusta. The Center for Total Access spent the last 2
years developing a strategic plan for the implementation of
telemedicine in the Army's Southeast Regional Medical Command
and the Department of Defense TRICARE Region 3, which you are
very familiar with.
There are 23 military treatment facilities and 1.1 million
beneficiaries in the region served by the Center for Total
Access. Specific clinical needs at each site have been
identified in which telemedicine will provide a real benefit in
the delivery of health care in our region.
The Center for Total Access seeks to establish a regional
communication network interconnecting with these treatment
facilities, VA hospitals, university-based hospitals and
clinics, and community medical treatment facilities in rural
areas. The appropriate equipment provided to each clinical
service will enable the direct consultation between health care
providers, irrespective of their distance.
Additionally, in May of 1996, the Department of Defense
designated Fort Gordon as a theater medical informatics program
test-bed. The primary purpose of this tri-service test-bed is
to improve patient visibility, minimize evacuations, respond to
trauma, leverage specialty care, and improve command and
control situational awareness.
Funds appropriated for DOD telemedicine projects directly
enhance the capabilities of battlefield medicine and civilian
health care. It is anticipated that operating costs for the
Center for Total Access in fiscal year 1998 will be $5.4
million in Army operations and maintenance funding. This is
essential to allow the center to sustain existing systems and
continue telemedicine initiatives to its fullest extent
possible. Out year funding requirements is approximately $1
million per year.
I believe this investment in military telemedicine
infrastructure and different initiatives will enhance the
battlefield medicine capabilities of our armed forces.
Telemedicine technologies validated in austere military
environment will improve health care in rural America by
ensuring patient access to diagnosis and different medical
services.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you and the members of your
Subcommittee for this opportunity, and I will be very up front
with you. I have a very large bias concerning this subject. I
served in a MASH unit in Vietnam where we had four physicians
and where we had two dentists, and frequently our numbers of
casualties were a great deal more than we could handle. We were
young, we were enthusiastic, which meant we may have not had
all the experience in the world. And I can envision in my mind
so clearly how valuable this would be to our troops in time of
war. I can envision telemedicine packs on the backs of spec 5
medics out in the field that bring to the patient on the ground
in a firefight the needed information to save a life.
Besides the great value I see of it in our armed forces, we
know firsthand in Georgia how valuable it is because our State
I think leads the way in this area in rural areas where we are
connected up--the Medical College of Georgia is connected up
with health clinics in almost all of our rural areas, and I go
by constantly these clinics and see the value of this system.
We hope you will look favorably upon our request.
Mr. Young. Congressman, thank you very much for your very
specific testimony. I think the members of this Subcommittee
have established a very good record in recognizing the needs
that you have identified, and we have, much to the chagrin of
some of those across the river, added considerable funds on
occasion to upgrade our medical capabilities for those in
uniform.
Mr. Norwood. Yes, sir, I know that, and thank you.
Mr. Hefner. No questions.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much again. We appreciate your
being here.
[The statement of Mr. Norwood follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
ROCHESTER INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
WITNESSES
HON. LOUISE SLAUGHTER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF
NEW YORK
JUDITH GUSTINIS, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR INTEGRATED MANUFACTURING STUDIES,
ROCHESTER INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Introduction
Mr. Young. Now I would like to introduce Representative
Louise Slaughter from Fairport, New York, and I understand she
is here to introduce another of our witnesses.
Congresswoman Slaughter is a member of the Rules Committee,
which is an extremely important Committee here in the Congress
which is probably an understatement of the importance of that
committee. We are happy to have you here this morning to
introduce your guests.
Statement of Congresswoman Slaughter
Ms. Slaughter. Thank you, sir. We are a little bit inclined
to overstate it on the Rules Committee as well.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for your time.
Congressman Hefner, it is wonderful to see you this morning. I
thank you both for giving me the opportunity to introduce to
the Subcommittee Judith Gustinis, who is the Director of the
Center of Integrated Manufacturing Studies at the Rochester
Institute of Technology.
Mr. Chairman, I am proud to say that the Rochester
Institute of Technology is one of the Nation's greatest
institutions of higher learning. It is the home of the national
and internationally recognized programs in imaging,
photography, software engineering, microelectronics
engineering, packaging science, printing technology, and
environmental management, and is also the home of the National
Technical Institute for the Defense.
Mr. Chairman, one of its great contributions to Rochester
and the Nation is its effort to keep U.S. manufacturing
industries with their viability and their competitiveness.
Rochester and the Upstate New York area have the greatest
concentration of manufacturers in the country. Assisting the
companies is the main mission of our Center for Integrated
Manufacturing Studies, or CIMS, as it is called.
The CIMS center is designed to be a much-needed bridge
between industry and academia. It allows small, medium, and
even large manufacturing companies to work with the RIT
researchers and students in finding the solutions to pressing
manufacturing problems using the latest technological
innovations.
Judith Gustinis is the Director of the CIMS program and has
an impressive program in industry, government, and academia.
She has an MBA from Fairleigh Dickinson University and worked
as a manufacturing executive for the Westinghouse and Pitney
Bowes Companies. Prior to taking over the leadership of the
CIMS program, Ms. Gustinis was head of the very successful New
York State Manufacturing Extension Partnership. Supported by a
multidisciplinary group from the RIT's Colleges of Engineering
and Applied Science, Technology, Business and Imaging, along
with its major industry partners such as Kodak, Xerox and IBM,
and many small and medium-sized manufacturers, Ms. Gustinis'
program in support of U.S. manufacturing is unique in the
Nation and a major innovation.
Mr. Chairman, Ms. Gustinis is here today to ask the
Subcommittee to support a proposal to ask the Department of
Defense to join CIMS as a supporting partner in a new and
exciting research program that directly supports the
department's own manufacturing technology research mission, the
creation of a National Center for Remanufacturing at RIT CIMS
center.
The Nation's manufacturers, learning the process of
remanufacturing, is an important way for us to regain
competitiveness by increasing profitability and reducing waste.
RIT's remanufacturing research program is currently training
engineers to design products and systems so that they can be
returned to the manufacturer, easily disassembled and
remanufactured in a like-new condition, thereby dramatically
reducing manufacturing and product unit costs.
Mr. Chairman, DOD's MANTECH program exists to help defense
contractors, large and small, improve their manufacturing
processes in order to make their products more affordable. The
program has established a number of Centers of Excellence in
important manufacturing technology areas. RIT believes that its
manufacturing research program can and should become a MANTECH
Center of Excellence. Financial support provided by MANTECH
will allow RIT's program to expand and become a model for the
Nation.
I hope that after you hear from Ms. Gustinis and review the
proposal for a National Center for Remanufacturing that the
Subcommittee will include funding for the initiative in the
fiscal year 1998 national security appropriations bill.
I would like to introduce Ms. Gustinis and give you my
thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much. We are happy to have Ms.
Gustinis here this morning. Your entire statement will be
placed in the record. We would ask that you summarize it now.
Statement of Ms. Gustinis
Ms. Gustinis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me begin by thanking Congresswoman Slaughter for her
very kind introduction, and also her tireless efforts on behalf
of the Rochester Institute of Technology and the Center for
Integrated Manufacturing Studies. Seated with me today is Dr.
Nabeel Nasser, an expert on remanufacturing and a professor
from the RIT College of Engineering. He works with us in the
CIMS center.
Mr. Chairman, I am the director of the very unique
integrated manufacturing center which does work with companies
on issues of affordability and manufacturing competitiveness
for the U.S. The Department of Defense does have a very
comprehensive program known as MANTECH which focuses on many of
the issues that we as well focus on within the Center for
Integrated Manufacturing Studies.
We work with hundreds of manufacturers to help them improve
their processes so that they can get their time to market down
and improve their costs. This is where the concept of
remanufacturing really arose and why we have been so involved
in it over the past years.
Remanufacturing is indeed a process, which Congressman Tim
Roemer was talking about earlier, whereby material comes back
from the field, it is disassembled, it is cleaned, it is
inspected, it is reworked, replaced, reassembled and tested and
out again into service.
The result of this process is twofold: Much is learned
about real wear and design, the effective design, that can go
back into the design process. Second of all, the remanufactured
product, as Congressman Roemer mentioned, is often better than
when new, yet the total cost can be 30 to 50 percent lower. The
reason it is lower is that as much as 85 percent of the
original cost is recaptured in the process, rather than with
recycling, where often it is returned to a raw material state
and the energy and labor are lost. In remanufacturing they are
captured.
Remanufacture has been around for many years and some of
the major companies in the United States, Detroit Diesel,
Xerox, and Kodak being others, have learned if you apply more
scientific process to the process of remover, you cut cost,
time, and become highly competitive.
The Eastman Kodak Company recently announced the
remanufacture of the 100 millionth Fun-Saver Camera, for
example. This, in fact, was designed to be remanufactured, and
as a result, over 1,400 pounds of material is back in the
product as opposed to being in waste, which is what allows it
to be so competitive.
Affordability is the key issue and it spans military
systems and sustainability issues as well. As a result, there
is a current dramatic increase of remanufacturing in the
military. The defense contractors are the largest group of
remanufacturers in the world. A few examples, the Bradley
fighting vehicle, approximately 1,600 existing A-2s will be
remanded to A-3s. In the Army, the medium tactical vehicle,
this 5-ton truck, 8,000 of those are going to be
remanufactured. In the Marine Corps, the AV-8B Harrier is in
the process of remanufacture. In the Navy, the HH-60H and the
SH-60CV helicopters are in a continuous process of
remanufacturing.
Our research indicates that there is no major mandate by
the Congress or within the MANTECH program to take a scientific
research look at this process of remanufacturing. Yet more
scientific and technical approaches to this area will produce
improvements in quality, in availability, and, most of all,
affordability of weapons and other military systems.
Mr. Chairman, we at the Rochester Institute of Technology
at the Center for Integrated Manufacturing Studies would like
to propose consideration of our center as a MANTECH Center of
Excellence to focus on research in the area of remanufacture.
At this center, we will execute a 5-year partnership with the
Department of Defense and with defense contractors and industry
that we work with today to provide scientific and technical
leadership in this area. We will deliver research, training,
tools, technical project work, that will advance design and
remanufacture and affordability for defense-related
requirements.
For this program, we are requesting $4 million for fiscal
year 1998, and this would cover start-up and first year program
costs. Thank you for considering our request, Mr. Chairman. Dr.
Nasser and I would be happy to answer any questions.
Mr. Young. I thank you very much for your excellent
testimony.
As you know, this Committee has been very supportive of the
remanufacturing and MANTECH, and we appreciate your being here
today.
Louise, thank you for bringing her.
Any questions?
Mr. Hefner. Just one question. Is there anyone else that is
in this process? Are you standing alone? I know not in
remanufacturing, but in what you are asking for here?
Ms. Gustinis. To the best of our knowledge, there are some
institutes of higher education looking at policy issues in
remanufacturing, and to some extent at one piece of the
remanufacturing process, known as disassembly. But no program
of the comprehensive nature that we are aware of that we have
at RIT.
Mr. Hefner. You are kind of pioneering this?
Ms. Gustinis. Yes, we are, sir.
Mr. Young. Thank you again. We appreciate your being here
and appreciate your testimony.
Ms. Slaughter. Thank you very much.
[The statement of Ms. Slaughter follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
FORT MONMOUTH, NEW JERSEY
WITNESS
HON. MICHAEL PAPPAS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW
JERSEY
Introduction
Mr. Young. Next we will hear from Congressman Michael
Pappas, from Rocky Hill, New Jersey. Congressman Pappas serves
on the Government Reform and Oversight Committee, the Small
Business Committee, and the National Security Committee.
Congressman Pappas, welcome. We will be happy to hear from
you. Your entire statement will be placed in the record, and
please feel free to summarize it.
Statement of Congressman Pappas
Mr. Pappas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members of
the Committee. Congressman Pallone and I had planned to be here
together and to jointly make several requests, and I expect
that he should be here shortly. But my schedule precludes me
from waiting any longer from this, so I appreciate you taking
me out of order.
I am a freshman and fortunate to serve as a member of the
National Security Committee. Several weeks ago we had jointly
attended a meeting of the Military Construction Subcommittee,
and Mr. Hefner was there, so he probably is going to hear from
me a second time. But two facilities that are mostly in my
district, but the employees and the businesses associated with
these two facilities, they being Fort Monmouth and Earle Naval
Weapons Station, straddle our districts, and many of the people
concerned with the future of those facilities are constituents
of mine and Mr. Pallone's.
Three of the four things I am going to speak about deal
with Fort Monmouth, and one deals with Earle.
Fort Monmouth is the main base of CECOM, and I am sure you
are somewhat familiar with that. There is a request in the
order of $27 million for infrastructure improvements for that.
We believe that it is important that that get very serious
consideration, because more and more--as communications become
more and more important to not just our society, but in
particular our national defense systems, having facilities such
as that that have the tools that they need, I think is
critically important.
There is also a $300,000 request for walkway improvements,
physical improvements, to connect some of the buildings that
are very, very close. Several of these buildings have already
been connected, and this would, we believe, assist the staff
there in being much more efficient.
Lastly, there is a request for $12 million for Fort
Monmouth. There is a relationship which has been developed with
Monmouth University which, from their perspective, they would
be bringing to the table approximately $8 million in private
funds for software engineering projects, and we believe that
deserves consideration.
Lastly, with regard to Earle, there are piers that are
World War II vintage. Later this year there are to be two new
ships that will be berthed there, and we believe to the tune of
about $500,000 that there would be necessary improvements to
electrical systems that are needed to adequately service that
facility.
I would appreciate it if I could include my entire written
statement for the record.
Mr. Young. Congressman, your entire statement will be
included for the record.
We appreciate your calling these items to our attention.
Some of them we are familiar with from last year and the year
before; some of them we tried to work out and were not able to.
We will do the best we can to support your efforts. We
appreciate your being here.
[The statement of Mr. Pappas follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Thursday, April 17, 1997.
FORT MONMOUTH, NEW JERSEY
WITNESS
HON. FRANK PALLONE, JR., A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF
NEW JERSEY
Introduction
Mr. Young. Our next witness is Congressman Frank Pallone of
Long Branch, New Jersey. Congressman Pallone has testified
before the Committee before. We are glad to have you back again
this year.
Last year, you presented a very persuasive argument to
cover some of the walkways that Congressman Pappas just
mentioned between the buildings at Fort Monmouth. This is the
type of project that would normally be funded in the military
construction bill. We tried to figure out a way to fund it in
our bill since it was relatively small, but we were just not
able to do that.
So we are happy to hear from you again this year and hope
we can do a better job for you. We understand there are many,
many requirements out there we are not able to fund. We do the
very best we can.
Welcome again. Your entire statement will be placed in the
record, and we would ask you to summarize in about 5 minutes.
Statement of Congressman Pallone
Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good to see you and
my Democratic colleagues.
Since you have already said you are going to try to do
this, maybe I just should leave.
Mr. Young. I think we told you that last year, too.
Mr. Pallone. I am assuming that my colleague from New
Jersey Mr. Pappas probably went through some of the same
things. I am just submitting my statement for the record.
If I could just briefly summarize, basically our requests
are with regard to Fort Monmouth and also Naval Weapons Station
Earle. Both of these happen to basically bridge our
congressional districts. Part of Fort Monmouth and Earle Naval
Station are in my district and Mr. Pappas's district.
With regard to Fort Monmouth, there are three projects. One
is a $27 million telecommunications modernization plan. Fort
Monmouth is the CECOM headquarters, Communications and
Electronics Command for the Army. Much of their
telecommunications and computer infrastructure were installed
between the 1950s and 1970s and, therefore, is out of date.
Basically this upgrading program is to bring them up to the
present day.
It is important because Fort Monmouth, pursuant to the Base
Realignment and Closure--BRAC, was made to consolidate to the
main post. In other words, we didn't lose anything, we actually
gained jobs during the BRAC, but we took on additional
functions with regard to communications and electronics. So we
need to upgrade that basic infrastructure at Fort Monmouth, and
that is our first request.
The second one, of course, are the walkways that were
already mentioned. I actually have been there during the winter
and seen the situation. It may seem like what do they need
walkways for, but it is very disruptive. Essentially what
happened is all the people that work in the command in CECOM
used to be about 2 miles away at a central building. Now they
are in buildings that were refurbished that used to be
barracks. So basically they are walking between these
modernized barracks, and it is very difficult if the weather is
severe. It has an impact on their job.
The third thing is a request for $12 million for the
development of an information resource center to be managed
jointly by Fort Monmouth and nearby Monmouth University. A few
years ago when Congressman Dwyer, one of my predecessors, was
on the Appropriations Committee, he actually received funding
through DOD to build a center for technological development and
transfer at Monmouth University that also dovetailed with Fort
Monmouth. This IRC concept is basically a continuation of that.
Monmouth University is basically the university that trains
people that work in the R&D functions at Fort Monmouth. So in
the same way that the fort has a need to upgrade its
infrastructure, the university has a need to develop and
provide new computers and new centers for electronics and
information and the new Information Age in order to train
people to work at the fort.
So that is basically what this IRC concept is. It is in the
testimony, but it would basically provide video
teleconferencing, library archives, educational video,
recording capabilities, learning facilities, an essential link
between the university's research and that of Fort Monmouth.
I also wanted to mention Naval Weapons Station Earle again
very briefly. We are also fortunate there in, again, we are
taking on more responsibilities. There are two new AOE class
ships now stationed in Norfolk, Virginia--I don't see the
Virginia people here, so I guess I am okay in talking about
this--that are going to be reassigned to Naval Weapons Station
Earle. One is actually going to be moving there this year, and
the other next year. As a result of these ships coming, as well
as others that are anticipated beyond that, there need to be
structural upgrades to Earle's pier complex.
There are really three projects there. Two of them fall
under military construction. The third, for $500,000, is to
refurbish the pier's power distribution center. That falls
within the DOD's Operation and Maintenance--O&M account.
So, again, I don't know that I need to go into the details
of that, but that is another thing we need in order to
accommodate these new ships coming into Earle.
I just wanted to make a couple of other comments. Later
today I understand you are going to be getting proposals from
the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey. One is
with regard to construction of an international center for
public health, and secondly is a proposal to do a series of
studies. I think that Senator Torricelli is a sponsor of this
in the Senate, and Senator Lautenberg has been helpful as well.
They are trying--New Jersey has one of the highest rates, I
think the highest rate, for breast cancer in the country. At
the same time, we have the most Superfund toxic waste sites.
Over the years and over the last 10 or 20 years, there has been
a lot of evidence there is a link between the two. Essentially
what we are trying to do is to get a research grant together
with the University of Medicine And Dentistry and our Cancer
Institute of New Jersey and the National Institute of
Environmental Health Sciences to do a study on the link between
those two.
Again, I am not sure why that is here before your
Subcommittee, but it is my understanding that they are going to
be testifying later today on that proposal. I endorse both of
those proposals. I think they are very important for our State
and ultimately for the country as well.
Thank you.
Mr. Young. Thank you for being here. We will do the very
best we can to work with you on these important issues that are
important to you and the national security agencies.
Thank you again for being here.
----------
Thursday, April 17, 1997.
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
WITNESSES
ELOY SIFUENTES, RECORDING SECRETARY, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES
MARIO VILLARREAL, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
Introduction
Mr. Young. Now I would like to recognize Congressman Henry
Bonilla, who is a very important Member of this Committee.
Congressman Bonilla will be introducing two representatives of
the AFGE from Laughlin Air Force Base. We will be more than
happy to hear from them.
Congressman, you have the Floor.
Statement of Congressman Bonilla
Mr. Bonilla. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am delighted to
have my constituents here today from Del Rio, Texas. They who
have had a fine record of performance, an outstanding record of
performance for their work over the years at Laughlin Air Force
base on engine repair work.
Many of us are troubled about the contract that has been
awarded, the A-76 award for jet engine repair that went to a
private contractor, not because it is a private contractor, but
because it involves a surcharge that created an unfair
opportunity for the contractor to win this bid. We have been
fighting on this issue, and, for the record, I have been
supportive of a more reasonable surcharge of 4 percent. I know
that the members of the Local 1749, American Federation of
Government Employees, feel very strongly about that as well.
This affects their lives directly and their families and
future. And I am delighted that you have an opportunity today
to tell us your story, Mr. Eloy Sifuentes and Mario Villarreal.
They are accompanied in the audience by Mr. Alfredo Garcia and
Hector Guadalarama.
At this time, gentleman, we would be pleased to hear your
testimony.
Statement of Mr. Sifuentes
Mr. Sifuentes. Thank you, Congressman. Like you heard from
the Congressman, we are from AFGE Local 1749 at Laughlin Air
Force Base, Del Rio, Texas. We represent over 900 government
employees.
I appear before this Committee to ask your assistance in
reforming one aspect of the OMB A-76 competitive process.
Specifically I want to address the application of a 12 percent
factor against in-house personnel costs and how the in-house
bid is put at a disadvantage by this 12 percent factor.
I would like to make it clear that our local wholeheartedly
supports the purpose and intent of the A-76 process. We believe
that the A-76 process, its imperfections notwithstanding,
provides a needed procedural framework which ensures through
public-private competition that taxpayers and the Armed Forces
get the most effectiveness, efficiency and reliability for the
tax dollar invested.
We support the stated goals of the circular and its
supplements, which are to balance; provide a level playing
field between the private and public sectors in the bid
process; encourage competition and choice in the management and
performance of commercial activities. However, you will see in
my testimony the 12 percent direct cost difference applied to
the in-house bid does not contribute in any way to these goals.
Let me illustrate this point through our experience with
the process at Laughlin Air Force Base. In December of 1994,
the command announced its intent to examine jet engine
maintenance at Laughlin Air Force Base. Both in-house and
contractor costs were submitted. The most competitive
contractor bid was $31.4 million. $32.3 million is the
management in-house bid. It is our contention the in-house bid
was made uncompetitive because the government is required by
the Supplement to apply an arbitrary 12 percent surtax, a cost
factor applied against the personnel's cost.
