[House Hearing, 105 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 1999
_______________________________________________________________________
HEARINGS
BEFORE A
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida, Chairman
JOSEPH M. McDADE, Pennsylvania JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania
BOB LIVINGSTON, Louisiana NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington
JERRY LEWIS, California W. G. (BILL) HEFNER, North Carolina
JOE SKEEN, New Mexico MARTIN OLAV SABO, Minnesota
DAVID L. HOBSON, Ohio JULIAN C. DIXON, California
HENRY BONILLA, Texas PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana
GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, Jr.,
Washington
ERNEST J. ISTOOK, Jr., Oklahoma
RANDY ``DUKE'' CUNNINGHAM,
California
NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Livingston, as Chairman of the Full
Committee, and Mr. Obey, as Ranking Minority Member of the Full
Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees.
Kevin M. Roper, David F. Kilian, Alicia Jones, Juliet Pacquing,
Gregory J. Walters, Patricia Ryan, Doug Gregory, Paul W. Juola, Tina
Jonas, Steven D. Nixon,
David L. Norquist, and Betsy Phillips, Staff Assistants
Jennifer Mummert and Sherry L. Young, Administrative Aides
________
PART 1
Page
Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army......................... 1
Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, and Commandant
of the Marine Corps............................................... 229
Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force.................... 449
________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations
________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
77-494 WASHINGTON : 2002
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
BOB LIVINGSTON, Louisiana, Chairman
JOSEPH M. McDADE, Pennsylvania DAVID R. OBEY, Wisconsin
C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida SIDNEY R. YATES, Illinois
RALPH REGULA, Ohio LOUIS STOKES, Ohio
JERRY LEWIS, California JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania
JOHN EDWARD PORTER, Illinois NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington
HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky MARTIN OLAV SABO, Minnesota
JOE SKEEN, New Mexico JULIAN C. DIXON, California
FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia VIC FAZIO, California
TOM DeLAY, Texas W. G. (BILL) HEFNER, North Carolina
JIM KOLBE, Arizona STENY H. HOYER, Maryland
RON PACKARD, California ALAN B. MOLLOHAN, West Virginia
SONNY CALLAHAN, Alabama MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio
JAMES T. WALSH, New York DAVID E. SKAGGS, Colorado
CHARLES H. TAYLOR, North Carolina NANCY PELOSI, California
DAVID L. HOBSON, Ohio PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana
ERNEST J. ISTOOK, Jr., Oklahoma ESTEBAN EDWARD TORRES, California
HENRY BONILLA, Texas NITA M. LOWEY, New York
JOE KNOLLENBERG, Michigan JOSE E. SERRANO, New York
DAN MILLER, Florida ROSA L. DeLAURO, Connecticut
JAY DICKEY, Arkansas JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia
JACK KINGSTON, Georgia JOHN W. OLVER, Massachusetts
MIKE PARKER, Mississippi ED PASTOR, Arizona
RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey CARRIE P. MEEK, Florida
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina
MICHAEL P. FORBES, New York CHET EDWARDS, Texas
GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, Jr., ROBERT E. (BUD) CRAMER, Jr.,
Washington Alabama
MARK W. NEUMANN, Wisconsin
RANDY ``DUKE'' CUNNINGHAM,
California
TODD TIAHRT, Kansas
ZACH WAMP, Tennessee
TOM LATHAM, Iowa
ANNE M. NORTHUP, Kentucky
ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama
James W. Dyer, Clerk and Staff Director
(ii)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 1999
----------
FISCAL YEAR 1999 ARMY POSTURE
WITNESSES
HON. ROBERT M. WALKER, ACTING SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
GENERAL DENNIS J. REIMER, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY
Introduction
Mr. Young. The Committee will come to order. This morning
the Committee will conduct an open hearing on the posture of
the United States Army. And we are pleased to welcome the
Acting Secretary of the Army, the Honorable Robert M. Walker,
and the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Dennis Reimer. The
Committee looks forward to hearing from you on the Army's
posture, as well as your fiscal year 1999 budget.
I also would like to recognize that in the audience is
General Navas of the Army National Guard and General Baratz of
the Army Reserve. And we are happy to have you as well. As our
force gets smaller, your particular forces become extremely
important, more so every day; and it is important because as we
meet today, we have over 100,000 American troops deployed
overseas, including the several thousand recently sent to the
Persian Gulf region, as well as the peacekeeping mission in
Bosnia.
So we know that the demands on the Army are great, we know
that the missions are being conducted extremely effectively.
The Committee is very proud of the men and women who serve in
uniform and who are conducting these missions.
We will hear from you as to your assessment of the budget
that is presented for the Army by the administration. The bad
news is that, unlike previous years, we don't have any extra
money this year. We always like to ask if there were extra
money, what would you like to do with it? And you have never
been bashful about submitting a list of unfunded priorities.
We may still ask that question this year, but it is very
doubtful whether there will be any extra money. So we will have
to scrutinize the budget very closely.
I have a very lengthy statement that I will have presented
for the record.
[Chairman Young's prepared statement follows:]
This morning, the Committee will conduct an open hearing on the
posture of the United States Army. The Committee is pleased to welcome
the Acting Secretary of the Army, the Honorable Robert M. Walker, and
the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Dennis J. Reimer. The Committee
looks forward to hearing from you on the Army's posture as well as your
fiscal year 1999 budget request.
Today's Army is one-third smaller than it was just six years ago,
but this smaller force is still defending America's interests around
the globe. As we meet today, over 100,000 soldiers are forward deployed
overseas, including several thousand recently sent to the Persian Gulf
region, as well as those involved in the peacekeeping mission in
Bosnia. The movement of troops to the Persian Gulf provides a vivid
reminder to all of us that the world is still a dangerous place. And it
also reminds us what we ask of our men and women in uniform: with
little warning, or on short notice, they may be called away from home,
away from their families, to carry out difficult and challenging
missions. Once again ``America's Army'' has been called, and once
again, it has responded, and for that we want to thank you and
especially our soldiers for helping to keep the peace.
As we all know, the Army's ability to fulfill these missions
depends largely on the type of support it receives, which brings us to
your fiscal year 1999 budget request. As Chairman of this subcommittee,
I have previously expressed my concerns over your current and near-term
readiness, a major challenge given a shrinking force, new missions, and
budget cuts; and also future readiness, which depends on an adequate
modernization program.
We need to ask you today whether this budget meets these demands. I
must say we are concerned, because once again we are facing major
unfunded shortfalls in your readiness accounts, starting with the
operations in Bosnia and the Persian Gulf. And we continue to hear
reports from the field of how training is suffering, of shortages in
base operations funding and problems with maintenance and spare parts.
As for long-term readiness, your fiscal year 1999 modernization
budget is $13 billion--almost a $800 million increase over last year's
appropriated amount. This is good news, I guess, but we can't forget,
as you reminded me the other day, Secretary Walker, this is the first
proposed increase for Army modernization in 13 years. My own view is
that we still have a lot of catching up to do.
Even though your modernization budget goes up, it is still focused
on upgrading or extending the life of existing weapons systems. There
is not a lot of new production. Based on your fiscal year 1999 budget
request, it will take 30 years to procure your requirement for new
medium tactical trucks; the Kiowa Warrior scout helicopter will remain
in the fleet until fiscal year 2022; and the Army will continue to dip
into its war reserves for ammunition to satisfy training requirements.
I worry that as a result, your current modernization programs may lead
to long term readiness problems.
We do know you are thinking about the future. The Army's major
effort in this area is ``Force XXI'', and with this budget you are
putting Force XXI on the fast track, by accelerating the fielding of
the first ``digitized'' division from fiscal year 2001 to 2000. This
goal poses may challenges. Many of the basic design and technologies
needed for Force XXI are still in development, and we hope that your
plan does not sacrifice performance in order to maintain this
accelerated schedule. In bringing these revolutionary technologies to
the battlefield, we have to be prepared to go a bit slower, if that is
what's needed to get it right. We look forward to hearing your vision
of Force XXI and the added capabilities you believe it will bring to
the battlefield.
In closing, we look forward to your testimony today on these and
other issues, and I want to once again pledge our willingness to work
closely with you in meeting the needs of the Army and its most
important asset, its soldiers. We have the same goals you do, and we
want to know where this Committee can help you strike a balance between
funding for current readiness and a modernization program that protects
readiness in the long run.
Mr. Young. I would ask that you could present your full
statements for the record and summarize them as you would.
Before we recognize you, Mr. Secretary, I would like to yield
to my colleague, Mr. Murtha.
Mr. Murtha. I have no statement.
Mr. Young. Mr. Secretary, we would be happy to hear from
you.
Summary Statement of Secretary Walker
Secretary Walker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
will submit my written statement for the record.
A couple of you here still remember my old mentor, Joe
Evins, of Tennessee. When he asked Chairman Mahon to hire me to
be a staff member on the House Appropriations Committee in
1971, I had no idea that I would ever be back here as a
witness, testifying as the Acting Secretary of the Army. I am
very honored to do so.
My career started right here on the House Appropriations
Committee, on what was then the Subcommittee on Public Works,
now the Energy and Water Subcommittee, which Chairman McDade
chairs. What I learned here on Appropriations has helped me
throughout my career, and this is where it all started for me,
so I thank this Committee for that.
Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the men and women who are the
United States Army, I want to thank this Committee for your
strong support of soldiers. It is recognized and deeply
appreciated.
Mr. Chairman, this is an historic budget request. It is the
first time in 13 years that the Army has requested an increase
from the previous year's appropriation. Secretary Cohen
listened to us during major budget issues, and he helped us
where we asked and where we needed it most.
As you alluded to in your statement, Mr. Chairman, the Army
is very, very busy these days. It is clearly the force of
choice. In 28 deployments since the end of the Cold War, the
Army has provided 60 percent of the personnel to those
deployments. The Army is doing that heavy lifting today for
about 25 percent, about a fourth of the defense budget. So
America is getting a great bargain from her Army.
READINESS
Last week more than 28,000 soldiers, in addition to those
already forward deployed, were training or on deployment inside
the United States or in 76 other countries.
To help ease the tempo of the active force, as you
indicated, Mr. Chairman, more than 6,000 of those soldiers were
from the Reserve components. So the total force is very busy
and hard at work.
Now as you know, readiness continues to be our top
priority. So no potential enemy or international tyrant should
ever doubt the United States Army is ready to do the job that
it is called on to do.
Now, I know that because I spent this weekend with our
deploying soldiers at Fort Bliss, Fort Benning, and Fort
Stewart, Georgia. I spent hours talking to these soldiers,
hundreds of them. My staff tells me I shook hands with over a
thousand soldiers before they left. I looked in their eyes and
I thanked them for their courage and their sacrifice and the
sacrifice of their families.
Our soldiers today are the best. You all have seen that, as
I have. They are the best trained, the best led and the best
equipped. They just don't get any better, and our country is
very, very fortunate for that.
Mr. Chairman, of course, there have been some recent
questions raised about readiness. Concerns have been expressed,
for instance, about training at the National Training Center.
As many of you know, I was the clerk of the MILCON Subcommittee
on the Senate Appropriations Committee for 13 years, before
President Clinton nominated me to be an Assistant Secretary of
the Army.
From that position, I have visited Fort Irwin and the
National Training Center since it first began, as Congressman
Lewis knows. I have been there on so many different rotations I
can't count them, and I can tell you from observation that the
quality of the training there is better than ever. It is more
complex. It is more sophisticated. It is one reason the United
States Army is an even better prepared Army today than it was
before Desert Shield/Desert Storm.
Of course, we have to work hard to maintain readiness, and
we will need to continue to pursue certain enablers which help
us keep readiness high, enablers such as afloat and ashore
prepositioning and Army the National Guard Division redesign
plan to convert 12 combat brigades into combat support and
combat service support. And we will continue to need access to
assured and sufficient airlift and sealift.
Every month General Reimer and I are briefed on the details
of readiness by unit, and we also serve on OSD's Senior
Readiness Oversight Council which meets monthly to monitor
readiness trends. When specific shortfalls are identified, the
Army staff works very closely with our field commanders to
resolve them.
RECRUITING
For instance, we have seen an increase in the number of
unfilled infantry squads. That has been the result, in part, of
shortfalls in recruiting for certain Military Occupational
Specialties, MOSs, such as infantry. With the help of this
Committee, we are turning that around. Increasing the college
fund and the number of recruiters and other initiatives are
beginning to pay off. So today we are meeting our overall
recruiting goals, and we are improving the number of those
being recruited for infantry. And as those new infantry
soldiers come out of the training base and begin to join units,
we will see the number of unfilled squads being reduced.
As you know, though, it is getting harder to recruit today.
Young people have many other opportunities in a good economy.
Even McDonald's provides money for college now to people coming
on to work for them.
Since the defining characteristic of our Army is quality
people, we must continue to recruit and retain the best that
America has to offer. To do that, we are going to need to
continue to have the support of this committee, and we
appreciate that.
EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL
Mr. Chairman, there are two other issues which impact
readiness. As you know, the President will soon request a non-
offset emergency supplemental to fund the cost of contingencies
for the remainder of 1998. In addition, the 1999 budget
includes an allowance for contingencies in the 920 function, I
believe.
I want to stress the importance of these requests to Army
readiness. We cannot absorb those costs. Without these funds,
commanders will be forced to curtail training. They will be
forced to reduce equipment maintenance. And if that happens,
readiness of a number of Army units will fall to unacceptable
levels.
So I respectfully request this Committee to approve an
emergency non-offset supplemental in the additional allowance
for 1999.
BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE
Mr. Chairman, I also solicit your support for two
additional rounds of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC). When
I was an Assistant Secretary, I was the Army's base closure
official. It was the hardest thing I ever did. But base
closures do save money, money that we could invest in the Army
of the future to invest in the future readiness of the Army.
By the year 2001, the Army will be saving almost a billion
dollars annually from previous rounds of BRAC. But after four
rounds of BRAC, we still have excess infrastructure. So to fund
future modernization and future force structure, to fund the
future readiness of the Army, the next generation of Army
leaders will need us today to make some hard decisions. They
will need us to reduce excess infrastructure and they will need
us to adopt best business practices, reduce overhead, and
engage in that Revolution in Business Affairs that Secretary
Cohen has spoken so eloquently about.
FISCAL YEAR 1999 BUDGET REQUEST
Now, Mr. Chairman, with regard to the fiscal year 1999
budget request specifically, the most significant achievement
in this request is the increase for procurement. Using
resources freed up by the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and
by taking a certain level of risk in budgeting for
efficiencies, we have increased procurement 17 percent over
last year. At last, the procurement holiday is over. We are
transforming an Industrial Age Army into an Information Age
Army, and we must stay on that path. Our equipment is aging and
wearing out and technology marches on.
Today, 80 percent of our fielded weapons systems employ
technology from the 1970s, and our soldiers are driving trucks
that are older than they are. So to free up the resources
required for a sustained and adequate modernization program, we
must improve our commitment to acquisition reform and we must
reduce our overhead and support costs.
We must also capture the promise of Information Age
technology. We must improve the speed, firepower and accuracy
of the Army and reduce the weight of the Army in order to make
it more deployable and better sustainable.
Our acquisition officials tell us that the Force XXI
process underway today can actually double the combat
effectiveness of our current fielded weapons systems and then
lead us to a truly revolutionary Army, the Army After Next,
around the year 2025.
The best way to achieve a real and solid Revolution in
Military Affairs, while maintaining combat overmatch and
meeting our readiness and engagement responsibilities, is to
make sound business decisions today, to focus science and
technology on the future, and to seize technological
breakthroughs as they become viable. I assure this committee
that we will work very closely with the Congress as we
transform the Army to the 21st century.
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I will briefly discuss
two additional issues. Secretary West and General Reimer showed
great leadership last year in developing the Human Relations
Action Plan. We are now conducting in-progress reviews to
monitor 128 separate actions required by that plan. General
Reimer and I will work very closely to ensure that an
atmosphere of equal opportunity continues to exist in the Army.
We will work hard to ensure that in the Army, all soldiers
serve together with dignity and respect.
RESERVE COMPONENTS
Mr. Chairman, as you have pointed out, we are accompanied
to this hearing today by the leadership of the total Army, by
the Director of the Army National Guard, General Navas and the
Chief of the United States Army Reserve, General Baratz.
We want to assure this Committee that the Department of the
Army is fully committed to a total force. You alluded to the
fact that budget reality requires it, the taxpayers deserve it
and, in truth, the future of the Army depends on it. So we are
actively engaged in implementing Secretary Cohen's Total Force
Integration Policy. The National Guard and the Army Reserve
will always be at our decision table.
The Army Resource Board Support Group brings final
recommendations to the Chief and to me on all resource issues
in the Army. We have invited the Director of the Army Guard and
the Chief of the Army Reserve to be full members of that
important forum.
So, Mr. Chairman, the National Guard and the Army Reserve
will be there on the takeoff and they will be there on the
landing. We will make decisions as one seamless Total Army
team. In the 1999 budget, you will see something that I have
never seen before. We have requested more, for instance, for
the Army National Guard than was appropriated last year. In
fact, the request for the Guard is almost $400 million more
than our request in fiscal year 1998. So we are making
progress.
Do we fund every requirement? No, we don't fund every
requirement for any of the components. That is true throughout
the budget because of budget constraints. But the bottom line
is the budget is getting better.
Mr. Chairman, as you know, we are engaged in a number of
initiatives for Reserve component integration, and I would call
your attention to only one of them. Since I became an Assistant
Secretary, I have overseen the Department of Defense support to
civil authorities. That responsibility has traditionally
focused on floods, earthquakes, hurricanes and the like. Since
Oklahoma City, however, we have been devoting a considerable
amount of time to the potential of weapons of mass destruction.
I will never forget the overwhelming sadness I felt when I
entered the rubble of what had been the Murrah Federal
Building. I still keep on my desk a thick piece of glass that
the FBI gave me from the child care center. I keep it there as
a reminder of what can happen in this country. One hundred
sixty-eight people died that day in Oklahoma City, but 5,000
would have died if that weapon--if that bomb--had been a
chemical weapon.
So I want to thank this Committee for your leadership in
domestic preparedness. As the DOD executive agent for domestic
preparedness, we are working with the Federal Emergency
Management Agency and other Federal agencies to help emergency
first responders in 120 cities nationwide. When that program is
complete, we will have helped train tens of thousands of
emergency responders.
But, Mr. Chairman, there are five million emergency
responders in this Nation today. Last fall, Secretary Cohen,
after hearing the request of this Committee, asked us to begin
better integrating the Guard and Reserve and to meeting the
threat of weapons of mass destruction. The budget we present
today includes a new initiative to do just that. So I urge the
Committee to approve this important new initiative.
SUMMARY
Mr. Chairman, the members of this Committee have recently
traveled to Bosnia, Kuwait, and Korea. You know what kind of
soldiers they are. They are just like those soldiers I saw this
weekend. They are the best of America. Not only do they work
hard, but like those soldiers who boarded those 747s this
weekend, they are prepared to put their lives on the line for
our country.
We owe them not only our respect and admiration, but we owe
them a good quality of life, and we owe them an opportunity to
achieve their own personal hopes and goals and aspirations. So
I conclude my testimony as I began, by thanking this committee
for everything that you do for soldiers. If we get it right
with soldiers, all these other issues, all these other
challenges will fall into place.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear today
and we look forward to your questions.
[Clerk's note.--The statement of Secretary Walker follows.
The fiscal year 1999 Joint Posture Statement of the Secretary
of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army is printed at
the end of this hearing. See page 137.]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
REMARKS OF MR. YOUNG
Mr. Young. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for an
excellent statement. And I think I can safely say that I don't
think anyone in the world has more respect for the members of
our military than the members who serve on this Committee. And
I don't think that there are any persons in the world who are
more committed and dedicated to a good quality of life for them
and for their families. And I would include you and the General
in that category, because I know that we are all working for
the same thing.
And General Reimer, we would like to hear from you. I just
wanted to say that I don't know how you have done it, but you
have managed to do a lot more with a lot less in recent years,
and you have done an outstanding job. And I know that the
problems that are presented to you with downsizing and with the
funding not--and I think you might not agree publicly, but
funding not being adequate for the needs of the United States
Army, and I am pleased that this year's budget does appear to
be a lot better. The increases that the Secretary mentioned and
the increases that we see as we go through the budget, it is a
lot better than it has been in recent years and we compliment
you for that, because I know that you had an awful lot to do
with making sure that that happened. So we would like to hear
from you at this time, sir.
Summary Statement of General Reimer
General Reimer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, and
members of the Committee, first of all, I am delighted to be
here and to be able to represent the soldiers of the total
Army; the Active, the Guard and the Reserve, and the dedicated
Army civilian workforce that we have.
I think the Secretary has covered it very well. I would
just like to highlight two or three points that he has made in
his opening statement and of course, submit my statement for
the record.
First of all, let me say that when President Clinton talked
about change in the State of the Union address, and I was
there, I thought about the United States Army. He talked about
the ground literally shifting underneath our feet as we change
into the Information Age and into a new world. And certainly if
you look at what has happened to the United States Army and
what is programmed to happen to the United States Army, that
change is very evident.
Since the Wall came down, we have taken over 630,000 people
out of the Army, soldiers and civilians. We have closed over
700 bases throughout the world. We have changed from a forward-
deployed to a power-projection Army. Our strategy has changed
from containment to engagement and enlargement. It is almost a
180-degree change for us. That change has had tremendous
ramifications, and the budget that we have submitted to you
today, the 1999 budget, I think reflects those changes.
I have been involved with the formulation of the Army
budget now since 1991, and I can remember, as the Vice Chief of
Staff of the Army, we used to always look at 1998 and 1999 as
tough years. The problem with staying around the Army so long
is that you get the chance to live through those tough years
and that is what we are doing.
But I would tell you that what we have done with the 1998
and the 1999 budgets which we have before you today, is to
balance near-term readiness and future readiness as equally as
we possibly can.
Our first priority remains near-term readiness, but clearly
in this 1999 budget, you see us shifting some of the risks to
near-term readiness in order to prepare for the future. If we
do not, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I think we
face a window of vulnerability in the outyears. We have to
address that, and we have to make those tough decisions now, as
Secretary Walker said, now so that we will not have that window
of vulnerability, and the people who follow us in the 21st
century will have the same great Army that we have been very
fortunate to lead.
So I would say that the most important part of this budget
is that we have tried to keep it as balanced as we possibly
could. We have tried to make sure that we have as many
efficiencies as possible in this budget. It has $10.5 billion
worth of efficiencies built into the program years. If we are
unable to achieve those efficiencies, then we have holes, and
some of those efficiencies are very tough. They involve more
efficient business practices. They involve reduction of
personnel. But the reduction of personnel, for example, the
reduction of 15,000 Active and in the 45,000 Reserve soldiers
that came out of the Quadrennial Defense Review, results in us
shifting $5 billion over the program into the modernization
account.
So those are the tough decisions that we have had to make,
and we have had to make them while making sure that we don't
increase the PERSTEMPO for our soldiers who are working very
hard. We believe this is doable.
I would also say to you that the Reserve component funding
is very, very important to us, because the Reserve component
constitutes 54 percent of our service. We rely on them heavily.
In Bosnia today, there are about 3,000 reservists helping us
out, and they have been there since the very start. We could
not do that mission without them. The Army is put together as a
total Army, and we must make it work.
Today, the Reserve component budget that we submit to you
is funded at about 14.5 percent of the Total Obligation
Authority (TOA). As a mark on the wall in 1985, that was
somewhere around 9\1/4\ percent. So what we have tried to do is
to give a greater percentage of the dollars we get to the
Reserve component. But I will be the first to tell you that
they are underfunded in terms of the total requirements that we
have across the board.
We have tried to spread the risk as best we could, keeping
in mind, first of all, the National Military Strategy, which is
built on the three pillars of shape, respond and prepare.
Finally, let me just say, as the Secretary said, thanks to
the members of this Committee. You have been magnificent in
your support of our soldiers. Many of you have taken the time
to visit our soldiers, in past years and in the present. You
have gone to Bosnia, you have gone to other places. You have
seen those soldiers out there. They deeply appreciate it. I
want you to know how much I appreciate it and how much I
enjoyed the opportunity to talk to you about what you observed
over there. That is very, very important to me.
These magnificent soldiers who represent our Nation,
represent our Army, don't ask for much. But they certainly
deserve an adequate and predictable quality of life and that is
what we are stressing. I think when we talk about adequate and
predictable quality of life, we are talking about four things.
Adequate pay, and that is why you are seeing us come in with as
much of a pay increase as we possibly can. They deserve
adequate medical care and that is very, very important to them.
They deserve adequate housing, whether they are married or
whether they are single. And the last thing is a stable
retirement benefit program.
We are on the third retirement program since I have been in
the military. And each year there are other ideas about how we
can change retirement, and quite frankly, the soldiers are
becoming confused. We need to stabilize that, and we need to
give them those four things. That is what we have concentrated
on in our quality of life program.
Let me just close by saying that soldiers are our
credentials and I, like Secretary Walker, saw those soldiers at
the Third Infantry Division at Fort Stewart going to Kuwait.
They are truly magnificent. I couldn't be more proud of them.
We ought to judge our readiness by how they perform in Bosnia
and Kuwait and wherever we ask them to perform.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. And I
look forward to your questions.
[The statement of General Reimer follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Young. General, thank you very much. As you know this
afternoon, we will, in closed session, deal with acquisition
programs, so probably the questions this morning would be more
directed to the overall posture.
I am going to yield my first 5 minutes of questioning to my
colleague, Mr. Lewis.
Mr. Lewis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, General Reimer, it is a pleasure to be with
you. I must confess that when I first looked at this
magnificent brochure, I kind of looked around the room. I have
been calling the Secretary ``Mike'' for so long, I couldn't
find Robert Walker, our former colleague from Pennsylvania.
Secretary Walker. I get confused myself, sir.
EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL
Mr. Lewis. Mr. Secretary, at the outset of your statement,
you indicated that this was the first time in recent history, I
think since 1985 anyway, that the Army budget is requesting an
increase from the previous year.
I have to presume from your opening comment that you
anticipate shortly that a supplemental request will come up
here. I presume it will come in a package that might relate to
the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Probably tucked away
within that will be minor questions that relate to the military
and specifically to the Army.
Secretary Walker. I don't specifically know how it will be
packaged, but we hope by the end of next week the Committee
will have requests for the supplemental.
Mr. Lewis. The Federal Emergency Management Agency comes
under a subcommittee's responsibility that meets in another
room that relates to some of my own work. But I too shared with
you that disaster in Oklahoma City and went and visited shortly
after that explosion, and to say the least, that kind of
responsibility that is technically domestic in most of its form
but nonetheless very much relates to those Reserve forces is a
very important piece of our work.
I would assume that the President will be requesting then,
in whatever supplemental, however it comes up here,
supplemental funding that is a non-offset supplemental. That is
your understanding as well?
Secretary Walker. That is correct.
Mr. Lewis. Did your testimony indicate that the President
will request another BRAC round?
Secretary Walker. Yes, sir. The authorization bill, at
least, includes a request for two additional BRAC rounds in
2001 and 2005, I believe.
NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER
Mr. Lewis. Okay. General Reimer, I believe that since I
have arrived on this Committee, that we now have our fourth
commander at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin. It may
be more than that, but roughly that is the number that I
remember. General Cash is a recent arrival.
There is only one difficulty with that natural process of
exchange and turnover. It is that you have got to get the new
guy up to speed with some regularity. I have been very
concerned about the fact that there is only so much territory
around the NTC, and the availability of the expanded territory
is every year becoming more and more limited. With the passage
and eventual signing of the East Mojave territory, room for
expansion was significantly limited. We are all but cut off to
the west in terms of future expansion.
Presently, I can tell you that there are forces developing
that all but close the door to the east, even though after a
short hop there is all that East Mojave expansion potential,
but the desert tortoises to the south. There is some
opportunity to provide reserve territory for the tortoise in
the East Mojave, but if we don't get at it soon, those who
would essentially close down the Army in that region will have
their way. It is very important that you help us in the
remainder of this Congress to make sure that those
opportunities are not lost to the south.
We have in place in the other agencies, Interior, people
who are ready to move. In some way that has to be raised in
terms of priorities so that we get that accomplished now, not
later. Otherwise we are going to lose the opportunity.
General Reimer. Well, Congressman, as you know, and I
certainly agree with you, we need more land at the National
Training Center and we have estimated our requirements at about
200,000 acres or a little bit higher. The recent Advanced
Warfighting Experiment (AWE) we ran out there with the task
force indicated that our battle space requirements, given the
capabilities we now have in this Force XXI process, are going
to require additional territory.
And as you stated also, we are looking at two different
options over there. There is an Environmental Impact Statement
ongoing, which should be completed shortly. I don't know the
results of those studies, but as you outlined, there are pros
and cons with each of the different expansion options, and what
we have to do is to look at them and figure out which way is
the best way to go.
Mr. Lewis. The reason I raise the point to this level,
General, is because I am concerned that, you know, the map is
different than the territory, and the people in place out there
have interests that are different than the Army's needs and the
Army's interests. And unless we actually raise that to a level
where we insist upon action in the near term, we could lose the
opportunity for action. I am not trying to ring a bell that is
not an important bell. Literally, there are those who would
like to stop any NTC expansion and they are working against it
every day.
Timing is everything on this expansion and I would urge you
to consider moving forward in the months ahead.
General Reimer. I fully understand. We have tried to always
put good people at the National Training Center and the Joint
Readiness Training Center and which are our combat training
programs, the dirt part of it. And because of that, there has
probably been more frequent rotation than some would like, but
I think it is important to get those good people in there.
I understand the need to move quickly on this. We are
moving as quickly as we possibly can, and we will continue to
push that.
Mr. Lewis. Well, if you would look at this. If we do find
ourselves with a supplemental in the short time ahead of us,
from time to time we do have occasion to use language, even in
an appropriations bill, it is very infrequent but this is a
really critical consideration. It may be that your people may
want to consider our being of some assistance if we consult
with our authorizing committees and the like. We should not
delay this another year.
Mr. Young. Mr. Lewis, thank you very much.
Mr. Lewis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
GUARD AND RESERVE ROLE IN DOMESTIC TERRORISM
Mr. Young. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned that this Committee
had taken the lead in providing the ability for the military,
especially the Reserve and Guard, to respond to domestic
terroristic activities and Mr. Murtha, of course, was the
leader in initiating that effort. And that is included amongst
his long list of accomplishments.
Of course, one of the others at the top is that fact that
he engineered the new seats for the High Mobility Multipurpose
Wheeled Vehicle, the HMMWV.
Secretary Walker. And I personally thank him for that.
Mr. Young. Mr. Murtha.
Mr. Murtha. I appreciate that. I really don't have any
questions but I have got a couple of things that I am concerned
about.
What the Chairman just mentioned, the President went into
great detail about this. I have been concerned that the Army is
not moving forward with the fundamental decision to do the
study that is necessary in order to get this thing moving.
Now, I see all of the extra stuff, after you decide what do
we do when we have one of these disasters; but I am going to
tell you, Secretary Cohen says, the President says, but you,
the folks that have to make this thing work--and I am concerned
we are going to have an incident and we are not going to be
prepared if you don't get the fundamentals down. And so I would
hope the Army is working on it.
I was just with the President at Camp David two weeks ago.
He has been studying these books. Now, that is fine.
Intellectual and theoretical arguments are fine, but the
practical solution to this thing has got to be found and we
have got to get moving because FEMA can't handle it, as much as
they would like to. The initial response, I realize, is going
to have to be local, but if we don't bring to bear on this
problem, we are going to have a real disaster on our hands, as
one of you said, about the number of casualties if there it
were a chemical weapon.
Secretary Walker. Congressman, you are exactly right. Let
me say tomorrow afternoon, Secretary Hamre and I are meeting
with the director of FEMA on this very subject.
OPERATING TEMPO
Mr. Murtha. Yes. The other thing is OPTEMPO. I see a more
subdued presentation today than I have heard in the past. Now,
this Committee, and almost everyone on this Committee, has been
out in the field talking about OPTEMPO. We have said to the
White House we can't support a budget that doesn't have more
money to fill in the holes when we have these massive
deployments time after time.
I remember going to Fort Hood a few years ago, and we
didn't have anybody in the Bradleys, no infantry people in the
Bradleys. We just went to Korea. No infantry in the Bradleys.
Now, you know, you tell me things are fine. You say, okay,
everything is all right, we have met our overall recruiting
goals. When we don't have infantry in the Bradleys in Korea, we
have got a problem, and we have got to find a way to solve that
problem.
Now, that brings up to me this deployment in the Sinai. We
have got 1,000 people deployed to the Sinai. I asked one of the
high officials, one of the generals in the Israeli Army the
Egyptian chief of staff was in to see me yesterday. I asked
specifically, can we get rid of this unit in the Sinai?
So is there any way that, and I am not asking you to answer
this today, but the logistic support is actually larger than
the unit or just about as large as the unit, if I remember. I
would appreciate if you would look at the possibility of maybe
contracting out at least the logistic support to reduce some of
the impact on the soldiers themselves, because what I am
hearing is that they are deployed so much and gone so often
that we are starting to have real problems.
This Committee put language in the bill, a general
provision that said, look at the fiscal problems; counsel these
members of the armed services about the fiscal problems they
are having. I just read an article the other day where a lot of
the young people in the service are having checks--all kinds of
checks are bouncing because they don't have the money, don't
handle their resources right. We learned that from being out in
the field.
We realize that there is just this tremendous OPTEMPO, all
of these kind of things reflect on the morale. Now, it is nice
for you to get up here and tell us how good things are, but you
have to address these specific problems.
For instance, Korea; 4 or 5 years ago a group of us went to
Korea. We found all kinds of problems. And we said we have got
to put some money in and we found a way to take money from O&M
and shift it to military construction. I don't remember exactly
how we did it, but we started a program where 5 years later
they are just beginning to get the barracks, they don't have
them finished yet, but are just beginning to get the barracks
straightened out.
But let me make this recommendation. They have devaluated
their money in half. It seems to me you still have a lot of
construction to do; that you to consider in this supplemental
putting a request in for military construction in Korea now.
They are still using outside toilets. The officers themselves
have a 6-to-1 restroom where in some cases the new buildings
for the enlisted people have 2 people per room per restroom.
Now, that just doesn't make sense to me. So I would hope you
would consider looking at pumping up a little military
construction which would increase the quality of life for those
people overseas.
I appreciate what the Chairman said about the HMMWV seats.
I know that it has only been 5 or 6 years, and we may not
appreciate it here, but I will tell you those troops out in the
field appreciate it. And the pads that they sleep on, I don't
remember where I was but I said, where are these pads you sleep
on? And I know you brought pads in to show us this new air
cushion you have got that is a little bit better, I went to
Bosnia with the President. I told the Army, put a pad on there
for me so I can sleep on it, because this is long trip and a
lot of time. I can see what they mean. I mean, it is not the
most comfortable thing I have ever seen. And I understand how
tough these guys are. But, if you don't get some sleep in the
end, you are not able to perform the next day. And I hope that
you will see that you can afford to do a little better job on
this mattress that you are talking about.
Secretary Walker. Thank you.
Mr. Murtha. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
PERSONNEL TEMPO
General Reimer. Mr. Chairman, you didn't ask for a comment,
but may I just comment?
Mr. Young. Yes.
General Reimer. First of all, that air pad may be the only
one we have. I don't know, but we have one. We are going to get
more.
Mr. Murtha. That seat you used to bring was the only seat
you had.
General Reimer. Mr. Chairman, I don't want you to think
that I don't agree with you on personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO). It
is an issue with the troops, and we are working very hard in
that area to manage it. When I say that we think that we can do
the reduction in personnel without impacting the PERSTEMPO, it
is primarily because we are going after administrative
headquarters and streamlining. We are not going inside the
division--to the people who are deploying.
Let me just give you some of the figures to agree with you.
I did some spot checking with the battalion commanders. For
example, in fiscal year 1997 we had a goal of 120 days; we
wanted to keep people deployed less than that. One hundred
eighty days breaks our threshold, but we manage, in between 120
and 180 days very carefully. But in fiscal year 1997, for
example, in this particular brigade for signal, MOS 33 Romeo,
70 percent of those soldiers were deployed more than 120 days.
In the military intelligence arena, 64 percent in one
particular MOS and 85 or 83 percent in another one were
deployed more than 120 days.
That was just a spot check, but that is, I would say,
pretty much average in Europe right now, because they have been
shouldering the burden of Bosnia. Now, as the Bosnia operation
continues to stabilize, we will spread that across the Army.
Mr. Murtha. Are you counting the Bosnia deployment as part
of the time they are away from home?
General Reimer. Absolutely. A day away is a day deployed as
far as we look at it.
Mr. Murtha. Yes.
General Reimer. So we are managing that very carefully, and
I think once we stabilize the follow-on force and spread that
across the Army, we will still be busy, but we can spread some
of it. We initially focused it on Europe because we thought
that this was going to be a mission that ended at a certain
point in time. So I don't disagree with you a bit. This is a
busy force out there, and they are doing the Nation's bidding
and doing it very well. We have to work this PERSTEMPO issue,
and I am continuing to focus on it.
MILITARY RETIREMENT
Mr. Murtha. Let me ask one other thing, Mr. Chairman. What
he mentioned was the pension, the three-tier pension. I think I
hear more complaints--I am amazed at how much these young
soldiers know about the pension system. I mean, they are upset.
I have been trying to get the Defense Department to tell me why
this happened, increase in wages--you know, it didn't make any
sense to me that all of us would have let this happen.
General Krulak told me he didn't know about this until he
became Commandant, that these pension systems had changed. So,
you know, I think that we have got to be more careful when we
make these changes because they are having a real long-term
impact on keeping people in.
General Reimer. Your point on financial management is also
true. At Fort Hood, we have a noncommissioned officer whose
primary job is to teach financial management, because they are
not getting it when they come in to us. It doesn't start with
the Army, but we have got to correct it, because otherwise we
spend all of our time writing letters back and forth to
companies. So we have chosen in that particular area to educate
our people, train them.
Mr. Young. Mr. Skeen.
Mr. Skeen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And Mr. Secretary, and General Reimer, good morning.
General Reimer. Good morning, sir.
PERSONNEL REDUCTIONS
Mr. Skeen. As each of you know very well, I am concerned
about the depth of personnel cuts in this year's Army budget,
and I am most concerned because your service branch has been
adversely affected by the Pentagon's budget process which is
about to cause a major problem, in my view, throughout the
Army, both at White Sands Missile Range, which is in my
congressional district, and throughout the country on other
Army bases.
On the first hand, this budget which is based on the
Defense Department's quadrennial program review of the QDR,
requires the Army to cut its civilian personnel and its
research and development and testing accounts by 33 percent
over the next 5 years. Is this the case?
Secretary Walker. I don't know the exact percentage.
General Reimer. The numbers associated with the Quadrennial
Defense Review, Congressman, were 15,000 Active component full-
time equivalents, 15,000 Reserve component full-time
equivalents, and 15,000 Active soldier equivalents in
civilians. And when you do the full-time equivalents, there are
more Reserve component soldiers than civilians involved than
just the----
Mr. Skeen. Is that percentage of reduction in budget for
those items a correct analysis?
General Reimer. I am not totally familiar with that number.
I will have to get back to you for the record on that.
[The information follows:]
Based on our current program, we estiamte that civilian personnel
positions associated with research, development, test, and evaluation
(RDTE) will decrease by about 29 percent between fiscal years 1999 and
2003. Over the same time frame, RDTE funding will decrease about seven
percent. Much of the apparent reduction in RDTE funding, however, is
the result of revised accounting procedures. Specifically, beginning in
fiscal year 2000, we will transfer base operations costs of our RDTE
installations from RDTE funding lines to Operations and Maintenance,
Army, funding lines.
ARMY BUDGET
Mr. Skeen. Well, Congress has not approved this plan and I
hope that us and--I certainly hope the plan is not passed as
introduced, because of several deficiencies, and I will try to
point those out. On the other hand, your agency was underfunded
in this year's budget and cannot meet the requirements imposed
by the Army and by the QDR, and that is quite a predicament.
You must follow Pentagon personnel cut directives, yet you
don't have the money and the personnel to carry out the
military requirements as specified by the leadership.
I am concerned that the Army is not getting its fair share
of defense allocations and you are responsible for most, if not
all, of the Defense Department deployments, yet the Army
doesn't get its proportional share of the dollars allocated to
these missions. And, more important, the Army has taken most of
the casualties that our forces have suffered in the last
decade.
As each of you know, it is the responsibility of the
Congress to raise funds for national defense. That is specified
in Article I of the U.S. Constitution, and I am concerned that
the QDR has become the baseline for future defense expenditures
and that Congress had nothing to do with the review and
approval of that document. And that is why we are here today,
conducting a hearing on the Army budget for 1999, and I hope
that we can produce a better budget for the Army through this
process than the one submitted to Congress by the President.
Mr. Secretary, and General Reimer, would each of you
comment to the Committee on the Army's budget in light of the
fact that you are underfunded and cannot meet all of your
requirements? I would appreciate your thoughts on this matter,
because it is a very effective thing. We had to go through the
veto process, the line item veto process, to get the cuts
restored to this test facility that I am particularly
interested in, and I think you know the scenario.
General Reimer. Congressman, I will start and maybe the
Secretary will want to join in. Basically, we take our guidance
from the Defense Planning Guidance and the National Military
Strategy and, as I mentioned, it involves being able to
respond, shape and prepare. And the Army budget, given the
dollars that we were allocated to execute, is as tightly
balanced as we can possibly make it. There were hard decisions
that had to be made in this budget, and as I indicated, we
shifted some of the risk from the future readiness, which we
had been primarily using as we drew down the Army, to the near-
term readiness.
What that translated to was a reduction of personnel in
order to beef up the modernization account. We have a $5
billion increase in the modernization account over the program
years; and this budget in 1999, for example, compared to the
1998 budget, as a percentage of the Operation and Maintenance,
Army TOA, modernization increases from 65 percent in 1998 to 76
percent in 1999. The only way we could do that in the Army was
through personnel reductions, and so that is what we were faced
with doing.
Those personnel reductions were not popular with anybody,
but in order to get more into modernization and avoid this
window of vulnerability in the 21st century, those were the
options that we had to deal with. They impact across the Army,
and they are tough issues. They involve saying good-bye to some
very dedicated soldiers and civilians. But otherwise we can't
improve our modernization account.
Mr. Skeen. I understand that perfectly, and I think we are
repeating the same mistakes that we have made historically in
the past. The only way that we can adjust the budget is to have
a reduction in personnel, which I think is the wrong thing to
do.
Secretary Walker. Congressman, if I could add.
Mr. Skeen. Yes, sir.
Secretary Walker. First, on the question of the number of
civilians. In 1999, we will have 237,000 civilians, and by the
end of the QDR period, 2003, we will be at around 218,000.
Mr. Skeen. This is civilian personnel?
Secretary Walker. Civilian personnel, yes.
With regard to your comment about resources, it points up
two things for certain; that we do need the supplemental to be
non-offset emergency, because we can't absorb the costs. If we
had to absorb the cost of contingencies this year and the
unbudgeted contingencies in 1999, we would break readiness of a
number of units. We would have a much more difficult resource
situation than we have got today. And second, I would indicate
that our OMA account is as tight as I have ever seen it. It is
tight because we took a risk by budgeting for efficiencies. We
have about $1.3 billion in this budget assumed for
efficiencies. If we are not able to do that, then we will have
a problem in the OMA account.
Last year, the net reduction directed by Congress in the
OMA account was about $450 million. Our commanders are having a
very tough time dealing with that net reduction. We have
already seen them reduce their operating tempo miles earlier in
the year than they normally do in order to absorb that cost. So
I would just take this opportunity to encourage the Committee
to look very carefully at approving our request for O&M this
year.
Mr. Young. If the gentleman would yield.
Mr. Skeen. I yield.
Mr. Young. I can't miss this opportunity to say, Mr.
Secretary, that members of this Committee in the previous years
have attempted to get the administration to agree to an
emergency designation on those supplementals. Last year, the
leadership of the House was prepared to go along with that, but
the administration did not. So I would like to respond to you,
we are happy to see that your side of the table has finally
recognized that we can't continue to pay for these
contingencies out of the muscle of the United States Army or
the other services.
Mr. Skeen. Absolutely.
Mr. Young. So, Mr. Secretary, thank you very much. And I
yield back to Mr. Skeen.
Mr. Dicks. Does the Chairman of the Budget Committee concur
with this?
Mr. Young. I doubt that, but I am not going to speak for
him. He is only one vote.
Mr. Dicks. Good.
Mr. Lewis. He doesn't have to represent the President.
Secretary Walker. Are any of your members on the Budget
Committee?
Mr. Young. As a matter of fact, one of our members is on
the Budget Committee, yes, but he is not here.
Mr. Skeen. Reclaiming my time.
Mr. Young. Yes, Mr. Skeen. I am sure you will excuse me for
that.
WHITE SANDS MISSILE RANGE
Mr. Skeen. Of course, this is somewhat parochial in my view
because of the White Sands Missile Range, but if these cuts are
allowed to take place, I believe that it will have a
tremendously adverse effect on the experiments scheduled in the
test programs that I think are absolutely vital. And almost
two-thirds of the range work is reimbursed by other defense
program customers. The lack of personnel at White Sands will
most certainly cause these programs to be scaled back, and I
hope this is not going to cause a negative funding spiral and
impact the range and its personnel infrastructure.
If you want to restructure the nature of testing in the
Army, that is a laudable goal. I am concerned that this budget-
driven restructuring will wreak unnecessary havoc on all of the
Army's and the Nation's testing programs and I hope that
doesn't happen.
Would each of you comment on the matter and provide for the
record any restructuring plans that the Army is developing, or
intends, to perform its testing and evaluation in the future
years with a third less Army personnel at the White Sands
Missile Range?
I understand that General Laws has announced that he is
retiring, and he has gone through a lot of problems with his
personnel cuts and so forth, trying to downsize. It is a great
test facility and we don't want to repeat some of the mistakes
we made in the past by letting this range deteriorate.
General Reimer. Congressman, I totally agree and also would
thank you for commenting on General Laws. I think he has done a
great job over there--in terms of handling; what I consider,
again, a great national asset for the Nation, not only the Army
but for the other services.
Let me start by saying that White Sands Missile Range falls
underneath our Army Materiel Command. The Army Materiel Command
commander controls about 62 different installations. He
estimates that he doesn't need 62 installations; he needs far
less than that. As we are unable to get a BRAC or move into a
base closure process, then he has to spread limited resources,
less resources, across 62 installations. If it was less than
that, it would be a help.
What you are finding, though, in White Sands in that
particular area is that the 1999 funding is about $10 million
less than it was in 1998, and that does impact around 343 or
350-some people. It will have some impact on base operations.
It may have some impact on testing. But basically, as I said,
and as both of us have said, this budget is very tight. We
don't think it will be a show stopper. It would be better if we
didn't have to do that, in my opinion. But given the dollars
that we have, given the mission we have, and given the Defense
Planning Guidance, this is the best that we could do.
MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
Mr. Skeen. As you know, we had an override vote over here
on the military construction bill. And I think that that is an
indication that we are very sensitive about that thing because
these are facilities that have not been renovated to some
degree within the last 30 or 40 years.
General Reimer. If you look at our whole budget, the area
of Real Property Maintainance, which is really being able to
keep up our facilities, that is the lowest funded portion of
it. You have helped us in the past, and you may not be able to
help us this year. We don't know.
Mr. Skeen. We are going to do our best.
General Reimer. We appreciate that.
Mr. Skeen. We appreciate what you have to go through, and
this rendering process is going to have to reach a finality
someplace. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Dicks.
NATIONAL DEFENSE PANEL
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to welcome Secretary Walker and General Reimer.
Coming from the State of Washington, of course, we are very
proud of all of the soldiers we have out at Fort Lewis,
Washington, and the great job they do. I have been out there
and met with General Crocker several times and I think he is
doing an outstanding job.
One of the things you have been talking today about is the
National Defense Panel, they recommended that the Army become
more expeditionary, fast, shock exploiting forces, with greater
urban operations capability. The NDP was critical of the Army's
procurement programs which they claim continue to modify heavy
weapons systems, which are difficult to transport into theater.
Additionally, the NDP recommended that the Army take the
lessons learned from Force XXI experiments and transition
quickly to the Army After Next.
Now, General Reimer, Secretary Walker, do you agree with
the NDP findings or do you disagree with them?
General Reimer. Congressman, I agree with them to a certain
extent, and I need to clarify that.
I think where the National Defense Panel and I differ is
that I don't think you can put those kind of time lines on how
fast you move. Clearly our intent, and what we have been
working on with this Force XXI process, is to change the Army
from the Cold War Army, which I talked about to a post-Cold War
Army that is more relevant, more strategically mobile, more
lethal and incorporates new systems. And eventually, you want
to get rid of the heavy equipment that you have right now. But
you can't do that until you get technology that comes along to
take its place, because the battlefield is still going to be a
dirty place and a very dangerous place. So what we are embarked
upon is a process called Force XXI, in which we are changing
from that Cold War Army to the Army After Next, as we refer to
it. That will be a totally different Army.
But it is more than just technology. It is about developing
the leaders that you need for it. It is about developing the
doctrine--how you are going to train that force. All of that is
centered around Fort Hood right now.
Now, at some point in time you convert the majority of your
effort from this force we have today into the expeditionary
force. What we are doing now is investing in a focused Science
and Technology (S&T) program to pull forward the technologies
we will need for the Army After Next.
And General Paul Kern and Secretary Ken Oscar, who are
coming this afternoon, I think can elaborate more on that
through our Army After Next war games. I think the process of
change we have in place is the right process. Where I disagree
with the National Defense Panel is I don't think you can put
time lines on it this fast. You have to run the experimentation
program. You have to make sure that the technology is there,
but the basic thrust is in the right direction.
One other thing on urbanization, because they are
absolutely right and this is a good news story, we are working
with the Marines on a series of Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstrations in which we run about eight different exercises,
and next year we will run a major combined exercise with the
Marines in urbanization. If you go down to the Joint Readiness
Training Center right now, you will find world class Military
Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) facilities. We have moved in
that area, and we are moving with our friends in the Marine
Corps in that particular area. I think it is terribly important
because the urbanization trends that we see in the 21st century
have to be addressed now.
Secretary Walker. Congressman, I would add that QDR has
enabled us to accelerate our process. We will have a division
by 2000. We will have the first corps of Army XXI fielded in
2004 as opposed to 2006, which is what we told you last year.
[Clerk's note.--In Secretary Walker's original statement,
he said ``By 2006, under the current plan we will have two
corps fielded as opposed to one.]
Mr. Dicks. You will have two what?
Secretary Walker. We will have one division by 2000 and
one corps by 2004.
And I would just reiterate what I said in my testimony. We
have to be very careful and proceed in a deliberate fashion so
that we focus science and technology, that we maintain always
our readiness and our combat overmatch throughout the
transformation process, that we are always able to do the
missions that we are assigned by the National Command Authority
while we transform the Army into that new revolutionary Army.
M1 TANKS
Mr. Dicks. What the NDP is saying is that you have been
investing your money in modifying, fixing tanks. Are we still
buying new tanks?
General Reimer. We are not buying new tanks. We are buying
M1A2s, through an upgrade of the M1.
Mr. Dicks. But isn't part of their recommendation that we
go to a lighter tank?
General Reimer. Yes, and if somebody could give me a
lighter tank that would do something, I would be glad to buy
into that. That is where the NDP stops.
Mr. Dicks. So you are----
General Reimer. Great concept. It is not reality.
Mr. Dicks. But are we doing any R&D on it? Is the Army
looking into it?
Secretary Walker. Yes.
General Reimer. Yes. We have a number of systems that we
think that----
Mr. Dicks. I thought the M1 was a great tank.
General Reimer. It is the best tank available.
Mr. Dicks. Is your argument that it is hard to get on an
airplane, it is hard to move it?
General Reimer. It is 70 tons. It is difficult to move and
you have to move it through fast sealift. The other way we do
it is by pre-position. That is why we were able to close the
brigade out of the Third Infantry Division in a matter of
hours, whereas during Desert Shield it took us 28 days. We had
done the pre-po business. And the M1A2 tank is a much better
tank. But for somebody to say, give me a 20-ton tank that will
do the same thing as the M1A2, sign me up right away. But there
is nothing there.
Secretary Walker. As I indicated in my testimony, you
know, we need to insert technological breakthroughs as they
become viable. As the Chief says, we are not there yet.
LEGACY SYSTEMS
Mr. Dicks. I think they were also critical of a couple of
other weapons systems, weren't they, like the Comanche
helicopter, which I have been a big supporter of? What do you
think of that?
General Reimer. I think they are wrong on the Comanche
helicopter. I think the Comanche helicopter has to be the
quarterback of the digitization effort. It is the command and
control piece. It is a very highly deployable system. It can
self-deploy. It can do the things we want in the Army After
Next. It is very easy to maintain. It has the right logistical
concept built in with the test and diagnostic equipment.
They were critical of the Crusader because they said this
is a 55-ton vehicle. The problem is you have to measure
capabilities. You can deploy an equal capability with the
Crusader, compared to what we have now with the M109 Paladin,
with about 60 percent less sorties. Said another way, with the
same number of sorties, you can deploy three times the
capability.
The Crusader also gives you the technology carrier. It also
gives you a smaller crew. It is moving in the right direction.
The M109 has been around the Army longer than I have. It is
1950s technology. It is probably time for both of us to go. If
we are ever going to maximize the capability of our combined
arms teams, we have got to get fire support to stay up with
Abrams and Bradleys.
Secretary Walker. For the record, I want the record to show
I do not agree with the Chief on his statement about his being
around too long.
RESERVE COMPONENTS
Mr. Dicks. We hear from the total Army, by the way, we want
you to know that. And I understand that you are trying, and I
know this is in your statement, that you said that the
procurement budget this year is greater for the Guard and the
Reserve than the amount that was appropriated by the Congress
last year. Maybe that is because Congressman Montgomery is no
longer here.
But having said that, this is a serious issue, and I have
had a chance to talk to General Reimer about this. I think it
is very important that the Army be a total Army and that there
is an effort to work with the Guard and the Reserve. And quite
honestly, I think it is a bit unseemly, that there seems to be
this kind of almost open dispute between the Guard and the
Reserve and the active Army force.
Now, I know that, General Reimer, you have tried to do to
resolve this. Can you tell us today that things are better?
General Reimer. Yes, sir, I can. I think they are better. I
would also say that I am professionally embarrassed that this
is an issue that has to be raised in an open forum. I think we
have to solve this for the good of the Nation.
I will be the first to say that the link back to the
American people is strongest through our Reserve components.
The Army is 54 percent Reserve components--that is not only
fighting strength but that is the link back to the American
people. If we ever lose that, then we will lose this Army that
we are all so proud of. So we have to get it fixed. I have
spent a lot of time recently, and I will spend whatever time it
takes, as long as I am Chief, to get this back on track. It got
off track, quite frankly, because of quick decisions that were
made with the QDR process and a lot of misunderstanding. We are
working hard to get it back in terms of communicating amongst
the leaders of the total Army. And I think there is a
dedication that I feel from all the components to make it
happen.
But it is not peaches and cream right now. It is getting
better, but it is not where it needs to be, and we will
continue to work it to get it to where it has to be. I can tell
you that there are a lot of good initiatives going on. Not only
are we talking about it, but we are doing something about it.
There will be two integrated divisions that will have got
Active component and Reserve component, primarily National
Guard working together. They will be stood up in October of
1998.
That was an initiative that came from the Adjutants
General. There are other issues about how you can integrate the
forces from the Active component and Reserve component. I think
we have to pick up from some of the successes in the Marine
Corps and the Air Force and use those models. When you do that,
you are talking about integrating at a lower level and having
more full-time support and getting more Active component
involvement. Those are issues that we are developing, and I
think it is moving in the right direction. But I am
professionally embarrassed that this has occurred and that we
have to deal with that. We will deal with it.
Mr. Dicks. And you have tried to work hard on this. This is
not the first Chief of Staff of the Army who has had to deal
with this problem. This has been a problem. But I think you are
right, too. The Air Force, I think, has done a better job here.
Does it get down to these two issues, does it get down to
this--this festering concern over the combat capability of the
Guard brigades, and money? Is this what we are really talking
about?
General Reimer. Well, that is a key issue. It is not the
sole issue. It has a lot to do with trust and confidence and
understanding of what each component brings. That is why I
think if you integrate at a lower level, you start to develop
leaders who understand each other better, and they rise to the
leadership positions of the Army in all components. But it has
a lot to do with combat operations and resources.
To compare the Army and the Air Force, I think it is
important to understand the Army is about 54 percent Reserve
component, and we have got a full-time support cadre of less
than 13 percent. On the other hand, the Air Force has something
like 30 percent, 32 or 33, and they have a percentage of full-
time support that is probably above 30 percent. So it is a
different type of situation that we face.
Additional resources could solve a lot of issues for us,
absolutely.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Walker. Congressman, if I could only add----
Mr. Young. Yes, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Walker. That since the end of the QDR process,
General Reimer has done an extraordinary job in trying to work
with all the components of the Total Army, to bring them
together to foster a spirit of trust and confidence, and I
commend him for that, and we thank the Committee for your
concerns at the present.
Mr. Young. Mr. Nethercutt.
TRAINING AMMUNITION DESTRUCTION
Mr. Nethercutt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Walker, General Reimer, welcome. Last September
at Fort Lewis, there was an incident reported in the newspaper
about some explosion of ammunition supplies and it made some
local people sick from smoke and gas inhalation, apparently, as
a result. And if you read the article--you in the broad sense--
I get the sense that there was a policy, sort of a use-it-or-
lose-it mentality there, to expend annual ammunition stocks.
Do you see that in other instances in the Army? If so, has
there been an admonition to not do--use it or lose it in terms
of ammunition supplies or any other supplies? I think there was
some fear that they wouldn't get budgeted fully for the
following year. I hope that is not the case. I am just wanting
to get some assurance from you to this committee that that is
not the case or that some steps have been taken to make sure
that it is not.
General Reimer. Congressman, I think that I can assure you
that is not a prevailing attitude across the Army.
Mr. Nethercutt. Yes.
General Reimer. As I said, I have been in the Army 35
years. I think, obviously, some of that attitude has existed
over my career. It is far less than it has ever been because
people are very tight out there. One of the reasons we have put
so much efficiency in is to make sure that they know that we
only have limited resources.
Now, I think the Fort Lewis incident in the paper had to do
with the destruction of some training ammunition and the
effects when it got away from us, and I think, basically, the
bottom line is we screwed up in the way we did it. But I don't
think that is something that is prevalent across the Army. I do
not detect that at this point in time.
Mr. Nethercutt. Is there a system in place for inventorying
our ammunition stocks, that is clear, that would show that that
is not the case? I don't assume that it is the case, but I am
just wondering if you all have quantified that in your
analysis?
General Reimer. We have a very good system of inventory and
protection of sensitive items, probably less so from the
standpoint of ammunition, except through the chain of command.
And I think that is the way we enforce the accountability for
ammunition--through the chain of command.
When a unit draws a certain amount of ammunition, they will
get a signed receipt for that amount of ammunition. When they
finish their training, they will turn in the remainder or else
they will turn in the cartridges that account for the
ammunition that was expended. So that is well documented and
controlled.
Now, whether it is 100 percent, my guess is probably not,
but it is a pretty good system.
ADEQUATE AMMUNITION SUPPLIES
Mr. Nethercutt. I understand. The point of my questions are
really to emphasize, again, that we are struggling to pay for
all of those things that we want you to have and we want to be
certain that there isn't some sort of systemic waste when--at
lean times like I think we have and want to get you what you
need.
I noticed in an article a couple of days ago in the
Washington Post, regarding the situation in Korea relative to
the situation in southwest Asia. General Tilleli, apparently,
noted in a memo that with the transfer of an aircraft carrier
and ammunition supply ships to the Gulf, there was a weakening
of our ability to respond to North Korean aggression. I was
concerned about his reference to shortfalls in the availability
of Patriot antimissile batteries, several Army missile systems
and main gun rounds. The General noted that they would be
severely impacted by these shortfalls. I am just wondering, is
that a failing, a shortcoming of the QDR or the two MRC policy?
And are we going to have shortfalls there in the future? Is our
budget adequate or is your budget adequate to make sure that
the Korean forces have adequate ammunition supplies?
General Reimer. I read the article. I don't feel
comfortable talking about that. It was a classified message
from General Tilleli to the Joint Staff. I can just simply say
that whenever we approve a deployment, we look at worldwide
readiness and we look at the threat to make sure that we are
not putting somebody in danger.
Mr. Nethercutt. Sure.
General Reimer. Obviously, if you take forces from any
theater, that theater commander will say, I have less forces.
Mr. Nethercutt. Sure.
General Reimer. But I think that risk is considered in any
deployment decision made by the Secretary of Defense and the
President.
Secretary Walker. I think the record should show we have
not reduced the number of Patriot batteries in Korea.
General Reimer. We have not pulled any Patriot munitions or
any Patriot batteries out of Korea. We don't intend to.
RECRUITING
Mr. Nethercutt. I was concerned--I know it is sort of a
leak but I just was concerned that there was some jeopardy
perhaps there, and I assume that you are well aware of it and
making sure that we are protected.
The final question, Mr. Chairman. I noticed in your
testimony, Secretary Walker, that nearly 10 percent of the new
recruits to the Army didn't have high school diplomas. In order
to get the GI bill, you have to have, I understand, a high
school diploma. And I am just wondering if this is a problem in
your recruiting. Are you seeing the need to change standards a
little bit?
Secretary Walker. The 10 percent who do not have high
school diplomas must have a GED or an equivalent home schooling
or something of the like, and they must also be in the upper
half of the aptitude test. So we think it is the right
approach.
Mr. Nethercutt. So that is--if the GED is in place,
notwithstanding the lack of a diploma, these recruits will
qualify for the GI Bill?
Secretary Walker. That is correct.
Mr. Nethercutt. Okay. I was concerned that perhaps there
would be some longer-term shortcomings if that was the policy.
Thank you very much for your testimony.
Secretary Walker. Thank you.
BOSNIA VISIT
Mr. Young. Mr. Nethercutt, thank you very much.
I want to yield to Mr. Sabo but before I do, General, and
Mr. Secretary--the Speaker has asked me to take a sizable
delegation to Bosnia next week to visit with your soldiers that
are there. And I have a meeting of that delegation coming up in
a few minutes so I am going to have to excuse myself. Mr. Lewis
will assume the chair.
And if you have any messages that you would like for us to
deliver to the troops over there while we are there, we are
going to see as many of them as we can. We are going to spread
out across the country in different subgroups of the
delegation.
Secretary Walker. We want to thank you for the trip. It is
very important and very timely. We thank you so much for going.
And tell the troops what we always tell them; that we love them
and we are going to do our best to take care of them.
Mr. Young. We will certainly do that.
And let me yield to Mr. Sabo at this point. And, Mr. Lewis,
if you will assume the chair, I will move on to my next
assignment. Thank you very much for an excellent hearing.
General Reimer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Walker. Thank you.
ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP LIABILITY
Mr. Sabo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary, General, welcome to the Committee.
This is not a question, but a comment on an issue I hope
the Secretary would watch closely. We are involved in a cleanup
program with the Twin City Army Ammunition Plant in Minnesota,
and it is coming along fairly well. But, one of the things we
have discovered over the years, is that we have spent a
significant amount of Federal dollars to pay insurance premiums
for government-owned, contractor-operated facilities.
And it would appear that in many cases, insurance is liable
for some of the cleanup costs. But very little effort has been
made to collect so far. So I suggest to you that some
aggressive action by the Army might well free up some dollars.
We have begun working with our Committee staff and with the
Army on the issue, but it is somewhat time sensitive because
there are time limits on some of these claims. The statute of
limitations for insurance liability may soon be running out in
some cases.
It may well be that it has been simpler over the years to
come to this Committee for cleanup appropriations than to
pursue the claims against insurance companies which would
appear to be legitimate. But I believe this is something we
should pursue, and so we simply ask for your cooperation, and
ask that you highlight this issue within the Army.
Secretary Walker. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sabo. And make a few million dollars available.
Secretary Walker. When I get back to the Pentagon, I will
discuss that very issue with the Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Environmental Affairs. Thank you.
Mr. Lewis. Mr. Sabo, are you finished?
Mr. Sabo. Yes.
Mr. Lewis. Mr. Visclosky.
PERSONNEL REDUCTIONS
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
If I could follow up, Mr. Secretary, and General, on some
of the comments my colleagues made, including Mr. Skeen, about
the personnel reductions. If I could ask: Do you have units
that are today undermanned because of personnel reductions?
General Reimer. The answer to that is somewhat complex. The
short answer is, yes, but I need to explain why, and I need to
talk a little bit about the difference between force structure
and end strength.
As we drew down the Army, and I mentioned we took down
630,000 people, most of them soldiers from the Active and
Reserve components, we also drew down our force structure
allowance, which were the units that those soldiers were in. As
we got to 1997, we carried across that whole year an operating
strength deviation of about 10,000 soldiers, which meant we had
10,000 less soldiers than we needed to fill up those units.
That was in the Active component.
What we did during 1997 was to transfer some of the Active
component structure, the later deployers for the major theater
wars, to the Reserve component, but not transfer any of the end
strength. This, then, in fact will fill up our units and we are
now back where we ought to be, right where force structure and
end strength become very close to the same.
It also makes the Reserve component more relevant to the
war fight. It was an action that we took in 1997. So the answer
was, yes, we had some unmanned and undermanned units out there.
We have corrected that, and we think we have them back in
place. In fact, the anecdotal evidence coming out of the
National Training Center and other places is saying that the
foxhole strength is filling up in the units.
READINESS
Mr. Visclosky. Do you have units that are rated below C-3
because of personnel shortages?
General Reimer. Not to my knowledge. We have some--I have
to be careful in the classification in here--but we have some
units and Reserve components that are C-3 or lower, but not
because of personnel. No Active components units that I am
aware of are below C-3 because of personnel.
Mr. Visclosky. With the projected decrease in personnel
levels this year, is there a danger of that occurring during
1998/1999?
Secretary Walker. The projections do not anticipate that,
is my memory.
General Reimer. No, sir. We think we have brought our force
structure and end strength in balance. We should not have that
problem of as many unmanned and undermanned squads, and we
should not have any C-3 units for personnel.
Mr. Visclosky. Okay. Today and prospectively, is that
right?
Secretary Walker. Right.
General Reimer. Yes, sir.
TRAINING
Mr. Visclosky. On the readiness training, my understanding
is that your training objective for tank miles is 800 and that
it is anticipated for fiscal year 1997 and 1998 that we will be
just over 650.
Is 650 actually typical and is 800 an illusion or are we
falling off the mark here?
General Reimer. Eight hundred is not an illusion. Prior to
the drawdown, we were executing at about 800 miles. What has
happened as we have gone through the drawdown and as the money
available to us has come down, is that we have had to work the
balance between OPTEMPO mileage and base operations--the
quality of life on the installations where our soldiers live
and work. So you will see in the 1999 budget, for example, that
we have funded base operations at about 84 percent and that
Real Property Maintenance is about 58 percent. That is repair
of the facilities.
Installation commanders are faced with a real choice: How
do they keep that base running at that particular level and how
do they also keep the right amount of miles on their equipment
to make sure they keep up with training? They are weighing that
very, very carefully right now. We have to bring tank miles
back up, and the projections that you are using in 1998
absolutely are correct except that, as you look at it, Korea
will now come back up towards the 800 miles. Most of the lower
mileage is in the Continental United States in Forces Command
and the United States Army Europe; the United States Army
Europe, for valid reasons, because they have been in Bosnia.
So the balance that the installation commanders are working
is trying to keep the quality of life and the training up.
Right now, they are doing it, but we have to stay with that
800-mile mark as the goal for us.
Mr. Visclosky. Could you provide for the record how much
money you would need to hit 800 miles?
General Reimer. Yes, sir.
Secretary Walker. Yes.
[The information follows:]
In fiscal year 1998, the Army fully funded the tank mile program.
Major Army Commands chose to spread Congressional unspecified cuts and
must-pay bills that arise during the year of execution, or funds
withdrawn or withheld due to contingency operations, in the areas where
they had the most flexibility. Commanders are responsible for the
readiness of their units in all areas. As a result of balancing
competing needs in readiness, training an quality of life, some funds
originally intended for training were used in these other areas. The
Army requires $218,000,000 to attain 800 tank miles in fiscal year
1998. The Army's 800 mile tank training strategy is fully funded in the
fiscal year 1999 budget.
General Reimer. They are funded at 800 miles, but what
happens is you are migrating money into base operations to keep
the base operations running.
I should also say, they are using a lot of efficiency
measures. Instead of driving tanks to the range, they will put
them on heavy equipment transporters and take them out. That
saves them a lot of miles. So I wouldn't want you to think that
the training aspect of it has gone completely down.
Mr. Visclosky. Completely, okay.
General Reimer. They are using all the efficiency measures
they can possibly get. They are managing their money very, very
carefully.
Mr. Visclosky. I am all for efficiency, but you are going
to have to squeeze a lot more efficiencies out of that system.
General Reimer. Well, the 800 miles pertains to tanks.
Mr. Visclosky. Not just tanks, but looking at some of the
earlier discussions.
When the Department released its budget, they claimed that
they were going to add about $1 billion onto operations and
maintenance accounts to preserve readiness. What did you get
out of that $1 billion? What did the Army get?
Secretary Walker. I am not sure of the exact amount, but
during the major budget issues, we were able to increase the
amount that we had presented for real property maintenance and
others. Even with that amount, though, as you heard, we are
still substantially below our requirement.
General Reimer. Most of our plus-ups in the 1999 budget are
in the modernization account. As you see, we have tried to
build up our modernization account, which had gotten way too
low. So we are trying to build that back up now.
CAPABILITIES
Mr. Visclosky. The Army Times had an article recently about
each division, on average, having about 18 fewer guns than they
did during Operation Desert Storm. It is anticipated that the
Crusader will make up the difference, but apparently the
Crusader will not come on line for about 7 years.
Is the article, first of all, reasonably correct? And what
would the Army, if push came to shove, do to make up that
deficiency?
General Reimer. Well, first of all, I don't recall the
exact article you are talking about, but trying to compare the
Desert Storm force against today's force is kind of
interesting, and we have done some work on that. If you will
bear with me, I would just like to point out a couple of
things.
Mr. Visclosky. Sure.
General Reimer. We started in Desert Shield in 1991. We had
no pre-positioned assets in the Persian Gulf. Now we are pre-
positioned over there so we are able to close that brigade in a
matter of hours as opposed to 28 days. We had no C-17s. Now we
have C-17s. We had Ready Reserve Force Roll-On, Roll-Off (RORO)
ships. Now we are about midway through pre-positioning forces
on large, medium-speed, RORD ships. So the basic issue here is
that we are able to close this force a whole lot better.
We had limited detection capability in Nuclear, Biological,
and Chemical (NBC). Now we have M93 Fox vehicles in the force.
We had limited anthrax vaccine. Now we have adequate anthrax
vaccine. We had an ad hoc air defense command and control
system. Now we have something called the Army Air Missile
Defense Command that is over there now in place.
If you look at the tactical end of this thing, in terms of
what we have done for the force, we had a radio system called
the AN/VRC-12 series. Now we have Single Channel Ground and
Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS), a quantum leap forward. We
had 5,000 of the SLGRs, which are Global Positioning Systems,
in the force. Now we have over 70,000 of them spread across the
force. We were upgunning the tanks from M1s to M1A1s. Now we
have M1A1s in the force, and we are upgunning those to M1A2s, a
much better tank.
People that try to compare Desert Shield to where we are
right now--and by the way, this was all while we were on a
modernization holiday--realize that this is a much better
force. Then you get the personnel aspects of it. Of the people
I saw going out at Fort Stewart, most of the NCOs had been
there before, two or three times. Twenty or 30 percent of the
force, I would imagine, has experience there.
When I was in the office, Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations and Plans, John Yeosock, a lieutenant general of the
United States Army, was the most experienced person we had in
the Army. I could count the number of people that served in
Saudi Arabia on one hand. Now, this is a different force, a
better force.
Mr. Visclosky. Okay.
General Reimer. Smaller.
MATERIEL SHORTAGES
Mr. Visclosky. With the deployments in Bosnia, the Persian
Gulf, all of the other demands, people have also raised
questions about whether or not there are deficiencies as far as
the Army's forces, shortages of materiel. Two that have been
brought to my attention are potential shortages of Patriot
batteries to meet current requirements; also a shortage of main
gun tank rounds. Would you comment on those two issues?
General Reimer. First of all, we have more Patriot units
than we had during Operation Desert Shield but because of the
threat increase in that area, in terms of tactical missile
defense, my feeling would be that we don't have enough Patriot
batteries. We don't have as much as the CINCs, the Commanders
in Chief, out there would like.
As far as the tank rounds are concerned, we went over with
limited M829A1 rounds. We still have M829A1 rounds which are
very, very good, but now we have a product-improved A2 also
fielded in the force.
Do we have 100 percent of the requirement in that? No. But
if you look at the whole range of anti-armor killing systems
that we have, we are adequate for what we have to do in two
major theater wars.
Mr. Visclosky. You are adequate, but could you attach a
percentage as to what your shortfall is for the tank round?
General Reimer. For the tank round, in terms of preferred
munitions, I can't attach a percentage to that right now. We
probably would like to have more M829A1s or 2s, but we are not
short tank ammunition in general. And as I said, I think the
M1A1 tank can defeat any tank on the battlefield right now.
Mr. Visclosky. Okay.
General Reimer. So in preferred selected munitions, yes, we
have some shortages, but it is in our program to build those
up.
Mr. Visclosky. Okay, thank you. I have no further
questions, just a comment, and a number of members on the panel
have already said it today. I just think that you need
additional resources. You have some very difficult choices here
between quality of life, training, your TEMPO of operations,
your modernization tension with upgrades of existing systems
that you need today if something happens.
You are in a very difficult spot, I think.
General Reimer. Thank you, sir, and I am not going to
argue.
Mr. Visclosky. The question is whether you are better off.
Mr. Lewis. That may be a very clear commitment for support
for that emergency supplemental.
Mr. Visclosky. Yes.
General Reimer. Thank you.
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lewis. Mr. Cunningham.
WEST POINT ACADEMY
Mr. Cunningham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, I was very happy to see that the Navy sticker I
put on the bottom of the bleachers at West Point did its job
this year.
General Reimer. It was a long ride back.
Mr. Cunningham. It was a long ride back. I know it was a
long ride for 2 years in a row, or 3 years in a row.
But I want to tell you something. Sue Kelly, who represents
your district--when I was Chairman on the Subcommittee on
Education, the impact aid issue for that area is very
important. I know we talk about weapons systems but we need two
things, Mr. Chairman, that we really need to do in this
Committee. I visited the other academies. West Point, built way
back during the Civil War, they have got a gym with the old
track around the top like they used to have at the University
of Missouri, where they have to have classes in hallways
because they don't have the areas to do it. Conditions compared
to the other academies are dismal, and this Committee owes it
to the Army to--and I am a Navy guy, okay? But we owe it to the
Army and the people that we are going to ask to be the leaders
of this country in the future in our military to fix that place
and to invest in it, because it is a crime what they are having
to do.
And I want to take the lead on that. I know Sue Kelly
would.
Mr. Lewis. Would the gentleman yield just a moment on that?
Mr. Cunningham. Yes.
Mr. Lewis. In the time I have been on the subcommittee, I
think that is the first time I have heard that question raised
in quite that way, and it is overdue. I really appreciate the
gentleman pointing that out and I think the Committee ought to
take a hard look. Maybe we should go visit West Point sometime.
I am not sure the Committee has since I have been here.
Mr. Cunningham. I was not aware of West Point and the
dismal conditions there. I mean, you have got thousands of
people going through there in a substandard facility, an old
facility. I mean, they do the best they can. I mean, you have
got sports activities, you have got fencing in the hallway. You
know, they have asked for some meager changes and stuff, and we
have been unable to do that and it ought to be a focus area.
Secretary Walker. We want to thank you for your comments,
both of you, because this year we do begin a plan; it is in the
budgets, a modest beginning, and we do need to correct that
deficiency.
QUALITY OF THE FORCE
Mr. Cunningham. You will find a very strong supporter here,
and I am sure with this Committee, on the thing.
The M1A2 tank, I notice you are only going to produce or
retrofit about a third of them. And with no real technology out
there, that means a new one would take until about 2020. And
when you are talking about 80 percent of your force is from the
seventies, and trucks are older than many of the drivers, to
me, when we talk about deficiencies in war capability that it
is a real problem.
The AA-12 missile is better than our AMRAAM. The SU-37 and
35 are better than our F-14 and F-15. That is why we have got
to invest in the F-22 and the F-18 E/F. But in the Army, the
same thing. The technology that foreign countries are investing
in, and we keep drawing down without the ability to do that, I
am concerned. Maybe the tank is good but I want to tell you it
doesn't stop the technology, and I am fearful that we are not
investing in that as well.
I want to bring up, now comes the point where--I don't know
if you saw that movie, ``I am tired of this and I am tired as
hell,'' and that is where I get to that point. And the first
statement I would like to make, I would like to take off, I am
very proud to be a member of this Committee. Both Republicans
and Democrats, they fight for the same things that I do, in
some cases even stronger than I do on this Committee. What I am
going to talk about now is the White House and many of the
Members on the House floor and the direction that they want to
go instead of the directions that we want to go, and I want to
caveat with that.
The White House has continually through many different
routes cut the military readiness, funding, and support.
Cutting Defense further is hazardous to the security of this
country and the well-being of our allies, and that is wrong.
And I will be very specific.
First of all, in 1993, when Colin Powell and Dick Cheney
said a $50 billion drawdown would be detrimental and would put
us into a hollow force, immediately there was $127 billion cut
in defense. Bang, like that. And then all the other things; the
defense conversion which takes money out, the contingencies
that over and over we have had to take out of military budgets
and so on.
Something else that bothers me also is that I look at your
statement here, as far as what you need, and then I see gender
training, and political correct training.
You know, when we have a limited force like this--and I
have supported women in combat, but we cannot accept or
tolerate anything less than superlative. Anything that detracts
from superlative combat troops should be eliminated. The very
first bill out of the President, out of the White House, was
putting homosexuals in the military, our kids don't like that.
They don't like the political correctness, that causes them to
look over their shoulder on every decision.
When I was in the service, I made my mistakes, but my
senior commanders stand up for you. And if you stand up for
your kids today and you may get fired, and that is wrong.
Mr. Lewis. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Cunningham. Yes.
Mr. Lewis. I don't want to be indelicate here, but these
are items that probably you should have taken care of in the
authorizing committee when you were a member of that committee.
We are trying to find money here.
Mr. Cunningham. I will do that, and I will be more
succinct, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Skeen. He is just getting warmed up.
Mr. Cunningham. I am fired.
Secretary Walker. Congressman, may I only say a couple of
things, and I think General Reimer will agree with this. In the
Army, we do not make decisions based on political correctness.
We have not done that, and I assure you as long as I am there,
we are not going to do that in the future. We are going to make
decisions based on what is best for the Army, to keep readiness
up and to do the right thing for our soldiers. I want to assure
you of that.
With regard to the capability and the quality of the force,
the quality is the best it has ever been. In terms of the
capability, in terms of numbers, for instance, we may have
fewer divisions, but if you measure in terms of number of
brigades, we have only one less brigade than we had when Colin
Powell had created the base force. We have 32 brigades compared
to 33. To make up for that, we have now have 15 enhanced
brigades which are growing in capability in the National Guard.
And in addition to that, as the Chief pointed out a few
minutes ago, since the end of Desert Shield/Desert Storm, we
have come--even in a period of drawdown and budget reduction,
we have made substantial improvements in the capability of our
equipment and training.
So we watch it very carefully.
Mr. Cunningham. I know, and I understand the limits that
you have, and I understand what you have to say because you
work for the President. But I also know that when you are
talking about equipment that 80 percent of it is from the
seventies, when you are talking about trucks that are old, when
you can't upgrade your tanks, when the other equipment isn't
there, readiness is relative.
Secretary Walker. Oh, absolutely. I made those very points
in my opening statement, as you may recall.
Mr. Cunningham. And that it is very, very difficult. And
why we got there is that this country is in such debt that we
pay nearly a billion dollars a day before anything, and that
hurts from across the board from NIH to military to everything.
We are trying to put this country's fiscal responsibility back
on track so that your kids and my kids aren't going to fall
under a Socialist, Communist regime.
In France, one in four works for the government. What do
they have? They have a Communist and socialistic model of
government.
And the reason that you are there is because, if you take
the unions and give them the power away from small business,
which is the opposition--they don't want higher taxes, they
don't want bigger government--it impacts on our ability to do
that, and right on down the line.
You talk about Office of the Secretary of Defense, I had a
program to copy all defense mapping agencies. OSD tied that up
for one year. We got $12 million. We could have done everything
for you in all services. OSD tied it up because they wanted to
steal the money or hide it or take it somewhere else. We had it
appropriated also. They delayed 1 year. They continued copying
the same way. They did 10 percent of the maps at a cost of $16
million. And we could have done it. That is the kind of fraud
and waste and abuse we need to look at in this.
You ask--and the reason I bring up this other budgetary
stuff, you ask for an offset, a nonoffset supplemental for
emergency, and I agree with that. But the President's budget,
he puts 100,000 teachers in there just like 100,000 cops, and
it is a lie. Where is the money going to come from?
I happen to believe that our veterans that we ask to go out
and survive and fight our wars, and the separation and all the
troubles that they suffer, have got a priority over somebody
that has not served and only wants money from the government.
We owe those men and women a priority. But yet this White
House, most of these programs are social programs and promises
that we can't meet that increases our deficit by over a
trillion dollars for political reasons, and how--where are we
going to pay for this? Is the President going to tell us that
the money is coming out of Social Security? Is it coming out of
education? Is it coming out of National Institutes of Health?
Where is he going to get the money?
Secretary Walker. Congressman, I appreciate your comments.
Let me say something about education in America. Nothing is
more important to the United States Army than having well-
educated and well-trained young people in America. They are
threatened today by gangs and drugs like they never have been
before. The family itself is threatened, as you know.
We must invest, and it is a national security imperative to
invest in the education of our young people.
Mr. Cunningham. Reclaiming my time, we only get 48 cents
out of a dollar of the Federal education dollar down to the
classroom, because of the bureaucracy. The President wanted $3
billion for a new literacy program. California is last in
literacy. Sounds good. That comes with a new bureaucracy.
We have 14 literacy programs. Title I and Title VII are two
of those. What is wrong with getting rid of 12 or 13 of them
and focusing on the ones that work? But yet we would be accused
of, quote, ``cutting education'' by the White House.
So let's do invest. I won't get into a debate here, but I
am trying to enforce why we are having difficulty funding the
needs that you have because of this flesh-eating disease.
Secretary Walker. Yes.
Mr. Cunningham. And we support funding you, and the people
on this Committee do. But outside of this room--many do not.
They would increase the deficit, increase spending and risk
economic ruin and depreciate national security.
Mr. Lewis. I know, as the Secretary understands, that my
colleague from California----
Mr. Cunningham. There is a difference.
Mr. Lewis. He has considerable expertise in education, as a
matter of fact, and has made that contribution. But here he
also has expertise in the military, and picking up on his
initial question----
Mr. Cunningham. I am upset because we can't help you as
much as we want.
DEFICIENCIES IN THE FORCE
Mr. Lewis. Picking up on his initial question, we do have
troops deployed around the world and the special pressures that
we have with the deployment in the Persian Gulf, along with
Bosnia, raises that whole specter of what are the specific
deficiencies that you see in the Army. And I would like to have
us pursue that in the little time we have left here. And if you
would outline that, because that really goes to the heart of, I
think, both of what Mr. Visclosky was asking and what Mr.
Cunningham was asking as well.
General Reimer. Mr. Chairman, just a point of
clarification. Are you talking about the efficiencies that are
being----
Mr. Lewis. The deficiencies.
General Reimer. Deficiencies?
Mr. Lewis. As a result of that deployment and the pressures
that the budget brings to you.
General Reimer. Well, I think the way that I would measure
it in terms of readiness--I think we have talked about this in
general but let me be a little bit more specific. We still have
units that are not completely filled up. As I said, we are
getting better, and we are bringing our force structure and end
strength in line. But you can go out to any battalion, for
example, and probably find that they do not have all of the
right MOSs, the right skills that they need in that battalion.
The units are better than what they have been in the past.
I have been in the Army, as I said, 35 years, and have been
in a lot of units, and I have never had 100 percent fill. So
this is not something unique. But I think it is felt more
because the second part of it is PERSTEMPO. The people are
deployed more. They are in Bosnia. They are getting people
ready to go to Bosnia.
The real bill payers, quite frankly, are the people who are
left behind. For example, I commanded the post at Fort Carson,
Colorado, and when I was there, we had three brigades. Now we
have two brigade equivalents. When you pull a brigade out of
there, you have to do cross-leveling in order to fill up that
brigade going into harm's way to make sure they have the
necessary people. The brigade left behind then is working very
hard to do the things that they have to do and also train and
do the housekeeping that always is a part of living on an
installation and making a contribution. So it is a shortage of
people; it is a turbulence of people.
The second thing is that they are working very hard to
manage the money that they have, to make sure they provide the
right quality of life. We want to give our troops better living
conditions. They deserve that. So commanders are taking money
and putting it into rehabilitation of barracks. They are doing
it at the expense of what was already mentioned, the OPTEMPO
miles.
So battalions come to the National Training Center, for
example, and they don't have the opportunity to do a battalion
field training exercise before they got there. Entry level
skills into the National Training Center are a little bit lower
than what in the past. But that is a learning experience, and
they come out at the other end of the rotation well trained.
There has been some publicity about National Training
Center rotations. We never compare units going over there. We
should never do that. If we ever start doing that, we will lose
the goodness of the United States Army training system.
The third area that I would say, in addition to quality of
life, which I have tried to weave into these comments is that
we need to modernize faster. We need to bring on the force--the
Army After Next. We need to be able to make sure that the
equipment that I just went through continues to improve and
that we send our troops, wherever they go, with the best
equipment that the Nation can provide. At the same time, I
think we have a responsibility now to make those decisions so
that in the 21st century those troops have the best equipment.
That is the way that I would look at deficiencies.
DEPOT MAINTENANCE
Mr. Lewis. Expending on deployment just a bit, does the
deployment in southwest Asia put depot maintenance schedules
for the Army equipment at risk?
General Reimer. Does it put it at risk?
Mr. Lewis. At risk, yes.
General Reimer. Mr. Chairman, no, I don't think it puts it
at risk. I think that we are funding depot maintenance in the
1999 budget, somewhere around 58 percent or 59 percent overall.
But as you get into some specific items, such as the
communications, electronics, it is about 80 percent in that
particular area. Again, it is a balancing act.
Could we use more in all areas? Sure. But given what we
have, we have tried to balance it the best we can.
I don't think that the deployment into southwest Asia or to
Bosnia puts depot maintenance at risk as long as we are getting
reimbursement for those excess costs.
Mr. Lewis. The Army in depot maintenance uses a process
that is known as ``centers of excellence.'' Are you looking at
money savings that might be possible by possibly having some of
your depot maintenance work done closer to locations like the
National Training Center for the Army?
General Reimer. Yes, sir. In terms of depot maintenance, we
have five depots. The Army Materiel Command feels that we
really have requirements for about three. So we are carrying a
little excess capacity in this particular area. We have tried
to establish a Center of Excellence concept on a regional
basis, which you identified, but that is not related to depot
maintenance. We are trying to locate the repair area for
equipment, validated in terms of quality control by the Army
Materiel Command, closer to the equipment and providing
regional management structure. The idea is to save the cost of
transporting it to the depots, to make it return quicker, and
make sure we don't let quality slip.
To that extent, the Center of Excellence concept is as you
describe it.
Mr. Lewis. The reason I raise that question is that
currently a lot of equipment goes to the National Training
Center and we use it in sizable form. It comes into need for
repair regularly. We take a tank and put it on a train and send
it across the country for repair and yet there is a depot right
next door. And it just occurs to me that reviewing the
effectiveness of centers of excellence, at least there is a
question that comes to my mind. It is not my final question but
nonetheless one that seems to be obvious to me.
General Reimer. The depot that is near there does not
repair M1A1 tanks.
Mr. Lewis. No, it doesn't now, but in the past the local
personnel used to strip those tanks down to metal and put them
back together again. Now we put them on a train and send them
across the country. And I just wonder, in tight budgets, if we
should not at least take a look at those earlier decisions to
see what kind of savings is available.
Let's see. Mr. Cunningham, I interrupted you. I don't know
if you have additional questions at this moment or not.
COMANCHE HELICOPTER
Mr. Cunningham. I just had a question on the Comanche
program. I know it is a priority and the statements were that
it is a mismatched program. I know the value of air
superiority. Like in Desert Storm, looking at CNN and watching
you go in ahead of the force and taking out the command and
control and taking out the eyes and ears of the enemy so you
can get in your troops and so on; are you coming along okay?
Most of us are very supportive of that kind of a program
because I know it is important to you. That is one of the
advanced technology systems that you have got coming up. But
can we help in that area or is there problems? You know, the F-
18 had problems but you fixed it, the services fixed it. What
about the Comanche program?
General Reimer. We have got the prototype in Florida. I was
there less than 9 months ago and flew behind the Comanche and
also talked to the test pilot. He is a veteran test pilot. His
view is that the Comanche is much further along at this stage
of development than any other aircraft that has ever been
brought in. So I think it is on glide path and certainly a key
part of our budget submit here.
Mr. Cunningham. Good. Well, I used to make fun of marines
and helicopters until a marine helicopter rescued me over the
south of Hanoi. So it is the prettiest airplane I ever saw, and
I would go out there and support it. And I almost kissed a
marine, in a manly way, sir.
General Reimer. Congressman, having been in Vietnam, I also
like them.
Mr. Cunningham. I said in a manly way, Joe.
General Reimer. Having been in Vietnam, I also like
helicopters very much.
Mr. Cunningham. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lewis. Thank you, Mr. Cunningham.
Mr. Visclosky, additional questions?
Mr. Visclosky. No. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
TWENTY-NINE PALMS
Mr. Lewis. I have one question that is provincial, but of
regional concern. NTC, as you know, is out there in the
countryside that I represent and not far away is Twenty-nine
Palms Marine Corps Base, and for a long, long time, there has
been discussion of the possibility of linkage between those two
facilities as we move in the direction of trying to get our
people on the cutting edge of training.
Have you been discussing that in any way?
General Reimer. Mr. Chairman, we have done some work in
that area. During the task force AWE, we used a little bit of
Twenty-nine Palms and also had some Marines participate at NTC.
General Krulak, the Commandant, and I discussed that. We both
intend to move in that direction. We haven't gone as far and as
fast as we should, but we will continue to push that. It is a
natural type of thing, I think, to use the resources that are
there and also to get the combined aspect of the training with
the Marine Corps.
Mr. Lewis. The only reason I raise that question at all is
because earlier we discussed briefly the need for expanded
territory to the south and those same people I was trying to
ring the bell about who would like to see no expansion of
activity at all have their focus upon that question, too, and
so timing is everything. I would urge you to consider it.
The Committee has pretty well completed its questions for
this morning. We are scheduled to recess the Committee until
1:30 this afternoon and that will be a closed hearing. And so
with that, I appreciate the members participating and, General,
we will see you at 1:30.
General Reimer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Walker. Thank you.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the
answers thereto follow:]
Army Budget
Question. Last year, Congress appropriated $58,800,000,000 for the
Army. The Army is requesting $61,500,000,000 in fiscal year 1999. The
Army budget includes funds for military and civilian pay, operation and
maintenance, research and developments, and procurement activities.
What are the Army's top priorities for fiscal year 1999?
Answer. The Army requested $64,300,000,000 in Total Obligation
Authority for fiscal year 1999. Training and readiness are the number
one priority for the Army. This budget enables the Army to recruit and
retain quality people--the Army's most important resource--and provides
essential quality of life programs for soldiers and their families. It
provides for operational training superior to that of any nation in the
world. It adequately supports fielded equipment and logistics items
that are critical to near-term readiness. The budget additionally
supports future readiness in investment accounts. Critical
modernization programs, such as Comanche, Crusader, Longbow Apache,
Abrams Tank Upgrade, and the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles,
continue to move forward.
[Clerk's note.--The Army response includes Military
Construction, Base Closure and Realignment Funding and Family
Housing Funds which are not appropriated by the National
Security Subcommittee].
Question. Does the President's fiscal year 1999 budget request
reflect the Army's priorities? If not, why?
Answer. The President's fiscal year 1999 budget is the result of a
very careful assessment by the Army of needs and priorities. This
budget strikes a finely tuned balance between current and future
readiness needs, and maintains the quality soldiers, training, and
sustainment capabilities needed for a full spectrum force. This budget
reflects today's fiscal realities, but it also reflects the Army's
continuous process of change and growth and its commitment to the
American people.
Question. What capabilities does the fiscal year 1999 budget
provide?
Answer. The fiscal year 1999 budget reflects a balanced program
among the Army's priorities and requirements for fielding an 18
division force structure (10 Active and 8 National Guard) in support of
the National Military Strategy. It seeks to: preserve readiness,
enhance modernization, integrate the force structure, and maintain
quality of life.
The budget enables us to recruit and retain quality people, the
Army's most important component of readiness. The budget provides for
operational training in both Active and Reserve units that is superior
to that of any other nation. It adequately funds the support of fielded
equipment and logistics items that are critical to near-term readiness.
