[House Hearing, 105 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 1998
_______________________________________________________________________
HEARINGS
BEFORE A
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida, Chairman
JOSEPH M. McDADE, Pennsylvania JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania
BOB LIVINGSTON, Louisiana NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington
JERRY LEWIS, California W. G. (BILL) HEFNER, North Carolina
JOE SKEEN, New Mexico MARTIN OLAV SABO, Minnesota
DAVID L. HOBSON, Ohio JULIAN C. DIXON, California
HENRY BONILLA, Texas PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana
GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, Jr.,
Washington
ERNEST J. ISTOOK, Jr., Oklahoma
RANDY ``DUKE'' CUNNINGHAM,
California
NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Livingston, as Chairman of the Full
Committee, and Mr. Obey, as Ranking Minority Member of the Full
Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees.
Kevin M. Roper, John G. Plashal, David F. Kilian, Alicia Jones, Juliet
Pacquing,P Gregory J. Walters, Patricia Ryan, Doug Gregory, Paul W.
Juola, Tina Jonas, andP Steven D. Nixon, Staff Assistants
Stacy A. Trimble and Jennifer Mummert, Administrative Aides
________
PART 4
Page
Army Acquisition Programs........................................ 1
Navy and Marine Corps Acquisition Programs....................... 131
Air Force Acquisition Programs................................... 297
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Defense-Wide:
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization............................ 425
Future Bombers................................................... 525
________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations
________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
77-432 WASHINGTON : 2002
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
BOB LIVINGSTON, Louisiana, Chairman
JOSEPH M. McDADE, Pennsylvania DAVID R. OBEY, Wisconsin
C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida SIDNEY R. YATES, Illinois
RALPH REGULA, Ohio LOUIS STOKES, Ohio
JERRY LEWIS, California JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania
JOHN EDWARD PORTER, Illinois NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington
HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky MARTIN OLAV SABO, Minnesota
JOE SKEEN, New Mexico JULIAN C. DIXON, California
FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia VIC FAZIO, California
TOM DeLAY, Texas W. G. (BILL) HEFNER, North Carolina
JIM KOLBE, Arizona STENY H. HOYER, Maryland
RON PACKARD, California ALAN B. MOLLOHAN, West Virginia
SONNY CALLAHAN, Alabama MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio
JAMES T. WALSH, New York DAVID E. SKAGGS, Colorado
CHARLES H. TAYLOR, North Carolina NANCY PELOSI, California
DAVID L. HOBSON, Ohio PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana
ERNEST J. ISTOOK, Jr., Oklahoma THOMAS M. FOGLIETTA, Pennsylvania
HENRY BONILLA, Texas ESTEBAN EDWARD TORRES, California
JOE KNOLLENBERG, Michigan NITA M. LOWEY, New York
DAN MILLER, Florida JOSE E. SERRANO, New York
JAY DICKEY, Arkansas ROSA L. DeLAURO, Connecticut
JACK KINGSTON, Georgia JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia
MIKE PARKER, Mississippi JOHN W. OLVER, Massachusetts
RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey ED PASTOR, Arizona
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi CARRIE P. MEEK, Florida
MICHAEL P. FORBES, New York DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina
GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, Jr., CHET EDWARDS, Texas
Washington
MARK W. NEUMANN, Wisconsin
RANDY ``DUKE'' CUNNINGHAM,
California
TODD TIAHRT, Kansas
ZACH WAMP, Tennessee
TOM LATHAM, Iowa
ANNE M. NORTHUP, Kentucky
ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama
James W. Dyer, Clerk and Staff Director
(ii)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 1998
----------
Thursday, March 13, 1997.
ARMY ACQUISITION PROGRAMS
WITNESSES
GILBERT F. DECKER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, RESEARCH,
DEVELOPMENT & ACQUISITION
LIEUTENANT GENERAL RONALD V. HITE, UNITED STATES ARMY, MILITARY DEPUTY
TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT &
ACQUISITION
LIEUTENANT GENERAL OTTO J. GUENTHER, UNITED STATES ARMY, DIRECTOR FOR
INFORMATION SYSTEMS FOR COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND
COMPUTERS
Introduction
Mr. Young. The Committee will come to order.
This morning we had an excellent hearing with Secretary
West and General Reimer, and this afternoon we will be
conducting a hearing specifically on acquisition.
We are very happy to welcome back Mr. Decker and Lieutenant
General Hite and General Guenther. We are pleased to have all
three of you at the table.
I made a lengthy opening statement this morning. I am not
going to repeat it. I am concerned that the budget is not
adequate to maintain the tremendous amount of OPTEMPO that we
are seeing, and so I will not repeat that for you.
This afternoon's questioning will probably go to that same
issue. Are we doing everything that we need to do to take care
of our Army and make sure that we have adequate training,
readiness capabilities and are we planning enough modernization
so that ten years from now, twenty years from now, the Army is
still what we want it to be?
We are happy to welcome you here. We will hear your
statements in just a minute.
Let me ask Mr. Murtha if he has any opening comments.
Mr. Murtha. No.
Mr. Young. Okay.
Mr. Decker, we will place all of your statements in their
entirety in our record, and you feel free to summarize in any
way you like, and when you have completed at your leisure, we
will have some questions.
[Chairman Young's prepared statement follows:]
Opening Statement
This afternoon, the Committee will conduct a hearing on Army
acquisition programs.
We are pleased to welcome Mr. Gil Decker, the Assistant Secretary
of the Army for Research, Development, and Acquisition. He is
accompanied by Lieutenant General Ronald Hite, the Military Deputy to
the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development and
Acquisition.
The Army's overall budget has been declining steadily over the last
ten years and most of the reductions have been levied against
modernization programs. The fiscal year 1998 budget continues this
trend. The Army's fiscal year 1998 budget request for modernization
programs is $2.9 billion less than last year; or a 15% cut. Most of the
Army's aircraft, missile, vehicle, and ammunition accounts are below
last year's level and rarely at levels that make economic or
operational sense. Based on the fiscal year 1998 budget, for the
immediate future our soldiers will be flying 40 year old cargo
helicopters, driving 30 year old trucks, and using war reserve
ammunition for training.
We are concerned that this budget will not supply our soldiers with
the right types and quantities of equipment. For example, the fiscal
year 1998 budget proposes no funds for heavy tactical vehicles, even
though the Army is short of its requirements by hundreds of vehicles
and we are relying on trucks which have exceeded their original design
life.
Under this budget, the Army is procuring items at such low
quantities and stretching out development for so long that it actually
increases the cost, making it even more difficult to buy the equipment
necessary to support Army missions. For example, the fiscal year 1998
budget proposes procuring only 12 Improved Recovery Vehicles although
the annual economic rate of production is 24 vehicles.
Finally, by failing to put new equipment in the field, we are only
increasing the long term costs of maintaining and operating old weapon
systems. We see this in your helicopter programs, where the fiscal year
1998 budget proposes terminating Black Hawk production after 1999,
forcing the Army to maintain almost 600 old, Vietnam-era UH-1
helicopters in the fleet.
At the same time we see all these problems in Army procurement, we
have noticed that the Army's 1998 request for research and development
activities is higher than last year's request. We have to ask whether
those R&D activities should come at the expense of producing equipment
which is essential to meet your warfighting requirements today.
During the past two years we have worked hard with the Army to
provide funding increases that you asked us to provide, but it is clear
from your fiscal year 1998 budget that many of these needs are, once
again, being deferred. We want to work with you to identify and remedy
the most pressing shortfalls, and to eliminate budget growth where it
is not needed.
Finally, we understand that this will be the last time Mr. Decker
will testify before our Committee. Mr. Secretary, we will miss your
candor and appreciate all of your efforts to ensure that our nation's
soldiers are equipped with the best equipment available.
Summary Statement of Mr. Decker
Mr. Decker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I promise you faithfully this will be brief. I am sure the
questions and answers are where we will all learn from each
other in the interchange.
Toward the end, I do have a short 5-minute video of some of
the clips of some of the recent successes in our systems that
we field, and I would like to show you that. We will get to
that at the end.
I thank you very much for this opportunity and I thank you
for your kind remarks.
As I begin, I would like to express our very sincere
appreciation for this committee's help and guidance and
thoughts through the last few years in these tough times and
for your very generous support of Army modernization in the
last two years.
We are trying our best to be careful stewards of the
resources provided, but the successes and stability that we are
having would not have been possible without that support.
In addition to Generals Guenther and Hite, I also have here
today Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans,
Major General Ron Adams from Force Development, who is our
partner in harmonizing requirements.
I also have Brigadier General Bill Arbuckle, who is our
Army Ammunition Officer, and if you have any specific questions
in those arenas that come up, I would like to defer to them.
I also have Dr. Fenner Milton, who is my Deputy Assistant
Secretary in Science and Technology.
As you pointed out, we have a detailed written statement,
and I thank you for reading it into the record.
America's Army is today, in my honest opinion, the world's
premier land combat force. We are only the eighth largest Army
in the world, but today, 13 March 1997, I think we are clearly
the best.
And the challenges are great. In terms of mission spectrum
as opposed to mission mass, we are engaged in far more missions
and deployments in more places than ever before and in more
diverse kinds of operations. And if you look over the last
several years, since the world became not bipolar but became
far more diverse, the majority of these deployments have one
thing in common: The bulk of the military participation are men
and women soldiers on the ground. So it is clear that in
today's world, America's Army is the force of choice. And as I
pointed out, the statistics seem to bear this out.
FISCAL YEAR 1998 BUDGET REQUEST
This year, meaning coming into the fiscal year 1998 budget
year, we were faced with some very tough budget choices again
in trying to balance readiness, end strength, quality-of-life
programs and modernization. We have the lowest percentage, a
little less than 15 percent, of the total Department of Defense
Research and Development Acquisition Budget.
In these times of declining resources and squeeze on
resources, modernization in the Army has essentially become a
``design to price'' endeavor. Within this constraint, I would
like to believe that we are getting the biggest bang for the
buck, but it is leaving some unfilled holes for the future.
The fiscal year 1998 budget request funds our highest
priority programs based on our best assessments between
ourselves on the acquisition side and the other Army leadership
on the war-fighting side, and we have attempted to make the
most of these limited resources.
We are continuing to fund at the same level as projected
development of only two new--operating word is new--high payoff
weapons systems and that is Comanche and Crusader. We are
introducing in this budget a new, well-thought-out requirement
for a future Scout and Cavalry vehicle. We have some systems
already in procurement. I won't list them all.
ATACMS-BAT, that is the Army Tactical Missile System with
its brilliant anti-armor submunition package; JAVELIN, the
light infantry antitank weapon, which is absolutely a wonderful
weapon, and we are continuing to maintain procurement of
tactical trucks.
But our main strategy continues to be to extend the lives
and to improve the performance of existing systems by
technology insertion and upgrades. Examples of that are the
ABRAMS M-1A2 tank upgrade; the Bradley M-3 fighting vehicle
upgrade, the Apache D-Model helicopter upgrade; and a series of
power projection Command/Control Communications Infrastructure
programs at our Army installations, to be able to handle the
critical exchange of data as forces deploy overseas to those
locations.
We have had to accept risks in our modernization program in
the near-term to protect readiness and quality of life, which
have been the avowed priorities during this period of drawdowns
and reductions. And so, in fact, modernization in this sparse
environment has been the bill payer.
In this environment, in addition to the specific systems I
have given examples of, and our modernization strategy, our
overall focus is on information dominance. Supporting
information dominance, such as the Army Enterprise Architecture
and the Warfighter Information Network or WINS is critical. We
evolved an Army technical architecture which enables us to be
truly operable in the battlefield and without which we would
not be able to do a digitized Army and create situational
awareness.
Investments in this architecture and in the warfighting
information network will significantly enable the capacity and
velocity of information distribution throughout the battlefield
and throughout our forces.
We have an Information Security program that recognizes
that protecting this information is an important element of
protecting our soldiers.
FORCE XXI AND ARMY-AFTER-NEXT
So where are we headed? The Army set in motion a series of
initiatives to arrive at the 21st Century with the requisite
capabilities, including this information dominance, and we call
this program Army XXI. And that will be the initial product of
our current initiatives.
Army XXI can be viewed as what is happening between now and
the 2010/2015 time frame. It will use the digital technology to
optimize the flow of information and create situational
awareness at all levels on the battlefield.
Beyond Army XXI, the intellectual energy of the Army and
its planning is focused on what we call Army-after-next. As you
can expect, when you are looking out 15 years in the future,
you are looking through a cloudy crystal ball.
But I believe the efforts of the Army and the intellectual
energy and looking at scenarios and looking at requirements in
the future is sufficient enough to really help us factor our
science and technology investments so that the outcomes of
those will be ready when we go the next round of modernization.
We are looking for ways to be more efficient. We have
reduced our infrastructure and we are continuing to make major
reforms in the acquisition process.
As I said, America's Army today is the eighth largest Army,
and thank God it is the first best. It needs to remain that
way.
There are four elements that make the first-best Army:
Quality people, quality training, quality leader development
and quality technology and modernization. And if we fall short
in the long-term in any one of those, we will slip from first
place.
You will recall last year, we demonstrated capabilities of
tomorrow's soldiers. The individual soldier is once again
assuming a dominant role in the warfighting capabilities with
the diverse missions we have, and we are working hard on our
Land Warrior program. We have to place great importance on
enhancing the battlefield capabilities of the individual
soldier. It is a top Army priority, and I am proud to say that
the Soldier Modernization program is moving well.
With that, sir, if I may, I would like to direct your
attention to the video. I think you will find it interesting
and informative, and then I will close my statement.
The Committee proceeded to view the video.
MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS
Mr. Decker. These are FMTV modern trucks, being procured
and fielded as we speak. That is our heavy trucks, or heavy
transport. These systems are being extremely well received by
our soldiers.
That is the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle,
HMMWV, in its many multifarious mission configurations; another
version of the HMMWV. That is the up armored HMMWV, which we
delivered several thousand to Bosnia. Our palletized load
system. One person can load and unload that truck on the
battlefield. Our Forward Air Defense Ground-Based system, which
couples into the Avenger and the Bradley Linebacker, Air
Defense Network; our Patriot system, including the Enhanced
missile.
I mentioned our soldier system. It is moving along very
nicely. Our tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, UAV program. That
system is the Hunter you see flying, doing very, very well at
the National Training Center.
Our Theater High Altitude Area Defense, THAAD system, which
we will talk about later. That is Comanche. I was down
yesterday with Dr. Kaminski and watched it go for a series of
its engineering test flights. It is on schedule and performing
remarkably well at this stage of development. The Enhanced
Position Locating Reporting system, which is also a part of our
digital network on the battlefield.
We finally have a Maneuver Control system, Mobile
Subscriber Equipment, our Single Channel Ground and Airborne
System SINCGARS radios. We have the ground station module for
Joint Survelliance Target A Hack Radio System, JSTARS. And that
is the TAMS, Tactical Missile System with the standard cluster
munitions.
This is the Brilliant Antitank Armor Submunition; the Sense
and Destroy Armor 105 centimeter precision-guided munition; the
ABRAMS M1A2 tank, which we sincerely believe is still the
finest battle tank in the world.
Our Apache Longbow, which the marketplace has proven it is
the best heavy-attack helicopter in the world, and the Bradley
fighting vehicle in its infantry configuration.
Our new Command and Control vehicle that is being used by
the Digitized Brigade at the National Training Center as we
speak; Crusader, our new Advanced Field Artillery system. This
is a schematic of that. It is under early development as we
speak.
Grizzly is a Breacher and a mine-plowing system to clear
land mines. And that is the Javelin, a terrific antitank light
infantry missile.
Mr. Chairman, I know that is a little bit of PR, but it is
illustrative that we have done a lot with what you have given
us.
I think these are wonderful weapons systems. And with that,
I once again want to thank you for having us and that concludes
my opening statement.
[The statement of Mr. Decker follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Young. Mr. Secretary, how about General Hite, do you
have any opening comments, or General Guenther?
General Hite. No, sir.
General Guenther. No, sir.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much. We don't mind the PR,
because we are very proud of this Army as well.
Mr. Decker. Great.
Landwarrior Program
Mr. Young. A lot of those systems that you showed us this
committee had a lot to do with pressing ahead, and there are
some others that you didn't put up there that fall into that
category.
Mr. Murtha.
Mr. Murtha. Well, I noticed the music in the background and
I just wonder, are you going to pipe this music into this new
system you have got for this ground control guy?
I mean, I can imagine, I know you guys are big on this, but
a guy is out in the mud and somebody is sitting back in his
tent, a one Star, and he is watching this guy on a television
set and you have a little music because he doesn't want to get
bored out there, and things are starting to go wrong, and he is
telling him what to do, he has no senses because something is
in his ear and he is watching something over a television set.
Now, are we still spending money on that? I mean, are we
taking away--when I came back from Vietnam, I could feel
people, I could feel people for 6 months, and you know what I
am talking about. You get out in the jungle, you feel them. We
put this stuff on somebody, we are not going to feel it and
somebody back there is going to give them orders that are not
going to work.
I just can't comprehend that we are not wasting a lot of
money on something that is going to not work.
Mr. Decker. That is a very interesting question, sir.
Let me maybe give you a thought on that and then maybe get,
in a simple way, a little bit technical.
When a soldier unit, a real soldier unit, be it a light
infantry unit or somebody with soldiers on the ground, or out
on that kind of a mission and they will be bored more in
today's world, it is a pretty messy environment, whether it is
jungle, whether it is a lone patrol in the desert, whether it
is bad weather, whatever. And you do develop a sixth sense, I
would accept that, but the thing is, when you are in that
obscuration-type environment, you need to see what is around
you and so does your next higher echelon if they are not going
to do something stupid, and one of the things we have
discovered with the Army warfighting experiments down at Fort
Polk, that is the National Training Center for light infantry-
type things as opposed to the desert, which is the heavy stuff.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Secretary, rather than have a long
explanation, I have to come down and see this because I cannot
conceive that this is going to be an advantage to the person
that is out there in the field. So rather than have you go
through a long explanation here, if you will invite me down, I
will go down and take a look at it.
Mr. Decker. You are invited. We will take that for the
record, and let me just make a quick closure then.
Mr. Murtha. Okay.
Mr. Decker. When you go, ask the soldiers about owning the
night--they now own the night--and ask them how they feel about
this kind of equipment, that will be a lot better testimony
than I can give.
Reserve Component Automation System
Mr. Murtha. Now, RCAS is something that we started about
ten years ago, which is the call-up system for Reserve and the
Guard. We took it away from the Army because they did such a
bad job and we gave it to the National Guard. Where is that
program?
Mr. Decker. I will give a very quick, less than one-minute
summary, and I would like for General Guenther to comment.
Today, that is one of the best-managed programs in the National
Guard due to our excellent partnering with the Guard. So we
have turned that program around.
Mr. Murtha. So we can now call up people using that system?
Mr. Decker. We can do that. Now, we have to get it
proliferated to each of the States. One of our first major
demos of that system was in Iowa, and it is beautiful and I
invite you to go see it. So it is a matter of fielding schedule
now, not a system that isn't working.
Mr. Murtha. One other thing that we worry about is the
ability to disrupt our logistics or administrative
capabilities, such as a call-up. Do we have safeguards in that
RCAS system so that they couldn't break into the computer and
disrupt it, a country couldn't do that? So this is a safe,
secure system?
General Guenther. Yes, sir. If we have to send classified,
we go off-line for that, and we use an encryption device. We
assessed the RCAS as to how much classifed traffic you would
pass, which is about two percent. In the RCAS system itself, we
have security built in also to keep hackers out and all the
antiviral protecton stuff already built into the system.
If I might comment on the system itself and where we are,
we are ahead of schedule on what we had projected to you. We
have fielded 35 out of 49 Program Objective Memorandum, POM
sites this year already. We expect to be on schedule all the
way through fielding or even ahead of it.
As you know, this system gets fully fielded out through
'02, and if we keep going the way we are, we will complete the
program ahead of schedule.
Mr. Murtha. I believe that is the latest schedule, that is
what you are ahead of.
General Guenther. Sure. Sir, I would just say that the
reason we are making such progress is because we have team work
between the National Guard and the Reserves, and the Active
component right now.
Mr. Dicks. Well, Mr. Chairman, I want to compliment General
Guenther on this, because a few years ago, maybe it wasn't that
long ago but it seems like it, RCAS was in disastrous shape and
the staff of the committee did a lot of good work on this
issue, we sat down with General Guenther and he promised that
the Army wouldn't take advantage of the National Guard. There
was some concern about that.
And I think that they did work together very cooperatively.
And the contractor also, the present CEO of the company pledged
that they would straighten out the problems, which were largely
part of the company's fault. I think that is saying it
accurately. But I think because Mr. Shrontz did commit to get
this straightened out----
General Guenther. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. That Boeing did finally get this thing rolling.
As I understand it, it is moving in the right direction.
High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
Mr. Murtha. I have got to ask one last question. My HMMWV
seat, now when I went to Bosnia with the President, he was
going to ride off in a HMMWV in my seat. I said, no Mr.
President, I am riding off in that HMMWV seat, and I rode off
and Senator Leahy took a picture of me riding off in the HMMWV.
It is the only one I have ever seen. I mean, is there a HMMWV
seat we can improve so the guy is comfortable in that right-
hand seat in a HMMWV?
Mr. Decker. I have been assured that that newly designed
seat is in procurement, at a reasonable rate, and it is
getting--I don't know what the priorities of them are.
Mr. Murtha. I will tell you if you are riding in the right-
hand seat, the priorities are pretty high. You have got every
kind of seat I have ever seen out there.
Mr. Decker. Okay. But I am told that that program is in
good shape.
General Hite. Sir, you ask me this question every year.
Mr. Murtha. Right.
General Hite. One of these years I am going to get it
right.
Mr. Young. And he is going to keep on asking, too.
General Hite. Yes, sir. We started in 1991, all the HMMWVs
coming off the line after that year have the new seats. We have
also put the upgrade seat into the supply system so commanders
of units can order that seat.
Mr. Murtha. When you say ``improved,'' is this the bucket
seat or is this the one that you showed me a couple of years
ago? Which one is it?
General Hite. It is the--we have had two versions of the
improved one. One came in in 1991, was the first version, of
course. The bucket seat is the one that is in the supply system
now. You can order that.
Mr. Murtha. Okay.
Mr. Dicks. What was wrong with the old seat?
Mr. Murtha. Well, I tell you, it was over a battery. It was
like sitting on this. It just squashed down. It was bad enough
before it got squashed down, but I mean it was absolutely
uncomfortable, and this guy had to sit in this all the time
going over not the smoothest roads in the world.
General Hite. I think Mr. Murtha described it very good
last year in terms of what you had to carry with you after you
had ridden on that seat for a while.
Mr. Murtha. Thank you.
Command and Control Vehicle
Mr. Young. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned the Bradley
Fighting Vehicle, and you had a couple of shots of it on the
video, as well as the Command and Control Vehicle. And I
recently had a chance to observe a Bradley exercise in the
field demonstrating the system, but while I was there, in that
command and control system, this sergeant was showing me this
communications equipment and really bragging about how good it
was and how he could really keep in command of the whole
situation.
He said the only problem was that in order to connect all
of the communications gear together, it took harnesses about
this long that you plugged in one to the other, and he said
there was such a shortage of those harnesses that much of the
time they couldn't use their communications gear.
I wonder if you are aware of the fact that kind of a
shortage exists?
Now, that may only be at the training level, but if it is
at the training level, there is a problem even if you have
plenty at the combat level. What is the situation there,
General?
General Guenther. Yes, sir, I will take that one.
As we have been building up for the National Training
Center, NTC rotation--let me take that first and then take the
question in general. As we have been building up for the NTC
rotation, we did find that we were losing a lot of cables. So
we set up what we call the Consolidated Technical Support
Facility, CTSC, which is a capability to support units as they
were training, a capability to bring extra cables in and
support them totally.
A lot of our cables in the force for those type of coaxial
cables or other connectors that we have for the radios inside
the Tactical Operations Center, we buy through the prison
system. It is very well done by them, and we provide those.
There is a basic load that they take, assessed by the
command in an operating unit, and, sir, I am not aware of any
cable problems right now, and they have been out at the NTC now
for about three weeks. But we have a capability to support them
that we built for the NTC also.
Individual Solidier Equipment
Mr. Young. They also said they were really short on
binoculars and compasses. Those seem like they are fairly
important items for soldiers out fighting a battle. Is this
something that is on your scope?
General Guenther. Sir, was this at Fort Hood?
Mr. Young. No, sir. This was at Fort Carson.
Mr. Decker. We need to look into that, sir. I really--
wasn't aware of this at all. This is new input. I am surprised.
Mr. Young. Well, I added it to my list of things that go on
my big scroll, so we will discuss them with you more in detail
when we get ready to go to markup. But, you know, these kind of
shortages could cause problems in the conduct of the
battlefield.
Mr. Decker. You bet. Those bread-and-butter items are
terribly important. We shouldn't let them get off the screen.
Crusader Program
Mr. Young. Tell me something about where we are with the
Crusader. I think it was either last year or the year before we
tried to get you to accelerate the Crusader program a little.
Is that something that has happened?
Mr. Decker. I have a general view of that, but General Hite
follows those two programs in some detail, so let me turn that
one over to him.
General Hite. The Crusader program is on track now in terms
of cost and performance. We are a little bit behind schedule in
that particular program, but otherwise it is doing very good.
We took a decrement last year of $25 million. Ten of it was in
the propellant line; fifteen was in the regular Crusader line.
That is not the entire cost of the schedule slip. A lot of that
can be blamed primarily on decision-making apparatus when we
switched from liquid propellant to solid propellant, and I was
part of that process.
Mr. Young. Mr. Dicks.
Mr. Dicks. Does ``decrement'' mean cut?
General Hite. Yes.
Mr. Dicks. I thought we were trying to increase that
program.
Mr. Young. I thought our purpose was to try to accelerate
the Crusader program.
Mr. Dicks. It says here in the questions that this cut is
causing a 6-month delay.
Mr. Young. Well, the general just indicated that.
General Hite. Any time you take $25 million out of a
program, it is going to have an impact.
Mr. Young. We didn't take that $25 million out, did we?
General Hite. Yes, sir, you did.
Mr. Young. Let me find out why.
That obviously was a casualty of the conference. We did not
take the $25 million out in our Committee, but in conference.
General Hite. When I say by ``you,'' in Congress.
Mr. Decker. Not you specifically, sir.
General Hite. So it served as a combination of the cut plus
the fact that it took us some time to make a decision, a final
decision, to switch from Liquid Propellant, LP to solid. When
the program manager came to me, I was uneasy with making that
decision without giving a lot more study. We probably studied
it just a little too long, and it got us off schedule a little
bit. But we are okay on the program now. The program is funded
in 1998 where it should be, and we are moving forward with it.
Mr. Young. Good.
Mr. Dicks.
Comanche Helicopter Program
Mr. Dicks. Could you tell me where we are on the Comanche
program?
Mr. Decker. Yes, sir. We are well into the flight test
program of the first vehicle. As you recall, there will be two
vehicles built in this phase. The second one is under
construction as we speak.
We have had about 34 flight hours on the first system. At
the test facility in West Palm Beach, Florida--it is performing
well. The program is using a very rigid scheduling and variance
measuring--and cost variance measuring techniques. It is less
than 1 percent variance from the baseline program. So relative
to the planned program, it is right on target, and that is an
absolutely accurate statement.
Mr. Dicks. Well, last year we added $49 million. Was that
necessary to keep it on track?
Mr. Decker. It certainly keeps the future events on
schedule. There are several things that needed to be put into
the system that would have had to have been delayed until later
in the program relative to making sure we have the low
observable capability that is in the system that it needs.
We did need to increase the flight testing a bit, and we
needed to accelerate the mission equipment package, which is
the reason for existence, that is the sophisticated electronic
reconnaissance gear, in order to keep the second bird on
schedule.
And so those were on schedule, but the schedule was risky,
and your addition last year significantly reduced the risk of
keeping those on schedule.
Mr. Dicks. Now, is the budget this year adequate, or do you
need additional funds this year as well?
Mr. Decker. The budget this year is adequate in relation to
the program plan and schedule that we have laid out for the
dollars that are available. But there will be a period of down
time where we don't have enough funds to test but one vehicle,
and we would like to fill that up with testing time because it
will further reduce risk later in the schedule of the program
when we start building the first six vehicles, and so we could
use some extra money this year to fill that gap.
Mr. Dicks. How much would that require?
Mr. Decker. That is about $40 million.
Theater High Altitude Area Defense System
Mr. Dicks. Okay. Let me ask you, this committee has been
very interested in Theater Missile Defense, and as I understand
it now, we have had our--is it our fourth failure in a row on
the THAAD program?
Mr. Decker. No, sir. It is the third. The first flights of
THAAD was to check out the efficacy and operation of the
missile, and they weren't--it wasn't aimed at a target. So
since we started firing for targets, we have had three failures
in a row.
Mr. Dicks. Well, what is the current status of the program?
Mr. Decker. The status of the program is that we are on
schedule in the sense of--well, actually we are about 4 months
behind schedule in the sense of meeting the test--goals of
test, and we have had these problems that have----
Mr. Dicks. You mean you are meeting the goal of having the
test, not that the tests are successful?
Mr. Decker. Right. Let me explain the rest of that. So in
terms of schedule, had we had successes, we would be in
outstanding shape.
Mr. Dicks. Didn't Dr. Kaminski say that this now is the
program that is under some risk of going forward because of
these failures?
Mr. Decker. Well, I think until we fully understand the
ensemble of the failures, which we have an outside team,
outside of our program management, that is being chaired by
General Lyles, Director, Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization, personally, and we support this fully, going
through a complete overview of the program in total to try to
get at not only the specific technical cause of the failed
hit--there were a lot of successful things that worked about
the missile and the radar on this last one. So this is not a
colossal disaster by any means, but we are scrubbing that down.
But we are concerned there may be somewhere in the system of
management some quality control issues that we haven't
uncovered that we have got to find and screen out, and that
would not be necessarily a technical design flaw, but something
we have got to fix so we don't--all three of the failures we
have had were due to different causes, and that is a problem.
So we would expect in 2 or 3 months to have the--maybe
sooner, to have the results of this scrub team and to give an
assessment of the program.
Mr. Dicks. Can you give us any idea of what kind of
problems these are?
Mr. Decker. Yes, sir. All of the problems relate to the end
game. That is the last couple kilometers as you are closing in
on the target. The tracking of the radar and the feeding of the
control of the missile to get it into the bucket have gone
superbly. There is a seeker, and the seeker images the target,
and you can tell from the ground when it has imaged it, and it
takes over control of the missile and its warhead. The seeker
can determine where the missile is heading in relation to the
target and generate a digital signal through a computer that
fires small little motors that are called divert motors, and
they are part of the attitude divert system, and that steers
the missile in to hit. It is in that end system.
The seekers are a very tricky technology. I will assure you
in any, any missile, defender missile, the whole game is the
seeker and the divert system at the end, and that is where we
are having the trouble. We are getting close, but we haven't
hit it yet.
Mr. Dicks. Who builds the seeker?
Mr. Decker. This--now, this gets a little more complicated.
The seeker design for this missile is the platinum silicide
PtSi. We used the best available technology at the time. Along
the way, we are changing to a new technology; indium antimonide
(InSb) seeker. We have continued to test the missile with the
PtSi seeker until we get the new seeker in, the InSb, ready to
use with confidence in future tests beginning with the next
flight test number 8.
Who is the builder of the double seeker we have now?
General Hite. I forget the name.
Mr. Decker. I am sorry. I will have to take that for the
record. The new seeker will be made down in Corpus. They won
that in a competitive contract.
[The information follows:]
The maker of the old and new seekers is Lockheed Martin
Infra-Red Imaging Systems (LMIRIS), formerly Loral, located in
Lexington, Massachusetts.
Mr. Dicks. Now, we are talking about a later defense here;
isn't that correct?
Mr. Decker. Lockheed Martin Infra-Red Imaging Systems
Corporation is doing the current seeker and the planned seeker
which represents an advancement in technology. The InSb Focal
Plane Array for the seeker is commercially available; and it
has greater performance, costs less, and is easier to produce.
[Clerk's note.--The witness did not discuss the performance
characteristics of the InSb seeker in his original answer.]
Mr. Dicks. Was the change made because of your concerns
about this seeker working, or was it competitive or what?
Mr. Decker. No. The change was made because the basic
imaging material in the seeker we have now, which is platinum
silicide, is not as sensitive and not as responsive to the
signals, it is a thing that forms the image, as the new
material known as indium antimonide. It is a better technology.
It is more stable, more precise and more sensitive. So we made
the decision for that reason, and it will be a better seeker.
Also, the design, the platinum silicide, the seeker is
really two halves, and I am not sure how it ended up that way.
That was before my time. It may have had to do with the kind of
materials. And it is really two seekers in one, and they image
together, and they get coupled through the computer into the
resultant image. And trying to keep that in synchronism--and
one of the failures, one-half of the seeker entirely failed,
and the software wasn't ready to accommodate that. So there
were those kind of deficiencies in the present seeker,
partially due to technology and design, that some time ago we
decided to go to a new design and went out on competition and
awarded that to Raytheon. And our plan----
Mr. Dicks. So when is the first test with the new seeker?
Mr. Decker. Well, I tell you when it was scheduled. We
might delay until next year to make sure we don't have other
problems in the missile review.
When was the next flight schedule?
General Hite. Flight number 8 is scheduled to have the next
seeker in it, sir. We will probably shoot that seeker in that
flight.
Mr. Dicks. When is that going to be?
General Hite. Depending on the results of this failure
investigation we are doing, we are looking at the end of July
or the first--the end of June or the first week of July for
shot number 8, sir.
Mr. Decker. That was the schedule that existed before we
had the failure the other day. We will have to wait.
Mr. Dicks. Well you all are very experienced individuals.
Do you think the new seeker is going to solve the problem, or
do you think there are other problems.
Mr. Decker. I am concerned there are some other problems
somewhere in that total front end assembly beyond just the
seeker, and we have got to find that out. This is the first the
absence----
Mr. Dicks. This is starting to sound a lot like TSSAM.
Mr. Decker. I don't know what TSSAM is.
Mr. Dicks. Well, that was the missile we were going to fire
off all of our airplanes.
General Hite. The TSSAM, yes, sir.
Mr. Decker. No, sir. If we can't get to the root of this to
really understand it, we probably ought to stop.
Mr. Dicks. All right. If you don't have it, though, what
are you going to do? Theater Missile Defense is one of the
great vulnerabilities we faced in the Gulf War. Any time you
deploy forces, if the other side has got cruise missiles or
Scud launchers, you have got to be able to defend these troops.
How are you going to do it if you don't have this?
Mr. Decker. Well, that is a good question, but in my
opinion, if you step back and you look at the base of
technology, engineering, management and experienced talent in
the nation on these highly complicated technologies that make
up these missiles, virtually every program we have, and there
are four of them in major form, the Navy Lower Tier, the Navy
Upper Tier, the PAC-3 upgrade and the THAAD, we have the entire
talent base of the country tied up. So, I mean, I am not sure
where to go if we can't get at the root of this. If I knew
somebody else that was better, we would have them on board.
Mr. Dicks. Well, I didn't necessarily mean that. What you
are saying is there really isn't an alternative. You have got
to get this right.
Mr. Decker. You have got to get this damn thing fixed, but
we don't want to do it and tell you that it is fixed until it
is.
Mr. Dicks. That is what we don't want you to do. But
sometimes, you know, people over in the Defense Department
cancel things prematurely and then----
Mr. Decker. I wasn't hinting at that.
Mr. Dicks. No, I know. But I am not saying that. I am just
saying that my concern is we had to fix the Abrams tank. We had
to fix the Apache helicopter. We had to fix the Bradley. We had
to fix the F-17 airplane. Every one of these things go through
problems.
Mr. Decker. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. And sometimes because the press is bad and
criticism from Capitol Hill, people say, well, we will just
have to cancel the program. Well, if you have got to have it,
you better make the extra effort to try and make it work. And I
don't think we are at the point where you can really say that
this thing can't be redeemed. I hope you guys can figure out
the answer, because I think we desperately need it
Mr. Decker. We do.
Mr. Dicks. We need this capability. And if you don't have
it, which is what I was asking you, what else would you do? If
THAAD was cancelled, what would you do? Would you start a new
program or what?
Mr. Decker. I am not sure starting a new program--I mean,
if there was another base of talent someplace in a company that
wasn't in the ballgame, you might want to try a new team. We
don't have that.
Mr. Dicks. Yes.
Mr. Decker. So we have got to get it fixed.
Patriot Advanced Capability
Mr. Dicks. How are the other programs doing? How is PAC-3
doing?
Mr. Decker. Well, PAC-3 is moving well. I think it is in
good shape.
Mr. Dicks. But that is just the lower part.
General Hite. Yes, sir.
Mr. Decker. Yes. But it has yet to kill a missile. The Navy
Lower Tier----
Mr. Dicks. Has it been able to intercept a missile? I have
seen one video of it we had here a couple of years ago.
Mr. Decker. Yes, sir, it has. The new PAC-3, an upgrade
missile, when is it first firing?
General Hite. September.
Mr. Decker. September is its first firing. It is on track.
Mr. Dicks. And they can't expand that and go higher? If you
could explain it to me, I don't know this as well. Mr. Wilson
was our expert on this. He has left us.
General Hite. Yes, sir.
Sir, there is a possibility that you can do that, if you
take that missile and do some things to it, that is within the
realm of possibility.
Mr. Dicks. It works?
General Hite. It is something that we are looking at, but
it would be a redesign of the missile because it is a much more
stressing environment the higher it goes.
Let me pick up on your point do we stop the program. What I
would say is that this is--this program is in the
demonstration/validation phase, and the purpose of that phase
is to demonstrate and validate technology, find out what your
problems are, and correct your problems before you go in to
full-scale engineering.
Mr. Dicks. Right.
General Hite. When you have problems, you sort them out,
and we are having some problems. The issue now is not the
seeker. We are pretty comfortable with the new seeker that is
coming on. We are pretty comfortable with that. All we were
waiting on was the technology to get to the point where we felt
confident to move that new seeker technology in the missile. We
waited, and we are ready to do that.
Our concern is, of the failures we have had, as Mr. Decker
said, they are all different. That points us to a reliability
or a quality assurance problem. Now, if you are having that
kind of problem, you tighten up the management, find out what
your processes are, are they the right processes, are they
being conducted properly? Or you go and look for someone else
to build a missile. If you look at each one of those firings,
take away the fact that we didn't have an actual intercept, but
look at the tremendous amount of things that have to happen to
get that missile up in the air into the intercept box, all that
equipment worked great; the radar, the BM/C2, the battle
management devices. I mean, that is a big part of the program,
the boosters. The problem is--might be in the reliability or
quality assurance area, and that is what we are looking at. So
which----
Mr. Dicks. It sounds a lot like TSSAM. This was the same
kind of problem we had with that.
General Hite. Would you kill the program for that? I
wouldn't kill the program for that. I would probably--if I
can't get those problems fixed or those quality and reliability
problems, if that is, in fact, what it is, I might look to a
second source for this second missile portion.
Mr. Dicks. Or you bring in a new program manager or try to
get the manager's position.
Is this Texas Instruments? Who is running this one?
General Hite. Lockheed Martin.
Mr. Decker. Lockheed Martin.
Mr. Dicks. I have heard of them.
Mr. Decker. Say again?
Mr. Dicks. I have heard of them.
Are they giving you management attention on this thing?
Mr. Decker. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. Do they understand that they have got to get
this thing fixed?
General Hite. Yes, sir, they are now giving us management
attention.
Mr. Dicks. You say now?
General Hite. My spin on it is I don't think we gave it the
proper management attention early in the program.
Mr. Dicks. Is the Army doing its part in terms of looking
at its own program manager?
General Hite. Yes, sir. We changed our program manager
about 6 months ago. We have an extremely capable and bright
individual running that program, one of the best we have.
Mr. Dicks. How are the two Navy programs? Do you follow
those as well?
Mr. Decker. Well, certainly not in the detail of our two,
but at the micro-level, the Lower Tier, which is the Navy
analogy to Patriot, seems to be coming along quite well. Their
Upper Tier, which is the echelon Spirit, is earlier in the
entire stage in terms of even immaturity than THAAD. It just
got out of sync. It started there. So it is too early to tell
if they are going to have similar problems.
Mr. Dicks. But we are talking about a layered defense;
right?
Mr. Decker. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. Is that what we are trying to do?
Mr. Decker. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. It is area protection plus point protection?
Mr. Decker. It is small area versus large area protection.
Obviously, the Patriot is geared to defending a small area,
with----
Mr. Dicks. An airfield?
Mr. Decker. Envelope and airfield or a small town or a
corps headquarters, whatever, logistics installations, it is
defending that area, but its range of the defense envelope,
where the missiles can intrude and be in there, is fairly big.
But if you go in to the--the physics, if you will, the shorter-
range ballistic missiles, the 3-to-500 kilometer have a
different ballistic reentry coefficient and different speeds
and you can defend them with the Patriot. When you get up to
the 1,000-kilometer range missiles, you have got to get up
higher and get them earlier, and that is why we went to the
layered.
Now, the good news is, for good, better or indifference,
the best intelligence data we have is that the proliferation of
the missiles today and over the next few years are the shorter-
range SCUD class. They are cheaper and they are easy to get. It
will be awhile----
Mr. Dicks. So PAC-3?
Mr. Decker. PAC-3 will provide that initial okay at the
lower tier, but when you get out to 7, 8, 9 years from now you
will begin to see the advent of the 1,000-kilometer missiles.
Mr. Dicks. I have stretched my time here, and I have to
leave, but let me ask one thing.
Are we getting any of these systems into the inventory? Are
we getting any of the new PAC-3s?
Mr. Decker. PAC-3s, the Patriot, with--the enhanced Patriot
II missile is fielded, as we speak.
Mr. Dicks. Right.
Mr. Decker. It has got a limited capability against other
missiles.
Mr. Dicks. Right.
Mr. Decker. And it is better than nothing. The new missile
is scheduled to be fielded beginning in late 1999.
Mr. Dicks. So we have got a year, a couple of years to go?
Mr. Decker. A couple of years to go to get that missile
out.
Mr. Dicks. That is the PAC-3.
Mr. Decker. That is the PAC-3, to get you up to the little
larger envelope.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Decker. Thank you, Mr. Dicks.
I would like to say one thing, I read a little philosophy a
long time ago I saw in a fortune cookie. It said: ``The world
is full of people who gave up just before they would have
succeeded.'' We don't want to do that.
Mr. Dicks. And I think that is a very important point. I
mean, we were reviewing this morning with General Reimer, all
these systems that were criticized in the press. They said they
were terrible and then when we got to DESERT STORM/DESERT
SHIELD and they worked and worked dramatically well. So by
staying with it and fixing up the problems, we got the country
systems with value.
What I worry about is you will cancel this thing and then
it is going to take you years to come back, and we have a big
void here of not having protection for our soldiers.
Mr. Decker. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you.
Mr. McDade. The gentleman from Ohio is recognized.
Family of Heavy Tactical Wheeled Vehicles
Mr. Hobson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have three areas of questions I would like to ask, if I
may.
I have some problems with the way you all buy stuff,
especially in the area of trucks, although I noticed you added
funding for trucks. I didn't get to see the movie, but I want
to add some things about heavy tactical vehicles. You know, you
talk about the importance of them, Mr. Decker, but for the
second year in a row, as I understand it, your budget proposed
no funds to procure heavy tactical vehicles. I assume from that
you have got enough of them, you don't need any more?
And yet in 1999--let's see. In 1998 or 1999, I guess you
are going to come back. I don't know how you are going to do
that. Are you going to start all over again with somebody new?
Mr. Decker. That is a tough one.
Mr. Hobson. I don't like to ask easy ones.
Mr. Decker. No, I know you don't and that is fair. You
shouldn't ask easy ones. You should keep us on our toes.
I think the best answer I can give you on that is we ended
up late in the year with what looked like was going to be an
enormous hit on top of our budget plan to that date. And in
looking at the Army's piece of what that cut was going to be,
the decision of the Army leaders was to say if that cut happens
at that magnitude, we have got to stick with our readiness
budget we submitted and stick with our quality-of-life related
budgets, of which pay is certainly a big piece, and so the cut
was all going to come out of the modernization program.
Well, it turned out the cut wasn't quite as big as we
thought, but we still had to do some things at the end. And
when we got down to what the final bottom-line number was going
to be for the Code Alarm and Research and Development
Acquisition Account, we had to take a program out someplace. I
mean, there was no way to salami-slice it, and I don't believe
in salami-slicing.
Mr. Hobson. Is that going to be cost-effective----
Mr. Decker. No, sir.
Mr. Hobson. To go cold-turkey and then come back?
Mr. Decker. No, no. But it would have been less cost-
effective to kill some other program. And so we didn't fight
the warfighter priorities too hard. We do that a lot on the
basis of efficiencies, because from a warfighter priority view,
we are in better shape with our units that we deploy first with
the heavy trucks than we are with the others. And so we just
said we will take a break for one year so we don't have to
wreck these other programs.
Now, I don't really know if we thought about the
competitive strategy but, in reality, we always compete, but
the maker that is currently making our heavy trucks is an
excellent contractor. They deliver and stand behind their
product. They have other business, and we didn't put them in
jeopardy as a company and so they can restart. It will be
efficient for a restart. So we put all of those thoughts
together and said that is the program we will take out to fit
this budget bogey.
Mr. Hobson. You don't think they are going to be in
jeopardy?
Mr. Decker. I don't know the company is going to be in
jeopardy. It is a good company and they have another base of
business. If you put the company in jeopardy, I would be
concerned, but I don't believe we have done that.
Mr. Hobson. Let me go on and ask about some other vehicles.
Mr. Decker. But it is an inefficient decision, you are
absolutely right.
Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles
Mr. Hobson. How many Medium Tactical Vehicles are sitting
down in Texas rusting, that you haven't accepted or you won't
accept?
General Hite. Sir, I don't have the exact number that are
sitting down there rusting. We have resolved that problem with
the contractor and he has shipped those out several months ago.
We are fielding now those trucks to both Fort Campbell and Fort
Bragg.
Mr. Hobson. The rusty ones?
General Hite. Yes, sir. The ones that have been corrected.
We put them in. We made--we asked the contractor to come up
with a solution to that. The contractor did come up with a
solution to that, gave us a 10-year warranty on the cab that
was rusting and fixed those problems.
The number that was down there, when we testified last
year, was very high. It was like 1,700 or 1,800. That problem
has been resolved now and we are shipping trucks every day we
can out of Texas.
High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles
Mr. Hobson. Let me ask you another question. I want to
switch subjects for a second. The HMMWV, is it a good vehicle?
Does it work?
General Hite. Which one, sir?
Mr. Hobson. HMMWVs.
Mr. Decker. Other than a qualitative answer, but yes, as
far as I know, absolutely, it has got many variances and it has
done yeomen's work on the battlefield.
General Hite. I would add to that, I used to be the program
executive officer to that vehicle many, many years ago, also
tested it for about 5 or 6 or 8 years. It is a good vehicle,
but it is a 1970s' technology vehicle. We are at the point now
where we are starting to overload the vehicle. We are asking
more of the vehicle than it was originally designed to do in
terms of weight, power requirements. Also, the environmental
problems with the vehicle, it does not meet all those.
Mr. Hobson. The reason I asked that, and you anticipated
where I was going because in 1999, as I understand it, you are
going to come back and want to do a whole new vehicle. Based
upon our experiences with new vehicles and how they are
developed, having had some of this experience in my district--
--
General Hite. Yes, sir. I was with you.
Mr. Hobson. And Mr. Wilson who is not here had been through
it at least once or twice before that.
General Hite. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hobson. I think Mr. Murtha and Mr. McDade went through
it.
Mr. Decker. Right.
Mr. Hobson. I do not get really excited when we start
talking about great technology advancements we are going to get
with some of these new vehicles because as--I have got to tell
you, is all I see are cost-overruns, unacceptable vehicles, as
the experience we have had on the warranty problem on the FMTV,
when we begin to do these new things.
Now, one of the things that just happened yesterday, in one
of the other services, which is somewhat encouraging to me, is
that there was a $15 billion mistake, that some people got
together with the contractor and worked it out, which maybe
some people are beginning to get the message after a long, long
time.
General Hite. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hobson. That business can't be the same as before, and
we have got to write these contracts in the beginning, because
the FMTV contract was more expensive to stop than it was to
complete. And that kind of thing just, sir, can't continue on.
We can't afford that kind of stuff.
General Hite. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hobson. So I am worried about 1999. I hope I am going
to be here in 1999, and I don't want to go through this again
and I don't think anybody else does. The problem is, there is
always different program managers, everybody retires and moves
on. We still tend to live with it. So I hope you don't plan on
going through that with some radical design that isn't going to
work in 1999.
General Hite. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hobson. I hope everybody gets the message on that.
General Hite. Yes, sir.
Sir, I understand the message, but I hope you also
understand that these vehicles are getting old and we bought
about 100,000 of them and some of them are 12, 13 years old
now. We do have to upgrade the technology. If an upgraded HMMWV
is an answer to a requirement, that will be, you know, part of
the competition.
Mr. Hobson. Well, I understand. But sometimes some of
that--I have some problems with these advanced fighters. I kind
of like some of the old stuff that works every day. Some of
this stuff works every day. I hate to get into some stuff that
doesn't work, we can't fix and when the warfighters have to use
it, it isn't there.
General Hite. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hobson. But I understand, and we want to work with you.
I think we proved that in the trucks, sir.
General Hite. Sir, you have.
Mr. Hobson. Last year, Congress provided more money for the
trucks than the B-2. Now, nobody wrote about that, but you did.
And this Committee is here to help you, but you have got to
help us, too.
General Hite. Sir, you gave us $242 million last year and
we really appreciated that. That saved the life of the trucks.
Mr. Hobson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General.
Mr. McDade. The gentleman from North Carolina.
THEATER HIGH ALTITUDE AREA DEFENSE SEEKER
Mr. Hefner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would just follow up just a bit on the trucks. A few
years ago we had one of the hearings here and we discovered in
some of the proposals that they had, I don't remember the exact
number, it was like $60 or $70 million to reinvent a truck. And
we got to looking into it, and the only benefit we were going
to get out of this reinventing the truck was it was going to
get a little bit more speed over the road. It wasn't going to
get any advantage when you take it out into the field and what
have you. So now we have an upgrade of the HMMWV, I don't know
how they are doing with the Army, but a lot of folks are
getting fidgety about that, I know.
To follow up on Mr. Dicks' question, how many successes
would you have to have before you would be comfortable with
Theater High Altitude Area Defense system, that you would
really be confident that it would do the job? And the new
seeker, what does it have that the old seeker doesn't?
Mr. Decker. Let's see. Let me take the questions in reverse
order. And I don't want to get into a lot of stuff that even I
don't understand that well. But the new seeker uses a different
material in the little elements that make up the sensors, the
imager. It is like taking a picture and instead of film, you
have this stuff that is sensitive to infrared radiation but it
does form an image. The material in the new seeker is a much
better material that is been proven out. It is more sensitive
to dimmer, dimmer images, instead of bright images and those
things. So it will perform better and it is very much more
mature material.
Also, the design of the other seeker, these two halves, was
not a good way to go. I am not sure how that design was
selected originally. It may have been a derivative of an
earlier design.
So we clearly believe that the new seeker is going to be
more reliable and operate better in that environment.
Mr. Hefner. But let me interrupt. But you don't know it
that was the total problem?
Mr. Decker. No. We selected the new seeker, before we had
the first failure, on other factors. And so we felt all along
that this new seeker, the new seeker design--material was going
to be the right way to go. The old seeker was performing in its
simulations and we said we should go ahead and test with it to
prove out all the missile, and if it worked, we would hit,
until we got to the new seeker. Well, as you know, we have had
the three failures that failed to hit.
Mr. Hefner. How bad did you miss?
Mr. Decker. Do you know how far the missile was the other
day?
General Hite. I do not know about the other day.
Mr. Decker. No. The first one, where the seeker failure
wasn't a problem--we know that miss No. 2, it was a seeker
failure, that was diagnosed carefully and we know why that
seeker failed.
I think it was maybe a half a kilometer.
General Hite. Yes.
Mr. Decker. Because you are getting in to pretty close
velocities, and the last--the seeker failed and it couldn't
order the divert motors to steer it in, but at those speeds
that is fairly close. I mean, everything else on the system
worked because, if you can get it up to about a 10-kilometer
bucket, and the seeker and the divert motors work, you are
going to hit it.
Divert just means little steering rockets that steer it in.
The seeker is telling it where to steer and it steers. That
entire divert rocket, the complete rocket system failed. We
don't know the cause of that failure yet.
Mr. Hefner. How many successes would you have to have?
Mr. Decker. Now, to get to your first question, I could
probably go and do the statistical modeling to deal with our
view--the statistical confidence levels, but my judgment says,
well, certainly more than one, so at least two, probably three,
to where you would feel like you really were there.
Mr. Hefner. And three without a miss?
Mr. Decker. Yes, three hits.
Mr. Hefner. And you would feel comfortable----
Mr. Decker. If you had two hits and a failure, you would be
in a dilemma.
Mr. Hefner. If you had two we were on to something?
Mr. Decker. I would feel we were on to something. And if
you had two in a row and a third failure, and it was an
equipment failure rather than a design failure, I wouldn't feel
that badly. It is kind of a judgment call there, but don't take
that as gospel. I am giving you just a judgment view.
PATRIOT MISSILE
Mr. Hefner. I understand.
Was the Patriot which we kept alive around here for many,
many years, and it became the hero in the Gulf----
Mr. Decker. Right.
Mr. Hefner. How really effective, when you did all of your
analysis after the Persian Gulf was over, how effective was the
Patriot?
Mr. Decker. In the Persian Gulf?
Mr. Hefner. Yes.
Mr. Decker. In all honesty, Mr. Hefner, and I am not
copping out, I have never gone and looked at whatever hard data
exists. It did apparently hit one of the incoming Scuds on one
occasion. But in terms of hard data, I am going to turn it over
to General Adams. He may not know the answer, either.
I don't know if we ever had any hard data that might be
collected on a test run that says we know there were these many
missiles coming in over a period of time, and we actually hit
this many. It is a controversial subject. It clearly hit at
least one in those engagements.
Mr. Hefner. Okay. I have a couple of questions.
General Adams. There was a study, Mr. Hefner, done
immediately after the Gulf War because, as the Secretary
indicated, there was quite a bit of controversy, and so we have
some numbers. I don't recall exactly, but the documentation
that was looked at at the time, indicated we had a 70 percent
success rate.
[Clerk's note.--General Adams testified during the hearing
that ``we were 80 percent confident that we had an 80 percent
hit.'']
Mr. Hefner. You had an 80 percent hit on that one, we know,
right?
General Adams. Sir, we were 70 percent successful.
Mr. Hefner. The reason I ask, the Patriot has a very
interesting history around here. It goes back a long, long way,
as you gentlemen know.
I have a couple more questions here, and you can do this
one for the record for me.
Mr. Decker. I will answer it.
ABRAMS TANK
Mr. Hefner. The M-1 tank, there have been press reports
suggesting that the Army intends to indefinitely defer fielding
M1A2 tanks to the Second Division in Korea in favor of
providing a more modern tank to the experimental digitized
division.
What impact would this decision have on this Second
Division? And you can do that for the record, if you wish.
Mr. Decker. All right, sir.
[The information follows:]
The Army is considering a four to five year temporary diversion of
120 M1A2 tanks to the experimental digitized division. This temporary
diversion, if approved, will not affect Second Infantry Division
fielding plans. What may impact the fielding of the M1A2 to Korea is an
ongoing Army review of M1A2 requirements and affordability.
Starstreak Missile
Mr. Hefner. I have another on the Starstreak, a lot of
these systems I don't really know--I don't understand all the
intricacies of these. Congress provided funding last year for
phase 2, evaluation of the Starstreak missile on the Apache
helicopter. When will these funds be obligated and when will
phase 2 testing be completed?
Mr. Decker. Just a moment. They have been released to the
Army. They were on hold from OSD. We now have the money, so let
me ask when they will be obligated.
Do we have instructions as to that?
[The information follows:]
The fiscal year 1997 (FY97) were obligated in February 1997 to
fully fund the Phase II contract. Phase II missile firings are
scheduled for completion in October 1998, with the final report
expected in November 1998.
Background: Air-to-Air Starstreak (ATASK) is a two phase effort.
Phase I was initiated in July 1995 to assess the technical feasibility
of the air-to-air Starstreak missile through analysis of integration
design, system effectiveness, and separation test results. Phase I
testing was completed in October 1996 and concluded that the Starstreak
missile could be fired safely from an AH-64A Apache helicopter, and it
was safe to proceed to the next phase. An integrated cost analysis will
be completed as part of Phase I, the results of which are due in April
1997. The Phase II contract, awarded on 20 December 1996, is directed
at the demonstration of the ATASK integration of hardware on an Apache
helicopter, conducting airborne missile launches against aerial
targets, and demonstrating full technical feasibility of the Starstreak
missile as an Air-to-Air (ATA) self defense weapon for the Apache.
ATASK was a congressional add in FY94-FY97 as follows: FY94 (Program
Element (PE) 0203801A, $6 million) and FY95 (PE 0603003A, $3.0 million)
for ground-to-air (GTA) and ATA evaluation of Starstreak respectively
(Congress also added $8 million (PE) 0203801A) FY95 funds, which were
eventually rescinded); FY96 (PE 0603003A, $4 million); and FY97 (PE
0603003A, $15 million). Congress directed the Army to evaluate the air-
to-air missile capability of the Starstreak missile and the FY96 budget
Joint Authorization Conferees specified the AH-64 Apache helicopter as
the platform. Shorts Missile Systems Ltd. is the prime contractor and
McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Systems and Lockheed Martin are major
subcontractors.
General Hite. Phase 2 is working now.
Mr. Decker. It is underway, phase 2 is under way. Once we
got the money from OSD, we were ready to go. And I believe--
Fenner, do you know when phase 2 is scheduled?
General Adams. It began in February of 1997 and will
conclude in November of 1998.
Dr. Milton. I would like to answer that for the record. The
funding has been released and the phase 2 schedule is under
review.
General Hite. December 1998 is when we are supposed to have
all the analysis done.
Mr. Decker. We are supposed to have everything done in the
next year. The actual testing and modeling and all that will be
done ahead of time.
Mr. Hefner. Okay. I have a little three-parter here.
Mr. Decker. We will make an official answer for the record
and give you that.
Mr. Hefner. Okay. Given the availability of funding, is the
Army committed to conducting phase 3 side-by-side evaluation of
the Starstreak and the Stinger missile?
Mr. Decker. No, we are not----
Mr. Hefner. And is further work required to launch a
Stinger from Apache? If so, tell us--describe the additional
work and associated costs.
And finally, what is the projected cost of a phase 3 side-
by-side evaluation?
Mr. Decker. The only answer I know for sure is, no, we
aren't committed to phase 3, and I would appreciate it if we
could take those other costs for the record. I just don't have
them off the top of my head.
[The information follows:]
The following are estimated development costs for a Phase III side
by side evaluation:
Stinger Starstreak
Modification of the Stinger Development of Starstreak launcher for
Universal Launcher and its an Apache Longbow aircraft;
integration onto an Apache integration of the Starstreak missile
Longbow aircraft, and with the fire control radar: $8.0
modification of the existing million
Stinger Air-to-Air launcher to
ensure MIL-STD-1760
compatibility with the Stinger
Universal Launcher: $11.6
million
Launcher qualification $7.0 Launcher qualification $5.0 million
million
Total prior to Side-By- Total prior to Side-By-Side
Side Testing: $18.6 Testing: $13.0 million\1\
million
Phase III Starstreak/Stinger Side-By-Side Testing: $5.0 million
Grand Total: $36.6 million
\1\Does not include $22 million of Starstreak funding for Phases I and
II.
This side-by-side comparison testing includes targets, use of test
range, and final evaluation report. The assumption is that the Army
provides the Stinger Block I missiles and the United Kingdom provides
the Starstreak missiles.
Apart from the development costs associated with Starstreak Phases
I and II, and not even entertaining the costs associated with funding
Phase III, the Army is very concerned that the Starstreak rotorcraft
integration costs in the production phase will prove unaffordable. The
following cost drivers make the Starstreak missile retrofit more of an
affordability issue than originally envisioned: the kits which provide
for the integration of the missile's laser guidance system with the
target acquisition designation system, and missile system integration
with the fire control radar; the cost to retrofit the Longbow Apache
fleet with Starstreak missile launchers; and the replacement of at
least seven secondary structural components in order to withstand the
missile's blast/over pressure effects. On the other hand, the
production costs associated with rotorcraft integration to retrofit the
Longbow Apache fleet with Stinger Block I or II missiles appears to be
minimal: the unit production costs of $100,000 per aircraft (2
launchers), and minor modifications to the aircraft's fire control
radar. With Stinger, no change to the Apache's target acquisition
designation system is needed.
Mr. Hefner. Okay. We would appreciate that.
Mr. Decker. We will give you that. To make sure I
understand, you want to know--well, first, we are not
committed, but if we did a phase 3, what would be the cost of
bringing the Stinger or doing phase 3, really, which would be
Stinger side-by-side with Starstreak from Apache.
And then what was the other question?
Mr. Hefner. What is the projected cost of the phase 3?
Mr. Decker. Okay. That is one question. We will get you
that.
Mr. Hefner. And is further work required to launch a
Stinger from Apache?
Mr. Decker. We will get you the answer to that.
Mr. Hefner. Okay. Since you used a cliche earlier about
giving up just before you succeed----
Mr. Decker. Just before you succeed.
Mr. Hefner. There was a story I heard about the guy who
invented a soft drink, and he called it 1-Up, and when he got
to 6, he quit.
Mr. Decker. I am going to use that in my next speech.
Mr. Hefner. I thank you very much.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Decker. Thank you, sir.
[The information follows:]
To launch Stinger from an Apache, modification of the existing
Stinger Air-to-Air launcher would have to be made to ensure Military
Standard-1760 compatibility, appropriate battery cooling to the
hellfire launcher to accommodate Stinger, and associated launcher
qualification work would need to be conducted as part of a development
program. Total development costs are estimated to be $18.6 million.
After development cost investments for launcher development/
qualification, the cost to retrofit the Longbow Apache fleet would
entail unit production costs of $100,000 per aircraft (2 launchers),
and minor modifications to the aircraft's fire control radar.
Mr. McDade. The gentleman from Indiana.
AMMUNITION
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary, General, thank you very much for coming today.
I would like to talk to you about ammunition, if I could.
My understanding is that the Army's annual consumption of
training ammunition is about $900 million. My understanding of
your budget request for FY 1998 is that for training, and war
reserve, you have asked for about $694 million. As a result,
you will have to use some of your war reserve.
Is this of concern to you, and is there something we on the
Committee should be concerned about?
Mr. Decker. Sir, if I may, that is why I asked General
Arbuckle, our ammunition officer for the whole Army, to come.
He keeps track of this in great detail. There are so many
different types of ammunition, I can't run them around in my
head.
General.
General Arbuckle. Your figures are about right, sir, and
yes, in fact, the Army has been over about the past 3 or 4
years consciously going into war reserves to help offset the
training requirements.
Now, the reason we do this is twofold. One is
affordability, but we also have to note that there is quite a
bit of excess in our war reserve right now as a result of the
Cold War drawdown. So we have assumed, I think, a prudent
strategy, and we are firing some of that excess in training
rather than having to demilitarize it.
Is it of concern? Yes, but it is not a pressing issue that
we have to address right now. In fact, as we look to the
outyears, what we are going to be doing with our training
ammunition is ceasing to dip into the war reserve for those
things that we truly need for a war fight, but not the excess,
instead of going to new procurement to support training. So
this is going to come to an end over the next few years, about
the next 3 years.
Mr. Murtha. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Visclosky. Absolutely.
Mr. Murtha. I am not sure I understand. You say it is a
concern. War reserves are set aside for a specific purpose,
obviously. How serious is it? I mean, I think we need for the
record an answer so we know exactly where we are, because we
put ammunition in many times when you folks don't ask for it
because we know--you have told us there is a problem, and then
when you start using that up, that defeats the very purpose of
what we are trying to accomplish.
So I would appreciate it if you would answer this for the
record so we know exactly where we are with the sustainability
we need with war reserves.
General Arbuckle. Okay. There is a couple of ways I will
come at that, sir.
Mr. Decker. We will give a detailed answer for the record.
Mr. Murtha. Just give it to us for the record.
General Arbuckle. Okay. We will do that, sir.
Mr. Murtha. We need to get it right away. We don't need to
wait until the transcripts come out. We need to see this as we
go through our markup.
General Arbuckle. Absolutely.
Mr. Decker. We will get that information for the record.
[The information follows:]
The Army has sufficient assets (preferred plus suitable
substitutes) to support the National Military Strategy. The following
list of preferred munitions notes the ammunition item and the
approximate asset posture against the Army's stockage objective at the
end of the fiscal year 1998 funded delivery period.
Item Percentage of Stockage Objective
120mm Tank, M829A2, APFSDS-T...................................... 70
120mm Tank, M830A1, MPAT.......................................... 90
120mm Tank, STAFF................................................. \1\0
120mm Mortar, M934A1, HEMO........................................ 20
120mm Mortar, M929A1, Smoke....................................... 100
120mm Mortar, M930, Illuminating.................................. 100
120mm Mortar, M933, HEPD.......................................... 100
155mm SADARM...................................................... 5
155mm, M795, High Explosive....................................... 80
Wide Area Munition................................................ 5
VOLCANO........................................................... 20
Selectable Lightweight Attack Munition............................ 20
40mm, M430, High Explosive-Dual Purpose........................... 100
60mm Mortar, Illum, M721/M767..................................... 90
105mm Artillery, M915/916......................................... 5
105mm Artillery, M913............................................. 100
25mm, M919, APFSDS................................................ 25
25mm, M792, HEI................................................... 100
155mm, Artillery, M549, HE RAP.................................... 100
155mm, Artillery, DPICM, M483A1................................... 250
155mm, Artillery, DPICM, M864.....................................\2\100
AMMUNITION SHORTFALL
155mm, Artillery, M731, ADAM-L.................................... 100
155mm, Artillery, M692, ADAM-S.................................... 100
155mm, Artillery, M718A1, RAAM-L.................................. 100
155mm, Artillery, M741A1, RAAM-S.................................. 35
Mine Clearing Line Charge......................................... 65
2.75'' Rocket, MPSM............................................... 90
155mm, Propelling Charge..........................................\2\100
Fuze, Inductive Set Artillery.....................................\2\100
\1\No procurement planned for 120mm, Tank, STAFF.
\2\Replacements for these three preferred munitions are in the final
stages of research and development.
General Arbuckle. A key point here is, and we will put it
in the record, the majority of the war reserve drawdown we are
doing is, in fact, excess ammunition that we would not require
for the war fight. Again, it is there from the Cold War, a
large stockpile.
Mr. Murtha. Okay.
Mr. Decker. One general comment, a detail for the record.
Part of the issue, when you get into war reserve, is what is
called preferred munition versus the older generation. The
older generation is good ammunition, but it is a big debate. If
you are a CINC in the field, you want 100 percent preferred,
and so if you want to build up to that, we are efficient today.
We will explain all that.
Mr. Murtha. We need to know that. We need to know exactly
where we are.
Mr. Decker. Okay. We will have that answer for the record.
Mr. Visclosky. If I could follow up on the same theme, you
had mentioned part of the equation is affordability. I guess it
would be pretty hard to attach a percentage to that, but is
that a small part of the reason for the drawdown? Is the
majority of the reason because you want to get to 100,000 tons,
as I understand it, by, 2004?
General Arbuckle. Let me break down the ammunition budget
into four pieces to answer that, and I think it will come into
perspective that way.
First is training ammunition. We talked about that briefly.
And because training is connected directly to near term
readiness, obviously we give that priority. So with available
funds, we put that first on training ammunition. We keep it
above 90 percent. That is the way it is in this budget request,
and so that is okay.
The next category is ``demil,'' which you just talked
about, demilitarization. It is either obsolete or excess
ammunition.
Now, we plan to do about $100 million worth of that per
year, and that program has been well supported by Congress and
OSD, so we are in good shape in 1998 on that also.
The third part of the ammunition budget is modernization,
modern munitions, and the Army has been tracking 15 items we
have identified in the modernization category.
In this particular budget request, we are funding--
requesting funds for 5 of those 15.
Mr. Visclosky. Is that of concern to you?
General Arbuckle. Yes. In fact, that is in step with the
rest of the Army approach to funding priorities, i.e., emphasis
on training/readiness, but we pay the bill out of
modernization. That is what is happening with munitions.
Mr. Visclosky. And I think again, for the record, if you
could detail the 5 of the 16 munitions that you are interested
in modernization and where our shortfall is occurring, I would
appreciate that.
General Arbuckle. Absolutely.
And the fourth category is production base. Now, the Army
has ammunition plants where we actually produce ammunition.
Part of the budget goes toward the equipment there, maintaining
it, replacing it, the facilities, infrastructure, environmental
concerns and so forth. That is marginally funded in the budget.
Mr. Visclosky. Marginally, meaning underfunded?
General Arbuckle. Yes.
Mr. Visclosky. So your primary problems are not on demil or
training, it is on the last two categories?
General Arbuckle. Correct. Modern munitions and production
base.
CHEMICAL MUNITIONS DEMILITARIZATION
Mr. Visclosky. Time is short. I know we have a vote.
Mr. Secretary, General, if you could comment just generally
on the problems you are facing as far as chemical
demilitarization.
Mr. Decker. Chemical demilitarization?
Mr. Visclosky. Right.
Mr. Decker. The problems are public fear. Some of it is
legitimate. I think--I understand it. That is an oversimplified
answer. And part of that public fear is a mixed bag, sometimes
intense anti-incineration feeling in the country. There is a
generic anti-incineration feeling in the country to dispose of
any kind of waste, the clean air concerns. There are extremes
in that group that won't let you burn leaves in your backyard
if they had their own way. Others are more thoughtful, but they
would rather not have incineration.
The only proven mature technology that is operating and has
been demonstrated to be safe is the reverse assembly
incineration techniques that we use at Tooele, Utah.
But we do not have universal acceptance of that, even
though we have hard scientific evidence. So the problem is
working with the public, trying to convince them this is the
best and the fastest way to go--we have been partially
successful at that--and getting the permits.
The permits come from the States, not from the Federals in
this case. The Federal law has not seen fit--this is not a
recommendation; it is a statement of fact--to abrogate the
States' permitting responsibilities. So we have to satisfy
eight different States with many different standards to get a
permit to do our facility.
Mr. Visclosky. Let me ask you from a political standpoint,
transportation to several facilities is probably not a
practical solution, just from a monetary perspective?
Mr. Decker. I guarantee you it is not an acceptable
solution. The States that we have had good support and good
understanding and have cooperated, so they want to get rid of
this stuff, have made it very clear we understand you and we
will now trust you, please get rid of this stuff, but don't you
bring one more ounce of this stuff in here. It is just that
simple. And so I would not advocate it.
Mr. Visclosky. From your perspective then, maybe this is
just a question of frustration on my part, is there something
particular we can do? The politics I don't know how we solve.
As far as the allocation of resources to dispose of these in as
efficient a manner as we could, is there anything--I am just
very frustrated.
Mr. Decker. That is a fair and an honest question. I wish I
could give you a pat answer, but the problem really is in
reaching public acceptance of whatever method is chosen so we
can get our permits.
Most of the costs, though, the time to get permits is
taking 5 and 6 years, we estimate, because Governors don't like
to go in the face of a lot of resistance, so they will hold
excess public hearings. And I don't know how to solve that,
except to work at it hard.
The Congress has been very supportive in resources. We have
not been nickeled, but it is just a tough problem.
We have made a lot of progress in the last 3 years. We now
are permitted in Oregon. I didn't think we would ever get a
permit in Oregon, but they finally said, you know, you are
right. So we are starting work on that plan. So we have just
got to slaughter our way through it.
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
TACTICAL HIGH ENERGY LASER SYSTEM
Mr. McDade. Let me underline, if I may, the concerns about
the ammunition. I know you have and you share a lot of them. I
just want to underline my interest in the issue, and we really
want detailed answers from you.
I want to yield to Mr. Hobson in a second, but first let me
ask you about the high energy laser system.
My understanding is that there is no money in the budget to
test the unit that is scheduled, I guess, to be delivered to
the Israelis; is that right?
Mr. Decker. You are talking about the Tactical High Energy
Laser (THEL), or the laser demonstration system that we are
working on in conjunction with the Israelis.
There is a total contract budget, and the contract is in
reasonably good shape in terms of funding. TRW is the prime
contractor in conjunction with a couple of Israeli companies.
The original thoughts--this was a program that got a bit
politicized, and more was promised than could be delivered, and
we had to get that boxed in. So now the system consists of
system design and testing and integration, and it will be
demonstrated at the San Juan Capistrano range in California.
And if it works there, the contract is done. Then it is really
up to whatever the Israelis----
Mr. McDade. You say you have money in the budget to test
it?
Mr. Decker. Well, now, there was a glitch on funding
shortfall.
Mr. McDade. Yes. Mr. Skeen has a great interest, if I may
say, too.
Mr. Decker. I understand.
Mr. McDade. And the information we have is that you didn't
fund the testing.
Mr. Decker. There was a $12 million shortfall created in
1997, and I am not sure. Was that a decrement at OSD, or do you
remember?
General Hite. It was a cost growth.
Mr. Decker. No, it is not a cost growth. We have a fixed
price award fee program. There was some problems in funding
flow there, and we lost----
Mr. McDade. Well, Mr. Decker----
Mr. Decker. We are $12 million short to stay on schedule.
Mr. McDade. And the $12 million is for testing?
Mr. Decker. Well, if you look at the program schedule and
the way the funds flow to get the work done, taken on through
to testing, it is a shortfall in near term work, and if you
used all of the funds doing that, you will have none left to do
the testing.
Mr. McDade. I guess the answer is, yes.
Mr. Decker. I think it is yes, because you have got to do
the near term work, or you will never get to testing.
Mr. McDade. We are glad to hear the answer. Let me get you
on this because I----
Mr. Decker. Well, I am only talking about the testing at
San Juan. We never did commit--we finally got an agreement with
the Israelis that we--they thought we were going to do
additional testing on the side, so we are only going to test it
at San Juan Capistrano.
Mr. McDade. Whatever. The point is that you don't have
money to test the system, nor do you have any money to procure
it for you.
Mr. Decker. We never had any intention of procuring it.
Mr. McDade. Why not?
Mr. Decker. The system is too limited in what it can do
unless you spend a hell of a lot more money. It was driven by a
desire on the Israelis to put it into a fixed station
environment to protect the villages against Katyusha rockets.
Mr. McDade. I saw a tape about 2 years ago of the results
out at White Sands, where the system was knocking out Katyusha
rockets like they were deer in Pennsylvania with you behind the
gun.
Mr. Decker. You saw a tape I never had any knowledge of. I
know of one highly, highly staged demonstration with the
miracle laser that shot one Katyusha.
Mr. McDade. Well, you better look at some additional tapes,
and I will send you one.
Mr. Decker. All right.
Mr. McDade. I will tell you what has got me really
concerned. We had to add money for this program last year, and
several years ago Chairman Murtha took a delegation over to
Korea, and General Luck was there, and his biggest concern was
something popping over the mountain and he has no defense.
This system--and the Air Force is spending, as you know,
about a billion dollars on an airplane-mounted system to get
something in the boost phase, but here you guys are in the
front lines, and you have got no defense, and this system, if
that tape is accurate and what I have been told and Mr. Skeen
has investigated it as well, would be perfect for the defenses
in Korea, of the General's concern about something coming over
that mountain and stopping his activities to reinforce or
whatever the heck he has to do.
It looks to us like it ought to have a very high priority,
and I don't know why there is not more activity on it.
Mr. Decker. Because to perfect the system and make it
tactically hard in an environment that is probably 10 times
more harsh than a C--I mean, a 737 airplane is probably a
billion-dollar program.
Mr. McDade. Well, is it worth $1 billion to get security in
Korea?
Mr. Decker. I am not sure that the probability of success
is as high as our missile defense systems in any reasonable
time frame. That is a judgment call.
[The information follows:]
In support of the joint United States-Israel Nautilus
program, the United States Army Space and Strategic Defense
Command (USASSDC) conducted tracking tests on 14 March 1997.
Using the Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser (MIRACL) system
located at the High Energy Laser Systems Test Facility
(HELSTF), USASSDC conducted low power tracking tests on six
incoming inert rockets. These tests were low power tests using
the MIRACL system and not representative of the power levels or
system required for a tactical configuration. However, the
results and analysis contribute to pointer-tracker algorithm
development in support of the United States-Israel cooperative
Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration (ACTD).
The first and second rockets were launched individually to
verify the target impact point. The MIRACL system, using
developmental THEL ACTD pointer-tracker algorithms,
successfully tracked both rockets. The other four rockets were
launched sequentially, approximately 15 seconds apart. All four
targets were initially acquired with the HELSTF SeaLite Beam
Director, and three out of four were successfully tracked
during the predefined engagement window. Analysis continues in
an effort to determine the cause of an anomaly preventing
successful tracking of one of the four rockets.
Mr. McDade. Well, I will tell you, we have got a big
disconnect, and I would be very, very grateful if you would go
back and take a look and call White Sands and find out if they
tested the system against six incoming rockets and whether or
not they were successful, because the information that we have
is that they were successful.
Mr. Decker. I will certainly do that, sir. I will get you
some information for the record.
Mr. McDade. Give me a call back.
Mr. Decker. Okay.
Mr. McDade. Because it comes down to the question, we have
always been concerned about the vulnerability of the forces in
Korea to that kind of an attack.
Mr. Decker. Yes, sir.
Mr. McDade. And the system has never been in place to try
to stop it. It looks like it might be. That is why I want to
raise it with you, I want to talk to you about it, and I would
appreciate a call.
Mr. Decker. Sure. You bet.
Mr. McDade. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
PROCUREMENT FUNDING
Mr. Hobson. Very quickly, and I will try not to tie you
into this, but I am concerned about your statement that the
Comanche, if fielded; and I would also like to know where the
$50 million went that we put in it last year to help funding
move forward. I am also concerned about the Black Hawks. But we
don't have--I don't think you have time--we only have a couple
of minutes left to vote.
Mr. Decker. I will give you detail for the record, unless
you want an answer now.
Mr. McDade. For the record?
Mr. Hobson. Yes, that is fine.
Mr. McDade. Without objection, for the record, the Chair
recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
Mr. Murtha. I want to know who I am going to ask about this
seat. I understand you are retiring this summer. Who am I going
to ask about this HMMWV seat? You have been in that program for
20 years.
General Hite. Yes, sir. Sir, that is why we have the seat.
Mr. McDade. It took 20 years.
General Hite. It took 20 years.
Mr. McDade. We will have some undoubtedly additional
questions and information.
Mr. Decker. We will be happy to answer any additional
questions for the record. We will get the information on the
envelope post haste. I will put a high priority on that, but we
will get the others over expeditiously as well.
Mr. McDade. We thank you very much for your presentation.
It was, as usual, professional and excellent. We look forward
to working with you.
Mr. Decker. Thank you very much, sir. Thank you all.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Skeen and the
answers thereto follow:]
Test and Evaluation Infrastructure
Question. Mr. Decker, would you comment for the record on the
Army's budget request for Test and Evaluation (T&E) Programs? I am
particularly interested in the Army's proposals, if any, to upgrade
existing infrastructure to keep pace with military modernization
requirements.
Answer. The Army has continued to focus its T&E investment funding
on modernization of the infrastructure. This focus enables the Army to
test increasingly sophisticated weaponry, and to accomplish this
testing more efficiently, utilizing fewer operating resources, and in a
safe and environmentally acceptable manner.
A prime example of the Army's investment of the T&E infrastructure
is the ongoing Test Support Network project at White Sands Missile
Range. This network of modern, digital fiber-optic cable communications
will provide efficient data collection and remote operations through
increased bandwidth and data throughout capabilities, reduced costs to
customers, quicker turnaround time between tests, and signal security.
The Test Support Network alone represents an Army commitment of
approximately $100 million for T&E modernization. The network will
support testing of some of the highest profile weapons programs in the
Army, including the Theater Area Air Defense Program, the Multiple
Launch Rocket System, and the Army Tactical Missile System.
Sustainable instrumentation requirements average $90 million
annually across the Program Objective Memorandum versus a $30 million
annual budget. The major investment focus is the Virtual Proving
Ground, a reengineering of the Army's test capabilities to leverage
modeling, simulation, synthetic environments, high performance
computers and distributed communications in support of Acquisition
Streamlining.
Current investments in virtual test technologies are primarily
directed toward Command, Control, Communications, Computers and
Intelligence and missile testing at White Sands Missile Range and
Redstone Technical Test Center, and support for Comanche helicopter
development and ground vehicle performance modeling. These investments
are proceeding consistent with the limited funding provided.
The Military Construction, Army budget for fiscal year 1998
includes $18 million to complete the construction of a $28 million
National Range Control Center at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico.
The new center replaces an obsolete facility which poses a health and
safety health because of asbestos pollution. The new facility will
enable the Army to manage all range activities consistent with
environmental and safety parameters.
The Maintenance and Repair program for fiscal year 1998 funds $60
million of a $100 million annual requirement. An additional $10 million
is budgeted specifically to rebuild the central stream system for the
Edgewood Area of Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. The total backlog
of repair projects for the Test and Evaluation Command is $300 million.
Question. Does the Army have any unfunded requirements related to
Test and Evaluation (T&E) programs and/or infrastructure? Please
provide for the Subcommittee a listing of such requirements.
Answer. Congress was already provided a list of unfunded Army
requirements on 17 March 1997 and many of the programs and/or
infrastructure were included. The following programs represent the
unfunded requirements in the Army's T&E infrastructure.
The Mobile Automated Instrumented Suite is a mobile real-time
casualty assessment data collection instrument which needs $33.2
million in fiscal year 1998 to accelerate production into one year,
saving $20 million dollars.
The Fire Support Automated Test System is an automated test set for
fire support acquisition which needs $4.2 million in fiscal year 1998
and 1999 to upgrade along with the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical
Data System (AFATDS) software to allow operational testing without
significant test cost growth.
The Army requested an increase in technical test capability for the
U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM) to raise developmental
test operations capability from 62 percent to 80 percent of executable
workload. The request is for approximately $21.7 million and $10.2
million for fiscal years 1998 and 1999 respectively.
The Technical Test Sustainment Instrumentation program would fund
66 percent of the prototype and replacement instrumentation backlog at
the TECOM test centers. The request is for approximately $43.7 and
$45.9 million for fiscal year 1998 and 1999 respectively.
Test Range and Facility Modernization requires $10 million per year
for fiscal year 1998 and 1999 to modernize TECOM test ranges and
facilities. This will ensure TECOM's test capability, improve safety of
test operations and comply with Occupational Safety and Health
Administration guidelines.
Virtual Ground Targets needs approximately $.8 million (fiscal year
1998) and $.5 million (fiscal year 1999). This project will develop
high fidelity virtual ground targets for modeling and simulation
efforts to supplant developmental weapon system support, reducing the
amount and cost of live testing.
The Army requested $.6 million for fiscal year 1998 for the
Universal Drone Control System. These funds will be used to complete
development of a Universal Drone Control System which will eliminate
the need (and high cost) for continued development of custom designed
rotary wing target control systems.
The Army requested $3 million and $4 million for fiscal years 1998
and 1999 respectively to support the US Army Operational Test and
Evaluation Command's new consolidated evaluation mission and to fund
new requirements to evaluate Advanced Technology Demonstrations and
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations.
Finally, the Army requested approximately $6.7 million and $6.9
million in fiscal years 1998 and 1999 respectively for Survivability
Analysis, to include information warfare vulnerability assessment of
Army Information and Tactical Systems.
[Clerk's note.--End of the questions submitted by Mr.
Skeen. Questions submitted by Mr. Hobson and the answers
thereto follow:]
Comanche (RAH-66)
Question. Last year, Congress added $49 million to the Comanche
program to help level out the funding profile and to make a more
efficient development program. If Congress were to make additional
money available for the program, would it bring the number two
prototype to flying status sooner?
Answer. The acceleration of prototype #2 is dependent on the amount
of additional funding that may be provided by Congress as part of the
fiscal year 1998 (FY98) appropriation. While prototype #2 acceleration
is important, restoring the flight test program and accelerating the
reconnaissance mission equipment package design effort is more critical
at this point in the program. The Comanche Program Manager has
developed a prioritized list of areas that would be accelerated if
additional funding is available in FY98. The acceleration of prototype
#2 falls within the items listed if $100 million was added to the
budget request.
Question.Would additional money accomplish tasks that would provide
a more capable aircraft for the demonstration of the so-called EOC
``Early Operational Capability'' aircraft? Specific areas would be low
observables and enhancing communications with other elements of the
joint force.
Answer. Additional funding in FY98 would certainly allow for an
improved program to ensure the reconnaissance capability on the EOC
aircraft was fully tested and would provide the user a more
``production like'' reconnaissance capability to operate during the
field evaluation. Two of the significant areas of added capability
planned if additional funding is provided are enhanced communications
and improved low observable features or characteristics. There are
several low observable features that could be added that would provide
enhanced signature characteristics and give us an opportunity to
evaluate the maintainability and durability before production.
Additional funds would also allow increased functionality with greater
opportunity for communicating in the joint area via voice, data and
imagery. Now that a stable flying platform has been demonstrated during
the flight test program, the priority is on adding the reconnaissance
capability as soon as possible to allow sufficient time to prove out
the design prior to building the EOC aircraft.
Heavy Tactical Vehicles
Question. In your statement, you assert that the Army's tactical
wheeled vehicle program is ``essential to projecting and sustaining the
forces.'' However, your fiscal year 1998 budget request includes no
funds for heavy tactical vehicles. Your fiscal year 1998 request for
light tactical vehicles is $100 million less than your fiscal year 1997
appropriation. Although your statement addressed the need for heavy
tactical vehicles, for the second year in a row, the Army budget
includes no procurement funds for heavy tactical vehicles. General
Reimer, please explain why the Army is not requesting funds for heavy
tactical vehicles?
Answer. Affordability is the reason. The Army prioritizes programs
and, although heavy tactical vehicles are important, funding was
insufficient to cover all our requirements.
Question. Are the requirements for these vehicles fully satisfied?
Answer. The Army's requirement for heavy tactical vehicles have not
been met. The required/on-hand quantities are: (1) Palletized Load
System (PLS)-3,711/2,277, (2) PLS Trailers-2,891/1,195, (3) PLS
Flatracks-55,626/10,059, (4) Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck
(HEMTT)-13,203/12,165 (HEMTT Wreckers-2,483/1,630 and HEMTT Tankers-
4,842/4073), and (5) Heavy Equipment Transporter System-2,412/1,358.
Question. Does the Army intend to procure additional heavy tactical
trucks in the future? If so, which ones?
Answer. As stated in the fiscal year 1998 proposed President's
Budget, in the future, the Army intends to procure heavy tactical
vehicle systems consisting of the Palletized Load System (PLS), which
includes trucks, trailers, flatracks, and devices, Heavy Expanded
Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT), Heavy Equipment Transporter System
(HETS), and HEMTT Extended Service Program (ESP) as follows:
[Dollars in millions]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PLS........................... \1\9. 59.6 16.6 48.7 34.8 34.8
1
HEMTT......................... 0.0 38.3 30.7 48.7 1.0 0.0
HETS.......................... 0.0 64.7 11.8 0.0 89.2 89.4
HEMTT ESP..................... 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.8 19.9
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Flatracks and Devices Only.
Question. Does the Army TAA03 reorganization result in the need for
additional heavy tactical trucks for National Guard units? Provide for
the record a list of the units and the number of trucks per unit
involved in this reorganization.
Answer. Yes, five additional Palletized Load System (PLS) truck
companies and three additional Heavy Equipment Transporter System
(HETS) truck companies will be added to the National Guard. Each PLS
company has 48 PLS trucks and each HETS company has 96 tractor-
trailers. The companies are as follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unit designation Location Activation date
------------------------------------------------------------------------
137th (PLS).................... Olathe, Kansas.... 1 Oct 97
1462nd (PLS)................... Springfield, 1 Sep 98
Michigan.
1056th (PLS)................... Gering, Nebraska.. 1 Sep 99
TBD (PLS)...................... (\1\)............. FY01
TBD (PLS)...................... (\1\)............. FY02
TBD (HETS)..................... (\1\)............. FY02
TBD (HETS)..................... (\1\)............. FY02
TBD (HETS)..................... (\1\)............. FY03
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\To Be Determined (TBD).
Question. Provide for the record a list of priority unfunded heavy
tactical truck requirements, for both the active Army and the Reserve
Components, that could be funded in fiscal year 1998. Include a
description and justification.
Answer. Fiscal year 1998 funding for all tactical wheeled vehicles
is 52 percent less than fiscal year 1997 due to affordability and
priorities. The fiscal year 1998 Family of Heavy Tactical Vehicles
(FHTV) is funded at only 3 percent of fiscal year 1997 budget. The
funding for FHTV, which includes the Palletized Load System (PLS),
Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT), and the Heavy Equipment
Transporter System (HETS), could be increased by $95 million in fiscal
year 1998 as follows: (1) $50 million for 150 PLS trucks and 50 PLS
trailers for new units, and (2) $45 million for 96 HETS for a new unit.
Optimally, an additional $111 million would be used as follows: (1) $33
million for 109 HEMTT Wreckers to fill shortages throughout the Army,
(2) $45 million for an additional 96 HETS for a second new unit, and
(3) $33 million to procure HEMTT remanufactured vehicles earlier than
planned. (Congress increased the fiscal year 1997 R&D budget by $2
million to develop a HEMTT remanufacture program). All of these
vehicles, except the HEMTT Wreckers, would be fielded to Reserve
Components.
Light Tactical Vehicles (LTV)
Question. The fiscal year 1998 budget request includes $66 million
for High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) production. Last
year, Congress provided $162 million--$66 million over the budget
request. According to your statement, the reduced funding is a result
of fiscal restraints; however, the Committee has learned that the Army
is planning to develop a new HMMWV in fiscal year 1999. According to
the Army, the HMMWV is a ``world class vehicle''; however,
supportability is becoming a problem. What supportability problems are
you experiencing?
Answer. The HMMWV has been the world's best light tactical off road
vehicle. However, over the past 17 years since the HMMWV was designed,
significant commercial component changes, statutory requirements and
our demand for increased capability from the vehicle have significantly
reduced the reliability of the vehicle and increased the sustainment
cost. The demand for increased capacity has been a result of the new
missions and constraints placed on the Army in the areas of payload,
electrical power, configuration, and mission requirements. The
significant increase in applique equipment and use of the light fleet
vehicles for more roles has pushed the envelope with regard to the
ability to package all of the new equipment in the vehicle. This has a
major impact on the human factors of the vehicle and its ability to
effectively execute the mission as well as increasing the safety risk.
The HMMWV has a high scheduled maintenance time requirement with
increasing unscheduled maintenance. This demands that we develop a
vehicle that requires significantly less scheduled service time and
reduced unscheduled time. Finally the changing commercial components
are not easily packaged in the 17-year-old design and the cost to
reconfigure the vehicle to accommodate new components is increasing
dramatically. The Project Manager Light Tactical Vehicles is preparing
a detailed discussion and justification for this program which will be
forwarded to Congress next month. This document will fully explain the
investment strategy for the light fleet.
Question. Furthermore, the Army believes that the High Mobility
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) is only ``marginally meeting new
requirements.'' What new requirements are not met by the HMMWV?
Answer. There are standards that were objectives for the original
HMMWV that were waived during prototype phase based on cost and
complexity versus other critical mission requirements. An example of an
original requirement not met is interior noise. The interior noise
exceeds that the operation without hearing protection. The use of
hearing protection reduces the combat effectiveness of the system. To
meet the new mission demands for the light tactical vehicles we have
had to make significant changes. We have: increased the payload and
ballistic protection, redesigned the vehicle to meet new federal
standards for emissions and safety, and reconfigured the vehicle to
accommodate a plethora of new applique and integrated components. The
latter effort stemmed from the increased emphasis on Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, and Information (C4I) which are key elements
for Force XXI. In meeting these requirements we have increased the
maintenance burden on the Army in an environment of decreasing manpower
and money. The vehicle also does not meet all of the federally mandated
safety requirements and, in fact, can not be sold in the military
configuration to the general public for operation on the highway.
Question. Could those deficiencies be resolved by modifying the
current vehicle? If not why?
Answer. The Army is currently conducting a formal Analysis of
Alternatives as a normal part of an Major Defense Acquisition Program.
This analysis will identify the most cost-effective way to meet the
Army's requirements. This study will be completed before the planned
release of the solicitation later this year. Preliminary results
indicate that adapting the current vehicle is not an economically
viable alternative and would have greater risk. As a minimum, a new
body, frame, engine, electrical system and transmission will be
required to meet the user's requirements. It is probable that such
extensive changes would result in a very expensive program.
Question. What is the anticipated cost of the new light tactical
vehicle acquisition program? For the record, please provide the total
cost, per unit cost and anticipated fielding schedule.
Answer. Based on our current program assumptions and analysis, we
estimate that the prototype phase will cost $50 million and per unit
average cost will be $86 thousand. Our anticipated First Unit Equipped
(FUE) is in fiscal year 2002.
Question. Given the Army's past experience with tactical vehicle
programs, in terms of cost growth and schedule delays, do you think it
makes sense to develop a new light vehicle? Why or why not?
Answer. Yes, we and industry have learned a lot and have overcome
the pitfalls of prior programs through general and specific acquisition
actions. Application of Integrated Process Teams within the government
and industry are reducing risk in both the requirement and acquisition
arenas. We have established effective Teaming arrangements with
contractors to identify and reconcile cost, schedule and technical
performance issues quickly and amiably between the parties. These
efforts are focused on resolution of conditions that have previously
created complications in contracting for tactical vehicles.
Light and Heavy Tactical Vehicles
Question. The Army continues to stress the importance of tactical
vehicles. However, our fiscal year 1998 budget does not sustain the
light and heavy tactical vehicle manufacturing lines. What steps are
you taking to ensure that future Army requirements for tactical
vehicles can be satisfied?
Answer. Army High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV)
production will cease in fiscal year 1998. In fiscal year 2000 we will
begin production of the Light Tactical Vehicle which will replace the
HMMWV. In addition, the Army will start remanufacturing HMMWVs with the
USMC in fiscal year 1999. To ensure that platforms are available for
other Army systems during the interim when there will be no production,
we will store HMMWVs built in fiscal year 1996 and 1997. These HMMWVs
will be issued as a platform as necessary. Also, 350 HMMWVs built in
fiscal year 1997 will be armored in fiscal years 1998 and 1999. As
stated in the fiscal year 1998 proposed President's Budget, the Army
intends to procure HMMWVs and heavy tactical trucks including the
Palletized Load System (PLS), Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck
(HEMTT), Heavy Equipment Transporter System (HETS), and HEMTT Extended
Service Program (ESP) as follows:
[Dollars in millions]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HMMWV........................................................... 66.2 14.1 120.5 114.5 129.0 234.5
PLS............................................................. \1\9.1 59.6 16.6 48.7 34.8 34.8
HEMTT........................................................... 0.0 38.3 30.7 48.7 1.0 0.0
HETS............................................................ 0.0 64.7 11.8 0.0 89.2 89.4
HEMTT ESP....................................................... 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.8 19.9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Flatracks and devices only.
Question. What impact does your fiscal year budget have on the
industrial base?
Answer. The impact on the industrial base in regards to light
tactical vehicles is that the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled
Vehicle (HMMWV) plant may close if the commercial customers, direct
sales and Foreign Military Sales do not sustain the production line.
The impact to the Government if the vendor is not able to sustain
production would be the early closing of the current requirements
contract. For heavy tactical vehicles, based on a fiscal year 1998
program of $9.1 million, production stops on: (1) Palletized Load
System (PLS)--April 1998, (2) PLS trailer--December 1997, (3) Heavy
Equipment Transporter System--July 1998, and (4) Heavy Expanded
Mobility Tactical Truck--July 1998. Based on a fiscal year 1999 program
of $162.6 million, for those types of heavy trucks in which production
stops, contract awards occur in December 1998 and the production
startup is 9 months later. Reductions in the work-force at both prime
contractors and suppliers will take place including migration of
suppliers and vendors away from Defense business. Startup will most
likely necessitate requalification of vendors and suppliers and result
in approximately a 15 percent cost increase to the Army. Lastly, a
restart may require redesign to meet Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards which are exempted if production is kept constant.
Question. If the heavy and light tactical vehicles production lines
are closed in fiscal year 1998, what is the anticipated cost of
restarting the production lines at a later date?
Answer. In regards to light tactical vehicles, the Army has no
plans to restart the High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle
(HMMWV) production line. We will fund the facilities for the Light
Tactical Vehicle and the HMMWV remanufacture program as necessary. The
heavy truck prime contractor, Oskosh Truck Corporation, Oskosh,
Wisconsin, has somewhat adapted to the fiscal reality through risk
mitigation by combining their commercial and military production lines.
If a particular type of military truck production is stopped, such as
Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck, the entire line will not stop.
Startup will most likely necessitate requalification of vendors and
suppliers and result in approximately a 15 percent cost increase to the
Army. In addition, a restart may require redesign to meet Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standards which are exempted if production is kept
constant.
Heavy Tactical Vehicles Extended Service Program
Question. Congress provided $2 million in fiscal year 1997 for a
Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT) Extended Service Program
(ESP). When does the Army intend to begin this program?
Answer. The HEMTT ESP will develop enhancements by leveraging
commercial technology to significantly improve vehicle reliability and
maintainability resulting in higher fleet readiness rates. Pending
release of these funds from withhold within the Defense Department,
development of the HEMTT ESP will begin in April 1997. Procurement
could begin in fiscal year 1998, earlier than the Army originally
budgeted, if Congress provides an additional $33 million which would
buy approximately 200 trucks.
Question. HEMTT is a key vehicle for heavy and medium truck units.
It is important for recovery and tactical unit fuel support. Does the
Army have sufficient quantity of these trucks to meet these
requirements?
Answer. No. the requirements/on hand quantities of the HEMTT are
13,203/12,165 (HEMTT Wreckers--2,438/1,630 and HEMTT Tankers--4,842/
4,073).
[Clerk's note.--End of the question submitted by Mr.
Hobson. Questions submitted by Mr. Dicks and the answers
thereto follow:]
Comanche Helicopter
Question. Last year, Congress added $49 million to the Comanche
program to help level out the funding profile and to make a more
efficient development program. If Congress were to make additional
money available for the program, would it bring the number two
prototype to flying status sooner?
Answer. The acceleration of prototype #2 is dependent on the amount
of additional funding that may be provided by Congress as part of the
fiscal year 1998 (FY98) appropriation. While prototype #2 acceleration
is important, restoring the flight test program and accelerating the
reconnaissance mission equipment package design effort is more critical
at this point in the program. The Comanche Program Manager has
developed a prioritized list of areas that would be accelerated if
additional funding is available in FY98. The acceleration of prototype
#2 falls within the items listed if $100 million was added to the
budget request.
Question. Would additional money accomplish tasks that would
provide a more capable aircraft for the demonstration of the so-called
EOC ``Early Operational Capability'' aircraft? Specific areas would be
low observables and enhancing communications with other elements of the
joint force.
Answer. Additional funding in FY98 would certainly allow for an
improved program to ensure the reconnaissance capability on the EOC
aircraft was fully tested and would provide the user a more
``production like'' reconnaissance capability to operate during the
field evaluation. Two of the significant areas of added capability
planned if additional funding is provided are enhanced communications
and improved low observable features or characteristics. There are
several low observable features that could be added that would provide
enhanced signature characteristics and give us an opportunity to
evaluate the maintainability and durability before production.
Additional funds would also allow increased functionality with greater
opportunity for communicating in the joint arena via voice, data and
imagery. Now that a stable flying platform has been demonstrated during
the flight test program, the priority is on adding the reconnaissance
capability as soon as possible to allow sufficient time to prove out
the design prior to building the EOC aircraft.
Heavy Lift Aircraft Fleet
Question. Last year Congress added $17 million for an important
Army warfighter requirement, the CH-47D ICH program. However, that
funding has yet to be released. Could you please tell us the status of
this funding? Does the delay in obligation of these funds reflect a
belief by the Army that this is not an important program?
Answer. The $8.7 million of the $17.772 million ICH fiscal year
1997 (FY97) Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Congressional
add has been released to the Army. This $8.7 million will allow the ICH
Program Office to fund all programmatic requirements through the end of
FY97. The balance of the congressional add, currently on withhold in
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (ODS) must be released to the
Army at the beginning of FY98 to allow for the award of the ICH
Engineering and Manufacturing Development contract in December 1997. On
the contrary, the Army views the ICH as a critical program which will
have a significant positive impact on our warfighting capability. The
funding was not obligated because it was on withhold in OSD.
Question. Would you please provide for the record your specific
thoughts and concerns about the current and future state of the Army's
heavy lift aircraft fleet, specifically the ability to conduct another
operation such as Desert Storm and carry modern artillery?
Answer. The Army believes that the CH-47D Engine Upgrade and the
Improved Cargo helicopter (ICH) programs are absolutely necessary to
keep its only heavy-lift cargo helicopter operationally effective well
into the 21st century. A replacement cargo helicopter for use by all
services--the Joint Tactical Rotorcraft (JTR)--is projected to be
available no earlier than 2015. Specifically, the CH-47D Engine Upgrade
program will upgrade the entire CH-47D fleet of T55-L-712 engines to
the new, more powerful T55-GA-714A configuration. This engine will
allow the CH-47D to lift an additional 3,900 pounds of payload. The ICH
program, then, will extend the useful life of this aircraft an
additional 20 years. The ICH will consist of an airframe remanufacture,
airframe vibration reduction modifications, and an upgraded cockpit
featuring multi-service digital compatibility and interoperability.
These modernization efforts will result in a significant increase in
the aircraft's operational capability and effectiveness, allowing it to
bridge the gap to the procurement of the JTR.
Question. On 1 December 1996, the Army submitted a report to
Congress in response to language included in the FY97 Defense
Authorization Act. This report lists modernization priorities for the
Army Reserves. At the top of the list is a requirement for eight
additional CH-47D Chinook Helicopters. Yet, the Army's budget does not
appear to include a request for funds to procure Chinook helicopters
for the Reserves. Recognizing the increasing rule that our reserve
forces have played in military commitments around the world, why has
the Army not requested funds for its top Army Reserve modernization
requirement?
Answer. The current total Army requirement for CH-47s is 525, with
an inventory of 467, leaving a total shortage of 58 CH-47Ds. This
shortage exists primarily in the operational readiness float accounts.
Most of the warfighting requirements have been filled with certain
exceptions. The Army Reserve has a warfighting requirement of 53 CH-
47Ds, which includes five operational readiness floats. However, they
only have 45 aircraft on hand. The Army is currently planning to
partially fill this shortage in FY97 or FY98. However, when CH-47Ds are
inducted into the Improved Cargo Helicopter program beginning in FY02,
shortages will again result in the Army Reserve fleet. Current fiscal
constraints and competing priorities have prevented the Army from
procuring the necessary aircraft to fill shortages within both the Army
and the Army Reserve.
Question. If the Congress included funds for procurement of three
additional CH-47D helicopters, would the Army obligate the funds to
this purpose?
Answer. Yes. If given the approporaite level of funding, the Army
would obligate the funds to procure three additional CH-47Ds.
C-17 Aircraft
Question. I am told that the C-17 creates a wake of turbulent air
proportionally greater than those of a C-141--making it unsafe to
airdrop troops and sometimes ineffective when airdropping equipment. Is
this accurate information?
Answer. As with all large aircraft, the C-17 does create wing tip
vortexes that create air turbulence. However, the Army has recently
completed a successful personnel airdrop test with a mass tactical
personnel airdrop of 612 paratroopers from a six C-17 ship formation on
31 January 1997 at Fort Bragg. The Army and the Air Force have also
successfully demonstrated the C-17's ability to execute its heavy
equipment airdrop capability. There have been several (4) failures, but
they have not been attributed to the C-17. One was attributed to the
failure of a loadmaster to properly lock down the load and the other
three were determined to be rigger errors.
Question. Is the Air Force working with the Army to mitigate this
problem? Are you confident that a fix can be implemented that will
allow us to meet the airdrop requirements outlined in the initial C-17
program?
Answer. the C-17 meets the airdrop criteria as contained in the
current C-17 Operational Requirements Document. However, the Air Force,
Air Mobility Command, the C-17 Program Office, the Army and the Army
Operational Test and Evaluation Command, along with the contractor,
continuously strive to improve the C-17's effectiveness. On 31 January
1997, the Army successfully executed a battalion size personnel
airborne operation consisting of six C-17 aircraft with 612
paratroopers. The separation between each three ship element was 40,000
feet. No parachute/wing tip vortices interaction was experienced.
Question. How is the C-17 performing in Bosnia?
Answer. During the initial buildup of forces, the C-17 flew 26
percent of the missions and moved 44 percent of the cargo. The C-17
maintained a mission capable rate of 86.2 percent verses the
requirement of 82.2 percent. The C-17 will continue to support
Operation Joint Endeavor, when the mission requires the C-17's unique
capabilities.
Question. Is the C-17 able to meet the runway requirements outlined
in the initial C-17 program?
Answer. The C-17 has successfully demonstrated every requirement in
the current C-17 Operational Requirements Document. The Army and the
Air Forces have established a Joint Team to develop techniques, tactics
and procedures to allow routine C-17 operations into small austere
airfields.
Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
Question. The THAAD Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system recently
failed its fourth test since the initiation of the program. I am very
concerned about this development because I believe that we lack the
lack of adequate TMD is one of the critical issues facing our armed
forces right now. The concern was echoed by the Commander-in-Chief's
who testified in front of our subcommittee over the past couple of
weeks. What is the current status of the THAAD program?
Answer. The THAAD project is in the Program Definition and Risk
Reduction (PDRR) phase of the development, and has completed seven of
the eleven flights in the PDRR test flight program. The flight test
program will validate system segment designs and integrate the full
THAAD weapon system in a progressive step-wise fashion. The majority of
the weapon system objectives have been accomplished during the seven
flight tests.
THAAD flight tests results are encouraging. In the seven flight
tests conducted to date, the majority of weapon system objectives have
been successfully accomplished. The Battle Management, Command,
Control, and Communication and Intelligence (BMC\3\I) segment generated
proper engagement solutions and implemented successful launch commands
on all five tests in which it has been utilized. The launcher system
has successfully issued the launch command to the missile on all seven
flight tests. The radar has tracked the target and interceptor on four
of the five missions in which it participated. Most notably, in the
last flight test the radar performed as the primary sensor for the
first time. The vast majority of missile functions have been
successfully demonstrated in the seven flight tests. In the most recent
test at the White Sands Missile Range on 6 March 1997, three ground
segments of the THAAD weapon system (radar, BMC\3\I and launcher)
responded appropriately to a representative tactical ballistic missile
target as an integrated THAAD weapon system for the first time.
Although the flight test program has achieved major steps in weapon
system integration, unrelated missile anomalies on the four planned
intercept attempts have precluded target intercept--the final step in
achieving full system operation. The characteristics of the missile
anomalies are typical of a PDRR phase for a sophisticated system
development effort, and the THAAD team has taken steps to correct the
problems discovered in the flight test program.
THAAD near-term and far-term development schedules are being
reviewed to maintain a baseline program with acceptable risk.
Independent review teams chartered by the Ballistic Missile Defense
Office (BMDO) Director are reviewing aspects of the missile design and
flight test results as well as THAAD system requirements. They are
scheduled to report findings to an Executive Steering Group chaired by
the BMDO Director in mid-April. The THAAD Project Office and the prime
contractor (Lockheed Martin) are formulating a recovery plan in
parallel with the independent review process, and the plan is expected
to incorporate key recommendations from the review process.
The THAAD team is currently working to the next flight test in the
July-August 1997 time frame. As a result of the missed intercept on
flight seven, the decision to procure the forty missile rounds for the
User Operational Evaluation System has been delayed. In addition, the
Milestone II schedule extends approximately three to four months (to
third quarter of fiscal year 1998). The program is also reviewing First
Unit Equipped criteria to determine impacts, if any.
Question. Is the most recent test failure going to result in a
restructuring of the THAAD program?
Answer. At this time, THAAD is executing to a baseline flight test
program with the next flight test in the July-August 1997 time frame,
and with subsequent tests every two to three months. The impact of test
results from Flight Test #7 failure is uncertain. Initial findings
indicate that the THAAD missile missed the target because the missile's
Divert and Attitude Control System failed to function. A detailed
anomaly investigation was initiated to determine the root cause. Some
program schedule impacts may result from the flight seven failure
investigation and on-going government independent reviews. Several more
weeks may be required before the root cause is identified, and
corrective actions defined.
Based on the flight seven failure investigation and independent
reviews, THAAD's development program will be revisited to reduce
overall program risk, while maintaining timely delivery of THAAD to the
user. Any recommended changes to the program, especially those
impacting funding requirements or schedule will be made available to
Congress at the earliest opportunity.
Question. Is the problem with THAAD fixable in your judgment?
Answer. The judgment of the government and prime contractor team is
that the problems experienced to date are indeed fixable. Current
expectations are that the THAAD system should be performing at a
maturity level typically found in mid- to late Engineering
Manufacturing Development phase that are about ready to be fielded.
The information gathered in the seven flight tests on the THAAD
system is invaluable to the successful deployment of a robust upper-
tier missile defense system that meets the warfighter's needs. The
problems discovered on previous flight tests have been fixed and
successfully demonstrated on subsequent flights. As a result of the
flight seven failure investigation and independent government review of
the missile design, additional component and system testing may be
implemented prior to the next flight test to assure product quality and
increase the probability of intercept success.
[Clerk's note.--End of the questions submitted by Mr.
Dicks. Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the answers thereto
follow:]
Modernization Shortfalls
Question. The Army is requesting $11.2 billion for Army
modernization programs. This is $2.9 billion--about 15 percent less
that the fiscal year 1997 appropriated amount. These funds will procure
aircraft, ammunition, tracked and tactical vehicles, missiles and
combat support equipment. This funding will also be used for research
and development programs.
Mr. Decker, your statement says, ``modernization must be given
additional resources if the Army is to maintain its technological
edge.'' What major modernization requirements are not funded in the
fiscal year 1998 budget?
Answer. The Fiscal Year 1998 budget is balanced and funds our
programs at a level that permits the Army to develop and procure the
equipment which enables our soldiers to remain the best in the world.
There are however, opportunities where additional investment dollars
would permit us to secure some savings. During his testimony, the Chief
of Staff said that his first priority for any additional funding that
might be made available would be applied to information systems such as
those associated with Digitization/Force XXI activities. Programs that
could be accelerated to place key capabilities in the hands of
commanders and soldiers include: Additional funding for Information
Technology integration and digitization which includes All Source
Analysis System (ASAS), Digital Topographic Support System (DTSS),
Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control (FAAD C2), Enhanced
Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS), Aviation Radios, and Force
XXI Tactical Operation Centers; Modification and improvements to Kiowa
Warrior, Avenger, Improved Cargo Helicopter, Sentinel, Bradley,
Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), and Stinger, Firefinder, Bradley
Fire Support Vehicle, and Bradley Linebacker; Accelerated procurement
of Palletized Load System (PLS) Trucks, Family of Medium Tactical
Vehicle (FMTV) and Heavy Equipment Transporter (HET); and development
of the M1 Breacher prototype and the Comanche Flight Test.
Question. What are your top four modernization programs? Are they
fully funded in FY98? Are they optimally funded in the accompanying
fiscal years of the Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP)? If not, what are
the shortfalls?
Answer. The top Army programs are ForceXXI/Digitization, Comanche,
and Crusader. These programs are adequately funded to accomplish the
Army's program objectives for fiscal year 1998. Currently, the Comanche
program is flying one prototype aircraft to demonstrate and validate
design criteria and capabilities. Crusader has down selected to a solid
propellant to reduce program risk and has been successful at
automatically firing 2 successive rounds using solid propellant. The
resupply vehicle program is on track to field with the self propelled
howitzer. The Army's digitization program recently completed its
Brigade-Level Advanced Warfighting Experiment at the National Training
Center. The results of this experiment will enable the Army to select
the most promising technologies for the Army's first digitized
division.
In the FYDP, these programs have been optimally funded to achieve
the most capability for the available funds. While increased funding of
some programs can accelerate fielding, the cost to other programs would
result in a less than optimal mix of capabilities on the future
battlefield.
Question. Mr. Decker do you believe that your fiscal year 1998
(FY98) budget allows you to procure items at a rate that makes economic
and operational sense? Which programs concern you the most?
Answer. The FY98 budget funds our programs at a level that permits
the Army to develop and procure the equipment which enables our
soldiers to remain the best in the world. There are however,
opportunities where additional investment dollars would permit us to
secure some savings. For example, some items are purchased below the
economic quantity rate and therefore, the unit cost is higher.
Obviously, those programs with the highest per unit cost cause the
greatest concern. Whenever we can reduce the cost per item even a
fraction, the savings can be great over the life of the program. For
example, in FY96, we bought 750 Hellfire 2 missiles. This was below the
minimum sustaining rate of 1248 missiles. In FY97, the Army doubled the
amount of funding to the program and purchased more than twice the
number of missiles. The unit cost dropped from $68,000 to $46,000.
Another example is the Stinger Block 1 missile. In FY96 by adding $4.8
million to the $12.4 million in the line, we were able to drop the unit
cost by eighteen percent. The added benefit to investments such as
these is that it enables us to buy out the line earlier and get the
equipment in the hands of the soldier sooner. We are constantly looking
for ways to fund our programs to get the best quality for the least
cost. You have been a great help to us in the past and we look forward
to your continued support.
Question. According to your statement, the Army's strategy for
fiscal year 1998 (FY98) is to procure a limited number of new high pay-
off weapons and extend the lives of existing systems. What new high-
payoff systems are you procuring in fiscal year 1998? Is the funding
adequate in fiscal year 1998?
Answer. The Army is scheduled to begin full production on the Joint
Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) Common Ground Station
(CGS) in FY98. The module will provide long-range radar and other
sensor surveillance battle management and targeting data to tactical
commanders. This system is critical to achieving information dominance.
Funding in FY98 is adequate to begin procurement of CGS.
The Bradley Fire Support Team Vehicle will enter Low Rate Initial
Production in FY98. This vehicle will allow fire support teams to
decrease the response time and increase the accuracy of indirect fires
in support of maneuver combat units. This vehicle will enhance the
ability of the services to conduct precision engagement. Funding in
FY98 is adequate to ramp into full production later in the Future
Year's Defense Plan.
Additional Funding
Question. Last year, you were very candid about identifying your
top unfunded requirements to the Committee and working with us to
provide additional funding for many of them. I hope you will continue
that cooperation with us. General Hite, please describe your top
unfunded weapons system acquisition priorities and why the fiscal year
1998 budget is not sufficient in these areas.
Answer. To achieve prominence as a superior fighting force, the
Army has relied on and will continue to depend upon technology. As our
force has become smaller, we must replace aging and obsolete systems
and upgrade our capabilities, to maintain this advantage. The Fiscal
Year 1998 budget is balanced and funds our programs at a level that
permits the Army to develop and procure the equipment which enables our
soldiers to remain the best in the world. There are however,
opportunities where we can develop and buy additional required
technologies and weapon systems beyond amounts affordable in our
balanced, yet constrained budget. During his testimony, the Chief of
Staff said that his first priority for any additional funding that
might be made available would be applied to information systems such as
those associated with Digitization/Force XXI activities. Programs that
could be accelerated to place key capabilities in the hands of
commanders and soldiers include: information technology integration and
digitization systems which includes All Source Analysis System (ASAS),
Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control (FAAD C2), Enhanced
Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS), Aviation Radios, and Force
XXI Tactical Operation Centers; modification and improvements to Kiowa
Warrior, Avenger, Improved Cargo Helicopter, Sentinel, Bradley,
Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), and Stinger, Firefinder, Bradley
Fire Support Vehicle, and Bradley Linebacker; accelerated procurement
of Palletized Load System (PLS) Trucks, Family of Medium Tactical
Vehicle (FMTV) and Heavy Equipment Transporter (HET); and development
of the M1 Breacher prototype and the Comanche Flight Test.
Question. What are the potential savings if the Congress were to
provide additional funding in fiscal year (FY) 1998 for these items,
either by buying them earlier than planned or by lower production unit
costs through procurement at higher quantities? Please put the costs
and savings in the record.
Answer. The Army has developed an extensive list of unfinanced
requirements, along with potential savings derived if additional funds
were received in fiscal year 1998. These savings are not always
monetary, but reap operational impacts/benefits as well. A
representative sample of these savings/benefits follow: (a) Bradley
Fire Support Team Vehicle (BFIST), receiving a plus up of $18.6 million
in FY 98 will allow BFIST production to be completed in FY 07 instead
of FY 08. This acceleration represents a cost avoidance of $31.6
million in FY 07 and $8.2 million in FY 08. This plus up will result in
a net savings to the Army of $13.0 million (b) Family of Medium
Tactical Vehicles (FMTV), receiving $517 million more in FY 98 will
allow the Army to realize a savings of an average $6 thousand per year
per 2.5 ton truck replaced and $4 thousand per year per 5 ton truck
replaced or a total of approximately $16.6 million dollars in operation
and support class. This plus up will allow for the procurement of 3,336
more FMTV's, alleviating truck shortages and increasing equipment
readiness rates. (c) Sentinel, receiving $20.3 million in FY 98 will
allow for the procurement of 14 additional Sentinel radar systems (for
a total of 27) and decrease the fielding gap between Sentinel and FAAD
C2. This will result in a $14.3 million savings and shorten production
schedule by one year.
Question. Which of these items are on any of the Commanders-in-
Chief (CINC) integrated priority lists?
Answer. Information technologies, integration and digitization
programs (ASAS, FAAD C2, and EPLRS) compliment the capabilities
described on the CINC Integrated Priority Lists (IPL). CINC IPLs also
addressed enhancements to logistics capabilities which specifically
mentioned HETs, FMTV and aging truck fleets.
Question. Last year, the Army submitted a list which focused on
``smart investments.'' However, the list included: $24 million for
unfunded digitization requirements that required an additional $470
million in the outyears to complete; $360 million for 18 additional
Apache Longbow helicopters to ``heavy up'' the 2nd Armored Calvary
Regiment--a fielding decision that had not and still has not been made;
$500 thousand to increase the Warfighter Information Network's
capacity, which required an additional $370 million in the outyears to
sustain; and $199 million to accelerate Comanche, which required an
additional $1 billion in the outyears, which the Army stated it cannot
afford to sustain. Mr. Decker, how will you ensure that the fiscal year
1998 unfunded requirements list will focus on ``smart investments''?
Answer. The Army has gone to great lengths in an effort to ensure
that any of the high priority items included in our listing of unfunded
requirements represents a ``smart investment'' with the potential to
pay dividends in varieties of ways. Each of these requirements has been
scrutinized for its executability, and the magnitude of its
operational, functional, and/or economic payback has been carefully
weighed and evaluated in terms of dollars saved, costs avoided, and/or
capabilities enhanced. All of our high priority unfunded requirements
represent opportunities to garner significant, quantifiable benefits by
proven and effective techniques such as program accelerations;
expedited fielding; procuring at the most economic production rates
possible; through the economy-of-scale savings possible with multi-year
procurement contracts; and through implementing the improvements and
efficiencies we're pursuing as part of our acquisition streamlining and
acquisition reform initiatives.
Question. How will you ensure that the items are critical
warfighting requirements and not just ``nice to have'' items?
Answer. The Fiscal Year 1998 budget funds our programs at a level
that permits the Army to develop and procure the equipment which
enables our soldiers to remain the best in the world. Most of the
Army's procurement decisions are based on warfighting requirements.
These requirements are examined in great detail within the Army to
insure the appropriate capabilities and quantities are being developed
and procured. These requirements are validated by the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council to insure interoperability across all of
the Services. The Army also procures some items which are not directly
tied to a warfighting requirement, but are critical requirements for
the operation of the Army installation activities. Many of these items
are purchased off-the-shelf like sedans, buses, power plant equipment
and commercial air traffic control equipment. The Joint Services
Intrusion Detection System, for example, is required to ensure maximum
security of Army small arms weapons that are ordinarily secured in unit
arms rooms. This equipment is required to ensure the proper functioning
of day to day activities, the safeguarding of Army Equipment and the
protection of soldiers and their families.
With the severe funding constraints in today's budget, every
requirement is closely examined to insure only the highest priority
requirements were submitted in the President's Budget Request.
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Funding
Question. The Army is requesting $4.5 billion for Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) activities--this is $200
million higher than last year's budget request. In 1997, the Army spent
29 cents of Research and Development (R&D) for every dollar of
procurement. In this budget the Army proposes to spend 66 cents of R&D
for each procurement dollar. Your 1998 budget clearly shows that the
Army conducts much research and produces very little equipment. Mr.
Decker, what has caused this trend and why is the budget so biased
toward research rather than production?
Answer. In 1997, before the Congressional Marks, the Army budgeted
$6.32 billion in procurement and $4.32 billion in RDT&E. This equates
to approximately 68 cents of RDT&E for every dollar of procurement.
Currently the fiscal year 1998 budget is at an approximate ratio of 67
cents of RDT&E for every dollar of procurement ($6.75 billion of
procurement and $4.51 billion of RDT&E). Our RDT&E investment develops
and provides significant technical insertions in our current systems
while at the same time investing in the development of future systems
that will ensure the accomplishment of our nation's goals. It is
imperative that we maintain the Army's technological advantage on the
battlefield now and in the future. Our investments in research today
are critical to ensuring that the technologies and capabilities will be
available when needed to forge the Army After Next.
Question. Mr. Decker, you talk about a crisis in procurement. Most
of the Army's aircraft, missile, tactical vehicle and ammunition
accounts are funded below last year's budget request. However,
Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation (RDT&E) is funded at a
higher level than last year's budget request. Why are you trading off
procurement dollars for research and development activities?
Answer. In 1997, before the Congressional Marks, the Army budgeted
$6.32 billion in procurement. Currently, the fiscal year 1998 (FY98)
budget requests $6.75 billion, representing an increase of 6 percent.
The FY97 budget requested $4.32 billion for RDT&E, while the FY98
budget asks for $4.51 billion in RDT&E, only a 4 percent increase over
the previous year.
The RDT&E program in FY 98 is focused on supporting affordable
options to achieve the capabilities envisioned for Force XXI, Army
Vision 2010, and the Army After Next with emphasis on demonstrations of
promising technologies with warfighter applications. The Army continues
to maintain a strong and stable RDT&E program to ensure the timely
development and transition of technology into weapon systems and system
upgrades, and to explore alternative concepts in future global,
capabilities-based warfighting.
[Clerk's note.--Although the overall procurement funding
does increase, $349,109,000 of the increase is a result of a
transfer from the Ballistic Missile Defense Office (BMDO) for
Patriot Missile Procurement to the Army missile procurement
appropriation. Funding requested for ammunition and other
procurement are less in fiscal year 1998.]
Question. For the record, please provide a list of all ``new
start'' Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation (RDT&E)
activities in fiscal year 1998. Which ones are included in the
Commanders-in-Chief (CINC) priority list?
Answer. Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System in Engineering and
Manufacturing Development and High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled
Vehicle (HMMWV) prototype. Although these systems are not specifically
listed in a CINC's priority list they will provide Army components of
the Joint Force with the Precision Engagement and Dominant Maneuver
capabilities needed to enable Joint Vision 2010 operational concepts.
The Military Operations in Urban Terrain Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration (ACTD), although not on a CINC's priority list, began in
FY97 with Department of Defense funding. FY98 is the first year of Army
funding for this ACTD.
Heavy Tactical Vehicles
Question. The Army is requesting no funds to procure heavy tactical
vehicles in fiscal year 1998. Mr. Decker, in your statement, you stress
the importance of tactical vehicles. However, for the second year in
the row, your budget proposes no funds to procure heavy tactical
vehicles. Why?
Answer. Affordability is the reason. The Army prioritizes programs
and, although heavy tactical vehicles are important, funding was
insufficient to cover all our requirements. Heavy tactical vehicles
include the Palletized Load System (PLS), the Heavy Expanded Mobility
Tactical Truck (HEMTT), and the Heavy Equipment Transporter System
(HETS). In the Fiscal Year 1997 President's Budget, the Army budgeted
$77.4 million for PLS flatracks/devices and $86.9 million for HETS. The
Congress increased the Army's heavy tactical vehicle request by $50.0
million for PLS trucks/trailers and $30.6 million for HEMTT wreckers/
tankers. The Army is requesting $9.1 million in Fiscal Year 1998 for
PLS flatracks/devices.
Question. General Hite, what is the Army's requirement for heavy
tactical vehicles? Is the requirement satisfied? If not, what is the
shortfall?
Answer. The Army's requirement for heavy tactical vehicles have not
been met. The required/on-hand quantities are: (1) Palletized Load
System (PLS)-3,711/2,277, (2) PLS Trailers-2,891/1,195, (3) PLS
Flatracks-55,626/10,059, (4) Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck
(HEMTT)-13,203/12,165 (HEMTT Wreckers-2,483/1,630 and HEMTT Tankers-
4,842/4,073), and (5) Heavy Equipment Transporter System-2,412/1,358.
Question. What is the impact of the fiscal year 1998 budget on the
industrial base--both the prime and its suppliers?
Answer. Oshkosh Truck Corporation, Oshkosh, Wisconsin is the prime
contractor for the Palletized Load System (PLS), Heavy Expanded
Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMITT), and Heavy Equipment Transporter
System (HETS) tractors and produces these vehicles on a combined
commercial and military assembly line to keep unit costs as low as
possible. System and Electronics Incorporation, St. Louis, Missouri
produces the HETS trailer. Based on a fiscal year 1998 program ($9.1
million), production stops on: (1) PLS-April 1998, (2) PLS trailer-
December 1997, (3) HETS-July 1998, and HEMTT-July 1998. The fiscal year
1998 program (Standard Study Number DA0500) of $9.1 million buys: (1)
968 Container Roll-in/Out Plantforms-$8.1 million, and (2) 40 Container
Handling Units-$1.0 million. Based on a fiscal year 1999 program
($162.6 million) for those types of trucks in which production stops,
contract awards occur in December 1998 and the production startup is 9
months later. Reductions in the work-force at both prime contractors
and suppliers will take place including migration of suppliers and
venders away from Defense business. Startup will most likely
necessitate requalification of venders and suppliers and result in
approximately a 15 percent cost increase to the Army. Lastly, a restart
may require redesign to meet Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards
(FMVSS) which are exempted if production is kept constant.
Question. Based on your 1998 budget, you plan on spending $162
million in 1999 on heavy tactical vehicles. Since you will have a
``cold'' manufacturing line, what will be the cost of restarting the
line?
Answer. Oshkosh Truck Corporation, Oshkosh, Wisconsin is the prime
contractor for the Palletized Load System (PLS), Heavy Expanded
Mobility Tactical Truck, and Heavy Equipment Transporter System (HETS)
tractors and estimates that if a particular type of truck production is
stopped, even though the total line does not stop, then start-up costs
associated with renegotiating venders and suppliers (which represent 75
percent of the assembly process) would increase unit costs by
approximately 15 percent. In addition, a restart may require redesign
to meet Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards which are exempted if
production is kept constant. Start-up costs from System and Electronics
Incorporated, St. Louis, Missouri, which produces the HETS trailer, are
currently being developed.
Question. It is our understanding that the lead time for heavy
tactical vehicle is approximately 9 months. Does the fiscal year 1998
budget include funds to procure long lead items required for 1999
production? Why?
Answer. No, the 1998 budget does not include funding for long lead
items due to affordability.
Light Tactical Vehicles
Question. Last year, Congress appropriated $166 million for light
tactical vehicles, the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
(HMMWV). The Army is requesting $66 million in 1998 for HMMWV
production. Does the fiscal year 1998 budget satisfy Army requirements
for light vehicles? If not, what are the shortfalls?
Answer. The requested budget does not fill the remaining
requirement for light tactical vehicles in the Army inventory. The
total Army requirement for HMMWV is 119,518 vehicles. This is an
increase over prior year requirements based on the Department of the
Army decision to ``Pure Fleet'' the light tactical fleet using only the
HMMWV. We have on hand today 100,854 leaving a shortfall of 18,664. The
Army has budgeted for 774 vehicles in FY98 and of these 524 represent
new production.
Question. Does the budget request sustain the industrial base? If
not, what is the impact?
Answer. The U.S. Army can not predict the commercial, foreign
commercial/military direct and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) of the
HMMWV by the prime contractor AM General Corporation (AMG). AMG has
advised the Government that to sustain a production rate of 16.5
vehicles per day, their new minimum sustaining rate, they require the
Department of Defense to procure 10 per day (2,350 vehicles per year).
This represents Government funded procurements exclusive of any FMS
cases. Thus, the amount requested would not satisfy the contractor
identified requirement for the full year.
Question. The Army has decided to develop a new light tactical
vehicle and terminate the production of the High Mobility Multipurpose
Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) at the end of 1998. According to the Army, the
HMMWV is a ``world class vehicle''; however, supportability is becoming
a problem. What supportability problems are you experiencing?
Answer. The HMMWV has been the world's best light tactical off road
vehicle. However, over the past 17 years since the HMMWV was designed,
significant commercial component changes, statutory requirements and
our demand for increased capability from the vehicle have significantly
reduced the reliability of the vehicle and increased the sustainment
cost. The demand for increased capacity has been a result of the new
missions and constraints placed on the Army in the areas of payload,
electrical power, configuration, and mission requirements. The
significant increase in applique equipment and use of the light fleet
vehicles for more roles has pushed the envelope with regard to the
ability to package all of the new equipment in the vehicle. This has a
major impact on the human factors of the vehicle and its ability to
effectively execute the mission as well as increasing the safety risk.
The HMMWV has a high scheduled maintenance time requirement with
increasing unscheduled maintenance. This demands that we develop a
vehicle that requires significantly less scheduled service time and
reduced unscheduled time. Finally the changing commercial components
are not easily packaged in the 17-year-old design and the cost to
reconfigure the vehicle to accommodate new components is increasing
dramatically. The Project Manager Light Tactical Vehicles is preparing
a detailed discussion and justification for this program which will be
forwarded to Congress next month. This document will fully explain the
investment strategy for the light fleet.
Question. Furthermore, the Army believes that the High Mobility
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) is only ``marginally meeting new
requirements.'' What new requirements are not met by the HMMWV?
Answer. There are standards that were objectives for the original
HMMWV that were waived during prototype phase based on cost and
complexity versus other critical mission requirements. An example of an
original requirement not met is interior noise. The interior noise
exceeds that for operation without hearing protection. The use of
hearing protection reduces the combat effectiveness of the system. To
meet the new mission demands for the light tactical vehicles we have
had to make significant changes. We have: increased the payload and
ballistic protection, redesigned the vehicle to meet new federal
standards for emissions and safety, and reconfigured the vehicle to
accommodate a plethora of new applique and integrated components. The
latter effort stemmed from the increased emphasis on Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, and Information (C4I) which are key elements
for Force XXI. In meeting these requirements we have increased the
maintenance burden on the Army in an environment of decreasing manpower
and money. The vehicle also does not meet all of the federally mandated
safety requirements, and, in fact, can not be sold in the military
configuration to the general public for operation on the highway.
Question. Could those deficiencies be resolved by modifying the
current vehicle? If not why?
Answer. The Army is currently conducting a formal Analysis of
Alternatives as a normal part of an Major Defense Acquisition Program.
This analysis will identify the most cost-effective way to meet the
Army's requirements. This study will be completed before the planned
release of the solicitation later this year. Preliminary results
indicate that adapting the current vehicle is not an economically
viable alternative and would have greater risk. As a minimum, a new
body, frame, engine, electrical system and transmission will be
required to meet the user's requirements. It is probable that such
extensive changes would result in a very expensive program.
Question. What is the anticipated cost of the new light tactical
vehicle acquisition program? For the record, please provide the total
cost, per unit cost and anticipated fielding schedule.
Anwser. Based on our current program assumptions and analysis, we
estimate that the prototype phase will cost $50 million and per unit
average cost will be $86 thousand. Our anticipated First Unit Equipped
(FUE) is in fiscal year 2002.
Question. Given the Army's past experience with tactical vehicle
programs, in terms of cost growth and schedule delays, do you think it
makes sense to develop a new light vehicle? Why or why not?
Answer. Yes, we and industry have learned a lot and have overcome
the pitfalls of prior programs through general and specific acquisition
actions. Application of Integrated Process Teams within the government
and industry are reducing risk in both the requirement and acquisition
arenas. We have established effective Teaming arrangements with
contractors to identify and reconcile cost, schedule and technical
performance issues quickly and amiably between the parties. These
efforts are focused on resolution of conditions that have previously
created complications in contracting for tactical vehicles.
Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV)
Question. The Army is currently procuring the Family of Medium
Tactical Vehicles (FMTV), 2.5 and 5 ton trucks, to replace those that
have been in the fleet for over 20 years. The Army is requesting $209
million for fiscal year 1998 for FMTV. During the past year, the Army
has developed a new acquisition plan to develop a second producer. Mr.
Decker, please describe the Army's new FMTV acquisition plan.
Answer. We changed the FMTV acquisition strategy to mitigate a
break in production, to reduce Operations and Support costs, to keep
the FMTV pipeline flowing, to ensure commonality in FMTV rebuys and to
ensure continual competition in the program. We plan to award a sole
source, multiyear procurement contract to Stewart and Stevenson (S&S)
in fiscal year 1998. The following year, fiscal year 1999, we plan to
award a competitive, multiyear contract to a second source. While the
new contractor is facilitizing and becoming qualified, S&S will
continue to produce vehicles. Once the second source is qualified to
produce, they will compete with S&S for FMTV funding.
Question. Is you new acquisition plan funded in the budget?
Answer. No, as a minimum we need an additional $44 million in
fiscal year 1998 to mitigate a potential two month production gap.
Question. We understand that the economic rate of production to
maintain two Family on Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) producers would
require an annual procurement of $600 million. In the past few years,
the Army has been unable to budget that amount for its entire tactical
vehicle fleet. Given all of the modernization shortfalls you need to
``fix'' how are you going to maintain that level of funding in your
budget?
Answer. I believe that the $600 million figure came from the
Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Investment Strategy that the Department sent
to the Congress in fiscal year 1995. Initially, to maintain two
producers the Army believes that it needs $400 million per year. As you
know, our budget process is an internal trade off between our
prioritized requirements as affordability. We will do our best to fund
our highest priorities.
Question. As you know, out year projections usually do not
materialize. If this happens, would you still want to continue with a
second source?
Answer. Our planning is predicated upon certain out year funding
streams. If, at a future date those funding streams change, we will
adjust our plans accordingly.
Question. Are you satisfied with the Family of Medium Tactical
Vehicles (FMTV's) that are currently being delivered to the Army?
Answer. The Army is extremely satisfied with the FMTV. It is a
first class vehicle that is very easy to maintain.
Question. The Army is not required to compete the FMTV program or
develop a second source. If your are satisfied with the product you are
fielding, why not save the cost of the FMTV competition and award the
contract to the current producer?
Answer. The Army believes that it is in its best interest to
interject competition in its procurement awards whenever possible.
Black Hawk Multiyear Procurement
Question. Although the Army has a requirement for 500 additional
Black Hawk helicopters, the fiscal year 1998 budget proposes to procure
only a total of 36 in FY98 and FY99. The FY98 budget proposes to
terminate Black Hawk production in 2000. Last year, the Army requested
funding to begin a new multiyear contract for Black Hawk helicopters.
Furthermore, the Army identified a $243 million shortfall in FY97 for
Black Hawk procurement. The Congress provided $225 million for Black
Hawks--$64 million above the President's Budget and the authority to
proceed with a multiyear contract. This year's budget does not include
funding for a Black Hawk multiyear contract. Why does your FY98 budget
not include funds for the multiyear contract that you requested in
fiscal year 1997?
Answer. The FY98 budget reflects program budget decision (PBD) 722
which anticipates a multi-service/multiyear contract for FY97-01 at
quantities of 36, 18, 18, 18 and 18. The FY98 request reflects
requirements to procure 18 aircraft in FY98 and advance procurement for
12 aircraft in FY99. This completes the Army's portion of this
contract.
Question. Congress appropriated $65 million advanced procurement
funds in fiscal year 1997 for the production of 36 aircraft in 1998.
Since you are only procuring 18, can we rescind the money?
Answer. The $65 million FY97 advance procurement funding is
required to protect schedule, avoid breaks in production and procure
Economical Order Quantities for the production quantities in FY98 and
FY99. The budget is based on receiving $65 million in FY97. Even though
we are only procuring 18 aircraft, any reduction to this amount would
cause an increase in FY98 and FY99.
Question. When, if ever, will you procure the additional
helicopters to meet your requirements?
Answer. The Army does not anticipate having sufficient
modernization funds in the foreseeable future to enable it to procure
the remaining Black Hawk requirement.
Question. What is the operational impact of not fielding Black
Hawks after 1999?
Answer. The Army will have filled 100 percent of its active and
reserve Black Hawk warfight requirements by 1999. The Army has decided
it will accept the risks associated with Black Hawk shortages in the
sustaining accounts (training, operational floats, repair cycle floats,
and projected attrition) and the strategic reserve.
Question. Does the fiscal year 1998 (FY98) budget request sustain
the industrial base? Please explain.
Answer. Yes. The intended program from program budget decision 722
produces a multiservice/multiyear contract in FY97-01 which will
maintain the Sikorsky industrial base.
Question. If the Army decides to procure Black Hawks at a later
date, what is the cost of restarting the production line?
Answer. The cost impact of restarting the production line due to a
significant production break is estimated to cover over $50 million in
shut down and start up efforts.
Question. The unit cost for Black Hawks, based on the multiyear
procurement of 36 aircraft per year, is $8.7 million. The exact same
helicopter will cost you $11.6 million with a single year procurement
contact. The 36 aircraft you are buying in 1998 and 1999 will cost over
$104 million more than if you would have continued the multiyear. Does
this make good business sense to you? Why?
Answer. The Army decided to withdraw funding from fiscal year 1998-
2001 (FY98-01) due to affordability. No additional cost would have
occurred in FY98-99. Program budget decision 722 implemented the Deputy
Secretary of Defense decision that directed the Army to continue to buy
Black Hawk aircraft in FY 98-99.
Question. The Army Aviation Modernization Plan is the strategy for
replacing helicopters currently in the fleet. According to the plan,
all UH-1, (Huey) utility helicopters will be replaced by the Black Hawk
for both the active and reserve forces. How many UH-1 helicopters are
currently in the army inventory?
Answer. There are approximately 1000 UH-1s in the current Army
inventory. The ongoing retirement and draw down programs will reduce
the UH-1 inventory to approximately 900 aircraft by late 1999.