It is our contention, based on our discussion with
Laughlin's management and the facts they provided us, that the
12 percent factor is too high. The facts gathered and confirmed
by our management would indicate there is no cost associated
with general and administrative support from internal or
external activities in the case of Laughlin jet engine
maintenance function which was competed for under A-76. The
bottom line, Mr. Chairman, is that our general and
administrative costs should have been zero, not 12 percent of
the total personnel costs as is required by the new Supplement,
a difference of $1.7 million.
Mr. Chairman, if all costs had been correctly calculated,
the most competitive bidder, the Federal employees at Laughlin,
would have won, and the national defense and taxpayer would
have gotten the savings we would have provided. Because of the
12 percent factor rather than the factual data being applied,
the best and cheapest competitor did not win. Consequently, 50
Civil Service jobs were lost, and an additional 150 will be
impacted over the life of the contract.
We are not opposed to competition, but we oppose the
application of a standard 12 percent penalty in this case,
which denies us the opportunity to be competitive and provide
the A-76 competitive analysis accurate data. It is our
contention that the application of a static, across-the-board
percentage fails to achieve cost estimate accuracy or lessen
the controversy surrounding the definition, calculation and
inclusion of overhead costs. The straight-line percentage
concept is too rigid, would be too inaccurate and lead to
overcharges to the government.
This approach fails to take into account the different
commercial activities that may be justified in costing
different overhead considerations. Certainly it is not
appropriate when performance of the function requires extensive
equipment and space.
Agencies, with the participation of labor, should define
what is acceptable overhead cost and how it should be
calculated. The agency as well as the in-house and private-
sector bidders should be held accountable for proper
calculation of the fully allocated costs, and they should be
forced to live with the consequences of the calculation. This
would be in contrast with the current policy which requires the
taxpayer to pay for a bailout every time there is a cost
overrun.
Mr. Chairman, we request you sponsor a General Accounting
Office--GAO study, using the Laughlin jet engine competition as
an example, which examines the justification for using a
straight-line cost factor as opposed to itemized accounting as
was required by past editions of A-76's Supplement. If the
resulting reports support the facts as presented in my
testimony, then I would ask your Committee to assist us in
revising the Supplement to A-76 so that it would more
accurately reflect general and administrative costs.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. Thank you for
allowing me to present this important issue before the
Committee. I stand ready to answer any questions on this
matter.
Mr. Young. I thank you very much.
Did you have a statement also?
Mr. Villarreal. I am here to support him. No, sir.
Mr. Young. I wanted to tell you you are represented here by
a very capable and very effective Member. He has kept the
Members of the Committee fairly well advised on this issue. We
will consider that as we proceed.
Mr. Bonilla. Mr. Chairman, would you yield for one
question?
Gentlemen, one of the most important agencies that could
hear your testimony is the Office of Management and Budget--
OMB. I am wondering if there is anyone from OMB here in the
room today?
It is unfortunate. We will make sure they receive your
testimony, because when decisions like this are made, it is
important to hear how people are actually affected; rather than
just looking at numbers on a page of percentages, the way it
affects you directly is very important.
If I could ask just briefly, tell me how this has affected
families and the morale of the workers at Laughlin Air Force
Base. Maybe Mario would like to address that.
Mr. Villarreal. Mr. Bonilla, we are just a small base in
Texas, you represent our district there, and this is just a
small contract. We were one of the first to go under the study,
this 12 percent overhead, and it drastically affected us. We
submitted a lower bid, a competitive bid, and consequently that
12 percent overhead just threw us out of the playing field.
It is kind of late for the jet engine shop there, but we
need to look at this for the future, because we are a total
Civil Service maintenance there. We are all manned Civil
Service, and we put out quality engines, and the quality is
what we do. We are not against privatization or private
contractors. All we ask is to compete fairly on the bid.
Mr. Bonilla. I appreciate that very much. I can assure you,
as we discussed privately, we are continuing to try to knock
that surcharge down to make it more fair.
I want to thank you all for being here today. I appreciate
your testimony very much.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much.
Mr. Hefner. You have to put it in laymen's terms what this
12 percent is--why it is there and how does it work?
Mr. Sifuentes. It represents general and administrative
costs that are applied to line 1 of the bid, which is personnel
costs. It is a surtax. OMB at this point, other than by the
title being ``administrative overhead costs,'' has not
identified it. Specifically under the current policy of 12
percent, overhead cost is based on personnel cost plus fringe
benefits. The 12 percent overhead cost is based on personnel
costs plus fringe benefits. This is what they applied it
against. Under the previous policy, it was based on
reapplication of managed standards and actual growth
requirements, but that is no longer the case. It is just a
straight across 12 percent applied against that personnel cost.
Mr. Bonilla. Mr. Hefner, I would be happy to sit down with
you and explain this a little more at a later time. In essence,
when a private contractor puts out a bid, the base workers
enter their bid, and have 12 percent charge added because OMB
feels that the full cost of labor is not included in the
original bid and some of the other costs. They say just add
that on, and it makes it more fair, but it is not, because the
workers are already there at the facility and would not have to
be hired in order to do this job.
Mr. Hefner. So what you are saying is that you have got to
add 12 percent in there to offset the people that you are going
to hire to do it for the benefits that they already have?
Mr. Bonilla. The real cost would not be 12 percent more. It
is just an extra percentage----
Mr. Hefner. I understand that, but that is the reason for
it.
Mr. Bonilla. I am not exactly sure what you are saying.
Mr. Hefner. I am saying these guys are already there. They
are doing the job.
Mr. Bonilla. They have been doing years of good work.
Mr. Hefner. If you had it contracted out, the contractor
that makes the bid has to add 12 percent?
Mr. Bonilla. Not the contractor. Only the base.
Mr. Villarreal. Our contention is these are hidden costs,
not attributable to the government side of the bid. Nobody can
account for this 12 percent.
Mr. Bonilla. It is just a figure that is in essence pulled
out of thin air.
Mr. Hefner. I may be dense, but where does the 12 percent
go? It is paid by the taxpayers, isn't it?
Mr. Bonilla. Well, the 12 percent in essence is already
there. They are working there. They are at the base.
Mr. Hefner. I understand that.
Mr. Bonilla. So there is no additional cost--it is almost a
phantom number that is added to what they have to bid.
Mr. Hefner. Okay.
Mr. Visclosky. It is an attributable overhead, I assume.
The theory would be to make sure the bids are fair. They are
attributing overhead to your labor.
Mr. Bonilla. That is the theory.
Mr. Visclosky. The argument is that the attributable
overhead is too high.
Mr. Bonilla. One very important point, the Air Force
believes it is too high.
Mr. Visclosky. Okay.
Mr. Villarreal. We worked closely with management to come
up with this testimony. Their contention is it is not 12
percent. It is not there. We cannot find it, you know. But it
is a fixed rate. It is added onto your personnel costs plus
fringe benefits and actually comes out to--in reality it comes
out closer to 16 percent, because you are adding on 30 percent
of fringe benefits included in the calculation. So we are not
actually looking at 12 percent, but more like 16 percent on the
government's bid, not on the contractor's bid. We cannot
compete competitively.
Mr. Young. Well, thank you very much. Obviously this is a
rather sticky issue and a very important issue. Mr. Bonilla
will lead us through this and find a solution, if there is one.
Thank you all for being here. You stimulated this hearing
this morning.
[The statement of Mr. Sifuentes follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS
WITNESS
HON. MAXINE WATERS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA
Introduction
Mr. Young. Next our witness is Congresswoman Maxine Waters
from Los Angeles, California. Ms. Waters serves on the Banking
and Financial Services Committee and the Judiciary Committee.
She is also chair of the Black Caucus.
We are very happy to have you here this morning. Your
entire statement will be placed in the record, and you can
summarize it any way you like.
Statement of Congresswoman Waters
Ms. Waters. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and Members.
I would like to give you a little bit of background about
why I am here. The Congressional Black Caucus developed its
agenda for the 105th Congress. Our top priority is the
eradication of drugs in our society. We are tired of the
devastation of drugs in our communities and in this country. So
we are trying to pay attention in any number of ways to how we
create some real discussion and some real action on drug
eradication in our work.
I came here today because you fund a number of crucial
programs, or funded in this Subcommittee's jurisdiction, and I
want to focus today on the Central Intelligence Agency--CIA.
I am going to introduce legislation to eliminate the CIA,
and I know that is not going to happen. However, I think it is
extremely important to create some attention and some focus in
an area where I think there is a problem.
I recently got involved as a result of the San Jose Mercury
News series called The Dark Alliance, where after a year of
investigation they discovered that there had been a large drug
ring that operated in the 1980s in south-central Los Angeles,
and they alleged and made a good case for CIA connection.
So I have been working on this, and I have learned more
than I would like to know about our Intelligence Community, and
I am worried. I am worried about it because I do not think that
our Intelligence Community should ever allow, participate in or
turn their backs while there is drug trafficking, no matter
what their goals are. There should be no connection with drugs
by any of our Intelligence Community in an effort to carry out
their work.
I think that this message is very important because I have
been able to identify not only some very, very serious concerns
about the drug ring that was identified by the San Jose
Mercury. For example, if I can just divert here for a minute,
the person who laundered the money for this drug ring, Mr.
Morio, was absolutely identified in the DEA reports, and we
have gotten the information about all the companies that he
organized as he laundered the money, is now back down in
Nicaragua, head of an arm of government that receives foreign
aid, in charge of the privatization efforts creating more
companies supposedly to buy up the government-owned assets for
privatization. And what I am trying to find out is whether or
not our own U.S. foreign aid is in the hands of someone who is
identified as a money launderer for drug traffickers.
I think that is very serious. I will not go into detail. I
will submit this for the record. But let me just point this
out. Earlier this year, General Ramon Guyan Devilla,
Venezuela's former drug czar, was indicted by Federal
prosecutors in Miami for smuggling cocaine into the United
States. According to a New York Times November 20th, 1993,
article, the CIA anti-drug program in Venezuela shipped a ton
of nearly pure cocaine into the United States in 1990. The CIA
has acknowledged that the drugs--that they were involved in the
shipment, and that the drugs were sold on the streets of the
United States. The joint CIA-Venezuelan force was headed by
General Devilla, and the ranking CIA officer was Mark
McFarland, who worked with anti-guerilla forces in El Salvador
in the 1980s. Not one CIA official has ever been indicted or
prosecuted for this abuse of authority.
I could go on and tell you about the involvement in Haiti,
the Los Angeles--L.A. Times reported that Lieutenant Colonel
Francois, one of the CIA's Haitian agents, a former army
officer and key leader in the military regime that ran Haiti
between 1991 and 1994, was indicted in Miami on a charge of
smuggling 33 tons of cocaine into the United States. It goes on
and on and on. But I am submitting this for the record.
I guess what I am saying to you is this: As we look at the
work that we are trying to do with drugs and working with the
President and the drug czar and everybody else, we are looking
at our own Intelligence Community, we are looking at the big
boys, and I am going after Citicorp, who is identified and is
under investigation now for the money laundering with Salinas'
brother out of Mexico, some $200 million that was deposited in
Citicorp, where they wire-transferred this money offshore into
Antigua and the Cayman Islands.
This is serious business, and we as policymakers can do
more than we are doing about it. I know the Intelligence
Community is secret, and we are not supposed to know or ask
questions, but you guys ought to send them a message. You ought
to do at least across-the-board cuts. Cut 10 percent of the
intelligence budget and talk about the development of policy
that will not allow the Intelligence Community to ever be
involved in drug trafficking or know about it, turn their backs
on it, or use it in any way.
We cannot afford to continue to allow the amount of drugs
that come into this country to be dumped on our streets,
poisoning our children and devastating our communities. And it
is time each of us takes some responsibility in this.
I want to tell you that you guys have some power here to do
something about it, and I wish you would help send this message
in some profound way, because I think our greatest threat, the
greatest threat to security, is certainly not the Soviet Union.
The Cold War is over. And I don't think, no matter how much we
dislike or we talk about a threat, nobody really wants to go to
war with us. Our greatest threat is this, drugs being dumped on
our streets, undermining our communities, poisoning our
children, and devastating us in so many ways.
So I have had an opportunity to preach to you, and I
appreciate it. If you have any questions, I will be happy to
answer them.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much. I would just have to say
for the Committee that we share your strong commitment on this
issue. Last year during a major battle over having enough
dollars, we added $165 million over the President's budget for
counter-drug activities. When the Cali warlords were put in
jail, it was the Department of Defense that helped identify and
locate those warlords. So we are all working on that.
I can tell you we are committed and appreciate your
thought-provoking comments this morning. They are not wasted
here. We paid close attention, and I assure you that we are
strongly committed to this same objective.
Are there other Members with questions?
Thank you very much. We really appreciate your being here.
We will stay in touch with you throughout this process.
[The statement of Ms. Waters follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
NAVAL RESERVE ASSOCIATION
WITNESS
REAR ADMIRAL JAMES J. CAREY, USNR (RET.), NATIONAL PRESIDENT, NAVAL
RESERVE ASSOCIATION
Introduction
Mr. Young. Now I would like to welcome Rear Admiral James
J. Carey, president of the Naval Reserve Association. Admiral
Carey presented a list of unfunded Naval Reserve equipment
items last year when he testified, and we were able to provide
$247 million above the President's budget for that equipment
including 36 C-9 replacement aircraft, funds for 10 mobile in-
shore undersea warfare vans, and $72 million dollars for P-3
modifications.
I want to say to you, Admiral, that I took a lengthy flight
in a P-3 not too long ago. The crew was outstanding. The
aircraft could use a little bit of cleaning up, but it is an
old workhorse and does a good job.
We are very pleased to have you here today, sir.
Statement of Admiral Carey
Admiral Carey. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and the
other Members here, for allowing us indeed to present our
testimony again. I would salute this Committee for what you did
for us last year, because it was correcting an incredible
shortfall from the previous year.
Mr. Chairman, when I testified last year, you, in fact,
pointed out that the things I was talking about were not
included. So I and the Naval Reserve Association fully
appreciate what you all did for us.
You also tasked me last year, you said your Committee would
support, but I would have to go out and work with the Senate
and the administration, and we did that, and it worked. So
thank you, thank you, thank you.
By the way, the lady from RIT, my last active-duty job was
over in the Pentagon on the Chief of Naval Operatives--CNO
staff. That program, the similar program came under me. It is a
good program. I would just add that to her testimony.
My main theme today will be that you get 20 percent of the
entire Navy, the entire United States Navy, for 3 percent of
the budget with the Naval Reserve. So your money is really
spent well and stretched. If you forget everything else I say,
that is my key theme: 20 percent of the whole Navy for 3
percent of the budget.
As you indicated, you have my written statement, so I will
try to hit key focus areas as outlined in that paper. One of
the first would be manpower. Several years ago when the cut was
going from 150,000 Naval Reservists down to 100,000 and then
ultimately 96,000, we went along with that because we thought
it was in the best interests of the country and the Navy, and
we felt it could be done. But we stride to draw a line in the
sand and say we cannot go any lower and carry out the missions
that have been assigned to us.
The President's budget this year has a cut below that, to
around 94,000; in fact, possibly even 93,500. I would tell you
gentleman and the other Members of your Committee, that is not
a good idea, and we should stay at the 96,000. We outline that
in our written statement, and I would ask you all to take a
look at that, if you would.
On National Guard and Reserve Equipment--NG&RE equipment,
as I asked you last year and you did, all I am asking for is
our fair share of whatever the ultimate NG&RE budget is, that
we get the Naval Reserve fair share. You did that last year.
Mr. Chairman, as you indicated, you have an unfunded
requirement from the Navy for about $1 billion of Naval Reserve
equipment. I realize that is more than your whole NG&RE budget.
That is why I stress simply our fair share. I would prioritize
that from our side as the C-9 replacements, which we have 100
percent of the whole Navy's logistics arm; the MIUW and costal
warfare stuff, because we have 100 percent of that mission;
and, although you funded some of the vans last year, I don't
know that all of that money has been spent, and I think we have
another 30 that need to be looked at.
Finally, the other priority is SH-60B helicopters, which
are needed on the FFGs that are coming into the Reserve fleet.
The key for us to be able to operate with that fleet is
compatibility with the regular Navy. If we can't talk to them
or have the same equipment, it doesn't work, so we need those
SH-60Bs.
Finally, I would tell you that we also support Senator
McCain's initiative to ultimately--if it can be done--to get
away from NG&RE as a congressional add-on. We support it,
however, only if we can be an equal player at the table, so
when the President's budget, the Navy's budget comes up to you
all, that the Naval Reserve requirements are in that budget.
Until that happens, we desperately need you, however.
I would say that in the bill last year, Senator McCain put
a provision saying the services were supposed to come forth. In
fact I know the Navy CNO ultimately did. We are very supportive
of him for that effort.
Military Construction, MILCON, last year you gave us $38
million. The President's budget has that cut to $14 million
this year. I would simply urge to bring it back to the 38 to 40
million level, because we have buildings falling down around
our people, and it is becoming a safety hazard.
Operations and maintenance last year was $85 million. The
President came in with $50 million less. I would tell you we
need to keep it at the old level. If we are expected to do all
the Operations--OPS, both drug OPS and the humanitarian and
Bosnia's and other things, we have to have the money to do it.
The Reserve Mobilization Insurance Program, I am sure all
of you have heard from your constituents on that. We would
simply urge this Committee to pay the troops that are paid to
be in that program what was promised them if they paid the
fees. I had heard a possible plan of trying to take the money
to fund that thing out of NG&RE. That is absolutely lunacy as
far as we are concerned and not a good idea. It should not come
out of the other Reserve programs.
I did see the DOD came out with an instruction on how they
planned to handle the insurance thing. It is dated 8 April. I
have not read it, but it tells me they have taken a hard look
at it and have a proposal. I would urge each of you to have
your staffs look at that.
On health care, Congressman Moran had put a bill in. We
were initially supportive of that, but yesterday Congressman
J.C. Watts came out with a bill that my staff thinks is better,
because it says if you cannot work out the TRICARE/CHAMPUS
problems, that at least then our military members be allowed as
an option to get into the Federal employees' health benefit
plan so they are treated equally along with the rest of the
Federal employees. So we now support the J.C. Watts bill on
that.
In closing, we have two point papers on a couple of these
issues that I would like to ask if we could give them to the
staffs. You can all see them. I was hoping Congressman Bonilla
would be here, because we have been very supportive of his
efforts in Val Verde County on his efforts for the military's
right to vote where we, the United States Government, send them
and where they live.
With that, I think that is my 5 minutes. You helped us a
lot last year. I am asking you for your help once again this
year. I would ask to be added to your scroll up there on these
things. That completes my statement. I again thank you for all
you have done. I would answer any questions.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much. We appreciate that.
Some of the items on this scroll are items you provided for
us. We are doing the best we can to put a blue line on them,
which means they are done. We are doing the best we can with
very, very limited resources.
Okay, sir, thank you very much. We appreciate your being
here.
[The statement of Admiral Carey follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
RESERVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES
WITNESS
MAJOR GENERAL ROGER W. SANDLER, AUS (RET.), EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, RESERVE
OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES
Introduction
Mr. Young. Our next witness is Major General Roger Sandler,
Executive Director of the Reserve Officers Association.
General Sandler's organization represents all of the
Reserve forces, and, as usual, his prepared statement contains
a detailed list of unfunded equipment requirements, which are
also on our scroll for each of the Reserve components. We are
pleased to have you back before the Committee, and please
proceed with your testimony.
Statement of General Sandler
General Sandler. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is a
pleasure to be back. Again, I thank you, as did Admiral Carey,
regarding what you have done for the Reserve forces in the
past.
We have a significant involvement these days with the
Reserve components in all areas of national defense, and I
think it has become a reality that whenever there is an
emergency, any kind of a contingency, we are calling upon the
Reserve components. They were certainly well-founded in Desert
Storm and they have gone on to perform extremely well in both
Haiti and now in Bosnia. There are continuing rotations in
Bosnia and so forth.
What I wanted to do was really talk to you about three key
issues: personnel, training, and equipment. Some of it will be
overlapped with Jim Carey.
I will not get into a lot of detail on this because you do
have it in my submission for the record. But we are a great
bargain, both for DOD and the country, with our Reserve
components. Inasmuch as Admiral Carey indicated, the very small
portion of the defense budget goes to maintain the Reserve
components in all of the services. Therefore, it is important
that they be maintained to the degree that is necessary to keep
their readiness at a level that is important.
The important thing that I wanted to bring up regarding
personnel is that each of the services are being faced with
personnel cuts. The indication of the Army Reserve, they have
an off-site agreement which is carrying them through fiscal
year 1998 and perhaps into 1999. We fully support that
agreement in the indication of the Army.
We support the Navy's position on maintaining the end
strength at the levels they suggested, the 96,000-plus mark,
the Marine Corps being held steady at the 42,000 end state, and
we would also urge you to consider maintaining the Coast Guard
at a level of 8,000. There has been a suggestion that they
ought to be reduced to 7,600. Coast Guard missions go on
regardless of war or peace, and the Coast Guard is integral,
and we would urge this Committee to fund the 8,000.
In the area of training, we find ourselves in the situation
where many of our Reserve components are finding monies being
diverted from readiness training to other purposes because of
contingencies and so forth that are coming. We need to maintain
a level of readiness training in our Reserve components to
maintain their viability.
In addition to that, schooling has suffered as a result of
the shifting of money and so forth. Schooling is absolutely
vital in the case of the Reserve components for their promotion
and upward mobility. So, again, I would urge this Committee to
continue to fund adequate training for readiness and for
military education.
Finally, let me talk about this Reserve equipment: I think
the NG&RE account has certainly proved itself over the years.
