[House Hearing, 105 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 1999
_______________________________________________________________________
HEARINGS
BEFORE A
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida, Chairman
JOSEPH M. McDADE, Pennsylvania JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania
BOB LIVINGSTON, Louisiana NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington
JERRY LEWIS, California W. G. (BILL) HEFNER, North Carolina
JOE SKEEN, New Mexico MARTIN OLAV SABO, Minnesota
DAVID L. HOBSON, Ohio JULIAN C. DIXON, California
HENRY BONILLA, Texas PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana
GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, Jr.,
Washington
ERNEST J. ISTOOK, Jr., Oklahoma
RANDY ``DUKE'' CUNNINGHAM,
California
NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Livingston, as Chairman of the Full
Committee, and Mr. Obey, as Ranking Minority Member of the Full
Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees.
Kevin M. Roper, David F. Kilian, Alicia Jones, Juliet Pacquing,
Gregory J. Walters, Patricia Ryan, Doug Gregory, Paul W. Juola, Tina
Jonas, Steven D. Nixon,
David L. Norquist, and Betsy Phillips, Staff Assistants
Jennifer Mummert and Sherry L. Young, Administrative Aides
________
PART 4
Page
Army Acquisition Programs........................................ 1
Navy and Marine Corps Acquisition Programs....................... 121
Air Force Acquisition Programs................................... 247
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Defense-Wide:
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization............................ 355
________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations
________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
77-457 WASHINGTON : 2002
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
BOB LIVINGSTON, Louisiana, Chairman
JOSEPH M. McDADE, Pennsylvania DAVID R. OBEY, Wisconsin
C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida SIDNEY R. YATES, Illinois
RALPH REGULA, Ohio LOUIS STOKES, Ohio
JERRY LEWIS, California JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania
JOHN EDWARD PORTER, Illinois NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington
HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky MARTIN OLAV SABO, Minnesota
JOE SKEEN, New Mexico JULIAN C. DIXON, California
FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia VIC FAZIO, California
TOM DeLAY, Texas W. G. (BILL) HEFNER, North Carolina
JIM KOLBE, Arizona STENY H. HOYER, Maryland
RON PACKARD, California ALAN B. MOLLOHAN, West Virginia
SONNY CALLAHAN, Alabama MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio
JAMES T. WALSH, New York DAVID E. SKAGGS, Colorado
CHARLES H. TAYLOR, North Carolina NANCY PELOSI, California
DAVID L. HOBSON, Ohio PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana
ERNEST J. ISTOOK, Jr., Oklahoma ESTEBAN EDWARD TORRES, California
HENRY BONILLA, Texas NITA M. LOWEY, New York
JOE KNOLLENBERG, Michigan JOSE E. SERRANO, New York
DAN MILLER, Florida ROSA L. DeLAURO, Connecticut
JAY DICKEY, Arkansas JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia
JACK KINGSTON, Georgia JOHN W. OLVER, Massachusetts
MIKE PARKER, Mississippi ED PASTOR, Arizona
RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey CARRIE P. MEEK, Florida
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina
MICHAEL P. FORBES, New York CHET EDWARDS, Texas
GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, Jr., ROBERT E. (BUD) CRAMER, Jr.,
Washington Alabama
MARK W. NEUMANN, Wisconsin
RANDY ``DUKE'' CUNNINGHAM,
California
TODD TIAHRT, Kansas
ZACH WAMP, Tennessee
TOM LATHAM, Iowa
ANNE M. NORTHUP, Kentucky
ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama
James W. Dyer, Clerk and Staff Director
(ii)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 1999
----------
Thursday, February 26, 1998.
ARMY ACQUISITION PROGRAMS
WITNESSES
DR. KENNETH J. OSCAR, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION
LIEUTENANT GENERAL PAUL J. KERN, MILITARY DEPUTY TO THE ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION,
U.S. ARMY
LIEUTENANT GENERAL WILLIAM H. CAMPBELL, DIRECTOR OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS
FOR COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPUTERS, U.S. ARMY
Introduction
Mr. Young. The meeting will come to order.
This afternoon the hearing is closed because of the
potential classification of some of the material that we will
be discussing.
We are very happy to welcome Dr. Kenneth Oscar, the Acting
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development and
Acquisition; Lieutenant General Paul Kern, the Military Deputy
to the Assistant Secretary; and Lieutenant General William H.
Campbell, Director of Information Systems for Command, Control,
Communications and Computers.
I believe this is the first time that the three of you have
appeared before the Committee. We will place your biographies
in the record so that we will have a record of your appearance
for posterity.
We obviously are interested in the future of the Army. We
had a good session this morning with the Acting Secretary of
the Army and with General Reimer, and we saved all of the
specific acquisition issues for this afternoon.
We are anxious about the modernization of the Army, as you
would expect, as we have been for many, many years. We are
concerned about the rapid rate that we are using up our Army
assets and many of the contingencies that we are dealing with.
We are pleased that the President's budget seems to be a little
more realistic this year than it has been in recent years, and
we are especially glad of that because we don't have any extra
money to spend this year to add to the President's budget,
unless we get a miracle of some kind through the Budget
Committee.
We are interested in Force XXI, where we are getting, where
we are in dealing with Force XXI, where we expect to be, what
Force XXI needs in order to stay on schedule. Army helicopters,
of course, are always a big issue. And so, Dr. Oscar, we are
happy to hear from you.
First, let me see if Mr. Murtha would like to comment.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Chairman, I will only say that the
intelligence of these guys, meaning the gathering of
intelligence, is superb, because this morning the chief came
having all the answers before we even started. These guys, of
course, are acquisition, but we gave the chief all the
questions.
Mr. Young. Dr. Oscar, we are very happy to hear from you.
You are welcome to summarize your statement. Your entire
statement will be placed in the record, and you are welcome to
summarize it any way you would like, sir.
SUMMARY STATEMENT OF DR. OSCAR
Dr. Oscar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will summarize it,
and I would also like General Kern to make a brief statement.
Before I do, I would like to introduce three additional
people: Dr. Fenner Milton, who is the Chief Scientist of the
Army; General Rose, is the Head Director of Requirements in
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS); and,
behind me, Colonel Jeanette M. Edmunds is the Director of
Ammunition.
Mr. Young. We are happy to have all of you.
Dr. Oscar. Thank you.
As you know, over the last several years the Army has had a
lot of reductions--reduced budgets; reshaping for the new
world. At the same time, we have accomplished a lot of
missions--helped in riots; in hurricanes; in drug wars; and
floods in the Midwest; deployments in Haiti, Rwanda, Saudi
Arabia, and Bosnia.
With your help, we have been able to mitigate the effect on
our soldiers and still do all those things. We had to focus on
readiness and quality of life; and, oftentimes, modernization
was sometimes pushed out a little bit or sacrificed. And so we
weren't always able to take advantage of all the technology
that we would like to have put into our weapons for thefuture.
And, indeed, some of our equipment has aged.
This fiscal year 1999 President's budget, for the first
time in over 10 years, shows over a billion dollar increase in
procurement. Our procurement budget is about $8.2 billion,
which is about one-sixth of the Defense Department's
procurement budget. And it not only goes up a billion dollars
over 1998, but it goes up a billion dollars every year from the
1999 to 2003 period.
Our Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E)
budget is about $4.7 billion, about one-eighth of the Defense
Department research and development budget, and it is pretty
steady. There is a slight growth in the outyears.
With that increase we have been able to put together what I
think is a good modernization plan that has five key elements.
The first is digitization; second is overmatch capability; the
third is equipment recapitalization; the fourth is equipment to
integrate the Guard and Reserve with the Active force; and the
last is focusing the technology base on the Army After Next.
For several years we have been fielding digitization or
information management systems with our weapons. That is in the
form of digital radios, computers, data buses, and so on,
vehicles like the M-1 and A-2 tank. They have been fielded with
these new devices.
We have added to the budget $261 million in fiscal year
1999 to take all of these weapons that we are fielding and
integrate them together. We have determined that through our
warfighting experiments, we can get a leap-ahead technology
capability by linking them together instead of having each one
digitized separately.
It is very much like our houses. AT&T and America Online
puts a backbone in, an Internet, and allows our telephones, our
computers, our TVs to be linked together so that we can
communicate and get synergism between each other. The
battlefield is like that also.
We have found that if we can spend this extra money taking
a mobile internet and putting the switches in, the backbone,
all these weapons would be linked together and give us a real
big additional capability on the battlefield. So, as a result
of that, our goal is to digitize a division by the year 2000
and a Corps by the year 2004.
In the second area, we would like to make sure that we
maintain our combat overmatch so we can have a few selected
weapons. Such as a Javelin fire-and-forget antitank weapon, a
Comanche helicopter, the Crusader howitzer, Brilliant Anti-
Armor Submunition (BAT), or, for the Army Tactical Missile
System (ATACMS) that will give us a good leap-ahead capability
and make sure we maintain various areas of the battlefield on
overmatch capability against the enemy.
In the third area, equipment recapitalization, this is an
area that over the last number of years we have had to stretch
out; and, indeed, our equipment has aged. So what we are doing
is we are putting additional money into focus on trucks, cargo
helicopters, mobile electronic generators, and water purifiers.
These are the items that have aged the most; and these are the
items, like in Bosnia today, where they are really at war every
day. The trucks are running up and down the highways in these
exercises, like Haiti, Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia; and they are
getting a lot of use and are wearing out.
So we are focusing on a lot of the older ones that have
significant operations and support costs to do either depot
maintenance overhaul or do a kind of Extended Service Program
(ESP) or, in some cases, buy new so we can either get new
equipment in to lower the age or to redo this equipment and
extend their life, and lower the operations and support costs.
The fourth area, we have put 33 percent more money this
year into our Guard and Reserve to give them the equipment they
need as we integrate them into the Active force. We have
purchased with that money a lot of new air defense systems: ten
new Black Hawk helicopters a year, a Sentinel, 200 line haul
tractors, and over 54 20-ton dump trucks. Together with the
additional money, the cascading equipment, we feel that we will
be able to support the Army's integration plans to have a real,
total Army.
The last area is to focus our tech base on the Army After
Next. This digital Army we talk about that we are going to be
fielding between the year 2000 and about 2010 is our next Army.
The money we are spending today in tech base is going to
produce the Army After Next.
We have done a series of analysis and war games. We will
soon be looking at perhaps identifying the second Armored
Calvary Regiment (ACR) to use that as kind of a strike force,
an experimental force to test out new concepts in a tech base.
To date, we have learned that we need to focus our money, and
we have done that, on increased mobility, reducing the
logistics footprint on the ground, reducing Operations and
Support (O&S) costs and new target acquisition capability to
take advantage of these precision strike weapons.
So, in summary, I feel that we have taken our budget an we
have balanced it among all the options of the new equipment,
upgrading the old equipment, leap-ahead capability,
digitization; and we have a good, balanced budget that will
continue our capability today to win our Nation's wars and
reduce our casualties on the battlefield.
With that, I would like General Kern to make a few remarks.
[The joint statement of Dr. Oscar and General Kern
follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Summary Statement of General Kern
General Kern. Mr. Chairman, as you noted, this is my first
testimony before this Committee; and I am very pleased to be
here today. But I have to note a year ago today I was at Fort
Hood, Texas, deploying a division to Fort Irwin, California,
for the experiments that we did in the desert last year.
A remark was made about that it was largest rail move out
of the State of Texas since Desert Storm. And that was a
typical movement now for the United States Army to be able to
pick up and deploy and get ready to do something in an area for
which they are not home based.
The second point I would make of that was the tremendous
performance of the soldiers that took place in the field with
some very high-tech equipment that was still very much in the
prototype phase.
I would like to read, if I could, just two comments from a
letter from Secretary Cohen, that was sent to me when he
returned from that exercise.
He said, ``These warfighting experiments may well prove to
be as important in defining the Army of the future as George
Marshall's Louisiana maneuvers were to defining the Army that
won World War II.''
There is a process that is ongoing within the United States
Army to adapt to the 21st century, and we are living now as
part of that. I have to tell you it was very exciting to be
part of that.
He then went on to say, ``I saw soldiers who had put aside
fatigue and stress to give everything they had to fight the
battle at hand. I saw soldiers who had mastered complex
technology and turned it to their advantage on the
battlefield.''
Again, a testimony to our soldiers. These are bright young
men and women who have to teach many of the older folks, like
myself, as the division commander, how to really master this
technology. They are very comfortable with computers. They are
very comfortable with a lot of the equipment we are using and
now putting in the relatively tough environment, and they
showed us what could be done.
I was joined by General Campbell at the time, who was in a
different role also as the Program Executive Officer for
Command and Control Communications; and we had to narrow down
some 300 different ideas to things that would work. We took
about 70 of them to the desert to prove that they could work,
and we learned an awful lot.
Colonel Edmunds at the time also was out there with us. She
commanded a Corps support group. I had taken many of her trucks
with me that we had modified. These were Palletized Loading
System (PLS) trucks that we used, but we had enhanced them with
digital technology so we really knew where they were. So
instead of wondering where the truck was out there with the
part and the fuel and the ammunition that was trying to get to
the battlefield, we were able to precisely get it from the
supply base to the tank, the Bradley, the Howitzer, that needed
those components.
It was a very remarkable performance for all of us to be
able to see those things come together and learn what the
future could look like for the United States Army. We are not
there yet. With your help, though, and this budget we have
submitted, we will move a long way towards achieving the goals
of a division by 2000 and a Corps by 2004.
I would like to point out one other experience to you that
is perhaps not usually associated with the acquisition
business.
Two weeks ago, I was in Sarajevo visiting a number of our
officers but also some young enlisted Marines and Air Force
Noncommission Officers (NCOs) who were working with our
acquisition contracting officers in contingency contracting.
Some of these same people we have been working in our
acquisition offices back here are going over to Bosnia, and
they have been to Haiti and Somalia as well for 6 months, to
take their skills as contracting officers and to put them at
work providing supplies and services to our soldiers in the
field there, renting vehicles, buying fuel, buying goods on the
local economy.
Two remarkable things about that: One, it was clearly a
joint operation, with a Marine gunny sergeant working for an
Army major and an Air Force chief master sergeant working for
another Army major; and we had these people working together
that were putting money into the Bosnian economy to rebuild it.
So the acquisition skills that we learned back here in building
our weapons programs are also being used by our young
acquisition personnel in rebuilding a country overseas.
So this is, sir, an honor to be here today; and I am
looking forward to your questions.
Mr. Young. General, thank you very much.
Summary Statement of General Campbell
Mr. Young. We are happy to have you here today, General
Campbell. Did you want to make a statement before we go to
questions?
General Campbell. I would add briefly, Mr. Chairman, these
are very exciting and important times for the Army. We are
committed to providing the digitized Army of the 21st century
and our soldiers of the 21st century the very best weapon
systems possible; and we are adopting from the commercial
industry their best practices, to include cycle development and
shortening cycle times and continuous product improvement into
the systems that we provide to our soldiers so that they can
get ahead, stay ahead and win the nation's wars.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Young. Thank you, sir, and I hope that you know that
this committee is committed to that same dedication that you
just mentioned.
DIGITIZED ARMY
Mr. Young. Now, would one of you tell us, give us some
examples of what is a digitized Army. I know some of our
Members went to the exercise that you mentioned in California.
Mr. Lewis was an observer there for the Committee; and his
reports were very, very positive and pretty exciting, actually.
But give us some specific examples that we can understand about
what is a digitized Army.
General Kern. Sir, I will start; and then I will ask
General Campbell to add some more technical aspects of it.
From the perspective of the warfighters, the commanders and
the soldiers there, the digitized Army answers the questions
for them: Where am I, where are you, where my buddies are, and
where is the enemy? And we do that through a series of
networked systems.
We created two networks, one a tactical network, which was
down at the individual crew level. That was done by taking the
Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS),
which is a digital radio and, in addition to carrying voice,
they also carry a digital message stream. That was coupled
through a network system which General Campbell can explain
which we borrowed from the commercial world and technology. We
added as you went up there, another data radio, which is also a
data radio which is in our system today, the Enhanced Position
Location Reporting System (EPLRS), which is used by both the
Army and the Marine Corps, that was meant to carry pure data.
The data information that was carried there painted a
mapped picture of where each vehicle was on the battlefield so
that you could look around at your computer screen and see
where the members of your platoon were, day or night, and you
could tailor that software so that it could also tell you where
your company was and a battalion commander could look to see
where his companies were.
That system was networked into the Army's battle command
system, which provided the commander of the battalion and
brigade a picture of where every unit was on the battlefield.
In an analog unit, that would have been done by voice reports
which were passed over the voice net and then recorded by a
radio telephone operator at each echelon and forwarded up the
stream.
Normally, in a division, for that information to make it
from the platoon back up to the division headquarters usually
took about four hours, and about a third of the information was
probably not very accurate by the time it was transferred. What
happens in a digital division, the information is passed
electronically, and the map showing where the units are is
accurate, and its usually within 2 to 3 minute of being real
time.
This allowed us also to data link that information to the
cockpits of some of our A-10s, and a satellite link with the
Marines. It gave us and their cockpit a picture of where the
closest friendlies were to a target they wanted to hit. So we
had that exchange of information.
We also down-linked information that came through multiple
intelligence sources to paint the picture of where the enemy
was. We down-linked Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar
System (JSTARs) data, down-linked Guardrail data, down-linked
national information data from satellites, and this was brought
back through the command and control system. We also displayed
it on the broadcast system all the way down to the battalion
level so that they had a pretty accurate picture of not only
where the friendly forces were, but also where we were
detecting the enemy to allow us to target them.
This was all done through these electronic digital systems.
Two networks, a tactical one, which today we call the Force XXI
battle command brigade, and the and below ATTC system and the
Army battle command system, which is a series of systems which
are linked to together to provide combat service support,
intelligence and maneuver information for our support.
This is a big picture of what digitized Army means,
answering the question to the soldier about where he is on the
battlefield, where his friends are on the battlefield and,
through the intelligence collection systems, then paints the
picture back to him about what we can detect on where the enemy
is.
Mr. Young. How does the individual soldier know where he
is? Does he have something that he carries with him to indicate
to him where his command battalion headquarters might be or
where the regimental leadership is? To what level does that
digitization make that available?
General Kern. Sir, we did that with a mechanized unit, so
most of that information was then displayed in tanks and
Bradleys and in command posts rather than on the individual
soldiers. We did it with one of the light infantry battalions
we had from the 25th Division at Fort Lewis which had some
individual systems.
But I have to be honest with you that those systems were
very much a prototype and not nearly as reliable as the
vehicular system. So what I will describe to you is what was in
the vehicle.
Essentially, it was a computer screen that had on it a
digital map of, Fort Irwin, in this case, and displayed on the
map were the icons for the different types of vehicles within
that friendly unit. So if you were a tank commander you could
look at your screen and you could see where the rest of your
platoon and company was located. If you were the battalion
commander, you could look at the 58 systems that were in your
battalion and see where they were arrayed on the ground.
So it was done on a computer screen with a map database
pictured, and then messages came through just as they would on
your computer as a line message type data.
Dr. Oscar. This is enabled by the Global Positioning System
(GPS), that comes from the satellites that show the location of
these.
General Kern. Two systems were used to actually geolocate
our vehicle. One, as Dr. Oscar said, was the GPS, and the
second was the RPLRS system, which also is a position locating
system, one doing it from satellite time and distance factors,
another triangulation across the EPLRS base stations.
MODERNIZATION ACCOUNT PRIORITIES
Mr. Young. Your modernization account is about 6 percent
over last year's appropriated level for fiscal year 1999, and
we are happy to see that, as I mentioned earlier. Tell us, what
are your highest priorities for this modernization? Give me
that four highest priorities that you are dealing with.
Dr. Oscar. The highest priority is the digitization, $261
million to integrate all this together and form that backbone.
The second and third are the Crusader howitzer and the Comanche
helicopter. That will give us leap-ahead capability on the
battlefield. The fourth is really kind of a collection of
certain missiles that are guided, like the fire-and-forget
Javelin and BAT ATACMS.
It is kind of a grouping of equipment that will give us an
increased capability on the battlefield very much over whatwe
have today.
[Clerk's note.--Dr. Oscar did not include the BAT ATACMS
system in his original testimony.]
Mr. Young. Does this budget submission keep those programs
at the rate that they ought to be?
Dr. Oscar. I believe this program that we have has the best
balance of introducing new equipment and having programs to
protect the equipment that exists.
It is sort of like you have a taxi cab fleet in Brooklyn
and you have 100 taxicabs and they last 10 years apiece and if
you buy 10 taxicabs a year, you keep your fleet at the average
age. So we need so much money a year. If you push it out and
don't buy taxicabs, you are going to get to a point where you
are going to have to buy more. Or if you wait to the end, you
have to buy a whole hundred; and you rally can't afford that.
At the same time as you would like to modernize, maybe you
would like to put radios in your taxicabs or a GPS system so
you know where they are and can communicate with them.
The Army is committed to those two parts. Part of the
budget is to replace equipment that is aging. And sometimes we
have to decide, well, I can't afford to buy all new; maybe I
will rebuild some to stretch out their life; and I would like
to introduce some new things, like digitization or radios or a
guided missile.
I believe this program has the best balance with the money
available to increase our technical capability in our weapons
that give us combat overmatch from the enemy so we can win and
maintain that average age or try to keep it from getting too
old and having our operations and support costs go too high.
Mr. Young. You all must have been comparing notes over
there across the river. We heard that taxicab story yesterday,
too.
Dr. Oscar. Is that right?
CRUSADER ARTILLERY PROGRAM
Mr. Young. That is a good story.
Several years ago, the Committee was interested in moving
or accelerating the Crusader program, and the information we
received was, well, we ought to keep it on track. Are you
saying now we are moving more expeditiously to go to the
Crusader?
Dr. Oscar. Yes, we are. We had, a few years ago, a
technical problem. The original program had a liquid propellant
gun, and we had some technical difficulties, and we switched
over to a parallel program we had. Actually, Congress very
helpfully suggested that we create a parallel program because
it was a high-risk program to start with.
So we had a very novel gun system conventionally but with a
modular ammunition that would give us very rapid firepower and
range. So we came to a point a year or two ago where the liquid
wasn't working out well, so we have switched over and rebase-
line the program, and it is proceeding at a very good rate,
probably about the optimum rate as you can develop something.
We are in development now, and it would be very difficult to
speed it up.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much.
Mr. Murtha.
DIGITIZATION VULNERABILITY
Mr. Murtha. Now, you all have seen the reports about
hackers breaking into our system. As you probably know, the red
team broke into our system much more extensively than the
hackers did. How vulnerable is this system to breaking in and
disrupting the system?
Dr. Oscar. I am sorry, sir. Mr. Murtha, are you talking
about the battlefield or----
Mr. Murtha. No, the digital battlefield. All the components
or any of the components of the digital battlefield.
Dr. Oscar. The battlefield is much tougher, because it is a
closed system. It is not open to people with modems to get into
like the internet, like your business or office machines. The
battlefield is more of a closed system.
We have tested at the division level an exercise that we
had at Fort Hood this November, not only trying to break into
it but trying to jam it and bring it down, and we had pretty
good results.
I would like to ask General Campbell to address that in a
little more detail.
General Kern. I could make one quick comment.
The systems we are using are encrypted. The Single Channel
Ground Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) radios and the Enhanced
Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS) I talked about are
encrypted systems, so they have the same level of protection
that our voice data have that we are using. And we have an
organization called the Land Information Warfare Agency (LIWA),
which the Army has built; and which was very much, in part, the
work we have done in red-teaming; both in the exercise last
March and in the exercise that was done in November.
Now I will let General Campbell, who is a real expert in
this business in his other life, talk to you about the details.
General Campbell. Yes, sir, I would like to talk about two
aspects of the battlefield communication systems.
The first is the tactical internet, which is the system
General Kern described earlier that links all of the individual
weapon systems together on SINCGARS and EPLRS today and in the
future will also include the near-term digital radio. That is
essentially an intranet, a closed system, which, as General
Kern mentioned, is encrypted.
The biggest security risk that we have with the tactical
internet is loss or capture of a tactical internet component
which has the crypto key loaded. That could compromise
everything that was being transmitted across the battlefield.
Consequently, we have built capabilities into the system to be
able to block any individual radio and computer that captured
or might have been lost or captured from entering back into the
intranet. I think that is the most significant vulnerability
for that tactical internet.
[Clerk's note.--In General Campbell's original testimony he
stated that the information security capabilities were
currently being developed and would be tested this summer.]
Mr. Murtha. That is a significant vulnerability?
General Campbell. Yes, sir, it is.
Mr. Murtha. What about the administrative attachments to
it? For instance, obviously logistics, administration,
deployments, all of those things are not near as secure. What
is the interplay between the two systems?
General Campbell. Yes, sir, attachments connected to the
system, include the larger computer systems that are not just
on the intranet but have internet connections as well. And
there are two aspects of vulnerability there. One is a
connection that goes off into the unclassified world into
portions of the logistics world, and the second is----
Mr. Murtha. Tell me what you are talking about. Are you
talking about bringing water, food, ammunition up?
Specifically, what is the administrative side versus the
tactical side?
General Campbell. The administrative side would be ordering
spare parts, sending information on personnel, linking and
things of that nature.
Mr. Murtha. The medical side.
General Campbell. Yes, the medical systems as well. With
telemedicine we have a need for large communication pipes to
link the medical community to the battlefield.
What we are bringing into the system to protect ourselves
in that area is a series of tiered capabilities, ranging from
intrusion detection systems to firewalls, where we can block
certain domains from getting into that portion of our internet.
Mr. Murtha. But how would you recognize that somebody has
interjected themselves into it?
General Campbell. Your first look would be at the address
itself. We are using commercial protocols. The way the
commercial internet works, any internet protocol address can be
pinged from any other protocol address. So it becomes very
important to use to be able to exclude non military addresses
or domains like educational institutions, as an example. At the
same time, we have to provide linkages that go back into those
portions of the commercial or the sustaining base world as
needed and in order to execute our missions.
We set up these introduction detection devices so that only
a certain set of addresses would be allowed in. Then the next
level beyond that is to have the computer recognize any
patterns of unusual activity where people failed on two or
three attempts on a password or where people are going into
areas of the system that they should not be allowed. So it is
tiered and layered defense.
Mr. Murtha. Are you working in trying to stop jamming or
just interception, are you working against experts who are
funded by a country? For instance, do you have the experts
working this problem? The red team, you know, the best people,
okay; is that who is working against you and you are trying to
then solve a problem with the red team working against the
administrative sides of it?
General Campbell. Yes, sir. We are doing two things: We are
working against the red teams, and we are concurrently
implementing countermeasures to capabilities that exist in the
real world today. If you read The Washington Post front page
this morning you would have seen the article about the
intrusions that were attempted into the nonsecure portion of
the government's internet.
Mr. Murtha. All right. I can't get it in my head. You have
the tactical side of it, which is an envelope, say. Then how
does the administrative side attach to it? I assume they can
jam or intercept or interject themselves into the
administrative side fairly easily at this stage before you have
worked out or eliminated the vulnerability. Is that accurate?
General Campbell. Yes, sir, generally. So the tactical
components I mentioned earlier are isolated, both by either
blocking of external addresses or operating on an encrypted
intranet.
Mr. Murtha. That is even against jamming?
General Campbell. Let me address jamming as a separate
question.
Where we deploy on the battlefield in a division, there
will be about 5,000 SINCGARS radios that are used in both the
voice and a data mode. All of the radios will be working in a
frequency hopping mode. They are all working with the same hop
set interleafed at different times so that many nets can
communicate simultaneously.
That is an extraordinarily difficult challenge to work
against in a jamming mode because, first of all, because it
would be a huge challenge to deploy a jammer powerful enough to
jam the whole division area. Such a jammer would be an enormous
target and would probably be blown away within the first 2
minutes after it was turned on. And if you try to use selective
jamming against all those radios that are frequency hopping, it
would be a very, very difficult challenge.
The EPLRS system, that we also use as part of the data
backbone, is also a frequency agile system that hops over
another set of frequencies in the Ultra High Frequency (UHF)
range. I think, just as a matter of physics, all systems that
use the electromagnetic spectrum are vulnerable to interference
and jamming, either intended or notintended. But a hostile
attempt to jam the entire force would be extraordinarily difficult to
pull off and extraordinarily dangerous.
Mr. Murtha. At this point even a large country wouldn't
have the capability or, if they did, you would have the ability
to destroy it very soon because you would be able to recognize
the source of the jamming?
General Campbell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murtha. That is inside the envelope and outside the
envelope?
General Campbell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murtha. All right. Now, then, getting back to the
intercepts or the interjection into the administrative side,
that would be much easier, and you are working on trying to
reduce that vulnerability. And part of the demonstration as you
move to 2010 you hope you will be able to resolve those
problems?
General Campbell. Yes, sir, that is correct,
The problem on the administrative system is that you link
back into the sustaining base. As we employ our posts, camps,
and stations in a power projection role, we need to have the
communications pipes that go from a deployed force back to
their home base.
Mr. Murtha. I don't need to hear the details. I just want
to make sure that as you are working your way towards what you
consider this 21st century Army, that you recognize the
vulnerability and you are working to overcome it, and that is
what it sounds like you are saying.
General Campbell. Absolutely.
Dr. Oscar. We definitely recognize it and are testing it.
Tactical is very hard, as we mentioned. It is closed, and we
are testing that constantly in the exercises.
The administrative one, as you said, is easier; but we have
a wide array of programs to toughen it up and to detect
intrusions.
Mr. Murtha. Well, this demonstration project, this will be
a major part of it, to see if you can overcome the
vulnerability of the system itself, both the tactical system
and the administrative system.
Dr. Oscar. There was a division level exercise in November
that was a major part of the test.
Mr. Murtha. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Lewis.
General Kern. One comment on that, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Certainly.
General Kern. If I look back at my career as a young
lieutenant in Vietnam, we manually encrypted everything over
radio nets which were not encrypted electronically. We did this
by looking up codes and changing it every day. Very, very
laborious and slow. Today, all that at the tactical level is
done through our automated encryption system. So we are far
better off than certainly I was 30 years ago.
Mr. Murtha. But also the enemy is better off.
General Kern. The enemy also is better off, without
question. But what has been the Achilles' heel is that our
admin systems have always been open, and we are really focusing
on that right now.
Mr. Murtha. And add one thing to it. With less materiel
forward and with more stockpile, this becomes a big problem
because you have to order it so much in advance. This could be
a major concern as you work your way through this thing.
Mr. Young. Mr. Lewis, our expert on the digital Army,
because he is the only one of us that has actually seen it in
operation.
NATIONAL DEFENSE PANEL
Mr. Lewis. And the National Training Center (NTC) is in my
district, gentlemen, if you didn't know that.
I had the opportunity, as I sat here initially listening to
this, to review the biographies of the people who make up our
panel, Mr. Chairman. Just one more time, it is always
impressive for me, as a layman sitting on this Committee, to
know that we have the mix of talent, training and expertise
that you gentlemen bring to us; and we appreciate it very much.
I wanted to say that the National Defense Panel (NDP), who
reviewed a lot of these subject areas and some of our
modernization challenges, has stated that it did not followthe
logic of several service procurement programs. The NDP expressed
concern over the Army's Comanche helicopter, the M-1, A-2 tank and the
Crusader field artillery system. Do you plan on making any adjustments
to your modernization strategy based on those recommendations?
Dr. Oscar. We continually look at the best mix, but I feel
this budget is very well balanced.
The National Defense Panel didn't say these weapons were
better. They said they are very good weapons, and they are
needed. They recommended maybe buying them slower or stretching
them out.
We have a difficult problem, which is trying to get a
balance between what we have today, like in our Crusader
howitzer. We have the Paladin, and that is aging. We are
replacing it with Crusaders, which is a real leap ahead in
capability that will dramatically improve our strategic
mobility and firepower.
If we were to stop these weapons or dramatically slow them
down, first of all, these weapons are the road to the future.
Many of these weapons you are proving out the technology step
by step that will lead to the next weapon, and you just can't
take this gigantic leap often.
Second, if you take all that money and start working on
developing a new weapon, it is going to be another 10, 15 years
out in the future; and, meanwhile, our equipment is aging. So
you have to kind of balance protecting the aging of the
equipment you have today and keep on improving it with
available technology and working for the next one.
So what we would like to do in our strategy, like in the M-
1 tank, you would not want to stop something if you do not have
an alternative. We have 7,000 tanks; our upgrade program is for
only 120 a year. At that rate, it will take us 58 years to turn
over that fleet. It is critical to keep on buying the M-1 tank.
Now that doesn't mean that we won't look at an alternative
at some point in time. Maybe 10, 15, 20 years from now we ask
ourselves do I keep buying the existing tank, do I buy a
modified improved tank or a completely new leap-ahead tank? But
you can't stop that or else our aging will be ridiculous. We
would have a real significant gap in the near-term.
Mr. Lewis. The NDP suggested, at least in two of those
systems, the Comanche and the Crusader, that you slow down the
process. Do you agree with that? And do you believe that you
can field lighter systems than Comanche and Crusader, let's say
by the early part of the next century?
Dr. Oscar. No. The Crusader and Comanche will be fielded in
the near part of the next century. They are both in Engineering
and Manufacturing Development (EMD) and will take until the
year 2006, in the case of Comanche, to get fielded. So to slow
it down would be to push it out.
TECHNOLOGY BASE FUNDING
Mr. Lewis. Is that a technology question or a funding
question, the problem?
Dr. Oscar. It is both a technology question--we don't have
a better technology right now than Comanche. It is our best
technology. But it is also a strategy question of if I push out
Comanche or I slow it down, the Kiowa and Cobra are Vietnam-era
helicopters, so they are already 30 years old.* So if I slow
Comanche from 2006 to 2016, I am going to have these
helicopters another 10 or 15 years longer, and I just can't do
that.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Kiowa Warrior will bridge the gap between Kiowa/Cobra and
Comanche.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
General Kern. If I could add, Congressman, the issue we
have with the National Defense Panel (NDP) report is not one of
logic but is of timing, about when we can do things; and we
believe that we have our programs----
Mr. Lewis. And that is as much a technology question as it
is a funding problem.
General Kern. That is correct. But it is both. It is both a
funding problem for the Army and balancing our resources. If we
had the technology today to build a 20-ton tank with the same
lethality and survivability and mobility of an M-1, we would do
it, but we don't have that today.
We are working the tech base very hard, and we hope in the
next few years to be able to match some of the concepts of the
Army After Next, which the NDP suggests we accelerate with
technologies that are at hand.
Mr. Lewis. Which raises kind of the next logical question
as far as development is concerned. Are their recommendations
realistic? If you are suggesting not realistic, then the
question is, can you develop and field a new light tank, as
early as 2010?
General Kern. I will try that first.
Dr. Oscar. Go ahead.
General Kern. The technology to build a 20-ton tank by 2010
by any measure that we have been able to find is not there
today. We have looked at composite materials, we have looked at
different propulsion systems, we have looked at different kill
methods, the lethality of the gun systems that we have today.
So I do not have in hand today the technology to build a 20-ton
tank that is even close to the capability of the current Abrams
series.
That follows the logic that Dr. Oscar described to you
about our current acquisition strategy until we are in that
position. I have asked our program executive officers to look
at that question very hard to determine when is the right time
for us to be able to bring on a new system.
We are looking very hard at the tech base, and we are
challenging Dr. Milton over the next year with an Army Science
Board study, with the National Academy of Sciences, and with
our own technology wargames to really examine what we have in
thetech base in academia, in industry, and in the Defense
Department to see what technologies are available that we can
accelerate.
So all of those pieces are under scrutiny. We would like to
be able to do all the things that are described within the
concepts of Army After Next, which are suggested that we could
accelerate, but we do not have that in hand today.
Mr. Lewis. Mr. Chairman, you mentioned that I had been
exposed to the digitization program. I was going to mention
that the Speaker, as you know, from time to time has been known
to visit the NTC and other locations where he observes these
developments with keen interest.
I think it would be really fabulous, if we can, as we plan
for the next 4 to 6 years, to have more of the committee go out
to those fields, especially NTC. But if we could get Mr. Murtha
out to California it would be a tremendous assist to us as we
deal with this next generation. So the invitation is open any
time you want to come.
Thank you.
AMMUNITION
Mr. Young. Okay. Mr. Visclosky.
Mr. Visclosky. On ammunition, are you adequately funded to
sustain your capabilities in your industrial base, do you
think?
Dr. Oscar. I believe we are. We have increased the budget.
It is a billion dollars, roughly, for ammunition. We have tried
our best to sequence our ammunition needs to look at which
industries make which kinds and arrange them so we are not all
of a sudden buying all of one and not the other. We are very
concerned about the industrial base, and we have done several
studies on it, and we take that into account in our strategy.
So I believe that the budget we have today not only is
proper for the Army to fill its ammunition needs with training,
ammunition and war reserve, but it is also sequenced in such a
way to protect the industrial base.
Mr. Visclosky. My understanding is you use about $900
million a year for training, for ammunition. That is the value
of the ammunition you use in training. And you are asking for
$827 million this year for training and war reserve.
I am looking at those numbers and wondering. There is a
shortfall or decline somewhere. Is that of any concern to you
or not?
Dr. Oscar. No, it isn't. Our war reserve is kind of like my
refrigerator. You have to rotate the stocks. And in some ways--
I shouldn't say that. My refrigerator is a little bit of a
mess.
Mr. Visclosky. Mine is like that myself.
Dr. Oscar. In some areas, we have too much ammo. Not too
much, but we have more than we need, so we are purposely
drawing down some of our war reserves in some areas for
training ammunition to kind of rotate this.
So, overall, the difference between the $800 and $900
million predominantly is that. It is drawing down in certain
selected areas where we have too much. In other areas we don't
have enough, and we are building back up.
Mr. Visclosky. On your modernization you have 14
categories, and you are funding four of them this year. What
about the other 10 categories and the modernization issue as
far as ammunition?
Dr. Oscar. We have spaced those out over the 1999 to 2003
period. I think it is actually six that we are buying, and in
the next couple of years we are buying three more. Throughout
that period there is only two we are not buying. I don't recall
the names of them. I could perhaps ask.
Mr. Visclosky. If you could give us justification for not
doing so, we would appreciate that.
Dr. Oscar. Would you like Jan to answer?
Colonel Edmunds. The Volcano and the XM-915 105 millimeter
howitzer round are the two.
Mr. Visclosky. Is there a particular reason for that? Do
you know?
Dr. Oscar. Prioritization within the ammo accounts, of
which we felt were most important right now.
Mr. Visclosky. I take it from your answer, then, you would
want to use the modernization for those two munitions but you
don't have the money to do that?
Dr. Oscar. Overall, in our budget, we are balancing
everything. We think this combination is the most optimum.
Mr. Visclosky. But you could use more money.
Dr. Oscar. It is no different than the fire or police
departments. Everyone wants more money. But within the
reasonable resources, I think this program is the best balance.
Mr. Visclosky. Could you, for the record, for those two
munitions, indicate what you would need to include them in your
rotation, as far as modernization?
I assume they are on the list because you need them, and it
is a question that you don't have money for all 14, so
something gives. What do you need for those last two?
Dr. Oscar. We will do that. It is a priority issue. But we
will certainly do that.
[The information follows:]
The two `modern' munitions not in the President's Budget
Submission or the Five Year Defense Plan are the XM915 105MM
Howitzer Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions Cartridge
and the Volcano Mine system. The total shortfall value of the
XM915 is $100,000,000 of which approximately $20,000,000 can be
executed in the next year of procurement. The total shortfall
value of the Volcano Mine system is $485,000,000 of which
approximately $20,000,000 can be executed in the next year of
procurement.
TOP MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS
Mr. Visclosky. Certainly.
As far as your modernization programs, and I guess to the
extent if you could do this for the record that would be fine,
but there are one or two you might want to highlight. Do you
have in this case four programs specifically you would list as
your top four modernization programs? And, if so, are they
fully funded for fiscal year 1999 in your budget?
Dr. Oscar. They are. Without question, our top program is
digitization; and in 1999 we have plussed it up $261 million,
which is enough money along with the other years to field a
division by 2000 and a corps by 2004. We are a little short in
1998, and we are working that issue. But that is our top
program.
Our other two, next two top programs, are the Crusader
howitzer and the Comanche helicopter; and we believe we have
them going at the optimum rate, trying to balance the technical
risk of how fast you can develop a weapon and available
resources.
Mr. Visclosky. Your budget also indicates you have
increased your modernization budget by $800 million from last
year. My understanding is some of that increase is a result of
reclassification.
Could you provide us a list of the programs previously
funded in Operations and Maintenance, or service budgets, which
were transferred during the fiscal year 1999 budget process to
Army research and procurement programs so we could have a
better sense as to how much real new money is included in that
$800 million?
Dr. Oscar. Yes, we will. Some of them are like chemical
DEMIL that the Department is requesting Congress' permission to
switch over, but we will do that.
Mr. Visclosky. $800 million sounds better than nothing, but
if it is not truly $800 million, it would be nice to know what
the true figure is.
Dr. Oscar. Yes.
BLACK HAWK HELICOPTER
Mr. Visclosky. On the Black Hawk, my understanding is that
you, over the next couple of years, have in your budgets 1999
and the year 2000 requests for 82 additional helicopters. I
think the total requirement you have talked about is actually
90.
Dr. Oscar. To my knowledge. Several years ago, we
determined the optimum number of Black Hawks. We have redone
that with the integration and reorganization of the Active and
Reserve. And to my knowledge, our requirement is 90. Now, we
have plused up the budget to take care of 50, and still in this
fiscal year budget, there is 40 that we don't have funding.
Mr. Visclosky. So you are only 40 short of the 90?
Dr. Oscar. Yes.
Mr. Visclosky. And 22 of those would be in this year's
budget?
Dr. Oscar. Correct.
Mr. Visclosky. Then I assume it is 10----
Dr. Oscar. And plus-up 10 a year after that.
Mr. Visclosky. I don't understand your answer.
General Kern. You are correct in what you described. There
are 22 in this year's budget, and in the outyear budgets which
we are now looking at, what we have submitted with the FYDP is
10 a year, and we will continue--from the Army only.
Now, the Black Hawk line, remember, has other aircraft that
come into it from the other Services as well, and that is how
we get to our sustaining rate within the Black Hawk production.
We have reviewed that aviation modernization plan this year and
resubmitted it to Congress this past fall, and that is what we
outlined. We are just talking the Black Hawks in this case.
Mr. Visclosky. I might want to follow up with you later on
that if I could.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Kern. Yes.
TRUCK PROGRAMS
Mr. Young. Mr. Hobson.
Mr. Hobson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, as you might expect I want to talk about trucks,
High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs), tanks,
the Black Hawk I want to revisit, and a collision warning
system.
As you know, this Committee has been very supportive of
trucks, and a couple of years ago this committee added more
money for trucks than we added for the B-2. What does the
budget contain for Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTVs)
this year?
Dr. Oscar. We have plused up, and it is about $236 million
last year; 1998 it was about $204 million, and 1999 is about
$336 million, and I can get you the exact numbers.
[The information follows:]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prior Current (FY98) Budget (FY99) FYDP (FY00-03)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RDTE........................................ 90.7 ............... ............... 1.6
Procurement................................. 1,310.8 204.0 336.4 2,188.7
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Total................................. 1,401.5 204.0 336.4 2,190.3
Qty......................................... 9,699 121.3 2,038 12,659
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This funding stream demonstrates the Army's firm commitment to the
FMTV program.
Mr. Hobson. Well, let me ask you this question: Do you
think that there is enough additional funds to prevent a
production gap to the contractor? Have you talked to the
contractor?
Dr. Oscar. We are working with the contractor to close that
gap. He just recently advised us that there may be a gap
between the 1998 and 1999 multiyear contracts, and it has to do
with lead items. And so we are looking at buying a few long
lead items to prevent that gap? And I think we can.
What happens is we award the contract and then he says it
takes him so many months to get started. Well, he is obviously
in production now. It is a matter of purchasing up the long-
lead time items. So I think we can close that gap by making a
small amount of money in fiscal year 1998 available for those
long-lead items.
Mr. Hobson. Let me ask you about the----
Dr. Oscar. Here is the--I am sorry. The exact amount was
$600 million over the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP).
[Clerk's note.--Dr. Oscar testified the exact amount was
$336 million.]
Mr. Hobson. The plus-up?
Dr. Oscar. A total of over $600 million
Mr. Hobson. You know, we had a lot of painfully discussed
competition strategy, which we finally worked out with
everybody. Is that fully funded in both fiscal 1999 budget and
future POMs?
Dr. Oscar. Yes, it is. We have fully funded the money
necessary to compete and bring on a second source.
Mr. Hobson. Okay. I just want to get that on the record.
One other thing I would like to ask. Is there any money
tucked away in here, like we found last year, to do a new HMMWV
thing?
Dr. Oscar. It will take me a little while to describe this.
We have changed our HMMWV strategy a little bit, and if you
will permit me.
Mr. Hobson. I would hope so.
Dr. Oscar. I know last year the Army was talking about new
HMMWVs and then competing HMWVs in the near term. The Marines
were talking about initiating an Extended Service Program
(ESP). In this fiscal year 1999 budget, it is kind of a switch-
around. The Marines have looked into it and determined that the
ESP effort is inappropriate. Most of the Marine Corps HMMWVs
have salt water corrosion, and they do a lot of fording in and
around beaches and have a lot of rust on them. Due to the
severity of the rust problem they have decided to go with new
HMMWVs.
We also are in the process of relooking at it, and in the
long term it is better for us to buy new. And so we are putting
the finishing analysis together, and we may come back to you
shortly to request moving the ESP money to new HMMWVs. And so
our strategy will probably be to buy new HMMWVs out through at
least 2002. We will also look at a kind of a maintenance
upgrade with some technical insertion to kind of help keep them
modern.
Now, at the end of that time period, we need to also look
at whether we should upgrade the HMMWV to insert new technology
or buy a commercial HMMWV. But we will come back to you.
Mr. Hobson. But your strategy before, as I understood it,
was you were going to try to take $9 million and start going
down the road of building a totally different--new, whatever,
vehicle and you put that on the old until longer down the road.
Is that the short answer?
Dr. Oscar. That is correct. We no longer have that. We
intend to buy new HMMWVs through 2002.
Mr. Hobson. I just want to get that on the record, sir, so
we don't have any misunderstanding down the road.
You know, it always concerns me that we tend to upgrade all
of these things. I mean, we tend to do the ones who do these
things, and you guys all seem to know it, and it becomes a
game. But I am telling you, the game is not as easy as it used
to be. First of all, there isn't the money. Second of all, we
have got somebody down there who is going to draw a line
through it for something else they may want, and it is going to
be a different game.
And I don't think you guys can depend upon the benevolence
of this Committee. First of all, I think the Army gets short
shrift in the--and I could use another word--the amount of
money they get based upon the load they carry. And then when
this kind of thing happens, it makes it even harder for us to
help you guys out, which I think we want to do. We have to have
an understanding between ourselves and not try to do each other
in.
We had a hard time, and Trish was very helpful on the
staff, and everybody, in working out this competition strategy,
because I think long term we are going to save money with that.
I will bet you it is cheaper, and I bet you we can build them
more expeditionary when we compete it. And the HMMWV is another
example because there have been times when there has been no
money for the HMMWV, and this Committee had to do it.
Let's go on to tanks, if we can, unless you want to say
something about HMMWVs.
Dr. Oscar. It was just going to say the HMMWV fleet is
arelatively younger fleet compared the 2.5-ton truck fleet. And as we
look in the future, we realize we only have so much money. So we are
saying, how can we best optimize this?
So we were doing a lot of analysis. And I realize at the
early stages we were kind of flip-flopping between whether is
it better to ESP all of them or, whether to buy some new and
ESP some. And we are about done with that analysis. Like I
said, the conclusion in the near-term, it is better to buy new.
Mr. Hobson. And one of the things--and it is true with the
tank, and it is true with trucks, and it is true with HMMWVs--
this supplier base is very fragile.
You know, personally, if I were out in the private sector,
I am not sure I would want to work with you guys, to be frank
with you, because you never know where you are.
I mean, I can't get anybody who builds trucks, and I have
said this before, for a living in a commercial sense who wants
to build them for you guys. And it is not just the special
requirements you have, but it is all the stuff you have got to
go through. I mean, I have got Kenworth in my district. I have
got Navistar in my district. They don't build any heavy trucks
for you people anymore. GM, I don't think, does anymore, the
big stuff. So they have all walked away.
So what we get are--you know, for stuff that shouldn't be,
in my opinion, we have to get specialty contractors in there
that have to start all over again. And I am not crying over the
BMY thing. Navistar just bought it, so I don't have to worry
about that anymore. Our State has probably lost a lot of money
for selling it to Navistar. Sorry about that.
They are located in his district.
ABRAMS TANK UPGRADE PROGRAM
But I would like to go ahead and talk about tanks a little
bit. Again, these are not in my district. They are in the State
that I live in, and I have been up there. But I would like to
read through this scenario on tanks and go back through it so
you know where I am coming from and what I am doing.
Let me read through this. I have got three different
scenarios here, and I will read through them, and then I will
come back to them so you know overall what I am talking about.
Recent press reports stated that the Army intends to
terminate the M1A2 tank upgrade program as early as fiscal year
2003. Why have you decided to cancel the Abrams upgrade
program, if you have? How many M1A2 tanks will the Army have at
that point? What percentage of the total tank force will be
modernized with the M1A2? What effect does termination of
production have on sustaining combat overmatch? That is one.
Two, the plan seems to accept a long production gap between
termination of the Abrams upgrade program and the beginning of
some Future Combat System. The lack of continuous modernization
of our tank fleet appears to be a high risk, given the
uncertainty of the emerging armored threats worldwide.
One, what is your plan to deal with these threats? What
level of risk is appropriate for our soldiers? Two, what do you
do if unforeseen events require accelerated modernization
before Future Combat System is ready for production?
And three, a recent Army white paper says that the
centerpiece of the Army's modernization program is
digitization. Digitization is primarily the timely sharing of
information done more effectively than in the past by other
forms of communication. True modernization, however, is
characterized by maintaining combat overmatch.
I am concerned that the Army is confusing the public when
it says that the modernization of one-third of the active armor
force is digitized M1A1 tanks which are certain eventually to
be overmatched.
Now, those are three big things I want to talk about.
The thing that bothers me about digitization, and I know
you have got to do all this, but I will tell you, if you are
the kid out there who has got to push the button, you want that
thing to fire and where it is going to fire. I am worried you
get so much of this stuff and you get out there in weather and
all kinds of other things, and you push the button, and, you
know, it doesn't fire because you have got so much--it is so
mechanized, so automated, that it just doesn't work when it is
supposed to work.
And, you know, when they pull that trigger, I want it to
fire. If you are the kid standing there, you know, you don't
want to have to worry about fixing all of this stuff.
I can remember years ago, and I am sure it is a lot better
today, pulling radar systems around in trucks, when we would
get them on top of the hill and they never worked, and they
overheated when you got up over the hill, and they weren't
worth anything. I am sure today they work. But that is why I
worry about the over emphasis on digitization. But I would like
to go back through this and let you answer so you know where I
am going. Do you want to talk about the----
Dr. Oscar. I was just going to comment on your last
comment, because my last assignment, I was the head of research
and development at the Tank Automotive Command in Detroit. And
I guess--I have a lot of pride in the M1 tank. I think it is
the best in the world, and if you ask the Iraqi soldiers in
their tanks that we were knocking off first round every time at
three clicks, and their turrets were popping off, I think they
would admit that we have the best tank in the world.
Mr. Hobson. Well, I want to continue to build them.
Dr. Oscar. Right.
Mr. Hobson. And I am worried about that supplier base. So
why don't we go back and terminate the M1A2 tank and upgrade as
early as fiscal year 2003, and then the other questions with
that.
Dr. Oscar. Okay. If you don't mind, I would like General
Kern to answer that.
Mr. Hobson. Whoever wants to is fine.
General Kern. We have a current program, which is funded in
this budget, we will complete the 5-year multiyear, which the
M1A2s, are currently funded for in the fiscal year 1999 budget.
The question you asked, sir, we will buy 1,150 M1A2s with
the current budget which we have submitted.
Your question then, I believe, was is that adequate? And
then should we continue on producing them?
Those are the same questions which we are asking ourselves
right now, as we look beyond this budget and as we build our
future program.
The question which I asked the program office to look at
last year, which was widely reported as kill the tank, we in
fact----
Mr. Hobson. We all heard that.
General Kern. In fact, the question which you just asked,
that this tank, the Abrams, is going to be with us for some
period of time, well into the 21st century. Icannot tell you
exactly how long that is today.
We also know that we have a concept which is described, and
we discussed earlier with Mr. Lewis, on the Army After Next in
getting to a 20-ton tank. And I also stated earlier, I don't
have the technology in hand today to be able to build that.
So the question then is how do we balance the risk of
current technology that is incorporated in the M1A2? How do we
build the digital force which we are describing? And the A2 is
a digital tank. It has a 1553 data bus. It has a digital
messaging system, and what we are building in this program is
an analog system enhancement program which matches its
capability to communicate with the rest of the force. So it is
not an analog system.
Mr. Hobson. I am familiar with it.
General Kern. How do we match those pieces within the
resources that we have, as we go forward in the 21st century?
Today, we believe that the 1,150 is about the right number.
Would I like to pure fleet the entire United States Army on
M1A2s? Yes, sir, I would. And if we had enough resources to do
all of that, I am sure that you would also.
But that is not the prudent plan that we see today, that we
are going to build a balanced fleet of the M1A1, with a digital
capability, and the M1A2. But in addition, we have to be able
to bring in the rest of our Bradleys and our artillery, our
Apaches, and bring in the other systems. So that is the balance
which we must strike when we look at the tank program for the
future, because the question is whether we will have another
multiyear or whether we will continue buying at a single-year
rate. And the question of how many total tanks will be
purchased in a rebuilt M1A2 configuration with the system
enhancement?
All of those are questions which we are asking ourselves to
address as we go forward in this year's program, beyond what we
have submitted in the current FYDP.
I think the last question that you asked was, how smart is
it to invest in these high technologies versus overmatch? How
much risk do we want to take?
Our assessment right now is that the capabilities
incorporated by allowing everyone to know where they are, where
their buddies are and where the enemy is, has a significant
synergistic effect on the current weapons platforms to given
them much greater capability.
We also believe that the reliability of these systems will
be very high, and, in fact, many of the digital electronics,
which we already have, have higher reliability than some of the
other analog and mechanical systems which are currently
incorporated in our weapons platforms.
So I don't think we are shortchanging the soldiers on
giving them systems which are not going to be reliable. And we
will test to ensure that, in fact, what we do deliver is
reliable.
But I also have to tell you that I was a tanker back when I
was a young fellow, and we also have backup systems in every
one of those tanks, whether it is an A2 digital or not. It is a
blasting device where you turn the switch that sends the round
downrange. We will not leave them off.
We will also make sure that we have strictly pure optical
sites, which allow us to continue in a backup mode.
I believe you know that we train in a regime which requires
our soldiers to fight only with a full-up capability of our
systems, but also requires them to fight in a degraded mode so
that they know how to use the entire capability which we build
into our system.
And we will do this for all of our systems. We are not
going to put equipment out there for our soldiers which puts
them at risk.
Mr. Hobson. Let me tell you the thing that concerns me as
we go through this. The indecision on the part of the Army
affects the ability to sell this equipment overseas in some
contracts that are out there.
In keeping the supplier base up, are you sending any
messages or can you send any message to people that are
thinking--there are a lot of people I suspect, as I understand
it, a couple of people anyway, who are looking to buy a
substantial number of tanks that are worried about buying our
tanks versus other people's tanks because of the scenario that
your are going through.
Are you able to give any comfort to them or to the
manufacturers so that we can get those sales? I think they
enhance your ability, if we can get those sales, to get prices
that you need and to get the capability that you need. If we
lose that supplier base--and I don't mean the company that
builds the things. I am talking about the people down below.
Dr. Oscar. Right.
Mr. Hobson. Apparently there are some contracts pretty
close out there that are affected by this indecision or the
timing of your decisions. Do you know anything about that?
Dr. Oscar. So we work very hard with these other countries
to brag about and to tell them about the good things about our
equipment.
Our budget stream, as they see it, does fund this M1 tank,
and they know with 7,000 tanks this is going to be in our
inventory for many, many years, and we are going to support it.
We have given them that message.
General Kern. Sir, I could add two comments. Yes, I am
aware of some of the pending foreign military cases that are
being looked at. I do believe that, as Dr. Oscar described, we
have a more stable production base, than almost any other
country in the world despite the low numbers we have.
Certainly, if I were looking to buy a Russian tank, which I
could buy cheaply on the market today, they aren't building
any. So they have tremendous capacity. If I were buying, I
would be very much worried about their supplier base.
Mr. Hobson. Right.
General Kern. The French are relooking their entire defense
industry today, with another big competitor out there, with the
LeClerc. It is also one which, if I were buying from a foreign
source and looking around, I would feel less than comfortable.
The Germans also produce a very capable tank, and their
economy has had some problems.
So nobody is going to look elsewhere and not come back and
look at the United States and say we have had a very good track
record over the last 50 years of being a very stable supplier
of weapons platforms; not just for the initial purchase, but
for the sustained.
Mr. Hobson. Well, I think that is true over the last few
years, but people are worried about where we are going. Oneof
the places is Israel. The other place is Turkey.
General Kern. Uh-huh.
BLACK HAWK HELICOPTER
Mr. Hobson. And those sales could be very important, I
think, to you all long term, and I hope you will work with
whoever--however you do it to see that we are competitive and
that we get those sales.
I want to talk a little bit about the Black Hawk. It is my
understanding that if you--you have 22, I think, in the fiscal
1999 budget, which is what we were talking about before. If you
added 8 to that, don't you get a big savings long term by
adding--instead of buying 22, if you bought 30? Don't you save,
I don't know, $60 million or more or something? There are some
numbers in here that if you just added some of that rather
than----
Dr. Oscar. That's true of most programs we have,
unfortunately. With the strategy we have of trying to--you
know, if I buy all Black Hawk, and then I can't buy Apaches, or
if I buy all Apaches, I can't buy tanks, so we are trying to
balance the money available and buy new and fix it all up. And
in some cases, yes, we are not buying--we could get discounts
if we bought higher rates, that is true.
General Kern. The total rate at which we would like to buy
the Black Hawk is 36 a year, but that includes all services. So
the 22 is only the Army number. There is also a Navy buy of
Black Hawks as well.
[The information follows:]
In order to gain these savings, DoD would have to commit to
36 Black Hawks per year for 3 years (FY99-01). This would
rebaseline the current multiyear contract and generate
approximately $30 million in savings over three years. However,
to save this $30 million the Army would have to find
approximately $240 million over three years to procure the
additional UH-60's.
Mr. Hobson. What is the Navy buy? Does anybody know?
General Kern. I could not verify that.
Mr. Hobson. Six? So that gets them to 28?
So if you bought--so is the total number then not--so you
only have to buy, what, two more to get to the savings number
where you get the big savings? I don't know. Could somebody
look at that and then figure it out?
Dr. Oscar. We will have to look at it.
Mr. Hobson. That is something we need to know. If you buy
two more and you save $60 million, you know, maybe it is
something we ought to look at. That is all I am saying. I don't
know whether that is what Mr. Visclosky was getting at in his
questions, but that is where I was coming from to you.
General Kern. Sir, we will provide that information for you
for the record.
[The information follows:]
The Army could achieve significant savings by buying at
least eight additional UH-60s per year in each of the three
remaining years of the current multiyear contract (fiscal years
1999, 2000 and 2001). The current multiyear contract is based
on a procurement strategy of 18 H-60 helicopters per year for
all Services (Army, Navy and Air Force). Furthermore, the
contract contains an option for the Army to re-baseline to a
more economic rate of 36 H-60 helicopters per year. The
advantage of going to 36 H-60s per year versus 18 would be a
savings to the Army of $33,200,000 spread out over three years
($10,900,000 in fiscal year 1999, $10,700,000 in fiscal year
2000, and $11,600,000 in fiscal year 2001). This assumes the
Navy buys six H-60s in FY99, eighteen H-60s each in fiscal
years 2000 and 2001, and the Army funds eight additional H-60's
in fiscal years 1999, 2000, and 2001. In order to achieve the
more economical rate of 36 per year (18 Army & 18 Navy) and
save $33,200,000 the Army would have to invest an additional
$240,000,000 into its Black Hawk helicopter program. This would
commit the Services to 36 H-60 helicopters per year, not only
in fiscal year 1999 but the remaining two years of the
multiyear contract (fiscal years 2000 and 2001).
TRUCK SAFETY
Mr. Hobson. And the last thing, this is kind of a parochial
one, I guess, not for me, but for somebody else, Army tactical
vehicle accidents cost the Army approximately $25 million a
year in material damage and medical injuries. Further, and
worse, over 460 soldiers have been injured and 49 killed per
year in truck accidents. Commercial off-the-shelf systems exist
to alert drivers to avoid impending collisions.
Dr. Oscar, you recently sent me the results of testing and
analysis of the collision warning system. I would like you to
talk about that to the committee, and on what vehicles will it
be installed, and where else could this be installed that it
would be cost-effective, and at what cost?
Dr. Oscar. The Army is very proud of what it has done in
dual-use technology. We formed a National Automobile Center in
Detroit to try to compare our requirements and technology with
the automobile industry, and so we have many joint programs
with the Big 3, and one of them is on collision avoidance. We
helped the Big 3 develop collision avoidance along with Anti-
Lock Brake System (ABS) off road, and refiltering of oil and
many other initiatives.
We have tested the collision device on our trucks, and it
does provide an added capability to reduce accident rates. We
are going to embed it in some of our new trucks. We are looking
at the cost of doing it versus the kinds of accidents various
trucks get into; many of them are roll-over or many of them had
head-on accidents.
This collision warning avoidance is best suited for convoy
missions. The radar on the side of the vehicle alerts you not
to pull over into the next lane, so you don't hit somebody in
your blind spot. It is typically not a death or a serious
injury kind of an accident. But we are doing the analysis now
to determine if it is worthwhile to retrofit and put that
device on current vehicles rather than just embed it in the new
ones.
General Kern. I have also asked our program office to look
at putting them on the fleet of trucks which are out at the
National Training Center (NTC), where we run convoys under
relatively hazardous conditions with dust and at night. We do
have some statistics at the NTC which we could go back and look
at to see whether that makes good sense.
Mr. Hobson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You have been very
patient with me. I appreciate it very much.
Mr. Young. Mr. Hobson, thank you very much.
I want to apologize for a rather poor attendance this
afternoon. The House adjourned early, and many Members chose to
go to their districts to do what they do in their districts.
But we appreciate very much your being here and your very
thorough responses to our questions.
We have additional questions that we would like to submit
in writing and ask that you would respond for the record, if
you would please.
And the Committee will stand adjourned until 2:00 on
Tuesday next, when we will meet in this room, H-140, of the
Capitol for a closed hearing with the Commander in Chief of the
Special Operations Command. And if there is nothing further,
the Committee will be adjourned.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the
answers thereto follow:]
Modernization Shortfalls
Question. The Army is requesting $13,000,000,000 for Army
modernization programs. This is $800,000,000--about six percent higher
than the fiscal year 1998 appropriated amount. These funds will procure
aircraft, ammunition, tracked and tactical vehicles, missiles, and
other combat support equipment. This funding will also be used for
research and development programs.
What are your top four modernization programs? Are they fully
funded in the fiscal year 1999? Are they optimally funded in the
accompanying fiscal years of the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP)? If
not, what are the shortfalls?
Answer. The Army's goal of digitizing a Division by fiscal year
2000 and Corps by 2004 is our top initiative. Our Digitization efforts
include the ongoing modernization efforts of approximately 97 systems
encompassing 538 budget lines. The total estimate of the digitization
effort is $2,600,000,000 in fiscal year 1999. The Army did not take
this $2,600,000,000 from programs to create a new effort. It was
already part of the Army Total Obligation Authority that was allotted
to these many existing programs. Of this total, approximately
$261,000,000 was added to digitization by Office of the Secretary of
Defense for fiscal year 1999. The $261,000,000 provides for improved
interoperability, increased integration, improved security, network
management, and more robust common architectures. It is key to the
horizontal efforts that go across these systems. Crusader and Comanche
are two major weapons systems programs that continue development of new
platforms. Other top Army's dollar value modernization programs in the
President's fiscal year 1999 budget are the Longbow Apache helicopter,
the Abrams tank, and the Army Tactical Missile System--BAT brilliant
anti-armor. During the FYDP (2000-2005) we will spend approximately
$10,400,000,000 on those systems.
Question. Do you believe that your fiscal year 1999 budget allows
you to procure items at a rate that makes economic and operational
sense? Which programs concern you the most?
Answer. Based on the fiscal constraints, the fiscal year 1999
President's Budget and FYDP are adequate operationally and
economically. Additional funds would provide increased flexibility
while a decrease would cause reprogramming detrimental to some
programs. The programs that concern me most are those that are funded
at a level where production is at or close to the minimum sustaining
rate. Examples of such programs include Extended Range Multiple Launch
Rocket System, Army Tactical Missile System production, and Avenger.
Our production rates for trucks, the Palletized Loading System,
Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck and Heavy Equipment Transporter
System are also being produced at or above the minimum sustaining rate.
Finally, the M829A2 Kinetic Energy Tank Rounds that we are procuring in
fiscal year 1999 are being produced at their minimum sustaining rates.
[Clerk's note.--According to the Army $38,000,000 is
required for the M829A2 to be produced at the minimum
production rate. The fiscal year 1999 President's Budget
request is only $9,700,000, well below the amount required to
fund the minimum sustaining rate.]
Question. Your fiscal year 1999 budget request is $800,000,000
higher than last year's appropriated amount. Do you sustain this level
funding in the outyears? If not, what programs do not maintain the
momentum of the fiscal year 1999 budget?
Answer. Yes, an increase of approximately $1,000,000,000 is
realized each year throughout the FYDP. The momentum will be continued
through the outyears.
Question. Last year, Congress provided $12,200,000,000 for Army
modernization. The Army's fiscal year 1999 budget request for
modernization program is $13,000,000,000--this is $800,000,000 higher
than the fiscal year 1998 appropriated amount. These funds are used to
develop and procure aircraft, ammunition, tracked and tactical
vehicles, missiles, and other combat support equipment. Although your
modernization program is higher this year than last year's appropriated
amount, the majority of your funds are to modify and extend the life of
systems that are currently in the Army inventory. Does this concern
you?
Answer. The Army has developed a budget that adequately funds our
programs consistent with our modernization strategy and within the
existing fiscal constraints. The Army's fiscal year 1999 budget is
approximately $1,700,000,000 above last year's President Budget
submission. Based on fiscal constraints, the fiscal year 1999
President's Budget and FYDP are adequate operationally and
economically. An increase of approximately $1,000,000,000 is realized
each year throughout the FYDP. Despite these increases we remain about
$3,000,000,000 to 5,000,000,000 short of the requirements necessary to
maintain modernization and prepare for the Army After Next.
Question. Your budget request for modernization is $800,000,000
higher than last year's appropriated amount; however, some of the
increases is a result of transfers. For example:
a. modifications previously budgeted in operations and maintenance
are now funded in procurement;
b. the dual-use technology program which was previously funded in
defense-wide was transferred to Army, research and development; and
c. the chemical demilitarization program which was previously
funded in defense-wide was transferred to Army, procurement.
For the record, please provide a list of the programs previously
funded in operations and maintenance (O&M) or service/defense-wide
budgets which were transferred during the fiscal year 1999 budget
process to Army research and procurement appropriations.
Answer. To comply with Department of Defense (DoD) Funding Policy
requiring certain modifications to be funded from investment
appropriations, depot maintenance funds were realigned from O&M to
procurement beginning in the fiscal years 1998/1999 Program Budget
Decisions (PBD) cycle to support equipment modernization.
$80,900,000 was moved from O&M to procurement accounts for systems
such as Apache Longbow, Abrams upgrades, Carrier modifications, and
improvements to the Bradley Fighting System Vehicle.
The following programs were transferred into the Army Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation (RDTE) appropriation in the fiscal
year 1999 budget:
a. SERDP (Strategic Environmental R&D Program). $55,600,000.
Transfer from Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), under the
Defense Reform Initiative. Objective is to improve DoD mission
readiness by providing new knowledge, cost effective technologies, and
demonstrations in the areas of environmental cleanup, compliance,
conservation, and pollution prevention. Addresses high priority,
mission-relevant defense environmental technology needs necessary to
enhance military operations. Also enhances pollution prevention
capabilities to reduce operational and life-cycle costs.
b. HBCU (Historically Black Colleges/Universities). $4,700,000.
Transfer from OSD, under the Defense Reform Initiative. Program is
devolved from OSD equally to the Services. Increases the amount that
Army has for contracts/grants to minority institutions. Increases
amount of budget activity 6.1 (basic research) funding.
c. DUAP (Dual Use Applications Program). $20,000,000. Transfer from
OSD. Provides incentive for Army agencies to exploit new ways of doing
business with the private sector in development of technologies having
both military and commercial applications. Provides matching funds for
projects proposed and funded by private sector.
OTHER R&D INCREASES IN FISCAL YEAR 1999
d. Net Assessment Directorate to National Defense University (NDU).
$8,000,000. Transfer under the Defense Reform Initiative from OUSD (P)
to the National Defense University, for which the Army has executive
agency. The President, NDU, will only provide administrative oversight.
The Director will still be tasked by OUSD (P) and serve clients in OSD.
Outrider Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), $75,600,000. Program
management for the Outrider UAV was transferred from the Defense-wide
RDTE program to Army R&D beginning in fiscal year 1999. Funds Low Rate
Initial Production in fiscal year 1999, and allows a more though
evaluation of the utility of this UAV prior to beginning full rate
production in fiscal year 2000.
Chemical Demilitarization, $980,400,000. The Chemical
Demilitarization program devolved from Department of Defense to Army
effective fiscal year 1999. Fiscal year 1999 funds of $855,100,000 were
moved from Chemical Agents and Munitions Destruction (CAMD), Defense
appropriation to an Army CAMD account. Fiscal year 1999 funds in the
amount of $125,300,000 were moved from Military Construction, Defense-
Wide appropriation to Military Construction Army appropriation.
Additional Funding
Question. Last year, you were very candid about identifying your
top unfunded requirements to the Committee and working with us to
provide additional funding for many of them. I hope you will continue
that cooperation with us. General Kern, please describe your top
unfunded weapons system acquisition priorities and why the fiscal year
1999 budget is not sufficient in these areas.
Answer. To achieve prominence as a superior fighting force, the
Army has relied on and will continue to depend upon technology
insertion to maintain our combat overmatch advantage. As our force has
become smaller, we must replace aging and obsolete systems and upgrade
our capabilities to maintain this advantage. The fiscal year 1999
budget is balanced and funds our programs at a level that permits the
Army to develop and procure the equipment which enables our soldiers to
remain the best in the world. There are however, opportunities where we
can develop and buy additional required technologies and weapon systems
beyond amounts affordable in our balanced, yet constrained budget. We
have divided our top fiscal year 1999 unfunded priorities into five
broad areas: Readiness and Soldier Quality of Life, (including fiscal
year 1999 contingency operations in Bosnia, real property maintenance,
and base operations); Equipping the Force, (systems such as Comanche,
Crusader, and Soldier Life Support); Additional Reserve Component
Modernization Enhancements, (procurement of additional Blackhawk
helicopters and tactical vehicles and trailers); Soldier Support and
Cost Reduction Initiatives, (procurement of Apache helicopter and
Javelin training devices); and Sustainment of Industrial Base,
(conventional ammunition demilitarization and test equipment and range
improvements. Total dollar amount of these Unfinanced Requirements
(UFRs) is $3,900,000,000. This amount includes $976,400,000 for
modernization associated with these broad areas.
Question. What are the potential savings if the Congress were to
provide additional funding in fiscal year 1999 for these items, either
by buying them earlier than planned or by lower production unit costs
through procurement at higher quantities? Please put the costs and
savings in the record.
Answer. The Army has developed a prioritized list of uses for
increased fiscal year 1999 funding, should it be made available, along
with potential savings to be derived. These savings are not always
monetary, but reap operational impacts/benefits as well, and would
allow the Army to increase readiness, revitalize infrastructure, and
accelerate modernization programs. A representative sample of these
savings/benefits follow: $24,000,000 for Comanche will accelerate the
flight test program and provide continuous flying of the first
prototype and additional flight test support for both aircraft,
reducing program risk. $11,500,000 for Crusader will finance a risk
mitigation program for the Crusader transmission, ensure that the
program will achieve First Unit Equipped in fiscal year 2005, and
deliver a system that meets all mobility performance requirements.
$88,000,000 for Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles will accelerate
fielding to National Guard and Army Reserve Force Package (FP) 1 and 2
units, permitting mobilization of all FP 1 and 2 units with a fully
modernized medium truck fleet rather than a half equipped force with a
mixed fleet. It will also bring production to a more economic rate of
200 per month, and the average unit cost of fiscal year 1999 production
will drop at least 5 percent. More trucks fielded sooner will also
lower support costs. $22,000,000 for Command and Control systems will
provide automated terrain analysis, digital database updates,
commercial and national imagery inputs and products in support of
terrain visualization. These Command and Control systems will serve as
critical enablers of information operations in peacetime and
information warfare during hostilities.
Question. Which of these items are on any of the CINC's integrated
priority lists?
Answer. All of the CINCs requested enhancements to their Command,
Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I)
capabilities. Command and Control systems such as those mentioned above
compliment the capabilities described on the CINC Integrated Priority
Lists (IPL). These systems contribute to providing a secure, robust,
integrated, deployed global and sustaining base information
infrastructure to ensure critical decision-making information is
available to the warfighter, and protected against enemy exploitation.
CINC IPLs also addressed enhancements to logistics capabilities which
specifically mentioned FMTV and aging truck fleets.
National Defense Panel (NDP)
Question. The National Defense Panel (NDP) recommended that the
Army become ``more expeditionary: fast, shock-exploiting forces, with
greater urban operations capability.'' The NDP was critical of the
Army's procurement programs which continued to modify heavy weapons
systems because they will be difficult to transport into theatre.
The NDP stated that it did not follow the logic of several of the
services procurement programs. The NDP expressed concern over the
Army's Comanche helicopter and the Crusader field artillery system. Do
you plan on making any adjustments to your modernization strategy based
on these recommendations? Please explain.
Answer. Our Army Modernization Strategy continues to prioritize
investments over time and reflects the linkage to the operational
concepts described in Joint Vision 2010 and the patterns of operation
outlined in Army Vision 2010. I agree with the National Defense Panel's
finding that ``it is important to begin the transformation process
now.'' That's what our Force XXI and Army After Next processes are all
about. Through Force XXI, we are exploring the potential, and
leveraging the power, of Information Age technologies. The result--Army
XXI--will be a product-improved version of today's force, with its
principal increases in capability coming from our exploitation of
information systems. I believe this is a prudent course to take based
on our understanding of the current and future geostrategic
environment.
Where Force XXI seeks to achieve ``mental agility'' throughout the
force--the ability to understand all facets of the task at hand and to
act decisively and in a timely manner--our Army After Next process is
focused on providing the ``physical agility'' to fully exploit the
accomplishments of Force XXI. Where Force XXI is a product-improved
force, the Army envisioned in our Army After Next effort--the Army of
2025 and beyond--will be a much different force, with vastly different
capabilities, equipment, and tactics. Many of the technologies required
to realize our vision of the Army of 2025 do not now exist. We have
identified some of them in our Army After Next process, and we are
funding them appropriately. As other required technologies are
identified, we will pursue them, as our funding permits. These leap-
ahead technologies will not be developed overnight. Our patience and
sustained commitment will be critical to their attainment.
I do not believe that the effort we are putting into Force XXI is
hindering our ability to realize the vision described by Army After
Next. In fact, I believe that the course we've laid out in Force XXI is
required to get to the Army of 2025. There are no short cuts. However,
I agree with the National Defense Panel's recommendation that we should
look hard at our Force XXI investments, and where possible, free funds
for Army After Next developments. I do not think it is necessary for
each unit in the Total Army to pass through the same transition
elements on the way to the Army of 2025. We are committed to carefully
determining requirements and reengineering our process to achieve the
savings necessary to finance future needs.
With regards to Comanche, Crusader, and the Abrams tank, I believe
these are important to modernizing our force. Our current M1A2 tank
program includes the upgrade of about 1100 older M-1 tanks to the M1A2
version. Given that our total tank requirement is about 7600 tanks,
fielding of the M1A2 tank will be limited to selected forces--
essentially as recommended by the NDP.
The Comanche armed reconnaissance helicopter is essential to how we
anticipate fighting in the future. Until is it fielded, we will accept
risk in this portion of the force, and continue to employ aircraft in
interim organizational designs to bridge the gap. No currently
available aircraft is adequate to perform all the functions we envision
for Comanche, including the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior and AH-64D Apache
Longbow. We have already downsized our aviation force in anticipation
of the fielding of the Comanche. While the Comanche will largely
replace interim aircraft on a one-for-one basis, the superior
capabilities provided by Comanche will enable us to address the
significant risk we have accepted in the interim in our armed
reconnaissance and light attack capabilities.
The Crusader will provide indirect fire support to future maneuver
forces. As with Comanche, we have already made organizational changes
in anticipation of fielding the Crusader. In fiscal year 1996, we
changed the Army's fire support force structure to leverage the
capabilities inherent in the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and
Crusader. As a result, our requirement for self-propelled howitzers
decreased from 2160 to 1378. Until Crusader and the additional MLRS
units are fielded, we have accepted risk in our fire support
capabilities.
The successful fielding of each of these systems--M1A2 tank,
Comanche, and Crusader--will enable us to bridge the gap between the
Army of the Gulf War, the Army of 2010, and the Army envisioned in our
Army After Next process. Each of these programs enables the Army to
more fully exploit the potential of information age technologies and
reduces the risks we've already accepted in anticipation of their
fielding.
Question. The Comanche helicopter and Crusader field artillery
system are two of the Army's top modernization programs. However, the
NDP believes that future requirements would best be met if the Army
used these systems as an interim until newer, lighter systems could be
fielded. The NDP recommended that the Army reduce the planned
procurement quantity of these two systems. Do you agree with the NDP
assessment? Why or why not? Do you believe that you can field lighter
systems than the Comanche and Crusader by 2010? Please explain--is it a
technology or funding issue?
Answer. Our Army Modernization Strategy continues to prioritize
investments over time and reflects the linkage to the operational
concepts described in Joint Vision 2010 and the patterns of operation
outlined in Army Vision 2010. I agree with the National Defense Panel's
finding that ``it is important to begin the transformation process
now.'' That's what our Force XXI and Army After Next processes are all
about. Through Force XXI, we are exploring the potential, and
leveraging the power, of Information Age technologies. The result--Army
XXI--will be a product-improved version of today's force, with its
principal increases in capability coming from our exploitation of
information systems. I believe this is a prudent course to take based
on our understanding of the current and future geostrategic
environment.
Where Force XXI seeks to achieve ``mental agility'' throughout the
force--the ability to understand all facets of the task at hand and to
act decisively and in a timely manner--our Army After Next process is
focused on providing the ``physical agility'' to fully exploit the
accomplishments of Force XXI. Where Force XXI is a product-improved
force, the Army envisioned in our Army After Next effort--the Army of
2025 and beyond--will be a much different force, with vastly different
capabilities, equipment, and tactics. Many of the technologies required
to realize our vision of the Army of 2025 do not now exist. We have
identified some of them in our Army After Next process, and we are
funding them appropriately. As other required technologies are
identified, we will pursue them, as our funding permits. These leap-
ahead technologies will not be developed overnight. Our patience and
sustained commitment will be critical to their attainment.
I do not believe that the effort we are putting into Force XXI is
hindering our ability to realize the vision described by Army After
Next. In fact, I believe that the course we've laid out in Force XXI is
required to get to the Army of 2025. There are no short cuts. However,
I agree with the National Defense Panel'srecommendation that we should
look hard at our Force XXI investments, and where possible, free funds
for Army After Next developments. I do not think it is necessary for
each unit in the Total Army to pass through the same transition
elements on the way to the Army of 2025. We are committed to carefully
determining requirements and reengineering our process to achieve the
savings necessary to finance future needs.
With regards to Comanche, Crusader, and the Abrams tank, I believe
these are important to modernizing our force. Our current M1A2 tank
program includes the upgrade of about 1100 older M-1 tanks to the M1A2
version. Given that our total tank requirement is about 7600 tanks,
fielding of the M1A2 tank will be limited to selected forces--
essentially as recommended by the NDP.
The Comanche armed reconnaissance helicopter is essential to how we
anticipate fighting in the future. Until it is fielded, we will accept
risk in this portion of the force, and continue to employ aircraft in
interim organizational designs to bridge the gap. No currently
available aircraft is adequate to perform all the functions we envision
for Comanche, including the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior and AH-64D Apache
Longbow. We have already downsized our aviation force in anticipation
of the fielding of the Comanche. While the Comanche will largely
replace interim aircraft on a one-for-one basis, the superior
capabilities provided by Comanche will enable us to address the
significant risk we have accepted in the interim in our armed
reconnaissance and light attack capabilities.
The Crusader will provide indirect fire support to future maneuver
forces. As with Comanche, we have already made organizational changes
in anticipation of fielding the Crusader. In fiscal year 1996, we
changed the Army's fire support force structure to leverage the
capabilities inherent in the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and
Crusader. As a result, our requirement for self-propelled howitzers
decreased from 2160 to 1378. Until Crusader and the additional MLRS
units are fielded, we have accepted risk in our fire support
capabilities.
The successful fielding of each of these systems--M1A2 tank,
Comanche, and Crusader--will enable us to bridge the gap between the
Army of the Gulf War, the Army of 2010, and the Army envisioned in our
Army After Next process. Each of these programs enables the Army to
more fully exploit the potential of information age technologies and
reduces the risks we've already accepted in anticipation of their
fielding.
Question. The NDP recommended that the Army develop a 30-35 ton
tank to replace the Abrams. The current M1A2 weighs approximately 68
tons. Is the NDP recommendation realistic? Can you develop and field a
new light tank by 2010?
Answer. The Army agrees with the NDP recommendation that a future
force must be lighter and is now charting a prudent course that will
transform the force. Today's Army took 25 years to develop and field;
technology for the lighter force of the future is at least 20 years
away. To get the most out of technology we plan to invest in the
development of a new close combat system we call the Future Combat
System (FCS). Our current strategy is focused on first unit equipped in
2018.
Question. Has the Army decided if it will continue to procure tanks
after the current contract is completed at the end of fiscal year 2000?
Answer. The Army has funded a program to upgrade 1069 M1 tanks into
M1A2s, which, in addition to 81 M1A2s previously acquired, makes an
1150 M1A2 fleet. In procurement, the Army is executing a five-year
multiyear contract for 580 M1A2 upgrades. The contract, covering the
fiscal years 1996-2000, was awarded to General Dynamics Land Systems
Division (GDLS) in July, 1996. A follow-on multiyear contract is
contemplated for fiscal year 2001, with Congressional approval required
in 2000.
Question. Is the Army evaluating alternatives to the M1A2? If so,
when will you make a decision?
Answer. Yes. The Army is studying a Future Combat System (FCS) as
an alternative to Abrams in the Army After Next (AAN). The FCS responds
to the requirement for a close combat system that is leap ahead in
lethality, survivability, and sustainability for the Army After Next. A
key element of FCS is the ability of this system to perform expanded
battlefield roles in the close heavy battlespace while significantly
reducing the logistical support required for deployment and sustainment
of such a system. FCS concept development is focused on candidate
armament technologies, which are the main design driver for FCS. Also
under consideration in Science & Technology are alternative power
sources and approaches to provide a platform capable of maximum output
with minimum logistical demands. Advanced survivability measures will
also be integrated into the FCS to ensure the crew is protected to
fight in the close combat battlespace.
Digitization Overview
Question. The Army is creating a ``digitized battlefield'' that it
believes will give it the ability to maintain a modern, but smaller
force capable of decisive victory. Digitization is the application of
information technologies--sensors, communications, computers,
displays--to meet the needs of battlefield commanders at all levels,
providing a common picture in near-real time, shared data among
battlefield systems and the synchronization of combat power.
Please describe the Army's plan to digitize the battlefield.
Answer. The Digitization strategy is an integral subset and
underlying guiding principle of the Army's modernization effort.
Digitization applies modern Information Technology concepts to the
military environment resulting in an integrated, high-speed Command and
Control structure reaching from the National Command Authority to the
individual soldier.
The Army is using a process called ``Force XXI'' to evolve from our
current Army of Excellence (AOE) structure to the ``Army XXI''
structure. The Force XXI process consists of three axes: redesigning
the tactical Army; redesigning the institutional Army; and integrating
digital technologies. Force XXI includes battle lab experimentation,
Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWEs), and other innovative processes
to inform our efforts to modernize for the 21st century. Among the many
initiatives of Force XXI are the Division Design Analysis, which
provided a solid analytical foundation for redesigning the division,
and the Warfighter Rapid Acquisition Program (WRAP).
Simply stated, Force XXI projects our quality people into the 21st
Century and provides them the right organizations, the most realistic
training, robust and predictable sustainment during both peace and war,
and the best equipment and weapons systems our Nation can provide given
the resources available. We will leverage technology in order to arm
our soldiers with the finest, most lethal weapons systems in the world.
The power of information will allow the ultimate weapon--the individual
soldier--to successfully meet the challenges of the 21st century and
achieve decisive victory. Digitization will allow the Army to
effectively integrate command and control hardware and software with
communications systems and weapons systems to provide information
sharing both horizontally and vertically, in the Army as well as Joint
and Combined forces. The strategy is to leverage the latest mature
technology advances in information management from the commercial
sector. The improved and increased level of integration and
interoperability will provide for highly effective Joint and Coalition
operations.
Our Digitization efforts include the ongoing modernization efforts
of approximately 97 systems encompassing 538 budget lines. The total
estimate ofthe digitization effort is $2,600,000,000 in fiscal year
1999. The Army did not take this $2,600,000,000 from programs to create
a new effort. It was already part of the Army Total Obligation
Authority that was allotted to these many existing programs. Of this
total, approximately $261,000,000 was added to digitization by Office
of the Secretary of Defense for fiscal year 1999. The $261,000,000
provides for improved interoperability, increased integration, improved
security, network management, and more robust common architectures. It
is key to the horizontal efforts that go across these systems.
Digitization applies information technologies to acquire, exchange,
and employ digital information throughout the battlespace. Accordingly,
the Army will digitize all command and control systems, as well as
communications systems, including tactical radios, military satellite
communications, and network management. Our digitization strategy will
set the conditions for full-spectrum dominance by integrating command
and control (C2) and situational awareness systems across multiple
weapons platforms (Abrams tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and
Comanche helicopters), as well as combat support and combat service
support platforms.
Programs receiving increases from the $261,000,000 in fiscal year
1999 include the Longbow Apache, Kiowa Warrior, Bradley Fighting
Vehicle, Abrams Tank, Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS)
family, Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2), Integrated
Systems Control (ISYSCON) network management, Tactical Operations
Centers, architecture development, and training support. Other
adjustments identified include increased funding for Advanced
Warfighting Experiments, Information Security, Satellite
Communications, and the Warfighter Information Network.
Question. Last year, you planned on fielding the first digitized
division in 2001. This year you have accelerated the fielding to 2000.
What is the urgency? Is it threat driven? What is the impact if you
delay the fielding?
Answer. The First Digitized Division has been scheduled for the end
of fiscal year 2000 in support of Joint Vision 2010 and Army Vision
2010. Joint Vision 2010 states: ``by 2010 we should be able to enhance
the capabilities of our forces through technology. This will, in turn,
expand our greatest advantage: the adaptability, initiative, teamwork,
and commitment of our people at every level.''
Fielding the first digitized division (FDD) was part of Chief of
Staff of the Army Sullivan's ``mark on the wall'' as early as 1994.
Fielding a digitized division is a very complex undertaking, especially
when considering the task from the perspective of broader issues
including doctrine, training, organizational structures, logistics and
manpower. Since that clear vision of fiscal year 2000 was established,
the Army has been marching to accomplish the mission.
While this acceleration is not threat driven, in order to achieve
the full spectrum dominance envisioned in Joint Vision 2010, we must
leverage the mature leading edge of commercial technology. The earlier
we field this new capability, the earlier we can adapt the new
operational tactics, techniques, and procedures as a way of life in the
entire Army. This minimizes the expense of having to train and support
both an analog and a digitized Army for an extended period of time. We
should also maintain the momentum of the digitization effort that began
with the spiral development process where the user, developer, and
industry come together to translate requirements into fielded
capabilities in significantly reduced timeframes.
The sooner we can field a standard integrated and interoperable
hardware and software infrastructure the easier it will be to respond
to new threats and technology advances. We have to start in fiscal year
2000 in order to accomplish all facets of training, doctrine, and force
structure development for the entire Army by fiscal year 2010. We
realize that there is some risk that some of the programs may not be
ready to field in 2000. However, most of the systems are mature and
will provide a solid basis of improved capability for the Division even
if a few systems get fielded later.
Over the last year and a half we have managed to successfully
synchronize the Army fielding process to meet the First Digitized
Division objective by the end of fiscal year 2000. These first steps
firmly ground us in the multiyear framework to achieve Joint Vision
2010 on schedule as directed by the Joint Staff. In addition, this
schedule lines up with Year 2000 (Y2K) compliance efforts in fiscal
years 1998 and 1999, along with Allied force interoperability
capabilities to be implemented in fiscal year 2000.
Question. Last year, by your own admission, you defined the
digitization program as generally high risk in terms of cost, schedule
and technology. Now you are accelerating the program. What is the level
of risk in your new program? Based on your own risk assessment of the
digitization effort, do you believe that fielding the first digitized
division by fiscal year 2000 is overly ambitious? Please explain.
Answer. The schedule risk to field all systems by fiscal year 2000
remains high. However, many key systems have a version already fielded.
Even if a few systems have delayed fieldings, the fiscal year 2000
improved capability will be significant. The Army has implemented a
spiral software development process using operational units to evaluate
successively more capable software drops, which occur on a yearly
basis.
Spiral Development is a process which uses short, incremental
developments--each of which build on previous work to shorten the
development cycle and speed products to the field. Getting users
involved throughout the development process will ultimately reduce the
risk associated with a formal Initial Operational Test and Evaluation
(IOTE), but adds more installation, training, and testing time to the
schedule.
Cost risk is moderate because the Army received approximately
$261,000,000 for fiscal year 1999 during the last Program Objective
Memoranda (POM) cycle to fund the requirements to meet our fielding
goals. However, because each of the product increments builds on
previous increments, long range cost estimates tend to have a wide
range. Technology risk is moderate since we now have conducted and
analyzed the results of Task Force XXI, conducted in March 1997 and the
Division XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE) in November 1997.
None of the deficiencies require technological fixes beyond that which
is used commercially. It remains moderate simply because there are a
large number of systems that must be integrated.
Risks have been reduced in two of three areas and we have taken
steps to make the goal less ambitious. For example, we only intend to
equip the first digital division with the highest priority command,
control and communications (C3) equipment by fiscal year 2000. Other
weapons systems will be fielded on a schedule determined by individual
program funding profiles. Many systems are already fielded to the first
digital equipment and we only plan to field two of the three brigades
(those located at Fort Hood) of the first digital division.
Question. The Army has conducted Advanced Warfighting Experiments
(AWEs) to evaluate what impact digitization has on the battlefield.
During the AWEs, the Army's test community found that the ``digitized
brigade performed much like the baseline non-digitized brigades at the
NTC in areas of lethality, survivability, and operational tempo. Is
this what you expected?
Answer. We stated going into the Task Force XXI Advanced
Warfighting Experiment (AWE) that our focus was on how digitization and
the other new technologies we were looking at would improve our mental
agility * * * and this it clearly did. There were striking examples in
the TFXXI AWE, and again in the Division AWE, in which commanders and
staffs perceived the battlespace with greater clarity and tempo than
ever before--and then acted on that perception with great speed.
The Experimental Force, the EXFOR, went up against the world-class
Opposing Forces or OPFOR on their ``home-turf'' at the National
Training Center. The AWE featured wins and losses on both sides. Given
the immaturity of many of the digital systems that were part of the
experiment and the detriment this lack of maturity had on the train-up
for the AWE, we were pleasantly surprised that they were able to hold
their own against a well-trained force like the OPFOR. The EXFOR
successfully demonstrated the potential that digital battle command can
offer towards decisive military operations. The AWE revealed the
exciting vision of a future battle in which the tactical commander is
capable of destroying the enemy force through the effective application
of information to his combat power.
Question. What criteria are you using to measure the success of the
AWEs?
Answer. The Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWEs) are a process
developed by the Army to provide insights that will shape the future
force, Army XXI. The primary data collection effort for the Division
Advanced Warfighting Experiment (DAWE) was conducted using over 100
subject matter experts (SMEs) and 60 Battle Command Training Program
(BCTP) observer/controllers (OC). This data was consolidated into a
database, containing over 6,000 SME/OC observations, interviews,
surveys, etc. Analysts from the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
Analysis Command (TRAC), Operational Test and Evaluation Command
(OPTEC), and the Army Research Laboratory (ARL) evaluated the data. The
results, quantitative and qualitative, are used to support our decision
making process. An AWE that provides little or no insights to get at
those decisions would not be considered successful. The TF XXI AWE
exceeded the expectations of planners and participants alike. It
revealed the dynamic potential in the digital land force and validated
the Army's approach to experimentation. AWEs serve to put concepts of
doctrine, training, leaders, organizations, material and soldiers to
the most rigorous test possible, short of actual war. They also serve
as a ``forcing function'' to synchronize all the pieces of a digitized
force together at the same place and time. The Army overcame many
technical obstacles in this process that would have taken years to
solve in the normal requirements-development model.
Question. Do you believe that you did not see a significant
increase in performance because of technical issues? What were they and
how have you resolved them?
Answer. Certainly, the varying levels of maturity and functionality
of the technologies that were experimented with during the Advanced
Warfighting Experiments (AWEs) affected the performance of the force.
To some extent, soldiers lacked time for sufficient training and
familiarization with the many new digitized systems and associated
procedures. The greatest challenge was insufficient interoperability of
all the digital command and control systems, communications systems,
sensors, and weapons platforms on the battlefield. The Army recognized
the enormous amount of effort that is required and has taken action to
increase funding in critical areas such as development of operational
and systems architectures, system integration, and the Central
Technical Support Facility. In addition, existing programs are
migrating to the standards outlined in the Joint Technical Architecture
and all new starts must build to these standards to support
interoperability.
We most definitely saw not only in increase in performance, but a
dramatic increase--albeit one that was not apparent to some forms of
data collection and analysis. Let me give you an example. At one point
during the Task Force XXI AWE, one of the experimental company teams
had to traverse the area known as ``the washboard''--a very difficult
piece of terrain to cross. Most units avoid it, because even apart from
enemy action, units tend to get lost, delayed, and disrupted when they
operate there. But this company team traversed the washboard unscathed
and emerged as a coherent fighting force on the other side, because the
soldiers had situational awareness--allowing them to move and fight as
a cohesive team even when they couldn't see each other. This incident
may not have caught the attention of analysts focused only on attrition
dynamics, but military history would attest to the fact that the
ability to cross ``uncrossable'' terrain has won battles many times in
history. This is just one exciting aspect of what digitization is doing
for us.
Question. Based on the outcome of the AWEs, what is the advantage
of accelerating the digitized division?
Answer. We have seen the potential of a Joint Task Force that has
an integrated digital capability. Joint Vision 2010, the conceptual
template for how America's Armed Forces, will channel the vitality and
innovation of our soldiers to the entire Army.
During the Task Force XXI rotation at the National Training Center
(NTC), commanders failed to take full advantage of the capabilities
offered by enhanced situational awareness, because of a lack of
confidence in the new technology. Fielding these technologies sooner
will provide commanders and their staffs more opportunities to learn
how to effectively use the digitized capabilities during routine
training activities. In other words, the sooner we can field standard
hardware, the easier the transition will be to new versions of software
across the Total Army.
To make all these changes by fiscal year 2010, we have to start in
fiscal year 2000 to accomplish all the issues of doctrine, training,
leaders organizations, materiel and soldiers that must be implemented
through brigade, division, corps and the entire Army.
Over the last year and a half we have managed to successfully
synchronize the Army fielding process to meet the First Digitized
Division objective by the end of fiscal year 2010. These first steps
firmly ground us in the multiyear framework to achieve Joint Vision
2010 on schedule as directed by the Joint Staff and leverage the
technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in
Joint warfighting. The earlier we field this capability, the earlier we
can adapt the new tactics, techniques and procedures as a way of life
in the Army.
Question. The General Accounting Office (GAO), the Committee's
Surveys and Investigations Staff (S&I), and the Army's Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation (OPTEC) have all raised questions as to
the technical maturity of the digitized systems. Last year, the GAO and
S&I believed that the Army digitization systems had complex technical
issues that would be difficult to resolve before fielding in 2001--now
you have accelerated the schedule. Do you believe that you have
resolved the technical issues? How?
Answer. The technical and maturity issues documented by the test
communities were expected. The Army's intent was to conduct an
experiment--not a test--at the National Training Center last March. We
knew going into the experiment that the functionality was not adequate
for go-to-war systems, but it was adequate to answer the experimental
hypotheses.
One of the most significant problems with the systems used in the
Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE) was the inability
to support battlefield dynamics, such as the ability of a network
manager to rapidly reconfigure units task organized for a particular
mission. Since we did not intend to field the TFXXI AWE system, we used
a large contingent of contract support, rather than investing in
software functionality that had a high risk of being discarded
immediately after the exercise. Armed with the lessons learned from the
nine months of TFXXI experimentation, we have made significant changes
to the communications architecture, and have plans in place to
substantially automate the few residual functions.
Question. Are you willing to trade off schedule to ensure essential
performance?
Answer. We will not field a system that does not meet the users
essential performance requirements. We have included a large number of
technical and operational tests between now and the formal Initial
Operational Test and Evaluation (IOTE) in the first quarter of fiscal
year 2000 to monitor the program's progress. This is another benefit of
the spiral software development process we're using.
Question. What issues would cause you to delay the fielding of the
first digitized division?
Answer. There is a subset of critical command, control and
communications systems that must meet user requirements before we can
turn the equipment over to operational users. For example, the Tactical
Internet (TI) is need to support the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade
and Below (FBCB2). Without the TI, we cannot field FBCB2. However, we
would still field the systems that digitize tactical operations centers
(TOCs) down to battalion level.
Question. When would you make the decision to delay fielding?
Answer. As mentioned in the response above, we have included a
number of tests over the next two years to monitor program progress.
Potentially, we could decide after any of the test events whether or
not the overall program schedule needs to be changed. Only those
systems requiring further development would have fielding schedule
adjustments. Other systems will be fielded on schedule.
Question. To date, you have spent almost $500,000,000 on the
digitization effort. However, there have been no formal operational
tests on two of the most important components of the digitization
program--the computer software (FBCB2) and the communications link
(Tactical Internet). Together they provide a common picture across the
battlefield--increasing situational awareness. The only evaluation of
either system has been through your Advanced Warfighting Experiments
(AWE). How would you assess the performance of FBCB2 and the Tactical
Internet in the AWEs? Would the test community agree?
Answer. Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) and the
Tactical Internet actually performed much better than was anticipated.
The Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE) was an
experiment and not an operational test of a ``go-to-war'' capability.
The AWE itself included the 6-month train-up prior to the 2-week
rotation at the National Training Center. With each major live training
event at Fort Hood, platoon, company, and battalion lanes, and finally
the National Training Center (NTC) rotation, the performance and
reliability of the system improved. Based on results from the NTC
rotation, the Operational Test and Evaluation Command (OPTEC) reported
that the situational awareness provided by FBCB2 and the tactical
internet was the highlight of the AWE. Over 50 percent of all platforms
were visible on the screens at any one time at company and battalion
levels. Numerous interviews with the participants support the critical
role this situational awareness played during the AWE. OPTEC also
reported that the ability to send operational graphics and orders was
not sufficient. Due to the instrumentation and data collection provided
by the test community the material developer has been able to isolate
the causes of these problems and is restructuring the network
architecture to preclude this from occurring in the fielded version.
Question. What criteria did you use to measure effectiveness of
FBCB2 and the Tactical Internet? Would you use the same criteria in a
formal test? How would it differ?
Answer. The test community looked at many of the same measures of
effectiveness that they will use as Force XXI Battle Command Brigade
and Below (FBCB2) progress through its acquisition process. There is a
Limited User Test (LUT) scheduled for later this year (August-September
1998), a Force Development Test and Experiment (FDTE) and an Initial
Operational Test and Evaluation (IOTE) in October 1999.
These measures of effectiveness included speed of service, message
completion rates, human factors impacts, platform visibility
(situational awareness), kill ratios, etc. What will differ between the
experiment and the formal testing will be that the measures of
effectiveness will be compared to specified criteria provided by the
user. In addition, the formal test will be more structured to ensure
sufficient data is collected under controlled conditions to show
whether FBCB2 meets these performance criteria.
Question. OPTEC has stated that the FBCB2 and Tactical Internet you
will field will be markedly different from what was used in the AWE.''
Why?
Answer. The ``system'' that was taken out to the Advanced
Warfighting Experiment (AWE) was developed to provide sufficient
functionality to support investigation of the hypothesis. The Force XXI
Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) and Tactical Internet systems
that will be fielded will change based on what we learned during the
Task Force XXI AWE. The hardware is markedly different, using a smaller
footprint, increased processing capability and better screen
visibility. The software is expanded to include the full complement of
messages identified by the user as being critical to operations on a
digital battlefield, user interfaces to develop and send messages have
been reworked to be more user friendly. We are migrating to a Joint
Variable Message Format to ease interoperability with other services.
The tactical internet architecture is redesigned to eliminate the
shortcomings identified during the experiment and ensure operationally
suitable message completion rates. Also included will be increased
network management capability to increased the flexibility of
thenetwork to force design changes and command and control protect
(C2P) tools to decrease the vulnerability of the tactical internet.
Question. When will you test the ``new'' FBCB2 and Tactical
Internet?
Answer. The Army begins technical testing of Force XXI Battle
Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) and the Tactical Internet (TI), to
include electronic and information warfare, in April 1998 at the
Electronic Proving Grounds, Fort Huachuca, Arizona. This is followed in
August by the Limited User Test (LUT) at Fort Hood with troops from the
4th Infantry Division. The purpose of this LUT is to verify the fixes
that resulted from Task Force XXI and validate the scalability of the
architecture. A second technical test is scheduled approximately a year
later.
That test will be followed by a Force Development Test (JUL 99) and
an Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOTE) in October 1999,
together constituting the operational test program for FBCB2. The FBCB2
and TI will be fully examined at each of these events.
Question. Are both programs adequately funded to meet your
accelerated schedule? If not, what is the shortfall? What is the impact
on your schedule?
Answer. Both programs are funded to meet fielding of the First
Digitized Division and First Digitized Corps. Digitizing the remainder
of the force is subject to availability of funding in the outyears.
However, the Army is undergoing a significant transition in the way it
does business. This revolutionary change, known as ``Spiral
Development'', is a process that will lead us to Force XXI, Army After
Next, and Joint Vision XXI. This process of experimenting with change
leads us to changes in warfighting requirements. As these changes
appear, additional resourcing may be required. We all needs to
understand that threat and technology change is the norm and resourcing
needs to be responsive.
Question. What interoperability issues will the digitized force
have with non-digitized Army units, the other services, and Coalition
allies? How will you resolve the interoperability issues?
Answer. The Army continues to pursue many ongoing efforts with the
other services and allies to ensure interoperability and seamless
communications throughout the battlespace. Additionally, the common,
minimal set of information technology standards developed by the Army
on behalf of digitalization is the basis of the Joint Technical
Architecture (JTA) that is now mandated for use throughout the
Department of Defense.
Interoperability between digital and analog units was an issue
during the Division Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE) at Fort Hood,
Texas in November 1997. It was concluded that digital and analog units
can interact and fight well together. The problem is how to transfer
the information between a paper map and a computer.
This is solved, in part, by sending liaison teams with digital
equipment to the analog units. The transfer of information can then
take place in one location, taking into account that the analog unit
requires a significantly longer period to pass operational overlay
information through its ranks. This solution creates a new requirements
for additional liaison officers and equipment that are not yet clearly
defined.
Question. The other services?
Answer. There are a number of initiatives underway between the Army
and other Services leading toward systems interoperability. For
example, the Marine Corps has purchased the Army's Combat Service
Support Control System (CSSCS) and Advanced Field Artillery Tactical
Data System (AFATDS). In addition, a number of Department of Defense-
sponsored Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) cut across
Service boundaries. The Army Digitization Office (ADO) has recently
begun an initiative to work Joint Service Interoperability issues, to
produce a coherent Joint Interoperability strategy and coordinate,
where possible, with Army digitization advances. These efforts include
steps to identify a single point of contact within each of the other to
provide a digitization focus for Joint interoperability.
We successfully integrated the USMC Newton systems during the Task
Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE) in March 1997 and have
been working with the U.S. Air Force on the Situational Awareness Data
Link (SADL) development, fielding and joint doctrine.
Question. Coalition allies?
Answer. For digitization international interoperability issues,
there are a number of NATO and multinational fora available for
discussion and resolution. The principal NATO groups include the NATO
Command, Control and Communications Board (NC3B), the Joint C3
Requirements and Concepts Sub-Committee (JC3RCSC) and the NATO Army
Armaments Group (NAAG). In the multinational environment, groups range
from American, British, Canadian, Australian (ABCA) to bilateral staff
talks and exchanges with multiple countries.
The ADO is responsible for the Army's International Digitization
Strategy (IDS), which identifies high level requirements for
international interoperability. Practical steps toward interoperability
are extensively worked at the weapon system level (such as the British
and Dutch purchase of Apache). At the command level, the Command &
Control System Interoperability Program (C2SIP) is a major step
forward.
C2SIP brings work from three previous international initiatives
into a single U.S. program. C2SIP will both refine already developed
capabilities and lead to fielding of these capabilities in the Army
Battle Command Systems (ABCS) by 2003. C2SIP provides two levels of
interoperability based on legacy requirements and future technology.
By 2003, the US Army will have interoperability at either one or
the other of these levels with the armies of Canada, Denmark, France,
Germany, Holland, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom.
Two other initiatives, the Artillery Systems Cooperative Agreement
(ASCA) and the Low Level Air Defense Picture Initiative (LLAPI), are
aimed at achieving interoperability with multiple ally artillery and
air defense systems. An international interoperability agreement has
been reached in the LLAPI and is being negotiated in the Artillery
Systems Cooperative Agreement (ASCA).
Question. What equipment will be fielded in 2000?
Answer. The 4th Infantry Division (4ID) (Mech) at Fort Hood, Texas
is the First Digitized Division (FDD). It is organized as a armored
division with two armored bridages at Fort Hood, TX and one infantry
brigade at Fort Carson, Colorado. The brigades at Fort Hood will be
digitized with U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
backbond systems by the end of fiscal year 2000 and the remaining
systems in accordance with (IAW) the Department of the Army Master
Priority List (DAMPL).
One of the armored brigades and the division cavalry squadron will
be ``embedded'' while the other armored brigade will be ``appliqued.''
The term embedded means that those units will receive the M1A2 System
Enhancement Program (SEP) Main Battle Tank and the M2/M3A3 Bradley
Fighting Vehicle with the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below
(FBCB2) software. This will provide a built-in, or ``embedded,''
digital capability that operates the communications software on the
internal vehicle systems as well as the othersystems improvements
inherent in the new vehicles. This precludes having to ``bolt on'' an
additional computer to run the software as is done with applique. The
``appliqued'' units will have the FBCB2 installed in their M141s and
M2/M3A2s to provide a digital communications system, but will not have
the other improvements associated with new vehicles.
The 3rd Brigade, 4ID at Fort Carson will receive TRADOC backbone
systems by the end of fiscal year 2004 and the remaining systems that
are available in accordance with DAMPL. This will bring the division in
line with the U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS)
directive of one embedded and two appliqued brigades.
Question. Have you completed your First Digitized Division Design
document? I not, how did you determine what equipment (in terms of type
and quantity) needs to be fielded?
Answer. The First Digitized Division (FDD) design document will be
completed and released on or about April 27, 1998. Until then,
equipment densities are derived from the Task Force XXI model.
Quantities for Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2)--
applique sets--and radios were extrapolated using actual equipment
counts from units assigned to Task Force XXI. For example, if a tank
battalion in Task Force XXI was equipped with 100 applique sets, the
total number of tank battalions within the FDD was multiplied by 100.
This provided a planning figure for appliquesets within the FDD.
Question. What is the total cost of digitizing the division in
2000? For the record, please provide the cost and equipment you plan on
fielding.
Answer. In November 1997, the Army provided an estimate of
$423,000,000 required to digitize the 4th Infantry Division 4ID(-);
however that estimate included RDTE costs that are properly distributed
across multiple divisions. The Army has further refined the definition
of digitization, resulting in a broader subset of programs. Of the
total cost for digitization, $373,700,000 is procurement of programs to
be fielded specifically to the first digitized division (FDD). The
$373,700,000 does not fund any RDTE. The attached tables provide a
breakdown of equipment and costs per fiscal year for the FDD. Table 1
includes Operations & Maintenance (O&M), OPA and RDTE costs that can
only partly be attributed to fielding the first digitized division,
while Table 2 contains costs of fielding equipment just to the FDD.
The remainder of the resources includes the existing Army command
and control programs (Maneuver Control System, Advanced Field Artillery
Tactical Data System), communications programs (SINCGARS, EPLRS,
Satellite Systems), sensor programs (GBCS, Sentinel, Tactical Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle, Spitfire), and the digitization related pieces of
weapon systems (Abrams and Bradley). The funding for these programs
procures systems that are distributed in accordance with Army
modernization priorities.
TABLE 1: O&M, OPA AND RDTE COSTS, PARTLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO FIELDING FDD
[$ in millions]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY99 FY00
------------------------------------------------------------------------
RDTE Costs:
Force XXI WRAP.................................... 99.5 99.4
FBCB2............................................. 52.5 47.0
C31 Interop Network............................... 2.7 3.2
C41 System Certification.......................... 4.6 5.5
Army System Engr.................................. 6.5 7.8
WPN System Technical Arch......................... 0.0 1.1
Army Warfighting Exper............................ 6.9 7.1
AFATDS Functionality.............................. 15.0 0.0
Total RDTE Costs.............................. 187.7 171.1
O&M Costs............................................. 54.4 51.7
OPA Costs............................................. 37.7 38.2
TOTAL OPA, O&M, RDTE...................... 279.8 261.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TABLE 2: EQUIPMENT COST FOR FDD \1\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
System:
A2C2S........................ 12.6 ........... 12.6
IDM/EBC...................... 10.7 5.0 15.7
FAADC2....................... ........... ........... 0.0
Linebacker................... 6.2 ........... 6.2
ASAS......................... ........... 4.3 4.3
GBCS/AQF..................... 31.6 54.0 85.6
GRCS......................... ........... ........... ...........
WIN-T........................ 6.6 11.1 17.7
ISYSCON...................... 0.8 ........... 0.8
C2 Protect................... 7.4 ........... 7.4
SPITFIRE..................... 0.4 ........... 0.4
SCAMP........................ 0.1 ........... 0.1
SMART-T...................... 0.6 ........... 0.6
STAR-T....................... ........... ........... ...........
GBS.......................... 3.1 ........... 3.1
MCS.......................... 56. ........... 5.6
M1A1/2....................... 21.1 2.2 23.3
M2........................... 11.5 ........... 11.5
AFATDS....................... 0.0 ........... 0.0
FED.......................... 3.5 3.5 7.0
Paladin...................... ........... ........... ...........
Laser Marker................. ........... ........... ...........
DTSS......................... 21.2 ........... 21.2
SIDPERS-3.................... 0.4 ........... 0.4
CSSCS........................ ........... ........... 0.0
Applique..................... 35.0 ........... 35.0
--------------------------------------
Total.................... 178.4 80.1 258.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Zero in the total column indicates that the equipment item was
purchased in a previous fiscal year.
Digitization Program--System Development
Question.Two important components of the digitization program are
the Force XXI Battle Command and Below (FBCB2) program and the Tactical
Internet. FBCB2 is basically a computer which is either mounted on a
vehicle or carried by a soldier. The FBCB2 software allows soldiers to
automatically send and receive position reports and command and control
messages. The Tactical Internet is a network of radios and routers that
link the various FBCB2 computers.
To date, have there been formal development or operational tests of
either system? When will you conduct formal tests?
Answer. No formal testing of either Force XXI Battle Command and
Below (FBCB2) or the Tactical Internet (TI) has occurred to date. Field
Test 1 will begin in April 1998, and initiate the formal developmental
test program. Field Test 2 will be the second development test
approximately a year later. A Limited User Test (LUT) is scheduled for
August 1998, and will be followed by a Force Development Test (July
1999) and an Initial Operational Test (October 1999), together
constituting the operational test program for FBCB2. The TI will be
tested and evaluated during the FBCB2 testing.
Question. Both the FBCB2 and Tactical Internet have been part of
the Army's Advance Warfighting Experiments (AWE). What is your
assessment of their performance?
Answer. Force XXI Battle Command and Below (FBCB2) and the Tactical
Internet actually performed much better than was anticipated. The Task
Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE) was an experiment and
not an operational test of a ``go-to-war'' capability. The AWE itself
included the 6-month train-up prior to the 2-week rotation at the
National Training Center (NTC). With each major live training event at
Fort Hood: platoon, company, and battalion lanes, and finally the NTC
rotation the performance and reliability of the system improved. Based
on results from the NTC rotation, the Operational Text and Evaluation
Command (OPTEC) reported that the situational awareness provided by
FBCB2 and the tactical internet was the highlight of the AWE. Numerous
interviews with the participants support the critical role this
situational awareness played during the AWE. OPTEC also reported that
the ability to send operational graphics and orders was not sufficient.
Due to the instrumentation and data collection provided by the test
community the material developer has been able to isolate the causes of
these problems and is restructuring the network architecture to
preclude this from occurring in the fielded version.
Question. According to the Operational Test and Evaluation Command,
the ``degree of digital connectivity achieved during the Task Force XXI
AWE was low-not suitable for tactical operations.'' Do you agree? What
changes have been made since that time?
Answer. The system provided to 4th Infantry Division (4ID) for the
task force was never intended to be fielded for ``tactical
operations'', It was an experimental system intended to test the
concept of digitization. Is the concept viable? Will digitization
provide a significant advantage to the force? The system development
was a massive engineering undertaking to provide a totally new
capability, in a minimum amount of time.
The first priority in regards to ``digital connectivity'' was to
provide situational awareness (SA) to the force. This is defined for
Task Force XXI as primarily friendly location information (blue force),
but included enemy location (red force), as well as air tracks from
Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control (FAADC2). As a secondary
and add-on to the initial requirement, Command and Control (C2)
information was considered. Due to the nature of the difference between
C2 type information and SA type information, two distinct
communications sub-architectures were developed, one for SA and one for
C2. The SA architecture and implementation worked quite well at the
Task Force XXI Advance Warfighting Experiment (AWE). The Operational
Test and Evaluation Command (OPTEC) evaluation supports this statement.
What did not work well was the C2 portion sub-architecture of the TI.
In the design of C2 architecture, it was a priority to be as close to
commercial standard internet design as possible, hence the commercial
internet architecture was followed as closely as possible. Standard
commercial routing protocols were used and a grid of radio circuits was
established to route over, much the same way as the commercial
internet. This architecture did not work well for a number of reasons.
The commercial routing protocol did not work well in the tactical
environment, and there were some software problems which created
routing loops.
Since the time of the Task Force XXI exercise the basic SA
architecture has been retained, but improved upon to make it more
flexible. All software problems have been corrected and upgrades to the
INC have been accomplished to provide greater performance. The entire
C2 architecture has been redesigned to be more like the SA architecture
and take advantage of the inherent broadcast capability of the radios.