Question. Will you keep UH-1 helicopters in the fleet to meet
utility requirements? If not, how will those requirements be satisfied?
Answer. Yes. UH-1s will fill requirements for the light utility
helicopter mission, strategic reserve utility requirements, and
peacetime training and support requirements.
Question. What is the life expectancy of the UH-1 in the fleet?
Answer. The UH-1 life expectancy is 30 years.
Question. When will they reach their life expectancy?
Answer. The remaining UH-1 fleet will reach an average fleet age of
30 years in 2002. The Army has determined that it can safely operate
and maintain its UH-1 fleet until 2010. The key to the UH-1's
sustainability in its historical performance data and the abundant
world wide parts supply.
Question.For the record, please provide the anticipated retirement
schedule for the UF-1 based on the Black Hawk fielding schedule?
Answer. The majority of anticipated UH-1 retirements are based on
ongoing Army National Guard force reductions. The Army will procure
another 64 Black Hawks for fiscal years 1997-1999 (97=34, 98=18,
99=12). These aircraft will enable the Army to displace 12 active
component Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) UH-1's, 30 reserve component
MEDEVAC UH-1's, field 8 UH-60As for a new command aviation company in
Germany, and provide eight additional operational ready float Black
Hawks.
Question. According to the Army Modernization Plan, the UH-1 HUEY
helicopters are ``old airframes, possessing inadequate lift, speed, and
range for operations in high/hot environments.'' The Army was planning
to replace all UH-1s with the Black Hawk, ``a solid performer with
excellent deployability, sustainability, and maintainability.'' Since
it appears that the Army is going to have UH-1s in the fleet for quite
some time, are you going to improve the UH-1 to correct those
deficiencies?
Answer. These deficiencies describe the UH-1s inability to perform
assault and general support missions in a wartime environment. Since
the Army has filled 100 percent of its UH-60 wartime requirements,
there are no warfight deficiencies to correct in the UH-1.
Question. What is the estimated cost of a UH-1 upgrade program?
Answer. The Army does not have a requirement for a UH-1 upgrade
program. There has not been a cost estimate done for a UH-1 upgrade
program.
Question. Would it not be cheaper to procure new Black Haws,
instead of upgrading the UH-1? Please explain.
Answer. Since the Army has no plan to upgrade the UH-1, there is no
cost basis to compare upgrading the UH-1 against the cost of procuring
new Black Hawks.
Question. What are the operation and maintenance cost for a Black
Hawk? For a UH-1?
Answer. Operational and maintenance costs are based on the theater
in which the aircraft is operated. Current cost factors per flight hour
for aircraft in Korea are: UH-60L-$1554 per hour; UH-1-$397 per hour.
Question. The Army claims that reducing the type of helicopters in
the fleet will reduce support and logistics costs. For the record, what
would be the savings if you retired all helicopters and had only Black
Hawks in the fleet?
Answer. The Army will provide cost data at a later date. If all UH-
1s were retired, the Army would have a large number of mission
requirements that do not need a Black Hawk. The 120 aircraft light
utility helicopter mission does not require a UH-60. The Army also has
a wide variety of UH-1 peace time support missions that do not require
a UH-60.
[Clerk's note.--The cost data was not provided to the
Committee.]
Question. The Congress directed that the global positioning system
(GPS) be integrated on all service aircraft by 2000. Since you will
have more UH-1s in the fleet than you anticipated, will you meet the
deadline? If not, how many UH-1 helicopters will not have GPS by 2000?
Answer. The Army has funded the procurement of GPS to integrate
them in all remaining UH-1s by the year 2000.
Question. Since you have decided not to go forward with the Black
Hawk multiyear, it appears as if the Army will have to:
--pay $104 million more than you planned on spending for 18
helicopters;
--Pay to maintain the UH-1; and pay the higher support and logistics
costs associated with maintaining more than one type of utility
helicopter fleet.
Mr. Decker, do you still believe the Black Hawk multiyear contact is
unaffordable?
Answer. Program budget decision 722 provided sufficient funding for
an Army/Navy multiyear contract at 18 per year from fiscal years 1998-
2001 (FY98-01).
Question. Recently, we have heard testimony from several of the
Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs). All of the CINCs testified that they are
faced with critical shortfalls in areas such as equipment maintenance
and airlift. What do you think the CINCs would say about your decision
to terminate Black Hawk production?
Answer. Due to fiscal constraints, the higher priority of other war
fighting systems is more important to our soldiers.
Question. For the record, please provide, for each CINC, the number
of UH-1s that are in his area of operations.
Answer. Projected to the end of FY98: U.S. Army Europe--28; Korea--
3; U.S. Army Forces Command--81; U.S. Army Pacific--8; U.S. Army
Southern Command--0; U.S. Special Operations Command--0.
CH-47 Improved Cargo Helicopter
Question. The CH-47 is the Army's cargo helicopter which was
fielded almost 40 years ago; its useful life expires beginning in 2002.
The replacement helicopter, the National Transport Rotorcraft (NTR)
will be a joint service helicopter and will be fielded after 2015. The
Army's shortfall list in fiscal year 1997 (FY97) included funds to
accelerate the procurement of new engines for the CH-47. The Army also
identified funds to begin the development of Improved Cargo Helicopter
(ICH) program. The ICH will be a CH-47 which will undergo an airframe
overhaul and cockpit upgrade program. Congress provided the additional
funding for both unfunded requirements. What is the status of the FY97
funds?
Answer. The $8.7 million of the $17.72 million ICH FY97 Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation (RDTE) Congressional add has been
released to the Army. This $8.7 million will allow the ICH Program
Office to fund all programmatic requirements through the end of FY 97.
The balance of the congressional add, currently on withhold in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, must be released to the Army at the
beginning of FY98 to allow for the award of the ICH Engineering and
Manufacturing Development contract in December 1997.
Question. The Congress provided $17 million to begin the
development of the ICH, an airframe overhaul and cockpit upgrade
program for the CH-47. The Army is requesting $2.6 million to continue
the program in FY98. The Army plans on delivering the first ICH to the
fleet in 2003. The last ICH will be delivered in 2016. What is the
anticipated cost of the ICH program?
Answer. The current RDTE funding requirement for this program is
projected to be $103 million in then year dollars. The current
Procurement funding requirement for this program is projected to be
$3.102 billion in then year dollars.
Question. Is the ICH program adequately funded in your 1998 budget
request? If not, what is the shortfall?
Answer. The ICH program is not adequately funded in FY98 due to a
$26 million FY98 RDTE decrement in Program Budget Decision 722. While
the program remains executable, additional RDTE funds in FY98 would
``buy back'' the year delay in fielding caused by this decrement and
maintain program efficiencies during the Engineering and Manufacturing
Development phase.
Question. What is the anticipated useful life of the ICH?
Answer. Once fielded, the useful life of the ICH will be 20 years.
Question. The useful life of the CH-47 expires beginning in 2002.
The first ICH will not be delivered until 2003, the last in 2016.
Should the ICH program be accelerated? Please explain.
Answer. The initial fielding date of 2002 was established to
coincide with the end of the projected useful life of the CH-47D.
Therefore, any delays of ICH fielding beyond this date would be unwise.
Due to budget constraints during the production years, the ICH will
only be fielded at one half the rate at which the CH-47D was fielded.
Additional Procurement funding during the production years would allow
the Army to accelerate procurement and fielding, providing our war-
fighters with this critical capability early.
Question. The ICH program will be the second ``service life
extension program'' for the CH-47; the first took place 20 years ago. A
replacement helicopter, the NTR, for CH-47 will not be produced until
after 2015 almost 20 years from today. Do you believe that the ICH will
remain safe and operational until after 2015 or will not have to do
another life extension program?
Answer. Yes, the ICH will remain safe and operational for 20 years.
The first ICHs will be operational until 2023, while the last ICH
deliveries will be operational until 2036. The safety of these aircraft
will be maintained through continued safety and sustainment efforts,
much like the CH-47D fleet is today.
Question. The Marine Corps is also considering a service life
extension program for its cargo helicopters. Since both services will
procure the NTR, would it not make more sense, operationally and
economically, to accelerate the NTR instead of doing two service life
extension programs?
Answer. The ICH is intended to bridge the gap between now and the
fielding of what is now known as the Joint Tactical Rotocraft (JTR).
This is why the ICH program includes only the necessary quantities--300
of the Army's 431 CH-47Ds--to achieve this bridge. The need to sustain
the CH-47D fleet through another service life extension program in the
immediate future is critical and cannot be delayed. Delaying the ICH
program would result in an anticipated reduction in aircraft
operational availability and increased Operating and Support costs
until a replacement is fielded. Should the replacement program be
delayed, this program would continue to grow. While the Army cannot
speak for the Marine Corps, the JTR program is only in the very early
stages of Concept Exploration. Many of the anticipated technologies
required to achieve the desired performance objectives are still being
defined. The JTR is currently projected to be fielded no earlier than
2015, at which time the entire fleet of CH-47Ds will be over 20 years
old.
Apache Longbow Helicopter
Question. The Apache is the Army's attack helicopter originally
fielded in the 1980's. The Army is planning to modify 758 of the Apache
helicopters to the Apache Longbow. With its improved radar and weapon
systems, the Apache Longbow will have improved targeting, survivability
and maintainability features. Last year, the Army's shortfall list
included funds to modify the Apache Longbow with a Second Generation
Forward Looking Infrared (2nd GEN FLIR) that is being developed for the
Comanche. Since the outyear integration costs for the Apache 2nd GEN
FLIR program were not budgeted and projected to be approximately $700
million, the Committee requested that the Army provide a report with
the fiscal year 1998 budget submit outlining the risks and costs of the
program. What is the status of the report?
Answer. An interim report was approved for release on 11 March
1997. The final report cannot be prepared until results of a flight
evaluation are assessed. I the contract can be awarded by 30 June 1997
a flight demonstration could take place in the Third Quarter, FY98. A
final report will be prepared at that time.
Question. When will you provide it to Congress?
Answer. The interim report was sent the week of 24 March 1997.
Question. The Senate provided the funds to begin the 2nd GEN FLIR
program and their position prevailed in conference--the Congress
provided $5 million to begin the program. What is the status of the
FY97 funds?
Answer. The funding provided in FY97 is being withheld by the
Department of Defense Comptroller. The FY97 funding would allow the
Army to do a flight evaluation of the Comanche FLIR on Apache. The
intent of this evaluation is to provide the detailed information
necessary to fully respond to the Congressional reporting requirement.
Question. Does your FY98 budget include funds to continue the
program? If not, what is the shortfall?
Answer. Funding to support a FY98 program is not included in the
FY98 budget. A FY98 program start would require $13 million.
Question. Do you plan on providing offsets to continue the program
in FY98?
Answer. Offset decisions for FY98 have not been made yet.
Question. The Army told us last year it believed using the Comanche
2nd GEN FLIR would be cost effective because it would allow development
of a single sensor for two aircraft. However, it is our understanding
that competing contractors have told the Army they will protest ``sole
source'' award. They say it is unfair not to compete the contract. If
you must compete the contract, what is the anticipated cost of
developing a new 2nd GEN FLIR for the Apache Longbow? Are funds
included in the FY98 budget request?
Answer. The cost of developing and procuring a new 2nd GEN FLIR
would be approximately $774 million, $26 million more than the
projected cost of leveraging the work already completed on the Comanche
FLIR. Funding to support a 1998 program is not included in the 1998
budget request.
Question. It appears as if your Apache Longbow 2nd GEN FLIR program
is in trouble because you did not provide Congress with a report as
requested; the Office of the Secretary of Defense has not released your
FY97 funds; you did not provide funds in FY98 to continue the program;
and you can not award the contract without a competition. So why
shouldn't we rescind the funds?
Answer. Funding should not be rescinded because it was provided for
the express purpose of investigating the feasibility of using the
Comanche FLIR on the Apache, not necessarily to begin a Apache 2nd GEN
FLIR program. Data derived from the feasibility study and flight
demonstration will not only provide valuable information for any future
Apache 2nd GEN FLIR program, but also serves as a risk reduction to the
Comanche program. A sole source contract can be awarded for this
feasibility study because there is only one developer of the Comanche
FLIR. However, any new effort to develop and produce an Apache 2nd GEN
FLIR would be competed in accordance with the Competition in
Contracting Act.
Funding to support follow-on 2nd GEN FLIR requirements will be
addressed in the FY99-03 Mini-Program Objectives Memorandum.
Question. Last year, the Congress provided $27 million to procure
one crew trainer for the Apache Longbow. The Army identified an
unfunded requirement for two crew trainers. It is our understanding
that funds are not included in the fiscal year 1998 budget for the
second trainer. Why?
Answer. The FY98 budget request contains $81.7 million for Apache
Longbow training devices. The 1998 funding would procure the best mix
of required training devices based upon available funding. Devices to
be procured in 1998 are two Longbow Crew Trainers, two Longbow
Collective Training Systems, two Multiplex Avionics, Visionics,
Weapons, and Electrical Systems Trainers, three Airframe Engine and
Drivetrain Systems Trainers, and 45 Tactical Engagement Simulation
Systems. With an additional $28 million, the Army would procure one
additional Longbow Crew Trainer; one Multiplex Avionics, Visionics,
Weapons, and Electrical Systems Trainer; and two Airframe Engine and
Drivetrain Systems Trainers.
Question. The Army is pursuing a six year multiyear contract for
the Fire Control Radar (FCR), which is a key component of the Apache
Longbow weapon system. The FCR provides automatic target detection,
classification, and prioritization and a firer and forget capability.
The Apache Longbow airframe is a five year multiyear procurement. Why
are you requesting a six year multiyear contract for the FCR?
Answer. A six year multiyear contract is being requested because it
would complete the procurement of the remaining 207 FCRs and offer a
considerable cost avoidance. Army analysis projects a cost avoidance of
approximately $80 million.
Kiowa Warrior Helicopter
Question. The Kiowa Warrior is the Army's armed reconnaissance
helicopter. Originally fielded during the Vietnam War as the OH-58,
this helicopter will start to be replaced after 2006 by the Comanche.
The Army is requesting no funds for Kiowa Warrior production for fiscal
year 1998. What is the Army's requirement for Kiowa Warriors? How many
are in the current fleet? How many are on contract?
Answer. The Army's requirement for Kiowa Warriors is 507, and
includes all units, both Active and Reserve, that have Kiowa as part of
required equipment. There are currently 314 in the fleet. There are a
total of 398 on contract.
Question. Last year, Congress provided an additional $190 million
for Kiowa Warrior (FY97 plus up). What is the status of those funds?
Answer. $79 million of the $190 million has been released by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The $22 million will be used
to continue procurement of 10 additional aircraft. The $57 million will
be used for the Safety Enhancement Program (SEP). The remaining $111
million for procurement of aircraft above the 398 quantity is still on
withhold by at OSD.
Question. The Army has requested that $57.3 million of the 1997
funds appropriated for Kiowa Warrior production be reallocated to
correct safety problems on Kiowa Warrior helicopters in the fleet. The
funds will be used to procure and install crashworthy seats, airbags,
restraint systems and engine upgrades. Last year you told us the cost
of the program was $172 million. Has the cost of the safety enhancement
program (SEP) changed? If so, by how much and why? Is it adequately
funded in the budget? If not what is the shortfall?
Answer. The entire SEP cost as estimated last year is $189 million.
This includes a program which began in fiscal year (FY96) and continues
through FY04. In FY96, $15 million was spent on the SEP; which leaves a
remaining requirement of $174 million. The SEP is partially funded in
the FY 97-01 budget at $115 million (includes the $57.3 million from
the FY97 plus up). There is a total $59 million shortfall in FY00
through FY04.
Question. What effect will the Bell-Textron's recent contract award
for the Marine Cobra and Huey upgrade program mean to its overhead
rates? Will it lower the cost of production of Kiowa Warriors?
Answer. During the first two years of the Marine Cobra and Huey
program there will be no effect on the overhead rates. This is because
the majority of the effort during the first two years will be for non-
recurring engineering. After two years of the effect will be to reduce
the overhead rates for all programs and the cost of producing the Kiowa
Warrior.
Comanche Helicopter
Question. The Comanche is the next generation armed reconnaissance
helicopter. The Comanche will significantly expand the Army's ability
to collect reconnaissance information in all battlefield environments
because of its improved sensors and greater flexibility for deployment.
The Comanche will replace the Kiowa Warrior. The Army is requesting
$282 million in fiscal year 1998 for continued development of Comanche.
Mr. Decker, your statement says ``Comanche, if fielded,''--Is the Army
considering not fielding the Comanche? Please explain.
Answer. The Army has always expected to field this critical
warfighting asset. My statement simply recognized that we have
acquisition decision points to evaluate the operational performance
before fielding a new system. I am confident that as Comanche fully
demonstrates the capabilities it is designed to provide, it will be
procured and fielded as programmed.
Question. Last year, the Army requested an additional $199 million
to accelerate the development of Comanche. Accelerating the program
would not only field Comanche sooner, but would also save $3 billion in
acquisition costs. Congress provided an additional $50 million for
Comanche in FY97. How did the Army spend the additional $50 million?
Answer. The $50 million was released to the Army on February 28,
1997. Specific uses are additional flight testing, beginning
development of the Link 16 communication capability for Comanche,
earlier development work on the Electro-Optical Sensor System and the
Low Observable development programs, and wind tunnel tests.
Hellfire II Missile
Question. Last year, the Army's unfunded priority list included a
request for economic order quantity funding for a proposed four-year
Hellfire II multiyear contract. In this year's budget, the Army
eliminated all Hellfire II production in fiscal year 1998 and out.
Given that stability of requirement and funding are prerequisites for
multiyear contracts, why did the Army request a multiyear for Hellfire
II only to eliminate production in the FY98 and out?
Answer. The Army could not afford the continued buy of Hellfire II
missiles at less than the annual minimum economic rate and Congress did
not support the requested economic order quantity funds to initiate
multiyear procurement. In the near term, Army has over 37,000 Laser
Hellfire missiles (all tactical configurations), which fully meet all
anticipated operational requirements. The Army expects Foreign Military
Sales to sustain the Hellfire II production line through FY99, as a
minimum, and the Army will address restarting the Hellfire II (or an
improved version) production line in the FY99-03 Program Objectives
Memorandum build.
Question. How can we work with you to understand the priorities
that the Army is committed to sustaining in future budgets?
Answer. The Congress needs to continue its open dialogue with Army
Leadership to understand our priorities. In addition, the Army needs
the assistance from the Congress in stabilizing individual program
funds; minimizing the decrements to the modernization programs that
have heretofore been required to support contingency operations; and
its continued support for the Force XXI technical initiatives.
Extended Range Multiple Launch Rocket System (ER-MLRS)
Question. Last year, the Army's unfunded priority list included a
request for funds for additional ER-MLRS rockets in order to smooth
``the ramp up'' to the fiscal year 1998 buy. However, this year's
budget reduces the FY98 buy of this rocket to zero. Why did the Army
request additional quantities in FY97 only to zero the program the next
year?
Answer. Estimated Foreign Military Sales for FY98 allowed the Army
the flexibility to fund higher priorities. Funding for FY98 will be
used to help the Army execute Field Artillery redesign, allowing the
Army to modernize more of the Army National Guard with Paladin
howitzers, while maintaining combat capability in the Active Component
divisions. Additionally, Extended Range Guided (ER-Guided) Rocket
technology was successfully demonstrated in 1996 and resulted in the
Army giving the ER-Guided Rocket program a higher priority than the
Extended Range Rocket. Thus, during the FY98 budgetary process, the
Army adequately funded an Engineering, Manufacturing and Development
program for the ER-Guided Rocket beginning in FY98. The FY96 and FY97
buys of 2,826 ER-MLRS Rockets and follow-on procurements provide an
interim capability until the ER-Guided Rocket begins production.
Question. What is the Army inventory requirement for this weapon?
Answer. The requirement for the ER-MLRS Rockets is 150,000 rockets.
The Army is currently assessing the requirement for the ER-Guided
Rocket and will use the ER-MLRS Rocket as an interim capability until
the ER-Guided Rocket is fielded in FY2003.
Question. Under the current plan, when will this inventory
requirement be met?
Answer. The current plan required procurement of the ER-Guided
Rocket to continue thru FY2012.
Question. Would any of the Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) agree that
it is prudent to eliminate United States production for the ER-Rocket
in FY98?
Answer. The FY96 and FY97 procurement of 2,286 ER-MLRS Rockets
provides the CINCs an interim capability through FY98. Limited follow-
on production planned for FY99 through FY01 will further increase
quantities of the ER-MLRS Rocket available to meet contingency
requirements. The CINCs require an MLRS rocket that provides them
operational and logistical flexibility. The ER-Guided Rocket is the
objective MLRS rocket that will provide the operational and logistical
flexibility required by the CINCs. The ER-Guided Rocket is scheduled to
begin production in FY2002 with fielding in FY2003.
Question. How can we work with you to understand the priorities
that the Army is committed to sustaining in future budgets?
Answer. Maintaining an open dialogue with the Army leadership,
assisting in stabilizing funding for individual missile programs, and
continued support for the Army's Force XXI modernization initiatives
will serve to provide a better understanding of the Army's priorities
in sustaining future budgets.
Starstreak Missile
Question. Given the availability of funding, is the Army committed
to conducting Phase III side by side evaluation of the Starstreak and
Stinger missiles? If not, why not?
Answer. The FY97 Joint Appropriations Conference was specific in
their language regarding Starstreak. The language stated, ``an increase
of $15,000,000 only for continuation of the air-to-air Starstreak
evaluation. The conferees agree that side-by-side testing with other
missile candidates should not occur until after completion of Phase II
testing of Starstreak''. Phase II missile firings are scheduled for
completion in October 1998, with the final report expected in November
1998. It is very important to complete the Phase II testing and data
analysis prior to development of a launcher, and integration of the
Starstreak missile system with the fire control radar on the AH-64 D
Apache Longbow. Until Phase II is completed, the Starstreak missile's
ability to accurately track and engage airborne targets, and its
associated probability of hit for which target acquisition and tracking
are major factors, will be unknown, and will significantly increase
risk to the launcher and system integration designs for the Apache
Longbow. Accordingly, the Army initiated an analytical effort to
conduct a parallel cost and performance assessment of Stinger Block I/
II and Starstreak missiles fired from Longbow Apache and Comanche
aircraft in simulated one-on-one and few-on-few combat scenarios, which
also coincides with the Starstreak Phase II contract completion date.
The Starstreak Phase II test results will be used to validate the model
and achieve a high degree of confidence in the analytical performance
comparison between missiles. The model provides the Army and the UK a
means to evaluate the two air-to-air missiles without having to fund a
costly Phase III side-by-side comparison test. Use of modeling and
simulation, therefore, is the affordable approach to provide the
comparisons between missiles without having to fund a Phase III side-
by-side test evaluation program which is estimated to cost $36.6
million.
Question. Is further work required to launch a Stinger from Apache?
If so, please describe the additional work and the associated costs.
Answer. Modification of the existing Stinger Air-to-Air launcher to
ensure MIL-STD-1760 compatibility, appropriate battery cooling to the
hellfire launcher to accommodate Stinger, and associated launcher
qualification work would need to be conducted as part of a development
program. Total development costs are estimated to be $18.6 million.
After development cost investments for launcher development/
qualification, the cost to retrofit the Longbow Apache fleet would
entail unit production costs of $100,000 per unit aircraft (2
launchers), and minor modifications to the aircraft's fire control
radar.
Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS)
Question. The Committee understands that there may be possible
foreign sales for the Block IA extended range variant of ATACMS. What
is the status of these Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases?
Answer. The extended range ATACMS Block IA is not currently being
considered for foreign sales. However, the export version of ATACMS
Block I is being offered for FMS. Turkey and Greece have agreed to buy
72 and 41 Block I missiles, respectively. In the near term, the only
possible additional FMS case is with South Korea.
Question. Have the benefits of the additional quantities been
factored in the pricing in the fiscal year 1998 President's Budget? If
not, what savings are anticipated in FY98?
Answer. Benefits to the Army from the Turkey case are reflected in
the FY97 ATACMS Block IA budget. The contract for the Greece buy has
not been definitized, therefore further Army FY97 benefits are not yet
quantified. The Army bases savings on the increase in the production
rate from FMS. The production rate benefits are leveled across all the
missiles being procured concurrently ensuring the Army shares in the
savings. The exact amount of the savings realized is dependent upon the
contract that is negotiated, the number of additional missiles per year
procured, and the actual contractor costs incurred in the early years
of production. The Army is unable, at this time, to determine any
potential FY98 benefits from the possible South Korean case.
Abrams Tanks
Question. The 1998 budget requests $342 million to continue the
multiyear procurement of M1A2 tanks. Last year, the Army procured 120
M1A2 tanks for a unit cost of $1.8 million. For fiscal year 1998, the
Army is planning on procuring 120 tanks at $2.9 million a copy. A
Second Generation Forward Looking Infrared Radar (II GEN FLIR) and
electronic upgrades, which were not included in previous M1A2's, will
be included in the 1998 production vehicles. What is the per unit cost
to procure and integrate the II GEN FLIR on the M1A2?
Answer. First some clarification. The Army requests $622.2 million
in procurement funding to continue and support the Abrams multiyear--
$328.6 million in regular procurement for the 1998 quantity, $266.2
million in advance procurement for the 1999 quantity, $13.9 million in
initial spares and $13.4 million in system training devices. The unit
costs shown on the P-40 form only reflect ``Regular Procurement'', the
correct unit costs can be derived from the Program Summary on the P-40
form and are shown on the P-5 form. The correct unit costs for FY97 and
FY98 are $4.18 million and $4.9 million respectively. In addition, II
GEN FLIR upgrades the ``thermal sensors'' and is not a ``radar.'' The
budget documentation shows the System Enhancement Program (SEP),
including II GEN FLIR, cuts into the final 10 tanks of the 1998
quantity. As a result, the 1998 buy bears the non-recurring start-up
costs in addition to the recurring costs. We estimate $2.66 million per
tank is required to start-up and procure 10 sets worth of II GEN FLIRs.
As another point of comparison, for the first 500 tanks, our estimated
costs for II GEN FLIR are:
UNIT COST--1ST 500 UNITS
[Dollars in thousands]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY96
Const $ Esc $
------------------------------------------------------------------------
II GEN FLIR......................................... $753 $856
I GEN FLIR.......................................... 359 408
-------------------
Delta............................................... 394 448
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Constant--Const, Esc--Escalated.
Project Manager Abrams is assessing a potential delay in the M1A2
SEP development effort which may slip SEP production cut-in by two
months/10 tanks.
Question. What electronic upgrades, which were not included on
earlier M1A2's, will be integrated on the tanks produced beginning in
1998?
Answer. The following lists the improvements to be introduced in
1998:
a. 2nd Generation Forward Looking Infrared Sensors
b. Core Electronics (Digitization) Upgrades
(1) New Hull/Turret Main Processors
(2) Mass Memory Unit
(3) Task Force XXI Command and Control Software
(4) Open Architecture
(5) Upgraded Displays and Soldier Machine Interface
c. Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS) interface
d. Embedded Global Positioning System
e. Voice Synthesis
f. Under Armor Auxiliary Power Unit (APU)
g. Thermal Management System
Question. What is the per unit cost to procure and integrate the
new electronics on the M1A2?
Answer. Our estimate for the average unit cost for the first 500
units as compared to the original electronics is shown below:
ELECTRONICS UNIT COSTS--1ST 500 UNITS
[Dollars in thousands]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY96
Const $ Esc $
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under Armor APU..................................... $104 $118
Thermal Management System........................... 80 90
Other Electronics................................... 278 316
-------------------
Total Average Cost.............................. 462 524
===================
1st GEN Electronics & External APU.................. $389 $443
-------------------
Delta............................................... $73 $81
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. Will you retrofit the M1A2 tanks produced in prior years
with the II GEN FLIR and electronic upgrades?''
Answer. Yes, our current plan is to retrofit all M1A2s to the M1A2
SEP configuration.
Question. What is the cost of the retrofit program?
Answer. The estimated total cost to retrofit 617 M1A2s to the M1A2
SEP configuration is $828 million ($1.34 million each) over the period
from FY00 through FY06.
Question. What is the anticipated schedule for the retrofit
program?
Answer. The FY98 President's Budget initiates funding in FY00 for
an initial quantity of two. Based on the funding in the modification
line, the program will complete in FY07 at a total quantity of 617
M1A2s.
Question. Are funds included in the FY98 budget for the retrofit
program? if not, what is the shortfall?
Answer. Funds are included in the 1998 budget documentation to
initiate the retrofit program. Over the period from FY00 to FY03, we
plan to procure 187 M1A2 to M1A2 SEP retrofits.
Question. In Fiscal Year 1997, the Congress provided $8 million to
begin the development of the next generation tank. It is our
understanding the funds have not been released by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense Comptroller. Have you requested the funds?
Answer. No. the Army has not requested the funds. It has taken some
time to define an Army position regarding the use of the funds. In
addition, the Congressional language supporting the plus-up requires
competitive contracting. Since the Army did not anticipate this
funding, we're behind where we'd like to be in preparing contractual
documentation. Current policy is to not request release of funding
until near contract award.
Question. If the funds are released, would you use the $8 million
to begin the development of the next generation tank?
Answer. If the funding was released, we would apply it to tank
modernization in accordance with Congressional language as follows:
a. $3.5 million for two studies to (1) define a post M1A2 SEP ($1
million) program to provide target acquisition and accuracy
improvements increasing the tank's lethal range and (2) conduct Future
Combat System (FCS) concept studies ($2.5 million) to assess potential
requirements and technologies for a future tank.
b. $2.8 million for Abrams (M1A2 and M1A1) operating and support
cost reduction efforts. Specifically, $1.4 million to undertake a
project to increase track and roadwheel life and $1.4 million for a
Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Filtration system redesign. Both projects
can make a significant impact in reducing the ownership costs of the
Abrams fleet.
c. Finally, $1.5 million to assess the feasibility of M1A1 Command
and Control digitization using modified M1A2 SEP components.
Question. If so, are funds included in the budget request to
continue the effort?
Answer. The Army has included funding for an FCS in the FY98
budget. Program Element 63645, Project DQ19 (shown below) is
specifically designated for initiating a focused FCS development
effort. The FY97 piece is the result of the FY97 Congressional plus-up:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PE 63645DQ19............................................ 7.8 0 0 2.0 24.8 28.9 38.5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, there is a significant amount of work ongoing in the
Tech Base which supports the FCS. In essence, we plan to use a portion
of the 1997 plus-up to focus the Tech Base and subsequently initiate a
new start in the 2000 timeframe.
Question. Is the Army planning to procure additional M1A2 tanks
upon completion of the current multiyear contract? If so, how many?
Answer. The Army may continue M1A2 procurement after the multiyear
procurement; however, affordability will influence the annual upgrade
production rates and may influence the configuration of the tank. The
challenge is to strike the right balance among operational
requirements, affordability and industrial base considerations.
Currently, about 2,127 M1A2s are required to equip the Core Force
(Force Packages 1 and 2) and meet the requirements for the training
base and test vehicles. The current approved M1A2 program is for 1,079
vehicles--19 pilots/prototypes, 62 new production and 998 upgrades.
This quantity provides M1A2s for Force Package 1, training base and
test vehicle requirements. At this point in time, the Army is not
certain ``How many M1A2s'' it will procure. Right now, we're committed
to buying M1A2 upgrades through the end of the multiyear (786 upgrades
or 867 M1A2s).
Ammunition Programs
Question. Last year, the Congress provided $1.1 billion for the
procurement of ammunition. This represented an increase of almost $300
million to the fiscal year 1997 budget request. The additional funds
were provided to adequately modernize the ammunition inventory and
preserve the industrial base. The Army's fiscal year 1998 budget
request for ammunition is $890 million. Does the fiscal year 1998
budget request adequately fund the Army's requirement for ammunition
and sustain the capabilities of the industrial base?
Answer. Within the context of the overall Army budget, we have
built a balanced program that is suitable. We place funding priority on
readiness which means training ammunition. We then buy modern munitions
based on affordability. The fiscal year 1998 request adequately funds
our demilitarization program and marginally funds requirements for our
organic production facilities.
Question. The Army's annual consumption of training ammunition is
approximately $900 million. The fiscal year 1998 budget request for
both training and war reserve ammunition is $694 million. As a result,
the Army must use war reserve ammunition to support training
requirements. Does this concern you? Why?
Answer. The Army's use of war reserve to support training draws
down the existing war reserve for use in training. Some of these items
became excess as a result of post Cold War requirements reductions over
the last several years. The use of these munitions in training avoided
storage and eventual demilitarization costs. However, some of these
items, which are not excess, have been drawn below the total needed for
war reserve purposes and replacing them will be prioritized within our
fiscal constraints.
Question. The Army is responsible for the storage and maintenance
of all conventional ammunition. In the past, the Army has budgeted $300
million for this activity. How much is included in the fiscal year 1998
budget request for this activity?
Answer. The Army's fiscal year 1998 budget request for ammunition
management totals $369.4 million, and includes funding for both the
toxic chemical and conventional ammunition stockpile management
programs. The toxic chemical munitions program ($79.1 million) provides
for the proper storage, maintenance, and surveillance of chemical items
until demilitarization actions are complete. The conventional
ammunition stockpile management program ($290.3 million) provides for
supply management, inspection, maintenance, and surveillance for the
world-wide wholesale stockpile of conventional ammunition. This is
considered an adequate level of funding to support the Army, as well
our conventional ammunition storage mission in support of other
Services.
Question. Several contractors who operate Army ammunition plants
have made Post Retirement Benefit (PRB) claims against the Army. The
Army believes the cost of settling one of the claims, by Uniroyal,
Inc., is approximately $35 million. What is a PRB claim?
Answer. A PRB claim is a request for funds to pay post retirement
benefits for health and life insurance or other non-pension welfare
benefits to qualified retirees.
Question. Why is the government liable?
Answer. The issue of government liability has not been determined.
The Army position is that there is no legal liability under the
contracts as a direct cost. The Uniroyal request for extraordinary
relief did not include a determination of government liability. The
Army Contract Adjustment Board (ACAB) decided to grant the Uniroyal
request under Public Law 85-804, in recognition of an equitable
obligation based on how the Army historically told the contractors to
account for costs. The ACAB decision gives rise to a legal obligation
to pay in accordance with the decision.
Question. It is our understanding that the Army would like to use
expired years dollars to pay the claim. How would this be accomplished?
Answer. The use of expired year dollars may require Congressional
approval because the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Comptroller
has determined the Army must use current funds.
Question. What steps will you take to ensure that no future claims
are filed against the government?
Answer. We know of no way to ensure there are no future claims
against the government other than to encourage all contractors to
accrue the funds necessary to finance Post Retirement Benefit costs
against current customers.
Question. The fiscal year 1998 budget proposed that the Army
procure no kinetic energy tank ammunition after 1998. Will the Army's
requirement for kinetic energy tank ammunition be satisfied with the
fiscal year 1998 procurement?
Answer. No.
Question. Last year, Congress requested a report on the industrial
base for kinetic energy tank ammunition. Briefly outline your findings
and solutions.
Answer. The report determined that the depleted uranium projectile
assembly was the critical issue (sabot and penetrator). The report
indicates a viable option to fill the void with a combination of 25
millimeter (mm) and 120mm kinetic energy rounds until the next
generation of 120mm kinetic energy round completes development, if the
Army decides to pursue the next generation.
Question. What will be the restart costs for depleted uranium
kinetic energy tank rounds if the production line closes?
Answer. If we implement the findings of the report, there are no
restart costs. If we choose to completely halt kinetic energy munitions
production, it may not be possible to reconstruct the industrial base
as currently configured. For example, the issue with the Depleted
Uranium penetrator is not restart costs but Nuclear Regulatory
Commission and state licensing over which the Army has no control.
Restart costs are cartridge and acquisition strategy dependent and will
require further study.
Question. It is our understanding that the Army has no plans to
procure Depleted Uranium (DU) in fiscal years 1998 through fiscal year
2003. There are only two DU suppliers in the United States. What impact
does this decision have on the industrial base?
Answer. The fiscal year 1998 budget includes funding for both the
120 millimeter (mm) (M829A2) and 25mm (M919) kinetic energy rounds,
both of which have DU penetrators. If there is no procurement of
kinetic energy munitions in fiscal years 1999 through 2002, the
commercial facilities which produce DU would have no Department of
Defense business. The decision to close the commercial facilities would
be a commercial decision.
Question. In the last five years, how much has the Army spent on
DU?
Answer. The Army buys cartridge which contains DU. the cartridges
are procured from systems contractors; the DU is provided to the
systems contractors by subcontract. Congress has funded the 120mm
(M829A2) in each of the last five years, with an average DU component
cost of approximately $10 million per year. The 25mm (M919) was funded
in fiscal years 1994, 1995, and 1997, with an average DU component cost
of $4.5 million per year.
Question. Do either of the DU suppliers have non-defense customers?
If so, do they have enough non-defense sales to keep them viable until
2003?
Answer. Both suppliers have multiple business activities, most of
which are defense related or connected. Neither of the suppliers
appears to have sufficient non-defense sales at this time to remain
viable through 2003.
Question. How will you ensure that DU is available after 2003?
Answer. As indicated in our report to Congress, the Army is
considering a plan to procure a combination of DU munitions until the
next generation of 120mm kinetic energy round completes development. If
this item is type classified, we would expect to procure modest
quantities.
Question. The Army demilitarizes conventional ammunition at an
annual cost of approximately $100 million. The Army believes it can
lower the cost of the demilitarization program by selling munitions to
industry, who will destroy the munitions and then sell the by-products.
What are the benefits of commercial demilitarization?
Answer. There are two major benefits of selling munitions to
industry. The first is a cost avoidance for demilitarization which can
range from $800 to $1,200 per short ton, depending on the complexity of
the to be demilitarized. The second benefit is the additional
demilitarization which could be bought by the Army with the proceeds
from these sales.
Question. What are the anticipated savings?
Answer. The actual savings would depend on the number of short tons
actually sold and the price the Army could get for these obsolete or
excess munitions.
Question. The demilitarization program's goal is to reduce the
ammunition stockpile to less than 100,000 tons by 2004. Based on
funding available, will you reach your goal using the current methods
of demilitarization?
Answer. The three major factors which will impact the Army's
ability to reach this goal are the accuracy of the forecasted
generations into the demilitarization account; annual funding levels;
and the Army's ability to minimize or reduce future cost increases. If
the Army is able to successfully manage these three factors but is not
able to increase sales of obsolete or excess munitions, then we
estimate we could have approximately 40,000 short tons in addition to
the desired inventory level of 100,000 short tons by the end of fiscal
year 2004.
Question. Would you reach your goal using the proposed method?
Answer. The Army believes that the goal can be reached or exceeded
if we have greater flexibility to sell obsolete or excess munitions
from the demilitarization account as requested in our legislative
proposal. This does not mean that we would not have to continue to
closely monitor and manage other aspects of this program, i.e., funding
levels, generations, and costs.
Question. Are there any obstacles that will not allow you to
implement your plan? If so, what are they and how can they be overcome?
Answer. The Conventional Ammunition Demilitarization Program has
received good support from both Congress and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense. The Army is intensively managing this program to
assure we have a balanced program (private industry/government and
destructive/non-destructive technologies). One of our initiatives is
the legislation allowing greater flexibility for sales from the
demilitarization account. The Army is committed to reducing the
demilitarization backlog to less than 100,000 short tons by the end of
fiscal year 2004. The legislative initiatives is one of our efforts to
assure that this goal is met.
Question. Last year, Congress appropriated $45 million for the
Armament Retooling and Manufacturing Support (ARMS) program. How do you
plan on spending the $45 million?
Answer. Approximately $5 million would be used for loan guarantees
and to support program costs. The additional $40 million will support
expansion of ARMS to four additional facilities that are not currently
participating and support additional ARMS proposals at the other eleven
eligible facilities.
Question. You are requesting $5 million for fiscal year 1998 to
continue the ARMS program, but no funds are budgeted for the outyears.
Why?
Answer. This is the maximum amount available for the Army to
allocate to this program within current fiscal constraints. The Army
will continue to assess future funding of this program as it refines
its future programs and needs.
Question. Will you terminate the ARMS program after 1998?
Answer. The ARMS program will continue after 1998; the goal is to
make it a self-sustaining operation.
Question. The fiscal year 1998 budget provides funding for only
five of the sixteen munitions required to modernize the Army's
ammunition inventory. When does the Army plan on buying the 11
munitions required to modernize its inventory?
Answer. The Army intends to procure all fifteen of the munitions to
modernize the inventory as soon as possible within its current fiscal
constraints. Of the ten munitions which are not being procured in
fiscal year 1998, three have filled the requirement, three are at or
above fifty percent of the requirement, and one is still in
development. Of the remaining three, one is programmed for procurement
in the future.
Question. What is the impact of the Army's decision not to procure
all of the munitions required to modernize its inventory?
Answer. The Army must continue to rely on the substitute munitions
previously procured and maintained in the stockpile. The Army has
chosen to accept this moderate risk in order to fully support training
and thereby support near term readiness.
Digitization
Question. The Army is creating a ``digitized battlefield'' that it
believes will give it the ability to maintain a modern, but smaller
force capable of decisive victory. Digitization is the application of
information technologies--sensors, communications, computers,
displays--to meet the needs of the battlefield commanders at all
levels, providing a common picture in near-real time, shared data among
battlefield systems and the synchronization of combat power.
The Army is requesting only $57 million for ``horizontal
battlefield digitization''. The fiscal year 1997 budget request
forecast $110 million for fiscal year 1998 horizontal battlefield
digitization. What is horizontal battlefield digitization?
Answer. Horizontal battlefield digitization is the name of a
specific program element and project in the Army's budget which funds
the development of the Applique/Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and
Below system and helps to support the overall digitization effort. That
project is managed at the department level by the Army Digitization
Office.
Question. Why do you only need half of the funds you were planning
on spending in FY98?
Answer. The Army had planned to procure prototype digitization
hardware in FY98 to outfit a heavy division for the division Advanced
Warfighting Experiment (AWE). Due to fiscal realities, the Army decided
to downsize the division AWE to a division command post exercise,
reducing the requirement. However, I do need to clarify this. Recently,
we have identified through the AWE process, other digitization related
efforts which will require additional funding, such as some applique
prototype improvements and testing.
Question. What activities were you planning in fiscal year 1997 for
fiscal year 1998 that are not funded?
Answer. Hardware upgrades for a Limited User Test, and some
improvements to software functionality.
Question. What is the impact of the reduced horizontal battlefield
digitization funding?
Answer. The Division Advanced Warfighting Equipment (AWE) has been
revised to make maximum use of simulation and will concentrate on those
initiates which show promise in the Task Force (TF) XXI AWE. This
event, as revised, will be executable. However, as the Army is still in
a learning process, in reference to digitization, we may have to
accommodate unforeseen requirements resulting from events such as the
ongoing TF XXI AWE at the National Training Center.
Question. According to the Army, schedule and cost risk of the
digitization program is medium, however, the Army rates technical risk
as high. Please define what you mean by ``medium'' and ``high'' risk.
Answer. These ratings you refer to were a snapshot in time as of
the first of December. High technical risk results when expected levels
of performance are not realized and the fixes are not identified or
sufficiently developed to overcome the problem. High cost risk results
when sufficient funding is not available within the current budget to
pay for unexpected cost increases. Medium technical risk results when
expected levels of performance are not realized and potential fixes are
identified and developed but not yet implemented. Medium cost risk
results when additional costs have been identified and may cause
reprioritization within existing program funding. The schedule risk is
greatly influenced by the technical risk and the availability of
funding.
Question. Last year, we were told by General Reimer that cost risk
was ``low'' and technical risk was ``medium''. This year you identify
cost as ``medium'' and technical as ``high'' risk. What changed?
Answer. Last year the risk assessment was based on our best
estimate since we had not yet equipped the Experimental Force. In 1996
we delivered the equipment into the hands of the soldiers in the field,
and we have been able to assess complexity and the level of technical
integration required. Based upon lessons learned during the platoon,
company, and task force train-up, additional architecture, security,
and integration work is required for the objective system, thereby
raising the technical risk and cost risk.
Question. Congress has provided over $350 million for the
digitization effort. Given the resources committed to this effort,
shouldn't the risk diminish each year? Please explain why this is not
happening.
Answer. The effort to ``digitize a division by the year 2000'' was
initially judged to be high risk. This was a qualitative judgment based
on the limited knowledge of the true complexity of digitizing the
force. The experimental process has provided the opportunity for the
Army to ``peel back the onion'' during successive experiments and
simulations. Lessons learned and insights gained have formed the basis
for updating operational requirements impacting on the technical
performance issues and have served to provide a more complete blueprint
of the digitization efforts required. The biggest technical and
schedule challenge has been the integration of various diverse systems.
Question. The Army is planning on fielding an ``interim'' digitized
division in fiscal year 2001. The Army would like to field an
``objective'' digitized division in FY06. What is an ``interim''
digitized division?
Answer. An interim digitized division is an organization:
a. Equipped with a mix of both legacy and immature (early design,
but acquisition approved) systems.
b. Able to command and control using digital methods; and able to
maintain common relevant picture, situation awareness and Combat
Service Support management throughout the unit.
c. Organized in accordance with the Table of Organization and
Equipment, but modified to compensate for lack of certain ``enabling
technologies.''
d. Trained primarily at the unit through both New Equipment
Training and unit training.
Question. What is the cost of fielding the interim digitized
division? Is it adequately funded in the budget? What is the shortfall?
Answer. The costs associated with fielding the first interim
digitized division includes not only materiel, but all the other
functional domains such as Doctrine, Training, Leadership,
Organizations and Soldiers. The first interim digitized division will
be fielded, for the most part, with systems that are in the pipeline
and are scheduled to be fielded somewhere in the Army by FY00/FY01.
Some additional funding will be required to do the architecture work,
to develop security measures for the network, to integrate the system
of systems, to develop training support packages, and to develop and
integrate the system of systems Tactical Operations Centers. Ongoing
analysis and experimentation indicate that additional FY98 and outyear
funds may be required to perform the above stated functions. It looks
like approximately $100 million in FY98.
Question. What is an ``objective'' digitized division?
Answer. An ``objective'' digitized division is an organization:
a. Equipped with mature (objective) systems.
b. Able to fully command and control using digital methods.
c. Able to maintain common relevant picture, situation awareness
and Combat Service Support status throughout the unit.
d. Organized in accordance with the Table of Organization (TOC) and
Equipment and with all currently planned ``enabling technologies.''
e. Trained primarily at Training and Doctrine Command institutions
as part of the institutionalized soldier development and training
process.
Question. What is the cost of fielding the objective digitized
division? Is it adequately funded in your budget? What is the
shortfall?
Answer. The cost associated with the objective division is much the
same as for the interim division. Since the objective division is not
required and until 06, much of the equipment will be available through
existing budgeted quantities. There may be an additional requirement
for communications capacity, as well as the architecture, security,
training, integration, and TOC costs indicated for the interim
division. The architecture development may show a need for additional
command and control workstations.
Most of the funding to equip this division is available. However,
the experimentation process is expected to demonstrate a need for
additional funding for the above functions.
We will not know the answer to this question until the results of
the Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE) are finalized.
There may be a need for more items of equipment as we learn the value
of digitization to the entire force. As we analyze the AWE we will
identify those areas that need increased funding and welcome your help
in addressing those.
Question. What will be the benefit of the digitized division in:
a. a lesser regional conflict?
b. peacekeeping operations?
c. an urban environment?
Answer. The benefit of a digitized division compared to a non-
digitized division is the achievement of information dominance and the
capability to place greater force at the decisive point in order to
destroy the Threat. It doesn't matter what type of mission is assigned;
the application of information in formulating decisions is what will
allow the division to accomplish it's mission rapidly. Combined with
his real time awareness of the disposition of his own forces, the
commander can move essential and tailored force to influence and
control events many times faster than can be done today. Thus, whether
the event is a full scale enemy assault or a humanitarian assistance
mission, the commander can stabilize the situation before it is out of
control and he can accomplish this with minimum risk to his own force.
Furthermore, the capability to deploy forces with higher efficiency
reduces the total force commitment required to effect United States
policy regardless of where it is in the spectrum of operations. The
other advantage lies not necessarily in application of the capability
that a digitized division brings to the battlefield, but rather that a
potential hostile force knows that you know what he is doing and can
bring more firepower to bear, quicker, than he can. A digitized
division allows the United States to operate from a position of
advantage decreasing the risk associated with these type operations.
Question. What is the urgency of fielding the Army's interim
digitized division by 2001? What is the perceived threat?
Answer. An interim digitized division by 2001 should not be viewed
as an urgency of fielding, but as capitalizing on windows of
opportunity by optimizing programs that have been in development for
years. For example, synchronizing their fieldings of the Army Tactical
Command and Control System battlefield automation systems and creating
a tactical internet by integrating existing communications systems
through network engineering and management provides a leap ahead in
capability to command and control. The threat today is not necessarily
a specific country but the availability and proliferation of advanced
offensive weapons capabilities available on the open market to
virtually anyone with the where-with-all to purchase it. The reduced
force structure of the Army requires the ability to rapidly respond to
a variety of threats across the spectrum of operations.
Question. Based on your own risk assessment of the digitization
effort, do you believe that fielding the first digitized division by
2001 is ambitious? Please explain.
Answer. Yes, it is ambitious for a purpose. The Army has put an
ambitious ``mark on the wall'' designed to continue with the rapid pace
of modernization and development. Maintaining that ``mark'' has helped
to maintain momentum of development.
Question. Given the Army's tight budget, what is the benefit of
fielding an interim digitized division? Why not save the dollars and
accelerate the fielding of the objective division?
Answer. The Army plans to embed, vice applique, the digitization
capability into many of the combat vehicle systems scheduled for the
objective division. The Research Development Test and Evaluation effort
required to embed digitization into the combat vehicles is underway.
Fielding of systems with embedded capability, e.g., M1A2 System
Enhancement Package and M2A3 are scheduled for the fiscal year 2000-
2005 timeframe. In order to get the digitized capability in the field
earlier than those dates it will have to be done with applique.
Fielding an interim digitized division allows the Army to make use of
technology enablers sooner, continue the learning curve for concepts
and doctrine for the force, and continue to learn and develop tactics,
techniques, and procedures as we move to the objective division.
Question. How will you offset the cost of the digitized division in
your budget? What is of lesser priority, pay, operations and
maintenance, research and development? Or procurement dollars? Please
explain.
Answer. Both the interim and objective divisions will use systems
which are either already fielded or programmed for delivery in time to
meet Army digitization objectives. However, given the experimental
underpinning of the digitization effort, additional operation and
maintenance, research and development, and procurement funds may be
required to completely link systems together and integrate them into
the divisions. Efficiencies, such as those gained through the
synchronization of fielding schedules, will help to mitigate the impact
of these incremental costs. Ultimately, though, the Army may have to
make hard choices between systems and programs to ensure that we are
able to fully realize the enhanced capability of digitization. You can
rest assured, however, that the Army remains committed to maintaining
unit readiness to support the National Military Strategy.
Question. Digitization depends on the ``Tactical Internet''. Last
year, the Army said the Tactical Internet was the ``long pole'' in the
digitization effort. This year, it continues to be the ``long pole''.
It is our understanding that the Tactical Internet provides limited
Command and Control connectivity, that voice-data contention is a
problem, and the robustness and capacity of the network has not been
fully determined. The Tactical Internet is an Enhanced Position
Locating System (EPLRS) based system. Is this the tactical internet you
will field with the ``interim'' digitized force? To the objective
digitized force? Please explain.
Answer. The architecture of the Tactical Internet is being matured
to substantially improve delivery of command and control messages.
Functionality of the EPLRS will be enhanced to provide more flexible
and adaptable services. Selected parameters of the Single Channel
Ground and Airborne Radio System System Improvement Program and the
associated internet controller will be adjusted to provide significant
improvements in combined voice-data nets. The TI provided to the
interim digitized division will be a significant step forward from that
used in Task Force XXI. The TI for the objective division will continue
to evolve from this base, while introducing improved capabilities and
functionalities as they can be matured and tested.
Question. What is the objective tactical internet?
Answer. The next increment of the tactical internet will increase
capacity through the incorporation of components of the Warfighter
Information Network such as the Future Digital Radio Block II, High
Capacity Line-of-Sight Radio and Asynchronous Transfer Mode hubs.
Question. When will you field the objective tactical internet?
Answer. There really is not an ``objective'' tactical internet. We
expect as technology moves forward the Army will adapt to those
improvements and upgrade as required. We have adopted an open systems
architecture to allow us to leverage from the commercial sector.
Question. The digitized battlefield will have high data rate
requirements. The current infrastructure can not support all of the
communication requirements of the digitized battlefield. Which Army and
other Department of Defense systems will satisfy the high data
requirements for the digitized force?
Answer. The requirements for data capacity have not yet been fully
defined. However, currently under development are some systems designed
to give increased data rates. Those include systems such as; Near-Term
Data Radio (NTDR) also called Future Digital Radio Block I.; Future
Digital Radio Block II; High Capacity Line-of-Sight Radio; Global
Broadcast Service--Battlefield Awareness Data Dissemination System. On-
going enhancements to Enhanced Position Location Reporting System
(EPLRS) and Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS)
will also provide modes data capacity improvements that will be
available near-term.
Question. Will those systems be available when you field your
``interim'' digitized division? If not, what is the impact?
Answer. The NTDR is scheduled to be available for the interim
division. Enhancements to SINCGARS and EPLRS will also be available. We
are looking for an interim capability and these systems should be able
to provide sufficient data handling capacity.
Question. The Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) is
the software for the digitized force. Currently in development, all
digitized platforms, from tanks to Apaches, will receive FBCB2. What is
the status of the FSCB2 development program?
Answer. FBCB2 is more than just software. It also includes
hardware, which is commonly referred to as the applique, and platform
interfaces. Version 1 of the FBCB2 software is currently undergoing
experimental testing with the Experimental Force at the National
Training Center. It contains sufficient functionality for
experimentation. Version 2, with increased functionality and robustness
and fixes resulting from the lessons learned thus far, is currently
under development. It should be available in mid fiscal year 1998.
Question. Initial Operational Test and Evaluation for FBCB2 is
scheduled for late 1999; fielding is scheduled for 2000. Do you believe
this is an ambitious schedule? Why?
Answer. Yes, we have always said that the schedule is aggressive.
We are following a streamlined approach to acquisition. Although the
schedule is aggressive, we have included successive iterative testing
of the hardware and software and have incorporated the users during the
development to ensure the products are useful and meets the users
needs.
Question. If FBCB2 encounters problems in development, will the
date for the ``interim'' digitized division slip? Please explain.
Answer. Not necessarily. Although we have the aggressive schedule,
we have built into that schedule time for the iterative testing of the
hardware and software. We also are building the software with a
``core'' functionality with which the division should be able to
execute its mission even if all, the desired functionality is not
there. The problems would have to be severe and it of course would
depend on the nature and criticality of the problem.
Question. The digitized force will be extremely vulnerable to
information warfare. According to the Army, information security poses
one of the greatest challenges for the digitized battlefield. The Army
is currently assessing the vulnerabilities of the digitized battlefield
systems to attack. How are you testing the vulnerability of individual
digitized systems to attack?
Answer. We are conducting vulnerability assessments both in the
field (Red Teaming) and in the laboratory so we can develop fixes and/
or mitigate the effects in support of the warfighter. The six Red Team
tasks we are conducting during Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting
Experiment (AWE) is a good example of what we are doing to test the
vulnerability of systems.
Question. How will you reduce the vulnerability of the
``digitized'' systems from attacks?
Answer. We're building a warfighter information system that will
provide the decision maker the information needed in a timely,
accurate, and secure manner.
a. A security Integrated Concept Team and Integrated Process Team
have been stood up to address the network security issues/designs for
the AWEs and the First Digital Division. Concerned with the total
spectrum of Information Warfare attacks, but focusing on Electronic
Warfare and hacker/virus attacks first.
b. We're designing the network to be as protected as possible with
the Command and Control (C2) Protect tools/devices that are available
and a ``defense in depth'' approach.
c. An external perimeter made up of Transmission Security,
Communications Security, firewalls, security guards and physical
isolation will protect our systems and the information on them from
external attack. Within the tactical environment, the Army has a
classified backbone network, which utilizes bulk encryption techniques
thereby giving us a high level of assurance.
Throughout the infrastructure, all classified information
processing is protected by the best encryption technology provided by
the National Security Agency. Security guards (Hardware/Software) and
physical access controls then isolate the network.
d. Internal subperimeters limit the access between user domains
using firewalls and/or router filtering while remaining transparent to
authorized users.
e. Workstations include individual access controls, configuration
audit capability, and C2 Protect procedures and tools to identify any
security anomalies.
f. This technologically evolving network will be overlaid with a
network management system and workstation procedures that provide real-
time security management and intrusion detection.
Question. Does the budget provide funding to implement information
security tools for the ``digitized'' systems? If not, why?
Answer. Yes, funding is available, at the system level, but not
enough. The Army is currently addressing the requirements for the First
Digital Division and Force XXI.
Question. The Maneuver Control System (MCS) is an automated Command
and Control (C2) system for the Force Level Commander. MCS will
integrate data from other C2 systems to create a common picture of the
battlefield. MCS has been in development since the mid-1980's. Riddled
with developmental problems since its inception, MCS is scheduled for
its Initial Operation Test and Evaluation in fiscal year 1998. The Army
is using MCS in the Force XXI Army Warfighting Experiment (AWE). Are
you satisfied with its performance? Please explain.
Answer. Yes. The Task Force XXI AWE at the National Training Center
indicates that the Army is on the right track for digitizing the
battlefield, and that training and leader development are key
imperatives in this effort. Based upon the excellent performance of MCS
during this experiment at the National Training Center, the Army fully
supports the fielding of common hardware II devices to the MCS training
base. Institutional training of MCS and other Army Battle Command
Systems is vital to the training and leader development imperatives of
the Army's Force XXI initiative. The Army needs to equip the schools
with MCS now to allow for the timely development of training before the
system is fielded to operational units. The risk in procuring
commercial hardware is low, and the payoff of averting the normal two
year lag between the fielding to operational units and the first
graduation of school training users is high.
Question. The Army is using Maneuver Control System--Block III in
the AWE; however, Block IV is currently under development and will be
fielded to the ``interim digitized force'' in fiscal year 2001. What is
the difference between Block III and Block IV software?
Answer. The major difference between Block III and Block IV
software is that Block IV uses the advanced Common Operation
Environment (COE) software and has additional functionalities. Block
III software contains COE 2.1 from the Defense Information Systems
Agency (DISA). Block IV software will contain COE 3.1, 4.0, and 5.0 as
it is developed. Approximately 50 percent new functionality will be
built in Block IV (upon this improved foundation) over that which
currently exists in Block III. Additional functionalities to be added
in Block IV, for example are: Engineering, Military Police, and
Aviation support software.
Question. Do you believe the Block IV program schedule is high
risk? Please explain.
Answer. No, the schedule is not high risk. However, the schedule
assumes the risk characteristics of the Defense Information
Infrastructure (DII) COE upon which it is based. Whenever DII COE
software is not delivered, Block IV will have to develop this software
independently if DISA, or not have needed functionality.
Question. If the problems with MCS are not resolved with the Block
IV upgrade, will the date for digitizing the ``interim'' division slip?
Please explain.
Answer. Developmental problems with the Block III software were
primarily limited to the Army's experience in 1993 with the Loral
contract. Since 1993, MCS has been on a progressive and planned
recovery. This recovery has exceeded expectations in III Corps and Task
Force XXI. Digitizing the ``interim'' division could occur with the
Block III software with its limited COE and functionality. However,
this is not the Army's plan. The Army wants and needs an MCS based on
COE, Army Technical Architecture, Joint Technical Architecture and the
additional functionalities Block IV provides.
Question. The Near-Term Digital Radio (NTDR) will replace the
SINCGARS and EPLRS radios. A production contract will be awarded in
1999. The Army is requesting $18.6 million to build and test the NTDR
in 1998. What is the status of the NTDR development program?
Answer. A contract for $10.7 million was awarded in January 1997 to
a team led by ITT to procure and test 110 NTDRs. NTDR is planned to
meet the Block I requirements of the Future Digital Radio (FDR) ORD as
the backbone data radio system to augment/replace the EPLRS system for
Force Package I units. The production contract for 1999 is contingent
upon successful technical/operational testing planned for early fiscal
year (FY99). The Army has $201 million in the President's Budget from
FY99 through FY06 to produce, field, and support the procurement of
4,579 radios and 23 Network Management Terminals. NTDR is a data only
radio and will not replace SINCGARS which has voice capabilities.
Contingent upon funding being made available, a competitive Research
and Development contract in FY99 will be awarded for the development of
the FDR Block II/III (programmable multi-band multi-mode radio) which
is planned to eventually replace all of the legacy radios and
potentially be a joint service program. The FDR Mission Needs Statement
is scheduled for a Joint Requirements Oversight Council decision in
June 1997.
Currently, the NTDR system is undergoing integration testing to
serve as the inter-Tactical Operations Center data hauler for the
Division XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment planned for November 1997.
Question. What is the anticipated per unit cost of the NTDR?
Answer. It is anticipated the average hardware unit cost for the
4,579 fieldable NTDRs will be around $14 thousand each.
Question. The Army believes to digitize its force, it can no longer
field weapons systems one system at a time. Since systems will be
operationally and technically interdependent they need to be fielded in
``packages.'' The Army would like to field systems based on
requirements for a particular division. Who has the responsibility for
ensuring that the future Army systems will be operationally and
technically interdependent? Will it be the program managers for each
system or will you create a new ``oversight'' office?
Answer. The Army is currently studying the entire process to
determine who and how to best perform this function. Since this is a
new way of doing business, we must ensure we have done our homework. We
suspect that an overall system integrator will be required.
Force XXI Initiatives
Question. Last year, the Army's number one unfunded requirement was
the ``Force XXI Initiative.'' The Army identified a $100 million
shortfall; Congress provided $50 million in fiscal year 1997. The Force
XXI Initiative is ``an ACTD-type approach to streamlined acquisition of
high pay off technologies.'' This year the Army is requesting $99
million to continue the Force XXI Initiative.
The Army believes that the Force XXI Initiative would provide
``funding flexibility to jump start technology programs early, without
having to wait up to two years to fund a new initiative'' during the
budget cycle. Please give us some examples of the technologies the Army
want to ``jump start.''
Answer. The largest number of ``technologies'' are in the
information dominance area and have to do with improving the way
information is transmitted, formatted, stored, retrieved, used, and
interpreted on the battlefield. Some of the systems designed to improve
information use are Army Airborne Command and Control System (A2C2S),
Aviation Tactical Operations Center (AVTOC), Maneuver Control System
Courses of Action Tools Integrator for Situational Awareness, Network
Encryption System (NES), Tactical Internet (TI) and Applique. Other
technologies involve the updating of combat systems with new
technologies or providing new systems that leverage information and
weapons technologies needed to operate in Army XXI. Some of these
technologies are incorporated in the Palletized Loading System-Enhanced
(PLS-E) which provides enhancements to reception, staging and movement
activities in addition to implementation of velocity management,
intransit visibility and battlefield distribution. Radio Frequency
Technology/Tagging provides total asset visibility and intransit
tracking capability to combat service support managers. Mortar Fire
Control System (MFCS) provides a complete, fully integrated digital on-
board fire control system for mortars and brings them in line with
capabilities on the battlefield such as the upgraded Advanced Field
Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS). Gun Laying Positioning System
(GLPS) allows faster and more accurate fires from light artillery
units. The Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder (LLDR) provides
both artillery and dismounted infantry a lightweight and portable
rangefinder that is more accurate than current capabilities.
Question. The Army is also requesting $137 million to fund Advanced
Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) which according to your
testimony last year ``give us a great opportunity to transfer
technology to the warfighter.''
ACTDs and the Force XXI Initiative appear to be mechanisms for
fielding systems outside of the acquisition and budget process. What is
the difference between ACTDs and the Force XXI Initiative?
Answer. Neither the ACTD process nor the Force XXI Initiative/
Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Process (WRAP) are done ``outside the
acquisition and budget processes''. Both methods use nontraditional
acquisition techniques such as rapid prototyping, commercial
technologies, use of available evaluation data, etc., to shorten the
time it takes to field new systems and new technology to the
warfighter. The methods are not the same. Force XXI initiatives are
potential solutions which have already undergone all or most of the
development and evaluation necessary to reach production within one to
two years. The Force XXI initiatives concentrate on providing
immediately available technology that matches future goals to the
warfighter as fast as possible and requires a funding commitment before
being accepted as a final candidate. These initiatives cover the full
spectrum of capabilities required. ACTDs are designed to match a
warfighter's requirement with a concept and technology expected to
satisfy the requirement. The nearly mature technology and concept
evolve to a residual capability at the end of the demonstration period
(assuming success). ACTDs take between two and four years to complete.
There is not a requirement to acquire technologies developed as a
result of the ACTD. Acquisition Integrated Process Teams (IPT) are
formed for each ACTD to develop proposed acquisition strategies for
ACTD ``systems'' if required by the user/sponsor (Commander-in-Chief)
and successfully competed in the service's Program Objective
Memorandum.
Question. The technologies which you will ``jump start'' are part
of the Army's Warfighting Experiment (AWE). During the AWE the Army
will test other new technologies to see how they would operate under
battle conditions. The AWE will take place at the National Training
Center (NTC) in the California desert.
Since the AWE is an experiment, will those technologies that you
wish to ``jump start'' go through additional testing?
Answer. The final evaluation from the Operational Test and
Evaluation Command (OPTEC) of the effectiveness and capabilities of the
system are probably the most significant part of the final choice of
candidates. OPTEC will provide information on success or failure (and
degree), additional testing required and effectiveness to the force
among other issues. All of the issues considered under normal
circumstances for operational test and evaluation will be considered
under the WRAP process. The difference is that WRAP uses ongoing
evaluations and other available data on usage and capability to
evaluate the system not just what is gathered from the experiment.
OPTEC is required to certify each system as having met the requirements
of operational testing as prescribed by law. Because some of the
systems must undergo additional test and evaluation at some level, any
Force XXI Initiatives funds for those systems will be used to complete
that evaluation and get the system into production.
Question. The NTC is in the desert; how will you ensure that the
technologies are operable, reliable and supportable when taken out of a
controlled warfighting experiment for example:
a. Will it operate in cold or wet weather;
b. Is it rugged enough to survive the battlefield; and
c. Is it interoperable with other Army or service systems?
Answer. OPTEC will determine what additional test and evaluation is
required based on the maturity of the system including any evaluations
necessary under other weather conditions or if the system is ruggedized
enough for the battlefield. The AWE is utilizing links to Joint STARS,
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and national intelligence assets to
receive and pass information just as would be required on a
battlefield. In addition, information has been passed through planned
nets to the Marine Corps operating out of Twenty Nine Palms. Close Air
Support (CAS) aircraft have been used in the AWE to provide strikes.
The AWE is evaluating interoperability within the evolving architecture
required by the Joint Staff for all the services. As such, all the
systems being used in the AWE should be interoperable with Army and
other service battlefield systems.
Question. The Committee understands there are 96 candidates
currently being evaluated to receive the fiscal year 1997 Force XXI
Initiative funding. One example of the type of technologies you are
evaluating is the mortar fire control radar. It is our understanding it
will cost approximately $200 million to field the mortar fire control
radar.
How will you ensure there is adequate funding in the outyears to
sustain projects funded with Force XXI Initiative dollars?
Answer. The WRAP process requires that outyear funding requirements
(funding tails) be identified for all candidate systems. If a candidate
is selected, then the sponsoring functional area must find the funding
internally before turning to the rest of the Army to fund. In any case,
no candidate will be accepted without having identified the out year
funding necessary and the offsets to pay the bill.
Question. When will you budget for outyear dollars required to
develop and field Force XXI technologies?
Answer. Army is using current input on candidates to affect the
current mini-POM actions. In addition, for candidates that could go
into production (possible low rate) in fiscal year 1998, we will be
looking at how to reprioritize within functional areas in the upcoming
budget year. For longer term funding, all programming and budgeting
documents for years after fiscal year 98 will reflect the funding lines
for the approved initiatives.
Question. Will they continue to be funded in the force XXI
Initiative account?
Answer. WRAP policy is specific in that no more than two years of
``jump start'' funding will be provided to complete ALL actions to get
to procurement. This accounts for the time it usually takes for the
system to be put into the resourcing cycle. At that time, the system
will no longer be carried by the Force XXI Initiative account. Because
we allow two years maximum, we also require the candidates to identify
two years of funding if necessary.
Question. Since you are not budgeting for the total development and
fielding costs of Force XXI initiatives, you will be forced to
reallocate funds in your budget. Will you provide offsets to the
Congress? What programs in your budget do you view as potential offsets
for Force XXI initiatives?
Answer. The Army will identify the outyear bills and give Congress
assurance that these will be funded in the next Future Years Defense
Plan (FYDP). Details of offsets must achieve concurrence through the
formal Program Object Memorandum (POM) and budget process to accomplish
this.
Question. What will be the average development and fielding
schedules for Force XXI technologies? Do you plan on fielding them at a
quicker rate than trucks or helicopters?
Answer. WRAP policy requires putting the systems into regular
programming and into production within two years of receipt of funding
(less if done later in the fiscal year). Fielding schedules are based
on the individual system and he quantity, production rate, spread
across the force, etc. If a ``buy out'' of the total Army quantity at
an inexpensive rate can be accomplished in one year and it is smart to
do so, we will make that recommendation. If it takes longer to field,
then we will look at that timeframe with reference to all the
candidates and other Force XXI issues. Systems based on commercially
available or immediately available military technologies that are
usable with little or no modification may be fielded faster than
others, the length of time to field is system dependent. The key is
that we will not spend years in development for the systems.
Question. Congress provided $50 million in fiscal year 1997 for the
Force XXI Initiative. Has the Army received the fiscal year 1997 funds?
Answer. Funds are on withhold at Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) until the Army completes the evaluation of candidate systems,
provides recommendation to Congress as required by law and receives
approval from Congress on the candidates recommended. Notification to
Congress is expected to occur during the first week of May 1997.
Question. If not, why?
Answer. Evaluation of candidate systems will not be completed until
the AWE is finished. There is no requirement to use these funds until
that evaluation is finished.
Question. When do you expect the funds to be released?
Answer. Late May to early June 1997.
Question. When do you expect to obligate the funds?
Answer. Depending on the system, between late June and late August
1997. It is a requirement of all candidates that the program office be
able to obligate the funds by the end of August this fiscal year to
receive the funds.
Question. Last year, the Congress directed that none of the Force
XXI Initiative funds may be obligated without prior notification. The
notification is to include the requirements, maturity, affordability,
and sustainability for each system. When will the Congress receive
notification for the fiscal year 1997 funds?
Answer. Notification is expected to be provided the first week of
May 1997.
Question. Will the notification include the funds required to
complete the program in fiscal year 1998?
Answer. If a candidate requires fiscal year 1998 funds from the
Force XXI Initiative account, they will be identified. If other funds
are required, those will also be identified. The Army is viewing these
funds across several years not just one year at a time.
Question. Will you provide the offsets in your fiscal year 1998
budget request to continue the activity?
Answer. If the activity requires funding from regular sources
during fiscal year 1998, offsets/billpayers will be identified for
reprioritization.
Question. This year you are requesting $100 million for the Force
XXI Initiative, $50 million more than last year's appropriated amount.
Given the shortfalls in your modernization accounts, why did you
increase the funding?
Answer. The Army requested $100 million in fiscal year 1997 but
only received $50 million. The funding request for fiscal year 1998
remains the same as for fiscal year 1997--$100 million. These funds
allow us to apply streamlined acquisition techniques to rapidly acquire
new and available technologies at lower risk and lower cost thereby
filling gaps in our modernization accounts that might otherwise not be
funded. It also allows us to bridge to the Program Object Memorandum
build for fiscal year 1997 initiatives having requirements in fiscal
year 1998.
[Clerk's note.--The fiscal year 1997 budget request
included no funding for the Force XXI initiative.]
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTD)
Question. Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) are
the Department of Defense sponsored initiatives developed to accelerate
and facilitate the application of mature technologies to solve military
problems and provide new operational capabilities to the field sooner
than the normal acquisition process.
This year the Army is requesting $137 million for ACTDs--this is 35
percent higher than last year's appropriated amount. Mr. Decker, why is
your fiscal year 1998 request for ACTDs 35 percent higher than last
year?
Answer. The amount requested by the Army for ACTDs in the FY98
President's Budget is $154 million ($137 million + $16.5 million for
Theater High Energy Laser (THEL) ACTD). In FY97, the amount
appropriated last year for Army ACTDs was $157 million. The net change
is a reduction of $3 million in FY98. THEL ACTD funding of $44.06
million was provided by the Congress in FY97. The Army request for THEL
in FY98 is $16.5 million.
Question. For the record, please provide the ACTDs planned for
FY98. Please include prior year funding, planned funding for the fiscal
year and future funding requirements. Also include any Defense-wide or
other Service Research, Development, Test and Evaluation funds which
have or will be provided for each ACTD.
Answer. Approved Army ACTD chart follows. Please note that MOUT
ACTD, the Combat ID ACTD, and the Rapid Terrain Visualization ACTD are
dependent on transfers from the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) ACTD funding line FY98.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Question. What process is in place to determine which technologies
should be fielded?
Answer. To determine which technologies should be fielded, the ACTD
selection process forces a technical evaluation to be made of the
proposed advanced capability. Successful candidates must provide
residuals (software/hardware) which are of sufficient maturity to be
available in the timeframe of the ACTD with low risk in a configuration
which troops can use. The selection process includes:
a. Technology reviews by Army Chief Scientist
b. ACTS requirements validation by Commanding General, Training and
Doctrine Command (CG, TRADOC)
c. Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) prioritization
d. Commander in Chief (CINC) sponsorship
e. Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) approved
f. CINC/field commander acceptance prior to fielding with soldiers
From an acquisition reform in action--getting technology into the
hands of soldiers quickly for evaluation, getting immediate feedback,
while providing CINCs a new operational capability. This approach is
supported in the Department of Defense (DoD) 5000 series regulations.
Question. How do you ensure that the technology will be reliable
and operable in military operations?
Answer. Prior to putting technologies in the hands of soldiers.
ACTDs go through developmental, operational and safety testing. Exit
criteria is established in coordination with users to ensure the ACTD
meets CINCs requirements. Ultimately, CINC/field commanders evaluate
test results and ACTD performance prior to deploying ACTD technology
with soldiers.
Prior to transitioning ACTD, the Army, with OSD, conducts ACTD
Transition Integrated Product Teams (TIPTs). These teams ensure that
necessary preparations are made during the formulation, execution and
residual support phase of an ACTD. The TIPTs recommend appropriate
acquisition strategies for Army consideration. Upon successful
completion of an ACTD and favorable evaluation of the leave behinds by
the user, the acquisition and fielding of the new capability will
compete against Army Program Objective Memorandum (POM) priorities in
the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) process.
Question. How do you ensure that the operating and logistics cost
for successful ACTD technologies can be supported in future budgets?
Answer. Transition Integrated Product Teams (TIPTs) also ensure
that supportability assessments of ACTDs residuals are developed. These
assessments include estimates for out year funding of leave behind
systems, assuming favorable ACTD results. Operating and logistics costs
are included in the system life cycle cost estimates which are
considered in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) prioritization
process. As an example, the Rapid Force Projection Initiative (RFPT)
ACTD TIPT is addressing four key areas related to future fielding:
requirements; acquisition; fielding and supportability; and test,
evaluation and analysis.
Question. For the record please provide a list of technologies
fielded as a result of the ACTD process. Please include testing,
fielding, and support cost for each system.
Answer. Since ACTDs began in 1995, and these are normally 3-5 year
programs, the Army has completed the demonstration phase of only one
ACTD to date, Precision/Rapid Counter-Multiple Rocket Launcher ACTD, in
October 1996, in Korea for the Commander in Chief United Nations
Command (CINCUNC). The following hardware and software (SW) items are
continuing to be evaluate in the residual phase of the ACTD:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Procurement,
testing and
Leave behind support costs
($ in
thousands)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Work Stations........................................... 5,500
Visualization SW........................................ \1\125
Weapon-Target Pairing SW................................ 3,150
---------------
Total............................................. 8,775
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\(Government furnished equipment).
The Army also supports other Service/Agency ACTDs. The highly
successful Predator ACTD provided a radar mission package called
Tactical Endurance Synthetic Aperture Radar (TESAR). TESAR is enabled
by the Army-developed aided target recognition hardware and software.
Question. What are your views as how the present ACTD program is
structured? How can it be improved?
Answer. The ACTD program is structured for evaluation of relatively
mature technologies and concepts in an operational environment. The
Army view is to use the ACTD process in complex system-of system
scenarios to solve critical military needs for the warfighter. The
success of Precision Rapid Counter Multiple Rocket Launcher ACTD in
Korea for the Commander-in-Chief United Nations Command is an
outstanding example of the value ACTDs provide to rapidly and
effectively respond to warfighter urgent needs for technology
innovation. The ACTD process could be improved by stronger commitment
from Services/Agencies to cooperate in the joint arena and by greater
stability in the Office of the Secretary of Defense funding lines.
Chemical Demilitarization
Question. The Army has the responsibility for destroying all
chemical warfare related material. The Army is currently constructing
chemical demilitarization facilities at various storage locations.
Congress mandated that the 31,493 tons of chemical munitions must be
demilitarization by 2004. To date, 1,440 tons have been destroyed. The
Army is requesting $620.7 million for chemical demilitarization in
fiscal year (FY) 1998.
The FY97 Appropriations Act included a general provision which
prohibited the obligation of funds for the construction of a baseline
incineration facility in Kentucky or Colorado until 180 days after the
Secretary of Defense submitted a report on alternative destruction
technologies. The President's FY98 budget proposes to delete the
provision. Why?
Answer. This prohibition could potentially delay the completion
date for the disposal of chemical weapons from four to ten years. The
Department's intent is not to delay the timelines to destroy the United
States' chemical weapons. The National Research Council (NRC) of the
National Academy of Sciences concluded that the greatest risk
associated with the chemical weapons stockpile results from its
continued storage. In the interest of public safety and environmental
protection, we want to get on with the chemical weapons destruction
process as quickly as possible and proceed with a concurrent program to
assess alternative technologies for the assembled chemical munitions.
This is our commitment and obligation to the citizens whose communities
surround the stockpile storage sites. The NRC also concluded that the
incineration baseline technology is currently the only mature process
which can demilitarize the complete weapon--the agent, explosives, and
decontamination of metal parts.
Question. What impact does the general provision have on the
chemical demilitarization schedule? On program costs?
Answer. The schedule and cost impacts are not known at this time as
the Program Manager for Assembled Chemical Munitions was just recently
designated (December 1996). The prohibition could potentially delay the
disposal completion date from four to seven years beyond the
Congressionally mandated date of December 2004, if a technology is
identified and demonstrated at the location where it is to be employed;
and if the technology is demonstrated at a different location from
where the technology will be used, delay could be as great as seven to
ten years. Delays to the program will result in additional cost
growth--inflation factors, storage of the stockpile, Chemical Stockpile
Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) costs, and program management
costs. The annual cost of delay for these two sites is approximately
$50 million.
Question. If the provision is repealed, do you believe that
Kentucky or Colorado will allow the Army to begin the construction of
demilitarization facilities before the alternative technologies studies
are completed? Please explain.
Answer. Repealing the prohibition would not remove all obstacles
which could jeopardize the Army meeting the operations completion date
of December 2004. There are other site-specific and public acceptance
issues which must be resolved and locally legislated mandates which may
prohibit or delay the Army obtaining the necessary environmental
permits. The Commonwealth of Kentucky has passed legislation which
requires that the technology used be fully proven in a comparable sized
facility, for a sufficient period of time, at a 99.9999 percent removal
efficiency for all substances proposed for destruction or treatment
under all operating conditions, including occurrence of malfunctions,
upsets, or unplanned shutdowns. Colorado requires a Certificate of
Designation, issued by the local county for the location, construction,
operation, and closure of a hazardous waste incinerator. This is a
lengthy process which is initiated after the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act permit is issued.
Question. With the exception of the Colorado and Kentucky
facilities, do you believe that the chemical demilitarization program
will remain on track?
Answer. Yes, the other sites are on track for completion by 31
December 2004. The greatest risk to schedule is in environmental
permitting activities. Changing community perception also impacts on
schedule attainment. Implementation of alternative technologies poses
schedule risk. Delays are anticipated awaiting investigation, pilot
demonstration and testing of technologies to achieve required levels to
validate their efficiency, maturity and effectiveness.
Question. Currently chemical munitions are demilitarized through
incineration. Congress provided $40 million in fiscal year (FY) 1997 to
identify and demonstrate no less than two alternative technologies to
the baseline incineration process for demilitarization of assembled
chemical munitions. Explain how you intend to use the $40 million
appropriated in FY 1997? Is the $40 million sufficient to conduct the
alternative technology demonstration program? If not, what are the
shortfalls? When will this program be complete?
Answer. Congress appropriated $40.0 million in FY 1997 to identify
and demonstrate alternative technologies to the baseline incineration
process to demilitarize assembled chemical munitions. In compliance
with Public Law 104-208, Dr. Paul Kaminski, the Under Secretary of
Defense (Acquisition and Technology), appointed Mr. Mike Parker as the
Program Manager for Assembled Chemical Munitions Demilitarization
Alternatives. Mr. Parker reports directly to Dr. Kaminski and not
through the Army. Answers to these questions should be addressed to the
office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology).
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Young.]
Thursday, March 6, 1997.
NAVY AND MARINE CORPS ACQUISITION PROGRAMS
WITNESSES
JOHN DOUGLASS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH,
DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION
VICE ADMIRAL DONALD L. PILLING, UNITED STATES NAVY, DEPUTY CHIEF OF
NAVAL OPERATIONS, RESOURCES, WARFARE REQUIREMENTS AND ASSESSMENTS
LIEUTENANT GENERAL JEFFREY W. OSTER, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS, DEPUTY
CHIEF OF STAFF, PROGRAMS AND RESOURCES
Introduction
Mr. Young. The Committee will come to order.
This afternoon the Committee will conduct a hearing on Navy
and Marine Corps acquisition programs, and this is an open
session. We are pleased to welcome Mr. John Douglass, Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and
Acquisition. Secretary Douglass is accompanied by Vice Admiral
Donald L. Pilling, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
Resources, Warfare Requirements, and Assessments; and by
Lieutenant General Jeffrey W. Oster, Deputy Chief of Staff for
Programs and Resources.
Admiral Pilling's biography will be placed in the record
inasmuch as this is his first appearance before this
Subcommittee in this capacity, and we are happy to make a
permanent record of that, Admiral.
The Department of Navy's fiscal year 1998 budget request
for modernization provides for only 51 new aircraft, of which
only 39 are combat aircraft, 512 missiles and 4 combatant
ships. Last year we were told that four combatant ships was the
lowest Navy ship acquisition since 1933, so we added funds for
more ships. But this year the Administration's new budget
returns us to the 1933 level. The problem isn't just in
shipbuilding. The number of tactical aircraft requested is the
lowest since 1941.
Mr. Douglass, your statement implies that the Navy's
acquisition budget supports the war fighting needs of the
theater CINCs, and their forces. When we look at the details of
the budget, we see a number of problems. For example, we
understand that under your current program for the DDG-51
destroyer program, the next 12 ships to be built will lack any
cruise missile self-defense and ballistic missile defense
capabilities.
Your statement further claims that the Navy's budget
continues an ``all-out effort'' to protect our sailors and
Marines serving aboard ships against missile attack. But the
budget zeroes out all production funds for cooperative
engagement and ship self-defense installations.
The budget proposes an overhaul of the USS NIMITZ aircraft
carrier without any new ship self-defense features, including
cooperative engagement, that were planned a year ago.
The budget terminates or delays several other important
ship self-defense programs.
We talked about this this morning with the Secretary of the
Navy and Admiral Johnson, and we were told that that is the way
it had to be, that budgetary problems were budgetary problems.
We are frankly concerned about that, and I would like to have
you get into great detail with us on the importance of building
ships without self-defense capabilities.
We are talking about systems where the R&D has already been
done, the IOC has been reached, and all we have to do is
produce and install them. Where ship self-defense is concerned,
it is particularly disturbing that programs are proposed to be
delayed or halted after billions of dollars of R&D has been
completed and the leadership of the Defense Department and the
Navy have raved about their technical performance.
So, we do have some concerns about your acquisition budget.
We agree with those from the Defense Department who have told
us there are a lot more things that you really need in order to
maintain the modernization schedule that we have been led to
believe the Administration wanted. So we would like to get into
detail with you today about some of those items. But I am
really concerned about tremendous amounts of money building
ships that aren't going to have these new self-defense features
on them.
So I would like to hear your statement and the admiral's
and the general's, and then we will have some interesting
questions for you.
Mr. Murtha, do you have an opening statement?
Mr. Murtha. Let me just add to what the Chairman said. We
started this self-defense thing, Mr. Kilian recommended it, I
don't know how many years ago. We started it 5, 6, 7 years ago.
The Navy, kicking and screaming and complaining, didn't want to
do it. Admiral Boorda recognized the importance of it. Research
was done, a lot of money was spent on research, and now we are
talking about $20 million a ship, as I understand it, this
could be implemented. I cannot believe that we are spending
money the right way when we are allowing these ships to go out
without sufficient protection.
We are limited in the amount of money that we can
distribute. You are limited by the amount of money you get. But
it just doesn't seem wise to me that you are leaving a hole,
which is so important to the security of our forces out there.
I just cannot imagine that you are letting this happen.
So I hope you will be able to explain it, and look forward
to hearing your explanation. But I hope we can resolve this
thing.
Mr. Young. Mr. Secretary, we welcome your statement and
look forward for the opportunity to discuss it in detail with
you.
[Clerk's note.--The Charts referred to by Mr. Douglas are
printed at the end of this statement. See page 180.]
Summary Statement of Mr. Douglass
Mr. Douglass. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
begin by requesting that our joint statement be entered into
the record, sir, in its entirety. What I would like to do, if
this is acceptable to you, is summarize it in a series of
charts and some videos that we think will be interesting to the
Members. We will try to get through that as quickly as we can.
All of us will participate in this briefing with the charts and
the videos, and then we will move quickly into any questions
that you may have, sir.
Mr. Young. Mr. Secretary, that is fine. I am remiss, I
should have mentioned your statement in its entirety will be
placed in the record.
Mr. Douglass. Thank you, sir.
I want to open my testimony by saying that no one is more
mindful than me, sir, of some of the comments that you and Mr.
Murtha have made about ship self-defense and other programs. I
am especially mindful that the way our system works is that you
gentleman are the representatives of the people, and these
questions that you are asking are right on target, sir. So we
hope that we can have a good dialogue with you and answer these
questions to your satisfaction. Sir, for anything we can't
answer today verbally, we are committed to working with this
committee to get you a full and complete answer for the record,
sir.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much.
Mr. Douglass. You have already beat me to the punch in
introducing my two colleagues today, both distinguished
warriors. It is a great pleasure for me to work with them.
I would just remind the Members that last year was the
first year we brought to you a fully integrated budget in which
the Navy and the Marine Corps budgets had been integrated from
the ground up. We followed that procedure again this year, and
as you pointed out, this is Don's first year. Jeff was here
last year as we went through that process. I think the process
of integration is getting better as the time goes by, sir.
Could I have the next chart.
Procurement and Research and Development
(CHART 1) This is a brief summary here of what you are
going to see. We will go into it in a lot more detail. The
budget, if you add up all the RDT&E and procurement and
National Defense Sealift Fund, NDSF, is actually up 1 percent
from where we were last year when you view the combined the
Navy and Marine Corps budget request.
As you can see, what we are trying to do, sir, is stabilize
our programs. We are mindful of the direction that this
Committee has given us regarding multiyear procurement on some
of our aircraft programs and so on, and you will see we do plan
to take that very seriously.
The Department is working hard at acquisition reform. We
will have a little bit to say about that at the end. You are
going to see, sir, as we go through this briefing, some real
concerns about the future industrial base for the maritime
forces. This is becoming an increased concern.
The systems you see on the bottom of the chart are all new
systems in which we are investing. Major systems we are
investing research and development dollars in that have not yet
gone into production. We will go very briefly into those, and
we will then be able to answer any detailed questions that the
Committee has. The next chart, please.
Budget Summaries
(CHART 2) We thought this might be helpful in placing this
$27 billion budget request in some perspective. You can see the
blues columns are where we were last year, and the reds columns
are where we are this year. All the accounts except for
shipbuilding are down slightly from last year. Shipbuilding has
increased this year, and we will discuss that in some detail.
But you are absolutely right in your opening statement. We are
back to four ships again this year, not counting our ships that
are in the Ready Reserve Fleet or going to our Prepositioned
forces. We haven't counted them in that count. But that is how
our dollars are being spent. I would also note on the right
side of the chart procurement of ammunition for the Marine
Corps and Navy is up slightly this year. The next chart,
please.
Navy Trendlines
(CHART 3) This is the dilemma. You all have been very
helpful to us in explaining this to the American people. This
is where we were in the 1980s, and many of us were in this
business in the 1980s. You can see on that chart that the level
of procurement was up there at or above $50 billion early in
the 1980s. This was pretty much sustained with a slight decline
during this time frame. There was also a very robust RDT&E
funding level back at the 1980s.
(CHART 4) The next chart is where we have been in the
1990s. This is the problem I know this Committee has been
deeply concerned with, and that is the nose-dive you see in the
procurement budget includes airplanes, ships and other systems.
There has been a gradual erosion of our research and
development base, noted by the blue line, as we have gone
across the 1990s and on into the beginning of the next century.
Mr. Murtha mentioned to me just before the hearing, he is
concerned, and we certainly share his concerns, about how are
we going to get up that slope again. That is something that we
have tried to pay some considerable attention to, Mr. Chairman.
We are very open to working with this Committee as we work out
the inevitable gives and takes on the priorities required for
our Navy and Marine Corps to get up that slope. We are
dedicated to trying to get there from here.
Shipbuilding Plan
(CHART 5) The next chart I think will be revealing in this
respect. This is our shipbuilding plan. We start here because
that is probably the defining point for our Navy. As you
correctly pointed out, there are only four ships in fiscal year
1998, but I think it is very important to tell you that we have
been able to fully fund all these ships in this program.
In our previous programs, you may recall, we had received
some policy direction from the authorization committees that
some of these ships could be shown in the budget but did not
have the money put in the budget. We had various qualifications
on our submarines, and we didn't have the carrier in until this
year. So this is the first year in recent years that we have
brought to the Congress a shipbuilding program in which all of
these ships are fully funded in our Future Year Defense
Program. That has been a very substantial effort for us to be
able to fit these ships in, and it is something we are proud
of.
We do have two block buys or multiyear buys, if you will.
We are proposing on our New Attack Submarine to buy all four of
the initial submarines on a single contract. This is new and
something different. Of course, we have the DDG-51 multiyear
buy for which the Congress gave us authority last year. The
next chart, please. We will get into individual programs in
detail.
CVN-77 AIRCRAFT CARRIER
(CHART 6) Our first priority in the ship area, of course,
is CVN-77, the last of the NIMITZ carriers. As you may recall,
Mr. Chairman, last year we only had the advanced procurement in
for this ship. This year it is fully funded, and that is a
fairly significant addition to our shipbuilding program.
We have proposed to the Congress a change in our New Attack
Submarine construction program. Right now the law requires us
to compete either the first two boats or the first four boats.
We have been working with both Newport News and Electric
Boat, the two shipbuilders that will be the builders on the New
Attack Submarine. They have made some proposals to us on how to
develop this submarine as a team instead of in a competitive
way. We estimate just in the Future Year Defense Program,
compared to last year's budget, this would save us between $450
and $600 million, by going into this teaming arrangement. We
think it is a good idea. We are proposing it to the Congress.
We are hopeful that it will be well received and we will have
permission from the Congress at the end of this legislative
cycle to go ahead with this teaming approach, because we really
can't afford the competitive program that was directed in the
law the last 2 years.
SEAWOLF SUBMARINE
As we talk about the SEAWOLF program, this is where the
videos start. SEAWOLF has been doing exceptionally well in its
sea trials so far. She is quieter and faster than we had
predicted her to be. As a matter of fact, she surprised us so
much with her speed that we had some flooding in the wide
aperture array and had to put her back in the shipyard and
batten down the array fairing. But all of the systems are
performing actually quite a bit better than we predicted. So
technically she is a wonderful success, and we just put her
back in the water again to finish the sea trials.
We have a short video. Admiral Pilling will narrate the
video.
[Clerk's note.--The Committee proceeded to view a series of
short videos.]
Admiral Pilling. The video is a 40-second clip that starts
off with the christening back in June of 1995 and ends with
some of the sea trials.
Mr. Douglass. It starts with your morning witness and his
wife breaking the champagne bottle.
Admiral Pilling. We are getting underway for the sea
trials. It was last fall, and Mr. Douglass already mentioned it
was a superb set of sea trials, with one exception, a fairing
on the aft part of the ship for the wide aperture array failed.
That whole covering has been redesigned and repaired. The ship
will continue the sea trials at the end of this month and will
be commissioned in the late spring.
Mr. Douglass. We are very proud to tell you, Mr. Chairman,
that we remain under the $7.2 billion cost cap that the
Congress has given us, and we are sure that we will be able to
finish the three submarines within those provisions.
DDG-51 DESTROYER
On the DDG-51 program, you may recall last year the
Congress gave us authority to procure the next 12 ships in a
block buy. In round numbers, this is going to result in a
savings to the taxpayer of around $1 billion. We are in the
process now of formulating the request for proposals that would
go out to the two builders. Those will go out sometime in the
weeks ahead, and we will be glad to answer any questions you
may have on that.
LPD-17
We have also awarded the lead ship contract for the LPD-17,
and we will be glad to answer any questions the Committee may
have on that. That program, as you probably know, is being
reviewed by the GAO right now. The next chart, please.
SMART SHIP
(CHART 7) I don't know if you have had the opportunity to
go to Pascagoula and see the Smart Ship Program. This is a
program started by our late CNO, Admiral Mike Boorda. It has
been an outstanding success. The idea is to use technology to
take crew members off the ships. For every crew member we can
get off the fleet, we can save $800,000 in life cycle costs.
This project has shown us a way to get the crew size down by 90
to 100 people.
I have been out on the YORKTOWN, and she is doing very
well. We have a skipper, Mr. Chairman, from the University of
Florida. He has that Gator in his wardroom just like I have in
my office. I can tell you this program is doing really well and
is a great credit to our late CNO.
ARSENAL SHIP
We are also in the business of working together with
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), to develop
an Arsenal Ship. This is a completely new kind of ship. We have
three contractor teams working on this ship now. We just down-
selected from five teams. The idea is to produce a ship with
massive firepower but very low life cycle costs. I am very
proud to tell you that the three proposals involved crew sizes
of 30, 23, and zero. One of the offerers is proposing a ship
that for all practical purposes will go into combat with no
people aboard it.
This is a demonstrator program, it is a one-of-a-kind. We
have not decided whether we are going to put it into production
or not, but we are learning enormous amounts of information,
things we really need to know as we design our new carrier and
our new surface combatant of the future.
CVX AIRCRAFT CARRIER
CV(X) 78 is our next-generation aircraft carrier. This year
we are getting underway on the research and development for
this ship. It is a tremendous challenge. We lay her keel in
2006; she goes to sea in 2013.
I have a 1-year-old son at home, just celebrated his
birthday. He will be 78 years old when that ship retires from
the fleet. So you can imagine, Mr. Chairman, we are trying to
look at where will aircraft technologies be when my little son
is 78 years old. Where we will be with computers, with
propulsion systems and so on. We are trying to design a ship
that can have the long-term technical viability to absorb all
these changes in technology that we know are coming in the
years ahead and still be an effective weapons system for the
Navy of the future.
SC-21 SURFACE COMBATANT
Our next surface combatant is SC-21. This is an enormously
innovative program. We are trying to take lessons from the
Smart Ship, from the Arsenal Ship, from the work we are doing
on our aircraft carriers, from the work we are doing on our
submarines, channel that learning about the Navy of the future
and how to build the ships of the future into our SC-21
program. Don and I have most recently looked at how we could
accelerate the schedule for this program so it fits nicely into
the back of the current DDG-51 program.
COMBAT LOGISTICS SHIPS
Finally, in our shipbuilding programs in the beginning of
the early years of the next decade, the next century, we are
going to have to build some future combat logistic ships. We
will be bringing forward legislative proposals to the Congress
about instead of buying these ships and putting them in the
Navy's inventory, how we could acquire these ships under a
build and charter concept that would allow us to avoid the
capital expenditures so we could spend our scarce capital on
other things. But it would require some legal changes on our
ability to do long-term charters. The next chart, please.
AVIATION PROGRAMS
(CHARTS 8 and 9) We will be switching to our aviation
programs. This is a snapshot of aircraft procurement. And here
again, Mr. Murtha, this is the bow wave we talked about. You
can see we are in the bottom of an even steeper valley on
airplanes than we were on ships. The bottom of that valley is
the lowest level in my time. You mentioned 1941, Mr. Chairman.
I was told the year was 1938. I think we are both in the
ballpark. It has been a long time since we were down at that
level.
We are starting up the ramp. Fiscal year 1998 is
substantially higher than where we were a couple of years ago
in fiscal year 1996, as you can see. The main thing is we are
beginning to increase the numbers of F/A-18s and V-22s that we
are purchasing for the Department. You will see that as we go
on into the next couple of charts.
Please take that chart down and let's show a quick video
first on the F/A-18E/F and then on the V-22. Don and Jeff will
narrate the video.
F-18 FIGHTER
Admiral Pilling. The F/A-18 video is about one minute long.
As you know, the first flight of the F/A-18E was in
November of 1995. This is a video of the sea trials we had in
January where we actually went out on the STENNIS in a
snowstorm. The first landing was made by a Navy Lieutenant by
the name of Frank Morley. While we were out there, we did 64
catapult launches and 64 arrested landings. No problems. The
plane is on schedule. It is under weight, which is unusual for
a plane at this stage.
Mr. Murtha. You didn't mention cost.
Admiral Pilling. It is still under the cost profile we
agreed on at the beginning.
Mr. Douglass. It is under cost.
Admiral Pilling. You can see it was a very successful sea
trial.
Mr. Douglass. Under cost in both development and
production, Mr. Murtha.
Mr. Young. Some of our colleagues suggested we would be
better off buying more C and Ds rather than going into the more
expensive E and Fs, and that we would get more airplanes for
the dollar. Can you give us an answer on that? How much more do
we get from the E and F than we do the C and D?
Admiral Pilling. For a complete answer, we would have to be
in a closed session. There are some classified aspects of this
plane. But we have growth in this airplane. There is no more
room for growth in the C and Ds. It is under weight; it has 17
cubic feet of volume that can be used for growth in the future.
Some of the capabilities being built into that airplane,
including range and increased bring-back capability to the
carrier deck, we think are well worth the investment.
Mr. Douglass. When you look at the size of the RDT&E
program, I think it has been an outstanding success. It is the
first program to win the Packard Award for Excellence from the
Department of Defense. We are very proud of the F/A-18E/F.
I am aware of a few questions from other committees
regarding engine problems. You may be interested to know that
we had a slight engine problem during the development flight
test program. It had to do with some improvements in the engine
that we were trying to make. We looked very quickly at the
parts involved, changed them slightly, and completely solved
the problem. That is the only real problem we have had in the
flight test program so far.
So I am very happy to report that the handling capabilities
are excellent, its takeoff and landing capabilities are
excellent, and this is really a success story, Mr. Chairman.
Do you want to go on into the MV-22 here?
MV-22 AIRCRAFT
General Oster. Mr. Chairman, the film clip will show some
full-scale development aircraft. The first part of the film
will show the aircraft and flight operations around and aboard
the flight decks. The V-22 is fully compatible with the LHA/LHD
class ships. This is a wingfold test with the blade folded to
show it, and then you will see it moved on the elevator. It is
fully shipboard compatible.
The next series of clips show a simulated assault landing
in rugged terrain, taking Marines into the objective area, to
be followed up by another full-scale development craft
evacuating a wounded Marine.
Next you will kind of see, you saw it real quickly, that is
the flight mode versus the helicopter mode. We are happy to say
we are now into an Engineering and Manufacturing Development,
(E&MD). Aircraft number seven was delivered. The first flight
was February 5th, with all tests successful. We have had four
other flights since then, and the next event we are looking
forward to is the flight ferry up to Pax River to finish the
testing. That will finish the exit criteria for the E&MD
models.
JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER
Mr. Douglass. If you can put the chart back up, we are
pressing on with the Joint Strike Fighter. As you probably
know, Mr. Chairman, we had a source selection this year. The
way we manage this program is we provide the program manager to
my colleague Art Money in the Air Force who is the Senior
Acquisition Executive, (SAE). Then we flip-flop the SAE when we
rotate the program manager. So it went through its transition
on into full-scale development under Art's leadership, and we
down-selected under his leadership. We are now down to two
contractors, which would carry it into the next phase. The Navy
investment this year in this program is $449 million.
Marine Corps Aircraft
The AV-8Bs are on track. We are doing really well with this
program. The Marines love it. We are buying 11 airplanes in
fiscal year 1998 for an investment of just under $300 million.
We are very happy to tell you we have gotten our 4 Bladed
November/4 Bladed Whiskey/4BN/4BW, helicopter remanufacture
program approved by the Department of Defense and are on into
the research to make that program a reality. It is $81 million
of RDT&E funds this year. The next chart, please.
advanced amphibious assault vehicle
(CHART 10) I will talk about that first bullet for a
second. The AAAV, Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle is
another outstanding acquisition reform success. We went through
a source selection since my last testimony here. We co-located
the program office with the contractor in Woodbridge, VA.
General Electric Land Systems is the contractor. The program is
on track and doing well. We have a short video on it that you
might like to see, if you will run the video.
General Oster. Throughout this program we have gone through
a series of technology demonstrators. In the first part of the
video you will see what we called the hydro-dynamic test rig.
The real technological concern all along was could you get it
up on plane. We demonstrated you could do that with the engine
and propulsion, and we have achieved speeds in excess of 30
knots. We have been able to demonstrate the transition from sea
to land with the hydrodynamic test rig.
But we also want it to be an infantry fighting vehicle, so
we have also gone through some tests with automotive testing.
We have involved the user from the beginning, so we have had
the Marines in and around the mock-ups. Their suggestions have
been built in.
In terms of the tests up at Aberdeen, we passed all the
tests and out-performed the M-1A1 tank on all overland
operations, which were part of the threshold capabilities of
the vehicle.
We are real proud of our AAAV technology center down in
Woodbridge. Some of your staffers have already visited. We
would like to invite any of the Members or staffers to come
down. We have a virtual design facility. We have the user and
the designer and the fabricator working together to deliver
what the Marine needs for the 21st century.
MARINE CORPS GROUND PROGRAMS
Mr. Douglass. Putting our development team right in there
with the contractor is, we think, a pretty interesting approach
to increase communication and to hold these people accountable.
We have got a great Marine Corps program manager down there,
and I am very proud of that program.
The next program is the Lightweight 155. This is an
artillery improvement program for the Marines. We had three
bidders on this program. We had a shoot-off. We are just about
to announce the source selection on this within the next week
or 10 days. The source selection authority is actually an Army
general who reports to my colleague in the Army, Gil Decker. I
will review that decision in the next week, and we should be
announcing it before the month is out.
Then, of course, we have our Medium Tactical Vehicle
Remanufacture program. This is really a success story, where
the Marines have gotten together with the Army and worked on
the vehicle remanufacture program in order to get the costs
down and be able to revitalize the Marine Corps truck fleet. We
are looking at this technique and other kinds of Marine ground
vehicles. The next chart, please.
C4I SPACE AND INFORMATION WARFARE
(CHART 11) Here we get into programs that are of vital
interest to this Committee. The are in the C4I Space and
Information Warfare area. Cooperative Engagement Capability is
one you mentioned in your opening statement, Mr. Chairman.
Technically this program is doing very well. The issue, of
course, is how quickly can we get this capability out into the
fleet. We will be glad to answer any questions that you have on
that.
THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
Regarding Theater Ballistic Missile Defense, we have a
video we would like to show you, and I would like to make a few
comments about where we are with that program. This one has an
audio on it, as I recall.
This is a dramatic picture here. That was taken from the
actual sensor in the front of the missile.
I am happy to put credit where credit is due. We wouldn't
be where we are in this program if it wasn't for the leadership
in this Committee and some of the interests of some of your
Members, Mr. Chairman. We are doing very well in the Area-Wide
program. This was our first direct hit success. I now have the
authority from Dr. Kaminski to buy all of the missiles that I
need to finish the development of this program, the engineering
development of this program, and to do what we call an initial
user capability. We are pressing ahead to do that.
In my judgment right now, getting this out into the fleet
is only limited by the time it is going to take us to build
these missiles and get them deployed. We are pretty confident
that we are going to be able to get an initial capability
during fiscal year 1999 on this program. We will have a full
unit operational capability in fiscal year 2001. So the Area-
Wide system is doing well, and a lot of the credit for its
success is due to the leadership and the support that has been
evident on this Committee.
Theater-wide, as you know, we are also----
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Secretary, I misunderstand what you are
saying. You are saying it is going to be deployed, or you are
saying it is just research?
Mr. Douglass. Admiral Pilling knows, it will be deployed.
We will have our first ability to have this out in the fleet in
fiscal year 1999, and the first full unit deployment will be in
fiscal year 2001. We are pressing on.
Mr. Murtha. I thought, though, you weren't putting it on
the ship.
Mr. Douglass. Mr. Murtha, this might be a good time to
explain that. There are kind of two things you need to do to
get this out into the fleet. You need to build the missiles
themselves, which we are doing, and which we have now got the
authority to build, and those missiles are actually under
construction today. Then you actually have to make changes to
the ships, certain technical changes in the ships, so that they
can launch them. That work is also underway.
Now, the question is how many ships do you modify to be
able to launch these missiles, and how many missiles do you
have?
Ideally you would want to keep this in balance. In other
words, you wouldn't want to spend the money to have, say, 30
ships able to shoot the missiles if you didn't have any
missiles to go on the 30 ships. You would want the
modifications to the ships and the modifications to the
missiles to be roughly in sync.
I think one of the things that your Committee has pointed
out in its analysis of our budget is that some of the ships
that are going to be converted to be able to do the Theater
Missile Defense are ships that are under construction now, and
some of those ships are ships that are out there in the fleet
already. Some of our budget documentation has indicated that of
the 12 ships in the multiyear contract we are buying, we were
not buying the capability to put the missiles in those 12
ships.
We are committed to relooking at that. That is not in
concrete. We can fix that in the outyear budgets. But we will
get ships and missiles in sync. We are committed to do that,
sir.
Mr. Murtha. That answers the question.
Mr. Douglass. On Theater Wide, the issue over the long haul
is how many resources do you put in year after year. As you
know, we get our resources from the BMDO organization. Due to
the plus-ups of this Committee last year, you have been able to
put us on the road to a very robust program. The issue for us
is how much money is going to be put into the outyears to keep
this program sustained. Frankly, how much we are able to
accomplish and when we can get an operational capability for
Upper Tier depends on that allocation of resources. But
technically that program is moving ahead.
I have to be fair and tell you that there is a lot of
debate, both in the Congress and in the Pentagon, about how
much money should go into which programs. This program has
competing programs in the Army, as you know, and sometimes we
don't all agree. But ultimately, what we do depends on how many
resources we can afford to put into it.
Basically once I know how much per year I have to work
with, I can tell you what date that I could bring this into the
fleet.
COMMUNICATIONS PROGRAMS
Regarding Global Broadcast Service, this is getting the
small TV satellite antennas where you can get 100 channels we
can all buy for our houses now, and getting those out into the
fleet. The problem has been that commercially nobody beams that
kind of traffic out to the middle of the ocean because there
are no subscribers out there.
For a very modest amount of money, we were able to get
transponders put on three satellites that we had already paid
for. We had to stick our neck out a little bit betting on the
conference for some funding. Your Committee and the other three
oversight committees worked on this with us, and we saved a lot
of money for the taxpayers.
This program is on track, and we will be moving that
capability out to the fleet. Of course, we will not just use it
to show TV movies. There will be an enormous amount of
intelligence information, weather information, status
information on weapons systems and other things that we can now
push out to the fleet.
Challenge Athena, which is our voice and imagery across the
SATCOM program provides a big boost in the quality of life for
our Sailors and Marines at sea. We started to bring you a video
on this. Every time I see it, it brings tears to my eyes
because it is a lot of videos of young Sailors talking to their
moms and dads or little kids and so on. We are moving ahead
with Challenge Athena as quickly as we can. The next chart,
please.
MINE WARFARE
(CHART 12) Mine and undersea warfare is next. This is an
area that in the past from time to time has been neglected. We
are doing our very best within our resources to support it now.
The Congress has asked us for the last couple of years for a
Mine and Undersea Warfare Plan and has asked that we certify
that it is fully funded and meets the requirements of the
Chairman of the JCS and in a joint service way.
I am happy to report to this subcommittee that again this
year, it is fully funded. Every year this is a struggle within
the Pentagon. We have to all stretch and work hard together to
get this fully funded, but we have kept it on track. It is
going to give us a good organic capability in the fleet to do
the kind of mine warfare that we need to do as we move on into
the next century.
As you can see, we have already completed conversion of the
INCHON. We have the remote minehunting system, our interim
system deployed with the KITTY HAWK last year. So that area is
reasonably well-funded.
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
Anti-Submarine Warfare is another area of great concern. We
are pressing ahead. We have made some pretty significant
accomplishments there. Some of them are listed on the chart,
not the least of which is that we are going to have on the New
Attack Submarine a dynamite C3I system that is a big leap
forward from the one we have on SEAWOLF, which is itself a
great improvement from what we have had in the past. There will
be a significant amount of commercial off-the-shelf information
and display equipment. It is just a tremendous leap forward.
There will be no periscopes anymore.
We are going to have displays on big video screens, some of
which will be three dimensional portrayals of the ocean
environment the submarine is in. We think this part of our
Anti-Submarine Warfare program is well-funded, but it is
something we are having to watch very carefully.
We also, Mr. Chairman, I would draw your attention to the
fact that we have been asked to provide both a classified and
unclassified report to the Congress on how well we are doing
here, and we are committed to getting that report over here in
a few months on time and at the proper classification level so
that you can see the whole picture.
ACQUISITION REFORM
(CHART 13) I will wrap this up very quickly with one final
chart, by telling you that we are working hard to maintain the
steam on our Acquisition Reform Program. We had a stand down
this past year in which all 43,000 Navy acquisition employees
stopped for a day and asked ourselves what can we do to improve
the way we do acquisition in the Navy and Marine Corps.
I had some 5,000 suggestions come in to me as a result of
the stand down. My staff is going through every single one of
those suggestions, and hundreds and hundreds of them are being
implemented. We are focusing on total ownership costs. That
means as we modernize the fleet, we are trying to produce
weapons systems that will take fewer and fewer Sailors into
harm's way.
By reducing the crew sizes on our ships in the outyears, we
are going to be able to bring the operations costs down very,
very dramatically. I mentioned the Smart Ship. We have already
seen a way to get 100 sailors off of a cruiser. The Arsenal
Ship is planned to have a very small crew. We think the SC21
crew size will be below 100.
So focusing on total life cycle costs, it is really going
to pay some of the bill, Mr. Murtha, to get us up that hump in
the outyears. We are also doing a lot of partnering with
industry. This year we had our second conference with the CEO's
of many of the companies that do business with the Navy. We are
listening to what they say. I give them a report at the end of
the year on how we are doing on things that the industry people
have suggested we change in Navy acquisition. We have received
many accolades during the year, far too many to list here
today.
The one I am most proud of here is the F/A-18 E/F. It won
the Packard Award this past year. We are very proud of that. We
have received now some 22 Hammer Awards from Vice President
Gore on acquisition reform, which are outstanding examples of
acquisition teams in the Department.
These range all the way from small teams of Marine Corps
personnel getting together to figure out how to bring down life
cycle costs of existing equipment, to new ideas on our
submarines and airplanes.
That is a very quick overview, Mr. Chairman, of the
multibillion-dollar program that we have proposed for your
review and approval, and we will be glad to answer any
questions you have, sir.
[The joint statement and charts of Mr. Douglass, Vice
Admiral Pilling and Lieutenant General Oster follow:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
SHIP SELF-DEFENSE
Mr. Young. Okay. Mr. Douglass, thank you very much. We
appreciate the extensive details in your presentation. I need
to go back to this issue one more time now, the issue of the
ship defense systems. You had a very good answer to the
question, but as I thought through it, the answer left out a
few things. That is, this morning one of the answers was we
will probably retrofit. But when you retrofit, that gets very
expensive, much more so than if you put the systems in as you
go.
Another problem that we haven't mentioned is--we did
mention, but there was no response--on the DDG-51's, we are
talking about a multiyear contract on 12 ships. What is that
multiyear contract going to say about ship defense systems? Is
it going to be included? Is there going to be a provision in
the multiyear? If there is no answer for that now, how can you
enter into a multiyear if you don't have the answer on what you
are going to do with the ship defense systems?
Mr. Douglass. One thing I could tell you, Mr. Chairman,
there is a misconception here. The DDG's are going to have a
significant amount of ship self-defense.
Mr. Young. But not the state of the art.
Mr. Douglass. The two items that have been contentious have
been getting them ready as we produce them for ballistic
missile defense capability, and the incorporation of CEC. As I
said earlier, we are re-looking at our plans there.
Some of these changes, as you point out, are much cheaper
if you catch them while you are building the ship. Things that
generally require mechanical changes to the ship are expensive
to retrofit. But some of these are also, Mr. Chairman, just
electronics changes where you pull out one black box and put in
another one or change the software. In that category it is
really not that much more expensive to do retrofits than it is
doing it in production.
I will tell you, it is my own hope and I will dedicate
myself to try and do this, because I feel that I am in the same
place you are, Mr. Chairman, on this issue. I would not like to
see us emerge from this congressional cycle or from our budget
development cycle for next year with that multiyear contract
not having those capabilities in the ships to the maximum
degree that we can. We are dedicated to doing that.
There is a long story about why it is not in the plan. It
is more along bureaucratic lines than it is along the intent of
what Admiral Pilling and I, the CNO, and the Secretary
intended. We are going to fix it.
Mr. Young. I am sure with all of us working together, we
will get it fixed. As you can tell, there is considerable
concern.
Admiral Pilling. There are really two issues here on CEC.
One is the forward-fit issue on the DDG's, and then there is
another issue on back-fits. I think I would like to just
address both of them fairly quickly. The DDG issue is 12 ships
in the multiyear. It was our original plan that the last four,
the third ship in 2000 and the three ships in 2001, would have
an upgrade to their radar systems.
There was some risk in that. As we put the multiyear
package together, we took the radar upgrade system out, and CEC
was part of it. We checked retro back-fit costs and forward-fit
costs for the CEC, because it would be mostly installing black
boxes and racks, there would not be much of a difference. That
is what happened with the DDG's.
On the back-fit of the other ships, it had been our plan
all along to have five carrier battle groups fully outfitted
with CEC by fiscal year 2002. We already have two outfitted.
For a variety of reasons that John alluded to in the 1998
column, we ended up not procuring, at low rate initial
production, any CEC units in fiscal year 1999, because the
OPEVAL for CEC is in fiscal year 1998. So instead of getting to
five battle groups by 2002, we are going to get to three. We
will go to full rate production in 1999.
Mr. Douglass. The bottom line though is we share your
concern and we are going to do what we can.
Mr. Young. We will work it out, right?
Mr. Douglass. Yes, sir.
V-22 Aircraft
Mr. Young. You mentioned the V-22 and you were pretty proud
of the V-22 program as we are, because it was this Committee
that kept the pressure on to keep the V-22 a viable program for
years when there were those across the river who said we
couldn't afford it.
Last year, the Committee directed that the V-22 program
achieve a production rate of 36 aircraft a year by the year
2000. In your statement, you said today we were going to
achieve a production rate of 18 aircraft per year. Tell us why
the Congress said 36 a year, and you decided on 18 a year.
Mr. Douglass. Sir, it is pretty simple. It is money. Last
year you gave us the money. You gave us $70 million for
advanced procurement for seven additional airplanes, and we do
not have the money in our budget to buy those additional seven
airplanes. So I am not trying to hide anything. I would love to
see those extra airplanes in there as an acquisition person.
We simply did not have the money to add. It is another
$700-plus million as I recall, Jeff. If you just take that and
push it on forward, we can't get up to the 36 aircraft when you
told us to.
I don't know how to say it in any other way other than I
share your concern. As soon as we can possibly get this past
low rate production, I want to see us have a multiyear contract
here. What I would hope that we could do is, have a multiyear
contract. Sometimes when we make a multiyear contract, you save
hundreds of millions of dollars, and the money tends to go
somewhere into other programs or some other place.
I would hope that any savings on this program that come
from multiyear, once we get through this low-rate production
part in the program, we would plow back, to get those numbers
up as high as we can as early as we can. We share all the
concerns. I went back and read some of the previous testimony
of this Committee about your concern about the age of our older
helicopters. It is just a financial limitation problem.
Mr. Young. Can you tell us what the unit cost would be at
18 per year versus the unit cost at 36 per year?
Mr. Douglass. I could, sir. I don't have it at the tip of
my fingers.
Mr. Young. If you could provide it. My question comes back
to this: I thought we provided 12 versus 5 advanced
procurement. I thought we already provided the money for 12.
Mr. Douglass. You provided the advanced procurement. It was
$70 million, and to give you the exact status of that, Mr.
Chairman, I am going to choose my words carefully here because
we are getting into some fighting in the building. We get every
year undistributed reductions from the Congress.
In other words, when you get down to the end game, you say,
we can't figure out how to balance the books, so here is an
undistributed reduction of so many million dollars. We get
Bosnia bills to pay. We get bills for the Small Business
Innovative Research Program. We get this and that.
It turns out on this program, those bills added up to 7 or
8 percent of the whole cost of the program. It was in the range
of 40 or 50 millions of dollars in our RDT&E program. So I have
asked the Department to forward over to the Congress a request
to reprogram this $70 million back into the research and
development program so I can keep this program as healthy as I
possibly can, so we can get the numbers up into the future. But
I regret, and I sincerely regret we could not follow through
and build those extra seven airplanes for which you gave us the
advanced procurement.
General Oster may want to add to that.
General Oster. Yes, sir. There is also a little bit of good
news. As you know, we have been operating under the billion-
dollar cap before, which was kind of an arbitrary restriction.
The best we were ever able to do in the FYDP in the last year's
budget, we thought we could get to 21. That has been lifted,
and in this particular FYDP we get up to 24 a year.
Clearly not 36, but 24 a year moves the Initial Operational
Capability (IOC) and the Full Operational Capability (FOC) up
for us. Our goal still is to get up to 36 a year. So there is
some good news in this, but it really comes down to, as the
Secretary indicated, there is the affordability issue as these
programs compete.
Mr. Douglass. Just to give you an idea, Mr. Chairman, in
this program even as it is, we have $530 million in research
and development, and I am asking that we supplement that with
the $70 million from last year that I mentioned to you. We have
$542 million to buy those five low rate production birds. That
is almost $1.1 billion. I am sure this Committee is acutely
aware of the fact that Marines stretch their bucks as far as
they can. That is a big bill for our Corps.
We are going to continue to try to get the numbers up as
high as we can. That is my commitment to this Committee as your
acquisition person, but I can't invent the money. These two
individuals more or less control the money. But I will do
everything I can as your acquisition person to get the most
airplanes for the dollars. I tell you, I have been out to the
plant twice now. I have had the contractors in, to see me when
we started getting the prices on these airplanes. They came in
with a pretty substantial price increase. General Krulak and I
personally called the CEO's of those two companies in and
looked them in the eye and said, you know, you are going to
have to show us where every penny of this price increase is.
The result was that the price increase went away. So we are
paying all the attention we can to the program. It has the
support of our Commandant, it has the support of Secretary
Dalton, and beyond that, sir, I don't know what to say to you.
FAST PATROL CRAFT PROGRAM
Mr. Young. We appreciate that. We know it is not easy. The
goals are the same, to provide the best technology and the best
equipment at the best price. Some of my colleagues who are not
members of this subcommittee have asked me to just ask one
further question.
Last year, the Committee directed that fiscal year 1996
funds appropriated for the Fast Patrol Craft Program be
released by the Office of the Secretary of Defense to the Navy
and expeditiously obligated only for that purpose. That
language was in the report.
My understanding is that has not been done and that is not
going to be done and several of my colleagues have asked me to
ask you why?
Mr. Douglass. I think the most basic reason why is that it
hasn't been released to the Navy. The Department of Defense has
never released it. That is my answer as the acquisition person.
I think beyond that, the reason why the money hasn't been
released is because, frankly, we haven't asked for it to be
released, because I don't think the requirement side of the
Navy sees a requirement for those boats.
Admiral Pilling. There is no Navy requirement. We are
trying to find out from the Special Operations Forces if they
have a requirement for such a craft.
Mr. Young. Okay. Thank you very much. I apologize to my
colleagues for taking so much of the Committee's time.
Mr. Murtha.
CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
Mr. Murtha. One of the programs that I went down to visit
last year during the Atlanta Olympics was the chemical-
biological warfare mission. We brought it up last year in the
Committee that I feel this is one of the major threats. I think
this is as important as anything we can do, is find a way to
combat that threat.
When I went down to visit, I came back and visited with the
Chairman, and we decided what had been done, with the little
bit of the Marine Corps money. The Marine Corps really handles
that money well. Nobody does it better than the Marine Corps.
They had a system, but it wasn't good enough. It wasn't near
good enough. So we put $10 million in, and it has been improved
substantially, and I understand during inauguration they
brought the unit up here.
Is this program to the point where we should have units,
say, on both coasts?
The reason I ask that question, one of the ways you
overcome biological warfare is you have to react very quickly,
and even with chemical warfare you have to act quickly. Should
we also have a unit that could deploy on the West Coast because
of the time element? Is this something we should consider? Are
we to that point where the demonstration is over and we can
adapt another unit like this? Maybe not in the Marine Corps,
but another unit like this?
General Oster. As you know, this is one of the things that
came out of the commandant's planning guide. As we looked over
the horizon of the requirements there, there wasn't an incident
response capability out there. So we set about to do that. It
was really an idea that went rapidly from concept to
deployment. We deployed it first to Atlanta, even before we
came up here.
We have always believed that with the reach-back
capability, the small amount of gear, and the rapid time lines
for deployment, that we can deploy in a very rapid time in the
United States. We considered the aspect of adding additional
forces, additional units, but as of now, we have not decided to
do that.
Mr. Murtha. How about if we prepositioned equipment?
General Oster. Certainly, if we preposition equipment in
other locations, that would make life an awful lot simpler.
Mr. Murtha. They tell me the biological response time is 4
hours. If you have a contamination, you have to respond within
4 hours. I think they are based at Camp Lejune to hustle them
together and get them any place in the West Coast would take a
lot longer obviously.
General Oster. Clearly, it is a concern with regard to the
response. We feel especially proud we have this capability out
there right now.
Mr. Douglass. Mr. Murtha, I might add to that. I think that
the fact that the Marines have that capability is testimony to
General Krulak's leadership and the support by you and others
on this Committee. I think the issue begins to go beyond the
Marines, though, in the sense that we probably should look at
that more widely across the Services.
One of the concerns that I have heard General Krulak
express when he and I have testified together is that if he has
to deploy that overseas, let's say we had another DESERT STORM,
and then we had a terrorist event back here, we would be in a
pickle. We couldn't do things like move it down to the
Olympics.
Mr. Murtha. I wish you would take a look at it and see if
we couldn't come up with a plan to cover an emergency, once you
get it up to a point where you think it is working.
One other thing I would like to mention. The Chairman
mentioned a couple Members wrote letters about releasing money.
I am not sure, Mr. Secretary, and both of you realize how
difficult it is for us to put a bill together. I mean, we don't
take these requests lightly.
When a Member comes to this Committee and makes a request,
we turn down probably, what, three for every one.
We put a bill together and there is nobody better at it
than us. We do as good a job as anybody. But then it gets stuck
because in your shop down there, both Republicans and Democrats
tell me we got problems getting stuff broken loose, because
some administrator is making a decision that this is not
important.
Well, let me tell you, to get the bill through is
important, and to get the overall bill through is important.
And I hope you will consider that as you go through this
process. It is a matter of opinion whether some of these things
are important or not important. And the Members are careful,
considerate, and usually have good recommendations. If they
aren't, we throw them out. So I would hope----
Mr. Douglass. Mr. Murtha, I couldn't agree with you more.
As you know, I spent 4 years working for Senator Nunn over on
the Senate side. I know how hard we struggled and I know what a
conference is and I know how the Members end up over here at
9:00, 10:00, 11 o'clock at night trying to hammer out these
deals.
Just suffice it to say that it is not stuck in my shop.
Where these things get stuck are in the Comptroller's shops.
They have a job to do. We have to recognize that they have to
worry about how we are going to pay for Bosnia, and this, that
and the other possible contingencies.
One of the problems we are looking at in the building today
is that year after year, what we find is in order to pay for
today's operational problems, we borrow from tomorrow's
modernization dollars. Often the first place they look, let us
all face it and be honest about it, over there in that
building, if it was added by the Congress and it hasn't been
thought up over there in the building that is the first place
they look when they have to cut.
I guess that is human nature. I don't know. So I agree with
you.
Mr. Murtha. That is a real mistake, Mr. Secretary, because
so many of the programs we have added have absolutely turned
out to be beneficial. The V-22 is a perfect example. You folks
wanted to kill it, and it went straight from the Secretary
right down. And this Committee right here with Bill Young in
the forefront trying to save the V-22.
Mr. Douglass. Mr. Murtha, I agree with you. I argued that
to the best of my ability within the constraints of my office
and there is no better example than some of the things that you
have brought up. I can think of others.
Mr. Murtha. The sealift transport ships, just on and on and
on. CEC. We have been around a couple of years. It is not as
though we haven't been around. And Manufacturing Technology,
you zeroed MANTECH out. MANTECH is a program that saves us
money, for heaven's sake. That is frustrating.
Mr. Douglass. I think the young man sitting next to you
rocking in his chair will tell you that I have bent my pick
trying to get MANTECH funded. It is another one we are going to
take a tough look at.
Mr. Murtha. Okay, thank you.
Mr. Young. I just wanted to comment that I am sure the
Florida Gators want to figure out how to solve a lot of these
problems.
Mr. Douglass. I sometimes feel like an old alligator
arguing some of these.
Mr. Young. At least you have a tough hide.
Mr. Douglass. We can always remember who has a tough hide.
Mr. Young. Mr. Cunningham.
Mr. Cunningham. Thank you.
I am not concerned that the Secretary was not enlightened
because he was appointed by the President of another party. Not
only is he a Gator, but he is Air Force.
Mr. Douglass. Sir, I was in the Navy before I was in the
Air Force. My dad was a Chief Petty Officer, and I am proud of
it.
GROUND PROXIMITY WARNING SYSTEM
Mr. Cunningham. I know that. And I would say that having
worked with Secretary Douglass, I would be proud to serve with
him because of the work that we have done.
And if you could, you know, make Duncan Hunter happy, you
have done a lot. And the Secretary is accessible, and if
everybody in the President's administration was as
straightforward, nonpolitical, get to the question and the
problem, as the Secretary, we would be much better off in this
organization. I want to thank you.
I have a program I would like to raise. The Ground
Proximity Warning System for Cargo and Troop-Carrying
Airplanes, we put about $2 million in that program last year.
Do you still consider that a viable system that is going to
save aircraft and lives, and if so, do you have any plans to
put it on other assets for Marine Corps or Navy? If you don't,
you can provide that for the record.
Mr. Douglass. I would have to provide that for the record.
I think the answer is yes, but I really don't know.
[The information follows:]
Ground Proximity Warning is an important capability to the
Navy and Marine Corps. To illustrate its potential, analysis of
CH-53E Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) mishaps over the
last 10 years shows that a Ground Proximity Warning System
(GPWS) would have provided a warning in 75% of these accidents.
The CH-53E has lost an average of 0.4 aircraft and 1.4 lives
each year due to CFIT. Implementation of the GPWS into the CH-
53E would have had the potential to save 3 aircraft and 14
lives over the last 10 years.
The Navy and Marine Corps will complete the development and
integration of a GPWS in fiscal year 1997 using the $2 million
appropriated last year. Installations into CH-53E, CH-53D, MH-
53E, CH-46E, CH-46D, UH-46D, and MH-46D will begin in fiscal
year 1998. Additionally, the Navy is defining requirements for
the potential installation of GPWS into the H-60 and UH-1
platforms.
PRIVATE/PUBLIC YARDS
Mr. Cunningham. The second thing, Mr. Secretary, we have
been working on the issues of Bosnia funding, its impact on
ship repair and the private versus public yards. This is very
important to San Diego and the West Coast and the Nation for
national security. The supplemental now looks like it will
include, as I hear, Mr. Chairman, a disaster supplemental tied
into it.
Are there plans to take the money from the supplemental and
give back the ships that we have lost in the private yards, or
are they going to take the money they have already stolen from
you, plus the supplemental, and apply it to Bosnia? Can we
expect some of those ship repairs which were scheduled for
private shipyards to come back our way?
Mr. Douglass. I am not sure I fully can predict the outcome
of that, but let me say this----
Mr. Cunningham. Say it this way, would you fight for that?
Mr. Douglass. Yes, sir. You know that I came over to talk
to you, Congressman Hunter, and Congressman Filner about this
issue. And we tried to work out an agreement, which is that we
can get as much of this backlog that is done in those private
yards as possible. We have made a commitment to you for a
certain amount for the San Diego area, and I am going to fight
like a tiger for that money.
I would also say that I am busy trying to make sure that we
balance the work load in our public yards so that we don't have
to keep moving people around. I know that is an irritant for
all of us, and I am going to do the best I can to stay on top
of that.
BUDGET PROJECTIONS
Mr. Cunningham. Mr. Secretary, knowing how professional you
are in the job, one of the things I think we all ought to be
concerned about is solving the problem. We look at things like
affordability. We don't have the dollars to do it. The
President proposes to cut $4.8 billion out of the defense
budget, so we don't have the money to do the things we really
need to do.
The Bosnia money, I am not naive. I would bet my house
against yours, and I have got a pretty nice one, that we are
going to go through another conflict in the next 4 years and we
will have to pay for it just like that. I believe it is
unrealistic and the chart you put up there that showed in the
year 2002 where our modernization takes place. Remember last
year when General Shalikashvili and all the Joints Chiefs put
their careers at risk by saying that $60 billion is what we
need for procurement, and the President said no, $35 billion.
Well, something you ought to be really concerned about, Mr.
Secretary, is the President's balanced budget cuts 98 percent
of its domestic spending during the last 2 years. And I don't
think logically there is any way that those who want to put the
money in social spending are going to allow us to make those
increases in national security spending. I mean, it is just not
logical.
You know the smoke and mirrors that goes on around here,
but it is something we ought to be taking a look at. If I would
have had my way, I got here just as Dick Cheney cancelled the
fighter the Chairman was talking about in the last hearing, and
I disagreed with it.
But my intent was to increase the dollars for the F-14, F-
14D. I went against McDonnell Douglas on this one. We got the
F-18 after I pushed a personal check, like I did with my house,
and said hey, it is going to cost us more than the $2 billion
in R&D, for the F/A-18 effort and we only get 15 percent more
in range. The radar won't see as far as the SU-27s radar, it
won't even see as far as the AA-10 or AA-11 missile we will go
up against. But we have to buy that airplane, and to fill our
decks, and I support that.
But in doing that, in looking at the out-year dollars, I
would also support the increasing procurement of the V-22 to
36. Here is an article that showed the value of a higher
procurement rate. It is one of the best articles to make the
case. It is written by Major General John Rhodes. And if you
don't have this, I will provide you copies and submit it for
the record.
I didn't provide copies in the last hearing, but the
article makes a really good case and us well written. I will
give you copies. Talks about an operation which took something
like 87 hours for a helicopter to go in, fly 480 miles, refuel
twice, put them in daylight risk. While it only took 7 hours in
the V-22. with lower risk.
But with straight-line funding, we are faced with having to
build three versions of the JSF, three completely different
ones. The R&D cost for those, in the low-procurement numbers
that are projected, are astronomical. If you want to save
money, give us a flat-line procurement, we don't have to bring
on and lay off workers. We have some idea of the spare parts
needed and those sorts of things, which we never seem to do
that.
These are things we can really do together. But the V-22, I
would increase the procurement rate, if it were up to me. I
don't know if we can or not. But last year, you said we cut
things that Congress added. But we also put in things that you
really needed, that you were short.
When the Secretary stood up and said everything is rosy, we
found out the Marine Corps has AV-8Bs that are falling out of
the sky. 50 percent of them have a interim fix because the
Department doesn't have the money in order to truly repair
them. So these are life-and-death questions, and I would hope
that you would support us for the adds that we put in. And I
know you do for the supplemental, Mr. Secretary, and the
Admiral and General here.
But I have some real concern because we push everything
into the out-years. Since I have been here, when Les Aspin was
sitting in the Chair for National Security, everything was
going to the out-years and we were always going to do it later.
We are not going to be able to do that, sir, realistically.
Mr. Douglass. We understand your concerns, Mr. Cunningham,
and we appreciate your support and we will do everything we can
to work with you.
One thing you said that I particularly agree with is this
interwar period. I think people who think that there is no
conflict going to come for the next 30, 40 years, or something
like that, just haven't read the history books.
We can't predict how these things develop. But if you look
at the history of our country--and I am pretty proud of the
fact that I read history pretty avidly and really stay on top
of it--we all know it is a dangerous world and it is cyclic.
One of the challenges we have, all of us, those on this
Committee, and the people appointed by the President to take
care of things for the Administration, is to stretch these
dollars as far as we can.
Mr. Cunningham. I have a couple of questions for the record
I would like to submit, and when I do, I will submit this for
the record.
Mr. Young. No objection, Mr. Cunningham.
Thank you very much.
[The article follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Young. Mr. Visclosky.
NEW ATTACK SUBMARINE PROGRAM COST
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I also have a number of questions for the
record, if I could have those submitted, I would appreciate
that very much.
Mr. Secretary, Admiral, General, I want to associate myself
with the remarks made earlier by the Chairman and Mr. Murtha on
the ship self defense systems. I think that there is a great
importance that we ought to all attach to that, and I would
want to associate my remarks with them.
I would like to talk to you about the submarine program, if
I could, and now that the administration has decided to do a
teaming arrangement between Electric Boat and Newport News, I
am wondering if you could compare for me the total program
costs today for that original 30-boat program compared to what
it would have looked like with the sole source.
Mr. Douglass. The original program which was made some
years ago is some $60-plus billion program, Mr. Visclosky. The
part that we of course struggle with, is the front end of the
program, how are you going to build the first four or five
boats? And as you know, the Navy's original plan was to select
Electric Boat as the designer and builder. We were going to
build submarines there and carriers down at Newport News.
For several years now, the Congress has not only urged us,
but written it into the law that we would have a competition
between the two yards. That competition added, depending on
whether you are conservative or liberal with your figures,
between $3 and $6 billion cost to the program. We figured it
was around $3 billion, the GAO figured it was closer to $6
billion.
Those costs were because instead of building one boat in
one facility with one design, you were going to have two basic
design teams, two learning curves, smaller quantity buys for
the initial procurement of the materials and so forth. We were
never able to fully come to grips with that extra cost of that
competitive program, and last year we brought forward a
recommendation to the Congress that committed us to try to do
this competition, but did not have the money for all of the
boats, those first four boats.
In the time that has gone by since our last round of
hearings on the Hill, the shipbuilders came into us and said
look, it would be to everyone's advantage to allow us to team
to build the New Attack Submarine. With regard to teaming,
there is another example, Mr. Chairman, of something that was
added by the Congress that we very much appreciate and turned
out to be fortuitous for us. Congress added a new submarine
large scale research vehicle for us, and the Congress allowed
us to get these two shipyards to team on this research vehicle.
It is a miniaturized submarine that we can use, to try on
various new techniqies.
Their teaming on that research vehicle went so well that
they came to us and made proposals to me and my staff that they
would be willing to team on the overall program on the first
four boats, provided that we could: A. Obtain Congressional
approval of their teaming concept, and B. That we could buy the
first four boats in a block buy.
Now, that has not been done before, and there is some risk
associated with that. We looked at it very carefully. My staff
has estimated that the savings in that program, not from this
competitive program but from what we had in the budget, was
going to be in the neighborhood of $450 to $600 million. That
is a lot of money that I can spend on other things. So I
recommended that proposal to the Secretary of the Navy, the
Secretary recommended it to the Secretary of Defense, he
recommend it to the President, and now all of us are
recommending to the Congress that we change the law and allow
us to move from a competitive program, which we never had the
money to fund, to one of teaming.
The bottom line of all of this is that we think the
ultimate total cost for all those 30 ships under this approach
will probably fall. But the reason why I have not given you a
30-ship number for teaming versus a 30-ship number for
competition, was that we never developed that 30-ship number
for competition. We never extrapolated it all out.
But I can tell you competition was at least $3 to $6
billion more expensive on just the first four boats alone.
Further, more and this is an important point, there was never a
point where you could say, let's have a real competition, in
the sense that we might have on an airplane. Where there are
big quantities, and you can give so many to one company and so
many to the other. For years and years, we were only going to
be building one boat a year. So it meant every year one yard
would get one, and another the other, unless you simply wanted
to say we will just go down to one builder. First, we didn't
think that was politically viable. Secondly, what would you do
with the boats built by the loser who is now out of the
submarine business? We would have what we refer to as orphan
boats, and very expensive orphan boats. So for all of those
reasons teaming began to look better and better for us, and
that is what we have proposed to the Congress.
Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Secretary, I have been on sabbatical for
the last two years on this issue, but my recollection is one of
the Committee's concerns two years ago, if not before that, was
that there would be room in your budget over the years for the
procurement on an annualized basis of a regular number of new
attack submarines. You indicated here that the estimate for
those 30 boats was $60 billion. And then you mentioned----
Mr. Douglass. Approximately.
Mr. Visclosky. Approximately.
Mr. Douglass. Yes, sir.
Mr. Visclosky. And then that the increased cost was $3 to
$6 billion. That is not over the $60 billion, as I understand
your answer, that is over the first four boats.
Mr. Douglass. But it would have been added to the $60
billion. We just never calculated it all the way out.
Mr. Visclosky. Now, I don't understand your answer. Are you
saying----
Mr. Douglass. Let's say it was $60 billion, just for
hypothetical purposes.
Mr. Visclosky. For 30 boats.
Mr. Douglass. It would have gone up to somewhere between
$63 and $66 billion.
Mr. Visclosky. With the single yard?
Mr. Douglass. No, no, with the competition. There was all
this extra cost at the beginning of the program. We saw no way
of recapturing it back.