The administration this year has put zero monies against
National Guard and Reserve equipment accounts. We have in our
detailed submission to you a submission of the variety of
equipment that is necessary in each of the services. But I
would like at this point to insert the absolute necessity
predicated on the CINCs request to the commandant of the Coast
Guard to establish and equip three Newport security units. I
would urge this Committee and, Mr. Chairman, I know you have
had some discussions with the commandant, to go ahead and
support those Port Security Units--PSUs, because they are
vitally necessary for the CINCs to carry out their mission.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I know I am ahead of schedule, but
I do want to thank you again for having the Reserve Officers
Association represented here today, and hope that we can
continue to count on this committee to support the vital
involvement of the Reserves.
Mr. Young. General, thank you very much for your testimony.
We appreciate that.
You can count on our continued recognition of the
importance that the Reserve forces play in our overall strategy
and overall force concept. Again, thank you for being here.
[The statement of General Sandler follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR UNIFORMED SERVICES
WITNESS
MAJOR JAMES W. BAPPLE, U.S. ARMY (RETIRED), NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR
UNIFORMED SERVICES
Introduction
Mr. Young. We would like to welcome Major James Bapple of
the National Association for Uniformed Services.
The Major has submitted a very detailed statement on the
medical situation within the Department of Defense. I think
everyone in this room knows we are definitely concerned about
that and we do things about it. We are concerned about the
health care available to our Nation's military personnel and
their families.
Major, I understand you also represent the 14 military and
veterans organizations which make up the National Military and
Veterans Alliance. We appreciate them.
Your statement will be placed in our permanent record. I
understand you have three exhibits that you would like to have
made part of that record, which is fine and will be done.
At this point, please proceed with your testimony.
Statement of Major Bapple
Major Bapple. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We appreciate this
opportunity to speak with you this morning. It is good to see
you again.
Before I begin, let me say we appreciate your hard work and
the hard work of this Committee. We appreciate your continuing
support for the entire military family.
As you correctly said, in addition to the National
Association for Uniformed Services--NAUS--I am speaking on
behalf of the National Military and Veterans Alliance, a group
of 14 associations with a combined membership of 3.5 million
members.
For my 5 minutes, I want to talk about health care, which
is only about 6 percent of the DOD budget, but it is a very
important issue to most of our retirees and to the active duty
population.
Sir, we are very concerned with the medical system that
even when it is fully operational it is only going to care for
4 million of the 8.5 million beneficiaries. The medical system,
of course, is TRICARE, and it is worthwhile to note there is no
other plan at present that is going to take care of the
remaining 4.5 million beneficiaries.
A seasoned and well-respected soldier recently had this to
say. He said ``TRICARE is a reduced version of the medical
benefit that military members, their families and retirees have
treasured for so long. And its primary reason for being is to
save money, not improve service. If that were not the case,
military aid societies would not be seeing increases in the
number of families asking for help paying medical bills and
retirees would not be flocking by the hundreds to join a class
action lawsuit that claims the government is reneging on its
promise of lifelong health care benefits.'' The soldier's name
was General John Shalikashvili, Chairman of our Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
To maintain readiness and preserve the fighting strength of
our men and women in uniform, the military health services
system through our military treatment facilities does a good
job; some would even say, I believe correctly, a world-class
job.
NAUS and the National Military and Veterans Alliance are
enthusiastic supporters of TRICARE, particularly TRICARE-Prime.
We continually see that health care, when it is accessible, is
truly excellent. The key, of course, is accessibility.
My son recently had knee surgery at a military hospital,
and his military orthopedic surgeon remarked to me he and his
wife both had a supplemental insurance policy for themselves
and their families because even doctors within the hospitals
and families could not be guaranteed care.
As many of the members of this Committee know from
firsthand experience, the number of installations and the
number of military treatment facilities continue to decrease.
Even today at least 17 hospitals are being targeted for
downgrading to clinics. Additional closures seem inevitable.
TRICARE-Extra and TRICARE-Standard, which of course, is the
CHAMPUS replacement, are supposed to accommodate those eligible
beneficiaries who cannot receive care through a military
treatment facility. Unfortunately, our members in many regions
throughout the United States are reporting extraordinary
difficulties with industry care, particularly TRICARE.
A retiree in Corpus Christi reported that five of six local
doctors participating in the TRICARE network were breaking
their contracts to leave the network. According to the retiree,
it was because of the very low reimbursement rates and the
extremely slow reimbursement rate.
A young active duty sailor in Philadelphia told us of using
CHAMPUS following the closure of the Naval hospital when he
took his daughter with a broken arm to a civilian doctor and
was subsequently saddled with bills totaling over several
hundred dollars, which CHAMPUS refused to pay.
A retiree in Indiana had his hip replaced. The doctor's
bill was $5,000. The reimburse was $1,700, of which the retiree
had to reimburse 25 percent.
In spite of TRICARE's apparent efforts to reduce costs, and
despite the low reimbursement rates, Richard Davis, the
Director of the National Security Analysis for the GAO, said in
a February 21 report to you, that future defense health program
costs are likely to be greater than DOD has estimated. We are
very concerned.
Administrative costs are rising and more money is required
to finish work on a system that will only take care of 4
million of 8.5 million beneficiaries and a system that will
disenfranchise our medicare-eligible beneficiaries, the only
Federal employees who lose their employer-sponsored medical
benefit when they become eligible for medicare.
Mr. Chairman, yesterday your colleague from Oklahoma, the
Honorable J.C. Watts, introduced a Military Health Care Justice
Act that would offer all military health care beneficiaries a
chance for DOD-sponsored health care. We believe that this bill
will go a long way to fulfilling that promise of lifetime
health care, and we ask for your support and support of this
Committee. It would cost far less than many other options and
would support the continuation of MTS and TRICARE with
improvements as a primary source of care and it would make
FEHBP available as an option. This act has the full support of
the Veterans Alliance.
Sir, that concludes my statement. Do you have any
questions?
Mr. Young. Thank you very much. We appreciate your
statement. We appreciate your interest, and I think you know
the commitment of this Committee is good, not adequate, not
proper, but good medical care for the military and their
families.
We are wrestling with the issue of TRICARE. I am not
exactly sure how that is going it play out, but we are doing
our best to help the authorizers find a solution there.
Again, thank you very much for being here. We appreciate
your testimony.
[The statement of Major Bapple follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
BRAIN INJURY ASSOCIATION, INC.
WITNESS
MARTIN B. FOIL, JR., CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, BRAIN INJURY ASSOCIATION,
INC.
Introduction
Mr. Young. I would like to now yield to Mr. Hefner, a very
distinguished member of this Committee, as well as the
Subcommittee on Military Construction, and he will introduce
Mr. Martin Foil, the volunteer Chairman of the Brain Injury
Association.
Mr. Hefner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, the
members that are here, I would urge you to read the
biographical data on Mr. Foil. It is so lengthy and his
accomplishments are extraordinary, and I will not bother to
read them all.
But I do want to point out that Martin Foil has been a
friend longer than both of us would care to remember, I guess.
But he has been so involved in this particular endeavor. I
would say this before I make my introduction. We have a
sympathetic ear in our Chairman here who long before he was
Chairman, championed the cause for bone marrow transplants and
this sort of thing, and he certainly has been a big asset to us
in this endeavor we are engaged in.
Martin, I don't know, I guess one of your great assets is
your lovely wife, who is not with you today.
Mr. Foil. That is my best asset.
Mr. Hefner. He had a 26-year-old son that unfortunately was
struck with an accident. We were real happy you were able to
come here, and went to the White House, and we had a session
with the President and Senator Hatch and some of the folks that
had supported us in this endeavor. And it is through the
efforts of people like Mr. Foil that we have made tremendous
advances in brain injury trauma.
A lot of folks have said, why are you doing cancer research
and doing bone marrow and head injuries in the defense bill?
But I think it is very appropriate, because all these things we
have to deal with in the military, just like we have to do in
the private sector.
So I want to welcome you to the Committee today. I think
the Chairman would say your entire statement will be a part of
the record, and any statement you would like to make other than
that we would be happy to hear. You have some support folk with
you here.
Mr. Foil. Yes, I do.
Mr. Hefner. I am not the Chairman, but I feel you can go
ahead and introduce them.
Mr. Foil. I will be happy to introduce them. This is Alice
D'Nicholas. Alice is a mother, a prime volunteer, and mover and
shaker in our organization, a mother of a brain injured son,
who also volunteers in our office in Washington, a wonderful
human being. This is Jean Brubay. She is our congressional
liaison on our staff in Washington. She is new with us, but
certainly not new to the Hill. We are just certainly tickled to
death.
Mr. Hefner. Also for the Members, Martin, you sponsor two
fund-raisers in our area, the golf tournament.
Mr. Foil. Coming up August 4th.
Mr. Hefner. And also the big ball out at the Charlotte
Motor Speedway.
Martin, it is a real pleasure to have you.
Mr. Chairman, in your absence, I took the liberty of
putting you on record as being supportive of these issues like
bone marrow and cancer research and head injuries, that we have
a receptive ear, because you have been a leader.
I remember years ago when you were not the Chairman and we
worked together on the bone marrow issue, and we want to thank
you for that, and thank you for letting me introduce my
constituent.
Mr. Young. Mr. Hefner, thank you very much. You and I have
had a good working relationship on these medical issues, and I
am proud of the role you played.
Statement of Mr. Foil
Mr. Foil. Thank you, Chairman Young. It is a pleasure to be
here.
I want to thank my Congressman, Representative Hefner, from
the 8th District of North Carolina, for that kind introduction.
I want to make one more introduction. This is Robert
D'Nicholas. He is a brain injury survivor and a worker in our
office, and we are very pleased to have him here today.
I was thinking as I stood in the hall what a wonderful
country we have, and watching these young people, which is our
future, running up and down the hall, that is what it is all
about. So I am happy to be here, and if we all work to try to
make a difference, we are really trying to make a difference
for those young folks.
My name is Martin Foil, and I come before you today as the
father of a young man named Phillip with severe brain injury.
In my real work, I am the Chairman and Chief Executive Office
of Tuscarora Yarns in Mount Pleasant, and I must state I
receive no compensation from the association for the programs I
am testifying about here today, but I do contribute
considerable sums of my own money to this organization, to the
work which it does, to improve the life of people with brain
injuries. I am here because I really care about the 9 million
Americans who are living with brain injury and their families.
I am going to talk about the Defense and Veterans Head
Injury Project--DVHIP--and the program in the Violence and
Brain Injury Project--VBIP--under the DOD. It is really
critical for improving the lives of people with brain injury
and to the prevention of brain injury in the first place
because you understand, prevention is the only cure.
As you know, this project not only serves all the active
duty military personnel who sustain brain injuries, and, Mr.
Chairman, that is approximately 8,000 a year in peacetime, but
it also serves the veterans and the civilian population as
well. It is truly an exemplary use and case of dual funding.
I am proud to tell you that today this collaborative effort
between the DOD, Veterans Affairs, and the BIA, or the Brain
Injury Association, is continuing to pay off.
What are some of the things we have done with these
programs? We have established a patient registry treatment and
referral network that includes over 20 medical centers, toll-
free help lines for people with brain injury and their care
givers, and a multicenter randomized control clinical outcome
study. This is something, that is a mouthful in the first
place, but it is something that the civilian sector, Mr.
Chairman, has not been able to accomplish and perform.
We have established prevention and educational programs for
people with brain injury, their families, their care givers,
including our BIA, BIA programs and our multimedia interactive
resource center, which is now in place at over 40 civilian and
DVHIP centers. Fifteen of those centers are hospitals for the
veterans.
In addition, the programs further the international brain
injury research effort in collaboration with the World Health
Organization, and we sort of have been adopted by NATO, so-to-
speak.
Brain injury truly is a silent epidemic. It is the single
largest killer and cause of disability among our young people.
We need your support for this $8.5 million in funding so that
at the DVHIP, the VBIP, and the Brain Injury Association, we
can carry on this unique partnership.
Let me just make a couple other statements. It is truly a
unique partnership that has done a lot of good. As you have
seen and read, and I hope you will read in the larger
testimony, some of the stories we have to tell about why it
does work. But more importantly, as we go forward, the World
Health Organization estimates that by the year 2010, 20 percent
of the total cost of all health care problems will be due to
violence. That is very scary. And this is a very important part
of the program that we bring, not only to the military, but to
civilians through this project.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to be
here and all of us. Stand up, Mike.
Mike is a young man from West Point who sustained a brain
injury and is going to go to West Point who will be here before
not too long and testify. Have you already been? You have
already been. We are proud to have him here. I salute you, sir.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much. We appreciate your
testimony.
You know this Committee feels very strongly about the
issue. In fact, we added substantial funds last year for brain
injury research through our university research programs, and
we very strongly support this.
I want to tell you that your concerns are very well
represented here by your Congressman, Mr. Hefner, who will make
sure we don't forget about any of this.
Mr. Foil. I appreciate that.
Mr. Young. Thank you for bringing your guests with you
today.
Mr. Foil. Thank you, Congressman. Thank you, Bill. I
appreciate that.
[The statement of Mr. Foil follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
NAVAL ORDNANCE STATION
WITNESS
HON. ANNE M. NORTHUP, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF
KENTUCKY
Introduction
Mr. Young. The Committee is pleased now to welcome
Congresswoman Northup from Louisville, Kentucky. Congresswoman
Northup is a member of the Appropriations Committee and
actually serves on one of our other subcommittees that several
of us serve on but seldom get to attend because we spend most
of our life in this room. She is on the Subcommittee on Labor-
Health, Human Services and the Education Subcommittee.
We are pleased to have you here this morning and look
forward to your testimony. Your entire statement will be placed
in our record, and you may proceed any way that you wish.
Statement of Congresswoman Northup
Mrs. Northup. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am
delighted to be here and appear for the first time before this
Subcommittee. I will submit my testimony for the record, but
briefly summarize it now.
Mr. Chairman, I am here on behalf of primarily the Naval
Ordnance Station in Louisville, Kentucky. You may remember that
was privatized last year. It has been really a tremendous
opportunity for our armed forces and particularly the Navy to
judge whether privatization is a good deal for the taxpayers
and a good deal for defense.
The truth is, it is a good deal for taxpayers. They are
doing the same work with a 40 percent reduction in space and a
40 percent reduction in personnel. What this means is that the
American's tax dollars that go to defense can accomplish a
great deal more.
First of all, I am here to ask you to make sure that we
keep intact the funding stream that is so essential in these
early years so that naval ordnance can get up and on its feet
and provide the real efficiencies and opportunities. It also
serves as such a great test case for us for future
privatization. So it is very important if we are going to gain
the full benefit of this that we make sure the funding stream
stays in place.
I am sure you know, Mr. Chairman, that there is a great
deal of political interest in bringing projects back to
people's districts, and naval ordnance is no exception. There
are certainly political interests in seeing the business at
naval ordnance gravitate to other Members' districts. It would
be a terrible mistake. It would lose all of the benefits we
stand to gain from this experiment, and it also would be a
terrible time at this time to allow anybody to use the up-
front, start-up costs, and use that as a reason to--as an
operational cost and try to convince the Committee that this
isn't so good for the taxpayers.
Like I said, it is undisputable, for 40 percent less
people, less room, they are accomplishing the same mission. In
addition, Mr. Chairman, it has come to my attention that the
Navy has reassessed the readiness of the guns that are repaired
and updated at the naval ordnance, and has found that they are
below the capacity that they think is so important to defense.
I am going to be submitting an additional plus up for these
guns.
The Navy has asked that they speed up their renovation so
that they can meet their obligations. Naval ordnance is the
only place that this work is being done, and this would help
them reach the capacity that they believe is so important.
Finally, I want to warn you that there are several other
requests that the Navy has made, and we are working with them
to finalize figures in order to reach the capacity that Hughes
needs for the work they also do in Louisville.
Finally, I see in the President's budget that he has
reduced the Kentucky Air National Guard by four airplanes, from
12 to 8. That is a very unfair cut. We rank 23rd in population.
Our Air National Guard is 42nd in population, and we are ranked
as one of the top units in the country. We are at 97 percent
full capacity. We fly 60 percent of our missions in actual
missions in support of defense, and they have asked that that
be retained at 12 planes.
I know we are on a tight schedule. I appreciate your
interest, giving me the opportunity to talk to you about these
very important projects.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much. We certainly share your
concern, and, and your interest in these matters.
As you are well aware, we have budgetary problems with the
President's budget request being much lower than many of us
think that it should be. We do the best we can to find the
adequate resources to guarantee the programs like you have
talked about continue on. We will continue to do that to the
very best of our ability. We thank you for calling attention to
some of these issues.
Mrs. Northup. I look forward to working with this
subcommittee. Thank you very much.
Mr. Young. We invite you to stay in touch as we proceed
through the year.
Mrs. Northup. Thank you.
[The statement of Mrs. Northrup follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
WITNESS
RITA MASON, NATIONAL VICE PRESIDENT, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES
Introduction
Mr. Young. Our next witness is Rita Mason, the National
Vice President of the American Federation of Government
Employees--AFGE. Ms. Mason represents more than 700,000
government workers, including 300,000 employed by the
Department of Defense.
Ms. Mason, your entire statement, including the seven
issues that you feel so strongly about, will be made a part of
the permanent record, and at this time we would ask you to
summarize your statement.
Statement of Ms. Mason
Ms. Mason. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to begin my testimony by thanking the
Committee for this opportunity to testify on the fiscal year
1998 appropriations bill for DOD. We know that you, Mr.
Chairman, and other members of this Committee, share our belief
that the United States must continue to remain ready to meet
any threat to the security of our Nation. While there are many
important issues affecting our Federal work force which this
Committee will consider, I will limit my statement today to the
three issues which are the most important to the American men
and women who do so much to ensure our Nation's defense by
protecting the depots, ensuring a strong public-private
competition, through preservation of A-76, and preventing
arbitrary personnel ceilings from causing wasteful contracting
out.
I fully understand that not all matters I will discuss fall
routinely under this panel's jurisdiction. However, because
they are so important to readiness and our members, I believe
that they are relative to this hearing.
The 60-40 safeguard and the $3 million competition
safeguard plus the core work load safeguards protect our depots
by retaining a federally controlled core work load which is
capable of meeting maintenance needs of our armed forces in
times of war and peace. AFGE strongly recommends that the
Committee continue in the absence of any viable alternative to
strongly support the statutory safeguards which ensure that our
depots are ready when called upon to support our men and women
in uniform.
AFGE also asks this Committee to work to ensure that the
Nation's depots are given maintenance assignments for new
weapons systems.
As Mr. Robert T. Mason, by the way, not a relative, the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Maintenance, Policy
Programs and Resources told the congressional delegation in
early 1996, ``If the depots don't get any new work from new
weapons systems or from closing depots,'' a scenario that at
least some senior officials in the Pentagon would actually like
to bring about, ``they will all be closed in 9 years.''
I would now like to address the issue of contracting out
generally.
For AFGE and its members, the central issue which should
drive the discussion surrounding the outsourcing debate is
readiness, how we can get the most effectiveness, efficiency,
and reliability for the taxpayer dollars invested.
AFGE is not antiprivatization. We are, however,
unreservedly and nonnegotiably pro competition. On this
principle we will not cave or compromise.
It is imperative to remember that the way to generate
efficiencies and savings is not contracting out or outsourcing
or privatizing. Rather, what is key is ensuring real and
genuine competition between the public and private sectors.
AFGE was extensively involved in the 1995-1996 reform of
Office of Managment and Budget--OMB Circular A-76. This effort
resulted in a revised supplement that while permitting more
flexibility to contract out, also enables Federal employees
greater involvement in the competitive process and makes
contracting out a two-way street by permitting work to be
returned back in-house when it is more cost effective to do so.
We have two recommendations to offer, Mr. Chairman,
regarding A-76: One, AFGE urges the Committee to resist any
attempts to exempt the Pentagon from the competitive
requirements of A-76; two, AFGE urges the Committee to deny
appropriations for conversions to contractor performance for
all activities involving 10 or more employees until a
commercial activities performance analysis has been completed
in accordance with A-76.
I would now like to address the serious consequences of
full-time equivalent, FTE, personnel ceilings.
Personnel ceilings are forcing some military bases to lay
off their civilian employees and then to contract out the work
at higher costs.
The problem is especially noticeable at service depots
where Federal employees are getting reduction in force notices
while planes, tanks, and ships await repairs. But don't take
our word for it. The personnel directors of four branches of
the armed forces in testimony before the Congress in 1995
bemoaned the fact that civilian ceilings, not work load costs
or readiness concerns, are forcing them to send work to the
contractors that could have been performed cheaper in-house.
The representatives asserted that their services' depots
must turn away valid, funded work load requirements because of
the FTE ceilings, limiting the flexibility of our depots to
adjust and meet quickly and critical unprogrammed surge
requirements of our operating forces.
In the fiscal year 1996 Defense Appropriations bill, the
Congress instructed DOD to stop managing by FTE ceilings.
However, that mandate has been defied. An example of this
defiance is attached as an exhibit in my testimony.
In a letter a senior Army official explicitly instructed an
installation commander to abide by in-house staffing quotas,
and then contracted out work that may have been performed more
cheaply in-house.
Clearly, the outcome of any competition at Fort Hood or
elsewhere within forces command, for that matter, has already
been decided in advance of the requirements of the A-76 and the
interest of the taxpayers in fair public-private competition
notwithstanding.
I wish that I could say that this is an isolated case.
Unfortunately, while it may be one of the more blatant cases,
it is by no means unique. DOD's own Inspector General--IG
reported 2 years ago that the goal of downsizing the Federal
work force is widely perceived as placing DOD in a position of
having to contract out services regardless of what is more
desirable and cost effective.
AFGE urges the Committee to require DOD to manage by budget
rather than FTE ceilings. AFGE also urges the Committee to ask
the service chiefs to appear before you and acknowledge or deny
that they are managing by FTE ceilings. We also urge you to ask
the General Acconting Office--GAO to determine whether the
Pentagon has complied with the congressional prohibition
against management by FTE ceilings.
That concludes my overview of AFGE's views and concerns,
with respect to the fiscal year 1998 defense appropriations.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much for your testimony.