At the same time, the resourcing of critical modernization programs
such as Crusader, Comanche, Longbow Apache, Army Tactical Missile
System-Brilliant Anti-Tank, Abrams Tank Upgrade and the Family of
Medium Tactical Vehicles is moving forward. The budget makes
significant progress toward digitizing a mechanized infantry division
by fiscal year 2000 and a heavy corps by fiscal year 2004.
It sustains and propels the force structure in the direction of a
more seamless Total Army--seeking improvements in Active and Reserve
component integration and communication. Included in these improvements
are modernization investments for the Army National Guard and U.S. Army
Reserve units.
This budget request continues to focus resources on maintaining
crucial quality of life programs for our soldiers and their families;
at the forefront is a 3.1 percent pay raise for military personnel.
Question. Last year, the Army identified critical unfunded
requirements to the Committee. As a result, the Committee was able to
provide additional funding for many of these requirements. I hope you
will continue to cooperate with us this year. If additional funds were
made available in fiscal year 1999, how would you allocate them? For
each of the programs you have identified, what would be the benefit of
providing the additional funds?
Answer. The Army has developed a prioritized list of uses for
increased fiscal year 1999 funding should it be made available. A list
will be provided to the Committee as requested. The benefit of
additional funds would be to increase readiness. revitalize
infrastructure, and accelerate modernization programs.
Question. Would additional funds fix critical shortfalls, field
modernization programs sooner, or just fund ``nice to have'' programs?
Answer. Any additional funds provided would help fix critical
shortfalls in readiness and support fielding modernization programs
sooner. You can rest assured that any additional resources provided the
Army will be spent carefully and wisely.
Question. If the Army received additional funding in fiscal year
1999 for the programs that you have outlined, would the Army be willing
to sustain those programs in the outyears? Why or why not?
Answer. We will sustain all programs according to their yearly
requirements within the constraints of the Army's overall
affordability. In some cases, the funding we have requested is a one
year requirement, usually an up-front investment, for which level of
effort sustainment funds are available in the outyears. In other cases,
the outyear funding requirement gradually decreases as force structure
reductions or efficiencies take effect. You can rest assured that any
additional funding we receive will be carefully shepherded by
appropriate outyear support while maintaining balance across
requirements and considering the affordability issues which limit
support of additional requirements.
Question. Does the fiscal year 1999 budget adequately fund
operations and maintenance and personnel requirements? If not, what are
your highest priority shortfalls?
Answer. The fiscal year 1999 estimate in the Military Personnel,
Army, appropriation represents a fully funded program for the manpower
displayed.
[Clerk's note.--Operation and maintenance shortfalls are
included on the Army's unfunded requirements list.]
Question. Would there be savings if Congress provided additional
funds to procure items at an accelerated rate? If so, which procurement
items would you accelerate? What would be the near-term cost and long-
term savings of the accelerated procurement?
Answer. The items for which we requested additional funding in
fiscal year 1999 are mostly accelerations of existing programs and the
quantifiable benefits in most cases result in getting critical
warfighting capabilities into the hands of our soldiers sooner, not
necessarily monetary savings.
Procurements that could be accelerated to place key capabilities in
the hands of commanders and soldiers, and serve as a representative
sample of these savings or benefits follows. Seventy-two million
dollars for Soldier Life Support Systems--such as containerized
kitchens, laundry systems, space heaters, air conditioners,
organizational equipment, latrines, and showers--will improve supply,
safety, and environmental concerns and enhance soldier quality of life.
Eighty-eight million dollars for the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles
will accelerate fielding to Army National Guard and Reserve Force
Package 1 and 2 units, permitting mobilization of all Force Package 1
and 2 units with a fully modernized medium truck fleet rather than a
half-equipped force with a mixed fleet. It will also bring production
to a more economical rate of 200 per month, and the average unit cost
of fiscal year 1999 production will drop at least five percent. More
trucks fielded sooner will also lower support costs.
Additional funds provided by Congress allow the Army an opportunity
to develop and procure additional required technologies and weapon
systems. Be assured that additional resources which we receive are used
for our highest priority unresourced requirements.
Question. In the past, we have testimony from several of the
Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs). Each year, all of the CINCs testify that
they are faced with critical shortfalls in areas such as equipment
maintenance, air and sea lift, and operating tempo (OPTEMPO) funding.
The CINCs do not submit their own budget requests to the Congress. The
resources required at the various commands are requested by the
services. What critical shortfalls identified by the CINCs are included
in your fiscal year 1999 request?
Answer. In building the Army budget, we have made every effort to
support the requirements of the CINCs of the Unified Commands. The Army
gave careful consideration to each Army program in the CINCs Integrated
Priority Lists. CINC priorities were considered in conjunction with
fiscal year 1999 Fiscal Guidance, the Defense Planning Guidance, and
Army priorities. The CINCs, as a whole, were most concerned with global
communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance,
strategic lift/prepositioning, force protection, weapons of mass
destruction defense/counter proliferation, missile defense, force
readiness, and quality of life. Army programs supporting all of these
issues counter proliferation, which is funded at the Department of
Defense level, were included in the fiscal year 1999 budget.
Question. What requirements identified by CINCs have not been
included in your budget submission? Why were those requirements not
funded?
Answer. CINC requirements underwent the same review and scrutiny as
all other Army requirements. Of necessity, this includes collection of
detailed resource requirements by Army component commands, review by
the Army staff proponent, and finally, a detailed analysis of
shortfalls in Army programs. This review includes consideration of the
potential impact. Typically, the only requirements which were not
supported were those which could not be validated by this process or
were dependent upon external resources. For example, the Army could not
validate a request by United States Southern Command to replace
discontinued Defense Security Assistance Agency manpower with Army
resources because the requirement had not been reviewed by the joint
community.
Question. Which shortfalls were not funded at their highest levels?
Why?
Answer. In most cases, the Army was able to satisfy the CINCs'
requirements. The Army gave careful consideration to each Army program
in the CINCs Integrated Priority Lists. Those requirements which were
not funded at high levels reflect Army decisions on affordability
versus risk. Typically, CINCs' shortfalls were similar to those
experienced by Army major commands, such as infrastructure, Command,
Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C41), force
protection, and Active component/Reserve component (AC/RC) integration.
The Army has programmed steady improvements for infrastructure but
remains constrained by affordability in the near-term. For example, the
Army is on a steady ramp to meet the Defense planning target to fund 75
percent of requirements for real property maintenance by fiscal year
2003, but remains limited by affordability during fiscal year 1999. For
other programs, such as C41 systems and infrastructure, the Army was
able to accept some risk without jeopardizing support of the National
Military Strategy. While requirements for force protection continue to
evolve, the Army supported these programs to acceptable levels within
fiscal constraints. Finally, AC/RC integration and training remain a
priority and continue to receive increased levels of funding. The Army
resourced CINCs' requirements at adequate levels given resource
priorities and acceptable levels of risk.
Additional Modernization Funding
Question. The Army's fiscal year 1998 list of unfunded requirements
totaled over $3,000,000,000 dollars. Does the fiscal year 1999 budget
sustained the level of funding required for those activities that
received additional funding in fiscal year 1998?
Answer. We increased modernization funding in the fiscal year 1999
budget over the previous year's funding to assure the long term
readiness of our forces, and to achieve Quadrennial Defense Review
goals such as a digitized force and modernization of the Army National
Guard and Army Reserves. We were able to sustain or exceed fiscal year
1998 appropriated levels in the fiscal year 1999 budget for some
programs.
Question. For the record, please provide a list of projects that
received additional funding in fiscal year 1998, but are not adequately
funded in fiscal year 1999.
Answer. The attached is the total Congressional plus ups for fiscal
year 1998. We have added a column which indicates the 10 items in
priority which appear on the fiscal year 1999 list of unfunded
requirements. This indicates that the item is not fully funded in
fiscal year 1999.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Personnel Reductions
Question. The Fiscal Year 1998 National Defense Authorization Act
established an end strength floor for the Army at 495,000 personnel,
but included language which allows the Army a 1.5 percent variance from
that floor. Mr. Secretary, is the Army on track to meet its fiscal year
1998 end strength goal of 488,000 personnel by September 30, 1998? As
of this date, are you currently overstrength or understrength in
managing these personnel reductions?
Answer. The Army expects to achieve its strength target of 488,000
personnel at the end of fiscal year 1998. Due to lower than expected
attrition and robust enlisted accessions, the Army is currently about
2,300 personnel overstrength. Fewer enlisted soldiers will be recruited
from April through July to compensate for this overstrength. Policy
decisions on further strength adjustments will be made as additional
strength information becomes available.
Question. Have you had to reduce your recruiting accessions in
order to balance your 1998 manpower program? What is your accession
goal for fiscal year 1998?
Answer. Primarily due to lower than expected attrition, the Army is
currently about 2,300 personnel overstrength. To balance the manpower
program, adjustments to the recruiting mission have already been made
which lowered the fiscal year 1998 recruiting mission from 76,900 to
the Army's current goal of 73,000. February projections of Army end
strength indicate an additional accession reduction of 1,000 might be
necessary.
Question. In the fiscal year 1999 budget request, the Army is
requesting to reduce another 8,000 personnel, which would make the
Army's end strength level 480,000 Active duty personnel. The Committee
understands that the Department will ask the Authorization Committees
to repeal this end strength floor for fiscal year 1999. If the
Authorization Committees do not repeal this language, what is the
fiscal year 1999 total unfunded shortfall for these additional manpower
and operation and maintenance costs?
Answer. We estimate the fiscal year 1999 Military Personnel, Army,
appropriation would incur additional costs up to $341,000,000. The
Operations and Maintenance, Army, appropriation would incur base
support increased costs of about $17,000,000.
Question. Are the fiscal year 1999 personnel reductions directly
tied to force structure changes or Quadrennial Defense Review
reductions?
Answer. The majority of the Army's fiscal year 1999 personnel
reductions are directly tied to the Department of Defense's Quadrennial
Defense Review decision to reduce end strengths in the Active component
by 15,000; in the Reserve component by 45,000; and in Department of the
Army civilians by about 17,000 by fiscal year 2003. In fiscal year
1999, the Active component expects to reduce its end strength by 8,000
to bring it to the Quadrennial Defense Review target of 480,000. The
Army National Guard expects to reduce its end strength by 5,000 to
357,000 in step with its plan to comply with Quadrennial Defense Review
recommendations. Department of the Army civilian end strength is
projected to be reduced by about 2,000 based on workload and
efficiencies. However, these reductions were already programmed for
elimination and not due to Quadrennial Defense Review decisions.
Question. If the Army's personnel tempo and operating tempo is
already being stretched thin, how can you justify reducing your end
strength numbers further in fiscal year 1999?
Answer. During the Quadrennial Defense Report (QDR), and after a
comprehensive analysis of the new National Military Strategy, our
derived requirements, and anticipated resource levels, we determined
that modest reductions to Army Active, Reserve, and civilian personnel
end strengths could be achieved without significantly degrading our
ability to implement all aspects of the National Military Strategy. At
the same time we are focusing our efforts on adjusting our force
structure to enhance the utility of our Reserve component (RC).
The Army will achieve a 15,000 reduction in the Active component
(AC) from 495,000 to 480,000 through measured reduction in the
generating force (those forces required to meet basic wartime support
requirements and to accomplish routine Title 10 responsibilities) and
through the reduction and transfer of missions of lower priority AC
combat support and combat service support units to the RC. This
approach shields units that bear the highest operating tempo burden and
allows the reductions to occur in the generating force where the burden
can be more easily dispersed.
Question. Do you have units that are undermanned due to personnel
reductions? If so, how do these manning levels effect your Status of
Readiness and Training System (SORTS) rates? Are any units rated below
C-3 because of personnel shortages? If so, how long will it take the
Army to fix these personnel shortages?
Answer. Personnel ``end strength'' reductions do not result in
undermanned units, providing that force structure is reduced on a
commensurate basis to end strength. In general, the Army has been
successful in synchronizing end strength and force structure
reductions. Accordingly, the Army has no units undermanned due strictly
to end strength/personnel reductions. However, due to the occurrence of
a recruiting shortfall in certain military occupational specialities
(MOSs), especially Infantry and service support MOSs, and coinciding
with a temporary strength shortfall in the junior ranks, which had been
deliberately programmed to take care of our career force during the
Army's downsizing, some units have experienced serious spot personnel
shortages. This situation was more pronounced during the latter half of
1997. The recruiting problem has been corrected and the programmed
temporary strength shortfall is self-correcting. Overall, the Army has
dramatically improved the balance between force structure and end
strength. Consequently, March 1998 Unit Status/SORTS Reports indicated
that unit-manning levels improved measurably to 98 percent.
A number of Active component battalion size or larger units
reported C-3 or C-4 one or more times during the second quarter of
fiscal year 1998. A small portion of those units are Authorized Level
of Organization (ALO) 3 or lower (ALO 3-9). These units will never
report higher than C-3/4. The primary drivers behind the remaining
units not achieving C-1 were, in approximately equal proportion,
``personnel shortages'' and ``personnel not available.'' Moreover,
personnel not available affected both the Personnel and Training
resource areas of the ALO 1/2, C-3/4 units. The major factor in
``personnel availability'' shortfalls has consistently been operational
commitments. Thus, operational commitments were at least as great a
driver of Army units not achieving C-1/2 as personnel shortages. This
peace operations readiness bill is the price we pay for accomplishing
our Nation's policy of shaping the international security environment
in ways favorable to U.S. interests.
Through the remainder of fiscal year 1998, the Army will continue
to be faced with personnel readiness challenges as we reshape the force
in response to the Change in Noncommissioned Officer Structure
initiative, Officer Reduction Initiative and the Quadrennial Defense
Review. Despite these challenges, there is cause for considerable
optimism throughout fiscal year 1998 and as we look forward into fiscal
year 1999. Recruiting is doing well, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense forecast looks positive, and retention remains strong.
Question. The Army Reserve and Army National Guard are reducing
approximately 45,000 of their selected reservists under the Quadrennial
Defense Review also. Is there still some disagreement on how these
reductions will be allocated between the two components? When will this
be decided?
Answer. The Quadrennial Defense Review recommended reduction of
Reserve component end strength by 45,000. The first 20,000 reduction
has been allocated. Seventeen thousand has been allocated to the Army
National Guard and 3,000 to the United States Army Reserve. Specifics
of the remaining 25,000 Reserve component reduction will be determined
through a process including Total Army Analysis 2007. The Deputy Chief
of Staff for Operations and Plans, in coordination with the Office
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs),
National Guard Bureau, The Adjutant Generals (Force Structure
Committee), and Office of the Chief Army Reserve will lead the
assessment of Reserve component force structure and determine how the
Army will achieve the balance of the 25,000 reductions in fiscal years
2001 and 2002.
Reserve Forces in Bosnia
Question. The Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC) allows
the Department of Defense the authority to involuntarily call to Active
duty up to 200,000 Reserve component personnel for up to a maximum of
270 days. President Clinton implemented the call-up for military
operators in Bosnia on December 8, 1995. Secretary Perry authorized the
use of Reserve forces until August 15, 1998, at which time all
Reservists would be back at their home bases. Mr. Secretary, has
Secretary Cohen rescinded the August end-date for the call-up? If so,
what is the length of time he has extended the call-up?
Answer. Yes. In light of the President's decision that the United
States mission in Bosnia should extend beyond June of this year,
Secretary Cohen has determined that the stated August end date no
longer applies. No end date has been reestablished.
Question. The Committee understands that the Department is studying
whether the law allows the President to activate Reservists for a
second 270-day tour. Has the General Counsel provided you with a legal
opinion on this question yet?
Answer. No. The issue is still with the Department of Defense
General Counsel for resolution.
Question. If the Pentagon does not have the legal authority to
order double tours for Reservists, do you believe the Army Reserve and
Guard units can supply enough people who have those skills that are
critically needed in Bosnia?
Answer. Those critical skills that continue to be required to
support the Bosnia mission and have been habitually filled by the Army
National Guard (ARNG) and United States Army Reserve (USAR) will
continue to be supported; although not necessarily by the ARNG or USAR.
Alternatives to the use of the Army's Reserve component (RC) include:
contracting, Active component soldiers, other services with a like
capability, RC volunteers, Department of the Army civilians, and, if
necessary, coordinating a modification of the requirement while still
providing the required capability.
Question. What types of units has Forces Command indicated will be
difficult to fill either because the Presidential Selected Reserve
Call-Up (PSRC) is scheduled to expire in August or because the Reserve
component has been used under the PSRC already?
Answer. Forces Command has indicated that the following types of
Reserve Component units may be difficult to fill because the units were
previously mobilized under the current PSRC for Bosnia: broadcast
public affairs detachments, engineer fire fighter detachments, military
history detachments, and some types of movement control teams. Please
note that on February 20, 1998, the Secretary of Defense lifted the
stated PSRC end date of August 15, 1998.
Individual Ready Reserve
Question. Last year the Authorization Conference included language
that would authorize the President under the PSRC authority to recall
up to 30,000 members under a new category of the Individual Ready
Reserve (IRR). This new category would consist of personnel in special
military skills designated by the Secretary of Defense and who
volunteered for this category prior to leaving active duty. Before this
change in law, the President could only involuntarily mobilize the IRR
in times of war or national emergency. Now IRR members can be ordered
to Active duty in times other than during war or national emergency,
for contingency operations, for example.
Please explain to the Committee how the Department feels about
expanding the President's call-up authority on decisions of troop
deployments.
Answer. The Army is pleased with the expanded call-up authority. It
helps solve a long-standing mobilization problem within the Army: how
to meet individual filler requirements for early deploying Active and
Reserve component units under existing PSRC. Many units require
``fillers'' to bring them to their full authorized strength prior to
deployment. In the past, fillers were obtained through the cross
leveling of soldiers from non-alerted units and volunteers from the
IRR. This strategy met the requirements for fillers; however, it
adversely affected the readiness and cohesiveness of units, which might
have been needed later. The expanded call-up authority provides the
Army with a source of needed individual fillers without sacrificing
unit readiness. This enhances our overall capabilities in meeting the
National Security and Military Strategies.
Question. How do you envision this new authority would work for the
Army? For instance, would the Army plan to transfer more combat service
support specialities to the IRR?
Answer. The IRR's members are individuals who have completed their
Active duty obligations and either have a remaining service obligation
or desire to remain on the service roles, but are not able to find a
suitable position in the Selected Reserve. Many are recently trained
and experienced. In the past, the Army could not effectively access
these individuals short of a mobilization authority. This new authority
will, in the event of a Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up, give the
Army access to a large pool of recently trained and experienced
soldiers in order to meet early, individual requirements for
contingency response missions.
Question. With over 880,000 selected reservists in all the
services, why should the President need this additional authority to
call-up 30,000 from the retired ranks for contingency operations? Can't
these critical job specialities be found within the 880,000 Reserves or
the Active duty personnel?
Answer. For clarification, these are members of the Reserves and
not members of the Retired Reserve, a different category than the IRR.
In any case, Reservists in the IRR have volunteered to be part of this
program. These soldiers are recently trained and experienced in their
military specialties, a requirement for this category of the IRR.
Access to these volunteers is an extremely valuable tool for the
Army. The Army has identified over 30,000 requirements for filler
personnel in the early stages of a single Major Theater War. In the
past, these shortfalls have been met through the use of volunteers,
Individual Mobilization Augmentees, or reassigning personnel from later
deploying units. These methods of filling individual shortfalls have
negative effects on unit cohesion, readiness, and the viability of
later deploying units upon crisis escalation. The 30,000 IRR call-up
authority will allow the Army to meet these Commander-in-Chief
requirements for trained, experienced soldiers, while avoiding the
negative effects to the Selected Reserve and the Active component.
Question. Will retired Army personnel be required to attend the two
weeks of annual training and specialty skill training like other
Selected Reserve personnel? If so, what is the additional cost to the
Army Reserve and Army National Guard to supply this training?
Answer. Retired soldiers are not required to attend any training.
The soldiers volunteering for this new category are members of the IRR.
There will be no mandatory training requirement for soldiers in this
new category. Selection of volunteers for this category of the IRR
requires that the soldiers be within two years of separation from
active service and be fully qualified thus requiring minimal post-
mobilization training.
Guard and Reserve Role in Domestic Terrorism
Question. Mr. Secretary, the Committee understands that the
Department of Defense (DoD) has approved plans to use Guard and Reserve
components to help respond in the event of a domestic terrorist
incident and/or a biological and chemical attack against the United
States, and places the Army as Executive Agent for the Office of the
Secretary of Defense. Please summarize for the Committee how the
Department plans to integrate Guard and Reserve forces for response to
domestic Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).
Answer. While many military units possess basic skills and
capabilities that can be applied to WMD response requirements, few have
been specifically focused on the precise tasks or equipped with the
appropriate assets to immediately respond to such an event. During the
development of the plan, services were asked to identify WMD response
plan and to indicate if those units were adequately organized, trained,
and equipped to perform these specific tasks.
For many of the WMD response tasks, focusing units on the missions
they may be asked to perform and developing their awareness of the
Incident Command System is all that may be necessary. For others,
specific task will require training. These are very different practices
when compared to our military doctrine today. Here again, the value of
training to the same standards and using common terminology and
exercising with first responders, we have the opportunity to prepare
for this most demanding mission. The plan addresses the areas requiring
DoD attention and isolates in some detail the response options the
Department may be asked to perform. In the end, the solution to the WMD
response mission requires a partnership--military and civilian.
This program will dramatically increase those elements that are
prepared to respond quickly. The Consequence Management Program
Integration Office, being established now, will develop the
organization of each element as well as the training and equipment
necessary for that element. These elements will range in size from 5 to
6 people to 50 or 60. During the first year of the program, we will
establish three types of elements: Assessment, Decontamination, and
Reconnaissance, and being training some of the medical personnel. These
elements will be equipped with state of the art detection and analysis
equipment, as well as computer models for various types of attacks. As
a National Guard element, they may be employed by the Governor or be
federalized and deployed to respond with other federal assets.
The structure, training courses, and equipment for these elements
are described in the WMD response plan. We will also begin to refine
the definition and planning for the other elements identified in the
plan. These elements are created out of existing force structure. We
are able to leverage the National Guard and Reserve capabilities by
focusing existing units on the consequence management mission tasks,
providing specific training, and delivering supplemental equipment to
enhance their current capabilities. Using National Guard and Reserve
elements already stationed throughout the United States also improves
the response time to incident sites. The National Guard elements may be
employed as state assets or as federal assets under the Response Task
Force.
We believe this program will develop capabilities required by our
Nation to meet the overwhelming challenges from the use of Weapons of
Mass Destruction. These are the same capabilities we require in DoD to
respond to the use of WMD against our forces anywhere in the world.
Question. What are the most likely tasks the Department of Defense
(DoD) would be asked to support if a Federal Response Plan were
implemented because of a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) event?
Answer. To support a Federal response to a WMD event, DoD intends
to exploit our tested and proven capabilities. This support will be
provided through a Response Task Force (RTF) capable of bringing the
full-range of crisis and consequence management assistance. The RTF
will provide command and control of those technical resources and
forces required to support both the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) during crisis management and Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) during consequence management. The National Guard provides the
first line of military response. They will bring their resources to
bear when requested by the governor to support local first responders.
When requested by a lead federal agency, DoD support may include
technical assistance to law enforcement authorities. As the support
transitions to consequence management, it would likely include:
explosive ordnance disposal and chemical and biological support
(survey, detection, monitoring, consultation on WMD effects, laboratory
support, assessment and decontamination). A network of Reserve
Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers from all the services in each
state and federal region support DoD and provide technical expertise
and coordinate response requirements with each state. It is anticipated
that DoD will identify a base support installation within close
proximity to the area which will allow for staging areas, emergency
medical services, airfield operations and basic subsistence services.
Additional support requirements would include: search and rescue teams;
hazardous materials medical teams; aeromedical evacuation; and medical
response teams to provide equipment, triage, and treatment, as well as
ground transportation and evacuation of causalities. Depending on the
type of incident and the extent of destruction, DoD can and is able to
support all of FEMA's 12 Emergency Support Functions.
Question. What is the amount of funding being requested in the
fiscal year 1999 budget for the Reserve component's participation in
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)? Please provide for the record a
detailed breakout of this funding for fiscal year 1999, and what the
continued outyear funding will be.
Answer. For fiscal year 1999, $49,200,000 has been requested in the
President's budget for implementation with the following
recommendations: $19,900,000 to stand up, train, and equip National
Guard Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection elements; $15,900,000 for
patient decontamination and WMD reconnaissance element training and
equipment in the Army and Air National Guard, and the Army and Air
Force Reserve; $6,900,000 to establish and staff a Consequence
Management Program Integration Office; $3,300,000 to train and prepare
medical personnel to provide medical care to nuclear, chemical, and
biological causalities; $1,800,000 for additional Emergency
Preparedness Liaison Officer training and equipment; and $1,400,000 to
upgrade simulation systems and conduct civil-military response
exercises. The Program Integration Office, for inclusion in the
Department of Defense fiscal year 2000-2005 Program Objective
Memorandum, is currently developing funding requirements beyond fiscal
year 1999. We will use $295,000 of the WMD domestic preparedness
program funds for Reserve component/National Guard personnel
participation at city visits and training in fiscal year 1999.
Question. The Committee included $10,000,000 in fiscal year 1998
for the Army National Guard to develop a comprehensive mission plan,
train personnel, and acquire new chemical/biological defense
technology. Explain how the Army National Guard's program will be
coordinated within the Department of Defense to leverage existing
capabilities that already exist in the Active forces and other Reserve
components.
Answer. The National Guard Bureau is drafting a Report to Congress
titled ``Domestic Chemical/Biological Mission Planning to Combat
Terrorist Attacks.'' This report will detail the Guard's plan for
leveraging existing response assets. The study will potentially
identify gaps existing between Department of Defense, other Federal
Agency assets, and Guard resources. This will ensure the Guard does not
duplicate existing assets.
Question. In last year's bill, the Committee requested the Guard to
submit a report by February 1, 1998, explaining in detail how these
funds will be used. When will this report be finished?
Answer. The National Guard Report to Congress is currently in its
final stage of completion. Due to the complexity of the issue and
planned scope, the report necessitated extensive interdepartmental and
interagency coordination. The National Guard will complete the report
in the near future.
Question. How do you envision the Guard as having the role of a
``first responder'' to an incident, since many Guardsmen have other
full-time jobs and could not be activated for a job requiring quick
reaction?
Answer. Local civil law enforcement agencies, firemen, and
emergency medical technicians are the ``first responders'' to a Weapons
of Mass Destruction (WMD) incident. The National Guard is the first
military responder to a WMD incident when military assistance is
requested by the incident commander and approved by the Governor. This
has historically been the case with all other Military Support to Civil
Authority actions and will not change for WMD incidents. They will not
replace municipalities' fire fighters, police, hazardous material, or
medical first responders. All National Guard and Reserve forces already
have some capabilities to function in a nuclear, biological, and
chemical environment. During any incident, they become instate force
multipliers. National Guard forces are already familiar with the local
area. They know its plans, infrastructure, and the geography. They also
have strong community links that will be invaluable in times of crisis.
Additionally, the National Guard has been authorized by Congress to
stand up 10, 22-member elements called Rapid Assessment and Initial
Detection elements. These elements will be manned by full-time National
Guard soldiers and will be able to respond to a WMD incident much
quicker than a traditional National Guard unit that meets once a month.
Question. Do you feel that the Guard has the technical expertise to
train local civilian agencies in detecting or confronting a chemical/
biological threat?
Answer. Because the Guard and Reserve are being tasked to respond
to the very real threat of a domestic terrorist attack, they will
demonstrate their ever ready support to the Armed Forces, and immediate
support to local authorities across the Nation. Of significance is the
fact that these personnel live and work in all these communities. They
have already established the links to fire, police, and emergency
medical personnel who are always the first to arrive on the scene of
any disaster. Some of these National Guard and Reserve personnel have
jobs as policeman, fireman, or emergency medical technicians. We have
leveraged their skills and experience to augment the trainers in the
Weapons of Mass Destruction Domestic Preparedness ``Train the Trainer''
training that Department of Defense is supporting with its interagency
partners. The training is taking place in the 120 largest metropolitan
areas in the United States. These servicemen have some of the same
experiences of other first responders, but also have had military
training in defense against Weapons of Mass Destruction. Based on both
military and civilian first responder experience, they bring additional
experience and skills to support the first responders in being better
prepared. These servicemen compliment the interagency and local first
responders who are also a part of the training team.
Sexual Harassment Training
Question. The Committee understands that an Army Senior Review
Panel recently reviewed the Army's equal opportunities policies and
practices to assess the extent of sexual harassment. Several
initiatives were proposed aimed at correcting problems. One
recommendation, for example, was to add an extra week extension to
Basic Combat Training in order to focus on core values. Please
summarize the findings of the Review Panel. What is the Army doing to
help identify and eliminate sexual harassment?
Answer. We are reviewing former Senator Kassebaum Baker's report
and will provide the Army's response to the Secretary of Defense on
March 16, 1998. However, the findings of the Review Panel have centered
on four main areas: the Army Equal Opportunity (EO) program, the extent
of sexual harassment in the Army, leadership, and Initial Entry
Training (IET). The Panel found that: the Army lacks institutional
commitment to the EO program and soldiers distrust the EO complaint
system; sexual harassment exists throughout the Army, crossing gender,
rank, and racial lines; sex discrimination is more common than is
sexual harassment; Army leaders are the critical factor in creating,
maintaining, and enforcing an environment of respect and dignity in the
Army; too many leaders have failed to gain the trust of the soldiers;
and the overwhelming majority of drill sergeants and instructors
perform competently and well, but respect as an Army core value is not
well institutionalized in the initial entry training process.
The Army is taking results of the Panel report seriously and has
already made significant progress implementing its recommendations
throughout the Army. The Army published the Human Relations Action Plan
in September 1997 in response to the findings resulting from the
investigations conducted by the Secretary of the Army's Senior Review
Panel on Sexual Harassment and the Department of the Army's Inspector
General Special Inspection of Initial Entry Training. The Action Plan
serves as a tasking and tracking document for Army leaders to implement
those actions necessary to improve the human relations environment in
the U.S. Army today and to eliminate sexual harassment. Actions the
Army has taken or will take include the following:
Implemented new procedures for drill sergeant selection, training
and background investigations;
Assigned 110 additional lieutenants as training unit executive
officer to ease drill sergeants' administrative burdens and free them
to do their primary jobs;
Redistributed 54 chaplains to training bases;
Implemented a ``Consideration of Others'' program Army-wide; the
goal of program is to ensure that all soldiers learn how to treat one
another with dignity and respect;
Standardized, improved and expanded human relations training for
all soldiers;
Extended basic combat training for one week to ensure the recruits
understand the importance of Army values and tradition as well as to
increase time spent on the ``soldierization'' process;
Implemented chain teaching throughout the Army to educate soldiers
and leaders on the Army's policy and standards of behavior regarding
sexual harassment and misconduct;
Trained commanders at all levels on how to establish a healthy
command climate and how to measure this command climate; mandated that
all commanders conduct a climate assessment within 90 days of assuming
command and annually thereafter; provided the field with new command
climate assessment tools to help leaders monitor the climate within
their units;
Published a pamphlet entitled Leadership and Change in a Values-
based Army which reinforced core values and leader responsibilities;
Implemented ``Character Development XXI'' initiatives to refocus
the Army on its core values;
Established a Leadership Advisory Group, comprised of principal
leadership policy and doctrine action officers, to examine leadership
issues of importance to today's Army;
Conducting a series of In-Progress Reviews (IPRs) to monitor the
progress of the implementation of the plan; and
Will conduct a follow-on assessment of the U.S. Army to determine
if the action plan has made a difference in the Army's organizational
climate.
Question. Has the Army made the decision yet to extend basic
training to nine weeks? How many personnel go through Army basic
training each year?
Answer. The Army decided to extend basic training to nine weeks
beginning October 1, 1998. Approximately 110,000 recruits go through
Army basic training each year.
Question. What is the average cost for the Army to train a new
service member?
Answer. The average cost to train a new service member is
$18,308.00. This includes $5,075.00 for basic combat training and
$13,233.00 for advanced individual training.
Question. Besides new recruits, who else will be required to attend
Sexual Harassment Training?
Answer. Everyone. All soldiers, noncommissioned officers, officers,
and civilians must attend prevention of sexual harassment training
every year, and all except civilians must attend twice a year. Soldiers
must understand what sexual harassment is, how to recognize it, how to
prevent it, how to report it, and what are the negative consequences of
engaging in sexual harassment. Elimination of sexual harassment within
a unit begins with a policy of aggressive and progressive training to
identify and prevent inappropriate behavior. Unit training for junior
enlisted and civilian employees will focus on defining sexual
harassment and gender discrimination, sanctions which may be used to
punish harassers, techniques for soldiers to deal with sexual
harassment and methods of filing a complaint through the complaint
system. Unit training or professional development training for junior
officers, noncommissioned officers and civilian supervisors will
reinforce the aforementioned training. In addition, emphasis will be
placed on promoting a health work environment within the section or
unit as well as on techniques for receiving, handling and resolving
complainants. Training on the Equal Opportunity complaint system will
include leader responsibilities in processing informal and formal
complaints. It will emphasize the prevention of reprisal actions
against complaints. Training at the unit level for senior
noncommissioned officers, warrant officers, officers, civilian
managers, and senior executive service will focus on fostering a
healthy command climate and using appropriate means for determining a
healthy command climate. All training will reinforce training conducted
a more junior levels.
Question. When will you implement this additional week's training,
and how will the Training and Doctrine Command resource this training
within budget constraints?
Answer. The Army will implement the additional week's training
beginning October 1, 1998. The Department of the Army will provide the
Training and Doctrine Command adequate resources to conduct the
training.
Question. What is the estimated cost to the Army for extending this
training an additional week?
Answer. In fiscal year 1998, the Army provided $8,600,000 to the
Training and Doctrine Command to develop an expanded basic training
program and to partially expand the training base to conduct the
additional training. Estimated costs for fiscal year 1999 are an
additional $38,000,000. This does not include the salaries of Active
Army cadre or Active Army trainees for the additional week.
Land Forces Training Readiness
Question. The Army 1999 budget request indicates that actual tank
miles (the measure of readiness related training for ground forces) for
fiscal year 1997 and 1998 are just over 650, well below the training
objective of 800 miles. General Reimer, what effect will the planned
reduction in tank miles have on Army readiness?
Answer. The Army did not intentionally plan a reduction in
operating tempo (OPTEMPO). The combination of unspecified Congressional
cuts, reductions in other programs (such as base operations) and
reprogramming limitations challenged field commanders with maintaining
a balance between readiness, training, and quality of life. When faced
with the realities of their fiscal year 1998 funding levels and the
concerns about reprogramming limitations during execution, the Major
Command commanders recommended that funding be realigned to reflect
expected spending plans. Consistent with past years, commanders
absorbed these cuts and program shortfalls in OPTEMPO. By optimizing
simulations, maximizing the use of Heavy Equipment Transports and
spreading the mileage reduction over the year, commanders can maintain
their training program within acceptable readiness levels.
Question. Setting aside the effect of contingencies, when was the
last time that the Army actually executed its readiness training
program at or above 800 miles.
Answer. Because mileage execution varies by Major Command, units
must be looked at individually to determine their execution of the
training strategy. During fiscal year 1997, the 2d Infantry Division
achieved 735 miles in Forces Command. Further, all the light forces
trained at their equivalent of ``800 miles.'' The last time the Army
executed 800 miles or greater overall was in fiscal year 1989, when 815
miles were executed. Since 1992, operating tempo mileage has fallen
below the programmed training strategy. This occurred for many reasons,
including commanders in the field balancing training requirements with
other underfunded programs that also impact on readiness.
The Army does not use executed miles as a readiness barometer.
Mileage execution alone fails to include commanders use of training
aids, devices, simulators and simulations, and Heavy Equipment
Transports in training strategies. We have also taken several steps to
reduce the overall cost of training, to include incorporation of
simulation into our training strategies to reduce the number of miles
required to be driven by combat vehicles. These techniques maintain the
overall readiness of the Army without generating many miles.
Question. The press release that accompanied the roll out of the
fiscal year 1999 budget claims that about $1,000,000,000 was added to
the Operation and Maintenance accounts to preserve readiness. What is
the Army share of this adjustment?
Answer. While the Army has no fiscal year 1999 Operation and
Maintenance budget increase attributable to a $1,000,000,000 Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) add to Operation and Maintenance
accounts, the Army did receive some increases during the Fall review of
the Army Budget Estimate. Those increases resulted from OSD mission
transfers to the Army and have no impact on Army readiness. Overall,
increases generally were offset by decreases.
Question. General Reimer, the Committee understands that emergent
Department of the Army requirements are, in part, responsible for the
reallocation of Operation and Maintenance funding away from readiness
training. Could you describe for the Committee those priorities that
have been funded instead of readiness related training?
Answer. Austere funding in 1998 forced the Army to divert resources
from readiness training accounts to cover critical needs in other
programs and pay their assessed share of the Operation and Maintenance,
Army (OMA), unspecified congressional reductions. The major unspecified
reductions levied against the readiness accounts include: civilian
personnel underexecution; National Defense Stockpile Fund; OMA excess
inventory; revised economic assumptions; and temporary duty expenses.
The adverse impact of these reductions is much greater because
readiness funding levels had already been adjusted for reduced pricing
and travel, as well as personnel and equipment levels.
When resources are scarce, commanders absorb funding reductions
within readiness accounts and protect other activities which are
essential to the overall operational readiness of the Army. This
includes funding for: training infrastructure and support facilities,
including operation of training areas and ranges; centrally procured
clothing and equipment; training ammunition; unit Nuclear Biological
and Chemical and medical supplies; maintenance and supply support
facilities; Power Projection Facilities; the incremental cost of
participation in Joint Chief of Staff exercise; Active and Reserve
component support; force communications requirements; facilities
associated with certain combat development activities; and Land Forces
Depot Maintenance. In addition, other infrastructure and unique
management activity funds, including Base Operations Support, Real
Property Maintenance, Army, funding for Unified Commands, and other
miscellaneous activities, are funded at bare minimum levels and were
not able to absorb any additional reductions. These supporting
activities are essential components of the Army's ability to train,
deploy, and sustain operations and are primary contributions to quality
of life throughout the Army.
Shortages in 1998 are causing commanders to make year of execution
`boots-on-the-ground' decisions on selected training in order to
achieve the optimal readiness balance between all the myriad of factors
impacting readiness. Already, some units are maintaining equipment
below normal maintenance standards, repair parts stockage levels will
drop well below authorized levels, and units are eliminating collective
unit training at task force level and above, except for Combat Training
Center rotations and tasks force deployment exercises. Commanders are
attempting to balance their existing resources by paring down training
to those events required to sustain bare minimum acceptable training
readiness. Commanders are forced to make necessary resource trade-offs
in order to maintain the delicate balance of unit readiness and
preserve the minimum acceptable quality of life standards for Army
soldiers and their families.
Question. Would the Army find it advisable to develop more
restrictive reprogramming guidance for the Operation and Maintenance
account to prevent the migration of funds from readiness related
training to other support functions? If not, why?
Answer. More restrictive reprogramming guidance is not the way to
go. For fiscal year 1998, we already have more restrictive guidance
than in the past, both in the reduced dollar threshold and in the
number of budget lines to which it is applied. This has increased the
workload at all levels of the Army to implement and track these
thresholds. It has not eliminated the underlying driving forces behind
migration, which are a tight budget and the need for field commanders
to flexibly adjust to emergent requirements. Rather than more
restrictive guidance, we need less. Eliminating the thresholds, or at
least raising them to $50,000,000, would allow us to manage our funds
more efficiently during the year with less of a workload than we are
currently experiencing.
National Training Center and Readiness
Question. In the 1998 budget request, the Army proposed that units
on rotation to the National Training Center absorb the cost of these
rotations from home station training funds. In the fiscal year 1998 DoD
Appropriations Act, the Congress rejected this proposal, and added $30
million to Operation and maintenance, Army to ensure that adequate
funding would be available for NTC rotations, and to preserve home
station training funds. The Army has again made this proposal in the
fiscal year 1999 budget request. How does the Army propose spending the
additional National Training Center funding provided in the Fiscal Year
1998 National Defense Appropriations Act?
Answer. The Fiscal Year 1998 National Defense Appropriations Act
provided an additional $30,000,000 in funding for the National Training
Center (NTC). The Army proposes to spend this funding on approximately
170 miles for each of 17 the Active component heavy battalions using
the prepositioned fleet while participating in NTC rotations in fiscal
year 1998.
Question. The Committee understands that the Army will, once again,
propose that units absorb the cost of National Training Center (NTC)
rotations from home-station training rather that separately funding
such rotations. Why?
Answer. The Army has updated the Combined Arms Training Strategies
that are used to determine training and resource requirements. A major
change in these strategies included making the NTC rotation a part of
the unit's overall Home Station Training (HST) program. The Army
changed the way it resources the prepositioned fleet at the NTC to
reflect current training doctrine, to ensure all units are resourced
equally, and to align the programming of its scarce Operations and
Maintenance, Army, dollars with the way they are actually executed.
Units in Germany who participate in NTC-like training exercises at the
Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) are resourced such that their
CMTC rotations are included in their Home Station Training funding.
Until fiscal year 1998, Forces Command (FORSCOM) units that rotated to
the NTC and used the prepositioned fleet received additional resources
for this training. This caused the Army to resource FORSCOM units at a
higher level than the rest of the Army, to include units stationed in
Korea. A review of the vehicle execution reports show that FORSCOM
units are training at approximately the 800 mile level if the rotations
to the NTC are included. Consequently, the Army changed its resourcing
strategy to make the best use of scarce resources and to more closely
reflect the way resources were being used by commanders in the field.
There is no reduction on the overall resourcing of training and the
change will not have an adverse impact on readiness.
Question. The Committee understands that rotations to Hoenfels and
the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) are absorbed within home
station training funds. Why?
Answer. Since the inception of the Combat Maneuver Training Center
(CMTC) at Hoenfels and the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort
Polk, units have paid for the cost of these rotations with home station
training funds provided in the annual training accounts because
rotations are considered part of their normal training strategy. This
allowed heavy units driving at the Combat Maneuver Training Center and
the Joint Readiness Training Center to report mileage driven as part of
their training strategy execution. This includes the cost of spare
parts and fuel for CMTC rotations of units in Germany who participate
in training exercises at the CMTC. In addition, neither the CMTC at
Hoenfels nor the Joint Readiness Training Center at Folk Polk maintain
an armored vehicle prepositioned fleet. Heavy forces within Europe use
rail transportation to move their vehicles to Hoenfels, as do Forces
Command heavy units participating at the JRTC. The cost of this rail
transportation also is included in their home station training funds.
Question. Recent press indicates that there has been a decline in
the quality of the units participating in National Training Center
(NTC) rotations. Does this decline in quality make an argument for
increasing the resources provided for both home station training and
training rotations?
Answer. One must remember that there is no comparison of units at
the NTC or any of the Combined Training Centers (CTCs). The CTC
experience is a learning environment. Commanders, soldiers, and units
use the CTC experience so that they can identify weaknesses in battle
operating systems and correct them. Having said that, I am not sure
that there is, in fact, a decline in the quality of these units. While
I think that the entry level experience and training may be lower as
they go to the NTC, I think that their exit level is as high as it has
been in the past. Operations and Maintenance funding is extremely tight
as we have tried to shift some funds into modernization. So, basically,
at home station, we are not doing as many large scale field training
exercises now. Clearly, more dollars would help to alleviate this, as
well as give more flexibility for installation commanders to balance
the base operations and operating tempo portions of their budget.
Question. In conjunction with the reported decline in the readiness
of units going to the NTC, it has been noted that units are doing less
combined arms training at their home stations during the work-up to the
NTC. General Reimer, could you comment on this observation?
Answer. Readiness is not evaluated at the CTCs. Readiness is
assessed by unit commanders. CTC rotations are designed to immerse
units in extraordinary training conditions. There is no comparison of
units; the CTC experience is a learning environment. Commanders,
soldiers and units use the CTC experience so that they can identify
weaknesses in battle operating systems and correct them. We are doing
less large scale field training exercises than we have in the past, but
all units arriving for training at the NTC meet the Forces Command
minimum training standards. Units arrive at the CTCs at various states
of training proficiency based on the training strategy and guidance of
the commanding general. Equipment readiness, level of personnel fill,
and the factors affect a unit's state of training. Some units arrive
after a deliberate train-up program at home station; others arrive in a
``come as you are'' mode.
Contingency Operations
Question. In the Fiscal Year 1998 National Defense Appropriations
Act, the Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund included nearly
$1,900,000,000 for Operation and Maintenance costs associated with
contingency operations in Bosnia and the Persian Gulf. Of this amount,
$1,467,500,000 is for Bosnia and $416,500,000 is for Southwest Asia.
Contingency operations for fiscal year 1998 are underfunded. Unofficial
estimates indicate that Bosnia is underfunded by approximately
$700,000,000, and Southwest Asia is underfunded by a similar amount
(assuming the current buildup, but no hostilities). What are the Army's
Military Personnel and Operation and Maintenance requirements in fiscal
year 1998 for Bosnia outside of what has already been funded in the
1998 Defense Appropriations Act?
Answer. The Army's fiscal year 1998 shortfall for Bosnia, including
Task Force Able Sentry in Macedonia, is $516,600,000. This includes
$405,100,000 for Operations and Maintenance and $111,500,000 for
Military Personnel.
Question. What are the Army's total Military Personnel and
Operation and Maintenance costs for Bosnia in fiscal year 1998?
Answer. The Army's total fiscal year 1998 costs for Bosnia,
including Task Force Able Sentry in Macedonia, is $1,515,000,000. This
includes $1,250,900,000 for Operations and Maintenance and $264,100,000
for Military Personnel.
Question. What are the Army's Military Personnel and Operation and
Maintenance requirements in fiscal year 1998 for operations in the
Southwest Asia outside of what has already been funded in the Fiscal
Year 1998 National Defense Appropriations Act?
Answer. The Army's fiscal year 1998 shortfall for Southwest Asia is
$609,700,000. This includes $537,100,000 for Operation and Maintenance
and $72,600,000 for Military Personnel.
Question. What are the Army's total Military Personnel and
Operation and Maintenance costs for Southwest Asia in fiscal year 1998?
Answer. The Army's total fiscal year 1998 cost for Southwest is
$694,500,000. This includes $617,400,000 for Operation and Maintenance
and $77,100,000 for Military Personnel.
Question. Have funds yet been transferred from the Overseas
Contingency Operations Transfer Fund to Operation and Maintenance, Army
to fund your contingency related expenses?
Answer. Yes. The Office of the Secretary of Defense has transferred
$930,700,000 in fiscal year 1998 from the Overseas Contingency
Operations Transfer Fund to Army's Operation and Maintenance account to
fund contingency related expenses. This transfer has already been taken
into account when identifying fiscal year 1998 contingency operations
shortfalls.
Gender Integrated Training
Question. In June 1997, the Secretary of Defense appointed the
Federal Advisory Committee on Gender-Intergrated Training and Related
Issues to assess the current training program of the Military Services
and determine how best to train a gender-integrated, all volunteer
force. The recommendation of the December 1997 Kassebaum Baker Report
center on the quality of recruits and the need to instill discipline
throughout the training process. The report also recommends
establishing separate barracks for male and female recruits. The
January 1998 Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Military
(DACOWITS) Report highlights some of the same issues as the Kassebaum
Report but adds that the Services need to establish and enforce clearer
gender related policies in areas such as fraternization. What is the
estimated cost to implement the recommendation in the Kassebaum Report?
What would the impact be on each: the Defense Appropriations bill and
the Military Construction bill?
Answer. The Army is reviewing the report prepared by the Federal
Advisory Committee on Gender-Integrated Training and Related Issues.
The estimated cost to implement the recommendation will be completed
and submitted to the Secretary of Defense on March 16, 1998. At this
time, the impact of these costs on the Defense Appropriations bill and
the Military Construction bill have not be considered.
Question. The Committee understands that each military service is
developing its own recommendations independently on the Kassebaum
Report. Would you please give the Committee an indication of your
position.
Answer. The report contains an extensive amount of valuable
information. The Army is still studying it in depth and preparing a
report to the Secretary of Defense. Once the report is released, we
will promptly inform Congress.
Question. What is your understanding of the Secretary of Defense's
role in coordinating your recommendations with those of the other
services?
Answer. The Army, along with the other services, will provide the
Secretary of Defense a response to the Federal Advisory Committee
report no later than March 16, 1998. I know of no plan for the
Secretary of Defense to coordinate Army recommendations with the other
services.
Army Modernization
Question. Last year, Congress provided $12,200,000,000 for Army
modernization. The Army's fiscal year 1999 budget request for
modernization program is $13,000,000,000--this is $800,000,000 higher
than the fiscal year 1998 appropriated amount. These funds are used to
develop and procure aircraft, ammunition, tracked and tactical
vehicles, missiles, and other combat support equipment. Although your
modernization program is higher this year than last year's appropriated
amount, the majority of your funds are to modify and extend the life of
systems that are currently in the Army inventory. Does this concern
you?
Answer. The Army has developed a budget that adequately funds our
programs consistent with our modernization strategy and within the
existing fiscal constraints. The Army's fiscal year 1999 budget is
approximately $1,700,000,000 above last year's President's budget
submission. Based on fiscal constraints, the fiscal year 1999
President's budget and Future Years Defense Program are adequate
operationally and economically. An increase of approximately
$1,000,000,000 is realized each year throughout the Program Objective
Memorandum.
Question. Does your budget sustain your modernization efforts in
the outyears? If not, what are the shortfalls?
Answer. Yes, an increase of approximately $1,000,000,000 is
realized each year throughout the Future Years Defense Program. The
momentum will be continued through the outyears.
Question. Do you believe that there is enough emphasis in the
fiscal year 1999 budget on Army modernization programs? Why?
Answer. The Army has developed a budget that adequately funds our
programs consistent with our modernization strategy and within the
existing fiscal constraints. The Army's fiscal year 1999 budget is
approximately $1,700,000,000 above last year's President's budget
submission. Based on fiscal constraints, the fiscal year 1999
President's budget and Future Years Defense Program are adequate
operationally and economically. An increase of approximately
$1,000,000,000 is realized each year throughout the Program Objective
Memorandum.
Question. What are your top modernization programs? Are they fully
funded in the fiscal year 1999 budget request and in the outyears? If
not, what are the shortfalls?
Answer. The Army's goal of digitizing a Division by fiscal year
2000 and Corps by 2004 is our top initiative. Our digitization efforts
include the ongoing modernization efforts of approximately 97 systems
encompassing 538 budget lines. The total estimate of the digitization
effort is $2,600,000,000 in fiscal year 1999. The Army did not take
this $2,600,000,000 from programs to create a new effort. It was
already part of the Army Total Obligation Authority that was allotted
to these many existing programs. Of this total, approximately
$261,000,000 was added to digitization by Office of the Secretary of
Defense for fiscal year 1999. The $261,000,000 provides for improved
interoperability, increased integration, improved security, network
management, and more robust common architectures. It is key to the
horizontal efforts that go across these systems.
Crusader and Comanche are the two major weapons systems programs
that continue development of new platforms.
Other top Army's dollar value modernization programs in the
President's fiscal year 1999 budget are the Longbow Apache helicopter,
the Abrams tank, and the Army Tactical Missile System/Brilliant Anti-
Armor Submunition. During the Future Years Defense Program (2000-2005),
we will spend approximately $10,400,000,000 on those systems.
Question. Are you concerned that near term readiness is funded at
the expense of long-term readiness? If so, what programs concern you
the most? How would you reduce that risk?
Answer. My primary concern is balance. The Army must receive
adequate and predictable funding to sustain its full spectrum
capabilities and ensure our Nation remains versatile, flexible, and
credible in response to crises around the world. Maintaining the
delicate balance between requirements and resources is increasingly
difficult. Funding must be adequate, sustained, predictable, and
synchronized to meet the readiness, force structure and endstrength,
quality of life, and modernization requirements of today and an
uncertain future. With 13 consecutive real declines in Army budgets
from 1985 to 1998, the Army has had to assume risk in certain areas and
make tough choices to balance requirements with risks. Even with a
marginal increase in fiscal year 1999, the Army must assume prudent
risks in a number of areas. All Army requirements must vie for steadily
decreasing resources in a world of steadily increasing operational
requirements and uncertainty. Balance reduces both near- and long-term
risk to the extent possible without any increases in resources. We are
counting on achieving efficiencies to help mitigate the risk to current
readiness. We must closely monitor our progress in these and to the
extent that we lose buying power increases our risk to current
readiness. We will closely monitor our Army unit readiness
contributors, such as base operations, real property maintenance, and
Army training, to maintain current readiness while preserving our
future modernization activities.
National Defense Panel
Question. The National Defense Panel (NDP) recommended that the
Army become ``more expeditionary: fast, shock-exploiting forces, with
greater urban operations capability.'' The NDP was critical of the
Army's procurement programs, which continued to modify heavy weapons
systems which are difficult to transport into theater. Additionally,
the NDP recommended that the Army take the lessons learned from Force
XXI experiments and transition quickly to the Army After Next. Do you
agree with the NDP findings? Which have the most merit? Why? Which do
you disagree with? Why?
Answer. I agree with the NDP's characterization of the security
environment of 2020. I also believe it will contain a wide array of
military challenges, and some different from today, some quite
familiar, that will require our forces to exercise a broad range of
capabilities in support of our national security and military
strategies. In support of those strategies, our Army today, and in the
future, must be a full spectrum force, capable, as part of a joint and
often multinational force, of conducting important shaping and
engagement activities, executing the full range of smaller-scale
contingencies, and if required, fighting and winning major theater
wars. Many of the recommendations of the NDP, including those about
becoming more mobile and deployable and being able to operate in
increasingly urbanized terrain around the world, are things we have
been working on for some time, and are implementing in the Army today.
Our advocacy of strategic sealift and C-17 programs, increasing numbers
of urban operations training facilities, division Army Warfighting
Experiments, upcoming light force experiments and urban operations
joint experiments with the Marine Corps, and our Army After Next
studies and wargames are some of our efforts in this regard. Our Army
in 2020 will be able to get to the battlefield more quickly; it will
seek, as our doctrine has always advocated, to exploit speed of
maneuver, pace of operations, and shock, to overmatch, collapse, and
destroy our adversaries; and we will continue refining our experience
in urban operations to address increasing urbanization.
While in general I support the idea of moving quickly to future
capabilities, I have concerns with the NDP's suggestion that we are
ready or able to move to 2020 capabilities today. First, we have much
more to learn about information technologies. We need the experience
with applying and exploiting information technologies that will come
with our Army XXI effort. Our Force XXI process is exploring new
concepts that are influenced by, and in turn, guide our experimentation
and Science and Technology research. We will need our current
procurement programs to build Army XXI and sustain us while we reap the
fruits of experimentation and research. Second, while we must and will
continue to seek change, we must carefully consider the impact of the
pace of change. Mental change must precede and guide physical change.
We must be careful that the pace of change does not outstrip the
ability of our organizations, doctrine, leaders, and soldiers to
distill, comprehend, and incorporate the lessons of experimentation and
the implications of change. Failure to manage the stresses and pace of
change unacceptably risks our ability to deal with near-term
requirements while maintaining our path to the future. Finally, while
the insights and concepts emerging from our Army After Next process are
guiding our science and technology efforts to fashion future
capabilities, we must recognize that some of the technologies that
would support the capabilities we need simply do not exist today, and
we do not know when they will become available. As desirable as it
might seem, for all these reasons, we simply cannot leap to 2020
capabilities today. In the immediate future, we believe our procurement
programs will best ensure our ability to fulfill our National Military
Strategy.
Question. Based on your fiscal year 1999 budget and the
accompanying Five Year Defense Plan, are you postured to meet the
challenges facing you in 2010-2020? Which areas concern you the most?
Answer. Yes, I believe we are postured to meet the challenges of
2010-2020. Joint Vision 2010 provides the conceptual template for how
America's Armed Forces will develop to meet those challenges. Army
Vision 2010 is the supporting blueprint for the Army's contributions to
the operational concepts identified in Joint Vision 2010, building a
capabilities-based, threat-adaptive Army with the proper mix of forces
to achieve full-spectrum dominance for the land component of the joint
team. In particular, the Army's Modernization Strategy accommodates the
realities of ongoing multiple commitments coupled with the requirement
to meet the demands of our military strategy in a constrained resource
environment. It provides a path to developing the capabilities we will
need to meet the challenges of 2020 through a combination of near-term
focus on achieving information dominance by 2010, and an effort to
prioritize and focus science and technology resources to leverage
technology advances that will help maintain decisive battlefield
dominance well into the future. The Army's Modernization Strategy
addresses a full spectrum of military mission areas, from defending or
liberating territory to humanitarian operations, across a full range of
environments, including the urban environment. Each component of the
strategy--information dominance, combat overmatch, essential science
and technology, recapitalization, and others--helps to position the
Army to meet the challenges of the future.
Although the NDP criticized Army procurement programs, I believe
those programs are necessary to balance correctly the present day
requirements of the National Military Strategy, while simultaneously
preparing for the challenges of 2020. As you know, many of our concerns
about the budget have been around modernization issues, because our
procurement programs help us maintain combat overmatch for today while
building the same for 2020.
As to what concerns me most, I consider the pace at which we move
toward the future and the adequacy of funding the most significant. The
rate of change must carefully balance toady's readiness with the
modernization necessary to meet future challenges. We must also
continue to receive adequate funding for the procurement and other
elements of our Modernization Strategy that will move us along the
right path to meeting the challenges of 2010-2020.
Question. The National Defense Panel (NDP) stated that it did not
follow the logic of several of the services procurement programs. The
NDP expressed concern over the Army's Comanche helicopter, the M1A2
tank and the Crusader field artillery system. Do you plan on making any
adjustments to your modernization strategy based on these
recommendations? Please explain.
The Comanche helicopter and Crusader field artillery system are two
of the Army's top modernization programs. However, the NDP believes
that future requirements would best be met if the Army used these
systems as an interim until newer, lighter systems could be fielded.
The NDP recommended that the Army reduce the planned procurement
quantity of these two systems. Do you agree with the NDP assessment?
Why or why not? Do you believe that you can field lighter systems than
the Comanche and Crusader by 2010? Please explain--is it a technology
or funding issue?
Answer. Our Army Modernization Strategy continues to prioritize
investments over time and reflects the linkage to the operational
concepts described in Joint Vision 2010 and the patterns of operation
outlined in Army Vision 2010. I agree with the National Defense Panel's
finding that ``it is important to begin the transformation process
now.'' That is what our Force XXI and Army After Next processes are all
about. Through Force XXI, we are exploring the potential, and
leveraging the power, of Information Age technologies. The result--Army
XXI--will be a product-improved version of today's force, with its
principal increases in capability coming from our exploitation of
information systems. I believe this is a prudent course to take based
on our understanding of the current and future geostrategic
environment.
Where Force XXI seeks to achieve ``mental agility'' throughout the
force--the ability to understand all facets of the task at hand and to
act decisively and in a timely manner--our Army After Next process is
focused on providing the ``physical agility'' to fully exploit the
accomplishments of Force XXI. Where Force XXI is a product-improved
force, the Army envisioned in our Army After Next effort--the Army of
2025 and beyond--will be a much different force, with vastly different
capabilities, equipment, and tactics. Many of the technologies required
to realize our vision of the Army of 2025 do not now exist. We have
identified some of them in our Army After Next process, and we are
funding them appropriately. As other required technologies are
identified, we will pursue them, as our funding permits. These leap-
ahead technologies will not be developed overnight. Our patience and
sustained commitment will be critical to their attainment.
I do not believe that the effort we are putting into Force XXI is
hindering our ability to realize the vision described by Army After
Next. In fact, I believe that the course we have laid out in Force XXI
is required to get to the Army of 2025. There are no short cuts.
However, I agree with the National Defense Panel's recommendation that
we should look hard at our Force XXI investments, and where possible,
free funds for Army After Next developments. I do not think it is
necessary for each unit in the total Army to pass through the same
transition on the way to the Army of 2025. We are committed to
carefully determining requirements and reengineering our process to
achieve the savings necessary to finance future needs.
With regard to Comanche, Crusader, and the Abrams tank, I believe
these systems are important to modernizing our force. Our current M1A2
tank program includes the upgrade of about 1,100 older M-1 tanks to the
M1A2 version. Given that our total tank requirement is about 7,600
tanks, fielding of the M1A2 tank will be limited to selected forces--
essentially as recommended by the NDP.
The Comanche armed reconnaissance helicopter is essential to
fighting in the future. Until it is fielded, we will accept risk in
this portion of the force, and continue to employ aircraft in interim
organizational designs to bridge the gap. No currently available
aircraft is adequate to perform all the functions we envision for
Comanche, including the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior and AH-64D Apache Longbow.
We have already downsized our aviation force in anticipation of the
fielding of the Comanche. While the Comanche will largely replace
interim aircraft on a one-for-one basis, the superior capabilities
provided by Comanche will enable us to address the risk we have
accepted in the interim in our armed reconnaissance and light attack
capabilities.
The Crusader will provide indirect fire support to future maneuver
forces. As with Comanche, we have already made organizational changes
in anticipation of fielding the Crusader. In fiscal year 1996, we
changed the Army's fire support force structure to leverage the
capabilities inherent in the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and
Crusader. As a result, our requirement for self-propelled howitzers
decreased from 2160 to 1378. Until Crusader and the additional MLRS
units are fielded, we have accepted risk in our fire support
capabilities.
The successful fielding of each of these systems--M1A2 tank,
Comanche, and Crusader--will enable us to bridge the gap between the
Army of the Gulf War, the Army of 2010, and the Army envisioned in our
Army After Next process. Each of these programs enables the Army to
more fully exploit the potential of information age technologies and
reduces the risks we have already accepted in anticipation of their
fielding.
Question. The National Defense Panel (NDP) recommended that the
Army procure fewer M1A2 tanks than planned. Instead, the Army should
begin the development of a new, unique tank--30-35 tons, fast, agile,
and with a hypervelocity gun technology. Is this a realistic plan?
Answer. We are in fact limiting the procurement of M1A2 tanks and
plan to field them to just one third of the force. While this entails
some risk our current plan to field about 1,100 M1A2s with our existing
fleet of M1A1s affords us an acceptable level of overmatch as we
transition to Force XXI. The Abrams tank is a key system in the Army of
2010 and we must keep it viable well beyond that time. This is
important as the Army Science Board recently reviewed technology
applicable to a future tank and concluded that a hyper-velocity gun is
not likely until 2020 or beyond. Today's Army took 25 years to develop
and field; technology for the lighter force of the future is at least
20 years away. We do not have the luxury of allowing legacy systems to
lose their relative advantage over potential adversaries while we
invest in leap-ahead capabilities. We must do both, simultaneously. The
safety of our soldiers--today's and tomorrow's--demand that we get the
balance right. The Army is charting a prudent course that will
transform the force to one that can fight the battle of 2020 and
beyond.
Question. Could funds be diverted in the outyears from the tank
production program to a new tank program?
Answer. We are in fact limiting the upgrade of Abrams tanks to
conserve resources for future system development and fielding. We are
now upgrading the M1 Abrams tank into the M1A2 configuration. In 1999,
we will add the System Enhancement Package (SEP) to the M1A2 as part of
the digitized force. Key elements of this upgrade are the M1A2's
Commander's Independent Thermal Viewer, 2d Generation Forward Looking
Infrared Radar (FLIR) sights, and embedded Force XXI command and
control hardware and software. These improvements provide the increased
lethality and survivability overmatch essential for our soldiers in the
mounted force between now and Army After Next (AAN). We plan to equip
just one third of the force with the M1A2. Fielding of the M1A2 with
the SEP upgrade will complete in 2008. Coupled with a rebuild program
and digitization of the M1A1, we feel this will afford an appropriate
level of overmatch. This strategy allows us to invest in the
development of a new close combat system we call the Future Combat
System FCS). The FCS responds to the requirement for a close combat
system that is leap ahead in lethality, survivability, and
sustainability for the Army After Next.
Question. Is this a technology issue?
Answer. This is very much a technology issue. The FCS responds to a
requirement for a new close combat system. A key element of FCS is the
ability of the system to perform expanded battlefield roles in the
close heavy battlespace while significantly reducing the logistical
support required for deployment and sustainment of such a system. This
need for an expanded battlefield role resulted in a change from a
Future Main Battle Tank concept to FCS. FCS concept development is
focused on candidate armament technologies, which are the main design
driver for FCS. Also under consideration in Science and Technology are
alternative power sources and approaches to provide a platform capable
of maximum output with minimum logistical demands. Advanced
survivability measures will also be integrated into the FCS to ensure
the crew is protected to fight in the close combat battlespace.
Question. What is the estimated cost of a new tank development
program and when is the earliest it could be fielded?
Answer. Our current strategy is focused on first unit equipped in
2018. To achieve that goal, we project a cost during our Extended
Planning Period of 2006 to 2014 of $1,300,000,000.
Question. The National Defense Panel (NDP) asserts that ``speed''--
the rate at which an Army can mobilize, deploy, set action and reset
action--will be fundamental to its success.
Are you confident that you have the ``speed'' to be successful?
Which systems ``slow'' you down?
When will those systems be replaced?
Do you believe that Comanche, Crusader, and the M1A2 meet the
``speed'' requirement? Why?
Answer. Speed will be important for successful military operations,
but it will not be the only factor fundamental to success. A force
capable of full-spectrum dominance requires not only speed--the ability
to enter into an area quickly and conduct prompt and sustained
operations--it requires the capability to obtain, disseminate, and
decipher key information. This is information dominance. Secondly,
full-spectrum dominance requires the lethality to overmatch our
adversaries, not system for system but as a combined arms, joint team.
Further, we must have the capability to provide sustained timely
logistics support with a minimal logistics footprint. Finally, we must
protect our forces from the risks of air-to-surface and surface-to-
surface missiles. These factors are reflected in our Modernization
Strategy, which sets investment priorities over time and links the
operational concepts of Joint Vision 2010 and the patterns of
operations outlined in Army Vision 2010.
The speed with which we are able to get our systems to the warfight
is dependent upon airlift and sealift capabilities, the locations and
accessibility of our prepositioned equipment, and the dimensions and
weight of that equipment. In addition, the lethality of certain systems
gives us the ability to enter a conflict with the initial firepower
necessary to conduct operations until the arrival of follow-on forces
with capabilities to continue and sustain operations.
None of our systems slow us down, per se. They do, however, require
us to make additional tactical considerations in order to provide the
necessary capabilities when we require them. The Army After Next will
require systems that provide the capabilities of speed, lethality and
deployability. We are currently focusing our Science and Technology
efforts on improving the existing technology to develop systems that
possess these capabilities.
With regard to Comanche, Crusader, and the Abrams tank, Comanche
exemplifies ``speed.'' It is self-deployable to about 1260 nautical
miles, or if transported in Air Force C-17 transport aircraft, Comanche
will be ready to fight 45 minutes after arrival. No boresight for
firing weapons or test flight will be required. During combat, it will
take about 15 minutes to refuel and rearm Comanche.
Regarding Crusader, we will field eight Army Prepositioned Sets
under the current fielding plan. This will allow us to rapidly deploy
forces to support a wide variety of contingencies. The Army will also
be able to strategically deploy Crusader. Crusader is deployable by
both sea and air. In fact, Crusader increases the commander's
flexibility when deploying. Fewer Crusaders, requiring less lift, can
provide fire support equivalent to our current system. This is
especially beneficial when tailoring forces for operations other than
war. The commander may not require his complete fire support
organization, and with Crusader, he can deploy a highly capable fire
support package suited for the situation. Crusader lets the commander
deploy the fire support he needs using less strategic lift, and freeing
up assets to carry other systems.
We also play to field M1A2s to selected Army prepositioned sets to
ensure rapid deployability. Coupled with the M1A1s is already deployed
to the Army prepositioned sets, we can get heavy forces on the ground
very quickly, as we have most recently proven in Kuwait.
The successful fielding of each of these systems--M1A2 tank,
Comanche, and Crusader--will enable us to bridge the gap between the
Army of the Gulf War, the Army of 2010, and the Army envisioned in our
Army After Next process. Each of these programs enables the Army to
more fully exploit the potential of information age technologies and
reduces the risks we have already accepted in anticipation of their
fielding.
Question. The NDP recommended that the Army develop lighter, more
agile automated systems of the 21st century.
Do you believe Comanche, Crusader, and the M1A2 all meet those
requirements?
Which systems currently in development meet those requirements for
the 21st century? When will they be fielded?
Answer. Comanche meets the requirements. It is self-deployable to
about 1,260 nautical miles, or if transported in Air Force C-17
transport aircraft. Comanche will be ready to fight 45 minutes after
arrival. No boresight for firing weapons or test flight will be
required. During combat, it will take about 15 minutes to refuel and
rearm Comanche. Fielding is set to begin in fiscal year 2005.
While Crusader is not lighter than current systems, it will more
agile, automated, and takes less aircraft sorties to deploy an
equivalent amount of firepower. The weight requirement for Crusader and
its companion Resupply Vehicle is 55 tones (each) combat loaded. The
Army After Next (AAN) will have two components: Campaign Forces and
Battle Forces. The Campaign Forces will be equipped with Crusader and
overmatch systems such as Multiple Launch Rocket System, Abrams, and
Bradley. Campaign Forces will make up approximately 75 percent of the
Army's combat forces.
The Battle Forces will be equipped with future lighter more lethal
systems and will make up approximately 25 percent of the Army's combat
forces.
Crusader will be the keystone fire support system for Army XXI and
AAN. In addition Crusader is a technology carrier for future ground
combat weapon systems for both the Campaign and Battle Forces. Fielding
of Crusader is set to begin in fiscal year 2005.
Crusader's mobility will exceed the requirement to support Abrams/
Bradley based maneuver forces. It will also be able to cover 750 meters
in a 90 second period of time when required for increased survivability
from counter battery fires. Its automation is state of the art and will
take the traditionally manpower intensive tasks of firing an artillery
weapon and resupplying an artillery unit out of the hands of soldiers.
Once the Resupply Vehicle (RSV) is uploaded, these tasks will be
accomplished without a solder ever touching the projectiles.
The M1A2 combines the well-known agility, of the Abrams tank will
increased fightabilty, survivability, and maintainability. For example,
M1A2 target acquisition is 45 percent faster than the M1A12 we have
incorporated the most up to date armor package to enhance
survivability, and its on board diagnostics allow continuous
diagnostics of the system. In 1999, we will add the System Enhancement
Package to the M1A2 as part of the digitized force. Key elements of
this upgrade are the M1A2's Commander's Independent Thermal Viewer, 2d
Generation Forward Looking Infrared Radar sights, and embedded Force
XXI command and control hardware and software. These improvements
provide the increased lethality and survivability overmatch essential
for our soldiers in the mounted force for Army XXI and the Campaign
Forces of Army After Next (AAN). Fielding began in fiscal year 1995 and
is ongoing.
Question. The National Defense Panel (NDP) recommended that the
Army take the lessons learned from Force XXI experiments and transition
quickly to the Army After Next.
What is the Army After Next?
Answer. Army After Next is our project to explore and assess the
nature of warfare in the next century and the future evolution of U.S.
national security requirements. Via this process, we are conducting
broad studies of warfare to frame issues vital to the future
development of the Army and present them to the senior Army leadership
for consideration and decision. Currently, these studies focus on, but
are not constrained to, the period of 2010 to 2025 and beyond, and
address four broad research areas: the geostrategic setting of 2025,
the evolution of military art to 2025, human and organizational issues,
and technology trends to 2025.
We envision that the results of our Army After Next project will be
an Army that is significantly different than today's in terms of
doctrine, organization, and equipment.
Question. Do you think the NDP's recommendation is realistic?
Please explain.
Answer. I agree with the NDP's fundamental recommendation that we
should seek to transition to the concepts embodied in Army After Next
as soon as possible, consistent with the strategic environment, our
National Military Strategy, and available resources. That may include
limited fielding of some systems that are currently in procurement or
about to enter production. The NDP recommended that some systems be
fielded only to our III Corps and forward-based forces as a risk
mitigation capability. That is essentially what we are already doing.
However, the new capabilities we envision in our Army After Next
project are not available today, and we do not believe they are
achievable in the near term. To realize the concepts embodied in Army
After Next, we have focused our Science and Technology investments
where we believe they will best support the leap-ahead capabilities we
seek.
Question. What new technologies are you developing for Army After
Next?
Answer. We are both developing new technologies through basic
research, as well as seeking to mature emerging technologies
sufficiently to permit their application to military requirements. They
are addressed in considerable detail in the Army Science and Technology
Master Plan. They include, but are not limited to, hybrid power
systems; logistics efficiencies (fuel efficiency, ultra-reliability,
weight reduction); human engineering and cognitive engineering;
signature control (including counters); protection schemes for land
systems (including active protection); advanced materials; affordable
precision and alternate lethality means; alternative propellants; non-
lethal capabilities; and biological and chemical protection, antidotes,
and vaccines.
Question. How will the Army After Next be organized?
Answer. Getting the answer to your question is a significant thrust
of our Army After Next project. We continue to conduct broad studies
and experiments to understand and explore the range of options. From a
practical standpoint, we know that the Army of 2025 will be a
combination of Army XXI forces (resulting from our Force XXI process)
and newly created forces that are optimized to exploit ``knowledge and
speed'' at all levels of war. We believe these new forces will include
organizations that are significantly more mobile, strategically and
tactically; logistically unencumbered and, therefore, more capable of
sustained, independent operations; and able to fully exploit
Information Age technologies. We intend to employ the 2d Armored
Cavalry Regiment (Light), currently based at Fort Polk, Louisiana, as
our Army After Next experimental force.
Question. Do you believe you could transition to the Army After
Next at a quicker pace? Why? Is it a technology issue, funding, or
both?
Answer. Our transition to Army After Next is a factor of funding
and technology, as well as the appropriate rate of change. I think we
can get to Army XXI more quickly if additional resources were
available, but I do not believe we can accelerate Army After Next by
bypassing Army XXI. We still have significant technological challenges
to resolve and much experimentation to conduct before we will be ready
to commit to a defined course of action for Army After Next. Perhaps
most importantly, we must change how we approach military problem
solving, educate our leaders, and train our soldiers and units to fully
exploit the ``knowledge and speed'' that we envision our new
capabilities will provide. This mental change may, in fact, be more
difficult than the development and introduction of new technologies.
However, we know that our transformation to Army XXI is a significant
and necessary step towards Army After Next. We believe that to
accelerate our transition to the Army After Next, we would need to both
accelerate our Force XXI initiatives and increase our investments in
the research and development of new technologies and capabilities.
While we do not believe there is a discrete, linear relationship
between investment in research and development programs and our pace
towards the Army After Next, we believe there are prudent opportunities
for modest increases in research and development investments.
JLENS System
Question. Last year, this Committee recommended that the Aerostat
program be terminated, but it did not prevail in conference. Instead,
the conferees appropriated $35,000,000 a decrease of $51,000,000 from
the budget request. This year the Army renamed the program, the Joint
Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System
(JLENS), and is requesting $103,000,000 to continue the program. Please
explain the JLENS concept.
Answer. JLENS is a critical joint program for developing advanced
elevated radars to provide sensor support for Land Attack Cruise
Missile Defense (LACMD) using the Air Directed Surface to Air Missile
concept. JLENS sensors provide a significant capability, contributing
to the creation of a Single Integrated Air Picture, a key Commander-in-
Chief (CINC) requirement. The system also is a key system contributor
to the comprehensive Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense (JTAMD)
cruise missile defense architecture laid out in the JTAMD master plan.
The JLENS system uses off-the-shelf aerostats at an altitude of
15,000 feet for extended periods to elevate sensors and communication
systems. The JLENS system cost is hundreds of dollars per flight hour
compared to thousands of dollars per flight hour for fixed wing
aircraft. The JLENS system takes a major step in addressing the
emerging cruise missile threat at low altitudes and in ground and sea
clutter. JLENS is following a fast track acquisition approach beginning
with a technology demonstration program. At the program's conclusion,
it will provide a leave-behind operational system for CINC contingency
operations. As such, it will be employed at corps level or above corps,
supporting active air defense, passive defense, attack operations, and
communications relay missions. The greatest contribution to CINC's
warfighting capabilities is the sensor date required for over-the-
horizon engagements by Patriot and overland engagements by the Naval
Standard Missile.
The radar and software technology required to achieve the desired
capability from JLENS is strongly leveraged from other Department of
Defense programs, such as the Theater High Altitude Air Defense sensor
(Ground Based Radar), multiple Battle Management Command, Control,
Communications, Computers and Intelligence programs, and advanced radar
development initiatives.
The technical concept is two radars, one providing surveillance
capability, and one providing precision track capability, installed on
two separate aerostat platforms. Mobile mooring stations are used to
launch and retrieve the aerostats. A ground processing station controls
the radar operations and the dissemination of target location and track
data over Joint Tactical Information Distribution System and
Cooperative Engagement Capability communication networks to tactical
operations centers.
Question. How will it be deployed and what will be its mission?
Answer. The operational concept in support of the Joint Theater Air
and Missile Defense (JTAMD) cruise missile defense architecture is
described in the JTAMD master plan. One or more surveillance platforms
will be deployed to cover the theater area of operations and one or
more precision track radar platforms will be deployed with each
surveillance system. The surveillance radars are deployed to provide
long-range detection and continuous tracking in support of the entire
battlefield. The precision tracking radars are deployed to provide the
best ability to assist surface based air defense weapons to defend
surface assets. Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated
Netted Sensor System (JLENS) will be employed at corps level and at
echelons above corps supporting active defense, passive defense, and
attack operations. In addition, JLENS can support secondary missions
such as communications relay, range extension for Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles, Theater Ballistic Missiles detection, and general
surveillance missions.
Question. Why do you need the Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile
Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS)?
Answer. We need the system because of the cruise missile threat.
The primary concern of the Land Attack Cruise Missile (LACM) threat is
the enemy's ability to deliver Weapons of Mass Destruction on the
battlefield. The LACM includes a flight profile of low altitude
incursion using earth curvature and terrain features to prevent
observation by surface based defensive weapon sensor systems. Surface
based sensor coverage is limited to a line-of-sight geometrical
relationship with the LACM or, indeed, or any target. Detection and
track of a LACM using the low altitude tactic is prevented either until
the target appears over the horizon or as it emerges from behind an
intervening terrain feature. In either event, obtaining timely
information about the threat in order to engage it is delayed or
perhaps lost entirely.
All existing Army Air Defense radars are ground-based and have
limited coverage against low altitude targets due to terrain masking
and earth curvature. Deployment of adequate numbers of ground-based
radars and air defense systems required for complete or near-complete
coverage of the battle space would be cost and manpower prohibitive.
The solution is to raise the radars. The line-of-sight limitation
is mitigated by cost effective long-term elevation of advanced sensors
to an altitude where observation beyond the radar horizon of the ground
based sensors becomes possible. The benefits of having a capability to
observe targets beyond the sensor horizon are significant. Low altitude
and surface coverage is extended far beyond that of surface sensors.
Detection and track range is potentially increased by several orders of
magnitude, and weapon systems can engage at the maximum capability of
the designed missile. Having a capability to detect and track threats
in this formerly blind zone greatly improves defensive effectiveness
by:
(1) Supporting acquisition of a Single Integrated Air Picture
(SIAP) providing detection, track, and identification information about
airborne targets that would otherwise not have been observed.
Continuous target track can now become a reality. Maintaining tracks is
more likely and the inadvertent loss of tracks and confusion caused by
targets emerging is minimized. This is accomplished through the use of
the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) and the Joint Tactical
Information Distribution System (JTIDS).
(2) Providing precision tracking data to air defense weapon systems
that can be used to initiate and conduct intercepts against the LACM
threat at long range.
this Air Directed Surface-to-Air Missile (ADSAM) capability
increases the cost effectiveness of air defense forces by permitting
effective defense of assets from low altitude attack without requiring
the addition of more surface based weapon systems to cover the over-
the-horizon or terrain masked blind zones. Furthermore, the ADSAM
engagements of LACM targets at long-range increase the battlespace and
permit intercept of weapons of mass destruction at locations more
favorable to the defense.
An elevated platform designed to detect and track low-altitude
targets can provide additional benefits to the battlefield commanders
by:
(1) Providing information about moving surface targets, such as
armor columns, to establish a basis for engagement by ``attack
operations'' weapons;
(2) Providing a basis for vectoring aircraft to intercept over-the-
horizon hostile air forces; and
(3) Assisting the surface commanders in the maintenance of
continuous knowledge of the location of friendly force units (friendly
protection).
JLENS, using aerostat platforms, provides an economical means of
elevating tactical sensors to achieve the foregoing benefits for thirty
days at a time. Additionally, a capability to elevate communication and
communication network systems, such as JTIDS and CEC, is inherent in
the modular payload approach of the JLENS architecture. This provides a
relay capability to extend the range and coverage of tactical
communications. Recently, analyses have been initiated to investigate
the possibility of providing a backup capability to the Global
Positioning System by providing a line-of-sight limited, position
determination system based on the elevated JLENS aerostat platform.
Question. What other system (either currently fielded or in
development) could be used to do the Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile
Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS) mission?
Answer. Some fixed wing aircraft with radar have the capability to
provide over-the-horizon surveillance when they are on-station.
Airborne sensor systems currently deployed include Joint Surveillance
Target Attack Radar System, Airborne Warning and Control System, and
the E-2C Intelligence Electronic Warfare system. None of these aircraft
can detect advanced cruise missiles, nor can they provide the precision
track and target identification support capability required to
accomplish Air Directed Surface to Air Missile engagements of Land
Attack Cruise Missile Defense (LACMD) targets in an intense surface
clutter environment. Further, no other system will allow the multiple
over-the-horizon engagement of multiple service weapon systems
(Patriot, Standard Missile, Advanced Medium Range Air to Missile).
The major draw back of fixed-wing assets is cost. Anywhere from
four to five fixed-wing aircraft are required to provide 24 hour, seven
days a week, continuous coverage. Each aircraft has a crew size of 10
to 24 personnel. In addition, airfield(s) are required to service and
support the fixed-wing platforms. This cost for fixed wing assets
translates into thousands of dollars to tens of thousands of dollars
per hour for missions such as Bosnia, Desert Shield, Korea, etc.
compared to the hundreds of dollars per hour required for the JLENS
system. To provide both a surveillance and precision tracking
capability to support the entire JLENS mission would require additional
planes and personnel and increase cost significantly.
The best solution to LACMD is a joint JLENS/fixed-wing solution.
Both systems provide the synergism required to defeat the LACMD.
JLENS augments and extends the capability of these aircraft based
sensors. Deployment of JLENS permits 24-hour coverage of the airspace
at operational costs and manpower estimate at 80-90 percent savings
over aircraft based assets. Deployment in peacetime and under pre-
hostility conditions is economically and tactically effective
mitigating a need to effect early deployment of the higher cost
aircraft based assets. Upon the onset of hostilities, JLENS uniquely
supports ADSAM engagements and, thereby, improves the effectiveness of
air defense operations.
Question. To date, the Joint Requirements Oversight (JROC) has not
validated the requirement for the Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile
Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS) program. When will the
JROC validate the requirement?
Answer. The Army has approved the JLENS Operational Requirement
Document (ORD). Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and Joint Theater
Air and Missile Defense Organization (JTAMDO) representatives have
developed a Joint ORD. The ORD was reviewed by each of the services and
comments were provided to the JLENS user proponent, the United States
Army Air Defense Artillery School (USAADASCH), for a final ORD.
Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC) should receive the revised
USAADASCH-approved JLENS Joint ORD by March 12, 1998. SMDC will then
prepare a forwarding letter to Headquarters (HQ), Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC), requesting expeditious processing of the ORD. Once
finalized at HQ TRADOC, the ORD will go to Headquarters Department of
the Army (HQDA), for release to the Joint Staff. The Joint Staff will
send it out for general officer review, which normally takes 15 days.
Once the general officer review is complete, the Joint Requirement
Oversight Council (JROC) will then schedule the ORD for review and
approval, probably around the middle of May. The JLENS ORD final
approval is expected by June 1, 1998.
Additionally, the JTAMDO briefed the JLENS program to the JROC in
November 1997. The JROC approved the participation of JLENS in the
JTAMDO demonstration in fiscal year 2002.
Question. Have the vulnerability assessments been completed? Please
summarize the finding.
Answer. Initial vulnerability assessments have been completed. Over
the past year, significant analysis has been conducted on the Joint
Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor Systems
(JLENS) system. The initial results show that the JLENS system
vulnerability will be mitigated by either JLENS active/passive counter
measures and/or operational strategies. The Special Operations Forces
(SOF) threat against the mooring system appears to represent the
greatest potential hazard. This threat is no more intense or effective
than SOF directed against other battlefield/airborne systems. Further
testing is planned.
Question. The estimated development cost of the Joint Land Attack
Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor (JLENS) (formerly called
Aerostat) is $400,000,000--this includes one demonstration system. It
is our understanding that the demonstration program has a shortfall of
$87,600,000. Please explain.
Answer. The shortfall of $87,600,000 for fiscal year 2002 was
created by the Congressional $51,200,000 reduction ($86,200,000 to
$35,000,000) in program funding levied in September 1998. The result of
this reduction is that the JLENS Project Office is unable to complete
the originally envisioned program by the end of fiscal year 2001. The
major impact of the reduction was to reduce funding to the prime
contractor by 65 percent ($60,300,000 to $21,100,000) which lead to a
corresponding delay in radar development. The delayed radar effort has
created a ripple effect whereby fiscal years 1999-2001 funding is
required to accomplish the effort originally planned for fiscal year
1998. In addition, the reduction has delayed Cooperative Engagement
Capability (CEC) procurement until fiscal year 1999. Further, early
demonstrations of JLENS capabilities had to be substantially modified,
delayed, or even canceled. Finally, the reduction has delayed final
JLENS system integration and testing until second quarter, fiscal year
2002, forcing the Early User Test (EUT) and Joint Theater Air and
Missile Defense (JTAMD) demonstration to be combined due to scheduling.
The breakdown of the $87,600,000 is as follows: $64,200,000 for the
prime contractor to complete integration and testing of the JLENS
prototype and $23,400,000 for government costs for JLENS in-house
costs, other government agencies (Navy, Army) providing support, and
costs to run the EUT and JTAMD demonstration.
The fiscal year 1999 President's budget has programmed fiscal years
1998-2001 funding for the JLENS Program at $389,000,000. The currently
programmed funding is budgeted in the amount of $276,000,000 for the
prime contract effort to develop the JLENS surveillance and tracking
radars, the aerostat platform, the processing station, and
communications payloads. An additional $66,600,000 is programmed for
developing and integrating modifications to the weapon and
communications systems with which the JLENS will be interfacing and the
acquisition of items of government furnished equipment required by the
prime contractor to complete the JLENS systems. The remaining
$46,400,000 is budgeted for JLENS in-house costs (salaries, travel and
facilities), contractor support, the maintenance of the JLENS testbed
at the White Sands Missile Range.
[Clerk's note.--The Army reduced funding for the JLENS
program and reduced the scope of work before the budget was
submitted to the Congress.]
Question. Are future vulnerability assessments planned? When will
they occur and what vulnerabilities will you evaluate?
Answer. Additional vulnerability analysis is being planned now that
a prime contractor has been selected. An independent evaluation will be
conducted to asses the full vulnerabilities of the Joint Land Attack
Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System selected design.
The assessment will include, but not be limited to: infrared (IR)
missiles, radio frequency missiles (Doppler), RF missiles (non-
Doppler), smart bombs/missiles (IR, laser), air gun systems, iron-
bombs, anti-radiation missiles, jammers, surface to air missiles,
tactical ballistic missiles, man portable air defense systems, direct/
indirect artillery fire, and direct energy weapons.
Question. It is our understanding that the Department of Defense
does not know if they will procure additional JLENs after the
demonstration is complete. When will the production decision be made?
Answer. A decision to procure additional JLENS units has not yet
been made. The JLENS Project Office has submitted a request for
Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD), Low Rate Initial
Production (LRIP), and Production funding in the current Program
Objectives Memorandum cycle for the period fiscal year 2002-2010 to the
Department of Army. Following the EUT and the JTAMD demonstration, four
options are available to the government in fiscal year 2002 for the
JLENS program. These are:
(1) Operations and Support--the JLENS prototype would be placed in
use for a 24-month period at a location to be determined; or
(2) EMD--after a Milestone II decision, the program would build one
additional prototype and one operational system; or
(3) Block I LRIP--produce a limited quantity based on the initial
design; or
(4) Product Improvement Program (PIP)--if the Block I LRIP option
is not chosen, the program could enter a PIP phase followed by
production.
Question. The Office of the Secretary of Defense strategy is to
conduct a demonstration of the JLENS and then make a procurement
decision. For each alternative please provide the required development/
production-funding, schedule, and operations and support costs. Field
the one JLENS test system?
Answer. Please note the following four answers are preliminary
pending results of the ongoing JLENS demonstration program. The JLENS
system consists of two aerostats, surveillance radar, at least one
tracking/illuminating radar, processing stations, and communications
payloads.
--Development and production funding: $476,600,000
--Schedule: fiscal year 1998-2002
--Operations and support costs: $8,000,000 per year/system
Question. Enter EMD?
Answer.
--Development and production funding: $100,000,00 for one EMD
system \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Requires $78,000,000 in fiscal year 2004 to complete the EMD
system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--Schedule: fiscal year 2003
--Operations and support costs: $800,000,000 per year/system
Question. Begin LRIP?
Answer.--Development and production funding: $100,000,000-
$150,000,000 for one LRIP system \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Requires $116,000,000 in fiscal year 2004 to complete the LRIP
system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--Schedule: fiscal year 2003
--Operations and support costs: $800,000,00 per year/system
Question. Stop the program?
Answer.
--Development and production funding: $10,600,000
--Schedule: third quarter of fiscal year 2002
--Operations and support costs: $0
Question. Your fiscal year 1999 budget includes no funding for
JLENS in 2002 and 2003. How much more would be required if the Office
for the Secretary of Defense makes the decision to field the one JLENS
test system?
Answer. Please note the following four answers are preliminary
pending results of the ongoing JLENS demonstration program. For fiscal
year 2002, $87,600,000 is required to complete the demonstration
system.
Question. Enter EMD?
Answer. In fiscal year 2003, the JLENS requires $100,000,000 to
start the EMD system.
Question. Being LRIP?
Answer. In fiscal year 2003, JLENS needs $100,000,000-$150,000,000
to start the LRIP system.
Question. Stop the program.
Answer. The JLENS requires $10,600,000 to stop the program in
fiscal year 2002.
Question. Since neither the Army nor the Navy have committed to a
procurement program, what is the benefit of conducting the $400,000,000
JLENS demonstration program?
Answer. The JLENS program will deliver state of the art
surveillance and illuminating sensors to the Nation following the fast
track acquisition philosophy beginning with a technology demonstration
program. The demonstration program will provide the initial
architecture for air defense as envisioned in the JTAMD Vision 2010
document. Capability provided and demonstrated will be the initial
development of a single Integrated Air Picture meeting all four
services' requirements, including an air-directed surface to air
capability leveraging the Navy's SM-2 interceptor, the Army's PAC-3
interceptor, and the Air Force's Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air
Missile interceptor. Upon completion, the results of the demonstration
program can be used to enhance existing battlefield weapon systems
regardless of whether a production and corresponding deployment
decision is made.
Question. Last year we were told that the Aerostat demonstration
program would cost $600,000,000--now the cost has been reduced to
$400,000,000. What was done to bring down the cost of the program?
Answer. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and
Technology) established JLENS program funding via Program Budget
Decision 725 in the amount of $538,000,000. The $538,000,000 was
established as a best estimate funding wedge prior to a more refined
estimate, which was developed during the concept definition phase of
the program. The $600,000,000 estimate was based on several program
options which are no longer required as a result of the concept
definition studies and the competitive proposals submitted by the three
offerors during the source selection evaluation conducted in fiscal
year 1997. Originally, the program was oriented towards providing both
a strategic and a tactical solution to the problem of land attack
cruise missile defense. The JLENS demonstration program was directed to
focus solely on he tactical solution for cruise missile defense, which
significantly contributed to lowering the program's cost estimate. The
JLENS program originally planned to carry two prime contractors for the
first 19 months of the program through concept design review. With the
funding reduction in fiscal year 1998 of $51,200,000, this option was
eliminated, which also contributed to lowering the overall program
costs. The program was also originally investigating the development of
a 90-meter aerostat. Terrain analysis demonstrated little value was
added with the additional altitude and radar performance obtained with
a 90-meter aerostat when compared to the additional cost required to
develop a new aerostat. The selection of an existing 71-meter aerostat
significantly reduce program costs and risk.
[Clerk's note.--The Army also reduced the planned funding
for JLENS before the budget was submitted to Congress. Funds
from JLENS were moved to pay for higher priority Army
programs].
Digitization
Question. The Army is creating a digitized battlefield, which it
believes will give it the ability to maintain a modern, but small force
capable of decisive victory. The Army is developing digital information
systems that will allow it to gather, transfer, and analyze data in
order to have improved situational awareness.
Please describe the Army's plan to digitize the battlefield.
Answer. The Digitization strategy is an integral subset and
underlying guiding principle of the Army's modernization effort.
Digitization applies modern information technology concepts to the
military environment resulting in an integrated, high-speed command and
control structure reaching from the National Command Authority to the
individual soldier.
The Army is using a process called ``Force XXI'' to evolve from our
current Army of Excellence (AOE) structure to the ``Army XXI''
structure. The Force XXI process consists of three axes: redesigning
the tactical Army; redesigning the institutional Army; and integrating
digital technologies. Force XXI includes battle lab experimentation,
Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWEs), and other innovative processes
to inform our efforts to modernize for the 21st century. Among the many
initiatives of Force XXI are the Division Design Analysis, which
provides a solid analytical foundation for redesigning the division,
and the Warfighter Rapid Acquisition Program (WRAP).