Mr. Visclosky. Okay. So the $3 to $6 billion would be the
additional costs because of the partnering, spread over the
course of the 30-boat contract, that additional cost being
attributed to the up-front cost of testing the theory of the
partnering?
Mr. Douglass. Not partnering. That was the extra cost for
competition. Partnering allowed us to reduce the cost not back
to what it would be as a sole-source producer, but
substantially less than what it would be to have two yards
competing with each other, two design teams, two different
learning curves, et cetera.
Mr. Visclosky. Okay. So because of the competition today,
all of the things being equal, the costs for a 30-boat run
would be, ballpark, $63 to $66 billion.
Mr. Douglass. Yes, sir.
Mr. Visclosky. You mentioned savings of $450 to $600
million. Is that because of the partnering, and is that
attributable only to the first four boats or over the 30 boats?
Mr. Douglass. No, that is over just the first four boats,
and it is attributable to teaming and it is a fairly
conservative figure.
UNIT COSTS
Mr. Visclosky. What do you anticipate the unit costs of the
first four boats to be?
Mr. Douglass. I don't have an average figure, but let me
give you a figure that deals with the fifth boat, if I could.
It is pretty close to that. Let me see if I have it here in my
notes somewhere. Because I asked that same question of my staff
early this morning, and I do have it somewhere.
We had a metric that the Congress asked for in a similar
line of questioning that you are putting forward. And they
said: Tell us what you think the fifth boat would be under
these various ways. And if you did it sole source, just one
yard, original plan, back to Electric Boat, that fifth boat was
going to cost about $1.55 billion. Doing it in a competition,
the price of that boat went up to about $1.8 billion. By
teaming, we can get the price back down to $1.65 billion for
that boat.
Mr. Visclosky. Okay.
Mr. Douglass. Those are fairly rough, sir.
CONTRACT STRATEGY
Mr. Visclosky. The next question I have, as I understand
it, the contract for these first four is going to be a
multiyear contract and is not for advanced procurement. These
are actual construction dollars.
Mr. Douglass. Yes, sir, we are asking for authority to
build the first four boats in one contract. I would point out
that some people sort of opened their eyes and said: Oh, this
has never been done before. That is not true. It is done all
the time.
The only thing is we don't usually do it on submarines. We
do it all the time on airplanes. On the B-2 program, we bought
the first six B-2s, which cost almost as much as a submarine,
one big contract, that was a team between Northrop and Boeing
where Northrup was the prime contractor.
I have got other statistics here in my notes about how many
F/A-18s we bought on the first contract, how many various other
kinds of things we normally buy. We just don't normally buy
ships that way. So one of the things we are trying to do----
Mr. Visclosky. Your contract would be cost plus, I
understand?
Mr. Douglass. Yes, sir, like any development contract.
Mr. Visclosky. My recollection, and I don't have any notes
in front of me from two years ago, but that the $1.65 billion
for the fifth ship, I assume today is higher than it was two
years ago?
Mr. Douglass. Well, as I said, two years ago the figure we
had was based on a sole source.
Mr. Visclosky. And then we have the competition and then we
have the savings because--my point on this would be that I
appreciate knowing of any ship contract where the costs came in
under what we thought they were at the beginning of a program.
Mr. Douglass. I could supply that for the record. There are
some, you might be surprised to know that, but there are some.
Mr. Visclosky. My concern, to be honest with you here, is
we are starting a new shipbuilding program on a very
sophisticated piece of equipment, multi-lot contract, cost
plus. And I am very concerned on behalf of the Committee of the
obligation we are going to find ourselves in with the
tremendous pressure you face on your entire shipbuilding
program.
[The information follows:]
From Fiscal Year 1971 through Fiscal Year 1995, 402 ships were
authorized at an original Navy budget request of $173.4 billion. These
ships have been and will be delivered to the Fleet at a final budget
cost projection of $169.5 billion (2.3 percent variance).
The Naval ship acquisition and industrial construction process is
one of the most challenging and successful joint government and
industry endeavors. We have consistently delivered high quality ships
to the fleet within our estimated costs. Competitive forces have
influenced industry prices but in general the final cost outcome has
been predictable. Many hardware components of a ship cost more and take
longer to build than other weapon systems. Subsystem software, testing,
and infrastructure support costs are higher. Long production cycles
require long-range forecasting for productivity, industrial workload,
overhead structure and industrial base. Long production cycles for the
ship platform creates cost risk associated with technology changes and
obsolescence of ship components and weapons systems.
The cost of a ship evolves on a constant basis from the time of
award until its delivery. The change is driven by a wide range of
factors, including engineering changes inserted into the ship design
after award to more effectively respond to desired changes in war
fighting capability, or to implement changes in the desired number of
hulls or ship construction profile, as well as other factors, such as
changes in the inflation rate between contract award and ship
completion. As a result, the initial estimate of ship cost at the
``beginning of a program'' is not a very good metric. Point estimates
of a ship's estimated cost are done two to five years in advance of the
actual construction contract award. These estimates constantly evolve
to account for changes in proposed ship design and market conditions. A
more valuable metric is to examine the variability between Navy ship
cost estimates versus actual construction costs over a long period of
time.
The Navy has done an exceptionally credible job of accurately
estimating the total costs of ship programs over the past 15 years. The
Navy has also institutionalized an aggressive policy of both
controlling costs and improving cost estimating procedures. Based on
these factors, we have high confidence in our ability to accurately
estimate ship construction costs in the Five Year Defense Plan.
INDUSTRIAL BASE CONCERNS
Mr. Douglass. If I might add, there is another factor here
that I think is important for the Congress to take into
consideration. I don't think you were here when I showed the
ship production that our country has proposed for the next 6
years--the lowest levels since the 1970s.
There are six big private yards that can build ships for
our Navy. I cannot keep all of those yards viable with four or
five ships a year. So what we are going to see, unless I am
able to get some legislation through the Congress that will
open up American shipbuilding to the world commercial
shipbuilding market to help us build more ships for our own
domestic and commercial shipbuilding, is some form of collapse
of our shipbuilding industry.
Now, we have to ask ourselves do we, as the greatest
maritime nation in the world, want to sustain this industrial
base? The Navy came up with a sustainment plan, and it was to
build the New Attack Submarine at one builder, and the Congress
said no, no, you are not going to do that, you have to have two
builders.
All I am saying is if we are going to keep two builders in
business, the best way is to have those builders team rather
than through a competitive situation that is much more
expensive than a teaming arrangement. We recognize and agree
with you that there are significant challenges for the long-
term controlling costs on these programs, but I am pretty proud
of our record in recent years in getting costs under control on
all of our programs.
We are paying off a few bills from 4 or 5 years ago on our
Roll-on/Roll-off RO-RO sealift ships, but other than that, all
our airplane, ships, across the board, are not overrunning. The
Navy acquisition team working with our war-fighters has done a
tremendous job.
It is not my job alone. I am just the leader of the 149,600
people in the Navy acquisition commands. But we have done a
tremendous job of holding the line as numbers have gone out of
the building programs, and so on, to keep these programs from
overrunning.
I share your concern, sir, but all I am saying to you is
that I can save between $450 and $600 million on those first
four boats, and also get technology into those boats much
quicker. Because those submarine yards are not going to share
their best technology with each other if ultimately they think
we are going to pull the rug out from under one of them in some
form of competition. Then we have the problem of orphan boats,
what do we do with the loser's boats, the two or four, or
whatever they built during the competition?
Mr. Visclosky. Are you saying those yards collapse because
they don't have the capacity, or don't have the business?
Mr. Douglass. No, we don't have the business for them.
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
MULTIYEAR CONTRACTING
Mr. Young. Mr. Douglass, the questions that Mr. Visclosky
raised on the submarine, I realize that was a tough issue. We
dealt with that last year, if you recall, trying to figure out
how to handle that issue and keep both yards viable, and Mr.
Visclosky asked some important questions relative to the
submarine contract.
I want to come back to the issue of the multiyear contract
for the first four items off of a production line. And you said
that has been done before. I have asked around the table here
with the staff, and nobody remembers when that was done before.
Mr. Douglass. Not on ships has it been done, not that I
know of. It has been done on other complex programs like
airplanes and other projects.
Mr. Young. The first item?
Mr. Douglass. Sure.
Mr. Young. Give us some examples of that, for the record.
Mr. Douglass. I have a list of them here. I just didn't
want to spend too much time on the issue.
Mr. Young. Do that for us, and then go back to the fixed
price versus the cost plus. If the contractors are getting the
advantage of a multiyear contract, why do we also have to give
them a cost-plus contract?
Mr. Douglass. Well, one of the reasons that I think it is
important to not rush too quickly, we are eventually going to
get to fixed-price contracts on these. But again, I am choosing
my words carefully here because I don't want to make anybody
mad.
There has not been consensus in the Congress on this issue.
We have some Members, Mr. Chairman, who really are pushing us
hard to put more technology into those boats, and we have upped
our budget substantially. We have in the neighborhood, in
addition to all the money, which is, as I recall, over $300
million a year now for research on the New Attack Submarine
itself, we have about $100 million per year in the budget for
submarine technology.
Now, we want to take that technology, the results of that,
and insert it into our boats as quickly as we can, to improve
the boats as we go along. And indeed, to further answer the
Congressman, maintaining the submarine base is often thought to
be maintaining the shipyard workers who can build submarines.
That doesn't maintain the industrial base.
You have to keep the engineers who design the submarines
employed, or when it comes time for the next submarine you
don't have anyone who knows how to design a submarine. So we
are getting into an area where we have got to do preplanned
product improvement. So on the one hand, we are being driven
not to go down to one contractor, we are being driven to put as
much technology into the boats as we can and to allocate boats
in certain ways between these two builders. So we found sort of
the middle ground, the best compromise that we have been able
to work out is to get these yards to work together, to share
their good ideas. Now they are willing to open up all their
design secrets to each other and really team.
Now, this is a lifetime team. So people have asked, are you
just going to team on the first boats and have a competition?
No. This is it.
If the Congress gives approval to do this, these two yards
for submarines are teamed for the life of this program. That
means they have to share all their internal production secrets.
We are going to build all the front ends in one place, and all
the back ends in another place for example, so the members of
the team concentrate on their part of the program, so we don't
need two design teams for the back. We get down to one design
team in each place.
In order to do that, we have to give them some reasonable
degree of stability, and that is why I have recommended those
four boats be bought on a block contract buy. But frankly, as a
person who has been in this business for 35 years, I don't see
any difference between building the first four submarines on a
class in this kind of arrangement as in some other big program,
like bombers. I don't remember the number on B-1s. I was around
in those days, but I have forgotten the number.
I think on B-2s, we built the first six on a development
contract. In the FA-18 program, we had 8 or 9 airplanes, all
built on the first contract. These big aircraft programs or
armor contracts are essentially teaming programs. They are not
all built 100 percent at one place. They get together.
In the case of the B-2, the wings are built by Boeing,
Grumman builds the fuselage, somebody else the tail, and so on.
We have got to take that idea, which has been very, very
successful in our aerospace industry and we are still the best
aerospace country in the world. We know how to build the best
airplanes in the world. We need to get that expertise and how
to do those things into our shipbuilding industry.
Unfortunately, I am sad to tell you that our shipbuilding
industry is not the best in the world. They build the best
warships in the world, but, you know, we are losing out on the
commercial market. So somehow we have got to get those modern
construction techniques and modern management techniques into
the shipbuilding business or we are going to wake up some day
and there will be some future Assistant Secretary of the Navy
come before you with a radical idea of building a ship
overseas, instead of here.
All I am telling you is on my watch, Mr. Chairman, if there
is anything I can do, work 24 hours a day, it isn't going to
happen on my watch. I believe at the core of my soul that we
need a maritime industrial base for this country. We are a
great maritime nation. We need to build our warships, including
our submarines, here at home. That is what I am trying to do,
keep this industrial base viable so we can do that.
Mr. Young. I think we can close on that thought, because I
don't think you will find any disagreement from any Member of
this Committee certainly, by any Member of Congress. We agree
we have a great maritime nation and we must maintain our base,
there is no doubt about that, our ability to build our own
ships and submarines.
Thank you very much for an interesting hearing. We will
undoubtedly have additional questions, in fact, we have some,
and ask that you respond in writing along with those that Mr.
Cunningham and Mr. Visclosky asked for.
The Committee will adjourn now until next Tuesday, March
the 11th, when there will be an open hearing at 1:30 p.m., in
2212 Rayburn, on the Fiscal Year 1998 Air Force Budget. The
witnesses will be the Secretary of the Air Force, and the Air
Force Chief of Staff, General Fogleman.
Nothing further, the Committee is adjourned until then.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Livingston and
the answers thereto follow:]
LPD-17 Program
Question. If additional funds were provided in Fiscal Year 1998 by
Congress for the second LPD, would the Navy be able to execute the
program or a contract in FY98 for this ship?
Answer. The Navy would be able to execute the LPD 17 program if
$739.3 million were provided in Fiscal Year 1998 for LPD 18. The
current cost plus award fee contract structure provides for a lead ship
and options for two follow ships with the phased combat system. The
current budget structure provides for only a lead ship and one follow
ship with the phased combat system, before beginning the fixed price
incentive contract for the full combat system with Evolved Sea Sparrow
Missile and Vertical Launch System. Consequently, the existing cost
plus award fee option for the third ship, the first ship at the second
yard, would not be exercised in the budget as now structured.
Accelerating a follow ship into fiscal year 1998 also has a beneficial
effect on the shipbuilding industrial base workload. The estimated cost
of a fiscal year 1998 LPD 17 class ship reflecting option prices from
the Full Service Contract is $739.3 million. A ship added in fiscal
year 1998 would result in a reduction in total Shipbuilding and
Conversion, Navy program costs of approximately $50 million.
Question. In terms of unfunded requirements, is a second LPD ship
of high, medium, or low military utility?
Answer. The LPD 17 class ships have extremely high military value,
because the national strategy of forward presence through naval
expeditionary forces fundamentally depends on amphibious ships. The LPD
17 class is urgently required to accomplish the critical replacement of
the four aging and obsolescent classes in the Fleet that have been
extensively and continually deployed in fulfilling national strategic
objectives. Accordingly, the LPD 17 program will significantly improve
readiness and provide warfighting capability that has extremely high
military value in the national strategy.
LMSR Ship Program
Question. The FY 1998 budget request includes $70 million for
advance procurement of the last Large, Medium Speed, Roll-On/Roll-Off
(LMSR) ship in 1999. If Congress were to accelerate the last LMSR from
FY99 to FY98, what would be the total funding requirement for this
ship?
Answer. The Fiscal Year 1998 President's Budget requests $70
million for Advanced Procurement in Fiscal Year 1998 and $322 million
in fiscal year 1999 for the final ship. In Fiscal Year 1998, $265
million would be required to accelerate the Fiscal Year 1999 ship--this
translates to $92 million in total program savings ($35 million
reprogrammed in Fiscal Year 1997 and $2 million in Fiscal Year 1999).
Question. Would the Navy be able to execute a contract for this
ship in FY1998 if additional funds were provided by Congress?
Answer. If funds in the amount of $265 million above the
President's Budget Request of $812.9 million were provided by Congress
in Fiscal Year 1998, the Navy would be able to execute the contract
option to procure the nineteenth and final Sealift ship. In April, the
Navy ran a limited competition for the last 2 LMSRs. On May 23, 1997,
NASSCO was awarded the third Fiscal Year 1997 ship. An option for the
remaining Fiscal Year 1999 ship was established on the Avondale
contract with an Advanced Procurement option for long lead time
material in Fiscal Year 1998.
Question. What is the Navy's current plans for the award of the
last two LMSRs?
Answer. In April, the Navy ran a limited competition for the last
two LMSRs. On May 23, 1997, NASSCO was awarded the third Fiscal Year
1997 ship. An option for the remaining Fiscal Year 1999 ship was
established on the Avondale contract with an Advanced Procurement
option for long lead time material in Fiscal Year 1998.
Question. What are the Navy's plan for the construction of the
extra LMSR funded in the Fiscal Year 1997 DOD Appropriations bill? When
will an award be made?
Answer. The Navy plans for the construction of the third Fiscal
Year 1997 LMSR to be completed by NASSCO. The award was made May 23,
1997.
Question. If Congress provided additional funding in Fiscal Year
1998, what is a higher priority for the Navy, accelerating the last
LMSR or a second LPD?
Answer. Assuming that the last LMSR remains in Fiscal Year 1999,
the LPD 18 would be a higher priority, since the current program meets
strategic mobility requirements for Fiscal Year 2001.
ADC(X) Ship Program
Question. Last year's budget submission funded the first ship of
the ADC(X) class in Fiscal Year 2000. This year's submission does not
include the ADC(X) in Fiscal Year 2000 or any outyear. Is there still a
requirement for the ADC(X) ship?
Answer. There is still a requirement for ADC(X). While there is no
Fiscal Year 2000 ADC(X) reflected in this year's budget submission, the
Secretary of Defense Guidance directs the Navy to explore Charter and
Build as a procurement alternative for ADC(X).
Question. If so, what is the current time frame for this class of
ships?
Answer. If the Navy is allowed to lease these vessels through a
Charter and Build approach, the current projections for ADC(X) are:
--Contract awards for design & construction commencing in
Fiscal Year 2000.
--Two new ships would commence construction each year through
Fiscal Year 2005.
--Ship deliveries would commence in late Fiscal Year 2003.
--Two ships would deliver each year through Fiscal Year 2008.
ADC(X) Delivery Schedule
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Contact.......................................... 2 2 2 2 2 2 ..... ..... .....
Deliver.......................................... ..... ..... ..... 2 2 2 2 2 2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. How many ships are planned for this class and what is the
current price estimate for one of these ships?
Answer. Ten to twelve ships are currently planned at an estimated
average ship cost between $300 and $400 million.
Question. Describe the current characteristics and capabilities of
this class of ships. How will this ship be classified in terms of
military specifications?
Answer. The purpose of ADC(X) is to replace the current capability
of the T-AE 26, T-AFS 1, T-AFS 8 and AOE 1 Class ships. ADC(X) will
provide logistic lift from sources of supply such as friendly ports, or
at sea from specially equipped Ready Reserve Force merchant ships by
consolidation, and will transfer this cargo (ammunition; food; limited
amounts of petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL); repair parts; and
expendable supplies and material) at sea to station ships and other
ships operating with naval forces. ADC(X) may be required to act in
concert with a T-AO Class ship as an equivalent station ship. The
ADC(X) is intended to operate independently underway, but could be
escorted by Navy combatants when required for protection. The ADC(X)
will be built to commercial standards and will have few, if any,
military specifications.
Question. Is the Navy considering a ``build and charter'' approach
to the ADC(X)? If so, how would it work?
Answer. Yes, the Navy is considering a ``build and charter''
approach. The Navy would sign agreements to charter the vessels with
commercial entities, who would then design and construct the vessels to
meet the Navy's requirements. The Navy would then make lease payments
to the owners upon delivery of the vessels. The Navy's preferred
``build and charter'' approach would be a bareboat charter where the
Navy would lease the asset from a commercial entity and operate it as a
public vessel. Crewing would be provided by the Military Sealift
Command (MSC) with civilian mariners.
Question. Would the Navy contract with an operator as opposed to a
shipyard?
Answer. The contract could be with either an operator or a
shipyard. Charter arrangements are normally made through an owner. This
owner could be an operator, a shipyard, or another type of company with
marine interests.
Question. Does the Navy currently have the authority to proceed
with such a procurement approach? What changes in current law are
required?
Answer. OMB has established guidelines regarding leases of capital
assets. Depending on how OMB evaluates the proposed ADC(X) ``Build and
Charter'' program structure, legislation may be required if the program
is to be executed without the need for upfront Budget Authority and
Appropriations. However, in order to enter into a long-term charter
arrangement, statutory authority would be required. Specifically, the
Navy would need authority to charter vessels for 25 years, allowance
for termination liability to be held in reserve in current Navy O&M
accounts, and view the hire as a cost of the Navy Working Capital Fund.
Question. If Congress did not approve changes in law to allow a
``build and charter'' approach, what are the Navy's back up plans for
acquiring these ships?
Answer. If Congress does not approve any changes that might be
necessary to executive the building and chartering of ADC(X) vessels,
the Navy will have to enter into costly Service Life Extension Programs
for AOE-1s, AEs, and AFSs. If and when Budget Authority and
Appropriations become available, the Navy will replace these aging
vessels with ADC(X) ships.
Question.What is the Navy's current or past experience with ``build
and charter'' arrangements?
Answer. The Navy successfully executed long-term vessel leases in
the 1980s for the MPS and T-5 tanker programs. In addition, MSC
frequently leases vessels on a short term basis for up to five years.
Question. Has the Navy ever compared its financial experience in
the build and charter arrangement for the MPF ships versus the cost of
acquiring and operating these ships by the government? If so, what does
this comparison show?
Answer. Such an analysis was conducted prior to the procurement of
the MPF ships. A similar financial analysis based on OMB guidelines is
being conducted for the ADC(X) vessels.
LCAC Service Life Extension Program
Question. The Committee understands that a ``basic'' SLEP phase to
extend the service life of LCACs to 30 years and bring the craft up to
a common configuration will be ready for implementation in 1998.
However, this transition to production has not been programmed to start
until 2000. If so this is a departure from the LCAC SLEP plan the Navy
submitted to Congress in 1996. Why has the Navy elected not to start
the ``basic'' SLEP effort in fiscal year 1998?
Answer. On October 7, 1996, the Secretary of the Navy informed the
Honorable Bob Livingston, of the House of Representatives, that funding
limitations precluded commencement of the SLEP program in fiscal year
1998 and fiscal year 1999, and that Navy requirements could be
satisfied by commencing the program in fiscal year 2000.
Question. If Congress were to provide the additional funds for this
effort, what would be required to restore this program to the original
schedule so that it can begin in FY 1998?
Answer. The funding profile required would be ($M): fiscal year
1998, $24.1; fiscal year 1999, $24.7; Total, $48.8.
These amounts include the required integrated logistics, interim
support of equipment, technical trainer upgrades, government furnished
equipment in support of SLEP, and Department of the Navy engineering
services support in areas of testing, configuration management,
technical support and craft scheduling and transportation.
CVN-77 Aircraft Carrier
Question. It has been reported that changes in the method of
construction of the CVN 77 could reduce the cost of this ship by as
much as $600 million. What changes have the potential to reduce
acquisition costs of one ship by this amount?
Answer. Newport News Shipbuilding (NNS) has proposed a ``Smart
Buy'' approach for CVN 77 that would optimize the aircraft carrier
industrial base and improve CVN 77 affordability. NNS proposes to
accelerate the purchase of selected components and materials, detailed
design work, and construction of low risk hull sections/modules on CVN
77. These efforts would begin in Fiscal Year 1998 instead of Fiscal
Year 2002. The ship delivery date will be remain in Fiscal Year 2008.
NNS claims its ``Smart Buy'' proposal will generate potential savings
to the total ship cost of $600 million.
More specifically, the NNS ``Smart Buy'' proposal would generate
savings from three main areas:
1. Early Construction of Low Risk Hull Sections/Modules: NNS
asserts that $300 million can be saved by starting the
construction of selected low risk hull sections/modules in
Fiscal Year 1999. This would maintain critical structural
trades (welders and shipfitters) across the dip in the manning
curve at NNS and would preclude it from having to incur costs
associated with the layoff, and subsequent rehiring and
retraining of workers between CVN 76 and CVN 77.
2. Increase Advance Procurement Funding: NNS states that $150
million in savings can be obtained by purchasing additional
long lead time material and equipment starting Fiscal Year
1998, to take advantage of current contracts for CVNs 75 and
76. This would allow critical subcontractors to maintain their
production lines and keep costs down. This would be in addition
to the advance procurement of nuclear components currently
programmed in Fiscal Year 2000.
3. Escalation Savings. NNS estimates substantial escalation
savings (approximately $150 million) could be realized under
its ``Smart Buy'' proposal.
The Department of the Navy has reviewed the NNS ``Smart Buy''
proposal (which includes a $17 million RDT&E plus-up and a $345 million
SCN plus-up in Fiscal Year 1998) to determine if it is feasible and
would generate the proposed costs savings. The Navy believes the
proposal is feasible and has merit, however, cost estimators from Naval
Sea Systems Command, RAND and the Office of the Secretary of Defense/
Cost Analysis Improvement Group (OSD/CAIG) have reviewed the estimates
and the consensus is that the savings would be closer to $400 million.
Early construction/workforce savings are expected to be $220 million,
the advanced procurement savings $120 million, and escalation savings
$60 million.
Additionally, RAND has studied the cost impacts of accelerating or
delaying the start of construction of CVN 77 and various build periods
as part of its overall aircraft carrier industrial base study. They
concluded that significant savings, on the order which NNS asserts, can
be generated by starting construction of CVN 77 in Fiscal Year 2000
while holding the delivery date of the ship in Fiscal Year 2008.
Shipbuilding Industrial Base
Question. What is the Navy's assessment of the financial health of
the shipbuilding industrial base?
Answer. The major shipyards which build new Navy ships are healthy
enough today to compete for and win major U.S. Navy shipbuilding
contracts. The Navy conducts periodic reviews of the financial health
of individual shipbuilding companies and also conducts more detailed
reviews when a major shipbuilding contract is pending. Awards are not
made to financially troubled shipyards, if the Navy determines that
they lack the financial resources to complete the contract under
consideration. An assessment of the financial health of the industry
over future years will be part of the ongoing joint Department of
Defense and Navy Shipbuilding Industrial Base Study.
Question. What steps could be taken by the Navy to improve this
health?
Answer. All of the shipyards which conduct the bulk of their
business with the Navy are facing downturns, or, at best, no growth in
future Navy business prospects, as the last of the ships ordered in the
waning days of the Cold War are completed. This has prompted the Navy
to emphasize the potential for growth in the industry through expanded
commercial and foreign military sales. As a result of a significant
amount of work by the Congress and the Maritime Administration over the
past several years, some new commercial work has begun in shipyards
that had not recently built for the international commercial market. In
addition, American shipyards are bidding on, and winning, international
combatant shipbuilding contracts. While entering these new, highly
competitive markets may place some shipyards under short term financial
stress, the long term benefits of increased market access, increased
diversification, and improved competitive pressures may help the long
term financial health of the individual companies involved in these
projects.
In order to assess how the Department of Defense should address
these and related issues in the industry, The Office of the Secretary
of Defense and the Navy are conducting a joint study of the
shipbuilding industry. This study is a follow-on to the work done
during the Quadrennial Defense Review. One portion of this study will
include an assessment of the financial health of the industry. A
strength of this study is the emphasis on early information input by
U.S. shipyards. This should increase the veracity of the results within
the Department of Defense, with the Congress, and, most importantly,
within the American shipbuilding industry.
Question. What is the Navy's current position on the NDF (National
Defense Features) program as one method of maintaining the industrial
base?
Answer. The Navy supports a National Defense Features (NDF) program
to provide an active complement to the successful inactive Ready
Reserve Force (RRF) in time of mobilization. The follow-on surge
sealift mission is accomplished today through ships in the RRF.
Currently, a shortfall exists and is projected to continue through
fiscal year 2001. NDF ships could be used to augment the RRF and
possibly replace aging RRF assets in a more cost effective manner,
thereby transitioning some RRF capacity to an active status. Congress
provided $50 million of fiscal year 1996 funs for the National Defense
Features program. The Navy has requested proposals and is currently
evaluating them in anticipation of a late September 1997 contract
award. Depending on the lessons learned from this effort, follow-on
solicitations may be issued, if future funding is identified.
Deep Ocean Relocation
Question. Why is the Deep Ocean a viable candidate for relocation
of contaminated harbor and coastal sediments?
Answer. The potential benefits of deep ocean disposal has been
under discussion for over twenty years. Marine sediments are uniquely
qualified for ocean disposal. By law, and for scientific reasons, they
may be the only waste stream that should merit such consideration. The
principal contaminants in marine sediments are likely to remain bound
to the sediments as long as they remain in the marine environment. The
deep ocean, in particular, offers the potential for long term, reliable
isolation of relocated sediments. The deep ocean is a relatively benign
environment, characterized by low currents, relatively few living
organisms, is geologically stable, and not susceptible to inadvertent
human intervention.
Left in place, or disposed of in shallow water, which is the
current accepted practice in harbors such as New York, Boston, San
Francisco and other locations, contaminated sediments are currently
subject to resuspension by natural disturbance and can propagate
through the environment and potentially into the food web.
Relocation to the deep ocean can provide a long term dredged
disposal solution, however, the environmental benefits as well as the
economic viability must be rigorously demonstrated.
Question. Does the Navy have a role in solving the problem and, if
so, why?
Answer. Contaminated sediments are both a national and
international problem. Long term solution of the problem must answer
scientific, engineering, and regulatory questions that affect world-
wide commercial and naval operations. Like the Navy's contribution in
the TWA recovery process, there is no single agency with a broad enough
scope to address the complete problem. However, we believe the Navy
with its deep ocean technical and operational experience, can
contribute to assembling a government/industry team capable of
grappling with the total problem and prototyping potential solutions.
We believe our experience in demonstrating and validating complex
military systems can be applied to rigorously quantifying the costs,
risk, and benefits of deep ocean relocation of marine sediments.
Finally, we also believe that solving the international problem of
contaminated sediments, especially as it relates to international fresh
food and water supplies, falls within the context of preventative
defense and creative, confidence building international diplomacy in
terms of working with our allies to enhance our peace-strengthening
capabilities through increased attention to our common natural
environment in the Post Cold War World.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr.
Livingston. Questions submitted by Mr. Lewis and the answers
thereto follow:]
F/A-18 E/F Aircraft
Question. Secretary Douglass, I can't help but notice with
admiration that the F/A-18E/F program has been a stellar performer in
that it has been on schedule, under cost and under weight throughout
its development. What are your thoughts relating to the consideration
of a multi-year procurement of the F/A-18E/F?
Answer. I have tasked the F/A-18E/F program office and the Hornet
Industry Team to investigate the implementation of a multi-year
contracting approach for procurement of the F/A-18E/F as early as full
rate production. Once this Government-Industry team is able to assess
appropriate timing, resources required, strategy, and commensurate
savings, Department of Defense and the Navy will consider a prudent
application of a multi-year approach, given that the F/A-18E/F weapon
system design is sufficiently mature and stable, and there are
sufficient cost savings to be garnered.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Lewis.
Questions submitted by Mr. Nethercutt and the answers thereto
follow:]
EA-6B Prowler Aircraft
Question. This year the EA-6B will assume its role as the primary
radar jamming aircraft in the Department of Defense. Last year, the
Navy named EA-6B modernization as a priority unfunded item, and
Congress added over $100 million for this purpose. I am disappointed to
see, then, that the Navy's request for EA-6B modifications has slipped
back to about $87 million. What modifications are funded in the budget,
and what additional modifications would you like to fund this year to
ensure that the EA-6B can adequately protect our nation's aviators?
Answer. The President's Budget reflects EA-6B modernization with
$32 million for upgrading eight Block 89 aircraft to the Block 89A
configuration. Over the course of the Future Years Defense Plan, all
EA-6B aircraft will be upgraded to the Block 89A configuration. $5
million is planned for completion of the three year long safety of
flight upgrade by finishing installation of the Electronic Flight
Instrumentation System (EFIS). $33 million is planned for procurement
of 103 Universal Exciter Upgrades, and $16 million for reliability
improvements to the jammer hard back. The remainder of the Fiscal Year
1998 funding request is for miscellaneous improvements to support
equipment.
Additional modernization upgrades not funded or fully funded
include: Polarization fix to transmitters, Universal exciter upgrade,
USO-113 communications jammer, Center Wing Sections, Overhead
connectivity, and J52P408A engine blade containment efforts.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr.
Nethercutt. Questions submitted by Mr. Cunningham and the
answers thereto follow:]
F/A-18 E/F Program
Question. What will be the total RDT&E costs associated with the F/
A-18E/F program?
Answer. The following table presented in million of dollars,
illustrates the F/A-18E/F program's total RDT&E cost as reflected in
the Fiscal Year 1998/1999 President's Budget request:
[In fiscal years]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1992-1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3,836........................................... 803 343 268 129 61 55 6 6 5,507
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The above total cost is lower than the original program's total
RDT&E estimate.
Question. As you know, I have always been concerned with our
ability to give our warfighters the air assets that they need. One of
the toughest decisions that we will have to make over the next few
years is how to most efficiently plan and fund the F/A-18E/F program
and the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program. You currently plan to buy a
total of 1000 Super Hornets for the Navy and the Marine Corps. When
considering this program, has the Navy discussed or investigated the
possibility of a multi-year procurement arrangement as a cost saving/
efficiency measure?
Answer. Yes, the Navy is investigating the application of a multi-
year procurement strategy for the F/A-18E/F as early as full rate
production. The F/A-18 program office has teamed with the Hornet
Industry Team to develop a proposed multiyear approach which addresses
appropriate timing, resources required, strategy, and commensurate
savings. Upon completion of this study this effort, the Department of
Defense and the Navy will consider a prudent application of a multiyear
approach, given that the F/A-18E/F weapon system design is sufficiently
mature and stable, and there are sufficient cost savings to be
garnered.
(Point of clarification: Current plans do not include procurement
of F/A-18E/F aircraft for the Marine Corps. The current inventory
requirement for the F/A-18E/F is a total quantity of 1000 for the Navy
only, to replace the F/A-18C/Ds, F-14, and A-6E.)
The Navy is investigating the feasibility of a multi-year
procurement for the F/A-18E/F aircraft, and the potential benefits in
cost and efficiency a properly funded and administered multi-year
procurement could yield. Based on the F/A-18E/F's demonstrated
performance, technical maturity, success in flight test and significant
test hours accumulated to date, as well as the program's unprecedented
success acquisition arena, this multi-year procurement could reasonably
be initiated as early as the first lot of full rate production in
Fiscal Year 2000. In addition to the potential cost avoidance through
the term of a multi-year procurement, this could also favorably impact
the industrial base. The relative stability afforded by a multi-year
procurement allows our prime contractors (McDonnell Douglas in St.
Louis, MO, and General Electric in Lynn, MA) to enter into long term
agreements with suppliers which incentivize investment in process
improvements and workforce training, yielding long term benefit in
terms of product quality, cost, and improved competition.
The Navy has been working with its industry partners, as well as
the Department of Defense, to formulate a budget which reflects
procurement of the first five lots of full rate production (222
aircraft) into a multi-year, fixed price incentive fee contract. This
proposal will be forwarded to the Department of Defense for final
review and endorsement.
Advanced Self-Protection Jammer
Question. Last year the Congress added $50 million for Advanced
Self-Protection Jammer (ASPJ) procurement to support pilots flying in
contingency operations such as Bosnia. I am told that the responses
coming back on this technology from the operators in the field is
excellent. I also understand that, with the limited number of these
systems currently in the fleet, our operators are forced into a ``hand-
to-mouth'' situation. Are you satisfied with this type of operation
with respect to such a promising pilot survivability asset; and would
you support additional funding to buy more ASPJ systems?
Answer. The ``hand-to-mouth'' situation, called crossdecking,
always provides challenges and are a typical event in on station
reliefs (at sea or ashore); ASPJ certainly is not the only system the
Navy currently has to crossdeck. The Navy believes that the current
number of systems (to include Fiscal Year 1997 plus-up systems) are
sufficient given present deployment schedules and projections in
support of contingency operations.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr.
Cunningham. Questions submitted by Mr. Hefner and the answers
thereto follow:]
P-3C Aircraft Update III
Question. Secretary Douglass, there has been much discussion about
the benefits of COTS and NDI equipment. It is clear that more and more
benefits are being derived by all the services through the use of these
commercial systems instead of using the old mil-specs for everything.
Just the other day I learned of one instance where two companies
independently developed a COTS NDI acoustic system which can be used
for the P-3 upgrade. This product known as the ``rainbow system'' is
currently being flight tested and I understand the results have been
very impressive. Additionally the procurement cost and support cost are
significantly less than mil-spec equipment. Mr. Secretary, the Navy
should be commended for taking advantage of these opportunities when
industry provides them. Would you let me know how the Navy plans to
take advantage of this opportunity?
Answer. The Navy plans to provide industry the chance to compete
for an upgrade to a portion of the P-3C Update III common
configuration. We anticipate receiving responsive proposals using
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS ) or non-developmental item (NDI)
hardware.
The Navy has 140 P-3C in the Update III configuration. The current
Update III procurement performs a Block Modification to 25 additional
P-3C. The Navy intends to maintain a common configuration for the P-3C
Update III. If a strategy other than maintaining the common
configuration is pursued, new trainers and support infrastructure will
be required, the Tactical Mission Software will have to be modified,
and a separate software version will have to be supported.
The Navy does continue to upgrade the common Update III
configuration to account for out-of-production equipment. For these 25
aircraft, because the AN/UYS-1 Acoustic Processor is out of production,
the functionality of the AN/UYS-1 will be embedded within the AN/USQ-
78A acoustic Display and Control System using COTS or NDI hardware. The
Navy's acquisition strategy is to have a competition conducted at the
subcontractor level to embed the UYS-1 capability into the USQ-78A.
The Navy intends to contract with Lockheed Martin Tactical Defense
Systems (LMTDS) on a sole-source basis for the P-3C Update III upgrade
kit. LMTDS will be responsible for delivering a fully integrated
system. The Navy is awarding a sole-source contract to LMTDS for the P-
3C Update III upgrade kits because Lockheed Martin is the designer,
developer, and sole manufacturer of more than 65% of the total avionics
suite to be installed. LMTDS is the only source with the technical
capability, specialized expertise, experience, and technical data
necessary to perform the required effort, and maintain a common
configuration.
LMTDS will subcontract to Lockheed Martin Federal Systems (LMFS)
Manassas, the designer, developer, and sole manufacturer of the AN/USQ-
78A acoustic Display and Control System, to be the acoustic systems
integrator. LMFS will conduct a competition to incorporate the
functionality of the AN/UYS-1 in the AN/USQ-78. No Lockheed Martin
division will be allowed to compete for this upgrade. An Integrated
Product Team has been designated, with Government participation, to
oversee the competition.
Because a validated technical data package does not yet exist for
the AN/USQ-78A, a competition conducted by the Navy would put the
Government at schedule and performance risk. The Navy would have to
provide the newly competed system as Government Furnished Equipment to
LMTDS, placing system integration responsibility on the Government
without validated technical data. In addition, achieving a common
configuration would be jeopardized.
At the request of industry, the fleet Patrol Wings allowed multiple
contractors the opportunity to prototype their engineering design
models on P-3Cs for contractor conceptual demonstrations, to include
Lucent Technologies' Rainbow system. Data obtained during these
demonstrations were for the contractors' systems development purposes
only and were not reviewed by Navy procurement and acquisition
personnel due to the planned subcontractor competition. To preserve the
integrity of the contractor's acoustic processor competition, the
potentially competitive systems were not evaluated by Program Office
personnel.
The Navy's acquisition strategy reduces the integration risk
associated with this P-3C Update III upgrade to the lowest level
achievable. With this acquisition strategy, the Navy is likely to
obtain the benefits of COTS/NDI while competing that portion of the
effort that can be competed.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Hefner.
Questions submitted by Mr. Visclosky and the answers thereto
follow:]
Advanced Self Protection Jammer
Question. Are you pleased with ASPJ performance while it was
installed on F/A-18C/D and F-14D fleet aircraft flying in Bosnia and
the Persian Gulf?
Answer. Yes, While no operational data is available regarding
aircraft ``saved'' with ASPJ installed, operational evaluation testing
indicates that ASPJ provides a very robust response to a particular
threat weapon system of interest. Modifications to the ASPJ rack have
proven successful. Built In Test (BIT) problems have not been mentioned
by forward deployed squadrons. To further research this area, the
COMOPTEVFOR/DOT&E approved method for BIT reliability data collection
is being utilized by ASPJ equipped squadrons in a carrier airwing
currently on deployment.
Question. Last year the Congress added $50 million for ASPJ
procurement to support contingency requirements. It looks like that is
still not enough to cover potential hostile areas. Do you have enough
ASPJ systems to adequately protect aircraft that are currently flying
in Bosnia, the Persian Gulf and other potential hot spots?
Answer. The Fiscal Year 1997 plus-up money will yield an additional
36 systems, to include spares. This will provide a sufficient number of
assets for current deployment schedules in support of contingency
operations (Bosnia and South West Asia). The final delivery for this
buy is predicted to be complete in November 1999.
Question. We understand that with the limited number of ASPJ
systems currently in the fleet you are forced into a cross-decking
situation on a hand-to-mouth basis. Are you satisfied with this type of
operation?
Answer. While not optimal, cross decking operations are a fact of
life in a fiscally constrained environment. The number of ASPJ units
available after this year should ensure the Navy retains a robust
capability to both train and fight (if necessary) in all of our routine
environs.
Question. Would you desire for the Congress to add funding to the
budget to buy more ASPJ systems?
Answer. The Navy believes that the current number of systems (to
include Fiscal Year 1997 plus-up systems) is sufficient until IDECM
Radio Frequency Countermeasures (RFCM) sub-system reaches initial
operational capability in 2002.
Question. We understand that IDECM could be an alternative system
for the F/A-18C/D but, with initial deliveries of IDECM systems
scheduled for 2002, they won't be ready for retrofit on the F/A-18C/D
for another 6-8 years. Are you comfortable with the current F/A-18C/D
protection for several more years?
Answer. As stated above, after the Fiscal Year 1997 plus-up systems
have been fielded, a sufficient amount of ASPJ equipped aircraft would
be realized for contingency operations for this interim period. The
February 14, 1997 report to Congress cites possible candidates for
radio frequency self-protection systems for the F/A-18C/D, to include:
ASPJ
Portion of IDECM (internal IDECM RFCM components
without a towed decoy)
ALQ-126B upgrade
The only cost and operationally suitable options are ASPJ or a
portion of IDECM RFCM (minus towed decoy) mounted internally in the F/
A-18C/D. A decision will be made in FY99 regarding what path will be
taken. This decision will coincide with the IDECM LRIP decision.
Question. We understand that it may not be possible to install a
towed decoy on the F/A-18C/D. If you wait several years for IDECM for
the F/A-18C/D and the IDECM towed decoy is not installed, how will
IDECM performance compare with today's ASPJ performance?
Answer. Performance for the two systems, ASPJ or IDECM (without the
towed decoy), is comparable. There are obvious long-term logistic
benefits (fleet commonality) to a solution involving a portion of the
IDECM system.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr.
Visclosky. Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the answers
thereto follow:]
CINC Priorities
Question. Mr. Douglass, your statement says that the programs in
your budget ``reflect the priorities established by the warfighters--
the theater Commanders-in-Chief.'' Your budget proposes a 12 ship DDG-
51 multiyear contract. However, not a single ship will be delivered to
the fleet with anti-ship missile defense nor theater ballistic missile
defense capabilities installed. Is this what theater CINCs want?
Answer. ------. The option that provides the Navy the most rapid
deployment of these capabilities is via backfit. Under the current Navy
plan the first ships to receive Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defense
capability, other than the User Operational Evaluation System (UOES)
demonstration ships will be two Aegis cruisers in FY 00. Additional
cruisers will be backfit in FY 02 and FY 03. The first DDG-51 class
destroyer will be backfit in FY 03 with additional ships scheduled in
FY 04 and out. By the Secretary of the Navy and Chief Naval Operations
direction, Navy is reviewing acceleration options that could nearly
double the number of ships provided both Area TBMD and CEC capabilities
(from 15 to 28) by FY 03.
Navy considerations associated with balancing Ship Construction,
Navy funds for the entire Department and executing a fully funded DDG-
51 class ship procurement plan moved the introduction of Cooperative
Engagement Capability (CEC), and Theater Ballistic Missile Defense
(TBMD) capability in a forward fit configuration, out of the FY 98-FY
01 DDG 51 Multi-Year Procurement (MYP).
These 12 ships will be built with the combat systems and computer
software configuration base to allow rapid introduction of these
capabilities as funds become available for procurement and installation
of CEC and TBMD. The 12 ships in the DDG 51 Multi-Year Procurement will
have the greatest capability of any ships built to date, with respect
to individual anti-ship cruise missile defense. CEC, is a synergistic
enhancement to total Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) or Amphibious
Readiness Group (ARG) self defense, including those ships, in company
with Aegis ships, whose self defense systems are not as advanced. In
this manner CEC leverages the superior defense capability of Aegis
ships enhancing the entire battlegroup's defense, CEC, will also
enhance TBMD for ships operating in a group as a means for advanced
cueing.
Question. Cooperative engagement is essential to fleet situational
awareness and coordination, ship self-defense, and ballistic missile
defense. Former Secretary Perry called it ``the most significant
technological development since stealth.'' Your budget proposes to
funds for cooperative engagement installations in 1998 although the
system achieved IOC in 1996. Is this what the theater CINCs want?
Answer. CEC was designed to counter the threat posed by
increasingly capable cruise missiles and aircraft and provide greater
C4I at the tactical level through the provision of a coherent tactical
picture. ------. By FY 1999, there will be two CEC-equipped
Battlegroups in the Fleet and CEC will be installed on an additional
three Battlegroups in FY 2000. By FY03, the CEC inventory is projected
to reach 60 units.
Question. Your budget proposes to perform a nuclear refueling
overhaul on the U.S.S. Nimitz aircraft carrier. Yet the ship would be
delivered back to the fleet without: cooperative engagement, integrated
self-defense (SSDS), the advanced combat direction system, the rolling
airframe missile, the SPQ-9 navigation radar, a common high-band data
link, the battlegroup passive horizon extension system, an outboard
weapons elevator, conversion of nuclear magazines, emergency ordnance
handling, and improved propellers. Is this what the theater CINC's
want?
Answer. Navy's plan supports the currently established CINC
priorities. The following installations are currently planned for
accomplishment during the Refueling Complex Overhaul (RCOH):
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC)
Advanced Combat Direction System (ACDS)-reduced scope
Nuclear magazine conversions
Emergency Ordnance Handling-increment 1
The Outboard Weapons Elevator Engineering Change Proposal is
currently under review for potential inclusion in the RCOH. The RCOH
drydock work includes refurbishment and modifications to the ship's
existing propellers.
Following the RCOH, U.S.S. Nimitz will undergo a Post Shakedown
Availability/Selected Restricted Availability (PSA/SRA), as is typical
after an overhaul of such scope. The Navy is planning the following
installations as a part of the PSA/SRA:
Ship Self Defense System (SSDS)
Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM)
SPQ-9B navigational/fire control radar
Common High Band Data Link (CHBDL)
Battle Group Passive Horizon Extension System (BGPHES)
Upon completion of the RCOH and the PSA/SRA, U.S.S. Nimitz will
rejoin the Fleet as a modernized, recapitalized, fully capable asset
prior to her first post-RCOH deployment.
Question. Your budget proposes no funds for installation of ship
self-defense systems in 1998 that are vital for a lone ship to defend
itself from cruise missile attack. In the outyear plan, only 8 ships
are now going to get the equipment rather than 15 planned just last
year, and apparently the whole class of LHA ships to support Marine
Corps combat operations is simply gone. Is this what the theater CINCs
want?
Answer. In the case of SSDS this slipped the procurement and
installation of 1 LSD, 1 LHD and 2 shore based sets. We have
satisfactorily rescheduled those ships for installation during follow-
on availability's. In the interim those ships will be protected by the
baseline self defense systems now installed. LHAs are not currently
included in the program due to affordability issues and projected
service life. The theater CINCs fully support SSDS as a program and
would like to have this capability in the fleet as soon as possible.
Question. Our nation has already built missiles that are
essentially invisible to radars. It is only a matter of time until
other nations field advanced stealthy anti-ship missiles, and the Navy
knows it. Once a ship's radar detection becomes limited, infrared
detection becomes essential. The budget proposes no funds for
development or production of infrared (heat-sensing) sensors for Navy
ships. Is this what the theater CINCs want?
Answer. Higher program priorities in the Fiscal Year 1998 budget
submission necessitated a reduction in development funding for Infrared
Search and Track (IRST) Sensor. There is sufficient funding in place to
complete landbased prototype testing. Based on that test data,
consideration will be given to fully fund this program within fiscal
limits and against other program priorities. Theater CINCs recognize
that IRST has the potential to add capability to ship self defense but
also await test data before providing the appropriate level of support
relative to other requirements.
Question. The budget proposes insufficient funds for both the near-
term (Lower Tier) and far term (Upper Tier) theater ballistic missile
defense, and the Navy is not planning to meet any Congressional
fielding deadlines for these systems. Is this what theater CINCs want?
Answer. The Navy is very serious about developing and delivering a
sea-based theater ballistic missile defense capability to the Fleet as
soon as possible. Navy has incurred difficulties in achieving
Congressional fielding deadlines for these systems due to several
factors: the amount of time required to initiate the programs; delays
experienced in executing the Congressionally directed plus-ups; and, in
the case of Navy Theater Wide, the process leading to a program
decision from DoD. However, the Navy has made significant progress over
the past year toward delivery of an initial capability to the theater
CINC. On 24 January 1997 at the White Sands Missile Range, the Navy
conducted the first ever intercept of a TBM target with a modified SM-2
Block IV missile. Subsequently, at a Milestone II DAB on 22 February
1997, OSD approved the Navy AREA TBMD program to proceed to
Engineering, Manufacturing and Development. I have approved a plan to
designate two ships (U.S.S. Lake Erie and U.S.S. Port Royal) to serve
as focal points for TBMD system testing and evaluation, much like the
approach used to achieve early evaluation of CEC in U.S.S. Eisenhower
Battle Group, Designated by the codename ``LINEBACKER,'' (in lieu of
the term User Operational Evaluation System (UOES)) these two ships
will lead the Navy in TBMD development. They will receive the first
TBMD equipment and software modifications in Fiscal Year 1998 and begin
serving as the Navy's spearhead for both testing and tactics
development. The sailors of these two ships will provide early feedback
to the technical and tactical communities which can influence the
system design and TBMD doctrine development. Most importantly, as we
begin to deliver BLK IVA EMD missiles in fiscal year 1999, these ships
will provide the theater CINC a contingency capability in the event of
a crisis involving the threat of TBMs. We have also made some recent
progress in the Navy Theater Wide program. Our work with BMDO and OSD
over the past year has been structured to demonstrate the affordability
of our evolutionary strategy and credibility of the Navy Theater Wide
capability in order to ensure appropriate funding and priority within
the DoD Ballistic Missile Defense family of systems architecture. This
past December Dr. Kaminski designated NTW as a core BMDO program and,
in support, in January 1997 Navy added over $200 million to the Navy
Theater Wide program across the Future Years Defense Plan. Finally, to
further ensure our resources are appropriately focused, in October
1996, the Secretary of the Navy and I directed our staff conduct a
comprehensive review of Navy TBMD programs and report back with a plan
that could accelerate delivery of this capability to the Fleet. The
review is nearing completion and we will be briefed on the results. All
of these actions confirm Navy's commitment to deliver this capability
to the theater CINC as early as possible.
Question. The budget proposes no funds for production of an
improved CIWS gun (called CIWS surface mode) that allows Navy ships to
see and hit terrorist patrol boasts such as the Iranian boghammers. The
Navy's budget plan leaves LHA, LHD, FFG-7, and LSD ships unprotected.
Is this what theater CINCs want?
Answer. These ships are not unprotected. Deployers to contested or
high threat areas are routinely outfitted with 25mm chain guns.
Additionally each have 50 caliber machine gun self defense emplacements
coupled with support from other smaller caliber weapons. Additionally,
FFG 7 class has a MK 75 76mm gun and standard missile with excellent
anti-surface capabilities. All the above mentioned ships have the
flexibility to carry armed helicopters equipped with either missile
pods or automatic guns. The CIWS surface mode can provide the
capability to detect and engage terrorist patrol boats as well as
hostile attack Helos. The Navy will complete operational testing of the
system later this year and receive fleet comments before we commit to
full scale production. The fleet CINCs are very supportive of the CIWS
surface mode for ships that do not have a major caliber gun.
Question. The first new strategic sealift ship is underway, but it
has no support equipment (lighterage) for the Army to unload it during
combat operations. If no port was available, a theater CINC would have
to take support away from the Marines and give it to the Army--which of
course jeopardizes the Marine's mission. Is this what the theater CINCs
want?
Answer. The situation today is no different than it has been since
deployment of the afloat prepositioned Army War Reserve (AWR-3) package
in 1993. If no port is available, the Army must use the modular
causeway sections (MCS) onboard T-ACS GOPHER STATE and the watercraft
onboard AMERICAN CORMORANT that are part of the AWR-3 package
prepositioned in Diego Garcia to offload the ships. The Army intends to
augment this capability in Fiscal Year 1998 with an additional heavy
lift prepositioning ship, the STRONG VIRGINIAN. If additional
lighterage is required, the CINC must choose whether or not to use
lighterage from ships of the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) to
assist in the offload of these ships.
Question. In your budget, the V-22 has a 25 year production profile
which the Commandant thinks will cost $8-11 billion more than an
economic production program. Is this what the theater CINCs want?
Answer. The new production run is 24 years (based on the
President's Fiscal Year 1998 budget). With our revised economic
assumptions, we estimate that it will cost approximately $1 billion
less than the 25 year production profile.
Two of three CINCs responding (IPL List) requested that the V-22
procurement be increased over the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB)
profile. The Department in the President's fiscal year 1998 budget
increased the procurement rate over the DAB profile by 14 aircraft in
the FYDP to 24 MV-22 inn fiscal year 2003.
The Department would defer to the theater CINCs for further
comments.
Question. In your budget, funding for basic research and RDT&E
management support are increased $87 million above last year's level.
Is this what theater CINCs want?
Answer. Basic Research was appropriated last year at $352 million
(after Congressional undistributed reductions). This year's budget
request is for $382 million or $30 million more than last year.
However, the Department originally requested $35 million more last year
than was appropriated. Congress cut $20 million specifically against
Basic Research and levied another $15 million in general undistributed
reductions. These FY 1997 reductions give the false appearance of a $30
million ``increase'' over last year, when in fact, the Department's
requirements for Basic Research have basically not changed.
RDT&E Management Support was appropriated last year at $540
million. This year's budget request is for $595 million or $40 million
more than last year. In these programs, a major change in funding Test
and Evaluation programs resulted in about $5 million of the increase
(funds were transferred into a centrally managed program from other
customers in RDT&E) and $15 million was added for development of the F-
4 aircraft into targets to support test and evaluation of major
aircraft and weapons systems. However, part of this ``increase'' is
actually a reduction in FY 1997 of $22 million for specific and
undistributed Congressional reductions. Taken from this perspective,
only $15 million of the noted ``increase'' is growth and that supports
other major aircraft and weapon system.
In addition to their fundamental support of the President's Budget,
the Fleet CINCs are direct and significant players in the Navy R&D
requirements process. They develop a set of Command Technology Issues
(CTIs), which are submitted for inclusion in the Navy Science and
Technology Requirements Guidance. Coupled with Fleet representation at
every Science and Technology (S&T) Round Table and Working Group
meeting, the Fleet has multiple direct channels to request and
influence S&T support. The RDT&E management investment supports the
above activities; the 6.1 Basic Research investment is designed to
provide the scientific basis and enabling technologies to address these
issues and other Navy needs.
Question. In your budget, the Navy has deferred outyear funds for
the LCAC (Landing Craft Air Cushion) service life extension, yet the
Marines are looking for LCACs to perform more missions such as
transportation of fuel to ground combat vehicles and mine clearing. Is
that what the theater CINCs want?
Answer. Navy requirements support commencing the LCAC SLEP program
in fiscal year 2000 in consonance with fleet concerns. An affordable
LCAC SLEP program that meets CINC requirements is under review. We are
actively engaged with the CinCs to identify evolving roles and missions
for LCAC, of which fuel delivery and mine clearing are two.
Question. In your budget, funding for Advanced Technology
Transition--``demonstration projects''--is increased $18 million. Is
this what theater CINCs want? Name which CINC has included Advanced
Technology Transition as a program on his integrated priority list, and
how it ranks in terms of his priorities.
Answer. Advanced Technology Transition was appropriated last year
at $69 million (after Congressional undistributed reductions and plus
up for SLICE project). This year's budget request is for $87 million or
$18 million more than last year. However, the Department originally
requested $37.4 million more last year than was appropriated. Congress
cut $34.4 million specifically against Advanced Technology Transition
program and levied another $3 million in general undistributed
reductions. These FY 1997 reductions give the false appearance of a $18
million ``increase'' over last year, when, in fact, the Department's
requirements have declined.
Yes, without question. Although the CINCs' Integrated Priority
Lists are expressed in terms of capabilities rather than specific
programs, the Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD) Program responds
directly to those needed capabilities and ranks first in terms of CINC
S&T priorities and interests. The Fleet CINCs are an integral part of
the annual ATD proposal and evaluation process, in which CINC
priorities play a dominant role.
The Advanced Technology Transition program (PE 0603792N), which in
fiscal year 1997 includes a total of 16 active ATDs, is developed from
proposals based on the Science and Technology Requirements Guidance
(developed in part from CINC input). Fleet CINCs are represented on the
Navy Science and Technology Working Group (STWG), with the opportunity
to review the entire list (usually about 150) of ATD proposals and to
review in depth the 25 finalists as part of the ATD selection process.
The fiscal year 1997 President's Budget request of $104 million was
reduced in the appropriation to $72 million as a result, a number of
high-priority Fleet needs could not be satisfied. The $87 million
request for fiscal year 1998 level for PE 0603792N represents a modest
increase to satisfy the highest priority CINC requirements. Even at the
requested level, an additional 10% growth would be necessary to return
to the level appropriated in fiscal year 1995.
The ATDs represent the Navy S&T program with strongest CINC
engagement and support. The CINC-recommended list of ATD selections,
each with high ratings for need, transition opportunity and technical
quality always greatly exceeds the dollars available.
Question. In your budget, $150 million is included as a downpayment
towards development of an Arsenal Ship demonstrator project. Is this
what the theater CINCs want? Name which CINC has included the Arsenal
Ship program on his integrated priority list, and how it ranks in terms
of his priorities.
Answer. The Arsenal Ship is not specifically listed on the CINC
integrated priority list; however it will enhance our ability to meet
many of those requirements.
Question. In your budget, growth is requested for ``Studies and
Analysis Support'', the ``Center for Naval Analysis'', ``Management,
Technical and International Support'' and ``RDT&E Science and
Technology Management.'' Is this what theater CINCs want? Name which
CINC has included any of these programs on his integrated priority
list, and how it ranks in terms of his priorities.
Answer. Studies, Analyses and Support was appropriated last year at
$6.7 million (after Congressional undistributed reductions). This
year's budget request is for $8.8 million or $2.1 million more than
last year. This increase reflects a new study for the Large Land Based
Aircraft (LLBA) as a potential replacement to the E-6, EP-3, P-3, C-130
and C-9 aircraft.
The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) was appropriated last year at
$38.6 million (after Congressional undistributed reductions). This
year's budget request is for $43.4 million or $4.8 million more than
last year. However, 75 percent of this ``increase'' is actually a
reduction in FY 1997 of $3.6 million for undistributed Congressional
reductions.
Management, Technical and International Support was appropriated
last year at $19.7 million (after Congressional undistributed
reductions). This year's budget request is for $24.3 million or $4.6
million more than last year. This increase reflects the addition of
funds supporting Modeling and Simulation (M&S) efforts, including
support for a central M&S office which will coordinate all Navy M&S
initiatives to avid duplications among programs. It is anticipated
substantial long term cost and operational savings will accrue.
RDT&E Science and Technology Management was appropriated at $56
million (after Congressional undistributed reductions). This year's
budget request is for $57.6 million or $1.6 million more than last
year. This increase reflects the transfer of the Naval Industrial
Reserve functions to the Office of Naval Research and is a net zero
change within the total Navy budget.
To map CINC Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs) directly to management
support programs is difficult, as Fleet priorities tend to be expressed
in terms of capabilities rather than specific programs or line items.
In addition, the IPLs address predominantly O&M issues rather than S&T.
The studies, analyses and management programs listed above support the
development of technical responses to the CINCs' IPL capabilities.
Those IPL requirements which can be addressed by S&T in terms of long
term improvements are developed through direct Fleet CINC participation
in the S&T requirements process.
Ship Self-Defense
Question. Mr. Douglass, your statement says ``Bottom line: our
budget continues an all out effort to protect our Sailors and Marines
serving aboard ships against missile attack.'' Under your plan, not a
single ship from the 12 ship DDG-51 multiyear buy would be delivered to
the fleet with either cooperative engagement capability nor theater
ballistic missile defense capability. Is this ``an all our effort'' by
the Navy?
Answer. The 12 ships in the Multi-Year Procurement (MYP) will be
built with the combat systems and computer software configuration base
to allow rapid procurement and installation of Cooperative Engagement
Capability (CEC) and Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) as funds
become available. The Navy has an integrated backfit plan for
installing these capabilities and is reviewing acceleration options
that deliver these much needed capabilities to the fleet as the
technology becomes available, at the beginning of the next century.
Significant progress has been achieved over the past year.
Evaluation continues of the two CEC IOC ships, CG 68 and CG 71, in
fleet exercises, along with correction and refinement of both system
equipment configuration, software and CEC integration with the Aegis
Weapon System on those ships. On 24 January 1997 at the White Sands
Missile Range, the Navy conducted the first ever intercept of a TBM
target with a modified SM-2 Block IV missile. Subsequently, at a
Milestone II DAB on 22 February 1997, OSD approved the Navy AREA TBMD
program to proceed to Engineering, Manufacturing and Development. In
addition, efforts in working with BMDO and OSD to elevate the funding
and priority of the Navy Theater Wide (NTW) program within the DoD
Ballistic Missile Defense Architecture are beginning to pay off. This
past December, Dr. Kaminski designated NTW as a core BMDO program and,
in support, in January 1997, Navy added $207 million to the Navy
Theater Wide program across the Future Years Defense Plan. Most
importantly, in October 1996, the Secretary of the Navy and Chief of
Naval Operations directed their staffs to conduct a comprehensive
review of Navy TBMD programs and report back with a plan to accelerate
delivery of this capability to the Fleet. The acceleration plan
includes both TBMD and CEC. This plan, nearing completion, will be
briefed to the Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations in
the near-future. All of these actions confirm Navy commitment to
deliver these capabilities to the Fleet.
Question. Under your plan, the U.S.S. Nimitz would be overhauled
and sent back to the fleet without ship self-defense, cooperative
engagement, and rolling airframe missiles. Is this ``an all out
effort'' by the Navy?
Answer. Following the Refueling Complex Overhaul (RCOH), the ship
will undergo a Post Shakedown Availability/Selected Restricted
Availability (PSA/SRA) as is typical following an overhaul of this
scope. The Navy's plan is to incorporate the most critical warfighting
improvements during either the RCOH or the follow-on PSA/SRA.
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) is in the CVN-68 RCOH work
package. Ship Self Defense System (SSDS) and Rolling Airframe Missile
(RAM) are both planned for installation during the PSA/SRA.
Question. Under your plan, no funds are requested in 1998 for
cooperative engagement capability installations although the system
reached IOC in 1996. Is this ``an all out effort'' by the Navy?
Answer. The Navy views CEC as a top priority and is committed to
its implementation in both surface ships and aircraft. Given the
restraints and budgetary decisions that had to be made, Navy is
continuing procurement and production of CEC units. CEC systems to
complete a second battlegroup are currently being procured and
installed with RDT&E funds to support OPEVAL in fiscal year 1998. By
fiscal year 2003 Navy will have installed CEC into 60 ships and
aircraft. This will put CEC into 6 Carrier Battlegroups by fiscal year
2003. In addition, Navy intends to integrate CEC in the E-2C Mission
Computer Upgrade Program starting in fiscal year 1998. The airborne CEC
system will IOC in the first E-2C squadron in fiscal year 2002.
Question. Under your plan, no funds are requested in 1998 for ship
self-defense system installations, which are vital to lone ship
survivability from cruise missile attack. Is this ``an all out effort''
by the Navy?
Answer. The fiscal year 1998 budget request slipped Ship Self
Defense System (SSDS) procurement and installation of 1 LSD, 1 LHD and
2 shore based sets. We have satisfactorily rescheduled those ships for
installation during follow-on availability. In the interim those ships
will be protected by the baseline self defense systems now installed.
SSDS continues to be a high priority system that fulfilled the
Congressionally mandated Quick Reaction Combat Capability.
Question. Under your plan, no funds are requested in 1998 for
infrared sensor development or production which are essential for
detection of stealthy cruise missiles. Is this ``an all out effort'' by
the Navy?
Answer. Higher program priorities in the fiscal year 1998 budget
submission necessitated a reduction in development funding for Infrared
Search and Track (IRST) Sensor. There is sufficient funding in place to
complete landbased prototype testing in fiscal year 1998. Based on that
test data, consideration will be given to fully fund this program
within fiscal limits and against other program priorities. Theater
CINCs recognize that IRST has the potential to add capability to ship
self defense but also await test data before providing the appropriate
level of support relative to other requirements.
Question. Under your plan, no funds are requested in 1998 for
installation of surface ship CIWS guns (CIWS surface mode) which have
been a fleet requirement for many years to see and hit terrorist patrol
boats that may attack Navy ships. Is this ``an all out effort'' by the
Navy?
Answer. Post cold war maritime operational concepts have been
developed and concentrate in coastal or ``littoral'' areas. US Navy and
Coast Guard operations around Haiti and Cuba are well documented
examples of this type of maritime operation. These littoral operations
require a defense against small, high speed, very maneuverable surface
threats and low, slow air threats that are expected. The requirement
initially centered on an Advanced Minor Caliber Gun System (AMCGS) for
the US Navy. The Navy conducted an extensive COEA as well as additional
follow-on analysis, testing, and detailed review. Based on the results
of these efforts, the AMCGS requirements was planned to be best
operationally and financially satisfied by implementing the CIWS
Surface Mode. We agree that CIWS surface mode can provide the
capability to detect and engage terrorist patrol boats. To that end, we
will complete Operational Testing of the capability this year and
receive fleet comments before we commit to full scale production.
Question. Isn't the bottom-line really that in its budget the Navy
has taken care of its industrial base, its contractors, and Navy labs
rather than taking care of the theater CINCs, Sailors, and Marines?
Answer. Our nation's industrial base, contractors, and Navy labs
support the Navy and Marine men and women who form the heart of the
United States Navy, and the theater CINCs that command them.
In attempting to strike a balance between today's needs and
tomorrow's, the budget cannot completely meet all priorities. The final
budget product is by necessity a compromise and I appreciate
Congressional support and interest in fashioning the best balance
possible.
Shipbuilding Rate
Question. The Navy requests $7.4 billion for shipbuilding in fiscal
year 1998. To support a ``346 Ship Navy'' as suggested by the Bottom Up
Review, consisting of ships whose service life is about 30 years,
requires average construction of about 10 ships per year. Secretary
Douglass, what annual rate of construction does the Administration's
new budget request and accompanying future years defense plan envision?
Answer. The fiscal year 1998 President's Budget request and
accompanying future years defense program support a construction rate
of 5 to 6 ships per year. A summary of the Navy's fiscal year 1998
shipbuilding and conversion plan is attached.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Question. Admiral Pilling, given this low rate, how can you
maintain a 346 ship Navy?
Answer. Procurement rates must increase. I share the Chief of Naval
Operations' view that the greatest concern right now is focused after
the end of the current Future Years Defense Plan (1998-03) when the
lead SC-21 ship is procured in fiscal year 2003. With the SC-21, Navy
surface combatant production has to increase to help bring total SCN
new procurement quantities up to the 9-10 ship/year level necessary to
support long-term recapitalization.
The NSSN procurement rate will also have to increase following the
initial 4 ship teaming arrangement requested in the fiscal year 1998
FYDP program. The budget also supports ships refueling and service life
extensions that help maintain ship force levels in the near-term.
The ship acquisition is also a large topic with in the Quadrennial
Defense Review. Options to increase SCN funding to support higher
procurement levels are being addressed there.
Question. What is the magnitude of the Navy's ship modernization
shortfall from now until 2002?
Answer. I share the view of Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of
Naval Operations expressed earlier today. I am satisfied with the ship
procurement plan today. However, certainly the DoN needs to eventually
increase its ship building rate to about 10 ships per year once the
ships procured back in the 1980s reach the end of their service lives.
The current 5 ship per year budget is 4-5 ships per year below the
goal. The ``procurement holiday'' enjoyed in recent years must end. I
do not underestimate the immense challenges ahead to recapitalize and
invest in the Navy of tomorrow.
Question. The Navy's shipbuilding plan envisions multiyear
contracts for 12 DDG 51 destroyers and the first 4 new attack
submarines. Isn't this risky strategy, given that ``outyear budgets''
never seem to materialize at the level originally forecast by DoD?
Answer. The Navy intends to comply with the fiscal year 1997
Authorization and Appropriations Acts and execute a multiyear contract
for the 12 fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2001 DDG 51 Class ships
at a rate of three per year. The three ships planned in fiscal year
1998 are fully funded in the fiscal year 1998 President's Budget
request and the funding for the remaining nine ships are programmed in
the accompanying Future Years Defense Program. The DDG 51 Class
multiyear procurement is currently estimated to yield a total savings
of $1.2 billion dollars over four years. Final savings will not be
known until contracts are awarded in the fall of 1997.
The Navy has proposed a new acquisition strategy for the New Attack
Submarine which constructs four ships over five years under a single
contract with an Electric Boat Corporation/Newport News Shipbuilding
team. Teaming and a single contract is expected to save $450 million to
$650 million over a similar construction profile without teaming. The
single contract is an important element of this acquisition strategy
because it provides the business incentive to the two shipbuilders to
team. The first New Attack submarine is fully funded in the fiscal year
1998 President's Budget request and funding for the remaining three
ships is programmed in the accompanying Future Years Defense Program.
The benefit of using an explicitly stated single contract is that
it stabilizes the program, thus providing the opportunity for savings
for economic order quantities of material procurement and reduction of
workforce fluctuation costs. Although explicitly stated termination
liability costs for the single contract make subsequent reductions in
procurement quantity much more expensive than would normally be the
case with annual contracting, the savings opportunities override this
risk. A single contract is literally a ``win-win'' strategy for
industry and Government, so long as the Government can avoid under
funding the procurement in the outyears. We believe that the
procurement levels we are estimating for both programs over the Future
Years Defense Program are the minimum, and consequently the termination
risk is low.
Question. We have seen much industry consolidation in the aircraft
production industry (e.g. Boeing and McDonnell Douglas proposed
merger). What are your views on the need for similar consolidation in
the nation's shipbuilding industry, and how will the Navy foster it?
Answer. The reduction in defense spending has resulted in a
significant number of mergers in other industrial sectors--primarily in
those industries with shorter build times and lower backlog compared to
the shipbuilding industry. These other sectors have been forced to
rationalize their business base arrangements and many did so by
downsizing or merging.
The shipbuilding industry has also begun a similar rationalization
process with General Dynamics' purchase of Bath Iron Works, the teaming
arrangements for the LPD 17 amphibious assault ships, and most recently
the proposed teaming for New Attack Submarines. Both OSD and the Navy
view the current state of the industry with concern, and are working to
determine the best possible plan for the long term health of this
critical national industry. With the downsizing of the defense budget,
industry must continue to consolidate, reengineer itself to be
sustainable at proposed funding levels, or expand into new markets.
These new markets include both commercial shipbuilding and foreign
combatant sales. We anticipate further changes in the shipbuilding
industry and will work closely with OSD to monitor the effects of any
proposed business decisions. We will take the necessary actions to
ensure sufficient viability of the overall shipbuilding industrial base
to meet our national defense requirements.
Shipbuilding Plan
Question. During the past year, the Navy has placed great emphasis
on developing an integrated shipbuilding plan that fully funds the next
aircraft carrier, revises the New Attack Submarine Program, and buys
destroyers in a multiyear program. Secretary Douglass, please describe
the Navy's new shipbuilding plan.
Answer. The Navy's shipbuilding plans for fiscal year 1998 include
a continued, stabilized procurement of DDG 51 Aegis destroyers through
use of a 12 ship multi-year procurement to meet Congressional direction
contained in the Fiscal Year 1997 Authorization and Appropriations
Acts. In addition to requesting three DDG 51s, we are requesting
research and development funds for three new classes of surface
combatants, SC 21, the new advanced development Arsenal Ship and CV(X),
the next generation aircraft carrier. These efforts demonstrate the
Navy's intention to invest in future technologies and ship designs to
position our surface fleet for the challenges of the next century.
Submarines are very much a key element of our overall shipbuilding
plan. Our budget includes funding for the lead New Attack Submarine and
for the final incremental procurement funding for SSN 23 in fiscal year
1998. The Navy is ready to proceed with lead ship construction and has
requested $2.6 billion in fiscal year 1998 for the design and
construction of the first New Attack Submarine. The Navy has proposed
an innovative teaming arrangement for procurement of four New Attack
Submarines over the next five years from Electric Boat Corporation and
Newport News Shipbuilding. Use of a single contract for the four
submarines is a key element of the Navy plan because it provides the
business incentive for the two submarine shipbuilders to team.
Together, the contracting and teaming approaches generate substantial
cost savings over the current plan. This acquisition strategy is
affordable, executable and supports our national security requirements.
The Navy executed the contract award for the first ship in the LPD
17 Class in December 1996. No LPD 17s are planned in fiscal year 1998.
We plan on resuming procurement in fiscal year 1999, procuring an
additional nine ships between fiscal year 1999 and fiscal year 2003.
No new construction aircraft carriers are planned in fiscal year
1998; however, we still need to maintain a fleet of 12 aircraft
carriers (11 deployable and 1 reserve/training carrier). To meet this
need, the Navy is requesting funding in fiscal year 1998 for the
refueling of U.S.S. Nimitz (CVN 68) which is scheduled to begin complex
refueling overhaul in fiscal year 1998, and advance procurement funding
for the refueling of U.S.S. Eisenhower (CVN 69) which is scheduled to
begin a complex refueling overhaul in fiscal year 2000. The cornerstone
of our shipbuilding plan for the Future Years Defense Program in fiscal
year 1998 through fiscal year 2003 is full funding of the final Nimitz
class aircraft carrier, the CVN 77.
On average, we are planning to build approximately five new
construction ships per year throughout this period. Key factors used in
developing our plans for the future are the number of active ships now
in the fleet (approximately 350 ships and submarines today) and their
average age. As we right-size the Navy, we have decommissioned a large
number of older surface combatants, amphibious ships, and aircraft
carriers which has resulted in not only a smaller fleet, but a younger,
more capable one.
Question. We understand that significant changes to any
shipbuilding program within the plan, such as accelerating the funding
for the aircraft carrier into fiscal year 1998, may cause negative
impact on other programs such as DDG-51 or LPD-17 construction. Please
explain this to us.
Answer. The fiscal year 1998 ship building plan requests 1 new
attack submarine, 3 DDG-51 Arleigh Burke class destroyers, the U.S.S.
Nimitz refueling complex overhaul, and 2 sealift ships. CVN-77 is
needed in fiscal year 2008 to replace the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk (CV-63), so
fiscal year 2002 is the right time to build CVN-77. It is not needed
earlier. Accelerating SCN funding into fiscal year 1998 could
unnecessarily ``crowd out'' other shipbuilding funding dollars required
for submarines, surface combatants, the U.S.S. Nimitz refueling, and
sealift ships.
However, an addition of $17 million in RDT&E funds could be of
great use to the CVN-77 program in fiscal year 1998. This would allow
accelerating efforts that will make CVN-77 a true ``smart transition''
carrier which will introduce technology improvements to reduce life
cycle and construction costs. The Navy is currently evaluating
contracting RDT&E proposals that claim to save up to $600 million
against the final cost of CVN-77.
Question. DoD outyear budget projections usually do not materialize
as originally planned. If this happens again, what priority would the
Navy assign to its shipbuilding plan?
Answer. The shipbilding plan would receive the highest priority
possible within the constraints of reduced funding. As with all budget
submissions, a balanced plan is forged to meet Navy's requirements.
Aviation procurement and shipbuilding would be near the top of that
plan.
Question. Secretary of Defense Cohen recently announced the
formation of a Program Management Advisory Group that will conduct a
comprehensive review of the shipyards that build surface ships. Please
explain why this is necessary, why now, and what will be done. Why was
this review not conducted prior to the LPD 17 contract award?
Answer. Dr. Kaminski (USD(A&T)) and Mr. Douglas (ASNRDA)) formed
the joint Program Management Advisory Group to conduct an independent
assessment of the viability of Bath Iron Works and Ingalls Shipbuilding
as producers of surface combatants and to make recommendations for a
long term integrated approach to the surface combatant industrial base.
This was done in response to Ingalls Shipbuilding's concerns about its
long term viability. The Navy did a formal analysis of the DDG 51
industrial base in 1994 and 1995, which included several variations on
possible LPD-17 award outcomes.
modernization shortfall
Question. The Navy's fiscal year 1998 budget requests $25.7 billion
for Navy and Marine Corps procurement, shipbuilding, and R&D. This is
$.5 billion--about 2 percent--lower than the fiscal year 1997
appropriated amount. The funding provides for only 51 new aircraft (of
which only 39 are combat aircraft), 512 missiles, and 4 combatant
ships. Admiral Pilling, is the Navy's fiscal year 1998 modernization
budget adequate?
Answer. Yes. However, if additional modernization was made
available by Congress, they could be used to accelerate development and
procurement of systems in our long-range program.
Question. What is the risk to the future of readiness of the Navy
and the Marine Corps of such low procurement rates of Navy Weapons?
Navy Answer. The Navy funding contained within the fiscal year 1998
budget and that in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) contains
what we believe to be the right choices to modernize our forces while
ensuring readiness is maintained within existing resources.
It should be noted that in comparing the fiscal year 1998 budget to
fiscal year 1997, the advanced procurement funding in the fiscal year
1998 Navy aircraft procurement account was reduced by approximately
$500 million to reflect the minimum essential funding for government
and contractor furnished equipment. Navy has budgeted for advance
procurement only when it is cost-effective.
In addition to funds for 4 combatants, Navy Shipbuilding Account
includes $1.7 billion for a Refueling Complex Overhaul (RCOH) that will
enable CVN-68 to provide 25 years of additional service.
Marine Corps Answer. No, our fiscal year 1998 modernization budget
is not adequate. Maintaining current readiness levels and sustaining
the momentum of quality of life initiatives are our top priorities.
Funding these priorities within our reduced fiscal year 1998 topline--a
topline which is 4.5% less in real terms than the fiscal year 1997
level, required a shift from investment accounts, both in terms of
modernizing equipment for our ground forces (PMC and ammo) and
maintaining our bases and stations (MRP, Base Ops, and MilCon).
Although Marine Corps modernization funding begins to improve in fiscal
year 1999, the fiscal year 1998 level is at a historical low--the
lowest level since 1972. In order to reduce the risk to future
readiness, we have selectively funded our top priority ground combat
programs such as C4I equipment and Javelin. The budget request for
fiscal year 1999 and the current estimate for the outyears reflect
significant increases in funding for modernization--funding for PMC and
ammo doubles in fiscal year 1999, allowing us to capitalize on recent
investments in R&D.
Question. What major requirements are not funded in the fiscal year
1998 budget?
Navy Answer. All immediate Navy major readiness and modernization
requirements are funded in the fiscal year 1998 budget. However, the
pace with which we are outfitting our ships with integrated ship self-
defense and cooperative engagement systems is not as fast as many would
like. As pointed out in Admiral Johnson's testimony, this has been
purely an affordability budget decision, and by no way demeans Navy
commitment to ship self-defense. The Navy is dealing with finite
resources and procurement requirements compete with near-term
readiness, quality of life must be supported, and a balance must be
struck. Not all requirements can be funded.
Marine Corps Answer. The fiscal year 1998 budget is an austere,
fiscally-constrained program emphasizing Defense Planning Guidance
priorities on readiness and quality-of-life programs. With a fiscal
year 1998 topline 4.5% less than the fiscal year 1997 level, we were
forced to make difficult choices in order to fund our top priorities--
readiness and quality of life. As in past years, financing these
priorities has forced the diversion of funds from investment accounts
and precluded budgeting for investment at desired levels. My concerns
include the continued reliance on aging systems and failure to more
rapidly field readily available improved technology. Following is a
list of systems which could be accelerated if additional funds were
available:
(In Millions of Dollars)
Base Telecommunications Infrastructure............................ $42.6
Javelin........................................................... 17.0
Lightweight Tactical Vehicle Replacement.......................... 65.1
ITEMS LESS THAN $10 MILLION....................................... 18.2
Combat Vehicle Appended Trainer............................... (9.2)
ISO Beds...................................................... (6.2)
Improved Direct Air Support Center (IDASC) PIP................ (0.4)
Combat Rubber Reconnaissance Craft............................ (1.6)
LAV RAM....................................................... (.8)
Chemical Biological Incident Response Force....................... 15.1
Power Generation Equipment, Assorted.............................. 22.1
MX11620 Generation III 25mm Image Intensification Tubes........... 11.1
ITEMS LESS THAN $10 MILLION....................................... 24.3
Close Quarters Battle Weapon.................................. (.4)
M2 Flatrack................................................... (3.2)
Logistics Information Systems................................. (3.5)
Defense Message System........................................ (2.4)
Underwater Breathing Apparatus................................ (1.2)
Marine Enhancement Program.................................... (1.7)
Special Effects Small Arms Marking System..................... (1.5)
Military Motorcycle Replacement............................... (3.3)
Advanced Demolition Kit....................................... (3.0)
TERPES........................................................ (4.1)
Shop Equipment Contact Maintenance................................ 12.2
______
Total..................................................... 227.7
=================================================================
________________________________________________
(In Millions of Dollars)
RDT&E, N Account:
Commandant's Warfighting Lab...................................... 19.8
Marine Enhancement Program........................................ 0.6
Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle............................... 10.1
Light Weight 155MM Howitzer....................................... 3.6
Tactical Remote Sensor Systems.................................... 1.5
Marine Common Hardware Suite (MCHS) Development & Management...... 0.7
TERPES............................................................ 1.0
______
Total..................................................... 37.3
=================================================================
________________________________________________
Question. What are your top 4 modernization programs? Are they
fully funded in fiscal year 1998? Are they optimally funded in the
accompanying fiscal years of the Future Years Defense Plan?
Navy Answer. New procurement, and capability upgrades to current
systems and platforms, continue to be the top modernization priorities
for the Navy in the fiscal year 1998 budget. Procurement of the U.S.S.
Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, the Osprey (MV-22) tilt rotor aircraft,
the Super Hornet fighter/attack aircraft (F/A-18 E/F), and the New
Attack Submarine (NSSN) are critical components of Navy future
readiness and need continued Congressional support. These four programs
are fully funded in fiscal year 1998. CVN-77 is also a top
modernization program, a critical warfighting requirements. However,
advanced procurement funding for this national asset is not required
until fiscal year 2000.
These programs are optimally funded in the 1999-2003 fiscal years
of the Future Years Defense Program given the resources available for
modernization.
Marine Corps Answer. The Marine Corps' top four modernization
programs are AV-8B, V-22, general acceleration of ground equipment, and
the AAAV. I remain concerned about the pace of modernization for these
and other aviation and ground equipment programs.
If additional funds were available, I would like to accelerate
these important modernization programs:
I would like to maintain the fiscal year 1997 pace of
remanufacturing our AV-8Bs. The budget provides funding for
remanufacturing of 12 aircraft in fiscal year 1997 and 11 in fiscal
year 1998. The remanufacturing program, among other things, provides
for a more capable, reliable engine. Also, the current budget does not
allow for remanufacturing of our training assets--the TAV-8B. I would
like to procure improved engines for the TAV-8Bs, thus adding needed
safety and reliability improvements to an important warfighting asset.
I would accelerate procurement of the V-22. At the current level,
we will attain our procurement objective in fiscal year 2020.
Acceleration would allow us to field this needed capability to the
fleet earlier, and would provide for a more efficient rate of
production.
In the area of support to our ground forces, I would like to
accelerate the acquisition of modernized equipment to include improved
C4I equipment for our MAGTFs, the Javelin--replacement for the aging
Dragon medium antitank system, Light Tactical Vehicle Replacement
Program, combat rubber reconnaissance craft, rebuilding our light
tactical vehicles, and improving telecommunications support.
I would also accelerate the development of the AAAV. Fabrication
and testing of an additional Demonstration and Validation prototype
would allow testing activities to be safely conducted in parallel,
mitigating the impact of equipment failures.
Additional Funding
Question. Last year were very candid about identifying your top
unfunded requirements to the Committee and working with us to provide
additional funds for many of them. I hope you will continue that
cooperation with us.
Admiral Pilling and General Oster, please describe your top
unfunded priorities and why the fiscal year 1998 budget is not
sufficient in these areas?
Navy Answer. In addition to the integrated ship defense and
cooperative engagement capability concerns discussed previously,
several other programs could benefit from increased fiscal year 1998
funding, if additional resources were made available by Congress.
Priorities here are accelerating procurement of systems in our long-
range program. Navy priorities would be to accelerate procurement of
aircraft (F/A-18 E/F and E-2C), ship (DDG-51 and LPD-17), and weapons
(Navy Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defense, Tomahawk, and Joint
Standoff Weapon) systems. Navy Theater Wide TBMD, surface fire support,
CVN-77, and other high priority RDT&E investment efforts could also be
accelerated in a more cost effective manner. The attached table
summarizes these priorities.
Faster development and procurement was not possible in the fiscal
year 1998 budget request due to competing requirements to maintain
near-term readiness and to support the quality of life of all Navy
personnel.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Marine Corps Answer. The Marine Corps' fiscal year 1998 topline is
down by 4.5% from the fiscal year 1997 level in terms of real spending
power. In order to fund our top priorities, near-term readiness and
quality of life for our Marines and their families, we were forced to
shift funds from our investment accounts, both in terms of
modernization of equipment for our ground forces, and maintaining our
bases and stations.
The Marine Corps' fiscal year 1998 account for procurement of
equipment to support our ground forces is at a historical low--the
lowest since fiscal year 1972. Within this level of funding, we have
selectively funded our top priorities ground combat programs, however,
I am concerned about the pace of ground equipment modernization as well
as aviation platforms.
If additional funds were available, I would like to accelerate
procurement of several important aviation and ground weapon systems.
My first priority is safety issues. I would like to maintain the
fiscal year 1997 pace of remanufacturing our AV-8Bs. The budget
provides funding for remanufacture of 12 aircraft in fiscal year 1997
and 11 in fiscal year 1998. The remanufacturing program, among other
things, provides for a more capable, reliable engine. Also, the current
budget does not allow for remanufacturing of our training assets--the
TAV-8B. I would like to procure improved engines for the TAV-8Bs, thus
adding needed safety and reliability improvements to an important
warfighting asset.
I would accelerate procurement of the V-22. At the current level,
we will attain our procurement objective in fiscal year 2020.
Acceleration would allow us to field this needed capability to the
fleet earlier, and would provide for a more efficient rate of
production.
I would procure additional F/A-18Ds. The current inventory of F/A-
18Ds is inadequate to meet future training or Fleet squadron Primary
Aircraft Authorized requirements until replacement by the Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF). First deliveries of JSF are currently scheduled for
fiscal year 2007.
In the area of weapon systems to support our ground forces, I would
like to accelerate the acquisition of modernized equipment to include
improved C4I equipment for our MAGTFs, the Javelin--replacement for the
aging Dragon medium antitank system, Light Tactical Vehicle Replacement
Program, combat rubber reconnaissance craft, rebuilding our light
tactical vehicles, and improving telecommunications support.
I would also like to accelerate the development of several programs
which are critical to ensure we remain a viable force into the next
century. These include the Commandant's Warfighting Lab, the Advanced
Amphibious Assault Vehicle, and the Light Weight 155MM Howitzer.
Question. What are the potential savings if the Congress were to
provide additional funding in fiscal year 1998 for these items, either
by buying them earlier than now planned or by lower production unit
costs through procurement of higher quantities? Please put the costs
and savings in the record.
Navy Answer. Potential savings that may be achieved as a result of
any additional funding provided by the Congress in fiscal year 1998
will be addressed as part of the fiscal year 1999 budget process.
Marine Corps Answer. It is reasonable to assume that savings will
be generated as a result of increased production quantities in addition
to cost avoidance realized from escalation and inflation by buying
ground and aviation systems earlier than currently planned. In addition
to the savings and cost avoidance to be realized by accelerated
procurement of these systems, earlier fielding will significantly
enhance our warfighting capability.
One ground program worthy of note is the International Standards
Organization (ISO) Bed Modification program. Funding this program in
fiscal year 1998, at the current contract option prices will save
approximately $2 million over projected contract option prices in
fiscal year 1999 by investing an additional $6.2 million in fiscal year
1998.
A $7.85 million future development cost avoidance could be achieved
with an additional $3.6 million in Marine Corps ground combat RDT&E, N
funds for the Lightweight 155 Howitzer program. These funds would allow
for rapid evaluation of engineering change proposals by computer
modeling vice live fire testing; earlier integration of lessons learned
in the Commandant's Warfighting Lab experiments; as well as
acceleration of improved optical fire control systems.
There are a number of programs which will accelerate combat
capability rather than generate cost savings or avoidance. For
instance, an additional $17 million to fund acceleration of the Javelin
program would allow for attainment of 100% of the Acquisition Objective
during the FYDP and satisfy an out-year funding deficiency. The Marine
Enhancement Program (MEP) buys only a few items as budgeted, thus
minimal cost avoidance from inflation or a slightly lower unit price
would be gained from buying additional MEP items; the same is true of
Power Equipment items. Additional fiscal year 1998, funding to support
these programs would for earlier fielding, thereby enhancing our
warfighting capability.
My top aviation acquisition priority is accelerating procurement of
the V-22 aircraft. The most cost-efficient rate of procurement of the
MV-22 is 36 per year. As the Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition and
Technology) stated in his letter of 30 May 1996 to the House Committee
on Appropriations, as we increase production to 36 V-22's per year, we
will realize additional real savings of $2.7 million per aircraft
(constant fiscal year 1994 constant dollars). A production rate of 36
per year thus saves $1.2 billion in constant fiscal year 1994 dollars
over the total program, and up to $4.8 billion of inflation savings for
a combined savings of up to $6.0 billion. Multi-year procurement is
estimated to save even more since we can order materials more
economically. Increasing V-22 production rates, even without multi-year
procurement, is the most cost-effective way to modernize our aging
fleet.
Also, procurement of one additional remanufactured AV-8B in fiscal
year 1998, would result in cost savings to the total program of
approximately $1.7 million.
Question. Which of these items are on any of the CINC integrated
priority lists?
Answer. The latest set of Unified CINC Integrated Priorities Lists
(IPLs) were submitted to OSD between November 1996 and January 1997 to
support the fiscal year 1999-2003 Program Review. The Unified CINCs'
IPLs continue to stress near-term readiness, recapitalization, upgrades
of existing systems, personnel quality of life, and have added
counterterrorism and force protection.
The unfunded Navy procurement, research and development, operation
and maintenance, and manpower items identified in the answers above are
all mentioned as priority items in separate READINESS, MODERNIZATION,
RECAPITALIZATION, COMBAT FORCE STRUCTURE, THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE,
STRATEGIC LIFT, AIR COMBAT, SEA COMBAT, COMBAT IDENTIFICATION, THEATER
C41, MUNITIONS STOCKPILE, and FOLLOW-ON TACTICAL AIRCRAFT category
sections of various CINC IPLs.
Examples
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CINC IPL priority Navy program
------------------------------------------------------------------------
USACOM.......................... Near-Term Depot Maintenance
Readiness and Qol DDG-51, F/A-18 E/
Recapitalization F E-2C, Acoustic
Modernization. COTS
CENTCOM......................... Theater Missile Area and Theater
Defense Sea Wide LPD-17, ADS
Combat Combat ID. CEC
PACOM........................... Theater-wide C4ISR Info-Tech 21, DAMA
Munitions TLAM, JSOW LPD-17
Stockpile F/A-18 E/F Real
Amphibious Lift Property Maint.,
Follow-On Piers
Tactical A/C Base
Infrastructure.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Marine Corps Answer. The following items are listed on CINC
integrated priority lists:
($ in millions)
PMC........................................................... $159.1
Base Telecommunications Infrastructure.................... 42.6
Javelin Medium Antitank Weapon System..................... 17.0
Light Tactical Vehicle Replacement (LVTR) Prgm............ 65.1
Combat Rubber Reconnaissance Craft (CRRC)................. 1.6
Light Armored Vehicle-Reliability and Maintainability (LAV
RAM).................................................... 0.8
Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF)
Equipment............................................... 15.1
MX11620 Gen III 25mm Image Intens Tubes................... 11.1
Marine Enhancement Program (MEP).......................... 1.7
Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance Processing and
Evaluation System (TERPES).............................. 4.1
O&MMC......................................................... 355.9
Operating Forces O&M and Training Support................. 38.8
Base Operations........................................... 40.7
Initial Issue............................................. 20.7
Chem/Bio Incident Response Force (CBIRF) Training and
Support................................................. 4.5
Personnel Support Equipment............................... 25.4
Joint Recruiting Information Support System (JRISS)
Infrastructure.......................................... 4.8
Rigid Raider Craft (RRC) Rehab Program.................... 1.9
Maintenance of Real Property (MRP)........................ 194.1
Depot Maintenance......................................... 25.0
O&MMCR........................................................ 0.4
Maintenance of Real Property.............................. 0.4
APN........................................................... 1,424.3
AV-8B (1 A/C, 22 T-AV8B Engines, Simulators............... 236.5
V-22 (11 A/C, Spares and AP for Additional 9)............. 1,094.0
F/A-18D (2 A/C and Spares)................................ 93.8
RDT&E (AVN)................................................... 3.9
AV-8B Safety, Reliability and Operational Enhancement..... 3.9
RDT&E (GRND).................................................. 15.3
Marine Enhancement Program (MEP).......................... 0.6
Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV)................ 10.1
Light Weight 155MM Howitzer (LW155)....................... 3.6
Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance Processing and
Evaluation System (TERPES).............................. 1.0
SCN........................................................... 746.0
LPD-17.................................................... 746.0
--------------------------------------------------------------
____________________________________________________
Total......................................................... $1,280.6
==============================================================
____________________________________________________
DDG-51 Destroyers
Question. The fiscal year 1998 budget requests $2.8 billion for
construction of 3 DDG 51 destroyers. In last year's law, the Committee
provided both additional funding and legislative authority for the Navy
to pursue a 12 ship multiyear buy over 4 years. Secretary Douglass,
please explain the Navy's acquisition plan for DDG 51 destroyers.
Answer. The Navy intends to comply with the Fiscal Year 1997
Defense Authorization and Appropriations Acts and execute a multiyear
contract for the 12 fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2001 DDG 51
Class ships at a rate of three per year. We plan to issue a multiyear
Request For Proposals from Bath Iron Works and Ingalls Shipbuilding
this spring, and award a contract before October 1997.
Question. Last year, when the Navy formally requested (because it
was not a proposal in the President's budget) additional funds to
pursue a DDG 51 destroyer multiyear procurement contract, we were told
that the tradition of evenly allocating ships between the 2 shipyards
(Bath and Ingalls) would be maintained. Is that still your plan? If
not, on what basis would you allocate work to the destroyer shipyards?
Is it your intent to penalize the Bath yard in the DDG 51 program
solely because it won the competition for a different (LPD 17) class of
ships?
Why is the Navy willing to compensate the Ingalls yard with
more work (taken from Bath) when Bath was not compensated in
the DDG 51 program years ago in an identical situation (when
Ingalls received contracts to build 7 LHD ships)?
Answer. The Navy plan has been to evenly allocate ships between the
two yards unless both shipbuilders concur with some alternative
arrangement. The LPD-17 award has caused some concerns, and these
concerns are under evaluation. The Navy will be involved in discussions
with both shipbuilders on this issue, and the exact distribution of
ships will be decided before the multiyear Request For Proposals is
issued. The Navy does not intend to penalize any shipbuilder that loses
a competitive contract. The Navy, however, must always reserve the
authority to take appropriate action to preserve the defense industrial
base when required. The Navy closely monitors the overall viability of
the shipbuilding industrial base to ensure adequate sources of supply
and capabilities are maintained to support the future needs of the
Navy, and total program affordability.
Question. Admiral Pilling, please explain why it is acceptable to
the CNO, the fleet CINCs, and you that in the Navy's budget not a
single ship under the multiyear plan (1998-2001) will be delivered to
the fleet with anti-ship cruise missile defense nor ballistic defense
capabilities?
Answer. The Navy, in considerations associated with balancing Ship
Construction, Navy (SCN) funds for the entire Department and executing
a fully funded DDG-51 class ship procurement plan moved the
introduction of Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), and Theater
Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) capability in a forward fit
configuration, out of the fiscal year 1998-fiscal year 2001 DDG-51
Multi-Year Procurement (MYP). The 12 ships in the Multi-Year
Procurement (MYP) will be built with the combat systems and computer
software configuration base to allow rapid procurement and installation
of Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) and Theater Ballistic
Missile Defense (TBMD) as funds become available. The Navy has an
integrated backfit plan for installing these capabilities and is
reviewing acceleration options that deliver these much needed
capabilities to the fleet as the technology becomes available, at the
beginning of the next century.
Question. Under your current plan, when is the first year that a
DDG-51 would be delivered to a CINC's fleet with these capabilities
installed?
Answer. The option that provides the Navy the most rapid deployment
of these capabilities is via backfit. Under the current Navy plan the
first DDG-51 class destroyer will be backfit in fiscal year 2003 with
additional ships scheduled in fiscal year 2004 and out. Under the
current plan, ships appropriated in fiscal year 2002 will receive the
first forward fit configuration, in production/construction. By
Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations direction, Navy is
reviewing acceleration options that could nearly double the number of
ships provided this capability (from 15 to 28) by fiscal year 2003.
Question. Is there any technical reason why ship self-defense and
ballistic missile defense capabilities cannot be installed on DDG 51
destroyers prior to 2002 funded ships.
Answer. It is technically feasible to introduce both Cooperative
Engagement Capability (CEC) and Theater Ballistic Missile Defense
(TBMD) as part of the multiyear procurement. The Navy is developing a
plan which details the schedule and funding requirements necessary to
ensure that both computer programs and equipment will support in-line
introduction of TBMD and post-shakedown availabilities of CEC for the
multiyear ships.
Question. Mr. Douglass, we have never formally discussed the DDG 51
multiyear proposal in a hearing. What are the costs, and what are the
savings, from a multiyear strategy for 12 DDG 51 ships?
Answer. The DDG multiyear procurement will save $1.2 billion
dollars between fiscal year 1998 and fiscal year 2001. Savings that can
be attributed to procurement savings, material savings and other
factors equate to $788 million and are directly tied to the
unprecedented long term stability offered by the multiyear process. The
remaining $420 million is from increasing the number of ships purchased
from 11 to 12 and by guaranteeing long term orders to the shipbuilders
which reduce the unit cost of each ship by $35 million. In order to
reap these impressive savings, we will spend $525 million in fiscal
year 1997 and fiscal year 1998 for large economic order quantity buys
of selected shipboard equipment. These funds were appropriated in
fiscal year 1996 and fiscal year 1997 for this purpose or are included
in the fiscal year 1998 budget request.
The multiyear plan is a ``win-win'' strategy for the Congress, Navy
and industry. Industry gets the long term stability in ship acquisition
that they need to successfully plan for the future, the Navy gets an
extra ship, and Congress sees significant cost reductions for the DDG
program.
Question. For the record, show the costs by fiscal year and ship
hull number for capabilities that were dropped from DDG 51 ships
between the time the multiyear approach was presented to Congressional
committees last year and the current FYDP. Show each capability (e.g.,
CEC, TBMD, others) separately.
Answer. The Navy had planned to introduce Baseline 7 Phase II in
the Fiscal Year 2000 ships starting with DDG 97. This baseline includes
CEC, TBMD, Advanced Processing, ID Upgrade Phase 2, SM-2 Blk 3B full
integration, LAMPS Mk3 Block II, AIEWS Phase II, IRST/Precision ESM,
NSFS, and several other software and hardware upgrades. Due to fiscal
and technical concerns assessed in July and August 1996, we elected to
defer the implementation of this baseline by four ships to fiscal year
2002 (DDG 101), the first year after the multiyear. Since last July, we
have been able to resolve many of the technical issues we faced, but
the fiscal constraints remain. Deferring Baseline 7 Phase II from DDG
97, 98, 99, and 100 saved a total of $117 million across fiscal year
2000 and fiscal year 2001.
Arsenal Ship
Question. The 1998 budget requests $150 million for development of
the Arsenal Ship, which is basically a ship loaded with long range
attack missiles. While cost estimates are very sketchy at this early
stage in the program, the six ship program would cost at least $3
billion. Admiral Pilling, please explain the Arsenal Ship concept.
Answer. Arsenal Ship represents an affordable and much needed
enhancement to our existing force of carriers and land attack capable
combatants and submarines. It is not a replacement for these or for
land-base air. Instead, it is a part of the whole--just as the
Battleship was a part of the whole for nearly a century. Operating
under the control and umbrella of regularly deployed Aegis combatants,
Arsenal Ship will supply substantial firepower, early: giving unified
Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) the capability to halt or deter invasion
and, if necessary, enable the build-up of coalition land-based air and
ground forces to achieve favorable conflict resolution. With a force
totaling about six, Arsenal Ships will be stationed continuously
forward, always available for rapid movement upon receipt of even
ambiguous or limited strategic warning. Much like our maritime pre-
positioning force, they will remain on station in support of a Unified
CINC for indefinite periods without dependence on host nation support
or permission.
Question. Why do we need an Arsenal Ship, and why is it urgent to
build it now?
Answer. We need the Arsenal Ship as an affordable way to station
massive firepower continuously forward, as an enhancement to our
existing forces. The urgency to build it now falls into two areas:
operational and programmatic. Operationally, we have a need to position
massive firepower in forward areas and we need to do it affordably. We
can and do currently accomplish that; Arsenal Ship allows us to do it
cheaper. The sooner we build that capability, the sooner we can take
advantage of those economies. Programmatically, there are many
technologies that are now maturing to the point that they can be
incorporated into this ship and the timing allows the Arsenal Ship to
provide a technological bridge to the Navy's next surface combatant,
the SC-21. Also programmatically, the Arsenal Ship is the Navy's most
radical example of acquisition reform. Conducting this research and
development project under DARPA's Section 845 authority now will allow
us to learn from this effort and to incorporate the most successful
aspects of acquisition reform into subsequent acquisitions.
Question. Is the Arsenal Ship on any of the CINC integrated
priority lists of requirements?
Answer. The Arsenal Ship is not specifically listed on the CINC
IPL, however it will enhance our ability to meet many of those
requirements.
Question. Who will ``own'' the Arsenal Ship?
Answer. Arsenal Ship will operate in both peace and war as an
integral fleet unit within the chain of command under Joint Combatant
Command (COCOM). Peacetime Operational Control (OPCON) will normally be
exercised by numbered fleet commanders. Within a Joint Task Force
structure, OPCON will normally be exercised by the Joint Force Maritime
Commander. Tactical Command (TACON) will normally be assigned to a
naval commander.
Question. How will the Arsenal Ship be employed, and what will be
its mission?
Answer. With about 500 missiles and space for future extended range
gun systems, Arsenal Ships will be capable of launching many current
and planned Department of Defense weapons across the warfare spectrum.
Arsenal Ship can be positioned to destroy the enemy's critical
infrastructure at or near inception of hostilities. Using precision
guided missiles equipped with advanced penetrating warheads and sub-
munitions, this ship will serve as an additional maneuver element in
the landing force or ground force commander's plan by isolating,
immobilizing, or destroying enemy armored fighting vehicles, as well as
providing fire in direct tactical support of ground forces.
Employing the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) ``remote
magazine'' launch concept, the Arsenal Ship will provide additional
magazine capacity for Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TMBD) and air
supremacy missiles. This concept allows for remote missile selection,
on-board missile initialization and remote launch orders, and provides
remote ``missile away'' messages to the control platform.
Question. How will the Arsenal Ship contribute to the CINC's
warfighting capability?
Answer. Arsenal Ship is a firepower multiplier that, in conjunction
with other naval forces, increases decisively the options available to
the theater CINC. Arsenal Ship will be assigned to theater CINC to
provide:
Conventional Deterrence against regional aggression inimical
to U.S. interests,
Flexible response for demonstration of power independent of
diplomatic limitations,
Credible forward firepower support to joint and coalition
land forces early in a regional contingency if deterrence
fails.
The Arsenal Ship weapon loadout will be robust, flexible and
tailorable to CINC requirements in order to expand CINC options for use
of assigned joint forces.
Arsenal Ships will be fully integrated into the joint warfighting
force structure. The ships will be capable of firing a variety of
weapons in support of a land campaign, including Long Range Strike,
Invasion topping, Fire Support to Joint Ground Forces, Tactical
Ballistic Missile Defense and Air Superiority.
Arsenal Ships will be stationed, operated and supported in
forward theaters for conventional deterrence and to provide
immediate responsiveness upon onset of hostilities.
Question. Won't the Arsenal Ship be more vulnerable than other
warships in theater?
Answer. Though the Arsenal Ship will operate in any threat
environment under the protective umbrella of the joint battle force, it
must be survivable against 21st century anti-ship missiles, torpedoes,
and mines. Passive defense will capitalize on the benefits of mass
(tonnage), innovative applications of multiple hull integrity, and
signature reduction. Active self-defense, if required, will be roughly
equivalent to that of a combat logistics force ship.
Question. What size crew will man the Arsenal Ship?
Answer. Offboard integration of all but the most rudimentary C4I
and survivability achieved primarily through passive design techniques
will allow the Arsenal Ship to have a very small crew. Crew size will
not exceed 50 personnel and the design objective is to minimize crew
size to the maximum extent which is technically feasible. Reduced crew
size is a principle driver in reducing the cost of ownership i.e., life
cycle costs.
Question. What is the total estimated development cost of the
Arsenal Ship, and how was this number derived?
Answer. Total Current Estimated Then-Year Dollar Development Cost
for Arsenal Ship (in thousands of dollars)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DARPA.............................. 1,000 18,577 47,200 50,000 36,000 22,000 174,777
NAVY............................... 3,999 17,976 102,994 139,499 79,680 11,287 355,435
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total.............................. 4,999 36,553 150,194 189,499 115,680 33,287 530,212
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
During the formulation of the Arsenal Ship Program in early 1996,
rough order of magnitude (ROM) estimates were prepared for the various
elements of the program. These included concept formulation, functional
design, detailed design, the integration of various technologies,
construction and testing of the prototype ship. The Navy/DARPA funding
split was based on these ROM estimates and technology focus areas for
the Navy and DARPA was codified in the May 26, 1996 Memorandum of
Understanding between ASN(RD&A), CNO, and DARPA.
Question. What are the estimated production costs for each of the
six Arsenal Ships planned by the Navy, and upon what methodology are
these amounts derived? Explain ``learning curve'' assumptions in
detail.
Answer. To allow the industry teams the maximum flexibility in
meeting the aggressive Unit Sailaway Price (USP) goal of $450 million
per ship, they have been asked to provide their production profiles for
the construction of five Arsenal Ships and the conversion of the
Demonstrator to an Arsenal Ship. The proposed production schedule of
the one industry team selected to do detailed design of the Arsenal
Ship and construction of the Demonstrator will be known in January
1998. The Navy will use this input in developing its production profile
and supporting SCN funding stream. The cost estimate for a production
ship is unknown at this time as it is contingent on the successful
industry team's irrevocable fixed price USP based on construction of
the five ships. The USP will be strongly influenced by the production
rate and build schedule proposed by the successful Phase III industry
team. The three industry teams presently performing functional design
work under DARPA Section 845 agreements are in an aggressive
competition. Based on this competition, it is anticipated they are
closely analyzing cost as an independent variable to ensure their
concept designs can meet the government's USP goal of $450 million
($550 maximum) in fiscal year 1998 dollars.
Question. The Navy originally down-selected from five to two
contractor teams for Arsenal ship development. Please explain your
recent action, apparently in response to pressures from the Senate
related to the Ingalls LPD 17 contract award protest, to reinsert the
Ingalls team into the Arsenal ship competition after it had lost.
Answer. The Arsenal Ship Phase II Source Selection, conducted by
the joint Navy/DARPA team, determined that three, vice the previously
anticipated two, industry designs were of such maturity and offered
best value to the Government so as to be worthy of continued effort.
LPD-17 Amphibious Assault Ship
Question. The LPD 17 class of 12 ships is a competitive program
which will allow the Navy to retire 41 current ships and reduce
manpower by 7,800. Congress appropriated funds for the first ship in
fiscal year 1996, and the second ship was planned for fiscal year 1998.
However, in the new budget, no funds are requested for the second ship.
Secretary Douglass, would you please explain the Navy's acquisition
strategy and rationale for your recent selection of the winning
contractor team.
Answer. The Request for Proposals (RFP) informed industry of the
specific evaluation criteria to be used and their relative importance.
The four categories used to evaluate proposals were:
1. Detail Design, Total Ship Systems Integration, Testing,
Logistics and Life Cycle Support Planning. This was a pass/fail
category encompassing the traditional evaluation areas of management
approach, program build strategy, technical approach to detail design,
total ship engineering and integration, production approach, past
performance and configuration management. In this category, the
Offerors were also required to address the acquisition reform
initiative known as Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD),
a management approach required to be used for performance of the
contract consisting of co-located Government/Contractor personnel.
2. Integrated Product Data Environment (IPDE). Another acquisition
reform initiative implemented by the LPD 17 RFP, IPDE was defined as an
information system capability which would be implemented in phases and
which would support all phases of ship design, construction and life
cycle support. Its core is to be a central product model database which
is to serve as the single source of configuration data over the live
cycle of the ship class. Traditional support data products, such as
drawings and technical manuals, and program execution information, such
as plans, schedules and procedures are also to be integrated within the
IPDE. The RFP required that all of these previously paper-bound
products be developed, updated, and available for reuse in an
electronic form in a digital data environment.
3. Ownership Cost Reduction Approach--Offerors were required to
describe changes to existing processes and ways of doing business while
designing and constructing LPD 17 that would lead to life cycle cost
reductions during the in-service phase of all 12 ships in the class.
Additionally, Offerors were required to describe an approach to
developing tools and techniques to create a realistic baseline of life
cycle costs against which savings could be measured and validated and a
plan for integrating these tools and techniques into the IPDE.
4. Price to Government--the price evaluation consisted of
determining a realistic total evaluated estimated cost for each
Offeror's proposed technical approach, taking into consideration audit
findings with regard to each Offeror's projected labor and overhead
rates for the period of performance.
Section M of the RFP indicated that the basis for award would be
overall best value to the Government and the best value would be
determined as follows: non-price categories were significantly more
important than price, and provided an Offeror received an acceptable
score in Category 1, Category 3 was more important than Category 2.
Section M also stated that the Government was willing to pay a premium,
within budget constraints, and accept reasonable risk for the technical
approach that demonstrated the potential for greater life cycle cost
reductions.
The Navy awarded the contract to the Avondale Alliance, a team
consisting of Avondale Industries, Inc., as the prime contractor, Bath
Iron Works as a shipbuilder teammate and major subcontractor, Hughes
Aircraft Corporation as the total ship systems integrator, and
Intergraph Corporation as the IPDE integrator. Using the criteria
discussed above, a decision was made that the Avondale Alliance
proposal represented the ``best value'' to the Government.
Question. What, in your opinion, are the merits of the losing
contractor team's recent protest to the General Accounting Office?
Answer. By decision dated April 7, 1997, the General Accounting
Office upheld the Navy's decision to award Avondale Industries, Inc.,
the contract for detail design, integration, and construction of U.S.S.
San Antonio (LPD 17), with options for construction of LPD 18 and LPD
19. The General Accounting Office's decision reflects a thorough
examination of the facts related to the Navy's contract award. This
decision validates the Navy award to Avondale Industries as proper and
representing the best value to the Government and the American
taxpayer.
Question. The Navy's new shipbuilding plan proposes multiyear
contracting for both DDG 51 destroyers and new attack submarines for
many years. What is the risk to the LPD 17 program if Congress agrees
to ``lock in'' funding for these ship programs, and then outyear
budgets fail to materialize as currently projected by DoD--which by the
way is what historically always happens?
Answer. If outyear budgets fail to materialize, the production
profile of LPD 17 could be reduced if production profiles of
shipbuilding programs in multiyear contracts are held constant.
However, the outyear shipbuilding budget profile for all programs is a
balanced plan and we fully expect to fund the programs we have
reflected in this plan.
Question. How much would be required, and how much would be saved,
if Congress appropriated funds for the second LPD 17 in fiscal year
1998 rather then waiting until next year as envisioned by the
Administration's plan?
Answer. Accelerating a fellow ship into fiscal year 1998 has a
beneficial effect on the shipbuilding industrial base workload. The
estimated cost of a fiscal year 1998 LPD 17 class ship reflecting
option prices from the Full Service Contractor is $746 million. A ship
added in fiscal year 1998 would result in a reduction in total
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy program costs of approximately $50
million. Also, the current cost plus award fee contract structure
provides for a lead ship and options for two follow ships with the
phased combat system. The current budget structure provides for only a
lead ship and one follow ship with the phased combat system, before
beginning the fixed price incentive contract for the full combat system
with Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile and Vertical Launch System.
Consequently, the existing cost plus award fee option for the third
ship, the first ship at the second yard, would not be exercised in the
budget as now structured.
If a ship is added in fiscal year 1998, the following table
illustrates the delivery dates of the first, sixth and twelfth ship of
the LPD 17 class:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 1998 Plan......................... Sept 2002.............. Dec 2005............... Dec 2008
FY 1998 Add.......................... Sept 2002.............. Jun 2005............... Jun 2008
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. Will the winner of the competition be awarded all 12
ships of the class?
Answer. The approved acquisition strategy provides for establishing
a long term relationship with the selected Full Service Contractor.
Negotiated procurements with the Full Service Contractor are planned
for the remaining nine ships assuming continued successful performance
of each contract.
Question. Compare estimated delivery dates of the first, sixth, and
twelfth ships under the new budget plan compared to last year's plan.
Is the program on track or slipping?
Answer. The estimated delivery dates for the last ship of the LPD
17 class is estimated to be six months later in the fiscal year 1998
plan compared to the fiscal year 1997 plan. The following table
illustrates the delivery dates of the first, sixth, and twelfth ships
of the LPD 17 class:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 1997 Plan......................... April 2002............. June 2005.............. June 2008
FY 1998 Plan......................... Sept 2002.............. Dec 2005............... Dec 2008
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
New Attack Submarine
Question. The Administration's plan for new submarine construction
has been contentious in Congress during the past 2 years. The budget
proposes a new plan, and Secretary Douglass is the architect. Mr.
Douglass, please explain the Navy's new strategy for a teaming
arrangement between Electric Boat and Newport News to jointly build the
first 4 New Attack Submarines under a multiyear procurement contract.
Answer. The Navy originally planned to sustain nuclear ship design
and construction capabilities at Electric Boat with New Attack
Submarines and at Newport News Shipbuilding with CVN construction and
overhauls. The Fiscal Year 1996 and Fiscal Year 1997 National Defense
Authorization Acts rejected this plan and split the first four New
Attack Submarines between the two shipbuilders and directed a price
competition for the fifth and later ships. The Navy could not fund the
Congressional plan within its budget constraints.
The Secretary of Defense Report on Nuclear Attack Submarine
Procurement and Submarine Technology submitted to Congress on March 26,
1996, stated that the Department would face major near term
affordability issues in pursuing the plan directed by the Congress. The
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy, however, certified
that the Navy would compete future New Attack Submarines on the basis
of price in response to requirements in the National Defense
Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 1996 and 1997. In making this
certification, the Navy made it clear that the Navy budget did not
contain sufficient funds to execute the competition as directed by
Congress.
In addition to the funding issues mentioned above, the wording of
the competition legislation presented other problems. The legislation
directed that competition take place after allocation of two or four
submarines. If competition were conducted after allocation of two
submarines, neither submarine would be anywhere new completion at the
time of the competition. If the competition were to occur after four
submarines had been allocated, none of the four would be complete at
the time of the competition.
The legislation also called for a competition based on ``price''.
This strongly implied that the winner should be chosen on the basis of
price alone, regardless of the performance of the contractor in
constructing the allocated submarines or the quality of the
contractor's proposal. This section of the legislation also implied
that the competition would be a ``winner-take-all'' competition. After
such a competition, the Navy would be back in a sole source position
and the losing contractor would still be building one or two
submarines, leaving the future of these ships and their costs open to
question.
Finally, the fiscal year 1996 legislation contained a gap in
production in fiscal year 2002 that would have created serious problems
at one of the construction yards.
A winner-take-all competition also risks shutting down one of the
two remaining nuclear capable shipbuilders. In response to questions
from Congress in 1995, the Navy estimated that it would cost $650
million to $1.1 billion to transfer New Attack Submarine to Newport
News Shipbuilding and shut down Electric Boat Corporation (worst case
scenario). The Navy would also be faced with completing construction of
expensive orphan submarines allocated by Congress to the losing
shipbuilder and large cost impacts to the Seawolf program, should the
Seawolf contractor lose the competition.
Construction teaming will involve both shipbuilders, as Congress
directed, but at a price the Navy can afford. Predicted cost avoidance
from construction teaming ($450 million-$650 million over like
profiles) makes the four-ship plan affordable. Specifically, teaming
will:
Enable near single learning curve economies;
Avoid certain one-time costs from being incurred at both
yards (e.g., duplicate data bases, jigs, fixtures, etc.);
Take advantage of each builder's strengths;
Avoid the costly inefficiencies inherent in the restricted
communications which occur between two competing shipyards as a
result of proprietary concerns; and
Provide stability to vendors, which yields savings in
material procurement.
Competition in construction will not benefit the Government given
the anticipated low build rate for submarines because:
For effective price competition, at least two suppliers are
needed.
To sustain two suppliers, there must be a sufficient, steady
level of business. The Navy outyear budget projections do not
contain sufficient submarine production to sustain an annual
competition until well into the next century.
Loss of a builder with ongoing construction would be
extremely costly and result in a sole source submarine
supplier.
Therefore, neither the Congressional mandate to have two
builders engaged in submarine construction nor the Department
of Defense policy to sustain two nuclear capable shipbuilders
would be achieved.
The New Attack Submarine is a critical piece of a long range
shipbuilding program that satisfies two overarching objectives. First,
it meets the submarine force level requirements in the near term, as
needed to maintain readiness by providing our Sailors with the best
equipment at the most affordable price. Second, it seeks to protect to
the extent possible without limited resources, the nation's critical
maritime industrial base--shipyards, equipment suppliers, and
engineering support base--that provides us with the most modern and
war-ready Navy in the world.
To be successful in these two objectives, we had to develop an
affordable shipbuilding program that brings together all of the major
constituent interests including Congress, the Department of Defense,
the Navy research, development and acquisition communities, the
warfighters, and the shipbuilding industry. To make this program more
affordable, we had to be innovative and commit to establishing and
maintaining a consistent shipbuilding program while investing in long-
term affordability initiatives as a key objective in the face of
limited budget levels. The New Attack Submarine construction teaming
and a single contract for four ships over five years is an affordable
plan that is fully funded, executable and supports our national
security requirements.
Question. Has a Defense weapon system ever used a multiyear
contract for the first four items off a production line? What are the
risks? What are the benefits?
Answer. Multiyear contracts for the first four items off a
production have not been used by the Department of Defense. In the case
of the New Attack Submarine the program was budgeted using a teaming
approach and a single contract for production of the first four
submarines. The use of a single contract for four ships provides the
stable fiscal environment and business incentive for the two
shipbuilders to team. Additionally, use of a single contract provides
the least cost approach for maintaining both nuclear shipbuilders in
the submarine construction business.
Multiyear contracts have not been used for initial production
contracts due to the statutory requirement for a stable design, which
is usually proven out by Engineering and Manufacturing Development
(EMD) units. In the case of aircraft programs, multiple units have been
procured under a single, research and development contract for first
item testing:
The B-2 bomber program procured 6 EMD aircraft from Northrop
with Boeing as a major subcontractor. A production run of 20
aircraft were ultimately procured.
The F/A-18 E/F program is procuring 7 EMD aircraft.
McDonnell-Douglas is the prime contractor and has a major
subcontractor relationship with Northrop-Grumman. The prime
holds the production contract with the government and has
associate contracts with all subcontractors.
In the case of ships and submarines, the high unit costs make it
impractical to have unique test platforms--so every effort must be made
to reduce both risk and cost in the design, testing and production of
the initial ship. Contracts for the first unit of any new design
inherently involve a higher degree of cost uncertainty than follow-on
contracts which can be priced using return cost data. However, the New
Attack Submarine contract should present far less risk of cost growth
than prior lead ship contracts due to actions taken by the program to
mitigate risk and keep a focus on cost control.
New Attack Submarine is the first submarine application of the
design/build process, which eliminates the government as a middleman by
making the shipbuilder responsible for ensuring that communications
between designer and builder are fast, effective, and efficient.
Historically, the government has acted as a middleman between the
design agent and construction yard. A significant number of contract
disputes over the past 25 years attributed major cost overruns to
defective or late design information from separate Government design
contracts. This problem should be avoided with New Attack Submarine's
design/build approach.
Based on the demonstrated success of the design/build process,
confirmed by an OSD Design Maturity review completed in January 1997,
the New Attack Submarine design will be far more mature than other
submarine designs at the beginning of construction. For example,
Seawolf had 4.5% of ship drawings available prior to construction
contract award. New Attack Submarine plans and is on track to have 36%
of ship drawings available prior to construction contract award and 60%
available at construction start. Consequently, New Attack Submarine
drawings will be available on average 1.5-2 years prior to construction
requirements, as compared to less than a year for Seawolf. The early
availability of drawings greatly reduce the risk of design changes
during ship construction--traditionally, a major cause of cost
increases.
New Attack Submarine cost estimates are the most detailed ever
developed for a new design submarine, and are based on an order of
magnitude more cost estimating relationships than available on any
other submarine. Consequently, the contract cost negotiated should be
the most realistic ever.
The use of a single contract for the first four New Attack
Submarines will benefit the government by:
Provides the opportunity for economic order quantities of
material,
Allows for managing gaps in the production by providing a
mechanism for level loading of the manpower and workload,
Gives near term stability for the shipbuilders and their
component suppliers to commit assets to the most cost effective
capitalization plans in support of this critical program.
Question. The Committee understands that the contracts for the
first 4 ships will be ``cost-plus'' versus ``fixed price.'' Is there a
precedent in DOD for cost plus multiyear contracting?
Answer. There is no precedence in shipbuilding for using a cost-
plus multiyear contract. Recent Department of Defense Guidance requires
that a cost reimbursable contract be used for the lead ship of a class.
In order to effectively manage ship construction costs under a cost
reimbursable contract, the Navy will include incentive provisions
similar to those used in fixed price contracts where the contractor can
earn additional fee through reduction of costs.
Question. Explain the Navy's plan to seek ``advance construction''
funding rather than the traditional ``advance procurement'' funding.
Isn't this really just a euphemism for ``incremental funding''?
Answer. The Future Years Defense Program accompanying the Fiscal
Year 1998 President's Budget request identifies $767 million in fiscal
year 2000 for the New Attack Submarine Program. These funds will be
used as follows:
$295 million will be used for advanced construction of the
fiscal year 2001 submarine. These advanced construction funds
will sustain critical waterfront tradesmen during the break in
New Attack Submarine production in fiscal year 2000. During
fiscal year 2000, these trades will begin work on the fiscal
year 2001 submarines. The funds are similar to the $450 million
industrial base funds provided by Congress for SSN 23 in fiscal
year 1992.
$472 million will be used for advanced procurement of reactor
plant components for the fiscal year 2002 New Attack Submarine.
Question. What is the Navy's acquisition strategy for the remaining
boats, after the first 4 are built?
Answer. The Navy intends to team for construction of the 30 ship
New Attack Submarine class. The proposed construction teaming
arrangement for the first four ships, however, neither requires, nor
precludes, competition for subsequent submarine classes. The Navy
reserves the option to adjust its submarine acquisition strategy based
upon actual teaming experience and projected workloads in the future.
Question. Why didn't the Administration simply propose a teaming
arrangement years ago in the first place?
Answer. The teaming proposal evolved as an affordable compromise
between the Navy and Congressional New Attack Submarine construction
plans. The Navy originally planned to sustain nuclear ship design and
construction capabilities at Electric Boat with New Attack Submarines
and at Newport News Shipbuilding with carrier construction and
overhauls. This plan is affordable and retains two nuclear capable
shipbuilders, as recommended in the 1993 Bottom Up Review. The Navy's
proposal for single source New Attack Submarine construction was
rejected by Congress. The Fiscal Year 1996 and Fiscal Year 1997
National Defense Authorization Act required the Navy to allocate the
first four New Attack Submarines to two shipbuilders then compete
following ships on the basis of price.
To reduce the cost of involving both shipbuilders, Electric Boat
Corporation and Newport News Shipbuilding proposed a construction
teaming arrangement under which the work for the first four ships will
be shared by the shipbuilders. Construction teaming will allow both
shipbuilders to be involved in New Attack Submarine construction, as
Congress directed, but at a price the Navy can afford.
Strategic Sealift
Question. The program to procure 19 Large Medium Speed Roll-on/
Roll-off (LMSR) ships is well underway at a cost of $6 billion. The
1998 budget requests $813 million for LMSRs, to include $611 million
for procurement of 2 ships, $132 million for overruns on the first five
conversion ships, and $70 million for advanced procurement of the last
ship in 1999. Mr. Douglass, what is the status of the LMSR program?
Answer. The total requirement is for 19 ships of which five were
conversions of commercial ships and the remaining 14 will be new
construction. The five conversion ship contracts were awarded in July
1993. Three ships have been delivered and the remaining two will
deliver in May and November of this year. Of the 14 new construction
ships we have 10 under contract; five each at Avondale (New Orleans)
and NASSCO (San Diego). The first three new construction ships are
scheduled to deliver in fiscal year 1998. Included in the 10 ships are
two contract options for ships appropriated in fiscal year 1997 that we
exercised in December 1996. Congress appropriated funds for a third
ship in fiscal year 1997 which is not currently under contract.
Question. What is your acquisition strategy for the additional ship
added by Congress in 1997, and for the last ship remaining in fiscal
year 1999?
Answer. Our plan is to issue a two ship Request For Proposals in
April 1997, combining the third fiscal year 1997 and the fiscal year
1999 ships as a limited competition between the existing builders,
Avondale and NASSCO. Contract award is planned for this summer.
Question. How much would be required and how much would be saved,
if Congress appropriated funds for the last LMSR in fiscal year 1998,
rather that waiting until next year as envisioned by the
Administration's plan?
Answer. The fiscal year 1998 President's Budget requests $70
million for advanced procurement in fiscal year 1998 and $322 million
in fiscal year 1999 for the final ship. In fiscal year 1998, $306
million would be required to accelerate the fiscal year 1999 ship--this
translates to $51 million in total program savings. There would be no
schedule recovery as each shipbuilder will be near maximum capacity in
fiscal year 1998.
Question. Explain the need for $131 million to cover overruns on
the first 5 LMSRs, which were conversions of existing commercial ships.
Is this the entire cost growth?
Answer. The $131 million covers the portion of the cost growth for
which the government is responsible. This is the entire cost growth of
this program and remains unchanged from a year ago.
The government was responsible for an initial schedule delay of
approximately seven months for two primary causes. First, the U.S.
Coast Guard revised and significantly increased the fire fighting
system requirements to account for the hazardous cargo load. Second,
the government furnished class standard equipment detail design
information was delivered later than required by the shipbuilders. This
was caused by accelerating the ship contract awards to support Army and
JCS required delivery dates as well as strong interest in getting work
into the industrial base. There is an additional 8-15 months of
contractor responsible delay due to underestimating the complexity of
the project, inefficient production, and slow start up by both
contractors. These delays are reflected by the increased cost on the
contract sharelines which the government shares with the contractor up
to the ceiling amount.
Question. What is the cost and schedule performance of the new
construction LMSRs so far?
Answer. Based on the December 1996 Selected Acquisition Report
(SAR) and current returns on cost and schedule, all signs indicate each
contractor will deliver their ships at or slightly above target price
but within the Program Managers Estimate to which the Program is
budgeted. The ships should also deliver within the revised schedule,
which includes one or two months delivery date slippage related to
recent strikes.
Question. The Navy Comptroller revised all aircraft program advance
procurement funding to conform to a new policy starting in 1998. Is the
LMSR advance procurement following the same policy?
Answer. No, LSMR advance procurement is not following the same
policy as the aircraft program. The new policy for aircraft programs is
to reflect minimum essential funding for advance procurement and
contractor furnished equipment and budget for advance procurement only
when it is cost effective and not to protect production schedules. The
aircraft program advance procurement analysis now includes a present
value analysis comparison of the procurement profile with and without
advance procurement funding, showing cost effectiveness. In addition,
the amount of termination liability coverage provided with advance
procurement has been kept to a minimal level, covering only until the
regular funding becomes available in October of the next fiscal year.
In the past, some programs had adequate termination liability funding
to cover the first quarter.
The LMSR advance procurement reflects $70 million in fiscal year
1997 to procure Contractor Furnished Equipment (CEE) equipment such as
reduction gear, main control console, ship control console and main
diesel engine. These long lead items, have a fifteen to eighteen month
delivery schedule. In order to meet the Army load out date of fiscal
year 2001, it was necessary to accelerate the build process of the
fiscal year 1999 LMSR ship.
Question. Explain why advance procurement is needed at all for the
last ship.
Answer. Advanced procurement is required only for the fiscal year
1999 ship to support the DoD requirement to have all LMSRs delivered by
the end of Fiscal Year 2001.
Question. Was advance procurement used for the first 18 ships?
Answer. There was no advanced procurement used for the first 18
ships because there was sufficient time to build the ship after
appropriations and still meet the required delivery dates as
established in the Mobility Requirements Study.
Question. What is the cost penalty if Congress denies this request
in 1998?
Answer. Should Congress deny this request, the penalty would be an
increase in escalation and the inability of the Navy to meet the DoD
requirement to deliver all LMSRs by the end of fiscal year 2001.
Strategic Sealift Support Equipment (Lighterage)
Question. The strategic sealift (LMSR) ships being built by the
Navy are to support operations of the Army during war. Therefore, it is
the Army's responsibility to buy support equipment for the new ships
once they are delivered. Admiral Pilling, is it true that the first
LMSR is now in operation but it has no lighterage aboard it?
Answer. Yes, but Army modular causeway sections (MCS) are aboard T-
ACS GOPHER STATE and AMERICAN COMORANT also has Army watercraft assets
aboard as part of the current Army War Reserve-3 package.
Question. Are we buying $6 billion of LMSR sealift ships, yet have
no equipment to unload them during combat?
Answer. The Army is responsible for equipping and offloading the
LMSRs. I defer to the Army to answer the offloading issue.
Question. If the Army fails to buy lighterage, then a theater CINC
would have to take lighterage from the Marines (MPS ships) and give it
to the Army (LMSR ships). General Oster, would this be acceptable
generally to the Marines during wartime?
Answer. Generally, this option is acceptable upon the completion of
the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) mission. The CINC has fully
capable, self-sustaining MPF assets and any use of the MPS lighterage
to offload the Army LMSRs, prior to completion of the MPF mission, will
degrade this mission capability.
Question. Admiral Pilling, explain the CINC's requirement for ``Sea
State 3'' lighterage.
Answer. The CINCs require a sea state 3, service-interoperable
LOTS/JLOTS capability to support expeditionary and theater sustainment
logistics when ports are degraded or unavailable. In some critical
areas of operation, sea state 3 conditions exist greater than 50% of
the time. Failure to operate in sea state 3 in these situations may be
a war stopper for these CINCs, if he cannot meet his throughput
requirement to sustain the warfighting effort. A sea state 3 capable
causeway lighter is one of the key systems required to successfully
execute LOTS in a sea state 3 environment.
Question. Mr. Douglass, please explain the Navy's plan and
acquisition strategy to pursue Sea State 3 lighterage development and
procurement.
Answer. The Navy and the Army signed a Memorandum of Agreement in
August 1996 to jointly develop a sea state 3 lighterage system. We are
currently developing the Operational Requirements Document. The Navy
plans to develop this as an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration
and has submitted a proposal for a two year $43.4 million development
to OSD. The OSD approval will not be known until June 1997.
Question. Does the Navy have all the funds it needs in the fiscal
year 1998 budget for a robust development program to meet the CINC's
requirements for sea state 3 lighterage? If not, how much is needed?
Answer. No, we do not. The Navy has $4.8 million in the NDSF
sealift R&D account for this development. The Navy has requested $15.9
million from the OSD ACTD program to complete the fiscal year 1998
funding requirements. An additional $22.7 million will be required in
fiscal year 1999 to be shared by Army, Navy, and the ACTD program. As
part of the ACTD, the following funding profile was proposed:
($ in millions)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 98 FY 99 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ACTD (OSD)............................................. $15.9 $9.3 $25.2
Navy................................................... 4.8 4.3 9.1
Army................................................... 0.0 9.1 9.1
--------------------------------------------------------
Total Funding...................................... $20.7 $22.7 $43.4
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. What would be the benefits, in terms of mating lighterage
equipment to LMSR ship deliveries, of beginning the Sea State 3
lighterage program in 1998?
Answer. The proposed fiscal year 1998 ACTD would allow procurement
of sea state 3 lighterage systems to begin in fiscal year 2000. The new
systems could be loaded on the propositioned LMSRs as they return to
the United States as part of their scheduled maintenance cycle.
Question. What are the advantages during combat operations of
having Sea State 3 lighterage versus today's Sea State 2 equipment?
Answer. Advantages:
1. With existing lighterage systems, offload of sealift ships stops
as conditions approach the upper end of sea state 2. In some areas of
operation, sea state condition 3 exists greater than 50% of the time.
Having sea state 3 lighterage provides a critical element in achieving
a sea state 3 capability that will enable the CINC to continue
operations during higher sea states.
2. Reduced life cycle costs through:
O&M savings in operations and training through use of
identical systems by both services.
O&M savings by using composite materials in lighterage
construction to decrease maintenance costs resulting from
storage and operations in a salt water environment.
Economies of scale in acquisition and parts support.
LCAC Service Life Extension
Question. The Navy's ``From the Sea'' strategy needs V-22s in the
air and LCAC (Landing Craft Air Cushion) boats in the water to allow
Marine combat forces to strike at great distances. Unfortunately, the
LCAC fleet is not in good shape and the Navy has been slow to address
the problem. Admiral Pilling, in what condition is the LCAC fleet
today?
Answer. The average craft in today's LCAC fleet is in very good
condition. Today's LCACs have continued to perform well in a variety of
challenging roles and have demonstrated a high degree of reliability.
Every LCAC in the fleet currently meets or exceeds the Mission
Reliability goal of 0.94 set by the LCAC Top Level Requirements (TLR).
Although today's news is good, our concern is focused on the future
condition of the LCAC fleet. The goal of our LCAC Life Cycle
Maintenance Plan is to ensure that the current high levels of
performance and reliability will be sustained well into the future.
Question. How long can it remain viable if no Service Life
Extension is performed?
Answer. The cumulative detrimental effects of corrosion on the LCAC
hull and its components pose a threat to the attainment of a full 20
year design life. Without a major Depot Level effort to correct
corrosion damage, the service life of some craft may be reduced to
between 12 and 15 years. If a SLEP is not performed, the LCAC of the
future will be less capable, less reliable, and significantly less
affordable.
Question. Does the FYDP (Future Years Defense Plan) accompanying
the President's fiscal year 1998 budget contain an LCAC service life
extension program. Is it fully funded?
Answer. The FYDP accompanying the President's fiscal year 1998
budget does contain an LCAC SLEP program. Navy requirements support
this program commencing in fiscal year 2000. The LCAC's planned for
induction into the SLEP program are fully funded.
Question. The Committee understands that when the Navy retires its
LST ships, the Marines will have to use LCACs to deliver fuel to shore.
Do you have a sufficient number of LCACs to perform this mission?
Answer. A number of concepts are currently being explored regarding
future methods for the delivery of fuel, some of which involve the use
of LCAC. These studies have not yet been completed, therefore, it has
not been conclusively determined that fuel delivery will be a future
LCAC mission.
Fuel delivery is a follow-on assault echelon effort that could be
supported by LCACs made available as the required lane breaching and
critical landing of troops, amphibious vehicles, and HMMWVs are being
completed. Bulk fuel delivery will be performed after hostile fire has
been suppressed or eliminated around the craft landing zones.
Reconfiguration for fuel delivery should not be a problem, since LCAC
breaching and troop transporting configurations are designed for rapid
installations and removals. Existing fuel container and pump systems
can be accommodated by the LCAC. However, the exact number of LCAC
required to carry out this mission has not yet been determined.
Question. The Committee understands that a main mine-clearing
approach involves LCAC launched anti-mine explosive charges. Do you
have a sufficient number of LCACs to perform this mission?
Answer. The Navy is currently developing mine clearing systems
known as the Shallow Water Assault Breaching System (SABRE) and
Distributed Explosive Technology (DET). Both are expected to reach a
Milestone III decision in fiscal year 1998. A contingency capability is
also being developed which will utilize the currently available MK-58
Linear Demotion charge until the SABRE line charge is available in the
fleet. At present, the LCAC is envisioned as the delivery platform for
both of these systems. The number of LCAC required to perform the Lane
Breaching mission has not yet been definitized. The quantity varies
depending on a number of factors such as the tactics to be utilized,
the number of lanes to be cleared, the egress route to be followed, and
hydrography. War games and simulations are planned for the future to
help quantify the number of craft required. It will then be necessary
to determine whether or not the Lane Breaching mission requires
dedicated craft in addition to those required for the basic mission of
amphibious assault.
Question. So without fuel and the ability to clear mines, how can
the Marines perform their mission?
Answer. Current doctrine capitalizes on the speed, range, and
maneuverability of the LCAC to assault enemy beaches at locations of
our own choosing, where the mine threat is minimal or non-existent. If
this option is not available, traditional methods of mine clearance
would be utilized. Delivery of fuel would likewise be accomplished
utilizing traditional methods, whereby displacement craft and
helicopters would transport fuel to the beach until such time as an
offshore pipeline system could be put in place as part of the follow-on
Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) or the Joint Logistics over-the-
Shore (JLOTS) Systems.
Question. The LCAC fleet of today consists of 91 vehicles. Is that
enough?
Answer. The currently planned inventory level of 91 craft is
sufficient to provide the 60 craft required to perform the mission of
Amphibious Assault assuming a lift requirement of 2.5 Marine
Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) plus 12 craft for training. Craft in excess
of these requirements can be used to fulfill other missions or to cover
for those craft in extended maintenance cycles.
Question. Explain how the $37 million appropriated by Congress two
years ago for LCAC SLEP was used.
Answer. The $37 million is being used for LCAC SLEP development.
This effort includes developing engineering packages for a new skirt,
improved engine, improved corrosion control and updated electronics.
Installation of these items on LCAC 91 will be accomplished in new
construction. This is the last craft on the assembly line, scheduled
for delivery in fiscal year 1999, and it will be the test platform for
the new improvements.