[The statement of Mr. Harnage follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION
WITNESS
JERRY M. WIENER, M.D., AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION
Introduction
Mr. Young. Our next witness will be Dr. Jerry Wiener of the
American Psychiatric Association, which represents some 42,000
psychiatric physicians.
The association has not been bashful in its opposition to
psychopharmacology demonstration projects, and the
association's objections, contained in your full statement,
will be noted. Your entire statement will be placed in the
record. You may proceed as you wish.
Statement of Dr. Wiener
Dr. Wiener. Thank you very much, Congressman Young. I
appreciate your allowing me to go out of turn, so I have to
leave earlier than I thought I would come on the regular
schedule. So I very much appreciate that.
I am the Past President of the American Psychiatric
Association and Chairman of the Department of Psychiatry at
George Washington University.
I am going to address three issues. The demonstration
project which you just mentioned in the Defense Department,
which is proposed to train psychologists to prescribe
medications for the treatment of mental illness, the American
Psychiatric Association, together with the Defense Department,
are in full agreement with the conclusion of the April 1997
report, ``Given the Defense Department's readiness
requirements, the Psychopharmacology Demonstration Project,
PDP, substantial costs and questionable benefits and the
project's persistent implementation difficulties, we see no
reason to reinstate this demonstration project.''
I will next talk about the coverage and delivery of mental
health service in the military medical system, and third, the
confidentiality of patient records.
First, the PDP and the General Accounting Office report.
When this program was terminated by the Congress, it
required the GAO to evaluate the program and make
recommendations regarding its continuation. This report
entitled, ``Defense Health Care: Need for More Prescribing
Psychologists Is Not Adequately Justified''; this report, it is
attached at the end of my written testimony.
The report documents what the American Psychiatric
Association has consistently maintained, that the program is,
and was from its beginning, a major boondoggle which was never
needed and never requested by the military, but only by one
Senate aide, who happens to be a psychologist and who used his
Senator's control over the military's budget to fund a program
which was of no benefit except to the profession of psychology
and which began without any House or Senate hearings or any
consideration by this Committee or Full Committee.
This program has wasted now $6.1 million taxpayer dollars
and used military personnel and their families as its subjects.
Its original justification was to train psychologists to treat
something called ``battle fatigue.'' When it was pointed out
there was, per se, no such condition, then the rationale was
changed to a shortage of psychiatrists and the cost-benefit of
training psychologists to write prescriptions.
So the GAO report concludes: ``Training psychologists to
prescribe medication is not adequately justified because the
military health services system has no demonstrated need for
them, the cost is substantial, and their benefits uncertain.
The MHSS has more psychiatrists than it needs to meet its
current and upcoming readiness requirements.''
The report goes on to make the following important points,
that even with the training provided psychologists because they
have no medical education, they cannot substitute for
psychiatrists in diagnosis and treatment, and furthermore that
the cost of the program is extremely high for the value of the
product.
$6.1 million has been spent, $610,000 per each graduate
from the program, that has produced 10 prescription-writing
psychologists, the last two of which had to be recruited out of
the Senator's office and appointed to the rank of major in
order to get sufficient students in the class, because there
were no volunteers or insufficient volunteers from the Army.
That cost of $610,000 compares to a cost of about $300,000
in tuition and stipends and costs to produce a fully educated
and trained psychiatrist over an 8-year period of medical
school and residency, compared to the $610,000 for a 2-year
quick course and one year of training, which the DOD's own
oversight committee thought brought these psychologists about
to the level of second year residents.
Under the heading is that no government program is easily
terminated, and despite the GAO report and the statement from
the DOD that it has no plans to extend the program after the
termination date of June 30th, 1997, as each of you may be
aware, a major lobbying campaign has been undertaken to
discredit the GAO report, to influence the Congress to
reinstate this program, which from its inception was only a sad
monument to a psychologist's wish to be a physician.
The GAO report is solid, it is well balanced, and it is
your own. Reinstatement would only tend to support the public's
perception that the Congress sometimes spends millions of
dollars on wasteful and needless programs.
Now, in the delivery and coverage of mental health services
in the military medical system, studies repeatedly document
that mental disorders are as diagnosable, as serious, and as
treatable, certainly as prevalent, and as costly as heart
disease, diabetes, and cancer. There is a move at the present
time to shift the CHAMPUS delivery system for mental health
services into a managed care system, much as many other
services are being shifted.
For many reasons military life is more stressful than
civilian life, especially for children and adolescents. CHAMPUS
has now implemented the TRICARE program which moves CHAMPUS
into the managed care arena. These systems generate savings for
the insurer by limiting access to mental health care. We are
concerned that TRICARE will follow this plan, including special
limits on psychotherapy. These policies may save money in the
short run, money which is converted into managed care profits,
but these measures are more costly in terms of dysfunction,
morale, and long-term costs, and that has been demonstrated
several times over.
Patients should receive the medical care they require, no
more and no less. Our hope is that Congress will expect that
TRICARE will strive to achieve this goal.
Third and last, and very briefly, is the issue of great
importance of confidentiality of patient records. Recently at
Elmendorf Air Force Base in Anchorage, Alaska, the 20-year-old
daughter of a military counterintelligence agent was allegedly
raped by an airman. Her records, when she sought therapy at the
base to deal with this, detailing her sessions with the
psychiatrist, were requested by military lawyers to defend the
airman charged with the rape because the records are considered
government property.
The Supreme Court majority in Jaffee v. Redmond stated that
the balance of interest regarding psychotherapy was clearly on
the side of confidentiality. I will not quote that statement,
but it makes a very strong statement of the importance to the
public and in this case to the military by extension on my part
to the military, that the importance of confidentiality very
much outweighs the evidentiary benefit that would result from
the denial of the privilege.
The Department of Defense's Assistant Secretary for Health
Affairs has recommended that nonactive duty patient/Department
of Defense psychotherapist communication should be privileged,
as it is in the civilian sector.
It is time overdue to take action on this generally agreed
upon position. It is prima facie that confidentiality is
necessary for accurate diagnosis and effective treatment. It is
in the self-interest of the military to afford family members
of active duty personnel the same right and access, and
therefore to effective health care to which they would be
entitled if they were not members of the military family. We
urge you to request the DOD to amend the military rules of
evidence to create this privilege.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Young. Doctor, thank you very much.
[The statement of Dr. Wiener follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION
WITNESS
MORTON ANN GERNSBACHER, Ph.D., AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION
Introduction
Mr. Young. I would like to invite Dr. Morton Ann
Gernsbacher of the American Psychological Association to come
to the table. They have a little different opinion of the PDP.
Dr. Gernsbacher, you are recognized for 5 minutes. Your
entire statement will be placed in the record. Please summarize
as you wish.
Statement of Dr. Gernsbacher
Ms. Gernsbacher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am Dr. Morton Gernsbacher, the Sir Frederick C. Bartlett
Professor of Psychology at the University of Wisconsin in
Madison. So I am here on behalf of American psychologists who
don't necessarily aspire to be physicians.
I am here on behalf of the American Psychological
Association, and I want to make three brief points: The
continuing need to invest in research, including psychological
research at the Department of Defense; the need to sustain
support for the Army Research Institute for the behavioral and
social sciences; and APA's continuing support of the
department's demonstration program that is training
psychologists to prescribe psychotropic medications.
DOD has supported psychological research since World War
II. Today, as our military forces streamline, downsize, and
become more diverse, DOD-funded behavioral research is
revealing ways in which to enhance human performance, train for
complex tasks, and identify and build leadership.
We believe that maintaining DOD's technology base must be
6.1, 6.2, and 6.3A research in these areas. It is important to
recognize that increasingly sophisticated weapons systems place
more, not fewer, demands on human operators and maintainers. We
must ensure that our military personnel are as well prepared as
their machines to meet the challenge. This is not possible
without a sustained investment in human-oriented research.
Our written statement includes specific requests for
research programs in the Navy, Air Force, and Army. But I want
to highlight the need for the Committee to support an increased
budget for the Army Research Institute--ARI.
APA recommends a 1998 funding level of $21.4 million for
ARI, and the allocation of 165 full-time equivalent positions.
This is $3.65 million and 468 positions more than requested,
yet it is lower than the current funding level of $23.7
million.
Funding for ARI has been eroding, despite the strong record
of ARI in sponsoring research that is essential to the training
and performance of Army personnel. It is critical that this
Subcommittee stop the erosion this year.
About half the Army's budget, some $45 billion, is spent on
personnel, but less than $24 million is now spent to make these
personnel more effective. In comparison, $16.2 billion is spent
on material procurement and around $4.3 billion is spent on
research to make the equipment more effective.
ARI works to build the ultimate smart weapon, the American
soldier, and its efforts deserve your support.
The ARI was established to conduct personnel and behavioral
research on such topics as minority and general recruitment,
personnel testing and evaluation, training and retraining, and
leadership. And this is the type of research that I conduct.
Reliable data about these issues is critical, as you know
from today's headlines. While the Army seeks to solve the
problem of sexual harassment within its ranks and establish
workplace ethics and procedures that bring out the best from a
diverse work force, good data collected for the Army from
scientists who understand how the Army works will help the Army
plan and execute reasonable policies.
ARI is the focal point and principal source of expertise
for all the military services for leadership research, an
important area for all the armed services. Research that helps
identify, nurture, and train leaders is critical to their
success. In addition, ARI conducts research on the training and
other demands of the peacekeeping role, a difficult job that
requires different training than the combat role.
APA urges you to support a modest increase for ARI. Its
budget has been reduced well over 50 percent from a high of
around $50 million in 1995. The Army cannot buy this research
more cheaply elsewhere. DOD's investment in ARI's scientific
skills and its honest brokering of essential research will
continue to serve our Nation well.
Finally, I want to remind the Committee that APA remains
very supportive of pharmacology training for psychologists in
the military health services system.
A respected research organization, Vector Research, Inc.,
in a May 1996 report commissioned by the DOD, extensively
analyzed the Psychopharmacology Demonstration Project, PDP.
This is the project within DOD that has trained a small number
of military psychologists to prescribe psychotropic medication
when appropriate. Vector showed the benefits of having
pharmacopsychologists in the military, 10 of whom will have
graduated from the 2-year Fellowship by mid-1997.
I can only briefly summarize the report in my remaining
time, but I refer you to the APA's written statement for a more
complete discussion. The report states that, ``if
pharmacopsychologists are utilized in lieu of some physicians
on deployment, their contribution would be the safe and
effective treatment of service members with psychotropic
medications at a lower cost than could be achieved by utilizing
physicians in that role.''
A recent GAO report unfortunately misses the point,
ignoring the beneficial effect of psychologists prescribing on
the military health system overall. APA has serious concerns
with the methodology used in this study, and with the fact that
GAO ignored its own evidence that contradicted its conclusions.
GAO itself admits that clinical psychologists can be trained to
prescribe, and even admits that by using pharmacopsychologists
DOD can save money.
DOD is running a health care business, and the bottom line
is what skills are needed and which providers can most
efficiently provide those skills. The PDP shows that this type
of training has proved to be a good way to increase access for
military personnel to appropriate, high-quality mental and
behavioral health care.
APA urges Committee members to recognize the value to the
MHSS of psychopharmacological training and to support making
such training a permanent option for psychologists in the
military.
In summary, both psychological research and practice have
and will continue to provide savings from increased efficiency
and enhanced productivity in the armed forces, and we ask again
for your support.
Thank you.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much.
Mr. Young. Mr. Visclosky has some questions on this issue,
and I would like to recognize him at this time.
Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Chairman, if I could direct them to Dr.
Wiener?
Doctor, what would your reaction be to the Vector study?
Dr. Wiener. Well, the Vector study has a number of serious
problems in it. One, of course, is it was an internal study
rather than an external study.
Mr. Visclosky. Internal to the Department of Defense?
Dr. Wiener. Yes. And there are many actual--they made a
number--all of these studies make assumptions, and they start
out if you start with this set of assumptions, you come out
with this set of figures, and if you start with other sets, you
come out with very different figures.
The GAO study, for example, took all of the costs of the
program, including the start-up costs, because there had been
so few people in the program that they justified that, I
thought very rationally so, that you couldn't ignore what the
start-up costs were.
Then they asked Vector to use the same cost basis and see
what would happen. If I remember correctly, in the Vector
study, even on the re-analysis, and this is contained in the
GAO report, you would require that the psychologist prescribe
anywhere from 85 to 110 percent of their time, and nobody is
going to spend 85 percent of their time basically writing
prescriptions or dealing with writing prescriptions. That is
not realistic.
Mr. Visclosky. They are at about 38 percent now, right?
Dr. Wiener. The psychologists, you mean? I think that was
the figure. I don't remember exactly. It is also important to
remember that 38 percent is also still, for each one of them,
under supervision, so there is an additional component of
supervisory time involved in the cost. They have not been able
to yet attain nonsupervised prescription writing privileges or
psychopharmacology privileges. Also, they don't take into
account the fact that particularly severely ill patients, sick
patients, have a number of other illnesses as well, and that
writing only prescriptions for psychoactive drugs without any
realization or training or preparation to understand the other
illnesses and their medications and their interactions is not
really very appropriate.
Mr. Visclosky. You would have us believe that a trained
psychologist would not understand their limitations and would
not therefore, prescribe in that circumstance?
Dr. Wiener. I won't make that assumption.
Mr. Visclosky. Would you presume, then, that psychologists
shouldn't prescribe at all?
Dr. Wiener. Yes. There is no purpose and no value and no
adequate training available for psychologists to write
prescriptions.
Mr. Visclosky. In other fields of medicine you have MDs
anesthetizing patients, and nurses anesthetizing patients as
well.
Dr. Wiener. Wait a minute, did you say MD?
Mr. Visclosky. They are not MDs, nurses who are not MDs
delivering anesthesia. In the field of eye care, you have
ophthalmologists. And I would understand you have both nurse
anesthetists in the military; you have ophthalmologists in the
military; you have nurse practitioners. As you indicated, we
are in health care. We have $15 billion here at stake and we
are looking for cheaper solutions.
I don't have a firm position one way or the other on the
difference between the two of you, but I would suggest we ought
to be looking at competition in the military, to reduce costs.
Dr. Wiener. Well, I think you have looked at it, and I
think the GAO report looked at it.
Mr. Visclosky. I would respond as far as Vector, if it is
going to be a permanent program, that the start-up costs that
were factored into the GAO study are a one-time occurrence and
would not be permanent to the program.
Thank you very much, Doctor.
Mr. Young. Doctor, do you have any response to any of those
questions?
Ms. Gernsbacher. No, thank you.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much, both of you, for being
here.
[The statement of Dr. Gernsbacher follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
NON COMMISSIONED OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
WITNESS
SERGEANT MAJOR MICHAEL F. OUELLETTE, U.S. ARMY (RET.), DIRECTOR OF
LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS, NON COMMISSIONED OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Introduction
Mr. Young. I would like to welcome back before the
Committee Sergeant Major Michael Ouellette, the Director of
Legislative Affairs for the Non Commissioned Officers
Association of the United States. The sergeant major and I
spend a lot of time together working on the quality-of-life
issues for our troops and make sure we do the best we can to
provide a good quality of life for them.
I was interested in reading your testimony, Sergeant,
that--I want to quote you--you say, ``Enlisted people indicate
they no longer can afford to shop in the exchange for many
items. In fact, many enlisted members have referred to the K-
Mart, WalMarts and Target Stores in the local communities as
`enlisted exchanges.' ''
You indicate that the solution to the problem would be
lifting exchange restrictions. Tell us more about that as you
proceed with your time.
Statement of Sergeant Major Ouellette
Sergeant Major Ouellette. Fine, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
very much again this year for the invitation to appear before
you to discuss many issues that are very important to enlisted
people currently serving in the Armed Forces and to virtually
everybody serving.
I would like to personally extend to you the thanks of the
Non Commissioned Officers Association and the other members of
the Military Alliance for the outstanding work that you have
done in the past years to provide pay increases that went
beyond those recommended by the administration, to do separate
Basic Allowance for Quarters--BAQ increases, to provide
military construction money for increases. I would really hate
to see what the Armed Forces today would look like from a
quality-of-life standpoint if it had not have been for the
outstanding efforts of this Committee over the past number of
years.
The point that you mentioned in your opening remarks
concerning the exchanges, I have found when I have traveled to
many of the installations, military enlisted people will come
up to me, and I will talk about exchanges. I feel the
importance of exchanges are this: That by encouraging people to
use them, to spend their dollars there, that money then rolls
over into Morale, Welfare and Recreation--MWR programs and goes
back into the installation. That consequently could reduce
taxpayer liability for those programs. It is sort of a self-
supporting issue.
When I talk to enlisted people, many of them say they no
longer use the exchange on post, they are going down downtown
to the WalMarts, the Target Stores, and even go so far as to
refer to them as ``enlisted exchanges.'' And when I question
them on that, it is simply this: They will say the exchanges
tell you they will save you 30 to 40 percent on name brand
merchandise, but if you can save 40 percent on a Tommy Hilfiger
shirt that is sold in the exchange for $65, it really doesn't
do me any good because I can't get there from here anyway.
What we need to do is lift the restrictions. I think a lot
of the lifting of the restrictions are really concerns that
product lines, large top-of-the-line products, big-dollar
products, will be brought in, and I don't think so.
I think the other thing will be that the exchanges are
recognizing the fact that they have pretty much priced enlisted
people out of the market and retirees out of the market, and
hopefully by allowing those stores to remain competitive with
the outside, that we will be able to roll over money, maintain
the money to help ourselves within their military communities,
thereby reducing the appropriations needed to support those
programs.
When I was coming here to testify, I wanted to make a
special note. Most of the statements submitted by military
associations pretty much sang the same songs. We understand the
issues and support the same kind of programs for the most part.
I wanted to not take a whole lot of time, but I called a
constituent of yours, an old retired command sergeant major
named Jim Hare, who lives down in your area, was a great
soldier, served for 35 years, has never worked after
retirement. He does volunteer work, driving senior citizens to
doctors' appointments in the area. He has been sort of slowed a
little bit lately because he has glaucoma.
But I called him, and I said, Jim, I am going to appear
before your Representative, Bill Young. He said, a good man. I
said, what would you want me to tell him? And he said, Mike, he
said, if anything, he said, tell Mr. Young that I need his
Committee to make decisions that support and protect the
institution of the Armed Forces, that take care of the people
that are in the Armed Forces that are currently doing the
things I used to do and the people that worked for me did. But
it is the institution that you really look at, and saving that
in terms of recruiting, retention, you draw money into taking
care of people, thereby maintaining that institution.
He said, the other thing I would say is talk to Mr. Young
about protecting my earned retirement benefits, whether it be
military health care, which I am having a tough time with right
now. I need some options out here. I have got to take care of
my wife. She has got some medical problems. I need some help
here because I don't know where to turn.
We need to protect the commissary as an earned, non-pay
benefit that I served for, that helps me make ends meet. We
need to protect the exchanges and those kind of things.
He was very sincere. He was most appreciative for the work
you have done, particularly in cost-of-living-adjustments--
COLAs. He said that work has allowed him to continue doing what
he has been able to do, because the cost-of-living adjustments,
allowances, that you have provided every year, above and beyond
removing the inequities, have allowed him to continue to pay
the bills and be able to be an important part of the community,
and he was most appreciative to you.
Mr. Chairman, that is about all I have to say right now. If
you have any other questions, I have got a statement that
outlined our issues, and I know you understand them, and the
Committee will work very hard to make life better for the
people who serve this country.
Mr. Young. We appreciate all the time you spend in this
work and the way that you stay in touch with us, and we also
appreciate the aid and assistance you give us on occasion when
there are issues that need to be resolved.
Mr. Young. Peter?
Mr. Visclosky. No, thank you.
Mr. Young. We appreciate your being here. I invite all of
you to stay in touch. The quality of life of the people that
serve our Nation is utmost in our priorities.
Sergeant Major Ouellette. Thank you for the invitation and
allowing the other military associations to bring their issues
to the table. I appreciate it.
[The statement of Sergeant Major Ouellette follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
AIR FORCE SERGEANTS ASSOCIATION
WITNESS
CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT JOSHUA W. KREBS, USAF (RET.); MANAGER,
LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS, AIR FORCE SERGEANTS ASSOCIATION
Introduction
Mr. Young. Next on our agenda is Joshua Krebs of the Air
Force Sergeants Association. When I reviewed the written
statement, I was particularly interested in the discussion of
increasing responsibilities given to enlisted members. You said
the Air Force has converted many jobs from commissioned to
enlisted, greatly raising the level of responsibility of
enlisted members without a commensurate raise in pay.
My son tells me about that, because he is a one-striper at
Sheppard Air Force Base, and he wonders about that same thing.
We would like to hear from you also. Your entire statement will
be placed in the record.
Statement of Chief Master Sergeant Krebs
Sergeant Krebs. Thank you, sir. Understanding that you are
running late, I will, in fact, just go to the issue you just
brought up.
The Air Force in particular has been converting many
positions from officer to enlisted, noncommissioned, and at the
same time the ratio of enlisted pay to officer pay has remained
steady over many years. I did not go into any particular
details of the positions that were converted, but I can tell
you that over 1,000 weapons director positions have been
converted from officer to enlisted. A number of forward air
control positions that used to be fighter pilot have been
converted. Scores of support positions throughout have been
converted.
Just as the military has taken away some of the layers of
responsibility, they have also brought down the levels of
responsibilities, so that the senior commissioned people have
more responsibility than they had.
We believe it is time that somebody takes a hard look at
what was there 10 years ago as far as what enlisted people did
and what is there today, and look at the same time at the
proportionate pays that were given to enlisted people then
versus today, and the officers. I think if we did that and took
an honest look at it, we would find that the enlisted member is
giving more to the military today than what they did 10 years
ago for disproportionately less pay.