We now have a broadcast capability, a multicase capability, and a
point-to-point capability based on switched virtual circuits. These
changes have drastically simplified the C2 architecture and will
provide SA-like performance for C2 message traffic that requires both
speed for service and a high message completion rate (``degree of
digital conductivity''). A primary focus of the Force XXI Battle
Command and Below (FBCB2) Limited User Test (LUT) will be to verify the
basic improvement to the C2 architecture.
Question. Have you completed and approved the Operational
Requirements Document (ORD) for FBCB2? the System Threat Report? The
Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP)? When will they be completed?
Answer. The Operational Requirements Document (ORD) and System
Threat Assessment have both been completed and approved by U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The Test and Evaluation Master
Plan (TEMP) is in final draft, and expected to be approved after the
Force XXI Battle Command and Below (FBCB2) Key Performance Parameters
are validated, and the Critical Operational Issues and Criteria are
finalized.
Question. Given where you are in the development of the FBCB2
program, are you confident you will be able to field the system in
fiscal year 2000? Why?
Answer. Program Manager (PM) Applique is no-track to field the
system to the First Digitized Division, consisting of 1st Brigade, 2nd
Brigade, 4th Brigade (Aviation), 1/10 Cavalry Squadron, and the
associated Division slice by end of fiscal year 2000.
The knowledge gained during the Task Force XXI effort has provided
the Program Manager's office with a comprehensive understanding of the
technology and logistics required to accomplish system fielding by
fiscal year 2000. We believe we understand what did not work in Task
Force XXI and why it did not work. We believe we have an executable
plan to correct all deficiencies required to field a basic capability
to meet threshold requirements. We have a considerable amount of
infrastructure in place as a result of Task Force XXI. We feel we have
met all challenges in principal and are executing physical
implementations on schedule.
Question. If FBCB2 or the Tactical Internet schedules slip, can you
still field your first digitized division in Fiscal Year 2000? Please
Explain.
Answer. The Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2)
schedule is defined by fielding the First Digitized Division (FDD) by
the end of fiscal year 2000.
If the FBCB2 schedule slips, we will not be able to field GBCB2 by
the end of fiscal year 2000. The FBCB2 program has no schedule slack,
and is inherently tied to the Tactical Internet.
If either schedule slips it is doubtful that Program Manager for
Applique will be able to complete its portion (FBCB2) of the FDD
fielding by fiscal year 2000. Of course, any slip would have to be
analyzed for its potential impact, since the nature of some type of
slips, but not all, can be mitigated quite effectively. However, we
will field the other systems, and will have operational digitized
tactical operations center (TOCs) from battalion through division
level. This will provide a significant level of digitization to the
division.
Digitization--Information Security
Question. The digitized force will be extremely vulnerable to
information warfare. According to the Army, information security poses
one of the greatest challenges for the digitized battlefield. The Army
is currently assessing the vulnerability of the digitized battlefield
systems to attack. How are you testing the vulnerability of individual
``digitized'' systems to attack?
Answer. We have several testing agencies, including the Operational
Test and Evaluation Command (OPTEC), the Survivability/Lethality
Directorate, the Digital Integration Laboratory, and the Technical
Integration Center which use a two phased approach for testing the
individual components of the Army's digitization systems.
Phase One is done in a laboratory environment. Security system
testers do a complete test of a specific system against known
susceptibilities. We compare these susceptibilities to the known threat
of adversaries that have the capability and the intent to exploit
United States systems, categorizing these susceptibilities as
vulnerabilities. The vulnerabilities are prioritized by ease of
exploitation and possible damage if exploited. Countermeasures are then
developed to offset the vulnerabilities and susceptibilities in a cost-
effective manner. We then look at the complete system to identify any
new vulnerabilities or susceptibilities that may have been created by
merging the various technologies together.
Phase Two occurs when we place the system in the field and stress
the system in an operational environment to identify any new
vulnerabilities or susceptibilities. These new vulnerabilities or
susceptibilities may be created by introducing human factors into the
fast-paced operational requirements that our soldiers must meet. We
take these results and again develop and implement countermeasures to
reduce the risk of hostile exploitation.
Question. How vulnerable are our digitized systems to jamming,
computer network attacks, and command post detection?
Answer. Any electronic system has a signature that may be
identified and exploited to some degree. Our use of spread spectrum
communications provides us a level of security by forcing an adversary
to use wide band jamming that will allow us to easily identify, target
and eliminate hostile jamming systems in a timely manner. We rely
heavily on Command and Control Protect (C2P) tools that reduce an
adversary's ability to reach our systems. Our goal is to ensure the
reliability, integrity and confidentiality of our information. We
accomplished this in the Division Advanced Warfighter Experiment (DAWE)
by creating an electronic perimeter using an in depth strategy of
firewalls, guards, and complimentary intrusion detection software.
This electronic perimeter was sufficient to repel the efforts of
Red Teams trying to penetrate our systems. Test results from Task Force
XXI and the DAWE show that the electronic battlefield is a noisy place.
Because of all the noise it was very difficult to pinpoint command
posts. What we have done is further reduce the electronic signature of
command posts by blending into the general background electronic noise,
thereby improving battlefield survivability.
Question. How will you reduce the vulnerabilities of the digitized
systems from jamming? Computer network attacks, and command post
detection?
Answer. The Army is currently testing and developing technologies
which we plan to integrate into each information and information-based
system. We will provide these systems the ability to detect abnormal
information operations. These technologies include, but are not limited
to: Intrusion Detection, Penetration Alerts, and use by authorized
members doing unauthorized activities. Protection from jamming is more
difficult to address. Jammers interfere with the correct operation of
an information system by overpowering the transmitted signal of U.S.
emitters at intended receivers--thereby disrupting transmission to
jammed sites. The most successful method we have to deter jamming by
unauthorized elements is to identify it, and then destroy the jammer or
neutralize it in some manner using anti-jam countermeasures.
Reductions in the vulnerabilities will be accomplished in several
other ways as well. We will continue to refine the ``defense in depth''
concept so that security will eventually extend to the desktop.
Security training of operators is key to our overall program. Security
training of network managers will also reduce the risk of compromise or
system disruptions. We have already started teaching Information
Systems Security courses within the Army. In May 1998, we will expand
our systems and network management courses at Fort Gordon to include
information systems security tools and techniques.
Question. Does the budget provide funding to implement information
security tools for the digitized systems? If not, what are the
shortfalls?
Answer. We initiated our developmental efforts towards the
implementation of Command and Control Protect (C2P) tools by conducting
market analysis of available government-off-the-shelf (GOTS),
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) and non-development item (NDI)
available protection and detection technologies. It was our strategy to
lessen our research and development (R&D) efforts by focusing our
efforts toward minor modifications, rather than a full R&D effort.
Based on our early testing and evaluation (completed in January 1998)
of over 20 of these types of tools for integration into the Tactical
Internet, we feel that present acquisition funding seems adequate.
However we also feel that we may have to increase our R&D efforts to
ensure we can implement NDI and COTs tools in our digitized force. We
are planning a major portion of our current budget towards the
integration of C2 Protect tools into our C2 systems.
Aerostat Program
Question. Last year, this Committee recommended that the Aerostat
program be terminated, but it did not prevail in conference. Instead
the conferees appropriated $35,000,000, a decrease of $51,000,000 from
the budget request. This year the Army renamed the program, the Joint
Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System
(JLENS), and is requesting $103,000,000 to continue the program. Please
the explain the JLENS concept.
Answer. JLENS is a critical Joint program developing advanced
elevated radars to provide sensor support for Land Attack Cruise
Missile Defense (LACMD) using the Air Directed Surface to Air Missile
(ADSAM) concept. These sensors provide a significant capability
contributing to the creation of a Single Integrated Air Picture (SIAP),
a key Commander In Chief (CINC) requirement. The JLENS system uses off-
the-shelf aerostats at an altitude of 15,000 feet for extended periods
to elevate sensors and communication systems, including Cooperative
Engagement Capability (CEC) and Joint Tactical Information Distribution
System (JTIDS), required to pass information to the weapon systems. The
JLENS system cost per flight hour is $100s versus $1000s per flight
hour for fixed wing solutions. The JLENS system takes a major step in
addressing the emerging cruise missile threat at low altitudes and in
ground and sea clutter. The system is a key system contributor to the
comprehensive Joint Theater Air & Missile Defense (JTAMD) cruise
missile defense architecture laid out in the JTAMD master plan. JLENS
is following a fast track acquisition approach beginning with a
technology demonstration program. At the program's conclusion, it
provides a leave behind operational system for CINC contingency
operations. As such, it will be employed at corps level or echelons
above corps (EAC), supporting active air defense, passive defense,
attack operations and communications relay missions. The greatest
contribution to commander-in-chief's warfighting capabilities is the
sensor data required for over-the-horizon engagements by Patriot and
over-land engagements by the Naval Standard Missile (SM-2) and bringing
a complete SIAP to the warfighter.
The JLENS concept uses off-the-shelf aerostat platforms to lift
advanced prototype radar sensors to operational altitudes for extended
periods at very low cost. The radar and software technology required to
achieve the desired capability is strongly leveraged from other
Department of Defense programs such as theTHAAD sensor (Ground Based
Radar), multiple Battle Management Command, Control, Communications,
Computers & Intelligence programs, and advanced radar development
initiatives. The JLENS mission requirements are:
a. Support development of a SIAP.
b. Support Over-the-Horizon (OTH) ADSAM engagements with the Army's
Patriot and Navy's SM-2 interceptors.
c. Provide a platform capable of carrying alternate payloads such
as other sensor and communication suites.
d. Accomplish such secondary missions as detection and tract of
theater ballistic missiles (TBMs) during boost and moving surface
targets.
The technical concept is two radars, one providing surveillance
capability, and one providing precision tract capability, installed on
two separate aerostat platforms. Mobile mooring stations are used to
launch and retrieve the aerostats. A ground processing station controls
the radar operations and the dissemination of target location and track
data over JTIDS and CEC communication networks to tactical operations
centers.
Question. How will it be deployed and what will be its mission?
Answer. The operational concept in support of the JTAMD cruise
missile defense architecture, described in the JTAMD master plan, is
one or more surveillance platforms are deployed to cover the theater
area of operations and that one or more precision track radar platforms
be deployed with each surveillance system. The surveillance radars are
deployed to provide long-range detection and continuous tracking in
support of the entire battlefield. The precision tracing radars are
deployed to provide the best ability to defend assets in the presence
of terrain in support of surface based air defense weapons. JLENS will
be employed at corps level and at EAC supporting active defense,
passive defense and attack operations. In addition, JLENS can support
secondary missions such as communications relay, range extension for
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, TBM detection, and general surveillance
missions.
JLENS is a low-density, low cost, and operationally cost effective
system supported in the field by contract personnel. The greatest
contribution to the warfighting capabilities is the provision of
precision track information upon which over-the-horizon engagements by
the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 and the SM-2 can be
accomplished.
Question. Why do you need JLENS?
Answer. The primary concern of the Land Attack Cruise Missile
(LACM) threat is the enemy's ability to deliver weapons of mass
destruction on the battlefield. The LACM threat includes a flight
profile that consists of low altitude incursion using earth curvature
and terrain features to prevent observation by surface based defensive
weapon sensor systems. Surface based sensor volumetric coverage is
limited to a line-of-sight geometrical relationship with the LACM or,
indeed, of any target. Detection and track of a LACM using the low
altitude tactic is prevented either until the target appears over the
horizon or as it emerges from behind an intervening terrain feature. In
either event, obtaining timely information about the threat is delayed
or perhaps lost entirely.
All existing Army Air Defense radars are ground-based and have
limited coverage against low altitude targets due to the terrain
masking and earth curvature. Deployment of adequate numbers of ground-
based radars and air defense systems required for complete or near-
complete coverage of the battle space would be cost and manpower
prohibitive.
The line-of-sight limitation is mitigated by cost effective long-
term elevation of advanced sensors to an altitude where observation
beyond the radar horizon of the ground-based sensors becomes possible.
The benefits of having a capability to observe targets beyond the
sensor horizon are significant. Low altitude and surface coverage is
extended far beyond that of surface sensors. Detection and track range
is potentially increased by several orders of magnitude and weapon
systems can engage at the maximum capability of the designed missile.
Having a capability to detect and track threats in this formerly blind
zone greatly improves defensive effectiveness by:
a. Supporting acquisition of a SIAP providing detection, track, and
identification information about airborne targets that would otherwise
not have been observed. Since continuous target track, that may have
been terrain masked to surface sensors can now become a reality,
maintenance of tracks is more likely and the inadvertent proliferation
of tracks and the resulting confusion caused by targets emerging from
the mask, is minimized. This is accomplished through the use of the CEC
and JTIDS systems.
b. Providing precision tracking data to air defense weapon systems
that can be used to initiate and conduct intercepts against the LACM
threat at long range. This ADSAM capability increases against the LACM
threat at long range. This ADSAM capability increases the cost
effectiveness of air defense forces by permitting effective defense of
assets from low altitude attack without requiring the addition of more
surface based weapons systems to cover the over-the-horizon or terrain
masked blind zones. Furthermore, the ADSAM engagements of LACM targets
at long-range increases the battlespace and permits intercept of
weapons of mass destruction at locations more favorable to the defense.
In addition, an elevated platform designed to detect and track low-
altitude targets can provide additional benefits to the battlefield
commanders by:
a. Providing information about moving surface targets, such as
armor columns, to establish a basis for engagement by attack operations
weapons.
b. Providing a basis for vectoring aircraft to intercept OTH
hostile air forces.
c. Assisting the surface commanders in the maintenance of
continuous knowledge of the location of friendly force units (friendly
protection).
JLENS, using aerostate platforms, provides an economical means of
elevating tactical sensors to achieve the foregoing benefits for thirty
days at a time. Additionally, a capability to elevate communication and
communication network systems, such as JTIDS and CEC, is inherent in
the modular payload approach of the JLENS architecture. This provides a
relay capability to extend the range and coverage of tactical
communications. Recently, analyses have been initiated to investigate
the possibility of providing a backup capability to the Global
Positioning System by providing a line-of-sight limited, position
determination system based on the elevated JLENS aerostat platform.
Question. What other system (either currently fielded or in
development) could be used to do the JLENS mission?
Answer. Some fixed wing aircraft with radar have the capability to
provide over-the-horizon surveillance when they are on-station.
Airborne sensor systems that are currently deployed include Joint
Surveillance Target Attack Radar System, Airborne Warning and Control
System, and the E-2C Airborne Early Warning System. None of these
aircraft can detect advanced cruise missiles, nor can they provide the
precision track and target identification support capability required
to accomplish ADSAM engagement of LACM targets in an intense surface
clutter environment. No other system will allow the multiple OTH
engagement of multiple service weapon systems (Patriot, Standard
Missile, Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM)).
The major draw back of fixed-wing assets is cost. Anywhere from
four to five fixed-wing aircraft are required to provide 24 hour, seven
days a week, continuous coverage. Each aircraft has a crew size of 10
to 24 personnel. In addition, airfield(s) are required to service and
support the fixed-wing platforms. This cost for fixed wing assets
translates into the $1000s to $10,000s per hour for missions such as
Bosnia, Desert Shield, Korea, etc., compared to $100s per hour required
for the JLENS system. To provide both surveillance and precision
tracking capability to support the entire JLENS mission would require
additional planes, personnel and increase cost significantly.
The following table summarizes and highlights how JLENS and
proposed fixed wing LACMD altneratives are complementary:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Performance parameter Fixed wing JLENS Both combined
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Deployability....................... Best.................... Good................... Best.
Extended Time on Station............ Good.................... Best................... Best.
Combat Survivability................ Good.................... Good................... Best.
Weatherability...................... Good.................... Good................... Best.
Life Cycle Cost..................... Good.................... Best................... Best.
System Affordability................ Good.................... Best................... Best.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a. The best solution to LACMD is a joint JLENS/fixed-wing solution.
Both systems provide the synergism required to defeat the LACM.
b. JLENS augments and extends the capability of these aircraft
based sensors. Deployment of JLENS permits 24-hour coverage of the
airspace at operational costs and manpower estimated at 80-90 percent
savings over aircraft based assets. Deployment in peacetime and under
pre-hostility conditions is economically and tactically effective
mitigating a need to effect early deployment of thehigher cost aircraft
based assets. Upon the onset of hostilities JLENS uniquely supports
ADSAM engagements and thereby improves the effectiveness of air defense
operations.
Question. To date, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)
has not validated the requirement for the JLENS program. When will the
JROC validate the requirement?
Answer. The Army has approved the JLENS Operational Requirements
Document (ORD). Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and JTAMD
representatives have developed a Joint ORD. The ORD was reviewed by
each of the services and comments were provided to the JLENS user
proponent, U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery School (USAADASCH) for a
final ORD.
The Space & Missile Defense Command (SMDC) received the revised
USAADASCH approved JLENS Joint ORD on March 12, 1998. SMDC is currently
preparing a forwarding letter to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
command (TRADOC) requesting expeditious processing of the ORD. Once
finalized at TRADOC, the ORD will go the Department of the Army for
release to the Joint Staff. The Joint Staff will send it out for the
two-star review, normally 15 days. Once the two-star review is
complete, the JROC will then schedule the ORD for review and approval,
probably around the middle of May 1998. The JLENS ORD final approval is
expected by June 1, 1998.
In November 1997, the Joint Theater Air & Missile Defense
Organization (JTAMDO) briefed the JLENS program to the JROC. The JROC
approved the participation of JLENS in the JTAMD demonstration in
fiscal year 2002.
Question. Have the vulnerability assessments been completed? Please
summarize the finding.
Answer. Initial vulnerability assessments have been completed. Over
the past year, significant analyses have been conducted on the JLENS
system. The initial results show that either JLENS active/passive
counter measures and/or operational strategies will mitigate the JLENS
system vulnerability. The Special Operations Forces (SOF) threat
against the mooring system appears to represent the greatest potential
hazard. This threat is no more intense or effective than SOF directed
against other battlefield/airborne systems. Further testing is planned.
Summary of findings is provided in the following table:
JLENS THREAT SUMMARY TABLE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Threats Target Risk Survivability
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air Delivered Threats:
Infrared (IR) Missile........... Air Platform............ Moderate............... High.
Radio Frequency Missile \1\..... Air Platform............ Low.................... High.
Radio Frequency Missile \2\..... Air Platform............ Moderate............... High
Smart Bomb/Missile (IR/TV/laser) Air Platform............ Moderate............... High.
Gun............................. Air Platform............ Moderate............... High.
Iron Bomb....................... Ground Base............. Moderate............... High.
Smart Bomb/Missile (IR/TV/laser) Ground Base............. Moderate............... High.
Gun............................. Ground Base............. Moderate............... High.
Anti-Radiation Missile.......... Radar Emitter........... Moderate............... High.
Jammer.......................... Radar Emitter........... Moderate............... Moderate.
Surface Delivered Threats:
Surface-Air Missile............. Air Platform............ Moderate............... High.
Theater Ballistic Missile....... Ground Base............. Moderate............... High.
SOF/Terrorist Threats:
Man Portable Air Defense System. Air Platform............ High................... Moderate.
Direct & Indirect Fire.......... Ground Base............. High................... Moderate.
Other Threats: Directed Energy Radar Emitter........... High................... High.
Weapon.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Doppler.
\2\ Non-Doppler.
Question. Are future vulnerability assessments planned? When will
they occur and what vulnerabilities will you evaluate?
Answer. Additional vulnerability analysis is planned now that a
prime contractor has been selected. An independent evaluation will be
conducted to assess the full vulnerabilities of the JLENS selected
design. The assessment will include, but not be limited to: infra-red
(IR) missiles, radio frequency (RF) missiles (Doppler), RF missiles
(non-Doppler), smart bombs/missiles (IR, laser), air gun systems, iron-
bombs, anti-radiation missiles, jammers, surface to air missiles,
tactical ballistic missiles, man portable air defense systems, direct/
indirect artillery fire, and direct energy weapons. Finally, the JLENS
program will continue to refine availability data due to weather.
Question. The estimated development cost of the JLENS is
$400,000,000--this includes one demonstration system. It is our
understanding that the demonstration program has a shortfall of
$87,600,000. Please explain.
Answer. The shortfall of $87,600,000 for fiscal year 2002 was
created by the $51,200,000 reduction ($86,200,000 to $35,000,000) in
program funding levied in September 1998. The result of this reduction
is the JLENS Project Office is unable to complete the originally
envisioned program by the end of the fiscal year 2001. The major impact
of the reduction was to reduce funding to the prime contractor by 65
percent ($60,300,000 to $21,100,000) which lead to a corresponding
delay in radar development. The delayed radar effort has created a
ripple effect whereby fiscal year 1999-fiscal year 2001 funding is
required to accomplish the effort originally planned for fiscal year
1998. In addition, the reduction has delayed CEC procurement until
fiscal year 1999. Further, early demonstrations of JLENS capabilities
had to be substantially modified, delayed or even canceled. Finally,
the reduction has delayed final JLENS system integration and testing
until 2nd quarter, fiscal year 2002 forcing the Early User Test (EUT)
and JTAMD Demonstration to be combined due to scheduling. The breakdown
of the $87,600,000 is as follows: $64,200,000 for the prime contractor
to complete integration and testing of the JLENS prototype; and
$23,400,000 for government costs for JLENS in-house costs, other
government agencies (Navy, Army) providing support, and costs to run
the EUT and JTAMD demonstration.
The fiscal year 1999 President's Budget has programmed fiscal year
1998-2001 funding for the JLENS Program at $389,000,000. The currently
programmed funding is budgeted in the amount of $276,000,000 for the
prime contract effort to develop the JLENS surveillance and tracking
radars, the aerostat platform, theprocessing station and communications
payloads. An additional $66,600,000 is programmed for developing and
integrating modifications to the weapon and communications systems with
which the JLENS will be interfacing, such as the Navy's CEC and SM-2
interceptor programs, the Army's PAC-3 interceptor program, and the
acquisition of items of government furnished equipment required by the
prime contractor to complete the JLENS system. The remaining
$46,400,000 is budgeted for JLENS in-house costs (salaries, travel and
facilities), contract support, the maintenance of the JLENS testbed at
the White Sand Missile Range, and various small contractual efforts
performing needed analyses on topics such as interoperability,
survivability, weatherability, etc.
Question. It is our understanding that the Department of Defense
does not know if they will procure additional JLENS after the
demonstration is complete. When will the production decision be made?
Answer. A decision to procure additional JLENS units has not yet
been made. The JLENS Project Office has submitted a request for
engineering and manufacturing development (EMD), low rate initial
production (LRIP), and production funding in the current Program
Objectives Memorandum cycle for the period fiscal year 2002-2010 to the
Department of Army. Following the EUT and JTAMD Demonstration, four
options are available to the government in fiscal year 2002 for the
JLENS program. These are:
a. Operations and Support--the JLENS protype would be placed in use
for a twenty-four month period at a location to be determined.
b. EMD--after a Milestone II decision, the program would build 1
additional prototype and 1 operational system.
c. Block I LRIP--produce a limited quantity based on the initial
design.
d. Produce Improvement Program, if the Block I LRIP option is not
chosen, the program could enter a Product Improvement Phase followed by
production.
Question. Since neither the Army nor the Navy has committed to a
procurement program, what is the benefit of conducting the $400,000,000
JLENS demonstration program?
Answer. The JLENS program will deliver state of the art
surveillance and illuminating sensors to the nation following the fast
track acquisition philosophy beginning with a technology demonstration
program. The demonstration program will provide the initial
architecture for air defense as envisioned in the JTAMDO Vision 2010
document. Capability provided and demonstrated will be the initial
development of a single integrated air picture meeting all four
services' requirements including, an air-directed surface to air
capability leveraging the Navy's SM-2 interceptor, the Army's PAC-3
interceptor, and the Air Force's AMRAAM interceptor capabilities to
bear on the problem of cruise missile defense. Upon completion, the
results of the demonstration program will enhance existing battlefield
weapon systems regardless whether a production and corresponding
deployment decision is made. The JLENS program will provide a
battlespace commander with a single integrated air picture, a CEC/JTIDS
communications relay, an initial overland LACMD defense capability,
sensor fusion advances, a light weight CEC antenna, an initial cruise
missile defense capability, remote queuing for fire control systems,
illumination for semi-active RF missiles, advances in the state-of-the
art light weight sensor technology, and technology risk mitigation for
future air defense systems.
Question. The Office of the Secretary of Defense strategy is to
conduct a demonstration of the JLENS and then make a procurement
decision. For each alternative please provide the required development/
production-funding, schedule, and operations and support costs. Field
the one JLENS test system?
Answer. (The following four answers are preliminary pending results
of the ongoing JLENs demonstration program. The JLENS system consists
of two aerostats, surveillance radar, at least one tracking/
illuminating radar, processing stations, and communications payloads.
Development/production funding, $476,600,000; Schedule, Fiscal year
1998-2002; Operations and Support Cost, $8,000,000 per year/system.
Question. Enter EMD?
Answer. Development/production funding, $100,000,000 (One EMD
system); \1\ Schedule, Fiscal year 2003; Operations and Support Cost,
$8,000,000 per year/system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Requires $78,000,000 in fiscal year 2004 to complete the EMD
system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. Begin LRIP?
Answer. Development/production funding, $1000,000,000-$150,000,000
(One LRIP system); \2\ Schedule, Fiscal year 2003; Operations and
Support Cost, $8,000,000 per year/system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Requires $116,000,000 in fiscal year 2004 to complete the LRIP
system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. Stop the program?
Answer. Development/production funding, $10,600,000; Schedule, 3rd
quarter, fiscal year 2002; Operations and Support Cost, $0.
Question. Your fiscal year 1999 budget includes no funding for
JLENS in 2002 and 2003. How much more would be required if the Office
of the Secretary of Defense makes the decision to field the one JLENS
test system?
Answer. (The following four answers are preliminary pending results
of the ongoing JLENS demonstration program.) $87,600,000 for fiscal
year 2002 to complete the demonstration system.
Question. Enter EMD?
Answer. In fiscal year 2003 the JLENS requires $100,000,000 to
start the EMD system.
Question. Being LRIP?
Answer. In fiscal year 2003 JLENS needs $100,000,000-$150,000,000
to start the LRIP system.
Question. Stop the program.
Answer. The JLENS requires $10,600,000 to stop the program in
fiscal year 2002.
Question. Last year we were told that the Aerostat demonstration
program would cost $600,000,000--now the cost has been reduced to
$400,000,000. What was done to bring down the cost of the program?
Answer. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and
Technology) established JLENS program funding via Program Budget
Decision 725 in the amount of $538,000,000. The $538,000,000 was
established as a best estimate funding wedge prior to a more refined
estimate, which was developed during the concept definition phase of
the program. The $600,000,000 dollar estimate was based on several
program options which are no longer required based on the results of
the concept definition studies and the competitive proposals submitted
by the three offerors during the Source Selection Evaluation conducted
in fiscal year 1997. Originally, the program was oriented towards
providing both a strategic and a tactical solution to the problem of
land attack cruise missile defense. The JLENS demonstration program was
directed to focus solely on the tactical solution for cruise missile
defense, which significantly contributed to lowering the program's cost
estimate. The JLENS program originally planned to carry two prime
contractors for the first 19 months of the program through Concept
Design Review. With the funding reduction in fiscal year 1998 of
$51,200,000, this option was eliminated which also contributed to
lowering the overall program costs. The program was also originally
investigating the development of a 90-meter aerostat. Terrain analysis
demonstrated little value was added with the additional altitude and
radar performance obtained with a 90-meter aerostat when compared to
the additional cost required to develop a new aerostat. The selection
of an existing 71-meter aerostat significantly reduced program costs
and risk.
Kinetic Energy Tank Round
Question. Over the last several years the committee has expressed
its concerns about the Army's 120 millimeter kinetic energy tank
ammunition industrial base. In response the Acting Assistant Secretary
of the Army for Research, Development and Acquisition, Dr. Oscar, sent
a letter to the Congress stating that the Army would fund the M829A2
kinetic energy tank round ``at a minimum sustaining level'' in fiscal
year 1999. The letter also stated that the Army had added funding ``to
accelerate the development'' of the follow-on munition, the M829E3. Dr.
Oscar, do you agree with the contractor's claim that a minimum
sustaining level of the M829A2 requires $42,000,000 annually? If not,
what do you believe is the correct level of funding and why?
Answer. The Army agrees with the system contractor's assessment
that the minimum rate requires $38,000,000-$42,000,000.
Question. Your fiscal year 1999 budget request includes only
$9,700,000 for M829A2 production. Does your budget fund the M829A2 ``at
a minimum sustaining level''?
Answer. For fiscal year 1999, the Army has $31,700,000 of the
$38,000,000-$42,000,000 required to procure the minimum production
quantity of M829A2s.
a. $9,700,000 from the fiscal year 1999 procurement request.
b. $22,000,000 from Foreign Military Sales (FMS) proceeds.
The Army recognizes it has an obligation to provide another $10,000,000
to complete the needed funding requirement to procure the M829A2.
Question. It is our understanding that you have a proposal to
increase funding for the M829A2 in fiscal year 1999. Could you please
explain your proposal?
Answer. For fiscal year 1999, the Army has $31,700,000 of the
$38,000,000-$42,000,000 required to procure the minimum production
quantity of M829A2s.
a. $9,700,000 from the fiscal year 1999 procurement request.
b. $22,000,000 from FMS proceeds.
The Army recognizes it has an obligation to provide another $10,000,000
to complete the needed funding requirement to procure the M829A2.
Question. It is our understanding that your proposal includes an
``internal'' reprogramming of $10,000,000. When will you reprogram the
funds? For the record, please provide the proposed sources.
Answer. The Army expects to provide this funding in early fiscal
year 1999. At the present time, a specific source(s) has not been
identified.
Question. Does your fiscal fund the M829A2 ``at a minimum
sustaining level'' in fiscal year 1999?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Does your Future Years Defense Plan support M829A2 ``at a
minimum sustaining level'' until the M829E3 enters production? If not,
what is the shortfall? What is the impact?
Answer. The M829A2 procurement is not yet fully funded. It is being
addressed in the Army's budgetary process for fiscal year 2000. The
funding level is $38,000,000-$42,000,000 per year. The fiscal year 1999
President's Budget request for the M829A2/M829E3 production is as
follows (all dollar amounts are in millions):
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PB SSN FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
M829A2/E3........................................ FY99 E78001 9.7 5.3 19.1 39.9 70.2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. Based on your fiscal year 1999 budget, when will the
M829E3 round enter into production? Is this an accelerated schedule?
Answer. With the fiscal year 1999 President's Budget, the Army
funded the acceleration of M829E3 Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation so production could begin in fiscal year 2002, rather than
fiscal year 2003, which was the case with the fiscal year 1998 budget.
However, it is not yet fully funded for production in fiscal year 2002.
Question. What will be the restart cost for the kinetic energy tank
rounds if the production line closes?
Answer. Restart costs are estimated at $70,000,000-$80,000,000.
Question. If the kinetic energy round line goes cold, what is the
impact on the depleted uranium (DU) industrial base? (There are only
two DU suppliers in the United States).
Answer. Aerojet Ordnance, Tennessee would probably go out of
business. Starmet (formerly Nuclear Metals, Incorporated) will
experience financial difficulties, but it is expected to remain in
business. Overall, we expect loss of expertise, added risk of restart,
and added cost to training rounds and other products.
Question. Do either of the DU suppliers have non-defense customers?
If so, do they have enough non-defense sales to keep them viable until
the M829E3 enters production?
Answer. Aerojet Ordnance, Tennessee does not have any commercial
business. Starmet has limited commercial DU production work, including
shielding for x-ray machines. Based upon the Army's best estimate, we
believe Aerojet Ordnance, Tennessee, will go out of business unless
they are awarded the production contract. Starmet will probably stay in
business, however the future of their depleted uranium facilities is
uncertain.
Question. How will you ensure that DU is available for future
requirements?
Answer. The Army is currently reviewing all options in the
budgetary process to insure that our DU requirements remain viable for
the future.
Reserve and National Guard Modernization
Question. The budget includes $675,000,000 for the Army National
Guard and $167,000,000 for the Army Reserve modernization--a 33 percent
increase over last years budget request. Additionally, the army is
cascading $34,300,000 in equipment to the National Guard and
$137,300,000 to the reserve from its active units.
Is the level of funding sustained in the Future Years Defense Plan
(FYDP) accompanying your fiscal year 1999 budget? If not, what are the
shortfalls?
Answer. The level of funding for Reserve Component (RC)
Modernization for the most part sustained throughout the FYDP.
Increases are noticeable, particularly for the National Guard (NG),
during the period 2000-2003 to support Total Army analysis (TAA) 03 and
Army National Guard Division Redesign Study (ADRS) related conversions
and activations. The Army Reserve (AR) is concerned with modernization
shortfalls in Echelon Above Corps Signal Systems, Combat Service
Support (CSS) equipment (shower sets, tactical power generation),
Combat/Construction engineering equipment (Breacher System, Heavy
Assault Bridge, Rock Crushers, Water Distributors) and Tactical
Vehicles (line haul trucks and 25-ton/5-ton cargo trucks).
Question. Are you satisfied with current equipment interoperability
among the active Reserve Components?
Answer. Overall the equipment interoperability between the active
and reserve components is satisfactory within affordable constraints.
The bulk of this improvement is the result of large amounts of cascaded
equipment going from the active component to the reserves with little
new equipment being procured during the early 90's. Despite equipment
compatibility improving between the components, some challenges remain
in the ares of communications, maneuver systems and combat service
support equipment.
Question. In what area do you have the biggest interoperability
gaps?
Answer. The area displaying the greatest interoperability gap
between the active and reserve component is communications
equipment.VRC series tactical radios have a limited ability to
communicate with Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems
(SINCGARS) radios. Component compatibility is improving as compatible
radios continue to flow to higher priority reserve units.
Question. Does your fiscal year 1999 budget and the accompanying
FYDP maintain interoperability between the active and reserve
components?
Answer. Within affordability constraints, levels for the fiscal
year 1999 budget and the FYDP do maintain a satisfactory level of
interoperability between the active and reserve components. Looking to
the future, the reserve components are concerned about equipment
compatibility issues as a result of the Army's move to become more
digitized. The reserve component is particularly concerned about
falling behind in the area of Army Tactical Command and Control Systems
and standard Army management information systems.
Aviation Modernization Plan
Question. The Army has just completed its ``Total Army Aviation
Modernization Plan'' for the active Army and National Guard. The
modernization strategy is to provide modernized and updated aircraft to
the first to fight units--initiatives within the plan will increase
integration between the Active and Reserve Components. Please summarize
your modernization plan. What are your priorities? What are the major
deficiencies on your current fleet?
Answer. The 1998 Total Army Aviation modernization priorities are:
(1) Solve Aviation's most critical battlefield deficiency-tactical
record and security (2) Maintain attack overmatch in attack helicopter
into the 21st Century (3) Enhance Command, Control Community, and
Intelligence (C3I) and joint/combined interoperability through
battlefield digitization (4) Recapitalize aging utility, cargo and
fixed wing fleets until replacement is possible (5) Develop technology
underpinnings for Joint Vision 2010 and Army After Next requirements.
Major deficiencies in the current fleet include: maintenance of the
OH-58D Kiowa Warrior as the interim scout aircraft in both the active
and reserve force until sufficient numbers of Comanches are procured to
replace them; continued operation of legacy AH-1 Cobras until they can
be replaced by either Apaches or Comanches; modernization of the UH-60
Black Hawk fleet to meet Force XXI battlefield requirements and to
extend the life of the UH-60 until it can be replaced by the Future
Utility Rotocraft; modernization funding needed to either upgrade or
replace significant numbers UH-1 Huey helicopters; an Improved Cargo
Helicopter program to extend the life of the CH-47 Chinook until it is
replaced by the Joint Transport Rotorcraft.
Question. Your aircraft modernization plan ``recognizes that
funding to resource all modernization goals are outside current Army
funding levels.'' How much is required to fund the plan? How much is
included in your fiscal year 1999 budget and the outyears? What is the
operational impact if resources are not made available?
Answer. The Army Aviation Modernization Plan addresses aviation
modernization requirements out to fiscal year 2020. The total cost of
modernization through that time frame have not been determined. The
fiscal year 1999 President's Budget includes $1,320,000,000 for
aviation modernization programs. Additionally, the Future Years Defense
Program (fiscal years 2000-2003) includes $6,909,000,000 for aviation
modernization. This funding supports major procurements that include:
Comanche Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E); 400 AH-64D's; 207 Fire
Control Radars for the AH-64D; 90 UH-60L's; 11,497 Longbow Hellfire
Missiles, 11 UC-35 jet aircraft. The Army has identified unfunded
modernization requirements that exceed $2,500,000,000 in fiscal years
1999-2003. These requirements include programs such as: Aviation
digitization requirements. Apache systems upgrades; procurement of 40
additional UH-60s needed to fill warfight requirements; procurement of
48 of the 145 required LUHs; and to improve reliability and provide
sustainment upgrades for the UH-1 fleet. If sufficient modernization
funds are not available, the Army will continue to operate its current
helicopter fleet without the increased operational capabilities
provided through modernizations. The Army will also have to fund
operational and support cost that will continue to grow as the fleet
ages.
Question. Your modernization strategy runs counter to be
recommendation made by the National Defense Panel. The National Defense
Panel recommended that the Army move toward advanced vertical lift
systems versus service-life extensions of current rotary wing aircraft
as proposed in your modernization plan. Why the difference?
Answer. The Army has conducted extensive analysis of the current
tilt rotor technology as a potential solution for future vertical lift
requirements. However, the significant costs associated with this
technology make it an unaffordable option for Army requirements. Given
available resources and the absence of affordable technology, the Army
has chosen service life extension programs as the most affordable and
achievable means to meet some of its aircraft modernization
requirements.
Question. What is your rationale for submitting a ``Total Aircraft
Modernization Strategy'' that cannot be supported in your budget? Why
isn't your strategy based on budget projections?
Answer. The Army has openly an accurately stated its aviation
modernization requirements for both achieve and reserve components.
These requirements are based on the capabilities the Army needs to
accomplish missions outlined in the defense planning guidance.
Requirements are determined by missions, not fiscal constraints. Fiscal
constraints do limit the Army's ability to execute this modernization
plan. The Army will continue to prioritize available resources to
accomplish its aviation modernization requirements.
Question. Have your developed alternatives to ensure that the
aviation fleet remains reliable and safe it funding does not
materialize to support your modernization strategy? Please explain.
Answer. The Army will continue to insure its aviation fleet remains
safe and reliable until aircraft can be either replaced or modernized.
If adequate modernization funding is not available, the Army will have
no choice but to continue to operate its present fleet. Operational and
support costs will continue to grow as the fleet ages. The longer
modernization is delayed, the longer the Army will be forced to operate
without the advanced capabilities needed to accomplish assigned
missions.
Question. The National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year
1998 stated that no more 80 percent of the funds authorized for the
modernization or upgrades or aircraft may be obligated until the Army
provides a plan that addresses current and future modernization
requirements and proposed funding. What impact did the restriction have
on your programs? Has the restriction been lifted?
Answer. The Army maintained tight control over obligation rates
during this period to insure that it did not violate this restriction.
A combination of the timely submission of the Aviation Modernization
Plan and the availability of up to 80 percent of authorized funds
enabled the Army to execute all essential programs when the restriction
was in effect. The restriction was lifted on March 6, 1998.
Utility Helicopter Modernization Plan
Question. The ``Total Army Aviation Modernization Plan'' requires
that Army procure an additional 90 Black Hawks, accelerate the
procurement of the Light Utility Helicopter, enhance or extend the life
of the current UH-1 Huey helicopter, and extend the life of older Black
Hawks. The Army's aircraft modernization strategy has always been to
reduce the type of aircraft in the fleet. Based on your new plan, the
Army will have a mixture of Black Hawk A, L and extended life models;
current model and upgrades Hueys; and the new Light Utility Helicopter.
Isn't this a logistics nightmares? Please explain.
Answer. The Army's Aviation Modernization Plan calls for
modernizing the UH-60 Black Hawk fleet to a single configuration,
replacing the UH-1s in the Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) battalions
with a ``commercial off the self'' replacement aircraft, and providing
a Service Life Extension Program for the remaining UH-1s. As the Army
transitions to a modernized UH-60, there will be a period of time where
multiple configurations of the Black Hawk will be in the fleet.
However, the end state objective for the UH-60 fleet is to have just
one model of the Black Hawk. If funding were available, the Army would
prefer to procure replacement aircraft for the entire UH-1 fleet. Under
current funding projections, this goal is unaffordable. The Army
intends to procure replacement aircraft for the LUH mission and provide
the necessary life extension upgrades needed to ensure the remaining
UH-1s continue to be safe and reliable.
Question. The budget provides funding for only 50 of the 90
additional Black Hawks. When do the Black Hawks need to be fielded?
What is the impact if funds are not included in future budget submits?
Answer. These Black Hawks are needed to modernize six National
Guard companies that are currently equipped with UH-1s. These units
will continue to support their States with UH-1s until modernized.
However, they will not be able to perform their wartime mission of
providing support to active duty light infantry divisions until they
receive UH-60s. The Army would like to modernize these companies as
quickly as possible; however, their modernization is not associated
with a specific date.
Question. The Army would like to identify a Light Utility
Helicopter by 2001. The estimated cost of the Light Utility Helicopter
program is between $507,000,000-$625,000,000. Does your outyear budget
include funding for the new helicopter? What is your acquisition plan?
Answer. Not at this time, however, it is competing in the Army's
Program Objectives Memorandum 2000-2005. The Army is conducting a
Utility Fleet Assessment study and is developing a Light Utility
Helicopter Operational Requirements Document. These documents will
provide the basis to determine the most achievable and affordable
method to meet the future Light Utility Helicopter battlefield
requirements. The results of this process will lead to development of
an acquisition plan for the Light Utility Helicopter program.
Question. The Army will conduct an assessment of the cost and
alternatives for a Huey/UH-1 enhancement program. When will this study
be complete? When do you need to begin your UH-1 enhancement program?
How many UH-1's will remain in the fleet through 2010?
Answer. The Utility Fleet Assessment study is expected to be
completed by the end of calendar year 1998. In addition, the U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command is developing a Light Utility Helicopter
Operational Requirements Document (ORD). The ORD is expected to be
completed by January 1999. Once the results of both efforts are
available, a Huey/UH-1 enhancement program can be planned. The Army's
UH-1 fleet may exceed 700 aircraft in fiscal year 2010, depending on
its ability to procure replacement aircraft and the specific outcome of
the ongoing trade studies.
Black Hawk Multiyear Procurement
Question. The Army is requesting $242,400,000 to procure 22 Black
Hawk helicopter. Last year, we were told that the Army had satisfied
its warfighting requirement for Black Hawk helicopters. Recently, the
Army released its ``Total Aviation Modernization Strategy'' which
stated it has a requirement for 90 additional aircraft for its first-
to-fight units. What changed from last year?
Answer. The primary change from last year was the release of Total
Army Analysis-05 (TAA-05) which added an additional 90 Black Hawks to
the warfighting requirement. The prior requirement was based on TAA-03.
Question. Does the fiscal year 1999 budget adequately support the
Army's requirement of Black Hawk helicopters in the outyears? If not,
what is the shortfall?
Answer. The fiscal year 1999 budget begins to address our out year
requirements. The Army has funded 50 additional UH-60s toward its 90
additional aircraft requirement. The remaining 40 UH-60s will compete
in the Program Objectives Memorandum.
Question. The National Guard has a requirement for a total of 260
additional Black Hawk helicopters to replace aging Huey helicopters. Is
the Army's acquisition plan for Black Hawk's acceptable to the National
Guard?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Based on the Army's Black Hawk acquisition plan, how long
will Huey's remain in the National Guard fleet?
Answer. The Army will retain UH-1s beyond 2010 or until a
replacement aircraft can be procured.
Question. What is the estimated operational life of the Huey?
Answer. The standard operational life of Army helicopters including
the UH-1 is 30 years.
Question. When will Huey's currently in the fleet reach their
operational life?
Answer. The UH-1 fleet will reach its 30 year operational life in
2000, however, the Army's position is the UH-1 can be safely operated
and sustained out to 2010.
Question. Do you believe that the current Hueys will remain
reliable and safe until they are retired? If not, what upgrades/
modifications need to be done and when?
Answer. Yes. The Army is committed to keeping the UH-1 fleet safe
and reliable until they are either retired or replaced. The Army is
conducting a Utility Fleet Assessment study to provide the basis for
determining the most cost effective means to meet its Utility
Helicopter requirements.
Question. How does the Army plan on satisfying the National Guard
utility aircraft requirement or do you view this as a National Guard
issue?
Answer. The Total Aviation Modernization Plan, approved by the
Secretary of the Army on February 6, 1998, addresses the modernization
of the Army National Guard's Utility aircraft fleet and includes buying
90 additional UH-60s, a proposed Light Utility Helicopter, and a
Service Life Extension Program for the remaining UH-1s. Furthermore,
the Army is conducting a Utility Fleet Assessment study, which will
provide guidance on the most cost-effective methods to replace or
modernize the UH-1 fleet and meet future requirements.
Question. Although the Army is planning to procure ten Black Hawks
in fiscal year 2000, the Army is not requesting advance procurement
funds? Why?
Answer. Based on the Army's current multiyear contract with
Sikorsky, advance procurement is only required for the first 18
aircraft. Since the Navy is on contract for 18 H-60s in fiscal year
2000, the Army does not have an advance procurement requirement for the
10 additional aircraft.
Kiowa Warriors Helicopter Modernization Plan
Question. Based on the ``Total Army Aviation Modernization Plan''
the current Comanche production schedule will require Kiowa Warriors to
remain in the strategic reserve until fiscal year 2022. According to
your plan, the strategic reserve requires a minimum of 190 Kiowa
Warrior helicopters. Based on attrition, will you have sufficient
quantities in the outyears?
Answer. Once fielding of Kiowa Warriors to the 25th Infantry
Division is complete in 2000, we will have about 312 aircraft in the
active component. All of these will be cascaded to the reserve
component as Comanche is fielded. Using an attrition rate of two
aircraft per year, we will have sufficient Kiowa Warriors for the
reserve component until they too are replaced by Comanche.
Question. Kiowa Warrior helicopters will require future safety and
sustainment upgrades to remain viable until 2022. When do the aircraft
need to be upgraded and what is the estimated cost?
Answer. The Kiowa Warrior's will require a major modification
upgrade beginning about 2008. We estimate the cost to be $120,000,000
per year to modify 48 aircraft per year for eight years. The total cost
is estimated at $960,000,000.
Question. Why can't you take the resources required to upgrade the
Kiowa Warrior helicopter and use them to accelerate the Comanche
program?
Answer. The Initial Operational Capability of the Comanche is
currently scheduled for December 2006. While this date might be
marginally accelerated with Kiowa Warrior funds, Comanche fielding is
programmed in both active and reserve components through 2020. Kiowa
Warrior is the bridge to Comanche and will remain in service for
another two decades; it is important to maintain its capability.
Completing the Kiowa Warrior Systems Safety Enhancement Program is an
immediate priority which should not be deferred, as it improves current
safety margins and makes the aircraft relevant to the digitized Army of
the next decade.
Question. Based on your modernization strategy, Comanche will not
be fielded to the heavy division/corps attack battalions until the
``far-term.'' In the interim, Apache aircraft will serve as the scout
platform for those units. When will the Comanche helicopter be fielded
to the heavy units?
Answer. The current plan fields Comanches to heavy attack
battalions in fiscal years 2017 through 2024.
Question. How many aircraft will be fielded?
Answer. The Army's modernization plan fields Comanche to twenty-
nine active duty and reserve component battalions; each battalion will
each receive nine Comanches, for a total of 261 aircraft.
Hellfire Missiles for Comanche
Question. Based on the fiscal year 1999 budget, there will not be
sufficient quantities of Hellfire missiles in the inventory to meet
future Comanche requirements. What are your doing to ensure that you
can meet Comanche missile requirements?
Answer. In fiscal year 2003 the Army will begin research and
development of a modernized Hellfire missile (LBHF+) that is dedicated
to meet Comanche missile requirements and to replace an aging inventory
of Hellfire missiles for Army Scout/Attack Aviation. Major product
improvements will evolve the Longbow Hellfire missile into production
of the LBHF+ which will increase the range, improve the lethality, and
provide multi-seeker capability to defeat projected threats in the mid
to far term. This will be a Joint Program (with United States Navy/
United States Marine Corps).
Kiowa Warrior Helicopter
Question. The Kiowa Warrior is the Army's armed reconnaissance
helicopter. Originally fielded during the Vietnam War as the OH-58,
this helicopter will be replaced by the Comanche. The Army is
requesting $40,400,000 for the Kiowa Warrior System/Safety Enhancement
Program (SSEP). Please explain the SSEP retrofit program.
Answer. The SSEP is designed to enhance the Kiowa Warrior's margin
of safety by increasing engine performance, and improving
crashworthiness and crew survivability. It adds the R3 engine with Full
Authority Digital Electronic Control crashworthy seats, cockpit
airbags, Improved Master Controller Processor Unit, Improved Data
Modem, and the Single Channel Ground Airborne Radio System (commonly
known as SINCGARS) Systems Improved Program radios. Installation begins
in fiscal year 1998 and is expected to be complete not later than
fiscal year 2005.
Question. How long will the Kiowa Warrior fleet remain viable
without the SSEP retrofits?
Answer. Notwithstanding any safety issues, obsolescence in the
Master Controller Processor Unit can be expected to reduce the number
of flyable aircraft beginning in fiscal year 2002 at an estimated rate
of one squadron/battalion per year. However, safety will always be the
overriding issue, and SSEP modifications begin in fiscal year 1998 to
correct those deficiencies.
Question. Your current plan is to fund 201 SSEP retrofits. However,
you have a requirement for 311 retrofits--29 percent of the fleet will
not have the SSEP modifications. What is the impact if funding is not
provided to retrofit the remaining aircraft? Will you have to ground
aircraft? Does this concern you? How do you plan on fixing this
problem?
Answer. If full funding is not provided, the Army will face
approximately 109 obsolescing aircraft with flight restrictions imposed
to reduce the likelihood of mishap or injury. The Army will give due
consideration to grounding those aircraft. The Army is concerned with
this issue and is addressing a $130,000,000 shortfall in the fiscal
year 2000-05 Program Objectives Memorandum to fix it.
Question. Last year, the Army requested $15,000,000 for the SSEP
retrofit program. What is the status of the fiscal year 1998 funding?
Answer. Contracts are in negotiation for the $15,000,000 for SSEP.
Question. When will the funds be obligated?
Answer. A contract award, obligating the funds, is planned for the
first week in March 1998.
Comanche Helicopter
Question. The Comanche is the next generation armed reconnaissance
helicopter. The Comanche will significantly expand the Army's ability
to collect reconnaissance information in all battlefield environments
because of its improved sensors and greater flexibility for
development. The Comanche will replace the Kiowa Warrior. The Army is
requesting $367,800,000 in fiscal year 1999 for continued development
of Comanche, almost $90,000,000 more than the fiscal year 1998
appropriated amount. According to the Comanche program office, the
Comanche program schedule is ``mismatched''--it is ``not in synch''
with Force XXI schedules. Please explain what you mean by a
``mismatched program.''
Answer. The delivery of Comanche's six Early Operational Capability
(EOC) aircraft occurs in fiscal year 2002, in time to capture the
lessons learned from the First Digitized Division (FDD) in fiscal year
2000 and to participate in the First Digitized Corps (FDC). Although
the initial operational capability is in December 2006, technology
improvements from FDD digitization initiatives will be incorporated in
all Comanche aircraft.
Question. Why is one of the Army's top modernization programs
``mismatched?''
Answer. The Comanche program schedule was established in March
1995, two years before the Digitization schedule was developed.
Initiatives to accelerate development of the Mission Equipment Package
would allow the Comanche to better participate in digitization
initiatives. The Army is looking for ways to fund the acceleration in
the fiscal year 2000-2005 Program Objective Memorandum (POM).
Question. What are the risks of a ``mismatched program?''
Answer. The Comanche is the centerpiece of the digitized force,
linking together all other elements of that force and distributing near
real-time battlefield intelligence and targeting data. The risk is that
some digitization experiments will take place without Comanche's full
participation. Synergistic improvements that Comanche will bring out in
other systems will not be identified, and Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for the digitized force will be developed without the
Comanche's full impact. We anticipate reducing that risk by seeking to
incorporate more capability in our EOC aircraft and use these aircraft
in our digitization initiatives.
Question. Why are we buying six early operational aircraft at an
estimated unit cost of $50,000,000 if they are not going to be in sync
with the capabilities required for the digital battlefield?
Answer. The EOC aircraft serve several purposes, one of which is to
support the digitization plans for the FDD/FDC. Additional purposes are
early user evaluation of Comanche capabilities and the development of
new tactics, techniques, and procedures. Lessons learned on how to
fight these EOC aircraft will ensure that production aircraft are
fielded in accordance with the doctrine for fighting them.
Question. What are you going to do to ensure that the Comanche
program is in sync with the Army's schedule for digitizing its force?
Answer. The Army is currently addressing this issue as a high-
priority unfunded requirement in the POM and evaluating possible
alternatives that could accelerate the digital capability of Comanche's
EOC aircraft. The Army is also minimizing the impact of not having EOC
available for the FDD by using the Comanche Portable Cockpit and its
simulation capabilities to represent Comanche in warfighting
experiments
Question. The Comanche development program, which was initiated in
1988, was to have cost $4,500,000,000. Since the program has been
stretched out numerous times, the development cost is now estimated to
be $7,800,000,000, a difference of $3,300,000,000. Additionally, the
Army has consistently included Comanche on its unfunded requirements
lists which have been submitted to Congress. How confident are you that
the development program will not increase in cost?
Answer. The Army is committed to developing the Comanche with the
available resources. The Comanche program manager is in the process of
updating the program office estimate for completing the remaining
development phase of the program and the preliminary data indicates the
funding level is about right. The funding profile is not at the desired
level but the Army will continue to make improvements to the program
funding profile, as resources are available.
Question. Does the $7,800,000,000 include the cost of developing
the integrated armed reconnaissance/attack mission equipment package?
If not, what is the cost of that effort?
Answer. The $7,800,000,000 includes both the reconnaissance and the
armed reconnaissance/attack mission equipment packages.
Question. Does the $7,800,000,000 include integrating digitization
technologies? If not, what is the added cost?
Answer. The $7,800,000,000 includes integrating the digitization
technologies. The unfunded issue addressed above provides that
capability at an earlier point in the program to match the Army's
digitization program schedule.
Question. As a result of funding shortfalls, we understand that the
Army has reduced the number of prototypes from six to two, reduced the
number of tests, waived certain military specifications, and increased
the weight limit to reduce the number of design changes for the
Comanche development program. Is this true? If so, does this concern
you? Why?
Answer. The Comanche program, as well as many defense programs, has
incorporated program improvements in the form of acquisition reform
initiatives; elimination of military specifications and performance
trade-offs are two of those incorporated in the Comanche program. While
there are risks associated with the changes addressed, they are
recognized and are being managed. The available resources do not allow
for ``no risk'' program plans, but we do not allow a level of risk in
programs that we do not believe is manageable. The number of prototypes
versus EOC aircraft was carefully evaluated before the plan was
approved in March 1995 and we continue to believe the program is
executable with the aircraft available. Due to the extended period of
time for development, we determined that the number of prototypes could
be reduced and we could continue to perform all the required
development tests. In fact, the six EOC aircraft will be used to
perform some of the component and system qualification testing late in
the development program after the user field evaluation of the EOC
aircraft has been completed. The weight empty limit has grown, from the
arbitrary 7,500 pounds at the start of the program, to the current
empty. Much of this growth has been due to satisfying changing or
additional requirements.
Question. The Army's acquisition objective for Comanche is 1,292
aircraft at a cost of approximately $37,000,000,000. It is our
understanding that the unit cost of Comanche is based on an annual
production rate of 72 aircraft. Are you confident that your budget can
support an annual procurement of 72 aircraft?
Answer. The current approved budget fully supports the procurement
and fielding of 72 aircraft per year. The Army will have to balance its
requirements in the coming years due to projected reduced level of
resources and some adjustment to the quantity and rate of Comanche
production may have to be considered.
Question. Comanche is scheduled to enter low rate initial
production (LRIP) in fiscal year 2004. What is the cost of the LRIP
aircraft?
Answer. The recurring cost of the LRIP aircraft vary due to
projected learning curve and varying quantities procured in each year,
but the initial unit cost is estimated to be approximately $30,000,000.
Question. When will you enter full rate production?
Answer. The current production plans are for a Milestone III
decision in December 2006 which would approve ramping up from the LRIP
quantities to the full rate of 72 in fiscal year 2009.
Question. The National Defense Panel (NDP) believes that the Army
does not have a requirement to procure 1,292 Comanche helicopters. If
the Army were to implement the NDP recommendations, what would be the
impact on the procurement cost for Comanche?
Answer. Any reduction in quantity or reduced rate of production
results in a higher average unit cost. The current projections indicate
that as a worse case of procuring approximately one half the quantity
at a reduced rate the average unit cost would increase about 15 percent
to 20 percent.
Question. The original Army's empty weight requirement for Comanche
was 7,500 pounds. Since the Army has added features, the low rate
initial production empty rate goal is 8,690 pounds. What impact will
the increased weight have on the range, speed and vertical rate of
climb requirements?
Answer. The Comanche program has incorporated an upgrade to the
T800 engine to a T801 engine that will provide approximately 13 percent
more shaft horsepower allowing the production aircraft to meet all of
the Operational Requirement Document performance requirements and Key
Performance Parameters.
Question. What does the prototype aircraft currently weigh? What
plan do you have in place to reduce weight?
Answer. The current weight empty of the first prototype is 8,988
pounds. The prototypes were fabricated without weight optimization
features incorporated in the design. The Army/contractor team has a
comprehensive weight management program in place to meet the production
weight goal of 8,690 pounds with a not to exceed weight of 8,943
pounds. The current status of the production aircraft design is 8,838
pounds. The design-to-weight program includes identified weight
improvement features, as well as incentives for the contractors to meet
the weight goal by tying weigh performance to award fee.
Patriot Missile
Question. For the last two years, Congress has funded three
different Patriot variants that each have an anti-cruise missile
capability: Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3, Guidance Enhancement
Missile (GEM)+ Upgrade, and Patriot Anti-Cruise Missile (ACM). Describe
the three variants and their capabilities.
Answer. The three variants consist of the PAC-3, GEM+ and Patriot
ACM. The PAC-3 is an active seeker missile, which incorporates hit-to-
kill technology--the only viable counter to threats armed with weapons
of mass destruction. It is a totally new technology missile unlike
anything in current inventories. It has a robust capability to counter
the full range of Theater Ballistic Missile (TBM), Air-Breathing Threat
(ABT) and Cruise Missile (CM) threats with high lethality. It is the
missile of choice to handle current and projected TBM and low altitude
CMs. With future software changes to the ground equipment and missile,
it has the potential to engage CM and ABT threats over the horizon
using external engagement quality track data. PAC-3 offers a four fold
improvement in firepower over that of GEM+ and Patriot ACM.
The GEM+ missile incorporates minor modifications to the existing
fielded Patriot missiles that would enable them to achieve higher
lethality than currently fielded missiles against a subset of TBM
threats at altitudes below the PAC-3 missile keep-out altitude. The
changes enable the GEM+ missile to intercept more stressing CM and ABT
threats at lower altitudes. This technology does not offer the
potential to intercept CM and ABT threats beyond the ground radar line
of site. If funded, the plan is to update PAC-2 missiles when they are
re-certified. This would significantly increase the capability of the
existing PAC-2 missiles at relatively low cost, but the resulting
missile will still be less capable than the PAC-3 missile.
Patriot ACM was initiated at a low Research, Development Test &
Evaluation funding level to prove out technology as a risk mitigation
program for the PAC-3 missile. It combines GEM+ technology with an
active seeker technology to provide a capability to counter the full
range of ABT threats at all required altitudes and ranges. Patriot ACM
would be as robust as PAC-3 against the CM threat. It also has the
potential to engage CM and ABT threats over the horizon at greater
ranges than the PAC-3 based on engagement quality external track data.
With additional modifications, Patriot ACT could provide better
lethality than existing, fielded Patriot missiles against a subset of
the TBM threats and warheads.
Question. Provide an average unit cost comparison of the three
variants.
Answer.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PAC-3 Missile...................... $1,200,000 Missile flyaway cost
based on 1,200
missiles
GEM+............................... 200,000 Average modification
cost
Patriot ACM........................ 600,000 Average modification
cost
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. What are the Army's plans for production of each variant?
Please explain the rationale for these plans.
Answer. The PAC-3 missile is the only configuration with a
definitive plan for production. The PAC-3 missile is scheduled to enter
into Low Rate Initial Production late fiscal year 1998 with full rate
production scheduled for fiscal year 2000. A total of 1,200 missiles
will be procured (fiscal years 1998-2004) with first unit equipped
being accomplished fiscal year 1999. The GEM+ modification is competing
with other programs in the fiscal year 2000 Army Program Objectives
Memorandum. If funds become available, existing PAC-2 missiles would be
modified during re-certification. The Army does not have a plan to
procure the Patriot ACM missile.
Question. What would be the implications of fielding all three
variants in Army Patriot batteries in terms of military capability,
acquisition costs, and logistics?
Answer.
Military Capability: The Patriot system design architecture will
accommodate the multiple missile configurations and can be programmed
to select the best missile to counter the threat. The battalion would
provide a very robust capability to counter the full range of current
and future TBM, ABT and CM threats at better altitudes and longer
ranges with growth potential to conduct over the horizon engagements
unconstrained by terrain masking. Depending on scenario, significant
opportunity may exist to destroy ABT and CMs over hostile territories,
thus reducing the effects of their conventional munitions or weapons of
mass destruction.
Acquisition Costs: BMDO has programmed $1,400,000,000 for the
procurement of 1,200 PAC-3 missiles. As stated previously, the GEM+
modification would cost approximately $200,000 per missile. Given that
funding is available, GEM+ missiles would become available 24 months
after contract award. The Army does not intend to procure the PACM
missile, but if funds were made available, missiles would become
available 24 months after contract award.
Logistics: At the organizational maintenance level, both the GEM+
and PACM missiles will be contained in existing PAC-2 canisters and
will be deployed on existing Patriot launchers. The PAC-3 missile will
be contained in a new 4-pack canister. Maintenance of this canister is
similar to that of the existing PAC-2 missile, however minor changes to
maintenance training/procedures will be required due to extensive
modifications made to the launcher.
With the addition of PAC-3, new depot level test equipment,
fixtures and procedures must be added to existing depot facilities to
support the missile and launcher. Depot personnel will require training
for both missile and launcher. A depot study is in process to determine
depot maintenance support requirements.
Question. What are the security implications of providing Patriot
ACM to foreign customers?
Answer: There would be no major stumbling blocks that would
preclude provision of Patriot ACM to existing foreign customers.
Patriot has received approval to offer the PAC-3 Missile, which is more
advanced technology than the Patriot ACM, to foreign customers. Patriot
would have to go through the appropriate release processes, but there
should be no impediment that would preclude release. There would be
constraints on release of some design and manufacturing information
just as there is on PAC-3, but release guidelines should be similar to
those received for the PAC-3 missile.
Brilliant Anti-Armor Submunition (BAT)
Question. What is the status of the BAT program in terms of
development, testing, and production?
Answer. All major technical issues have been resolved and
demonstrated successfully in flight tests. We have shown that the
design is mature and the system is meeting its performance
requirements. The most significant challenge remaining is completing
the hardware deliveries to support Army Tactical Missile System
(ATACMS) Block II missile testing by June 1998. The Block II program
completed its Engineering Development Test (EDT) flight in October 1997
and its Pre-Production Test (PPT)-1 flight in December 1997. Both
flights were dramatic successes that demonstrated the Block II
capability to dispense BATs. The second Block II flight test dispensed
a single live BAT and 12 instrumented simulants. The missile flew 134
km and hit a moving BMP with the single live BAT. BAT Contractor
Development Testing (CDT) was completed on January 12, 1998 when the
flight-test vehicle acquired and impacted a T-72 tank at White Sands
Missile Range. All known design issues have been successfully mitigated
and demonstrated in the CDT flight test program. In April 1998, we will
dispense Preproduction Verification Test (PPVT) vehicles from an ATACMS
Block II. This will complete the Engineering and Manufacturing
Development (EMD) testing for BAT. Additional BATs will be deployed as
part of the Block II flight test program during fiscal year 1998 and
fiscal year 1999. The completion of BAT EMD supports a Low Rate Initial
Production (LRIP) decision in early fiscal year 1999. Also, the system
level qualifications are ongoing and on schedule to support the
production decision. The fiscal year 1999 President's Budget requests
$100,400,000 to support BAT LRIP of 420 submunitions. This submunition
production supports the ATACMS Block II LRIP of 30 missiles also in the
fiscal year 1999 President's Budget.
Question. The BAT Pre-planned Product Improvement (P3I), which
allows the submunition to attack both warm moving vehicles and cold
stationary vehicles, ``played'' well in the Deep Attack Weapons Mix
Study (DAWMS). Some observers have suggested that we terminate
production of basic BAT and proceed directly to P3I BAT. Please discuss
the pros and cons of such a strategy.
Answer. The Army needs the capability to deny the enemy of
uncontested maneuver at depth--this is especially important for our
light and early entry forces. Given the proliferation of armored
vehicles in over 140 different countries, not fielding BAT and waiting
for P3I BAT would deprive the warfighter of a near-term capability to
engage and destroy moving armor at depth. Additionally, waiting for P3I
BAT would result in shifting the integration risks from BAT to P3I BAT,
impacting the vendor base--creating parts obsolescence problems, and
significantly increasing qualification costs. P3I BAT is currently
structured as an improvement program, not a full development program.
The P3I BAT program develops upgrades or improvements to selected
components of the basic BAT. The P3I program is developing an improved
seeker that uses leading-edge technology, an improved acoustic target
acquisition capability and an improved warhead. These improved
components will be integrated into the base BAT system. All the other
subsystems comprising the P3I BAT derive from the base BAT system. An
attempt to incorporate these subsystems into the P3I BAT now would
introduce an unacceptable level of risk to the entire ATACMs-BAT
program and significantly raise the unit cost of the P3I BAT. Waiting
for the P3I BAT would also result in a break in the ATACMS production
line, dramatically increasing future unit costs. Base BAT meets a
critical operational deficiency today, P3I BAT expands performance to
meet the threat tomorrow.
Question. Can P3I BAT be accelerated?
Answer. No. At this time it does not appear that we can accelerate
P3I BAT. The P3I BAT program is developing a leading-edge seeker to
replace the seeker in the basic BAT. This program is currently
completing its Program Definition and Risk Reduction phase and will
enter EMD in October 1998. The EMD phase requires time to mature the
seeker electronics behind the gimbals and system support software
algorithms. There is a significant amount of testing planned in the EMD
phase to prove out the seeker electronics and integration with system
level subsystems. The main driver in the entire EMD test program is
hardware deliveries. Specifically, the miniaturization of the
electronics must be accomplished before initiating flight-testing. The
Application Specific Integrated Circuits to support the electronics
miniaturization have a 22 month lead time before they can be integrated
into flight test vehicles. The P3I BAT EMD flight test program consists
of a Captive Flight Test (CFT) phase, a Developmental Engineering Test
phase, and culminates with a ATACMS Block II System Test with P3I BAT.
Consequently, this testing can not be accelerated because of the
hardware lead time.
Longbow Hellfire Missile
Question. Last year, the General Accounting Office said that the
Army overstated its requirement for the Longbow Hellfire missile.
Further, during the Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study, the less expensive
Laser Hellfire ``played'' better than Longbow Hellfire. Last year, the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) agreed to study the best mix
between Laser Hellfire and Longbow Hellfire. This year, the Army is
requesting a multiyear contract for Longbow Hellfire. When will the
Hellfire mix study be completed?
Answer. The mix study is complete and strongly supports the Army's
position for the stated requirement. The emerging mix study results
were considered in the preparation of the fiscal year 1999 President's
Budget. The budget includes a five-year multiyear procurement, which is
critical to the Longbow Hellfire Cost Reduction Plan, and supports the
Army's Longbow Hellfire requirement.
Question. Why did the Army request a multiyear approval in the
budget prior to the availability of this study?
Answer. The Army completed the OSD required mix study in December
1997, prior to the submission of the fiscal year 1999 President's
Budget. The results confirm that the multiyear quantities are valid.
Question. What are the requirement assumptions for Longbow
Hellfire, and are these stable enough for a multiyear contract?
Answer. Yes, the Longbow Hellfire requirement is stable for a
multiyear contract. The Army's requirement process takes into account
the total Longbow capable aircraft for the two major theater wars. The
Longbow Apache aircraft requirement and procurement is stable and
funded. The Apache Longbow helicopter procurement quantity will field
25 attack battalions against the force structure requirement and
modernizes the entire AH-64 fleet in both the Active and Reserve
components. Present aircraft procurement schedule is based on the
recent Total Army Analysis 2005 Force Structure process, which is
designed to define the Army's force structure thru fiscal year 2005.
Longbow requirements are those necessary to equip the two major theater
war force to its designed capability to meet warfighting Commanders-in-
Chief requirements to decisively defeat the enemy, and to maintain
operational flexibility in accordance with the Department of Defense
instructions for determining munitions requirements.
Question. What are the savings from the multiyear procurement
compared to annual buys at the same annual quantities?
Answer: The estimated savings are $172,186,000.
Question. How many years is the proposed multiyear procurement?
What is the total contract value for the multiyear procurement?
Answer. The proposed multiyear procurement is for five fiscal
years, starting in fiscal year 1999 and ending in fiscal year 2003. The
estimated contract value for the multiyear procurement is
$1,199,000,000.
Line-of-Sight Anti-Tank (LOSAT) and Follow-On-To-Tow (FOTT)
Question. Please provide a side-by-side comparison between the
LOSAT and Follow-On-To-TOW (FOTT) weapon systems including, but not
limited to the following areas, initial operating capability, average
unit cost (with assumptions) number weapons projected to be fielded,
firing platform, number of firing platforms projected to receive
weapon, number weapons per firing platform, weapon range, reload times,
lethality, and targeting method.
Answer. LOSAT/FOTT Characteristics:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Characteristics LOSAT FOTT
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Range......................... Greater than 4 Greater than 4
kilometers. kilometers.
First Unit Equipped........... Fiscal year 2003 Fiscal Year 2005--
(Start of Missiles with
Extended User Improved TOW
Evaluation) Acquisition System
Fiscal year 2005 (ITAS)/BFVS A3
(Advanced Improved Bradley
Concept Acquisition
Technology Subsystem (IBAS)
Demonstration appliques.
Completed).
Fiscal year 2007--
Bradley Fighting
Vehicle System
(BFVS) A2/A2
Operation Desert
Storm (ODS)
appliques.
Platform(s)................... 12 each M1113 Current ground TOW
(Expanded Platforms (ITAS-
Capacity HMMWV). 1165, BFVS-4164).
No. of missiles per platform.. 4 per LOSAT HMMWV 6 per ITAS vehicle, 7
vehicle 8 each per BFVS M2, 12 per
in trailer BFVS M3.
behind LOSAT
HMMWV.
Missile Reload Time........... Less than 10 ITAS--30 sec (single
minutes for each missile). BFVS-2 min
missile pods (two missiles).
(each pod holds
2 missiles).
Average Unit Procurement Cost Fire Unit Cost: Missile Cost: $78,400
(Fiscal Year 1998 Constant $3,000,000 each each (based on buy
dollars). (based on buy of of 39,267 missiles).
12 ACTD Fire Platform applique
Units) Missile kits: BFVS-$42,953
Cost: $181,000 Each ITAS-$31,484
each (based on Each BFVS A2/A2 ODS-
buy of 144 ACTD $82,588 each.
missiles).
Missile Warhead............... Kinetic Energy Chemical Energy
(hit to kill). Warhead--Potential
for either an
Explosively Formed
Penetrator (similar
to TOW 2B) or Tandem
shaped charged
warhead (similar to
Javelin).
Targeting Method.............. 2nd Generation 2nd Gen FLIR target
(Gen) Forward acquisition with
Looking Infrared fire & forget and
(FLIR) Target alternate mode
Acquisition. (command line of
Sequential sight mode). BFVS
engagement of platforms have
two targets, no ability to
gunner actions sequentially engage
after trigger two targets.
pull.
Rate of Fire Time of flight >20 seconds to
Approximately 4 seconds to maximum range..
maximum range.
Engagement Timelines.......... 2 targets on one Single Shot
trigger pull (2 sequential firing.
kills at maximum BFVS A/A2 ODS. Two
range in 10 missiles per
seconds). launcher--Fire and
forget mode: <5 sec
+ missile time of
flight to target;
Alternate Mode: 1.5
sec + missile time
of flight to target.
BFVS A2/A2 ODS. Two
missiles per
launcher--Fire and
forget mode: <5 sec
+ missile time of
flight to target:
Alternate Mode: 1.5
sec + missile time
of flight to target.
ITAS. One missile per
launcher--Fire and
forget mode: <2 sec
+ missile time of
flight to target +
reload time;
Alternate Mode 1.5
sec + missile time
of flight to target
+ reload time.
Deployment.................... 1 Company (12 Replaces all current
Fire Units) to ground TOW
XVIII Airborne platforms.
Corps.
Missile Length/Weight......... 113 in./175 lbs.. 46 in./65 lbs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Abrams Tank Upgrade Program
Question. The Army is requesting $698,000,000 for the M1A2 Abrams
tank modification program. It is our understanding that the Army M1A2
program does not include adequate funding for safety modifications in
fiscal year 1999. What safety modifications are not funded?
Answer. We have four safety modifications funded through fiscal
year 2003. We are adequately funded in fiscal year 1999 for safety
modifications. We have some outyear funding issues we are working in
the fiscal year 2000 Program Objectives Memorandum (POM). Safety has
the Army's highest priority.
Question. What is the risk to the soldier if the safety
modifications are not included?
Answer. We strive to train our soldiers in the safe use of all of
our equipment. We have no safety issues placing soldiers at high risk
if proper operating procedures are followed. There are a few open
safety issues where the chance of occurrence is remote but the results
are catastrophic or fatal. An example is the Driver's Hatch Interlock
(DHI). The DHI will prevent the tank commander from rotating the turret
while the driver's hatch is open. Over the course of the entire Abrams
tank program, we've had 18 turret rotation incidents with 5 fatalities.
In these cases, we are implementing hardware fixes and updating
training to take the remote chance of occurrence to nearly non-
existent.
Question. What is the funding shortfall in fiscal year 1999? The
outyears?
Answer. There is no fiscal year 1999 shortfall. At this point in
time, we have only four safety modifications in progress for the tank.
Budget documents show that two of the modifications, DHI and Nuclear,
Biological and Chemical (NBC) Fire Warning, need about $45,000,000
between them to finish before fiscal year 2003.
Question. The current multiyear contract is for an annual
production rate of 120 tanks. However, the contract has a ``ceiling
price'' if the Army procures less than 120 tanks. Could you please
explain ``ceiling price'' and the production quantities required?
Answer. The current funding of the weapon system cost profile for
120 tanks each in fiscal year 1999 and fiscal year 2000 is as follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year Fiscal year
1999 2000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
General Dynamics Land systems (GDLS) MY $255,000,000 $262,500,000
Procurement Price (4th and 5th Years)..
GDLS System Enhancement Program (SEP) 50,300,000 51,300,000
Engineering Change Proposals (ECPs)....
GDLS other approved/pending ECPs........ 16,900,000 21,000,000
2nd Generation Forward Looking Infrared 78,300,000 80,100,000
(2nd Gen FLIR) Hardware................
2nd Gen FLIR Technical Support.......... 18,300,000 6,300,000
Other Government Furnished Equipment 127,600,000 122,400,000
(GFE)..................................
First Destination Transportation & 3,900,000 3,900,000
Auxillary Services.....................
Total Package Fielding and Special Tools/ 24,300,000 29,800,000
Test Equipment Hardware................
Government Technical Support, Systems 18,500,000 18,800,000
Test and Evaluation, Management........
Contractor Technical Support............ 73,100,000 71,500,000
Total Weapon System Requirements........ 666,200,000 667,600,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Abrams multiyear procurement is a firm fixed price (FFP)
contract for 580 M1 to M1A2 upgrades at a 10/month average delivery
rate. There are no clauses allowing adjustment for inflation, labor
rates, etc. The contract value is $1,279,300,000 and the contract unit
cost is $2,206,000 per tank. The contract unit cost is lower than the
M1A2 unit cost because, as shown above, the contract only covers about
45 percent of the tank. Separate contracts for GFE (such as thermal
sights, hulls, guns, depleted uranium armor, etc.), Government
activities, system technical support, fielding costs, etc. account for
the remaining 55 percent.
During negotiations for the multiyear, we added a contract re-
opener to take up to 18 tanks out of each of the four final years of
the contract. We negotiated ceiling prices for the following five
scenarios:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of tanks (by year) Ceiling price Unit cost
------------------------------------------------------------------------
580 (100, 120, 120, 120, 120)..... $1,279,300,000 $2,206,000
562 (100, 120, 120, 120, 102)..... 1,301,000,000 2,315,000
544 (100, 120, 120, 102, 102)..... 1,275,800,000 2,345,000
526 (100, 120, 102, 102, 102)..... 1,249,500,000 2,375,000
508 (100, 102, 102, 102, 102)..... 1,223,300,000 2,408,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because of limited resources, the primary focus of the negotiation
team was the planned acquisition of 580 tanks. A lesser effort was
spent in refining the reduced rate ceilings or in pricing every
conceivable option for taking up to 18 tanks out each year because we
expected to be able to renegotiate if we had to exercise this re-
opener.
Throughout the negotiation process, there was growing conviction
that the Saudis were going to but 150 additional tanks (already
included in foreign military sales case VKZ and approved by Congress,
but deferred by the Saudis because of cash flow issues). Locking the
overheads' business bases was one of the late issues settled in
reaching a definitized firm fixed price agreement inSeptember 1996. By
then, both parties felt there was a high probability that the sale
would be executed, and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) tanks would be
delivered concurrently with the U.S. Army quantity (in particular, over
the delivery period for fiscal year 1998, fiscal year 1999 and fiscal
year 2000). Multiyear procurement prices were finalized with the
expected increase in business volume factored into the overheads and
general and administration costs. Both parties accepted risk. In this
particular case, GDLS came out on the short end of the bargain, because
the 150 KSA tanks has been deferred for two years in a row. The tank
program and taxpayers received a windfall of about $75,000,000 at GDLS
expense. The only alternative considered by the negotiation teams at
the time, was settling the multiyear procurement at a higher total
amount ($75,000,000) with a downward adjustment provision if the Saudi
case had materialized.
The two issues above are of importance when considering the impact
of exercising the alternate rate provision. For example, to buy 544
tanks, (10 tanks per month for the first 34 months and 8.5 tanks per
month for the last 24 months) the ceiling price is $1,275,800,000.
We're only assured of saving $3,500,000 in total by cutting 18 tanks
each out of fiscal year 1999 and fiscal year 2000. Re-opening the
existing multiyear procurement for the purposes of renegotiating the
fiscal year 1999 and fiscal year 2000 ceiling prices is an option;
however, that would give the contractor the opportunity to put these
additional overhead expenditures back on the table. These types of
situations are not uncommon when terminating a contract for
convenience. The contractors have an opportunity to revisit these types
of issues when the price/contract is reopened/renegotiated.
Question. It is our understanding that you can reduce the
production quantity to 102 tanks without a significant increase in
cost. If this is the case, why not reduce the number of tanks procured
in fiscal year 1999 and fund the safety modifications?
Answer. First, safety modifications are adequately resourced in
fiscal year 1999. We also believe that by the time dust settles not
just from the adjusting the multiyear, but also the myriad of other
contractual documents for GFE supporting the multiyear; years will have
passed and there will be little funding left on the table.
Question. The fiscal year 1999 budget request includes funding for
a SEP. The SEP modification includes a software upgrade, which will
provide increased situational awareness. The Army's Operational Test
and Evaluation Agency believes that the software development program is
``high risk and could adversely impact the M1A2 schedule''. Do you
agree with this assessment? Why or why not?
Answer. At this point, the Army has decoupled the Embedded Battle
Command software from the SEP (and Bradley A3) production decision. At
the Abrams Follow-on Test and Evaluation (to be conducted in 3rd
through 4th Quarters, fiscal year 1999 with the Bradley A3 Initial
Operational Test and Evaluation (IOTE)), we will demonstrate a voice
only communications capability. The digital command and control
capabilities will be demonstrated during the Force XXI Battle Command
Brigade and Below (FBCB2) IOTE in 1st through 2nd Quarters, fiscal year
2000. The M1A2 SEP tank will perform all tank functions and the tank
can be deployed and fought without the situational awareness software.
The project manager for Abrams will integrate situational awareness
software as it becomes available. The situation is analogous to buying
a Pentium Personal Computer to upgrade Word, Excel and PowerPoint to
Office 97 and hooking it up to e-mail at a later date. However the
integration of Embedded Battle Command (EBC) software for situational
awareness is complicated and is not a ``plug and play'' type of
integration.
Question. If the SEP program is delayed, what impact will that have
on the M1A2 schedule?
Answer. With fiscal year 1998 advance procurement, we're already
buying SEP components such as 2nd Gen FLIR, thermal management system,
etc. There are no workarounds to go back to 1st Gen FLIR hardware. SEP
will be cut into production as scheduled or we will suffer a production
break. The same situation occurred when the M1A2 was cut into
production. Like the M1A2, we have a risk mitigation program for the
M1A2 SEP.
Question. For the record, what is the current development schedule
for the SEP?
Answer. The SEP Program is currently in the fabrication and testing
phase of development. Component testing has been initiated, and in some
cases already successfully completed. Six M1A2 SEP prototypes are being
assembled with one tank completed and en route to Yuma Proving Ground
(YPG) for contractor testing. Over the next three months, the remaining
five prototypes will be completed. Government testing of three of those
prototypes will begin in June. The remaining three tanks will stay at
the contractor's facility to support software development/upgrades,
conduct engineering evaluations, and to support the logistics program.
System software is being completed with functional tank software
available for contractor testing. Fully functional, safety release
software will be available for Government testing in June 1998.
Integration of the EBC software from the FBCB2 program will occur over
the next eight months, with EBC version 1.02b released to the SEP tanks
in December 1998. Upgrade to EBC version 3.1 will also begin over the
remainder of fiscal year 1998, with actual release of software from the
FBCB2 program to the Abrams SEP program in February 1999 (version 3.0)
and June 1999 (version 3.1). After the Abrams EBCintegration program is
complete, the M1A2 SEP prototype tanks will have EBC 3.1 functionality
to support the FBCB2 IOTE in October 1999. Long lead hardware is in the
process of being procured to support August 1999 production of the M1A2
SEP tank.
Question. When will SEP be tested?
Answer. SEP testing has been on going at the component level. The
first M1A2 SEP prototype was shipped to YPG in February 1998 to start
technical testing. A follow-on operational test and evaluation is
scheduled for 3rd through 4th Quarters, fiscal year 1999 to demonstrate
tank requirements with an additional follow-on operational test in
conjunction with the FBCB2 IOTE in 1st Quarter, fiscal year 2000 to
demonstrate command and control requirements.
Question. Last year, your budget proposed upgrading a total of 998
tanks. This year your budget funds a total of 1,069 upgrades. Why are
you increasing the number of upgrades?
Answer. The Original M1A2 upgrade program was for 998 upgrades
which when combined with 62 new and 19 pilots and prototypes added to
1,079 M1A2 tanks. This quantity fielded our ``First-to-Fight''
continental United States contingency force. Subsequently, several
implemented and planned force structure changes caused us to adjust the
quantity. The key change is as ``digitization'' is introduced, we
believe it will be such a combat capability multiplier that we can
reduce the size of a tank battalion from 60 tanks to 45 tanks
(including floats). Within a heavy division, we plan to outfit the
division cavalry (27 tanks) and two battalions (90 tanks) with embedded
platforms like the M1A2 SEP, and the remaining two to three battalions
(90-135 tanks) with M1A1D. The 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment will be all
M1A2 SEP. Given these force structure assumptions, 1,150 M1A2 SEPs
(including 1,069 upgrades, 62 new and 19 pilots and prototypes) are
required to provide for our active forces, war reserve, testing and
training base requirements.
Question. What is the Army's acquisition objective (AAO) for M1A2
tanks?
Answer. We don't have an official AAO for a model of tank. Our
official AAO is 6,760 tanks, by about fiscal year 2010. Our desire
would be for all to be M1A2s, but this is not affordable. We currently
plan to field 1,150 M1A2s.
Question. Since the Army cannot afford to upgrade enough M1 tanks
to the M1A2 to field throughout the force, the Army is proposing a new
upgrade program, the M1A1D, which will ``digitize'' M1A1 tanks. Please
explain how a M1A2 will differ from a M1A1D?
Answer. The Abrams Upgrade converts an M1 into an M1A2 by adding a
new turret, a 120mm main gun, NBC protection, a commander's independent
thermal viewer (CITV), digital electronics architecture, position/
navigation system (POS/NAV), improved armor, and an improved
commander's weapon station (ICWS). Beginning in fiscal year 1999, the
SEP will be cut into production. SEP includes 2nd Gen FLIR thermal
sensors, Army Force XXI software, digital maps, integrated global
positioning system (GPS), improved electronics, an under armor
auxiliary power unit (UAAPU) and a thermal management system. The M1A1D
integrates the FBCB2 applique computer and command and control (C2)
software with the tank's laser rangefinder, a pointing device (like a
compass), the GPS and radios to provide digital C2/situational
awareness (SA) and a far target designate capability. The M1A1D does
not update any of the tanks analogue electronics, nor does it contain
the fightability improvements of the M1A2 and M1A2 SEP such as the
CITV.
Question. What is the cost of the M1A1D program?
Answer. The total cost is yet to be determined. The development
cost is estimated at $12,000,000. The current estimated unit cost is
$68,000 per tank in situational awareness and integration hardware,
$150,000-$200,000 in GFE radios, EPLRS, PLGR and applique computer
equipment and $50,000-$60,000 per tank to apply and provide technical
and field support, (i.e., special tools and test sets, initial spares,
training device modifications, engineering and logistics support).
Question. Is the program fully funded in the budget?
Answer. No. While the Army has funded the M1A1D development costs
and most of the procurement costs for the first digital division (and
identified funding for the rest), funding issues remain beyond fiscal
year 2000. Digitization has a high priority and we will fund the
remainder of the program in the on-going POM.
Question. What is the schedule for the M1A1D upgrades?
Answer.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Preliminary Design Review................. 2nd Quarter, fiscal year
1998
Contractor Test & Evaluation.............. 3rd Quarter, fiscal year
1998
Critical Design Review.................... 4th Quarter, fiscal year
1998
IPR Production Decision................... 4th Quarter, fiscal year
1998
Tech Data Package Available............... 1st Quarter, fiscal year
1999
Operational Testing....................... 1st Quarter, fiscal year
2000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. Who will do the upgrade?
Answer. Current plan is for contractor teams to visit the units and
apply the kits. A specific contractor is not yet identified. Another
possibility is to accomplish some installations during the AIM XXI M1A1
remanufacture program. The Army is currently assessing the results of
the AIM XXI proof of principle effort and a decision is expected in the
next few months.
Question. At the completion of the M1A2 and M1A1D upgrade programs:
How many M1A2, M1A2 SEP, M1A1D, M1A1 and M1/IPM1's will be in the
active and National Guard Army components?
Answer. At end state around fiscal year 2010, current Army plans
are for 1,150 M1A2 SEPs, 0 M1A2s, 1,535 M1A1Ds and 39 M1s in the Active
Army, War Reserve and Training Base. The Guard will have 2,792 M1A1s
and 343 M1s. Another 901 M1s will be available for other Department of
Defense purposes.
Question. Will all the tanks be able to ``talk'' to each other?
Answer. The M1A2 SEP and M1A1D will have common digital
communications. All will have ``voice'' communication.
Question. Will they all need different spares?
Answer. In general terms, there are spares that are common across
the fleet and there are unique spares requirements for each model of
Abrams tank. For example, all have essentially the same gas turbine
engine and powertrain. The M1s and IPM1s have 105mm tank main guns and
mounts while the M1A1 and M1A2 have 120mm tank main guns and mounts.
The M1 and M1A1 have primarily analogue electronics (and little
computing power) while the M1A2 (equivalent to a 286mhz computer) and
M1A2 SEP (equivalent to a Pentium) will have different versions of
digital electronics.
Crusader Artillery Program
Question. The Crusader is the Army's next generation field
artillery system. The Crusader System includes a self-propelled
howitzer and an armored resupply vehicle. The Crusader will have
greater firepower range and will be lighter than the current Paladin
system. These capabilities will result in increased survivability,
lethality, mobility, and operational capability.
The Crusader development program will cost $2,900,000,000. The Army
has estimated that Crusader procurement will require $12,000,000,000.
Crusader is a ``leap-ahead'' indirect fire support system.
Generally, complex technologically advanced programs all have some risk
in schedule, cost, and technology development. How would you
characterize the risk in each of these areas for Crusader? Why?
Answer. The Crusader program has an extensive risk management
program to assess cost, schedule, and technical risk (hardware and
software). In addition, the Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity
(AMSAA) provides a continuous independent risk evaluation of the
Crusader program. At this time, the program office and the AMSAA
consider the combined program risk moderate to moderate-high. The goal
of the program is to have all risks reduced to moderate or low by
Milestone II. Based on the extensive risk management program and the
status of risk mitigation plans, we are on track to satisfy the program
goal. The overall technical risk is moderate to moderate-high. The
areas driving the risk include Automotive (mainly powerpack
integration, and powerpack cooling), Armaments (cannon wear life and
laser ignition) and Software (number of lines of code and complexity).
The program cost risk is considered moderate based on the status of the
program today and performance to date. The schedule risk is moderate to
moderate-high. The program is well planned, but optimistic. The AMSAA's
independent assessment is consistent with the Program Office
assessment. In addition, the AMSAA has stated that they are unaware of
any program with a more extensive risk management program and are
confident that the Crusader program knows its risks and is proactively
mitigating and managing the risks.
Question. In fiscal year 1997, the Crusader program was
restructured. The new development schedule compresses the Engineering
and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase by almost one year, but
retains the First Unit Equipped (FUE) date in fiscal year 2005. The
Army's Operational Test and Evaluation (OPTEC) office says the schedule
causes a high degree of risk in the program. Do you agree with the
assessment?
Answer. The new development program did not really compress EMD.
What it did do was compress the overall development schedule by
introducing some concurrency among a limited number of the Program
Definition and Risk Reduction (PDRR) and EMD activities. The new
program was worked by a working level integrated product team (WIPT)
made up of key Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Army
personnel. The OPTEC was part of this WIPT. The OPTEC concurs with the
program office risk assessement--the new development plan is an
acceptable risk program.
Question. Have you reduced or combined any of the testing to meet
the compressed timelines? If so, what have you done?
Answer. From an overall test and evaluation perspective, the
actions taken resulted in a better and lower risk test and evaluation
(T&E) approach--such as moving live fire testing forward and improving
the time phasing of the overall program testing. The new development
program did not reduce testing; in fact it has more testing than the
original program. There is some combined operational and developmental
(OT/DT) testing which was carried over from the previous program plan.
Often as in Crusader's case, this is the most cost effective approach
to T&E. The current program is assessed as well planned and within
acceptable risk by both the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
and the Army.
Question. Since the schedule causes a high degree of risk in the
program, why not slow down the schedule and field Crusader one year
later?
Answer. There is no reason to slow down the program and slip
fielding one year. Slowing the program will not appreciably reduce risk
in the program; but it will increase program costs. The Army made a
decision in 1996 to reduce the size of its cannon battalions from three
batteries of eight guns each (3X8) to three batteries of six guns each
(3X6). This was done in anticipation of Crusader's increased
capabilities and to meet other urgent personnel requirements. This,
deliberate decision to reduce the cannon fire support available until
Crusader is fielded, places the force at a calculated risk
(insufficient fire support) in theevent of high intensity combat until
Crusader is fielded. The risk in this decision is considered
acceptable--knowing Crusader will begin fielding in 2005.
Question. Is the restructured Crusader program on track?
Answer. The program is on track since the restructuring. It is
within budget and schedule. The Program Executive Officer and Field
Artillery Commandant In Process Review (PEO/CMDT IPR) was
satisfactorily concluded, as scheduled, on March 12, 1998.
Question. When will the first prototype be completed?
Answer. The first vehicle is available in April 1999. It will be a
reliability test bed, which integrates the objective hull, suspension
and propulsion system. The first full-up Program Definition and Risk
Reduction (PDRR) prototype howitzer and resupply vehicles will be
delivered for test in April 2000.
Question. When will testing begin?
Answer. Significant component testing, modeling, and simulation are
ongoing at this time. As examples the cannon, gun cooling and gunmount
have been in testing for well over a year and a mobility platform
(prototype) will begin testing in third quarter, fiscal year 1999.
Question. We understand that the Army estimates a $45,000,000-
$55,000,000 overrun on the Engineering and Manufacturing Development
contract? What caused the overrun?
Answer. The Crusader program is in Program Definition and Risk
Reduction (PDRR). Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) will
begin in fiscal year 2001. The contract overrun being referred to is on
the Program Development and Risk Reduction (PDRR) contract.
The contractor currently estimates the overrun on Crusader's PDRR
contract at $55,800,000 versus the contract target cost of
$1,030,500,000, or 5.4 percent. The Government is maintaining close
scrutiny on the latest revised estimates and the variance at completion
could range up to $85,000,000. The contract's variance at completion is
primarily driven by:
a. Unrecoverable overruns in the now terminated Liquid Propellant
Armament efforts;
b. Higher projected rates than negotiated, primarily driven by
overhead rate degradation affected by the shrinking defense production
base;
c. Required design iterations (beyond those planned) for the
powerpack driven by size and cooling constraints; and
d. Higher than planned system engineering and program planning
costs.
Question. How will you pay for the overruns?
Answer. The Crusader Program Development and Risk Reduction (PDDR)
development contract is a cost based contracted effort. Risk is
inherent in this stage of the program and development risk is accounted
for during the estimating process at Milestone I. Additionally, the
anticipated development risk and fiscal year constraints were taken
into consideration during update of Crusader's Approved Program
Baseline in 1997. The Army believes that most of the contract overrun
is currently accounted for in its current budget for Crusader.
Affordability is and will continue to be perpetually monitored through
the ``Cost as an Independent Variable'' (CAIV) process. However, the
Crusader program can no longer absorb further reduction to its budget
in the future without damaging cost, schedule or performance.
Question. The National Defense Panel expressed concern over the
weight of Army weapon systems. Crusader will weight 55 tons when fully
loaded. Is weight a concern in the Crusader development program?
Answer. We are concerned about weight and have an extensive weight
management program. The Crusader system weight requirement is 55 tons
with growth to 64.5 tons for each vehicle. Today's most likely vehicle
weight, based on the current concept is 58.5 and 59.9 tons for the
resupply vehicle and self-propelled howitzer respectively at the end of
PDRR. The most likely weights represent the current allocated weight
based on today's concept. The current concept is based on what team
Crusader believes is the right balance of operational performance,
weight, cost, schedule and risk. The program has an extensive weight
reduction program with contractor incentives to cost effectively reduce
vehicle weight. The weight reduction program is a combination of good
engineering practices, making smart engineering decisions, and a series
of weight reduction initiatives to make engineering changes to the
current concept to eliminate or reduce weight. The program has a
significant contract incentive program and an individual incentive
program. Based on the current state of technology and a comprehensive
CAIV program the Army believes the right weight requirement is 55-60
tons per vehicle. There are technologies available to decrease weight,
but they are not believed to be cost effective when balancing cost,
weight, operational performance, risk and schedule.
Question. Are you confident that you will achieve your weight
goals?
Answer. We are confident that based on these assessments that we
can achieve our weight goals.
Question. What strategic lift will be required to transport one
Army armor division's dedicated fire support when Crusader is fielded?
Answer. The Army will be able to strategically deploy Crusader. The
Army deploys combat power four different ways. We forward deploy forces
in high-tension areas such as South Korea. We preposition equipment in
some critical areas and deploy soldiers to fall in on the equipment. We
also preposition equipment afloat, and finally, we deploy forces from
the continental United States. Crusader fits into all of these
alternatives.
Should an Army armor division (equipment and soldiers) deploy from
the United States, it would do so by sea. Parts may go by air. Crusader
is deployable by both sea and air. In fact, Crusader increases the
commander's flexibility when deploying. Fewer Crusaders, requiring less
lift, can provide equivalent fire support as compared to our current
system. This is especially beneficial when tailoring forces for
operations other than war. The commander may not require his complete
fire support organization, and with Crusader, he can deploy a highly
capable fire support package suited for the situation. Crusader lets
the commander deploy the fire support he needs using less strategic
lift, and therefore, freeing up assets to carry other systems he may
need more of like tanks or infantry fighting vehicles.
M113 Upgrade Program--Reactive Armor
Question. Last year the Congress appropriated $40,200,000 for the
M113 program, an increase of $20,000,000. Of the increase, $15,000,000
was only to modify M113 tracked vehicles with reactive armor. The
authorization conference legislated that $35,200,000 of the $40,200,000
may only be used for the procurement and installation of M113 upgrade
kits. The remaining $5,000,000 was to procure driver night viewers as
directed by the appropriation conference. What is the status of the
$15,000,000 appropriated for reactive armor?
Answer. The Department of the Army intends to fully comply with the
law on this issue. The Army notified the House and Senate Appropriation
Committee Chairmen on December 5, 1997, of its intent to use funds for
the M113A3 upgrade kits as directed by statutory language contained in
Section 113 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1998. Currently, these funds are on withhold at the Office of the
Secretary of Defense pending resolution of this issue.
Question. Does the Army have a requirement for reactive armor on
the M113?
Answer. The Army does not have a requirement for M113 reactive
armor.
Question. If the Army were to begin a M113 reactive armor
modification program, what would be the acquisition strategy? What
would be the cost of such a program?
Answer. The Army does not have a requirement for M113 reactive
armor tiles and thus does not support funding for tiles at the expense
of M113A3 conversion kits. However, a strategy to achieve a reactive
armor capability on an M113 platform would require: two years of
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDTE) funding ($3,500,000
in the first year and $7,500,000 in the second) to modify and test
commercially available armor packages and to make vehicle modifications
in order to accommodate the increased weight of the tiles; and two
years of procurement funding ($33,600,000 in the first year and
$6,500,000 in the second), starting the second year of the RDTE effort,
to buy enough armor tiles for 96 vehicles (three battalion sets) and to
buy and install the associated vehicle application kits.
Light Tactical Wheeled Vehicles
Question. The Army is requesting $12,100,000 in fiscal year 1999 to
procure High Mobility Multipurpose Vehicles (HMMWV). The Army is also
requesting $24,800,000 to begin a HMMWV extended service program.
Recently, we received budget documentation supporting a multiyear
contract for the HMMWV extended service program. Why are you requesting
the authority to proceed with a multiyear contract since it does not
meet the criteria legislated in the fiscal year 1998 Appropriations
Act.
Answer. The value of the HMMWV extended service program multiyear
contract as presented in the budget exceeds $500,000,000, which is the
threshold for seeking multiyear procurement authority from Congress.
However, due to the high unit cost of a remanufactured HMMWV, the Army
does not intend to execute this contract.
(Clerk's note.--The fiscal year 1998 legislation directed
that all multi-year procurement requests must be submitted with
the President's budget request. The President did not request
approval for a HMMWV-ESP multi-year contract in the request
submitted to the Congress. The Army requested approval during
the budget hearings.)
Question. Last year, the Army requested funds to develop a new
light tactical vehicle. Since the Army had not completed its light
tactical wheeled strategy, the Congress denied/terminated the program.
Instead, Congress provided funding to procure HMMWVs to meet inventory
shortfalls. Have you completed your light tactical wheeled strategy?
Answer. No, we have not. Our Light Tactical Wheeled Vehicle
Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) will be completed no earlier than
December of 1998.
Question. If so, please summarize the strategy.
Answer. Our analysis is not complete.
Question. Does the budget request sustain the industrial base? If
not, what is the impact?
Answer. No, it does not. The impact on AM General is dependent upon
the amount of purchases by other Services, Foreign Military Sales,
commercial and direct sales.
Question. For the record, please provide the following for each
alternative evaluated by the Army; the requirement; estimated
development and procurement cost; estimated operations and support
costs; and proposed schedule.
Answer. The Army's Light Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Analysis of
Alternatives is not complete. We will not have that detailed
information until at least December 1998.
Question. What is the Army's acquisition objective for HMMWVs?
Answer. The acquisition objective exceeds 119,000 vehicles.
Question. Does the fiscal year 1999 budget satisfy the Army
requirements for HMMWVs? If not, what are the shortfalls?
Answer. No, the Army will still be short over 17,000 vehicles.
Question. The Army is requesting $24,800,000 for a HMMWV extended
service program (ESP). The Marine Corps planned on a HMMWV ESP. After
evaluating the cost and capabilities of such a program, the Marine
Corps decided it made more sense to procure new vehicles. Why would the
Army want HMMWV ESP's rather than new vehicles?
Answer. The Army originally wanted to remanufacture basic HMMWVs
into the A2 configuration with some corrosion resistance enhancements.
This did not prove to be a cost-effective means of modernizing the
fleet. Therefore, we are asking the Congress to authorize and
appropriate these dollars into the HMMWV production line.
Question. What is the condition of the Army's HMMWV fleet?
Answer. It is generally good with readiness rates of about 95
percent. This is one of the reasons why we now want to postpone the
Remanufacturing effort.
Question. What is the Army's acquisition plan for the HMMWV ESP?
Answer. We are postponing any plans to remanufacture HMMWVs.
Question. What is the unit cost of the HMMWV ESP program?
Answer. We estimate the current hardware cost of taking a basic
HMMWV to a near A2 configuration to be approximately $45,000.
Question. What are the performance objectives of the HMMWV ESP?
Answer. As I stated earlier, we planned to remanufacture basic
HMMWVs into a near A2 configuration with some corrosion resistance
enhancements.
Question. What is the unit cost of producing new HMMWVs?
Answer. The hardware cost for an M1097A2 in FY99 is $55,000.
Question. Has the Army decided on the configuration for the HMMWV
ESP? When will the configuration study be complete?
Answer. We no longer intend to do the HMMWV ESP program in Fiscal
Year 1999.
Question. When do you anticipate awarding the HMMWV ESP Program?
Will it be completed?
Answer. We do not intend to pursue the HMMWV ESP program Fiscal
Year 1999 and would like the Congress to put these dollars into the
HMMWV production line.
Question. Does your research and development budget include funds
to develop a new tactical wheeled vehicle? If so, how much? What is the
total funding required to complete the program?
Answer. As I have stated earlier, we have abandoned our efforts to
develop a new light tactical vehicle. There is an ongoing effort in the
National Automotive Center called the Commercially Based Tactical Truck
(COMBATT) program. This program is exploring the feasibility of
modifying production vehicles to meet the HMMWV performance
specifications. Ford, General Motors, Chrysler and AM General are
participating in this program.
Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles
Question. The Army is currently procuring the Family of Medium
Tactical Vehicles (FMTV), 2.5 and 5 ton trucks, to replace those that
have been in the fleet for over 20 years. The Army is requesting
$336,000,000 for fiscal year 1999 for FMTV. During the past year, the
Army has developed a new acquisition plan to develop a second FMTV
producer. Dr. Oscar, please explain the Army's strategy for developing
a second FMTV producer.
Answer. Beginning in fiscal year 1998 we will award up to two pre-
production qualification contracts to qualified military, truck
manufacturers. We will provide the winners vehicles, technical manuals,
technical drawings and test reports. The winners will build pre-
production qualification vehicles that will be tested against the
FMTV's performance specifications that include requirements for
maintaining the fleets' high commonality of parts and components. At
the conclusion of the testing, the Army will down select to a single,
second source contractor in fiscal year 2000.
Question. What is the status of the FMTV competition?
Answer. We plan to publish our second source synopsis in Commerce
Business Daily in March 1998. We will follow this with a draft Request
for Proposals (RFP) 15 days later. The Army will convene an Industry
Day to meet with potential bidders 15 days after draft RFP. Fifteen
days after Industry Day we will release the RFP. We intend to award up
to two contracts in the fourth quarter of this fiscal year.
Question. What is the cost of the competition program?
Answer. The anticipated cost of the second source pre-production
qualification program is about $14,000,000.
Question. Who is paying the cost associated with the development of
a second source?
Answer. All costs associated with the development of a second
source are paid from the FMTV program line.
Question. Is your new acquisition plan adequately funded in the
budget?
Answer. The acquisition plan is executable within the Army's
current funding.
Question. Last year, the Congress provided the authority to proceed
with a second multiyear for FMTV. Have you awarded the new multiyear
contract?
Answer. No, the award is now planned for April 1998.
Question. What is the value of the multiyear contract?
Answer. Subject to final negotiation, the value of the multiyear
contract is $1,734,000,000.
Question. What are the anticipated savings?
Answer. The anticipated savings of executing a multiyear contract
versus annual contracts are estimated to be $130,000,000 or 6.4 percent
of the value of the contract.
Ammunition Program
Question. Last year, the Congress provided $1,040,000,000 for the
procurement of ammunition. This represented an increase of over
$200,000,000 to the fiscal year budget request. The additional funds
were provided to adequately modernize the ammunition inventory and
preserve the industrial base. The Army's fiscal year 1999 budget
request for ammunition is $1,010,000,000. Does the Fiscal Year 1999
budget request adequately fund the Army's requirement for ammunition
and sustain the capabilities of the industrial base?
Answer. The Fiscal Year 1999 Budget request adequately funds Army
ammunition requirements for training (with a modest drawdown of war
reserve stocks) and provides a modest improvement in the Army's war
reserve stockpile by funding M829A2 120MM tank ammunition, M934A1 120MM
Mortar Ammunition, SADARM, and HORNET (Wide Area Munition). It funds
the Armament Retooling and Manufacturing Support initiative at a
minimum level and provides modest funding for Army's industrial base.
The Army was unable to fund VOLCANO, XM915 105MM DPICM Howitzer
cartridge, 25MM M919 APFSDS cartridge and the Selectable Light Weight
Attack Munition within its current funding levels, and was unable to
fully fund the training pipeline. There are recognized weaknesses in
the overall industrial base in medium caliber metal parts, explosives
manufacturing, and fuze components, which are not addressed by the
fiscal year 1999 budget. The Army believes its appropriation represents
a balanced program given current funding constraints, and represents an
acceptable level of risk.
Question. The Army's annual consumption of training ammunition is
approximately $900,000,000. The fiscal year 1999 budget request for
both training and war reserve ammunition is $827,000,000. As a result,
the Army must use war reserve ammunition to support training
requirements. Does this concern you? Why?
Answer. The drawdown of selected war reserve stocks to support
training is a minor concern of the Army in fiscal year 1999. This is
because the Army's drawdown in fiscal year 1999 is primarily in
munitions that are currently excess to the Army's needs. A few
stockpile munitions used to supplement training in Fiscal Year 1999
budget request will require eventual replacement.
Question. The Fiscal Year 1999 budget provides funding for only
four of the fourteen munitions required to modernize the Army's
ammunition inventory. When does the Army plan on buying the remaining
munitions required to modernize its inventory? What is the impact of
the Army's decision not to procure all of the munitions required to
modernize its inventory?
Answer. The Army has already completed its buy of 6 modern
munitions and is deferring continued production of a seventh until a
newer version is available. Three items currently in short supply (Wide
Area Munition, Sense and Destroy Armor Munition, and 120MM Mortar High
Explosive Cartridge with Multioption Fuze M934A1) are procured in the
Fiscal Year 1999 budget. Two additional items (Selectable Lightweight
Attack Munition and the M919 25MM cartridge) are programmed for
procurement in future years. This leaves two munitions, the VOLCANO,
and the XM915 105MM Howitzer cartridge, which are not in the budget
request or programmed for future procurement. The current program
attempts to balance the risk of deferring procurement of some
modernized munitions against the projected requirements for near-term
readiness. The Army believes it has struck the best balance possible
given current budget constraints.
Wide Area Munitions
Question. The Wide Area Munitions (WAM) program was restructured in
fiscal year 1997. The Congress provided a funding to minimally sustain
funding of the basic WAM until the improved system was fielded. What is
the status of the basic Wide Area Munition program?
Answer. The Army has awarded a basic fiscal year 1996 contract with
options for fiscal years 1997 and 1998. The contractor is presently
buying parts and preparing to assemble units. The first delivery is
scheduled for March 1999, but an early delivery in late 1998 is
possible.
Question. What was the estimated cost of the basic Wide Area
Munition?
Answer. The original estimated cost of WAM in fiscal year 1998 was
$69,000 per unit. This was before any contract had been signed. It also
was before the restructuring of the program by Congress reduced
production quantities.
Question. What is the new cost of the basic Wide Area Munition? Why
has it increased?
Answer. The new procurement cost for the basic Wide Area Munition
in fiscal year 1998 is $202,432. The fiscal year 1997 President's
Budget estimated 215 units could be produced in fiscal year 1998. This
estimate was developed with a learning curve model using higher
production quantities for fiscal years 1996 and 1997 than were actually
funded, and before production was initiated to validate the learning
curve model and material costs. The low funding levels in fiscal years
1996 through 1998 have resulted in very inefficient production buys.
This situation can be expected in a low-rate production environment.
Actual contract award data and the realities of low-rate production
have been factored into the new learning curve model which now yields
more realistic unit cost projections. Given the funding available in
fiscal year 1998, the quantity of 74 is consistent with the new
learning curve. Wide Area Munition production funding was reduced by
$9,300,000 in fiscal year 1997, $3,600,000 in fiscal year 1998, and
$5,600,000 in fiscal year 1999 at Congressional direction. In fiscal
year 1998, the Army initiated a Producibility Enhancement Program (PEP)
to reduce unit costs in the future. These actions have decreased the
amount of funds available for hardware and delayed the Wide Area
Munition advancement along its learning curve.
Question. How will you resolve your production problem?
Answer. There is no production problem. Delays in deliveries have
resulted from a contractual effort to consolidate the fiscal year 1996,
1997 and 1998 buys to make the production economically viable.
Storage and Maintenance of Ammunition
Question. The Army is responsible for the storage and maintenance
of all conventional ammunition. In the past, the Army has budgeted
$300,000,000 for this activity. This year you are requesting
$400,000,000. Why did it increase? Does this fully satisfy the
Department of Defense requirement? If not, what are the shortfalls?
Answer. It must be recognized that the Army's Fiscal Year 1999
Budget Request for storage and maintenance supports management of both
the conventional ammunition stockpile and the toxic chemical munitions
stockpile awaiting demilitarization. The increase in ammunition
requirements in fiscal year 1999 is primarily attributable to rate
increases that affect the entire ammunition program. This funds the
Toxic Chemical Program at 100 percent and the conventional ammunition
Program at 98 percent. This minor shortfall effects a minimal amount of
maintenance and in-house automated systems development.
Sales of Excess, Obsolete, or Unserviceable Ammunition
Question. In fiscal year 1998, Congress passed legislation allowing
the Army to sell excess, obsolete, or unserviceable ammunition. The
Joint Authorization conference directed that the Army conduct a review
of sales under this legislation. Please describe how the Army plans to
implement the program.
Answer. On February 3, 1998, the U.S. Army Industrial Operations
Command (IOC) published a Commerce Business Daily notice to announce a
market survey to interested companies. This survey requested companies
to provide the kinds and types of ammunition or ammunition components
they would be interested in purchasing.
IOC's initial survey was open for thirty days. To date, IOC
received nine valid responses. IOC will not determine if these
respondents meet the requirements for sale under the direct sales
legislation. Most of the responses IOC received were requests for
additional information from political groups, requests for ammunition
from individuals, requests to buy serviceable ammunition which is in
short supply (e.g., blank ammunition and 9 millimeter), or requests
that did not meet the sales criteria of this legislation.
To implement this initiative in the future, IOC will list excess or
obsolete ammunition for sale on its direct sales web site. Qualified
purchasers must register to access IOC's Web site. This site will show
the type of ammunition available for sale, quantity, weight, condition
code, and asking price--based on a fair market value analysis. In
addition, this Web site will allow any qualified purchaser to identify
stocks that they are interested in, thereby eliminating the need for
future market surveys. The contractual language for these sales will
include a ``Hold Harmless'' agreement as required by the direct sales
legislation.
Per the legislation, the Army Audit Agency will schedule a review
of sales that Army makes under this legislation to ensure Army's
compliance. The Army Audit Agency is required to provide a report to
Congress no later than 180 days after the end of each of then next 3
fiscal years.
Tactical Radios
Question. The Army is requesting $11,000,000 to develop the Near-
Term Digital Radio (NTDR). The Army plans on having a competition
between the current radio, EPLRS, and the NTDR in fiscal year 2000.
However, the Army is also requesting $15.6 million to develop a follow-
on radio, the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS). Please explain the
Army's strategy for competing the Near Term Digital Radio (NTDR) and
Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS) radios. What
criteria will be used to determine the winner?
Answer. In fiscal year 2000, the Army plans to procure a data radio
to suppoprt continued modernization fielding for Army's Force Package
One units. The current requirement is for 2,941 data radios to fill the
gap in Army digitization requirements until a fieldable Joint Tactical
Radio System (JTRS) with a wideband waveform is available. For the
First Digitized Division/First Digitized Corps (FDD/FDC), the EPLRS
radio provides the tactical internet data backbone. For the FDD, the
NTDR is the TOC-to-TOC data-hauler between battalion and brigade
tactical operations centers (TOCs). The Data Radio is a system that
will be capable of being upgraded via software and will be scaleable to
the JTRS architecture. Our preliminary strategy of looking at a limited
competitive procurement in fiscal year 2000 enables the Army and OSD to
obtain a better value data radio. We will continue to review this
strategy as our future digitization needs evolve. The strategy for
competing the data radios will be a limited competition based on best
value with the criteria being developed in fiscal year 1999 being based
on operational requirements (mission need statement/operational
requirements documents), cost, and supportability.
Question. How many radios will the winner produce?
Answer. Up to 2,941 data radios will be procured from the limited
competition between Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS)
and Near Term Digital Radio (NTDR) in fiscal year 2000 for the data
radio backbone at brigade level. The Data Radio Army Acquisition
Objective is 8,157 and a total of 5,216 EPLRS will have been procured
by fiscal year 1999.
Question. The original target value of the Near Term Digital Radio
(NTDR) contact was $12,000,000. Today the government's estimate to
complete is $39,700,000. What caused the increase?
Answer. The NTDR increase to the Cost Plus Incentive Fee portion of
the contract (increase from $12,000,000 to $27,400,000 or $15,400,000)
was caused primarily by prime and subcontractor underestimates. Of this
amount, the Government is responsible for $10,000,000 and the
contractor is liable for an estimated $5,400,000. Risk reduction
measures, and minor design changes (communications security (COMSEC)
and functionality) have also contributed to the increased cost. The
remaining $12,300,000 is attributable to Government-directed changes
(new work efforts) for information security (INFOSEC), Multicast, and
Division XXI.
Question. Who will pay for the increase?
Answer. The government and the contractor share the increases to
the basic portion of the contract--government pays $10,000,000; the
contractor pays $5,400,000. Government-directed changes for new work
are not subject to cost sharing; the government pays the full
$12,300,000 for these changes.
Question. Is the increased cost included in your budget request?
Answer. Yes. the current program budget is sufficient to cover
program completion.
Question. What is the Enhanced Positioning Location Reporting
System (EPLRS) unit cost?
Answer. The contract cost of the EPLRS receiver/transmitter (RT)
was reduced from $40,000 to $27,969 as a result of the value
engineering change proposal (VECP) and Multiyear Contract acquisition
strategy. Option buy for fiscal year 1998 was awarded with a unit cost
of $26,450.
Question. To date, how many Near Term Digital Radio (NTDR)
development radios have you procured? How many will you procure in
fiscal year 1999 in support of testing? What is the unit cost of NTDR
development radios?