Question. Explain how the $37 million appropriated by Congress two
years ago for LCAC SLEP was used.
Answer. The $37 million is being used for LCAC SLEP development.
This effort includes developing engineering packages for a new skirt,
improved engine, improved corrosion control and updated electronics.
Installation of these items on LCAC 91 will be accomplished in new
construction. This is the last craft on the assembly line, scheduled
for delivery in fiscal year 1999, and it will be the test platform for
the new improvements.
Trident Backfit
Question. The 1998 budget contains $154 million in the Other
Procurement appropriation to start in earnest the TRIDENT submarine
backfit with the D-5 missile. Secretary Douglass, is the TRIDENT
backfit on track?
Answer. Yes. The Fiscal Year 1998 President's Budget request funds
the backfit of four of the original TRIDENT I (C-4) SSBNs stationed at
Bangor, Washington, to TRIDENT II (D-5) capability under a ``split
backfit'' approach. This approach was adopted, following the Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR), as a strategy in the Navy's Fiscal Year 1996
Budget to minimize then-current FYDP costs. The second set of backfits
are funded entirely outside the FYDP. USS ALASKA (SSBN 732) and USS
NEVADA (SSBN 733) will be backfit during the non-refueling engineered
overhauls starting in fiscal year 2000 and fiscal year 2001,
respectively. USS HENRY M. JACKSON (SSBN 730) and USS ALABAMA (SSBN
731) will be backfit during refueling overhauls beginning in fiscal
year 2004 and fiscal year 2005, respectively. Since each of the
refueling overhauls is scheduled for a nominal two years, the four-ship
backfit program will complete by the beginning of fiscal year 2007. The
remaining four TRIDENT I (C-4) SSBNs are scheduled to be removed from
strategic service in accordance with the NPR--two in fiscal year 2002
and two in fiscal year 2003. All procurement actions leading to a
planned May 2000 backfit start are proceeding on schedule.
Question. In what years is the Trident Backfit program funded, and
when will it be completed?
Answer. The TRIDENT backfit schedule, as directed by the Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR), is fully funded. Four of the original C4 TRIDENTs
are planned to be backfit to D5 capability in a split schedule, the
first two in fiscal year 2001 and 2002 and the second two in fiscal
year 2004 and 2005. Other Procurement, Navy (OPN) funding for the
shipboard portion (separate from Missile Flight Hardware and Motor Set
expenditures) of the backfit program commences in fiscal year 1997 with
procurement of long-lead (three year) hardware equipment. Funding
continues through planned program completion in fiscal year 2007.
Question. The budget proposes to slip $50 million for training
equipment at the Bangor base from 1998 to fiscal year 1999. Why was
this done and what is the impact? If the backfit program itself is not
slipping compared to last year's schedule, then why would the training
equipment be slipping?
Answer. As an affordability measure within the Navy during Program
Objective Memorandum (POM) 1998, $50 million in funds to procure
equipment required to establish D-5 Strategic Weapons System training
at Bangor were moved from fiscal year 1998 to fiscal year 1999. The
funding delay of one year will have minimal, if any, impact on the
ready for training (RFT) date in Bangor, since the strict lead-away-
from-need contract date was late fourth quarter of fiscal year 1998.
The program manager (Director Strategic Systems Program) is attempting
to prevent any delay in the RFT date by offsetting a one to two month
procurement delay with a corresponding reduction in installation, test
and checkout lead time. It should be noted that the original RFT date
was set to coincide with the Pacific D5 initial operational capability
(IOC) (May of 2002), and included provisions to fly the crews of the
first two backfit units to Kings Bay for their conversion training. If
a delay in training RFT date were to occur, there would exist a need to
fly additional crews to Kings Bay for their refresher training, but no
impact on the backfit schedule would be imposed.
Question. When (and if) the START II Treaty is ratified, what are
the Navy plans for use of the 4 Trident submarines that would be
retired in 2003 not because of their service life but because of treaty
constraints? Describe the expected conditions of these boats. What
alternative uses are being considered?
Answer. The Nuclear Posture Review determined that only 14 TRIDENT
SSBNs are required for strategic service under START II, making 4
available for other uses. Once START II ratification occurs or if a
relaxation of the law prohibiting removal of these units from strategic
service prior to START II ratification were provided, the possibility
exists to convert them to a tactical role. The TRIDENT platform's
inherent stealth, mobility and endurance, and potential for offensive
armament could be put to good use in what the Navy is currently
examining as the TRIDENT SSGN concept (combined Strike/Special
Operations Forces (SOF)).
Under the concept, the TRIDENT SSGN would carry up to 132 vertical
launch missiles (Tomahawk or Navy Tactical Missile (NTACM)) and be
fitted to employ both the dual dry-deck shelter (DDS) or Advanced Seal
Delivery System (ASDS) and over 100 fully equipped SOF troops. The
extensive planned maintenance program for the TRIDENT submarines has
kept them in outstanding condition.
Aircraft Carrier R&D
Question. The budget requests $90 million for aircraft carrier
research and development for the carrier after the next one. The next
one, CVN-77, is planned for construction starting in 2002 while the
future carrier, CVX, is planned to begin construction in 2006. Total
R&D investment for CVX will be at least $650 million through 2002.
Admiral Pilling, please discuss the Navy's vision for the next 2
aircraft carriers, CVN-77 and CVX.
Answer. The total R&D investment for CVX will be at least $812
million through 2002. The Navy is fully committed to a dual track
carrier acquisition strategy that maintains the current force
structure. This strategy procures the tenth and final Nimitz class
carrier, CVN 77, in fiscal year 2002 to replace a KITTY HAWK class
carrier after completion of 47 years of active service in fiscal year
2008. The second element of the Navy's strategy is to transition to the
future with a new carrier design, CVX, to begin in fiscal year 2006 to
replace USS Enterprise (CVN 65) at the end of her service life at 52
years in fiscal year 2013.
CVN 77 will be a ``Smart Transition'' aircraft carrier that will
incorporate new technologies to improve affordability and reduce total
ownership costs for CVN 77. In addition, these technologies could be
backfit into the existing Nimitz class carriers to reduce life cycle
costs. It would also mitigate risk for selected new technologies to be
fully implemented in CVX.
The Navy's vision for CVX is to design a new class of aircraft
carrier for operations in the 21st century that will maintain the core
capabilities of naval aviation (high-volume firepower, survivability,
sustainability and mobility), to significantly reduce total ownership
costs, and to incorporate an architecture for change within the design
of the ship. Achieving this vision will require significant design
changes for a new platform. The Navy is pursuing significant
improvements in the future design, such as a new aircraft launch and
recovery system, increased sortie generation capability to match
projected fast turnaround capabilities of next-generation aircraft,
improvements in ship survivability, improvements in C4I capability,
reducing topside design congestion, and reducing manpower requirements.
Such ambitious goals require a new ship design to incorporate the
advances that are being made in technology and to incorporate
affordability initiatives.
Question. How would CVX be different from the current class of
aircraft carriers, and why is so much R&D required?
Answer. CVX will be the first new carrier designed in over 30
years. In March 1996, the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) approved the
Navy's long term aircraft carrier acquisition strategy which provided
the Navy an opportunity to fundamentally review design options from a
clean sheet of paper for the future carrier, CVX. The design review now
being conducted includes analysis of all aspects of the carriers
concept of operations, airwing types and sizes, aircraft carrier launch
and recovery development, ship type and size, and numerous other ship
systems development. CVX will be similar to our current aircraft
carriers in that it will maintain the core capabilities of naval
aviation (high-volume firepower, survivability, sustainability,
mobility, and responsiveness). CVX will be different in that it will
introduce new technologies, systems, designs, and processes that will
significantly reduce total ownership costs as compared to a Nimitz
class ship, and incorporate flexibility for change within the design of
the ship.
In the fiscal year 1998 President's Budget, there is $125.1 million
funded to start the development of key technologies for CVX and to
continue concept studies and analyses of CVX design alternatives. Some
of the efforts planned to commence in fiscal year 1998 are development
of an Advanced Technology Launcher (ATL), assessment of ski-jump
options for integration with catapults, dynamic armor and other passive
protection systems, Zonal Electric Distribution Systems, assessments of
technologies to reduce manpower requirements, and assessment of
technologies to develop an adjunct multi-function radar system to
perform control and landing guidance functions.
Question. What would be the impact of delaying the CVX R&D program
for one year?
Answer. A delay in the CVX R&D program for one year would adversely
impact development of time-critical technologies for CVX. In the Fiscal
Year 1998 President's Budget request, the time-critical technology
initiatives planned to start are propulsion systems, alternative
aircraft launchers, advanced armor systems, manning reduction, topside
design, advanced computing, aviation weapons handling, and alternative
flight deck design. All of these initiatives are intended to reduce
onboard manning, reduce required maintenance over the life of the
carrier and maintain warfighting capability into the future. Any delay
in the funding of these R&D technologies for the future carrier design
would seriously jeopardize the Navy's ability to deliver in time the
new technologies needed to improve CVX performance while at the same
time reducing life cycle costs.
Question. What would be the impact of providing only half of what
you requested in 1998 for CVX?
Answer. A reduction in the funding of these R&D technologies for
the future carrier design would seriously jeopardize the Navy's ability
to deliver in time the new technologies needed to improve CVX
performance while at the same time reducing life cycle costs. A
reduction in the CVX R&D program by one half would adversely impact
development of time-critical technologies for CVX and result in a one
year delay in the program. In the Fiscal Year 1998 President's Budget
request, the time-critical technology initiatives planned to start are
propulsion systems, alternative aircraft launchers, advanced armor
systems, manning reduction, topside design, advanced computing,
aviation weapons handling, and alternative flight deck design. All of
these initiatives are intended to reduce onboard manning, reduce
required maintenance over the life of the carrier and maintain
warfighting capability into the future.
Question. The Navy has already demonstrated its inability to fully
fund its carriers by dropping $120 million of critical features from
the Nimitz overhaul in 1998. What critical features have already been
dropped from CVN-77?
Answer. The Navy plan for USS Nimitz includes incorporation of all
critical warfighting improvements, including ship self defense
capability. Following the Refueling Complex Overhaul (RCOH), Nimitz
will undergo a Post Shakedown Availability/Selected Restricted
Availability (PSA/SRA), as is typical after an overhaul of such scope.
Critical modernization items not included in the RCOH budget are
planned for execution during the PSA/SRA. Upon completion of the RCOH
and the PSA/SRA, USS Nimitz will rejoin the Fleet as a modernized,
recapitalized, fully capable asset prior to her first post-RCOH
deployment.
CVN 77, the last Nimitz Class carrier, will replace an aging Kitty
Hawk Class carrier after 47 years of service life in fiscal year 2008,
and it will be a ``Smart Transition'' carrier that will introduce new
technologies to improve affordability and reduce life cycle costs for
CVN 77. In addition, these technologies could be backfit into the
existing Nimitz class carriers to reduce life cycle costs. It would
also mitigate risks for selected new technologies to be fully
implemented in CVX. Initial funding for CVN 77 R&D is scheduled to
begin in fiscal year 1998. The range of options on critical features
for CVN 77 remains to be evaluated.
Submarine Technology R&D
Question. In the late 1980s, the Congress insisted that the Navy
spend more on submarine technology R&D and the Navy fought it.
Eventually, the Navy saw the wisdom of this approach, but unfortunately
was so slow to act that little of the $500 million investment actually
resulted in equipment for the Seawolf or New Attack Submarine. The Navy
now claims that we should start investing in submarine technology
again. Admiral Pilling, why does the Navy now think an increased
investment in submarine technology R&D is worth making?
Answer. Historically, submarine technology development, maturation,
and transition have been performed on a cyclical base in conjunction
with building the ``next'' class of submarine. This cyclic approach was
generally successful when there was overlapping development of multiple
submarine classes and block upgrades. The current situation of low
production rate of submarines coupled with high rate of technology
turnover, dictate a more steady funding profile for technology
development, maturation and transition. Therefore, the Navy intends to
pursue a funding approach to submarine R&D to ensure technologies
continue to transition to NSSN. As NSSN moves to production phase, the
development dollars in the NSSN program are declining. The Navy has
programmed increased money into its two primary program elements for
submarine R&D-PE 0603504N (Advanced Submarine Combat Systems
Development) and PE 0603561N (Advanced Submarine Systems Development).
The increased funding in these program elements will maintain a funded
R&D program at an appropriate level to support exploration of promising
technologies and development to maturity.
Question. How much more is in the Navy's outyear budget plan for
submarine technology R&D compared to last year?
Answer. Following the lead of the $60 million congressional plus-up
in fiscal year 1997, the President's Budget for fiscal year 1998
sustains the $60 million level of increased funding through fiscal year
2000, for a total of $180 million. Funding for fiscal year 2001 and
later will be addressed in the Navy's upcoming budget review cycle.
Question. In what areas does the Navy now plan to invest, and why
are they deemed important?
Answer. The Navy's near term and long term submarine technology
investment plans are outlined in the first annual update to the
Secretary of Defense report on Nuclear Attack Submarine Procurement and
Submarine Technology. This report was forwarded to the Congress on
March 14, 1997. An excerpt from this report describing the Navy's
technology investment plans is attached.
2.1 Background
Historically, several nuclear submarine development programs
proceeded in parallel. Each new submarine program drew extensively from
the previous program, and general research and development (R&D)
programs. Technology funding was increased in the early years of a
submarine program, and reduced to a subsistence level during serial
production. This cyclic approach worked in the past because there was
an overlap of multiple submarine design, production, and modernization
programs. This approach was successful for the New Attack Submarine
(NSSN) design, which incorporates advanced technology to meet all
projected military requirements, and has the flexibility to accept
emerging technologies that will reduce life cycle costs or enhance
capabilities.
2.2 Current Submarine Technology Development
Today, extremely low submarine production rates, coupled with the
rapid pace of technological advancement, dictate a more steady funding
profile for technology development, maturation, and transition. This
approach requires a change in technology management. Accordingly, the
Department of Defense (DoD) established the Submarine Technology
Oversight Council (SUBTOC) to advise submarine technology integrated
product teams (IPTs). This increases the opportunity to identify and
select innovative technology for insertion in the NSSN to maintain its
margin of warfighting superiority. A description of this approach can
be found in the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology)
Report on Advanced Submarine Technology issued in October 1996.
Subsequently, a new flag officer position, the Office of the Director,
Submarine Technology (ODST), has been created in the Naval Sea Systems
Command to be the single point of contact for submarine R&D.
2.3 Submarine Technology Management
To help improve submarine technology management and coordination,
the Navy recently established the ODST. Accountable to Assistant
Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition)
(ASN(RDA)) and the Chief of Naval Operations, ODST is the single point
of contact for all submarine R&D programs in the Department of the
Navy, and is key to coordinating submarine technology efforts between
the NSSN Program Manager and the submarine R&D community. Specifically,
ODST's mission is to:
coordinate and integrate all submarine R&D activities among
the DoD, Navy, and industry;
identify new technologies to meet changes in warfare
requirements;
ensure that Navy technology plans support and are in
accordance with DoD and national strategies for science,
technology, and national security objectives;
articulate Navy warfare requirements to industry technology
providers;
develop technology transition plans for incorporating
improved technology into submarine hulls;
ensure submarine shipbuilders participate fully in the Navy's
submarine technology development program; and
co-chair the Flag Chaired IPT responsible for integrating
major technology providers within the Navy.
As co-chairman of the Flag Chaired IPT, the Director, Submarine
Technology oversees the activities of the working level teams in
support of the SUBTOC. The SUBTOC ensures that the efforts to advance
submarine technology from initial concept to production are coordinate
within the DoD. The SUBTOC is co-chaired by the Under Secretary of
Defense (Acquisition and Technology) and ASN(RDA). It has regularly met
to provide top-level guidance to submarine technology managers. The
major issues it has addressed include strategic areas for submarine
technology investment, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) participation in submarine technology development, insertion of
technology in NSSNs, and the development of effective dialog between
shipbuilders and the Navy on technology issues.
The Flag Chaired IPT integrates and prioritizes inputs provided by
the System Oriented IPTs (SOIPTs), and provides recommendations to
resource sponsors. The Flag Chaired IPT, in conjunction with the
SOIPTs, completed a seven-month process in February 1997 that
established the integrated submarine technology strategic goals and
plans described in Sections 2.5 and 2.6. The SOIPTs developed consensus
on technology goals, evaluated on-going projects, and developed
investment recommendations for the Flag Chaired IPT. Objectives of the
Flag Chaired IPT include improving the definition of requirements and
objectives for the technology development community, and balancing
performance, schedule, and cost for potential technology improvements.
2.4 Submarine Technology Investment Strategy
The NSSN is designed to provide a capable, technologically robust
warship that meets all military requirements at an affordable price. It
is important to recognize that incorporation of future technologies
into the NSSN platform will be made feasible, in large measure, due to
the innovative ``design and build'' process. The extensive use of
computer-aided design and engineering tools permitted the Navy to
incorporate state-of-the-art technologies into the baseline design,
while providing sufficient flexibility into the ship necessary to
permit the insertion of technologies that may be developed in the
future. Figure 2.1 identifies the advanced technologies that have been
incorporated into the base design of the NSSN.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The fiscal year 1998 (FY98) budget contains funds to support
insertion of advanced technologies to further enhance the stealth,
affordability, and capability reflected in the NSSN. The Congress
strongly supported this approach by providing an additional $60 million
to accelerate the insertion of selected technologies. Table 2.1
provides the spending plan for the additional $60 million of R&D funds
provided by Congress.
Table 2.1
Technology Development and Maturation Plan
FY97 Funds ($ in millions)
Insertion Opportunities:
Fiber Optic Sensors (LWWA).................................... $8.8
Advanced Hybrid Propulsor..................................... 3.2
Elastomeric Ejection System................................... 1.5
Advanced Acoustic Sensors..................................... 1.1
Advanced Acoustic Sensor Processing........................... 10.0
Core:
Rim Driven Motors............................................. 4.4
Structural Acoustics.......................................... 13.0
Hydrodynamics................................................. 5.0
Propulsion.................................................... 7.0
Design Improvement Evaluations................................ 5.0
Congressional Direction:
Doppler Sonar Velocity Log.................................... 1.0
______
Total....................................................\1\60.0
\1\Of the above, each shipbuilder received $9.4 million
In addition, the Congress redirected $50 million of FY96 funds from
the National Defense Sealift Fund to pursue design and construction of
a second Large Scale Vehicle (LSV-II). Newport News Shipbuilding (NNS)
and Electric Boat Corporation (EB) have agreed to collaborate on the
development of the LSV-II. The Navy plans to have the LSV-II under
contract in the summer of 1997. LSV-II will provide a key capability
for future technology development.
The President's Budget for FY98 sustains the $60 million level of
increased funding in submarine R&D through FY00 in order to provide
mature technologies that will be available for insertion into early
NSSNs. Additional funding to enable the insertion of these technologies
during the construction of NSSNs will be addressed as maturing
technologies are evaluated through the design improvement process
described in the accompanying report. This additional funding will be
prioritized within the DoD's program and budget review process. The $60
million provided by Congress for FY97, along with the additional
funding the Navy has committed to submarine technology, will help
enable the DoD to advance the development and maturation of submarine
technologies, and invigorate the technology pipeline.
Based on the available funding and the efforts of the management
team, technology focus areas have been established and the technology
insertion plan has been refined. These focus areas have enabled the DoD
to establish a balanced investment strategy employing a steady funding
stream to achieve substantial gains in submarine military performance
and affordability.
2.5 Submarine Technology Focus Areas
Advanced submarine technology R&D programs will focus on achieving
large step improvements in connectivity, payload (which includes power
projection), stealth, and sensors and processors. Incremental insertion
of these maturing technologies into the NSSN, as was done with the LOS
ANGLELES class, will ensure the US maintains submarine superiority.
Connectivity: Technologies that provide secure command and control
connectivity between the National Command Authorities and the on-scene
commander. Effective real-time two-way communication with the National
Command Authorities, combined with a total area situational awareness
capability is vital to submarines in support of joint warfighting
missions. As international crises change rapidly, a submarine must
provide and receive updates on tactical situations in its assigned area
to achieve maximum advantage.
Investments in rapidly developing fields of connectivity span the
entire range of information warfare and battlefield dominance
technologies. The ability to receive, transmit, and comprehend ever-
increasing volumes of data while remaining stealthy are a vital part of
this investment. Advanced displays will be developed using the best
commercial, open system architecture offered by industry, as will off-
board vehicles that will greatly expand the submarine sensor's reach.
Payloads: Technologies that enhance maritime support of land
forces, in-theater fire support, and reconnaissance capabilities. As
with the NSSN, flexibility of mission assignment is a vital attribute
for future submarines. Payloads possess the warfighting capabilities
for submarines, and a varied selection of payloads will provide maximum
flexibility to national and theater commanders, whether the mission is
reconnaissance, interdiction at sea, or strike in support of land
forces.
Advanced strike weapons such as Navy Tactical Missile System
(NTACMS) expand the range of stealthy strike options for the battle
force commander. Submarine launched and controlled Unmanned Undersea
Vehicles (UUVs) will expand the battle force horizons.
Stealth: Technologies that improve covertness and minimize
vulnerability. Since its invention, the principle military value of the
submarine has been its inherent stealth; i.e., its ability to control
an area without being detected by the enemy. The submarine has the
capability to operate in an assigned area with impunity, and conduct
intelligence and surveillance missions in advance of a battle group,
launch special operations forces, or support deployed forces ashore.
Hence, stealth is the one essential element that distinguishes
submarines from all other warfighting platforms. During the Falklands
war, for example, the threat posed by British submarines in the area
after the Belgrano was torpedoed and sunk forced the Argentinean navy
to sit in port. This had a strategic impact on the course of the
conflict since Argentinean ground forces in the Falklands were
prevented from being re-supplied.
Continued technology investment in stealth is vitally important to
the sustained advancement of submarine warfare. Stealth investments
represent efforts to become undetectable to acoustic, infra-red,
optical, radar, and electromagnetic sensors. Both SEAWOLF and NSSN
represent major advances in stealth. Past stealth investments such as
quiet nuclear reactor coolant pumps and propulsors originated from
long-term efforts, and are just now entering the fleet aboard the
SEAWOLF class submarines. In the future, electric drive propulsion and
hydrodynamic advances will be necessary to provide substantial
improvement in submarine acoustic quieting, which will be needed to
maintain our margin of superiority. These long-term efforts must be
coupled with a steady investment.
Sensors and Processors: Technologies that enhance battlefield
preparation and interdiction. Coupled with our strategy for enhancing
the military value of submarines in connectivity, payloads, and
stealth, the extraordinary flexibility of NSSN open architecture allows
for the rapid and affordable integration of industry-driven leaps in
advanced sensors and processors. These advances will be vital to
sustaining battlefield awareness and tactical control, and to meet
targeting requirements for advanced weapons.
Technologies to be pursued include high-frequency sonar imaging,
wake detection, advanced electronic countermeasures, advanced sonar
synthetic aperture processing, and the application of fiber optic
technology to sonar sensors. In particular, the advanced hull sonar
program, if successful, has the potential for substantially altering
the design of the submarine's hull by eliminating the need for a
conventional sonar sphere in the bow section.
Inherent to all focus areas is the commitment to affordability by
pursuing technologies that will reduce submarine design, construction,
and life cycle costs.
2.6 Technology Investment Plan
Near-Term Technology Insertion Opportunities: The near-term
emphasis to develop those technologies that will enhance joint force
interoperability and real-time communications, and ensure sustained
dominance of littoral (coastal) engagements. While achieving this goal
will require technologies from each of the areas discussed above, the
focus will be connectivity and payload. Near-term technologies in
connectivity that have potential for insertion include situational
awareness, data fusion, acoustic communications, and NTACMs. Near-term
technology opportunities are also driven by industry advances,
especially in the area of sensors and processing. The DoD will continue
to use methods such as rapid insertion of commercial-off-the-shelf
(COTS) equipment into NSSN open architecture systems to capture
industry advances.
Appendix A provides a list of technologies that have the potential
to enhance affordability to capability of early NSSNs. Many of these
technologies were previously reported as Category I and II
technologies.
Core Technology Development: The long-term emphasis is to assure
our continued dominance in stealth, which is the single most important
attribute for submarines operating in either the open ocean or littoral
waters. Stealth allows submarines to operate in any ocean in the world
with virtual impunity. Existing propulsion and hydrodynamic
technologies have limited potential for growth.
Many new technologies and novel approaches must be pursued. Though
many of the new concepts for achieving the necessary technological
breakthrough exist, their development will entail a moderate level of
technical risk, and an unprecedented degree of integration over a broad
range of disciplines.
Foremost among these efforts is the commitment to electric drive as
a replacement for steam turbine propulsion. Electric drive, with its
accompanying flexibility in electric plant architecture and component
design, is expected to provide the necessary acoustic growth potential
for the propulsion plant. Equally important are fundamental and
synergistic changes to submarine hydroacoustic and hydrodynamic
architectures. This includes significant changes to the sail,
propulsor, hull shape, sonar, appendages, and other items pertinent to
maneuvering and acoustics.
The wide range of core technologies being developed or evaluated
are listed in Appendix B. This reporting category includes technologies
previously reported as Core and Category III technologies.
Question. Can you assure us that this time ``we won't get burned
again,'' and that the results of this R&D will actually go into a
future Navy submarine?
Answer: Many of the technologies developed from the R&D infusion of
the 1980s (Advanced Vibration Reducer, Non-Penetrating Periscope, EM
Silencing Equipment, etc.), have transitioned to submarines at sea
today or are in use as vital development tools (Hydroacoustic/
hydrodynamic Technology Center, Intermediate Scale Measurement System).
The Secretary of Defense Report on Nuclear Attack Submarine
Procurement and Submarine Technology dated March 1997, identifies
several promising technologies for development. For those technologies
identified in the 1997 update as having the greatest potential for
insertion, the Navy has budgeted the necessary R&D funds to mature them
to the point of transition to a submarine design. At this point,
potential design improvements will be evaluated based on a variety of
criteria, including military requirements, technical feasibility, total
ship impact, risk elements, impact on the mission effectiveness, cost
impact and relative maturity of the technology. The Secretary of the
Navy Report on Shipbuilder Design Improvements for the New Attack
Submarine dated March 1997 provides a detailed description of the
formal process the Navy will use to ensure continued improvement of
submarines through insertion of technological innovations.
Question. How did the Navy use the $60 million additional funds
that Congress appropriated in 1997 for advanced submarine technology?
Answer. The Navy plans to spend the $60 million provided by
Congress in fiscal year 1997 as follows:
Insertion Opportunities: ($ in million)
Fiber Optic Sensors (LWWAA)................................... $8.8
Advanced Hybrid Propulsor..................................... 3.2
Elastomeric Ejection System................................... 1.5
Advanced Acoustic Sensors..................................... 1.1
Advanced Acoustic Sensor Processing........................... 10.0
Core:
Rim Driven Motors............................................. 4.4
Structural Acoustics.......................................... 13.0
Hydrodynamics................................................. 5.0
Propulsion.................................................... 7.0
Design Improvement Evaluations................................ 5.0
Congressional Direction:
Doppler Sonar Velocity Log.................................... $1.0
Total..................................................... $60.0
\1\Of the above, each shipbuilder received $9.4 million
In addition, the Congress redirected $50 million of fiscal year
1996 funds from the National Defense Sealift Fund to pursue design and
construction of a second Large Scale Vehicle (LSV-II). Newport News
Shipbuilding and Electric Boat Corporation have agreed to collaborate
on the development of the LSV-II. The Navy plans to have the LSV-II
under contract in the summer of 1997. LSV-II will provide a key
capability for future technology development.
Question. Has the entire $60 million, other than pro-rata fair-
share of undistributed reductions, been made available for obligation
for advanced submarine technology? If not, why would you need any
additional funds in 1998?
Answer. Yes.
Question. DARPA had a world-class operation in submarine technology
development, which apparently has been dismantled by the current DARPA
director as being a ``low priority.'' Do you agree with that approach?
Answer. Both the Navy and DARPA believe that DARPA should be
involved in high impact, revolutionary technology programs. DARPA's
role in submarine technology development is under review by the
Submarine Technology Oversight Council (SUBTOC). This Council is co-
chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology)
and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and
Acquisition) and its membership includes submarine technology
stakeholders in the Department of Defense, including the Director of
DARPA, and both submarine builders. The SUBTOC has produced encouraging
results, including the possible pursuit of a joint Navy/DARPA small,
minimally manned submersible project.
AEGIS Ship Follow-On (SC-21)
Question. The 1998 budget and accompanying outyear budget plan
envision spending at least $750 million to develop a follow-on ship to
the DDG-51 destroyer. Admiral Pilling, what is the Navy's requirement
for a follow on to the DDG-51?
Answer. DDG-51 is the most capable destroyer in the world. There
will be no requirement for a follow-on to the DDG-51 class until they
retire at the end of their service life. A follow-on is required to
replace the retiring FFG-7s and soon the DD-963s and DDG-993s. The
Mission Need Statement (MNS) for a 21st Century Surface Combatant,
signed in September 1994, provides the requirement for a follow-on for
those classes of ships. SC-21 is not a follow-on to DDG-51, but an
entirely new class being designed to perform land attack warfare, to
accommodate new capabilities through advanced technology, and to
incorporate cost reduction measures that can not be integrated on a
mature platform such as DDG-51.
Question. Why is this urgent now?
Answer. Beginning in 2008, surface combatant force levels are
projected to begin a long period of decline as the last DDG-51 is
delivered and the aging FFG-7, DD-963 and DDG-993 class ships retire. A
new class must begin delivering at that time in order to maintain
adequate force levels. Due to the long lead time required to design and
construct a major new surface combatant class, maintaining the current
development schedule is urgent.
Question. The Navy can't afford to put cooperative engagement,
infrared sensors, theater ballistic missile defense, or advanced guns
on the destroyers it is building today and for the foreseeable future.
Why is it that the Navy can't adequately equip its current ships, yet
it hungers for a new ship?
Answer. The option that provides the Navy the most rapid deployment
of Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) and Theater Ballistic
Missile capability is via backfit. Under the current Navy plan the
first ships to receive Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defense
capability in conjunction with CEC, will be two Aegis cruisers in
fiscal year 2000. Additional cruisers will be backfit in fiscal year
2002 and fiscal year 2003. The first DDG-51 class destroyer will be
backfit in fiscal year 2003 with additional ships scheduled in fiscal
year 2004 and out. Under the current plan, ships appropriated in FY
2002 will receive the first forward fit configuration, in production/
construction.
Additionally, the Navy has planned to introduce DDG-81 and follow
with the MK 62 gun in conjunction with the Extended Range Gun Munitions
(ERGM) rounds. All ships in the DDG-51 class Multi-Year Procurement
(MYP) for fiscal years 1998 through 2001 will have this gun.
What the Navy can't afford is to not attempt to capture the latest
technology and acquisition initiatives, increase warfighting
capability, increase automation, and reduce manning to thus to reduce
the cost of procuring and maintaining Surface Combatant force structure
as exemplified most recently by Operation Desert Strike. The Navy can
not afford to maintain force structure levels without building new
ships.
Question. What are the deficiencies of the DDG-51 that require the
development of a follow-on ship? Describe each in detail for the
record.
Answer. Procurement Cost: It is anticipated that the Navy and the
Nation will be little able to afford to continue procuring Surface
Combatants at a cost of $800 million to $900 million a piece, well into
the future, and at a sufficient rate to maintain Surface Combatant
force structure for the future.
Cost of Manpower: At an annual cost of between $30,000 to $75,000
per crew member, the Navy is compelled to reduce manning, while at the
same time increase levels of warfighting capability and complexity in
addressing the future threat facing its Surface Combatants. New
missions, including TBMD, CEC, and enhanced Naval Surface Fire Support
(NSFS) in conjunction with an evolving threat, are drivers for change
in ship and combat systems design.
Cost of Maintenance: The Navy is compelled, via Congressional
direction, and to technically keep pace, to go to procurement of
Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) based computing systems. We must
``break with the past'' in the costly procurement of MILSPEC equipment,
and the costs associated with upgrade and maintenance.
Question. If the Congress were to deny funds for a new ship
development, why couldn't you keep producing DDG-51s?
Answer. If the Congress were to deny funds for a new ship
development, the Navy could continue to procure DDG-51's, but given
cost, and a fiscally constrained environment, procurement would be
reduced to such an extent that Surface Combatant force structure could
not be maintained. Additionally, the Navy would miss the opportunity to
take advantage of advanced technology initiatives, and acquisition
reform, to help reduce cost of procurement, manning and maintenance.
Question. In what year does the Navy project that a potential
adversary country would field a ship as capable as today's DDG-51?
Answer. The Navy can not currently predict when any potential
adversary could possibly field a ship with the same capabilities as
today's DDG-51. But in examining recent events, the Navy can look with
some concern to the arranged sale by the Russians to the Chinese of 2
Sovremenny class DDGs with their accompanying SS-N-22 missiles ------.
While this development is of concern, it was not unanticipated. A
series of improvements to ships and weapon systems including AN/SPY-
1D(V) on ships in the Multi-Year Procurement, CEC and SM-2 Block IV,
will go a long way in keeping our Surface Forces ``pacing ahead of the
threat.''
The Navy will strive in continued improvements to DDH-15s and in
development of future Surface Combatants to maintain this goal.
Intercooled Recuperative (ICR) Gas Turbine Engine
Question. Two years ago, the Committee recommended that the
Intercooled Recuperative gas turbine engine program be terminated, but
did not prevail in conference. The fiscal year 1998 budget requests $32
million for continued development. How much have we spent on ICR
development so far?
Answer. To date we have spent or obligated $273 million in U.S.
funds plus $31 million provided by France and the United Kingdom. The
United Kingdom has also provide another $22 million in testing
services. This totals $326 million.
Question. Does it work?
Answer. The testing shows that the ICR concept does work. We have
demonstrated 21% fuel efficiency improvement and predict at least 28%
improvement for the final fully developed configuration. The
demonstrated performance is based on a variety of different tests which
total 680 hours of engine operation, including 374 hours of operation
with the redesigned recuperator (known as the Limited Operational
Unit). Two 500 hour tests and a 3000 hour endurance test remain to be
conducted. These tests will help determine the reliability and
maintainability of the ICR engine.
Question. How much more is contained in the outyear budget plan for
additional development of the engine?
Answer. $93.8 million for fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year
2001.
Question. How much more is required above the amount in your
outyear plan in order to achieve development of an engine that could
actually be installed in a ship?
Answer. The Navy estimate is that there is an additional $124
million required to complete full qualification testing, at-sea testing
and logistics support.
Question. Explain the Navy's plan to ask Britain to foot more of
the bill for this program, which is based on a British Rolls-Royce
turbine engine. What has been your success so far?
Answer. The ICR engine is a U.S. Navy program. Under a 1994
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), the UK and France have provided some
funding, testing support and services. To date, they have provided $53
million in funds or testing services, which is 16% of the obligations
thus far. The British Navy has been very interested in the development
of the ICR engine and would like it accelerated to be available as a
propulsion alternative for the Horizon Frigate, a joint project
involving the UK, France and Italy. We are discussing the possibility
of the UK providing additional funding (or in-kind services) to help
offset the estimated $124 million required to complete the full
qualification and at-sea testing. In addition, we have proposed that
they also make suitable arrangements for sharing any future cost
overruns. These discussions have just recently begun. While not
accepting these terms, the UK has indicated a willingness to pursue
further agreements, after receipt of our formal proposal. The UK
recently provided $7 million toward the $124 shortfall via an amendment
to the MOU. The French have also expressed interest in continuing the
program, and similar discussions are underway with them.
Question. Explain why, after spending $.3 billion on this program
so far, the Navy recently decided to drop the engine as a candidate for
installation on the DDG-51 destroyers?
Answer. It is not cost effective to amortize the class unique non-
recurring costs given the few remaining candidate ships in the DDG-51
class.
Question. If we agree to your plan, which will eventually costs $.5
billion, will ICR be the ``engine of choice'' for installation on new
Navy ships such as the Arsenal ship or the DDG-51 follow on ship (SC-
21)?
Are you testifying that it will be installed if it works?
Or are you testifying that it just must be one of the
candidate engines?
Answer. The ICR engine will be one of the candidate engines.
Question. Under what conditions would the Navy terminate this
program?
Answer. The Navy would recommend termination if the U.K. and French
MOU partners don't:
a. pay at least 50% of the shortfall for full engine
qualification (in cash or in kind-services)
b. make suitable arrangements for sharing future cost growth.
Question. Admiral Pilling, would you say the technology merits a
$.5 billion R&D investment in this program? Do fleet CINCs agree with
you?
Answer. This technology and others that save fuel costs are
important to the Navy. Although the ICR testing is currently on track,
earlier problems with the recuperator severely impacted the cost and
schedule of the program. As a result, key efforts to fully qualify the
engine for fleet transition (for example, shock testing, logistics
development) are no longer funded. The Navy can not affort to pay for
all these transition items, so we have entered into discussions with
the U.K. and France to see if they can share the costs.
The fleet CINCs support technologies that save fuel and support our
approach of getting the U.K. and France to share more of the costs.
Given the severe fiscal constraints that we are operating under, the
CINCs are concerned about the cost effectiveness/payback of the ICR
technology.
Question. When all costs, including $.3 billion in sunk cost are
considered, how many years will it take to reach a payback of the
taxpayer investment in this program?
Answer. The OSD Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) recently
prepared an analysis of the payback. Based on the current estimate to
complete the program, the CAIG predicted the earliest payback period
for the remaining investment (not counting sunk costs) to be on the
order of 30 years. All analyses are based on assumptions about fuel
inflation rates and the number of candidate ships. Over a range of
assumptions, the payback periods average 30 to 40 years.
New Model F-18
Question. The 1998 budget includes $2.5 billion for the F/A-18 E/F
aircraft, of which $268 million is for R&D and $2.2 billion is for
production of 20 aircraft. Mr. Douglass, your statement says that the
F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet program is on track, within cost, below weight,
and meeting all performance criteria. F/A-18 E/F aircraft cost $79
million each for a total program cost of $79.5 billion. What is the
status of the F/A-18 E/F development program?
Answer. The F/A-18E/F entered E&MD (Engineering and Manufacturing
Development) in June 1992. To date, the airframe E&MD contract with
McDonnell Douglas (St. Louis, MO) is 88.9% complete, and the engine
contract with General Electric (Lynn, MA) is 94% complete. The Super
Hornet completed Initial Sea Trials aboard the USS JOHN C. STENNIS
(CVN-74) in January 1997, successfully conducting 64 catapult launches
and arrested landings, as well as demonstrating its flight stability
during carrier approach. All seven flight test aircraft are currently
flying in support of the flight test effort, and have flown in excess
of 441 flights and nearly 713 hours to date. The first year of flight
test has cleared nearly all of the aircraft's clean (without weapons)
flight envelope. Stores separation work was initiated in February 1997.
By February 1998, a significant portion of the loads envelope will have
been flown and the test team will know a great deal about the precise
characteristics weapons exhibit as they are launched from the aircraft.
The F/A-18E/F flight test program will continue through November 1998.
Question. Please explain what difficulties have been experienced in
the test program with the F414 engine.
Answer. The F414 engine experienced failure of a compressor
component which had been recently redesigned to increase engine
efficiency and enhance already existing performance margin. The problem
was addressed by returning to the previous, proven configuration. With
only two ground tests remaining--Engine Gyroscopic Test and Fan
Containment Test, the F414 team anticipates completion of Limited
Production Qualification within the established program schedule.
Although overall impact to the flight test program was a two month
slip, all flight test assets have been reconfigured, and the team is
working to recover margin by closely managing test assets and
capitalizing on test efficiencies.
Question. Please explain what difficulties have been experienced in
the test program with the landing gear.
Answer. Generally there have been no issues with the landing gear
in flight test. The only incident noted so far was an indicator switch
miss rig that caused a planing link warning light to illuminate on one
flight. However, there were no problems with the gear itself.
Question. What problems have been discovered with the structure and
flying qualities of the aircraft?
Answer. Extensive ground test on the Static Test article and
aircraft E-3, the loads aircraft, has been conducted with test results
generally matching analysis, With regards to flying qualities, the
flight control software has remained the same since first flight and
has been praised by test pilots, especially in the powered approach
flight regime around the carrier.
Question. Aircraft weight affects range, speed, payload, and
carrier recovery payload. Although the aircraft remains below its
weight goal--which is good--aircraft weight has been steadily
increasing. Is there a weight problem when all known potential weight
increases and structural redesigns are considered?
Answer. No. Even with all potential weight increases accounted for,
aircraft weight still remains well below the specification weight
requirement. However, with three years remaining in the test program,
additional design changes will likely be identified which will require
use of some of that weight margin.
Question. What effect will McDonnell Douglas' recent loss on the
Joint Strike Fighter competition mean to its overhead, and indirectly
to the F/A-18E/F cost?
Answer. Short-Term Impact--McDonnell Douglass submits proposals
excluding potential contracts that they may be competing for, so the
effect of the loss will have little or no effect on our contracts. In
addition, the JSF work would have been extensively engineering with
little relation to our manufacturing dominated contracts.
Long-Term Impact--McDonnell Douglass will have fewer programs to
spread its overhead rates across; however, overhead cost should
stabilize/slightly increase if McDonnell Douglass optimizes its
infrastructure to meet the needs of its programs.
Joint Strike Fighter
Question. The 1998 budget requests $931 million for concept
development of the Joint Strike Fighter which could become the largest
acquisition in the history of the Department of Defense in terms of
total costs. Mr. Douglass, what is the status of the Joint Strike
Fighter development program?
Answer. The Joint Strike Fighter Program (JSF) plans to develop and
deploy a family of aircraft that affordably meets the next-generation
strike needs of the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps and allies. JSF
Program activities are centered around three distinct objectives that
provide a sound foundation for start of Engineering and Manufacturing
Development (E&MD) in 2001:
(1) facilitating the Services' development of fully
validated, affordable operational requirements;
(2) lowering risk by investing in and demonstrating key
leveraging technologies that lower the cost of development,
production and ownership; and
(3) demonstrating operational concepts.
A multiyear $2.2 billion JSF Concept Demonstration effort commenced
in November 1996 with competitive contract awards to Boeing and
Lockheed Martin for Concept Demonstration programs. These competing
contractors will build and fly concept demonstrator aircraft, conduct
concept unique ground demonstrators, and continue refinement of their
ultimate delivered weapon system concepts. Specifically, Boeing and
Lockheed Martin will demonstrate commonality and modularity, STOVL
hover and transition, and low speed handling qualities of their
respective weapon system concepts. Pratt and Whitney is providing
propulsion hardware and engineering support for both Boeing's and
Lockheed Martin's on-going JSF Concept Demonstration efforts. The JSF
Alternate Engine Program, with General Electric, continues technical
efforts related to development of an alternate engine for production in
order to reap the financial and operational benefits of competition.
Early warfighter and technologist interaction continues as an
essential aspect of the JSF requirements definition process, and is key
to achieving JSF affordability goals. To an unprecedented degree, the
JSF Program is using cost-performance trades early as an integral part
of the weapon system development process. The Service's completion of
the Joint Operational Requirements Document is planned in Fiscal Year
2000 to support the Milestone II decision in Fiscal Year 2001 for start
of E&MD.
A sizable technology effort is underway to reduce risk and life
cycle cost (LCC) through technology maturation and demonstration. The
primary emphasis is on technologies which have been identified as high
payoff contributors to affordability, supportability, survivability and
lethality. Numerous demonstrations have been accomplished and others
are in process to validate performance and LCC impact to component,
subsystem, and the total system.
Question. Last year, concern was expressed by the House National
Security Committee over the viability of the ASTOVL variant of the
aircraft for the Marines (to replace AV-8B Harriers). Please discuss
the issue and how it was resolved, and please verify for us that the
Defense Department is committed to developing an ASTOVL variant of the
aircraft.
Answer. Last year the House Authorization bill stated that no JSF
funds could be spent for ASTOVL development. Neither the House
Appropriations bills contained that language. In fact the House
Appropriations bill contained language stating that the JSF STOVL
variant must be developed ahead of or concurrently with the other
variants. Neither of the final Fiscal Year 1997 Defense Authorization
and Appropriations bills contained STOVL prohibitions. We hope that
support for ASTOVL development continues to be strong both on the
committee, and in the House.
The Defense Department is fully committed to development of a STOVL
JSF variant for the Marines. The JSF program is fully funded within the
FYDP and STOVL is an integral part of it.
As you know, we are in the Program Definition and Risk Reduction
phase (PD&RR) of JSF now. The Concept Demonstration portion of PD&RR
requires each industry team to build two flying demonstrators, one
conventional and one STOVL. Demonstration of STOVL hover and transition
is a key aspect of this phase and is required by the Single Acquisition
Management Plan. The Concept Demonstration program provides two
different STOVL approaches and aerodynamic configurations, and
maintains a competitive environment between contractors prior to E&MD.
Additionally propulsion development continues during this phase with a
byproduct of STOVL development being significant improvements in single
engine durability and reliability for all variants. In short, we feel
that we have a strong STOVL development program within JSF and we are
committed to maintaining it.
Question. Most of us remember the Air Force's ``Great Engine War,''
where a billion dollars were spent to bring a second contractor into
the fighter engine business and which resulted in better engines at
significantly lower cost. The Navy recently signed a $97 million
``alternate engine'' contract for the Joint Strike Fighter. Please
explain your strategy and your plans to use $10 million provided by
Congress for risk reduction to facilitate this effort.
Answer. During the JSF Concept Development Phase, all three
competing weapon system contractors chose the Pratt and Whitney F-119
or derivative as the primary propulsion system for the Concept
Demonstration Phase. Recognizing the financial and operational benefits
of competition, the JSF Program is pursuing the development of a
competitive engine for production.
Phase I of this effort began in fiscal year 1996 with a General
Electric study effort to determine the comparative Life Cycle Cost and
performance of the GE F110 and YF120 derivative engines in each of the
preferred weapon system concepts. Based on the study results, the
government selected the YF120 engine derivative for continued
development. Phase I initiated preliminary design risk reduction
studies, systems design/integration, cycle refinement, and component
design and associated technology maturation for the YF 120 derivative
engine. Phase II, which commenced in fiscal year 1997, will continue
detailed design and begin hardware testing of the YF120 engine,
culminating in core testing beginning in fiscal year 1999.
Conress appropriated an additional $10 million for fiscal year 1997
competitive engine efforts. This funding will be used for a variety of
risk reduction efforts including: turbine rig test and analysis, core
integration, core supportability, material characteristics, weapon
system concept integration, and diagnostics.
Question. Please discuss your plans for cooperation with other
nations in this program, and what they bring to the table in terms of
capabilities and financial contributions.
Answer. The JSF Program Office has established a framework to
accommodate international participation during the concept
demonstration phase of the program. Currently, the United Kingdom is on
board as a full collaborative partner, with emphasis on the JSF STOVL
variant. The UK is contributing $200 million to the program for this
phase. The Netherlands, Norway and Denmark will soon join the program
as associate partners, with primary interest in the JSF CTOL variant.
The total planned financial contribution for this effort is $32 million
with signature of the multilateral agreement planned in April 1997. The
Canadians have formally requested to join the program and negotiations
are expected to commence in April 1997. Numerous other countries have
received briefs on the program and are interested as well.
Benefits to be derived from international participation in the
program include a harmonization of the requirement with our allies
which will lead to improved interoperability, strengthened
international ties and lower overall program cost as a result of future
anticipated international buys of the JSF (i.e., lower unit cost).
Firm financial contributions and associated efforts are
incorporated in JSF Program plans and funding and are reflected in the
fiscal year 1998 President's Budget request.
V-22 Aircraft
Question. The 1998 budget requests $530 million in R&D and $542
million in procurement for production of 5 V-22 aircraft. Mr. Douglass,
your statement says that MV-22 is the highest priority for Marine Corps
aviation and that the current acquisition profile for the MV-22 will
complete the projected aircraft procurement in 25 years. At this rate,
V-22 cost $87 million each for a total program of $45.5 billion Last
year, the Committee directed that the V-22 program achieve a production
rate of 36 aircraft per year by the year 2000. Why did the Navy ignore
us?
Answer. We have increased the procurement of V-22s by 16 aircraft
over the request from last year, increasing to 24 aircraft per year by
the end of the FYDP. We fully recognize the need to get the rate up and
to replace the current fleet of medium lift helicopters. In the final
analysis, we had to take a hard look at balancing all of the
Department's requirements with the available resources.
Question. Last year, all 4 Committees in the Defense budget process
provided advance procurement funds for 12 aircraft in 1998. Yet, only 5
aircraft are now budgeted. Why did you not take advantage of this
opportunity?
Answer. We share the Committees' commitment to increasing the
production rate of the V-22, and we have made significant progress with
the current request. In reviewing the additional funds required to
procure the additional 7 aircraft, we simply were not in a position to
pursue it this year. Since the Conference Report made provisions for us
to request reprogramming of the $70 million, we have made that request
and ask for your prompt approval.
Question. Is a 25 year production profile acceptable to the
Commandant or the theater CINCS?
Answer. I cannot speak for the CINCS, but for the Commandant, based
on the Fiscal Year 1998 President's Budget, a 22 year procurement
profile is not desirable. The last MV-22 aircraft would be received in
fiscal year 2000. Given the current MV-22 procurement profile, our CH-
46s will be approaching 50 years of age at retirement. I would much
prefer a higher production ramp to 36 MV-22's per year that would
replace our aging CH-46E fleet aircraft 5 years earlier while providing
a significant savings of up to $6 billion.
Question. So, how do we get out of this dilemma?
Navy Answer. In this declining DoD budget era, equipment must be
procured at less than optimum rates in order to achieve a balance that
supports total Department of the Navy warfighting requirements. The
only way to modernize more quickly is to obtain additional fiscal
resources, either from another program or from a Congressional
Enhancement.
Marine Corps Answer. In this declining DoD budget era, equipment
must be procured at less than optimum rates in order to achieve a
balance that supports total Department of the Navy warfighting
requirements. The only way to modernize more quickly is to obtain
additional fiscal resources, either from another high priority program
or from a Congressional Enhancement.
Question. Mr. Douglass, please explain the new plan to pursue a
Special Operations Forces variant of the V-22 aircraft. What are the
costs and what are the benefits?
Answer. A major contract modification was awarded in December 1996
to develop the SOF variant. The plan includes the modification of E&MD
aircraft #8 to integrate the terrain following/terrain avoidance radar
and avionics equipment and the remanufacture of E&MD aircraft #9 to a
full CV-22 configuration. The RDT&E costs are approximately $560
million and procurement costs are about $4.3 billion. The benefits will
be a unique aircraft that will accomplish the long range SOF mission
with the minimum of assets. The 50 CF-22 aircraft to be procured will
replace approximately 100 H-53, H-60 and C-130 aircraft currently being
used by USSOCOM.
Navy Helicopters
Question. The Navy's helicopter master plan consolidates missions
and reduces the types of helicopters used by the Navy. The Navy will
reduce the types of helicopters from seven to two. The plan, which will
be complete by 2012 is aimed at reducing manpower and logistics support
costs. Based on the plan, the Navy will procure a Blackhawk derivative,
the CH-60, to replace current logistics and combat helicopters;
remanufacture SH-60B/SH-60F/HH-60H helicopters to a multi-mission
helicopter, the SH-60R; and outscore military sealift requirements to a
private contractor.
The Navy plans to retire its logistics and cargo helicopters and
replace them with a Blackhawk derivative, the CH-60. In fiscal year
1997, Congress provided an additional $7.5 million to begin the CH-60
program. This year the Navy is requesting $31 million for the CH-60.
The Navy will begin procuring the CH-60 in fiscal year 1999.
During the fiscal year 1998 budget build, DoD accelerated the
schedule and increased the procurement quantities of the CH-60. What
was the rationale for accelerating the CH-60 program? Do you believe
that this is an ambitious schedule? Why or why not?
Answer. The schedule was accelerated for two reasons. First, to
replace the combat logistics aircraft as rapidly as possible to
minimize the investment in components required to keep these aircraft
safely flying. Second, to minimize the potential increased costs
associated with allowing the production line of Sikorsky aircraft to
``go cold'' prior to the initiation of the previously planned CH-60
production. The program acceleration is currently executable, without
incurring unnecessary risks.
Question. What is the program cost and schedule?
Answer. The CH-60 program is currently scheduled to enter full-rate
production in fiscal year 2000, with a production rate of a minimum of
18 aircraft per year through completion of minimum of 134 aircraft in
fiscal year 2006 to support the combat logistics and combat SAR
requirements. The Navy is reviewing potential revisions to the rotary
wing infrastructure which may adjust the total number of required
aircraft upwards. The total procurement cost of the program, as
currently planned, is $2.6 billion in instant fiscal year 1997 dollars.
Question. It is our understanding that the fiscal year 1998 budget
request does not include advance procurement funds. Are advance
procurement funds required in fiscal year 1998 in order to begin
production in fiscal year 1999? If so, how can you begin production in
1999?
Answer. Advance procurement (AP) for the CH-60 program was removed
from the fiscal year 1998 budget by the Navy, in response to the
interpretation of OSD direction to remove AP when not required or
economically justified. The CH-60 had planned to benefit by the pricing
provided by the contractor in the current Army H-60 contract. The lack
of Navy H-60 production or advance procurement funding in fiscal year
1998 will result in a production break of approximately nine months at
the contractor's facility, with a resulting increase in ``production
start-up costs'' and a requirement to enter into a new and distinct
contract. The program office has recognized and briefed that without
advance procurement the production schedule will increase from the
currently planned 12 to 18 months, to between 21 and 27 months. There
will be no change in production start (manufacturing of components),
but there will be a 9-month delay in production completion of fully
assembled aircraft.
Question. Last year, the Army requested funds and the authorization
for a Blackhawk multi-year contract for fiscal years 1997 through 2001.
In the fiscal year 1998 budget request, the Army has reduced the
funding and production schedule of Blackhawks. What is the impact on
the Navy CH-60 program, in terms of per unit and total program cost, by
the Army's decision not to go forward with the multi-year contract?
Answer. The current program pricing is based upon commitment by
Sikorsky aircraft to maintain the previously provided pricing for a
sustained rate of 36 per year as long as the Navy maintains a minimum
production rate of 18 aircraft per year. As a result, the Navy does not
expect a change in per unit or total program cost.
Question. It is our understanding that DoD has released the fiscal
year 1997 funds for the CH-60 program; however, the Army has not
provided the Blackhawk helicopter for CH-60 development and testing.
Could you explain what the problem is? When will it be resolved?
Answer. The requisite Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the
Army and Navy for transfer of a UH-60L to the Navy for demonstration of
the CH-60 capabilities in fiscal year 1997 has been signed. The MOA was
delayed as both Components' counsel ensured it to be in accordance with
Congressional direction and law. (Congressional support (i.e., waiver
of statute) is believed to be required to allow the Navy to replace the
UH-60L ``in-kind'' from the production line in fiscal year 1999). The
UH-60L is at Sikorsky, and the CH-60 modification effort has begun.
Question. To reduce costs and infrastructure associated with its
anti-submarine and surface warfare platforms, the Navy will
remanufacture Seahawk (SH-60B/SH-60F/HH-60H) helicopters to a multi-
mission helicopter, the SH-60R. For fiscal year 1998, the Navy is
requesting $71 million for the SH-60R development program. What is the
acquisition strategy for the SH-60R? What is the cost of the
acquisition program?
Answer. The Navy is using cost-type contracts to conduct
Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD). Fixed price contracts
will be used for production phases of the SH-60R program. Total
procurement is expected to be $4.7 billion (FY93$).
Question. According to the Navy, flight hours for Seahawk
helicopters are exceeding planned operational usage--H-60s are wearing
out faster than anticipated. Given the increased optempo of the
Seahawk, are you satisfied with the delivery schedule of the SH-60R?
Why or why not?
Answer. The current SH-60R schedule will satisfy the Navy's
requirement. The increasing operational demands on the HSL community
caused by the introduction of additional LAMPS MK III capable surface
combatants makes the number of available HSL aircraft in the fiscal
year 2001 through fiscal year 2004 critical. Bureau number by bureau
number management of aircraft undergoing re-manufacture as well as
those undergoing standard depot level maintenance will be used to
mitigate impacts to the operational forces.
Question. Although it is called a ``remanufacture'' program, the
SH-60R is really an integration of improved sensor and system
improvements to ensure the viability of the helicopter for the next 20
years. Last year, the Navy was considering a service life extension
program that would increase the life of the platform from 10,000 to
20,000 hours. Are you still planning to do a service life extension
program? If so, is the program funded in your budget--what is the cost
and schedule? If not, why?
Answer. A SLEP, extending the useful aircraft service lives from
10,000 flight hours to 20,000 flight hours, remains part of the
remanufacture program. The Service Life Assessment Program (SLAP, which
identifies the SLEP requirements) has not been completed. However,
preliminary assessment indicates an approximate labor and material cost
of $5 million per aircraft. This amount is included in the existing
funding request.
Question. The Navy believes it will reduce logistics and
infrastructure costs by developing identical avionics and cockpits for
the SH-60R and the CH-60. The CH-60, which is primarily a transport
helicopter, will receive the same sophisticated avionics required by
the multi-mission SH-60R helicopter. The SH-60R will perform anti-
submarine and -surface warfare. The unit cost for the CH-60 could
increase as a result of commonality; however, the Navy believes that
the life cycle cost savings will outweigh production costs. Which
components will have an increased unit cost as a result of commonality?
What is the estimated increase?
Answer. The Navy Helo Master Plan resolves the Navy's entire
current and anticipated rotary-wing needs in a well formulated and
thought-out plan, with consideration for minimizing the future
procurement, support and infrastructure costs. Within this plan, the
CH-60 directly addresses the near-critical availability, age, and cost
of ownership of the CH-46 Combat Logistics Support aircraft, and the
requirements for air-station, amphibious, and Combat Search and Rescue
(SAR) aircraft. Additionally, because the CH-60 replaces HH-60H that
will be remanufactured into SH-60R, the CH-60 helps address the
identified shortfall of available Light Anti-Submarine Warfare
Helicopter (HSL) assets to support existing and future surface
combatants, and the need to update the reserve HSL components with
capability equivalent to the active forces.
The CH-60 and SH-60R are intended to include nearly-identical
cockpit and flight avionics, but not sensors and mission avionics, to
reduce supply requirements, maintenance costs, and operator training
costs. The common cockpit for these platforms is still in design.
However, the two prime contractors have been given guidance that the
entire cockpit and flight avionics suite is not to exceed $1 million
per aircraft. The flight avionics for the last lot of HH-60H aircraft
cost approximately $635 thousand; the maximum expected procurement cost
increase to support commonality approximates $250 thousand per
aircraft. Components that may increase in procurement costs to support
the benefits of commonality are: programmable keysets vs. Control/
Display Navigation Units (CDNUs), 6 x 8 inch flat panel flight displays
vs. 4\1/4\ x 4\1/4\ inch situational displays, and inertial navigation
vs. doppler based navigation. Each of these changes would still be
required as ``kits'' for those CH-60 performing the Combat SAR mission
if not already provided in the baseline aircraft.
Question. What is the estimated life cycle cost savings as a result
of commonality? When will the Navy realize those savings?
Answer. While the total anticipated life cycle cost reduction to
the Navy is the ``cornerstone'' of the Navy Helo Master Plan, any
numbers presented now would be incomplete. We continue to identify and
refine projected cost reductions using the model developed by US
AIRWAYS to support their decision to reduce type/model/series aircraft
across their organization in order to increase their profits. Although
final organizational performance measures are different for the Navy
(e.g. readiness vs. profits), the areas for reducing expenses are
strongly similar. The Navy will realize the anticipated cost reductions
as type/model/series helicopters are removed from the active Naval
inventory.
Question. Many of the avionics components for the SH-60R are
currently in development. Integrating these new components may result
in a schedule slip and increased cost for the CH-60 program. Which
components are currently under development? When will those components
be available for integration on the CH-60? Which components are most
likely to cause a schedule slip?
Answer. The design of SH-60R flight avionics is under revision, due
to the potential reduction in cost of ownership through use of
available commercial technology. All major components for revised
flight avionics are existing commercial or ``ruggedized'' commercial
components. While the potential always exists for a schedule slip, the
plan to reduce dependence on technology development by using hardware
and software available in the open market leads the program office to
believe there will be no schedule slip for either aircraft. The costs
of flight avionics designs have been predominantly allocated to the SH-
60R program, so the integration costs to the CH-60 revolve around
wiring modification, drawings, and generation of installation technical
directives; the estimated cost to the CH-60 program is approximately
$6.5 million. No further cost growth is anticipated. Both the SH-60R
and the CH-60 programs will need the designs completed, and hardware
flight qualified and available by first quarter fiscal year 1998; this
is achievable, with low to moderate risk. The components or activities
most likely to cause a schedule slip would be the integration of cards,
``cardsets'', backplane and the operating system that would make up the
scaleable mission computer.
Question. The Navy is conducting a demonstration for outsourcing
military sealift requirements. The Navy believes it may be more
operationally and economically effective to allow commercial helicopter
operators to transport equipment from shore to ship. When will this
demonstration be completed?
Answer. The demonstration of outsourcing of MSC requirements is
expected to be completed in mid September 1997.
Question. When will the Navy make a decision on outsourcing?
Answer. The Navy will make a decision after demonstration
completion, and submission of the associated report to the Smith
Appropriations Committee (about third quarter Fiscal Year 1998).
Question. If the Navy decides that outsourcing is not operationally
and economically feasible, how will you satisfy your helicopter
military sealift requirements? Will this require an increased
procurement of helicopters? If so, how many helicopters will be needed
and what is the estimated cost of such a procurement?
Answer. If the Navy decides that outsourcing is not operationally
and economically feasible, the helicopter MSC requirements will be
reviewed. Additional procurement of helicopters may be required.
Marine Corps Helicopters
Question. The helicopters in the Marine Corps fleet were fielded in
the mid 1980's. The Marine Corps developed a ``Rotary Wing
Modernization Plan'' as the guideline to modernize its current
helicopter fleet. According to the plan, the Marine Corps will replace
heavy and medium assault support helicopters with the MV-22 and upgrade
Huey utility and Cobra attack helicopters. In fiscal year 1998, the
Marine Corps is requesting $529 million to procure MV-22's and $80
million to begin a Huey/Cobra helicopter upgrade program. Is the Marine
Corps ``Rotary Wing Modernization Strategy'' adequately funded in the
budget? If not, what are the shortfalls?
Answer. The Marine Corps is adequately funded within the
constraints of the Department of the Navy's budget. Additional funding
would allow an accelerated replacement of our aging aircraft with
modern, technologically advanced, and Joint Strategy Review/National
Military Strategy aircraft.
The helicopters in the Marine Corps fleet were fielded in the mid
1980's. The Marine Corps developed a ``Rotary Wing Modernization Plan''
as the guideline to modernize its current helicopter fleet. Accordingly
to the plan, the Marine Corps will replace heavy and medium assault
support helicopters with the MV-22 and upgrade Huey utility and Cobra
attack helicopters. In fiscal year 1998, the Marine Corps is requesting
$529 million to procure MV-22's and $80 million to begin a UH-1N Heuy/
AH-1W Cobra helicopter upgrade program (4BN/4BW).
Question. The Marine Corps ``Rotary Wing Modernization Strategy''
outlines a plan for replacing helicopters currently in the fleet. Some
of the aircraft will be over 40 years old when they are retired. Is the
``Rotary Wing Modernization Stragey'' based on fiscal restraints or
operational requirements? Are you comfortable with the helicopter
replacement schedule--should it be accelerated? Why or why not?
Answer. Our modernization program is based on our long standing
neckdown strategy of: the V-22, the 4BN/4BW and the CH-53E. We are
concerned with the paced of this modernization effort; however, fiscal
constraints prevent the Marine Corps from modernizing at a faster rate.
Question. The MV-22 will replace the CH-46E and CH-53A/D
helicopters. The CH-46E provides medium assault support; the CH53A/D
provides heavy assault support. Based on the Marine Corps budget, it
will take 29 years to replace the CH-46E and CH-53A/D with the MV-22.
What is the anticipated structural life expectancy for the CH46E and
CH-53A/D?
Answer. In February 1996, Naval Air Systems Command extended the
structural life of the CH-46 to 15,000 hours. The estimated airframe
fatigue life limit for the CH-53D is 10,000 hours. The CH-53A is no
longer in service.
Question. When will the CH-46E and CH-53A/D reach their anticipated
structural life expectancy? How many of each type of helicopter will be
in the inventory at that time?
Answer. The first CH-46E will reach the 15,000 hour service life
limit in fiscal year 2010. Based on the current MV-22 acquisition plan,
the estimated CH-46E inventory in fiscal year 2010 will be 43 aircraft.
Based on an estimated airframe fatigue life limit of 10,000 hours,
operational CH-53Ds begin to reach their fatigue life limit in fiscal
year 2000 with an inventory of 46 aircraft. The CH-53D will require a
Service Life Assessment Program (SLAP) to determine future life
extension requirements. The CH-53A is no longer in service.
Question. Are the actual operational hours exceeding the planned
hours for the CH-46E and CH-53A/D? If so, please explain.
Answer. Actual utilization is not exceeding budgeted utilization.
Budgeted versus actual utilization is shown for the CH-46E and the CH-
53D. The CH-53A is no longer in service.
Utilization
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CH-46E\1\
-------------------
Budgeted Actual
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 95............................................... 25.5 24.3
FY 96............................................... 25.6 21.9
FY 97*.............................................. 25.4 18.2
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CH-53D\1\
-------------------
Budgeted Actual
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 95............................................... 21.5 19.3
FY 96............................................... 22.4 18.0
FY 97*.............................................. 22.3 11.1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Reflect 3 months of reporting.
CH-53D transition to Hawaii prevented achievement of budgeted
utilization during FY 95/96.
Question. For the record, please provide the planned retirement
schedule for the CH-46E and the CH-53A/D based on the current MV-22
acquisition plan.
Answer. The lengthy 24-year ``procurement-to-delivery'' profile of
the MV-22 prevents a rapid transition and retirement of the aging CH-
46E and CH-53D fleet. Current plans call for a ``one-for-one''
transition of our CH-46E and CH-53D aircraft. Based upon current
delivery schedules, we will initiate the transition of our first CH-46E
Squadron during fiscal year 2001 and transition the last Medium Lift
Squadron during fiscal year 2015.
Question. The fiscal year 1998 budget request includes funds to
improve the CH-46E and the CH-53D. The upgrades include installing the
global positioning system and new radios on the helicopters. For the
record, please provide a list of the budgeted improvements/upgrades for
the CH-46E and CH-53A/D. Do you believe making only those improvements,
which are currently funded, will make the CH-46E and CH-53A/D
operationally safe until after the year 2015? Why?
Answer. These aircraft will be safe to operate. The Marine Corps'
modernization program ensures that medium helicopters will be safe to
operate until planned replacement by the MV-22.
The CH-46 fleet is undergoing a Dynamic Component Upgrade Program
which replaces rotor heads, critical components in the flight control
system, and certain drive train and transmission components. This
upgrade will remove all the burdensome operating limitations now in
place on the CH-46.
The CH-53D will undergo a service life assessment to determine
future life extension requirements. Accelerating the V-22 procurement
will help us to avoid a Service Life Extension Program on either the
CH-46 or the CH-53D.
Budgeted improvements/upgrades for the CH-46E and CH-53D are as
follows:
CH-46E
Global Positioning System
AN/ARC-210 SINCGARS capable radios
Dynamic Component Upgrade
Night Vision Goggle Head Up Display (NVG HUD)
CH-53D
Global Positioning System
AN/ARC-210 SINCGARS capable radios
Night Vision Goggle Head Up Display (NVG HUD)
Night Vision Goggle Compatible Exterior Lighting
Question. The CH-53E is a heavy cargo helicopter. Originally
fielded in the mid-1980's, the CH-53E will remain the Marine Corps
inventory until after 2015. The CH-53E will be replaced with the
``National Rotorcraft Transport.'' What is the anticipated structural
life expectancy of the CH-53E?
Answer. The H-53E Service Life Assessment Program (SLAP) interim
report determined that the H-53E airframe fatigue life is 6,750 hours.
The SLAP is scheduled for completion in May 1997 at which time Sikorsky
will release the final report.
Question. When will the CH-53E reach its anticipated structural
life expectancy?
Answer. At the current utilization rate, the first CH-53E will
reach the 6,750 hour airframe fatigue life limit in the fiscal year
2000 timeframe with the last CH-53 planned to reach its fatigue life
limit in the fiscal year 2017 timeframe.
Question. Are the actual operational hours (of CH-53E) exceeding
the planned operational hours? If so, by how much?
Answer. Recent execution in our tactical heavy lift squadrons have
not exceeded our budgeted hours. Actual utilization versus budgeted
utilization since fiscal year 1995 is as follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Utilization
-------------------------------------
Budget Actual
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY95.............................. 20.5 21.8
FY96.............................. 20.6 16.6
FY97\1\........................... 20.4 13.8
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Based upon 3 months of reporting.
The fiscal year 1996/1997 decline in utilization can be directly
attributed to our swashplate maintenance problem. This problem is being
corrected and we should see a utilization increase in the future.
Question. The Marine Corps ``Rotary Wing Modernization Plan''
proposes a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) for the CH-53E
beginning in 2000. For the record, please describe the proposed SLEP--
include the anticipated cost, schedule, and proposed upgrades. Also
include the new structural life expectancy of the SLEP CH-53E.
Answer. As presently funded, the proposed SLEP for the H-53E will
correct critical airframe structure components identified in the
interim Service Life Assessment Program (SLAP) report. Correction or
modification of these critical areas will extend the service life out
to 12,000 hours. Within the Future Years Defense Plan, $38 million is
applied to the H-53E SLEP. The SLAP is scheduled for completion in May
1997. At that time, the SLAP report will be reviewed in order to
determine program content. Subsequently a firm schedule and funding
profile will be developed.
Question. The ``National Rotorcraft Transport'' (NRT) will replace
all of the services heavy cargo helicopters sometime after 2015. To
date, no funds have been requested to begin the development of the NRT.
Since the Marine Corps and the Army's heavy lift cargo helicopters are
aging, both services are planning service life extension programs. What
is the anticipated cost of the NRT program? Would it make more
economical and operational sense to accelerate the NRT rather than
extend the life of the Marine Corps' CH-53E and the Army's cargo
helicopter? Why or why not?
Answer. Estimated costs for the NRT are unknown at this time since
the program is still in the requirements definition phase. However,
acceleration of the NRT would not affect the Marine Corps' requirement
to extend the service life of the CH-53E. Based on historical program
development, any economical delivery of the NRT would occur after the
first CH-53E reaches its airframe structural limit of 6,750 hours in
fiscal year 2000.
Question. The fiscal year 1998 budget request includes $80 million
to begin an upgrade program for the Marine Corps Cobra Attack and Huey
Utility helicopters. In October 1996, the GAO issued a report stating
the Marine Corps program to upgrade HUEY utility aircraft may not be
cost effective. The report stated that greater savings may be achieved
if the Marine Corps replaced HUEY's in the fleet with new Black Hawk
helicopters. DoD is assessing the Marine Corps HUEY upgrade program and
will issue a report later this month. It is our understanding that the
DoD requested that all of the services attempt to use common
helicopters. The Navy, Air Force, and Army all use Black Hawk
derivatives. The Marine Corps evaluated using Black Hawk for its
utility mission but decided it would be too costly to buy and support.
Therefore, the Marine Corps has decided to upgrade 100 HUEY utility
helicopters. What are the unique Marine Corps requirements that can not
be met with the Black Hawk?
Answer. Although both the UH-1N and the Blackhawk meet our
operational requirements, the Blackhawk costs more to procure, costs
more to operate over the life of the program, requires more manpower to
support, and has a significantly larger logistics footprint. The larger
logistics footprint and manpower requirements would have a negative
impact on our ability to deploy aboard amphibious ships and move our
squadrons via strategic airlift.
Question. What is the coast of the HUEY upgrade program? Is it
adequately funded? If not, what are the shortfalls?
Answer. The UH-1N upgrade program recently singed an Engineering,
Manufacturing, and Design (EMD) contract for $134 million and
anticipates the procurement cost to be $1003.1 million for 100 upgraded
aircraft. The program is fully funded.
Funding
(Then Year $ Million)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
H-1 upgrade FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 To complete Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RDT&E......................... 70 80.7 90.3 152 108.3 51 20 12.6 584.9
APN........................... 0 0 0 0 0 73.7 216.3 2,595.5 2,885.5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. What is the current procurement schedule for the HUEY
upgrade program?
Answer.
Delivery Schedule
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4BN#...................................... 5 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 11 .....
4BW#...................................... 0 5 12 24 24 24 24 24 24 19
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. What is the per unit cost of the HUEY upgrade? What are
the estimated operating and support costs?
Answer. The UH-1N upgrade program recently signed an Engineering,
Manufacturing and Design (EMD) contract for $134 million and
anticipates the procurement cost to be $1003.1 million for 100 upgraded
aircraft. According to the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) the
operating and support costs for the UH-1N are $2.375 billion over 28
years. The per unit cost for the upgraded UH-1N is $10.49 million (OSD
PA&E report dated September 16, 1996.
Question. What was the estimated unit cost of a Black Hawk? Is the
estimated cost based on a multiyear contract or single year? What are
the estimated operating and support costs?
Answer. The estimated unit cost of the Blackhawk is $14.04 million
(OSD PA&E report dated September 16, 1996. This cost was based on a 5
year multiyear contract with a procurement schedule of 36 aircraft per
year. According to the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) the
operating and support costs for the Blackhawk are $3.018 billion over
28 years. This compares with a $2.375 billion cost for the 4BN.
Question. What is the anticipated structural life expectancy of the
upgraded Huey? What is the anticipated structural life expectancy of
the Blackhawk?
Answer. The anticipated structural life expectancy of the upgraded
Huey will be 10,000 flight hours. The anticipated structural life
expectancy of the Blackhawk is 10,000 flight hours.
Question. For the record, please provide the logistic support costs
and manpower requirements for the HUEY and the Black Hawk.
Answer. The Institute for Defense Analysis, in the conduct of the
DOD Helicopter Commonality Study, estimated the operations and support
(O&S) costs for the upgraded UH-1N to be $2.375 billion as compared to
$3.018 billion for the Blackhawk. The Naval Air Systems Command's
HARDMAN maintenance manpower requirements model estimates an additional
288 Marines are required to maintain the UH-60/AH-1W combination over
the requirement for the upgraded UH-1N/AH-1W mix. The O&S costs include
manpower and logistics costs and are calculated using fiscal year 1996
constant dollars for the period of fiscal years 2004 to 2032.
Question. What is the cost impact on the Cobra upgrade program if
the Huey upgrade program is canceled?
Answer. The cost of the Cobra upgrade program will increase by $90
million in procurement costs if the Huey upgrade is canceled.
Marine Corps Ground Systems Research and Development
Question. The Marine Corps fiscal year 1998 budget request for
ground systems research and development is $230 million. This is $43
million--or 18% less than last year's appropriated amount. These funds
are used to develop and test countermine systems, assault vehicles, and
command, control and communications system. Marine Corps Advance
Concept Technology Demonstrations are also funded in this account.
General Oster, is the Marine Corps ground systems research and
development program adequately funded? If not, what is the risk to
future readiness?
Answer. No, our research and development account is not adequately
funded. With our fiscal year 1998 topline down by 4.5% from fiscal year
1997 in terms of real spending power, striking a balance was no easy
task. In order to fund our top priorities--maintaining near-term
readiness and sustaining momentum of quality of life initiatives, we
were forced to shift funds from investment accounts. In order to ensure
the future readiness of the Corps, however, we must adequately fund the
timely development of combat capabilities. If additional funds were
available, I would accelerate the development of the following
programs:
$ in Millions
Program:
Commandant's Warfighting Lab.................................. $19.8
Marine Enhancement Program.................................... 0.6
Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle........................... 10.1
Light Weight 155MM Howitzer................................... 3.6
Tactical Remote Sensor Systems................................ 1.5
Marine Common Hardware Suite Mgmt & Development............... 0.7
Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance Processing & Evaluation
System...................................................... 1.0
Question. Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTD) and DoD
sponsored initiatives developed to accelerate and facilitate the
application of mature advanced technologies to solve military problems
and provide new operational capabilities to the filed sooner than the
normal acquisition process. For the record, please provide the ACTD's
planned for fiscal year 1998. Please include prior year funding,
planned funding for fiscal year 1998, and future funding requirements.
Also include any Defense-wide Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation funds which have or will be provided for each ACTD.
Answer. The only Marine Corps funded ACTD is Extending the Littoral
Battlespace (ELB ACTD). This ACTD is jointly sponsored by the USMC and
the USN. Marine Corps funding is contained in RDT&E, N, PE 0603640M,
Advanced Technology Demonstrations, Project C2223, Advanced Technology
Demonstrations. Funding for this ACTD is as follows: fiscal year 1997,
$5M; fiscal year 98, $10M; fiscal year 99, $10M; fiscal year 00, $10M;
fiscal year 01, $10M; fiscal year 02, $1M; fiscal year 03, $1M.
The Marine Corps participates generically in the Joint Countermine
ACTD. The total cost of this ACTD includes direct funding from OSD as
well as generic support from the Army, Navy and Marine Corps RDT&E
accounts. This ACTD ends in fiscal year 1998. USN funding is as
follows: fiscal year 1997 $0.9 million, fiscal year 1998 $0.8 million.
Question. What process is in place to determine which ACTD
technologies should be fielded? How do you ensure that the technology
will be reliable and operable in military operations?
Answer. ACTD's have a User Sponsor assigned as part of the
management structure. The User Sponsor is responsible for assigning an
Operational Manager who is charged, in conjunction with the
Demonstration Manager, with the execution of the System Demonstration.
Additionally, the User Sponsor is responsible for identification of the
ACTD's Measure's of Effectiveness (MOE's) and ultimately the evaluation
of the technology's military utility and suitability.
ACTD's are chartered to look at both mature and emerging
technologies that can contribute to significant new operational
concepts. Thus, ACTD's are as operationally oriented as they are
technology oriented. Technologies selected for demonstration are
evaluated for their potential contribution to the concept and will
still go through a series of limited objective demonstrations in order
to assess their maturity, interoperability, safety, and reliability,
availability and maintainability with the objective of a major system
demo as a culminating event.
The User Sponsor will incorporate Operational Test activity
personnel as part of his evaluation team. After the major system demo,
successful technologies will be transitioned to the formal acquisition
process for procurement and other further development.
Question. How do you ensure that operating and logistics costs for
successful ACTD technologies can be supported in the budget?
Answer. After a successful ACTD, technologies determined to have
military utility will be left with the operating forces as residuals.
The ACTD office has budgeted for the support of residuals for two years
until the formal acquisition process can assume management
responsibility for these items. Transition planning must be started
early in the ACTD to ensure that necessary funds are programmed and
budgeted for operating and logistics costs. Once budgeted and upon
transition to Milestone III, Approval for Production, systems which
commenced development as Advanced Technology Demonstrations are funded
individually in the Operation & Maintenance, Marine Corps and
Procurement Marine Corps appropriations budget requests.
Question. For the record, please provide a list of the technologies
fielded as a result of the ACTD process. Please include testing,
fielding and support costs for each system.
Answer. The Marine Corps has not had any technologies fielded as a
result of the ACTD process. The only ACTD to which the Marine Corps has
committed fiscal year 1998 funding is the Extending the Littoral
Battlespace (ELB) ACTD. The ELB ACTD is tied closely to the Marine
Corps' Commandant's Warfighting Laboratory and the Navy's Fleet Battle
Experiments. This ACTD process for the Marine Corps began in January
and technologies and concepts demonstrating military utility and
suitability will be transitioned into acquisition.
Question. What are your views as to how the present ACTD program is
structured? How can it be improved?
Answer. The ACTD program is managed by the Deputy Under Secretary
for Defense (Acquisition and Technology) ((DUSD (AT)). The program
provides the Services and the Commanders in Chief (CINCs) with an
alternative approach to streamline the acquisition cycle while
concurrently demonstrating new operational concepts for enhanced
warfighting. The ACTD process allows for more informed acquisition
decisions based upon greater user community involvement early in the
process. ACTD's provide much greater understanding for technology and
concepts prior to a committed acquisition program.
The Extending the Littoral Battlespace (ELB) ACTD has been underway
for approximately 2 months. Due to inexperience in this area over a
reasonable length of time, the Marine Corps can not adequately assess
the ACTD process or structure. As the ELB/ACTD program evolves and
matures, there will be numerous lessons learned which will be applied
to future ACTD programs.
Question. The Marine Enhancement Program (MEP) is an initiative
which provides non-developmental, commercially available equipment
which can be quickly tested, evaluated and fielded for the Marine
Infantryman. The Marine Corps is requesting $4 million for MEP in
fiscal year 1998; $2.5 million for research and development and $1.5
million for procurement. What is the average acquisition timeline for
programs funded in MEP?
Answer. The goal of the MEP acquisition cycle is to take advantage
of procurement reform legislation and initiatives to field meaningful
and important items in shorter than normal timeframes. The average goal
is comprised of one to two years for research, development, testing,
and evaluation and one to three years for procurement. Of additional
importance is the occasional opportunity to test and procure items in
the same year funds are appropriated.
Question. What MEP systems will be tested and evaluated in fiscal
year 1998? When will those systems be fielded?
Answer. The MEP systems to be tested and evaluated in fiscal year
1998 are as follows: Improved Extreme Cold Weather Clothing System;
Improved Medium Pack with Assault Pack; Family of Body Armor; Rifle
Combat Optics; Hardened Day/Night Sight; Lightweight Helmet; Improved
Sun/Wind Goggles; Fire Fly Marking System; Assault Snow Shoe; Cold
Weather Sled; Multi-Purpose Cart; and, Expedient Portable Shower Bag.
These systems will be fielded in the fiscal year 1999-2003 timeframe.
Question. The Army has a similar initiative, the Soldier
Enhancement Program. What process is in place to ensure that there is
no unnecessary duplication between the two programs?
Answer. A Memorandum of Agreement delineates Army and Marine Corps
responsibilities. Also, Marine Corps personnel just attended a Joint
Conference with the Army during March 3-6, 1997. Further, continual
coordination exists between the Marine Corps and Army personnel to
ensure unnecessary duplication does not occur.
High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
Question. The High Mobility, Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV)
is the light tactical vehicle for all of the services. The HMMWV has
been in production since the 1980s. The Army is planning a service life
extension program (SLEP) for the HMMWV. Does the Marine Corps have a
requirement for a HMMWV SLEP? If so, please provide the anticipated
acquisition cost of the program and optimal fielding schedule for the
Marine Corps HMMWV SLEP?
Answer. We have not yet determined whether we will remanufacture
our existing fleet or buy new HMMWVs. However, in order to make a fully
informed decision, we recently completed (January, 1997) a Life Cycle
Cost Estimate (LCCE) for a HMMWV remanufacture (SLEP). The LCCE
estimated the SLEP cost for 17,626 USMC HMMWVs to be $642 million in
fiscal year 1998 constant budget dollars. Optimal remanufacture and
fielding quantities are 10% to 15% of the USMC HMMWV fleet each year
(1,763 to 2,644 vehicles per year).
Question. Would it be more cost effective to procure new, rather
than remanufacture old HMMWV'S? Please explain.
Answer. Based on the current life cycle cost estimate, the
remanufacture of the existing fleet appears to be the most cost
effective acquisition approach to meet the needs of the Marine Corps.
The decision to either buy new HMMWV's or remanufacture existing
HMMWV's will be based on responses to the U.S. Army's future ``Request
for Proposal'' (due to be published during fiscal year 1997) for HMMWV
remanufacture. Based on the costs bid in these future proposals, a
fully informed procurement decision can be made regarding the overall
cost effectiveness of either ``remanufacturing or buying new.''
Question. What is the economic life expectancy of a remanufactured
HMMWV? Of a new HMMWV?
Answer. The service life expectancy of both a remanufactured HMMWV
and a new HMMWV is 14 years.
Question. The Army plans on terminating HMMWV production in fiscal
year 1999. According to Army officials, the HMMWV is a ``world class
off road vehicle''; however, ``supportability'' is becoming an issue.
Furthermore, the Army believes that the HMMWV is ``only marginally
meeting new requirements.'' Do you agree with the Army's assessment of
the HMMWV program? If so, what supportability issues are you
experiencing?
Answer. The existing HMMWV meets the current and projected Marine
Corps requirements for the ``Light Tactical Vehicle Fleet.'' It is our
understanding that the Army has a heavier payload requirement for its
light fleet than the Marine Corps does. This may explain the statement,
``only marginally meeting requirements.'' Parts and logistics support
for USMC HMMWV fleet are considered adequate.
Question. What new requirements will not be met by the current
HMMWV? Could those deficiencies be resolved by modifying the current
vehicle? If not, why?
Answer. No new requirements will be unfilled by the current HMMWV.
Question. Given the cost and development schedule of other tactical
vehicles program, do you think it makes sense to develop a new HMMWV?
Why or why not?
Answer. The USMC does not have a current or projected requirement
for a newly developed HMMWV.
Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle
Question. The Marine Corps is developing the Advanced Amphibious
Assault Vehicle (AAAV). The AAAV will replace the Amphibious Assault
Vehicle which was fielded in the 1970's The AAAV will transport Marines
from a ship to the beach and will also used as a land fighting vehicle.
Mr. Douglass, last year you identified the AAAV as a program that could
be accelerated by one year if additional funds were made available.
According to your testimony, the accelerated program required
increasing the budget request by $20 million in fiscal year 1997 and
$23 million from 1998 to 2002. Congress provided the additional $20
million in fiscal year 1997. The fiscal year 1998 program schedule
shows a Milestone II decision in 2001, a low rate production decision
in 2004, and an initial operating capability in 2006. Ironically, this
is the same schedule you included with your fiscal year 1997 budget
request. Last year you testified that each one of these events would
occur one year earlier if the additional funds were provided. Why is
there no change in the AAAV schedule?
Answer. In our Fiscal year 1997 Report to Congress on AAAV we
provided the funding required to accelerate development one year and
restore the program to its original funding level. The report
identified the need for $20 million in fiscal year 1997 which would
contribute four months of the 12 month acceleration. This is now being
accomplished. The remaining funds displayed would be required to
achieve the additional eight months.
Since the submission of the fiscal year 1997 report, the AAAV prime
contractor has been selected and as such, has afforded us an
opportunity to relook at other ways to accelerate AAAV.
Question. The fiscal year 1998 schedule does show that Full
Operational Capability has been accelerated by one year, from 2014 to
2013. Since the Future Years Defense Plan includes budgets for only
five years when will the accelerated program take place, after 2003?
What is the anticipated cost of the ``accelerated'' AAAV program from
2004 to 2013?
Answer. In April of this year we will submit to Congress a revised
plan and its associated costs.
Question. Since the Navy did not provide the additional funds
required to accelerate the AAAV, what impact, if any, did the
congressional add have on the AAAV program?
Answer. All acceleration plans deal with the AAAV's development
schedule leaving production resources beyond fiscal year 2004
unaltered.
Question. As discussed earlier, the AAAV will replace the
Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV) which was fielded in the 1970's. Based
on the AAAV procurement schedule which ends in 2030, some AAV's will be
almost 60 years old when they are retired. What is the anticipated
economic life for the AAV?
Answer. Current plans call for an AAAV Initial Operational
Capability (IOC) in fiscal year 2006 and Full Operational Capability
(FOC) in 2013. The hull life of the AAV was designed for 50 years which
would indicate a useful life until approximately calendar year 2022. A
depot inspection to repair only as necessary is scheduled for each AAV
every four to five years. With the exception of some normal surface
cracking, which is quickly and easily repaired, no structural defects
have yet been detected and the AAV hull life will likely exceed its 50
year design parameter.
The cost to repair in the field and during scheduled depot
inspections is increasing, but adequately funded at this time. Studies
have been conducted to reduce the expected cost growth with age
(vehicle rebuilding and component replacement). These efforts should
maintain AAV affordability until replacement by the AAAV begins in
fiscal year 2006. Through a combination of continuing improved
reliability and maintainability changes and cost reduction efforts
within the depot, the economic life of the AAV should reliably extend
through the final fielding of the AAAV.
Question. When will the AAV reach its anticipated economic life?
Answer. The cost of maintaining the AAV is increasing with its age.
Projections indicate that by the time the replacement AAAV reaches Full
Operational Capability (FOC) in fiscal year 2013, we will spend over a
billion dollars maintaining the current AAV fleet through cyclical
repairs in the depot. Yet, this maintenance solution remains less
expensive than buying replacement AAVs. The marine Corps systems
Command and marine Corps Logistics Base in Albany, GA have jointly
investigated a number of ways which would reduce the cost of ownership
from between 20% to 40% and ensure the affordability of the AAV until
it is completely retired.
Question. Since it was fielded, what upgrades have been made to the
AAV?
Answer. The procurement schedule for the production of 1013 AAAV's
ends 2012, with FOC in 2013. Additional procurement appropriation
funding is required beyond 2012 to sustain the AAAV through its
remaining life cycle. Since fielded the following upgrades have been
made to the AAV:
Service Life Extension Program (1984-86)
Replaced Engine
Added P-900 Armor
Incorporated Electric Drive Gun Turret
Enhanced Applique Armor
UpGunned Weapons Station
Automatic Fire Sensing and Suppression System
Rotary Bow Plane
Improve Reliable and Maintainable Transmission
Improved Radiator
SINCGARS Radios
Question. Has the AAV gone through a service life extension
program? If so, when and was the vehicle ``remanufactured'' or were
just specific components replaced? Please explain.
Answer. Yes. The service life extension program (SLEP) was
conducted from 1984-1986. The vehicle was stripped down to the hull.
Hull modifications were made to the AAV to improve water dynamics and
to incorporate a new engine. All other components were removed and
either new or rebuilt replacements were installed. The procurement
schedule for the production of 1013 AAAV's ends in 2012, with FOC in
2013. Additional procurement appropriation funding is required beyond
2012 to sustain the AAAV through its remaining life cycle.
Question. The Marine Corps is not considering a service life
extension program for the AAV. Last year the committee was told there
are no anticipated cost estimates for such a program and you believe
that the AAV can remain operational over the next few decades. What are
the potential problems that may arise when using a 30, 40, or 50 year
old amphibious assault vehicle?
Answer. The Marine Corps is not considering a service life
extension program (SLEP) for the AAV. To address the increasing cost to
maintain the aging AAV fleet, a study has been completed for rebuilding
the AAV and applying reliability and maintainability modifications. The
Marine Corps is evaluating the results of that investigation for
affordability.
Some problems associated with the aging AAV asset are as follows:
the diminishing manufacturing resources for parts, normal wear and
fatigue on mechanical and electrical components, compliance with
changing environmental constraints, old technology not easily
compatible with latest innovations, and many years exposure to the
harsh climatic elements in which the Marine Corps normally operates.
The procurement schedule for the production of 1013 AAV's ends in
2012, with FOC in 2013. Additional procurement appropriation funding is
required beyond 2012 to sustain the AAAV through its remaining life
cycle.
Marine Corps Ammunition
Question. The Marine Corps is requesting, $98.8 million for
ammunition. Last year, the Congress provided $132.1 million. Does the
fiscal year 1998 President's budget adequately fund the marine Corps'
requirement for ammunition and sustain the capabilities of the
industrial base? If not, what are the shortfalls?
Answer. The fiscal year 1996 Marine Corps ammunition requirements
study significantly lowered Marine Corps War Reserve (WR) Requirements.
This reduction in the WR has allowed the Marine Corps to prudently
shift assets that had previously been earmarked for WR to training. The
Fiscal Year 1998 President's Budget for ammunition funds the annual
training requirement and funds the combat requirement in the program
years. The residual readiness requirement and strategic readiness
requirement are not completely funded for some ammunition items. The
status and impact of the Fiscal Year 1998 President's Budget on the
industrial base can only be determined by the US Army Industrial
Operations Command (IOC).
Question. Does the fiscal year 1998 budget request fully fund the
Marine Corps combat training requirements for ammunition? If not, what
is the shortfall and what is the impact on your war reserve?
Answer. The Fiscal Year 1998 President's Budget adequately funds
the Marine Corps ammunition requirements. The budget funds the annual
training requirement and meets the combat requirement in the program
years. It reflects an acceptable balance between ammunition
requirements and other high priority Marine Corps requirements.
Nonetheless, some ammunition shortfalls do exist. These can be caused
by adjustments in geographical positioning, production delays, new
training items and changes in training requirements, or when large
quantities of ammunition are relegated to an unserviceable condition
code. At this time the Marine Corps has identified the following
shortfalls:
a. Ctg, 40mm practice Linked M918 (DODIC B584) will be at 16% of
the Approved Acquisition Objective (AAO) at the end of fiscal year 1998
Funded Delivery Period (FDP).
b. Charge, Demolition Assembly M183 (DODIC M757) will be at 33% of
the AAO by the end of the fiscal year 1998 FDP.
c. Ctg, 5.56mm Training Rounds M200 (DODIC A080) will be at 42% of
the AAO at the end of the fiscal year 1998 FDP.
d. Ctg, 5.56mm Training Rounds M200 Linked (DODIC A075 will be at
32% of the AAO at the end of the fiscal year 1998 FDP.
War reserve ammunition is used to satisfy training requirements
only in isolated situations where procurement deliveries are not
keeping up with training demands and the item has such high training
priority that a case-by-case decision is made to support limited
training with war Reserve ammunition.
The fiscal year 1996 ammunition requirements study significantly
lowered Marine Corps War Reserve requirements. This has allowed the
Marine Corps to shift assets that had previously been earmarked for War
Reserve to training. These former war Reserve assets are not considered
as excess since they support training. This drawdown of the former War
Reserve supports near term readiness. When these assets are drawndown,
ammunition procurement levels will have to be increased to support the
long term readiness requirement.
As stated above, the Marine Corps does drawdown War Reserve to meet
training, but only in isolated cases. This affects short term readiness
since the assets are replaced as soon as possible (typically when
delivery of ordered ammunitions occurs).
Question. In fiscal year 1998, the Marine Corps conducted a study
to reevaluate ammunition requirements. The result of the study was a
$1.4 billion drop in war reserve requirements. Based on the study, the
Marine Corps determined that $621 million budgeted for war reserve
ammunition could be applied toward training ammunition. Briefly
describe the Marine Corps ammunition study. What were the assumptions,
the methodology and the conclusions.
Answer. The decrease in the War Reserve Requirement was based on
improvements to the Marine Corps' ammunition model and scenario
changes. In fiscal year 1996, the model looked at 2 near simultaneous
Major Regional Contingencies (MRCs), lasting approximately 90 days each
as per the Defense Planning Guidance. Marine Forces were based on Joint
Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) allocation. Input to the study was
provided by Marine Battalion Commanders, Executive Officers, Operations
Officers, and by the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity. Direct study
oversight was provided by a Marine Corps study group with periodic
briefings to a General Officer Steering Group for recommendations and
concurrence. The study input was run through two computer models, which
were improved to better represent the way Marines fight. The model
incorporated superior integration of the effects of Naval Surface Fire
Support and Naval Aviation into our methodology, and provided more
realistic attrition algorithms. The Scenario changes involved smaller
enemy forces and a shorter combat time frame. The study concluded with
the War Reserve Requirement for POM 98.
Question. The ammunition study resulted in a drastic change in the
ammunition requirements for the Marine Corps. It is our understanding
that the change in requirements was based on a change in Marine Corps
doctrine. Please explain the changes in Marine Corps doctrine.
Answer. The decrease in the War Reserve Requirement was based on
improvements to the ammunition modelling capability and scenario
changes rather than doctrinal changes. The model improvements better
represent the way we fight. They incorporate superior integration of
the effects of Naval Surface Fire Support and Naval Aviation into our
methodology, and provide more realistic attrition algorithms. The
scenario changes involved smaller red forces allocated to the Marine
Corps ground forces and a shorter combat time frame.
Question. The study determined that $833 million of artillery war
reserve requirements were not necessary based on current inventory
levels. For the record please provide a break-out of the type of
artillery round, the acquisition requirement type, and the current
inventory levels for artillery rounds currently in the inventory.
Answer.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sept. 30,
DODIC Nomenclatuore TM/AAO 1996
Inventory
------------------------------------------------------------------------
D003......................... Charge, 6,935 72,236
Spotting
Projectile.
D501......................... PROJ, 155MM 5,971 27,697
APERS ADAM-L.
D502......................... PROJ, 155MM 20,502 56,045
APERS ADAM-S.
D505......................... PROJ, 155MM 13,697 196,142
ILLUM.
D510......................... PROJ, 155MM 1,827 2,474
COPPERHEAD.
D514......................... PROJ, 155MM 15,653 62,758
RAAM-S.
D515......................... PROJ, 155MM 5,189 30,245
RAAM-L.
D528......................... PROJ, 155MM 13,497 1089,362
SMOKE WP.
D532......................... CHG, PROP 155MM 247,461 306,675
RED BAG.
D533......................... CHG, PROP 155MM 101,326 586,916
WHITE BAG.
D539......................... CHG, PROP 155MM 3 123
DUMMY.
D540......................... CHG, PROP 155MM 76,701 592,425
GREEN BAG.
D541......................... CHG, PROP 288,904 865,476
15L5MM WHITE
BAG.
D544......................... PROJ, 155MM HE. 234,161 698,440
D550......................... PROJ, 155MM 28,657 60,689
SMOKE WP.
D563......................... PROJ, 155MM 70,676 909,022
HEDP (ICM).
D579......................... PROJ, 155MM 157,041 12,729
HERA.
D864......................... PROJ, 155MM DP- 65,421 171,424
ICM BASEBLEED.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. The Marine Corps ammunition study did not define
industrial base issues. When will you evaluate the impact of the
ammunition study recommendations on the industrial base?
Answer. The Office of the Secretary of Defense has not defined how
regeneration of the industrial base is to be addressed in the budget
process for items which can not be produced within the Defense Planning
Guidance timeframe. Industrial base regeneration requirements following
a major regional conflict have been provided to the US Army Industrial
Operations Command for use in accurately sizing the munitions
industrial base.
Question. Did the ammunition study aggregate old munition
quantities with modern munitions quantities to determine the levels of
ammunition on hand? If so, which modern munitions would need to be
procured to replace old munitions?
Answer. The Marine Corps ammunition study established the War
Reserve Requirement for Preferred Munitions only. The Marine Corps
ammunitions. Older munitions are drawn down as substitutes for training
where applicable. This process ensures Preferred Munitions are
available for combat, while making efficient use of current assets for
training.
Question. Last year, the Committee requested that the Marine Corps
submit a report regarding the type and acquisition objective for
kinetic energy tank rounds. What is the status of the report?
Answer. Information regarding the type and acquisition objective
for kinetic energy tank rounds was submitted in the response to a
Congressional Data Request (CDR). That CDR included the following
statements:
Based upon Congressional direction, the Marine Corps has reviewed
the requirement for kinetic energy tank ammunition and made the
following determinations:
a. The current War Materiel Requirement (WMR) for 120mm kinetic
energy rounds for the M1A1 main battle tank is 15,481 model M829A1
rounds (DODIC C380). The model M829A2 round is not included in this
requirement nor is there a specific Marine Corps requirement for the
M829A2.
b. The currently fielded M829A1 is capable of defeating the
majority of targets. The added capability of the M829A2 does not
provide enough of a performance advantage over the M829A1 to justify
making the M829A2 the preferred munition.
c. The Marine Corps believes that there is a greater cost benefit
in waiting for the significant performance improvements expected to be
offered by the M829A3 (currently undergoing testing).
Question. It is our understanding that there has been a significant
increase in the cost of explosives manufactured at the Holston
Ammunition Plant--up to a 500% increase. Last year, Congress provided
funds to procure items which use explosive material manufactured at
Holston. Briefly describe the situation at the Holston Ammunition
Plant. How does the Marine Corps proposed to resolve the issue?
Answer. The ammunition item prices for explosives produced at
Holston were significantly increased based upon the new anti-terrorist
legal requirement to ``tag'' the explosive material portion of the
ammunition called C4. Exact technical explanations are available from
the U.S. Army Industrial Operations Command. Re-utilization of old C-4
components by melting and inserting ``tags'' is one alternative to
reduce the increase in price. Additionally, the Marine Corps will begin
to search for competitively priced off-shore tagged C4 and ammunition
sources.
Question. Will you use fiscal year 1997 funds to procure the items
which require explosives manufactured at Holston? If not, will you
reprogram the dollars?
Answer. Yes. The Marine Corps intends to procure items requiring
explosives manufactured at Holston. Some funds will be used to tag and
reutilize the existing C-4 explosive material in order to lower the
cost of the Mine Clearing Line Charges and the Demolition Charges.
Question. For the record, please provide a listing of the items
which require explosive material manufactured at Holston. Please
include the amount appropriated for each item.
Answer. The amounts appropriated in fiscal year 1997 for items
which require explosive materials manufactured at Holston are as
follow:
M183 Demolition Charges, $19. 6 million
M59A1 Mine Clearing Line Charges, $16.7 million
M58A4 Mine Clearing Line Charges, $8.0 million
M830A1 120mm HEAT-MP-AA Cartridges, $6.9 million
Question. The DoD established the Conventional Ammunition Working
Fund (CAWF), a working capital fund, to standardize ammunition
procurement. Since a large number of conventional ammunition items
share common components and materials, DoD believed that it made
economical sense to have a single manager buy the conventional
ammunition for the all services. The initial order it funded by the
CAWF; upon receipt of the ammunition the service reimburses the CAWF.
It is our understanding that the CAWF will be eliminated in fiscal year
1999. What do you believe will be the impact of that decision?
Answer. The Marine Corps cannot yet ascertain the impact of closing
the CAWCF in fiscal year 1999. The replacement procedures have not yet
been approved by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The potential
loss of fixed standard pricing for ammunition concerns the Marine
Corps. This loss could result in increased price changes during the
execution of the budget which would cause a lower quantity of rounds to
be procured. In practice, orders are not processed within the CAWCF
until funding is received from the Service requiring the ammunition.
Question. What are your views of the CAWF? How can it be improved?
Answer. The Marine Corps has supported the CAWCF with proposed
improvements in financial tracking, discipline and control over support
costs. These support costs are commonly referred to as surcharges,
i.e., engineering, industrial stocks, and quality assurance. The Marine
Corps also supported the CAWCF in acquisition reform to reduce lead
times and to better determine actual costs of ammunition.
Question. DoD has not made a decision on what acquisition process
should replace the CAWCF. What is the Marine Corps position?
Answer. The Marine Corps is an active member of the Ammunition
Process Improvement Team (APIT) that has joint Service membership. The
APIT is chaired by OSD and tasked with proposing the follow-on funds
and procedures for ammunition procurement after the CAWCF is closed. A
final recommendation has not been forwarded for review.
Chemical Biological Incident Response Force
Question. Last year Congress provided $10 million to establish the
Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF). This year, the
Marine Corps is requesting $1 million to continue the effort. The
CBIRF's mission is to respond to terrorist chemical and biological and
toxic industrial chemical incidents. What did the fiscal year 1997
funds provide?
Answer. Purchase of certified commercial off the shelf state of the
art equipment for detection, decontamination, force protection,
medical, communications and general support. Fiscal year 1997 funds
will provide the following to CBIRF: Level ``A'' Suits, Level ``A''
(Durable) Suits, Level ``A'' Gloves, Protective Sleeves, Level ``B''
Suits/Coveralls, Self Contained Breathing Apparatus, Portable Air
Compressor, Multi Gas Monitor, Personal Gas Detectors, PH Tester,
Autovent System, Automatic Chemical Agent Director Alarm, Biological
Detector, Photoionization Tester, Air/Liquid Detector Tube System,
Handheld Pulse Oximeter, and Portable Defibrillator. In addition, over
200 other items authorized in the Table of Authorized Material will be
procured during fiscal year 1997.
Question. For fiscal year 1998 you are requesting $1 million for
CBIRF research and development activities. Please explain what
initiatives are funded in fiscal year 1998.
Answer. Technologies being looked at include the following: Phase
Change Cooling Garment, Hand-washing Portable Decontamination System,
Advanced Handheld Chemical/Industrial Hazard Detector Plume modeling,
Bio-Sensors, Chem/Bio Mass Spectrometer. Additionally, live agent and
testing on commercial equipment to ensure acceptability for CBRIF
mission will be performed.
Question. According to your budget documents the CBRIF will be
equipped with off-the shelf equipment, yet your budget includes no
procurement dollars until 2000. What research and development
initiatives are in your future year defense plan? Does your budget
include adequate funds to field those systems you will be developing?
If not, what is the shortfall?
Answer. Last year's funds were used to procure those end items
deemed urgent in providing a reasonable CBIRF response capability. If
an additional $15 million were provided, the remaining ``off-the-
shelf'' end items would be procured, thereby completing the outfitting
of CBIRF.
The CBIRF R&D budget supports the following technology capabilities
that will be developed and tested in the fiscal year 1999-2003
timeframe: Bio Samplers with Ultra Violet Long Wave Lamps, Gas
Chromatographer, Spill Control Systems, Decontamination Apparatus
(Trailers, Shelters, and Vehicles), Field Deployable Labs, Chemical/
Biological Protective Shelters, Medical Microscopic Isolator, Tele-
medicine Capability (Mini Camera, Mobile Video Tele-Conferencing), and
Fiber Optic Wave Guide Biological Detectors (Testing), Lightweight
Portable Decontamination System, and an ability to interface with Joint
Warning And Reporting Network Communication links.
Accordingly, the procurement dollars budgeted in fiscal year 2000-
2003 represent purchase of the above items as they transition out of
development and into production.
Question. Given their mission, it is essential to provide the CBIRF
with equipment that provides protection from chemical and biological
weapons and toxic industrial chemicals. To date, what equipment have
you provided to the CBIRF? What equipment is still required? Is funding
for that equipment provided in the budget? If so, please provide the
type of equipment, acquisition schedule, and cost.
Answer. Protection procured to date for CBIRF includes: Level ``A''
Suits, Level ``A'' Boots, Self Contained Breathing Apparatus, Portable
Air Compressor, Level ``B'' Suits, Level ``A'' (Durable) Suite, Level
``A'' Gloves, Protective Sleeves.
The following items have not yet been procured: Saratoga Suits,
Quick Donning Masks, Bio Hazard Suits, additional C2 Canisters,
Toxicological Agent Protective Aprons, Skin Decon Kits, Chemical
Footwear Covers, Chemical Protective Gloves, Chem-Bio Protective Mask
(M40) helmet covers, and First Aid Kits. Funding for these items is not
included in the FY98 Budget due to topine constraints. However, if an
additional $15 million was provided, these remaining CBIRF procurement
items would be procured.
Question. The proposed unit strength for the CBIRF will be 350 to
400 marines. What is the current strength? When will you achieve your
planned unit strength?
Answer. The current strength for CBIRF is 345. A total manpower
strength of 374 is scheduled to be achieved during fiscal year 1998.
Mine Warfare
Question. Mine warfare was identified as a major deficiency during
Operation Desert Storm. Mr. Douglass, please describe the Navy's mine
warfare strategy.
Answer. Navy has developed a mine warfare strategy based on
progressive introduction of mine countermeasures (MCM) capabilities
developed to become an integral element of fleet operations. The vision
is to provide MCM functionality to the commander with a mix of
dedicated and organic capability, rather than relying solely on our
current force of dedicated MCM assets. The immediate focus is defined
by a Near-term Campaign Plan which encompassed 1996 and 1997 programs
and initiatives. This plan identified shortfalls in mine warfare
capabilities and programs which could resolve these deficiencies in the
shortest period of time with the greatest increase in capability. The
next element, the Mid-term Campaign Plan, is defined by the budget
years, fiscal years 1998 to 2003. This Plan continues the initiatives
and expands on the programs of the Near-term Plan. These investments
stress the steady improvement of mine countermeasures readiness and
sustainability, and progressive funding of initiatives to eliminate
capability gaps and integration of MCM into the fleet. The final
element, the Far-term Campaign Plan, focuses beyond the current budget
with an emphasis on those science and technology developments which
have the most promise for solving capability shortfalls. The Navy's
mine warfare strategy is an evolutionary effort that has demonstrated
over the past two years stability in its planning and commitment for
its successful execution.
Question. What major mine warfare programs are in your budget, and
are they fully funded?
Answer. Most mine warfare programs do not fall within the ``major''
acquisition program category. Mine warfare capabilities are being
developed as many minor acquisition efforts managed by the Program
Executive Office for Mine Warfare. The largest mine warfare acquisition
program we have, the mine countermeasures ships (MCM and MHC classes)
are nearing completion with only three MHCs remaining to be delivered
within the next year.
Funding for mine warfare programs receives attention at the highest
levels of Navy, the Joint Staff and OSD. In accordance with Public Law
102-190 Section 216, both Navy and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
determine that the programs contained in the Mine Countermeasures
master plan have sufficient funds in the President's Budget. The
Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) also reviews the
plan before certifying to Congress that Navy has sufficient resources
for its execution.
Question. What mine warfare funding shortfalls remain?
Answer. In the formulation of the fiscal year 1997 Mine Warfare
Plan, the resource sponsor for Mine Warfare, Director, Expeditionary
Warfare Division (N85) identified some funding shortfalls that required
resolution to execute initiatives in the Near-term Campaign Plan. As
part of the fiscal year 1997 budget submission, offsets were identified
for the RDT&E and OPN shortfalls. The only remaining funds to be
resolved are $6.155 million of OMN for the Near-term Campaign Plan
initiatives of: readiness and substainability; route survey and
database development; and the Mine Warfare Readiness/Effectiveness
Measuring (MIREM) Program. Since OMN is one year money, this shortfall
is being addressed in the on-going mid-year budget review.
With regard to the fiscal year 1997 budget, there are ongoing
efforts to coordinate the release of Congressional plus-up funds for
fiscal year 1997 for specific mine warfare programs. These funds are
intended to accelerate the delivery and development of our more
promising programs such as the Integrated Combat Weapons System (ICWS)
and the field evaluation of Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD) 111
and Magic Lantern® for the Airborne Laser Mine Detection System
(ALMDS).
Question. Under current plans, when will modern mine warfare
equipment actually be delivered to the field?
Answer. Our Mine Countermeasures ships (MCM and MHC classes) are
among the most modern in the world. We have completed the MCM class
construction program and have only three MHC class ships remaining to
be delivered.
As an indication of our vision to transition MCM capabilities to
the fleet, the Remote Mine-hunting System (RMS) is being developed to
provide our surface conbatants the capability to conduct independent
mine hunting operations. RMSs is progressing towards accelerated fleet
introduction. The prototype unit, RMS(V)2, completed an at-sea exercise
with the Kitty Hawk Battle group in the Persian Gulf in January 1997.
The low rate initial production (LRIP) version, RMS(V)3 will be
introduced in Fiscal Year 1999 with the final operational version,
RMS(V)4, reaching initial operational capability IOC) in fiscal year
2003.
From the airborne MCM perspective, we have provided a contingency
airborne Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) capability to detect
floating and moored mines in the near surface region using the Magic
Lantern (Deployment Contingency) (ML(DC)) system. The Reserves received
the first of three ML(DC)) units this past December. A restart of
Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS) is being planned for the
1999 budget.
The submarine force is actively pursuing an MCM role through the
development of a clandestine mine reconnaissance system with tethered
Near-term Mine Reconnaissance System (NMRS). This system is on schedule
for a limited capability introduction 1998. The operational autonomous
version, the Long-term Mine Reconnaissance System (LMRS), is planned
for IOC in 2003.
Other programs, such as the Distributed Explosive Technology (DET)
and the Shallow Water Assault breaching System (SABRE) are on schedule
to provide our amphibious forces the capability to counter landing zone
mines ``in stride.'' Both of these systems passed Milestone II this
past year, and will achieve Milestone III in 1999.
Manufacturing Technology
Question. The Navy's manufacturing technology program provides
funding to improve the way in which Navy weapon systems are
manufactured, thereby lowering their cost. The Congress has added
between $30 to $50 million to the Navy's manufacturing technology
budgets in each of the last three fiscal years. It would not have been
hard for the Navy to guess that this is a Congressional interest item.
Mr. Douglass, is the Navy's manufacturing technology program a good
program?
Answer. Yes, Manufacturing Technology (MANTECH) is the only process
technology development program we have. MANTECH has historically
provided a significant return on investment, (average of about 20:1).
Question. Why does the Navy traditionally underfund it each year in
budgets to Congress?
Answer. Few programs get all the money they believe is necessary.
Process technology does not compete well against product technology,
especially in a declining budget scenario. Process technology is
perceived to benefit industry rather than weapons systems--a
misconception.
Question. Please explain why there are no funds requested for
manufacturing technology in your 1998 budget, and whether you
personally believe this is wise.
Answer. Historically, the Congress has appropriated funds in excess
of the President's Budget request, and such was the case in fiscal
yearr 1997. While the Department does support a robust MANTECH program
linked to our acquisition program, fiscal realities have required that
difficult choices be made to balance competing valid requirements. This
was the basis for using $36 million of the fiscal year 1997
appropriations to ``forward fund'' MANTECH in fiscal year 1998. During
the coming year, we will be conducting an assessment to determine just
what the most appropriate sustainable funding level for MANTECH should
be for fiscal year 1990 and following years.
Question. The Committee understands that industry has submitted
about $300 million of proposals to the Navy for manufacturing
technology projects that may offer high payback to the Navy. How would
you implement these proposals if there are no funds in the budget?
Answer. MANTECH issues come from both industry and the Navy. Our
data base currently contains over $300 million in issues (not
proposals).
Our Executive Steering Committee has prioritized these issues and
found that just over $100 million have truly significant impact in
terms of return on investment on the affordability of our weapon
systems.
The forward funding strategy would provide $36 million for
execution in fiscal year 1998. Funding levels for fiscal year 1999 and
future years will be reappraised during the coming year.
University Research
Question. The Navy is the Defense Department's executive agent for
university research. The Office of Naval Research (ONR) negotiates and
administers DOD research contracts with universities. A few years ago,
abusive overhead charges to government contracts (for example, at
Stanford) was a major issue. Mr. Douglass, where do we stand today on
the issue of reform of the Defense Department's university research
contracts?
Answer. The problem was not with the awarding of research
contracts, but with the indirect costs that were charged to these
contracts. The Navy revised its indirect cost rate setting procedures
by consolidating the negotiation function at its headquarters and
establishing an expert negotiation staff.
Question. How many DoD contracts with academic institutions still
have unresolved, prior-year overhead rate issues?
Answer. Over the last three years, DoD has resolved over 125 open
prior-year overhead rate issues and is current at all our cognizant
universities, except for one.
Question. What is being done to simplify the procedures used to
determine indirect overhead rates charged to government contracts?
Answer. The Navy is using more predetermined rates, on a multi-year
basis, where business conditions permit.
Use of multi-year predetermined rates reduces the overall audit and
negotiation costs to both the Government and universities. DoD's policy
to rely on A-133 audits, prepared by independent public accountants,
will also reduce the Government's auditing costs.
Question. What is being done to streamline the number of government
personnel who negotiate, administer, and audit our currently cumbersome
systen?
Answer. The Navy has six people assigned to the negotiation of
indirect cost rates and audit resolution matters at universities. These
functions were previously handled by 14 Field Offices.
Question. How much is contained in the Navy's fiscal year 1998
budget for contracts with universities for any purpose, and how does it
compare to the 1997 level?
Answer. Within the total Fiscal Year 1998 RDT&E, Navy Budget
request, we plan to spend approximately $365 million at educational
institutions, of which approximately $132 million will go to UARCs
(APLs/ARLs). This is approximately $16 million lower than fiscal year
1997, with UARCs being approximately $22 million lower.
Question. Admiral Pilling, we discussed with you today many severe
shortfalls in equipment for Navy combat ships. You are head of Navy
requirements. What is the Navy's requirement for this level of annual
spending with universities?
Answer. The Navy long-term strategy has relied on maintaining a
technological superiority over potential adversaries. This is even more
important as we reduce and modernize our fleet assets. New enabling
technologies for developing superior warfighting systems are dependent
upon new knowledge and concepts produced by basic research, largely
conducted in universities. Basic research in the initial and
fundamental step in the process of scientific discovery and has a
considerable impact on the development cycle time and operational
capability of a broad range of military systems. The maintenance of our
technological superiority in the long term is directly dependent on our
sustaining a robust program of basic research focused on naval relevant
issues.
A-12 Litigation
Question. DOD terminated the A-12 aircraft (a fighter-sized B-2
shaped aircraft) years ago, and has been in court with its contractors
ever since. Mr. Douglass, what is the status of A-12 litigation?
Answer. We expect that a judgment in the amount of approximately
$1.1 billion plus interest will be entered against the United States in
the near future, which will then provide the opportunity for appellate
review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
Question. What legal decisions were made last year, and what do
they mean to the Navy?
Answer. On June 12, 1996, the Court of Federal Claims ruled: 1)
that only incurred costs remain to be determined in deciding the amount
of plaintiffs' termination for convenience recover, and 2) that in
determining the monetary relief for the plaintiffs, the Court will not
consider a loss adjustment, or plaintiffs' entitlement to equitable
adjustments, or profit. On December 13, 1996, the Court issued an
opinion elaborating upon the June 12, 1996, Order. It said that the
issues under ``2)'' above will not be considered because one party or
the other would be unfairly prejudiced due to limitations on discovery
by the Executive for national security reasons, and that plaintiffs'
damages will be limited to incurred costs with certain adjustments. On
February 5, 1997, the parties stipulated that allowable incurred costs
for purpose of any judgment will be $3.749 billion, with various
adjustments resulting in a net judgment to be entered in the amount of
$1,071,365,444.
Question. What events lie ahead?
Answer. A judgment will probably be entered in the near future and
the case will be appealed by both parties to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
Question. When do you expect court proceedings to end?
Answer. We expect a final judgment to be issued by the Court of
Federal Claims in the near future, and we expect that appeals will be
filed by both parties. It will probably be at least a year before the
Court of Appeals issues an opinion. We expect that the case will then
be remanded to the Court of Federal Claims for further proceedings in
accordance with the decision of the Court of Appeals. It is difficult
to speculate when all court proceedings will end.
Question. Should a judgment be made against the government, what is
the range of likely dollar values involved and how would these be paid?
Answer. A judgment will likely be entered against the United States
in the near future in the amount of approximately $1.1 billion plus
interest as computed under the Contract Disputes Act. When the
accumulated interest through March 31, 1997 is added to the principal
amount of the judgment, the total will be approximately $1.49 billion.
The government is not required to pay a judgment until after all
judicial proceedings have been completed, including further proceedings
in the Court of Federal Claims after any remand. We expect that the
judgment will be reversed on appeal.
In general, a judgment under the Contact Disputes Act involving a
Navy contract is paid in the first instance from the judgment fund,
which is administered by the Department of the Treasury. Treasury then
seeks reimbursement from the Navy. Any reimbursement must be made from
funds currently available for obligation at the time of the judgment or
from funds appropriated by Congress in the future. No judgment in this
case will be paid until all judicial proceedings are completed.
Question. What would be the effect on Navy modernization budgets if
a court judgment were rendered and upheld against the Navy?
Answer. We do not know when a court judgment would be rendered or
upheld against the Navy. Therefore, it is too speculative to determine
what effect, if any, such a judgment would have on Navy modernization
budgets.
TSSAM Lawsuit
Question. The government terminated the A-12 contract for
``default'', but terminated the TSSAM (Tri-Service Standoff Attack
Missile) for ``the convenience of the government''. Both programs
suffered similar problems in terms of cost, schedule, and poor
performance after expenditure of billions of dollars each. Termination-
for-default means that the contractor is held liable for overruns,
while under a termination-for-convenience the contractor is not
penalized for its poor performance. Secretary Douglass, the Committee
is surprised to learn that the TSSAM contractor (Northrop-Grumman) has
filed suit against the government to recover $750 million of
``uncompensated performance costs, investments, and a reasonable
profit'' on this terminated program. What are your views on the merit
of this lawsuit?
When the contract was originally terminated for convenience, didn't
the government and the contractor reach agreement on a fair settlement
cost? If so, what has changed now?
How do you characterize the contractor's performance on the Navy
portion of the program?
Did the government get its money's worth from the $3 billion
investment made in this program?
How much could the government have to spend to defend itself in
court against this lawsuit?
Answer. While the Department of the Navy (Navy) is a participant in
the TSSAM program, TSSAM contract administration is a matter under the
cognizance of the Air Force. With respect to the litigation, the
Department of Justice, working with the Air Force, represents the
United States in this case.
Accordingly, although the Navy will cooperate in any way possible
to assist the Air Force and Department of Justice with this matter, I
must defer to the Air Force and Department of Justice with respect to
answers to these questions.
Question. Where would the Navy get its share of $750 million if it
had to pay additional TSSAM costs under a court penalty? Would it
likely come from weapons modernization funding?
Answer. Generally, a court judgment against the United States is
paid from the judgment fund, and an agency is required to reimburse the
judgment fund from its available funds or by obtaining additional
appropriations.
UNFUNDED REQUIREMENTS
Question. What are the top ten unfunded requirements in each R&D
and procurement account in your service?
Navy Answer. Navy's fiscal year 1998 budget, in my view, reflects
our commitment to sufficiently fund critical long-term recapitalizaiton
programs while protecting the near-term readiness of our forces. I
remain concerned, however, about overall procurement levels.
Accelerating procurement of certain platforms and systems would be
desirable if we are to maintain a ready force into the next century. We
also recognize that we must continue to decrease our maintenance
backlogs in ships, aircraft and real property. Additional funds
provided by you last year enabled us to do just that.
This year, in addition to our maintenance backlog, a number of
long-range programs would benefit from increased funding, should such
resources be made available. Along with the Integrated Ship Self-
defense and Cooperative Engagement Capability Programs discussed in my
previous answer, I would like to accelerate procurement of ships (DDG-
51 and LPD-17), aircraft (F/A-18 E/F and E-2C), and weapons systems
(Navy Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defense, Tomahawk, and Joint
Standoff Weapon). High-priority RDT&E investments such as CVN-77, Navy
Theater-Wide TBMD, Naval Surface Fire Support, and MANTECH could also
benefit. A prioritized list detailing how we would use any additional
funds is attached.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Marine Corps Answer.
(Note: In some cases Official Marine Corps Unfunded Lists include
less than ten items.)
The top unfunded requirements in R&DT&E (Ground) in millions of
dollars are:
$19.8--Commandant's Warfighting Lab.
$0.6--Marine Enhancement Program.
$10.1--Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle.
$3.6--Light Weight 155MM Howitzer.
$1.5--Tactical Remote Sensor Systems.
$0.7--Marine Common Hardware Suite Development & Management.
$1.0--Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance Processing &
Evaluation Syst.
The top unfunded requirement in RDT&E (Aviation) are:
$3.9--AV-8B Safety, Reliability and Operational Enhancement.
The top unfunded requirements in Procurement, Marine Corps are:
$42.6--Base Telecommunications Infrastructure.
$17.0--Javelin Medium Antitank Weapon System.
$65.1--Light Tactical Vehicle Replacement Program.
$18.2--Items Less Than $10 Million.
$(9.2)--Combat Vehicle Appended Trainer.
$(6.2)--International Standards Organization Bed.
$(0.4)--Improved Direct Air Support Center PIP.
$(1.6)--Combat Rubber Reconnaissance Craft.
$(0.8)--Light Armored Vehicle--Reliability & Maintainability.
$15.1--Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force Equipment.
$22.1--Power Equipment, Assorted.
$11.1--MX 11620 Generation III 25 mm Image Intensification
Tubes.
$24.3--Items Less Than $10 Million.
$(0.4)--Close Quarters Battle Weapon.
$(3.2)--M2 Flatrack.
$(3.5)--Logistics Information Systems.
$(2.4)--Defense Message System.
$(1.2)--Underwater Breathing Apparatus.
$(1.7)--Marine Enhancement Program.
$(1.5)--Special Effects Small Arms Marking System.
$(3.3)--Military Motorcycle Replacement.
$(3.0)--Advanced Demolition Kit.
$(4.1)--Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance Processing &
Evaluation Syst.
$12.2--Shop Equipment Contact Maintenance.
The top unfunded requirements in Procurement of Ammunition, Marine
Corps are:
$5.0--Ctg, 40mm practice Linked M918 (DODIC B584).
$15.0--Charge, Demolition Assembly M183 (DODIC M757).
$2.0--Ctg, 5.5mm Training Rounds M200 (DODIC A080).
$1.0--Ctg, 5.56mm Training Rounds M200 Linked (DODIC A075).
Question. Identify all production programs for which funds are
included in the fiscal year 1998 budget request where fiscal
constraints have prevented acquisition of sufficient quantities in
either fiscal year 1998 and/or the accompanying FYDP to meet validated
military requirements/inventory objectives.
Navy Answer. These procurement items are listed in the previous
copy of the CNO's Priorities List for fiscal year 1998 Additional
Congressional R&D and Procurement Program list.
Marine Corps Answer. FY 1998 fiscally constrained procurement
programs (PMC, PANMC and APN) which could benefit from additional
funding (to procure additional quantities to meet validated military
requirements/inventory objectives) are listed below. All items are in
the FYDP which accompanies the FY 1998/1999 President's Budget.
Procurement Marine Corps:
($ in Millions)
Base Telecommunications Infrastructure.................... 42.6
Javelin Medium Antitank Weapon Systems.................... 17.0
Light Tactical Vehicle Replacement Program................ 65.1
Combat Vehicle Appended Trainer........................... 9.2
International Standards Organization Bed.................. 6.2
Improved Direct Air Support Center Pip.................... 0.4
Combat Rubber Reconnaissance Craft........................ 1.6
Light Armored Vehicle-Reliability/Maintainability......... 0.8
Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force............... 15.1
Power Equipment Assorted.................................. 22.1
MX 11620 Gen III 25mm Image Intensification Tubes......... 11.1
Close Quarters Battle Weapon.............................. 0.4
M2 Flatrack............................................... 3.2
Logistics Information Systems............................. 3.5
Defense Message System.................................... 2.4
Underwater Breathing Apparatus (UBA)...................... 1.2
Marine Enhancement Program................................ 1.7
Special Effects Small Arms Marking System (SEASAMS)....... 1.5
Military Motorcycle Replacement........................... 3.3
Advanced Demolition Kit................................... 3.0
Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance Processing and
Evaluation System (TERPES).............................. 4.1
Shop Equipment Contact Maintenance (SECM)................. 12.2
Procurement Ammunition, Navy and Marine Corps:
Ctg. 40mm Practice Linked M918 (DODIC B584)............... 5.0
Charge, Demolition Assembly M183 (DODIC B584)............. 15.0
56mm Ctg. 5.56mm Trng Rounds M200 (DODIC A080)............ 2.0
Ctg. 5.56mm Training Rounds M200 Linked (DODIC A075)...... 1.0
Aviation:
AV-8B (1 A/C, 22 T-AV8B Engines, Simulators).............. 236.5
V-22 (11 A/C, Spares and AP for Additional 9)............. 1,094.0
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy:
LPD 17 (1 Ship)........................................... 746.0
Question. What initiatives are currently approved in an outyear POM
which could either be done cheaply and/or be fielded earlier by
initiating them in fiscal year 1998?
Indicate program by appropriation account along with an estimated
funding stream for each of the five subsequent fiscal years (assuming a
fiscal year 1998 start) along with potential savings that could be
achieved.
Navy Answer. The previous copy of the CNO Priorities List contains
the top Navy investment areas where additional fiscal Year 1998 funding
would be of benefit, to both accelerate the pace of new equipment
purchases, and to save money in the outyears of the fiscal year 1998-
2003 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). Savings would accrue in fiscal
years 1999-2003 years because of increased acquisition quantities,
higher learning curves, or earlier completion of total program buys.
Specific funding streams for each fiscal year depend, however, on such
things as contract re-negotiations, adjustments in research &
development and procurement profiles, and other decisions that would
have to be worked as part of the fiscal year 1999 Program Review this
summer and fall
Marine Corps Answer. There are many items, both ground and
aviation, that could be fielded earlier. These items are listed in the
table below. The second column of the table represents the amount of
the program that can be accelerated into fiscal year 1998. Columns
three through seven represent the current funding stream of each
program. The items that could be fielded more quickly are as follows:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PMC Enh. Amt FY 99 FY 00 FY 01 FY 02 FY 03
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Base Telecom Infrastructure....... 42.6 16.8 16.7 17.3 17.5 0.0
Javelin Medium Antitank Weapon.... 17.0 83.4 81.7 28.8 0.0 0.0
Lt. Tac. Veh. Replacement......... 65.1 0.0 57.4 56.6 65.0 80.9
CVAT.............................. 9.2 0.0 13.0 13.8 21.8 30.1
ISO Beds.......................... 6.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
IDASC PIP......................... 0.4 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6
Combat Rubber Reconn Craft........ 1.6 2.6 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1
LAV-RAM........................... .8 1.4 1.7 1.3 1.7 2.0
CBIRF............................. 15.1 0.0 1.0 1.6 1.4 1.0
Power Equipment, Assorted......... 22.1 4.1 4.3 4.6 4.7 4.9
MX11620 Gen III Tubes............. 11.1 10.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Close Qtrs Battle Weapon.......... .4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
M2 Flatrack....................... 3.2 3.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Logistics Info System............. 3.5 5.9 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.1
Defense Message System............ 2.4 4.6 7.7 3.4 0.0 0.0
Underwater Breathing App.......... 1.2 1.1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Marine Enhancement Program........ 1.7 2.1 1.8 11.3 11.6 1.8
Sp. Effects Small Arms Mk......... 1.5 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Military Motorcycle............... 3.3 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Advanced Demolition Kit........... 3.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
TERPES............................ 4.1 0.0 4.0 0.0 3.0 0.0
Shop Equip Contact Maint.......... 12.2 11.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
PANMC
Ctg. 40mm Prac. Linked (B584)..... 5.0 9.7 9.7 6.7 6.7 7.8
Ctg. Demo Assembly (M757)......... 15.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0
Ctg. 5.56mm Trng Round (A080)..... 2.0 7.7 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3
Ctg. 5.56mm Trng Lnkd (A075)...... 1.0 4.6 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
APN
AV-8B (1 A/C, 22 T-AV8B Engines, 236.5 ........... ........... ........... ........... ...........
Simulators)......................
V-22 (11 A/C, Spares & AP for 1,094.0 676.1 739.5 976.2 1,302.3 1,561.5
(additional 9)\1\................
VH-3/60 Simulators................ 10.0 ........... ........... ........... ........... ...........
F/A-18D (2 A/C and Spares)........ 93.8 ........... ........... ........... ........... ...........
RDT&E (AVN)
AV-8B Safety, Reliability and 3.9 ........... ........... ........... ........... ...........
(Operational Enhancement)........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\The additional funds added in Fiscal Year 1998 for the V-22 would accelerate the program more rapidly towards
the most efficient production rate of 36 aircraft per year. This rate would save the total program
approximately $1.2 billion (a unit cost savings of $2.7 million per aircraft) and, combined with estimated
inflation savings of $4.8 billion, would enable the program to save approximately $6 billion.
Question. Provide a list of R&D or production programs or projects
for which funding is included in the fiscal year 1998 budget that are
stretched out beyond technically attainable schedules primarily due to
lack of funding in fiscal year 1998 and/or the outyears.
Navy Answer. The R&D and procurement programs included in the
President's Fiscal Year 1998 Budget request are adequately funded to
meet current schedule goals.
Marine Corps Answer. There are no Marine Corps systems acquisition
programs stretched out beyond ``technically attainable schedules''
primarily due to a lack of funding in the Fiscal Year 1998 budget and/
or the outyears. However, many programs are budgeted at minimum
sustaining rates or are budgeted in subsequent years due to fiscal
constraints. Programs which could benefit, if additional fiscal year
1998 funds were provided are as follows:
PMC: ($M)
Base Telecommunications....................................... 42.6
Javelin Medium Antitank Weapon................................ 17.0
Light tactical Vehicle Program................................ 65.1
Combat vehicle Appended Trainer (CVAT)........................ 9.2
International Std Organization (ISO) Bed...................... 6.2
Improved Direct Air Support Center (IDASC) PIP................ 0.4
Combat Rubber reconnaissance Craft (CRRC)..................... 1.6
Light Armored Vehicle--LAW-RAM................................ 0.8
Chemical/Biological Incidence Response ForcePower Equipment,
Assorted.................................................... 22.1
MX 11620 Gen III 25MM Image Intensification Tubes............. 11.1
Close Qtrs Battle Weapon...................................... 0.4
M2 Flattrack.................................................. 3.2
Logistic Information System................................... 3.5
Defense Messaging System...................................... 2.4
Underwater Breathing Apparatus (UBA).......................... 1.2
Marine Enhancement Program (MEP).............................. 1.7
Special Effects Small Arms Marking System (SESAMS)............ 1.5
Military Motorcycle Replacement............................... 3.3
Advanced Demolition Kit....................................... 3.0
Tactical Electronics Reconnaissance Processing and Evaluation
(TERPES).................................................... 4.1
Shop equipment Contract Maintenance (SECM).................... 12.2
PANMC:
Ctg. 40 mm practice Linked M918............................... 5.0
Charge Demolition Assembly M183............................... 15.0
Ctg. 5.5mm Training Rounds M200............................... 2.0
Ctg. 5.56mm Training Rounds M200 Linked....................... 1.0
R&D (GRND):
Commandant's Warfighting Lab (CWL)............................ 19.8
Marine enhancement Program (MEP).............................. 0.6
Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV).................... 10.1
Light Weight 155 MM Howitzer (LW155).......................... 3.6
Tactical remote Sensor System (TRSS).......................... 1.5
Marine Comman Hardware Suite (MCHS) Development and Management 0.7
TERPES........................................................ 1.0
APN:
AV-8B (1 A/C, 22 T-AV-8B Engines, Simulators)................. 236.5
V-22 (11 A/C, Spares, and AP for Additional 9)...............1,094.0
VH-3/60 Simulators............................................ 10.0
F/A-18D (2 A/C and Spares).................................... 93.8
R&DT&E (AVN):
AV-8B Safety, Reliability & Operational Enhancement........... 3.9
SCN:
LPD-17........................................................ 746.0
Question. Indicate all programs for which procurement funding is
included in your fiscal year 1998 budget that would be good candidates
for multiyear procurement funding, assuming additional funding were to
be available in fiscal year 1998 and the outyears. Provide for these
programs a comparison of the current acquisition funding stream
compared to a potential multiyear profile (assuming a fiscal year 1998
start), along with the additional up-front investment that would be
required and the potential savings that would be likely.
Navy Answer. At this time, the Department of the Navy has no
candidates for multiyear procurement funding. However, we are
continually evaluating programs to assess potential benefits of a
multiyear procurement strategy and may propose candidates in future
years.
Marine Corps Answer. There are no ground equipment programs for
which procurement funding is included in the fiscal year 1998 budget
that would be good candidates for multiyear procurement (MYP) funding
assuming additional funding were to be available in fiscal year 1998
and the outyears.
For my aviation programs, the most likely candidates for MYP
contracts are the MV-22 and the AV-8B.
The ideal time to begin multiyear procurement for the MV-22 is with
the first full rate production lot (fiscal year 2001). OPEVAL completes
in the first quarter of fiscal year 2000 which would allow initiation
of MYP in fiscal year 2001 in a fully evaluated, stable configuration.
Initiation prior to fiscal year 2001 could result in subsequent
significant configuration changes, based on OPEVAL results.
MYP for the MV-22 is expected to save between 4-10% of the cost of
the aircraft. This could be in addition to the 23% savings already
realized and the $2.7 million savings (fiscal year 1994 constant
dollars) per aircraft we will realize with an increase to a more
economic rate of 36 MV-22s per year.
Annual
[$ in millions]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Quantity...................................... 18 24 24 24 24 114
Gross P-1..................................... 1279.8 1587.3 1689.3 1609.3 1528.8 7694.5
Less AP....................................... -99.2 -121.6 -115.8 -148.4 -145.8 -630.8
Advance Procurement........................... 121.6 115.8 148.4 145.8 144.6 676.2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Total Annual............................ 1302.3 1561.5 1721.9 1606.6 1527.6 7719.9
Multiyear
Quantity...................................... 18 24 24 24 24 114
Gross P-1..................................... 1279.8 1523.6 1647.8 1569.0 1489.4 7509.6
Less AP....................................... -99.2 -154.3 -270.1 -270.1 -77.2 -870.9
Advance Procurement........................... 154.3 270.1 270.1 77.2 175.8 947.5
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Total Annual............................ 1335.0 1639.3 1647.8 1376.1 1588.0 7586.2
=================================================================
MYP SAVINGS............................. -32.7 -77.8 74.1 230.5 -60.4 133.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the AV-8B Remanufacture contract is an eight percent cost
savings. The AV-8B current and multiyear profiles are:
Annual
[$ in millions]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Quantity................................................. 11 12 12 9 44
Airframe/CFE............................................. 192.4 210.2 214.1 173.1 789.8
Gross P-1................................................ 300.1 334.4 322.8 297.6 1254.9
Less AP.................................................. -22.4 -18.9 -19.4 -15.0 -75.8
Adv Procurement.......................................... 18.9 19.4 15.0 0.0 53.3
------------------------------------------------------
Total annual....................................... 296.6 334.9 318.4 282.6 1232.5
Multiyear
Quantity................................................. 11 12 12 9 44
Airframe/CFE............................................. 177.0 193.4 197.0 159.2 726.6
Gross P-1................................................ 284.1 316.9 304.1 282.6 1187.7
Less AP.................................................. -22.4 -37.3 -52.7 -43.6 -156.0
Adv Procurement.......................................... 62.2 53.6 17.8 0.0 133.6
------------------------------------------------------
Total Annual....................................... 323.8 333.2 269.2 239.0 1165.2
======================================================
MYP SAVINGS........................................ -27.3 1.7 49.2 43.6 67.3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The AV-8B Multiyear option will require Congressional approval to
enter into a contract with an unfunded liability which may result if
the program is either prematurely canceled or the Navy is otherwise
unable to meet its contractual obligations.
Question. Identify any procurement programs in the fiscal year 1998
budget where provision of additional procurement funds in fiscal year
1998 would have a very favorable impact on production unit prices.
Navy Answer. Provision of additional procurement funds in fiscal
year would have a favorable production unit price impact on the
following programs:
F/A-18E&F
E-2C
DDG-51
Tomahawk
Info Technology-21
Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion
Marine Corps Answer. The Marine Corps can identify no ground
equipment programs where additional fiscal year 1998 procurement funds
would have a significant impact on budgeted production unit prices.
However, in the case of the Javelin program, the additional $17 million
contained in the fiscal year 1998 Budget Enhancement List provides a
significant capability enhancement. These funds procure 186 missiles
for six Marine battalions earlier than scheduled in the fiscal year
1998 President's Budget. No additional cost savings are realized in the
Javelin multi-year contract containing three years of level pricing.
In the area of aviation support, additional funds in FY 1998 for
the V-22 would allow for acceleration of the program more rapidly
towards the most efficient production rate of 36 aircraft per year.