That concludes my statement. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Young. My understanding is that the enlisted Air Force
personnel are now operating and flying the Satellite
Constellations. Am I correct in that?
Sergeant Krebs. To the best of my knowledge, yes, sir.
Mr. Young. Well, that is a very interesting point that you
raise. We will take a close look at that. Getting pay increases
is not really easy. We will provide a pay increase this year.
It won't be very much, unfortunately, but there have been times
when we provided pay raises over the objection of the
administration which didn't ask for them. But we understand we
are way behind in pay for the members of the military, and we
are way behind in a lot of the quality-of-life issues. We are
doing the best we can to catch up.
Again this year we will do the very best we can to make
housing better, to make the medical care better, to make their
responsibilities more recognized properly. So we are in this
with you, and we are going to do the best we can. We appreciate
your calling this to our attention.
[The statement of Chief Master Sergeant Krebs follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
FLEET RESERVE ASSOCIATION
WITNESS
CHARLES L. CALKINS, NATIONAL EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, FLEET RESERVE
ASSOCIATION
Introduction
Mr. Young. I would like to welcome back Charles Calkins,
the National Executive Secretary of Fleet Reserve Association.
I think you now have about 162,000 members, and you are
representing active-duty, Reserve and retired U.S. Navy, Marine
Corps and Coast Guard enlisted personnel.
Your prepared statement points out reducing end strength
and increasing deployments place considerable strains on the
service personnel and their families, and you will hear a very
strong amen from the Members of this Committee. We recognize
that, we see what it is doing to our overall readiness, to the
morale of the troops, to the condition of our equipment. We
understand that, believe me. We are happy to hear from you on
the subject. You are recognized.
Statement of Mr. Calkins
Mr. Calkins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You just stole half
of my presentation.
What we want to do is on behalf of the 162,000 members of
the Fleet Reserve Association is to thank you for the watchdog
that you have been, trying to protect those rights and benefits
of the members at sea, to show our appreciation to you and our
Committee.
At the outset, the Fleet Reserve Association, as you said,
directs your attention to the impact of continued high
operational tempo within the uniformed services. End strengths
have been reduced by roughly 25 percent during the drawdown,
yet deployments have increased significantly, resulting in
considerable strain on service personnel.
A little personal note that I might add into that. About 3
weeks ago I was headed up to Groton to do a legislative
briefing to an active-duty group at the sub school, and I
personally know a sailor up there, and I called and said, I am
flying up on Sunday, why don't we get together Sunday afternoon
or evening for lunch or for dinner. My presentation is on
Monday morning, and I have got to fly back Monday evening. And
he said, Dad, I would love to, but I got to work. I said, you
don't have duty. He says, Dad, I haven't had a weekend off for
about 3 or 4 weeks. I said, that is fine. I said, what time do
you get out of work? He said, 5 o'clock. I said, 5 o'clock on a
Sunday? He says, yeah.
So we did eventually get together for dinner. I said, you
know, you need some time off. You look like you are kind of run
down. This young fellow is about 12 years in the Navy, and he
is at a point where he has to make a decision to continue or to
walk, and, of course, being retired Navy myself, I am kind of
hoping he is going to follow my footsteps all the way to 30
years and not stop at 20.
And he said, Dad, I have to really take a hard look at what
is going on. And he said, I look around at the civilians that
come aboard to fix our ship. He says, they have Mondays through
Fridays, they are off for the weekends, they get more pay than
what I get, they get to spend more time with their families
than I do.
That is the real hard issue, and I think that is pretty
well servicewide. I don't want to pick out the Navy
specifically, but it really hits home with me and brings back
some memories. I think we can go from every home port to every
home port, discussion, it is the same issue. I think it is a
very real thing.
Specifically, and we are looking at more downsizing in the
Navy further, 3 or 4 weeks ago there were discussions or rumors
of cutting the Navy about another 11,000 people, and since then
it is going to be cut another 6,000 people by 1999. I am
looking at that and saying that is an awful lot of carriers or
ships to go to sea, and what happens to our defense in the
meantime.
Several issues are out there as it has been indicated in
our statement. The one thing that I think that really should
hit home with the Committee, if I might ask, is the addendum
that we added to my statement referring to the pay raises, a
time lag in the pay raise. The pay raise becomes effective or
is discussed in October. It doesn't become effective for 15
months later. And the pay gap, as the chart shows, prior to the
all-volunteer force, the pay comparability between senior
enlisted personnel and junior enlisted personnel was 4.5 to 1,
and yet senior officers and junior officers was 5.0 to 1. Since
then, 1997, senior enlisted to junior enlisted is 2.6 to 1, and
officers is 4.6 to 1.
We need to take a hard look at that. The people that are
making the Navy, the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard work are
in our senior enlisted category, a group of people, and we
should consider those pay raises.
Mr. Chairman, again, welcome back. I hope you are in good
health. You look good. Your color is back. Keep up the good
work for us. We really appreciate it.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much, sir. We appreciate you
being here, and we appreciate the work you do for those who
serve in our military. I also thank you for your comment. My
health is very good now. I had a few bumps along the way, but I
am back at full force again, and things are well. Again, thank
you very much for being here.
[The statement of Mr. Calkins follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
NATIONAL MILITARY FAMILY ASSOCIATION
WITNESSES
SYDNEY T. HICKEY, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, GOVERNMENT RELATIONS, NATIONAL
MILITARY FAMILY ASSOCIATION
Introduction
Mr. Young. Our next witness is Sydney Hickey, the Associate
Director of Government Relations of the National Military
Family Association. Mrs. Hickey has been a military family
member for most of her life, is a spouse of a retired Naval
officer and has an Air Force daughter. She also puts out one of
the best newsletters in town, and last year I remember telling
you that and asking that we be kept on your mailing list, and I
make that request again. Please keep us on your mailing list,
because we find it very, very informative.
We would like to recognize you now. Your entire statement
will be placed in the record. Please summarize.
Statement of Mrs. Hickey
Ms. Hickey. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I can assure
you you will be the top of our mailing list. The families we
serve remain indebted to you and the Members of the
Subcommittee for your strong support of their quality of life.
This morning I would like to touch briefly on three issues
from our written testimony: compensation, health care and
military communities. I think it is important to note that to
military families, compensation is not only what goes into the
bank account, but what doesn't have to come out of it for the
basics such as food, shelter, clothing and the care of their
children. So if you propose a cut in savings at the
commissaries, or a 20 percent increase in child care costs as
envisioned in the Navy's pilot program to subsidize bases in
the civilian child care centers, if you propose housing
privatization initiatives that may end up costing the members
out of pocket, families view these as compensation cuts.
Obviously depressing active-duty pay raises will continue
to put military families further and further behind their
peers, as will the Department of Defense's proposal to rob
Peter in order to pay Paul a small amount of the basic
allowance for subsistence.
In health care, I think some of the problems of the TRICARE
program have been adequately discussed before, so I would just
like to jump to the fact that NMFA believes the underlying
problem with the health care system is that the benefits
provided, the cost to the beneficiary of those benefits, and
the population covered by those benefits are subject to yearly
budget battles within the Pentagon. We do not believe the
military beneficiaries should be subject to the budget of a
single agency. If, as with the Federal Employees Health
Benefits Program, an economic change becomes necessary for the
fiscal safety or health of the country, then, fine, let's
debate that in the halls of Congress, not the halls of the
Pentagon.
Debate in the halls of the Pentagon has led to our leaving
the age 64 and older population out of the current health care
problem. Debate in the halls of the Pentagon is including
discussions right now of charging even CHAMPUS-eligible
military retirees over $900 just to put their big toe in the
military health care facility. Is it any wonder that military
families, including active-duty, are asking the question who is
next?
In the military community, the military community includes
the installations, the organizations, the institutions and the
people, and it is viewed as home by military families whether
or not they actually live on the installation. Our family
support centers teach skills enabling service members and their
families to cope with the demands of military life, and then
they provide that safety net to assist the families when their
coping skills are not enough.
With the current high personnel and operational tempo and
the long workdays and workweeks even when the service member is
home, the need for the services provided by these family
centers has increased. Privatization and out-sourcing
initiatives, whether for family housing, family support
functions, or child care, have the potential to increase
quality of life and reduce costs. NMFA believes that care
should be taken that such initiatives reinforce the community
and do not, no matter how inadvertent, lead to the destruction
of the community and its support infrastructure.
To conclude, as important as NMFA believes the strong
family support structure is for military families, in the end
nothing can totally stop the negative effects on family life of
frequent separations, including what we call the ``they only
sleep here'' syndrome. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much for being here. We certainly
share your concerns. It will be part of our consideration as we
proceed to provide the funding for fiscal year 1998. We will do
the best we can.
Ms. Hickey. I know you will. Thank you, sir.
[The statement of Ms. Hickey follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
THE AMERICAN LEGION
WITNESS
DENNIS M. DUGGAN, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY-FOREIGN
RELATIONS COMMISSION, THE AMERICAN LEGION
Introduction
Mr. Young. I would now like to now invite Colonel Dennis M.
Duggan of the American Legion to come to the table. In addition
to his post at the American Legion, Colonel Duggan served 25
years in the military, including two tours of duty in Vietnam.
We are always interested in hearing the views of the
American Legion. You have expressed something in your written
statement that is bothering all of us seriously, and that is
the question of the possibility that we are returning to the
days of the hollow forces. There is a lot of reason to believe
that is happening. We would like for you to expand on that
issue.
Your entire statement will be placed in the record. Please
feel free to summarize as you wish.
Statement of Mr. Duggan
Mr. Duggan. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to appear before
you and your distinguished Committee. We have always looked
forward to that. On behalf of the 3 million members of the
American Legion, we are extremely grateful for this
opportunity. We, as in our entire membership, as well as the
members of the Armed Forces, I am sure, owe you a tremendous
debt of gratitude for your continuing efforts to not only
maintain a strong national defense, but to enhance the quality-
of-life features for our men and women who serve in uniform. We
know, we are convinced, that you and your Committee will do
your very, very best for our men and women.
We receive daily letters not only from veterans and
military retirees, but from a number of active-duty people and
their families, and they actually cite, and we know you are
aware of them, the actual and proposed string of broken
promises and the growing list of benefits which apparently seem
to be under attack. Letters daily from medicare-eligible
military beneficiaries who are prohibited from enrolling in the
TRICARE program. We are aware that some 58 military medical
facilities are closed or are closing, and another 17, we
understand, are identified for closure. The Department of
Defense, once again, is proposing the closure of a cost-
effective Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences,
which we strongly support, and the Defense Commissary Agency
may have to close some 37 commissary stores to make up
budgetary shortfalls. And the list goes on.
If we had to prioritize, the Legion's greatest concerns
include, first of all, military quality of life, closely
followed by the readiness--and we realize quality of life is a
form of readiness--and, lastly, modernization. A marked decline
in quality-of-life features for the active force and military
retirees, coupled with heightened operational TEMPOS, we
believe, can only adversely impact on both retention and
recruiting.
As Chairman Floyd Spence noted in his extremely revealing
and great report, there is a widespread perception that not
only is the military having to do more with less, they are also
getting less. Good soldiers, sailors, Marines and airmen are
questioning the desirability of a career in uniform, and
undoubtedly our youth will question the sincerity of a military
service that provides diminishing health care, closing
commissaries, paying less-than-inflation pay raises, living in
substandard housing, and enduring frequent family separations.
Most civilians would not endure a fraction of the sacrifices
that our military and their families undergo.
We also believe that many of our military retirees can no
longer recommend a military career, or, for that matter, even
military service. They themselves are seeing the promise of
lifetime health care being broken.
So we in the Legion support a broad array of options to
help the medicare-eligible military retirees to include
medicare subvention, the option of enrolling in the Federal
Employees Health Benefits Plan regardless of age or health care
status, and, of course, the GI Bill of Health.
We also support the correction of such longtime inequities,
for example of the concurrent receipt, however small, of both
military retired pay and VA disability compensation, and
removing the unfair automatic age 62 social security offset to
the Survivors' Benefit Plan, or SBP.
We have always believed that military service represents
honorable and noble service to the Nation as it represents
fulfillment of American patriotic obligation, but it is also a
privilege and responsibility that has always embodied the
highest form of service to the Nation. It is the only form of
service which may call for paying the ultimate price for the
common defense of the United States. We believe, therefore,
that the beneficiary, the United States Government, continue to
honor its obligations to all service members, all veterans,
military retirees, and their dependents, or else we stand to
lose the finest military in the world.
Thank you, sir. If you have any questions?
Mr. Young. Colonel, thank you very much.
Mr. Young. Peter, do you have any questions?
Mr. Visclosky. No. No, thank you.
Mr. Young. I just want you to know we are committed to
doing the very best we can. You know our resources get more
limited all the time. The OPTEMPO that you mentioned, the
Bosnia operation, which was supposedly going to cost us $1.5
billion, is now over $6 billion. We are wearing out the
equipment, we are wearing out the troops, and we are having to
work with the real world. We are doing the best we can. You can
count on us.
Mr. Duggan. Yes, sir, we will.
[The statement of Mr. Duggan follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
THE MILITARY COALITION
WITNESSES
VIRGINIA TORSCH, CDR, MSC, USNR, THE RETIRED OFFICERS ASSOCIATION
MIKE LORD, CDR, USN (RET.), COMMISSIONED OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF THE
U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, INC.
Introduction
Mr. Young. Next is The Military Coalition, which is
comprised of 23 military and veterans' organizations. The
Coalition stays in touch with us on a regular basis, and we
always appreciate those communications and the views that we
receive.
Representing The Coalition are the cochairs of the Health
Care Committee, Commander Virginia Torsch and Commander Mike
Lord. Your statements will be made a part of the record. It is
my understanding that Commander Torsch will be making the
testimony for both of you.
Mr. Lord. That is correct, sir.
Statement of Ms. Torsch
Ms. Torsch. Thank you very much, sir. In the interest of
time, I only wanted to concentrate on one of our major issues,
although we cover the other two components, the fix in TRICARE
and medicare subvention. The most important one for this
committee is our legislative initiative opening up the Federal
Health Employments Benefits Program to the medicare-eligibles.
I would like to express our very deep appreciation for your
leadership and strong support last year for this initiative.
Although your efforts to work out provisions for a
demonstration fell short of its goal, we did make considerable
progress. Significantly, the fiscal year 1997 defense
appropriations conference agreement directed DOD to submit a
report on the viability of such a demonstration program.
Unfortunately, we understand this report is still in progress
and probably will not arrive in time for the fiscal year 1998
hearing cycle. Given this disappointment, these hearings take
on added significance.
First, it seems DOD will not cooperate in designing and
setting up an FEHBP-65 demonstration program unless directed to
by statute. Second, the TRICARE program is not measuring up to
expectations, and, of course, as I said, our written testimony
detailed many problems with TRICARE that must be worked out to
make this program a more effective health care benefit.
Further, although the Coalition strongly supports medicare
subvention, we recognize there is little likelihood it will
benefit more than 40 percent of the eligible beneficiaries. The
Coalition estimates that even after accounting for those who
may already be enrolled in medicare at-risk HMOs or already
participate in comparable private sector plans, there are still
about 480,000 medicare-eligible beneficiaries who will not have
any access through the government-sponsored health care program
DOD promised them as a part of their lifetime health care
commitment.
Mr. Chairman, military retirees do not understand, and
neither does The Military Coalition, why they should not be
given the opportunity to participate in the health care program
that provides Federal civilians retiree health care that is
second to none. Therefore, The Coalition is seeking your
support to authorize all medicare-eligible uniformed service
beneficiaries to enroll in the Federal Health Employment
Benefits Plan.
Mr. Chairman, although The Military Coalition strongly
endorses implementation of FEHBP-65 nationwide, we recognize
there are still many unanswered questions that need to be
addressed about the initiative. Therefore, The Coalition
strongly urges this committee to spearhead the enactment of an
FEHBP demonstration program. A test would provide concrete
information on the number of uniformed services beneficiaries
who would avail themselves of this option if offered. If the
number of enrollees is less than the 95 participation rate
predicted by the Congressional Budget Office, an estimate we
believe is extremely high, the actual cost of the FEHBP-65
option would be considerably less than current estimates.
Secondly, since a separate risk pool would be established,
there is every likelihood the cost to DOD would be further
reduced. One reason is that the vast majority of military
retirees are covered by medicare, and when you combine medicare
with FEHBP, the health care outlays for FEHBP insurers are only
70 cents for every dollar of premium paid.
The Coalition therefore supports a test of this as a
critical bridge to health care equity and requests the
subcommittee appropriate an amount not to exceed $50 million to
test this program at two sites in fiscal year 1998. Given the
reality that Congress will approve more than $4 billion to
provide FEHBP to Federal civilian retirees, some with as few as
5 years of service, it doesn't seem unreasonable to ask for
this insignificant sum be allocated to those who sacrificed to
keep this Nation free. They did not equivocate then, and this
Nation should not equivocate now.
That concludes my testimony. I would be happy to answer any
questions you have.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much. As you heard throughout the
day, this is an important issue. Last year, unfortunately, we
ran into some jurisdictional issues, and medicare subvention,
for example, died on the vine when the Congress adjourned.
Fortunately, our colleagues recognize the importance of
resolving this problem, and all I can tell you is you have our
assurance we are going to continue to find a way to do this,
and hopefully our authorizers will be able to get together and
at least decide which of the three potential committees will
actually assume jurisdiction.
We appreciate your statement. Thank you for being here.
Thank you.
[The statement of Ms. Torsch follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
ENLISTED ASSOCIATION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD OF THE UNITED STATES
WITNESS
MICHAEL P. CLINE, MASTER SERGEANT (RET.), EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, ENLISTED
ASSOCIATION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD OF THE UNITED STATES
Introduction
Mr. Young. Now I would like to welcome back Master Sergeant
Michael Cline of the Enlisted Association of the National
Guard.
We have again, as in the past, examined your statement as
well as the other statements, and as you point out very, very
accurately, the Guard is being called upon more and more to
provide not only peacetime, but combat-ready support for
contingencies around the world. As the drawdown of the active
force continues, your role becomes that much more important.
Your prepared statement will be included in the record, and
we would like for you to summarize them.
Statement of Master Sergeant Cline
Master Sergeant Cline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would
like to bring greetings from Command Sergeant Major Bill Reed
from the Florida National Guard, and also from your group,
Major General Bob Inslen. They have both inquired about your
health. I will report back to them you look better than ever.
One thing I would like to comment on, Mr. Chairman, your
status on the list of Sydney Hickey. I don't know if I would
want to be on that list, so you may want to take that into deep
concern, because being on Sydney's list is not good.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the subcommittee, we thank you for
giving us the opportunity to present the views of the enlisted
men and women of the National Guard of the United States.
Pursuant to House rules, the Enlisted Association of the
National Guard receives no Federal grants or other public
funds.
What I would like to expand upon is what House National
Security Chairman Floyd Spence wrote about in his April 9th
report on the rhetoric and reality of military readiness.
Although Congressman Spence's report did not address issues of
the National Guard and Reserve components, I did find many
interesting similarities to what the National Guard is faced
with in the administration's fiscal year 1998 budget request.
In his report, the Chairman wrote that more than one
division of the Army's 10 active-duty divisions is hollow and
has no manning. The active Army is confronted with increased
deployments, which is stretching not only the manpower
resources, but also the funds necessary to properly train and
maintain units, and therefore have turned and are relying on
increased participation by the National Guard and its sister
Reserve components to fill the void.
However, the Guard is also faced with similar problems. The
units that are being called upon to either backfill active
component units or for deployment to Bosnia and other
peacekeeping operations around the world will receive only 8
percent of OPTEMPO funds necessary to train with.
It does not take a master's or doctor's degree to figure
out if the Guard units, under tiered readiness, who only train
at a portion of the active components requirements and only are
funded at the 8 percent level of the reduced requirement,
which, by the way, are more than 60 percent of your Army and
National Guard units, will not have sufficient training and
will not be available for the active component to deploy,
because no longer can they maintain many minimal readiness
levels.
Can you imagine, Mr. Chairman, having a professional truck
driver who has a minimum of 23 miles behind the wheel of an
80,000-pound truck to be qualified to run our Nation's
highways, or, better yet, the Beltway or Interstate I-95 at
rush hour? Yet the budget submission will only allow tank crews
to drive and train with a 69-ton tank 23 miles per year. How
will someone tell the families of Guard members that they were
injured or gave their life because there were not sufficient
funds to properly train them?
Chairman Spence wrote about the shortcomings in training
and lack of unit cohesion. The Guard is also faced with the
same problems. More than 60 percent of the Army National Guard
forces have no funds earmarked for schools. This includes 12 of
the 15 enhanced readiness brigades. Individuals will have to
attend what schools they can, using their 15 annual training
days. Units going to annual training will report without
sufficient personnel to do unit-level training, and have the
same unit cohesiveness problems that the Chairman wrote about.
Again, these are the same units that are being called upon to
relieve the active component.
The Chairman wrote about the 30 percent overall failure
rate of new recruits in the Army. The Guard is faced with a
similar problem, and it is because of the budget shortfalls.
Twenty-four out of every 100 new recruits into the National
Guard will not enter into initial entry training.
The Congress has mandated the requirement of prior service
personnel to be recruited into the National Guard. However,
with the budget shortfalls, the strong possibility that the
Guard would have to go below the required end strength levels
agreed to in the off-site agreement, there will be no spaces
for these prior service personnel.
It is ironic, Mr. Chairman, that we, the taxpayer, spend
$70,000 to $80,000 to initially train a new soldier regardless
of whether they are active duty, National Guard, or Reserve.
Then we spend millions of dollars to transition them out of the
service because another study changes something.
Congressman Spence also wrote that there is concern over
the readiness assumptions, and those in charge of conducting
the administration's Quadrennial Defense Review, QDR, that they
will use. Recently Secretary of Defense Cohen stated we need to
modernize and technologically advance the military for the
future. However, the active Army has had to resort to
recruiting CAP-3 recruits to meet recruiting goals.