Answer. In fiscal years 1996/1997, 20 developmental prototypes were
procured followed by 110 NTDRs for testing. No NTDR radios are budgeted
for procurement in fiscal year 1999. However, in fiscal year 1998, 80
NTDRs are planned for procurement for testing. IN fiscal year 1999, the
NTDR radios will be tested as part of the Force XXI Battle Command
Brigade and Below (FBCB2) Initial Operational Test and Evaluation
(IOT&E). The hardware unit cost for the 110 radios (radio and antenna
only) was $9,900 on the Firm Fixed Price portion of the contract.
Question. Since the cost of the Near Term Digital Radio (NTDR)
program quadrupled, do you think it would have made more sense to
forego the competition and just buy Enhanced Position Location
Reporting Systems (EPLRS)? Why?
Answer. Continuation of the Near Term Digital Radio program
provides key insights into new technology. It also provides a critical
data hauler for our Tactical Operation Center (TOC)-to-TOC radio
requirements. In addition, the hardware unit for the NTDR is
significantly less than the unit cost of EPLRS (i.e., currently $9,900
versus the EPLRS cost of $26,450), and the bandwidth provided by the
NTDR is nearly 500 percent more than EPLRS bandwidth.
The potential future EPLRS/NTDR competition enables the Army and
OSD to obtain a better value data waveform radio until a fieldable
Joint Tactical Radio System with a wideband data waveform is available.
Question. Recent testing concluded that the Enhanced Position
Location Reporting System (EPLRS) radio had not demonstrated its
effectiveness for transmitting long message. What does this mean for
the digitized force?
Answer. No impact. The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation
(DOT&E) Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) report and the
Army's agreed in terms of the major conclusions--that EPLRS is
considered operationally effective and suitable at communicating the
type of Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS) messages used
during the IOT&E. DOT&E Also reported the IOT&E was not adequate to
assess EPLRS' ability to carry the larger TOC-to-TOC type messages seen
in the subsequent ATCCS VI test. The Army has no intent to use EPLRS to
carry the TOC-to-TOC type data seen in the ATCCS VI test. Therefore,
after reviewing the issue with DOT&E and ASD(C31) all agreed to
proceeding with the EPLRS full rate production (FRP) units called for
in the Army's February Acquisition Decision Memorandum. These radios
will be used to carry the time-sensitive type of ATCCS data tested in
the IOT&E and for position location data. Additionally, radios will be
reallocated to support the continued experimentation and testing
associated with the Army's digitization program to include the Tactical
Internet. The FRP radios will have increased capabilities (e.g., double
current data rates, ability to provide bandwidth, externally
reprogrammable) and a significantly reduced price (i.e., contract price
less than $28,000 per unit).
Question. When will you test the systems ability for transmitting
long messages?
Answer. There is no need for this test unless the Army decides to
use the EPLRS to carry the larger TOC-to-TOC type messages.
Question. According to your budget documents, the Joint Tactical
Radio System (JTRS) program was funded in fiscal year 1998; however,
the Congress never appropriated funds to the Army for that program.
Please explain?
Answer. The intent of the JTRS program is to comply with
congressional language to better manager radio procurements within the
DOD. The preliminary efforts associated with organizational definitions
and mission development are being accomplished by representatives of
the three services as a special task force effort, pending
congressional recognition as a New Start program. Consequently
participating service personnel are being funded from their respective
permanent duty stations. All participating personnel are employed by
project or headquarters staff offices that have a direct interest in
the future JTRS program. A Program Budget Decision (PBD) 704 directed
services to identify funds to support the beginning of this program for
fiscal years 1998 and 1999. OSD Comptroller designated the funds to be
allocated under the Science and Technology Budget Activity 3 and
directed that the lead Service (Army) begin a request for above
threshold reprogramming and request new start authority from Congress.
The Army has been waiting for final line item designated program
offsets from the other Services before forwarding reprogramming action.
Budget documentation reflected the Army's support for the JTRS in
accordance with the PBD. The budget submission timelines came earlier
than the delayed reprogramming action and new start request.
Question. To date, have you obligated funds for the JTRS program?
Answer. No.
Question. When do you plan on giving Congress the new start
notification?
Answer. Prior to obligating any funds for this effort, we realize
Congress must approve Request for Reprogramming Action first.
Question. When will the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) be
fielded?
Answer. JTRS will be a spiral development with incremental
capabilities available every 12-18 months. Architecture compliant
prototypes for increment one will be available in fiscal year 2000 and
service production and fielding will follow. Based on historical data
for other tactical radio programs, planning time is 12-18 months
minimum from prototype to production delivery. Architecture compliant
prototypes of the wideband waveform form, fit, and function capability
will be available in fiscal year 2002/03. The raw prototype with
wideband waveform and networking would require some manufacturing
development and testing in fiscal year 2004/05. This schedule assumes
that Congress will approve DoD's Request for Reprogramming and new
start approval for JTRS by 3rd quarter of fiscal year 1998.
Question. What is the estimated cost of the development program?
Answer. Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) is an aggressive
acquisition program that will replace a wide range of existing single
function radios with an integrated, interoperable, multimode, multiband
system. Acquisition reform offers some fantastic opportunities to do
things faster and cheaper than we ever have before. JTRS is using an
incremental development and demonstration strategy. The Department is
planning to meet the challenges of evolving requirements and advancing
technology through ``spiral development.'' Spiral development is a
process that uses short, incremental developments to shorten the
development cycle and speed product to the filed. Each of the
increments builds on previous increments. This approach will also allow
us to leverage and integrate developments in commercial technology.
Over the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) years, we estimate
research and development to be $232,500,000. The Army is postured to
buy JTRS beginning in fiscal year 2000 if a wideband waveform variant
is developed by then. However, we do not expect a wideband variant
until the third increment of development in fiscal year 2004. We
estimate Army procurement for wideband data radios over the POM years
to be $310,600,000; of which we expect $169,000,000 to buy and field
JTRS. Out year funding depends on the size and shape of the Army and
DoD which will drive the volume of the buy and cost per unit. If
applied across all services by fiscal year 2015, total procurement
costs may be in the range of $5,000,000,000.
Question. If additional funds were provided, could the Joint
Tactical Radio System (JRTS) be accelerated? Please explain.
Answer. Yes, if additional funds are provided, the prototype phase
(if required) and the Increment Two of the JTRS architecture
development phase could be accelerated by about six months. However,
there are significant unknowns in the JTRS cost estimate. The DOD has
chosen to fund Increment One of JTRS architecture development at the
``low'' level--approximately $34,500,000. If a prototype is required in
fiscal year 1999, then the ``high'' level cost estimate becomes a
reality, and additional funds would be needed in fiscal year 1999 to
accelerate the JTRS program versus waiting for fiscal year 2000
funding. If a prototype phase is not required, then the additional
funds could be used to accelerate Increment Two.
Year 2000 (Y2K) Computer Problem
Question. One of the problems that we face as we enter the next
century is older computers that one only programmed to remember the
last two digits in a year. Thus they remember 1997 as simply `97'. The
year 2000, however, will be saved as `00', the same as the year 1900.
This can lead to calculation errors and system failures. How serious is
this problem for the Army? What would be the impact if your Mission
Critical Systems were not corrected by the year 2000?
Answer. The Army is dependent on information technology and Y2K
poses a significant threat to our operations. If our Mission Critical
Systems are not corrected in time we will experience a degradation in
our ability to perform our core business functions. Command and
control, communications, logistics, personnel, financial, intelligence
and other information systems are all impacted.
Question. How many systems does the Army have to evaluate and where
do they stand in the process of assessment, renovation, validation and
implementation?
Answer. As of January 1998, the Army had identified 12,240 systems
that require repairs due to Y2K: 239 are Major Army systems, of which
120 are identified as Mission Critical; 12,001 are Other Army systems.
The vast majority of these are in the renovation or later stages of the
process, including all of our Mission Critical Systems. Major Army
systems are Mission Critical systems, migration systems, legacy
systems, any system with a $2,000,000 total cost per year, and any
system that interfaces with a system that meets any one of the previous
criteria. Examples of Major Army systems that are not Mission Critical
include the Black Hawk Flight Simulator and the Apache Mission Trainer.
Mission Critical systems are systems that when their capabilities are
degraded, the organization realizes a resulting loss of core
capability. Examples include the Apache Attack Helicopter, The Army
Total Asset Visibility System, and The Standard Installation/Division
Personnel System--3 (SIDPERS-3). Other Army systems are major command
and installation systems. Examples include the Airborne Student Account
Program System, The Command and General Staff College Nonresident
Instruction System, and the Combined Arms Services and Staff School
System.
Question. Are there any systems, particularly Mission Critical
Systems, whose Year 2000 efforts could be improved with additional
funding? If so, which systems are they, how much money would you need,
and how would the money be used?
Answer. The Army can always use more money. The Army worked very
hard to develop a balanced budget for fiscal year 1999 and the
President's Budget adequately reflects that effort. We have been very
successful in reprioritizing resources to solve our Y2K problems. While
there are programs that will experience delays in their original
modernization plans in order to make their hardware and software Y2K
compliant, we do not see any show stoppers at this time.
Question. Has your organization appointed a Year 2000 program
manager and established an agency-level program office to manage and
coordinate your Year 2000 program activities?
Answer. Yes, Mr. William Dates is the Army's Year 2000 Program
Manager and his office is an integral part of the Army CIO's staff.
Question. Have you completed a service-wide inventory of
information systems?
Answer. We have found that this is a process of discovery. The Army
is a very large organization in an almost constant state of change. We
are confident that we have inventoried all of our Major systems.
However, in each of the last three quarterly reports our inventory of
Non-Major Systems and IT-controlled devices has increased. There are
probably still a few unknown Non-Major systems and devices out there.
We are aggressively searching for them all.
Question. Have you deferred or canceled any new system development
efforts in order to reprogram the funds to achieve Year 2000 compliance
with an existing Mission Critical System? If so, which systems were
deferred or canceled?
Answer. We haven't canceled any programs to fund fixes for a
different, more critical system. However, many program managers are
deferring required capabilities within their own programs to fund the
Y2K fixes first.
Question. Have you developed contingency plans for Mission Critical
Systems?
Answer. This process is not yet completed. 60 percent of the
Mission Critical Systems requiring repair have contingency plans. The
Army CIO has published a policy directing all non-compliant Mission
Critical Systems to develop a contingency plan by 1 June 1998.
Question. Overall, are you confident of the Army's ability to
correct this problem before the year 2000?
Answer. Yes. We are committed to ensuring the Army is ready to
deploy, fight, win and take care of its soldiers and families now and
in 2000 and beyond.
Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996
Question. The Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996
(known as the Clinger-Cohen Act) requires each agency to make specific
changes in how they select and manage information technology programs.
Among other steps, this includes performing an analysis of
alternatives, a cost-benefit analysis and identifying specific
performance measures. What steps has the Army taken to come into
compliance with the Clinger-Cohen Act?
Answer. Once the Clinger-Cohen Act was enacted, the Secretary of
the Army immediately designated the Director of Information Systems for
Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4) as the Chief
Information Officer (CIO) of the Army. The Secretary has approved the
CIO Implementation Plan, which provides a roadmap as to how the Army
will accomplish the CIO mission. The CIO is an active participant in
the Army's major processes, e.g., resource management, acquisition, and
digitization. He has defined an overall C4/Information Technology (IT)
investment strategy that successfully programs the best, affordable C4/
IT solutions for the warfighter for the 21st century. He has developed
an IT architecture to improve interoperability and reduce costs, both
at the tactical and infrastructure levels. He has established an
effective information security program. He validates all warfighting
requirements against such CIO criteria as the architecture, emerging
technologies, business process reengineering, performance measurements,
and information assurance. He is the Headquarters, Department of Army
functional proponent for business process reengineering with a C4/IT
impact. He serves as a member of both the Federal and Defense CIO
Councils. Although the Army has much to do, our accomplishments are,
nonetheless, considerable.
Question. Is the Army now in compliance with this Act?
Answer. Yes. Among other actions, the Army developed an Information
Technology strategic plan and investment strategy. It also performs an
analysis of alternatives as part of its acquisition strategy prior to
Milestone II; it completes a cost-benefit analysis at each milestone;
and it identifies its specific (outcome-oriented) performance measures
in its requirement documents. These measures are evaluated at each
milestone.
Question. What improvements has the Army seen as a result of the
Clinger-Cohen Act?
Answer. As a result of a comprehensive Army Enterprise
Architecture, we now have systems which are more interoperable--from
the installation to the battlefield. The Army leadership has a better
understanding of the importance of Information Technology (IT), both in
IT dedicated systems and IT embedded in systems. The CIO is more
involved in all levels of the resource and acquisition processes. The
CIO provides a more comprehensive assessment of IT investments through
its investment strategy, the use of architectures to build integrated
IT systems, and its CIO assessment of systems during the acquisition
process. By evaluating all Army IT systems, redundant areas have been
identified and corrected. This has contributed to realizing a better
return on Army investments.
Question. In the last year, as a result of your Information
Technology (IT) Milestone Reviews, did the Army delay, cancel or
significantly restructure any of their IT systems? If so, which ones?
Answer. There have been no cancellations of Information Technology
(IT) programs as a result of Chief Information Officer (CIO) reviews of
IT acquisitions. Through other prioritization processes (e.g., the
program and budget), resources may have been redirected from IT
systems/programs to weapons and infrastructure programs. Any changes
that occurred are being reevaluated in the fiscal years 00-05 Program
cycle. The purpose of CIO reviews is to ensure compliance with the
Clinger-Cohen Act so that IT programs comply with the integrated
technology architecture and promote effective and efficient designs.
Question. What documentation does your review panel require for
each milestone review?
Answer. Documentation requirements for all major programs are
outlined in Department of Defense (DoD) Regulation 5000.2-R, Mandatory
Procedures for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPS) and Major
Automated Information Systems (MAIS) Acquisition Programs and Office of
the Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Information Technology (IT)
Investment Management Insight Policy for Acquisition. All programs that
meet ACAT I or ACAT IA criteria, listed in the DoD Regulation, are
required to submit the following items prior to receiving Milestone
Decision Authority concurrence to proceed into the next phase:
Acquisition Program Baseline
Acquisition Strategy
Analysis of Alternatives
Acquisition Decision Memorandum
Affordability Assessment
Beyond Low Rate Initial Production Report
Component Cost Analysis
Component Analysis Requirements Descriptions
Exit Criteria
Future Years Defense Program Funding
Independent Estimate of Life Cycle Cost
Interoperability Certification
Live Fire Test and Evaluation Waiver
Live Fire Test and Evaluation Report
Legality of Weapons Under International Law
Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) Quantities
Manpower Estimate
Mission Needs Statement
Operational Requirements Document
Overarching Integrated Product Team (OIPT) Leader's Report
OIPT Staff Assessments
Program Office Estimate
System Threat Assessment
Test and Evaluation Master Plan
Test Results
CIO Assessment Memorandum
Some of these elements are not appropriate for all programs and
will not be required. For example, live fire testing, threat
assessments, and LRIP authorizations are normally not required for IT
programs. In accordance with DoD policy, MAIS acquisitions will be
streamlined and tailored to the maximum extent possible through DoD
concurrence and guidance. The CIO assessment is required by the
Clinger-Cohen Act and will be addressed during any program review.
Question. In conducting these reviews (reference question 154), how
many involved an actual meeting of the senior decision makers, and how
many were paper reviews.
Answer. The Army Major Automated Information System Review Council
(MAISRC) has not done any paper reviews in the past year. Senior Army
leadership has chaired and attended two formal MAISRC meetings. OSD
staff principals have also participated in these reviews. The OSD
MAISRC has not done any paper reviews of Joint programs where the Army
was a part of the program. OSD principals have chaired three OSD
MAISRCs. The significance of the low number of reviews (either paper or
formal) is a testament to the success of the Integrated Process Team
(IPT) concept that we have been using for program oversight. This
teaming process has brought together members of the program offices,
Army staff elements and OSD principals in a collaborative environment
to help solve problems and guide the program manager. The success of
the IPTs has reduced the number of formal MAISRC actions and
streamlined the entire acquisition process. In most cases the IPT
process has not eliminated the requirement for proper documentation and
reporting. However, the oversight principals now participate in the
development of the program and the OSD leadership has an opportunity to
be a part of the success of a program.
Question. Has the OSD MAISRC, in its reviews, delayed, canceled or
significantly restructured any of the Army's IT systems? If so, which
ones?
Answer. There have been no changes to any IT program that resulted
in any significant impact. Several major programs have been submitted
to OSD for consideration of delegation to the Army for oversight. For
the past year, only the Total Army Distance Learning Program was
delegated from OSD oversight to Army oversight as an ACAT IAC with the
Army CIO as the Milestone Decision Authority.
Chemical Demilitarization
Question. The Army has the responsibility for destroying all
chemical warfare related material. The Army is currently constructing
chemical demilitarization facilities at various storage locations.
Congress mandated that the 31,493 tons of chemical munitions must be
demilitarized by 2004. To day, 1,440 tons have been destroyed. The Army
is requesting $855,000,000 for chemical demilitarization in fiscal year
1999. What is the progress and status of the Chemical Demilitarization
Program?
Answer. The Chemical Demilitarization Program is well underway. Two
baseline incineration facilities are operational--Johnston Atoll
Chemical Agent Disposal Systems (JACADS) at Johnston Island in the
South Pacific and Tooele Chemical Disposal Facility (TOCDF) at Desert
Chemical Depot in Utah. Over 1,470 tons of agent have been destroyed at
JACADS, which represents over 72 percent of the original chemical agent
stored on the Atoll, and over 1,400 tons of agent destroyed at TOCDF,
which represents approximately 10 percent of the original chemical
agent stored at Desert Chemical Depot.
Systems contracts have been awarded for disposal sites at Anniston
Army Depot, AL and Umatilla Chemical Army Depot, OR. Construction
efforts are continuing at both sites. Construction of the Anniston
Chemical Disposal Facility is approximately 15 percent complete and the
Umatilla Chemical Disposal Facility is approximately 13 percent
complete.
The systems contract for the disposal facility at Pine Bluff, AR
was awarded in July 1997. A protest on the contract award was filed by
an unsuccessful offeror. The protest was upheld by the General
Accounting Office in November 1997. A decision resolution of the
contract award is expected in March 1998. We anticipate receiving
necessary environmental permits in fourth quarter of fiscal year 1998,
at which time construction will begin.
The projects for Pueblo Chemical Agent Disposal Facility and Blue
Grass Chemical Agent Disposal Facility are on-hold as directed by
Public Law 104-208 which prohibits baseline facility construction until
180 days after the Secretary of Defense provides to Congress the final
report evaluating demonstrated alternative technologies to incineration
for assembled chemical munitions. This program, the Assembled Chemical
Weapon Assessment Program, is managed by the Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition and Technology).
The Army is proceeding to initiate the necessary activities to
support pilot testing of neutralization-based technologies at the bulk-
only storage sites, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD and Newport Chemical
Depot, IN. At present, the Army has entered the procurement process to
acquire system contractors for these facilities. The Request for
Proposal (RFP) for the Aberdeen facility was issued in November 1997
and proposals are expected by early March 1998. The RFP for the Newport
facility was issued in early March 1998.
The Army and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provide
emergency response/preparedness to the communities surrounding the
eight stockpile storage sites. Army and FEMA signed a new Memorandum of
Understanding on October 10, 1997 that agrees to give FEMA full
authority, responsibility, and accountability for managing and
directing the off-post emergency preparedness. The Army will continue
to manage the on-post aspects of program and provide technical support
and expertise to assist FEMA. The Army and FEMA will continue a
partnership to execute the program and will continue to use integrated
product teams as a management tool.
Public Law 102-484 directed the Secretary of the Army to provide
Congress a report on the Army's plan for destroying all chemical
warfare materiel that is not part of the chemical stockpile disposal
program. The Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Project (NSCMP) was
established to carry out this plan. The Project Manager for NSCMP
continues to support the emergency recovery of chemical warfare
materiel (CWM), the treatment and disposal plans for future CWM
recovery efforts, and the preparation of required documentation and
plans to meet the provision of the Chemical Weapons Convention. As part
of this program, the binary munitions projectiles, with the alcohol
component are being destroyed at the Hawthorne Army Ammunition Plant in
Nevada.
Question. Which sites are currently operational?
Answer. Two sites are currently in operation. Johnston Atoll
Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (JACADS) located on Johnston Island in
the Pacific Ocean has been in operation since January 1994 and has
safely destroyed over 72 percent of the original chemical agent stored
on the Atoll. The Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility, the first
continental United States disposal facility located at Desert Chemical
Depot, UT, has been in operation since August of 1996. The Tooele
facility has safely destroyed over 10 percent of the Depot's original
chemical agent. To date, these two sites have destroyed over 9.0
percent of the original United States chemical agent.
Question. Which sites will be delayed? Why?
Answer. The program schedule reflected in the fiscal year 1999
President's Budget remains valid. It should be noted that the program
schedules for the Pueblo and Blue Grass facilities are on hold as a
result of Public Law 104-208, the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriation
Act for Fiscal Year 1997. However, environmental permitting activities
for incineration-based disposal facilities are continuing in the event
no viable alternatives are identified. If alternatives are not
available, a decision to proceed with incineration by Congress is
needed by June 30, 1999 in order to meet Chemical Weapons Convention
disposal deadlines.
Question. Last year, the Congress appropriated $600,000,000 for
chemical demilitarization. This year you are requesting $855,000,000.
Your research and development (R&D) budget has tripled and your
procurement budget is doubled. Why?
Answer. Primarily, the fiscal year 1999 R&D increase of
$116,500,000 over the fiscal year 1998 R&D budget request is required
to support the Alternative Technologies and Approaches Project which
involves the R&D of two low-temperature, low-pressure technologies for
the disposal of bulk chemical agents at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD and
Newport Chemical Depot, IN. The funding increase is primarily for the
finalization of the pilot facilities' design; equipment acquisition;
completion of Resource Conservation and Recovery Act permitting
process; and the award of the system contracts for the two sites.
The procurement increase of $68,500,000 over the fiscal year 1998
procurement budget request can be attributed primarily to equipment
acquisition and installation at Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal
Facility, OR, and Anniston Chemical Agent Disposal Facility, AL.
Question. This year the budget proposes to fund the chemical
demilitarization program within the Army. In previous years, funds were
appropriated to the office of the Secretary of Defense. Why the change?
Answer. As part of the DoD Defense Reform Initiative, all program
funding and milestone decision authority for the Chemical
Demilitarization Program is being devolved from the Office of the
Secretary of Defense to the Department of the Army. The Defense
Acquisition Executive will delegate Milestone Decision Authority for
the Chemical Demilitarization Program to the Army Acquisition
Executive. Legislative changes to Public Law 99-145 are required to
allow funds to support the Chemical Demilitarization Program to be
transferred from Defense accounts to Army.
Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment (ACWA)
Question. Currently, chemical munitions are demilitarized through
incineration. Congress provided $40,000,000 in fiscal year 1997 to
identify and demonstrate no less than two alternative technologies.
When will the alternative technology demonstration be complete?
Answer. The overall technology demonstration program will be
complete by the end of calendar year 1998. A status report will be
provided to the Congress by December 15, 1998, followed with an
addendum on April 30, 1999. The addendum will coincide with the
congressionally mandated independent assessment by the National
Research Council on the technologies demonstrated and any additional
information generated after December 15, 1998. The ``hands-on''
technology demonstration phase within the overall technology
demonstration program will be from July 1, 1998 to December 15, 1998.
Question. What will be the total cost of the demonstration program?
Answer. The total cost of the overall demonstration program is
estimated at $40,000,000. The technology demonstration phase within the
overall program is estimated at $24,000,000.
Question. Does your budget provide sufficient funds to conduct the
alternative technology demonstration program? If not, what are the
shortfalls?
Answer. The $40,000,000 provided to the Congress for the overall
program was ``to identify and demonstrate not less than two
alternatives to the baseline incineration.'' In accordance with the
intent of Congress, the Program Manager for ACWA has conducted the
program in a manner to demonstrate as many technologies as reasonably
possible within the challenging timeline desired by the Congress. At
this point, seven technology candidates are being considered for the
actual demonstration phase of the overall program. The evaluation
process is underway to determine how many technology candidates will be
taken forward and the cost to demonstrate each individual technology.
As the technologies vary widely, it is anticipated that the individual
technology demonstration cost will vary from technology to technology.
At this point, the Program Manager, ACWA does not have adequate
information to provide a hard estimate. If all seven technologies
participate, it is likely that an increase on the order of $10,000,000
may be required to complete the program.
Acquisition Reform
Question. Dr. Oscar, in your statement you declare that as a result
of acquisition reform ``efficiencies within our operation enable us to
reinvest savings--in some cases substantial savings--in modernization
and other high priority needs.'' To date, how much have you saved
through acquisition reform?
Answer. During the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) 1998-2003 we
projected savings of $2,100,000,000, spread over the six-year period,
as a result of acquisition efficiencies. In addition, last year we
instituted a Cost Reduction Program (CRP) which will begin generating
savings in 1999. The CRP is expected to produce $458,000,000 in savings
over the remaining five years of the POM 98-03. Additional savings
reported earlier are a combination of actual savings and cost avoidance
for an extensive period including the POM and beyond. This period runs
until the end of all projected life cycle savings (more than 20 years).
Question. Please give us some examples of some of the areas you
have achieved efficiencies?
Answer. The Army has undertaken a number of initiatives to
implement acquisition reform. We have simplified acquisition
procedures; we are using commercial practices, performance based
contracting and electronic commerce; and we are streamlining and
integrating processes. We are working with Defense Contract Management
Command (DCMC) in streamlining and standardizing manufacturing/business
processes at contractor plants under the Single Process Initiative. In
essence, we are taking several steps to reduce overhead and barriers to
acquisition reform.
Question. In which modernization programs did you reinvest those
savings?
Answer. As you know, readiness is of primary importance to the Army
leadership. To help improve the readiness of the forces, most of the
savings due to efficiencies gained within the acquisition community
were provided to the Army leadership as discretionary savings and were
allocated into the Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA) and Military
Personnel, Army (MPA) accounts to improve the readiness of the force.
However, some savings were invested in the following modernization
programs: Javelin; ATACMS/BAT; Abrams Tank; and Patriot Advanced
Capability (PAC-3). Additionally, some savings from the Cost Reduction
Program (CRP) were applied to high priority Army modernization efforts
including digitization programs.
Question. Were you able to accelerate the fielding of any systems
as a result of reinvesting your savings? If so, please give us some
examples.
Answer. Some of the systems that we are accelerating the
procurement as a result of savings include: Abrams Tank (from 11 to 9
years); Bradley A3 Upgrade (to be in sync with the M1A2 SEP Tank);
Javelin (from 14 to 11 years which enabled us to buy an additional
3,660 rounds); and Longbow Hellfire (from 10 to 8 years).
We are also using Force XXI initiatives funding to jump-start
technology programs. Congress approved $50,000,000 in fiscal year 1997
and $100,000,000 in fiscal year 1998. The Army requested $100,000,000/
year for the remaining Program Objective Memorandum years. This money
is being used to accelerate the fielding of systems under the umbrella
of the Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Program (WRAP). Some of the
systems being purchased through the WRAP include: Radio Frequency Tags/
Interrogators; Striker; Gun Laying Positioning System; Avenger Slew-to-
Cue (STE); Mortar Fire Control System; Lightweight Laser Designator/
Rangefinder (LLDR); Army Airborne Command & Control System (A2C2S);
Palletized Load System-Enhanced (PLS-E); and Combat Synthetic Training
Assessment Range (CSTAR).
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
Question. The Army is requesting $4,700,000,000 for Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) activities--this is
$200,000,000 higher than last year's budget request. The fiscal year
1999 budget request includes $20,000,000 to begin an Army ``Dual-Use
Applications Program''. Previously a DARPA program, the budget proposes
transferring the program to the Service. Please explain your plan for
executing the Dual-Use Applications Program?
Answer. The Army Dual Use Applications Program (DUAP) will be
executed in a fashion similar to the current program. Specifically, the
DUAP funding ($20,000,000 in fiscal year 1999) will be used as matching
funds for Army laboratories and centers who solicit dual-use project
proposals from the private sector. These proposals will be solicited
via Broad Agency Announcements (BAAs) from the participating agencies
and will be executed via Cooperative Agreements or Other Transactions.
Funding for the projects will come from the DUAP line (>25 percent),
the lab/center mission funding (>25 percent), and the private sector
partner(s) (*50 percent). At least half of the non-Federal funding must
be in the form of high quality cash cost-share. The other half can be
in the form of in-kind contributions.
Question. Why does the Army need a dual-use program?
Answer. The Army has been an aggressive partner in dual-use
Research and Development (R&D) for a number of years, with the primary
motivation of leveraging commercial technology for military
applications. Such leverage is critical in an era of dwindling defense
resources that cannot support a military-unique industrial base. It is
also smart business, particularly in areas where the commercial sector
has the technical lead and the incentive to invest in co-development of
technology. The Army has utilized Cooperative R&D Agreements more
heavily than the other two Services combined to leverage the R&D
investment by industry. The Army has also established two major centers
focusing on ways to exploit dual use technologies:
a. National Automotive Center (NAC) serves as a focal point for
dual use technologies and application to military ground vehicles.
Cooperative R&D Agreement with General Motors Ford, and Chrysler
provides basis for significant technology transfer.
b. National Rotorcraft Technology Center (NRTC) established a
government/industry partnership that combines the resources of the
government, U.S. rotorcraft industry, and academia, and identifies and
develops dual use rotorcraft technologies.
The Army strongly supports the concept of focusing applied research
(6.2) funds on dual-use technology projects, as this is the phase of
development where the dual-use potential is highest and industry may be
most willing to co-invest. However, the Army is concerned that our year
goals for the percentage of 6.2 funds devoted to dual use are too high.
Question. For the record, please provide a list of all the ``new
start'' RDT&E activities in fiscal year 1999.
Answer. There are no major system new starts. There are a number of
programs transferred from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
to the Army reflected in the Army's 1999 fiscal year budget submission.
These include:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title Pe/Project
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dual-Use Application Program DUAP)....... 0602805A/A105
Net Assessment Directorate............... 0605803A/M735
Joint Tactical Radio System.............. 0604280A/D152
Commercial Operating and Support Savings 0604824A/D112
Initiative (COSSI).
Tactical Unamanned Aerial Vehicle........ 0305204A/D114
Strategic Environmental Research and 0603780A/D852
Development Program.
Minor new initiatives for fiscal year
1999 are:
Combat Service Support Equipment-- 0604804A/DL43
Engineering Development.
Munitions Survivability and Logistics 0605805A/D297
Auto Test Equipment Development...... 0604746A/DL65
Reliability, Maintainability and 0708045A/DE27
Sustainability (RMS).
Pollution Prevention................. 0602720A/A895
Army After Next (AAN) Applied 0602308A/A636
Research.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. How much is included in the Army's Future Years Defense
Program (FYDP) for Dual-Use Applications?
Answer. Based on the transfer of funding from OSD to the Services
in the Program Decision Memorandum for fiscal years 1999-2003, the Army
has approximately $19,000,000 per year for the DUAP effort through the
FYDP. In fiscal year 1998, Congress established goals for dual-use
Science and Technology spending as a percentage of the overall 6.2
funding: 5 percent in 1998; 7 percent in 1999; 10 percent in 2000; and
15 percent in 2001. This translates into an overall dual use goal of
approximately $75,000,000 per year in 2001 and beyond. Given the
limited funding in the Army DUAP Program Element (0602805A), which
currently provides approximately 50 percent of the Army funding for
dual use efforts as described above, the Army is concerned about the
excessive burden on core 6.2 funds this imposes (i.e., approximately
$56,000,000 per year). The Army recommends limiting the dual-use goals,
established in terms of percentages of the applied research (6.2)
program, to the extramural portion of 6.2 only, similar to the Small
Business Innovation Research (SBIR) set-aside. The goal would then
appropriately apply to funds targeted for use in the private sector,
reducing the burden on core 6.2 in the out years to an acceptable
level.
Question. Which ones are included on the Commander in Chief (CINCS)
priority list?
Answer. The CINC Integrated Priority List includes Pollution
Prevention, Combat Service Support equipment, and Tactical Unamanned
Aerial Vehicle.
Question. Your statement addresses the criticality of investing in
Science and Technology (S&T) programs to ensure that the capabilities
required by Army After Next (AAN) are available when needed. How much
are you requesting for S&T in fiscal year 1999?
Answer. The Army's S&T (6.1-6.3) budget request for fiscal year
1999 is $1,196,000,000.
Question. Of your request, how much is for Army After Next? Please
give us some examples of initiatives included in your fiscal year 1999
budget.
Answer. A detailed analysis of the Army's S&T program indicates
that approximately 90 percent of the funding is devoted to technologies
that will contribute to essential AAN capabilities, with particular
emphasis in basic research (6.1) and early applied research (6.2). Some
specific examples of initiatives in the fiscal year 1999 budget
include:
a. Initiation of an AAN Applied Research program, which will
provide matching funds to Army laboratories and centers to enhance
private sector participation in new Science and Technology Objectives
(STOs) focusing on AAN enabling technologies.
b. Increased investment in Key AAN technology enablers, including
full spectrum active protection and cognitive engineering to reduce
information overload.
c. Early investment in technologies leading to enhanced, AAN-
focused programs in the Program Objective Memorandum, such as the
compact kinetic energy missile and a lighter weight (<50 lbs.) soldier
system (including lightweight ballistic protection for the individual
soldier and hybrid fuel cells for lightweight power sources).
d. Focusing the National Automatic Center (NAC) on the issue of
enhanced fuel efficiency to reduce the logistics burden associated with
future vehicles.
Question. Do the outyears support the fielding of those
technologies?
Answer. The technologies are adequately funded in the Army's
planned S and T program, allowing them to mature into integrated
advanced technology demonstrations. Funding for further development
will depend on the success of such demonstrations and on further
definition of the Army's requirements for specific AAN systems.
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD)
Question. Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) are
aimed at rapidly fielding new systems to evaluate their military use--
generally in two to four years. After extended user evaluation,
successful test systems, called ``residuals'' are fielded. The Army may
make the decision to produce additional residuals for fielding after a
successful extended user evaluation. Please explain the extended user
evaluation?
Answer. Prior to answering the question on extended user
evaluation, clarification of an ACTD is required. In the Army, an ACTD
is comprised of a 2-4 year period of technical test, integration and
troop training leading to a large-scale field experiment (FE), and a 2
year extended user evaluation (EUE) of residual quantities. Based on
the results of the Field Experiment, the new capability/technology has
three possible outcomes: (1) proceed through the acquisition process
(e.g., Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD), procurement)
for Army-wide fielding; (2) be retained as a niche capability only with
the ACTD residual quantity; or (3) terminated if not deemed successful
in the ACTD.
The ACTD extended user evaluation is the two-year period after the
large-scale field experiment during which the user/warfighter can
continue training with the ACTD residuals to maintain proficiency,
refine operational concepts and tactics, techniques and procedures
resulting from the ACTD, while having a limited go to war capability.
For those residual systems intended to transition to procurement,
further assessment by the operational test agencies will be conducted
to support procurement decisions.
Question. What criteria is used to determine a successful user
evaluation?
Answer. All Army warfighting units operate with a Mission Essential
Task List (METL) which lists the tasks the unit must be able to perform
in their combat mission. Prior to the Field Experiment Measures of
Evaluation (MOE) and Measures of Performance (MOP) are developed in
conjunction with the METL. During the Field Experiment the designated
ACTD warfighting unit will evaluate the new capability and attendant
concept of operations against the METL using the MOEs and MOPs.
Question. Who develops the criteria for a successful user
evaluation? The program manager or the Army test community?
Answer. In the Army, the Battle Lab in the Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC), responsible as ACTD Operational Manager and the
designated ACTD warfighting unit address evaluation of the new
capability during against the METL.
Question. Are representatives from the developmental and
operational test community present during the user evaluation?
Answer. Representatives from the operational test community are
part of the team that develops the Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) and
Measures of Performance (MOP) and they are present during the user
evaluation.
Question. Do ACTD residual systems undergo a formal development and
operational test?
Answer. No. The residual systems would undergo formal development
and operational test outside of the ACTD and only if the Army
leadership should decide to further develop the capability through the
acquisition process (EMD) for Army-wide fielding.
Question. If a residual system does not go through ``formal''
testing, how do you ensure that the system is reliable and operable in
military conditions?
Answer. Each ACTD has a set of criteria called MOEs which must be
met in the large-scale field experiment. The MOEs address performance,
reliability and risk assessment, are delineated in the ACTD Management
Plan, and are agreed upon by all signers of the plan. In addition,
residual systems are safety tested and man-rated during the ACTD by the
U.S. Army Operational Test and Evaluation Command (OPTEC).
Question. What process is in place to determine which technologies
should be fielded?
Answer. The MOEs used in the large-scale field experiment are the
criteria against which ACTD new capabilities/technologies are judged
for leave behind as residuals with a warfighting unit. Successful
evaluation of the residuals by the user in EUE could lead to the
decision to acquire the system for fielding.
Question. How do you ensure that the operating and logistics costs
for successful ACTD technologies can be supported in future budgets?
Answer. If the decision is made to acquire the new capability/
technology, resources will be identified in the budget planning process
to cover operating and logistics costs based on real data and
experience gained from the ACTD.
Question. For the record, please provide the ACTD's planned for
fiscal year 1999. Please include prior year funding, planned funding
for fiscal year 1998 and future funding requirements. Also include any
Defense-wide or other Service Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation funds which have or will be provided for each ACTD.
Answer.
[$ in millions]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY98 PB RDT&E FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RFPI:
Army........................... 69.50 69.50 28.50 11.00 ......... ......... 326.80
CMRL:
Army........................... 5.30 ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 50.40
JCM:
Army........................... 20.60 21.20 17.40 ......... ......... ......... 116.10
Navy........................... 47.30 3.90 1.50 ......... ......... ......... 223.90
USMC........................... 7.50 ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 26.60
TPSO:
OSD............................ 1.00 4.00 4.50 4.00 ......... ......... 13.50
Army........................... 5.37 9.50 18.80 22.00 10.00 8.00 73.92
MOUT:
OSD............................ 5.00 ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 6.20
Army........................... 20.30 21.10 20.90 2.00 ......... ......... 66.30
JCID:
OSD............................ 16.40 4.00 4.00 ......... ......... ......... 41.90
Army........................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 14.70
RTV:
Army........................... 10.57 14.35 12.53 ......... ......... ......... 46.60
OSD............................ 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 ......... ......... 10.00
LOSAT:
OSD............................ 5.00 7.00 5.00 1.00 ......... ......... 18.00
Army........................... 5.00 20.00 40.00 55.00 60.00 27.8 207.80
C4ICW:
OSD............................ .40 .90 .96 1.07 .75 ......... 4.08
Army........................... 4.05 3.20 3.84 2.40 1.75 ......... 15.24
THEL:
OSD............................ ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 3.50
Army........................... 61.00 ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 107.40
Israel......................... 7.60 ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 22.10
Total
OSD.................... 29.80 17.90 17.46 9.07 .75 ......... 97.18
Army................... 201.69 158.85 141.97 92.40 71.75 35.80 1025.26
Navy................... 47.30 3.90 1.50 ......... ......... ......... 223.90
USMC................... 7.50 ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 26.60
Israel................. 7.60 ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 22.10
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. For the record, please provide a list of the technologies
fielded as a result of the ACTD process. Please include testing,
fielding, and support costs for each system.
Answer. To date, no Army ACTD has completed EUE so that no
technologies have yet been fielded as a result of the ACTD process.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Young.
Questions submitted by Mr. Skeen and the answers thereto
follow:]
High Powered Microwave
Question. In my briefing by the Army Research Laboratory during my
visit to White Sands Missile Range last year, I was shown a
demonstration of the results of their RF coupling investigation on a
workstation. They also noted that Russia was developing RF weapons.
I have been briefed from Sandia National Laboratory and the Air
Force on their interest in High Powered Microwave (HPM) effects on
computers and computer networks. What is the Army doing to establish a
program to evaluate and address the HPM effects on its digitized
formations? I am most interested in this matter since I have been told
that the Army is placing a processor on every platform to achieve its
digitized battlefield.
Answer. The Sensors and Electron Devices Directorate (SEDD) of the
Army Research Laboratory has a program that addressed High-Power
Microwave (HPM) effects. For fiscal year 1998, the SEDD has committed
approximately $2,270,000. Specifically, the Directed Energy and Power
Generation Division has two ongoing efforts. The first effort is to
focus on the survivability of the digitized battlefield of the next
century. In particular, it addresses the electromagnetic (EM)
environments that will permeate the future battlefield and develop
technologies for Force XXI and Army After Next (AAN) that will be
required to assess survivability and mitigate the adverse effects on
military equipment in the environments. The work draws upon the
methodologies employed and the technologies developed in the successful
nuclear EM pulse (EMP) and HPM Survivability program and will
concentrate on developing new hardened devices and techniques with
emphasis on an integral hardening approach applicable to all EM
environments. Major elements include: measurements and analyses of the
susceptibility of electrical devices; coupling to unhardened systems;
performance of hardening technologies; installation of hardening
technology into test subsystems/systems to verify performance of the
hardening; documentation of the hardening performance; and
recommendations for future hardening activities. The second effort is
to develop Directed Energy Weapons (DEW) (narrow-band and ultra-wide-
band) sources, amplifiers, and antennas and associated hardware for use
in HPM susceptibility experiments, developing field demos and DEW
systems. The research and development for Force XXI and the AAN will
concentrate on developing sources and components that have agile output
parameters, and have multi-functional antennas to enable DEW systems to
be effective against multiple classes and types of targets at extended
ranges. This effort will enable the Army to constantly evaluate the
potential threats due to HPM weapons via susceptibility experiments,
assessment and field demonstrations. It will also provide the Army with
new and improved HPM radiators and enable the Army to weaponize HPM
concepts in appropriate scenarios.
[Clerk's note.--End of Questions submitted by Mr. Skeen.
Questions submitted by Mr. Bonilla and the answers thereto
follow:]
Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles
Question. Has the Army done a cost benefit analysis of the FMTV
dual source acquisition strategy?
Answer. The Program Manager provided cost and benefit analysis data
as part of the FMTV, second source Determination of Findings (D&F).
Question. Does the Army have sufficient funding in the out years to
sustain an economic production rate for two contractors?
Answer. Yes, we believe that we do.
Question. One of the main objectives of the FMTV was to achieve 85
percent commonality of parts among all 14 FMTV variants. How will
commonality be maintained if we add a second production source?
Answer. Commonality between variants will be evaluated as part of
the best value, source selection process.
Question. Will a second source be required to meet the same
Reliability, Availability and Maintainability (RAM) performance levels
as the current FMTVs? If not, why not?
Answer. All the second source variants must meet the same RAM
requirements as those built by Stewart and Stevenson.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Bonilla.
Questions submitted by Mr. Hefner and the answers thereto
follow:]
Smokeless Nitrocellulose
Question. Smokeless nitrocellulose, which is used as a military
propellant, is produced by the Army's facility at Radford, Virginia, at
considerable higher costs than is available in the commercial market.
Is this correct?
Answer. No, preliminary research found that the unit cost
(unburdened) per pound is nearly the same as commercial sources in the
United States and Canada. It is noteworthy that nitrocellulose is a raw
material in the propellant production process and the ``make or buy''
decision resides with the production contractor.
Question. What are the cost savings, say over 10 years, if the Army
bought this product from the commercial supplier? I understand the cost
savings could be as much as $100,000,000 over ten years.
Answer. The Army recently received the same cost savings data for
the commercial supplier. We have initiated an investigation to compare
this cost to today's fully burdened costs to produce nitrocellulose at
the Radford facility. We expect the results of this investigation by
the end of May 1998.
Question. With all of the efficiencies the Army is trying to
achieve now to save dollars for modernization, why are they not buying
smokeless nitrocellulose from domestic suppliers?
Answer. The Army is not buying smokeless nitrocellulose. Rather,
the Radford facility use contractor procures this raw material for
propellant production after conducting a ``make or buy'' decision. Over
the past several years, the Army has strongly encouraged ``full and
open'' competition for raw materials by both the organic and commercial
ammunition sectors. With a few exceptions, the Army plans to continue
its strategy to procure ammunition end items from both the commercial
and organic ammunition producers; and allow these producers to acquire
raw material. This allows the market place to determine the price,
while the Army focuses on end item quality and performance at the best
value.
Starstreak Missile
Question. Last year, the Committee added funds to allow the
Starstreak missile to engage in a side-by-side comparison with Stinger
for use on the Apache helicopter. The Committee also directed the Army
to fully fund this competition in fiscal year 1999. General Kern, what
is the status of the Starstreak missile program?
Answer. Congress directed and funded the technical feasibility of
the air-to-air missile capability of Starstreak on the Apache
helicopter in fiscal years 1995-1997. The United Kingdom Ministry of
Defence (MOD) is participating with the United States Army in a two-
phased assessment and is providing the required missiles under
government loan agreements quid pro quo technical data results.
Phase I Air-to-Air Starstreak (ATASK) testing was successfully
completed October 1996. It was directed at evaluating initial technical
feasibility and safety aspects of ATASK for the AH-64A Apache
helicopter. Based on limited modeling, simulation, and test results,
the Army concluded that the current configuration of ATASK limits the
aircraft launch envelope to airspeeds less than 30 knots. A preliminary
affordability analysis from Phase I was also conducted and is now
available. This analysis raised significant concerns because it
revealed that ATASK production integration costs for the Apache Longbow
are projected to be two times greater than Stinger (largely driven by
the integration of the laser guidance unit with the AH-64 Target
Acquisition Designation System (TADS)).
The Phase II contract was initiated in December 1996. Phase II will
continue the technical feasibility for the system effectiveness of
ATASK on the AH-64A Apache and is to be completed in December 1998. The
Phase II program involves the integration of the missile laser guidance
unit into the aircraft TADS, limited crew station integration, few-on-
few constructive simulations to assess system effectiveness and support
test matrix development, AH-64A and Starstreak missile system
modifications, airborne tracking tests, firing flight envelope/guidance
verification, and live fire tests against simulated and live airborne
targets. Detail design of the laser guidance unit integration with the
target acquisition designation system is complete and hardware
fabrication is underway. Simulation model development, methodology, and
scenario development for few-on-few scenarios began in April 1997.
These scenarios are providing a primary basis for the flight test
matrix scheduled to commence in June 1998. One full scale remotely
controlled drone (QUH-1) and an adequate number of stationary and
moving ground based targets are sufficient to meet Phase II test
requirements and to keep the program within budgeted cost constraints.
The U.S. Army Operational Test and Evaluation Command is ensuring that
the test matrix developed for ATASK Phase II will yield an adequate
representation of operational feasibility.
In parallel with Phase II, the Army is conducting a comparative
system performance and cost effectiveness study to be completed in
December 1998. To provide a fair and independent evaluation of
Starstreak and Stinger, the Army Materiel System Analysis Agency, with
direct support from Ministry of Defence Evaluation and Research Agency,
will assess suitability of each system for future air combat. The study
will include the evaluation of the improved version of ATASK (no
limited launch envelope) and a more comprehensive operational cost
analysis than was conducted during the Phase I ATASK program. This
analysis will evaluate all costs associated with Starstreak and Stinger
missile systems for the Apache Longbow.
Continuing threat assessment will dictate the path forward for an
air-to-air requirement. Any follow-on-side-by-side comparison effort
will be dependent on ATASK Phase II results. System effectiveness and
affordability results from ATASK Phase II and the comparative study
will drive Army strategy and prioritization recommendations.
Question. Did the Army comply with the Committee's direction to
fully fund a side-by-side competition in fiscal year 1999? If not, why
not?
Answer. No. The Air-to-Air Starstreak (ATASK) Phase II program will
not be completed until December 1998. A decision to fund and/or conduct
a side-by-side comparison at the February 1998 submittal of the
President's Budget (PB), and prior to Phase II completion is premature
based on the incompleteness of the technical and affordability data to
date. The United States/United Kingdom comparative study Senior
Advisory Group agreed that the current two phase approach including the
captive tracking flight trials and live fire flight tests of the
Starstreak, and modeling and simulation efforts for side-by-side
comparisons of Starstreak and Stinger air-to-air missile systems, is
the most cost effective approach at this time. Additionally, the air-
to-air threat in the near and mid term is low and as such budgeting of
scarce Army funding to support a side-by-side test of Starstreak and
Stinger missile systems is not warranted in the fiscal year 1999
Presidents Budget.
Question. What did the Army budget for Starstreak in fiscal year
1999?
Answer. The Army did not budget for Starstreak in fiscal year 1999.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Hefner.
Questions submitted by Mr. Visclosky and the answers thereto
follow:]
Ammunition: Unfunded Items
Question. Does the Army Ammunition budget fund all ammunition
required by the Army (including both training and war reserve) that
could be reasonably produced in the fiscal year 1999 funded delivery
period? If not, please identify those items that were not funded, or
were funded at less than an economic buy quantity, and for each item
identify the dollars required to meet the minimum sustaining rate
quantity and the dollars required to meet the economic buy quantity.
Answer. Due to limited funding, the Army was unable to fund all
ammunition requirements in fiscal year 1999. In particular, several
modernization items and a few war reserve munitions used to support
training which have been drawn down in earlier years are unfunded, or
funded at less than the economic buy quantity.
The attached table represents the status of funding in fiscal year
1999 for preferred war reserve munitions, and war reserve munitions
with significant training implications, and training munitions with
shortages. This table shows that of $7,500,000,000 in shortfalls in
these munitions, only $957,000,000 is required today after considering
substitutes. The other shortfall items have adequate substitutes in the
current stockpile to meet current threats. There are a small number of
munitions for which no, or limited, substitutes exist: Hydra 70
Training Rockets, certain Small Arms Ammunition, the XM90 Light Vehicle
Obscuration System Grenade, Non-Lethal Munitions, the XM915 105MM DPICM
Projectile, and the Wide Area Munition. A maximum of $225,000,000 above
the President's budget can be executed in fiscal year 1999 on munitions
for which no suitable substitute is available. Thus the Army's Fiscal
Year 1999 Ammunition Budget has only moderate risk when substitutes and
potential for execution is considered.
With regard to execution rates, the table also shows that for the
listed munitions the minimum sustaining rate is about $476,000,000. The
economic buy, or in many cases maximum program execution level, totals
about $657,000,000. Of the executable range $393,000,000 is currently
in the President's budget and $22,000,000 is available as Foreign
Military Sales credits, leaving a fiscal year 1999 executable shortfall
between $55,000,000 and $256,000,000.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Abrams Tank Upgrade Program
Question. The National Defense Panel issued its report last year
and called on the Department to spend five to ten billion more dollars
each year in procurement and Research and Development (R&D) to take
advantage of the so-called revolution in military affairs. The Panel
criticized some legacy systems and called specifically for an end to
the M-1 upgrade program. To the best of your knowledge, what factors
would have led the Panel to believe that the M-1 upgrade program should
be ended, when it failed to make the same recommendation on dozens of
other systems?
Answer. I am not aware of the rationale used by the National
Defense Panel (NDP) that contributed to these recommendations. The NDP
report did not specifically call for an end to the M-1 tank upgrade
program. The report recommended that land forces ``should reduce
systems that are difficult to move and support; shift to lighter, more
agile automated systems.'' We agree with this recommendation. This is a
key element of the force we envision in our Army After Next Process.
However, the NDP questioned the continuing upgrade of the M-1A1 tank
beyond its current capabilities. I share the concerns the NDP expressed
in its report, but disagree with those individuals who have
subsequently suggested that the program should be canceled. The Army's
greatest challenge is balancing near-term readiness with mid-term
modernization investments. We do not have the luxury of allowing
current systems to lose their relative advantage over potential
adversaries while we invest in leap-ahead capabilities. We must do
both, simultaneously. The safety of our soldiers--today's and
tomorrow's--demand that we get the balance right. The Army is charting
a prudent course that will transform the force to one that can fight
the battle of 2020 and beyond.
Question. Given today's limited resources and reduced forces, are
we going to see the continued fielding of evolutionary improvements
(like the M-1 upgrade), rather than the more rapid exploration of
revolutionary ideas (like the Future Combat System (FCS))?
Answer. We will seek to maintain the combat overmatch that we
currently enjoy in critical systems, while simultaneously developing
the leap-ahead capabilities we envision for our Army After Next (AAN)
in 2025 and beyond. We envision that some evolutionary improvements to
existing systems may be required to maintain combat overmatch. For
example, the upgrade of part of our Abrams tank fleet will enable us to
maintain combat overmatch until our AAN systems are developed.
One of those AAN systems, the Future Combat System (FCS), will
provide leap-ahead capabilities in lethality, survivability and
sustainability. Currently efforts for the FCS are in science and
technology focused on armament technologies, alternative power sources
and advanced survivability measures. We project that FCS technologies
will mature such that production can being in the 2018-2025 timeframe.
Question. What is the current Research and Development (R&D)
funding profile for the Future Combat System?
Answer. The Army has budgeted no development funds for the Future
Combat System (FCS) to date since fielding of this system is not
planned until about 2020. Early research programs considered necessary
to enable feasible FCS and related platform concepts are funded at
about $40,000,000 in the fiscal year 1999 President's Budget request.
General Reimer, in his recent testimony to the Congress, emphasized
that the Science and Technology (S&T) base is focused on future needs
of the Army--Army After Next (AAN). The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC) has identified several technology areas that they deem
essential to achieve the emerging vision for the AAN, one of which is a
lightweight, lethal FCS. From an S&T perspective, TRADOC's priority
areas of investment include: active protection, signature management,
light weight materials and, protection against kinetic energy and
chemical energy projectiles, lightweight fuel efficient ground vehicle
propulsion systems, and lightweight highly lethal armaments. In
response to the User's interest in these technologies, the S&T base has
realigned funds that constitute part of the total amount shown above
for fiscal year 1999. These technologies have potential applications
across a wide range of vehicles including those in the inventory now
and emerging in the near future. The Army S&T community is supporting
TRADOC battle laboratories with advanced technology demonstrations as
well as virtual system designs, analyses and advice to help frame the
technology issues and strategies to provide essential AAN capabilities.
Question. If the Department dropped down to one Major Theater War
(MTW) requirement (instead of two), would that affect the number of
tanks that are scheduled to be upgraded in the future?
Answer. In accordance with the defense planning and the National
Military Strategy, the Army tailors its force in order to fight two
nearly simultaneous Major Theater Wars, therefore, any modification to
the schedule or number of future upgrades for our tanks--given other
parameters--has not been considered. While recapitalizing the Army to
meet future challenges under our current strategy and planning
guidance, we will assume some degree of calculated risk (with shrinking
budgets) in terms of readiness and allocation of sufficient resources
to conduct the science, technology, and modernization efforts that will
lead to long term capabilities. However, we must manage that risk
carefully to ensure that readiness does not suffer to an unacceptable
degree. The key is to monitor the risk while maintaining a balance
among six fundamental imperatives of our Army: quality people,
training, leader development, doctrine, force mix, and modern
equipment.
The Army has established a balance that enables us to meet the
National Military Strategy, but the balance is fragile. It could be
easily disturbed by failure to meet Quadrennial Defense Review-derived
end strength targets, unpredictable funding, or less than expected
efficiencies from programmed infrastructure reform. If we were to
reduce readiness, we would increase risk associated with our ability to
meet real world security challenges today. If we were to divert
modernization funds, we would jeopardize the readiness of the future
force. As leaders, we must ensure not only that our soldiers of today's
full-spectrum Army are the best trained and equipped in the world,
capable of fighting and winning our current two MTW strategy, but that
future generations of soldiers enjoy the same ability to fight and win.
Army Ability To Support Two MTW Strategy (Abrams Upgrade Program)
Question. If the Department dropped down to one Major Theater War
(MTW) requirement (instead of two), would that effect the number of
tanks that are scheduled to be upgraded in the future?
Answer. In accordance with defense planning and the National
Military Strategy, the Army tailors its force in order to fight two
nearly simultaneous Major Theater Wars, therefore, any modification to
the schedule or number of future upgrades for our tanks--given other
parameters--has not been considered. While recapitalizing the Army to
meet future challenges under our current strategy and planning
guidance, we will assume some degree of calculated risk (with shrinking
budgets) in terms of readiness and allocation of sufficient resources
to conduct the science, technology, and modernization efforts that will
lead to long term capabilities. However, we must manage that risk
carefully to ensure that readiness does not suffer to an unacceptable
degree. The key is to monitor the risk while maintaining a balance
among six fundamental imperatives of our Army: quality people,
training, leader development, doctrine, force mix, and modern
equipment.
The Army has established a balance that enables us to meet the
National Military Strategy, but the balance is fragile. It could be
easily disturbed by failure to meet Quadriennial Defense Review (QDR)-
derived end strength targets, unpredictable funding, or less than
expected efficiencies from programmed infrastructure reform. If we were
to reduce readiness, we would increase risk associated with our ability
to meet real world security challenges today. If we divert current
funds earmarked for modernization it would jeopardize the readiness of
the future force and adversely affect the number of tanks and other
critical equipment to be upgraded. It would also impact on new systems
to be fielded in the near term. It is imperative, therefore, that
balance between current readiness and force modernization be
maintained. The soldiers of today's Army must remain the best trained
and equipped in the world and we must also remain on track with our
modernization effort to ensure that future generations of soldiers
enjoy the same ability to fight and win.
UH-60 Black Hawk Helicopter
Question. I understand the active Army and the Army National Guard
have acknowledged a shortfall of 90 UH-60L Black Hawks helicopters in
Guard ``warfight'' units. Isn't it true that these 90 Black Hawks meet
the ``warfighting'' requirements and fill the missing third assault
company in six assault battalions thereby bringing these battalions to
their doctrinal configuration?
Answer. Yes, this is true.
Question. I understand that all but eight of the 90 ``warfighting''
Black Hawks are either in the fiscal year 1999 budget request or
projected in the Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) 2000. Are there
significant cost savings associated with this 90 aircraft buy achieved
by adding eight additional Black Hawks to the 22 included in your
fiscal year 1999 budget?
Answer. By way of clarification, 40 of the 90 additional UH-60s are
competing in the POM 2000-2005. The Army has funded 50 UH-60s in fiscal
year 1999 through 2003 and recognizes an unfunded requirement for 40
additional UH-60s. Funding for the remaining 40 aircraft will compete
in the POM process. However, the Army would have to add at least eight
additional UH-60s per year in each of the three remaining years of the
current multiyear contract (fiscal years 1999, 2000 and 2001). The
current multiyear contract is based on a procurement strategy of 18 H-
60 helicopters per year for all services (Army, Navy and Air Force).
Furthermore, the contract contains an option for the Army to re-
baseline to a more economic rate of 36 H-60 helicopters per year. The
advantage of going to 36 H-60s per year versus 18 would be a savings to
the Army of $33,200,000 spread out over three years ($10,900,000 in
fiscal year 1999, $10,700,000 in fiscal year 2000, $11,600,000 in
fiscal year 2001). This assumes the Navy buys six H-60's in fiscal year
1999, eighteen H-60s each in fiscal years 2000 and 2001, and the Army
funds eight additional H-60's in fiscal years 1999, 2000 and 2001, and
the Army funds eight additional H-60's in fiscal years 1999, 2000 and
2001. However, in order to achieve a more economic rate of 36 per year
(18 Army & 18 Navy) and save $33,200,000 the Army would have to invest
an additional $240,000,000 into its Black Hawk helicopter program. This
would commit the Services to 36 H-60 helicopters per year, not only in
fiscal year 1999 but the remaining two years of the multiyear contract
(fiscal years 2000 and 2001).
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr.
Visclosky.]
Wednesday, February 25, 1998.
NAVY AND MARINE CORPS ACQUISITION PROGRAMS
WITNESSES
HON. JOHN W. DOUGLASS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (RESEARCH,
DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION)
VICE ADMIRAL CONRAD C. LAUTENBACHER, JR., DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS, RESOURCES, WARFARE REQUIREMENTS AND ASSESSMENTS, U.S.
NAVY
LIEUTENANT GENERAL JEFFREY W. OSTER, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, PROGRAMS
AND RESOURCES, U.S. MARINE CORPS
Introduction
Mr. Young. The Committee will come to order.
This afternoon the hearing will be on Navy and Marine Corps
acquisition programs, and by previous vote of the members of
the Committees, the hearing will be closed because of the
classification of much of the material to be discussed.
I am very pleased to welcome Mr. John W. Douglass, the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and
Acquisition. He is accompanied by Vice Admiral Conrad C.
Lautenbacher, Jr., the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
Resources, Warfare Requirements and Assessments; and by
Lieutenant General Jeffrey W. Oster, Deputy Chief of Staff of
the Marine Corps for Programs and Resources.
Admiral, we will put your biography into the record because
I understand this is your first appearance before the Committee
in this capacity, and we do welcome you, as we welcome all of
the witnesses.
The Department of the Navy's fiscal year 1999 budget is
encouraging in that funding for Navy and Marine Corps
modernization programs have been increased over last year's
appropriated levels.
We are still concerned, however, that the budget provides
funding for 71 new aircraft and helicopters--only 54 are combat
aircraft--also 810 missiles and 5 combatant ships.
While this number is better and the budget number is
better, we have a situation for fiscal year 1999 that is
different than we had for the previous 3 fiscal years, and that
is we don't have any surplus in our budget figures over and
above your budget. And so the room that we had to make adds to
take care of unfunded priorities that you identified for us in
the previous years, it is not going to be quite as easy this
year to do that.
We will obviously do the very best that we can to provide
the Navy and the Marine Corps what you need to accomplish the
mission that you are assigned, whatever it might be.
And we are happy to have you here this afternoon. And, Mr.
Douglass, let me yield first to see if Mr. Dicks has a comment
he would like to make, and then we will yield to you to make
your presentation.
Mr. Dicks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, want to
welcome our distinguished panel, and I want to thank Secretary
Douglass for all the help that he has given to me. We have
worked on a number of these programs and issues that affect my
area, and he has been tremendous to work with. Thank you.
Mr. Young. Okay, sir, you have the floor.
Summary Statement of Mr. Douglass
Mr. Douglass. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would
like to begin, sir, with your permission, by entering our
statement into the record in its entirety.
Mr. Young. Yes, sir, without objection.
[The joint statement of Mr. Douglass, Admiral Lautenbacher
and General Oster follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
NAVY AND MARINE CORPS ACQUISITION
Mr. Douglass. I will very quickly, sir, run through a
summary presentation so that the Members have plenty of time to
ask questions. I understand that you have some other
commitments this afternoon.
I want to begin by indicating that this is my third
appearance before this Committee. General Oster has been with
me all the way. We are starting to become joined at the hip in
making these presentations and discussions, and he was been an
outstanding colleague through it all. It is Vice Admiral Conrad
Lautenbacher's first year. We have had a very successful year,
and what you will hear today is consensus. We have, we believe,
a very good program to put forward, sir.
I think the Committee might find it interesting that
exactly 2 years ago, almost to the minute, my wife was over in
Columbia Hospital giving birth to my little son Alex, who is 2
years old today. I think that somewhat symbolizes what we are
all trying to do here. I mean, his little life is something
that symbolizes the future of America, and what we are trying
to do is provide for the future combat forces of America in
what we do in research, development and production. We are
looking long into the future, and some of the weapons systems
you will see us describe this morning will be what he uses when
he comes on active duty as a Marine or a Sailor.
BUDGET OVERVIEW
(CHART 1) Let's have the first chart, please. This is a
quick summary to tell you that our budget for procurement is in
the $20 billion category and about $8 billion for research and
development. I would also add, as you will see in the next
chart that there is about $25 billion in O&M money that also
comes under Navy/Marine Corps acquisition.
Mr. Dicks, it is in that O&M category where you and I often
work together in the repair of our weapons systems.
We are very much mindful of acquisition reform. As we show
you the charts today, you are going to see that we have saved a
lot of money through multiyear procurements. We have funneled
that money back into Navy programs for the future, and we could
not have done that without the cooperation of Congress. We are
very appreciative of the support we have received.
We are also desperately trying to look beyond the initial
cost of these weapons systems, sir, and look at their life
cycle costs. Oftentimes, the initial cost of the system is only
a fraction of the total life cycle cost. If we can cut down on
the maintenance costs, the number of crew members on a system
and so on, this makes weapon systems much more affordable for
the Navy and the Marine Corps of the future.
One of the important changes from last year is that we have
moved procurement up for our carrier by a year. This makes it
more affordable for us and fits into our shipbuilding profile
better. We have followed the advice of this Committee andother
committees to look very carefully at putting some of our airplane
programs on a multiyear status. You will see this as we go through our
presentation.
I would remind the Committee, our highest priorities in the
Navy side are the F/A-18E/F, our new carrier, the CVX, and our
next carrier, CVN-77. I will have a few things to say about
them later.
The next chart, please.
NAVY TRENDLINES
(CHART 2) This is just a graphic presentation of what I
have described to you. The important thing to glean from this
chart is that the procurement line is on an upward slope. The
rise in the procurement line you see there is the carrier in
2001. It is very important. We have worked very hard to make
that procurement line have an upward slope. I know this
committee and other committees of Congress have been concerned
that we are not investing in the future. This is not easy for
us to do. You can see the RDT&E profile is about flat. That is
tough on us, but we are doing everything we possibly can to get
the most out of every dollar.
Also, Congressman Dicks, you can see that the O&M line is
pretty much flat, too. Embedded in that line are all those
repair costs that we talked about before.
AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION
(CHART 3) The next chart, please. This is our aircraft
program for the future years defense plan. What is important to
note about this chart, Mr. Chairman, it is almost exactly the
same as the chart we showed you last year, with a couple of
very minor changes. The changes that are on the chart are
positive ones. In fiscal year 1998, we asked for 51 airplanes
and the Congress gave us 62. That is a good news story for us.
Fiscal year 1999 is the same number as last year--that
represents stability and we are very proud of that fact. We are
not telling you from one year to the next that we are going to
do something and then we don't follow through with it.
In the outyears, the numbers are within one or two
airplanes of what we told you last year. We have been able to
hold the line here, but it is tough going up that ramp. That is
a pretty steep ramp, but we are committed to doing it, Mr.
Chairman. My point in showing it to you is to tell you that it
is approximately the same as last year. The next chart, please.
F/A-18E/F AIRCRAFT
(CHART 4) The F/A-18E/F, of course, is our number one
aircraft program. I brought a model of it today. I thought you
might have some questions about its performance. There have
been a lot of reports in the press about the wing drop issue.
We have found several solutions to fix the problem. It never
got beyond the category of a minor problem to us. What has made
it somewhat notorious is there have been some leaks of memos
within the building that made it somewhat sensational.
The plane is doing well. It is on cost. It is under weight.
The range estimates are all holding. It has had a very, very
ambitious and good test program. If you would like more
information on this wing drop issue, I am prepared to use the
model to explain it. I know there have been GAO reports about
the airplane. We can explain the GAO issues on a point-by-point
basis, as you deem necessary, sir.
What is most important, probably, to tell you is Secretary
Cohen has publicly stated that before we turn on the production
contract for fiscal year 1998, the wants to have a review of
the program. It have already scheduled that review. We
anticipate it will occur somewhere in about the last 10 days of
March. You can imagine there will be an orderly series of
briefings. They start, as a matter of fact, next week, with
briefings to me, and they go to the Secretary of the Navy and
so on up the chain. I am happy to report that the program is on
course.
Mr. Young. Mr. Secretary, before you leave that, I just
wanted to tell you that this Committee has its own test pilot
amongst our ranks.
Mr. Douglass. Yes, sir. we are proud of him. I don't know
where he is today.
Mr. Young. He is sitting to your left.
Mr. Douglass. There he is.
Mr. Young. He has given us a similar report earliertoday on
his experience on flying that airplane.
Mr. Douglass. He is not only a test pilot, he is an ace.
You are a great American, Mr. Cunningham, and we love you in
the Navy.
Mr. Lewis. He is being stealthy today.
Mr. Douglass. Right. He snuck in here on me. I didn't see
him come in.
Mr. Cunningham. You can't see ugly very good.
V-22 AIRCRAFT
Mr. Douglass. The MV-22, is the Marine Corps' number one
aviation priority. As you know, we are in the engineering and
manufacturing development phase. We are flying the heck out of
this bird. She is a little behind schedule, but everything we
can see in this program tells us this is going to be a great
airplane. The Marine Corps and the Navy are fully behind it.
I think you will see, if you look at our production
figures, we are getting the costs down. We are getting the
production rate up. That is what you have asked us to do. We
are going to keep pushing on that. Once we have bought a few of
these and we get a little more flying time, I am hopeful we can
get this on a multiyear procurement and save even more money,
which we plan to put back into this program to get the
production numbers up.
JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER
Concerning the Joint Strike Fighter, the program is doing
well. I am the service acquisition executive of it right now.
We have an Air Force general who is the program manager. The
program has been under my control for about 6 or 8 months now.
We go back and forth between the Air Force and the navy. It is
on track. It is in the DEMVAL phase.
It is a very ambitious program in terms of meeting its cost
goals and meeting its schedule goals, but it is on track.
Probably the highest risk part of that program is the engine
program. We are pursuing what the Congress told us to pursue
last year, which was to keep the alternate engine program
alive. I will be glad to go into whatever detail is required on
that program, sir. The next chart, please.
SHIPBUILDING PROGRAMS
(CHART 5) This is our ship procurement profile. I think the
most important thing to note about this profile is there is no
big hump out there, like there is in airplane procurement.
There will be in the future. We have got to get our numbers up,
or we won't have a Navy of the size that we need.
The good news on this chart is that the numbers are very
stable. Three years ago, when we were here we didn't have our
carrier in the program. We didn't have our submarine program
squared away. We didn't have the multiyear contract on the
DDGs. We have resolved all of those issues, and saved $1.4
billion with the multiyear contract on the DDGs. I am pleased
to tell you that the bids are in on that, so those savings are
real. We are getting four submarines that the Congress
authorized on contract this summer. If you look at the
quantities in the outyears for the LPD-17, this is an excellent
opportunity for a multiyear in the future.
I know that there has been some question about are we going
to compete those ships? The answer is, no, we are not. We have
had a competition. There was a team that won it. The GAO
reviewed it, and that is the team we are sticking with. I am
prepared in the future to consider a multiyear procurement if
the Congress feels that is appropriate. Next chart, please.
CVN-77 AIRCRAFT CARRIER
(CHART 6) CVN-77, our next carrier, has been moved up a
year. It is the highest priority of our ship programs. I think
anybody that has been watching the crisis unfold in Iraq
realizes how important the carriers are to our Navy and our
Nation. The difference between the Navy we have today and the
Navy of 1917, when they were about roughly the same number of
ships, is naval aviation. That is predominantly the striking
power of our fleet today, naval aviation. That is why we need
the F/A-18E/F, that is why we need CVN-77 and that is why we
need eventually a new class of carriers, the CVX. That program
is progressing on track.
DD-21 DESTROYER
DD-21, our new surface combatant, has been approved by the
Defense Department for development. Our first ship will be
procured in 2004, and it is fullyfunded in the budget.
DDG-51 DESTROYER
We are in the second year of the 4-year multiyear for the
DDG program. The savings are real, and that is working out
fine. We anticipate that we may even be able to glean more
savings because some of the contractors are doing so well. We
expect some underruns on that contract.
LPD-18 AMPHIBIOUS TRANSPORT DOCK SHIP
Concerning LPD-18, we are requesting the second ship of the
class. Once we get that authorized and appropriated we would
begin to look for a multiyear procurement for the future. The
next chart, please.
SSN-21 SEAWOLF SUBMARINE
(CHART 7) Regarding SEAWOLF, as you know, it is a three
ship program. I have the model of the SEAWOLF here in front of
me because I know that you may have some questions on it, sir.
I will go into greater detail, after I summarize my statement.
The first one is at sea. She is doing very well. We had her
acoustic trials last summer. I will explain those, if you would
like, at the end of my presentation.
The second boat is about 87 percent complete. We will
deliver her in December of 1998. The third boat is 34 percent
complete. She delivers in December 2001. The program is under
the cost cap and performing well. Last year, the Congress asked
the DoDIG to come in and do an independent review of the cost
cap. They have done it, and they have said they agree with us.
She is under the cost cap.
NEW ATTACK SUBMARINE
New Attack Submarine is working well. The second ship
starts this fiscal year and the teaming arrangement between the
two yards that we are able to work out last year is working
extremely well. The next chart, please.
MARINE CORPS PROGRAMS
(CHART 8) Concerning Marine Corps Programs, our number one
priority for our ground forces is the Advanced Amphibious
Assault Vehicle (AAAV). I brought in a model of it today. This
is going to be a huge leap forward in our ability to project
forces ashore. The AAAV goes very fast. I have seen it in
operation.
There are many war stories around about the equipment that
we have today, How slow it is and how unreliable it is. I know
General Zinni has a wonderful story about when he was being
evacuated out of Somalia. I think he was the last Marine off
the beach in Somalia, and incidentally, his AAAV broke down and
bobbed around in the surf for a while. They had to go out and
rescue him.
We need the AAAV. I have a team working on this program
near Quantico. We have the government team and the Marine team
co-located in the same building, with the contractors that are
building the AAAV. That is the way we are doing the LPD-17 as
well. This is the wave of the future, breaking down these
barriers to save money for the taxpayers. That program is on
track.
Our new Light Weight 155 is doing well. We have about $35
million in the budget this year. It is a British-American
design built in Louisiana and it is doing very well.
We are going to SLEP our medium tactical trucks in the
Marine Corps. I have been out and rode on these. These are
dynamite trucks. You can go up a 45-degree slope with a huge
load. This program is being executed by the Army. We are doing
240 vehicles this year for about $85 million.
The Commandant's Warfighting Lab, which we have worked very
closely with him to develop, is about a $25 million program.
Mr. Chairman, we are so lucky in this country to have a
Commandant like Chuck Krulak. He is innovative, he is a leader,
and he is doing wonderful things in that Warfighting Lab. At
some point in time it might be helpful to have him meet with
you.
I am going to break it off here. I have a lot more charts,
but to be mindful of time, I think this is a good place to
stop.
(The Charts referred to by Mr. Douglass follow:)
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
SSN-21 SEAWOLF SUBMARINE
Mr. Young. Before we go to vote, and Mr. Nethercutt will
chair, why don't you go and tell us about the SEAWOLF.
Mr. Douglass. Yes, sir, I will.
The model that you see in front of you is what the SEAWOLF
is going to look like after we bring her back in for a post
shakedown availability when we coat her with an acoustic
coating. If you can imagine this ship with about that much of
her coating taken off, that is what it looks like today. It
would look similar to the B-2 if you took the radar absorptive
material off of it. In addition, the hull has protrusions that
stick out that will be flush when we put the coating on.
We wanted to get some acoustic information about how well
she was doing, but we didn't want to wait until we put the
coating on, so we don't have the final figures. What we are
going to do is put the coating on next year, take it back out
and measure acoustics again. So I am reporting preliminary
information to you today.
This is her propulsor in the back. This is not the final
design for the SEAWOLF, so we don't have the final propulsor,
and we don't have the coating on her. What we found is, ------.
We met our design specifications there, and that is really
great news.
What we found at high speeds was that in the condition that
she is in today, she is the quietest submarine that exists in
the world today, ------. Now, it is difficult for us to
estimate acoustic performance at high speed with all these
protrusions on the hull, because you get a lot of turbulent
water noise around the hull when you go at high speeds. It is
like driving your car with the windows down. You get a lot of
wind noise. If you crack window, you know how annoying that is
if you are trying to listen to the radio or something like
that. We are trying to figure out how much of the noise we hear
at high speed is due to that and how much is inherent.
We believe right now, ------. However, she will still be
the quietest submarine in the world.
We are going to take this technology and move it forward
into the New Attack Submarine. We believe the New Attack
Submarine will clearly be at this acoustic level or better,
because we are doing a lot of acoustic research in Lake Pend
Oreille in Idaho ------.
I would mention, Mr. Chairman, that the speed of this
submarine is faster than we predicted she would go. You may
recall when she first went to her sea trial [she went so fast
that one of the outboard conformal array covers was sucked off
its mounting flanges because the full acoustic coating wasn't
installed. So it is a good news story, ------ quieter than any
other submarines in the world. We are pretty proud of that.
There have been some issues about the white outlined things
you see in the front of the submarine. Those are the torpedo
outer doors. They are like shutters that open up. At flank
speeds we have had some problems opening those doors because of
the hydrodynamic pressure. It is a fairly minor problem. We
will get that solved during our post shakedown availability.
Those are the main points, I think, that need to be made
concerning the status of what we have learned from the at sea
test program. I would be glad to answer further questions
concerning these issues.
Connie, do you have anything you think I have left out?
Admiral Lautenbacher. I think that is a good summary, sir.
Mr. Young. Okay. Why don't we move on.
Mr. Douglass. All right, sir. With that introduction. I am
ready to answer any general questions that the committee may
have.
Mr. Young. Okay. Well, this would be a good time for us to
take a quick break and go to the House chamber and vote. Mr.
Nethercutt will be in the chair. I apologize.
UNMANNED COMBAT AIR VEHICLES
Mr. Nethercutt. Mr. Douglass, the Navy posture statement
makes reference to the Outrider system as a replacement for the
Pioneer UAV. While I recognize the importance of this system
for C4I functions, I would like your comments on what the Navy
is doing to pursue UCAVs.
Aviation Week has reported that operational costs of UCAVs
could be 15 percent of an F/A-18, and given the tight outyear
budgets that Secretary Dalton and Admiral Johnson testified
about this morning, I believe this concept deserves further
consideration.
Just as the NDP endorsed this concept, the panel also urged
greater use of unmanned underwater vehicles to complement our
smaller submarine fleet. So I am wondering if you could, for
the record, please testify what research funds are being
directed to pursuing this concept?
Mr. Douglass. Yes, sir. Let me start with the UAV part of
it, the Outrider. The Outrider started out, sir, as a program
that was to be joint between the Department of the Navy, which
includes both Navy and the Marine Corps requirement, and the
Department of the Army. We had a hard time getting the
requirement for this UAV settled down. About the first 6 months
I was in office, I went to many meetings on this subject. Many
of us urged that there be allowed a large bird for the Navy and
a smaller bird for the Army, but with common guidance and
control systems and a common ground control system.
For a variety of reasons, it didn't turn out that way. We
were told, one bird had to fit all. What this means is, the
Navy needed about 200 miles of range and we wanted to launch it
off of a ship to go out and check the coast before the Marines
went in and do other missions with it, and then fly it back.
The Army only needed approximately 50 miles of range, and I
am doing these miles from memory, sir, so forgive me if I miss
them a little bit.
Mr. Nethercutt. That is fine.
Mr. Douglass. I think I will be in the ballpark.
So automatically, what you were going to have, if you met
the Navy requirement, is a bigger, heavier, more expensive bird
than the Army needed, and if you met the Army requirement, you
couldn't do what the Navy wanted to do.
We finally said, okay, we will give it the college try. We
went out on an RFP and one contractor came in and promised us
they could meet the requirement. When they began to deliver the
first vehicles, I think they were supposed to weigh in the
neighborhood of 300 pounds, instead they weighed 700 pounds. We
have had a lot of problems with this ACTD.
Ultimately, we decided that the most urgent requirement was
the Army requirement--the 50 mile,short-range requirement. It
looks like the Outrider can meet that requirement. The Marines can use
that once they are ashore. We decided to focus on that requirement and
try to get that requirement met first and then see if we could grow it
into the Navy's requirement for a longer-range bird.
Based on this decision I made arrangements with the Office
of the Secretary of Defense to transfer my management of the
program over to my colleague in the Army so that he could
oversee that focus on the ground mission. That is where we are
today. I will tell you, sir, my bottom line about UAVs in
general is I am coming up on, let's see, about 35 years in
Federal service, 28 years in the Air Force retiring as a
general, 4 years on the Senate professional staff, and 3 years
in this job now, and when I was a second lieutenant, we were
trying to get UAVs operational, and we are still trying. We
have a few of them out there. We need to do a better job, the
whole Department, and I am not satisfied with the progress.
UUVs, Unmanned Underwater Vehicles, is another story. We
are doing a lot there. We have a multistage program, a shorter-
range vehicle and a longer-range vehicle, coming. We see, as
your question implied over the long haul, a lot of synergism
between our submarine force and these Unmanned Underwater
Vehicles that go out and look at mine fields and do various
things. There is a very exciting research project within our
Office of Naval Research called the Mantra program, which we
are trying to develop one of these for the long-term future. We
are aware of their utility and trying to work in that
direction, sir.
If either of my colleagues would like to comment.
Admiral Lautenbacher. Can I just add for a second?
Mr. Nethercutt. Please.
Admiral Lautenbacher. Our current program now includes the
Pioneer UAV, which is the one we deploy on our ships today. It
is very important both to the Marine Corps and the Navy. It is
a requirement. We have it funded in our program, and our
strategy is to try to hold on to that and use that, and as we
get and solve some of the problems that Mr. Douglass is talking
about, then transition into something that will give us more
capability.
Mr. Nethercutt. You are satisfied with the requests that
you have made budgetwise that you will keep on track and make
progress?
Mr. Douglass. Yes, sir.
Admiral Lautenbacher. Yes.
F/A-18 E/F AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE
Mr. Nethercutt. I understand that there has been some
testimony about the F/A-18 wing drop, and I know Congressman
Cunningham's experience in that respect to some extent. I am
just wondering if you can let us know whether you see any
restrictions on range or any other capability of the airplane
by virtue of the fix?
Mr. Douglass. Yes, sir. Thank you for asking that question.
Yes.
If you can hand me the model, Connie.
This is the F/A-18 E/F and you can't see it too well from
where you are sitting, but there is a little hump right here,
and that is where the wing folds on both sides. Once we
understood that we had a little bit of a problem with wing
drop, our first approach was to focus on these flaps in the
front and the back that are controlled by the computer on the
airplane. It is a fly-by-wire system that when the pilot gives
it a command, the computer adjusts the airfoils to optimize
what the pilot wants to do. We thought we could solve it in the
beginning with just software.
As the program progressed and we solved many other issues
we began to realize we needed a different approach. We have
looked at a lot of different options, and it turns out that by
replacing the solid plate that goes on this wing fold with a
porous plate, in other words, a plate with holes in it, that we
can solve the problem. That looks to us like the solution.
Now, if you think about that for a minute, sir, it is going
to be lighter than the plate that is on there because itis full
of holes. Also, perforated surfaces like that tend to trap radar; they
don't reflect it. As a matter of fact, the air intakes on the F-117,
the stealth fighter, are really a perforated screen so that the radar
goes in, bounces around and can't come out in a coherent way. So it is
certainly not going to hurt the radar cross-section to have a
perforated fairing there. It doesn't hurt range, and it doesn't hurt
radar cross-section.
There might be some very, very slight extra drag due to the
airflow over the wing. We have, I think, in the neighborhood of
25-26 miles more range in this airplane than we designed her
for, and we expect that to grow, not to go away. I don't think
this is going to affect that at all.
The bottom line is we are not asking for any more money. We
don't think it affects any of the airplanes' performance. We
think we have a solution in hand. I am going to take this
solution up the chain or command this month, starting on the
3rd of March, I think. I am pretty confident that we will be
able to convince the Secretary of Defense that we have put this
behind us.
It has been a very, very successful test program, and as we
mentioned before you came in, we have one of the test pilots
sitting here. He has flown it, and he probably knows more about
this than I do. I am confident about this program. I have been
in the airplane business for well over 30 years designing and
building airplanes, and I have seen a lot of test programs come
and go in my day. This one is a good program. I put my
reputation behind it.
The thing that has made this a notorious issue, sir, has
been leaking of memos and things like that. In the environment
we live in today in Washington, if you want something to be
sexy or sell newspapers, you refer to leaks.
The other thing that I would point out about this, sir,
that I think is really important, is the last time our system
put an airplane through a test program like this was the F-117.
I was one of the young officers in charge of that program. We
did it in the black, totally top secret. There wasn't a
reporter in the country who knew about it.
Then you have to go all the way back to the F/A-18A and B,
which is 20 years ago. The young people that are reporting on
this have never reported on a test program, before, and
frankly, a lot of the other people that are around today in
various management positions have never taken a fighter plane
through the test program. There is an expectation that, if you
find some little problem here and there that the roof is
falling in.
This program has been great compared to the kind of
problems that we had in the past. When Dr. Kaminski and I were
taking the stealth fighter, and you know how well she did over
Baghdad, through the test program, the tails broke off of the
airplane. We had a pilot come back one day with no tails. Thank
God we had such a good flight control system he could do it. We
had to redesign the whole back end of the airplane. Nobody knew
about it because it was in the black. We had one of them crash
because we hooked up the flight control systems backwards. So
this has been a model program. We haven't lost any airplanes,
and she is doing great.
Mr. Nethercutt. A few of us went up and over to Pax River
and prepared for an F/A-18E/F flight, and I talked to one of
the Super Hornet test pilots who was there at the time and
spoke very highly of the airplane and said it is a great
airplane. And so--and having flown in a generation of it,
without any great expertise, I know that it is exciting, that
is for sure, and it shows you whether you have an inner ear or
not, and I do.
In any event, Mr. Dicks.
F/A-18E/F BLUE RIBBON PANEL
Mr. Dicks. Thank you.
On the F/A-18E/F, you are going to have a Navy board that
is going to look at this is it on March 12th?
Mr. Douglass. We have already had them look at it. Thank
you, sir, for asking that. I forgot to mention that inmy other
discussion.
It is not a Navy board, Mr. Dicks. When this problem came
up, given all the cynicism that exists in this town today, I
realized fairly quickly we had to have some outsiders take a
look at this issue who aren't Navy people.
Mr. Dicks. Right.
Mr. Douglass. I went to the Air Force, and I said, send me
your best aerodynamist. I went to industry, not the people that
build that plane but their rivals, and asked them to send me
their best aerodynamist and promise me they would give me an
honest evaluation. I went to academia to find the best
professors who teach aeronautics and said to MIT and other
places, send me your best professors to look at this
independently. I also went to the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration. None of these people are on this program.
They have no connection to it. Their jobs aren't going to get
big if the program does well.
That is what I called my Blue Ribbon Panel. They came in
and they looked at the program. They looked at the test
program. They have given me a report in writing that says the
Navy is on track. This is not a significant problem. We can
solve it.
They did say this, though, Mr. Dicks, and I think this is
important: That as we go into the high-performance regimes that
are represented by this type of airplane, we don't have
anywhere in our country, not in NASA, not in our universities,
or not in the Navy, the kind of computer modeling we need that
could have predicted this wing wiggle phenomena. So they said,
number one, please don't throw away your flight test data. You
need to keep it. You need to give it to the Air Force for the
F-22. You need to keep it for the Joint Strike Fighter program.
Secondly, between NASA and the Department of Defense, we need
to do some more research to fill out our knowledge concerning
complex aerodynamics and what happens to shock waves at these
high G, high angle of attack regimes, for this kind of wing.
The good news is, we are on track for the short-term, but need
to do more in the long-term for future programs.
TOWED DECOYS
Mr. Dicks. Tell me about the towed decoy? Now, this is, I
think, very important because it is necessary to fool incoming
missiles.
Mr. Douglass. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. Because the F/A-18E/F is not as stealthy as the
F-22 and F-117.
Mr. Douglass. Yes, sir, I would remind everybody in the
room, this part of what we are going to talk about is
classified.
[Clerk's note.--Classified discussion removed.]
This is not rocket scientist work. It is not an F/A-18E/F
problem. It is a generic towed decoy issue. We are going to
have the same problem on the Joint Strike Fighter. We are
working on the problem.
Mr. Dicks. When it goes after the towed decoy, does the
missile explode?
Mr. Douglass. Yes, sir, if it has proximity fuse.
Mr. Dicks. Do you only have one of these towed decoys?
Mr. Douglass. Oh, no, sir. You have several of them.Let's
say you are penetrating and Congressman Cunningham probably knows this
story better than me--and somebody starts painting you, ------.
JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER ALTERNATE ENGINE
Mr. Dicks. Regarding the Joint Strike Fighter, can you tell
me a little bit about the alternate engine program and what you
are thinking about there? As you recall, we did an engine
competition on the F-100 and F-110 a number of years ago, and
that turned out to save the government a lot of money. Now, are
we wrong about this congressional directive? Can you give me a
little feel for what it could do in this situation?
Mr. Douglass. Yes, sir.
As you know, on the F-15 and the F-16 in the Air Force,
there was a competition and it was basically between General
Electric and Pratt-Whitney. We referred to it in soldier talk
in the Pentagon as the great engine war. The idea was to
compete these two against each other, and there are obvious
advantages of that.
This year, the Congress, in the authorizing committees,
passed a provision which said that we have to certify that we
are going to keep a second engine on the Joint Strike Fighter
all the way through installation and test in a test airplane.
If we don't certify to that effect, we are going to lose $100
million of Joint Strike Fighter money.
That came as a surprise to everyone in the Pentagon, and
created two camps within the Pentagon. There was one camp that,
frankly, got mad about it and said, well, okay, if that is what
they want to do, the hell with them. We will just not have an
alternate engine, and we will take our $100 million hit. It
turned out it was more than $100 million. We had already
budgeted for the alternate engine, so we got our money back by
cancelling the program. but to me, sir, that doesn't make
sense. The highest risk item in the Joint Strike Fighter is the
engine program.
I am pleased to tell you that the Pratt-Whitney engine,
which won the competition for the program, is doing well. I
have been to Palm Beach and I have seen the engine that is
going to go in the F-22 operate. The engine seems to me to be
on track, but we have got to grow that engine by 40 percent. It
is a high-risk item.
Mr. Dicks. Forty percent?
Mr. Douglass. Yes, sir, roughly 40 percent. It has to grow
in different ways for the three variants of Joint Strike
Fighter. I think it is prudent to carry an alternate engine at
least through the next 4 or 5 years.
After much debate in the Pentagon, we were able to extract
from both the Air Force and the Navy promises that we will fund
this in our next budget. Dr. Gansler has certified to that
effect. I think we all agree that for now we need to keep that
alternate engine program going.
Mr. Dicks. How much will that cost us?
Mr. Douglass. Sir, just to keep it the next couple of
years, I think we added a couple hundred million dollars to the
budget.
To take it all the way through, sir, it is estimated to be
between $1 billion and $2 billion extra.
You might be interested to know, Mr. Dicks, I went to the
airframe contractors and said, ``What do you guys think about
this?'' They said, ``We think we need an alternate engine, Mr.
Douglass.'' I said ``Are you willing to pay for it?'' They
said, ``No. If you ask us to pay for it, we aregoing to one
engine.''
Mr. Dicks. So at some point 4 or 5 years from now you
decide it is going to be the Pratt-Whitney engine or the GE
engine. Will there be a competition?
Mr. Douglass. No, sir. We don't envision a competition.
What we envision is something like the following: If the Pratt-
Whitney engine stays on track and on cost, there may be a point
in time where we say don't need the other engine, we are just
going to stop it. On the other hand, if it doesn't stay on
track, or if we see that we can gain significant competitive
advantages in the production program, we may just go ahead and
carry the alternate engine all the way on through. It will not
be a second competition. It will be a decision to go forward
with the alternate engine based on the status of the program as
we see it. I would guess that best time to make that decision
would probably be in the next 2 years.
Mr. Dicks. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Nethercutt. Mr. Cunningham.
BUILD AND CHARTER
Mr. Cunningham. Thank you.
Let me switch from aviation over to shipbuilding, ship
repair, Mr. Secretary. And I want to thank you personally for
your efforts in this arena. It doesn't mean we haven't locked
arms a couple of times, but it means that we have really tried
to work things out for the different entities.
But the combat logistic force ships continually kind of
fall at the bottom of the food chain, and I understand why,
when you have got destroyers, you have got carriers, but yet
the funding for these ships has fallen short, and as we look at
a 546 ship fleet shrink down to, at the current rate, even
below 270, we are talking about additional funds down the line.
But the problem we have today is we keep putting things off,
putting if off and when it comes time to pay all of the
backlog, they know we don't have enough money. So what we have
to do is we have to cut it out in infrastructure. We have to do
all the other things necessary.
I know you are familiar with the problem, and I asked the
question of the Secretary this morning, about charter and
build.
Mr. Douglass. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cunningham. We tried to do the same thing with the Air
Force on the C-17s to where a company would come in, operate
them and actually have Air Force pilots fly them, but in time
of war they would have access to those C-17s for logistics. And
the charter and build concept, do you see that as an option; in
the future, do you foresee it as a possibility for savings
where we could use that type of program, Mr. Secretary?
Mr. Douglass. Yes, sir. Admiral Lautenbacher and I as well
as Admiral Lautenbacher's predecessor, Admiral Pilling, and I
looked very hard at that program. We think there are some real
possibilities for the future. Not only do we think that the
realities of the budget world lead us towards this approach,
but we think that we would end up with a cheaper ship. In other
words, one that was more like a commercial ship and less like a
military ship.
Unfortunately, there are some barriers to doing it. To make
this economically profitable, we have to change the law on the
length of time that you can lease a ship. Frankly, we have to
convince some of our colleagues in the administration that this
is the right way to go.
We have put some placeholder money in the outyears of our
budget. It is in the SCN accounts now, but it could be moved
back into O&M, Navy if we could achieve consensus on this in
the future.
As you know, I have been doing everything I possibly can to
find ways to keep our maritime industrial base healthy, and I
see this as one of the components of that program. If they are
commercial-like, these ships could be used by the Navy when we
need them, and we could get some money back by letting
contractors use them commercially if we didn't need them,
things of that nature, innovative techniques.
Connie, do you have anything to add to that?
Admiral Lautenbacher. I just want to say that we support a
balanced Navy, and we want to make sure that we recapitalize
the combat logistics force for us. It is a critical issue for
us. And as Mr. Douglass said, we have scraped together some
money. We put in money for the ADCX in the outyears. It
represents seed money. It represents a way we could get this
started should we be able to achieve consensus in a way to do
this that makes sense from a business point of view. We do see
it as a way to be more efficient and to obtain the advantages
of commercial techniques for both building and maintaining
these ships. So it is a viable alternative for us.
PRIVATIZING DEPOTS
Mr. Cunningham. One of the things that I am going to--and I
am going to have to work with my colleague from Washington on
this, as well as my colleague like Duncan Hunter, but when we
look at cost savings, and doing it without a big increase in
the budget, which we are limited to in the balanced budget act,
there is a lot of us who feel there are just sensible ways to
do things. For example, the depots, we have got one at North
Island, the key is to ensure the people understand that because
of privatizing at, say, a depot, you could do repairs cheaper,
which actually gives you more money to operate on the product
so that workers actually keep their jobs. That is going to be a
big sale thing. The same thing with--in our public yards, where
your cost is $900 an hour, and the private yard is $300 an
hour, you take those savings and you actually buy more product,
but you get someone up in Washington State that has got a
public yard, it's going to take a big not only PR but an
assurance that it is going to be better for them, not worse, to
do that. And that is the direction I think you have got to have
some great savings.
The BRAC that is--and I made this statement earlier--that
the President wants for 2001, 2005, to be able to boost up our
procurement to $60 billion is, to me, Mr. Secretary, in my own
personal opinion, kind of smoke and mirrors. You won't reap any
benefit from that for another 5 or 10 years, and to say that is
what we are waiting for to boost up our funding for procurement
is kind of smoke and mirrors. And many of us feel that when OSD
and the White House get involved with it, because of the past,
we are afraid that the politics will come into it again. And
the only way that many of us, I think, would support it is to
let the military have a cut at it Because they know, they know
where they have got some excess without the politics coming in
with OSD and with the White House into it, if they could go
through and offer this up and work with the Congress so that we
could eliminate that, that might be a possibility. But I know a
lot of us would resist another BRAC. And I don't think you have
got a chance in sugar to, you know, get another one through the
Congress.
CONTINGENCY DEPLOYMENTS
Another area that I think is important, that hasn't been
mentioned here, is that we cannot continue to have
contingencies and take it out of an already low budget, the
emergency supplemental. We just can't afford to take and offset
that thing. You look at, and I don't know what it costs us in
Iraq, but I can imagine now, we have got the savings--you know,
you have got a fleet deployed up to, what, 50.2 days or
something or 2 man days per quarter, but when you go up to 75,
you know, it costs a million dollars a day to operate a
carrier, and then the air wing and the rest of the thing, those
costs go up.
We need your help to work with the President--the President
has got to find a way to fund that instead of just taking it
out of the hide of DOD in which all of our services go down at
an already low budget. So--but I want to thank you for those
kind words, and I have got to sit there and work with my
colleagues, but I want you know, I personally thank you for
that.
F/A-18E/F AIRCRAFT
The last think I would say is that the A-4 Skyhawk, when I
first test-flew that, I put it into dive. I went supersonic,
which you are not supposed to do, and honked back on the stick
and put it in a dive, and I had two F-4s comingout that I was
going to attack, and I had an exact position where I was going to roll
in behind him. I started at 50,000 feet, so there is no way they could
pick me up on the radar, and I was going to get their knickers real
quick and pull back on the stick, and ended up going like this because
the tail wasn't active, and you end up with them going up here, and the
next thing you are looking at is pulling out of this dive because of
the water, and you have got to trim.
The F-5/E has an inverted pitch hang-up. You get up there,
and the airplane wants to go like this, and they have actually
lost airplanes like that. The F-16 had a deep stall condition
that the Air Force had, and even with the new one with the 110
engine we went into problems with it.
I have got to go up and vote, but the F-18, like I said, as
strong as I feel about the F-14, if I was going to go to a
squadron, if I was still in the service, I would want to go to
an F-18E/F squadron rather than an F-14 squadron. It is that
good an airplane.
Mr. Douglass. Thank you, sir. We appreciate your
willingness to go out there and fly the airplane. Your
testimony means a lot to us.
Mr. Cunningham. I will do it again, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Nethercutt. Mr. Visclosky.
300 SHIP NAVY
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, is the Navy still committed to a 300-ship
Navy?
Mr. Douglass. Yes. That is more in Connie's area than mine,
but I would say, yes.
Would you, Connie?
Admiral Lautenbacher. Yes, sir. We don't want to get locked
in on the number 300. We have just gone through the Quadrennial
Defense Review, which has affirmed the need by the President
and the Secretary of Defense to have our 12 carrier battle
groups, our 12 amphibious ready groups, 116 surface combatants
and 50 attack submarines, as well as the strategic force that
we have, which is, of course in support of START I and START
II. So that is the core--kind of core capability that has been
decided on as necessary to meet the needs of national defense.
When you add in the combat logistics force that Congressman
Cunningham was talking about and the support ships that make
that a blue water worldwide capability, the number is around
300. So what I would like to say to you, it is the capability
brought to you by a roughly 300 ship Navy. And I mean, you
know, one or two up or down. So we are not locked into the
number.
Mr. Visclosky. You don't have an explicit number, but is
300 the ballpark we are talking about?
Admiral Lautenbacher. We are talking ballpark with 300.
That meets the need of the Quadrennial Defense Review strategy,
with the shape, respond and prepare strategy which is
articulated by Secretary Cohen.
Mr. Visclosky. Looking at the current FYDP, we are
scheduled to be at 306 ships. I am not fixated on 300----
Mr. Douglass. Yes, sir.
Mr. Visclosky But we are scheduled to be at 306 in the year
2003. Looking at the outyears as far as the projections for
shipbuilding and ship retirement, by the time we get to the
year 2015, which is not all that far away given the lead time
for construction, we begin to fall below that ballpark figure.
I appreciate the fact that there may be a bulge in the
shipbuilding program.
Mr. Douglass. Yes, sir.
Mr. Visclosky. Clearly there have been all of these things
we have had to work out over the last decade now. What happens
to the shipbuilding budget? Is there a bulge after these years
we have looked at?
Mr. Douglass. There are two issues here, sir.
Mr. Visclosky. Will there be a necessity for a bulge at
some point?
Mr. Douglass. In one respect, in terms of the numbers,
there will have to be a bulge. In other words, if we are going
to keep the force structure up, we are going to have to buy
more ships. Thereis no question about that.
The question is how big a bulge is there going to be in the
dollars? My challenge is to be able to design future classes of
ships that cost substantially less than the warships we have
today, but still allow us to take advantage of the revolution
in military affairs; in other words, better performance, but a
lot less cost.
SHIPBUILDING PROGRAM
That is what we are trying to do, essentially, with our
shipbuilding program. It is not very well understood in the
United States today, but we are going through a revolution on
how you build ships and how you design them as well as how you
manage them over their life cycle. There is significant on life
cycle costs.
Just to give you a couple of data points, a DDG-51, which
is one of our main surface combatants today, has a crew of over
350. Our next surface combatant will have a crew of less than
95. That is going to give us a tremendously lower life cycle
cost. Clearly, wherever we can substitute technology for crew,
we are doing that. We are also trying to drive down the costs
of construction of the ships through whatever means we have at
our disposal. For example, by buying the ships on multiyear
contracts, I can save substantial amounts of money. Our
challenge is going to be to produce our next class of ships in
a way that takes advantage of all of these things.
The other thing is the old paradigm used to be that
basically the Navy designed the ship in the Naval Sea Systems
Command. We gave the plans to the contractors and said, bid on
this, and they bid on them. They would flesh out the designs,
then we would compete it, and the winner would win the
contract. We had a lot of problems with that paradigm. Number
one, there were always disputes when something went wrong
later. Well, this is your design. No, it is your design.
Right now we are asking that for the next class of ships
the contractors will be responsible not only for the designing
of the ship in its entirety and all of its weapons systems that
go on it, but also the whole life cycle maintenance of the
ship. Through techniques like this we are going to be able to
get the costs down, and if we are not, sir, the size of our
Navy will go down.
DD-21 DESTROYER
Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Secretary, I appreciate that frank
comment, and I appreciate the importance of life cycle costs.
My concern, looking at the outyears, is our human ability, not
doubting your expertise or in this case the Navy's to try to
ratchet those costs down in acquisition.
I have a prepared question for the record about the Navy
bumping up on the cap for the SEAWOLF. Not to be derogatory,
but we tend on all of these ship construction projects to end
up spending more than we anticipate. Looking at the outyears, I
find it difficult to believe it is going to be cheaper.
One of the questions I have is on the DD-21 teaming
arrangement and trying to get the best value for our dollar.
Mr. Douglass. Right.
Mr. Visclosky. If you have a teaming agreement between
Ingalls and Bath Iron Works, are you going to be able to have a
vigorous competition?
Mr. Douglass. Yes, sir.
Mr. Visclosky. How are you going to do that?
Mr. Douglass. Well, I think what you are referring to is
the Navy issued a for-comment RFP on our DD-21 some months ago
to see what industry thought about it. In response to that,
three contractors got together and declared they were going to
form an exclusive team. The team includes Bath Iron Works,
Ingalls Shipbuilding in Pascagoula, and Lockheed Martin.
The competitor to Lockheed in the systems integration part
of the project is Raytheon, Raytheon has gone to the Justice
Department, to the Department of Defense, and to others and
said that they feel that that exclusive team is not in the best
interest of the government and asked us to look into it.
We have looked into it, and we have looked at some of the
other issues that we face from the overall consolidation of
industry. Four or five years ago, I would have had maybe five
integration houses I could go to. Now I have two. We recently
reissued that RFP and we said, among other things, in the front
end of the program, there can be no exclusive teaming. In other
words, those three contractors that I mentioned to you are
certainly welcome to team together, but they cannot declare
themselves exclusive.
If either of those shipyards would want to cut a separate
arrangement with Raytheon and do what we call ``firewalls''
where they have one team at the shipyard that deals with one
integrator and another team at the shipyard that deals with the
other integrator, they are welcome to do so.
Our actions are based, sir, on a fundamental principle, and
that principle is that in the world of business, these business
decisions are best made in the board rooms of America's
corporations and not by bureaucrats in the United States Navy.
Mr. Visclosky. When you say ``exclusive,'' if the two
companies team, setting aside for a minute Lockheed, who is
left to compete?
Mr. Douglass. You mean in the shipbuilding part of it?
Mr. Visclosky. Yes.
Mr. Douglass. Avondale could build a ship. Newport News
could build a ship. NASSCO could build a ship.
Mr. Visclosky. Do any of those yards make surface
combatants?
Mr. Douglass. They don't now, but there is no reason why
they couldn't.
Mr. Visclosky. Do you anticipate that they will?
Mr. Douglass. I think they will. I think at least one of
them will get into the equation. I don't want to get into
hypotheticals here, sir, but you could find a team that might
involve either one of the two shipbuilders that were on the
Lockheed team deciding to pick somebody else, and then in that
arrangement have an arrangement with Raytheon. We don't know
what industry is going to do on this, but I have committed to
doing everything possible to gain competition in this program.
I will say this, though, Congressman, and that is that we
also have a clause in this RFP that says that if you don't come
to the table at this part of the program you cannot come
later--and that is important to put into context. What we are
talking about here, sir, are 1-year contracts for preliminary
design that we anticipate will be about a $6 million contract
each. We are not talking about a contract to actually go out
and build the ships, we are just talking about industry giving
us their ideas.
If somebody starts being petulant with us and they won't
come in and bid, hoping to force us into something, we reserve
the right to stay with whatever team does come in and bid.
Within that team, there are lots of tools in my tool kit to
generate competition.
Mr. Visclosky. Okay.
Mr. Douglass. In other words, you have got to have so much
of your subsystems under competition and that sort of thing.
SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRIAL BASE STUDY
Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Secretary, if I could, the Navy and DOD
apparently has done an industrial-base study for shipbuilding.
When are they going to release that report?
Mr. Douglass. Mr. Congressman, we will be glad to brief you
on that report at your leisure, but we are not going to
publicly release it, for the reason that it is full of
proprietary financial information from all of the shipyards as
to what their hourly rates are and what they are projected to
be into the future. If these were exposed to public disclosure,
it would create competitive advantages between these yards.
They would know what the other guy's plans are.
Mr. Visclosky. You won't issue a summary?
Mr. Douglass. We won't make it public, but we will be glad
to brief you.
Mr. Visclosky. You won't have the summary report
generically about the industrial base?
Mr. Douglass. Yes, we might release some sort of a generic
summary. We do not expect to be making public the actual
details of the report. But I will be glad to either now, or at
some point in the future, generally tell you what is contained
in the report.
Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Chairman, if I could ask just one more
question on the shipbuilding.
Mr. Nethercutt. Yes.
CVX AIRCRAFT CARRIER
Mr. Visclosky. On the CVX, in the Navy's fiscal year 1999
posture statement, on page 51, you describe the CVX as a
nuclear-powered carrier.
Is this the appropriate time for the Navy to conclusively
state that the CVX will be a nuclear carrier?
Mr. Douglass. I don't recall conclusively saying that in my
statement.
Mr. Visclosky. It says, the CVX will be the most
technologically advanced nuclear-powered carrier the Navy has
ever developed.
Mr. Douglass. Oh, that is the Secretary's statement. Oh, I
am sorry.
Mr. Visclosky. Okay.
Mr. Douglass. I thought you were talking about my
statement.
Mr. Visclosky. I am sorry. No.
Mr. Douglass. I want to quickly say, there is a typo in
mine that I will correct for the record, and I apologize for
that. I thought maybe you were pointing out that there is
another mistake that slipped in there. Let me tell you where I
am coming from on that, sir.
This a model, a conceptual model of what CVX might look
like. You can see this is radically different than a Nimitz
class carrier. On this model the catapults are down here so we
could catapult airplanes from this lower deck at the same time
airplanes are landing on the upper deck. You could also egress
airplanes from the hangar deck without elevators onto the
catapult area.
Please notice these things on the side. If you look at it
from the side, it has a very, very low radar cross-section.
This is the equivalent of the sea-borne B-2, if you will, or
stealth fighter. We believe this is what is going to carry us
into the next generation.
Mr. Visclosky. I understand.
Mr. Douglass. My own personal opinion, is that it is going
to be big, and will be nuclear.
Mr. Visclosky. Okay. The GAO has recently raised the issue
of nuclear costing 66 percent more. You don't have any other
nuclear-powered surface combatants, as I understand it.
Mr. Douglass. Yes, sir.
Mr. Visclosky. And you have, I think, pretty clearly
enunciated it will be a nuclear ship.
Mr. Douglass. I am just expressing my opinion.
Mr. Visclosky. Isn't that something that is still subject
to analysis?
Mr. Douglass. It is, sir.
Mr. Visclosky. Isn't that whole process prejudiced here?
You didn't say it, but the Secretary said it. We take it, it is
going to be nuclear.
Mr. Douglass. Sir, my saying it to you is meant in the
interest of not trying to beat around the bush or be ambiguous
with you.
Mr. Visclosky. No. I appreciate that.
Mr. Douglass. I sometimes get into trouble with this, I
tell it the way I see it. I think it is going to be big, sir,
for the reason that this ship has got to go anywhere in the
world. If you have ever been out on a carrier in a Sea State 5
storm in the North Sea, you realize that for us to be able to
launch the airplanes off of this deck and recover them and be
able to operate on a 24-hour basis, you can't be bobbing around
there like a cork. You have got to have enough stability.
Mr. Visclosky. I am not disputing the size. I am asking
about the propulsion system.
Mr. Douglass. On the propulsion system the issue that you
run into there is that, when you are nuclear, you get a lot of
speed, a lot of power and a lot of mobility to go anywherein
the world you need to go fast without anybody going with you if you
have to. When you are not nuclear, not only do you have to carry all
the fuel for your airplanes aboard, but you have got to carry the fuel
for the engines of your own ship. That creates a complicating factor
for the long term.
We are still doing the studies, and in all honesty, I am
trying to keep my design folks open-minded on this. But from an
old soldier who has been around a long time, and seen a lot of
these things come and go, my guess is it is going to end up
being nuclear.
Mr. Visclosky. And I think it would be----
Mr. Douglass. This is the requirements issue.
Mr. Visclosky. I am very sensitive about the issue of
whether it is the corporate Navy who designs the ship or the
Office of Naval Reactors. Designing the ship is the corporate
Navy's job and that is your responsibility.
I am opposed to the reactor system and the Office of Naval
Reactors dictating to the United States Navy what the power
plant and what the ship is going to look like.
Mr. Douglass. Yes. Let me just give you a perspective on
that.
Mr. Visclosky. I think too often ships have been built
around a reactor because nobody at Naval Reactors has bothered
to tell anybody in the United States Navy or the Congress what
is going on.
Mr. Douglass. For an Air Force officer, I am kind of an
unusual duck because when I was a young Captain, I worked for
Admiral Rickover for 4\1/2\ years, and I know from firsthand
experience, I went through the interview, I know Mrs. Rickover,
and I know what those Rickover years were like.
We now have an Admiral in naval reactors by the name of
Skip Bowman, and he is a different kind of person. I am not
taking away from Admiral Rickover. I nominated Admiral Rickover
for the Navy's Acquisition Hall of Fame, and his picture hangs
outside my office, and God bless him. You know, in my early
life he played a significant leadership role. But Admiral
Bowman is a different kind of person and the way we work
together with the nuclear folks today is different than it was
in the old days.
Admiral Rickover was getting nuclear power into a Navy that
didn't want it. Now you have a Navy that basically does want
it. The interaction between my design people and his office is
a good one, and I feel very good about my relationship with
Admiral Bowman.
Connie, do you want to comment on that?
Admiral Lautenbacher. Yes. I think it has changed
significantly.
If I could just go back and answer the last question, the
study that we are involved in is a three-phased study. The
first phase was completed last year, and it basically dealt
with the combat capability you are going to need and the size
of the air wing. That sort of determines the platform then. So
that has been decided and approved through the Department of
Defense.
We have another phase that is going on right now, and what
you are hearing is the battle that is going on in the
background about what the propulsion system should be, and that
won't be decided until September----
Mr. Visclosky. Okay.
Admiral Lautenbacher. Or October when this next phase is
completed. And there are a number of, you know, competing
interests putting their stories on the table, and it is being
reviewed right now.
So that is kind of where it is. And I think as far as
designing ships around a nuclear plan, as Mr. Douglass has
said, that is not the case. I mean, we are looking at the
combat capability and the requirements from a warfighting point
of view.
Mr. Visclosky. Okay.
Admiral Lautenbacher. If nuclear power is the right answer,
then we could, we should look at it very carefully, andwe need
to be able to build a system that supports the combat capability, not
the other way around. I think all of the Navy leadership is dedicated
to that.
Mr. Visclosky. I am pleased to hear you say that.
Mr. Douglass. Propulsion has been a tough issue across the
board. As you know, we have programs to improve the efficiency
of our gas turbines, and they are very controversial, too. I
have to fight all the time to keep those programs funded,
because there is a tendency to let the future take care of
itself and not put money aside for it. We are staying open-
minded, sir. I am probably influenced because I worked for
Rickover for those 4 years.
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you.
Mr. Douglass. His legacy lives on.
YEAR 2000 COMPUTER PROBLEM
Mr. Nethercutt. Mr. Secretary, in your testimony you note
that no additional new funding is requested for the year 2000
computer problem that faces the government and faces the
country.
Mr. Douglass. Yes.
Mr. Nethercutt. How much do you expect to spend on that
problem, the year 2000, in the fiscal year 1999 budget?
Mr. Douglass. Frankly, sir, we don't know. All we know is
we have been told to take it out of our hide. I have, in this
respect, been wearing two hats. I am not only the Navy's
Acquisition Official, but for a while I was the Navy's Chief
Information Officer because the one we had left. I had to
``double-hat'' myself. I just appointed a new person to be our
Chief Information Officer. This is the number one task I gave
her. You have got to go out and figure out, make sure we are on
the right track for Y2K.
I worry about a problem of this complexity, when you tell
people to take it out of their hide. You always wonder if there
isn't somebody out there who won't tell you they have got a
problem because they don't want to take it out of their hide.
We are making estimates right now, sir. I just want to tell
you, I don't think we really know to the same degree of
fidelity that we know, for example, how much this airplane is
going to cost or that airplane or the AAAV.
We are being very vigorous about this effort. I can tell
you that it has the personal attention of the Deputy Secretary
of Defense. He calls me to meetings on about an every-two-week
basis and makes me show him where we are. I think the Navy is
making good progress on it. We know what most of our problems
are, and we have fixes for most of them.
One thing that we do worry about is how are we going to get
all the ships back into port and get the fixes done in time to
get it implemented. We are working hard on that problem.
Mr. Nethercutt. And what is the cost, and how long will it
take? Are we going to have any surprises relative to
implementing a solution?
Mr. Douglass. Right. Jeff, do you want to comment on it?
General Oster. Yes, sir. For the last 2 years, I have made
it a special interest item in the Marine Corps and have had the
folks bring in to, as what we call in our program objective
memorandum development phase, bring in to me everything that
they know about Y2K, and I made it very user-friendly, because
I said you bring anything in and I will fund it. There is no
extension of this beyond the end date. The good Lord has fixed
that for us.
So the problem is the complexity of what is involved in it,
and the learning process that goes on. We have plussed up about
$5.5 million, and in our major systems, mainframe kinds of
systems that run our logistics and our manpower, I think we are
in pretty good shape. We have got the test cycles funded. We
are ready to go.
It is the interaction, and most recently it has been the
local and the wide area network and even the PC that you
pluginto the local and wide area networks that we are starting to learn
more and more about, because the computer itself, PC, also has to be
Y2K-compatible to work. Those issues are ongoing now, and the largest
dollar amount would be if we had to replace all of the PCs.
Now, the good news there is that everybody doesn't need to
be on-line in order to do the kinds of business that we need to
do. But it is a very interactive problem. I have got 152
systems that are mission-critical. Eighty-eight of them are
complete, and I am satisfied with them. But I have got 48 of
them that are in the process of discovery right now and how
they interact. So this is an area that we are very concerned
with. But the honest answer is it is an area that even the best
technologists are having trouble with, and it is hard to give a
dollar figure that fixes the problem.
Mr. Douglass. My concern, Mr. Chairman, is that General
Oster gave you the Marine Corps numbers. In the total
Department of the Navy, we have 2,387 systems that we think
need to be looked at. My worry is what if it is 2,389, and
those other two are mission-critical? We are looking at this
every way we can to comb through it. We are taking it very
seriously. You can see from Jeff's comments that he is combing
through it. I know Connie is doing the same thing.
We have written letters to our Fleet Commanders. We have
done everything we think we can reasonably do to find all of
the systems and try to get the fixes in. It has the personal
attention of the Deputy Secretary of Defense. I think the
Department is approaching this with the proper attitude.
Mr. Nethercutt. Have you set a target date any sooner,
hopefully, than the year 2000?