This rate would result in total program savings of approximately $6
billion ($1.2 billion as a result of unit cost savings of $2.7 million
per aircraft, and $4.8 billion in estimated inflation savings).
Question. Identify each production program in the fiscal year 1998
budget whose main rationale is to sustain a minimal industrial base.
Navy Answer. The Navy has no production programs in the fiscal year
1998 budget whose main rationale is to sustain a minimal industrial
base.
Marine Corps Answer. There are no Marine Corps procurement programs
in fiscal year 1998 whose main rationale is to sustain a minimal
industrial base.
Question. Please indicate in total and for the top 20 largest
weapon systems both the peacetime operating requirement (separately)
for spare parts funded either as initial spares in procurement accounts
or as consumable spares in NWCF, and the percentage of requirement met
through the fiscal year 1998 budgeted level of funding. Project how
this would change by the end of the FYDP.
Navy Answer. Peacetime Operating Stocks and War Reserve material
for operating forces are managed in the wholesale supply system and
carried in the Navy Working Capital Fund (NWCF). The spares requirement
for fiscal year 1997 associated with the Navy's top 20 weapon systems,
expressed by obligation, are listed below. Table values are in millions
of dollars.
SYSTEM: FY 1997
F/A-18.................................................... 550.4
Helos (H-46, H-53, H-60, AH1W) (Considered as 4 systems).. 393.2
F-14...................................................... 188.2
Avionics RADARS--common (Considered as 2 systems)......... 153.9
P-3....................................................... 137.2
AV-8B..................................................... 119.0
E2/D2 (considered as 2 systems)........................... 112.5
S-3....................................................... 77.5
CASS (Consolidated Aviation Support System................ 75.4
MK 15 Close-In Weapon System.............................. 39.3
General Purpose Test Equipment............................ 36.3
Carrier Planned Equipment Replacement (CARPER)............ 34.6
AEGIS..................................................... 22.2
Elec Suspended Gyro Navigation............................ 13.9
LM2500 Engine............................................. 8.0
(Source: Fiscal Year 1998/1999 President's Budget, Exhibit 3B)
Supply System Inventory Requirement:
War Reserve............................................... $369.0
Total Wholesale Inventory Requirement................. 11,212.9
Source: (SSIR, 30 Sep 96)
Navy combines peacetime operating support and war reserve
requirements for these and all installed equipment/components into
onboard spare parts allowances termed Consolidated Shipboard Allowance
Lists (COSAL) for ships and submarines, and Aviation Consolidated
Allowance Lists (AVCAL) for aircraft embarked on air-capable ships.
Allowances discussed above provide demand or readiness-based parts
support with insurance items to support a set endurance period,
nominally 90 days, without resupply. The wholesale systems stocks
material to support the consumption and replenishment of allowance
material and other anticipated maintenance requirements. The Supply
System Inventory Requirement represents the total wholesale supply
system requirement in support of the Navy and includes $369 million for
war reserve material.
Financed as part of the Navy Working Capital Fund (NWCF) account,
the wholesale supply system provides outfitting and replenishment
spares to support Navy customers. This investment account fully funds
program requirements and is balanced to Navy's overall requirement.
Maintenance of weapon systems and stock replenishment of parts used by
operating forces are supported in the OM&N appropriation through the
Flying Hour/Steaming Hour Programs which are similarly balanced to the
overall requirement.
Initial spares to support new weapon systems or upgrades to
existing systems being introduced into the operating forces are
budgeted and funded as initial spares in Navy's three investment
accounts. Through fiscal year 1998, these accounts are fully funded.
Marine Corps Answer. The fiscal year 1998 funding contained in the
President's Budget for the Procurement Marine Corps budget line item
titled ``Spares and Repair Parts'' is sufficient to meet peacetime
operating requirements.
Question. Please indicate any potential FMS sales that are being
discussed that could influence production unit prices once consummated,
not including those whose impact is already factored into the
production unit prices portrayed to Congress in the fiscal year 1998
budget.
Navy Answer. Sales are projected for the below listed weapon
systems:
Harpoon; Standard Missile; P-3 Upgrade; MK-41 (VLS); MK-48 (GVL);
CIWS; AEGIS; E-2C Upgrade; F/A-18 C & D; LAC (AAV); LAV (Variant Kits);
Predator; AH-1W; SH-60B; AEWC; ASPJ; MK-46 Torpedo; AIM-7M; HARM; AIM-
9L/M/S.
Marine Corps Answer. Currently the United States Marine Corps
(USMC) has 103 foreign military sales (FMS) agreements with twenty two
(22) countries. To the extent that the USMC was aware of FMS, for these
efforts, the associated unit cost impacts are reflected in the fiscal
year 1998 President's Budget. There will continue to be opportunities
for additional FMS agreements in the future but there are no potential
sales known over those included in our budget.
Question. Please indicate what policy your service uses for major
R&D and production programs, such as ``budget to contract target cost''
or ``budget to ceiling contract cost'' or ``budget to most likely
cost'', and identify which of your major programs in the fiscal year
1998 budget deviate from this policy and the attendant rationale.
Navy Answer. The Department of the Navy budgeting policy for major
R&D and production programs is to budget to the most likely cost. This
budget quality estimate is developed through detailed review and
analysis of costs of the engineering characteristics and requirements
associated with the item under development or production. There are no
programs which deviate from this policy.
Marine Corps Answer. When budgeting for a program for which a
contract has been awarded, the maximum liability, including award/
incentive fees, is initially budgeted. Adjustments are made as
appropriate throughout the life of the contract. For a program where a
contract has not been awarded, a ``most likely cost'' approach is
generally used.
Question. Please indicate what your service uses to provide a
budget within R&D and production programs for unknown allowances and/or
economic change orders, and identify any programs in the fiscal year
1998 budget which deviate from this policy and the attendant rational.
Navy Answer. The Department of the Navy budgeting policy for major
R&D and production programs relative to unknown allowances and/or
allowances for engineering change orders is directly related to the
maturity of the program in the acquisition process. Maturing
productions are afforded a small allowance for emergent engineering
change orders based upon the specific historical acquisition and
engineering analysis experience of that program. New start endeavors
for which this experience is absent but for which a reasonable estimate
can be determined based upon the acquisition history of similar
programs are afforded a somewhat larger allowance incorporating lessons
learned. The fiscal year 1998 budget was prepared in accordance with
this policy.
Marine Corps Answer: Marine Corps acquisition programs are managed
to an Acquisition Program Baseline Agreement (APBA) with objective and
threshold values which permit limited cost/program growth. Changes in
excess of the established thresholds require reporting and action by
the Milestone Decision Authority. Tradeoffs within the program
consistent with the principles of Cost as An Independent Variable
(CAIV) are further used to reduce risk and manage cost. Engineering
Change Orders (ECOs) or any other cost elements are budgeted at levels
consistent with the most likely values indicated by the program life
cycle cost estimate or other documents. A limited number of recurring,
level-of-effort programs such as power generation equipment and
environmental control equipment are currently being baselined to also
conform to the APBA approach to program management. Additionally, minor
modification budget lines used primarily to address emergent readiness
and safety issues are not amenable to baselining.
Question. Please identify any R&D or production program which as a
contract for which all or a portion is budgeted in fiscal year 1998 for
a contract award fee larger than $10 million. Provide amount budgeted
for the award fee, the basis on which the amount was calculated (e.g.
100% fee based on the contract), and the historical performance of the
contractor in terms of percentage of award fee awarded during prior
award fee periods under the same contract.
Navy Answer. The following programs have contracts in which all or
a portion is budgeted in fiscal year 1998 for a contract award fee
larger than $10 million.
The budget for the Joint Strike Fighter Program includes $24.2
million in fiscal year 1998 for award fee under the Concept
Demonstration Program contract with Pratt and Whitney. The available
award fee amount for each period of the contract was determined as a
percentage of the total available award fee, based on the amount and
importance of work to be performed in each period. The key events for
the fiscal year 1998 award fee determinations are first engine to test
and first lift system and nozzle to test. This is a new contract and no
award fee payments have been made yet.
A portion of the fiscal year 1998 RDT&E budgeted amount for the F/
A-18E/F program is for contract award fees larger than $10 million.
Award fee amounts are budgeted in fiscal year 1998 for both the F/A-
18E/F airframe and engine engineering and manufacturing development
contracts in the amount of $21.7 million and $22.8 million,
respectively. Pursuant to contractual obligations, the budgeted amounts
are based upon 100 percent of the available contract award fee pool
which is due to be paid in fiscal year 1998. The following table
illustrates the percentages of award fee awarded under each contract
thus far.
[In percent]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Airframe Engine
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lowest percentage............................. 85 84
Highest percentage............................ 97 96
Cumulative Average to Date.................... 94 90
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The V-22 program's airframe engineering and manufacturing
development contract is a cost plus award fee contract. The program
budgets for 100 percent of the award fee liability incurred each year.
In fiscal year 1998 the award fee liability is $29 million over two
award fee periods. Historically, the contractor has been awarded
approximately 85-100 percent of the award fee available pool.
Marine Corps Answer. There are no fiscal year 1998 Marine Corps
ground allocation of RDT&E,N or Procurement Marine Corps programs which
have a contract award fee larger than $10 million.
Question. Please identify all R&D and production programs/projects
for which Congress appropriated funds in fiscal year 1997 which since
the Appropriations Act was enacted have been either terminated or
significantly down-scoped. For each, indicate the status of the fiscal
year 1997 and any earlier active fiscal year funds where funds have
been diverted to another purpose.
Navy Answer. There has not been any significant downscoping of
budgeted programs or new program terminations since submission of the
Fiscal Year 1997 President's Budget in March 1996. Program adjustments
reflected in our current estimates are due to rebalancing of resources
consistent with rephrasing of requirements and revision of production
and delivery schedules. Accordingly, since so terminations or
significant downsizings have occurred, no prior year funds have been
diverted.
Marine Corps Answer. The only Fiscal Year 1997 program that has
been terminated since the Fiscal Year 1997 Appropriations Act is the
Marine's Off-Route Smart Mine Clearing System (ORSMC). This action was
taken due to fiscal constraints. This adjustment is in line with
briefings provided to your staff subsequent to this action as well as
submission of the Fiscal Year 1998 President's Budget.
Question. Identify all ACTD funding in the RDT&E, Navy
appropriation account in each fiscal year 1997 through the FYDP.
Indicate total cost of each listed ACTD and whether other service
appropriations are contributing funds for it.
Navy Answer. The Department of the Navy has RDT&E funding related
to three ACTD's, the Precision Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) Targeting
System (PSTS); the Joint Countermine ACTD, and Extending the Littoral
Battlespace ACTD.
Precision Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) Targeting ACTD--(funding in
thousands)
FY 97--12,299;
FY 98--7,467;
FY 99-03--4,766.
The total cost of this ACTD and related core funding is
$24,532,000. No funds from other services or DOD are included in this
total cost.
Joint Countermine ACTD--(funding in thousands)
FY 97--90,738;
FY 98--76,810;
FY 99-03--ACTD ends in FY98.
The total cost of this ACTD includes direct funding from OSD as
well as generic supporting ``core funding'' from Army, Navy and Marine
Corps RDT&E accounts.
OSD........................................................... 68,900
Military services............................................. 585,330
--------------------------------------------------------------
____________________________________________________
654,238
Extending the Littoral Battlespace ACTD--(funding in thousands)
There is no funding in the current Navy FYDP for this ACTD. A
program plan and funding levels for future years is being developed.
The Marine Corps has funding in the FYDP as follows:
FY 97--5,000;
FY 98--To be determined;
FY 99-03--To be determined;
Total cost projections for the ACTD are pending development.
Marine Corps Answer. The only Marine Corps funded ACTD is Extending
the Littoral Battlespace (ELB ACTD). This ACTD is jointly sponsored by
the USMC and the USN. Marine Corps funding is contained in RDT&E,N, PE
0603640M, Advanced Technology Demonstrations, Project C2223, Advanced
Technology Demonstrations. Funding for this ACTD is as follows:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ELB ACTD........................... $5M $10M $10M $10M $10M $1M $1M
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Marine Corps participates generically in the Joint Countermine
ACTD. The total cost of this ACTD includes direct funding from OSD as
well as generic support from the Army, Navy and Marine Corps RDT&E
accounts. This ACTD ends in Fiscal year 1998. U.S. Navy funding is as
follows: fiscal year 1997 $0.9 million, fiscal year 98 $0.8 million.
The one program where extra investment could provide the highest
payback is additional dollars for the V-22.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Young.]
Wednesday, March 12, 1997.
AIR FORCE ACQUISITION PROGRAMS
WITNESSES
ARTHUR L. MONEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION
LT. GENERAL GEORGE K. MUELLNER, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
THE AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION, U.S. AIR FORCE
Introduction
Mr. Young. The Committee will come to order.
We are pleased to welcome Mr. Arthur Money, the Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, and Lt. General
George Muellner, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the
Air Force for Acquisition.
Gentlemen we thank you for being with us today and we
appreciate all the good testimony that you have given us over
the years.
Yesterday I made a fairly lengthy opening statement at the
hearing with Secretary Widnall and General Fogleman. I am not
going to repeat that this morning, but I think you basically
know what it was about.
We are concerned about our aviation programs. We are
concerned about the fact that we are not really making as much
of an investment in new tactical airplanes as maybe we should.
And so you know that and I am not going to bore you with that
statement all over again.
[Chairman Young's prepared statement follows:]
This morning we are pleased to welcome Mr. Arthur L. Money, the
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, and General
George K. Muellner, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Acquisition. Gentlemen, thank you for coming today.
The Air Force's fiscal year 1998 budget continues the trend of
emphasizing near-term readiness to carry out contingency missions, but
unfortunately at the price of delayed modernization of Air Force weapon
systems. The Air Force's 1998 budget requests $29.8 billion for
procurement and R&D. Though this is $600 million higher than fiscal
year 1997, when inflation is taken in to account it is once again lower
than last year's appropriated amount. In fact, from fiscal year 1990 to
1998, the Air Force modernization accounts have declined 51% in real
terms. And as we have noted for some time, we are concerned that
continued delayed modernization of your weapon systems will lead to a
long-term readiness problem, potentially resulting in unnecessary
casualties in some future conflict.
The decline in Air Force modernization leads to some starting
observations about your budget:
The 1998 Air Force budget funds only 3 tactical aircraft,
the lowest quantity in the 50 year history of the Air Force.
The Air Force budget allocates less for aircraft
procurement than the Navy--for the second year in a row!
And we see that already inefficient production rates have
been reduced further: For example, the budget proposes a cut in JSTARS
production from 2 aircraft per year to just 1 in fiscal year 1998.
Even the Air Force's highest priority, the F-22 stealth fighter,
does not escape reductions. F-22 production over the FYDP has been cut
approximately in half compared to last year's plan.
The Committee is also interested in hearing about programs that are
new in this budget, or that are just now taking shape. For example,
starting in 1998, the Air Force and Army budgets include $318 million
over a two year period to provide upfront US funding for a NATO JSTARS
program. The Committee is concerned that NATO has not yet decided to
buy JSTARS and that the program could be underfunded by as much as a
billion dollars. Also, this program comes at a time in which the Air
Force has cut the US JSTARS program.
The Committee would also like to hear more about the Airborne Laser
program. Though the Air Force was still working out the scope of the
program last year, we went ahead and provided funds to begin
development. This year we learn that it will cost $11 billion to
develop, procure, and operate 7 aircraft.
Finally, the Committee is very interested in hearing about the
reported cost growth to the F-22 program. The R&D program has increased
by $2 billion and as I already mentioned, production quantities have
been cut approximately in half over the Future Year Defense Plan. We
know the Air Force is working hard to eliminate a potential $13 billion
cost growth in production, and we look forward to hearing how that will
be accomplished.
So, I have outlined the issues we need to discuss today. As I have
said too often since becoming Chairman, it appears that we are on the
road to a severe long term readiness problem in the Air Force.
Hopefully, you can convince us that the situation is better off than
your acquisition budget would indicate. We want to work with you to
identify and remedy the most pressing shortfalls, and to eliminate
programs in your budget where budget growth is not needed.
Mr. Young. Mr. Murtha, do you have any opening commitments?
Then what we would like for you to do is proceed any way that
you would like. Your statements in their entirety will be
placed in the record, and just feel free to summarize them any
way you wish, and then we will have some questions for you.
Summary Statement of Mr. Money
Mr. Money. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Murtha and committee
staff, General Muellner and I are in fact delighted to be here
with you again to speak about the Air Force Modernization
Program. We welcome this opportunity to continue the frank and
open discussion that we have had over the past years concerning
the Air Force program.
As you are keenly aware, the Air Force RDT&E and
procurement program is an important part of the fiscal year
1998 budget request. It consists of a time-phased approach that
is coupled with aggressive acquisition reform initiatives, all
designed to ensure that the Air Force is properly postured to
provide the Nation a global engagement capability at an
affordable price as we move into the 21st Century.
Today we plan to provide you a thorough review of the
overall program, highlight key activities and events, and
discuss, explain, and clarify any issues and concerns you may
have.
As we did last year, General Muellner will walk and, in
fact, talk you through the presentation using the poster boards
here, and together he and I will answer any questions and
discuss any key issues that you may have.
We will talk about the TACAIR modernization and highlight
the importance of this program to the Nation and to the Joint
Force Commanders. We will explain how the F-22 and the Joint
Strike Fighter both fit as crucial pieces into this plan, and
will address the affordability issues.
In addition, we will include a discussion on the F-22 Joint
Estimate Team, the JET review results, the program
restructuring, and explain how this proactive initiative is
patterned after a similar review, one we used to pull out the
C-17 program. However, I might point out here that these issues
on the F-22 are being addressed much earlier in time than they
were on the C-17 program.
We will talk about our space superiority program and show
you how we will continue to modernize in these areas. We will
discuss the bomber force and highlight our efforts and
enhancements in this area. We will include a discussion on the
precision weapon program and we will address for you the
timelines for integrating these systems on the weapons program.
On those weapons platforms, excuse me. We will discuss our
Information Superiority Program and show what efforts we have
under way to ensure that the joint team is ready to achieve
dominant information awareness.
We will also discuss our Global Mobility programs, address
the S&T, science and technology investments and show you how we
are expanding our acquisition reform efforts moving beyond the
Air Force Lightning Bolts all designed to help us move into the
21st Century. It is our intent to spend as much time as you may
desire in these areas and to ensure you are fully comfortable
with these issues.
We truly feel that the budget request balances investments
across this entire range of combat and support capabilities
while sustaining the technology base. We are committed to
provide the Joint Force Commanders with the best capabilities
possible in the shortest time practical at the most affordable
price, providing effective weapons systems and services in the
most efficient process.
This overall plan provides the warfighters the entire
spectrum of combat capabilities and at the same time maintains
and sustains the critical technology base. Working together,
partnering with you in Congress, the warfighter, industry, the
administration, as we execute this plan, we can and will
proceed into moving the Air Force and this Nation into the 21st
Century.
So, Mr. Chairman, that is all I wanted to say at the
beginning, we will proceed with the plan.
Please ask questions as we go.
Mr. Young. Okay. Thank you very much.
Mr. Young. General, we will be happy to hear from you.
[Clerk's note.--The charts referred to by General Muellner
are printed on page 340.]
Summary Statement of General Muellner
General Muellner. My intent is again to lead you through
the program, and I encourage any questions you might have.
MEETING THE WARFIGHTERS' NEEDS
(CHART 2) The focus of my discussion today will be on what
we call our Air Force core competencies, these are the
capabilities or abilities that we provide to the joint
warfighting elements to execute our National Strategy as
captured in Joint Vision 2010 and as mentioned in the Air Force
piece of that, which is global engagement.
I point these out only in that we will be talking to each
of these areas and our programs all fall within them.
They are fed, as Mr. Money just defined, an acquisition
program that is based upon a time-phased modernization. What
that means is that we are right now fielding C-17s, airlift
capability, finishing up the bomber modernization efforts and
then we will be starting our TACAIR modernization phase. So
these are time-phased in the budget process.
Nurturing this is a streamlined acquisition approach and we
are driving for ever-increased efficiency in our
infrastructure. Same is true, as I will point out, in providing
additional agility to our sustainment operations so that we can
operate more expeditionary and do so in a more efficient
manner. The end result of this, as Mr. Money just pointed out,
is that we believe this time-phasing, along with the
streamlined acquisition and sustainment, is what gives us an
affordable program.
AIR SUPERIORITY
(CHARTS 3 AND 4) Let me start with the Air and Space
Superiority side. Air Superiority, and you all have seen this
chart before, obviously, we assemble one of the most important
elements and it is the first thing that the Joint Force
Commander asked us to provide. When you have it, you can have
freedom of action on the battlefield and prosecute the campaign
as you want it. When you don't have it, then you are at the
mercy of your adversary. So clearly we believe air superiority
is something that is very, very important to this Nation or as
Secretary Perry coined, air dominance, something that we really
like to have, and clearly we are focused on keeping that record
alive.
As we look at our Air Superiority Programs, the two that I
am going to spend most of the time talking about will be the F-
22 program and the Airborne Laser. Just on the relationships
side we have two key programs that will persist into the
outyears, the Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile, AMRAAM,
program is executing very well. It is meeting or exceeding all
of the warfighter's requirements, in some cases, by significant
amounts, and the cost itself continues to come down.
Just this year we had a down-select for our next-generation
infrared, IR, missile, a joint program under Navy helm. That
contract was won by Hughes and that program is in execution. So
we will have two frontline missiles on our force in the
outyears, as will the Navy.
What I would like to do now is address the F-22 program,
please.
F-22 Aircraft
(CHART 5) As you know, this is a revolutionary step forward
in that it combines the first highly maneuverable low-
observable platform, one that can operate at high supersonic
speeds on the battlefield efficiently for the first time and
has an integrated avionics suite that really brings all the
off-board and on-board information to the decisionmaker, which
is the operator. This provides them dominant battlefield
awareness.
Right now we are in the engineering and manufacturing
development phase of that program. And we are ahead of schedule
for first flight, which will occur in the last part of May of
this year. The official rollout of that airplane is on the 9th
of April, and we would certainly encourage your attendance at
that in Marietta. That airplane is actually in the fuel barn as
we speak. So that program is executing out very well and all
performance parameters are exceeding the warfighter's
requirements.
F-22 RESTRUCTURE
(CHART 6) As a result of the importance of this program, we
put together a Joint Estimating Team to go out and look not
only at the EMD program to ensure that we had confidence that
we could execute it, that we understood the various risk areas
and we have adequately resourced it, but also to look ahead at
the production program to ensure that we understood the
production costs and what the cost drivers were. And we have
used this very effectively, as Mr. Money pointed out, on the C-
17, also on the Joint STARS program, and so we put it in place
here. And an issue came about a year ago at this time when we
started that particular program.
C-17 AND F-22 SOFTWARE PROBLEMS
Mr. Murtha. Have you had the software problems with the F-
22 that you had with the C-17?
General Muellner. With the C-17?
Mr. Murtha. Yes.
General Muellner. We have not seen any of the software
problems to date. We are still growing the software. The flight
control software for the first flight airplane has actually
been flown already in the Vista F-16. We are still, at the
most, 30 percent through the entire software build for the
entire weapons system. But first flights off, we are actually
ahead of schedule, sir.
Mr. Murtha. What is the difference between the way you did
this and the way you did the C-17 that will eliminate that
problem?
General Muellner. We did this the way we ended up doing the
C-17, which was in a very structured standpoint of A-level, B-
level, C-level specs and flow-down and such.
Mr. Murtha. You remember in the C-17, you had one
contractor that only had a few people working on it? You had to
fire that contractor and hire a new one, so you have a
flowchart that recognizes that problem and you solved it.
General Muellner. Yes, sir, and I will tell you one of the
stressing elements in this program and one of the areas that we
managed very closely and in all of the programs is the access
to software programmers. They are a shortfall across the
industry. And these companies and the government manages those
assets very, very carefully.
Mr. Money. Let me just add to that, Congressman Murtha, and
foot-stomp two things here. We are obviously learning from one
program to another. Having all the flight control software
tested already on an F-16 Vista, so all the software needed for
the first flight and, in fact, for the first three vehicles, is
already done, been tested. The next major step, if you will, in
software, the General will talk about in a minute, is in the
avionics area. That doesn't enter until aircraft 4, and that is
a major issue, and we are putting all the heat we can, all the
attention we can into that area. But it is a significant issue,
about 1.6 million lines of code.
Mr. Murtha. But if you change any way you do the
procurement--we visited a couple of times with McDonnell-
Douglas on the C-17, and they said part of the problem is we
have to go clear back to the Pentagon in order to get changes
made. It was really an unbelievable paperwork problem. Is that
all eliminated?
General Muellner. Yes, sir, I guarantee you our office in
the Pentagon is the last place we have them come to for changes
on their software. We have a structure in the field that
incorporates those changes. We have a very extensive test
process, as indicated with the Vista F-16, to wring those out,
and there is an Independent Review Team that reviews all of
these actions prior to first flight and every successive
milestone. There are people separate from the program office
and separate from the contractors that are doing this.
Mr. Murtha. These cost estimates ought to be fairly
realistic at this point because you have taken care of the
problems early on, is that what you are saying?
General Muellner. You are absolutely right.
Mr. Murtha. Unless the numbers that you asked for go down.
General Muellner. Certainly rate and quantity will affect
the unit costs, but we have more definitions of these costs now
at the early stage in the program than we ever had in the past.
Mr. Money. Lockheed is the prime contractor and we hold
them responsible and accountable for all of that, so the paper
trail doesn't need to come to the Pentagon. We do review that
periodically, monthly, in fact, with Lockheed.
The second point is regardless of the quantity, the
software isn't changing. That same amount of software is
required if we have 100 units or 400 units.
F-22 JOINT ESTIMATING TEAM RECOMMENDATIONS
(CHART 7) General Muellner. Sir, the JET team came back
with several recommendations, and one is they looked at the EMD
program and their recommendation was that we needed to add
additional resources to that EMD program to assure that we had
the risk under control before we stepped forward in the
production.
The second part of that--and they focused on the avionics
as we have been talking about. This is the first aircraft where
we have had an integrated avionics suite rather than individual
federated things. So in this case they focused additional
attention to how we integrated avionics.
As a result of this, we added a total to the EMD program,
of about $2.1 billion. That was made up of two elements. We
added a $1.45 billion transfer by slowing the production ramp,
moving some of that money out of the total program top line
back into the development side. And at the same time, we
restructured our test program which freed up $706 million. So
the end result is that we had to add to the EMD program that
amount of money significantly reducing the risk from the
standpoint of getting the production side of the airplane ready
to go before we set forward into production.
Contractors and the government sat down and looked at
production cost estimates. The production cost estimates said
that if we did not effectively manage those production costs,
there could be upwards of a $13 billion increase in cost.
As a result of that, the contractors and government sat
down, put a plan in place. And that plan which was agreed to by
Norm Augustine, Karl Kropek, are the two primary CEOs,
definitizes how they took that cost out of the program. And on
the next chart I will give you some examples of that.
Mr. Money. So by doing this restructuring now, I believe we
have a much more executable program. We are putting in money
early to lower those production costs later. So I think you
will see that it makes more sense than what we had planned a
year or so ago.
F-22 COST SAVING INITIATIVES
(CHART 8) Mr. Young. General, as you go through that chart,
will you point out realistically what are the paper savings and
what are the real savings?
General Muellner. I would offer to you on this chart, as
well as in our production cost estimate, of course they were
all paper at this point because we are talking about something
in the 2004-2005 time frame that we are dealing with. But in
reality everything on this chart in both columns are
initiatives that have been put in place in other programs and
implemented. So from that standpoint, they are not conjecture.
They are issues that we have hard data on.
In fact, Alan Mulally, who is the new President of Boeing
Military, when he sat in our CEO meeting here the other day he
said we have all of these things in place right now in the 777.
So they are not indeed conjecture; they are proven techniques
that we have used in other programs, that is why we brought
them into this program, sir.
Specifically, the ones that we already have well-
definitized is specific process improvements and the insertion
of technologies to deal with obsolescence of parts and things
of that nature on the production line and in the production
vehicles. A multiyear approach similar to what we use in the F-
16, and by that is that the contractor does not go out and ask
for his subtier vendors to price a lot of 6 airplanes or 12
airplanes, but rather they look ahead and try to get economies
of scale in the way they do that, the way to deal with the
warranties. It turned out that we were overbooking what we were
requiring for warranties because of the way we were supporting
the weapons system during its initial fielding, and the same is
true on the subcontracts and material management.
For instance, across the entire Lockheed company now they
are able to buy as a company as opposed to one division. As a
result of that, they get much better economies of scale in
their material management programs. Those things have now been
incorporated in the program.
As we look at as other activities out here, again looking
at the F-16, the F-16 average, a 10 percent savings by using a
rotating 3-year, multiyear approach from the standpoint of
buying stock and programming ahead.
Lean Enterprise, we just consummated a Lean Aircraft
Initiative. It is similar to what the auto industry had and MIT
has been leading with the aerospace industry. We have
incorporated those benchmarking procedures into this particular
program.
And the last part of it is that we have rolled in the
acquisition reform techniques that we have been nurturing and
developing in other programs like JDAM, where we go to
performance-based contracting and we get out of the business of
telling the contractor how to do something and just tell them
what it is we want them to do. The end result of this gives us
very, very high confidence that what the contractors committed
to with the government, that is that there would be no
production cost increase, indeed is realizable, and that is
what we expect out of the program.
Mr. Dicks. Mr. Augustine signed this, correct?
General Muellner. That is correct.
Mr. Young. I want to have that chart placed in the record
to go along with your commentary so that we will have a record
of the chart.
Mr. Money. Let me just foot-stomp and give the General a
chance to grab a little drink here. Two things when we met with
the CEOs on the 19th of December and reviewed the JET team
output, the production costs at that time, if no actions were
taken, if business as usual, was going to be in the $60 billion
area. We said this is totally unacceptable. We need to work
this back to the original budget, the $48 billion production
number.
The work that has gone on between December and now--we just
this Monday had a 5-hour meeting with the CEOs that the General
referred to. What has come out of that is we in fact have plans
in place with meat on the bones to get that cost back down to
$48 billion.
Now, you undoubtedly hear a lot of things that are going on
in the Pentagon, a group in the Pentagon called the Cost
Analysis Improvement Group, CAIG, is still at the $60 billion
number. My answer to why there is a difference is that they are
looking at historical models of what has happened in the past.
Clearly we are looking forward to what can be done, and this
comment that Mr. Mulally made came out of the commercial side
of Boeing: My God, there is nothing new here, we have been
doing this on the commercial side.
This is good government. We have taken the initiative to
get the costs down and have meat on the bones and plans. Those
plans obviously have to be executed, and you can watch that
over the next 20 years. But I am very confident here, sitting
here saying with clear conscience that the most probable cost
for the production cost of this aircraft will in fact be $48
billion, and we are not stopping there, we are continuing to
drive efficiencies into the program.
Mr. Dicks. On that point, isn't it true that when you
compare the C-17 and the F-22, there is a universe in
difference. In fact, one of the things we had to do in the C-17
program was go back and insert technology.
As I understand it, we are using commercial practice. CAD/
CAM or Computer Aided Design/Computer Aided Manufacturing, all
of this is part of this program from the inception. So it is
really very different than the problems we faced with C-17, in
my judgment.
Mr. Money. Absolutely right. And all the things that we are
talking about, the difference between the 60 number and getting
back to 48, is well beyond the normal learning curves. These
are new initiatives, new practices, modern technology being
applied and so forth.
Mr. Murtha. I hope that you will get a better savings than
we got on the C-17. An awful lot of us thought that the savings
that you folks were so anxious to get the ball here that you
caved. I hope you worked the pencil. All the services want to
get a multiyear, that they--we got a little bit better with
ours, but we still--I think you could have gotten better.
Mr. Money. Yes, sir, I hear you, and thank you for your
help on C-17. And we will do a better job on this before we
come to you for the multiyear. We won't come to you for the
multiyear until this design is stable and we have a good
program. We have a lot of work to do yet, so we are a year or
two away from talking to you about that.
Mr. Hobson. I am not sure, I have a lot of respect for you
guys, I think you do a good job, but I don't understand all of
this at this point.
I have one question on this particular problem. As I
understand it, people talked about a $15 billion cost overrun.
Does that take you from the $48 to the $60 billion?
Now, I understood that about half of that was due to
expected inflation rates. And the problem I have is that you
never find out where all of this came from and how it got
started. Everybody gets promoted and retired and are gone and
we all live with it. I want to know you are telling me things
that are going to be put in so it doesn't happen again, or it
didn't happen that way, or there are other savings out there?
So you are going to work this back in? You are still going to
have $8 no matter what you do--$8 billion.
Mr. Money. No, sir.
Mr. Hobson. What you are telling us on paper, anyway, and
there is a commitment being made. I want to go through this
again. I hope to be here a little longer.
You have taken the action that you guys are comfortable
with. And as I say, you have a lot of integrity with me. That
all of this stuff is handled--I mean, if Baxter understands it
is handled, and you guys understand that it is handled, you
still have some problems with your other people down in your
shop getting them to agree that that is where you are. Is that
what is being said here today?
General Muellner. Yes, sir, indeed.
Let me explain the inflation issue for you. The $15 billion
that you described, about $8 of that--$8 billion of the $13
billion on the production side and on the EMD side, $743
million of the $2.1 billion was due to the fact that we in the
government program inflation about 2.2, now 2.1 percent.
This segment of industry is experiencing an inflation rate
up in the order of about 3.2 percent. When the cost-estimating
team went out and looked at what the projected costs were based
upon forward cost projections based on labor contracts,
material costs and everything else, they used the 3.2 percent
number. As a result of that, that gave you the delta between
what we in the government can program based upon the OMB-
provided rates.
The commitment by the contractors that Kropek and Norm
Augustine signed was to take the cost out of the program to
account for that inflation difference also. So the answer is
that $15 billion, $13 of that $15 billion has been taken out of
the program by those cost-saving initiatives you saw on the
previous chart that is correct.
Mr. Hobson. Okay.
Mr. Money. We had very candid discussions with the
contractors and said we cannot handle a cost growth due to
inflation if there is a different rate here. That is all
incorporated, so we talk about then year dollars here.
Mr. Hobson. I assume they do; these are smart people. They
cannot come back here and say, folks, you know, this is a
different ball game. I think you all have to remember that the
other way they get you on this is the same old way in building
contracts. That is if you all change the specs and what you
want this airplane to do and not do, they got you.
General Muellner. Yes.
Mr. Hobson. And that is what happens every time we do this,
the gotcha's get you.
General Muellner. Sir, our warfighters understand that
well, and those are the ones that generally have the
requirements creep. They are very sensitive to that. And,
indeed, they have been willing to trade to ensure that we
preserve the affordability of the program.
Mr. Money. Let me just add one thing just to emphasize what
General Muellner--just at that time, General Hawley, the
Commander of Air Combat Command, ACC and General Hawley, the
Director of Requirements, have been involved with every step we
have taken here. So the warfighter is totally on board with
this. We have a stable requirement. We have a stable program,
so we are going forth with that--and let's finish this here--
but all of those things have been taken into consideration so
we won't come back to Congress and say we need more money. $48
billion is what is needed to produce 438 airplanes, and that is
where the program is.
Mr. Young. General, why don't you proceed with your charts
and presentation, and then we will come back to more questions.
F-22 UNIT COSTS
(CHART 9) General Muellner. When you aggregate that all
together, and to agree with the point that Congressman Hobson
just made, is the commitment of this airplane--this is a chart
similar to the one that we showed you last year, and that is
the reason I used it again--this is indeed the flyaway cost in
constant-year dollars similar to what we showed you last year.
This is indeed the unit procurement cost in then year dollars,
again similar and what you see is some very, very small changes
up and down here. But the bottom line is that they have
remained constant, consistent with what we just said.
AIRBORNE LASER PROGRAM
(CHART 10) Now, sir, let me move on to the other element in
the Air Superiority that I think is a new and important
capability, and that is the issue of the Airborne Laser. The
Airborne Laser is again a revolutionary way of dealing with
theater ballistic missiles. All the other approaches we have
got are what we call catcher's-mitt approaches, where we try to
shoot them down in the incoming phase.
The important thing here is to try to shoot them down when
they are in the launch phase, the boost phase. When you do
shoot them down, if they have warheads that have either
chemical, biological or nuclear content, that warhead then
falls on the enemy rather than on us.
What the Airborne Laser gives us is the ability to reach
out with a speed-of-light weapon, intercept these things in the
boost phase. These capabilities have been maturing for years.
This is the first program where we have really tried to
field these on an airplane. The airplane, as you can see, is a
747-400 aircraft. We had a source selection earlier this year
to select between two contractors, Boeing won that contract and
they are indeed the integrator to integrate this laser on that
airplane.
We are in a phase of the program right now called Program
Definition and Risk Reduction. This will result in an airborne
demonstration against a boosting missile out in the 2002 time
frame. Eventually resulting in a seven-aircraft fleet; Interim
Operational Capability, IOC of about 2006.
Again, several important technologies have come along, not
only the laser technology, but even more important than that,
the ability for adaptive optics and atmospheric compensation to
ensure that we do indeed get a good energy on the target. An
event-driven, milestone-driven program. And we have exceeded
every one of our demonstration milestones along the way, so we
have a lot of confidence in this program, and right now, as I
said, it has entered the demonstration phase.
SPACE SUPERIORITY
(CHART 11) Sir, if I could, I would like to now move into
the Space Superiority side, and I would like to talk about the
key programs. There are a lot of other success stories here,
and we are making good progress, not the least of which is that
we are using acquisition reform to save upwards of $500 million
over the five year defense program in the last block of GPS
satellites we put on contract.
The two programs I would like to talk about are keystones,
one of them is the Space-Based Infrared Program. This is a
keystone not only for continuing our threat-warning
capabilities that the Defense Support Program now provides, but
also a significant underpinning in the outyears to theater and
national missile defense. I will talk about this more.
And then I would like to talk about where we are going in
launch vehicles, because we have to drive down the cost per
pound of getting things into orbit, and that is the keystone
for doing that.
SPACE BASED INFRARED SYSTEM
(CHART 12) The Space Based Infrared System SBIRS program,
constitutes two major elements: A high element composed of
geosynchronous and high-earth orbiting, six of those in that
constellation, and then what has been referred to as the space
and missile tracking system, or the SBIRS low concept is a low
constellation of satellites which provides increased tracking
coverage and accuracy.
So if you look at these high ones as providing threat-
warning intelligence characterization, these are the low ones
that really constitute what you need to intercept theater
ballistic or ballistic missiles launched at the CONUS.
The key part of this program is we are in the engineering,
manufacturing development phase for the high constellation.
With help from the Hill, we have accelerated the SMTS or SBIRS
low portion and are in the program definition and risk
reduction phase. It was originally going to have capability up
in 2006. We have accelerated that to 2004. That program remains
technically and from a schedule standpoint, high risk, and the
reason is we have accelerated that technology, and some of the
sensors technology in particular, is going to need that length
of time to play out. So we do have a 2004 capability on the
books right now. We laid the money into the budget to
accelerate that program and we are off executing it right now.
EVOLVED EXPENDABLE LAUNCH VEHICLE
(CHART 13) On the EELV side, again we just finished a
competition. We went from four contractors competing for this
very important mission area, down to two that are now remaining
in the competition. As you can see, they are McDonnell Douglas
and Lockheed Martin. The important part of their concepts, they
are a family of systems, if you will, that give us full
coverage up from the small-medium category, all the way up to
the heavy-lift capability. And if we look at our mission models
all the way out in the outyears, we need to have capability
across that whole range of potential lift, and orbit placement
capabilities.
The key focus of this program is to decrease the cost to
orbit by anywhere from 25 to 50 percent, depending on what
orbit and what payload you are talking about. A significant
reduction in what it is going to cost us as we expand in the
case of the Air Force, from an air-and-space force to a space-
and-air force as we see ourselves doing in the future. And,
again, this program is now in the competition between these two
contractor teams.
GLOBAL ATTACK
(CHART 14) Sir, if I could I would like to move into the
Global Attack area here. In this particular area I am going to
focus on the fact that in our fighter force we are necking down
in the outyears the primary fighters and the attack aircraft
that we will be using will be the F-22 and the JSF. But also,
of course, the bomber force. And I will describe for you what
we are doing in both the case of the B-1 and the B-2, in many
cases with your help, to accelerate the conventional capability
on those platforms.
B-1 Bomber
(CHART 15) Sir, in the case of the B-1, again with your
help, we have accelerated a Joint Direct Attack Munition, JDAM
capability coupled with an ALE-50 towed decoy. We will have
eight airplanes that have moved up a year and a half, into the
first quarter of 1999, to get that capability fielded on the
airplane. So we will have those eight airplanes that will be
capable of carrying Joint Direct Attack Missions with the ALE-
50.
They already have improvements to the on-board 161 program,
so these airplanes now have reasonably good survivability. Not
as good as they will have downstream when we get the defensive
systems upgrade, but they can go out and prosecute attacks
within most of our theaters with some packaging help.
The other key capabilities that we are bringing on board
brings along the whole family of attack weapons systems that
use GPS-aided information; the Joint Standoff Weapon, JSOW,
which is a Navy program which now gives us 40 to 50 mile
standoff; the wind-corrected munitions dispenser, which allows
us to drop at medium and high altitude, again, with high
accuracy and not worry about winds and other issues like that.
And finally, the Joint Standoff Missile. This is a very,
very important one because it is a highly survivable long-range
standoff weapon that allows us to go after precision targets
with a thousand-pound penetrating warhead. These capabilities
are all programmed for fielding on the airplane. We see no
technical risk in doing that.
Probably the most significant technical challenge, and it
is an integration challenge as opposed to a technology itself,
is the Defensive Systems Upgrade Program. This program, the
content of it will be two major elements: One of them will be
the IDECM, the Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasure
program, the Navy-developed program that is going on a wide
range of platforms. That coupled with the ALR-56, which is a
very proven radar homing and warning system which we have on a
lot of our systems now, an upgraded version of it, will
constitute this Defensive Systems Upgrade Program. That is the
program that is structured to go on the B-1, and we are off in
the process of executing that right now.
Mr. Young. General, I am interested in the ribbon at the
bottom that says B-1 is the backbone of the bomber force. Tell
us how many combat missions the B-1 has flown?
General Muellner. It hasn't flown any yet, sir.
Mr. Young. That is what I thought. When I came to this
Congress in 1971, the B-1 was a big issue. I was one of the
very strong supporters of the B-1. And I have always wondered
why we talk about the B-1 but we have never done anything with
it, I am sure this is not in your shop or in your area of
jurisdiction, but you tell a very positive story here--but the
B-1 has never been used in a combat role, strategic or
conventional.
General Muellner. Sir, when I was Director of Requirements
at Air Combat Command when we stood up that command and we
brought the bomber force in from then Strategic Air Command
into Tactical Air Command, and merged the two together, we put
heavy focus on making the B-1 a strong conventional player,
because it has really good capability if you can get the
weapons on board in support of conventional warfighting.
It was an airplane that prior to that had been focused on
the strategic aspect of delivering nuclear weapons. We have
spent the time since then, and we used to say the airplane was
in the penalty box for a long time. We weren't able to do some
of the things necessary to it because of its previous history.
Since then we have brought weapons on board and upgraded
the computer systems and upgraded defensive systems so that it
can be an active participant in theater warfighting and
conventional warfighting, and I think we are on a good track to
do that.
Mr. Young. How old is the oldest airframe?
General Muellner. Sir, we will have to take that one for
the record. I do not know offhand. I do know when I was at
Edwards in the late 1970s and the 1980s--of course, we were
testing the airplane then, so obviously----
Mr. Dicks. It has got to be early 1980s.
General Muellner. Yes, sir, that is my guess.
Mr. Dicks. Early 1980s is when we started getting the B-1.
[The information follows:]
No B-1A airframes are flying nor were any converted to B-
1Bs. The oldest operational B-1B was delivered to the Air Force
at Dyess AFB in June 1985.
Mr. Young. Just one second, I just wanted to say that I
still remain a strong supporter of the B-1, and I hope that all
of these good stories that we hear about the B-1 happen some
day.
General Muellner. Sir, they are happening, as we speak, in
exercises. You know, I think you have seen some of the
exercises, two B-1s launches out of Dyess, refuel en route,
join up with the carrier battle group in the Med, and drop on
Corsica, and then return to Dyess. Those sorts of global power
missions are being flown. They are flown as part of Green Flags
and Red Flags, the things you need to normalize this capability
in conventional warfighting.
Mr. Dicks. Just on this point, many of us in this Committee
and on the Armed Services Committee have been very concerned
about the pace of getting these weapons on the B-1s and the B-
2s. Could you put in the record for us when we are going to get
these weapons on all of the B-1s, and all of the B-2s, so we
can have a real clear picture of what the plan is, how much
money is in there?
General Muellner. Absolutely, sir.
[The information follows:]
The B-1 present and future weapons capability is as follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Weapon Carriage RAA FOC
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mk-82.......................... 84 Current....... Current.
Mk-62 Naval mine............... 84 Current....... Current.
CBU-87/89/97................... 30 Current....... Current.
JDAM........................... 24 FY99.......... FY01.
WCMD........................... 30 FY02.......... FY04.
JSOW........................... 12 FY02.......... FY06.
JASSM.......................... 24 FY02.......... FY06.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
RAA--Required Assets Available (3 aircraft plus support infrastructure).
FOC--Full Operational Capability (all 95 B-1s modified).
The total cost to integrate CBUs, JDAM, WCMD, JSOW and JASSM on the
B-1 is $1.65 billion. Included in this cost is upgrade of the mission
planning system, simulators, and upgrade to the aircraft infrastructure
necessary to integrate and employ GPS-aided and other future weapons.
The infrastructure upgrade includes GPS, secure communications, 1760
smart data bus, and a new computer suite. The computer suite upgrade
will enable the B-1 to employ multiple types of smart weapons on a
single sortie and provide for future growth. The computer upgrade will
also improve the cost of ownership of the B-1 by reducing the annual
sustainment cost of the system by $40 million a year after FOC.
An additional $0.94 billion is funded to improve the survivability
of the B-1. These upgrades are essential for the B-1 to employ weapons
in the low to medium threat environment. The ALE-50 towed decoy
provides interim protection against certain threats. The Defensive
System Upgrade Program (DSUP) reuses components of the ALE-50 system,
but will provide a more robust self-protection capability against a
multitude of threats. DSUP will also improve the cost of B-1 ownership
through a sustainment savings of $60 million a year after FOC. The
fielding dates of the survivability enhancements are:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
RAA FOC
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ALE-50 Towed Decoy................ FY99............. FY03.
DSUP.............................. FY02............. FY08.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The B-2 present and future weapons capability is as follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Weapon Carriage LOC FOC
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mk-84 (2000 lb)................ 16 Current....... FY99.
GAM............................ 16 Current....... N/A.
GAM-113 (4700 lb).............. 8 FY98.......... FY99.
Mk-82 (500 lb)................. 80 FY98.......... FY99.
Mk-62 Naval mine............... 80 FY98.......... FY99.
CBU-87/89/97................... 34 FY98.......... FY99.
M-117 (740 lb)................. 36 FY98.......... FY99.
JDAM........................... 16 FY98.......... FY99.
JSOW........................... 16 FY99.......... FY99.
JASSM.......................... 16 FY03.......... FY03.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LOC--Limited Operational Capability (initial capability).
FOC--Full Operational Capability.
The total cost to integrate GAM-113 and JSOW on the B-2 is $13
million and $72 million respectively. These funds were part of the FY
97 Congressional plus-up. Cost to integrate JASSM is estimated at $137
million. Included in this cost is upgrade of the mission planning
system, simulators, and upgrade to the aircraft infrastructure
necessary to integrate and employee these weapons. The B-2 is also
developing a generic weapon interface system in conjunction with JSOW
integration to facilitate integrating future weapons. the remaining
weapons are part of the B-2 baseline program.
Mr. Dicks. We have added money in the past because of our
concern. But you have this platform that has been around since
the early to middle 1980s and it is now going to be 2002 before
we get real capability on the airplane. And I worry that by the
time we get there, the plane is going to be pretty darn old.
PGM OVERVIEW
(CHART 15a) General Muellner. Sir, you have this chart in
your backups, if you would like to look at it closely. What
this shows you is the fielding schedule on these weapons on
each of the weapons systems that you see here.
In some cases that fielding schedule is driven by
capabilities of the airplane that are needed. For example, a
new computer, a new database. In some cases it is driven by
availability of the weapon. The JASSM program and the JSOW
program are still in development; those weapons have not been
fielded yet. And some of the early capability will go on the
bomber force, in the case of the JASSM in particular. And we
will add to that the costs associated with each one of them.
They are not on those charts.
Mr. Dicks. I think one of the revolutionary aspects of this
weapon is the cost. For example, JDAM is $13,000 a weapon
compared to Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile, CALCM at
$3 million, or Tomahawk at $1.2 million. Even though these
platforms are expensive and have had difficulties, you have
still got the potential of putting them together with smart
weapons at a lower cost than standoff weapons, and they are
much more effective. You have got the ability to go against
fixed targets, mobile targets, advancing armor and relocatables
and underground targets. That is pretty impressive.
How many B-1s are we going to do this on? Is it 70 you are
talking about?
General Muellner. Yes, sir, we are going to modify the
whole fleet. We have 95 total aircraft available; 95 B-1s.
Mr. Dicks. Do we plan to keep 91 B-1s in the inventory?
General Muellner. Ninety-five Total Active Inventory, TAI.
I am not sure what the primary weapons code will be. We will
have to find that out for you. But it is something less than
that.
We always have attrition reserves in that built-in. But 95
total aircraft is what the inventory is for that, and our
intent is to modify the entire inventory so we have attrition
reserve and TAI airplanes built in. We will find out what the
exact number is.
[The information follows:]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
B-1B........................................................ 98-1 98-2 98-3 98-4
PTAI........................................................ 16 16 16 16
PMAI........................................................ 51 52 53 54
BAI......................................................... 7 7 7 7
AR.......................................................... 19 18 17 16
TEST........................................................ 2 2 2 2
---------------------------------------------------
TOTAL................................................. 95 95 95 95
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Dicks. One show-stopper was the necessity of getting a
certain kind of bomb racks authorized. Are the bomb racks part
of this program now?
General Muellner. When we talk about capability, that means
everything is on the airplane, including the software, which we
were talking about early, the racks, the necessary support
equipment so you have combat capability there. It is not just
the availability of a weapon and an airplane. That is combat
capability which is reflected on these charts.
Mr. Hobson. When would you have the capability if the
President called you tomorrow and said we have got to go to
war, you are not going to take B-1s now; you are going to take
B-52s first?
General Muellner. No, sir, it would depend on what the
President asked for. In the case of the ALE-50, we just tested
that and demonstrated it. The B-1 can drop hard bombs and drop
Cluster Bomb Units, CBUs and can penetrate in doing that. But
the answer is we would use a mix, depending on what the
specific targets are.
Mr. Dicks. But are there no smart weapons on the B-1B as of
today? The B-2 has smart weapons with the Global Positioning
System Aided Targeting System/Global Positioning System Aided
Munitions, GATS/GAM, which have been tested and certified to
drop.
Mr. Murtha. This wasn't all the Air Force's fault. Remember
the deal was we put a limitation of $20.5 billion, which I was
against, I knew we should have improved it as we were building
it. And instead, we stuck with the $20.5 billion, and many of
the improvements that would have added cost, but were
eliminated because of this cost limitation.
General Muellner. Yes, sir, that was one of the great
benefits we had at Air Combat Command. About the same time we
took over the airplanes, the folk on the conventional side, we
came out of that penalty box that you just described for us.
Mr. Dicks. I think the other point is as frustrated as a
lot of us are about the pace of getting the smart conventional
weapons on the B-1 and the B-2, the reality is that these
weapons are just coming into the inventory. So they have been
in development. The marriage of the platform is now occurring
because we are now getting these weapons. It isn't like we had
these weapons sitting around and JDAMs and JSOW just appeared.
General Muellner. We are going to start our first initial
production on JSOWs this year. We are--JSOW is in the same
state and JASSM is downstream. The Wind-Corrected Munitions
Dispenser is a brand-new contract, we just had a down-select
recently and, in fact, under protest now. We haven't been able
to kick that off, but these weapons, as the Congressman pointed
out, are just coming on board. So we are moving rapidly in this
area to be able to exploit both the global range and the
ability to range the battlefield all-weather that the bomber
force gives us. These are all-weather munitions, as opposed to
laser-guided bombs, which require favorable weather conditions.
Mr. Money. The defensive systems were not there with the
ALE-50. And it was just tested in the last week; we have a
better defensive system that will enable the operational folks
to use that if needed, and that we are continuing to upgrade
the defensive system. Just one more point. The chief of staff
called both General Muellner and I in and said this needs to be
fixed. This is high on our list, and we are fixing it.
B-2 AIRCRAFT
(CHART 16) General Muellner. Moving on to the B-2, what you
see is just one of the B-2 GAM/GATS tests. As was pointed out,
the B-2 has near-precision capability on it with the GAM/GATS,
which is the GPS-aided munition, and a special targeting scheme
that allows it to improve over just the basic JDAM-like
capability.
Mr. Lewis. General, could I interrupt you for just a
moment. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. I have to chair a Committee
down the hall, so I won't be able to be here. I would almost
like to yield my time to Mr. Dicks. I was watching C-SPAN the
other night, and there were those Members of Congress making a
presentation regarding the fact that the Department of Defense,
the greatest pool of discretionary money we have, continues to
spend three times more on the procurement side than any
potential enemy is spending. There is quite an elaborate
display that lays the foundation for what is going to be
arguments presented to us on the Floor regarding whatever we
propose. I suggest all of us review that tape that must be
available, just because it provides interesting information.
Having said that, there are those of us who would suggest
that there is a different window out in front of us presently.
That window involves Russia being in very, very serious
economic difficulty. While she continues to spend huge portions
of her total available capital on defense, a very, very
significant piece of that is going just to try to meet the
payroll of their personnel that they have in such large numbers
around the country.
It is suggested that as we look to the new millennia that
China is the big target in terms of our interest that we are
concerned about concerning peace. But there is a window of
opportunity perhaps.
The question that swirls in my mind, is do we have an
opportunity here for a shifting of gears that would cause us,
to move forward with conventionality of B-1, but, more
importantly, to move more quickly towards that aircraft with
such a tremendous reach that is so important to us?
Conventional capability of the B-2 is what I am suggesting.
Are you internally thinking through the feasibility of a
major shift in gears that might say, you know, if this window
is really here, if our intelligence, and I don't know what they
say, indeed, should we be pushing the B-2 button harder and in
terms of results, more effectively than we have?
General Muellner. Sir, we have indeed taken a hard look at
that. I think you have heard the Chief and the Secretary talk
about our long-range planning activities that we are just in
the later stage of that. It has been going on for the last year
and a half. As a part of that, we look at varied options for
the future, and, as a result of that, backed that down into
what our force structure needs.
If you look at all those options for the future, though,
regarding whether it is a China as a peer competitor or some of
the other potential coalitions that could pose that sort of
threat, you still end up with a major regional contingency
focus and a lot of these lesser regional contingencies.
There are still out in the future, as we see it, a lot of
potential engagements similar to what we had to go through with
Iraq here back in the early 1990s time frame. So as a result of
that, we need a balanced force structure that gives us not only
the enablers, which is certainly what the B-2 is, we need some
of those enablers to be able to go in and rip apart the
integrated air defense system. We also need a more affordable
element of the force structure in larger numbers, which is
going to allow us to deliver the mass of weapons that we need
across the whole range of the battlefield.
Mr. Lewis. You talk about 95 aircraft, all conventional
over time, rethinking what we do with the last 35 of those,
whether there is reprogramming potential. It is that sort of
question that I don't know if you are prepared to answer in
some other forum.
General Muellner. Well, sir, we would be glad to sit down
and discuss with you how we went through our rationale and what
our force structure demands were driven by those various
options in the future. QDR is obviously looking at that issue,
and General Ralston probably highlighted that or will when he
comes over. That is exactly the focus, to look at the range of
options for the future and see where we have headroom to move
in other areas.
Mr. Money. Secretary Cohen is also with his new team at the
Pentagon addressing the issues, and the strategy of what will
come out of that--being quick, decisive and flexible--what will
come out of that will be more apparent over time. We will match
the force with that.
Mr. Dicks. We just received a letter from the President
again reassuring us that they will in the Deep Attack Weapons
Mix Study and in the quadrennial review look at all these
comparisons between various capabilities, B-2 versus other
capabilities. I have been reassured again that that is going to
be done before the quadrennial defense review is completed. So
we are finally going to get the kind of analysis that I think
all of us on this Committee at least feel we ought to do.
General Muellner. One comment about the B-2, an interesting
weapon, I will point this out again later, is that the GPS
munition I talked about earlier, they found a very effective
way to take that same guidance kit and put it on the BLU-113
weapon. This is the 4,700 pound weapon developed for Desert
Storm, a high-penetrator weapon. It is the one that grew out of
the artillery tube. It turns out that that same GPS-guidance
capability will give us the ability in the case of the B-2 to
carry eight of these weapons internally and go after high-value
hard targets.
We are well along the way. In fact, we are using the
additional funds you all helped us with this last year to bring
that capability on board and that weapon is in development. In
fact, we have done our first separation tests already.
JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER
(CHART 17) If I could just briefly comment on the Joint
Strike Fighter. From the Air Force's standpoint, this is the
low end of the infamous hi-lo mix, like the F-16 is to us. It
is the truck, if you will, of the fighter force in the out
years. There is competition now head to head between Lockheed
Martin, and Boeing. It is a tri-service program, of course, the
U.S. services, with a variant of this airplane satisfying the
Air Force, the U.S. Navy, and the U.S. Marine Corps' needs.
This program is in the concept definition phase right now
where each of these contractor teams will build flying
demonstrators of their variants of the airplane. Those will fly
just prior to the turn of the century. It is very, very
important to this airplane from the U.S. Air Force's standpoint
not only for it to be effective on the 2010 battlefield, but
also for it to be affordable. So there is heavy emphasis on
that, not only from the Air Force, but from all three of the
services.
I might add right now the United Kingdom, the Royal Navy is
already part of this program. There are three other of our NATO
allies that have indicated intent in bringing money to the
table to join the program also. Canada is expected to join here
within the next couple of weeks.
RAPID GLOBAL MOBILITY
(CHART 18) We talk about global mobility. Obviously, the
mainstay of our focus in global mobility is indeed the C-17
program. I will give you a quick update on that program as it
is, indeed, executing out very, very well.
C-17 AIRCRAFT
(CHART 19) Indeed, with your help, we did indeed get the
multiyear. That multiyear saved us in excess of $1 billion when
you look at the airplane and the engine. The airplane has been
performing very, very well. We have 30 aircraft operational out
in force. It is just finishing and is waiting for final
certification for its necessary airdrop certification.
The program right now is hard at work with the new
requirement that the Army brought forward to be able to operate
and deliver Army armor in the semi-prepared fields and what
have you. We expect to have certification to be able to do that
by the mid-summertime frame.
Mr. Money. I might point out here, Mr. Chairman, that the
last 17 C-17s have all been delivered early and with great
quality, excellent quality. So this program, albeit it has had
a hell of a start, is now clicking on all cylinders, and we are
meeting every milestone. I appreciate Congressman Murtha's
comment about the multiyear, but clearly the program is on a
great path.
Relating this back to the F-22, we see the F-22 emulating
this in a general sense, but we have addressed the F-22 issues
much earlier in the program.
PRECISION WEAPONS PLAN
(CHARTS 20, 21, and 22) General Muellner. To look at the
weapons themselves, and we have already talked about a lot of
these, so I can step through them quickly, we are still
procuring and fielding our laser family of weapons. The GBU-28
is that big 5,000 pound weapon I just described. There is a GPS
version called the GAM-113. This will be a B-2 weapon only
initially because it is primarily focused on the GAM/GATS
capability and the ability to carry it internally is important
for signature control. Obviously Mavericks persist and we have
just upgraded those for improved reliability.
JASSM is improved and will be our primary standoff weapon
in the future. That, coupled with the JDAM and the wind-
corrected munitions dispenser, that allows us the direct attack
that we have talked about, which is a very effective way to
prosecute attack, especially with things like the Wind
Corrected Munitions Dispenser, WCMD against advancing armor
formations and things of that nature, where you have to deal
with a large array of armor or other vehicles on the
battlefield.
Of course, with the Navy we are participating with the
Joint Standoff Weapon. That will be an important weapon
specifically for our bomber force. It gives it that 40-50 mile
stand off with a wide array of munitions, both anti-armor and
anti-personnel type weapons.
Mr. Dicks. Could I ask one question on that point. Does
JASSM give you enough range to deal with the SA-10 problem?
General Muellner. Yes, it does. If you look at the
signature of something like say, the B-2, it clearly does. With
most of our other high-value weapons systems, you can get in
within the 40 to 50 miles. You can't, for instance, though,
against a SA-10 take a conventional airplane in an SA-10 netted
environment. You still need some stealth to get into that
range, because the SA-10C is a very effective air defense
system.
Mr. Dicks. So initially you need some standoff.
General Muellner. Yes, sir, you need an enabler like the B-
2 and the F-22 to take down the defense to now where you can
deal on it with a one-on-one basis.
Mr. Money. Or go to a JASSM.
Mr. Dicks. Which is better once we get it.
General Muellner. Again, the GPS has been a great success
story for the contractor-government team in that they have put
this program together very, very rapidly. Indeed, it has
demonstrated really good capability in the initial test to
date.
We will have some demonstration capability within the next
several months of actually dropping a live weapon against a
target that we have used the entire system to metric against.
JASSM competition again is ongoing. The two contractors
that are in that heated competition are McDonnell-Douglas, who
builds the JDAM, by the way, and Lockheed Martin here, who
builds at least one wind-corrected munitions dispenser
contract. They are both focusing on this area.
I might add, both of them are highly leveraged in
commercial content, Global Positioning System/Inertial
Navigation System (GPS/INS), and so are straight out of the
commercial production line to keep the price down on these
systems.
They are in a competition right now. The initial fielding
of this will be on the B-52 just because we are going to use
that for a test aircraft, and then the rest of the bombers flow
according to the plan you saw on the previous chart.
I might add one thing on the cost of that. Right now the
estimated cost of that is under $400,000 a round. At the time
of cancellation, the Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile,
TSSAM, the program it replaced, the estimate was up around $1.3
million a round. So that is what commercial focus, commercial
content, and getting rid of all those mil specs and mil
standards does for you.
JOINT DIRECT ATTACK MUNITION (JDAM)
(CHART 23) JDAM, of course, is probably the best success
story. It is indeed $14,000 a round, as we talked about.
Mr. Dicks. That is cost growth. It is up from $13,000 to
$14,000.
General Muellner. It depends on what round you are talking
about.
Mr. Money. When we get to round 84,000, it will be at
$13,000.
General Muellner. It depends on which round you are talking
about. The end result of this is they brought in a lot of
commercial content and they have made this program work.
The one problem they are having with it right now is they
are about 60 days behind just because we have accelerated the
program so rapidly. Some of the second tier vendors are having
difficulty delivering the GPS Inertial Measurement Units, IMUs,
as rapidly as they can. Other than that, the accuracy has
exceeded all of our requirements on all of the tests, and we
have a very large database here already.
PGM CAPABILITIES
(CHART 24) Mr. Money. Congressman Dicks, here was your
favorite chart from last year.
Mr. Dicks. Good.
General Muellner. Again, what this chart just shows you is
from the Air Force perspective what our family of weapons is
going to be in the outyears and they reflect that same thing.
This is a function of standoff formation. This is as a function
of either a submunition all the way up to precision accuracy.
The next chart, please.
Mr. Young. Gentlemen, we have a vote now. Mr. Hobson will
chair the Committee until we get back. It won't take us long.
Mr. Hobson. Why don't you continue on, General.
INFORMATION SUPERIORITY
(CHART 25) General Muellner. We are going to get into the
information superiority area. I would comment that what we show
on here are primarily platforms, but I would like to preface
this comment with the fact that we are also working those
information superiority issues very, very hard that do not
involve platforms, and that is protection of our databases from
a standpoint of a defensive standpoint, and also building
offensive capability to use information warfare. It is an
effective warfighting tool.
There is heavy emphasis on protection of our weapons system
databases and systems primarily focused by Electronic Systems
Center up at Hanscom, where they go through every weapons
system and provide a vulnerability assessment back to the
program office, and a detailed definition of what has to be
done to indeed have robust Information Warfare, IW
capabilities.
We look at the platform, the primary contributors to
situational awareness are, of course, the Airborne Warning and
Control System, AWACS and Joint STARS aircraft from an air and
ground surveillance standpoint.
------. What you see here and will see in the program I
described are efforts to maintain and improve these
capabilities on these weapons systems, but also a new focus of
moving into the world of unmanned aerial vehicles to pick up
some of these loads, especially in areas where we want to have
persistent long-standing surveillance over a portion of the
battlefield.
You see the Predator which we currently have fielded, and I
will describe it in a little more detail. We have the Global
Hawk and the Dark Star, both of which will fly again this year.
JOINT STARS AIRCRAFT
(CHART 26) First I will talk a little about the Joint
STARS. We have two production aircraft on the ramp. They are
being employed on a daily basis. As you know, they employed
again in Joint Endeavor. They performed as well there,
performed very well there, as they had in Desert Storm. So the
warfighters love this weapons system.
Right now we are in the midst of negotiations with our NATO
allies. There is a program called NATO AGS, or alliance ground
surveillance, over there, where they are evaluating the Joint
STARS to make a decision this fall in the November time frame
as to whether to start up a Joint STARS program in NATO similar
to the AWACS program that they have in NATO.
We are moving to a fleet of 19 aircraft. In this last year,
we have put major investment in the program to get commercial
content on board to ease the transition of technologies,
commercial work stations, commercial computers, and, as a
result of that, that helps us deal with the out year issues of
obsolescence of key parts and so on.
Mr. Money. General Muellner can speak with firsthand
knowledge, flying 50 sorties of JSTARS in the desert.
PREDATOR UAV
(CHART 27) General Muellner. Sir, on the Predator, we are
operating that today in Hungary. It is providing good support
of the warfighter. We have had challenges doing that in the bad
weather months, because the system was not capable of flying
under icing conditions and also because of the low ceiling.
We are working on the icing problem. We have an aircraft
that is up, either is or today or will be flying in the next
week or so, up in Duluth, Minnesota, doing the icing test in
order to certify the deicing mod and new engine on the airplane
that will give it the ability to operate.
The training and sustainment operations are set up at
Indian Springs outside of Las Vegas, and it is currently
supporting these deployments.
Mr. Money. I might point out here Secretary Perry moved the
operation and maintenance of the Predator to the Air Force
starting 1 July, and subsequent to that the program has an Air
Force officer in charge reporting through a Navy Program
Executive Office, PEO, but directly to me. So all the high
altitude, long-enduring Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, UAVs are
within one spot within the Air Force.
Mr. Hobson. I might say I was there, and that was their
real problem with it. They liked it when they could use it, but
they couldn't use it when they should be using it.
General Muellner. Unfortunately, that program, of course,
is an Advance Concept Technology Development, ACTD, part of the
initial ACTD all-weather support operations, and were not part
of what demonstrated. As we transition that from an ACTD to a
long-standing combat capability, we had to build in that
capability and also build in the procedures to be able to
operate it under lower weather conditions and also to give it
the capability to climb through weather to get out to its
target area. That was the big problem.
Mr. Money. We have gone to school on that in that the other
two high altitude, long enduring, Dark Star and Global Hawk,
are still in ACTD. But we stood up a System Program Office, SPO
at Wright Patterson, 2 years in advance of that program
transferring to the Air Force so we can alleviate transition
problems from an ACTD into an operation.
AGILE COMBAT SUPPORT
(CHART 28) General Muellner. To talk about the last of the
core competence, I would like to talk a minute about what we
are doing in the combat support area because this is a
different way of doing business from our standpoint.
We are focused on really getting down our deployment tail
for our weapons systems. By that I mean that when we deploy an
F-15 squadron somewhere, it takes upwards of 17 C-141s to get
those 24 airplanes, necessary people, and equipment to where
they can operate.
Mr. Dicks. How long does that take, General?
General Muellner. A normal squadron will move out--our
squadrons are on a one, two, three basis. So the first wing, as
you know, was deployed to Dhahran. Within 24 hours they were on
the ground. So we have mobility commitments that would move
those folks out over a 3-day period.
Mr. Dicks. If you had to move 1,000 airplanes from CONUS
out to the Gulf, just roughly how long would it take? A month?
A month and a half?
General Muellner. The TPFD, which is the time-phased force
deployment staff, which the Joint Staff puts together, has for
each theater an integrated plan to do that. Under a different
forum we could run through that with you. But it is a long
time. Not for the air side. We tend to be fairly ready to go
immediately.
Mr. Dicks. You have to get all the equipment out there,
don't you, in order to fight?
General Muellner. Absolutely. But remember, when I said the
17 C-141s, that took that 24 aircraft squadron and put them on
the ramp at Dhahran ready to fight. Now, they had missiles when
they got there and there were other missiles brought in. There
were the people and support.
Mr. Dicks. That is 24 airplanes.
General Muellner. Twenty-four airplanes for the 17 C-141s.
In the case of the F-22 and the JSF, we are talking about
bringing that from 17 141s to 8 141s. We have cut the airlift
requirement in half, and it is going to go down even more in
the case of the JSF.
Mr. Young. Let me ask, General, basically on management of
our time here, how many more charts do you have and how much
more time do you have in that presentation?
General Muellner. We have six more, and they are pretty
quick.
Mr. Young. Okay. Because I want to give Mr. Nethercutt
time. He has not had any opportunities at all today. Why don't
we go ahead and proceed with the charts, and then let Mr.
Nethercutt have the first round of questioning.
General Muellner. The other key elements of this obviously
are modernizing our loaders to support the airlift operation,
and of course the C-17 is a key part of that. The other key
part of it is improving our transportation and information
systems so we can track spare parts. This is the Federal
Express, call up, know exactly where your part is at approach.
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
(CHART 29) Well, sir, underpinning this whole thing is our
science and technology, S&T program. That total program in the
1998 budget is about $1.2 billion. As you can see, it is pretty
well balanced against the 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 areas, with the
heavy focus in the 6.2 area, but still a significant amount out
in the 6.3.
These are the transitional technologies starting to take
place, mostly contracted out, which has been the focus of our
Air Force operations. We are continuing to do this while we are
continuing to draw down our work force to the tune of about 30
percent.
These are the key focus areas in the President's 1998
budget. You can see the shifting focus of where we think we
need to invest in the future and also dealing with some things
with aging aircraft. We clearly have and will have aging
aircraft which is also a big problem for the conventional
airline industry in the civil end of it.
On the S&T, these are major focus areas in the future that
you see.
ACQUISITION REFORM
(CHART 30) Acquisition reform continues to do well. I have
given you a couple of examples already. Right now just from the
Air Force perspective, we have freed up $17 billion that would
have had to be invested in other things, that is either savings
or cost avoidance, as a result of things like JDAM, like the
multiyear and C-17 and so on. So that is money we can invest to
keep from having a modernization bow wave.
A key part of that also is we are doing that and a key part
of that is we are also drawing down our work force. This is the
efficiency part that Mr. Money talked about of efficiently
producing effective weapons systems.
WIND CORRECTED MUNITIONS DISPENSER
(CHART 31) Here is a good example. This is a contract that
was just recently won. I might add it is in protest right now,
so I can't go into a lot of detail about it. It was won by
Lockheed Martin. It is for the wind-corrected munitions
dispenser. This is the tail kit that goes on the munition. That
was expected to cost upwards of $25,000 a round. The actual bid
price that they came in with is just under $9,000. So, again,
streamlining, commercial content, which there is a lot of in
here, really pays off. Getting rid of those mil specs and
standards and letting the contractor go off and figure how to
do it, not us telling him how to do it, $850 million saved
across the expanse of that program.
Mr. Money. Actually I think the money is greater than that
in that we have a 20-year warranty on that so the depot and
those issues are not going to be there. We go back to the
manufacturer with that warranty.
SUMMARY
General Muellner. Bumper to bumper. If it breaks, they take
it back and give us a new one.
(CHART 32) In summary, the bottom line is, one, we are
keeping a high focus on modernization. We believe it is our
future and we have to do that for our warfighters. We are
trying to do that by freeing up investment through acquisition
streamlining and also at the same time our warfighters
understand it is important to keep those weapons systems
affordable, so they are learning how to understand the cost of
their requirements and they are factoring that into their
decisions. Thus far, we have been successful in using the
combination of those things to keep our key programs on track.
Sir, that completes all the charts. I would be glad to take
any other questions, sir, that you might have.
[The joint statement and Charts of Mr. Money and Lt.
General Muellner follow:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Young. Okay. Thank you very much for a very interesting
presentation this morning.
I would like to yield now to Mr. Nethercutt, who has not
had an opportunity to ask any questions.
AIRBORNE LASER PROGRAM
Mr. Nethercutt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the
Committee. Welcome, General, and Secretary Money. I was at
another hearing, I am sorry, that is the story of our lives
around here. I apologize for missing your presentation. I was
glad to hear a little of it and I look forward to reading the
materials.
To the extent you have talked about the airborne laser
already, I apologize. Let me just follow with a question, if
you could, please answer, either or both.
I think this is a good program. I am supportive of the
development of ballistic missile defense generally, and I think
this is a good component of the Pentagon's missile defense
architecture.
I sense, at least my understanding is, that the airborne
laser is funded and managed by the Air Force. The other missile
programs are managed by the Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization, BMDO. What is the reason for that and why was the
program transferred?
General Muellner. Well, sir, the reason it was initially
transferred out of BMDO is on the advice and recommendation of
the Congress. In 1992, the Congress directed that those
programs that were more than 10 years out from a transition
standpoint should be transitioned back to the services. That
was done, and the Air Force picked up that responsibility, and
the BMDO transferred an amount of money when that occurred.
Post-Desert Storm, as we looked at the need to deal with
the ballistic missiles, the one area that was not being covered
was the boost phase.
There was at that time one approach that surfaced, which
was to use a kinetic kill, an Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air
Missile, AMRAAM, if you will. What we found when we looked at
doing that, we were going to have to have so many orbiting
interceptors so close to where the missile was launched that
you needed very good intelligence. The reason was because of
the time of flight of the missile. You had to get your airplane
pointed, detect the launch, launch this AMRAAM, and then it had
to close very rapidly, because you had an accelerating missile.
As we looked at that, it became obvious that wasn't a
viable solution. We couldn't get enough velocity out of the
missiles.
What had matured in previous demonstrations and was coming
along rapidly was a speed-of-light weapon. So, indeed, we
solved the velocity issue and at the same time came up with a
solution that allowed us to stand off and not have to put all
those airplanes orbiting in enemy territory.
As a result of those key technologies that make it up, the
laser technology, the adaptive optics, the atmospheric
compensation, we put together demonstration milestones which
they successfully completed that allowed us to go through this
phase of the program.
Mr. Money. I was just out on the West Coast last Friday. We
had a program review and that program is off to a great start.
We are past the physics. The physics in this are proven. It is
a packaging job, an engineering job of getting it on an
airplane. With time, we will get there. Ultimately, then we
will have a weapon that, as the General said, reacts at the
speed of light and roughly $1,000 a round. It gets the missile
while it is up and it will fall on whoever launched it. For all
those reasons, I think we have a winner here, and it is just a
matter of getting through the program and to the engineer.
JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER
Mr. Nethercutt. I think you are right, it is a winner. I
was briefed this week and informed it has had great success,
and there are exciting developments to come. So I encourage you
to keep going.
General, I noted in your testimony when I was here a little
while ago that the Joint Strike Fighter appeared to be
affordable, I wrote down your words. I think that is a great
testament to this idea that we need to initiate serious
procurement reforms, certainly in the Air Force and the other
services, and this Joint Strike Fighter is really a good
example of that.
I am wondering if after the reform legislation in 1994 and
1995, you have any other recommendations about what Congress
can do to streamline the procurement process and make it more
efficient? Are there any regulations that are holding you back
that are unnecessary that we should pay attention to? If you
can answer either now or for the record, I would be grateful.
General Muellner. I think we will take that for the record
for you.
I would just offer to you, I had the opportunity to start
the Joint Strike Fighter program and work that hard. I can tell
you that the vast majority of the encumbrances we had before
have already been removed. Our problems really right now are
the institutionalizing of that and the behavior of the service
acquisition folks, and even with the contractors. The
contractors really need to change the way they accommodate and
do business. We are seeing that change.
The comment I made earlier from Alan Mulally from Boeing
that says what we are doing, everything we have been doing in
the commercial field we are now bringing into the defense
world. That is an important issue which I think we are now
incorporating. We will be happy to provide you additional
information.
[The information follows:]
The legislative relief Congress provided in 1994 and 1995
has improved our flexibility to streamline the Air Force
procurement process. We believe that the previously provided
legislative relief is adequate for now. Our challenge is to
change the acquisition culture, and to institutionalize the
increased flexibility.
However, there are still areas for which legislative change
is necessary to improve the efficiency of the process. For
example; The Davis-Bacon Act, which was enacted in 1931, is
applicable to construction type (construction, alteration/
repair) contracts in excess of $2,000. What this means is that
the Contracting Officer is required to do labor checks to
ensure the applicable minimum wages/benefits are being paid by
the contractor. This imposes a significant administrative
burden on Contracting personnel. Congress, through FASA,
provides for acquisitions to be made via commercial procedures;
yet for construction type contracts, the Davis-Bacon Act still
applies. Therefore, true efficiency has not been achieved.
There are other laws, such as the Service Contract Act, Walsh-
Healy Act, and Copeland Act, which, like the Davis-Bacon Act,
are still applicable to commercial item contracts. Therefore,
we would recommend that commercial item contracts be exempt
from these Acts.
As part of our ongoing Lightning Bolt initiatives, we
recently had a team look at reducing the cycle time between
requirements identification and contract award. The team's
final report was just published in February 1997. The final
report listed 63 proposed best practices and suggested 14
possible areas for legislative relief. We are currently
reviewing these suggestions to determine if they should be
included in any future requests for legislative relief.
Mr. Money. The only other thing I would just add to that,
Congressman, is funding stability is paramount. We are in this
phase now over the next 4 years of two contractors building two
models, one model each that will be tested in two
configurations, and then we will down select. The more stable
that program is now and in the early parts of production, will
pay off great benefits.
On F-22, when we disrupted that program, for every dollar
we took out, we had to put three back in. So funding stability
is very, very important.
Mr. Nethercutt. We are trying up here.
Mr. Money. You bet. We appreciate that.
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE
Mr. Nethercutt. I just have one final question, if I may. I
had the chance to go to California last August and look at
Global Hawk, as it was being constructed. I missed your formal
presentation, but I think unmanned aerial vehicles have great
potential. To the extent you can in this hearing, give us some
idea of what you see as the future of UAVs, either by design or
capability, and what your view is from the Air Force
standpoint?
General Muellner. We certainly endorse your views, not only
on Global Hawk but that whole family. There are a lot of these
persistent surveillance missions, Inverse Synthetic Aperture
Radar (ISAR) type missions, where a persistent UAV is an ideal
solution for it. Clearly as Global Hawk matures, as Dark Star
matures, which gives us better survivability deep and so on,
they can pick up a big segment of what we have to do with
manned flights, or cover an area where we are unable to do
anything right now.
We are going beyond that in our focus. We had a summer
study last year from the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board
that has recommended other areas to focus UAVs. One of the ones
that seems to jump out at you is the area to deal with a
persistent suppression of enemy air defenses, to be able to put
a platform up over the enemy air defenses so that if you come
up on the net, we are going to kill you right now. And right
now we are off working a program with Defense Advanced Research
Project Agency, DARPA, put together a demonstration program, to
stem off aggressively in that program.
Another area is the area of com relays. Right now we are
moving to where we are going to depend totally on satellites
for an awful lot of our--even in theater bandwidth
requirements. It is not clear why you can't take a Milstar-like
package and rather than putting it on a bus up in space, put it
on a Global Hawk and put it up at high altitude over the
battlefield to give the commanders on the battlefield that same
sort of connectivity.
We are moving off in that direction with a joint
demonstration, again with DARPA and the Army to go off and
demonstrate that potential. So we see a lot of benefit in the
UAV field opening up.
Mr. Money. I will add to that and put the chart up to
remind us we are very much enthused about that. That manifests
itself in the Air Force a couple ways. I mentioned earlier we
stood up a SPO in Wright Patterson to handle Global Hawk and
Dark Star 2 years before they transferred to the Air Force.
The Air Force is also initiating a battle lab down in
Eglin, and the main reason for that is how to incorporate
CONOPS, concept of operations, deconfliction, those types of
things, so we can integrate UAVs into the force.
In the long term, we too see, especially in the long
enduring mode, we will far exceed what a man can do, and
probably overtime, but it is way too early, this Global Hawk
might be an U-2 replacement. But I just want to caution people,
we need to prove this, have that technology mature so maybe 10
years from now we can be addressing that issue.
[Chart follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Nethercutt. You mentioned the issue of satellite
vulnerability--you may have seen the report last week about the
revelations regarding satellite vulnerability. So to the extent
that Global Hawk is consistent with trying to reduce these
vulnerabilities, I think it is well worth doing.
General Muellner. It opens up the envelope to give us much
more robust and probably more affordable solutions.
Mr. Money. I don't see one replacing the other in toto. It
is a combination, then, of getting the maximum optimizing the
mix, if you will.
Mr. Nethercutt. I understand. Thank you for your work and
thank you for your testimony.
Mr. Young. Has Global Hawk flown yet?
General Muellner. No, sir.
Mr. Young. You had the roll-out of the vehicle?
General Muellner. The roll-out was several weeks ago out in
San Diego. Both it and Dark Star after its accident will fly
this summer and fall time frame.
Mr. Money. August.
Mr. Young. Where do you plan to fly it?
General Muellner. Global Hawk I think is flown out of--will
be flown out of Edwards. Dark Star is also flown out of
Edwards. It is being jointly managed by NASA, Dryden and the
contractors; and the Global Hawk is Air Force Flight Test
Center and the contractor teams.
ACQUISITION REFORM
Mr. Young. As we proceeded throughout your presentation
today, for those of us that have been following these issues
for a long time, we detect some improvement in the way that we
are approaching some of these acquisitions. It looks like you
are getting a little more for the money because of the changes
in the way you are letting the contracts.
A person in the Pentagon who is quite important when it
comes to the area of money and purchasing, et cetera, and I
will not identify the person, said that there are a lot of
other improvements that could be made in acquisition. One
improvement deals with very small contracts that could actually
be purchased with a credit card rather than going through the
whole contracting procedure, which in some cases he said
actually costs more than the product that you were purchasing.
What can we do about that? What can we do to be able to do
a smart approach to this type of acquisition reform that would
let us eliminate the bureaucracy that really isn't necessary
and that is costing more than the product?
General Muellner. Sir, I will give you an example as an
answer. What it shows is the problem is culture; it is not
regulation right now.
A couple of months back I gave an award to an outstanding
young scientist in the Air Force, a Ph.D. out at Edwards who
just invented a new high-temperature plastic. In talking to him
and his wife at lunch, I asked him what his greatest challenge
was. I thought he was going to give me some exotic technical
issue. He said, I can't get chemicals.
This plastic compound he invented was with off-the-shelf
chemicals. You can buy it in almost any store. I said, why
don't you use your credit card to go buy them, your
International Merchants Purchase Authority Card, (IMPAC) Card?
He said, well, they won't let me use it. This is a Ph.D.
inventing this new high-temperature plastic for rocket motors.
So when we ran the audit trail, somebody up the chain of
command made the decision, well, we can't entrust this
individual out there in the field with these credit cards. So
now that individual has a credit card. He literally drives into
Lancaster and buys the chemicals he needs or sends somebody in
to get them when he needs them.
The ability to do that is out there right now. It is
difficult in some cases to get over many, many years of writing
out purchase orders, getting them validated and stamped by four
or five levels, which in reality added little value to the
whole process and certainly added cost. So I think we have made
a lot of progress.
John Hamre has been pushing that really hard down at the
services. The services I think are responding very positively
to that approach.
Mr. Money. I might add, the IMPAC Card has made an impact.
I don't know off the top of my head, but I think we are in
the--30,000, 40,000 people are using them. I was over in Europe
this last June. It hadn't got there. It is there now. There are
some problems with paying the bills and all that kind of stuff,
but it is being fought through. If you would like for the
record I can get you back the magnitude of purchases that are
now ongoing, and we are working through the culture and the new
way of doing business.
[The information follows:]
Approximately 78% of micropurchases (actions under $2,500)
are now being done using IMPAC in the Air Force. The statistics
for fiscal year 1997 as of the end of February, show 352,699
actions valued at about $119 million have been procured by the
Air Force. Currently, the Air Force has 23,724 cardholders.
Mr. Money. I might add, Mr. Chairman, that I have been here
confirmed in this job a little over a year now, and what I have
seen just in the last year has been remarkable. But we are not
there yet. It is clearly a cultural shift. I am still asked the
questions about, well, do you want me to do my job or do you
want me to do this acquisition reform stuff. When we get that
being that is my job, we will be there. We have a ways to go.
Every day I see a positive sign.
This wind-corrected munition, there are examples coming in
every day. I don't hear that this is an all uphill--we have
some negatives to work through as well. But I think back to
what Goldwater-Nichols, the thought and the insight Congress
had back there, put in an acquisition executive with industrial
experience in place, but then augmenting that with a general
here like General Muellner that has 8 years of test, Purple
Heart, been around, fought wars and so forth, bringing that
together. Then with a person like Darleen Druyun, a
professional, been in the business a long time. That
combination of events is clicking on all cylinders.
I appreciate you saying that, and we keep trying every day
to improve the system. I am really serious about the warfighter
sets the requirements. That ensures the effectiveness of the
weapons system. My job, our job, then is to ensure the
efficiency of the process, the getting there. This whole thing
about better, faster, cheaper, and smoother, we live every day.
So I appreciate that comment.
INTERNATIONAL MERCHANTS PURCHASE AUTHORIZATION CARD (IMPAC)
Mr. Young. Mr. Money, tell us about the IMPAC Card. Is that
a credit card through a commercial bank, much like a Visa or
MasterCard, or is it like an American Express card, or is it a
government institution of one type or another?
Mr. Money. It is in fact a credit card. I am going to fall
off real quick.
General Muellner. It is a credit card. I think it is a
commercial bank, if my recollection is correct. I think it is
one in Denver. We will find out the specifics for you.
[The information follows:]
Since January 1989, the General Services Administration
(GSA) has been contracting for purchase cards for Federal
agencies. The government-wide purchase card is called the
International Merchants Purchase Authorization Card (IMPAC),
which is a VISA charge card program managed by Rocky Mountain
Bank Card System, Inc. (RMBCS) through contract with GSA.
General Muellner. The intent was to get out of the business
of managing those accounts, get the government out of that
business. So it is indeed a commercial application that is used
and the entire tracking and auditing system that is used with
it is commercial in nature also, i.e., not done by the
government.
Mr. Young. Give us a summary, if you would for the record,
we won't take the time to do it now, as to how many of these
credit cards have been issued, what type of person in the
process is authorized to use it, what kind of audit trail there
is to make sure that there are no abuses. We would like to know
more about that, and any suggestions that you might have as to
whether it should be expanded or where it might be used to save
additional money.
The Speaker has challenged me as Chairman of this
subcommittee to find a way to turn the Pentagon into a
triangle. That indicates to me you take two legs out of five.
That is 40 percent. I don't know if we can do 40 percent. But
we do have that challenge, to find ways to get more for the
dollar. A lot of the cost in the Pentagon is bureaucratic.
We were told at a hearing just recently that there are more
shoppers in the Pentagon than there are soldiers in the entire
United States Marine Corps. I don't know if that is true or
not, but the source that came up with that information I think
is a very reliable source.
One of our witnesses said maybe we can make it a square,
maybe not a triangle. But anyway, the idea is to try to squeeze
out the additional bureaucracy that we really don't need. I
think this IMPAC Card is an example of the fact that it can be
done if we look hard enough and work hard enough to do it.
Mr. Money. I apologize again for not having those numbers
off the top of my head. We will get those to you.
[The information follows:]
Currently, the Air Force has authorized 23,724 IMPAC
cardholders to procure goods and services under $2,500 directly
from vendors. The cardholders can be anyone in a given
functional area appointed by an Approving Official which is
usually a supervisor who is in the same chain of command. When
appointed, the cardholder is trained in IMPAC procedures by the
Installation IMPAC Program Coordinator who is a contracting
expert. Purchase activities are monitored and verified that the
transactions are valid. Various oversight mechanisms to include
Installation Program Coordinators, Inspector Generals, and
Auditors are active at all levels in the Air Force to ensure
integrity in the system is maintained. Management reports are
issued by RMBCS to assist program management officials in
tracking and monitoring card usage. Various internal reviews
and audits have indicated there are no significant deficiencies
or abuses of the Air Force's management of the IMPAC Card
Program. We do support expanded use of the credit card.
Currently, we focus on the legislatively established micro-
purchase limit of $2,500.
Mr. Money. In fact, let me just chain on to what you said.
We have, in fact, brought down the acquisition work force 28
percent. We are getting closer to the 30, the commitment
mandate of getting to 35. We are getting there. We have limited
the size of SPOs to roughly 50 people. There are a few still
above that, but they are coming down. So all that, we are
marching to, and as you eliminate people and so forth and
fewer, there is less mischief in my mind that can be created,
less low or no-value added work going on. So we are approaching
that. We still have a ways to go. I appreciate that comment.
INDUSTRY MERGERS
Mr. Young. Let me ask another question along the same line
of streamlining, modernizing and acquisition. This might appear
to be a negative, but we are seeing an awful lot of mergers in
industry. What is that going to do in the long run to the
competitive nature of the business, the availability, the
maintaining of the industrial force? What are these mergers
doing now and what do you see them doing in the future?
Mr. Money. Up until now I frankly think the mergers have
been good. We are still overcapacity in a lot of areas and by
bringing down the industry that sorts that out for itself,
albeit up until now we still have two competitors in every
general field. We are rapidly approaching that with the
tentative Raytheon-Hughes-TI. That could bring down the U.S. to
one air-to-air missile maker. Frankly, that is not going to
disturb us for roughly 10-plus years.
AMRAAM, we have already worked those against Hughes and
Raytheon together and gotten from $1.87 million per copy down
to roughly $292,000 per AMRAAM. So, so far it hasn't been an
issue.
We are still overcapacity in a lot of areas, so in this
sense the marketplace is sorting itself out and predetermining
or determining where it ought to be. So a long-winded answer
that it hasn't been a problem yet, although when we get down to
only one U.S. manufacturer in a particular area, then to have a
competition obviously, you open it up to overseas. Then we
haven't had to address that issue yet.
General Muellner. One additional comment, if I could, in
that area.
When we look at industrial base, we tend to focus on
manufacturing capability. I would offer to you that the
technological edge that we have on the battlefield is not only
based upon manufacturing but the ability to innovate original
designs, develop them and field them. We had reached a stage,
at least in the basic aircraft industry, we had so many
competitors, and there were so few new starts that that initial
design capability was atrophying out.
So in a lot of respects, necking down of the industry to
two main competitors now in this area or three main competitors
is productive for maintaining those design capabilities,
because we probably have starts, enough demonstrators to keep
those design teams intact, keep them productively employed
doing what they do best.
Mr. Young. But you have got to keep enough competition in
the industrial base to have an incentive to think ahead and
create these new designs. If you don't have the competition,
then, why hire a big expensive design team or team of creators
to go out there when there is nobody competing with you anyway?
I think I tend to agree that the mergers have been good to
this point, but I am concerned about what the future might be
in eliminating the competition that has been really very good
for the industry and very good for the national defense effort.
Mr. Money. Absolutely. Secretary Perry mentioned several
years ago that we are overcapacity and in fact encouraged
industry to downsize. That is happening.
As you just pointed out and we talked about, when it gets
down to only one in the U.S., then we have a different issue
and we have to work through that. We are about to have to
address that issue.
Mr. Young. Mr. Dicks, do you have further questions?
Remarks of Mr. Dicks
Mr. Dicks. The only point I would say on this question is
that when you do merge these companies, you do get rid of a
substantial amount of overhead, which does help make this work.
If you have Boeing and McDonnell Douglas and Lockheed Martin,
you have two very strong competitors in most areas, as we have
seen by the charts you put up.
One of the reasons that I have been so strongly committed
to the B-2 is because of the charts you put up earlier today.
Those charts demonstrate the capability you get once all these
smart weapons are on this long-range aircraft.
The thing that really drives this home in my mind is this
question, and General Peay of CENTCOM, alluded to this at
breakfast this morning, that one of the crucial detriments in
getting forces equipment or TACAIR into the theater of
operations in the event of hostilities was the availability of
overflight access through the airspace of several countries, or
the loss of overflight permission or the loss of use of even
one en route base--all of which could drastically affect his
ability to introduce TACAIR and troops to the Gulf region.
So, again, we are always premising our strategy here on
being able to immediately move men and weapons and airlift into
an area. What if the country says, we don't want you to come
in, like the Saudis did recently when we had the problem in
Iraq and we had to negotiate with them for some time frame?
That is why some of us believe that a long-range stealthy
bomber with all these smart weapons gives you a revolutionary
capability. What we worry about is that the studies that have
been done by RAND and Jasper Welch and others that indicate
that 21 B-2's simply don't allow you the sortie rate necessary
to really take maximum use of the potential.
What I worry about from your perspective is this is a big
industrial base issue now. There are a lot of people who are
not nearly as sanguine about our ability to go back and start a
new stealthy bomber at some point in the future. Now, if you
keep this industrial base open, this line we have keeps the
costs down, and you can continue to get a number of these B-2s
over the next several years and improve your capability,
especially in the early going.
This is where I think people are not really looking at the
potential of this bomber. If you can leave Whiteman Air Force
Base and with one aerial refueling, with wind-corrected
munition dispenser and sensor fuzed weapon, and attack Saddam,
moving from Iraq into Kuwait, that is a revolutionary
capability. You can't do that with TACAIR, in my judgment. You
will not have enough normally in theater. You have some in
theater. If you have to move 1,000 airplanes, that, as you
suggested, that is going to take a considerable period of time.
In the early going, the first 14 days, especially when you have
zero warning, as we did in World War II, in Korea, and in the
Gulf War, we had zero actionable warning time, having a long-
range bomber with these capabilities seems to me to be exactly
what you would want to have.
And what I worry about is that we seem to have missed this.
General Fogleman and I talked about this yesterday. Even
without lockout, even if you don't worry about chemical or
biological weapons contaminating these fields, you have still
got the political problem of are you going to have these fields
accessible or is the conflict going to be in an area where you
even have fields available to you.
So there is this potential of time delay. It seems to me
that is where there is a period here in the first several weeks
of any of these engagements where long-range stealthy bombers
that can operate autonomously would have enormous importance.
That is why we keep bringing this issue up. It isn't that we
don't like the Air Force. We love the Air Force. But this is
just one area where we think you guys need to take another look
at this.
ENHANCED GROUND PROXIMITY WARNING SYSTEM
Since my time is limited, I want to get one question on
another subject, and that is the safety of our people. I am
told if Secretary Brown had the enhanced ground proximity
warning system on this plane, the plane would not have flown
into a mountain.
Now, the Secretary of Defense has ordered the Air Force to
go out and procure this equipment. We wouldn't have the lost C-
130, and if American Airlines had the enhanced ground proximity
warning system on it, it wouldn't have flown into the mountain
down in South America.
To me, the fact that American Airlines on all 7,000 of its
airplanes is going to put the system on, says something.
I was under the impression you were going to put $264
million in this budget to carry out the recommendations under
phase one, including flight data recorders, cockpit recorders,
ground point warning system, emergency locator, transmitter on
the 89th Air Wing, for the distinguished visitor and
operational support aircraft.
Has that happened? Is that in this budget? Nobody can seem
to find it.
General Muellner. Yes, sir. Navigation safety upgrades,
which are the ones you are talking about, are indeed in this
budget. We added that in last year. As you recall, we came in
for some reprogramming authority to get that started.
Mr. Dicks. Could you help my staff by locating that for us?
General Muellner. We have got the numbers now. I don't know
what the exact number is.
[The information follows:]
Yes, funds for Phase One of the Navigation & Safety
Equipment Baseline were included in the budget request. The Air
Force requested approximately $10 million to accelerate GPS
integrations and $31 million for safety equipment. This funding
was an increase from the FY97 President's Budget. No single
line item exists for these funds. The funds are requested in
the individual weapon systems and are included in the aircraft
procurement modification requests for those weapon systems. The
$264 million figure was composed of $59 million in FY95/FY96
reprogrammings, $10 million FY97 Chief of Staff Plus-Up
request, and $65 million added to the FY98 President's Budget
(FY98-03). Congress approved the reprogramming request and
appropriated $82 million of the FY97 Plus-Up request. The $57.3
million FY97 shortfall was accommodated through force structure
changes, revised acquisition strategies/cost estimates and
safety program content revisions.
Mr. Dicks. I have a few questions here, just to give us a
sense of how you are going to deal with this problem which I
will place in the record. Because to me, if we can just save
one airplane, one crew, I am told these systems are $50,000
apiece, and it seems to me we need to get them on the airplane.
It is obvious that these systems work, and I am kind of
curious. Is there some resistance or is it budgetary problems?
General Muellner. No, sir. It clearly has been a budgetary
issue in the past. The focus has been putting those systems on
the airplanes that have the highest ground contact issue, and,
i.e., those have tended to be in some cases fighters. Some of
the fighters have had those. The Fourth Generation Ground
Collision Avoidance System (GCAS), which is what American
Airlines is putting on--as you know, the American Airlines did
have GCAS on it. It wasn't predictive, though. It was a
reactive GCAS and gave them a pull-up too late to respond to
it. The Fourth Generation GCAS is indeed what we are putting on
all of our airplanes. Indeed, we have an investment account
that goes out to the FYDP to put those on all the airplanes.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you. The gentleman has been very
reasonable.
Mr. Young. Mr. Hobson.
LAB CONSOLIDATION
Mr. Hobson. I have a couple questions to ask you, one about
lab consolidation. You are developing this long-range Vision 21
plan to reorganize labs and test evaluation centers in the next
century. You have got an option consolidating the four Air
Force labs and the Office of Scientific Research in this single
lab. It is not due until 1998. Are there going to be any lab
changes between now and then?
Mr. Money. Congressman Hobson, the whole idea here of going
to a single laboratory does not have in it relocation
geographically. The idea is much like Congressman Dicks
mentioned a moment ago, when you are merging companies, you
scrape off some of the overhead that is duplicative. That is
what we are trying to do there. We see a fair amount of
savings. Probably you are talking about a few tens of people
moving, primarily in the planning function, to centralize that
in Dayton, bringing that out of each of the other labs. But
overall, we believe that will make a much more efficient
operation.
We are not disturbing the scientists and the engineers, if
you will, but just the duplicative overhead functions, mostly
centered around planning.
We are not moving the labs. They are staying where they are
geographically. As I said, there may be a few tens of people
being relocated. We think it is the right thing to do. Frankly,
it helps in the drawdown in the Dorn amendment and so forth. We
are working on it. It is about to be started to be implemented
in the next couple of months.
CONTRACT PROTESTS
Mr. Hobson. It is going to be implemented. Okay. All right.
I would like to talk to you sometime a little more about that.
The other thing, just a comment, one area that I see as a
potential problem, the increased cost and everything, is this
protest system you have got. Somebody needs to look at that
protest system. We don't have a lot of time here, but I just
think if you look at that at some point.
Mr. Money. I will be glad to get you back some more data on
that. Actually the number of protests are going down. They are
dropping roughly 100 a year from several hundred, albeit there
are a few. I believe part of the reason for the reduction in
that is that we do a much better job debriefing both the
winners and the losers of why they won or lost.
Mr. Hobson. Probably only hear from the guys that won.
Mr. Money. The ones we hear about are the big ticket items
and so forth.
Mr. Young. As we have more mergers, there are less
companies out there to make the protests.
[The information follows:]
Data on number of General Accounting Office (GAO) protests received
against Air Force procurements for the last five years:
FY92.............................................................. 440
FY93.............................................................. 493
FY94.............................................................. 358
FY95.............................................................. 331
FY96.............................................................. 246
The Air Force attributes the downward trend in protests to more
meaningful debriefings given to unsuccessful offerors. Debriefings
conducted by the contracting officer explain to a contractor the
strengths and weaknesses of its proposal. The contracting officer may
also comment on the technical evaluation and overall strengths and
weaknesses of the winning proposal.
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
Mr. Hobson. In the information technology, Air Force
Materiel Command, AFMC is considering some restructuring and
development management technology stuff. You spent a lot of
time talking to me about that. Is that stabilized now or what
are we looking at?
General Muellner. Yes, sir. If you are talking about the
relationship between MSG, SSG, down at Gunter and Hanscom, I
think that has stabilized. As we talked to you before, the work
load doesn't change. That was just a case of how the management
operation would proceed to MSG from Hanscom.
AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT
Mr. Hobson. Okay. I guess the last thing, Mr. Chairman, is
that with all these three airplanes that you are looking at out
there, we are talking about a combined cost of about $350
billion, I think, someplace in there. Are you giving any
thought to purchasing two airplanes, cancelling one of the
three, or moving forward?
General Muellner. Sir, I think from the Air Force
perspective, we have taken a hard look, as you saw I think from
the earlier chart, we are necking down from a large number of
airplanes down to two. We will have in the outyears an F-22,
and a variant of it, and a Joint Strike Fighter, JSF, and a
variant of that, as the only airplanes on the ramp.
We have focused on the affordability. We don't have a bow-
wave problem in the Air Force dealing with this. The reason is
that our C-17 airlift funding is ending before we start this
procurement. Our bomber force modernization will have occurred,
and so we have time-phased this activity. And basically it is
the fighter force's turn to be modernized to move away from
what was bought and procured in the late-1970s and early 1980s
and is now aging out and will be replaced. So this time-phased
activity will make us have an affordable solution.
Mr. Hobson. These two professionals here have been very,
very refreshing and very refreshing to work with, and I
appreciate their activity.
Mr. Young. Mr. Hobson, I certainly would concur with the
statement you have just made.
And thank you for your interesting questions.
Mr. Nethercutt.
Mr. Nethercutt. No further questions.
Mr. Young. With no further questions--we have reached our
time limit. We do have additional questions that we would like
to submit to you in writing and ask you to respond for the
record, if you would.
The Committee will be adjourned now until 10 o'clock
tomorrow morning, when we will meet in an open hearing in Room
2226, the Rayburn building, on the fiscal year 1998 budget
request with the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff
of the Army. And then tomorrow afternoon, another open hearing
in this room, H-140, on Army Acquisition Programs.
And with nothing further, the Committee is adjourned.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the
answers thereto follow:]
F-22 Aircraft
Question. Mr. Secretary, the FY 1998 budget includes several
changes to the Air Force's high priority F-22 stealth fighter program.
The development program has increased in cost by $2 billion and has
been stretched 9 months. Last year, the Air Force planned to procure
128 aircraft including 4 pre-production vehicles during the period FY
1998 to FY 2003. The current budget reduces this quantity by 58, almost
a 50% reduction over the same period. Secretary Money, your statement
touches on the cost growth of the program, but can you tell us more
about what caused the program growth and changes to the program as a
result?
Answer. The Joint Estimate Team (JET) recommended a program
restructure which added time and funding to the EMD program to ensure
the achievement of a producible, affordable design prior to entering
production. This resulted in the addition of $2.2 billion to the EMD
program and an extension of nine months. This funding requirement was
offset by eliminating three test aircraft ($706 million) and slowing
the production ramp ($1.45 billion). The additional funding is
contained within the F-22 total program budget through the FYDP. The
primary drivers of the cost growth in EMD include better information on
touch labor (actuals from the first EMD aircraft builds versus
parametrics); additional flight test time based on historical rates
from other programs; and a projection that more time will be required
to complete avionics integration.
For the production phase, the JET identified the possibility of a
$13 billion costs growth, $8 billion of which is due to the
identification of an industry unique rate of inflation in this high
technology segment of the economy. The remainder of this potential cost
growth is due to higher than expected touch labor and material costs.
The CEOs and senior Air Force leaders signed a formal memorandum of
agreement (MOA) in December 1996 committing the government/contractor
team to, at a minimum, remain within the current production budget.
Currently the contractor and government teams are implementing plans to
maintain production unit cost at or below current levels.
Despite the changes to the program, the warfighter will continue to
receive the F-22's revolutionary capabilities on time at an affordable
cost.
Question. Secretary Money, the Air Force now plans to buy only two
aircraft in the first year of production. Please compare using then
year dollars flyaway cost of these first aircraft to that estimated
last year for the first production aircraft.
Answer. The FY98 President's Budget reflects an average unit
flyaway cost for the first 2 production aircraft (Lot 1) of $392
million compared to the FY97 President's Budget estimate of $149
million for the first 4 production aircraft (Lot 1). The FY98
President's Budget average unit flyaway would become $313 million if 4
aircraft were bought in Lot 1 versus 2 aircraft.
As documented by the Joint Estimate Team, the early production
program is more costly than previously envisioned. The total potential
production cost growth of $13 billion has been eliminated by the
implementation of a number of cost avoidance initiatives. Payback from
these initiatives begins in small increments in 2000, but significant
payback does not occur until 2004.
Question. Is two aircraft an efficient quantity to buy in the first
year? Would it be smarter to buy more in the first year?
Answer. Two aircraft is an efficient quantity to buy in the first
year of production. This approach balances the higher early production
program estimate with the production funds available. Purchasing more
in the first year would contradict our plan to increase system maturity
relative to the production ramp rate (6 fewer production aircraft at
EMD end in the restructured program).
Question. Please compare in then year dollars the flyaway cost of
the first 128 aircraft in last year's budget plan compared to this
year.
Answer. The flyaway cost of the first 128 aircraft in last year's
budget plan was $13.5 billion compared to this year's $16 billion. As
documented by the Joint Estimate Team, the early production program is
more costly than previously envisioned. Total potential production cost
growth of $13 billion has been eliminated by the implementation of a
number of cost avoidance initiatives. Payback from these initiatives
begins in small increments in 2000, but significant payback does not
occur until 2004.
The Air Force/contractor team has high confidence that, at a
minimum, production cost growth will be zero because: (1) team
commitment to long-term affordability is documented in a formal
memorandum of agreement signed by the Chief Executive Officers of
Lockheed-Martin (Mr. Norm Augustine) and Pratt & Whitney (Mr. Karl
Krapek); and (2) Lockheed-Martin, Boeing, and Pratt & Whitney are
incentivized to improve efficiencies due to the Joint Strike Fighter
competition.
Question. The GAO reports that there was some disagreement within
DOD about inflation indices and that as a result the current F-22
budget could be significantly understated. Can you explain this issue
to the Committee?
Answer. There is no disagreement within DOD about inflation
indices. The OSD Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM), issued 11
February 1997 after the DAB review, directed the F-22 progrma to use
OMB rates but take account of existing forward pricing agreements. The
Air Force applied Forward Pricing Rate Agreements rates, which had
already been negotiated, through FY01 and applied OSD rates in FY02 and
beyond. These rates have been incorporated into the FY98 President's
Budget.
Question. How much could the F-22 production cost be understated
from FY 1998 to FY 2003?
Answer. F-22 production costs are not understated from FY 1998 to
FY 2003. Beyond the FYDP, the potential for a difference in industry
inflation projections versus DOD projections has been accounted for in
the implementation of cost avoidance initiatives which maintain
production costs at or below current levels. Of the potential $13
billion in production cost growth, $8 billion is attributed to this
potential difference in inflation projections.
Question. Last year, the Committee appropriated $81 million for
long lead components for 4 pre-production vehicles. The Air Force has
eliminated the pre-production vehicles from the budget and now proposes
to use the $81 million in FY 1997 to buy-out obsolete parts. Given that
the F-22 is the most advanced aircraft ever developed and is still 7
years from being operationally fielded, why does the Air Force need to
buy obsolete parts before the aircraft even goes into production?
Answer. Obsolete parts are an electronics industry fact of life,
where parts availability life is approximately 2 to 5 years vice the F-
22 production duration of 13 years. The Out of Production Parts (OPP)
issue is one affecting programs throughout the aerospace industry.
However, the F-22 program has a plan to properly manage this potential
cost and schedule driver.
F-22 OPP funding requirements for FY97 and throughout production
have been identified. No additional funding will be needed but the
program requires congressional approval for use of FY97 appropriated
funds for OPP. FY97 OPP requirements include: (1) cost for partial
redesign, primarily avionics; (2) cost to procure parts for production
aircraft when schedule is insufficient to redesign or to avoid multiple
redesign costs. By allowing for redesign and incorporating a more open
system architecture, the program will achieve greater reliability due
to the incorporation of more modern, up-to-date technologies while
making future obsolescence easier to correct.
Loss of FY97 funding forces a one year slip in the production
program. Avionics hardware would not be available for production when
needed and the inflation effect alone equates to approximately $1
billion.
Question. Please tell the Committee what you see as the biggest
risk areas remaining for the F-22.
Answer. The biggest risk areas remaining for the F-22 are
production cost containment and integrated avionics capability.
Regarding production cost containment, the Joint Estimate Team
identified the potential for $13 billion in cost growth. However,
effective implementation of our Production Cost Reduction Business Plan
will keep the cost of the F-22 at or below our current production
budget of $48.3 billion.
With respect to avionics, the F-22 will feature a capability not
previously achieved in a fighter weapon system, the integration of
numerous sensor inputs to provide the pilot a complete, unambiguous
picture of the surrounding environment. The major development risks for
F-22 avionics are well understood. In fact, the recent program
restructure added development time, expanded ground test facilities,
and added flight test time due to the anticipated complexity of the
avionics effort.
Question. Why is there no money budgeted for Engineering Change
Orders in the First year of F-22 Production?
Answer. The F-22 program has money budgeted for Engineering Change
Orders (ECOs) in FY99, the first year of production. Approximately
$51.3 million is allocated for the Air Vehicle ECOs and $8.2 million is
allocated for Engine ECOs.
The F-22 program used Air Force historical percentages to estimate
overall ECO values, with Airframe totaling 4%, Avionics totaling 8%,
and Engines totaling 3%. F-22 ECO data was unintentionally omitted from
the FY98 President's Budget procurement documentation due to format
changes from the coordination process.
Modernization Shortfall
Question. The Air Force fiscal year 1998 budget requests $29.8
billion for procurement and R&D. Though this is $600 million higher
than FY 1997, in real terms it is once again lower than the fiscal year
1997 appropriated amount. The funding provides for only 61 new aircraft
though 75% are for Civil Air Patrol and pilot training. Only 3 are
tactical aircraft. Secretary Widnall and General Fogleman, is the Air
Force's fiscal year 1998 modernization budget adequate?
Answer. The Air Force's FY98 modernization budget is adequate,
though barely. The program the Air Force submitted reflects a very
careful balance between sustaining our readiness for operations over
the near term and building our forces for the demands we will face in
the decades to come. The Air Force uses a time-phased modernization
plan that synchronizes the size and timing of multiple programs to fit
in the available budget authority. Consequently, there may be years
when we wouldn't buy any tactical aircraft or we'd buy only a few, as
we're buying other needed items.
The FY98 modernization budget reflects this philosophy. In the 70s,
we developed and built first the F-15, then the F-16. Today, after
downsizing the number of wings as a result of the end of the Cold War,
we're fully manned to our Primary Aircraft Authorization (PAA). The
three F-15s we're buying fulfill a requirement for tactical attrition
reserve aircraft, and they're the only tactical aircraft we're buying
this year. Our continued ability, though, to provide command of air and
space depends on maintaining our current course for the F-22. In FY98,
we're funding development efforts for both F-22 and Joint Strike
Fighter, and we begin buying F-22s in FY99. Though we're only buying
three tactical airframes in FY98, we are making a strong commitment in
this budget to preserve our tactical force.
We are buying 18 Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS)
aircraft and 27 general aviation aircraft for Civil Air Patrol search
and rescue, which comprise the vast majority of the airframes we're
purchasing. They, however, represent only 1% of aircraft procurement
funding. The rest goes to buy other high priority needs in our
modernization plan. We're buying nine C-17s for $2.3B (40% of aircraft
procurement funding) to fill our highest near-term priority, airlift.
We're also buying two large VC-X aircraft (Boeing 757s designated the
C-32A), one E-8C JSTARS, and one C-130J--aircraft which help fulfill
our balance program. We must also balance across other areas, such as
munitions and space to fulfill our Global Engagement requirements. This
mix of purchases reflects the best value for the Air Force needs,
balances the funding between readiness and modernization, and meets the
requirements for a time-phased modernization plan.
Question. What is the risk to the future readiness of the Air Force
of such low procurement rates of weapons?
Answer. There is some risk to future readiness caused by low
current procurement. The Air Force will face higher Operations and
Support costs as the aircraft fleet ages which, to some extent, takes
resources away from readiness. However, the relatively low procurement
rates in fiscal year 1998 reflect the cyclical nature of tactical
aircraft procurement and a fiscal year 1998 ``snapshot'' is a poor
indicator of overall future readiness. Principally, it doesn't capture
our time-phased modernization program which balances current readiness
with future readiness (modernization) goals.
In recent years, we've been able to take a ``break'' in
procurement, especially with tactical combat aircraft. This is a direct
result of the strong buildup of forces in the early to mid-eighties and
the subsequent drawdown in forces in the early nineties after the end
of the cold war. We were able to retire our oldest systems as part of
the drawdown leaving ourselves a fairly young force. Now this ``break''
is over and we recognize we don't have the ability to build all the new
systems we need at once. Consequently, we set out a time-phased
modernization program that began by first addressing the most pressing
near-term requirements, then the midterm, and finally the far-term
needs. This sequenced modernization schedule avoids large overlaps in
funding requirements between major procurement programs. The result is
that we can modernize all parts of the force within a fairly constant
investment share of our total budget authority. However, any delays in
procuring aircraft per our modernization plan (e.g. F-22, Joint Strike
Fighter) would have significant readiness impacts.
Question. What major requirements are not funded in the fiscal year
1998 budget?
Answer. The budget the Air Force submitted is a balanced budget,
fully supporting National Military Strategy requirements. We have fully
funded all areas required to maintain and improve our capabilities.
There exist, however, areas where we could realize cost savings and
efficiencies by accelerating the procurement or increasing the quantity
of some of our modernization/improvement programs. To this end, the Air
Force has created a list of our FY98 Unfunded Priorities. This list is
rank ordered by relative importance, with the number 1 item being our
most critical issue. This 34 item list was provided to the House
Appropriations Committee in the first part of March 1997. An additional
copy is provided here for your review.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Question. What are your top four modernization programs? Are they
fully funded in fiscal year 1998? Are they optimally funded in the
accompanying fiscal years of the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP)?
Answer. The Air Force uses a time-phased modernization plan that
synchronizes the size and timing of multiple programs to fit in the
available budget authority. Our modernization programs are divided into
four major areas: near-term, near mid-term, later mid-term, and long-
term priorities. Near-term top priority is the procurement of the C-17
Globemaster III airlifter. This program funds a multi-year procurement
contract for desperately needed inter- and intra-theather airlift
capability. Our near mid-term priority is Bomber Conventional Upgrades.
This funds airframe modifications and procurement of Precision Guided
Munitions that enhance reliability and capability of our current
conventional bomber forces. Our later mid-term priority is air and
space technology. This priority funds the Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicle (EELV), Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS), and Airborne Laser
(ABL). Our long-term priority is air superiority. This funds the
Engineering Manufacturing Development (EMD) for F-22 and Joint Strike
Fighter.
All of these programs are fully funded in FY98. We do list a line
item for Precision Guided Munitions on the FY98 Unfunded Priority List.
This, however, reflects a desire to accelerate the procurement of these
munitions and their integration rather than a shortfall in the existing
program. By implementing the time phased modernization plan outlined
above, we are able to include all these priorities within the available
FYDP budget. We are able to achieve our modernization objectives
without creating ``bow waves'' in out-year budgets. This plan ensures
that the Air Force continues to provide global capabilities to meet
National Military Strategy requirements.
Additional Funding
Question. Last year, you were very candid about identifying your
top unfunded requirements to the Committee and working with us to
provide additional funding for many of them. I hope you will continue
that cooperation with us. Would you please describe your top unfunded
priorities and why the fiscal year 1998 budget is not sufficient in
these areas?
Answer. Our top unfunded priorities are described in the FY98 Air
Force Unfunded Priorities List. The Air Force annually reviews all
programs and priorities based on the available Air Force budget. Given
current financial constraints, were could not afford the items on the
FY98 Unfunded Priorities List and stay within the Air Force topline. As
you can see, the FY98 Unfunded Priorities List accelerates critical
modernization, readiness, and people programs.
Question. What are the potential savings if the Congress were to
provide additional funding in fiscal year 1998 for these items, either
by buying them earlier than now planned or by lower production unit
costs through procurement at higher quantities? Please put the costs
and savings in the record.
Answer. Our list of unfunded requirements is based principally on
meeting modernization, readiness, and people requirements, not on
potential savings. For example, Sensor to Shooter accelerates our
ability to share digital data among combat platforms. If additional
dollars are provided, we would fund item on the FY 1998 Unfunded
Priorities List which may not result in direct financial savings.
Purchasing these items earlier does afford some cost savings associated
with inflation. In general, however, the emphasis was on capability
rather than cost avoidance.
Question. What are your highest unfunded O&M or personnel
requirements?
Answer. The Air Force FY98 Unfunded Priorities List is a
combination of modernization, readiness, and people programs. Our
highest O&M and personnel requirements on the list include:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
O&M Personnel
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Force Protection.......................... Community Support.
KC-135 Depot Maintenance.................. Dormitory Housing.
Real Property Maintenance................. Family Housing.
Recruit Advertising.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. Which of these items are on any of the CINC Integrated
Priority Lists?
Answer. For the FY98-03 Integrated Priority Lists, four CINCs
(STRATCOM, PACOM, EUCOM, and SOCOM) listed Quality of Life as IPL
requirements. Issue #9 (Community Support), issue #12 (RPM) and issue
#21 (Housing O&M/Construction) on the FY98 Unfunded Priority List
support these Quality of Life Initiatives.
The Number 1 items on the FY98 Unfunded Priority List is Force
Protection. Due to the bombing of Khobar Towers in June 1996, this
issue was identified by 7 of the 10 warfighting CINCs on their FY99-03
Integrated Priority Lists. Recognizing this recently arisen critical
need, the Air Force has fully funded this requirement in the FY99-03
APOM. CINC EUCOM has publicly stated that Quality of Life Improvements
remain his Number 1 priority, both on and off his Integrated Priority
List. EUCOM is the only remaining CINC (of the original four) to carry
forward Quality of Life from the FY98-03 IPL to the FY99-03 IPL. The
Air Force is diligently working to fund those programs which support
this requirement.
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
Question. Secretary Money, last year you provided the Committee
with a list of priorities for additional funds. On that list, the Air
Force's number one priority was the procurement of an additional JSTARS
aircraft. Ms. Secretary, your fiscal year 1998 budget cuts the JSTARS
program from 2 aircraft to only 1. We now understand that the Air Force
made this reduction in May of last year at the same time your priority
list was circulating in Congress. Why did you ask Congress for
additional funds for a program you were in the process of cutting?
Answer. If you look at the single year of FY 1998, it appears we
cut the program. However, a review of our actions across the Future
Years Defense Program (FYDP) during the same period shows we took
action to strengthen the program. Due to higher priority requirements
and fiscal constraints the Air Force decreased FY 1998 procurement
quantity from 2 aircraft to 1. However, the Air Force also fixed JSTARS
outyear funding shortfalls caused by procurement cost increases in the
FYDP as a whole. During FY 1998 Program Objectives Memorandum (POM),
the Air Force decreased the FY 1998 procurement quantity from 2
aircraft to 1 and funded all 19 aircraft in the FYDP. During FY 1998
Budget Estimate Submission (BES), the Air Force de-funded the
nineteenth aircraft in FY 2003 in anticipation of FY 1997 Congressional
plus-up. During FY 1998 President's Budget, in consultation with the
Air Force, OSD re-funded the nineteenth aircraft in FY 1999.
Question. Would you describe a procurement rate of one as
``efficient''?
Answer. The Air Force realizes it is more efficient to buy more
than one aircraft per year; however, budget constraints precluded that
in FY 1998. The FY 1998 flyaway cost for one aircraft is $313 million
and the FY 1999 average flyaway cost for two aircraft is $265 million.
The average flyaway cost for the JSTARS fleet of 19 aircraft is $261
million. Current contractor facilities support aircraft induction every
five months.
Question. For this coming year, how can we work with you to
understand the priorities you are committed to sustaining in future
budgets?
Answer. Communication is the key to increased understanding of the
Air Force's commitment to providing the most capable Air Force, both
today as well as in the future, while operating within a constrained
budgetary environment. The Air Force has always balanced its
modernization versus readiness requirements, providing current and
future capability to deter aggression. We are committed to maintaining
and increasing our capabilities while minimizing the risk associated
with modifying program funding profiles. Your awareness of this ``risk
versus requirement'' dilemma will allow us the flexibility to continue
to provide the most capable Air Force both now and in the future.
NATO JSTARS
Question. The FY 1998 budget proposes a new start program to
provide NATO with its own JSTARS aircraft. Since NATO has not decided
it wants JSTARS, the administration decided to budget for much of the
US cost share up front to keep the program on a fast track. Please
explain the benefits of the NATO JSTARS program.
Answer. Employment of Joint STARS to satisfy NATO's Alliance Ground
Surveillance (AGS) requirements provides several political and military
advantages. Politically, it provides a cooperative development
opportunity, reinforcing Alliance solidarity, at a time when common
military goals and defense needs in Europe are at a critical junction.
Militarily, it provides NATO with a common ground surveillance
capability building on US combat experience and concepts of operation.
It reduces taskings on US force structure to operate in NATO areas of
responsibility (AORs), such as Bosnia. At the same time, NATO's core
capability would be interoperable with reinforcing US elements in a
broader crisis. In addition to the political and military advantages,
cooperative development of system improvements reduces the cost of
upgrades to the US fleet.
Question. Estimates of the US share for NATO JSTARS range from $800
million to $1.3 billion. Secretary Money, what is your best guess of
the final US share?
Answer. US estimates will vary relative to number of NATO nations
that participate in the program. The minimum cost estimate of $800
million reflects the maximum number of participating NATO nations (16).
The maximum cost estimates of $1.3 billion is based on the
participation of approximately 12 NATO nations. Until a decision is
made, we have no better estimate.
Question. Why does the budget plan include only $318 million for
the program, less than half of even the low estimate of the US share?
Answer. The out-year US budget will be determined in the FY00
Program Objective Memorandum (POM) after actual cost shares and program
scope are determined. The Conference of National Armaments Directors
(CNAD) will decide on the procurement of a fixed wing core capability
in November 1997
The US has budgeted the cost necessary to keep the Alliance Ground
Surveillance (AGS) program on the ``fast track'' schedule to deliver
NATO an AGS capability by 2000. The $318 million (Air Force and Army)
in the US budget pays for all but $100 million of the total program
effort in FY 1998 and 1999. We expect NATO to fund the remaining $100
million in FY 1999. The $318 million the US invests up front would be
credited to the total US contribution.
Question. What are your plans to budget for the balance of the
funding requirement?
Answer. The Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) will
decide on the procurement of a fixed wing core capability in November
1997. The out year US budget will be determined in the FY00 Program
Objective Memorandum (POM) after actual cost shares and program scope
are determined.
Question. Are the efforts funded in FY 1998 unique to NATO
requirements, or could they benefit the US JSTARS program?
Answer. The $32.6 million of Air Force RDT&E funding is for NATO
unique requirements with $3.5 million of that among for system program
office operations. The FY 1998 efforts are focused on modifications to
facilitate operations in NATO. These funds will benefit the US program
indirectly by improving its interoperability with the NATO Command and
Control System.
Question. Is it prudent to initiate this costly NATO program at the
expense of other modernization priorities, including the US JSTARS
program?
Answer. Initiation of this program benefits the US program because
the cooperative development effort includes some radar upgrade work
planned, but not funded in the US program. Reduced Operations Tempo
(OPTEMPO) and Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO) demands on US forces and
systems also provide cost avoidance.
Airborne Laser Program
Question. Last year, the Air Force requested funds to initiate a
program that will integrate a high power laser into 747 aircraft with
the mission to destroy tactical ballistic missiles in the boost phase.
The program will develop, procure, and operate 7 aircraft at a cost of
$11 billion. Mr. Secretary and General Muellner, one of the major areas
of risk on this program is taking existing laser technology and
reducing its weight sufficiently for aircraft use. What is the current
weight of the existing ground laser demonstrator?
Answer. The weight of this ground demonstrator is 5,535 pounds.
This was a ``non-flightweighted'' prototype laser module designed to
demonstrate the Contractor's ability to meet power and chemical
efficiency requirements.
Question. What is the weight requirement for the laser module that
will go on the aircraft? What are the Air Force weight reduction
proposals for meeting this requirement?
Answer. The flightweighted laser module weight requirement is 2,920
pounds. The laser module design successfully met its weight requirement
at the Critical Design Review an dis being manufactured now using
composite, plastic, and milled-out metal components.
Question. Another area of risk on the program is our lack of
detailed understanding of atmospheric conditions in the regions of the
world where we would expect to use the laser. How much does the
atmospheric conditions affect the operation of the laser? How would you
characterize our understanding of these conditions?
Answer. Atmosphere does affect the Airborne Laser's (ABL) lethal
laser range and laser dwell time performance. As atmospheric conditions
worsen, the dwell time required to destroy theater ballistic missiles
increases and additional laser fuel is consumed. The ABL will
predominantly engage missile at co-equal or higher altitude, well above
most of the earth's atmosphere. Therefore, a large majority of the
potential atmospheric impact is eliminated by flying and engaging
missiles at a high altitude. Currently, a wide range of ``real world''
atmospheric conditions are included in our models, simulations, and
tests. Results of these efforts show ABL will meet the user's
operational requirements with margin.
We are confident we understand the environment and have collected
sufficient atmospheric data to establish the ABL design point. To
increase our knowledge of the atmosphere's variability, we will
continue to expand the existing database by collecting atmospheric
measurements worldwide.
Question. Please outline the other areas of risk for this program
and how you plan to manage these risks?
Answer. Risk management is an integral component of the Airborne
Laser (ABL) systems engineering process and documented in the
Integrated Task and Management Plan. In addition to the risk management
of issues associated with aircraft weight and the atmosphere, other
risk areas identified include beam control and software development.
The government/contractor team is mitigating beam control risk by
performing: (1) scaled beam control tests at Phillips Lab and MIT's
Lincoln Lab; (2) functional tests on the contractor's beam control
brassboard; (3) active illuminator laser tracking of boosting missiles
at White Sands Missile Range; and (4) integrated weapon system beam
control tests at low and high power.
The ABL team is mitigating software development risk by: (1) using
best commercial practices; (2) emphasizing commercial and government
off the shelf software reuse; (3) focusing on open systems
architecture; (4) identifying software development as award fee
criteria; (5) early rapid prototyping in the software integration lab;
and (6) establishing an outside software risk reduction team for
independent oversight.
Question. The Ballistic Missile Defense Office is charged with the
mission of prioritizing and funding tactical missile defense. yet, the
Air Force has chosen to fund the Airborne Laser program internally
independently of BMDO. Why is the Air Force committed to funding this
ambitious program even at the expense of other Air Force priorities?
Answer. In 1992, as a result of HR 5006, Congress directed all SDIO
(now BMDO) programs that would not be fielded within 10 years be
transferred to the appropriate service. The Airborne Laser (ABL) was
subsequently transferred to the Air Force. The Air Force then fully
funded the ABL in the FY98 Program Objective Memorandum.
The Air Force is committed to the ABL program because it is a key
element of the Air Force's 21st Century architecture and Join Vision
2010. It is a truly revolutionary system which contributes directly to
each of the Air Force's core competencies: air superiority; global
attack; rapid, global mobility; precision engagement; information
superiority' and agile combat support. ABL's maximum potential as a
multi-role platform is still to be determined and, as a result, the Air
Force is conducting studies to fully exploit its capabilities. These
potential additional missions include cruise missile defense,
suppression of enemy air defense, imaging surveillance, and high value
airborne asset protection which includes self-defense.
Question. As you are aware, DoD is pursuing several programs to
counter the tactical ballistic missile threat. How do you respond to
the concern that the next available missile defense dollar should go
towards reducing the risk on these core systems rather than towards a
new system?
Answer. Funding Airborne Laser (ABL) will greatly enhance the Joint
Theater Missile Defense (TMD) architecture. Although not designated one
of the original core programs, ABL is now a fundamental component of
the multi-layered TMD architecture and will provide many unique
capabilities to the theater commander. By destroying missiles early in
their boost phase of flight, ABL will become the first layer of active
defense and will enhance the overall effectiveness of the
architecture's ``system-of-systems.'' Destroying missiles early in
their flight is an enormous deterrent against weapons of mass
destruction as the theater ballistic missiles will potentially fall
back on the enemy's own territory. ABL also provides the architecture a
more robust capability against potential TMD countermeasures like early
release of missile submunitions, decoys, and well coordinated mass
raids. In addition, the ABL can self-deploy within hours to anywhere in
the world, rapidly providing a force projection capability for our
deploying forces.
Question. Please discuss the other missions that could be performed
with the Airborne Laser and which of these you are already committed to
incorporating into the baseline system.
Answer. The Airborne Laser (ABL) is currently being designed for
the primary mission of Theater Missile Defense; however, the Air Force
envisions the ABL will mature into a multi-role platform due to the
inherent capabilities of the high energy laser. To maximize ABL's
revolutionary capabilities, the Air Force is studying adjunct missions
during the Program Definition and Risk Reduction (PDRR) phase for
possible inclusion into the ABL baseline in the Engineering and
Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase. The adjunct missions are imaging
surveillance, cruise missile defense, suppression of enemy air defenses
and high value airborne asset protection which includes self-
protection.
Formal studies will evaluate weapon system modification risks,
costs, and benefits of performing the adjunct missions. Modest efforts
were begun on these studies in FY97; however, the bulk of the study
efforts will be performed in FY98/FY99. The studies will be completed
prior to PDRR Critical Design Review in 1999. Decisions will be made at
the time for inclusion of any of the adjunct missions into the EMD
baseline.
Acquisition Cycle vs. Technology Cycle
Question. We are all too familiar with the accelerated pace of
technological change these days. A home computer we buy today can be
outdated in as little as 15 months. In some cases, software can be
outdated in just 6 months. For the military, the problem is especially
acute because of the years required to develop and field new weapon
systems. Secretary Money, what is the Air Force doing to address this
serious issue, especially in the area of computers that permeate our
aircraft, missiles, and command and control systems?
Answer. We are implementing Open Systems. The Open Systems approach
encourages the use, where applicable, of commercial products,
processes, specifications, and standards. By relying more on commercial
products and standards, we expand the industrial base for acquisition
and sustainment and we are better positioned to deal with obsolescence
and the need to incorporate new technology.
A key thrust of Open Systems is ``performance-based requirements.''
Emphasis on performance relies on the idea that we can reduce costs by
eliminating government ``how to'' requirements up front in weapon
systems acquisition. Management of performance at the interface level
instead of detailed parts encourages the use of components across a
wide range of systems and, when necessary, facilitates replacement with
state-of-the-art (commercial) technologies.
In addition, we are striving through various acquisition reform
efforts to drive the acquisition cycle inside/within the technology
cycle of computers, software and deploy thus enabling the Air Force to
deliver equipment/capability in the same technology generation as it
was conceived.
Question. Your statement talks about fitting he acquisition cycle
within the technology cycle. How do you propose to do this, especially
with large and complex weapon systems?
Answer. One of the primary tenets of acquisition reform has been
cycle time reduction. Systems bound by over regulation and inefficient
processes simply cannot get ``rubber on the ramp'' before the newly
fielded equipment is technologically (or possibly operationally)
obsolete. This past year, I announced ``Lightning Bolt #10,'' a reform
initiative chartered to examine the acquisition cycle and look for
innovative, ``out-of-the-box'' ways to reduce the time it takes to get
from a defined need to fielded hardware. The Lightning Bolt #10 team
focused on the critical time between receipt of a warfighter
requirement and contract award. Their final report identified 63 best
practices and 14 recommendations for statutory and regulatory relief
that, when implemented, could reduce the time it takes to get on
contract by as much as half. And this is only the beginning. Our
strategic goals incorporate our desire to achieve cycle time reductions
throughout all phases of a system's life. We are just beginning to get
our hands around the crucial processes and practices that drive cycle
time. Re-engineering these practices is our long-term goal.
Let me illustrate with a specific example. Air Force Materiel
Command's Electronic Systems Center (EXC), located at Hanscom AFB,
Massachusetts, is rapidly moving forward in its implementation of a
``spiral development process,'' a revolutionary concept in the
acquisition of computer hardware and software. Spiral development is
unique in that it is designed to respond to user requirements within
the context of the commercial computer industry, where hardware can
become obsolescent in less than two years. It became apparent to the
managers and engineers at ESC that the standard, conservative way of
doing business was ensuring that old hardware ended up in the
warfighter's hands--better machines and software could be purchased on
the open market. EXC is constructing a process which will move new
equipment to the user in 18 months--a real-life example of ``fitting
the acquisition cycle inside the technology cycle.''
Question. Is it true that the F-22 will become operational in FY
2004 with so-called ``486'' processors that are at least two
generations older than the ``Pentium Pro'' processors available today
for our kids to use at home?
Answer. The F-22 does not use the 486 processor--the F-22 main
processor is the Intel 80960, a 32 bit superscaler device more
comparable to a Pentium processor than the 486. The current processor
will meet the warfighters' needs at the lowest cost with acceptable
technical risk when the F-22 becomes operational in FY 2005 (November
2004). However, the F-22 plans to upgrade to a faster processor and
decrease the number of processors in production Lot 6 (FY04) with a
decrease in recurring cost. Significant nonrecurring cost is required
to ``chase'' the latest technology, our mandate is to meet the
warfighters' needs at the lowest total cost.
Question. Is there some way we can field our most modern and
sophisticated aircraft with modern computer technology?
Answer. To minimize concurrency and avoid multiple redesign costs,
a technology baseline must be established prior to critical design
review. Moreover, significant nonrecurring cost is required to
``chase'' the latest technology. The F-22 plans to upgrade to newer
technology in an incremental fashion by grouping lot buys. The goal is
to make all hardware within a group identical. Hardware across groups
may not be identical, but will be form, fit, function and interface
compatible and transparent to the warfighter. The F-22 mandate is to
achieve a producible design that meets the operational need at the
lowest cost with acceptable technical risk.
Making the Air Force More Expeditionary
Question. The Air Force is increasing its emphasis on expeditionary
forces, able to deploy from the United States in a matter of days or
even hours. Improving this capability requires changes in the way we
organize, equip, and support our forces. Secretary Money, can you tell
us what you are doing on the acquisition side to become more
expeditionary?
Answer. The acquisition community enhances the USAF's ability to
become more expeditionary by addressing the first three components of
the Air Force's four element modernization plan--time phased
modernization, managing programs effectively, and revolutionizing
current business practices. The warfighter depends on us to conduct
fast-paced acquisitions which can seize upon developing technologies,
enabling our forces to respond in near real-time to the exigencies of
the moment. Our success or failure will be measured by our ability to
re-create business practices that can respond quickly, flexibly, and
cost effectively, and which can leverage the commercial marketplace for
new technology to apply to both new and existing systems. Air Force
acquisition's ability to bring tools to the warfighter ``faster,
cheaper, and better,'' has already contributed significantly to this
nation's ability to employ expeditionary air forces. Allow me to
illustrate with three examples.
The advanced concept technology demonstrators are one means of
accelerating the technology development process and fielding
applications more expeditiously. Predator UAV use in Bosnia is one good
example of this approach.
Our weapons' development programs are remarkable success stories in
our quest for cost control through acquisition streamlining. The recent
contractor downselect of the Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser (WCMD)
highlights this potential for cost avoidance. Originally projected to
come in at $25,000 per tailkit, both competing contractors submitted
proposals for under $10,000 unit cost, reflecting a total program
savings of over $850M--money which could be used to support additional
needs of the AEF.
The F-22 will provide the battlefield air dominance prerequisite
for successful joint expeditionary warfare in the 21st century. It is
incumbent on the Air Force acquisition community to bring this
revolutionary capability into the inventory on cost, on schedule.
All that having been said, however, we must not lose sight of the
fact that for an AEF to be effective, it must deploy rapidly--
minimizing airlift requirements is a key enabler of this capability.
The Air Force has recently ``stood up'' an AEF Battle Lab at Mountain
Home, who's charter includes exploring ways to reduce the logistics
``footprint'' of all deployable weapons systems--new, as well as
fielded. Acquisition's greatest air expeditionary impact will be felt
by delivering products tailored to reduce deployment requirements. Here
are several examples.
Our newest platform development programs, the Airborne Laser (ABL),
the F-22, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), and the CV-22 are all
designed with supportability in mind. The ABL is a self-deployable
weapons system which can arrive worldwide within 24 hours, providing
ballistic missile defense for both-in-place and deploying allied
forces. In the fighter arena, the F-22 and the JSF are both committed
to reducing, by over half, the current number of aircraft C-141
equivalents required to deploy a squadron of comparable earlier
generation fighters. In support of special operations, the CV-22 will
eventually replace 88 rotary and fixed wing aircraft of various types,
simultaneously increasing capability as well as reducing the deployment
logistics burden currently imposed by an aging and diverse fleet.
For our fielded fighters, there are several notable examples of the
progress being made in reducing ground support equipment. In both the
F-15 and F-16 the Avionics Intermediate Shop (AIS) will soon by
replaced by a more capable and consolidated array of avionics test
equipment, resulting in an airlift-required reduction of over 2 C-141
equivalents per squadron deployed. The F-16 is also migrating to an on-
board oxygen generating system (OBOGS) staring in 2001, which will
entirely eliminate the current liquid oxygen (LOX) squadron deployment
requirement and free up another one-half of a C-141 equivalent.
The Conventional Mission Upgrade Program (CMUP), which is an
ongoing effort to increase B-1 combat capability through lethality,
survivability, and supportability, will make its logistics mark through
a significant improvement in the defensive countermeasures system it
upgrades. The current 17.5 hour mean-time-between-failure (MTBF) ALQ-
161 system of 120 line replacement units (LRUs), weighting over 5000
lbs, will be supersedes by a more capable installation of only 34 LRUs,
weighting 1000 lbs, with a MTBF of 112 hours--dramatically reducing the
deployment requirements of this backbone of the bomber fleet.
As you are well aware, the acquisition community was instrumental
in facilitating multi-year procurement of the evolving core of our air
expeditionary airlift capability, the C-17. This aircraft, with its
high launch reliability, ease of maintenance, as well as its superb
ground maneuverability and rapid onloading/offloading capability, can
globally transport more people and equipment into austere or
constrained airfields than any other airlifter.