You would think that we would want the highest and smartest
to be part of America's Army. It takes dedication, education,
and skills to manage and use the new, updated equipment we
already have, yet alone that of the future. Meanwhile, we have
transitioned out of the service those who currently have the
necessary skills and education to meet the needs of today's
modern Army. The money invested into their training and
education is totally lost, and we are not able to maintain them
in the Guard and Reserve because of budget reductions or loss
of positions.
As a father and a husband, I want to know, Mr. Chairman, is
the Congress and the administration going to provide the
required resources so that National Guard can perform the
missions that are requested of them and do it in a manner which
is not only professional, and properly resourced and trained?
Because if that is not going to happen, I don't want my wife
and my two sons who serve in the National Guard to be in harm's
way.
I believe in the saying that the more you sweat in the
classroom, there is less blood that will be spilled on the
battlefield. However, to sweat in a training field or a
classroom, the Guard must be properly resourced and funded.
Mr. Chairman, I want to make it quite clear that our
association actively supports our active-duty brothers and
sisters. We believe they must be funded at 100 percent to be
the first line of defense for our country. But to provide the
necessary relief that they need in peacekeeping operations, and
to relieve the stress on active-duty members and their
families, the National Guard, a parent of America's Army, must
also be properly resourced and trained. Although our Air Force
and Navy can deploy anywhere in the world and literally bomb
the heck out of a potential enemy, it takes trained, well-
disciplined soldier and Marines who occupy the real estate to
say we now have undeniable control.
Mr. Chairman, the Enlisted Association of the National
Guard is proud to be a member of The Military Coalition, and we
fully support and endorse the legislative proposals. Again,
thank you for giving the Enlisted Association of the National
Guard an opportunity to express its views on the fiscal year
1998 defense budget.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much for your views. You know we
place a lot of credibility in the position that you represent.
We appreciate your being here to talk with us about this. As I
have told so many folks earlier today, we are going to do the
best we can, and we do understand the importance of the
National Guard.
[The statement of Master Sergeant Cline follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF NURSE ANESTHETISTS
WITNESS
RONALD L. VAN NEST, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF NURSE ANESTHETISTS
Introduction
Mr. Young. I would like to invite now Ronald Van Nest of
the American Association of Nurse Anesthetists. The association
represents over 26,000 certified registered nurse anesthetists,
including more than 600 in the military.
Mr. Van Nest, your prepared statement will be made a part
of our official record. We ask you to summarize your statement
for us at this time.
Statement of Mr. Van Nest
Mr. Van Nest. Mr. Chairman, I am a certified registered
nurse anesthetist, a CRNA, and I am here to speak to you on
behalf of the American Association of Nurse Anesthetists, the
AANA. I have been a member of the AANA Federal Services Ad Hoc
Committee for 3 years, and I am a recent retiree of the U.S.
Navy Nurse Corps, and the immediate former nurse anesthesia
consultant to the Navy Surgeon General.
The AANA is the professional association that represents
over 26,000 CRNAs, including over 600 CRNAs in the military.
I am here to speak with you about the cost savings of your
continued support of CRNAs in the military. It is important to
note that CRNAs provide the same high-quality care as our
physician counterparts as measured by outcome studies.
Now, how do CRNAs save Americans money? Nurse anesthetists
are less costly to educate and far less expensive to retain on
active duty. The cost of a 30-month nurse anesthesia education
is approximately $29,000, while the cost of a 4-year residency
for physicians is approximately $339,000. On those numbers
alone, more than 10 CRNAs can be created for the cost of one
physician anesthesia provider.
Bonus money is another great savings when using CRNAs. If a
nurse and a physician start anesthesia training at the same
time, in 8 years the nurse anesthetist will have received
$69,000 in special pays, while the anesthesiologist will have
received $253,500, a quarter of a million dollars. In the case
of the physician, all of it was received under payback
obligation for their education.
Now to staffing ratios. DOD can save more money by
utilizing the two anesthesia provider groups in more
appropriate numbers. The CRNA-to-anesthesiologist levels right
now in the services are Army, 2 to 1; Air Force, 1.6 to 1; and
the Navy, 1 to 1.
It is ironic that during World War II when, nurse
anesthesia training was very brief and mostly on-the-job
training, that the ratio was 17 to 1. Yet now, when the
anesthesia is far safer, with sophisticated technology,
computerized monitors and alarms, and nurse anesthesia at the
master's degree level, CRNAs are being supervised at much lower
ratios.
In the invasion of Panama, only CRNAs were assigned to the
deployed combat units. When aircraft carriers deploy now for
extended periods of time, the usual anesthesia provider on
board is a highly qualified CRNA as the sole anesthesia
provider. If such practice models are acceptable for deployed
situations, then they should be acceptable in urban medical
treatment facilities.
I would like to briefly discuss the issue of board
certification pay, BCP. The AANA is highly supportive of the
board certification pay for all advanced practice nurses, yet
many CRNAs do not receive it. This is the result of the
interpretation that a CRNA must hold a master's degree in
clinical anesthesia. Many experienced officers who are CRNAs
have over their military career chosen to broaden their
education by pursuing an advanced degree in fields such as
education and management, but these do not qualify for the BCP.
In the future, this bonus will act as a financial disincentive
for nurse anesthetists to broaden their education.
The AANA encourages DOD and the respective services to
reexamine the issue of awarding board certification pay only to
CRNAs who have clinical master's degrees.
In conclusion, the AANA thanks this committee for its
support of military nurse anesthetists through the incentive
special pay increases and the board certification pay. The AANA
believes that the appropriate utilization of CRNAs in the
military is of critical concern and is an area that DOD could
examine for increased cost savings.
I thank the Committee members for their consideration of
these issues, and I will be happy to answer any questions they
may have.
Mr. Young. Mr. Visclosky?
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you very much for your testimony. I have three
questions, if I could. On the issue of certification, my
understanding is that the current national certification
program does not require a master's degree.
Mr. Van Nest. In 1998, that will be a requirement.
Mr. Visclosky. You will have to have graduated from an
accredited program.
Mr. Van Nest. The Task Force on Accreditation requires by
1998 all nursing anesthetist programs will be at the master's
degree.
Mr. Visclosky. Will it specify what type of master's degree
you will have to have?
Mr. Van Nest. No, sir.
Mr. Visclosky. So you would want essentially DOD's policy
to mirror what the national accreditation standards would be?
Mr. Van Nest. That is correct.
Mr. Visclosky. On the bonus program, you allude to that in
your testimony, you don't have a recommendation. Do you have
one you would be willing to submit to the subcommittee? You
talk about the disparity, the discrepancy between nurse
anesthetists and anesthesiologists.
Mr. Van Nest. I am glad you asked that question. I don't
want to give the committee the impression I came here to
``doc'' bash. It is just that money has been put in this to
these folks at a time that they are already under service
obligation. When the bonuses were awarded to the nurse
anesthetists, that argument that they were already under
contract was used to use it more as an incentive to basically
reenlist, to retain on active duty. My recommendation perhaps
would be, personal recommendation would be, to utilize it more
as a retention tool after service obligation has been paid
back.
Mr. Visclosky. Okay. As far as the ratios, have the ratios
developed near 1-to-1 simply because of hiring practices; that
is, not because of the regulations that have been proposed?
Your testimony relates to the proposals that there be 1-to-1
supervision on many of the bases. Is it just the way hiring has
transpired?
Mr. Van Nest. There are no regulations to that effect.
Mr. Visclosky. You would be concerned about those
occurring?
Mr. Van Nest. Yes, sir, I certainly would. There are no
such regulations. What seems to be going on is there is a glut,
if you will, of anesthesiologists in particular in the civilian
world, and that has created somewhat of a backfill in the
military of people who used to get out and do not now. I think
this has helped raise the issue of supervision as basically a
personal opinion, a means of justifying the continuation of
these billets.
Mr. Visclosky. Getting back to bonuses, I understand you
are not trying to pull anybody down. You are looking at trying
to narrow a discrepancy. You are suggesting instead of using
bonuses to attract enlistment, you are asking that it be used
more as a retention tool?
Mr. Van Nest. That is correct.
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you very much.
Mr. Young. Thank you. Thank you very much, sir, for your
testimony. We appreciate your being here today.
[The statement of Mr. Van Nest follows:]
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NATIONAL GUARD ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES
WITNESS
WILLIAM H. SKIPPER, JR., DIRECTOR, LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITIES, THE NATIONAL
GUARD ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES
Introduction
Mr. Young. Next is Mr. Bill Skipper, Director of
Legislative Activities for the National Guard Association.
In reading your testimony, we see that you raised some of
the same points that Sergeant Cline did, but you even spell out
more shortfalls in the President's budget for the National
Guard and the Air Guard. We appreciate the cost-effectiveness
of the investment that the taxpayer makes in the Army Guard and
the Air Guard, and we would like to hear your testimony. We
will place your entire statement in the record and ask you to
summarize.
Statement of Mr. Skipper
Mr. Skipper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On behalf of the
National Guard Association of the United States and the tens of
thousands of commissioned and warrant officers who constitute
our membership, I thank you for the opportunity to express our
views regarding the National Guard today and its prospects for
the future. I have a prepared statement and ask it be submitted
for the record. I will revise and extend some of those remarks
as we go through. Mr. Chairman, first, I would like to start
off thanking you personally for the hard work and what your
Subcommittee has done for the National Guard. And also I would
like to extend thanks to your staff. You have got a fine staff
that we can always count on to assist us with frank discussion
on the issues.
The continuing support of this Committee for National Guard
and Reserve programs has earned it the gratitude of every
member of this association. Your continued support in the
future will become increasingly important as the Department of
Defense attempts to define the requirements of our national
defense strategy through the ongoing Quadrennial Defense
Review--QDR.
Our association is, though, extremely concerned, however,
about the funding levels requested for the National Guard in
fiscal year 1998, which is not adequate to maintain the
existing force levels, readiness, OPTEMPO or modernization
programs. In other words, Mr. Chairman, we cannot sustain the
Guard as you know it today based on that budget. It is just not
there for us to do that.
We have established three legislative priorities for fiscal
year 1998 that addresses the problem. These priorities are: The
stabilization of the National Guard force structure and end
strength, full resourcing of readiness requirements and a
reduction of the National Guard military construction backlog.
And for brevity sake, I would like to address the major issues
and that will be the funding.
Mr. Chairman, the continuing reductions in the overall
Defense budget have resulted in funding shortfalls in important
National Guard readiness accounts; namely, pay and allowances
and operations and maintenance. Readiness funding shortages are
particularly acute in this year's budget request for the Army
National Guard. For fiscal year 1995, the resources provided to
the National Guard were commensurate with the assigned
missions. The 1998 budget shortfall is $743 million short of
meeting that readiness requirement.
As a result, Mr. Chairman, none of the soldiers in 12 of
the 15 enhanced brigades or eight guard divisions will be able
to attend a military school. Twenty-five percent of the new
recruits will not be able to go to basic training or advanced
individual training. And over 27,000 Army Guard soldiers will
be unable to attend annual training in 1998 based on the
budget.
This 1998 budget request provides operations and readiness
funding for some of our tiered readiness early-deployed units.
Funding is not provided to maintain the minimum levels of
readiness for later deploying units. Base operations and depot
maintenance are also severely underfunded.
Given the increase in OPTEMPO for many of these Guard
units, as I alluded to earlier, any reduction in readiness
could have a long-term impact on the National Guard's
capability and accessibility, and, Mr. Chairman, as you know,
the thousands of guardsmen and women on duty today in support
of State-related missions up and down the Ohio River in North
and South Dakota and deployed throughout the world in support
of the CINCs' missions.
The 1998 budget request proposes a reduction in the number
of aircraft and several airlift units of the Air National
Guard. Last year, thanks to you and to the Congress, you were
able to reverse the proposed reduction of 12 to 10 primary
aircraft units--PAA. The funding provides for only 8 PAA in
those same units that you worked so hard on last year.
These reductions will place an increased burden on the Air
National Guard and its support of the Air Force missions and
commander in chief's requirements.
Mr. Chairman, as you know, modern compatible equipment is
critical to National Guard readiness and the relevance of the
National Guard units. Army National Guard requirements include
a field artillery system such as Paladin and Multiple Launch
Rocket System--MLRS; tracked combat vehicles such as M1A2
Abrams main battle tank, and Bradley fighting vehicle, air
defense systems such as Patriot and Avenger systems; Black Hawk
utility helicopters, training devices and simulators,
communications equipment and the list goes on and on.
The Air National Guard is also in need of equipment
modernization, airlift, refueling fighter and bomb
requirements. The National Guard Association asks you and the
committee, sir, to direct the DOD to fully resource National
Guard readiness requirements and increase funding for National
Guard operations and maintenance, military personnel and
equipment modernization. Fully resourced readiness accounts
will assure a trained and ready National Guard for the conduct
of combat operations peace support and support of our
Governors.
Mr. Chairman, in addition, the National Guard Association
urges the committee to review the total military construction
backlog and direct the Department of Defense to develop
innovative and reasonable solutions to rectify this problem.
In conclusion, the National Guard Association remains
convinced that the Army and Air National Guard represent the
most cost-effective and capable component of the U.S. military,
as you spoke to earlier.
The Army National Guard provides over 50 percent of the
combat forces, 15 percent of the combat support forces and 24
percent of the combat service support forces for the total
Army, while accounting for only 9 percent of the Army's budget.
Also this force is paid for within only 2 percent of the DOD
budget.
The Air Guard provides 30 percent of the general purpose
fighter Air Force, 20 percent of the air support forces and 42
percent of the theater airlift forces with only a 6 percent
share of the Air Force's budget. At a time when reductions in
defense spending appear to be imminent and maintaining a robust
national security posture seems increasingly difficult, the
National Guard should not be viewed as a bill payer, but
represent a solution.
Mr. Chairman, I think we could both agree that the economic
benefit that the Guard provides the national defense is
quantifiable and indisputable.
Mr. Chairman, the National Guard Association appreciates
the past support of this committee and the opportunity to
express our views regarding our national security and the
National Guard, and we appreciate your time, sir.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much and we appreciate your
statement and your statement of support, and we will do the
very best that we can with the limited resources we have. If
you have any influence at the White House, tell them to get
that number a little bit higher when they send the budget over
here.
[The statement of Mr. Skipper follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF TROPICAL MEDICINE AND HYGIENE
WITNESS
ROBERT EDELMAN, MD, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR CHEMICAL RESEARCH CENTER FOR
VACCINE DEVELOPMENT, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND SCHOOL OF MEDICINE
Introduction
Mr. Young. Our next witness is Dr. Robert Edelman of the
University of Maryland School of Medicine, representating the
American Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene. The society
has been supportive of infectious disease and HIV research
programs, as has been this Subcommittee, and, doctor, we
appreciate you being here and we will place your entire
statement in the record and ask that you summarize at this
time.
Statement of Dr. Edelman
Dr. Edelman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to
be here. You have been exposed to the statement for a week now
and I would like to give over to you some personal thoughts.
I have been involved in this field for 30 years. I got--I
cut my teeth in tropical medicine and infectious disease as
part of the Walter Reed Research Team assigned to Bangkok,
Thailand and Vietnam. And I can tell you firsthand, I have been
able to see for 30 years the evolution in the emergence of
these infections which are now beginning to lap at our shores.
There have been focal outbreaks along the Caribbean,
thousands of thousands of cases creeping up through Mexico. I
run--I helped direct a tropical disease traveler's clinic at
the university medical system. We see some of our patients who
go overseas coming back with malaria, dengue fever at a rate
that we have never seen before in the past. I can tell you from
very personal feeling that I am very much concerned about these
developments throughout the world, and I am sure that your
subcommittee and yourself also share that.
Really, the Department of Defense maintains a unique
capability in medical research. It is one of the few government
groups or private groups who are committed for maintaining the
health of our forces overseas, but it also has very important
impacts upon many other segments of our society. An example
would be we send over about 8 million travelers overseas every
year of which 4 million go into the tropics, and many of these
individuals are exposed to the same things that our troops are.
Again, I will repeat that many--we are all seeing an
increased number of these infections breaking out and we are
particularly concerned that there is increasing numbers of
drug-resistant forms of diseases such as malaria and infectious
diseases that affect the bowel causing traveler's diarrhea that
is becoming a tremendous concern not only for the military, but
all segments of our society.
I am also involved as part of one of the largest vaccine
development units in the United States, academic units on the
development of vaccines against dengue and malaria and I have
been involved in working with dengue vaccines with the Walter
Reed Institute of Research and with the malaria vaccines with
the Navy Medical Research Institute.
We are concerned that recently there has been some funds
that have been diverted from the support of these tropical
medicine programs to support the peacekeeping efforts in
Bosnia. For example, some of the research going on at the Navy
in the Navy Research Institute here and overseas has been
curtailed as of last March because of funding decrements as a
result of peacekeeping efforts and to support those efforts in
Bosnia.
The other aspect I would like to touch on is the unique
opportunity that these programs play for training future
physicians and health care providers to protect our troops
overseas and as a result, to help with other segments such as
our enormous numbers of travelers overseas. An example of that,
I am a child of two of those laboratories and I can tell you
that they are really jewels in the crown of the American health
care establishment.
The Society would like very much to encourage your
continued bipartisan support for these laboratories and for the
Walter Reed group and for the Navy Medical Research Program and
for the program of Infectious Disease Institute in Frederick,
Maryland.
We would also like to focus a moment on the importance of
about a $5 million budget to help establish a program for
surveillance of infectious diseases throughout the tropical
areas of the world. We are increasingly seeing, as I mentioned
before, sexually transmitted diseases, malaria, and diarrhea
diseases being increasingly resistant to available antibiotics.
We don't have vaccines as of yet. We have a vigorous
program, and we are trying to explore that avenue, but we need
to have constant surveillance for these infections, and these
overseas laboratories in South America, in Kenya, and in Asia
will provide eyes and ears for the military and for our entire
society for the incursion of these highly resistant pathogens.
As a conclusion, I would like to summarize we are all very
grateful for your support of the military medical infectious
disease efforts. We encourage you to continue that support and
we would like for you to consider the addition of roughly $5
million to help support a plan for putting surveillance in
place for these emerging infections and to become cognizant of
the problem we have with the divertment of funds more recently
away from their intended use by the medical research
establishment toward peacekeeping efforts. Thank you very much.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much, Doctor. We will do the best
we can to continue. You know that we have a sincere interest in
medical care and the prevention of diseases if possible. And as
our troops are deployed around the world, they become more and
more exposed. So thank you very much for calling this to our
attention and we look forward to working with you.
Dr. Edelman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The statement of Dr. Edelman follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
NATIONAL COALITION FOR OSTEOPOROSIS AND RELATED BONE DISEASES
WITNESS
SANDRA C. RAYMOND, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL OSTEO- POROSIS
FOUNDATION
Introduction
Mr. Young. Congressman McDade is one of the very
distinguished members of this Committee and a senior Majority
Member on the overall Appropriations Committee, and I would
like to yield at this time to Congressman McDade to introduce
the next witnesses.
Mr. McDade. Mr. Chairman, I am very, very grateful to you
for letting me sort of break into the program for a minute. I
want to explain to the audience that I am chairing another
Committee which requires my attendance in two places at once.
But I was able to break away and I wanted to come over to
introduce Sandra Raymond, who is the next witness, who is going
to testify. I have known Sandy for a long, long time and she
takes a very deep and active interest in health issues in the
country. I am thrilled to come over and welcome her because,
like so many of you, she has only one ax to grind: The public
health of the people of the United States.
Sandy, won't you please come up and offer your testimony.
Mr. Young. Ms. Raymond, you are recognized.
Statement of Ms. Raymond
Ms. Raymond. Thank you, and I thank Congressman McDade for
being here. He is certainly an advocate for the American people
and I have great admiration and respect for him. I am here
representing the National Coalition for Osteoporosis and
Related Bone Diseases and, I want to thank you and your
Committee for your very generous $10 million appropriation for
bone disease research in the fiscal year 1997 DOD budget.
I want to emphasize just a few points. You have my written
testimony. This is not--the DOD program is not an extension of
the NIH bone disease research program. This is funding that
will carry on a bone disease research program that has specific
relevance to the military age population. The goal of the Bone
Disease Research Program is to enhance military readiness by
reducing the incidence of fracture which spells loss of time
and a lot of money, especially during physically intensive
training, and we think it may have long-lasting effects.
You may know or you may have heard of the word, ``stress
fractures.'' Perhaps somebody in your family has had a stress
fracture. Stress fractures affect 10 to 15 percent of women
recruits during the 8 weeks of basic training, and I am only
speaking about women here, not the male recruits. Most of us
think of stress fractures as ones that sort of heal over time,
and the integrity of the bone is maintained.
But, in fact, untreated and repeated stress fractures which
occur in the same long bone in the leg, for example, or in the
arm, can lead to a complete fracture and this results not only
in pain and disability, and costly surgery at some times, but
also follow-up rehabilitation.
There is a very famous woman marathon runner who ran in the
Boston marathon. I am not going to mention her name. She
suffered stress fractures and she is now foreclosed from ever
running again, ever training again because she is at such risk
for fracture. We have an increasing number of women in the
military, and the bone health of female recruits is a growing
concern for all Americans, and for these Americans, if they are
going to serve at a maximum capacity and strength.
According to the Army itself, the minimum time away from
significant duty for a male or a female soldier who develops a
stress fracture is 6 to 8 weeks. Stress fractures are very slow
to heal. Full recovery takes as long as 12 weeks, and they are
one of the more frequent injuries that affect men and women in
the Army.
In a recent survey, 1,338 stress fractures were diagnosed
in 100,000 undergoing basic training. We need advances. We need
to understand the overall bone health of military men and
women.