Simply stated, Force XXI projects our quality people into the 21st
century and provides them the right organizations, the most realistic
training, robust and predictable sustainment during both peace and war,
and the best equipment and weapons systems our Nation can provide given
the resources available. We will leverage technology in order to army
our soldiers with the finest, most lethal weapons systems in the world.
The power of information will allow the ultimate weapon--the individual
soldier--to successfully meet the challenges of the 21st century and
achieve decisive victory. Digitization will allow the Army to
effectively integrate command and control hardware and software with
communications systems and weapons systems to provide information
sharing both horizontally and vertically, in the Army as well as Joint
and Combined forces. The strategy is to leverage the latest mature
technology advances in information management from the commercial
sector. The improved and increased level of integration and
interoperability will provide for high effective Joint and Coalition
operations.
Our digitization efforts include the ongoing modernization efforts
of approximately 97 systems encompassing 538 budget lines. The total
estimate of the digitization effort is $2,600,000,000 in fiscal year
1999. The Army did not take this $2,600,000,000 from programs to create
a new effort. It was already part of the Army Total Obligation
Authority that was allotted to these many existing programs. Of this
total, approximately $261,000,000 was added to digitization by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense for fiscal year 1999. The
$261,000,000 provides for improved interoperability, increased
integration, improved security, network management, and more robust
common architectures. It is key to the horizontal efforts that go
across these systems.
Digitization applies information technologies to acquire, exchange,
and employ digital information throughout the battlespace. Accordingly,
the Army will digitize all command and control systems, as well as
communications systems, including tactical radios, military satellite
communications, and network management. Our digitization strategy will
set the conditions for full-spectrum dominance by integrating command
and control and situational awareness systems across multiple weapons
platforms (Abrams tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and Comanche
helicopters), as well as combat support and combat service support
platforms.
Programs receiving increases from the $261,000,000 in fiscal year
1999 include the Longbow Apache, Kiowa Warrior, Bradley Fighting
Vehicle, Abrams tank, Army Tactical Commands and Control System family,
Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below, Integrated Systems Control
network management, Tactical Operations Centers, architecture
development, and training support. Other adjustments identified include
increased funding for AWEs, information security, satellite
communications, and the Warfighter Information Network.
Question. Last year, you planned on fielding the First Digitized
Division (FDD) in 2001. This year you have accelerated the fielding to
2000. What is the urgency? Is it threat driven? What is the impact if
you delay the fielding?
Answer. Acceleration is not threat driven. The FDD has been
scheduled for the end of fiscal year 2000 in support of Joint Vision
2010 and Army Vision 2010. Joint Vision 2010 states: ``by 2010 we
should be able to enhance the capabilities of our forces through
technology. This will, in turn, expand our greatest advantage: the
adaptability, initiative, teamwork, and commitment of our people at
every level.'' We must leverage the mature leading edge of commercial
technology in order to achieve the full spectrum dominance envisioned
in Joint Vision 2010. The earlier we field this new capability, the
earlier we can adapt the new operational tactics, techniques, and
procedures as a way of life in the entire Army. This minimizes the
expense of having to train and support both an analog and a digitized
Army for an extended period of time. We should also maintain the
momentum of the digitization effort that began with the spiral
development process where the user, developer, and industry come
together to translate requirements into fielded capabilities in
significantly reduced timeframes.
The sooner we can field a standard integrated and interoperable
hardware and software infrastructure the easier it will be to respond
to new threats and technology advances. We realize that there is some
risk that some of the programs may not be ready to field in 2000.
However, most of the systems are mature and will provide a solid basis
of improved capability for the FDD, even if a few systems get fielded
later.
Over the last year and a half, we have managed to successfully
synchronize the Army fielding process to meet the FDD objective by the
end of fiscal year 2000. In addition, this schedule lines up with Year
2000 compliance efforts in fiscal years 1998 and 1999, along with
Allied force interoperability capabilities to be implemented in fiscal
year 2000.
Any delay fielding this critical capability will further delay
understanding personnel requirements, resolution of technical issues,
and integration of newly developed information technologies. A delay
will also increase costs exponentially, as we would be forced to
stretch contracts over longer periods of time and continue to train
soldiers for both digital and analog units.
Question. Last year, by your own admission, you defined the
digitization program as generally high risk in terms of cost, schedule,
and technology. Now you are accelerating the program. What is the level
of risk in your new program? Based on your own risk assessment of the
digitization effort, do you believe that fielding the first digitized
division by fiscal year 2000 is over ambitious? Please explain.
Answer. The schedule risk to field all systems by fiscal year 2000
remains high. However, many key systems have a version already fielded.
Even if a few systems have delayed fieldings, the fiscal year 2000
improved capability will be significant. The Army has implemented a
spiral software development process using operational units to evaluate
successively more capable software. Spiral development is a process
which uses short, incremental developments--each of which builds on
previous work--to shorten the development cycle and speed products to
the field. Getting users involved throughout the development process
will ultimately reduce the risk associated with a formal Initial
Operational Test and Evaluation, but adds more installation, training,
and testing time to the schedule.
Cost risk is moderate because the Army received approximately
$261,000,000 for fiscal year 1999 during the last Program Objective
Memorandum (POM) cycle to fund the requirements to meet our fielding
goals. However, because each of the product increments builds on
previous increments, long range cost estimates tend to have a wide
range. Technology risk is moderate since we now have conducted and
analyzed the results of Task Force XXI (TFXXI), conducted in March
1997, and the Division XXI AWE in November 1997. None of the
deficiencies require technological fixes beyond that which is used
commercially. It remains moderate simply because there are a large
number of systems that must be integrated.
Risks have been reduced in two of three areas, and we have taken
steps to make the goal less ambitious. For example, we only intend to
equip the first digital division (FDD) with the highest priority
command, control and communications equipment by fiscal year 2000.
Other weapons systems will be fielded on a schedule determined by
individual program funding profiles. Many systems are already fielded
to the FDD, and only two of the three brigades (those located at Fort
Hood) of the FDD will be fully digitized by the end of fiscal year
2000.
Question. The Army has conducted Advanced Warfighting Experiments
(AWEs) to evaluate what impact digitization has on the battlefield.
During the AWEs, the army's test community found that the ``digitized
brigade performed much like the baseline non-digitized brigades at the
NTC in areas of lethality, survivability, and operational tempo.
Is this what you expected?
Answer. We stated going into the Task Force (TF) XXI AWE that our
focus was on how digitization and the other new technologies we were
looking at would improve our mental agility; it clearly did this. There
were striking examples in the TFXXI AWE, and again in the Division AWE,
in which commanders and staffs perceived the battlespace with greater
clarity and tempo than ever before--and then acted on that perception
with great speed.
The Experimental Force, the EXFOR, went up against the world-class
Opposing Forces, or OPFOR, on their ``home-turf'' at the National
Training Center. The AWE featured wins and losses on both sides. Given
the immaturity of many of the digital systems that were part of the
experiment and the detriment this lack of maturity had on the train-up
for the AWE, we were pleasantly surprised that they were able to hold
their own against a well-trained force like the OPFOR. The EXFOR
successfully demonstrated the potential that digital battle command can
offer towards decisive military operations. The AWE revealed the vision
of a future battle in which the tactical commander is capable of
destroying the enemy force through the effective application of
information to his combat power.
Question. What criteria are you using to measure the success of the
AWEs?
Answer. An AWE is successful if it provides insights that will
shape the future force--Army XXI. AWEs, to date, have successfully
placed our Experimental Force in rigorous and dynamic battlefield
environments in order to generate sufficient data to allow analyses of
the impact and effectiveness of information technology on the
battlefield. The primary data collection effort for the Division AWE
was conducted using over 100 subject matter experts (SMEs) and 60
Battle Command Training Program observer/controllers (OC). This data
was consolidated into a database, containing over 6,000 SME/OC
observations, interviews, surveys, etc. Analysts from the U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command's Analysts Command, Operational Test and
Evaluation Command, and the Army Research Laboratory evaluated the
data. The results, both quantitative and qualitative, are used to
support our acquisition and fielding decision-making process.
The TFXXE AWE exceeded the expectations of planners and
participants alike. It revealed the dynamic potential of the digital
land force and validated the Army's approach to experimentation. AWEs
serve to put concepts of doctrine, training, leaders, organizations,
material, and soldiers to the most rigorous test possible, short of
actual war. They also serve as a ``forcing function'' to synchronize
all the pieces of a digitized force at the same place and time. The
Army overcame many technical obstacles in this process that would have
taken years to solve in the normal requirements-development model.
Question. Do you believe that you did not see a significant
increase in performance because of technical issues? What were they and
how have you resolved them?
Answer. Certainly, the varying levels of maturity and functionality
of the technologies that were experimented with during the AWEs
affected the performance of the force. To some extent, soldiers lacked
time for sufficient training and familiarization with the many new
digitized systems and associated procedures. The greatest challenge was
insufficient interoperability of all the digital command and control
systems, communications systems, sensors, and weapons platforms on the
battlefield. The Army recognizes the enormous amount of effort that is
required to integrate systems and has taken action to increase funding
in critical areas, such as development of operational and systems
architectures, system integration, and the Central Technical Support
Facility. In addition, existing programs are migrating to the standards
outlined in the Joint Technical Architecture and all new starts must
build to these standards to support interoperability.
We most definitely saw not only an increase in performance, but a
dramatic increase in performance--albeit one that was not apparent to
some forms of data collection and analysis. Let me give you an example.
At one point during the TFXXI AWE, one of the experimental company
teams had to traverse the area known as ``the washboard''--a very
difficult piece of terrain to cross. Most units avoid it, because even
apart from enemy action, units tend to get lost, delayed, and disrupted
when they operate there. But this company team traversed the washboard
unscathed and emerged as a coherent fighting force on the other side,
because the soldiers had situational awareness--allowing them to move
and fight as a cohesive team even when they could not see each other.
This incident may not have caught the attention of analysts focused
only on attrition dynamics, but military history would attest to the
fact that the ability to cross ``uncrossable'' terrain has won battles
many times in history. This is just one aspect of what digitization is
doing for us.
Question. Based on the outcome of the AWEs, what is the advantage
of accelerating the digitized divisions?
Answer. We have seen the potential of a Joint Task Force that has
an integrated digital capability. Joint Vision 2010, the conceptual
template for America's Armed Forces, will channel the vitality and
innovation of our soldiers to the entire Army. During the TFXXI
rotation at the NTC, commanders failed to take full advantage of the
capabilities offered by enhanced situational awareness because of a
lack of confidence in the new technology. Fielding these technologies
sooner will provide commanders and their staffs more opportunities to
learn how to effectively use the digitized capabilities during routine
training activities. In other words, the sooner we can file standard
hardware, the easier the transition will be to new versions of software
across the Total Army. To make all these changes by fiscal year 2010,
we have to start in fiscal year 2000 to accomplish all the issues
implementing doctrine, training, leaders, organizations, materiel, and
soldiers that must be addressed for the brigade, division, corps, and
the entire Army.
Over the last year and a half, we have managed to successfully
synchronize the Army fielding process to meet the First Digitized
Division objective by the end of fiscal year 2000. These first steps
firmly ground us in the multiyear framework to achieve Joint Vision
2010 on schedule as directed by the Joint Staff and leverage the
technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in
Joint warfighting. The earlier we field this capability, the earlier we
can adapt the new tactics, techniques and procedures as a way of life
in the Army.
Question. The General Accounting Office (GAO), the Committee's
Surveys and Investigations Staff (S&I), and the Army's Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation have all raised questions as to the
technical maturity of the digitized systems.
Last year, the GAO and S&I believed that the Army digitization
systems had complex technical issues that would be difficult to resolve
before fielding in 2001--now you have accelerated the schedule. Do you
believe that you have resolved the technical issues? How?
Answer. The technical and maturity issues documented by the test
communities were expected. The Army's intent was to conduct an
experiment--not a test--at the National Training Center last March. We
knew going into the experiment that the functionality was not adequate
for go-to-war systems, but it was adequate to answer the experimental
hypotheses. One of the most significant problems with the systems used
in the TFXXI AWE was the inability to support battlefield dynamics,
such as the ability of a network manager to rapidly reconfigure units
task organized for a particular mission. Since the concepts and
technologies used in the TFXXI AWE were experimental and had a high
risk of being discarded immediately after the exercise, we chose not to
expend the time and resources needed to develop highly robust systems.
Armed with the lessons learned from the nine months of TFXXI
experimentation, however, we have made significant changes to the
communications architecture, and have plans in place to substantially
automate the few residual functions.
Question. Are you willing to trade off schedule to ensure essential
performance?
Answer. We will not field a system that does not meet the users
essential performance requirements. We have included a large number of
technical and operational tests between now and the formal Initial
Operational Test and Evaluation in the first quarter of fiscal year
2000 to monitor the program's progress. This is another benefit of the
spiral software development process we're using.
Question. What issues would cause you to delay the fielding of the
first digitized division?
Answer. There is a subset of critical command, control, and
communications systems that must meet user requirements before we can
turn the equipment over to operational users. For example, the Tactical
Internet (TI) is needed to support the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade
and Below (FBCB2). Without the TI, we cannot field FBCB2. However, we
would still field the systems that digitize tactical operations centers
down to battalion level.
Question. When would you make the decision to delay fielding?
Answer. As mentioned in the response above, we have included a
number of tests over the next two years to monitor program progress.
Potentially, we could decide after any one of the test events whether
or not the overall program schedule needs to be changed. Only those
systems requiring further development would have fielding schedule
adjustments. Other systems will be fielded on schedule.
Question. To date, you have spent almost $500,000,000 on the
digitization effort. However, there have been no formal operational
tests on two of the most important components of the digitization
program--the computer software (FBCB2) and the communications link
(Tactical Internet). Together, they provide a common picture across the
battlefield--increasing situational awareness. The only evaluation of
either system has been through your Advanced Warfighting Experiments
(AWE).
How would you assess the performance of FBCB2 and the Tactical
Internet in the AWEs? Would the test community agree?
Answer. FBCB2 and the Tactical Internet actually performed much
better than was anticipated. The Task Force (TF) XXI AWE was an
experiment and not an operational test of a ``go-to-war'' capability.
The AWE itself included the six-month train-up prior to the two-week
rotation at the National Training Center (NTC). With each major live
training event at Fort hood--platoon, company, and battalion lanes, and
finally the NTC rotation--the performance and reliability of the system
improved. Based on results from the NTC rotation, the Operational Test
and Evaluation Command (OPTEC) reported that the situational awareness
provided by FBCB2 and the Tactical Internet was the highlight of the
AWE. Over 50 percent of all platforms were visible on the screens at
any one time at company and battalion levels. Numerous interviews with
the participants support the critical role this situational awareness
played during the AWE. OPTEC also reported that the ability to send
operational graphics and orders was not sufficient. Due to the
instrumentation and data collection provided by the test community, the
material developer has been able to isolate the causes of these
problems and is restructuring the network architecture to preclude this
from occurring in the fielded version.
Question. What criteria did you use to measure effectiveness of
FBCB2 and the Tactical Internet? Would you use the same criteria in a
formal test? How would it differ?
Answer. The test community looked at many of the same measures of
effectiveness that they will use as the FBCB2 progresses through its
acquisition process. There is a Limited User Test scheduled for later
this year (August 1998), a Force Development Test and Experiment in
August 1999, and an Initial Operational Test and Evaluation in October
1999. The measures of effectiveness include speed of service, message
completion rates, human factors impacts, platform visibility
(situational awareness), etc. The difference between the experiment and
the formal testing will be that the measures of effectiveness will be
compared to specified operational criteria provided by the user. In
addition, the formal test will be more structured to ensure sufficient
data is collected under controlled conditions to show whether FBCB2
meets these performance criteria.
Question. OPTEC has stated that the FBCB2 and Tactical Internet you
will field will be markedly different from what was used in the AWE?
Why?
Answer. The ``system'' that was taken out to the AWE was developed
to provide sufficient functionality to support investigation of the
hypothesis. The FBCB2 and Tactical Internet systems that will be
fielded will change based on what we learned during the TF XXI AWE. The
hardware is markedly different, using smaller systems with increased
processing capability and better screen visibility. The software is
expanded to include the full complement of messages identified by the
user as being critical to operations on a digital battlefield and user
interfaces to develop and send messages have been reworked to be more
user friendly. We are migrating to a Joint Variable Message Format to
ease interoperability with other services. The Tactical Internet
architecture is redesigned to eliminate the shortcomings identified
during the experiment and ensure operationally suitable message
completion rates. Increased network management capability, to increase
the flexibility of the network to design changes in the force, and
command and control protection tools, to decrease the vulnerability of
the Tactical Internet also will be included.
Question. When will you test the ``new'' FBCB2 and Tactical
Internet?
Answer. First, there is a series of contractor in-plant testing
done in accordance with contract requirements. This is followed by
Field Test I of FBCB2 and the Tactical Internet, to include electronic
and information warfare technical testing, in May 1998 at the
Electronic Proving Grounds, Fort Huachuca, Arizona. This is followed in
August 1998 by the Limited User Test (LUT) at Fort Hood with troops
from the 4th Infantry Division. The purpose of this LUT is to verify
the fixes that resulted from TF XXI and validate the scalability of the
architecture. A second technical test (Field Test II) is scheduled
approximately a year later. That test will be followed by a Force
Development Test and Experimentation (August 1999) and an Initial
Operational Test and Evaluation (October 1999), together constituting
the operational test program for FBCB2. The FBCB2 and Tactical Internet
will be fully examined at each of these events.
Question. Are both programs adequately funded to meet your
accelerated schedule? If not, what is the shortfall? What is the impact
on your schedule?
Answer. Both programs are funded to meet fielding of the First
Digitized Division and First Digitized Corps. Digitizing the remainder
of the force is subject to availability of funding in the outyears.
However, the Army is undergoing a significant transition in the way it
does business. This revolutionary change is known as ``Spiral
development.'' This concept involves working more closely with
industry, whereby soldiers suggest changes and industry immediately
responds.
Question. What interoperability issues will the digitized force
have with non-digitized Army units? How will you resolve the
interoperability issues?
Answer. Interoperability between digital and analog units was an
issue during the Division Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE) at Fort
Hood, Texas in November 1997. It was concluded that digital and analog
units can interact and fight well together. The problem is how to
transfer the information between a paper map and a computer. This is
solved, in part, by sending liaison teams with digital equipment to the
analog units. The transfer of information can then take place in one
location, taking into account that the analog unit requires a
significantly longer period to pass operational overlay information
through its ranks. This solution creates requirements for additional
liaison officers and equipment that are not yet clearly defined.
Question. The other services?
Answer. The Army continues to pursue many ongoing efforts with the
other services to ensure interoperability and seamless communications
throughout the battlespace. Additionally, the common, minimal set of
information technology standards developed by the Army on behalf of
digitization is the basis of the Joint Technical Architecture that is
now mandated for use throughout the Department of Defense.
There are a number of initiatives underway between the Army and
other services leading toward systems interoperability. For example,
the Marine Corps has purchased the Army's Combat Service Support
Control System and Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System. In
addition, a number of Office of the Secretary of Defense-sponsored
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations cut across service
boundaries. The Army Digitization Office has recently begun an
initiative to work joint service interoperability issues, to produce a
coherent Joint interoperability strategy, and coordinate, where
possible, with Army digitization advances. These efforts include steps
to identify a single point of contact within each of the other services
to provide a digitization focus for Joint interoperability.
We successfully integrated the Marine Corps Newton systems during
the Task Force XXI AWE in March 1997 and have been working with the Air
Force on Situational Awareness Data Link development, fielding and
joint doctrine.
Question. Coalition allies?
Answer. For international digitization interoperability issues,
there are a number of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces
and multinational forces available for discussion and resolution. The
principal NATO groups include the NATO Command, Control and
Communications Board (NC3B), the Joint C3 Requirements and Concepts
Sub-Committee (JC3RCSC), and the NATO Army Armaments Group (NAAG). In
the multinational environment, groups range from the American, British,
Canadian, Australian group to bilateral staff talks and exchanges with
multiple countries.
The Army Digitization Office (ADO) is responsible for the Army's
International Digitization Strategy, which identifies the high level
requirements for international interoperability. This was produced in
1995 in conjunction with Director of Information Systems, Command,
Control, Communications and Computers and other Army departments.
Practical steps towards interoperability are extensively worked at the
weapon system level (British and Dutch purchase of Apache). At the
command level, the Command and Control System Interoperability Program
(C2SIP) is a major step forward. C2SIP is a fiscal year 1998 start
Advanced Concept Technical Demonstration (ADO helps finance) which
brings work from three previous international initiatives into a single
U.S. program. C2SIP will both refine already developed capabilities and
lead to fielding of these capabilities in the Army Battle Command
Systems by 2003. C2SIP provides two levels of interoperability based on
legacy requirements and future technology. By 2003, the U.S. Army will
have interoperability at either one or the other of these levels with
the armies of Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Holland, Italy, Spain,
and the United Kingdom.
Two other initiatives, the Artillery Systems Cooperative Agreement
(ASCA) and the Low Level Air Defense Picture Initiative (LLAPI), are
aimed at achieving interoperability with multiple allied artillery and
air defense systems. An international interoperability agreement has
been reached in the LLAPI and is being negotiated in the Artillery
Systems Cooperative Agreement.
Question. What is the total cost of digitizing the division in
2000? For the record, please provide the cost and equipment you plan on
fielding.
Answer. In November 1997, the Army provided an estimate of
$423,000,000 required to digitize the 4th Infantry division; however
that estimate included Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
(RDTE) costs that are properly distributed across multiple divisions.
The Army has further refined the definition of digitization, resulting
in a broader subset of programs. Of the total cost for digitization,
$373,700,000 is for the procurement of systems to be fielded
specifically to the first digitized division (FDD). The $37,700,000
does not fund any RDTE. It includes funding for: the All Source
Analysis System; Avionics; Forward Area Air Defense Command and
Control; Avenger; Linebacker; Guardrail Common Sensor; Integrated
System Control; Command and Control Protect; Spitfire; Maneuver Control
System; M1A1/2 Abrams; M2 Bradley; Striker; Advanced Field Artillery
Tactical Data System; Paladin; Laser Marker; Applique; Combat Service
Support Control System; Maneuver Control System; Secure Mobile Anti-Jam
Reliable Tactical Terminal; Fire Support Team Improved Data Modem;
Ground Based Sensor; Digital Topographic Support System; Warfighter
Information Network. It also includes funding for existing Army command
and control programs (Maneuver Control System, Advanced Field Artillery
Tactical Data System), communications programs (Single Channel Ground
and Airborne Radio System, Enhanced Position Location Reporting System,
Satellite Systems), sensor programs (Sentinel, Tactical Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle), and the digitization-related pieces of weapon systems (Abrams
and Bradley).
Question. Your first digitized force will be a heavy division. When
will you digitize your light forces?
Answer. Given that digitization is a subset of modernization,
decisions are pending on several key issues including: digitizing the
Army's light forces; corps troops; digitization schedule for the
remainder of the Army, to include the Reserve components; and heavy
division and corps redesign. These issues are being worked and
coordinated between the Army Staff and the major commands.
Based on implementing Army Vision 2010, the Army has scheduled
modernization of the ``light divisions'' that are part of the XVIII
Airborne Corps: the 82nd Airborne Division, 101st Airmobile Division,
10th Mountain Division, and appropriate corps troops. Many of the
systems being provided to these divisions, and to the XVIII Airborne
Corps, are considered to be part of the overall modernization plan.
However, affordability may constrain these plans.
Digitization includes all the Army's command and control systems.
It also includes communications systems, such as our tactical radios,
military satellite communications, and network management. Integration
of communications and situational awareness systems into key weapons
platform (tracked combat vehicles, Avenger air defense, and Comanche
helicopters) and combat support and combat service support platforms
must also take place as a part of the overall digitization effort.
As a part of Army modernization, these systems are scheduled for
fielding to all XVIII Airborne Corps. The level of fielding varies, and
current fielding plans may change based on U.S. Army Training and
Doctrine Command's pending division and corps redesign.
Question. Your current plan is to digitize your first division in
2000 and your first corps in 2004. Does your budget adequately fund
your plan? If not, what are the shortfalls?
Answer. With the approved $54,200,000 digitization reprogramming,
and plus-ups by Office of the Secretary of Defense totaling
approximately $261,000,000, the Army is on track to field the First
Digitized Division in fiscal year 2000 and the First Digitized Corps in
fiscal year 2004.
Question. When will you digitize the Army Reserve Components?
Answer. Decisions are pending on several key issues, including the
digitization schedule for the remainder of the Army, to include the
Reserve components. The issue is being worked and coordinated between
the Army Staff and the major commands.
Digitization is providing our commanders with a common relevant
picture of the battlefield, and with the command and control to
prosecute effective warfare in response to this picture. The Army
desires to provide this information dominance to the force, both Active
and Reserve, by 2010. However, affordability may constrain that plan.
Currently, the Army Digitization Office is working with the National
Guard Bureau and the Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve to
determine the appropriate level of digitization for Reserve component
(Guard and Reserve) units.
Digitization includes all the command and control systems. It also
includes communications systems, such as our tactical radios, military
satellite communications and network management. Integration of
communications and situational awareness systems into key weapons
platforms (Abrams tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and Comanche
helicopters) and combat support and combat service support platforms
must also take place as a part of the overall digitization effort.
As a part of Army modernization, many of these systems are already
resourced and scheduled to be fielded to the Reserve components. The
level of fielding varies, and current fielding plans may change based
on U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's pending division and corps
redesign.
Question. How much is required to digitize the Army Reserve
Components? Is that funding included in your Future Years Defense Plan?
Answer. Funding for Army modernization includes the Reserve
components. As a part of Army modernization, many of the digitized
systems are already resourced and scheduled to be fielded to the
Reserve components. The level of fielding varies, and current fielding
plans may change based on U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's
pending division and corps redesign.
Advanced Warfighting Experiments
Question. The Army has conducted several Advanced Warfighting
Experiments (AWEs) designed to evaluate the benefits of digitized
force. An experimental brigade completed live training at the National
Training Center (NTC) in March 1997 and a division level experiment was
conducted at Fort Hood in November 1997. This completed a three year
experimental phase.
The Army's Operational Test and Evaluation Command (OPTEC)
evaluated the AWEs. However, data from the most recent exercise has not
been released.
When will the Army release the OPTEC evaluation of the November
1997 AWE?
Answer. The OPTEC evaluation comprises a single input to the
overall analytical effort of the November 1997 AWE. Headquarters, U.S.
Army Training and Doctrine Command, is assimilating all inputs, and
will publish a consolidated report in April 1998.
Question. AWEs provide the opportunity to assess how digitization
improves situational awareness and command and control. What is your
assessment of the last AWE? What were the lessons learned?
Answer. The Division Advanced Warfighting Experiment (DAWE)
provided an excellent opportunity to examine the contributions of high
fidelity blue and red Situational Awareness (SA) to Experimental Force
(EXFOR) commanders. The high fidelity SA was dependent on systems that
ranged in maturity from fielded systems to prototypes. In addition,
``near perfect'' blue SA feeds were provided to the brigade and
division command centers from simulated subordinate units. These
systems provided more timely and accurate information about friendly
units on a moment's notice. In looking at the interface between analog
and digitized units, the engineer battalion was degraded because of the
very limited number of digitized systems.
Red SA was highly accurate and comprehensive as a result of the
availability in the simulation of Joint-Surveillance Target Attack
Radar and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle throughout the exercise, except
during periods of adverse weather. Commanders relied heavily upon these
two systems during the DAWE to give them unparalleled knowledge of
enemy forces. The Army has yet to determine the realistic availability
of these systems for a division.
Question. According to OPTEC, command and control messaging
problems ``have been seen throughout all Task Force XXI exercises.''
For example, during the March 1997 AWE, only 30 percent of the command
and control message traffic actually made it to its destination. Have
you resolved these problems? If not, what are the outstanding issues?
Answer. In the initial design of command and control (C2)
architecture, it was a priority to be as close to commercial standard
internet design as possible; hence the commercial internet architecture
was followed as closely as possible. Standard commercial routing
protocols were used and a grid of radio circuits was established to
route message traffic over it much in the same way as the commercial
internet. This architecture did not work well for a number of reasons.
The commercial routing protocol did not work well in the tactical
environment, and there were some software problems which created
routing loops, to name a few of the biggest problems.
Since the time of the Task Force XXI AWE, the basic SA architecture
has been retained, but improved upon to make it more flexible. In
addition, all software problems have been corrected and upgrades to the
internet controller have been accomplished to provide greater
performance. The entire command and control (C2) architecture has been
redesigned to be more like the SA architecture and to take advantage of
the inherent broadcast capability of our tactical radios. We now have a
broadcast capability, a multicast capability, and a point-to-point
capability based on switched virtual circuits. These changes have
drastically simplified the C2 architecture and should provide SA-like
performance for C2 message traffic that requires both speed of service
and a high message completion rate (``degree of digital
conductivity''). A primary focus of the Force XXI Battle Command
Brigade and Below Limited User Test will be to verify these basic
improvements to the C2 architecture.
Question. Situational awareness--the ability to know where the good
guys and the enemy are has improved throughout the AWE, however, it has
not proved to prevent fratricide. During the March AWE, the digitized
force had a total of 32 fratricide incidents. (The average NTC rotation
has nine).
What impact did digitization have on the incidence of fratricide in
the November 1997 AWE?
Answer. The November 1997 AWE did not include force-on-force
events, so there was no opportunity for fratricide to occur in any
manner comparable to the March 1997 AWE.
Question. OPTEC's assessment is that situational awareness in its
current form is insufficient to prevent fratricide. Do you agree?
Answer. We will do everything in our power to prevent fratricide, a
terrible accident where our own firepower comes too close to a portion
of our own force. But we should remember that accidents occur in much
less stressful and dynamic conditions than today's battlefield. the
current state of digitization--situational awareness--should go a long
way towards reducing fratricide, and it's getting better every time we
do an experiment or test.
In some respects, the findings go a long way to showing how
effective situational awareness is in preventing fratricide. Of the 32
incidents you mentioned--and keep in mind that the Brigade Combat Team
that composed the Experimental Force was considerably larger than an
average rotational unit--only 5 occurred when both victim and killer
had operational applique. My point is that applique--when working
properly--definitely contributed to fratricide prevention.
Question. How do you plan on reducing fratricide for Force XXI?
Answer. Improved situational awareness and integrated battle-
command capabilities should translate into a more lethal and a more
survivable force, with less fratricide, through a combination of
Information Age technologies; associated tactics, techniques, and
procedures; and solid training.
Question. During the March 1997 AWE, the Director of Operational
Test and Evaluation conducted an assessment of the digitized force's
performance. The assessment concluded that the ``digitized brigade
performed much like the non-digitized baseline brigades at the NTC in
areas of lethality, survivability, and operational tempo.'' However the
Army's assessment was that the ``lack of discernible difference in the
performance data does not imply a lack of potential for more mature
versions of this initiative.''
Please explain what you mean by this.
Answer. We have seen the potential of a Joint Task Force that has
an integrated digital capability. The Army's intent during the March
1997 AWE was to conduct an experiment--not a test. We know going into
the experiment that the functionality was not adequate for go-to-war
systems, but it was adequate to answer the experimental hypotheses. We
also knew that significant research and development would still be
required to fully mature some systems before fielding them.
The Experimental Force, the EXFOR, went up against the world-class
Opposing Forces, or OPFOR, on their ``home-turf'' at the NTC. The AWE
featured wins and losses on both sides. Given the immaturity of many of
the digital systems that were part of the experiment and the detriment
this lack of maturity had on the train-up for the AWE, we were
pleasantly surprised that they were able to hold their own against a
well-trained force like the OPFOR. The EXFOR successfully demonstrated
the potential that digital battle command can offer towards decisive
military operations. The AWE revealed the vision of a future battle in
which the tactical commander is capable of destroying the enemy force
through the effective application of information to his combat power.
Force XXI Initiative
Question. General Reimer, you worked hard to establish funding for
the Force XXI Initiative which is ``an Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration-type approach to streamline acquisition of high pay off
technologies.'' This year the Army is requesting $99,000,000 to
continue the Force XXI Initiative. Last year, Congress appropriated
$38,900,000 for new Force XXI initiatives. The Congress directed that
none of the Force XXI Initiative funds may be obligated without prior
notification. The notification is to include the requirements,
maturity, affordability, and sustainability for each system. When will
the Congress receive notification for the fiscal year 1998 funds?
Answer. The Congress will receive notification in mid-April 1998.
Question. Will the notification include the funds required to
complete the program in fiscal year 1999?
Answer. Yes. The notification will include information papers on
each new fiscal year 1998 Force XXI Initiative which have a fiscal year
1999 budget request.
Question. Last year, we were disappointed at the Army's reluctance
to provide data supporting the Army's plan for obligating the Force XXI
funds. We view that the supporting data provides us the only
opportunity to assess the requirements, maturity, and sustainability
for the proposed initiatives since they are not part of your budget
submit. Why did it take so long for us to get the supporting data?
Answer. The delay was mainly due to the schedule of our
experiments. The Army's Advance Warfighting Experiment (AWE) was
performed in March 1997. The Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Program
(WRAP) Army Systems Acquisition Review Council (ASARC) was conducted in
April 1997. I signed the Congressional letters of notification in late
May 1997. This year, the Divisional AWE, which had some of the fiscal
year 1998 Force XXI Initiatives, was preformed in November 1997. The
WRAP ASARC was held in January 1998. The Congressional notification
letters are scheduled to be sent to the Congress in mid-April 1998.
Question. In the future, will you provide the Operational Test and
Evaluation assessment with the notification letter?
Answer. Yes. We will enclose the Operational and Test Evaluation
assessments with this year's notification letter.
Question. Do you anticipate that we will have the same problems
this year? Why not?
Answer. No. The Congressional notification letters will be sent to
Congress ahead of last year's notification by over a month. We will
enclose the Operational and Test and Evaluation assessments with this
year's notification letter.
Aviation Modernization
Question. The Army has just completed its ``Total Army Aviation
Modernization Plan'' for the Active Army and National Guard. The
modernization strategy is to provide modernized and updated aircraft to
the first to fight units in both the Active and Reserve components.
Please summarize your modernization plan. What are your priorities?
What are the major deficiencies on your current fleet?
Answer. The 1998 Total Army Aviation Modernization Plan defines
priorities and outlines modernization goals for both the active and
reserve component. Factors driving modernization are: maintaining
combat overmatch, affordability, operational and support costs,
recapialization efforts to guard against fleet obsolescence, joint
systems interoperability, and joint and combined arms training and
simulation requirements.
Army Aviation's modernization priorities are: (1) solve Aviation's
most critical battlefield deficiency--tactical reconnaissance and
security; (2) maintain attack overmatch in attack helicopters into the
21st century; (3) enhance Command, Control Communication, and
Intelligence (C3I) and joint/combined interoperability through
battlefield digitization; (4) recapitalize aging utility, cargo and
fixed wing fleets until replacement is possible; and (5) develop
technology underpinnings for Joint Vision 2010 and Army After Next
requirements.
Major deficiencies in the current fleet include: maintenance of the
OH-58D Kiowa Warrior as the interim scout aircraft in both the active
and reserve force until sufficient numbers of Comanches are procured to
replace them; continued operation of legacy AH-1 Cobras until they can
be replaced by either Apaches or Comanches; modernization of the UH-60
Black Hawk fleet to meet Force XXI battlefield requirements and to
extend the life of the UH-60 until it can be replaced by the Future
Utility Rotorcraft; modernization funding needed to either upgrade or
replace significant numbers UH-1 Huey helicopters; and execution of an
Improved Cargo Helicopter program to extend the life of the CH-47
Chinook until it is replaced by the Joint Transport Rotorcraft.
Question. Your aircraft modernization plan ``recognizes that
funding to resource all modernization goals are outside current Army
funding levels.'' How much is required to fund the plan? How much is
included in your fiscal year 1999 budget and the outyears?
Answer. The Army Aviation Modernization Plan addresses aviation
modernization requirements out to fiscal year 2020. The total cost of
modernization through that time frame has not been determined. The
fiscal year 1999 President's budget includes $1,320,000,000 for
aviation modernization programs. Additionally, the Future Years Defense
Program (fiscal years 2000-2003) includes $6,909,000,000 for aviation
modernization. This funding supports major procurements that include:
Comanche Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E); 400 AH-64D's; 207 Fire
Control Radars for the AH-64D; 90 UH-60L's; 11,497 Longbow Hellfire
Missiles; and 11 UC-35 jet aircraft.
Question. Your modernization strategy runs counter to the
recommendation made by the National Defense Panel. The National Defense
Panel recommended that the Army move toward advanced vertical lift
systems versus service-life extensions of current rotary wing aircraft
as proposed in your modernization plan. Why the difference?
Answer. The Army has conducted extensive analysis of the current
tilt rotor technology as a potential solution for future vertical lift
requirements. However, the significant costs associated with this
technology make it an unaffordable option for Army requirements. Given
available resources and the absence of affordable technology, the Army
has chosen service life extension programs as the most affordable and
achievable means to meet some of its aircraft modernization
requirements.
Question. What is your rational for submitting a ``Total Aircraft
Modernization Strategy'' that cannot be supported in your budget? Why
isn't your strategy based on budget projections?
Answer. The Army has openly and accurately stated its aviation
modernization requirements for both Active and Reserve components.
These requirements are based on the capabilities the Army needs to
accomplish missions outlined in the Defense Planning Guidance.
Requirements are determined by missions, not fiscal constraints. Fiscal
constraints do limit the Army's ability to execute this modernization
plan. The Army will continue to prioritize available resources to
accomplish its aviation modernization requirements.
Question. Have you developed alternatives to ensure that the
aviation fleet remains reliable and safe if funding does not
materialize to support your modernization strategy? Please explain.
Answer. The Army will continue to ensure its aviation fleet remains
safe and reliable until aircraft can be either replaced or modernized.
If adequate modernization funding is not available, the Army will have
no choice but to continue to operate its present fleet. Operational and
support costs will continue to grow as the fleet ages. The longer
modernization is delayed, the longer the Army will be forced to operate
without the advanced capabilities needed to accomplish assigned
missions.
Light Tactical Wheeled Vehicles
Question. Last year, the Army requested $9,000,000 to begin a High
Mobility Multipurpose Vehicles (HMMWV) replacement program. Both
Appropriations Committees denied funding because the Army had not
completed a light tactical vehicle strategy, which evaluated four
alternatives. Recently, we received budget documentation supporting a
multiyear contract for the HMMWV extended service program. Why are you
requesting the authority to proceed with a multiyear contract since it
does not meet the criteria legislated in the fiscal year 1998 National
Defense Appropriations Act.
Answer. The value of the HMMWV extended service program multiyear
contract as presented in the budget exceeds $500,000,000, which is the
threshold for seeking multiyear procurement authority from Congress.
However, due to the high unit cost of remanufactured HMMWV, the Army
does not intend to execute this contract and has abandoned these
efforts to develop a new light tactical vehicle.
Question. Have you completed your light tactical wheeled strategy?
Can you summarize your findings?
Answer. No, we have not. We are currently conducting a Light
Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Analysis of Alternatives which will be
completed no earlier than December of 1998.
Question. When will you submit your plan to Congress?
Answer. We plan to submit our plan during the second quarter of
fiscal year 1999.
Question. Your budget request includes $24,000,000 to begin a HMMWV
Extended Service Program. If you have not completed your tactical
wheeled vehicle strategy, how did you determine that this was the
optimal plan for keeping a viable light tactical fleet?
Answer. As an interim strategy, the Army wanted to remanufacture
basic HMMWVs into the A2 configuration with some corrosion resistance
enhancements. This did not prove to be a cost-effective means of
modernizing the fleet. Therefore, we are asking the Congress to
authorize and appropriate these dollars into the HMMWV production line.
Question. The Marine Corps considered a HMMWV Extended Service
Program (ESP), but decided it made more cost effective to procure new
HMMWVs. Why are your conclusions different?
Answer. Last fall, in conjunction with the USMC, the Army had Am
General remanufacture basic HMMWVs into a near A2 configuration. The
Army and the Marine Corps learned from this effort that Marine Corps
vehicles were too corroded to remanufacture and that the cost of such
an effort, $45,000 per vehicle, was prohibitive. The Army along with
the USMC has concluded it is more cost effective to procure new
vehicles than to take basic HMMWVs to the A2 configuration.
Question. Does your research and development budget include funds
to develop a new tactical wheeled vehicle? If so, how much? What is the
total funding required to complete the program?
Answer. In regard to research and development funding, we have
abandoned our efforts to develop a new light tactical vehicle. However,
we are monitoring an ongoing technology base effort at the National
Automotive Center called the Commercially Based Tactical Truck
(COMBATT) program. This program is exploring the feasibility of
modifying commercial, production vehicles to meet the HMMWV performance
specifications. Ford, General Motors, Chrysler, and AM General are
participating in this program. If we believe the results can improve
the light tactical fleet, we will build and test prototypes from the
COMBATT program. In the meantime, we will continue to buy HMMWVs.
Crusader Self-Propelled Howitzer
Question. A recent ``Army Times'' article highlighted that the Army
has slashed the number of field artillery guns in its divisional
artillery force. According to the article, some divisions has 18 fewer
guns than they had in Operation Desert Storm. Crusader is expected to
make up the difference; however, Crusader will not be fully deployed
for another seven years. Does the article paint an accurate picture?
Answer. Yes. In fiscal year 1996, I made a decision to modernize
the total Army Field Artillery force in order to enhance our
warfighting capability. This modernization initiative involved
restructuring the self-propelled 155mm cannon battery from an eight-gun
to six-gun, two platoon configuration and fielding a second Multiple
Launch Rocket System (MLRS) battery in the heavy division artilleries
to form a composite 2x9 MLRS battalion. This force structure decision
reduced the number of self-propelled howitzers in a division from 72 to
54 and reduced the total Army self-propelled howitzers requirement from
2160 to 1378.
Question. Do you believe that there is an operational risk by
having this long-term gap in the Army's fire support capability? Please
explain.
Answer. Yes, I made this decision realizing that there was some
risk, but acceptable risk, until Crusader and the 2x9 MLRS battalions
were fielded. I consider this risk acceptable based on our Quadrennial
Defense Review, which indicated that the security environment between
now and 2015 will be marked by the absence of a ``global peer
competitor'' able to challenge the United States militarily. By
following our current modernization strategy, we will field Crusader to
22 Active component battalions, 10 Army National Guard battalions and 8
Army Prepositioned Sets, in addition to six 2x9 MLRS battalions by
2015.
Question. Can other weapon systems be used to fill the gap until
Crusader is fielded? If so, what are they? What are their limitations?
Answer. First, let me say that no other cannon artillery system in
development anywhere in the world can meet all of Crusaders
requirements. This has been validated by the United States General
Accounting Office in their report to the Secretary of Defense on June
1997. No other weapon system can take the place of Crusader; however as
you know, we are currently fielding the Paladin howitzer, which is the
Army's most modern self-propelled howitzer and will be the primary
means of fire support of the first part of the Army XXI. Paladin is a
fine weapon system, but the fact remains that it is currently outgunned
by 11 threat cannon systems in range and rate of fire, cannot keep pace
with its supported Abrams/Bradely based maneuver forces, and is based
on a 35 year-old chassis. Many of the technologies that Paladin
pioneered, such as self-location and on-board fire control, are
becoming increasingly common on more modern and capable self-propelled
weapons being fielded around the world.
Question. According to the article, the reduction was made to save
money for the Crusader development program. Is the Crusader program
fully funded?
Answer. Yes, the Crusader program is fully funded. The reductions
were not made to save money for the Crusader development program, they
were made to allow the fielding of a 2x9 MLRS battalion to each heavy
division and to allow Paladin to be fielded to more of the total force.
Question. Last year, the Army restructured the Crusader program.
The new schedule compresses the development phase by almost one year,
but retains the First Unit Equipped date in fiscal year 2005. The
Army's Operational Test and Evaluation office says this restructured
schedule causes a high degree of risk in the program. Do you agree with
the assessment? If the program slips, what are the operational
implications since you reduced the number of guns in the divisional
artillery force?
Answer. No. The new development program did not really compress
Engineering, Manufacturing and Development (EMD). What it did do was
compress the overall development schedule by having concurrency in some
of the Program Definition and Risk Reduction activities with EMD
activities. The new program was worked by working level integrated
product team (WIPT) made up of key Office of the Secretary of Defense
and Army personnel. Operational Test and Evaluation Command (OPTEC) was
part of this WIPT. OPTEC concurs with the program office risk
assessment--the new development plan is an acceptable risk program. The
Crusader program is on track to meet a fiscal year 2005 First Unit
Equipped with the most cost-effective system required to meet the
operational requirements. If the program were to slip, the force would
remain at risk until Crusader were fielded. The current self-propelled
howitzer force structure depends upon Crusader fielding to provide our
soldiers with a world class weapon system which will restore United
States cannon supremacy.
Two Major Regional Conflicts (MRC) Strategy
Question. Supporting the indefinite extension of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) mission in Bosnia combined with the recent
increase in the deployment of U.S. forces to the Persian Gulf has
stretched the ability of the U.S. to meet its security commitments
elsewhere in the world. Recent press coverage indicates that the strain
placed on U.S. forces is evident in each of the military services. For
example, the Army is reportedly experiencing shortages in the
availability of Patriot anti-missile batteries and main gun tank
rounds. Shuffling assets to meet both emergent requirements and long-
term security commitments may also hinder the Department's ability to
conduct required maintenance actions on time. In addition, the need to
meet the increasing demand for U.S. forces will significantly increase
the strain placed on U.S. military personnel. Given the indefinite
extension of the Bosnia mission and the recent buildup in the Persian
Gulf, do you feel that the Army has adequate equipment and personnel
resources to fulfill its share of current national security
commitments?
Answer. Yes. In requiring the U.S. military to engage in activities
to shape the international environment and respond to the full spectrum
of crises, the National Military Strategy envisions us conducting, when
in the national interest to do so, smaller-scale contingencies, like
Bosnia, as well as posturing ourselves to conduct major theater wars.
Engaging in multiple concurrent contingencies requires careful
consideration to ensure our forces are not dissipated and, therefore,
neither unable nor perceived as unable, to respond to more critical
threats. I believe our operations in Bosnia do not prevent us from
fulfilling the requirements of our National Military Strategy.
Within its current end strength, the Army can execute its portion
of the National Military Strategy with acceptable risk, but it is not
easy, particularly for our soldiers and their families. The Army
receives the smallest total obligation authority of any Department, yet
it is performing the lion's share of the day-to-day execution of the
National Military Strategy. For example, in addition to our forces
stationed abroad, an average of 31,000 soldiers were deployed on any
given day during fiscal year 1997. This is roughly the equivalent of
two divisions of personnel.
Recognizing that the Army must bear its share of the burden in
meeting the requirements of the National Military Strategy, the Army
strives to meet its commitments by closely monitoring risk, while
maintaining a dynamic, synchronized, balance among the six fundamental
imperatives: quality people, training, leader development, doctrine,
force mix, and modern equipment. We have established a balance that
enables us to meet the National Military Strategy elements of shape,
respond, and prepare now, but the balance is fragile. It could be
disturbed easily by failure to meet Quadrennial Defense Review-derived
end strength targets, unpredictable funding, or less than expected
efficiencies from programmed infrastructure reform. If, for example, we
were to maintain, without additional funding, a larger total Army end
strength, diversion of funds to support that end strength could
jeopardize our ability to build the Army we will need to meet future
challenges.
Question. What specific deficiencies do you see in Army forces?
Answer. While recapitalizing the force to meet future challenges,
we will assume some degree of calculated risk (with shrinking budgets)
in terms of readiness in order to allocate sufficient resources to
conduct the science and technology and modernization efforts that will
lead to long-term capabilities. However, we must manage that risk
carefully to ensure that readiness does not suffer to an unacceptable
degree. The key is to monitor the risk while improving the balance
between the vital components of our Army--readiness, modernization, and
people.
We have established a balance, but it is fragile and could easily
be disturbed by inconsistent funding, a failure to meet end strength
targets, or to achieve programmed efficiencies. Our current
capabilities are less robust than previous resource levels permitted,
and as a result, we have less margin for error--operationally or
fiscally. However, the Army realizes that failure to balance current
readiness and future modernization will result in a future force that
is nothing more than a smaller version of today's Army. To maintain the
proper balance, the Army needs: timely supplemental funding for
unplanned contingency operations in Bosnia and Southwest Asia; to
achieve its Quadrennial Defense Report-determined personnel reductions;
flexibility to program, budget, and adjust expenditure of funds during
the year of execution; additional rounds of Base Realignment and
Closure to being infrastructure in line with current needs; and
adequate resourcing to include the availability of critical enablers,
such as adequate sea and airlift, equipment modernization, and enhanced
intelligence and communications architectures.
Question. Supporting the indefinite extension of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) mission in Bosnia combined with the recent
increase in the deployment of U.S. forces to the Persian Gulf has
stretched the ability of the U.S. to meet its security commitments
elsewhere in the world. Recent press coverage indicates that the strain
placed on U.S. forces is evident in each of the military services. For
example, the Army is reportedly experiencing shortages in the
availability of Patriot anti-missile batteries and main gun tank
rounds. Shuffling assets to meet both emergent requirements and long
term security commitments may also hinder the Department's ability to
conduct required maintenance actions on time. In addition, the need to
meet the increasing demand for U.S. forces will significantly increase
the strain placed on U.S. military personnel. Recent press accounts
indicate the Army may have a shortage of Patriot batteries to meet
current requirements. General Reimer, please describe the shortfall in
light of current requirements.
Answer. Recent events in the Persian Gulf reflect that the Army is
prepared to play its unique and key role in our National Military
Strategy. During the recent Iraqi crisis, all units requested by
Commander-in-Chief, Central Command, including Patriot batteries, were
allocated and rapidly deployed as scheduled.
Patriot batteries, as you are aware, are in high demand to support
worldwide joint military operations. Therefore, they are managed under
the Global Military Force Policy (GMFP). This policy requires strict
monitoring of the operating tempo of monitored units, such as Patriot
batteries. We acknowledge some risk in executing two Major Theater of
Wars (MTWs) with current Patriot assets. To mitigate the risk, we have
initiated a plan to standardize the Patriot force by increasing the
available Active duty batteries. The risk concerning Patriot batteries
is acceptable in the near-term for conducting two Major Theater Wars.
There is no risk in conducting current operations within the scope of
the GMFP.
Tank Ammunition
Question. General Reimer, there are also accounts which claim that
the Army is suffering from a shortage of main gun tank rounds. Does the
Army face a shortage in this area?
Answer. The Army does not have a shortage of tank main gun
ammunition. The Army has sufficient inventory of tank main gun, armor-
piercing, and high explosive anti-tank rounds to defeat the threat
posed in two Major Theater Wars.
Depot Maintenance
Question. Do the new deployment requirements in Southwest Asia put
depot maintenance schedules for Army equipment at risk?
Answer. Equipment maintenance is not at risk as long as the Army is
reimbursed for excess costs associated with the deployment.
Question. If the Army is unable to meet its maintenance schedules
for equipment, what risks does this pose to the Nation's ability to
meet its security commitments?
Answer. We do not anticipate equipment maintenance precluding us
from meeting our security commitments, unless we are not reimbursed for
excess costs associated with the deployment. Should we deploy, we would
have the necessary capability to take assets with us for essential
maintenance, and other major depot maintenance would be deferred until
after the deployment.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Young.
Questions submitted by Mr. Lewis and the answers thereto
follow:]
Black Hawk Helicopter
Question. General Reimer, I understand the Active Army and the Army
National Guard have acknowledged a shortfall of 90 UH-60L Black Hawks
helicopters in Guard ``war fight'' units. As you know, Chairman Young
and this Committee have been strong supporters of the Black Hawk
program. We are pleased that the Army and Office of Secretary of
Defense are no longer planning to terminate the Black Hawk. Isn't it
true that these 90 Black Hawks meet the ``war fighting'' requirements
and fill the missing third assault company in six assault battalions,
thereby bringing these battalions to their doctrinal configuration?
Answer. Yes, this is true.
Question. Under that all but eight of the 90 ``war fighting'' Black
Hawks are either in the fiscal year 1999 budget request or projected in
Program Objective Memorandum 2000?
Answer. This is not correct. The Army has funded 50 UH-60s in
fiscal years 1999 through 2003 and recognizes an unfunded requirement
for 40 additional UH-60s. Funding for the remaining 40 aircraft will
compete with other priorities in the Program Objective Memorandum
process.
Question. Aren't there sufficient cost savings associated with this
90 aircraft buy achieved by adding eight additional Black Hawks to the
22 included in your fiscal year 1999 budget?
Answer. Yes. Re-baselining the current multiyear, multi-service
contract from 18 H-60 helicopters per year to 36 H-60 helicopters per
year would save the Army $33,200,000 over the remaining three years of
the multiyear contract (fiscal years 1999, 2000 and 2001).
Question. Isn't it true that the five-year multiyear contract to
procure Black Hawks contains an option which would allow a baseline
change to a more economic rate resulting in significant savings of up
to $60,000,000 over the life of the contract?
Answer. The current multiyear contract is based on a procurement
strategy of 18 H-60 helicopters per year for all services (Army, Navy,
and Air Force). The contract does contain an option for the Army to re-
baseline to a more economic rate of 36 H-60 helicopters per year. The
advantage of going to 36 H-60s per year versus 18 would be a total
savings of $33,200,000 spread out over three years ($10,900,000 in
fiscal year 1999; $10,700,000 in fiscal year 2000; and $11,600,000 in
fiscal year 2001). this assumes the Navy buys six CH-60s in fiscal year
1999 and 18 CH-60s each in fiscal years 2000 and 2001 and the Army
funds eight additional H-60s in fiscal years 1999, 2000, and 2001.
However, in order to achieve a more economic rate and save $33,200,000,
the Army would have to invest an additional $237,000,000 ($73,800,000
in fiscal year 1999; $74,800,000 in fiscal year 2000; and $88,400,000
in fiscal year 2001) into its Black Hawk program. Additionally, this
would commit the services to 36 H-60 helicopters per year not only in
fiscal year 1999, but in the remaining two years of the multiyear
contract (fiscal year 2000 and fiscal year 2001). The Army has a valid
requirement for additional Black Hawks but simply lacks the additional
$237,000,000 (within current Army Total Obligation Authority) necessary
to achieve a more economic rate.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Lewis.
Questions submitted by Mr. Skeen and the answers thereto
follow:]
Unfunded Requirements
Question. Would you provide, for the record, a listing of the
Army's major unfunded requirements in this year's budget proposal?
Answer. The Army Staff is currently evaluating and prioritizing
fiscal year 1999 unfunded requirements. Upon completion of this process
and approval by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the fiscal year 1999
list of unfunded requirements will be provided for Congressional use.
Question. Would you provide for the record, a listing of the Army
Materiel Command's (AMC) and the Testing and Evaluation Command (TECOM)
unfunded requirements in this year's budget proposal.
Answer. The Army's consolidated fiscal year 1998 list of unfunded
requirements is currently under development and contains high priority
unfunded items for both AMC and TECOM. Upon approval by the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, the list will be released to the Committee.
Civilian Cuts
Question. What is the Army's rationale for an across-the-board
civilian personnel cut at this time?
Answer. The Army has no plans at this time for an across-the-board
civilian cut. The Army plans civilian reductions in conjunction with
workload changes, efficiency studies, and available funding.
Army's Tactical High Energy Laser Program
Question. What is the status of the Army's Tactical High Energy
Laser (THEL) program? Please provide an update for the Committee and
note if there are any unfunded requirements in this program in the
fiscal year 1999 budget?
Answer. The Army Space and Missile Defense Command has issued a
letter contract modification to the original contract with TRW Space
and Electronics Group, Redondo Beach, California, to include
integration and field testing of the THEL demonstrator at the High
Energy Laser Systems Test Facility (HELSTF), White Sands Missile Range,
New Mexico. To date, the TRW team of U.S. and Israeli contractors has
done an excellent job of maintaining jointly agreed to cost, schedule
and performance baselines. Most of the THEL hardware has been
fabricated and is in the final stages of integration and various stages
of subsystem testing. The Command, Control, Communications and
Intelligence (C31) subsystem, which includes an Israeli furnished
radar, has already been successfully tested in Israel and will be
shipped to HELSTF in late March 1998. The C31 subsystem testing at
HELSTF is scheduled in the April and May timeframe. The Pointer Tracker
subsystem is in final integration at TRW and will be shipped to HELSTF
in late June to early July 1998. The Laser subsystem will be undergoing
subsystem integration and testing at TRW's Capistrano, California, test
facility through June 1998 and then will be shipped to HELSTF for
integration and testing with the other two subsystems. Live fire
testing at HELSTF is scheduled for completion by the end of 1998, at
which time the demonstrator will be available for shipment to Israel.
After completion of the HELSTF field testing, Israel is expected to
fund any follow on phases of the program in fiscal year 1999 and
beyond. No U.S. funds are budgeted for the cooperative THEL program in
fiscal year 1999, and there are no unfunded requirements in fiscal year
1999 for THEL.
Army's Solid State Laser Program
Question. Would you comment on the progress of the Solid State
Laser Program, which is managed by the Army Space and Missile Defense
Command?
Answer. Overall the program is progressing toward demonstrating
Solid State Laser (SSL) weapon level technologies that support the
development of compact, highly mobile, all electric, high power lasers
for missions such as short range point air defense against low
observable, low altitude, and highly maneuverable targets. The SSL
program offers the potential to support the warfighter of the Army
After Next.
This Diode Pump (DP) SSL disk amplifier technology program has
three main technology phases. The first phase leverages the Department
of Energy's series of developments in SSL devices used for laser fusion
(at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories). The second phase is the
development and demonstration of low cost manufacturing processes for
laser diode pumping sources. The third phase is the initial field
testing of the developed DP SSL disk amplifier module leveraging the
existing high energy, lightweight Army Pointer Tracker (APT) at the
High Energy Laser Systems Test Facility, White Sands Missile Range, as
a surrogate laser beam director.
The DP SSL disk amplifier program is in the process of developing
the first of three laser modules needed for a high average power laser.
The first set of modifications to an existing APT to allow operation at
the SSL wavelength is complete. When the laser hardware fabrication is
completed, the components will be integrated to initiate a proof-of-
principle demonstration of the operation of a single laser module under
correct thermal loading and control. The testing of this disk amplifier
laser module is planned for completion with fiscal year 1998 funding.
High Energy Laser Test Facility
Question. Would you comment for the Committee on the current status
of the High Energy Laser System Test Facility (HELSTF), which is
located at White Sands? Will this year's budget request adequately
sustain these unique national resources?
Answer. The HELSTF fiscal year 1999 budget of $15,000,000 is
sufficient to perform the HELSTF mission. Although the prime contractor
recently reduced their staff by about 40 people, the government
believes that the remaining staff of 125 people can do the tasks
associated with HELSTF operation and maintenance and operations of the
Sealite Beam Director and the Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser used
in testing at the facility.
Directed Energy Space Control
Question. Would you update the Committee on the status of the
recent directed-energy space control experiments conducted at High
Energy Laser Systems Test Facility last year? Please comment on any
findings and recommendations for future activities related to these
experiments.
Answer. The Data Collection Exercise used the Low Power Chemical
Laser, the Mid Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser and the Air Force MSTI-
3 satellite. The Army Space and Missile Defense Command successfully
illuminated MSTI-3 with both the high and low power lasers. Data
collected from the exercise is being used to directly support the
initial assessment of U.S. satellite vulnerability to ground based
lasers. This data also partially validates atmospheric propagation
codes and is being entered into satellite vulnerability assessment
database.
The specific details of the experiment and results are classified;
however, the experiment did raise some important satellite tracking
issues which require further investigation.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Skeen.
Questions submitted by Mr. Cunningham and the answers thereto
follow:]
Hollow Army
Question. General Reimer, in your statement you say that some
people fear a return to a ``hollow Army'' where requirements far
outstrip resources. You indicate that Army deployments have increased
more than 300 percent with an average of 31,000 soldiers deployed in
over 70 countries. You are recently quoted in the press as saying that
the Army ``has too many undermanned and unmanned squads.'' This would
seem to indicate a disparity between resources and requirements. Every
year senior military officials testify that while their service is fine
for short term, the mid- and long-term are problematic or in danger.
What is your definition of a ``hollow force?'' What would be the
telltale signs that requirements have outstripped resources? What
assurances can you provide to this Committee that your claim that
``today's Army is the best ever'' is more believable than the same
claim, which was given in the 1970s by your predecessors?
Answer. In early 1980, General Meyer, then Chief of Staff of the
Army, called attention to some specific readiness problems and coined
the term ``hollow Army'' to describe them. Specifically, overseas units
were manned at 105 percent strength and a significant number of
noncommissioned officers (NCOs) were sent to recruiting and Reserve
component duty. Units located in the United States were the billpayers,
which resulted in fill rates of 75 percent to 90 percent. Reductions in
available NCOs led to reductions in quality training. An underlying
concern was the ``quality'' of soldiers and new recruits. Regarding
modernization, General Meyer stated there were insufficient funds
available for Research and Development or new equipment. However, the
preponderance of his remarks on the ``hollow Army'' referred to
personnel shortages and personnel quality. Thus ``Hollow Force'' is
defined when the above conditions are present.
The term ``hollowness'' is not descriptive of the Army today. A
comparison of the quality of today's recruits with those of the
``hollow Army'' clearly shows why. In 1979, only 64.1 percent of
recruits had a high school diploma and 46 percent scored in the lowest
category of the Armed Forces Qualification Test. In 1997, 90 percent of
our recruits had high school diplomas and only two percent scored in
the lowest category. The Army of today consists of high quality
soldiers and civilians led by competent, well-trained leaders equipped
with the best equipment found anywhere in the world. Although personnel
shortages and turbulence in the field do exist, and the Army continues
to face personnel challenges, they are largely a function of the
drawdown of 488,000 Active component soldiers starting in fiscal year
1989. This turbulence and need to manage endstrength, while we shape
the force internally, provides continuing challenges. The Army
leadership continues to aggressively work the force structure balance
issues while simultaneously keeping the Army trained and ready.
Today's Army is the best ever. The significance of land forces to
our national security has been validated time and again since the fall
of the Berlin Wall. As a full spectrum force, each day America's Total
Army meets the requirements for forward presence overseas while
remaining prepared to project landpower into any area where our
Nation's interests are threatened. The Army has done the heavy lifting
in 28 of the 33 significant military operations since 1989, providing
more than 60 percent of committed forces for these vital missions.
Recent successes are demonstrated by operations in Bosnia and our
ability to deploy combat brigade teams to Southwest Asia within 96
hours in response to the current situation in the Gulf. Soldiers are,
as always, our credentials and our legacy.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr.
Cunningham. Questions submitted by Mr. Dicks and the answers
thereto follow:]
Comanche Helicopter
Question. As you know, I have been a long-time supporter of the
Comanche, because of its ability to collect reconnaissance in a wide
variety of battlefield environments and to perform light attack
missions at night, in adverse weather, and in low visibility
conditions, represents a truly revolutionary system. No other United
States helicopter can or will possess the capability of the Comanche.
Does the Army still rate the Comanche as one of their top modernization
programs?
Answer. Comanche is certainly one of our most important
modernization programs, and its fielding will address aviation
deficiencies in armed reconnaissance. We continue to accept risk in our
armed reconnaissance fleet, relying on the Vietnam-era Cobra and the
interim Kiowa Warrior. In addition to the quantum leap in capability
that Comanche brings, it is aviation's technology carrier into the Army
After Next.
Question. Can you provide the subcommittee with a general overview
on how the program is doing?
Answer. The Comanche program is doing quite well. Prototype 1
continues its envelope-expansion test flights at West Palm Beach,
Florida. Prototype 2 is nearing completion and will be brought to
Washington, D.C. later this spring. Development of its Mission
Equipment Package (MEP) continues on track, with encouraging technical
breakthroughs in avionics and cockpit displays. Recently, Comanche was
nominated for the prestigious Collier Trophy, which is awarded for
significant aerospace engineering achievement. From a program
management standpoint, Comanche is performing superbly, with very small
variances from cost and schedule objectives.
Question. Is the program being funded at an efficient rate? Is
additional funding needed?
Answer. The current Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation
(RD&E) funding profile ramps up gradually to a peak in fiscal year
2004, dictating a sequential development of the program's sub-elements.
A more desirable RD&E profile would dedicate more funds up front to
allow for simultaneous development. However, funds are being obligated
in an effective manner and the program is executable as currently
budgeted.
Question. If you had additional funds provided by the Congress for
this program, how would the monies be used?
Answer. Any additional funds would go to accelerate the development
and testing of the MEP, leading to a more capable Early Operational
Capability (EOC) aircraft. Specifically, funds would be applied to
avionics development, helmet display testing, software development,
Comanche Portable Cockpit upgrades, armament testing, and diagnostics
improvements. We would also use those funds to provide the Comanche
with Longbow Fire Control Radar capability as early as feasible. This
would enhance Comanche's participation in the digitization experiments
scheduled for next decade.
Question. According to the Comanche program office, the Comanche
program is ``mismatched'' with the Force XXI Initiative. What does the
program office mean by ``mismatched?''
Answer. The program is not really ``mismatched,'' although we do
have some concerns about Comanche's ability to fully participate in
planned Force XXI activities. The delivery of Comanche's six Early
Operational Capability aircraft occurs in fiscal year 2002, after but
in time to capture the lessons learned from the First Digitized
Division (FDD) in fiscal year 2000 and to participate in the First
Digitized Corps. The Initial Operational Capability in December 2006;
however, technology improvements from FDD digitization initiatives will
be incorporated in all Comanche aircraft.
Question. The Army has budgeted $2,600,000,000 for its Force XXI
initiative. Why is the Comanche, which according to the Army is its top
modernization program, not being given the capability to operate in the
digital battlefield of the future?
Answer. Comanche is fully digitized and will be a key player on the
digital battlefield. Its advanced Mission Equipment Package will accept
and pass digital information to a wide range of ground and air
platforms in near real-time. Comanche has been termed ``The Quarterback
of the Digitized Force'' and will link Tactical Operation Centers,
Longbow Apaches, Crusaders, and joint platforms to significantly
enhance the ground commander's situational awareness. Its modular
avionics suite will set the standard for future ``radios,'' replacing
today's black boxes with a more flexible system in which individual
components can be replaced and waveforms can be reprogrammed with
software.
Question. What are the risks of a ``mismatched'' program?
Answer. The Comanche is the centerpiece of the digitized force,
linking together all other elements of that force and distributing near
real-time battlefield intelligence and targeting data. The risk is that
some digitization experiments will take place without Comanche's full
participation. Synergistic improvements that Comanche will bring out in
other systems will not be identified, and tactics, techniques, and
procedures for the digitized force will be developed without the
Comanche's full impact. We anticipate reducing that risk by seeking to
incorporate more capability in our Early Operational Capability (EOC)
aircraft and using these aircraft in our digitization initiatives.
Question. Why are we buying six early operational aircraft at an
estimated unit cost of $50,000,000 if they are not going to be in sync
with the capabilities required for the digitized battlefield?
Answer. The EOC aircraft serve several purposes, one of which is to
support the digitization plans for the First Digitized Division/First
Digitized Corps. Additional purposes are early user evaluation of
Comanche capabilities and the development of new tactics, techniques,
and procedures. Lessons learned on how to fight these EOC aircraft will
ensure that production aircraft are fielded in accordance with the
doctrine for fighting them.
Army After Next (AAN)
Question. The Army has been criticized in some quarters--most
recently by the National Defense Panel (NDP)--for its decision to
continue investments in Cold War legacy systems instead of moving out
to a smaller, faster, more agile force equipped with top-notch
technologies as envisioned under the Army After Next (AAN) plan--your
blueprint for the force beyond 2010. Can you give the subcommittee a
brief overview on the Army After Next blueprint?
Answer. The Army After Next (AAN) project serves to clarify our
vision for the 2025 timeframe and examines concepts, organizations, and
technologies that will be needed then. The holistic approach of the AAN
project enables the Army to maintain a balance between doctrine,
organizations, training, leader development, force mix, and material
for a future force. This approach allows the Army to properly focus its
long-term investment in technology.
The purpose of AAN is to conduct a broad range of studies of
warfare to the year 2025, frame issues critical to the development of
the Army during that period, and integrate them into the Force XXI
process. The AAN project consists of an annual cycle of war games,
workshops, and conferences.
In 1997, the Army conducted the first major AAN war game. The war
game was a free-play, political-military exercise involving United
States, allied regional nations, and special player teams. Participants
included ambassadors, educators, retired generals, and senior leaders
from allied nations, government agencies, industry, and all services.
Insights gained from the war game proved invaluable to developing a
vision of the future and to the process of change. The war game
reinforced the criticality of speed and mobility, strong military ties
and alliances, well-developed space assets, back up systems for digital
communications, and full spectrum dominance.
The AAN project is in its second full year of inquiry into the
future. The next scheduled annual war game will take place April 20-30,
1998, at the Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. The next
annual report outlining the year's insights is scheduled to be
published in November 1998.
Question. Why does the Army seem to be moving slower than the other
services in investing in systems that will be relevant in the
battlefield of the future?
Answer. The Army has developed a long-term strategy and is
investing in the future. Both the Quadrennial Defense Review and the
National Defense Panel complimented the Army for moving quickly to
leverage information technology.
The Force XXI process is the process of continuous transformation
to achieve America's 21st century Army. The Force XXI product, Army XXI
will be a knowledge- and capabilities-based, power projection Army,
capable of land force dominance across the continuum of 21st century
joint military operations; an Army capable of responding to the world's
changing geopolitical environment. The Army After Next is a project
designed to assist the Army's leadership with their effort to develop a
long-term view of the Army's future. It represents the next phase of a
continuous modernization process. The course we have laid out in Force
XXI is required to get to the Army of 2025. There are no short cuts.
The Army recently conducted a series of Advanced Warfighting
Experiments to determine equipment for the First Digitized Division and
First Digitized Corps which will incorporate information technology
into heavy force weapons systems and provide leaders with unprecedented
speed and synchronization of information on friendly and enemy forces.
The Army is also developing a light force Advanced Warfighting
Experiment to determine the future light force design.
The new capabilities we envision in our Army After Next project are
not available today, and we do not believe they are achievable in the
near term. To realize the concepts embodied in Army After Next, we have
focused our Science and Technology investments where we believe they
will best support the leap-ahead capabilities we seek.
We are developing new technologies through basic research, as well
as seeking to mature emerging technologies sufficiently to permit their
application to military requirements. They are addressed in
considerable detail in the Army Science and Technology Master Plan.
They include, but are not limited to, hybrid power systems; logistics
efficiencies (fuel efficiency, ultra-reliability, weight reduction);
human engineering and cognitive engineering; signature control
(including counters); protection schemes for land systems (including
active protection); advanced materials; schemes for land systems
(including active protection); advanced materials; affordable precision
and alternate lethality means; alternative propellants; non-lethal
capabilities; and biological and chemical protection, antidotes, and
vaccines.
Army Modernization
Question. When will we see a significant shift from legacy systems
upgrades to the Army After Next Systems?
Answer. The Army Modernization Strategy's approach is near-, mid-,
and far-term. In the near-term (1998-2003), achieving information
dominance by 2010 will be the focus of our efforts. We will continue to
maintain necessary funding to sustain combat capability overmatch. In
addition, we will fund research and development to support the Army
After Next. The Army is inserting technology to extend the lives and
capabilities of many existing systems, and retiring older, expensive-
to-maintain systems that provide minimal operational return. In the
mid-term (2004-2010), the emphasis on information dominance continues
while we recapitalize through technology insertion and replacement of
aging equipment. for the far-term (2011-2020), the Army will prioritize
and focus its science and technology resources to leverage technology
advancements that help maintain decisive battlefield dominance for Army
After Next. From the near-term through the far-term, we will integrate
technological advances into existing systems, through Horizontal
Technological Integration, to provide the warfighter with common,
efficient, and high-payoff enabling technologies across multiple
systems.
M829A2 (A2) Round
Question. Last year this subcommittee included language directing
the Army to provide full funding for the A2 round in its fiscal year
1999 budget and directed the Army to explain to Congress their plan for
ensuring this happens. The subcommittee received a letter from Dr.
Oscar on December 10, 1997, assuring us the round would be funded at a
``minimum sustaining level.''
I understand the minimum sustaining level for the A2 round is
$42,000,000 for fiscal year 1999. The Army included just under
$10,000,000 in the request. There has subsequently been a commitment
made by the Army to reprogram the A2 to meet the FY99 requirement.
However, I am very unhappy that the Army made a promise to the
subcommittee and then so blatantly walked away from it. Why did the
Army ensure minimum sustaining funding then include only 25 percent of
the funding required for sustainment?
Answer. The Army remains committed to funding the fiscal year 1999
M829A2 requirements. The Army has $31,700,000 of the $38,000,000 to
$42,000,000 required to procure the minimum production quantity of
M829A2s. The Army plan to fund the procurement of M829A2 was based on
reducing development funding for the M829E3 by $10,000,000 (later
adjusted to $9,700,000 for inflation) and to using $22,000,000 from
proceeds of foreign sales to partially complete the M829A2 funding
requirement. The Army will include this item as an unfunded requirement
on the fiscal year 1999 list of unfunded requirements for those funds
outstanding. We recognize that if additional funding is not
appropriated, a below-the-threshold reprogramming action (moving funds
from other accounts to cover the commitment without exceeding the
Congressional thresholds for notification/approval) is required.
Question. Can you explain the plan to reprogram the funds to meet
the minimum sustaining level?
Answer. At the present time, a specific source(s) has not been
identified.
Question. What is the time frame for this to occur?
Answer. The Army expects to provide this funding in early fiscal
year 1999.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Dicks.
The Fiscal Year 1999 Army Posture Statement, as referred to on
page 7, follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Wednesday, February 25, 1998.
FISCAL YEAR 1999 NAVY POSTURE
WITNESSES
HON. JOHN H. DALTON, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
ADMIRAL JAY L. JOHNSON, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, U.S. NAVY
GENERAL CHARLES C. KRULAK, COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS, U.S. MARINE
CORPS
Introduction
Mr. Young. The Committee will come to order.
We are happy to have Secretary Dalton and Admiral Johnson
and General Krulak back with us again to talk to us about the
posture of the Navy and the Marine Corps. We look forward to
your expert testimony. The challenging times for all the
military forces as we meet today become more interesting on a
daily basis, with the deployment of the Navy and Marines
throughout the world, probably in excess of what the normal
deployments are with additional costs.
We would like to hear what you have to tell us about the
state of the services, what the requirements are for fiscal
year 1999, what this Committee can do to guarantee that the
soldiers and sailors, the Marines, the men and women in our
uniform are properly cared for. And Mr. Secretary, we are very
happy that you are back with us today.
[The Chairman's prepared statement follows:]
This morning, the Committee will conduct an open hearing on the
posture of the Navy and the Marine Corps. The Committee is pleased to
welcome John H. Dalton, the Secretary of the Navy; Admiral Jay L.
Johnson, the Chief of Naval Operations; and General Charles C. Krulak,
Commandant of the Marine Corps. The Committee warmly welcomes you here
today and looks forward to your expert testimony.
These remain challenging times for all the military services. As we
meet today, Navy and Marine forces are deployed throughout the world.
In the Persian Gulf they are working overtime, preparing to go directly
into harm's way--without hesitation. I can tell you that all of us in
the Congress are very proud of the excellent performance of the men and
women in our nation's Navy and Marine Corps, and the skill,
professionalism, and bravery they exhibit every day in carrying out
very difficult missions.
For the last three years since I became Chairman of the National
Security Subcommittee, I have been warning about the danger resulting
from delayed modernization of your weapon systems. The Committee and
the Congress have done the best we can during the last three years to
provide increases in funding to the Defense Department to address
potential readiness problems and to address weapon system modernization
shortfalls. We appreciate your willingness to work with us in the past
to identify priorities for additional funding, and I stress to you
today the importance of maintaining that open dialogue as we enter this
new era of balanced budgets and a fixed level of defense spending.
Your fiscal year 1999 budget is encouraging, in that funding for
Navy and Marine Corps modernization programs is increased over last
year's appropriated levels. However, it still only provides funding for
71 new aircraft and helicopters (of which only 54 are combat aircraft),
810 missiles, and 5 combatant ships. We cannot lose sight of the need
to pursue a strong modernization program, nor should we ``declare
victory'' now that we have seen the first proposals from the
Administration to modestly increase funding for weapons system
procurement. We have a long way to go to meet the JCS goal of $60
billion per year for modernization spending, and we may never reach
that goal in a balanced budget environment if the Administration
continues to expand the peacetime missions to which military forces are
assigned.
Finally, last year's budget from the Department of the Navy was
very discouraging in terms of funding for ship self-defense,
cooperative engagement, and theater ballistic missile defense
capabilities for new-construction DDG-51 ships. We believe these new
capabilities are badly needed, as they provide greater protection for
our sailors and Marines, other deployed forces, and civilian
populations both here at home and abroad. Your new budget is much
improved in these areas and I want to commend you for your attention
and commitment to these important programs. We still have some concerns
about these programs which we plan to discuss with you today.
So, the purpose of the hearing today is to hear first-hand what is
the posture of our nation's Navy and Marine Corps, and to discuss in
detail some of the issues I just mentioned. We want to understand how
you are meeting the challenge of increased deployments and new threats.
We also want to identify those areas where this Committee could help
you better perform your mission. Our goal is to strike a balance
between funding for current readiness and a prudent modernization
program that protects readiness in the long run.
Mr. Young. Before we turn the microphone over to you, I
would like to see if Mr. Dicks has a comment he would like to
make.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome
Secretary Dalton and Admiral Johnson and General Krulak, and we
look forward to the hearings today, and also to get a report on
your views on the supplemental appropriations bill as well.
Thank you.
Mr. Young. Mr. Secretary, welcome and we will be happy to
hear from you at this time, sir.
Summary Statement of Secretary Dalton
Secretary Dalton. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Mr.
Dicks, distinguished members of this Committee, it is a genuine
pleasure to be back with you today. This is my fifth time to
report to this Committee, and it is indeed an honor and
privilege to represent the men and women, along with these two
outstanding service chiefs, from the Department of the Navy.
If I could, and take a moment to reflect on the Department
of the Navy in terms of over those last 5 years, where we have
been, where we are today, and where we are going. I would like
to do that by discussing briefly where we are operationally,
programmatically, and in personnel.
OPERATIONAL STATUS
First of all, operationally, I think the last few weeks
have proved Winston Churchill to be accurate when he said that
the best ambassador is a warship. By having the Sailors and
Marines in the Arabian Gulf in the last few weeks, we now have
the possibility of an agreement that will hopefully resolve
that issue. I think it would not have happened without the
resolve that was shown by the forward presence of the Sailors
and Marines in the Gulf.
Those forces didn't need anybody's permission to be there.
I think that puts a very strong exclamation point behind what
we have been saying about the importance of our forward
presence and having our Sailors and Marines forward deployed,
getting the job done for the American people.
But it is not just the Arabian Gulf. The same thing has
happened with respect to Haiti; with respect to bringing the
parties to the peace table and making the Dayton Accords
possible for Bosnia; we brought stability in the Taiwan Strait;
the rescue of Captain Scott O'Grady; the noncombatant
evacuation operations that were done in Albania and Sierra Leon
and the former Zaire. From A to Z and anywhere in between, the
Navy and Marine Corps have answered all bells, have responded
professionally and gotten the job done for the American people.
I am very proud of those outstanding men and women and the fine
job they are doing.
PROGRAMMATIC STATUS
Programmatically, I want to thank you and this Committee,
for the support that you have provided to the Department of the
Navy. Whether it was aircraft carriers or submarines, combatant
ships, aircraft, big deck amphibs, or support for Marines,
Sailors and civilian personnel, you have been there. Not only
have you supported our requests but in many cases you have
enhanced those requests and moved procurement programs forward.
We are grateful to you for that.
I want to commit to you our continued work in the area of
acquisition reform to ensure we bring the highest quality Naval
Service at the most reasonable cost. We continue to seek the
most cost-effective way possible to take maximum advantage of
those dollars to provide quality for the American people.
PERSONNEL STATUS
In personnel, we simply have the best ever. The men and
women who are serving in our service today are outstanding, and
I am very proud of them.
We all know that several years ago we were reading adverse
headlines about poor behavior, sexual harassment problems, a
cheating scandal at the Naval Academy, those kinds of things.
We recognized the problem, we attacked the problem, and I think
we have made great headway. You are not seeing those kinds of
incidents today. This is because we reemphasized our core
values: honor, courage, and commitment, with training, and
education, focusing on the importance of team work, through
venues like the ``Crucible'' in the Marine Corps and ``Battle
Stations'' in the Navy. From the day these Sailors and Marines
come into the Naval Service, they are taught the importance of
those core values and the importance of working together. In
addition to that, and emphasizing the diversity in our officer
ranks, we have gone back to the foundation and bedrock
principles that have made our department the great department
that it is, and I am very proud of the progress that we have
made in that regard.
STRATEGY
With respect to the future, I believe we have the right
vision with our ``Forward from the Sea.'' It is something we
decided on several years ago and continue to review but we are
convinced that it is the right vision. We have not tried to
reinvent ourselves every couple of years. We are focusing on
the future and realize that recent incidents like those to
which I just referred continue to occur, and reinforce this as
the right vision. Yet we want to enhance it and make sure that
we progress with the Revolution in Military Affairs and the
Revolution in Business Affairs. We want to make sure our
Sailors and Marines have the right platform as we look to the
future and consider things like information warfare and
information technology for the 21st century. We are focusing on
the future with things like the Navy's Fleet Battle Experiments
and the Marine Corps' Warfighting Labs; the Hunter Warrior last
year, and the Urban Warrior that we have this year. Our efforts
are to look to the future to ensure that we have the platforms
and programs in place for our people.
BUDGET PRIORITIES
Mr. Chairman, we are proud of this budget that we have
presented to you today. We think it is a solid plan and
encourage your support of it.
If I could just emphasize a couple of platforms in terms of
priorities. The F/A-18E/F program last year was our number one
priority. It is again this year. That program remains on time,
on budget, underweight, and it is moving forward well.
CVN-77 is a must program that we have in 2001 and we
request your advanced procurement for that. DD-21, the Land
Attack Destroyer for the 21st Century and TBMD--it is very
important that we continue to move forward with these programs.
V22 and the AAAV are programs that are very important to us.
Challenges we face, we indeed have them. Readiness.
Readiness is in good shape for our forces that are forward
deployed. However, we have some work to do for periods when
these units are in a non-deployed status--as we build back up,
getting ready for deployment.
Retention and recruiting. We all know the economy has been
very strong in the last several years and, indeed, there are
many options for young men and women. That is a challenge that
we are addressing.
OTHER INITIATIVES
If I could ask for your particular support for three major
issues, Mr. Chairman. One is the emergency supplemental that is
before the Congress. It is very important to the Department of
Navy that the emergency supplemental be supported without
offsets, and I ask for your support for that.
Secondly, base realignment and closure, another round of
BRAC. Both the Quadrennial Defense Review and the National
Defense Panel have looked at this issue and concluded, as the
Secretary of Defense has, as I have, that we simply have too
much infrastructure and we need your support for additional
rounds of BRAC.
Finally, we have before you, that has just arrived to the
Congress, a reprogramming request for manpower and personnel
totaling $220 million. We request that reprogramming to take
care of our people. We have some permanent change of station
orders and other home port changes affecting almost 14,000 of
our people and we sincerely request your support of that
reprogramming for fiscal year 1998.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you again for the
support this committee has provided the Department of the Navy.
We really appreciate what you have done and continue to do for
our people. I am very proud to be here this morning to
represent the Sailors and Marines and civilians of the
Department of the Navy, and I would be happy to respond to your
questions.
[Clerk's note.--The statement of Secretary Dalton follows.
The Fiscal Year 1999 Joint Posture Statement of the Secretary
of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant
of the Marine Corps is printed at the end of this hearing. See
page 370.]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Young. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much. And as you
have stated, in recent years we have been able to add to the
President's budget and we have been able to accelerate some of
your programs and move them ahead. We are all pretty much aware
that this year is a little different. We don't have that
cushion of additional money over the budget. So we are going to
have to work very closely to make sure that the priority items
are taken care of.
Again, thank you for your statement.
Admiral Johnson, I would be happy to hear from you at this
time.
Summary Statement of Admiral Johnson
Admiral Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Dicks,
members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to
appear before the committee once again, and I would only add
very briefly that I share the Secretary's enthusiasm for our
Navy and Marine Corps team. I am very intensely proud of our
Navy, what they are doing, and what they represent for our
country right now.
We have had a good year. We are planning to have another
one, and your support is fundamental to that and we appreciate
what you did for us in the past year. We are on station, as you
know, out forward, where we belong. We will stay on station as
long as the country needs us out there.
And I have spoken to our commanders only today. They are
taking a nice even stream out in the Arabian Gulf. They are
ready and they will stay ready. They are very proud of what
they are doing.
BUDGET PRIORITIES
As to the budget, it is indeed a good and balanced budget.
I believe it reflects a lot of good team work. It also is
reflective of the work that we did in the Quadrennial Defense
Review, and I think that is significant because we were part
and parcel of that whole process. Indeed, it reflects a
reshaping of our Navy into what I call a leaner but more
capable Navy.
We focused a lot of our effort and our investment on
filling our operating and maintenance accounts, filling our
manpower accounts and solidifying our procurement strategy in a
way that we think is very balanced and will serve the Navy
properly in the 21st century.
Once again, sir, I too am very grateful for the support of
the committee here in Washington, and I am also particularly
grateful for the time and effort the members of the committee
spend out forward with our men and women, telling them thank
you. It means a lot to all of us. And I stand by for your
questions.
Mr. Young. Admiral, thank you very much.
General Krulak, we would like to hear from you at this
time, sir.
Summary Statement of General Krulak
General Krulak. Chairman Young, Mr. Dicks, distinguished
members of the Committee, I think you have my written
statement. I wrote it myself so all the misspellings are mine.
Rather than take any time, I am prepared for your questions.
[The statement or General Krulak follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
ADVERSE IMPACT OF DEPLOYMENTS
Mr. Young. I would like to first--thank you very much,
General.
I would like to get into the question that was raised in a
story in the Washington Post yesterday about the increased
deployment of carriers and other combatants in the Gulf region
taking away from the Pacific. And General Tilelli was quoted
several times in the story expressing some concern.
Where do we stand there? We understand the need for the
presence in the Gulf area but what is that doing to the rest of
our commitment?
Admiral Johnson. Well, Mr. Chairman, we have, as you well
know, a two-carrier battle group presence in the Arabian Gulf
right now, and that does indeed mean that we are without
carriers in both the Mediterranean and the western Pacific.
With a 12-carrier force and a 6-month deployment policy that we
believe is good and proper, it means we have to share the risk,
and that is what you see here.
To that end we have, in fact, on both coasts, the next
carrier battle groups to deploy in what we call a ``surge
status'' so that they are in an increased state of readiness.
They are able to respond on short notice if required. But
indeed there is a gap in both places right now.
General Krulak. Sir, for the Marine Corps, we have, with
the permission and concurrence of both General Tilelli and
CINCPAC Admiral Prucher, we have moved the 31st Marine
Expeditionary Unit ARG down into the Indonesia area so that it
can go either way. We pulled the new Amphibious Ready Group,
(ARG) out of the Mediterranean, put it into the northern
Arabian Gulf and we have standing by at Camp Lejeune, an MPF
fly-in echelon that would fly in to join with Maritime
Prepositioning Force, (MPF) ships that are currently acting as
the reserve for EUCOM.
So we are covered all around.
SIX-MONTH ROTATIONS
Mr. Young. Let me ask, what is the effect of the normal 6-
month rotation? Is that going to be affected or will the
deployments be longer than 6 months now?
Secretary Dalton. Mr. Chairman, we learned some valuable
lessons from the hollow force that we experienced in the
seventies by extending deployments beyond their schedules. We
have learned that 6 months is about the right length of a
deployment. People come in the Navy and Marine Corps to deploy
and go to sea, but we also know that predictability is very
important to our people. If we leave for a 6-month deployment,
the expectation is that we are going to keep to that, and we
have an excellent record of keeping those deployments to 6
months.
Obviously, if the situation becomes aggravated and we need
to respond, then that is what we are there to do and we will do
what we need to do for the Nation. However, as things stand
today, we will make every effort to continue to meet those 6-
month deployments, and once our Sailors and Marines get home,
there is a 2 to 1 turnaround. They are home for a year before
they are asked to go back, and we give them the opportunity to
be at home for at least 50 percent of the time over a 5-year
period. This has worked well and is something our people like
and we have found is in the best interest of retention.
So, near term, we see no reason to change that. The current
situation does not call for a change.
COST OF PERSIAN GULF DEPLOYMENTS
Mr. Young. Mr. Secretary, the Speaker has organized a group
in the House of certain Members who deal with national defense,
national security issues, to meet with Secretary Albright,
Secretary Cohen, Mr. Berger, and General Shelton. And we have
had several meetings in the last couple of weeks. And one of
the questions that I keep raising at these meetings is the cost
of the deployment to the Gulf region. No one has been able to
give us any kind of an answer on what the costs might be,
whether we bomb Saddam or whether we just stay in the area.
Can you give us any idea what the additional costs will be
to the Navy and the Marine Corps for this deployment?
Secretary Dalton. Mr. Chairman, deploying for 6 months at a
time is what we do. As the CNO pointed out, those carriers are
in a 2.0 presence in the Gulf today. If they were not there,
they would be someplace else, in the Med or the western
Pacific.
So one of the things that we talk about is the fact that
when you approve our budget, with that sticker price includes
our ability to deploy and be forward--have a forward presence
and get the job done.
Obviously, if we are extending beyond our plan, there is
going to be additional costs. To date, that is not a problem,
but it certainly could be a problem if we have to surge
forward, as the CNO indicated, and send more of our people to
sea earlier. We would expend more resources, in which case we
would be addressing our needs in a supplemental request.
Mr. Young. So I think what you are telling me is that
because the Navy and Marine Corps are basically a deployable
force at any given time, peace or no peace, that unless you
start to use up a lot of ammunition and fire a lot of missiles
and do a lot of things like this, that you are not going to be
the big cost to the deployment; it will be another service?
Secretary Dalton. Well, Mr. Chairman, there are marginal
costs associated with this, and let me ask the CNO to address
that.
Admiral Johnson. Well, just to follow on what the Secretary
said, as you know, for instance, with our ships, sir, we
program 50.5 steaming days per quarter. That is the sticker
price, if you will. At the present time, given the circumstance
in the Gulf, we are steaming those ships at a rate nominally
between 70 and 75 days a quarter. So there is, indeed, a
marginal cost increase for that level of operation, even though
it is in the bounds of the 6-month deployment and all that we
have talked about before. So there will be some incremental
costs.
If you ask for a specific figure, I could tell you today it
is about $130 million, but that is a very soft number. We will
provide you specifics as things evolve, and we will give that
to you for the record, sir.
[The information follows:]
The Navy's budget for FY 1998 included funding to operate one
Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) for three quarters of the year and one
Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG) in the Arabian Gulf for about one half
of the year (189 days). The increased cost associated with operating
two CVBGs and one ARG for the remainder of the year is estimated to be
$209 million. This includes increased levels of flying and steaming
($150 million), transportation and equipment ($31 million), and
additional military personnel costs ($28 million) for imminent danger
pay and reservist activation. This estimate is included in the
Department of the Navy's portion of the Emergency Supplemental request
currently before Congress.
Mr. Young. Okay. Thank you very much.
Mr. Dicks.
RECRUITING
Mr. Dicks. Again, I want to welcome you. I noticed in
Secretary Dalton's statement, that the Navy is having a problem
with recruiting. In the first 2 months of 1998, Navy recruiting
accessed only 91 percent of goal. If that trend continues
through fiscal year 1998, it may lead to an annual accession
goal shortfall of 4,000 personnel. I noticed the Marine Corps
doesn't seem to have that problem.
What are we trying to do about that?
Secretary Dalton. We are addressing that issue, Mr. Dicks.
As I mentioned in my statement, I think in large measure the
background for that problem is the strong economy. People are
finding jobs in the local area as opposed to considering
options that include the military service. Also the propensity
to enlist is down. When those of us here were growing up, we
had fathers, uncles, and relatives who had served in the
military. That number is much lower today and people don't have
role models to look to who have served. Those things have
caused the propensity to enlist to be lower.
However we have addressed this issue from the standpoint of
enhancing our advertising budget by some $15 million. We are
putting more recruiters in the field and supplying additional
funds for college funds, to offer educational opportunities.
Just recently, in February, I signed out letters to every high
school principal in the country that our local recruiters will
take to the high schools and present to the principals. The
letters show the opportunities for their high school graduates
who go into the Navy or Marine Corps. It is a personal one-on-
one approach to try to get us in doors that we have not been in
before.
I talked about individuals not having role models. Many of
our administrators in schools also don't have the same support
for our military in terms of offering or speaking out and
offering opportunities for those high school students.
One other initiative is we were asking newly promoted
admirals and generals to return to their high schools, present
the case of their own careers and explain how fulfilling their
careers have been in the Navy and Marine Corps, addressing
people that are sitting in the same seats where they sat
before. It is a good opportunity for them to show what a career
in the Navy and Marine Corps can be.
So we are attacking this. We recognize it is going to be a
challenge but I think we are addressing it and I feel good
about our approach.