Mr. Douglass. Yes, sir. Our orders are to be compliant by
the end of 1998.
General Oster. 1998.
Mr. Douglass. There is going to be a big test in early
1999.
Mr. Dicks. Fiscal year or calendar year?
Mr. Douglass. Calendar year. Our worry is that we will have
some ships at sea when the tests begin in 1999 that haven't
received the modifications. We have had to ask for some
waivers, but we will have all of them back into port and get
them fixed before the year 2000. It is just getting them all
ready for this test at the end of calendar year 1998.
General Oster. OMB has set 31 March 1999 for the entire
government.
Mr. Douglass. For the test.
General Oster. For the test. And the Deputy Secretary
backed that up 90 days for us for our deadline to shoot for so
we would have the time between.
Mr. Nethercutt. I think that is good planning. I think that
is smart to do.
Mr. Dicks.
Mr. Dicks. Yes. This is a software issue; isn't that
correct?
General Oster. Sir, it is a complex issue in that, yes, it
is a software issue, but much of the software, especially in
combat systems, is really hard-wired into the system. So there
is a hardware component also.
Mr. Dicks. As well?
General Oster. The basic input/output system, the BIOS, of
the computer that runs the programs has got to be able to
recognize the year 2000 also. And that is where the desktop and
work station computers come in, because they are not, even the
ones being sold today, are not guaranteed to be year 2000-
compliant.
So it is very complex. When we first started looking at it
years ago, we focused on software. That is why in terms of the
major mainframe systems such as our payroll and logistics
systems, we are in pretty good shape, because we looked at the
software because we were indifferent to the hardware that it
was playing on. It has gotten more and more complex as we have
looked into itbecause there is a hardware component to it. In
combat systems where you have hard-wire algorithms, that can also be
affected in terms of the year 2000.
Mr. Douglass. Also, Mr. Dicks, there is the dilemma that we
have that not every system nicely rolls up to 2000. What do you
do about systems that you had planned to deploy, let's say, in
the first 6 months of 2000? So you have got the old system you
are going to hang on for a couple of months. You don't want to
invest the money to fix the old one because you are going to
throw it away, and the new one isn't ready yet. We are looking
at accelerating things.
TRIDENT SUBMARINE BACKFIT
Mr. Dicks. I asked the Secretary and the CNO this morning
about the Trident program. Can you tell me where you see the
Trident program as it relates to the 18 versus 14 and the D-5
and the backfit program? And I realize that there are some
uncertainties here because of the Russian Duma.
Mr. Douglass. Why don't I let Admiral Lautenbacher give you
the requirements part of it.
Admiral Lautenbacher. Let me talk about the 14 and the 18.
We, of course, have to maintain the capability of
supporting the national strategic strategy, START I, START II
and whatever may follow.
Mr. Dicks. Right.
Admiral Lautenbacher. And the current force structure and
the current agreement that is in place is 18 boats,
essentially, to support the START I. We have in our program,
however, committed and funded to program 14 of those boats to
the D-5 configuration. That is a funded program, committed to
and locked in. What is at issue is between the 14 and the 18.
What we have done is for the last couple of years has
maintained the hedge to keep that force at the level of 18. We
have those boats now on line.
If we had to keep those boats forever and ever, and we were
struck at the 18 level, we would have to convert them to a D-5
program. That program is not funded. That is a large
multibillion-dollar program that would occur after the FYDP.
Mr. Dicks. Not funded for the last four of them, but they
are funded for the next four?
Admiral Lautenbacher. Four are funded; from 10 to 14 are
funded.
Mr. Dicks. Right.
Admiral Lautenbacher. Fourteen to eighteen we are
maintaining a hedge to be able to do that. We can do that for
the next couple of years, and then a decision has to be made.
Either we keep the 18 boats, or we do something else. But right
now, we are funded to convert 14 of our boats to Trident or to
have Trident D-5 capability in 14 of our boats. That includes
four conversions. That is the program, and we are maintaining
the hedge and will continue to for 18 boats in the force. So
that is the requirement.
Mr. Dicks. But that is unfunded at this point?
Admiral Lautenbacher. Fourteen to eighteen for D-5 is
unfunded, yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. Okay.
Now, how are we doing on the D-5 program itself? Last year
we didn't quite get what the administration requested, but we
had the foreign buy and then the domestic buy for the U.S. Navy
and then the British. Is the D-5 program okay?
Admiral Lautenbacher. We have funded the D-5 program to
maintain continuity the best that we can. We used the funds
that we were authorized and appropriated last year to keep the
sub component lines and the assembly of the missile itself
going. We are asking, again, this year, for five, which, when
combined with the foreign buy, is the right number to keep the
industrial base going.
Because of the fact that there was a shortfall in the
funding that we needed last year, there will be one sub
component line that in the future we will have to spend some
extra money on to get started again.
So we have--we have taken our money, I would say, as
prudently as possible to keep the sub components working.
Theassembly line is going. The money we are asking for this year is for
five missiles, but there is enough money in there to keep our--three of
the four sub assembly lines or critical component lines going. So I
think this is a prudent program that we have submitted for you this
year, sir.
Mr. Douglass. It is important, Mr. Dicks, the line is
broke. I mean, if we don't get that subcomponent started again,
you are going to have all the other pieces but not these sub
components for the last 40 some missiles.
Mr. Dicks. Well, you are going to get that fixed, aren't
you, Mr. Secretary?
Mr. Douglass. Well, we are trying, sir.
Mr. Dicks. Is this a serious, difficult problem that can't
be fixed?
Mr. Douglass. It is not something that can't be fixed, sir.
I am just trying to say we shouldn't trivialize it.
Mr. Dicks. So you think it is a serious matter?
Mr. Douglass. Yes, sir, we have to fix it.
Mr. Dicks. What is your plan to do that?
Mr. Douglass. Our plan is that we have added some money
this year and we plan to add more money next year to our budget
to fix it.
Mr. Dicks. To fix this problem?
Mr. Douglass. Yes, sir.
SHIP SELF-DEFENSE
Mr. Dicks. One of the issues Mr. Young, our Chairman,
raised this morning that hasn't been raised here this afternoon
is on the question of ship self-defense, and this has been a
concern of this Committee. You and I, Mr. Secretary, had a
chance to talk about this, very fast Russian cruise missile. I
am not sure we can get into it at this level, so I am not going
to mention the name, but it is one that I have been briefed on
by the CIA, and this is one that they are talking about selling
to other countries around the world. So all of a sudden, you
are going to have a major threat, I believe, to surface ships,
including aircraft carriers, that could affect our ability to
operate.
Now, that is why we feel here that this ship self-defense
issue is one that deserves serious consideration because it is
only a matter of time, frankly, until other people can develop
stealthy missiles like we are developing. And so we are
concerned, again, that the budget falls back from five ships
that were supposed to be given self-defense to two.
Mr. Douglass. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. I mean, we heard a little bit this morning about
that. Can you give us a little more detail about what is
happening here?
Mr. Douglass. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. Because I know the budget is very difficult.
Mr. Douglass. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. But this one seems to me it is one we shouldn't
ignore.
Mr. Douglass. Yes, sir. Let me begin by saying, we agree
with you. This Committee has been in the lead on this issue,
and consistently, as I said to you last year, you have been
right on this issue. You won't get any disagreement from us
about the degree of priority.
Specifically, what happened on the SSDS program this year
is a kind of good news/bad news story. The good news is we did
an operational test on the USS ASHLAND that was dynamite. It
showed that against the slow-speed skimmers, we really have a
terrific system. Next year we are going to look at the high-
speed sea skimmers, so we have got another step in the program
next year.
Mr. Dicks. I am going to have to vote. You finish the
answer, and you and I can talk about it some more.
Mr. Douglass. Yes, sir. What happened to us is when we did
the test, we found that we have this great capability, but we
need to build in a few more things. The price went up, and when
we looked at how much money we had in our budget, instead of
being able to buy five, we canonly buy two. This was very late
in the budget cycle and we couldn't adjust the outyears. Our commitment
to you is we are going to adjust the outyears.
Mr. Dicks. Mr. Kilian will be very pleased to hear that.
Mr. Douglass. We will get this fixed. For those of us that
are here, and I have said this to the Members before, but I
think it is important to say it to Mr. Kilian as well. I have
been a staffer for the Congress myself over the years, and what
people in the Pentagon forget is the continuity in America's
national security is not in the Pentagon. It is in the
Congress. There are men and women who sit on these Committees
for 15, 20, 30 years. They see Secretaries come. They see
Secretaries go. They see admirals and generals come. They see
them go. Where the continuity lies is in these Committees, and
that is the great strength of our system. There are staff
people like Dave, who have been here for a long time and see
the big picture and the long picture, and they play a damn
important role in American security, and so we listen.
I used to work for Senator Nunn, and he used to
occasionally remind me of how many Secretaries he saw in his 28
years in the Senate. I am mindful of that, sir, and we make
mistakes sometimes and sometimes our cycle is awkward. When we
find something out late in the cycle, and everybody has got all
the charts done and all the papers done, and they don't want us
to change. We will fix this one.
Mr. Nethercutt. Good. I think it is worth fixing, Mr.
Secretary.
Mr. Visclosky.
TACTICAL TOMAHAWK MISSILE
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you very much.
Mr. Kilian is a Notre Dame grad and I don't think has ever
made a mistake. So just for the record, we might put that in.
Mr. Secretary, I have heard that you may have an initiative
as far as the Tactical Tomahawk program. Do you want to talk
about that?
Mr. Douglass. Yes, sir, we do. Would you like me to explain
it?
Mr. Visclosky. If you could in a little detail, please.
Mr. Douglass. We had a program, sir, that was basically to
take some of the Tomahawks we now have, our older Tomahawks,
and rebuild them in a modernization program. We were also at
the same time finishing the buy-out of the last of our older
style Tomahawks, and we had contract options with our
contractors that build the Tomahawk. The contractors came to us
and said, instead of us building the last year of the old
missile, why don't we take this money and let's design a newer,
much cheaper and more capable Tactical Tomahawk so that you end
up with the current inventory of older missiles, and add newer
missiles. The newer ones have more capability than the old
ones. Through this new program, for the same amount of money
that you were going to spend in rebuilding the old missiles, to
give you about 1,200 low-cost Tomahawks.
We looked at this. We took a long look at it last year. It
looks like a good deal for us. We have proposed a reprogramming
to Congress that was supposed to come up concurrent with our
President's Budget request. I am not sure if it has arrived
here in the committee or not yet. If not, it will be arriving
imminently. It has been all the way through all the approval
loops in the administration. This reprogramming allows us to
take the production money that we have for the last buy of
exiting Tomahawks and turn them into research and development
dollars. There is a substantial industry contribution to this
program. In other words, it is a cost-sharing program. It would
be to build about 1,200 low-cost Tomahawks. I think it is about
$560,000 per missile instead of about $1.2 million per missile.
SSN-21 SEAWOLF SUBMARINE
Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Secretary, how does the Navy plan to
deal with the SEAWOLF cost cap situation?
Mr. Douglass. Well, sir, the good news on the cost cap is
we have consistently stayed under the cost cap. I meetwith the
independent cost team about every 2 weeks. Not only does my program
office come in and tell me they are under the cap, I have this
independent team of auditors who are independent of my submariners,
also come in and give me their views. They have both consistently
monitored this, and the amount that we are under the cap has ranged in
my 3 years from about $30 million up to about $100 million.
What we have run into, though, sir, is that as we near the
end of the program, we clearly do not need any additional money
from the Congress to finish the program. But what we have found
is people are now going back and looking at decisions that were
made 5 or 6 years ago, and they are saying things like, well,
at the time the cap was established, you should have put this
or that in the cap, so there has been some discussion on that.
Last year, the Congress raised the cap a little bit to
recognize that some of the old money that was in the program
before the cap was established should have been put into the
cap.
As we get down to the end of the program, we may have to
make another one of those adjustments, depending on what people
think. But I want to really clearly emphasize, this is not new
money from Congress. This is just bookkeeping on old money. So
we have stayed under the cap.
I would also like to say, sir, too, that at some point
these caps become counterproductive. Early in a program, they
have a lot of value. If you think the program is starting to
spin out of control, it is a way the Congress can say, now,
look, guys, this is it. We are only going to give you this
much, and if you can't do it for that, then, by God, you know,
you are in trouble. I support that.
When you get down to the end of the program, at some point
it begins to reverse itself, and you get into funny things
like, well, we could really improve this thing if we had a few
extra dollars, but we can't put the money into it because we
don't want to go over the cap.
The first boat is built. The second one is approximately 87
percent complete. The third one is about 38 percent finished.
We know how much it is going to cost, and we are under the cap.
The IG came in and looked at it this year and agreed with us
that we are under the cap.
NEW ATTACK SUBMARINE
Mr. Visclosky. On the New Attack Submarine, my
understanding on the report that was issued is you have a
smaller performance margin against the advanced Russian SSN
than predicted. Could you comment on that, please?
Mr. Douglass. The New Attack Submarine is still evolving,
obviously. It is in its design phase right now, and my guess is
that we are going to maintain the margin we currently have,
between the SEAWOLF and the new classes that the Russians have
been building.
Mr. Visclosky, I think the thing that is very hard to
predict here, sir, is that, a few years ago, we thought the
Russians were going to build these new, better submarines like
hotcakes, and of course their economy has gone to heck on them.
They aren't building them near what anybody thought they would
do. In some cases, they have stopped construction altogether.
There is an intelligence story that goes with that if you are
interested in it. I could get the Naval Intelligence people to
come over and give you a full brief on that.
I think I can safely report to you that given the $60
million to $100 million that we are investing in new submarine
technology each year, in large degree because Congress has
urged us to do more in this area, coupled with the lessons we
have learned from SEAWOLF, and coupled with the revolution in
acquisition reform that is going on in the Navytoday in ship
design and construction, we will be able to produce a New Attack
Submarine that will maintain America's undersea superiority
indefinitely. I see no threat to that right now, given all the factors.
AMMUNITION SHORTFALLS
Mr. Visclosky. Okay.
General, if I could talk to you for a moment about
ammunition, do you have a shortfall as far as your budget for
1999, and if so, what do you need?
General Oster. We manage a large number of different items
in ammunition and work very, very diligently to put all of the
money in each year that is required. We do come up against late
price changes from the Army and other things that cause some
particular problems in terms of our requirements. We have just
rerun all of the calculations based on the prices we got from
the Army, and we do, across the FYDP, have some small
shortfalls in a few of the items that we manage, but we don't
have any serious problems in our ammunition, either against our
combat requirement for wartime or our annual training
requirement.
Mr. Visclosky. If you could for the record.
General Oster. Yes, sir.
Mr. Visclosky. Understanding they are relatively minor, if
you could review those shortfalls.
General Oster. Yes, sir, be happy to.
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Clerk's note.--The information was not provided for the
record.]
MODULAR SHIPBUILDING
Mr. Nethercutt. Mr. Secretary, I have had a chance to
recently see the USS BATAAN and the MAHAN, the destroyer, and
went to Newport News and took a look at their operations. It
seems to me the new generation of ships that are being built by
the Navy for the Navy have sort of a modular concept so you
can--you sort of build a shell, and then you decide how it is
best configured. Is that the way you see the future of
shipbuilding in the Navy in the years ahead for all classes of
ships, or is that just suitable for smaller ships?
Mr. Douglass. No, sir. I see that as a concept that we will
probably evolve more and more towards. It does vary from class
of ship to class of ship. For example, it is a little bit
harder to do that on a submarine than, say, it is on a DDG or
the like.
Mr. Nethercutt. Right.
Mr. Douglass. Some of our European allies, Mr. Congressman,
have a real modular concept that has gone even farther than
ours in which they have a turret that you take off and you put
on a rocket system; you take that off and put on an ASW system.
They keep them on the dock, and if they want to go out in an
ASW mission, they put on that equipment, and when they come
back in if they think they are going to be in gunnery, they put
on the gun turret.
I don't see us getting that far into it, but I do see us
moving more and more into using commercial-off-the-shelf
displays and computers and electronic equipment that work in an
open architecture. It has to be modular. It has to be refreshed
periodically so that when the ship comes into port, instead of
getting the old chief petty officer in the electronic section
who is working with his replacement boards and the soldering
irons you get sailors working throughout the night fixing
things by just taking the old module out, putting the new one
in. Now instead of having 64K RAM, you have 128K Ram. I do see
modular and open architectures in our ship construction as a
thing of the future, especially in the electronics area.
Mr. Nethercutt. From a personal standpoint, Admiral and
General, has that been accepted pretty much by the commanders
and others, ship personnel, who have to either work on these
ships or live on them?
Admiral Lautenbacher. Absolutely. It shortens the amount of
time the equipment is down, but it makes absolutely essential
that we fund the logistics systems in our maintenance depot-
level repair capabilities and those types ofitems, because as
you get these higher-level components, you really have to be able to
shift them back and forth to keep your readiness levels up. But this
is--this is very well accepted by Navy personnel as the right way to
go.
Mr. Nethercutt. General.
General Oster. I was down on the BATAAN myself just 3 weeks
ago, spent a whole day all the way from down in the engine
room, which surprised them. As a matter of fact, when they knew
I was going to spend the whole day, they spent a lot of time
wanting to know what the real agenda of a three-star general
was to come and spend a whole day on a ship. But I hadn't had a
chance to be on that class.
First of all, I was impressed by the fact that the user
input into the original design gets reflected in the later
class of ships. Clearly, you want to maintain a configuration
control, but as this particular class of ships is operated and
it has real world missions and so on now, the feedback is fed
back into the system.
The modular configuration and the kind of snap-in/snap-out
with regard to the work stations and so on, is also very
amenable because tactics and techniques are changing, and the
configuration of the command and control that the new
commanders are executing in neo-operation, is evolving over
time. In the old days it was really hard-wired in and you had
to work around the configuration. Now it is much more user-
friendly in terms of being able to go aboard and do that.
And so our communications officers and command and control
folks are able to get on the ships well in advance of
deployment, lay out their configuration, work it out with the
ship, and then move on board, and the transition is a lot
better.
Also, you know, BATAAN, for instance, something that should
have been probably obvious to begin with was how do you
maintain the integrity of the operating theater? In the first
class of the ships, the triage was in the center of the medical
spaces, and the operating theaters to the outside, which meant
maintaining the integrity of the operating theaters was very,
very difficult.
They have reconfigured that now. The operating theaters of
the BATAAN are down the center line and the triage is to the
outside. So that modularity gives a lot of flexibility to be
able to fix the things that you find were wrong with the basic
design.
Mr. Nethercutt. I was very impressed.
Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Douglass. I would like to add to that. It is not just
the commanders that support it; it is the chief petty officers
and the senior chiefs and the senior Marines that are aboard
these ships. But in some ways, and equally important, it is the
admirals and the generals. When I was a young officer, a second
lieutenant, most of the people that were generals in those days
were people that fought in World War II, and, God bless them,
they were hardened veterans, but they didn't really understand
computers and all the wave of modern technology that was coming
aboard. We had a lot of problems integrating the new technology
into warfighting in the beginning. The thing that kept us
moving forward in those days was, of course, the pressure of
the Cold War.
Nowadays, you have a generation of very well-educated, very
sophisticated admirals and generals in the Marine Corps and in
the Navy, who have grown up in the computer world and are very
sophisticated in their approach. I would invite you, sir, to at
some time go down to the Commandant's Warfighting Lab if you
want to see how Marines are going to fight in 2010 and you will
see some really sophisticated thinking about this.
Mr. Nethercutt. Sure. And I think the sailors----
Mr. Douglass. Right.
Mr. Nethercutt. Not just the officers, but the sailors.
Mr. Douglass. That is why I mentioned the young petty
officers.
SHIP DISPLAYS
Mr. Nethercutt. Right.
Anyway, thanks very much.
Is there a cost savings associated with that, do you
perceive?
Mr. Douglass. Yes, sir, there is. It is one of the things
that relates to what Mr. Visclosky asked me before, and that is
that we are going to have to go to open architectures and
commercial--off-the-shelf equipment to get the cost of these
things down.
Just to give you an idea, next time you get a chance to go
out on these ships look at some of the displays on the ships,
and what you will see in the combat information centers, are
big, wide-screen, flat-panel displays that are, bigger than
these pictures here, that are really great. On one of the DDGs
there is a wide-panel display that is bigger than those doors
behind you.
In older combat information centers, you will see some poor
sailor sitting there looking at this little TV screen with
little squiggly green figures on it. That is the old
technology, that shows him numbers and tables. When he sees a
number come up, he has to get a big book like this and quickly
go to some tab and read the thing.
The modern ones show him the picture of the system. If
something has gone wrong, a light flashes. He touches his
finger to the screen. It goes back--now he can see the
subsystem that is broken, and then he can touch his finger
again and he goes back and sees exactly the part that is
broken. He can hit another area, and it issues an order for a
part from the depot. It is a dramatic difference.
The interesting thing is that the military specification
ones with green squiggly lines, you and I and Mr. Visclosky and
all of us, we paid 100 percent of the development bill for
those. The commercial ones, everybody shared the cost with
everyone else, including the international partners. I don't
have to pay the total development bill.
There is a wave of new business revolution going on here,
and I am trying to push it out there to the fleet as quickly as
I can.
Mr. Nethercutt. Good. Thank you.
Mr. Dicks.
V-22 AIRCRAFT
Mr. Dicks. Mr. Secretary, the fiscal year 1999 budget
request for the V-22 is $355 million for continued testing and
$692 million for procurement of seven V-22 aircraft.Your
statement says that the V-22 test program is several months
behind schedule, and this and other factors has led to some
cost growth in the $6.9 billion R&D program, which is estimated
to be about--the cost growth to be about $130 million.
Can you tell me what the status is of the V-22 program?
Mr. Douglass. Yes, sir. It is doing very well. the cost
growth that I spoke to you about, Mr. Dicks, is due to the fact
that we are about 4 months behind in the test schedule.
I will tell you, sir, that the program has suffered through
various cuts in the building. Every time the inflation rate
changes, we get a little cut, and every time we get
undistributed reductions when the congressional bills come out
and things of that nature.
We have all the money we need to execute this program, and
I am confident that it is on track. But in the world we live in
today, Mr. Dicks, there is an enormous amount of cynicism in
the air, and if I am not utterly frank with the Congress and
tell them when we are a little bit behind or a little bit over
our costs, people accuse us of hiding things and being
misleading. You have seen the press articles that people
accused me of hiding the problem of the F/A-18E/F. I have
never, to the best of my knowledge, ever hid a single thing
from anybody in the Congress or in the senior leadership of the
Department of Defense.
So, what you are seeing is the realities of a very, very
ambitious test program. We are a little bit behind. I have a
plan to catch up. We are on that plan right now. The Commandant
and I have talked to the contractors. We believe we have their
support. All of our cost growth has been funded from within the
President'sbudget, so we are not asking for anything from the
Congress.
Mr. Dicks. I am a very strong supporter of this program.
Mr. Douglass. It is kind of a full disclosure statement.
Mr. Dicks. I wanted to give you a chance to have that full
disclosure.
Is IOC still on track?
Mr. Douglass. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. What are your plans to pursue multiyear
contracting for the V-22?
Mr. Douglass. Sir, we would like to go ahead and get a
little further into our test program and get the birds from
last year and this year firmly on contract. We are looking at
it as a way of getting the production numbers up in the
outyears. We haven't made a decision exactly when we would like
to propose that to the Congress, but it is going to be within
the next year or so.
Mr. Dicks. Now a recent GAO audit indicates that the Navy
has not included a ground collision avoidance and warning
system with voice warning on V-22 production aircraft. Why is
that?
Mr. Douglass. Well, the reason is that none exists. We have
to develop one, and we are looking at it.
Mr. Dicks. You couldn't use the ground proximity warning
system that is out there for other aircraft?
Mr. Douglass. No, sir. It just doesn't work right in this
kind of an airplane. As you know, there is no commercial
version of this new tilt-rotor concept. We are looking--working
with the contractors to develop a system, but we don't have it
developed yet.
Mr. Dicks. General, what do you think about that? Should we
be doing something here? Should we be putting a couple bucks
into the budget to look at a ground proximity warning system,
or is this not the kind of aircraft that needs that?
General Oster. No, sir. I think we all agree that there is
a requirement there, and the application--the direct transfer
of the application is not available. I agree with Mr. Douglass
that we need to work with the contractors, and develop that
system for this program.
GROUND/COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEMS
Mr. Dicks. Did you see ``60 Minutes'' on Sunday?
Mr. Douglass. No, sir.
Mr. Dicks. They had a big segment on TCAS. Are you familiar
with TCAS?
Mr. Douglass. Yes, sir, I know what it is.
Mr. Dicks. And it was another situation where we told all
of these people we are going to do it, we are going to put
these systems on these airplanes, and we didn't put them on.
And then a C-141 and a German plane crashed, head-on collision.
Mr. Douglass. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. And we lose the planes, and we don't have this
TCAS system on.
Now, this was an Air Force issue. But I asked this morning,
and I want to mention this to you all, since you are the
acquisition people, I think we ought to--where possible, put
these systems on our aircraft. I have been a big supporter of a
ground proximity warning system, TCAS is most relevant unless
planes are coming right at each other, a voice, a system
activates and communicates to the pilot to go high or, go low,
in order to avoid head-on collisions.
Now, you know, if you could save a few planes here or a few
lives, as far as I am concerned, this thing becomes affordable,
and yet on these things, it is like pulling teeth to get the
services to do them. I know the money is tight, you might have
to cut something out. You shouldn't cheat on the safety
modifications. Now, why do we do that?
Mr. Douglass. Sir, I feel more like the dentist than the
patient. I am trying to pull the teeth with you. It is asymptom
of the shortness in the budget. You may recall, when we had that
unfortunate incident in Bosnia in which Secretary Brown was killed.
Mr. Dicks. Right, and Secretary Perry said we are going to
go take care of these things. We are going to put these safety
systems on.
Mr. Douglass. That is what I was getting ready to say. Dr.
Perry, who is a very dear friend of mine, called everybody in
and pretty much gave them the speech you just gave to me, and
lined us all up and said, now, get out there and do it. We are
and the Navy is ahead of its schedule to meet Dr. Perry's
commitment to do that.
Mr. Dicks. I will tell you this: The Air Force officer, who
gave the response on ``60 Minutes''--and I realize that on ``60
Minutes'' they may interview you for an hour, and they pick out
the 2 minutes that make you look the worst--well, this guy, he
succeeded in looking about as bad as you can look. I mean, his
answers were really shocking, saying, well, it isn't cost-
effective, and we are not sure it makes sense to do this. This
isn't on fighter airplanes now. This is on cargo planes and
passenger planes.
And, you know, United Airlines put them on, I think it was
like $25,000 per airplane. They did it real fast. The cost for
the military is much higher. I don't know why it is much
higher, because it sounds like it is the same system that they
are using in the commercial area. But I would like you to put
in the record what your plan is so that we can----
General Oster. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. You sit there and listen to the wives of the
people who are on that plane, whose husbands aren't coming back
because we don't think it is cost-effective, I mean, there are
certain things you just have to do.
Mr. Douglass. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. This is one of them.
Mr. Douglass. In general, we agree with you, sir.
Mr. Dicks. Yes. Thank you.
Tell us what, in the record, too, what you think we ought
to do on the V-22.
[The information follows:]
There are two slightly different safety systems, one called
Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) which deals
with other aircraft and another called Ground Proximity Warning
System (GPWS) that deals with avoiding controlled flight into
terrain. TCAS is effective in air operations like commercial
flights where aircraft operate independently and with
significant separation distances. The use of TCAS for an
amphibious assault aircraft is more complex and we have not
decided how to proceed, however, we have plans for integration
of a GPWS into the V-22. The V-22 program plans to take fixed-
wing and rotary-wing aircraft algorithms that have already been
developed and combine them into a new algorithm especially for
tiltrotor aircraft. We plan the system for a fiscal year 2001
production line cut-in. Funding for these systems is being
addressed in the fiscal year 2000 budget development process.
General Oster. Yes, sir.
SSN-21 SEAWOLF SUBMARINE
Mr. Nethercutt. Mr. Visclosky.
Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Secretary, I remain very concerned about
the shipbuilding budget. I appreciate what you are telling me
about the SEAWOLF and the cost cap. Culpability is the wrong
word, simply because the world radically changed in midstream
on everyone, including the Congress, the Administration and the
Department. You still have hundreds of millions of dollars of
unused equipment sitting out there, and I think it is just an
example of in an unsettled world what can go wrong, in many
instances, is going to go wrong through, again, no fault of
anybody in this room or the Department.
You know, with a shrinking industrial base, and the issue
of diminished competition, we need to make sure that we do keep
people, and caps on costs.
Mr. Douglass. Right.
CVX AIRCRAFT CARRIER
Mr. Visclosky. I appreciate your comments on nuclear
propulsion. You still have a GAO report out there saying that
those life cycle costs that you had emphasized earlier are
going to be higher because of that. Maybe GAO is right, maybe
wrong; maybe the truth lies----
Mr. Douglass. We don't agree with that.
Mr. Visclosky. I assumed you would not. I am just concerned
because I do think the world situation that we face today, we
have to have the ability to project power. In the end it is
based on the Navy's ability to project our presence. I just,
again, remain apprehensive that, whether it is myself or
somebody else sitting here 5 and 10 years from now; they are
going to face a huge shipbuilding bubble potentially if we are
not very careful and very methodical about what we do here in
the next 3 to 4 years
Mr. Douglass. Mr. Visclosky, we need your support on or
maritime industrial base. One of the things that I have been
very outspoken about, to the point where occasionally I get
myself in trouble with certain people around town, is that we
have got to protect our maritime industrial base. I argue very,
very strongly that we need to build more commercial ships in
this country, which lowers the cost of the ships that I buy
from the big shipbuilders.
Three or four years ago, there were no commercial ships
under construction in the United States, capital-sized ships.
Today the number is 21 with orders pending for an additional
30. For the first time since 1957, two cruise ships will be
built in the United States, starting this year. That is a whole
industry. It is a travesty that 80 to 90 percent of the people
all over the world that go on cruises are Americans, and that
only one of those ships was built in the United States. When
you are a passenger on one of those ships, you as an individual
pay more income tax to the United States than the entire cruise
line pays to the United States. That is a travesty, and I don't
like that, and I go after these people strongly, and the idea
is to protect our industrial base.
We are making some progress, sir, and it has been because
of people like yourself, Congressman Cunningham and Congressman
Hunter have been helpful, and there are strong advocates over
in the Senate. We all need to cooperate to protect this part of
our industrial base because we cannot let it slip away. More
and more, I think, in the post Cold War world, American
security is going to depend on its maritime forces. Certainly
our trade depends in large degree on these maritime sea lanes
of communication staying open. The Navy's job is to keep those
communication lanes open. To have an affordable Navy, we have
got to have a robust industrial base, and we have got to have
competition.
Your comments, sir, are right on track. I saw the
endorsement, and we need to continue the kind of cooperation
that we had in the past from your colleagues on this Committee
and others.
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Nethercutt. Gentlemen, thank you very much for your
responses and your frankness and your preparedness for today.
We thank you. We will see you again soon, and thank you for
your testimony.
Mr. Douglass. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Nethercutt. The Committee is adjourned.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Sabo and the
answers thereto follow:]
Penguin Missile Program
Question. Over the past two years, the Committee has provided the
Navy with $14.5 million to support the PENGUIN missile program. What is
the current status of the program, and how have these funds been
utilized?
Answer. The PENGUIN missile is operational and is carried by
deployed carrier battle groups and the Middle East Force Squadron. The
$14.5 million in fiscal year 1997 and fiscal year 1998 funding has
allowed procurement of 6 telemetry rounds to be delivered in fiscal
year 1999; additionally, contract negotiations are ongoing for the
construction of 5 tactical rounds for fiscal year 1999/2000 delivery,
acquisition of 45 missile simulators to correct program deficiencies,
and acquisition of missile loading tools and spare components.
Question. Why is this program not funded in the fiscal year 1999
budget?
Answer. The President's Budget represents the best balance of
programs and priorities given constrained resources. This balance has
precluded funding for PENGUIN acquisition in the fiscal year 1999
budget. Funding for maintenance of existing PENGUIN missiles is
provided in the fiscal year 1999 budget.
Question. Does the Navy still have a valid requirement for the
PENGUIN missile?
Answer. The Navy requirement for PENGUIN missile remains valid at
193 tactical missiles. The Navy has procured 101 tactical missiles to
date with an additional 5 tactical missiles to be delivered in fiscal
year 1999.
Question. If so, exactly how many missiles does the Navy need?
Answer. The Navy requirement for PENGUIN missile was validated at
193 missiles; 101 tactical missiles were procured and delivered with an
additional 5 tactical missiles to be constructed as a result of the
fiscal year 1998 plus-up.
Question. Does the Navy intend to initiate a multi-year contract to
fill the requirement?
Answer. The Navy does not currently intend to initiate a multi-year
contract to acquire the missiles necessary to meet the requirement.
Balancing programs and priorities within constrained resources has
resulted in the missile being held as an ``above core'' funding issue.
Question. If the Navy does not intend to use multi-year contracting
procedures, what other methods are being examined?
Answer. Funding for the PENGUIN missile is examined as part of each
budget cycle. At this time, affordability constraints preclude
programming the funds required to procure the missiles necessary to
fulfill the requirement.
Question. is the PENGUIN missile on the Navy's fiscal year 1999
unfinanced requirements list?
Answer. The PENGUIN missile is not on the Navy's unfinanced
requirements list.
Question. If not, why?
Answer. The PENGUIN missile remains an ``above core'' issue; its
priority against competing Navy requirements is insufficient to warrant
inclusion on the unfinanced requirements list.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Sabo.
Questions submitted by Mr. Nethercutt and the answers thereto
follow:]
SSBN to SSGN Conversion
Question. In fiscal year 2000 we will reach a decision point for
retiring 4 SSBNs to reach START II levels of 14 SSBNs. Please provide
detailed comments on the costs and performance attributes associated
with converting the 4 retired platforms for the so-called SSGN option.
Answer. Congressional language prohibits removal of any of the 18
Trident SSBNs from strategic service prior to START II ratification.
Pending START II ratification, the four oldest Trident SSBNs are
planned for removal from strategic service, two each in fiscal years
2002 and 2003.
Right now, the Trident conversion (SSGN) concept is just a concept
and not yet a program. No funds have been applied to it in the fiscal
year 1999 budget, but the Navy continues to evaluate the concept.
Conversion costs are currently estimated to be approximately $400
million per ship (includes the refueling overhaul required for 20
additional years of service life), with a one time initial design cost
of approximately $170 million.
Commandant's Warfighting Laboratory
Question. The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab is aggressively pursuing
the doctrinal changes required for the urban battlefield. Are the
experimental technologies required to dominate this future battlefield
adequately funded in this budget? Please comment on the technologies
and research funds for this effort.
Answer. The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL) conducts concept-
based experimentation in accordance with an analysis plan developed
within the MCWL. Results of all experimentation are evaluated within
the Combat Development System at Marine Corps Combat Development
Command (MDDDC), Quantico, VA for their warfighting enhancement
potential. Doctrinal, organizational, training & education, and support
areas are assessed by MCCDC and implementation actions initiated.
The President's Budget funding provides adequate support for
experimental technologies support in Urban Warrior. This funding level
supports the conduct of the experiment, but limits the number and depth
of technologies available for examination. With additional funding, the
MCWL would be able to more fully exploit the concepts and enabling
technologies of Urban Warrior such as the autonomous indirect fire
system, training initiatives, testing of Commercial Off The Shelf
(COTS) communications equipment, and an instrumentation program. The
Marine Corps estimates that a more in depth pursuit of these efforts
would require an additional $10 million in fiscal year 1999.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr.
Nethercutt. Questions submitted by Mr. Visclosky and the
answers thereto follow:]
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
Question. It is your intention to have dual engine sources for the
Joint Strike Fighter?
Answer. Yes, the JSF is continuing an Alternate Engine Program with
General Electric to develop an alternate engine for production.
Question. It is correct to assume that the alternate engine will
now be fully funded for its development and flight qualifications?
Answer. Yes. The alternate engine program is fully funded through
the current Future Years Defense Program, which ends in fiscal year
2003. The Navy and Air Force are committed to funding the program in
the outyears as well. The Department is currently structuring its
options during the year 2000 budget development process for
implementing an alternate engine program beyond fiscal year 2003.
Question. Realizing that funding constraints are always an issue,
do you not agree that annualized competition for the engine would
benefit the Joint Strike Fighter Program and should be implemented as
soon in the production process as possible?
Answer. The Service recognize the benefits of an alternate engine
program. The Department is currently structuring its options for
implementing an alternate engine program beyond fiscal year 2003 that
achieves annualized competition in production as soon as possible
within affordability constraints.
CVX Aircraft Carrier
Question. What is the Navy's inclination on the size of the ship?
What is the Navy's inclination on the ship's propulsion?
Answer. The Navy's preferred alternative for CV(X) being evaluated
in the Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) is a large deck nuclear-powered
carrier. This alternative provides the greatest capability, mobility,
flexibility and survivability of all the alternatives being analyzed in
the CV(X) AOA. A large deck provides the Navy the greatest flexibility
in airwing size, mix of types of aircraft or other payloads carried on
the ship, and for operations in all types of weather. Nuclear power
provides the carrier force added mobility, operational flexibility and
survivability as compared to a conventional carrier. In addition, given
that the next class of aircraft carriers will be in service throughout
the next century, it is prudent to provide the Navy's capital ship with
the greatest capability practicable. The ongoing CV(X) AOA is examining
several design alternatives, and a final decision on CV(X) size and
propulsion will be made after the next phase of this AOA has been
completed and reviewed by the DOD senior leadership.
Question. In light of the GAO report that is scheduled to be
released in the near future, please provide information about the cost
comparison between nuclear and conventionally powered carriers. The
Navy does not build other surface combatants with nuclear reactors. How
does a nuclear-powered carrier's additional capabilities over a
conventionally-powered carrier relate to comparisons amount other
surface combatants and their nuclear versus conventional debates? Are
conventionally powered cruisers and destroyers not so less capable than
nuclear ones that the Navy could accept the lesser cost and
capabilities of conventional destroyers but does not wish to do so with
carriers?
Answer. The DoD position on this GAO report has been provided to
the GAO and the Congress recently by the Office of the Under Secretary
of Defense (Acquisition and Technology).
Shipbuilding Program
Question. Is the planned rate of shipbuilding sufficient to
maintain a Navy of 300 ships over the long run (past 2015)? After what
date will the Navy fall below 300 ships? Why wasn't the reduction in
the planned size of the Navy from the BUR figure of 346 ships to the
new figure of 300 ships made explicit in the Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR)?
Answer. In order to sustain a 300 ship Navy our shipbuilding rate
must be maintained at approximately 8-10 ships per year. Within the
fiscal year 1999-fiscal year 2003 budget, we buy an average of 6 ships
per year which is not sufficient over the long term to sustain a 300
ship force.
The QDR affirmed the need for 12 carrier battle groups, 12
amphibious ready groups, 116 surface combatants and 50 attack
submarines, as well as the strategic force that we have, in support of
START I and START II. This represents the core capability necessary to
meet the needs of national defense. In addition, we need to provide the
combat logistics and other support ships to make this core capability a
world wide force. When looking at our force structure from a
capabilities focus, it is more essential to ensure we provide the
required capability and not a specific number of ships. Navy's
shipbuilding and modernization efforts are designed to produce ships
that will provide the core capabilities well into the 21st Century.
Shipbuilding Industrial Base Study
Question. What is the status of the joint Navy/DoD shipbuilding
industrial base study? Wasn't this study supposed to have been done by
November or December of last year? Why is the Navy sitting on it? Can
you tell us anything about the findings of the report? Should the
government award shipbuilding contracts without regard to possible yard
closure? What should be the government's policy about consolidation or
mergers?
Answer. On April 7, 1997, Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Research, Development and Acquisition) and the Under Secretary of
Defense (Acquisition & Technology) commissioned a Shipbuilding
Industrial Base Study (SIBS). While the study was originally envisioned
to be completed by November or December, the magnitude of data received
from the shipbuilders required additional effort on the part of the
Navy and OSD. The SIBS Working Group has completed its efforts and is
in the process of briefing senior Navy and OSD management. Specifics on
each shipyard are not releasable based on the business sensitive
information provided by the shipyards. However, the study determined
there is sufficient capacity to meet the Navy's needs. Therefore, it is
important for the Navy to promote commercial and Foreign Military Sales
opportunities.
The two questions relating to contract placement and a policy on
consolidations and mergers are the two questions asked in the study.
Since the study has not been officially reviewed by the interested Navy
and DoD officials, it is premature to present findings. Due to the
sensitive nature of the report, it is likely that it will never be
published publicly. However, the study would not have been successful
without the involvement of the shipbuilding community. They were asked
to participate up-front and were very cooperative.
DD 21 Teaming
Question. Can you have vigorous competition after the announced DD
21 teaming arrangement between Ingalls, Bath Iron Works, and Lockheed
Martin? What is the Navy going to do about this? How does the Navy
intend to prevent ``group think'' during the conceptual design phase if
both major surface combatant yards are on the same team? Can the
Government prevent the teaming arrangement? On the issue of prevention
of exclusivity, what is the incentive for the first yard to break ranks
and join up with a second team?
Answer. The original draft DD 21 request for Proposals (RFP) was
issued in November 1997. Shortly thereafter, the proposed team of
Ingalls, Bath Iron Works and Lockheed was announced. Raytheon expressed
concerns about this team to the Navy and DoD, and then referred the
matter to the Department of Justice for review. In order to encourage
competition to the maximum extent, the Navy made amendments to the RFP
(listed below), and issued a revised DD 21 Draft RFP on February 20,
1998. Major changes included:
Use of Section 845/804 Authority vs. the original FAR/DFAR
RFP.
Prohibition against industry entering into exclusive
teaming arrangements.
Provisions to allow industry to propose competition at the
system and subsystem level if only a single bid is received.
Additional funds allocated to industry in Phase I and
Phase II (1998-2001) of the development program.
Additional opportunities for industry to innovate in the
development process by removing Navy cost and schedule oversight,
removing Navy performance specifications other than those in the Joint
Chiefs of Staff approved Operational Requirements Document, and
removing Navy control over the Integrated Product Teams.
Extended Phase I from 9 months to 12 months.
Affirms that the Navy wants a two shipyard program for DD
21 series production.
All industry feedback to date is positive, including comments
received during a day long industry brief on February 27, 1998. More
than 200 industry and government representatives attended the RFP
review. The Navy expects at least two bids; however, the RFP puts
industry on notice that if only one proposal is received, the Navy has
a right to negotiate with that offeror to explore whether that offer
contains a sufficient level of competition. Two or more bids will
ensure intense competition and innovation for DD 21.
DD 21 was not conceived as a ``business as usual'' ship, and its
development will not be executed in a ``business as usual'' manner. All
of America's shipyards have innovative ideas that could be used in DD
21. Some U.S. shipyards are world leaders in ship signature control,
others have been setting new technical standards in automated design
and construction of Navy ships, some have been able to compete in the
commercial shipbuilding market by using advanced processes, while
others are acknowledged leaders in ship systems integration. Any of
these shipyards, when teamed with a capable combat systems or C4ISR
integrator will be able to provide the high degree of innovation the
Navy needs to build and DD 21 within its aggressive cost and
performance envelopes.
As always, the Department of Justice remains free at any time to
take action against the team as it deems appropriate. The Navy
considers it in the best interest of any given shipyard to be on as
many DD 21 teams as possible, thus increasing the chances that the yard
will be on the ``winning team'' that designs and builds 32 DD 21 ships
over the next 15 years.
The Navy is committed to ensuring innovation through competition on
DD 21. Only through aggressive competition in all aspects of ship
design will the challenging cost and performance requirements set by
JCS be met. Competition for ideas must occur at both the shipyard and
integration levels throughout the early phases of DD 21 development.
CG 47 Upgrades
Question. What is the scope of the work to be done on each ship and
what is the cost per ship? What shipyard or shipyards will be doing
this work?
Answer. The ultimate goal of the Cruiser Conversion Plan is to
modernize all 22 Baseline 2, 3, and 4 Aegis cruisers (CGs 52-73)
eventually. Upgrades include significant improvements to the command
and control systems for theater air warfare; upgrades in computer
equipment and programs; installation of extended range guided munitions
guns; and installation of modernized machinery control systems and
other ``Smart Ship'' technology.
After conversion, each Aegis cruiser will be Area TBMD and Land
Attack capable. Of those ships, 12 will have an AADC capability
required to manage joint integrated air defense in the 21st Century.
Seven of the cruisers (CGs 52-58) will be fitted with a fully
distributed, COTS based computer system architecture for the
introduction of Theater-Wide TBMD.
Conversions will require from 20 weeks to a maximum of ten months.
Shipyards capable of conducting cruiser Regular Overhauls could perform
the cruiser conversion work. This plan will generate significant
industrial work across a variety of shipyard trades. Equipment
procurement and installation costs are estimated at approximately $90
million per ship.
Seawolf Cost Cap
Question. What is the Navy's current plan on dealing with the
SEAWOLF cost cap, and are there any outstanding issues that the
Congress needs to address?
Answer. The Navy continues to execute the SEAWOLF program within
the limitations of the cost cap. The Navy does not intend to pursue
cost cap issues with Congress this year.
Arsenal Ship Lessons Learned
Question. The Navy has prepared a ``lessons learned'' document
following the cancellation of the Arsenal Ship. It is my understanding
that one of the lessons learned was that having multiple teams in which
no one team included both of the surface combatant yards was a good
thing. Do you intend to apply this important lesson to the DD 21
teaming arrangement between Ingalls and Bath Iron Works?
Answer. The Arsenal Ship report did not include such a
recommendation. The Arsenal Ship report you discussed has documented
the important lessons learned from that program. One important lesson
learned was for the Government to allow winning teams to ``pick up''
members of losing teams in order to incorporate their good ideas into
the winning team's proposal. This concept will be used during the DD 21
development process to ensure that the very best ideas available
throughout industry will be available for use by the winning DD 21
team. It is the Navy's expectation that both Bath Iron Works and
Ingalls Shipbuilding will be active participants in DD 21 competition,
and that both shipyards will being many new and innovative ideas to the
table regardless of any specific business arrangements that they may
have negotiated with other members of industry.
Surface Fire Capacity
Question. Mr. Douglass, when is the Navy going to choose between
NTACMS or the Land Attack Standard Missile? Why did you have to do a
panel to make this decision?
Answer. The Navy chartered an analysis of alternative missile
systems to support a decision on a Land Attack Missile in early-mid
1998. A panel of recently retired Navy Admirals and Army and Marine
Corps Generals was used to determine whether the analysis provided
sufficient foundation for selecting between alternative missile systems
and to make recommendations for additional study that may be required
to support the decision. The panel has provided its recommendations and
a decision is expected to be made by the end of April.
Question. How much in additional funds would be required to R&D
both programs?
Answer. An additional $230-250 million would be required to
complete R&D on both programs.
Mine Warfare
Question. I understand that Secretary Cohen was concerned about the
Navy's mine warfare program. Are you still confident that mine warfare
improvements are fully funded and moving forward at a vigorous pace?
Answer. The Navy continues to ensure sufficient resources are
applied to maintain a fully ready and sustainable dedicated Mine
Countermeasures (MCM) capability while vigorously pursuing the
introduction of an organic capability to the fleet. The Navy's MCM
vision, first articulated clearly in 1995 by the CNO, addressed the
need to develop an organic MCM capability for the Joint Task Forces to
carryout all phases of mine countermeasures in a timely fashion. This
robust organic MCM capability will allow a reduction to the dedicated
capabilities of the Navy's current MCM forces. The vision has been
reiterated in the third edition of the Navy's Mine Warfare Plan and in
all of the subsequent annual certifications signed by the Under
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) and forwarded to
Congress. The fiscal year 1999 Mine Warfare Certification Package,
currently en route to Congress, clearly demonstrates the Navy's
continuing commitment to vigorous pursuit of this vision.
Trident Conversion
Question. I have heard of a concept to convert four Tridents from a
strategic role to a more conventional role.
Is there funding in the budget for it?
Answer. The Trident conversion (SSGN) concept is just that, a
concept and not a program. No funds have been applied to it.
Question. If it is not budgeted, how much money would it take to
study the viability of the concept?
Answer. Approximately $2 million would be required to validate a
concept design.
Question. What amount of funding would be needed this year to
actually begin to implement the program?
Answer. No funding would be needed to implement the program.
Tactical Tomahawk Missile
Question. I've heard your initiative to pursue a Tactical Tomahawk
program. Is the Navy still interested? What are the advantages?
Answer. Yes. Tactical Tomahawk is being pursued because it is more
capable and affordable than the current Block III missile. The
Satellite Data Link, Anti-Jam GPS, in-flight re-targeting, and launch
platform mission planning all contribute to greater accuracy and
operational flexibility and responsiveness. Tactical Tomahawk meets or
exceeds all performance requirements, including range, accuracy,
reliability, and survivability as identified in the current Operational
Requirements Document.
Question. What is the current status?
Answer. The Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) authorizing
transition to Tactical Tomahawk was signed March 2, 1998. The
reprogramming request to fund the research and development effort was
delivered to the Congressional Committee Chairmen the first week of
March. Once the funding is authorized, Tactical Tomahawk will become a
program with an Initial Operating Capability of fiscal year 2003.
Question. We've been expecting it, when can we see it?
Answer. The reprogramming request was delivered to the Committee
Chairmen the first week of March.
E-2C Aircraft Multiyear Procurement
Question. I understand that the E-2C multiyear procurement will
save in excess of ten percent vs. continuing with annual procurements.
Is this true and why is the E-2C multiyear good for DoD?
Answer. The E-2C multiyear procurement will save in excess of ten
percent versus continuing with annual procurements. The Navy estimates
a savings of approximately 14 percent which equates to $204 million
over a six-year annual budget. The E-2C is an ideal candidate for a
multiyear procurement. The airframe has been in production since the
mid 1960's and the configuration will be stable throughout the five
year program. These factors substantially reduce the risk associated
with a multiyear procurement. The E-2C multiyear is very good for the
Navy and DoD because the $204 million saved allows the Navy and DoD to
reapply resources towards modernization without any increase in
obligation authority.
Question. Since the advance procurement funding ($19 million)
contained in the 1998 budget supports the fiscal year 1999 aircraft
which are the first year of the multiyear program, would granting
approval to use these funds this April towards the multiyear (vs. the
existing annual plan) be beneficial to the Navy?
Answer. The use of the $19 million fiscal year 1998 Advance
Procurement (AP) is not a requirement for the fiscal year 1999
multiyear procurement. The Navy has submitted a multiyear procurement
program for the E-2C Hawkeye in the fiscal year 1999 President's
Budget. The five-year, 21 aircraft program is projected to save the
Navy approximately 14 percent ($204 million) vs. continuing to purchase
the 21 aircraft over the next six years.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr.
Visclosky. Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the answers
thereto follow:]
Increased Use of Multiyear Contracts
Question. The Department of the Navy budget request for fiscal year
1999 requests authority for new multiyear procurement programs and also
continues existing multiyear programs. The effect of the fiscal year
1999 budget, if approved by Congress, would be to have DDG-51 ships,
AV-8B aircraft, E-2C aircraft, T-45 trainer aircraft, CH-60
helicopters, the Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement, and Javelin anti-
tank missiles purchased under multiyear contracts. The Navy is also
closely examining the feasibility of multiyear procurements for V-22,
F/A-18E/F aircraft, P-3 aircraft modifications, and LPD-17 ships in
future years. Secretary Douglass, please describe the Navy's new
strategy of aggressively pursuing multiyear procurement programs.
Answer. By capitalizing on the increased stability in our
modernization accounts, we can accelerate procurement of crucial
systems and reduce unit costs, increasing our modernization potential
by billions of dollars (including existing multiyear contracts) which
this approach saves.
Question. Defense outyear budget projections are often optimistic,
and usually materialize into actual programs at much lower funding
levels. What is the risk that the Navy will start a number of multiyear
programs that it cannot finish?
Answer. The stability of funding and the stability of the
requirement was carefully evaluated in each of our fiscal year 1999
multiyear proposals and was rated low risk. What little risk there is
will be further mitigated through appropriate use of variation in
quantity liability limitation contract clauses.
Question. For each of the programs in the 1999 budget for multiyear
procurement please tell us: What is the ``up-front'' investment cost?
What are the savings? What is the percentage of savings resulting
solely from multiyear procurement?
Answer.
e-2c
--Additional up-front investment: fiscal year 1999 $139.3 million,
fiscal year 2000 $109.2 million.
--Savings: fiscal year 2001-fiscal year 2003 $355.1 million (net
fiscal year 1999-fiscal year 2003 $106.5 million).
--Percentage savings multiyear alone: 8.3%.
--Net savings multiyear plus acceleration: $204 million, or 14.4%.
t-45ts
--Additional up-front investment: fiscal year 1999 $41.2 million,
fiscal year 2000 $14.2 million.
--Savings: fiscal year 2001-fiscal year 2003 $102.9 million (net
fiscal year 1999-fiscal year 2003 $47.4 million).
--Percentage savings multiyear alone: 5.2%.
--Net savings multiyear plus acceleration: $246 million, or 18.5%.
mtvr
--Additional up-front investment: None.
--Savings: fiscal year 1999-fiscal year 2003 $86.1 million.
--Percentage savings multiyear alone: 7.4%.
--Net savings multiyear plus acceleration: Not applicable, pursued
as multiyear from beginning.
Question. Under what conditions and when would the Navy pursue
multiyear procurement for F/A-18E/F aircraft, V-22 aircraft, or LPD-17
ships?
Answer. Future multiyear procurement candidates will be evaluated
in terms of expected benefit (substantial economic and/or national
security benefit), requirement stability, funding stability, program
maturity and configuration stability, cost confidence, and contractor
confidence. Those which offer substantial benefit at acceptable risk
will be proposed for multiyear procurement.
It is important to note, however, that most of the programs
mentioned have potential for large savings through the use of multiyear
contracts. In the case of the F/A-18E/F, the outyear budget has been
constructed on the assumption that multiyear contracting will be
utilized.
Use of multiyear procurement for the V-22 is dependent upon the
maturity of the aircraft (concurrence with R&D), stability of
configuration, and degree of cost confidence (ability to negotiate a
fixed-price type contract). The Navy is examining MYP options involving
a full rate production decision as early as fiscal year 2001 with
advanced procurement in fiscal year 2000.
In addition, the Department of the Navy is also examining multiyear
procurement for the LPD 17 class, and will balance the advantages of a
multiyear program against the projected program savings. The LPD 17 is
the replacement for four aging class of ships (LST, LKA, LSD 36, LPD 4)
built between 1965 and 1973. When construction is complete, the 12
ships will allow the DoN to meet both our forward presence requirement
for Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) and the fiscally constrained
warfighting goal of 2.5 MEBs of lift. Additionally, the LPD 17 class
will eliminate our reliance on mothballed ships presently needed to
meet our 2.5 MEB lift goal.
Current procurement and commissioning profiles:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 Tot
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LPD 17s Funded....................... 1 0 0 1 2 2 2 2 2 ... ... ... ... ... 12
LPD 17s Commissioned................. ... ... ... ... ... ... 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 12
Total in Inventory................... ... ... ... ... ... ... 1 2 3 5 7 9 11 12 12
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SSN-21 Seawolf Submarine Performance
Question. The Navy has recently analyzed the results of the Pre-
Post Shakedown acoustic sea trials for the first SSN-21 SEAWOLF
submarine. The submarine is not in a final configuration, some results
are estimates and are subject to change in later tests. But they
indicate in some areas the ship may not meet its quieting goals. The
information is not ready for formal transmission to the Congress, but
since we are in a closed session today this is a good opportunity for
Members to hear first hand about the issues. What does this mean
tactically and operationally to a SEAWOLF submarine commander in
combat?
Answer. SEAWOLF's slow speed acoustic characteristics will meet or
exceed the Program's goals. Her projected high speed acoustic
characteristics will be close to the Program's goals. The tactical
significance of her predicted high speed signature is being evaluated.
The most significant potential impact is that SEAWOLF's secure speed
will be slightly slower than originally planned, although still much
higher than the SSN 688I against the most demanding threat.
Question. In ``ballpark'' terms, what could it cost in the future
if the Navy elected to redesign the SEAWOLF's propulsor to meet low
frequency design objectives?
Answer. Depending on the approach, the cost to redesign and replace
all three SEAWOLF propulsors would be approximately $140 million. The
estimate is based on extensive NSSN propulsor testing to date at Lake
Pend Oreille, Idaho, on our unmanned LSV 1. A follow on acoustic trial
is scheduled to be conducted this spring to obtain additional data.
This data will be used for determining the best technical course of
action.
Question. There have been negative press articles on issues other
than acoustics, such as inability to fire weapons at high speed. What
technical problems are being found in SEAWOLF during testing and what
are your plans to fix them?
Answer. The press articles have focused on torpedo issues from
SEAWOLF's Naval Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) trial in June
of 1997. The most significant findings of the INSURV trial were weapon
launch issues. Fixes for all these issues are either installed or in
progress:
--Salvo launch. Salvo launch was not achievable on the trial.
Replacement of the gaskets on all 8 torpedo tube slide valves solved
this issue. Successful retest was accomplished at sea in early February
1998.
--Torpedo tube reload time was not within specifications. This is
principally due to slow tube flood and drain times. The flood times
have been improved with a software revision. The drain times are in the
process of being improved.
--High Speed Weapons Launch. The article in Defense Week refers to
SEAWOLF's inability to open her torpedo tube shutter doors and ejection
pump inlet doors while at flank speed. The torpedo tube shutter doors
are portals through which weapons are launched from the submarine. The
ejection pump inlet doors allow seawater to enter the submarine to be
used in launching a weapon. The cause is hydrodynamic forces generated
by SEAWOLF's high flank speed. An engineering solution has been
identified and will be tested at sea this spring.
Additionally, while testing SEAWOLF's ability to launch weapons at
higher ship speeds, the exercise weapons and the guidance wire
dispenser sustained damage during moderate speed launches. The ship
continued the test program, successfully completing all low to moderate
speed launches. However, due to the exercise weapons damage, higher
speed launches were not attempted during this test phase and will be
scheduled at a later date. The initial indication is that SEAWOLF's
Large Diameter Tubes and Turbine Ejection Pump configuration are
causing the exercise weapons to drift backward into the tube at launch
initiation, with sufficient force to cause damage above moderate ship
speeds. A team of experts is evaluating root causes, design
modifications for corrective action, and an implementation plan to test
and install these corrective actions during the shakedown period, which
continues through the summer.
Question. Mr. Douglass, please describe Navy plans to perform a
``shock test'' on SEAWOLF. What is a shock test, how much does the
SEAWOLF shock test cost, and when is it budgeted?
Answer. $47.45 million has been budgeted in fiscal year 1999-fiscal
year 2001 to conduct the full ship shock test. Both law and DoD
regulations require the conduct of survivability testing of major
systems prior to full rate production. Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation and the Navy will shock test SEAWOLF in fiscal year 2000.
The break out of costs is as follows (RDT&E):
[Dollars in millions]
Fiscal year 1999.................................................. 5.05
Fiscal year 2000.................................................. 41.0
Fiscal year 2001.................................................. 1.4
Question. For the record, please answer each question individually.
Is the cost worth the benefit, given that there are only 3 ships in
the class?
Answer. It is important to shock test the USS SEAWOLF. The SEAWOLF
class represents the first major evolution in submarine technology in
the past twenty years. The information gained from shock testing can be
backfit into the SEAWOLF class and translated to ongoing design and
future construction of the NSSN. There has been concern that the
expense involved in shock testing is great and the benefit may not be
seen with a three ship class. The Navy believes it is important to
fully test the design of the SEAWOLF class in its final warfighting
configuration because the benefits can be applied not only to the three
SEAWOLF submarines, but to the NSSN as well.
Question. If we found structural problems with the hull at this
point, could anything different be done to the submarines of which ones
already built and the other two are well into construction?
Answer. If we found structural problems with the hull, we would
backfit modifications to correct them. There is no reason to believe
there are any structural problems with the hull.
Question. Can SEAWOLF be tested to the design limit?
Answer. No. The full ship shock test will subject the ship to 1/2
the design limit. Separately, the program is testing ship components to
their design limit under the component shock qualification program.
Question. The Secretary of Defense's Director of Operational Test
and Evaluation recently provided a report to Congress which made the
following observation: The final planned shot at 2/3 design level shock
factor for the Coastal Minehunter Ship (MHC 51) was canceled because of
the extent of cumulative structural damage incurred on the fifth and
earlier shots. How may cumulative shock tests are contemplated for
SEAWOLF and what is the risk of significant damage to the ship?
Answer. Five shots are scheduled for the full ship shock test.
These loads will not risk significant damage to the ship.
Ship Self Defense System
Question. The Committee has been concerned for a number of years
about Navy ship self defense programs. A key program is the Ship Self
Defense System, an upgrade to the short range air defense systems of
aircraft carriers and amphibious ships, which uses computers to
integrate the sensors on ships (such as radars) with weapons (guns and
missiles) to shoot down incoming anti-ship cruise missiles.
The Secretary of Defense's Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation recently submitted a report to Congress which described
testing done by the Navy last summer on the Ship Self Defense System
aboard an amphibious assault ship used to bring Marines into combat:
18 of 19 anti-ship cruise missile targets in quick
reaction raids engaged in less than the required 2 seconds (.4 second
average).
Correct engagement decision in 99 percent of subsonic
anti-ship cruise missile presentations.
Appropriate tactical engagement sequences in 94 percent of
the time.
Demonstrated engagement by at least one defending system
of 99 percent (160 of 162) of the targets.
Correct decision in 32 of 35 (91 percent) of friendly
aircraft presentations. In 3 cases, the operator manually entered the
wrong identification for friendly aircraft, although SSDS provided
correct identification.
There were no hardware failures.
. . . marks a major improvement in the self-defense
capability of amphibious warfare ships against air threats, and
justifies acquisition.
Mr. Douglas, based on the results of these tests, how good is the
Ship Self Defense System?
Answer. SSDS MK-1 is an outstanding system. The commercial off the
shelf, open architecture technology incorporated into the SSDS MK-1
system to provide sensor fusion and automatic anti-air defense
detection through engagement is truly revolutionary.
Question. Last year, the Committee brought to your attention
anomalies in your budget request that upon reflection the CNO, Admiral
Pilling, and you told us needed to be fixed. The Ship Self Defense
System was one of those items, so our committee provided additional
funds last year. Please explain why the Navy has requested procurement
funding for only 2 SSDS systems in fiscal year 1999, compared to your
plan last year to purchase 5 systems in 1999.
Answer. The unit cost figures provided in the fiscal year 1998
President's Budget represented the best available estimates based on
the SSDS MK-1 Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis. Subsequent
to the LSD 41 system evaluation it was determined that additional
equipment was required to maximize system performance. Specifically, an
additional $1.9 million was required to incorporate a command table,
updated Interrogation Friend or Foe (IFF) system, and large screen
tactical display to allow the ship's commanding officer and tactical
action officer to employ the system properly. Also, Navy required $4.8
million of additional installation funding to install the 2 systems
Congress added to the fiscal year 1998 President's Budget.
Procurement funding in the fiscal year 1999 Budget request is a 25%
increase over the fiscal 1998 Budget (fiscal year 1998 = $17.5 million,
fiscal year 1999 = $22.9 million). The number of planned installations
reflects actual unit cost of $6.0M vice fiscal year 1998 President's
Budget estimated cost of $3.2 million.
Question. Admiral Lautenbacher, what now justifies a 60 percent
reduction in SSDS funding in fiscal year 1999 (two ship installations
rather than five)?
Answer. There is no reduction in SSDS funding in fiscal year 1999.
Navy requirements for Maritime Force Protection of surface ships are
contained in the Ship Class Anti-Air Warfare Self Defense CAPSTONE
Requirements Document which was approved by the Chief of Naval
Operations in February 1996. This document specified the ship self
defense anti-air warfare contribution for each ship type and spells out
the raid size, density, and required Probability of Raid Annihilation
(PRA) for battle force and amphibious ready group ships. Furthermore,
it identifies the operational environments that may be encountered in
the post Cold War era.
Procurement funding in the fiscal year 1999 Budget request is a 24%
increase over the fiscal year 1998 Budget (fiscal year 1998 = $17.5
million, fiscal year 1999 = $22.9 million). The number of planned
installations reflects actual unit cost of $6.0 million vice fiscal
year 1998 President's Budget estimated cost of $3.2 million. Navy
utilizes a Combat Systems approach to validate each ship class
performance against this Capstone requirement. All systems in the
detection through engage sequence are modeled against the validated
Defense Intelligence Agency threats. No one system is good enough, by
itself, to meet the Capstone performance requirements. For the LSD-41
class, the SSDS installation plan has been aligned with the fielding
plan for the other major upgrades planned for the ship--most notable
the RAM weapon system. Accelerating SSDS without coordinating the
fielding plan with other required upgrades would do little to improve
the ship's performance against the predominant anti-ship cruise missile
threat.
Question. What justifies a 38 percent reduction in SSDS ship
installations between fiscal years 1999 to 2002 (18 ship installations
rather than 29)?
Answer. Navy's fiscal year 1999-2002 fielding plan represents a
balanced approach to fielding maritime force protection capability
rather than focusing on individual system procurement plans. As stated
previously, Navy utilizes a combat systems approach to validate each
ship class' performance against this Capstone requirement. All systems
in the detection through engage sequence are modeled against the
validated Defense Intelligence Agency threats. No one system is good
enough, by itself, to meet the Capstone performance requirements. The
SSDS Fielding plan is indicative of this balanced approach to maritime
force protection. The reduction is the result of the per unit cost
increases previously discussed.
Question. Mr. Douglass, your statement indicates that the Navy's
R&D budget is now $250 million higher than it was for fiscal year 1999
in the last budget. Why couldn't you find $18 million for installation
of potentially life saving equipment on combat ships?
Answer. As with Maritime Force Protection, the fiscal year 1999
President's Budget strikes a balance across all warfare areas to
deliver the capable Navy this nation needs and Congress demands.
Fielding the total fleet capability is our goal. The increase in the
Navy Research and Development accounts is required to support all
warfighting requirements.
Navy's fiscal year 1999-2002 fielding plan represents a balanced
approach to fielding maritime force protection capability rather than
focusing on individual system procurement plans. As stated previously,
Navy utilizes a combat systems approach to validate each ship class's
performance against this Capstone requirement. All systems in the
detect through engage sequence are modeled against the validated
Defense Intelligence Agency threats. No one system is good enough, by
itself, to meet the Capstone performance requirements. The SSDS
fielding plan is indicative of this balanced approach to maritime force
protection.
F/A-18E/F Aircraft Performance (Wing Drop)
Question. There have been a number of negative press reports lately
concerning technical problems in the development of the F/A-18E/F
aircraft. These problems are occurring in a program which is on
schedule and under cost. Since we are in a closed session, we can
discuss these technical problems in detail.
What are the implications for:
The flying quality/handling of the aircraft?
Range and bring-back payload?
Range cross section signature?
Meeting development program cost and schedule goals?
Answer. We have been able to correct wing drop using several
technical solutions with no noticeable flying qualities/handling
implications. The porous fairing appears to be the most promising
solution at this time. The porous fairing posed no impact to bring back
payload for the F/A-18E/F and a slight decrease in range. Initial
flight test data shows the range decrease to be less than 10 nautical
miles.
New Technology data has been obtained at the component level and
porous fairing has virtually no impact on the aircraft radar cross
section.
The Integrated Test Team is working the fine details of a
productionized version of the wing fold fairing, e.g., moldline,
fastener heads and contour. There are no anticipated schedule or cost
changes.
Question. A recent draft GAO report discusses other technical
problems with the F/A-18E/F involving weapons separation, engine
performance, and survivability features of the aircraft. In your view,
are there any other problems considered to be technical ``show-
stoppers'' in the F/A-18E/F development program?
Answer. The Integrated Test Team has identified and solved numerous
technical problems since testing began on the F/A-18E/F, in 1996. At
this stage of maturity in a testing program, most technical problems of
the magnitude to be ``show-stoppers'' should have been identified. I
see nothing at this point which I would consider a technical, schedule
or cost ``show-stopper''. The F/A-18E/F wing drop was never considered
a ``show-stopper''.
F/A-18E/F Aircraft Budget
Question. The fiscal year 1999 budget requests $2.9 billion to
purchase 30 F/A-18 E/F aircraft, an increase of ten aircraft from the
1998 appropriated level (20 aircraft). Mr. Douglass, what is the status
of the F/A-18E/F development program?
Answer. The F/A-18E/F Super Hornet is a textbook model of how a
successful acquisition program should be run. The program is 95 percent
complete after six years and is on cost, on schedule and meeting or
exceeding technical requirements. This Program Team is obviously doing
things right. At present, the Cost Performance Indices are 100.9
percent and 93.1 percent for the airframe and engine manufacturers,
respectively. Corresponding Schedule Performance Indices are 99.3
percent and 99.2 percent. With so little of the Engineering and
Manufacturing Development (E&MD) program remaining, I am confident we
will continue to see these impressive numbers through the completion of
E&MD.
Question. You have not yet approved low rate production of the Lot
II (fiscal year 1998) aircraft, which otherwise would have been
accomplished last fall, due to the wing drop issue. When is the low
rate production decision now planned, and what does this mean to the
program schedule?
Answer. The low rate production decision will occur in the late-
March/early April 1998 timeframe. Contractual coverage with advanced
procurement funds for Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) II aircraft is
adequate through May 1998. The airframe contractor is protecting
schedule on LRIP III with company funds.
Question. Our nation sells F/A-18s to a number of foreign
countries. Please explain what impact the recent Asian financial crisis
has had on F/A-18 FMS sales, and implications for the cost of the U.S.
production program.
Answer. The Government of Thailand reconsidered its purchase of
eight F/A-18C/D aircraft. This was obviously tied to the Asian
financial situation. The U.S. government is working with Thailand to
identify other potential customers for these aircraft. Several
countries are currently in the market for new fighter aircraft which
have expressed interest in the F/A-18 aircraft. We are hopeful that we
can match up the Thailand aircraft with one of these emerging
customers.
In the interim, On April 3, 1998, the U.S. Government received
confirmation from the Thais to:
1. Convert the eight aircraft from a Thai configuration to a
U.S. configuration;
2. Restructure the delivery schedule;
3. Sell appropriate items to other, interested buyers;
4. Defer delivery of additional F/A-18 related components to
Thailand; and
5. Terminate other items to allow time to achieve a
comprehensive solution without exposing the Thai program to
further financial liability.
Question. The total F/A-18E/F buy has been reduced from 1,000 to
548 aircraft, and the Navy now plans to build a higher proportion of
``F'' model aircraft than before. Please explain these changes.
Answer. The fiscal year 1999 budget reflects a QDR revised
procurement objective of 548 aircraft with a mix (314E/234F) that
reflects a roughly proportional reduction from the (608E/392F) mix in
fiscal year 1998 budget. The mix of E/Fs included in the current FYDP
supports the Navy's transition plan of F-14s into F/A-18Fs and F/A-18A/
Cs into F/A-18Es. In the fiscal year 2000 budget development process,
the Navy is refining the optimum outyear mix of E/Fs to meet force
structure and mission requirements.
Question. Aircraft weight affects range, speed, payload, and
carrier recovery payload. How is the F/A-18E/F doing in regard to its
weight goals?
Answer. The aircraft is approximately 450 pounds under
specification weight.
Question. Fiscal year 1999 funds the third production lot of F/A-
18E/F aircraft. Is all support equipment which is necessary to
completely stand up the first F/A-18E/F squadron at Initial Operational
Capability (IOC) fully funded? If not, how much additional funds in
fiscal year 1999 would be needed to rectify that problem?
Answer. Support equipment necessary to completely stand up the
first F/A-18E/F squadron at IOC is fully funded. No additional funds in
fiscal year 1999 will be required.
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
Question. The fiscal year 1999 budget requests $920 million in the
Navy and Air Force to continue the Joint Strike Fighter concept
demonstration phase. The total R&D cost of the JSF is estimated to be
$2.3 billion. What significant events occurred during the past year,
and what significant events are scheduled in 1998 and 1999?
Answer. In fiscal year 1997, the following significant events
occurred:
Awarded contracts to Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Pratt
and Whitney for a multiyear $2.2 billion competitive Concept
Demonstration Program (CDP).
Successfully completed initial technical baseline and
design reviews with Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Pratt and Whitney, and
General Electric.
Numerous Technology Maturation efforts completed critical
design reviews.
The Services completed the second iteration of the
requirements.
Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands signed agreements to
join the program with a focus on requirements validation.
In fiscal year 1998, the following significant events occurred:
The first engine core assembled at Pratt and Whitney in
February 1998 (engine comprised of core, turbine, and fan).
Canada formally joined the program, focusing on
acquisition processes and the basic JSF design concept development.
In fiscal year 1998, the following significant events are scheduled
to occur:
First engine to test in early summer of 1998.
Final design reviews for the Boeing and Lockheed Martin
Concept Demonstrator Aircraft (CDA) in summer 1998.
Third iteration of the requirements completes in August
1998.
In fiscal year 1999, the following significant events are scheduled
to occur:
Rollouts of the primes' Concept Demonstrator Aircraft;
ground testing begins preparatory to first flights in 2000.
The Services complete the JSF Joint Operational
Requirements Document in December 1999.
About half of the ongoing technology maturation
demonstrations are completed.
Request to begin negotiation with the United Kingdom for
cooperative partnership in Engineering and Manufacturing Development.
Question. DoD expects foreign countries to participate in the Joint
Strike Fighter program, and to contribute significant amounts to its
cost: United Kingdom ($200 million), Denmark and Norway ($32 million),
and Canada ($11 million). What do these countries pay for, and what do
they get? What other countries are being invited to participate in the
program?
Answer. The United Kingdom is a Collaborative Partner; fully
integrated and participates in all aspects of the program; and has
influenced the design of the aircraft. Denmark, Norway, and the
Netherlands are Associate Partners to assist them in performing
requirements validation analyses, incorporate them in modeling and
simulation efforts; very limited, if any, influence on JSF
requirements. Canada is involved as an Informed Partner; they
participate in the acquisition process in order to understand the
design concept; they cannot influence requirements.
Question. The Joint Strike Fighter will be very stealthy in terms
of reduced radar signature. How does DoD plan to export this
technology, which is of the quality achieved by the B-2 and F-22
aircraft?
Answer. The JSF program is in the process of developing the
strategy for Engineering and Manufacturing Development participation
and follow-on production, and will appropriately address these issues
as decisions are made.
Question. This is the first year that DoD has requested no funds in
the DARPA line to support the Joint Strike Fighter program. Please
explain what DARPA has contributed so far, and why it no longer has a
role.
Answer. Fiscal year 1995 legislation merged the DARPA CALF/ASTOVL
program with the then-JAST Program. In February 1996 USD(A&T) approved
DARPA's request to ``fade-out'' of the program effective in fiscal year
1998. DARPA's position was that development under the JSF Program has
progressed to the point where continued DARPA participation would be
outside the bounds of that organization's charter. DARPA contributed
$122 million (in then-year dollars) from fiscal year 1996-fiscal year
1998.
V-22 Osprey Program
Question. The fiscal year 1999 budget requests $355 million for
continued testing and $692 million for procurement of seven V-22
aircraft. Mr. Douglass, your statement says that the V-22 test program
is several months behind schedule. This and other factors has lead to
cost growth in the $6.9 billion R&D program, which is estimated to be
$130 million.
Last year, the Navy forecast building 473 V-22s for $34 billion
(about $73 million each) while the current estimate is 408 V-22s for
$26 billion (about $64 million each). So while we have a ``blip'' on
the R&D side, there are major savings on the production side--as the
Committee has been saying for a number of years. Please explain these
changes.
Answer. The decrease in the Navy procurement estimate reflects
savings as a result of accelerated production rates (about $1.5
billion), lower total aircraft quantities ($3.0 billion), reduced
support costs ($3.0 billion) inflation/economic adjustments ($0.7
billion), and revised flyaway estimates ($0.2 billion).
Question. Excessive downward ``propwash'' on deploying troops
remains a challenging technical issue. Please explain what is being
done to address it.
Answer. A quantitative assessment (collection of flow data) of the
V-22 proprotor downwash was completed in December 1997. Initial
analysis of the data shows that the V-22's downwash is comparable to
that of helicopters. The velocity profile data will be utilized in
developing acceptable operational procedures for aircrew and personnel
working near the airplane. It is not viewed as a problem.
Question. A recent GAO audit indicates that the Navy has not
included a ground collision avoidance and warning system with voice
warning on V-22 production aircraft. Please explain your rational for
deleting this equipment. Could such a capability be included in the
aircraft if Congress were to provide additional funds in fiscal year
1999?
Answer. The equipment was not deleted. A Ground Proximity Warning
System (GPWS) is not presently available for integration on the V-22.
Forms of GPWS exist for helicopters and fixed wing aircraft, but a
system for a tiltrotor has not yet been developed. Non-recurring
development and integration is projected to be a two-plus year effort
and is estimated to cost approximately $18 million. Based on current
planning (fiscal year 2000 start), GPWS integration is planned for
fiscal year 2001. If Congress provided funds in fiscal year 1999, GPWS
could be added to the fiscal year 2000 production aircraft.
Question.Is all support equipment necessary to completely stand up
the first V-22 squadron at Initial Operational Capability (IOC) fully
funded?--if not, how much additional funding would be needed in fiscal
year 1999 to rectify this problem?
Answer. The V-22 suppport plan is to provide O-level capability by
IOC in fiscal year 2001 and full I-level capability by 2003. All known
O-level requirements are funded at this time. I-level requirements will
be better defined as in the fiscal year 2000 budget development
process.
Question. Is the aircraft meeting its weight projections?
Answer. Yes, the MV-22 is currently 722 pounds under specification
weight.
LPD-17 Amphibious Transport Dock Ship
Question. The LPD-17 class of 12 ships allows the Navy to retire 41
current ships and reduce manpower by 7,800. Congress provided $100
million in fiscal year 1998 for advance procurement for the second LPD-
17 ship, and the 1999 budget requests $628.8 million to complete its
construction.
Mr. Douglass, what is the status of the LPD 17 program?
Answer. A contract for detailed design and construction was awarded
on December 17, 1996, to an alliance led by Avondale Industries. The
alliance includes Bath Iron Works, Hughes Aircraft Corp., Sperry
Marine, Lucent Technologies, and Intergraph. The losing bidder, Ingalls
Shipbuilding, contested the award. Since we briefed you last year, the
General Accounting Office upheld the Navy's decision to award the lead
ship contract to Avondale Industries, Inc. and performance under the
contract resumed in April 1997. Avondale will build eight LPD 17s. Bath
Iron Works will build four LPD 17s. In June 1997, the Integrated
Product and Process Development Team was established at Avondale with
the program manager, most of the program office, and many functional
experts collocated on-site in New Orleans, LA. LPD 17 is a solid
program on the forefront of acquisition reform, is an excellent low
risk design, and is making excellent progress toward the urgent
requirement to replace aging amphibious ships in the Fleet.
Current procurement and commissioning profiles are:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 Tot
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LPD 17s Funded....................... 1 0 0 1 2 2 2 2 2 ... ... ... ... ... 12
LPD 17s Commissioned................. ... ... ... ... ... ... 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 12
Total in Inventory................... ... ... ... ... ... ... 1 2 3 5 7 9 11 12 12
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question.What consideration are you giving to multiyear procurement
for future LPD 17 ships?
Answer. The Department of the Navy will examine a multiyear
procurement for 10 of the 12 LPD 17 class ships funded in fiscal year
2000 through fiscal year 2004. The LPD 17 is the replacement for four
aging classes of ships (LST, LKA, LSD 36, LPD 4) built between 1965 and
1973. When construction is complete, the 12 ships will allow the DON to
meet both our forward presence requirement for Amphibious Ready Groups
(ARGs) and the fiscally constrained warfighting goal of 2.5 MEBs of
lift. Additionally, the LPD 17 class will eliminate our reliance on
mothballed ships presently needed to meet our 2.5 MEB lift goal.
Question. The Navy recently announced its decision to remove the
LPD-17's main self defense weapon for protection against anti-ship
cruise missiles (the Enhanced Sea Sparrow Missile). Please explain your
rationale.
Answer. Navy's individual ships class Maritime Force Protection
planning is based on providing the most cost-effective force protection
possible, consistent with available funding, force wide. Furthermore,
all ship classes will receive or retain a level of force protection
consistent with their expected service life and potential exposure to
operational threat environments.
To ensure appropriate Maritime Force Protection capability across
the battle force, the same rigor used to select Anti-Air Warfare self
defense configuration for DDG-51 Flight IIA ships was applied to ships
with primary missions other than air defense, like the LPD-17. When
operating independently, LPD-17 will be as capable as any other ship to
deal with expected threat levels in the normal operating environment.
To accomplish this in the LPD-17 design, Navy has invested heavily
in the benefits of RCS reduction combined with softkill (NULKA)
capability; this combination provides a fundamental shift in
warfighting philosophy for this amphibious ship class. In addition, RAM
hardkill provides the firepower and performance necessary to meet Navy
Capstone requirements and Congressional guidance against the validated
threat. The Anti-Air Warfare combat system configuration for the LPD-17
class, selected after careful analysis, meets all threats through 2012
with growth potential provide to meet far term threats when defined.
Question. The Navy has elected to also remove the Vertical Launch
System from the ship, which would have been necessary for launching the
ESSM missile but which would have provided the Marines with the
capability to launch land-attack missiles (such as ATACMS) in direct
support of Marine amphibious assault combat operations. What is the
cost to put a Vertical Launch System on an LPD-17 ship, and given this
relatively low amount, why don't we go ahead and do it while the ships
are being constructed? Isn't it penny-wise and pound-foolish to drop
the VLS systems now?
Answer. The decision to remove the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile
(ESSM) and its Vertical Launching System (VLS) is based on requirements
and affordability. LPD 17 has no mission requirement to launch land
attack missiles. A VLS launcher to fire ESSM missiles was originally
planned for LPD 17 to contribute to the force protection of the LPD
from anti-ship cruise missiles in a multi-tiered, hardkill and softkill
layered structure. ESSM and VLS are not required to meet the Navy Anti-
Air Warfare (AAW) CAPSTONE Requirement for self defense against anti-
ship missiles for the LPD-17 class. The LPD-17 class will be equipped
with the Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) and NULKA decoy. These, in
combination with low radar cross-section design meet the AAW CAPSTONE
Requirement and Congressional guidance against the validated threat.
Cabling and foundations for VLS (for ESSM) remain in the LPD-17 design
to accommodate the addition of ESSM in the future should threats beyond
the capability of RAM require it.
The LPD 17 program was reduced by $434 million when the decision
was made to remove VLS and ESSM from eight ships in fiscal year 2000
through fiscal year 2003. A cost estimate for stand-alone VLS
installation without an associated missile has not be conducted,
however, it is estimated that a land attack missile could cost twice as
much as ESSM. If these systems are installed after delivery of the
ships, it is estimated that there is at least a 30 percent premium to
reflect the costs of ripping out existing structure and shipboard
equipment and then installing the missile magazines and systems. This
premium is based on reserving space and weight for backfits, and if
these reservations are not made now, the premium is expected to be
higher than 30 percent. Additionally, there would be the costs
associated with the Weapons Control and Command and Control for the
land attack mission which is currently not in the LPD-17 design.
The Mk41 VLS was designed to be part of the multi-layered self
defense system of LPD-17. In a threat environment, maritime dominance
and subsequent force protection will be established and maintained by
Aegis combatants. Amphibious forces will close the operating area once
the threat has been diminished. In situations where amphibious forces
could be detached to operate independently, combatants would be
committed when required by threat. Navy's individual ships class
Maritime Force Protection planning is based on providing the most cost-
effective force protection possible force wide, consistent with
available funding.
CVN-77 Aircraft Carrier
Question. CVN 77 is the tenth and last ship of the Nimitz class.
Last year, Congress provided $50 million to initiate the ``Smart Buy''
advocated by Newport News. In the fiscal year 1999 budget, the Navy has
accelerated funding for CVN 77 in a manner which has reduced the total
cost of the ship from $5.2 billion a year ago to $4.5 billion today.
Just two years ago CVN 77 was predicted to cost $6 billion. The fiscal
year 1999 budget requests $124 million in the shipbuilding account and
$39 million in R&D to support construction of CVN 77 in 2001.
Mr. Douglass, please explain what the Navy has done to accelerate
funding for construction of CVN 77.
Answer. Following a detailed review of program priorities, the
Department's funding profile for CVN 77 has been substantially adjusted
in the fiscal year 1999 President's Budget request. Including the $48.7
million provided by Congress in the fiscal year 1998 DoD Appropriations
Act, we have applied a total of $241 million above the originally
planned advance procurement of nuclear components, for advance
procurement and advance construction of components in fiscal years 1998
through 2000. With assistance from the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), we accelerated
the full funding of CVN 77 one year to fiscal year 2001. The resultant
profile, which shortens the production gap between CVN 76 and CVN 77,
will provide significant industrial base benefits and savings while
balancing other shipbuilding priorities.
Question. Describe the Navy's plan to use CVN 77 as a
``transitional carrier'' to incorporate some technologies on it that
will bridge to the next generation of carriers (CVX).
Answer. The Navy has budgeted R&D funding to support the ``Smart
Transition'' approach for CVN 77. These funds will assess, select, and
develop process changes and technologies which will reduce the total
ownership cost of CVN 77 as well as provide opportunities for backfit
into the previous nine ships of the CVN 68 class. CVN 77, as the smart
transition carrier, will also provide opportunities to reduce
technology risk for CVX.
Fiscal year 1998 is the initial year of the CVN 77 RDT&E effort. A
joint CVN 77 and CVX aircraft carrier R&D roadmap is being developed to
achieve R&D synergies between the two programs. Additionally,
guidelines have been established to ensure that the CVN 77 R&D design
process identifies, evaluates, and ultimately incorporates transition
technologies on CVN 77 that can also benefit CVX.
The CVN 77 R&D program has concentrated its resources in seven key
focus areas. These areas are Manpower and Material Support, Design
Tools and Processes, Hull, Mechanical, Electrical, and Auxiliary
Systems, Combat and Intelligence Systems, Aircraft Launch, Recovery,
and Support, Battle Damage Prevention and Recovery, and Propulsion and
Power Generation. These R&D investment focus areas have been aligned
and integrated with the CVX program to prevent duplication of effort.
These focus areas further address O&S cost reduction efforts for both
manning and maintenance within their respective systems.
Over the coming year, CVN 77 R&D transition technology candidates
will be evaluated for risk reduction to CVX and overall return on
investment.
Question. In last years budget, the Navy deleted $300 million of
``transition technology'' development. What is the Navy's plan for
transition technology development in support of CVN 77? How much is
funded? How much remains unfunded?
Answer. The Navy's plan is for CVN 77 ``transition technology''
efforts to reduce aircraft carrier Operation and Support costs and to
help transition to the next generation of aircraft carrier, the CVX.
Toward this end, the CVN 77 research and development investment has
been structured to identify and validate transition technologies which
will enhance shipboard workload reductions, reduce life cycle costs for
CVN 77 and the other nine ships of the NIMITZ class, and mitigate
future risk for CVX.
Transition technology funding is being addressed in development of
the fiscal year 2000 budget. The total CVN 77 funding of $4.45 billion
in the Future Years Defense Program accompanying the Fiscal Year 1999
President's Budget request was derived from application of revised
Office of Management and Budget inflation projections to the $4.6
billion ``limitation on total cost of procurement'' of CVN 77
established in Section 122 of the fiscal year 1998 National Defense
Authorization Act. In a February 9, 1998, letter to the Congressional
Defense Committees, the Secretary of the Navy advised that this ``cost
cap'' (and the attendant funding for CVN 77) may need to be adjusted at
some time in the future to reflect differences in the Department's plan
(as outlined in the fiscal year 1998 Budget request) from the
shipbuilder's original ``Smart Buy'' funding plan, as well as the cost
of new transition technology which we plan to incorporate into CVN 77.
Before the Secretary adjusts the ``cost cap'', we will evaluate our
program with the shipbuilder to ensure that all possible cost reduction
efficiencies are considered. With the fiscal year 2000 President's
Budget request, the Navy will provide the required annual report giving
a full evaluation and any revision to cost cap, as well as the plan for
transition technologies. This additional time will also allow us to
include results from our CVN 77 research and development program, which
began in fiscal year 1998.
Question. Will CVN-77 include the Ship Self-Defense System (SSDS)
and Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) installed during it
construction?
Answer. SSDS is part of the baseline construction program for CVN
77. CEC is being procured for every carrier in the fleet. Navy is still
working to determine when and how to fund CEC installation on CVN-77.
CVX Aircraft Carrier
Question. Mr. Douglass, why does the Navy need a new class of
aircraft carriers?
The fiscal year 1999 budget envisions spending about $1.1 billion
in R&D between now and 2003 to develop a new class of aircraft carrier.
The fiscal year 1999 budget requests $190 million for this purpose.
Answer. The goal is to reduce the costs of operating and
maintaining the aircraft carrier force and to maintain essential force
levels through the next century. The current aircraft carrier design is
capable of meeting current and foreseeable requirements, but the
ability to improve affordability and adapt to future technology is
limited with the existing 30 year old design. It is time now to start
work on development of a new class of carriers that will last
throughout most of the next century.
Question. Do you intend to evolve the current (NIMITZ) design, or
will it be a totally new design?
Answer. The Navy is currently analyzing several alternative designs
for CVX. These alternative designs run the gamut from an evolution of
the current NIMITZ design to a totally new design which includes a new
hull, new propulsion plant, new communications suite, new distributive
systems, new functional arrangements and significant improvements in
ship survivability and signature management.
Question. The current cost estimate to build the last of the NIMITZ
class ships (CVN-77) has fallen from $6.0 billion two years ago to $4.5
billion today. Is it possible to build a new class of aircraft carriers
that cost no more than today's ships? Why not continue building NIMITZ
class aircraft carriers?
Answer. On a average follow-on ship cost basis, the CVX is expected
to be at or near current aircraft carrier unit costs. On a life cycle
cost basis, the CVX will be significantly lower in costs than current
carriers. Additionally, the CVX will have additional performance
capabilities and will have increased survivability features
incorporated in its design.
The Navy goal is to reduce the costs of operating and maintaining
the aircraft carrier force in order to maintain essential force levels
through the next century. The current aircraft carrier design is
capable of meeting current and foreseeable requirements, but the
ability to improve affordability and adapt to future technology is
limited with the existing 30 year old design. It is time now to start
work on development of a new class of carriers that will last
throughout most of the next century.
Question. What is the urgency of spending so much R&D money now--
why can't we go at a slower pace?
Answer. The fiscal year 1999 request is critical to initiate key
technology development programs having major ship configuration and
design impacts. Among these programs are:
Advanced Technology Launcher--Electromagnetic catapult development
will require development of power conversion and control systems.
Following component development, land-based testing will be required to
ensure safety of flight.
Propulsion Plant Development--A new, modern propulsion plant
requires continued funding in fiscal year 1999 to meet an fiscal year
2006 construction start date. It has been over 30 years since the last
carrier propulsion plant design. Funding is needed to incorporate
lessons learned over this period of time into a new design.
Advanced Protection Systems--Survivability of the carrier is
achieved through passive features that protect vital ship spaces and
are major ship configuration drivers. To keep pace with modern threats,
and to limit the weight and space impact of upgraded protection
systems, requires development of advanced armoring and protection
systems. These systems will require small and full-scale land-based
testing to ensure adequacy against the threat.
Information Integration--Advanced computing plant architectures
will enable significant reductions in manpower and will ensure
survivability of the ship's computer-based systems. The information
architecture and development of the substantial network control systems
are key to fielding this capability. All of the ship control and
monitoring systems that will reside on CVX in the future will need to
be integrated into this architecture.
Automation for Reduced Manning--Manpower is the leading driver in
ship life cycle cost. Automated systems are key to reducing the
shipboard manpower requirement for CVX. Development of automated
systems must be undertaken early to enable the ship design to
incorporate them. Unless these systems are definable early in the
design process, the ship will be designed to accommodate large numbers
of personnel and will not be properly arranged to enable backfitting
automation into the ship.
Computer Aided Design Tools--A clean-sheet aircraft carrier design
has not been undertaken for over 30 years. Modern, computer based tools
have not been applied to efficiently engineer, design, test and
simulate construction of an aircraft carrier design in the virtual
environment to significantly reduce overall product cost. These tools
are needed now--not later.
Question. The Navy completed the CVX Analysis of Alternatives in
1997. What did it show? Place details in the record at this point.
Answer. Only the first of a three-phase schedule for the CVX
Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) was completed in 1997. This portion of
the analysis was focused to make recommendations on the maximum size of
the airwing on CVX, the airwing capacity, and on ship-related aspects
of the aircraft type, specifically, conventional take-off and landing
(CTOL) versus vertical/short take-off landing (VSTOL). The AoA analysis
showed clearly that the smallest airwings were unable to conduct
simultaneous strike missions and battlespace dominance missions due to
an insufficient number of aircraft. The analysis also led to
elimination of a ship design which would have predicated an all VSTOL
airwing and would not have supported any CTOL aircraft.
DDG-51 Destroyer Susceptibility to Torpedo Attack
Question. The Secretary of Defense's Director of Operational Test
and Evaluation made the following observation about the DDG-51 Aegis
destroyer in a recent report to Congress: ------. Admiral Lautenbacher,
this appears to be a serious problem. What is the Navy doing about it?
Answer. The Navy acknowledges that the DDG-51 Class AEGIS Destroyer
is susceptible to torpedo attack as are any surface ships when
operating one-on-one against a highly trained enemy submarine. The
sensor suite aboard a DDG-51 Class ship is capable of detecting post
launch acoustic energy emitted by threat torpedoes. However, a highly
trained and alert operator is required to classify torpedoes in time
for the ship to take evasive action. If the classification is made in
time, evasion techniques used by surface combatants are often
successful. ------.
To rectify this deficiency, the Navy has developed a Multi Sensor
Torpedo Recognition and Alertment Processor (MSTRAP). This technology
will be integrated via Engineering Change into the DDG-51 AN/SQQ-89 ASW
Combat System, as the Torpedo Recognition Alertment Functional Segment
(TRAFS). MSTRAP has been successfully demonstrated during Prospective
Commanding Officer (PCO) operations under the witness of Surface
Warfare Development Group (SWDG) and found to be potentially
operationally effective and potentially operationally suitable by
Operational Test and Evaluation Force (OPTEVFOR) in the integrated AN/
SQQ-89(V) configuration. Follow-on OT&E will be conducted in FY 1999 to
determine the operational effectiveness and suitability of TRAFS. The
Navy is proceeding with the introduction of TRAFS in this integrated
configuration.
TRAFS uses AN/SQQ-89 ASW sensors (AN/SQS-53C hull sonar, AN/SQR-19
towed array, and AN/SQQ-28 sonobuoy processor) to detect and classify
torpedo threats, present evasive maneuver recommendations to ship
command personnel, and recommend placement of Launch Expendable
Acoustic Devices (LEAD) torpedo decoys. Navy plans to backfit a Multi-
Function Towed Array (MFTA) on the DDG-51 Class Ships starting in FY05.
In addition to active receive and passive detection capabilities, the
MFTA will provide an enhanced torpedo detection aperture to exploit
passive torpedo signatures for TRAFS processing.
Navy plans to test the TRAFS and LEAD in realistic scenarios this
year to assess the improvement to torpedo defense these two
technologies provide. Furthermore, Navy has funded a software algorithm
refinement effort for further TRAFS enhancement.
DDG-51 SQQ-89 ASW Capabilities
Question. In discussing the DDG-51 ASW combat system (known as SQQ-
89), the report indicates that in the last test (in 1992) ``the system
passively detected only 1 out of 6 submarine maneuvers, leaving its
passive tracking ability in question.''
What are the capabilities today of a DDG-51's SQQ-89 ASW combat
system against an enemy submarine?
Answer. Designed to detect, classify and engage a nuclear submarine
threat in deep water, the DDG-51 AN/SQQ-89(V)6 ASW Combat System has
outstanding capability against this enemy threat. Since the break up of
the Soviet Union, the surface force has ostensibly changed the focus of
ASW from a deep water nuclear threat to a shallow water littoral diesel
threat. ------. Facing a quieter submarine threat, the Surface Ship
Navy's strategy is to focus on improving active sonar and multi-static
operations.
Over the past few years, signal processing and display improvements
have been developed and incorporated into the existing AN/SQQ-89(V)6
hull systems (AN/SQS-53C) on DDG-51 Class Ships. Starting in fiscal
year 2000, additional active improvements will be backfit on our most
capable ASW platforms (Baseline III DD-963s and all DDG-51 Class Ships)
through a COTS based adjunct capability providing improved sonar Active
Classification. This capability will assist the sonar operators with
initial detection of submarine echo returns through improved clutter
reduction, automated detection algorithms and improved evaluation
displays.
Starting in fiscal year 2005, the surface navy will replace the
SQR-19 TACTAS with the backfit of a Multi-Function Towed Array (META)
on board all DDG-51 class ships. The MTFA will allow for below layer
monostatic echo reception from above the layer, active hull array (AN/
SQS-53C). In addition, the MTFA will provide a bistatic/multistatic
receiver capability with either the LAMPS MKIII SH-60R ALFS dipping
sonar or another platforms' AN/SQS-53C hull sonar. This cross-layer
detection capability has demonstrated a substantial performance gain
against enemy submarines operating below the acoustic layer, typical in
the littorals. In addition, the MTFA will provide an acoustic aperture
for passive detection. Our intention is to evaluate future signal
processing improvements developed by the submarine and surveillance
communities, such as Advanced Processing Builds and integrate them into
the MFTA signal processing architecture. The MFTA will also provide a
torpedo detection aperture to exploit passive torpedo signatures for
auto-detection and man-in-the-loop evaluation using the Torpedo
Recognition Alertment Functional Segment (TRAFS).
New Attack Submarine (NSSN)
Question. The fiscal year 1999 budget requests $219 million in R&D
for continued development and testing and $2 billion for construction
of the second New Attack Submarine. Mr. Douglass, what is the status of
the NSSN program?
Answer. The NSSN Program is on schedule to ensure the design in
mature, construction plans and processes are in place, and material is
available to begin construction on the lead ship in fiscal year 1998.
The four ship construction efforts will be executed as a modification
to the existing Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD)
contract with Electric Boat (EB), with Newport News Shipbuilding (NNS)
as a major subcontractor. This approach ensures that the prime
contractor retains responsibility for the entire design/build process,
which is a major ``lesson learned'' from prior submarine construction
contracts. EB has submitted a proposal with NNS as a major
subcontractor for joint construction of the first four NSSNs. The
Department is reviewing the proposal and contract award is planned for
third quarter fiscal year 1998.
The teaming arrangement between Electric Boat and Newport News was
a controversial issue last year.
Question. Is the teaming arrangement working?
Answer. Yes, the teaming arrangement is working well. Some examples
are:
a. The free exchange of ideas and know-how between experienced
construction personnel at both shipyards is resulting in the
identification and implementation of improved and more efficient
construction process.
b. Electric Boat (EB) and Newport News Shipbuilding (NNS) formed 15
integrated process teams, the teams have been working together over the
past year. To date, about 50 NNS personnel have relocated to EB and are
participating on the Design/Build Teams.
c. Shipbuilders are sharing design data and establishing bills of
materials.
d. A pilot construction test will validate electronic transfer/
sharing of data between the shipyards using the electronic design
passage.
Question. In a new report to Congress by the Secretary of Defense's
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, the following observations
are made. Mr. Douglass, could you please explain these findings and
what the Navy has done to respond to the them?
``The January 1997 operational assessment indicated high risk
existed in several programmatic areas, since formal plans of funding
didn't exist for the external communications system, the towed array,
mines, or anti-surface warfare missiles. As a result of DoD funding
shortfalls, New Attack Submarine and supporting programs faced
significant down-scoping which reduced the effectiveness of the
submarine.''
``Technical risks were found in propulsion cavitation, in
controlling electromagnetic signals, and in high data rate antennas.''
Answer. Formal plans now exist and funding is in place to implement
both the External Communications System (ECS) and the TB-29 Thin Line
Towed Array on the New Attack Submarine (NSSN). There is no requirement
in the NSSN Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for Anti-Surface
Ship Warfare (ASUW) missile capability; however, the Navy has retained
Over-the-Horizon targeting capability for the ship within general
features of the combat control system and ECS so thatwhen the Navy
develops a follow on submarine launched ASUW missile, it could be
readily integrated into the NSSN. The Navy is evaluating offensive mine
options to replace the Submarine Launched Mobile Mine (SLMM). The NSSN
is committed to incorporating and employing any full diameter submarine
launched offensive mine that is in the Navy's inventory at the time of
ship delivery.
A corrective action plan for propulsion cavitation was initiated in
fiscal year 1996. Two design teams developed modified propulsor
components which have shown acceptable performance at small scale and
are currently undergoing quarter-scale testing to verify that
performance. Results from these tests will provide design data in time
to support manufacturing timelines for lead New Attack Submarine
construction.
Application of Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) electronics in the
electromagnetic (EM) environment anticipated in New Attack Submarine
caused the program to undertake a variety of risk mitigation actions.
Projection of local EM fields was modeled and provided to electronics
systems designers in the form of field maps. EM control and
compatibility plans have been developed and implemented across the
subsystems by their developers. Thirdly, the susceptibility of COTS
electronics to EM fields has been characterized and found to be
substantially less affected than anticipated.
The supposition that submarine high data rate antenna size
constraints severely limit communications bandwidth is valid only in
very specific implementations. The ability of submarines to communicate
with the bandwidth and data rate able to support video teleconferencing
has been demonstrated at sea during Joint Warrier Interoperability
Demonstration-97 and is continuing to evolve. Future application of
commercial satellite communications promises even more robust
communications capability.
Question. ``Additionally, the Cost and Operational Effectiveness
Analysis (COEA) engagement model was re-run against the Russian SSN
using an updated Office of Naval Intelligence assessment (showing the
advanced Russian SSN to be potentially more capable than previously
estimated). The simulation showed New Attack Submarine having a smaller
performance margin against the advanced Russian SSN than predicted.''
Answer. NSSN acoustic performance margins will be reduced against
threats with reduced acoustic signatures compared to the ``threat of
record''. However, better than threshold level performance margins were
sustained against even the most capable (quietest) threats postulated
in updated threat scenario modeling. It is noted also that NSSN
performance against these postulated threats is projected to be
improved over that achieved by SEAWOLF. Further, the prospect of
development and deployment of such updated threat submarines is
questionable.
Question. ``In shock testing of a scaled down NSSN hull section,
human dummies demonstrated anomalous behavior. However, they were not
instrumented, so it is not known how severe a risk to personnel will
exist on the NSSN-unique floating modules. Additional anomalies
discovered in undamped tests that . . . shock produced much larger
vertical displacement than predicted, and some high capacity mounts
tore. This is a potentially serious risk. . . .''
Answer. Deck motion vertical displacement (in inches) with
undamped, unsnubbed mounts were larger than initially predicted.
However, even with the larger than anticipated displacements and
despite some tearing of the mounts elastomer material, the mounts
satisfied their specification. Further, subsequent tests with the torn
mounts demonstrated that they still satisfied specification. Current
design includes mechanical dampers which further limits the motion of
the deck module under shock and reduces the induced motion to within
acceptable limits for COTS electronics mounted on the deck.
Strategic Sealift/LMSR Ship
Question. The fiscal year 1999 budget requests $251.4 million to
construct the last of 19 Large Medium Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off ships
(LMSRs), which are used to support Army operations during war.
Mr. Douglas, since the first 18 ships were funded in the Sealift
Fund, what is the merit of funding the last ship in the Shipbuilding
account as the 1999 budget proposes?
Answer. Procurement of the last ship in fiscal year 1999 has been
shifted to the Shipbuilding Conversion, Navy appropriation to provide
maximum visibility of our recapitalization efforts.
Question. The Committee understands that OSD removed funds during
the last internal budget process based on a DoD/IG report that
suggested possible savings in the program. How much was removed and
why?
Does the Navy think this level of savings is valid?
If this amount of savings cannot be obtained, what is the
implication on configuration of the LMSR ships and their utility to
support wartime operations?
Answer. Funding for the LMSR program was reduced by $31.0 million
primarily in anticipation of the savings postulated by a finding in the
DoD/IG audit report which suggested that the Operational Requirements
Document (ORD) did not require cargo space temperature and humidity
control equipment on the last six LMSRs. Initial estimates from the two
shipbuilders suggests that little savings will be achieved by removing
the equipment. Since there is no potential for realizing the previously
estimated savings and considering the major impact to full utilization
of any of these ships in the prepositioned role, the space temperature
and humidity control equipment on all 19 ships will be retained. No
additional funds are required to retain these systems. Contractor
(NASSCO) efficiencies will cover the additional cost.
Question. Last year the Navy disclosed a $131 million overrun on
the first five LMSR ships, which were conversions of existing ships
rather than new construction. What is the current estimate?
Answer. The Navy still continues to anticipate a $131 million
overrun for the five conversion LMSRs all of which have been delivered.
Question. What is the performance in terms of cost and schedule on
new construction LMSR ships?
Answer.
NASSCO
The Navy anticipates delivery of the lead ship
approximately five months early (June 1998) with similar early interval
delivery on all follow on ships.
NASSCO will deliver the seven new construction ships at
approximately target cost with the potential to come in below target.
AVONDALE
The Navy anticipates delivery of the lead ship in August
1998 (from January 31, 1998) due to a defect in Peck & Hale cloverleaf
cargo tiedown fittings and delays in testing. The defect will also
impact delivery dates on all follow on ships.
The Navy estimates that Avondale will deliver the seven
new construction ships at slightly above target cost but will
experience a profit on the total contract.
Question. When OSD reestimated inflation rates last fall, how did
this affect the Sealift fund in fiscal years 1998 and 1999? How much
does the changes in inflation indices show should be applied to the
fund in each year, and how much of that amount has actually been
removed from the fund?
Answer. In fiscal year 1998 no reduction was taken. In fiscal year
1999, the National Defense Sealift Fund (NDSF) was reduced by $38
million for inflation. The Navy estimate for total reduction to the
fund is approximately $13.2 million ($9.6 million from the LMSR ship
construction portion and $3.6 million from the Operations and
Maintenance portion). Of the total $38 million amount, $14 million was
taken out of the LMSR which transferred to the SCN account. The
remaining $24 million was taken out the Ready Reserve Force Funds.
Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) Service Life Extension Program (SLEP)
Question. The Navy's ``From the Sea'' strategy needs (V-22s in the
air and Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) in the water to allow Marine
combat forces to strike at great distances. Unfortunately, the LCAC
fleet is not in good shape and the Navy has been slow to address the
problem. The fiscal year 1999 budget includes no funds for LCAC service
life extension, although Congress provided $3 million in 1997 and $20
million in 1998 as a matter of special Congressional interest. The Navy
plans to spend $168 million on LCAC service life extension through
2003.
Mr. Douglass, please explain the Navy's strategy for LCAC service
life extension.
Answer. About 95 percent of Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is
projected ashore on LCACs. Along with Advanced Amphibious Assault
(AAAV) and MV-22s, LCACs form the third and central pillar of the
Marine's future power projection triad.
During the Navy's Program Review 1999, it was determined that 74 of
91 total craft were sufficient to meet future power projection
requirements and would satisfy the fiscally constrained 2.5 Marine
Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) lift goal by 2010. The 17 excess craft--the
oldest and/or worst condition--will be inactivated and disassembled.
Based on the average age (7.6 years) and condition of the 74 remaining
craft, Navy determined that fiscal year 2000 is sufficiently early to
commerce the service life extension program. Navy will program SLEPs to
sustain the 74 craft force.
The LCAC modernization and service life extension program will be
conducted in two phases. Phase I, performed at the Assault Craft Units
(I level maintenance facility), will consist of corrosion abatement
work and may include replacement of command modules. New command
modules will incorporate upgrades to command, control, communications,
computers, and navigation (C4N) capabilities necessary to keep pace
with emerging Marine Corps operational concepts. Phase II (SLEP),
performed at the contractor site, will extend the life of the craft
from 15 to 30 years. The major Phase II effort is the replacement of
the buoyancy box, an area of the craft that has experienced accelerated
corrosion. Besides extending the life of the craft, the new box will
incorporate modifications to improve damage stability and trim, and
improve fuel availability to extend operating ranges. LCACs that are
not scheduled for C4N upgrades during Phase I will receive them during
Phase II.
The fiscal year 1997 and fiscal year 1998 Congressional plus-ups
will be used to fund one Phase I (including a C4N upgrade) in fiscal
year 1998, and one Phase II SLEP in fiscal year 1998/1999.
Additionally, the Congressional plus up will fund transportation,
disassembly, and warehousing of LCACs scheduled for inactivation, and
detailed design work, advanced procurement and integrated logistic
product development for future SLEPs. Approval has been granted to
award a sole source contract to Textron Marine and Land systems to
perform the fiscal year 1998 work. A work proposal from Textron is due
in April 1998.
The $22.4 million Congressional plus-ups have been distributed
across the Operations and Maintenance, Navy (O&M,N), OPN and
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) appropriations as follows:
O&M,N: $5.69 million
--Transportation, disassembly, warehousing of inactive LCAC
--Corrosion portion of Phase I
OPN: $4.31 million
--C4N portion of Phase I
SCN: $12.4 million
--Advanced procurement
--C4N portion of Phase II
--Buoyancy box replacement
--Non-recurring cost for C4N
Question. Last year, this Committee directed that the LCAC SLEP be
funded in the shipbuilding account. Your new budget ignores our
direction, funding it instead in the O&M and Other Procurement
accounts. Why?
Answer. The actual Phase II Service Life Extension portion for the
LCACs will be performed with SCN funds. The Phase II SLEP deals with
the problem of corrosion deterioration which compromises the watertight
integrity of the craft through installation of a new hull or buoyancy
box.
Phase I tasks replacement of obsolete C4N equipment and correction
of corrosion deficiencies of the hull to get the craft to the 15 year
point. These efforts are more appropriately funded in Other
Procurement, Navy and Operations and Maintenance, Navy, respectively.
Question. The Committee understands that the navy plans to
reprogram the 1998 funds we provided in the Shipbuilding account into
the O&M and Other Procurement accounts, in contravention of the
specific direction on the matter. Given our Committee's known keen
interest in LCAC SLEP, do you plan to submit such a reprogramming to
the Committee on a prior-approval basis?
Answer. The Phase II of the LCAC SLEP program is being funded in
SCN. However, some of the tasks necessary to maintain the craft in
fleet readiness and modernize prior to a scheduled SLEP are funded in
the Other Procurement, Navy (OM, N) appropriations. For example,
cropping out corroded portions of the service craft and replacing with
aluminum plates is general maintenance of the craft and is funded in
the OM, N appropriation. Replacing the unreliable, obsolete component
of Command, Control, Communication, Computers, and navigation (C4N)
equipment is an upgrade/modernization of the service craft and is
funded in the OPN appropriation. Navy intends to inform the Committee
of the reprogramming requirements including the amount of reprogramming
and the rationale for it by April 1, 1998.
New Design Destroyer (DD-21)
Question. The fiscal year 1999 budget envisions spending about $874
million in R&D between now and 2003 to develop a new class of
destroyers. The fiscal year 1999 budget requests $85 million for this
purpose. In only one year, development costs have already risen by 15
percent ($762 million last year vice $874 million currently).
Mr. Douglass, why does the Navy need a new class of destroyers?
Answer. The emphasis on naval operations in the littoral, coupled
with the decommissioning of DD-963 and FFG-7 classes, will create
shortfalls in the capability of the surface force to execute the land
attack mission in a cost-effective manner. The DD 21 Operational
Requirements Document further describes the shortcomings of the
existing systems. The SC-21 Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis
(COEA) analyzed both new designs and evolving the DDG-51 class as means
of correcting the shortfalls. The COEA concluded a new class was the
most cost-effective solution to satisfy Navy mission requirements in
the littoral.
Question. Do you intend to evolve the current (DDG-51 Aegis)
design, or will it be a totally new design?
Answer. The DD 21 will be a totally new design. The requirement for
a new design is driven by the aggressive land attack, signature,
survivability, manning, and cost objectives documented in the DD 21
Operational Requirements Document (ORD). The SC-21 Cost and Operational
Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) analyzed evolving the existing DDG-51 (in
Decision Alternatives DA-01 and DA-03) and rejected this approach as
cost prohibitive and not satisfying the mission requirements.
Question. What are the deficiencies of the DDG-51 Aegis class that
warrant spending around $1 billion on a new design? Describe each in
detail for the record.
Answer. DDG 51 does not meet the CJCS-approved Operational
Requirements for DD 21 in several areas. The most important include:
DD 21 is required to support the land campaign by
engaging, suppressing, and destroying targets ashore. Modifying the DDG
51 to provide the required level of firepower is cost prohibitive.
The procurement cost objective for the fifth DD 21 hull is
$750 million (in fiscal year 1996 dollars) at each shipyard.
The DD 21 Operations and Support (O&S cost objective is
70% lower than a DDG 51. Radical changes in ship design and manning are
required to achieve this level.
The DD 21 manning objective is 95 people. Current DDG 51
manning is 383. The DDG51 ship design and associated legacy systems
onboard severely limit manning reductions.
DD 21 requires substantial ship signature reductions from
DDG 51 levels, and redesigning DDG 51 to meet the aggressive acoustic,
magnetic, RF, and IR signatures is cost prohibitive.
The DD 21 design and architecture will facilitate pacing
the evolving threat and transition to the next generation cruiser. An
open, modular ship architecture is needed and cannot be achieved on DDG
51 without significant and costly redesign.
Question. Are the contractors for this class of ship likely to be
different than the incumbent contractors on the current destroyers?
Answer. One industry team has announced its intention to bid on DD
21. Others are expected. All major corporations building DDG 51 have
announced their intentions to bid on DD 21.
Question. What is the urgency of spending so much R&D money now--
why can't we go at a slower pace?
Answer. The Operational Requirements established for DD 21 are
technologically challenging. The Navy has developed, and OSD has
approved, an innovative and aggressive acquisition strategy that will
meet those goals through the use of new acquisition practices that will
inspire industry competition. The current schedule is achievable, but
reductions in RDT&E funding would cause a slip in the IOC for DD 21. In
order to avoid a significant gap in production for surface combatants,
DD 21 must enter production in fiscal year 2004, and start series
production in fiscal year 2005. DoD established a requirement for 57
DDG 51 class ships. At the current rate of production, all 57 ships
will be ordered by fiscal year 2003 and will be completed by fiscal
year 2008. With a fiscal year 2004 start, DD 21 production will allow
for near-continuous surface combatant production at a rate of three
ships per year. The net result minimizes industrial base peaks and
valleys caused by significant breaks in surface combatant production
which would mean increase costs to the taxpayer.
Question. The Navy advertises this ship as a ``Land Attack
Destroyer'', and the lead ship is estimated to cost at least $1.2
billion. For $1.5 billion, the Navy could convert 4 excess Trident
submarines (assuming START II is ratified by the Russian government) to
each carry over 100 land attack missiles. What formal analysis has been
done between the Navy surface and submarine communities to ensure no
duplication of effort?
Answer. The SC-21 Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis
(COEA) analyzed several approaches for providing immediate, massive
firepower to support the Unified CINC early in the campaign. One of
these alternatives considered Production Arsenal Ships, which would
fulfill a role much like the one you postulated for Trident submarines.
That alternative was found to be less effective than the selected (DD
21) alternative. Additionally, since the Trident SSGN remains a concept
with no funds yet applied, formal analysis on it has not been conducted
for such a comparison.
Question. How often do Navy DDG-51 or destroyers go to sea with a
full load of missiles in their Vertical Launching System? What formal
analysis has been done by the Navy to see if the Land Attack Destroyer
mission can be performed by existing DDG-51 ships simply by fully
loading their VLS cells?
Answer. DDG-51s carry a mix of USW (vertical launch ASROC), strike
(Tomahawk) and AAW (Standard) weapons in the Vertical Launching System
(VLS) when deployed out of CONUS. The exact mix is based on a shipfill
allowance tailored by the Fleet CINCs to meet the requirements in a
particular theater. Fleet CINCs review NonNuclear Ordnance Requirements
and publish revised shipfill loadouts annually.