Finally, current weapons' developments are engaged in a two-pronged
attack on deployment footprints. First, given the inherent adverse
weather capability and improved accuracy of our newest Precision Guided
Munitions, the number of aircraft sorties necessary, as well as the
number of bombs expended, to destroy a given target will dramatically
decrease. Depending on the CINC's campaign plan, this factor will allow
him the flexibility to shift some of the airlift normally reserved for
large quantities of (dumb) munitions to other priorities. Second,
several in-development miniaturized munitions, such as the ``small
smart bomb,'' have the potential to be as lethal as currently fielded
counterparts 2 to 4 times their size. Such munitions could permit the
Air Force to carry more weapons per platform, as well as significantly
reduce the logistics footprint of the total number of weapons deployed
to a given theater.
Question. Are there areas that require further attention in your
view?
Answer. The acquisition community must continue to be proactive in
sponsoring the supportability upgrades which contribute to the overall
health and deployability of our maturing fleet. Even though initial
fielding of our newest developmental weapons systems--those which have
a reduced logistics footprint designed in--will commence in the not too
distant future, we must remain conscious of the fact that a viable AEF
will depend on our current aircraft inventory for a number of years to
come.
Question. Your statement mentions ``Agile Combat Support'' and
``Focused Logistics''. Please explain these concepts as they relate to
the Air Force.
Answer. Agile Combat Support will improve transportation and
information systems to allow time-definite resupply, reduce the lift
requirement to get materials and troops to the field, and streamline
the infrastructure providing parts and supplies to reduce cycle times.
Agile Combat Support will yield the revolution in combat support
discussed in Joint Vision 2010's tenet of Focused Logistics.
Focused Logistics will be the fusion of information, logistics, and
transportation technologies to provide rapid crisis response, to track
and shift assets even while enroute, and to deliver tailored logistics
packages and sustainment directly at the strategic, operational, and
tactical level of operations. The operational concept of Focused
Logistics will provide the Joint Force Commander with an Air Force that
is more mobile, responsive, efficient, and significantly more potent.
Future Air Force logistics will maximize both technology and resource
management reinvention techniques to achieve and provide unparalleled
combat power to the joint warfighter.
B-2 Bomber Program
Question. Gentlemen, last year the Congress added funding to
accelerate integration of advanced precision weapons on the B-2. Does
the FY98 budget continue this integration at the accelerated pace?
Answer. The accelerated weapons programs funded with the FY97 $116
million Congressional Add are fully funded and require no additional
funds in FY98. The Air Force will use the FY97 Congressional Plus-up to
integrate:
GPS Aided Munition (GAM) 113: Very Hard Target Kill
Capability;
Joint Stand-Off Weapon (JSOW); and
Generic Weapons Integration System (GWIS): Reduces
Cost and Schedule to Integrate Additional Weapons.
Question. Compare the IOC for each advanced precision weapon on the
B-2 between last year's Air Force budget plan this year's.
Answer.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Precision weapon FY97 PB FY98 PB
------------------------------------------------------------------------
GAM (2000-POUND)................... FY96............. FY96
JDAM (2000-POUND).................. FY98............. FY98
GAM-113 (4700-POUND)*.............. N/A.............. FY98
JSOW (1000-POUND)*................. N/A.............. FY99
JASSM.............................. FY02............. FY03
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Funded with FY97 $116 million RDT&E Congressional Plus-up.
Question. Your budget plan this year cut $212 million from the B-2
in fiscal year 1999 as compared to last year's plan. Please explain
what was cut and why.
Answer. Air Force reduced B-2 fiscal year 1999 RDT&E funding by
$212 million during fiscal year 1998 PB deliberations to resolve Air
Force funding shortfall. Impacts of this reduction:
Eliminates Block 30 Upgrade of two EMD test
aircraft, and
Delays JASSM IOC one year to FY03.
Partial restoration of funding shorfall currently being worked in
Air Force POM process:
Accepts one Block 30 aircraft delivery on time, one
nine months late, and
Accepts JASSM IOC of FY03.
Question. Secretary Money, what is the Air Force's cost estimate to
procure nine additional B-2 aircraft starting in FY 1998? For the
record, please provide a funding profile, by year, reflecting the Air
Force cost estimate.
Answer. The Air Force has no government estimate since we have no
requirement. We have never requested the Program Office to prepare an
estimate. Such a detailed estimate would require in excess of 120 days
(150 days and several million dollars).
Question. From an acquisition standpoint, what are the pros and
cons of buying additional B-2s starting this year?
Answer. The Air Force does not plan to buy more than 21 operational
B-2s:
Funding for more B-2s is not practical within
current Air Force budget and force structure, and
Additional B-2s would contribute significantly to US
combat capability--however, issue is affordability, not
capability.
C-17 Aircraft
Question. Mr. Money, can you update the Committee on the status of
the C-17 multiyear contract?
Answer. The C-17 multiyear contract is on track, and will save
$1.025 billion over seven years. The airframe contract was signed on 1
Jun 96 for the last 80 C-17s. The associated engine multiyear contract
option was awarded in December 96. It provides for 320 Pratt & Whitney
engines, which are derivatives of the commercial Boeing 757 engine. The
first multiyear contract aircraft is the P-41, which will be delivered
summer of 1998.
Question. The Committee is aware of concerns from the Army
regarding the suitability of the C-17 for airdropping soldiers and
equipment and landing on semi-prepared runways. Can you explain these
issues and the status of their resolution?
Answer. The C-17 airdrop issues are resolved. On 31 Jan 97, six C-
17s in formation airdropped 612 paratroopers, successfully completing
the Air Force/Army formation personnel airdrop test effort. This effort
validated the formation spacing required to prevent paratroopers from
interacting with aircraft wake vortices.
The Air Force will work with the Army to procure and field a
universal static line and continue follow-on operational testing to
further develop airdrop tactics. There is no issue with equipment
airdrop--C-17s are routinely performing this mission. Minor
modifications to airdrop systems and some changes to airdrop procedures
resulted from operational experience.
Joint test effort exists to characterize the C-17's capability to
operate routinely on semi-prepared runways. Testing involves numerous
measurements of semi-prepared surfaces to quantify their effect on C-17
performance. This information is then input into the C-17 mission
computer so the aircrew can predict aircraft performance. Testing also
helps identify expeditionary runway design criteria, construction
procedures, equipment requirements, and maintenance criteria. Data
collection was accelerated. Planned capability release in the Summer of
1997.
Question. As you know, one of the criteria for multiyear
contracting is stability in design. The budget this year includes
additional funding for several configuration changes to the aircraft
that were not planned last year including precision approach
modifications, a new radio, dual row airdrop, and a CINC communications
program called Silver Bullet. From FY 1998 to 2003, the same period as
the multiyear, the Air Force plans to spend $882 million in research
and development for the C-17. Gentlemen, is the C-17 configuration
stable during the multiyear?
Answer. The C-17 configuration is stable under the multiyear
strategy, but a changing world and the aircraft's computer-intensive
design result in new requirements and the need for upgrades. The
environment in which the C-17 operates is not stable. Evolving
requirements of the International Civil Aviation Organization and the
Federal Aviation Administration concerning future air traffic control
systems and air navigation system are forcing major avionics changes
Air Force-wide. The Air Force is developing Global Access, Navigation &
Safety roadmaps.
CINCTRANS has identified the requirement for a precision approach
capability for rapid deployment to austere airfields, based on
operational limitations experienced in deploying to Bosnia last year. A
modification is being developed to meet that requirement.
Question. Why do we need to spend another $822 million in research
and development on this aircraft?
Answer. Operational experience continues to highlight areas for
improvement as occurs with any new aircraft. R&D investment sustains
computer-intensive aircraft (like F-15 and F-16) and integrates new
required capabilities. Changes in avionics and tactics drive software
changes. Software changes in one computer affect software in other
computers because of the high degree of integration in the aircraft.
All enhancements are retrofitted into delivered aircraft and
incorporated in the production line to ensure the user a homogeneous
fleet of aircraft.
Mission Planning Systems
Question. The Air Force and Navy have developed separate aircraft
mission planning systems that perform almost identical functions. To
operate the two systems--the Air Force Mission Support System (AFMSS)
and the Navy Tactical Aircraft Mission Planning System (TAMPS)--draw
information from various databases including digital map databases,
weather databases, threat databases, etc. Unfortunately, the Navy and
Air Force use separate databases at tremendously added cost. Mr. Money,
how much money is the Air Force spending on its mission planning system
in FY 1998, including all funding from individual aircraft and weapon
program?
Answer. The Air Force is spending approximately $136.4 million in
FY 1998 to support mission planning. Of that amount, $56.4 million
funds the Air Force mission planning system core software and hardware
in support of the AFMSS and sustainment of several legacy mission
planning systems. This reflects continuation of new software
development and procurement of ground and portable workstations, and
hardware retrofit. It continues over 50 Aircraft/Weapons/Electronics
(A/W/E) integration efforts, interoperability with Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence Systems and major data base producers,
and research and development for Global Command and Control System
migration. This also includes annual operating and maintenance costs.
Most of the dollars, nearly $80 million, funds over 50 A/W/Es which
there is little overlap between USAF and USN. These A/W/Es are service
unique, platform specific, require specialized system software, and
discrete digital Transfer Devices. They are programmed in the
individual aircraft and weapons system program elements.
Question. Mr. Money, in your opinion, does it make sense for the
two services to develop incompatible mission planning systems?
Answer. The services recognize the value of a common mission
planner. Since the 1993 initiation of the Interservice Mission Planning
Working Group, the Air Force and Navy have pursued joint efforts to
achieve compatibility. To date, joint efforts with proven success
include: standard data for fuel planning, current development of stores
planning/weaponeering application, shared Precision Guided Missile
target sets, and a common data base for imagery and digital maps
provided by the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. The Air Force and
Navy are finalizing a memorandum of agreement which addresses a joint
migration strategy to pursue a Defense Information Infrastructure,
Common Operating Environment. The objective is to field a Global
Command and Control System complaint, interoperable mission planning
system which meets the requirements of each service.
Question. Is there a plan in DOD to eventfully migrate the Air
Force and Navy systems towards common modules and databases? If so, can
you discuss the schedule? Can the schedule be accelerated? At what
cost?
Answer. The Air Force and Navy are currently developing a plan and
acquisition strategy to jointly pursue Air Force and Navy mission
planning system migration to the Global Command and Control System
(GCCS). Our objective is to field a GCCS complaint mission system which
meets the requirements of each service by 2002. The migration plan will
focus on evolutionary development to a Defense Information
Infrastructure, Common Operating Environment. A Joint Integrated
Process Team was chartered to produce an acquisition strategy to
develop common mission planning components. Discussions on schedule,
costs, and programmatics started on 6 Mar 1997. It is too early in the
migration process to establish a firm schedule and cost figures. Most
importantly, planned migration efforts can not distract from our first
priority, which is to keep the current Air Force and Navy programs on
track to deliver an operational system that satisfies the users'
current operational requirements.
Question. Please characterize the amount of savings you would
expect if these mission planning systems become more common?
Answer. The migration plan and acquisition strategy currently under
development will address the cost savings potential. Currently, it is
premature at this stage in our migration study efforts to estimate cost
savings. Our objective is to seek savings in software engineering and
development, hardware procurement, and operations and maintenance.
F-16 and F-15 Aircraft
Question. The FY 1998 budget includes just 3 tactical combat
aircraft--all F-15E Strike Eagles. The budget includes no funds for
additional F-16's. What is your total requirement for F-16's?
Answer. Beginning with the FY 1998 budget, the Air Force
requirement for F-16C aircraft is 1340. This number includes combat
coded, test, training, backup, and attrition reserve. The Air Force has
funded 1312 F-16C aircraft through FY 1997. There is no procurement of
F-16C aircraft funded in the FY 98 President's Budget, leaving the Air
Force 28 aircraft short of its requirement.
Question. What is the funded inventory through FY 1997?
Answer. The Air Force has funded 1312 F-16C aircraft through FY
1997. There is no procurement of F-16C aircraft funded in the FY 98
President's Budget, leaving the Air Force 28 aircraft short of its
requirement.
Question. Why didn't the Air Force budget for additional F-16s in
FY 1998?
Answer. The Air Force procured twelve F-16C aircraft in the FY 1996
and FY 1997 budgets. In FY 1998, continued severe funding constraints
forced the Air Force to fund other higher priority programs.
Question. What is the current status of the media reported Saudi
FMS interest in the F-16?
Answer. There has been no formal request from the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia (KSA) for the purchase of F-16 aircraft. The Saudi Arabian
Minister of Defense and Aviation announced publicly that he did not
intend to discuss an aircraft sale when he visited Washington in
February, and the issue was not discussed in his talks with the
Administration, including Secretary of Defense Cohen.
Question. What is the funded backlog of F-16s, including FMS?
Answer. Please see the attached delivery schedule, representing the
delivery of currently funded USAF and FMS F-16 aircraft orders. While
the chart depicts expected deliveries of the FY97 USAF F-16 buy of six
aircraft, please note all funding for the FY97 buy ($154.9 million) is
currently on OSD withhold.
[Chart follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Question. What is the total F-15E requirement?
Answer. Beginning with the FY 1997 budget, the total requirement
for F-15E aircraft is 219. This number includes all combat coded, test,
training, backup, and attrition reserve. The funded inventory of F-15E
aircraft through FY 1997 is 213. There is funding for the procurement
of three additional F-15E aircraft in the FY 98 President's Budget,
leaving the Air Force three aircraft short of its requirement.
Question. What is the funded inventory through FY 1997?
Answer. The funded inventory of F-15E aircraft through FY 1997 is
213. There is funding for the procurement of three additional F-15E
aircraft in the FY 98 President's Budget, leaving the Air Force three
aircraft short of its requirement.
F-16 and F-15 Engines
Question. Defense Daily reported that General Hawley, head of Air
Combat Command and General Donald Sheppard, head of the Air National
Guard, have complained of constant, costly problems with thousands of
F-15 and F-16 engines. Can you tell Congress about the problems with
these engines?
Answer. Statistically the F100 and F110 series engines have been
the safest fighter engines in USAF history, but safety and maintenance
problems continue during operations. The biggest concern is related to
vibrational stresses in the fan area and high thermal and mechanical
stresses in the turbines. Other parts of the engines have also had
problems, but their impact has not been as serious. Corrective action
plan are developed and executed as new failure modes are encountered.
Root causes for all these problems have been identified, field risk
management procedures are in-place, and corrective actions are being
developed and implemented. Some hardware redesigns are being developed
under the Component Improvement Program (CIP) and these changes are
aggressively being qualified and incorporated. Until fixes are
implemented, operational units are performing more frequent inspections
and failure-prone parts are being replaced more often.
Question. The (20 Feb Defense Daily) article suggested that engine
components were not being installed in a timely manner because of
budget problems. How do you respond to this?
Answer. The budget is adequate to fix all engines safety problems,
however, additional funding could be used to address reliability and
maintainability (R&M) problems. The solutions to the majority of
current safety problems require hardware redesigns and retrofits. All
identified safety redesigns have been completed or are well on their
way to completion. MAJCOMs have committed to the incorporation of these
redesigned/improved parts by identifying funds required to retrofit
their fleets. The strategy and pace for each hardware retrofit program
represents a balance of risk, hardware availability, maintenance
workload, readiness and funding. The impact of safety issues on scarce
Component Improvement Program (CIP) and MAJCOM modification and
operations and maintenance (O&M) funding is significant though, and
severely limits our ability to fix non-safety R&M problems. Additional
funding for the CIP program to support reliability and maintainability
upgrades is currently #7 on the Chief of Staff of the Air Forces' FY98
unfunded priority list.
Question. Last year, the Congress added funds for the F-15C/D
engine upgrade. The Committee was pleased to see that the Air Force
continued this program in the FY 1998 budget. Will this upgrade program
address the problems experienced by ACC and the Air National Guard?
What else can be done to address this problem?
Answer. The F-15 C/D engine upgrade is not currently planned for
ACC or the Air National Guard. The engine upgrade program converts
existing F100-PW-100 engines to the F100-PW-220E configuration on F-15
C/D aircraft overseas (at PACAF and USAFE) where there is the highest
payback. Meanwhile, every effort is being made to incorporate fixes for
all F100-PW-100 safety issues. The Component Improvement Program (CIP)
is used to fix safety and reliability and maintainability problems on
existing engines. CIP is adequately funded to support all known safety
problems, however, funding for non-safety reliability and
maintainability is limited. Additional funding for the CIP program to
support reliability and maintainability upgrade is currently #7 on the
Chief of Staff of the Air Forces' unfunded priority list.
Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile
Question. JASSM is a highly accurate stealthy cruise missile that
will be launched from Air Force and Navy strike aircraft and Air Force
long range bombers. Please update the Committee on the status of the
JASSM program.
Answer. JASSM is finishing up the 9th month of the 25.5 month
Program Definition and Risk Reduction phase. Both Lockheed Martin and
McDonnell Douglas have completed their preliminary design and have
entered the critical design phase on hardware and software items. In
addition, both contractors are well into air vehicle development--to
include extensive modeling and simulation efforts as well as wind
tunnel testing on threshold aircraft (B-52H, F-16C/D, F/A-18E/F). The
Air Force is generally satisfied with the contractors' progress on
JASSM.
Question. Now that the development contracts have been awarded,
what is the total development cost currently projected? What is the
total procurement cost?
Answer. The total development cost currently projected for JASSM is
$716.8 million of which $648.5 million is funded by the Air Force and
$68.3 million is funded by the Navy. The Air Force funding for
development includes the Program Definition and Risk Reduction (PDRR)
contracts awarded to Lockheed Martin and McDonnell Douglas in June
1996, the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) contract to
one of those two contractors in July 1998, integration of JASSM on the
Air Force threshold aircraft (F-16 Blk 50 and B-52H), all required test
support (flight test, live fire test, aircraft modifications, target
construction, etc), and associated program and mission support costs.
The Navy funding for development includes integration on the Navy
threshold aircraft (F/A-18E/F) and testing unique to the Navy
requirement. The Air Force missile procurement budget is $1,793.4
million for the programmed buy of 2400 weapons. The Air Force's
requirement for production funding begins in FY00 for low rate initial
production. The Navy currently has no funds in the FYDP for JASSM
procurement.
Question. What are the major areas of risk on the program?
Answer. The Joint Program Office has identified the following two
areas as potential schedule risks for the overall JASSM development
effort:
a. F-16 aircraft integration (moderate risk). The F-16 Operational
Flight Program (OFP) which adds JASSM capability is scheduled for
fielding in December 2003. January 2004 is the Acquisition Program
Baseline threshold date for F-16/JASSM Required Assets Available (RAA).
Thus the OFP tape is the primary schedule risk area for F-16 threshold
aircraft integration. Developmental test tapes will be produced to
support JASSM PDRR and EMD flight test to mitigate F-16 integration
risk.
b. Mission planning (moderate risk). The mission planning for a
seeker is not easy and could pose a schedule risk. Mission planning
performance is a critical component to the total system performance.
Mission planning elements considered by the JASSM contractors include
acquisition of target ``signature'' data, database preparation and
distribution, integration of products into existing structure,
weaponeering and aircraft sortie generation, and the final preparation
of mission planning products. Additionally, the mission planning must
be compatible with the air tasking order (ATO) cycle. The system must
take advantage of existing Air Force and Navy intelligence, C41, and
mission planning systems (Air Force Mission Support System (AFMSS) and
Tactical Aircraft Mission Planning System (TAMPS)). A JASSM mission
planning module will be incorporated into both the AFMSS and TAMPS.
Question. What is the Air Force doing to manage these risks?
Answer. F-16 Aircraft Integration: The JASSM Joint Program Office
(JPO) chartered a Joint Interface Control Working Group (JICWG) to
manage risk associated with missile/aircraft integration, including the
F-16. The JICWG includes the JASSM JPO, host aircraft System Program
Offices (SPOs)/Program Management Agencies, JASSM prime contractors,
aircraft prime contractors, and other involved Government agencies. The
JICWG along with Memoranda of Agreement (MOAs) and Associate Contractor
Agreements (ACAs) among government agencies and contractors will be
used to reduce risk during the Program Definition and Risk Reduction
phase. In addition, developmental test tapes will be produced to
support JASSM PDRR and EMD flight test to mitigate aircraft integration
risk.
Mission Planning: The JASSM mission planning effort, including risk
reduction, is managed through the JASSM mission planning Intelligence
Support Working Group (ISWG). The ISWG includes the JASSM JPO, the
AFMSS SPO, TAMPS JPO, JASSM prime contractors, and Government
intelligence and mission planning agencies. Formal agreements between
participating organizations include: (1) Interface impact assessment,
interface problem and integration resolution through the ISWG; (2)
Documentation to establish, define, and control interface requirements;
and (3) Higher level interface management under the purview of the
Interface Control Steering Group and the Interface Management Board.
MOAs are being established between appropriate organizations, and ACAs
will be required between the mission planning, aircraft, and weapon
contractors.
Large Aircraft Reengine Programs
Question. In the past several years, there has been a lot of
interest in both industry and the Pentagon in replacing old engines in
many of the Air Force's large aircraft with modern, fuel efficient,
highly reliable commercial engines. Congress has already funded
reengine programs for the KC-135 tanker and the RC-135 Rivet Joint.
Reengine programs for AWACS, B-52, and JSTARS are also under
consideration. Secretary Widnall, has the Air Force developed a
comprehensive strategy for dealing with the need to reengine these
aircraft? If so, can you outline this strategy to the Committee?
Answer. A study is being initiated to look at feasibility of a
comprehensive program. The potential operational benefits are longer
effective time on station, higher altitudes, higher reliability,
improved fuel efficiency, and reduced noise. Cost analysis studies show
independent reengining of aircraft types are not cost effective,
however, a comprehensive reengining program could offer potential
sayings from economy of large numbers; cheaper, more reliable engines;
and new/innovative ideas.
Question. Last year, reengining the AWACS was the sixth priority on
the Air Force unfunded priority list and Congress provided funding to
initiative the program. We now understand the Air Force completed a
study in August 1996 and concluded that such a program might not be
cost effective and so the Air Force did not fund the program in FY 1998
and out. What is the basis of the study's conclusion that reengining
AWACS is not cost effective? Why didn't the Air Force inform the
Committee of this conclusion in August prior to the Appropriation
Conference in September?
Answer. The study found that the reduced operations and support
costs for a re-engined AWACS fleet (increased fuel efficiency,
decreased maintenance, etc.) did not recoup the large investment costs
required for re-engining. There was no cost payback in O&S in either
the lease or buy scenario for operations of the fleet through the
expected life of the system (2025). A summary of the study findings
will be submitted to Congress by 1 April 1997 per the FY 1997
Appropriations Conference Language.
The cost study results presented in late August 1996 showed there
was no cost benefit to re-engine AWACS for operations through 2025. Re-
engining does, however, provide operational benefits such as increased
surveillance volumes, improved time on station, and reduced noise. It
was not until late CY 1996 (after the Conference actions closed) that
the Air Force made the final decision not to pursue re-engining in the
FY 1998 President's Budget.
Question. Last year, the Congress asked the Air Force to evaluate a
proposed B-52 engine lease program. Now that you have had a chance to
evaluate the proposal, what are the pros and cons of such a lease
program?
Answer. The Air Force has completed its report on B-52 re-engining
and will forward the report to Congress in the near future.
The PROS of the new Allison/Rolls Royce RB211 engines include
improved operational capability and improved maintainability. Some
examples: solves the JP-8 cold start problem with the current TF33
engine, reduces takeoff fuel loads for training; reduces scheduled
engine removal rate, makes engine design more robust and resistant to
foreign object damage, and provides an engine which is 33% more fuel
efficient.
The CONS include affordability, high termination liability,
statutory issues and unknown future force structure. The estimated
additional cost is over $1.3 billion. There is high termination
liability; over $2 billion in FY08. the Air Force would need statutory
relief to permit a contracting officer to lease ``equipment'' long-
term. Anti-Deficiency Act. 31 U.S.C. section 1341 prohibits obligations
in advance or in excess of appropriations by Congress. A long-term
lease would obligate the government to support the aircraft fleet as
currently projected, not allowing for force structure changes which may
occur from QDR or subsequent realignments.
Question. How does the Air Force propose to proceed with respect to
B-52 engines?
Answer. Based on studies to date, the Air Force currently does not
have plans to make any major changes to B-52 engines (TF33s).
Information Warfare
Question. Information Warfare involves the disruption of an
adversary's information systems. For example, instead of using a smart
bomb to destroy a command and control center, we could instead use a
computer virus to achieve the same end. The good news is that the
United States, being on the forefront of information technologies, is
in an excellent position to develop offensive capabilities. The bad
news is that we are more dependent on information systems, and
therefore, more vulnerable to disruption of these systems. John Deutch,
as director of the CIA, assessed computer-based ``cyber'' attacks as a
threat second only to nuclear arms and other weapons of mass
destruction. There are numerous computers in our aircraft, our
missiles, and our command and control systems. What are you doing to
ensure the systems you are procuring for the Air Force will be safe
from such ``cyber'' attacks?
Answer. Efforts are underway within the Air Force Material Command
(AFMC) to institutionalize an Information Warfare Vulnerability
Assessment and Risk Management (IW VA/RM) process for all procurements
as part of each Program Protection Plan. IW VA/RM addresses system
security from program concept phase through the system procurement life
cycle in risks versus system vulnerabilities, threat, vulnerability
countermeasures, and cost benefit analysis. Current weapon systems that
have been evaluated utilizing Vulnerability Assessment and Risk
Management process with systems assessments are Joint STARS, F-15E, and
the Theater Battle Management System.
Question. Do you feel the Air Force is currently ahead or behind
the threat as it relates to defending our systems from ``cyber''
attack?
Answer. We are aggressively defending our systems from ``cyber''
attacks, but the threat is increasing. The Air Force is beginning to
field the Base Information Protection (BIP) portion of the Combat
Information Transport System (CITS) to address the following areas:
Boundary Protection which prevents unauthorized external
access of data and systems.
Intrusion Detection which detects near-real-time security
anomalies in computer network activity.
Internal Control which prohibits mis-use of systems and
data through posture reporting.
Recovery Systems which recovers from damage caused by
breach in network security.
Denial of Service Attacks which protects from structured
attacks inhibiting network services.
The Air Force has a research and development program in place to
address technology advances and keep ahead of future threats.
Question. What are your suggestions for how we may best add
resources to reduce our vulnerability to such attacks:
Answer. The Air Force fully supports the funding for Information
Warfare (IW) in the Presidents' budget as the minimum set of measures
to protect and defend Air Force information systems against IW attack
and to manage the risks associated with such attacks. The Air Force
must, however, also address our vulnerabilities to evolving IW threats.
We may best add resources to reduce our vulnerabilities to IW
attacks as follows:
Increase education and training in threat awareness and
information system administration and protection.
Implement the formal IW Risk Management and Vulnerability
Assessment Program that the Air Force developed to provide programs
with the skills and tools to conduct their own IW vulnerability
assessment and support risk management decisions.
Provide the capability to integrate IW protection across
Air Force weapons and information programs and systems to ensure that
critical mission functions are not interrupted.
The Air Force would use added resources to emphasize support tools
to IW warfighting units to monitor systems for IW attacks, and to
provide IW situational awareness, C2 decision aids, and damage
assessment/recovery. These tools are essential for counter information
modernizing planning and requirements development. To achieve these
objectives, the Air Force estimates that $2.0 million would be needed
each year (FY99 to FY03) for a total of $10.0 million. The Air Force is
examining ways to fund this offset through a realignment of internal
Air Force resources.
Question. How is the military's growing interdependence with
civilian information infrastructure going to impact the vulnerability
of the Air Force now and in the future?
Answer. Air Force systems vulnerability will need to be evaluated
due to their dependence on the civilian information infrastructure.
Systems evaluations will need to address this dependence and ensure
that they are protected and can contain damage and ensure that mission
critical functions continue. This vulnerability impact is being studied
by the Presidential Commission on Critical Information Protection
(CIP). The DOD has a CIP working group with a sub-group for Information
Assurance to address these issues.
Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile Lawsuit
Question. The government terminated the A-12 contract for
``default'', but terminated the TSSAM (Tri-Service Standoff Attack
Missile) for ``the convenience of the government''. Both programs
suffered similar problems in terms of cost, schedule, and poor
performance after expenditure of billions of dollars each. Termination-
for-default means that the contractor is held liable for overruns,
while under a termination-for-convenience the contractor is not
penalized for its poor performance. Secretary Money, the Committee is
surprised to learn that the TSSAM contractor (Northrop-Grumman) has
filed suit against the government to recover $750 million of
``uncompensated performance costs, investments and a reasonable
profit'' on this terminated program. What are your views on the merit
of this lawsuit?
Answer. The TSSAM contractor filed a lawsuit against the United
States in the United States Court of Federal Claims on 2 December 1996.
The United States is being represented in the lawsuit by the Department
of Justice. Because the matter is in litigation, I am not able to
answer questions about this lawsuit.
Question. When the contract was originally terminated for
convenience, didn't the government and the contractor reach agreement
on a fair settlement cost? If so, what has changed?
Answer. There was no agreement at that time.
Question. How do you characterize the contractor's performance on
this program?
Answer. I cannot comment since this matter is in litigation.
Question. Did the government get its money's worth from the $3
billion investment made in this program?
Answer. I cannot comment since this matter is in litigation.
Question. How much could the government have to spend to defend
itself in court against this lawsuit?
Answer. The Department of Justice is defending the United States in
this case. I cannot comment since this matter is in litigation.
Question. Where would the Air Force get its share of $750 million
if it had to pay additional TSSAM costs under a court penalty?
Answer. Generally, a court judgment against the United States is
paid from the judgment fund, and an agency is required to reimburse the
judgment fund from its available funds or by obtaining additional
appropriations.
Question. Would it likely come from weapons modernization funding?
Answer. Generally, a court judgment against the United States is
paid from the judgment fund, and an agency is required to reimburse the
judgment fund from its available funds or by obtaining additional
appropriations. It is my understanding that cases of this size may last
for several years, and I cannot project into the future from what
particular sources any ultimate judgment against the United States
might be paid.
Joint Strike Fighter Program
Question. The 1998 budget requests $931 million for concept
development of the Joint Strike Fighter which would become the largest
acquisition in the history of the Department of Defense in terms of
total cost. Mr. Money, what is the status of the Joint Strike Fighter
development program?
Answer. The Joint Strike Fighter Program (JSF) plans to develop and
deploy a family of aircraft that affordably meets the next-generation
strike needs of the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps and allies. JSF
Program activities are centered around three distinct objectives that
provide a sound foundation for start of Engineering and Manufacturing
Development (E&MD) in 2001:
(1) facilitating the Services' development of fully
validated, affordable operationally requirements;
(2) lowering risk by investing in and demonstration key
leveraging technologies that lower the cost of development,
production and ownership; and
(3) demonstrating operational concepts.
A multi-year $2.2 billion JSF Concept Demonstration effort
commenced in November 1996 with competitive contract awards to Boeing
and Lockheed Martin for Concept Demonstration Programs. These competing
contractors will build and fly concept demonstrator aircraft, conduct
concept unique ground demonstrators, and continue refinement of their
ultimate delivered weapon system concepts. Specifically, Boeing and
Lockheed Martin will demonstrate commonability and modularity, STOVL
hover and transition, and low speed handling qualities of their
respective weapon system concepts. Pratt and Whitney is providing
propulsion hardware and engineering support for both Boeing's and
Lockheed Martin's on-going JSF Concept Demonstration efforts. The JSF
Alternate Engine Program, with General Electric, continues technical
efforts related to development of an alternate engine for production in
order to reap the financial and operational benefits of competition.
Early warfighter and technologies interaction continues as an
essential aspect of the JSF requirements definition process, and is key
to achieving JSF affordability goals. To an unprecedented degree, the
JSF Program is using cost-performance trades early as an integral part
of the weapon system development process. The Services' completion of
the Joint Operational Requirements Document is planned in FY 2000 to
support the Milestone II decision in FY 2001 for start of E&MD.
A sizable technology maturation effort is underway to reduce risk
and life cycle cost (LCC) through technology maturation and
demonstration. The primary emphasis is on technologies which have been
identified as high payoff contributors to affordability,
supportability, survivability and lethality. Numerous demonstrations
have been accomplished and others are in process to validate
performance and LCC impact to component, subsystem, and the total
system.
Question. Last year, concern was expressed by the House National
Security Committee over the viability of the ASTOVL variant of the
aircraft for the Marines (to replace AV-8B Harriers). Please discuss
the issue and how it was resolved, and please verify for us that the
Defense Department is committed to developing an ASTOVL variant of the
aircraft.
Answer. Last year the House Authorization bill stated that no JSF
funds could be spent for Advanced Short Take-Off/Vertical Landing
(ASTOVL) development. Neither the House Appropriations bill nor the
Senate Authorization and Appropriations bills contained that language.
In fact the House Appropriations bill contained language stating that
the JSF STOVL variant must be developed ahead of or concurrently with
the other variants. Neither of the final FY97 Defense Authorization of
Appropriations bills contained STOVL prohibitions. We believe that
support for ASTOVL development to be strong both on the committee and
in the House.
The Defense Department is fully committed to development of a STOVL
JSF variant for the Marines. The JSF program is fully funded within the
FYDP and STOVL is an integral part of it.
As you know we are in the Program Definition and Risk Reduction
phase (PH&RR) of JSF now. The Concept Demonstration portion of PH&RR
requires each industry team to build two flying demonstrators, one
conventional and one STOVL. Demonstration of STOVL hover and transition
is a key aspect of this phase and is required by the Single Acquisition
Management Plan. The Concept Demonstration program provide two
different STOVL approaches and aerodynamic configurations, and
maintains a competitive environment between contractors prior to
Engineering and Manufacturing Development (E&MD). Additionally
propulsion development continues during this phase with a byproduct of
STOVL development being significant improvements in single engine
durability and reliability for all variants. In short, we feel that we
have a strong STOVL development program within JSF and we are committed
to maintaining it.
Question. Most of us remember the Air Force's ``Great Engine War'',
where a billion dollars were spent to bring second contractor into the
fighter engine business and which resulted in better engines at
significantly lower cost. DoD recently signed a $97 million ``alternate
engine'' contract for the Joint Strike Fighter. Please explain your
strategy and your plan to use $10 million provided by Congress for risk
reduction to facilitate this effort.
Answer. During the JSF Concept Development Phase, all three
competing weapon system contractors chose the Pratt and Whitney F-119
or derivative as the primary propulsion system for the Concept
Demonstration Phase. Recognizing the financial and operational benefits
of competition, the JSF Program is pursuing the development of a
competitive engine for production.
Phase I of this effort began in FY 1996 with a General Electric
study effort to determine the comparative Life Cycle Cost and
performance of the GE F110 and YF120 derivative engines in each of the
preferred weapon system concepts. Based on the study results, the
government selected the YF120 engine derivative for continued
development. Phase I initiated preliminary design risk reduction
studies, systems design/integration, cycle refinement, and component
design and associated technology maturation for the YF120 derivative
engine. Phase II, which commenced in FY 1997, will continue detailed
design and begin hardware testing of the YF120 engine, culminating in
core testing beginning in FY 1999. The JSF Engineering and
Manufacturing Development program will continue development of an
alternate engine, with production competition currently planned
effective with Production Lot 5.
Congress appropriated an additional $10 million for FY 1997
competitive engine efforts. This funding will be used for a variety of
risk reduction efforts including the following: turbine rig test and
analysis, core integration, core supportability, material
characteristics, weapon system concept integration, and diagnostics.
Question. Please discuss your plans for cooperation with other
nations in this program, and what they bring to the table in terms of
capabilities and financial contributions.
Answer. The JSF Program Office has established a framework to
accommodate international participation during the concept
demonstration phase of the program. Currently, the United Kingdom is on
board as a full collaborative partner, with emphasis on the JSF STOVL
(Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing) variant. The UK is contributing
$200 million to the program for this phase. The Netherlands, Norway and
Denmark will soon join the program as associate partners, with primary
interest in the JSF CTOL (Conventional Take-Off and Landing) variant.
The total planned financial contribution for this effort is $32
million; signature of the multilateral agreement is planned in April
1997. The Canadians have formally requested to join the program and
negotiations are expected to commence in April 1997. Numerous other
countries have received briefs on the program and are interested as
well.
Benefits to be derived from international participation in the
program include a harmonization of the requirement with our allies
which will lead to improved interoperability, strengthened
international ties and lower overall program cost as a result of future
anticipated international buys of the JSF (i.e., lower unit cost).
Firm financial contributions and associated efforts are
incorporated in JSF Program plans and funding and are reflected in FY
1998 President's Budget requests.
Cheyenne Mountain Upgrades
Question. Cheyenne Mountain is the Nation's strategic facility for
warning of an incoming nuclear attack on our country. During the last
two decades, the Air Force has had great difficulty effectively
modernizing the computers within the facility. Mr. Money, what is the
status of the computer upgrades at Cheyenne Mountain?
Answer. To improve resource management and implement the remaining
portions of the CMU program in an incremental acquisition, a four-
phased replan of the remaining CMU program were proposed and approved
by the user community, SAF/AQ, and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense's Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I)
Systems Committee in August 1994.
The first phase was scheduled for completion of basic Air, Space
and Missile Warning efforts by 30 November 1995. This effort was
successfully completed, installed, and operationally accepted by the
User on 13 Sept 1995. A second (Missile Warning Mission) phase, closely
integrated with the Space Command's Integrated TW/AA software releases,
was to be completed by an objective date of June 1996. This effort was
successfully completed, installed, and tested by AFOTEC by 16 August
1996, and fully operationally accepted by CINCSPACE on 11 Oct 1996. A
third (Air Warning Mission) phase, also closely integrated with the
Space Command's Integrated TW/AA software releases, was to be completed
by an objective date of June 1997. This effort was successfully
completed, installed, and completed Operational Assessment on 28 Feb
1997. Air Mission Operationally Acceptance and Approval is on schedule.
A fourth (Space Warning Mission) phase is scheduled for completion by
an objective date of June 1998. This effort is on schedule. An
integrated system IOT&E will follow phase four and is scheduled for
completion by March 1999. This effort is on schedule.
Overall Status: The Cheyenne Mountain Upgrade Program is on
schedule to be completed, installed and fully operational by 31 March
1999.
Question. What actions has the acquisition community taken to
strengthen the management of these programs, and what success have you
had?
Answer. The Integrated TW/AA Community, including the acquisition
community has taken a number of actions to strengthen the overall
Cheyenne Mountain program. Many of these actions were taken as part of
the 1994 replan of the Cheyenne Mountain Upgrade (CMU) program and have
previously been reported to the Congress.
Cooperative approach to CMU Implementation. The key, and most
critical action has been the establishment of a mutually cooperative
approach among the acquisition, user, and test communities in the
completion, installation and test of the CMU program. The actions noted
in our 1995 report to the Congress, and our successful actions since
then are a result of all elements of the various communities working
together.
Integrated Tactical Warning/Attack Assessment System Program
Office. To more effectively manage the support of the Integrated TW/AA
network and the Cheyenne Mountain Complex, AFMC, and SAF/AQ established
an Integrated TW/AA SPO under the Air Force Program Executive Office
for Command, Control, and Communications. The SPO contains the CMU,
Missile Warning and Space Surveillance Systems (MWSSS), and CINC Mobile
Alternate Headquarters (CMAH) programs. This IWSM SPO is now
responsible for the Integrated TW/AA C4, the Integrated TW/AA ground
based missile warning and space surveillance sensors, and the mobile
command centers. The Integrated TW/AA SPD is located in Colorado
Springs and provides direct response and support for the NORAD/Space
Command Users.
Systems Engineering, Integration and Text (SEIT) Team. The
establishment of an integrated team of experts from Electronic Systems
Center (ESC), AFSPC, the CMU contractors, and the testers to identify
and solve, on-site, CMU problems has been critical to the
implementation of the replan. This team, working with the users,
testers, and the contractors, ensures that the scheduled CMU work is
understood, that all critical deficiencies have been corrected, and
that the system is ready for testing. If problems are identified, the
SEIT team priorities the solution effort with an action plan involving
all stakeholders including the user and test communities, and expedites
the solutions. The team also identifies and resolves Integrated TW/AA
issues which must be worked with NORAD, USSPACECOM, AFSPC and other
Integrated TW/AA organizations. The SEIT is also responsible for all
CMU integration activities, including integrated test scheduling.
Integrated Planning and Scheduling. The close integration of all
the schedules for the contractors, System Program Office (SPO), and
user events in Cheyenne Mountain has been key to deconflicting the
development, test and operational work in the SWSC and Cheyenne
Mountain. With CMOC in the lead, test accountability has been
established through metrics and mandatory weekly/monthly updates. The
Integrated Scheduling team now has a clear understanding of what time
and resources are available, and what the user, developer and testers
needs are for the system in any Phase. With this understanding, the
scheduling team, the SEIT, the SWSC, and AFSPC can now rapidly respond
to and reliably schedule corrective actions and testing.
Test Management And Training. The SPO assigned a top-level test
manager (senior O-5) to the CMU effort to provide senior on-site
oversight and decision making of all development testing. As part of
this enhancement of the CMU test capability the SPO also provided
training to hundreds of SPO, contractor and user test managers, test
monitors and test directors. This significantly expanded the number of
people available to conduct development tests and resolves one of the
major test resource contention problems.
Interface Control Document (ICD) Development. Inadequate interface
descriptions for the Integrated TW/AA programs and interfaces has been
a continuing problem. While CMU is only a small part of this Integrated
TW/AA system problem, ESC, Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC), the Space
System Support Group (SSSG), and AFSPC have been working since 1992 to
identify the interfaces and build a joint Integrated TW/AA ICD database
containing the interface descriptions and data. Approximately 167
interfaces in 68 Integrated TW/AA subsystems have been identified to
date with system documentation on-going.
AFMC Integrated TW/AA System of Systems Management. To improve
overall Integrated TW/AA system management and engineering, AFMC has
established a General Officer Broad Area Review (BAR) group to oversee
the management of the entire Integrated TW/AA system. Under this group,
AFMC has also established a Colonel level action group (O-6 AG) to
provide a single AFMC Integrated TW/AA point of contact to address
issues that cut across Integrated TW/AA systems. The group, chaired by
the Integrated TW/AA System Program Director (SPD), is responsible for
development and sustainment, from an interoperability perspective, of
Air Force systems that are part of the Integrated TW/AA network.
Membership is from Integrated TW/AA SPO (CMU, Missile Warning and Space
Surveillance Systems (MWSSS) and CINC Mobile Alternate Headquarters
(CMAH)), Atmospheric Early Warning Systems (AEWS), Space Based Infrared
System (SBIRS), and NUDET Detection Systems (NDS) system program
offices.
SWSC Integration Into AFMC. We have completed the integration of
the SWSC into the Cheyenne Mountain Complex program within the
Integrated TW/AA SPO. This action puts all the software development and
support capability for Cheyenne Mountain under the integrated direction
of the Cheyenne Mountain Complex Integrated Weapon System Management
(IWSM) program manager to more effectively respond to the operational
needs of AFSPC.
Oversight. SAF/AQ has continued a regular cycle of management
reviews in Colorado Springs. These process reviews are jointly held
with AFSPC and provide senior (SAD/AQ, AFSPC/CV, ESC/CC, AFOTEC/CC,
AFPEO/C3 and CMOC/CC) review and assessment of the progress of the CMU
effort. These reviews have been held about every four months. The next
review is scheduled for 23 May 1997.
Question. How much is in the 1998 budget for Cheyenne Mountain
upgrades, by project and in total?
Answer. R&D funding for Program Element 0305906F NCMC-TW/AA Systems
in FY98 totals $7.362 million, broken out by project as follows:
Project 3880 Cheyenne Mountain Upgrade $0.603 million, Project 3881
Integrated TW/AA $5,132 million; and Project 4409 Legacy Interfaces
$1.627 million. Procurement funding in the Cheyenne Mountain Complex P-
1 line totals $0.737 million, none of which is for the Cheyenne
Mountain Upgrade. In the Comm-Electronics Modifications P-1 line,
$5,261 million is allotted to Cheyenne Mountain Complex modifications,
broken out as follows: Mod#S529382 Tech Control (Bytex) $4.000 million;
#S604622 Electronic Warfare Workstation $0.575 million; and S604622
Miscellaneous Low Cost Mods $0.686 million.
Question. What is the current cost estimate of each of the projects
within the Cheyenne Mountain Upgrade in then year dollars, and how does
this compare to the last program funding baseline?
Answer. The Acquisition Cost in the Acquisition Program Baseline
for the Cheyenne Mountain Upgrade program has not changed from $1663.0
million in change 2 to the APB, dated 09/03/92. The APB is not broken
out by project, only by R&D ($1294.0 million) and Procurement ($369.0
million). The current cost estimate (from the Cheyenne Mountain Upgrade
31 Dec 96 SAR) is $1750.6 million, $1407.3 million in R&D and $343.3
million in Procurement. The current estimate is $87.6 million or 5.3%
higher than the 1992 APB estimate. By project, the R&D funds are:
Project 3880 CMU $1297.1 million; Project 3881 Integrated TW/AA $62.7
million; and Project 4409 Legacy Interfaces $47.5 million. The
Procurement funds ($343.3 million) are all CMU. The Acquisition Cost
Estimate in the SAR does not include post-CMU R&D funding in the
Integrated TW/AA project (3881) from FY00 to FY03, totaling $16.1
million, nor any of the Comm-Electronics Mod funding for the Cheyenne
Mountain Complex, totaling $54.7 million from FY98 through FY03.
Question. When will all the upgrades be completed, installed and
fully operational?
Answer. All the modifications to Cheyenne Mountain planned as part
of the Cheyenne Mountain Upgrade Program will be completed, installed
and fully operational by 31 March 1999.
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV)
Question. The Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) is being
developed to replace the current fleet of medium and heavy lift class
launch vehicles with a more affordable family of space launch vehicles.
The fiscal year 1997 budget request for EELV is $63.3 million to
support pre-EMD work prior to one contractor for development and
production in June of 1998. What are the major goals of the EELV
program in this year and in fiscal year 1998?
Answer. The EELV Pre-Engineering, Manufacturing, and Development
(Pre-EMD) contract was awarded in Dec 96. The Air Force goal during
this fiscal year is the continued contractor development of the system
design, demonstrate key technologies, update Life Cycle Cost estimates,
and support of the Environmental Impact Analysis Process (EIAP). In
FY98, the goal is to complete the Pre-EMD contract and downselect to
one EMD contractor in Jun 98. The Pre-EMD contracts will mature the
design and produce the EELV developmental, product, and interface
control specifications. To award the EMD contract and downselect to one
contractor, we will issue a Request For Proposal (RFP), conduct a
Downselect Design Review (DDR), and seek Milestone II approval to enter
EMD.
Question. What are the current cost reduction goals for the EELV
program vice the costs of the Titan, Atlas, and Delta launch programs?
Answer. The EELV program goal is a cost reduction of 25-50% in Life
Cycle Cost over current systems. This equates to approximately $5-10
billion (constant FY95 dollars) in savings from 2002-2020.
Question. Describe the Air Force's acquisition strategy for EELV
after the downselect.
Answer. After the downselect in approximately Jun 98, the Air Force
will have one contractor execute the EMD phase of the program. At this
time, the government anticipates a $1.6 billion, Cost Plus Award Fee
contract, with a period of performance of 6 years. The winning
contractor will conduct a tailored critical design review not later
than Dec 98. The contractor will conduct two system test flights to
collect payload environmental data, validate manufacturing processes,
modify and activate launch facilities and support systems, and obtain
the necessary environmental and operating permits. After the system
test flight of the medium lift variant in FY01, and six medium
operational launches in FY02, DoD will hold Milestone III review in
FY03, where OSD will review progress and decide whether to approve the
system for full rate production. In FY03, the Air Force will fly the
test flight of the EELV heavy lift variant.
Question. What percentage of total EELV development costs are
related to the heavy lift variant?
Answer. EELV is being developed as a system and each of the two
contractor concepts satisfies a variety of payload requirements with
different family configurations built around the common core and common
upper stages. There is no clear distinction, other than perhaps a
fairing unique to a heavy variant and the cost associated with the
heavy test flight. Therefore, there is no separate, distinguishable
amount related to development of the heavy capability.
Question. Have there been any revisions to the national mission
model being used by the Air Force to compute EELV program savings since
last year? If so, what are they?
Answer. Yes. The projected savings for the EELV program was based
was on the Jan 96 National Mission Model (NMM) and in Dec 96, the NMM
was updated. The launch vehicle quantities remained the same, however,
some mission launch dates moved slightly to the right. These launch
schedule changes had a negligible effect on the projected $5-10 billion
cost savings for the EELV program.
Question. Is it still economical for the government to develop the
heavy lift variant of EELV given the extremely limited number of heavy
launches assumed in the national mission model?
Answer. Yes. Due to the high cost of the Titan IV program, the
small marginal cost of developing the EELV heavy lift variant, and the
estimated 25-50% cost reduction for heavy lift, it is still economical
to develop the heavy lift variant of EELV.
Spaced Based Infrared System (SBIRS)
Question. The Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) is being
developed as the follow on to the Defense Support Program (DSP) to
provide initial warning of a ballistic missile attack on the United
States, its deployed forces or its allies. The system will consist of
satellites in geosynchronous, highly elliptical and low earth orbits.
The low earth portion of SBIRS, the space missile tracking system
(SMTS), will support theater missile defense requirements. Describe the
present acquisition strategy for SMTS.
Answer. SBIRS Low (formerly SMTS) supports all four mission areas
of the overall SBIRS program: missile warning, ballistic missile
defense, technical intelligence and battle space characterization.
SBIRS Low contributes the unique capability of post boost mid-course
track to both theater and national missile defense missions. SBIRS Low
will enter a full and open competition for Pre-EMD in 2Qtr FY99. Two
contractors will be selected and will complete a System Design Review
and a System Functional Review with a down select to one EMD contractor
in 2Qtr FY01. First launch is scheduled for 3Qtr FY04.
Question. Why did the Air Force find it necessary to compete the
SMTS flight demonstration system?
Answer. To foster competition and to have technical alternatives
given the high risk involved and relative immaturity of the system
concepts.
Question. Describe the results of the SMTS critical design review
earlier this year.
Answer. The TRW Flight Demonstration System contract conducted a
successful CDR in December of 1996. All of the CDR entry and exit
criteria were satisfactorily dispositioned. A complete FDS system
design concept was presented. Based on simulations, analyses and
measured component level data, the design's projected capability
exceeds all threshold FDS key performance measures. Similarly, all
lower level technical performance measures are being met or exceeded.
The design is mature, but there are still significant challenges in
fabrication, assembly and test. A payload pathfinder and spacecraft
electrical mock-up will be put through rigorous ground tests to
validate system interfaces and functional capability before completing
fabrication and delivery of flight hardware and software. The planned
on-orbit test program is designed to provide the data most critical to
making a deployment decision in the first year of FDS test operations.
The second year of on-orbit test will expand the demonstrated
performance envelope and build confidence in the SBIRS Low concept. The
ground system fabrication has begun and a demonstration of some of the
expected control screen displays was provided.
Question. What would you characterize as the principal technical
and producibility risks for SMTS at this time?
Answer. The primary technical risks include:
--Long wave infrared sensors and cryocooler technologies to
support stressing cold-body targets;
--Integration into an overall system;
--Autonomous on-board processing and operations; and
--Real-time command/control in support of multiple mission
areas.
The main producibility risks include:
--Obtaining the level of radiation hardening required at an
affordable price;
--Production build up for rates required to support FY04
deployment; and
--Achieving long-life and stressing capabilities at an
affordable price.
Question. It is the Committee's understanding that the fiscal year
1998 budget request for SBIRS supports a 2004 launch date for the first
operational SMTS satellite. Is this accurate? Is any additional funding
required to maintain this schedule?
Answer. The FY1998 budget request did include the estimated funding
required to support an FY04 first launch. The projected funding is
based on a cost assessment conducted in early FY97. This is the best
estimate available at this point in time. This estimate will be updated
at a SBIRS FY97 DAB and again refined in FY99 during the SBIRS Low Pre-
EMD.
Acquisition Program Issues
Question. Should extra funds be made available for the Defense
Department this year, the Committee would like to know where some
investments can be made which would have a potentially high payback.
What are the top ten unfunded requirements in each R&D and procurement
account in the Air Force?
Answer.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
R&D Procurement
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Sensor to Shooter...................... 1. Force Protection.
2. Engine Component Improvement Program... 2. Global Air Traffic
Management.
3. Aging Aircraft......................... 3. Navigation Safety Phase
II.
4. Precision Guided Munitions............. 4. Base Information
Protection.
5. Range Standardization & Automation..... 5. Sensor to Shooter.
6. Global Command & Control System........ 6. Bomber Modernization.
7. AWACS Extend Sentry.................... 7. F-15C/D PW-220E Engine.
8. Spacetrack............................. 8. Precision Guided
Munitions.
9. Nuclear Command and Control............ 9. Range Standardization &
Automation.
10. Threat System Modeling Vehicles....... 10. Mission Operations.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Sensor to Shooter, Precision Guided Munitions, and Range
Standardization & Automation are on both lists because they require
both R&D and procurement appropriations.
Question. Identify all production programs for which funds are
included in the fiscal year 1998 budget request where fiscal
constraints have prevented acquisition of sufficient quantities in
either fiscal year 1998 and/or accompanying FYDP to meet validated
military requirements/inventory objectives.
Answer.
AIR SUPERIORITY
Sensor to Shooter: Additional fiscal year 1998 procurement funds is
ranked number five on the CSAF's FY98 Unfunded Priorities List. This
initiative accelerates the ability to share digital data among combat
platforms and ground control stations using Link 16, a standard
datalink message format and waveform. The initiative requires $24.0
million for Link 16 procurement on the B-1, $5.2 million for Link 16
procurement on the F-15C/D, and $7.5 million for Link 16 procurement
for Ground Tactical Control Stations (GTACS).
Bomber Modernization: The B-52 modernization program includes an
Electro-optical Viewing System (EVS) Reliability and Maintainability
(R&M) upgrade. This program consolidates electronic hardware increasing
Mean Time Between Failure Rates. Additional fiscal year 1998
procurement funds ($2.9 million) will accelerate this upgrade to
increase maintainability of aging equipment. It is number 10 on CSAF's
Unfunded Priorities List.
F-15C/D PW-220E Engine: The PW-220E engine modification provides
improved safety, performance, reliability, and operability, reduced
maintenance and logistics support and reduced life cycle cost. Funding
an additional $73.2 million in fiscal year 1998 will accelerate the
upgrade of 1.5 squadrons (27 PAA) and will result in a savings of
approximately $28.3 million across the life cycle of the weapons
system. This initiative is number 13 on CSAF's Unfunded Priorities
List.
Precision Guided Munitions: Current inventories of GBU-28 and CALCM
weapons are below established requirements. These weapons are force
multipliers, allowing better mission effectiveness while reducing
attrition, sorties required, conflict duration, and collateral damage.
An additional $35.6 million in fiscal year 1998 will accelerate
procurement of these weapons and IOC dates of each by one year. This
initiative is number 14 on CSAF's Unfunded Priorities List.
HH-60G FLIR: There are currently tow different FLIR systems for the
HH-60G in the Air Force inventory. The Q-16 Forward Looking Infrared
(FLIR) is designed for full HH-60 integration. The Q-22 is a less
expensive and less capable substitute purchased with drug enforcement
funds by the Reserve Component. Additional funds in fiscal year 1998
will allow procurement of the remaining 43 Q-16 sets to equip the total
force HH-60 fleet planned for acquisition in FY04-05. The current
Hughes assembly line is scheduled to close in FY98. Acquisition in
fiscal year 1998 will avoid line shutdown/startup costs in FY04. These
additional FLIRs will also preclude having to transfer existing FLIRs
between units and aircraft to meet current operational requirements.
Because the HH-60s have already been wired for accepting this FLIR, no
additional installation costs are required. This initiative is number
18 on CSAF's Unfunded Priorities List.
F-15E Attrition Reserve Aircraft: The F-15E is the sole platform
which can employ the GBU-15/AGM-130 data-link weapons and GBU-28
hardened/buried target weapons. It also maintains air-to-air
capabilities. The current Air Force planned inventory is three aircraft
short of the requirement. An accelerated buy of these three aircraft in
fiscal year 1998 ($100.8 million) will result in a savings of $165
million in fiscal year 1999. This initiative is number 26 on CSAF's
Unfunded Priorities List.
F-16 Support Equipment: The Avionics Intermediate Shop (AIS) is
used for test, repair, reprogramming, and modification of F-16 avionics
LRU's. Older systems are no longer transportable and will have parts
obsolescence problems within three years. The Air Force has procured 32
Improved Avionics Intermediate Shops (IAIS) with several multi-year
contracts, with a requirement to procure 17 additional IAIS sets. An
additional $31.5 million in fiscal year 1998 will fund 7 Improved
Avionics Intermediate Shops. This initiative is number 28 on CSAF's
Unfunded Priorities List.
MOBILITY
GATM: New start, only funds previously identified include $8.5
million in FY98 for VC-25 initial capabilities. FY98 request includes
$67.7 million for initial funding of Global Air Traffic Management
(GATM) as mandated by ICAO/FAA.
Nav Safety Phase II: The FY98 request includes $126.3 million in
funding for SECDEF directed aircraft safety modifications. Equipment
procurement for Phase II includes Global Positioning System (GPS),
Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS), Emergency Locator
Transmitter (ELT), Flight Data Recorder/Cockpit Voice Recorder (FDR/
CVR), and Terminal Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) for mobility
aircraft not currently equipped. The phase II Nav/Safety request
initiates installation of fourth generation Enhanced Ground Proximity
Warning Systems on all passenger aircraft and starts the installation
of safety components on other than DV/OSA passenger aircraft. The Air
Force is updating program requirements, executability, costs, and
identifying aircraft retirements to more accurately define the cost.
Air Force will provide Congressional notification of SECAF waiver for
aircraft retiring within 5 years prior to obligation of funds.
KC-135 DPEM: No procurement funding is tied to this issue. DPEM is
funded from O&M accounts (3400). The FY98 request for $54.6 million
funds the short fall of KC-135 Depot Maintenance.
C-130 Support: The FY98 request includes $48.0 million for C-130J
interim contractor support (ICS), support equipment and spares which
were not fully funded by FY96 and FY97 Congressional adds of C/EC/WC-
130Js. This initiative is ranked number 22 on CSAF's FY98 Unfunded
Priority List.
SPACE/NUCLEAR
Range Standardization and Automation (RSA) Program: Fiscal
constraints prevent timely development and acquisition of key
components of the integrated Spacelift Range System. These fiscal
constraints delay attainment of improved operational capabilities and
defer operations and maintenance savings essential to the continuing
viability of the Air Force space program.
SCAMP terminals: Due to fiscal constraints on military satellite
communications (MILSATCOM) terminals program, the FY98 budget request
does not include the $9.5 million required for the installation and
integration of 14 Extremely High Frequency (EHF) Single-Channel Anti-
jam Man-Portable (SCAMP) satellite communication terminals to provide
Milstar connectivity to the tanker bases (6.0 million) and electro-
magetic pulse (EMP) hardened input/output devices (laptops and
printers) for 87 EHF SCAMP terminals for CINCSTRAT ($3.5 million). The
SCAMP terminals will provide Milstar connectivity to the tanker bases
for secure, survivable Emergency Action Message (EAM) dissemination to
ensure survivable force direction and reportback to strategic airborne
assets.
MEECN: Due to fiscal constraints on the Minimum Essential Emergency
Communications Network (MEECN) Defense Improved Emergency Messaging
Automated Transmission System (IEMATS) Replacement Command and Control
Terminals (DIRECT) program, the FY98 PB request does not include $8.5
million in procurements costs. DIRECT has a validated requirements to
be fielded no later than 2Q FY 99 to match the scheduled AUTODIN
closure. The FY98 PB delivers two (2) of the required eight (8) suites
by 2Q FY99 and the remaining six by 2QFY00, one year late. By funding
$8.5 million of procurement funds in FY98, all eight DIRECT systems can
be delivered in FY99.
LOGISTICS
Vehicular Equipment: The Vehicular Equipment procurement account in
the Other Procurement, Air Force (3080) Appropriation has a requirement
to replace over 40,000 vehicles; the fiscal year 1998 budget request
asks for funds to buy only 2,370. An additional $95 million would be
readily executable in fiscal year 1998 and would permit much needed
modernization by funding procurement of an additional 3,000 vehicles.
Among other vehicles, $95 million would buy over 300 flight line
tractors, 150 forklifts, 90 construction vehicles, and 80 law
enforcement vehicles; all critical to day-to-day Air Force operations.
Deployable Radioscopic X-ray Devices: The FY98 budget includes $0.2
million for nine X-ray devices for use by Explosive Ordnance Disposal
(EOD) teams during contigency operations. Another 51 X-ray devices at
$1.1 million are required and are unfunded in FY98. These unites
provide a more reliable, real-time analysis of unexploded ordnance
devices and, therefore, reduced risk to EOD personnel.
M16A2 Modification Kits: Fielding of the improved M16A2
modification kits for M16 rifles can be accomplished earlier and
potentially cheaper if funds are provided in FY98.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY98
Appropriation 3011* ------------------
Millions Kits
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current Program...................................... $6.0 22,414
Unfunded Requirement................................. 2.0 7,242
Total Requirement.................................... 8.0 29,656
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Appropriation 3011 is munitions.
The kits modify existing equipment to fire steel-jacked bullets
with greater accuracy, range and penetration; they provide three-shot
burst firing (vice full-automatic), modern sights, new handguards and
stock.
COMMUNICATIONS
National Airspace System: Additional fiscal year 1998 procurement
funds in the amount of $7.0 million has been ranked a number two
priority on the Air Force's FY98 unfunded priority accelerated list.
This effort to procure an additional 9 digital voice switches will
accelerate replacement of analog voice switches. This acceleration will
improve availability and reliability of air traffic control operations.
Additional procurement funds are required in the FYDP to meet
validated military requirements/inventory.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current FYDP...................................................... 54.6 56.3 58.9 66.6 51.5
Plus Up........................................................... 32.78 44.9 42.3 66.9 39.4
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This plug up would allow the Air Force portion of the NAS
modernization program to complete approximately 54 unfunded sites
located in the CONUS and Europe. This equipment will provide complete
interoperability between the FAA and all CONUS and European sites.
These procurements can be accomplished with existing contracts. In
addition, this equipment will have a positive impact on the cost of
maintaining the existing air traffic control equipment currently in
use.
Question. What initiatives are currently approved in an outyear POM
which could either be done more cheaply and/or be fielded earlier by
initiating them in fiscal year 1998? Indicate program by appropriation
account along with an estimated funding stream for each of the five
subsequent fiscal years (assuming a fiscal year 1998 start) along with
the potential savings that could be achieved?
Answer.
AIR SUPERIORITY
Sensor to Shooter: This initiative accelerates the ability to share
digital data among combat platforms and ground control stations using
Link 16, a standard datalink message format and waveform. Required
procurement funding for FY 98 and beyond is ($ in millions):
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title APPN FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F-15C/D (160)........................... 3010 5.2 17.1 33.6 1.3 0.0 0.0 57.2
B-1 (6)................................. 3010 24.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 24.0
GTACS (20).............................. 3080 7.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.5
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Total............................. ....... 36.7 17.1 33.6 1.3 0.0 0.0 88.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This initiative accelerates a much needed combat capability, and
therefore may not reflect specific cost savings in procurement,
however, the force enhancement provided by Link 16 will create a
synergistic effect which will result in higher combat effectiveness and
shorter combat duration.
Bomber Modernization: The B-52 modernization program includes an
Electro-optical Viewing System (EVS) Reliability and Maintainability
(R&M) upgrade. This program consolidates electronic hardware increasing
Mean Time Between Failure Rates. Required procurement funding for FY98
and beyond is ($ in millions):
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title APPN FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
B-52 EVS R&M............................ 3010 2.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This initiative will result in potential savings of $42.5 million
over a 40 year life cycle of the weapons system.
F-15C/D PW-220E Engine: The PW-220E engine modification provides
improved safety, performance, reliability, and operability; while
reducing maintenance and logistics support. Required procurement
funding for FY 98 and beyond is ($ in millions):
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title APPN FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F-15A/B/C/D............................. 3010 73.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 73.2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This additional funding in fiscal year 1998 will accelerate the
upgrade of 1.5 squadrons (27 PAA) and will result in a savings of
approximately $28.3 Million across the life cycle of the weapons
system.
Precision Guided Munitions: The GBU-28 and CALCM weapons are force
multipliers, allowing better mission effectiveness while reducing
attrition, sorties required, conflict duration, and collateral damage.
Additional funding in fiscal year 1998 will accelerate procurement of
GBU-28 and 10 CALCM Block II penetrator missile kits. Required
procurement funding in FY98 and beyond is ($ in millions):
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title APPN FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CALCM (10).............................. 3020 18.8 25.4 25.0 30.0 0.0 0.0 99.2
GBU-28 (152)............................ 3011 16.8 150.0 150.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 316.8
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additional funding of $18.8 million in fiscal year 1998 will
accelerate CALCM Block II IOC by one year, and an additional $16.8
Million will accelerate procurement of the GBU-28, which is well below
its required inventory.
HH-60G FLIR: Additional funds in fiscal year 1998 will allow
procurement of the remaining 43 Q-16 sets to equip the total force HH-
60 fleet planned for acquisition in FY04-05. Required procurement
funding in FY98 and beyond is ($ in millions):
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title APPN FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HH-60 FLIR (43)......................... 3010 33.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
These additional FLIRs will preclude having to transfer existing
FLIRs between units and aircraft to meet current operational
requirements. Because the HH-60s have already been wired for accepting
this FLIR, no additional installation costs are required. Acquisition
in fiscal year 1998 will avoid line shutdown/startup costs in FY04.
F-15E Attrition Reserve Aircraft: The Air Force is currently three
short of the F-15E requirement. Unfortunately, fiscal constraints
prevented funding of these aircraft in the FY98 budget. Required
procurement funding in FY98 and beyond is ($ in millions):
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title APPN FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F-15E................................. 3010 100.8 -165.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.8
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This initiative will result in approximately $65 million cost
savings in economy of scale, and also avoids approximately $25 million
in shutdown/overhead costs due to concurrent production with Saudi F-
15s.
F-16 Support Equipment: The Avionics Intermediate Shop (AIS) is
used for test, repair, reprogramming, and modification of F-16 avionics
LRU's. Older systems are no longer transportable and will have parts
obsolescence problems within three years. The Air Force has procured 35
Improved Avionics Intermediate Shops (IAIS) with several multi-year
contracts, with a requirement to procure 14 additional IAIS sets.
Required procurement funding for these sets is ($ in millions):
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title APPN FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F-16.................................... 3010 31.5 36.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 76.5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This initiative will result in significant decreases in shipping/
depot costs and will also significantly reduce the deployment
requirements of F-16 units. Deployment savings have been confirmed at
approximately $2 million per year for every 12 aircraft that deploy.
Manpower requirement have decreased from 18 to 8 for the Improved AIS
kits, and airlift requirements have decreased from over 30 pallets down
to just 2.
INFORMATION SUPERIORITY
AWACS Extend Sentry: The effort (PE 27417F), currently #22 on the
CSAF FY98 Plus-Up Priorities List, is a candidate for earlier and
cheaper ``fielding''. Extend Sentry is an aggressive sustainment effort
which takes the AWACS program into the 21st century, decreases air
aborts, and addresses Reliability, Maintainability, and Availability
(RM&A) issues. Extend Sentry is not a program per se, but a
comprehensive list of individual projects with a common goal of
increasing aircraft availability through reduced maintenance/depot
downtime and addressing long-standing operational deficiencies.
The additional funding requested (by appropriation) is as follows:
FY98
3600.............................................................. 28.1
3010.............................................................. 27.0
3400.............................................................. 4.1
______
Total......................................................... 59.2
These funds will be used to fund several currently unfunded Extend
Sentry projects. Savings achieved will be in reduced maintenance man-
hours, reduced on-equipment maintenance hours, reduced number of
aborts, and reduced Programmed Depot Maintenance (PDM) flow days, thus
increasing overall RM&A of the AWACS fleet.
It is important to note that, as a collection of individual
projects, Extend Sentry can be implemented on an incremental basis
consistent with available funding, thus any increase in funding will
allow the incremental achievement of program objectives at an earlier
date.
MOBILITY
GATM: NA--GATM is not currently funded.
Nav Safety Phase II: NA--Nav Safety Phase II is not currently
funded.
KC-135 DPEM: NA--DPEM is not an acquisition program.
C-130 Support: NA--This unfunded priority is not an acceleration,
but fixes unfunded ICS, support equipment, and spares for aircraft
already in the USAF program. The concepts of fielding the weapon system
cheaper or earlier do not apply.
SPACE/NUCLEAR COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2)
Range Standardization and Automation (RSA) program: The upgraded
communications, range safety, remote control, status display, and
mobile telemetry systems could be fielded earlier and more cheaply by
adding $36.8 million of RDT&E and procurement funding in FY 1998 to
accelerate the program to the original schedule. The added RDT&E and
procurement funding would increase the estimated FY 1998 RDT&E and
procurement funding total to $157.7 million. The estimated RDT&E and
procurement funding stream for FY 1999 through FY 2003 averages $140.2
million per year. This estimate includes potential RDT&E and
procurement savings averaging $14.0 million per year in FY 2000 through
FY 2002. Beginning in FY 2003, the estimate includes operations and
maintenance savings of $20.0 million per year.
Spacetrack: Providing an additional $39.1 million for program
activities saves $7.5 million over the FYDP. Given the additional $39.1
million, the outyear funding required, by appropriation, is as follows.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RDAF Adjustment..................................... +22.6 ........ ........ ........ ........ ........
Total RDAF Required................................. 51.2 14.1 12.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
OPAF Adjustment..................................... +1.3 ........ ........ ........ ........ ........
Total OPAF Required................................. 8.7 1.5 1.3 4.0 4.0 4.0
OMAF Adjustment..................................... +15.2 ........ ........ ........ ........ ........
Total OMAF Required................................. 59.0 48.0 50.1 60.6 57.3 62.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Global Positioning System (GPS) Accuracy Improvement: Initiative is
currently projected to provide a 32% increase in accuracy for our
warfighters in April 2000. The requested FY98 funding increase ($6
million) would allow us to accelerate delivery of this dramatic
improvement to provide a majority of the capability (18-28% accuracy
improvement) by November 1998.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RDAF Adjustment..................................... +6.0 ........ ........ ........ ........ ........
Total RDAF Required................................. 12.3 2.6 ........ ........ ........ ........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MEECN: The FY98 PB starts procurement of the Minimum Essential
Emergency Communications Network (MEECN) Extremely High Frequency (EHF)
capability for the ICBM Launch Control Centers in FY99. By adding $1.5
million for Request for Proposal (RFP) package development, the RFP
package could be developed and released in FY98 allowing contract award
to occur at the beginning of FY99 avoiding approximately six months of
RDT&E schedule delay.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RDAF Adjustment..................................... +1.5 ........ ........ ........ ........ ........
Total RDAF Required................................. 1.5 12.5 23.6 12.0 0.0 0.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCAMP: The Extremely High Frequency (EHF) Single-Channel Anti-jam
Man-Portable (SCAMP) satellite communication terminals outyear funding
is currently being addressed in the FY99 APOM. Decisions on the funding
are not yet complete. The SCAMP terminals will provide secure,
survivable Milstar connectivity to strategic forces.
$9.5 million in FY98 would procure for CINCSTRAT (a) installation
and integration of 14 SCAMP terminals and (b) electro-magnetic pulse
(EMP) hardened input/output devices for 87 SCAMP terminals. The input/
output devices will be utilized at tanker bases and with bomber
dispersal terms to insure survivable force direction and reportback.
Cost savings and earlier fielding could be achieved if $9.5 million in
Other Procurement was provided in FY 98. $0.3 million would be saved
due to inflationary costs and discontinuing the current communications
system (the Ground Wave Emergency Network (GWEN)) would result in $20
million of operations and maintenance cost avoidance.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY98
Start FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
OPAF Adjustment..................................... +9.5 ........ ........ ........ ........ ........
Total OPAR required................................. 9.5 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nuclear-detonation Detection System (NDS): Outyear funding is
currently being addressed in the budget process. Decisions on the
funding are not yet complete.
FY98 program start funding profile:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY98 Start FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RDAF Required............................. 1.4 2.8 3.4 3.6 4.0 4.3 19.5
OPAF Required............................. 1.8 1.3 2.2 2.5 3.8 10.6 22.2
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Total............................... 3.2 4.1 5.6 6.1 7.8 14.9 41.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Funding profile for FY99 program start:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY99 Start FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RDAF Required............................. ........ 3.8 5.1 5.8 7.5 13.2 35.4
OPAF Required............................. ........ 1.5 2.0 2.2 2.9 5.0 13.6
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Total............................... ........ 5.3 7.1 8.0 10.4 18.2 49.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Funding profile for FY00 program start:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY00 Start FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RDAF Required............................. ........ ........ 8.4 9.8 12.2 14.8 45.2
OPAF Required............................. ........ ........ 3.3 3.8 4.0 5.9 17.0
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Total............................... ........ ........ 11.7 13.6 16.2 20.7 62.2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The potential savings to the program (assuming FY98 Start) are $7.3
million over an FY99 program start and $20.5 million over a FY00
program start.
LOGISTICS
The POMM approved a 12-year modernization program (fiscal year 1999
through fiscal year 2010) for the Vehicular Equipment procurement
account (Budget Program 82) in the Other Procurement, Air Force (3080)
Appropriation. An additonal $95 million in fiscal year 1998 would start
the modernization program one year earlier and result in outyear
(fiscal year 2010) savings of $127.1 million. Current POM funding
stream: FY99--$203.6 million; FY00--$261.4 million; FY01--$226.2
million; FY02--$234.8 million; FY03--$269.8 million.
Fielding of the improved M1642 modification kits for M16 rifles can
be done earlier and potentially cheaper if funds are provided in FY98.
The total funded FYDP requirement of almost 51,400 kits can be procured
in FY98. The kits modify existing equipment to fire steel-jacketed
bullets with greater accuracy, range and penetration; they provide
three-shot burst firing (vice full-automatic) modern sights, new
handguards and stock.
Appropriation 3011*
Total Current Program:
FY98.......................................................... 6.0
FY99.......................................................... 2.8
FY00.......................................................... 2.0
FY01.......................................................... 4.0
FY02.......................................................... 0
FY03.......................................................... 0
______
Total....................................................... 14.8
*Appropriation 3011 is munitions.
Exact savings are difficult to quantify, but at the minimum, we can
save approximately $.4 million in inflation costs.
Question. Provide a list of R&D of production programs or projects
for which funding is included in the fiscal year 1998 budget that are
stretched out beyond technically attainable schedule primarily due to
lack of funding in either fiscal year 1998 and/or the outyears.
Answer. The following programs would fall under this category:
Spacetrack; Eastern Ranges; the Minimum Essential Emergency
Communications Network (MEECN) projects for Modified Miniature Receive
Terminals (MMRT) and Defense Improved Emergency Messaging Automated
Transmission System (IEMATS) Replacement Command and Control Terminals
(DIRECT); Military Satellite Communications (MILSATCOM) terminals; the
Global Command Support System-Air Force (GCSS-AF); the B1B Conventional
Mission Upgrade Program (CMUP) Block D Simulator; and the B-1B CMUP
Defensive System Upgrade Program (DSUP) Low Rate Initial Production
(LRIP).
Question. Indicate all programs for which procurement funding is
included in your fiscal year 1998 budget that would be good candidates
for multiyear procurement funding, assuming additional funding were
available in fiscal year 1998 and the outyears. Provide for these
programs a comparison of the current acquisition funding stream
compared to a potential multiyear profile (assuming a fiscal year 1998
start), along with the additional up-front investment that would be
required and the potential savings that would be likely.
Answer. There are no additional programs that would be good
candidates for multi-year procurement except those that are currently
funded with multi-year procurement.
Question: Identify any procurement programs in the fiscal year 1998
budget where provision of additional procurement funds in fiscal year
1998 would have a very favorable impact on production unit prices?
Answer.
AIR SUPERIORITY
F-15E Attrition Reserve Aircraft: To meet the 20 Fighter Wing
Equivalents (FWE) force requirement, the Air Force needs to procure 3
F-15E attrition reserve aircraft in addition to the 3 which are
currently in the fiscal year 1998 budget. These aircraft must be
procured no later than FY98 to take advantage of current foreign
military sales (FMS) to Saudi Arabia. Buying these additional
quantities in concert with FMS sales saves between $32 million and $38
million per aircraft.
SPACE
Range Standardization and Automation (RSA): This is an
infrastructure program developing instrumentation, communications, and
control & display systems for a wide rang of functions at two
geographically separate locations. A major program objective is
equipment standardization to save acquisition and support costs.
Consequently, large quantities of communications and computer equipment
will be procured. Due to fiscal constraints, large quantity purchases
planned for fiscal year 1998 are being broken up into smaller buys,
increasing overall program cost. $36.8 million additional funds in
fiscal year 1998 will alleviate this situation and allow the program to
resume the plan for the large quantity buys. Accordingly, the unit
costs will be reduced by the economies of scale possible with increased
procurement funds.
LOGISTICS
Vehicular Equipment: Most of the budget lines in the Vehicular
Equipment procurement account (Budget Program 82 in the Other
Procurement, Air Force (3080) Appropriation) would realize unit price
savings by buying substantially higher quantities. Many of the vehicles
are procured through GSA, whose contracts in most cases call for lower
unit prices for increased quantities or contain clauses which allow the
Air Force to negotiate directly with contractors for lower prices for
higher quantities. In addition, inflation costs would be saved by
buying the vehicles in fiscal year 1998 rather than in a later fiscal
year.
PERSONNEL
Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS): The planned JPATS
acquisition profile meets military requirements; however, savings and
decreased beddown times would be realized for each training based with
a more efficient profile. Aircraft Procurement funds are in program
element 84740F, New AEFC Aircraft. The current FY98 President's Budget
FYDP profile is:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(TY$M) FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aircraft Procurement, AF............................ 65.4 92.5 92.4 123.0 181.7 256.3
Quantity............................................ 18 12 18 34 43 43
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The increases required for a more efficient production rate are:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(TY$M) FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aircraft Procurement, AF............................ +12.2 +27.0 +24.6 -0.5 +51.0 +69.5
Quantity............................................ +4 +10 +10 +/-0 +17 +17
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The accelerated profile will decrease JPATS unit cost, result in a
program savings of $59.4 million decreased beddown time from 3 to 2
years per base.
Question. Identify each production program in the fiscal year 1998
budget whose main rationale is to sustain a minimal industrial base.
Answer. The Air Force has not budgeted any FY 1998 funds for
programs whose main rationale would be to sustain a minimal industrial
base.
Question. Please indicate in total and for the top 20 largest
weapon systems both the peacetime operating requirement (separately)
for spare parts funded either as initial spares in procurement accounts
or as consumable spares in DBOF, and the percentage of requirement met
through the fiscal year 1998 budgeted level of funding. Project how
this would change by the end of the FYDP.
Answer. Beginning in FY 1998, replenishment spares are funded in
O&M. The table below identifies what percent of known initial spares
requirements by weapon system for the top twenty weapon systems is
funded in the FY 1998 procurement accounts and what percent will be
funded by the end of the FYDP.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percent of
Percent of requirement
Ranking and weapon system FY98 requirement funded by
funded in the end of
FY98 the FYDP
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 C-17 Aircraft.................. 89.652 7 96
2 B-2 Squadrons.................. 67.924 18 91
3 JOINT STARS.................... 35.139 7 90
4 F-15E Squadrons................ 22.870 28 100
5 Manned Reconnaissance System... 17.781 5 72
6 KC-135S........................ 10.470 30 100
7 B-1B Squadrons................. 9.938 5 39
8 F-16 Squadrons................. 8.692 3 53
9 F-15 A/B/C/D Squadrons......... 7.231 6 92
10 Airborne Warning & Control 7.117 6 74
System..........................
11 C-130 Airlift Squadrons....... 3.690 2 58
12 F-117A Squadrons.............. 2.404 15 100
13 A-10 Squadrons................ 1.560 19 100
14 C-141 Airlift Squadrons....... 1.193 16 100
14 B-52 Squadrons................ .837 6 65
16 Advance Communication System.. .823 29 100
17 Tactical Cryptologic Units .782 22 100
(ANG)...........................
18 Depot Maintenance (NON-IF).... .559 10 100
19 MILSTAR Satellite Comm System .513 19 100
(SPACE).........................
20 Logistics Operations (NON- .428 5 100
DBOF)...........................
Other Requirements.............. .287 ........... ...........
Total Initial Spares: 289.89.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. Please indicate any potential FMS sales that are being
discussed that could influence production unit prices once consummated,
not including those whose impact is already factored into the
production unit prices portrayed to Congress in fiscal year 1998
budget.
Answer. There are two potential system sales that are currently
being discussed that could impact the FY98 budget.
Discussions are ongoing with the United Arab Emirates and Norway
for F-16 Fighter Aircraft purchases. If consummated soon these sales
would have an impact on the FY98 budget. How much of an impact can not
be determined at this time, as the impact would be dependent on the
size of the buy.
We are aware of direct commercial sales negotiations between
McDonell Douglas and the United Kingdom for the lease or purchase of C-
17 Cargo Aircraft. This sale could result in savings to the US in the
FY98 budget due to the company's increased business base. Exact dollar
figures have yet to be finalized.
Question. Please indicate what policy your service uses for major
R&D and production programs, such as a ``budget to contract target
cost'' or ``budget to ceiling contract costs'' or ``budget to most
likely cost'' and identify which of your major programs in the fiscal
year 1998 budget deviate from this policy and the attendant rationale.
Answer. It is the practice of the Air Force to ``budget to most
likely cost''. Responsibility for determining funding levels is left to
the individual program manager, subject to review in the programming
and budgeting cycles. While indeed there may be some programs with
budgets equating to target or ceiling cost, the Air Force has
determined that this is indeed the most likely cost for the budget.
Question. Please indicate what policy your service uses to provide
a budget within R&D and production programs for unknown allowances and/
or economic change orders, and identify any programs in the fiscal year
1998 budget deviate from this policy and the attendant rationale.
Answer. Determination of the amount of reserve budgeted for in
modernization programs is based on the judgment of the individual
program managers. These estimates are based upon the technical
complexity and schedule risk associated with each program. These
estimates are then reviewed during the programming and budgeting
process for reasonableness.
Question. Please identify any R&D or production program which has a
contract for which all or a portion is budgeted in fiscal year 1998 for
a contract award fee larger than $10 million. Provide the amount
budgeted for the award fee, the basis on which the amount was
calculated (e.g. 100% fee base don the contract), and the historical
performance of the contractor in terms of percentage of award fee
awarded during prior award fee periods under the same contract.
Answer. F-22: $88,293,426 award fee for LMAS, 0006 Contract;
$10,288,291 award fee for Pratt & Whitney, 0007 Contract.
For both contracts the basis of the award fee amount is the
estimated contract cost for that particular fiscal year. If the
contractor meets all of the requirements during a given award fee
period, the contractor will receive 100% of that period's award fee
pool. Beginning with period 9 (1 Apr-30 Sep 95), any unearned portion
of the award fee pool is available for rollover to incentivize high
priority topics. Specific criteria are established for these topics. If
the contractor meets the criteria, he will be awarded 100% of the
rollover. Below are the historical performance of the contractors in
terms of percentage of award fee earned during the prior award fee
periods.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percent of Percent of
LMAS P&W Fiscal year
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Period 1......................... 93 97 1991
Period 2......................... 91 96 1992
Period 3......................... 84 97 1992
Period 4......................... 91 89 1993
Period 5......................... 87 82 1993
Period 6......................... 88 81 1994
Period 7......................... 82 85 1994
Period 8......................... 84 80 1995
Period 9......................... 83 85 1995
Period 10........................ 83 79 1996
Period 11........................ 79 81 1996
------------------------------------------------------------------------
JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER (JSF)
The budget for the Joint Strike Fighter Program includes $24.2
million in FY 1998 for award fee under the Concept Demonstration
Program contract with Pratt and Whitney. The available award fee amount
for each period of the contract was determined as a percentage of the
total available award fee, based on the amount and importance of work
to be performed in each period. The key events for the FY 1998 award
fee determinations are first engine to test and first lift system and
nozzle to test. This is a new contract and no award fee payments have
been made to date.
AIRBORNE LASER
ABL's award fee pool in FY98 is $10,960,136.
Award fee basis is 12% of the cost line items on contract
for that period.
No historical award fee performance on the contract.
First PDRR award fee period ends 31 March 97.
B-1B
No single B-1B Conventional Mission Upgrade Program (CMUP) contract
has more than $10 million for award fee in FY98. The total budgeted
award fee pool in FY98 for all B-1B CMUP contracts (100% of fee based
on actual contract or best estimate) is approximately $16.5 million (3
different contracts for 4 programs). The percentage range previously
awarded under these various CMUP contracts was 94% to 100%.
TITAN
Titan Space Launch Vehicles has two such contracts. The launch
operations contract, F0471-95-C-0012, has an award fee of $12.5 million
budgeted for FY98. The award fee is based on contract cost and up to
100% of the $12.5 million may be awarded. For the past few years, the
contractor has received between 95 and 100% of the award fee. The
production contract, F0471-95-C-0001, has an award fee of $17.3 million
budgeted for FY98. This is also based on contract cost and the award is
also up to 100% of the $17.3 million. For the past few years, the
contractor has earned between 95 and 100% of the award fee.
MILSTAR
Milstar production contract (F04701-92-C-0049) for the BLOCK II
satellites has an FY98 award fee of $62.9 million. The amount of the
fee is based on contract cost. Up to 100% of the $62.9 million may be
awarded. To date, Lockheed Martin Missiles and Space has been awarded
94% of the award fee. There is a contract clause that enables the
program office to roll forward unearned award fee from the previous
contract period as additional incentives to the contractor.
SPACE BASED INFRARED SYSTEM (SBIRS)
Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) HIGH EMD Contract (F04701-95-C-
0017) has an FY98 award fee of $37 million. The amount is 100% fee
based on contract cost. Due to recent award of contract (8 Nov 96), the
first award fee period has not completed and no fee yet awarded. There
is a contract clause that enables the program office to roll forward
certain unused portions of the award fee pool to the next award fee
period.
Question. Please identify all R&D and production programs/projects
for which Congress appropriated funds in fiscal year 1997 which since
the Appropriations Act was enacted have been either terminated or
significantly down-scoped. For each, indicate the status of the fiscal
year 1997 and any earlier active fiscal year funds where funds have
been diverted to another purpose.
Answer. Congress appropriated $81.3 million in FY97 funds for
advance procurement of F-22 Pre-Production Vehicles (PPVs). The Air
Force has since terminated this project.
The Air Force intends to use FY97 F-22 Aircraft Procurement Advance
Procurement funding, which was appropriated for Pre-Production
Verification (PPV) aircraft, for Out-of-Production Parts (OPP). The
Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) approved an F-22 program restructure,
thereby requiring a change in use of the FY97 funds. The Air Force is
forwarding notification letters to the Congressional Defense Committees
that will explain our purposed use of these funds.
As documented in the FY96 President's Budget (PB), the original use
for the FY97 Aircraft Procurement Advance Procurement funding was to
support long lead funding requirements for PPV aircraft, with a lot buy
to occur in FY98. The FY97 President's Budget submission moved all PPV
funding for Aircraft Procurement to the RDT&E appropriation. The Air
Force's interpretation of the FY97 Appropriation Conference position
was that the Aircraft Procurement line ($81.3 million) was for PPV long
lead buy usage. The DAB approved the F-22 program restructure which
eliminated the PPV aircraft requirement and used for long lead funds
for OPP.
The use of FY97 Aircraft Procurement Advance Procurement funds for
OPP will support the cost of partial redesign and the purchase of
parts. Both of these efforts support production Losts 1-5. Funds to
begin the redesign effort are required by May 97 to support forecasted
contract award in June 97. In order to complete the redesign effort,
additional funding has been budgeted on an incremental basis in Advance
Procurement funding starting in FY98 through FY02. Loss of FY97 OPP
funding forces a one year slip in production resulting in cost
increases due to inflation, overhead, and breaks in production.
Question. Identify all ACTD funding in the RDT&E, Air Force
appropriation account in each fiscal year 1997 through the FYDP.
Indicate total cost of each listed. ACTD and whether other service
appropriations are contributing funds for it.
Answer. The Air Force is using RDT&E funds in two active ACTDs,
Combat Identification and Navigation Warfare. Funding is as follows, in
thousands of dollars:
COMBAT IDENTIFICATION
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air Force........................................ 3,600 2,992 0 0 0 0 6,592
Army............................................. 6,824 6,929 0 0 0 0 13,753
OSD.............................................. 17,459 15,268 4,000 4,000 0 0 40,727
--------------------------------------------------------------
Total...................................... 27,883 25,189 4,000 4,000 0 0 61,072
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAVIGATION WARFARE
(Note: Totals include FY95 funds, not shown.)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air Force........................................ 10,450 18,902 7,263 939 1,300 0 42,029
OSD.............................................. 6,669 4,500 3,900 300 0 0 15,369
--------------------------------------------------------------
Total...................................... 17,119 23,402 11,163 1,239 1,300 0 57,398
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Young.]
Wednesday, April 16, 1997.
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM
WITNESS
LIEUTENANT GENERAL LESTER L. LYLES, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, DIRECTOR,
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE ORGANIZATION
Introduction
Mr. Young. The Committee will come to order.
General, let me explain to you that some of our
subcommittee members are marking up their portions of the
supplemental, so our attendance might not be too good this
afternoon. Also I wanted to tell you that I had a really great,
exciting opening statement to make, but I am going to wait and
talk to you about that later, because I want to recognize
Chairman Livingston for any statement that he would like to
make and questions that he would like to ask before he moves on
to some of the markups.
If that is okay with you, General, we will turn it over to
Chairman Livingston.
[The statement of Mr. Young follows:]
Today, the Committee will conduct a hearing on the Department of
Defense's programs in the area of Ballistic Missile Defense. Our
witness is Lieutenant General Lester L. Lyles, the Director of the
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO). We welcome you on your
first visit to the Committee General Lyles, and look forward to your
testimony.
This Committee has paid close attention to our nation's Ballistic
Missile Defense programs. In part, this is because we remember the
single SCUD attack which took the lives of 28 Americans during Desert
Storm. Yet our concern is not focused on the past, it is focused on the
future protection of our troops and our citizens.
The proliferation of ballistic missiles has increased dramatically.
The number of nuclear states has more than doubled over the last 20
years. In addition to these 13 nuclear states, there are about 30 non-
NATO countries who collectively possess thousands of theater ballistic
missiles. About 16 developing nations have chemical weapons programs
and 11 others have biological weapons research programs.
In light of this threat, and out of a desire to protect our troops
and our citizens, this Committee added $800 million to the 1997 budget
request for missile defense. We hoped that the same emphasis on missile
defense would be reflected in this year's budget. Unfortunately, the
President's Budget for 1998 is much less than we expected. The budget
request for Ballistic Missile Defense is $2.9 billion, almost $700
million below the 1997 appropriation of $3.6 billion.
Although the President's budget plan is discouraging, there is some
good news to report. There have been several successful flight tests
over the last several months--in large part due to the additional
resources provided by Congress to BMDO over the past two years.
In January, the Navy Lower Tier system intercepted a Lance target
missile and is now proceeding to the Engineering and Manufacturing
Development phase of the acquisition process.
In March, a SCUD missile was shot down by an upgraded guidance
enhanced Patriot missile.
And, on March 11, the Arrow missile had a partial failure but still
destroyed its target, with a body-to-body kill.
In addition, programs that were lacking direction a year or so ago
now have been given new focus. The Navy Theater Wide program has been
designated as a ``core'' theater missile defense program by the
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology. And, the
National Missile Defense (NMD) program has been designated as a
``Deployment Readiness'' program.
Unfortunately, there have also been some failures. Most notably, on
March 6, the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile failed
to intercept its target. This was a difficult setback--particularly
since this was THAAD's fourth consecutive failure.
While there are certainly technical reasons for this failure, the
Administration's erratic policy and budget approach to ballistic
missile defense has certainly not helped in the management or execution
of this program.
General Lyles, this Committee would like to work with you to bring
some stability into ballistic missile defense programs. A rational
strategy and stable funding are critical factors for the proper
management and execution of these programs. I know you will want to
address these issues in your testimony and so I will not go into
further detail at this time.
Mr. Young. Mr. Livingston.
Mr. Livingston. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Rather than preempt your statement, let me simply ask
unanimous consent, which I hope to get, which would put my
exchange with General Lyles after your opening statement.
Mr. Young. We can do that.
Helsinki Agreement
Mr. Livingston. All right. General, we are glad to have you
here. I appreciated your comments off the record just as we
were standing there chatting, but I thought it was important to
put a couple of comments of my own on the record.
As you know, the administration has just worked out an
agreement with the Russians, and I think three former states of
the old Soviet Union, to put some degree of limits on our
ability to intercept missiles from abroad. At the same time,
the Russians, signatories to that agreement, we read, are
selling, actively selling, some of their missile technology to
the Iranians, who are not signatories to that agreement.
It strikes me as a little strange why we are, on the one
hand, negotiating to slow down our defenses and limit our
ability to intercept incoming missiles, when the cosignatories
or coparticipants to that agreement are selling highly
technical capabilities to people who will not, even if they
were signatories, abide by it, and certainly will not so long
as they are not signatories.
So I am very, very concerned about the wisdom of all of
this, especially in light of the most recent revelations in the
newspapers. But I accept your earlier assurances that currently
the negotiations and agreements with the Russians would not
limit our ability to deploy Theater High Altitude Area
Defense--THAAD or Navy Upper Tier or some of the other systems
that are on the books as being developed--unfortunately, not
deployed, but developed.
I am gratified by that, and I certainly would hope that,
likewise, those agreements wouldn't preclude us in the future
from adopting space-based systems.
But I guess my one big question that I would like you to
address on the record is specifically why we are slowing down
our defenses, agreeing with the Russians to slow down our
defenses, when in fact adversaries who are not parties to this
agreement may develop faster systems, faster offensive weapons,
which will take faster defenses, and because of this, we would
have to go to the Russians and those other countries to get
permission to upgrade our defenses before we could deal with
them. Why is that?
General Lyles. Congressman Livingston, I can't comment
exactly on what stimulated some of those discussions and the
rationale for all the words that are there. I can assure you,
however, that the agreement that was struck at Helsinki in no
way dumbs down, slows down or affects our current theater
missile defense systems. Nor does it affect any system that we
currently have planned in the theater missile defense arena.
In fact, the demarcation limits specifically impact the
types of targets that we can test against, targets that
potentially could replicate an strategic intercontinental
ballistic missile, or ICBM--I am sure that is the primary
concern of the Russians--to 5 kilometers per second, 3,500
nautical mile range. Those are essentially the limits in terms
of the types of targets that we could test against with our
current Theater Missile Defense or TMD systems.
The part that impacts speed for our particular intercepts
as referred to in the language of the Helsinki agreement is
that we currently have no plans for systems that have a speed
greater than the numbers that are quoted in the Helsinki
agreement. Our interpretation, the interpretation of our policy
people is, since the words say ``planned for,'' if we saw a
need to actually develop something that has a higher velocity,
yes, under the agreement we would have to notify the Russians.
But I don't think that would in any way constrain us if we
thought the threat required that we have a system with certain
capabilities.
The words were carefully construed to ensure that for those
systems that maybe require higher velocities, that they would
be put in a planned-for stage, and not forbidden stage. We are
not forbidden from having systems with certain speeds.
Mr. Livingston. Just for the sake of argument, suppose the
Iranians or Chinese or North Koreans or Libyans or somebody
else were to develop two types of missiles, say, missile A and
missile B, and missile A could be easily intercepted by a
countermeasure traveling 5,000 kilometers per second or slower,
but missile B took a countermeasure traveling at least 6,000
kilometers per second.
Why would we logically, under any circumstances, wish to
limit the speed of our ability to defend against such a weapon?
General Lyles. Congressman, I think, again, the rationale
was to ensure that we had some confidence-building measures
relative to dealing with the Russians, to assure them that our
theater systems, theater missile defense systems--I remind you,
we are not talking about national missile defense systems, but
theater--would not have the capability to be used to counter
their strategic ICBMs.
If we saw, however, a threat out there that had the speed,
say, of a strategic ICBM, it was much, much higher and we
required something with higher speeds for our interceptor, I am
sure, again, the way the words are worded, that we can go ahead
and develop that. We would have to notify the Russians, though,
according to the Helsinki agreement. But the words do not
require us to actually stop it. It doesn't say you cannot do
that.
Mr. Livingston. I can only judge from the press reports,
but the press reports indicate to me that we have to gain their
consent because we have mutually agreed with them not to
develop these systems; and it would seem, if we want to develop
faster systems, that we have to gain their consent.
Now, we have agreed the Chinese are selling to the
Iranians, the Russians are selling to the Iranians, the
Iranians are not signatories to this thing. Presumably the
Russians are not making a distinction between whether they are
a theater or national defense system or offensive weapons. They
are just selling missile technology. I don't see why we should
make that distinction.
Frankly, this entire set of issues is not only mind-
boggling to me, but I think to 98 percent of the American
people. We have made a distinction without a difference. We
have proclaimed to be for arms control without any gain to the
American people, and if anything, I think we have jeopardized
the American people.
Suppose our intelligence is not up to snuff, and one day we
find out there is not only a threat, but that a potential
attack is imminent within a week. Are we going to say to our
striped trousers folks to go out and negotiate an agreement
with the Russians so we can defend ourselves against getting
New York blown up?
General Lyles. I am obviously not the right one to answer
that question, but my personal view is, given a threat of that
particular nature, I am sure we will do what is right to
protect our troops and our resources analysis, et cetera, and
not go back and beg for forgiveness, if you will, in a scenario
like that.
Mr. Livingston. General, you are answering me, as well you
should. You are an outstanding, not only public servant, but a
representative of the armed forces; and I am sure the Air Force
is proud of you, and you can't criticize current policy. But
the current policy, as negotiated between this administration
and the Russians, doesn't make sense when you compare it to the
potential threat from the Iranians, the Libyans, the Chinese,
the North Koreans, or any other asinine group out of there that
doesn't give a whit about what we have signed our names to.
Moreover, we are sitting here discussing whether or not we
should develop systems in the distant future, and there is not
one single word in any of this discussion about deployment of
antimissile systems. I think that we ought to stop dithering
about developing and start deploying, and I mean start
deploying as quickly as we possibly can. Because the people
that wish to eliminate hundreds or thousands or perhaps
millions of our people in one fell swoop aren't going to sit
around and worry about our agreement with the Russians, and
they are not going to sit around and worry about whether or not
we are developing an antimissile system.
If they know we don't have an antimissile system, that is
the time they are going to want to strike.
General Lyles. Yes, sir.
Mr. Livingston. Thank you very much. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I know you
have an extremely busy schedule today, with all of the
subcommittee markups, so we appreciate your being here.
Mr. Murtha, do you have any opening comments?
Mr. Murtha. No.
Mr. Young. General Lyles, you have the floor, sir. Your
entire statement will be placed in the record and you can
summarize any way you like.
Summary Statement of General Lyles
General Lyles. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that.
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, it really is a
pleasure to be here to testify before you about a very
important set of programs, our missile defense programs for the
United States. I do have a formal statement that I will submit
for the record, but if you don't mind, I would like to take
just a couple of minutes to run through a very, very short
statement and run through a few charts to illustrate exactly
some the concerns of where we are today with our missile
defense programs.
I hope Congressman Livingston got a copy of the charts,
because some of them are intended to illustrate some of his
concerns about deploying and executing and getting programs out
on the field to protect our resources.
[Clerk's note.--The charts referred to by General Lyles are
printed after his prepared statement. See page 468.]
Mr. Chairman, when I was nominated to be the Director of
the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization--BMDO, last year,
last summer, I was charged by Dr. Kaminski and our Deputy
Secretary of Defense, Dr. White, to bring my now 28 years of
acquisition experience to all the issues that we are dealing
with in the area of missile defense.
There are two critical issues that they asked me to
address. One is to ensure that our acquisition programs, all of
our programs, are executable, that we are not just in an
research, development and demonstration phase, but we are
clearly trying to get systems out and capabilities out to the
field; and also to ensure that our requisite technology
programs, which have been the heart and soul of the old
Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, SDIO, the early
incarnation of BMDO, that those programs have an acquisition
focus, that they are intended to help supplement and support
both our current acquisition programs and even the future
programs that we may have to take on in the near term.
I consider this to be my personal charter, a charter for
the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Defense, and
obviously Dr. Kaminski. And the one keyword that I used with
our people to illustrate exactly our key focus, it is the word
``execution,'' to make sure we are doing things that have
executable programs.
My report to you today is along those lines, to show you
where we are today, what we have accomplished, what some of our
challenges are, and the things that we are trying to address in
the very near future, and obviously, for the far term.
I realize that this particular Committee has been very,
very supportive of all of our missile defense programs,
particularly our theater missile defense programs; and in that
light, I am very pleased to report to you, Mr. Chairman and
members, that we are aggressively moving on towards protecting
our forward deployed forces, protecting our allies, protecting
our assets, and improving our Theater Missile Defense--TMD
systems and national systems to provide protection for the
homeland in addition to our forward forces.
I will give you a couple of examples of where we are today
with some of the charts, but I also want to just illustrate we
are complying, I think, with the National Missile Defense Act
of 1991, 1993 and 1995 in trying to provide those capabilities
as rapidly as possible.
Patriot System
As an example, the Patriot system, the air and missile
defense system we are fielding today, is much, much more
capable than the system used during the Gulf War. We recently,
as an example, completed fielding the first of three
improvements that are part of the Patriot Advanced Capability 3
or PAC-3 system. We are scheduled to field the final phase
which consists of the full configuration PAC-3 in fiscal year
1999, about a year and a half from now. This will include the
very critical hit-to-kill capability that we think is
absolutely necessary to be able to counter the threat out
there, particularly the threat against weapons of mass
destruction, whether they be nuclear, chemical or biological.
The full-up system, which is very similar to the Extended
Range Interceptor--ERINT, which this Committee has long
championed from the technology development early on and the
SDIO through the integration with the Patriot system, that full
system will be tested and undergoing tests starting this
summer.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to call your attention and the
attention of the members to the charts in front of you, if you
will, and very quickly walk through those to illustrate exactly
the kinds of things that we are accomplishing today.
The TMD family of Systems
The first chart illustrates the total family of systems in
the theater missile defense arena. There are a wide variety of
weapons systems there, battle management command and control
systems, sensor systems from space, ground-based systems. You
see even the airborne laser program reflected there.
Though this is not a BMDO program, it is managed and funded
fully by the United States Air Force. It is part of our theater
missile defense architecture, so we do consider it an integral
part of our family of theater missile defense systems. It
represents the tiered capabilities, the layered capabilities of
defense that we feel that we have to have in order to protect
our resources; and they all very, very complimentary in terms
of the battlespace they are intended to protect, the assets
they are intended to protect and how they would work together.
They are also intended to be and will be interoperable,
sharing information and also providing backup to each other.
TMD Capability of Growth
If I can call your attention to the next chart, a key point
that I think has been in the minds of the Congress for some
time, since the Missile Defense Acts of 1991, and again 1993
and 1995 and beyond, is to ensure that we are providing a
robust set of capabilities for missile defense. What you see
there, with the time lines at the bottom, are the kinds of
improvements we have made since Desert Storm in our current
missile defense posture, and the systems and capabilities that
we are going to provide to increase that improvement so that we
can really say we have an effective family of systems, a robust
family of systems, to provide missile defense protection.
You see up until today leading up to the top blue bar that
says PAC-3, configuration 2, that is where we are as of today.
Those capabilities are significantly greater than what we had
in Desert Storm, as illustrated by the star to the far left-
hand side of the chart. We made changes in weapons systems and
also made changes in some of our battle management command and
control, and those are primarily shown in the blue bars here.
We have made improvements, but we still have a long way to go.
Patriot System
The next two charts give a better illustration relative to
where we are today and where we will be very shortly with
Patriot versus the Patriot system we had in Desert Storm. What
you see illustrated on the first chart is the Patriot system
performance versus a 500-kilometer theater ballistic missile
threat, the kind of threat we saw during Desert Storm.
The white space that you see, the white tear-shaped space
you see on the left-hand side of the chart, is the capability
in terms of battlespace, et cetera, that Patriot was able to
provide for protection during Desert Storm.
The green space is where we are today, significant
improvement in terms of capability.
The blue space is where we will be with the full-up PAC-3
missile in the next year and a half or so.
The second part of the chart to the right-hand side shows
sort of a perspective of range capabilities. The numbers for
the actual ranges are classified. I can provide those for the
record. But the baseline is that we have essentially an 800
percent increase in volume of protection with the Patriot
system for 500-kilometer theater ballistic missile threats.
Patriot System Performance
The next chart, if I can call your attention to that, shows
the same Patriot system performance versus a 1,000-kilometer
ballistic missile threat, a much longer threat than we saw
during Desert Storm. You don't see a white space there
representing what we had in Desert Storm, because we
essentially had no capability with the Patriot for this sort of
range of theater ballistic missile threat.
The green is where we are today, and you see a tremendous
improvement with PAC-3 when we get that hit-to-kill capability.
That is where we are going with the PAC-3 system.
Willow Dune
I would like to call your attention to an illustration of
where we have dramatically shown what PAC-3 can do with the
next chart. It is labeled Willow Dune. We have had over the
last couple of months a series of tests that we code named
Willow Dune. They were tests of the Patriot system against an
actual SCUD. A couple of months ago, I could not have said that
in an unclassified forum. The information is now unclassified.
We tested the Patriot system in the Kwajalein and Pacific
missile range against actual SCUDs. The type of SCUD is still
classified, and where we got the SCUDs from is classified, and
I will be very happy to provide that for the record or provide
that outside of this particular forum.
We tested in early February, and then again in early March,
the Patriot system against a SCUD missile fired from some 360
kilometers away. In the first test, in February, we used both a
Guidance Enhanced Missile, GEM and a PAC-2 missile firing from
a Patriot battery. We were very, very successful.
We fired two missiles. The first one hit the target, hit
the SCUD, and intercepted it perfectly. The second one was
absolutely not necessary, but we had fired it anyway to
demonstrate this salvo capability.
We repeated the same test in March, in early March, again
with another SCUD from our assets, again with a Patriot system.
This time we used the Guidance Enhanced Missile, the GEM
missile, fired from a Patriot battery. Once again, it was very,
very successful.
This test illustrated to us that with the threats that
exist out there today, the SCUD missile threats and its various
applications or variants that are in the hands of potential
adversaries, that we can, even with the current Patriot 2 and
the enhanced missile for the Patriot system, we can intercept
it and have a very successful way to protect our resources.
Also illustrated on that Willow Dune chart you see the list
of assets at the very top. We not only tested the Patriot
system against the SCUD, we had other sensors that were on
board and being checked out to see how they worked in the
interoperability sets, and a whole wide variety of various
instruments that we had, both airborne and ground, to collect
data, to make sure we fully understood exactly what a Patriot
looks like when it is being fired as a threat system and
exactly what kind of intercept we would accomplish.
The tests were extremely successful. I would be happy to
provide for you, or for any of the members or their staff, more
details about both of the tests that we had.
[The information follows:]
In the first WILLOW DUNE test, the PATRIOT Fire unit
acquired the Willow Dune target, and determined that a PAC-2
missile could successfully engage and destroy the target. A GEM
missile also was available and was launched immediately after
the PAC-2 missile as part of the salvo firing doctrine against
Theater Ballistic Missiles--TBMs and to additionally support
the engagement if the PAC-2 did not successfully destroy the
target.
Data show the PAC-2 missile properly acquiring and fuzing
its warhead at the intended intercept point against the target
and that, after warhead detonati9on, the Willow Dune target was
destroyed. The GEM missile following the PAC-2 missile could
only identify target debris when it reached its intended
intercept point. Additionally, ground sensors did not identify
any ``large'' pieces of the target hitting the water under or
near the intercept point. A THAAD radar tracking the engagement
identified only target debris after the detonation of the PAC-2
warhead.
In the second WILLOW DUNE test, the target was engaged with
a PATRIOT GEM missile. The missile had good Track Via Missile
guidance and fuzed and detonated on the target (initial data
data indicate detonation was at 5 meters or less from the
target). The target telemetry package continued to provide data
after detonation, however, the datastream did not continue from
the previous Willow Dune engagement (this is indicative that
more fragments were directed toward the target warhead,
illustrating the differences between the GEM and PAC-2
missiles).
NAVY AREA DEFENSE TEST
General Lyles. If I can call your attention to the next
chart, we not only have had successes with our Patriot system
and the Army system and the Navy area program, we have also had
successful intercepts very recently to demonstrate the
capabilities there.
The chart you are looking at is one that is very, very
dramatic, particularly for those of us in the technology and
acquisition realm. Much of what you see on the left-hand side
of that chart is the last infrared image taken from the seeker
of the Navy area system, the Navy area missile, just before it
intercepted a Lance target. That particular target was a
replicate of a SCUD; it was not an actual SCUD, but a replicate
of a SCUD, and we had a very successful body-to-body intercept.
Again, you can see the dramatic picture just from the
seeker prior to the actual intercept itself. The right-hand
side just shows the obvious explosion when the interception did
take place. This test was on the 24th of January. It was a
milestone test, and allowed us to proceed with the next phase
of the Navy Area Defense Program.
SYSTEM INTEGRATION TEST
The next chart illustrates another part of our
responsibility within BMDO. It is not just to develop
individual weapon systems, but to ensure that all of those
systems are interoperable, that they can play together. We have
been doing a series of what we call systems integration tests,
really trying to check out and test the interoperability of all
of the systems, all of the intercept systems, their radar
systems, their battle management command and control, their
sensor systems.
We have done a series of tests involving the subsystems
that you see listed in this chart to see how they play
together, how we pass information from one system to another,
and each one of them has also been very, very successful. We
have done a series of those since last summer up until about
the last month or so, and we will continue some of those tests
starting this coming summer.
I talked about the successes. I obviously can't go without
talking about some of our failures. As you know, Mr. Chairman,
we have not been very successful recently in our planned
intercept test for our showcase high altitude program, the
Theater High Altitude Area Defense Program, or THAAD.
THAAD SYSTEM ACCOMPLISHMENTS
What you see illustrated on the next chart are really a
compilation of all the tests we have done with the THAAD
program. The last four tests were intended to be intercept
tests. They were to show that we could really pull together all
the different elements, all the capabilities of THAAD, and
actually have a body-to-body intercept.
It is a major, major milestone in our program, not just to
demonstrate the capability, but also to allow us to proceed
into the next phase of the program.
We have not been successful in accomplishing that
intercept. What we do illustrate on this chart, or try to
illustrate to you, is that we have been successful in
demonstrating a lot of the other things that are necessary to
develop and provide a viable weapons system.
I won't talk to all the details on that chart, but each one
of our tests, including the ones where we did not have a
successful intercept, provided us some success relative to
developing an integrated total weapons system. But we will not
try to fool ourselves. The key is to ensure that we do have a
successful intercept, and we have yet to do that.
I will be happy to address any of your questions later
about where we are in regards to our THAAD program.
I will mention to you that as a result of the most recent
failure, I have chartered a very, very detailed scrub of the
THAAD program. We are doing a review of the recent failures and
what occurred. We are reviewing the design of the program. We
are reviewing the margins associated with the program. We are
reviewing the management on the part of the contractor and
contractor team. We are looking at the requirements of the
program. It is a complete end-to-end scrub of the entire THAAD
program to ensure we know not only what happened, but where do
we go next with this program and do we have confidence it is
the kind of thing we need to invest our time, energy and money
in.
Mr. Chairman, I can tell you that my initial opinion is
that I am still very, very confident that THAAD is going to be
a successful program. Each one of the tests, anomalies we have
had, the test failures we have had, have occurred during the
end game. Every other aspect of the total weapons system,
including the radar, the battle management command and control,
work very, very, very well. We failed in the very last few
seconds in the actual intercept.
Something is happening there relative to design margins,
and we are going to get to the bottom line to ensure we can fix
it and provide an adequate capability.
TEST RESULTS
If I could draw your attention to the next chart, we like
to show this chart to illustrate some of the challenges we have
relative particularly to THAAD and even for our future Navy
Upper Tier program, and that is how difficult hit-to-kill is.
As you know, that is essentially the kill mechanism, the
mechanism we are planning for THAAD and some of our other
systems in the future.
What you see illustrated on this chart goes back and shows
history of what we have done, and more importantly, what we
have not done relative to hit-to-kill intercept tests, attempts
and successes over the years. We go all the way back to 1982
and some of the SDIO programs.
What you see listed there, the charts or the parameters
were zeros there, are plan intercepts where we missed a target.
Those that are darkened in are the plan intercepts where we hit
the target. Unfortunately, you can see a lot more open zeros
than closed zeros.
This a very, very challenging problem we are trying to
address. We think we know how to do this in terms of
technology; I have no doubt in that regard. We are doing some
basic systems engineering, and engineering issues we are trying
to grapple with to ensure we cannot only do this one time, but
do it in a stressing environment and do it every time, to
provide the kind of capability we need. That is the challenge
we have ahead of us relevant particularly to the THAAD program.
NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM ELEMENTS
Mr. Chairman, I would like to move very quickly to our
National Missile Defense Program. What you see illustrated on
the next chart are the system elements, the key elements of the
National Missile Defense System we are trying to provide.
We are now up and running. We now have a formal joint
program office established as of the 1st of April to work
together with all of the various elements required, all the
program offices, all the various systems, to provide an
integrated capability for national missile defense.
What you see listed on the chart are the various elements
of a National Missile Defense System, and they comprise not
only Army systems, but Air Force systems, BMDO systems. This is
not just the purview of one service, it is the purview of a
national perspective, and we are trying to manage and develop
an integrated capability along those lines.
NMD SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
The next chart gives you just a picture of a notional
systems architecture for a National Missile Defense System.
This particular illustration is from a single-site National
Missile Defense System.
We are looking at the various alternatives to try to
understand what capabilities do we really need. Is a single
site going to be sufficient to provide us protection against
our territories, or do we need to have multiple sites? We are
examining all options that might be available to ensure we get
not only the best capability, the most effective capability,
but also the most affordable capability.
NMD DEPLOYMENT READINESS
The next chart is one that is probably very familiar to
you, Mr. Chairman and the other committee members. It is just a
notional cartoon to illustrate our 3+3 Program. We are still
aggressively pursuing our 3+3 strategy; that is, trying to
rapidly develop as much as we possibly can a capability within
the next 3 years for a National Missile Defense System to test
in an integrated sense all of those different elements and, if
that test is successful, review the threat to see what the
threat looks like, and if a decision is made we need to deploy
something, be able to deploy that in another 3 years. That is
our 3+3 strategy.
Mr. Chairman, as I have told you personally, and I would
have told other members, and will always tell this to the
Congress, I intend to be very, very honest with you. I will
tell you, this is a very, very difficult task. It is very, very
high risk relative to the schedule that we are trying to meet.
Nevertheless, the urgency of this problem, the urgency of
the issue of protecting our homeland, is such that we are
aggressively pursuing this, and this is still the strategy we
are trying to embark upon, our 3+3 strategy.
THE JOINT PROGRAM OFFICE
The next chart goes back to a point I mentioned earlier,
Mr. Chairman. As of the first of April, we stood up a formal
joint program office for our National Missile Defense System.
That joint program office is now managed by Army Brigadier
General Joe Cosumano, who is sitting behind me over my right-
hand shoulder. He has now been chartered to bring together all
the different elements to ensure we have an integrated
capability and the right kind of talent to develop a National
Missile Defense System.
His program office is one we call sort of a federated
approach, very similar to one of the acquisition streamlining
initiatives we have taken from the Joint Strike Fighter
Program.
General Cosumano has a very small office here in the
Washington area reporting to him, and he in turn reports to me.
We will have no more than about 60 people in this program
office here in the Washington area, and they will draw upon the
expertise of the talents where the various elements are to
actually manage and help us develop the total system.
We will take advantage of the expertise down at Huntsville,
we will take advantage of the expertise in the space sensors
out at the Air Force's space organization in Los Angeles, we
will take advantage of the Ground-Based Battle Management
Command and control capability up at Hanscom Air Force Base in
Boston, and we will take advantage of our own national test
facility out at Colorado Springs that I think you have visited
last year.
This is, I think, an appropriate centralized approach to
managing the program but decentralized execution relative to
the various elements and bringing in its right expertise.
FEDERATED ORGANIZATION
The next chart of the United States shows you the various
elements and where they are. We think this is the right way to
manage this program, and we are now aggressively marching
forward in that particular manner.
TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS
Mr. Chairman, to try to wrap up very quickly, let me just
hit the last part of our responsibilities in BMDO. It is our
very, very important technology programs. We have had great
success over the years since the original SDIO program in
developing unique and innovative technologies to help provide
missile defense capabilities for the United States. I can tell
you that we would not be where we are today with our various
systems or success-systems were it not for the technology
programs that went back all the way to the SDIO days.
CLEMENTINE SATELLITE
We are still working aggressively on a technology program,
looking at various components and also looking at advanced
capabilities. As an illustration of one reason that I am very
concerned to make sure that we never forget about our
technology is your next chart which talks about the Clementine.
All of you are very familiar with the announcement made
last December about the discovery of the possibility of water
on the moon. What most people, certainly most Americans, are
not aware of was that the satellite that made that discovery
was the Clementine 1 satellite, an SDIO-sponsored satellite. We
had support obviously from NASA, from the National
Reconnaissance Organization, and other agencies, but it was
primarily an SDIO and BMDO innovative satellite technology
program that allowed the mapping of the back side of the moon
and made that discovery.
My baseline concern in the technology realm is, if we don't
keep up a robust technology program, we will not be able to
brag about these kinds of successes 5 or 10 years from now and
we will not be able to ensure we have the kind of capabilities
to add to our missile defense systems that we will need for the
future. So we try to make sure we still continue a very robust
technology program.
Midcourse Space Experiment
One illustration of how we are using technology and how it
plays into our existing capabilities is on the next chart, the
last chart in front of you in your package. It talks about the
Midcourse Space Experiment. This is another BMDO experiment
that was launched almost exactly a year ago, last April 1996.
This satellite is intended to measure and provide information
about sensing targets in space in the midcourse realm: What
happens after they are passed their boost phase? We know we can
detect the launch of a theater missile or even a satellite
system, a space system, or an ICBM with the current systems we
have in space. What we do not know for sure is, can we measure
what happens after the boost phase, after the booster is cut
off? This is vital information for our theater missile and
national missile defense systems. We need to be able to
identify, characterize, and discriminate what is an actual
target and what is a decoy. The Midcourse Space Experiment--MSX
is helping us to do that, and we have had great success since
we made that launch last April.
The picture on your left-hand side may look to some people
like a photograph of little pin points. What you are actually
seeing are from 2,000-plus kilometers away decoys and an actual
Re-entry Vehicle--RV from a dedicated launch where we use the
MSX to try to determine can we discriminate between the RV and
decoys or surrogates that might be launched in an adversary's
threat missile system. We were able to do that.
Those little points you see, some of those are as small as
a football, and we were able to not only detect them but to
characterize them and to discriminate them with the Midcourse
Space Experiment.
The right-hand side of the photo in that particular chart
shows a similar sort of concern, what happens if you are trying
to detect an RV or decoy against a background of the earth. The
earth limb, if you will, where you have a contrast between the
warmer atmosphere and the cold background of space, we were
able to show with our various test that we can, with the MSX
system, discriminate and determine what are actual RV's and
what are decoys.
All of this information is now being provided to our
various sensor systems, and particularly provided to our space
and missile tracking system--SMTS to ensure that we have a
robust capability.
Those are the kind of technologies we want to continue over
the next few years to ensure that we are protecting our ability
to provide a robust missile defense system both in the theater
realm and in the national realm.
Summary
Mr. Chairman, I would like to close my statement there. I
probably talked a little bit too much, but I wanted to give you
some illustration of things that we have actually done and what
some of our challenges are and where we are going.
I would be happy to take any of your questions, but I
wanted to be sure you were fully dedicated as you have asked us
to be to all of our missile defense programs, and we really
appreciate the strong support we have received from you and all
the other Committee members personally in ensuring that we have
been able to get to where we are today.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
[The statement and unclassified charts of General Lyles
follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Unfunded Requirements
Mr. Young. General, thank you very much for an outstanding
statement and presentation of where we are and where we are
going. I would like to ask you just a couple of quick questions
about the budget.
This budget request is about $700 million less than the
actual appropriations for fiscal year 1997. Are there any
unfunded requirements in the Theater Missile Defense Program
that are not included in the President's budget?
General Lyles. I think the best way to answer that is sort
of twofold: One, to explain the difference between the budget
and what was appropriated. The numbers that are reflected in
the budget, the fiscal year 1998 budget, are actually about
$100 million higher than what we initially went in for last
year for fiscal year 1997.
As you know, thanks to you and the Congress, we got a
significant plus-up in our fiscal year 1997 budget for missile
defense systems. We ended up getting about a $855 million plus-
up across the board in all of our various areas, national
theater missile defense and technologies.
What we tried to do is to go back and ensure that, based on
last year's original budget that we were able to address some
of our shortfalls, and we did provide a 1998 budget that is
about $100 million higher than last year's original input,
though it is less, if you will, if you look at it in terms of
the plus-ups we got for 1997.
To answer the question about unfunded requirements, as I
look at trying to provide executable programs and I look at the
risks we have for all of our theater missile defense systems,
and even for our National Missile Defense System, I would have
to say yes, I am concerned that we have some unfunded
requirements relative to things that could help reduce the
risk. Additional test assets as an example, additional test
capabilities in our infrastructure, things of that nature,
areas where I consider we have some unfunded requirements that
probably need to be addressed to help us to ensure that we can
do the job and do it with as low a risk as possible.
We have accepted the current risk, but, as an acquisition
expert, I would always like to see a low-risk program as much
as possible, and from that context I would have to say yes,
there probably are some unfunded requirements that could help
us to address the risk area.
Mr. Young. You might think about those and provide some
more specific examples for the record, if you don't mind.
General Lyles. I would be very happy to do that, Mr.
Chairman. We could do that very quickly.
Mr. Young. Okay. We would like to take a look at some of
the things you think should have been funded.
[The information follows:]
The Fiscal Year 1998 President's budget could be augmented with the
following prioritized list. Funding the items on this list will
minimize outyear tails and assist in solving immediate pressures. First
priority goes to risk reduction programs for the Major Defense
Acquisition Programs (MDAPs); second, joint interoperability risk
reduction issues with MDAP enhancements, third, improvements to our
Advance Technology base, and finally, procurement of weapon systems not
funded by BMDO.
Navy Area Defense (Lower Tier) ($44 million RDT&E)--for risk
mitigation efforts associated with EMD testing that were not in the
previous program baseline.
($35 million)--for upgrades to the Pacific Missile Range
Facility (PMRF) to meet Congressionally mandated use of PMRF and
Multiple Simultaneous Engagement (MSE) testing. Funding would avoid
offsets from other ballistic missile defense activities.
($9 million)--for targets, target support and range
support due to new requirement for UOES characterization testing.
Joint Theater Missile Defense (JTMD) ($94 million RDT&E)
($50 million)--to ensure sufficient fiscal year 1998
Family Of System (FoS) testing and activities for joint
interoperability testing, system exerciser simulations, hardware-in-
the-loop, CINC exercises, and system integration tests (SITs). Although
the MDAPs' activity level has been increased by plus ups, JTMD has not
received an additional TOA for interoperability support in step with
activity levels. Outyear funding for JTMD through fiscal year 2003 in
the areas PMRF, FoS Strategic Targets (STARS) and MEADS will be
addressed in the POM update.
($22 million)--Attack Operations. To make an investment in
definition and development of joint attack operations: The required
investment is comprised of four major activities: (1) perform field
tests, exercises, and training that focus on Attack Operations, (2)
develop a joint attack operations operational requirements document,
(3) formulate an integrated investment strategy, and (4) define the
payoff to other mission areas from investments/improved performance in
Attack Operations.
($12 million)--Cruise Missile Defense. To execute new role
as Integration Systems Architect for Theater Air and Missile Defense,
incorporating analysis, modeling and simulation for Cruise Missile
Defense.
($10 million)--Israeli Cooperative Projects--to foster
system interoperability between Israeli Arrow system and US TMD
systems.
PATRIOT ($15 million RDT&E Defense Wide)--additional funding would
support unanticipated range and hardware funding requirements needed
during the ongoing Engineering and Manufacturing Development flight
test program without changing the number of flight tests or reducing
other risk mitigation activities.
Navy Theater (Upper) (not to exceed $80 million RDT&E)--to increase
risk reduction activities by increasing the number of pre-EMD flight
tests and ship and missile system engineering to support early entry
into EMD. Consistent with current program approach.
PATRIOT PAC-3 (($14.7 million) Although Army procurement is not
funded by BMDO, we are the BMD managers.
($10.5 million Weapons Procurement, Army) Additional
missile procurement funding. Addition to funds would restore eight
missiles to the production schedule, deferred to beyond the Future
Years Defense Program in order to solve an immediate fiscal year 1998)
$10.5 million RDT&E missile target underfunded requirement. Workaround
in place does not impact the publicized 4th quarter fiscal year 1999
First Unit Equipped (FUE), but does delay deployment of the second
PATRIOT PAC-3 battalion.
($4.2 million Weapons Procurement, Army) Radar kit
procurement funds. Additional funds would allow PATRIOT to restore one
radar kit, deleted following receipt of undistributed cuts in fiscal
year 1996, ensuring timely fielding of the second PATRIOT battalion.
Procurement of Missile Defense Systems
Mr. Young. The President's budget proposes to shift
procurement of missile defense systems to the services in
fiscal year 1998. Do you have any concern about this from your
vantage point at BMDO?
General Lyles. Mr. Chairman, again, in all honesty, we did
have some concerns. We understand the rationale for the
decision made back last December by Dr. Perry and the leaders
within the Pentagon. The decision primarily was in some
respects to try to provide additional ownership on the part of
the services relative to our missile defense systems and all
the other things that are trying to be done within the
Department of Defense.
In some respects, to use a vernacular that Dr. Kaminski, my
boss, likes to say, the services before him have had sort of a
free lunch, if you will. They can concentrate their service
budgets on planes, boats, trucks, et cetera, and not have to
worry about missile defense because they knew that was under
the purview of BMDO.
The decision was made to provide procurement ownership to
the services and in part to get their ownership and make some
tough decisions in the out years relative to whether or not
they need to provide money for missile defense systems or money
for other priorities within the services. The concern that
causes us obviously is, is there a chance that the services--as
an example, the Army or the Air Force or the Navy--may they
take some of the money that is planned for our missile defense
system and use it to buy trucks or airplanes or boats? So we do
have a concern that we have lost a little bit of control in
that regard.
I might mention, Mr. Chairman, that to help alleviate that
situation a little bit, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Dr.
White, sent a memo out shortly after that decision was made to
all the service chiefs and all the service secretaries to
reinforce the role and responsibilities of BMDO and indeed my
particular role as the acquisition executive for the missile
defense systems.
The bottom line of that memo was to tell them that our
charter responsibility to provide integrated capability has not
changed, and it also gave us the leeway to have at least a
voice all the way up to the Secretary of Defense if it turns
out that somebody does want to take some of our missile defense
money and use it for other things. That is not quite the same
as being totally in control, but it does provide us a little
bit of an out and at least gives us a voice up through the
Secretary of Defense if anybody does try to make a move of that
nature.
Mr. Young. You explained the position on that very well,
but now what do we gain by having the services deal with this
procurement as opposed to your office?
General Lyles. Again, Mr. Chairman, the only thing that I
think we really gain from that is a sense of ownership, if I
can use that terminology on the part of the services, that they
are going to have to make some tough choices. And, by the way,
we are looking at some of those in the Quadrennial Defense
Review right now. The services are agonizing over those, not
just because of missile defense programs, but they have to make
tough choices, sometimes between our vital need for missile
defense capabilities and some of the other needs that they have
within their service purview. So that sense of ownership is the
primary gain, and in all honesty the primary rationale for
making that decision.
Arrow Testing
Mr. Young. General, this Committee has always been very
excited about THAAD and supportive, but the news on that
program isn't all that good right now. Tell us about ARROW. We
understand that some of the ARROW testing is doing very well.
General Lyles. Sir, the ARROW program, which, as you know,
is a joint program that we are working jointly with the
Israelis. The ARROW program recently has been very successful.
They have had two intercept tests planned over the last 6
months, one last August and one last month. Both of those
intercept tests were very successful. There was a slight
anomaly I might mention for the last test, intercept test.
The warhead itself did not go off, but they had an actual
body-to-body intercept, so they did manage to kill the specific
target they were going after.
This is a joint program. We are working it cooperatively
with the Israelis. There is some sharing of technology relative
to ARROW. There are some capabilities like the focal plane
array that they use in the ARROW system, which is made of
materials similar to the focal plane array we will be using in
the THAAD. So we are gaining some information and knowledge
about some of the things that we will need and plan to have
within our own systems, missile defense systems. It is also
intended, obviously, that this be an interoperable program, so
whatever we do with the ARROW system, working with the
Israelis, we intend for it to be interoperable with our Patriot
system, eventually our THAAD system and our Navy systems. So we
are very happy that that program has been very successful.
But I am always very careful to point out that that system
is unique to the Israeli requirements. It does not meet our
requirements, so it is not something that we can look to and
point to their success and say we should consider bringing it
into our inventory. It does not meet our requirements at all.
Mr. Young. General, thank you very much. I have some
additional questions when I get a second chance. Now, I would
like to recognize Mr. Murtha.
Theater High Altitude Area Defense Testing
Mr. Murtha. General, what is the problem with THAAD
specifically?
General Lyles. Congressman Murtha, the problems we have had
on the intercepts have all been in the critical end game, as I
like to define it. We have had, unfortunately, a different
failure mechanism in each one of the four anomalies we have
had. The system in terms of the total system, the radar, the
battle management command and control, the rocket motor, all
seem to work very well. But when we have gotten to the critical
intercept, the ability to actually hit-to-kill the actual
target, in each case we have had a different failure mechanism
and it has been a different thing. We would repair or figure
out what it was in one test, we fix that, and the next test it
would be something else.
From my experience, what that brings to mind is a question
about systems engineering, a question about quality control on
the part of the contractor. Those are the kind of things we are
looking at very aggressively in this scrub we are doing.
Mr. Murtha. That is the impression I got. This was a
quality control, because there are things you didn't
anticipate. The areas that you anticipate you may have a
problem, you didn't have a problem.
General Lyles. None whatsoever, Mr. Congressman.
National Missile Defense Program
Mr. Murtha. So does that translate into being able to solve
the national ballistic missile defense problem, for instance? I
know you are early on, but four failures here, since this is
the centerpiece of your system, does that translate at all into
problems down the road in the bigger system?
General Lyles. Congressman Murtha, it doesn't translate
directly in terms of technical problems. What it does do,
however, is make us very, very conscious and be very careful,
as you know from all the experience you have had in DoD
programs, to ensure we have the best acquisition strategy, the
best test strategy, and a realistic schedule relative to our
programs.
Right now, the reason I stated about our National Missile
Defense Program being very high risk, is because we structured
it specifically because of the urgency of time in trying to do
the 3+3 element. We structured it with a minimum of tests. We
have structured it with a minimum of time. I think THAAD is a
perfect example of the old Murphy factor, if you will, that we
need to look very carefully as to how we have structured our
National Missile Defense Program and provided the kind of
assets and resources, including dollars, to provide back-up
spares in case we have a failure, those kind of things, so that
they don't provide a link-up to us.
Mr. Murtha. Are you saying that 2003 is at best an estimate
of when you can deploy the system?
General Lyles. Right now, Congressman Murtha, I would say
that is at best, yes. But once again, I am not hesitant in
saying that it is very high risk in our ability to do that.
That 2003 is based on absolutely everything being perfect,
working everything perfectly, no failure, no THAAD-like
anomalies.
My experience tells me that is probably not realistic, but
we laid it out that way because of the urgency.
Mr. Murtha. In fact, we have never had a system where we
went perfectly the whole way through I am familiar with. Maybe
there have been some, but I am not familiar with them.
General Lyles. None that I am familiar with, Congressman.
We have seen a lot of different programs, obviously, including
some of our black programs that have gone in a short time
frame. They have had a lot of anomalies, too, usually not well
known by people, but they have had anomalies.
Mr. Murtha. We appreciate the problem you are taking on,
because the district I represent lots more people in the Gulf
War than any other district because of the SCUD missile and the
fact that that missile happened to go through a slot that
wasn't protected by the missiles. I know there has been a lot
of controversy about it, but it looks like the PAC-3 and the
ERINT are coming along, and THAAD, it sounds like they are
controllable problems and we are going to get there in the end
with that system.
General Lyles. Congressman, I think that is a correct
statement. I might just mention for you and the Chairman and
the other committee members, we are within the next week or so
going to get the out briefing back to me of the detailed
analysis and scrub we have done on the THAAD program, looking
at all the requirements, looking at the issues, and looking at
where we go from here. I would be very, very happy to provide
that information back to you and your staff after that is
completed.
Mr. Murtha. I appreciate it. Thank you very much.
Mr. Young. Mr. Dicks.
Theater High Altitude Area Defense
Mr. Dicks. General, I am sorry I missed part of your
statement, but I, too, am concerned about the THAAD program.
Obviously, it is a great disappointment to have this fourth
consecutive failure. Can you tell us, maybe in a little more
detail what you think the problem is?
General Lyles. Congressman Dicks, for the most recent
failure, what happened is what we call the divert in attitude
control system, the sort of roll control, the vector control
system for the missile, failed to operate properly. We got an
initial signal, we think, from the guidance systems, from the
computers, to turn on that roll control, turn on those
thrusters on the system, but, for some reason, it failed to
operate.
Obviously, without roll control, without divert control,
even though we got within the basket of the actual intercept,
we actually have a photo that shows the target coming in and
the intercept missile all within the same frame, there was no
way we could divert to actually make the body-to-body
intercept. That was the most recent failure, and that is what
we are concentrating on there.
As I mentioned with Congressman Murtha, there has been a
different failure mechanism for each of the previous three
failures.
Mr. Dicks. That can be even more worrisome than if you had
the same problem. At least you can fix one. It sounds as if you
have some kind of a management problem here. We have had this
on other weapons systems. I can remember one of the cruise
missile problems, we continued to have, it was always something
different. I think finally we had to cancel it. Now, do you
believe in the technical viability of the current missile
design?
General Lyles. Congressman Dicks, I do believe in the
technical viability of that design. However, I want to qualify
and tell you that is one of the key questions I have asked this
independent team to look at and scrub very, very thoroughly.
Mr. Dicks. When is the independent team going to come back
and give its report?
General Lyles. They will be reporting back within the next
week or so to me and I will in turn be reporting to Dr.
Kaminski and eventually to the Secretary of Defense within the
very near future.
Mr. Dicks. Dr. Kaminski has suggested the THAAD program
will probably require some sort of restructuring. What does he
mean? Will the program be delayed further? What will be the
impact on resources? Or are we going to have to wait for this
independent group to get back before we can make a judgment?
General Lyles. It is definite in detail, Congressman Dicks.
We probably need to wait to see what the report is back to me
relative to the total program. I think what Dr. Kaminski was
referring to, and I wholeheartedly agree, we know just because
of the anomalies and failures that we have had in the last four
tests that we have not been able to meet our current
milestones.
We were hoping to have proceeded into the engineering, the
manufacturing and design phase for the program, to have
actually made the decision to go on contract for our UOES
capability, our User Operational Evaluation Systems capability.
We have not done that because a key milestone criteria, exit
criteria to allow us to do that, was an actual intercept. So
there has been a slip within the program.
What I am waiting for in terms of the details from the
review teams is what is the nature of the problem, what kind of
fixes do we have to do, and how does that translate to more
schedule concerns, if necessary.
Airborne Laser Program
Mr. Dicks. Can you tell me what you see as the primary role
of the airborne laser ABL system?
General Lyles. Yes, sir. The airborne laser system, as I
showed in one of my earlier charts, is an integral part of our
family of systems with theater missile defense. It provides
what I consider to be a very, very key air joint that we
absolutely must have in our capabilities, and that is to boost
phase intercept, to be able to intercept and kill theater
missile system while they are in the critical boost phase. This
adds several benefits.
One is that it destroys the target. Two it has a deterrence
element to it, particularly if you consider the possibility
that some of those threats may have weapons of mass destruction
in the warheads, chemical or biological or, God forbid, nuclear
warheads. The fact that we, if we have this capability and we
hold that threat over an adversary and he knows there is a high
probability that his systems could get shot down and fall down
in his territory, there is an element of deterrence there that
we think the boost phase intercept system can provide us. ABL
right now is our primary boost phase intercept program.
Mr. Dicks. What can you tell the committee about the status
and progress of the ABL program?
General Lyles. Sir, the ABL program proceeded as of last
November into its first phase. It is a program definition
phase, an early concept definition phase. As you are well
aware, the Air Force down-selected to a single contractor team,
to manage this particular effort. It involves Boeing, TRW, and
several other contractors who are working together to provide
the capability. I have great confidence that the program in
this new revolutionary technology is going to be very, very
successful. They are still in the early phase in that program
and leading up to some initial tests of the laser system
itself, design tests of the laser systems, and some surrogate
intercept tests they would do on the ground about this time
next year.
As far as everything I have seen in my latest review, the
program is on track and seems to be proceeding as successfully
as the Air Force and the contractors would hope it to.
THEATER HIGH ALTITUDE AREA DEFENSE
Mr. Dicks. Mr. Chairman, just a little indulgence. On going
back to THAAD now, is the contractor giving you the best effort
here to try to deal with this problem? Are you getting good
management attention on this?
General Lyles. Congressman Dicks, I can assure you we are.
Notwithstanding my earlier concern about quality control, I
can tell you that I have great confidence in Lockheed Martin
and their efforts to do the job. Norm Augustine, their CEO, and
I and his other people in the senior office have been not only
corresponding but talking very, very aggressively together and
working together to ensure that they understand our concerns
about their management attention and the right team to do the
job and looking at it with all the best talent they can muster
literally in the United States, not just Lockheed's talent, but
anybody that is necessary to address the issues associated with
THAAD.
I know I have the attention of Mr. Augustine. I know I have
the attention of the senior management within Lockheed Martin
headquarters here in Bethesda. I feel also we have the
attention of the people who are managing the effort in their
Sunnyvale plant out in California. I visited them to ensure
they understand our concerns and personally to look to ensure
they are putting the right attention to that.