Let me ask the CNO if you would like to expand on that.
Admiral Johnson. Only to add, sir, the Secretary said it
well, and I share his concerns. I am troubled by things like
this propensity to enlist. The last numbers I saw show a very
distinct trend line down to where the propensity for service is
in the 10 percent range, which is really low. So I think it is
a national concern that we all need to share.
We are working very hard, stabilizing the recruiting force.
We have great recruiters out there. We provide a quality
product for the sons and daughters that come aboard, but it is
a very challenging environment. I do not think that is going to
change. So we have got our work cut out for us.
F/A-18E/F AIRCRAFT
Mr. Dicks. Good.
Well, I encourage you to do everything you can. It sounds
like you are doing a lot.
The Navy has requested $3.2 billion for the F/A-18E/F, for
continued RDT&E and the purchase of 30 aircraft, which I
strongly support. I have been briefed on the wing drop issue,
and I know that Congressman Cunningham is our test pilot for
this subcommittee. I am convinced that the Navy is very close
to developing a fix to this problem that will not impact the
costs or schedule of the program. And I commend the Navy
leadership for its diligence and forthrightness on the matter.
The Navy has been experimenting with several, I think
three, different fixes to the wing drop problem. Has a decision
been made as to which one will be incorporated on the aircraft?
And if it hasn't, when will there be a decision made?
Secretary Dalton. Mr. Dicks, just to reemphasize just how
important this program is, it really is--the high priority for
this year's budget.
The program is doing well. As I said, it is on time, on
budget, underweight. We have the issue of the wing drop, which
I would like to ask the CNO to address, but first of all I want
to thank Congressman Cunningham for taking the time and going
down to fly that aircraft. It really shows great interest and
support and we are grateful to you, Mr. Cunningham.
Mr. Dicks. I am glad you didn't say ``courage,'' because
there might be an implication there was something wrong.
Secretary Dalton. It was a completely safe flight. I think
he will be happy to address that. But let me ask the CNO to
speak to that.
Admiral Johnson. The specific answer, Mr. Dicks, is that we
believe the pathway now is taking us to the wingdrop solution.
We are marching forward with a combination of flight tests,
fluid dynamics, wind tunnel testing and an independent blue
ribbon panel verification to lock all of that in by 12 March at
the Navy program review.
That is when we will have this. We believe it will be done
and gone away then. It will be within budget. There won't be
any impact to the program and we will be off and running again.
It is a very solid program.
Mr. Dicks. Now, we have all had our problems with the GAO.
Sometimes we like what they say, sometimes we don't. GAO has
alleged, and I understand that a lot of their information is
outdated, in addition to the wing drop problem, the aircraft is
faced with other problems including signature, cost, engine
capability, and the ability of the aircraft to properly
dispense munitions. Now I have seen nothing in the briefings I
have received to substantiate any of the GAO claims.
In your judgment, is there any validity to these charges or
could you at least give us, for the record an answer to what
the GAO has alleged about the F/A-18E/F?
Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. Any comments you want to make now?
Admiral Johnson. There are no show stoppers in there, no
surprises. We opened everything we had to the GAO. They were
with our folks for months putting that product together. So we
will provide you, as we are doing right now, a point by point
explanation, if you will, of the issues that arose.
[The information follows:]
The following information is the Department of Defense (DoD)
response to the General Accounting Office (GAO) draft report, ``NAVAL
AVIATION: F/A-18E/F Development and Production Issues,'' dated January
8, 1998 (GAO Code 707258/OSD Case 1517).
1. WING DROP (PAGE 10).--GAO States: ``To Navy and Boeing
officials, wing drop is the most challenging technical risk to the F/A-
18E/F program. The deficiency has been classified by Boeing and the
Program Risk Advisory Board (PRAB) as a medium technical, schedule, and
cost risk to the low rate production phase of the E/F program. Program
officials consider it a high risk deficiency.''
DoD Response: The PRAB had consistently classified wing drop as
medium risk and considers it equal to other medium-risk items. The
December PRAB reclassified wing drop as ``high'', reflecting the fact
that no single wing modification at that time had completely resolved
the problem. The second Blue Ribbon Panel, which met in January 1998,
indicated that a variety of promising solutions were identified that
mitigate the wing drop problem. All are relatively minor changes to the
basic wing and do not involve redesign of the wing box. The Panel
stated that there is considerable risk that all of the essential tests
(needed to determine the optimum configuration and assess performance
impacts) cannot be completed by the ``target completion date'' of March
1, 1998, and recommended extending future tests to investigate some
additional potential fixes. The panel erroneously considered March 1,
1998, to be a milestone date for resolution of the wing drop problem.
The Department is confident that a cost-effective solution to wing drop
will be demonstrated and validated on a schedule permitting a timely
decision on additional production aircraft.
2. NEW TECHNOLOGY (PAGE 14).--GAO States: ``The ITT (Integrated
Test Team) has documented new technology anomalies that could
negatively affect the new technology features to be incorporated into
the aircraft. Boeing and the Navy have stated that there is currently
no definitive answer as to the impact these changes will have on the
reduced radar cross section of the E/F. They believe that the F/A-18E/F
will have unacceptable operational test and evaluation results if the
fixes do not work. However, if the fixes do work, they need to be
included on the aircraft being produced under the first lot of low-rate
initial production, because these aircraft will be used for operational
test and evaluation. If these fixes are not included, it is likely that
operational evaluation will be unacceptable.''
DoD Response: The program is committed to implementing all required
LRIP aircraft fixes prior to operational test and evaluation.
Significant design margin in radar cross section (RCS), successful EMD
weapon system RCS specification tests, accurate signature predictions,
and the defects test data all support our conclusions.
Prior to the formulating of candidate modifications to solve the
wing drop problem, the F/A-18 E5 aircraft was flown on the RCS range to
dynamically measure in-flight RCS. F/A-18 E5 successfully passed the
RCS specification test. This demonstration occurred 16 months ahead of
schedule without any retesting required. F/A-18 E5 predicted signature
levels correlated extremely well with the measured flight test RCS
date. This same approach will be taken to investigate the RCS impacts
of any future revisions to the aircraft design. The effects of the
solution to the wing drop problem on RCS are under evaluation as that
solution is developed.
Using full scale models to evaluate the effect of defects to RCS
degradation has determined that the F/A-18E/F weapon system RCS overall
is very robust. Moderate degradation due to damaged or missing form in
place seals, radar absorbing material (RAM), blade seals, and trailing
edge boots can be tolerated without significant degradation to the
aircraft's RCS.
Forward fuselage and Aft/Center Fuselage RCS model degradation
testing has been completed. With the exception of the windshield
changes, (where the signature effects are mitigated with RAM and R-
card), none of the problems (seals, latches, special coatings)
referenced would result in a significant change to the aircraft
signature.
The materials and processes used to reduce the signature of the F/
A-18E/F aircraft have been very successful, and many advances have been
made over previous low observables aircraft.
Development and evaluation of F/A-18E/F during EMD have been
successful thus far. Simulation and analysis estimates of aircraft
signature have been borne out well in flight testing. Consequently,
there is confidence that these predictive tools will help resolve any
RCS issues that might arise as a result of incorporating solutions to
the wing drop problem.
3. F/A-18E/F COST ESTIMATE (PAGE 19).--GAO Stated: ``The Navy has
consistently maintained that the F/A-18E/F will be developed and
produced within the cost estimates established for the program.
However, certain key assumptions on which F/A-18E/F cost estimates were
based have been overcome by events. These assumptions related to such
things as: no unanticipated issues during the development program; the
number of aircraft to be bought, in total and on an annual basis; the
ratio of the ``E'' and ``F'' models to the total number of aircraft to
be bought; and inflation factors to be used in projecting future year
costs.''
DoD Response: The F/A-18E/F development cost goal is $4.88 billion
in (FY90$). The current F/A-18E/F budget is $48 million (FY90$) below
the goal. The Department considers that sufficient margin remains for
technical issues now being addressed, including wing drop.
4. COST (PAGE 5) GAO States: ``The Navy's F/A-18E/F unit
procurement cost estimates are understated. These cost estimates were
based on what has become unrealistically high quantities of E/F
aircraft that will be bought; the Navy's not factoring not factoring in
the cost effect of its decision to buy more of the higher cost F models
than was factored into the original cost estimates; and unrealistically
low out-year inflation factors for aircraft to be purchased in the
later years. More realistic assumptions indicate that, although the
total procurement cost will decrease, the F/A-18E/F unit cost will be
more than the Navy currently estimates,''
DoD Response: The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Cost
Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) conducted an independent review of
program cost estimates in March 1997. Their results were within 1% of
the program office budget estimate for Engineering and Manufacturing
Development (EMD), 6% for production, and 3% for operations and
support. In accordance with Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) direction,
program quantity was reduced from 1000 to a minimum of 548 aircraft
with a reduction in total program cost of $21.7 billion (FY97$). As
expected, the unit procurement cost of the aircraft increased. The
decision in FY97 to replace F-14s with the F/A-18F (two seat model) was
accounted for in the CAIG's estimates as well as the program office
estimate. The President's Budget prepared by the program office and
submitted by OSD reflected the increased quantities of ``F''s and the
reduction in total number of aircraft. The Department agrees with the
related unit procurement cost change to $64 million (FY97$). The
program cost estimate shows differences with the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) projection of $73.1 million (FY97$). These differences are
seen in the CBO projection of support costs where they use historical
F/A-18C/D numbers. The F/A-18E/F estimates takes advantage of projected
F/A-18C/D commonality savings.
5. ENGINE CHALLENGES (PAGE 14).--GAO States: ``The Program Risk
Advisory Board has identified engine-related issues, including engine
warm-up time required before carrier launch, partial engine flameouts
during some flight tests, visible engine smoke, and engine failures
during flight.''
DoD Response: Engine warm up. Potential solutions for this problem
have been identified and include Full Authority Digital Engine Control
(FADEC) software changes, as well as hardware rework to eliminate ``W''
seal leakage. Testing is being conducted on engines at General Electric
and Patuxent River in January 1998 to verify potential solutions. The
solutions will be incorporated in OT-IIB flight test engines, as well
as all production engines.
Flameouts. Partial flameouts have been detected by the FADEC during
some throttle transients on engines equipped with the ``low smoke''
combustor. These flameouts are not detected by the pilot and represent
no operational impact. The FADEC detected partial flameout results when
the flame at several lean-flowing nozzles momentarily goes out. The
flamed-out nozzles are quickly re-lit by the continued burning at
either the adjacent nozzles or the single rich flowing nozzle, as
designed. Potential solutions include revising the FADEC's flameout
detection algorithm or modifying the engine deceleration schedule in
the FADEC. These have been tested in ground tests and shown to be
effective.
Visible Engine Smoke. The visible engine exhaust issue has been
resolved for some time. Two ``low smoke'' combustor configured engines
have been flight tested and have demonstrated engine exhaust plume
visibility to be the same as, or better than, the F404 engine in the F/
A-18C/D.
Engine Failures. The F414 development program has encountered no
significant hardware failures beyond what is normally expected during
any development program. The only significant failure was a compressor
stator failure in November 1996. Analysis showed the cause to be a
design change incorporated into the stage 6 stator of some of the
flight test engines. All engines were retrofitted to the original
design with no subsequent problems. No further stage 6 failures have
been experienced with the original design stator.
6. WEAPON SEPARATION PROBLEMS (PAGE 16).--GAO States: ``In recent
flight tests during November and December 1997, bomb-to-bomb collisions
occurred when releasing certain weapons. In addition to the weapons
separations problem, recent tests have revealed that noise and
vibration may cause structural damage to stores being carried under the
wing. Currently, this problem is resulting in speed limitations on the
aircraft when carrying certain weapons.''
DoD Response: Weapons separation and bomb-to-bomb collision
challenges are a part of every aircraft designed to deliver air-to-
ground ordnance. These problems have been fixed through a combination
of towed pylons and stores release software (modifying minimum release
interval) incorporated into the Stores Management System. The issue of
noise and vibration is limited to the outboard pylon on each wing and
to the MK-83 Conical Fin Assembly, which is susceptible to fatigue
cracks in a very narrow Mach/altitude regime. This problem has been
mitigated through use of the BSU-85 bomb stabilizing unit fin with no
tactical impact. There are no current flight restrictions (speed or
altitude) in place or anticipated, and there is no tactical
significance associated with the minimum release interval adjustments.
7. HORIZONTAL STABILATOR DELAMINATIONS (PAGE 17).--GAO States: ``A
redesign of the horizontal stabilator for the low-rate initial
production aircraft was completed in October 1996 and is currently
undergoing testing. In November 1997, a delamination occurred during
testing of the redesigned stabilator. This resulted in a decision to
stop production pending completion of a review of the delamination
problem. Production is estimated to resume in February 1998.''
DoD Response: Since November 1997, additional coupon and element
testing with subsequent analysis has led to the conclusion that the
original EMD stabilator design with fasteners is capable of a full
flight envelope following a maximum load test. The EMD aircraft are in
the process of completing this test and the LRIP 1 aircraft that will
have the same design, will have stabilators tested prior to delivery.
For LRIP 2 and beyond, a slightly redesigned stabilator is now in full
scale test, to be completed this summer. When completed, this will
allow full flight envelope without the maximum load test. This plan has
negligible cost or schedule impact to the program.
8. VERTICAL TAIL DEFICIENCIES (PAGE 18).--GAO States: ``The F/A-
18E/F vertical tail has not been certified because it experienced
deficencies during testing early in the test cycle. This deficiency has
been classified by both Boeing and the PRAB as a medium technical risk
to the low-rate initial production phase of the F/A-18E/F program.''
DoD Response: The first failures experienced during testing were of
subsystem components. These components were installed in the test
article to achieve accurate mass representation of a fully assembled
tail. Certification of these components was not an objective of the
test, and technically the failures were non-relevant. The team treated
the failures as relevant and revised the design of these components
such that the stress level in each component and its mounting was at or
below the endurance level by analysis; that is, by analysis we now show
no flight hour restrictions on these items.
All components of the tail which completed the two lifetimes of
testing without failure are considered certified by test with no
additional substantiating analysis required. No new parts were added
during the second lifetime; therefore, all components that were
modified or added by the start of the second lifetime have undergone
one full lifetime of testing and are considered certified by test for
3,000 hours. Additional analyses, taking into account the failures
experienced during the first lifetime of fatigue testing, show that the
vertical tail redesign is good for 24,000 hours. This will be submitted
along with the final test report to certify the part meets the full
6,000-hour life requirement.
9. PERFORMANCE RESULTS IN BRIEF (PAGE 3).--GAO States: There are
numerous deficiencies relative to the aircraft's operational
performance, and that the most technically challenging is wing drop.
DoD Response: Finding discrepancies from predicted performance is
the purpose of flight testing. The F/A-18E/F is meeting or exceeding
all Key Performance Parameters called for in the Operational
Requirements Document (ORD).
10. RESULTS IN BRIEF (PAGE 4).--GAO States: ``In July 1997, a Navy
board that assesses risk areas in the E/F program stated that
operational testing may determine that the aircraft is not
operationally effective or suitable. According to program officials,
this assessment means that the F/A-18E/F may not be as capable in a
number of operational performance areas as the most recently procured
F/A-18C aircraft.''
DoD Response: the F/A-18E/F ORD defines performance requirements.
That document was revalidated by the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council (JROC) on March 7, 1997. Specific quantifiable parameters--such
as speed, acceleration, maneuvering energy (PS)--are used as
requirements. In other areas, a more subjective ``as good as or better
than AC/D'' is identified. The Program Risk Advisory Board (PRAB)
identified acceleration and PS in the ORD as key performance
parameters (KPPs) that are being met with margin, but are slightly less
than that of a F/A-18C/D, as potential risk factors. Trades made in
designing an overall more capable F/A-18E/F aircraft required
performance trades in certain areas. The OT-IIA operational assessment,
the first in which operational testers flew the E/F aircraft, found
that the slight reduction in acceleration and PS had no
significant tactical impact.
Mr. Cunningham. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Dicks. Yes, I yield.
F/A-18F TEST FLIGHT
Mr. Cunningham. First of all, Norm, I took the airplane up
to 45,000 feet in a pretty high angle of attack and they told
me to go to burner, to idle, to burner, and I said, no, because
if you do that in any other airplane you are going to flame the
thing out.
I had no engine problems and I went from idle to burner,
selected turn, yaw on the airplane, and the engines held. And
not only that, they outperformed the F/A-18C/D in every
circumstance; in climb, in acceleration, at different
altitudes. As a matter of fact, when I climbed to 45,000, I had
the C/D stay down below because I had to come home when the
other plane did and he had about 3 to 4,000 pounds less fuel
than I did by the end of that time. So we kept him.
But in all of those areas, in the engine drop--in the
weapons drop, what you do is, if you got that many stores and
they are dropping off, you want to make sure they don't
collide, especially if they are electrically fused. All you do
is take your accelerometer and you delay, different delays on
those things coming off. And then you have to do the study when
you hit the target, does that affect, you know, the PK or the
kill probability of the target and stuff. They are working on
addressing those issues.
But I want to tell you that I flew--and for the Committee,
every airplane going through the test cycle, for example, the
F-5 when I tested it, had something called inverted pitch hang-
up. I mean you couldn't do that in a wind tunnel. It still has
it, but you know about it. It is no problem. The F-16 hit deep
stall condition. They lost some airplanes with that.
I tested that airplane with the F-110 engine because it had
a further FCG. They put an NPO switch in the thing to control
it.
I have flown a lot of airplanes in test scenarios and I
have never come back with one that I was so pleased with. And
you know how strong I am on the F-14?
Mr. Dicks. Right.
Mr. Cunningham. I would rather fly the F-18F than the F-14.
Mr. Lewis. Did you get your flight pay?
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Dicks.
Mr. Lewis.
Mr. Lewis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, gentlemen.
Mr. Young. Excuse me just a minute, Mr. Lewis. I just want
to say it is not every chairman that has his own test pilot to
send out on missions like this, and we are real pleased to have
Duke. And his report when he came back from that flight was
very, very optimistic.
Mr. Cunningham. Can I move up a few chairs?
Mr. Young. Mr. Lewis.
VISITS TO HIGH SCHOOLS
Mr. Lewis. Admiral Johnson, what is your high school?
Admiral Johnson. I went to West Salem High School in
Louisana.
Mr. Lewis. I wanted to follow up on the Secretary's earlier
comments when he said that the recruiters were going out to
their high schools.
Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir. I was the guest speaker at the
high school graduation last year. It was one of the biggest
thrills of my life.
Mr. Lewis. You and General Krulak are the kind of symbol we
need out there to encourage those people to sign up, so I am
excited to hear about your efforts.
Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir.
IMPACT OF BOSNIA AND PERSIAN GULF DEPLOYMENTS
Mr. Lewis. Bosnia seems to be with us forever, and combined
with the recent buildup in the Persian Gulf, raises questions
about the Navy and the Marine Corps having adequate equipment
and personnel resources to fulfill their share of the current
national security commitments. Can you both comment on that,
Bosnia and the Persian Gulf?
Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir.
Secretary Dalton. Sir, we feel very positive about where we
are with the Navy and Marine Corps. Our men and women are
working hard and doing a great job and this committee and this
Congress have been very supportive of our request. We are
getting the job done.
Our troops that are forward deployed, our Sailors and
Marines are ready and they are on capable platforms. They are
well trained and are getting the job done. So I feel very good
about where we are today and where we are going.
Obviously, as I mentioned in my statement, those forward-
deployed forces are doing well. We have some challenges with
respect to readiness of those that are not out there, ready to
go, and the CNO, the Commandant, and I are addressing those.
Let me ask them to expand on that.
Admiral Johnson. I would add, sir, that the nondeployed
side of our lives is where the focus of effort is being placed
right now. That gets back to your point on adequate resourcing
and it gets to the readiness aspect.
You know that the Navy and the Marine Corps, by the nature
of our rotational business, we work ourselves up to a
deployment level of readiness and then when we come back from
that deployment, we step off the readiness, by design, and then
work ourselves back up.
I describe that as a bathtub. And if you picture that
bathtub in your mind, what we are really seeing on the
nondeployed side of our lives is that the bathtub, in readiness
terms, is getting deeper and the climb out comes later and it
is steeper. We get back to the readiness we need for
deployment, but it is challenging to do that. That is why we
have reshaped ourselves in the Quadrennial Defense Review. That
is why we have taken the investment that we are saving by the
reshape and putting it into the operating and maintenance and
manpower accounts to fix that.
General Krulak. Sir, let me answer. There is no single
Service, nor a Service Chief, who appreciates this Committee
more than the Marine Corps and Chuck Krulak, because without
your support, certainly over the last years that I have been
the Commandant, our position and our posture would be far worse
than it is now.
I agree with both the Secretary and the CNO regarding our
readiness of the forward deployed forces. It is top notch. I
reiterate what I have said now for the third time in front of
this committee: We are underfunded in procurement. Because of
that underfunding, we have systems, whether it is the AAV or
whether it is a generator, whether it is the truck, whether it
is a HMMWV, that are beyond their service life. As a result,
the bathtub that the CNO so well described is there in spades
for us. The Marine works 18 hours a day, the lights are never
off in the hangar bays, they are never off in the maintenance
bays, and we must solve the procurement shortfall.
We have taken some big steps. I think you see it reflected
in this budget that is on the Hill as a result of the QDR. We
have been able to raise our procurement. We are still a half a
billion dollars short of where we need to be.
Mr. Lewis. Mr. Secretary, both gentlemen have responded but
I am not sure they took us right to the heart of my question.
We have ongoing presence in two very serious locations. Bosnia
does seem to go on forever. I would like to have you be a
little more specific about what deficiencies you see in the
Navy and the Marine Corps forces in view of this present
circumstance.
General Krulak. I think that those, from the Marine
standpoint, for those that are both in the Gulf and are
participating in the Bosnia situation, they are forward-
deployed forces and they are ready to go. It is, again, what
happens to them when they come back; and that is this issue of
can we get them back on the step, get their equipment back up
and get them ready to go for the next contingency.
It gets tougher every year. I think the Navy would feel the
same way.
Admiral Johnson. And I think the other thing I would add,
Mr. Lewis, from a slightly different angle, is to reiterate the
point that because our focus of effort right now for the
carriers and the battle groups and the amphibious ready groups,
as Chuck described is in the Arabian Gulf, we are unable to
service the requirement in the Mediterranean and some of the
other theaters. So there is a cost there, if you will.
UNFUNDED BUDGET PRIORITIES
Mr. Lewis. Let me follow up just one line that relates to
the same question. Secretary Dalton, would you describe for the
Committee the Department of the Navy's top unfunded priorities
and why the fiscal year 1999 budget is not sufficient in those
areas?
Secretary Dalton. Mr. Lewis, if I could take that for the
record, I would appreciate it, sir.
Mr. Lewis. Can you give us anything on the record at this
point?
Secretary Dalton. I don't know of anything off the top of
my head, sir. This budget, as I indicated in my statement, is a
solid plan. Obviously, there are constrained resources with
which we are dealing. This body has made it clear they wanted
to balance the budget and we support that. However, with that,
you can't do everything you might like to do. But this is a
solid plan. It reflects our priorities that are expressed and
we think--we ask for your support of this budget. We think it
will get us where we need to be. With respect to any shortfall,
nothing occurs to me but I would be happy to review it and
respond for the record.
[The information follows:]
The Department of the Navy's top priorities have not changed in
recent years. Readiness, quality of life and modernization issues
remain our highest priorities, in that order. In prioritizing our
fiscal year 1999 funding the Department has dedicated the resources
needed to maintain a high level of readiness and sustainability, thus
allowing more realistic and stable commitments to the capabilities
needed to defeat future threats.
With that in mind, I would first stress that I do consider our
budget sufficient in all these areas. There are always, however,
instances where more resources would be beneficial. The Chief of Naval
Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps have developed lists of
their top unfunded priorities. I support their views. However, I wish
to emphasize that our fiscal year 1999 budget request is finely
balanced and our first priority is to get the budget approved as
submitted, including the amendment for contingency operations. We can
not afford general reductions and don't desire priority changes. Any
additional funds over and above that could be applied to the priorities
provided by my Service Chiefs.
Mr. Lewis. Well, Mr. Secretary, let me say that there is
one responsibility that we have relative to the Federal
Government's role and that is securing our national defense.
You share that with us.
Secretary Dalton. Absolutely.
Mr. Lewis. But we need to know up front and in clear terms
where the deficiencies are, for it is my own personal view that
we have gone way beyond the pale relative to shortfalls and
this Committee certainly should not be hesitant to discuss
those shortfalls with us. I know that you are not, but, you
know, this is the first hearing, not the last hearing of the
year. Some of them will be open, some of them will not. We will
be coming back this afternoon, I presume, Mr. Chairman, and
maybe we can discuss some of these things further. Thank you
for the time.
Mr. Young. We will have a closed session this afternoon on
acquisition.
Mr. Lewis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Skeen.
Mr. Skeen. I yield my turn, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Okay. Mr. Bonilla.
V-22 AIRCRAFT
Mr. Bonilla. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen,
good morning.
General Krulak, I would like to start out, if I could, with
a question about the V-22 because you talk about the benefits--
--
General Krulak. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bonilla. Of having accelerated production.
General Krulak. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bonilla. And the upcoming budget proposes a budget
reduction in procurement from last year's appropriated levels.
So my question is: Isn't that the wrong request? Shouldn't we
continue to have accelerated production of the V-22?
General Krulak. Sir, as a result of the QDR, I think you
are aware we are, in fact, increasing the numbers of V-22s over
the FYDP. We are getting a plus-up of 11. We reach at FY 04 the
mark of 30 a year. This particular year is a very tough one. We
did the very best we can, but if you see, we have, in fact, put
the money against a very good ramp that will take us, as I
indicated, in 04, to 30 a year.
I look at the V-22 almost like the Phoenix that has arisen
from the ashes multiple times. And so to be honest, I am really
excited about this. I wish we could go quicker, but I think
that it is a credit to the administration, the Congress, that
in fact we are now seeing this remarkable capability finally
entering and finally with full support.
Mr. Bonilla. Well, I appreciate your comments about the V-
22 and, as I have stated on this subcommittee before, I am
highly suspicious of the QDR and that the agenda was set out in
the beginning. It was kind of a veiled, disguised effort to
just cut even further into the bone of the military, and I want
to make sure that we are doing the right thing for you and what
you need.
General Krulak. Yes, sir. I will share that both the
Secretary of the Navy and myself went down and sat down with
the Secretary of Defense on this very issue, and we were able
to articulate the case and, in fact, this was one of the shifts
of dollars within the QDR that the Secretary made. And we are
excited about it.
RECRUITING ISSUES
Mr. Bonilla. General, thank you.
Secretary Dalton, I am always so proud to see what you are
doing for the Navy, with the Navy. As a fellow San Antonian, it
gives me great pleasure to see the success that you have
enjoyed as Secretary of the Navy.
Secretary Dalton. Thank you very much, Mr. Bonilla.
Mr. Bonilla. You are very welcome.
I would like to just address a question here for you,
Secretary, today. I noticed your comments in your letters that
you are writing to high school principals, and I think it is a
good idea, and I just would urge you to consider doing this in
some of the more rural areas as well. The areas that I
represent, as you know, go all the way to the Mexican border
and out to El Paso and you know our territory down there. There
are a lot of good people that are looking for opportunity, very
patriotic, and the principals out there might be good avenues
to go down to get to some of those young people that are
looking for opportunities to serve their country.
Secretary Dalton. Absolutely, Mr. Bonilla. Our plan is to
have one of those packages in the hands of every high school
principal in the country and have one of our recruiters present
it personally to them and express that. And I would like to
show you one of these packages. I really do think it is a
first-class package. It shows opportunities for education, for
responsibility early in one's career, for travel, for
management opportunities early, the things that should
challenge young men and women to experience this adventure and
opportunity in the Navy and Marine Corps. I think it is
something that really will help us and I would like present one
of these to each member of the Committee so you will what we
are presenting to principals throughout the country.
INTERSERVICE RIVALRY
Mr. Bonilla. I appreciate that, Secretary.
I would like to move now to a question about interservice
rivalry because we have been hearing rumblings that we are not
going to have as much of an ability for the Air Force to set up
over in the mid-East as we would like, but that perhaps the
interservice rivalry has affected decisions at the Pentagon as
to what the right direction is going to be. I mean, if we have
to rely on our carriers and our Navy aircraft, so be it. I
mean, I am a huge fan of the Navy and the Air Force. We have
got to do what is right and I just want to be reassured by
those of you here today that we are not going to inject some
fairness in this to make somebody happy. We have got to do the
right thing for our country's Armed Services in that part of
the world. Period, end of story.
Secretary Dalton. Mr. Bonilla, we agree with you. I think
the spirit of jointness that is in the Pentagon is indeed real.
I sense it in dealing with my counterparts and I know that the
service chiefs do with theirs. I think this particular
situation was one where we didn't need anyone's permission to
sail ships in international waters in order to bring power and
to show our resolve. I think that what we experienced was that
some of the nations in the area were not as forthcoming with
giving us the opportunity to launch aircraft from their soil as
we might have liked. I think that we are likely to continue to
see that sort of thing in the future, because there is a spirit
of nationalism that is taking place around the world. I think
it just reemphasizes the importance of having those platforms
of 4\1/2\ acres of American territory that can be moved
anywhere, anytime, expeditiously, and get the job done for the
American people. But we clearly work well with our other
services and there is indeed a spirit of cooperation and
jointness to get the job done for the American people.
Mr. Bonilla. I appreciate that, Secretary.
Just a closing comment. I know I share a lot of the
sentiment on this Committee. We want to give you everything--
all of the resources you need to do your job. I know it has
been tough in recent years, but just rest assured there are a
lot of us and you have a lot of support in this Congress for
what you are doing.
Secretary Dalton. Well, thank you very much and we
appreciate that support very much.
Mr. Young. Mr. Bonilla, thank you very much.
Mr. Sabo, would you mind if we went to Mr. Visclosky next?
Mr. Sabo. No. That is fine.
Mr. Young. He has a conflicting schedule this morning and
does have some important questions. So if you have no
objection, Mr. Visclosky, you are recognized.
NAPALM DISPOSAL
Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
And, Mr. Secretary, I would preface my remarks by
indicating that I am not angry at you, but I am at my wit's end
and I am furious at the United States Navy.
I used to represent the First Congressional District of
Indiana. I now represent Napalm USA.
I have had in my local papers articles about a factual
Apocalypse Now. I have had headlines in my papers about my
county commissioners joining opposition to the napalm disposal
program in the First Congressional District of Indiana: Napalm
Foes Get Support from County.
I have had to answer questions in my office because press
conferences have been held and allegations made that Battelle
Corporation, who was hired as one of the consultants in the
Napalm disposal program, was involved in government-sanctioned
human radiation experiments and appears to have secured the
contract because of long-standing ties to the Department of
Energy. I spent the better part of a day answering questions to
my constituents about why I am allowing a company which allowed
the radiation experiments on human beings to make a decision to
have napalm brought to my congressional district.
I have editorials from all of my local papers, talking
about how the residents of my district deserve an honest answer
from the Navy about napalm, and I could go on.
Wanting to show that I am on your side, as far as the
public perception of my district, let me just read some more
headlines. These are relatively random samplings from the last
8 to 9 weeks of my life:
Visclosky to Explain Support For Napalm Recycling in East
Chicago, Indiana.
Visclosky Says Napalm Recycling Will Be Safe.
Visclosky Satisfied Napalm Recycling Will Be Safe.
One of my favorites: Visclosky Endorses Napalm Plan.
Another one of my favorite ones: Indiana Congressman
Accepts Napalm.
That warms my heart.
NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS
I found out that the Navy is going to recycle napalm in
East Chicago, Indiana, because a colleague of mine from
Illinois held a press conference during the Christmas holidays.
No one had the courtesy from the Department of the Navy to
inform one of the constituents I represent, one of the public
officials in any of the communities affected, and they had no
courtesy in informing me ahead of time.
The Navy's plan here was to begin to recycle napalm in East
Chicago, Indiana, and then tell somebody about it. And I would
suggest, Mr. Secretary, that napalm, that one word, is a flash
point.
COMMUNICATION WITH LOCAL COMMUNITIES
I have had many briefings from the Navy in the last 8 weeks
since I was surprised about this issue, about the process
involved. The image the average constituent I represent has of
this plan is, first of all, that the Navy who is storing this
napalm in the State of California looked for some place to dump
it. They are going to dump it in the First District. They are
going to bring a train with 100 train carloads of bombs into
East Chicago, Indiana, park it on a side rail and dump it
there.
Now, you know, everybody at the Navy knows and I know that
is not true. It is true in my district because that is the
image that was allowed to be connoted by Members of Congress
who jumped you and the Navy and me.
I have press secretaries for other Members of Congress in
other States talking about the reason why they are so involved
is their Members' conscience doesn't stop at the Indiana State
line, implying that I have no conscience in this matter.
The question of environmental justice and environmental
racism has been brought up because the facility is in a
minority a community, large Hispanic population, a large black
population.
I hate to take people's time but I am furious. Here is the
Navy's response to that very, very sincere, heartfelt,
frightened outrage of those constituents.
The Navy's response is, the EO12891, 11 February 1994,
generally requires Federal agencies to achieve environmental
justice, EJ, as part of their missions to the greatest extent
practical and to establish policy to achieve this purpose.
Pursuant to the EO, the DOD issued a strategy of EJ on 24 March
1995. The strategy focuses on ensuring a healthy and safe
environment around DOD installations that are located in or
near minority and low-income populations. With respect to
CERCLA response actions, neither EO nor the strategy focuses on
the effects of shipping CERCLA substances via railroad to
permitted treatment facilities. One assumes this is because the
substances being shipped have already been approved by the
appropriate agencies for transportation and treatment by the
permitted agencies. And as part of those permitting processes,
the permitting agencies are generally responsible for assuring
public participation in making decisions as to the list of
chemicals that permitted entities may accept, and for making
proper land use decisions.
Nevertheless, the CERCLA off-site policy did require the
Navy to check PCI's compliance record with EPA Region 5 and the
Indiana Department of Environmental Management. These agencies
reviewed their records and concurred that PCI's compliance
record was such that the shipment of Navy CERCLA substances was
permissible.
What made me furious was, first of all, it is
unintelligible to the constituents I represent. It is
unintelligible to me. The Navy faxed me this so I could send it
out to the media. So that I could send it out to the media. And
then the media calls me and says, what does it mean? And the
Navy won't return their calls. The Navy won't return their
calls.
CONTACT WITH LOCAL COMMUNITIES
The Navy has been, one, just absolutely insensitive. It has
been absolutely nonresponsive here. We have asked for a public
education program. I asked the Navy to come out, and they came
out. They did four public hearings, one in Chicago, one south
side Chicago, two in my district, at my request. They didn't
think to do it. I had to request it. But they did it, and I
appreciated that.
You had a large number of white males come in and give a
very detailed technical analysis of this situation, and people
whose opinion I trust, public officials and others who were in
the crowd, who are reasonably neutral on the issue, said that
that is all it was. There wasn't a shred of sensitivity given
to the people of this community. The fact is, there are a host,
because of the industrial history of that area, of recycling
facilities and companies people that have hazardous materials,
and toxic substances. They closed the Indiana toll road within
the last 18 months because of a hazard spill they had at
another recycling facility in this same neighborhood. We closed
the Indiana toll road. People are scared to death.
The Navy said they are going to engage in a public
relations campaign. We are creating a World Web Site where the
public can obtain information on this project. And hey, that is
great. But the people who are most frightened, who live by that
plant, they don't have enough money to pay the electric bill.
They don't have any computers. They don't have access to the
Internet. computers.
CONTACT WITH PUBLIC OFFICIALS
I have repeatedly asked the Navy, as part of their public
relations, to go see people like Mr. Lipinski, Mr. Jackson, Mr.
Davis, Mr. Rush, Mr. Weller, every member of the Illinois
delegation; the Illinois senators who are opposed to this
program. My staff had a stack of press calls because the Navy
sent out a press release and then they refused to return
reporters' calls. My office is answering their calls.
I asked the Navy, given people's concern, would you
consider stationing one of your personnel at this facility for
these 2 years? Not as a hostage, because you have committed
that this is a safe process, but to show that you are not just
worried about this situation today and tomorrow but that when
it is dumped in East Chicago, Indiana, there is going to be
somebody there because they care. They are going to be there,
and they are going to be making sure this is a safe process.
The Navy should have to do that.
The Navy, by law, had to hold a public meeting in
California, and I appreciate their doing it. But they didn't
have to hold one in Indiana. I think in a situation like this
where it is just apparent that this is going to be a
controversial issue, that the Navy gets ahead of the curve; the
Navy goes out of their way to be sensitive; the Navy goes out
of their way to hold public hearings; the Navy goes out of
their way to be accessible to people, especially in Indiana.
The Army has a good program as far as involvement and
outreach and mobile units as far as their chemical weapons
disposal program. They have information repositories. They hold
fairs, festivals, public meetings, speaking engagements, media
inquiries, outreach offices. It wasn't enough they have a
mobile unit.
Mr. Secretary, I hate to take the Committee's time and,
again, I respect you and I am not angry personally at you. I am
furious at the Navy, furious at the Navy, and I have nowhere
else to go but you. Thank you.
Mr. Young. We will let the witnesses respond first, Mr.
Cunningham.
NAVY GOALS
Secretary Dalton. Congressman, our goal is certainly to be
responsive and to be sensitive on matters such as this. Our
goal is to safely, permanently and responsibly remove and
recycle napalm. We perhaps have not done everything--obviously
we have not done what you would like for us to do but I know
that we have held hearings in the area. I know that Under
Secretary Hultin and Assistant Secretary Pirie have worked with
your office and I understand have had conversations with you
about this over the period of time. We have been working with
the Department of Energy. As a result of some of the issues
that were raised and that you mentioned, I asked our Inspector
General to review the situation with respect to the company
that was involved.
In addition to having our own Inspector General review the
issue, I have also asked the Department of Energy to review the
matter because they are the ones that actually made the
engagement with Battelle and specifically with Pollution
Control Industries.
But obviously you are unhappy, and I understand that. We
would be happy to work with you to try to have your
constituents advised of what we are doing. I think there is a
misperception of napalm being more than it is. We know that it
is, indeed, less volatile than gasoline and it is not dangerous
to transport but there is a misperception. We certainly want
and would be happy to work with you to educate your
constituents with regard to the situation. And I pledge to you
that we will do that.
Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Secretary, your answer is not responsive
to my question and my statement. I don't want the Navy to work
with the Department of Energy anymore. I want them to work with
my community.
I don't want the Department of the Navy to work with
Battelle anymore. I want them to work with my local public
officials. I want them to go see Mr. Lipinski, I want them to
go see Mr. Jackson. I want them to go see Senator Durbin. I
want them to go see Senator Moseley-Braun. I want them to see
John Porter and and Jerry Weller. I want them to see those
public officials. I want them to sit down with my county
commissioners. I don't want them working with the Department of
Energy anymore. I don't want you working with my office
anymore. I have my own job to do. I have my own press to deal
with. I am tired of answering questions about radiation
experiments.
Battelle can do that, the Navy can do that. I don't want to
do that anymore. The Navy has not done what you said they have
done. They have not done that. They held four public
informational meetings at my request, and I am telling you the
two that took place in East Chicago were not sensitive to the
emotions and the fears of the people in that community. It was
not clearly conducive to convincing my county commissioners,
who then passed a resolution in opposition to my position,
saying that, hey, we are taking this all the way to the top.
Those county commissioners, elected public officials in my home
county, were at that meeting and the Navy did such a swell job
of public relations that they convinced them that they have got
to go to the State of Indiana for relief because the Navy is
not going to provide them any and that I am not because I
invited the Navy in.
Don't misunderstand me. I am not opposed to this. I have
just read you all the headlines where I am on your side--I am
your guy. I am your guy. All I do at home is tell people why we
are bringing this two-thirds of the way across the country from
the State of California. Why don't you do it there? And I tell
them, and I go through the whole process.
You have never gotten ahead of the curve here. And I--and
if anybody here can tell me you have talked to any of that
Chicago delegation in the last 3 or 4 days like they said they
were going to do, just correct me right now.
Secretary Dalton. I have spoken with Senator Durbin.
Mr. Visclosky. There you go.
Secretary Dalton. You said I hadn't, and I have spoken with
him.
Mr. Visclosky. Okay. There you go.
Secretary Dalton. But as I said a minute ago, I would be
happy to work with you and your constituents to try to explain
what we are doing and how we are doing it and I am pledging to
you, sir, cooperation. I really don't want to be combative. I
would like to be cooperative.
TIMING OF DISPOSAL PROCESS
Mr. Visclosky. The final question is on the timing. I was
told by the Navy that they would start the process in early
March to mid-March. I have been told by the people at the plant
that is not true, and that the Navy has been telling them that
since last September, and that this is going to spill over
until April, May or June before any of those substances or the
canisters are going to arrive in East Chicago. I have been told
that within the next 2 weeks this process is going to start.
The people at the plant in my district tell me that is not
true. I would like to know is the plant correct or incorrect?
Secretary Dalton. I will respond for the record. I don't
want to give you inaccurate information in terms of when it is
going to start.
[The information follows:]
While I do not have an exact date for the first shipment's arrival,
the Navy will continue to be the most accurate source of information
and dates on this project. Facts and dates on the project will be
provided to all interested members and the public through various media
when available. As of February 25, 1998 cannisters were scheduled to
begin processing in early March with the first shipment occurring
approximately seven days later, barring unforeseen circumstances or
events.
Mr. Visclosky. I appreciate that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Nethercutt, would you have any objection if
we go to Mr. Cunningham for his time at this point?
Mr. Nethercutt. No objection.
Mr. Young. As much as he has an interest in this same
issue?
Mr. Nethercutt. No, I have no objection.
Mr. Young. Mr. Cunningham.
Mr. Cunningham. I will discuss this issue, and I will hold
the other questions that I have.
I think all of us empathize with the gentleman from
Indiana. This is not my district, but it is North County. It is
in Mr. Packard's district where this is coming from. And there
is a difference between a perception and a reality, that the
perception within the community of this stuff is it is
dangerous, it is going to be bad, but he needs help with
convincing his people the reality.
We all know the value of the press and how they whip people
up to sell newspapers and a lot of miscommunications.
I wish we could have done it right in California, too.
Unfortunately, this body, just like Ward Valley on EPA rules
and different things, we have gotten so extreme that we prevent
ourselves from doing the things that are smart. The extreme
environmentalists have shut us down from doing a lot of that
stuff, but I empathize with the gentleman. And some of the
things that are the actual facts on this, it wasn't the Navy,
it was the Department of Energy, since they have the expertise
in getting rid of hazardous material, made this selection in an
open bid. It was a fair and open bid.
VENDOR SELECTION
Secondly, the company, a fact that we need to get out, I
think, to your constituents, was given a clean bill of health.
You know, when you talk about the things way in the past, we
are talking now, no--there is a lot of things that happened in
the past with different companies, but I, myself, worked with
the individual. He is coming out of California. I am a
Californian. But when you are dealing with gas and getting rid
of gas, basically, and this company was deemed probably one of
the more appropriate to do that, even though I asked the same
question, why can't we just light this stuff off? It is gas. Of
course, the EPA would go nuts if you do that with clean air.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS
So maybe we need to think about clean air when we are
dropping it on foreign countries. But we are going to get rid
of it. There is a problem. It has been delayed since 1985.
And the other problem is, these canisters are leaking and--
some of the canisters are leaking, and it creates a problem to
the environment itself. And we need to dispose of it. But I
know the California delegation would be happy to work with you
on this and work with it. We will write letters to your editor
and work with the Secretary and whatever it takes.
Mr. Visclosky. I appreciate the gentleman's comment. And,
again, from the press, it is obvious that I have--you know, I
understand what the process is. The fact that we are not going
to use this as a weapon, I congratulate the government on that
decision, and I would congratulate the Navy, instead of burning
it up. I mean, that is the first thought that comes up.
This is a recycling process. I mean, you know, that is a
very positive story, and it has just absolutely been--that is
my frustration. I have been trying to hold the line, and I have
Members of this body and the other, on the other side of the
State line, who are not convinced. At some point, I am looking
for some assistance.
Mr. Cunningham. Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to state this.
I will yield back the balance of my time. Since I am in a lowly
low-level position down here, I will not usurp the others.
Mr. Lewis. Before you do that, if you would yield to me
just for a moment?
Mr. Cunningham. Yes.
WARD VALLEY NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL
Mr. Lewis. Mr. Visclosky, the gentleman mentioned a place
called Ward Valley, which is the recipient of low-level nuclear
waste that happens to be in my district, and you are just
exactly the kind of Member who probably did exactly what he
should have done relative to a national problem.
I will never forget the session with a cross-section of
people regarding Ward Valley, and when we were talking about
that disposal 14 years ago, I said, look, I know you are going
to be looking in my desert, and I know there are a lot of
impervious basins there. Very likely the location is going to
be somewhere in my district. Please don't expect me to be a
cheerleader. On the other hand, I am not going to demagogue the
issue. And the next I know--our State is a big one, but the
next thing I know, we have got people coming from other parts
of the States demagoging the issue, with no solution at the
other end. And frankly, you are suffering from what I call GGS.
The gentle word is good government stuff. But in the meantime,
if there is a way that some of us can help with this process, I
certainly would volunteer.
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you.
VIEWS OF CONGRESSMAN PACKARD
Mr. Young. Mr. Secretary, I have received a letter from
Congressman Ron Packard, who is chairman of the Appropriations
Subcommittee on Military Construction, expressing his support
of the current plan, and I would ask that the letter be made a
part of the record at this point.
[The information follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Young. All right. Let's go back now, Mr. Sabo.
Mr. Sabo. I will pass.
Mr. Young. Mr. Sabo passes. Mr. Nethercutt.
Mr. Nethercutt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, gentlemen. I feel almost benign here with my
questions, with all respect to my colleague.
Mr. Young. Mr. Nethercutt, you are never benign.
Mr. Nethercutt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cunningham. I don't think so, either.
NEXT GENERATION DESTROYER
Mr. Nethercutt. Mr. Secretary, Operational Maneuver from
the Sea acknowledges that precise, long-range, sea-based fire
support will be an increasingly critical element for Naval
expeditionary forces. In your written testimony, you noted that
DD-21 will support the land attack mission, but these ships
won't join the fleet until after 2008.
And recognizing--and to the extent you may have testified
about this, I apologize. Recognizing the Southwest Asia
situation, we can certainly see and appreciate the importance
of sea-based deterrence.
With the cancellation of the maritime fire support
demonstrator, what is being done to bridge the gap for the land
attack mission?
Secretary Dalton. Mr. Nethercutt, let me ask the CNO to
address that, if he could.
Admiral Johnson. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Nethercutt, a lot is being done, is the short answer.
We are very serious about our fire support plan. The Commandant
knows that. We have been working very closely with the Marine
Corps. DD-21 is indeed a part of that solution. But let me just
give you a couple of specifics, from short range to long, if
you will, and in close to out a way.
The specific answer is we will have a fire support level of
effort for the 21st century in place by 2001. What that
specifically means is we will have modified the 5-inch gun that
exists today to allow it to fire extended-range guided
munitions, which will give us precision accuracies out to 63,
to 65 miles, which is the Marine Corps standard for now.
We also know that because of the V-22 that we are all
excited about receiving, and what that is going to mean to
Operation Maneuver from the Sea, that the battle space is going
to deepen from that. Therefore, in addition to that, we are in
the process right now of evaluating two systems, vertical
launch systems. One is a Navy version of the Army ATACMs, which
we have already done some testing with. The other is one we
call the land attack missile, the Land Attack Standard Missile
(LASM), which will be tested this year.
One of those, or some combination of those, is going to
solve the problem from 100 to 200 miles ashore very precisely.
That is the short term, if you will. And we are on record
saying by 2001 we are going to have the capabilities that I
described.
What happens after that is we work ourselves towards DD-21,
which intros in 2009 or 2008, and with that we are also looking
at a--what we call VGS, a Vertical Gun System, 155-millimeter,
very precise out to 100 miles. So there is a lot going on in
just that piece of the fire support in addition to the tactical
Tomahawks, et cetera. So that is probably longer than you
wanted, but we are very serious about our commitment to our
troops ashore.
Mr. Nethercutt. I understand. And that was the point of the
question, just to make sure the record is clear, that there is
consideration being given; it is a multifaceted.
Admiral Johnson. Absolutely.
Mr. Nethercutt. And serious.
Admiral Johnson. Absolutely.
Mr. Nethercutt. Budgetwise and functionally.
Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir.
PILOT RETENTION
Mr. Nethercutt. I will just tell you, I had the good
fortune last year, last fall, to sit in the back seat, and fly
in a Harrier and an F-18 from Beaufort with Navy and Marine
pilots, and I was very, very impressed with the quality of
people that you have serving in the Navy; and also had a chance
to go down and help commission a ship, the U.S.S. Mahan, just a
week, I guess, or so ago, and was so impressed with the crew
and the young men and women who were serving the Navy.
What I heard in Beaufort and also talked a little bit about
down in Florida was this issue of retention of pilots as well
as retention of other military personnel, Navy and Marine
forces. What is your sense of our challenge there? Are we
meeting it adequately? Do you expect that we are going to be
able to keep these good young men and women serving at sea and
in the air?
Secretary Dalton. Mr. Nethercutt, first of all, I want to
thank you for taking the time to go down to Beaufort and be
with our people. They really are the best, and we are awfully
proud of them. We are grateful to you, and we appreciate your
colleagues when you have the opportunity to get out and be with
our people. We also thank you for speaking at the commissioning
of MAHAN. That is our newest DDG, and we are awfully proud of
it, and thank you for being there.
Mr. Nethercutt. Sure.
Secretary Dalton. Pilot retention is, indeed, a challenge
for us, and we are addressing that. This body has been
supportive of giving us some additional tools with respect to
bonuses and additional flight pay.
We just sent a team of people out to talk with pilots in
squadrons around the Navy. This was in addition to the kinds of
things that the CNO and I do on a regular basis. But we wanted
to get into what is bothering them, and what are their
concerns. The team has just returned and given us some ideas of
things that we can do to address the pilots' concerns.
However, the airlines are hiring at an aggressive pace.
There is more money for people from that standpoint than we can
compete with in terms of dollars. What we intend to do is to
make sure that we are giving these young men and women the
opportunities they need with respect to flight hours, with
respect to spares, with respect to compensation to the extent
that we can. We also need to try to meet the concerns relative
to retirement and things of that nature. We are addressing
those issues.
Since the CNO is an aviator and has been there, let me ask
him to address it as well.
Admiral Johnson. Only to comment additionally, Mr.
Nethercutt, that we consider retention across the board to be a
serious issue with us right now. I will focus in on the pilot
retention because that is the basis of your question.
If you look at the overall numbers today, we don't have a
problem. If you peel those numbers back and look at it
community by community and project yourself ahead a couple of
years and look at what is coming, we have a problem. We are not
in denial of that reality.
But as the Secretary touched on, there is no silver bullet
solution to pilot retention, and I think Mike Ryan will tell
you the same thing from the Air Force, and I am sure Chuck
would agree from the Marine Corps. It is lots of things. So
what we have to do is take the inputs that we get, look at the
realities from the eyes of the junior officer pilot and try to
tackle what I call a multipronged attack, and that is exactly
what we are doing.
The compensation piece is a part of it. The fixing our
programs and funding our accounts is a part of it, and so it
goes. We are seriously committed to fixing and staying ahead of
the curve. We have time to do that. I am doing everything I can
to make that happen.
MARINE CORPS PERSONNEL RETENTION
General Krulak. Let me take it in two points, sir. First
has to do with overall retention. The Marine Corps, similar to
our successes in recruiting, we are finding our enlisted
Marines standing in line for retention. By the end of this
first quarter, I had 88 percent of all of the available boat
spaces that I could in fact fill were already filled, and we
had to stop reenlisting so that the good Marines who would
become available and eligible to reenlist later in the year
would have a space to go to. And so we are very happy about
that.
On the pilot side, I have personally visited every single
ready room in the Marine Corps. I have a book beside my phone.
I call a ready room a week. The bottom line is exactly what the
CNO said. I wish he could say it was just airline hiring. It is
not. It is a lot of things that span the issue of are they able
to get their aircraft up, are there spare parts there on the
flight lines, to are we making it challenging enough, are they
getting the flight hours they want, all the way to such issues
as the airline hiring.
It has got to be attacked on all fronts. We think we are
doing a good job of it, but you really have to keep your eye on
it.
Mr. Nethercutt. Well, I think you are right. And housing
and family care and medical care, those things are important to
these young pilots and others. And, frankly, the idea of
recreation, I mean, we always look askance at building gyms and
recreation facilities and all that, but I tell you I have been
there and I have seen them, and we have one coming out in our
state, in Norm's district, and those are very important in
terms of keeping these people occupied and keeping them out of
the taverns and working out and playing handball and whatever
else needs to be done. So I commend you on it, and your
attention to it is going to be, I think, bringing long-term
dividends.
Secretary Dalton. Mr. Nethercutt, your point about quality
of life is indeed very important. We are talking about pilots,
but that is true across the board. It is something that we have
addressed and are addressing, but we still have a ways to go in
terms of enhancing quality of life for our people.
Mr. Nethercutt. One more question, if I may, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Yes.
HORIZON CONCEPT
Mr. Nethercutt. Admiral Johnson, I understand the Navy's
Warfare Development Command has begun this 2-year study on the
horizon concept--I think you and I talked a little bit about
that when we met a little bit earlier--by which crews rather
than ships would be rotated.
Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Nethercutt. What is your sense of it as a short-term or
a long-term concept that should be employed in the Navy?
Admiral Johnson. I think, just briefly, sir, the horizon
concept as you describe it is one that was brought forward from
our strategic studies group. I tasked them to look way out.
Mr. Nethercutt. Sure.
Admiral Johnson. So this is a long-range project. There is
nothing in the short term in the context of stationing ships
and rotating crews, because quite honestly, when you start
getting into it, what it really takes is a whole different kind
of ship to be able to sustain that.
So I put that in the category of long-range planning and
downstream issues, but it is a good effort.
Mr. Nethercutt. I think it is, too. And I would say to my
colleagues, to those of you who haven't seen some of these
modern ships, I saw the U.S.S. Bataan down at Newport News and
the Mahan and some of the other ships. I mean, they are really
exciting and enticing in terms of recruitment, but also in
terms of being sort of able to use this concept perhaps in the
shorter rather than longer term.
Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Nethercutt. So thank you, Mr. Chairman.
SHIP SELF-DEFENSE
Mr. Young. Admiral Johnson, you know the Committee's
interest because of our meeting last year at this time on ship
self-defense, and we have talked about that numerous times
since that hearing last year. Your budget does provide for some
additional ship self-defense, but as we look at the numbers of
ships being outfitted with the self-defense system, I would
like to see it accelerated even more. I think it would be hard
to excuse sending a ship into harm's way and have it attacked
and not have a self-defense system.
Where are we going? We know where we are today based on
this budget. Where are we headed? When are we going to have
self-defense systems on the combatant ships especially? And
tell us about the tests that you ran.
Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Young. Tell us about that and when we might expect to
be full up on ship self-defense.
Admiral Johnson. Well, sir, let me just say straight up
that I don't want there to be any mystery about our commitment
to ship self-defense. Okay? We are committed to ship self-
defense, and we will stand up to that.
What happened specifically this year, as the Chairman may
or may not be aware, is that we originally were looking at five
units. We are now at two units. That is really a good news
story in one sense, and it gets back to your question, which is
why I mentioned it. What really happened to us was, among other
things, we were so taken by what happened aboard ASHLAND in our
OPEVAL with the absolutely eye-watering success of that OPEVAL,
frankly it caused us to reevaluate what we were doing. We are
enhancing the program based on that OPEVAL.
What that translated to in the short term was the same
amount of money, but it is going to cost a little bit more per
unit. So we rephased and kept the money in there, and that
impacts the number of units. We are committing to SSDS for
that. When we have the 21st century ARG, it will be properly
defended, and we are committed to that, sir.
Mr. Young. Does it cost more to retrofit the ship with
self-defense systems than it would be to install them as you
go?
Admiral Johnson. I can give you that answer for the record,
sir. My gut reaction answer is, yes, sir, it would cost more to
back fit rather than forward fit. But I will be happy to
provide that for the record.
[The information follows:]
Navy's individual ships class Maritime Force Protection planning is
based on providing the most cost-effective force protection possible,
consistent with available funding, force wide. Furthermore, all ship
classes will receive or retain a level of force protection consistent
with their expected service life and potential exposure to operational
threat environments.
Navy utilizes a combat systems approach to validate each ship
class' performance against the CNO AAW Ship Self Defense Capstone
requirement. All systems in the detection through engage sequence are
modeled against the validated Defense Intelligence Agency threats. No
one system is good enough, by itself, to meet the Capstone performance
requirements. All new construction ship combat systems provide the
firepower and performance necessary to meet Navy Capstone requirements
and Congressional guidance against the validated threat. The AAW combat
system configuration for all new ships, selected after careful
analysis, meets all threats through 2012 with growth potential provided
to meet far term threats yet to be defined.
Normally, the cost to retrofit a ship with ship self defense
systems is greater than the cost of building the ship initially with
these systems. The reason for this is that in the retrofit case,
equipment which is already installed must be removed or repositioned as
part of the new installation. For example, the installation cost to
retrofit a ship with Ship Self Defense System Mk-1 (SSDS) is greater
than the cost of building the ship initially with SSDS.
Installation cost comparison ($M) for SSDS is as follows:
Retrofit (based on USS COMSTOCK):
Advance Planning (PSNSY Det Boston)........................... $0.130
Shipalt 1176 (to be contracted to NASSCO)..................... 1.950
Alteration Installation Team (NSWC PHD)....................... 1.114
Alteration Installation Team (NAWC-AD)........................ 0.500
--------------------------------------------------------------
____________________________________________________
TOTAL..................................................... 3.244
Forward Fit (based on USS PEARL HARBOR):
Construction Work Package (Avondale) (1)...................... 2.016
Miscellaneous Materials....................................... 0.150
On-Site Technical Support (NSWC PHD).......................... 0.190
On-Site Technical Support (NAWC AD)........................... 0.046
SUPSHIP New Orleans Support................................... 0.125
--------------------------------------------------------------
____________________________________________________
TOTAL..................................................... 2.527
Note (1): Actual contract cost was reduced by 20% due to rework
costs.
Mr. Young. Admiral, I appreciate that. We will continue to
express concern about Ship self-defense until we get them on
all of our ships.
Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Young. I would expect the Marines riding on those ships
would have some feeling about that, General.
General Krulak. Yes, sir. We have been working very hard
with Jay. Obviously, my desire is to get my amphibs forward-
fitted as best we can, and that is going with the LPD-17, and
that is going to look good.
The LSDs, as Jay indicated, are also looking good. The
issue, of course, is the LHDs and the LHAs. The LHDs we
anticipate getting done by the end of 2003. The LHA, of course,
is up in the air, pending the decision of what we are going to
do on the service life extension.
But the LPD looks good. The LSD is coming along; LHD also.
I think by 2003, we are going to be okay. It is during that
time frame that is in between that we are concerned. But it is
not a case of Jay not supporting us, because he has given
support.
Admiral Johnson. May I make one more comment, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Young. Certainly.
Admiral Johnson. What we have also done inside the
Lifelines is I asked my team to just go back and look at the
whole business of ship self-defense. As you know, and as the
staff knows, there have been lots of puts and takes and hills
and valleys here. So what I asked for was kind of a clean look
at the requirement and how we were servicing that requirement
just to make sure we had it right. That look is coming to me
here in probably another 6 weeks. So that will validate, I
think, where we are going. But I just want you to know we are
taking it very seriously.
FINANCIAL DIFFICULTY FOR PERSONNEL
Mr. Young. Mr. Secretary, I think that you all are
convinced that the members of this subcommittee are just
totally dedicated and determined to improve quality of life for
those who serve in the uniform at every opportunity. We have
that commitment to ourselves. We have that commitment to you.
But more importantly, we have that commitment to those who
serve in the uniform and their families.
A very distressing article that appeared in the
Philadelphia Enquirer a couple of weeks ago and they quote from
a recent DOD study that says, at least one-third of Navy
personnel can't pay their bills and are costing the Pentagon
more than $200 million a year in bad checks, loan defaults and
bankruptcies. It goes on to say that the Navy personnel were
losing security clearances because of their financial
difficulties, and their military readiness was being affected
by their money problems.
Is this accurate? Is this actually happening?
Secretary Dalton. Mr. Chairman, the background for that
story is that we in the Navy asked for a study done by the
Military Family Institute to assist us in evaluating some data
that we had seen with regard to this. Actually, we read about
that report in the newspaper before we got the study, so it was
a little premature.
Mr. Young. A little leak, huh?
Secretary Dalton. I guess that is what you would call it,
but it let us know that there are some issues that we need to
address and are addressing. What the study pointed out is that
there is access to credit for people today at a younger age
than we have historically experienced in this country. There is
not a stigma of being in debt as there once was, and more
people are taking advantage of credit, particularly at a
younger age.
We are increasing the training of our people to make them
aware of this. We have Family Service Centers that are
increasing the emphasis and the importance of staying out of
debt and having a personal financial situation one can manage.
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve
Affairs has an initiative called Lifeline which is a computer
based virtual quality of life information center that has been
made available to our people. We also have a financial
management CD ROM which is available for personal financial
management. This issue is important to us because these young
people for the first time in their lives, 18, 19, 20 years old,
are having money to manage and they need some training in order
to deal with it.
So it is something that we are addressing and realize that
we have to educate our personnel in terms of the importance of
taking care of their personal finances.
Mr. Young. Is this problem basically at that level, the
newer members as opposed to, say, the officer corps?
Secretary Dalton. That is where a good deal of the problem
is. As I said, I have not actually reviewed the study to give
you a direct answer. I will be happy to provide that for the
record, if I could.
Mr. Young. Okay. If you have any suggestions where we might
be able to help with that problem, let us know that also.
Secretary Dalton. Thank you. I would be happy to do that.
[The information follows:]
The majority of our enlisted members are between 18 and 23 years
old. For many it is their first time away from home, receiving their
first steady paycheck, having few financial responsibilities (food and
shelter provided), and experiencing a strong desire to enjoy life
(cars, stereos, etc.) to the fullest extent, like many of their
civilian counterparts of similar age and maturity. The combination of
these demographics with little or no education or experience in
managing finances, easy access to credit, vulnerability to financial
scams, and occasionally the desire for immediate gratification, renders
these young people particularly susceptible to financial problems.
However, such financial difficulties are by no means confined to the
young enlisted ranks. Many officers and senior enlisted also lack the
financial training needed to successfully handle their finances. As a
result, they contend with many of the same type of financial problems
experienced by their junior enlisted counterparts, but often to a much
greater extent, as a result of their greater access to credit.
The Military Family Institute (MFI) study, a copy of which I have
provided for the Record, demonstrates that personal finance is one of
the important quality of life issues facing the Navy today. The proper
administration of our Personal Financial Management Program (PFM) is a
way to effectively reach all Sailors at a time when they are receptive
to learning the financial lessons required to manage their personal
finances.
Mr. Young. We are concerned about that.
Mr. Dicks.
JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me go to the Joint Strike Fighter program. As I
understand it, the budget includes $919 million for continued
RDT&E on the JSF, of which $463 million is Navy money.
Now, as everyone knows, this is a program between the Navy,
the Marine Corps and the Air Force.
Can you give the Committee a general overview on the status
of the JSF program?
Secretary Dalton. Mr. Dicks, this is a very important
program for the Department of the Navy. It is one that we now
have the cognizance of and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
for Research, Development and Acquisition, Mr. Douglass, is
leading that program. He can provide information in greater
detail this afternoon when you meet with him.
Mr. Dicks. All right.
Secretary Dalton. But let me just say that we are committed
to it. It is extremely important to the Navy and the Marine
Corps, and it is one that I think does make sense. We are going
to save significant dollars in terms of doing this jointly with
the Air Force Department, and we are also pleased to have our
allies, particularly the United Kingdom, participating in the
program.
So it is going to reduce the overall costs with respect to
the initial design, research, and development--It is extremely
important, and we are watching it closely.
The CNO and Commandant could certainly add to that
response.
General Krulak. I concur with the Secretary. I mean, this
is a critical program for the Marine Corps. It is the STOVL
(Short Take-Off Vertical Landing) version that we are looking
at. It is, in fact, the results of our neck-down strategy. That
is the aircraft we are going to. We have at the program office
a Marine general who is one of the deputy program managers to
ensure that our support and our desires are kept at the
forefront. And so I would just reiterate, this is a critical
program for the Marine Corps.
Admiral Johnson. We are four square behind it. We are
putting our money where our mouth is. It is the future for us,
along with the Super Hornet. I tell the fleet that between 2010
and 2015, what we want on the decks of our aircraft carriers is
a mix of F-18 Super Hornets and JSFs. I like the way that looks
because both of them are going to be frontline, top-of-the-
line, state-of-the-art assets. So we are very much committed.
And every indication we have right now is, as Chuck says, the
program is very solid. So we are excited about it.
Mr. Dicks. Good.
TRIDENT D-5 BACKFIT
Last year, there was a little fight here in the Congress on
the backfitting of the D-5 missile on the Trident submarines,
and thanks to a strong cooperative effort between the
subcommittee and the Navy, we were able to minimize the
Trident-related reduction. Does the Navy remain fully committed
to the Trident program?
Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir. Short answer, yes, sir. We
absolutely do, and those D-5s are very important to us.
Mr. Dicks. It is my understanding that the plan is to go
from 18 Tridents to 14, but that depends on the Russia Duma
approving START II. Is that your understanding as well?
Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir, it is.
Mr. Dicks. Now, if they don't do that, then it is the plan
to remain at 18?
Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. And that will have implications, obviously, for
the budget; isn't that correct?
Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir, it most definitely will. By
about the year 2002, it will have serious budget implications
for us.
Mr. Dicks. I guess you would have to refuel, overhaul and
retrofit the submarines, the D-5. You also have to buy the
additional D-5 missiles.
Admiral Johnson. That is correct.
Mr. Dicks. Now, as I understand it, the CINC at STRATCOM
has said that if we do go to 14, that it would be on the basis
of a 7/7 split between the West Coast and the East Coast. Is
that your understanding, Admiral Johnson?
Admiral Johnson. I think, sir, if I could, I would--I would
prefer to discuss that in another place.
JSTARS EXERCISES
Mr. Dicks. Okay. I understand the Navy and Marine Corps
employed Joint STARS during the fleet battle experiment Alpha,
the Hunter Warrior exercise and in an amphibious planning
exercise in Korea last November. Can you comment on the utility
of JSTARS for the Navy and Marine Corps operations?
General Krulak. It is a magnificent piece of gear, sir. It
assisted us in Hunter Warrior, enabled us to do things that
without that aircraft we would not have been able to do. It
is----
Mr. Dicks. Can you tell us a couple of those?
General Krulak. Your Hunter Warrior was an effort to
determine whether a small organization, tailored to bring fires
to bear on a much larger organization, whether they could, in
fact, dominate that larger organization if you had the
intelligence and the ability to bring fires. The JSTARS was
able to assist in providing that intelligence, particularly in
the onward columns, and very, very accurately; it allowed us
then, using burst transmission to overhead platforms, to bring
down fires almost immediately and very effectively.
Jay, do you want to comment?
Admiral Johnson. No, I concur fully. It was very effective.
We were very positive and encouraged by what we saw.
A-12 AIRCRAFT LAWSUIT
Mr. Dicks. Secretary Dalton, can you tell us about the
status of the A-12 lawsuit and the Navy's plans to proceed in
its defense?
Secretary Dalton. Yes, sir. As you know, the judgment was
rendered recently. A final opinion and order was filed, I
think, on February the 20th, and the Government immediately
filed its notice of appeal the same day.
The case will now be reviewed in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. It averages about a year for
an appeal to be heard and decided by a three-judge panel of the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Some appeals take
more time; some take less. The appellate process could also
involve additional appellate review. Therefore, it is not
possible to predict when the appellate process will be
completed.
I think if the appeal is upheld, then there would be
significant liability, and we would have to address that. The
judgment fund would----
Mr. Dicks. The judgment fund is at the Justice Department?
Secretary Dalton. At the Treasury Department, I believe.
Mr. Dicks. Treasury.
Secretary Dalton. So that would be the initial response. I
think we are a long way from getting to that point.
Mr. Dicks. Would there be any effort to try and settle
this?
Secretary Dalton. We are exploring other options, but I
think the first thing to do is to get the appeal process
started.
Mr. Dicks. Then as I understand it, that is paid for out of
the Treasury and would not come out of the defense budget. Do
you know the answer to that question or not?
Secretary Dalton. You are correct, sir, in that the
original judgment would be paid by the judgment fund. However,
we are one government, and there is no free lunch. I think that
obviously there would be some potential repercussions to the
Department of Defense and the Navy Department. But I think we
are a long way from reaching that point.
Mr. Dicks. It would be interesting to know whether that
liability is going to come down on the Navy, on the Defense
Department, or is it going to come down on the government as a
whole through the judgment fund.
Secretary Dalton. I will respond for the record.
Mr. Dicks. And I think the answer is it is the judgment
fund, if there is a final judgment against the Federal
Government, because we have all kinds of various lawsuits that,
you know, if we settle them, we would pay it one way, and if
you--and if it isn't settled and it is a judgment, then it is
done through this other fund. Obviously, there is probably
limits to how much money is in that fund for judgments, but
that is one that I was--if you can put something in the record.
Secretary Dalton. Yes, sir, I will respond for the record
on that.
[The information follows:]
The Navy has appealed the $1.8 billion judgment to the Court for
Appeals for the federal circuit. We believe that the appeal will be
successful. Thus we are unable to determine now what the final outcome
of the litigation will be or when it will be.
After all appeals, any final judgment would be paid initially from
the judgment fund. The Navy would be required to reimburse the judgment
fund with the same kinds of appropriations that were used on the
contract.
COLLISION AVOIDANCE
Mr. Dicks. And give me a figure on that.
There was a segment on 60 minutes this weekend, about the
lack of the TCAS system--on our military aircraft. I don't know
if this is a major issue for the Navy, but it certainly is for
the Air Force. But I think you know, this is a system in
which-- if planes are going to crash into each other; somebody
in the cockpit, go high, or go low, so that the planes can
avoid each communicates to the pilot to other. Apparently there
was some efforts made after Secretary Brown's death by
Secretary Perry to try to make certain that each of the
services was doing what they have to do with their airplanes in
order to avoid collisions of this nature.
Recently there was a collision between a German aircraft
and an Air Force C-141, and a substantial number of lives were
lost.
I have been concerned about this for a long period of time;
I realize on fighter aircraft that TCAS technology may not be
appropriate, but, for other aircraft that carry personnel and
other things of that nature, I think having this kind of a
system, has real value. United Airlines put it in at some
minimal amount, like $25,000 per airplane. We are doing it and
at--at the defense level it is much more expensive. But can you
tell us what the Navy is doing to have a system so that we can
avoid these kind of crashes, save lives, save the airplanes?
Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir. We, like the rest of the
Department of Defense, sir, responded in the wake of Secretary
Brown's tragedy and have gone forward with a very concrete plan
that puts global positioning systems in all of our transport-
type aircraft and indeed ground proximity warning devices of
one sort or another.
The TCAS, the collision avoidance systems, on the
nontacticals is something that we have looked at. I will
provide you a very specific answer for the record, sir, but I
share your concern.
[The information follows:]
Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) provides audible and visual
warnings to alert aircrew of impending controlled flight into terrain
(CFIT) unless corrective action is taken. Traffic Alert and Collision
Avoidance System (TCAS) provides audible and visual collision avoidance
warnings regarding an aircraft's position relative to another aircraft
for the prevention of mid-air collisions.
Navy policy requires the installation of GPWS and TCAS equipment
similar to U.S. commercial airline equipment, in all its passenger
carrying aircraft.
Navy is also installing GPWS in all tactical and rotary wing
aircraft that have shown a high risk of mishaps due to CFIT. TCAS
installation into tactical and rotary wing aircraft is not currently
programmed, awaiting the development of TCAS equipment that would be
effective in formation flying. The mission for tactical aircraft
differs significantly from the mission of passenger or commercial
aircraft; tactical aircraft most often operate distant from civilian
aircraft, in restricted airspace and in close proximity to one another.
TCAS equipment addressing these flight regimes has not been developed.
Navy is developing a formation collision avoidance system for rotary
wing aircraft.
Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System and Ground Proximity
Warning System are funded for installation on the following non-
tactical Navy passenger carrying aircraft: C-2, C-9, C-12, C-20
(derivative 737), C-130 and KC-130. TCAS installations commenced in
fiscal year 1998 and will be completed in fiscal year 2004. GPWS
installations commenced in fiscal year 1998 and will be completed in
fiscal year 2003. The Navy's priority for installations are in the
commercial derivative aircraft (C-9, C-12 and C-20). Both C-9 and C-20
have GPWS installed as part of their original equipment; and will
complete the TCAS installations in fiscal year 1998. C-12 aircraft will
complete both installations by fiscal year 2003.
Mr. Dicks. Yes, I mean, it did not look good.
Admiral Johnson. Yes.
Mr. Dicks. Especially for the Air Force, but I am going to
ask each of the groups as they come through to give us what
they have done for the record.
Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir. But by the end of 1998, we will
be compliant with the first part that I mentioned specific to
the GPS and the proximity.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Lewis.
BASE CLOSURE
Mr. Lewis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, there is not a district in the country that
has had more experience with base closure than my district in
the West. Since you mentioned BRAC, I can't help but at least
raise that question.
In the last go-around, reaching beyond the Air Force bases
that were closed, the Commission was looking very closely at
the Marine Corps logistics base, which is located at Barstow.
It was all but a final decision that that facility was closing,
and then one of our Commissioners visited the facility, saw the
kind of personnel we have there, what they can do in terms of
weather, year-round work, storage in that weather, et cetera,
and the Commissioner did a 180. That just speaks to the point
that the map is different than the territory.
I am very concerned about our problems relative to
infrastructure. I think they are appropriate concerns. I am
also concerned that unless people visit places like China Lake,
they don't really know what those assets are all about. So I am
concerned about China Lake versus other discussions we get
within our committee regarding assets of value. Would you
comment?
Secretary Dalton. Yes, sir, Mr. Lewis. I think you are
right. It is very important to visit the site of each of the
places that are under consideration to have a full
understanding of what they do, and why they do it, how they do
it, and how well they do it.
I would like to emphasize is the fact that we simply have
far too much infrastructure. Whereas, we have come down almost
45 percent in terms of the number of ships since 1988, we have
come down more than 30 percent in terms of the number of
personnel, Sailors and Marines in the Department of the Navy.
Our procurement is down 40 percent. Our base structure is down
only 17 percent in net replacement value.
It is clear that everything we recommended closing didn't
get closed in 1995, and we have come down significantly since
then. So it is clear that we have too much infrastructure.
The base realignment and closure process is the only
process that has worked. I mean, prior to BRAC, it was really
impossible to close a facility because of the situation that
exists with legislative maneuvering that is possible in both
chambers. We simply need more rounds of BRAC. In terms of how
it is done, this body has the ability to write the law in the
best way to make sure that it is done properly, and then
perhaps we can, in fact, learn lessons from how it was done
before and enhance that procedure.
I think it is undeniable that we have too much
infrastructure, and the only way that we know that works is to
have base realignment and closure. I know it is a tough issue.
I know it is something that the Members don't like to talk
about, and particularly Members that have facilities in their
districts. I just encourage this body to do the courageous
thing and give us the opportunity to rid ourselves of
infrastructure that we don't need, because we simply don't have
the funds to give the services the procurement dollars they
need and take care of our people if we are spending money on
things that are not necessary. To me, it is a clear issue, and
I really would appreciate the support of this body to give us
the legislation necessary to go forward for rounds of BRAC in
the year 2001 and 2005.
Mr. Lewis. Mr. Secretary, I would make two points. The
first is it is very important to recognize that that
infrastructure may very well serve a very important military
purpose, but it is clear that we have got to be willing to go
forward and close those assets that are somewhere lower down on
the schedule in terms of priorities. There is just no question
that you have got to have our support in connection with that.
The second point, however, is that the record of DOD so far
on BRAC is so miserable in terms of their relationships with
the communities that it is a very, very tough sale. I mean,
assets that have tremendous community potential value are
languishing for 8 and 9 years because of a lack of follow-
through, you know, after the supposed closure. And I tell you
that really is going to hurt you in the Congress.
Secretary Dalton. Mr. Lewis, I can tell you that in the
Department of the Navy we have made a strong, very strong,
effort to work with communities, and I think our record is good
in terms of getting facilities closed and working with the
community, with their reuse plans, to assist them and indeed
enhancing the opportunities for economic development in places
where we have closed bases. I think the record is good with
respect to that, and I pledge to you that we would try to even
enhance what we have done in the past in that regard.
In terms of the record with respect to what we have
realized from the base closures to date is the fact that the
savings have been greater than we anticipated, and the costs
have been less than anticipated. So I think the record is a
positive one, and I would be happy to supply specifically for
the record just exactly what that has been for the Navy.
[The information follows:]
At the end of 2001, when all four BRAC rounds will be complete,
Navy will have spent a total of $10.0 billion and saved $15.7 billion,
for a net savings of $5.7 billion. Beginning in 2002, Navy will save
another $2.6 billion every year.
Mr. Lewis. I am very interested in personalizing it beyond
that, for as we look to the Pacific and the future significance
of the Pacific to the Navy's mission, items like China Lake
become very special assets that we all need to understand
better. I need to understand them better as well.
Frankly, I look forward to your visit. I am not looking for
a commitment today, but rather it is very, very important that
we do that firsthand rather than secondhand.
Secretary Dalton. I agree, sir.
Mr. Lewis. Thank you.
Mr. Young. Mr. Hobson.
JUNIOR ROTC
Mr. Hobson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you for your PR move with
the wives. That was a smart move on your part. As you know,
there was a little trouble with the Air Force, the wives on the
Air Force base, and he did a great job of taking some wives out
to the aircraft carrier, and it gave them a great appreciation
of what the young people do on those ships, and it makes--with
the Navy, you have got wives now promoting the Navy with the
Members. So it was a pretty smart thing on your part.
General Krulak, I wanted to ask you a question. There is
just one thing wrong with Marine Corps' junior reserve officers
training program. There just aren't enough of them. And this is
a popular and successful high school program, and I think a
positive factor in the lives of a lot of young people. I also
think it is probably a good recruiting and public relations
tool for the Corps.
Springfield South High School, in my hometown, it is
eligible for a junior ROTC unit, and this is a school that is
in an area that could really, I think, benefit a lot of young
people from the Marine Corps presence. Unfortunately, this year
there aren't enough funds, as I understand it, to maintain the
existing 174 units scattered throughout the Nation, and no new
units will be established.
How many schools can be accommodated in your 1999 request,
and how much more money would it take to include Springfield,
Ohio? I need to be a little parochial about this.
General Krulak. Let me first--from the macro level, I was
with General Colin Powell when he determined, certainly with
the great concurrence of all of the Service Chiefs during his
last year, to boost the number of junior ROTC units. I mean,
there is absolutely no question that if you are going to reach
the youth of America, you are going to have to use methods that
may not always seem mainstream.
One of those is to, in fact, inculcate within the youth
this idea of service, whether it is with the Navy, the Air
Force or the Army, in our case the Marine Corps. So we
absolutely believe that this is probably one of the best
returns on any dollar we can give, because, one, you are
helping the service, and, two, you are absolutely helping the
young man or woman.
I will get you the exact dollars. I will tell you that
right now, we, the United States Marine Corps, get 6 percent of
the total money allocated to the junior ROTC organizations. I
would obviously like to have more than 6 percent because I
don't think that is--it certainly does not equate to the number
of people we have in the Corps vis-a-vis the entire Armed
Forces. I will get you the number, the dollar figure, that
would take us down to your high school. We think this is a
winner.
[The information follows:]
Present fiscal year 1999 funding accommodates 174 MCJROTC units.
The MCJROTC Program has 44 schools on the waiting list. Based on a
geographical distribution, Springfield South High School is Number 3.
Using this distribution, estimated cost to fund three additional units
is:
$364,500--(3 units @ 50% one time stand-up cost);
$307,500--(Annual maintenance of 3 units);
42,000--(1 additional civilian billet--GS-6);
$349,500--(Annual cost);
$714,000--(Total cost to establish three additional MCJROTC units,
to include Springfield, Ohio).
Mr. Hobson. Well, the interesting thing is, you know, I
have Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in my district, and I have
some Air Force ROTC units which do very well, but I don't have
a Marine Corps one. This didn't arise with me. This came out of
the local community, which is reasonably close to Wright-
Patterson, saying, we think this would be good in our
community, this would be good for our school. And when you get
a local community that wants it, I think, you know, we in
Congress need to try to do that for the young people as
something we do.
If I had my way, every kid who graduated from high school
ought to go to basic training for at least 9 weeks, but I don't
think we can do that in this environment.
General Krulak. I often wondered whether it should not be
looked at more than just a defense issue, but one from
education, because I will tell you just as an officer and
Marine, but more importantly a father, these types of things
that can get at the youth of today, to inculcate within them a
value, a sense of values and character, are critical, and I
will tell you, the best dollar spent is to spend it on the
development of our young men and women.
So I am just not sure that we as a Nation shouldn't start
looking at not just the military part of it, but if we really
believe in this, then we get our education folks to get
involved and take a look at their budgets, too.
Mr. Hobson. Just as an aside, in the State of Ohio, when I
was in the legislature, we had a program, and I don't know
whether it affects the Marines or the Navy, I don't know, but
for the Air Force and the Army Guard, we will pay 100 percent
of any young person who joins the Guard's college education if
they go to an Ohio institution. So if we can figure out a way
to help you guys also.
Mr. Young. Sounds real good.
Mr. Hobson. But you have got to be an Ohio resident. It is
a good program, and there are a number of States that do this
for the Guard.
General Krulak. Yes, sir.
Mr. Young. Mr. Cunningham.
COMBAT LOGISTICS FORCE SHIPS
Mr. Cunningham. Acquisition plans right now, the combat
logistic force, there is not funding in there enough. Any
change in funding causes a delay, and if you take a look at
those types of ships, they usually lose out to the other
combatant carriers, destroyers, those kind of things, and there
is not enough money. When we talk about acquisition, you know,
the President's budget isn't large enough, you know. Or is it
adequate? I say, no, primarily because we have these things
that are delayed, delayed, delayed, and BRAC isn't going to do
it. You have a BRAC in 2001, 2005. You don't get the savings
for 5 to 10 years. Are we going to get to $60 billion in
procurement because of a BRAC? You better change the spin and
tell the President to do that, because it just don't work, Mr.
Secretary.
But on these kinds of ships, I am very supportive of
alternative funding, charter and build. We tried to do the same
thing with the C-17 with the Air Force, to privatize those
things. Do you see a future in that kind of creative accounting
and data funding?
Secretary Dalton. Mr. Cunningham, we think charter and
build has merit. We are debating that issue within the
Administration, and if I could answer for the record, I would
appreciate it.
Mr. Cunningham. All right. I appreciate it. And I have some
questions for the record on that issue I would like to submit.
Secretary Dalton. Okay.
[The information follows:]
The Navy continues to look at Charter and Build for the T-ADC (X)
vessels as one alternative to direct procurement. There is significant
pressure on the Shipbuilding Conversion, Navy (SCN) account to purchase
necessary aircraft carriers, submarines, and surface combatants.
Therefore, the Navy is considering alternative acquisition approaches
to acquire services necessary for the fleet.
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requires a two-step
process when evaluating lease versus buy. First, an economic analysis
is required. To Accomplish this task, the Navy commissioned an
independent entity to evaluate the financial aspects of Charter and
Build. In accordance with the OMB guidelines, the analysis shows that
leasing is cost neutral to buying on a present value basis.
If leasing is attractive, OMB then requires the Navy to classify
the lease in accordance with budgetary guidelines. This review shows
that the T-ADC (X) vessels should be scored as capital leases, which
require up-front budget authority and outlays on a ``pay as you go
basis''. This approach appears no different than acquiring the ships
through the SCN account (from a budget authority perspective).
Therefore, the Navy is working with the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and OMB to discuss scoring and budget authority aspects of the
Charter and Build approach. The three ships in the SCN account (in
fiscal year 2002/fiscal year 2003) allow us to continue exploring this
alternative while ensuring the needed Combat Logistics Force
replacement program starts.
MIRAMAR HELICOPTERS
Mr. Cunningham. I will go to General Krulak.
You are well aware of the problems with the helicopters
there at Miramar?
General Krulak. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cunningham. I want to thank you, you know, for all the
effort that the guys have stepped up with the community
relations, but you have got a group of hard-core zealots there
trying to stir up the folks. Is there any end in this lawsuit?
Is there a direction that we are going to go on this thing?
General Krulak. We, as you know, we are still in the middle
of trying to reach a resolution. We have provided some 17,000
pages of documentation. We believe that the magnitude of what
they are going to have to go through will probably bring this
to a halt. We are getting a sense of that from my counsel. I
can get back to you on it specifically. We are working it,
working it very hard. We will try, as you know, with the
introduction of the V-22, the earlier the better to get them
out there to help solve that. We have got the trainers being
put out there so that we can actually move our squadrons out as
quickly as possible to try to diffuse this.
I can get back to you on the exact time. But right now we
are still in the battle.
[The information follows:]
MV-22s will begin to arrive at MAG-16, MCAS Miramar, in fiscal year
2005. Twenty-one (21) aircraft are forecast to arrive during fiscal
year 2005, twenty-five (25) during fiscal year 2006, and the final two
(2) aircraft in fiscal year 2007. This puts 48 MV-22 Ospreys at MCAS
Miramar completing the MAG-16 stand-up.
CAMP PENDLETON LEVEE
Mr. Cunningham. I appreciate it.
Mr. Secretary, I want to thank the Department also we have
had some problems with the sand issue out there, and a lot of
it was caused because of the lack of sand on the beaches. I
mean, it is just solid rock there, and the bluffs are going
away with this El Nino, and people's homes are falling down. We
are talking monumental problems especially in California.
But we would like your continued support to be able to beef
that up, and if we don't get some resolution, we are going to
be looking to take out that levee up around Pendleton, which is
causing a lot of the change in flow. And the Marine Corps may
not like that, or the community up there may not like that, but
we have got to change that because it is destroying people's
lives. This is a heads up.
RETENTION ISSUES
I would like to just close on the retention issue. It is
not, as you say, just because of the economy. Family separation
in all services is the number one issue for retention. And
where we draw down our ships to like 300 ships, and we draw
down the numbers. You draw down the services, and they have to
deploy longer. You increase Bosnia, you increase like in
Kuwait, and, Jay, you talked about $130 million. It costs
nearly a million dollars a day to steam a carrier with all the
operations and everything. When we look at the expansion of
that, the cost, the retention, you talk about readiness, we
have all our adversary squadrons are gone. That not only made
us readier to fight, but it gave our kids shore duty billets to
come where they could fly instead of having them come back to
this damn Pentagon to work that you and I drag ourselves away
from just so we can stay in the cockpit, all of those things.
And I want to tell you, they don't like homosexuals forced
on to them. I talk to them every day. They don't like the
politically correct Navy. To where I used to get in trouble as
a JG and stuff, my skipper would stand up for me. They do that
today and they get fired in many cases with the political
correctness of it. It is making it very, very difficult.
You talk about fathers not having their sons, because of
the erosion of the benefits. Subvention helps, but we have got
a long way to go with veterans' care and those kinds of things
to help to keep these guys turned around.
Bonuses help a little bit. It went from 29 to 33 in the Air
Force. I am sure it helps the Navy as well. But that is just a
minimum. We keep asking our kids to do more with less, where
the markets are open out there and expect them to stay in.
When I was a lieutenant commander, I didn't look out to go
fly with the airlines. I said, hey, my benefits are there. I
can serve my country. I can fly fighters, and I can do that.
All of that has gone away, Mr. Secretary, and these kids are
losing face with it.
Yeah, they like to fly and they want to serve their
country, but they are losing a lot of it, and we have got a
tough time.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much for a very good hearing.
Admiral Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Dalton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. The Committee is adjourned.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the
answers thereto follow:]
Contingency Operations
Question. In the fiscal year 1998 DoD Appropriations Act, the
Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund included nearly $1.9
billion for Operation and maintenance cost associated with contingency
operations in Bosnia and the Persian Gulf. Of this amount, $1,467.5
million is for Bosnia, and $416.5 million is for Southwest Asia.
Contingency operations for fiscal year 1998 are underfunded. Unofficial
estimates indicate that Bosnia is underfunded by approximately $700
million, and Southwest Asia is underfunded by a similar amount
(assuming the current buildup, but no hostilities).
What are the Navy and Marine Corps' Military Personnel and
Operation and maintenance requirements in fiscal year 1998 for Bosnia
outside of what's already been funded in the 1998 DoD appropriations
Act?
Navy Answer. In order to provide two carrier battle groups in the
Arabian Gulf for the remainder of the fiscal year, it was necessary to
reposition one carrier which was deployed in the Mediterranean Sea
supporting the Bosnia contingency operations. As a result, the Navy and
Marine Corps' overall estimate of funding required for Bosnia has
decreased by $5.1 million. This reduction was taken into consideration
when the Emergency Supplemental request was submitted by DoD to the
Congress.
Marine Corps Answer. Funding requirements for fiscal year 1998
Bosnia costs beyond that included in the fiscal year 1998 appropriation
for the Military personnel, Marine Corps appropriation and in the
Transfer account for O&M requirements total $2.5 million; $1.4 million
for MPMC and $1.1 million for O&MMC. The proposed Supplemental request
includes the O&MMC portion under the Overseas Contingency Operations
Transfer Fund. Funding under the MPMC appropriation supports Reserves
activated for support, imminent danger pay and family separation
allowances. O&M funding is primarily for equipment maintenance and
travel and per diem.
Question. What are the Navy and Marine Corps' total Military
Personnel and Operation and maintenance costs for Bosnia in fiscal year
1998?
Navy Answer. The total cost for the Navy and Marine Corps
contingency operations in Bosnia for fiscal year 1998 is $76.9 million.
Marine Corps Answer. Total MPMC requirements in support of Bosnia
operations are $2.7 million. Total O&MMC requirements are $2.3 million.
Question. What are the Navy and Marine Corps' Military Personnel
and Operation and maintenance requirements in fiscal year 1998 for
Southwest Asia outside of what's already been funded in the 1998 DoD
appropriations Act?
Navy Answer. The additional cost to the Navy and Marine Corps of
the enhanced presence currently being maintained in the Gulf (two
carrier battle groups and one amphibious readiness group) is estimated
to be $209 million. Offsetting this increase is a reduction in cost for
Bosnia of approximately $5 million, bringing the Department's net
requirement down to $204 million.
Marine Corps Answer. Additional costs for the MPMC appropriation
are $3.7 million. Additional costs for the O&MMC appropriation are $5.7
million. The Military Personnel costs support primarily imminent danger
pay and family separation allowances. The Operation and Maintenance
costs primarily support incurred predeployment costs, subsistence
expenses, a planned MPF off-load, and equipment maintenance.
Question. What are the Navy and Marine Corps' total Military
Personnel and Operations and maintenance costs for Southwest Asia in
fiscal year 1998?
Navy Answer. The total cost for the Navy and Marine Corps
contingency operations in Southwest Asia for fiscal year 1998 is $322.4
million.
Marine Corps Answer. Total MPMC costs are estimated to be $3.7
million and total O&MMC costs are estimated to be $5.7 million in
support of Southwest Asia operations in fiscal year 1998.
Question. Have funds yet been transferred from the Overseas
Contingency Operations Transfer Fund to Navy and Marine Corps'
Operation and maintenance to fund your contingency related expenses?
Navy Answer. As of 18 March 1998, $157.8 million has been
transferred to the Navy and $1.2 million has been transferred to the
Marine Corps for contingency related operations and maintenance costs.
Marine Corps Answer. Funding has not yet been received from the
Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund. The Marine Corps is
scheduled to receive $1.2 million in support of Bosnia operations from
this account in fiscal year 1998.
Navy Ability To Support the Two MRC Strategy
Question. Supporting the indefinite extension of the NATO mission
in Bosnia combined with the recent increase in the deployment of U.S.
forces to the Persian Gulf has stretched the ability of the U.S. to
meet its security commitments elsewhere in the world. Recent press
coverage indicates that the strain placed on U.S. forces is evident in
each of the military services. For example, redeployment of a carrier
to meet the emerging threat in the Persian Gulf may result in a carrier
gap in the Mediterranean. Shuffling assets to meet both emergent
requirements and long term security commitments may also hinder the
Department's ability to conduct required maintenance actions on time.
In addition, the need to meet the increasing demand for U.S. forces
will significantly increase the strain placed on U.S. military
personnel.
Given the indefinite extension of the Bosnia mission and the recent
buildup in the Persian Gulf, do you feel that the Navy and Marine Corps
have adequate equipment and personnel resources to fulfill its share of
the current national security commitments?
Navy Answer. Yes. The Navy continually monitors and assesses its
ability to fulfill its share of the current national security
commitments. Although some challenges exist, we have the equipment and
people to meet all commitments. Unfunded contingencies, however, result
in funds being diverted from non-deployed forces to deployed. Such
action negatively impacts the balance of current readiness across the
force by delaying vital equipment repairs and disrupting quality
training.
Marine Corps Answer. Yes. Currently our forward deployed forces
have been able to meet most of the CINC's requirements for Marine
Corps. We have deployed a modest number of additional Marines to
enhance our command control and to support our Maritime Prepositioned
Squadron operations in the Arabian Gulf. These deployments will enhance
our ability to quickly respond to any further requests for Marine
forces from USCINCCENT.