The SC-21 Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA)
analyzed variants of the DDG 51, as well as new ship designs (i.e., DD
21), to address the projected capability shortfalls of the future
surface combatant force. All ships were analyzed assuming full VLS
loadouts. The COEA found DD 21 to be the most cost-effective solution.
DDG 51, even with a full VLS loadout, was found inadequate to meet the
needs of land attack in the littoral.
Question. The Navy claimed last year that it needed to build a $500
million Arsenal ship as a ``demonstrator'' platform for SC-21. Since
Arsenal ship is now defunct, how will SC-21 technologies be
demonstrated at sea to reduce risk prior to ship construction?
Answer. The DD 21 Program Office has identified alternative test
strategies for all of the technologies initially proposed for the
Maritime Fire Support Demonstrator.
Key systems or technologies will be tested at land based test sites
followed by selected at-sea testing on operational ships, dedicated
test ships (such as the SSDS test ship ex-DECATUR) or other platforms
as appropriate.
Question. How much did the Navy add to the SC-21 R&D program in the
new budget to compensate for loss of the Arsenal ship demonstrator, and
how will these funds be used?
Answer. The fiscal year 1999 President's Budget reflects an
increase of $110 million over the previous budget in the area of RDT&E
core funding for DD 21 and associated technologies. This funding is
primarily used for program risk mitigation and additional land based
testing.
Risk mitigation techniques include:
--Navy participation on contractor IPTs;
--Use of both government and contractor testing;
--Exploitation of state-of-the-art Computer-Assisted Design
and Modeling (CAD/CAM) techniques;
--Use of Land Based Engineering Sites (LBES) and enhanced
modeling and simulation.
Question. Is SC-21 on any of the CINC integrated priority lists?
Answer. The CINC integrated priority lists contain broad statements
of required military capabilities. One would not expect to see explicit
reference to platforms (e.g., SC-21) and/or systems in these lists,
although the CINC statements infer requirements for SC-21. SC-21 (i.e.,
DD 21) will enhance our ability to meet many of the CINC's priorities.
Question. In what year does the Navy project that a potential
adversary country would field a ship as capable as today's DDG-51?
Answer. There are a number of countries, none considered threats,
which currently have the capability to, or are, producing a ship nearly
equivalent to DDG-51. All of the technology required to produce such a
ship exists outside the U.S. or is in final development. For example,
various European nations are cooperating to develop the HORIZON family
of surface combatants. These ships are projected to become operational
in 2002-2004 and will incorporate a phased array radar and surface-to-
air-missile (SAM). It is possible that this class of ship could be sold
to a threat country, but probably not until after the ships become
operational in European navies. A second example is Russia's
advertisement of a ``Multi-mission Major Combatant'' with phased array
radar and SAMs. While Russia currently has no funds to produce the
ship, the technology exists and, given a buyer, the ship could be
completed by 2007. Finally, the French-built LAFAYETTE already exists
and has been exported to Taiwan. Current versions do not posses an
advanced SAM capability but the ship does incorporate many advanced
signature reduction techniques. Future versions are likely to
incorporate phase array radar and SAMs. In summary, the technology to
build a DDG-51 equivalent ship already exists outside the U.S. Various
efforts to produce such a ship are ongoing, with actual ships likely to
be completed by 2002-2005, and proliferation to threat countries
possible thereafter.
DDG 51 vis-a-vis another nation's ship is not a driving factor in
the determination to build DD 21. DDG 51 is an open ocean design
modified to operate in the littoral and support the land campaign. DD
21 is a ship designed and optimized for the littoral environment and
support of land forces. DD 21 and DDG 51 capabilities are
complementary.
The submarine community suffered (in terms of cost and schedule)
for many years in development of combat systems (SUBACS/BSY-1/BSY-2),
and has recently adopted Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion based on state-
of-the-art commercial computers and open systems architecture for all
submarine combat systems. Your statement indicates that the Navy will
use the SQQ-89 system as the technological foundation for SC-21, which
suggests that the surface Navy community has not learned the lessons
that the submarine community did in development and standardization of
combat systems.
Question. Mr. Douglass, what action have you taken to develop a
common, open combat system architecture for both surface ships and
submarines?
Answer. As part of the SC-21 Cost and Operational Effectiveness
Analysis (COEA) investigation of advanced computing architectures for
DD 21, System Engineers from the NSSN and SQQ-89 (V) communities
participated, bringing with them their experiences, lessons learned,
and knowledge from their combat system developments. This team
recommended a common engineering approach to development of the DD 21
ship combat system computer architecture. The Navy has adopted this
approach for DD 21, and will provide this data to all industry teams
that bid on the DD 21 development contract.
The Navy had also established a strategy known as Total Ship
Computing (TSC) to develop and validate this common, open system
architecture approach. The Navy's internal Technology Ship
Characteristics Improvement Panel (TSCIP) has endorsed this strategy as
the ``advanced computing strategy for the Navy''.
Representatives from both the NSSN and the Surface USW (SQQ-89)
communities are members of this team to ensure that we have not
forgotten the lessons learned from the submarine community. The DD 21
Program Office is well aware of the Rapid COTS Technology Insertion
process of the NSSN Program and expects that industry will implement a
similar strategy for DD 21. The acquisition strategy for DD 21 seeks
innovative solutions from industry based on aggressive competition in
the early phases of the DD 21 development process. Industry will be
able to build on the Navy's lessons learned, and we expect to see a
substantial improvement in the affordability, maintainability, and
performance of the DD 21 Total Ship Computing architecture.
Trident Submarine Backfit
Question. Under the conditions of the START II treaty, the Trident
submarine force will assume a role of growing importance within the
strategic triad by carrying approximately one-half of the allowable
strategic nuclear warheads. The Trident Backfit program, to retrofit 14
of the 18 boats with D-5 missile, began last year but was controversial
in the Senate and a major issue in our conference. How much is included
in the fiscal year 1999 budget to continue it?
Answer. $231 million in fiscal year 1999 Other Procurement, Navy is
requested to continued the D-5 Backfit program in this year's
President's Budget.
Question. What has been the effect of the Senate reductions (to
which we agreed in conference) to the D-5 missile production program in
terms of impact on the D-5 missile production line, the program
schedule to support Trident submarine loadout, and outyear cost to
restore the missiles deleted by the Congress?
Answer. The fiscal year 1998 Defense Appropriations Act reduction
of $65 million in WPN was intended to reduce D-5 procurement by two
missiles, thereby slowing the rate of D-5 production.
The actual effect was that the Program Manager was forced to break
production lines in fiscal year 1998 for four critical components
because the quantity dropped below minimum sustaining rates:
(1) Post Boost Control Systems gas generators,
(2) Nose Fairing Jettison Motor,
(3) MK-6 Guidance system electronics Assemblies (EA), and
(4) HMX rocket motor propellant.
Without additional funding, the program will be approximately 44
missiles short of the inventory objective of 434 D-5 missiles (required
to fully out-load the 14 D-5 Trident force).
The most cost effective plan to restore the D-5 program utilizes
$14 million provided in the fiscal year 1999 budget request to restart
three of the four broken production lines (all except HMX propellant)
and run the lines at the minimum sustaining rate in fiscal year 1999.
$130 million (fiscal year 2000-2005) is required to procure the
hardware deleted from fiscal year 1998 at the end of the prospective
runs and restore the HMX propellant production line as needed to meet
loadout requirements.
Question. Congress directed that the Navy maintain the option to
increase (from 14 boats) to an 18 all D-5 SSBN force until the Russian
Duma ratifies START II. The fiscal year 1999 budget contains $18
million to begin purchasing of equipment for the last 4 Trident boats
that will be wasted if the Russian Duma makes such ratification. What
is the Navy's plan for investment in the last 4 Trident ships that
would be decommissioned once START II is ratified?
What is the potential cost next year?
What is the potential cost during the next five years?
How much of this cost is currently addressed in the
Administration's future years defense plan?
Answer. The fiscal year 1998 Defense Authorization Act prohibits
obligating any funds to retire or dismantle (or prepare to retire or
dismantle) Trident ballistic missile submarines, pending START II
ratification and Congressional approval. The fiscal year 1999 budget
has $18 million programmed to preserve the option of maintaining the 18
D-5 Trident SSBN force. These funds provide for the procurement of
long-lead reactor components to support the additional refueling
overhauls. If START II is ratified, this $18 million would not be
wasted, since these reactor components will be procured for future
refuelings of the other Trident SSBNs.
Maintaining this year-by-year ``hedge'' option open is only
possible until fiscal year 2002. Beyond that a decision must be made to
either refuel or remove the four Trident SSBNs from strategic service.
The costs for maintaining the option for an 18 D-5 Trident force beyond
fiscal year 1999 are not programmed, pending a recommendation for START
I force structure by the OSD/Joint Staff co-chaired START I Task Force.
For fiscal year 2000, the estimated costs are high as $683 million
above the current program, and fiscal year 2001, the hedge option costs
up to $960 million. These funds would only maintain the option for 18
D-5 Tridents, not execute an 18 D-5 Trident program. Executing an 18 D-
5 Trident SSBN force would cost between $5 and $7 billion in additional
funds across the Future Years Defense Program.
The START I Task Force is presently examining both costs and
alternative force structures in the event START II is not ratified. The
Defense Department will make a full report on the Task Force findings
to Congress by April 15, 1998.
Intercooled Recuperative (ICR) Gas Turbine Engine
Question. Three years ago, the Committee recommended that the ICR
Gas turbine engine program be terminated, but did not prevail in
conference. The engine was targeted by the Navy for DDG-51 Aegis
Destroyers, but it is now clear that no DDG-51 will ever have an ICR
engine. Over $300 million has been sunk in the project, and a total
investment of nearly $500 million is needed to make it viable.
Secretary Douglass, how much have we spent on ICR development so far?
Answer. The total U.S. investment through the end of fiscal year
1998 is approximately $326 million.
Question. Does it work?
Answer. Yes. The current development engine has successfully
demonstrated a fuel savings of 22 percent, and is
projecting a savings of 27 percent compared to an LM2500,
mechanical drive application with a speed vs time profile similar to
that of DDG 51s. In an all electric architecture as envisioned for DD
21, the fuel savings attributed to ICR will be lower. The engine
completed a 500 hour development test which revealed additional
mandatory development work that will have to be incorporated into the
current schedule and funding profile. The development work is required
to engineer and implement solutions to technical problems in three
areas: Combustor section, Recuperator, and Compressor. To be ready in
time for the 3,000 hour qualification test in fiscal year 2000, the
efforts to engineer, test, and implement these technical fixes must be
integrated into the existing program.
Question. How much is contained in fiscal year 1999 and in your
outyear plan for additional development of the engine?
Answer. The President's budget proposes $23.6 million in fiscal
year 1999, $29.4 million in fiscal year 2000 and $6.9 million in fiscal
year 2001.
Question. How much more is required above the amount in your
outyear plan in order to achieve development of an engine that could
actually be installed in a ship?
Answer. Current estimates are that about an additional $128 million
will be required in U.S. funding for an engine that could be installed
in a U.S. ship. This assumes that the British and the French contribute
about $60 million in non-cash services as they have proposed to do. The
U.S. Navy is working closely with the Royal Navy to develop lower cost
alternative strategies that meet both services needs.
Question. Last year, the Navy approached the British government
about footing more of the bill for this program. How did the British
react?
Answer. The British reaction was mostly positive. The ICR program
appears to be very important to the British, for their Common New
Generation Frigate and especially for their future carrier. In light of
how important the ICR is to them, the British and the French together
offered to add about $60 million in non-cash services. The U.S.
requirement for an additional $128.4 million is over and above this
offer from our Memorandum of Understanding allies. This $460 million
will only be provided if there are assurances that the U.S. will cover
the $128 million shortfall and commit to at-sea testing on a U.S. ship.
Question. The next class of surface combatants is the SC-21, which
at best will not enter service until 2008. Yes or No: will the ICR
engine be the engine of choice for SC-21?
Answer. While we believe that the ICR engine will be a leading
candidate for industry design teams, the Navy has no intention of
dictating that ICR be used for DD 21 or any other ship acquisition
program.
Question. Under what conditions would the Navy terminate this
program?
Answer. The Navy would terminate this program if the technical
performance of the ICR engine failed to meet our expectations. We would
also cancel the program if the prime contractor demonstrated a
consistent inability to successfully manage the program within the
established costs and schedule criteria. Allied withdrawal from the
program would also result in termination of the ICR development
program.
Question. Admiral Lautenbacher, would you say the ICR technology
merits a $.5 billion investment in this program?
Answer. The Navy expects to reach a decision concerning the U.S.
share of the ICR shortfall as part of fiscal year 2000 budget
development process. There are many factors to consider, including the
ramifications of terminating the Memorandums of Understandings with the
British and the French.
Question. How does the fleet feel about putting ICR engines on
their ships?
Answer. The fleet is concerned about reliability which is
jeopardized by the engine's complexity and the life of the combustion
section life of about 400 hours must be improved to at least 5,000
hours. If the technical problems can be overcome, the projected fuel
savings are of interest to the fleet.
Question. When all costs are considered, including over $.3 billion
in sunk costs, how many years will it take to reach a pay back of the
taxpayer investment in this program?
Answer. Based on an independent analysis by the OSD Cost Analysis
and Improvement Group (CAIG), pay back occurs in 2028, under the most
favorable assumptions for ICR. These assumptions include the largest
possible population of ships with ICR engines (about 80 SC 21
equivalents) and a zero discount rate (out year savings not penalized
for time value). The latest pay back estimated was 2037 under less
favorable assumptions. These analyses showed a strong sensitivity to
the number of ships in the fleet. Sunk costs were not considered in the
analysis.
Defense Features on Commercial Ships
Question. The Congress provided $50 million in fiscal year 1996 to
allow the Navy to reimburse shipbuilders for the costs of including
features on their commercial ships that would be useful to DoD during
wartime. The Navy recently solicited bids for these funds, but did not
get much of a response from industry. Mr. Douglass, what is the status
of the Defense Features portion of the Navy's sealift fund?
Answer. Over the last year, the Navy (through Military Sealift
Command) ran a competition under the National Defense Features program.
Question. What were the results of your solicitation process?
Answer. While there were initially six offerors, all but one
dropped out during the course of the solicitation. The Navy awarded a
single contract to Hvide Van Ommeren for $4.9 million on August 29,
1997 to install refueling stations on the ships.
Question. What causes the apparent lack of interest in the program?
Answer. At the time, the National Defense Features (NDF) Program
was constrained by the pending Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) Shipbuilding Agreement. The Agreement required
the NDF Program to pay only for acquisition, installation and
maintenance of features that had defense utility and required that
operators which used these features to reimburse the government. Most
offerors considered the red tape and accounting to be extremely
cumbersome which deterred competition. Working with U.S. Trade
Representatives over the past year, the Navy has stressed the need for
the pending OECD legislation to be flexible enough to ensure that a
follow-on program could treat the national defense features program as
a service.
Question. The Committee understands that the Navy can consume only
$10 million of the $50 million appropriated. How will you use the
remainder of the funds?
Answer. The Navy only consumed $5 million of the $50 million total.
Of the remaining $45 million, Navy intends to use $40 million primarily
to fund Ready Reserve Force upgrades (strongly supported by
USTRANSCOM). $5 million would remain in the National Defense Sealift
Fund for establishing a renewed NDF approach and solicit industry
interest after issues surrounding the OECD Agreement have been resolved
and future sealift requirements have been determined in a new Mobility
Requirements Study expected to commence the end of calendar year 1998.
Common Support Aircraft (CSA)
Question. The fiscal year 1999 budget requests $27 million in the
R&D to begin a $8 billion R&D effort, leading to a $19 billion
production run, for a new common support aircraft to replace C-2 (COD),
E-2, and S-3 aircraft. Mr. Douglass, what is the Navy's plan to develop
a common support aircraft?
Answer. Common Support Aircraft (CSA) is a phased modernization
program to replace aging and costly E-2C. ES-3A, S-3B, and C-2A
aircraft. The Navy wants to begin exploring a wide range of
alternatives such as derivatives of the E-2 or a possible new start
program that would develop a single, long service life, carrier-based
airframe that could be delivered in different weapon system variants. A
new start program would conceptually utilize a commercial derivative
engine, off-the-shelf million avionics, modular construction, and open
system architecture to achieve high commonality across all variants.
The first task includes a formal Analysis of Alternatives, cost
analyses and up to four industry trade study efforts. Results of the
analyses and studies will be used to determine whether to proceed to
with the new start option or the E-2 derivative option.
Question. The Committee understands that the program before the
Congress is a ten-year R&D effort which, if properly funded, could be
accomplished in five years. Is this accurate? If yes, why not kill it
now and fund it properly starting in 2004?
Answer. The CSA program is properly funded in a profile that is
compatible with affordable recapitalization of Naval Aviation. A
portion of the ten year period is used for the analysis of alternatives
that precedes Engineering & Manufacturing Development (EMD). The actual
EMD profile could be accelerated somewhat into a six-year period (e.g.,
fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2008) but that would increase execution
risk and would require rebalancing all naval aviation modernization and
readiness priorities or adding resources beyond the Navy's current
authority.
Deferring the CSA program by four years to a 2004 start date would
require a significant, yet low return investment to sustain current
aircraft. Subsequent program initiation would still impact naval
aviation priorities to fund what would be a more urgent and critical
fleet modernization program.
Question. How strong is the requirement for these funds in fiscal
year 1999?
Answer. Fiscal year 1999 funding is essential to commence the
variety of critical activities such as the formal Analysis of
Alternatives, cost analyses, and industry concept exploration studies.
Without the requested funds, there is no solid basis from which to
select the path forward.
Dehumidified Preservation of Aircraft
Question. Dehumidification is a method of preventing metal
corrosion by reducing the amount of water vapor in the air. A September
1997 Naval Audit Service report suggests that the Navy could save up to
$331 million between 1998 and 2003 after investment costs if it were to
apply dehumidification technology to reduce depot maintenance actions,
provide better care for aircraft in attrition reserve, and preserve
Reserve aircraft during variances in training cycles. Admiral
Lautenbacher, the auditors make it sound simple: invest $100 million in
aircraft dehumidification equipment and save $400 million on aircraft
maintenance. What have you done to implement the Naval Audit Service
recommendations?
Answer. The Navy has not acted upon the Naval Audit Service
recommendations to date. We have concerns with its findings, dispute
the savings cited in their report, and have requested more detail. For
example, the report claims savings based upon reduced maintenance
actions equating to immediate reductions in manpower at the
organizational, intermediate and depot level, and that other deferred
maintenance actions would be funded in ``later'' years. Additionally,
we are concerned with the added workload involved with using
dehumidification equipment and the difficulties of using this equipment
at sea. We received Naval Audit Service's latest finding update on
March 10 and will complete our analysis of this new information by
April 30, 1998.
Question. Mr. Douglass, have you and Admiral Lautenbacher even
taken a briefing on this subject from your Naval Audit Service?
Answer. Neither Mr. Douglass nor Admiral Lautenbacher were
personally briefed. However, Naval Audit Service personnel briefed Mr.
Schaefer and Mr. Stussie (Deputy Assistant Secretaries to Mr. Douglass)
on the audit of Dehumidified Preservation of Aircraft (Report 052-97)
on June 11, 1997. Additionally, Admiral Lautenbacher's Deputy, Mr.
Blickstein was briefed on June 12, 1997.
Question. Did you know that the Naval Audit Service is located in
the National Capital Region?
Answer. We are very aware of the Audit service presence in the
National Capitol Region.
Question. Is the Naval Audit Service off-target? If yes, on what
basis do you make this judgment?
Answer We believe the Naval Audit Service finding is ``off-
target''. The initial report did not adequately document savings and
the assumptions upon which they were based. We cannot invest money
unless we are confident that the savings will actually materialize. We
received more information from the Naval Audit Service on March 10,
1998, and we should complete our analysis by April 30, 1998.
Question. If Congress provided additional funds in fiscal year
1999, how much could prudently be spent to implement the Naval Audit
Service recommendations?
Answer. We will make our recommendation by May 1, 1998, after
completing the analysis of the additional information provided by the
Naval Audit Service.
Infrared Detection of Advanced Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles
Question. Our nation has developed stealthy attack missiles, like
TSSAM and the Advanced Cruise Missile, which are nearly undetectable to
radars. It is only a matter of time until other nations field advanced
stealthy anti-ship missiles that could someday threaten a Navy ship.
Once radar detection becomes limited, infrared (heat-sensing) detection
becomes critical. Unfortunately, a number of Congressional Committees
continue to point out each year that the Navy does not have a plan
leading to development and fielding of infrared anti-ship missile
equipment for surface ships. Admiral Lautenbacher, would you agree with
this characterization of the problem?
Answer. Electro-optical and infrared sensors are complementary
systems for other combat system detection elements. Navy has valid
requirements for radar systems, electronic surveillance and attack as
well as infrared sensing system. Although future high-technology
threats you speak of are feasible, none are validated Defense
Intelligence Agency threats and are not expected to appear before 2013.
The radar systems we are fielding and developing are more than adequate
to defeat all known and valid threats. The multi-function radar,
introduced for development in the fiscal year 1999 President's Budget,
is designed to provide capability against the most stressing
technologically feasible threat. Additionally, the SLY-2 Advanced
Integrated Electronic Warfare System was recently authorized to proceed
into the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase. This system
is designed to counter radio frequency homing missiles that are still
expected to comprise the majority of anti-ship cruise missiles for as
long as we can forecast. Because infrared sensing systems cannot
provide all weather capability, these advanced radar and electronic
surveillance systems must be in place in our ships to counter the most
stressing anti-ship cruise missiles. Consequently, they are considered
a priority for fielding before an infrared surveillance system.
Question. Do fleet CINCs want infrared detectors on their ships?
Answer. There is a valid requirement for both an infra-red
surveillance and tracking system as well as a thermal imaging sensor
system.
Question. Is there a technical reason why the Navy could not
develop and quickly field advanced IRST devices?
Answer. No. It is purely an affordable issue. The only systems
available are too expensive to develop and field at the expense of
other more critical programs.
Question. How much is contained in the fiscal year 1999 budget for
surface ship IRST development?
Answer. $983,000 is in the fiscal year 1999 Budget request to
complete the at-sea demonstration and validation of an IRST system. The
demonstration and validation is scheduled to be completed in early
fiscal year 1999.
Question. How much is contained in the future years defense plan
accompanying the fiscal year 1999 budget?
Answer. No funds are contained in the Future Years Defense Program.
Question. Under existing Navy plans, when is the first year that a
surface ship IRST device for ship self-defense purposes will be fielded
to the fleet?
Relate this to the previous question on CINC requirements.
Answer. Currently, Navy has no plans to field an infrared search
and track capability in the surface fleet. We intend to complete in
early fiscal year 1999 the at sea demonstration which Congress
authorized in fiscal year 1998. We acknowledge a valid requirement for
an infrared search and track capability and intend to monitor advances
in the technology to potentially take advantage of more affordable
options.
Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) and the Rolling Airframe Missile
(RAM)
Question: Admiral Lautenbacher, the Navy has recently decided to
forego integration of the ESSM close-in ship defense missile on LPD 17
in favor of RAM Block 1 missile. Yet on the DDG-51 class destroyers,
the Navy has opted to integrate ESSM and not RAM. The Navy has
indicated that RAM Block 1 can defeat any postulated threat through the
year 2012. Both ESSM and RAM are international cooperative programs.
Admiral, why is RAM good enough for LPD-17 but not good enough for the
DDG-51?
Answer. Navy's individual ships class Maritime Force Protection
planning is based on providing the most cost-effective force protection
possible force wide, consistent with available funding. Furthermore,
all ship classes will receive or retain a level of force protection
consistent with their expected service life and potential exposure to
operational threat environments.
To ensure appropriate Maritime Force Protection capability across
the battle force, the same rigor used to select the Anti-Air Warfare
(AAW) self defense configuration for DDG-51 Flight IIA ships was
applied to ships such as the LPD-17, with primary missions other than
air defense. When operating independently, LPD 17 will be as capable as
any other ship to deal with expected self-defense threat levels in the
normal operating environment.
To accomplish this in the LPD 17 design, Navy has invested heavily
in the benefits of Radar Cross Section (RCS) reduction combined with
softkill (NULKA) capability. This combination provides a fundamental
shift in warfighting philosophy for this amphibious ship class. In
addition, RAM hardkill provides the firepower and performance necessary
to meet Navy CAPSTONE requirements and Congressional guidance against
the validated threat. The Anti-Air Warfare combat system configuration
for the LPD-17 class, selected after careful analysis, meets all
threats through 2012 with growth potential provided to meet far term
threats when defined.
In 1992, Navy decided to launch all hard kill weapons in the DDG 51
Flight IIA from the MK-41 Vertical Launching System. Consequently,
vertically launched ESSM was the self defense weapon selected for this
class of ships. At that time, RAM Block I performance was not know. The
Aegis SPY-1D(V), in DDG-79 and above, is the only US radar today that
can fully exploit ESSM missile midcourse guidance capability in the
near land environment. The performance of the Aegis/ESSM combination
provides superior ship self defense capability. Combined with the
advanced RCS reduction and soft-kill systems planned for this ship, the
ESSM/SPY-ID(V) combination allows DDG-79 and above to meet Navy AAW
self defense CAPSTONE requirements. It would not be cost effective to
reverse the 1992 decision, and reconfigure the DDG's for RAM vice ESSM.
Navy's decision to install ESSM in DDG-79 and above is the most
operationally effective and affordable option for forward fit in this
class.
Question. Why do we need to buy ESSM now when RAM Block 1 can
defeat the threat until at least 2012?
Answer. Navy requirements for Maritime Force Protection of surface
ships are contained in the Ship Class AAW Self Defense CAPSTONE
Requirements Document, which was approved by the Chief of Naval
Operations in February, 1996. This document specified the ship self
defense anti-air warfare contribution for each ship type and spells out
the raid size, density, and required Probability of Raid Annihilation
(PRA) for battle force and amphibious ready group ships. Furthermore,
it identifies the operational environments that may be encountered in
the post-Cold War era.
Navy utilizes a combat systems approach to validate each ship
class's performance against this CAPSTONE requirement. All systems in
the detect through engage sequence are modeled against the validated
Defense Intelligence Agency threats. No one system is good enough, by
itself, to meet the CAPSTONE performance requirements. For engagement
systems, both soft-kill and hard-kill systems are required to meet the
required measures of effectiveness. The answer to the previous question
laid out the requirements for ESSM in the DDG-51 class. For other very
large ship classes, including CV/CVN ships, where soft-kill systems are
ineffective, multiple hard-kill systems will be required to meet the
expected threat level. In these ships RAM Block 1 alone is not capable
of meeting the threat. The existing NATO Sea Sparrow Missile Systems
require upgrade, to include the capability to fire ESSM, to adequately
defend against the projected threat.
Question. Compare the average unit cost of ESSM to RAM Block 1 and
state all assumptions.
Answer. RAM and ESSM Cost Comparison for DDG-51 Flight IIA ships:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost Category RAM Block 1 ESSM
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Launcher Installation....................... \1\ $8.5 \3\ None
million
Missile Cost................................ \2\ $.35 \2\ $.5
million million
Cost Per Round.......................... \4\ $.74 $.5 million
million
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Two 11-shot RAM launchers.
\2\ Missile hardware costs only.
\3\ ESSM fired from MK-41 VLS.
\4\ Includes cost of launcher and missiles.
Question. What would be the cost to integrate RAM Block 1 on DDGs?
Answer. Integrating RAM Block 1 into the DDG-51 Flight IIA ships
authorized for construction would require inclusion in two planned
Aegis Baselines. The total integration (computer system integration
only) cost for both baselines is estimated at $28 million. Because of
the tight timelines associated with the major capability changes (TBMD
& CEC) included in these two baselines, a computer program including
RAM would not be available until 2002 at the earliest, to support
delivery of these ships. Additional costs would also be incurred to
procure the launchers and missiles, conduct chip configuration
modification studies, and for system installation.
Question. What is the cost to integrate ESSM on DDGs?
Answer. There is no additional cost associated with integrating
ESSM into the DDG 51 Flight IIA ships. The Aegis Baseline 6 and 7
programs planned for these ships have always incorporated ESSM
capability in their development.
Question. Based on the current funded program, what other platforms
will get ESSM and when is the IOC on these other platforms? Would RAM
Block 1 be suitable for these other platforms? Why or why not?
Answer. LHDs are expected to receive an inherent ESSM capability
in/about 2003. CV and LHD platforms will eventually be equipped with
ESSM. When CVN 76 delivers and CVN 68 completes her Reactor Complex
Overhaul (planned for 2001), their combat systems will have the
inherent ability to fire ESSM. RAM Block 1 hardkill alone does not
provide adequate self-defense for these ship classes. Since their radar
cross section is too large to take advantage of NULKA decoys, CVN and
LHD class ships require two hardkill systems to meet Navy CAPSTONE
Requirements. Therefore, Navy plans include incorporation of ESSM
capability in CVN/LHD classes.
Question. How long is the anticipated production run for ESSM?
Answer. The last order year for ESSM production is planned in
fiscal year 2008 with delivery in fiscal year 2010. The MOU terminates
December 26, 2011, unless all signatories agree to extend it.
Question. What would be the impact of the Navy buying ESSM at the
tail end of the international cooperative program when the threat
merits versus buying at the front end?
Answer. This is the only self defense weapon designated for DDG 79
and above. Delay of ESSM until the end of the production run would
leave these ships with no near-term self defense capability.
Additionally, the MOU requires production support at a fixed level even
if we do not procure the quantities currently planned in the near term.
However, if the US portion of the missile procurement is deferred to
the outyears, outyears production support funding levels would increase
dramatically.
Tactical Tomahawk
Question. Mr. Douglass, the Navy is proposing to terminate the
Tomahawk Baseline Improvement Program (TBIP) in favor of a new program
called Tactical Tomahawk. Please explain the advantages of the Tactical
Tomahawk program and why the Navy believes the program is worth the two
year delay in Initial Operating Capability (IOC)?
Answer. The Tactical Tomahawk program is the Navy's best option to
fill long-term inventory objectives. It delivers a more capable missile
at a greatly reduced cost (Tactical Tomahawk: $569,000 each; either
Block III or IV: over $1.2 million each) while providing an open
production line should we need even greater production in the future.
Additional advantages that support a two year delay in IOC are:
The Commanders-in-Chiefs agree that 2,800 Tomahawks will
be sufficient inventory to cover the period of delay in IOC.
Tactical Tomahawk would put an additional 700 missiles in
the inventory, at the same total program cost as the current Tomahawk
program.
Fleet Commanders gain responsiveness and flexibility due
to mission planning on each shooter, inflight retargeting, and an
onboard camera system. (Not funded in the current program.)
The Tactical Tomahawk 1990's technology addresses
obsolescence and high operation and support costs. The current Tomahawk
is 1970's technology.
Tactical Tomahawk brings a new production line through the
year 2008. Current plans call for new production line to close in the
year 2000 for the Tomahawk Block III and the remanufacture line for the
Tomahawk Baseline Improvement Program, Block IV to remain open after
2000.
Question. Because Tomahawk missiles have been relatively expensive
and require intensive mission planning, they have been primarily used
against high value ``strategic'' targets. The Navy has advertised that
lower unit costs and simplified targeting will give the weapon a
tactical capability. However, if we include the cost of the additional
R&D required for the new missile, its acquisition unit cost is
equivalent to or possibly more than TBIP. Mr. Douglass, if Tactical
Tomahawk costs the same or more as TBIP, would the Navy really be
willing to use it in a tactical role against lower value targets?
Answer. Tactical Tomahawk's improved operational capabilities were
specifically intended to provide the warfighting Commaner in Chief(s)
(CINCs) with more options against tactical targets. The genesis of the
Tactical Tomahawk initiative was to have a more responsive and flexible
missile for the warfighters. If the inventory requirements increase or
large quantities of missiles are expended, the follow-on Tactical
Tomahawk production will cost less than 50% of the Tomahawk Baseline
Improvement Program (TBIP) for the same quantity. Tactical Tomahawk
research, development, and production is estimated to cost less than
completing TBIP.
Question. Cost estimates for production of Tactical Tomahawk are
currently based on future congressional approval of a multiyear
procurement contract. Mr. Douglass, how many missiles over how many
years would be under the multiyear contract?
Answer. The contract offer for $569,000 (unit cost) requires a
commitment of purchasing 1353 Tactical Tomahawk missiles within a six
year period.
Question. If a future Congress opts to not approve the multiyear,
what would be the projected increase in procurement cost given the same
year quantity purchases (then year dollars and percent)?
Answer. Without multi-year procurement authority the cost of
Tactical Tomahawk will increase approximately 7.5-12.5% to $612,000-
$640,000 based on a purchase price of $569,000 per missile.
Question. Last year, the Navy argued that one reason it did not
wish to pursue the JASSM program is that SLAM-ER could take the service
through the year 2010 when hypersonic missiles would be available.
Compare the capabilities of a hypersonic missile and tactical Tomahawk.
Answer. The Office of Naval Research is investigating the concept
of a hypersonic missile, hence it is difficult to compare the
capabilities of the two missiles. However, the following assumptions
may be applicable:
--A hypersonic missile will probably have less range (700nm versus
approximately 1600nm) than Tactical Tomahawk. If air launched, this
implies possible risk to the aircrews.
--Requires the same type of mission planning as Tactical Tomahawk
to achieve the same level of precision.
--Response time (sensor to target) would be less with hypersonic
missile.
--Estimated cost of hypersonic missile development and production
would probably be more than Tactical Tomahawk.
--Technical, cost, schedule risk for hypersonic missile are very
high versus low technical and moderate cost/schedule risks for Tactical
Tomahawk.
--Tactical Tomahawk also provides an open design to facilitate
alternate payload growth while hypersonic delivery of anything other
than a unitary warhead would be difficult.
Question. Where do we stand on the development of hypersonic
missile?
Answer. Hypersonic missile is in the risk reduction study phase.
Question. Given the current state of development, is it reasonable
to assume a hypersonic missile can be deployed in the 2010 timeframe?
Answer. We do not yet have sufficient data upon which to base a
definitive estimate. However, the current studies are generating the
necessary data.
Question. The Navy is projecting operations and support savings
with Tactical Tomahawk as compared to TBIP assuming a 30 year service
life for the new missile. Is this a reasonable service life assumption
given the potential availability of hypersonic weapons within 8 years
of Tactical Tomahawk Initial Operational Capability (IOC)?
Answer. Yes. The 30 year life cycle encompasses the second
recertification period of Tactical Tomahawk. The bulk of costs would
accrue between 15 and 20 years during the first recertification. The
Warfighting Commanders-in-Chief want to increase the inventory as soon
as possible, but are willing to accept a brief delay for the larger
inventory and additional capabilities afforded by Tactical Tomahawk.
Eight years may be an overly optimistic estimate for hypersonics, but
eight years is an unacceptable delay for inventory growth.
Aerostat Program
Question. The Army is requesting $103 million to continue the Joint
Army/Navy Aerostat program, now called the Joint Land Attack Cruise
Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS). Last year, this
committee recommended that the Aerostat program be terminated, but did
not prevail in conference. Instead the conferees appropriated
$35,000,000, a decrease of $51,193,000 from the budget request. Please
explain the JLENS concept. How will the Navy deploy JLENS and what will
be its mission?
Answer. JLENS is designed to detect, track and provide fire control
quality data in a sensor-netted network against the overland cruise
missile threat. JLENS could support final illumination requirements in
an over-the-horizon engagement in support of overland cruise missile
defense.
Navy does not plan to procure or deploy JLENS at sea. Navy interest
lies in ensuring integration of critical sensors in a Joint Composite
Tracking Network (JCTN); CEC is phase I of the JCTN.
Question. Why do you need a JLENS? What other systems (either
fielded or in development) could be used to do the JLENS mission?
Answer. Elevated sensors, netted together to form composite tracks
are critical to detect low flying, low radar cross section cruise
missiles. Airborne fire control is required to conduct over-the-horizon
engagements at the full kinematic capability of Standard Missile (SM-
2). Upgrades to surveillance aircraft including E-2C Hawkeye and E-3
AWACS and aircraft with airborne fire control could fulfill this
mission.
Question. Secretary Douglass, the DoD is requesting $103 million in
fiscal year 1999 for JLENS demonstration. The demonstration will cost
$400 million--the Army has told us the program is underfunded by $86
million. Are you willing to offset the shortfall within the Navy
budget?
Answer. No. Navy cannot support reductions in other much needed
programs to offset the JLENS demonstration.
Question. In what fiscal year will the Navy begin procuring JLENS?
Answer. Navy has no plans to procure JLENS.
Question. Do you have funds budgeted in the outyears for JLENS? If
so what years and how much?
Answer. JLENS is a Joint Advanced Technology Demonstration Army-led
program with Navy interest due to Standard Missile support and CEC.
Navy does not provide funding for JLENS. JLENS provides funds for
Standard Missile (SM-2 BLK 1) development and CEC integration.
CH-60 Helicopter
Question. The Navy plans to retire its logistics and cargo
helicopters and replace them with a Black Hawk derivative, the CH-60.
In fiscal year 1998, Congress provided $31 million for the development
of the CH-60. Congress also appropriated $31 million above the budget
request to procure two CH-60 helicopters for the Navy Reserve. This
year the Navy is requesting $152 million to complete testing and
procure four CH-60 helicopters. Recently the Navy has stated that the
CH-60 research and development program is underfunded by $21 million in
fiscal year 1998. Based on your current budget, what is the status of
the CH-60 program--will it be delayed?
Answer. The CH-60 program could be delayed, based on current
budget. However, we are considering alternative program structures, and
so the CH-60 program is continuing to move to a Milestone II/Low Rate
Initial Production decision in fiscal year 1998.
Question. What activities are unfunded in fiscal year 1998?
Answer. The Navy is still reviewing any potential unfunded
requirements in the areas of manufacturing (such as modification of
production drawings), tooling and logistics activities.
Question. Currently the fiscal year 1998 procurement funds are on
OSD withhold pending approval from the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB).
When are you anticipating a DAB decision?
Answer. We anticipate a DAB decision in the third quarter of fiscal
year 1998.
Question. What is the impact if the CH-60 procurement funds are not
released?
Answer. The government may be unable to meet its contracted
obligation to provide Government Furnished Equipment 90 days prior to
aircraft delivery.
Question. It is our understanding that the Navy would like to
reprogram $12 million of the fiscal year 1998 funds appropriated for
one CH-60 aircraft to research and development. Why?
Answer. The Navy has not decided whether a reprogramming is
required. The Cost Analysis Improvement Group independent cost estimate
indicated the preliminary RDT&E estimates were low. As the program has
gained more definition, the estimates have become better defined. This
later estimate shows a larger amount of RDT&E funding could be
required.
Question. What is the impact if the reprogramming is not approved?
Answer. The Navy is still assessing whether a reprogramming is
required to avoid deferring some tasks, potentially delaying the
program.
Question. If the research and development shortfall is not fixed,
can you still enter production is fiscal year 1999?
Answer. The Navy is still reviewing if shortfalls exist in fiscal
year 1998 and the resultant impact on production in fiscal year 1999.
Question. Last year, the Navy told this Committee that it was not
premature to appropriate funds for production aircraft. Less than six
months later you are requesting that we allow you to reprogram a
portion of the procurement funds to research and development. Please
explain what has changed. Will you still procure one CH-60 aircraft
with the fiscal year 1998 funds?
Answer. Since meeting the Committee, the Navy has conducted an in-
depth cost analysis in conjunction with OSD. The findings of that
analysis indicated a potential $21.5 million R&D funding shortfall in
fiscal years 1998 and 1999.
Once the design is complete, the Navy intends to procure CH-60
aircraft with the fiscal year 1998 funds.
Question. Last year, the Navy CH-60 budget proposed procuring six
helicopters in fiscal year 1999. However, your fiscal year 1999 budget
submission reduces the level of funding, allowing you to procure only 4
aircraft. Why did the production quantities change?
Answer. Congress provided Aircraft Procurement, Navy, funding in
fiscal year 1998 to procure two aircraft for the Naval Reserves. As
design efforts were incomplete, we were unable to procure those
aircraft in fiscal year 1998, but rather delayed them to fiscal year
1999, which is the timeframe for the first scheduled production lot of
CH-60s. Two aircraft from fiscal year 1999 were then reprogrammed to
the fiscal year 2000 procurement to reduce risks to the program in the
early stages of production. This was intended to allow the Navy to meet
its obligations to the Army's multiyear contract with minimal or no
delay to aircraft delivery to the fleet.
SH-60R Helicopter
Question. To reduce cost and infrastructure associated with its
anti-submarine and surface warfare platforms, the Navy will
remanufacture SEAHAWK (SH-60B)/SH-60F/HH-60) helicopters to a multi-
mission helicopter, the SH-60R. For fiscal year 1999, the Navy is
requesting $358 million for the SH-60R development program. The funding
is to continue Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) and
procure three test aircraft. What is the status of the SH-60R program?
Answer. The SH-60R program is currently in Engineering
Manufacturing and Development post Milestone II. Most development
hardware is in assembly. The first drop of software has been completed.
The first prototype aircraft has undergone re-configuration at Sikorsky
Aircraft, Stratford, CT, and has been delivered to Lockheed-Martin,
Oswego, NY, for avionics equipment installation, grooming and
contractor test in preparation for the planned DT/OT test period in
fiscal year 1999 to support the first Low Rate Initial Production
decision mid fiscal year 2000.
Question. It is our understanding that the Navy will request that
additional funds be reprogrammed in fiscal year 1998 for the SH-60R
development program. Please explain which planned activities are not
funded in fiscal year 1998.
Answer. The Navy has not decided whether to reprogram any funds
into SH-60R.
Question. What is the impact if the fiscal year 1998 reprogramming
is not approved?
Answer. The Navy has not decided whether to reprogram any funds
into SH-60R.
Question. The Airborne Low Frequency Sonar (ALFS), which is part of
the SH-60R upgrade program experienced reliability issues during
initial testing. Please describe the reliability issues and the
recommended fixes.
Answer. Three reliability issues were discovered during initial
ALFS system testing. These include: a compass failure in the
transducer, a reeling machine drum failure, and a back-up optical
sensor system failure for the reeling machine.
Fixes are in work for all three of these reliability issues. The
fixes include redesign of cabling in the transducer for the compass
problem, a change to a composite drum for the reeling machine, and the
optic sensor system is being re-engineered.
Question. The Navy estimates that it will require an additional $15
million to implement the recommended fixes to reliability problems
discovered during testing. Is funding included in the budget to
implement the fixes to ALFS? If not, how will you fund the required
changes?
Answer. The funding for resolution of these fixes is programmed
within the SH-60R program. This unanticipated funding requirement will
be at the expense of some acoustic system automation intended to
optimize system performance in the littoral.
Question. In fiscal year 1998, the Congress appropriated an
additional $15 million for the SH-60R program for avionics. What is the
status of the funds? When do you anticipate obligating the funds?
Answer. Some of the funds were used to support initial system
design in preparation for the Common Cockpit System Design Review. The
remainder are scheduled for contract award during March 1998.
Helicopter Avionics Commonality
Question. The Navy believes it will reduce logistics and
infrastructure costs by developing identical avionics and cockpits for
the SH-60R and the CH-60 helicopters which are currently in
development. The CH-60, which is primarily a transport helicopter, will
receive the same sophisticated avionics required by the multi-mission
SH-60R helicopter. The SH-60R will perform anti-submarine and surface
warfare.
What is the status of the cockpit development program?
Answer. The cockpit development program remains on schedule. System
Design Review (SDR) was held January 14 and 15, 1998. Preliminary
Design Review (PDR) is scheduled for the last week of April. Critical
Design Review (CDR) is planned for early July.
The cockpit is not expected to experience the usual delays, as the
current contractor has a reputation for on time delivery of avionics
components. The majority of the hardware and software have also been
previously developed, further reducing the risk of delay.
The cockpit and its immediate avionics are one of three major
avionics systems in the Navy's future H-60 series helicopters. The
common cockpit is integrated to the mission and survivability avionics
systems peculiar to each H-60 series. This allows the cockpit to
support the same basic flight duties in every H-60, and the other
systems to support the individual mission aspects of each helicopter
series.
Question. What is the estimated cost of the program?
Answer. The estimated cost of the avionics program is $59 million.
Question. Fiscal year 1999 is the first year of CH-60 production.
Based on the fiscal year 1999 budget, will the common cockpit be ready
for integration on the CH-60?
Answer. Yes. Development and test plans are on schedule.
Question. Do you have adequate funding?
Answer. Yes. The funds are adequate to support the current
commercial technology insertion plan.
Question. What is the impact on the CH-60 program if the common
cockpit schedule slips?
Answer. If common cockpit slips, the CH-60 first production lot
aircraft (five aircraft) will be produced with a commercially available
cockpit that was flown in the CH-60 demonstration aircraft in fiscal
year 1997. This commercial cockpit contains some of the hardware
required in the Common Cockpit. The remaining production lots will be
outfitted with the Common Cockpit.
Question. If the cockpit development program slips, the Navy will
integrate an interim cockpit on the CH-60. Later, those CH-60's will be
retrofit with the common cockpit. What is the anticipated unit cost of
the retrofit program?
Answer. Although an in-depth analysis has not been conducted, the
anticipated unit cost is approximately $1.0 million.
Light Weight 155mm Howitzer
Question. The fiscal year 1999 budget requests $35.4 million for
the development of the Marine Corps Light Weight 155mm Howitzer
program. Last year, the Marine Corps included the Light Weight Howitzer
on their shortfall list and the Congress provided an additional $3
million for the program.
Secretary Douglass, it is our understanding that during the fiscal
year 1999 budget build, the Light Weight 155mm Howitzer program was
decremented because funds were added in fiscal year 1998 by the
Congress. Why would you reduce funds for a program you asked us to
accelerate? Please explain.
Answer. The fiscal year 1998 Budget Enhancement was requested for
P3I integration. Congress increased the program by $3.6 million. The
fiscal year 1999 reduction for the same amount, $3.6 million, was taken
by the Department, which inaccurately assumed the fiscal year 1998
budget enhancement accelerated the program.
Question. How will the fiscal year 1998 funds be spent? Does the
budget request continue those activities planned in fiscal year 1998
for fiscal year 1999? If not, which activities are not fully funded?
Answer. The fiscal year 1998 funds will be spent on basic
engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) and pre-planned product
improvement (P3I item integration to manufacture the test fixtures and
design the gun to accept P3I items.
The fiscal year 1999 budget request funds the continuation of basic
EMD. There is no ``tail'' associated with the fiscal year 1998
Congressional plus-up. However, testing efforts and capability may be
less than optimal due to the Marine Corps pursuit of P3I integration,
necessary, during fiscal year 1998 to maintain the design schedule, and
the Departments decision to decrement fiscal year 1999 by $3.6M
(consistent with the fiscal year 1998 add).
The original development schedule remains unchanged and the LW
155mm Howitzer program completes EMD in fiscal year 2000. The fiscal
year 1999 request for PMC supports both long lead material and
production line facilitization and setup. The actual cannon production
begins in fiscal year 2000.
Question. Based on the fiscal year 1999 request, what is the
current schedule for the Light Weight 155mm program?
Answer. The original development schedule remains unchanged and
completes engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) in fiscal
year 2000. The fiscal year 1999 request for PMC supports long lead
material and production line facilitization setup. Cannon production
begins in fiscal year 2000.
Logistics Vehicle System Replacement Program
Question. The Marine Corps is requesting $900,000 to begin the
Logistics Vehicle System Replacement Program (LVSR) for its existing
heavy cargo transport fleet. The Marine Corps plans on spending $15
million to develop the LVSR. Fiscal Year 1999 funding will be used for
``demonstration and validation.'' During this time the Marine Corps
will determine the most cost effective way to modernize the current
fleet.
Please explain the LVSR acquisition strategy and funding
requirements.
Answer. Shortly after the fiscal year 1999 President's Budget was
submitted, the LVSR schedule was updated to reflect a Low Rate Initial
Production (LRIP) phase. The new schedule is attached. A two year LRIP
contract will be awarded in fiscal year 2003 and the Milestone III (MS-
III) is then scheduled in fiscal year 2005. The Operational Test I (OT-
I) was incorporated concurrently with Developmental Test II (DT-II).
The list of events comprise the current LVSR schedule as follows:
The LVSR program is now in the Concept Exploration phase of
research and development and employs streamlined acquisition. An
Analysis of Alternatives, an Early Operational Assessment, and a
Development Test I are scheduled during fiscal year 1999 for $910
thousand. A Combined MSI/II decision is planned in fiscal year 2000 for
$1.031 million. Engineering and Manufacturing Development prototype
contract award is scheduled in fiscal year 2001 for $5.517 million.
Development Test II and an update of the Operational Testing I are
scheduled in fiscal year 2002 for $6.507 million. A two year Low Rate
Initial Production contract will be awarded in fiscal year 2003 with an
RDT&E cost of $979 thousand and Procurement Marine Corps (PMC) cost of
$31.807 million. Milestone III, approval for full production, is
planned in fiscal year 2005.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Question. Please explain the three LVSR replacement options that
you are evaluating: new vehicle, rebuy, or remanufacture.
Answer. An Analysis of Alternatives will begin in fiscal year 1999
to determine greatest Cost and Operational Effectiveness for replacing
the existing Logistics Vehicle System (LVS). Alternatives include
replacing the current LVS with a completely new vehicle,
remanufacturing the existing LVS to enhance its capability, rebuilding
the existing LVS to original standards, or a Service Life Extension
Program for the LVS.
Question. What criteria are you using to determine the winner of
the demonstration and validation phase--operational requirements,
price, and/or contractors past performance? Is the source selection for
this program based on hardware testing or a paper concept? Please
explain.
Answer. All of the criteria above will be used to downselect to the
winner of the LVSR program demonstration and validation phase. The
current strategy is to combine Milestone I and Milestone II decisions
if possible. Development source selection will probably be based upon a
paper concept. Production source selection will be based upon hardware
testing.
Question. What is the procurement profile for the LVSR program?
What is the acquisition objective and funding profile?
Answer. LVSR acquisitions are currently planned as follows: fiscal
year 2003, 152 vehicles; fiscal year 2004, 450 vehicles; fiscal year
2005, 1,130 vehicles; to Completion 2,218 vehicles. The total
acquisition objective is 3,950 vehicles. The total funding estimate for
RDT&E,N is $15 million and the total funding estimate for PMC is $838
million.
Question. The Army is requesting procurement funds in Fiscal Year
1999 for heavy tactical vehicles.
How do your requirements differ from the Army's heavy tactical
vehicle requirements?
Answer. The Marine Corps uses one vehicle system while the Army
uses three different vehicle fleets. Differences between the Army and
Marine Corps in Logistics Vehicle System requirements include air
transportability by fixed wing aircraft of the assembled logistics
vehicle system, ship transportability with a turning radius under 34
feet, air transportability by CH-53E helicopter when the logistics
vehicle system is separated into front and rear units, a mission
profile of 70% on-road and 30% off-road, and detachable/interchangeable
front and rear body units. The Army's heavy tactical vehicle (HEMMT) is
a single unit without interchangeable/detachable front and rear body
units.
Question. Could the Army's heavy tactical vehicle fleet satisfy
Marine Corps requirements? Why or why not?
Answer. The Army's heavy tactical fleet cannot satisfy the Marine
Corps requirements. The Marine Corps Logistics Vehicle System must be
air transportable by fixed wing aircraft of the assembled logistics
vehicle system, ship transportable with turning radius under 38 feet,
air transportable by CH-53E helicopter when the logistics vehicle
system is separated into front and rear units, capable of mission
profiles of 70% on-road and 30% off-road, and capable of detachable/
interchangeable front and rear body units. The Army's vehicle is only
transportable by a C-5 or C-17, not transportable by helo. The Army's
vehicle cannot meet the required turning radius. The Army's heavy
tactical vehicle HEMMT is a single unit and with a flat bed or wrecker.
This trailer configuration is not interchangeable.
Light Tactical Vehicle Replacement
Question. The Marine Corps is requesting $39 million to procure 714
High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) to replace HMMWV's
that were fielded in the 1980's. Based on the budget, the Marine Corps
will replace \1/14\th of the fleet each year.
What is the condition of the Marine Corps light tactical vehicle
fleet?
Answer. The Marine Corps has critical reliability, availability,
maintainability and durability concerns for the HMMWV fleet. In
addition, corrosion problems arising from both fleet age and its
operations in a maritime (salt spray) environment now require beginning
the replacement of the Marine Corps' aging HMMWV fleet. A recent HMMWV
fleet corrosion study conducted by the Naval Surface Warfare Center has
found that the vehicles surveyed had severely corroded frame rails that
no longer complied with the minimum metal width (thickness) structure
specifications from the manufacturer.
Question. Please explain the Light Tactical Vehicle Replacement
(LTVR) acquisition strategy. What is the cost of the program? What is
your acquisition objective?
Answer. The LTVR acquisition strategy is to procure new model A2
HMMWVs from the US Army to replace the existing HMMWVs. This strategy
is pending the March 1998 approval of the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy for Research Development and Acquisition. The strategy is to
procure 7% of acquisition objective each year over a 14 year time
frame. This time frequency is consistent with the HMMWV useful life
span. Total PMC cost between fiscal year 1998 and fiscal year 2013 is
$1.3 billion in Future Year Defense Plan dollars. The acquisition
objective for the HMMWV is 19,280 vehicles.
Question. At the request of the Marine Corps, Congress added $30
million in fiscal year 1998 to being the HMMWV Service Life Extension
Program (SLEP). This year you are requesting $39 million to procure new
HMMWV's.
Have you decided against a HMMWV SLEP program? Why?
What will you use the fiscal year 1998 funds for?
What is the status of the fiscal year 1998 funds? When will they be
obligated?
Answer. Based upon documented HMMWV corrosion conditions, we
believe it may be more cost effective and efficient to buy new vehicles
than to remanufacture old ones. Recent LTVR analyses of alternatives
studies indicate that the current production HMMWV A2 vehicle, now
being procured by the Army, may be the preferred alternative to meet
the LTVR requirement. Pending a 31 March 1998 approval of this
alternative by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research
Development and Acquisition ((ASN(RDA)), the Marine Corps LTVR and
HMMWV programs will be combined.
The fiscal year 1998 funds will be used to procure 530 new A2
HMMWVs. These funds are currently on OSD withhold. OSD will release
funds in conjunction with the ASN(RDA) decision. Funds obligation is
planned for the 3rd quarter of fiscal year 1998, with production
beginning in July 1998 and deliveries starting in August 1998.
Question. According to the contractor, the government must annually
procure 2,300 HMMWV's to maintain a production line. The Marine Corps
fiscal year budget only procures 714 vehicles. The Army's fiscal year
1999 budget request for HMMWV's includes funding for only 10 new
vehicles.
At this low rate, will the contractor produce sufficient HMMWV's in
fiscal year 1999 to keep the production line open? Please explain.
How does this low level of production impact overhead rates?
Answer. Both the Army and Marine Corps fiscal year 1999 HMMWV
procurements will be exercised through Firm Fixed Price options to an
existing Army contract. The total quantity of vehicles for the fiscal
year 1999 option on the contract are funded in the Marine Corps budget
and in the Army's expressed intent to reprogram fiscal year 1999 funds
from their HMMWV rebuild line to their new HMMWV production line. These
fiscal year 1999 funds support a total of 714 Marine Corps vehicles and
677 Army vehicles. Therefore, the total funded fiscal year 1999
vehicles will be 1,391 or 909 less than the minimum economic production
rate of 2,300 vehicles. Given the potential for both Foreign Military
Sales and continuing commercial sales, as well as existing backlog, AM
General has communicated no indication of a necessity to close the
production line in fiscal year 1999.
Question. Your budget proposes to procure approximately 1,100
HMMWV's annually until the Marine Corps requirement is satisfied.
Is your outyear budget price based on an annual production rate
price of 2,300 vehicles?
What impact does a reduced production rate have on the price of
HMMWV's?
It is our understanding that fiscal year 1999 is the last year of a
fixed price contract for HMMWV's. What is the unit cost for HMMWV's in
fiscal year 1999? Does this assume a production rate of 2,300 HMMWV's?
Based on the DoD budget, what will be the unit cost in the outyears
(assuming that the Marine Corps quantities are the entire buy)?
If the Army does not include HMMWV funding in future budget
submissions, can you still afford to procure HMMWV's? Please explain.
Answer. The outyear budget price for HMMWV production is based on
an annual production rate price of 2,300 vehicles.
The HMMWV currently has priced options through October 2000. The
price will most probably increase if the minimum sustaining rate is not
maintained.
The fiscal year 1999 unit cost of HMMWV is $55 thousand each
assuming a production rate of 2,300 HMMWV's.
The unit cost of the HMMWV in the outyears for Marine Corps
procurements has not been negotiated and identified.
If the Army's final decision does not include HMMWV funding in
future year budget submissions, the Marine Corps must then revisit the
LTVR strategy. Our current understanding is that the Army intends to
buy new vehicles through fiscal year 2002, and that the follow-on years
may be a combination of remanufactured and new vehicles.
Question. AM General, the HMMWV producer, is competing for the
Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement Program. What would the loss on
that competition have on its overhead rates and the cost of the HMMWV?
Answer. There are a variety of ways a contractor can determine how
to spread overhead rates among the various projects on which they may
be working. Since no contract has yet been awarded for the production
of the MTVR, the determination of the spread of overhead cost
projections are proprietary and competition sensitive. At this point,
neither the Project Officer nor the contractor can provide additional
detailed information. It is reasonable to assume, however, that should
AM General be awarded the contract for MTVR, the overhead rates and the
cost of the HMMWV might be reduced.
Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement
Question. The Marine Corps is requesting $131 million for the
Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) Program. The MTVR program
will replace aging medium tactical trucks (5 ton) with remanufactured
trucks. Of the budget request, $83 million is to begin production of
the MTVR.
What is the condition of the Marine Corps medium tactical vehicle
fleet?
Answer. Our total FY99 request for MTVR is $85.7 million ($2.0
million for R&D, and $83.7 million for PMC). Our current 5-ton truck
(Medium Tactical Vehicle) fleet has been in service for 17 years of a
20 year life cycle. It is becoming more expensive to operate and
maintain, it is corroding rapidly, and the projected rebuild costs
exceed 93% of a new 5-ton tactical vehicle. The current 5 ton truck
fleet meets neither our payload and mobility requirements, nor federal
safety and emission standards.
Question. Please explain the MTVR acquisition strategy. What is the
cost of the production program? What is your acquisition objective?
How long will it take you to remanufacture all of the trucks
currently in the Marine Corps fleet?
Answer. Our total fiscal year 1999 request for MTVR is $85.7
million ($2.0 million for R&D and $83.7 million for PMC).
We are currently in the EMD phase of development of this program.
Our acquisition strategy involves evaluating prototypes from the two
contractors with a down select to one contractor currently scheduled
for November 1998. After down select, we plan to award a 5-year
multiyear contract if approved by Congress, with a total cost of the
production program at $1.2 billion. The acquisition objective is 7,360
vehicles for the Marine Corps. The current medium tactical fleet of 5
ton trucks will be remanufactured to the new MTVR in 5 years. We
currently have a total of $85.7 million ($2.0 million in R&D and $83.7
million in PMC) anticipated to be spent on MTVR in fiscal year 1999.
Question. What is the projected unit cost for the MTVR?
Answer. The current projected unit cost for the MTVR cargo and
variant chassis is between $135,700 and $142,250 each. This program is
currently in the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase and a
downselect to one contractor will occur in November, 1998. At the time
of the downselect, the unit price, which will be level over a 5-year,
multi-year contract, will be finalized.
Question. To date, what testing has been done to support the Marine
Corps MTVR requirements? Who conducted the testing?
For the record, please provide the technical and performance
requirements for the MTVR program (objective and threshold) and what
has been demonstrated to date.
Answer. Our total fiscal year 1999 request for MTVR is $85.7
million ($2.0 million for R&D, and $83.7 million for PMC). Two advanced
technology transition demonstrators were constructed and successfully
tested by the Nevada Automotive Test Center as proof of concept.
Currently, both Aberdeen Test Center and Yuma Proving Grounds are
conducting extensive developmental testing on competing prototypes.
Concurrently, Marines are conducting an operational assessment on the
prototypes to assist in determining suitability from the user's
perspective.
Following are performance and technical requirements for the MTVR:
Operational Mission Profile %
High Mobility Tactical
Paved Road RMS 0.1-0.3.................................... 10/10
Gravel Road RMS 0.3-1.0................................... 20/20
Trails RMS 1.0-3.4........................................ 30/30
Cross Country RMS 1.5-4.8................................. 40/40
Payload (Tons) Mean Square (Inches)...........................
Off Road.................................................. 8/> 7
Highway................................................... 15/> 12
Towed..................................................... 8.5/8.5
Speeds (MPH)
Highway @ Off Road GVW on 0% Grade........................ 55/55
Highway @ Off Road GVW on 2% Grade........................ 55/55
Highway @ Off Road GVW on 3% Grade........................ 45/45
Off Road GVW on RMS 0.7 Surface........................... 30/15
Off Road GVW on RMS 2.0 Surface........................... 20/15
Off Road GVW on RMS 3.0 Surface........................... 15/15
Grade Operation (% of Slope)
Longitudinal.............................................. 60/60
Side Slope................................................ 40/40
Fording Capability (Inches)
Without Kit............................................... 60/30
Operating Range (Miles)....................................... 450/300
Operational Temperature Ranges (Degrees F) Hot................ 125/125
Cold without kits......................................... -25/-25
Cold with kits............................................ -50/-50
To date, everything above has been demonstrated, except for cold
temperature, fording capability, and range, which will be completed
soon.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. The Marine Corps is requesting the authority to proceed
with a multiyear contract for the MTVR in fiscal year 1999. However,
according to your budget documents, you will not award a production
contract until November 1998 and testing will not be complete until
July 2000.
Why do you need multi-year procurement legislation in fiscal year
1999?
It is our understanding that the first 240 production vehicles will
be used for testing. Is it common to use a multi-year contract in the
first year of production? For the record, please provide any instance
where the Marine Corps had awarded a multi-year contract in the first
year of production.
Anticipated savings and a stable design are all criteria for a
multiyear contract. Since you have not chosen a contractor at this
time, is it fair to say, given the criteria for multi-year contracting,
it is premature to award a multi-year contract? Why?
Answer. Our total fiscal year 1999 request for MTVR is $85.7
million ($2.0 million for R&D, and $83.7 million for PMC). Multi-Year
Procurement (MYP) legislation is required in order to award the initial
MTVR production contract in November 1998. The Marine Corps does not
believe it is premature to award a MYP contract. The Marine Corps feels
MTVR as budgeted meets all the stability requirements of a MYP (i.e.
funding, configuration, by capturing the full benefits of competition
between the two EMD contractors and incorporating the same commercial
components in use by industry today, the Marine Corps risk in awarding
MTVR as an MYP is even further reduced.
This type of approach is quite common in military truck contracts
to provide adequate facilitization time, permit production of system
technical manuals, accommodate testing requirements, and avoid a break
in production while allowing for an orderly ramp-up leading to full-
rate production. Although the Marine Corps infrequently uses MYP
contracts, the U.S. Army's TACOM, through which the Marine Corps
procures tactical wheeled vehicles, routinely employs MYP contracts.
Recent examples include the 2.5 Ton Extended Service Program, the
Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles, the Pallet Load System, the Heavy
Expanded Medium Tactical Truck programs, and the High Mobility
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle A2 program. Both of our prototype
contractors are currently manufacturing military vehicles under MYP
contracts. The strategy complies with acquisition reform and continued
pressure to ensure best value for the government.
Predator Anti-Tank Missile System
Question. The Marine Corps is requesting $9.8 million for Predator,
a man-portable, disposable top-attack, anti-tank missile system. What
is the status of the Predator development program?
Answer. The Predator program is in the engineering and
manufacturing development (EMD) phase of RDT&E. The program has had
some technical difficulties with sensors which resulted in accuracy
problems. The program also underwent a change in contractor (Loral Inc.
to Lockheed Martin) in March 1997, which resulted in developmental
delays associated with the industry transition. These problems required
a schedule extension to allow sufficient time to correct them and
complete all required testing while complying with fiscal constraints.
These difficulties appear to be resolved and recent shots have been
good. The Milestone III approval for production is scheduled for 4th
quarter fiscal year 2000 and production assembly to begin in the 1st
quarter fiscal year 2001.
Question. Please explain the accuracy issue that was experienced
during testing. What is the solution to the accuracy problems? When
will the system be retested to ensure that accuracy is not longer an
issue?
Answer. Lockheed Martin, in conducting its Fault Tree and
Sensitivity Analyses, determined that the key contributors (in order of
magnitude) to the accuracy errors were: (1) Telemetry effect on Quartz
Rate Sensors; (2) Vertical bias; (3) Parallax error; (4) Spin radius
for AZX Calculation; and (5) Borescope Calibration.
The original Quartz Rate Sensor (QRS) was determined to be overly
sensitive to the dynamic shock environment experienced by the missile
during firing. To compensate for this environment, an improved QRS was
incorporated with greater internal vibration isolation that was less
sensitive. Further shock isolation was incorporated into the auto pilot
assembly to provide greater protection.
The vertical bias was corrected through a software correction, and
the remaining alignment and calibration errors were corrected through
improved quality assurance.
Lockheed conducted missile shots in January and February 1998 to
verify individual corrective actions. Subsequently missiles, with all
corrective actions integrated, verified that the accuracy issues were
corrected. A small number of missiles (4) will now undergo a series of
highly stringent environmental tests/exposures to simulate worst case
extremes in climatic and vibrational conditions. Upon completion of
these exposures, each missile will be fired to assess operational
impact. These tests are currently planned for completion in May 1998.
Upon successful completion of this testing, the accuracy problems will
have been fully corrected.
Question. What is the anticipated cost of correcting the accuracy
issue?
Answer. Costs for the program have grown $96.5 million (which
included original estimated growth due to a contractor and location
transition) to the new estimate at completion of $121.3 million. This
can be attributed to the underestimated cost of the contractor
transition, the cost of associated developmental and manufacturing
learning curves, and the cost to resolve technical and accuracy issues.
Question. Who is responsible for the costs associated with the
``accuracy fix''--the government or the contractor?
Answer. Resolution of technical problems is a normal part of
engineering and manufacturing development and the associated correction
costs are the responsibility of the government; however, the contractor
has agreed to a fiscal year 1998 correction cost sharing of $2.0
million.
Question. The government's Estimation At Completion for Predator
was approximately $96,000,000. It is our understanding that the EAC is
now over $102,000,000. What has caused the increase? Who will pay for
the increase in cost?
Answer. The new estimate at completion (EAC) cost is $121.3
million, attributable to contractor transition and technical problems.
The government is responsible for all costs to the new EAC of $121.3
million. The contractor has agreed to absorb any costs over $121.3
million. It should be noted that Lockheed Martin has invested $5.0
million in fiscal year 1997 to cover transition cost growth and has
agreed to a fiscal year 1998 cost sharing of $2.0, thereby reducing the
government investment to $114.3 million.
Question. Does the fiscal year 1999 budget support operational
testing in fiscal year 1999 and a production decision in fiscal year
2000, or originally planned? If not, what do you need to do to get back
on schedule?
Answer. Since submission of the fiscal year 1999 President's
Budget, the Predator development program has slipped 12 months.
Consistent with briefs provided to the Congressional Defense Committee
staffs, the Predator program has rescheduled operational Testing to
fiscal year 2000, Milestone III to 4th quarter of fiscal year 2000, and
production to the first quarter of fiscal year 2001. This program
extension will require an additional $4.0 million of RDT&E, Navy in
fiscal year 1999. Subsequent years' funding requirements are being
addressed in the development of the fiscal year 2000 budget.
Amphibious Assault Vehicles
Question. The Marine Corps is requesting $84.5 million to rebuild
the Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAV) which were fielded in the 1970's.
The AAV will be replaced by the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle
(AAAV) which will enter production in fiscal year 2005. What is the
condition of the AAV fleet?
Answer. The AAV fleet has been depot maintained through an
``Inspect and Repair Only As Necessary'' (IROAN) Program. The fleet is
in the third cycle of this program and maintenance costs in both the
depots and fleet are becoming increasingly more expensive. The
originally planned cycle for IROAN was to induct vehicles every six
years. With the degrading condition of the vehicles, this criteria was
shortened in the early 1990s to every four years. Recently, many
vehicles have been nominated by the fleet operators with as little as
three years since their last depot servicing. Costs to IROAN vehicles
have also increased with the age of the vehicles. For instance, the
personnel variant AAVP7A1, which represents the majority of the fleet's
population, has increased in depot cost from $122,407 per vehicle in
fiscal year 91 to $237,975 per vehicle in fiscal year 97. The problems
with these aging assets are also reflected in the operating fleet with
suspension, engine and corrosion concerns occupying most of the fleet's
maintenance resources.
Without significant application of rebuild, reliability and
maintenance improvements, the AAV assets would become increasingly more
unaffordable and unavailable during the first decade of the new
century. The AAV Reliability Availability and Maintainability/Rebuild
to Standard (RAM/RS) program returns the AAV to the original six year
IROAN cycle, reduces the workload of the fleet maintainers, and
provides the operators with more reliable and combat ready assets until
replacement by the AAAV.
Question. What is the difference between a ``rebuild'' and a
``service life extension'' program?
Answer. ``Rebuild to Standard'' returns the AAV to original
performance and specifications and reduces expected rising costs.
``SLEP'' extends the life of a vehicle, incorporates product
improvements and capability enhancements. This is a ``Rebuild to
Standard'' program.
Question. What is the cost and schedule for the AAV rebuild
program?
Answer. The AAV RAM/Rebuild to Standard (AAV RAM/RS) cost is $308.6
million over a four (4) year production beginning in fiscal year 99.
Milestone III decision is scheduled for 1st Qtr of fiscal year 99.
Question. It is our understanding that you actually began the AAV
rebuild program in fiscal year 1997. However, the Congress never
appropriated funds for this project in fiscal year 1997 or 1998.
To date, how much has been obligated for the AAV rebuild program in
fiscal years 1997 and 1998?
When did you plan on formally notifying us that you were planning a
$300 million rebuild program?
How did you fund the program in fiscal years 1997 and 1998--a below
threshold reprogramming? Please explain.
Does the Marine Corps usually fund new starts with below threshold
reprogrammings?
Answer. Funding within the AAV/7A1 Mods (R&D) program and the AAV/
71A1 PIP (PMC) program support the continuation of funded and approved
efforts associated with the modification and improvement of the AAV/7A1
vehicle. As a result of decisions made during the Marine Corps fiscal
year 1999 program review process, specific ongoing AAV/7A1 improvements
were packaged into a discrete PIP effort now referred to as the AAV
Reliability Availability.
Maintainability/Rebuild to Standard (RAM/RS). Due to the large
dollar value of the RAM/RS PIP effort, the Marine Corps made certain
all four Congressional committees were briefed concerning the Marine
Corps' intentions relative to the AAV RAM/RS effort and in concert with
Department policy formal written notification has been provided.
A below threshold reprogramming was accomplished in fiscal year
1997 and fiscal year 1998 R&D for the continued research and
development of efforts now associated with RAM/RS. In fiscal year 1998
Procurement, Marine Corps funds associated with the continuation of
existing AAV PIP efforts were realigned from within the AAV PIP Program
for execution of efforts now associated with RAM/RS.
Of the $2.1 million budgeted in fiscal year 1997 for R&D efforts,
$1.2 million has been obligated for efforts now specifically associated
with AAV RAM/RS. In fiscal year 1998, $.2 million of RDT&E, Navy funds
have similarly been obligated for RAM/RS. Additionally, $1.2 million of
fiscal year 1998 PMC funds have been provided to MCLB Albany for
execution on RAM/RS related efforts.
Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF)
Question. In fiscal year 1997, Congress provided $10 million to
establish the Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF). The
CBIRF's mission is to respond to terrorist chemical and biological and
toxic industrial chemical incidents. Last year, the Congress provided
$10 million to continue procuring equipment for the CBIRF. This year,
the Marine Corps is requesting no funds to procure CBIRF equipment and
$1.2 million to continue the development of protective equipment and
detectors.
How did you spend the fiscal year 1998 procurement funds?
Answer. Fiscal year 1998 funds are being used to procure Command
and Control (C2) Vehicles, 8 kilowatt Generators, Search and Rescue
Mobile Video and Lights, Decontamination Showers, Powered Air Purifying
Respirators (PAPR), Biological Hazard Suits, Improved Remote Sensing
Chemical Agent Alarm (RSCAAL), Chemical Biological Casualty Evacuation
Hoods, 15 kilowatt Trailer Generators, 24, Beverage Trucks,
and Military Band Very High Frequency (VHF) Manpack Radios. This is a
partial list, the entire list can be provided under separate cover.
Question. Did the fiscal year 1998 funds buy out your requirement?
Answer. The fiscal year 1998 funds completed the procurement of the
mission critical equipment. However, expansion of the CBIRF mission to
include a radiological response and the outfitting of seven Marine
Expeditionary Units will require additional funding.
Question. For fiscal year 1999, you are requesting $1.2 million for
CBIRF research and development activities. Please explain what
initiatives are funded in fiscal year 1999.
Answer. The fiscal year 1999 President's Budget request is
primarily for the development of protective equipment and to fund
detector initiatives. Current protective equipment initiatives include
M40 Protective Mask Powered Air Purifying Respirator, Self Contained
Breathing Apparatus and General Purpose Filters. Detector initiatives
include the Portable Mass Spectrometer, Small Point Detectors,
Biological Detectors, Field Rugged Mass Spectrometer and Digital
Dosimeters to include the Small Unit Biological Detector.
Question. According to your budget documents, the CBIRF will be
equipped with off-the shelf equipment, yet your budget includes no
procurement dollars until fiscal year 2000. What research and
development initiatives are in your Future Year Defense Plan? Does your
budget include adequate funds to field those systems you will be
developing? If not, what is the shortfall?
Answer. The Marine Corps is not continuing to review technology for
chemical/biological and individual Marine protection improvements. Some
of the initiatives which are currently under development include the
electrostatic decontamination system, general purpose filters, phase
change cooling garment and the self contained breathing apparatus with
cooling system. The development of these systems could be accelerated
into fiscal year 1999 with an additional $1.2 million. The procurement
of systems now under development will be included in the fiscal year
2000 budget request.
Question. Given their mission, it is essential to provide the CBIRF
with equipment that provides protection from chemical and biological
weapons and toxic industrial chemicals. To date, what equipment have
you provided to the CBIRF? What equipment is still required? Is funding
for that equipment provided in the budget? If so, please provide the
type of equipment, acquisition, schedule, and cost.
Answer. Mission critical and a majority of the mission essential
items have already been procured for the CBIRF. The remainder of CBIRF
mission essential equipment will be procured with fiscal year 1998
Procurement, Marine Corps funds. This completes procurement of
approximately 264 items which comprise CBIRF initial equipment needs.
In addition, the CBIRF would like to procure Military Medical
Evaluation Tool software and a Nuclear Material, Nerve Gas and Blister
Agent Detection System. Both of these programs are in development Phase
I and could be procured in fiscal year 1999 with an additional $1.0
million.
Question. The proposed unit strength for the CBIRF will be 350 to
400 marines. What is the current strength? When will you achieve your
planned unit strength?
Answer. There are a total of of 374 Marines and Sailors listed in
CBIRF's Table of Organization (T/O). Currently, there are 368 Marines
and Sailors assigned. Recognizing that most Marine Corps operational
units are manned at 90% of required strength, CBIRF has achieved an
acceptable manning level.
Question. What impact would the decision to use the National Guard
as the ``first shield'' in a chemical or biological attack have on the
CBIRF's mission? Please explain.
Answer. CBIRF's mission is to provide a national consequence
management (CM) capability to assist first responders in cities and on
military installations, and our allies overseas in the wake of a
terrorist initiated release, or threat to release, of a chemical or
biological weapon of mass destruction (WMD). CBIRF also enhances force
protection against WMD for forward deployed forces by providing
training assistance. Additionally, CBIRF is charged with developing the
operational concepts and researching technologies that will enhance and
enable more efficient WMD CM operations. CBIRF is most effective when
forward deployed in response to a credible threat or to provide
protection for events of national significance, such as the Olympics,
State of the Union, 1996 Inauguration, etc.
When the National Guard is ready to provide the ``first shield'' in
a chemical or biological terrorist attack, it will provide a vital link
in the nation's domestic consequence management capability. National
Guard assets should be able to respond to no-warning WMD events more
quickly than CBIRF and to provide similar assistance. The geographic
spread of National Guard units will provide the nation with a more
viable local presence that should have the capability to appropriately
reinforce local responders to assist in extraction of victims and save
lives. The National Guard should be able to provide a much needed
robust local response capability in a more timely manner than CBIRF and
is a key part of the Nation's domestic response capability.
While the National Guard will significantly enhance domestic
preparedness, it will be difficult for Guardsmen to maintain the level
of training and speed of response that CBIRF has once it is forward
deployed. As the National Guard shoulders the responsibility for
providing national level assistance at the local level during no-notice
attacks, CBIRF will be able to focus on improving methods and
technologies, providing assistance overseas and will still be prepared
to augment local, state, and National Guard assets for pre-planned
events or when credible treats are delivered.
The timely local response capability of the National Guard and the
comprehensive capability provided by CBIRF should prove to be
synergistic, not redundant. CBIRF welcomes the opportunity to work with
the National Guard to share lessons learned, and to work on the
development and integration of respective response capabilities.
Ammunition Programs
Question. For fiscal year 1999, the Marine Corps is requesting
$146.7 million for ammunition. This is an increase of $22.1 million
over last year's appropriated level. What is your annual combat
training ammunition requirement?
Answer. $299 million based on the most recent pricing. An extensive
Marine Corps ammunition study conducted in 1996 reduced the overall War
Reserve (WR) requirement. This reduction in the WR freed up some assets
that are now being consumed to meet annual training requirements. These
available assets have allowed the Marine Corps to fund only that
portion of the ammunition requirement not covered by the drawdown of
the old WR and apply the savings to other readiness and modernization
needs.
Question. Is your annual combat training requirement for ammunition
fully funded in fiscal year 1999? If not, what is the shortfall and
what is the impact on your war reserve?
Answer. Through the fiscal year 1999 funded delivery period, the
predominance of the Marine Corps training requirement is funded.
However, spot shortfalls do occur from time to time. Once these
shortfalls are identified they receive high priority until a solution
can be found. Currently, the Marine Corps has identified fiscal year
1999 shortfalls in the following items:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shortfall
DODIC Item ($M)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
C784............................... CTG, 120MM Target 0.7
Practice w/Tracer (TP-
T).
C785............................... CTG, 120MM Target 0.5
Practice Sabot
(TPCSDS-T).
A940............................... CTG, 25MM Target 0.9
Practice Sabot (TPDS-
T).
A075............................... CTG, 5.56MM Blank 0.6
Linked.
A143............................... CTG, 7.62MM Ball 0.7
Linked.
A555............................... CTG, Cal .50 Ball 0.3
Linked.
A363............................... CTG, 9MM Ball......... 0.8
HX05............................... Rocket, 83MM Dualmode 18.0
PIP.
G878............................... Fuze, Hand Grenade 2.5
Practice.
G940............................... Grenade, Hand Smoke 0.5
Green.
G982............................... Grenade, Hand Practice 0.2
Smoke.
L283............................... Signal, Smoke and 0.5
Illum, Marine.
MN08............................... Igniter, Time Fuse 0.6
Blasting.
Total.......................... .................... 26.8
------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are other shortfalls identified in items requiring large
quantities of C-4 explosive. Due to the increased cost of these items,
the Marine Corps is reviewing its requirements for these items and
waiting for C-4 pricing to stabilize. As the situation becomes clearer,
the Marine Corps will address all shortfalls in its fiscal year 2000
budget development.
In general, the Marine Corps does not draw down its War Reserve to
support training. The Marine Corps ammunition program has been built to
support the annual training requirements, meet the Combat Requirement
through the five year defense plan, and preserve the Strategic and
Residual Reserve inventories.
Question. Last year, we discussed that there had been a significant
increase in the cost of explosives manufactured at the Holston
Ammunition Plant. The unit cost of explosives has gone from
approximately $10,000 to $57,000. Congress appropriated funds in fiscal
year 1997 and 1998 to procure explosives manufactured at Holston. It is
our understanding that you may go ``off-shore'' to procure explosives.
Has the situation been resolved? How? Have you obligated the fiscal
year 1997 or 1998 funds?
Answer. No, it is anticipated that in June 1998 the Army will
resolve this issue via a full and open competition. The Marine Corps is
reviewing its requirements for these items and will address this issue
during the fiscal year 2000 budget development. Fiscal Year 1997 and
fiscal year 1998 funds status is identified below:
--Fiscal Year 1997 funds for linear charges and demolitions have
been obligated.
--Fiscal Year 1998 funds for demolitions have been obligated.
--Fiscal Year 1998 funds for linear charges have not yet been
obligated. (Anticipate obligation by April 1998).
Question. The Marine Corps is requesting $10,000,000 to procure
M767 fuzes which are used with 155MM Howziter projectiles. Based on
outyear budget projections, the M767 will not be produced after fiscal
year 1999. Does the Marine Corps have a requirement for M767 fuzes
after fiscal year 2000? What is the impact if the M767 fuze line goes
cold after fiscal year 1999? (To the Marine Corps and industrial base).
Does the fiscal year 1999 budget maintain the M767 production line for
a full year?
Answer. Yes, the Marine Corps has requirements beyond fiscal year
2000 for M767 1998 and fiscal year 1999 funding will enable a ``bulk''
buy of these fuzes with the Army. This will provide Marine Corps with
sufficient M767 fuze quantities through fiscal year 2003.
It is assumed if the M767 fuze line goes ``cold'' i.e. stops
production, there would be an increase in unit costs associated with
the line's restart. The Marine Corps receives all ammunition pricing
data from the Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition, who can
address such impacts in greater detail.
Yes, the fiscal year 1999 budget maintains the M767 fuze production
line for a full year.
Year 2000 Computer Problem
Question. One of the problems that we face as we center the next
century is older computers that are only programmed to remember the
last two digits in a year. Thus they remember `1997' as simply `97'.
The year 2000, however, will be saved as `00', the same as the year
1900. This can lead to calculation errors and system failures. How
serious is this problem for the Navy? What would be the impact if your
Mission Critical Systems were not corrected by the year 2000?
Navy Answer. The Year 2000 (Y2K) problem is a pervasive problem
within any organization that heavily employs information technology to
accomplish its mission. We recognize that it resides in all ships,
submarines, aircraft, and facilities, afloat and ashore, and it
potentially affects systems in all areas from targeting to pay. It is a
serious problem in that effects from Y2K problems can directly impact
Navy operational readiness. The impact of Mission Critical Systems not
being corrected by the year 2000 would be significant. A service wide
approach to provide oversight of Navy Y2K efforts is being coordinated
to reduce the chance that any Mission Critical systems will not be Y2K
compliant by the year 2000.
Marine Corps Answer. As we assessed the impact of the Year 2000, we
determined that it touches all mission and support systems; may cause
program and upgrade delays; places additional cost burdens on some
programs; may require require early termination of systems; and may
drive a solution toward early migration and modernization.
The Department of the Navy (DON) is totally committed to assure
that no mission critical system failures occur due to the Year 2000
issue. If a mission critical system would fail due to the Year 2000
problem, it could potentially lead to a degradation in our ability to
accomplish our missions. Therefore, the Navy and Marine Corps are using
an integrated, system-by-system, ship-by-ship approach that will ensure
critical war-fighting and war-fighting support capabilities remain
intact through the Year 2000 and beyond.
Question. How many systems does the Navy have to evaluate and where
do they stand in the process of assessment, renovation, validation and
implementation?
Navy Answer. The following is a status of the Navy Y2K efforts:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Navy MarCorps
Phase Navy Mission MarCorps Mission
Systems Critical Systems Critical
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Awareness................................................... 0 0 0 0
Assessment.................................................. 0 0 0 0
Renovation.................................................. 772 162 51 46
Validation.................................................. 1,178 266 12 12
Implementation.............................................. 28 10 4 4
Completed................................................... 281 225 100 90
---------------------------------------------------
Total................................................... 2,259 663 167 152
Total DON:
(Navy & MarCorps)................................... 2,426 815
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Department of Navy has 2,426 systems--815 are mission critical
and 1,611 are non-mission critical. All 815 mission critical systems
have completed assessment (208 Mission Critical systems are in
renovation, 278 are in validation, 14 are implementation, and 315 have
completed all phases).
Marine Corps Answer. The Marine Corps has 167 systems--152 are
mission critical systems, all of which have completed assessment (46
Mission Critical systems are in renovation, 12 are in validation, 4 are
implementation, and 90 have completed all phases). Of our Non-Mission
Critical systems, 5 are in renovation, and 10 have completed all
phases.
Question. Are there any systems, particularly Mission Critical
Systems, whose Year 2000 efforts could be improved with additional
funding? If so, which systems are they, how much money would you need,
and how would the money be used?
Navy Answer. The Department of the Navy's target date for
completing all fixes is June 30, 1998. The Department of the Navy's
target date for installing the fixes at all user sites is December 31,
1998.
Because much of our testing is still ahead of us, it would be
premature today to state which systems would or would not need
additional funding. As we progress through the rigorous in-depth
testing of systems and interfaces, we may encounter needs for
additional funding that have not been identified to date.
The following programs, while scheduled to be fully completed by
the Year 2000 will not meet the DoD mandated December 1998 completion
date. Additional funding would accelerate the fielding of the Year 2000
fixes from October 1999 to March 1999.
JMCIS/GCCS-M Ashore: $800 thousand/OMN
The additional funding, beyond current program funding, would be
used to accelerate the installation of Y2K software and required
training at ashore command centers. Upgrades are scheduled to commence
June 1998 and current plans and budget allow for fielding at the final
ashore site not later than October 1999.
JMCIS/GCCS-M Tactical Mobile: $1.1 million/OPN
The additional funding, beyond current program funding, would be
used to accelerate the acquisition and installation of Y2K compliant
hardware and software in Tactical Support Centers, Mobile Operations
Control Centers, Mobile Ashore Support Terminals, and Mobile Integrated
Command Facilities (TSC, MOCC, MAST, MICFAC). Current plans and budget
allow for fielding at the final Tactical Mobile site not later than
October 1999.
Infrastructure: $88 million
The additional funding, beyond current modernization funding, would
be used to accelerate the procurement of the hardware required for the
software to run. Though not mission critical, it is considered mission
essential.
Marine Corps Answer. Because much of our testing is still ahead of
us, it would be premature today to state which system would or would
not need additional funding. As we progress through the rigorous in-
depth testing of systems and interfaces, we may encounter needs for
additional funding that have not been identified to date. US Navy
Command and Control (C2) systems have Year 2000 plans identified and
funded. The following additional funds would be used to accelerate the
completion of fielding of the Year 2000 fix from October 1999 to March
1999.
JMCIS/GCCS-M Ashore: $800 thousand/OMN
The additional funding, beyond current program funding, would be
used to accelerate the installation of Y2K software and its associated
training at ashore command centers. Current plans and budget allow for
fielding at the final ashore site not later than October 1999.
JMCIS/GCCS-M Tactical Mobile: $1.1 million/OPN
The additional funding, beyond current program funding, would be
used to accelerate the acquisition and installation of Y2K compliant
hardware and software in Tactical Support Centers, Mobile Operations
Control Centers, Mobile Ashore Support Terminals, and Mobile Integrated
Command Facilities (TSC, MOCC, MAST, MICFAC). Current plans and budget
allow for fielding at the final Tactical Mobile site not later than
October 1999.
Marine Corps Infrastructure: $20 million
The additional funding, beyond currently budgeted modernization
funding, would be used to accelerate the procurement of the hardware
required for the software to run. $88 million is the amount required to
bring the Marine Corps' inventory (approximately 35,000 286, 386 and
low-end 486 computers) into Y2K compliance. However, only $20 million
(approximately 8,000 computers) is executable in Fiscal Year 1999.
Through not mission critical, this is mission essential.
Question. Has your organization appointed a Year 2000 program
manager and established an agency-level program office to manage and
coordinate your Year 2000 program activities?
Navy Answer. The Chief of Naval Operations is in the process of
establishing a Y2K Project Office to coordinate all Navy Y2K activity.
The project office will be headed by a Rear Admiral who will report
directly to the Director, Space, Information Warfare, Command and
Control (N6), VADM Cebrowski. The project office will be co-located
with the Department of the Navy's Chief Information Officer Y2K staff
and is in close coordination with the U.S. Marine Corp's Y2K staff.
Marine Corps Answer. The Department of the Navy (DON) is totally
committed to assure that no mission critical system failures occur due
to the Year 2000. Efforts by the Secretary of the Navy Staff and
Department of the Navy Chief Information Officer (DON CIO) have been
ongoing for two years. The DON CIO staff currently has a dedicated Year
2000 team led by an O-6 (US Navy Captain). The Year 2000 Team includes
three professional Naval Officers, three government employees, and two
man-years of contract support from a leading IT corporation. The Chief
of Naval Operations has initiated a program office within CNO N6 to
manage the Year 2000 risk and ensure there is an operational response
to any emergent Year 2000 issues. The Commandant of the Marine Corps
has tasked his Assistant Chief of Staff C4I (Marine Corps CIO) with
oversight and management of the Year 2000 issue within the Marine
Corps.
Question. Have you completed a Service-wide inventory of
information systems?
Navy Answer. As part of the Assessment Phase, the Department of the
Navy's Chief Information Officer directed all Program Managers to
provide a complete inventory of information systems and to report their
status of effort in the Defense Information Systems Tool (DIST). That
action has been completed.
Marine Corps Answer. Yes. Our inventory is contained in the Defense
Integration Support Tools (DIST).
Question. Have you deferred or canceled any new systems development
efforts in order to reprogram the funds to achieve Year 2000 compliance
with an existing Mission Critical System? If so, which systems were
deferred or canceled?
Navy Answer. There have been no reports of any system development
cancellations for reprogramming of funds to the Y2K effort.
Marine Corps Answer. The Department of the Navy (DoN) has not
identified the need to reprogram fiscal year 1998 funds to meet its
Year 2000 requirements. That does not preclude the possibility that
future reprogramming actions may be necessary if the situation
dictates.
Question. Have you developed contingency plans for Mission Critical
Systems?
Navy Answer. The Department of the Navy's Year 2000 action plan
directs the development of contingency plans for those Mission Critical
Systems that will not complete Renovation by June 30, 1998 or complete
Implementation by January 1, 1999. Currently, there are nine identified
Mission Critical systems meeting this criteria. Two of these systems
have a contingency plan in place and the other seven contingency plans
are in draft.
Marine Corps Answer. The Department of the Navy will closely
monitor mission-critical systems scheduled for replacement or
remediation for progress in meeting targeted year 2000 compliance
deadlines. For each mission critical system for which replacement or
remediation requirements exist, and for which operational fielding is
scheduled to extend beyond January 1, 1999, the program office of the
system, in coordination with the operational users, has developed a
contingency plan that was effective no later than February 1, 1998.
Systems which do not complete renovation by June 30, 1998, are required
to have a contingency plan developed by July 31, 1998.
Question. Overall, are you confident of the Navy's ability to
correct this problem before the year 2000?
Navy Answer. I am very confident of the Navy's approach to fixing
Year 2000 problems. It is a comprehensive and integrated approach that
seeks to manage the Year 2000 problem as a management challenge rather
than a technical issue. The management approach has been endorsed by
the CNO and requires Navy-wide participation. We are leveraging the
lessons learned from industry and the other services and are working
closely with the Office of the Secretary of the Defense and the
Department of the Navy's Chief Information Officer in the management
and coordination of effort in order to successfully meet the Y2K
challenge.
Marine Corps Answer. The Marine Corps and the Navy are totally
committed to assure no mission critical system failures occur due to
Year 2000. The Navy/Marine Corps is working in concert with OSD, the
Defense Agencies and the other Services in addressing the Year 2000
challenge. We will continue to aggressively manage and monitor progress
until full Year 2000 compliance is achieved throughout the Department
of the Navy.
Information Technology Management Reform Act (ITMRA)
Question. The Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996
(known as the Clinger-Cohen Act) requires each agency to make specific
changes in how they select and manage information technology programs.
Among other steps, this includes performing an analysis of
alternatives, a cost-benefit analysis and identifying specific
performance measures. What steps had the Navy taken to come into
compliance with the Clinger-Cohen Act?
Answer. The Department of the Navy has established a Department of
the Navy Chief Information Officer and created an office supporting the
Department of the Navy Chief Information Officer. We have modified
directives to take advantage of the new acquisition philosophy inherent
in the Clinger-Cohen Act. The entire approach to Information Technology
management in the Department of the Navy has been restructured to allow
the panoply of stakeholders to participate in the development and
implementation of policy. A Board of Representatives from all major
second echelon commands is the senior body for central leadership of
the Information Technology program. Various Integrated Product Teams
working for the Board do the detailed work in assigned functional
areas.
Question. Is the Navy now in compliance with this Act?
Answer. We are completely in compliance and are working constantly
to assure we remain so. We see compliance as a continuing
responsibility rather than a project with a terminal date.
Question. What improvements has the Navy seen as a result of the
Clinger-Cohen Act?
Answer. We have observed a major increase in momentum as the
Department of the Navy moves to better harness the capabilities of
information technology for mission accomplishment. Initiatives such as
Information Technology for the 21st Century (IT-21) are receiving
widespread and enthusiastic support as it becomes increasingly apparent
that innovative use of information technology is welcomed and
facilitated at the highest levels in both the Executive and Legislative
branches.
Question. In the last year, as a result of your Information
Technology Milestone reviews, did the Navy delay, cancel or
significantly restructure any of their Information Technology systems?
If so, which ones?
Answer. The process of molding Information Technology systems is
best facilitated by constant informal relations between reviewers and
project managers rather than overt countermanding of programs in
process. There have been no dramatic, formal actions to change systems
during the last year. This is seen as a strength in the process since
it reflects a continuing dialog between the parties involved.
Question. What documentation does your review panel require for
each milestone review?
Answer. Documentation is tailored to the size and nature of each
individual project. Specific requirements are contained in Secretary of
the Navy Instructions 5000.2B and 5420.188E.
Question. In conducting these reviews, how many involved an actual
meeting of the senior decision makers, and how many were `paper'
reviews?
Answer. As noted above, we take pride in working out problems
before they reach the stage of requiring action by senior decision
makers, and this has been the approach reflected in our extensive use
of `paper' reviews. With respect to those conducted at the Department
of the Navy level, three during Calendar Year 1997 involved actual
meetings and six were `paper' reviews. Many reviews are conducted at
subordinate echolons and no central data is maintained.
Question. Has the OSD MAISRC, in its reviews, delayed, canceled or
significantly restructured any of the Navy's Information Technology
systems? If so, which ones?
Answer. No. Actions have been taken as a result of OSD reviews, but
MAISRCs, per se, have been supportive.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Young.]
Thursday, March 5, 1998.
AIR FORCE ACQUISITION PROGRAMS
WITNESS
LIEUTENANT GENERAL GEORGE K. MUELLNER, USAF, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE (ACQUISITION)
Introduction
Mr. Young. The Committee will come to order. General
Muellner, thank you very much for being here this afternoon.
Your entire statement will be placed in the record, and we
will be happy to have you consolidate it and summarize it any
way you like.
Summary Statement of General Muellner
General Muellner. Absolutely, sir. I do appreciate the
opportunity to address you both.
What I would like to do is just quickly step through the
layout of our RDT&E and procurement programs this year. I will
lead you through a couple of the key programs that we have and
give you an update on how we are doing, and also give you an
opportunity to ask any questions that you may have relative to
those particular systems. Then I will wrap up with what I think
is a good news story on where we are going wit some of our
business affairs improvement and also some of the reduction in
the acquisition work force.
MEETING THE WARFIGHTER'S NEEDS
(CHART 1) Obviously, we built upon Joint Vision 2010 when
we put this plan together, and I think you will find, and I am
sure the Chief and the Secretary pointed out to you earlier
today, we are really trying to embrace the revolution in
military affairs, so we are really pushing the information and
technology, clear down to the shooters and the ability to put
precision weapons where we want it, when we need it, and that
is the key focus of our program.
MODERNIZATION ACCOUNT HEALTH
(CHART 2) The good news I think from the standpoint of our
1999 President's Budget as submitted is our acquisition program
overall has turned upwards; 1998 was a low ebb for us as far as
the overall program content, down to 31.6 percent of the total
budget. As you can see, we have stepped up, so that is a very
positive trend as we work to correct some deficiencies in our
modernization programs and replace some of our aging equipment.
GENERAL REDUCTIONS
(CHART 3) One area of concern that we do need your help on,
and that is in the area of undistributed cuts, or general
reductions as they are called. We certainly understand the need
for both of us to work together as a team in doing this, but
when these come across to us as these undistributed reductions,
unfortunately, they give me very little flexibility as to how
to distribute them to minimize program content.
As you can see from the percentages reflected here, these
have been on a steady rise. This rise has gotten to the point
where in some programs, because of multiple applications, the
impact on the programs is rather significant. Programs, for
instance, like Joint Tactical Information Distribution System,
JTIDS and JDAM ended up getting hit not only with the
adjustments because of economics, some of the general
reductions, but they also get taxed again as a result of them
using Federally Funded Research and Development Centers, FFRDC
support or advisory service support. In general, these programs
just don't have the flexibility to absorb a 12 or a 13 percent
cut. So we really would like to work with your staffs to see if
we could get some flexibility so that we could distribute these
cuts to areas where we can better absorb and take out the
content, rather than hurting some of these key programs like
JTIDS.
AIR SUPERIORITY
(CHART 4) What I would like to do now is just set the
stage, if you will, and go through the key programs that we
have and give you a brief update. We emphasize these terms of
our core competencies, air and space superiority being the
first of those; it was highlighted on the previous chart. I
will start with the air and then go to the space side.
Obviously the key program here for us is the F-22. That
program is well into Engineering and Manufacturing Development,
EMD, the first of the test airplanes is out at Edwards that we
will start flying here very soon. The second one is down in the
fuel barn right now and will be out at Edwards later on this
summer also starting its flying activity.
The EMD program is moving along very well. We have had, I
think, 2 or 3 produceability issues that have come up as
aresult of executing the manufacturing and development aspects of that,
and one with some issues with titanium castings that we have worked our
way through, a welding problem and how to inspect those. Another one
with some tail, composition of the tail honeycomb, a very conventional
design, the same that is used in the F-15 and F-18, but again, they
have a manufacturing process which they have since fixed.
The end result of that was ships 3, 4, 5 and 6 ended up
slipping anywhere from about 5 months down to a couple of
weeks, and by ships 7 and 8, which are the last of our
airplanes in the EMD program, they are back on schedule. The
impact of that is they have had to go out and adjust the flight
schedule activities to accommodate for it. It will not impact
the beginning of Independent Operational Test and Evaluation,
IOT&E, and we think that those problems are behind us, but
rather typical I think of the EMD activities, at least that I
have seen.
The other most important issue from my standpoint with the
F-22 is the Air Force and the contractors have I think put
together a program that we are highly confident we can execute
within the cost caps, and I think we are getting good closure.
The real test will be later on this summer when the CAIG comes
in with their independent assessment. But all the feedback I am
getting shows that they are pretty well on board with where we
are at, so I am very optimistic that we will get good
enforcement with that. The other thing, the contractors are
willing to sign at a firm, fixed priced contract for the first
two lots, so that is certainly good news, given their risk
aversion.
The other key program is of course the Airborne Laser.
Again, it is a heavily milestone-driven program. It has met or
exceeded every one of those milestones. There is a lot in the
press about it. I can tell you most of it is not founded by any
factual information. There are 4 demonstration milestones that
have to be achieved before we leave the current phase of the
program. They have already satisfied two of those and will
complete the other two by June of this year. The program is
exactly on cost and schedule from the standpoint of actual
program execution.
The task remaining in Air Borne Laser, ABL, is one of an
engineering, it is not science. We have moved beyond that. All
of the atmospheric collection we have done around the world and
in Southwest Asia and Northeast Asia have reinforced all the
modeling that has gone into it, and we have had some of the
finest scientific talent in this country review this. I have
had 3 separate review teams. All three of them have come back
with exactly the same conclusion: press on, you are exactly
where you should be, and we have found nothing that would take
you off your model to date.
SPACE SUPERIORITY
(CHART 5) As we move into space superiority, again, this is
a very important area for the Air Force. It is one where we
have a very large percentage of the Total Obligational
Authority, TOA, missions. On the Communications side, I think
the medium data rate, high capacity MILSTAR communication
program is executing out very well. I think we have
significantly improved our customer satisfaction. We had some
problems in the early days, primarily with the use of the
ground terminals and the user friendliness of those. I think we
have moved beyond that. The only thing that I know of that
General Habiger is still not real happy about is his inability
to hold the conference calls with a large number of conference
participants and not have significant lags that you would
expect in this sort of communication, but we are working on
that in the medium data rate field.
Beyond that, I think our GPS is executing out very well.
The Boeging North American, the contractor on that case, has
done well, and has indeed I think achieved the cost savings we
expected through the multiyear contract. The big push for us
right now is to deal with increased interest by the FAA and
other folks to get access to the more secure GPS to get better
accuracy, and we are working with DOT to bring that issue to
closure here, hopefully in the near term.
The other key area of course is SBIRS, which is the space-
based IR system, a high interest item to many Members on the
Hill, especially the SBIRS Low. Both of those programs are on
schedule and as we were directed to do, we accelerated the
SBIRS Low to a 04 time frame. So that program is still on
schedule, although it does carry a fair amount of technical
risk with it.
With EELV, the evolved expendable launch vehicle concept,
we changed our acquisition strategy this year, and because of
the market demands that are seen out in the future, they
clearly dictated the fact that having two competitors out there
would do both us and our commercial users a great service. So
what we elected to do at that point in time was change our
strategy, not down-select to a single contractor for EMD, but
carry both of them and split our EMD investment, which was
about $1 billion total, so that each of them will get about
$500 million. It is a robust effort; their own capital, they
are chasing the commercial markets. Right now I think both of
those contractors seem to be meeting their cost goals, and
estimates have typically reduced dollars per pound to orbit,
and that is the main objective of this program, of course,
reduce the excess cost of access to space.
GLOBAL ATTACK
(CHART 6) As you get into the global attack area, the
bomber force, if you will, the primary emphasis here has been
the robust and conventional capabilities of the bomber force.
The B-1 defensive systems upgrade and conventional munitions
upgrade programs are both doing very well. The acceleration
that you all helped us with, the JDAM capability along with
improved communications on a small fleet of 7B-1s is executing
well,and by the end of this calendar year we will have the
first of those airplanes on the map, and by February of next year we
will have all 7 of them operational, JDAM-capable, and capable of
operating in much higher threat environments. So that program I think
is executing out quite well.
The B-2 of course is kind of on hold. We have frozen our
investment in the immediate expenditure of all of the
appropriations this year, pending the outcome of the
presidential commission. As soon as that commission executes
out, and we certainly hope it is done by the 1st of April or we
are going to have some major challenges, we are prepared to
step off and if the decision is to indeed be all that you can
be with this number of airplanes, we are prepared to spend that
money to robust the Low Observable, LO, supportability of the
airplanes and also enhance the conventional weapons delivery.
We have pretty good plans in place and actual contracts in
place to execute that at this point in time.
The Minuteman upgrade program, we did something this year
that we have been trying to do for 2 years, in that we took 150
individual contracts that we had to integrate as the government
on the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, ICBM, programs. We
went out and found the prime contractor through a competition,
in this case TRW, and they now manage the entire ICBM Program.
I might add that we project $1.5 billion in cost-avoidance over
the long-term program as a result of doing that.
So not only did we achieve the same satisfaction in this
case, STRATCOM, I think we significantly reduced the cost as a
result of going to this prime contractor total system
performance responsibility approach.
PRECISION ENGAGEMENT
(CHART 7) On the precision engagement standpoint, probably
the most contentious of the airplanes up there, since the
others are all in existence, is the Joint Strike Fighter. From
our perspective, the program is executing well with the Navy
now at the helm of that ship, if you will, with an Air Force
program manager over there. The program remains focused on
affordability. The contractors, the warfighters and the
developers all understand the importance to Air Force force
structure and the other services, of bringing that program in
on cost. And I think Major General Select Kenne over there is
doing a great job of keeping them focused on that.
We, with the Department of the Navy, also made the
commitment to fund the alternate engine program such that it
would be ready for competition out in production. It really
didn't buy us much as far as risk reduction during the
development, but in production, hopefully like the 100 and 110
competition did, it will get us lower prices and more product
improvements as they compete with each other in the outyears.
WEAPONS
(CHART 8) As we look at the weapons, I think this has been
a good use year in both JDAM and in the Wind-Corrected
Munitions Dispenser (WCMD-GPS) aided in both cases, for JDAM
and for WCMD, have come along and matured very well. We went
through some developmental issues with JDAM this year. One, we
had a truncated envelope as a result of some hardware issues
that they fixed. The residual problem that they are just now
fixing was the fact of a low altitude, high-speed condition.
The F-18's flow field wanted to vibrate one of the fins off of
the weapon. They have had to go in and have now actually pinned
the guidance assembly on that fin, and that looks like it is
going to fix the problem. The good news is that while that fix
cost us a little bit in the development program, it will not
increase the cost and we are still going to bring that in at
the $14,000 round that they committed to.
Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser, WCMD, which is going to
allow all of us to deliver our cluster bombs with accuracy from
altitude and correct for winds, and so on, also is executing
well. They went through a similar issue with the fin rigidity
issue as a result of the flow field effects, and they have
probably come to the same conclusion, although that will not be
decided until next week, and they are actually going to pin the
fins until they are free of the airplane. But again, good news
on both of those.
The other program of course that is in development and a
very important one to the Air Force in particular is the JASSM
program. That is undergoing an Analysis of Alternatives right
now which will report out to the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council, JROC on the 23rd of March, and subsequently come to
the Hill very shortly thereafter.While I haven't seen the
Analysis of Alternatives, AOA results yet, based upon what I am seeing
from both of those contractors, I think we are going to find that JASSM
is not only significantly more effective, but also is significantly
cheaper than the other alternatives. And that program to date has
executed well. A good example of what acquisition reform and
competition will do for you, because that has been a real cut-throat
competition.
INFORMATION SUPERIORITY
(CHART 9) In the information superiority area, probably the
platform that has gotten the most attention up there is the
JOINT STARS. As you know, as a result of the QDR activity, that
war reduced from 19 to 13 aircraft, that was based upon the
possibility of NATO buying some additional platforms. That has
since been moved to the right. NATO has not made that decision
yet. They are still studying the effort, and historically, my
guess is that they will be for many years. So the end result of
that is the department right now is reviewing how many MIT-
based platforms we really need and what the nature of those
need to be. The contenders are additional JOINT STARS; we could
look for a UAV application, possibly from something like Global
Hawk which just recently flew, or the possibility is we may
have the ability to move some of those to space.
Just recently, we and the NRO and DARPA have signed an
agreement on a joint program we have just stepped off on that
will produce hopefully lower-cost satellites, $100 million or
less, that will be able to provide the warfighter direct MTI
from space. Not the efficiency of JOINT STARS, but still good,
and I think in the future we will see some of that migrating
through that sort of venue for detection.
As I just mentioned, Global Hawk finally flew. That had
slipped several times because of software problems, but last
Saturday it had a very successful, 55-, 56-minute flight. It
did very, very well. Thus far, all the data reduction will
probably go on for another month or so, because they tend to be
very conservative. All the data reduction so far indicates that
they are on a good track, and they are not about to repeat the
problem Dark Star had on its second flight, I guarantee you
that. Dark Star meanwhile is probably still 30 to 60 days away
from its next flights.
RAPID GLOBAL MOBILITY
(CHART 10) Global mobility, our biggest challenge has been
getting the C-5 reliability up. Because of engine problems,
some of which have been associated with the drawdown of the
depot down at Kelly, some of which has been associated with
some erosion and failure problems in the turbine section, our
reliability had fallen unacceptably low. We have put a fair
amount of money, almost $500 million, in the 1999 budget to
address the turbine problems and also address some of the real
major bad actors on the airplanes as far as failures, and those
were in the flight control system, our autopilot and stab
augumentation devices. We are optimistic, and we have already
seen an upturn in those numbers, so I think we have worked that
problem. The long-term solution that General Keoss is studying
right now is what type of integrated modernization program do
we need for the C-5 or what other options do we need to handle
the airlift issues. One of the proposals on the table that he
is looking at is what is called the C-5M. It is a proposal that
would replace the TF-39s which have been difficult for some
time to maintain, and at the same time, update the avionics to
deal with the global air navigation issues all in one package.
That will be reviewed this year in the budget process.
Mr. Hobson. Excuse me. The line out there is 2015 on the C-
5s?
General Muellner. Yes, sir. The assumption we have, and I
think that clearly is what Air Mobility Command, AMC carriers,
is that some version of the C-5 will indeed persist for quite
some time. Those will likely be As and Bs modified to the same
configuration.
C-17----
Mr. Hobson. Those get the C-141 mission, right?
General Muellner. No, they don't. But the C-141 will age
out as the C-17 comes in, and we will have about 53 C-141's
that will continue on out until probably 2006 time frame, but
it will be totally replaced as the C-17 comes on board.
The one issue that still remains that AMC has asked us
todeal with this year is the fact that there is a special operations
support requirement that the 141 performs, and that right now was not
factored into the original analysis that showed that 120 was the right
number. So AMC has come in with a request to augment the C-17 by as
many as 15 C-17s to pick up that special operations tasking, and that
sole tasking as it is normally called, will be dealth with by the Air
Force this year in our 2000 POM.
Mr. Young. General, we are sort of pressed for time.
General Muellner. You bet.
The long-term plan for the C-130s are we are going to take
the Es and Hs, drive them to a common configuration called the
X, which we will try to standardize the engines and the cockpit
on, and then the C-130J will augment our BR force in the
outyears.
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
(CHART 11) Sir, in the science and technology area, I think
this year we had some very, very tough decisions, but in the
long term I think we maintained a reasonably good percentage of
funding and balance, as it was, across all 3 of the areas. You
can see the focus. The focus was on space technologies heavily
and information, two of the more leveraging areas for us from
the standpoint of the Revolution in Military Affairs, RMA. We
also had some key technology investments in those other areas,
and you have copies of those, so I won't belabor them.
REVOLUTION IN BUSINESS AFFAIRS
(CHART 12) Acquisition work force drawdown has been a key
part of our strategy to try to improve our efficiency. As you
can see from this, we have continued that drawdown, and by the
2003 time frame, between 1989 and 2003 we will have drawn that
force down 36 percent. That continues by going to more of this
total system performance responsibility, and by getting the
government out of those areas that are not inherently
government activities, that don't require the government to be
the only performer of those functions. That has been very
effective to us, to driving down the costs of procuring things.
COST REDUCTIONS
(CHART 13) Overall, the revolution, if you will, in
business affairs and the acquisition streamlining has saved us
or avoided the cost of about $18 billion. The vast majority of
that has gone back into our modernization programs, which is
one of the things that allowed us to maintain the delicate
balance that we have, and we are continuing to work these areas
to institutionalize them, and they are paying off.
AIR FORCE ACQUISITION
(CHART 14) Sir, in summary, we have a whole program. I
won't tell you that it isn't fragile, because it is. As I am
sure the Chief and the Secretary pointed out this morning,
things like dealing with the supplemental, the emergency
supplemental is a very important issue to us as it came over.
If we had to consume that out of our--absorb it, rather, in the
modernization program, that would significantly impact what is
right now a balanced program.
Sir, I would be happy to take any questions that you have.
[The statement and charts of General Muellner follow:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
SUPPLEMENTAL AND GENERAL REDUCTIONS
Mr. Young. General, thank you very much. I would like to
tell you that we hope, most of us at least hope that we can
deal with the supplemental on an emergency basis and not have
to offset it. We tried to sell that idea last year, but we
didn't get any help from the administration. They refused to
sign off on that, but this year, of course, they have.
So maybe we can make that work. But you are absolutely
correct. We really can't afford any longer to dig into your
budget to pay for contingencies, either planned or unplanned.
I just wanted to make one quick comment. You mentioned the
general cuts and how they hurt. What I have to tell you,
General, is that they hurt us to. We don't like to see those
general cuts. But if we hadn't added a little over $6 billion
to the President's budget last year, those general cuts would
have been a lot more substantial, but this Committee took the
lead to add those additional monies. Even after we got the
President's budget, Secretary Cohen then came back to us and
said that the budget was deficient in the area of spare parts,
in the area of missile defense, and in the area of spare parts,
in the area of missile defense, and in the area of health care.
So we need to increase those amounts.
So there is the problem. We are not stingy with you because
we are your partners. We want to make sure you have whatever
you need to be the Air Force that we all want you to be. So we
are trying. This year we don't have that extra money that we
had last year to add, so it may not be as easy this year as it
was last year. But anyway, we are with you. I think our record
speaks for itself in trying to provide the funding for the
programs of the United States Air Force.
With that, I would like to yield to Mr. Lewis, and because
we do have a time problem this afternoon, we would like to
adhere to the 5-minute rule as closely as we can.
Mr. Lewis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Where is George Air Force Base, anyway?
General Muellner. Sir, as you well remember, my wife still
liked that house out there.
BOMBER FORCE
Mr. Lewis. Well, it's a pleasure to see you.
I do have some questions for the record, Mr. Chairman, that
I would like to submit.
I noted that you took from your list of charts a chart that
involves an area that is of great interest to the Committee and
it had to do with the bomber force, so I would like to ask just
a couple of questions about that subject area, if I could.
Could you bring us up to date as to where we are on the B-
52, the B-1, the B-2, the actual numbers that we have,
especially numbers that might be usable if we needed to use our
bomber force with a long reach involved? How many B-52s do we
have?
General Muellner. I will dig those numbers out for you so I
don't mislead you. Right now, on the B-2 side, forinstance, and
I know the Chief had some questions this morning that he could not deal
with because of the classification. Right now, as we speak, if General
Zinni so chose, we have 4 Block 30 B-2s and 5 Block 20 B-2s. They are
ready, willing and able to be employed. We have GPS-aided munitions,
both of the 2,000 and 5,000 pound class that those airplanes could
employ. So those airplanes, they are ready to go, and obviously, as you
well know, it is General Zinni's call as to actually what goes into the
plan.
On the B-52 side----
Mr. Lewis. That is 9. I am just counting out rough numbers.
General Muellner. Yes, sir. I might add, that is 9 building
that, as you know, 16 of the 21 will be Backup Aircraft
Authorized, BAA, as we normally describe them.
In the case of the B-52 we have 71 of those, and in the
case of the B-1, of course the answer is unfortunately we have
92 of those now, as a result of the accident we had here a
couple of weeks ago.
Mr. Lewis. Tell me about the condition of the bomber force
from your perspective. What adjustments would you make? Don't
worry about what the Commission might say; I am interested in
what you have to say.
General Muellner. I think the main areas, if I start with
the B-1, the B-1 would be the workhorse of the bomber force in
the outyears. The key issues there are to get the defensive
systems upgraded so that it can be a viable player without
inordinate packaging in the theater. I think that program is
executing well. We are dependent upon a Navy program called
IDECM, which is the Integrated Defensive Counter Measure
Program, and at the moment, I think that program will deliver
what we ask from it there.
The other key part of it, as you know, we have a 5-phase
investment initiatives upgrade program under drawn executing
right now in the case of B-1. That has met all of its schedule.
The only impacts it has undergone recently as a result of some
of the cuts that we had to take this year, a couple of
movements occurred with some of the capability, but generally
it is pretty well on track. That will put the B-1 in the
condition of being able to deliver both GPS-aided weapons, and
also cluster bombs with the wind corrected munitions dispenser,
and then most importantly, being able to employ the JASSM
weapon, the standoff weapon in the outyears. Right now it is
limited in that effect in JASSM or the A0A alternative JSLAM, I
think is the name of the competitor now, it is going to give it
that type of reach-out. I think that makes that B-1 very, very
leveraging. Its main benefits are not only its long range and
its connectivity, but equally important is because of the small
footprint of the airplane on the ground.