Mr. Dicks. All right. One final thing. How about the cost
on this program? Is the cost staying within the bounds of what
you had anticipated or have there been escalations in the cost
of this program?
General Lyles. Congressman, there have been some
escalations, and we had a recent--what we call an over-target
baseline for the program, to increase the baseline--program
baseline--above what was originally approved or last approved--
within the last year.
Currently, however, we think we can do all of this and
manage these things within the current budget we have for
THAAD. It is above the baseline we established for the program
director and the program office; but we think that, right now,
we can operate currently within the current budget that we have
for the THAAD program.
Mr. Dicks. Is there any technical alternative? Is there any
other program that can do the high altitude piece of theater
missile defense?
General Lyles. No, sir, there is not, not to do that
particular part of the mission.
We, obviously, have two upper-tier programs. THAAD is one
for our ground systems, if you will. The Navy Upper Tier
program, which is far less mature, further along relative to
THAAD and anything else we have, the Navy Upper Tier will
provide us an additional Upper Tier program. Navy Theater Wide
is another name we call that. That program does not meet all
the requirements that we have for THAAD. It is a complimentary
program and is not intended to be a substitute for the THAAD
program.
Mr. Dicks. All I can say is when we cancel these things,
you have to start over, and it costs billions and billions of
dollars. My instinct is it is always better to try to fix a
system if you can and keep the program going.
General Lyles. Congressman Dicks, I can assure you I agree
with that wholeheartedly; and I am sure we can address the
question.
Mr. Young. Mr. Visclosky.
NAVY LOWER TIER
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, General.
General, I would like to talk to you about the Navy Lower
Tier program. My understanding is that the Navy has designated
from your testimony the USS Lake Erie and the USS Port Royal as
the cruisers to support the system, and that would be in the
year 2002. Do you think the Navy is fully committed to this
system and having it installed on those ships in the year 2002?
General Lyles. Congressman Visclosky, I think they are
absolutely committed to it; and I reaffirmed that in recent
months with the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), with the
Secretary of the Navy, in addition to the program office and my
own visits to actual operational units of Navy systems down at
Norfolk. They are fully committed to the program.
Mr. Visclosky. My understanding is in this year's budget
the Navy has not asked for any money for these two ships in
preparation for the installation of this system. When will we
see those monies in the Navy's request?
General Lyles. I have to take that for the record. I am not
sure when they actually need the dollars for that, but I will
provide that information for the record, Congressman.
[The information follows:]
Office of the Secretary of Defense--OSD Program Budget
Decision of December 1996 transferred BMDO TMD procurement
funds (SM2 Block IVA and AEGIS) to the Navy, specifically to
the Weapons Procurement, Navy (WPN) Standard Missile SM-2
(12FE) account. Recognizing a misalignment of funds, the Navy
set aside, within the PB98 WPN, Standard Missile SM-2 (12FE)
account, funds necessary to conduct the AEGIS TBMD
modifications. The Navy will realign these funds to Other
Procurement, Navy (OPN) during Off-Year POM to modify and equip
AEGIS ships for the TMD mission.
Mr. Visclosky. If the ships are not operational, what
impact would that have on the system? What would that do to our
cost?
General Lyles. As I understand it, those two specific ships
have been designated to have the initial capability for the
Navy Area system. As I know, the Navy is committed to ensuring
that that capability is there. They are working to ensure the
ships are prepared by that time period----
Mr. Visclosky. By the year 2002.
General Lyles. We are obviously working to ensure the
missile systems and the battle management command and control
are there also to support the integrated weapons system that we
need.
Mr. Visclosky. I am concerned about both parts. I am
particularly concerned because, again, my understanding of the
budget this year is there is no money in the Navy's budget to
begin any modifications of equipment of these ships, that there
is a coincidence of both being ready in the same year. If you
could comment on that for the record, I would appreciate that.
General Lyles. I would do that, Congressman. It was my
understanding one of the primary reasons there were no dollars
this year is because they didn't need to have those dollars
this year. I will go back and verify that.
Mr. Visclosky. That may very well be the case.
[The information follows:]
The two User Operational Evaluation System (UOES) AEGIS
cruisers, USS Lake Erie and USS Port Royal, will be configured
to support the UOES beginning in fiscal year 1998 with the
installation of the UOES computer program. At sea testing of
the UOES will commence in fiscal year 2000 as the first UOES
SM-2 Block IVA missiles are delivered. Equipment to support the
UOES installation aboard these two cruisers was procured with
BMDO procurement funds in fiscal years 1996 and 1997. This
procurement supports a fiscal year 1998 fielding of the AEGIS
TBMD UOES computer program. The Navy Area program is currently
scheduled to achieve First Unit Equipped (FUE) in fiscal year
2002.
ARROW FUNDING
Mr. Visclosky. On the ARROW program, it is my understanding
the administration recently announced that they would provide
additional funding for the program. Do you know what that
amount of money is?
General Lyles. Yes, sir. We, as a result of a meeting a
couple of weeks ago with Minister of Defense Mordechai and the
Secretary of Defense, Secretary Cohen, an agreement was made we
would look to see ways we could help them with the ARROW system
and help the Israelis, who would like to provide additional
capabilities for their forces, additional ARROW capabilities
for their forces.
We have an agreement, however, that we are not responsible
for nor are we going to procure additional ARROW systems for
them, ARROW missiles. Our responsibility is to help them
develop the system and specifically to ensure we have an
interoperable capability.
We have--in this recent agreement, we have reached an
accord where we think that we can provide an additional $48
million over the next four years and use that money to offset
some of the interoperability needs of the ARROW program and
allow the Israelis to take some of their development money and
align it to their procurement needs for their additional
systems.
So what we are going to use that money for is to support
what we are chartered to do--to help do, and that is work the
issue of interoperability and development. We are not using the
money to buy systems for them. That would violate our agreement
with the Israelis. It is $48 million over the next four years.
Mr. Visclosky. So we are in it for the development
knowledge and not the procurement?
General Lyles. Yes, sir.
Mr. Visclosky. The range, as far as procurement, was
anywhere from $2 to 10 billion, as I understand it. Is there a
narrower figure or range now? For the ARROW system?
General Lyles. I have to provide that for the record in
terms of where we are today.
The only reason I am hesitating on that is because of the
current desire on the part of the Israeli defense system to
procure an additional battery, additional missiles, over and
above, beyond what we were originally working towards even a
few months ago. So that number has changed a little bit, and I
need to verify that, and I will provide that for the record.
[The information follows:]
The cost estimate of Arrow at program inception in 1994 of
approximately $1.2 billion remains valid today. Phase I (Arrow
I) of the program cost $158 million, Phase II (Arrow II) costs
$330 million, and Phase III (Arrow Deployability Program) costs
$556 million. These costs do not include $42 million in
infrastructure costs and $252 million for Arrow Weapons System
components (Radar, Launcher, Fire Control) both of which were
funded entirely by the Israelis.
Mr. Visclosky. We are not obligated for any of the
production costs?
General Lyles. That is not our responsibility, to worry
about the production costs.
Mr. Visclosky. If this program was in your budget, would
you give it more money?
General Lyles. In terms of our agreement, I have sort of
answered that question in part by our R&D area. In terms of
working research and development, working interoperability,
this additional $48 million, I and my people in my organization
agreed that was a fair sum to consider adding to the ARROW
program. Anything beyond that--anything beyond that $48 million
or anything that even smacks of production is not our
responsibility, and we would not fund that at all.
Mr. Visclosky. General, thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
MEDIUM EXTENDED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM (MEADS)
Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Visclosky.
General, I would like to ask you about MEADS. This started
out as a U.S. program and because of the expense we went into a
multinational, basically a NATO program. Now France has dropped
out, which I expect will increase our share of the cost. I
would like for you to tell us why France dropped out and also
why we need to do MEADS at all?
General Lyles. Congressman, as I understand it, the French
dropped out primarily because of budget considerations of their
own, their own internal needs. We have restructured the program
between us and our two allies, Germany and Italy, the two
cooperative partners, in terms of their and our share of the
program, both the dollars and potential work share for the
future.
MEADS is a vital program, just like the original Corps Sam
that you alluded to, because of the specific requirement to
provide maneuver force protection for our troops and our
assets. We do not have that in the sense that we really need it
with today's Patriot system or even the THAAD system. They do
not have the maneuver capability that we really need.
They also provide defense against multiple and simultaneous
attacks of both short- and medium-range ballistic missiles,
cruise missiles and air breathing threats. So there is a wide
compendium of capability that we will get with the MEAD system
we don't have today, particularly in the aggregate of all those
potential threats. We don't have those today with THAAD and
with the Patriot system. Maneuver force and cruise missile
defense, air breathing defense, multiple engagement defense
capability is a primary requirement for MEADS.
Mr. Young. The budget request for 1998 is $48 million.
Where will that take us?
General Lyles. That $48 million, plus I think an additional
$9 million in fiscal year 1999, are essentially going to take
us through the program definition phase for MEADS. It will
allow us to, in working with our partners, working with the two
international contractor teams that have been established to
define the concepts, the valid concepts for a MEAD system, to
try to down-select, if you will, to the appropriate concept for
the design for the MEAD system, and that is as far as it will
go.
The obvious question is, what do we do from there and how
do we proceed on? I think probably the best way to answer that
is to tell you that this is a very, very tough decision that is
currently being addressed in the Quadrennial Defense Review.
Even as late as last night, that issue was being discussed
within QDR; and sometime within the next week or two we are
going to present options to the Secretary of Defense and make a
decision from there what is going to happen with the MEAD
program.
QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW (QDR)
Mr. Young. The Secretary of Defense has been complaining
that the QDR has not been quite as aggressively approached as
he would like it to be. Are we getting near the end of the QDR
process?
General Lyles. As I understand it, Congressman Young, the
Secretary has mandated and he is going to report to Congress on
time; and I think you can see that with the scurry of activity
that is happening within the building and all the QDR meetings
that are taking place.
The ones I have been involved in recently, particularly as
late as yesterday at the senior steering group level with the
deputy secretary and the vice chiefs of the various services
and the vice chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, there are
some very, very tough issues and alternatives and very, very
tough decisions that are being laid out. And everything I saw
showed it is being done very aggressively, but there are no
easy answers there as to how we are going to address some of
our needs.
HELSINKI AGREEMENT
Mr. Young. General, Mr. Livingston at the beginning of our
session this afternoon asked you about the Helsinki agreement.
You and I had discussed this previously, and I wanted to have
you answer for the record your role in reaching the actual
agreements and the wording in the Helsinki agreement. Because
we have come upon a few instances where the actual user, the
commander that was involved in a particular issue, was not
consulted when certain decisions were made.
Were you consulted and were you part of the decision making
as to the Helsinki agreement?
General Lyles. Congressman, it would be probably unfair to
say we are part of the decision making; but we definitely were
part of the consultation process. Let me explain exactly what
took place.
Literally over the last year, even before I came on board
and certainly as I have seen it since the end of August, the
activities that have taken place, all the previous--the
preliminary discussions with the Russians prior to the Helsinki
agreement for the most part had been done through the Standing
Consultive Committee and some other bodies, primarily in
Geneva. And for each one of those sessions we did have a
technical representative from BMDO who was part of the
consultation body and part of the advisory body to the United
States representatives at that particular forum.
Each time there was a meeting, a senior level meeting
involving senior leadership from the Pentagon, be they Office
of the Secretary of Defense, OSD, civilians or military people
from the joint staff, each time prior to one of those meetings
I was consulted, my senior staff and I were consulted, and our
issues, our concerns were provided to those who were
representing the United States. And our views--clearly our
views and the views as we understood it from the warfighters,
from the CINCs were clearly presented to them so that they
could proceed with caution in all of the discussions.
I admit I consider my view to be sort of a minority one
relative to the bigger view that was provided to each one of
those forums, and that is the view of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili, in short. Prior to each
one of those meetings, one key mandate was there, and that was
we do nothing to impact the ability to protect our forces for
the future.
So from the position of consultation, we were an integral
part of the activities, both prior to the meetings, as people
prepared for them here, and even at the meetings with our
technical representatives there. It would be unfair to say we
were part of the decision-making process; but I feel very, very
comfortable that we did have a say-so as far as consultation.
Mr. Young. Well, let's jump over the decision part and go
to the end product. Do you feel that the end product reflected
to a large extent or a small extent the views of your
technicians and your consultants that were involved or
consulted?
General Lyles. For the most part, Mr. Chairman, I think
that was the case.
Obviously, we are still looking at questions relative to
future systems, particularly the words in the agreement that
talk about theater missile defense by other physical properties
other than OPP, as they refer to it, space-based primarily, to
ensure that what we think that means--and when I say we, not
just BMDO but our representatives for the United States and the
Russians are exactly the same thing.
But as far as the other issues, the demarcation limits, the
limits on the types of speed and range for the targets, our
concerns were aired properly there and our issues were
represented relative to the final statement.
ACQUISITION PROCESS
Mr. Young. General, thank you very much.
Now the easiest question that I have for you. We have
talked with you about acquisition reform, and you have a very
strong record in acquisition reform. Tell us some things that
you think ought to be done or at least considered in the area
of reforming the acquisition process.
General Lyles. Mr. Chairman, as we mentioned just briefly
yesterday, we are trying to do as much as we can to embrace
acquisition reform in all of our programs. I think as I look at
it back in my experience with other programs, one of the key
things we want to ensure that we do is to, as much as possible,
give free rein to our program directors to make decisions
without being encumbered with lots of layers of somebody
checking or double-checking what he is trying to do.
A key way of trying to address that is to ensure that we
work as integrated teams. So integrated product teams, IPTs as
we refer to it in the vernacular, is the way we are trying to
manage all of our programs.
What we like to do is bring all of the stakeholders
together and help them to help us make decisions and
recommendations for our programs so we don't have somebody
second-guessing or, worse, still coming in at the last minute
and disagreeing with a decision in terms of how we acquire a
program, our strategy for a program, our contract strategy or
any decision that we might make.
General Cosumano behind me, General Dan Montgomery over on
my left behind me, are also working as part of their activities
in both the national missile arena and the theater missile
arena to ensure we use Integrated Product Teams to manage each
one of our efforts. That is a major, major breakthrough I think
in terms of the way we manage programs; and it really provides
streamlining in terms of decision making and coming to the
right conclusion as to what we want to do.
The other thing I think we are trying to ensure we do is to
minimize the paperwork in the bureaucracy associated with each
one of our programs. We are trying to manage each one of our
efforts very, very aggressively to use electronic means for
communicating information, to use the minimum amount of
documentation.
You may be familiar with the term we call the Systems
Acquisition Management Plan, SAMP, a document only about 2 or 3
inches thick, to define what it is we are trying to do with our
program as opposed to the reams and reams and literally table
full of documentation that our program officers have had to
provide in the past to define our programs. We are using that
mechanism to streamline not only in time but in dollars what it
is we are trying to do, and that is another thing that we are
embracing totally.
I might mention for our national missile defense program
one key area of acquisition reform that I think is really sort
of a breakthrough is one we have used successfully in other
programs, and that is to go as much as we possibly can to an
electronic means of communication. It is a paperless
environment as much as we can possibly embrace it.
The request for the proposal that we have for bringing in a
prime contractor for NMD was sent out electronically to
industry. All the updates to that request for proposal were
done electronically with industry; and industry, in turn,
provided us their proposals that we are currently evaluating
through electronic means. There are no big documents, no big
mailings of paper that they had to submit to us. All of this
was done electronically.
We are also doing the evaluation of the proposal in an
electronic mechanism, and we will eventually make a
determination and decision on that program through electronic
means so we can give quick feedback to industry as to what we
are trying to do.
There are lots of other things like that, Mr. Chairman,
that we are trying to do.
Perhaps to better answer your question, what I would like
to offer to you is the opportunity to come back to talk to you
or any one of the Committee Members and tell you specifically
how acquisition reform is being applied to each one of our
programs and then, more importantly, what I think the payoff is
going to be for each one of those examples.
Mr. Young. Well, General, thank you very much for that
offer. We will take you up on that, because we are extremely
concerned and interested in acquisition reform and getting more
for the dollar as the dollar continues to shrink and the budget
requests seem to get smaller and smaller.
Thank you very much, General.
Mr. Murtha.
DEMARCATION LIMITS
Mr. Murtha. Let me ask you, is the demarcation agreement
between tactical and strategic weapons in the Helsinki Accord
under development in any of the six TMD systems currently under
way?
General Lyles. Congressman, none of the six systems we
currently have under way are impacted by that. They all fit
very well within the Helsinki agreement.
Mr. Murtha. Does it hinder in any way your ability to
develop theater systems to protect our troops?
General Lyles. Currently, no, sir. It does not hinder our
ability to do that.
Mr. Murtha. Thank you.
Mr. Young. Mr. Dicks.
Mr. Dicks. Was it not a fact, as I recall--and I can speak
directly on this. Wasn't there a bill that Congress passed, the
defense authorization bill in fiscal year 1995, that codified
the 5 kilometers a second or 3,500-kilometer range?
General Lyles. I think that was the case, Congressman
Dicks.
Mr. Dicks. So all the administration basically did was
agree to something the Congress had already enacted into law?
General Lyles. Well, that is one of the key reasons why we
are not currently impacted with our current programs. I am not
exactly sure what was in the law for the 1995 act relative to
the demarcation limits, but we have been talking about the 5
kilometer per second speed of a target and 3,500-nautical-mile
range for some time, and we felt very, very comfortable with
that agreement would not impact any of our current programs.
Mr. Dicks. Is it true that nothing was limited in terms of
space-based systems that isn't already part of the ABM
agreement?
General Lyles. Congressman Dicks, I think that is the one
area that we have a little bit of a concern about. The
statement relative to space-based theater missile defense
systems or directed energy systems is one that could impact--
and we are trying to verify this--could impact our current
space-based laser program.
We think the current interpretation of the Helsinki
agreement, that is, we can still do a space-based laser program
as long as it is couched in the area of research and SBL. And
we are not trying to deploy a limited capability. We think our
current space-based laser program can still proceed.
However, I am in the process of defining exactly what it is
we need to do in space-based laser, run that by Secretary
Cohen, get his concurrence on that, so we can make sure we
aren't doing anything that violates the agreement.
Mr. Dicks. Would the airborne laser have a similar problem?
General Lyles. No, sir. One of the key things--going back
to answer an earlier question from the Chairman, one of the key
things that we were very careful about relative to the
discussions at Helsinki was to ensure that nothing was in the
language that would impact the airborne laser.
There were some discussions, to be honest with you, of some
words that could have impacted ABL. They were taken off the
table thanks to the people who listened to our concerns, and
airborne laser is not impacted by the Helsinki agreement.
Mr. Dicks. So you are saying--and do you think it is
compliant with the ABM agreement?
General Lyles. I did not say that. I mentioned the Helsinki
agreement. We still have to go through the formal process. I
say we--I mean the Air Force, working with us at BMDO, have to
go through the formal process of the compliance review group
assessment of ABL, when it is ready to go through that. We
still have to do that to get formal compliance certification.
But nothing happened relative to the Helsinki agreements that
would impact the current ABL program.
Mr. Dicks. And nothing happened there on national missile
defense either?
General Lyles. No, sir. They specifically were looking at
theater missile systems, so nothing happened relative to NMD
programs.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Visclosky.
Mr. Visclosky. No further questions, thank you.
COOPERATIVE ENGAGEMENT CAPABILITY
Mr. Young. General, let me ask you just a few more
questions on the Navy Lower Tier. We are being asked to approve
a multiyear procurement for the DDG 51s. Most of us are
concerned, I think all of us are concerned, with the fact that
this budget does not provide funding for any missile defense,
theater missile defense on those ships. Cooperative engagement
capability, or CEC, which has been a big item with this
committee, is not going to be on any of those ships.
Given that it takes three to five years in construction
time to build a ship, the earliest that the Navy could field
theater ballistic missile defense is 2005. I am wondering why
BMDO--why did you state that Navy Lower Tier will be deployed
in 2002? There seems to be a difference of opinion on the dates
here by three years.
General Lyles. Congressman Young, Mr. Chairman, we and the
Navy are still dedicated to providing that capability by the
year 2002. I would like to take for the record and provide some
specific answers as to why the Navy doesn't reflect that kind
of money for CEC and the ship improvement in their current
multiyear.
[The information follows:]
The Navy Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD)
program will add TBMD capability to the AEGIS computer program
under development by the Navy. This Navy-developed computer
program, AEGIS Baseline 6 Phase I, includes Cooperative
Engagement Capability (CEC). The TBMD Tactical computer program
(AEGIS Baseline 6 Phase 1T) is scheduled for delivery in Fiscal
Year 2000 and will be retrofitted to previously built AEGIS CGs
and DDGs and will be forward fitted to DDGs as they are being
built.
Because the Department decision to transfer all procurement
funds to the Services starting in Fiscal Year 1998 was made
relatively late in the budget submission process, all Navy TBMD
procurement funds, including AEGIS TMD upgrade funds, were
placed in the Standard Missile procurement line (Project 12FE,
Flight Hardware--SM AEGIS improvement, totaling over $360
million between Fiscal Year 1998 and Fiscal Year 2003). During
this Summer's budget cycle, the procurement funds will be
realigned from Standard Missile to the appropriate AEGIS TMD
Weapon system procurement line, as specified in the Cost
Analysis Requirements Description (CARD). The CARD identifies
DDG AEGIS Weapon System acquisitions beginning in Fiscal Year
2000 (for installation if Fiscal Year 2003), and AEGIS cruiser
TMD retrofit schedules beginning in Fiscal Year 1998 (for
installation in Fiscal Year 2000).
General Lyles. As far as I know, as I answered Congressman
Visclosky, the Navy is fully dedicated to not only providing
the Navy Lower Tier and Navy Area Defense capabilities but also
getting CEC in as many of their ships as possible. What that
tells me is, at least for this next fiscal year, they didn't
think that the money was necessary, but I will go back and
verify that and find out exactly how this is being handled.
Mr. Young. I would appreciate that.
We have been asking this question of a lot of witnesses.
Does it make sense to build the ships without the ability to
defend themselves or be part of the theater missile defense
program? So we would appreciate your answer.
I want to thank you very much for the dynamic way you have
responded to our questions.
Mr. Murtha.
Mr. Murtha. Isn't CEC absolutely essential to the
deployment of these ship self-defense systems?
General Lyles. I wouldn't say it is absolutely essential.
It does provide you an enhanced capability, because you can net
information from one ship to another. You can provide advanced
sensor information. You can provide fire control information.
It is not absolutely essential, the way you stated it. The
ships can be autonomous, but you get a greatly enhanced
capability. You get a greatly force multiplier capability with
something like CEC, and that is why the Navy is very much
interested in it, and we are very interested in assuring we
have CEC-like capability for our ground systems and eventually
for any air systems like ABL, connectivity for that.
SHIP SELF DEFENSE
Mr. Murtha. As the Chairman pointed out, we have had a
terrible problem with the Navy. For instance, five or six years
ago, we put money into--at the suggestion of one of the staff,
because the fleet was saying we don't have good self-defense
for individual ships. So we put money in. They resisted it,
reprogrammed it. Finally, they said, it is now a priority. Then
they don't put the money in again.
I can't understand with the incidents we have had with low-
flying cruise missiles that the Navy is having such a problem
getting this through their head or we have had such a problem
convincing them this is something that needs to be done. I know
once they get it developed they will take full credit and say
they developed this whole system and this is all our idea and
we were way ahead of everybody else, as they have done in many
other systems that this Committee has suggested to them.
I wish you would take a look at that and let us know what
you think of their spending pattern.
General Lyles. Congressman Murtha and Mr. Chairman, I am a
little bit embarrassed, because I thought for sure that that
capability was something that the Navy was fully embracing. You
and Congressman Visclosky have raised something I was not aware
of, and I feel so bound to make sure that we get an answer. I
would like to bring Admiral Rod Rempt, who is the Navy Theater
Missile Defense Program Executive Officer, with me and come
back literally in the next week or two and give you an answer
to that.
Mr. Murtha. Well, if the Navy comptroller is still there
when we get done with the bill, then you might bring the
comptroller up also.
General Lyles. I will ask him to join me, yes, sir.
Mr. Young. Incidentally, we have asked the Secretary of
Defense, the Secretary of the Navy and the Chiefs on that same
issue, so if you can bring the comptroller, that might help.
Maybe he will get us an answer.
General Lyles. Yes, sir. I will do that.
Mr. Young. Mr. Dicks.
Mr. Dicks. No further questions.
Mr. Visclosky. One follow-up on the Chairman's remarks on
the three to five discrepancy. The USS Lake Erie and USS Port
Royal are, I assume, existing ships.
General Lyles. Yes, sir.
Mr. Visclosky. That may be part of the differential. I do
think it would be important for you to follow-up with the
Committee.
General Lyles. I just got an update from my deputy, Admiral
West behind me. It mentions the initial capability is upgrades
to current ships and initially those two specific cruisers.
I think, again, that is the rationale as to why they didn't
feel that a lot of money needed to go into that particular
effort. These are upgrades. I failed to mention that earlier.
It is not like we are building ships from scratch in order to
provide this capability.
Mr. Visclosky. I would still have a concern.
General Lyles. Yes, sir, I agree. I am very anxious to get
the answer and very anxious to bring it back to you.
Mr. Young. General, thank you very much for a really
outstanding hearing. We appreciate the way you have responded
to our questions. We look forward to working with you on the
issues we agreed to follow up on.
If there is nothing further, the Committee will stand
adjourned.
General Lyles. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Skeen and the
answers thereto follow:]
Over Land Testing
Question. General Lyles, we've had several discussions about the
THAAD missile testing program today, and I appreciate your comments on
the future of this important program.
One of my major concerns is that the program to date has justified
the need for over-land missile testing. We've had four failures of the
THAAD to date, but because the tests were conducted over land, we've
been able to find the missile after each test, do an autopsy, and make
a conclusive finding as to the reasons for each test failure, and
provide this information to Congress, the Department of Defense and the
program managers.
Would you comment on the need for continued over-land testing of
BMDO missile programs and your experiences at the White Sands Missile
Range?
Answer. As noted in your question, our experience with THAAD has
benefited from our ability to recover test hardware in support of post-
flight failure investigation. THAAD will continue its Program
Definition and Risk Reduction (PD&RR) flight testing at WSMR;
currently, 6 flight tests remain. The choice of where to conduct a
system's test program, however, is directly related to its stage of
development, level of design maturity, and the specific test
objectives. In the case of THAAD, the goal of PD&RR is to resolve key
system integration and technology issues, which will allow the program
to then move into the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD)
phase. While WSMR has proven adequate for THAAD to work out these
technical issues during PD&RR, our flight test scenarios have been
constrained by WSMR's boundaries. During EMD, the more mature system
design will require target trajectories more representative of the full
range of threats the system will face when fielded. This is true for
not only for THAAD, but for our other missile defense systems that must
engage the longer range targets. Overland ranges limit our ability to
engage long range targets--we simply lack protected real estate of
sufficient are to safely launch these targets, drop their boosters,
fire interceptors to engage them, and contain the debris within
restricted boundaries.
Space Based Laser (SBL)
Question. Would you please update us on the status of the Space
Based Laser Program and your plans for the future of this program?
Answer. The Space Based Laser (SBL) technology program has
demonstrated key laser system components, including the laser, the
large lightweight optics, beam control, tracking and pointing, and
structural isolation. These components have shown performance close to
what is needed for a demonstration/ validation flight experiment. With
the recent alpha Lamp Integration high-power test, we have increased
our confidence that these components will work together in the presence
of megawatt-class laser radiation.
The approved SBL program, which is funded at $30 million per year
in fiscal year 98 and the Future Years Defense Program, is still a
technology development program.
Question. Is the Air Force going to become a partner in this
program?
Answer. Because of increased Congressional interest, and Air Force
interest in this program, I am considering transferring the SBL
Readiness Demonstrator (SBLRD) program execution to the Air Force while
maintaining overall Directed Energy Program management and funding
authority here in the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization.
Question. We've been hearing a lot lately about a Spaced Based
Laser demonstrator. Would you please tell the Committee your plans for
a demonstrator?
Answer. The SBL Technology Readiness Demonstrator, currently in
concept design, would test in space the components required for an
operational missile defense platform but at reduced scale. Successful
completion of this readiness demonstration would establish the
feasibility of this approach to defending against hostile ballistic
missiles during their boosting phase.
I recently appointed an Independent Review Team, chaired by retired
General Larry Welch, to review the SBL technology readiness to support
a research and development proof-of-concept flight and to recommend a
program among several options presented to his team. In their report,
they observed that the technology is mature enough to support an SBL
sub-scale flight experiment with medium risk by 2005. This would be an
important step in demonstrating the feasibility of Space-Based Lasers
as an option for future defense against ballistic missiles.
The next step is to investigate and document the cost, technical
feasibility, and treaty compliance of completing an integrated ground
demonstration and a flight demonstration, and present program options
for prioritization in the fiscal year 00 Program Objectives Memorandum.
[Clerk's note. End of questions submitted by Mr. Skeen.
Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the answers thereto
follow:]
Fiscal Year 1998 Budget Request
Question. The Administration's 1998 budget request is $2.9 million.
This is almost $700 million less than the 1997 appropriation of $3.6
billion. The budget also proposes to fund all BMD procurement within
Service accounts, not under the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
(BMDO). General Lyles, the 1998 budget request is significantly less
than the 1997 appropriation. Does the budget contain a sufficient level
of funding to continue to develop and deploy the core Theater Ballistic
Missile Defense programs?
Answer. a. Yes--the fiscal year 1998 budget for Ballistic Missile
Defense does contain a sufficient level of funding to continue to
develop and deploy the core Theater Ballistic Missile Defense programs.
FY97 AND FY98 PLUS-UP COMPARISON
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY97 in FY97 FY98 in FY98 in
FY97 PB Appn FY97 PB FY98 PB
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BMDO managed programs:
PROCUREMENT
THAAD System................ 0.0 0.0 0.0 \1\0.0
HAWK........................ 19.4 19.4 0.0 \1\0.0
TMD-BMC3.................... 19.3 19.3 20.2 \1\20.1
PAC3........................ 215.4 215.4 361.4 \1\349.1
Navy Area Wide.............. 9.2 9.2 15.5 \1\15.4
---------------------------------------
Total Procurement....... 263.2 263.2 397.1 384.6
RDT&E:
Support Tech................ 226.3 366.3 244.1 249.5
THAAD System................ 481.8 621.8 481.5 556.1
Navy Theater Wide........... 58.2 304.2 96.2 194.9
CORPS SAM/MEADS............. 56.2 30.0 48.1 48.0
BPI-DEM/VAL................. 0.0 24.3 0.0 12.9
NMD......................... 508.4 833.4 511.5 504.1
Joint TMD................... 520.1 525.5 557.0 542.6
PAC3-EMD.................... 381.5 381.5 195.3 206.1
Navy Area Wide.............. 301.6 301.6 268.5 267.8
---------------------------------------
Total RDT&E............. 2,534.2 3,388.7 2,402.2 2,582.0
MILCON:
NMD......................... 0 0 0.0 0.5
Joint TMD................... 1.4 1.4 2.0 2.0
THAAD System................ 0 0 4.6 4.6
---------------------------------------
Total MILCON............ 1.4 1.4 6.6 7.1
Total BMDO Program.. 2,798.8 3,651.8 2,805.9 2,973.7
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Procurement Funding has been transferred to the services.
These figures are displayed here for information only.
Question. Do you have any unfunded requirements in theater missile
defense?
Answer. The fiscal year 1998 President's budget could be augmented
with the following prioritized list. Funding the items on this list
will minimized outyear tails and assist in solving immediate pressures.
First priority goes to risk reduction programs for the Major Defense
Acquisition Programs (MDAPs); second, joint interoperability risk
reduction issues with MDAP enhancements, third improvements to our
Advance Technology base, and finally, procurement of weapon systems not
funded by BMDO.
Navy Area Defense (Lower Tier) ($44 million RDT&E)--for risk
mitigation efforts associated with EMD testing that were not in the
previous program baseline.
($35 million)--for upgrades to the Pacific Missile Range
Facility (PMRF) to meet Congressionally mandated use of PMRF and
Multiple Simultaneous Engagement (MSE) testing. Funding would avoid
offsets from other ballistic missile defense activities.
($9 million)--for targets, target support and range
support due to new equipment for UOES characterization testing.
Joint Theater Missile Defense (JTMD) ($92 million RDT&E)
($50 million)--to ensure sufficient fiscal year 1998
Family Of Systems (FoS) testing and activities for joint
interoperability testing, system exerciser simulations, hardware-in-
the-loop, CINC exercises, and system integration tests (SITs). MDAPs
have been accelerated, but JTMD has not received any additional TOA for
interoperability support in step with program schedules. Outyear
funding for JTMD through fiscal year 03 in the areas of PMRF, FoS
Strategic Targets (STARS) and MEADS will be addressed in the POM
update.
($22 million)--to make an investment in definition and
development of joint attack operations. The required investment is
comprised of four major activities: (1) perform field tests, exercises,
and training that focus on Attack Operations, (2) develop a joint
attack operations operational requirements document, (3) formulate an
integrated investment strategy, and (4) define the payoff to other
mission areas from investments/improved performance in Attack
Operations.
($10 million)--JTAMDO. accelerate system engineering and
modeling and simulation and complete the Technical Requirements
Document.
($10 million)--Israeli Cooperative Projects--to foster
system interoperability between Israeli Arrow system and US TMD
systems.
PATRIOT ($15 million RDT&E Defense-Wide)--additional funding would
support unanticipated range and hardware funding requirements needed
during the ongoing Engineering and Manufacturing Development flight
test program without changing the number of flight tests or reducing
other risk mitigation activities.
Navy Theater (Upper) (not to exceed $70 million RDT&E)--to increase
risk reduction activities by increasing the number of pre-EMD flight
tests and ship and missile system engineering to support early entry
into EMD. Consistent with current program approach.
Question. Is the funding in the budget sufficient to continue to
develop and deploy the National Missile Defense (NMD) program?
Answer. No. As part of the acquisition review process, the
Department has revised its estimates of the costs for the current 3
plus 3 program. We now estimate that another $2.3 billion will be
required across the Fiscal Year 1998 through 2003 Future Years Defense
Program (FYDP) to maintain the currently defined program and schedule.
The Department established during the Quadrennial Defense Review that
the program cannot meet the 3 plus 3 schedule with currently programmed
funds.
The Department felt the funding programmed for the 3 plus 3 NMD
program was adequate at the time the Fiscal Year 1998 President's
Budget was prepared and submitted to Congress. But during the past year
NMD program maturity was increasing as a result of DoD--and
Congressional--focus, review, and definition. Before accurate or even
reasonable cost estimates can be defined for the NMD system, we must
define what ``it'' is.
Early last year the Department designated the NMD program a major
defense acquisition program. While the NMD technologies continue to
mature, the NMD program itself is still composed of multiple concepts
common to early acquisition programs. Thus, the requirements, designs
and resulting cost estimates to date have been, of necessity, coarse.
All of these estimates will be refined as the program proceeds through
the acquisition process.
During the definition period, the warfighting community prepares
and submits mission needs statements and capstone operational
requirements documents. In August 1996, the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC) approved a National Missile Defense Capstone
Requirements Document (CRD) specifying the preliminary operational
requirements that the NMD system would need to meet. On March 10, 1997,
the JROC validated the Key Performance Parameters of Joint Operational
Requirements Document (ORD).
The NMD program has undergone a formal review process, called the
Systems Requirements Review (SRR). This process began last August and
concluded on April 4, 1997. This greatly increased our understanding of
the NMD system's requirements, as well as its projected cost, schedule
and performance. This activity ensures we inject realism and rigor into
both the planning and execution of the NMD program. When the SRR
concluded--in the middle of the QDR process--the final result was a set
of NMD System and Element requirements and a baseline architecture that
would meet all the NMD Capstone Requirements Document objectives,
namely protecting all 50 states against a small number of
unsophisticated ballistic missile threats.
The NMD development program is at an early stage of program
maturity. This has led to a situation in which our previous cost
estimates were based on rough order of magnitude costs, grounded in
parametrics, lab tests, and simulations. The Department's cost
estimating process was further complicated by delays in forming the NMD
Joint Program Office--which limited the number of people who could help
manage these issues--and in the awarding of the Lead System Integrator
contract.
The recent completion of the Systems Requirements Review will lead
to increasing system definition and stability in cost estimates. Our
systems engineering and cost analyses provide us a better understanding
of the RDT&E funding required to develop an NMD system on a highly
compressed schedule.
Question. Do you have any unfunded requirements in National Missile
Defense?
Answer. Based on the NMD life-cycle cost estimate supporting the
QDR process, the NMD program will require an additional $474 million in
fiscal year 98 RDT&E funds to execute the 3 plus 3 schedule and
program. These additional resources would be roughly spent on:
Program shortfalls ($100 million). Delays and hardware
(additional target) associated with Integrated Flight Test 1 failure;
delays in transferring the THAAD dem/val radar to the GBR-P; BMC3
development as a result of contract negotiations; EKV communications
development as a result of contractor estimates; and radar
discrimination algorithms.
Previously deferred program content ($85 million). EKV
telemetry unit development; EKV hardness and lethality testing; and
Forward-based X-band Radar and UWER development under the LSI
contractor.
Cost Risk Reduction ($74 million). Additional funding to
all elements (in line with established cost estimates) to allow for
development/test unknowns without sacrificing program content.
Schedule risk reduction ($110 million). Accelerate
procurement of and add hardware (such as targets and boosters) to
mitigate test delays or failures (most items are lead-time away and
still unavailable until fiscal year 99 timeframe); accelerate Hardware-
in-the-loop model and hardware procurements; and improve test launch
capabilities.
Technical risk reduction ($105 million). Increase Systems
Engineering to include development of high fidelity system simulator
for performance verification; continued EKV competition through first
intercept flights; long-lead procurement of hardware for added test
flights beginning in fiscal year 00; and explore alternative
technologies, such as radar transit/receive modules, to maintain
program flexibility and to reduce procurement costs.
Question. The budget proposes to shift procurement of missile
defense systems to the Services in 1998. Do you have any concerns about
this? Will you continue to have adequate management control over these
systems once the funds have been transferred?
Answer. In February memorandum to Department's senior leadership,
Deputy Secretary of Defense White affirmed BMDO's role as central
planner, manager, and integrator for the BMD mission, and in
particular, the role of the Director of BMDO as the BMD Acquisition
Executive (BMDAE). As such, the Director will continue to serve on the
Defense Resources Board (DRB) when BMD programs and issues are
discussed and, thereby, will be able to influence the allocation of
funds to programs and DoD components. As the BMDAE, the Director will
have the opportunity to concur or non-concur with Service funding
proposals that impact BMD programs. Third, the DoD Comptroller will
provide BMDO the opportunity to review any transfer proposed by a
Service. Should BMDO and the Service be unable to reach an agreement,
the issue will be evaluated to the DRB level where the Director will
work with the Service and the Department's senior leadership to ensure
BMD programs are appropriately funded.
However, despite these three venues for managing BMD procurement
funding, there remain significant challenges to doing so.
First, BMDO will not be able to affect BMD procurement funding
directly. New procedures for BMDO to influence BMD procurement funding
levels, on a program-by-program basis will have to be established.
These could prove to be cumbersome and less efficient.
Second, it is inevitable that the Military Services will attempt to
budget for BMD programs in the context of total Service requirements.
To the extent that BMD programs are not a Service's top priority, there
could be attempts to move BMD funding into other accounts, or to offer
BMD funding as a bill payer when Congress or the Department issues non-
specific reductions to the DoD budget.
Third, each service will tend to favor its own BMD programs over
those of the other Services, and to resist a BMDO plan which, while
optimizing performance and/or response to the total threat, favors one
particular Service's system at the expense of another Service's system.
Fourth, in the past, BMDO has tended to produce system cost
estimates that substantially exceeded cost estimates generated by the
Services for the same system. While in full control of the funds, BMDO
has typically budgeted at the higher number to minimize risk. Should
the Services continue to produce lower cost estimates and insist on
budgeting at those lower levels, the risk of not meeting schedules or
having to reduce system performance could increase substantially.
Navy Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (Navy Lower Tier)
Question. The Navy Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (Navy
Lower Tier) system detects, tracks, and engages short and medium range
theater ballistic missiles. In January, the Navy Lower Tier
successfully intercepted a Lance missile at White Sands Missile Range.
Subsequent to that test the program entered into the Engineering
Manufacturing and Design (EMD) phase of acquisition. The budget request
for 1998 is about $268 million.
General Lyles, last year when this Committee met, the Navy Lower
Tier program had some delays and setbacks. However, we understand that
a recent flight test was successful and that a Lance missile was
intercepted. Will you please tell the Committee about that test? What
were the objectives of that test?
Answer. The Standard Missile Block IVA (SM-2 Blk IVA) Developmental
Test Round (DTR-1A) intercept was accomplished on January 24, 1997. The
objectives of the test were to intercept a TBM-like target utilizing
infrared (IR) guidance, to demonstrate dome cover removal and dome
cooling, to demonstrate IR acquisition, track, handover, and guidance,
to demonstrate IR aero-optical performance, and to place a warhead
fragment on target. We successfully demonstrated these test objectives
and Dr. Kaminiski approved the program's proceeding to EMD.
Question. Did the Navy Lower Tier system meet all the objectives of
that test?
Answer. Yes, all test objectives were met.
Question. The Congress directed that a User Operational Evaluation
System (UOES) be deployed by 1997 and provided full funding for Navy
Lower Tier to ensure the earliest possible deployment of that system.
The President's Budget projects a UOES capability by 2000. Please
explain why the Navy requires an additional three years to deploy this
system. Are there technical problems? Are there resource problems?
Answer. There were programmatic and technical issues that have
delayed the UOES and deployment dates. Those issues have now been
resolved and the program has left the ``Preliminary Design and Risk
Reduction'' phase and entered the Engineering and Manufacturing
Development (EMD) phase.
Prior to the Navy Area TBMD program entering EMD, a 1994 OSD
Acquisition Decision Memorandum required the Navy to obtain OSD
concurrence on an acquisition strategy and for the program to conduct
specific Risk Reduction Flight Demonstration (RRFD) activities,
including demonstration of Infra-Red (IR) seeker performance. Delays in
this process included the following:
Approval of the acquisition strategy involved getting
permission from the Department of Justice to combine two competing
contractors (Raytheon and Hughes) into a single company that could then
leverage the best of competing design concepts. Delays in obtaining
required approvals, and then accomplishing this unique strategy,
contributed to approximately a six month schedule slip.
Problems integrating an IR seeker into the missile's
existing Radio Frequency guidance section, and then adequately testing
it prior to flight, took almost a full year longer than originally
planned.
The first Environmental Test Flight failed when the
missile booster malfunctioned. Although the booster was not a new
design, to confirm the reason for the failure and prepare another
missile for that specific test required approximately 5 additional
months.
Finally, the first intercept test flight was a ``no-test''
when the interceptor could not be launched due to problems confirming
target telemetry at the test site. The interceptor had to be
refurbished after this no-test to replace batteries.
Following the successful intercept on January 24, 1997, a Defense
Acquisition Board Readiness Meeting was conducted on February 19, and
permission to enter EMD was granted on February 22. On March 14 the
Navy completed Critical Design Review (CDR) of the UOES computer
program. The first AEGIS cruiser is scheduled to receive the TBMD UOES
computer upgrade in Fiscal year 1998 and the UOES missiles are
scheduled to begin delivery in Fiscal year 1999. UOES at-sea testing is
now scheduled for Fiscal Year 2000.
Question. In the absence of a Phase II agreement, will compliance
determinations still remain a ``national responsibility''? In other
words, will it still be up to the U.S. to decide whether or not a TBM
system is compliant?
Answer. Yes, if the negotiators in Geneva fail to reach a Part II
agreement, the United States will continue to make its own compliance
determinations regarding TMD systems.
Question. If we are capable of deciding what is compliant or not on
our own now, what is the need for the demarcation agreement? What do we
gain by signing this agreement? Doesn't the agreement just tie our
hands in terms of future TBMD systems?
Answer. The demarcation agreement has two parts. Part I says that
TMD systems with interceptor missiles having velocities of 3 km/sec or
less are compliant with the ABM Treaty, provided they are not tested
against ballistic target missiles with velocities greater than 5 km/sec
or ranges greater than 3,500 km. Thus, as long as these parameters are
not exceeded, lower-velocity TMD systems--Patriot, THAAD, and Navy
Area--will no longer require time-consuming national compliance
determinations, even when the configurations of these systems change.
Although Part II will still require national compliance determinations
for higher-velocity TMD systems, such compliance determinations will
less likely be challenged by the Russian Government so long as the U.S.
adheres to the target limitations of the Part II agreement. Both
agreements continue to evolve the cooperative, non-threatening,
strategic relationship between the U.S. and Russia. Regarding the
impact of the Helsinski Agreement on future TMD systems, it does not
affect any aspect of TMD systems that are currently planned for future
deployment.
Question. How many ships and how many missiles will be used in the
UOES system?
Answer. UOES is comprised of two AEGIS cruisers and thirty-five
missiles.
Question. The President's Budget also projects that the First Unit
Equipped (FUE) for Navy Lower Tier will be 2002. Are your fairly
confident with this projected date?
Answer. Yes.
Question. All told, how many ships will be equipped with Navy Lower
Tier?
Answer. Seventy-nine (79) ships (22 cruisers and 57 destroyers)
will be equipped with the Navy Area TBMD system.
Question. Do you have any unfunded requirements?
Answer. The fiscal year 1998 President's budget could be augmented
with the following prioritized list. Funding the items on this list
will minimize outyear tails and assist in solving immediate pressures.
First priority goes to risk reduction programs for the Major Defense
Acquisition Programs (MDAPs); second, joint interoperability risk
reduction issues with MDAP enhancements, third, improvements to our
Advance Technology base, and finally, procurement of weapon systems not
funded by BMDO.
($44 million RDT&E)--for risk mitigation efforts
associated with EMD testing that were not in the previous program
baseline.
$35 million)--for upgrades to the Pacific Missile Range
Facility (PMRF) to meet Congressionally mandated use of PMRF and
Multiple Simultaneous Engagement (MSE) testing. Funding would avoid
offsets from other ballistic missile defense activities.
($9 million)--for targets, target support and range
support due to new requirement for UOES characterization testing.
Question. The Navy Lower Tier system on AEGIS ships is comprised
of: a modified Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) capable Navy
Standard Missile and an improved SPY-1 radar. The Navy's new DDG--51
shipbuilding plan drops funds for theater ballistic missile defense
from all new DDG-51 ships funded through the year 2001. BMDO plans to
deploy Navy Lower Tier by 2002.
Given the 3 to 5 year construction time to build a ship, the
earliest that the Navy could field theater ballistic missile defense is
2005. Why does BMDO state that Navy Lower Tier will be deployed in
2002? Who is wrong, BMDO or the Navy?
Answer. The Navy has not stated Navy Lower Tier will be deployed in
2005. They do not have new construction ships with TBMD upgrades funded
until 2001. However, the Navy Area TBMD First Unit Equipped (FUE) will
be an already commissioned AEGIS cruiser that will be upgraded to
accommodate TBMD. This upgrade consists of installing adjunct processor
software and firmware modifications (a TBMD ship set) to the ship's
combat systems during a planned maintenance availability period. These
TBMD upgrades will begin in late 1998. The Navy has over $300 million
budgeted for TBMD upgrades between 1998 and 2003. The first TBMD
missiles (SM-2 BLK IVA) will be available for TBMD retrofitted ships in
fiscal year 2002. This will allow deployment of the Navy Area TBMD
``Navy Lower Tier'' in 2002. After 2001, TBMD ship sets will be
installed on the DDG-51 class (AEGIS) destroyers as they are being
constructed while retrofit of AEGIS cruisers (22 total) and all
previously commissioned DDG-51 class destroyers continues.
Question. Do you believe that the Navy is fully on board with the
Navy Lower Tier program?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Does the Navy agree with the First Unit Equipped date of
2002?
Answer. The Department's position for the Navy Area program FUE is
2002.
Question. If the Navy is fully committed to the Navy Lower Tier
system, is there a reason why funds were not included in the budget to
modify planned AEGIS ships to accommodate theater ballistic missile
defense systems?
Answer. The Department's fiscal year 1998 President's Budget submit
included the transfer of BMDO TMD procurement funds (missile and AEGIS)
to the Navy, specifically to the Weapons Procurement Navy (WPN),
Standard Missile SM-2 (12E) account. The Navy set aside funds within
the FY 1998 President's Budget, WPN Standard Missile SM-2 (12E)
account, necessary to conduct the AEGIS TMD modifications. The navy
will realign these funds to Other Procurement, Navy (OPN) to modify and
equip AEGIS ships for the TMD mission.
Question. What would the impact be to theater ballistic missile
defense systems if the Navy does not modify these ships as they are
built?
Answer. The Navy is fully committed to fielding theater ballistic
missile defense systems across the AEGIS fleet. Indeed, every effort is
being made by both the BMDO and the Navy to accelerate the fielding of
these systems and provide the nation with this critical defensive
capability.
Question. Is there potential for added cost and delay in the
deployment of the sea-based theater ballistic missile defense systems?
Answer. Barring any unforeseen problems, the Navy Area TBMD program
is assessed as being low to medium risk for both cost and schedule.
Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3)
Question. The Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) missile defense
system is comprised of four basic elements: a radar, an engagement
control station, a launching station and interceptors. PAC-3 will
engage and destroy short and medium range theater ballistic missile and
cruise missiles within the atmosphere. Development is being done in
stages: configuration 1 upgrades the guidance system; configuration 2
enhances the radar; configuration 3 includes the PAC-3 hit-to-kill
missile (formerly known as Extended Range Interceptor, ERINT). The
budget request for 1998 is $556.1 million ($206.1 million in R&D, $350
million in Service procurement.). The PAC-3 missile defense system is
being developed incrementally. General Lyles, will you please explain
the differences between the various development stages and
configurations?
Answer. Based on the lessons learned from Operations Desert Shield
and Desert Storm, the Army initiated a new development program that
improved the PATRIOT systems' performance. This new development program
planned to extend the PATRIOT units' battlespace while enhancing
lethality of the system against TBMs. The first improvements were near-
term upgrades fielded in 1992-1993 to the PAC-2 system that: (1)
provided for rapid, accurate fire unit emplacement through the use of
the Global Positioning System and a North Finding Seeker; (2) improved
the defended area of the fire unit by remoting missile launchers up to
12 km from the ground radar set; and (3) provided ground radar
enhancements that improved TBM detection and increase system
survivability.
More substantial improvements to the PAC-2/QRP system were
initiated under the Army's new PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3)
program. To more rapidly field improvements and modifications to the
PATRIOT system as they were developed, the PAC-3 program was separated
into three separate configurations.
Configuration 1 modifications include: the Guidance Enhanced
Missile (GEM), a new pulse Doppler process for the ground radar, and
new processing and data storage upgrades to the Expanded Weapons
Control Computer (EWCC). The new EWCC provides four times the
throughput of the current WCC and eight times the memory. This
expansion in memory is critical to allow PATRIOT the ability to
continue to grow in its performance capabilities with advanced software
techniques since the current WCC cannot support any substantial
increase in lines of software code. The new pulse Doppler processor
improves the ground radar dwell time for the pulse Doppler waveforms
and well as improving the performance of the radar against targets in
clutter. The GEM missile provides improved system effectiveness and
lethality against high speed TBMs and reduced radar cross section (RCS)
air breathing targets (ABTs). All of these modifications have completed
development and were fielded starting in 1995, with the last of the 10
PATRIOT Battalions modified in spring 1997.
Configuration 2 modifications included: (1) communications upgrades
through the use of the JTIDS terminals at the Battalion level for
interfacing on the Joint arena net; (2) ground radar enhancements that
improves detection of lower cross section targets at a greater
distance; (3) an improved defensive capability against Anti Radiation
Missiles; (4) provides for the first phase of Classification,
Discrimination, and Identification (CDI), an upgrade which correlates
target tracks received from external sources to a fire units tracks
generated by the ground radar; and (5) PDB-4 software, which maximizes
the capability of all previous hardware improvements and additionally
has TBM message capability. These upgrades have completed operational
testing and the first tactical unit was fielded with these improvements
in December 1996. Two of the ten PATRIOT Battalions have received these
modifications, with the remaining receiving the modifications through
1998.
Configuration 3 modifications include: (1) the new PAC-3 hit-to-
kill missile which provides improved lethality against TBMs: (2)
improved defended area of the fire unit by remoting missile launchers
up to 30 kms from the ground radar set; (3) CDI Phase III modifications
to improve identification and classification and discrimination of
TBMs; (4) adding several improvements to the ground radar that
significantly increases its detection range while at the same time
increases its reliability; (5) communications upgrade that provides
JTIDS terminals at the Fire Unit level; and (6) adding PDB-5 software
upgrades which will maximize the capabilities of the previous
improvements to the PATRIOT system. These upgrades are currently in
either engineering and manufacturing development or production and will
be fielded as a complete system in 4th Quarter, fiscal year 1999.
Question. The Army recently conducted two tests of the PAC-3
configuration. What were the results of those tests? Did the system
meet all of the objectives of the tests?
Answer. The PATRIOT program recently conducted extensive testing
and two missile firings at Kwajalein Missile Range. The PATRIOT program
participated in a tri-fold event which included Willow Dune, TMD
Critical Measurements Program (TCMP) and System Integration Test (SIT)-
97.
During the Willow Dune engagement, the objectives for the PATRIOT
Missile System were to search, detect, track, engage, guide to and fuze
on the target. A tactical PATRIOT Fire Unit with Configuration 2
modifications was used during this exercise. The tactical PATRIOT Fire
Unit met or exceeded its test objects and engaged and intercepted the
SCUD targets with both a PAC-2 and GEM missile.
During the TCMP exercise (non-engagement), the objectives for the
exercise were to characterize the capabilities of both the
Configuration 2 and Configuration 3 ground radars against a medium
range target. During the TCMP exercise, both radars demonstrated the
ability to detect and track medium range targets.
During SIT-97, the PATRIOT Configuration 2 modified Fire Unit test
objectives were to demonstrate current interoperability capability,
although full interoperability is not expected or achieved until the
units receive Configuration 3 modifications. However, the Configuration
2 modified Fire Unit did demonstrate a limited interoperability
capability.
Question. How will the PAC-3 Configuration 3 system benefit from
these tests? What lessons have we learned?
Answer. The direct benefit of such testing clearly demonstrates
that the PATRIOT missile system can counter the current TBM threat.
Furthermore, these tests enable the PATRIOT program to collect and
analyze the performance data from actual threat targets and thus
utilize that data during the development of the Configuration 3
modifications.
Additionally, the testing demonstrated that the PAC-2 and GEM
missiles can successfully intercept a Scud target, and that the GEM
missile can provide more fragments to the target warhead. The testing
also demonstrated that the Configuration 2 ground radar provides a
significant improvement over the PATRIOT ground radar used in Operation
Desert Storm, and that the Configuration 2 ground radar. Finally, we
demonstrated that the Configuration 3 CDI III Wide Range Resolution
waveforms can provided warhead debris discrimination based on length,
radar cross section (RCS) and drag measurements.
Question. The Army has fielded that PAC-3 configuration 1 and has
begun to field configuration 2. When will the PAC-3 missile be tested?
Answer. Initial missile integration and Hardware-in-the-Loop
testing has begun on the PAC-3 missile at the contractors facility. The
first Controlled Test Flight of the PAC-3 missile is scheduled for late
Summer 1997 at White Sands Missile Range, NM.
Question. How many flight tests will be conducted with the PAC-3
(ERINT) missile before the a decision to procure is made?
Answer. Three flights tests will be conducted before a Low Rate
Initial Production (LRIP) procurement decision is made. The first two
flight tests are controlled test flights and the third is a guided test
flight. The difference between the two are the first two missions are
not intended to intercept targets while the third mission is designate
as an intercept mission.
Question. When will the PAC-3 configuration-3 be fielded?
Answer. Configuration 3 is scheduled to be fielded in the 4th
quarter of fiscal year 99. This configuration is the last in the series
of three incremental improvements to the PARTIOT Missile Defense
program.
Question. What will the advantages of the PAC-3 configuration 3 be
compared with the current PATRIOT System?
Answer. The most significant advantage of the PAC-3 Configuration 3
modifications is the combined effects of improvements to the ground
systems coupled with the new hit-to-kill PAC-3 missile. The
Configuration 3 system can detect a target at a greater range, better
identify target type and will have a greater missile inventory.
Furthermore, the PAC-3 missile has a significantly capability against
more stressing threats, such as chemical submunition warheads.
Additionally, the Configuration 3 system will have an eight fold
increase in defended area and a 100% increase in lethality against
stressing threats, over the Configuration 2 system. The Configuration 2
system has an 8 fold increase in defended area coverage and a 50%
increase in lethality, over the Desert Storm PATRIOT system.
Question. What is the total acquisition cost of the PAC-3?
Answer. The PATRIOT program then year (TY$) cost for the PAC-3
program (Configuration 1 through Configuration 3) is $2.9 billion in
development and $4.3 billion in procurement. The total acquisition cost
is $7.2 billion.
Question. Do you have any unfunded requirements?
Answer. The fiscal year 1998 President's budget could be augmented
with the following prioritized list. Funding the items on this list
will minimize outyear tails and assist in solving immediate pressures.
First priority goes to risk reduction programs for the Major Defense
Acquisition Programs (MDAPs); second, joint interoperability risk
reduction issues with MDAP enhancements, third, improvements to our
Advance Technology base, and finally, procurement of weapon systems not
funded by BMDO.
($15 million RDT&E Defense Wide)--additional funding would
support unanticipated range and hardware funding requirements needed
during the ongoing Engineering and Manufacturing Development flight
test program without changing the number of flight tests or reducing
other risk mitigation activities.
Question. The budget includes $350 million in Army procurement for
the PAC-3. What will be procured with these funds?
Answer. Fiscal year 1998 is the first year of low rate initial
production for the new PAC-3 hit-to-kill missile. Approximately $115
million of the $350 million requested in fiscal year 1998 is
specifically tied to procurement of these 52 missiles. The balance of
the funding is for ground support equipment and the accompanying
engineering support for Configuration 3 radar improvements,
classification, discrimination and identification upgrades, and
improvements to the remote launch capability. Other ground improvements
include the enhanced launcher electronics system, allowing the existing
PATRIOT launcher to fire either pre-RAC-3 missiles or the new PAC-3
missile.
Question. Do you have any concerns about being able to manage the
BMD programs if the Services, in this case the Army, manage their own
procurement funds?
Answer. Subsequent to the notification of the transition of
procurement funds to the Services in fiscal year 98, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense sent a Memorandum to the Services validating the
Acquisition Executive role of BMDO and mission to oversee the
coordination and submission of all Ballistic Missile Defense efforts.
The implementation of this memorandum is still underway. I remain
confident that the Services will continue to support critical Ballistic
Missile Defense programs.
Question. What assurance do you have that funds programmed in other
Service accounts for ballistic missile defense will be spent for these
purposes and not programmed for other Service priority?
Answer. The implementation of the Deputy Secretary of Defense
Memorandum, dated February 12, 1997, will provide a test case on the
Service's continued support to ballistic missile defense. To date, I
have not observed any attempt by the Services to downplay the need or
priority of ballistic missile defense programs. In fact, the Army is
working hard to resolve an internal problem tied to PATRIOT
interoperability via the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System
to ensure success of the program. However, a true measure of the effect
of the transition of procurement funds to the Services will become
clear during the Summer and Fall review cycles of the Fiscal Year 1999
President's Budget development.
Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
Question. The Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile
defense system provides protection against short and long range theater
ballistic missiles by intercepting them both in and out of the
atmosphere (endo and exoatmosphere). THAAD consists of four components:
truck mounted launchers, interceptors, a radar, and battle management
command, control and communications (BM/C3I) systems. The THAAD program
is in its fourth year of demonstration and validation. To date, seven
flight tests have been conducted. The first three were to test the
propulsion, controls and the seeker. The fourth and following flight
tests were to intercept a target. Each of the four interception tests
failed. The budget request for 1998 is $560.7 million. General Lyles,
the THAAD missile system has experienced a series of failures. The most
recent failure was extremely disappointing because it was the fourth
consecutive failure. What exactly happened? What components worked and
what did not work?
Answer. The THAAD missile program conducted its seventh flight test
at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico on March 6, 1997. This most
recent failure was caused by anomalous behavior of the Divert and
Attitude Control System (DACS). The DACS receives guidance and
navigation control commands from the missile's in-flight computer and
provides the divert and attitude control required to guide the THAAD
kinetic kill vehicle toward intercept of its target. The DACS has
performed nominally on all six prior flight tests. Although THAAD did
not achieve an intercept, the radar, launcher, the battle management/
command, control, and communications all performed nominally.
Corrective actions based on results of the flight test failure analysis
are underway.
Question. What do you intend to do to ensure that the next test
will be a success? When is that test scheduled? Will there be a delay?
How long of a delay?
Answer. The date for the next THAAD flight test is still to be
determined. As a result of this most recent failure, I chartered two
independent review teams. One of those teams evaluated the design of
the THAAD missile to determine if there are sufficient design margins
to ensure reliability on future flight tests. The second team performed
an evaluation of the total program concept and requirements to
determine the developmental risk involved in executing the program. The
teams' findings validated the THAAD concept of a hit-to-kill, endo/
exoatmospheric interceptor. Additionally, it was determined that the
current THAAD design is capable of performing the intended mission.
Numerous recommendations were made to rectify subsystem reliability,
test, and quality assurance shortfalls. Recommended changes are being
assessed by BMDO and the Army for implementation. The most immediate
impact will be a delay in conducting the next flight test, previously
planned for July 97, to allow implementation of the recommendations and
corrective actions.
Question. Last year the President's Budget proposed to severely cut
the funds for the THAAD program and to delay its deployment to 2006.
General O'Neill testified that the THAAD program could be deployed
sooner if the proper resources were committed. He also said that the
delay was due solely to budget cuts not technical problems. It was on
that basis that this Committee decided to restore $140 million to the
program. General Lyles, do you believe General O'Neill was mistaken?
Does this program have serious technical problems?
Answer. I do not believe Lt Gen O'Neill was mistaken. The problems
that THAAD has encountered during flight testing have primarily been
problems with subsystem reliability, verification, and quality control.
This assertion was confirmed by the two independent review teams. In
December, the Department of Defense added $722 million in Future Years
Defense Program to accelerate the program to achieve a First Unit
Equipped (FUE) in fiscal year 04. Although BMDO and the Army continue
to assess the details of the impact of the flight test program on the
FUE schedule, the Quadrennial Defense review (QDR) has restructured
THAAD in light of the test difficulties and the Independent Review Team
findings for an FUE of fiscal year 06.
Question. Do you believe the THAAD program has been too aggressive
in terms of schedule and resources? Did the Administration's decision
last year to cut the program back and our subsequent reversal of that
decision have an effect on the program?
Answer. It is generally understood, that the threat from the
theater ballistic missiles has warranted an aggressive schedule for the
THAAD program. The decision to remove funding from the program in 1996
effectively delayed the program from an fiscal year 02 to fiscal year
06. The Department's decision to add funding back to the program has
accelerated the program by 17 months to achieve an FUE in late fiscal
year 04. However, the recent flight test setback and implementation of
the review teams' recommendations will delay the FUE. The Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR) has subsequently restructured THAAD--in light of
the test difficulties and the Independent Review Team findings--for an
FUE of fiscal year 06. However, my staff is aggressively looking at the
schedules and options available to meet the FUE as soon as
programmatically possible.
Question. How would a stable funding profile help the management of
the program?
Answer. Stable funding is critical to the successful execution of
any program. The technical complexity associated with the THAAD
development makes a stable funding profile all that more critical.
Stable funding allows the project manager to optimize the development
and test schedule and lay out the contractual efforts accordingly.
Funding instability, specifically reductions, are particularly
detrimental to a successful acquisition program.
Question. Should the Congress continue to aggressively fund this
program? Or should we reevaluate this program given its recent
technical problems?
Answer. The THAAD program is adequately funded to execute the
program the BMDO and the Army are developing. It would be premature for
me to suggest that the program be aggressively funded until I've had an
opportunity to review, and the Department to approve, the
aforementioned program options.
Question. Do you believe in the technical viability of the current
missile design?
Answer. The technical viability of the missile is a concern which
generated my desire to have an independent team look at the missile
design. The team's findings validated the THAAD concept of a hit-to-
kill, endo/exoatmospheric interceptor. In spite of the failed
intercepts, it was determined that the THAAD design is capable of
performing the intended mission. The problems have been with the
program subsystem reliability and verification, and in quality
assurance.
Question. Dr. Kaminski suggested that the THAAD program will
probably require some sort of ``restructuring.'' What does he mean?
Will the program be delayed further? What will the impact on resources
be?
Answer. Any restructure of the program would seek to lower the
cost, schedule, and performance risk in executing the program.
Additionally, a restructure would reestablish a THAAD program with
achievable milestones, acceptable developmental risk, and within
available resources when balanced against the TBM threat. The QDR, in
fact, has done exactly that--restructure the program, with an FUE date
of 2006.
Question. Will the review include a look at other potential
contractors? Have you made a mistake in putting all your eggs in one
basket?
Answer. The independent review teams I chartered are focusing their
efforts on the program and its prime contractor. Seeking an alternate
contractor for development of the THAAD system is an option, but not
one we are currently pursuing. Seeking an alternate contractor to
perform the remaining development on the program would be costly and
likely delay completion of the program by several years. However, we
are considering duel sourcing certain high risk subsystems and
components. With respect to a single source acquisition strategy for
THADD, I do not think we have erred. The urgency for the earliest
possible development of an upper tier system drove the decision to
limit the program to a single contractor.
Question. Is the contractor applying enough rigor to reviewing its
THAAD program?
Answer. I am concerned about the contractor's performance with the
THAAD development. I have expressed this concern to them on a number of
occasions and believe that they are making an earnest effort to put the
program back on a successful track. We, clearly, have the attention of
the senior management at Lockheed Martin to make THAAD a successful
program.
Question. Given the urgent requirement for an upper tier missile
defense system and the problems that THAAD is now experiencing do you
think we should seek alternative systems?
Answer. The THAAD design has been developed and improved for more
than 5 years. The test program is performing its role of uncovering
areas where changes must be made to ensure that the risks have been
addressed and can be mitigated. This most recent flight test, while not
successful in getting its primary intercept objective, was the first
time that the entire THAAD system was used and demonstrates the
progress that the program continues to make. I am convinced that the
reliability and quality assurance problems can be overcome and that the
system will work as intended.
Question. What does the recent failure do to the current schedule?
Will the User Operational Evaluation System (UOES) be deployed in 1999?
Answer. THAAD is, and has been, developed on an event based
schedule. Flight test failures have been investigated and design
changes made consistent with a program in the Demonstration/Validation
(prototype) stage of development. The UOES, minus the missiles, has
already been successfully integrated into system level testing.
Software increments will continue to be added for increasing
capability. The UOES missiles will not be brought until at least one
successful intercept has been made. Right now those UOES missile
deliveries will begin in 1999, and be completed in 2000.
Question. Is the Army planning to commit funds early for the 40
UOES missiles? Has the Army reconsidered its position?
Answer. The Army position is that THAAD is a vitally needed
defensive capability. It is that urgency of need that calls for a
balance between comprehensive testing and the production of 40 UOES
missiles. An intercept of a representative target along with the
extensive ground testing done and planned provides us the minimum
confidence that the missile design is well understood and modeled, and
that the ground testing is sufficiently rigid.
Question. The General Accounting Office (GAO) recently issued a
report criticizing the Army for planning to base a procurement decision
for the 40 UOES missiles upon a single test. It seems that with the
failure of flight 7, GAO's specific criticism is now moot. However, do
you think that GAO's overall concerns about concurrency are valid?
Answer. The Army position is that THAAD is a vitally needed
defensive capability. It is that urgency of need that calls for a
balance between comprehensive testing and the production of 40 UOES
missiles. An intercept of a representative target along with the
extensive ground testing done and planned provides us the minimum
confidence that the missile design is well understood and modeled, and
that the ground testing is sufficiently rigid.
Question. What are you doing to assure that the Army's procurement
plans are sound and executable?
Answer. BMDO is reviewing the production schedules and costs to
ensure that based on our lessons learned to date, and the changes
planned, that the hardware and software can be delivered and that cost
controls are in place. I review these plans regularly to make sure that
we understand and control the process and provide assistance to the
program where needed.
Question. How can you enforce management decisions if the Army
controls the procurement funds for THAAD in the future?
Answer. Despite the transfer of BMDO procurement funds to the
Services, several mechanisms exist which will allow BMDO to work with
the Services and manage the funds. In a February 1997 memorandum to the
Department's senior leadership, Deputy Secretary of Defense White
affirmed BMDO's role as central planner, manager, and integrator for
the BMD mission, and in particular, the role of the Director of BMDO as
the BMD Acquisition Executive (BMDAE). As such, I will continue to
serve on the Defense Resources Board (DRB) when BMD programs and issues
are discussed and, thereby, will be able to influence the allocation of
funds to programs and DoD components. Second, as the BMDAE, I will have
the opportunity to concur or non-concur with Service funding proposals
that impact BMD programs. Third, the DoD Comptroller will provide BMDO
the opportunity to review any transfer proposed by a Service. Should
BMDO and the Service be unable to reach an agreement, the issue will be
elevated to the DRB level where I will work with the Service and the
Department's senior leadership to ensure BMD programs are appropriately
funded.
Question. What is the exit criteria for Demonstration and
Validation?
Answer. The primary exit criteria for THAAD to proceed to
Engineering and Manufacturing (EMD) is three body-to-body intercepts of
threat representative targets within an accepted aim point.
Question. When will the next THAAD flight take place?
Answer. At this time, I am assessing the recommendations received
from my review panels, the Air and Missile Defense Program Executive
Officer, and the THAAD Project Manager. I plan to implement some
changes, as necessary, to maximize our changes of success of the next
intercept attempt. The next flight will not take place until I am
satisfied that we have done all that is reasonable and prudent to
ensure its success.
Question. What is your present estimate as to how soon this system
will be able to be fully deployed? Is 2004 still a reasonable date?
Answer. While BMDO and the Army continue to assess the details of
the impact of the flight test program on the FUE schedule, the QDR has
restructured THAAD in light of the test difficulties and the
Independent Review Team findings for an FUE of fiscal year 2006.
Certainly, we need to get a couple of flight test intercepts to give us
real confidence in when a First Unit Equipped date can be met.
Navy Theater Wide Ballastic Missile Defense (Navy Upper Tier)
Question. The Navy Theater-Wide program will intercept ballistic
missiles in their ascent, apogee and descent phases. As with the Lower
Tier system, Navy Upper Tier will use the extant capabilities of the
Aegis weapon system. A Standard Missile with a kinetic (hit-to-kill)
vehicle will provide exoatmospheric intercept capability. The budget
request for 1998 is $194.9 million. Is this finding at a level
sufficient to deploy Navy Theater Wide? Is the program a deployment
program?
Answer. Navy Theater Wide is currently transitioning from a
technology program to a Major Defense Acquisition Program which will
focus on developing and eventually deploying a viable, effective
system. Our current program for Navy Theater Wide is consistent with
the direction of last year's Ballistic Missile Defense Program Review.
This program consists of three parallel efforts. The first of these is
a kinetic warhead technology assessment. In parallel with the
technology review, we are proceeding to a system level intercept,
called the NTW Flight Demonstration program (FDP) or AEGIS LEAP
Intercept (ALI). The third portion of our Navy Theater Wide program is
risk reduction activities. These activities will examine the critical
risk areas for NTW engineering and develop solutions that will allow
BMDO and the Navy, at the appropriate time, to make a more informed
decisions to enter the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase.
The Department has neither approved an acquisition strategy nor
validated an operational requirement for Navy Theater Wide.
Additionally, the program office has not prepared a program manager's
life cycle cost estimate for the program nor has the Cost Analysis
Improvement Group performed an Independent Cost Estimate. Until these
actions are complete the Department can determine neither what the Navy
Theater Wide program entails nor the required resources, including
funding, required for deployment. Currently, we expect to have these
actions complete for the fiscal year 1998 Defense Acquisition Board
review of Navy Theater Wide. However, the program is fully funded
through the completion of the Flight Demonstration program / AEGIS LEAP
Intercept (FDP/ALI).
Question. The Navy Theater Wide system has been through five major
reviews which have all reaffirmed the requirement for a Navy Theater
Wide system. In addition, the CINCs repeatedly testify that theater
missile defense is their number one priority. Why is it then, that the
Administration has not requested the necessary funds to deploy the Navy
Theater Wide System?
Answer. Funding is only one portion of program execution. prudent
execution for this program (or any program) requires completing the
program one phase at a time and not commencing a large number of
parallel activities. This means retiring risk in an orderly, logical
sequence, fully defining the program requirement based on warfighter
needs, which ensures that public funds are not placed at risk to
procure a system until the system is proven to meet a valid
requirement.
In the case of NTW, the next steps to retire risk are:
completing the Flight Demonstration Program/AEGIS LEAP
Intercept (FDP/ALI) to demonstrate that the LEAP vehicle can
achieve an exo-atmospheric intercept,
validating the warfighters requirement for a Navy
upper-tier system, and,
confirming that LEAP is the proper solution for the
Navy upper-tier mission.
Until the intercept is achieved and the Department of Defense
confirms the material solution, there is significant risk in proceeding
to engineer a tactical system based on LEAP.
The Navy Theater Wide program is fully funded through the
completion of the FDP/ALI. Additional funds may allow for additional
risk reduction in specific areas. However, additional funds will allow
only marginal acceleration in the initial intercept, currently
anticipated in the second quarter of fiscal year 2000.
Question. How much more would be required to fund a program that
would actually deploy Navy Theater Wide?
Answer. The Department has neither approved an acquisition strategy
nor validated an operational requirement for Navy Theater Wide.
Additionally, the program office has not prepared a program manager's
life cycle cost estimate for the program nor has the Cost Analysis
Improvement Group performed an Independent Cost Estimate. Until these
actions are complete the Department can determine neither what the Navy
Theater Wide program entails nor the required resources, including
funding, required for deployment. Currently, we expect to have these
actions complete for the fiscal year 1998 Defense Acquisition Board
review of Navy Theater Wide. However, the program is fully funded
through the completion of the Flight Demonstration Program/AEGIS LEAP
Intercept (FDP/ALI).
Question. What is the total acquisition cost of Navy Theater Wide?
Answer. The Department has neither approved an acquisition strategy
nor validated an operational requirement for Navy Theater Wide.
Additionally, the program office has not prepared a program manager's
life cycle cost estimate for the program nor has the Cost Analysis
Improvement Group performed an Independent Cost Estimate. Until these
actions are complete the Department can determine neither what the Navy
Theater Wide program entails nor the required resources, including
funding, required for deployment. Currently, we expect to have these
actions complete for the fiscal year 1998 Defense Acquisition Board
review of Navy Theater Wide.
Question. The total acquisition cost for THAAD is expected to be
approximately $13 billion. (The newspapers have said between $16 and
$17 billion.) The Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) is
expected to cost the U.S. $11 billion or more--even with our allies
sharing the cost. The Airborne Laser will also cost $11 billion. The
total acquisition cost for Navy Upper Tier is estimated to be about $7
billion. General Lyles, given its substantial capabilities doesn't the
Navy Upper Tier seem to be a ``better deal'' compared to these other
systems?
Answer. The relative costs of TMD systems is an important factor to
consider when making decisions regarding whether a system should be
built. However, it is not the only factor, and more importantly not the
most critical. The most critical factor is the ability to intercept
missiles and provide an effective multilayered missile defense. The
importance of a multilayered and multiservice missile defense system is
the benefit of combining each individual system's capabilities,
increasing the complete defense against any theater ballistic missile.
There is no one single ``best'' form of active defense for stopping
missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction. For example, PAC-3 and
Navy Area Defense are terminal defense systems which have a multi-
mission capability against both ballistic and cruise missiles. MEADS is
designed to be highly mobile and remain at the forward edge of the
battle field providing protection against very short range TBM systems
in addition to aircraft and cruise missiles. However, MEADS, PAC-3 and
Navy Area are relatively short ranged, and less effective against long
range missiles with high closing velocities. The THAAD and Navy Theater
Wide systems greatly expand the warfighter's engagement battlespace,
allow multiple shot opportunities and significantly increase our
capability to defeat faster and longer range ballistic missiles. The
Airborne Laser will offer further expansion of the battlespace, more
shot opportunities, added capability against longer ranged missiles,
and the prospect of causing collateral damage from intercept debris to
occur over the aggressor's own territory. Boost Phase Intercept (BPI)
has a high potential payoff as a BMD mission capability, but concepts
to perform high performane BPI against TMD and NMD threats are
generally less mature and therefore somewhat higher risk than terminal
defense systems.
The BMDO has adopted a prudent acquisition and development strategy
that balances warfighter needs, system capabilities, and technological
maturity against the threat. Adjustments to the strategy can be made if
warranted by circumstances. BMDO's strategy is to develop an integrated
and interoperable TMD Family of Systems (FoS) architecture. The
elements of which can be tailored by the warfighting CINC for the
specific conditions and threats which will be faced.
Question. General Lyles, why has the Administration repeatedly
decided to hold back on Navy Upper Tier in favor of other more risky
and more expensive systems like the Airborne Laser?
Answer. Although Airborne Laser is a member of the ``family of
systems'' it is not a BMDO program. It is an Air Force Major Defense
Acquisition Program (MDAP) and resources are allocated based on its
designation (MDAP) and priority in the Air Force. Navy Theater Wide
(NTW), a program for which BMDO is the resource sponsor, is designated
as a ``core program'' and was declared a pre-MDAP in October 1996.
Although NTW is not yet an MDAP, BMDO and the Navy have tentatively
scheduled a Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) review for NTW in February,
1998.
Airborne Laser (ABL)
Question. The Airborne Laser is not technically part of the
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) program. It is being
funded within the Air Force's budget. Last year, the Air Force
requested funds to integrate a high power chemical laser into a 747
aircraft with the mission to destroy theater ballistic missiles in the
boost phase. The program will develop, procure, and operate 7 aircraft
an approximate cost of $11 billion. The budget request for 1998 is
$157.9 million. General Lyles, your office is charged with the
responsibility for setting priorities for Ballistic Missile Defense.
Support for a moment that additional funding was available was
available to your office and that the Air Force had not funded the
Airborne Laser program. What would be your highest priority for use of
the additional funds: to reduce risk on your current programs, to
develop the Airborne Laser program, or to fund some other program?
Answer. There is a definite need for a boost phase intercept
capability in the architecture which could be filled by the Airborne
Laser. Current priorities for the BMDO program provide for allocating
additional funding: first priority for MDAP risk reduction efforts;
second priority to joint interoperability risk reduction issues with
MDAP enhancements, and finally improvements to Advanced Technology
programs. Depending on the quantity of funds provided, BMDO would
seriously consider maintaining the Airborne Laser Program (ABL) at a
modest level to ensure contractor team stability and continued level of
efforts pending our ability to fit a more substantial program in our
top line. BMDO funding could not provide for a more aggressive ABL
program until PAC-3, Navy Area, THAAD and Navy Theater Wide are well
into the production phase.
Question. The Administration recently decided to amend the ABM
Treaty by agreeing to demarcation limitations. The Joint Statement also
indicated that development and deployment of the Space-Based Laser was
off the table. Are the Russians also concerned about the ABL? Is the
ABL Treaty compliant?
Answer. The Air Force's ABL is designed to be a theater missile
defense system. When deployed, the system should not pose a realistic
threat to the strategies nuclear forces of Russia (or any other
successors to the ABM Treaty). The Air Force is pursuing the ABL in a
manner fully consistent with all provisions of the 1972 ABM Treaty. The
Russians have not offered any substantive comment on the Airborne Laser
to date. During the Helsinki Summit, the Presidents developed an
approach to concluding an agreement to higher velocity theater missile
defense system which would not limit the Airborne Laser.
Question. A recent study was done by the office of net assessment
that suggested that there are operational limitations to the ABL. What
are those limitations? How well did the ABL do in comparison to the
Space-Based Laser? How will did the ABL do in comparison to other
missile defense systems?
Answer. The objective of these studies is to develop innovative
concepts of operations for Space-Based Laser and to expose the ware
game ``players'' to the challenges of integrating the various systems
into the Joint Theater Ballistic Missile Defense Architecture systems.
In the scenario that was analyzed, severe operational constraints were
placed on the ABL which limited its effectiveness. The scenario was
against a peer competitor with sophisticated anti-aircraft weapons. The
``players'' preferred to establish air superiority before directly
targeting the peer competitor or forward basing the ABL. In post-game
analysis, however, it was concluded that this may have been too
conservative an employment of the ABL.
Question. What is the maximum range of the Airborne Laser?
Answer. The Airborne Laser's (ABL) maximum range is dependent upon
several factors including atmospheric conditions (e.g., optical
turbulence, cloud height), location of the target relative to the
aircraft, and type of missile (hardness and boost time). Thus a single
maximum range value cannot be provided; however, the current estimated
ranges for various types of missiles under nominal conditions are as
follows. ------.
Question. In circumstances where the ABL cannot reach a target due
to the laser's range limitations, overflight would be necessary. Has
the Air Force given ample consideration to this limiting factor? How
would ABL work with other BMD systems?
Answer. The ABL will be a highly flexible standoff weapon system.
The theater commander will have the ability to place the ABL Combat Air
Patrols (CAP) where he deems most effective (including locations over
enemy territory) based on current intelligence, theater threats, level
of air superiority, coverage requirements and optimal deterrence/
engagement potential. ABL will share AWACS and JSTARS escort. In
addition, a defense suite will protect against surface-to-air and air-
to-air threats.
The ABL will work with the remaining Ballistic Missile Defense
systems using the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (Link
16) as an integrated member of the TMD architecture. Through this
network, the ABL will provide early missile, track, launch and impact
point predictions and kill assessments.
Question. Can ABL perform its mission in all weather?
Answer. Yes. The ABL is being designed to operate ``above'' the
weather (notionally 40,000 ft.). Even with complete cloud cover, the
ABL can detect, track and destroy theater missiles.
Question. What are the fuel requirements for ABL? How many shots
can the laser shoot with the allotted fuel aboard? What if a potential
adversary were to fire more than 30 missiles? Wouldn't that defeat the
ABL?
Answer. ------. The number of TBMs which can be killed typically
varies between 20 and 40 depending on the specific engagement geometry,
target type, and atmospheric conditions.
ABL will detect all 30 missile launches, prioritize and engage as
many missiles as possible following the specific mission's rules-of-
engagement (e.g., the ABL may be directed to engage all missiles
launched from certain regions due to their high probability of carrying
weapons of mass destruction). In addition, track data will be passed to
the joint missile defense architecture via Link 16 enhancing the
overall architecture's effectiveness.
No. Typically, there will be two ABLs on Combat Air Patrol (CAP)
with overlapping coverage and the ability to deconflict engagements. In
salvo launches, the ABL is not designed to defeat all missiles; rather
it is designed to thin the threat, provide warning and tracking data,
and to significantly enhance the effectiveness of the other missile
defense systems.
Question. What has been done to solve the problem of beam
attenuation? Are you confident that you will be able to counteract the
effects of the atmosphere and turbulence on the ABL?
Answer. Atmospheric attenuation has a negligible effect on ABL's
performance. The atmosphere at ABL's operational altitudes (nominally
40,000 ft) is so thin that 90 percent or more of the weapon laser
energy is transmitted.
Therefore, we are highly confident ABL will meet the JROC-validated
range requirements. To achieve these requirements, ABL will employ
active and passive tilt jitter correction and atmospheric compensation
subsystems to overcome the negative effects of the atmosphere and
turbulence. Critical components and algorithms have been proven in a
number of airborne, brass board, and field tests. The data from all
tests conducted to date match detailed ABL simulation results and
indicate ABL will exceed its range requirements.
Question. The chemical laser must be reduced to meet certain size
requirements of the aircraft. How does the Air Force plan to do this?
Answer. The laser module design meets all performance, size and
weight goals for the Program Definition and Risk Reduction (PDRR)
system. A prototype laser module recently passed its Critical Design
Review and is now being manufactured using proven lightweighting
techniques such as composites, titanium and milled-out structural
components.
Arrow Missile System
Question. The ARROW is a U.S./Israeli cooperative program to track
and destroy theater ballistic missiles. The Committee seriously
considered terminating the ARROW program in 1995 because of extremely
poor technical performance and the substantial level of past and future
U.S. financial commitments for the program. The Administration has
acted to shore up the program and last year signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) which limited future U.S. funding to approximately
$35 million a year from 1997 to 2001 ($175 million). The Administration
has recently announced plans to commit additional funds to the program.
General Lyles, you are aware that this committee has in the past had
concerns regarding the performance and cost of the ARROW missile
system. Will you please give us an update? How is the ARROW doing in
its flight test?
Answer. The ARROW missile is doing quite well. Of two intercept
tests (August 20, 1996 and March 11, 1997), the missile has scored two
direct hits, destroying the target.
Question. the Administration has recently announced that it will
provide additional funding for the Israeli ARROW program. What exactly
has the Administration agreed to provide? How much funding? For what
period of time?
Answer. The Secretary of Defense has agreed to provide $48 million
over a 4 year period beginning in FY 1998.
Question. Is the Israeli government still committed to production
of this system?
Answer. The Israeli government has identified the Arrow program as
its highest national priority and is fully committed to the program.
Question. When we last discussed this issue, the total acquisition
cost estimates for ARROW varied and ranged anywhere from $2 to $10
billion. What is the latest, most accurate cost estimate?
Answer. The cost estimate of Arrow at program inception in 1994 of
approximately $1.2 billion remains valid today. Phase I (Arrow I) of
the program cost $158 million, Phase II (Arrow II) costs $330 million
and Phase III (Arrow Deployability Program) costs $556 million. These
costs do not include $42 million in infrastructure costs and $252
million for Arrow Weapon System components (Radar, Launcher, Fire
Control) both of which were funded entirely by the Israelis.
Question. Has the U.S. committed to fund any amount of that
production? Does the Administration intend to do so?
Answer. A portion of the $48 million the United States has agreed
to provide the Israelis will be used to accelerate the production of
the User Operational Evaluation System (UOES).
Question. Why should the U.S. continue to fund this program? Have
we learned anything about our missile defense system based on our
cooperation with the Israelis? What about the seeker?
Answer. The U.S. has, and continues to, receive technical data,
risk reduction, and lessons learned from the Arrow missile development
efforts which are used in development of U.S. ballistic missile defense
efforts. With respect to the seeker, the focal plan array in the Arrow
is the same as that used in the THAAD. Moreover, we look to ensure
interoperability between U.S. and Israel's missile defense to systems.
Question. Would you find this program in your budget if you were
given no additional funds to do so?
Answer. No. We could not because we have no operational requirement
for the Arrow missile. Arrow is not a mobile, transportable TMD system
such as our warfighters require. Instead, it meets Israeli military
requirements.
Question. Where is the ARROW on your priority list?
Answer. While low on the list in fulfilling DoD operational
requirements, the technical benefits of Arrow development efforts are
very useful and place it at a higher relative priority. In addition,
the development and deployment of air missile defense capability by a
key friend is a high priority.
Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS)
Question. MEADS is a mobile missile defense system that would
protect maneuvering forces from short range ballistic missiles. The
program was initially an Army program (Corps SAM) but was made an
international cooperative program in order to defray the cost of
developing the system. Originally, the U.S. agreed to provide 50% of
the cost and work. Germany was to provide 20%, France was to provide
20% and Italy was to provide 10%. However, France dropped out of the
program last year leaving U.S. with 60% of the cost and work share. The
budget request for 1998 is $48 million. DoD officials concluded during
the Bottom-up Review, that the unilateral Army program, Corps SAM, was
not affordable. However, shortly thereafter, the program was
reestablished as MEADS, a multilateral program. Do you believe the
multi-lateral MEADS program is affordable?
Answer. MEADS funding has been constrained by affordability
considerations and DoD examined this issue closely during the
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The QDR agreed to continue the MEADS
program but only provided $35 million additional funding in fiscal year
99, bringing the total fiscal year 99 funding to $45 million. DoD is
proceeding with negotiations for the design and development phase of
the program.
Question. What is the current agreement between the U.S. and its
partners on this program? What is the current cost share?
Answer. The current cost share/work share agreement for the Project
Definition-Validation (PD-V) phase is the U.S. 60%, Germany 25% and
Italy 15%.
Question. The total cost of MEADS is expected to be about $11
billion for the U.S. How does this compare with the total acquisition
costs of other theater ballistic missile defense systems?
Answer. In perspective, the cost of MEADS is comparable to other
air and missile defense programs. In conjunction with on-going PAC-3
upgrades (ground equipment modifications and a new missile) and past
Army procurement efforts, the Department is spending $7.2 billion
(fiscal year 97) to acquire and field ten PAC-3 battalions. The two
THAAD battalions are anticipated to cost $10.6 billion (fiscal year
97). The expected U.S. cost to acquire and field six MEADS battalions
is approximately $11.0 billion (fiscal year 97).
Question. According to BMDO, the total acquisition costs of THAAD,
PAC-3, Navy Lower Tier, HAWK, MEADS and Navy Upper Tier could be about
$43 billion. General Lyles, do you believe that we can afford MEADS?
Answer. I have conducted an independent review of the MEADS program
to address affordability. We have examined with the Army several
methods to rephase and restructure the program to continue to support
the warfighter and our international partners while addressing
modernization. The results of that study were fed into the Quadrennial
Review (QDR). The QDR agreed to continue the MEADS program but only
provided $35 million additional funding in fiscal year 99, bringing the
total fiscal year 99 funding to $45 million. DoD is proceeding with
negotiations for the design and development phase of the program.
Question. Has MEADS been reviewed in the Quadrennial Review? What
has been the outcome of those discussions?
Answer. MEADS has been reviewed by the QDR. The QDR agreed to
continue the MEADS program but only provided $35 million additional
funding in fiscal year 99, bringing the total fiscal year 99 funding to
$45 million. DoD is proceeding with negotiations for the design and
development phase of the program.
National Missile Defense
Question. The National Missile Defense (NMD) system will provide
protection against long range ballistic missile threats using ``hit-to-
kill'' technology. The Administration's ``three plus three'' deployment
readiness plan would allow for the deployment of a minimal NMD
capability in 2003 if the threat warrants. This plan is ABM Treaty
compliant. The budget request for 1998 is $504 million, $324.7 million
less than the 1997 appropriation. General Lyles, if you were required
to deploy a NMD system by the year 2003 would be 1998 budget request be
sufficient?
Answer. No. Based on the NMD life-cycle cost estimate supporting
the QDR process, the NMD program will require an additional $2.3
billion over the Future Year Defense Program, starting with $474
million in fiscal year 98 RDT&E funds to execute the 3 plus 3 schedule
and program. These additional resources would be roughly spent on:
Program shortfalls ($100 million). Delays and hardware
(additional target) associated with Integrated Flight Test 1 failure;
delays in transferring the THAAD dem/val radar to the GBR-P; BMC3
development as a result of contract negotiations; EKV communications
development as a result of contractor estimates; and radar
discrimination algorithms.
Previously deferred program content ($85 million). EKV
telemetry unit development; EKV hardness and lethality testing; and
Forward-based X-band Radar and UWER development under the LSI
contractor.
Cost Risk Reduction ($74 million). Additional funding to
all elements (in line with established cost estimates) to allow for
development/test unknowns without sacrificing program content.
Schedule risk reduction ($110 million). Accelerate
procurement of and add hardware (such as targets and boosters) to
mitigate test delays or failures (most items are lead-time away and
still unavailable until fiscal year 99 timeframe); accelerate Hardware-
in-the-loop model and hardware procurements; and improve test launch
capabilities.
Technical risk reduction ($105 million). Increase Systems
Engineering to include development of high fidelity system simulator
for performance verification; continued EKV competition through first
intercept flights; long-lead procurement of hardware for added test
flights beginning in fiscal year 00; and explore alternative
technologies. e.g., radar transmit/receive modules, to maintain program
flexibility and to reduce procurement costs.
Question. Do you have any budget shortfall?
Answer. Yes. Due to our flight test failure in January, we have at
least a $60 million shortfall in fiscal year 98. Based on the NMD life-
cycle cost estimate supporting the QDR process, the NMD program will
require an additonal $2.3 billion over the Future Year Defense Program
starting with $474 million in fiscal year 98 RDT&E funds to execute the
3 plus 3 schedule and program. These additional resources would be
roughly spent on:
Program shortfalls ($100 million). Delays and hardware
(additional target) associated with Integrated Flight Test 1 failure;
delays in transferring the THAAD dem/val radar to the GBR-P; BMC3
development as a result of contract negotiations; EKV communications
development as a result of contractor estimates; and radar
discrimination algorithms.
Previously deferred program content ($85 million). EKV
telemetry unit development; EKV hardness and lethality testing; and
Forward-based X-band Radar and UWER development under the LSI
contractor.
Cost Risk Reduction ($74 million). Additional funding to
all elements (in line with established cost estimates) to allow for
development/test unknowns without sacrificing program content.
Schedule risk reduction ($110 million). Accelerate
procurement of and add hardware (such as targets and boosters) to
mitigate test delays or failures (most items are lead-time away and
still unavailable until fiscal year 99 timeframe); accelerate Hardware-
in-the-loop model and hardware procurements; and improve test launch
capabilities.
Technical risk reduction ($105 million). Increase Systems
Engineering to include development of high fidelity system simulator
for performance verification; contained EKV competition through first
intercept flights; long-lead procurement of hardware for added test
flights beginning in fiscal year 00; and explore alternative
technologies, such as radar transmit/receive modules, to maintain
program flexibility and to reduce procurement costs.
Question. General Lyles, the NMD program has recently had a few
delays not the least of which was a delay which we agreed in conference
last year affecting the establishment of the Joint Program Office. I
understand that this had more of severe impact than we expected at the
time. Will you please explain the status of the Joint Program Office?
Answer. We officially stood up the JPO on 1 April with Brigadier
General Joe Cosumano in the lead. We're now finalizing organizational
relationships between BMDO and the Services and staffing up to do the
NMD mission. This has delayed our execution of the NMD program.
Question. What is the importance of having a Lead System
Integrator? What is the benefit to the government of having a
contractor versus a Service manage this program?
Answer. The JPO, which consists of BMDO and Service organizations,
is managing the program. The Lead System Integrator serves only as a
prime contractor for the end NMD product and assumes much of the risk
associated with developing this complex system. The government
historically has not excelled as a system integrator.
Question. What has been done lately to get the program moving? What
can we do to ensure no further delay in the program?
Answer. We have officially stood up our JPO and are staffing up to
do the NMD mission. We're also ready to award Lead System Integrator
concept development studies to move us forward and help make decisions
on various architecture solutions. Your support of these endeavors, in
particular support for a Lead System Integrator, and stable program
resources will ensure we move steadily forward.
Question. In January, a planned test of the Exoatmospheric Kill
Vehicle (EKV) failed. In your statement you suggest that the problem
has been traced to a ``human procedural error and corrective procedures
have been implemented.'' General Lyles, can you explain exactly what
happened?
Answer. During the countdown for the booster used to launch the
EKV sensor payload, external power was disconnected but internal power
did not come on. Investigation showed the booster's ground support
equipment power supply had been improperly configured for 1.5 ampres
instead of 15 amperes. Nine months before the test, a test engineer
correctly set the power supply and a quality engineer verified the
setting. However, the test engineer erroneously used the power supply's
``multiply by one-tenth'' range selector switch, reducing the current
to 1.5 amperes. Neither the test engineer nor the quality engineer was
aware of the wrong setting, and subsequent testing did not check for
correct current. As a result, the power supply delivered insufficient
current to start the booster's internal batteries and the booster
failed to launch.
Question. What corrective procedures have been implemented?
Answer. A team of Army, Air Force, and Lockheed-Martin (booster
contractor) personnel reviewed the Payload Launch Vehicle (PLV) program
and investigated the launch failure. The team reviewed 121 internal PLV
procedures and found 30 which required change before the next flight
text. The most significant changes would make laboratory testing
exactly match flight hardware testing. To address the cause of the
failure, the power supply circuit was modified to verify the minimum
current for battery activation. Also, critical PLV system checks were
added to the countdown prior to target launch to avoid wasting future
targets.
Question. What are the cost and schedule impacts of this failed
test?
Answer. We have to replace the target vehicle that was launched
from Vandenberg AFB and continue to fund our competing Exoatmospheric
Kill Vehicle contractors longer than planned. This will cost us about
$60 million in fiscal year 98. We will repeat the test in July with the
target intended for our second test. The second contractor will be
unable to fly until January 1998, about an eight month slip in
schedule.
Question. How much additional funding would be required to make up
for the loss associated with the payload launch vehicle?
Answer. The payload launch vehicle is the booster used with the
EKV. We did not lose this but we did expend a target vehicle which
consists of the Multi-Service Launch System booster and target suite.
The target vehicle will cost us about $20 million. Another $40 million
is associated with the resulting delays to the test program.
Question. As you have pointed out, this schedule has a high level
of risk because you do not have backup test hardware. What would be
required to reduce risk?
Answer. With the funding Congress provided last year, we moved to
procure additional test hardware to mitigate schedule delays. However,
the long lead time to acquire these assets does not make them readily
available and we continue to incur delays such as recent experienced
with our first sensor flight test. Continuing to procure additional
test assets, ground hardware and spares will mitigate schedule risks ad
we move forward.
Question. The NMD program was designated as a Major Defense
Acquisition Program (MDAP). What are the benefits of this designation?
Does this designation give the program more focus? Is it an indicator
of the seriousness of a potential threat?
Answer. The MDAP designation is warranted by the amount of the
investment involved and commitment the Department has to the NMD
program. It portrays a seriousness to development efforts that ensures
a more thorough involvement by the user, OSD, and the Services that
aids in fleshing out and addressing all issues. The designation causes
a focus on meeting user requirements which is based on projected
threats.
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
Question. At the Helsinki summit in March, President Clinton and
President Yeltsin reaffirmed their commitment to the ABM treaty. They
agreed not to deploy Theater Ballistic Missile (TBM) systems that pose
a threat to the strategic nuclear force of the other side or to test
TBM systems against strategic targets. General Lyles, which BMD systems
have been judged to be ABM Treaty Compliant?
Answer. The following BMDO sponsored systems currently under
development have been certified treaty compliant as currently
configured: PATRIOT, THAAD, Navy Area, and Navy Theater Wide. As these
systems continue to develop and acquire greater capabilities, DoD's
Compliance Review Group (CRG) will continue to review them for
compliance.
Question. What about Airborne Laser? Has the Treaty Compliance
Review group assessed that system? Will you submit that?
Answer. The Air Force has not yet determined when the ABL should be
formally submitted to the CRG for review. When the ABL is sufficiently
developed for a treaty compliance determination, I expect the Air Force
will approach the CRG in accordance with DoD Directive 2060.1--
Implementation of, and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements.
Question. How does the Joint Statement affect our current core
programs?
Answer. The Joint Statement will have no effect on our current core
programs. Upon entry into force, Part I of the so-called demarcation
agreement reached at the last meeting of the Standing Consultative
Commission will remove PATRIOT, THAAD, and Navy Area-Wide from coverage
by the ABM Treaty. The Part II agreement being finalized in Geneva
pursuant to the agreed Joint Statement will not affect the U.S.
Government's ability to make unilateral ABM Treaty compliance
determinations in the future for the Navy Theater-Wide system.
Question. In responding to questions for the record last year, BMDO
indicated that the only system that would be a problem under the
demarcation agreement would be the Navy Upper Tier program. However,
there have been statements in the press which suggest that
administration officials now do not believe Navy Upper Tier will be a
problem. Why is this so?
Answer. Prior to the March 1997 Helsinki Agreement, the U.S. and
Russia had only reached agreement that TMD systems with interceptor
missiles having velocities of 3 km/sec or less are compliant with the
ABM Treaty, provided they are not tested against ballistic target
missiles with velocities greater than 5 km/sec or ranges greater than
3,500 km. The Helsinki Agreement provides the elements for a Part II of
the demarcation agreement covering TMD systems with higher interceptor
velocities such as Navy Theater Wide. Pursuant to that agreement, the
U.S. will still be required to make national compliance determinations.
However, that agreement establishes restrictions on the testing of
higher velocity interceptors that won't impact the Navy Theater Wide
development and test program, thus reducing the potential issues to be
addressed in future U.S. Navy Theater Wide compliance determinations.
Question. Are you deliberately limitation or ``dumbing down'' the
capability of our TBM systems to squeeze into the tight framework of
this agreement? Are the designs of our TBM systems being determined by
the threat, by the requirements, or by the arms control negotiators?
Answer. DoD is not ``dumbing down'' its TMD systems. TMD systems
are designed to meet military operationally requirements established by
the Joint Staff and those requirements are determined by the military
threat.
Question. General Ron Fogelman, Air Force Chief of Staff, recently
was quoted saying. ``All the chiefs have great concerns about this
[agreement], . . . I would hate to see us negotiate away any kind of
advantage we might have in space-based sensors, or in the airborne
laser or anything like that.'' General Lyles, do you have any concerns
about the development of future ballistic missile defense technologies
under this agreement?
Answer. The Helsinki Joint Statement does not address the two
issues previously raised by General Fogelman, nor does it address
components or technologies that are necessary for our foreseeable TMD
systems.
Question. Does this agreement limit the advanced technology
program?
Answer. No it does not. Research activities up to the point of
field testing a prototype system are not prohibited by the Helsinki
joint statement.
Question. The agreement specifically prohibits the development,
test or deployment of space-based interceptor missiles or ``. . .
components based on other physical principles.'' General Lyles, this
agreement seems to require that the Space-Based Laser program be shut
down. What is your understanding as to how this agreement affects SBL?
Do you have plans to close down the program?
Answer. No, we do not plan to close down the SBL program. The
Helsinki agreement does not affect our plans for that program because
our research plans for SBL fall short of any development, testing, and
deployment that could violate either the proposed Part II agreement or
the ABM Treaty.
Question. Are there provisions for opening up discussions with the
Russians should higher velocity systems and future capabilities be
required due to a future threat?
Answer. Yes, there are such provisions in the ABM Treaty. Any party
to the ABM Treaty can raise questions or concerns through the Standing
Consultative Committee (SCC), which was created for that very purpose.
Question. Last year, the demarcation discussions included a Phase I
(for lower velocity systems) and a Phase II (for higher velocity
systems, e.g. Navy Upper Tier). Have the Russians agreed to discuss
higher velocity systems?
Answer. Yes, the Russians have agreed to discuss higher velocity
systems. The Russians are participants in the ongoing Phase II
negotiations, the purpose of which is to discuss such systems.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submited by Mr. Young.]
Wednesday, June 11, 1997.
FUTURE BOMBERS/DEEP ATTACK CAPABILITIES
WITNESSES
JOHN J. HAMRE, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, COMPTROLLER GENERAL EUGENE
HABIGER, USAF, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND
GENERAL RICHARD E. HAWLEY, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR COMBAT COMMAND
LIEUTENANT GENERAL DAVID McCLOUD, USAF, DIRECTOR FOR FORCE STRUCTURE,
RESOURCES AND ASSESSMENT
Introduction
Mr. Young. The Committee will come to order. Gentlemen,
please be seated.
This hearing is closed. I would say to everyone we are
cleared to the top secret level today. If we should get to the
point there is any compartmentalized or special access
information that you would like to present or that we would
like to ask about, then we would clear the room for those not
cleared at that level.
This morning we are going to be discussing one of several
major issues that face the Committee this year, and that is the
Nation's overall deep attack and strike capabilities and
specifically the future direction of the U.S. bomber program.
This is a critical period for our Nation's air power, and
the decisions we make this year will have a lasting impact on
our ability to field an appropriately balanced mix of forces
for the next century.
So we take this very seriously, and that is the reason that
we invited you specifically to be here, because you have a
major, major role in this whole effort, and you are, as far as
we can tell, the best witnesses we could have to help us make
our decisions as to what we will do this year, because what we
do this year, I think, is going to affect where we are 20 years
from now, to be honest with you.
We have as witnesses the Honorable John Hamre, well known
to the Committee, Under Secretary of Defense/Comptroller;
General Eugene Habiger, Commander in Chief, United States
Strategic Command; General Richard Hawley, Commander, Air
Combat Command; and Lieutenant General David McCloud, director
for force structure, resources and assessment.
Many of the members of this Committee have been here from
the inception of the B-2 program when it was developed in the
black world. As we all know, initially the Department planned
on procuring 132 B-2s. Then the threat changed, and the
Department thought it needed 75 B-2s. Then that number changed
to 20. Last year it became 21 through a manipulation of some of
the funding.
The question we face today is, do we need more B-2 bombers?
Can we afford to buy more B-2 bombers? These questions can't be
addressed in a vacuum. Instead, they must be addressed in the
context of all the other force structure and modernization
needs facing the U.S. military.
The B-2 provides our CINCs with a powerful tool, the
ability to accurately deliver large payloads at long ranges
against heavily defended targets. Under current plans and with
funds provided in prior years, the Air Force will have 21
operational aircraft, enough to outfit two squadrons.
This year we have been asked by several members to consider
beginning the process of buying an additional 9 B-2s, bringing
the total force to 30 aircraft, enough to outfit three
squadrons. So today we are here, in part, to assess the need
and cost of such an expanded B-2 bomber force.
During the course of the hearing, there are several
questions that need to be addressed: What are the missions we
expect to assign B-2s in the future? What are the missions we
expect to assign B-2s in the future? Are more B-2s required to
adequately conduct these missions? Are there alternative means
of accomplishing these missions? What is the cost of an
expanded B-2 program? What might we have to give up to fund an
expanded B-2 program, and are the trade-offs worthwhile?
Another element of this equation is the B-1 program. The
committee has supported the B-1 and the mods that have been
made to it. It is an impressive platform, but we are often
asked by our colleagues, if the B-1 is such a great aircraft,
why don't we ever use it? We would like to hear how you respond
to questions like those and how the B-1 fits into the overall
heavy bomber force mix.
Finally, the issue does not just involve bombers. If we go
to war, there are many other assets to consider, such as
carriers and their air wings, tactical fighters and fighter
bombers, as well as a variety of smart and dumb munitions.
As I mentioned earlier, this year may well be critical,
because we are also being asked to make an important decision
on the next generation of tactical aircraft, the F-22, the F/A-
18E/F, and the Joint Strike Fighter.
All of these programs, as well as the B-2, were reviewed in
the context of the recently completed Quadrennial Defense
Review. The QDR concluded we should not go ahead with
additional B-2 production, but it also recommends cutting back
on the F-22 and the F/A-18E/F. As Secretary Cohen has pointed
out, the QDR is just a proposal and it is largely up to the
Congress to decide what elements of the QDR are turned into
reality.
So these are very important issues, and this committee
takes them extremely seriously. We want to explore them
thoroughly.
Because of the time constraints we all face, we will have
to adhere to the 5-minute rule, with each of our members having
5 minutes of questioning in the first round, and we will have
as many rounds as we possibly can in the time available. I also
urge each witness to be as brief as possible with the answers
so we can delve into more and more issues.
Again, I thank you all for coming. I apologize for the
length of my opening statement, but as chairman of this
Committee, I have to be responsible for what I recommend not
only today, for fiscal year 1998, but for fiscal year 1999, and
the balance of the payments in 2000, 2010 and 2020.
We have some very serious decisions to make, and we
appreciate your being here to help us with those decisions.
Dr. Hamre. you are recognized, sir.
Summary Statement of Mr. Hamre
Mr. Hamre. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and thanks to
all of the members for letting us come up to this hearing. I
personally am very pleased to be here this morning.
When Mr. Dicks came in, he said, ``I have got nothing to
say about you, Hamre,'' and I said, ``Well, that is the highest
compliment a comptroller ever gets.'' I am not kidding when I
say the patron saint of all comptrollers is Judas Iscariot.
This is high praise indeed.
Mr. Young. We are going to give Mr. Dicks a chance to
respond to that later on.
Mr. Hamre. We really are glad to be here.
I must say on a very personal level, these last 5 days have
been pretty tough in Washington for those of us in the
Department, and all of us personally lost working with a very
good friend, with what happened to Joe Ralston. And when I see
this cacophony going on outside, this Committee is holding a
serious hearing about one of the most important subjects we are
facing, and I thank you for it. This is exactly what
congressional oversight is about, and so I personally am very
grateful.
I am grateful for, again, this Committee bringing back the
Congress to the fundamental, what is it about? I think I really
do applaud you for doing that.
When I was coming in the door, I got hit by one of the
press types that are out there on a stakeout, you know, and
again there are those that would like to characterize this
hearing in a very cheap way, that this is just about narrow
interests and parochial interests, and that is absolutely not
the case. This is about a very important thing for the future,
what is the best way we are going to protect this country. This
is not about narrow interests at all.
So we are glad that we can be here. We appreciate very much
having a change to be invited to come and address, because I
think everybody in this room is dedicated to exactly the same
thing, how do we get a stronger defense in the long run?
Here I think this Committee, unlike probably everybody else
in Washington, this Committee is the only Committee--well, your
counterpart Committees--are the only people that have the same
job that the Secretary of Defense has, and that is, you have
got to bring together an integrated defense program, not just,
am I for this little project or that little project, but you,
like the Secretary, have to put together a composite program
and say this is what we need to defend the country in the
future.
The Secretary has a little bit harder job in the sense that
he has to build that over a 5-year period, but, frankly, you do
too. The decisions that you are going to be making in this
Committee really are going to dictate the composition of our
program over the next 5 years, and we know you understand that,
and that is very much the frame of reference that we come today
to this hearing with.
BOMBER QUESTIONS
I think that there are five questions, not to be
presumptuous, but I think there are five questions that you are
going to be, in your minds, asking about us today. Maybe they
aren't the questions you ask, but it is in the back of your
minds.
You are going to first say, did we honestly look at the B-2
during the QDR, or was it just a sham? Did we just do a make-
work job to come to a preconceived conclusion that we already
had, or did we really look at it fairly? I think that is the
first question in your mind.
Second, I think if we did look at the B-2, did we look at
it properly? Did we evaluate it in the right context? Did we
use the right tools? Or did we not use the right tools and
therefore didn't give a fair evaluation to the B-2? I think
that is probably the second question.
I think the third question in your minds is, why cannot we
afford the B-2? I mean, even when it gets to its full run, it
is $1.5 billion a year, and that is only about a half of 1
percent of the DOD budget. Why in the world can't we afford
that? Why did you guys decide you couldn't afford that? I think
that is a very important and fair question.
I think a fourth question in your minds may be, was this
just a political deal? Was this just something that Secretary
Cohen had in his mind and he wanted to shove it down
everybody's throats? And is there dissention in the Department
over this, or is this a decision that we all came to reach
together? And you need to look at that.
Finally, I think probably the most important question is,
can we defend America with only 21 B-2s? Would it be a better
program if we had to change other things and give them up in
order to have more B-2s? Would that be a better defense
program?
I think those are the questions really that shape what is
on your minds. Maybe they are not the questions you will ask
us, but I know that is the backdrop, and I hope that in this
hearing today that we can go through all of that. We ought to
absolutely ask those questions in that way, and hopefully we
can answer them.
But ultimately you are going to reach a conclusion. All of
you have the responsibility to decide in your own minds on
behalf not only of your constituents but the entire Congress
what is the best defense program for the future.
We honestly feel we have brought it to you, but I have
never seen a defense program we ever delivered that was not
improved by Congress, and I fully expect this to go through a
rough tumble, and that is what this hearing is about, and the
fact you would invite us here, I think, again, is a testament
to how important this issue is and how important this committee
considers these decisions. So we thank you for being here.
Back in 1883, Mark Twain and Rudyard Kipling were on the
stage together, and Mark Twain said, ``Well, between Rudyard
Kipling and I, we know everything in the world. He knows
everything that is important, and I know the rest.'' And that
is really the way I am today.
I don't know anything of importance about the B-2, but I am
joined by three people who do, and I am very delighted that
they are here as the real experts at this hearing, and then I
would like to answer at the very end, any resource questions
that you might want to ask me.
Thank you.
Mr. Young. General Habiger, are you going to be next?
Summary Statement of General Habiger
General Habiger. Yes, sir. I look forward to the
opportunity to express my views today.
I would like to point out, I have spent most of my adult
life as a bomber crew member, commander, squadron and wing
level. I have over 3,000 hours in the airplane, 75 combat
missions in bombers as a colonel. I was involved in the start-
up beginning of the B-2 program while assigned to Air Force
plans and policies back in the early eighties and now, as
Commander in Chief of Strategic Command, I am intimately
involved with all three legs of the triad, to include the
bombers, and I look forward to expressing my observations,
views, and professional judgments today.
Thank you.
Mr. Young. General Hawley.
Summary Statement of General Hawley
General Hawley. Like my colleagues here, Mr. Chairman,
members of the Committee, I am delighted to be here to talk
about an important issue.
As I think most of you know, I am a force provider to a
number of CINCs, to include General Habiger on my right. I
provide the bomber leg of the nuclear forces. Of course, we
provide fighter assets, bombers, C41SR capabilities, and search
and rescue capabilities to all of the warfighting CINCs.
Our forces are very heavily tasked today. Perhaps the most
difficult issue that we deal with in air combat command on a
day-to-day basis is our operational tempo, because the tasking
levels of our forces are very high.
Therefore, as we go through this discussion on the B-2, I
think one issue we need to keep at the forefront is the need
for a balanced set of capabilities in our national defense
establishment, because that is what my customers, the
warfighting CINCs, ask me to deliver, is a balanced set of
forces that can cover the whole spectrum of responsibilities
that we have given them to deal with our national security
interests around the world. Today I think we do that. We have a
pretty good balance in the force, and we need to make sure we
maintain it.
Thank you.
[The statement of General Hawley follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Young. General McCloud.
Summary Statement of General McCloud
General McCloud. Sir, if you think it is appropriate, I
would like to read a very short statement, about 3 to 3\1/2\
minutes long.
As director of force structure, resources, and director for
the past year, I have cochaired one of the most comprehensive
studies of our Nation's deep attack capabilities ever
undertaken. The Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study, or DAWMS has
been an extraordinary, unprecedented effort, conducted by top
experts from OSD, the Joint Staff, services, and the CINC
staffs. Hundreds of operators and analysts dedicated hundreds
of thousands of hours to develop insights on weapons and
operational concepts that will enable us to win conflicts
decisively with minimum loss of life.
This effort draws from joint doctrine, analysis, military
judgment, and is founded in our National Military Strategy. We
strove to provide a balanced force, capable of executing our
strategy in the face of an uncertain, ambiguous world.
DAWNS employed a campaign level model called TACWAR and an
optimization model called WORRM. I don't like the acronym, I
didn't name it, but we used it for the primary analysis. These
models were available and familiar to all participants. We
understood their strengths; we understood their weaknesses.
To overcome their shortfalls, we initiated nine parallel
studies to ensure that DAWMS' effort was bounded and all issues
considered. As individual issues arose, if we could agree,
changes were made; if we could not, we ran sensitivities to
encompass the extremes and articulate the impact.
If you will refer to your tabletop slide that I have put on
all of your desks, it is a little bit complex, you will see the
scope of the nine supporting studies and many organizations
that participated in them. We can return to this topic later,
if you wish.
[Chart follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Young. General McCloud.
Summary Statement of General McCloud
General McCloud. We have completed more than 1,500
sensitivities to ensure we have captured each issue. Instead of
pointed solutions, DAWMS, The Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study,
has given us a range of valuable insights. We applied military
judgment at every step of the way.
Another key to the study's success was the openness to all
participating parties. We had nothing to hide, no preordained
outcomes.
As we did in the QDR, DAWMS sought to balance the needs and
risks of today with the ambiguities of tomorrow. The key was to
understand how force changes impact our overall capability to
support our National Military Strategy. In part 1, we
determined an optimized mix of deep attack weapons the CINCs
will need to cover a broad range of conditions. While the
programmed weapons budget is sufficient, modest adjustments to
the mix of next-generation munitions will ensure our forces
retain their superior engagement capability.
For example, investing in additional precision standoff
munitions and smart antiarmor submunitions will increase force
survivability and lethality. We also determined that our
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance architecture
will increasingly provide the leverage needed to maintain our
advantage over future enemies.
Insights gained during the first part of DAWMS established
the foundation for our follow-on trade-off analysis in part 2.
In DAWMS part 2, we assessed a broad range of bomber, land,
and sea-based TACAIR force options across a variety of two
major theater war scenarios. We ran excursions that restricted
force access during the halt phase of a major theater war. To
further investigate the issues, DAWMS explored a wide range of
factors, including stealth capabilities, CINC goals, strategic
airlift availability, and potential budget changes.
The procurement and infrastructure costs of the force
options we assessed were based on a 20-year weapons system life
cycle. Over a 20-year period, savings from retiring forces are
used to fund a cost equivalent number of B-2s. Our estimates
include about $2 billion in modifications to maximize the
conventional capabilities of existing and additional B-2s.
Our force comparison focused on four main areas:
Warfighting capability, risk caused by changes to the force
mix, savings and costs, and support of the National Military
Strategy.
Based on extensive analysis, we determined additional B-2s
can deploy quickly and improve our capability to halt an
adversary's advance during the opening stages of a major
theater war, especially when access is limited or warning times
are reduced. However, this advantage diminishes after the first
weeks of combat as the full weight of U.S. air power arrives
and enemy air defenses are suppressed.
To maximize savings, we assume the trade-off force
structure retires immediately. Since it requires several years
for the first B-2 delivery and 10 to 14 years for the final
aircraft to become operational, the end result is a capability
gap of a decade or more. Additionally, the savings generated by
retiring current forces only partially offset the up-front B-2
procurement costs, requiring additional unprogrammed funding
for a decade or more before annual savings exceeds costs.
Finally, we determined that reducing current force
structure to pay for B-2s will have a negative impact on other
mission areas. For example, assuming we do not change our
current level of global commitments, retiring fighter wings or
carriers increases personnel and operational tempos, increasing
presence gaps in the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean, and
further stresses the forces that remain engaged globally.
Mr. Chairman, based on this comprehensive analysis, we have
concluded that while there are advantages to procuring
additional B-2s, they do not provide a sufficient range of
capabilities to shape and respond to the full spectrum of
national military strategy.
I would like to conclude by saying the insights we have
gained from DAWMS will pay substantial dividends in the future.
The study has been a means for all participants to increase
their knowledge of existing and emerging capabilities. DAWMS
has been, and remains, a catalyst for increased competition
between deep attack capabilities we will filed. While the
process is sometimes painful, this competition is good for the
warfighter and the American taxpayer.
Finally, the comprehensive efforts like DAWMS and the
insights they provide will ensure we fight the next war, and
not the last one.
I thank you, and would be glad to take your questions.
[The statement of General McCloud follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Young. General, thank you very much.
I assume that all of you have seen the DAWMS and explored
it fairly thoroughly. Is that a safe assumption?
DAWMS Analysis
General Hawley. In my case, I have seen a briefing on the
DAWMS study but have not had an opportunity to review the study
or the background or analysis that went into it.
Mr. Young. That is basically my exposure to the DAWMS. I
haven't digested every page of it. I have had the overview.
Does anyone disagree with the analysis that came out of the
DAWMS?
General McCloud. Lots of people disagree with it, sir.
Mr. Young. I am talking about any of the four of you.
General Habiger. No, sir.
B-2 Strategic mission
Mr. Young. Now, were there any scenarios involving
strategic use of the B-2 or strategic use of any of the other
aircraft? I understood you did a lot of various scenarios while
going through the DAWMS.
General McCloud. Sir, we did not go into the nuclear role
of the bombers. We covered various options on the tactical
side.
Mr. Young. Could we go into that at this level, just
briefly? I spent a lot of time with Admiral Jones in your shop,
and he gave us a number of BB-2s that he thought would required
for your strategic mission. I think the number he said was 14
would be the number that----
General Habiger. 16, sir.
Mr. Young. 16.
General Habiger. Yes, sir. Would you like me to elaborate
on that?
Mr. Young. Please.
General Habiger. The way we apply weapons in the single
integrated operational plan is a matter of looking at the
target base that we have and looking at a targets base in the
year 2002-2003 ------ it is articulated in the national
security decision directive--that would be targeted to deter
the Russians.
If we look at the forces available today and the forces
available under a START II agreement, we have a balance of
bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and sea launch
ballistic missiles coming off our Ohio class Trident submarine.
The B-2 is part of the bomber triad leg, along with the B-52s
and the cruise missiles that would be carried by the B-52s.
Today, sir, with the B-1 also in our nuclear war plan, the
end of this fiscal year, the B-1 becomes completely a
conventional carrier, it will no longer be part of our war
planning, although I will tell you, though we are looking at
out in the out years, and perhaps, will use the B-1 in a
conventional role to support our single integrated operational
plan. The utility there is that the B-1 will no longer be
counted under the arms control agreements of START II and
beyond ------.
Mr. Young. General, in order to have 16 B-2s available for
your mission, how many B-2s do we have to have in the
inventory?
General Habiger. Sir, my force provider, General Hawley on
my left, will give you perhaps a little longer answer. I go
into the system with a requirement for 16 B-2s to do my job.
then as a force provider, he will then look at what is required
to give me those 16.
So, sir?
General Hawley. As you know, Mr. Chairman, when we
structure an aircraft fleet, we include aircraft for a number
of purposes, our PMAI, Primary Mission Aircraft Inventory,
which in this case is 16, and then we need some backup aircraft
inventory to support other needs.
Sometimes in a large fleet we will break those additional
aircraft into categories to include BAI, Back-up Aircraft
Inventory, depot support, tests and training. So we will have
five airplanes when we take delivery of the 21st airplane, and
we will use that to satisfy all those requirements.
This unit, of course, only has experienced pilots, so all
pilots come to this program with experience, and we train them
in the unit using those 16 primary assigned aircraft. So we
don't have any tests or training.
There will be continued tests, of course, and we will use
both the operational airplanes and those designated as BAI. You
can't tell the difference on a day-to-day basis, by the way.
And we will just use out of that inventory airplanes that we
need to go do continuing follow-on tests for the system. They
will also serve our needs for attrition reserve.
As we look at all of those requirements, that is why we
structured the program as we did. Twenty-one, as you know,
wasn't our number. We got issued 21 airplanes, and we
concluded, out of 21, we could support an operational fleet of
16, and that is what we will plan and equip for.
Mr. Young. You raised an excellent point that makes me very
curious, but my 5 minutes has expired. I want to come back to
that point. I am going to adhere to the 5-minute rule so
everybody else won't think I am sneaking up on their time.
Mr. Dicks, 5 minutes.
DEEP ATTACK WEAPONS MIX STUDY
Mr. Dicks. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I want to welcome
all the witnesses here today. I believe that what the Deep
Attack Weapons Mix Study shows, is that we can stop an enemy in
the halt phase with the B-2. The problem is, we don't have
enough B-2s. The studies that have been done by Rand, and by
General Jasper Welch, all conclude that 21 B-2s is not
adequate.
I think the analysis done in the Deep Attack Weapons Mix
Study demonstrates that if you have a lockout situation, if you
can't get TACAIR in, you can't get those aircraft carriers in,
and this study again puts the carriers in the play right away.
They have two carriers, I think, in the Persian Gulf within 150
miles of the assault, again, so that they can make a TACAIR
look good. But if you don't have that and the enemy invades,
like Saddam did, you can't stop him unless you have an adequate
bomber force that can come in from outside. That is what this
study shows.
It also shows that bombers in the halt phase can play an
enormously effective role. With stealth bombers, you can come
in and stop the enemy before he gets to his target. And if you
can continue to use them and then make usable the B-1s, the B-
52s, TACAIR, et cetera, it is a force enabler.
Now, every one of the Joint Chiefs, I asked them at a
hearing a week ago, do they think these models that we used are
fair and accurate? They said no. They all said that these
models are no good, that they should be replaced, that there
are force-on-force models that simply do not look at the
effectiveness of the forces that we have today. So I think it
is flawed.
On the integrity question that Mr. Hamre raised here
initially, I asked the President of the United States to give
us a fair, objective study. I don't think we got it.
I want to read to you just a couple things from a person
who is intimately involved in this. Let me just tell you what
he says right up front. ``Outcome has been predetermined. No
more B-2s. PA&E officials stated study conclusions before
analysis conducted. OSD has been party to irresponsible
modeling and subjective support inputs.'' And basically they
say that the Tactical Warfare war model and WORRM simply do not
give you a fair look at the effectiveness of these weapons.
This deeply bothers me, because the President of the United
States, the Commander in Chief, promised us a fair, objective
study, and by using these models, I am afraid that study was
inherently flawed. All of the Joint Chiefs, each one of them,
said we ought to have new models, a new way to do this in the
future, so we can effectively look at all these weapons.
Now, what I am concerned about here, frankly, is the
question of balance. How can you say we have a balanced tour
when we are going to spend $350 billion on TACAIR and not spend
a nickel on bombers? That is no balance. That is just going
with the existing programs that the services want. It is rice
bowl protection at its worst, and it is a failure on the part
of this administration to make hard priority decisions on this
issue. It is just, we are going to do it our way, and the hell
with everybody else. And I think it is terrible, I think it is
irresponsible, and here is why I think it is so outrageous.
It is because the halt phase is the most important phase.
If you can stop the enemy before he achieves his objectives and
destroy him in the field, then you don't have to spend $70
billion going over there and fighting the war, $10 billion to
deploy your forces, $60 billion to fight the war with us and
our allies. If you can stop him before he gets there, because
you have got an adequate bomber force, then you can save
American lives and save American dollars.
And that is why I am so upset, again. And I must tell you,
I am deeply, deeply disappointed in the Department for, one, I
think failing to do a good study, and, two, failing to make the
hard priority decisions. And the idea, it is the position of
this administration that we are never going to build another
bomber----
HALT PHASE
Mr. Lewis. If the gentleman will yield, I hope the panel
will ask the question about the halt phase. That is a very,
very fundamental question here. I think you were asking that
question.
Mr. Young. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Dicks. The Minority wasn't given an opportunity to make
an opening statement, and I made the opening statement for the
Minority.
Mr. McDade. Mr. Chairman, I would like to yield some time,
if I may, of my time to the panel, to answer, because I think
the dialogue is excellent. I think we should hear it.
Mr. Young. Mr. McDade, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
You may yield your time any way you like.
Mr. McDade. Go ahead, John.
Mr. Hamre. I would just like to start by framing a brief
response and then turn it over to my colleagues.
First of all, I think the DAWMS study showed exactly what
Mr. Dicks said, that there is no question that the B-2 is very
important to the halt phase, and it clearly demonstrates that.
That is one of the reasons why we consider it such an important
asset.
The DAWMS study went beyond it to say would we get more
benefit if we had more of them, and if we were to do that, what
would we give up and how much would be lose in doing that? I
think that becomes this analytic issue, where we will have some
dispute.
Now, Mr. Dicks----
FORCE MIX
Mr. McDade. He asked you a very specific question about
TACAIR and bombers. He gave you numbers. Respond to that. Are
you claiming you have a balanced program?
Mr. Hamre. Sir, first of all, we did in this analysis--and
Dave McCloud led it--I think they did 1,500 runs on the best
models we have. Are they perfect? Heck, no. Should they be
better? Yes, absolutely.
Mr. McDade. You gentleman are responsible for the resource
allocation, and the gentleman from Washington asked you, what
was the number, $350 billion?
Mr. Dicks. That is about what it was. Maybe with the cuts
in the F-22, it is going to be less. But there is zero in
bombers, I hope some in weapons. We have to weaponize the
bombers. We are buying no additional bombers. There is no
bomber program for the future. We are investing all in TACAIR.
Mr. McDade. Let me reclaim my time so I can ask a question.
You all agree that the number $350 billion is the number in
the ball park for TACAIR?
Mr. Hamre. It is down to about $290 billion now because of
changes we made in the QDR.
Mr. McDade. What would you describe the bomber?
Mr. Hamre. The investment for the bombers is for upgrades
for the existing fleets.
Mr. McDade. $290, $300 billion in TACAIR?
Mr. Hamre. Yes.
Mr. Dicks. And zero for bombers.
General Hawley. You have to look at the balance over a
period of time. If you look at investments in other systems and
bombers in the eighties and nineties, you will find the
predominance of our investment has gone into bombers and
airlift within the Air Force. That is when we equipped the
bomber force. We bought the B-1, we bought the B-2. We invested
large sums in modernizing those and bringing them from the
nuclear era into an era where they can provide the robust
capabilities we need from the bomber force.
Beginning around the turn of the century, we will begin
reinvesting in the fighter force. That is why there appears to
be an imbalance, if you just take one slice of time. I think
you have to look at this over the decades that it takes to
build and shape a force.
Mr. McDade. That is a look back. We are trying to look
forward. The purpose the hearing is to say, what are we
supposed to do tomorrow?
And while looking back, General, I agree and appreciate
what you said, because I was here when all those programs came
through. But what the gentleman from Washington is saying is,
we look forward and see a ramp-up in TACAIR and a flat or
perhaps ramp down, whatever.
General Hawley. It might be interesting to correlate that
ramp-up with the age of the weapons system in the inventory and
being replaced.
Mr. McDade. You define the comparison any way you want. I
don't want to go back and hear about what we did 20 years ago.
I wanted to talk about what we are going to do in the next 10
years.
Would you describe it that way? What is the allocation of
recourses that makes you comfortable that we are spending the
right amount of money on the bombers compared to TACAIR for the
next 10 years out?
General Hawley. I think studies like DAWMS highlight that
this produces a balanced force structure. Certainly as I try to
do my job in supporting the needs of the CINCs, responding to
their requests for support, this looks like a balanced force
structure to me.
If we said we want less fighter force in order to support a
larger bomber force, I would have to say no to the CINCs for
their request today. I am not in a position today where I have
to say no to the CINCs on any bomber issues. So I think from
the CINCs' perspective, at least as I see their demand for
forces, we have a balanced force that satisfies those
requirements today, and this program will sustain that balance.
Mr. McDade. Does anybody disagree with that?
Mr. Hamre. May I add, sir, that I think Mr. Dicks is right,
that bombers, long-range bombers, are enormously helpful in
that halt phase, as are all aviation assets, frankly. But there
are other things that tactical aircraft do that bombers cannot
do. It was a much richer mix of requirements that the generals
are facing and why it leads them to their conclusion.
Mr. Young. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from California now has 5 minutes, and he may
use it to continue this discussion.
CHALLENGES TO THE UNITED STATES
Mr. Lewis. General Hawley, when you talked about our not
spending money on the fighter force and we are building up the
bomber force, during that very time we were moving forward with
the F-15 and the F-117, so I wonder about that. Clearly, there
were expenditures there. And Norm is saying there is zero in
terms of bomber focus looking forward.
I might remind you that the building did not want to go
forward with the numbers of F-117s that eventually we procurred
to. It was Senator Nunn who drug you all, kicking and screaming
down the halls, and following our experience in the Gulf with
the F-117, the halls couldn't be happier about the numbers of
aircraft.
It is of great concern to me that we try to use that sort
of background perspective as we look forward.
The halt phase is critical, in my mind's eye. If you think
it is critical, what kinds of wars are we likely to fight in
the coming two decades, and is that halt phase likely to be
required in a very short time of notice? And, if so, then it is
fundamental.
So tell me, what are we going to face? What is the real
challenge from? If you can't answer that, why are we here?
General Hawley. We have some scenarios in DAWMS that would
be enlightening.
General McCloud. DAWMS did look at various options in major
theater wars in northeast Asia and southwest Asia. We did
excursions to try to address the issues that Congressman Dicks
alluded to. We did lock out various forces from a theater to
see the role that the bomber would play and how it would play
best. We locked out naval tactical air. We locked out Air Force
tactical air. We locked out the combination of the two at
various levels from 10 percent all the way up to 90 percent. So
we got a good feel for where the bombers played.
He is absolutely right, the bomber plays heavily in the
early halt phase, and it is a critical phase to play. It comes
with the stealth precision.
Mr. Lewis. I know you have all kinds of scenarios. But in
terms of the real challenge to us in the next 2 decades, what
is likely in terms of our needs? We are not going to have the
wonderful notice that we got in the Middle East last time. A
lot of people observed all that, I can tell you.
So assuming that the first 2 weeks are not automatically
available to move troops, et cetera, et cetera, how important?
What priority is this? Should we shift the priority, assuming
that?
General McCloud. Sir. I think it gets back to balance. We
have to be prepared for that; we have to be prepared for the
options of short warning. We don't think that will happen, but
if it does, we ought to be prepared for it. The bombers play a
central role in that.
Mr. Dicks. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Lewis. Just a moment. Let me just kind of interrupt you
myself. There is little question within the building as you
talk about a ``balanced force,'' if you move in the direction
of saying we need more B-2 stealth assets, that has an impact.
The National Training Center for the Army is in my
district. I know how they get excited about discussion like
that. We are talking about peace maybe in our time or not
having peace in our time. What is the priority and what is the
likely reality of serious confrontation ahead of us?
Let me add to that, General Hawley, 2 years ago we had a
panel like this. About that time, I was red hot for the B-2 at
that point, and I began backing off. The panel sat there and
said we don't need any more B-2s. The only guy who said we
needed more was sitting in your chair, General Loh, the force
provider. He said we need more. Why did he say it and the rest
didn't then?
General Hawley. I think General Loh and I would probably
look at this through very similar eyes.
Mr. Lewis. I beg your pardon?
General Hawley. General Loh and I would look at this issue
through similar eyes, because we face the identical problem.
Mr. Lewis. Let me back you off one more time. Yesterday I
was having a discussion with another colleague of mine on
another Committee. The subject was F-18E/F or C/D. The
discussion was, if we back off of the E/F, it will save us $18
billion and that will get us to the Joint Strike Fighter
faster.
Friends, we are in this together. We need advice and
counsel that reflects your best judgments, not balanced force
to keep one portion of the force happy. I am concerned we are
getting a lot of that.
Mr. Young. The gentleman's time has expired for this turn.
Why don't you go ahead and somebody respond to the issue
Mr. Lewis raised.
General. Hawley. I will try. I think the analysis and
studies we keep doing over and over keep yielding a similar
result.
You referred to General Loh's support for the B-2. Believe
me, I support the B-2. I think the B-2 is a marvelous weapons
system that fills a very important role within the ACC force
structure we provide to our fighting CINCs. The issue is not,
would I like more B-2. I would love to have more B-2s. I would
love to have a bomber force that is all B-2s. But I don't have
enough budget authority to buy a bomber force of all B-2s.
Therefore, we have developed a mix that includes 21 B-2s,
95 B-1s, 71 B-52s in the out years that will satisfy our
overall requirement within the constraints that we face in
terms of our obligation authority for the budget. We think that
is the right balance.
Congressman Dicks pointed out this is a great enabler. It
is an enabler. That is how we will use it. It will be used to
leverage all of the other capabilities that we bring to the
fight. it will allow our B-1s to get in and do that heavy
lifting that the B-1 is so good at.
Mr. Chairman, you commented on the B-1 in your opening
statement. ------. And that capability will be leveraged by the
B-2, which will be able to go in and take out command and
control structures and take down defenses and open the door for
that heavy lifter, the B-1.
Meanwhile, the B-52, which will initially do standoff work
with its CALCM capabilities and its HAVE NAP, then it will get
in. After we have taken down those defenses, using the B-2 and
our other high end weapons systems, it will be able to get in
and do that heavy bombardment mission which will be so crucial
in the halt phase.
But we will also need air superiority and need to provide
that over the battlefield, because non of these weapons
systems, to include the B-2, can be used with impunity in a
high threat environment. So we have got to be able to control
that airspace. We will need to be able to deliver sustained
firepower against a whole array of targets. That is what the
fighter force will do as it comes in and is able to generate
those high sortie rates of two to three sorties per day per
airplane, be able to attack that broad array of targets that we
really can't get out of the bombers.
So this balance that we have created within the fiscal
constraints that we have been given, frankly, is about right,
and it will produce a modern bomber force, it will by 2010 or
2015 produce a modern fighter force.
We have already begun to modernize the airlift force so we
will have the mobility assets that we need with the C-17 and
with our sealift capabilities to get these people to the fight
in a prompt and timely way and we will be able to get our job
done. While we are doing those opening days, we will be able to
launch bombers from the States and deliver that long-range
combat firepower to the theater. But that comes at great cost.
------. This is tough work, we do, and it requires a balanced
and a flexible force that can satisfy a broad array of
contingency requirements.
As we have gone through and used tools like those imperfect
models that the DAWMS study used and that have been sued in
other ways, but they do provide insight, though they are not
perfect and you can't just take the results on a spreadsheet
after analysis like that and say, there is my force structure,
you have to apply judgment to it.
That is, I think, what you pay us to do, is to bring our
judgment to the table and the judgment of people like Dr. Hamre
who have been involved in this business for a long time, as
well as your own judgment. And out of that, collectively, we
produce a force for this country. I think the one that has been
proposed is a balanced force that will do a pretty good job of
satisfying our national security requirement.
Am I a bomber advocate? You bet I am. I am not a fighter
general, I am an airpower general, and my job is to deliver
combat airpower for our warfighting CINCs. I am supposed to
make sure that that force is well trained, well equipped, well
organized, and capable of responding to those needs on short
notice, and that is what they can do today.
And they do it because over the years, together, between
various administrations and this Congress, we have delivered a
very capable set of airpower forces for the country. They are
ready to go to war today and fight effectively, and the B-2
will be a tremendous addition to that. It is now committed to
the SIOP. It is now available to the CINCs. I made that
available on the first of January. ------. A tremendous
capability. And we will be able to use that as an enabler to
help leverage all of our other investments.
Mr. Dicks. I just want to point out, we had to provide that
GATS/GAM over Air Force objections.
Mr. Young. Thank you for that excellent response.
Mr. Skeen, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
B-2 and Halt Phase
Mr. Skeen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will not use all of
my time.
I was very interested and engaged with the treatise that
General Charles Horner came out with a few days ago in which he
analyzed our experiences in that Desert Storm operation and
what we didn't learn, and I was very impressed, with having
known him well. I think the crucial point that he made was the
time limit for the halt phase, and his summary was that the
only kind of response we had that would be adequate would be
the use of B-2s.
I know we need the DAWMS study. The critical thing is, how
much time do we have for the next go abound in these situations
to respond? ------ which becomes more and more tackier day by
day. When you are talking about that. ------. You folks have
done a great job, and I know you do your job well or you
wouldn't be where you are today, but there is a lot to be said
for the allocation to the kinds of Air Force resources. So put
us down as second-base umpires. We are not the greatest, but we
are concerned. We appreciate the dialogue that you have given
us today.
Thank you.
Mr. Young. Mr. Hobson.
Cost of Bomber Aircraft
Mr. Hobson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have some concerns about how we pay for things, since I
sit on the Budget Committee as well as this Committee. I also
have some district concerns because we do a lot of stuff at
Wright-Patterson in may district. And I remember General Loh
when General Loh was at Wright-Patterson, and he inherited
that.