Question. What specific deficiencies do you see in the Navy and
Marine Corps forces?
Navy Answer. Maintaining and attracting the highly qualified people
necessary to man our force is a significant challenge. Recently, we
have been experiencing some manning shortfalls. These shortfalls can be
attributed to our conscious decision to reduce accessions, especially
accessions of unskilled personnel, to achieve mandated force level
reductions yet keep faith with out career force.
We are working hard to fill these shortfalls in a very difficult
recruiting environment--characterized by a strong U.S. economy, low
unemployment and a low propensity for enlistment age young adults to
join the military.
We have submitted to Congress a significant fiscal year 98
reprogramming request to move additional funds into out Personnel
account. Among the things this reprogramming will provide are:
Increased funding to the Permanent Change of Station (PCS)
move program--which helps improve distribution.
Increased funding to the Selective Reenlistment Bonus
(SRB) program--which helps retain individuals with critical skills.
Increased funding to the Enlistment Bonus Program,
advertising, and Navy College Fund programs--tools which will assist
Navy recruiters in attracting prospective recruits.
Maine Corps Answer. The Marine Corps does not have any additional
equipment or personnel deficiencies caused by both the Bosnia mission
and the recent build-up in the Persian Gulf.
Tempo of Operations
Question. What risks are posed by the requirement to maintain a
constant two carrier presence in the Persian Gulf for the foreseeable
future?
Navy Answer. The Department of the Navy is striving to support the
current requirement for two carriers battle groups in the Persian Gulf
with regularly scheduled forward-deploying forces. It must be
emphasized however, that this support comes at a cost, in reduced
presence in other theaters, and poses significant challenges for the
Fleet Commander.
To date, there have been no exceptions to the Navy's
PERSTEMPO guidelines specifically caused by the increased carrier
presence in the Persian Gulf.
Short term impacts are slight due to the forward deployed
posture and inherent mobility of naval forces which make them an ideal
choice for crisis response and easy to shift between theaters of
operation when contingencies arise.
Longer term support comes at a greater cost due to
compressed Interdeployment Training Cycles (IDTC) and perturbations to
long range CVBG deployment schedules, which could result in increased
OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO.
Higher transit speeds, increased flight/steaming hours,
and the requirement to compress or defer maintenance have potential
impact on force readiness and quality of life for Sailors and Marines.
Marine Corps Answer. Further stresses to OPTEMPO. The U.S. Navy has
answered this question in detail.
Question. Do you foresee any long term carrier gaps emerging
because of the need to maintain an increased presence in Southwest
Asia?
Navy Answer. In order to maintain a two CV presence in the Arabian
Gulf while: (1) limiting our deployments to six months; (2) minimizing
the impact upon maintenance and training schedules; and (3) ensuring
force readiness and quality of life for our Sailors and Marines,
carrier gaps exist now in the form of reduced coverage in the EUCOM and
PACOM Areas of Responsibility (AORs).
For example, it is projected that only 13 percent of the CV
presence requirement for EUCOM will be met in calendar year 1998,
should the two CV presence requirement for the Arabian Gulf remain in
effect. Additionally, only 87 percent of the CV presence requirement
for PACOM will be met during this same period. As long as there is a
requirement for a two CV presence in the Arabian Gulf, there will be
gaps in CV coverage in other AORs.
Question. The Committee understands that increased carrier coverage
in the Persian Gulf may produce a gap in coverage in the Mediterranean.
In your view is there a tradeoff between supporting the NATO mission in
Bosnia and meeting the threat we face from Iraq?
Navy Answer. As per Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe
(SHAPE) Statement of Requirements, there is currently no requirement
for CV support to the NATO mission in Bosnia. However, due to the
volatile nature of the AOR, a situation could quickly arise in which a
CVBG would be required.
Marine Corps Answer. The use of multiple carriers in the Gulf
allows for independent US action against Iraq in strength. It provides
a force that is not bound to restrictions imposed by foreign
governments for the use of their bases or territory. In my view, it is
the continuous presence of the two carriers, and the option for
independent US action which has brought Saddam to the negotiating
table. This is a clear example of the inherent flexibility of Naval
forces which allows our National Command Authorities to shift combat
power from one theater to another unencumbered by the vagaries of
foreign governments. So in that respect, the movement of the Med
carrier battle group to the Arabian Gulf was a sound decision.
Although the use of carrier air has proven a most efficient support
mechanism for forces in Bosnia, we also have the cooperation and
support of the Italian government, where we have many aircraft based in
support of the NATO mission in Bosnia. I would defer to CINCEUR on any
preferences he may have for shore-based versus afloat aircraft,
although I suspect that he would prefer to have both available to him.
The Navy, of course, has the capability to backfill our carrier
presence in the Med if required, although at an increase to operational
and deployment tempo.
The current situation is but one more example of the flexibility
and efficiency of naval forces, and the importance of these strategic
assets to our warfighting CINCs and to our nation.
Question. Does the redeployment of ships and aircraft put the
maintenance schedules for equipment at risk?
Navy Answer. Since the Navy is supporting a two carrier presence in
the Persian Gulf with regularly scheduled forward-deploying forces,
maintenance schedules have not been affected. However, if we are
required to maintain this presence indefinitely, the Navy will face
some challenges. A condensed Interdeployment Training Cycle (IDTC) will
likely be required. Additionally, some work scheduled to be
accomplished during upcoming ship and aircraft maintenance
availabilities may need to be deferred.
Marine Corps Answer. Yes, in at least, some cases.
Question. If the Navy is unable to meet its maintenance schedules
for equipment what risks does this pose to the nation's ability to meet
its security commitments?
Navy Answer. Deferring equipment maintenance can lead to readiness
degradation and eventually have an impact on the Navy's ability to meet
its operational commitments. However, if maintenance schedules were
condensed to support an emergent need for additional deployed forces,
non-essential work would be deferred, and those resources made
available would be directed toward accelerating the repair of essential
equipment.
Marine Corps Answer. The risks would be many and varied and will be
answered in detail by the Navy.
Naval Strategy
Question. Admiral Johnson, in April 1997 you declared that the Navy
was shifting from ``platform-centric'' to ``network-centric'' warfare.
This is warfare which derives its power from the networking of a well-
informed but geographically dispersed force.
Please describe your vision of network-centric-warfare, and the
implications for naval warfighting.
Answer. Network Centric Warfare (NWCW) is warfare based on the
ability of a widely distributed, self-synchronizing force to mass
effects when and where desired. Based on timely, accurate, and shared
information obtained through high quality, widely distributed netted
sensors, a streamlined command structure is able to alter conditions
and respond to rapidly changing scenarios.
The network centric Navy will consist of a sensor grid, command and
control process, and a shooter grid; all riding on a common information
backplane. Properly executed, NWCW allows us to mass fires not forces.
Other benefits of NWCW are a flattened command hierarchy which enhances
speed of command and synchronization. The ultimate goal is to lock out
enemy options early on and thus effectively change their actions.
One of the most important aspects of a network-centric naval force
will be the ability to gain and maintain information superiority. The
principal utility of network-centric operations is time--more time for
our warfighters with the right information at the right place. This
superior information position gives us the ability to change the
critical initial conditions of the battle to our advantage. It will
allow us to control how and when the battle will be fought. Not only
will this advantage of time allow us to determine the conditions of the
battle, but it may dissuade the enemy from taking any action because we
can preempt his actions.
The implications for naval warfighting are far-reaching and are
still in an embryonic stage. As the civilian and commercial sectors are
only just beginning to realize the full economic and social potential
of the Internet, the military services are only glimpsing the beginning
of a new era in warfighting.
Question. How does the Cooperative Engagement Capability program
fit into this strategy?
Answer. Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) is a crucial
component of network-centric warfare. In essence, CEC provides the
sensor grid of a networking-centric navy. The goal of CEC is to link
geographically dispersed sensors, of differing capabilities, with all
potential firing platforms. Thus, all firing platforms will have the
identical real-time picture of the battle-space.
For the first time in naval warfare history, we are able to
initiate fire engagements based on tracking data provided by sensors
located on remote platforms, such as Naval vessels or shore-based
Marine Corps radars. This has immense potential for application to the
littoral battlefield or to overload engagements using Naval weapons.
This leads to a tremendous capability to combine Army and Air Force
sensor grids with Naval sensor grids to provide a joint firing
solution. Joint warfighting capabilities would be significantly
enhanced by the ability to combine all Services' sensor grids. We are
not at that point yet, but it is a definite possibility.
Question. What programs are now in the 1999 budget before us that
were not there before you announced this new strategy?
Answer. There are no programs within the Navy's budget which can be
specifically identified with network-centric warfare. In the broad
sense, all the Navy's programs support or will support network-centric
warfare. As network-centric warfare forces the command hierarchy to be
flattened, it will also require a shift in how the Navy views its
resources. Information technology and warfare capabilities will be co-
mingled in such a way that it may be detrimental to view them as
separate and distinct. We are only at the beginning of this process so
it is difficult to judge the need for any new programs at this point.
But we have determined the need to examine how the capabilities
interact and what is the best way to implement the change to network-
centric warfare.
To facilitate this change, we employ the Fleet Battle Experiments
(FBE). Prior to fiscal year 1999, we funded the FBEs within existing
programs. In the fiscal year 1999 budget, we decided to set aside a
discrete project line to support the Maritime Battle Center (MBC).
MBC is specifically charged with planning, design, analysis, and
reporting of Fleet Battle Experiments (FBE). Guided by the National
Military Strategy, Navy Operational Concept, and Joint Vision 2010, MBC
will develop FBE themes and a long range execution schedule. Through
the MBC and FBEs, we hope to realize the full potential of network-
centric warfare.
Question. Explain your recent decision to establish the Navy
Warfare Development Command and restructure the Navy War College.
Answer. Establishing an innovation process and identifying an
organization responsible for developing concepts and doctrine are
essential to maintaining the Navy on the cutting edge of future
warfighting capabilities. This decision was based on recommendations
from a high level civilian task force (CNO Executive Panel) which were
thoroughly staffed within the Navy and concurred in by the Navy's
uniformed leadership.
The purpose behind my decision to establish the Navy Warfare
Development Command and restructure the Naval War College was to:
Tie together concept development, fleet experimentation
and doctrine formulation within the framework of the Navy strategic
vision.
Draw on the unique resources and talent available at the
Naval War College.
Provide a formal process for innovation in naval
operations required to continue meeting our strategic vision.
Capitalize on our recent Fleet Battle Experiment
successes.
Revitalize and empower the doctrine development process.
The reorganized Naval War College, incorporating
responsibilities formerly assigned to the Naval Doctrine Command, will
provide the appropriate leadership to develop strategy and guide the
Navy's warfare innovation efforts into the twenty-first century. The
relocation of functions will enable a complete synergy with the CNO
Strategic Studies Group (located at the Naval War College), and the
faculty and military chairholders. This reorganization is the most
effective and efficient approach to achieving the desired enhancement
in naval warfare innovations, warfare experimentation, and doctrine
development.
Unfunded Requirements
Question. The Department of the Navy did a good job of funding
items in the fiscal year 1999 budget that have been problem areas
requiring Congressional adds during the past 3 years. In the new
balanced budget environment, it is unlikely that the Congress will be
able to continue providing large funding increases unless corresponding
offsets are found. Nevertheless, it would be useful to us to know what
your unfunded priorities are in case we find ways to address them
during our appropriations process.
What are the potential savings if the Congress were to provide
additional funding in fiscal year 1999 for any of these items?
Navy Answer. The costs and savings for each item on the March 25,
1998 unfunded priority list are as indicated below:
Flying Hour Spares:
25 Mar unfunded priority amount: $45 million.
Savings: As a result of increased reliability of the repair parts
these funds would procure, savings are expected in the outyears. To
qualify for this program the improved components must be expected to
generate at least a two for one savings over a ten year period. If
funded, these savings would be phased into the budget.
Ship Depot Maintenance:
25 Mar unfunded priority amount: $90 million.
Savings: N/A.
Recruiting:
25 Mar unfunded priority amount: $62 million.
Savings: N/A.
ADT:
25 Mar unfunded priority amount: $10 million.
Savings: N/A.
ADSW:
25 Mar unfunded priority amount: $10 million.
Savings: N/A.
Real Property Maintenance:
25 Mar unfunded priority amount: $391 million.
Savings: The additional cost of increased deterioration resulting
from deferral of $391 million in maintenance and repair requirements to
fiscal year 2000 is estimated to be $20 million, not including the cost
of impacts to mission readiness and efficiency.
Ship Self Defense:
25 Mar unfunded priority amount: $30 million.
Savings: Inflation savings.
CEC:
25 Mar unfunded priority amount: $20 million.
Savings: None.
CVN-77 Technology Insertion:
25 Mar unfunded priority amount: $33 million.
Savings: The provision of additional RDT&E funds in fiscal year
1999 would produce savings by expanding the identification of
transition technologies to reduce life cycle costs for the CVN 77, the
other nine ships of the CVN 68 class, as well as for the CV (X).
Savings estimates are currently being refined.
CVN-77 Advanced Procurement:
25 Mar unfunded priority amount: $100 million.
Savings: The savings achieved from the acceleration of $100 million
of advanced procurement and advance construction items for CVN-77 are
estimated at several hundred million dollars.
CH60 MCM:
25 Mar unfunded priority amount: $15 million.
Savings: None. This is an emergent requirement to investigate the
feasibility of starting a formal program plan to transition from the
MH-53E to the H-60 to conduct AMCM in an organic role with the fleet.
AQS 20X:
25 Mar unfunded priority amount: $7 million.
Savings: None.
IT-21:
25 Mar unfunded priority amount: $143 million.
Savings: It is expected that there will be operational savings due
to electronic/communication efficiencies, but at this time we cannot
predict a rough order of magnitude.
Piers, Runways and Quality of Life:
25 Mar unfunded priority amount: $192 million.
Savings: By advancing the projects into fiscal year 1999 cost
avoidance from inflation would be 1-5 percent. Some of the projects
would have operational savings which would result from improved
efficiencies. Inflation savings are determined by taking the cost of
the individual project and calculating the savings based on the
inflation rate and the number of years the project is accelerated.
Precise calculations of the savings have not been performed for the
listed projects.
Bachelor Quarters:
25 Mar unfunded priority amount: $81 million.
Savings: By advancing the projects into fiscal year 1999 cost
avoidance from inflation would be 1-5 percent. Some of the projects
would have operational savings which would result from improved
efficiencies. Inflation savings are determined by taking the cost of
the individual project and calculating the savings based on the
inflation rate and the number of years the project is accelerated.
Precise calculations of the savings have not been performed for the
listed projects.
Bachelor Quarters Furniture:
25 Mar unfunded priority amount: $10 million.
Savings: There are minimal inflation savings expected due to the
provisions of additional funds in fiscal year 1999.
Family Housing:
25 Mar unfunded priority amount: $53 million.
Savings: There would be minimal savings realized from the
acceleration of this project.
NSIPS:
25 Mar unfunded priority amount: $19 million.
Savings: IT-21: There are no savings from these technology
upgrades. These funds will be used to accommodate technology upgrades
coming from several systems which must be used in Personal Support
Activity offices.
RT-21: No direct savings. Hardware maintenance may be reduced.
BPR: Business Processing reengineering and more efficient and
effective staff performance are expected to generate savings. Because
the work proposed is what is required to identify these savings, it is
not possible to state at this time.
ACC: The ACC will reduce by 25% the outyear operations and
maintenance for systems supported.
SDS: N/A.
EFSR: The improvement/cost savings will be realized by the more
efficient method of doing business. With all of current manning
reductions already in place, this will enable PSDs to work more
efficiently and maintain the level of service required. These savings
have been determined based on already taken reductions in the PSD
manning. A full economic analysis and identification of further
manpower savings is part of the NSIPS implementation plan.
ATM Machines at Sea:
25 Mar unfunded priority amount: $12 million.
Savings: This is a fact of life requirement and not a potential
cost saver. Shipboard assessment demonstrated that the systems will
fail at the turn of the century. The ATM I hardware is out of
production and is no longer supported by the contractor. The ATM II
systems require hardware upgrades to run the new Y2K software. The
software has been tested and is currently deployed to four ships with
another 20 scheduled this fiscal year. The requested funds are to
complete the replacement/upgrade of the remaining 124 platforms by
December 1999.
E-2C:
25 Mar unfunded priority amount: $71 million.
Savings: If we assume the multiyear procurement is approved, the
total savings achieved by moving an aircraft from fiscal year 2003 to
fiscal year 1999 is minimal. The minimal savings is primarily the
result of the multiyear procurement buying all the detail parts and
Prime Mission Equipment (PME) in fiscal year 1999. The fiscal year 1999
buy of parts and equipment already includes the plus-up aircraft's
parts and equipment. There are some savings in fiscal year 1999 by
spreading overhead over four aircraft instead of three aircraft, but
this is offset by an increase in fiscal year 2003 due to the movement
of the aircraft from fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 1999. Approximate
inflation savings would be $2.6 million.
AIP Acceleration:
25 Mar unfunded priority amount: $72 million.
Savings: When the amount under consideration ($72 million) is
combined with existing fiscal year 1999 funding, an AIP kit average
unit procurement cost decrease of $0.5 million is anticipated. This
would allow the procurement of 8 additional kits for the $72 million.
Significant increase in operational effectiveness will reduce operating
hours necessary to carry out ASUW and surveillance missions.
Submarine Connectivity:
25 Mar unfunded priority amount: $61 million.
Savings: Availability of an additional $61 million in fiscal year
1999 funds would result in a future savings of $6.3 million to the
Department of the Navy. These savings will accrue due to quantity
savings based on contract negotiated prices.
Submarine Towed Arrays:
25 Mar unfunded priority amount: $12 million.
Savings: None.
Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion:
25 Mar unfunded priority amount: $21 million.
Savings: Increased fiscal year 1999 funding supports new and
additional requirements currently not funded within the FYDP. There are
no specific savings that can be attributed to increased fiscal year
1999 funding.
Standard Missile:
25 Mar unfunded priority amount: $48 million.
Savings: Total savings to the Program are $28 million. Acquisition
savings of $26 million, and $2 million in operational and support
savings.
The long term effect of the procurement of additional rounds in
fiscal year 1999 allows for the program to get further along the
learning/rate curve earlier, resulting in a reduction in the cost of
rounds in the outyears. The result is a net savings of $26 million
across the total procurement (acquisition savings).
The $2 million savings in operational and support dollars is a
direct result of procuring rounds early in the acquisition cycle. This
allows earlier cessation of operational and support dollars, providing
savings.
TOMAHAWK:
25 Mar unfunded priority amount: $27 million.-OMN
Savings: There are no acquisition savings associated with the
additional recertifications and refurbishments. This is a readiness
driven requirement. There will be approximately $600,000 per year
inflation savings by performing recertifications and refurbishments in
fiscal year 1999 vice in FYDP outyears.
TADCX:
25 Mar unfunded priority amount: $450 million.
Savings: The potential exists to eliminate 2 SLEPs for a total of
$35 million in then year dollars.
SH60R:
25 Mar unfunded priority amount: $23 million.
Savings: There are no direct savings to be gained. However, the
addition of a fourth test asset mitigates the possibility of potential
schedule slip with attendant cost increase during TECHEVAL/OPEVAL. An
additional test asset provides the test team with flexibility in test
scheduling and mitigating technical risks. After testing completion,
all test assets will return to the fleet with no further rework
anticipated.
LANTIRN PODS:
25 Mar unfunded priority amount: $8 million.
Savings: None.
Steaming Days:
25 Mar unfunded priority amount: $20 million.
Savings: N/A.
Marine Corps Answer. Following is a list of our unfunded priorities
for procurement and R&D for aviation, ground equipment, and amphibious
support programs. This list is arranged by appropriation and
prioritized within each appropriation.
Generally speaking, acceleration of these programs would result in
inflation savings. There are several ground equipment programs for
which the unit price would decrease as a result of a larger quantity
procurement. Examples follow the table.
Additionally, earlier fielding of many of these critical
replacements for our aging aviation platforms and ground equipment will
result in savings in terms of decreased equipment maintenance costs.
[Dollars in millions]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
APPN Item Total
------------------------------------------------------------------------
APN MV-22 (Acft) $78.0
APN AV-8B Acft & Spares (2 Acft) 43.1
APN CH-53E HNVS ``B'' Kits 30.0
APN AV-8B Act Modifications 2.3
APN AH-1W Night Targeting System 11.0
OPN OMNI IV Night Vision Goggles 22.6
OPN LCAC C4N Upgrade 16.8
WPN Hellfire II/TOW Rocket Motors 3.6
RDT&E AV-8B OSCAR & LSO Upgrade 12.2
RDT&E AV-8B Advanced Targeting FLIR 64.3
RDT&E USMC H-1 Upgrades, 4BN/4BW Acft 23.4
PANMC Ctg, 120mm Target Practice w/Tracer (TP-T) (DODIC 0.7
C784)
PANMC Ctg, 120mm Target Practice, Cone Stabilized, 0.5
Discarding Sabot w/Tracer (TPCSDS)
PANMC Ctg, 25mm Target Practice Discarding Sabot-Tracer 0.9
(TPDS-T) (DODIC A940)
PANMC Ctg, 5.56 Blank Linked (DODIC A075) 0.6
PANMC Ctg, 7.62mm Ball Linked (DODIC A143) 0.7
PANMC Ctg, Cal .50 Ball Linked (DODIC A555) 0.3
PANMC Ctg, 9mm Ball (DODIC A363) 0.8
PANMC Rocket, 83mm Dualmode (DODIC HX05) PIP 18.0
PANMC Fuze, Hand Grenade Practice (DODIC G878) 2.5
PANMC Grenade, Hand Smoke Green (DODIC G940) 0.5
PANMC Grenade, Hand Practice Smoke TA M83 (DODIC G982) 0.2
PANMC Signal, Smoke & Illum Marine (DODIC L283) 0.5
PANMC Igniter, Time Fuse Blasting (DODIC MN08) 0.6
PMC Base Telecom Infrastructure 64.1
PMC LTVR 37.0
PMC Mod Kits Tracked Vehicles 4.6
PMC Y2K Compliance/Computer Replacement 20.0
PMC P-19A Aircraft Firefighting SLEP 4.6
PMC SECM 5.4
PMC Night Vision Equipment 6.1
PMC Hose Reel 16.5
PMC Network Infrastructure 16.5
PMC Avenger 7.6
PMC Power Equipment 9.5
PMC Material Handling Equipment 10.4
PMC Mods Kits (Artillery & Other) 1.3
PMC JTIDS 3.0
PMC GPA-123 IFF Antennas 1.2
PMC CBIRF 1.0
RDT&E Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory 10.0
RDT&E LW155 Howitzer 6.8
RDT&E Predator/SRAW 4.0
RDT&E AAAV 5.0
RDT&E CBIRF 1.2
RDT&E Unit Ops Center (UOC) 1.1
RDT&E Global Broadcast System 0.7
SCN LCAC SLEP 3.6
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Examples of programs with potential unit cost savings: AAAV: The $5
million fiscal year 1999 Budget enhancement would allow the AAAV
program to fund development of an alternative propulsion system and
alternative suspension components.
The current primary propulsion system is estimated to have a
Design-to-Unit-Production-Cost (DTUPC) of $467,000 (in constant fiscal
year 1995 dollars). This enhancement would allow development of an
alternative propulsion system that is estimated to have a DTUPC of
$311,000. This would yield a potential procurement savings for the
1,013 vehicles, and spares of $202.8 million, for the years fiscal year
2006 through fiscal year 2012.
An AAAV alternative suspension subsystem (HSUs) has an estimated
DTUPC reduction of $35,500 per vehicle for 1,013 vehicles totaling
$35.9 million in procurement and $205 million in O&M. Another
alternative suspension component is an alternative lightweight track
system. If successful this would provide competition between two
vendors thereby reducing the DTUPC for the track system. Past
competition has yielded DTUPC reductions of fifteen (15) percent.
Shop equipment contact maintenance (SECM): Potential savings of
$300,000 associated with reduced unit cost derived from an acceleration
of the program and increased production quantities.
Material handling equipment: Savings associated with MHE
procurement via commercial channels are $1.6 million on the RTCH and
$2.0 million on the TRAMS.
PANMC: The cost savings associated with the ammunition on the
Budget Enhancement List (BEL) is largely attributable to the inflation
savings. Of the 11 ammunition items on the BEL, 10 are requested to
raise the Marine Corps acquisition objective to 100%. These 10
ammunition items total $8.8 million and will save approximately
$168,000 in additional inflation costs.
The $18 million requested for the Shoulder Launched Multi-Purpose
Assault Weapon (SMAW) Dual Mode Rocket (DODIC HX05) will replace the
encasements. Additionally, the HX05 has a current effective range of
250 meters. With the planned scope of work, both the encasement and the
spotting cartridge will be replaced, thereby increasing the range and
effectiveness to 500 meters, which complies with the current
Operational Requirement Document (ORD). The cost avoidance, NOT A
SAVINGS, realized by replacing the encasements vice procurement is
approximately:
Procurement 34,000 rockets @ $1,433.73 ea............... $48,746,820
Repair 34,000 rockets @ $529.41 ea...................... 17,999,940
--------------------------------------------------------
____________________________________________________
Total cost avoidance................................ 30,746,880
Question. What are the highest unfunded O&M or personnel
requirements?
Navy Answer. The Department of the Navy's top priorities have not
changed in recent years. Readiness, quality of life and modernization
issues remain our highest priorities. In prioritizing our fiscal year
1999 funding, the Department has dedicated the resources needed to
maintain a high level of readiness and sustainability, thus allowing
more realistic and stable commitments to the modernization needed to
defeat future threats.
With that in mind, I would stress that I consider our budget
sufficient in all these areas. There are always, however, instances
where more resources would be beneficial. The Chief of Naval Operations
and Commandant of the Marine Corps have developed lists of their top
unfunded priorities. I support their views. However, I wish to
emphasize that our fiscal year 1999 budget request is finely balanced
and our first priority is to get the budget approved as submitted,
including the amendment for contingency operations without offsets by
the Department. We can not afford general reductions and do not desire
priority changes. Any additional funds over and above that could be
applied to the priorities provided by my Service Chiefs. I have
attached their lists.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Marine Corps Answer: Following is a list, in priority order, of our
highest priority unfinanced requirements for both the active and
reserve O&M and Military Personnel accounts. These items represent
either new, emergent items that could not be addressed in the
formulation of the budget (e.g., advertising, operating forces
support), or items that, because of a topline constraints, could only
be financed at a certain pace, either in the budget or the FYDP (e.g.,
personnel support equipment, initial issue, maintenance of real
property, recruiting). If additional funding became available, the pace
of these programs could be accelerated. Back-up papers are attached for
each item.
O&MMC:
Advertising................................................... $12.0
Operating Force Support....................................... 16.1
Base Operations............................................... 10.4
Active Duty Special Work (ADSW)............................... 2.1
Initial Issue Equipment....................................... 25.0
Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory........................... 1.0
Personnel Support Equipment................................... 25.0
Recruiting Operations......................................... 1.5
Maintenance of Real Property.................................. 72.0
Norway Containerization....................................... 7.5
Distance Learning Initiative.................................. 10.0
Automated Recruit Management System........................... 1.0
Voluntary Education (Tuition Assistance)...................... 1.0
Depot Level Maintenance....................................... 20.7
Human Resources Management and Forecasting.................... 1.0
Family and Individual Readiness............................... 1.6
MAGTF Logistics Automated Information System.................. 0.6
______
Total O&MMC............................................... 208.5
=================================================================
________________________________________________
O&MMCR:
Increased Use of Guard & Reserve.............................. 1.2
Initial Issue................................................. 10.0
782 Gear Career Issue......................................... 4.0
Unit Relocations/Host-tenant Departures....................... 1.5
Contracted Engineer Technical Services........................ 0.8
Corrosion Control and Coating Program......................... 3.2
______
Total O&MMCR.............................................. 20.7
=================================================================
________________________________________________
MPMC:
Recruiting-Enlistment Bonus Program........................... 3.0
Recruiting-Marine Corps College Fund.......................... 5.9
______
Total MPMC................................................ 8.9
=================================================================
________________________________________________
RPMC:
Increased Use of Guard and Reserve............................ 3.4
______
Total RPMC................................................ 3.4
=================================================================
________________________________________________
Question. Which of these items are on any of the CINC Integrated
Priority Lists?
Navy Answer. The latest set of Unified CINC Integrated Priority
Lists (IPLs) were submitted to OSD in December 1997 to support the
upcoming Program Objective Memorandum. Unified CINCs' IPLs continue to
stress force protection, force readiness, combating terrorism,
personnel quality of life, upgrades of existing equipment, theater
missile defense, tactical and strategic mobility, and C4I systems
improvements.
Unfunded Navy procurement, R&D, O&M, and manpower items are all
prioritized within the Force Readiness, Force Protection, C4I Systems,
Theater Missile Defense, Flying Hours and Steaming Days, Logistics and
Mobility, Force Structure, and Quality of Life categories of various
CINC IPLs.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Marine Corps Answer. Although this budget fully funds my highest
priority, near-term readiness, there are areas where I could use help
should additional funds become available.
I would ask, however, that you also consider the following items:
That you support the Fiscal Year 1998 Supplemental, and that the
request be treated as an emergency, with no offsets required by the
Department; and,
That you support our funding and program requests as reflected in
the Fiscal Year 1999 President's Budget Request. The items funded in
the budget represent our top priorities within existing topline
constraints.
The Marine Corps is in the business of warfighting and funds each
program based on its cost-benefit to the Corps warfighting capability.
Because the Unified CINCs will ultimately employ the Marine Corps
warfighting assets, the Marine Corps measures each investment by its
contribution to supporting the warfighting CINCs. Whether it's arming
our firing batteries or enhancing our Marines' quality of life, the
justification for funding must be an increase to our warfighting
effectiveness. During the development of the Budget Enhancement List,
careful consideration was given to each program's impact on warfighting
capability. If the enhancement did not support a CINC's warfighting
capability by either directly or indirectly supporting an IPL item, it
was not included on the Enhancement List. Each of the programs included
in the list meets this criteria of supporting at least one of the CINC
Integrated Priority Lists.
Attached is a listing of our underfunded or unmet items which are
not financed due to present fiscal constraints. These items are arrayed
as requested by the House National Security Committee, HNSC, in the
categories of Quality of Life, Readiness and Modernization, and are
prioritized by appropriation or area of support, within each category.
I remain concerned about the long-term implications of underfunding
investment in infrastructure at our bases and stations in terms of
maintenance of real property and minor construction. I added a fourth
category to those requested by the HNSC, ``Other'', which covers these
areas, as well as other items in the area of operations and maintenance
support of our active forces which could be accelerated in the event
additional funds became available.
[Clerk's note.--The list was provided for the Committee's
files.]
Increased Use of Multiyear Contracts
Question. The Department of the Navy budget request for fiscal year
1999 requests authority for new multiyear procurement programs and also
continues existing multiyear programs. The effect of the fiscal year
1999 budget, if approved by Congress, would be to have DDG-51 ships,
AV-8B aircraft, E-2C aircraft, T-45 trainer aircraft, CH-60
helicopters, the medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement, and Javelin anti-
tank missiles purchased under multiyear contracts. The Navy is also
closely examining the feasibility of multiyear procurements for V-22,
F/A-18E/F aircraft, P-3 aircraft modifications, and LPD-17 ships in
future years.
Secretary Dalton, please describe the Navy's new strategy of
aggressively pursuing multiyear procurement programs.
Navy Answer. By capitalizing on the increased stability in our
modernization accounts, we can accelerate procurement of crucial
systems and reduce unit costs, increasing our modernization potential
by the billions of dollars (including existing multiyear contracts)
which this approach saves.
Question. Defense outyear budget projections are often optimistic,
and usually materialize into actual programs at much lower funding
levels. What is the risk that the Navy will start a number of multiyear
programs that it cannot finish?
Navy Answer. The stability of funding and requirements in each of
our fiscal year 1999 multiyear proposals were carefully evaluated and
were rated low risks. What little risk remains will be further
mitigated through appropriate use of variation in quantity liability
limitation contract clauses.
Marine Corps Answer. There is low/no risk that the Department of
Navy will start a number of multiyear programs that it cannot finish.
All programs requesting multiyear procurement (MYP) must meet certain
criteria. Following is the list of criteria and an example of how one
program, the AV-8B, has satisfied each criterion. The criteria are to
be used in a comparative benefit/risk analysis format where criterion 1
below, represents the benefit factor and criteria 2 through 6 represent
risk factors.
Benefit to the Government. A MYP should yield substantial cost
avoidance or other benefits when compared to conventional annual
contracting methods.
Stability of Requirement. The minimum need for the item remains
unchanged or varies only slightly during the contemplated contract
period in terms of production rate, fiscal year phasing, and total
quantities.
The AV-8B 3 year MYP saves $32 million over annual funding.
Stability of Requirement. The minimum need for the item remains
unchanged or varies only slightly during the contemplated contract
period in terms of production rate, fiscal year phasing, and total
quantities. The Department of the Navy (DON) posture statement
revalidated the remanufacture of 72 day attack AV-8B's and demonstrates
the DON's commitment to properly fund this weapon system to the
quantities proposed in the multiyear plan.
Stability of Funding. There should be reasonable expectation that
the program is likely to be funded at the required level throughout the
contract period. The DON has shown a commitment to support the AV-8B
MYP plan by fully funding the requirements. Funding for the AV-8B has
been stable since 1992.
Stable Configuration. The item should be technically mature with
relatively few changes in item design anticipated and underlying
technology should be stable. The AV-8B is a mature airplane that is
currently over half way through its procurement life. No major
engineering change proposals are planned during the multiyear profile.
Degree of Cost Confidence. There should be reasonable assurance
that cost estimates for both contract costs and anticipated cost
avoidance are realistic. AV-8B MYP savings were developed utilizing
contractor Boeing (MDA) input. The assumptions, methodology, and
savings utilized by Boeing were independently reviewed by the NCCA, and
were deemed to be reasonable.
Degree of Confidence in Contractor Capability. There should be
confidence that the contractor can perform adequately, both in terms of
government furnished items and their firm's capability. The Government
is confident that Boeing (McDonnell Douglas) will be able to support
and deliver the AV-8B based on past performance with MYP scenarios
(FY88-FY91).
Risk Factors. Each risk factor should be categorized as low, medium
or high and an explanation of the risk assessment provided. All AV-8B
risk factors are rated as low based on the comments above.
The Marine Corps reviews all multiple year and multiyear
procurements for all of the criteria above, and for affordability in
both the current years and future years of the budget. Funding ``bow
waves'' are assessed for Service affordability. For large dollar
multiple year procurement items, plans for future years affordability
beyond the six budget years are assessed in the Program Objective
Memorandum development process. Additionally, most Marine Corps
multiyear ground equipment procurements are related to joint or multi-
Service programs and involve future year commitments within the larger
funding bases of the other Services.
Question. For each of the aircraft programs (AV-8B, T-45, E-2C) now
proposed in the 1999 budget for multiyear procurement for the first
time please tell us:
what is the ``up-front'' investment cost?
what are the savings?
what is the percentage of savings resulting solely from
multiyear procurement?
Navy Answer.
e-2c
Additional up-front investment: fiscal year 1999 $139.3 million,
fiscal year 2000 $109.2 million
Savings: fiscal year 2001-fiscal year 2003 $355.1 million (net
fiscal year 1999-fiscal year 2003 $106.5 million)
Percentage savings multiyear alone: 8.3%
Net savings multiyear plus acceleration: $204 million, or 14.4%
t-45ts
Additional up-front investment: fiscal year 1999 $41.2 million,
fiscal year 2000 $14.2 million
Savings: fiscal year 2001-fiscal year 2003 $102.9 million (net
fiscal year 1999-fiscal year 2003 $47.4 million)
Percentage savings multiyear alone: 5.2%
Net savings multiyear plus acceleration: $246 million, or 18.5%
av-8b
(Note: AV-8B approved for fiscal year 1998 multiyear start, but
shown below as fiscal year 1999 multiyear start)
Additional up-front investment: fiscal year 1998--$.3 million,
fiscal year 1999--$1.4 million, fiscal 2000 $6.2 million, or fiscal
year 1998-2000 net $4.5 million additional investment
Savings: fiscal year 2001-fiscal year 2006 net $36.4 million (net
fiscal year 1998-fiscal 2006 $32.0 million)
Percentage savings multiyear alone: 6.5%
Net savings multiyear plus acceleration: Not applicable.
Marine Corps Answer. The fiscal year 1999 President's Budget
reflects funding for a 3 year MYP procurement for the AV-8B. The up
front investment is $25.3 million in fiscal year 1999 for a 3 year
multiyear contract.
The savings are $32.0 million over a 3 year multiyear (fiscal year
1999 to 2001) procurement. The savings are derived as follows: The
benefit from savings yield $15.7 million in fiscal year 2000 and $41.6
million in fiscal year 2001 for a total savings of $57.3 million. After
reducing total savings by the up front costs ($25.3 million in fiscal
year 1999), net savings as a result of entering a MYP are $32.0
million.
The percentage of savings are 6.5% over a 3 year multiyear (fiscal
year 1999 to 2001) for the airframe CFE.
The intent of the Department of the Navy is to enter the AV-8B into
a 4 year MYP. The AV-8B 4 year MYP has been forwarded by ASN (RDA) and
SECNAV. SECDEF approval is expected, with Congressional notification to
follow immediately. Once approved the following up front investment
cost and savings would apply.
For a 4 year MYP the up front cost would be $26.8 million in fiscal
years 1998 and 1999 for a 4 year multiyear contract that would include
fiscal year 1998 procurement.
The savings are $33.0 million for a 4 year multiyear (fiscal years
1998 to 2001) procurement. The savings are derived as follows: The
benefit from savings yield $17.2 million in fiscal year 2000 and $42.6
million in fiscal year 2001 for a total savings of $59.8 million. After
reducing total savings by the up front costs ($26.8 million in fiscal
years 1998 and 1999), net savings as a result of entering a MYP are
$33.0 million.
The percentage of savings are 4.9% over a 4 year multiyear (fiscal
years 1998 to 2001) for the airframe CFE.
Question. Under what conditions and when would the Navy pursue
multiyear procurement for F/A-18E/F aircraft, V-22 aircraft, or LPD-17
ships?
Navy Answer. Future multiyear procurement candidates will be
evaluated in terms of expected benefit (substantial economic and/or
national security benefit), requirement stability, funding stability,
program maturity and configuration stability, cost confidence, and
contractor confidence. Those which offer substantial benefit at
acceptable risk will be proposed for multiyear procurement.
It is important to note, however, that most of the programs
mentioned have potential for large savings through the use of multiyear
contracts.
Marine Corps Answer. Use of multiyear procurement (MYP) for the V-
22 is dependent upon the maturity of the aircraft (concurrence with
R&D), stability of configuration, and degree of cost confidence
(ability to negotiate a fixed-price type contract). The Navy recommends
MYP no earlier than the full rate production decision in fiscal year
2001 with advanced procurement in fiscal year 2000. As currently
programmed, the MYP will begin in fiscal year 2003.
In addition, the Department of the Navy is also examining multiyear
procurement for 10 LPD 17 class ships funded in fiscal year 2000
through fiscal year 2004, and will balance the need to multiyear the
program against available SCN funds. The LPD 17 is the replacement for
four aging class of ships (LST, LKA, LSD 36, LPD 4) built between 1965
and 1973. When construction is complete, the 12 ships will allow the
Navy to meet both our forward presence requirement for Amphibious Ready
Groups (ARGs) and the fiscally constrained warfighting goal of 2.5 MEBs
of lift. Additionally, the LPD 17 class will eliminate our reliance on
mothballed ships presently needed to meet our 2.5 MEB lift goal.
CURRENT PROCUREMENT AND COMMISSIONING PROFILES
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 Tot
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LPD 17s Funded................................. 1 0 0 1 2 2 2 2 2 ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... 12
LPD 17s Commissioned........................... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 12
Total in Inventory............................. ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... 1 2 3 5 7 9 11 12 12
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Personnel Reductions
Question. The fiscal year 1998 Authorization Act established end
strength floors for the active forces, but provided language to allow
the Navy and Marine Corps a one percent variance from that floor. The
fiscal year 1999 budget requests an additional reduction of 14,200 Navy
personnel, and approximately 790 Marine Corps personnel below the
fiscal year 1998 end strength levels.
Will the Department ask the Authorization Committees to either
repeal this end strength floor or waive it for fiscal year 1999?
Navy Answer. The Navy will seek repeal of the end strength floor
established by the fiscal year 1998 Defense Authorization Act. This
will allow the reduction of personnel commensurate with the
recommendations of the Quadrennial Defense Review and provide funds to
be reinvested in modernization and recapitalization of the Navy and
Marine Corps.
Marine Corps Answer. Yes.
Question. Since the additional end strength reductions proposed in
the budget can only be accomplished if the end strength floors are
repealed, what problems of risks does this present to the Navy and
Marine Corps in managing your forces if the floors are not repealed?
Navy Answer. Failure to repeal the end strength floors established
by the fiscal year 1998 Defense Authorization Act will jeopardize Navy
and Marine Corps efforts to replace and modernize our warfighting
platforms. A budget that supports the current floor of 390,802 would
require an additional $819.4 million in the non-discretionary portion
of the MPN account. It is not feasible to resource this shortfall from
MPN discretionary funds that total only $640 million. That $640 million
is critical to maintaining our current programs (Permanent Change of
Station moves, reenlistment bonuses, Navy College Fund, etc.).
Furthermore, the majority of the personnel reductions (66%) are
inextricably linked to force structure; their restoration would require
additional funding not only for the personnel costs, but also for the
platforms on which those personnel would serve.
Our planned Navy and Marine Corps force structure is adequate to
meet our National Security Strategy and was validated by the
Quadrennial Defense Review and the National Defense Panel. The total
required end strength is a function of our force structure and
infrastructure and is not a separate, independent, variable.
Marine Corps Answer. We would encourage the Congress to repeal the
end strength floors reflected in the fiscal year 1998 Authorization
Act. In accordance with the QDR, we reduced our active end strength by
1,800 from the authorized level of 174,000, and will achieve the total
reduction by the end of fiscal year 1999. We have taken these
reductions in order to free up funding to allow us to partially address
the urgent need to modernize equipment for our ground forces. Under
present fiscal constraints, this reduction was essential if we are to
have funds available to apply to modernization. If the fiscal year 1998
end strength floors are not repealed, we will not go below our
Congressionally mandated floor.
Question. Are the Navy and Marine Corps currently continuing to
execute towards the end strength numbers in the budget request?
Navy Answer. The Navy is working to finish fiscal year 1998 with as
close to the 386,894 (390,802 with 1% variance) end strength,
established in the 1998 National Defense Authorization Act, as
possible. However, due to continued limited success of recruiting and
retention, reaching this goal is unlikely. The Navy missed the
accession goal for the month of February by 699 accessions. We will be
unable to recover from this shortfall during the Summer months as the
Recruit Training Command will be at planned capacity for those months.
These additional accessions will have to be achieved during the fall of
1998. Swift action on the MPN reprogramming request will assist us in
providing the required resources necessary to mitigate this shortfall.
We are on track to reduce our end-strength to 372,696 by the end of
fiscal year 1999. The majority of these reductions (66%) are directly
linked to force structure changes while the remainder stem from
indirect savings in the infrastructure.
The Marine Corps is executing toward the end-strength numbers in
the fiscal year 1999 budget request, which incorporated the QDR
recommendations, but does not plan to break the established minimum
prior to approval of new end-strength levels.
Marine Corps Answer. The Marine Corps is currently continuing to
execute towards the end-strength numbers in the budget request, which
have incorporated the QDR recommendations. We do not plan, however, to
break the established minimum prior to the approval of new floor.
Question. What is the total unfunded shortfall for manpower and the
O&M costs associated with maintaining the additional force structure?
Navy Answer. The annual cost would be in excess of $1.43 billion.
This includes approximately $1,017 million in Military Personnel, Navy
and $410 million in Operations and Maintenance, Navy. This estimate is
very conservative in that it assumes the 25 ships scheduled for
decommissioning during fiscal year 1999 are fit for further service
without having to incur additional costs related to alterations and
maintenance which were deferred based on pending decommissionings. The
MP, N estimate is directly proportional to the fiscal year 1999
President's Budget, adjusted for force shaping and recruiting tools
which would be required at the higher end strength level. These figures
would need to be escalated for inflation in the out years.
Nine of the ships scheduled for decommissioning are nuclear powered
attack submarines. On the assumption that these boats are fit for
further service, they would require a nuclear refueling in the near
future. This would require a nuclear refueling in the near future. This
would require a one time cost in excess of $1.6 billion. In reality,
seven of the submarines have reached, or will shortly reach, the end of
their service life and would need to be replaced.
An additional $54.7 million would be required for the Marine Corps:
$48.6 million for MP, MC and $6.1 million for O&M, MC.
Marine Corps Answer. The additional cost of maintaining an end
strength of 174,000 would require $48.6 million for MPMC and $6.1
million for O&M.
Question. Are the fiscal year 1999 personnel reductions directly
tied to force structure changes, like ship deactivations? Explain what
those changes are.
Navy Answer. Of the 18,106 active Navy reductions from President's
Budget fiscal year 1998 to President's Budget fiscal 1999, 12.073 (67%)
were directly tied to force structure changes to include ship and
submarine decommissionings, transfer of select Combat Logistics Force
ship to the Military Sealift Command, and phased transition to the F/A-
18 from the F-14. Commensurate reductions in end strength were taken
against the operational staffs and shore infrastructure for an
additional 3,851 (21%), and 1,161 (6%) were reduced by competitive
initiatives to include outsourcing and civilian substitution. The
remaining 1,021 end strength reduction (6%), was based on a manpower
tail associated with training and transient personnel.
The Marine Corps has also tied the personnel reductions to force
structure changes. The most significant change for fiscal year 1999 is
the continued down-sizing of our Marine Corps Security of our Marine
Corps Security Force Battalion.
Marine Corps Answer. Yes, the Marine Corps has tied the QDR
reductions to force structure changes. The most significant change for
fiscal year 1999 is the continued downsizing of our Marine Corps
Security Force Battalion.
Question. The Navy Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve are also
reducing personnel by approximately 3,400 and over 800 respectively
from last year's levels. Are these personnel reductions also tied to
force structure changes?
Navy Answer. In fiscal year 1999, the Naval Reserve will
decommission one Maritime Patrol Air (MPA) squadron and eight Mine
Inshore Undersea Warfare units because of reduced wartime requirements.
Additionally, the remaining seven MPA squadrons will be restructured to
six aircraft each, and the Carrier Air Wing Fighter squadron will
transition from the F-14 to the F-18. These changes result in a lower
manpower requirements. The remaining reductions reflect reductions to
units that augment active forces and Full-time Support personnel
reductions within the infrastructure.
The Marine Corps Reserve personnel reductions are tied to force
structure changes.
Marine Corps Answer. The SMCR personnel reductions are tied to
force structure changes. Personnel reductions result from anticipation
of structure changes to be implemented from fiscal years 1999 to 2003.
Question. What is the total Reserve force reduction recommended by
the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) for the Navy and Marine Corps? In
which fiscal year will you finish these QDR reductions?
Navy Answer. The QDR recommended force reductions totaling 4,115
Naval Reserve end strength. This reduction is planned to be fully
implemented in fiscal year 2003.
Marine Corps Answer. The active duty reduction recommended by the
QDR was 1,800. This cut will begin in fiscal year 1999 and be completed
in fiscal year 2000 or when end strength floors are reduced by law. The
QDR recommended a reduction in the Marine Corps Reserve end strength of
4,200. The Marine Corps Reserve would finish implementing equivalent
QDR reductions in fiscal year 2002.
Tempo of Operations
Question. With the additional personnel cuts recommended by the
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and our continued commitments to
noncombat missions, do you feel that Navy and Marine Corps forces will
be further stretched because of inadequate levels of troops?
Navy Answer. No. As the Department's force structure and
infrastructure requirements decline, our required end strength is also
reduced commensurate with the reduction in ships, aircraft, and bases.
As a result, the QDR recommended end strength reductions will not
affect the Department's ability to meet operational commitments.
Marine Corps Answer. The recommended Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR) personnel cuts will stretch our forces further, but we have tried
to minimize the impact by taking the cuts from non ``trigger pullers''.
Instead, they will come out of the supporting establishment. In order
to implement the reduction and to restructure for the future, CMC
directed a force structure review. The major focus of effort was to
identify and make recommendations to reallocate Marine Corps Structure
which is no longer contributing significantly to our warfighting
capability. The goal is to put manpower into the operation forces at 90
percent of their T/O requirement. Sustaining the readiness of our Corps
remains our highest priority.
Question. Explain to the Committee the effects, if any, on
personnel tempo due to the carrier rotations in the Persian Gulf
region.
Navy Answer. The Navy is striving to support the current
requirement for two carrier battle groups in the Persian Gulf with
regularly scheduled forward-deploying forces. It must be emphasized
however, that this support comes at a cost, in reduced presence in
other theaters, and poses significant challenges for the Fleet
Commanders.
To date, there have been no exceptions to the Navy's
PERSTEMPO quidelines specifically caused by increased carrier presence
in the Persian Gulf.
Short term impacts are slight due to the forward deployed
posture and inherent mobility of naval forces which make them an ideal
choice for crisis response and easy to shift between theaters when
contingencies arise.
Longer term support comes at a greater cost due to
compressed Interdeployment Training Cycles (IDTC) and perturbations to
long range CVBG deployment schedules, which could result in increased
OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO.
Higher transit speeds, increased flight/steaming hours,
and the requirement to compress or defer maintenance have potential
impact on force readiness and quality of life for Sailors.
Marine Corps Answer. The Marine Corps personnel tempo due to
carrier rotations in the Persian Gulf has not been affected by the
recent deployments. Currently, the Marine Corps has one F/A-18 squadron
deployed with the Navy carrier airwing aboard the USS George
Washington. This deployment is in accordance with established schedules
governed by the Global Navy Force Presence Policy (GNFPP). At present,
no requirements exist for an increased carrier presence beyond that
which is covered by our regularly scheduled forward deployed forces.
Question. What is the current number of personnel in the region to
maintain the presence of two carriers in the gulf?
Navy Answer. Currently there are approximately 24,000 Navy and
Marine Corps personnel deployed onboard ships in the Arabian Gulf. This
number includes two carrier battle grounds, an amphibious readiness
group, the Middle East Force destroyers, frigates, and support ships.
Each carrier battle group in the Gulf consists of approximately 6,500
personnel.
Question. Is the Navy still trying to keep to a limit of six-month
long deployments for naval personnel?
Navy Answer. Yes. Exceptions for any units exceeding the six month
deployment rule must be personally approved by the Chief of Naval
Operations. In 1997, only two waivers were granted and since the
beginning of 1998, no waivers have been requested.
Question. What is the Navy's estimate of the financial impact of
deploying a second carrier to the Persian Gulf?
Navy Answer. The Department of the Navy's budget for fiscal year
1998 included funding to operate one Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) for
three quarters of the year and one Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG) in
the Arabian Gulf for about one half of the year (189 days). The
increased cost associated with operating two CVBGs and one ARG for the
remainder of the year is estimated to be $209 million. This includes
increased levels of flying and steaming ($150 million), transportation
and equipment ($31 million), and additional military personnel costs
($28 million) for imminent danger pay and reservist activation. This
estimate has been included in the Department of the Navy's portion of
the Emergency Supplemental request currently being considered by the
Congress.
Personnel Financial Problems
Question. Mr. Secretary, a news article dated earlier this month
quoted from a recent DoD study that ``At least one-third of Navy
personnel can't pay their bills and are costing the Pentagon more than
$200 million a year in bad checks, loan defaults and bankuprtcies.''
The article also states that Navy personnel were losing security
clearances over financial difficulties and their military radiness was
being affected by their money problems.
Would you agree with these statements? How widespread is this
problem?
Navy Answer. While I do not completely agree with what the article
implies, I agree with the study upon which the article was based. The
press article excerpts from a study requested by the Department of the
Navy and funded by DoD. The study examined existing data and tried to
provide a snapshot of the cost to the Navy of poor financial planning
by our Sailors. To address the questions raised in the article
directly:
The one-third statistic came from the 1995 Navy Needs
Assessment Study in which Navy personnel were asked if they
occasionally have trouble paying monthly bills. While 43% answered they
occasionally had trouble paying monthly bills, it cannot realistically
be inferred that this means they cannot pay every month. We cannot
break out the percentage of those who are having chronic problems
paying bills because of poor financial management, as opposed to those
who merely had a month or two when they may have had difficulty due to
an unexpected expense.
The article is misleading in that it attributes the $200
million figure directly to bad checks, loan defaults and bankruptcies.
The figure is actually an estimate of lost productivity and includes
issues such as cost associated with time off to handle personal
problems and command man-hours expended to resolve financial problems.
The Defense Investigative Service reported that between
1991 and 1995 approximately sixty percent of the service members who
lost their security clearances had financial problems as a primary
contributory cause.
Marine Corps Answer. Poor financial skills can be a problem for
Marines. However, we have not experienced the same widesspread problem
as was portrayed in the news article.
Question. Do these financial problems affect officers as well as
enlisted evenly?
Navy Answer. Personal financial problems affect every income and
professional level in America. One of the things we learned from this
study is that poor personal financial management is not just a problem
with personnel in the Department of the Navy. It affects all of
America. In the Navy, we do find the percentage of officers reporting
problems paying monthly bills to be about fifty percent less than the
percentage of enlisted personnel who report similar problems.
Marine Corps Answer. No. Most of our Marines with financial
problems are primarily in their first enlistment, when pressures of low
pay, inexperience, and growing families are most intense.
Question. How does this impact retention and readiness of your
forces?
Navy Answer. We do not have quantitative data to reply directly to
this question. While personal finance is one of the pressing problems
we are facing in the Department of the Navy, it does not stop ships
from sailing nor planes from flying. The impact is felt more at the
individual Sailor and Marine level with individual loss of productivity
as a result of time spent resolving financial problems. Clearly this
lost time could be spent in a more productive manner, however, the
impact has not been seen in quantifiable terms at the unit or higher
level in terms of readiness. I feel, however, that quality of life
problems impact individual readiness and hence the performance of our
Sailors at large. Poor financial management is a readiness issue in
that it ultimately impacts productivity, safety, and morale.
As for retention, although the study by the Military Family
Institute (referred to in the article) states that poor financial
management causes 11% of enlisted to leave the service, we have no
statistics or further studies of the impact of financial problems on
retention.
Marine Corps Answer. We have no evidence that either retention or
readiness has been affected by this problem.
Question. Are any steps being taken to provide financial planning
training for your personnel to help alleviate this problem?
Navy Answer. The Department of the Navy is integrating personal
financial training throughout the training continuums. We have
refocused personal financial training at the Recruit Training Center in
order to lower the number of recruits that experience financial
problems between recruit training and their first duty assignment. Our
training continuum includes fourteen hours of financial training after
recruit training graduation and prior to reporting aboard the first
permanent command. Additionally, we are incorporating personal finance
into the Career Options and Navy Skills Evaluation Program (CONSEP).
CONSEP involves three phases of training throughout the military
lifecycle: New Accession Course of Instruction (entry into military);
Mid-Career Course of Instruction (6-12 years); and Senior Course of
Instruction (18 years).
We have also increased the amount of time we spend on personal
finance in our General Military Training. We have executed education
and counseling Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) with the Navy-Marine
Corps Relief Society and are in the process of executing an MOU with
the Department of Defense Credit Union Council.
Taking advantage of information technology, we are working with DoD
to provide our commands and resource learning centers with an
interactive CD-ROM allowing the individual Sailor to learn about many
areas of personal finance. Additionally, we are piloting a project
called ``Lifelines'' which will put personal financial education and
counseling on the World-Wide-Web for use by our Sailors at home and at
work.
Marine Corps Answer. The Marine Corps has an extensive financial
planning training system. First term enlisted marines receive training
in the basics of direct deposit, ATM cards, checkbook management, and
credit. The individual Marine first receives training at the Recruit
Depots, where three academic hours of financial instruction are
included in the curriculum. This training is reinforced for enlisted
Marines with the completion of the Marine Corps Institute course on
Personal Finance. For officers and career enlisted Marines, we are
reviewing policy that will implement financial instruction into formal
Professional Military Education courses. In addition, informal
counseling is available for all Marines at our Family Service Center.
Gender Integrated Training
Question. In June 1997, the Secretary of Defense appointed the
Federal Advisory Committee on Gender-Integrated Training and Related
Issues to assess the current training programs of the Military Services
and determine how best to train a gender-integrated, all volunteer
force. The recommendations of the December 1997 Kassebaum Report center
on the quality of recruits and the need to instill discipline
throughout the training process. The report also recommends
establishing separate barracks for male and female recruits. The
January 1998 Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Military
(DACOWITS) Report highlights some of the same issues as the Kassebaum
Report but adds that the Services need to establish and enforce clearer
gender related policies in areas such as fraternization.
What is the estimated cost to implement the recommendations in the
Kassebaum report?
Navy Answer. The total estimated costs to implement the
recommendations in the Kassebaum report are not available at this time
since numerous initiatives are still under review. However, it has been
estimated that a minimum of $1.1 million would be required for
modifications to the existing barracks at Recruit Training Command,
Great Lakes, in order to provide separate barracks for male and female
recruits.
Marine Corps Answer. The Marine Corps presently billets its male
and female recruits separately. There is no additional funding required
to implement separate barracks as recommended in the Kassebaum Report.
Question. The committee understands the Military Services are
developing their recommendations independently on the Kassebaum report.
Would you please give the Committee an indication of what is the DoD
position?
Answer. Within DoD, all 30 recommendations cited in the Kassebaum
report are being implemented. However, not all 30 are being implemented
by each Service. Within DoD, three areas requiring additional
attention: leadership, rigor of training, and billeting.
As to leadership, it is essential to ensure that recruit training
billets are career enhancing and that there are rewards and incentives
for that demanding position. We in the Department of the Navy are
working toward that end.
The focus of rigor will be an increased emphasis on Physical
Training (PT) as well as developing realistic exercises that challenge
the ability to think and react positively while under stress.
A final determination has not yet been made regarding how males and
females will be berthed (e.g. separate floors, separate buildings,
etc.). However, the Department of the Navy is committed to ensuring
that berthing arrangements afford proper privacy, dignity, safety and
security.
Question. What role will the Office of the Secretary have in any
necessary coordination of the Services' recommendations?
Answer. The role of the Office of the Secretary in coordinating the
Services' recommendations will be to ensure that regardless of the
decisions made, military training remains fair, demanding and
effective, and that it produces fully qualified individuals to serve as
Sailors and Marines.
Aviation Readiness
Question. In the transmittal letter accompanying the DoD
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Defense Secretary Cohen indicated that
the Navy and Air Force faced shortfalls in fiscal year 1998 of over
$600 million for aviation spare parts. The Congress provided an
increase totaling $622 million in the 1998 DoD appropriations bill for
this purpose. Of the total, $322 million was added to Operation and
Maintenance, Navy. Despite this add, recent press accounts indicate
that deployed Naval Aircraft have a mission capable rate of about 75%.
How has the Navy applied the $322 million added by Congress for
aviation spares in fiscal year 1998?
Navy Answer. The fiscal year 1998 Congressional plus-up of $322
million was applied directly to the Navy's Flying Hour Program. This
money will allow our maintenance personnel to order the necessary parts
and perform the essential repairs needed to improve the material
condition of our aircraft. We have already observed improvement in
aircraft Mission Capable (MC) and Full Mission Capable (FMC) rates and
are optimistic these trends will continue to improve in the future.
Question. The Committee understands that the current mission
capable rates for deployed aircraft are about 75%. Is this a matter of
concern for the Navy?
Navy Answer. The material condition of our aircraft is an important
indicator of near-term readiness. Therefore, we pay close attention to
aircraft mission capable (MC) and Full Mission Capable (FMC) rates. The
Department's goal for deployed MC is 78% and anytime it is not
attained, it warrants our attention. In fiscal year 1997, deployed MC
dropped below 75% for the first time in 11 years. Historically, the
rate has fluctuated between 75%-78%. Our readiness indicators proved
reliable in identifying the deficiency and with the help of Congress we
were able to implement corrective action quickly to avoid further
degradation. We have already begun to see signs of improvement and are
optimistic this trend will continue to improve in the future.
Marine Corps Answer. Mission capable rates are not currently a
matter of concern for the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps includes all
its aircraft in the deployed category for computing readiness, giving a
more realistic view of our ability to fly and fight at a moment's
notice. The CNO goals for Marine aircraft readiness are 73 percent
mission capable (MC) and 56 percent fully mission capable (FMC)
aircraft, respectively. In fiscal year 1997, our fixed-wing MC rates
averaged over 75 percent while the FMC rates were nearly 70 percent. On
the rotary-wing side, fiscal year 1997 MC rates were 75 percent, and
FMC rates were 67 percent.
Question. What has been the trend for Navy aircraft mission capable
rates for deployed aircraft since operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm?
Navy Answer. With the exception of Fiscal Year 1997, the trend has
remained relatively flat. For the period Fiscal Year 1990-96, the
Department's deployed MC rate has fluctuated between 75%-78%.
Marine Corps Answer. The Marine Corps does not differentiate
between deployed and non-deployed aircraft when reporting mission
capable (MC) rates. Marine Corps Aviation MC rates since Operation
Desert Shield/Desert Storm have been fairly robust.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mission Capable Rates............................... 71.4 77.2 79.5 78.9 76.2 75.3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The CNO goal for Marine aircraft readiness is 73 percent mission
capable.
Question. What effect does the change in the mission capable rate
for Navy aircraft have on the reported readiness of the Navy?
Navy Answer. Mission Capable (MC) and Full Mission Capable (FMC)
rates are measures of aircraft material condition and, if not sustained
at appropriate levels, will eventually lead to readiness degradation.
It is important to note that MC and FMC are not the only measure of
aviation readiness. Areas such as aircrew proficiency and availability,
as well as aircraft inventory are among other critical elements that
determine overall aviation readiness. However, we do know that material
condition plays an important role in the ability of our aircraft to be
used for training and operations, and is therefore, an important
indicator of near-term readiness.
Marine Corps Answer. The mission capable rate is an aggregate
number reflecting combined aircraft mission capability of Navy and
Marine Corps aircraft, deployed and non-deployed. Navy mission capable
and fully mission capable rates combine with Marine Crops mission
capable and fully mission capable rates for a Naval Aviation Readiness
rate. If Navy readiness rates (mission capable and fully mission
capable) were to go down, and Marine Corps readiness rates remained
constant, the net effect would still be a decrease in the naval
aviation readiness rate.
Therefore, a change in the overall mission capable rate for Navy
aircraft may or may not reflect accurately the Marine Corps specific
readiness rates.
Cross-Decking and Navy Readiness
Question. The 1997 House National Security Committee Report on
Military Readiness indicates that there is an increasing incidence of
cross-decking of personnel equipment within the Navy. The House
Appropriations Committee Surveys and Investigations Staff has also
observed this phenomenon. Among the Navy's personnel specialties, the
most prevalent examples of cross-decking involve fire control and
electronics technicians. There has also been an increase in the
prevalence of cross-decking among unrated personnel.
How prevalent is the practice of cross-decking personnel?
Navy Answer. The term ``cross-decking'' is often used to describe
three different personnel management actions used by Manning Control
Authorities (MCAs) (i.e. CINCPACFLT and CINCLANTFLT) to support
deployment requirements.
Diverts: the first option. BUPERS modifies a Sailor's
ultimate duty station to another unit in same geographic location.
Cross-decks: the second option. Permanent Change of
Station (PCS) transfer from one deployable unit to another (same
geographic location); preferably from unit with excess. The Sailor must
have at least one year remaining on sea duty. These occurrences are
examined closely to ensure minimal impact to quality of life.
TAD Assists: the third option. Temporary fill to provide
relief for mid-deployment arrival or unanticipated loss (e.g. medical
emergency). These occurrences are examined closely to ensure minimal
impact to quality of life.
When necessary, these actions are most often used to fill personnel
shortages among critical and highly technical ratings. Usage is kept to
a minimum and monitored monthly by BUPERS. On average, the total number
of personnel who are either diverted, cross-decked or sent TAD,
averages approximately 2% of the total number of Sailor's transferring.
Question. How prevelant is the practice of cross-decking aircraft
and other equipment?
Navy Answer. Cross-decking aircraft and equipment while deployed is
uncommon. During the Interdeployment Training cycle (IDTC), non-
deployed aircraft undergo various repairs to ensure material condition
is maintained at acceptable levels. Since repair times vary, Squadrons
frequently receive the first available aircraft (which may or may not
be the aircraft they flew on their last deployment) to support the
necessary training during the IDTC.
Question. How do the rates of cross-decking equipment and personnel
compare to Navy goals?
Navy Answer. There are no established goals or limits set for
cross-decking equipment or personnel. Although the Fleet Commander's
intentions, with regard to personnel, are to minimize the amount of
cross-decking that occurs, cross-decking equipment is a viable solution
to an emergent requirement.
Question. Is cross-decking on the increase?
Navy Answer. There is no evidence to support the premise that
cross-decking has become more prevalent today than in the past.
Question. What effect does cross-decking have on readiness?
Navy Answer. Cross-decking is conducted to enhance the readiness of
deploying units. It may affect the readiness of the non-deployed unit
that is providing the asset. However, because of our cyclical readiness
posture, we expect non-deployed readiness to drop soon after units
return from deployment. This is a direct result of units entering the
Inter-Deployment Training Cycle (IDTC) where ships and aircraft undergo
various levels of maintenance. During the IDTC, proficiencies migrate
to a basic level due to crew turnover and the reduced opportunity to
train while conducting maintenance. Cross-decking within the IDTC can
be accomplished without adversely affecting a unit's ability to achieve
combat ready status prior to their next deployment.
A-6 Crash in Italy
Question. On February 3, 1998, a U.S. Marine Corps EA-6B struck a
cable suspending a ski lift in Italy. The aircraft sustained only minor
damage, but the ski lift collapsed killing 20 people. What compensation
does the Navy plan to offer to the families of those who were killed in
this accident?
Marine Corps Answer. This has not been determined. Under Title VIII
of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), claims (in this case)
against the U.S. must be filed with the Italian Ministry of Defense and
settled under Italian law. To date eight claims, all on behalf of
German victims, have been filed by an Italian lawyer. We do not know
what they are asking for, and we do not yet know what is appropriate
compensation under Italian law. Previously Department of the Navy (DON)
paid approximately $100,000 out of discretionary funds to help the
families arrange for burial.
Question. Does the Navy plan to alter low level flight training
procedures in response to this incident?
Marine Corps Answer. First and foremost, the Marine Corps would
like to express its heartfelt condolences to the families of those who
died in this tragedy. They remain in our hearts and prayers. As the
committee is aware, the Marine Corps immediately directed a command
investigation into this tragedy. The report of investigation was
recently completed, and clearly states that if the mishap crew had
followed current low level flight training regulations, the mishap
would not have occurred. This report makes no recommendations, nor
expresses any opinions, that would require the Marine Corps to alter
its training regulations in regards to low level flight training. Given
the content of the report of investigation, the Marine Corps currently
has no plans to alter the current low level flight training
regulations.
Question. Will the Navy have to identify new low level flight
training routes?
Marine Corps Answer. The Marine Corps is deeply concerned over the
tragedy in Cavalese and we continue to express our condolences to the
families of those who lost their lives in this mishap. As the committee
is aware, the Marine Corps immediately directed a command investigation
into this tragedy. The report of investigation was recently completed
and makes no recommendations, nor expresses any opinions, concerning
the designation of low level flight training routes. The report shows
that had the mishap crew followed existing low level flight
regulations, this mishap would not have occurred. The investigation
states that the low level training route the mishap aircraft was
operating on was designed by Italian authorities, authorized for U.S.
flight training and correctly scheduled. In view of these facts (a
correctly designated/authorized/scheduled route and an unexplained
deviation from low level training regulations) the Marine Corps will
not seek to identify new low level flight training routes.
Question. The Committee understands there are discrepancies between
locally produced maps and those produced by DoD concerning the location
of the ski lift. What measures will the Navy take to reconcile these
differences?
Marine Corps Answer. Two charts used during the low level mishap
flight were DoD National Imagery Mapping Agency (NIMA) Tactical
Pilotage Charts (TPC) F-2A and F-2B. F-2B is the chart that covers the
area of the mishap.
The TPC F-2B does not depict the mishap cable as a vertical
obstruction (tower). However, there is an aerial cable way depicted
four nautical miles north of the Town of Cavalese, five nautical miles
north of the mishap, and within the AV047 (low level) route structure.
The mishap pilot and Electronic Countermeasure Officer One (ECMO 1)
had all current DoD NIMA obstruction data correctly labeled on their
charts. The Italian F-1, Edition 2, 1:500K (low level flying chart)
chart depicts a horizontal obstruction (read cable) within one nautical
mile of the mishap location. VMAQ-2 and the 31st Fighter Wing
Standardization and evaluation were unaware of the Italian charts.
As the committee is aware, the Marine Corps immediately directed a
command investigation into this tragedy. The report of investigation
was recently completed, and the investigation board recommended that
``the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) should review all map
sources from a foreign country to ensure that all obstructions to
flight are accurately plotted.'' The Commanding General of Marine
Forces Atlantic has forwarded a copy of the report and this
recommendation to the Director of NIMA for review and action as he
deems appropriate.
F/A-18E/F Aircraft
Question. There have been a number of negative press reports lately
concerning technical problems in the development of the F/A-18E/F
aircraft.
Has the Navy eliminated or significantly reduced any key
performance requirements for the aircraft?
Navy Answer. No. The F/A-18E/F is meeting or exceeding all key
performance parameters called for in the Operational Requirements
Document (ORD). The ORD performance requirements were revalidated by
the Joint Requirements Oversight Council on March 7, 1997.
Question. Does the Navy currently plan to achieve the Initial
Operating Capability (IOC) date for deployment of the aircraft on time?
Navy Answer. Yes. The F/A-18E/F will IOC by September 2000. First
operations deployment is planned for Spring of 2002.
Question. Does the Navy currently plan to finish the development
program within budget?
Navy Answer. Yes. The program is currently $48 million (in fiscal
year 1998 constant dollars) below the 1992 Defense Acquisition Board
Funding profile.
Question. Is the aircraft meeting its weight projections?
Navy Answer. Yes. The aircraft's current weight is 30,135 pounds
which is a positive 429 pound margin to specification weight of 30,564.
Ship Self Defense System
Question. The Committee has been concerned for a number of years
about Navy ship self-defense programs. A key program is the Ship-Self
Defense System, an upgrade to the short range air defense systems of
aircraft carriers and amphibious ships, which uses computers to
integrate the sensors on ships (such as radars) with weapons (guns and
missiles) to shoot down incoming anti-ship cruise missiles.
What justifies a 38 percent reduction in SSDS ship installations
between fiscal years 1999 to 2002 (18 ship installations rather than
29).
Navy Answer. Navy's 1999-2002 fielding plan represents a balanced
approach to fielding maritime force protection capability rather than
focusing on individual system procurement plans. Navy utilizes a combat
systems approach to validate each ship class' performance against this
CAPSTONE requirement. All systems in the detect through engage sequence
are modeled against the validated Defense Intelligence Agency threats.
No one system is good enough by itself to meet the CAPSTONE performance
requirements. The SSDS fielding plan is indicative of this balanced
approach to maritime force protection.
Question. Secretary Dalton, why does Navy continue to submit
deficient ship self-defense budgets to the Congress? Is this
intentional?
Navy Answer. Navy's individual ships class maritime force
protection planning is based on providing the most cost-effective force
protection possible, consistent with available funding, force wide.
Furthermore, all ship classes will receive or retain a level of force
protection consistent with their expected service life and potential
exposure to operational threat environments.
Navy's 1999-2002 plan represents a balanced approach to fielding
maritime force protection capability rather than focusing on individual
system procurement plans. Navy utilizes a combat systems approach to
validate each ship class' performance against this CAPSTONE
requirement. All systems in the detect through engage sequence are
modeled against the validated Defense Intelligence Agency threats. No
one system is good enough by itself to meet the CAPSTONE performance
requirements. The SSDS fielding plan is indicative of this balance and
cost effective approach to maritime force protection.
Question. General Krulak, how many Marines are on an assault ship
of the LSD-4 1 class?
Marine Corps Answer. The LSD-41 class ships are configured to
embark 450 Marines, with surge capability up to approximately 500.
Generally, we embark between 400-430 Marines. This generally equates to
one infantry (rifle or weapons) company, two or more additional
platoons, and a variety of smaller detachments, depending on the load
plan.
Question. What would be the implications if an LSD-41 were lost to
an anti-ship cruise missile attack?
Marine Corps Answer. The answer to this question will vary,
depending upon the ship's load plan, which is a function of the assault
landing plan of the force. As a general rule, our MEU (SOC)s tend to
load the LSD-41 one of two ways:
Option 1:
MEU Command Element
--RadBn (-)
--JTF Enabler (-)
BLT
--H&S Co. (-)
--Weapons Co.
--LAR Plt or Co. (-) (Varies depending on whether or not a Tank
Plt. deploys)
--Tank Plt
--Arty Btry
--Combat Engineer Det.
MSSG
--Engineers (-); Maint (-); Supply (-)
Assault Craft Unit
--4 LCAC
Ammunition: 25 pallets
Option 2: Primary difference is with the BLT configuration, as
indicated below:
BLT
--H&S Co. (-)
--AAV Plt (Rein)
--Rifle Co. (Rein)
Comments:
Option 1: Significant loss in heavy weapons, both direct and
indirect fire, e.g., LAV-25s, 155mm Howitzers, 81mm mortars, .50 cal
and Mk 19 machineguns. Substantial loss of tactical mobility, fire
power, and combat engineering capability. Additionally, there would be
a significant loss in substantiality, e.g., maintenance and supply.
Finally, the loss of four LCACs would dramatically reduce ship-to-shore
movement. Impact: Loss of 400(+) Marines (20% of the MEU). The MEU
(SOC)'s ability to conduct an amphibious assault would be severely
degraded; its ability to engage in ground combat operations of any
significant would be highly questionable; risk to the force would be
significant.
Option 2: Loss of surface and assault capability, tactical
mobility, and fire power. Significant loss in sustainability, e.g.,
maintenance and supply. Impact: Loss of 400(+) Marines (20% of the
MEU). The MEU (SOC) would be unable to conduct a simultaneous surface
and heliborne amphibious assault; tactical ground mobility would be
effectively eliminated.
Question. General Krulak, are you personally satisfied with the
pace of installation of SSDS systems on Navy amphibious assault ships
that bring Marine Corps troops and equipment into battle?
Marine Corps Answer. I am satisfied with the pace of installation
for the SSDS. The Ship Self-Defense System MK-1 (SSDS) is a shipboard
integrated system that connects various shipboard systems through a
Local Area Network (LAN) to a Sensor Supervisor Console, Weapons
Supervisor Console, and Tactical Action Officer (TAO) Console work
stations. The commercial off the shelf, open architecture technology
incorporated into the SSDS MK-1 system to provide sensor fusion and
automatic anti-air defense detection through engagement is truly
evolutionary.
The SSDS will integrate existing shipboard sensors, including
Volume Search Radar (VSR), Horizon Search Radar (HSR), Surface Search
Radar (SSR), Electronic Warfare Suite (EWS) Central Identification
Friend or Foe (CIFF) System, and Electro-Optic Sensor System (EOSS)
assets, with RAM, NSSMS, ESSM, Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) and
softkill weapon systems including the Decoy Launching System (DLS). In
addition, the SSDS will interface with other systems (e.g. navigation,
radar video distribution) and both ship and force-level command and
control systems. SSDS possesses the capability to process all inputs
from these shipboard systems converting them into digital tracks
representing the various threats and the identification of intercepted-
emitters by using standard Naval Tactical Data System (NDTS) symbology.
This fully automated system greatly enhances ship survivability. The
SSDS will be designed to operate in multiple ship classes and
represents a significant increase in the self-protection afforded
amphibious ships.
The SSDS will provide:
--Reduced reaction time.
--Automatic multisensor integration
--Enhanced target identification and classification.
--Automated threat evaluation and weapon assignment.
--Integrated hardkill and softkill engagements.
SSDS is being installed on all amphibious ships under construction
and will be installed on the LPD-17 ship class. USS GUNSTON HALL (LSD-
44), USS ASHLAND (LSD-48), and USS HARPERS FERRY (LSD-49) have SSDS
installed. All LSD-41/49 class ships will complete the SSDS
installation by the end of fiscal year 2001. Four LHDs will be
backfitted by fiscal year 2002.
Theater Ballistic Missile Defense Capability on DDG-51 Ships
Question. The Navy's original plan to build 12 DDG-51 Aegis
destroyers on a multi-year contract covering fiscal years 1997 to 2001
would have delivered the ships to the fleet well after the turn of the
century without theater ballistic missile defense or cooperative
engagement capability. Because this is unacceptable to both the
Congress and the warfighting CINCs, the Committee last year directed
that this problem be fixed and provided additional funds for that
purpose. The Committee understands that the Navy is closer to fixing
the problem, but that in the outyear plan accompanying the fiscal year
1999 budget the DDG-51 shipbuilding program is not fully funded to meet
this objective.
Admiral Johnson, is it your intent that all 12 ships to be built
under the DDG-51 multiyear contract be delivered to the fleet with full
theater ballistic missile defense (TBMD) and cooperative engagement
capability (CEC) installed?
Navy Answer. Yes, all multiyear DDGs will sail from the building
yard with TBMD and CEC installed. Aegis Weapon System modifications for
Area TBMD are planned for SCN funded in-line installation on all 13
DDGs in the fiscal year 1998 to fiscal year 2001 timeframe. CEC
introduction will occur in-line with SCN funding for DDGs 91 and 92,
the last two ships in fiscal year 1998, as a result of the fiscal year
1998 Congressional SCN plus-up. All other multiyear ships are
programmed to receive CEC during the post-delivery availability. The
procurement and installation of these remaining 11 ships are funded in
OPN.
Question. The Committee understands that the program is fully
funded in 1998 (due to the Congressional add) and in 1999, but is off
in the subsequent fiscal years. Is your intention to fix this funding
problem before committing to the multiyear contract?
Navy Answer. The fiscal year 1998-2001 DDG-51 multiyear contract
was awarded on March 6, 1998. Initially, after receipt of the bids in
late November 1997, the multiyear contract appeared unexecutable due to
the following:
1. An undistributed fiscal year 1998 Congressional ``tax'' to all
procurement accounts ($95 million from the DDG 51 Program); and
2. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) inflation adjustments
that removed an additional $195 million over the four years of the
multiyear procurement
Working with OSD and OMB after the fiscal year 1999 DoD budget had
been submitted to the White House, Navy succeeded in adding the funding
necessary to fiscal year 1998 and fiscal year 1999 to make the
multiyear procurement executable. The fiscal year 2000 and fiscal year
2001 funding is sufficient to deliver complete ships, however some
upgrades are not funded. Funding of these upgrades are part of our
upcoming Program Objective Memorandum deliberations.
Question. Are the 3 DDG-51 destroyers in the fiscal year 1999
budget fully funded, in terms of including theater ballistic missile
defense and cooperative engagement capability?
Navy Answer. Yes, the DDG-51 destroyers are fully funded in the
fiscal year 1999 budget, to include Navy Area ballistic missile defense
and Cooperative Engagement Capability.
Future Aircraft Carriers/Nuclear Propulsion
Question. The fiscal year 1999 budget envisions spending about $1.1
billion in R&D between now and 2003 to develop the next class of
aircraft carrier (CVX). Last year the Navy testified that CVX design
would be from a ``clean sheet of paper'', and in this regard the issue
of propulsion type must be examined as part of the Defense Department's
internal management system.
In response to this Committee's direction in 1994, the General
Accounting Office has recently circulated a draft audit on the cost
effectiveness of conventionally and nuclear powered carriers. A few
observations made by GAO are:
Over a 50 year life, the cost of a nuclear-powered carrier
is 66 percent ($9.3 billion) more than a conventionally powered carrier
($23.4 billion vice $14.1 billion).
A force of 12 conventionally powered carriers can provide
a greater overseas presence in the European Command, the Central
Command, and the Western Pacific; or a force of 11 conventionally
powered carriers can provide an equivalent level of forward presence as
a force of 12 nuclear-powered carriers.
Although both types of carriers can transit to crisis
areas at the same top speed, the conventional carriers take somewhat
longer to cover long distances than nuclear carriers due to their need
to refuel. For an 18-day voyage from the West Coast of the United
States to the Persian Gulf--a distance of 12,000 nautical miles
steaming at a sustained speed of 28 knots per hour--a conventional
carrier would arrive about 6 hours later than a nuclear carrier.
GAO found little difference in the operational
effectiveness of nuclear and conventional carriers in the Persian Gulf
war. The five conventional carriers replenished aviation fuel about
every 2.7 to 3.1 days and the nuclear carrier every 3.3 days.
The larger storage capacity on today's nuclear carriers is
primarily due to design decisions that have little to do with
propulsion type.
Admiral Johnson, it seems that the General Accounting Office is
saying that nuclear powered aircraft carriers have significantly higher
cost with little real benefit. Do you agree with GAO?
Navy Answer. Navy concurs that there is a life-cycle cost premium
associated with nuclear propulsion on aircraft carriers. However, the
cost estimate provided by the Navy to the GAO and our preliminary
review of the GAO report for both types of carriers indicate that the
draft report overstates the premium by several billion dollars, largely
because of a number of internal analytic inconsistencies. Further, I
believe the draft report does not adequately address operational
effectiveness features provided by nuclear power.
Currently, Navy is conducting a forward looking analysis of carrier
capability and cost in the Analysis of Alternatives for the planned new
design carrier CV(X). At the completion of this process, we will have
detailed life cycle cost estimates for future nuclear and fossil-fueled
carrier designs.
Question. Last year, you and Secretary Dalton testified that you
were examining all options. This year, you seem to be strongly in favor
of retaining nuclear propulsion in any new class of aircraft carriers.
What has changed since last year?
Navy Answer. Nothing has changed since last year. All alternatives,
both nuclear and non-nuclear, are still being considered during the
Analysis of Alternatives (AOA). Each alternative will be evaluated as
to capability provided and cost. This process is designed to determine
which alternative provides the most cost-effective carrier. However, as
reflected in the Navy posture statement, the Navy has stated its
preferred alternative as a large deck nuclear-powered carrier. This
alternative provides the greatest capability, mobility, flexibility and
survivability of all the alternatives being analyzed in the CVX AOA. A
large deck provides the Navy the greatest flexibility in airwing size,
mix of types of aircraft or other payloads carried on the ship, and
operating in all types of weather. Nuclear power provides the carrier
force added mobility, operational flexibility and survivability as
compared to a conventional carrier. In addition, given that the next
class of aircraft carriers will be in service throughout the next
century, it is prudent to provide the Navy's capital ship with the
greatest capability practicable. The ongoing CVX AOA is examining
several design alternatives and a final decision on CVX size and
propulsion will be made after the next phase of this AOA has been
completed and reviewed by the DOD senior leadership.
Question. In the CVX program, do you plan to design a totally new
class of ships or do you plan to have an evolution from the NIMITZ
class design?
Navy Answer. The Navy is currently analyzing several alternative
designs for CVX. These alternative designs run the gamut from an
evolution of the current NIMITZ design to a totally new design which
includes a new hull, new propulsion plant, new communications suite,
new distributive systems, new functional arrangements and significant
improvements in ship survivability and signature management. While
there are obvious advantages to evolving the current design (minimal
retooling costs, etc.), we also need to examine alternatives that could
achieve total ownership cost reductions. The challenge is to
accommodate a major R&D program and lead ship cost inside a flat
topline. How ``new'' the ultimate design will be will hinge on the cost
effectiveness of the design as determined by the Analysis of
Alternatives (AOA) process and overall affordability.
Question. Was there a material difference between the performance
of nuclear and non-nuclear aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf War?
Navy Answer. Sustained high speed and almost unlimited endurance
provide the nuclear carrier far more flexibility, survivability, and
capability than a conventionally powered carrier. Due to current
airwing composition, the combat capability of all carriers is similar
but the logistics required to support not only propulsion fuel for the
carrier but aircraft fuel and ordnance to support sustained combat
operations is considerably more difficult for the conventional carrier.
This higher logistics requirement requires the conventional carrier to
replenish more often than the nuclear carrier and in a high threat
environment places the conventional carrier at greater risk.
Where today, the Navy has a predominately nuclear carrier force of
12 carriers, the carrier force at the beginning of Operation DESERT
SHIELD was a larger, predominately conventional, carrier force of 15
carriers. Following the long build-up of forces, there were six
carriers in theater at the start of DESERT STORM (five conventional,
one nuclear powered). These carriers were deployed to the Gulf based on
their deployment cycles without regard to their propulsion plants. Due
to the low threat and logistics availability, the nuclear carrier was
replenished at about the same periodicity as the conventional carriers.
The carrier force is built to provide a mix of capabilities and
flexibility for 50 years of operation. Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT
STORM was unique and does not portend the types of conflict in which
U.S. Naval forces expect to be engaged in the foreseeable future. In
the Gulf War, naval forces had a long, unopposed build-up, significant
host-nation support, the luxury of a large supply of oil nearby, little
naval opposition with the exception of naval mining, and sufficient
pre-planning time. The logistics situation and the low threat to naval
forces did not challenge the unique capabilities of the nuclear
carrier. Current DoD planning scenarios envision a much more stressing
threat from countries with significant naval and submarine threats and
do not assume the favorable logistics and threat conditions present
during DESERT STORM.
Downscoping the Capability of LPD-17 Ships
Question. General Krulak testified last year before this Committee
that ``the future LPD-17 class will have the best self-defense
capability (against anti-ship cruise missiles) of any amphibious
ship''. In the new budget, the Navy has decided to downscope the
equipment to be included for installation on the LPD-17 ships and save
$1 billion on the 12 ships in the program. The main deletions are the
Enhanced Sea Sparrow Missile--the main self-defense weapon--and its
vertical launching system. The launcher, once installed, could be used
for other missiles (such as Navy ATACMs) to perform other missions such
as land attack in support of amphibious assault operations.
Admiral Johnson, please describe the Navy's proposal to
significantly downscope the equipment to be installed on LPD-17 ships
during their construction.
Navy Answer. The decision to remove the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile
(ESSM) and its Vertical Launching System (VLS) is based on requirements
and affordability.
ESSM and VLS are not required to meet the Navy Anti-Air Warfare
(AAW) CAPSTONE Requirement for self defense against anti-ship missiles,
and land attack missile capability is not an operational requirement
for the LPD-17 class. The LPD-17 class will be equipped with the
Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) and NULKA decoy. These, in combination
with law radar cross-section design meet the AAW CAPSTONE Requirement
and Congressional guidance against the validated threat.
The defense of LPD-17 is multi-layered. In a threat environment,
maritime dominance and subsequent force protection will be established
and maintained by AEGIS combatants. Amphibious forces will close the
operating area once the threat has been diminished. In situations where
amphibious forces could be detached to operate independently,
combatants would be committed when required by threat.
Question. General Krulak, are you confident that the main ship
self-defense weapon can be removed from the LPD-17 class of ships
without significantly increasing the danger to the Marines who must go
into battle directly from those ships?
Marine Corps Answer. Mr. Chairman, given the performance of the
Rolling Airframe Missile system and Nulka decoy system against today's
threats, the United States Navy is confident they have provided an
effective ship self-defense capability for the LPD-17 for now and the
foreseeable future. Based on this assessment and the Navy's commitment
to sending ships with additional capability as escorts when the ARG
goes in harms way, I am confident that our needs can be met.
Question. General Krulak, what is the cost per ship of installing
the vertical launcher on an LPD-17 ship during construction?
Given this low cost, why would the Marines not want to have the
flexibility perhaps one day in the future to launch land attack
missiles for LPD-17 ships to protect the soldiers who are initiating an
amphibious assault from them?
Marine Corps Answer. The LPD-17 Program Officer would have to
prepare an estimate on the cost of installing the vertical launcher
system (VLS) on each ship.
The decision to remove the ESSM missile and the VLS was done after
assessing the strong performance capability of the RAM system and the
lack of any significant increase to self-defense capability, outside of
weapons redundancy, that the ESSM system provided. Furthermore, RAM
will meet the anticipated threats through fiscal year 2010. To upgrade
ESSM to a performance level beyond that provided by RAM would require
an investment of several hundred million dollars greater than the
program cost we presented in the fiscal year 1998 President's Budget.
As time passes and the threat environment becomes more severe, there
will probably be a need for future upgrades to ship self-defense as
envisioned in the AKCITA program.
A land attack missile capability for the LPD-17 has been discussed
to support our Marines during Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) deployments.
Several alternatives exist to provide a land attack capability. One
alternative is having it organic to the LPD-17. A second alternative
would be the routine deployment of Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS)
capable surface combatant ships with the Amphibious Ready Groups. The
first alternative is fiscally constrained, while the second is a policy
decision. The Department of the Navy has come to no conclusion at this
time as to which is the best alternative.
LHA Service Life Extension
Question. Admiral Johnson, last year the Committee asked you why
the Navy abandoned outfitting the entire class of LHA amphibious
assault ships with the Ship Self-Defense System, and you testified that
it was due in part to the short remaining service life of these ships.
In the outyear plan accompanying the 1999 budget, the Navy has budgeted
a service life extension for an LHA ship starting in 2003.
What is your current thinking about the service life of LHA ships?
Navy Answer. The five ships of the LHA class will reach their 35
year service life in the 2011-2015 time frame, one each year. A service
life extension program would add an additional 15 years to the service
life. As part of the outyear budget process, the Navy is evaluating
options for extending or replacing the LHA's.
Question. What specifically is the Navy considering doing to the
LHA ships in order to prolong their life and upgrade their
capabilities? Provide for the record each specific item that is under
consideration by the Navy.
Navy Answer. The Navy is considering an LHA service life extension
program which would consist of the following:
Overhauling/replacing selected hull, mechanical, and
engineering items to ensure viability for an additional 15 years of
service life.
Correcting the LHA class damaged stability shortfall and
restoring service life allowance for future weight additions (such as
MV-22).
Upgrading C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications,
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) and combat
systems to LHD-7 equivalent.
Question. Using ``ball park'' figures, about how much does an LHA
service life extension cost? How does this compare to the cost of
construction of a new LHD ship, in similar year constant dollars?
Navy Answer. A LHA service life extension program (SLEP) is
estimated to cost $0.95 billion per ship, in fiscal year 1999 constant
dollars. A new LHD is estimated to cost $1.3 billion in fiscal year
1999 constant dollars plus potential start up costs if LHD production
is gapped after LHD-7 delivers in fiscal year 2001.
Question. Is the Navy committed to performing an LHA service life
extension, or is the amount shown in your outyear plan just a
``placeholder''?
Navy Answer. The Navy is committed to maintaining 12 LHAs/LHDs
within the amphibious force structure. A decision to extend the service
life of the LHAs or build new construction replacements is an outyear
budget development process issue.
Question. Would you, General Krulak, or Secretary Dalton be in
favor of Congress adding some or all of the $1.3 billion required to
construct a new LHD ship in fiscal year 1999 rather than to perform an
LHA service life extension in 2003?
If yes, please provide for the record the amounts in your fiscal
year 1999 budget that you would suggest the Congress use as offsets to
finance such a program.
Navy Answer. The Navy's fiscal year 1999 budget funds our
requirements in a balanced manner. I would not be in favor of a new LHD
ship in fiscal year 1999 if offsets are required. I would also not be
in favor of partial funding of an LHD in fiscal year 1999 because
additional funds would be needed in subsequent budgets to fully finance
the ship. Current Navy planning projects LHAs to begin reaching the end
of their service lives (35 years) in fiscal year 2011, about 12 years
from now. The President's fiscal year 1999 Budget supports concept
exploration of a new-design amphibious ship, called LHX, which could
replace the LHAs. The Navy is also evaluating an LHA SLEP, and has
initiated an Analysis of Alternatives in fiscal year 1999. Thus due to
the life remaining in the existing LHAs without a SLEP, there is no
requirement for funding an 8th LHD in the fiscal year 1999-2003 Future
Years Defense Program (FYDP). A final decision to include funding to
extend the service life of the LHAs, or to plan for new-construction
replacements, will likely be reflected early next year in the fiscal
year 2000 President's Budget and fiscal year 2000-2005 FYDP.
Marine Corps Answer. I believe procurement of a new LHD is a wiser
investment for our Nation than refurbishing our oldest LHA. The LHD is
larger, has more carrying capability, and can better accommodate our
new technology systems that have been fielded in recent years or will
soon be added to our force. In short, it will carry more tanks
aircraft, amphibious assault vehicles, and LCACs than its LHA
predecessor.
As currently planned, the LHA service life extension, if initiated,
would start in fiscal year 2005. Current estimates for the service life
extension range from $800 million to $1.2 billion. The estimated cost
of a new LHD (modified) in fiscal year 2005 is $2.3 to $2.5 billion.
(This estimate includes approximately $750 million to restart the
production line.) The cost of a new LHD in fiscal year 1999 would be
approximately 20 to 40 percent more than the cost of the LHA service
life extension, and would provide the Nation with a much more capable
LHD that would complement our forward presence forces for 40 years, as
opposed to the 15 to 20 years gained with a service life extension. We
need to engage this issue actively so a solution can be implemented
before the end of the LHA's planned service life. I am working with the
Chief of Naval Operations on this important requirement.