Mr. Lewis. If you were discussing with me our total bomber
force, would you include the 117?
General Muellner. Sir, I look at force employment
seamlessly. I put together the original bomber road map when I
was director of requirements when we still had Air Combat
Command, ACC.
Mr. Lewis. When was that?
General Muellner. Five years ago. And I don't see any seam
at all between the application of force in 117s, F-15Es on the
outer edge of the tactical aviation side and what bomberd can
do in that part of the battlefield also.
Mr. Lewis. Someone suggested that we don't know a lot
recently about the value of the Navy and the aircraft carriers
because of the developments in the Middle East, and the lack of
availability of long-range bombers. I am very concerned about
our ability to have that reach in times of crises, and some of
my colleagues have talked a lot about the need to be able to
travel over long, long distances.
First, I would like to go back to that analysis you did 5
years ago and I would like to see whatever I can see about
that, classified or otherwise.
General Muellner. ACC has since updated it, and I am sure
they would be glad to come up. I mean they would welcome the
opportunity.
Mr. Lewis. I would like to look at that.
General Muellner. You bet. And that includes all the
weapons. It shows what is leveraging as far as they carry.
I think a key part of that also is our approach with the B-
2.
Mr. Lewis. My time is up, General, so you and I will have
to chat another time.
Mr. Young. We will have another round, Mr. Lewis.
Mr. Dicks.
B-1 BOMBER
Mr. Dicks. General, I want to welcome you here. We did have
a discussion this morning about the bombers with General Ryan,
and I think his testimony and your testimony called the B-1B
the backbone of our bomber fleet.
Now, it is my understanding that the requirement for B-1
mission capability is 75 percent. It is also my understanding
that the current mission capability rate for the B-1 bomber is
51.2 percent and going down. According to a recent press
report, the B-1's engine flight control system and Electronic
Counter Measures, ECM systems continue to break down far too
frequently. A shortage of spare parts has also sparked a
dramatic increase in the B-1's cannibalization rate, a
measurement of how many times a B-1 has to be raided for parts
to keep another B-1 flying. The Air Force admits the
cannibalization of the B-1 has reached the problem stage.
The B-1 is not stealthy, has never been used in a conflict
in its almost 20 years of existence, currently falls below Air
Force standards of mission capability, and is being continually
cannibalized for parts.
With all due respect, General, are you somewhat embarrassed
to call this the backbone of our bomber fleet?
General Muellner. No, sir, I am not. I am not sure where
all those numbers came from, but they are not consistent at
least with the Mission Capable, and the Sustainment Executive
Management Report, SEMR, reports of readiness.
The other key part of it is I think in those cases, when we
have called upon the B-1 to be ready, and in those cases where
we are flying global power missions right now around the world,
the B-1 performs very well. Clearly, we have spare parts
problems with the B-1.
As you recall, with the direction of the Congress a year
ago, we ran an assessment of, it fully provisioned, what could
the B-1 do? And if you recall, when we pulled all of the spare
parts together that we generally have a shortage of across the
fleet, the B-1 performed very, very well, as far as mission
capability.
So we understand how to fix the problems with the B-1. The
problem we have with the B-1, as we do with many of our other
weapons systems, is availability of spare parts often is driven
by something other than just money. It is the suppliers and the
existence of those suppliers still being around to produce, and
in many cases, our log centers and/or clients who are dealing
with these issues end up having to go out and find alternate
suppliers.
As I think you know, for the last 2 years, we have been
trying to fix the B-1 program and we have spent a lot of money.
In fact, the vast majority of the money that we have in bomber
upgrades is to make the B-1 a conventional, survivable player.
You are right, it is not stealthy, but on the other hand, when
you package it, for instance, with a carrier battle group who
is strike-poor, but support-rich, i.e., they have EA-6s, they
have HARM shooters, but they don't have many bomb-droppers, you
get a great synergy there, and we clearly I think have
demonstrated that in an awful lot of exercises.
So we think the B-1 is going to do a good job of carrying
its load in the outyears.
WEAPONIZATION OF B-1 AND B-2
Mr. Dicks. How long will it take on the B-1 and B-2 to get
them fully weaponized, assuming for the moment that we are
going to have 21 B-2s and the number of B-1s that you
mentioned, how long is it going to take us to get all of these
conventional weapons onto those two bombers so that we are not
in a situation like we are now where the B-1s and B-2s both
have a limited number of conventional weapons, at best?
General Muellner. The B-1 and the B-2 in particular will
both have, the last weapon to go on is in 2003, which is the B-
2, that is the JASSM or the JSLAM, if that would be the case.
In the case of the B-1, it will have all of the weapons,
including that standoff weapon in 2002, as will the B-2.
Mr. Dicks. Will this include sensor-fused weapon, JSOW,
JDAM and the BLU-113?
General Muellner. The only airplanes that can carry the
5,000 pound weapon right now will be the B-2 and the F-15E, and
this is a bay size issue or a carriage limitation of the
pylons. So that 5,000 or 4,800-pound weapon, which is in the
GPU-37 configuration for GPS-aided, or in the 28 configuration
for laser illuminator, will go only on the B-2 and the F-15E.
But again, we have limited numbers of those and we think that
is probably the right packages for those.
Mr. Dicks. And right now you have sensor-fused weapons on
the B-1?
General Muellner. This is correct.
Mr. Dicks. Are you going to put the upgraded version of
sensor-fused weapon on the B-1?
General Muellner. The Wind-Corrected Munitions Dispenser,
which is the INS-guided version of that, and theJSOW-B will
both have the skeet weapon in it which is what constitutes the sensor-
fused weapon, and JSOW will go on both the B-1 and B-2. WCMD will go on
the B-1B.
Mr. Dicks. Last question. Tell us about Terrain Collision
Avoidance System, TCAS. We asked the Secretary, and this came
up again on 60 Minutes 2 weekends ago. It was another reminder
that we had another crash, lost some airmen, and it just seems
to me that on the planes that it makes sense to, we ought to
get TCAS and ground proximity warning systems, the other safety
devices that are widely used in the commercial arena, they
ought to be put on these planes as quickly as possible, and I
am told that the 5-year program for at least TCAS and E-GPWS,
the ground proximity warning system, won't get us there. Is
that accurate?
General Muellner. I don't believe it is accurate, sir, and
as the Chief told you, certainly because of the accident off of
Africa, a lot of additional attention has been paid to
accelerating that to the degree we can.
I would like to correct, I guess, a couple of things that
you may have seen on the 60 Minutes show. I guarantee you, none
of the airlines that I talked to, and I talk to most of them
daily, or at least weekly, paid $50,000. They wish they could.
We are all looking for that vendor, whoever it is, that has
this $50,000 TCAS. Most of the airlines pay about $200,000 on
aircraft for the boxes, plus installation, which is about what
we are paying for. Our boxes are a little bit more expensive
because we have some combat modes, in the IFF system,
Identification Friend or Foe, they do not have, and ours have
to be night vision goggle compatible on some of our airplanes.
But other than that, it is noise level as far as the cost of
installation.
I think as the Chief and Secretary talked about this
morning, we have accelerated the program. For instance, the C-
17, which does not now have it, because it was designed before
that was either a requirement or even really available. By
2002, all of the C-17s either, coming off the production line
or through retrofit, will be fully equipped with TCAS and with
the other safety modifications. We are concentrating on our
passenger carrying fleet up front. I can tell you that the
ground proximity warning system from an Air Force perspective
is going to be much more of a lifesaver than TCAS is. History
shows that mid-airs that could have been prevented by TCAS are
very rare, very rare in the case of military aircraft. Most of
our mid-airs occur in close-in combat training and TCAS is not
functional in that mode.
But we agree with you. We are pushing hard as a result of
the initiative that Secretary Perry put in place following the
terrible accident with the CT-43, and I think you will find
that the TCAS schedule I think is pretty aggressive.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Hobson.
JOINT AIR-TO-SURFACE STANDOFF MISSILE
Mr. Hobson. General, nice to see you again. I hope you are
going to be around for a while, too. It worries me.
Let me ask some questions real fast. I want to talk about
JASSM replacing the old TSSAM program which experienced
significant cost growth. Some people say it was $1 million a
copy, and before you canceled the program for a total program,
$4 billion. The question is, will JASSM be different? Number 2,
can't SLAM-ER do the job? Can you explain, sir?
General Muellner. Well, sir, the first thing is when we
canceled, TSSAM, it is actually $1.3 million a copy, which is
the reason we canceled that down at ACC or TAC at the time.
I think there is a big difference between the two programs.
One is, we had at one point in time 7 different variants of
TSSAM that at that time Northrop was being forced to build for
the various services. The certification requirements across a
wide fleet of airplanes was very demanding. The end result of
that is that they ran into an unexecutable program.
I think that the big difference between that program and
JASSM is that one, we have had aggressive competition. We had
requirements that were open for negotiation by the contractor
in order to effectively balance the weapons characteristics as
far as range, kill effectiveness, carriage capabilities as far
as low-downs and the survivability against the costs. They
fully understood that from the very beginning, cost truly was
one of the decisions variables that would be used, and that
really wasn't the case previously in the case of the TSSAM.
The JASSM AOA that is going on right now I think is going
to do a good job of really quantifying what the cost of the 2
systems are, and equally important, what their effectiveness
is. Right now, based upon what I have seen, and admittedly I
have not seen the final AOA, which won't be out for about a
month, I think your are going to find that JASSM is going to be
radically changed. Both of the contractors, by the way, for
JASSM right now say they have enough confidence in their system
that they are willing to come in, not with a cost of the
weapons system, but with a price of the weapons system. And
they are talking 15- and 20-year warranties, no questions
asked. It is going to be very, very difficult for us to not
look favorably, I think, on those.
AIR FORCE VISION FOR SPACE
Mr. Hobson. One more question.
The Air Force needs to become the air and space force.
Space is the wave of the future and control thereof is
essential to military operations. I am going to run through
about 4 questions here and then you can answer them.
One, what is your future space vision? Two, does this run
afoul of the arms control community which may oppose
modernization in space? Three, will Congress see a shift in the
science and technology budget in support of the Air Force space
division, and when? And where, from my perspective, where will
this be done?
The military space plane was one of the programs eliminated
when the President used his line-item veto on the fiscal year
1998 Defense Appropriations Act. The research involves studying
a space vehicle that operates like an airplane. Some say that
DOD wants this system and it was line-item vetoed just for the
arms control advocates. Others say DOD does not want the
system, as it is not in the future years' defense plan. What is
the true story?
General Muellner. I guess as far as the long-term vision,
we clearly are focused on the seamless transition in this
aerospace environment. Where it makes sense, we want to migrate
missions to space. Examples I think right now are the ISR area,
surveillance reconnaissance in particular, where space gives
you the access and gives you the persistence, and hopefully a
lower cost from the standpoint of operations. So we are clearly
moving in that direction.
To jump ahead, if you look at our S&T budget this year, you
will find that one area that went up when most of the others
went down was space. You have already seen that migration. You
are going to see an even more aggressive migration to that next
year. So I think we are speaking with our pocketbook, if you
will.
I think the vision that we have for the future, the key
areas, I don't think you have to press the arms control. If I
just take a program that is very enthusiastically supported by
some of your colleagues on the other side of the Hill is the
Space-Based Laser. Us demonstrating the technology to find out
that there is a need for a viable approach we can do within the
existing treaties. I know of no treaty implications for the
space maneuver vehicle, for instance, which we wanted to
pursue. Our residency in pursuing this single stage-to-orbit
approach is a number of years ago the decision was made that we
would focus on expendables and NASA would focus on the reusable
space station and we have been pursuing that strategy. Clearly,
if you look at the Air Force Space Command Master Plan, a space
maneuver vehicle, a space operations vehicle, is the linchpin
of an awful lot of what they want to do.
At some point in the future, however, we are going to have
to take on some of these treaties. Clearly, there is concern of
satellite protection in the outyears, and we need to understand
how we are going to deal with that. We have not encountered
that yet and clearly it is on the horizon.
Mr. Hobson. Where do you see most of this space technology
money being spent?
General Muellner. Sir, I think it is split. Propulsion
technology will probably be done through the propulsion lab. A
lot of the other technology work will be done out at the
Phillips Lab out at Kirtland Air Force Base. Propulsion, of
course, that part of it is Wright-Patterson, continues to do
the hypersonics and those kinds of things.
Mr. Hobson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Visclosky.
SPACE LAUNCH
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, I would like to ask you about the EELV program. I
talked to the Secretary and the General this morning about it.
My understanding is you set aside $500 million per contractor?
General Muellner. That is correct.
Mr. Visclosky. Could you just fill me in as to how you got
to this point and where we are in the program?
General Muellner. Yes, sir, I would be glad to. Our
original process was going to lead to a down-select to a single
contractor for the EMD phase. What happened was as we started
to look at the national mission model for launch requirements
in the outyears, and we started to get approached by users of
launch; i.e., those people like Motorola and the others that
use launch. It was clear that the mission model was growing
very rapidly, and it looked like it would better support a
competitive environment in the outyears in order to keep U.S.
launch access costs down, and at the same time, make it most
competitive in the world environment.
After we had come to that conclusion, reinforced by our
space architects looking, we met with the contractors and at
that point made the determination to carry both of the
contractors. The agreement we came to was that there were
clearly some military requirements in the outyears, payload
interfaces and other things like that, that we had to ensure
were going to be captured in the vehicles they designed. At the
same time, they needed to be able to chase the commercial
launch requirements. So the compromise we came to was to carry
them both in the EMD, protect our interests with the $500
million of investment, and then hopefully, end up with
something that is commercially a very viable product that has
that 25 to 50 percent reduction in launch access cost.
Mr. Visclosky. As far as the scope of work for the $500
million, is everybody on board and is there a clear
understanding as to what that scope of work is going to be for
the contractor?
General Muellner. I think from a philosophical standpoint,
that is true. I don't think they worked out the entire work
breakdown structure with both contractors. They are going to be
doing that over the next 6 months. My Program Executive
Officer, PEO that works that has met Art Money, who was the
acquisition executive up until 2 weeks ago, has met with both
the contractors. I think we generally have agreement.
Each contractor is coming at this differently. One of them
has a segment of the market captured right now, and the other
one--and I might add, at a less--at a reducing degree of
competitiveness, which is the reason they want to pursue that
part even more. The other one wants to go after the full
market. So I think the closure on the work breakdown structure
is going to be what will occur over the next 6 months, but I am
optimistic that is going to work well.
Mr. Visclosky. You had some reprogramming, I think it is
about $7.5 million in the program for 1998. In your budget
request, do you anticipate any problems for 1999 from a
budgetary standpoint?
General Muellner. We may come in and request a
reprogramming as we sort it out, because as I mentioned to you
earlier, as a result of us trying to balance out the 1998 bills
that came back to us, that could drive us to a reprogramming,
but I don't think it will be a large number.
Mr. Visclosky. General, last point on this issue. My
understanding is that you launch from 2 different locations.
General Muellner. That is correct?
Mr. Visclosky. Is there any anticipation that that number
might be reduced to have one site?
General Muellner. Not at the moment. We are looking at
bringing in more commercial content. As you know, out at
Vandenberg we have already commercialized one of the launch
pads. There is a commercial operator there. There are people
that want to do that also at Patrick, but at the moment, we are
going to retain both of those. We are shutting down launch
capabilities for certain types of systems sequentially at one
or the other locations.
Mr. Visclosky. To save some of your money.
General Muellner. Titan, for instance. When we get down to
a reduced number of titan launches required, and as EELV stands
up, we will draw down one post before the other.
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Nethercutt.
YEAR 2000 COMPUTER PROBLEM
Mr. Nethercutt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, General.
Sir, I want to talk to you briefly about the year 2000, Y2K
problem. The GAO recently completed a report about the Air
Force with some findings that I assume you folks have looked at
carefully.
General Muellner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Nethercutt. What changes have you implemented in
response to the GAO report?
General Muellner. Well, we have done a number of things. In
all honesty, the Air Force has been pretty aggressive about
chasing the Y2K problem. All of our weapons systems have been
catalogued in this new package that OSD has, and for some time.
They talk about 4 categories starting with identification all
the way through full compliance in the Y2K issue.
Right now, the distribution of our system shows that the
vast majority of our systems are fully implemented. Better than
50 percent are fully implemented. When I add those that are in
validation for implementation, about 70 percent of them have
already had validation of the fixes that are in place there.
Of our mission-critical systems, again, the vast majority
of those are in validation and implementation. We only have, as
of today, only 3 systems, and these are primarily maintenance
information systems, that are just in the first phase. Those
are driven by the fact that they have a lot of COTS software in
them, and we have had some difficulty in dealing with those.
Mr. Nethercutt. I am informed that as of September last
year, about 33 percent of your systems had not been assessed. I
take it from your testimony that all that has been completed
now, with the small exception that you mentioned?
General Muellner. Sir, out of 3,407 systems, I only have 2
that have not been through assessment.
Mr. Nethercutt. Do you have enough money to do it? What's
your cost estimate?
General Muellner. Our cost estimate for all of these fixes
today is probably somewhere around $900 million. We have enough
money to do it because in each one of our programs we
established this as a top priority for them to deal with from
the standpoint of software. So as a result of that, other
software activities, like program upgrades or what have you
have been moved to the right in order to ensure that this is at
the top.
Mr. Nethercutt. In your process of assessment and follow
on, have you gone through any testing to see to what extent
they are in compliance or will be in compliance?
General Muellner. Oh, yes, sir.
Mr. Nethercutt. That is all part of the process?
General Muellner. One of the five phases is validation, and
so we verify the fixes and then implement them, and then after
we have implemented them system-wide, we do a system-to-system
test. For instance, Cheyenne Mountain is obviously a critical
area.
AIRBORNE LASER PROGRAM
Mr. Nethercutt. Let me switch quickly in my time left to
the Airborne Laser. I strongly support that program, and I have
been concerned about some recent press accounts about the
potential problems of atmospheric distortion of the laser beam.
I understand that since the initial GAO report on this subject,
the atmospheric data collection program has revealed that
turbulence problems are no longer a significant concern.
Could you state for the record what this data tells us
about the atmosphere in Southwest Asia and Korea relative to
the ABL?
General Muellner. Yes, sir, absolutely. As you said, we
collected data over Southwest Asia and also over Korea. We
collected both through balloons and also through a series of
airplane flights over there. In fact, just yesterday, they got
back from their last excursion into Bahrain where they were
flying. What it showed is that the model we have for the
atmosphere, if anything, is a little bit pessimistic. That is
especially true in the Southwest Asia scenario. In the Korean
scenario, it turned out to be about right.
The measure of merit that they use for that turbulence is
one or two times something called clear, and in reality, our
design point for the system is clear 1, but we spec'd it to
clear 2, which says turbulence twice as severe. What they are
finding is that our assessment of what is either clear 1 or
clear 2 was almost directly on the model that they have to
date.
So I think that, coupled with the understanding of the
atmospheric correction to the adaptive optics, and for those
who haven't been down to Kirtland or Star, if you ever get the
change to do it, I would highly recommend it to you. Adaptive
optics are wondrous things, especially if you are an
astronomer. But what that shows is we can clearly correct that,
because we understand it.
Mr. Nethercutt. You still have confidence in this program
and want it to move forward?
General Muellner. Absolutely, sir. In fact, we had a
program review yesterday with the OSD staff. We had 4
demonstration criteria to move on to the next phase. Two of
those have been satisfied, and the other two will be completed
by June of this year.
Mr. Nethercutt. Thank you very much for your testimony and
your service.
COMPUTER ATTACKS
Mr. Young. General Muellner, quite a few years ago, more
than I would like to admit, we began becoming so dependent on
our computers. One of my major concerns that I express
oftentimes in this Committee and in other committees is that I
was afraid those computers might not be as secure as we would
like to think they are.
Last week, Deputy Defense Secretary John Hamre announced
that the DOD had suffered the most organized and systematic
attack ever to its computer networks.
Let me read off a couple of questions and if you would just
respond to them generally. Were the Air Force computer networks
attacked? If so, which systems were attacked? Were they
successfully penetrated? If the hackers got into the system,
what did they do? Did they damage or manipulate data, or did
they merely obtain the capability to damage or manipulate data
and simply choose not to use it?
General Muellner. ------. Interestingly, in almost all but
one case, we detected it, because all our bases, ------ have a
detection system in place called ASIM. That is the one I think
Secretary Hamre referred to. ------.
Mr. Young. Well, one of the questions in my mind was, was
this a red team exercise, but obviously from what you said it
was not.
General Muellner. No, sir, it was clearly not. I guarantee
you there was a lot of activity, and as you also know from the
Secretary's comments, ------. The difference is we have the
security incident measurement device in place, the ASIM device,
which allows us to know when they are being attacked whereas --
----. They are now, though.
Mr. Young. General, what are the legal and policy issues
that have to be resolved to facilitate a more aggressive
protection of these networks?
General Muellner. Well, I think there are a couple of
issues, and clearly the FBI has been the lead agency working
that. We have several efforts going right now with information
ops-related activities with the FBI and with Department of
Justice, but obviously, when you get into the 4th Amendment
rights and that, that is an area that we obviously have to
protect.
But the primary area is the ability to trace them back and
then hold them accountable. As you said with your earlier
question, if all they do is penetrate and look around and don't
do anything, then it is not clear that a crime has been
performed. So there are certainly some issues there that have
to be resolved as far as is trespassing a crime ------.
Mr. Young. Can they do this to your classified systems?
General Muellner. We hope not. They certainly have not been
able to do that as of yet. We have not had any penetrations.
The closest I think we have had to having one of those systems
at risk was when there was an unauthorized linkage in the field
between a classified and unclassified network. Right now, we
have what we generally call air gaps or tennis shoe separation
between them; i.e., the only way to take something from one
classified network to an unclassified network is through a
human intervening and physically doing it. So we think that
protection is still holding. We have not had any classified
penetrations that I am aware of.
Mr. Young. Well, keep us advised as to whether or not these
gentlemen, or whoever they are, male or female, if they decide
to sign up with you. We would just be curious.
General Muellner. Will do, sir.
Mr. Young. Mr. Dicks.
MISSION PLANNING
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In our discussions this morning with the Chief, one system
came up for some criticism, and that is the Air Force Mission
Support System. Now, this is developing a common mission
planning system for all Air Force forces. The Committee
understands that there have been numerous complaints by the
user community that AFMSS is slow and difficult to use. For
example, it currently takes 30 hours to plan a single mission
for the B-2.
What is being done to address the complaints in the user
community?
General Muellner. Well, I certainly resonate with those.
Mr. Dicks. And who builds this system?
General Muellner. The system is built by, or is
orchestrated, if you will, because there are many components to
it, but the system is built by Lockheed Sanders, and that
system has indeed been brought under a lot of pressure by the
bomber force, but also by the fighters to some degree also.
I might add that the resident system on the B-2 takes 36
hours in planning a mission, so AFMSS is actually working it
down. That is the previous SIOP-based system. Right now, the
objective for AFMSS with our block 1.5 release, which will
probably be next year, is to get that 3, 2-to-3 day activity
down to 8 hours per mission. The end objective, which is a
result of conventional planning, is that the system will be
able to mission plan a 16-bomb, relative GPS-delivered weapon
scenario in no more than 8 hours for a combat mission and 4
hours for a training mission where route planning is not
critical.
Now, the problems they have had with it have not
necessarily been hardware problems; they have been based upon
the complexity of the software. To begin with, it uses an LO
auto router. If you are familiar with the ELVIRA system that we
had for the F-117 during Desert Storm, you will recall that
that was not built for the type of surge activities that we
historically employ in our airplanes and we had major problems
with it. The big part of it for LO airplanes is this management
of the signature with a change in threat database, and that is
one of the things that drives the long time on it.
So the short answer is planning time for combat missions
will go to 8 hours and hopefully 4 hours for training missions.
Mr. Dicks. You are saying by the end of 1999?
General Muellner. 1999, that is correct.
Mr. Dicks. Apparently there will be some difference in the
Block 30s and the Block 20s?
General Muellner. They use different mission planning.
Mr. Dicks. But apparently the Block 20 works better than
the Block 30.
General Muellner. Well, Tom Goslins' quote to me was that
the Block 20 system, which is the Strategic Mission Data
Preparation System, SMPDS, which is the Single Integrated
Operational Plan, SIOP-based system, if you will, primarily
designed for the nuclear side, right now takes 36 hours,
according to the wings assessment, to plan a mission. My cut at
the Air Force Mission Support System, AFMSS for the Block 30s,
it actually takes 48 hours to plan that mission, although they
say it is coming down to 30 hours.
So the answer is they are two separate systems, they are
not related. One is a legacy system that is really a spin-off
from the system that was in place out at STRATCOM, and it was
just a transition until AFMSS got on board. Because the AFMSS
LO auto router, a common auto router, was not available when
the Block 20s were fueled.
Mr. Dicks. But what I don't understand is why doesn't this
system work? What is wrong with it?
General Muellner. It does work, it is just very slow.
Mr. Dicks. Why is it slow?
General Muellner. The reason it is slow is because if you
lay out a threat database, especially one associated say with
the SIOP, where you are penetrating amongst a lot of corridors
and that, this system has to find you the optimum route to
manage your signature through all of those things. Just like we
found with ELVIRA. ELVIRA, when I started with the 117 program,
it used to take us 2 days to plan a route for an airplane that
could only stay airborne for a coupe of hours, not one that
could fly as far as B-2.
So the end result is that a long time is required for the
mission planning to effectively manage the signature, manage
the delivery of these 16 bombs, and individual targets and
that.
Mr. Dicks. Were we able to improve the F-117s?
General Muellner. Yes, sir. We got it down to probably in
the order of 6 hours per mission.
Mr. Dicks. How do you rate the chance of fixing this system
and making it fit into the 8 hours and then the 4 hours?
General Muellner. I rate it very good. I rate it good for 2
reasons. Why is that? We will be using the same auto router
that the 117 uses and obviously the B-2 will use. So as a
result of that, you will have the synergy between the 2 of
them.
The other part of it is that Lockheed Sanders has invested
quite a bit in this. We have been working with the Navy, and we
are going to migrate this system--I might add, the Navy has the
same problem with their Tactical Automated Mission Planning
System, TAMPS, and we are migrating the two systems together
here just past the turn of the century. So I think the problem
is going to get fixed. It is not going to get fixed, though,
for at least a year-and-a-half.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you.
Mr. Young. Mr. Visclosky.
REENGINING OF LARGE AIRCRAFT
Mr. Visclosky. Just one more question, Mr. Chairman, if I
could.
General, apparently the Air Force is undergoing a reengine
study for the larger aircraft. Are there any preliminary
conclusions as far as the study that you might share with us?
General Muellner. I think the key ones that jump out are
that, one, the option space they are looking at has everything
from new engines to consolidating on a single family of engines
across a lot of these airplanes like AWACS, Joint STARS and so
on.
The other part of it is that when we early on looked at
reengining the B-52s, the limiting factor in leasing these
engines powered by the hour, as the airlines do, were twofold.
One is the indemnification over loss of the system. Obviously,
providing insurance for that, if you will, which is what the
commercial operators do, is going to be difficult for us, given
that we are going to put these things at risk, intentionally.
The other part of it is termination liability. What happens
if we go out and reengine all of the B-52s with a 30-year lease
option and next year the decision is made to retire them all.
Obviously, some engine manufacturer has a lot of investment
there which he is going to want to recover.
And so in both of those cases, even when we looked at it
for leasing the airplanes and support DV activities out at
the--the ones that you all fly and that the Cabinet members fly
out there with these commercial 757s we just bought, we found
that the leasing, this was going to be very, very difficult and
economically didn't work out well.
They are still struggling with that. At least the 2 engine
contractors have come in with a very, very attractive offer
that would totally rule out the termination liability, because
the engine they would use is so commercially in demand that
they could easily absorb them back into the commercial pool, if
that would become necessary. So there are some options opening
up as a result of industry really taking a hard look. We still
have the indemnification issue, though, that we are going to
have to sort out.
Mr. Visclosky. General, thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
BOEING 757 AIRCRAFT
Mr. Young. General, do we have any of the 757s in our
possession yet?
General Muellner. Sir, you will get the first of them the
end of March, the second one in April, and the other 2 the
latter part of the year. The first has already flown. It is
over being outfitted internally and will enter the flight test
program. We were the lead customer for putting GPS on the 757,
hard to believe at this late date, but as a result of that,
they need to use our airplane for FAA certification
integration. But the end of March, end of April, and then the
end of the year for the other 2.
Mr. Young. Which airplanes are you going to retire from the
fleet as these 757s come on board?
General Muellner. Some of these old what we call the VC-137
airplane. We will only end up with one of those continuing for
several years.
Mr. Young. Well, general, thanks very much for an
interesting hearing. We appreciate your responses to our
questions.
The Committee will adjourn now until 9:30 a.m. next
Wednesday, when we will in closed session be hearing from the
DCI on the 1999 intelligence budget.
The Committee is adjourned.
[Clerk's note: Question submitted by Mr. Lewis and the
answers thereto follow:]
Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)
Question. The operational performance of the Predator Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle (UAV) supporting NATO and US operations in Bosnia is
impressive in all respects. The Predator UAV continues to be the only
operational endurance UAV available to support Defense Department
tactical intelligence requirements. With increasing frequency, the
Department of Defense is deploying Predator systems for worldwide
contingency missions. With other endurance UAV systems not operational
for several years and the Services' difficulty in fielding a tactical
UAV system, the committee is convinced that the Department should
exploit the operational success of the Predator UAV system. The Air
Force procurement plan only envisions a total purchase of 12 Predator
systems through the Future Year Defense Plan. With the increased demand
for Predator tactical surveillance support and a limited number of
Predator systems funded, the Committee feels additional Predators
should be purchased to field worldwide requirements. What is the
Department's plan for acquiring additional Predator systems? What can
the Committee do to help?
Answer. The Air Force is procuring its entire Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) requirement for Predator
systems. The Predator Operational Requirements Document (ORD),
validated by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), set the
requirement for two Major Theater Wars (MTW) at twelve systems. This
will provide five systems for each MTW, one training system, and one
RDT&E system. There are no plans to procure additional complete systems
at this time. We are procuring, in the fiscal year 1999 President's
Budget, sufficient attrition air vehicles to maintain our required
capability, and will continue to address this in subsequent budgets.
Currently, there is one partial system deployed to the European
theater. As we gain operational experience with Predator, and as we
evaluate additional UAV mission requirements, we will assess our need
for additional systems.
[Clerk's note: End of question submitted by Mr. Lewis.
Questions submitted by Mr. Visclosky and the answers thereto
follow:]
F-22 Aircraft
Question. My understanding is that the F-22 does not contain an
active jammer and no plans are being made to include IDECM in the
electronic warfare suite. Could you talk about why this platform should
not have an active jammer?
Answer. The F-22 tailors available Electronic Warfare (EW)
technology, radio frequency (RF), infrared (IR), sensors, etc.,
appropriately to its low observable (LO) signature, supercruise, and
agility to increase its survivability.
Incorporating Jammers
Question. I have heard reports in the media recently about the
unreliability of LO capabilities on the B-2. Shouldn't we be
incorporating active jammers into all of our platforms given the
possibility that someday our LO capabilities could be compromised by
new threats?
Answer. No, operational use of an active jammer on low observable
aircraft would serve to highlight the presence of the aircraft which is
counter to the objective of a low observable design--reducing the
radar, acoustic, visual, and electronic signature of the aircraft. If
jamming is needed at a future date, other operational options, such as
packaging the aircraft with a jamming aircraft, would be available to
the operational planner to achieve the mission objectives.
[Clerk's note: End of questions submitted by Mr. Visclosky.
Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the answers thereto
follow:]
Joint STARS
Question. The budget this year reflects a reduction to the Joint
STARS total procurement objective from 19 to 13. The last two aircraft
are funded in fiscal year 1999 with no advance procurement for follow-
on buys. Secretary Cohen wrote to several Members of Congress
indicating that he believed the requirements for Joint STARS aircraft
should be reassessed. General Muellner, what is the status of the Joint
STARS review within DOD and when can we expect an answer?
Answer. The DOD is conducting reviews of requirements and technical
alternatives to form choices about the overall architecture of DOD's
airborne surveillance capabilities. The DOD is evaluating Joint STARS
along with other surveillance systems and approaches to ensure dominant
awareness of the battlefield. The review will be completed in early
summer.
Question. When must a decision be in hand an action taken to
prevent an adverse impact to the production line?
Answer. A decision on whether to stop or continue production is
needed in the summer of 1998. A production shutdown will begin in
November 98, which is when the 14th production aircraft would have been
inducted into the production process.
Question. Are there components bought in previous years based on an
inventory requirement of 19 Joint STARS aircraft that are now excess to
program requirements? If so, what are these components and what did
they originally cost? What will be done with these components?
Answer. Six used B707 airframes, purchased at a cost of $5 million
each, are presently in storage, awaiting induction into the Joint STARS
production program. These are excess to program requirements, given a
production program of 13 E-8Cs. The Air Force has not yet determined
the final disposition of these airframes. Procurement of these
airframes was authorized and funded by the fiscal year 1995 Defense
Appropriation Bill.
Question. Last year, the Air Force budget assumed production of 19
aircraft and no development of a radar technology insertion program
(RTIP). This year, the budget deletes all but 13 aircraft and assumes
development of RTIP. General, why is RTIP now a higher priority than
aircraft quantities?
Answer. The fiscal year 1999 President's Budget submission is
consistent with recommendations in the QDR made by the Department
during the fiscal year 1999 budget cycle. In addition to reducing the
number of aircraft to 13, the QDR included a recommendation to invest
in radar improvements for joint STARS. The Radar Technology Insertion
Program (RTIP) is that radar improvement program.
F-22 Aircraft
Question. The F-22 has recently experienced delays in the
manufacture of test aircraft and development of software. General
Muellner, please discuss the cause of these delays and their impact on
the program.
Answer. There are two manufacturing related problems causing test
aircraft delays in the F-22 program: the manufacture of side-of-body
components and aft fuselage booms. The delays resulted from a new side-
of-body casting technique and a new welding process which provides for
a less expensive and more producible design to be used in the F-22
production phase.
The side-of-body issue is related to challenges in producing very
large, high-quality titanium castings. Shrink voids are created when
there is inadequate flow of liquid metal during the solidification
process, and shell inclusions are produced when portions of the ceramic
casting mold break off during the casting process and result in ceramic
``inclusions'' in the metal structure. In the interim, the side-of-body
casting design has been ``beefed up'' to provide adequate strength and
durability to accommodate possible shell inclusions in areas where the
inclusions cannot be removed or detected by conventional inspection and
weld repair techniques. The solution is to redesign the mechanism which
feeds liquid metal into the casting mold.
The aft fuselage boom problem resulted from extra time needed to
complete a unique titanium welding assembly process. This process,
electron beam welding, is used to join aft boom titanium sections in
order to save weight and cost and provide enhanced service life.
Limitations in the welding jig as the parts are tack welded in place
prior to final welding have resulted in extensive touch labor to adjust
and shim the parts to maintain tight tolerances needed for electron
beam welding. The contractors have made minor design revisions to
reduce part variability and to simplify machining and fit-up. This
problem is behind us.
The net effect of these two problems is a delay in the delivery of
test aircraft 3999 (static article) by 4.6 months; aircraft 4000
(fatigue article) by 4.7 months; aircraft 4003 by 5.3 months; aircraft
4004 by 5.5 months; aircraft 4005 by 2.7 months; and, aircraft 4006 by
0.4 months. We have solutions in place for the manufacturing
difficulties and will have a detailed EMD schedule recovery plan in
place by May 98. There will be no impact to the IOT&E schedule and no
delays in the production schedule.
Question. Please discuss any other delays in the development
program.
Answer. No other delays exist. However, you may have heard of a
stabilator debonding problem.
Prior to shipping aircraft 4001 to Edwards Air Force Base, non-
destructive investigation of the horizontal stabilator identified a
small defect in the aluminum honeycomb. The first two shipsets of
stabilators (aircraft 4001 & 4002) have experienced two different
process/design problems: ``Blown Core'' and ``Nodal Disbonding.''
The first problem, ``Blown Core,'' is caused by expansion of
moisture during the core bonding process. Repairs for this defect are
complete on aircraft 4001, nearly complete on aircraft 4002, and
corrective manufacturing processes are in place and will be proven out
on aircraft 3999 (static article).
The second problem, ``Nodal Disbonding,'' is caused by the mismatch
of thermal expansion coefficients between the aluminum and composite
materials during cool down in the manufacturing process. The corrective
process includes replacing aluminum with composite materials. The
repairs will be incorporated into aircraft 4002 during the
manufacturing process. There will be no impact to aircraft 3999 and
follow-on aircraft schedules.
Question. For fiscal year 1999, the Air Force budget requests for
the first time procurement funding for 2 F-22 aircraft. General
Muellner, will the program be ready for production in fiscal year 1999?
Answer. The Air Force has high confidence the F-22 program is ready
for low rate production, as we are executing the production plan we
briefed you last year.
The F-22 program was established utilizing an event based
philosophy. Exit criteria were established to ensure the program does
not proceed before it is ready. The exist criteria for awarding the
advance buy effort for Lot I have been achieved. We believe this is the
appropriate time to move into production.
The problems the program is currently experiencing are to be
expected for a complex weapon system during the development phase. The
program will work through these issues and make the improvements
necessary to mature the design that meets Air Combat Command
requirements.
Question. One of the biggest concerns currently for the B-2 is the
problem of low observable maintainability. What specifically is being
done on the F-22 program to avoid or mitigate these problems
experienced on older generation stealth aircraft?
Answer. The F-22 is a fourth generation Low Observable (LO)
aircraft that incorporated lessons learned from previous generation
stealth aircraft to enhance its LO maintainability. The F-22 program is
using gap treatment materials (instead of tape like the B-2) that are
qualified at all flight conditions and environments. The program
utilizes J-seals that do not require LO restoration after opening the
most commonly accessed panels. Additionally, the use of Form-In-Place
seals allows less frequently accessed panels to be opened without
removing the gap material, thereby eliminating the need for LO
restoration. Overall, 75 percent of all expected repairs on the F-22
can be accomplished without the need for LO restoration.
B-1 Bomber Upgrades
Question. What are the B-1's capabilities today in terms of
available weapons and aircraft survivability?
Answer. The B-1 weapon system is undergoing a metamorphosis from
its originally designed nuclear role. Over the next decade we will
continue the conversion of the B-1 into a highly capable conventional
platform capable of superior lethality, with vastly improved
survivability.
The Conventional Mission Upgrade Program (CMUP) is a multi-phase
modernization that began in 1993 with the addition of Cluster Bomb
Units (CBU-87 Combined Effects Munition, CBU-89 Gator, and CBU-97
Sensor Fused Weapon). In addition to this major block of critical
``halt phase'' munitions, and the existing gravity bomb capability,
CMUP added munitions for ``control of sea lanes,'' via the Mk-62 Naval
mine. The current CMUP block upgrade integrates the Joint Direct Attack
Munition (JDAM), and follow on blocks contain Wind Corrected Munitions
Dispenser (WCMD) in 2001, and the Joint Stand-off Weapon (JSOW) and the
Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Munition (JASSM) in 2002. The direct
attack, stand-off and precision munitions capabilities gained through
CMUP contribute to the B-1 being the ``backbone'' of the Air Force's
conventional bomber force.
The same block of software that added the B-1's CBU capability
implemented changes to the existing ALQ-161 Electronic Countermeasures
suite by improving survivability in low-to-medium threat environments.
Starting in 1999, the B-1 will employ with the ALE-50 Towed Decoy
System improving survivability against radar directed surface-to-air
missiles. The B-1's final CMUP modification is the Navy's Integrated
Defensive Electronic Countermeasure (IDECM) system, and the ALR-56M
Radar Warning Receiver which, starting in FY02, will replace much of
the B-1's current ECM system increasing B-1 survivability against 2010
threats.
The B-1's carefully structured modernization improves every aspect
of the B-1 program. CMUP improvements in reliability, maintainability,
lethality, and survivability will result in increased firepower and
flexibility to warfighting CINCs world wide.
Question. How many B-1's are currently deployed to the Gulf region?
What determined this number? Could more have been deployed?
Answer. There are currently three B-1 aircraft deployed to the Gulf
region as part of our Air Expeditionary Force (AEF). This number is
capped by the limited amount of ramp space at the deployed location,
and the limited number of suitable air bases. This is further impacted
by other critical AEF assets that are also deployed to the same
location; preventing increased numbers of bombers at the forward
operating base.
If the situation warranted an increased B-1 presence, the aircraft
could be deployed to locations on the perimeter of the theater, or
outside the Gulf region. The B-1, as with all of our bomber assets, can
take advantage of its long range, and short response time by conducting
operations from their home fields here in the CONUS.
Question. Can JSOW be accelerated on the aircraft?
Answer. The B-1 JSOW integration can be accelerated if funding from
the Congressional reductions and inflation adjustments were to be
restored. The maximum acceleration would be 3-6 months, which would
accelerate the scheduled initial capability to 2nd quarter fiscal year
2002 (earliest).
Question. What are the Air Force's plans with regard to integrating
Link-16 in the B-1?
Answer. The Air Force plans to outfit all combat aircraft with Link
16 as funding permits. However, Link 16 funding for bombers is
currently not included in the FYDP. The Air Force is weighing all Link
16 acceleration options in our 2000 POM submittal.
As an initial step in determining data link requirements for bomber
aircraft, the B-1 will demonstrate Link 16 capability in September 1998
during the Expeditionary Forces Experiment, EFX-98. This demonstration
was funded by a Fiscal Year 1997 Congressional plus-up for B-1 data
link. the plus-up will equip two B-1 aircraft with Link 16 and Beyond-
Line-of-Sight (BLOS) data link capability for use during the 4-day EFX-
98 exercise.
During this exercise, the B-1 will integrate into a network of
other aircraft and ground stations with similar data link capabilities.
Other aircraft involved in the exercise include JSTARS, AWACS, F-15s,
and RIVET JOINT. Funding for the B-1's demonstration will also allow
the two aircraft to retain the data link equipment for a period of one
year. This one year period will be used to develop a bomber concept of
operations for data link.
B-2 Bomber Upgrades
Question. General Muellner, is the B-2 ready to use today? What are
its current capabilities?
Answer. The B-2 is ready and available to meet potential tasking at
the request of the combatant CINC and with approval by the NCA We have
9 operational B-2s at Whitman AFB today: 5 Block 20 aircraft and 4
Block 30 aircraft. These aircraft are available for both conventional
and Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) taskings. The existing B-
2 force can employ a large variety of conventional or nuclear weapons
against high value, heavily defended targets. For Block 20, current
capabilities include 2,000 lb (GBU-36) and 5,000 lb (GBU-37) near-
precision weapons, B-83 and B-61 nuclear weapons, as well as MK-84
general purpose bombs. Block 30 capability includes all Block 20
weapons with JDAM replacing the interim GBU-36. In addition, Block 30
adds MK-82 and M-117 general purpose, MK-62 naval mines, and CBU-87/89/
97 cluster munitions.
Question. What are the Air Force's plans with regard to integrating
Link-16 in the B-2?
Answer. Air Combat Command is considering plans to make Line-16
capabilities available on a limited number of B-2 aircraft as part of a
``proof of concept'' effort pending release of the fiscal year 1998
Aircraft Procurement funding. Adding Link-16 to the B-2s will
complement the existing defensive management system in providing
critical situational awareness for the aircrews.
Question. Please update the Committee on the current status of low
observable maintenance on the B-2 and the steps being taken to improve
the situation.
Answer. The Air Force is aggressively working to reduce LO
maintenance requirements for the B-2. Positive results to date:
80% reduction in the LO maintenance backlog on ACC's B-2
fleet following the deployment of a contractor augmentation
team to Whiteman AFB
Development of an action plan to address: material
improvements and availability, technical data, support
equipment, improved designs, and LO repair and verification
tools
Use of improved materials, designs, processes, and diagnostic
equipment to reduce LO maintenance requirements
LO Combat Readiness (LOCR) Model is in place at Whiteman AFB,
providing the wing's leadership with the ability to prioritize
LO work requirements to maintain mission-ready fleet
Question. What is required to make the B-2 deployable? When will it
be deployable?
Answer. The B-2 can currently be deployed to locations possessing
facilities (temperature and humidity controls required) where Low
Observable maintenance could be performed. To demonstrate this
capability, the Air Force deployed 2 Block 30 B-2s to Andersen Air
Force Base, Guam for 10 days. During this time, the B-2 demonstrated
the ability to perform low observable maintenance both in a climate
controlled hangar, as well as outside on a heat-baked and rain-soaked
parking ramp. Air Combat Command is evaluating deployable shelters
which would allow a package of B-2s to be deployed to a wider range of
locations. We expect to be fully deployable by the B-2's full
operational capability date in late fiscal year 1999.
Question. Last year, Congress added funds to either restart B-2
production or upgrade the aircraft's deployability, survivability, and
maintainability. If the President were to decide not to restart
production, what upgrades, at what cost, would you recommend we pursue
with the additional funding?
Answer. The Air Force plans to use $174.1 million to fund the B-2
baseline program in accordance with the fiscal year 1998 President's
budget. In addition, the Air Force plans to fund as many of the
following Multi-Stage Improvement Program initiatives as possible with
the additional funds.
FY98 Funding
\1\ REQ'D
High Frequency Maintenance Improvements....................... $30.3M
Advanced Topcoat System....................................... 15.4M
Arrowhead Panel Tape Elimination.............................. 8.3M
Multi Mode Beyond Line of Sight UHF Satcom Radio/Mission
Management Upgrade........................................ 98.4M
LO Repair Verification Tools.................................. 9.3M
LO Enhanced Tiles............................................. 3.9M
8" x 10" Center Instrument Display (CID)...................... 52M
--------------------------------------------------------------
____________________________________________________
Total..................................................... 217.6M
\1\ Project estimates as of April 6, 1998.
Question. The media recently reported that there is an ongoing
debate within the Pentagon about using the B-2 in the event of a strike
against Iraq. It has been reported that there is reluctance to use the
B-2 because if it performed well, support for continued production
would be bolstered and if it performed poorly, it might embarrass the
Air Force given the cost of the aircraft. General Muellner, is there
any truth to these reports? Are these the appropriate considerations
for using a weapon in combat?
Answer. Any decision to employ the B-2 is based solely on achieving
national security goals. B-2s at Whiteman Air Force Base are available
for tasking at the request of the combatant CINC and with approval by
the NCA. The decision to request the B-2 to support a theater concept
of operations is an operational decision made by the combatant CINC.
The target allocation and assignment process used by the CINC optimizes
target assignments with combat capabilities of available weapon
systems. This process ensures our ability to achieve stated goals
against a given target or set of targets.
Airborne Laser Program
Question. We understand that the GAO, the Pentagon's Office for Net
Assessment, and the Pentagon's Office for Program Analysis and
Appraisal (PA&E) have reported serious deficiencies with the potential
effectiveness of the Airborne Laser program. The Air Force is seeking
$292 million in fiscal year 1999 to significantly ramp-up effort on
this $11 billion program. General Muellner, can you outline the major
concerns expressed to date by GAO, Office of Net Assessment, and PA&E
and the Air Force's response to each?
Answer. The GAO's concerns with ABL have been overcome by events
and are no longer relevant. Office of Net Assessment's work is focused
on Space-Based Laser (SBL) and should not be applied to ABL. PA&E's
analysis of ABL performance is fundamentally flawed and underestimates
ABL's effectiveness.
(a) In the summer of 1997, the GAO took issue with the Air Force's
method of measuring atmospheric turbulence. This method is non-optical,
i.e., it measures air temperature variations which are convertible to
optical turbulence values. The GAO expressed concern this method might
not be as accurate as the more complex and expensive optical technique
of passing a laser beam between two aircraft. Since ABL's turbulence
design specification is based on non-optical measurements, the GAO
warned that the specification may not be correct and ABL may be
underdesigned. The Air Force has since rendered the GAO's concerns
obsolete. Concurrent with the draft GAO report, released in late August
1997, the Air Force demonstrated a correlation (i.e., equivalency)
between non-optical and optical methods of measuring turbulence, thus
validating the non-optical method. Unfortunately, this crucial fact was
not incorporated into the final GAO report. Using the validated method,
the Air Force has collected in Northeast Asia and Southwest Asia over
five times the amount of turbulence data available at the time of the
GAO investigation. Thus in-theater data base validates ABL's design
specification--over 80% of the measured optical turbulence levels are
equal to or more benign than ABL's design specification, as predicted
when ABL's specification was set back in 1993-94.
(b) BMDO and the Office of Net Assessment have co-sponsored three
SBL Operational Concepts wargames since early fiscal year 1997, as part
of Net Assessment's larger Revolution In Military Affairs study. These
seminar-style wargames are explicitly intended to assess the
capabilities and utility of SBL in future warfare; they are not a cost
and operational effectiveness analysis of current or planned theater
missile defense systems. The first wargame was a 2010 scenario against
a large, peer nation. In it, restrictive rules essentially negated any
ABL contribution to the blue force. The second wargame was a 2015
scenario against a hostile regional state. This time ABL showed
positive contributions to the blue force when operated as part of a
multi-tiered theater missile defense architecture that included SBL.
Although promising, these results would need backup by much more
rigorous and quantitative simulations before they could be used to
assess ABL's military effectiveness. The third and most recent wargame
was held only last month and the results are still being analyzed.
(c) PA&E produced a preliminary analysis of ABL's effectiveness in
the fall of 1997. It purported to show ABL's performance will be poor,
based on PA&E's belief that atmospheric turbulence levels in theaters
of interest are routinely much higher than ABL's design specification.
This PA&E analysis is fundamentally flawed. It is based on an extremely
limited set of atmospheric turbulence data that was biased towards high
turbulence when it was collected in 1995 as part of a narrowly focused
scientific experiment. PA&E's analysis did not include any of the Air
Force's 1997-98 Northeast Asia or Southwest Asia theater turbulence
data. This latter data set is more than five times larger than what
existed in November 96 when ABL went through Milestone I and
overwhelmingly validates ABL's turbulence design specification.
Furthermore, the PA&E analysis is simplistic and misleading, as it
plays a single ABL against a single theater ballistic missile (TBM). It
ignores the essential truth that ABL's performance must be viewed in
the context of its role as a flexible ``team player'' in a multi-
tiered, theater missile defense Family of Systems architecture (i.e.,
attack ops, boost phase intercept, midcourse, and terminal systems). In
that context, ABL's contribution has consistently been shown to be
significant. Because of its dependence on a biased and very limited
data set and its simplistic approach, PA&E's analysis grossly
underestimates ABL's effectiveness.
The bottom line is that ABL will be a viable system available to
the CINCs to deploy and employ as a true deterrent to the use of TBMs
and weapons of mass destruction.
Question. General Muellner, please walk us through the operational
concept for the Airborne Laser in terms of its positioning in altitude
and location over the battlefield, the time required to detect a
missile launch, to acquire the missile, to slew the laser to fire at
the missile, to destroy the missile, and then to engage a separate
missile.
Answer. Given the unique aspects of fighting from the sky, the
Airborne Laser provides a dynamic air superiority weapon system to the
Theater CINC and Joint Forces Air Combat Commander (JFACC). The
location and altitude of the Airborne Laser orbits will depend on a
number of factors: threat TBM type and launch locations developed
through Intelligence Preparations of the Battlefield; level of threat
(imminent launch likely or low potential for launch), enemy firing
doctrine, current state of air superiority/air supremacy; integrated
Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense (JTAMD) Family of Systems (FoS)
rules of engagement and areas of responsibility, location of allied
defended assets, number of ABLs available in the theater, level of
atmospheric turbulence, location of clouds and cloud heights, etc.
In general, the ABL will be located under 90 km behind the Forward
Line of Troops (FLOT), or the enemy defended border, outside SAM threat
rings, at around 40,000 feet. As the level of blue force air
superiority/air supermacy increase, the JFACC may choose to move the
ABL orbits closer to the TBM launch locations.
The point in the TBM's boost phase when ABL will acquire the target
will vary depending on cloud height and range to target. The higher the
clouds and the longer the range to the TB, the later in the boost phase
ABL is able to acquire the target. Notional cloud break is about 40
seconds after launch, assuming a rare cloud deck top at 38,500 ft. ----
-- the TBM is detected by the ABL surveillance sensors (360 deg.
coverage). The surveillance sensors pass information to the Battle
Management, Command, Control, Communications, Computers and
Intelligence (BMC4I) suite. The BMC4I suite prioritizes the target(s),
coordinates its engagement with the other ABL orbits, deconflicts ABL
engagements with aircrafts and space assets, and directs the Beam
Control/Fire Control (BC/FC) system to engage the highest priority TBM.
Target prioritization is based upon a number of factors including
current rules of engagement of the theater JTAMD FoS and the
capabilities of the ABL. The time from initial detection to hand-off to
(BC/FC) ------ slew the BC/FC nose-mounted turret to the target
direction provided by the BMC4I suite. An infrared (IR) acquisition
sensor located in the turret acquires the target. The TBM is centered
in the acquisition sensor and passed to the plume tracker, a much
narrower field-of-view IR sensor. The plume is centered in the plume
tracker array and tracking information is passed to the BC/FC computer,
which points the Tracking Illuminator Lasers (TILL) to illuminate the
nose of the missile. The illuminated nose forms a beacon for ABL's fine
tracking (i.e. precision tracking) system, which stabilizes the line of
sight to the target by compensating for atmospheric beam jitter and
residual jitter from aircraft vibrations. With the line of sight
stabilized, the Beacon Illuminator Lasers (BILL) are fired at the
target to create an atmospheric compensation beacon at the desired
aimpoint for the weapon laser. The BILL's beacon is used by ABL's
adaptive optics to adjust deformable mirrors in the high energy laser's
path to compensate for atmospheric distortions to the weapon laser
beam. Once the line-of-sight is stabilized and the atmospheric
degradation compensated, the high energy, weapon laser is fired at the
specified aimpoint. All of the above adjustments are being done
hundreds of times a second. Lasing continues until the TBM kill has
been verified, booster burnout occurs, or the BMC4I system determines
that other targets should be engaged. Depending on range to the TBM and
the level of atmospheric turbulence, ------ BMC4I suite passing a
target to BC/FC through completion of kill assessment). In parallel to
the engagement of the first TBM, the BMC4I suite continues to detect,
track, and prioritize any other TBM targets, so that as soon as the
first engagement is completed, the turret is slewed to begin the second
engagement, etc.
Question. What is the time window from the point as missile exists
the cloud layer to the point it completes its boost phase.
Answer. ------.
Question. What is the highest altitude that clouds can be found?
Answer. Clouds can occur at altitudes up to 50,000 ft. However,
clouds are rare at or above the Airborne Laser's operational altitudes
of 38,000-40,000 ft. On average, clouds will occur at ABL altitudes 5-
10% of the time in SWA and 20-25% in NEA. On these infrequent
occasions, the Air Force's combatant operators will exercise the
inherent flexibility of an airborne platform to shift ABL's combat air
patrol orbits laterally or in altitude to compensate for the presence
of clouds.
Question. How many missiles is the Airborne Laser being designed to
attack without refueling the laser chemicals?
Answer. ABL can attack a notional 20-40 enemy theater ballistic
missiles (TBMs) before exhausting its laser fuels magazine. The reason
the classified size of ABL's magazine is not designed to support
attacks on a specified number of TBM targets is a reflection of the
fact that the time duration of any one missile engagement is very
dependent on senario variables. The two most influential variables are
the range to the TBM target and the strength of the atmospheric
turbulence. The shorter the range and/or more benign the turbulence
strength, the less time required for each engagement and hence the
greater number of shots the magazine will support. The longer the range
and/or higher the turbulence strength, the greater the amount of time
required to achieve each TBM kill and the fewer shots supported by the
magazine. In simulated wargames done to date, ABL rarely runs out of
laser prior to mission termination.
Question. If an enemy fires 30 SCUD missiles in a salvo
(simultaneously), how many of the missiles can we expect the Airborne
Laser to be able to destroy?
Answer. We have not calculated ABL's performance against a 1
second, 30 missile salvo. Additionally, meaningful answer is not
possible without a specific TBM threat laydown and engagement scenario.
Prior to Milestone I, set of Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
approved scenarios were developed which include fairly stressing
salvos. For example, the most intense day ------. Current DIA estimates
state the highest number of Theater Ballistic Missiles that a country
will be capable of salvo launching in the year 2006 is ------. This is
largely bounded by the number of launchers an adversary has available.
The ability for an adversary to coordinate a salvo so that all the TBMs
are launched within 1 second is very remote if not impossible. The
effects of theater blue force operations on the adversaries command and
control network along with the increased vulnerability to all his
exposed launchers to negation through attack operations during the set-
up/tear-down phase will affect the timing of the salvo launch, causing
it to be spread out over tens of seconds or even minutes. Missiles or
groups of missiles launched greater than 10 to 15 seconds apart are
considered independent events by the ABL.
Question. If the 30 missiles employ countermeasures like spinning
or reflective coatings, how many missiles would the Airborne Laser be
able to destroy?
Answer. A salvo launch of theater ballistic missiles (TBM)
employing countermeasures is obviously harder to handle than one
without countermeasures. The exact number of hardened TBMs killed by
ABL in such a salvo is impossible to quantify without a detailed
specification of the enemy threat laydown, the engagement scenario
conditions, and degree of effectiveness of the specific
countermeasures.
Although simplistic in concept, countermeasures to ABL, like
spinning and reflective coatings, are very difficult to implement and
will impact the desired range and accuracy of the TBM.
a. SCUD-type TBMs are predicted to remain the most numerous threat
missiles. SCUD-type missiles can't be made to spin without a complete
redesign of their guidance systems, and potentially, their control
surfaces. Furthermore, the speed of rotation is critical ------.
Spinning is neither a trivial nor inexpensive modification.
b. Coatings add weight to a TBM, thereby reducing range and/or
payload. Given their harsh mission environment, they are difficult to
apply consistently and effectively. Depending on a coating's upkeep in
the field, it may have negligible impact on the amount of lase time
required to kill the Theater Ballistic Missile (TBM).
Question. A February 17, 1998 Defense Week opinion editorial by Mr.
Angelo Codevilla States:
``* * * The assertion that the use of a high energy laser
aboard an aircraft firing horizontally, has been made possible
by recent discoveries in adaptive atmosphere-compensating
optics is nonsense. The airplane-laser combination is an old
Air Force fantasy. Airplanes are unstable platforms, and the
atmosphere is an inherently unpredictable medium * * * No
reputable scientist will stake his reputation on solubility of
this problem * * *.''
Do you think Mr. Codevilla is correct in his assertion that this is
a difficult scientific problem?
Answer. No, Mr. Codevilla is incorrect--Airborne Laser does not
suffer from scientific problems. On the contrary, we believe we have
solved the science issues pertaining to the ABL program through twenty-
five years of technology investment by the Air Force, DARPA, SDIO, and
BMDO in such areas as lasers, optics, airborne pointing and tracking,
atmospheric physics, atmospheric compensation and adaptive optics, and
laser lethality. ABL does face the engineering challenge of integrating
a high energy laser and a sophisticated optical system into an
airplane. This type of challenge is part and parcel of a program in the
Program Definition and Risk Reduction (PDRR) acquisition phase.
Question. How would you characterize the risks associated with the
Airborne Laser?
Answer. ABL is a moderate risk weapons development program; the
risks are engineering in nature. The engineering challenges include
such practical matters as light-weighting components, vibration
isolation, electrical power consumption, thermal management, and
achieving a proper aircraft center of gravity. None of these appear to
be showstoppers as we prepare for the ABL Program Definition and Risk
Reduction (PDRR) Preliminary Design Review in April 98.
Question. Is it true the Air Force eliminated all atmospheric data
collection in fiscal year 1999 and out in all theaters other than Near
East Asia and South West Asia?
Answer. Yes, funding cuts, levied during the Fiscal Year 1993-2003
President's Budget process, forced the ABL program to delete all of its
atmospheric data collection after fiscal year 1998 so as to preserve
the development schedule and technical content of the ABL PDRR
prototype. Some efforts in the atmospherics arena will continue under
Air Force technology funding, however the Air Force believes the vast
amount of data it has collected to date in Northeast Asia and Southwest
Asia (over five times the amount available at Milestone I in November
96) has sufficiently characterized the atmosphere for the PDRR ABL
program. During the fiscal year 2000 budget cycle, we will review the
program for possible payback.
Question. It was recently reported in the media that the Chief of
Staff named a special ``semi-independent'' panel to review the range of
the Airborne Laser. Is this true? Please name the individuals on the
panel, their technical backgrounds, and their professional
affiliations. When will the results from the panel's review be
available?
Answer. Yes. Under the auspices of the Air Force Scientific
Advisory Board (SAB), a team was impaneled to review the effects of
atmospheric turbulence on ABL's range performance. The panel was led by
Mr. Jack Welch, former Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Acquisition, and included: Dr. Gene McCall (PhD in physics, an employee
of Los Alamos National Lab and former head of the SAB), Dr. Walter Sooy
(PhD in physics, a long time laser expert now retired from Lawrence
Livermore National Lab), Dr. Daniel Murphy (PhD in Engineering and
Applied Science, now with MIT Lincoln Lab's Laser and Sensor
Applications Group), and Dr. Kenneth Fischer (PhD in Atmospheric and
Space Sciences, now a research scientist with the Environmental
Research Institute of Michigan). The panel concurred with the Air
Force's current ABL range estimates. These findings were briefed to Air
Force leadership in February 1998.
Question. Currently, the sole mission for the Airborne Laser is
ballistic missile defense with adjunct missions being ``studied.'' What
is the status of these studies and when might other missions be
incorporated as validated requirements for the weapon system? What are
these other missions? What other U.S. platforms are anticipated to
perform these missions?
Answer. The adjunct mission studies are being conducted in three
phases. A preliminary look was completed in fiscal year 1997, with more
detailed efforts planned for fiscal year 1998 and fiscal year 1999 that
will result in estimates of the cost effectiveness of the various
adjunct missions. After Air Combat Command (ACC) reviews the results of
these studies, they will decide which of the adjunct missions to accept
as new ABL requirements, and begin programming (mid-fiscal year 1999)
for additional funding necessary to incorporate the new requirements
into the EMD and operational designs. No adjunct missions are planned
for the PDRR ABL system. The adjunct missions currently being studied
are: cruise missile defense, imaging surveillance (using ABL's optical
system to image objects on the ground), protection of high value
airborne assets (self-protection and protection of other HVAAs using
the high energy laser), suppression of enemy air defenses (using the
high energy laser to kill enemy air defense components on the ground),
and post-boost tracking of TBMs. The Airborne Laser (ABL) is the only
USAF platform in development that potentially could address all the
adjunct missions. Similar adjunct studies would need to be performed
for the Space Based Laser (SBL) readiness demonstrator that the Air
Force is executing. Currently, the Air Force relies on a system of
weapon systems to address these missions. The system includes air,
space and ground C2 and weapon systems.''
Question. Can the Airborne Laser destroy a missile before exiting
the cloud layer or after completion of the boost phase? Does the
capability to destroy the missile diminish before completion of the
boost phase (based for example on lower missile fuel pressures near the
end of boost)?
Answer. The Airborne Laser (ABL) cannot destroy a missile before
the missile exits the cloud layer. The laser beam is near infrared
light and will not penetrate clouds. Rather, the beam would be
absorbed, refracted or reflected away from the target. ABL can destroy
missiles throughout the boost phase. ABL can target either the fuel
tank or the oxidizer tank, and ABL's lethality mechanism causes
catastrophic failure (i.e., burst) of either the TBM's fuel or oxidizer
tanks. While some TBMs may exhibit a drop in their fuel tank pressure
during the boost phase, the pressure in their oxidizer tanks appears to
stay constant or even rise slight during boost. Tests to quantify these
effects are planned for April 1998. The effects due to missile fuel and
oxidizer tank pressure changes during boost phase are explicitly
accounted for in the ABL lethality assessments and range estimations.
It is unlikely that ABL would be able to destroy a missile after
completion of the boost phase. ABL can physically lase a missile after
its boost phase has been completed. However, since ABL targets the fuel
and/or oxidizer tanks, which would have negligible internal pressure
after completion of the boost phase, the probability of causing
catastrophic failure of the missile drops tremendously. ABL can
continue to track missiles past their boost phase and send valuable
tracking reports, as well as missile impact point predictions, to other
elements in the family of systems supporting terminal system missile
intercepts.
Question. How will the capability of the Airborne Laser to detect,
track, and provide warning to other BMD systems compare to the
projected capability of SBIRS?
Answer. ABL and SBIRS are complementary systems that will give the
theater warfighters the best possible information on Theater Ballistic
Missiles (TBM) for improving attack operations, upper and lower tier
engagement opportunities and passive defense responses.
The sensor suite required by the Airborne Laser (ABL) to acquire
and track boosting TBMs in its surveillance mode has inherent
capabilities to provide launch point estimates (LPE), impact point
predictions (IPP) and position and velocity information on boosting
TBMs. Being a theater weapon, ABL can provide this localized capability
when flying in support of theater operations.
SBIRS, on the other hand, is envisioned to provide worldwide
continuous missile warning coverage. SBIRS is designed to provide LPE,
IPP (missile warning) and position and velocity information (missile
defense) on all ballistic missiles throughout their flight profile
(boost, midcourse and terminal). SBIRS' other missions are technical
intelligence and battlespace characterization.
Both SBIRS and ABL will provide data to theater users through Link-
16 and the Intelligence Broadcast System (currently TIBS/TDDS). ABL's
boost phase TBM position and velocity information will be more accurate
due to its active laser ranging capability, but SBIRS should provide
this data throughout the complete missile profile.
Question. Mr. Codevilla, in the same article cited earlier wrote,
``Contentions that ABL could defend itself with its beam are similarly
insincere because the Air Force knows that ABL would not have the
energy to defend itself against surface to air missiles . . . and that
it could not dogfight enemy fighters.'' Realistically, what is the
system's self-defense capabilities against air-to-air ground-to-air
threats?
Answer. Defense of large aircraft using laser weapons was
demonstrated first-hand in the Airborne Laser Laboratory (ALL) program,
the forerunner of the current ABL program. During this program the ALL
used its weapons laser and shot down five air-to-air missiles and one
cruise missile. ABL will be operated like other high value airborne
assets, with its orbits positioned so as to minimize the danger from
enemy surface-to-air missiles and will be fielded with a self-defense
suite (i.e., chaff, flares, ECM perhaps) to help reduce its
vulnerability to enemy threats. In addition, ABL will share a fighter
combat air patrol with other high value airborne assets and could
retrograde to safety if necessary. Finally, ABL's self-defense
capabilities against air-to-air and ground-to-air threats are being
studied in depth in the current phase of the program and preliminary
results suggest ABL's weapon laser will be lethal against SAMs and
fighters out to several hundred kilometers. At those ranges, enemy
fighters and SAMs are easily followed by the ABL's tracking system and
can be engaged and destroyed if necessary.
Question. What would be the per day cost of maintaining multiple
Airborne Laser aircraft on 24 hour Combat Air Patrol (CAP) in a
contingency? How many aircraft would be required for 24 hour CAP for
Near East Asia and South West Asia contingencies?
Answer. The cost per flying hour of the ABL (a 747-400) has not yet
been defined as the program is still early in the Program Definition
and Risk Reduction Phase. We expect to definitize our estimates of
ABL's cost per flying hour in fiscal year 2001 at the Authority to
Proceed (ATP)-2. As a result, we are unable to determine the cost of
maintaining multiple ABL aircraft on 24 hour CAP at this time. We can,
however, provide some very rudimentary insight concerning some known
costs. Boeing has indicated the cost of the E-4B (a 747-200) is
$35,000/hour. Air Combat Command has indicated that their cost per
flying hour for the E-4B is $40,000.
Five deployed ABL's will support two, 24-hour/day CAPs in a Near
East Asia or South West Asia contingency.
Joint Strike Fighter
Question. The Joint Strike Fighter program has been designated as a
`'flagship'' program for the acquisition reform initiative known as
Cost As an Independent Variable (CAIV). The purpose of Cost As an
Independent Variable is to allow contractors and government to conduct
trade-off analyses to determine which capabilities provide the best
value. These trade-off analyses are critical to making future aircraft
more affordable. Making Joint Strike Fighter affordable will require
some sacrifices in capability. The Committee is concerned with the
contractors, and perhaps some in the military, have not gotten this
message and still believe that whoever has the most bells and whistles
will win the contract. General Muellner, you were a former program
manager for the Joint Strike Fighter program and you have since
remained closely involved with the program. What can be done to ensure
both the military users and contractors are committed to making this
aircraft affordable?
Answer. The warfighters and the contractors fully understand
affordability is critical to the success of the program. The
warfighter's have established cost goals in their users' requirement
documents. The program acquisition plan stipulates contract award will
be based on best value for cost, not how much performance you can get
for the cost. Recently, the Program Manager and other senior DOD
officials have spoken with the prime contractors and stressed the need
to focus on providing acceptable performance at an affordable cost.
This message is being constantly reinforced throughout the government.
Ultimately, continuous interaction between the warfighters,
contractors, and acquisition community in conducting cost and
operational performance trades, with cost as a critical performance
metric, will ensure the Services get the best aircraft for an
affordable cost.
Question. What trade-offs have been made in the projected
capabilities of the Joint Strike Fighter based on the analysis
performed to date?
Answer. The JSF Operational Advisory Group, a team of operators and
maintainers, has made and continues to make cost and operational
performance trades. Two examples of major trades are the single-engine
versus dual-engine and single-seat versus dual-seat cockpit. Other
significant, though less noticeable trades include: reduced sustained
and instantaneous G requirements, reduced acceleration requirement, and
balanced aircraft radar signature with the concept of operations and
electronic warfare capabilities.
Question. The JASSM program is also a flagship program for Cost As
an Independent Variable and the same two contractors involved in that
program are also working on the Joint Strike Fighter program (Boeing
and Lockheed Martin). However, with respect to the JASSM, one senior
Air Force acquisition executive was recently quoted in the media as
saying, ``We are not willing to settle for `good enough.' '' General,
isn't ``good enough'' the whole point of Cost As an Independent
Variable?
Answer. No. The point of CAIV is ``best value''--making cost a
major driver while providing enough performance to ensure operational
effectiveness. This does not mean that in all cases we will drive
performance to the minimum acceptable levels, particularly when costs
can be reduced in other ways while maintaining a performance advantage.
The quote, attributed to a senior Air Force acquisition executive, was
taken out of context. The SLAM-ER program claimed it was ``good
enough'' for the Air Force's use of the Navy's weapon. The AF comment
stated we wouldn't settle for a ``good enough'' SLAM-ER when we can
have JASSM at a cheaper unit cost and with better performance.
Question. Is the Air Force sending the right message to the
contractors when it is not willing to settle for ``good enough''?
Answer. The AF is committed to an affordable JSF program. We are
looking for acceptable performance at an affordable cost (price). The
message to the contractors is they must use innovative manufacturing
methods, take full advantage of commonality among aircraft variants and
establish revolutionary business practices to reduce cost. Cost will
not be achieved by trading performance along. Based on the results
we're seeing in programs like JDAM, JASSM, and thus far on JSF, we are
confident the contractors are getting the ``right message.''
Question. Is the Air Force committed to Cost as an Independent
Variable as an acquisition reform? How is the Air Force treating this
concept differently from the previous acquisition strategy ``Design to
Cost.''
Answer. Yes, The Air Force is committed to CAIV. An example of this
commitment is the inclusion of cost goals as performance requirements
in the users' requirements document along with more traditional
performance requirements such as range, payload, and speed. The
difference between CAIV and ``Design to Cost;'' is CAIV focuses on
balancing cost and operational effectiveness through early warfighter,
industry, and program interaction during the requirements definition
process. In fact, CAIV elevates cost to the status of a performance
requirement. Using an iterative process called Cost and Operational
Performance Trades, the Services are defining joint requirements that
balance weapon system capability against life cycle cost. ``Design to
Cost'' didn't involve trades; requirements drove design, validation and
manufacturing. In addition, design to cost offered virtually no
flexibility after operational requirements were set, typically early in
the program.
Global Air Traffic Management (GATM)
Question. The civilian aircraft sector is in the process of
developing new aircraft standards that would allow more aircraft to
travel through the best air corridors for transocean flights. Military
aircraft lacking these new features will be unable to use the best air
corridors, adding cost and time to every flight. General Muellner,
please describe the modifications required to US military aircraft to
be compliant with the developing GATM standards. Which aircraft are
affected?
Answer. The specific communication, navigation, and surveillance
elements include: oceanic datalinks; VHF-AM voice that includes both 25
and 8.33 kHz channel spacing; air/ground datalinks; required navigation
performance (RNP) including a flight management system (FMS),
integrated multi-sensor navigation systems capable of basic area
navigation (BRNAV), and a precision area navigation (PRNAV) capability;
precision landing systems (PLS) to accommodate protected instrument
landing system (P-ILS), reduced vertical separation requirement (RVSM)
equipage; secondary surveillance radar (SSR) transponders; airborne
collision avoidance systems (ACAS), a.k.a. traffic alerting and
collision avoidance system (TCAS); automatic dependent surveillance-
addressed (ADS-A); and automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-
B).
The near term emphasis within the Air Force is on the mobility
forces required to airlift troops and material during the deployment
phase of contingency or humanitarian operations. Mobility aircraft are
the first affected by air traffic procedural upgrades. Eventually, all
aircraft will be affected.
Question. What would be the impact to military effectiveness if the
US failed to implement these modifications in a timely manner?
Answer. Noncompliance with new FAA and ICAO airspace restrictions
impacts USTRANSCOM's ability to support the Defense Transportation
System and the Warfighting CINCs. Without these upgrades, the
effectiveness of the air mobility fleet would be reduced, adversely
impacting the delivery of forces, as in a Desert Shield scenario, as
much as 50 percent.
Question. What is the projected total cost to make U.S. aircraft
compliant?
Answer. The initial estimate for mobility aircraft is $2.4 billion,
starting in fiscal year 1999. We are still validating and verifying
requirements for our fighters, bombers, and other aircraft. We expect
cost estimates to be ready for the fiscal year 2002 POM.
Question. How much has the Air Force budgeted in fiscal year 1999
for GATM related modifications?
Answer. $252.7 million was budgeted in fiscal year 1999 for GATM
related modifications.
Question. Under the current Air Force plan, how long will it take
to make all applicable aircraft compliant?
Answer. Mobility aircraft will be able to meet near-term
requirements (through 2003) except for the C-130 and the C-5. Current
programming, schedules the C-5 for completion in the 2006-2008 time
frame, and the C-130 in the 2010 time frame. As far-term (2003 and
beyond) airspace criteria are established by civil airspace regulatory
agencies, the Air Force will determine which requirements affect
military force structure and the appropriate means to address them.
Recent ``Hacker'' Attacks
Question. Deputy Defense Secretary John Hamre announced last week
that DOD had suffered ``the most organized and systematic attack'' ever
to its computer networks. What did the Air Force do to respond to these
attacks as they were happening?
Answer. ------.
Question. Were the vulnerabilities known to the Air Force prior to
the attack? If so, were these vulnerabilities being addressed in an
expeditious manner? If not, why not?
Answer. ------.
Question. Are there other known vulnerabilities in Air Force
computer networks that are not being addressed expeditiously? Why not?
Answer. No, the Air Force is working expeditiously to address all
known vulnerabilities to its computer networks. However, the complexity
of the software ``patches'' developed to close vulnerabilities, along
with the varying skills of the local network or system administrator,
can delay installation of patches, leaving our systems open to
exploitation.
The Air Force is moving aggressively to correct these shortfalls.
Through our ``Operationalizing and Professionalizing Networks''
initiative, we are working to improve the training of our system and
network administrators. Additionally, we are creating an environment
where information systems are managed and protected as mission-critical
assets. Recently, the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff released a message
to all commanders which mandates compliance with all Air Force Computer
Emergency Response Team and Defense Information Systems Agency computer
security advisories and emphasizes the importance of commanders'
involvement to ensure compliance. The Air Force is also establishing a
formal system of ``positive control'' to ensure tracking and compliance
with all such advisories and the reporting of intrusions through
operational channels.
While the Air Force will continue to face unauthorized users
(``hackers'') attempting to gain access to our networks, we are
committed to developing the right procedures and to providing adequate
resources and training to ensure identified vulnerabilities are closed
in a timely manner.
Question. What are the legal and policy issues that must be
resolved to facilitate more aggressive protection of our unclassified
networks?
Answer. Real-time tracking of hackers involves following the
electronic trail back to a hacker's electronic point of origin. This
pursuit may constitute warrantless electronic surveillance, and as
such, would be governed by the Fourth Amendment and federal statute.
Consequently, we can pursue a hacker real-time only with the consent of
the owners of the systems we will be transiting or with a court order.
Either type of permission can be time consuming and burdensome,
particularly since we must repeat the approval process for each
additional network the hacker transits.
Question. Were all the responsible parties for the recent attacks
found? What laws did they break? What will likely happen to the
responsible parties if found?
Answer. ------.
Question. What are the lessons learned from these attacks?
Answer. ------.
Question. What is the Air Force doing in the area of information
protection to defend its computer networks from attack?
Answer. The Air Force is committed to the DOD-wide effort of
creating a ``defense in depth'' for the Defense Information
Infrastructure (DII). Key Air Force players in this effort include the
MAJCOMs, AFIWC and Air Force Computer Emergency Response Team (AFCERT),
Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), Air Force
Communications and Information Center (AFCIC), 609th Information
Warfare Squadron (IWS), and the Network Control Centers (NCCs) at every
base. The Air Force leads the DOD in intrusion detection capability
with 108 AF facilities currently protected by real-time ASIM systems
monitored at the base NCCs and the AFCERT. The AFCERT operates 24/7 as
the AF correlation and analysis center for intrusion detection,
warning, and response. The Air Force Base Information Protection
Program will install enhanced boundary protection, intrusion detection
and internal controls tools at 108 AF facilities by the end of calendar
year 1998.
C-17 Aircraft
Question. The C-17 program is in the midst of a seven year, $16.3
billion multiyear contract. What is the status of the C-17 multiyear
contract?
Answer. The C-17 program has delivered 38 production aircraft, and
the last 26 have been delivered early (average 27 days) with excellent
quality. The last aircraft delivered (P38) was 46 days early. With
respect to the Multi-Year Procurement (MYP) contract, the fiscal year
1997 and fiscal year 1998 aircraft have been fully funded as well as
the advance buy for the fiscal year 1999 aircraft. The first MYP
aircraft (P41) is expected to deliver prior to the 31 August 1998
contract delivery date. The last MYP (P120) aircraft contract delivery
date is November 30, 2004.
Question. The Air Force has made significant reductions in both
procurement and research and development programs. What is the basis of
these reductions and their impact to the program, especially to the
integrity of the multiyear program?
Answer. The multi-year procurement (MYP) program is intact; the
procurement quantities and delivery schedule have not changed. The non-
MYP portion of the C-17 program has absorbed the funding reductions.
Funding for engineering change order activity was removed. Also,
several planned modifications have been delayed, extended, or deferred.
Finally, the Centralized Electronic Repair Capability (CERC), a
critical depot-level test and repair capability for over 40 Line
Replaceable Units (LRUs) and 350 associated Shop Replaceable Units
(SRUs), was eliminated.
Question. The Committee understands that Boeing is manufacturing a
number of additional C-17s as ``speculation aircraft'' in anticipation
of other buyers. How many aircraft have been initiated as ``speculation
aircraft''? What is the status of construction on these aircraft?
Answer. Boeing built two additional C-17 type aircraft in
anticipation of other buyers which did not materialize. The Air Force
entered into (and executed) an agreement to accept those aircraft as
early MYP deliveries at no additional cost to the Air Force. Final
assembly start is scheduled for later this year as Air Force aircraft
(P-49 and P-50).
Question. If Boeing is unable to find other customers for these
aircraft, are there any agreements to sell the aircraft to the Air
Force under the multiyear? What impact (or benefit) would this have on
the Air Force program?
Answer. The Air Force entered into (and executed) an agreement to
accept those aircraft as early MYP deliveries at no additional cost to
the Air Force. Final assembly is scheduled to start later this year
with delivery to the Air Force expected in the summer of 1999.
Question. What is the status of the British interest in using C-
17s?
Answer. ------.
Question. What work is being done to make the C-17 compliant with
Global Air Traffic Management (GATM) standards? Do we know enough at
this point about GATM to make wise decisions on the proper
modifications required to the C-17 fleet?
Answer. The C-17 Program has developed a road map to make the
aircraft fully GATM compliant in time to meet the deadlines. Schedules
are in place to incorporate capabilities into the production line and
for the retrofit of operational aircraft. For the near future, the
equipment and the capabilities required to comply with GATM are well
understood. The Air Force is pursuing open architecture strategies to
provide the capacity to meet emerging requirements in later years.
Question. Please update the Committee on the status of testing the
aircraft for Army parachute deployments and for operations on austere
runways.
Answer. Last fall, the Air Force used a new static line to drop 540
Army paratroops in a record-breaking formation airdrop. In addition,
the Air Force is developing a new method of dropping equipment (Dual
Row) to improve Army Airborne operations. Initial austere runway
testing is complete and aircrews are now authorized to use airfields
designated as semi-prepared. Development work will continue to further
refine semi-prepared runway operations data.
Question. What are the other testing issues currently being worked
by the Air Force on the C-17?
Answer. The C-17 Program is conducting normal tests to mature the
aircraft in the following areas: Low Level Special Operations,
Defensive Systems suitability and employment, Parachute Extraction,
Aeromedical Evacuation, Station Keeping Equipment, Core Integrated
Processor, Precision Approach Capability, Electronic Flight Control
System Processor Upgrades, Automatic Communications Processor, ARC-210
Radio, Dual-Row Airdrop, OBIGGS, Command Control Module, and the Blocks
9 and 10 Software Upgrades.
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV)
Question. The EELV program is designed to reduce the overall space
launch costs of DOD payloads by 25 to 50 percent through the year 2020.
The Air Force has recently announced changes to the EELV acquisition
strategy in support of the fiscal year 1999 budget request. Please
discuss the changes made to the EELV acquisition strategy between
fiscal year 1998 and 1999. Why were these changes necessary?
Answer. The Fiscal Year 1999 EELV acquisition strategy allows the
AF to select up to two contractors for development and launch services
versus the original strategy of using one contractor. This strategy
maintains competition throughout the life of the program, encourages
greater contractor investment, and reduces overall AF development
costs. The government's investment will be capped at $500 million per
contractor and contractors will fund the remaining development
(original estimate $1.5 billion). This new strategy eliminates the need
for dedicated test flights because commercial and government mission
flight data will meet test community requirements.
The Air Force changed the EELV acquisition strategy for two
reasons. The commercial launch market is growing much faster than was
initially forecasted, and is capable of sustaining two launch vehicle
providers. Second the new acquisition strategy affords the government
the opportunity to partner with industry, to develop a national system
to meet both commercial and government needs.
Question. What is the scope of work that these development costs
are expected to acquire?
Answer. The scope of work includes the government share of launch
vehicle development completion, establishment of the manufacturing
infrastructure, construction/modification of launch facilities, and
launch site activation. This work will provide a national launch
capability which meets the mass to orbit, standardized interface and
launch pads, and design reliability requirements contained in the EELV
System Performance Document (ORD requirements).
Question. Will an EELV capability be developed by industry
regardless of government investment, due to the demands of the
commercial market?
Answer. No, while the commercial launch industry has been investing
a significant amount of funds in improving their launch vehicle
capabilities, it is clear that without the government investment as
part of the EELV program, the capabilities required to meet DOD needs
at critical satellite block changes such as GPS IIF and SBIRs would not
occur. The contractors have indicated that they would continue to
improve their current commercial products that may eventually resemble
the EELV approach obtained through US Government investment, but not
provide the capabilities required by the DOD in terms of cost
reduction, responsiveness, wide range of payload delivery, and launch
need date, on a schedule to meet critical DOD satellite block changes.
Space Based Infrared System--High Component
Question. The estimated $18 billion SBIRS program is to replace the
Defense Support Program (DSP), providing initial warning of a national
or theater ballistic missile attack. The SBIRS space segment consists
of a high and low component which occupy orbital planes of varying
altitude. SBIRs--High is in the EMD phase at present. SBIRS--Low is in
the demonstration/validation phase and is scheduled to enter the pre-
EMD phase in fiscal year 1999. What is the life expectancy for the
existing DSP constellation?
Answer. The block of DSP-1 Satellites currently on orbit have a
design life ------.
Question. How are the remaining 5 DSP satellites that are currently
in storage to be used?
Answer. We will continue to launch the remaining DSP satellites to
maintain a health strategic/theater warning constellation, ------ orbit
at all times. Under the current baseline, DSP Flt 19 will launch in Dec
98, Flt 20 in Oct 99, Flt 21 in Aug 00, Flt 22 in June 01, and Flt 223
in Aug. 03.
Question. Considering that the DSPs are lasting longer than
originally projected, how should the transition to SBIRS be structured?
Answer. The present baseline validated at the August 97 JROC
ensures transition to a more capable IR system with acceptable risk.
The SBIRS GEO Fiscal Year 2002 launch is the earliest opportunity to
begin to meet expanded CINC requirements for Missile Warning, Theater
Missile Defense, Battlespace Characterization, and Technical
Intelligence.
Question. This summer OSD PA&E conducted a study on the longevity
of the present DSP constellation and the Air Force's transition plan to
SBIRS. What were PA&E's findings regarding this issue?
Answer. PA&E did not conduct a study of an orbit longevity of DSP.
DSP-SBIRS transition alternatives were developed by an issue team which
PA&E led. The issue team presentation to the Defense Resource Board
contained no recommendations and the SBIRS baseline program was
maintained.
Question. What are the Air Force's principal reasons for objecting
to DOD's alternatives to the SBIRS--High launch plans?
Answer. In Aug 97 the JROC reviewed DOD's alternatives and felt
they posed ``a significant risk to the warfighter.'' Warfighting CINCs
require greater accuracies and shorter warning timelines to counter the
growing proliferation of tactical ballistic missiles. ------ GEO's
performance must be proven prior to systems engineering and development
of a Block II SBIRS system.
Question. What effect would the changes in the SBIRS--High launch
schedule have on the SBIRS--Low component?
Answer. Slipping SBIRS High launches result in unacceptable
concurrency between the two programs. Grounds Systems Integration of
SBIRS and transition from DSP to SBIRS High is a large and complex
task. Concurrent fielding of SBIRS High and Low would present
unacceptable development, integration, and testing risk.
Air Force Mission Support System (AFMSS)
Question. The AFMSS program is developing a common mission planning
system for all Air Force aircraft. The Air Force and Navy have
developed two separate and incompatible mission planning systems. In
terms of the basic functions, there is little difference in the needs
of the Air Force versus the needs of the Navy. Having two different
planning systems causes significant inefficiencies. For example,
contractors manufacturing joint PGM weapons (JDAM, JSOW) must write
separate software code to support each mission planning system. Last
year, the services signed an agreement to try to migrate the two
systems to a common architecture. General, what is the status of this
migration plan?
Answer. Last year, the Air Force and Navy agreed to pursue a study
of a possible next-generation mission planning system, identified as
Joint Mission Planning Segment (JMPS). A joint service team developed
the initial set of requirements and is planning to release a draft
request for proposal (RFP) in Spring 1998. The first phase of the
effort is a Migration Study using two contractors. The purpose of this
phase is to investigate ways to minimize the operational and financial
impact of migration from our legacy systems (AFMSS Mission Planning
System and Portable Flight Planning Software (PFPS)) to JMPS. If the
results of the study are favorable and affordable, then JMPS will enter
the second phase. The second phase executes the development of the
common mission planning software using a single contractor.
Question. Please discuss the pros and cons of trying to achieve a
common architecture.
Answer. Last year, the Air Force and Navy agreed to pursue a study
of a possible next-generation mission planning system, identified as
Joint Mission Planning Segment (JMPS). A joint service team developed
the initial set of requirements and is planning to release a draft
request for proposal (RFP) in Spring 1998. The first phase of the
effort is a Migration Study, using two contractors, whose purpose is to
investigate ways to minimize the operational and financial impact of
migration from our legacy systems (Air Force Mission Support System
(AFMSS) and Personal Flight Planning Software (PFPS)) to JMPS. If the
results of the study are favorable and affordable, then JMPS will enter
the second phase. The second phase executes the development of the
common mission planning software using a single contractor.
The advantage of jointly pursuing this effort is to insure each
service will achieve a common system that operates in Defense
Information Infrastructure/Common Operating Environment. JMPS will
provide scaleable mission planning and collaborative inter-service
planning, while attempting to reduce life cycle cost.
The disadvantage is the initial investment by each service. A
primary program concern is investment funding constrained by the
ability to merge Air Force and Navy requirements and programmatic
constraints. The Air Force has invested heavily in its existing
systems. Also, the existing systems (AFMSS, Navy's Tactical Aircraft
Mission Planning System, and PFPS) are limited in software reuse.
Because of this portions of the JMPS software will require development
of new code which would increase overall cost.
ICBM Modernization
Question. During preparation of the current budget, the Air Force
made large reductions to the fiscal year 1999 and 2000 Minuteman
Guidance Replacement Program. Why did the Air Force reduce the planned
fiscal year 1999 and 2000 buy for Guidance Replacement units?
Answer. In the current fiscally constrained environment, the Air
Force found it necessary to reduce the funding for the Guidance
Replacement units procurement in 1999 and 2000 to apply to higher Air
Force priorities. This reduction extends the production schedule by two
years, but does not change the total procurement effort.
Question. What impact will this have on the readiness of Minuteman
III missiles?
Answer. The predicted Weapon System Reliability (WSR), and hence
readiness rate of the Minuteman III will be slightly degraded but has
been judged an acceptable risk.
Question. What was the position of the US Strategic Command on
those reductions?
Answer. There was a detailed dialogue with USSTRATCOM on this
issue. Following extensive analysis of the effects of the delay,
USSTRATCOM determined they could accept additional short term risk in
equipment failure as long as the total procurement effort remained
unchanged.
PGM Technical Problems
Question. Recent acquisition reform initiatives have been very
successful in lowering unit costs on new development precision guided
munitions (PGMs). Strong contractor competition in two recent PCM
development programs, the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) and the
Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser (WCMD), have resulted in contractor
production cost commitments far lower than originally projected by the
Air Force. However, both programs have recently experienced testing
problems which could result in higher production costs than originally
advertised. General Muellner, please describe the problems encountered
in the JDAM and WCMD programs.
Answer. JDAM is experiencing problems in the low altitude, high
speed environment on the in-board stations of the F/A-18 C/D. In this
flight regime, air flow locally exceeds the speed of sound, creating
shock waves which impact on the tail-kit fins. The shock wave adversely
impacts the structural life of the fins and causes vibrations severe
enough to interfere with the guidance unit. The current JDAM design is
adequate for operational use on all AF bombers, AF fighters, and
outboard stations of the F/A-18.
WCMD experienced problems with the weapon's autopilot software and
unexpected fin movement. During a test drop from an F-16, an error in
the weapon's auto-pilot software caused the tail-kit to reduce the
angle of attack too aggressively causing the weapon to drop below the
normal glide path and fall well short of the target. During another F-
16 test drop, the aerodynamic loads on the fins at weapon separation
and fin deployment were greater than expected. This resulted in the
fins moving 5 degrees from nominal, causing the weapon to spin-up,
saturating the Inertial Measurement Unit. As a result, the weapon never
attained controlled flight and fell wide and long of the target.
Question. What is the status of developing fixes for these
problems?
Answer. The JDAM Program Office is addressing the problem according
to the following schedule:
Mar 98: Fully characterize weapon environment through flight
test
Apr/May 98: Evaluate environmental data/update design models
May 98: Design fixes
Summer 98: Test fixes
Flight tests will be conducted in the troubling environment with
tail-kits equipped to measure the aerodynamic loads that are imparted
to the fins. After confirming the most stressing conditions, tail-kit
components will be strengthened to operate in the whole performance
envelope. Redesigned components will be flight tested this summer.
The WCMD autopilot problem was corrected and successfully test
flown on March 5, 1998, with a 67 foot miss distance, well within the
100 foot operational threshold requirement. The root cause was
determined to be a software coding error. The contractor investigated
the WCMD fin movement problem and pursued multiple corrective design
paths and options. The most promising solution appears to be the
addition of a fin locking mechanism. Testing of this fix will begin in
August 98.
Question. What is the estimated impact in terms of cost for
development and production of the fixes?
Answer. For JDAM, no additional development dollars are required to
cover the contractor overruns, beyond the $5 million FY98 congressional
research and development plus-up. As for the production costs, the
design changes on the drawing board are expected to have minimal, if
any, production price impact.
WCMD development cost impacts are yet to be determined. Very rough
estimates are in the range of $6 million to pay for engineering design,
wind tunnel testing, dynamic lab testing, associated subcontractor
redesign costs, and additional flight tests. The program has been
restructured to absorb these additional costs. Lockheed Martin will
meet with the Air Force to discuss proposed fixes and associated
production costs on April 1-2, 1998.
Question. Under the current contracts, who is responsible, the
government or the contractor, for paying for the development and
production of the fixes?
Answer. (JDAM) The government is responsible for the costs but does
not pay additional profits on any overrun since the JDAM development
contract is cost plus award fee. The prime contractor is overrunning
its initial target cost of $70.5 million by approximately $23 million.
The good news is, the reliability of the JDAM tail-kit has been
excellent in flight testing. Savings incurred from not having to repeat
flights have largely offset contractor cost growth.
(WCMD) The government is responsible for the additional development
costs since the development contract is a cost plus award fee contract.
The Air Force will pay for additional flight testing out of program
funds. However, LRIP I and LRIP II options are firm fixed price
options. Therefore any additional recurring production cost during LRIP
will be borne by the contractor. The contractor remains committed to
the prices for the LRIP options. For Full Rate Production (FRP), if the
contractor fails to meet the unit cost agreed to in Production Price
Commitment Agreement (PPCA) the government has the option to accept the
price increase or invoke penalties called out in the contract. The
responsibility of who pays for the recurring cost in FRP associated
with the fixes is currently being negotiated between the government and
the contractor.
Acquisition Reform
Question. Given our recent experience with problems in the Joint
Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) and Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser
(WCMD) programs, what lessons have been learned that can be applied to
future programs so that we can enjoy the cost benefits of strong
competitions while minimizing the cost impact of problems encountered
after contractor downselect? Have you adjusted your plans for the JASSM
program based on lessons learned from JDAM and WCMD?
Answer. The JASSM program is getting invaluable input from lessons
learned on JDAM and WCMD, our acquisition reform ``pioneers.'' JASSM,
WCMD, and JDAM are under one Program Executive Office, all are in one
building at Eglin AFB, and several key JASSM people, including the
program manager, came from the JDAM SPO. Because of this, the JDAM and
WCMD design problems have been communicated immediately to the JASSM
SPO. In addition, the JASSM competitors are the JDAM and WCMD
contractors.
The JASSM program has been refined based on overall lessons learned
from the JDAM and WCMD programs. One example is inclusion of a
``Remaining Risk'' factor in the JASSM source selection criteria, which
motivated the competing contractors to attack the toughest issues
early. To minimize the ``remaining risk'' the JASSM contractors have
used the most demanding environments (B-1 aft bay, B-52 aft inside
shoulder station) for wind tunnel, fit checks, and separation tests.
Question. There have been several proposals in recent years from
contractors regarding long term leases of major military end items; for
example, leasing aircraft engines. Many of these proposals, after
detailed review, turn out to be bad business decisions for the
military. What lessons have been learned from this recent experience
with leasing arrangements?
Answer. Termination liability and indemnification make long term
leasing a challenge. The latest B-52 re-engining proposal held the AF
immediately liable for a casualty or loss of leased assets. Termination
liability would be up to $2 billion in a given year. In addition a long
term lease is almost always more expensive in the long run than
outright purchase. The last proposal provided more operational
capability but was estimated to cost the Air Force over $1.3 billion
more in life cycle costs. Long term leases present procurement policy
and fiscal issues. Title 10 U.S.C. Sec 2401 allows leases up to 5
years--the authority to enter into longer leases must be authorized by
law. Long term leases could also greatly limit flexibility and restrict
fiscal options in future years (especially if the overall budgets
decrease or requirements change). Under certain conditions, the Budget
Enforcement Act of 1990, as reflected in OMB Circular A-11, requires
the present value of the total lease payments to be obligated during
the first year of the lease. This requirement makes a long term lease
very difficult to effect.
Question. Under what circumstances would a leasing arrangement be a
good business decision for the military?
Answer. Leasing would be a good business decision if it allowed the
Air Force to affordably satisfy a requirement with negligible
consequences for early termination. A lease could allow a requirement
to be met in a year when funding is tight. Policy issues would need to
be worked out for leases longer than 5 years. It is almost always
cheaper to buy outright, but leasing has the potential for more
flexibility if termination liability is not an issue.
Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile
Question. JASSM is a flagship program for the Cost As an
Independent Variable (CAIV) acquisition reform initiative. Please
provide a list of capabilities that were considered in the JASSM
program but sacrificed to reduce the cost of the missile. Did the
contractor recommend trade-offs that were rejected by the Air Force?
Please explain.
Answer. JASSM cost and performance have been achieved through
application of acquisition reform initiatives, competition,
incorporation of TSSAM ``lessons learned'' such as only having a single
variant, use of commercial parts and mature ``off-the-shelf''
technology, and an early emphasis on producibility (incentivized by a
15 year warranty requirement).
JASSM is structured as a CAIV program with only three Key
Performance Parameters (KPPs): Range, Missile Mission Effectiveness
(MME), and Carrier Operability. In addition, the JASSM program
identifies cost as a system requirement. The requirement sets a
threshold (maximum) cost of the missile at $700,000 with an objective
cost of $400,000 (both in BY95$). Boeing and Lockheed Martin are both
offering excellent performance at lower than objective unit cost--
$390,000 (basis for FY99 PB). All non-KPP requirements are tradable to
achieve the cost requirement under the CAIV concept.
CAIV trades are addressed in the IPT process with Air Force and
Navy user involvement. Specific trades examined are Source Selection
Sensitive. However, one ``generic'' case considered a slight reduction
in the low-altitude, high-speed (transonic) part of the JASSM
employment envelope on the F-16. Operation in this part of the launch
envelope would have precluded use of less expensive commercial parts
due to the temperatures which result from operating at those
conditions. This trade was accepted after the users confirmed they had
no requirement to operate in that small corner of the launch envelope.
There are some contractor recommended trades which have been rejected.
For instance, both contractors requested elimination of aircraft-
specific load items from the JASSM shipping container. This trade was
rejected by the users.
Question. Please update the Committee on the status of the JASSM
Analysis of Alternatives and the associated requirements to report to
the defense committees.
Answer. As of March 5, 1998, there were only preliminary results of
the JASSM Analysis of Alternatives (AoA). The AoA was complete, but the
results were not yet approved. JASSM's joint AoA team briefed the Air
Force, Navy, OSD, and Joint Staff on AoA results through the month of
March. The JROC reviewed the results on March 23, 1998. The OSD JASSM
Overarching IPT has the official AoA approval authority and reviewed
the AoA results on March 27, 1998. Dr. Ganlser, USD(A&T), reviewed the
AoA results on March 31, 1998. After Dr. Gansler's review, he forwarded
a letter for SecDef signature to notify Congress of the DOD's decision
on the JASSM/JSLAM acquisition strategy.
On April 9, 1998, the SecDef letter told Congress the AoA complete
and the results clarified the Department's position on JASSM and SLAM-
ER+. The AoA determined ``the JASSM requirement is valid'' and ``the
JASSM candidates are more survivable, lethal, and cost-effective than
modifications to the Navy's SLAM-ER.'' The Department is proceeding
with JASSM and has transferred the $43M ``JSLAM'' funds to the JASSM
program element. The SecDef notes the ``SLAM-ER missile is proven'' and
lists several reasons why SLAM-ER+ is appropriate for Navy use. The
Department supports continued Navy conversion and use of SLAM-ER+.
JASSM is still a joint program with active Navy participation and the
carrier operability requirement. The continuation of JASSM and SLAM-ER+
allows the Department to preserve an indirect competition between the
two programs and provide a hedge against potential JASSM development
problems.
Large Aircraft Reengine Study
Question. Last year, in response to the potential need to reengine
many of our large aircraft (B-52, C-5, AWACS, JSTARS), the Air Force
initiated a reengine study to look at innovative ways to address the
problem. What kinds of reengining programs has the Air Force considered
as part of this study? Which show the most promise?
Answer. This feasibility study is limited to an examination of
aircraft with the TF-33 engine. These aircraft include the B-52, KC-
135, RC-135, AWACS, and JSTARS. The study involves both government and
industry propulsion experts.
Two types of programs are included in the study:
--Upgrades to the existing TF-33 engine.
--Complete reengining of the aircraft.
Multiple business approaches are also being examined including
leasing the engines, buying the engines, organic maintenance, and
``power by the hour'' total contractor support.
At this time, the study results are insufficient to support any
particular approach. The Office of the Secretary of Defense will
provide a report on the study results for military aircraft derived
from Boeing 707 aircraft. The report will be provided to Congress by
June 1, 1998.
Availability of Software Programmers
Question. In recent months, the media has reported extensively
about the nationwide shortfall of software programmers. General, is
this shortfall of qualified software programmers impacting the military
sector?
Answer. We are acutely aware of the growth in demand for qualified
software experts in industry. The Air Force has seen some significant
impacts to its programs. As with the management of any highly technical
career field, contractors have a challenge to recruit and retain
experienced software programmers. While we have experienced
disturbances and delays during program development, there have been no
indications from contractors that they cannot execute the programs due
to a lack of software personnel resources.
Question. Do military contractors have trouble competing with
commercial industry for software programmers?
Answer. Contractors cannot easily be divided into military versus
commercial contractors. The typical Air Force contractor has both
military and commercial business. The Air Force relies on the
contractor to provide the expertise necessary for the program
development effort. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the contractor to
recruit and retain skilled software personnel as well as software
managers.
Question. Do you see the trend of shortages in software programmers
continuing?
Answer. We expect the growth in demand for qualified software
experts to continue. We are aware that our programs rely heavily on
software to perform their mission and that this reliance will more than
likely increase in the future. Although the Air Force has experienced
some significant impacts to its programs due to software personnel
turnover, we expect the free enterprise system will eventually self-
correct any existing programmer shortfalls.
Question. What can the Air Force do to mitigate the impacts of this
shortage?
Answer. As part of acquisition reform, the Air Force is increasing
its access to the commercial sector, thus, providing a greater source
of expertise and resources that can be used for Air Force acquisition
and development efforts. To meet the Air Force demand for software, we
are encouraging the use of best commercial practices, including
commercial off-the-shelf software and product-line practices for reuse.
Impact of Outyear Inflation Adjustments
Question. Every year, the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD)
adjusts the budget based on the latest approved OMB inflation
estimates. In theory, adjusting the budget to reflect the best
estimates of inflation should not affect program content. This year,
however, nearly every Air Force modernization program is reporting
significant programmatic impact resulting from these inflation driven
budget cuts from OSD for fiscal year 1999 and out. General Muellner,
does the Air Force disagree with the Administration on future inflation
estimates? Why or why not?
Answer. The Air Force agrees with the Administration on future
inflation estimates. Programmatic impacts occurred, because programs
were already on contract with established forward pricing rates and
union contracts. Programmatic impacts can be expected whenever
inflation adjustments affect the year currently being executed or years
under contract.
Question. Does the Air Force have its own approved inflation
estimates? If so, please provide a comparison of the Air Force
estimates with the Administration's estimates. If not, then what is the
basis of the Air Forces budget estimates? Is each program allowed to
make its own estimates of inflation? Is there any consistency between
programs?
Answer. The Air Force uses the administrations inflation estimates
as provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The provided
inflation estimates were reflected in the fiscal year 1999 President's
budget submission and supporting Congressional justification material.
Question. Did OSD approve the Air Force strategy of showing
programmatic impact from inflation adjustments?
Answer. The Air Force briefed the Procurement and RDT&E plan
proposed in the fiscal year 1999 President's Budget. The health of our
modernization plan depends on a number of primary factors including
inflationary impacts. Providing our proposed fiscal year 1999
Procurement and RDT&E budget without covering the effects of inflation
would provide an incomplete picture of those factors that impact the
success of the Air Force's modernization plan.
Shortfalls in Baseline Programs
Question. Several Air Force programs have already reported known
shortfalls in the budget for fiscal year 1999 and out, including F-22,
JSTARS, and Link-16. Please provide a list of all Air Force acquisition
programs with known (or highly suspected) shortfalls in the program of
record as presented to Congress in the Fiscal Year 1999 President's
Budget. Please breakout the list by program, appropriation, and fiscal
year over the Future Year Defense Plan using then-year dollars. Be sure
to total the list by program and fiscal year.
Answer. The following table lists the requested information:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description of
3-LTR Appn Program requirement FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AQI.......................... 3010 JSTARS.......... Estimated FY99- 0.00 40.00 20.00 20.00 0.00 0.00
FY01 costs for
the E-8C
production line
shut-down which
begins in FY99
on 13 A/C
program.
AQP.......................... 3600 SFW............. SFW P3I Cost 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Overrun--During
staffer day
briefs
requested
Congressional
support to
realign FY99
Procurement to
RDT&E.
Magnitude of
overrun
characterized
after FY99PB
submission.
AQ........................... 3010 .............. Total 3010 \1\ 0.00 40.00 20.00 20.00 0.00 0.00
Appropriation
Requirement.
AQ........................... 3600 .............. (1) Total 3600 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
\1\
Appropriation
Requirement.
AQ Total Requirement......... ....... ................ ................ 0.00 44.00 20.00 20.00 0.00 0.00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The F-22 contractor team is currently concluding the 1997-98 Affordability Analysis, with product delivery due in March 1998. In turn, the Air Force
will need some time to review the analysis. Once the Air Force has confidence that we have received a high fidelity estimate, the Air Force will
formulate a budget position with corporate Air Force approval to be included in the Fiscal Year 2000 President's Budget to execute this cost estimate.
To date, the Air Force is still working FYDP funding requirements. Based on preliminary data, the revised program budget adds funds within the FYDP
and makes outyear offsets within cost cap. The Air Force is confident that the program, with known constraints, remains executable.
Selling Key Technologies Abroad
Question. The US spends billions of dollars to provide our military
with technological advantages over our adversaries. However, there are
numerous examples of these advantages being compromised following the
marketing of these technologies abroad, in some cases forcing the
premature requirement to spend billions more to recapture the
advantage. Currently, several of our highest technology programs have
barely gotten off the drawing board and are already being marketed
abroad, including the most advanced aircraft (Joint Strike Fighter),
most advanced close-in-air-to-air missile (AIM-9X), and the most
advanced surveillance radar (JSTARS RTIP). General Muellner, from a
warfighting standpoint, do you believe it is wise for the US to be so
quick to sell our best warfighting technologies abroad?
Answer. Yes, I believe it is wise, but there are both positive and
negative aspects. There are several benefits to selling our latest
technology to Allied nations: reduced cost, improved interoperability,
easier planning, and simplified logistic support requirements for
Allied efforts. Also, our Allies often find ways to improve on our
products which we can then incorporate in upgrading our systems.
The negative aspect of selling our warfighting technology abroad is
proliferation to our potential enemies.
The US has a coherent and consistent policy that, when realized,
prevents technology from falling in to the wrong hands. This policy
also relies on similar precautions by our Allied customers to be
effective. Implementing these checks and balances allows for the wise
sale of our warfighting technologies abroad.
Question. What work is being done to protect these technologies
from exploitation once sold overseas?
Answer. All technologies are thoroughly reviewed and evaluated
prior to release overseas. In addition, the Air Force has an active
anti-tamper program implementing existing DOD policy in identifying and
protecting critical technologies. Its purpose is to prevent
exploitation of U.S. technology or the development of countermeasures
against our weapon systems. Included in the anti-tamper program are
techniques which not only protect the hardware, but also ensure
software algorithms are secure. Examples of anti-tamper techniques
include software encryption, integrated circuit protective coatings,
and hardware access denial systems.
Question. Are there currently policies in place to protect certain
kinds of advanced hardware or software, or are these decisions made on
an ad hoc basis?
Answer. Yes, DOD policy 5200.1-M directs protection of critical
technologies, including hardware and software, in our weapon systems. A
Program Protection Plan is required for all acquisition programs that
have critical technologies.
Question. Who typically makes these decisions?
Answer. The Program Protection Plan must be approved by the
Milestone Decision authority as part of the Milestone Review Process.
Additionally, systems proposed for foreign sale that have Low
Observable (LO) or Counter Low Observable (CLO) capabilities must be
approved by the LO/CLO Executive Committee. This committee is co-
chaired by the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology.
CV-22 Aircraft
Question. The CV-22 is the special operations variant of the
tiltrotor V-22 aircraft. Fiscal year 1999 is the first year the Air
Force has requested production funding for this aircraft. What is the
status of the CV-22 development program?
Answer. The CV-22 development program is on track and follows the
MV-22 development. The Navy is the lead acquisition agency for MV-22
and CV-22. CV-22 design reviews have been completed on or ahead of
schedule. The final CV-22 critical design review is scheduled for
December 98. CV-22 starts flight test in October 99.
Question. GAO recently reported several design issues with the
aircraft that could be a problem for special operations personnel.
These problems include inability for both pilot and copilot to see the
refueling probe, excessive downwash, elimination of the laser-warning
subsystem, interference between the terrain following radar and the V-
22 radar jamming system, absence of a ground collision avoidance and
warning system. Does the Air Force agree with these concerns? What is
being done about them?
Answer. The Air Force has been following the Navy's progress during
their test program; some of the concerns have been overstated.
Visibility of the refueling probe is not an issue for the right seat
pilot. Flight testing (Fall 98) will evaluate visibility for the left
seat pilot. A quantitative assessment (collection of flow data) of the
V-22 proprotor downwash was completed in December 97. Initial analysis
of the data shows that the V-22's proprotor downwash is comparable to
existing helicopters with regard to the magnitude of wind velocities.
The user, USSOCOM, has agreed to add laser warning as a preplanned
product improvement (P3I) item. Interference between the terrain
following radar and the radar jamming system has been taken into
consideration during engineering design, and will be investigated
during CV-22 flight test beginning in 1999. A Ground Collision
Avoidance and Warning System (GCAWS) is not presently available for
integration on the V-22. Forms of GCAWS exist for helicopter and fixed
wing aircraft, but a system for tiltrotor has not yet been developed.
GCAWS will be added as a P3I item on both the MV-22 and CV-22. The next
operational test, scheduled for this summer, will further clarify these
issues using the MV-22 EMD aircraft.
Question. GAO reported that the Pentagon's Director, Operational
Test and Evaluation said that the combination of limitations to
clearance and configuration in testing results in an ``extremely
artificial'' test environment for early operational test and
evaluation. General, are you concerned about the amount and type of
testing being performed on the aircraft? Is anything being done to make
the testing less artificial?
Answer. The Air Force is satisfied the Navy is addressing test and
evaluation issues realistically; envelope restrictions and pre-
production limitations in early operational assessments are the norm.
MV-22 enters the fourth phase of five operational test phases in Summer
98. Future test environments will be more challenging and realistic,
each building on the previous.
Question. The fiscal year 1999 budget requests $22 million in
advance procurement two years prior to funding of the first CV-22
production aircraft. What is this funding for? Why is it required two
years prior to full funding of the first CV-22 production aircraft?
Given the state of production, should this effort be funded in R&D? Why
or why not?
Answer. This funding is the Air Force portion of a joint
procurement with USSOCOM to buy a full motion Weapon System Trainer
(WST) to be located at Kirtland AFB, NM. Funding in fiscal year 1999
will deliver and integrate the simulator by March 02, to be ready for
training the initial instructor cadre by September 02. The initial
instructor cadre must be trained prior to arrival of the first aircraft
in March 03. Procurement funding is used because the Air Force
simulator procurement follows the Navy fiscal year 1997 procurement for
a simulator.
Year 2000 Computer Problem
Question. One of the problems that we face as we enter the next
century is older computers that are only programmed to remember the
last two digits in a year. Thus they remember `1997' as simply `97'.
The year 2000, however, will be saved as `00', the same as the year
1900. This can lead to calculation errors and system failures. How
serious is this problem for the Air Force? What would be the impact if
your Mission Critical Systems were not corrected by the year 2000?
Answer. Many Air Force systems depend upon computers and software
so that scope of all programs is of considerable depth and breadth. The
year 2000 remediation program has the attention of the senior
leadership in the Air Force. In fact, the Acting Secretary of the Air
Force and the Chief of Staff have declared it as the number one
software sustainment priority. The problem is diverse--as illustrated
by over 3400 weapon systems and automated information systems being
tracked--but we have a program to fix the year 2000 issues and we are
substantially on track. The impact of not correcting mission critical
systems encompasses an equally wide spectrum of possible results,
ranging from no operational impact to erratic system performance or
even system shut down. Mission critical systems have been our primary
focus. We are confident of the attention being given--mission critical
systems will operate when the year 2000 arrives.
Question. How many systems does the Air Force have to evaluate and
where do they stand in the process of assessment, renovation,
validation and implementation?
Answer. We currently have 387 (approximately 10 percent of total)
systems that are behind the assessment phase milestone. They are
receiving increased emphasis to understand the condition of the systems
and the plan to achieve the remedy by the required date. For some of
these systems still in assessment phase remediation action is underway,
but the responsible program managers still have some actions to take to
complete all steps required to exit the assessment phase. For complex
systems with complex interfaces, the remediation plan does not always
fit the discrete steps and phase points we have specified. Over 30% are
in renovation. The Air Force is tracking just over 3400 weapon and
automated information systems. Almost 60 percent are ahead of schedule
in the validation and implementation phases.
Question. Are there any systems, particularly Mission Critical
Systems, whose Year 2000 efforts could be improved with additional
funding? If so, which systems are they, how much money would you need,
and how would the money be used?
Answer. Our strategy is to defer nonessential sustainment and
system enhancements, and to use existing programmed resources to make
our Y2K fixes. Given our current strategy, we will be able to fix all
of our mission critical systems on time. While additional Total
Obligation Authority might accelerate some mission critical fixes and
avoid the undesirable consequences of diverting resources form
essential program content to fix the year 2000 problem, we believe our
strategy is sound and the President's Budget accurately reflect our
priorities and commitments.
Question. Has your organization appointed a Year 2000 program
manager and established an agency-level program office to manage and
coordinate your Year 2000 program activities?
Answer. Yes. The Air Force's Year 2000 program is directed by the
Air Force Chief Information Officer (CIO). The CIO Support Office in
the Air Force Communications and Information Center provides policy and
guidance, and coordinates program activities.
Question. Have you completed a service-wide inventory of
information systems?
Answer. Yes, we have used a variety of methods to identify all of
our weapon and information systems impacted by year 2000 issue.
Additionally, we used a wide range of data sources from program funding
lines, acquisition portfolios, system modification tests, etc. to cross
check our inventories. We are confident that we have identified most of
the systems but we fully understand that we will find additional
systems as we continue to rigorously work the year 2000 program.
Question. Have you deferred or canceled any new system development
efforts in order to reprogram the funds to achieve Year 2000 compliance
with an existing Mission Critical System? If so, which systems were
deferred or canceled?
Answer. The Air Force is not deferring or canceling any new system
development. However, we are deferring minor modifications and
enhancements to existing systems until after Y2K fixes have been made
and we are doing that every day. Resources spent on year 2000
remediation had to come from program content. While we have not
canceled any programs because we are doing year 2000, we clearly have
had to stretch out programs, delay content (features) in major software
releases and divert resources from other important issues. A few
examples of deferral action can be found in the Combat Information
Transfer System (CITS), we are delaying planned and needed fiber
optical cable modernization because we have to divert resources to
obtain the year 2000 remediation in our telephone switches; and in the
Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) program we have had to divert
resources to establish a GPS receiver test capability to validate YSK
fixes. We also had to spend resources to ensure our mission control
system has the year 2000 remedy in place. In total, this remediation is
consuming considerable resources but cost figures will never be more
precise than rough estimates because the year 2000 actions are
necessarily linked to a number of associated and on-going develop and
sustainment actions.