Military recruits are at an age where dietary and
environmental factors can still influence the amount of peak
bone mass that they develop. The greater bone mass that we
achieve during the first three decades of life, the stronger
the bones are likely to be throughout life. So to achieve that
peak bone mass and retain that inner structural strength, what
do we need to know in the DOD research program? We need to know
what the relationship is between muscle strength and
development and bone mass. We don't know those answers. We need
to know the impact of physical fitness and diet on peak bone
mass. We have to know what environmental factors are related.
Are carbonated beverages in the diet of our military
recruits doing damage? Is their alcohol intake a factor? Is
their smoking a factor? What are the predictors of risk? Are
there genetic factors that we need to have more information on?
And what are the best preventive, diagnostic and treatment
strategies for the young population? For those we recruit for
military service?
I think that the DOD research program is going to
contribute greatly to bringing bone disease under control not
only in the military, but in the U.S. population as a whole.
Osteoporosis and related bone diseases, the diseases that
we are talking about here, are serious threats to the American
public. To almost 30 million Americans. You know that these
diseases cause loss of independence, death, disability. The
annual cost is about $14 billion, and is rising. Bone diseases
affect women, men and children of all ages. From infancy to the
oldest, these diseases profoundly alter the quality of life for
millions of Americans.
By discovering how we can build bone mass to peak capacity
in young recruits, we are not only building a strong military,
we are building a strong Nation ready to withstand the stresses
of an extended life span. You know, NASA has long recognized
the importance of bone loss in space and how that relates to
their astronauts. It is a key priority for NASA. And equally, I
think, if they do not find the answers about those astronauts,
their missions are subverted. Equally, the mission of DOD
cannot be achieved without this important bone disease
research.
Today, Mr. Chairman, Mr. McDade, Mr. Murtha and others, we
are urging you to consider a very reasonable $20 million in
appropriations for bone disease research in fiscal year 1998.
I want to thank you for this opportunity and thank you
again, Mr. McDade.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much for being here. And I want
you to know that you and your cause are represented by one of
the great Members of Congress.
Ms. Raymond. I know that well. Thank you. Any questions?
Mr. McDade. No questions.
Mr. Young. Thank you again for being here.
[The statement of Ms. Raymond follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF OTOLARYNGOLOGY--HEAD AND NECK SURGERY, INC.
WITNESS
MICHAEL D. MAVES, M.D., MBA, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, AMERICAN ACADEMY
OF OTOLARYNGOLOGY--HEAD AND NECK SURGERY, INC.
Introduction
Mr. Young. Next on our agenda is Dr. Michael Maves,
Executive Director of the American Academy of Otolaryngology-
Head and Neck Surgery, Incorporated. The academy and the
physicians who belong to it are dedicated to the treatment of
patients' diseases of the head and neck.
Thank you for coming today and your entire statement will
be placed in our record, and summarize it as you wish.
Statement of Dr. Maves
Dr. Maves. Thank you. I appreciate the opportunity to be
able to present this testimony on behalf of the roughly 11,000
otolaryngologists in this country. I am Dr. Michael Maves,
Executive Vice President of the American Academy of
Otolaryngology and a practicing otolaryngologist at the
Georgetown University Medical Center.
We have three issues that we would like to bring before you
and, of course, we have testified on this in past years. The
first is the issue of tobacco cessation in the military. The
American Academy of Otolaryngology head and neck surgery has
been opposed to the use of tobacco for many decades. We are the
surgeons who, for the most part, take care of patients who are
afflicted with head and neck cancers and we see firsthand the
effects of tobacco use on our patients every day.
There are increasing news reports of tobacco companies
admitting to the adverse impacts of tobacco on their users. We
also know that there can be significant impacts on individuals
and especially children who are exposed to secondhand smoke and
have to live in households with this.
We were pleased several years ago to see that the
Department of Defense announced a policy banning smoking in all
DOD workplaces. This far-reaching initiative really makes DOD
workplaces free of harmful secondhand smoke and as well will
improve, I believe, the health of our overall military
personnel.
We do know, however, that many in the military have
substituted the use of smokeless tobacco for smoking tobacco to
avoid disciplinary action where smoking itself is prohibited.
As we indicated in our written testimony, we realize that
smokeless tobacco, again, is harmful, is a substance which can
cause cancer of the oral cavity and would like to seek
limitations of its use as well.
Even with all the information that we have about the
harmful effects of tobacco use, we find that it is still
indirectly subsidized by the military through subsidized sale
of tobacco products at military commissaries and PXs where
cigarettes and tobacco products can be bought at a much lower
price than otherwise would be charged.
We, today, as we have in the past have expressed our
concern of the action that the DOD would very likely not ban
tobacco product sales in the commissary system. For that
reason, we support the concept of bringing tobacco prices in
the PX and commissary to at least parity with civilian prices
to help cut down on use.
You know, there have been a number of recent studies which
have shown that cigarette smokers, particularly young people,
are very, very sensitive to the price of cigarettes and so we
feel that this would be an important action. We especially urge
the Department of Defense to promote tobacco cessation programs
with both personnel and their families, but especially in
relationship to mothers and children about the harmful effects
of secondhand smoke as far as tobacco.
The second issue I would like to discuss with you is that
of skin cancer and UV radiation. Last year, the Academy
indicated its strong support of the Environmental Protection
Agency and the National Weather Service and the Centers for
Disease Control and prevention in developing a nationwide UV or
ultraviolet index to alert members of the public to the dangers
of excessive radiation from the sun which can potentially cause
skin cancer.
We understand that one of your Senate colleagues, Senator
Connie Mack of Florida, has begun an effort with the National
Association of Physicians for the Environment to survey
selected Federal agencies to determine the extent of
educational programs regarding skin cancer as affected by
excessive ultraviolet radiation exposure from sunlight. Those
Federal agencies would obviously include those which have
employees, but also ones which have clients such as the
Department of Agriculture where farmers themselves are
routinely exposed to very high sunlight.
Of course, the major agency with such personnel is the
Department of Defense. Millions of our young men and women are
routinely exposed to excessive sunlight for long periods of
time in carrying out their routine duties. Senator Mack has
requested from the DOD a report on its educational activities
and we will follow up as we are sure with recommendations for
necessary actions to be taken.
We would be remiss if we did not report that in this same
vein we are pleased to see that a large number of military
units have been receiving awards from the EPA Stratospheric
Protection Division for their work in reducing the use of CFCs
and other atmospheric ozone depletion chemicals leading to
depletion of the stratospheric ozone protection. This layer
protects us from excessive UV radiation. In this activity, like
many others, the Department of Defense has become a leader, and
as we have seen also in ``greening'' of environmental areas of
departmental facilities.
The last area I would like to speak to you about, Mr.
Chairman, is that of noise reduction. Our Academy, from its
beginning, has been concerned about the effects of excessive
noise on the structures of the ear, particularly those noises
which are extremely excessive. The American Academy of
Otolaryngology, representing the 11,000 otolaryngologists in
this country, also known as ear, nose and throat doctors, are
the primary physicians who take care of patients with hearing
loss. We know that noise is necessarily a part of daily
military life, particularly so in wartime. Nonetheless, we
believe that many of these noise effects on military personnel
can be reduced by the use of appropriate noise-reducing and
prevention activities.
Mr. Chairman, in summary, it is a pleasure to once again
bring these issues up to you this year. We have raised these
before. We have been pleased to see the activities of your
committee and the Department of Defense on these areas and hope
to be able to come back to you again in the future and once
again report on the good progress which the Department of
Defense has made in these areas. Thank you, very much.
Mr. Young. Doctor, thank you very much and we do look
forward to your continued communication with us. As one of the
principal members involved in outlawing smoking on buses,
trains, planes and things of that nature, I am happy to have
your report and your support. Hopefully, we have a better
environment on those public transportation units because of
that.
Dr. Maves. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Thank you, sir.
[The statement of Dr. Maves follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Thursday, April 17, 1997.
JOSLIN DIABETES CENTER
WITNESS
KENNETH E. QUICKEL, JR., M.D., PRESIDENT, JOSLIN DIABETES CENTER
Introduction
Mr. Young. Next we will hear from Dr. Kenneth Quickel, the
President of the Joslin Diabetes Center. The annual cost
associated with diabetes is $138 million; more than 15 percent
of health care costs annually in the United States. We would
like to hear more about that and hear from you at this time.
Your entire statement will be placed in the record, and you may
summarize it as you wish.
Statement of Dr. Quickel
Dr. Quickel. Thank you for providing the opportunity to
summarize a program which I think can be of immense value in
helping to control some of that cost which falls on the
Department of Defense.
I am Dr. Ken Quickel and I am the President of the Joslin
Diabetes Center in Boston, which is one of the Harvard
institutions.
Our research and patient care teams who have led the world
in diabetes research for perhaps 100 years now, have now
developed some methods of diabetes care which can produce
improvements in health status and reduce the cost of providing
health care to people with diabetes. And we would like to talk
about those in the context of the department.
Diabetes among civilian and military Department of Defense
personnel will mirror the effects and the costs of diabetes in
the population in general. Among the Department's civilian and
military personnel, there will be about 188,000 people with
diabetes known to have diabetes. There will be an approximately
equal number of individuals who have diabetes, but do not yet
know it.
Four thousand of them will die every year from the
diabetes. Three hundred will develop end-stage kidney failure
from the diabetes. One thousand two hundred will have
nontraumatic amputations due to diabetes, and between 3 and 900
of them will develop blindness from their diabetes every year.
Joslin Diabetes Center in Boston is a comprehensive
resource for diabetes care and research and we would like to
make a proposal to join with the Department of Defense in
endeavoring to address some of these issues. And what we are
proposing is a pilot program that would have three primary
components. The first component would be to endeavor to use up-
to-date technology to detect undetected diabetes in department
personnel.
Recently, our researchers have discovered a method of
shining a little light through the pupil of the eye and then
measuring the scattering of that light from the proteins in the
eye fluids. We know that when the blood sugar is elevated, the
proteins combine with the glucose and that changes the
scattering of the light in a very characteristic and specific
way.
And it allows us, with this very simple technique, which
doesn't involve taking a urine specimen or blood specimen, to
very quickly and rapidly diagnose diabetes.
And we would like to use that technology among Department
of Defense personnel to try to gain early detection and
preventive aspects of that result.
The second piece is a telemedicine strategy, and we are
quite aware of the tremendous advances that the military has
made in telemedicine, and we think that there is an additional
use in application which could be of great benefit. In 1967,
our researchers at Joslin discovered that a laser could be used
to reduce the progress of diabetic eye disease. Subsequently,
the technology has developed to the point where we can now
prevent 98 percent of the blindness due to diabetes by proper
detection and aggressive therapy.
But diabetes remains the leading cause of blindness in
working age Americans despite that and the reason for that is
that many individuals, perhaps most individuals with diabetes,
do not get screened annually for eye disease as they should.
Others are screened by people who do not know what the
therapeutic possibilities are so they don't get into the health
care system effectively.
We have developed--our researchers have developed a thing
they call the Joslin Vision Network, which is a highly
effective method of taking a three-dimensional image of the
back of the eye using a small low-light camera. This form of
digitized image can be transmitted over phone lines, bounced
off satellites, stored on chips, and, in fact, read by experts
some place other than where the image is acquired.
The system has been linked to a medical records system
which automatically grades the eye disease, develops a
treatment plan and communicates with the referring physician or
the health care team on the site about what needs to be done.
And it can be done quite efficiently in terms of cost.
The third piece to address the problem of diabetes has to
do with some new strategies to train individuals with diabetes
in the skills of self-management. We know from a recent large
NIH-funded study that if we can normalize the blood sugar, we
can reduce the costly complications of diabetes by as much as
50 percent. Fifty percent, that is a huge reduction.
We also know that most people with diabetes do not have the
self-management skills that are necessary to implement that
degree of control. And since over 90 percent of the people with
diabetes are cared for by primary care physicians, many of
these physicians simply don't have the tools, the time, the
resources to train their patients in self-management.
We have developed a diabetes outpatient intensive treatment
program. We call it DOIT, which is a 3-day program to
intensively involve all of the physician and nonphysician
personnel, dieticians, exercise physiologists, psychologists,
who are part of the diabetes treatment team and over the past 4
years we have utilized this system for probably 700 patients
now. And we have been able to measure the effectiveness of the
system. We know which patients it works best on and we think
that we could very significantly, in a fixed population of
individuals such as the Department of Defense, significantly
improve health care and reduce costs.
What we are specifically proposing is a pilot program
consisting of the three strategies that I have outlined to
attack the problem of diabetes. And to apply it initially in
two regions; in New England where we have a number of
facilities and in Hawaii, where we have a partner facility at
the Stroub Clinic.
We would propose that this program be funded over a 2-year
trial period at a level of $2.5 million each year and the hope
would be that if we can document the effectiveness of the
program, we could then expand it to other areas in the
department, but also use the now validated methodology to apply
to the population in general through the United States.
We believe that since diabetes is such a major cause of
death and disability and cost, that the program that we are
proposing will pay for itself. And we hope that you will
consider our proposal as we bring it forward and we thank you
for your attention and your offering us an opportunity to
describe our proposal.
Mr. Young. Doctor, thank you very much, and I have one
quick question. Have you spoken to anyone in the Pentagon about
the pilot program that you are suggesting?
Dr. Quickel. We are scheduled to do that. We need to talk
locally also with people both in Hawaii and in the New England
region about this, and we have scheduled the meetings to do
that.
Mr. Young. Well, what I would ask you is that you let us
know after those meetings and let us know how things went and
see where we might be able to play a role in helping you.
Dr. Quickel. We certainly will. Thank you very much.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much, sir.
[The statement of Dr. Quickel follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Thursday, April 17, 1997.
NATIONAL BREAST CANCER COALITION
WITNESS
FRANCES M. VISCO, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL BREAST CANCER COALITION
Introduction
Mr. Young. Our next witness is Fran Visco, President of the
National Breast Cancer Coalition. The Coalition represents 400
member organizations and more than 40,000 individual women,
their families and friends.
Fran, your prepared statement urges Congress and the
President to continue support for the DOD peer review research
program. You know where this committee stands on that issue. We
have stood up to the administration on numerous occasions when
they thought we shouldn't use DOD money for that purpose and we
used it anyway. Hopefully, it has been used in an effective
way.
I actually asked the Department of Defense for an audit
trail to make sure where the money went, and if it actually was
used for what we intended it to be used for, so we are happy to
hear from you today. Please understand that your statement will
be printed in the record, and you may summarize it.
Statement of Ms. Visco
Ms. Visco. Thank you very much and thank you, Mr. Chairman,
for your continued support for this program.
You know that it has been an incredible success on all
fronts. One of the reasons I think it has been so successful is
because it really is a collaboration that works.
We hear a lot nowadays about public-private partnerships;
they are the ``in thing,'' but most of them don't work. This
one does. And it has captured the enthusiasm, the enthusiastic
support of the scientific community, of women like me who have
had breast cancer, of our organization, of policymakers
everywhere.
It is being covered more and more by the press. As a matter
of fact, it is the subject of a book that was published over
the past couple of weeks that was very well reviewed in The New
York Times Sunday Book Review last week. It is getting more and
more support, more credibility and more attention.
I think it is important to recognize that this program
continues to foster innovation and, at the same time, keeps the
quality assurance mechanisms that we put in place. And equally
important is the fact that there is no bureaucracy involved
here. The overhead for this program is 10 percent. That is it.
When the Coalition was successful initially, several years
ago, in getting more money for breast cancer research, I
remember meeting with Sam Broder, then the Director of the
National Cancer Institute, and I was complaining to him about
the fact that they weren't looking at the innovation and they
were not changing their strategies, and what he said to me was
the National Cancer Institute is like a huge battleship that
you cannot turn on a dime. And what I said to him was, what we
need is a program that can design a battleship that will turn
on a dime. And that is what we did with this program, and we
did it under the leadership of this subcommittee. It has been
incredible.
We are able every year to respond quickly to what we see in
the scientific community. We can shift our strategies, shift
the funding within the program. It has just been wonderful.
This November we are going to have a conference that is going
to showcase everyone who has been funded through the program.
It is going to be here in Washington, D.C. We expect a thousand
scientists and many consumer activities and we hope, Mr.
Chairman, that you will come and participate in the conference,
and we are going to showcase to the public all of the work that
this program has funded.
In addition, I am very excited to tell you that Canada, the
Government of Canada is coming to be briefed on this program
because they want to replicate it in their country. And I think
a briefing on that is already scheduled. And we have also been
contacted by Great Britain. The United Kingdom wants to come
and do the same thing, so the support and the recognition of
the success of this program is now worldwide.
I wanted to tell you very briefly about the strategy we
adopted last year, and that is to fund those idea grants, the
scientists who have a great idea, but they don't have a lot of
preliminary data. And they are distinguished scientists with
wonderful ideas, but they don't have years of research behind
them and tons of data to bring to the National Institutes of
Health to get funding. They don't have any place to turn for
their funding. They didn't in the past, but now they do; they
have this program.
And we were very excited to see the number of idea grants
and the ideas that this program generated. Unfortunately, we
are only able to fund 9 percent of those idea grants, and we
hope that this year we are going to keep that strategy in
place, and we hope that this year we can see an appropriation
of $175 million for this program so that we continue to fund
those ideas.
You know the statistics about breast cancer. I don't have
to remind you. But I really believe that this program is going
to be one of the key elements in changing those statistics and
eradicating breast cancer. So thank you for your continued
support, and I look forward to ongoing work with you on this
program.
Mr. Young. Well, we look forward to it as well. This is a
terrible, terrible disease, and as you pointed out, we have
worked together very closely to try to make adequate funds
available.
I appreciate you very much for being here and all the work
that you do.
[The statement of Mr. Visco follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
THE UNIVERSITY OF MEDICINE AND DENTISTRY OF NEW JERSEY
WITNESS
RUSS MOLLOY, DIRECTOR OF GOVERNMENT RELATIONS, THE UNIVERSITY OF
MEDICINE AND DENTISTRY OF NEW JERSEY
Introduction
Mr. Young. I would like to invite Mr. Russ Molloy, the
Director of Government Relations on behalf of the University of
Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey. Your statement will be
made a part of the record, and we would ask you to summarize at
this time.
Statement of Mr. Molloy
Mr. Molloy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is
interesting that two previous speakers today have already
talked about elements of what it is that we are seeking before
this subcommittee today. Let me give just a brief background
about the university and touch lightly on those two major
issues.
The University of Medicine and Dentistry is the largest
public health sciences university in the Nation. Its statewide
system is located on four academic campuses statewide,
consisting of three medical schools--schools of dentistry,
nursing, a graduate school of biomedical sciences, health-
related professions. It also has its own acute care hospital,
one of the largest in the State. It has in addition three core
teaching hospitals, a behavioral health establishment statewide
and affiliations with more than 100 health care institutions. I
appreciate this opportunity to make note of our two top
priorities with the university.
Let me begin also echoing the previous speaker to thank
you, Mr. Chairman, as well as Mr. Murtha for your achievements
and your work in the area of breast cancer research and
biomedical needs and funding, because this has been a critical
issue for the country. And one of the issues that we want to
bring before you is the need for us to continue to move forward
together to try to address this terrible issue of breast
cancer.
New Jersey itself has the fourth highest incidence of
breast cancer in the country and ranks second in mortality from
the disease. There is an estimation of some 6,500 new breast
cancer cases in the State of New Jersey alone in the next year
of which 2,000 women will die.
What makes this more ironic and of great concern to the
State of New Jersey and the State university is that the
numbers and statistics demonstrate that the individuals who are
being diagnosed with breast cancer, in fact, far surpass any
national or regional statistics. We are one of the most
affluent States in the Nation, but we are also highly urbanized
and densely populated and we have a unique title as well
because we are the home to, by far, the largest number of
Superfund sites and contaminated waste sites in the entire
country.
As a result, there has been a discussion of a linkage
between the environmental factors that are taking effect and
its linkage directly to breast cancer in the State of New
Jersey. What we need is the Committee and your personal
support, Mr. Chairman, to undertake a multifaceted approach to
actually detect, diagnose and treat breast cancer. We have an
ideal laboratory in the State of New Jersey that allows us this
opportunity to really look at the actual questions about the
causes of breast cancer because we are going to link not only
the lifestyle and the standard information, but we are also
going to focus on the environmental causes of this as well as
genetics.
New Jersey is the site of the National Cancer Institute's
newest designated clinical cancer center. The Cancer Institute
of New Jersey is the first and only such site in the state. It
has established the program focusing on the causes and
prevention of breast cancer that brings together the
oncologists, associate workers, specialty nurses, geneticists,
nutritionists, toxicologists, et cetera, all of whom are staff
members of the University of Medicine and Dentistry.
The Cancer Institute of New Jersey received its key funding
from this Subcommittee in order to allow it to be built, and it
is now serving--it was approximately 2 months ago it was
designated by the NCI as a clinical cancer facility. This was
also one--through the sponsorship and support of both Dean
Gallo and Mr. Bernie Dwyer. They have been the primary movers
behind moving this cancer institute forward. And now we are
taking it to the next level.
New Jersey has an additional linkage with the issue of the
environment because the University of Medicine and Dentistry
also houses one of the 18 National Institutes of Environmental
Health Science Centers, which is a joint venture between us and
Rutgers University. Its researchers are closely affiliated with
the Cancer Institute in a unique relationship that is not found
elsewhere which allows the clinicians, the people that are
actually treating people with cancer, to have direct access to
those researchers that are actually studying the causes, due to
the environment, of cancer.
The center itself also houses one of the leading and
largest academically based exposure assessment research teams
in the country, which is looking at a variety of different
toxic waste sites in developing molecular markers for exposure
and risk, which is now a level of technology which allows us to
really look into breast cancer and its causes due to the
environment.
To accomplish the goal of diminishing this incidence of
this terrible disease, we have proposed to you a project to
focus on the epidemiology, surveillance and prevention, and for
this project, we respectfully request an appropriation of $10.5
million. It will allow us and the Cancer Institute and the
NIEHS Center at the university to serve as the national
demonstration project for this issue into the linkage between
the environment and breast cancer.