Big deck amphibious ships are at the heart of the Navy-Marine Corps
team. Building a new LHD, more capable of accommodating leaps in
technology and expansion of equipment, would be a most welcome
initiative. However, within present top line constraints, the Marine
Corps has no program to offer as an offset. The entire Procurement
Marine Corps account is only $745.9 million and we have already applied
anticipated QDR Force Structure savings to help get this account near
its historical norms and begin ramp up of our number one modernization
priority, the V-22, to a realistic production rate. This is not a
reluctance to back up the need for this ship * * * there is simply no
fat in this budget request.
Question. Given the recent outstanding performance of the Ship Self
Defense System in its operational tests, would the Navy perform an LHA
service life extension without including the Ship Self-Defense System?
Navy Answer. Navy utilities a combat systems approach to validate
each ship class' performance against the CAPSTONE requirement. All
systems in the detection through engage sequence are modeled against
the validated Defense Intelligence Agency threats. No one system is
good enough, by itself, to meet the CAPSTONE performance requirements.
In the case of the LHA class, a Ship Self-Defense System is expected to
be part of any combat systems upgrades during a service life extension.
Marine Corps Answer. If a decision were made to SLEP the LHA class,
the USMC would want a robust Ship Self-Defense System included in the
overhaul. We would engage fully with the Navy to ensure the ship was
able to deal with threats envisioned in the post-2010 environment.
Question. Given the Navy's desire to now retain LHA ships for a
longer period than was thought last year, how much additional funding
could be provided by Congress in 1999 to install the Ship Self-Defense
System (SSDS) on LHA/LHD ships and for how many ships?
Navy Answer. None. Navy utilizes a combat systems approach to
validate each ship class' performance against this Capstone
requirement. All systems in the detection through engage sequence are
modeled against the validated Defense Intelligence Agency threats. No
one system is good enough, by itself, to meet the Capstone performance
requirements.
For the LHD 1 class, the SSDS installation plan is being aligned
with the fielding plan for the other major upgrades planned for the
ship--most notably Cooperative Engagement Capability, Advanced Combat
Direction System, Rolling Airframe Missile Block 1 and the NATO Sea
Sparrow Missile System. Navy plans to install this same integrated
combat system in CV/CVN ship classes. The full integration and testing
of all combat system elements is funded to coincide with a first ship
installation in CVN 68 in fiscal year 2001. After follow-on test and
evaluation of CVN 68, other LHD and CV/CVN ships will be upgraded;
these upgrades are projected to commence in fiscal year 2002. The
required SSDS procurements to support them are funded beginning in
fiscal year 2001. Accelerating SSDS without coordinating the fielding
plan with other required upgrades would do little to improve the ships
performance against the predominant anti-ship cruise missile threat.
Marine Corps Answer. The Marine Corps fully supports the
installation of the Ship Self-Defense System on LHA/LHD ships within
fiscal constraints. Although a modest amount of funds were programmed
for fiscal year 2003 LHA SLEP, the DoN is examining different options
concerning the LHA force in the upcoming Program Objective Memorandum
build. It would be premature to increase funds in fiscal year 1999 for
Ship Self-Defense until we have a plan for the LHA class in place.
Aerostat Program
Question. The Army is requesting $103 million to continue the Joint
Army/Navy Aerostat program, now called the Joint Land Attack Cruise
Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS). Last year, this
Committee recommended that the Aerostat program be terminated, but did
not prevail in conference. Instead the conferees appropriated
$35,000,000, a decrease of $51,193,000 from the budget request.
Please explain the JLENS concept. How will the Navy deploy JLENS
and what will be its mission?
Navy Answer. JLENS is designed to detect, track and provide fire
control quality data in a sensor-netted network against the overland
cruise missile threat. JLENS will support final illumination
requirements in an over-the-horizon engagement in support of overland
cruise missile defense.
Navy does not plan to procure or deploy JLENS at sea. Navy's
interest lies in ensuring integration of critical sensors in a Joint
Composite Tracking Network (JCTN). Cooperative Engagement Capability
(CEC) is phase I of the JCTN.
Question. Why do you need a JLENS? What other systems (either
fielded or in development) could be used to do the JLENS mission?
Navy Answer. Elevated sensors, netted together to form composite
tracks are critical to detect low flying, low radar cross section
cruise missiles. Airborne fire control is required to conduct over-the-
horizon engagements at the full kinematic capability of Standard
Missile (SM-2). Upgrades to surveillance aircraft including E-2C
Hawkeys, E-3 AWACS and aircraft with airborne fire control (aircraft
specifics are classified) could fulfill this mission.
Question. Secretary Dalton, the DoD is requesting $103 million in
fiscal year 1999 for JLENS demonstration.The demonstration will cost
$400 million--the Army has told us the program is underfunded by $86
million. Are you willing to offset the shortfall within the Navy
budget?
Navy Answer. No. Navy cannot support reductions in other much
needed programs to offset the JLENS demonstration.
Question. In what fiscal year will the Navy begin procuring JLENS?
Navy Answer. The Navy will not procure JLENS.
Question. Do you have funds budgeted in the outyears for JLENS? If
so what years and how much?
Navy Answer. JLENS is a Joint Advanced Technology Demonstration
program led by the Army with Navy interest due to Standard Missile
support and Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC). JLENS provides
funds for Standard Missile (SM-2 BLK 1) development and CEC
integration. As previously noted, the Navy does not provide funds to
this effort. Therefore, Navy does not budget for JLENS.
SLAM-ER Missile Program
Question. SLAM-ER is a Navy cruise missile program currently in
production with capabilities similar to the Air Force's future JASSM
program.
Admiral Johnson, what is the current status of the SLAM-ER program
including flight testing, projected delivery dates, and estimated unit
costs?
Navy Answer. At this time, the SLAM-ER development program is more
than 92 percent complete and is on cost, on schedule and meets or
exceeds all Operational Requirements Document thresholds. SLAM-ER has
successfully completed five of five Development Test flights which
verified SLAM-ER's performance. SLAM-ER will enter the combined
Developmental & Operational (DT/OT) test phase the first week of April
1998.
The SLAM fiscal year 1996 production contract was modified July
1997 to change the missile configuration from SLAMs to SLAM-ERs to
avoid $35 million in retrofit costs. The first production SLAM-ER is
scheduled to be delivered March 25, 1998.
The estimated unit cost for SLAM-ER retrofits is $476 thousand (in
fiscal year 1998 constant dollars) at a production rate of 90 missiles
per years. The current SLAM-ER production rate is about 40 missiles per
unit (unit cost approximately $575 thousand). Affordability of more
efficient buy rates is being explored.
Question. Admiral Johnson, in your opinion, will SLAM-ER be capable
of successfully attacking the same targets listed in the JASSM target
set? What JASSM targets will SLAM-ER be incapable of destroying?
Navy Answer. Yes. SLAM-ER, when improved to become SLAM-ER+ (with
Automatic Target Acquisition) meets all of the Key Performance
Parameters enumerated in the JASSM ORD, including Missile Mission
Effectiveness. Production of SLAM-ER+ begins in fiscal year 1998, and
retrofit of the 135 SLAM-ERs funded in fiscal years 1996 and 1997 is
budgeted in fiscal years 1999 and 2000.
Question. Admiral Johnson, can JASSM meet the Navy's requirements
for SLAM-ER? Why or why not?
Navy Answer. No. Current JASSM contractor Engineering/
Manufacturing/Development (EMD) proposals make no provisions to include
the enhancements required for JASSM to meet the Navy's ORD for SLAM-ER.
The requirements not addressed are: Main-in-the-Loop data link,
Positive target ID operations, Anti-ship capability (ability to attack
mobile targets), operational life in the carrier environment and a
maximum weight of 1,800 pounds. Additional requirements for SLAM-ER
(more stringent than those for JASSM) which JASSM could be modified to
meet include: minimum launch altitude, low altitude maximum launch mach
and target area weather minima.
Aegis Cruiser Conversion
Question. In the fiscal year 1999 budget, the Navy has a new plan
that did not exist last year to perform major upgrades to its fleet of
Aegis cruisers.
Admiral Johnson, please describe the Navy's plan for the cruiser
ship conversions.
Navy Answer. The Cruiser Conversion Plan is a mid-life, warfighting
capability upgrade for the Navy's Aegis guided missile cruisers. It is
designed to modernize and extend their Aegis combat system's viability
well into the 21st Century. The Cruiser Conversion Plan enables the
Navy's deployment of Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD), Land
Attack and Area Air Defense Command (AADC) capabilities, as well as
providing support of the Marine Corps' concept for Operational Maneuver
from the Sea.
In general terms, the Cruiser Conversion Plan incorporates a major
mission change for Aegis cruisers, converting them from ``blue water''
air defense and anti-submarine warfare ships, to ``littoral''
combatants specifically equipped for overland Theater Ballistic Missile
Defense (TEMD) and Land Attack/Long Range Naval Surface Fire Support
missions.
Question. How many ships are involved, and what is the total cost?
Navy Answer. The goal of the Cruiser Conversion Plan is to
eventually modernize all 22 Baseline 2, 3, and 4 Aegis cruisers (CGs
52-73). 12 conversions are currently funded between fiscal years 2001-
2003.
The total cost of the Cruiser Conversion Plan, including $1.38
billion for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation and Shipbuilding
and Conversion, Navy already programmed in the President's fiscal year
1999 budget, is $2.66 billion.
Question. Last year, the Committee affirmed the Navy's plan to
conduct a competition among shipyards for each ship conversion.
Secretary Dalton, do you still plan to compete each and every cruiser
conversion?
Navy Answer. The Navy still intends to compete all cruiser
conversions. Shipyards capable of conducting cruiser Regular Overhauls
could perform the cruiser conversion work. This plan will generate
significant industrial work across a variety of shipyard trades.
Whether the conversions are bid individually or in groups will be
determined by the Department of Defense acquisition process.
Question. Last year, the Navy contemplated converting all 27 of its
Aegis cruisers. Today, the Navy plans to only convert 22. What changed?
Navy Answer. During the early stages of developing the Cruiser
Conversion Plan, Navy investigated the feasibility of including the
five Baseline 1 cruisers in the plan. Conversion of these to the TBMD
and Land Attack mission would require removal of the current Mk 26 rail
launches and installation of the much heavier Mk 41 vertical launching
system (VLS). VLS installation would require ``double-hulling'' the
Baseline 1 cruisers. With double-hulling, the cost of converting a
Baseline 1 cruiser rose to over $220 million each. As a result of the
much higher cost to modernize these earlier ships, conversion of the
Baseline 1 cruisers (CGs 47-51) is no longer planned.
Trident Submarine Backfit
Question. Under the conditions of the START II treaty, the Trident
submarine force will assume a role of growing importance within the
strategic triad by carrying approximately one-half of the allowable
strategic nuclear warheads. The Trident Backfit program, to retrofit 14
of the 18 boats with the D-5 missile, began last year but was
controversial in the Senate and a major issue in our conference.
Secretary Dalton, what is the status of the Trident Backfit
program?
Navy Answer. Fourteen D-5 Trident SSBNs in two oceans are required
to assure the survivability and security of the SSBN force per the
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Ten of the eighteen Trident SSBNs in the
force today are already D-5 capable. The Trident Backfit program,
retrofits four of the remaining eight boats to the D-5 missile. The
Navy is fully implementing the D-5 backfit program as directed by the
Secretary of Defense in his 1995 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)
implementation guidance. This program conducts two D-5 backfits in
fiscal year 2000 and 2001, and two in fiscal year 2004 and 2005.
Strategic weapons system equipment production for the backfits is
already in progress. The fiscal year 1999 budget includes funds to
continue equipment production and to begin the upgrades to the
Strategic Weapons Facility, Pacific (SWFPAC) to handle the D-5 missile
and for the Trident Training Facility--Bangor.
Question. How much is included in the fiscal year 1999 budget to
continue it?
Navy Answer. There is $241 million in the fiscal year 1999 budget
request to continue the procurement of D-5 strategic weapons system
equipment for the first two of the four planned D-5 backfits commencing
in fiscal years 2000 and 2001.
Question. What has been the effect of the Senate reductions (to
which we agreed in conference) to the D-5 missile production program in
terms of impact on the D-5 missile production line, the program
schedule to support Trident submarine loadout, and outyear cost to
restore the missiles deleted by the Congress?
Navy Answer. The fiscal year 1998 Senate Appropriations Committee
(and Defense Appropriations Act) reduction of $65 million in Weapons
Procurement, Navy was intended to reduce D-5 missile procurement by 2
missiles, thereby slowing the rate of D-5 production. Because the D-5
missile procurement strategy purchases some missile critical components
at the most economical production rates, while purchasing all-up rounds
at the minimum sustaining rate, the actual effect was that the Program
Manager was forced to break production lines in fiscal year 1998 for
four critical components: (1) Post Boost Control Systems (PBCS) gas
generators, (2) Nose Fairing Jettison Motors (NFJM), (3) MK-6 Guidance
System Electronics Assemblies (EA), and (4) HMX rocket motor
propellant.
Without additional funding, the program will be approximately 46
missiles short of the inventory objective of 434 D-5 missiles required
to fully out load a 14 boat, two ocean, Trident D-5 force.
Although DoD reduced the fiscal year 1999 U.S. missile procurement
quantity from 7 to 5 to be consistent with the fiscal year 1998
Congressional action, additional funds were added to the fiscal year
1999 Weapons Procurement, Navy line to mitigate the impact of broken
production lines resulting from the fiscal year 1998 Congressional
reduction.
Specifically, the fiscal year 1999 WPN budget request of $323.5
million includes $14 million to restart and re-qualify production for
three of the fourth broken production lines (MK-6 Guidance EAs, PBCS
gas generators, and NFJM). The Department is reviewing the additional
out-year funding requirement to restart and re-qualify the fourth
broken production line (HMX propellant) and to procure the hardware
deleted from the fiscal year 1998 program to ensure that the inventory
objective of 434 missiles is achieved.
Question. Congress directed that the Navy maintain the option to
increase (from 14 boats) to an 18 all D-5 SSBN force until the Russian
Duma ratifies START II. The fiscal year 1999 budget contains $18
million to begin purchasing of equipment for the last four Trident
boats that will be wasted if the Russian Duma makes such ratification.
What is the Navy's plan for investment in the last four Trident ships
that would be decommissioned once START II is ratified?
What is the potential cost next year?
What is the potential cost during the next five years?
How much of this cost is currently addressed in the
Administration's future years defense plan?
Navy Answer. The fiscal year 1998 Defense Authorization Act
prohibits obligating any funds to retire or dismantle (or prepare to
retire or dismantle) Trident ballistic missile submarines, pending
START II ratification and Congressional approval. The fiscal year 1999
budget request reflects $18 million programmed to preserve the option
of maintaining the 18 D-5 Trident SSBN force. These funds provide for
the procurement of long-lead reactor components to support the
additional refueling overhauls. If START II is ratified, this $18
million would not be wasted, since these reactor components will be
procured anyway for future refueling operations of the other Trident
SSBNs.
Maintaining this year-by-year ``hedge'' option is only possible
until fiscal year 2002. Beyond that, a decision must be made to either
refuel or remove the four Trident SSBNs from strategic service. The
costs for maintaining the option for an 18 D-5 Trident force beyond
fiscal year 1999 are not programmed, pending a recommendation for START
I force structure by the OSD/Joint Staff co-chaired START I Task Force.
For fiscal year 2000, the estimated costs are as high as $683 million
above the current program, and for fiscal year 2001, the hedge option
costs up to $960 million. These funds would only maintain the option
for 18 D-5 Tridents, not execute an 18 D-5 Trident program. Executing
an 18 D-5 Trident SSBN force would cost between $5 and $6 billion in
additional funds across the Future Years Defense Plan.
The START I Task Force is presently examining both costs and
alternative force structures in the event START II is not ratified. The
Secretary of Defense will make a full report on the Task Force findings
to Congress in April 1998.
Use of Trident Submarines for New Mission
Question. If the START II treaty is ratified by the Russian Duma,
then 4 of the 18 existing Trident submarines would be decommissioned or
otherwise made available to perform other missions. A Trident submarine
would be an ideal platform for covertly launching conventional land
attack missiles--such as Navy ATACMs. A program to convert excess
Tridents for conventional missions may be more attractive with the
recent demise of the Arsenal surface ship. Admiral Johnson, what is
your thinking about converting Trident submarines to other missions
should START II be ratified?
Navy Answer. The Trident conversion (SSGN) is a topic of interest
and the Navy is continuing to consider the concept.
Question. Do the theater CINCs share your enthusiasm?
Navy Answer. There has been some interest in this concept from
several sources, including the Commander, US Special Operations Command
and the Commander, US Pacific Fleet.
Question. How much would be required to convert 4 Trident
submarines to a conventional mission, and how much would be saved by
avoiding the decommissioning cost?
Navy Answer. Conversion costs are currently estimated to be
approximately $400 million per ship (includes the refueling overhaul
required for 20 additional years of service life), with a one time
initial design cost of approximately $170 million.
Navy currently has a nominal $90 million per ship ($360 million
total) programmed for the fiscal year 2002 and fiscal year 2003
inactivations.
Question. How much is currently budgeted in fiscal year 1999 or the
accompanying future years defense plan?
Navy Answer. The Trident SSGN is a concept and not yet a program.
Therefore, no funds have been applied to it in the fiscal year 1999
budget or accompanying Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP).
Question. Why would the Navy need to develop a new land-attack
destroyer (DD-21) if it could convert 4 Trident submarines, which
otherwise would have to be scrapped, to carry hundreds of land attack
missiles?
Navy Answer. Supporting forces ashore from the sea requires a
balanced mix of long and medium range precision strike weapons (for
Strike and Interdiction missions) and shorter range munitions (for
Naval Surface Fire Support). Guns offer the biggest payoff on
investment for providing the rate and volume of fire required for Naval
Surface Fire Support, a capability unique to surface combatants.
The approved SC-21 Mission Need Statement (MNS) and DD 21
Operational Requirements Document (ORD) emphasize the need for a
surface combatant to provide independent forward presence and operate
as an integral part of joint and allied maritime expeditionary warfare
operations. Although the focus of DD 21 is land attack, it is also
required to provide in-theater presence, battlespace dominance, and
Joint Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) interoperability. These
capabilities are especially suited to surface combatants.
A-12 Lawsuit
Question. Last Friday, a federal judge ordered the government to
pay its contractors $1.8 billion for improperly terminating the
troubled A-12 stealth fighter program (a fighter sized, B-2 shaped
aircraft) in 1991. The judge awarded the contractors $1.2 billion and
$538 million in interest. The Justice Department will appeal the
ruling, but interest would keep accruing at $200,000 per day until the
legal process concludes.
If the verdict is upheld on appeal, would the Navy be liable for
the $1.8 billion cost or would the cost be apportioned DOD wide?
Navy Answer. After all appeals, any final judgment would be paid
initially from the judgment fund of the U.S. Treasury. The Navy would
be required to reimburse the judgment fund with the same kinds of
appropriations that were used on the contract.
Question. What would be the effect on Navy modernization accounts?
Navy Answer. The Navy has appealed the judgment to the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. We believe that the appeal will be
successful. However, we are unable at this point to determine what the
final outcome of the litigation will be or when it will occur. A $1.8
billion liability would have a significant impact on our
recapitalization and modernization programs.
Aircraft Accidents
Question. What is the current situation? The Committee wants to
remain vigilant on the issue of aircraft safety. In the past, Navy and
Marine Corps aircraft mishaps seemed to be happening too frequently.
Navy Answer. From October 1, 1997 to March 15, 1998, there have
been 13 Class A flight mishaps within the Department of the Navy, for a
rate of 2.02 per 100,000 flight hours. If this rate holds, fiscal year
1998 will be the third best year.
In 1996, Navy and Marine Corps aviation leadership established the
goal of a 50 percent reduction in human factor, Class A mishaps by
1999. At the same time the Navy's Air Board chartered a Human Factors
Quality Management Board (HF QMB) to lead Naval Aviation's efforts to
accomplish this goal. The HF QMB has been instrumental in developing a
safety systems plan as well as institutionalizing Operational Risk
Management (ORM) into our aviation culture.
Marine Corps Answer. During fiscal year 1998, the Marine Corps has
experienced 5 Class A Flight Mishaps (FM), resulting in 21 fatalities
(20 civilian, 1 USMC pilot) and 4 destroyed aircraft (2 AV-8B, 2 F/A-
18C).
The Marine Corps has also had two Class A Aircraft Ground Mishaps
(AGM): C-20G damaged by a tornado and a KC-130 damaged by bleed air
failure during a ground high power test.
USN/USMC/DON Class A Flight Mishaps:
NAVY/MARINE MISHAPS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year No. Rate
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1990.......................................... 66 3.00
1991.......................................... 60 2.79
1992.......................................... 55 2.80
1993.......................................... 53 2.84
1994.......................................... 28 1.67
1995.......................................... 34 2.05
1996.......................................... 36 2.18
1997.......................................... 27 1.77
-------------
Total..................................... 359 2.39
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Rate is per 100,000 flight hours.
As of April 7, 1998 the Marine Corps has suffered two fewer Class A
Flight Mishaps (5) during fiscal year 1998 than it did during fiscal
year 1997 (7).
Question. What is the Department of the Navy's most recent annual
mishap rate, and how does that compare to earlier years. The Committee
wants to remain vigilant on the issue of aircraft safety. In the past,
Navy and Marine Corps aircraft mishaps seemed to be happening too
frequently.
Navy Answer. Fiscal year 1997 was the second lowest year ever with
a 1.77 Class A flight mishap rate (27 mishaps).
The trends during fiscal years 1988-1997, specifically fiscal years
1988-1993 compared with fiscal year 1994-1997, show a twenty-nine
percent rate decrease in the Navy Class A flight mishap rate (2.24 to
1.59); a twenty-nine percent decrease in the Marine Corps Class A
flight mishap rate (4.16 to 2.94); and a twenty-seven percent decrease
in the Navy/Marine Corps Navy Class A flight mishap rate (2.64 to
1.92).
Marine Corps Answer. A single aircraft mishap is one too many and
we continue to work to reduce our mishap rate. As the numbers below
reflect, the four most recent years reflect numbers below historical
averages and two of these years are our best ever statistics.
NAVY/MARINE
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year No. Rate
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1990.......................................... 66 3.00
1991.......................................... 60 2.79
1992.......................................... 55 2.80
1993.......................................... 53 2.84
1994.......................................... 28 1.67
1995.......................................... 34 2.05
1996.......................................... 36 2.18
1997.......................................... 27 1.77
-------------
Total..................................... 359 2.39
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note. Rate is per 100,000 flight hours.
Question. How does the Navy's mishap rate compare to that of the
Air Force, for similar models of aircraft?
Navy Answer. Class A mishap rate for Fighter-Attack Aircraft:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year Navy Marine Navy/Marine Air Force
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997........................................................ 1.46 4.58 2.58 2.98
1998\1\..................................................... 1.66 7.40 3.72 1.58
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ As of March 15, 1998.
Note. Rates are mishaps per 100,000 flight hours, and include both ashore and deployed flight operations.
Marine Corps Answer.
FIGHTER-ATTACK COMPARISON--CLASS A FLIGHT MISHAP RATE
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year USN USAF
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1990.......................................... 4.64 3.63
1991.......................................... 4.55 2.54
1992.......................................... 5.05 3.17
1993.......................................... 6.38 3.01
1994.......................................... 3.68 3.38
1995.......................................... 4.71 2.56
1996.......................................... 5.35 2.18
1997.......................................... 1.46 2.98
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note. Rate is in mishaps per 100,000 flight hours.
Question. Name for the record each known unfunded aircraft safety
of flight upgrade that exists today, and how much would be required in
fiscal year 1999 to implement each of them.
Navy Answer. Naval Aviation identifies safety of flight hazards
when an aviation unit reports a safety of flight discrepancy through
the Hazard Reporting System. If a safety of flight hazard is severe,
the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) will ground the fleet of the
particular type/model aircraft affected. NAVAIR then researches an
engineering solution for the reported problem; and after a solution is
identified it is incorporated into the budget based upon the severity
of the hazard. At the current time there are no safety of flight
hazards which are grounding aircraft.
In an attempt to reduce the mishap rate, the HF QMB has developed
an aviation safety systems plan consisting of Global Positioning
Systems (GPS), Flight Data Recorders (FDR), Ground Proximity Warning
Systems (GPWS), and Collision Avoidance Systems (CAS). GPS is fully
funded for fiscal 1999. Funding for FDR, GPWS, and CAS is based on a
risk assessment using loss of life, aircraft life remaining and mishap
cost benefit analysis. Over $70 million was identified in the fiscal
1999 budget to increase procurement of these systems on aircraft with
the highest return on investment. For aircraft with low mishap rates,
the funding of these systems will start in 2000. Additional funded
aircraft improvements to reduce mishaps include fuel and electrical
system improvements, fatigue life enhancements, and fire detection and
suppression system upgrades.
Marine Corps Answer. The Navy/Marine Corps categorize aircraft
upgrades into three categories under the term HONA or Health of Naval
Aviation. They are defined as:
HONA A: Safety, structural, mandated and other issues that would
ground aircraft, or designate weapons unserviceable or unsafe.
HONA B: Readiness and maintainability issues and investments which
impact asset availability and/or lead to lower overall life cycle cost.
HONA C: Mission performance enhancements.
Marine aviation currently has no known unfunded HONA A (safety of
flight) requirements that could be funded in fiscal year 1999.
Privatization and Outsourcing
Question. The Navy has an aggressive privatization program designed
to contract out base support functions such as vehicle maintenance,
facilities maintenance and civil engineering, automated data processing
operations, and numerous administrative functions. DoD claims that a
significant portion of the end strength reductions specified in the
Defense Reform Initiative will be achieved through privatization of
functions currently performed in-house by DoD. DoD also claims that
outsourcing will result in cost reductions of about 20%.
What are the net savings from outsourcing and privatization assumed
in the Navy's fiscal year 1999 budget request?
Navy Answer. The Navy's Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)
reflects approximately $2.7 billion net savings through fiscal year
2003, with annual savings in fiscal year 2003 approximating $1.2
billion, that have been reapplied within our budget request, toward
recapitalization and modernization of our force structure. I need to
stress that the Navy's emphasis is on competition, not on outsourcing
and privatization per se. We expect savings regardless of the outcome
of the competitions either a new more cost effective in-house
organization or a contract. Recent studies have identified nearly $4
billion annually spent on commercial activities that might be performed
more economically by the private sector or more efficiently in-house
after they have been competed.
Marine Corps Answer. The Marine Corps budget does not reflect any
savings in fiscal year 1999. The budget assumes savings beginning in
fiscal year 2000 ($20 million) and growing to a steady state amount of
$110 million by fiscal year 2004.
Question. What costs have been incurred by the Navy to implement
its privatization program?
Navy Answer. Currently the Navy has programmed $141.5 million in
fiscal year 1999 through fiscal year 2003 to provide consultant support
for competitive sourcing studies under OMB Circular A-76. Using $2
thousand/Full Time Equivalent as a benchmark, these funds will be used
to augment the in-house efforts of personnel conducting the studies.
However, the major focus of the Navy program will rely upon personnel
already in place to conduct the bulk of the A-76 study effort. The use
of local expertise plays a critical part in establishing the
requirements for performance work statements (PWS) and in developing
the quality Most Efficient Organizations (MEO) required by OMB Circular
A-76.
Marine Corps Answer. To date the Marine Corps has spent $17
thousand to implement its privatization program. We plan to invest
approximately $37 million in our program from fiscal years 1998 to
2001.
Question. What measures has the Navy implemented to validate
savings?
Navy Answer. The Navy relies upon the cost comparison process
established by OMB Circular A-76. Circular A-76 not only provides
rigorous guidelines for identifying the costs of both in-house and
private sector performance, but it also incorporates an independent
review process and provides all affected parties with an independent
appeal process. To monitor costs after the comparisons have occurred,
we are establishing a reporting system that will track actual costs
across the five-year comparison period. Based on our past experience,
we expect actual costs to track well with the cost comparison estimates
but will take appropriate corrective action if they do not.
Marine Corps Answer. The Marine Corps is implementing Activity
Based Costing within facilities maintenance and logistics aboard its
U.S. bases. This will establish a baseline cost for those related base
commercial activities within two areas which produce approximately 70
percent of installation operating costs. These baseline costs can then
be compared to either the A-76 cost comparison process generated most
efficient organization costs and/or commercial sector contract offers.
Question. What are the limits of privatization? Are the Navy's
efforts limited by the need to maintain sea shore rotations? Does the
need to maintain certain skills among military or civilian personnel
limit your ability to privatize functions?
Navy Answer. Privatization of manpower is limited both by
legislation and by the application of Navy policy on sea-shore rotation
and home-basing goals/minimums. Our policy provides a structured check
and balance system between military manpower requirements and proposed
shore infrastructure reductions for regionalization, outsourcing or
privatization initiatives to ensure that our military readiness is not
adversely affected. The need to maintain a sea-to-shore rotational
base, along with the need to maintain certain critical skills, has
indeed limited our ability to compete certain military-intensive
functions. For this reason, the Navy's plan to achieve the savings
reflected in this budget focuses on competing civilian-intensive
functions.
Marine Corps Answer. Privatization is limited by the requirement to
have a commercial vendor willing to bid. The need to maintain certain
skills among military or civilian personnel will not likely limit the
ability of the Marine Corps to privatize functions. The need to
maintain certain skills among military personnel will limit the ability
of the Marine Corps to completely contract out some functions through
the A-76 Cost Comparison Process.
Question. What effect does increased outsourcing and privatization
have on the Navy's home porting policy?
Navy Answer. Increased emphasis on competitive sourcing of our
shore infrastructure functions requires Navy to focus any efforts
involving military-intensive functions towards the ``heartland'', vice
the fleet concentration areas (FCAs), to maintain the Navy's home-
basing (not home porting) goal in FCAs at 70% opportunity. Any
infrastructure reduction proposals which would take a military rating/
skill group below a 50% home-basing opportunity (considered minimum)
for an FCA would not be approved. Again, for this reason, the Navy's
plan to achieve the savings reflected in this budget focuses on
competing civilian-intensive functions.
Marine Corps Modernization
Question. The Marine Corps is requesting $745.9 million for Marine
Corps, Procurement, $272.4 million higher than last year's appropriated
level.
General Krulak, you have been critical of the administration's
defense budget. In the past, you have told us that the Marine Corps
needs an annual procurement budget of $1.2 billion to meet
modernization requirements.
Do you still believe $1.2 billion is the ``right'' level
of procurement funding?
What major items are not funded in your fiscal year 1999
budget request?
Marine Corps Answer. It is very difficult to define the ``right
level'' of procurement funding. For some time now, financing our top
priority, near-term readiness, has come at the expense of future
modernization. We have experienced severely depressed levels of
procurement funding, well below our historical average of $1.2 billion,
over the last six years. While this budget initiates a reversal of the
past year's historically low levels of ground equipment modernization
funding, the fiscal year 1999 level is still considerably below $1.2
billion. Assuming no change in our topline, we begin to approach that
level in the outyears; however, it is essential to note that it will
take a long time to recover from the cumulative effects of low
procurement levels necessitated during the budget deficit recovery
years.
Our equipment is aging and in many cases has exceeded its useful
life. Maintenance costs are increasing and our Marines are working
longer and longer hours to maintain aging equipment. The more time and
money we spend on repairing equipment, the less we have to train
Marines. We simply must maintain the increased levels of modernization
funding we begin to see in the outyears if we are to sustain a ready,
capable Corps in the next century. If we do not, today's modernization
concerns will become tomorrow's readiness dilemmas.
Following is a list of unfunded ground equipment and ammunition
items included on our fiscal year 1999 Budget Enhancement List. This
list is prioritized within appropriation (i.e., PMC, PANMC).
Millions
PMC:
1. Base Telecomm Infrastructure............................... $64.1
2. LTVR....................................................... 37.0
3. Mod Kits Tracked Vehicles.................................. 4.6
4. Y2K Compliance/Computer Replacement........................ 20.0
5. P-19A Aircraft Firefighting SLEP........................... 4.6
6. Shop Equipment Contact Maintenance......................... 5.4
7. Night Vision Equipment..................................... 6.1
8. Hose Reel.................................................. 16.5
9. Network Infrastructure..................................... 16.5
10. Avenger................................................... 7.6
11. Power Equipment........................................... 9.5
12. Material Handling Equipment............................... 10.4
13. Mod Kits (Artillery and Other)............................ 1.3
14. Joint Tactical Info Distribution System................... 3.0
15. GPA-123 IFF Antennas...................................... 1.2
16. Chem Bio Incident Response Force (CBIRF).................. 1.0
______
TOTAL PMC................................................. 208.8
PANMC:
1. Ctg, 120mm Target Practice w/Tracer (TP-T)................. $.7
2. Ctg, 120mm Target Practice, Cone Stabilized, Discarding
Sabot w/Tracer (TPCSDS)..................................... .5
3. Ctg, 25mm Target Practice Discarding Sabot, Tracer (TPDS-T) .9
4. Ctg, 5.56mm Blank Linked................................... .6
5. Ctg, 7.62mm Ball Linked.................................... .7
6. Ctg, Cal 50 Ball Linked.................................... .3
7. Ctg, 9mm Ball.............................................. .8
8. Rocket, 83mm Dualmode...................................... 18.0
9. Fuze, Hand Grenade Practice................................ 2.5
10. Grenade, Hand Smoke Green................................. .5
11. Grenade, Hand Practice, Smoke TA M83...................... .2
12. Signal, Smoke & Illum Marine.............................. .5
13. Igniter, Time Fuse Blasting............................... .6
______
TOTAL PANMC............................................... 26.8
Question. Your fiscal year 1999 procurement request is $272.4
million higher than last year's appropriated amount.
Does your outyear budget sustain this level of funding?
Which programs are not sustained in the outyears?
Marine Corps Answer. The fiscal year 1999 request for procurement
of ground equipment and ammunition is approximately fifty percent above
the level appropriated for fiscal year 1998, allowing for the start of
recapitalization of critical Fleet Marine Force equipment that is
approaching the end of its useful life, as well as replacement of aging
equipment with new, more capable equipment such as:
Lightweight 155mm Howitzer, the replacement for our almost 20 year
old, well-worn M-198 Howitzer;
Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR), medium truck fleet
upgrade for our almost 20 year old 5-ton trucks;
Light Tactical Vehicle Replacement (LTVR), a lightweight truck
fleet upgrade for our aging HMMWV;
Javelin, our medium range, man-portable, antitank weapon;
procurement of our short range anti-armor weapon, Predator; and
upgrades to our C4I systems--as all Marines know, if you can't
talk, you can't command.
While this budget initiates a reversal of the past years'
historically low levels of ground equipment modernization funding, the
fiscal year 1999 level is still considerably below our historical
average of $1.2 billion. Assuming no change in our topline, we begin to
approach that level in the outyears. It is essential to note, however,
that it will take a long time to recover from the cumulative effects of
low procurement levels necessitated during the budget deficit recovery
years, and that while the projected levels in the outyears will allow
me to accelerate procurement of some of our ground equipment, it will
not fully satisfy our requirements.
Our equipment is aging and in many cases has exceeded its useful
life. Maintenance costs are increasing and our Marines are working more
and more hours to maintain aging equipment. The more time and money we
spend on repairing equipment, the less we have to train Marines. We
simply must maintain the increased levels of modernization funding we
begin to see in the outyears if we are to sustain a ready, capable
Corps in the next century. If we do not, today's modernization concerns
will become tomorrow's readiness dilemmas.
V-22 Aircraft
Question. Two years ago, the Administration envisioned a 27 year
construction profile to purchase V-22 aircraft at low annual rates.
Funding of the program at a rate of 36 aircraft per year was thought to
save $8-11 billion. Last year, DOD forecast a 25 year production
profile.
General Krulak, in the new budget how many years does it take to
buy out the V-22 program?
Marine Corps Answer. At the rate currently budgeted, it will take
16 years to complete procurement of the V-22 (Fiscal Year 1997-Fiscal
Year 2012). Following is the profile based on the Quadrennial Defense
Review decision which allows completion of the buy 6 years earlier than
previously planned, increases by 11 the quantity purchased within the
Future Years Defense Program, but reduces the acquisition objective
from 425 to 360.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04-11 12 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5.................................. 7 7 10 16 20 27 30/yr 28 360
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. Under the Administration's new budget plan, when is the
first year that V-22s are manufactured at a rate of 36 per year?
Navy Answer. Under the current budget and the Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR) recommendation, the maximum number of MV-22 procured per
year will be 30 aircraft starting in fiscal year 2004. The QDR
production profile supports the completion of the buy 6 years earlier
than previously planned and increases the quantity procured in the
Future Years Defense Program by 11 aircraft; however the QDR also
revised the total acquisition objective from 425 to 360 aircraft.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 99 00 01 02 03 04-11 12 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aircraft................................... 7 10 16 20 27 30 28 360
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. Compared to a profile at the economic rate of 36 aircraft
per year, how much is wasted under the Administration's non-economic V-
22 production profile show in the fiscal year 1999 budget plan?
Navy Answer. The Quadrennial Defense Review enabled the Navy to
increase the procurement from 24 to 30 MV-22 aircraft per year starting
in fiscal year 2004. The goal of the Marine Corps has always been a
procurement rate of 36 Ospreys per year but this is not achievable due
to fiscal constraints. In the May 1996 DoD report to Congress on the
implementation of the Defense Science Board recommendations (including
options for more efficient V-22 production rates (36 per year)), the
report states:
``Given fiscal realities, the Department would find it difficult to
program the additional $4 billion to $5 billion (then-year dollars)
through Fiscal Year 2001 to achieve comparable budget reductions which
would not begin to accrue until at least ten years hence.''
Helicopter Modernization Programs
Question. The Marine Corps developed a ``Rotary Wing Modernization
Plan'' as a guideline to modernize its current helicopter fleet which
was fielded in the mid-1980's.
General Krulak, during last year's acquisition hearing, we were
told that the Marine Corps is concerned with the pace of the helicopter
modernization program.
Does the fiscal year 1999 budget accelerate the helicopter
modernization plan?
If so, which programs were accelerated?
Marine Corps Answer. No aircraft were accelerated in fiscal year
1999. However, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) increased the MV-22
program by 11 aircraft within the FYDP accompanying this budget. The
first year of this increase is in fiscal year 2000 when we will procure
10 MV-22's vice 8 aircraft as previously planned.
The CH-53D, which provides heavy assault support, will be replaced
by the V-22. Based on the current Marine Corps budget, it will take 29
years to replace the CH-53D. Last year, we were told that based on an
estimated fatigue life of 10,000 hours, CH-53's will reach their
fatigue life limit in fiscal year 2000.
Question. The Marine Corps was planning a ``service life assessment
program'' (SLAP) for the CH-53D. What is a ``service life assessment
program?''
Marine Corps Answer. The SLAP is a two year effort to develop usage
and fatigue life profiles, complete with analytical evaluations of
airframe dynamic interfaces leading to design recommendations.
Question. Has the SLAP been completed?
Marine Corps Answer. No. The first year of funding begins in fiscal
year 1999 and completes in fiscal year 2000.
Question. If not, when will the SLAP be completed?
Marine Corps Answer. The SLAP report is due in fiscal year 2001.
Question. If the SLAP was conducted, what were the findings?
Marine Corps Answer. Not applicable.
Question. Does your budget funds to implement the SLAP
recommendations? If so, in what fiscal years and for what amount?
Marine Corps Answer. No.
Question. Since the CH-53D will reach its fatigue life limit next
year, what plans do you have to ensure that the aircraft remains
operable?
Marine Corps Answer. We anticipate that a very small population of
the total number of CH-53D airframes will reach the HONA generated
estimated 10,000 hour service life limit in fiscal year 2000. The CH-
53D SLAP will identify and quantify those known/unknown risk areas
within the airframe structure that have been adversely affected by the
weapons systems' 25 year service life. Once those areas have been
identified, then a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) can be costed,
developed and funds programmed.
Question. Accelerating the procurement of the V-22 could avoid a
service life extension program. If the V-22 program is not accelerated
and a service life extension program is required, what is the
anticipated cost of the program?
Marine Corps Answer. The results of the SLAP will define the
composition of a SLEP kit. Based on preliminary SLAP reports a
budgetary estimate for SLEP will be developed.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Young.
Questions submitted by Mr. Cunningham and the answers thereto
follow:]
T-ADC(X) Program
Question. What is your confidence level that the T-ADC(X) program
will survive as an SCN program?
Navy Answer. The preferred strategy to acquire T-ADC(X) is through
a charter and build program. Under charter and build, the Navy will
enter into an agreement to charter (25 year lease) with a private
sector contractor and, on vessel delivery, the charter becomes
effective. Currently, the Navy is working with QSD and OMB to discuss
scoring and budget authority aspects of the charter and build approach.
The three ships in the SCN account in fiscal years 2002 and 2003 allow
the Navy to continue exploring this alternative while ensuring the
needed CLF replacement program starts.
Question. If money is available to be appropriated, would you
support this money being put into the Sealift fund and used to pay
capital lease payments for the T-ADC(X)?
Navy Answer. No. The Department has not yet evaluated the use of
the sealift fund for the procurement of a combat logistics force ship.
Additionally, the Department does not currently endorse acquiring these
ships using a capital lease.
Question. If money is not available, do you support changing the
scoring rules to allow Charter and Build authority to be used?
Navy Answer. The Navy is reviewing alternatives to the traditional
SCN procurement. During the POM process, we will determine if changes
to scoring rules are necessary to the Charter and Build proposal.
Combat Logistics Force
Question. Can you describe the Combat Logistics Force (CLF) fleet
of the future?
Navy Answer. The CLF fleet of the future will have 13-15 TAOs, 10-
12 T-ADC (X), 4 AOE/TAOE-6, and 5-7 Ready Reserve Force (RRF) Modular
Cargo Delivery System (MCDS) Ships in a Reduced Operating Status (ROS).
Question. What is the comparative cost (O&M) between the proposed
fleet (to include the lease cost of at least 10 new T-ADC (X) ships)
and the current fleet?
Navy Answer. The President's Budget has approximately $894 million
per year (in fiscal year 1997 constant dollars) to operate the current
Combat Logistics Force (CLF) Assuming a CLF of 13 T-AO's 4 AOE-6's, and
10T-ADC (X), with the T-ADC (X)'s being acquired through a Charter &
Build operating lease agreement, the O&M requirement will be
approximately the same in fiscal year 2010. Of this amount, $220
million would be required for the T-ADC (X) lease.
Question. What other actions need to be taken to achieve the new
CLF fleet structure?
Navy Answer. The current AOE-1, TAFS and TAE classes of CLF ships
will be decommissioned/deactivated and replaced by the T-ADC (X).
Industrial Base
Question. Currently, Boeing and Lockheed are developing Joint
Strike Fighters (JSF) demonstration aircraft for a ``fly-off''. Down
selection is scheduled for fiscal year 2001; low rate initial
production will begin in fiscal year 2007, with full rate production in
fiscal year 2011. It is expected that by 2010, the JSF will be the only
tactical aircraft in production. By 2010, production of the F-22 and F/
A-18E/F will have stopped leaving the JSF as the only tactical aircraft
in production for 10-15, perhaps 20 years. What are the implications to
our industrial base if only one U.S. company is producing tactical
aircraft? Do we risk the danger of losing innovation, increasing cost,
and missing efficiencies by down selecting to only one prime TACAIR
producer?
Navy Answer. This is a critical issue that will be addressed as we
develop our final acquisition strategy. We will continue to assess the
implications as we proceed toward 2001. Taking more than one contractor
through a full Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase would be
cost prohibitive. Over the next 18 to 24 months these risks will be
evaluated and deliberated within the Department of Defense until the
strategy is finalized.
However, there are numerous cooperative activities. For example,
Northrop-Grumman's center fuselage production on Boeing's F/A-18E/F
represents nearly 48 percent of the aircraft's total cost.
Additionally, Lockheed Martin and Boeing, the two largest U.S. military
contractors, have signed an agreement to govern their business
relationships. This agreement provides for non-discrimination in buying
and selling components between the two companies. It also protects each
companies' ability to compete and have access to the latest
technologies. These types of contractual arrangements will continue to
provide ample opportunity for development efforts, secure and
strengthen the national aircraft industrial base and benefit the
Department of Defense.
[Clerk's note.--End of question submitted by Mr.
Cunningham. Questions submitted by Mr. Dicks and the answers
thereto follow:]
F/A-18E/F Aircraft
Question. The Navy has requested $3.2 billion for the F-18E/F for
continued RDT&E and for the purchase of 30 aircraft, which I strongly
support. I have been briefed on the ``wing drop'' issue and am
convinced that the Navy is very close to developing a fix to this
problem that will not impact the cost or schedule of the program. I
commend the Navy leadership for their diligence and forthrightness in
this matter.
The Navy has been experimenting with three or four different fixes
to the ``wingdrop'' problem. Has a decision been made as to which one
will be incorporated on the aircraft?
Navy Answer. Extensive testing of the various solutions to wingdrop
indicate that the porous wing fold panel is the solution which has the
minimum impact in the areas of range, drag and radar cross section. The
Blue Ribbon Panel concurred with this solution. In the process of
testing the porous panel solution in all configurations, buffet was
detected in one particular configuration. Although the buffet is a well
understood phenomena which is much less technically challenging than
wing drop, we are continuing to refine the porous faring to optimize
performance.
Question. When will the flight test with the incorporated fix be
completed and ready for evaluation by the blue ribbon panel that was
formulated to provide oversight on this matter?
Navy Answer. The Integrated Test Team has been working hard to
solidify the wing drop fix. Flight testing is expected in late March.
We are keeping the Blue Ribbon Panel advised of our progress.
Question. Am I correct in understanding that whatever solution to
the ``wing drop'' problem is adopted, there will be no impact on the
signature of the aircraft?
Navy Answer. The solutions being tested to correct wing drop have
negligible impact on the overall radar signature of the aircraft.
Question. GAO has alleged that, in addition to the ``wingdrop''
problem, the aircraft is faced with other problems including,
signature, cost, engine capability and the ability of the aircraft to
properly dispense munitions. I have seen nothing in the briefings I
have received to substantiate any of the GAO claims. In your judgment,
is there any validity to these charges? Could you discuss these
assertions with the subcommittee?
Navy Answer. The GAO report discusses six specific deficiencies
(wing drop, new technologies, engine challenges, weapons separation,
horizontal stabilator and vertical tail), and addresses program funding
and cost in light of Quadrennial Defense Review reductions from 1,000
to a minimum of 548 aircraft. Of the six areas, three (new
technologies, weapons separation and vertical tail) are considered
fixed or closed. The other three items are works in progress, with
solid plans in place which will allow them to be closed in relatively
short order. The report contains some misstatements and factual errors,
and the overall tone and connotation are negative. The report makes no
effort to recognize that deficiency identification and correction is
the primary purpose of the Engineering and Manufacturing Development
effort, or that the E/F program is a success by any measure as compared
to past programs.
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program
Question. Can you give the Committee a general overview on the
status of the JSF program? As you know, the budget includes $919
million for continued RDT&E on the JSF program--of which $463 million
is Navy money. I believe that this program is critical to all three
services but that the Navy in particular must have this aircraft so
that we can deploy a stealthy aircraft off of our Carrier decks.
Navy Answer. The program is proceeding on schedule and on cost. The
Joint Strike Fighter Program will develop and field an affordable,
highly common family of next-generation multi-role strike aircraft for
the United States Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and our allies. The
cornerstone of the JSF Program is affordability--reducing the
development cost, production cost, and cost of ownership of the JSF
family of aircraft. In November 1996, JSF commenced a multiyear $2.2
billion competitive Concept Demonstration Program with Boeing, Lockheed
Martin, and Pratt and Whitney. In parallel, requirements are being
evolved between now and 2000 and include cost and operational
performance trades aimed at meeting warfighters' needs at the lowest
cost. Critical technology maturation demonstrations are proceeding on
schedule to lower risk in Engineering and Manufacturing Development
(E&MD) and reduce life cycle cost. The Services Joint Operational
Requirements Document (JORD) will be complete in fiscal year 2000.
Milestone 11 and E&MD start is planned in 2001. Delivery of initial
operational aircraft is planned in 2008.
Marine Corps Answer. The program is proceeding on schedule and on
cost at this time. The Joint Strike Fighter Program will develop and
field an affordable, highly common family of next-generation multi-role
strike aircraft for the United States Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and
allies. The cornerstone of the JSF Program is affordability--reducing
the development cost, production cost, and cost of ownership of the JSF
family of aircraft. In November 1996 JSF commenced a multiyear $2.2
billion competitive Concept Demonstration Program (CDP) with Boeing,
Lockheed Martin, and Pratt and Whitney. In parallel, requirements are
being evolved between now and fiscal year 2000 and include cost and
operational performance trades (COPT) aimed at meeting warfighters'
needs at the lowest cost. Critical technology maturation demonstrations
are proceeding on schedule to lower risk in E&MD and reduce life cycle
cost. The Services Joint Operational Requirements Document (JORD) will
complete in fiscal year 2000. Milestone II and E&MD start is planned in
2001. Delivery of initial operational aircraft is planned in 2008.
Question. Do the Navy and Marine Corps still view JSF as one of its
top modernization priorities?
Navy Answer. The Navy and Marine Corps are fully committed to the
JSF. It is the Marine Corps' top TACAIR modernization program and will
replace all of the Corps AV-8Bs and F/A-18 C/Ds. Initial Operational
Capability (IOC) for the Short Take-off Vertical Landing variant is
planned in 2010 with IOC for the CV variant to follow.
Marine Corps Answer. The Marine Corps is fully committed to the
JSF. It is the Marine Corps' top TACAIR modernization program and will
replace all of our AV-8Bs and F/A-18 A/B/C/Ds. IOC for the STOVL
variant is planned in fiscal year 2010.
Question. Is there still a commitment on the part of the Navy,
Marine Corps and AF to jointly develop and manufacture JSF?
Navy Answer. Yes. Joint development and manufacturing of the JSF is
imperative to an affordable weapon system platform that will meet the
needs of the warfighters.
Marine Corps Answer. Yes. Joint development and manufacturing of
the JSF is imperative to an affordable weapon system platform that will
meet the needs of the warfighters.
Trident Submarines
Question. Last year, the Senate attempted to eliminate the missile
and backfit money on the D-5 program. Thanks to a strong cooperative
effort between the subcommittee and the Navy and Joint Staff, we were
able to minimize the Trident-related reduction. Does the Navy remain
fully committed to the Trident program?
Navy Answer. The Navy is fully committed to all aspects of the
Trident program. Assuming ratification of START II by the Russian Duma,
14 D-5 Trident SSBNs in two oceans are required to assure the safety,
security and survivability of the force. With the recent service life
extension of the Trident submarine from 30 to 42 years, the Trident
SSBN will remain the most survivable leg of the strategic triad into
the 2030's.
Question. Assuming that we will end up with 14 as the Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR) recommends, is it still the plan to have a 7-7
basing split between Bangor and Kings Bay?
Navy Answer. The NPR recommended a 14 D-5 Trident fleet in two
oceans upon ratification of START II. An examination and evaluation of
targeting requirements, based on Presidential Decision Directive (PDD),
issued in November 1997 is being conducted by CINCSTRAT. This review is
expected to be completed by the Summer of 1998. The matter is also
under review within the Navy, and when these reviews are complete an
official decision on force distribution will be made.
Question. As you know, the plan as it relates to Trident has been
to move toward a 14 boat fleet but to maintain a hedge of 18 boats
pending Duma ratification of the START II. As you know, despite strong
efforts on the part of President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Primakov,
the Duma has not moved to ratify the Treaty.
I understand we are nearing the point where we can no longer
continue to sustain the hedge of 18 boats with low-level funding and
that a final decision must be made on the ultimate Trident fleet
composition. I am told that if we decide to maintain 18 boats, it will
come to a cost of $6-$8B.
Do you have an exact cost-estimate of maintaining 18 boats?
Navy Answer. Rough order of magnitude costs have been developed for
the execution of an 18 D-5 Trident force. Depending on when the
decision was made to execute the program, approximately $5-$7 billion
in additional funds across the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) (2000-
2005) would be required. These additional funds above the program of
record would be required for four additional refueling overhauls and D-
5 backfits, as well as additional D-5 missiles to outfit the four extra
SSBNs.
Question. What is the exact point where a decision must be made on
this issue? Can we sustain a hedge of 18 boats in next years budget
with low-level funding or does Fiscal Year 2000 constitute the first
stage of a substantial funding ramp for the four additional boats?
Navy Answer. Maintaining this year-by-year ``hedge'' option is only
possible until fiscal year 2002. Beyond that a decision must be made to
either refuel or remove the four Trident SSBNs from strategic service.
The costs for maintaining the option for an 18 D-5 Trident force beyond
fiscal year 1999 are not programmed, pending a recommendation for START
I force structure by the OSD/Joint Staff co-chaired START I Task Force.
For fiscal year 2000, the estimated costs are as high as $683 million
above the current program, and for fiscal year 2001, the hedge option
costs up to $960 million. These funds would only maintain the option
for 18 D-5 Tridents, not execute an 18 D-5 Trident program. An 18 D-5
Trident SSBN force would cost between $5 and $7 billion in additional
funds across the Future Years Defense Plan, depending on when a
decision was made to execute the program.
The START I Task Force is presently examining both costs and
alternative force structures in the event START II is not ratified. The
Secretary of Defense will make a full report on the Task Force findings
to Congress in April 1998.
Trident Conversion (SSGN)
Question. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Navy has
reoriented its strategy and forces to place much greater emphasis on
littoral warfare--recognizing that most conflicts of the future in
which US forces might be engaged would probably occur near coastal
areas. A major challenge in implementing this vision of the Navy's
future roles and missions is that much of the current fleet was
designed primarily for operations in open seas. The initiation of the
Arsenal Ship program, which was not funded this year, was in large part
an effort to develop assets that could operate in this new environment.
I have always believed that, assuming we go forward with the NPR
recommendation of a 14 boat Trident fleet, converting the remaining 4
Trident platforms to perform Arsenal ship-like missions made a great
deal of sense. Converted Tridents would give the Navy--at a relatively
low cost and short period of time--several highly survivable platforms
capable of carrying as many Tomahawk cruise missiles as an entire
carrier-battle group.
I understand that while the Navy has not put any money behind a
Trident conversion program to this point, it is something being widely
discussed.
Can you give the subcommittee your general opinion on the Trident
conversion idea?
Navy Answer. The Navy is continuing to consider the TRIDENT
conversion (SSGN) concept. The four oldest Trident SSGNs are currently
planned for removal from strategic service, two in fiscal year 2002 and
two in fiscal year 2003. Absent either the requirement to utilize these
ships in continuation of their strategic role or a program to convert
them to a tactical role, the Navy will decommission them.
Question. What is the status of discussions on this program within
the Navy?
Navy Answer. Current congressional language prohibits removal of
any of the 18 TRIDENT SSBNs from strategic service prior to START II
ratification. The Trident conversion (SSGN) is still a concept and not
yet a program. No funds have been applied to it in the fiscal year 1999
budget, but the Navy continues to evaluate the concept.
Question. Are there any cost-estimates for converting the four
boats to perform Arsenal Ship-like missions?
Navy Answer. Conversion costs are currently estimated to be
approximately $400 million per ship (includes the refueling overhaul
required for 20 additional years of service life), with a one time
initial design cost of approximately $170 million.
V-22 Aircraft
Question. As you all know, I have been and continue to be a strong
supporter of the V-22 program. However, I understand that there has
been about a $130 million cost-overrun in the program and that the
program is several months behind schedule on its test program. This
concerns me because I recognize how critical this revolutionary
aircraft is to the Marine Corps.
Can you explain the nature of the cost overruns?
Navy Answer. The increased completion cost of Engineering
Manufacturing and Development (EMD) is attributable to the late
delivery of four EMD aircraft.
Question. What is the impact of the delay on the test program?
Navy Answer. The EMD aircraft delivery delays caused the test
program plan to be revised. All major scheduled milestones are within
Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) thresholds. The MV-22 Milestone III
decision and CV-22 remanufacture schedule are unchanged.
Question. Do you view the cost and schedule programs as an isolated
one-time incident that can be easily addressed or should we expect
further hiccups with this program in the future?
Navy Answer. The cost-overrun represents less than a 5% cost
increase within the overall cost of the program. This increase is fully
funded in the fiscal year 1999 President's Budget. There is a very low
probability of any further cost increases. However, any fiscal year 99
taxes applied to the program will result in funding shortfalls and
potential restructuring or program slippage.
Marine Corps Answer. The increased completion cost of Engineering
Manufacturing and Development (EMD) is attributable to the late
delivery of four EMD aircraft.
The EMD aircraft delivery delays caused the test program to be
replanned. All major schedule milestones are within Acquisition Program
Baseline (APB) thresholds. The MV-22 Milestone III decision and CV-22
remanufacture schedule is unchanged.
The cost-overrun represents less than a 5 percent cost increase
within the overall cost of the program. This increase is fully funded
in the fiscal year 1999 President's Budget. There is a very low
probability of any further cost increases. However, any fiscal year
1999 taxes applied to the program will result in funding shortfalls and
potential restructuring or program slippage.
Navy Area and Theater-Wide Systems
Question. One of the real concerns that I have had over the past
couple of years is the pace at which we are developing a credible
Theater Missile Defense (TMD) capability. I have been strongly
supportive of all TMD systems including the Navy Area and Navy Theater
Wide systems which I know are of critical importance to the Navy.
However, I am still concerned that we are not developing and deploying
these systems quick enough.
What is the projected IOC for the Navy Area TBMD System and the
Theater-Wide TBMD System?
Navy Answer. At currently programmed funding levels, the Area
system will provide an initial capability with two ``Linebacker'' ships
in 1999 with the objective tactical IOC in 2001.
At currently programmed funding levels, the Navy Theater-Wide
system is planning for an IOC for Block I in fiscal year 2006 and Block
II in fiscal year 2009.
Question. Is it possible from a technical standpoint to accelerate
development and deployment of either of these programs?
Navy Answer. AREA: The Area program is funded to support initial
``Linebacker'' capability on two ships in late 1999, and full
operational capability in 2001. The development/test schedule leading
to IOC is aggressive with little possibility of overall acceleration.
THEATER WIDE: In an effort to find alternatives to deploy Navy TBMD
sooner than the current plan, the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief
of Naval Operations initiated a Comprehensive Program Review (CPR) of
Navy TBMD. The CPR became the basis for a complete evaluation of the
most appropriate programmatic and technical steps needed to deploy Navy
TBMD sooner. As part of this process, the Navy reallocated more than $1
billion across the future years defense program to speed introduction
of Area TBMD and the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) in
destroyers and cruisers, and Area Air Defense Commander (AADC)
capability in 12 Aegis cruisers. The Navy has initiated a cruiser
conversion program in part to prepare these ships to receive NTW
capability at a rapid pace.
In the fiscal year 1998 Defense Authorization Act, Congress
directed the Secretary of Defense to report the ``earliest technically
feasible deployment date'' of NTW. The earliest technically feasible
deployment date for NTW was assessed by the Navy during the CPR, and
again as a result of the Congressional direction, as a Block I
capability in 2002 with a follow on NTW Block II capability in 2005/
2006. It is important to note, however, that a deployment in 2002 would
be an extremely high risk venture. A more moderate risk program costing
considerably less would yield a deployment in 2003 or 2004.
Question. What would be the costs of accelerating one or both of
these programs?
Navy Answer. AREA: Little possibility of overall acceleration.
THEATER WIDE: The estimated additional funding to accomplish the
``earliest technically feasible deployment date'' for NTW is:
[In millions of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PB............................................. 192 191 191 145 149
Delta.......................................... 250 209 198 410 323
----------------------------------------------------------------
Total.................................... 442 400 389 555 472
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
To achieve NTW deployment starting in 2002, a decision to proceed
with long-lead missile hardware procurement and the commencement of
Aegis computer program development for NTW Block I would have to be
made in 1999 to support commencement of formal testing in 2001. This
funding profile also allows completion of risk reduction activities
earlier in the program and in parallel with Block I development.
A more measured approach for earlier deployment of NTW, with less
risk, has been developed. This option differs from the earliest
technically feasible approach by waiting to add funding to the program
to procure Block I test missiles until after a successful Aegis-LEAP
Intercept in 2000. This approach accelerates Block I related risk
reduction activities and begins necessary systems engineering
permitting more rapid deployment. This measured approach preserves the
ability to deploy an NTW Block I capability in fiscal year 2003 with
the following estimated funding:
[In millions of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PB............................................. 192 191 191 145 149
Delta.......................................... 135 165 125 50 50
----------------------------------------------------------------
Total.................................... 327 356 316 195 199
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Following successful completion of the Aegis-LEAP Intercept (ALI)
Program, a decision would be required to add additional funding to
support the fiscal year 2003 first deployment.
Question. Would there be technical risks to acceleration of one or
both of these systems?
Navy Answer. The Area program is funded to support initial
``Linebacker'' capability on two ships in late 1999, and full
operational capability in 2001. The development/test schedule leading
to Initial Operating Capability (IOC) is aggressive with little
possibility of overall acceleration. The ``earliest technically
feasible'' program for NTW would add significant technical risk to the
program by executing parallel systems engineering and development of
the Block I system. The ``measured'' approach for NTW was designed to
lessen technical risk by requiring completion of Block I risk reduction
and completion of the Aegis-LEAP Intercept (ALI) program prior to
making the NTW Block I procurement decision.
Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System (RAMICS)
Question. Can you provide the Committee your general impression of
the RAMICS program? In your testimony, you mention the Rapid Airborne
Mine Clearance System (RAMICS) as one potentially effective way to
modernize your Mine Countermeasure Forces. As you know, I have been an
active proponent of this program. In fact, this subcommittee has added
over $16 million over the past four years to develop RAMICS. I am
pleased to note that the Navy has selected this program for a three
year ATD project.
Navy Answer. RAMICS, a laser targeting gun projectile system, has
the potential to provide our battle groups and organic capability to
rapidly neutralize near-surface moored contact mines. Current
operational procedure requires mines to first be marked and then
neutralized, either by Explosive Ordnance Disposal divers or by
neutralization vehicles deployed from dedicated Mine Countermeasure
ships.
Question. What is the status of the ATD?
Navy Answer. RAMICS is in the first year of the three year Advanced
Technology Demonstration (ATD) project. Navy has assembled a team which
includes Raytheon, CTECH, Kaman Aerospace, and General Dynamics, to
execute the RAMICS ATD. Year one ATD goals include the development of a
RAMICS anti-mine munitions and the demonstration of lethality.
Question. Do you believe this program will transition to an
acquisition program after completion of the ATD assuming the program
continues to perform well?
Navy Answer. Yes. RAMICS is one of five systems that Navy has
identified to provide an organic mine countermeasures capability on the
next generation H-60 platform. The other systems that will constitute
this capability are the Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS),
the AQS-20/X, the Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS), and the
Shallow Water Influence Minesweep System (SWIMS). By combining the
potential neutralization capabilities of RAMICS with the search
capabilities of ALMDS, Navy will have the organic capability to detect
and neutralize rapidly near surface contact mines.
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS)
Question. I understand that the Navy and Marine Corps employed
Joint STARS during Fleet Battle Experiment Alpha, the Hunter Warrior
Exercise and in an amphibious landing exercise in Korea last November.
Could you comment on the utility of JSTARS for Navy and Marine
Corps operations?
Navy Answer. Hunter Warrior/Fleet Battle Experiment ALFA (FBE A)
was held in the Southern California operating area from March 3-13,
1997 under direction of Commander Third Fleet (COMTHIRDFLT) as
Executive Agent for the Chief of Naval Operations. FBE A demonstrated
command and control for a sea-based Joint Task Force commander
supporting dispersed Marine assault units ashore. This included
evaluation of emerging Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) techniques and
advanced munitions concepts. The Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar
System (JSTARS) aircraft linked target detection, identification,
tracking and battlespace imagery feeds to COMTHIRDFLT onboard USS
CORONADO via an afloat Deployable Ground Support System in support of
NSFS and air attack missions. COMTHIRDFLT initiated numerous fire
missions based upon the rapid turnaround of comprehensive targeting
data provided by JSTARS.
The utility of JSTARS demonstrated during FBE A far exceeded our
expectations. For the first time ever, JSTARS Moving Target Indicator
(MTI) and Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) images were transmitted
``live'' to a ship at sea. The ship then used this data to
electronically transmit calls for fire to a firing ship. In less than
ten minutes from the receipt of the JSTARS data to the first ship, the
firing ship put ordnance on target from over 100 nautical miles away.
Utilization of JSTARS has far reaching tactical implications because it
gives us the capability to provide direct fire support to the Sailor or
Marine on the beach or further inland. It will be one of the systems
which will help make the sensor-to-shooter concept a reality.
Marine Corps Answer. Yes, we have incorporated Joint Surveillance
Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) during the Marine Corps
Warfighting Experiment (Hunter Warrior), Fleet Battle Exercise ``B'',
ASCIET 97 and Exercise Foal Eagle (Korea) 97. During these exercises,
Joint STARS was used for the surveillance and rapid targeting of
opposing forces. It demonstrated the capability to provide near and
deep, wide area surveillance of the battle area, target detection and
tracking. Joint STARS and its battle management capabilities provide
the surveillance, detection, tracking and targeting required to support
key operational concepts called for in Forward from the Sea,
Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) and Ship to Objective
Maneuver (STOM). Joint STARS are currently being considered as
potential operational assets to be utilized during exercises Fleet
Battle Experiment ``C'' & ``E'', RIMPAC 98, Urban Warrior and Kernal
Blitz.
As the Marine Corps learned during Operation Desert Storm, Joint
STARS can significantly contribute to advancing the situational
awareness of commanders afloat and ashore. If available, a Joint STARS
capability will enhance the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF)
Commander's ability to plan and develop the tactical situation in his
area of operations. Potential uses and methods will include:
--Using its organic wide-area Moving Target Indicator and Synthetic
Aperture Radar, Joint STARS will be able to provide an afloat MAGTF
operating over-the-horizon with information on the changing situation
ashore for preliminary mission planning and for cross-cueing of other
information collectors.
--As courses-of-action are refined, Joint STARS will continuously
update the MAGTF Commander's near-real-time target data for the optimum
employment of supporting arms.
--While projecting forces ashore, Joint STARS will be used to
maintain the commander's situational awareness by contributing to the
existing common tactical picture.
--In a post-strike environment, Joint STARS data will be used to
assist in battle damage assessment and could also be used to support
target re-attack.
Currently, Marine Expeditionary Forces will receive Joint STARS
data directly from the E-8C Joint STARS aircraft via a dedicated link
and Common Ground Station. The Marine Corps' ultimate goal for
utilizing Joint STARS data is a capability designed within Defense
Information Infrastructure Common Operating Environment (DII COE)
parameters that is flexible enough to use across operational units
without being constrained by unique hardware and system configuration
dependencies. Additionally, units from the Marine Expeditionary Force
and down to and including the regiment/group level must be able to
receive, process and store the data for operational use.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Dicks.
Questions submitted by Mr. Visclosky and the answers thereto
follow:]
Napalm Disposal
Question. The Navy has been criticized by Illinois and Indiana
residents about the Navy's failure to inform the public about the
planned shipment of napalm from California to Indiana. The Navy has
responded that it did not have a legal requirement to inform the
public. Notwithstanding the wisdom of the law in this case, doesn't the
Navy have a moral responsibility to inform the public of hazardous
waste shipments through their communities?
Navy Answer. The Navy does have a responsibility to inform the
public when there is a unique or potentially dangerous situation
pertaining to hazardous waste shipments through their communities. In
this case, there is an extremely low risk posed to the public by the
shipment of napalm compared to materials and wastes routinely shipped
via rail in the normal day to day commerce of the country. In
comparison, while napalm burns extremely hot, it is much harder to
ignite than gasoline and it will not explode like propane. Gasoline and
propane are shipped every day throughout the country. The Department of
Transportation regulates how and what can be shipped on the railroads.
The Navy will follow these rules for the transport of the napalm.
Moreover, the hazardous waste permitting process allows PCI to
accept only those wastes specifically authorized by the Indiana
Department of Environmental Management. The napalm constituents are
among the authorized waste streams. The permitting process included
extensive public participation and facility siting requirements. Only
after checking with the regulatory agencies to ensure that PCI was
properly permitted did the Navy proceed with the plan to ship the
napalm to PCI.
The Navy notified the public in a series of information meetings in
the Illinois and Indiana area as well as with press releases.
Question. Why is it more cost effective to send this waste across
the country rather than blending it on site at Fallbrook? How is the
Navy's plan to dispose of napalm different from how the Army has been
disposing of its chemical weapons inventory? It is my understanding
that the Army is constructing cradle-to-grave disposal facilities at
each of its eight chemical weapons storage facilities. The Army is not
shipping any of its dangerous material outside of its current
locations. Why didn't the Navy follow this model and course of action?
What kind of public relations activity did the Army do prior to the
start of their disposal efforts and how is that different from what the
Navy has done?
Navy Answer. The Navy believes that it is more cost-effective, even
when you add transportation costs, to ship napalm to a facility which
has already been constructed and has already obtained permits than it
is to construct and permit wholly new blending facilities onsite. The
gel-like nature of napalm requires that it be blended with other more
fluid materials, such as those routinely received by permitted blending
facilities. If the Navy were to blend onsite, it would have to incur
the expenses of purchasing blending materials and constructing the
blending facility. Moreover, transportation costs would still be
incurred because the blended material would have to be shipped to a
permitted facility for use as an alternative fuel.
There is no civilian industry to recycle chemical munitions; unlike
Napalm, chemical munitions can not be burned in industrial incinerators
and there is no recycled market value. The Army consequently
constructed special facilities to dispose of unique chemical weapons.
The Army program involves a very complicated, multiple factor means
of demilitarization encompassing all aspects of the munitions (e.g.
propellants, motors, explosives, hardened non-detachable containers as
well as highly toxic chemical/nerve agents, etc.) since these munitions
do not have disposal streams in civilian industry. The constituents of
napalm on the other hand, as well as the Napalm metallic canisters,
have similarities with other common industrial hazardous waste
materials, and industry-recycling processes therefor, exist.
Navy's public relation plan for the Napalm disposal effort included
a series of public information meetings in the Illinois and Indiana
areas, as well as numerous press releases. Information on the Army's
public affairs program for chemical weapons should be requested from
the Department of the Army Public Affairs.
Question. I have been a supporter of this project since I first
became aware of it. I have, however, also been pressing Navy officials
about improving on their poor public relations campaign on this issue
since early December. The simple fact is that the real perception among
citizens in my communities is that the Navy is dumping napalm on them.
The Navy counters these perceptions with dense technical documents that
have done nothing to alleviate the very real fears of the residents of
East Chicago, a large portion of whom are minorities. Many of my
constituents have raised the issue of environmental racism regarding
this project. Instead of the Navy responding to this serious
allegation, Navy attorneys released a two-paragraph legal statement
announcing that the Navy was not legally required to examine the issue
of environmental racism and had no intention of doing so. The citizens
I represent in Northwest Indiana were not pleased with that answer.
Does the Navy intend to reexamine the issue of environmental racism
regarding this project, and do you think your subordinates handled the
issue with appropriate sensitivity and common sense then it was raised?
Navy Answer. Executive Order 12898 requires each federal agency to
identify and address, as appropriate, disproportionately high and
adverse human health or environmental effects of programs and policies
on minority populations and low-income populations as a means of making
environmental justice part of its mission. On March 24, 1995, the
Department of Defense (DoD) issued to the military departments its
Strategy on Environmental Justice, which focused on ensuring a healthy
and safe environment around DoD installations located near minority and
low-income populations. With regard to CERCLA actions, the DoD strategy
integrates environmental justice considerations through the community
relations plan and the Restoration Advisory Board (RAB), both of which
are used to provide information and receive input from the community in
which the cleanup is being conducted.
Neither Executive Order 12898 nor the DoD strategy applies to the
Navy's shipment of CERCLA substances via railroad to permitted
facilities. Rather environmental justice concerns involving
transportation and treatment/storage/disposal (TSD) facility permitting
fall under the purview of the cognizant regulatory agencies. The
entities involved in the shipment and treatment and disposal of the
napalm byproducts have valid permits evidencing regulatory agency
review and approval.
In any case, transportation of the materials, which complies with
all rail safety regulations, has no predictable high and adverse effect
on any community. Receipt and processing of the materials at PCI
similarly presents no explosive risk, and releases of hazardous
material into the environment will not occur in normal handling. Health
and Safety Plans are in place to deal with spills that might occur.
Question. Does the Navy intend to actually start answering press
calls promptly from now on, or is it going to continue to ignore press
calls until my office repeatedly asks that they be answered?
Navy Answer. The Navy believes it has answered media and other
queries promptly. The Navy endeavors to provide accurate replies to
media inquiries.
Question. Have any nationally recognized environmental
organizations endorsed this method of disposal?
Navy Answer. The Department of the Navy is unaware of other
environmental organizations that might support this program. However,
the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) headquarters
might be a source for such information, since EPA interfaced with many
such organizations during the Boiler and Industrial Furnace rulemaking
process, from which the Alternative Fuels Program evolved.
Question. The Navy has now passed off responsibility on part of
this project by asking the Department of Energy to examine the
suitability of one of the contractors involved in the project,
Pollution Control Industries (PCI), located in East Chicago, Indiana.
This requested action does not make sense. Specifically, it is my
understanding that once the Department of Defense certified that PCI
was a suitable subcontractor and was approved to participate in federal
contracts, then that action automatically requires that all other
federal agencies recognized that certification. DOE is not supposed to
reexamine PCI because DoD's original certification of the company is
backed by the authority of the entire federal government, including the
Department of Energy
Am I generally correct in that understanding?
Navy Answer. It is not true that the Department of Defense
certified that PCI was a suitable subcontractor or approved their
participation in federal contracts. The Navy is the lead federal agency
for the removal action under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensations and Liability Act (CERCLA) and has a statutory obligation
to ensure that wastes transferred off-site are shipped only to
facilities which are operating in compliance with applicable state and
federal laws. (See CERCLA Sec. 121(d)(3)). PCI is a facility permitted
by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).
The Department of Energy has technical and contracting experience
with disposals of this nature. For maximum efficiency and to make use
of DOE's experience, the Navy chose to have DOE manage the contract
using an interagency order placed under the Economy Act. The
acquisition process utilized by the Department of Energy's contractor
includes all acquisition and subcontracting functions. It is being
accomplished by the Department of Energy's Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory, operated by Battelle. A key element of the Navy's task
order with DOE was the requirement to ensure that all applicable state
and laws are met.
Consistent with applicable environmental regulations and guidance,
Battelle performed certain checks of PCI prior to award of a contract
to ensure it was properly permitted by EPA, technically competent, and
suitable to perform waste treatment services. These checks included an
inspection of the proposed facility, a review of PCI's permit status
and compliance history, and consultation with state and federal
environmental authorities. Battelle's checks did not result in a
``certification'' of PCI; Battelle relied on the status of the facility
as reported by environmental regulators.
In January and February 1998, the Department of the Navy performed
a review of the project. Because the Department of Energy is executing
the project on behalf of the Department of the Navy, the Department of
the Navy's review focused primarily on the overall program management.
The Department of the Navy's review was not intended to, nor did it
result in a certification of PCI.
Question. I have repeatedly asked the Navy to put in place a
comprehensive public and media relations master plan that will see us
through the completion of this project. Instead, the Navy continues to
believe that a reactive posture is the best solution and that the only
proactive action that should be taken is the establishment of an
internet site where the public can obtain the same unhelpful
information that has already been released. Do you agree with this
approach to public relations?
Navy Answer. The Navy has prepared and is executing a media
relations plan for this project. The plan includes a website and an on-
scene outreach and communication team located in East Chicago, IN.
Shipbuilding Rate
Question. Is the planned rate of shipbuilding sufficient to
maintain a Navy of 300 ships over the long run (past 2015)?
Navy Answer. In order to sustain a 300 ship Navy our shipbuilding
rate must be maintained at approximately 8-10 ships per year. Within
the fiscal year 1999-fiscal year 2003, we buy an average of 6 ships per
year which is not sufficient over the long term to sustain a 300 ship
force.
Question. After what date will the Navy fall below 300 ships?
Navy Answer. Based on current and projected ship building and
decommissioning rates the Navy could fall below the 300 ship threshold
as early as 2007. However, when considering the adequacy of our force
structure, the focus should be on ensuring the required capability vice
a specific number of ships. Modernization programs in some cases have
enabled us to accomplish the same missions with considerably less ships
and fewer personnel.
Question. Why wasn't the reduction in the planned size of the Navy
from the BUR figure of 346 ships to the new figure of 300 ships made
explicit in the QDR?
Navy Answer. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) validated that
the Navy's core combat capability should reside in twelve aircraft
Carrier Battle Groups (CVBGs) and twelve Amphibious Ready Groups
(ARGs). The total number of ships was not explicitly directed. The
numbers of surface combatants, attack submarines, and logistic support
ships were adjusted to match and support the core capabilities
represented by the 12 CVBGs and 12 ARGs identified in the QDR. Based on
the current capabilities of ships in the fleet, the total number of
ships required to support the 12 CVBG/12 ARG centered Navy is about 300
ships.
Navy Size (in Ships), Current Defense Plan
1998.............................................................. 333
1999.............................................................. 315
2000.............................................................. 314
2001.............................................................. 314
2002.............................................................. 308
2003.............................................................. 306
Shipbuilding Industrial Base Study
Question. What is the status of the joint Navy/DoD shipbuilding
industrial base study? Wasn't this study supposed to have been done by
November or December of last year? Why is the Navy sitting on it?
Navy Answer. On April 7, 1997, Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Research, Development and Acquisition) and the Under Secretary of
Defense (Acquisition & Technology) commissioned a Shipbuilding
Industrial Base Study (SIBS). While the study was originally envisioned
to be completed by November or December, the magnitude of data received
from the shipbuilders required additional effort on the part of the
Navy and OSD. The SIBS Working Group has completed its efforts and is
in the process of briefing senior Navy and OSD management. Due to the
sensitive nature of the data, it is unlikely that the results of the
study will be made available to the public.
Question. Can you tell us anything about the findings of the
report? Should the government award shipbuilding contracts without
regard to possible yard closure?
Navy Answer. Since the study has not been officially reviewed by
the interested Navy and DoD officials, it is premature to present
findings. Due to the sensitive nature of the report, it is likely that
it will not be released to the public.
Question. What should be the government's policy about
consolidation or mergers?
Navy Answer. Since the study has not been officially reviewed by
the interested Navy and DoD officials, it is premature to present
findings or attempt to articulate the Government's position. Due to the
sensitive nature of the report, it is likely that it will not be
released to the public. However, the study would not have been
successful without the involvement of the shipbuilding community. They
were asked to participate up-front and were very cooperative.
DD 21 Teaming
Question. Can you have vigorous competition after the announced DD
21 teaming arrangement between Ingalls, Bath Iron Works, and Lockheed
Martin? What is the Navy going to do about this? How does the Navy
intend to prevent ``group think'' during the conceptual design phase if
both major surface combatant yards are on the same team? Can the
Government prevent the teaming arrangement? On the issue of prevention
of exclusivity, what is the incentive for the first yard to break ranks
and join up with a second team?
Navy Answer. The original draft DD 21 request for Proposals (RFP)
was issued in November 1997. Shortly thereafter, the proposed team of
Ingalls, Bath Iron Works and Lockheed was announced. Raytheon expressed
concerns about this team to the Department of the Navy and the
Department of Defense, and then referred the matter to the Department
of Justice for review. In order to encourage competition to the maximum
extent, the Navy made amendments to the RFP (listed below), and issued
a revised DD 21 Draft RFP on February 20, 1998. Major changes included:
Use of Section 845/804 Authority vs. the original Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR)/Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation
Supplement (DFARS) RFP.
Prohibition against industry entering into exclusive
teaming arrangements.
Provisions to allow industry to propose competition at the
system and subsystem level if only a single bid is received.
Additional funds allocated to industry in Phase I and
Phase II (1998-2001) of the development program.
Additional opportunities for industry to innovate in the
development process by removing Navy cost and schedule oversight,
removing Navy performance specifications other than those in the Joint
Chiefs of Staff approved Operational Requirements Document, and
removing Navy control over the Integrated Product Teams.
Extended Phase I from 9 months to 12 months.
These changes affirm the Navy's desire for a two shipyard program
for DD 21 series production.
All industry feedback to date is positive, including comments
received during a day long industry brief on February 27, 1998. More
than 200 industry and government representatives attended the RFP
review. The Navy expects at least two bids; however, the RFP puts
industry on notice that if only one proposal is received, the Navy has
a right to negotiate with that offeror to explore whether that offer
contains a sufficient level of competition. Two or more bids will
ensure intense competition and innovation for DD 21.
DD 21 was not conceived as a ``business as usual'' ship, and its
development will not be executed in a ``business as usual'' manner. All
of America's shipyards have innovative ideas that could be used in DD
21. Some U.S. shipyards are world leaders in ship signature control,
others have been setting new technical standards in automated design
and construction of Navy ships, some have been able to compete in the
commercial shipbuilding market by using advanced processes, while
others are acknowledged leaders in ship systems integration. Any of
these shipyards, when teamed with a capable combat systems or Command,
Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence Surveillance and
Reconnaissance integrator will be able to provide the high degree of
innovation the Navy needs to build and maintain DD 21 within its
aggressive cost and performance envelopes.
As always, the Department of Justice remains free at any time to
take action against the team as it deems appropriate. The Navy
considers it in the best interest of any given shipyard to be on as
many DD 21 teams as possible, thus increasing the chances that the yard
will be on the ``winning team'' that designs and builds 32 DD 21 ships
over the next 15 years.
CVX Carrier
Question. What is the Navy's inclination on the size of the ship?
What is the Navy's inclination on the ship's propulsion?
Answer. The Navy's preferred alternative for CV(X) being evaluated
in the Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) is a large deck nuclear-power
carrier. This alternative provides the greatest capability, mobility,
flexibility and survivability of all the alternatives being analyzed in
the CV(X) AOA. A large deck provides the Navy the greatest flexibility
in airwing size, mix of types of aircraft or other payloads carried on
the ship, and for operations in all types of weather. Nuclear power
provides the carrier force added mobility, operational flexibility and
survivability as compared to a conventional carrier. In addition, given
that the next class of aircraft carriers will be in service throughout
the next century, it is prudent to provide the Navy's capital ship with
the greatest capability practicable. The ongoing CVX AOA is examining
several design alternatives, and a final decision on CV(X) size and
propulsion will be made after the next phase of this AOA has been
completed and reviewed by the DoD senior leadership.
Question. In your posture statement (page 51), you stated that the
CVX will be a nuclear ship. Is the Navy attempting by that statement to
prejudge the outcome of the second phase of the AOA? Do you think that
it was appropriate to include that claim in the posture statement prior
to a decision being made by OSD or the Congress on this issue? Do you
agree that it is Congress that has the ultimate responsibility and
authority to provide and maintain the Navy, to include the physical
characteristics of U.S. military equipment?
Navy Answer. The Navy is not prejudging the outcome of the AOA.
However, as reflected in the Navy posture statement, the Navy has a
preferred alternative in the AOA. All alternatives, both nuclear and
non-nuclear, are being considered during the AOA. Each alternative will
be evaluated as to capability provided and cost. This process is
designed to determine which alternative provides the most cost-
effective carrier.
Congress does have the responsibility to provide and maintain a
Navy. Further, Congress provides oversight of the design, development,
and construction of specific weapon systems through the annual Defense
Authorization and Appropriation Acts. Historically, Congress has
counted on the service's military technical and engineering expertise
for specific design characteristics of weapons systems.
Question. In light of the GAO report that is scheduled to be
released in the near future, please provide information about the cost
comparison between nuclear and conventionally powered carriers. The
Navy does not build other surface combatants with nuclear reactors. How
does a nuclear-powered carrier's additional capabilities over a
conventionally-powered carrier relate to comparisons among other
surface combatants and their nuclear versus conventional debates? Are
conventionally powered cruisers and destroyers not so less capable than
nuclear ones that the Navy could accept the lesser cost and
capabilities of conventional destroyers but does not wish to do so with
carriers?
Navy Answer. The DoD position on this GAO report has been provided
to the GAO and the Congress recently by the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology).
Question. What is the schedule on the CVX, and is it slipping? When
do we need to start the development process? Since the ship is
scheduled to be delivered in 2013, isn't the traditional 15-year window
for development and construction about to close?
Navy Answer. It is critical that major development effort for CVX
begin now. To achieve the total life cycle cost reductions with the
flexibility and capability currently planned for CVX, technology and
design development must start in earnest in fiscal year 1999 to meet
the required delivery date of 2013. The fiscal year 1999 request is
critical to initiate key development programs having major ship
configuration and design impacts.
Battleships
Question. It is my understanding that the Navy has returned two of
its battleships to the Naval Vessel Register as Mobilization Category B
ships in accordance with a provision of the fiscal year 1996 Defense
Authorization Act. What did it cost to return these two ships to the
Naval Vessel Register?
Navy Answer. The Navy has spent approximately $200,000 per year per
ship to maintain ex-NEW JERSEY and ex-WISCONSIN in a mobilization
status since the ships were stricken in January 1995. Each year these
ships remain on the Naval Vessel Register, $400,000 is required. No
other expense was incurred to place the ships on the Naval Vessel
Register.
Question. Is it the Navy's preference that these ships remain on
register in this status and does the Navy foresee any realistic
circumstances under which the Navy would seriously consider returning
these ships to active duty even for a temporary period of time?
Navy Answer. Absent Section 1011 of the fiscal year 1996 Defense
Authorization Act, the Navy would not retain the ships on the Navy
Vessel Register. The Navy struck all four IOWA Class Battleships from
the Navy Vessel Register in January 1995, after a full review of
requirements. The Navy does not plan to reactivate these ships. There
are no current contingency plans that call for their reactivation.
Network Centric Warfare
Question. Which programs are critical to it? How much money do you
intend to spend on it?
Navy Answer. From a practical point, any Navy program which
contributes to the sensor grid, command and control grid or shoot grid
will be critical to network-centric warfare. This could include all
warfare platforms and the information technology systems which support
those platforms. As a result, there is no specific dollar amount which
we can say is dedicated solely to network-centric warfare. Network-
centric warfare is a concept not a program.
As we transition to a network-centric Navy, we will be required to
view our programs and resources as part of a whole rather than as
individual pieces. Instead of looking at programs vertically, we will
be required to look at how they contribute or improve the network-
centric environment. As a result, it is difficult to give a relative
weight of importance to individual programs. The key to success for
network-centric warfare is a change in mindset or approach to the way
we do business. Network-centric operations flatten the command
hierarchy which requires that we no longer view programs or platforms
in isolation but as part of a whole.
With the Information Technology (IT)-21 implementation strategy we
have begun to look at programs across a horizontal plane rather than
vertical. With this approach, we are attempting to bring an entire
network capability to our ashore and afloat forces. This will provide
the basic backplane which will enable network-centric warfare. Instead
of installing individual programs at varying rates across a variety of
platforms, we propose to install the IT-21 capability on a Battlegroup
basis or Naval Operations Center (NOC) basis.
Anti-Submarine Warfare
Question. During the Cold War ASW was the Navy's number one
warfighting priority. After the Cold War it was no longer the number
one priority. Is it being neglected? Are we losing our proficiency?
Navy Answer. Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) is a top priority mission
and a core and enduring naval competency. The 1997 ASW Assessment
tasked by Congress will be delivered in early March and concludes that
ASW proficiency is, in fact, in decline. To reverse the decline, the
Department has re-focused ASW training opportunities in the fleets. To
enhance training effectiveness, the Navy is developing instrumental
shallow water training ranges and experimenting with the fleetwide
implementation of new training technology such as the Interactive
Multi-sensor Analysis Trainer (IMAT). Such initiatives allow for
accurate reconstruction and feedback which is essential to the Navy's
continuous improvement approach to training.
ASW modernization is balanced with the competing warfighting areas
of Strike, Mine Warfare, Theater Air Missile Defense, Ship Self Defense
and Nuclear Deterrence. The fiscal year 1999 Budget submission provides
adequate equipment to respond to likely submarine threats to the end of
the Future Years Defense Plan.
Question. Has ASW become an area that has suffered or do we need to
address this? The ASW office has been charged with writing a new master
plan. Is the Navy paying proper attention to its ASW exercise
activities? What has happened to the number of people in the fleet who
have ASW proficiency?
Navy Answer. The intense focus in ASW shifted after the Cold War
submarine threat declined in importance as a National Defense priority.
Subsequent threats and taskings have shifted warfighting priorities,
however, a core ASW program has been retained throughout. A review of
world wide technology proliferation and threats has renewed our
appreciation for the threat and difficulty of countering quiet diesel
submarines in a littoral environment.
The Navy recently completed the ASW Assessment that was tasked by
Congress, and is now working on an Integrated Requirements Document
that will articulate requirements from a threat capabilities and
warfighting mission perspective as opposed to a platform perspective.
This is consistent with the ongoing revolution in military affairs and
shift to network centric warfare.
The Navy never stopped exercising its ASW forces. Both the Atlantic
and Pacific Fleets continue to have area ASW commanders and each
warfighting community (surface, submarine, air and surveillance) has a
tactics development agent. Over the past few years, these organizations
have implemented initiatives to coordinate their efforts, consistent
with the shift in naval warfare toward network centric approaches in a
littoral environment. Additionally, ASW exercises continue to play a
vital role in the battle group deployment work-up cycle of the Second
and Third Fleet Commanders. Complementing this effort is a strong core
of bilateral and multi-lateral ASW exercises which continue to be
conducted. Across the board, the fleet commands tasked with these
efforts report that the trend is toward more ASW exercises now than in
the past.
As part of the Navy wide draw-down in force structure and people
over the past several years, there are fewer people in the fleet with
ASW proficiency. However, on a fair share basis, ASW retains its status
as a core and enduring Navy competency.
Question. If it is true that the Navy continues to place a high
priority on this area of warfare, has the Navy's training and exercise
schedule reflected this?
Navy Answer. ASW training and exercises are core capabilities
integrated into the Battle Group deployment work-up cycle, and form the
core of many multi-lateral and bilateral training exchanges such as the
LUNGFISH (US-Australia), SHINKAME (US-Japan), NORTHERN VIKING (US-
Canada-Norway), and STRONG RESOLVE (NATO) series. UNITAS cruises
provided significant ASW training for participating surface ships in
coordination with diesel submarines of South American navies. If
anything, the focus on these ASW training opportunities is a growing
trend.
Finally, the tactical development agents; Submarine Development
Squadron 12, Surface Warfare Development Group, VX-1 (Air ASW
Development), and Commander Undersea Surveillance, conduct numerous
exercises to evaluate new systems, tactics and coordination of the ASW
mission.
Question. Do measures of ASW proficiency as revealed in these
exercises bear this out?
Navy Answer. The 1997 ASW Assessment evaluated exercise results as
part of the detailed analysis, and concluded that ASW proficiency is in
decline. It is important to understand, however, that proficiency is
not merely a matter of training. A multimission penalty is being paid
as we downsize our force structure--fewer platforms executing more
missions resulting in less overall emphasis on ASW. The proliferation
of submarine technologies, including automated systems and engineering
improvements, are contributing to more capable systems the Navy may
have to engage. Because of this, numerous initiatives in training,
organization, infrastructure (underwater ranges, analysis, etc.) and
modernized equipment are being pursued as an integrated program, within
the myriad of competing missions and real world operations, to focus
the ASW effort and ensure proficiency improvements outpace the threat.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr.
Visclosky. The Fiscal Year 1999 Navy Posture Statement, as
referred to on page 233, follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Thursday, March 5, 1998.
FISCAL YEAR 1999 AIR FORCE POSTURE
WITNESSES
HON. F. WHITTEN PETERS, ACTING SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
GENERAL MICHAEL E. RYAN, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Introduction
Mr. Young. Good morning. The Committee will come to order.
This is an open hearing, so anyone who is interested in coming
in is welcome to come in.
This morning our hearing is on the posture of the United
States Air Force, and we are pleased to welcome Mr. F. Whitten
Peters, the Acting Secretary of the Air Force, and General
Michael Ryan, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. A more
important visitor is Mrs. Jane Ryan, the lovely wife of the
Chief of Staff of the Air Force.
Mrs. Ryan, we are awfully happy to have you here this
morning. We will go easy on your husband.
We welcome you both today in your first appearance before
this Committee in your new capacities. We look forward to
working with you in what I think will be a very interesting
year.
Inasmuch as your budget submission is a little better than
it has been in previous years, and we appreciate that, but I
think there is still some shortfalls that you would probably
agree with that are not funded in this budget. We would like to
fund, if we could find some additional money.
The OPTEMPO of the Air Force, the number of personnel
deployed overseas on a regular basis and on short deployments,
is very aggressive. We understand the costs that are associated
with that, and so far you have been making those dollars
available out of your existing budgets. We hope that we can
take care of your supplemental costs for contingencies through
a supplemental that would not have to be offset from your
regular budget, and we will keep our fingers crossed that we
can get enough support to do that.
There are a lot of important issues, the F-22, the Airborne
Laser, the Joint Strike Fighter, JSTARS and so many other
programs that we know that you are interested in and that the
members of this Committee are interested in. So we look forward
to hearing from you, General, and we will place your complete
statement in the record, and you may summarize it as you wish.
Before you do that, I would like to yield to Mr. Dicks for any
opening comment he would like to make.