Question. Have you developed contingency plans for Mission Critical
Systems?
Answer. Roughly 25 percent of all mission critical systems
currently have contingency plans. Air Force policy directs all mission
critical systems to have contingency plans in place by June 30, 1998.
This will be a special interest item as we continue in 1999 to perform
interoperability testing. We are also developing contingency plans for
all our operations centers to use as we roll into the year 2000. We are
doing this so we will have in place a good set of emergency checklists
and procedures that address the consequences and responses if essential
services become interrupted because of second and third order effects
of failure in systems or infrastructure outside Air Force control. We
will be ready for the unexpected anomalies that might surface.
Information Technology Management Reform Act
Question. The Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996
(known as the Clinger-Cohen Act) requires each agency to make specific
changes in how they select and manage information technology programs.
Among other steps, this includes performing an analysis of
alternatives, a cost-benefit analysis and identifying specific
performance measures. What steps has the Air Force taken to come into
compliance with the Clinger-Cohen Act?
Answer. The Secretary of the Air Force appointed the Assistant
Secretary for Acquisition as the first Chief Information Officer (CIO)
of the Air Force on August 8, 1996.
Organization
The Air Force CIO structure is aligned under the Secretary of the
Air Force with the Assistant Secretary for Acquisition dual-hatted as
Air Force CIO (AF-CIO). The Air Force's Director, Communications and
Information is appointed as Deputy AF-CIO and reports to the AF-CIO for
all CIO matters, the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA), and implementing
the provisions of the ITMRA.
CIO Management Board: The CIO Management Board is an executive-
level structure, composed of senior members of the Secretariat and Air
Staff, who advise the CIO on information technology and IRM issues from
a corporate Air Force perspective. The board is chaired by the CIO.
CIO Overarching Integrated Process Team (OIPT): The CIO established
an OIPT composed of members of the CIO staff and designated functional
staffs to address those cross-cutting issues which required a multi-
functional perspective. The OIPT is chaired by the Air Force
Communications and Information Center's Director, CIO Support (AFCIC/
IT).
CIO Support Staff: The Director, CIO Support reports to the Deputy
AF-CIO and is responsible for day-to-day management and oversight of
the responsibilities of the CIO under the ITMRA, PRA, A-130 and other
laws and executive orders as applicable. The Director, CIO Support
represents the AF-CIO at various Federal, DOD and National forums.
ITMRA in Strategic Planning: The Air Force has incorporated ITMRA
principles in its strategic planning. The AF-CIO published the Air
Force Information Technology Management (ITM) Strategic Plan in
accordance with the provisions of the ITMRA. The plan built on the 1995
strategic plan for Information Resource Management (IRM) and
established goals and objectives for information technology (IT)
investments. The Air Force ITM Strategic Plan was developed using the
Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and the DOD Information Management/
Information Technology (IM/IT) Strategic Plan.
AF-CIO Top Issues: The AF-CIO and his staff are currently
addressing the following:
Ensuring the Air Force is ready for the Year 2000 date
change--the Air Force's top software and IT sustainment issue
Air Force-wide standardization of its information
infrastructure
Information assurance to include information protection
Improve information technology skills of entire workforce
Implement supporting plans for strategic planning
documents
Institutionalize performance measurement, process
improvement by innovation, business and mission process reengineering
as precursor activities to information technology investments
Data standardization
Aggressive actions across the Air Force to recognize the power and
value of information as strategic resources that enables revolutionary
changes in the way we do the mission and business processes of the Air
Force
Federal and DOD CIO Councils: The AF-CIO is actively engaged with
the Federal and DOD CIO Councils to proactively address IT issues
common to all governmental agencies. An example of issues we're
addressing are Year 2000 conversion, capital planning and investment
control, and information architecture.
Question. Is the Air Force now in compliance with this Act?
Answer. Yes. Our structure and practices are in place. As with any
new process or initiative we are constantly reviewing our actions in
this area to seek improvements in the way we operate. Our fundamental
objective in the area of ITMRA is to be a leader in the smart use of
information and information technology to deliver to the American
people an Air Force that works better and costs less.
Question. What improvements has the Air Force seen as a result of
the Clinger-Cohen Act?
Answer. The most visible improvement Air Force-wide is the growing
institutional awareness that our entire Air Force (all of its mission
and business processes) is very information dependent. Information and
IT are integral to every mission and business process throughout the
Air Force. Consequently, we are continually improving our processes to
save resources and increase our effectiveness.
Examples of how we are exploiting information technology and
applying ITMRA principles to become a better, faster, cheaper Air Force
include:
--Electronic travel management: We reengineered travel management
processes and made smart use of IT to reduce customer service cycle
time from 7 days to 3 days. We reduced travel arrangement processing
time from 4 hours/traveler to 2 hours, and reduced travel processing
cost from $66/traveler to $41.
--Electronic mission briefings: We replace ``white board and
marker'' briefings with computer-based systems, providing ready access
to all flight regulations, safety supplements, training manuals,
briefing materials, and other presentations. This $300 thousand
investment produced $800 thousand savings in man-hours and increased
pilot utilization.
Since our mission is dependent on information, we are treating
information as a strategic resource. We have recognized its role in our
Global Engagement vision statement and we have declared that
``Information Superiority'' is a core competency of the Air Force in
parallel with ``Air and Space Superiority.'' We are convinced that the
essential improvements we have addressed in our intelligence, situation
awareness, precision engagement, lethality, global mobility, and combat
support are directly linked to effective exploitation of information
and information technology.
Question. In the last year, as a result of your Information
Technology (IT) Milestone reviews, did the Air Force delay, cancel or
significantly restructure any of their IT systems? If so, which ones?
Answer. Over the course of the past year, the Air Force did not
delay, cancel, or significantly restructure any programs as a result of
these reviews. We have incorporated the ITMRA requirements and
principles into all program, portfolio, and milestone reviews. ITMRA
compliance is closely scrutinized by the Air Force's Senior Acquisition
Executive, AF-CIO, Deputy AF-CIO, Program Executive Officers (PEO),
Designated Acquisition Commanders (DAC), and Program Managers. Joint
use programs are reviewed quarterly; detailed program reviews occur
semi-annually, and higher level portfolio reviews comprised of numerous
programs also occur semi-annually. We study various program performance
measures during these reviews to make the best decision for the Air
Force and American public. Continually searching for improvements in
effectiveness and opportunities to save resources, we are looking
forward to further institutionalizing the results of an ongoing pilot
study that validates our Air Force Information Technology Investment
Performance Measurement Guide.
Question. What document does your review panel require for each
milestone review?
Answer. Our PEO/DAC portfolio and milestone reviews, conducted
under DOD Directive 5000 requirements, consider schedules, funding,
Year 2000 compliance, Joint Technical Architecture/Defense Information
Infrastructure Common Operating Environment compliance, and performance
metrics. We review the Mission Need Statement and Operational
Requirements Document to ensure we deliver the right product with the
required capabilities. We also discuss the Single Acquisition
Management Plan (SAMP), a concise, comprehensive document that enables
the program decision authority to reach a decision. Specifically, the
SAMP consolidates the essential elements of the program's Acquisition
Plan, Program Management Plan, Integrated Logistics Support Plan, and
Systems Engineering Management Plan--documents typically evaluated at
milestone reviews.
Question. In conducting these reviews, how many involved an actual
meeting of the senior decision makers, and how many were ``paper''
reviews?
Answer. PEO/DAC portfolio and milestone reviews are actual meetings
with senior decision makers, not ``paper'' reviews. The Air Force's
Senior Acquisition Executive, AF-CIO, Deputy AF-CIO, Program Executive
Officers (PEO), Designated Acquisition Commanders (DAC), and Program
Managers are directly involved in portfolio and milestone reviews.
Joint use programs are reviewed quarterly, detailed program reviews
occur semi-annually, and higher level portfolio reviews comprised of
numerous programs also occur semi-annually.
Question. Has the OSD MAISRC, in its reviews, delayed, canceled or
significantly restructured any of the Air Force's IT systems? If so,
which ones?
Answer. The OSD MAISRC has not delayed, canceled, or significantly
restructured any of the Air Force's IT systems.
[Clerk's note: End of questions submitted by Mr. Young.]
Wednesday, March 4, 1998.
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE ORGANIZATION
WITNESS
LIEUTENANT GENERAL LESTER L. LYLES, USAF, DIRECTOR, BALLISTIC MISSILE
DEFENSE ORGANIZATION
Introduction
Mr. Young. The Committee will come to order.
This morning our hearing will be on the Department of
Defense's program in the area of ballistic missile defense. Our
witness is Lieutenant General Lester L. Lyles, the director of
the BMDO.
General, we welcome you back. We enjoyed your testimony at
the last visit, and we look forward to your testimony today.
You know, this Committee has placed a very high priority on
the issue of missile defense programs. We remember specifically
the SCUD attack which took the lives of 28 Americans during
Desert Storm. We have watched over the weeks the activity
relative to Iraq. We also recognize that Iran is also a
potential problem.
As we see these threats, this Committee remembers last year
that Congress added $800 million for the budget for missile
defense. We thought the administration's budget was a little
short. We are happy to see this year that the administration's
budget is substantially better as it relates to funding for the
ballistic missile threat.
The fiscal year 1999 budget request for ballistic missile
defense is $3.6 billion. That is only $100 million below the
1998 appropriation of $3.7 billion, so it is better. It
provides full funding for the Patriot Advanced Capability 3,
Navy Lower Tier, and the THAAD programs. We are not quite as
happy with the recommendation as it relates to the Navy Upper
Tier, but we will work on that, and we will talk to you about
that today.
We would anticipate that there will be numerous questions
from the members of the Committee, and we have some conflicts
this morning, so our attendance is not as great now, but other
members will be here as they complete their other assignments.
We are happy to have you here, and before we recognize you
I would like to ask Mr. Dicks for any comments he would like to
make.
Remarks of Mr. Dicks
Mr. Dicks. I welcome you, and I appreciated our chance to
talk the other day, and I just want to emphasize again how
important I believe theater missile defense is.
Again, if we are going to deploy soldiers all over the
world, we are going to have to have a way to defend them, and
we were fortunate in the Gulf War that Saddam's SCUDs in most
instances were pretty inaccurate. I know you told me about the
improvements in PAC-3, but, again, the failure on THAAD up to
this point has been a disappointment. I know you are working
hard on that, but I just want to emphasize how important I
believe this is for the safety of our deployed forces.
General Lyles. Yes, sir.
Mr. Young. General, we look forward to your testimony. Your
entire statement will be placed in the record, and you may
summarize it as you wish.
Summary Statement of General Lyles
General Lyles. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning. It is
a pleasure to be back here to address this Committee.
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I appreciate the
opportunity to present the Department's ballistic missile
defense program. As you stated, I will provide a formal
statement that will be submitted for the record. I have some
brief remarks I would like to go through very quickly, and then
I welcome your questions.
First off, because of some of the things that you just
stated, Mr. Chairman, along with Congressman Dicks, I would
like to introduce the Army, Navy and Air Force team that is
here with me today. I know this is a relatively small room and
it is not good always to bring a large group of people to a
hearing like this, but I thought it was very, very important,
and I wanted to consciously show you that this is a joint
mission. This is something that we are all working on together.
You met personally my deputy, Rear Admiral Dick West, who
is sitting behind me. By the way, he was recently selected for
second star; and we are looking forward to him pinning that on.
Brigadier General Cosumano, United States Army, my Joint
Program Manager for NMD. Mr. Rob Snyder, since you don't have a
uniform on, you can raise your hand. Rob Snyder is a member of
the Senior Executive Service. He is my deputy for program
operations or my comptroller, the guy I hold responsible and
actually keeps me honest to make sure we are spending the
dollars wisely.
Also with me today are representatives of the Service
Program Executive Officers, or PEOs. These are the guys who are
directly executing the missile defense programs. Unfortunately,
only one of the actual PEOs could be here this morning because
of schedule conflicts at the last moment, Brigadier General Dan
Montgomery for the Army. Dan is sitting behind me also. He is
the PEO for the Army's defense missile activities.
We have Colonel Ted Bowles for the Air Force, who is
representing Brigadier General Bruce Carlson for the United
States Air Force who oversees some of our missile defense
activities, and we work within the Air Force context.
Unfortunately, Rear Admiral Rod Rempt for the Navy got called
off at the very last minute.
This is the instant missile defense team, Mr. Chairman; and
they are all working with us to execute the theater missile
defense programs and major defense acquisitions programs for
missile defense for the Department. Together, we think we have
a leadership team. I can tell you it hascompletely dedicated
every one of us to forging missile defense as a joint mission area, a
joint mission area that we are trying to use or acquire these defensive
systems.
I don't need to tell you, you just stated it yourself,
today more than ever, when conflicts arise, the military is
called upon to fight jointly in an integrated matter. We all
firmly believe that we must develop and acquire missile defense
systems in that same joint manner, and we are dedicated to
doing that. This way, from the ground floor up, we build into
those systems and we acquire the ability to communicate, to
share information and, more importantly, to fight together. In
some ways, Mr. Chairman, we are breaking new ground for the
Department in this area.
INTEROPERABILITY
Mr. Chairman and Committee, this past year, BMDO has taken
on an additional responsibility to develop and to integrate a
joint architecture for both theater air systems and theater
missile defense systems, which includes cruise missile defense,
another major element of concern for the future. In all cases,
the missile defense programs we have structured are built on
the important foundation of interoperability. Let me explain
what this means to us.
Interoperability literally means the ability to detect and
track missile threats using a combination of space or sea or
ground-based sensors, communicating that information within the
entire missile defense system from one system to the other,
regardless of its origins or who is the operator, and allowing
the joint warfighter to make the most effective and efficient
use of the interceptors to counter the threat. This is the way
we are trying to operate our programs.
My prepared testimony outlines some of the important
efforts we have under way to ensure that interoperability is
pursued in everything that we do, and you can see that in the
context of the larger statement.
Mr. Chairman, working with and strongly supported by the
Congress, you mentioned yourself the additional $800 million
that the Congress gave to us last year, we are on the verge of
fielding comprehensive, highly effective missile defense
programs that are responsive to the existing and, more
importantly, to the emerging threat to the United States, our
deployed military forces, our allies and friends.
BMDO PRIORITIES
We still have within the BMDO three fundamental priorities:
first, theater missile defense; second, national missile
defense; and, third, and I am going to talk about this a little
bit, advanced technology.
Last year's Quadrennial Defense Review within the Pentagon
reaffirmed the importance of all of our programs and also
reaffirmed the priorities of our missile defense programs,
including the idea of integrated cruise missile defense
activities into our capabilities. The specific recommendations
of the QDR were provided to me, to the BMDO in the defense
planning guidance and the accompanying fiscal guidance from the
Secretary of Defense.
BMDO and our service executing agents, the individuals
sitting behind me and the programs that they oversee, have
successfully implemented the Department's direction. Our fiscal
year 1999 budget reflects these priorities for our missile
defense programs.
MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENTS
Let me also mention that in order to better manage and
execute these programs and to successfully field missile
defense systems for the warfighter, I personally have also
directed my organization and our service executive agents to
strengthen our management tools and our processes. Time, Mr.
Chairman, does not permit to get into some of the details of
these management improvements. We have provided them in our
prepared statement, and I would be happy to either address them
or at some time in the future tell you what we are doing to
improve management of our programs.
FISCAL YEAR 1999 BUDGET REQUEST
Mr. Chairman, let me quickly address our fiscal year 1999
program and this budget. The total fiscal year 1999 budget
request, as you stated, for ballistic missile defense is $3.6
billion. I have included two charts in my attachments we
provided to you that outline our specific fiscal year 1999
budget.
As you can see, our budget includes $3.1 billion for
research development, test and evaluation, $409 million for
procurement, and $17 million for military construction
activities. Within these three budget categories, theater air
and missile defense programs account for $2.1 billion or
roughly 59 percent of our total budget, while our national
missile defense represents $962 million or 27 percent.
We are also requesting $253 million for advanced
technologies, which is about 7 percent of our overall budget.
BMDO's technical operations, which doesn't just include
operating our offices, but also some of the other things we do
to support the major programs that we are developing, accounts
for $194 million and is about 5 percent of the budget.
Finally, two of our new program elements, threat and
countermeasures and international cooperation, represent a
total of $72 million or 2 percent of the budget.
Mr. Chairman, while very challenging on all fronts, our
theater air and missile defense programs are progressing well,
and we literally are on the verge of meeting some major
milestones. I would like to provide you with a quick summary of
where we are today.
PATRIOT ADVANCED CAPABILITY-3 (PAC-3)
Let me start with the Patriot PAC-3. This is the most
mature of our theater air and missile defense systems. It is
currently in the engineering and manufacturing development
phase of the acquisition process. PAC-3 is being fielded in the
course of three phased upgrades. Currently, we have fielded the
first two of these phases or configurations of the PAC-3,
providing the Army with improved operational performance,
greatly improving the capabilities that we had since Desert
Storm. These two configurations are available in the Middle
East today, Mr. Chairman, in the case of a conflict with Iraq.
The third configuration will provide the final element of
PAC-3 in the form of hit-to-kill interceptor technology, the
capability we ultimately need to counter threats of weapons of
mass destruction. I expect that the first PAC-3 with hit-to-
kill capability will intercept its first--make its first
intercept flight test in May of this year, a couple of months
from now, and that intercept will be followed by a decision to
begin low-grade initial production for this new missile.
The first deliveries of the ground system hardware and
software for PAC-3 have already begun, and development and
operational testing will start later this year. All of these
efforts support a first unit equipped date of late fiscal year
1999, less than 2 years from now, for the factory system.
Nevertheless, let me footnote and reemphasize that the
configurations that we have in the field today of Patriot can
defeat the current threat that is represented in the Middle
East.
NAVY AREA PROGRAM (LOWER TIER)
Let me switch to Navy Area. Following last year'ssuccessful
intercept flight test almost exactly a year ago, the Navy Area Program
was approved for entry into EMD, engineering and manufacturing
development. The program will commence development flight tests
beginning in fiscal year 1999, followed by an at-sea demonstration of
the User Operational Evaluation Systems, or UOES capabilities, in
fiscal year 2000. Low Rate Initial Production will begin in fiscal year
2000 also, with a first unit equipped date of fiscal year 2001.
THEATER HIGH ALTITUDE AREA DEFENSE
Let me switch very quickly to Theater High Altitude Area
Defense System, or THAAD. The THAAD program, as you noted, Mr.
Chairman, is the most mature of our Upper Tier TAMD systems. In
1997, as a result of our failure to achieve an intercept flight
test, we began a major effort to ensure that we understood
exactly what the design looked like and that we understood
exactly what the problems were with the program and how we
needed to solve them. The QDR endorsed a plan to restructure
the program because we had the failures and directed that we
achieve a first unit equipped in the year 2006, vice 2004,
which is what we were aiming towards previous to our flight
test failures.
Following a very successful THAAD unit flight test this
year, and I will talk a little bit more about that, we plan to
execute the UOES missile buy for THAAD of about 40 missiles.
This will provide us with some very early interim systems for
testing and, in addition, provide the warfighter with an
interim capability in case of a contingency conflict.
NAVY THEATER-WIDE (UPPER TIER)
Let me switch to Navy Theater Wide. The Navy Theater Wide
program is currently in the program definition and risk
reduction phase of development, and they are preparing now to
have their initial Defense Acquisition Board, or DAB, review in
April of this year.
The Navy program office and specifically their PEO, Rear
Admiral Rod Rempt, has proposed, and I fully endorse, an
evolutionary acquisition approach for the Navy Upper Tier or
Navy Theater Wide program. This evolutionary acquisition
approach consists of providing an initial Block I system
capability followed by a more capable Block II system. This
Block I capability for Navy Upper Tier will provide us the
Upper Tier capability of aegis platforms. It will be able to
counter the medium range threat and will be able to counter the
threat similar to the No Dong threat that we seek today in some
areas of the world. The Milestone I-level review, the DAB
review for the program, will review and approve this proposed
evolutionary acquisition strategy.
Meanwhile, we are pressing on in the Navy's Upper Tier
program with the Navy risk reduction effort and we are planning
to conduct, starting later this year, the aegis intercept tests
to assure that we are keeping up with technology associated
with Navy Upper Tier.
MEDIUM EXTENDED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM
Mr. Chairman, I talked about the programs that are
currently under way. Let me talk about a program that is not
fully under way but one that I know is very strong in the
hearts of the Congress, in addition to those of us in the
Department.
It is MEADS, the Medium Extended Air Defense System. It is
our cooperative program with Germany and Italy. That program is
currently in the project definition and validation phase and is
scheduled to be completed of that phase in the first quarter of
fiscal year 1999.
Negotiations for the next phase of the MEADS program are
currently under way with both of our international partners.
The QDR, the Quadrennial Defense Review, recommended
continuation of MEADS and increased the fiscal year 1999
funding for the program to allow us a bridge between the
current phase of the program and the next intended phase for
MEADS.
In light of the QDR guidance and the importance of this
international program and continuing congressional interest in
outyear funding, MEADS was raised during our last budget cycle
through the Department and we deliberated and looked at it
very, very hard. Nonetheless, other defense program priorities
superseded addressing this issue, and we are unable to clearly
define how we are going to fund the program in the year 2000
and beyond.
I can tell you, Mr. Chairman, that during this next POM
process, which is the 2000 POM process that will begin this
spring, the Department and my organization will identify
resource requirements and alternatives for us to figure out
exactly how we might structure the MEADS program and to look at
ways that we might be able to finally support the program for
the outyears.
FLIGHT TESTS DELAYS
Mr. Chairman, I mentioned earlier and I know the Committee
is very interested in flight testing of our Theater Missile
Defense System. You are very aware I think of the recent slips
in a couple of our major tests planned for this year. Let me
quickly address those two issues; and, again, I will be very
happy to answer any questions you might have.
The PAC-3 program. Our first hit-to-kill test was
originally scheduled to be conducted this month, the month of
March. We have had some flight test delays in the PAC-3
program; and we are now looking towards having our first hit-
to-kill test in the May time frame, late May time frame. The
results of those slips or the reason for those slips were the
aggressive testing and ground testing we have done where we
have uncovered some software development problems that are
taking a little longer than we had originally planned, and we
want to make sure that we complete all of the tests
satisfactorily before we take the PAC-3 out to White Sands and
begin our flight testing. We plan for this test to fly later
this spring, as I just mentioned.
The preflight qualification efforts that we are currently
doing are absolutely critical to ensure that all of the
systems, all the hardware, all the subsystems are performing
exactly the way we want them to perform before we actually try
to conduct a flight test. Even with this delay, from March to
May, I expect that we will conduct all of the scheduled PAC-3
flight tests that were planned for this year, Mr. Chairman.
Similarly, as you know, we have experienced some delays in
THAAD. We are hoping to start the flight testing again for
THAAD this month, again, in March. After last year's flight
test, BMDO, the Army, and the prime contractor each
commissioned independent review teams to review the entire
THAAD program from cradle to grave and looked at every
different aspect of the THAAD program. We looked at program
processes, we looked at design, we looked at the entire
missile, we looked at everything associated with THAAD to
ensure that we understood what we had there.
I believe the IRTs have had a direct positive impact on the
way the THAAD program is now conducting its business, both
within the government and certainly within the contractor
arena. As a result, we have increased the rigors of our testing
program to verify the design as we prepare for our next flight
test.
The IRTs, the independent review teams, I would like to
mention each one of them, have fully agreed that the design for
the THAAD program is very sound, but that systems engineering,
quality and reliability issues existed, and those are the kinds
of things we have been addressing since the last hearing. As a
result of these rigorous tests that we have been conducting
where we detected the most recent technical problems, we have
now addressed those problems and we are now well on the way to
being prepared for our first intercept, successful intercept
test in the May time frame.
Mr. Chairman, I can tell you that I actually applaud the
THAAD team for discovering the faulty components and the things
that caused us a little concern in the last couple of months
that caused the delays. They are exactly the kind of rigors of
testing, rigors of analysis that we have to have to ensure that
we have successful flight tests. We didn't quite have the same
sort of rigor previously. I can tell you, Mr. Chairman, we
certainly do now; and I am confident that, when we fly, we will
have a successful flight test.
THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE
Finally, to close my remarks about theater missile defense,
I would like to make a brief comment about another critical
element of our family of systems theater missile defense
architecture. This is a program that is not managed by BMDO,
even though it is within our theater missile defense
architecture. It is the airborne laser program, the only
program we currently have in the Department to test boost-phase
intercept, a capability we really need for theater missile
defense.
BMDO and the Air Force are working very closely to ensure
that the airborne laser program is effectively integrated into
our family of systems. It will provide our warfighters with a
powerful capability and will strengthen our overall missile
defense architecture.
AIRBORNE LASER PROGRAM
Let me deviate very quickly from my prepared remarks, Mr.
Chairman, and give a personal comment. There have been some
remarks I have heard from some sources here in Congress who
have questioned whether or not BMDO and particularly me fully
support the airborne laser program. I can tell you that I have
complete confidence and complete support for ABL.
In some respects, I am sort of like a fox in a hen house
because the airborne laser program used to report to me in my
previous capacity. I understand the technology, I understand
the risks, I understand how the program is laid out, and I have
complete confidence in the contractor team, the government team
that is managing the airborne laser program.
So anybody who has stated that BMDO and particularly
General Lyles do not support airborne laser really do not know
what they are talking about. I am a complete supporter of the
airborne laser.
NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE
Let me turn very quickly to our national missile defense
program or NMD. As you know, the primary mission of NMD is
defending the United States against a ballistic missile threat
by a rogue nation should such a threat emerge. In addition, NMD
will have some capability against a small accidental or
unauthorized launch of a ballistic missile from one of the
current nuclear powers.
As you know, to ensure that the Department has a required
capability to defend our Nation, all 50 States, against an
emerging threat, it has adopted an ambitious program that we
call ``3 plus 3.'' By the year 2000, Mr. Chairman, we will be
in a position to make a deployment decision, if warranted by
the threat, which would result in the deployment of an initial
NMD system by the year 2003. The program is laid out so that in
2000 a threat assessment will be done, and that threat
assessment may not warrant actual deployment. It depends on the
threat, and we will be consulting both within the building and
with Congress about the nature of the threat when we come to
that particular decision.
If a decision is made not to deploy because a threat does
not warrant in the year 2000, we have a continued program of
improvements to our NMD system and literally to allow it to
continue to improve the capability, refine the capability, but
we will always be prepared to deploy the system within a 3-year
time period if something crops up relative to the threat.
This is a very challenging program, and to meet these
challenging schedules and other technology risks and to
mitigate those risks we have taken numerous steps to leverage
the previous technologies and previous programs that have been
ongoing. The NMD system has gained development with what we
call a flexible architecture to allow for a variety of
deployment options in order to respond to the unknown and
emerging threats and to provide us with an evolutionary path in
order to give us a robust capability.
We are building on various elements that exist today. I
think I provided you a chart that shows you some of those
various elements. I won't talk to them specifically in my
comments right now, but, again, I can answer any questions you
might have.
Literally, as we approach the year 2000 and a potential
deployment decision and we assess the threat to the United
States, we will be in a position, Mr. Chairman, to determine
which NMD capabilities, which one of our two systems, we will
need to address the threat.
During the last year, we have actually conducted two very
successful flight tests for the NMD program. These flight tests
were specifically addressing the design and trying to compete
with the design and development of the Exoatmospheric Kill
Vehicle, the front end of the missile, the front end that has
to see the target and literally make the intercept.
We have two competing teams and we have each one of these
teams conducting fly-off tests, the first of a series of fly-
off tests to determine what their capabilities are. The first
of these sensor flight tests, as we call them, took place in
June last year, June 23, 1997. The second test occurred earlier
this year, on January 16 of 1998.
These tests were done to analyze the ability of the
sensors, these EKV sensors, to identify and track objects in
space and to identify a representative threat target, which is
the real target and which are decoys. Both of those tests were
very, very successful, and we have a very, very strong
competition ongoing.
The next flight test will be part of this EKV series of
tests, and we will do it as part of our ``3 plus 3'' program.
The next test will be planned to be an intercept test to be
conducted later on this year.
Mr. Chairman, as I think you are aware, BMDO and our joint
program office, headed by General Cosumano who is behind MEADS,
will announce the award of the Lead Systems Integration
contract, a prime contractor for our NMD program. We have two
very, very strong industry teams that are competing for this
particular contract. One is the Boeing Company and the other is
the United Missile Defense Company, a joint venture between
Lockheed Martin, Raytheon and TRW. The LSI contractor's main
task will be to complete theelement development and integrate
all the elements we need for a national defense system into a total
system to provide the Department a viable deployment option in the year
2000. We have received two excellent proposals. We are in the
evaluation phase, nearing the end of the evaluation phase, with those
proposals right now; and we are scheduled to have a decision briefing
coming up in the latter part of April and the first part of May.
The NMD program, I think, Mr. Chairman, is progressing
very, very well. We have benefited very strongly from the
additional money that the Congress has provided us to allow us
to add additional tests and do additional risk reduction for
the program, and I am confident that we are well on the way to
developing a national missile defense program for the country.
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to close by briefly
talking about our advanced technology effort. As the Committee
is very well aware, BMDO is a reincarnation or evolution of the
old SDIO program. The SDI and SDIO focus was largely on
technology; developing robust, advanced technologies to give us
a potential capability for missile defense in a wide variety of
different fronts. The funding that was provided by Congress
over the years to SDIO and its technology efforts in some
respects were the seed corn that allowed us and have allowed us
to do what we are doing today in all of our programs of theater
missile defense and national missile defense.
Dividends from those investments have paid off
substantially. Today's PAC-3, as an example, emerged from the
technology development program called ERINT under the SDIO, and
there are very, very similar examples like that.
Today, our technology budget accounts for only 7 percent of
the overall BMDO budget request. Mr. Chairman, I will tell you,
this concerns me. I know we are constrained in dollars, but we
still recognize a robust technology investment is still
absolutely necessary to address both the near-term technology
needs and things that we can provide to help our current
programs in the very near future but also to address future
threats.
It is the latter part that concerns me more than anything
else. We have made reductions and we have had reductions in our
technology budget because of our budget constraints, but in
spite of and perhaps because of those reductions we have done a
couple of very smart things to try to leverage our technology
dollars.
I won't go into all of the details. My prepared statement
will tell you more details about those things, but we are
trying to make sure that we are working closely with the
services and we are working closely within our own community to
understand and leverage where we need to spend our very scarce
technology dollars.
We have developed or are developing a technology master
plan; and we have something we call a Joint Technology Board
that provides me inputs on technology efforts not just from
within my own community within BMDO but specifically from the
services--from the Army's technology people, from the Navy's
technology people, and from the Air Force's technology people.
Together we are trying to identify where we need to spend our
scarce technology dollars and how we can leverage off from
other programs that are addressing technology needs that are
very similar to the ones we have within BMDO.
Nevertheless, we are going to be doing everything we can to
try to see where we can provide robust technology programs and
some increases in some very critical technology areas for
missile defense. No other organization is addressing some of
those needs, so we feel we have to take this on.
SUMMARY
In closing, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate again the
opportunity to appear before this Committee and to share my
perspectives on ballistic missile defense programs in our
budget. I will tell you again, this is a very, very ambitious
year for us and a very, very important year for the world of
missile defense. We will attempt more flight tests, more
intercept tests this year than in any previous year.
As you have already seen, some of these tests are already
experiencing delays but, in all honesty, Mr. Chairman, I
encourage the Committee to not equate delays with failure.
These are very, very complex programs and systems that we are
working on. They operate at extreme conditions of speed,
atmospheric pressure, short times for flight, with some very
specific and very strong demands on discrimination kinds of
methodologies we need to have, et cetera. I feel very confident
we are going to create a family of systems that are
interoperable and that is going to be the focus of all of our
flights and activities over the next coming years.
Mr. Chairman, I can also tell you from a personal
standpoint, after another year as director of ballistic missile
defense, I am totally impressed with the total team that we
have. To address some of the team members that are with me here
today, this is a combined government and industry team.
Industry is very strongly behind us and industry is working
very hard to address all of the issues and all of the concerns
that we have and that the Congress has, and I feel very
confident again that we are going to make joint mission area
acquisition for missile defense a success, not just for us, not
just for the Congress but, more importantly, for the country.
Mr. Chairman, I will close my remarks, and I look forward
to your questions or the questions of other members.
Mr. Young. General Lyles, thank you very much for what I
would consider a very enthusiastic and positive presentation.
[The statement of General Lyles follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Young. I am going to yield briefly part of my time to
Mr. Cunningham for one quick question.
THEATER HIGH ALTITUDE AREA DEFENSE
Mr. Cunningham. Very briefly, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
I am a strong supporter of THAAD, and also I believe that a
coordination of Upper Tier with the Navy will enhance,
especially in areas like the Gulf, if we end up going into the
Taiwan area, those kinds of things. Are you working close in
the coordination with THAAD and Upper Tier system, and do you
believe that that would be a better total package?
General Lyles. Congressman Cunningham, that is absolutely
the focus of all of our efforts--the interoperability of almost
all of our systems, Lower Tier and Upper Tier, Patriot and
THAAD, Patriot and Navy Lower Tier, Patriot and THAAD and Navy
Upper Tier. We are working very closely to ensure that this
entire family of systems are interoperable to provide us the
capabilities that we need.
I like to point out to people that use their hands, as I
told somebody jokingly yesterday, sort of the Italian way of
expressing things is by using my hands. If we worked on any one
of the programs, Navy Upper Tier or THAAD or Patriot alone, we
would have this much capability for the United States.
Mr. Cunningham. So you do support it?
General Lyles. Yes, sir.
NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE
Mr. Young. General, one of the statements that you made
about National Missile Defense is you talked about deployment
or nondeployment of a system. You said it would take about 3
years to deploy, but if something cropped up, we could move
quickly. In the opinion of this Member, and I think quite a lot
of other Members, 3 years isn't a very quick response if
something crops up.
You mentioned No Dong missiles. They are getting more range
all the time. Realistically, where do you see the threat when a
National Missile Defense should be in place and should be
deployed?
General Lyles. Mr. Chairman, let me just clarify. Our ``3
plus 3'' program, of course, has the first three of that ``3
plus 3'' title for development. We then test to make sure we
actually have the capability, to make sure we have actually
developed the kind of capability we need, and then we are
prepared to deploy in another 3 years after that.
In all honesty, 3 years from start, from go to deploy a
weapons system, is fairly rapid compared to most programs
within the Department. I recognize that it may not be as rapid
as we, any of us, would like in the face of the kinds of
threats that we are looking at, and probably the key thing that
we will have to make sure we get is good intelligence
information on when the threat is going to materialize.
The reason we have that second 3, and we look at the threat
very closely, is so that we can give ourselves lead time, that
3 years lead time to get capability out there before the threat
actually materializes.
The kind of threats we see are threats from rogue nations.
You mentioned the No Dong, and there are obviously some
variants of No Dong called Taepo Dong that the North Koreans
are thinking of developing. There are other systems that we
understand the Iranians may be developing. From a rogue-nation
standpoint, those probably represent the compendium on the
threats.
But I also mention, and I am always reminded of this by the
warfighters, we also want to have a system that protects
against an unauthorized or potential accidental launch from one
of the current nuclear powers.
Mr. Young. Well, I understand that many of us are anxious
about defending America from a missile threat, and the National
Missile Defense is very important to us. So keep moving that
along. At least one Member would like you to do that.
General Lyles. Yes, sir.
Mr. Young. Now, the question that I had, back to the
budget.
As I mentioned earlier, the President's budget is a lot
better this year as it relates to missile defense, but as we
look at the projected outyears it looks like the funding is
going to drop considerably. What is this going to do to the
programs? The programs that we initiate or that we accelerate
today with the increased funding, what happens to them in
fiscal year 2000, 2001 and so on and so on? To me, it doesn't
appear that the outyear funding is going to be adequate.
General Lyles. Mr. Chairman, you are correct in many
respects. When we look at the total dollars for the outyear for
all of our programs, we recognize, and I think something very
important to this Committee and many others, that we have an
affordability issue, of being able to afford to pay for all of
the programs we currently have on the books.
We are going to be addressing that affordability issue but,
more importantly, addressing the funding we need to ensure we
have the capability we need in the upcoming Program Objective
Memorandum 2000 for the next 5 years or so. This is a specific
issue that is going to be addressed during the POM, and one of
the programs that we obviously are going to have to address
from that standpoint is Navy Upper Tier.
The current structure for Navy Upper Tier program for the
funding that we currently have outlined shows about a 4-year
gap between the time we finish our risk reduction activities
and the time we start developing flight testing. None of us
think that is a wise thing to do, so we are seriously looking
at how we structure the program. That is going to be reviewed
in the Defense Acquisition Board, but also what are the options
and how might we make sure we have more robust funding for Navy
Upper Tier.
Mr. Young. General, thank you very much.
Let me yield now to Mr. Dicks.
AIRBORNE LASER PROGRAM
Mr. Dicks. General, I want to compliment you on a very
comprehensive statement. I was pleased to hear about your
support for the airborne laser program.
Let me ask you a couple of questions.
First of all, give the Committee a sense of why you think
it is important to have a system that can attack these missiles
in the boost phase, and if you could also discuss any technical
challenges that we face with this particular program I would
appreciate it.
General Lyles. Yes, Congressman Dicks. Let me start with
the issue of why it is very important.
Boost phase intercept is really a key part of our overall
architecture for missile defense. As you know, once we get this
capability, particularly with airborne laser, we would have the
opportunity not only to counter the threat but, more
importantly in many respects, we will have an opportunity to
provide a deterrence.
A Saddam Hussein or somebody else who might be anadversary
in the future will think twice if he knows that we have the ability to
shoot down air threat missiles over their territory, particularly if
those missiles carry weapons of mass destruction, either chemical or
biological or, God forbid, nuclear warheads. Boost phase intercept will
give us that capability, shoot down that missile while it is in its
boost phase over their territory. We think that is an important part of
our architecture.
There is another reason that goes back to a study we did 2
years ago, literally just before I came on board.
We did a study to evaluate the inventory of missile defense
systems that we would need for protecting ourselves in the
United States, protecting our forces against the kind of
threats we think are going to be available in the future. And
one major assumption that we made was that we can deplete and
attrit some of the threats out there by having a boost-phase
capability. We didn't say what. We just assumed something like
a 20 percent attrition due to having boost-phase capability and
an attack ops capability to shoot down the tails and those
sorts of things on the ground.
Now, having made those assumptions and as a result of that,
sizing our inventory and forces to me is very important, that
we get up with the programs that actually give us that
capability and make those assumptions very, very true. So, to
me, it is extremely important that we have that capability.
Mr. Dicks. All right. What are the technical issues here?
General Lyles. Speaking from my past, as the program used
to report to me, probably the key technologies are being able
to get a flight weight laser, a laser to give us the kind of
power we need and put it on a platform like a 747-400
freighter.
The Javelin laser program is on schedule to do risk
reduction effort and, actually, we are scheduled to fire the
first flight weight laser module, the first module, this
spring, later on this spring, early on this summer. That would
be one of the problems that we have been able to solve, that
particular technology risk.
Another risk is being able to integrate and fire the laser
off of a platform flying at 40,000 feet in the atmosphere and
still be able to target and get a small beam to the target.
There are lots of things being done to address that risk area
by the program office, lots of flight tests, lots of ground
tests. To me, they have addressed some of the concerns raised
by the General Accounting Office earlier this year; and there
is a lot more data to show that they are solving, if not have
already solved, that particular problem.
THEATER HIGH ALTITUDE AREA DEFENSE
Mr. Dicks. Let's switch over to THAAD. We are all concerned
about the failure of the testing program up to this point.
Have there been increases in the THAAD program?
Specifically, have there been increases in the baseline
selected acquisition report estimates; and, if so, how much?
If you need a little help on this, we have a copy of a
report here that says that the basic program was $4.3 billion.
Now, it shows here that the increases, because of the problems
we have, are $3.4 billion. Now, in other words, the program has
increased from approximately $4.3 billion to $7.7 billion. Is
that accurate?
General Lyles. I think that is accurate, Congressman Dicks,
but I would like to verify those specific numbers and get a
response to the committee. The last number is correct.
Mr. Dicks. That is a very substantial increase in the cost
of this program. I mean, has that been budgeted for? Are we now
assuming that this is accurate and, therefore, it is going to
cost us $3.4 billion more to do the testing program?
General Lyles. Congressman, we have budgeted for the number
that you mentioned previously, the $7 billion number. What I
can't verify is the $3 billion and when that actually occurred
in the program.
As you know, THAAD has been restructured because of the
flight test anomalies over the last couple of years. We did
slip just in this past year because of last year's failure from
a first unit equipage of 2004 to a first unit equipage of 2006.
That slip did not account for all of the increase that you just
mentioned. So I would like to verify that number and get back
to you.
[The information follows:]
We have in fact incurred significant cost growth in the THAAD
program since the development was initiated in 1991. The original
Research, Development, Test, and Engineering (RDT&E) program was
estimated to cost $4.3 billion; that program plan called for a 48 month
Program Definition and Risk Reduction (PD&RR) phase (fiscal year 92-
fiscal year 96), followed by a 60 month EMD phase and led to
declaration of First Unit Equipped (FUE) in fiscal year 02. I believe
this is the SAR estimate to which you refer. The following table is
extracted from the June 30, 1997, SAR and provides a breakout of the
components of the cost increase:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
fiscal
TY$M year 88
C&M
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Economic........................................ -318.3 ..........
Quantity........................................ .......... ..........
Schedule........................................ 1,278.6 808.9
Engineering..................................... 1,241.6 850.8
Estimating...................................... 1,241.7 874.2
Other........................................... .......... ..........
Support......................................... -4.4 -3.9
-----------------------
TOTAL....................................... 3,439.2 2,530.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since the program's inception, the Department has implemented three
major restructures--a result of both technical problems specific to
THAAD, and competing modernization requirements across DOD programs.
Since June 1997, the total program cost estimate decreased from $7.7
billion to $7.3 billion as cited in the December 1997 SAR and reflects
a development program that continues until fiscal year 07, with FUE
declared at the end of fiscal year 06.
There are a number of major contributions to this cost growth, to
include the program restructures I've noted, contractor cost overruns,
the addition of new scope to the program, and a change in cost
estimating methodology. As a result of flight test delays and program
restructures, the program's FUE has been delayed 4 years with an
increase in the contract period of performance in both PD&RR and EMD.
Further, the contractor has incurred additional costs as a result of
flight test problems and the need to implement corrective actions
following flight test failures.
Mr. Dicks. Let me just follow up here. It says, schedule,
$979.4 million, engineering, $770.4 million, estimated, $558.8
million. That is a total of $2 billion, $15 million. Then down
below that it says, schedule, $299 million, engineering, $471
million, estimated, $652.9. What is estimated?
These are current changes in the program. I can understand
schedule, engineering, but what is estimated?
General Lyles. Okay. I am sorry. General Montgomery just
reminded me.
That is the estimate for the operational and support costs
for the program. The one thing that we have not fully defined
yet is the operational support outyear cost of the THAAD
program, and the estimated number you see there reflects the
O&S part that we don't firmly have the numbers for yet.
Mr. Dicks. Well, again, THAAD is a very important program,
one that I have strongly supported, but I mean I am very
concerned that we kind of have an open-ended financial
situation where this was sold to us on a basis of being about a
$4 billion program and now we are at $7.7 billion. I think we
are going to have some problems.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Skeen.
Mr. Skeen. General, good to see you.
General Lyles. Thank you, sir. How are you?
WHITE SANDS MISSILE RANGE
Mr. Skeen. General Lyles, the White Sands missile range I
think is our best customer, and we appreciate that. Could you
give us some idea of what kind of schedule we have this year
for tests at White Sands?
General Lyles. Congressman Skeen, we have a lot of tests
planned this year for all of our programs.
The PAC-3 program, the Patriot Advanced Capability 3
program, we are scheduled to start on our flight test, our
first hit-to-kill test, in the late May time frame, with
several other tests planned over the next year at White Sands
missile range.
Our THAAD program is scheduled to have its first successful
intercept, and I say that very positively.
Mr. Skeen. We are for you on that.
General Lyles. Yes, sir.
Mr. Skeen. We suffer every time you miss.
General Lyles. We do, too, sir.
Mr. Skeen. So we want you to know how much we appreciate
what you have done out there and how well it is coming along.
It will be a success.
General Lyles. Yes, sir. Thanks a lot.
Mr. Skeen. We thank you.
PATRIOT ADVANCED CAPABILITY-3
Mr. Young. Mr. Hefner.
Mr. Hefner. Good morning, General. Good to have you here
today. I want to ask a couple questions.
Listening to your testimony and not being an expert in
anything in particular but certainly not in missiles and that
sort of thing, I would like to know how much more effective are
the Patriot missiles? They have been around with us for years
and years. How much more effective do you think they are than
they were in the Persian Gulf? We never really did get a real
feel on how effective they were overall in the Persian Gulf.
How effective are they?
General Lyles. They are significantly effective,
Congressman Hefner. And, if you don't mind, I have prepared a
couple charts just to hand over very quickly; and I will ask my
staff to do that.
I want to graphically show you exactly the improvements
since Desert Storm but, more important, to give you a feel for
what we have out in the desert today, out in the Middle East
today, and what we would have had in terms of capability if we
did have a conflict with Saddam Hussein. The improvements are
significant, and I think you see them graphically by the chart.
I will wait until you get there.
The first chart you see, the graphic talks about Patriot
system performance versus a 500 kilometer threat. That is
roughly the threat that exists today in theater missile defense
arena, the kinds of threats that Saddam Hussein and others have
in the inventory of SCUDs, latest generation of SCUDs. We have,
since Desert Storm, the capability that we have today four
times the coverage versus the 500 kilometer threat.
What you see on the graph on the right hand side, the one
area represents the area that we protect during Desert Storm.
The green represents the area we can protect today with today's
improvements in the Patriot system, in configuration 2, that we
have today. And the blue represents where we really are going
to be, where we really need to be, the kind of capability we
will have with the full PAC-3. You see that range presented a
different way, the cross range on the left-hand side of the
chart.
[Chart follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
General Lyles. If I can ask you to switch to the second
chart. This is something I think is even more dramatic because
of some of the threats that are emerging. This shows Patriot
capability against a thousand kilometer threat. We didn't have
any particular capability against a thousand kilometer threat
during Desert Storm. So if you look at the graph, both sides of
the graph, you don't see any white area. We couldn't protect
against this kind of threat during Desert Storm. What you see
in green is the kind of capability we do have today. And,
again, blue is the capability we will have in the very near
future.
There are some specific numbers I can give you,
Congressman. It would be classified for me to mention them. I
would be happy to come back and talk about specific numbers.
But I think these graphics sort of illustrates what we can do
today, where we are since Desert Storm and, more important,
where we are going to be in the future.
[Chart follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
AIRBORNE LASER OPERATIONS
Mr. Hefner. I want to ask a couple of questions here.
We talk about the two tiers; and what I am interested in,
you talk about the airborne laser, and you want to be able to
destroy a missile in the launching stage. How much time do you
have there? What is the window that you have in the launch
phase that would be requied to consider the hit a success in
the launch phase?
General Lyles. Congressman, let me describe the general
concept of operations. And the specific numbers are classified.
But one reason we have the airborne lasers--and the orbits the
airborne laser will be flying at is 40,000 feet. One is to get
above the cloud cover, if you have a cloud cover scenario; and
at 40,000 feet you are going to be assured that 99 percent of
the time you will be above any cloud that might be in the air.
Mr. Hefner. Let me interrupt you. Because I am assuming
that we are going to know where these missiles are.
General Lyles. Roughly, yes, sir.
Mr. Hefner. They are going to be targeted. The point I am
getting at is, how quickly? Because you are going to know the
very instant that they are launched. You have to have some
evidence that they are launched. How long would it take it to
respond to the launch to be able to use the laser to destroy
them?
General Lyles. Without getting into specific classified
information, it is roughly less than a minute. And we will be
able to, with our satellite sensors, to detect when they are
launched, to cue the airborne laser platform so we can slew. Or
if it is flying to one specific direction, slew the actual
turret with the laser on it to point it in that specific
direction and literally be able to fire the laser when the
missile breaks through the cloud cover at 40,000 feet.
Once we do that, we will lase the target, lase the missile.
Again, the specific number and how long in seconds it will do
to take lasing to actually destroy it is classified. But I can
tell you it is less than 10 seconds.
Mr. Young. Will the gentleman yield?
Is that real or is that theory?
General Lyles. I consider that to be very real, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Hefner. What amazes me is do you consider whenthe
missile is launched, or whatever the term is used, to be in the launch
mode. Will the Navy be able to intercept a missile in its ascent stage?
General Lyles. Ascent, yes, sir.
BOOST PHASE INTERCEPT
Mr. Hefner. That is in the launch stage?
General Lyles. Ascent is while it is still in the upper
part of its trajectory.
Mr. Hefner. The laser, the way I understand it, you are
going to hit him before he really got a good head of steam up.
General Lyles. Yes. As a matter of fact, one of the
specific kill mechanisms, Congressman, the reason we call it a
boost phase, a booster engine for the SCUD or whatever the
target might be is still being fired, it is still in that boost
phase. That is critical. Because during that phase is when the
tank of the SCUD is still pressurized, and it is that
pressurization plus the lasing that actually causes the
failure.
Mr. Hefner. And your platform would be in a position where
you could use the laser within 10 seconds?
General Lyles. Between the time we detect the actual launch
and the time it breaks through the cloud cover or against
roughly 40,000 feet, we should be able to slew the turret on
the nose of the airborne laser to point in the direction and
aim to be ready to fire.
Mr. Hefner. Well, I like the concept and I like your
optimism. And it makes a lot of sense to people especially if
they were carrying chemical warheads and it blows up it is
going to blow up in their backyard. And I understand that. I
just am a little bit concerned. Mr. Dicks talked about the cost
and we don't really have anything we can get our teeth into
that we have had some real successes. And we have been burned
on this Committee on some things that we stuck a lot of money
in and we made excuses for them. You know, it is like the folks
that are responsible for a program and, when it fails, somebody
else says, I remember this program. It wasn't my program.
I hope that you are right. Because we spent a lot of money
on this program and lot of time and we don't have anything that
we can go out to the public and tell them, these are the
successes we have in the past programs.
Of course, not a lot of folks understand it. I don't really
understand it. But I am leaving after this year, so I will be
one of the critical people that are complaining about you
spending so much money on something that doesn't work.
General Lyles. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hefner. But I am a little bit concerned about it, and I
hope it is not one of those that we can look back on and say,
there is another Sergeant York or, in my opinion, the B-1
bomber, which in my view was a total disaster even though we
don't want to admit it.
I wish you well, and you certainly seem to know exactly
what you are talking about, and that gives me some confidence
also. It is good to have you and your supporting staff here
with us today.
I have no further questions.
SUPPLEMENTAL MISSILE DEFENSE FUNDING
Mr. Young. Mr. Hefner, thank you very much, sir.
General, Congressman Weldon is proposing legislation that
would authorize the appropriation of an additional $147 million
for fiscal year 1999. You are familiar with that legislation?
General Lyles. Yes, sir, I am, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Give us your reaction to that proposal and what
you think it would do to your programs.
General Lyles. Mr. Chairman, as you know, that proposed
legislation came out of the emerging medium range threat that
we think is being developed in Iran, specifically the Shahab-3
missile, which will have a range of about 1,300 kilometers. The
concern is that that system could come into the inventory for
the Iranians a lot quicker than our original intelligence
estimate.
By the way, I think the director of CIA in testimony to the
Congress last month sort of reaffirmed reassessment of when
that threat might materialize. The concern is that it might
hold our allies, our forces hostage and vulnerable to having
that capability. The interest was to see if there are things
that we need to do now to ensure that we can protect ourselves
from that vulnerability.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, our upper tier programs,
particularly the Navy Upper Tier, were designed or are designed
to go against a medium range and long range threat.
Technically, the lower tier programs, PAC-3 and the Navy system
we are going to be fielding in the next couple years were not
designed to go against that caliber a threat.
I will come back to that comment in just a second.
But the proposed legislation was to see if there were some
things that we can do smartly today, starting this year, to
give us the capability to address that medium range threat and
to minimize the window of vulnerability until we get our upper
tier systems. We laid out and have provided recommendations
back to Congressman Weldon for a list of things that can be
done.
I will point to something I am interested in in my prepared
text. The number one thing in the list was interoperability. As
I mentioned to Congressman Cunningham, we get much more
protection by making sure all of our systems work together; and
there are some smart things that we can do today to make sure
our systems are interoperable, the current systems we are going
to have in our inventory.
Another part of the recommendation, going back to
Congressman Weldon to address the medium range threat, was
something that I think is very important. None of our systems
were designed with a clear cutoff in terms of their capability.
We did not just design PAC-3 or the Navy lower tier to cut off
at a certain range, and we think they actually do have
capability against that medium range threat.
To prove that, however, we need to do some flight tests. So
we recommended some testing that would be done in the next
couple years specifically where we can actually fire a PAC-3,
fire a Navy lower tier against a surrogate medium range threat
to see if we do actually have capability against that threat.
And I think we are going to find that we do.
If that is the case, that minimizes that window of
vulnerability until we get the PAC, the Navy upper tier
inventory. There are some other things we put in the
legislation to help address that.
Mr. Young. What is your position or the administration's
position on the Weldon proposal?
General Lyles. We provided the information to Congressman
Weldon with a letter signed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense
specifically addressing the things that we would recommend
being funded. The statement and theletter signed by Dr. Hamre,
by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, said that some of the things that
are in that package are so smart for us to do that if there is no
supplemental, which I think is what Congressman Weldon's objective is,
we will have to look closely to see how we reallocate or carve out of
our existing programs and existing budgets some way to address some of
the items.
Mr. Young. Are we talking about, basically, the same amount
of money?
General Lyles. Because it would be an impact to our current
programs, all the programs I just outlined to you, Mr.
Chairman, I don't think that, if there is no supplemental,
there is no way that we can smartly, without impacting one or
the other efforts, we can address a total reallocation for all
of the things.
We certainly would look at doing the testing against a
surrogate threat, because I think that is smart to do. And
interoperability is something that is part of our basic system
anyway, as I just mentioned to you, and that sort of smart
reallocation, we certainly will take that on.
Mr. Young. I mentioned earlier that we were pleased with
the President's budget submission for this year, but we were
concerned about the outyears. Now, in the Weldon legislation
what kind of outyear cost would there be that his legislation
doesn't address?
General Lyles. In the ground rules in the package that we
submitted and provided to Congressman Weldon, we state very
clear, we looked at specifically those things that helped us to
address this window of vulnerability and this medium range
threat, but we also looked at those things that could be
executed in fiscal year 1998, things that had outyear tails.
We actually did not provide the input and recommendation
back to Congressman Weldon. We did provide to him some
description of other things that we are continuing to look at,
a lot of which have outyear tails, but our specific
recommendations were things that could be executed in fiscal
year 1998 without any tails.
Mr. Young. I have some rather technical questions on this
very same subject, and I would like to submit those to you and
ask if you would respond to them.
General Lyles. Yes, sir, very happy to.
Mr. Young. Mr. Dicks.
MISSILE THREAT
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Iranians are engaged in a crash program to field two
medium range missiles, Shahab-3 and Shahab-4, within 1 to 2
years. The missiles will have enough range to hit targets
throughout the Middle East, and a longer range version will
eventually be able to target Europe. Now, will this capability
on PAC-3, this enhanced capability, be able to deal with that?
General Lyles. Congressman Dicks, as I just mentioned, the
Shahab-3 is the one that is an immediate concern, because that
is the one that may be in the inventory, at least to some
limited extent, within the next 2 years or so. With the Shahab-
3, one of the reasons we want to test PAC-3 against a surrogate
medium range threat is to see if we actually can't counter that
threat with the PAC-3. I think our analysis shows we can do
some countering.
Mr. Dicks. Will Europe have any capacity to meet the
Shahab-3 and 4 threat?
General Lyles. The Shahab-3, Europe will have some capacity
to meet it.
If you were to look at a different area photograph for the
country of Israel, Arrow was designed to go primarily against
shorter range threats than that medium range. What this does,
having a longer range system like Shahab-3, it decreases the
footprint of coverage for Arrow; and, hence, there is an
interest on the part of the Israelis to acquire additional
Arrow batteries to provide or get back some of the coverage
that they might lose against that particular threat.
ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE (ABM) TREATY
Mr. Dicks. All right. Let me go back to another subject
here.
At the Helsinki Summit in March, 1997, President Clinton
and President Yeltsin reaffirmed their commitment to the ABM
Treaty. They issued a joint statement that said, ``We will not
deploy theater ballistic missile systems that pose a threat to
strategic nuclear forces on the other side or test theater
ballistic missiles systems against strategic targets.''
General Lyles, which BMD systems have been judged to be ABM
Treaty compliant?
General Lyles. Congressman Dicks, all of our current
theater programs we are embarking on have been judged to be
compliant by the Compliance Review Group (CRG), the current
programs.
Mr. Dicks. What about the airborne laser?
General Lyles. Airborne laser has not been subject to the
formal CRG evaluation. I think that is scheduled to take
place--when I say, CRG compliance, that is the group that looks
into the Treaty. I think airborne laser is scheduled to have
its assessment by the CRG within the next 2 years.
Mr. Dicks. And, of course, the space-based interceptor,
that would have definite ABM problems; is that right?
General Lyles. That definitely will have to be looked at.
The current program, research program, technology program that
we have for space-based laser is research only. I think it was
stated as a result of the Helsinki agreement that we can do
research, and that is all we are doing currently.
Mr. Dicks. Under the demarcation agreement, will the Navy
upper tier program pose a problem under the ABM agreement?
General Lyles. Under demarcation, no, sir. It fits within
the demarcation agreements coming out of Helsinki.
Mr. Dicks. What is your strategy? I mean, in other words,
at some point are you assuming, as the program manager here,
that at some point we are going to have to make adjustments in
the ABM agreement in order to field a national missile defense
system? Or can we do one that is Treaty compliant?
General Lyles. Congressman Dicks, I will state, just like
Dr. Perry did when he first announced 2 years ago almost
exactly, our national defense program. The research and
development aspect of this program will be done in a treaty-
compliant manner. When it comes time to deploy the system, we
will have to go back and relook at the Treaty; and we may have
to make some adjustments to the Treaty.
The issue of deployment and where we actually deploy again
is going to be dependent on where the threat arises. But we
recognize, as stated literally 2 years ago by Dr. Perry, that
when we get to a deployment decision we will have to address
the Treaty.
MEDIUM EXTENDED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM
Mr. Dicks. Let's go to MEADS again. You know, I can
remember General Meade telling me, when Corps SAM was the issue
for the Army, having a mobile air defense system that could
deploy with Army units is a very important issue. And then
Corps SAM went away, and now we have MEADS as an international
program. But, again, we are winding up not funding it in the
outyears. Now, what happens to the Army?
General Lyles. Congressman, the requirement for MEADS has
been restated as being very strong by both the Army and the
Marine Corps.
Mr. Dicks. But there is no money in the budget for it.
General Lyles. Yes, sir. They are looking towards me to
provide the funding.
The issue we have, again, is one of affordability for all
of our missile defense programs and how to fit MEADS into the
budget, in addition to doing things like accelerating maybe the
upper tier, etc. So we are trying to address this.
Mr. Dicks. But let me get this right now. What does the
Army have today for a mobile air defense system?
General Lyles. Obviously, Patriot and THAAD are mobile, but
they are not the kind of maneuverability that MEADS would be to
move with the maneuvering force that we move with the troops.
So from the standpoint of a Corps SAM capability, other than
the air defense systems that we have, the shorter range air
defense systems, we don't have anything like a MEADS or a Corps
SAM.
Mr. Dicks. So our position is we don't have the money to
fund this. It seems to me that that is as important as some of
these other issues, but it isn't getting the priority. I mean,
the Army continues to have all these deployments, and it seems
to me you have got to have some capability to protect these
deploying forces.
Now, you know, obviously PAC-3 is a fixed system. It is a
point defense system. But if you are moving those forces you
are not going to have anything that goes with it. And somehow
that seems to me, if we are talking about doing things as
supplementals, that ought to be one that we ought to consider.
Are any of the Army people here prepared to talk about this?
General Lyles. I can ask General Montgomery to give his
comments.
Let me preface it by telling you we are taking that
requirement very seriously. We are examining not only budget
considerations and alternatives and options we have available
to us to be able to fund it but also architectural examples. We
want to stick with a MEADS program per se because of the
international cooperation of Germany and Italy. That is very,
very important to all of us for a lot of different reasons.
Mr. Dicks. How do they feel about us not having the----
General Lyles. They are very concerned, Congressman. I just
came back from a trip to Europe to visit Italy, visit Germany
and to talk with their military leaders. They are very, very
concerned about it, and we clearly understand the concern in
that regard. But I want you to know that we are not just
sitting back and just ignoring the issue. We are looking at
alternative architectures in addition to additional funding
structures.
Mr. Dicks. You know what Jerry McGuire would say, ``Show me
the money.''
General Lyles. If you would like, I can ask General
Montgomery to give his comments.
General Montgomery. Sir, I would only echo what General
Lyles said. The Army is very concerned about this mission area
and desperately needs this capability to protect the forces as
they move to contact. Germany and Italy also share a very dire
need for this kind of capability, as do nations around the
world. So we are pushing very hard to get this capability
developed and fielded to protect our troops.
The Army looks at this as an OSD bill to be paid not out of
their budget but out of the OSD budget because of the way we
are structured for development of air missile defense programs.
So they are very interested in it and pushing hard for funding.
We are going through a front end assessment with the Program
Analysis and Evaluation folks at OSD, and the Army is playing a
very active role in trying to get that done.
Mr. Dicks. How much money are we talking about?
General Montgomery. Sir, we have structured this program
now through three other nations to hold the cost over the POM
years for the United States to a billion dollars. So it starts
at about $160 million in the year 2000 and never gets above
about $230 million as we get out to 2005. And then we will have
another 2 years to finish development, with the first unit
equipped in 2007.
The other nations have agreed to that, that we are looking
for a 2005 fielding date. Because of funding constraints and
because of just the development cycle, both Germany and Italy
have signed up now for us to go out to 2007. But we need about
a billion dollars in the POM years to do this program because
it is a full of development of a complete new system.
Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Dicks. And I would like to follow
up on the subject Mr. Dicks has opened here. I remember, and I
am sure Mr. Dicks does, years ago we were dealing with Sergeant
York for the same program to defend ground troops from aerial
attacks. What did we then go on to?
General Montgomery. ADATS, air defense anti-tank system.
Mr. Young. Why can't we do this?
General Lyles. Mr. Chairman, I am a little bit familiar
with that program, and I know some problems of it. I think the
mission can be done, and I am very confident that we can define
the MEADS program, that it is going to be very successful from
a technical standpoint. There is no reason why we can't do it
and provide that kind of capability.
Let me come back to Congressman Dicks' question. General
Montgomery just mentioned that we are trying to find a billion
dollars in this POM cycle. To give you an example of the kind
of restructuring alternatives we are looking at, originally we
were trying to find $2 billion to stick with the original plan
for MEADS. We already have restructured and looked at options
and gotten it down to a program that will be a billion dollars
for us plus a billion dollars for our partners. So we are doing
everything we can to look at the alternatives and also look at
funding alternatives, and we will be seriously addressing this
in the POM.
As late as last night, I talked to some German officials on
this subject, so we know the issues and sensitivities andwe
also know this is an issue we will have to address.
Mr. Young. I appreciate that. I think those troops that are
out there on the front lines deserve this kind of protection.
As long as we can control the air and keep the missiles down,
that is one thing. But we just never know when that situation
might be different. So I encourage you to do whatever you can
to protect the troops.
General Lyles. Yes, sir.
Mr. Young. Mr. Skeen.
GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM
Mr. Skeen. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Just one question I would like to ask; and that is, we are
dependent on the GPS systems and satellites for a lot of this
work. But how safe are we from having those knocked out? I know
that the Russians had some ability some time back because they
practiced on shooting stuff at satellites.
General Lyles. Congressman Skeen, it is sort of an anti-
satellite capability. Something that might be worked on would
be primarily associated with lower attitude systems.
The systems that we heavily depend on for navigation, like
GPS, and certainly for surveillance and warning, like GSP and
SBIRS, Space-Based Infrared System, in the future are at much
higher altitudes. And I personally, since I have a space
background, am not concerned about dealing with that kind of
threat at all.
Mr. Skeen. Are you pretty confident that the system will
take care of itself?
General Lyles. Yes, sir.
Mr. Skeen. Thank you very much.
Mr. Young. Mr. Hefner.
AIRBORNE LASER PROGRAM
Mr. Hefner. First of all, I have seen a lot of weapons
systems come through. I remember in this Committee when we
would go to markup when Silvio Conte was here, and Tip O'Neill
was speaker, and we put a lot of AWACS in. They said, the
Speaker has got to have so many Patriot missiles. It was a dog
around here for a lot of years, and we never became a hero
until the Persian Gulf, and I don't know how successful it was
there.
But here is the point: I worry more about terrorists with
small weapons and chemical weapons to be able to pollute our
water systems and what have you. But we have a problem around
the world not knowing from one year to the next who our friends
are.
I remember back when Saddam was kicking the hell out of
Iran some of our Senators went to Iraq and said, he is not a
bad guy, and told him, you just need some PR work. You need
better PR. So, you know, we have got a potential for a
situation in Iran and in Iraq and all over those countries.
On the laser, what sticks in my mind, you have to have a
platform for the laser. What is the platform? A 747?
General Lyles. A 747-400.
Mr. Hefner. It is a great airplane to ride on. I don't know
about carrying a laser. The 10 seconds, the response on launch,
I can't comprehend that close a reaction time. How close does
the platform have to be to the target for the laser to be
effective?
General Lyles. Again, I apologize, Congressman. The actual
number capability we think we can get from airborne laser is
classified. I would be very happy to come back and give you
that. We are talking about hundreds of kilometers in terms of
its capabilities.
Mr. Hefner. I don't want you to give me that. Like the guy
said, don't tell me nothing you don't want told.
Mr. Young. He is not going to.
Mr. Hefner. No, seriously.
Mr. Dicks. It can do multiple shots, too. It can do one
right after another.
Mr. Hefner. I understand that, Norm. It is not something
you have to put a new battery in. But, still, you have got to
be within striking range to be effective if you are going to do
it on enemy launch; and that is the ultimate way to do it. But
it seems to me the lower tiers would be a bit more tight.
But to say that you can react in less than 30 seconds to me
is mind-boggling. I hope that you can. And I feel sure that on
paper and in the laboratory that it works. But on paper in the
laboratory, Sergeant York worked. Maybe it had to have a set of
charge in it to blow it up before we could have a successful
test.
So I guess I am getting old and cynical. But I don't want
to be spending my Social Security money on something that is
not going to work.
General Lyles. Congressman, I would love to come sit down
with you, with the Air Force, and lay out the specific time
lines and what we think the concept are. But one thing I think
is also very smart, the way the program has been laid out, it
has specific milestones to allow us to exit, I can use that
terminology, if certain things don't prove out. Like the flight
weight laser, that is a specific major milestone to see if we
can actually get a powerful laser and a small enough weight
that you can put it on that platform.
There are some major test events over the next couple years
to demonstrate we can do step by step each one of those
capabilities. It is not like we are going off and developing
and building this system without clearly identifying the risks,
deducing and solving the risks and doing all those step by step
before we proceed with the program.
Mr. Hefner. The thing that troubles me is your time level.
I remember when we had the argument about silos and then we had
the sophisticated weapons with the little mini-missiles that
would go up and blow them up on ascent. And, on that, if you
harm the silos, then my question was, how do you know that you
won't cover up the silos? We went to California, to observe,
and they had one that would come up 16 feet. I said, that is
good if the debris don't go over 16 feet. But there are a lot
of things that come up that really bother me just from a common
sense standpoint. I don't understand all the technology.
General Lyles. I am, again, familiar with all of those
concerns and risks and would love to have the opportunity to
sit with you.
Mr. Hefner. Well, maybe with the Chairman's indulgence he
can set a time when we could have a closed hearing and let them
come and brief us on all this stuff. Because I don't want to
know this by myself.
General Lyles. Yes, sir, the Air Force would love to do
that. I am here as an advocate because the capability is
greatly needed, and we will gladly ask the Air Force to come
and do that.
Mr. Hefner. I don't have that authority.
Mr. Young. Mr. Hefner, I would like to tell you that we
have actually been trying to work out an arrangement where the
Members could travel to the area and actually get on-site
demonstrations and a classified briefing. We have been trying
to work out a time when folks were available to do that.
But I agree. I have a very strong interest in this as well.
I asked the General, was it real or a theory, and he said he
thought it was pretty real.
General Lyles. Mr. Chairman, if I could amplify your
comment. If you ever take that trip to Kirtland Air Force base
in Albuquerque and see the Starfire optical range and see the
technology that exists, you will understand why it is real
rather than just theory.
Mr. Young. We are working in that direction.
Mr. Hefner. We are so busy around here this year, we may
not have time to do that.
General Lyles. Yes, sir.
Mr. Young. General, thank you very much for an excellent
hearing. We appreciate you and your knowledge of the issues
that you deal with and your forthrightness and your responses
to our questions. We appreciate it, and we look forward to
working with you to make all these good things happen.
The Committee will adjourn now until 1:30 this afternoon,
when we will be in closed session with Admiral Prueher and
Commander of the U.S. Forces Korea, General Tilelli.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the
answers thereto follow:]
Fiscal Year 1999 Budget Request
Question. General Lyles, the fiscal year 1999 budget request of
$3.6 billion is significantly higher than the 1998 budget request of
$2.9 billion. Moreover, it appears that most of the core programs are
fully funded. However, while the near term funding appears to be
sufficient, the out year funding drops considerably. General Lyles, are
you concerned about being able to support the core BMD programs in the
future?
Answer. Although the recent fiscal guidance issued by the
Department has elevated fiscal year 2004/2005 funding to the $3.0
billion level in each year, correcting the downward trend in BMD
funding, I am still concerned. All of the core programs are in the
research and development phase and, by implication, involve some degree
of technical, schedule and cost risk. We are trying to integrate
technologies, systems and subsystems that have never been integrated
before, and make them work under very stressing conditions. However,
that is the principal reason why my organization exists: to resolve
those problems within the context of total BMD requirements, and to
make the trade-offs within and across programs so that fielded BMD
capability is optimized. I have instituted cost control measures within
all programs, emphasized using Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV)
to ``scrub'' all requirements and continue to examine overhead-type
areas to minimize the costs of doing business. I have re-focused our
modest technology program so that it better supports the core TMD
programs and NMD in lowering costs and risks, and have involved the
military services in our technology planning in order to leverage work
done elsewhere.
Question. Is the out year funding in the budget sufficient to
support each of the core program? If not, what is your estimate of the
shortfall?
Answer. At the present, funding is adequate to support current
departmental guidance for each program. However, I must point out that
current departmental fiscal guidance does not include resources for the
MEADS program beyond the current phase, NMD deployment, or the Navy
Theater-Wide program after the ALI demonstration is completed (planned
for fiscal year 2001).
Question. What would the impact be to the core missile defense
programs if out year funding is not adequate? Will there be further
delays in program? Will there be increased risk?
Answer. As I stated earlier, to address budget shortfalls I will
conduct the necessary cost/performance trade studies with a view toward
fielding the best BMD capability at the earliest possible date. I
cannot provide specific impacts without knowing the size of the
shortfall. Additionally, since requirements and threats tend to evolve
over time, any answer I give you today in response to a hypothetical
shortfall situation could easily be different given a different set of
realities even in the near future. However, in conducting these trades,
I attempt to minimize increases in risk. Based on the size of the
potential shortfall, I would rather tend to allow modest schedule slips
or reduce inventories in one or more programs. Of course, large budget
shortfalls may have to be addressed with significant program re-
structuring, up to and including, the cancellation of one or more
programs. Additionally, it should be understood that the Department has
assigned three primary missions: TMD; NMD; and advanced technology to
support these two mission areas. And, as part of the annual DOD
planning and programming cycle, the Department provides specific
guidance relative to each mission area. It is then my job to allocate
funds to comply with this guidance and to sustain each mission area in
the most effective and efficient manner. Therefore, when conducting
trades to address a budget shortfall, I am constrained both by specific
departmental guidance and by my charter responsibilities to sustain the
three mission areas.
Question. In your view, does the budget contain a sufficient level
of funding to continue to develop the core Theater Ballistic Missile
Defense programs?
Answer. Yes, with regard to PAC-3, THAAD and Navy Area. However,
BMDO funding for the Navy Theater Wide (NTW) program is sufficient only
to conclude the ALI demonstration in fiscal year 2001. Funding for NTW
beyond fiscal year 2001 is not adequate for engineering and
manufacturing development at an efficient pace. I must stress this
funding posture is fully consistent with the latest DOD guidance for
the NTW program. However, I anticipate that the funding status of this
program will be re-visited by the Department over the next several
planning cycles, and especially after the ALI demonstration in fiscal
year 2001.
Question. In your view, does the budget contain a sufficient level
of funding to continue to deploy the core Theater Ballistic Missile
Defense (TBMD) programs?
Answer. Yes. However, deployment funding for our last mature TBMD
program, Navy Theater Wide, is not required until beyond the
President's Budget planning window, under the current program schedule.
Question. Is the funding in the budget sufficient to continue to
develop the National Missile Defense (NMD) program?
Answer. Yes, the funding in the budget is sufficient to continue to
develop the NMD program.
Question. Is the funding in the budget sufficient to continue to
deploy the National Missile Defense (NMD) program?
Answer. No. As the Committee is aware, the Quadrennial Defense
Review provided an additional $2 billion over the fiscal years. These
funds are adequate for conducting development and testing activities
and for demonstrating technical feasibility to support a deployment
decision as early as fiscal year 2000.
Question. The budget request for Technology is 40% less than the
1998 appropriated amount. What is the reason for this reduction?
Answer. In fiscal year 98 Congress authorized and appropriations
$425 million (less Congressional reductions) for advanced technology,
$156 million over the President's Budget Request. Specifically, Spaced-
Based Laser (SBL), Advanced Interceptor Technology (AIT), and other key
technologies were ``plussed up.'' The fiscal year 99 budget request,
roughly 40% less than the fiscal year 98 appropriated budget, largely
returns to the Department's planned budget level.
In response to Congressional interests in accelerating the
development of the SBL technologies through a readiness demonstration
program, both BMDO and the Air Force made a good faith effort to
increase program resources through the Department's POM process. Other
Defense program funding needs superseded this BMD funding issue.
Together, BMDO and the Air Force internally realigned approximately $65
million for SBL in fiscal year 1999, raising the combined budget
request to about $94 million. Similarly, BMDO increased resources for
the AIT program. BMDO, via the Technology Master Plan, is in the
process of assessing its overall technology program priorities and
matching them with the budget projections.
Question. Do you have sufficient resources to continue advanced
technology programs? If not, what is the impact of inadequate funding
for technology?
Answer. The Department's guidance for missile defense consistently
has been prioritized as: fielding highly effective TMD systems,
developing an NMD deployment option, and conducting an advanced
technology program. Nonetheless, as my testimony outlines, I have
specifically identified our advanced technology program as an area
where the Department and Congress must work together to maintain a
strong foundation in order to ensure our ``seed corn'' for the future
is adequately supported. That is why I have embarked on initiatives to
ensure we: first, involve the Services more closely in our technology
efforts to share resources and increase our ability to leverage off one
another's investments; and secondly, develop a Technology Master Plan
which will literally establish a ``roadmap'' for our technology base
program. The Technology Master Plan is the guiding document that will
help us plan and execute a coherent missile defense advanced technology
program that reduces risk, improves system performance and
affordability, and keeps pace with the threat. Ultimately, I would like
to increase our investment in our technology base from roughly 8
percent of the budget to about 12 percent. However, given the
importance of fielding effective TMD systems and increasing our NMD
efforts, this may not be feasible within our overall fiscal guidance.
Hence, I want to ensure we work with Congress to arrive at an
investment strategy that has the single, important goal of providing
maximum effectiveness for each defense dollar spent. We must ensure a
strong, effective and stable technology program which is responsive to
the needs of the joint BMD program, the Services, and the Nation.
Question. The budget request for Navy Upper Tier is $190 milliom--
54% less than the 1998 appropriated amount. Why is the budget request
$219 million less than the 1998 appropriated level? Is there adequate
support within the Pentagon for this program? Is this simply a matter
of resources or are there policy issues that are impeding this program?
Answer. The additional capability that Navy Theater Wide (NTW) adds
to the Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) Family of Systems is
well recognized and supported by the Department. There are tough
decisions that must be made given Departmental resource constraints.
The resources dedicated to NTW are a function of priorities established
by the Department. NTW is a lower priority than the lower tier programs
or THAAD, the more mature upper tier program. The fiscal year 1999
budget request of $190 million is sufficient to continue the flight
demonstration program associated with the NTW risk reduction efforts.
Navy Area Program (Lower Tier)
Question. The Navy Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (or Navy
Lower Tier) system detects, tracks and engages short and medium range
theater ballistic missiles. The system uses a modified Standard Missile
and an improved SPY-1 radar. In January 1997, the Navy Lower Tier
successfully intercepted a Lance Missile--fulfilling its requirements
for entry into the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD)
phase of acquisition (Milestone II).
The budget request for fiscal year 1999 is $289.1 million, $16
million less than the 1998 appropriation. The Navy plans to develop a
User Operational Evaluation System (UOES) capability by the year 2000.
The UOES capability will equip 2 Aegis ships with 35 missiles.
The First Unit Equipped (FUE) or capability delivered to the
warfighter is planned for 2002. The total acquisition cost of the
weapon system is estimated to be $6.2 billion. A total number of 1500
missiles are to be procured and 57 Aegis destroyers and 22 Aegis
cruisers are to be equipped between 1998 and 2011 with theater
ballistic missile defense capability.
General Lyles, when this Committee met two years ago to discuss
BMDO programs, the Navy Lower Tier program was experiencing serious
delays and setbacks. However, with the successful intercept of a Lance
target last year, the program has entered into the Engineering and
Manufacturing Development phase or ``Milestone II.'' What key events
are you planning for the remainder of fiscal years 1998 and 1999?
Answer. For fiscal year 1998, engineering efforts are underway at
AEGIS and STANDARD missile government and contractor facilities to
prepare for upcoming events. Preparations, including missile build-up
and test for developmental and operational assessment flight tests (DT/
OA) at White Sands Missile Range, NM (WSMR) next year are on track.
Upgrades to support the User Operational Evaluation System (UOES)/
LINEBACKER commence this summer with computer program installation and
crew training aboard USS Lake Erie (CG 70) and USS Port Royal (CG 73).
The Critical Design Review for the tactical AEGIS Weapon System
computer program is also scheduled for Summer 1998.
The Navy is currently conducting arena and sled track lethality
tests as part the program's Live Fire Test and Evaluation program.
These events will continue into fiscal year 1999.
The Navy Lower Tier program is on schedule to begin it's first
series of EMD flight tests starting in fiscal year 99. These tests,
scheduled to start in February 1999, will be conducted at the WSMR. The
initial flight in this series, coupled with lethality results and
significant system engineering efforts, will support Low Rate Initial
Production (LRIP) Long-Lead Material decision planned in Spring 1999.
Question. When do you plan to conduct further flight testing? Will
that be in fiscal year 1999? What are the objectives of those tests? Do
you believe that the schedule permits a sufficient number of tests to
ensure that Navy Lower Tier will be effective and technically sound
before the system enters production?
Answer. EMD flight tests are scheduled to begin in fiscal year 99.
The objectives of these initial developmental tests are to demonstrate
the accuracy of the interceptor's guidance system, to demonstrate a
missile-to-target intercept for the Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) mission and
the Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) mission, and to gather
data from actual flight events to validate missile performance
predictions based on modeling and simulation. Further flight testing
will continue during the DT/OT phase in fiscal year 2001.
Although the testing schedule is aggressive, we believe that there
are sufficient tests planned to ensure that the system is sound and
effective prior to committing the program to production.
Question. What developmental test and evaluation activities have
been conducted or planned?
Answer. Prior to the Milestone II decision in February 1997, a
series of risk reduction activities was conducted. The purpose of these
activities was to reduce the risk in the areas of AEGIS TBM detecting,
tracking, and control, IR guidance, and blast fragment warhead
lethality. In addition to the intercept of the Lance target in January
1997, the AEGIS Extended Tracking and Control Exercise and various
lethality sled and arena tests were conducted.
Extensive developmental testing is planned during the Engineering
and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase of the program. This includes
various ground tests prior to land based and at sea flight tests.
Ground testing of the missile and it's components include IR seeker
component testing on sled tracks and in wind tunnels, forward-looking-
fuze dynamic testing, and hardware-in-the-loop (HWIL) testing of
missile components and all-up-rounds. The AEGIS computer program will
also undergo extensive testing at the Combat System Engineering
Development Site (CSEDS), which includes HWIL testing with an Inert
Operational Missile (IOM). This ground testing will lead to initial
Developmental Testing (DT) at WSMR from the Navy's Desert Ship
beginning in fiscal year 99 and the at-sea DT from an AEGIS cruiser in
fiscal year 2001 prior to Operational Testing (OT).
Question. When do you plan to conduct operational test and
evaluation work?
Answer. OT&E activities, in the traditional sense, are scheduled to
begin in Winter 2001. In addition, there are plans to conduct interim
operational assessments of the UOES/LINEBACKER system and of WSMR
developmental test results prior to the LRIP decision.
Question. What activities will be conducted on the ground to ensure
that Navy Lower Tier does not run into the same type of testing
difficulties experienced by the Theater High Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD) program?
Answer. The Navy Area program is currently conducting extensive
ground-based test activities to reduce the risks of flight test
failure. These ground test activities include: warhead lethality arena
and sled track tests, IR seeker component wind tunnel and sled track
testing, forward looking fuze dynamic testing, computer-in-the-loop
(CIL) and hardware-in-the-loop (HWIL) testing, as well as extensive
modeling and simulation activities, culminating in all-up-round level
integration testing prior to flight testing. Extensive developmental
testing is planned during the Engineering and Manufacturing Development
(EMD) phase of the program. This includes various ground tests prior to
land based and at sea flight tests. Ground testing of the missile and
it's components include IR seeker component testing on sled tracks and
in wind tunnels, forward-looking-fuze dynamic testing, and hardware-in-
the-loop (HWIL) testing of missile components and all-up-rounds. The
AEGIS computer program will also undergo extensive testing at the
Combat System Engineering Development Site (CSEDS), which includes HWIL
testing with an Inert Operational Missile (IOM). This ground testing
will lead to initial Developmental Testing (DT) at WSMR from the Navy's
Desert Ship beginning in fiscal year 99 and the at-sea DT from an AEGIS
cruiser in fiscal year 2001 prior to Operational Testing (OT).
We have proactively examined THAAD lessons learned to try to
further reduce risk in our test program. As such, we have expanded the
WSMR testing schedule to accommodate additional ground based hardware
and one additional flight test.
Question. What are your current estimates as to when a User
Operational Evaluation System (UOES) will be deployed?
Answer. There are no plans to ``deploy'' a UOES capability. UOES
would only be deployed if its capability is required by the warfighter.
UOES is primarily for early user involvement and is not intended to
provide an operational capability. The UOES/Linebacker, if its
capability is required in a national emergency, could be deployed in
the second quarter of fiscal year 2000.
Question. How many AEGIS Cruisers (CG-47) and Guided Missile
Destroyers (DDG-51) will be equipped for the UOES system? How many
missiles will be procured for the UOES system?
Answer. Two AEGIS cruisers will be equipped with UOES/LINEBACKER
computer program and equipment; 35 SM-2 Block IVA missiles will be
procured. There are currently no plans to place the UOES capability on
destroyers.
Question. In total, how many ships does the Navy plan to equip with
theater missile defense capability? How many missiles does the Navy
plan to buy?
Answer. There will be 79 total Cruisers and Destroyers equipped
with the lower-tier capability. 1,500 SM-2 Block IVA missiles will be
procured during production.
Question. The President's Budget also projects that the First Unit
Equipped (FUE) for Navy Lower Tier will be in 2002. Are you fairly
confident with this projected date?
Answer. We are confident that the FUE for the Navy Area Theater
Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) System will be fiscal year 2002.
Question. Do you have any unfunded requirements?
Answer. No. BMDO is funded to meet its current requirements in the
Future Years Defense Program. From time to time, program developments
(schedule slips, changed requirements, cost growths) may require
budgeting adjustments. However, these are handled using normal
management processes, such as instituting cost control measures within
all programs, emphasizing using cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV)
to ``scrub'' all requirements, and continuing to examine overhead-type
areas to minimize the costs of doing business. I have re-focused our
modest technology program so that it better supports the core TMD
programs and NMD in lowering costs and risks, and have involved the
military services in our technology planning in order to leverage work
done elsewhere.
Question. Have you had any cost overruns? If so, what is the amount
of the overrun? What was the reason for the cost overrun?
Answer. The Navy Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defense program is
executing within cost projections.
Navy Area Program--GAO Concerns Regarding Schedule
Question. In November 1997, the GAO issued a report, ``Ballistic
Missile Defense: Improvements needed in Navy Area Acquisition
Planning.''
The GAO expressed concern that the Navy plans to begin Low Rate
Initial Production (LRIP) of the missiles in June of 2000, 5 months
prior to the date that development and operational tests are scheduled
to begin. The GAO stated: ``Scheduling low-rate initial production
concurrent with testing increases risk. . .if problems are uncovered
during the test phase, the program may need to acquire additional
hardware and incur design costs . . . Unless the acquisition plan and/
or the testing schedule is revised, the Navy will not have reasonable
assurance that the system will adequately perform before the Navy
commits itself to the production of the Block IVA interceptor
missiles.''
The GAO recently recommended that the Navy revise its testing
schedule to reduce the risks associated with concurrent production and
testing of the Navy Lower Tier program. What is your view regarding the
GAO report?
Answer. BMDO supports the Department's non concurrence with the
GAO's recommendations. The GAO is concerned that the Navy will not have
accumulated enough data to make the production decision and that no
independent assessment of the system's capabilities will have been
made. Low-rate initial production (LRIP) long-lead material purchase,
LRIP fabrication and Full Rate Production (FRP) are individual events
with their own distinct set of exit criteria. The LRIP fabrication
decision will require the program to go before the Defense Acquisition
Board (DAB). The Ballistic Missile Defense Acquisition Executive's
(BMDAE) approval to proceed in accordance with requirements. The GAO
recommendation to delay the Navy Area TBMD program's plan to acquire
185 LRIP missiles until after D/OT&E certifies that the missile has the
potential to meet its key performance requirements (KPR) is
unwarranted. Postponing the acquisition of these missiles is contrary
to the purpose of LRIP as stated in title 10 United States Code 2399
(10 U.S.C. 2399) and DoD 5000.2-R. The statute authorizes the
acquisition of LRIP quantities sufficient to provide production-
representative articles required for operational tests, establish the
initial production base for the system, and permit an orderly increase
in production rate.
Question. Is the Navy Lower Tier program schedule optimistic?
Answer. There have been concerns in the Department that the
program's schedule is overly optimistic due to planned test phases
appearing compressed. BMDO has been working closely with the Navy Area
Program Manager on understanding the implications and risks inherent in
the current schedule. The Program Manager has briefed BMDO on his
assessment and evaluation of the Navy Area program's schedule. The
schedule is evaluated to be in the moderate risk category. Absent
unforeseen difficulties, BMDO is confident there is sufficient time and
funding in the current program plan to execute all required phases.
Question. Should the testing schedule for Navy Lower Tier be
revised to reduce the risk of producing missiles before the Navy knows
if they will function correctly?
Answer. The Navy Area Program Manager is currently refining the
White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) Development Test/Operational
Assessment (DT/OA) test plan to include additional risk reduction
ground testing and an additional flight test. This refinement is a
direct result of applying lessons learned from the THAAD program. BMDO
agrees with the GAO that some amount of operational field testing be
conducted prior to committing to production and this concern is
reflected in the program's testing plans. After WSMR DT/OA in fiscal
year 2000, the Navy will conduct an at-sea demonstration and evaluation
of the UOES/LINEBACKER. An AEGIS cruiser, outfitted with the UOES/
LINEBACKER AEGIS Weapon System TBMD computer programs and equipment,
Block IVA missiles, and the Command and Control (C2) capability, will
be evaluated against threat-representative targets. An operational
assessment, based on this at-sea demonstration, will be made by DOT&E
and Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force (COMOPTEVFOR). In
BMDO's view, this level of testing is more than adequate to retire
concerns that the program is prematurely embarking on production before
some level of operational testing is conducted.
Question. What are the financial risks of having already entered
into initial production, if developmental and operational testing shows
the missile to be deficient? Will there be additional costs to the
program? If so, would those costs be substantial?
Answer. The financial risk associated with entering into low-rate
production before completion of development/operational testing (DT/OT)
is minimal. During EMD testing at WSMR in fiscal year 99-00, the
functionality of the missile round will be proven. One of the
objectives of the EMD phase is to translate the most promising design
approach into a stable, producible, supportable, and cost effective
design. We believe our current plan does this and minimizes the
probability of missile production cost problems arising in the OT
phase. Less than 15% of the low rate production (LRIP) missiles will
begin fabrication prior to operational testing by COMOPTEVFOR in the
first quater, fiscal year 01, and none are planned to begin fabrication
prior to the UOES/LINEBACKER at-sea demonstration and evaluation. The
current plan is for 32 of the 35 UOES/LINEBACKER missiles to be the
same configuration as the LRIP rounds (the first three rounds will be
delivered with a different IR seeker miscroprocessor). No other
differences are planned. However, if test results indicate the need for
modifications, these modifications would be included in the LRIP
production line. This plan will minimize the number of missiles that
may need modification, and missile modification costs should be
significantly less than the cost of shutting down and then restarting
the SM-2 missile production line. This acquisition strategy balances
the key program performance, cost, and schedule risks.
Question. What are the schedule risks of having already entered
into initial production, if development and operational testing shows
the missile to be deficient? Will there be substantial delays in the
program? If so, would those delays be significant?
Answer. The schedule risk associated with entering into low-rate
production before completion of developmental/operational testing is
minimal. During EMD testing at WSMR in fiscal year 99-00, the
functionality of the missile round will be proven. One of the
objectives of the EMD phase is to translate the most promising design
approach into a stable, producible, supportable, and cost effective
design. We believe our current plan does this and minimizes the
probability of missile production schedule problems arising in the OT
phase. Less than 15% of the LRIP missile will begin fabrication prior
to operational testing by COMOPTEVFOR in the first quarter, fiscal year
01, and none are planned to begin fabrication prior to the UOES/
LINEBACKER at-sea demonstration and evaluation. The current plan is for
32 of the 35 UOES/LINEBACKER missiles to be the same configuration as
the LRIP rounds (the first three rounds will be delivered with a
different IR seeker microprocessor). No other differences are planned.
However, if test results indicate the need for modifications, these
modif8iation would be included in the LRIP production line. This plan
will minimize the number of missile that may need modification, and
missile modification costs should be significantly less than the cost
of shutting down and then restarting the SM-2 missile production line.
This acquisition strategy balances the key program performance, cost,
and schedule risks.
Question. Do you believe the potential gain is worth the associated
risks of the ambitious schedule? Are there ways to mitigate the risk of
such a strategy? Would this require additional resources? If so, how
much and during which fiscal year?
Answer. Yes, I do. Since the August 1994 DAB meeting, the Navy has
executed a very deliberate plan to mitigate and reduce the risk
inherent in a program with concurrency and a pressing national need to
accelerate at every opportunity. The Navy Area program has conducted
numerous events that have proven the SPY-1 radar can track a Theater
Ballistic Missile (TBM). The risk reduction events that the Navy Area
program used to track a TBM were conducted using patch software to the
SPY-1 radar system. Two events successfully demonstrated that the AEGIS
system can be modified to fulfill the TBM defense mission. The design
used in the patch software will be used to support development of the
Linebacker tactical builds.
Risk in the interceptor has been steadily mitigated through the
Risk Reduction flight test program, hardware-in-the-loop testing, wind
tunnel testing of the IR dome and components, and a rigorous lethality
testing regimen. During EMD testing at WSMR, the functionality of the
missile round will be proven. The uplink messages from Desert Ship that
control the missile in flight are identical to those from the AEGIS
ship. AEGIS Weapon System (AWS) and SM 2 Block IVA round integration
will be conducted at the Combat System Engineering Development (CSED)
site (just as have all AEGIS missiles before the Block IVA).
Navy Area Program--Funding for Modifications to AEGIS Cruisers and
Destroyers
Questions. The Navy Lower Tier system is comprised of a modified
Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) capable Navy Standard Missile
(SM-2 Block IV) and an improved SYP-1 radar. The BMDO budget includes
funds to upgrade five Aegis ships to provide TBMD capability.
However, the Navy's budget includes only part of the funding
required to equip all of its new DDG-51 Aegis destroyers with theater
ballistic missile defense capability.
How much funding is included in the BMDO budget to upgrade AEGIS
cruiser and destroyers for theater ballistic missile defense?
Answer. A total of 79 cruisers and destroyers will be upgraded to
the Navy Area capability. A total 49 of these ships are funded in the
current President's Budget (PB), fiscal year 99-03. The remaining 30
ships are funded beyond fiscal year 03. Hardware/software delivery and
installation follows the funding by approximately three years. The
upgrade to four shore centers is also funded.
fiscal year $M
1998.......................................................... 15.058
1999.......................................................... 43.318
2000.......................................................... 60.313
2001.......................................................... 72.390
2002.......................................................... 60.214
2003.......................................................... 56.221
Question. How many ships will receive theater ballistic missile
defense capability in fiscal year 1999?
Answer. None. Our current estimate for declaring UOES/LINEBACKER is
the 2nd quarter of fiscal year 2000.
Question. Does the Navy's fiscal year 1999 budget include funding
to modify or equip AEGIS destroyer and/or cruisers with theater
ballistic missile capabilities? How many ships will be modified? Over
what time period?
Answer. Yes, PB-99 increased OPN and SCN accounts to equip DDG-51
class destroyers and CG-47 class cruisers and Navy Area TBMD
capability. The OPN funding will be used to incorporate TBMD capability
on two CGs and four DDGs (DDGs 81-84 during the Post Delivery
timeframe). The SCN funding will be used to incorporate Navy Area TBMD
capability on three DDGs (DDGs 93-95) which are to be appropriated in
fiscal year 99 as part of the multi-year procurement contract. These
ships will be delivered to the Navy in the fiscal year 04 timeframe.
Question. Does the Navy's fiscal year 1999 budget include enough
funding to modify or equip its new DDG-51 AEGIS destroyers with theater
ballistic missile capabilities? If not, why not?
Answer. Yes, all destroyers funded in fiscal year 99 will be
equipped with Navy Area TBMD capability.
Question. Do you believe that the Navy is fully committed to the
Navy Lower Tier program?
Answer. Navy and BMDO are working closely to ensure a successful
Navy Area (Lower Tier) program.
Question. Does the Navy agree with the First Unit Equipped (FUE)
date of 2002?
Answer. Yes, the Navy agrees with the BMDO threshold FUE date of
December 2001 (fiscal year 02).
Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3)
Question. The Patriot Advance Capability (PAC-3) missile defense
system is comprised of four basic elements: a radar, an engagement
control station, a launching station and interceptors. PAC-3 will
engage and destroy short and medium range theater ballistic missile and
cruise missile within the atmosphere.
Development is progressing in stages: configuration 1 upgrades the
guidance system; configuration 2 enhances the radar; configuration 3
includes the PAC-3 hit-to-kill missile (formerly known as Extended
Range Interceptor, ERINT). The budget request for 1999 is $480.5
million, about $75 million less than the 1998 appropriation.
The First Unit Equipped (FUE) or capability delivered to the
warfighter is planned for the fourth quarter of 1999. The total
acquisition cost of the weapon system is estimated to be $6.4 billion.
A total number of 1200 missiles and 54 Fire Units are to be procured.
The Army conducted two successful non-intercept tests of the PAC-3
missile last year. (A September test assessed the missile's flight
functions and another in December tested the systems in-flight
communications ability). Intercept tests will be conducted later this
spring and the program will enter into Low Rate Initial Production
(LRIP) in the third quarter. The first intercept test of the PAC-3
missile was schedule for second quarter 98 but slipped to the third
quarter.
The PAC-3 missile defense system is being developed incrementally.
General Lyles, will you please explain the differences between the
various development stages and configurations?
Answer. Based on the lessons learned from Operations Desert Shield
and Desert Storm, the Army initiated a new development program to
improve the PATRIOT system's performance. This new development program
planned to extend the PATRIOT unit's battlespace while enhancing its
lethality against TBMs. The first improvements were part of the Quick
Response Program (QRP). The QRP improvements were near-term upgrades
fielded in 1992-1993 to the PAC-2 system that: (1) provided for rapid,
accurate fire unit emplacement through the use of the Global
Positioning System and a North Finding Seeker; (2) improved the
defended area of the fire unit by enabling missile launchers to be
emplaced up to 10 km from the ground radar set; and (3) provided ground
radar enhancements that improved TBM detection and increase system
survivability.
More substantial improvements to the PAC-2/QRP system were
initiated under the new PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) program.
To more rapidly field improvements and modifications to the PATRIOT
system as they were developed, the PAC-3 program was separated into
three separate configurations. The Configuration 1 upgrade consisted
primarily of hardware installed to support future growth of the PATRIOT
system. System throughput, memory, and reliability, maintainability,
and availability were all increased. BMDO also funded procurement of
the Guidance Enhanced Missile (GEM) as a part of this configuration.
The GEM incorporated engineering changes to the PAC-2 missile to
improve its performance against high speed TBMs. All of these
modifications have completed development and were fielded starting in
1995, with the last of the 10 U.S. PATRIOT Battalions modified in the
Spring of 1997.
Configuration 2 consist primarily of software upgrades to achieve
improved capabilities using the hardware improvements fielded with
Configuration 1. The principal improvement was to radar performance in
detection, identification, and discrimination. In addition,
communications hardware was improved to enable PATRIOT to interface
with joint networks. Development on this upgrade is also completed and
the First Unit Equipped occurred December 1996. Fielding to the eighth
US battalion was recently completed, with the remainder receiving the
modifications in 1998.
Configuration 3 modifications include: (1) the new PAC-3 hit-to-
kill missile which provides improved lethality against TBMs; (2)
improved defended area of the fire unit by emplacing missile launchers
up to 30 kms from the ground radar set; (3) Classification,
Discrimination, and Identification Phase III modifications to improve
identification, classification, and discrimination of TBMs; (4)
improvements to the ground radar that significantly increase its
average power and detection range while at the same time increasing its
reliability; (5) communications upgrade that provides Joint Tactical
Information Distribution System (JTIDS) terminals at the Fire Unit
level; and (6) PDB-5 (Post Deployment Build) software upgrades which
will maximize the capabilities of the previous improvements to the
PATRIOT system. These upgrades are currently in either engineering and
manufacturing development or production.
Question. What systems do we currently have fielded? What equipment
is in the Gulf?
Answer. All U.S. PATRIOT Battalions are equipped with Configuration
1. Eight of the ten U.S. PATRIOT Battalions have received the
Configuration 2 upgrades, with the remainder receiving the
modifications through 1998. All of the PATRIOT batteries located in
Southwest Asia have the Configuration 2 system.
Question. What are the specific improvements associated with these
modifications? Do the improvements make the system more accurate or
more lethal?
Answer. Configuration 1 modifications consisted primarily of
hardware improvements which include: the Guidance Enhanced Missile
(GEM), a new pulse doppler signal processor for the ground radar, and
new processing and data storage upgrades to the Expanded Weapons
Control Computer (EWCC). The new EWCC provides four times the
throughput of the prior WCC and eight times the memory. This expansion
in memory is critical to allow PATRIOT the ability to continue to grow
in its performance capabilities with advanced software techniques since
the current WCC could not support any substantial increase in lines of
software code. The new pulse Doppler processor improves the ground
radar dwell time for the pulse doppler waveforms and improves the
performance of the radar against targets in cluter. The GEM missile
provides improved system effectiveness and lethality against high speed
TBMs and reduced radar cross section (RCS) air breathing targets
(ABTs).
Configuration 2 modifications consisted primarily of software
upgrades that leverage the hardware improvements installed in
Configuration 1. The Configuration 2 improvements include:
communications upgrades through the use of the Joint Tactical
Information Distribution System (JTIDS) terminals at the Battalion
level for interfacing on the Joint Data Net; (2) ground radar
enhancements that improve detection of lower radar cross section (RCS)
targets at a greater distance; (3) an improved defensive capability
against Anti Radiation Missiles; (4) provides for the first phase of
Classification, Discrimination, and Identification (CDI), an upgrade
which correlates target tracks received from external sources to a fire
units tracks generated by the ground radar; and (5) PDB-4 software,
which maximizes the capability of all previous hardware improvements
and additionally has TBM message alert capability. These upgrades have
completed operational testing and the first tactical unit was fielded
with these improvements in December 1996. All of the PATRIOT batteries
located in Southwest Asia have the Configuration 2 system. The
Configuration 2 improvements increase a firing unit's defended
battlespace against TBMs by a factor of eight compared to PATRIOT's
capability during the Gulf War and with 50% greater lethality.
Question. There has been some debate about the actual effectiveness
of the upgrades made to enhance the PATRIOT missile system in the
absence of the new hit-to-kill missile (e.g. radar and guidance
improvements). Do you believe the upgrades are effective in the absence
of the new missile? Will the upgraded system perform adequately in the
Gulf should we find ourselves in another conflict?
Answer. The Configuration 2 upgrades currently in the hands of our
soldier provide a greatly improved capability over what we possessed
during the Gulf War. The GEM missile provides improved lethality over
the PAC-2 missile. Every GEM flight test met or exceeded expectations.
The Configuration 2 improvements increase the battlespace defended by a
PATRIOT firing unit by a factor of eight over its Gulf War counterpart.
In addition, we are now capable of engaging longer range threats than
we could in the Gulf War. These improvements are significant and we are
confident that the PATRIOT configuration in the field today can defeat
the current threats in the Middle East.
Question. How will the addition of the PAC 3 hit-to-kill missile
enhance the system? What about that missile's lethality?
Answer. The PAC-3 missile provides PATRIOT with a hit-to-kill
capability. We need this capability in order to effectively counter
threats of weapons of mass destruction. The PAC-3 missile provides a
leap ahead in lethality compared to our current interceptors. The PAC-3
missile builds on the success of the ERINT missile demonstration and
validation program which demonstrated that hit-to-kill is achievable,
and assessed and reduced the risks associated with integrating the
missile into the PATRIOT system. Hit-to-kill relies on body-to-body
contact to generate high destructive energy against the target. Flight
tests, sled tests, and flight validated simulations showed that this
missile provides greatly improved lethality over the PAC-2 missile
against more stressing TBMs and air breathing targets.
Question. What will the advantages of the PAC-3 configuration 3 be
compared with the current PATRIOT system?
Answer. The most significant advantage of the PAC-3 Configuration 3
modifications is the combined effects of improvements to the ground
systems coupled with the new hit-to-kill PAC-3 missile. The
Configuration 3 system can detect a target at a greater range, better
identify what type of target it is and have a missile inventory that
has a higher probability of defeating the target. Furthermore, the PAC-
3 missile has a significant capability against more stressing target
warheads, such as those containing chemical submunitions. The
Configuration 3 system will have an eight fold increase in defended
area and a 100% increase in lethality against stressing warheads,
relative to the Configuration 2 system.
Question. The Army conducted two tests last fall of the PAC-3
missile. What were the results of those tests? Did the PAC-3 system
meet all the objectives of the tests? What have we learned?
Answer. The two flight tests conducted last fall did not involve
intercepts of targets; rather, the primary objectives were to evaluate
missile flyout functions flight worthiness, and integration of the
missile with the ground system. The first developmental test flight
(DT-1) of a PAC-3 missile was successfully conducted at White Sands
Missile Range, NM, on September 29, 1997. The only objective not
completed was the exercise of the missile communications uplinks and
downlinks due to a ground support system anomaly. The cause of this
anomaly was identified and resolved prior to the second developmental
test flight (DT-2) which was successfully conducted on December 15,
1997. A key objective in this test was a maximum duration flight for
the missile. The missile successfully flew for the expected period of
time, and all uplinks and downlinks were performed. The only anomaly
noted during the second test flight was the failure of the missile's
tactical self-destruct mechanism. The cause of this anomaly and its
solution have been identified. The missile met all of the objectives
desired and provided valuable data on the missile and ground system
performance. A significant finding was that the system simulations run
prior to each flight test accurately predicted the actual flight
profile. The validation and verification of these models and
simulations is critical to completing the development of the PAC-3
system.
Question. How many flight tests will be conducted with the PAC-3
missile before the system goes into initial production?
Answer. Three tests, firing a total of three PAC-3 missiles, will
be conducted prior to a milestone decision to approve the start of low
rate initial production. Two of these tests have been successfully
completed. The final test will be an intercept mission.
Question. When will the PAC-3 system with the hit-to-kill missile
be fielded?
Answer. The PAC-3 first unit equipped (FUE) date is planned for
late 1999.
Question. What is the total acquisition cost of the PAC-3?
Answer. $6,156 in TY$M is the total acquisition cost of the PAC-3.
Question. Do you have unfunded requirements in the PAC-3 program?
Answer. No. BMDO has programmed funds to meet current PAC-3
requirements in the FYDP. From time to time, unforeseen program
developments (schedule slips, changed requirements, cost growths) may
require budgeting adjustments. However, these are handled using normal
management processes.
Question. Have you had any cost overruns in the PAC-3 program? If
so, what is the amount and the reason for the overrun?
Answer. Based on the likely schedule change in the first intercept
mission to 4Q fiscal year 98, and a rescheduling of subsequent flight
tests, there has been growth in the RDT&E requirements. While there are
no major technical design problems, there are numerous first time
integration efforts that are requiring more time to resolve than
initially forecasted. A baseline review of the program schedule and
costs with the missile development contract was conducted in February
1998. The Department is working to request Congressional reprogramming
in fiscal year 98, along with changes in the fiscal year 99
appropriation to realign funds from missile procurement to RDT&E. This
realignment will address the cost growth expected in the missile
development contract. The realignment also shifts Low Rate Initial
Production (LRIP) missile procurement funding in fiscal year 98 and
fiscal year 99 which may be unexecutable based on delays in the LRIP
contract award. These LRIP contract awards cannot be in place until an
intercept flight has been successfully conducted.
Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
Question. The Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile
defense system provides protection against short and long range theater
ballistic missiles by intercepting them both in and out of the
atmosphere (endo and exoatmosphere). THAAD consists of four components:
truck mounted launchers, interceptors, a radar, and battle management,
command, control and communications (BM/C3I) systems.
The THAAD program is in its fourth year of demonstration and
validation. To date, seven flight tests have been conducted. The first
three were to test the propulsion, controls and the seeker. The fourth
and following flight tests were to intercept a target. Each of the four
intercept tests failed.
Subsequent to the fourth test, the program was reviewed and
restructured. The new plan, called ``2 plus 4,'' revised the testing
schedule to allow for two tests to be conducted in the first quarter of
fiscal year 1998. However, the first of those two flights has been
delayed until the third quarter of 1998 due to continuing technical
problems.
The budget request for 1999 is $821.6 million, $415.5 million more
than the 1998 appropriation. The present acquisition plan calls for the
procurement of a User Operational Evaluation System (UOES) or initial
capability--consisting of 40 missiles by the year 2001. The First Unit
Equipped (FUE) has been delayed by two years and is now scheduled for
the year 2006 versus 2004. The total estimated acquisition cost is $15
billion. The total number of missiles to be procured is 1233.
General Lyles, as we all know, the THAAD missile system has
experienced a series of failures which have caused cost increases and
long delays. Last year's failure was extremely disappointing because it
was the fourth consecutive failure and the missile has not flown in a
year. We know that a complete review of the program was conducted in
the aftermath of that failure. What have you learned about that test
and other test failures as a result of your independent studies?
Answer. With specific regard to THAAD's last flight test, the root
cause for the failure was determined to be contamination on the divert
and attitude control system (DACS) battery shorting plug. This
contamination prevented the DACS motors from operating properly, which
in turn prevented the kill vehicle from effecting the maneuvers
necessary to intercept the target. More broadly, though, DMDO and the
Army have worked very hard to document lessons learned as part of the
THAAD flight test program in order to benefit our other--both TMD and
NMD--development efforts. These lessons offer program management as
well as technical/engineering guidance to our contractor and Government
organizations alike. Documentation of these lessons is an ongoing
process, but allow me to provide a brief review of some of our
observations and the insights we have gained.
Though flight testing is often the focus of government, contractor,
and media attention, a rigorous ground test program is the most
critical pillar supporting the eventual successful transition to the
missile range. Prior to flight testing, critical components should be
tested to failure, where possible, to assess reliability and to define
the physical limits of selected parts, components, and subsystems. In
addition, full-up qualification tests and post-test teardown and
analysis of critical components should be conducted. Problems uncovered
during ground testing should be fixed and flight test vehicles properly
instrumented to verify fixes and better understand flight environments.
Once flight testing is underway, it is critical that the flight
test schedule allow for adequate preflight checkout/testing and post
flight data analysis; hardware-in-the-loop testing is an essential
element of preflight testing. Configuration changes should be minimized
where possible; excessive configuration changes from flight test to
flight test increase the risk of failure and make reliability
assessments extremely difficult. Finally, product assurance and
configuration management require interest/attention and visibility at
senior levels. It is especially important that product assurance
requirements and procedures flow down to subcontractors.
Question. Is the THAAD program still considered to be technically
sound? What exactly caused the problem in that last test flight? What
components worked? What components did not work? Do you expect to have
similar problems in the future or have you solved the problem?
Answer. The target launch and trajectory for the mission were
nominal. The THAAD radar acquired the target in its primary search and
the battle manager calculated an engagement solution. The interceptor
launch, energy management maneuver, flare deployment, booster and
shroud separation, and seeker operations were all nominal. Though the
avionics computer issued commands to the divert and attitude control
system (DACS) in response to in-flight-target updates from the radar,
the DACS motors did not operate properly. As a result, the kill vehicle
could not make the flight path corrections necessary to intercept the
target. The problem with the DACS was traced to a contaminated shorting
plug. Corrective actions have been implemented to preclude experiencing
this failure again.
Question. Subsequent to the fourth test, the program was reviewed
and restructured. The new plan, called ``2 plus 4'', revised the
testing schedule to allow for two tests to be conducted in the first
quarter of fiscal year 1998. However, the first of those two flights
has just recently been delayed again, until the third quarter of 1998,
due to continuing technical problems. Why has this test once again been
delayed? What is causing the problem? Are the delays due to serious
technical issues?
Answer. First, allow me to clarify that the ``2+4'' test plan does
not refer to the timeframe for conducting the remaining PD&RR flight
tests. Instead, it refers to the number of tests using each of the 2
THAAD Kill Vehicle (KV) configurations. Of the remaining 6 tests, the
first two (flights 8 and 9) will involve the baseline KV design that
has flown on the previous flight tests. The final 4 tests will test the
Block Upgrade (BUG) configuration, which incorporates some design
changes to enhance the producibility of the UOES missile without making
any fundamental functional changes to the kill vehicle.
Following the FT-07 failure, I chartered an independent review team
(IRT) to assess both the overall THAAD system concept and the missile
design. Lockheed Martin began implementing the recommendations of the
IRT in May 1997 to improve our understanding of system reliability and
reduce flight test risk. The changes included a complete review of the
acceptance test procedures and environmental test screening processes,
incorporation of a complete kill vehicle vibration test, and increased
test screening at both the Courtland, Alabama missile assembly facility
and White Sands Missile Range (WSMR). The delays to the flight test
program reflect the more thorough, more disciplined preflight checkout
tests and processes. The two most recent problems deal with the
communications transponder and the thrust vector control system. I
would characterize these issues as significant, however they do not
preclude the success of the next flight test. All technical issues are
being addressed appropriately to ensure the highest probability of
success. THAAD is an event-driven program and will only fly when ready.
Question. What do you intend to do to ensure that the next test
will be successful?
Answer. Following the FT-07 failure, the Missile Assessment Team
(MAT) I chartered as part of the IRT noted above thoroughly reviewed
the missile design margins and contractor test procedures and quality
assurance practices. The MAT did confirm that the overall missile
design is sound, although they made a number of recommendations to
reduce the flight test risk.
LMMS began implementing the recommendations of the MAT in May 1997
to improve system reliability and reduce flight test risk. The changes
included a complete review of the acceptance test procedures and
environmental test screening processes, incorporation of a complete
kill vehicle vibration test, and increased test screening at both
Courtland and WSMR. The chairman of the MAT now chairs the Project
Manager's independent readiness review team, which will monitor
implementation of the MAT recommendations and conduct a risk assessment
to support the executive readiness reviews prior to flight.
Question. In 1996, the President's Budget proposed to severely cut
funding for the THAAD program and to delay its deployment until 2006.
General O'Neill testified at that time that the THAAD program could be
deployed sooner if the proper resources were committed. He also said
that the delay was due solely to budget cuts, not to technical
problems. It was on that basis that this Committee decided to restore
funds to the program. General Lyles, do you believe General O'Neill was
mistaken? Why weren't these technical problems--or at least the
substantial risks involved--anticipated?
Answer. I don't believe Lieutenant General O'Neill was mistaken.
The 1997 President's Budget reduced the THAAD program by $2.1 billion
in the FYDP years and slipped the program's First Unit Equipped (FUE)
date four years from fiscal year 02 to fiscal year 06. At that point in
the program, we had conducted just two flight test intercept attempts
and had not benefited from the two subsequent years of additional
program development and flight test experience. Accordingly, our view
of the program today is not what it was in 1996. We believe the program
is now adequately funded, could not be accelerated without incurring
unacceptably high risk, and that the current program reflects a
moderate risk approach to achieving the FUE in fiscal year 06.
With respect to your question on risk, I think we have always
acknowledged that there was, and is, a significant technical challenge
associated with the THAAD program development. The warfighter's urgency
of need of an upper-tier theater missile defense capability, however,
drove the Department to accept a development schedule that was assessed
and recognized in the program's Milestone I Acquisition Memorandum as
being ``high risk.''
Question. Do you believe the THAAD program has been too aggressive
in terms of schedule and resources? Did the Administration's decision
in 1996 (President's Budget 97) to cut the program back and the
subsequent reversal of that decision have an effect on the program? Did
the lack of a stable funding profile disrupt the careful management of
the program?
Answer. As planned for in 1991, the original THAAD program was
directed toward achieving a First Unit Equipped (FUE) in fiscal year
02. In hindsight, given our experience with flight test failures, it's
apparent that a FUE in fiscal year 02 was probably too aggressive in
both schedule and resources. We have to remember, however, that urgency
of need was and continues to be a paramount concern in the development
of this program.
I believe the THAAD program that we have today, which achieves an
FUE in fiscal year 06, does reflect a moderate risk approach to the
development of the THAAD system. Since 1996, the Department has
implemented three restructures of the THAAD program. I would, in fact,
characterize these restructures as having a disrupting impact on the
program, but principally in terms of the Government and prime
contractor management attention and resources required to revise and
implement new program plans.
I do not believe, that either of those restructures have
contributed to the lack of flight test success to date. The program's
failure to achieve an intercept has been principally related to
problems with implementation of sound and rigorous systems engineering
and quality control processes. Working closely with the prime
contractor over the past year, we've accomplished a great deal in
improving and adding discipline to these processes--I'm optimistic that
they will contribute to a flight test success this year.
Question. Should the Congress continue to aggressively fund this
program? Or should we reevaluate this program given its recent
technical problems?
Answer. We have an urgent need for the development and fielding of
an upper-tier system to address the threat that THAAD is designed to
defeat. Irrespective of how the THAAD program proceeds, the threat will
remain and so we must continue to develop a capability to counter that
threat. We are currently funding the THAAD development at an
appropriate level and we have no plans to terminate the program. Should
the program fail to achieve an intercept on its next flight test, then
the Department may need to reassess the THAAD program development and
determine whether there are alternative acquisition strategies for
meeting the mission need.