The last item is something I don't want to give short
shrift to, but it has already been discussed by Dr. Edelman,
concerning the problem we have with infectious disease. We have
proposed before the Committee a project known as the
International Center for Public Health, to be located in the
City of Newark, to focus on and to bring together two key
current institutes: the Public Health Research Institute, which
is a world-class, well-known nonprofit agency, which focuses on
the basic biology and study of infectious diseases--we are
going to bring them over and put them into University Heights
Science Park in Newark and team them up with our national TB
centers, one of the three model TB centers in the Nation, and
have the two of them focus on dealing with the issues of
infectious disease, which is now becoming, as Dr. Edelman
described, of huge concern to the Department of Defense and
security.
This is now becoming--because of the immense amount of
travel that is taking place among the citizens, it is now
bringing to the United States this whole issue about how
infectious disease is being spread. Our proposal is designed to
address this issue directly at the Gateway for some of the
largest population changes and movements, because of the
location of our eight central seaports and airports in the
State of New Jersey.
I want to thank the Committee and you, particularly, Mr.
Chairman, for all of your efforts and thank you for the
opportunity to address you today.
Mr. Young. Mr. Molloy, thank you very much for an excellent
statement. I would like our record to show that you are
accompanied today by Marilyn Thompson as your backup. We
appreciate her being here, and look forward to working with you
as we proceed through the fiscal year 1998 season.
Mr. Molloy. Thank you very much, sir.
[The statement of Mr. Molloy follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
JOINT POLICY BOARD FOR MATHEMATICS
WITNESS
JOHN GUCKENHEIMER, PROFESSOR OF MATHEMATICS AND MECHANICS, CORNELL
UNIVERSITY
Introduction
Mr. Young. I would like to invite Dr. John Guckenheimer,
professor of math and mechanics at Cornell University, to come
to the table. The doctor is president of the Society for
Industrial and Applied Mathematics, and he is representing the
Joint Policy Board for Mathematics.
Doctor, your statement will be made a part of our record,
and you may summarize in any way that you like.
Statement of Dr. Guckenheimer
Dr. Guckenheimer. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
very much for giving me this opportunity to comment on fiscal
year 1998 appropriations for the Department of Defense. I will
be speaking on behalf of the Joint Policy Board for Mathematics
(JPBM), which represents three associations of mathematical
scientists.
Mr. Chairman, JPBM once again calls on Congress to provide
full support for DOD's investment in bank research, especially
research conducted at universities. The buying power of DOD's
support for research is down 30 percent compared to 30 years
ago and nearly 10 percent since fiscal year 1994. We urge this
subcommittee to stem the erosion in these critical investments
and provide DOD's full fiscal year 1998 funding request for
basic research, 6.1 activities.
We ask this because basic research is essential to
maintaining the technological superiority of our forces. The
origins of many key defense technologies can be traced to DOD's
support for basic research conducted at U.S. academic
institutions. Rigorous decision-making processes within DOD
guide these investments to ensure both scientific excellence
and consistency with DOD's strategic priorities. These
thoughtfully planned investments need stable year-to-year
funding.
Let me describe my own experience with DOD's investment in
basic research. I work on dynamical systems. My goal is to
reveal universal patterns in dynamical processes on phenomena
ranges from neural behavior to fluid flows. Today, I shall
describe research that is leading to new mathematical
technologies for use in the design of jet engines. Designers
attempt to optimize engine performance and fuel efficiency,
thrust, emissions and longevity. High cycle fatigue that leads
to catastrophic failure of engines is the cause of many tragic
accidents.
My research addresses limits on engine performance due to
harmful mechanical oscillations or combustion instabilities.
Computer models are used in engine design. My research produces
tools that automate the analysis of these models. In
particular, I seek faster, more efficient ways to determine
parameter values that lead to stable operation of engines.
Resulting tools greatly reduce the need for time-consuming
simulation and provide a framework for understanding engine
instabilities.
Fifteen years ago, the Air Force Office of Scientific
Research helped stimulate my interest in computation. The
research I described today began after foresighted mathematical
scientists at AFOSR introduced me to a group at United
Technologies' research center. This project and others
sponsored by AFOSR are outstanding examples of how the Federal
Government, universities and industry can work together on
matters of importance to the national defense and economy.
Basic research supported by DOD is making an impact within our
defense industries.
I strongly urge you to contribute your support for DOD's
investment in basic research and the contributions of
university-based researchers. Thank you for this opportunity to
express our views for the record regarding fiscal year 1998
appropriations.
I would be pleased to answer any questions you might have.
Mr. Young. Doctor, I had an opportunity to visit a number
of universities that were doing research on programs through
the Department of Defense, and I have to say that I have been
really impressed with the types of research they have done as
well as the results they are getting. We do have a little
difficulty on occasion. There are those who don't want to
provide any DOD money for university projects, but this
Chairman thinks that they are very productive, at least most of
them. The ones that I have seen are very productive and we
appreciate the work that you are doing. Hopefully, we will be
able to have a good bill for you that will carry on some of
this research.
My question would be, have you looked at the President's
budget and how do you see the university research doing in his
budget?
Dr. Guckenheimer. Well, there is a large coalition of
scientific organizations that have been recommending increases
of approximately 7 percent for basic scientific research across
many agencies, and the targets for DOD research happily are
approaching that level in the President's budget. But we would
certainly propose that increases of that order of magnitude are
needed to restore some of the losses that we have seen in
recent years.
Mr. Young. Well, I think it is a great investment, I have
to tell you. And I think an awful lot of things that the
Department of Defense gets credit for actually came from the
university research programs. So I thank you very much for
being here and being part of our program today, and I invite
you to stay in touch with us.
If you have an opportunity, give us some good examples of
what university research has produced that we can go to our
colleagues with and say, look, here is the money, but here is
what we have gotten for it. Those kinds of things are very
helpful when we get into the debates about whether or not to
fund or increase or reduce the research budget.
Dr. Guckenheimer. Thank you. We will do that. Thank you.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much.
[The statement of Dr. Guckenheimer follows:]
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Thursday, April 17, 1997.
FEDERATION OF BEHAVIORAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND COGNITIVE SCIENCES
WITNESS
DAVID JOHNSON, Ph.D., EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, FEDERATION OF BEHAVIORAL,
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND COGNITIVE SCIENCES
Introduction
Mr. Young. We now welcome Dr. David Johnson who is the
Executive Director of the Federation of Behavioral,
Psychological and Cognitive Sciences. Your prepared statement
expresses concern about a number of reductions in the
President's budget to research funding. That statement will be
made a part of the record, and we invite you to present your
testimony in any way that you would like.
Statement of Dr. Johnson
Dr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to say
that I appreciate every year that you sit here until the end.
Not every Chairman does that, so I am glad that you do.
I am testifying today primarily on the 6.1 or basic
research budget and particularly on the basic behavioral
research support in that budget.
But basic research begins a process toward application.
Thus, the 6.2 and 6.3a budgets go hand-in-hand with basic
research. Support of the whole research pipeline--research
development, testing and evaluation--is necessary to assure
that basic research contributes optimally to national defense.
So we support the administration's request for a 7.8 percent
increase for 6.1 research. The increase recovers some losses
suffered in the last 2 years, and provides an inflationary
adjustment.
While most of the research budget is consumed by hardware
and electronics development, a small part of the 6.1 budget,
only about $30 million across all the service branches, out of
the $1.164 billion requested for 6.1 research, is devoted to
research aimed at improving human performance. Much mission-
oriented research is supported by that meager allocation.
At the Air Force, behavioral research is determining how
much and what kind of information is needed to assure top
performance of pilots in combat. At the Navy, it is perfecting
systems and techniques for embedded training that will reduce
costs and improve training quality, especially for rare,
demanding tasks like threat recognition and response.
And among other things, the Army is supporting research to
understand the factors leading to sexual harassment in the
military.
We regret that the requests for 6.1 behavioral research at
the Navy and Air Force are zero percent and 3.5 percent, a far
cry from the 7.8 percent increase sought for 6.1 research
overall. Nevertheless, we are relieved that these requests
represent only an inflationary loss for the Navy and a steady-
state budget for the Air Force, rather than actual cuts. Thus,
we ask the subcommittee to support at least the funding levels
requested for behavioral research at the Navy and Air Force.
Those levels are $16 million for the Navy and $9.057 million
for the Air Force.
We are deeply troubled, however, by the requested 25
percent cut in overall research funding and a planned single-
year staff reduction of 53 percent for the Army Research
Institute.
The concept known as reliance is important in downsizing of
military research. The approach designates a lead service as
the provider to all the services for research in a given area.
All research on social and organizational issues is assigned to
the Army Research Institute. The Army is the only service doing
research on leadership, on the integration of recruits from
diverse backgrounds into well-functioning teams, on sexual
harassment, and on the training of troops for peacekeeping
missions.
The cuts proposed for 1998 will cripple ARI; both the
contemplated staffing level and the requested funding level are
well below what ARI needs to fulfill its responsibilities at an
acceptable level of quality. We must plead with this
subcommittee to give ARI the minimum tools it needs to do its
job.
Without your intervention, fiscal 1998 will see a
precipitous and, we believe, ultimately fatal plunge for ARI.
The research request is $17.75 million, with 6.1 receiving 2
million of that total. The current funding level is $23.7
million, with 6.1 receiving 2.9 million.
Its current authorized staffing level is 254 positions. The
planned level for 1998 is 119 positions. We urge the
subcommittee to support a fiscal 1998 funding level of $21.4
million and a staffing level of 165 full-time equivalent
positions. Both represent painful but survivable cuts from
their 1997 levels.
If ARI is crippled or eliminated, not just the Army, but
the Navy and the Air Force as well, will have lost a critically
important tool to address problems that are as current as
tomorrow's headlines.
I thank you for this opportunity to present our views, and
I thank the subcommittee for its continuing leadership in
support of the Nation's defense.
Mr. Young. Doctor, thank you very much and thank you for
being here. I hope you have the feeling that we are pretty much
committed to basic research; I think that it is essential to
keep America's forces equipped with the best technology that is
possible, and the best quality of life.
We will review your written statement. I tried to make some
quick notes as you were talking, but we will review those as we
get ready to do our markup later on in the early summer.
Thank you for coming. We appreciate your interest and your
involvement.
Dr. Johnson. Thank you.
Mr. Young. The Committee is adjourned.
[The statement of Dr. Johnson follows:]
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W I T N E S S E S
----------
Page
Bapple, Maj. J. W................................................ 461
Brown, L. P...................................................... 966
Bye, Dr. R. E., Jr............................................... 951
Cabral, R. J..................................................... 947
Calkins, C. L.................................................... 652
Carey, J. J...................................................... 415
Clark, Les....................................................... 947
Cline, M. P...................................................... 739
Combest, Hon. Larry.............................................. 941
Cunha, Manuel, Jr................................................ 947
Duggan, D. M..................................................... 693
Edelman, Robert.................................................. 780
Foil, M. B., Jr.................................................. 479
Gernsbacher, M. A................................................ 599
Guckenheimer, John............................................... 897
Gustinis, Judith................................................. 367
Harnage, Bobby, Jr............................................... 545
Harper, J. M..................................................... 939
Hickey, S. T..................................................... 672
Johnson, David................................................... 903
Jollivette, C. M................................................. 983
Joulwan, Gen. G. A............................................... 1
Kenny, M. P...................................................... 947
Krebs, Chief Mas. Sgt. J. W...................................... 643
Lord, Mike....................................................... 716
Mason, Rita...................................................... 542
Mauderly, J. L................................................... 974
Maves, M. D...................................................... 835
Molloy, Russ..................................................... 876
Mundy, Greg...................................................... 827
Northup, Hon. Anne............................................... 536
Norwood, Hon. Charlie............................................ 359
Quellette, Sgt. Maj. M. F........................................ 625
Pallone, Hon. Frank, Jr.......................................... 388
Pappas, Hon. Michael............................................. 384
Peay, Gen. J. H. Binford, III.................................... 161
Prueher, Adm. J. W............................................... 237
Quickel, K. E., Jr............................................... 845
Raymond, Sandra.................................................. 824
Reheis, C. H..................................................... 947
Roemer, Hon. Tim................................................. 351
Sandler, Maj. Gen. R. W.......................................... 431
Savoie, Dr. E. J................................................. 990
Schaffer, Hon. Bob............................................... 938
Schmidly, David.................................................. 942
Sheehan, Gen. J. J............................................... 95
Sifuentes, Eloy.................................................. 390
Skipper, W. H., Jr............................................... 768
Slaughter, Hon. Louise........................................... 367
Tilelli, Gen. J. H............................................... 237
Torsch, Virginia................................................. 716
Van Nest, R. L................................................... 753
Villarreal, Mario................................................ 390
Visco, F. M...................................................... 867
Waters, Hon. Maxine.............................................. 400
Wiener, J. M..................................................... 577
I N D E X
----------
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES ATLANTIC COMMAND
Page
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs)............... 152
Dragonfly.................................................... 159
Budget Inefficiencies............................................ 128
Cuba...........................................................140, 156
Current Operations/Training...................................... 141
Drug Interdiction..............................................135, 158
Haiti............................................................ 157
Information Warfare............................................125, 131
Interoperability................................................. 127
Introduction..................................................... 95
Joint Interoperability/C4I Programs.............................. 155
Joint Operations, Shortfalls in................................128, 139
Link-16.......................................................... 137
National Military Strategy....................................... 133
Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Weapons................... 137
Priorities and Deficiencies...................................... 146
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)...............................124, 150
Future Force Structure, and the.............................. 150
Quality of Recruits.............................................. 125
Remarks of Mr. Murtha............................................ 95
Russian Naval Activity........................................... 134
Statement of General John J. Sheehan............................. 98
Summary Statement of General Sheehan............................. 96
Tactical Aircraft Modernization.................................. 151
Theater and Ballistic Missile Defense............................ 136
Atlantic Command Role in Theater Missile Defense............. 152
Training, Joint.................................................. 126
Training, Readiness.............................................. 138
Troop Quality, Morale, and Medical Issues........................ 149
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)................................... 129
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
Afghanistan/Pakistan Concerns.................................... 217
Air Expeditionary Forces......................................... 228
Bahrain.......................................................... 231
Forward Presence................................................. 214
Guard and Reserve Personnel, Role of............................. 234
Intelligence Budget.............................................. 212
Intelligence Reports............................................. 219
Introduction..................................................... 161
Iran, Action Against...........................................220, 229
Iraq, Enforcing No Fly Zone Over................................. 227
Iraqi Threat...............................................214, 226
Khobar Towers Incident........................................... 218
Potential Retaliation for Khobar Bombing..................... 224
Kurdish Situation, United States Policy Regarding................ 217
Kuwait........................................................... 230
Oil Exports...................................................... 233
Persian Gulf Security............................................ 215
Prepositioned Assets in Middle East.............................. 232
Priorities and Deficiencies...................................... 223
Quality and Morale............................................... 234
Readiness Concerns............................................... 222
Saudi Arabia, Internal Unrest in...............................213, 224
Saudi Government, Cooperation of................................. 220
Statement of General J. H. Binford Peay, III..................... 166
Summary Statement of General Peay................................ 162
Key Enabling Requirements.................................... 165
Safeguarding United States Interests and Security............ 162
USCENTCOM's Five-Pillar Theater Strategy..................... 163
Terrorism........................................................ 216
Civilians as Terrorist Targets............................... 222
Counter-Terrorism............................................ 225
Theater Missile Defense.......................................... 231
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND
Africa........................................................... 91
Airborne Reconnaissance.......................................... 81
Bosnia, Operation Joint Endeavor:
Arms Control in.............................................. 87
Civilian Programs, Progress of............................... 86
Contractor Logistics Support................................. 85
Cost of American Presence in................................. 81
Deployment................................................... 52
Effect of United States Military Presence in................. 69
Exit Strategy................................................76, 83
Guard and Reserve in Bosnia, Role of.........................71, 86
Identification of Mines in................................... 54
Iranian Presence in.......................................... 51
Policy Issues................................................ 83
Reconstruction............................................... 72
Russian Troops in............................................ 67
Training Bosnia Muslims...................................... 53
Computer Security................................................ 74
Cooperation with Russia.......................................... 88
European Command (EUCOM) Priorities and Deficiencies............. 90
Fiscal Year 1997 Emergency Supplemental..........................50, 62
Full Spectrum Force..............................................73, 74
International Military Education and Training (IMET)............. 62
Introduction..................................................... 1
Israel........................................................... 52
Joint Intelligence Center........................................ 67
Joint Surveillance Target and Attack Radar System (JSTARS)
Aircraft....................................................... 67
Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS)....................... 74
Military Health Care............................................. 90
Military Personnel, Quality of................................... 89
Mine Threat to United States Troops..............................75, 86
Missile Defense.................................................. 65
NATO Expansion...................................................72, 82
NATO Forces.................................................. 72
NATO-Russian Brigade, Joint.................................. 58
Russian Reaction to NATO Expansion........................... 57
Quality of Life.................................................. 70
Remarks of Mr. Cunningham........................................ 78
Russian Military Forces..........................................75, 88
Statement of General George A. Joulwan........................... 7
Summary Statement of General Joulwan............................. 2
Bosnia, Operation Joint Endeavor............................. 3
Operations TEMPO (OPTEMPO)................................... 2
Partnership for Peace Programs............................... 4
Quality of Life.............................................. 5
Terrorism Threat................................................. 63
Troop Strength................................................... 84
Turkey........................................................... 51
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)................................55, 63, 64
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)................................ 80
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES FORCES, KOREA
Bosnia Funding................................................... 328
China............................................................ 342
Amphibious Capability........................................ 334
and the Pacific Region....................................... 315
Force Modernization, Chinese................................. 310
Power Projection Capabilities..............................311, 322
Combat Engineering Vehicle (CEV)................................. 335
Country Relations................................................ 309
Equipment Prepositioning in the Pacific.......................... 326
F-16 Sales to Indonesia.......................................... 314
Fiscal Year 1997 Supplemental Funding............................ 343
Force Levels in the Pacific Theater.............................. 344
Hong Kong Reversion.............................................. 314
Intelligence Requirements........................................ 321
International Military Education and Training (IMET)............. 323
Introduction..................................................... 237
Japan, United States Partnership With............................ 312
Okinawa, Japan............................................... 329
Joint Operations................................................. 343
Military Construction Appropriations...........................321, 324
Mobile Offshore Bases............................................ 318
Korea..........................................................339, 341
Assistance to North Korea.................................... 311
Food Shortages in North Korea................................ 322
Humanitarian Assistance to North Korea....................... 330
Military Construction in..................................... 315
North Korean Defectors....................................... 333
North Korean Military Capabilities........................... 316
North Korean Nuclear Program................................. 331
Policy Towards North Korea................................... 331
Water Quality for United States Forces in Korea.............. 329
Personnel, Quality of Life of..................................309, 325
POW/MIA Status................................................... 348
Priorities and Deficiencies...................................... 336
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and Future Force Structure...... 337
Quality of Life...........................................316, 318, 348
Recruits, Quality of............................................. 312
Remarks of Mr. Hobson............................................ 313
Russian Navy, Status of.......................................... 325
Shortstop Electronic Protection System (SEPS).................... 336
Statement of Admiral Joseph W. Prueher........................... 243
Statement of General John H. Tilelli, Jr......................... 292
Strategic Lift/Prepositioned Equipment........................... 347
Summary Statement of Admiral Prueher............................. 237
Balancing Resources for our Strategy......................... 241
Country Assessments.......................................... 239
China.................................................... 239
India.................................................... 240
Japan.................................................... 239
North Korea.............................................. 239
Russia................................................... 240
South Asia............................................... 241
Pacific Command Strategy..................................... 238
Summary...................................................... 242
Summary Statement of General Tilelli............................. 292
Quality of Life of Personnel................................. 293
Readiness of Forces.......................................... 292
Summary...................................................... 293
Theater Missile Defense (TMD).................................... 317
Training Exercises............................................... 319
Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO) and Training...................... 345
Reservist Contribution to Exercises.......................... 320
Troop Quality, Morale, and Medical............................... 347
Vietnam/Cambodia/Laos............................................ 326
Weapons Modernization............................................ 334
TESTIMONY OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AND OTHER INTERESTED INDIVIDUALS AND
ORGANIZATIONS
Air Force Sergeants Association.................................. 643
American Academy of Otolaryngology--Head and Neck Surgery, Inc... 835
American Association of Nurse Anesthetists....................... 753
American Federation of Government Employees....................390, 542
American Psychiatric Association................................. 577
American Psychological Association............................... 599
American Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene................ 780
Brain Injury Association, Inc.................................... 479
California Industry and Government Coalition on PM-10/PM-2.5..... 947
Colorado State University........................................ 938
Enlisted Association of the National Guard of the United States.. 739
Federation of Behavioral, Psychological and Cognitive Sciences... 903
Fleet Reserve Association........................................ 652
Florida State University......................................... 951
Fort Monmouth, New Jersey......................................384, 388
High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) and Other
Tactical Vehicles.............................................. 351
Intelligence Programs............................................ 400
Joint Policy Board for Mathematics............................... 897
Joslin Diabetes Center........................................... 845
National Association for Uniformed Services...................... 461
National Association of Energy Service Companies................. 957
National Breast Cancer Coalition................................. 867
National Coalition for Osteoporosis and Related Bone Diseases.... 824
National Guard Association of the United States.................. 768
National Military Family Association............................. 672
Naval Ordnance Station, Louisville, Kentucky..................... 536
Naval Reserve Association........................................ 415
New York University.............................................. 966
Non Commissioned Officers Association of the United States of
America........................................................ 625
Reserve Officers Association of the United States................ 431
Rochester Institute of Technology................................ 367
State of Louisiana............................................... 990
Telemedicine Technology.......................................... 359
Texas Tech University............................................ 941
The American Legion.............................................. 693
The Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute...................... 974
The Military Coalition........................................... 416
The University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey........... 876
University of Miami.............................................. 983