Mr. Dicks. General, we want to welcome you and the
Secretary. We realize that there are a lot of daunting
challenges that the Air Force faces with the budget problems
that we all face, and we want to welcome you in your first
testimony before this committee, and we look forward to your
service. We have a lot of good questions for you. We are going
to try to be as fair as possible.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Summary Statement of Secretary Peters
Secretary Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
members of the Committee. We appreciate the opportunity to
appear before you this morning to talk about our posture and
particularly our 1999 proposed budget. I would also like to
thank this Committee for all of its great support for the Air
Force in the past.
For fiscal year 1999, we continue our budget priorities of
people, readiness and modernization. People come first because
we cannot have a ready force today or tomorrow unless we
attract, train and retain the highest quality men and women to
operate our 21st century technologies. Readiness and
modernization are equally key to our present and future
national security, but in our constrained budget environment,
we must assume some risk in current readiness in order to pay
for modernization that is key to our future.
We believe that we have properly balanced our 1999 budget,
increasing funding for readiness related items by some $1
billion, while also providing increased funding for key
modernization programs and air superiority, global mobility,
and space. Importantly, over the Future Years Defense Plan,
FYDP we have achieved 15 percent real growth in investment
accounts. Our three budget priorities directly support the
Quadrennial Defense Review, QDR strategy and the report of the
National Defense Panel and the Chairman's Joint Vision 2010. As
the National Defense Panel, NDP reaffirmed, aerospace power
plays a significant role in shaping, responding and preparing
for an uncertain future.
AIR FORCE PERSONNEL
Let me turn first to people. People are central to our
efforts to shape the international environment. Over the past
year, our airmen have been engaged around the world and have
flown into virtually every country in the world. Our forces,
for example, have supported peacekeeping operations in Bosnia,
humanitarian firefighting operations in Indonesia, and
noncombatant evacuations operations in Albania and Sierra
Leone. We also contributed significantly to shaping events by
participating in 53 joint and multilateral exercises worldwide.
Of course, the Air Force has always been heavily engaged in
Southwest Asia, where last year on a typical day almost 8,500
Air Force men and women launched 150 sorties over Iraq, and
that number has of course grown over the last few months given
our current problems.
These operations, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, are not
without a cost. The deployment rates of our total force have
increased dramatically since the end of the Cold War. All
together last year about 14,000 total force airmen were
deployed on any given day, a fourfold increase over 1989,
despite a 35 percent decrease in total end strength since the
end of the Cold War. Two years ago, many of our men and women
were deployed well over our goal of 120 days a year. In the
last year, until recent deployments to Southwest Asia, we had
substantially reduced deployment rates for many units through
global sourcing, creative use of Reserve and Guard units, and
increases in manning highly stressed specialties.
However, these efforts have placed a heavy burden on our
Reserve forces. During 1997, our Reserve component deployed
during every contingency tasking. In 1997, Air National Guard
and Air Force Reserve air crews served on average 110 days in
uniform, and their support teams served about 80 days.
Strengthening the quality of life for all of our airmen
must, therefore, be our highest and enduring priority. We owe
it to our airmen to ensure that their faithful service is
rewarded with pay, housing, medical and community support
services that meet their needs.
Over the past year, we have worked hard also to decrease
the stresses of deployments. We have increased the amount of
time our men and women at home stations can spend with their
families after a deployment, and we have improved family
support during times of deployment. For example, we have
reduced Air Force participation in joint exercises by about 15
percent, and we have tried to combine operational readiness
inspections with other operational activities. We are also
testing Ombudsman Programs at five Air Force bases to assist
families and deployed airmen.
In 1999 we will continue our efforts to improve dormitories
and family housing, increase child care spaces and provide teen
and family centers. About one-third of our Military
Construction budget is devoted to these Quality-of-Life
improvements.
READINESS
We are also working hard on readiness to support the
``respond'' portion of the QDR strategy. Today, about 91
percent of our total units are at readiness ratings of C1 and
C2 with our frontline units in PACAF and USAFE significantly
higher, however, some readiness indicators are dropping. Our
mission capable rates, for example, have declined 8.8 percent
since the Gulf War. Engine readiness has also fallen, although
we are recovering some of that in more recent time periods. And
as General Ryan will discuss in more detail, pilot retention
remains a very grave concern.
The reasons for declining readiness are complex and go
beyond simply dollars. With respect to engines, turmoil in our
air logistics systems work force, coupled with a shortfall in
spare parts funding in 1997, have caused lower than average
productivity. Elsewhere, about one-third of our depot work is
moving to new locations with attendant disruption. Across our
fleet, old age has increased the difficulty of keeping aircraft
running and has raised the cost of readiness.
To overcome these challenges, we increased our readiness-
related funding in 1998 and in 1999. We are also investing in
additional engines for our F-15 fleet and in new engines for
our RC-135s. We have started an engine recovery program that
will shortly reactivate a TF-39 facility at Travis Air Force
Base in an effort to improve the reliability of the C-5 fleet.
Later this year the F-100 core engine workload will transfer to
a more stable work force at Oklahoma City.
Finally, we are upgrading our old equipment. For example,
our fiscal year 1999 investment in the PACER CRAG program
upgrades the avionics suites on 121 KC-135s with state-of-the-
art glass cockpit systems. We have also programmed over $500
million for C-5 engine and avionics upgrades. We are optimistic
about the result of these changes, but it will take time to see
their effects.
MODERNIZATION
Ultimately, readiness improvements will depend on
modernization. In this regard, we have increased procurement
funding for our breakthrough capabilities identified by the QDR
and the NDP, such as the F-22, the Airborne Laser, SBIRS and
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle, EELV. We are also funding
programs to defend against the asymmetric threats identified by
the NDP. For example, in 1999, we will invest approximately
$225 million in passive chemical biological defensive measures
and nearly $150 million in active defense. In addition, as part
of our defense in depth against cyber attack, we have
implemented the Automated Security Incident Management System
in all of our 108 Air Force bases to detect network intrusions,
and we are putting firewalls throughout the whole force in
about a year.
REVOLUTION IN BUSINESS AFFAIRS
To fund these modernization efforts, the Air Force achieved
significant cost reductions through ongoing efforts to bring
about a revolution in business affairs. Since 1995, we have cut
headquarters manning by 1,700 positions, and through the recent
C-5 depot competition, we should save $190 million over the
next seven years. Recent and planned A-76 competitions should
yield savings of about $1 billion. In acquisition reform, we
have saved about $7 billion in ongoing contracts and avoided
some $11 billion more.
This year's Air Force posture statement is tangible proof
of how we are saving resources. Last year, we produced 20,000
paper copies. This year, using electronic publishing, we
produced less than 2,000 paper copies and put other copies on
the Web for download. However, still more needs to be done to
save money.
We continue to pay for excess support structures. Prudent
Base Realignment and Closure, BRAC decisions are vital to our
ability to bring our infrastructure into line with our force
structure. We need Congress to approve two more rounds of
closures for 2001 and 2005. Simply put, BRAC is tomorrow's
readiness decision that we must begin planning today.
EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL
Finally, Mr. Chairman, as you mentioned, the administration
has submitted an emergency non-offset supplemental to cover the
unfunded costs of Bosnia and other operations for fiscal year
1998 and the total cost of Bosnia for fiscal year 1999. The Air
Force needs several hundred million dollars in each year to
cover our costs. We urge prompt congressional approval of this
bill, which is absolutely essential so we can plan effectively
and avoid disruption in our readiness and modernization
accounts.
SUMMARY
Your support has been, and I am sure will in the future be,
absolutely essential if we are to transform the world's premier
air and space force of today into the indispensable aerospace
force of the 21st century. As we plan for the future, our
principal focus will be on building a seamless total aerospace
force, one that is ready to meet the challenges of the QDR
wherever and whenever we are called upon to shape, respond or
prepare.
I again thank you for the opportunity to be here this
morning, and I will turn the podium over to General Ryan.
Mr. Young. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much.
[Clerk's note.--The joint statement of Secretary Peters and
General Ryan follows. The fiscal year 1999 Air Force Posture
Statement is printed at the end of this hearing. See page 584.]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Young. General, we are happy to hear from you, sir.
Summary Statement of General Ryan
General Ryan. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and distinguished
members of the Committee. I am pleased to join you today along
with the Secretary, and I would like to thank you for your
continued support of the United States Air Force.
Today we are globally engaged. As I speak, nearly 15,000
Air Force members are deployed in support of contingency
operations around the world; nearly 9,000 in SOUTHERN WATCH in
Iraq, and over 1,000 in NORTHERN WATCH, 3,000 in Bosnia, and
the rest supporting 11 other contingencies around the world.
They represent a fourfold increase in our deployments since the
end of the Cold War, with orer 35 percent fewer personnel to
cover the commitments.
More than ever, the United States Air Force is an
expeditionary force. Our Air Force men and women are meeting
every challenge they face, with a consummate commitment that
reflects service before self. Many of our members will spend 1
out of the next 3 years in support of contingencies away from
home. That is our job.
I have just returned from Southwest Asia where I had the
opportunity to visit with many of our young men and women
serving there. You would be proud of their professionalism and
their unsung sacrifices. For the most part, they live in
austere conditions. The majority are in tent cities they
erected and maintain, sleeping 8 to 10 to a tent. Privacy is
minimal, amenities are few, and trust and cohesion are
absolutely essential. They serve proudly, monitoring the no-fly
zone in Iraq and are ready for any contingency you can throw at
them, flying their aircraft hard and fixing them and loading
them and getting ready for the next day.
For the commanders, each morning brings, the hope of
discovering new ways of making things better for those young
men and women who live there every day. Each day brings
operational challenges and hopefully successes, and each night
brings the realization that the next day could bring combat.
The 15,000 people are currently deployed in contingency
operations, rotate in and out of their original bases. It has
been that way since the early 1990s with Iraq, Bosnia, Africa
contingencies, Haiti, et cetera.
I don't see a major change in what we have experienced over
the last 8 years. In effect, we are operating many additional
bases without the resources and people to make up the
difference. So the home station people feel the OPTEMPO as well
as we take the support out of their hide. Bases don't get any
additional personnel to make up for those who are deploying in
order to keep the bases running. The workload just increases on
those who remain. The bases must still be guarded, the
remaining aircraft maintained, the families still need medical
attention and the remaining personnel must train.
We need to restructure the Air Force to deal with OPTEMPO
by consolidating our Air Force bases so that they have the
breadth and depth to both deploy and maintain home-base
operations. For that reason alone we need BRAC legislation, not
to mention the savings that would accrue for future
modernization.
We also must take action to fend off the adverse affects of
this OPTEMPO in our readiness and retention. As Mr. Peters
said, our overall readiness is still high, but we are beginning
to see some adverse trends. The mission capability rates of our
operational flying units have dropped 7 percent in the 8 years
since the Gulf War. I attribute that to the aging nature of our
aircraft. In 1999, the average age of a United States Air Force
aircraft will be 20 years old. Predicting breakages is getting
harder and harder. That is why modernization is so important to
us.
MODERNIZATION
Three systems under development are very important to
maintain our preeminence as the greatest aerospace force for
the 21st century. The F-22, the Joint Strike Fighter, the
Airborne Laser, these systems are vital to ensuring our young
men and women have the advantage of technologically superior
weapons. We never want a fair fight. The F-22 stealth and its
ability to cruise at supersonic speeds its' integrated
avionics, and its large air-to-air payloads make it the
predominant air suppority fighter for the 21st century. It
allows all the forces, not just the Air Force, the freedom to
operate where we choose and when we choose. The inherent air-
to-ground capability of the F-22 could make it our high-end
attack aircraft. The Joint Strike Fighter, or JSF, will provide
a less expensive multirole partner for the F-22. The F-22 and
the Joint Strike Fighter will be complementary, and they are
not substitutable. Together they represent a synergistic high-
low mix. Because of the F-22's ability to gain and maintain air
dominance, it makes it possible for us to design the Joint
Strike Fighter as a multirole aircraft, which is less capable
and, therefore, less costly.
Finally, we are developing the Airborne Laser to provide
protection for our forces against theater ballistic missile
threats. The ABL system provides the Nation with a rapidly
deployable global capability for defending against theater
ballistic missiles. It will be a key component of the missile
defense architecture necessary to counter the theater ballistic
missile threat and protect our forces.
At the same time, we must continue our migration into
space. The Air Force is proud to be the leader in the American
military's use of space and will continue to be good stewards.
The key to protecting and exploiting space will be the seamless
integration of our assets. We plan to migrate those functions
to space which offer better capability when accomplished in
space. This transition and trade-off will be done as technology
makes it both physically and fiscally possible.
RETENTION
While modernization is an important element of tomorrow's
readiness, retaining quality people is a key factor in
maintaining readiness now and in the future. While enlisted
retention rates are down slightly, and we must improve in that
area, our biggest concern is pilot retention. It represents the
majority of our front-end warfighting capability. We simply
must retain more of these selfless warriors, as well as our
support and combat personnel who go in harm's way to support
our national commitment. We have worked hard, with your help,
to counter this trend.
One of the indications of future retention is the pilot
bonus acceptance rate in the United States Air Force. Last
year, 33 percent of our eligible pilots took the long-term
commitment of the bonus, and another 10 percent took shorter
bonuses. While this is below our target of 50 percent, we are
hopeful that the legislative assistance provided by Congress
will help us level off this decline. We thank you for that.
We are focusing on several other areas to counter our
retention decreases. They include reducing effects of OPTEMPO
on our forces and improving family care for our members,
improving quality of life and improving support programs.
SUMMARY
Our experience since the fall of the Iron Curtain has
reinforced the lessons about the pivotal nature of air and
space power, power which maximizes the flexibility of our
military and allows solutions to national security threats with
less risk to American lives. We want to ensure that the United
States Air Force remains the preeminent air and space power in
the world. We are today and our deployed men and women are
confident in their mission, their equipment and their
capabilities. We thank you for your support for making that
happen today and on into the future.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. General, thank you very much.
PILOT RETENTION
Mr. Young. Mr. Secretary, we will proceed with some
questions here this morning.
I want to first go back to the issue of pilot retention.
Members of the Committee have visited a lot of your
installations not only at home, but abroad, and we see the
problem with pilot retention, and we have had some pretty frank
discussions with some of your pilots. The OPTEMPO is a very
large part of their problem, and I just don't see how we can
continue to fly your airplanes and have the pilots that are
flying them keep going as fast and as furious as they do
apparently without any let-up, but at the same time we are
getting messages from the administration that we have to
continue to downsize. We have less fighter wings than we had 10
years ago. We have less personnel than we had 10 years ago, and
somewhere along the way that has to stop.
You didn't mention this, but I read a piece done by
Sergeant Benken about 6 or 8 weeks ago in the Air Force Times
saying that there was a terrible retention problem with the
enlisted personnel. When you start losing pilots and enlisted
at a greater rate, you are going to have some real serious
problems. It is not your problem. I think you probably would
agree with me and members of this Committee that we shouldn't
be downsizing as much as we are, especially in the view of the
tremendous OPTEMPO that your people are forced to carry out.
But anyway, part of the problem with the high OPTEMPO is
not only the people, and of course that is the important
problem, but also the equipment, and as you and I have
discussed numerous times, spare parts to keep the airplanes
flying becomes more of a problem constantly.
Last year, we added $622 million in the Air Force budget
for flying hours and for spare parts and maintenance. Despite
these adds, we are still getting reports that the mission-
capable rate for our aircraft now is about 76 percent, and that
it has been declining since 1991. Where are we going to be 5
years from now?
General Ryan. Sir, I would like to talk to the pilot part
of that and the enlisted and then go on to the aircraft, if I
could, and I am sure Mr. Peters will have some comments.
As you know, our pilot retention problem has been connected
almost directly to the ability of the airlines to hire. If you
look at the airline hiring rate projected over the next 5
years, and if you took all of the pilots that are eligible to
leave the Air Force, the Army, the Navy and the Marine Corps
who are qualified to go into the airlines, it wouldn't meet
half of the demands that the airlines have for the 13 major
airlines. That doesn't even include the commuter portion of
that. So there is an economic draw for our pilots out there.
The pilots that we are talking about are men and women who
have been in our Air Force for about 9 years. They have been to
the desert, they have been to Bosnia, they have been under
heavy OPTEMPO during those 9 years. They are wonderful,
wonderful men and women who have given a great part of their
young life to the service of their Nation. So we can't hold it
against them that they would want to change career patterns.
But from our standpoint, we want to keep at least half of them
as they reach that decision point, and with the help of this
committee, we have been able to give the bonus--we haven't been
able to tell directly how much the bonus affected us, except
that we think it upped the rate, you know, from 3 to 13
percent, and it is hard to tell yet.
We have a problem. It is not just a United States Air Force
problem, it is a problem throughout the services on retention
of our pilots. Part of it has to do with pay. A lot of it has
to do with the OPTEMPO.
From our enlisted standpoint--well, let me finish on the
pilots. We have done as much as we can in their concerns about
their capability to maintain their readiness. We have been able
to get agreements from the countries in which our pilots are
now based to be able to train, which was a concern about a year
ago. Both in Turkey and Southwest Asia, we have a training
capability now. We rotate our pilots for those kinds of
training capabilities that they can't get about every 45 days.
We have given them down time after they get back, 7 days for
every 45 gone. It has allowed them to get their personal and
professional life back together and get back with their
families and straighten out the checkbook and the kids. We have
all been in those situations. We are working hard on their
support mechanisms back home when they are deployed.
I don't know what the key is or that there is any one key
to the retention of our pilots. I think that we have to work
across the board, including pay, including flight pay,
including taking care of their families and their professional
lives.
On our enlisted side we have seen a downturn in those Air
Force Specialty Codes (AFSCs), those capabilities that are
employable on the outside where there are high demands, and
where we have a high OPTEMPO in the Air Force. We have targeted
those like F-16 avionic specialists with reenlistment bonuses,
and that appears at first blush to be turning that around. In
the past, that has worked fairly well for us to give the
bonuses for reenlistment, and it looks like that is working
fairly well.
We don't have a terrible problem on the enlisted side. We
want, at the second enlistment rate, we want about 75 percent
to stay with us, because these are the people that we put a lot
of work into and a lot of schooling, who are professionals, but
they are also the people bearing the brunt of the deployments.
So we are targeting those. We have doubled the number of those
variable enlistment rates, AFSCs that we have targeted.
MISSION CAPABLE RATES
On the mission capability rates of the aircraft, we have
had a problem. It has been a fairly constant decline. It is not
a precipitous dropoff. I would like to be able to attribute it
to underfunding in some ways, but the breaks that we are
getting on our aircraft for the most part are things that we
didn't predict, and then it takes us an 18-month cycle to catch
up, after you have found the problem, and you go out to get a
vendor to supply that particular part, and then go back in, and
it is this aging fleet of ours that is of great concern to us.
We are putting a lot of money into this budget, as you all
know, to shore up the capabilities of our fleet that will not
be modernized for the future, to make it more reliable and
maintainable. And with your support, I think we can turn this
trend around.
Thank you, sir.
BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE
Mr. Young. General, thank you very much.
I hope neither one of you think that I am being critical of
the Air Force. I think you do a tremendous job with the limited
resources that you have available. I think you have some
political obstacles that get in your way, but I think
considering what you have to work with, I think you are doing
an outstanding job. I don't know of anyone that wants to have a
United States Air Force come against them. We don't have to
tell the world, they know, how effective the United States Air
Force is, and we just want to make sure that we continue to
keep it that way, and I just have a real problem with the
downsizing, and even though this budget looks better, it is
still going to be less money than it was last year. I think it
is going to be the thirteenth year in a row that your budget
has gone down, and there are some of us that don't like that at
all. We all live with the same political realities.
Let me ask just one more quick question. Every one of your
colleagues who have been before us this year have talked about
two more rounds of BRAC. How do you all decide on two rounds of
BRAC? Why don't you say one round of BRAC or three rounds of
BRAC? Do you have a plan that works with a two BRAC scenario?
Secretary Peters. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The two rounds come
really from the Office of the Secretary of Defense level, but
it is based on analysis of the factors that were reported in
the last BRAC rounds, the accomplishments of the last BRAC
rounds. As you know, Secretary Cohen wants to get the BRAC
report that is not due for about another year up here in the
next several months, and we have been providing inputs into
that report.
I think two rounds is still about right. It takes a lot of
work to get ready for these rounds, and we need to get our
infrastructure down. As General Ryan said, we really look at
infrastructure as a problem for three reasons, one of which is
we like to make money, and we have made about $5.6 billion net
off of the last BRAC rounds through 2001.
But there really are two equally important reasons. One, as
General Ryan pointed out, when we deploy off of these bases, we
are putting people in the desert working 12- to 24-hour days,
very long days, and then they come home and we rotate another
unit out, and those at home face the same problem, because they
don't have enough mechanics, security guards and other
personnel on these bases of ours at this point because our
force structure is spread over too many bases. The only real
solution to that is to try to bring force structure back to a
smaller number of bases.
Similarly, we know from trying to reach our QDR targets for
the number of fighter wings and Reserve and National Guard,
that in order to put the modern equipment into the Guard that
we promised to do in QDR, we would have to take down another
active fighter wing, which we did not do this year, after
consulting with Secretary Cohen, because the pain of doing that
was very high, and the belief was we ought to do that in
connection with BRAC, which gives us economic redevelopment and
environmental restoration capabilities we would not otherwise
have. But at this point we are not going to be able to get
modern F-16s in the hands of the Air National Guard without
taking down one additional fighter wing equivalent, and we
still need to do that. Otherwise, we are left with seriously
aging equipment in the Guard.
So our sense is that really this is an OPTEMPO issue for
us. We need to make our total force as capable as possible and
as equal as possible, but we particularly need to get our
forces onto a fewer number of bases, so that when a unit
deploys, the people at home are not working 12-hour shifts just
like the people deployed. That is really critical, particularly
for the enlisted folks. The OPTEMPO is the number one reason we
hear people are leaving, particularly where they can move to
good civilian jobs. So it is a serious problem for us and one
that we need to overcome.
Mr. Young. Well, I recognize the need to do exactly what
you are saying, but what I am wondering is if there is another
way of approaching the problem rather than through the BRAC
process, because I think you all know that that left a fairly
bad taste here on the Hill with the several rounds of BRAC we
already did. I certainly would not disagree with what you said,
Mr. Secretary, about the need to consolidate, but I just wonder
if there is a better way to approach it that eliminates some of
the political pitfalls.
Thank you very much.
Let me now yield to Mr. Dicks.
FORWARD BASING ACCESS
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
One of the significant differences between the recent
buildup in the Gulf and the one which occurred in 1991 is the
lack of forward basing available to our ground-based base
tactical aircraft. In the most recent buildup, key allies such
as Saudi Arabia denied U.S. forces access to their airfields.
All of the assumptions the Pentagon has used in determining
their long-range air power force mix has assumed that we will
always have basing access similar to what we enjoyed in 1991.
This recent scenario proved the faultiness of that assumption,
something that many of us have been saying for years.
One of the core Air Force competencies you cite in your
testimony is unparalleled access. You didn't have anything near
that in the recent Gulf buildup, and this is just one way where
U.S. forces could be locked out of forward theaters. The real
concern I have is that next time, lockout won't be of a
political nature, but rather our forces will be denied access
because forward airfields will have been contaminated with
biological or chemical weapons, and that is a very major
possibility in South Korea.
Given our inability to get basing access in key Middle East
airfields, how could we have used ground-based tactical
aircraft in the most recent scenario?
General Ryan. First of all, sir, we did have access for the
most part into the nations where we needed it. What was at
question was would those nations allow us to use their
airfields for offensive operations, and that is still unclear.
So our priority, I don't think we can say that we were boxed
out. We never came to a decision to use force from those fields
to the extent that we were denied the use of those fields. So
that is--I think that is a supposition.
BOMBER FORCE
Mr. Dicks. Well, let's just assume for the moment, General,
in a hypothetical situation, that a somebody says, I am sorry,
even though we let you in 1991 use our airfields, we are not
going to let you use them this time. There is a lot of
speculation in this situation, that the Saudis--that we did not
want to get into an open, public situation with the Saudis, but
let's just say that they wouldn't let us use their airfields
for offensive operations.
What bothers me here, as you well know, is we are investing
all of our resources in the future here in tactical air. Now,
we are doing some good things, and I support and applaud what I
read in here about trying to conventionalize the existing
bomber force. I support that and have been fighting for that
for a number of years, and I think it is the right way to go.
What I worry about is when you look at the B-1 today, the
mission-capable rate is declining, cannibalization a serious
issue, and you have real problems with the B-1. If that is
going to be the backbone of our bomber force, don't we have to
do something about those issues?
General Ryan. Yes, sir. As you know, the bomber force, over
the last 10 years we have put $46 billion into it. We plan in
this budget that we have submitted for the 5-year program to
put over another $15 billion into our bomber force, to bring it
up, its maintainability, its operational capability on the
conventional side, and more standoff capabilities in B-1, B-2
and B-52. We think that that gives us a hedge against denial of
bases in specific areas. But you almost have to question our
reason for being in some of these areas, or even being engaged,
if the allies that are associated with that region are most
threatened won't allow us to prosecute our operations.
Mr. Dicks. The problem that I have is this question of
balance, and it looks to us up here on the Hill, to many of
your best supporters, the people that are pro-defense, pro-Air
Force for many, many years, that we are--and I support these
programs, I support Joint Strike Fighter, JSF, I support the F-
22. But it looks like we are putting all of our resources
into--Mr. Chairman, it is very hard to hear in this room. If I
could have the ability to pursue this line of questioning
without interference from the staff, I would appreciate it. It
is very hard to hear.
You know, it is whether we are putting all of our resources
into the tactical air side without getting to an adequate
bomber force, and it is because of this lockout situation and
the problem of what happens if there is zero or no warning.
General Tilelli was widely quoted in an Inside the Air
Force article as questioning whether you could really swing
assets from the Gulf back to Korea in a timely way, and in
order to stop a zero warning attack or a short-warning attack
from the North Koreans. That is probably the most distressing
scenario in these two major regional contingencies. That is why
a lot of us up here believe that having a robust bomber force
and one that has more than 21 B-2s--and I realize B-2's not all
up to Block 30 capacity, and we have some weapons shortages and
things of that nature, but as you look at this over the next 4
to 5 years, you are going to get all of the B-2s of the 21 up
to a Block 30 standard, which I think is very good.
What we see is this problem that we saw in the Gulf of
whether our allies don't let us in, and if you have chemical,
or, in the Korean scenario, what if they rain down chemical and
biological weapons. As General Tilelli said yesterday, maybe we
can get some of the C-17s and F-22s of the future in, but the
question is, can we get them out and can we use them if these
fields are contaminated?
That is why a lot of us again say, wait a minute, maybe we
ought to have more long-range, stealthy capability that could
be deployed in Guam. The simulators at Whiteman have
demonstrated these planes can be flown for 43 hours. It is
remarkable. So we see this capability as being paramount.
If you look at the Air Force's core capability over its
history, it has been long-range bombing. What we are worried
about here is that in the desire to--and as I said in my
opening remarks earlier, we recognize that there are very
limited resources available, but what we are worried about is
that we have an imbalance in the program, that over the next 20
years we are doing some things in weaponization but we are not
buying a single additional bomber. And we worry that if the B-1
can't be fixed and improved, and it isn't stealthy, and neither
is the B-52, we wind up only have 21 B-2s and the F-117s. And
if you look at the studies that have been done, Rand did a
study, Jasper Walsh did a study, all of which said that the
right force for the Air Force of the future would be 40 to 60
B-2s. This then was started, as you remember, 132, went down to
75, and down to 21. The 21 was totally a political number.
So I just want to give you an opportunity to explain what
your strategy is, and I want to just review this, because a lot
of us up here simply do not believe that we are doing the right
thing. It isn't because we are against the Air Force, we are
for the Air Force.
I think air power is on the ascendancy. When you look at
stealth, long-range and precision-guided weapons and the
ability to stop an enemy in the halt phase and I think destroy
the enemy make the ground operations much easier. This was
argued in the QDR proceedings. The Air Force presented a very
forceful case.
I think that is possible. But I worry that if we don't have
enough bombers so that we can execute, and come in from outside
of the theater, and get the sorties necessary to really utilize
this capability, that, yes, we will have less than the $44
billion, but we will have cut this thing off at a point where
we didn't realize the potential of this capability. That is
what we are worried about.
I am not trying to hurt the Air Force. What we are trying
to say to you is we think you have something here that has
remarkable potential conventionally and can be used, and we are
noting this because we are cutting this program off, and we
think it is a very serious mistake. That is why last year a lot
of us on this committee urged to have a Presidential commission
set up to take one final look at this, because we are so
concerned that we are making a mistake of historic proportion.
So I will give you a chance to comment on that.
General Ryan. Yes, sir. As you know, we have studied this
very hard. But because of the lack of resources,--of course we
would like to have had more B-2s, but we just could not afford
them. And in our studies, looking at the two major theater wars
both from a POM standpoint and from a QDR standpoint, both of
those concluded that we could stop buying the B-2 at the 21
level as long as we continued the modernization of the bomber
force as we have discussed before.
I agree with you completely that we need a capability for
long-range bombardment. In the form of our B-52, B-1 and B-2
fleet of right now over 200 bombers, our capabilities that we
are putting into those bombers will allow us, I think, to do
what you were suggesting, and that is, carry a very large load
a long way and use standoff munitions rather than penetrating
aircraft for the most part of that, to be able to go in and
service the targets that need to be serviced. It is an
affordability issue.
Mr. Dicks. Can I make one point on that?
General Ryan. Sure.
Mr. Dicks. If you look at General Howley's film, and if you
look at what Joint Direct Attack Munitions, JDAM is going to
cost, JDAM is going to cost $13,000 a weapon, and 16 times
$13,000 is $208,000. That is one-sixth the cost of a cruise
missile. This is revolutionary if you look at the capability of
World War II or Vietnam, the sortie rate and the ability to hit
16 separate targets, with the cost. People say the B-2 is so
expensive, but when you look at the weapons, it is much less
expensive than the standoff weapons, which are a lot less
effective.
General Ryan. The closer we can get, the better theater for
the aircraft we can have.
B-2 AIRCRAFT
Mr. Dicks. Let me ask you another question, reading all of
these clippings. Secretary Hamre says the B-2 is not ready.
General Goslin of the Air Force Association Magazine this month
says there are a limited number of B-2s that are ready. What is
the answer to that?
Mr. Dicks. Is the B-2 ready, or is it not ready?
General Ryan. It is a judgment call, and let me answer you
very straightforwardly. I would like to answer you in closed
session on that issue because of the sensitivity.
Mr. Dicks. That is fine. We will just leave it at that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Skeen.
Mr. Skeen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Secretary Peters, General Ryan, General Dicks. I
have to give him credit, though. He does some of the best
questioning I have ever heard, and at great length, and we
appreciate it.
Mr. Dicks. Never give up, right?
SPACE COMMAND AND CONTROL
Mr. Skeen. Never give up.
I am concerned about the Air Force's position on space
command and control issues, and I am most concerned that since
we are relying on a number of space assets for both peacetime
and wartime missions, that we must make every effort to ensure
our dominance and superiority in this. The question I would
like to ask, can you comment on this point and address whether
you believe that this year's budget and whether the outyear
contain adequate resources to accomplish these tasks?
Secretary Peters. Let me try to respond to that, if I can.
First, we have been looking at a number of these
technologies, and the President's policy, as we develop these
technologies that we need to have. We have security in space.
We have asked our chief scientists to do a project we call
``doable space.'' We have also talked with our Space Command
about a number of these issues, and they have recommended a
road map. We have asked our Scientific Advisory Board to also
look at these technologies and see where we are.
Right now, this is basically a science and technology
development issue, it is not really a fielding issue, so that
we are working this year to try to come up with a better plan
for space, a better funding plan for critical technologies that
we are going to need, which will cover, you know, cheaper lift,
which is a key issue of space superiority, and other
technologies that will be used to secure our satellites.
We are going to do a very broad review of that, and,
starting with our fiscal year 2000 Program Objective
Memorandum, POM and probably concluding in our 01 POM, make
sure we are funded appropriately.
One of the things we need to do and one of the things we
have asked our Scientific Advisory Board to do, is look at how
we could leverage our dollars with the dollars of private
industry, NASA, NRO, and DARPA to try to come up with a more
effective program. We are working this very hard right now, and
we have a number of ideas from Space Command as well that we
are trying to put together.
But the answer is we are funding the critical--what we now
know of as the critical technologies, and we are looking at
those issues, and we are going to try to come up with a better
way to prioritize a list of those technologies and also
strategy to try to go to our commercial partners and other
agencies to come up with a more effective program.
Mr. Skeen. Is there a feeling that we are open to a little
vulnerability at this point?
Secretary Peters. Well, I was surprised to learn the other
day that we don't have sensors on any of our satellites,
military or commercial, to tell if they are really under
attack. One of the things that we are looking at is perhaps
coming up with a fairly low cost sensor to look at that. We do
have other capabilities that we can discuss in closed session.
Mr. Skeen. Yes, sir.
Secretary Peters. We think we need to look hard at this. It
is really a technology development issue, and that is what we
have to try to do through these various means that we have
commissioned.
LINE-ITEM VETO
Mr. Skeen. The President line item vetoed three items
relating to space superiority in last year's defense bill,
which had strong congressional support, and that was the
Antisatellite, ASAT testing program, military launch vehicles
and the Clementine program. Has the administration revisited
these matters or come up with alternative proposals? Would you
comment on this?
Secretary Peters. Well, of the three that were vetoed, the
so-called military space plane was the one that we were
working. We have continued to fund the basic technology issues
for our space maneuver vehicle, because a lot of that is truly
just general technology development at this point. Space
Command has come back in with a new concept of operations,
something they call space maneuver vehicle. I think it has
never really been clear exactly what a military space plane
did. It was many things to many people. But one of the things
we have asked all of our folks who are looking at this to do is
come back and tell us what are the critical maneuvering
technologies, and one of them that they have identified is
developing a vehicle, unmanned, which could go into orbit and
could move satellites around orbit, could pick up a satellite
that is dead and bring it back for repair, and that looks like
the next piece of kind of enabling technology and that we are
looking at quite hard for funding.
Mr. Skeen. Well, we are becoming more dependent on this
kind of technology.
Secretary Peters. Absolutely.
Mr. Skeen. Thank you for your responses.
Mr. Young. Mr. Hobson.
BASE COMMANDER TURNOVER
Mr. Hobson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I have some frustrations with the Air Force, and
I think I have been a friend to the Air Force, but I am rapidly
becoming extremely concerned.
I have had an ASC since 1992. I am going to be on my fifth
commander of ASC. I am going to lose probably the best Air
Force officer I have ever met and dealt with since I was in the
Guard until now, General. I am on my 6th base commander at
Wright-Patterson Air Force base since 1992. I don't think that
is a very good situation.
I am not going to ask you to talk about it right now, but I
think it is terrible to have these kinds of command changes.
There is no continuity of command. It affects morale, it
affects the ability to perform the job, and I think the latest
retirement should have been avoided. It could have been
avoided, in my opinion.
I didn't find out about it, they never talked to me, but I
think we need to promote people in the Air Force, even if they
don't have wings. I know there is a preference for wings, but
there is also other great technical parts of the Air Force that
need to be supported. So I am very frustrated about that. That
is my first frustration, sir. And, Mr. Peters, we don't know
each other yet, but we are going to.
Secretary Peters. I have come to realize that.
Mr. Hobson. If you think I am bad, you should have been
here when the Navy was here when Mr. Visclosky got ahold of
them, with very good reason.
Mr. Visclosky. Don't drag me into this.
AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Mr. Hobson. You did a very good job, and you had every
reason, but his was much more difficult than mine.
And, Norm, I have a B-2 question here, too.
I am very concerned about the Air Force Institute of
Technology AFIT, and I have a long question that I have here. I
was going to read it all, but I am going to give it to you so
you can answer it for the record. I don't know if you have had
it yet or not, but what I am really concerned about, let me
tell you, is the major regard you give the law from this
committee. Maybe I better read it so I get to that point.
The Air Force Institute of Technology at Wright-Patterson
Air Force Base is a component of Air University, which directly
supports national defense through graduate, continuing and
professional specialized education programs. Further, it is an
important element of support and partner for the Air Force
laboratories. Last year, it became apparent that the Air Force
was considering closing AFIT. It seems that this decision was
based purely on budget considerations and does not address the
development of technology which continues to benefit the Air
Force.
Neither this committee nor the members of the Ohio
congressional delegation have yet to see any comprehensive
cost-benefit analysis study taking into consideration the
technological advances from research performed at AFIT. I would
like for you at some point to supply that now, both to the
Committee and to me personally.
I firmly feel that the Air Force should budget for a cost-
effective AFIT. However, as an alternative, the Dayton, Ohio,
local community proposed a plan to save AFIT by using the
Dayton Area Graduate Studies Institute, a consortium of
graduate engineering schools in the area and a cash subsidy
from the State. The plan was prepared with little or no input
from Air Force on numbers of students, costs, and so forth.
Hence, none were surprised when the plan appeared to be
rejected out of hand. Now, the Air Force has demonstrated a new
interest in the proposal, and I would like to know the status
of that negotiation.
In the fiscal year 1998 defense appropriations bill, this
Committee added language prohibiting the Air Force from paying
graduate tuition at civilian schools unless every empty student
slot was first filled at AFIT. I understand that all master's
degree spots were filled at AFIT, allowing others to attend
civilian schools. However, there are no new Ph.D. spots at
AFIT, and hence, none at civilian schools. Air Force officials
have had the temerity to, one, grouse about being barred from
educating Ph.D.s; but, two, to announce that that is temporary
and Ph.D.s will start civilian college class in January of 1999
after this bill language expires 30 September, 1998. Do you
understand that it is the Air Force blocking Ph.D.s? All you
have to do is admit them to AFIT first.
Although the situation I just outlined may be within the
letter of the law, do you think it is within the spirit of the
law, and is this a measure of the regard that the Air Force
gives the law from this committee?
Prior to his becoming the Under Secretary of Defense for
Manpower and Readiness, Rudy DeLeon chaired an AFIT working
group. Now the Ohio congressional delegation has received
conflicting information which has led us to conclude that there
is considerable confusion within the Air Force about the role
of AFIT. Who is empowered now to speak and negotiate for the
Air Force on AFIT? I would like his name, telephone number, and
rank and serial.
Secretary Peters. If I may respond to that on AFIT, it is
one of those problems that I learned about 20 days ago after
our folks came up and briefed the Ohio delegation, and they
came back and said, gee, the people weren't thrilled with this
briefing, and I learned about some of these opportunities to
try to use consortia and all to reduce our costs.
Mr. Hobson. You don't mean the congressional delegation,
you mean people from Ohio, correct?
Secretary Peters. Well, I know they met with the
congressional delegation and others as well. I wasn't at the
meeting, but there was a group that brought to their attention
very clearly there were other opportunities for doing
consortia. We have sent our folks back to look at this, and
they are not going to come back with a proposal until they come
to the Chief and myself to look at it.
Unfortunately, I have been spending a lot of my time on the
other problems with the depots, which is an all-consuming
problem, but I think this is one that is equivalently a serious
problem for us. We need to learn how to cut our costs while
also keeping the benefits, colocation and so forth. So we are
going to go back and look at that. We are not going to come
forward again until we have a chance to look at it.
Now, with respect to the Ph.D. situation, those were cut
off some time ago when we thought that we had a solution that
was going to be quick and that would please everybody. And
obviously we have not had a solution that is quick and that is
pleasing everybody, so that is going to have to be revisited as
well. But we thought we would have that in place in time to--we
did not want to start a Ph.D. program that might be closed, and
we thought we would have a fix to this within the appropriate
time frame, and it looks now that we are not.
We need to look at that again. I think the group that has
been working this is on my calendar in the next couple of
weeks, and they will come back to me and explain to me where we
are.
General Ryan. AFIT has always produced the kinds of folks
that we need in the Air Force, as you know, sir. But it was
costing us a lot of money. We need to come up with a solution
that allows us continuing education of our officers in those
specialties that contribute to where we are going in the future
as an aerospace force. So we will work with you.
PILOT RETENTION
Mr. Hobson. And you need to compare apples to apples and
oranges to oranges and they weren't doing that, and, I think
you got the message what we want to talk about on that.
Let me talk about pilot retention for just a second. I
understand you have been in this a little bit before, but I
want to say something that I said to Secretary Cohen when he
was in here talking about sexual harassment. You can't go out
and just have a meeting and expect everybody to stand up and
tell you what is wrong. They are not going to. You didn't do
this, but I understand the Air Force, for example, they go out
and they have these big meetings with officers to try to find
out when there is retention, and what happens to that, the four
commanders the day before, and they say if anybody says
anything, they are going to be in trouble. If a general isn't
smart enough to figure that out, sir, they will probably get
promoted to I don't know, whatever.
That seems to be the way it goes. But that isn't the way to
find out. You got to talk to troops when they are not
intimidated or not in a setting where they are intimidated, and
they will tell people the truth, and they will find out that it
isn't increasing the amount of money to pay them to stay in, it
is the question do you know where you are going to be, how long
are you going to be away from your family, what are these
sorties going to be and what is the predictability of your
lifestyle. Those are the questions you need to ask and talk to
people about, but it shows to me a lack of a certain type of
leadership when people don't understand that. Not you, sir, I
am not talking about you, but it is a problem. You've got to
talk to troops. They will tell you the truth, but they are not
going to do it in such a way--even if you are getting out, you
don't want to tell the truth, because that can hang around for
a long time, and you don't get out and you get shifted around,
so things can happen. But they will tell you the truth because
they want a change for themselves and other people to be
positive, and I think you do, too, sir.
I have a couple of other things, just two things, sir, if I
may. I am going to do one for Norm here. The Wall Street
Journal reports that the Air Force feels left out in plans for
Iraq.
Did you do this, Norm?
Mr. Dicks. No.
B-2 AIRCRAFT
Mr. Hobson. He usually gets to this.
But the Navy plans to play a central role in attack, and
the Air Force B-2 Stealth bomber was purposefully excluded.
What is the Air Force's role in Iraq, what should it be, and
why did they use the B-2?
General Ryan. Sir, if you allow me to defer the B-2
question, as I did with Mr. Dicks, to another forum where I can
speak directly to you all about that.
Mr. Hobson. Okay.
General Ryan. Newspapers are not necessarily a place where
you get factual information.
Mr. Hobson. We understand that.
General Ryan. If you look back on the United States Air
Force's commitment in the Persian Gulf with respect to Iraq,
you will find that 70 percent of the effort that goes into
that, in terms of sorties have been by the United States Air
Force. If you look at the number of aircraft that are deployed
in the theater right now, the United States Air Force has the
majority of the Air Force contingent in there. The United
States Air Force has a command and control system that makes it
work. The United States Air Force has the enabling systems like
AWACS and Joint STARS and RIVET JOINT, and the fuelers and the
bombers, et cetera. So what you read in the paper has a lot to
do with who has access to the particular areas where people are
located. In this case, the carriers are sovereign pieces of
U.S. territory and can lock up the press on board.
Mr. Hobson. We would like to lock up the press.
General Ryan. We would like to lock them up at some of our
bases.
We haven't been able to get out the word of the great
participation and dedication that our folks have over there. So
we are not locked out of this. In fact, we are locked into it.
TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MODERNIZATION
Mr. Hobson. I am not going to ask my Civil Air Patrol
question, but I am sure you are going to handle that. But I
have one quick question.
We currently are trying to buy three very expensive fighter
planes, the Air Force F-22, the Navy F-18E/F Super Hornet, and
the multi-service Joint Strike Fighter. Combined costs are
estimated at approximately $350 billion. Is any thought being
given to either, one, purchasing fewer planes, or two,
cancelling any one of these fighters? How much of an
acquisition budget do we need to afford all three? And as I
asked in the past, can we afford this configuration?
General Ryan. As we look at the Air Force needs for
modernization, we see that our air superiority capability as
representing the F-22 is the enabling technologies for lots of
other improvements, not only just in the Air Force, but in the
other services, and then the Joint Strike Fighter being the low
end to replacing our aging F-16s.
We have looked at our budget out through 10 years into the
future and have been able to make an affordable, capable force
by bringing in the F-22 early and then bringing in the Joint
Strike Fighter later. We think from an Air Force standpoint it
is doable. In fact, it is an absolute necessity that we do it.
RETENTION
Mr. Hobson. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you. I understand
the Secretary is looking at this overall, not just with the Air
Force, but with the Navy, and the Army and the Marine Corps,
this retention problem of senior officers. It is promotion of
senior officers. It is a very difficult problem.
General Ryan. I would like to talk to you about that
particular situation, too, Mr. Hobson.
Mr. Young. Mr. Hobson, thank you very much.
Mr. Visclosky.
EVOLVED EXPENDABLE LAUNCH VEHICLE
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, if you could tell me about the evolution of
the EELV program, because it started out as a competition, and
my understanding now is you have two that will continue. Will
that be through the production phase?
Secretary Peters. We anticipate that that will remain, two
competitors throughout the life of the program. Even today, if
you look at the number of space launches we have, commercial is
now greater than military. We think that there is a very large
volume market out there for commercial space lift and that the
EELV offers a very substantial cost advantage, both to
ourselves and to our commercial partners, and that there is
enough work in the commercial arena to fund both systems, and
we ought to allow both systems to go forward so there is
competition and continued interest in driving the price down
through the two competitors. So it is still our belief that the
best way to go is to let those two folks be out there. We buy
from both. We anticipate that commercial will buy from both and
that ultimately the volume of sales will drive the unit cost
down, which is what we want to do.
Mr. Visclosky. I might want to follow up with your staffs
later if I could, because to be honest with you, I have lost
track of that development program, and I was very concerned
some years ago about the cost of the program. My first
impression, based on your testimony and the written statement,
is the positive development of the program, if you are going to
have a two-contractor base.
General Ryan. We think that the commercial demand out there
will allow that to continue. We see the commercial demand
actually bypassing military demand in the next couple of years,
and that the costs per pound to orbit will come down
significantly with these two programs.
Mr. Visclosky. My understanding, too, has been about some
of the heavy payloads for the government and that some of the
private payloads are also getting larger.
Secretary Peters. We have a heavy payload requirement, so
we are going to have to continue there. I think there has been
some debate about how much requirement there is for commercial,
but our best information is that there will be a commercial
lift requirement for heavier payloads as well, particularly in
the communications area. But we definitely have that heavy
requirement, and we will just have to see how that unfolds.
JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER
Mr. Visclosky. General, as far as the Joint Strike Fighter,
do you believe that the contractors and the users have to
understand that it is not business as usual, and that there
might have to be sacrifices of capability for the Air Force?
General Ryan. The driving force behind the Joint Strike
Fighter has been affordability. We have done a lot of trade-
offs in keeping the affordability down. Some examples, we
talked about a Mach 2 airplane, then we bought it back to 1.5,
because that saves you money, and operationally it did not have
a lot of effect. We traded off the number of Gs on the airplane
back from nine to eight, but that is a weight savings, and the
times that you use it were not terribly operational or
significant.
So, yes, we have a very good process for doing it. It is a
joint process. It involves Marines and Air Force and Navy and
many competitors or many partners for this competition.
So I think not only that, but the competing companies
understand that that is the way we approach this particular
airplane to keep costs down.
Mr. Visclosky. The person that doesn't have the last bell
and whistle may get the contract?
Secretary Peters. Cost is a very, very important factor,
and there have been some very large trade-offs as well. For
example, the Navy originally wanted two engines, and it is now
one to save costs. So cost is very much a driver in this, and
there is no question about that.
The acquisition strategy is to keep two competitors in the
fight until a final configuration is worked out over the next
year to year-and-a-half type of time frame and then to have a
competition. But people see this as a very large opportunity,
and they are pretty aggressive, so I think the costs are going
to be pretty good when this all comes to pass.
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE SHORTFALLS
Mr. Visclosky. As far as your operation and maintenance
budget, do you have some shortfalls that you are concerned
about in this budget for 1999?
Secretary Peters. We think we have funded operation and
maintenance, at the right level for 1999. The area of great
risk is readiness. As you can see from our mission-capable
rates and some of the other statistics you may have seen, we
underfunded spares in 1997. With the help of this Committee we
were able to get spares back where they should have been in
1998. We left them at that level in 1999, and we are working
hard to stop some of the contributing factors to inefficiencies
at our depots, such as the turmoil in personnel as we move work
around. We are going to try mightily to get the public-private
competitions at McClellan and Kelly done this year so we can
stop the turmoil in that process, and our hope is that we have
funding correctly. But as General Ryan says, as these aircraft
age, things are breaking which nobody predicted would break,
and that is one of the largest O&M risks I think we have. So we
are looking at that, and we are trying to take that into
account.
General Ryan. O&M also, we have tried to make balances
under the top line that we are given, but O&M funds that have
to do with our infrastructure also are very, very important
considerations. And we never have funded those to the extent
that we think we need to, and that is a concern that we have.
Given the other priorities that we have with respect to
funding, we think we have a fairly balanced program. It isn't
the best, and O&M isn't at the level we like it, but neither
are a lot of other things.
Mr. Visclosky. You don't have a problem with the spare
parts budget for 1999?
Secretary Peters. We have funded the spares. We have the
levels we funded in 1998, which is bringing back readiness. We
also have funded modernization.
Mr. Visclosky. Is that showing a shortfall, though?
Secretary Peters. There was a shortfall in 1997 which we
are digging out of. This committee helped us bring back the
depot level numbers where they should be for correct numbers of
flying hours. We think we have that right, and we decided in
addition to funding that, we are putting a fair amount of money
into upgrading some of the systems that break a lot, try to get
past this. Once we can go to glass cockpits in our KC-135s, for
example, we don't have to repair the really old parts in some
of those cockpits today.
So our strategy here is to try to put some money into
forward-looking modernization programs as well as funding the
depot, day-to-day maintenance-type stuff, and I think we have a
balance there. We are continuing the funding at the high level
that we had in 1998.
Mr. Visclosky. You had mentioned infrastructure. Do you
have a specific example in mind?
General Ryan. Every year we calculate what our own property
maintenance expenditures are for our bases, and then we try and
fund that, and every year we are funding it much below what we
would project would be the catch-up rate. Eventually that
catches up with us. If we look at maintenance, we are going to
the lowest level we have been in a long time, and we haven't
closed any bases.
So I worry about the real property maintenance accounts and
O&M accounts that keep our infrastructure up. That is another
argument for reducing a certain number of bases we have. But we
are spreading it fairly thin and commanders out there who must
manage this money, are working very, very hard to spend every
dollar as wisely as they can, but they don't have that many
dollars.
Secretary Peters. Let me add one other thing, and that is
how critical it is for us to get the supplemental through on a
non-offset basis. We have not-budgeted for the monies that are
in the supplemental. If we have to eat those out of the current
levels, we are going to be in a very tough situation going in.
So right now, our number one priority is to try to make sure
that supplemental gets passed without an offset, because that
is going to give us the relief we need, and without that we
would have a terribly unbalanced budget.
Mr. Visclosky. Gentlemen, thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Bonilla.
FISCAL YEAR 1998 SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST
Mr. Bonilla. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, before I get into a couple of specific
questions, you touched on the supplemental that we are all
going to be dealing with in the coming days, and just to pass
along some very general concerns that I have heard from some of
my colleagues, not on this Committee, but on the Appropriations
Committee and beyond that, it is going to be very difficult to
pass a supplemental without offsets. And I am not here to
suggest at all that we need to take a dime from any other
budget at the Pentagon, but there are a lot of members that
have different agendas and--there is going to be some blood on
the floor after this battle is done behind closed doors here in
the Congress. So you probably have heard that. I just want to
reiterate that it is there, and it is something that we are all
going to have to deal with on this subcommittee and on the full
committee.
Secretary Peters. Let me just say if I may, Congressman, we
understand that, and I think it is important to stress how
incredibly damaging it would be to have to take these
operations out of our current budgets. For 1998, it will affect
them, and we will have to redo our whole flying schedule and
also look for offsets in modernization. For 1999, if those
costs are spread over all of our programs, it will badly break
every one of our acquisition programs, and 1999 is an
absolutely critical year.
We now have an aggrement with Lockheed Martin for a fixed-
price contract on the F-22 for the first two lots. Also, the
last year of major Joint Strike Fighter research and
development and configuration determination is in 1999, and
where we are going to get the cost trade-offs really is a 1999
issue. If we don't get that funded, it is going to either delay
Joint Strike Fighter from month to month or year to year, or we
are not going to get the cost trade-offs that are so important
to make that an important aircraft.
RETENTION
Mr. Bonilla. I am the messenger on this, so I just want to
let you know that.
Related to what my colleague Mr. Hobson said earlier, and
Mr. Visclosky, about pilot retention, that is--I have five Air
Force bases that are either technically in my congressional
district or right next door that we deal with in south and west
Texas, and I get an earful from people concerned about the
morale and how many pilots we are losing to the private sector.
So I concur with what he said earlier about the exchange of
some of the research methods that the private sector uses in
getting the truth from some of these pilots that are thinking
about leaving or have left already. I think we are reaching a
critical time, and before too long the horse is going to be out
of the barn, and we are going to be faced with what could we
have done to keep them?
General Ryan. I want to reassure both of you that the Air
Force is using every method we can to get at the root cause of
the reasons why our people leave. We do it through the command
chain, we do it by surveys, we do it by talking to the
families. We try and nail down the root causes for people
leaving, and it comes back, quite honestly, to the fact that we
have a very high OPTEMPO, and there are alternatives for our
pilots that are very, very stable for their families and
lucrative from an employment standpoint.
Most of our folks enjoy what they are doing, but we have
had a very high OPTEMPO for the last 8 years. We don't see much
of a change in that OPTEMPO for the future. We are just going
to have to figure out how to deal with what the demands of this
Nation are for the security that require us to deploy and
remain at locations overseas.
I have to tell you, we have a lot in the Air Force to learn
from our naval services, who schedule their deployments in a
way that allows some predictability in when they are going to
be gone and when they are home. But we are a bit of a different
service because we are stationed not only stateside, the
preponderance of our forces are stateside, but we have a very
large contingency overseas. Eighty thousand of our folks are
stationed overseas also, unlike the naval services. So we have
a bit of a different problem. We need to get at that problem
from a stability standpoint, and we are working that very hard.
LAUGHLIN AIR FORCE BASE
Mr. Bonilla. General, can you predict in the year 2000 what
you anticipate for Laughlin Air Force base, in your testimony
noting that pilot retention is going to increase by about 200
per year in fiscal year 2000? What does that mean for our fine
facility at Laughlin?
General Ryan. Laughlin will be at capacity for the
foreseeable future. We are ramping up from a low of 500 pilots
produced from the United States Air Force several years ago to
1,100 pilots produced for the United States Air Force active
duty force. That does not include Guard, Reserve, foreign
military, and NATO, which kick us up to about 1,400 plus.
We are on this ramp right now, and one of our constraining
factors is not the number of aircraft we have, but the airspace
and runway configurations that we have to be able to execute
the training in a safe manner. So from your standpoint, sir,
for Laughlin, they will be full capacity for the foreseeable
future.
Mr. Bonilla. We are so proud of what they do at Laughlin.
General Ryan. They do a wonderful job down there.
Mr. Bonilla. Our community hopes every day that they are
going to do even better. As you know, the community of Del Rio,
Texas, and Laughlin are joined at the hip and proud of it.
One of the problems that we want to anticipate about the
future of Laughlin is anything that might impede any training
missions, or any of the training there. There is a concern down
there about a dump site that is going to be constructed in the
town of Spaford. I don't know how much you know about this,
General, but there was an Air Force bird strike specialist that
testified that this proposed dump posed a risk to Air Force
operations, but the Air Force has not taken an official
position in opposition to this dump.
My question today is, can I get your commitment to look
into this threat to Air Force training, and if it would pose a
threat, as we expect it does, I think the Air Force should take
a strong position on this, because the last thing we want to do
is do anything to impede the training missions that we have
there.
General Ryan. Yes, sir. We will look at it and get back to
you with an answer for the record.
LACKLAND AIR FORCE BASE
Mr. Bonilla. I appreciate that.
The question now is about Lackland, the Air Force
Securities Forces Center, in your testimony you mentioned that
this has been established. Can you tell me a little bit more
about what this is going to entail?
Secretary Peters. Well, the Security Forces Center actually
is already established at Lackland. It is our major training
facility, and it is up and running and probably will be
increasing. One of the things we have recognized is that one of
our most stressed force elements is our security forces and our
major training school is at Lackland. So my guess is we will
continue to have to beef up training through that facility in
order to meet the OPTEMPO needs that we have.
Mr. Bonilla. Also at Lackland there is a situation with the
privatization effort at Lackland that is not going as well as a
lot of us thought it would. Frankly, I have always thought that
privatization of any project always increases competition and
bids, but it is not going as well as we would like because of
the quality of the construction bids that it is attracting. How
do you all see that going at Lackland Air Force base?
Secretary Peters. I would like to get back to you for the
record on details on that, but my understanding is that
Lackland is one of the areas in which we first tried to do the
housing privatization. It has been a slow process, as we
learned. Our hope is that it is still going to be successful
and will roll out well, but any time you do something for the
first time, it can be troublesome, and that is my
understanding, that there have been some unexpected glitches.
But people are trying to get that right, because we need the
housing.
[The information follows:]
We have taken a measured approach with our housing privatization
initiative. Privatization is an entirely new and different acquisition
approach requiring us to build a level of expertise over time. We have
been ``plowing new ground'' with the housing privatization initiative
at Lackland. It is nearing conclusion, and we are in the process of
requesting the best and final offers from the proposed contractors.
This marks the last step prior to congressional notification and
subsequent award. We continue to make progress in this landmark
endeavor and anticipate a July 1998 award. The Air Force has used a
three-step procedure in this privatization effort--first being the
qualification of the offerors; second being the solicitation and
evaluation of business, financial and technical proposal; and third
being the final negotiations with the selected offeror to conclude the
terms and conditions of the final agreement. We feel we have received
good responses from industry that demonstrate a high degree of interest
in housing privatization and are confident our selectee's offer will
satisfy the project requirements. Delays in execution of the Lackland
privatization initiative were mainly the result of the development of
procedures and policy that accompany this new financing process.
General Ryan. We really ascribe to the concept of
privatization, if it will give us a long-term benefit. We know
it gives us a short-term push where we can amortize the costs
of upgrading the housing for long-term commitment to that
particular type of housing. The question is what happens in 10
years with the contractor and those houses, and how we write
the contract on its maintenance and upkeep, and who can live in
it. We still have a lot of concerns about that, so we are going
slow. But we know that it leverages our money a lot and takes
care of our folks in the near term. The question is what
happens in the far term.
KELLY AIR FORCE BASE
Mr. Bonilla. I appreciate you keeping an eye on that.
Now I would like to talk about Kelly Air Force Base for a
second. In your testimony you decided that the Economic
Development Conveyance, EDC for Kelly was a model for reuse.
Could I get your commitment, Mr. Secretary, to work with me to
accelerate the ability of these facilities that are needed for
privatization, and also, that the Air Force will not strip
Kelly of the equipment necessary to continue some of the
maintenance work? We want to look forward to doing work in
future years.
Secretary Peters. Let me talk to you about both of those. I
have been to Kelly several times now, and we are trying to get
that running as smoothly as we can. I think we have been very
forthcoming, as you know. We have just recently put an
additional $11 million into environmental and safety issues on
the C-5 facility that is being used by Boeing now. I understand
that there is a list of other facilities which greater Kelly
would like to use for private purposes. It is clearly in our
best interest to try to get those facilities into private
hands, and I know we are looking at the cost trade-offs. It is
incredibly expensive, and we may not have the money to move,
but we are trying to accommodate them.
With respect to the equipment, there has been an
unfortunate problem, and now a lesson learned, and that is we
really need to tag pieces of equipment when we do one of these
public-private competitions, and that way we can avoid disputes
about what should stay and what should go. We are doing that in
the propulsion business area. My understanding is that with
respect to the other equipment, there were 4,000 items at one
point which were demanded both by Warner Robins and by greater
Kelly. We are down to 83 of those that have not been resolved.
We will continue to work that.
But with respect to the new competition, we hope to avoid
the issue in the first instance with a detailed property list
with a request for proposal, and when the offerors tell us what
they want, what they say they don't want goes to Kelly in the
ordinary course.
Mr. Bonilla. We appreciate what you have done to help us in
this privatization transition and the jobs that are going to be
kept there in the community, and we appreciate that. Thank you
very much.
Mr. Young. Mr. Cunningham.
RETENTION
Mr. Cunningham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Maybe I can get
some of these for the record and make it easier.
Mr. Secretary and General, I have a lot of respect for your
predecessor. He was a good friend, and I want to tell you that
in the eyes of the Navy pilots that I have talked to, he stands
head and shoulders for standing up for somebody that he
believed was getting a raw deal, and I feel the same way. I
want you to know that.
Anyway, I know for the last 30 years, the number one area
for retention has been family separation, at least in the
services that I have talked to the kids. Another one is erosion
of benefits, when you look at your package, and the medical
benefits and other things. So I know there is a lot of
different effects, but this 300 percent increase in reduction
rate and even the bonus, I think you went from 29 to 32 or 33
percent on pilot retention, but the kids, the wrench-pullers
and stuff, it is a real problem, and you lose that quality
aviator out of there.
Another thing that I want to talk to some Air Force guys,
and I didn't know you guys, but talking to Air Force, Army and
Navy pilots, part of the problem, too, is when we used to come
back, we had adversary assets which meant flying billets. It
not only kept a higher state of readiness, in my opinion,
because you trained against this similar aircraft, but it gave
them a flying billet to come back to that they felt very, very
proud to be with, the 64th and 65th, the 414th overseas and in
Europe and so on, and a lot of this has gone away. I know you
can't buy fighters if you don't have the money, but someday I
hope to change that.
C-17 AIRCRAFT
The main question I want to ask you about, though, is the
C-17s, and if somebody has already asked this, and I can read
the record, let me know. I understand you are going to look at
buying some additional C-17s because of the low level of
special ops. If you can let me know, you can even provide for
the record if you expect the Department to come out and request
that, or what your plans are. I know we had a plan that we put
in with Log Air to lease back some C-17s, have them operate
commercially, kind of a lend-lease kind of a thing, have the
commercial guys do it, and then in time of war actually have
Air Force pilots fly the C-17s. If it was a time of war, just
revert back to the military. I think that is the kind of
finance that if you could get behind and support, let me know
if you would like to take a look at those kinds of things in
the future.
TRAFFIC COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEM
Mr. Dicks. Let me ask you another question. About a week
ago, 2 weeks ago, there was a show on 60 Minutes. Two mid-air
collisions involving Air Force and Air National Guard aircraft
last week may highlight the lack of collision avoidance systems
in military cockpits, safety devices already required for all
civilian aircraft with more than 10 seats, Inside The Air Force
reports. Africa's poor air traffic control system may also have
played a role in the September 13th collision of a C-141 and a
German Air Force TU-154 off the coast of Namibia, sources said.
Neither of these planes--neither of the planes had equipment
that could detect other aircraft, and the collision probably
occurred outside the scope of any ground-monitored radar,
sources said.
Although this--manufacturing by Allied Signal, Rockwell,
Collins and Honeywell, separate versions of the scientific
alert are required in all American commercial aircraft carrying
more than 30 passengers and all regional aircraft carrying more
than 10 passengers, industry sources said. Although this
congressional mandate does not apply to military aircraft, the
Defense Department began considering TCAS for its aircraft last
year after the crash of an Air Force F43 carrying then
Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown. But DOD's Traffic Collision
Avoidance System, TCAS effort has been proceeding slowly, and
the Air Force has not given the purchase of collision-avoidance
systems a high priority--high enough priority to secure funding
for several platforms, sources said.
Can you give us an update on where you are? I have been
trying since 1986, Mr. Secretary, to try to convince all DOD
that you needed to have a ground proximity warning system and
this TCAS system. I mean, if you lose one airplane, it seems to
me that is one airplane too much. None of us want to see either
the loss of lives, of course, most importantly, or the aircraft
loss.
What I worry about here is I look at the 5-year plan, and
there is some money in here, but I am told that it is still
deficient in terms of being able to equip the necessary planes
with these systems.
Secretary Peters. Let me try to address that. First, I will
get back to you for the record with the installation schedule
for the ground proximity warning system. That is part of many
of the cockpit upgrades we are doing, and we are doing it in
many cases because it is much easier to do it as part of a
cockpit upgrade.
[The information follows:]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aircraft GPWS/GCAS EGPWS TCAS ELT FDR CVR
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C-5......................... C P ECD: FY04 P ECD: FY02 C C C
C-9+........................ C P ECD: FY01 P ECD: FY00 C C C
C-12........................ C P ECD: FY01 P ECD: FY99 C P ECD: FY99 P ECD: FY99
C-17........................ C P ECD: FY03 P ECD: FY02 C C C
C-20........................ C P ECD: FY01 P ECD: FY99 C C C
C-21........................ C P ECD: FY01 P ECD: FY01 C C C
C-22*....................... C U/U U/U C C C
C-26*....................... C U/U C C C C
C-27*....................... C U/U U/U C C C
C-32........................ -- C C C C C
C-37........................ -- C C C C C
C/T-43plus-minus ........... C S/U ECD: TBD S/U ECD: TBD C P ECD: FY99 P ECD: FY99
C-130....................... C S/U ECD: TBD S/U ECD: TBD C C C
C/KC-135.................... -- P ECD: FY02 P ECD: FY01 P ECD: FY04 P ECD: FY04 P ECD: FY04
C-137*+..................... C U/U P ECD: FY99 C C C
C-141+...................... C S/U ECD: TBD P ECD: FY01 C C C
VC-25....................... C U/U \1\ C C C C
KC-10+...................... C P ECD: FY04 P ECD: FY02 C C C
E-4......................... C P ECD: FY01 P ECD: FY01 C C C
H-1......................... N/A S/U ECD: TBD P ECD: FY04 P ECD: FY04 P ECD: FY04 P ECD: FY04
H-60........................ N/A S/U ECD: TBD S/U ECD: TBD U/U S/U ECD: TBD S/U ECD: TBD
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Legend: C = Complete P = Programmed (Funded) S/U = Scheduled/Underfunded
U/U = Unscheduled/Unfunded n/a = not applicable (Helos have GCAS-like system)
ECD = Estimated Completion Date TBD = To Be Determined
Notes: GPWS = Ground Proximity Warning System; GCAS = Ground Collision Avoidance System; EGPWS = Enhanced Ground
Proximity Warning System;
TCAS = Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System; ELT = Emergency Locator Transmitter; CVR = Cockpit Voice
Recorder; FDR = Flight Data Recorder.
* = Pending retirement.
1 = Aggressively working to establish Congressional ``New Start'' to equip VC-25 with EGPWS.
+ = Air Force has recently accelerated TCAS installations on the C-9, KC-10, C-137, and C-141.
plus-minus = CT-43 TCAS is programmed/funded for TCAS installation in FY99; T-43 is scheduled to be equipped
with TCAS in the outyears and is underfunded.
Secretary Peters. With respect to TCAS, one of our problems
of course is our aircraft are very old. TCAS commercially
available requires digital buses and things which many of our
aircraft don't have, so that we have to do extensive
engineering in order to get them onto an aircraft.
Having said that, I believe that roughly half of our fleet
will have TCAS in the next 2 years, and that all of our
passenger fleet will have TCAS very early in the next century.
We are looking at having all of our relevant fleet covered in
about 2005 at this point. But as I say, our costs have been
substantially higher because we have to figure out a way to put
TCASs into analog cockpits, so that has been a problem we have
which many of the airlines do not have, and we are working
that. So we have funds budgeted, we are spending them.
In terms of past aviation safety, the ground proximity
warning system is the more important of the two, given the past
history of accidents, but it is working, and as I say, we
should have the whole fleet covered in about 2005.
Mr. Dicks. I understand here, I have a funding profile here
that shows that TCAS this year is at 56--or the year we are
operating in is $56.2 million, ground warning system is $33.4
million, and then in 1999 TCAS jumps up to 125.50, and GPS is
at 27.7. I realize that this again is an affordability issue,
but if you could put in the record what you are trying to do on
this, and which airplanes.
This is another thing I would like to know: Which airplanes
are we going to put it on and which not? As I understand, some
fighter aircraft, this is not--you don't put it on those kind
of airplanes. This is more for the cargo planes and things of
that nature.
Secretary Peters. The strategy is to put it on the pure
passenger carriers first, followed by the mixed passenger-cargo
carriers second. We have a bit of an issue about the C-141,
which we are retiring. In fact, we have now decided to put it
on a number of the longer-life 141s, and we have those
scheduled. We will submit a complete list for the record.
[The information follows:]
The Air Force is considering whether the Traffic Alert and
Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) should be installed on non-passenger-
carrying aircraft, such as fighters and bombers. If a determination is
made that it should be, then a major engineering effort will be
required to ascertain the feasibility of installing the multi-component
TCAS on each of the various types of aircraft. Regarding training
aircraft (e.g., T-1, T-38), most will be equipped with TCAS--T-1s and
T-6s are being purchased with TCAS already installed; the T-38 is being
retrofitted; the T-37 is not being equipped as it will begin to retire
in FY00. The TCAS installation schedule for passenger/cargo/tanker
aircraft is laid out in the previous answer.
Summary funding data is shown in a separate chart on the following
page. Since the AF began combining modifications, other equipment may
be incorporated under combined mods and reported elsewhere (e.g., under
Global Air Traffic Management).
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Dicks. Are we putting these on the C-17s?
Secretary Peters. Yes. Ultimately we are putting them on in
assembly with hull 71, and I think it is 2001. That again is a
retrofit problem because the C-17 has been in gestation for
many years, and its initial cockpit design did not have TCAS
because it is a later add on that system. So it is being
reengineered, and that will start going in with ship 71 in
2001. We believe we will retrofit all of the fleet before that
by 2002.
Mr. Dicks. General, do you have any comments?
General Ryan. Just to say that, as you know, we went
through a very, very in-depth scrub of the safety systems that
we have on our aircraft as a result of the T-43 accident in
Europe, and that we think we have a very aggressive and good
program for bringing all of those on. And it isn't just TCAS we
are also adding ground proximity warning and GPS and some of
the other systems that we have on the aircraft from a safety
standpoint. So I think we are moving very well. We will give
you an answer for the record on what that schedule is.
[The information follows:]
C-5......................... C P ECD: FY04 P ECD: FY02 C C C
C-9+........................ C P ECD: FY01 SU ECD: TBD C C C
C-12........................ C P ECD: FY01 P ECD: FY99 C P ECD: FY99 P ECD: FY99
C-17........................ C P ECD: FY03 P ECD: FY02 C C C
C-20........................ C P ECD: FY01 P ECD: FY99 C C C
C-21........................ C P ECD: FY01 P ECD: FY01 C C C
C-22*....................... C U/U U/U C C C
C-26*....................... C U/U C C C C
C-27*....................... C U/U U/U C C C
C-32........................ -- C C C C C
C-37........................ -- C C C C C
C/T-43plus-minus ........... C S/U ECD: TBD S/U ECD: TBD C P ECD: FY99 P ECD: FY99
C130........................ C S/U ECD: TBD S/U ECD: TBD C C C
C/KC-135.................... -- P ECD: FY02 P ECD: FY01 P ECD: FY04 P ECD: FY04 P ECD: FY04
C-137*+..................... C U/U S/U ECD: C C C
FY99
C-141+...................... C S/U ECD: TBD S/U ECD: TBD C C C
VC-25....................... C U/U\1\ C C C C
KC-10+...................... C P ECD: FY04 P ECD: FY04 C C C
E-4......................... C P ECD: FY01 P ECD: FY01 C C C
H-1......................... N/A S/U ECD: TBD P ECD: FY04 P ECD: FY04 P ECD: FY04 P ECD: FY04
H-60........................ N/A S/U ECD: TBD S/U ECD: TBD U/U S/U ECD: TBD S/U ECD: TBD
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Legend: C = Complete P = Programmed (Funded) S/U = Scheduled/Underfunded U/U = Unscheduled/Unfunded N/A = not
applicable (Helos have GCAS-LIke system) ECD = Estimated Completion Date TBD = To Be Determined
Notes: GPWS = Ground Proximity Warning System; GCAS = Ground Collision Avoidance System; EGPWS = Enhanced
Ground Proximity Warning System;
TCAS = Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System; ELT = Emergency Locator Transmitter;
CVR = Cockpit Voice Recorder; FDR = Flight Data Recorder.
* = Pending retirement.
\1\ = Aggressively working to establish Congressional ``New Start'' to equip VC-25 with EGPWS.
+ = Air Force is working to accelerate TCAS installations on the C-9, KC-10, C-137, and C-141; will require
$19.6 million additional funding.
plus-minus = CT-43 TCAS is programmed/funded for installation in FY99; T-43 is scheduled to be equiped with
TCAS in the outyears and is underfunded.
JSTARS AIRCRAFT
Mr. Dicks. Let me ask you this. As I understand it, the
funding for JSTARS has been reduced; is that correct? What is
that going to do? Apparently we thought NATO was going to step
in and do part of this program.
Mr. Hobson. You are going to do 13?
General Ryan. Thirteen aircraft are currently in the
program. What we had thought, that NATO would have stepped up
to some and buy about six, but that has not been forthcoming.
Right now we have a study in OSD looking at long-term leads
with respect to Joint STARS and the other systems that we are
buying that are complementary to it and see what the
requirement is. That study is supposed to be complete this
summer.
Mr. Dicks. All right.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Cunningham.
JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER
Mr. Cunningham. General Ryan, the Joint Strike Fighter, my
concern is that we are building three different variations. I
know we are supposed to have a lot of commonality, I hope. It
is difficult enough to build one airplane and not have all of
the tests and evaluation series have a lot of problems with it.
I mean, that is F-15, F-14, F-5, everything, and the F-16 with
the deep stall.
But what I am looking at is the Navy is buying a low-end
airplane, and it has F-18E/F coming out, but in 10 years I am
concerned over what our potential enemies are building. Because
right now, with the SU-35, 37, Russia has some pretty
formidable airplanes. They are on line now, and we haven't even
built this thing, and I know that you want a replacement for
the F-16. It will probably have VSTOL and some other
capabilities, but are you concerned with the low-end airplane
that may not be as good as what the enemy has now that we won't
even have for 10 or 15 years?
General Ryan. As you know, the F-15 and the F-14 are top-
end aircraft. The air-to-air role are now essentially at parity
with some of the aircraft that are on line from other nations,
including the Europeans, who are producing the Mirage 2000 and
the European Fighter Aircraft, EFA. So there is no question
that we need to upgrade our top-end air-to-air capability. It
is always first in; that is always what leverages the others.
That is why for us in the Air Force, the F-22 is our answer to
that threat, and the F-22's capability to penetrate, super
cruise, and integrated avionics will then leverage the
capability of a lesser capable Joint Strike Fighter.
Mr. Cunningham. Do you plan on employing the F-22 with
Joint Strike Fighter as a cap-type airplane?
General Ryan. Yes, sir.
AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES
Mr. Cunningham. One of the other problems that we had in
the services, I noted that you all did different time frames,
the number of AMRAAMS and AIM-7s. I know we are not using the
AIM-7s, but AIM-9, quite often when we deployed so many
carriers that we were short on each carrier, the number of
rounds per airplanes, and then in areas like Bosnia and Iraq
where you are actually carrying those weapons on board, it is
just coming up stuck in a hole. You are banging those things
not on a boat like we do and rattle it, but you are using them
a lot, and I know there is a repair time and check time.
Do you have enough rounds, especially with us in Iraq, with
us in Bosnia and in Italy, and with the other increases in
OPTEMPO, do you have the number of rounds you need to meet
those kinds of requirements, because this is getting critical?
General Ryan. Yes. As you know, we do a calculation on the
number of those rounds that we need in the inventory and in War
Readiness Material (WRM) for the two major regional
contingencies. That number far exceeds what we need for this
small regional contingency. So we are in pretty good shape. We
think that we have the right stockpile for that.
Mr. Cunningham. Well, I don't know if you remember a guy
named Dr. Ressler Embro. That old doc came up when I was in the
Pentagon and said, hey, the AIM-7 is going to have a new one,
the AIM-9 with 879. Probability of kill PK, which means you
need less missiles to do the job; that the SPARROW had a 14
percent probability of kill PK in Vietnam, and the Sidewinder
at the end of it only had a 49 percent. So those statistics are
very important, too.
General Ryan. The way we calculate that now is we use our
Weapon System Evaluation Program, WSEP, where we go shoot the
missile in an essentially combat environment with crews that
aren't specifically trained on that, take the PKs that we get
out of that and apply them, and then after looking at the bases
for the number of shots that we would take in the two major
regional contingencies, then we arm the fleet one more time,
fully loaded, and that is how we do our calculation.
POTENTIAL SAVINGS
Mr. Cunningham. Let me close with one last issue. Mr.
Secretary, all of us go through the frustration of working
through OSD at different times, especially foreign military
sales (FMS), overseas things, but I would like to give you, I
will hand them to you, some ideas on how I think we could save
dollars.
One example in OSD is we had authorized $12 million for a
map copy that was a cross for all services. OSD held it for a
year. They continue doing it the same way. They copied 10
percent of the maps at $16 million. That is a waste of those
kinds of dollars, and when who has it, what pot has it and who
wants to hold it, or is it with DARPA and those kinds of
things. I just have some suggestions that I would like to give
to you. I think it would help us do the job better.
I won't go into the BRAC round or anything like that, but I
want to thank you for coming. I am a big supporter. I
understand with the logistics, the F-22, and I want to thank
you for coming.
Mr. Young. Mr. Cunningham, thank you very much.
Mr. Hobson.
C-141 AIRCRAFT
Mr. Hobson. Very briefly, gentlemen, if you can find a
flying unit for Wright-Patterson, we would be happy to take it
if somebody is filled up.
Lastly, and you don't have to answer this now, but
something I keep asking, I am really concerned about the future
of the C-141 and what is going to replace it, because I don't
know that anybody is looking--maybe they are, but I don't know
if we are going to have enough C-17s to replace it. That
airplane, if you look at what it does all the time, it is
flying all the time now, more and more capability that we are
using it for, and it is old, and it is tired, and I don't know
how you are going to handle--I don't know who is looking at
planning those missions and how you are going to replace that.
And you don't have to--I know you want to get out of here, but
at some point I sure would like to talk to you about that, sir.
Secretary Peters. I would have to say the Transportation
Command and our Air Mobility Command are looking at those
issues, and the short answer is the C-17 is going to ramp up to
replace that capacity. We would be happy to come over and talk
to you about it.
Mr. Hobson. I just don't think we are going to get there
fast enough. That is what worries me.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Secretary and General, thank you very much.
We appreciate you being here. Your time has expired, so we are
going to have some additional questions we will submit to you
in writing and urge you to respond as quickly as possible.
Again, thank you very much for the good job that you do,
and thank you for your very forthright responses to our
questions today. And as I told you before, we stand ready to be
your partner in providing for the security of the Nation and to
provide for the well-being of those who provide that security
for the Nation. Thank you.
General Ryan. Thank you for having us, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you. Good luck on your trip to Bosnia. I know the troops
appreciate you coming.
Mr. Young. I am taking a couple of your people with me, so
you know we are going to be in good shape.
General Ryan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Young. The Committee will meet again this afternoon at
1:30 to discuss Air Force acquisition programs. That will be in
a closed session.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the
answers thereto follow:]
Air Force Strategy
Question. General Ryan, your statement includes discussions of
information superiority, enabling technologies, agile combat support,
and revolution in military affairs. In your view, is the Air Force in
the midst of a revolution in military affairs? Please describe this
``revolution'' as it applies to your Service.
Answer. As in the past, the Air Force has embraced high-leverage
technological advances, innovative operational concepts, and new types
of organizations to enhance America's premier asymmetric advantage--its
aerospace power. We view the Revolution in Military Affairs, RMA as a
force multiplier that will compound our military capabilities
exponentially. We are, therefore, committed to exploiting further RMAs
by supporting research, experimentation, testing, exercising, and
evaluation of new systems and associated operational concepts. In
particular, we see five trends in the RMA which offer the opportunity
to link existing and emerging technologies with new operational
concepts and organizations.
Stealth technology, although not new, will continue to provide us
with unprecedented target access in medium to high threat environments.
Stealth F-22s will not only assure target access, they will remain
instrumental in providing air dominance over the battlefield. Other
stealth platforms, including Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, UAVs, will add a
unique battlefield edge that includes the freedom from attack to the
freedom to attack.
Second, technological advances in C41SR will provide us with
``global transparency'' and enhance our ability to know our enemy's
posture, capabilities, and intentions. C4ISR will also provide our
lowest echelons with archived and real-time, all-source, and fused
battlefield information. These capabilities will further enhance our
dominant battlefield situational awareness, which we already have in
Bosnia. We have, for example, the ability to view real-time, Predator
UAV missions, we display near-real time, correlated, and fused
electronic intelligence data from national and theater assets in local
squadrons; and when JSTARS is deployed in theater, we have the ability
to display their data real-time. As for imagery, we now have the
ability to pass images from U-2 and national sources--again in near-
real time--directly into local squadrons. In short, we view these C4ISR
capabilities as truly revolutionary and not just limited to Bosnia. We
will expand this concept throughout the Air Force.
Third, vast improvements have been made in precision guided
munitions. These advances, when coupled with advances in C4ISR, are
devastating in their effects. Today's family of GPS/INS guided
munitions gives us a limited all-weather ability to destroy targets in
all environments (including urban centers) with a high degree of
accuracy, probability of kill (Pk), and a very low degree of collateral
damage. In terms of wide-area cluster munitions, Sensor Fuzed Weapons
(SFW) provide us the ability to destroy advancing enemy armor in their
tracks. Each SFW carries 40 ``top attack'' projectiles that circle the
battlefield and seek out and destroy individual armor targets with a
high degree of accuracy. The B-1B can carry 30 SFWs, which means one B-
1B can release 1,200 projectiles on an advancing enemy. Such a
capability is both revolutionary and instrumental in the halt-phase of
major theater war. With PGM's we have broken the old paradigm of
numbers of aircraft needed to destroy one target and are now talking
about number of targets neutralized by one aircraft.
Fourth, we have made quantum leaps in the field of rapid, in-flight
targeting and retargeting. With Real-Time Intelligence in the Cockpit
(RTIC) and the Rapid Targeting System (RTS), we have now matched the
sensor to the shooter in real time. This capability will leverage our
ability to accurately strike fleeting, time-sensitive targets and/or
newly identified threats swiftly and precisely. This capability also
increases the responsiveness of Air Expeditionary Forces. AEFs can now
deploy with little or no preplanning. Instead they would receive their
target information (complete with GPS coordinates, imagery, and maps)
while enroute to the target area. When coupled with Precision Guided
Munitions, PGMs and C4ISR technology, RTIC and RTS will reinforce
aerospace power's capability to respond--vigorously and effectivel--
during Halt Phase operations.
Lastly, advances in directed energy technology elevate the airborne
laser (ABL)--the only boost phase theater missile defense program in
DoD. The ABL may well become our ultimate defensive and force
protection weapon because it will destroy enemy theater ballistic
missiles in their boost phase with a high degree of success. We are
also exploring some offensive options with the ABL against enemy
aerospace assets.
In summary, the RMA has already provided the Air Force with a
potent blend of combat capability--from quickly identifying potential
hot-spots through C4ISR-based ``global transparency'' to rapidly and
accurately responding to threats with Air Expeditionary Forces equipped
with stealth, PGMs, and real-time intelligence in the cockpit. We plan
on building on all these developments to exploit what is already an
unmatched U.S. asymmetric advantage--its aerospace force.
Question. What steps is the Air Force taking to reorganize itself
to take full advantage of information age technologies and other
enabling technologies?
Answer. At the top level, our organizational constructs are
underpinned by a vision and a commitment to air, space, and information
superiority--all of which are heavily dependent on information and
aerospace technologies. We have in fact declared Information
Superiority one of our core competencies and are committed to training
and sustaining our capabilities in this area. In all areas of
technology, the Air Force has put in place the organizational structure
to exploit a wide range of emerging technologies--many of which are
information dependent.
We have established an Information Superiority Mission Area
Directorate in the Secretariat and designated the Electronic Systems
Center, Space and Missile Center, and Aeronautical System Center to
serve as one-stop product centers overseeing the acquisition of our
weapons systems, all of which build on information age and aerospace
technologies.
In addition, last year the Air Force stood-up six battlelabs and
one agency charged with revolutionizing our military operations. The
six labs are small, focused, centers that explore innovative operations
and logistic concepts. They identify and apply new technologies to our
doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures in such areas as force
protection, information warfare and space. The Air Force took an
additional step in 1997 to focus our resources and attention on the
complex tasks of commanding and controlling globally engaged air and
space forces. We stood up the Air and Space Command and Control Agency,
at Langley Air Force Base to integrate command and control initiatives
and to develop new command and control concepts and procedures
strengthen through enabling information technologies. We treat command
and control like a weapon system and are developing comprehensive
programs to rapidly modernize.
At the same time, the Air Force has fully responded to the
Information Technology Management Reform Act (also known as the
Clinger-Cohen Act) by establishing a Chief Information Officer (CIO),
and a CIO support office. The CIO is responsible for a wide range of
information and information technology issues that focus on the smart
use of technology to achieve better, faster, cheaper performance in our
business and national security systems.
Question. Is there a single focal point within the Air Force
leadership responsible for developing the concepts and priorities that
will lead to the next revolution in military affairs?
Answer. The Air Force Headquarters stood up the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Plans and Programs last year. It is a primary focal point for
Air Force RMA and development of the Air Force Strategic Plan, which
explores the future security environment and defines the path for
necessary transformations. However, the responsibilities for
technological and conceptual Air Force RMA developments are shared
among other agencies/groups such as: AF Battelabs, the AF Research Lab,
Warfare Centers, Modeling and Simulation Centers, Major Command and
Headquarters Air Staffs (Strategic Planning, Programming, Operational
Requirements, Education and Training). The interaction between all
these agencies facilitates the capture of future capabilities and
enables a consensus building approach that is reflected in the Air
Force Strategic Planning process.
Additional Funding
Question. Last year, the Air Force identified critical unfunded
requirements to the Committee. As a result, the Committee was able to
provide additional funding for many of these requirements. I hope you
will continue to work with us this year. If additional funds were made
available in fiscal year 1999, how would you allocate them? For each of
the programs you have identified, what would be the benefit for
providing the additional funds?
Answer. In response to your request, I am providing a list of
underfunded or unmet quality of life, readiness and modernization
requirements. I wish to underscore the fact that the Air Force fiscal
year 1999 request is finely balanced. Our first priority is to execute
that budget as submitted. Second in priority is supplemental funding
without offset for ongoing contingency operations. Any additional funds
could then be applied against this list, but not at the expense of the
balance we have worked so hard to achieve. The benefits of providing
the additional funds are annotated on the list.
Question. Would the additional funds fix critical shortfalls, field
modernization programs sooner, or just fund ``nice to have'' programs?
Answer. Additional funds would be used first and foremost to
improve overall readiness by increasing spare parts availability,
reducing deferred aircraft and engine overhaul backlog, improving
equipment readiness, upgrading engines and funding important technical
data updates. Our list specifically focuses on improving force
readiness in critical areas.
Question. If the Air Force received additional funding in fiscal
year 1999 for the programs that you have outlined, would the Air Force
be willing to sustain those programs in the outyears? Why or why not?
Answer. All of the programs are sustained throughout the outyears,
but with a degree of underfunding, in order to remain within fiscal
constraints while balancing overall needs. The level of underfunding
represents the risk acceptable to the Air Force in order to achieve
fiscal balance. The Air Force cannot sustain higher funding levels for
these programs without an increase in overall funding.
Question. Does the fiscal year 1999 budget adequately fund
operations and maintenance and personnel requirements? If not, what are
your highest priority shortfalls?
Answer. While the fiscal year 1999 Air Force operation and
maintenance (O&M) budget imposes constraints in several readiness
related accounts, it adequately funds O&M and personnel requirements at
an acceptable level of risk. Certainly, the Air Force would feel more
comfortable if it could reduce the level of risk. Within the allowed
topline, the Air Force has properly balanced people, readiness and
time-phased modernization accounts.
If the Air Force had another dollar beyond that required for
contingency operations, its priority would be to continue to focus on
improving readiness. Of high interest would be increasing depot level
repairables (spares) to help stem a declining mission capable rate.
Also, addressing the growing deferred aircraft overhaul backlog with
additional funding for depot maintenance would improve overall
equipment readiness.
The fiscal year 1999 budget is sufficient only to sustain the Air
Force's infrastructure and base operating support (BOS). Being able to
fix a growing backlog of critical real property maintenance repair
projects would improve overall readiness. A more robust base operating
support account would reduce migration of mission funds to meet BOS
requirements.
There are other areas of O&M the Air Force would fund if it could
to improve readiness while maintaining a proper balance for
modernization and people programs. Among them are a backlog of
technical order updates and a less-than-required number of readiness
spares packages.
Question. Would there be savings if Congress provided additional
funds to procure items at an accelerated rate? If so, which procurement
items would you accelerate? What would be the near term cost and long
term savings of the accelerated procurement?
Answer. The fiscal year 1999 President's Budget reflects a
balanced, time-phased Air Force modernization program (near-, mid-, and
long-term), which allows us to modernize without sacrificing current
readiness and ensures no requirements bow-waves are created in the out-
year budgets. If additional funding were made available, the Air Force
Corporate process would be engaged to determine appropriate allocation
of any additional funding.
Question. In the past, we have heard testimony from several of the
CINCs. Each year, all of the CINCs testified that they are faced with
critical shortfalls in areas such as equipment maintenance, air and sea
lift, and OPTEMPO funding. The CINCs do not submit their own budget
requests to the Congress. The resources required at the various
Commands are requested by the Services. Which critical shortfalls
identified by the CINCs are included in your fiscal year 1999 request?
What requirements identified by the CINCs have not been included in
your budget submission? Why were those requirements not funded? Which
shortfalls were not funded at their highest levels? Why?
Answer. The Air Force used the Fiscal Year 1999-2003 CINC
Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs) to resource the CINC's highest
priority requirements as we developed the Air Force's Fiscal Year 1999-
2003 POM submission, which eventually evolved into the Fiscal Year 1999
President's Budget. As we documented in Tab I, the Unified Commands
annex of our POM submission, 102 of 103 Fiscal Year 1999-2003 CINC IPL
requirements were resourced at a level representing the highest
category of support as measured by the Air Force.
------. This requirement is satisfied by Air Force E-8 JSTARS
aircraft. As directed by the Quadrennial Defense Review report, the
total purchase of JSTARS aircraft was reduced from 19 to 13, saving
approximately $1.6 billion over the Future Years Defense Program
(FYDP). This decision was made with the expectation that NATO would
purchase six additional JSTARS aircraft. However, NATO recently
deferred a decision on JSTARS procurement. The total JSTARS requirement
is currently the subject of an OSD-led Front End Assessment for the
Fiscal Year 2000-2005 programming cycle to help determine the
requirement for this capability in lieu of its significant cost and
evolving technical alternatives. Results of this review will be
incorporated in the Fiscal Year 2000 President's Budget.
Question. The Air Force's fiscal year 1998 list of unfunded
requirements totaled over $2.2 billion dollars. Does the fiscal year
1999 budget sustain the level of funding required for those activities
that received additional funding in fiscal year 1998? For the record,
please provide a list of the projects that received additional funding
in fiscal year 1998, but are not adequately funded in fiscal year 1999.
Answer. The fiscal year 1999 budget sustains those activities that
received additional funding in fiscal year 1998. Some programs continue
to absorb a degree of underfunding in order to remain within fiscal
constraints while balancing overall needs. The level of underfunding
represents the risk acceptable to the Air Force in order to achieve
fiscal balance. While adequately funded within this framework, the
areas of spare parts, engines, MILCON, Real Property Maintenance, RPM,
aging aircraft, vehicles and recruit advertising are again reflected on
our list of underfunded programs.
Air Force Mission Capable Rates
Question. In the transmittal letter accompanying the DoD
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), Defense Secretary Cohen indicated
that the Navy and Air Force faced shortfalls in fiscal year 1998 of
over $600 million for aviation spare parts. The Congress provided an
increase totaling $622 million in the 1998 DoD appropriations bill for
this purpose. Of the total, $300 million was added to Operation and
maintenance, Air Force. Despite this add, recent press accounts
indicate that the composite mission capable rate for all Air Force
aircraft is about 76% and has declined every year since 1991. What has
been the trend for Air Force aircraft mission capable rates for
deployed aircraft since operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm?
Answer. While deployed force Mission Capable, MC rates have
averaged less than the 92 percent MC rates reported during the Gulf
War, they are generally higher than overall Air Force MC rates and have
always met deployed operational requirements. The January 1998 Air
Combat Command OPERATION SOUTHERN WATCH deployed MC rates for the F-16
(83.3%), B-52 (85.6%), and A-10 (79.6%) were higher than Air Force-wide
MC rates for the F-16 (74.9%), B-52 (74.9%), and A-10 (73.3%) during
the same period. Scheduling major maintenance inspections around
deployment dates, cannibalizing parts from home station aircraft for
spare parts kits, and assignment of higher priority for available spare
parts to those forces engaged in deployed operations, accounts for the
overall higher deployed force MC rates. However, maintenance and supply
factors driving the overall declining Air Force MC rate since fiscal
year 1991 effect our deployed forces as well. These factors include
aging aircraft (increased aircraft inspections, landing gear, and fuel
system problems), engine technical surprises, and higher than expected
demand rates. Funding spare parts at 82 percent in fiscal year 1997
compounded spare parts shortages, particularly in F-16 avionics
components in the last quarter of fiscal year 1997. Additionally, some
deployed forces have experienced wide fluctuations in MC rates due to
things like delays of international spare parts shipments as was the
case with OPERATION NORTHERN WATCH.