Question. Do you believe in the technical viability of the current
missile design?
Answer. The problems THAAD has experienced in its attempts to
achieve a hit-to-kill intercept have, in general, involved missile
reliability and system engineering and are not indicative of a
fundamental design flaw. Following FT-07, I chartered an Independent
Review Team (IRT) to assess the missile critical functions and design
margins, as well as review the concept for the overall system design.
Though the review made a number of recommendations to improve system
reliability and to reduce flight test risk, the IRT concluded that the
THAAD system concept and missile design are sound.
Question. Did your review include a look at other potential
contractors? Is it a mistake to put all your ``eggs in one basket''?
Answer. Since the competitive award of the PD&RR contract, the
Department has never initiated any formal assessment of potential
contractors, outside of the prime, for the THAAD development. To date,
the radar, launcher, and battle management segments have all performed
superbly during flight testing. Should the missile continue to
demonstrate problems in flight testing, however, seeking a new source
for the missile development is one of several possible alternative
acquisition strategies for the program.
Question. Apparently, some of the problems in THAAD were related to
issues of quality control. Do you believe contractor is now applying
enough rigor to reviewing its THAAD program?
Answer. While Lockheed Martin Missiles and Space (LMMS) has
admittedly had problems in quality control, the problems being
discovered now are a result of an increased emphasis on quality
control/product assurance and more rigorous pre-flight ground testing.
Following the FT-07 failure, LMMS implemented recommendations from the
government Project Office and an independent missile assessment team
that included a complete reassessment of the acceptance test procedures
and the environmental stress screening of the missile components. As a
result of this process, LMMS increased the ground test shock and
vibration testing for several components to more thoroughly test the
packages. This increased discipline and more rigorous approach to
ground testing has significantly increased confidence in the
contractor's overall quality control and flight test preparation
processes going into the next test.
Question. Given the urgent requirement for an upper tier missile
defense system and the problems that THAAD is now experiencing, do you
think we should seek alternative systems?
Answer. Based on the independent Government review I've discussed,
we have assessed the THAAD system concept as being sound for meeting
the requirement for an upper-tier TMD system. As I have indicated in
prior responses, the THAAD radar, battle management, and launcher
segments have all performed well throughout the flight test program.
The failures of the missile have been principally related to the rigor
with which systems engineering and quality control processes have been
applied. Since the last flight test, the Government and the prime
contractor have worked intensively to improve upon these processes.
Coupled with an enhanced flight test readiness process, we are
optimistic that an intercept will be achieved in flight testing this
year. Given this outlook, we believe the THAAD system represents the
most viable, near-term solution toward acquiring an upper-tier TMD
capability.
THAAD User Operational Evaluation System
Question. The present acquisition plan calls for the procurement of
a User Operational Evaluation System (UOES) or initial capability--
consisting of 40 missiles by the year 2001. The General Accounting
Office (GAO) and the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation
(DOT&E) and other have raised concerns about the use of just one
successful test as the criteria for the UOES award.
The Milestone II (Engineering and Manufacturing Development)
criterion requires three body-to-body intercepts.
What was the impact of the last flight test failure in terms of
schedule? When will the User Operational Evaluation System (UOES) be
deployed?
Answer. The failure to achieve an intercept last March caused the
program to breach a number of schedule milestones which led the
Department to assess and subsequently implement a restructure of the
program. This restructure slipped the program schedule for achieving
FUE by two years from fiscal year 04 to fiscal year 06.
As you are aware, the execution of the UOES option is contingent
upon achieving a successful intercept in flight testing. With the next
flight test scheduled for the third quarter of this fiscal year, we
project an initial capability (defined by the warfighter as two radars,
two battle management units, four launchers and twelve missiles) by the
end of fiscal year 00 with final deliveries of missiles in fiscal year
01.
Question. Last year, the General Accounting Office (GAO) issued a
report criticizing the plan to exercise a contract option for the 40
User Operational Evaluation (UOES) missiles upon one successful
intercept test. Do you think that GAO's overall concerns about
concurrency are valid?
Answer. The Department has come to share some of the concerns noted
by the GAO regarding award of the UOES missile option; however, we have
never agreed that the award should be delayed until completion of the
entire PD&RR flight test program and the Limited User Test (LUT). Award
of the UOES option based on a single intercept does require the
Government to assume increased cost and technical risk. We have always
sought, however, to balance that risk with the warfighter's urgent need
for an upper tier TMD capability. Given that the objective system will
not be available until fiscal year 06, the limited contingency
capability that UOES will provide continues to be an important aspect
of the UOES concept and the program as a whole.
As reflected in the response below, the Department still plans to
award the UOES option with a single intercept. Over the past year,
however, the Department has worked to develop a plan which reduces
technical risk and limits the government cost exposure based on
employing an incremental approach to execution of the UOES contract
option.
Question. Is the Army still planning to commit funds early for the
40 UOES missiles? Have they reconsidered that position because of the
recent technical failures? If no, why not? Is this a safe or prudent
choice? What are you doing to minimize the government's financial risk?
Answer. Per the Milestone I Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM),
2 criteria must be satisfied prior to exercising the contract option
for 40 UOES missiles:
(1) Hardware in the loop demonstration of guidance and
control systems,
(2) One body-to-body intercept using the THAAD radar.
Of these two criteria, a successful body-to-body intercept has not yet
been achieved. It is still the Department of Defense plan to exercise
the missile option following a successful intercept. However, because
each intercept tests failure to date has had a different root cause and
because of differences between the current test configuration and the
UOES missile, there is concern within DoD regarding the risk of buying
40 UOES missiles on the basis of only one intercept. As a result of
these concerns, OSD, BMDO, and the Army have agreed to revise the plan
for exercising the option. Formal contract option initiation is planned
following the first successful intercept, but a phased implementation
strategy that includes two interim progress reviews (IPRs) and a
subassembly review if necessary will be pursued. The first IPR will
follow the completion of FT-08, ground tests on the block upgrade (BUG)
configuration, and a 60-day planning session. This IPR would give
authority for partial contract execution to buy long lead items. A
second IPR will be conducted prior to the full contract execution of
hardware purchases. Finally, a Government subassembly review will be
conducted following FT-10, if necessary, to review plans to complete
assembly of the missiles. This phased approach limits government
financial and technical risk by allowing additional ground testing and
flight testing prior to purchase of all hardware components.
Question. Has the Director for Operational Test and Evaluation,
Philip Coyle, had any difficulty with this plan? Why is he concerned
about it? Does it pose any risk?
Answer. Dr. Coyle and his staff played a key role in developing the
phased approach described above and concurred with the plan's
implementation.
Question. What is the exit criteria for Demonstration and
Validation? Is that one test or more? Why did the Department decide to
insist on three body-to-body intercepts? Do you agree with that
decision?
Answer. The THAAD Milestone II (MSII) exit criteria address the
missile, sensor (radar), and battle management segments, as well as the
producibility of key components. These broad categories have been
broken down further in order to specify more detailed, focused
requirements that must be satisfied prior to the next milestone
decision. This includes demonstration of successful body-to-body
intercepts, missile kinematic flyout and guidance capability, radar
sensitivity, discrimination, and track handling, interoperability, and
lethality. Exit criteria are satisfied based on a combination of flight
test and ground test results and model/simulation-based analyses
conducted over the course of the entire Program Definition and Risk
Reduction (PD&RR) phase. At Milestone I (January 1992), three body-to-
body intercepts were believed sufficient to demonstrate that the THAAD
program had resolved issues associated with an Endoatmospheric/
Exoatmospheric interceptor and integration with the THAAD radar; I
concur with that assessment.
Question. Since the flight testing program has been delayed for
over a year, it is unlikely that the 2004 deployment date can be
achieved. What is your present estimate as to when this system will be
able to be fully deployed?
Answer. The current THAAD program will achieve its First Unit
Equipped (FUE), in fiscal year 06. As I've indicated in a prior
response, the THAAD program was restructured in 1997 to delay the
program FUE by two years from fiscal year 04 to fiscal year 06. Though
flight testing has been delayed by a year, the program is implementing
an EMD risk reduction program to keep the program on track to achieve
its FUE date.
THAAD Substantial Increased Cost
Question. The Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) for June 30, 1997
shows that the current cost estimate for THAAD has increased by $3.4
billion from the baseline estimate. The SAR also shows that $1.4
billion of that increase occurred during the last review period--
between December 1996 and June 1997. What is the specific reason for
the $3.4 billion increase?
Answer. We have in fact incurred significant cost growth in the
THAAD program since the development was initiated in 1991. The original
Research Development, Test, and Engineering (RDT&E) program was
estimated to cost $4.3 billion; that program plan called for a 48 month
Program Definition and Risk Reduction (PD&RR) phase (fiscal year 92-
fiscal year 96), followed by a 60-month Engineering and Manufacturing
Development (EMD) phase and led to declaration of First Unit Equipped
(FUE) in fiscal year 02. I believe this is the SAR estimate to which
you refer. The following table extracted from the June 30, 1997, SAR
provides a breakout of the components of the cost increase:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
fiscal
TY$M year 88
C$M
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Economic........................................ -318.3 ..........
Quantity........................................ .......... ..........
Schedule........................................ 1,278.6 808.9
Engineering..................................... 1,241.6 850.8
Estimating...................................... 1,241.7 874.2
Other........................................... .......... ..........
Support......................................... -4.4 -3.9
-----------------------
Total....................................... 3,439.2 2,530.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since the program's inception, the Department has implemented three
major restructures--a result of both technical problems specific to
THAAD, and competing modernization requirements across DOD programs.
Since June 1997, the total program cost estimate decreased from $7.7
billion to $7.3 billion as cited in the December 1997 SAR and reflects
a development program that continues until fiscal year 07, with FUE
declared at the end of fiscal year 06.
There are a number of major contributors to this cost growth, but
the largest is the flight test failures we have experienced. These
failures led to program delays, contractor cost overruns, and program
restructures. As a result, the program FUE has been delayed 4 years
with an increase in the contract period of performance in both PD&RR
and EMD. Further, the contractor has incurred additional costs as a
result of flight test problems and the need to implement corrective
actions following flight test failures.
Question. How much was due to the delay in the schedule and
additional testing?
Answer. The delay in the schedule caused increase of $808.9 million
(fiscal year 88C$/$1.278 billion (TY$)). The additional PDRR testing
increased costs by $96.0 million (fiscal year 88C$/$128.8 million
(TY$)).
Question. How much was due to cost estimating?
Answer. $874.2 million (fiscal year 88C$)/$1.2417 billion (TY$) was
attributable to cost estimating.
Question. What is being done to keep the cost of the program within
reason?
Answer. The Department is extremely concerned about the cost growth
we've observed to date on the THAAD program. We have prepared and are
forwarding a report to Congress which addresses the initiative the
Department is implementing to control and reduce costs. To briefly
summarize, since last Fall the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
(BMDO) and the Army have been working closely with the contractor to
control costs and identify areas where we can drive down total
acquisition and life cycle costs. Through Integrated Product and
Process Development (IPPD), the Government and the contractor are
assessing for implementation a broad range of initiatives in the area
of cost-performance trades, alternative acquisition strategies contract
management, test and evaluation, and producibility enhancements. We are
intensively working this effort. The technical challenges of the THAAD
program are still significant, however, we believe this work will
ensure that we provide the warfighter with not only a capable system,
but one that is affordable as well.
Navy Theater-Wide (Upper Tier)
Question. The Navy Theater-Wide program will intercept ballistic
missiles in their ascent, mid-course and descent phases. As with the
Lower Tier system, Navy Upper Tier will use the extant capabilities of
the Aegis weapon system. A Standard Missile with a kinetic (hit-to-
kill) vehicle will provide exoatmospheric intercept capability. The
Navy Upper Tier program is a pre-Milestone I program. The Defense
Acquisition Board (DAB) was scheduled to review the program in February
but this has been delayed.
Once the program formally enters into Milestone I, the Program
Definition and Risk Reduction (PDRR) phase, it will begin a series of
ten Aegis LEAP Intercept (ALI) flight tests. The last five of those
tests will be intercept attempts. As currently planned, the budget
provides funding for risk reduction and a Milestone II in 2003. The
budget request for 1999 is $190 million, $219 million less than the
1998 appropriation, and is not sufficient to support a deployment
program.
The Navy Upper Tier system is designed to provide intercept
capability against medium and long-range theater ballistic missiles.
The system has several advantages over current programs insofar as: it
builds upon existing infrastructure; it is highly mobile and can be
rapidly positioned around the world; and it will have the ability to
intercept a target in its ascent phase--greatly limiting potential
damage and increasing the area that is to be defended.
General Lyles, what is the advantage of Navy Upper Tier regarding
its ability to use the existing AEGIS Weapons System? Does this save
time? Does this save money?
Answer. Incorporation of the Lightweight Exoatmospheric Projectile
(LEAP) technology onto an existing AEGIS platform using Standard
Missile will provide both a cost and schedule advantage due to per-
existing infrastructure.
Question. General Lyles, what is the benefit of Navy Upper Tier's
mobility? How will that help the CINCs? What kind of advantage will it
provide in terms of logistics and warfighting capability?
Answer. The Navy's ability to position as needed within
international waters provides significant flexibility to our
warfighters. This is particularly important where Host Nation Support
may be limited. Additionally, because the Navy can self-deploy an
initial in-theater presence, logistical resources can be reallocated to
other non-TBM priorities.
Question. General Lyles, at what point in an incoming missile's
flight does the PAC 3, the Navy Lower Tier, and the THAAD actually
intercept that target? What is the disadvantage of intercepting a
missile in its final or ``terminal'' phase?
Answer. PAC 3, Navy Lower Tier, and THAAD all intercept in the
descent phase of target flight. The earlier a threat can be engaged,
the less likely the defended area will receive collateral damage from
the engagement. The lower-tier systems, PAC-3 and Navy Area TBMD, also
have very limited reaction time available to reengage if necessary.
Question. Will the Navy Upper Tier be capable of intercepting a
target early in its flight--or in its ``ascent'' phase? What is the
advantage of intercepting a missile in its ``ascent'' phase?
Answer. The Navy Upper Tier TBMD System, now known as ``Navy
Theater Wide,'' will be capable of ascent-phase intercept. Ascent phase
is the portion of a missile's flight after booster burnout and before
apogee, the highest point in the ballistic trajectory. The advantage of
ascent phase intercept is that it allows one AEGIS cruiser to defend
many different targets, since hostile missiles are intercepted before
they have proceeded far down range along different tracks toward their
targets. Additionally, the earlier a threat can be engaged, the less
likely the defended area will receive collateral damage from the
engagement.
Question. The budget request for Navy Upper Tier is $190 million,
$219 million less than the 1998 appropriated level. Do you think that
the request is sufficient to continue to develop Navy Upper Tier?
Answer. The fiscal year 99 figure of $190 million is sufficient to
continue development of Flight Demonstration Program associated with
the Navy Theater Wide risk reduction efforts.
Question. Does the President's Budget propose enough funding to
deploy the Navy Upper Tier program?
Answer. The President's Budget will support continued development
of the Navy Theater Wide (NTW) Block I capability, but does not include
funding for deployment. Under the current NTW program schedule,
deployment funding is not required within the current President's
Budget planning window.
Question. General Lyles, the Navy Upper Tier system has been
through five major reviews which have all reaffirmed the requirement
for a Navy Theater Wide system. In addition, the CINCs have repeatedly
testified that theater missile defense is their number one priority.
Why is it then, that the Administration has not requested the necessary
funds to deploy the Navy Upper Tier system?
Answer. The Navy Theater Wide system is the least mature of the
four TBMD Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) under development
at BMDO, including PATRIOT PAC-3, THAAD, and Navy Area TBMD System. In
addition to these MDAPs designed to defend against the Theater
Ballistic Missile threat, BMDO is also spending significant resources
on developing a National Missile Defense System in anticipation of a
future threat. All of these systems rely on a firm foundation of basic
research and technology, also funded by BMDO. NTW will require a long-
term commitment of sufficient dollars after the AEGIS LEAP Intercept
(ALI) demonstration concludes in fiscal year 01. Sufficient funds have
been requested for the ALI demonstration.
Question. How much more funding would be required to actually
deploy Navy Upper Tier?
Answer. A Navy Theater Wide Block I capability can eventually be
deployed under the fiscal year 1999 President's Budget funding profile.
Funding increases required to accelerate deployment are currently being
defined by BMDO and the Navy.
Question. What is the total acquisition cost of Navy Upper Tier?
Answer. Navy Theater Wide acquisition costs have not yet been
finalized. The total acquisition cost of the Navy Theater Wide System
will depend on many factors, including the final date set for a First
Unit Equipped (FUE), and whether or not a decision is made to proceed
with a Block II major system upgrade, the follow-on capability to the
initial Block I capability. A cost estimate for Block I will be
available after the completion of the Independent Cost Estimate and the
Milestone I-equivalent DAB Review later this year.
Question. What are the total number of missiles and ships that
would be equipped with Navy Upper Tier?
Answer. The Navy Theater-Wide Block I capability will consist of an
initial buy of 80 missiles, with four AEGIS cruisers modified to carry
and fire them. If a decision is later made to proceed with a Block II
capability as a major system upgrade, the Navy vision is to convert all
Vertical Launch System (VLS)-equipped AEGIS cruisers to the NTW
standard, with an inventory of several hundred Standard Missile SM-3
Block III missiles.
Navy Theater-Wide--Definition of Program
Question. The Navy Upper Tier is a ``core'' theater missile defense
program. However, it lacked definition until it was designated as a
``Major Defense Acquisition Program'' on September 16, 1997. This
designation should ensure that the program meets normal acquisition
guidelines. However, a Defense Acquisition Board (DAB)--scheduled to
validate the program's acquisition plan--was postponed. Some believe
that the DAB review is critical to ensuring the program's long-term
viability. General Lyles has expressed concern over the direction of
the program and has stated that he believes the program should not
receive funding increases until the Navy strategy is approved by the
DAB.
What is the objective of the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB)
meeting on Navy Upper Tier?
Answer. The purpose of the Milestone I-equivalent DAB for Navy
Theater Wide is to establish the Acquisition Program baseline (APB) for
the program. Major Defense Acquisition Programs such as NTW require an
APB with an approved acquisition strategy and an appropriate portfolio
of approved documentation, to include the Cost Analysis Requirements
Document (CARD), Single Acquisition Management Plan (SAMP), Test and
Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP), and Operational Requirement Document
(ORD). This provides the Department, Administration and Congress the
means to assess cost, schedule and technical performance.
Question. Why was the DAB meeting postponed?
Answer. The Navy Theater Wide DAB originally scheduled for February
was postponed due to a lack of definition in program documentation. The
DAB is likely to be further postponed due to a reassessment of program
testing and risk reduction in light of the recently released Report of
the Panel on Reducing Risk in Ballistic Missile Defense Flight Test
Programs (the ``Welch Report''). The Navy and BMDO wish to ensure that
the testing and evaluation regimen for Navy Theater Wide is
sufficiently robust to prevent unanticipated program delays due to
flight test failures.
Question. Do you think that it is necessary to have a clear plan,
as would be outlined at the DAB, before providing additional funds for
the Navy Upper Tier? Why?
Answer. A well-defined DAB approved acquisition program will
include an approved Acquisition Program Baseline (APB). The only way
that informed decisions may be made as to current status and future
options is from the ``benchmark'' of a well-documented, baselined
program. This is the discipline and rigor that the DAB process
enforces. A successful DAB will give the Navy, BMDO and Congress a
starting point from which to guide the progress of this important
program.
Question. What are the associated risks of not having a clear
acquisition strategy?
Answer. The cost, schedule and technical risks facing an undefined
program can be numerous, and reflects a degree of risk that the
Department seeks to avoid. Systems engineering rigor and financial
discipline cannot be effectively monitored. The pace of vital Risk
Reduction activities cannot be effectively measured, since no firm
strategy will have been outlined and agreed upon in an approved Test
and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP). All planning would be unstable
without a baseline.
Question. What are the technical challenges associated with the
Navy Upper Tier program? Do you think these risks can be overcome?
Answer. The Navy Theater Wide program promises high operational
value but pushes the state of the art. The challenge for the Navy, BMDO
and the testing community is to manage risk through a program of
comprehensive, incremental and sequential simulation and testing. Key
areas of technical risk in this program include:
--Hit-to-Kill intercept. This is the only way to deliver sufficient
energy to kill the entire range of potential NTW targets. Hit-to-Kill
is difficult, though, and has not yet proven reliable.
--Exoatmospheric intercept. The Navy Theater Wide Kinetic Warhead
(the ``LEAP'') must be able to maneuver rapidly in the vacuum of space
and discriminate against multiple objects, ranging from boosters to
debris to celestial bodies. It must pick out the lethal object, and
then maneuver to strike a specific spot on that object to achieve
maximum lethality.
--The AEGIS Weapon System. AEGIS is a superb system, but it was
originally designed to counter the Soviet air threat. That it has
demonstrated an inherent TBMD capability under real world conditions is
a measure of the excellence of the original design. However, in order
to provide robust detection and tracking support for NTW intercepts,
significant modifications must be made to improve the performance of
the SPY radar against the more challenging theater ballistic missiles
now being deployed.
--All of these risks must be successfully retired, and the NTW
Program Office is working to define a robust schedule of Risk Reduction
Activities designed to do so.
Question. What would be required to reduce the risk in this Navy
Upper Tier program?
Answer. Robust risk reduction requires a careful balance of
scientific discipline, adequate funding, and flexible scheduling. As
explained in the recently released ``Report of the Panel on Reducing
Risk in Ballistic Missile Defense Flight Test Programs'' (the ``Welch
Report''), a report commissioned by BMDO and the OSD testing community,
system testing and risk reduction activities must be comprehensive,
incremental, and sequential. There is grave danger inherent in
conducting risk reduction activities ``in parallel,'' hoping that tests
on many different subsystems conducted simultaneously will allow those
subsystems to work together when tested as a complete system.
Additional funding can allow additional risk reduction, but only up to
a point. At some point, tests must proceed sequentially, and that takes
a certain amount of time, both to execute tests and to properly
interpret the data resulting from those tests. That said, however, Navy
Theater Wide has a fairly comprehensive risk reduction program
including:
--The AEGIS Leap Intercept (ALI) program itself is a major risk
reduction activity, seeking to prove the basic hit-to-kill concept upon
which NTW is built, by intercepting a ballistic missile target outside
the earth's atmosphere using the LEAP Kinetic Warhead (KW).
--Vital lethality risk reduction activities include quarter-scale
light gas gun tests of LEAP performance against simulated threat
warheads, and full-scale rocket sled tests starting later this year of
the KW against actual threat-configured warheads. These tests will
allow researchers to better characterize the type of damage inflicted
on a TBM warhead by the hypervelocity LEAP.
--Discrimination risk reduction will involve captive carry of the
actual LEAP seeker in a specialized, BMDO-funded aircraft (the Airborne
Surveillance Testbed), use of Hardware-in-the-Loop facilities at the
Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, and enhancement of
the SPY-1 radar discrimination capabilities through use of the Navy's
High Range Resolution Testbed. Initial testing of some critical LEAP
algorithms will take place during BMDO's Red Crow experiment launch in
April, and during the ARIES Target Test Vehicle mission (TTV-1)
scheduled for September.
--The Department is planning additional NTW risk reduction in the
form of flight testing against threat-representative targets prior to a
Milestone II decision to proceed into the Engineering and Manufacturing
Development (EMD) phase. The Department is determining the appropriate
number of Developmental Testing/Operational Testing (DT/OT) flight
tests, to ensure that the warfighter gets a proven, capable system when
NTW Block I is deployed.
Airborne Laser Program
Question. The Airborne Laser is not technically part of the
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) program. It is being
funded within the Air Force's budget. The Air Force plans to integrate
a high power chemical laser into a 747 aircraft with the mission to
destroy theater ballistic missiles in the boost phase. The program will
develop, procure, and operate seven aircraft at an approximate cost of
$11 billion. The budget request for 1999 is $292 million.
Three studies of Airborne Laser have been conducted over the last
year. The General Accounting Office (GAO) concluded that the ABL could
be under-designed because atmospheric turbulence could be four times
greater--thus attenuating and weakening the laser beam--than the Air
Force assumed. An internal group from Program Analysis and Evaluation
(PA&E) reportedly agreed with GAO's findings--concluding that ``the
laser would meet its range requirements less than half the time against
Scuds'' according to Defense Week. In response to these findings, the
Air Force Chief of Staff named a panel of laser scientists to study
atmospheric propagation data of the ABL under the auspices of the Air
Force Scientific Advisory Board.
General Lyles, your office is charged with the responsibility for
setting priorities for Ballistic Missile Defense. Suppose for a moment
that additional funding was available to your office and that the Air
Force had not funded the Airborne Laser program. What would be your
highest priority for use of the additional funds: to reduce risk on
your current programs, to develop the Airborne Laser program, or to
fund some other program?
Answer. Deputy Secretary of Defense Hamre stated that the ABL
program is best funded and managed by the Air Force and the President's
fiscal year 99 Budget Request identifies the Department's priorities
and maintains the ABL program within the Air Force.
As Director of the BMDO, I am responsible for developing and
acquiring the best Theater Air and Missile Defense (TAMD) Family of
Systems (FOS) architecture available for US and Allied Forces. TAMD is
an urgent, near term U.S. defense priority that has been under
development since 1991. Although a high priority must be placed on
producing and fielding PATRIOT PAC-3, THAAD, Navy Area, and Navy
Theater Wide programs, I strongly support funding the ABL, as does the
Air Force. ABL is the Department's primary boost phase kill capability
program.
The ABL fits into the TAMD Family of Systems as it will provide the
only planned boost-phase theater ballistic missile (TBM) killer in the
FOS architecture. As you know, killing a TBM during the boost phase of
its flight profile improves the chance of dropping the missile body and
warhead within enemy territory. This early kill potential assumes great
importance against weapons of mass destruction or sophisticated
countermeasures such as advanced sub-munitions. As a rapidly deployable
active defense asset, the ABL complements all planned upper and lower
tier interceptor systems and would provide additional operational
flexibility for limited interceptor inventories.
Current priorities for the BMD program provide for allocating
additional funding: first priority for MDAP risk reduction efforts;
second priority to joint interoperability risk reduction issues with
MDAP enhancements; and finally improvements to Advanced Technology
programs. Depending on the quantity of funds provided, BMDO would
seriously consider maintaining the Airborne Laser Program (ABL) at a
modest level to ensure contractor team stability and continued level of
efforts pending our ability to fit a more substantial program in our
top line. BMDO funding could not provide for a more aggressive ABL
program until PAC-3, Navy Area, THAAD and Navy Theater Wide are well
into the production phase.
Question. In Helsinki in March 1997, President Clinton and
President Yeltsin agreed on a Joint Statement concerning the Anti-
Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The agreement effectively puts
limitations on theater missile defense systems. The Helsinki Joint
Statement indicated that development and deployment of the Space-Based
Laser was off the table. Are the Russians also concerned about the ABL?
Is the ABL treaty compliant?
Answer. The Russians have not offered any substantive comment on
the Airborne Laser to date. The Air Force's ABL is designed to be a
theater missile defense system. When deployed, the system would not
pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear force of Russia. The
Air Force is pursuing the ABL in a manner fully consistent with all
provisions of the 1972 ABM Treaty. The ABL is not yet sufficiently
mature for a compliance review. When the program is sufficiently
mature, the Air Force will present the program to the DoD Compliance
Review Group for a compliance determination.
Question. A study was done by the Office of Net Assessment last
year that suggested that there are operational limitations to the ABL.
What are those limitations? How did the ABL fare in comparison to the
Space Based Laser? How well did the ABL do in comparison to other
missile defense systems?
Answer. The fiscal year 1997 study did not identify operational
limitations to the ABL. In addition, this study was not a COEA of
current or planned theater missile defense systems and no comparisons
were drawn between ABL and SBL and between ABL and other missile
defense systems.
The fiscal 1997 effort was the first of three BMDO and the Office
of Net Assessment co-sponsored SBL Operational Concepts wargames, as
part of Net Assessment's larger Revolution In Military Affairs study.
The objective of these seminar-style studies is to develop innovative
concepts of operations for Space-Based Laser and to expose the war game
``players'' to the challenges of integrating various systems into the
Joint Theater Ballistic Missile Defense architecture. In the
particular, referenced scenario, severe operational constraints were
placed on the ABL which limited its effectiveness. The scenario was
against a peer competitor with sophisticated anti-aircraft defenses.
The ``players'' preferred to establish air superiority before directly
targeting the peer competitor or forward basing the ABL. In post-game
analysis, however, it was concluded that this may have been too
conservative an employment of the ABL.
Question. What is the maximum range of the ABL?
Answer. The ABL's maximum range is dependent on several factors
including atmospheric conditions (e.g., optical turbulence, cloud
height), location of the target relative to the aircraft, and type of
missile (hardness and boost time). Thus, a single maximum range value
cannot be provided; however, the current estimated maximum ranges for
various types of missiles under nominal conditions are shown below. --
----.
Question. In circumstances where the ABL cannot reach a target due
to the laser's range limitations, overflight would be necessary. Has
the Air Force given ample consideration to this limiting factor? How
would ABL work with other BMD systems?
Answer. Overflight is just one option the Air Force is examining.
The ABL will be a highly flexible standoff weapon system that provides
theater commanders a variety of options for deploying ABL Combat Air
Patrols (CAP) to provide effective coverage of the threat. If a
situation arises where ABL cannot reach a target due to a laser range
limitation, the theater commander actually has many options available
to him to provide the required theater ballistic missile defense. He
can:
(1) locate one or more ABL CAPs at a higher altitude to reduce
optical turbulence and increase the weapon laser's range;
(2) move an ABL CAP closer to the target (including the possible
choice of moving it over hostile territory) to reduce the range to
target;
(3) add an additional ABL CAP to increase coverage;
(4) assign targets originating from specific threat locations to
other deployed systems within the theater ballistic missile defense
architecture. The theater commander selects one of these options based
on current intelligence, theater threats, level of air superiority,
coverage requirements and optimal deterrence/engagement potential.
ABL is a high value asset and will be deployed with a fighter CAP
support in the same fashion that AWACS and JSTARS are deployed. In
addition, a defense suite will protect ABL against surface-to-air and
air-to-air threats.
The ABL is designed to work with other BMD systems as an integrated
member of the overarching TMD architecture using Link 16. Through this
network, the ABL will provide:
a. quick and accurate launch point estimates to enhance the attack
operations layer of the architecture,
b. TBM trajectory (position and velocity) data and impact point
predictions to enhance upper and lower tier system engagement
effectiveness
c. impact point predictions to theater commanders for passive
defense.
Question. Can ABL perform its mission in all weather conditions?
Answer. The ABL is being designed to operate ``above'' the weather
(notionally 40,000 ft.). Even with a solid cloud cover undercast, the
ABL will be able to detect, track and destroy theater missiles.
Question. What are the fuel requirements for ABL? How many shots
can the laser fire with the allotted fuel aboard? What if a potential
adversary were to fire more than 30 missiles? Wouldn't that defeat the
ABL?
Answer. The amount of laser fuel (magazine size), measured in
seconds of lase time, is classified. The Air Force estimates that the
number of TBMs which can be killed with this magazine typically varies
between 20 and 40 depending on the specific engagement geometry, target
type, and atmospheric conditions and amount of laser energy expended to
kill the TBM.
ABL will detect all 30 missile launches, prioritize and engage as
many missiles as possible following the specific mission's rules-of-
engagement (e.g., the ABL may be directed to engage all missiles
launched from certain regions due to their high probability of carrying
weapons of mass destruction). In addition, track data will be passed to
the joint missile defense architecture via Link 16, thereby enhancing
the overall architecture's effectiveness.
Such a large missile launch would not defeat the ABL. Typically,
there will be two ABLs on Combat Air Patrol (CAP) with overlapping
coverages and the ability to deconflict engagements. These ABLs would
operate as an integrated member of the Family of Systems architecture.
In salvo launches, the ABL is not designed to defeat all missiles.
Rather, it is designed to thin the threat and provide warning and
tracking data, to significantly improve the effectiveness of the other
missile defense systems.
Question. What has been done to solve the problem of beam
attenuation? Are you confident that you will able to counteract the
effects of the atmosphere and turbulence on the ABL?
Answer. Atmospheric attenuation has a negligible effect on ABL's
performance. The atmosphere at ABL's operational altitudes (nominally
40,000 ft.) is so thin that 90 percent or more of the weapon laser
energy is transmitted to the targets.
I am highly confident ABL will overcome the negative effects of
atmospheric turbulence on ABL performance. ABL will employ active tilt
jitter correction and atmospheric compensation subsystems whose
critical components and algorithms have been proven in a number of
airborne, brass board, and field tests. The data from all tests
conducted to date match detailed ABL simulation results and indicate
ABL will exceed its JROC-validated range requirements the vast majority
of the time.
Question. The chemical laser must be reduced to meet certain size
requirements of the aircraft. How does the Air Force plan to do this?
Answer. The chemical laser must be reduced in weight, not size. The
Air Force has already manufactured the first flight weighted laser
module using proven lightweighting techniques such as use of
composites, plastics, titanium and milled-out structural components.
This flight weighted laser module will be tested in April 1998.
Question. What is the purpose of the Air Force's ``Adjunct
Mission'' study? Does the Air Force believe that the ABL is capable of
performing other missions? What other types of missions?
Answer. The Air Force is studying several adjunct missions for the
ABL. These studies will continue through fiscal year 99 and are
designed to determine the cost effectiveness and feasibility of
performing these missions with ABL. The five adjunct mission studies
are:
Cruise Missile Defense
Protection of High Value Airborne Assets
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses
Imaging Surveillance
Post Boost Tracking
Question. In the February 17, 1998 Defense Week opinion editorial
by Mr. Angelo Codevilla stated: ``. . . The assertion that the use of a
high energy laser aboard an aircraft firing horizontally, has been made
possible by recent discoveries in adaptive atmosphere-compensating
optics is nonsense. The airplane-laser combination is an old Air Force
fantasy. Airplanes are unstable platforms, and the atmosphere is an
inherently unpredictable medium . . . No reputable scientist will stake
his reputation on solubility of this problem . . .'' Do you think Mr.
Codevilla is correct in his assertion that this is a difficult
scientific problem? How would you categorize the risks associated with
the Airborne Laser?
Answer. No, Mr. Codevilla is incorrect--Airborne Laser does not
suffer from scientific problems. On the contrary, we believe we have
solved the science issues pertaining to the ABL program through twenty-
five years of technology investment by the Air Force, DARPA, SDIO, and
BMDO in such areas as lasers, optics, airborne pointing and tracking,
atmospheric physics, atmospheric compensation and adaptive optics, and
laser lethality. ABL does face the engineering challenge of integrating
a high energy laser and a sophisticated optical system into an
aircraft. This type of challenge is part and parcel of a program in the
Program Definition and Risk Reduction (PDRR) acquisition phase.
Arrow Missile System
Question. The ARROW is a U.S./Israeli cooperative program to track
and destroy theater ballistic missiles. The Committee seriously
considered terminating the Arrow program in 1995 because of the
system's extremely poor technical performance and the substantial level
of past and future U.S. financial commitment for the program.
Over the past few years the Administration moved to shore up the
program and signed a Memorandum of Understanding to limit future U.S.
funding. However, the Administration has already gone beyond this
limitation and has extended assistance to the year 2001. The budget
request provides $37.9 million in 1999, $37.7 million in 2000 and $37.5
million in 2001 for Arrow.
The Arrow's test program has been more successful over the last two
years than in the past. However, it failed it most recent flight test
in August of 1997. Israel intends to begin production of the missile
and have it operational by 1999. In addition, Israel has reportedly
asked the U.S. for funding for a third battery of missiles.
General Lyles, you are aware that this Committee has in the past
had concerns regarding the performance and cost of the Arrow missile
system. Will you please give us an update? How is the Arrow doing in
its flight tests?
Answer. The Arrow Deployability Program (ADP) is proceeding toward
achieving an initial contingency capability projected in late 1999 with
one Arrow full User Operational Evaluation System (UOES) battery
available in the 2001 time frame and a second Arrow UOES battery in the
2005 time frame. Although Arrow has been successfully demonstrated and
intercepted surrogate ballistic missile targets, the most recent test,
conducted in August 1997, failed. The United States and Israel
conducted a failure analysis and successfully identified the cause. The
Arrow missile problem has since been remedied and a follow-on flight
test is planned for mid-summer 1998.
Question. We understand that the flight test in August of last year
failed to intercept its target. What exactly happened?
Answer. An intense U.S. and Israeli failure analysis identified a
circuit board in the Arrow Missile's flight control system that was
incorrectly wired and did not pass through the required testing prior
to installation into the missile. The required component test that was
not accomplished would have caught the faulty component before
installation into the missile. Clearly, it was a lack of quality
control that caused the failure and not any design flaw. As a result,
the quality control procedures for every component of the Arrow Weapon
System have been thoroughly analyzed and a more rigorous quality
control system is now in place.
Question. We understand that Israel is seeking additional funding
from the U.S. for a third battery of missiles. Is this true?
Answer. The Israeli Ministry of Defense presented a proposal for
the third battery to the Department of Defense in January 1998. The
Ministry is seeking funding support for the additional Arrow battery in
response to the emerging medium range ballistic missile threat in the
region. The Israeli Defense Minister will be visiting the Department of
Defense in March 1998, at which time the third battery, as well as
other Israeli defense issues, will be discussed.
Question. Has the Administration made any further financial
commitments for Arrow? If so, exactly, what has the Administration
agreed to provide? How much funding? For what period of time?
Answer. In February 1998, the Department of Defense and Israeli
Ministry of Defense concluded an amendment to the Arrow Deployability
Agreement to enhance the Arrow User Operational Evaluation System
(UOES) capability and provide a more thorough test regime for
interoperability. We agreed to a cost share for the amendment of $48
million for the United States and $12 million for Israel for fiscal
years 98-01. The February 1998 International Agreement, concluded
between the United States and Israel, specified that the increased DoD
cost share for the ADP enhancement is contingent upon Congressional
increases to the budget. Congress increased the Arrow program by $12
million in its fiscal year 98 Appropriation to fund the amendment's
first installment. Because of other competing priorities within the
BMDO budget, the U.S. cost share for fiscal year 99 through 2001 is
actually unfunded.
Question. Is the Israeli government still committed to production
of this system?
Answer. Yes. In light of current and emerging ballistic missile
threats and the possibilities of weapons of mass destruction in the
Middle East, the Israeli Ministry of Defense is fully committed to
producing and fielding the Arrow Weapon System.
Question. When we last discussed this issue, the total acquisition
cost estimates for Arrow varied and ranged anywhere from $2 to $10
billion. What is the latest, more accurate cost estimate?
Answer. The total cost estimate for the development and acquisition
of two Arrow User Operational Evaluation System batteries is $1.7
billion with the U.S. providing $614 million in RDT&E funds for Arrow
missile development only.
Question. Has the U.S. committed to fund any percentage of that
production? Does the Administration intend to do so?
Answer. No. The U.S. is only participating in the cooperative
development of the Arrow User Operational Evaluation System (UOES)
contingency deployment capability, as agreed in the ADP International
Agreement, signed March 29, 1997. The Government of Israel is
unilaterally responsible for subsequent production and deployment of
the Arrow operational systems.
Question. Why should the U.S. continue to fund this program? Have
we learned anything about our missile defense system development based
on our cooperation with the Israeli? What about the seeker?
Answer. The U.S has, and continues to, receive technical data, risk
reduction, and lessons learned from the Arrow missile development
efforts which are used in development of U.S. ballistic missile defense
efforts. Moreover, an Israeli national missile defense capability would
significantly reduce the requirement to deploy U.S. missile defense
assets to the Theater in crisis situations. With regard to the Arrow
seeker, the infrared focal plane array in the Arrow is the same seeker
technology that will be used in the THAAD intercept test later this
Summer.
Question. Would you fund this program in your budget if you were
given no additional funds to do so?
Answer. While the U.S. has no operational requirement for the Arrow
Weapon System, we strongly support this important cooperative missile
defense program. We have been engaged in developing the Arrow missile
with Israel since 1988 and have the funds necessary to see it through
final development in fiscal year 01. However, in February 1998, the
Department of Defense and Israeli Ministry of Defense concluded an
amendment to the Arrow Deployability Program (ADP) agreement to enhance
the Arrow User Operational Evaluation System (UOES) capability and to
provide a more thorough test regime for interoperability. We agreed to
a cost share for the amendment of $48 million for the U.S. and $12
million for Israel for fiscal years 98-01. The February 1998
international agreement specified that the increased DoD cost share for
ADP enhancement is contingent upon Congressional increases to the
budget. Congress increased the Arrow program by $12 million in its
fiscal year 98 Appropriation to fund the amendment's first
installation. If additional funding is not provided in fiscal year 99,
the increased U.S. share will likely be funded.
Question. Where is Arrow on your priority list?
Answer. While Arrow is not high on a priority list in fulfilling
DoD operational requirements, the technical benefits of Arrow
development efforts are very useful.
Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS)
Question. MEADS is a mobile defense system that would protect
maneuvering forces from short range ballistic missiles. The program was
initially an Army program (Corps SAM) but was made an international
cooperative program in order to defray the cost of developing the
system. Originally, the U.S. agreed to provide 50% of the cost and
work. Germany was to provide 20%, France was to provide 20% and Italy
was to provide 10%. However, France dropped out of the program leaving
the U.S. with 60% of the cost and work share. The budget request for
1999 is $43 million. The President's Budget contains no funding for
MEADS beyond 1999 and many top acquisition officials believe that it is
affordable.
DoD officials concluded during the Bottom-up Review, and the
unilateral Army program, Corps SAM, was not affordable. However,
shortly thereafter, the program was reestablished as MEADS, a multi-
lateral program. The President's Budget contains no funding for MEADS
beyond 1999. Does this mean that you will not proceed with this
program? Has the decision been made to cancel this program? If so, why?
Answer. It is our intent to proceed with the MEADS program.
Affordability consideration have been and are the driving factors in
determining the future of the system. BMDO, Army and OSD have given
considerable study to program alternatives that can make the program
affordable while satisfying the users requirements and maintaining the
international program. MEADS FYDP funding will be a priority review
issue in the preparation of the fiscal year 00 President's Budget.
Question. Do you believe the multi-lateral MEADS program is
affordable?
Answer. MEADS funding has been constrained by affordability
consideration and DoD examined this issue closely during the
Quadrennial Defense Review. The QDR agreed to continue the MEADS
program but only provided $35 million additional funding in fiscal year
1999, bringing the total fiscal year 99 funding to $43 million. Since
the ODR, BMDO, Army and OSD have done extensive study of alternative
programs that will reduce cost and still satisfy the user's
requirement. As my statement indicates, the Department will address
funding for all BMD programs in the fiscal years 00-05 POM. MEADS FYDP.
Funding will be a priority review issue in this process.
Question. What is the current agreement between the U.S. and its
partners on this program? What is the current U.S. cost share?
Answer. The current cost share/work share agreement for the Project
Definition-Validation (PD-V) phase is the U.S. 60%, Germany 25%, and
Italy 15%.
Question. The total acquisition cost of MEADS is expected to be
about $11 billion for the U.S. How does this compare with the total
acquisition costs of other theater ballistic missile defense systems?
Answer. The total acquisition cost estimate for the MEADS baseline
program is currently being updated. Also BMDO, the Army, and the Office
of the Secretary of Defense have given considerable study to program
alternatives that can make the program affordable while satifying users
requirements and maintaining the international program. When the cost
estimate is available, we will bring it forward.
Question. According to BMDO, the total acquisition costs of THAAD,
PAC-3, Navy Lower Tier, HAWK, MEADS and Navy Upper Tier are expected to
be about $43 billion. General Lyles, do you believe that we can afford
all of these programs?
Answer. Sufficient funds are currently programmed to acquire and
field the PAC-3, THAAD and Navy Area systems. By definition, they are
affordable. BMDO no longer provides funds for HAWK system upgrades--
this work has been completed. Neither MEADS nor the Navy Theater Wide
programs are currently funded as acquisition programs.
Question. MEADS are reviewed in the Quadrennial Defense Review.
What was the outcome of that review? Is there still a requirement for
this type of system? Is it technically feasible?
Answer. MEADS was an integral part of the QDR from the beginning
and was recognized as having a valid operational requirement for the
U.S. The QDR agreed to continue the MEADS program but only provided $35
million additional funding in fiscal year 99, bringing the total fiscal
year 99 funding to $43 million. I am confident the MEADS system is
technically feasible.
National Missile Defense
Question. The National Missile Defense (NMD) system will provide
protection against long range ballistic missile threats using ``hit-to-
kill'' technology and will be ABM Treaty compliant. The primary
components of the NMD system are: a ground based interceptor (GBI); a
ground based radar (GBR); Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR); and
Battle Management and Command, Control and Communications (BM/C3).
The program has completed two successful flight tests, one in June
1997 and one in January 1998. The purpose of the flight tests were to
test the ability of the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) sensor to
identify and track objects in space. The sensor views the target and
decoys and identifies the simulated warhead from among the decoys.
The Administration's ``three plus three'' deployment readiness plan
would allow for the deployment of a minimal NMD capability in 2003 if
the threat warrants. The budget request for 1999 is $950 million, $27.6
million less than the 1998 appropriation, but it does not include
funding for deployment.
This spring, the program is expected to award a multi-billion
dollar, 10 year contract to integrate the components of the NMD system.
Two companies are competing for the Lead System Integrator contract:
Boeing and the United Missile Corporation (a joint venture of Lockheed
Martin, Raytheon and TRW). The contractors were each asked to propose a
design for two systems: an initial system consisting of 20
interceptors--to defeat a crude or unsophisticated target; and a
follow-on system consisting of 100 interceptors for a more
sophisticated target.
General Lyles, the budget request for NMD is substantially higher
than the budget request for 1998. Does this reflect a change in
Administration policy or priorities? Was this change precipitated by
emerging threats?
Answer. The NMD Program's MDAP designation and the concomitant
increased budget reflect the Department's commitment to the NMD program
and recognition that a missile threat to the U.S. could arise sooner
than predicted by the Intelligence Community. The MIDAP designation
ensures more involvement by the user, DoD, and the Services that will
ensure access in executing the deployment readiness program.
The budget request of $968 million in fiscal year 99 is actually
lower than the fiscal year 98 request when the effect of the QDR-
related increases are included. The $504 million originally requested
for fiscal year 98 did not reflect the QDR's recommendations. The
Department asked Congress for an additional $474 million in fiscal year
98 to meet the QDR's intent to support accelerated R&D to facilitate a
deployment decision as early as fiscal year 2000.
Question. General Lyles, please explain the ``three plus three''
concept. What is the difference between a ``deployment readiness''
program and a program to actually deploy a NMD system? When will the
decision to deploy be made?
Answer. To accommodate the uncertainty of the threat, the NMD
``3+3'' program strategy was created as a hedge program. The program
transitioned from a technology readiness program to a deployment
readiness program in April 1996. The first three years of the ``3+3''
program are designed to develop the various elements of the NMD system
(Radars, interceptors, BMC3, and Space Based Early Warning). This will
lead up to an Integrated System Test in fiscal year 99, followed by a
deployment readiness review in fiscal year 2000. This is the first
opportunity to make a decision to deploy.
If a decision is made to deploy, development and deployment
activities must be completed in three years, by 2003. If the decision
is to not deploy, then the program will continue development
activities. The Joint Program Office must maintain a rolling capability
to deploy in three years, if asked to do so.
The difference between the ``3+3'' deployment readiness program and
a program to actually deploy is the compressed schedule of the ``3+3''
program initially, and the mandate to retain the flexibility to deploy.
Additionally, there are no production funds programmed in the
deployment readiness program. The decision to deploy will be made based
upon the emergence of a threat and the maturity of the NMD system. The
first decision opportunity is in fiscal year 2000.
Question. If you were required to deploy a NMD system by the year
2003 would the 1999 budget request be sufficient? How much more funding
would be required to actually deploy the system? When would those funds
be required?
Answer. The 1999 budget request is sufficient to permit a positive
deployment decision to be made in fiscal year 2000. It includes only
RDT&E (development) funds. Deployment funds (procurement) will be
requested when a positive deployment decision is made. If a deployment
decision is not made in fiscal year 2000, then continued development
will be undertaken with RDT&E funds, until a positive deployment
decision.
The Department has laid out an evolutionary approach to meeting all
the user requirements. This approach is defined in capabilities.
Capability 1 is an initial capability (earliest 2003) to defeat the
unsophisticated threat. It consists of a single site with 20
interceptors and associated radars, battle management and space based
early warning. Capability 2 is a more capable architecture consisting
of up to 100 interceptors at a single site, coupled with the Space
Based Infrared System (available in 2004) and associated radars and
battle management. Capability 3, a multi-site architecture, could be
deployed to meet the user's full objectives.
Cost estimates have been initially performed and validated by the
DoD Cost Analysis Improvement Group for Capability 1 and 2. We estimate
the C1 acquisition cost (RDT&E, Procurement, MILCON) in then year
dollars to be between $9 billion and $11 billion, depending on the
architecture chosen. Likewise, the C2 acquisition costs are between $14
billion and $15.5 billion.
These reflect government cost projections, which will be updated
once the LSI contractor has been selected and his proposed architecture
has been costed.
Question. BMDO is scheduled to award a multi-billion dollar
contract for a Lead System Integrator very soon. What is the importance
of having a Lead System Integrator? What is the benefit to the
government of having a contractor versus a Service manage this program.
Answer. There are several objectives for the LSI contractor. First,
the LSI contractor serves as a ``prime-like'' contractor for the
overall system being developed. As such, the LSI will be held
accountable for the effective operation of the NMD system. The LSI
contractor must ensure that the various elements operate together as a
single system in an effective manner. This requires that performance
trades be made between elements and that interface specifications be
properly defined. Second, the LSI contractor will be responsible for
developing those system components not currently under development on
some other contract. Third, the LSI contractor will integrate the
overall system to allow the elements to function together and to
demonstrate the system in integrated testing. Finally, the LSI
contractor will prepare the necessary plans to allow the rapid fielding
of the system if a decision to do so is made. Experience has shown that
these tasks are most efficiently and effectively performed by a prime
contractor rather than the government. There are several benefits to
the government of having an LSI contractor instead of a Service
managing NMD. Industry will be able to provide the best and most
innovative ideas needed for the development and possible deployment of
NMD. The use of an LSI contractor will also shift the burden of system
performance, coast and schedule outside of government, an essential
requirement given the limitation on manpower and therefore oversight.
Question. There has been some debate over whether or it is possible
to design a National Missile Defense system that is Treaty Compliant
and yet is capable of defending all 50 states. What is your view?
Answer. To defend all the territory of all 50 states from a threat
from any point of origin has been analyzed extensively over the past
two years. The current ``treaty complaint'' site does NOT provide the
high protection required for all the territory of all the 50 states.
All development activities will comply fully with the ABM treaty.
However, the program has been designed with a flexible ``plug and
defend'' architecture to allow deployment at a site after the threat is
identified. This deployment may comply with the treaty, or require
modifications of the ABM treaty.
NMD Schedule and Technical Risks
Question. The General Accounting Office (GAO) issued a report in
December that provided an initial assessment of the technical and
schedule risks associated with the National Missile Defense (NMD)
program. The report concluded that: DOD faces significant challenges in
the NMD program because of high schedule and technical risks. Schedule
risk is high because the schedule requires a large number of activities
to be completed in a relatively short amount of time... Technical risks
are high because the compressed development schedule only allows
limited testing.
The report also stated that the acquisition strategy calls for
conducting only one system test prior to the deployment decision and
one system test of the ground-based interceptor before production. GAO
further concluded that: ``If subsequent test reveal problems, costly
redesign or modification of a already produced hardware may be
required.''
General Lyles, the GAO recently issued a report that said that the
NMD acquisition strategy had high schedule and technical risks. With
regard to schedule, the GAO said that plan is high risk because it
``requires a large number of activities to be completed in a relatively
short amount of time.'' Do you feel that the NMD program is unduly
risky with regard to schedule? Do you think that the challenges with
regard to schedule can be overcome? What will be required to overcome
these challenges?
Answer. We have always maintained that the NMD ``3+3'' program is a
high schedule and technical risk program. With the additional funds
provided, we have tried to reduce risk by adding additional spares and
test articles, additional ground tests, simulations and, if a
deployment decision is made, additional flight tests.
The delay in standing up the Joint Program Office and selecting a
Lead System Integrator have added to the already tight schedule. The
selection of the Lead System Integrator will help us more clearly
understand the ability to meet the schedule we have laid out.
Question. The GAO's report said that the NMD acquisition strategy
had high schedule and technical risks. With regard to technical risks,
the GAO said that plan is high risk because the ``compressed
development schedule only allows limited testing.'' Do you feel that
the NMD program is unduly risky with regard to technical matters? Do
you believe that the technical challenges can be overcome? What will be
required to overcome these challenges?
Answer. Schedule risk is high, but we believe the technology is
within our grasp and builds upon years of development efforts from the
legacy of the technology readiness program. Our biggest concern is two-
fold: having enough data to make an intelligent deployment decision in
fiscal year 2000, if necessary; and the compressed schedule in the 3
years of deployment and continued development, if told to do so. The
program is high risk, but the risk is mitigated through the addition of
spares, additional ground tests, simulation and modeling, and
additional flight tests if a deployment decision is made.
Question. GAO also stated that: ``additional funding will not
reduce the high schedule risk inherent in the program.'' Do you agree
with this conclusion that additional funding will not reduce the high
risk in the program?
Answer. We are currently able to fund the efforts that are required
to support the 3+3 program through the Deployment Readiness Review
(DRR) in fiscal year 2000. If we have problems in any area of our
program, we may have to make suitable adjustments, and could face the
situation where there is insufficient time to recover from a problem
and still meet the program milestones. At this time, I cannot identify
fiscal year 2000 specific areas where we would apply additional funds.
The short schedule we've embarked upon will continue to be a challenge.
Question. General Lyles, in your view what are the toughest
challenges in National Missile Defense program? What issues present the
greatest risk?
Answer. The most challenging specific system risks facing the NMD
program are (1) test and evaluation, (2) discrimination of targets and
kill assessments, (3) the aggressive program schedule before the
deployment readiness review, and (4) system siting/site activation
actions required after a decision to deploy the NMD system.
Advanced Technology
Question. The technology budget is reduced by 40% from the 1998
appropriation of $425 million to $254 million. (This is due to
congressional adds and the program transition from research to
acquisition.) The advanced technology budget provides funding for the
development of next generation missile defense systems. This portion of
the budget funds two primary advanced systems: the Atmospheric
Interceptor Technology (AIT) ($24.5 million) and the Space Based Laser
(SBL) ($58.8 million). In addition to the funding for SBL in this
budget, the Air Force budget also includes $35 million.
In the fall of 1997, the services' missile defense chiefs
recommended terminating the AIT program. The program was revived by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense and requirements were changed. The
objective of the new program will be to produce a lightweight
interceptor that will improve the capability to intercept missiles at
high and low altitudes.
The Spaced Based Laser program is continuing to conduct advanced
technology experiments and is investigating the development of a Space
Based Laser Readiness Demonstrator (SBLRD)--an integrated system. The
budget does not support the deployment of such a system. This would
require the investment of about $2 billion in additional funding.
However, the budget does fund the continued investigation of these
advanced technologies.
General Lyles, the Atmospheric Interceptor Technology (AIT) program
has experienced considerable turmoil over the past several years and it
looked as if it were going to be canceled. What is the status of this
program?
Answer. AIT is a very important element of our advanced technology
program. During late summer 1997, BMDO initiated development of new
requirements for the AIT program to ensure AIT is developing and
demonstrating atmospheric interceptor technologies more closely related
to some of BMDO's major acquisition programs. This requirements
development process, guided by the BMDO Chief Architect and fueled by
BMDO's new technology master planning process, focused AIT to
capitalize on technology insertion opportunities. This will enable pre-
planned product improvements (P3I) and upgrades of BMDO's lower tier
(atmospheric) missile defense interceptors and additional missile
defense capabilities. BMDO also established a stakeholders' oversight
group (AIT Oversight IPT) which includes tri-service representation to
aid in developing the requirements and then to monitor execution of the
AIT program. Along with the new requirements, BMDO approved a revised
acquisition strategy for AIT, which calls for the competitive selection
and contract award of an interceptor testbed contractor in 3Q fiscal
year 98.
Question. What will the objectives of the new program be?
Answer. The objectives of the AIT program are to develop,
integrate, and demonstrate critical technologies for performing
hypervelocity hit-to-kill intercept of theater ballistic missiles
within the atmosphere. The program will provide atmospheric interceptor
components and subsystems for potential Pre-Planned Product Improvement
upgrades for current and future BMD systems.
Question. How do you expect to improve our current capability to
intercept missiles?
Answer. The AIT program expects to improve our current capability
to intercept missiles by providing interceptor technologies that yield
improved performance and reduced cost. For example, strapdown infra-red
seekers developed within the AIT program will have significantly
reduced parts counts over gimbaled designs. As a result, these seekers
will not only be less costly, but will also be more reliable. The
technologies being developed will provide: (1) new capabilities with
reduced costs/risks compared to current interceptor weapons systems and
enhancements to other interceptors under development; (2) reduction of
technical risks and costs in support of acquisition programs through
direct technology insertions; and (3) technical solutions to provide
theater defense interceptor capabilities for contingencies not
currently addressed by the TMD system programs.
Question. Do you expect to produce a whole new missile? Or, do you
expect to simply improve components of the existing systems?
Answer. The focus of the AIT program is on developing component and
subsystem technologies, not a whole new missile. However, in order to
demonstrate these technologies and their interactions in an interceptor
system context, the program has options to integrate selected
components and subsystems into interceptor test beds for ground and
flight test purposes. Since AIT is a technology development program
rather than a system acquisition program, these potential test beds
would be designed and fabricated solely to demonstrate the technology
components. They would not be qualified for immediate use in planned
operational systems. The program will be structured such that the
components and subsystems being developed could be inserted into
various system programs as needed at any stage of development when the
required technology maturity has been demonstrated.
Space Based Laser
Question. The BMDO budget includes $58.8 million for the Space
Based Laser. In addition, the Air Force budget includes $35 million for
this program. What are the objectives of The SBL program?
Answer. The Air Force, as executing agent, has recently contracted
with Lockheed Martin Astronautics, Denver, Colorado and TRW, Space and
Laser Programs Division, Redondo Beach, California to perform Concept
Definition Studies for the SBL Readiness Demonstrator (SBLRD). They are
investigating three program alternatives for the design and development
of an integrated laser demonstration vehicle to be tested in space.
These are (1) a vehicle to be flown in the 2005/2006 timeframe which
incorporates existing low risk component technology; (2) a launch in
the 2008 time frame given the same constraints regarding technology;
and (3) a launch in the 2008 time frame where more advanced technology
may be inserted to increase technical legacy to a potential operational
system.
The objective of the fiscal year 99 SBL program is to continue the
development of the Space Based Laser Readiness Demonstrator (SBLRD)
vehicle design that will be initiated following the completion of the
6-month Concept Definition Studies. The fiscal year 99 program also
includes continuing critical component technologies and subsystem
concepts (i.e., Acquisition, Tracking, Pointing, Fire Control) that
directly support the technical feasibility of a future space-based
laser type missile defense system.
Question. What is the distinction between the activities being
conducted under the auspices of your office and those activities being
conducted by the Air Force?
Answer. In 1997, we assigned to the Air Force as executing agent
responsibilities for the SBL program. This is consistent with other
BMDO programs (THAAD, PAC-3, Navy Area, Navy Theater Wide) which are
executed by the Army and Navy. Consistent across all these programs is
BMDO's responsibility to provide oversight of the activities being
conducted by the executing agents/Services. We are responsible for the
overall NMDD and TMD architectures in response to the current and
emerging threats and interoperability requirements of the Family of
Systems.
Question. Do you actually plan to build and deploy a satellite?
What is the current plan? What is a ``Readiness Demonstrator''? Will
that system have operational capability?
Answer. The SBL effort is a planned, joint BMDO and Air Force
advanced research effort to explore the technical feasibility of a
future spacebased laser type missile defense system. Hardware concepts
for a space test vehicle, called a Readiness Demonstrator, are
currently being studied by two contractor teams. Thus, the SBLRD would
be a proof-of-concept experimental satellite, not a prototype for
operational system testing. Current concepts for this subscale
demonstrator vehicle ahve inherent and designed-in limitations that
would prevent it from possessing an operational capability.
Question. What are the implications for continued development of
the SBL with respect to the ABM Treaty?
Answer. The SBLRD effort is a advanced research effort to explore
the technical feasibility of a future space-based laser type missile
defense system. The ABM Treaty was specifically negotiated not to
prohibit such advanced research. The hardware that may be developed
would be a proof-of-concept experimental platform, not a prototype for
operational system testing. Current concepts for this demonstrator
vehicle have inherent and designed-in limitations that would prevent it
from possessing an operational capability. Zenith Star, a similar
concept vehicle, was reviewed by the DoD Compliance Review Group (CRG)
in the late 1980s and found compliant, but it was never built. The
SBLRD concept, once arrived at, would go through a similar review.
Before the U.S. could pursue an SBL system, the Administration and
Congress would need to address implications for the ABM Treaty.
We will continue with the SBL program as planned. The Helsinki
agreement does not affect our plans for that program. Our research for
SBL falls short of any development, testing, and deployment that might
violate either the Second Agreed Statement, which was signed on
September 26, 1997, or the ABM Treaty.
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
Question. At the Helsinki summit in March 1997, President Clinton
and President Yeltsin reaffirmed their commitment to the ABM treaty.
They issued a Joint Statement and agreed not to deploy Theater
Ballistic Missile (TBM) systems that pose a threat to the strategic
nuclear force of the other side or to test TBM systems against
strategic targets.
General Lyles, which BMD systems have been judged to be ABM Treaty
compliant?
Answer. All of BMDO's core TMD programs have been determined to be
ABM Treaty compliant. These include PATRIOT PAC-3, THAAD, Navy Area
with Cooperative Engagement Capability, and Navy Theater Wide.
Our NMD development program is designed to be compliance with the
ABM Treaty, but as the Secretary of Defense has noted, deployment of
NMD may require changes to the treaty. This would depend upon the
architecture selected to address a specific threat.
Question. What about the Airborne Laser? Has the Treaty Compliance
Review group assessed that system?
Answer. The ABM is not yet sufficiently mature for a compliance
review. When the program is sufficiently mature, the Air Force will
present the program to the DoD Compliance Review Group for a compliance
determination.
Question. How does the Helsinki Joint Statement of President
Clinton and President Yeltsin affect the core BMD programs?
Answer. The Joint Statement will have no effect on our current core
programs. Upon entry into force of the First Agreed Statement, which
was signed on September 26, 1997, PATRIOT, THAAD, and Navy Area will be
deemed compliant with the ABM Treaty regardless of their
configurations. The Second Agreed Statement, which was also signed on
September 26, 1997, will not affect the U.S. Government's ability to
make unilateral ABM Treaty compliance determinations in the future for
the Navy Theater-Wide system.
Question. What is the status of the demarcation agreement? Have the
U.S. and Russian negotiators concluded an agreement?
Answer. A demarcation agreement has been concluded, although it
will be submitted to the Senate for advice and consent before it enters
into force. The agreement has two parts. Part 1 provides that TMD
systems with interceptor missiles having velocities of 3 km/sec or less
are compliant with the ABM Treaty, provided they are not tested against
ballistic target missiles with velocities greater than 5 km/sec or
ranges greater than 3,500 km. Thus, as long as these parameters are not
exceeded, lower-velocity TMD systems--PATRIOT, THAAD, and Navy Area--
will no longer require time-consuming national compliance
determinations, even when the configurations of these systems change.
Part II of the Agreement will not affect the U.S. Government's ability
to make unilateral ABM treaty compliance determinations in the future.
Question. Under the demarcation agreement would the Navy Upper Tier
program pose a problem?
Answer. The Second Agreed Statement, which was signed in September
1997, addresses higher velocity TMD systems, i.e., systems with
interceptors whose velocity exceeds 3 km/sec. NTW, which is expected to
have an interceptor exceeding 3 km/sec, would be covered by the
provisions of the Second Agreed Statement after its ratification and
entry into force. The Second Agreed Statement contains restrictions
against test TMD systems or their components against ballistic target
missiles with a velocity greater than 5 km/sec or a range greater than
3,500 km, this Agreed Statement would not constrain our planned NTW
program. The determination of ABM Treaty compliance of higher-velocity
TMD systems remains the national responsibility. NTW, as currently
planned, has already been certified to be complaint.
Question. Have the BMD programs been deliberately limited to
``dumbed down'' in order to accommodate the Helsinki agreement? Are the
designs of our TBM systems being determined by the threat, by
requirements or by the arms control negotiators?
Answer. None of BMDO's programs have been deliberately limited or
``dumbed down'' in order to accommodate the Helsinki agreement. BMDO's
TMD systems designs are determined by the threat which, in turn,
determines requirements.
Question. Does this agreement limit the advanced technology
program?
Answer. Neither the ABM Treaty nor the demarcation agreements place
limitations on advanced technology research. BMDO's advanced technology
program will remain unaffected by the demarcation agreements.
Question. The agreement specifically prohibits the development,
test or deployment of space-based interceptor missiles or ``components
based on other physical principles.'' General Lyles, this agreement
seems to require that the Space-Based Laser program be terminated. What
is your understanding as to how this agreement affects SBL?
Answer. We will continue with the SBL program as planned. The
Helsinki agreement does not affect our plans for that program because
our research for SBL falls short of any development, testing, and
deployment that might violate either the proposed Part II Agreement or
the ABM Treaty.
Question. Are there provisions for initiating discussions with the
Russians should higher velocity systems and future capabilities be
required due to the threat?
Answer. Yes. Article XIII of the ABM Treaty provides for the
establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to ``consider
questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed, . . . and
proposals for further measures aimed at limiting strategic arms.''
Discussions pertaining to higher velocity systems were initiated during
negotiations of Part II of the demarcation agreement, the purpose of
which was to discuss higher velocity systems. As additional
capabilities are pursued, the SCC may provide a forum in which to
discuss them.
Question. The demarcation discussions included a Phase I (for lower
velocity systems) and Phase II (for higher velocity systems, e.g. Navy
Upper Tier). Have the Russians agreed to discuss higher velocity
systems?
Answer. Yes, the Russians were participants in Phase II of the
demarcation negotiations. The purpose was specifically to discuss
higher velocity systems.
Question. In the absence of a Phase II agreement, will compliance
determinations still remain a ``national responsibility?'' In other
words, will it still be up to the U.S. to decide whether a TBM system
is compliant?
Answer. Yes. Regardless of whether the U.S. ratifies the Second
Agreed Statement, compliance determinations will continue to be a
national responsibility.
Question. If we are capable of deciding what is compliant on our
own now, what is the need for the demarcation agreement? What do we
gain by signing this agreement? Doesn't the agreement just tie our
hands in terms of future TBMD systems?
Answer. The demarcation agreement is part of the Administration's
effort to evolve the cooperative, non-threatening, strategic
relationship between the U.S. and Russia. It is intended to provide a
legal and political basis for the Russian Duma to ratify the START II
treaty which will significantly reduce the strategic nuclear
inventories of the two parties to that agreement. Regarding the impact
of the Helsinki Agreement on future TMD systems, it does not affect any
aspect of TMD systems that are currently planned for future deployment.
Iran Missile Act
Question. In response to the recent news that Iraq is developing a
medium range ballistic missile capable of hitting Saudi Arabia and
Israel, Representative Weldon has proposed legislation that would
authorize an additional $147 million in 1998 funds for missile defense
programs. The legislation would add funds to enhance our capability to
deal with the emerging Iranian missile threat.
Specifically, the bill would: add $35 million to integrate the
Patriot, Aegis and the Ground Based Radar; add $15 million to
accelerate the Patriot Remote Launch capability to double the defended
area of the PAC-3; add $40 million for additional tests of the PAC-3
and Navy Area system to consider how well they will perform against a
longer range missile; add $6 million for enhanced early warning
sensors; add $41 million for PAC-3 production enhancements to expand
the ability to produce more missiles in a faster time period; and add
$10 for the Arrow missile program to accelerate interoperability
between Arrow and U.S. systems.
The Administration responded to the Weldon legislation with a $100
million proposal that would fund similar enhancements but exclude the
$6 million for early warning and $41 million for production
enhancements. In lieu of the $10 million for Arrow interoperability,
the Administration proposal would invest in efforts to help detect,
identify and destroy tactical ballistic missile launchers, missiles and
related infrastructure on the ground.
General Lyles, Representative Weldon has proposed legislation that
would authorize the appropriation of an additional $147 million for
1998. Are you familiar with the legislation? What does the proposal
include?
Answer. Yes, I am very familiar with the proposed legislation which
was offered as an amendment to H.R. 2786 by Mr. Weldon, jointly with
Mr. Pickett and Mr. Spratt. In fact, the issue of the Iranian ballistic
missile threat, which this proposed legislation addresses, is of
considerable importance to the Department. Since the original bill was
introduced in October 1997, I have spent a considerable amount of time
developing options for near-term responses to this emerging threat and
coordinating these options within the Department. I have also held
numerous discussions with House National Security Committee bipartisan
staff and testified before this committee on BMDO programs and options
to address this threat.
I am pleased to note that the proposed legislation includes many of
the options which have been proposed by the Department. Specific
proposals made by the Department which have been included in the
proposed legislation are:
$35.0 million for the Joint Composite Tracking Network
which will link sensors from various platforms to allow earlier, more
accurate cueing of TMD missiles. The Department requested this funding
for improved integration of PATRIOT, AEGIS and the Ground-based Radar
(GBR).
$15 million to accelerate completion of the PAC-3 remote
launch capability which focuses on improving communication at the fire
unit level. Additionally, this capability will allow PAC-3 missiles to
be emplaced up to 30 Km from the radar, thereby doubling the defended
area. The remote launch capability had slipped to fiscal year 00 due to
program cuts. This funding will restore the operational capability to
fiscal year 99.
$40 million for PAC-3 and Navy Area Demonstrations. These
funds allow for additional live fire testing of PAC-3 and Navy Area
interceptors against the longer-range posed by Iranian medium range
ballistic missiles (MRBMs). This funding provides for one test of each
of these lower-tier systems against the more demanding threat.
The proposed legislation also provides additional funds for three
other programs that were not specifically requested by the Department.
The impacts of these funding increases must be studied in greater
detail. These three additional funding proposals are:
$6 million for enhanced early warning to support
integration of various elements of SHIELD.
$41 million for production rate enhancements of PAC-3 to
support an increased rate of production during initial low rate
production to provide a hedge if Iranian and other missiles threats are
deployed more rapidly and in larger numbers than currently anticipated.
$10 million for the Israeli Arrow TMD system to improve
interoperability between Arrow and U.S. TMD systems.
Question. Under Mr. Weldon's proposal, which missile defense
systems would receive funds? Do you agree with that choice?
Answer. The draft legislation proposes to authorize additional
funding for the Joint Composite Tracking Network, PATRIOT remote launch
capability, PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 and Navy Area Theater
Ballistic Missile Defense System testing, enhancement to our early
warning system, and the Arrow Weapon System interoperability. I am in
full agreement with the intent of this proposed legislation to
accelerate DoD's ability to counter enhanced ballistic missile threats.
The proposed legislation contains many of the options proposed by
the Department to fund PATRIOT/AEGIS/GBR integration through the Joint
Composite Tracking Network, the PATRIOT remote launch capability and to
support PAC-3 and Navy Area Demonstrations. The proposal also provides
addition funding for PAC-3 production rate enhancements and for
improved interoperability for Arrow. While improved interoperability
with Arrow is an important priority, it is not yet clear that
increasing the production rate for PAC-3 will provide any significant
capability against the Iranian medium range ballistic missile threat.
At the same time, the proposed legislation provides funds for SHIELD
integration, apparently as an option for attack operations. In its
proposal, the Department proposed that no specific option for enhancing
attack operations be identified at this point. Numerous options are
currently under review within the Department; SHIELD is one of those
options. However, until the Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense
Organization can properly analyze all options, it is premature to
legislate any one option.
Question. Does the Administration have an alternative proposal?
Under the Administration's proposal, which missile defense systems
would receive funds?
Answer. We do not have an alternative proposal.
Question. What would be achieved by increasing spending to
integrate the PATRIOT, AEGIS and Ground Based Radar? Is this feasible?
What sort of improvement could we realistically expect from the
investment of $35 million?
Answer. The $35 million for PATRIOT/AEGIS/GBR integration would be
spent to demonstrate Over The Horizon PATRIOT engagement of a TBM using
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC). In addition, this option would
enhance the interoperability and performance of all three systems. The
demonstration program would also create contingency assets which could
be used in the near-term. This funding would also be used to accelerate
the validation of THAAD GBR and AEGIS SPY-1b radar integration.
Question. What would be achieved by increasing spending to
accelerate a remote launch capability for PAC-3? Is this feasible? What
sort of improvement could we realistically expect from the investment
of $15 million?
Answer. The Remote Launch/Communication Enhancement Upgrade (RL/
CEU) effort focuses on improving communication at the fire until level
through the introduction of new switching equipment and a
communications processor in conjunction with a conversion to Band IV
UHF throughout the battalion. This funding allows the fielding of a
remote launcher ``farm'' up to 30 Km from the parent fire unit and
doubles the defended area forward of each radar. RL/CEU is required to
meet PAC-3 requirements for increased battlespace, lethality, and rate
of fire. Additional modifications will satisfy requirement documents in
the U.S. Army for interoperability and communication with other Theater
Missile Defense systems.
Question. What would be achieved by increasing spending to provide
two additional tests for the lower tier systems, PAC-3 and Navy Lower
Tier? Is this realistic? What sort of improvement could we
realistically expect from the investment of $40 million?
Answer. These funds would allow for additional live fire testing of
PAC-3 and Navy Area interceptors to demonstrate inherent capability
against the longer range threats. Testing could be carried out in
fiscal year 00 in two flight tests involving 2 PAC-3 missiles, 2 SM-2
Blk IVA missile, and associated targets. These systems are designed to
counter shorter-range threats. Therefore, these flights are not
currently planned in either the Navy Area or PAC-3 programs. However,
these flight tests would verify missile capabilities against the
emerging threat.
Question. What would be achieved by increasing spending for early
warning sensors? What sort of improvement could we realistically expect
from the investment of $6 million?
Answer. The SHIELD-developed CENTCOM Integrated Surveillance System
(CISS) is designed to provide layered, assured warning for theater
missile threats. The system integrates both passive and active sensors
to include multiple Defense Support Program (DSP) satellite and in-
theater radar data. Accurate cueing to other in-theater sensors
(JSTARS, AWACs, radars, etc.) is part of this concept. The SHIELD
facility at Falcon Air Force Base has been applying the CISS concept
for two years during National Missile Defense and Theater Missile
Defense Tests. This architecture consists of networking terrestrial
radars to a radar fusion processor where the various radar data are
fused. The resulting data are then fused with Infrared (IR) data. The
current architecture consists of separate processors for radar and IR
sensor fusion. This will be replaced with a single processor as part of
the CISS effort. The CISS network will be established using existing
communications paths where available and supplemented with UHF and S-
Band communications when needed. The initial CISS will have a fusion
processor located at a command and control facility or a Theater Event
System (TES) element if available. TES is made up of ALERT, JTAGS and
TACDAR.
SHIELD-developed software could allow the CISS processor to
initiate a track before the required minimum DSP track criteria is met
to reduce launch point ellipses by 50%. The CISS processor could also
use post boost radar data to reduce impact ellipses. CISS will ensure
warning with improved launch point, state vectors, and impact point
predictions to enhance Attack Operations, Active Defense and Passive
Defense.
This option is one of several potential options that the Department
is considering to enhance early warning for attack operations.
Question. What would be achieved by increasing spending to enhance
production of the PAC-3 missile? Is this reasonable? What sort of
improvement could we realistically expect from the investment of $41
million?
Answer. This increase in funding supports both a more robust
production rate during Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) and a more
robust PAC-3 missile production line for Full Rate Production (FRP). At
the time this question was initially answered, the planned Lot 1
procurement quantities were 48 missiles. However, recent program cost
overruns have caused the Department to request the conversion of fiscal
year 98-00 procurement funds to RDT&E funds. This reduction in
procurement funds decreases total missile quantities and decreased the
fiscal year 98 quantity to 20 missiles. $16 million of the $41 million
investment in fiscal year 98 restores missile procurement in fiscal
year 98.
The remaining $25 million adds special tooling and test equipment
to the PAC-3 production line to produce up to 30 missiles per month.
During FRP, the PAC-3 production line is required to support a 20
missile per month production rate to sustain the projected deployment
schedule.
Enhancing PAC-3 production was not part of the proposal submitted
by the Department of Defense because it is not clear, until completion
of testing, that it would provide additional capability for the
specific threats of concern.
Question. What would be achieved by increasing spending for
interoperability for the Arrow weapon system and U.S. weapon systems?
Is this feasible? What sort of improvement could we realistically
expect from the investment of $10 million?
Answer. The efforts associated with making the Arrow Weapon System
and U.S. systems ``hardware'' interoperable involve development of
several new pieces of equipment, which would permit the sharing of
tactical data. This is an ongoing part of the Arrow Deployability
Program. Increased spending would contribute to interoperability
testing using distributed interactive simulation, and the development
of combined Concepts of Operations to allow U.S. and Israeli missile
defense systems to operate cohesively in a contingency operation.
Based upon the language in the proposed legislation, it is not
clear what is intended. However, increased interoperability with U.S.
forces would enhance and supplement Arrow performance.
Question. In lieu of the $10 million for Arrow interoperability,
the Administration proposal would invest in efforts to help detect,
identify and destroy tactical ballistic missile launchers, missiles and
related infrastructure on the ground. What specifically is the
Administration's proposal regarding attack operations?
Answer. Attack Operations apply to operations initiated to destroy,
disrupt, or neutralize ballistic and cruise missile launch platforms
and their supporting command, control, and communications (C3);
logistic structures; and reconnaissance, surveillance, and target
acquisition (RSTA) platforms.
The Department is developing an integrated investment strategy for
attack. The strategy first proposes investment in non-material
solutions, such as the development and implementation of joint Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures, which are also low cost, low risk
investments with the potential to yield considerable near-term
improvements in attack operations effectiveness. Secondarily,
investment is recommended in technologies that enhance the capabilities
receiving the highest investment priorities.
Investment in technology programs that support the above activities
would allow use in the field at targeted exercises, allowing the ``user
pull'' (user needs drive development rather than the developers'
perception of user needs) for development of technologies and systems
that show the most utility.
It is not a question of pursuing attack operations in lieu of Arrow
interoperability. The Department of Defense submitted a proposal for
$10 million in fiscal year 98 to study specific threats and to look at
opportunities to invest in some short term attack operations capability
improvements which may have high payback potential. Initial analysis
shows that a credible approach to deal with the medium range ballistic
missiles (MRBM) threat lies in the attack operations arena. However,
until the Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense analytical process
completes its investment strategy and investigations, it is premature
to specify options at this time.
[Clerk's note.--End of Questions submitted by Mr. Young.
Questions submitted by Mr. Nethercutt and the answers thereto
follow:]
National Missile Defense
Question. Two Booster missile options have been considered for NMD.
Please describe the tradeoffs associated with selecting either disarmed
Minuteman missiles or a commercial rocket as well as the cost estimates
for both options.
Answer. During the last year we have studied the issue extensively.
The best data we have shows that there is no discernible cost advantage
to a Minuteman III booster versus a commercial off the shelf booster
over a twenty year life cycle. There are treaty issues concerning the
use of Minuteman III which are currently being addressed by the
Department. The current NMD acquisition strategy calls for the
Department to select the appropriate booster no later than 90 days
after award of the Lead System Integrator contract.
Arrow Missile System
Question. The U.S. had agreed to spend $48 million over 4 years for
interoperability testing of the Arrow system with Israel. Would this
testing make Arrow more effective? Does the Department of Defense
anticipate budgeting for this testing in the future?
Answer. The U.S. $48 million commitment over 4-years for enhancing
the Arrow Deployability Program (ADP) is provided for the purposes of
enhancing the User Operational Evaluation System (UOES) contingency
capability in all elements of the Arrow Weapons System, developing
U.S./Israeli weapon system interoperability, and testing that
interoperability with a thorough test regime. Interoperability will
allow Israeli missile defense capabilities to be fully tested and
integrated with U.S. TMD systems. Operationally, this will enable a
U.S./Israeli combined theater capability within U.S. European Command's
(USEUCOM) command and control architecture. Technically,
interoperability will allow the Arrow Weapon System rapid access to
missile track data to support early intercept engagement opportunities.
This translates into increased Arrow battlespace, making it a much more
effective system.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr.
Nethercutt. Questions submitted by Mr. Dicks and the answers
thereto follow:]
Airborne Laser (ABL) Program
Question. General, have you priorities for the Airborne Laser
program changed since last year? If so, why?
Answer. No, my priorities are unchanged. I believe that in last
year's testimony there was some miscommunication or misunderstanding of
the committee's question and/or my response to the question.
For the Theater Air and Missile Defense Family of Systems to be as
effective as possible, we are building a multi-tier architecture that
starts by engaging theater ballistic missiles prior to launch and
continues engagement throughout a TBM's flight (boost, mid course and
terminal). All tiers are required to provide effective negation of the
TBM threat. This is accomplished by taking full advantage of the
services' investments in attack operations, theater surveillance, and
boost phase intercept as well as BMDO's investment in the upper and
lower tiers. As a Department, we are building a robust TBM negation
capability that will be fielded in the most expeditious manner within
the available budget.
Question. General, we understand that you support the Airborne
Laser program. The issue is not of support, but of priority. If the Air
Force was not funding the Airborne Laser program, and you had an amount
of funding available to you in addition to your current budget, is the
Airborne Laser of sufficient priority that you would fund it at the
same pace as the Air Force, or would you fund something else like
reducing the risk of your core programs or adding to you Advanced
Technology programs?
Answer. Deputy Secretary of Defense Hamre stated that the ABL
program is best funded and managed by the Air Force and the President's
fiscal year 99 budget Request identifies the Department's priorities
and maintains the ABL program within the Air Force.
As Director of the BMDO, I am responsible for developing and
acquiring the best Theater Air and Missile Defense (TAMD) Family of
Systems (FOS) architecture available for US and Allied Forces. TAMD is
an urgent, near term U.S. defense priority that has been under
development since 1991. Although a high priority must be placed on
producing and fielding PATRIOT PAC-3, THAAD, Navy Area, and Navy
Theater Wide programs, I strongly support funding the ABL, as does the
Air Force. ABL is the Department's primary boost phase kill capability
program.
The ABL fits into the TAMD Family of Systems as it will provide the
only planned boost-phase theater ballistic missile (TBM) killer in the
FOS architecture. As you know, killing a TBM during the boost phase of
its flight profile improves the chance of dropping the missile body and
warhead within enemy territory. This early kill potential assumes great
importance against weapons of mass destruction or sophisticated
countermeasures such as advanced sub-munitions. As a rapidly deployable
active defense asset, the ABL complements all planned upper and lower
tier interceptor systems and would provide additional operational
flexibility for limited interceptor inventories.
Current priorities for the BMD program provide for allocating
additional funding: first priority for MDAP risk reduction efforts;
second priority to joint interoperability risk reduction issues with
MDAP enhancements; and finally improvements to Advanced Technology
programs. Depending on the quantity of funds provided, BMDO would
seriously consider maintaining the Airborne Laser Program (ABL) at a
modest level to ensure contractor team stability and continued level of
efforts pending our ability to fit a more substantial program in our
top line. BMDO funding could not provide for a more aggressive ABL
program until PAC-3, Navy Area, THAAD and Navy Theater Wide are well
into the production phase.
Question. General, you discussed that interoperability between your
systems will be a major focus for the coming years. Given that Airborne
Laser is not managed by you, but by the Air Force, is there more risk
that interoperability will suffer with respect to the Airborne Laser?
What is being done to ensure the Airborne Laser is fully interoperable
with the rest of the BMD architecture?
Answer. No there is not an increased risk to interoperability. The
Air Force has been interfacing with my organization since before the
ABL Milestone I in Nov. 96. One of ABL's Key Performance Parameters
(KPPs) is Link-16 Interoperability. Link-16 is the cornerstone of Joint
Theater Air and Missile Defense Theater (JTAMD) communications.
Interoperability is being analyzed within on-going JTAMD
architecture studies. At a minimum, the JTAMD Family of Systems (FoS)
architecture is expecting ABL to provide detailed information on all
Theater Ballistic Missiles within view of its surveillance system. ABL
could provide:
a. quick and accurate launch point estimates to enhance the
attack operations layer of the architecture,
b. TBM trajectory (position and velocity) data and impact
point predictions to enhance upper and lower tier system
engagement effectiveness,
c. impact point predictions to theater commanders for passive
defense.
During the Roving Sands 97 exercise, ABL participated through
simulation and demonstrated beneficial performance as the FoS boost
phase interceptor and as a FoS theater-wide surveillance system. We
anticipate ABL's continuing participation in CINC Exercises like Roving
Sands, FoS Systems Integration Tests (SITs) and being integrated into
the Theater Missile Defense System Exerciser (TMDSE) system.
Question. The budget includes $230 million for continued RDT&E on
the ABL. Although, this program does not fall under BMDO's
jurisdiction, I appreciate the strong support that you continue to
provide to this program. I believe ABL is a critical component of our
TMD portfolio because it is currently the only TMD program in
development with boost-phase capability.
Can you give the Committee a general overview of how this program
is going?
Do you agree with the importance of having a system that can
eliminate missiles in the boost-phase? Please share with the
subcommittee the value of destroying a missile in the boost-phase?
There are several unique technical challenges on the ABL program--
particularly on the tracking and beam control portions of the program.
I have talked with the Boeing Co. and believe they are on the right
path meeting these challenges. How do you assess the technical
challenges associate with the ABL program?
Answer. (Note: The fiscal year 1999 budget request for continued
ABL RDT&E is $292 million, not $230 million) ABL is a well-managed
program. It's on cost and on schedule. ABL has completed successful
risk reduction efforts in the areas of turret aerodynamic design, laser
exhaust, and optics fabrication. The program is on track for a
successful Authority-to-Proceed #1 decision in June 1998. The
flightweighted laser module will begin testing in April and there is
every indication it will meet its test objectives. The Air Force has
completed the collection of atmospheric turbulence data in Northeast
Asia and Southwest Asia and the data to date validates ABL's turbulence
design specification. ABL is progressing well towards it Preliminary
Design Review in late April 1998, and there are no showstoppers in
sight.
Destorying enemy missiles in the boost phase is extremely important
for several reasons to include:
(1) it thins the threat midcourse and terminal defense systems
face, enhancing their effectiveness;
(2) it kills missiles before any early release of submunitions
(ERS, a very significant challenge for interceptor defense systems);
(3) it presents an enemy with the possibility that missile debris,
including the warhead, may fall back on their territory (ABL serves as
a viable deterrent to use of weapons of mass destruction).
In addition to its role as a boost-phase ``shooter'', ABL will also
possess significant sensing capability that will improve the
performance of the other theater missile defense systems. ABL will
provide quick and accurate missile launch point estimates which will
cue attack operations assets. It will also pass on trajectory data and
impact point predictions on ``leakers'', permitting midcourse and
terminal systems to narrow their sensor search patterns and extending
their range. In short, ABL fills a critical niche in the TAMD
architecture.
ABL's challenges are engineering in nature. Over twenty-five years
of Air Force, DARPA, SDIO, and BMDO investments in high energy laser
technology areas have solved the scientific problems associated with
developing an ABL. What remains are the engineering issues of
integrating a weapon laser and a sophisticated optical system on board
an airplane. Such issues are the sort normally faced by acquisition
programs in the Program Definition and Risk Reduction Phase and I
believe the ABL program appears prudently structured to address them.
Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
Question. THAAD as you know is the most mature of our upper tier
system. I have always strongly supported this program but like many
members on this subcommittee, I am very concerned over the fact that we
have conducted four intercept attempts and had no successful
intercepts. And, I understand that the fifth intercept test which had
been scheduled for March, now has been delayed. While I recognize the
importance of ensuring the next test is a success, this most recent
delay does heighten the level of concern that a lot of us have with
this system.
What have you identified as the primary reason for the four
intercept misses? Does the trouble stem from a broad range of technical
glitches or is there simply one, identifiable issue that needs
resolution?
Why did the 5th intercept test have to be moved back? What is the
current target date for this test?
How much money has the schedule delays cost the program to this
point?
I understand that you have implemented a very substantial cost-
reduction program on the THAAD program that may also be carried over to
other TMD systems. Please provide for the subcommittee, an overview of
those cost-reduction measures.
Answer. The independent review I chartered following the FT-07
failure concluded that the THAAD fundamental system design is sound.
The flight test failures to date have principally been caused by
inadequate quality control and system engineering processes prior to
flight. In each intercept attempt this deficiency has manifested itself
in a flight anomaly associated with a different subcomponent (avionics
software, stage separation mechanism, seeker, and DACS). These
anomalies are summarized below.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flight test Root cause Corrective action
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FT-04........................... Faulty off-nominal Revised software
guidance, Increased logic
navigation, and testing
control logic.
Corrupt radar data
FT-05........................... Lanyard failure Connector
during stage separation
separation. mechanism
IAP reset due to redesigned
power interrupt
prevented.
Subsequent Maneuvers
FT-06........................... Dewar Clean dewar design
contamination and process
(smudge across implemented
adjacent traces
caused
electronics
short).
FT-07........................... DACS battery Eliminate epoxy
contamination potting
(epoxy potting). Re-ATP DACS valve
assembly
Add DACS test
during assembly
at WSMR
------------------------------------------------------------------------
As stated above, following the FT-07 failure, Lockheed Martin
Missile Systems (LMMS) implemented recommendations from the government
Project Office and an independent missile assessment team to improve
our understanding of system reliability and reduce flight test risk.
The recommendations included a complete reassessment of the acceptance
test procedures and the environmental stress screening of the missile
components. As a result of this process, LMMS increased the shock and
vibration ground testing for several components to more thoroughly test
the packages and increase confidence going into the mission.
As LMMS discovers problems with previously delivered hardware that
had not been subjected to the more stringent acceptance test
procedures, they have been correcting the problems across the entire
lot of hardware. The planning and implementation of this new testing,
as well as the requirement to perform detailed pedigree reviews of each
of the missile sub-components, has taken considerable time. This
disciplined approach has, however, identified some discrepancies which
may have gone undetected and which, potentially, could have contributed
to another flight test failure.
Recently, two problems were discovered as a result of this more
rigorous ground test approach. The first of these problems involved a
communications transponder (CT), a device used to receive and transmit
mission critical in-flight information with the THAAD radar. The second
problem involved firmware in the thurst vector control (TVC), a
subassembly of the missile booster. The TVC firmware determines the
steering commands to be executed during flight.
While conducting the pre-flight ground testing in late December/
early January, LMMS discovered that the CT and TVC firmwave were out of
tolerance and had to change out these components. In the case of the
TVC, although LMMS was able to replace the FT08 booster with one that
was already disassembled for re-testing (acceptance and environmental
testing), they incurred a four week delay to assemble and retest the
new package. The new test date is now projected for May 1998.
As I have noted in a prior response, the schedule delay schedule
caused an increase of ($808.9 million fiscal year 88C$/1.2786 billion
(TY$)).
As I've noted in a prior response, we have prepared a forthcoming
report for Congress which provides an overview of the cost reduction
work being performed on the THAAD program. To again briefly summarize,
since last Fall, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) and
the Army have been working more closely with the contractor to control
costs and identify areas where we can drive down total acquisition and
life cycle costs. Through Integrated Product and Process Development
(IPPD), the Government and the contractor are assessing for
implementation a broad range of initiatives in the area of cost-
performance trades, alternative acquisition strategies, contract
management, test and evaluation, and producibility enhancements. We are
intensely working this effort and I'm optimistic that we will find
areas where significant cost savings can be realized.
Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3)
Question. I have been a strong supporter of the PAC-3 enhancement
program as have all the members of this subcommittee. I understand that
the first two phases of the three phase enhancement program have been
completed on all PAC-3 systems and that the third phase--integrating a
hit-to-kill interceptor missile on the system--will be able to be
deployable starting in 2000.
Does the current PATRIOT configuration, with the first two phased
upgrades now completed, provide our forward troops in the middle east
with a TMD capability that meets the threat of potential missile
launches by Iraq?
I understand BMDO has planned a hit-to-kill intercept test for the
PAC-3 missile in February but that test date has been delayed. What is
the reason for the delay?
You have budgeted a total of $480.5 million for the PAC-3 upgrade
in this year's budget. If Congress were to provide money for this year
beyond the budgeted amount, how would that money be used? Could a
phase-3 PAC-3 system be deployed prior to the year 2000 target if
additional funds were provided?
Answer. The Configuration 2 upgrades currently in the hands of our
soldiers provide a greatly improved capability over what we possessed
during the Gulf War. The GEM missile provides improved lethality over
the PAC-2 missile. Every GEM flight test met or exceeded expectations.
The Configuration 2 improvements increase the battlespace defended by a
PATRIOT firing unit by a factor of eight over its Gulf War counterpart.
In addition, we are now capable of engaging longer range threats than
we could in the Gulf War. These improvements are significant and we are
confident that the PATRIOT configuration in the field today can defeat
the current threats in the Middle East.
We are now engaged in the key step in the development of the PAC-3
missile, the integration of the flight seeker and its software into the
missile. We must also complete the development of two hardware-in-the-
loop facilities which enable us to integrate and checkout the flight
hardware and software. The combined integration efforts are a complex
technical challenge that most likely will cause the currently planned
third quarter flight test to move to the fourth quarter. To assure
ourselves that we are not missing some technical problem, a government
missile flight readiness review team has conducted an intensive review
of the engineering development program with the contractor. This team
has extensive experience with managing missile and software intensive
development programs. Their conclusion is that the difficulties
currently being encountered are not unusual for this kind of program.
While progress is being made, it will probably require more time and
resources than originally thought. We will continue with our event-
driven philosophy and not proceed with the first intercept mission, DT-
3, until these technical challenges are resolved, and the ground tests
indicate we are ready. Based on the team's review we believe that,
while not impossible, it is unlikely DT-3 will occur in the third
quarter of this fiscal year. However, we are confident that DT-3 can
occur in the fourth quarter.
The Department provided a list of possible uses of additional funds
to Congress in February 1998, in answer to a request from the HNSC.
This list included three areas where additional funds could be used for
PAC-3. These are: additional funds to demonstrate the ability of
PATRIOT/AEGIS/Ground Based Radar to engage a remote TBM using CEC;
demonstrate the ability of the PAC-3 against the longer range threat;
and restore Remote Launch Communication Upgrades procurement
quantities. In December 1997, the Department considered funding
production line enhancements to increase the production rate for the
PAC-3 missile, however, this effort was not included in the final
response to the HNSC. The Department will address each of these
requirements in the upcoming Future Years Defense Program (fiscal year
DP) development cycle, depending on the results of the Congressional
action on the fiscal year 1998 Emergency Supplemental Appropriation and
the maturity of the PAC-3 program.
Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS)
Question. The MEADS program is the only mobile TMD system in
development. This is something I know the Army feels very strongly
about and I too have been a strong supporter of this program. The
fiscal year 1999 budget includes $43 million for Project Definition and
Validation. Our European MEADS partners, the Germans and Italians, are
contributing 50% of the funding associated with this program.
I understand that although this program was funded in fiscal year
1998 and is funded this year by the United States and our European
partners, that no money exits in the FYDP for MEADS beyond this year.
Why is there no funding for MEADS beyond this year?
What has the reaction of the Italians and Germans been to this
seemingly lack of commitment on the part of US to the MEADS program?
Do you agree that having a mobile TMD capability important?
How much money would be required by the U.S. in fiscal year 2000 to
keep the MEADS program on track?
How much is it anticipated that the MEADS program cost the U.S.
over the fiscal year DP?
Answer. Due to the affordability considerations, a conscious
decision was made not to address funding beyond fiscal year 99 until
BMDO, Army and OSD had completed their analysis of alternatives. Once
these studies are complete outyear funding will be addressed as a
fiscal year 00-05 POM issue. The Department's decision will be
reflected in the fiscal year 00 President's Budget Position.
Failure to adequately fund MEADS indicates to our allies a lack of
resolve on the part of the U.S. and jeopardizes any future cooperative
ventures of this kind. Our allies may see us as an unreliable partner
who cannot be trusted to see a project through to its conclusion.
Operationally and tactically our forces will fight on less dense
battlefieds, and over greater expanses of land with large gaps between
friendly forces. Ground force commanders will incur risks as they
construct forces in major unit assembly areas upon arrival to a theater
of operations, or tactical assembly areas while preparing for
operations. MEADS will play a key role in reducing these risks in
future Army or Marine Corps operations.
Both the Army and the Marine Corps have requirements for a system
that provides defense of vital corps and division assets associated
with their maneuver forces. This system must provide: (1) 360 degree
defense against multiple and simultaneous attacks by short and medium
range ballistic missiles, cruise missilesand other air breathing
threats; (2) immediate deployment for early entry operations using C-
141; (3) transportability in its road march configuration as roll-on/
roll-off cargo in a C-130 or in standard amphibious landing craft; (4)
mobility to move rapidly and protect the maneuver force during
offensive operations.
The requirements drive the system design to meet demands of the
operational mission against the next generation threat with an
appropriate mix of existing and next generation technology that will
remain viable well into the 21st century. MEADS is the system that will
satisfy these requirements.
As stated previously, extensive studies have been carried out in an
effort to streamline and reduce the costs of the MEADS program while
satisfying the users requirements. Once an affordable approach has been
selected, fiscal year 00 funding requirements will be established.
Several alternatives are under consideration; U.S. cost share over
the FYDP could vary widely.
National Missile Defense
Question. I have been a strong supporter of the Administration's
``3 plus 3'' plan on development and potential deployment of the NMD
system. I understand that BMDO plans to award the Lead System
Integration (LSI) contract for the NMD system this Spring. The
contractor who wins this competition will research and test a missile
defense capable of providing a ``limited shield'' against attack by a
limited number of long-range missiles directed at U.S. territory. It
will be the first step toward what could evolve into a 10-year, $10
billion program designed to be deployed by 2003.
I believe we ought to go forward with some type of NMD system if,
in the year 2000, our intelligence reports suggests a clear threat
exists. However, the TMD threat in my judgment is undeniable, immediate
and serious. I worry that if, in the year 2000, a decision is made to
deploy an NMD system, billions of dollars could be diverted from TMD
accounts to finance an NMD system.
Do you believe we currently have the right budgetary balance
between NMD and TMD systems?
If we decide to proceed with an NMD system in the year 2000, what
would be the impact on the TMD budget. Would we be able to retain all
the current TMD programs in development at their projected levels of
funding?
If in the year 2000, intelligence reports suggest that an NMD
system is not needed, how much money would be required annually to
maintain a hedge for deploying an NMD system in the future?
Under the ``3 plus 3'' program, and NMD system would have to be
deployed within three years of the time that a decision was made to go
forward with production. The aggressive nature of such a schedule has
been met with some skepticism by the defense community. A December GAO
study raised strong doubts about this compressed time-frame. The report
said that ``developing and deploying a national missile defense system
in the time allotted under the three plus three program will be a
significant challenge for DoD given its past history with other weapons
systems''.
Can you comment on the GAO report?
Are you confident that an NMD system can be deployed in the time-
frame mandated under the ``3 plus 3'' plan.
Answer. Yes. Sufficient NMD funds are programmed to comply with DoD
guidance to provide for an informed deployment decision by fiscal year
2000. With the exception of a modest technology program and normal
management and support requirements, the balance of funds are allocated
to the TMD programs which are somewhat resource-constrained. However,
any shift of funds from NMD to TMD would undermine our ability to meet
our NMD objectives for fiscal year 2000.
If BMDO were directed in fiscal year 2000 to begin deploying a NMD
system by fiscal year 2003, and to do so using currently-programmed
BMDO funds, then approximately 75 percent of TMD funds for the next
several years would have to be transferred to the NMD mission area.
This would be catastrophic, and clearly would result in several core
TMD program terminations as it would be wasteful and ineffective (and,
perhaps, unfeasible) to stretch all program schedules by three to four
years just to keep all programs alive. BMDO planning has always assumed
that if a deployment decision were made, it would be the result of a
rapidly emerging missile threat, and that it would be accompanied by
the additional resources needed to acquire and deploy an NMD system.
We are currently in the process of evaluating how much will be
needed. As you are aware, the fiscal year 1999 request is for RDT&E to
permit a deployment decision in fiscal year 2000. The exact amount that
will be needed in that budget for the years beyond fiscal year 2000 is
being derived as a part of the fiscal year 2000-2005 Future Years
Defense Program and will be submitted next year as part of the fiscal
year 2000 budget request.
I concur with the Department letter attached to the GAO report.
If the threat warrants a deployment and we continue the successful
execution of the first three years, I am confident we can deploy a
system by 2003. However, schedule risk remains high.
Arrow Missile System
Question. I have always been a strong supporter of the Arrow
program and am delighted with the technical success Arrow has enjoyed
to this point. I understand that the Israeli government has approached
the United States about the possibility of obligating somewhere around
$107 million for a third Arrow battery to complement the two in
existence in the northern and southern regions of the country.
Where does this proposal stand at this point?
Recognizing this is an open hearing, what can you tell the
subcommittee about the current missile defense threat faced by Israel
right now?
How much value added would a third Arrow battery bring to Israel's
missile defense capability?
How much of the cost of the Arrow battery does proposed $170
million cover?
Answer. The Israeli Ministry of Defense presented a proposal for
the third battery to the Department of Defense in January. The Ministry
is seeking funding support for the additional Arrow battery in response
to the emerging medium range ballistic missile threat in the region.
The Israeli Defense Minister will be visiting the Department of Defense
later this month at which time the third battery, as well as other
Israeli defense issues, will be discussed.
Presently, Israel faces the same threats that were evident during
the Gulf War. However, it has been widely reported that Iran is
aggressively developing a medium range ballistic missile that could be
fielded in the very near time frame. Much of Israel would be within
range of this emerging longer range threat, and much sooner than
expected. This threat will tax Israel's planned Arrow deployment in the
near-term and results in the Israeli request for U.S. funding support
for an additional Arrow battery.
A third Arrow battery would recapture the lost battlespace and
robustness, e.g., overlapping coverage, that would result from the
introduction the region of a longer range threat.
The Government of Israel has indicated that about $170 million will
buy a complete third battery that includes radar, BM/C3,
launcher control, launchers and interceptors.
Iran Missile Production
Question. There have been a number of reports alleging that the
Iranian government is engaged in a crash program to field two medium-
range missiles, Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 within the next year or two. The
missiles could have enough range to hit targets throughout the Middle
East and a longer range version may eventually be able to target
Europe. Recent reports have further alleged that the Russians are
carrying out secret missile technology transfers to Iran to assist them
in that effort.
How would PAC-3--our most mature TMD system--in current
configuration fare against a Shahab-3 or Shahab-4 missile?
How would a fully configured PAC-3 fare against the same threat?
What can you tell us about Arrow's capacity to meet Shahab-3 and
Shahab-4 threat?
Answer. The lower tier systems, which include PATRIOT, were not
specifically designed to deal with the medium range ballistic missile
(MRBM) threat. Analytically, however, we can show some limited PATRIOT
performance against the Shahab-3, to the degree that the Shahab-3
program is understood. Using the currently deployed PAC-3,
configuration 2 with the Guidance Enhanced Missile (GEM) there is a
very limited capability against the Shahab-3. Using the PAC-3,
configuration 3, including the PAC-3 interceptor, currently under test,
there remains a capable system performance against the Shahab-3.
However, this assumes near-ideal conditions and requires that the
PATRIOT be cued by an external source, such as other radars planned for
the Theater Missile Defense Family of Systems. This analysis was drawn
from a variety of sources--the Services and their Program Executive
Officers, Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization (JTAMDO),
Atlantic Command (ACOM), and Central Command (CENTCOM). Very little is
known about the Shahab-4, therefore, our analytic capabilities are
limited in assessing performance against this threat.
Our analysis shows that a fully configured PAC-3 would have better
performance against the same threat. However, the PAC-3 system was
designed to defend against threats of shorter ranges. As in the case of
the current configuration for PATRIOT, analysis of PAC-3 performance
has shown that this capability can be enhanced through the use of
external sensors and radars. This requires full integration of, and
interoperability between, the PAC-3 and other elements of the Family of
Systems. Therefore, BMDO has recommended increased funding for the
Joint Composite Tracking Network (JCTN) as a priority. When the upper
tier systems are deployed (THAAD and Navy Theater Wide), analysis shows
that these systems will have good capability to defeat the Iranian MRBM
threat. This is not surprising since this is precisely what they have
been designed to do.
Increasing the intensity of the systems engineering and risk
reduction activities associated with the integration and
interoperability of the Family of Systems will help ensure that full
capability will be available in the timeframe that these MRBM threats
will be deployed. This includes enhancing the capability of the lower
tier systems that will be fielded first, such as PAC-3, for potential
use against an Iranian MRBM threat.
The Arrow Weapon System possesses some capability against the
Shahab-3. Arrow performance against the Shahab-4 has not been assessed.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Dicks.]
W I T N E S S E S
----------
Page
Campbell, Lt. Gen. W. H.......................................... 1
Douglass, J. W................................................... 121
Kern, Lt. Gen. P. J.............................................. 1
Lautenbacher, Vice Adm. C. C., Jr................................ 121
Lyles, Lt. Gen. L. L............................................. 355
Muellner, Lt. Gen. G. K.......................................... 247
Oscar, Dr. K. J.................................................. 1
Oster, Lt. Gen. J. W............................................. 121
I N D E X
----------
AIR FORCE ACQUISITION PROGRAMS
Page
Acquisition Reform............................................... 345
Airborne Laser (ABL) Program...................................324, 333
Air Force Mission Support System (AFMSS)......................... 343
Aircraft Programs:
Boeing 757 Aircraft.......................................... 328
Bomber Force................................................. 315
B-1 Bomber Upgrades....................................317, 331
B-2 Bomber Upgrades...................................... 332
Weaponization of B-1 and B-2............................. 318
C-17 Aircraft................................................ 341
CV-22 Aircraft............................................... 350
F-22 Aircraft..............................................329, 330
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS)
Aircraft................................................... 329
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)................................... 338
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV)......................... 342
Global Air Traffic Management (GATM)............................. 339
Inflation Adjustments, Impact of Outyear......................... 348
Information Technology Management Reform Act..................... 352
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) Modernization.......... 344
Introduction..................................................... 247
Jammers, Incorporating........................................... 329
Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM)..................319, 346
Large Aircraft Reengine Study..................................327, 347
Mission Planning................................................. 325
Precision Guided Munitions (PGM) Technical Problems.............. 344
Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)........................... 328
Recent ``Hacker'' Attacks......................................324, 340
Selling Key Technologies Abroad.................................. 350
Shortfalls in Baseline Programs.................................. 348
Software Programmers, Availability of............................ 347
Space, Air Force Vision for...................................... 320
Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS)--High Component.............. 343
Space Launch..................................................... 321
Statement of Lieutenant General George K. Muellner............... 255
Summary Statement of General Muellner............................ 247
Air Force Acquisition........................................ 254
Air Superiority.............................................. 248
Cost Reductions.............................................. 254
General Reduction............................................ 248
Global Attack................................................ 250
Information Superiority...................................... 252
Meeting the Warfighter's Needs............................... 247
Modernization Account Health................................. 247
Precision Engagement......................................... 251
Rapid Global Mobility........................................ 252
Revolution in Business Affairs............................... 253
Science and Technology....................................... 253
Space Superiority............................................ 249
Weapons...................................................... 251
Supplemental and General Reductions.............................. 315
Year 2000 Computer Problem.....................................323, 351
ARMY ACQUISITION PROGRAMS
Abrams Tank Upgrade Program.................................49, 88, 117
Army Ability to Support Two Major Theater Wars (MTW) Strategy 118
Acquisition Reform............................................... 106
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD)................. 109
Aerostat Program................................................. 71
Aviation Modernization Plan...................................... 78
Utility Helicopter Modernization Plan........................ 79
Ammunition.......................................................44, 97
Sales of Excess, Obsolete, or Unserviceable Ammunition....... 98
Storage and Maintenance of Ammunition........................ 98
Unfunded Items............................................... 113
Wide Area Munition (WAM) Program............................. 97
Black Hawk Helicopter.......................................46, 53, 118
Multiyear Procurement........................................ 80
Brilliant Anti-Armor Submunition (BAT)........................... 86
Chemical Demilitarization........................................ 104
Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment (ACWA)................. 106
Comanche Helicopter.............................................. 82
Hellfire Missiles for........................................ 82
Crusader Artillery Program.......................................37, 92
Digitization Program, Army....................................... 34
Information Security......................................... 70
Overview..................................................... 60
System Development.......................................... 68
Vulnerability, Digitization.................................. 38
Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV).......................96, 111
Funding, Additional.............................................. 57
High Powered Microwave........................................... 110
Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996............. 102
Introduction..................................................... 1
Kinetic Energy Tank Round........................................ 76
Kiowa Warrior Helicopter......................................... 82
Modernization Plan........................................... 81
Light Tactical Wheeled Vehicles.................................. 95
Missile Programs:
Line-of-Sight Anti-Tank (LOSAT) and Follow-on-to-TOW (FOTT)
Missiles................................................... 87
Longbow Hellfire Missile..................................... 87
Patriot Missile.............................................. 84
Starstreak Missiles.......................................... 112
M113 Upgrade Program--Reactive Armor............................. 94
Modernization, Army:
Account Priorities........................................... 36
Reserve and National Guard................................... 78
Shortfalls................................................... 55
Top Modernization Programs................................... 45
National Defense Panel...........................................41, 58
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Army................. 107
Smokeless Nitrocellulose......................................... 111
Statement of Kenneth J. Oscar and Lieutenant General Paul J.
Kern, The Joint................................................ 5
Summary Statement of General Campbell............................ 34
Summary Statement of General Kern................................ 33
Summary Statement of Mr. Oscar................................... 2
Tactical Radios.................................................. 99
Technology Base Funding.......................................... 42
Truck Programs................................................... 46
Truck Safety..................................................... 54
Year 2000 (Y2K) Problem.......................................... 101
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE ORGANIZATION
Advanced Technology.............................................. 441
Airborne Laser (ABL) Program....................397, 405, 412, 433, 448
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty............................409, 443
ARROW Missile System......................................436, 448, 453
Boost Phase Intercept............................................ 405
Fiscal Year 1999 Budget Request.................................. 414
Global Positioning System........................................ 412
Introduction..................................................... 355
Iran Missile Act................................................. 444
Iran Missile Production.......................................... 454
Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS)................410, 437, 452
Missile Treat.................................................... 408
National Missile Defense.............................396, 438, 447, 453
Schedule and Technical Risks................................. 440
Navy Area Program (Lower Tier)................................... 416
Funding for Modifications to AEGIS Cruisers and Destroyers... 420
GAO Concerns Regarding Schedule.............................. 418
Navy Theater-Wide (Upper Tier)................................... 429
Definition of Program........................................ 431
PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3).....................400, 421, 451
Remarks of Mr. Dicks............................................. 355
Space Based Laser................................................ 442
Statement of Lieutenant General Lester L. Lyles.................. 366
Summary Statement of General Lyles............................... 356
Advanced Technology.......................................... 364
Airborne Laser (ABL) Program................................. 362
BMDO Priorities.............................................. 357
Fiscal Year 1999 Budget Request.............................. 358
Flight Tests Delays.......................................... 360
Interoperability............................................. 357
Management Improvements...................................... 358
Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS)................... 360
National Missile Defense..................................... 362
Navy Area Program (Lower Tier)............................... 359
Navy Theater-Wide (Upper Tier)............................... 359
PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3)........................ 358
Summary...................................................... 365
Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)................... 359
Theater Missile Defense...................................... 362
Supplemental Missile Defense Funding............................. 406
Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)...........396, 399, 424, 450
Substantial Increased Cost................................... 428
User Operational Evaluation System (UOES).................... 427
White Sands Missile Range........................................ 400
NAVY AND MARINE CORPS ACQUISITION PROGRAMS
300 Ship Navy.................................................... 175
Aerostat Program................................................. 228
Aircraft programs:
CG-47 Upgrades............................................... 200
CH-60 Helicopter............................................. 229
Common Support Aircraft (CSA)................................ 223
E-2C Aircraft Multiyear Procurement.......................... 201
F/A-18E/F Aircraft........................................... 175
Blue Ribbon Panel........................................ 170
Budget................................................... 206
Performance (Wing-Drop)................................168, 206
Joint Strike Fighter.......................................197, 207
Alternate Engine Program................................. 171
SH-60R Helicopter............................................ 230
V-22 Osprey Aircraft.......................................192, 208
Ammunition Programs............................................189, 208
Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAV)................................ 238
Arsenal Ship Lessons Learned..................................... 200
Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF).............. 239
Commandant's Warfighting Laboratory.............................. 197
Contingency Deployments.......................................... 174
CVN-77 Aircraft Carrier.......................................... 211
CVX Aircraft Carrier.................................179, 195, 198, 212
DD-21 Destroyer................................................177, 218
Teaming...................................................... 199
DDG-51 Destroyer:
SQQ-89 ASW Capability........................................ 214
Susceptibility to Torpedo Attack............................. 213
Defense Features on Commercial Ships............................. 223
Dehumidified Preservation of Aircraft............................ 224
Depots, Privatizing.............................................. 174
Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) and the Rolling Airframe
Missile (RAM).................................................. 225
Ground/Collision Avoidance Systems............................... 193
Helicopter Avionics Commonality.................................. 231
Information Technology Management Reform Act (ITMRA)............. 245
Infrared Detection of Advanced Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles......... 224
Intercooled Recuperative (ICR) Gas Turbine Engine................ 222
Introduction..................................................... 121
Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) Service Life Extension Program
(SLEP)......................................................... 217
Light Tactical Vehicle Replacement (LTVR) Program................ 234
Light Weight 155 mm Howitzer Program............................. 231
Logistics Vehicle System Replacement Program (LVSR).............. 232
LPD-17 Amphibious Transport Dock Ship............................ 209
Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) Program............... 236
Mine Warfare..................................................... 200
Modular Shipbuilding............................................. 189
Multiyear Contracts, Increased Use of............................ 202
New Attack Submarine (NSSN)....................................188, 214
Penguin Missile Program.......................................... 196
Predator Anti-Tank Missile System................................ 237
Ship Displays.................................................... 191
Ship Self Defense System.......................................185, 204
Shipbuilding Industrial Base Study.............................178, 198
Shipbuilding Program...........................................176, 198
Build and Charter............................................ 173
Strategic Sealift/Large Medium Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off Ships
(LMSR)......................................................... 216
SSBN to SSGN Conversion.......................................... 197
SSN-21 SEAWOLF Submarine..................................166, 187, 195
Cost Cap..................................................... 200
Performance.................................................. 203
Statement of John W. Douglass, Vice Admiral Conrad C.
Lautenbacher, Jr. and Lieutenant General Jeffrey W. Oster, The
Joint.......................................................... 123
Summary Statement of Mr. Douglass................................ 122
Aircraft Production.......................................... 153
Budget Overview.............................................. 152
CVN-77 Aircraft Carrier...................................... 155
DD-21 Destroyer.............................................. 155
DDG-51 Destroyer............................................. 155
F/A-18E/F Aircraft........................................... 153
Joint Strike Fighter......................................... 154
LPD-17 Amphibious Transport Dock Ship........................ 156
Marine Corps Programs........................................ 156
Navy and Marine Corps Acquisition............................ 152
Navy Trendlines.............................................. 153
New Attack Submarine......................................... 156
Shipbuilding Programs........................................ 155
SSN-21 SEAWOLF Submarine..................................... 156
V-22 Osprey Aircraft......................................... 154
Surface Fire Capacity............................................ 200
Tactical Tomahawk Missile.................................187, 201, 227
Towed Decoys..................................................... 171
Trident Conversion............................................... 201
Trident Submarine Backfit......................................184, 221
Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAVs)............................. 167
Year 200 Computer Problem......................................181, 242