Improved fiscal year 1998 and fiscal year 1999 spare part funding,
implementation of an engine life management planning, and streamlined
supply chain management are expected to stabilize both overall and
deployed MC rates and begin recovery.
Question. What effect does a change in the mission capable rate
have on the reported readiness of the Air Force?
Answer. Generally speaking, a small change in the mission capable
(MC) rate of an individual weapon system will not result in discernible
changes to the overall reported readiness of the Air Force. MC rates
are one of many indicators considered when assessing overall readiness.
Declines in MC rates are often accompanied by increased
Cannibalization (CANN), Non-Mission Capable-Supply (NMCS) and Non-
Mission Capable-Maintenance (NMCM) rates. Depending on the nature,
duration, and severity of the decline, these may reflect other
readiness issues not always addressed through a unit-level SORTs
report. ------.
Air Force Ability To Support the Two MRC Strategy
Question. Supporting the indefinite extension of the NATO mission
in Bosnia combined with the recent increase in the deployment of U.S.
forces to the Persian Gulf has stretched the ability of the U.S. to
meet its security commitments elsewhere in the world. For example, the
Air Force has two Air Expeditionary Forces (two wing equivalents
deployed in the Persian Gulf. The movement of carrier battle groups in
the Mediterranean and Pacific has caused the Air Force to carry an
increasing burden in Bosnia and on the Korean Peninsula, respectively.
Shuffling assets to meet both emergent requirements and long term
security commitments may also hinder the Department's ability to
conduct required maintenance actions on time. In addition, the need to
meet the increasing demand for U.S. forces will significantly increase
the strain placed on U.S. military personnel. Given the indefinite
extension of the Bosnia mission and the recent buildup in the Persian
Gulf, do you feel that the Air Force has adequate equipment and
personnel resources to fulfill its share of current national security
commitments?
Answer. The Air Force is able to fulfill its mission taskings.
However, several aircraft weapons systems will exceed the Air Force
desired TEMPO rates. By June 1, 1998, 13 of 27 flying Air Force units
deployed in support of Operation SOUTHERN WATCH would have an average
Temporary Duty (TDY) rate for the entire squadron of greater than 120
days. The effects of contingencies combined with exercises,
inspections, and training are stressing our people (negative impact on
Quality of Life, retention, efficiency, equipment, and maintenance)--
the backbone of Air Force readiness.
Question. What specific deficiencies do you see in Air Force
personnel and equipment?
Answer. As stated in the previous response, the Air Force is able
to fulfill its mission taskings albeit with greater than desired TEMPO
for some of our flying units. Overall, unit readiness is good, but we
have noted a downturn in readiness indicators:
Aircraft mission capable (MC) rates have declined nearly
nine percent since the Gulf War.
TEMPO is identified as the primary reason our personnel
are separating.
A strong economy is luring experienced pilots and highly
trained, mid-career sergeants from our ranks.
Question. Recent press accounts indicate that the Air Force may
have a shortage of spare parts necessary to deploy aircraft. It has
been reported that the Air Force must cannibalize CONUS based aircraft
to assemble the spares kits necessary to support deployments. Could you
please describe this shortfall in light of current requirements?
Answer. The Total Not Mission Capable for Supply (TNMCS) rate has
increased 5.5 percent since fiscal year 1991 (8.6 percent) to first
quarter fiscal year 1998 (14.1 percent) as a result of increased spare
parts shortages. Cannibalization trends per 100 flying hours have
increased from a low in fiscal year 1991 of 2.1 to a peak of 4.2 in
fiscal year 1997. Increased cannibalization represents a higher level
of effort to work around the spare parts shortages. Spare parts
shortages are driven by many reasons:
--Fleet Age
--F-15 water intrusion (corrosion of flight control surfaces)
and longer than expected depot repair times
--B-52 electronic countermeasures (ECM) parts--AF Material
Command has trouble finding vendors who still make the
components
--Contractor delinquencies
--Caused 3 of the 10 items driving F-16 part shortages
February-August 1997
--Organic repair constraints
--Supply chain management primary factor in depot repair line
production shortfalls
--Technical surprises
--High performance engine reliability problems drive spare
engine shortfalls
--B-1, F-16, and F-15E fleets have experienced engine
``holes''--has driven some engine cannibalization
--Excessive component repair part lead times; depot repair line
bottlenecks
--Caused 2 of top 10 items driving C-130 parts shortages
February-October 1997
--Spare parts funding
--Fiscal year 1997 82% funding compounded supply problems,
especially in fiscal year 1997/4
Corrective Actions:
--Improved fiscal year 1998/1999 spare parts funding
--Air Force implemented Improvement Process Team to improve flying
hour cost estimate methods
--Air Force implemented Engine Life Management Planning
--Focused on streamlined supply chain management
TNMCS and cannibalization rates should stabilize in fiscal year
1998 and begin to recover in fiscal year 1999.
Question. Do the new deployment requirements in Southwest Asia put
depot maintenance schedules for Air Force equipment at risk?
Answer. There has not been any significant impact reported.
Generally, we do not deploy equipment scheduled for depot maintenance.
Question. If the Air Force is unable to meet its maintenance
schedules for equipment, what risks does this pose to the nation's
ability to meet its security commitments?
Answer. A slip in depot maintenance schedules should not have a
significant impact on the ability of the Air Force to meet its security
commitments because the Air Force does not deploy equipment scheduled
for depot maintenance.
Contingency Operations
Question. In the fiscal year 1998 DoD Appropriations Act, the
Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund included nearly $1.9
billion for Operation and Maintenance costs associated with contingency
operations in Bosnia and the Persian Gulf. Of this amount, $1,467.5
million is for Bosnia, and $416.5 million is for Southwest Asia.
Contingency operations for Fiscal Year 1998 are underfunded. Unofficial
estimates indicate that Bosnia is underfunded by approximately $700
million, and Southwest Asia is underfunded by a similar amount
(assuming the current buildup, but no hostilities). What are the Air
Force's Military Personnel and Operation and Maintenance requirements
in fiscal year 1998 for Bosnia outside of what's already been funded in
the 1998 DoD Appropriations Act?
Answer. The Air Force's Military Personnel and Operation and
Maintenance requirements in fiscal year 1998 for Bosnia outside what
has already been funded in the 1998 DoD Appropriations Act is as
follows:
[In millions]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Appropriation Requirement Delta
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
O&M............................................................. $266.1 $222.0 $44.1
Milpers......................................................... 47.0 33.4 13.6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Savings resulting from reduced requirements in Bosnia will be
applied to Southwest Asia Contingency funding shortfalls.
Question. What are the Air Force's total Military Personnel and
Operation and maintenance costs for Bosnia in fiscal year 1998?
Answer. The Air Force's total Military Personnel and Operation and
Maintenance current estimates for Bosnia in fiscal year 1998 is as
follows:
Current Estimate
Millions
O&M........................................................... $222.0
Milpers....................................................... 33.4
Question. What are the Air Force's Military Personnel and Operation
and Maintenance requirements in fiscal year 1998 for operations in
Southwest Asia outside of what's already been funded in the 1998 DoD
Appropriations Act?
Answer: The Air Force's Military Personnel and Operation and
Maintenance requirements in fiscal year 1998 for Southwest Asia outside
what has already been funded in the 1998 DoD Appropriations Act is as
follows:
[In millions]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Emergency
Current supplemental
estimate requirement
------------------------------------------------------------------------
O&M..................................... $848.3 $422.0
Milpers................................. 67.8 24.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Savings from reduced Bosnia costs of $57.7 million will be applied
to Southwest Asia Contingency funding shortfalls within Air Force
Military Personnel and Operation and Maintenance accounts.
Question. What are the Air Force's total Military Personnel and
Operation and Maintenance costs for Southwest Asia in fiscal year 1998?
Answer. The Air Force's total Military Personnel and Operation and
Maintenance current estimates for Southwest Asia in fiscal year 1998 is
as follows:
Current Estimate
Millions
O&M........................................................... $848.3
Milpers....................................................... 67.8
Question. Have funds yet been transferred from the Overseas
Contingency Operations Transfer Fund to Operation and Maintenance, Air
Force to fund your contingency related expenses?
Answer. Funding in the amount of $692.4 million has been
transferred from the Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund to
our Operation and Maintenance account to fund our contingency related
expenses.
Personnel Endstrengths
Question. The fiscal year 1998 Authorization Act established an end
strength floor for the Air Force of 371,577 personnel. The fiscal year
1999 budget request reflects a very small reduction to your end
strengths levels, and generally complies with that end strength floor.
The Air Force's Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) goal, however, is
344,000 end strength, a reduction of approximately 27,000 additional
personnel below the Authorization floor. Mr. Secretary, unlike the
other Services, why has the Air Force decided to defer these personnel
reductions to the outyears? Doesn't this put the Air Force ``out of
sync'' with the QDR?
Answer. The vast majority of the 27,000 military reductions are
targeted toward competing non-military essential activities with the
private sector resulting in in-house civilian or contractor
performance. The timeline for the competition process precluded the Air
Force from realizing manpower savings through competition until the
outyears starting in fiscal year 2000. We do not believe this puts the
Air Force ``out of sync'' with the QDR since the QDR was designed to be
a fundamental and comprehensive examination of America's defense needs
from 1997 to 2015. These needs included potential threats, strategy,
force structure, readiness posture, military modernization programs,
defense infrastructure and other elements. Air Force concentrated on
infrastructure efficiencies while sustaining the forces and
capabilities needed to meet the National Military Strategy.
Question. Are the additional QDR reductions directly tied to force
structure or basing changes? Please explain.
Answer. The Air Force's Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) goal of
344,000 end strength as of the fiscal 1999 budget request reflects a
military end strength reduction of 27,000, of which 22,300 are directly
related to competing non-military essential commercial activities with
the private sector. The remaining reduction of 4,700 is a result of
rightsizing Air Force medical facilities, OSD's directed 15 percent
infrastructure reduction, and 1995 BRAC reductions that are effective
in fiscal year 2000 and fiscal year 2001.
Question. The authorities for the force management tools, like the
15-year Temporary Early Retirement Authority (TERA), expire in fiscal
year 1999. If the Authorization Committees do not extend those
authorities beyond 1999, can the Air Force achieve these future
personnel reductions without those drawdown programs?
Answer. If the authorities for these programs are not extended, the
Air Force may not be able to achieve planned force levels through
fiscal year 2003 without using involuntary programs. Providing these
tools allows the Air Force to target losses in overage skills and year
groups without negatively impacting morale and retention. Reducing
accessions for currently planned force levels is no longer viable. This
approach would cause significant force imbalances that would plague the
force for many years.
Personnel Recruiting and Retention
Question. Is the Air Force meeting its fiscal year 1998 recruiting
goals? What percent of your enlistees are High School graduates and GED
graduates? Are your enlisted recruiters having problems accessing
quality youth?
Answer. The Air Force is postured to achieve its 1998 recruiting
goal with a 99 percent high school diploma enlistment rate. Less than
one percent of our enlistees are GED graduates.
The robust economy with low unemployment creates intense
competition for high quality youth, but we are meeting our recruiting
goals with quality recruits. In fiscal 1997, the Air Force enlisted a
total of 30,200 first-time enlistees of whom 99 percent were high
school graduates and 79 percent scored in the top half on their
enlistment test (Armed Forces Qualification Test [AFQT] Categories I-
IIIA). This is well above the Department of Defense floor of 90 percent
high school graduates and 60 percent Cat I-IIIA. We are seeking 31,300
enlistments for fiscal year 1998 and although we have noted a slight
drop in the percent of enlistees scoring in the top half on the AFQT
(78 percent) we are maintaining a 99 percent high school diploma
enlistment rate.
Question. The country is currently experiencing low unemployment
rates and a robust economy. What challenges does this present to the
Air Force in order to have a successful recruiting program? What career
fields in the Air Force are the hardest to fill by your recruiters?
Answer. The Air Force continues to meet its recruiting goals, but
the challenges our recruiters face also continue. Ample opportunity to
attend college, a robust economy with low unemployment, military
drawdowns, and high-visibility overseas involvements have effectively
shrunk the pool of qualified and interested potential recruits. This is
further exacerbated by unfamiliarity with military service. As based
around the U.S. close and our total endstrength falls, today's young
people have less opportunity to be exposed to military life. Fewer
people serving in the military translates to fewer fathers, mothers,
brothers, sisters, cousins, and friends to positively relate their
military experiences.
As the recruiting market became more intense, the Air Force took
actions to remain competitive in the market. We've more than doubled
our advertising budget since the early 90s ($7.7 million fiscal year
1993 to $17.1 million fiscal year 1998). Through the addition of 80 new
authorizations and moving recruiters from overhead positions, we've
increased the number of enlisted program recruiters from 1093 to 1209
(+116). We've recently provided our recruiters with cellular phones and
laptop computers as we move to a web-based recruiting information
support system to bring our recruiting technology into the 21st
Century. These and other actions have improved our ability to meet our
accession goals and maintain quality enlistments. Special Tactics and
Maintenance Fields are hardest to fill. Combat Control and Pararescue
require unique qualifications. Due to the nature of their duties, these
skills attract few volunteers and are an ongoing challenge for our
recruiters to fill. Declining interest and average mechanical aptitude
decreases the maintenance qualified recruiting pool. We're using
directed advertising and enlistment bonuses to overcome these
challenges.
Question. What are your first and second term reenlistment rates
for your enlisted service members? For officers? Have these rates
declined from past years? What is the historical average for enlisted
and officer reenlistment?
Answer. Our fiscal year 1997 first-term reenlistment rate was 56
percent and our second-term rate was 71 percent. First-term rates have
dropped 5 percent since fiscal year 1993 (61 percent) but are still
above our first-term goal of 55 percent. Our fiscal year 1997 second-
term rate has dropped 11 percent since fiscal year 1993 (82 percent)
and is below our goal of 75 percent. Our fiscal year 1997 career
reenlistment rate was 95 percent down from a rate of 97 percent in
fiscal year 1993. Air Force goals are approximately equal to historical
averages.
Since officers do not reenlist, officer retention is tracked using
the Cumulative Continuation Rate (CCR)--percentage of officers entering
the 4th (6th for pilots and navigators) year of service that complete
their 11th year of service. Our fiscal year 1997 pilot rate was 71
percent, down 11 percent since fiscal year 1994 (82 percent). The pilot
historical average is 48 percent. The fiscal year 1997 navigator rate
was 73 percent, also down 11 percent since fiscal year 1994 (84
percent). The navigator historical average is 58 percent. Fiscal year
1997 non-rated retention was 50 percent, down 10 percent since fiscal
year 1994 (60 percent). The non-rated historical average is 55 percent.
Question. What are some of the factors that are influencing Air
Force personnel to separate from the military early? Explain what the
Air Force is doing to address its retention concerns.
Answer. The number one reason people leave the Air Force is tempo.
Today's Air Force is experiencing a four-fold increase in deployments
since the end of the Cold War; yet, we are 34 percent smaller. The
second most often reported reason for leaving the service is quality of
life. When you examine these concerns closely, many members are
specifically saying too much time away from home (e.g., tempo).
In an effort to mitigate the effects of increased tempo, the Air
Force has reduced the time in Joint Chiefs of Staff sponsored exercises
by 15 percent. We have also reduced the normal aircraft until rotation
time from 90 days to 45 days and many major commands have implemented
post-deployment stand downs to reacquaint themselves with their
families. In addition, we are reducing Operational Readiness
Inspections by 10 percent in fiscal year 1998 and 30 percent by fiscal
year 1999.
Quality of life also plays an important role in influencing a
member's decision to stay or leave the service. Our major command
commanders, unit commanders, and first sergeants recently validated
seven enduring quality of life priorities. They are to pursue fair and
competitive compensation and benefits; balance the impact of high tempo
rates; provide access to quality health care; provide access to safe,
adequate and affordable housing; preserve stable retirement system and
benefits; enhance community support; and to expand educational
opportunities.
Question. Last year the Authorization conference increased the
Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP) bonus from $12,000 per year to a
maximum of $25,000 per year. In addition, the Aviation Career Incentive
Pay (ACIP), or flight pay, was increased from $650 month to $840 month
for pilots with 14 to 22 years of service. Is the Air Force offering
the maximum amount for the ACP bonus? What has been the ``take rate''
for these increased bonuses? With the increases to the special pays, is
pilot retention still critical?
Answer. The Air Force is offering $22,000 maximum bonus per year
(versus $25,000) to restore the original value of the bonus. In fiscal
year 1989, the original pilot bonus paid $12,000 for seven years, or
$84,000. In fiscal year 1997 dollars, the original $84,000 is worth
$110,000. Because of a two-year increase in the active duty service
commitment for pilot training, today pilots are eligible for the bonus
for only five years. By increasing the bonus to $22,000 for five years
(or $110,000) we restored the original value and intent of the program.
The fiscal year 1998 ACP take-rate is currently 42 percent. The
long-term (five-year) ACP take-rate is currently 26 percent (88 of
335), while the short-term (one-, two- or three-year) ACP take-rate is
currently 16 percent (52 of 335). The legislative provision to
grandfather fiscal year 1997 ACP eligible pilots made a significant
impact on AF pilot retention. We had 38 pilots, who declined ACP in
fiscal year 1997, accept the improved bonus in fiscal year 1998. To put
this in perspective, 38 pilots is enough to man an entire fighter
squadron. It is too early to tell if the increase in ACP will have a
significant impact on the pilot force. As with last year, a large
portion (39 percent) of fiscal year 1998 eligible pilots become
eligible for the bonus in the last quarter of fiscal year 1998. We are
optimistic about the long-term retention effects of the bonus program.
Despite the increases to special pays, pilot retention is still a
major concern. As of the end of February 1998, approved pilot
separations have increased 85 percent when compared to the same time
period last year (880 in fiscal year 1998 vs. 475 in fiscal year 1997).
Approved pilot separations as of February 28, 1998 already exceed the
entire number of pilot separations in fiscal year 1997 (632). These
indicators coupled with a projection of a prolonged period of airline
hiring pose critical challenges for the Air Force in retaining its
pilots.
Our pilots are telling us that the increased TEMPO is the primary
reason why they are declining the pilot bonus and separating from the
Air Force. The next most cited responses are decreasing quality of life
and airline hiring. In response to these surveys and focus group
information, we implemented a gameplan designed to improve pilot
retention in April 1997. The gameplan is designed to reduce OPTEMPO,
improve quality of life, increase pilot production, reduce rated
requirements and restore compensation to original levels.
Question. The Committee understands that the Air Force Reserve has
expanded its mission to be included in the Undergraduate Pilot Training
(UPT) program. The active Air Force will employ full-time and part-time
Reservists as instructor pilots to offset a shortfall in active duty
instructors. Please explain why the Air Force has a shortage of
instructor pilots, and how the Reserves will be integrated into UPT
training.
Answer. Although the Air Force is experiencing an overall pilot
shortage (we are projecting a shortage of 835 pilots by September
1998), we have prioritized our pilot force to ensure that 100 percent
of our cockpits (including instructors) are manned. Filling all our
cockpits causes the shortages to be accepted in filling our pilot staff
requirements. To help ensure we continue to protect our combat
capability, we have embarked on a UPT Instructor Pilot program with the
Air Force Reserve that will allow 225 active duty pilots to return to
operational active duty flying units. Each active duty instructor pilot
will be replaced by either one Active Guard Reserve (AGR) technician,
or three Traditional Reservists (TR). Currently, we have Reserve
instructors training side-by-side with active duty Air Force
instructors at Columbus and Vance AFBs. These instructors provide the
same quality training as their active duty counterparts. The program
has proven very successful. By the end of fiscal year 2000, we will
have Air Force Reserve instructor pilots assigned to each of our
Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training (SUPT) bases and aircraft.
Personnel Tempo
Question. As the Air Force transitions from a forward-based force
to an air expeditionary force based in the United States, what are you
doing to maintain a balanced personnel tempo? How does the requirement
for frequent temporary duty assignments affect readiness and a service
member's quality of life?
Answer. The Air Force has already done much to address the
challenge of balancing TEMPO in the face of increasing demands for our
forces:
Tempo Initiatives
--Global Sourcing--spreads CINCs taskings across the Combat Air
Forces (e.g. PACOM unit may deploy to SWA to reduce OPTEMPO of ACC
units)
--Global Military Force Policy--establishes limits on tasking of
selected low density/high demand assets for contingency operations
(e.g. U-2, AWACS)
--Reduced Joint/Air Force Exercises
--Post Deployment stand downs (1 day ``down'' for each 7 days
deployed; up to 14 down days maximum)
--Eliminated Quality Air Force Assessments
--Reduced Operational Readiness Inspections (10% reduction in
fiscal year 1998; 30% in fiscal year 1999)
--Implemented temporary duty/deployment tracker
--Shortened the duration for aviation unit deployments from 90 to
45 days
--Funded 2 additional RC-135s
--Stood up Reserve Associate AWACS Squadron
--Heavy use of Guard and Reserve units in SWA and Bosnia operations
High TEMPO has a significant impact on readiness and Quality of
Life. For the past eight years our airmen have been deployed at a rate
unprecedented in our history. Many of our present forward contingency
bases began as bare base installations, where sustainment meant having
to bring from home most of the equipment and base support people.
Meanwhile, back at home base, our airmen who remain behind are working
longer and more intense hours to keep the base running to fill the void
left by those who are deployed. Every one of our stateside aviation
bases must still be guarded, aircraft still need to be flown and
maintained, our troops and families still need base support services,
and our people still need to train. Normal work stress becomes acute
across the force when the deployed mission includes the need to rotate
units, time and again, over an extended period.
Rotations for the Air Force are a double edged sword because of the
high readiness rates we are expected to maintain at both ends of the
deployment. Our high readiness requirements are what drive us to select
shorter rotations for tactical units. Tactical squadrons get their
SORTS readiness rating based on accomplishing a host of mission
training events that have proven to be very difficult, often
impossible, to accomplish in most contingency areas. So, we rotate
critical personnel (not necessarily equipment) rearward at shorter
intervals to reduce the accumulated training ``deficit'', before it
impacts C-ratings.
Today, the main aviation bases in the rear are spread so thin, that
despite airmen working harder and smarter, they have to work longer
hours and more days to keep aircraft flying. These long hours, while
gaining the wing a sortie the next day, do so at the cost of high
workloads and high frustration. That frustration migrates home at the
end of the day. Airmen and their families are telling us they are
getting tired of a way of life that cycles between 4-6 months per year
TDY, and 55 hour work weeks when they are back home. As more of our
experienced airmen and officers decide to leave us, it is left to our
inexperienced people to shoulder the load.
Privately, many of our Airmen might tell you they are becoming
professionally frustrated over the poor prognosis for a more managed
way of life for them and their families. Sound--but politically
unpopular--business and management steps can solve many of our
problems. Organizationally, we need to reduce our unneeded
infrastructure and consolidate our equipment and people into the right
number of locations from which to operate. The effort at home needs to
be better distributed so that when airmen rotate back from their TDYs,
they can slow down and still catch up on training, without having to
work weekends to do it.
Question. We continue to draw down personnel end strength and force
structure, but training, exercises, deployments and contingencies have
intensified. How many years has this high personnel tempo and
operations tempo been occurring? Would you say the main causes of high
deployment rates are the CINC demands in ongoing operations over other
everyday business?
Answer. Since 1986, the Air Force has downsized by nearly 40
percent, while military operations other than war have greatly
increased. Since 1989, the average number of personnel deployed daily
for contingencies and exercises has grown over fourfold from 3,400 to
14,600. CINC demands for contingency forces, considered necessary in
supporting our National Military Strategy, are unquestionably the
single biggest factor impacting deployment rates, and the demand for
aerospace forces is likely to remain high for the foreseeable future.
Question. Which aircraft systems have the highest demand, or are
always being requested by the CINCs? Does the high demand of these
types of aircraft cause the air crew to be away from their home station
more than the 120 day per year temporary duty (TDY) goal? Does this
vary by aircraft system? What actions have been implemented that
addresses post-deployment of personnel and aircraft unit rotations?
Answer. The following weapons systems experienced the highest
tasking rates between January 1 and December 31, 1997 in support on
ongoing contingency operations:
Percent of aircrews
Weapons system exceeding 120 days
U-2*.............................................................. 61
EC-130E*.......................................................... 46
MH-60*............................................................ 45
EF-111*........................................................... 45
MC-130P*.......................................................... 33
C-17.............................................................. 32
A-10*............................................................. 26
E-3 (AWACS)*...................................................... 24
MH-53*............................................................ 23
EA-6B * * *....................................................... 23
F-15E............................................................. 22
F-16 (HARM)....................................................... 20
HH-60*............................................................ 20
* Indicates CINC taskings restricted by Global Military Force Policy
(GMFP) Asset.
**Indicates Air Force Crewmembers assigned to Navy Asset.
The workload does vary by weapons system, and many of the systems
tasked in support of contingency operations receive focused management
attention under the Secretary of Defense's Global Military Force
Policy. Because of the additional stress incurred by many of our
aircrews and support personnel, the Air Force has introduced a number
of initiatives to provide a measure of relief for our people including:
Post Deployment Initiatives
Post deployment stand downs (1 day ``down'' for each 7
days deployed; up to 14 down days maximum)
Implemented temporary duty/deployment tracker
Reduced Joint/Air Force Exercises
Reduced Operational Readiness Inspections (10% reduction
in fiscal year 1998; 30% in fiscal year 1999)
Eliminated Quality Air Force Assessments
Aircraft Unit Rotation Initiatives
Global Sourcing--spreads CINCs taskings across the Combat
Air Forces
Global Military Force Policy--establishes limits on
tasking of selected low density/high demand assets for contingency
operations
Shortened deployments from 90 to 45 days duration for
aviation units worldwide
Increased use of Guard and Reserve units in all
contingency operations
Question. Explain how the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard
are helping to relieve perstempo/optempo of active duty forces.
Answer. Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve participation in
day-to-day Air Force activity has steadily increased since DESERT
STORM. Today, more than ever, the Air Force relies on its Total Force--
Active Duty, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve, working
together to meet today's peacekeeping, contingency and wartime
commitments. The Total Force was used extensively during 1997 as Air
National Guard and Air Force Reserve forces participated in every major
deployment and contingency tasking. This trend will continue as Guard
and Reserve forces play an increasing role in a variety of worldwide
operations.
Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve aircrew members serve an
average of 110 days a year in uniform. During 1997, an average of 6,000
Guard members and Reservists were deployed each month to support
exercises, contingencies, and military operations around the world. On
a volunteer basis, members of the Air Reserve Component around the
world. On a volunteer basis, member of the Air Reserve Component deploy
on a rotational schedule, helping to reduce active duty TEMPO without
jeopardizing their civilian employment.
In some cases, the Guard and Reserve are paired together to provide
extended support to the active force. An example of a joint Guard and
Reserve mission is the July 24 to October 25, 1997 deployment to
perform sustainment airlift from Ramstein Air Base, Germany, to the
forces in the Balkans. Other major efforts in 1997 included the
deployment of security forces to Saudi Arabia; the deployment of civil
engineers, firefighters, and Air National Guard air traffic controllers
to Taszar, Hungary, as part of Operation JOINT GUARD; the use of KC-
135s to refuel fighter aircraft enforcing the no-fly zone over Bosnia;
and the employment of F-15s and F-16s to enforce the no-fly zone over
Northern Iraq, as well as the use of rescue crews to provide combat
rescue support for those forces. The Air National Guard and Air Force
Reserve also participated in over 60 exercises worldwide.
Joint Stars Shortfalls
Question. The Air Force budget last year anticipated a total Joint
STARS buy of 19 aircraft. Subsequent to the submission of the budget,
the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) included a recommendation to
reduce the United States procurement objective for Joint STARS from 19
to 13 aircraft based, in part, on a proposal for NATO to buy 6
aircraft. Last fall, NATO rejected this proposal. Nevertheless, the Air
Force budget this year does not include the funds necessary to procure
beyond 13 aircraft nor the funds to shutdown the Joint STARS production
line. General Ryan, in your opinion, how many aircraft are required to
perform the Joint STARS mission?
Answer. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)-validated
Joint STARS fleet is 19 aircraft. The DOD is conducting reviews of
requirements and technical alternatives to form choices about the
overall architecture of airborne surveillance capabilities. The
Department will then evaluate Joint STARS along with other surveillance
systems and approaches to ensure dominant awareness of the battlefield.
The review will be completed by mid-summer.
Question. What are the operational and logistics implications of an
inventory of only 13 Joint STARS aircraft?
Answer. There are two operational implications of only 13 aircraft:
would only be able to cover two Major Theater War (MTW) requirement
with one 24-hour orbit vice two. That could increase the risk in a 2
MTW scenario; and the CINC's availability for joint training and
contingency support is reduced. The requirement for training aircraft
in depot maintenance and modifications has a greater relative impact on
operational aircraft availability with a smaller fleet size.
Question. The Joint STARS budget as presented to Congress is
``broken'' since it neither funds the $55-$110 million required for
fiscal year 1999 advanced procurement for continued production nor the
$40 million in fiscal year 1999 required for shutdown. Mr. Peters, what
would you like Congress to do with respect to funding the fiscal year
1999 JSTARS program?
Answer. The Air Force supports the President's Budget as submitted.
The Department will respond to Congress with a plan on how to provide
additional ground surveillance capability.
Question. The fiscal year 1999 request for Joint STARS research and
development includes $40 million for a Radar Technology Improvement
Program. Is this program fully funded in fiscal year 2000 and out? If
not, what is the funding required versus the funding budgeted, by year,
for fiscal year 2000 and out?
Answer. The Fiscal Year 1999 PB initiates the Radar Technology
Insertion Program (RTIP) and delivers a RTIP modified test aircraft in
the fourth quarter of Fiscal Year 2006. This profile is executable as
funded in the Fiscal Year 1999 PB.
F-22 Aircraft Problems
Question. Last year, first flight for the F-22 was projected to
occur in May 1997. Instead, mechanical issues with the fuel tank,
auxiliary power unit, and engine delayed the flight until September.
Recently, production of F-22 research and development aircraft has been
delayed by 4-5 months based on manufacturing problems. General Ryan,
please explain the nature of these manufacturing problems.
Answer. The F-22 first flight occurred within the window (May 1997-
Nov 1997) established by the Acquisition Program Baseline. Thus, the
mechanical issues you mentioned did not create any adverse costs or
schedule impacts to the program.
There were two manufacturing problems that caused the F-22 test
aircraft delays: (1) excessive shell inclusions and shrink voids in the
wing side-of-body castings and (2) excessive time required for the aft
fuselage boom welding process.
(1) Shell inclusions are produced when portions of the ceramic mold
break off into the casting. An excessive number of shell inclusions in
the F-22 wing side-of-body castings could have weakened the metal
structure. We solved this problem by increasing the strength and
durability of the ceramic molds. This decreased the size and quantity
of shell inclusions to an acceptable level.
Shrink voids, or air pockets, are created when there is an
inadequate flow of liquid metal into the mold during the solidification
process. We solved the shrink-void problem by redesigning the mechanism
which feeds liquid metal into the casting mold. To date, this solution
has resulted in 15 shrink-free castings.
(2) Excessive time was required for touch labor to adjust and shim
the aft fuselage boom parts in preparation for electronic beam welding.
Minor design revisions were implemented to simplify the welding
process, which decreased the time required to an acceptable level.
The net effect of these two problems has been a delay in the
delivery of test aircraft 3999 (static article) by 4.6 months; aircraft
4000 (fatigue article) by 4.7 months; aircraft 4003 by 5.3 months;
aircraft 4004 by 5.5 months; aircraft 4005 by 2.7 months; and aircraft
4006 by 0.4 months. Aircraft 4007, 4008, and 4009 deliveries are not
affected by the manufacturing issues. We are replanning final assembly
flow for these test aircraft and will have detailed EMD schedule
recovery plan in place by May 1998. There will be no impact to the
IOT&E schedule and no delays in production schedule.
Question. The Committee understands there have also been delays in
software development. How long are the delays and what caused them?
Answer. Both the communications/navigation/identification (CNI) and
common integrated processor (CIP) teams suffered from the loss of
qualified software engineers. The CNI and CIP software are elements of
Block 1 software. Lower than expected productivity due to manning
shortages caused a three week delay in scheduled CNI software
deliveries to the Avionics Integration Lab (AIL) and delivery of CIP
software for Version 1.1 to the AIL was 2.5 months late. The AIL is
continuing integration efforts using an engineering version (EV) of
software instead of a fully-qualified version, which has reduced the
delay to 1.5 months. Currently, Block 1 software development has 0.5 of
a 3 month schedule reserve remaining and overall F-22 software
development is still on schedule.
Question. How will these delays impact the F-22 test schedule?
Answer. There is no impact to the start of Dedicated Independent
Operational Test Evaluation, IOT&E. Both the communications/navigation/
identification and common integrated processor teams have hired back
personnel to cover their earlier losses, and schedule reserve is just
one of the tools the team will [continue to] use to deal with unknown
risks. The avionics suite is on track to support flight test of
aircraft 4004, the first full-up avionics and low observable test
aircraft.
Question. Despite these delays, the fiscal year 1999 President's
Budget proposes to award the first F-22 production contract 7 months
earlier than planned in the budget last year. Given manufacturing
problems and testing delays experienced in the program since last year,
is it wise to accelerate production? Are we in too much of a hurry to
commit the government to production before more of the ``bugs'' have
been worked out of the aircraft?
Answer. In reality, production is not being accelerated. The timing
of the award of the advanced buy contract for Lot 1 remains the same--
June 98. The scheduled deliveries of the Lot 1 aircraft remain the
same. These Lot 1 aircraft will be utilized in the Dedicated IOT&E
program. The only date that is changing is the full contract award for
the Lot 1 aircraft (now Dec 98). Therefore, we do not see this as an
acceleration of the production program but rather a prudent acquisition
strategy.
The F-22 program was established utilizing an event-based
philosophy. Exit criteria to ensure the program does not proceed before
it is ready. The exit criteria for awarding the advance buy effort for
Lot 1 have been achieved. Again, we believe this is the appropriate
time to move into production.
The problems the program is currently experiencing are to be
expected for a complex weapon system during the development phase. The
program will work through these issues and make the improvements
necessary to mature the design that meets Air Combat Command
requirements.
Question. One of the biggest concerns currently for the B-2 is the
problem of low observable maintainability. What specifically is being
done on the F-22 program to avoid or mitigate these problems
experienced on older generation stealth aircraft?
Answer. The F-22 is a fourth generation Low Observable (LO)
aircraft, incorporating lessons learned from previous generation
stealth aircraft to enhance its LO maintainability. The F-22 program is
using gap treatment materials (instead of tape like the B-2) that are
qualified at all flight conditions and environments. Other improvements
include using J-seals that do not require LO restoration after opening
the most commonly accessed panels; and, Form-In-Place seals allow less
frequently accessed panels to be opened without removing the gap
material, thereby eliminating the need for LO restoration. Overall, 75
percent of all expected repairs on the F-22 can be accomplished without
the need for LO restoration.
Question. Given the challenge and expense the U.S. faces bringing
new fighters into production, how is it that our adversaries with much
less resources will be able to afford aircraft that can challenge our
current fighters? Please list the types and quantity of aircraft, by
country, projected to have parity or near parity with current U.S.
aircraft (with future upgrades) in fiscal year 2005, 2010, and 2020.
U.S. aircraft sold to foreign countries should be listed separately.
Answer. (U) Our potential adversaries will be better able to afford
fighters that challenge our F-15s and F-16s because in the first
quarter of the 21st century, many of the world's air forces will be
smaller than they are today, cutting their inventories of combat
aircraft by 20 to 30 percent. The savings from maintaining a
significantly smaller force will enable the next century's air forces
to buy modest numbers of technologically sophisticated combat aircraft
on the world market (e.g., multirole mission capability, extended
range, and enhanced numitions). The combination of these improved
aircraft, upgraded air-to-air weapons, and modern SAMs, will
significantly increase the threat posed by hostile integrated air
defense systems. ------.
Question. The Committee understands that the F-22 budget might be
underfunded in fiscal year 2000 and out based on the quantities
currently projected. What is the amount required versus the amount
budgeted for fiscal year 2000 and out, by year (then year dollars) for
the F-22 program? Is there a shortfall in fiscal year 1999?
Answer. The F-22 program has no shortfall in fiscal year 1999.
Program budgets are being worked in the corporate Air Force Program
Objectives Memorandum (POM) build, which is ongoing. The Air Force is
committed to the F-22 program and will fully fund that program
throughout the Future Years Defense Program, in accordance with
mandatory cost caps.
Question. Does the OSD CAIG agree with the Air Force estimates of
the projected savings from the cost reduction initiatives?
Answer. No. The Air Force estimate for F-22 Production costs is
$40.9 billion; the CAIG estimate is $49-53 billion. The CAIG and the
Air Force estimates have moved closer since last year. According to the
OSD CAIG, the following factors have contributed to the estimate
differences:
(1) The CAIG reviewed and individually evaluated all of the
approximately 200 airframe contractor Production Cost Reduction Plans
(PCRPs). The net effect of all of these assessments was for the CAIG to
recognize about 50 percent of the claimed PCRP savings as net savings
to their estimate.
(2) The CAIG decided to reduce the engine contractor's proposed
realization factor on many of the 900 engine PCRPs by one-half when
computing the net reduction to their estimate from this source.
(3) The CAIG separately identified the use of contractor logistics
support, multiyear procurement, and reductions in overhead from
anticipated Joint Strike Fighter procurement as contingent upon
government actions. If these government actions are implemented, the
CAIG estimate ($53.3 billion without actions) would decrease an
additional $3.8 billion to $49.5 billion.
Question. Has the Air Force decided on the exact initiatives to be
pursued? If so, please list these initiatives.
Answer. Production Cost Reduction Plans (PCRPs) are selected by the
contractor team due to their insight into cost, risk, and savings
opportunities. The Air Force estimates $15.20 billion of cost avoidance
from the following 14 categories:
Billions
Lockheed-Martin Boeing initiatives:
Producibility improvement projects (PIPs)..................... $2.50
Diminishing manufacturing sources (includes OPP).............. 1.75
Lean enterprise initiatives................................... 2.45
Material efficiencies......................................... 0.80
Performance based contracting--includes acquisition reform
initiatives................................................. 0.50
Product support--full contractor support includes warranty
elimination................................................. 2.65
Joint Strike Fighter--overhead rate adjustments due to
business base increase...................................... 0.50
Multiyear procurement (for Lots 6 through 13)................. 1.25
______
Lockheed-Martin/Boeing subtotal............................. 12.40
=================================================================
________________________________________________
Pratt & Whitney initiatives:
Multiyear procurement......................................... 0.36
Warranty elimination.......................................... 0.19
Producibility improvement projects (PIPs)..................... 1.75
Flexible sustainment--subset of contractor logistics support.. 0.20
Diminishing manufacturing sources (includes OPP).............. 0.02
Rate/quantity improvements/other misc. initiatives............ 0.28
______
Pratt & Whitney subtotal.................................... 2.80
=================================================================
________________________________________________
Total estimated savings--F-22 team (as of February 1998).... 15.20
production cost reduction plans (pcrps) initiative definitions
DMS--Diminishing manufacturing sources
The DMS PCRP initiative (currently related only to electronic
components) uses a combination of parts buy-out and redesign strategies
to protect production schedules. Opportunities for improvement in cost,
performance, reliability, supportability, and weight are optimized
within the limits of available funding. While many DMS projects do not
necessarily provide net cost savings, the aggregate DMS initiatives do
provide net cost savings.
DMS projects are aimed at components that are, or will be,
unavailable in the quantities and at the times needed to support
aircraft production schedules. Diminishing sources are the result of
market forces, technological innovation and other economic factors
which motivate suppliers to end production on certain components or
product lines.
Lean enterprise
Combination of Lean Management and Lead Production principles
applied to a company or group of companies:
--Lean Management: Application of lean principles to activities
other than those on the factory floor which cause companies to become
more efficient, and which result in reduced cost.
--Lean Production: Application of lean principles to activities on
the factory floor which cause companies to become more efficient, and
which result in reduced cost.
Material efficiency
Cost reduction activities applied to procurement of raw material/
purchased parts, including but not limited to changes in make/buy
decisions, effective application of group buys, and use of preferred
supplies.
Performance based contracting
Utilization of acquisition reform concepts to reduce cost through
streamlining contract basis and requirements between SPO/contractor and
contractor/supplier.
PIP--Producibility Improvement Program
Projects which reduce cost through product redesign/manufacturing
process changes. Initial investments are required in order to implement
these projects.
The contractor team has committed $107M to initiate the investment
process. Projects funded with this initial investment are accounted for
within Affordability Analysis 97/98.
Product support
Savings opportunities reflecting a revised support concept
including:
--Avoidance of duplicative government/contractor resources by
utilizing contractor support and available contractor manufacturing
assets for depot support.
--Reduction in support equipment quantity due to reduction in
aircraft quantity.
--Deletion of contract warranty provisions.
--Reduction in number of initial spares procured.
Multiyear buy
Reduction in overall acquisition cost by committing the Government
to buy more than one (up to five) fiscal years of production
requirements with a single contract award in lieu of annual buys.
Currently applies to Lots 6-10 and Lots 11-13.
JSF (Joint Strike Fighter) rate
The benefit realized by the F-22 program as a result of the
reduction in contractor overhead costs resulting from the increase in
business base generated by concurrent development and production of JSF
with F-22 production.
Since both JSF competitors are F-22 team members, savings will be
realized regardless of the contractor selected for JSF.
Question. What is the Air Force's current projection of savings
from these initiatives and what will be the resulting total production
cost?
Answer. The Air Force estimates $15.20 billion of cost avoidance
from 14 categories of the Production Cost Reduction Plans (PCRPs). We
are the process of adjusting the production cap for the new inflation
values directed by OSD. The fiscal year 1998 National Defense
Authorization Act provided limitations on the total amount that could
be obligated or expended for the F-22 program. For engineering and
manufacturing development (EMD), the limit is $18.688 billion; for
production the limit is $43.4 billion. The Act further directs the
Secretary of the Air Force to adjust these limitations to reflect
increases or decreases attributable to compliance with federal, state,
or local laws enacted after September 30, 1997. The Air Force estimates
production costs to remain within the congressionally mandated cost
cap. We will notify you when the new cap number becomes available.
Question. Are all the initiatives fully funded?
Answer. Yes. The Production Cost Reduction Plans are now part of
the baseline program and will be negotiated into the production
contracts beginning with Lots 1-2.
Airborne Laser Program
Question. BMDO is charged with the responsibility within DOD for
setting priorities for Ballistic Missile Defense. Last year, General
Lyles, the head of BMDO, provided testimony to this Committee
indicating that even if the Air Force had not funded the Airborne Laser
program and even if BMDO received additional funding, that his
priorities for the additional funds would be first to reduce the risk
of his core programs rather than fund an aggressive Airborne Laser
program. In fact, BMDO would not fund an aggressive ABL program until
the PAC-3, Navy Area, THADD, and Navy Theater Wide programs were well
into production. General Ryan, would you agree that we should optimize
the limited DOD resources that can be applied to ballistic missile
defense?
Answer. Yes, it is critically important that we optimize our
limited resources as we pursue Department of Defense (and Service)
requirements. As stewards of the Air Force budget and as taxpayers, we
are constantly assessing our requirements and making the tough
prioritization decisions in order to meet validated needs with limited
available resources.
That said, it is important to clarify that the Air Force and BMDO
both recognize the importance of pursuing the ABL program. The
Director, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, testified to the
National Security Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee on
March 4, 1998, that ABL is needed as part of the Ballistic Missile
Defense Architecture. It remains DoD's only boost phase intercept
system and makes a vital contribution to the family of systems approach
to meet theater ballistic missile defense requirements.
Question. Do you believe that BMDO is in a reasonable position to
determine overall priorities for ballistic missile defense?
Answer. No. Prioritization of ballistic missile defense is the
responsibility of the Department of Defense, based upon validated
requirements as specified by service warfighters, reviewed and endorsed
by the Services, and approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council (JROC). BMDO's responsibility is to create and maintain the
Ballistic Missile Defense architecture and ensure that weapon systems
are fully integrated into the family of systems. While BMDO has a key
input, the JROC determines the overall priorities.
Question. General Ryan, how much does the Air Force plan to spend,
including R&D and procurement, on the Airborne Laser Program? What
quantity of aircraft will be procured?
Answer. The Air Force plans to spend a total of $11.1 billion for
the Airborne Laser program ($2.5 billion research and development, $3.7
billion procurement, $4.9 billion for 20 years operation and support).
A total of 7 aircraft will be procured. Initial Operational Capability
(IOC) is scheduled to occur in fiscal year 2006 with three operational
aircraft. Full Operational Capability (FOC) is scheduled to occur in
fiscal year 2008 with all seven aircraft operational.
[In billions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amount Qty
------------------------------------------------------------------------
R&D................................................. $2.5 2
Procurement......................................... 3.7 5
Operations & Support................................ 4.9 ........
-------------------
Total program................................... 11.1 7
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. Do you believe that BMDO is inappropriately biased
against the Airborne Laser Program?
Answer. No, the Director, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization,
has long been a strong Airborne Laser (ABL) supporter. In a March 4,
1998 letter to Mr. Young, Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security,
Committee on Appropriations, he stated:
``. . . . The ABL fits into the TAMD Family of Systems as it will
provide the only boost phase theater ballistic missile defense
capability in the FoS Architecture. . . . TAMD Family of Systems (FoS)
analysis indicates that ABL increases the number of TBMs killed in both
North East Asia and South West Asia scenarios, in both the near and far
term. . . . I must reiterate that a high funding priority must continue
to be placed on producing and fielding PATRIOT PAC-3, THAAD, Navy Area,
and Navy Theater Wide programs as well as our only boost phase kill
capability, the ABL. . . . I strongly support continued development and
risk reduction for the ABL at its current level.''
In addition, during his testimony before the House Subcommittee on
National Security, Committee on Appropriations on March 4, 1998, the
Director highlighted these same themes and expressed his strong support
for the ABL program and its integral role within the TMD Family of
Systems as the sole boost phase system.
Question. Currently, the sole mission for the Airborne Laser is
ballistic missile defense with adjunct missions being ``studied.'' What
is the status of these studies and when might other missions be
incorporated as validated requirements for the weapon system?
Answer. The adjunct mission studies are being conducted in three
phases. A preliminary look completed in fiscal year 1997, revealed
potentially four adjunct missions--cruise missile defense, imaging
surveillance (using ABL's optical system to image objects on the
ground), protection of high value airborne assets (self-protection and
protection of other HVAAs using the high energy laser), and suppression
of enemy air defenses (using the high energy laser to kill enemy air
defense components on the ground). As the TMD Family of Systems
architect, BMDO has identified and funded an ABL adjust mission study
dealing with post boost tracking of TBMs utilizing ABL's active
surveillance sensor.
In fiscal year 1998 and fiscal year 1999 an ACC cost/requirements
analysis will determine which adjunct mission requirements will be
submitted to the Joint Requirement Oversight Council (JROC) for
validation. If any new requirements are validated, funds will be
programmed for the fiscal year 2001 POM. There is currently no
requirement for adjunct mission capability in the Program Definition
and Risk Reduction (PDRR) phase.
Question. Is the Airborne Laser program the only platform
anticipated for these mission areas? If not, what are the other
platforms for these other mission areas?
Answer. No. The Airborne Laser (ABL) will be part of a system of
systems required to achieve success in both its primary and adjunct
missions. Contributing to the ABL capability will be space, air, and
ground based systems which provide intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance of the battle field, as well as a robust command and
control system. Examples of these systems are the U-2, JSTARS, AWACS,
UAVs, and intelligence and communications satellites. ABL is joined in
the attack phase by our fighter and bomber forces (some performing
attack operations against ballistic and cruise missile forces). ABL is
also one of the layers of ballistic missile defenses that include upper
tier and terminal engagement systems.
Passenger Safety
Question. Please update the Committee on the status of the Air
Force's efforts to install safety devices on its aircraft.
Answer. The tragic April 1996 CT-43 accident with Commerce
Secretary Brown on board led to SECDEF's direction to expedite Air
Force efforts to minimize controlled-flight-into-terrain (CFIT)
mishaps. The Air Force incorporated those CFIT-prevention initiatives
into a comprehensive Navigation and Safety Program that includes Global
Positioning System (GPS), Cockpit Voice and Flight Data Recorders
(CVRs/FDRs), Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS), Emergency Locator
Transmitters (ELTs), and Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System
(TCAS). The Safety portion of the program encompasses GPWS (including
Enhanced GPWS-EGPWS), TCAS, ELTs, CVRs, and FDRs. Navigation and Safety
Program implementation plan funding exceeds $1 billion. The fiscal year
1999 Presidents Budget funding for two very important systems--EGPWS
and TCAS--is approximately $450 million for the period fiscal year
1999-fiscal year 2003.
Question. Please provide a matrix describing which aircraft are
getting which upgrades.
Answer.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aircraft GPWS/GCAS EGPWS TCAS ELT FDR CVR
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C-5......................... C P P C C C
C-9......................... C P S/U C C C
C-12........................ C P P C P P
C-17........................ C P P C C C
C-20........................ C P P C C C
C-21........................ C P P C C C
C-22*....................... C U/U U/U C C C
C-26*....................... C U/U C C C C
C-27*....................... C U/U U/U C C C
C-32........................ -- C C C C C
C-37........................ -- C C C C C
C/T-43...................... C S/U S/U C P P
C-130....................... P S/U S/U C C C
C/KC-135.................... -- P P P P P
C-137*...................... C U/U S/U C C C
C-141....................... C P S/U C C C
VC-25....................... C U/U \1\ C C C C
KC-10....................... C P S/U C C C
E-4......................... C P P C C C
H-1......................... n/a n/a P P P P
H-60........................ n/a n/a U/U C S/U S/U
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Legend: C=Complete P=Programmed (Funded) S/U=Scheduled/Underfunded U/U=Unscheduled/Unfunded n/a=not applicable
(Helos have GCAS-like system)
Notes: EGPWS=Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System; GCAS=Ground Collision Avoidance System; TCAS=Traffic
Alert and Collision Avoidance System; ELT=Emergency Locator Transmitter; CVR=Cockpit Voice Recorder;
FDR=Flight Data Recorder.
AA*=Pending retirement. 1=Aggressively working to establish Congressional ``New Start'' to equip VC-25 with
EGPWS.
Question. Is it correct that Traffic Collision Avoidance systems
(TCAS) are currently not configured for use on tactical aircraft that
fly in formation? Where does the Air Force stand on integrating TCAS on
tactical aircraft?
Answer. The Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) is
installed or planned for installation on all passenger/cargo-carrying
aircraft (e.g., C-130, C-17) that can perform tactical missions and may
fly in formation. As long as each aircraft has an operating TCAS and
IFF transponder, traffic alert and collision avoidance information is
available to the aircrews. The Air Force plans to install Enhanced TCAS
(ETCAS) on some aircraft; ETCAS will facilitate extended formation
flying (e.g., formations of greater than one mile separation between
aircraft).
For non-passenger carrying aircraft performing tactical training,
including associated formation flying, TCAS would provide marginal
collision-avoidance benefits, if any. Also, the majority of aircraft
conducting tactical operations have radars and other avionics that
enhance collision avoidance. Thus, TCAS would have limited utility on
tactical aircraft, especially fighters. The Air Force will continue to
review the applicability of TCAS to tactical aircraft as the
international air traffic control and management system evolves over
the next few years.
C-130 Requirements
Question. The Committee understands that the Air Mobility Command
(AMC) has reviewed the problem of C-130 configuration management and is
currently recommending retiring 150 of the oldest C-130s and procuring
150 new C-130Js. AMC is also recommending bringing the remaining C-130s
to a common configuration. General Ryan, is this accurate? If so, what
is the corporate Air Force view of this AMC proposal?
Answer. Air Mobility Command has recommended the retiring of 150 of
the oldest C-130s and procurement of 150 new C-130J-30s. In addition,
modernization of the remaining C-130s to a common configuration with
state-of-the-art avionics was also proposed. The corporate Air Force is
reviewing C-130 modernization proposals and balancing these
recommendations with other competing Air Force requirements.
Question. Do you anticipate budgeting for a more robust C-130J
program in the future?
Answer. The C-130J is being actively considered as a C-130 fleet
modernization option.
Aircraft Accidents
Question. Over the course of the last twelve months, 27 Air Force
active, reserve, and National Guard aircraft have experienced Class A
mishaps. These are mishaps that result in fatality, a destroyed
aircraft, or more than $1 million of damage to an aircraft. General
Ryan, one of these mishaps involved an F-117 flying last September in
Maryland. What was the cause of this accident and are any modifications
required to other F-117 to address the problem?
Answer. According to the Aircraft Investigation Report, the cause
of this F-117 mishap was a structural failure of left wing support
brackets that attach the Brooklyn Bridge assembly to the ribs on either
side of a bay in the left wing. This was due to four missing fasteners.
The failure of the assembly allowed for excess movement of the left
outboard elevon, which began to oscillate until the left wing failed
approximately 2.5 feet inboard of the elevon.
The aircraft went through a phase inspection at Holloman, AFB, New
Mexico, in January 1996 where the Brooklyn Bridge assembly was removed
and reworked. When the assembly was reinstalled, four fasteners were
inadvertently left off by maintenance technicians. The remaining
fastener was not sufficient to hold the assembly.
The accident was caused by the unintentional maintenance oversight
during the left Brooklyn Bridge assembly reinstallation in January
1996. This oversight was exacerbated by USAF structural maintenance
technicians not having approved technical order guidance to complete
reinstallation, requiring them to rely on engineering support
personnel. This deficiency of technical orders has been corrected. No
modifications to the aircraft are required to address the problem.
Question. Two B-1 bombers crashed this year, one just a few weeks
ago in Kentucky. General, can you describe the circumstances of these
two mishaps and any implications there might be for the rest of the B-1
fleet?
Answer. On September 19, 1997, a B-1B crashed near Alzada, Montana,
killing all four crewmembers. According to the aircraft accident
investigation report, the aircraft began a planned high-speed threat
avoidance maneuver. The technique used was neither regularly practiced
nor taught by either of the two mishap pilots. The pilot flying the
aircraft placed the aircraft into an unfamiliar and ultimately an
unrecoverable flight regime resulting in a crash.
A B-1B crashed on February 18, 1998 near Mattoon, Kentucky. As the
mishap investigation is on-going, it is premature to discuss the mishap
sequence at this time.
Air Combat Command has conducted a Conventional Bomber Training
Review to assess the adequacy and thoroughness of our bomber force
mission training. The review found the training programs were basically
sound for the entire bomber force. Suggested improvements to enhance
the training have either been or are being incorporated.
Question. Of the 27 Class A mishaps over the last twelve months, 10
involved the F-16. About half of these involved engine failures and the
other half involved midair collisions. General, is there a trend here
with respect to F-16 mishaps? Is the Air Force studying this problem?
Answer. Between March 1, 1997 and March 1, 1998, the Air Force did
experience ten Class A Mishaps in the F-16. Four of those were midair
collisions, four were engine related malfunctions, one a ``G'' Induced
Loss of Consciousness, and one an out of control situation from which
the pilot was unable to recover.
It is unusual to have midair collisions in such a short time, but
there is no trend here. Each of the four occurred in a different phase
of flight and the accident board conclusions regarding the causes of
the mishaps were very different.
We are not conducting a special study of midair collisions, since
there is no common thread in these events. We do, however, train
vigorously in trying to prevent them. First, a pilot is taught from day
one that a comprehensive mission briefing, which emphasizes the roles
and responsibilities of each flight member during phases of flight, is
essential. Second, all pilots are required to adhere to ``training
rules'' designed to prevent midair collisions. Third, the flying
community emphasizes thorough debriefs where mistakes during a flight
are constructively criticized. This philosophy creates a more
proficient pilot and ensures that a midair mishap becomes less likely.
Midair awareness and prevention will always be a high interest item in
the USAF.
Specifically regarding the engines, two different companies
manufacture the six engines installed in the F-16. In the mishaps in
question, both manufacturers' engines where involved. However, there
was no common thread among them. Because the F-16 is a single engine
aircraft we are always very concerned when we have an engine
malfunction. Air Force experts work very closely with both
manufacturers to analyze trends and manage risk quickly. In these
particular malfunctions the Air Force has instituted short-term
solutions to minimize the possibility of a recurrence of the same
event. Long term solutions have been identified, are being implemented,
and will effectively eliminate the possibility of the same event
recurring.
T-3 Pilot Screener
Question. In fiscal year 1994, the Air Force began taking delivery
of the T-3 as a pilot screening aircraft. Since February 1995, there
have been three T-3 Class A mishaps with six fatalities at the Air
Force Academy. There have been 66 instances of engine stoppage
including nine in flight. General, how long has the T-3 been grounded
as a result of these mishaps?
Answer. On July 24, 1997 the Air Force suspended flight-screening
operations of the T-3A, and will not resume them until full confidence
in this aircraft and our training parameters is restored. In addition
to our suspension of flight-screening operations, the Secretary of the
Air Force recently asked the Air Force Inspector General to conduct a
Broad Area Review of the entire Enhanced Flight Screened Program (EFSP)
to reduce risks further. We expect this report to be completed by late
April 1998.
Question. What is the problem with the aircraft?
Answer. After careful analysis and testing, we believe most of the
uncommanded engine stoppages were caused by problems in the fuel
delivery system.
Question. Has the Air Force identified modifications that will
correct these problems? If so, what are they and how much will they
cost?
Answer. Yes, a series of ten modifications at a cost of $6.24
million for the entire 110 aircraft fleet was funded in December 1997.
We're confident these modifications will correct the fuel-system
anomalies that caused the uncommanded engine stoppages. The
modifications are:
Shorten and straighten fuel lines
Increase and standardize fuel line diameter
Relocate and increase diameter of fuel selector valve
Remove Automatic Moisture Control (AMC) from the system
(pilot will manually adjust)
Change fuel flow divider spring
Relocate fuel boost pump
Increase flop tube diameter
Increase engine accessory compartment cooling
Alter Ram-Air box geometry
Study to add engine stoppage (low Exhaust Gas Temperature)
audible warning
Question. When do you anticipate the T-3 will be returned to full
flight status?
Answer. We expect to resume Enhanced Flight Screening Program
(EFSP) operations in late August/early September 1998. Instructor pilot
requalifications should begin in late May/early June 1998.
Question. What has been the ``work around'' for not having these
pilot screening aircraft available? How has our pilot training been
impacted?
Answer. Students were granted waivers for entry into Specialized
Undergraduate Pilot Training (SUPT) without completion of Enhanced
Flight Screening Program (EFSP). It's too early to tell what the impact
will be on our pilot training, since the first unscreened students just
entered SUPT in September 1997. Anecdotal evidence from interviews
indicates that over two-thirds of those eliminated from SUPT would have
been identified during EFSP. We anticipate some increase in attrition.
Since we currently have no excess capacity in our pilot production,
this would lower the number of graduates, and cause us to fall short of
our pilot production goals.
Question. Are there any lessons learned from this experience with
the T-3?
Answer. The lessons we learned cover a broad spectrum from
acquisition and testing of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) items, to
training and procedures. We will incorporate lessons learned from the
T-3A acquisition into future COTS acquisitions. COTS strategies
streamline and compress the acquisition process; therefore, any
modifications to the off-the-shelf system must be thoroughly tested.
Additionally, the Air Force Inspection Agency (AFIA) is currently
conducting a specialized review (called Eagle Look) of the testing and
modification process. The acquisition of new equipment should go hand-
in-hand with the development of training procedures and a course
syllabus. We have thoroughly reviewed our Enhanced Flight Screening
Program (EFSP) training procedures and course syllabi, and are making
appropriate changes.
We are committed to providing a safe environment for all our
aviators. The Air Force has conducted several major studies, including
the SAF/IG and AETC Broad Area Review (BARs), and the AFIA's review of
Commercial and Non-Developmental Item (CaNDI) Aircraft Programs.
Numerous recommendations contained in these reports will be implemented
to continuously improve our acquisition, training, and flying
operations.
F-15 and F-16 Aircraft
Question. The baseline inventory requirements for both the F-15 and
F-16 were met several years ago, and in recent years, we have been
procuring aircraft to meet attrition reserve requirements. The budget
this year includes no funds for new production of either the F-15 or F-
16. General Ryan, have we met the inventory requirements, including
attrition reserve, for the F-15 and F-16? If not, what are the
shortfalls for each platform?
Answer. As you mentioned, we have met baseline inventory
requirements for both the F-15 and F-16. Additionally, the attrition
reserve fleets for the F-15C and F-15E are sufficient to meet
operational requirements throughout their programmed service lives.
However, based on our 20.21 Fighter Wing Equivalent, FWE, and given
historical attrition rates for the F-16, we will begin to experience an
F-16 attrition reserve shortfall beginning in fiscal year 2007. This
shortfall will grow to 25 aircraft by fiscal year 2010, when the Joint
Strike Fighter (JSF) reaches IOC.
Question. If there are shortfalls, what is the Air Force plan to
deal with these shortfalls?
Answer. The attrition reserve fleets for the F-15C and F-15E
aircraft are sufficient to meet operational requirements throughout
their programmed service lives.
Given our focus on readiness and modernization, we have chosen not
to purchase additional F-16 attrition reserve aircraft and we accept
the mid-term risk associated with this shortfall.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Question. General Ryan as you know, there currently are two high
altitude endurance UAVs under an Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration, ACTD, program, the Global Hawk and the DarkStar. There
has been some delay in schedule, however, I understand that Global Hawk
successfully flew this past weekend and the DarkStar is scheduled to
fly again the end of the month. I also understand that the cost per
vehicle is estimated to be considerably higher than the original
requirement of $10 million for vehicles 11 through 20. I realize that
these UAVs are currently under DARPA program management. But if they
successfully pass military utility assessment, the Air Force will take
over. From what you know of the current configuration and capabilities
that are being developed, how confident are you that these UAV systems
will meet military utility and suitability?
Answer. The Air Force believes both Global Hawk and DarkStar could
offer significant military utility. Global Hawk may provide significant
improvements in range and endurance. DarkStar may provide on-demand
imagery coverage in denied airspace. Neither system has completed the
flight test nor demonstration phases of their ACTD. It is premature to
estimate either system's utility or suitability until the ACTD is
complete and the JROC has compared the results to the operational
requirements document being written by Air Combat Command.
Question. The current estimate per vehicle for the Global Hawk is
now approaching $13.6 million and for the DarkStar almost $12 million.
Has the Air Force planned for these increases in costs?
Answer. The Air Force has made the post-ACTD funding of Global Hawk
and DarkStar an issue in the fiscal year 2000 Program Objectives
Memorandum. We will determine the appropriate level of funding for
post-ACTD activity at that time. Our options account for variations in
the unit flyaway price based on possible outcomes of the ACTD process.
Question. It is envisioned that the Global Hawk is the ``follow-
on'' platform for the U-2. I understand that you are looking at an
option to reopen the production line for the U-2. Is that correct? If
yes, why?
Answer. Currently, there are no plans to re-open the U-2 production
line. The Global Hawk is one of two complementary air vehicles being
developed, along with a Common Ground Segment, in the High Altitude
Endurance (HAE) Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Advanced Concept
Technology Demonstration (ACTD). The Global Hawk is envisioned to be a
long-dwell, stand-off collection platform similar to the U-2. The
Global Hawk had its first flight on February 28, 1998, and has entered
the airworthiness part of Phase II, System Test, of the ACTD.
If the HAE UAV ACTD is successful and a decision is made to acquire
and operate Global Hawks, the Global Hawk will initially augment the U-
2. The current ACTD version of the Global Hawk will carry EO/IR and SAR
sensors, but cannot fully replicate U-2 collection capabilities.
Decisions to phase out the U-2 and replace it with the Global Hawk will
not occur until the Global Hawk has been proven affordable, capable,
cost-effective, and reliable.,
The High Altitude Endurance UAV ACTD was initiated to alleviate our
shortfall in imagery intelligence. If the ACTD is unsuccessful, one of
the options that may be considered to achieve the required capability
is to acquire additional U-2s.
National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC)
Question. The National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC) program
consists of four Boeing 747 aircraft outfitted to carry a battlestaff
with the mission to mirror the capabilities of the Pentagon's National
Military Command Center (NMCC) during a nuclear war. The aircraft has
recently been designated for other missions including Secretary of
Defense transport and mobile command and control element for the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). General Ryan, do you
believe that the NAOC mission area will be with us for a long time? Why
or why not?
Answer. Yes, I believe the NAOC mission will be with us for the
foreseeable future. As long as our nation faces the threat of weapons
of mass destruction, we will need the survivable means to control our
forces only NAOC can provide--there simply is no substitute. DoD-wide,
we've already reduced the Strategic Military Command Center
architecture from its Cold War level of 59 airborne platforms to 20,
and although we consider this 66 percent reduction appropriate, what
remains, to include four NAOC aircraft, must be robust, capable and
viable with a fully combat-ready crew force. In peacetime, the NAOC's
considerable capabilities provide flexible and needed communications to
the National Command Authorities, and to the Federal Emergency
Management Agency during national emergency operations.
NAOC's force structure and missions are legitimate, validated and
necessary. NAOC will be around for a long time, and its modernization
should be vigorously supported.
Question. The switching system and multiplexers are at the heart of
the NAOC system. However, these components date to the 1960s and have
long since become obsolete. Currently, the switching circuit cards are
literally held in place by string. Replacement parts are not available
in the supply system and must be salvaged from the Air Force museum at
Wright Patterson Air Force Base. Given the many nuclear command and
control upgrades funded over the last decade, why have these aircraft
been so neglected? What is being done to rectify this situation?
Answer. First, let me assure you that the most vital NAOC systems,
while based on outdated technologies, can accomplish their most
critical tasks today. This is due in large measure to the dedication
and resourcefulness of the joint aircrew and staff assigned to perform
the NAOC mission.
As you correctly noted, past circumstances have occasionally
required somewhat ``unconventional'' methods of inflight
troubleshooting and repair of systems throughout the aircraft.
Unfortunately, this is a trend which is becoming increasingly more
frequent. For this reason, we are fully behind plans to modernize all
four NAOC aircraft and take advantage of tremendous advances in
communications and information processing technologies. We agree that
these upgrade efforts are long overdue.
That being said, many factors contributed to past underfunding--but
not neglect--of the NAOC fleet. Severe reductions in post Cold-War
defense spending forced us, and, in fact, all of DoD, to make tough
decisions on where to cut force structure, organizations and programs.
At the same time, perceptions of reduced nuclear threats shifted its
operational focus from strategic to conventional. As a result, funds
were made available for only the most critical upgrades to the NAOC
fleet, such as the recently completed MILSTAR modification. Another 30
or so key improvements have also been completed since 1979.
This past year, at the request of the Secretary of Defense, an Air
Force-led joint integrated process team developed a comprehensive
Roadmap to modernize the NAOC fleet. DoD then endorsed and budgeted
funds to support our plan, with a total cost estimated at $198 million
through fiscal year 2006. We ask for your support in funding the
initiation of these planned modernization efforts in the fiscal year
1999 President's Budget.
Question. The NAOC is extremely survivable once airborne. However
while sitting on ground alert, the aircraft is vulnerable to sabotage
and attack. Do you believe the Air Force has taken all the necessary
steps to ensure the safety of the aircraft and crew while on alert?
Answer. Yes. Adequate physical security measures are being employed
based on known and postulated threats. The NAOC alert aircraft and
crews are afforded priority protection to produce a safe and secure
operating environment, ensuring they are capable of meeting operational
requirements. Long term protection enhancement measures designed to
prevent potential vulnerabilities are constantly being evaluated and
improvements undertaken as warranted. An example of this is the
relocation of Wright Patterson AFB alert crew billets to house crew
members in a more secure and controlled location inside the alert area
and provide better access to aircraft. This project is planned to be
completed this fiscal year.
Question. How does the physical protection of NAOC compare to other
elements of the nation's nuclear infrastructure (weapons and command
and control elements)? How does the importance of NAOC compare to these
other elements of the nation's nuclear infrastructure?
Answer. The NAOC provides National Command Authorities (NCA) with
survivable airborne command and control throughout the full spectrum of
nuclear operations. It receives the same stringent force protection
measures (top priority) afforded all critical nuclear related resources
entrusted to AF control. Dedicated response forces are assigned, and
electromechanical intrusion detection and surveillance devices are
employed. Significant emphasis is placed on this C2 asset due the vital
role it plays in the execution of our national defense capabilities.
Cooperative Engagement Capability
Question. The nation has spent over $1.2 billion to develop the
Navy's Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), which is a network that
allows sharing of precise radar information between aircraft, ships,
missiles, and sensors. Since the network is only as good as the sensors
in it, AWACS must eventually be a key player in the CEC system if
theater CINCs are to be supported by interoperable forces. Former
Defense Secretary Perry called CEC ``the most significant technological
development since stealth.'' What is the Air Force doing to get ``the
most significant technological development since stealth'' onto Air
Force AWACs aircraft?
Answer. Last year the Air Force assessed the results of both the
Mountain Top exercise and the final results of the Joint Engagement
Technology Study (JETS). The Mountain Top exercise validated the
integration of CEC and the Joint Tactical Information Distribution
System (JTIDS), and the ability of the AWACS to act as an airborne
relay of CEC data utilizing JTIDS.
The JETS study results were limited to qualitative assessments
only. Operators perceived an increased situational awareness through
tracking continuity and improved timeliness of tactical information.
While CEC does not possess an organic aircraft identification
capability, once identification through other sensors was accomplished,
track identification maintenance was improved. As in the Mountain Top
scenario, netting sensors via CEC increased the battle space and
facilitated battle management decisions.
While these two studies provided a broadbrush assessment of placing
CEC on AWACS, neither produced quantifiable, objective results. In both
studies design limitations on sensor placement, sample size and lack of
statistically significant data collection limited the utility of the
results. Compounding the problem was the absence of a clearly defined
Navy, Air Force or joint concept of operations for CEC employment.
The Air Force, in conjunction with the Joint Theater Air Missile
Defense Organization (JTAMDO), has initiated a comprehensive four phase
study to determine the utility of CEC on AWACS. Phase 1, the
technological analysis, initiated in March 1998, will compare the All
Services Combat Identification Evaluation Team (ASCIET) baseline Link
16 picture against what CEC could have provided (accomplished via
modeling and simulation). The technological study will then take the
next step and compare those results against a projected `improved'
(2010 capability) Link 16 picture. Phase 1 is expected to last 3
months. Phase 2, an operational utility analysis, will compare the
value added benefit to the operator of a baseline/modified Link 16
picture versus a CEC picture. The operational utility assessment will
immediately follow the technological analysis; expected duration is 4
months. Phase 3, the electromagnetic study, will determine if CEC
interferes with any other sensor on board the AWACS. Phase 4, the CEC
employment study, will establish how CEC can be integrated into the
AWACS concept of operations. The electromagnetic and employment concept
studies will run concurrently. They are expected to commence in
September 1998, lasting approximately 6-9 months. Once these studies
are completed the Air Force will evaluate the results to determine
follow-on investment decisions.
Question. How much is in the Air Force's budget in 1998 and each
year of your outyear budget plan for this purpose?
Answer. The funds in the Air Force's budget for the demonstration
of CEC on AWACS are as follows:
[By fiscal year in millions of dollars]
1999.............................................................. 7.9
2000.............................................................. 15.8
2001.............................................................. 13.7
2002.............................................................. 3.8
2003.............................................................. 0.8
______
Total......................................................... 42.0
Question. On December 5, 1995 JCS Chairman Shalikashvili wrote to
the Committee and said: ``When equipment and funding are available, the
Air Force intends to put CEC on an AWACs aircraft to examine the full
benefits of AWACS/CEC employment applications.'' So, how did the Air
Force follow up on the JCS commitment to the Congress?
Answer. Last year the AF assessed the results of both the Mountain
Top exercise and the final results of the Joint Engagement Technology
Study (JETS). The Mountain Top exercise validated the integration of
CEC and the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS), and
the ability of the AWACS to act as an airborne relay of CEC data.
The JETS study results were limited to qualitative assessments
only. Operators perceived an increased situational awareness through
tracking continuity and improved timeliness of tactical information.
While CEC does not possess an organic aircraft identification
capability, once identification through other sensors was accomplished,
track identification maintenance was improved. As in the Mountain Top
scenario, netting sensors via CEC increased the battle space and
facilitated battle management decisions.
While these two studies provided a broadbrush assessment of placing
CEC on AWACS, neither produced quantifiable, objective results. In both
studies design limitations on sensor placement, sample size and lack of
statistically significant data collection limits the utility of the
results. Compounding the problem was the absence of a clearly defined
Navy, Air Force or joint concept of operations for CEC employment.
Consequently, in March 1998 the Air Force, in conjunction with the
Joint Theater Air Missile Defense Organization (JTAMDO), initiated a
comprehensive four phase CEC on AWACS integration study. This study
analyzes the technological and operational utility of CEC on AWACS,
CEC's electromagnetic impacts to the AWACS platform, and determines a
CEC on AWACS employment concept. The first phase, the technological
analysis study, is already underway and will last until June 1998. The
second phase, operational utility assessment, will be conducted
immediately following the technological analysis with an expected
duration of 4 months. The electromagnetic impact and employment concept
studies will run concurrently. They will commence in September 1998 and
are expected to last 6-9 months. Once this comprehensive study is
completed the Air Force will evaluate the results to determine follow-
on investment decisions.
Question. How much is required in the Air Force R&D appropriation
to perform the JCS directed demonstration, by fiscal year?
Answer. The Air Force estimates that approximately $53.1 million is
required to complete the JCS directed demonstration of integrating CEC
on AWACS. Currently, the Air Force has the following amounts budgeted
for the demonstration:
[By fiscal year in millions of dollars]
1999.............................................................. 7.9
2000.............................................................. 15.8
2001.............................................................. 13.7
2002.............................................................. 3.8
2003.............................................................. 0.8
______
Total......................................................... 42.0
The above funding may need to be adjusted based on results of the
Joint Theater Air Missile Defense Organization (JTAMDO) and Air Force
study.
Gender Integrated Training
Question. In June 1997, the Secretary of Defense appointed the
Federal Advisory Committee on Gender-Integrated Training and Related
Issues to assess the current training programs of the Military Services
and determine how best to train a gender-integrated, all volunteer
force. The recommendations of the December 1997 Kassebaum Report center
on the quality of recruits and the need to instill discipline
throughout the training process. The report also recommends
establishing separate barracks for male and female recruits. The
January 1998 Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Military
(DACOWITS) Report highlights some of the same issues as the Kassebaum
Report but adds that the Services need to establish and enforce clearer
gender related policies in areas such as fraternization. What is the
estimated cost to implement the recommendation in the Kassebaum report?
What would the impact be on each: the Defense Appropriations bill and
the Military Construction Appropriations bill?
Answer. Preliminary evaluation indicates costs to implement the
recommendations to provide separate barracks at both recruit and
advanced training would be, at a minimum, $48 million for
implementation and $2.2 million recurring costs. Manpower for recruit
training is six personnel and to be determined for advanced training.
Costs and manpower at Joint training locations requires study .
Until we determine the costs and manpower at Joint training
locations we cannot determine the overall impact on the two bills
cited.
Question. The Committee understands that each Military Service is
developing its own recommendations independently on the Kassebaum
report. Would you please give the Committee an indication of your
position?
Answer. Air Force views have been provided to the Secretary of
Defense for his consideration and, while Air Force supports most of the
conclusions reflected in the Kassebaum report, we have certain specific
concerns that are being evaluated with the Department.
Question. What is your understanding of the Office of the Secretary
of Defense's role in coordinating the Services' recommendations?
Answer. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) did not
review the Air Force report referenced in the prior question until it
was completed by the Air Force. After the Air Force report--and those
of the other services--was submitted to the Secretary of Defense, the
SECDEF evaluated the Services' inputs to ensure training programs met
mission needs and provided a safe/secure training environment. SECDEF
has directed each Service further investigate and report on: (1)
development of a system of rewards and incentives to ensure our best
become trainers; (2) adding rigor to basic military training's physical
fitness programs; (3) physically separated living areas, if not
buildings, for male and female basic trainees. A report is due by April
15, 1998.
Privatization and Outsourcing
Question. The Air Force has an aggressive privatization program
designed to contract out base support functions such as vehicle
maintenance, facilities maintenance and civil engineering, automated
data processing operations, and numerous administrative functions. DoD
claims that a significant portion of the end strength reductions
specified in the Defense Reform Initiative will be achieved through
privatization of functions currently performed in-house by DoD. DoD
also claims that outsourcing will result in cost reductions of about 20
percent. What are the net savings from outsourcing and privatization
assumed in the Air Force's fiscal year 1999 budget request?
Answer. The Air Force is projecting $1.5 billion savings through
fiscal year 2003 through competitive sourcing. The savings are
projected to result from competitions conducted under the A-76 process.
Savings in A-76 competitions since 1979 have been at the 24 percent
level; however, in the last ten years we have achieved savings of 34
percent. In the fiscal year 1999 President's Budget, we budgeted a
conservative savings of 25 percent. We have not programmed any dollar
savings for initiatives in housing and utilities privatization.
Question. What costs have been incurred by the Air Force to
implement its privatization program?
Answer. With respect to A-76 programs, Air Force has spent
approximately $7 million on training, systems upgrades, Performance
Work Statement development and contractor augmentation since FY95.
Based on our increased study loads, we will require additional dollars
to augment our force to accomplish the studies. Approximately $2
million has been spent on utilities and housing privatization studies.
Question. What measures has the Air Force implemented to validate
savings?
Answer. The AF has tracked cost comparisons and direct conversions
via the Commercial Activities Management Information System since 1979.
Per DoD policy, we are required to track/validate actual costs of
performing functions that have been cost compared for three performance
periods (which DoD is increasing to five years). Savings can be
computed by comparing the cost of performing the function prior to the
cost comparison to the actual cost of performance after a given
performance period is completed. This provides the historical basis to
project and program overall savings across the FYDP for our entire
Competitive Sourcing Program. We conservatively program dollar savings
at 25%. We track and report to OSD on every decision (both contract and
in-house) and adjust the overall projected savings to the ``actuals''
as they occur.
Question. What are the limits of privatization? Are the Air Force's
efforts limited by the need to maintain a rotation base? Does the need
to maintain certain skills among military or civilian personnel limit
your ability to privatize functions?
Answer. There are limits to privatization based on military
essential and inherently governmental requirements. Recently, General
Ryan and I directed all Major Commands to review positions identified
as A-76 candidates to ensure that any resulting military personnel cuts
would be consistent with Air Force OPTEMPO and rotation base goals. We
have taken those limits into consideration in our outsourcing and
privatization program. Our candidate population for outsourcing is
primarily at wing level or below within the Continental United States.
This candidate population is not required for deployment or forward
basing to support the 2 Major Theater War concept, but we are assessing
the role of these positions as they may affect OPTEMPO during times of
high deployment levels. We do not consider other military essential
positions, such as commanders, firefighters, security guards, etc., in
our candidate population, nor do we consider positions that are
determined to be inherently governmental.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Young.
Questions submitted by Mr. Lewis and the answers thereto
follow:]
Corporate Acquisitions
Question. There have been several recent news stories about the
possible acquisition of the Computer Sciences Corporation by Computer
Associates. I understand that Computer Sciences does a lot of sensitive
and important work for the Department of Defense as well as the
intelligence community and that Computer Associates currently does not
perform comparable sensitive work for the government. This possible
deal raises a number of issues in my mind and I urge you to watch it
carefully. I look forward to your reporting back to the Subcommittee
when you have had the chance to assess this proposed acquisition and
its possible ramifications.
Answer. The acquisition of Computer Sciences Corporation by
Computer Associates did not happen; however, the Air Force is very
sensitive to acquisitions or mergers within industry which may have an
impact on the Air Force. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of the
Air Force for Acquisition has a continuing responsibility to monitor
potential and ongoing acquisitions or mergers of companies with
existing DoD contractual relationships. The Air Force evaluates
mergers, acquisitions and restructuring in the industry with a specific
sensitivity to the impact such restructuring can have on the
competitive environment; the research, development, and manufacturing
base for essential military products and the protection of capabilities
and technologies that impact our national security. Foreign corporate
acquisitions represent an opportunity for unauthorized technology
transfer, particularly when the US firm is involved in sensitive,
state-of-the-art research and development. For this reason, the Air
Force evaluates mergers, acquisitions and restructuring in the industry
with a specific sensitivity to the impact on long term national
security interests and in particular, the impact such restructuring can
have on the competitive environment; the research, development, and
manufacturing base for essential military materials; and the protection
of capabilities and technologies that impact our national security
interests.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Lewis.
Questions submitted by Mr. Hobson and the answers thereto
follow:]
Civil Air Patrol
Question. The Civil Air Patrol is unhappy with the determination of
the Air Force General Counsel. CAP would now receive a grant from the
Air Force instead of the historic procedure which has worked perfectly
well of the CAP having a line item and congressional review. General
Ryan, I understand that you are a CAP alumnus. How are we going to help
the Civil Air Patrol?
Answer. It is well recognized that the Air Force has a long-
standing, mutually beneficial relationship with the Civil Air Patrol
(CAP). It is important, however, for us to ensure that our support
meets both the letter and spirit of the law.
The AF Audit Agency (AFAA) had that in mind during their recent
audit of CAP when they raised the question of the applicability of
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circulars to CAP. Because the
issue involved an interpretation of law rather than policy, we asked
the office of the Air Force General Counsel to review the matter. While
an initial review by her staff did not preclude the applicability of
the OMB Circulars, the General Counsel is still reviewing the matter
and has not rendered a final opinion.
The Air Force General Counsel is continuing to assess the
applicable guidance and appropriate internal controls to ensure the
accountability for appropriated funds, but this does not mean that the
Air Force is in any way reducing its support for the Civil Air Patrol.
The Air Force will keep CAP in its programming and budgeting process,
and will continue to transfer funds to them, whether by line item or
grant. It is noteworthy that the National Guard Bureau uses cooperative
agreements pursuant to the Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act
as the legal instruments through which Federal funds are provided to
state military departments.
While the Air Force General Counsel continues its review, an
Integrated Process Team (IPT) is being formed to review all of the
challenges currently facing CAP, including CAP organizational
structure, realignment possibilities, mission impacts, funding options,
and possible statutory changes. The IPT will report its findings and
recommendations to me before fiscal year 2000 program inputs are
completed.
We will continue to work with Congress to support CAP and its many
valuable activities.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Hobson.
Questions submitted by Mr. Dixon and the answers thereto
follow:]
Corporate Acquisitions and Mergers
Question. Recently, a number of reports have highlighted concerns
about the possible acquisition of the Computer Sciences Corporation by
Computer Associates International Inc. Although it appears that
Computer Associates current acquisition effort has been abandoned, I am
interested in the Department's views. Computer Sciences Corporation
does important classified work for the Department of Defense, and
concerns have been raised about the company's ability to do very
sensitive work with required objectivity and independence after
acquisition. What is the department's view on this matter, and in
general the problems of mergers between organizations active in highly
classified defense work by larger concerns with either little
experience in such activities or with substantial foreign ties?
Answer. The Air Force is very interested in acquisitions or mergers
within industry which may have an impact on Air Force procurement. The
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition has
a continuing responsibility to monitor potential and ongoing
acquisitions or mergers of companies with existing DoD contractual
relationships. Contractual agreements established with companies remain
binding throughout the performance period of the contract regardless of
organizational changes. Foreign corporate acquisitions represent an
opportunity for unauthorized technology transfer, particularly when the
US firm is involved in sensitive, state-of-the-art research and
development. For this reason, the Air Force evaluates mergers,
acquisitions and restructuring in the industry with a specific
sensitivity to the impact on long term national security interests and
in particular, the impact such restructuring can have on the
competitive environment; the research, development, and manufacturing
base for essential military materials; and the protection of
capabilities and technologies that impact our national security
interests.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Dixon.
The Fiscal Year 1999 Air Force posture statement, as referred
to on page 453, follows. The 1998 Annual Report to the Congress
by the Secretary of Defense is printed at the end of this
hearing volume. See page 630.]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
W I T N E S S E S
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Page
Dalton, Hon. J. H................................................ 22
Johnson, Adm. J. L............................................... 229
Krulak, Gen. C. C................................................ 229
Peters, Hon. F. W................................................ 449
Reimer, Gen. D. J................................................ 1
Ryan, Gen. M. E.................................................. 449
Walker, Hon. R. M................................................ 1
I N D E X
----------
FISCAL YEAR 1999 AIR FORCE POSTURE
Page
Additional Funding............................................... 558
Airborne Laser Program (ABL)..................................... 572
Aircraft Accidents............................................... 575
Aircraft Programs:
Bomber Force................................................. 530
B-2 Aircraft...........................................533, 538
C-17 Aircraft................................................ 546
C-130 Requirements........................................... 574
C-141 Aircraft............................................... 556
F-15 and F-16 Aircraft....................................... 577
F-22 Aircraft Problems....................................... 568
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS)
Aircraft................................................... 554
Shortfalls............................................... 568
Joint Strike Fighter Program (JSF).........................540, 554
T-3 Pilot Screener Aircraft.................................. 576
Air Force Institute of Technology................................ 535
Air Force Strategy............................................... 556
Air-to-Air Missiles.............................................. 554
Base Commander Turnover.......................................... 534
Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC).............................. 528
Civil Air Patrol................................................. 582
Contingency Operations........................................... 562
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC).......................... 579
Corporate Acquisitions and Mergers.............................582, 583
Evolved Expendable Launch (EELV) Program......................... 539
Forward Basing Access............................................ 529
Gender Integrated Training....................................... 580
Introduction..................................................... 449
Kelly Air Force Base............................................. 545
Lackland Air Force Base.......................................... 544
Laughlin Air Force Base.......................................... 543
Line-Item Veto................................................... 534
Mission Capable Rates, Air Force (MCR).........................528, 560
National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC)....................... 578
Operation and Maintenance Shortfalls............................. 540
Passenger Safety................................................. 573
Personnel Endstrengths........................................... 563
Personnel Recruiting and Retention Issues..526, 537, 539, 542, 546, 563
Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO)...................................... 565
Potential Savings................................................ 555
Privatization and Outsourcing.................................... 581
Report to the President and the Congress by the Secretary of
Defense, The 1998 Annual....................................... 630
Space Command and Control........................................ 533
Statement of F. Whitten Peters, and General Michael D. Ryan, The
Joint.......................................................... 454
Summary Statement of General Ryan................................ 524
Modernization................................................ 525
Retention.................................................... 525
Summary...................................................... 526
Summary Statement of Secretary Peters............................ 450
Air Force Personnel.......................................... 450
Emergency Supplemental....................................... 452
Modernization................................................ 452
Readiness.................................................... 451
Revolution in Business Affairs............................... 452
Summary...................................................... 453
Supplemental Request, Fiscal Year 1998........................... 542
Tactical Aircraft Modernization.................................. 538
Traffic Collision Avoidance System............................... 546
Two Major Regional Contingency (MRC) Strategy, Air Force Ability
to Support the................................................. 560
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).................................. 577
FISCAL YEAR 1999 ARMY POSTURE
Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWEs).......................... 123
Ammunition Supplies, Adequate.................................... 72
M829A2 (A2) Round............................................ 136
Tank Ammunition.............................................. 130
Training Ammunition Destruction..............................71, 75
Army After Next (AAN) Project.................................... 135
Army Budget......................................................64, 86
Black Hawk Helicopter............................................ 130
Bosnia Visit..................................................... 73
Capabilities..................................................... 77
Civilian Cuts.................................................... 131
Comanche Helicopter.............................................85, 133
Contingency Operations........................................... 104
Crusader Self-Propelled Howitzer................................. 127
Deficiencies in the Force........................................ 83
Depot Maintenance...............................................84, 130
Digitization..................................................... 116
Emergency Supplemental........................................... 58
Environmental Cleanup Liability.................................. 74
Force XXI Initiative............................................. 125
Gender Integrated Training....................................... 104
High Energy Laser Test Facility (HELSTF)......................... 132
Directed Energy Space Control................................ 132
Hollow Army...................................................... 133
Introduction..................................................... 1
Land Forces Training Readiness................................... 101
Legacy Systems................................................... 69
M1 Tanks......................................................... 69
Materiel Shortages............................................... 78
Military Construction............................................ 67
Military Retirement.............................................. 63
Modernization Issues:
Army.......................................................105, 136
Aviation..................................................... 125
Funding, Additional Modernization............................ 89
National Defense Panel..........................................67, 106
National Training Center........................................58, 102
Operating Tempo (OPTEMPO)........................................ 60
Personnel Reductions.........................................63, 74, 94
Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO)...................................... 62
Quality of the Force............................................. 80
Readiness........................................................ 75
Recruiting....................................................... 73
Remarks of Mr. Young............................................. 40
Reserve Components............................................... 70
Guard and Reserve Role in Domestic Terrorism.................60, 97
Individual Ready Reserve..................................... 96
Reserve Forces in Bosnia..................................... 95
Sexual Harassment Training....................................... 99
Solid State Laser (SSL) Program, Army's.......................... 132
Statement of General Dennis J. Reimer............................ 43
Statement of Robert M. Walker.................................... 8
Statement, The Fiscal Year 1999 Army Posture..................... 137
Summary Statement of General Reimer.............................. 40
Summary Statement of Secretary Walker............................ 2
Base Realignment and Closure................................. 5
Emergency Supplemental....................................... 4
Equal Opportunity............................................ 5
Fiscal Year 1999 Budget Request.............................. 5
Readiness.................................................... 3
Recruiting................................................... 4
Reserve Components........................................... 6
Summary...................................................... 7
Tactical High Energy Laser Program (THEL), Army's................ 131
Tactical Wheeled Vehicles, Light................................. 127
Twenty-Nine Palms Marine Corps Base.............................. 86
Two Major Regional Conflicts (MRC) Strategy...................... 128
Unfunded Requirements............................................ 131
West Point Academy............................................... 79
White Sands Missile Range........................................ 66
FISCAL YEAR 1999 NAVY POSTURE
Aegis Cruiser Conversion......................................... 346
Aerostat Program................................................. 345
Aircraft Carriers, Future (CVX)/Nuclear Propulsion.............340, 366
Aircraft Programs:
A-6 Crash in Italy........................................... 337
A-121 Aircraft Lawsuit.....................................297, 349
Aircraft Accidents........................................... 349
F/A-18E/F Aircraft....................................250, 338, 356
Test Flight.............................................. 254
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program.........................295, 357
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS).....296, 361
V-22 Aircraft....................................258, 303, 354, 359
Anti-Submarine Warfare........................................... 368
Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC).............................. 299
Battleships...................................................... 367
Budget Priorities/Requirements, Unfunded.......................257, 309
Camp Pendleton Levee............................................. 304
Collision Avoidance.............................................. 298
Combat Logistics Force Ships...................................302, 355
Contingency Operations........................................... 305
DD 21 Teaming.................................................... 366
Horizon Concept.................................................. 291
Industrial Base, Aircraft........................................ 356
Interservice Rivalry............................................. 259
Introduction..................................................... 229
Junior ROTC...................................................... 301
LHA Service Life Extension....................................... 343
LPD-17 Ships, Downscoping the Capability of...................... 342
Missile Defense Program:
Navy Area and Theater-Wide Systems........................... 360
Theater Ballistic Missile Defense Capability on DDG-51 Ships. 340
Modernization:
Helicopter Programs.......................................... 354
Marine Corps................................................. 352
Multiyear Contracts, Increased Use of............................ 326
Napalm Disposal................................................260, 362
Communication with Local Communities......................... 261
Contact with Local Communities............................... 262
Contact with Public Officials................................ 262
Environmental Concerns....................................... 266
Navy Goals................................................... 263
Notification to Congress..................................... 261
Timing of Disposal Process................................... 264
Vendor Selection............................................. 265
Views of Congressman Packard................................. 266
Ward Valley Nuclear Waste Disposal........................... 266
Naval Strategy................................................... 308
Network Centric Warfare.......................................... 367
Next Generation Destroyer........................................ 288
Personnel Issues:
Adverse Impact of Deployments................................ 247
Bosnia and Persian Gulf Deployments, Impact of............... 255
Gender Integrated Training................................... 334
Persian Gulf Deployments, Cost of............................ 248
Personnel Financial Problems................................. 333
Personnel Reductions.......................................293, 330
Quality of Life.............................................. 291
Recruiting.................................................249, 258
Quality of People........................................ 289
Visits to High Schools................................... 255
Retention.................................................... 304
Marine Corps Personnel................................... 290
Pilot Retention.......................................... 289
Six-Month Rotations.......................................... 247
Tempo of Operations........................................307, 332
Privatization and Outsourcing.................................... 351
Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System (RAMICS).................... 361
Readiness Issues:
Aviation..................................................... 335
Cross-Decking and Navy....................................... 336
Ship Self-Defense System.......................................291, 338
Shipbuilding Industrial Base Study............................... 365
Shipbuilding Rate................................................ 365
SLAM-ER Missile Program.......................................... 345
Statement of General Charles C. Krulak........................... 241
Statement of John H. Dalton...................................... 234
Statement, the 1998 Department of the Navy Posture............... 369
Summary Statement of Admiral Johnson............................. 240
Budget Priorities............................................ 240
Summary Statement of General Krulak.............................. 240
Summary Statement of Secretary Dalton............................ 230
Budget Priorities............................................ 232
Operational Status........................................... 230
Other Initiatives............................................ 232
Personnel Status............................................. 231
Programmatic Status.......................................... 231
Strategy..................................................... 231
T-ADC(X) Program................................................. 355
Trident D-5 Submarines Backfit/Conversion............296, 347, 348, 358
Two Major Regional Conflict (MRC) Strategy, Navy Ability to
Support the.................................................... 306