What bothers me is this configuration that we have got
ourselves into. You have the B-1 that we are going to spend all
the money on. I am worried not about the next 10 years alone, I
am worried further out, because you aren't going to have B-52s
around. Well, you have them longer than I think we all thought
we would have them. That is going to go by the board.
You have the Navy that doesn't have any stealthy aircraft
now, that I know of. And excuse me, Duke, for talking about the
Navy. you have a lot of assets there that have a certain need
for a lot of money.
We have got all these airplanes, all these fighter
airplanes we are building, I understand we want to have it all,
but I am worried. I don't have quite the passion that Mr. Dicks
has, but have four grandchildren that I am worried about out in
the future of this threat and of not having the capability to
stop that early threat.
I want to figure out how we can pay. If I had my druthers,
I would like to see us reconfigure circumstances and
reconfigure so we have that ability to stop that initial threat
better long-term. I think you can do it today. I think you
probably have got the capability that you can do that today.
but I am worried when you don't have some of this stuff out
there. And I want to ask, can't we reconfigure so we can pay to
keep this line open and to keep this technology moving forward?
The other question, sir, I would ask is, was he right? We
always get blamed for forcing people to buy things. Was he
right? If it did work in buying that system, over the objection
of the Air Force, why are we being forced to second-guess the
Air Force in how we pay for this stuff?
General Hawley. It is true the Air Force was not on board
buying GATS/GAM and it was issued to us. the reason was because
the air Force, I think, viewed it as an interim capability and
our judgment was that we would prefer to take a risk for a few
years not having that precision capability, given that JDAM was
going to be delivered this year, and we were willing to do
without that capability for the 2 years that the GAM gives use
a B-2 precision capability.
There was a difference in judgment, and the wisdom of the
Congress said we think we need it sooner. So we took it, we
have implemented it, we have it on the airplane today, and we
have committed it to the warfighting CINCs. So we honor that
judgment. It is now available to the CINCs. As I said, I made
it available to the CINCs on the first of January.
Mr. Hobson. Where is----
General Hawley. Joint Direct Attack Munition is essentially
the same weapon as the GAM. It will be procured in much larger
quantities and be much cheaper, and therefore GAM will be
phased out beginning this year as we begin to take delivery of
block 30s which begin this summer, and those will be delivering
JDAMs, while the block 20 deliver GAMS. So we will have a
period of time where we will have a unique capability that we
wouldn't have had it the Congress hadn't directed us to buy the
GAM.
The difference in opinion really lies in the area of risk.
Our assessment was, I think, that we should tolerate the risk
and save the money, and the Congress' judgment ran counter to
that, so we incorporated it, trained our crews to it, and
demonstrated it very effectively.
B-52 Aircraft
Mr. Hobson. Answer my other question, sir. How do we long-
term reconfigure when we don't have the B-52? You are going to
have B-1s that people don't really fly very much to do things
with when we have had past engagements, which may or may not be
there. What do you have? You have 21 B-2s. That is all you have
in the future to cover the world out. You don't have anything,
as far as I know, on the drawing board to replace the B-2s.
General Hawley. Okay, I think I can answer that. Number
one, the B-52 will be around a long time. I am not sure that
there is a retirement date for the B-52. It is a very well
constructed airplane and will fly for a long time, and we have
no projections to retire it. So it will be a significant part
of our bomber force structure for the next 3 decades.
BOMBER WEAPONS CAPABILITIES
The B-1, although it has not been employed in combat to
date, that is because it didn't have conventional capabilities
that were valued by the CINCs. Now it has that capability to
deliver sensor fused munitions. We just delivered that
capability this year. It will soon have the capability to
deliver JDAMs, just like the B-2 did last October.
So it will have that capability, and in fact for most
munitions in that new family of near precision capable
munitions, the B-1 will carry significantly more than any of
our other bombers. I call it our heavy lifter. That is because
it has the largest payload of any of our bombers. Once you can
enable its access to the theater with systems like the B-2,
then the B-1 what can really bring firepower to bear. I could
give you some examples.
The B-1 will deliver 24 JDAMs, the B-2 delivers 16, and the
B-52 12; the B-1 delivers 12 JSOWs, the B-2 will deliver 16,
and the B-52 will deliver 12. The B-1 will deliver 24 JASSMs,
the B-2 16, and the B-52 12.
So this family of weapons systems gives us a very effective
balance between that high-end system that can open the door,
the high-speed penetrator that can deal with medium threats,
the B-1, and then the standoff weapon system, the B-52, that
can eventually be rolled into the fight.
Mr. Hobson. Don't you have to have a whole lot of other
weapons out there to protect the B-1 and the B-52 that you
don't have to have with the B-2?
General Hawley. Our tactics for employing these weapons, we
would employ the B-2 against that family of targets that are
heavily defended and that the B-1 can't get access to.
There is another whole class of targets that are less well
defended that the B-1 can deal with. So we will use the B-1 to
deal with those, and then other targets once the systems like
the B-2 have taken down the defenses.
Then the B-52 is a standoff weapon initially, and we will
use it from outside the threat envelope and launch standoff
munitions. Once the defenses are beat down, then it will be
able to go in.
So this is an array of threats and an array of targets both
geographically and in the dimension of threats and over time,
because over time, the complex of the threat will change as we
defeat some of those systems and take down both of the command
and control structure that supports them and the weapon
systems.
Mr. Hobson. I will ask a last question, and that is, when
Secretary Perry was here, I thought he gave us a much shorter
date on the B-52 than you are giving us.
Mr. Young. Mr. Hefner.
REMARKS OF MR. HEFNER
Mr. Hefner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I feel inadequate, I don't feel the passion that I have
heard here, but there are some things that bother me. I
remember many years ago we sat in this room and we were told we
can have the B-1 and we can also have the B-2, and going ahead
with the B-1, it will not delay the production of the B-2; we
don't have to skimp on either one of them; we can have them
both; we can have a full contingent of everything.
We were sold on that concept, and we did the B-1s, and I
have been to some places, and the B-1, to my knowledge, has not
taken part in any significant programs that we have had in the
Persian Gulf or anywhere else.
If I understand you right, you said, the B-1 is going to be
downgraded to where it won't be counted in the agreements we
make with the Russians?
General Hawley. Right.
Mr. Hefner. So we spent billions of dollars to fix the
thing, and now we have downgraded it where it won't be counted.
Talk about the long-range plans. One of the things that has
always bothered me is, I don't have any manufacturing
facilities in my district, per se, but it is a lot more sexy to
talk about ships and planes and things like that. But we have
got a real problem as far as quality of life for our men and
women that are manning these systems. We have got a shortfall
that goes 50 years out into the future.
It seems the argument changes every few years. I remember
back in the beginning, if you weren't for the B-1, you weren't
for God and country and apple pie. That was the thing, the B-1:
We have to have the B-1, and don't give away the canal. That
was on everybody's political mind.
I just wanted to make one other point--somebody, Norm,
talked about the halt phase, and that is very important. I
understand that. But I don't foresee that we would have a real
threat in the future that would have to deal with the halt
phase.
But just say we did. The overall plan that you have put
into effect, I feel sure, dealt with the halt phase, but you
have got to have some other stuff to back up after you first
initiate the halt phase. If you go too far the other way, would
that take away some of the effectiveness of the overall
operation?
Does that make any sense?
General Hawley. I think that is my argument for balance,
sir. We do need that balance, so you can deal with the halt
phase, and then you can have a sustained capability to engage a
determined foe after that.
As to the B-1, I quibble with the word ``downgrade.'' We
rerolled it.
Mr. Hefner. I was oversimplifying it.
General Hawley. In fact, we have significantly upgraded the
capabilities of the B-1 in the conventional area in order to
give the CINCs that tool they need during the halt phase to put
a lot of firepower on target quickly, which it will do along
with the B-2 and B-52. So I would quibble with that a little
bit. And it has been in the fight. It is just that it was
unseen.
During the Gulf War, we took a number of B-52s off alert
and the nuclear commitment in order to make them available to
do conventional work in the theater, and we put the B-1 on
alert to back them up. At that time, that is what it was best
at, the nuclear mission. So it freed up other forces.
Mr. Hefner. It never flew any missions.
General Hawley. It didn't fly any missions.
Mr. Hefner. I guess I am not knowledgeable enough about the
strategic planning for future wars, but one of my big concerns,
having been on Military Construction for all these years, my
big focus has been on quality of life for our guys that man
these sophisticated weapons. and I guess people get tired of
hearing it, but to me, it is a little bit ridiculous when we
talk about the most sophisticated weapons that man could
conceive and you have still got guys living in conditions that
they have to walk across an unpaved parking lot to take a
shower and living in facilities that were, some of them, around
in World War II.
To me, that is just about as critical as all the other
stuff. If you don't have retention and you don't have morale,
then it is not going to make that much difference; people are
not going to be that committed.
I don't have an argument with your--I don't know about your
models or what you have used or what-have-you. Norm is our
expert here. But I am concerned that we should know where we
are going, because our money is so limited, it is about dollars
any more, and we have got to make sure that we spend them in a
prudent manner in my view.
Mr. Hamre. May I just very briefly say I think it is very
important you bring that up. This is not a decision about
spending $300,000 in fiscal year 1998. This is really about,
are we prepared to enter into a $20 billion commitment over the
next 15 years, and what is it that you have to give up if you
want to go into that, because we feel our top line is
constrained.
We just have gone through the budget negotiations that
clearly indicate we have a constrained top line. Therein lies
that very painful choice. There isn't a person sitting in this
room that doesn't want exactly the same thing. In the next
conflict, we want our people walking off the airplane carrying
a flag, and not carried off an airplane under a flag. Everybody
wants that. But that means we have to go through that very
painful process of looking at all of the things that the
Department needs and deciding what is an appropriate balance.
This was a hard decision. It didn't come easy. We would
much rather have more B-2s, much rather have barracks. We still
have guys living in deplorable conditions in Korea, and it is a
shame, it is a real shame. That is all of the things that we
had to struggle with. That is why we didn't come to this with
any joy. This was a hard decision.
Mr. Hefner. I am glad you mentioned Korea.
Just one second. General Ladd, who was at Fort Bragg and
Korea, came before this Committee and begged and pleaded, and
we gave $40 million to upgrade the living conditions in Korea.
That was atrocious, expecting these people to be on the front
lines. And we can talk about all the sophisticated weapons, but
there is a human element out there. They are counting on us to
look after them.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Young. Mr. Bonilla.
QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW
Mr. Bonilla. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would just like to start out by concurring with your
opening statement, Dr. Hamre. I am proud this Committee is
dealing with a serious issue here rather than some of the
things reported on the evening news each night. I am convinced
that a lot of that initiative results from people who are,
frankly, regularly trying to make a mockery of the military,
and I find it disgusting. I am delighted that this Committee
has chosen to discuss this very important issue.
It also ties into what I believe philosophically overall.
There are a lot of other agencies in Washington who, quite
frankly, waste and squander billions of dollars. No one is out
there asking for a comparable QDR for the Commerce Department
or the Energy Department or for the bureaucracy of the
Education Department. I wonder why we don't have a call out
there for comparable QDRs on some of these agencies.
It seems like the agendas that the Dan Rathers of the world
each night have are to constantly hammer the Defense Department
and constantly hammer one other area, and that is the
Agriculture Department. But no one will go in and do comparable
reporting on HUD or Energy or Commerce or some of these others.
So that bothers me, frankly, not just as a Member of Congress,
but as a citizen of this country.
Unfortunatley, we are faced with having to make decisions
within the Defense Department as to what we are going to pay
for in the future.
The chairman asked a good question in his opening statement
that I would like to have elaborated on, if I could, and Dr.
Hamre almost started to answer this a minute ago. But what
might we have to give up to fund an expanded B-2 program, and
are the trade-offs worthwhile? What are we talking specifically
about--I am talking about a hypothetical reality that we may
face here.
Are we talking about eliminating, cutting back on, another
aircraft like the F-22 or the joint strike fighter, or is there
something else with a comparable pricetag that we could look at
if we choose not to go with the recommendations of the QDR?
Mr. Hamre. May I just make a very general comment, and then
I would ask Dave McCloud to speak to what we did in the
analysis that led to the recommendation in the QDR.
The easiest money in town is other people's money. It is
always easy to say I would like somebody else, the Air Force
would love to have two fewer Army divisions so they could have
more F-22s, or the Army would love to get rid of TACAIR so they
could have more divisions.
We all ride our hobby horse around a little bit, but you
have to get off it and sit down and say how does it all land
because I have to pay for what is important for me. And when it
goes beyond the resources I can take care of myself, I have to
come in front of everybody else and make a good case for it.
You are absolutely in no different situation that was the
Secretary when he had to look at all of this.
Could we find room in the budget for the B-2? Of course we
could. The problem is giving things up for it. And all those
other shortfalls we have got, and we have got them all over the
place. We really did look at alternatives. Let me ask Dave to
talk about it, because the most important thing, as I say, is
you have to look at the opportunity costs. That is what led to
us.
David, General McCloud, if you would speak to that.
General McCloud. We looked at major force structure as we
went through the study, and we started out with, if you take
fighter wing equivalents, roughly 1,800 airplanes for example,
we looked at one, we looked at two, we looked at four. We
looked at carriers: Take out a carrier and its associated air
wing, take out two carriers and its associated air wing. We
looked at B-1s: Take out all of the B-1s, and that is an apples
to apples trade, so you could get an understanding.
In each case what we did, as I say, if we take out that
force structure today to pay for additional B-2s, what
happened? The general trend continued through all of those
looks. One was, as you take it out, as you free up monies to
pay for the B-2, you lose that capability. Each of those assets
I talked about--wings, carriers, bombers--has different
characteristics and capabilities, but when you take it out, you
lose that for a period of time. In general, that was a decade
or more.
So if you retired all the B-1s tomorrow, freed up the money
to pay for additional B-2s, by the time you get the B-2s on
line to take up that capability gap, it will have been roughly
10 to 14 years, depending on which of the comparisons you are
talking about.
Mr. Dicks. Will the gentleman yield to me out of my own
time, out of my next round of time?
Mr. Young. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Bonilla. I have no time.
Mr. Dicks. Could I just ask one question on this point?
Mr. Young. Go ahead. We will deduct it from your next
allocation.
PAYING FOR THE B-2
Mr. Dicks. This will be very brief.
That isn't how I see this. What you would say is, maybe we
won't buy something out there; instead, we will buy this. Why
couldn't you do it that way? Why do you have to say instead of
taking something out of the force structure right now, that you
already got--and F-16s would be the top of my list, by the way,
if you wanted to look at something that didn't have a
significant rule in the Gulf War--why not just say we are not
going to buy something that is nonstealthy that can't penetrate
and we are going to buy something that is stealthy and will
work? Why didn't you do it that way?
Mr. Hamre. I think it really is a cash flow problem, sir.
We have got to pay for $1.5 billion every year for the next 8
years in order to buy the B-2, and I can't simply use future
weapons systems not in the budget now to pay for that. I have
to pay for it right now. The only way to pay for it right now
is with force structure, frankly.
Mr. Dicks. We are talking about $1.5 billion over 6 years.
It isn't like a lot of money, John. That isn't how you do it,
John. You take it out of lower priority stuff and make room for
it.
Mr. Young. I would have to say we are barely touching the
surface of a lot of issues members are going to get to. We have
to stick to the 5-minute rule.
Mr. Dicks. Take that out of my time. This is a crucial
point, and I wanted to get to it.
Mr. Young. Mr. Nethercutt.
Mr. Nethercutt. Mr. Chairman, I came late. I know Mr.
Cunningham and Mr. Istook were ahead of me. Let me come back
after they finish.
Mr. Young. That is fine with me.
Mr. Istook.
B-2 Delivery Dates
Mr. Istook. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I wanted to ask really about two particular points. One
relates to this trade-off issue that you are discussing, and
that was in your testimony, General McCloud. If you could
quantify for us the current plan to finish off the purchase of
the B-2s, what are the delivery dates and operational dates,
because you thought it was a crucial factor. How long would it
be before additional bombers were delivered or operational? I
would like to have that information fleshed out.
Also I realize that sometimes that is a variable, but I
realize it is not as variable when you are building bombers as
when you are building fighters.
The second point to which I would like to get a response:
We are talking about the capabilities of 16 operational B-2s
out of 21 total, but I haven't heard anything mentioned about
what happens when a system has that few aircraft. If you lose
one bomber, that is 6 percent of your operational capability.
I haven't heard how that was accounted for in your study.
When you place assets at risk, even though this particular one
is designed for risk, I don't know if the word is defend
itself, but how do you make it less susceptible to being lost?
Nevertheless, I haven't heard anything that factors in what
happens when you have such a small number when you have any
losses whatsoever. Doesn't that really expand a lot of your
risk and therefore diminish a lot of the potential capability
that you are going to have?
I would like to hear those two things accounted for on the
delivery and operational dates and potential losses.
General McCloud. In the delivery and operational dates,
basically let me take an example. I think that will help
outline it.
If we retired all the B-1s tomorrow and we started freeing
up the money to pay for additional B-2 production, those monies
freed up immediately would mean the first airplane delivery
would be roughly 2003.
Mr. Istook. First additional airplane.
General McCloud. The first additional bomber, 2003.
Could Northrop do a different profile? They probably could.
We believed this was a reasonable profile to do. So part of
that, the up front cost there is associated with essentially
putting the production line back together, gearing up, getting
the work force in place, starting that process. It takes time
to build these very complex airplanes.
Mr. Istook. Of the 21, when is the last delivery date on
the current profile?
General McCloud. What I was describing for you was B-1s
versus B-2s. In this case, the worth of the B-1 frees up enough
money to buy 16 B-2s. One fighter wing equivalent frees up
enough money to buy a certain number of B-2s. We have 21 B-2s
in place today.
Mr. Istook. 21 have not been delivered?
General McCloud. Correct.
Mr. Istook. When is the last delivery date?
General Hawley. As you know, they are going through an
upgrade program. In the year 2000, we will have all the
airplanes.
Mr. Istook. And as far as the issue I raised about what
happens when you lose even a single one, much less if you have
multiple losses?
General Hawley. That is essentially what the five BAI
airplanes will have to cover. I am not the expert here, but I
have a note passed to me that says ------ DAWMS, during the
halt phase, ------. If we fought a major conflict and used this
conflict, and if the models are right--and I am not here to
defend models, but they are the best we have got ------ you
would have two left to support your tests and your depot
program and so on and so forth.
Typically in most of our force structure, we program 10
percent addition for BAI, so you would still have 10 percent
left at the end of that campaign.
Mr. Istook. That is modeling one major engagement ------.
If, for example, you had a scenario where there are two
engagements----
General Hawley. That was two, sir.
Mr. Istook. That had two engagements, different parts of
the globe, using the B-2 for halt in both of those?
General Hawley. Right.
Mr. Istook. ------?
General Hawley. ------.
Mr. Istook. Thank you.
Mr. Young. Mr. Sabo.
B-2 MAINTAINABILITY
Mr. Sabo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome. I have a question that doesn't relate to the
question of whether we should have more or not, but I am very
serious about General Hawley's testimony on the operations of
the B-2 which says in effect, if I understand it right, that
they can only be used once a week? So it true that the
maintenance after a flight requires so much time, so they are
only used once a week?
General Hawley. Yes, sir. The way we are operating the
airplane today is, we will fly two or three times a day for
training, and then we stand it down for as long as necessary.
As it turns out, necessary is about six days to make sure that
we sustain the stealthy characteristics of the airplane to the
levels that are required to support our commitments of General
Habiger.
Mr. Sabo. The turnaround is seven days. What is it for a B-
52 or B-1?
General Hawley. We don't have that problem with the
nonstealthy airplanes. This is a function of the materials used
to deliver the stealthy characteristics of the airplane. Many
of those have significant cure times. We have some material on
the B-2 that must cure for up to three days. If a blemish
occurs, and they occur on every flight, what we try to do is go
in and try to restore the finish, if you will, of the airplane
to like new conditions so that it retains the fullest measure
of stealth that we can deliver to the CINC in the event that he
should need it.
General Habiger. If I could add, my requirement for the
nuclear was plan is to have ------.
That is what General Hawley referring to. In order to get
------, he has to go through this maintenance program on the
composites in the wing and that sort of thing.
Mr. Sabo. What is the time required for the F-117?
General Hawley. The F-117 has similar materials. It is a
much smaller airplane, of course, and it has a different nature
of material. We use a lot of what we call putty on the F-117s.
When it comes back from a flight, a crew chief can actually
repair the F-117 using this putty and get it back in the air
pretty quickly, so we don't have the same kind of standdown
requirement. But it is a whole different generation of
material.
One of the things we are trying to do with the B-2 is
upgrade those materials, and in fact we are migrating much of
the materials technology out of the F-22 program and the joint
strike fighter program in order to gradually upgrade the
materials so we can reduce this need for long standdowns after
flight.
Mr. Sabo. What is the projected turnaround on the F-22
versus our current fighters?
General Hawley. The requirement for the F-22 is to be able
to sustain on the order of a 3.0 sortie rate per day. It is not
supposed to degrade in this day. That is why it is nice to
migrate those materials into the B-2 program so over time we
can upgrade the surface finish on the airplane to be more
durable.
Mr. Sabo. Is the material on the F-117 better than the B-2?
General Hawley. Different. I think you are talking
different generations of stealth technology. The F-117, of
course, was essentially our first stealthy airplane, so in fact
there are five different kinds of 117s. If you really went out
and looked at them, you would find five different sets of
materials on that fleet of barely 40 airplanes.
So you have got--as that technology matured, we changed the
surfaces on the F-117. The B-2 was delivered with a next
generation technology, and then, of course, as we have invested
in further stealth technologies in both our technology
programs, the F-22 and JSF, we will further improve the
technologies.
Another thing we use is a tester. One of the difficulties
we have is, it is hard to tell whether a blemish is, in fact, a
serious problem for the airplane. You may have after a flight
20 blemishes.
If I were to use an analogy, any of us who fly airplanes,
we look at what we call the 781, the airplane forms, before we
fly. On the back page of the 781 is a list of discrepancies on
the airplane. They have little red dashes next to them which
indicate it is okay to fly with them.
Our problem today is, when we send a crew chief out to look
at the B-2 after it lands, he really doesn't have any way, he
or she, to tell whether a blemish is a red dash, which you can
fly with, or a red X, which is grounding and has to be
repaired.
So our policy, in order to make sure that we have the most
stealthy aircraft that we can provide to the warfighter, is to
fix them all and fix them all immediately after flight. So that
is what has generated this kind of fly one, maintain six.
F-117 Production
Mr. Sabo. When was the last F-117 produced?
General Hawley. I would have to get back to you with that
answer. It was in the early eighties.
Mr. Sabo. That was before most of the B-2s were built.
General Hawley. Correct. The B-2 was in development.
Mr. Sabo. If the material for the F-117 was better, why
wasn't that used in the B-2?
General Hawyley. It is not that it is better, it is
different. It is an earlier generation, and it is designed
against a slightly different problem. The B-2 was developed, of
course, as a nuclear bomber, and it was designed to have a more
balanced signature reduction than the 117. The 117 was
primarily designed ------. The B-2 is designed to have a more
balanced signature ------. So it requires a different set of
materials, different kinds of technology in order to produce
it.
Mr. Young. The gentlemen's time has expired.
Mr. Cunningham.
Quadrennial Defense Review
Mr. Cunningham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You have stated
that the DAWMS is based on balance, but yet it is disputed as
not effective. If I was a lawyer, I think I would tear apart
your argument.
I looked at the QDR. The QDR was based not on what is the
real need and the real shortfall in dollars, but was based on
fiscal constraints, what bang can we get for the dollars that
we have. I think that is wrong.
I also know that the QDR is nothing like what went to the
White House. I know the board members and I talked to them
individually, and we are going to have hearings on that to show
the disparity of the preconceived analysis that came out of
QDR.
I would take a look and say what is the real problem? First
of all, why are we in this constraint? Why do we have to phase
in the difficult decisions that you are making right now?
First of all, the White House has had a propensity to cut
defense. Second, BRAC, including the proposed additional BRAC
rounds cost lots of money upfront. Third, ``defense
conversion'' is the cry of the left and the way to take DOD
dollars. Peacekeeping, I even read in the wire service that the
Southern Command is going to go down and protect endangered
species in South America.
Then we take a look at the contingencies in the OPTEMPO and
the equipment use. And then, last of all, those that want to
decrease the defense spending have always said we are going to
do it in the out years, just like the President. We are going
to do it in the out years. Trust me, we will build it up in the
out years. But they know good and well there is no way in the
out years you are going to be able to afford the things that
you need because of the deficit that you created. And that is
what the QDR does. It takes and causes the military to cut out
of its own bone marrow to make up the deficiencies of defense
spending in the past. And that is upsetting.
You say it yourself, the fiscal constraints we have, we
have to operate under. But why do we have those fiscal
constraints? I think that is the important thing that we are
not really attacking. What do we do when we have two babies and
we can only feed one? We kill one baby. That is not very good,
in my opinion.
The QDR, you know that Captain O'Grady wasn't even ACM-
trained when he got shot down because you didn't have the
assets to train him? You take a look at your adversary program,
it is deficient across the board. You said readiness. These
kind of things that we need to take a look at and say what is
the threat and what do we need and identify the dollars versus
this is what we have got. This is a direction that is totally
wrong in my opinion.
When most of us served in the military, we always assumed
the enemy had more than we thought he did, and that way we
didn't get caught with our pants down. Now, we are saying that
the Cold War is over, we are not going to need these assets.
Well, what if we do? ------. Why? How about the three
Typhoon-class nuclear submarines that they just dropped and the
three deep submersibles going down to the bottom of the
Atlantic using welded and molded titanium? How about the SU-27,
35 and 37 that is going to be at the Paris Air Show that
doesn't even give parity to our F-15 and F-14 with the A-10 and
the advancements we can't even talk about here?
I mean, we are saying what if. In the meantime, who is
going to pay for it? You talk about retention, because we can't
take care of the kids back home. It is not just the airlines
that are hiring that causes retention problems. You may say
before a hearing it is okay.
I go out into the street like you do, and you know who is
against this study and you know who is against the QDR? The
flag officers retired, not under the tentacles of the White
House. They are laughing. They say they cannot believe these
studies and what they are doing to the national security
forces. Instead of doing it the other way. I mean, we are
talking Air Force, we are talking Navy, I talked to ANA, I
talked to Marine Corps folks, and I guarantee you, General
Krulak, when he made statements like that in the hearings, I
was walking out, he had phone calls with OSD and the White
House before he got out of the building for saying what was
really needed. So did Admiral Boorda when he was alive.
I think that is the real concern in these things, we are
not meeting the threat. We are not talking about what do we
really need. Rather, we are talking here are the dollars we
have available. Live with it I think we need to identify what
are the dollar shortfalls so that we can have the B-2 like the
Air Force wanted it in the first place, and the B-1, instead of
getting our kids killed, which is, in my opinion, happening. We
are not going to have them come back with flags. They are going
to come back in body bags.
Mr. Young. The gentleman's time has expired.
Budget Shortfalls
Mr. Hamre. May I make one point. Sir, I missed probably
half of the last sessions on the QDR because I was spending my
time up here trying to get a budget negotiation to support the
President's budget level, and, indeed, we were modestly
successful, but we failed in the year 2003 budget numbers. I am
short $6 billion with the budget agreement that was negotiated.
I would love to have more money. There isn't anybody that
doesn't feel we couldn't give you a stronger Defense Department
if we had more money. And the criticism that you lodge, we all
feel very intently. We are now going to have a defense program
that will consume 2.9 percent of our GNP. I think that is
pretty cheap insurance. But I don't think, because we were
wrestling with it ourselves, there isn't support for more money
up here on the hill.
In fact, we have a problem. We spent late into the night
trying to avoid another $6 billion cut to our budget, and,
thankfully, all of you were with us, and we won that by only
two votes.
Mr. Cunningham. I agree. All I am asking is the White House
and you and my blue-belly friends here--I say that with
respect, they know that--but would identify that it is the
dollar shortfall, not that we have to cut out of bone marrow.
That is not the issue going out before us.
Mr. Young. Let me make one brief announcement. Our guests
have agreed that they could come back at 1 o'clock for a one-
hour continuation of this very interesting hearing, so from
1:00 to 2:00 we will continue. We will continue now until
12:00. Most of you indicated you could be back at 1 o'clock.
The other Members that have already left, we are polling them.
So that will be our plan, so go now until 12:00, and then be
back here at 1:00 for another concentrated hour on this issue.
I would like to yield to Mr. Visclosky for his 5 minutes.
B-2 Maintainability
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Hawley, if I could get back to Mr. Sabo's line of
questioning, I understand the concept that there are different
stealth materials involved, and that some are better than
others and that there are different purposes.
What I am having a hard time understanding is if you have a
sophisticated aircraft such as the B-2 and it is used three
times, that potentially it is then on the ground for 6 days.
General Hawley. We adopted that profile because the
airplane is not as durable as it was supposed to be when
delivered. Frankly, our requirement was for an airplane that we
could fly, turn and fly again, and we did not get that kind of
durability on the airplanes as they are currently delivered. --
----.
So we fly the airplane multiple times for training in one
day. Every time the airplane flies, defects occur. We have bird
strikes, at low altitude we have a lot of turbulence. The
turbulence has tape backs. Believe it or not, there is tape on
the surface of this airplane. Other defects occur. So after it
recovers from all that training activity, some of which is
tough, and do landings which are tough on the airplane, all of
the training requirements for the pilots, then it has some
defects.
One of our shortcomings with the B-2 and with the F-117
today is that we don't have a tool that I can give to my crew
chiefs so they can assess the importance of those defects. So
they really have to assume that every defect must be repaired
in order to assure the signature of the airplane for the
mission. So we go repair them all. And it takes us about 6
days.
It doesn't take 6 days of steady work. They go repair a
piece of the airplane and it requires the application of new
tape or new sealant or whatever, and then it has to cure for
some period of time. In some cases, it takes as much as 72
hours, like a new windshield in a car. You take your car down
and get a windshield put in, it takes some time, because it has
to cure, the sealant around the windshield. These fixtures have
to cure for, in some cases, up to 3 days in order to complete
the fix. And it has to stay in a climate-controlled hangar
during that period of time.
So on average, it is taking us about 6 days to get the
signature of the airplane fully restored after we fly it about
three times in one day.
Mr. Dicks. Would my colleague yield for a brief question?
Mr. Visclosky. No. On the fighter you said you had five
other variants of the stealth material. We have 21 B-2s. Are
there variations, and if there are on the B-2, have they
improved? Then my follow-up question, and I will then yield to
the gentleman. We are talking about potentially purchasing more
of these aircraft. I do find it amazing that you would have
them parked that long. If we are going to invest in additional
aircraft----
General Hawley. There are two kinds of B-2s on the flight
line. We have block 20. The block 30 is the fully upgraded
airplane that has the final configuration to include the most
stealthy configuration of the fleet. And that is what we will
be converting all of the B-2s to, so by the year 2000, when
they have all either been delivered as block 30's or
retrofitted to the block 30 configuration, they will all look
alike.
Mr. Visclosky. Will maintenance be simplified? Will the
period of time be shortened?
General Hawley. We are making progress every day as we
improve the materials, migrate technology from other weapons
programs onto this airplane. So I think it will be better. But
we have to invest some money in that, and that is kind of what
we have to work on within the Air Force, is identifying those
upgrades and trying to improve that durability of the
signature. We don't have a fix today for that. We still have to
invent it.
Mr. Visclosky. I yield.
F-117 IN GULF WAR
Mr. Dicks. In the Gulf War, the F-117 in the first two
weeks of the war, with two percent of the assets, took out
something like 38 percent of the targets, and not one was shot
down. So it appears to me whatever little defects they had, it
certainly didn't slow down General Horner's utilization of this
aircraft during the Gulf War.
General Hawley. That is true.
Mr. Dicks. So, I mean, in wartime you are going to use this
airplane, you are going to go out there and stop the enemy with
it. If you have a flaw or defect, you might lose a couple
airplanes. In fact, I think it makes a major argument for
making sure you buy additional B-2s so you can get a fix on
this thing so you have a more survivable airplane.
Thank you.
General McCloud. Can I comment on that very briefly? The F-
117 in the early days literally had radar-absorbant coatings
that were glued on to the airplane, top of the wings, bottom of
the wings. In those early days of flying the machine, which we
did at the Tonopah test range in the desert, it was not unusual
to come back from a mission and have a 4-foot section peeled
off the bottom of your airplane. We went from there, invested
some money with the contractor, Lockheed, and they developed
through the auto industry a robotic spraying technique to put
the same type of materials on, but through very precision
spraying.
That dramatically changed the equation in stealth
technology. Those types of advancements are being made all the
time. That is why we have high confidence that an airplane like
the F-22, when you sit it on the ramp outside at Langley Air
Force Base, will last and be very durable. But it has taken 15
years to get to this stage.
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you very much.
STEALTH CAPABILITIES
Mr. Istook. Mr. Chairman, one point that hasn't been
mentioned that I would like to make certain of from General
Hawley. When you are talking about this layover period of time
for the plane, you are only talking about assuring the stealth
capabilities. This doesn't affect airworthiness?
General Hawley. That is correct. The time is strictly
required to maintain the signature characteristics of the
airplane. It is done to make sure that for its nuclear mission
it is ready, and the nuclear mission is the most demanding,
because it has not other support. It is going to go in alone.
It is going to go into a potentially very heavily defended
environment, and we want to make sure that we provide the air
crew with the most survivable airplane that we can. So we are
taking these measures in order to do that. It has nothing to do
with airworthiness, with the avionics on the airplane. They are
all very good. In fact, I reviewed the status of this airplane
twice a wee, and our supply stats have been getting better at a
dramatic rate. It flies well. It is a good airplane.
Mr. Young. Mr. Cunningham for 10 seconds.
Mr. Cunningham. I support the B-2, but I don't want to
fight on false assumptions. If we had not had air superiority,
air dominance in Desert Storm, we would have lost 117's. That
is why the balance is needed over the target, because I can
shoot down F-15s with A-4 Skyhawks by putting a picket out
there, with no radar. It is important to have a balance in air
superiority.
B-2 ACQUISITION COSTS
Mr. Young. Mr. Cunningham makes an excellent point. I want
to change the subject just a little in the last few minutes
remaining.
The proposal to buy nine additional B-2s, 1, 2, 3 and then
3, the fly-away cost estimated by the contractor is $9.3
billion over the life of the program. The DAWMS estimate is
$20.8 billion for the same program, but DAWMS includes some
military construction for the forward operating locations,
upgrades of $1.7 billion, O&S and indirect costs of $4.7
billion, coming to a total of $20.8 billion. That is more than
twice as much as the contractor is estimating.
John, where do we really stand on the actual cost of this
and the requirements that go along with the procurement of the
additional nine airplanes?
[Chart follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Hamre. Yes, sir. We prepared a little handout to try to
give a crosswalk that would explain the relationship between
these. As you see, there are three items that were not in the
contractor's estimate, but you wouldn't criticize them for it.
It wouldn't be their responsibility to do that. For example,
the military construction, the upgrades, which we really
probably want to do with the existing fleet anyway, and the O&S
and indirect support costs. So you wouldn't criticize Northrop
for not having those costs.
Mr. Dicks. This is a 20-year ownership package, not just
flying the airplane.
Mr. Hamre. The real difference is it is a $9.3 billion
investment program compared to our estimate, which is $13.8
billion. Both of them are large amounts of money, and both of
them are spent over the next 4 to 5 years. This is an enormous
near-term cost commitment that we would have to finance inside
our top line that has been frozen through the budget
negotiations. So it is going to displace $13.8 billion worth of
program content. That is why it became a very difficult thing
for us in the QDR.
Mr. Young. I wanted to get this information on the record,
because there was this great difference. What you are saying is
that the $9.3 billion would be the fly away cost of the
airplane.
Mr. Hamre. Just the airplane. Our estimate is it is $12.4
billion. We think there are some----
Mr. Young. Your estimate is $12.4 billion, right. You show
$1.4 billion for support----
Mr. Hamre. Support, gear, things of that nature.
Mr. Young. The point is that the nine aircraft aren't
really usable unless you have the additional----
Mr. Hamre. That is right.
Mr. Young. The upgrades, the MILCON, the indirect costs, et
cetera.
Mr. Hamre. The head-to-head comparison is $9.3 or $13.8
billion, but it still represents a $20 billion commitment that
we would be making here.
Mr. Young. For the record, let's quickly indicate the
amount of money that the nine additional aircraft would cost in
the fiscal year 1998 appropriations. How much would have to be
appropriated?
Mr. Hamre. My understanding is it is approximately $300,
$350 million, something like that, which is to get it started.
Mr. Young. What would be the fiscal year 1999 requirement?
Mr. Hamre. I think that is like $1.1 billion. I don't have
that number right in front of me or in my mind. I think it is
like $1.1 billion. Then it goes to $1.5 billion per year.
Mr. Dicks. That is right.
Mr. Hamre. That is the contractor's number.
Mr. Young. I am looking at a paper that says $1.8 billion.
Mr. Hamre. Maybe it is $1.8 billion.
Mr. Young. And $1.8 billion in 2000, $1.7 billion in 2001,
$1.9 billion in 2002.
Mr. Hamre. Those are probably right.
Mr. Young. These are the contractor's figures.
Mr. Hamre. Then we would have some extra costs probably on
top of that, sir.
Mr. Dicks. Do you have another copy of those, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Hamre. We would be glad to go over and validate any of
this. But I think, sir, you are raising a very important point.
The decision to add $300 million this year, $350 million this
year, simply presumes we are going to add the $1.6 billion next
year, and we are not. We don't have the money for it.
Mr. Young. Let's assume that the contractor's numbers are
accurate, the $1.8 billion for next year. How much would you
have to add to that for support, spare parts, MRSP, production
costs, upgrades, indirect costs, et cetera?
Mr. Hamre. I will get you an answer for the record. My
suspicion is that will lag a couple of years. You don't need to
have the support gear, because it is a shorter production
cycle, so you probably don't need that much more immediately in
fiscal year 1999.
Mr. Young. When will you estimate that you would need that?
Mr. Hamre. Permit me to come back to you. We will get you a
very prompt response. I will do that promptly.
Mr. Young. I expect that you all have noticed that this
Committee is full of supporters of the B-2. I think that
General Hawley spoke to it very effectively, that he would like
to have a lot more that he could provide to the CINCs when they
call on him for bombers. But we also have the problem of--
suppose we can afford the down payment this year--are we
responsible if we make the down payment this year, but can't
afford the payments in the out years? That is what we have to
wrestle with.
Mr. Hamre. Sir, we wrestle with that, too. If you were to
put in the $300 million, we just don't have the money to do the
follow-through. We would confront this very same problem next
year and it would be much larger, because we just don't have
the resources.
B-2 Capabilities
Mr. Dicks. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make just a couple
comments on this point. First of all, you know, as General
Horner says, and I believe this, you must look at the value.
Mr. Hamre is very good at giving us numbers, but you have got
to look at what you are buying and what you get for it compared
to all the other things you are buying and what you get for it.
I would argue that you get a lot more with the B-2 and the
smart conventional weapons than with any other conventional
system.
As we go to START II or START III, as you downgrade your
strategic forces, you have fewer strategic forces. A bomber
that can go both ways, that can be used in the nuclear role and
used in the conventional role, I believe, becomes much more
valuable.
The third point, the industrial base is there and alive
now. If we don't do this now, then the industrial base goes
away and we have to spend $25 billion to get back to where we
are producing a new bomber. So if you are ever going to do
this, this is the time to do it, because you have the line
open, it will be least expensive now, than if you start 15
years from now or 10 years from now.
Again, the idea that this is the last bomber we are ever
going to build, I must tell you makes my stomach turn. The fact
that this administration, as Secretary White said, this is the
last bomber we are going to build, I can't believe this is the
policy of this administration. Again, I look forward to the
afternoon session.
Mr. Young. I appreciate very much the fact you are willing
to come back at 1 o'clock. I wish we could just continue on,
but a number of Members have commitments right now. We will
concentrate the balance of the hearing from 1:00 to 2:00.
John, you wanted to say something and I cut you off.
Mr. Hamre. I was just going to say I am a budget geek. I
don't pretend that I can speak to military value. That is, I
look to see those people who have spent their careers in the
military, and there is not dissent among the senior people in
the Department. Every chief and every CINC has said they agree
with this recommendation. It isn't just a finance weeny that
decided this.
PAYING FOR THE B-2
Mr. Young. I wanted to ask any one of you who would like to
respond, if we were to move ahead with the B-2 program, I know
that in the DAWNS you have exercised various options on how to
pay for it. Could one of you give us an example of maybe three
or four of the top options for paying for the B-2 program?
Mr. Hamre. Why don't I begin, and then I would welcome
anyone else to join in. I think this is a very hard question to
answer, because it gets to the core of how we build budgets in
the Department. It is rarely a case where you put in one thing
and you take out one thing. It tends to be in the mix. But,
unfortunately, as we are building things up, everybody that
comes to the table comes with shortfalls.
I look at the shortfalls, frankly, that are in our 1998
budget request. We didn't get into our 1998 budget request.
Frankly, I think we have written several letters to you. We
were short on our medical program this year. We were short by
$550 million, I think, growing to $650 million on our flying
hours for the flight force for the Navy and Air Force, things
that will affect readiness if we can't get additional funds in
1998. We have gone through a number of discussions and I have
with Mr. Dicks about some special intelligence capabilities,
enormously important programs.
Mr. Young. I don't think you satisfied him on that
conversation.
Mr. Hamre. He is not satisfied on that. I have broken his
heart on that one, too. So there are a number of things that
really come to the table with just this year. We probably have
$1 billion of things that we need you to help us with this
year, and things that we want in the Department. Then, of
course, there are things that others want intensely for us up
here on the Hill. We have got destroyers that people think we
need fairly badly, and we have got just a whole range of things
that people are anxious for us to have.
My experience has been there isn't anybody up here that is
asking us to support something they want that we genuinely
don't need. It is a question of priorities, how high a priority
it is. So coming to answer the question that you have posed,
Mr. Chairman, which is what would we give up or what two or
three things would we consider?
First of all, the actual truth is we wouldn't do it even if
you put in some money this year, because we don't have things
that we would take out to take out next year, so we would be
coming back to you again a year from now, but in this case a
year from now it is not a $300 million problem, it is going to
be a $1.8 billion problem. And unlike this year, where you have
$2.8 billion or $3 billion to add, next year we are going to be
submitting a budget resolution number, and you now have to
displace $1.8 billion worth of program next year to make room
for this.
You will be confronting next year exactly the condition
that the Secretary found himself in this year, where he was
saying I have to knock things out.
When you sit down with the chiefs, when you sit down with
the CINCs, everybody is coming to the table with things they
really need, and it is really a balancing process. There is no
algorithm or no computer program we have that says on the
margin, how would you want to spend another $1 billion or how
would you like to spend $1 billion less if you had to cut it
out.
As I said, there is a tendency for everyone to look to
somebody else's service to offer the money. The Navy would love
to have the Army be smaller and use the money for aircraft
carriers, and the Air Force would love to take fewer carrier
battler groups or something. When you get down to it, the true
requirements in our business is what are you prepared to pay
for; what do you think is so important for warfighting you are
prepared to pay for it?
This is where the trade-offs then become in aviation, and
in TACAIR, and with the terrible dilemma that the Air Force and
the Navy and these CINCs have when they are looking at, as I
say, I have to worry about a broad spectrum of things, not just
the halt phase, although the halt phase is very important. I
have to worry about all kinds of things. So it really has to go
into that process.
That is what led us to say we don't have the 300 million
this year, we don't have the $1.8 billion next year, we don't
have the $20 billion over the next 5 years for this. We do very
much want to keep the B-1 fleet we have, and to upgrade it, and
that becomes our first priority.
Mr. Young. Dr. Hamre, thank you very much.
Would any of the generals like to respond to that?
General Habiger. Mr. Chairman, just to make one comment,
sir. In addition to the issues that Dr. Hamre just discussed,
in an arms control environment, I would have to give up
something for those nine additional airplanes, because they
would count against the force structure I have got today. I
have got a good balance today between bombers, missiles, and
submarines. So there is another price to pay in terms of giving
something up, and I, at this particular point, wouldn't
particularly want to give up anything in that regard.
Mr. Young. Mr. Dicks.
Halt Phase
Mr. Dicks. Well, Mr. Chairman, on this issue, this is a
very important issue, and I can say, sitting on this Committee
for 19 years, that I have watched this Committee every single
year go through that budget that many comptrollers have
submitted up here, and we cut money out of that budget. Every
single year we find items that for one reason or another are
low priority items and in a $250 billion budget, you can find
$1.5 billion if you want to.
I could go through that R&D section of the budget and I
could get you $1.5 billion without any sweat.
In fact, you and I have had a conversation where I said to
you what about cutting 5 percent across. Do it. And maybe we
could do it that way. An that is, as far as I am concerned, the
way to do this.
It gets back to judgment and military value. General
McCloud, your notion that we are going to have warning troubles
me, we have never had a war in which we had warning. We had two
days of actionable warning at the time of the Gulf. In World
War II, surprise attack, zero actionable warning time. Very
little in Korea. I mean, it is in that situation when thousands
and thousand of American lives are at stake.
John, frankly, the halt phase is the most important phase
when it comes to losing lives and whether we are going to be
able to stop a war quickly and bring it to a quick end and save
the taxpayers' money and lives.
So having capability in the halt phase, in my judgment, is
crucially important. And one of the things we haven't talked
about, in the National Performance Review, it was very critical
of this, I said however, U.S. forces' long-term access to
foward bases, to include air bases, ports and logistical
facilities, can't be assumed.
You can't assume we are going to have carriers and be able
to fly TACIAR in the theater. Access may be granted or denied
for any number of political or military reasons. Moreover, U.S.
forces may find themselves called upon to project power in
areas where no substantial base structure exists. Perhaps more
important, with the proliferation of cruise and ballistic
missile technology, weapons of mass destruction and access to
space, the capability to hold at risk large soft targets, i.e.
carriers, at great range, will likely accrue to even regional
rogue states.
The QDR, in our in view, accorded insufficient attention to
our ability to project power under these circumstances. And
that is where the bombers come to play. And your own studies
show dramatically that you don't have enough bombers now if you
are locked out. If you can't get carriers into place and you
can't TACAIR there, then you have got nothing to rely on but
the bombers. Isn't that correct, General McCloud?
General McCloud. The study does show basically what you
said. If you were locked out and we ran problems with access,
we locked out the TACIAR, it shows that the bombers are very
effective in that halt phase.
STUDY FINDINGS
Mr. Dicks. It also shows have an insufficient bomber force
in every scenario, insufficient stealth bombers in every
scenario, isn't that correct?
Generall McCloud. It said the overall bomber force we could
get there is adequate.
Mr. Dicks. The new you can use initially, the enablers, the
B-2s. In each of the scenarios, it says you need additional
bombers in every situation, or you can lose. If you don't have
then, you can lose the war, isn't that correct?
General McCloud. What is says is that you need adequate
force in 2014 to take on that halt phase, and if you have the
extreme scenarios----
Mr. Dicks. Look at the scenarios we faced, World War II,
Korea and Desert Storm. We don't even get one that is easy like
you guys draw up on the board over there, 14 of preparation
time, under the kaminski study. Tell me when we got one like
that?
General McCloud. We ran excursions to make sure we
bracketed the problem. We did exactly what you said. That was
the purpose of the study, to look at the options----
Mr. Dicks. Didn't do it in the first bomber study, by the
way.
General McCloud. We did it in this one.
Mr. Dicks. It showed you in every situation, you need
additional bombers.
Mr. Hamre. It also said we need additional aircraft
carriers in the QDR and additional divisions. We are accepting
risk in every warfighting area.
Mr. Dicks. In this case, we have something that you know
will work, that gives you the potential to come from outside
the theater, that stops this lock-out potential. It trumps the
enemy's ability to use chemical and biological weapons on the
airfields and lock you out. It trumps that. And that is why I
see this tremendous value in having enough of it, and you can
still use it.
General Horner said he used the F-117's throughout the
entire war. It wasn't just at the front. You guys down play
this, but if you cant get TACAIR into Korea, and General Estes
worries about when he was the Air Force General over there an
told me about it, if you can't get that Air Force in there
because you are getting locked out, then our kids are going to
die. We are going to take more losses because of that.
Aircraft Carriers
With all due respect to the aircraft carriers, and I have
great respect for aircraft carriers, from Bremerton,
Washington, those planes can't do what the B-2 can do, because
they can't penetrate initially. The have to go in packages. And
the numbers you used, by the way, in this study, completely
overstate what the carriers can do or did do in the Gulf War.
You have them at 100 sorties a day, at some number like that,
when only 17 was achieved in the Gulf War.
They didn't perform very effectively, and you still don't
have a stealthy airplane coming off of there. So you have made
the comparisons even more favorable to nonstealthy airplanes
than, in fact is realistic, according to the people who have
looked at this study and know something about it and say that
you have had all kinds of assumptions in there about carriers
that are positive and not substantiated by the facts.
General McCloud. Let me respond to that briefly. In the
Gulf War, the carriers were launching somewhere between 50 and
60 sorties per day, of which about half of those were strike
sorties. The Nimitz off the cost of Washington just recently
ran 3-day exercise where they were launching between 170 and
180 sorties per day. The difference is that in those surge
rates, with airplanes that can generate more sorties, the newer
airplanes, in the year 2014, we think that is a reasonable
thing to do.
The question becomes what percentage of those go to strike,
what percentage of those go to air defense. As you evolve the
AEGIS class cruisers and destroyers and they become a principal
supporting force for the carriers, that air defense load is
going to be picked up by the long-range shooters, the surface-
to-air missiles. We don't have that capability today.
We will have it in that time period. So it will be a lower
demand for the air defense aircraft in that time period than we
see today. So a much bigger potion of the 170 sorties per day
can go to strike.
So all I am saying is what we put in the study, we
bracketed, we raise it up and down, but that 170 per day or 174
average that we used is reasonable----
Mr. Dicks. But you don't do much for self-defense. You have
to defend these things against Cruise Missiles and other
threats that are being built up. There are a whole series of
other things that affect the carrier's ability to operate, that
were not taken into account, I am told.
Mr. McCloud. Sir, that was taken into account.
Mr. Dicks. By some of your colleagues.
General McCloud. It was done by parametrically looking at
the problem and saying a portion of that force would be used
for the other missions that the Navy has to do to maintain a
balance. So we think we bracketed that problem. You can
disagree with the results, but we think we gave that a fair
sake.
Mr. Dicks. But you will admit that the attack rates, the
sorties rates for attack purposes, are dramatically higher in
the studies than they were during the Gulf War.
General McCloud. Absolutely correct.
Mr. Dicks. See, what bothers me here is you are still not
going to have a stealthy plane until you get the joint strike
fighter, and I am worried about that in terms of whether you in
actuality can do this. You have to have a number of carriers
operating together in order to do this, at least that was the
experience during the Gulf War.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Lewis. We are going to have to vote. We will
carry your time over until after the vote.
BUDGET ESTIMATES
Mr. Lewis. We could have a series of votes which could blow
this whole meeting. In that meantime, I want you all to know in
spite of our enthusiasm, Norm and I and the Chairman and others
are very appreciative of the work you are doing and it is very,
very important work. I sometimes scratch my head, though, for I
have difficulty understanding how numbers come out of the
building.
I note with interest that we got a chart yesterday, last
night, that showed this difference in cost between the
contractor and the DoD, and yet you have been working closely
with Northrop for a couple of years. So I am wondering about
that.
I am reminded of the fact that when I first got an analysis
of the air facility just off Fort Irwin, the Army gave me a
figure for developing it and so on. It was $30 million. The
next time they weren't sure they want it, the figure as $200
million. I see that happening a lot and it is of great concern
to me. When we went through the supplemental process, $4.8
billion, it has to be offset within the Department, $2.8
billion of that was specific, and then go find another $2
billion somewhere.
Having said that, I think we in our Committees have got to
be looking well into the 21st Century, 2025. You look beyond
the problems of terrorism and otherwise that we must deal with.
The challenges lie with China and the developing world, very,
very real questions of war and peace and freedom. It seems to
me the decisions we are making now are going to dramatically
impact that. And that is why I suddenly find myself going back
in the direction of stealth and the selection of the assets
that are critical to our ability to be successful in that new
environment.
So, a couple of questions. I would first like to know where
you are about developing and recommending a policy that would
move us towards this kind of feasibility of acquisition and the
trade-off beinging cutting back the number of personnel. There
is not any question the driving cost behind all of this
involves personnel, and that load over time.
I have got the National Training Center for the Army in my
district, the Marine Corps has Twenty-Nine Palms in my
district. I am concerned about the foot soldier. But, one way
or another we have to make sure we don't kill them before they
have a chance to fight.
Where is your recommendation regarding that aspect? Should
we be moving in the direction of shifting dollars away from
personnel, perhaps strengthening the Army Reserve, of a quality
and nature we see in the Air Force Reserve and cutting back? Do
you have a recommendation? General, I am asking you.
General Hawley. I don't participate in that.
Mr. Lewis. Shall we close the door and go off the record?
General Hawley. I will tell you in ACC our personnel are
stretched very thinly. So within my purview, the command I
oversee, I would be hard-pressed to say we could give up any
people in order to accommodate more force structure. It takes
people to run force structure. Ten percent of my own budget
goes to support the B-2.
Mr. Lewis. I am being very specific about the Army.
Mr. Hamre. May I speak to this?
General Hawley. Maybe somebody with a broader look than I
have.
Mr. Hamre. General Hawley has been in previous assignments
where he has these kind of broader responsibilities. He is not
in one now. He is perfectly capable to offer his own view, and
he should if you want him to.
The QDR that we are recommending already has us cutting out
200,000 people. We would be cutting out 80,000 civilians. We
will be cutting out 60,000 active duty personnel and 60,000
Reservists, already.
Mr. Lewis. No. Let me read a paragraph from something else
that says the same thing in a different way. If colonels ran
the Pentagon, the QDR might recommend the U.S. military shelf
the 2-war strategy, cut three Navy aircraft carriers, three
Army divisions, and six Air Force fighter wings, and use the
savings to invest heavily and radical new systems.
There are different views here. We have got to be looking
towards that view.
Mr. Hamre. Sir, we actually looked at that. That was one of
the paths that we explored in looking at the QDR. We didn't go
that route for a couple of reasons. One is that certainly is a
long-term view. That is a view to say I don't perceive that we
have a near peer threat my time in the next 15 years, and we
ought to be thinking out 15 years to be ready for that.
What it discounts in our mind is being ready to take on
real world challenges that could occur in the next 5 years.
Three times in the last 4 years, the Secretary of Defense has
two nearly simultaneous emergencies. Just a year ago, at the
very time we were sending the fleet to the Formosan Straits, we
were sending a reinforced brigade to Kuwait.
Deciding now you are not going to do that means that we, as
a Department, have to choose which of the--if we have two
contingencies, which are we prepared to abandon?
VIABILITY OF STEALTH
Mr. Lewis. John, I understand that. ------. There is
another question that I don't know the answer to that concerns
me a lot as we go down this pathway, which is can you tell me
what your best information is relative to the lifetime of the
value of stealth? When are we going to get to the point where
stealth isn't stealth? Have you done that sort of analysis?
General Hawley. I will take that one. Yes, we have. We have
Read Teamed Stealth, and the answer keeps coming back that we
have a very durable capability in stealth. There are no systems
on the horizon that can neutralize the advantage that we have
gained through the development of stealth technology, and our
lead in stealth technology exceeds that in most other areas of
technology. We have a huge lead in this area over the rest of
the world, which is one reason we are so anxious to protect it.
Mr. Lewis. Mr. Chairman, I think we need to learn a lot
about that subject.
Mr. Young. You still have 2 minutes left in your time
allotment. Why don't we catch two votes, it will take us maybe
3 minutes, and we will be back.
Mr. Dicks. Could I ask a couple of questions? You go ahead.
I will wait for you.
Mr. Young. Wait for us. You have a second vote coming right
away.
Mr. Dicks. I would like to proceed.
Mr. Young. Go right ahead.
Mr. Dicks. Let's go back to the subject, now that I know
what the answers are going to be. That is why I was on the
phone.
Mr. Young. Rephrase your question.
B-2 MAINTAINABILITY
Mr. Dicks. These were not asked on the record. Now we are
going to fulfill the record here.
That is one thing I learned in law school, don't ask
questions you don't know the answers for. Even I screw that up.
Let's go back to the question of the materials, General
Hawley. In terms of usability, if we were in a wartime
situation, based on what you know now, we would still use the
B-2. We don't know anything now that any of these blemishes
degrade the signature to such a point that you would feel
uncomfortable in using it, isn't that correct?
General Hawley. All of the evidence we have to date
indicates the kind of blemishes you usually experience as a
result of a flight, do not significantly degrade the signature
capability of the aircraft.
Mr. Dicks. You tested that?
General Hawley. We have tested that. We have taken
airplanes across the range that have been degraded as a result
of flights and the signature has not been significantly
degraded.
Mr. Dicks. As I understand it, we don't know anything yet
that tells us that we have got all these problems solved for
the F-22 either. So it is still an issue for the F-22, as well,
I think?
General Hawley. It is certainly to be proven in the F-22.
The SPO and the contractor say they are going to deliver a very
durable airplane.
Mr. Dicks. Is there anything we could do to fix or improve
the B-2 with the planes that are still being built to try to
take lessons learned from what we supposedly are learning in
the F-22 and incorporate it in improving the B-2?
General Hawley. In fact, we are doing that. We recently
changed out one material, a tape as it happens, that required a
72-hour cure time. We brought material in from the F-22 program
that requires a 3-hour cure time. So we got rid of 69 hours of
cure time on the fixtures to which that material is applied.
Mr. Dicks. So if, in fact, the Congress, in its wisdom,
decides to go forward, we could incorporate these improvements
and have a better plane and maybe retrofit the older ones in
order to get as much durability and to take advantage of
lessons learned, if we did go ahead with additional B-2s, is
that not correct?
General Hawley. In fact, I think that accounts for part of
the difference in the cost estimate between Northrop's estimate
and the government's estimate is to incorporate those kinds of
enhancements.
Mr. Dicks. You would recommend that?
General Hawley. I certainly would. And some others as well.
B-2 PRODUCTION
Mr. Dicks. Again, nobody would dispute if we are going to
buy additional bombers, buying them when the line is open would
be the best decision for the taxpayers. Rather than coming back
and doing a 25 to $40 billion until R&D before we could get
into production of additional airplanes. If you wee going to
buy them, isn't the time to buy them now while the line is
open?
General Hawley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hamre. Although there is still a fair amount of
nonrecurring that has to be spent in order to get it up and
running again, because a fair amount of the subcontractor
structure is gone away.
Mr. Dicks. John, you would have to agree, 15 years from
now, if you said we have to build another stealth bomber, we
are going to have to spend at least, I would say, the last
program was $22 billion, I would say you would have to do at
least 30.
Mr. Hamre. Sir, the premise of your argument is right, it
is better to do it earlier while you still have some of the
capability than to do it later when you have none of the
capability. I think it is important to note though one of the
reasons there is a price differential is we think there are a
fair amount of started up costs not captured in the Northrop
program.
Mr. Dicks. Is it true it is the Air Force plan to destroy
the tools for the B-2?
Mr. Hamre. No, sir. I believe we are using some of the
tools for its ongoing maintenance of the maintenance at depot.
Mr. Dicks. I would love for you to check on that, because I
think you are going to find it is in your plan. I plan on
stopping that if I can get the committee to agree with me. I
think they would be foolish, to get rid of the tooling for the
B-2. I understand currently that is your plan, to do away with
it. That doesn't make any sense to me at all. I hope we can
work together on that.
Mr. Young. If the gentleman would yield, what would be the
cost to close down the B-2 line?
Mr. Hamre. Sir, the cost is already embedded in our
program. I will find out what it is we are spending to shut
down the line, to orderly close out the dismantlement of tools,
if we are dismantling tools, the shipping of tools to the depot
for ongoing support where you do have a need for them. I will
find that out. That is already included in our budget.
Mr. Young. Then also, John, if you don't mind, find out
what it would cost to start up again if for some reason a
decision was made to start the B-2 program again. And for
anyone that thinks that sounds a little strange, we did exactly
that on the B-1.
Mr. Hamre. And, sir, we did that with the C-5s, and we
thought that would be cheap to start up the C-5 line again, and
it didn't turn out to be as cheap. We basically built tooling
again. We will check and find out.
B-2 STRATEGIC MISSION
Mr. Young. ------?
General Habiger. I would characterize my forces that I
would employ, if deterrence were to fail, into three
categories, three kinds of bullets, if you will. I have got
ICBM bullets which are very prompt, not very survivable. I have
the submarine bullets which are rapid reacting, but not nearly
as reactive as ICBM's, but much more survivable and accurate,
and I have bomber bullets that are, whether cruise missiles or
B-2 kind of delivered weapons, that get to the targets in a
relatively slow manner, are relatively accurate, and I can
recall them and use the resources again. ------.
I look in the overall equation, and it provides the target
coverage I need, whether it is today, 5 years from now, or 10
years from now, and, again, as I look out 10 years from now, I
don't know what the arms control environment is going to be,
but ------ will do the job. ------.
B-2 MODIFICATIONS
Mr. Young. General Hawley, do you agree with the DAWMS
study that the B-2 requires another $2 billion of investment in
modifications that are currently not programmed in order for it
to participate fully in the halt phase of a conventional
conflict?
General Hawley. I don't think I would agree that it needs
that much modification in order to participated fully I would
agree that on our list of mods that we would like to do to the
airplane, there are somewhere around $2 billion worth of mods
we would like to do to the current fleet to make it more
capable. But it can do a great job in halt phase just the way
we are getting it.
Mr. Young. So if you didn't spend the $2 billion, it would
still be an effective force in the halt phase?
General Hawley. B-2 is by far our most effective bomber,
that is right.
Mr. Young. Which would be a higher priority of investment,
the $2 billion for the modifications or the procuring of
additional B-2 aircraft?
General Hawley. In my view, we would get a greater return
on our investment by upgrading the current fleet than by adding
to the current fleet.
B-2 BASING
Mr. Young. Would there by any plan to forward base the B-2
in any of the scenarios?
General Hawley. That is our intent, is to be able to
forward deploy the airplane and operate it on a forward deploy
status. You really need to do that in order to get the number
of sorties from the airplane you would like.
Mr. Young. From what we have learned today, the B-2
requires certain types of climate control hangars to protect
it, to keep the temperatures, the moisture levels, et cetera,
proper. Are those programmed in this year's budget, John?
Mr. Hamre. Sir, the resources we have are programmed for
the existing fleet of 21. I can't say that they are actually
the 1998 budget. They are probably programmed through the
period. We don't have, of course, anything budgeted for any
extension beyond the current fleet.
Mr. Dicks. If the gentleman would yield, I don't think you
are planning on any forward deployment, money for forward
deployed B-2s at this juncture.
Mr. Hamre. Not right now.
Mr. Dicks. There is nothing in the budget for that nor
expected.
Mr. Young. The GAO says that Air Force officials said it is
unlikely that the aircraft's sensitivity to moisture and
climates or its need for controlled environment to fix LO will
ever be fully resolved, even with improved materials and repair
processes. Therefore, some form of aircraft sheltering at a
forward operating location will become a requirement in the
future if B-2s are to be deployed.
How does that fit in with what we are talking about?
General McCloud. If I could take a cut at that very
quickly, sir. In 2014, the focus of this study, we did, in
fact, put in the bomber costs, the B-2 costs in this. My set-
aside to do just what you said, to forward base it, to have the
right hangars in place to do that, so that we could closer,
generate higher sortie rates, so that was included in that, But
that is a long look out to 2014.
Mr. Dicks. Just let me raise one other point.
Mr. Young. We are down to 57 seconds left to vote. Take one
other point, I would say about a minute. Then, I think we will
cut off the hearing.
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES
Mr. Dicks. The National Defense Panel says, strategic
nuclear forces remain an essential element of our national
security strategy. Our strategic forces have been scaled back
significantly over the past decade. We believe that to move to
START II force levels should proceed even if the Duma fails to
act on START II this year. This is not the DOD issue.
Now, what they are raising here is a very significant
question. You didn't even look at nuclear weapons. With all due
respect, General, 18 Tridents, and I have eight of them right
near my district, didn't stop Saddam from coming south, nor did
the MX missile, which I was the strongest supporter of in the
United States Congress.
Mr. Young. Saddam never saw a B-2. Once he sees that, he is
really going to think twice.
Mr. Dicks. That is the point. The point is those strategic
weapons cannot be used, will not be used, unless the national
security of the country is directly threatened. So a
conventional bomber that has smart conventional weapons, that
can be utilized if deterrence fails, I think is a much greater
deterrent.
So I think we should have looked at nuclear forces in this
as well. I could put together a little package for Mr. Hamre of
where we can save some money in reducing strategic nuclear
forces that will never be used. Dr. Kissinger is completely
correct, they are there only for deterrence, and if deterrence
fails, we will not use them. And they weren't used against
Saddam.
So it is usability that seems to me to be at the highest
order. If you have to make trade-offs, you could certainly make
some reductions in nuclear weapons, as the National Defense
Panel said they may well recommend, in order to finance a
conventional weapon that can be used if deterrence fails. That
was another major selling point for the B-2 that I don't think
you have fully analyzed.
Mr. Young. We are totally out of time now. The vote is on
the floor. We will likely miss this vote if we don't hurry.
Thank you very much for coming today. We really appreciate it.
I think it has been the best hearing we have had all year, and
certainly very, very instructive and informative for all of us.
We do have some additional questions that we would like to
submit to you in writing and ask if you would respond.
As I think you all know, we will do the very best we can to
provide you with the best tools we can for you to do your jobs.
Again, thank you very much.
The Committee is adjourned.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Hefner and the
answers thereto follow:]
B-52 Aircraft
Question. Recognizing the significant combat capability of
the B-2, have you considered other alternatives to enhance the
existing bomber force? Specifically, are you looking at any
improvements to the venerable B-52 that increase capability,
extends service life and/or reduces long term operating costs?
Answer. The Air Force continues to upgrade its long-range
bomber force with conversion of the B-1 to a conventional role
and Block 30 upgrades to the B-2 bombers. With respect to the
B-52, modernization efforts are in the works to improve
communications capabilities and weapons interface improvements
that will allow utilizing future families of GPS-guided
weapons. Modifications to sustain avionics systems include
Electronic Countermeasures, Electro-optical Viewing System and
GPS Tacan improvements. The Aircraft Structural Integrity
Program (ASIP) has certified the B-52 aircraft airframe through
the year 2040.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Hefner.
Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the answers thereto
follow:]
B-2 Strategic Capabilities and Missions
Question. DOD originally justified the requirement for the B-2
solely in terms of its contribution to the strategic nuclear mission.
Today we primarily focus on modifications that make the B-2 a more
potent conventional bomber, although the aircraft nevertheless
continues to be an important part of the strategic nuclear triad. Are
the B-2s assigned to the nuclear mission at all times, or are they
assigned other missions until a threat situation requires them to chop
to you?
Answer. B-2 aircraft are tasked to support both nuclear and
conventional plans. Day-to-day operational control of B-2 aircraft is
assigned to United States Atlantic Command. When a nuclear generation
is directed by the National Command Authorities, operational control of
the B-2 is transferred from United States Atlantic Command to United
States Strategic Command.
Question. What kinds of nuclear weapons are carried by the B-2 and
how many of each can it carry?
Answer. The B-2 can carry 16 B-61-7, 16 B-83 or ------ weapons.
Question. What kinds of targets are best attacked with the B-2?
Answer. The B-2 is uniquely capable of holding hard and deeply
buried targets at risk as well as other high priority targets ------.
Question. The B-52 is the only bomber that will carry nuclear
tipped cruise missiles including the Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM)
and the Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM). General Habiger, compare and
contrast the capability of the B-2 with gravity nuclear weapons with a
B-52 with stand-off weapons. Is having to fly over each target
sequentially a limitation compared to launching multiple weapons at
multiple targets quickly from stand-off ranges?
Answer. The B-52 and B-2 each have a specific role to play in the
bomber leg of the Triad. A penetrating bomber, the B-2 with gravity
weapons is uniquely capable of holding at risk hard and deeply buried
targets. ------. They can get the job done right, the first time.
In contrast, the B-52 is essentially a truck. Its standoff
capability allows the aircraft to stay out of harms way ------.
Question. DOE is developing a glide variant of the B-61 bomb for
use on the B-2. Do you have a requirement for such a weapon? If so, how
has this requirement been documented?
Answer. The glide bomb program is an in-house DOE effort to develop
options to increase flexibility and survivability of stockpile bombs
while advancing and sustaining their technology base. ------.
B-2 Conventional Capabilities and Missions
Question. Increasingly, the B-2 is being viewed as a major
contributor to conventional missions. General Hawley, what types of
weapons can the B-2 carry now and in the future?
Answer. Our present Block 20 B-2 fleet has the USAF's only adverse
weather, near-precision weapon using the GBU-36B, GPS-Aided Munition
(GAM). The B-2 can also carry the Mk-84, and the B-61 and B-83 nuclear
weapons. When the Block 30 B-2 is delivered this summer it will be
capable of employing the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM); Mk-84,
Mk-82, and M-117 General Purpose Bombs; M-62 Sea Mines; Tactical
Munition Dispensers (TMD) capable of dispensing (CBU-87, 89, or 97
Cluster Bomb Units (CBU); and B61 and mod 7 and mod 11 and B-83 nuclear
weapons. Additionally, we are integrating BLU-113, a 5000 pound deep
penetrating weapon, with a GPS Aided Munition (GAM) tail kit. This
weapon should be available in the spring of 1998. We plan to put the
Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) and the Joint Air to Surface Standoff
Missile (JASSM) on the B-2 with JSOW capability in mid 1999 and JASSM
in mid 2003.
Question. Please characterize the types of targets and threat
situations in which you recommend using a B-2 rather than other weapons
systems, including for example B-52 launched CALCM, ship launched
Tomahawk, or tactical aircraft launched munitions?
Answer. The B-2 provides a unique combination of stealth, long
range, near precision strike, hard target kill capability, and large
payload. Other systems have some of these characteristics, but none
share them all. Selection of the B-2 rather than another weapon system
would depend on the overall situation, mix of available forces, and
target set. The B-2 is optimized for deep attack on hard targets in
heavily defended enemy airspace with line or no support. The B-2 and
cruise missiles can attack targets well behind enemy lines and are very
difficult to defend against, but CALCM and ship launched Tomahawk
weapons do not provide hard target kill capability and are
significantly more expensive than the munitions used by the B-2.
Additionally, the B-2 crew will be able to identify targets that may
have moved while they are enroute. So the B-2 would be preferred
against hard or imprecisely located targets, and cruise missiles would
be used when defenses are too heavy for even the B-2 to penetrate.
Other heavy bombers closely match the B-2 in range and payload, but the
B-2 would be used when defenses are too heavy for the B-1 or B-52.
Conventional tactical aircraft are capable of attacking targets in less
heavily defended areas with precision weapons but are less survivable
than the B-2 in the heavy threat environment. Tactical aircraft do not
provide the range and large payload carried by the B-2 but generate
higher sortie rates. Additionally, tactical aircraft other than the F-
117 and F-22 would not be able to service deep targets without
considerable support and risk to that additional support.
Question. What is the Air Force doing to remedy these apparent
deficiencies?
Answer. Each year we look at our current and future shortfalls in
all mission areas and identify solutions to meet these shortfalls.
DAWMS identified potential areas that we are looking at to upgrade the
B-2 not only to enhance its effectiveness during the halt phase, but to
ensure its effectiveness in all its mission areas and to ensure the it
remains effective within our overall force structure. We will invest in
B-2 enhancements when they provide the best overall combat capability
improvement for the amount of money available. We pursue those
solutions which most effectively solve our most pressing needs.
Question. What do you see as limitations, if any, of the B-2
aircraft relative to other forces?
Answer. With the B-2 we have been able to wrap the characteristics
of stealth, long range, large payload capacity, and the capability to
deliver near precision munitions in all weather into a total package.
However, this is the first time stealth has been applied to such a
large airframe. With any relatively new technology, there are unique
problems that have to be overcome. The primary limitation of the B-2 is
the heavy Low Observable (LO) maintenance required for this aircraft's
skin. Other conventional ``aluminum'' aircraft do not face this
limitation. As noted in my testimony, the B-2 is currently limited to
flying each aircraft one out of seven days. It was not until we began
measuring the adequacy of our operational LO repair capability in mid
1996 that we identified and understood the amount of work required to
maintain an acceptable signature. At the same time, we identified
procedures, training, facilities, manning, and materials as areas that
if improved could help to alleviate some of our LO maintenance
difficulties.
Question. Please elaborate on the maintenance issues that are
currently limiting B-2 operations to flying each aircraft one day out
of seven.
What is being done to improve them? At what cost?
Answer. As stated before, we assessed the entire LO maintenance
issue last year as we prepared the B-2 fleet for initial operational
capability. We instituted several initiatives, to include contract LO
technicians, direct procurement of LO materials from Northrop-Grumman,
additive Air Force LO technicians, and the ``fly one, sit six''
philosophy, that have already improved the B-2 mission capable rate
significantly. In addition, we identified facility shortages for LO
maintenance and have a new facility and upgrades to current facilities
programmed. Improved LO materials and processes are paramount for the
B-2 and are therefore a high priority. The B-2 System Support Manager
formed a dedicated team last September to pursue improved LO materials
and processes. The team has produced several successes to date,
including reducing the cure time for one of the most commonly used LO
materials from 72 hours to just 3 hours. Many of the LO material
advances funded in the F-22 program are now being transferred to the B-
2. We have also applied LO lessons learned on the B-2 to the F-22 and
several LO initiatives have estimated completion dates between now and
1999 and will be funded consistent with availability of sustaining
engineering funds.
Question. What are the benefits of a 3 squadron B-2 force compared
to a 2 squadron force?
Answer. Any plus up on B-2 force structure would be additive to the
existing 2 squadrons allowing more aircraft per squadron and some cost
and manpower efficiencies. More aircraft would provide greater
flexibility and capability. However, ACC believes the current
programmed force structure provides the best possible mix of bombers
and fighters when considering the postulated future threat and
projected budget constraints.
Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study
Question. The DAWM study was a two year effort analyzing over 1500
scenarios with 1 million variables each. Additional B-2s were compared
to a host of alternative force structures. General McCloud, there have
been a number of studies over the years involving the B-2. Can you
summarize the results of these studies, their shortcomings, and how in
your view the DAWM study has better addressed these short-comings?
Answer. Our review of studies identified nine relatively recent
force-level studies related to the B-2 to include; analysis authorized
by Maj Gen (Ret) Jasper Welch, Brig Gen (Ret) Leon Goodson, RAND, the
CORM, the Deep Attack issue team of the CORM, three studies sponsored
by Northrup Grumman and the FY-95 Heavy Bomber Force Study.
These studies resulted in a variety of conclusions. Three
recommended buying more B-2s with general supporting rational. Four
recommended buying more B-2s to improve our capability to stop an
invading army in a short-warning scenario (all assume very few U.S.
fighter assets are available in the critical early stages). The other
two studies recognized the effectiveness of the B-2 but concluded that
our current program was more cost effective.
The DAWM study is the most up-to-date with respect to U.S. and
Allied force structure. It includes modern rotary wing aircraft (RAH-66
Comanche), Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) with Brilliant Anti-
Tank munition (BAT) and modern stealth assets (F-22, Joint Strike
Fighter) in a two Major Theater War (MTW) scenario set in 2014. It is
the first study to include a proper characterization of all future
stealth assets and planned onboard electronic countermeasure upgrades
to conventional aircraft. It is also the first study to adjust the
weapons mix to fit alternative force configurations and include C4ISR
as a major input to force effectiveness. It is one of only two studies
to consider a robust mix of force tradeoffs and one of four studies to
consider force acquisition and operations and support (O&S) costs (six
of the earlier studies did not explicitly include costs in their
analysis). Its comprehensive analysis of four scenarios; 2-Major
Theater Wars, short-warning, Near Peer, and limited access is also a
first. The data base contained extensive target, threat, and weapons
effectiveness data and the tactics and concept of operations that were
used in the scenarios were approved by all services. Finally,
throughout every phase of the study, DAWMS had the active participation
of OSD, the CINCs, JCS, and the four Services.
Question. The DAWM Study shows that the B-2 is a valuable asset
during the halt phase of a conflict, assuming that $2 billion is
invested to better optimize the aircraft for this mission. General
McCloud, if we fail to make these investments which are currently
unfunded, what then is the capability of a B-2 in the halt phase?
Answer. The Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study modeled both the funded
Block 30-configured B-2 and an enhanced B-2. The latter included
unfunded upgrades for improved maintenance, communications, cockpit
controls and displays; the 1760 data bus interface and modified bomb
racks to allow expanded weapons carriage; and a Moving Target
Indicator/Moving Target Tracker for autonomous targeting of moving
targets. Including flight testing, these upgrades cost $2 billion for
the first 20 aircraft and $460 million for an additional 20 aircraft.
Several sensitivities focused on the added value of a partial set of
these upgrades, measured in terms of the B-2's contribution to the
warfight.
Improved maintainability is reflected in higher daily sortie rates.
We modeled B-2 sortie rates both above and below the reference values
to capture this improvement and other operational factors that affect
sortie generation. In general, lower sortie rates reduce the
contribution of the B-2, and basing has more of an impact on sortie
rate than does the $220 million improved maintenance upgrade.
The impact of improved communications and cockpit controls was not
examined since this was beyond the fidelity of our models.
------. A Moving Target Indicator/Moving Target Tracker capability
improves the accuracy of delivering these new weapons against maneuver
targets.
------. However, neither of these weapons benefit from the planned
weapons rack and targeting radar upgrades. Rather, the upgrades
improved the B-2s ability to more accurately deliver the Wind Corrected
Munitions Dispenser which is normally used for attacking maneuver
targets and can be delivered by many other platforms. Given the
priority and lack of alternatives for attacking heavily defended,
hardened infrastructure targets in the Halt phase when the air defense
threat is greatest, most B-2 sorties are used to deliver the Global
Positioning System Aided Munition-Penetrator and the Joint Direct
Attack Munitions against these targets, rather than attacking maneuver
targets with the Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser or small Joint
Direct Attack Munitions. In summary, the impact of failing to invest
the $2 billion to upgrade the B-2's weapon system will have minimal
impact on the Halt Phase of the warfight.
Question. Even after the Halt phase in a conflict, there will
continue to be targets and circumstances in which long range stealth
will be required. For example, going against targets in downtown
Baghdad. General McCloud, to what extent did the Deep Attack Weapons
Mix Study address these missions, and how did the B-2 perform relative
to alternative force packages?
Answer. There are three characteristics that describe ``missions to
downtown Baghdad,'' they are; long distances to the target, the
presence of heavy air defenses such as the SA-10C, and striking
infrastructure targets such as buildings or bunkers. The Deep Attack
Weapons Mix Study took a careful look at the requirement to perform
this type of mission.
In the baseline scenario for Iraq, with normal warning time, Allied
forces destroy over ------ targets of all kinds across all phases.
Within this target set there are about ------, infrastructure targets
that were located 80-180 nautical miles from the Iraqi-Kuwait border
and were protected by heavy air defenses. It's easiest to capture both
the difficulty of these missions and the continued value of the B-2
after the Halt phase if we address how these specific targets were
attacked by phase. ------. This heavy reliance on long range standoff
munitions and stealth platforms in the early days is similar to our
strategy in Operation Desert Storm, where the initial attacks used
stealth and long range standoff to cripple the Iraqui Integrated air
defense system. ------. There is very little use of long range standoff
during this phase since the strategic air defense threat is much lower.
------. By the start of the Counter-offensive phase, air superiority is
well established and the need for long range stealth or standoff
diminishes greatly. In this phase, payload and flexibility are most
important and become the greater factors in determining how the
remaining targets are distributed amongst the strike assets. ------. We
did not do a direct comparison of the deep strike alternatives for
targets and circumstances requiring long range stealth. Rather, we
examined force structure alternatives within the context of the entire
target set in a two Major Theater War scenario. What we found is that,
the B-7 has a major role to play in the ``mission to Baghdad'' subset
of targets but, we also found that there are a variety of alternatives,
including both stealth platforms and standoff weapons, that were used
during the first 60 days of the war to attack heavily defended targets.
This variance in the mixture over time demonstrates the inherent need
for flexibility within our munitions inventories and platform
capabilities.
Question. Briefly discuss some of the noteworthy observations and
conclusions resulting from the study with regard to the various
precision guided munitions currently in the inventory and in the
acquisition pipeline.
Answer. The Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study determined that the
current munitions programs, with modest adjustments, will provide the
capability to defeat potential aggressors in the years ahead. The next
generation of munitions will give our forces superior precision
engagement capability against projected threats. The fielding of
unitary and cluster bombs that can be delivered accurately from
altitudes above the effective range of enemy anti-aircraft artillery
and manportable surface-to-air missiles, standoff weapons that avoid
dense concentrations of air defenses, and highly effective precision
munitions will increase the survivability and lethality of our forces
in future conflicts as called for in Joint Vision 2010.
For the ``deep battle,'' the Wind-Corrected Munitions Dispenser
carrying Combined Effects Bomblets or the ``brilliant'' Skeet anti-
armor submunitions, the Army tactical Missile System with Brilliant
Anti-Armor Submunitions (ATACMS BAT/BAT Pre-Planned Product Improvement
(P3I), the product improved version of the Sensor-Fused Weapon, and the
Joint Stand-Off Weapon with a unitary warhead should be procured in
accordance with existing plans. In addition, we recommend the Services
review the acquisition objectives of the Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW)
variants carrying Combined Effects Bomblets (CEB) and Skeet for reduced
procurement; the Joint Air-to-Surface Stand-off Missile (JASSM) for
increased procurement; and the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) for
appropriate variant mix. We also recommend continuing Hellfire II
production as well as follow-on analysis to identify the appropriate
mix of Hellfire II and Hellfire Longbow missiles. GBU-24/27 Laser
Guided Bombs are required to destroy hard targets, therefore, current
production should continue for a minimum of one year. Finally, GBU-28
Laser Guided Bombs or other appropriate munitions for hard and deeply
buried targets are required and we must continue to identify
specialized weapons required for targeting WMD storage, production and
launch sites.
B-2 Costs
Questions. The nation has invested $45 billion already on the 21
aircraft B-2 program. The discussion this year has mainly focused on
expanding this force by 9 additional aircraft. What is the current
status of the B-2 production base and what is/are the projected costs
to reconstitute it to produce additional aircraft?
Answer. The Air Force has no requirement for additional B-2s. For
this reason, the Air Force has not requested a detailed cost estimate
from the B-2 Program Office to determine the required funding to
procure additional B-2 aircraft. Thus far, 19 of the 21 aircraft
purchased have been delivered and delivery of the last production
aircraft is expected in FY98. The last 2 production aircraft will be
delivered as Block 30s. Upgrades to modify the first 19 aircraft to the
Block 30 configuration began in 1995 and will continue into 2000.
Although the Air Force has not developed a detailed cost estimate,
the contractor has presented its own (unsolicited) figures for non-
recurring and recurring costs of $1.6B (FY 96 $s) for re-establishing
the production line for 9 additional aircraft.
Question. What is the Department's best estimate of the total
weapon system cost for 9 additional aircraft in real (then-year)
taxpayer dollars? For the record, please provide a breakdown of this
estimate including recurring, nonrecurring, support, etc. by fiscal
year.
Answer. The Air Force has no requirement for additional B-2s. For
this reason, the Air Force has not requested a detailed cost estimate
from the B-2 Program Office to determine the required funding to
procure additional B-2 aircraft. Thus far, 19 of the 21 aircraft
purchased have been delivered and delivery of the last production
aircraft is expected in FY98. The last 2 production aircraft will be
delivered as Block 30s. Upgrades to modify the first 19 aircraft to the
Block 30 configuration began in 1995 and will continue into 2000.
Question. Do these costs include any of the conventional
modifications assumed in DAWMS?
Answer. Not applicable. Since the Air Force has not developed a
detailed cost estimate, the costs of the conventional modifications
assumed in DAWMS have not been addressed.
Question. Are further facilities required at Whiteman Air Force
Base to accommodate 9 more aircraft? What is the cost of these
additional facilities?
Answer. The Air Force has no government estimate since we have no
requirement. We have never requested the Program Office prepare an
estimate. Such a detailed estimate would require in excess of 120 days
to prepare (150 days and several million dollars).
Although additional B-2s would add to our combat capabilities, they
are unaffordable in today's fiscal environment. The funds required to
procure more would be better spent on higher priority initiatives.
Question. What would be the yearly operation and support cost for 9
additional B-2s?
Answer. Because there is not a documented requirement for
additional B-2s, the Air Force has not completed a budget level cost
estimate, including operations and support cost, for additional B-2s. A
budget level estimate would require several months to complete after
Northrup was put on contract to help the Air Force complete the
estimate.
Question. Because of its stealth, the B-2 is less reliant on
expensive stand-off weapons to ensure aircraft survivability. This
means that a B-2 can drop inexpensive weapons whereas less stealthy
forces must use more expensive stand-off weapons. What analysis has
been conducted to determine the relative cost effectiveness of an
expensive platform such as the B-2 that carries cheap weapons compared
to a less expensive platform such as a tactical aircraft that carries
more expensive standoff weapons?
Answer. No recent analysis has specifically compared, in isolation,
the value of B-2 with direct attack munitions verses non-stealth forces
with standoff. However, all Air Force munitions modeling annually take
these factors into account when munitions requirements are calculated.
Several issues must be addressed in order to adequately answer this
question: (1) While direct attack weapons normally are less expensive,
standoff weapons cost (CALCM, JASSM, and JSOW) are essentially equal to
or cheaper than some direct attack munitions (SFW): (2) ------. (3)
Non-stealth platforms employ the vast majority of direct attack
munitions throughout the conflict; (4) The limited number of B-2s (even
with an increase to the B-2 inventory) and associated sortie generation
capability, when compared to the large number of available tactical
aircraft, limits the B-2s contribution to the war once stealth is not
required (due to sortie generation rate capabilities, operational
flexibility which multiple platforms provide the CINC, etc.). ------.
Additional B-2s, at the expense of standoff munitions programs,
severely limit the Air Force's ability to prosecute a conflict. The
current B-2 inventory fills a vital niche in the Air Force combat
arsenal and provides a synergistic enhancement of all our weapons
delivery platforms.
B-1 Bomber
Question. The Air Force is describing the B-1 as the ``backbone''
of the conventional bomber force. General Hawley, the B-1 has been
plagued in the past by operational and supportability concerns. This
Committee has taken the lead in trying to address these issues. In your
view, have we turned the corner on the B-1 program, and can we expect
to see this aircraft used more heavily in future conflicts.
Answer. Absolutely. I'm comfortable we have been and are continuing
to do the right things to ensure the B-1 plays a key role in fighting
and winning our nation's next conflict. Operationally, in 1997 we added
our latest technology cluster munitions to the B-1's arsenal, provided
a much better capability to hold invading armies at risk. We still need
to add precision weapons and enhanced defensive capabilities to
increase the number of targets we can attack. In terms of
supportability, we demonstrated we can achieve the ACC goal of 75%
mission capable rate during the June-November 1994 operational
readiness assessment, provided we receive adequate funding. This
committee has supported our efforts to field continued growth in B-1
warfighting capability. Still, we must remain vigilant against creating
long-term support equipment shortages due to accelerated buy-back of
reconstitution reserve, a vanishing vendor base, the expansion from 3
main operating bases to 5, and the long team times (2 to 5 years) t
deliver equipment already ordered. Given them, I believe we turned the
corner and theater commanders will be satisfied with what the B-1
brings to the fight.
Question. There are several survivability upgrades unded for the B-
1. General Hawley, briefly describe these upgrades and indicate
whether, in your view, they will make the B-1 a more survivable
platform than the B-52?
Answer. With the fielding of Block C in Oct 1997, we brought the B-
1 to the point where it has similar electronic countermeasures
capabilities to the B-52. With the ALE-50/Towed Decoy upgrade in late
98, and more significantly the fielding of the Defensive System Upgrade
Program (DSUP) in early 2002, we greatly enhance the B-1's ability to
penetrate and survive not only low to medium threat areas, but some
high threat areas as well. The approved architecture for DSUP is an
ALR-56M providing situational awareness and an integrated Defensive
Electronic Countermeasures (IDECM) system, providing protection against
a wide variety of radar threats. The primary jamming source is an off-
board towed decoy developed in conjunction with the Navy. The projected
capability against all threat systems considered a threat to the B-1 is
excellent. In short, DSUP gives the CINCs more flexibility on how and
when to use the B-1 in a conflict. The B-52 remains a survivable
platform under certain conditions, but will be mroe restrict than the
B-1 in its employment once DSUP is oeprational. However, we anticipate
each aircraft will be equally survivable in the roles and missions we
expect to use them. The B-52 will primarily launch standoff weapons and
only overfly selected medium to low threat areas. The B-1 will overfly
targets within low, medium and some selected high threat environments
using newly fielded standoff weapons like JSOW and JASSM, fighting its
way into certain target areas, and making way for other aircraft to
follow:
Question. General McCloud, how would you characterize the
performance of the B-1 in the wargame scenarios analyzed in the DAWM
Study? Would you agree with the characterization of the aircraft as the
backbone of the conventional bomber force?
Answer. The Air Force characterization of the B-1 as the backbone
of the conventional bomber force is based on the greater number of B-1s
in the conventional bomber force, its larger payload and its higher
speed. A comparison of the operational capabilities of the three Air
Force bombers supports this claim. The performance of the B-1 in our
Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study validates the importance of these
capabilities to the conventional battle.
The B-1 is the only bomber that will have a purely conventional
role. ------. Thus, in sheer numbers alone, there are more B-1s in our
conventional bomber force than any other type of bomber.
Conventional bombers will be tasked to deliver a wide array of
munitions to include: general purpose and cluster bombs, laser guided
and precision standoff weapons, and naval mines. In the general purpose
bomb category, the B-1 can carry more 500 lb bombs than any other
bomber. For cluster bombs, the B-1's greater payload for Wind Corrected
Munitions Dispensers and Combined Effects Bomblets offsets is payload
disadvantage relative to the B-52 in less effective cluster munitions.
The B-52 is the only bomber capable of delivering laser guided bombs.
The B-2 is the only bomber capable of delivering the Global Positioning
System Aided Munition-Penetrator. But, the B-1 can carry 30-50% more of
the other advanced unitary weapons like the Joint Standoff Weapon, and
the Joint Air-to-Surface Missile. It can also carry more naval mines
and, with the exception of laser guided bombs, can carry more of the
advanced conventional weapons than either of the other two bombers.
While the B-2 will be used to penetrate the most sophisticated
enemy defenses, the B-1 will be used to strike critical targets in the
medium threat environment. Because of its superior speed and electronic
countermeasures relative to the B-52 and its ability to fly nap-of-the-
earth, the B-1 can be integrated with composite strike packages of
fighters and defense suppression aircraft. The Air Force currently has
two B-1 squadrons deployed to Fairford England that are proving this
capability as part of an Air Expeditionary Force.
The Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study modeled the bomber force using
the platform-specific characteristics outlined above. ------. Its
ability to deliver Wind Corrected Munitions Dispensers and Joint Direct
Attack Munition proved indispensable in attacking maneuver units and
their logistics tail. These results are consistent with the Air Force's
assessment of the B-1 as the backbone of the conventional bomber force.
Question. It has come to the Committee's attention that expansion
of the number of B-1 bases to five has led to shortages in support
equipment. How are these shortages impacting the readiness of the B-1
force, and what is the Air Force doing to address them?
Answer. Expanding the B-1B to six operating locations, to include
Edwards AFB, has stretched support equipment (SE) resources to their
limits. B-1B fleetwide SE shortages result from a combination of
factors to include accelerated standups, re-activations, buy-back
schedules, under funded requirements and procurement lead times.
Specifics impacts are:
--Existing workarounds of borrowing SE from other units is
disruptive to operational missions of the loaning units and receiving
units.
--Workarounds will become less effective as accelerated buy-back
and force re-structuring efforts continue.
--Problem is acute for Air National Guard units requiring SE
capability for autonomous operations. Daily operations/Initial
Operational Capability is jeopardized by SE shortages.
--Accelerated unit standups/reactivations and historic funding
constraints coupled with 3 year procurement lead times severely
restrict our ability to support mission requirements.
In summary, the Air Force is requesting funding to help alleviate
the SE problem, along with putting together an IPT to come up with more
solutions. Unit readiness has decreased, but can undertake most wartime
missions for which it is designed. The lack of SE may cause isolated
decreases in flexibility but will not increase vulnerability of the
unit under most envisioned operational scenarios. The units will
require little, if any, compensation for deficiencies in SE.
Costs Involved With B-2 Program
Question. In the course of this hearing, I want to make sure we
have a full understanding of the costs involved with the B-2 program.
The contractor has provided an estimate of $9.3 billion for 9 aircraft,
but this does not include many of the costs associated with fielding
the aircraft including spares and support equipment. The DAWMS estimate
for the 9 aircraft is $16 billion including military construction and
various upgrades. Dr. Hamre, does the $16 billion estimate include the
additional $2 billion identified in the DAWM Study to optimize the
aircraft for the halt phase?
Answer. Yes, the $16 billion estimate for 9 additional B-2 aircraft
does include the $2 billion for all the aircraft improvements that the
B-2 was configured with throughout the conduct of the Deep Attack
Weapons Mix Study.
Question. Does your estimate include the additional funds required
to improve the LO maintenance problems recently identified on the
aircraft?
Answer. No, the $16 billion estimate does not include any costs
associated with the recently identified LO maintenance problems.
Question. Does the estimate include any shelters, or other major
support requirements associated with forward deployments?
Answer. Yes, the estimate for the 9 additional aircraft include
estimates for the costs associated with; new hangar construction,
maintenance docks, fuel storage tanks, munition facilities, and
security.
Question. Please elaborate on the $3 billion difference between the
Northrop and DAWMS estimates for flyaway costs.
Answer. The $3 billion difference between Northrop and DAWMS
flyaway cost estimates is due to differences in the costs associated
with; engineering change orders, sustaining engineering, liability,
warranty, and learning curve. Northrop's estimate includes recurring
flyaway, government furnished equipment, and non-recurring production
line restart costs but does not include costs for initial support and
spares, military facilities in Guam and Diego Garcia, and other minor
elements of non-flyaway cost which were included in the DAWMS
estimates. Additionally, Northrop assumes a rate of cost reduction
(learning curve) that is greater than B-2 history warrants, they
include a ``management challenge'' or reduction in the estimate not
attached to specific measures that would be used to achieve the
reduction, and finally, they assume the aircraft's configuration will
remain the same through the production period and therefore omitted
cost estimates for engineering change orders. The DAWMS estimates
include a more conservative learning curve, did not allow for a
``management challenge,'' and include costs for engineering change
orders.
Question. GAO recently identified an $89 million shortfall
associated with bringing the last 2 B-2 aircraft to the full block 30
configuration. General Hawley, how did this problem come about and what
is being done to address it?
Answer. During the fiscal year 1998 President's Budget process, the
Air Force removed $212 million from the fiscal year 1999 B-2 RDT&E line
to fund other more pressing needs. The Air Force is committed to the
schedule and content of the B-2 baseline program and is working the
funding issue in the fiscal year 1999 budget process.
Question. I am concerned about the problems we've been reading
about with regard to maintaining the aircraft's low observable
characteristics and how there problems might impact our ability to
deploy the aircraft. Given the need for extensive LO maintenance, can
we reasonably operate the aircraft from forward locations now? What
would be required to operate from forward deployed locations in the
future?
Answer. We cannot reasonably operate the B-2 from austere forward
locations now. The durability of the LO materials used on the B-2
require maintenance after every flight to repair blemishes that, if
allowed to add up, would cause degradation of the B-2's radar cross
section. These same materials require a temperature and humidity
controlled environment to cure properly, and the cure times are
lengthy. There is an aggressive effort focused on developing more
durable low observable materials and improved repair processes. This
effort has paid off in the short term, and we expect other successes in
the next two years. However, operating the B-2 from a forward location
would require an environmentally controlled enclosure or hangar until
these low observable maintenance issues are resolved.
Question. What are the missions we expect to assign B-2s in the
future?
Answer. During the early stages of the conflict, the B-2 will first
attack critical elements of an adversaries Integrated Air Defense
System (IADS). The elements include selected Early Warning (EW) Radar
sites, Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) facilities, Sector Operations
Centers (SOC), and critical nodes of the communications system. The
destruction of the critical elements of an adversaries IADS will allow
non stealthy bomber and fighter aircraft to be employed in support of
the combat commander's campaign plan. While attacking the critical
nodes of the IADS, the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) will
commit B-2s against deep, strategic targets. Strategic Interdiction
targets include critical choke points--bridges and tunnels;
transportation targets--rail lines, truck parks, marshaling yards, and
supporting maintenance facilities; the power grid--power generation
facilities, switching stations, and transmission lines; war supporting
industrial facilities--military hardware production sites, munitions
plants, and machine tool production facilities; petroleum facilities--
refineries, storage tanks, pumping stations, and pipe lines; enemy
command centers; and enemy troop concentrations prior to making contact
with US or allied forces. The JFAAC will also assign the B-2 to
offensive counter air mission. The B-2s will attack aircraft, aircraft
shelters, runways, maintenance facilities, munitions storage bunkers,
and petroleum storage tanks using gravity and standoff weapons. The
combat commander will also use the B-2 counter Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD, attacking storage areas and missile launchers in pre-
identified locations. The B-2 can also swing to a second theater should
another aggressor decide to take advantage of the commitment to the
first theater.
Question. Are more B-2s required to adequately conduct these
missions?
Answer. Force structure analysis conducted during several studies
indicates that the current B-2 force structure, 21 aircraft, is
adequate to meet campaign objectives included in two Major Theater Wars
(MTW).
Question. Are there alternative means of accomplishing these
missions?
Answer. Yes, the flexibility of air power allows the
characteristics of different aircraft to be packaged in many different
combinations to achieve campaign objectives. For example, non stealthy
aircraft could attack heavily defended targets assigned to the B-2
using standoff munitions or precision gravity weapons after the
defenses were eliminated by Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD)
assets. The objective of any campaign planner is to efficiently employ
assigned aircraft to achieve operational objectives while holding
attrition to acceptable levels.
Question. What is the cost of an expanded B-2 program?
Answer. The Air Force has no requirement for additional B-2s. For
this reason, the Air Force has not requested a detailed cost estimate
from the B-2 Program Office to determine the required funding to
procure additional B-2 aircraft. Such an estimate would require in
excess of 120 days (150 days) and several million dollars.
Question. What might we have to give up to fund an expanded B-2
program and are the tradeoffs worthwhile?
Answer. The Air Force believes the B-2 to be an extraordinary
bomber-especially valuable in deterring and defeating distant armed
aggression. Unfortunately, funding for additional B-2s within the Air
Force topline would unbalance the Air Force and deprive future Joint
Future Commanders of other needed capabilities. The Air Force would not
expect to fund additional B-2s at the expense of other Air Force
programs.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Young.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 1998
----------
Thursday, March 13, 1997.
ARMY ACQUISITION PROGRAMS
WITNESSES
GILBERT F. DECKER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, RESEARCH,
DEVELOPMENT & ACQUISITION
LIEUTENANT GENERAL RONALD V. HITE, UNITED STATES ARMY, MILITARY DEPUTY
TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT &
ACQUISITION
LIEUTENANT GENERAL OTTO J. GUENTHER, UNITED STATES ARMY, DIRECTOR FOR
INFORMATION SYSTEMS FOR COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND
COMPUTERS
Introduction
Mr. Young. The Committee will come to order.
This morning we had an excellent hearing with Secretary
West and General Reimer, and this afternoon we will be
conducting a hearing specifically on acquisition.
We are very happy to welcome back Mr. Decker and Lieutenant
General Hite and General Guenther. We are pleased to have all
three of you at the table.
I made a lengthy opening statement this morning. I am not
going to repeat it. I am concerned that the budget is not
adequate to maintain the tremendous amount of OPTEMPO that we
are seeing, and so I will not repeat that for you.
This afternoon's questioning will probably go to that same
issue. Are we doing everything that we need to do to take care
of our Army and make sure that we have adequate training,
readiness capabilities and are we planning enough modernization
so that ten years from now, twenty years from now, the Army is
still what we want it to be?
We are happy to welcome you here. We will hear your
statements in just a minute.
Let me ask Mr. Murtha if he has any opening comments.
Mr. Murtha. No.
Mr. Young. Okay.
Mr. Decker, we will place all of your statements in their
entirety in our record, and you feel free to summarize in any
way you like, and when you have completed at your leisure, we
will have some questions.
[Chairman Young's prepared statement follows:]
Opening Statement
This afternoon, the Committee will conduct a hearing on Army
acquisition programs.
We are pleased to welcome Mr. Gil Decker, the Assistant Secretary
of the Army for Research, Development, and Acquisition. He is
accompanied by Lieutenant General Ronald Hite, the Military Deputy to
the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development and
Acquisition.
The Army's overall budget has been declining steadily over the last
ten years and most of the reductions have been levied against
modernization programs. The fiscal year 1998 budget continues this
trend. The Army's fiscal year 1998 budget request for modernization
programs is $2.9 billion less than last year; or a 15% cut. Most of the
Army's aircraft, missile, vehicle, and ammunition accounts are below
last year's level and rarely at levels that make economic or
operational sense. Based on the fiscal year 1998 budget, for the
immediate future our soldiers will be flying 40 year old cargo
helicopters, driving 30 year old trucks, and using war reserve
ammunition for training.
We are concerned that this budget will not supply our soldiers with
the right types and quantities of equipment. For example, the fiscal
year 1998 budget proposes no funds for heavy tactical vehicles, even
though the Army is short of its requirements by hundreds of vehicles
and we are relying on trucks which have exceeded their original design
life.
Under this budget, the Army is procuring items at such low
quantities and stretching out development for so long that it actually
increases the cost, making it even more difficult to buy the equipment
necessary to support Army missions. For example, the fiscal year 1998
budget proposes procuring only 12 Improved Recovery Vehicles although
the annual economic rate of production is 24 vehicles.
Finally, by failing to put new equipment in the field, we are only
increasing the long term costs of maintaining and operating old weapon
systems. We see this in your helicopter programs, where the fiscal year
1998 budget proposes terminating Black Hawk production after 1999,
forcing the Army to maintain almost 600 old, Vietnam-era UH-1
helicopters in the fleet.
At the same time we see all these problems in Army procurement, we
have noticed that the Army's 1998 request for research and development
activities is higher than last year's request. We have to ask whether
those R&D activities should come at the expense of producing equipment
which is essential to meet your warfighting requirements today.
During the past two years we have worked hard with the Army to
provide funding increases that you asked us to provide, but it is clear
from your fiscal year 1998 budget that many of these needs are, once
again, being deferred. We want to work with you to identify and remedy
the most pressing shortfalls, and to eliminate budget growth where it
is not needed.
Finally, we understand that this will be the last time Mr. Decker
will testify before our Committee. Mr. Secretary, we will miss your
candor and appreciate all of your efforts to ensure that our nation's
soldiers are equipped with the best equipment available.
Summary Statement of Mr. Decker
Mr. Decker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I promise you faithfully this will be brief. I am sure the
questions and answers are where we will all learn from each
other in the interchange.
Toward the end, I do have a short 5-minute video of some of
the clips of some of the recent successes in our systems that
we field, and I would like to show you that. We will get to
that at the end.
I thank you very much for this opportunity and I thank you
for your kind remarks.
As I begin, I would like to express our very sincere
appreciation for this committee's help and guidance and
thoughts through the last few years in these tough times and
for your very generous support of Army modernization in the
last two years.
We are trying our best to be careful stewards of the
resources provided, but the successes and stability that we are
having would not have been possible without that support.
In addition to Generals Guenther and Hite, I also have here
today Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans,
Major General Ron Adams from Force Development, who is our
partner in harmonizing requirements.
I also have Brigadier General Bill Arbuckle, who is our
Army Ammunition Officer, and if you have any specific questions
in those arenas that come up, I would like to defer to them.
I also have Dr. Fenner Milton, who is my Deputy Assistant
Secretary in Science and Technology.
As you pointed out, we have a detailed written statement,
and I thank you for reading it into the record.
America's Army is today, in my honest opinion, the world's
premier land combat force. We are only the eighth largest Army
in the world, but today, 13 March 1997, I think we are clearly
the best.
And the challenges are great. In terms of mission spectrum
as opposed to mission mass, we are engaged in far more missions
and deployments in more places than ever before and in more
diverse kinds of operations. And if you look over the last
several years, since the world became not bipolar but became
far more diverse, the majority of these deployments have one
thing in common: The bulk of the military participation are men
and women soldiers on the ground. So it is clear that in
today's world, America's Army is the force of choice. And as I
pointed out, the statistics seem to bear this out.
FISCAL YEAR 1998 BUDGET REQUEST
This year, meaning coming into the fiscal year 1998 budget
year, we were faced with some very tough budget choices again
in trying to balance readiness, end strength, quality-of-life
programs and modernization. We have the lowest percentage, a
little less than 15 percent, of the total Department of Defense
Research and Development Acquisition Budget.
In these times of declining resources and squeeze on
resources, modernization in the Army has essentially become a
``design to price'' endeavor. Within this constraint, I would
like to believe that we are getting the biggest bang for the
buck, but it is leaving some unfilled holes for the future.
The fiscal year 1998 budget request funds our highest
priority programs based on our best assessments between
ourselves on the acquisition side and the other Army leadership
on the war-fighting side, and we have attempted to make the
most of these limited resources.
We are continuing to fund at the same level as projected
development of only two new--operating word is new--high payoff
weapons systems and that is Comanche and Crusader. We are
introducing in this budget a new, well-thought-out requirement
for a future Scout and Cavalry vehicle. We have some systems
already in procurement. I won't list them all.
ATACMS-BAT, that is the Army Tactical Missile System with
its brilliant anti-armor submunition package; JAVELIN, the
light infantry antitank weapon, which is absolutely a wonderful
weapon, and we are continuing to maintain procurement of
tactical trucks.
But our main strategy continues to be to extend the lives
and to improve the performance of existing systems by
technology insertion and upgrades. Examples of that are the
ABRAMS M-1A2 tank upgrade; the Bradley M-3 fighting vehicle
upgrade, the Apache D-Model helicopter upgrade; and a series of
power projection Command/Control Communications Infrastructure
programs at our Army installations, to be able to handle the
critical exchange of data as forces deploy overseas to those
locations.
We have had to accept risks in our modernization program in
the near-term to protect readiness and quality of life, which
have been the avowed priorities during this period of drawdowns
and reductions. And so, in fact, modernization in this sparse
environment has been the bill payer.
In this environment, in addition to the specific systems I
have given examples of, and our modernization strategy, our
overall focus is on information dominance. Supporting
information dominance, such as the Army Enterprise Architecture
and the Warfighter Information Network or WINS is critical. We
evolved an Army technical architecture which enables us to be
truly operable in the battlefield and without which we would
not be able to do a digitized Army and create situational
awareness.
Investments in this architecture and in the warfighting
information network will significantly enable the capacity and
velocity of information distribution throughout the battlefield
and throughout our forces.
We have an Information Security program that recognizes
that protecting this information is an important element of
protecting our soldiers.
FORCE XXI AND ARMY-AFTER-NEXT
So where are we headed? The Army set in motion a series of
initiatives to arrive at the 21st Century with the requisite
capabilities, including this information dominance, and we call
this program Army XXI. And that will be the initial product of
our current initiatives.
Army XXI can be viewed as what is happening between now and
the 2010/2015 time frame. It will use the digital technology to
optimize the flow of information and create situational
awareness at all levels on the battlefield.
Beyond Army XXI, the intellectual energy of the Army and
its planning is focused on what we call Army-after-next. As you
can expect, when you are looking out 15 years in the future,
you are looking through a cloudy crystal ball.
But I believe the efforts of the Army and the intellectual
energy and looking at scenarios and looking at requirements in
the future is sufficient enough to really help us factor our
science and technology investments so that the outcomes of
those will be ready when we go the next round of modernization.
We are looking for ways to be more efficient. We have
reduced our infrastructure and we are continuing to make major
reforms in the acquisition process.
As I said, America's Army today is the eighth largest Army,
and thank God it is the first best. It needs to remain that
way.
There are four elements that make the first-best Army:
Quality people, quality training, quality leader development
and quality technology and modernization. And if we fall short
in the long-term in any one of those, we will slip from first
place.
You will recall last year, we demonstrated capabilities of
tomorrow's soldiers. The individual soldier is once again
assuming a dominant role in the warfighting capabilities with
the diverse missions we have, and we are working hard on our
Land Warrior program. We have to place great importance on
enhancing the battlefield capabilities of the individual
soldier. It is a top Army priority, and I am proud to say that
the Soldier Modernization program is moving well.
With that, sir, if I may, I would like to direct your
attention to the video. I think you will find it interesting
and informative, and then I will close my statement.
The Committee proceeded to view the video.
MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS
Mr. Decker. These are FMTV modern trucks, being procured
and fielded as we speak. That is our heavy trucks, or heavy
transport. These systems are being extremely well received by
our soldiers.
That is the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle,
HMMWV, in its many multifarious mission configurations; another
version of the HMMWV. That is the up armored HMMWV, which we
delivered several thousand to Bosnia. Our palletized load
system. One person can load and unload that truck on the
battlefield. Our Forward Air Defense Ground-Based system, which
couples into the Avenger and the Bradley Linebacker, Air
Defense Network; our Patriot system, including the Enhanced
missile.
I mentioned our soldier system. It is moving along very
nicely. Our tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, UAV program. That
system is the Hunter you see flying, doing very, very well at
the National Training Center.
Our Theater High Altitude Area Defense, THAAD system, which
we will talk about later. That is Comanche. I was down
yesterday with Dr. Kaminski and watched it go for a series of
its engineering test flights. It is on schedule and performing
remarkably well at this stage of development. The Enhanced
Position Locating Reporting system, which is also a part of our
digital network on the battlefield.
We finally have a Maneuver Control system, Mobile
Subscriber Equipment, our Single Channel Ground and Airborne
System SINCGARS radios. We have the ground station module for
Joint Survelliance Target A Hack Radio System, JSTARS. And that
is the TAMS, Tactical Missile System with the standard cluster
munitions.
This is the Brilliant Antitank Armor Submunition; the Sense
and Destroy Armor 105 centimeter precision-guided munition; the
ABRAMS M1A2 tank, which we sincerely believe is still the
finest battle tank in the world.
Our Apache Longbow, which the marketplace has proven it is
the best heavy-attack helicopter in the world, and the Bradley
fighting vehicle in its infantry configuration.
Our new Command and Control vehicle that is being used by
the Digitized Brigade at the National Training Center as we
speak; Crusader, our new Advanced Field Artillery system. This
is a schematic of that. It is under early development as we
speak.
Grizzly is a Breacher and a mine-plowing system to clear
land mines. And that is the Javelin, a terrific antitank light
infantry missile.
Mr. Chairman, I know that is a little bit of PR, but it is
illustrative that we have done a lot with what you have given
us.
I think these are wonderful weapons systems. And with that,
I once again want to thank you for having us and that concludes
my opening statement.
[The statement of Mr. Decker follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Young. Mr. Secretary, how about General Hite, do you
have any opening comments, or General Guenther?
General Hite. No, sir.
General Guenther. No, sir.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much. We don't mind the PR,
because we are very proud of this Army as well.
Mr. Decker. Great.
Landwarrior Program
Mr. Young. A lot of those systems that you showed us this
committee had a lot to do with pressing ahead, and there are
some others that you didn't put up there that fall into that
category.
Mr. Murtha.
Mr. Murtha. Well, I noticed the music in the background and
I just wonder, are you going to pipe this music into this new
system you have got for this ground control guy?
I mean, I can imagine, I know you guys are big on this, but
a guy is out in the mud and somebody is sitting back in his
tent, a one Star, and he is watching this guy on a television
set and you have a little music because he doesn't want to get
bored out there, and things are starting to go wrong, and he is
telling him what to do, he has no senses because something is
in his ear and he is watching something over a television set.
Now, are we still spending money on that? I mean, are we
taking away--when I came back from Vietnam, I could feel
people, I could feel people for 6 months, and you know what I
am talking about. You get out in the jungle, you feel them. We
put this stuff on somebody, we are not going to feel it and
somebody back there is going to give them orders that are not
going to work.
I just can't comprehend that we are not wasting a lot of
money on something that is going to not work.
Mr. Decker. That is a very interesting question, sir.
Let me maybe give you a thought on that and then maybe get,
in a simple way, a little bit technical.
When a soldier unit, a real soldier unit, be it a light
infantry unit or somebody with soldiers on the ground, or out
on that kind of a mission and they will be bored more in
today's world, it is a pretty messy environment, whether it is
jungle, whether it is a lone patrol in the desert, whether it
is bad weather, whatever. And you do develop a sixth sense, I
would accept that, but the thing is, when you are in that
obscuration-type environment, you need to see what is around
you and so does your next higher echelon if they are not going
to do something stupid, and one of the things we have
discovered with the Army warfighting experiments down at Fort
Polk, that is the National Training Center for light infantry-
type things as opposed to the desert, which is the heavy stuff.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Secretary, rather than have a long
explanation, I have to come down and see this because I cannot
conceive that this is going to be an advantage to the person
that is out there in the field. So rather than have you go
through a long explanation here, if you will invite me down, I
will go down and take a look at it.
Mr. Decker. You are invited. We will take that for the
record, and let me just make a quick closure then.
Mr. Murtha. Okay.
Mr. Decker. When you go, ask the soldiers about owning the
night--they now own the night--and ask them how they feel about
this kind of equipment, that will be a lot better testimony
than I can give.
Reserve Component Automation System
Mr. Murtha. Now, RCAS is something that we started about
ten years ago, which is the call-up system for Reserve and the
Guard. We took it away from the Army because they did such a
bad job and we gave it to the National Guard. Where is that
program?
Mr. Decker. I will give a very quick, less than one-minute
summary, and I would like for General Guenther to comment.
Today, that is one of the best-managed programs in the National
Guard due to our excellent partnering with the Guard. So we
have turned that program around.
Mr. Murtha. So we can now call up people using that system?
Mr. Decker. We can do that. Now, we have to get it
proliferated to each of the States. One of our first major
demos of that system was in Iowa, and it is beautiful and I
invite you to go see it. So it is a matter of fielding schedule
now, not a system that isn't working.
Mr. Murtha. One other thing that we worry about is the
ability to disrupt our logistics or administrative
capabilities, such as a call-up. Do we have safeguards in that
RCAS system so that they couldn't break into the computer and
disrupt it, a country couldn't do that? So this is a safe,
secure system?
General Guenther. Yes, sir. If we have to send classified,
we go off-line for that, and we use an encryption device. We
assessed the RCAS as to how much classifed traffic you would
pass, which is about two percent. In the RCAS system itself, we
have security built in also to keep hackers out and all the
antiviral protecton stuff already built into the system.
If I might comment on the system itself and where we are,
we are ahead of schedule on what we had projected to you. We
have fielded 35 out of 49 Program Objective Memorandum, POM
sites this year already. We expect to be on schedule all the
way through fielding or even ahead of it.
As you know, this system gets fully fielded out through
'02, and if we keep going the way we are, we will complete the
program ahead of schedule.
Mr. Murtha. I believe that is the latest schedule, that is
what you are ahead of.
General Guenther. Sure. Sir, I would just say that the
reason we are making such progress is because we have team work
between the National Guard and the Reserves, and the Active
component right now.
Mr. Dicks. Well, Mr. Chairman, I want to compliment General
Guenther on this, because a few years ago, maybe it wasn't that
long ago but it seems like it, RCAS was in disastrous shape and
the staff of the committee did a lot of good work on this
issue, we sat down with General Guenther and he promised that
the Army wouldn't take advantage of the National Guard. There
was some concern about that.
And I think that they did work together very cooperatively.
And the contractor also, the present CEO of the company pledged
that they would straighten out the problems, which were largely
part of the company's fault. I think that is saying it
accurately. But I think because Mr. Shrontz did commit to get
this straightened out----
General Guenther. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. That Boeing did finally get this thing rolling.
As I understand it, it is moving in the right direction.
High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
Mr. Murtha. I have got to ask one last question. My HMMWV
seat, now when I went to Bosnia with the President, he was
going to ride off in a HMMWV in my seat. I said, no Mr.
President, I am riding off in that HMMWV seat, and I rode off
and Senator Leahy took a picture of me riding off in the HMMWV.
It is the only one I have ever seen. I mean, is there a HMMWV
seat we can improve so the guy is comfortable in that right-
hand seat in a HMMWV?
Mr. Decker. I have been assured that that newly designed
seat is in procurement, at a reasonable rate, and it is
getting--I don't know what the priorities of them are.
Mr. Murtha. I will tell you if you are riding in the right-
hand seat, the priorities are pretty high. You have got every
kind of seat I have ever seen out there.
Mr. Decker. Okay. But I am told that that program is in
good shape.
General Hite. Sir, you ask me this question every year.
Mr. Murtha. Right.
General Hite. One of these years I am going to get it
right.
Mr. Young. And he is going to keep on asking, too.
General Hite. Yes, sir. We started in 1991, all the HMMWVs
coming off the line after that year have the new seats. We have
also put the upgrade seat into the supply system so commanders
of units can order that seat.
Mr. Murtha. When you say ``improved,'' is this the bucket
seat or is this the one that you showed me a couple of years
ago? Which one is it?
General Hite. It is the--we have had two versions of the
improved one. One came in in 1991, was the first version, of
course. The bucket seat is the one that is in the supply system
now. You can order that.
Mr. Murtha. Okay.
Mr. Dicks. What was wrong with the old seat?
Mr. Murtha. Well, I tell you, it was over a battery. It was
like sitting on this. It just squashed down. It was bad enough
before it got squashed down, but I mean it was absolutely
uncomfortable, and this guy had to sit in this all the time
going over not the smoothest roads in the world.
General Hite. I think Mr. Murtha described it very good
last year in terms of what you had to carry with you after you
had ridden on that seat for a while.
Mr. Murtha. Thank you.
Command and Control Vehicle
Mr. Young. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned the Bradley
Fighting Vehicle, and you had a couple of shots of it on the
video, as well as the Command and Control Vehicle. And I
recently had a chance to observe a Bradley exercise in the
field demonstrating the system, but while I was there, in that
command and control system, this sergeant was showing me this
communications equipment and really bragging about how good it
was and how he could really keep in command of the whole
situation.
He said the only problem was that in order to connect all
of the communications gear together, it took harnesses about
this long that you plugged in one to the other, and he said
there was such a shortage of those harnesses that much of the
time they couldn't use their communications gear.
I wonder if you are aware of the fact that kind of a
shortage exists?
Now, that may only be at the training level, but if it is
at the training level, there is a problem even if you have
plenty at the combat level. What is the situation there,
General?
General Guenther. Yes, sir, I will take that one.
As we have been building up for the National Training
Center, NTC rotation--let me take that first and then take the
question in general. As we have been building up for the NTC
rotation, we did find that we were losing a lot of cables. So
we set up what we call the Consolidated Technical Support
Facility, CTSC, which is a capability to support units as they
were training, a capability to bring extra cables in and
support them totally.
A lot of our cables in the force for those type of coaxial
cables or other connectors that we have for the radios inside
the Tactical Operations Center, we buy through the prison
system. It is very well done by them, and we provide those.
There is a basic load that they take, assessed by the
command in an operating unit, and, sir, I am not aware of any
cable problems right now, and they have been out at the NTC now
for about three weeks. But we have a capability to support them
that we built for the NTC also.
Individual Solidier Equipment
Mr. Young. They also said they were really short on
binoculars and compasses. Those seem like they are fairly
important items for soldiers out fighting a battle. Is this
something that is on your scope?
General Guenther. Sir, was this at Fort Hood?
Mr. Young. No, sir. This was at Fort Carson.
Mr. Decker. We need to look into that, sir. I really--
wasn't aware of this at all. This is new input. I am surprised.
Mr. Young. Well, I added it to my list of things that go on
my big scroll, so we will discuss them with you more in detail
when we get ready to go to markup. But, you know, these kind of
shortages could cause problems in the conduct of the
battlefield.
Mr. Decker. You bet. Those bread-and-butter items are
terribly important. We shouldn't let them get off the screen.
Crusader Program
Mr. Young. Tell me something about where we are with the
Crusader. I think it was either last year or the year before we
tried to get you to accelerate the Crusader program a little.
Is that something that has happened?
Mr. Decker. I have a general view of that, but General Hite
follows those two programs in some detail, so let me turn that
one over to him.
General Hite. The Crusader program is on track now in terms
of cost and performance. We are a little bit behind schedule in
that particular program, but otherwise it is doing very good.
We took a decrement last year of $25 million. Ten of it was in
the propellant line; fifteen was in the regular Crusader line.
That is not the entire cost of the schedule slip. A lot of that
can be blamed primarily on decision-making apparatus when we
switched from liquid propellant to solid propellant, and I was
part of that process.
Mr. Young. Mr. Dicks.
Mr. Dicks. Does ``decrement'' mean cut?
General Hite. Yes.
Mr. Dicks. I thought we were trying to increase that
program.
Mr. Young. I thought our purpose was to try to accelerate
the Crusader program.
Mr. Dicks. It says here in the questions that this cut is
causing a 6-month delay.
Mr. Young. Well, the general just indicated that.
General Hite. Any time you take $25 million out of a
program, it is going to have an impact.
Mr. Young. We didn't take that $25 million out, did we?
General Hite. Yes, sir, you did.
Mr. Young. Let me find out why.
That obviously was a casualty of the conference. We did not
take the $25 million out in our Committee, but in conference.
General Hite. When I say by ``you,'' in Congress.
Mr. Decker. Not you specifically, sir.
General Hite. So it served as a combination of the cut plus
the fact that it took us some time to make a decision, a final
decision, to switch from Liquid Propellant, LP to solid. When
the program manager came to me, I was uneasy with making that
decision without giving a lot more study. We probably studied
it just a little too long, and it got us off schedule a little
bit. But we are okay on the program now. The program is funded
in 1998 where it should be, and we are moving forward with it.
Mr. Young. Good.
Mr. Dicks.
Comanche Helicopter Program
Mr. Dicks. Could you tell me where we are on the Comanche
program?
Mr. Decker. Yes, sir. We are well into the flight test
program of the first vehicle. As you recall, there will be two
vehicles built in this phase. The second one is under
construction as we speak.
We have had about 34 flight hours on the first system. At
the test facility in West Palm Beach, Florida--it is performing
well. The program is using a very rigid scheduling and variance
measuring--and cost variance measuring techniques. It is less
than 1 percent variance from the baseline program. So relative
to the planned program, it is right on target, and that is an
absolutely accurate statement.
Mr. Dicks. Well, last year we added $49 million. Was that
necessary to keep it on track?
Mr. Decker. It certainly keeps the future events on
schedule. There are several things that needed to be put into
the system that would have had to have been delayed until later
in the program relative to making sure we have the low
observable capability that is in the system that it needs.
We did need to increase the flight testing a bit, and we
needed to accelerate the mission equipment package, which is
the reason for existence, that is the sophisticated electronic
reconnaissance gear, in order to keep the second bird on
schedule.
And so those were on schedule, but the schedule was risky,
and your addition last year significantly reduced the risk of
keeping those on schedule.
Mr. Dicks. Now, is the budget this year adequate, or do you
need additional funds this year as well?
Mr. Decker. The budget this year is adequate in relation to
the program plan and schedule that we have laid out for the
dollars that are available. But there will be a period of down
time where we don't have enough funds to test but one vehicle,
and we would like to fill that up with testing time because it
will further reduce risk later in the schedule of the program
when we start building the first six vehicles, and so we could
use some extra money this year to fill that gap.
Mr. Dicks. How much would that require?
Mr. Decker. That is about $40 million.
Theater High Altitude Area Defense System
Mr. Dicks. Okay. Let me ask you, this committee has been
very interested in Theater Missile Defense, and as I understand
it now, we have had our--is it our fourth failure in a row on
the THAAD program?
Mr. Decker. No, sir. It is the third. The first flights of
THAAD was to check out the efficacy and operation of the
missile, and they weren't--it wasn't aimed at a target. So
since we started firing for targets, we have had three failures
in a row.
Mr. Dicks. Well, what is the current status of the program?
Mr. Decker. The status of the program is that we are on
schedule in the sense of--well, actually we are about 4 months
behind schedule in the sense of meeting the test--goals of
test, and we have had these problems that have----
Mr. Dicks. You mean you are meeting the goal of having the
test, not that the tests are successful?
Mr. Decker. Right. Let me explain the rest of that. So in
terms of schedule, had we had successes, we would be in
outstanding shape.
Mr. Dicks. Didn't Dr. Kaminski say that this now is the
program that is under some risk of going forward because of
these failures?
Mr. Decker. Well, I think until we fully understand the
ensemble of the failures, which we have an outside team,
outside of our program management, that is being chaired by
General Lyles, Director, Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization, personally, and we support this fully, going
through a complete overview of the program in total to try to
get at not only the specific technical cause of the failed
hit--there were a lot of successful things that worked about
the missile and the radar on this last one. So this is not a
colossal disaster by any means, but we are scrubbing that down.
But we are concerned there may be somewhere in the system of
management some quality control issues that we haven't
uncovered that we have got to find and screen out, and that
would not be necessarily a technical design flaw, but something
we have got to fix so we don't--all three of the failures we
have had were due to different causes, and that is a problem.
So we would expect in 2 or 3 months to have the--maybe
sooner, to have the results of this scrub team and to give an
assessment of the program.
Mr. Dicks. Can you give us any idea of what kind of
problems these are?
Mr. Decker. Yes, sir. All of the problems relate to the end
game. That is the last couple kilometers as you are closing in
on the target. The tracking of the radar and the feeding of the
control of the missile to get it into the bucket have gone
superbly. There is a seeker, and the seeker images the target,
and you can tell from the ground when it has imaged it, and it
takes over control of the missile and its warhead. The seeker
can determine where the missile is heading in relation to the
target and generate a digital signal through a computer that
fires small little motors that are called divert motors, and
they are part of the attitude divert system, and that steers
the missile in to hit. It is in that end system.
The seekers are a very tricky technology. I will assure you
in any, any missile, defender missile, the whole game is the
seeker and the divert system at the end, and that is where we
are having the trouble. We are getting close, but we haven't
hit it yet.
Mr. Dicks. Who builds the seeker?
Mr. Decker. This--now, this gets a little more complicated.
The seeker design for this missile is the platinum silicide
PtSi. We used the best available technology at the time. Along
the way, we are changing to a new technology; indium antimonide
(InSb) seeker. We have continued to test the missile with the
PtSi seeker until we get the new seeker in, the InSb, ready to
use with confidence in future tests beginning with the next
flight test number 8.
Who is the builder of the double seeker we have now?
General Hite. I forget the name.
Mr. Decker. I am sorry. I will have to take that for the
record. The new seeker will be made down in Corpus. They won
that in a competitive contract.
[The information follows:]
The maker of the old and new seekers is Lockheed Martin
Infra-Red Imaging Systems (LMIRIS), formerly Loral, located in
Lexington, Massachusetts.
Mr. Dicks. Now, we are talking about a later defense here;
isn't that correct?
Mr. Decker. Lockheed Martin Infra-Red Imaging Systems
Corporation is doing the current seeker and the planned seeker
which represents an advancement in technology. The InSb Focal
Plane Array for the seeker is commercially available; and it
has greater performance, costs less, and is easier to produce.
[Clerk's note.--The witness did not discuss the performance
characteristics of the InSb seeker in his original answer.]
Mr. Dicks. Was the change made because of your concerns
about this seeker working, or was it competitive or what?
Mr. Decker. No. The change was made because the basic
imaging material in the seeker we have now, which is platinum
silicide, is not as sensitive and not as responsive to the
signals, it is a thing that forms the image, as the new
material known as indium antimonide. It is a better technology.
It is more stable, more precise and more sensitive. So we made
the decision for that reason, and it will be a better seeker.
Also, the design, the platinum silicide, the seeker is
really two halves, and I am not sure how it ended up that way.
That was before my time. It may have had to do with the kind of
materials. And it is really two seekers in one, and they image
together, and they get coupled through the computer into the
resultant image. And trying to keep that in synchronism--and
one of the failures, one-half of the seeker entirely failed,
and the software wasn't ready to accommodate that. So there
were those kind of deficiencies in the present seeker,
partially due to technology and design, that some time ago we
decided to go to a new design and went out on competition and
awarded that to Raytheon. And our plan----
Mr. Dicks. So when is the first test with the new seeker?
Mr. Decker. Well, I tell you when it was scheduled. We
might delay until next year to make sure we don't have other
problems in the missile review.
When was the next flight schedule?
General Hite. Flight number 8 is scheduled to have the next
seeker in it, sir. We will probably shoot that seeker in that
flight.
Mr. Dicks. When is that going to be?
General Hite. Depending on the results of this failure
investigation we are doing, we are looking at the end of July
or the first--the end of June or the first week of July for
shot number 8, sir.
Mr. Decker. That was the schedule that existed before we
had the failure the other day. We will have to wait.
Mr. Dicks. Well you all are very experienced individuals.
Do you think the new seeker is going to solve the problem, or
do you think there are other problems.
Mr. Decker. I am concerned there are some other problems
somewhere in that total front end assembly beyond just the
seeker, and we have got to find that out. This is the first the
absence----
Mr. Dicks. This is starting to sound a lot like TSSAM.
Mr. Decker. I don't know what TSSAM is.
Mr. Dicks. Well, that was the missile we were going to fire
off all of our airplanes.
General Hite. The TSSAM, yes, sir.
Mr. Decker. No, sir. If we can't get to the root of this to
really understand it, we probably ought to stop.
Mr. Dicks. All right. If you don't have it, though, what
are you going to do? Theater Missile Defense is one of the
great vulnerabilities we faced in the Gulf War. Any time you
deploy forces, if the other side has got cruise missiles or
Scud launchers, you have got to be able to defend these troops.
How are you going to do it if you don't have this?
Mr. Decker. Well, that is a good question, but in my
opinion, if you step back and you look at the base of
technology, engineering, management and experienced talent in
the nation on these highly complicated technologies that make
up these missiles, virtually every program we have, and there
are four of them in major form, the Navy Lower Tier, the Navy
Upper Tier, the PAC-3 upgrade and the THAAD, we have the entire
talent base of the country tied up. So, I mean, I am not sure
where to go if we can't get at the root of this. If I knew
somebody else that was better, we would have them on board.
Mr. Dicks. Well, I didn't necessarily mean that. What you
are saying is there really isn't an alternative. You have got
to get this right.
Mr. Decker. You have got to get this damn thing fixed, but
we don't want to do it and tell you that it is fixed until it
is.
Mr. Dicks. That is what we don't want you to do. But
sometimes, you know, people over in the Defense Department
cancel things prematurely and then----
Mr. Decker. I wasn't hinting at that.
Mr. Dicks. No, I know. But I am not saying that. I am just
saying that my concern is we had to fix the Abrams tank. We had
to fix the Apache helicopter. We had to fix the Bradley. We had
to fix the F-17 airplane. Every one of these things go through
problems.
Mr. Decker. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. And sometimes because the press is bad and
criticism from Capitol Hill, people say, well, we will just
have to cancel the program. Well, if you have got to have it,
you better make the extra effort to try and make it work. And I
don't think we are at the point where you can really say that
this thing can't be redeemed. I hope you guys can figure out
the answer, because I think we desperately need it
Mr. Decker. We do.
Mr. Dicks. We need this capability. And if you don't have
it, which is what I was asking you, what else would you do? If
THAAD was cancelled, what would you do? Would you start a new
program or what?
Mr. Decker. I am not sure starting a new program--I mean,
if there was another base of talent someplace in a company that
wasn't in the ballgame, you might want to try a new team. We
don't have that.
Mr. Dicks. Yes.
Mr. Decker. So we have got to get it fixed.
Patriot Advanced Capability
Mr. Dicks. How are the other programs doing? How is PAC-3
doing?
Mr. Decker. Well, PAC-3 is moving well. I think it is in
good shape.
Mr. Dicks. But that is just the lower part.
General Hite. Yes, sir.
Mr. Decker. Yes. But it has yet to kill a missile. The Navy
Lower Tier----
Mr. Dicks. Has it been able to intercept a missile? I have
seen one video of it we had here a couple of years ago.
Mr. Decker. Yes, sir, it has. The new PAC-3, an upgrade
missile, when is it first firing?
General Hite. September.
Mr. Decker. September is its first firing. It is on track.
Mr. Dicks. And they can't expand that and go higher? If you
could explain it to me, I don't know this as well. Mr. Wilson
was our expert on this. He has left us.
General Hite. Yes, sir.
Sir, there is a possibility that you can do that, if you
take that missile and do some things to it, that is within the
realm of possibility.
Mr. Dicks. It works?
General Hite. It is something that we are looking at, but
it would be a redesign of the missile because it is a much more
stressing environment the higher it goes.
Let me pick up on your point do we stop the program. What I
would say is that this is--this program is in the
demonstration/validation phase, and the purpose of that phase
is to demonstrate and validate technology, find out what your
problems are, and correct your problems before you go in to
full-scale engineering.
Mr. Dicks. Right.
General Hite. When you have problems, you sort them out,
and we are having some problems. The issue now is not the
seeker. We are pretty comfortable with the new seeker that is
coming on. We are pretty comfortable with that. All we were
waiting on was the technology to get to the point where we felt
confident to move that new seeker technology in the missile. We
waited, and we are ready to do that.
Our concern is, of the failures we have had, as Mr. Decker
said, they are all different. That points us to a reliability
or a quality assurance problem. Now, if you are having that
kind of problem, you tighten up the management, find out what
your processes are, are they the right processes, are they
being conducted properly? Or you go and look for someone else
to build a missile. If you look at each one of those firings,
take away the fact that we didn't have an actual intercept, but
look at the tremendous amount of things that have to happen to
get that missile up in the air into the intercept box, all that
equipment worked great; the radar, the BM/C2, the battle
management devices. I mean, that is a big part of the program,
the boosters. The problem is--might be in the reliability or
quality assurance area, and that is what we are looking at. So
which----
Mr. Dicks. It sounds a lot like TSSAM. This was the same
kind of problem we had with that.
General Hite. Would you kill the program for that? I
wouldn't kill the program for that. I would probably--if I
can't get those problems fixed or those quality and reliability
problems, if that is, in fact, what it is, I might look to a
second source for this second missile portion.
Mr. Dicks. Or you bring in a new program manager or try to
get the manager's position.
Is this Texas Instruments? Who is running this one?
General Hite. Lockheed Martin.
Mr. Decker. Lockheed Martin.
Mr. Dicks. I have heard of them.
Mr. Decker. Say again?
Mr. Dicks. I have heard of them.
Are they giving you management attention on this thing?
Mr. Decker. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. Do they understand that they have got to get
this thing fixed?
General Hite. Yes, sir, they are now giving us management
attention.
Mr. Dicks. You say now?
General Hite. My spin on it is I don't think we gave it the
proper management attention early in the program.
Mr. Dicks. Is the Army doing its part in terms of looking
at its own program manager?
General Hite. Yes, sir. We changed our program manager
about 6 months ago. We have an extremely capable and bright
individual running that program, one of the best we have.
Mr. Dicks. How are the two Navy programs? Do you follow
those as well?
Mr. Decker. Well, certainly not in the detail of our two,
but at the micro-level, the Lower Tier, which is the Navy
analogy to Patriot, seems to be coming along quite well. Their
Upper Tier, which is the echelon Spirit, is earlier in the
entire stage in terms of even immaturity than THAAD. It just
got out of sync. It started there. So it is too early to tell
if they are going to have similar problems.
Mr. Dicks. But we are talking about a layered defense;
right?
Mr. Decker. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. Is that what we are trying to do?
Mr. Decker. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. It is area protection plus point protection?
Mr. Decker. It is small area versus large area protection.
Obviously, the Patriot is geared to defending a small area,
with----
Mr. Dicks. An airfield?
Mr. Decker. Envelope and airfield or a small town or a
corps headquarters, whatever, logistics installations, it is
defending that area, but its range of the defense envelope,
where the missiles can intrude and be in there, is fairly big.
But if you go in to the--the physics, if you will, the shorter-
range ballistic missiles, the 3-to-500 kilometer have a
different ballistic reentry coefficient and different speeds
and you can defend them with the Patriot. When you get up to
the 1,000-kilometer range missiles, you have got to get up
higher and get them earlier, and that is why we went to the
layered.
Now, the good news is, for good, better or indifference,
the best intelligence data we have is that the proliferation of
the missiles today and over the next few years are the shorter-
range SCUD class. They are cheaper and they are easy to get. It
will be awhile----
Mr. Dicks. So PAC-3?
Mr. Decker. PAC-3 will provide that initial okay at the
lower tier, but when you get out to 7, 8, 9 years from now you
will begin to see the advent of the 1,000-kilometer missiles.
Mr. Dicks. I have stretched my time here, and I have to
leave, but let me ask one thing.
Are we getting any of these systems into the inventory? Are
we getting any of the new PAC-3s?
Mr. Decker. PAC-3s, the Patriot, with--the enhanced Patriot
II missile is fielded, as we speak.
Mr. Dicks. Right.
Mr. Decker. It has got a limited capability against other
missiles.
Mr. Dicks. Right.
Mr. Decker. And it is better than nothing. The new missile
is scheduled to be fielded beginning in late 1999.
Mr. Dicks. So we have got a year, a couple of years to go?
Mr. Decker. A couple of years to go to get that missile
out.
Mr. Dicks. That is the PAC-3.
Mr. Decker. That is the PAC-3, to get you up to the little
larger envelope.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Decker. Thank you, Mr. Dicks.
I would like to say one thing, I read a little philosophy a
long time ago I saw in a fortune cookie. It said: ``The world
is full of people who gave up just before they would have
succeeded.'' We don't want to do that.
Mr. Dicks. And I think that is a very important point. I
mean, we were reviewing this morning with General Reimer, all
these systems that were criticized in the press. They said they
were terrible and then when we got to DESERT STORM/DESERT
SHIELD and they worked and worked dramatically well. So by
staying with it and fixing up the problems, we got the country
systems with value.
What I worry about is you will cancel this thing and then
it is going to take you years to come back, and we have a big
void here of not having protection for our soldiers.
Mr. Decker. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you.
Mr. McDade. The gentleman from Ohio is recognized.
Family of Heavy Tactical Wheeled Vehicles
Mr. Hobson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have three areas of questions I would like to ask, if I
may.
I have some problems with the way you all buy stuff,
especially in the area of trucks, although I noticed you added
funding for trucks. I didn't get to see the movie, but I want
to add some things about heavy tactical vehicles. You know, you
talk about the importance of them, Mr. Decker, but for the
second year in a row, as I understand it, your budget proposed
no funds to procure heavy tactical vehicles. I assume from that
you have got enough of them, you don't need any more?
And yet in 1999--let's see. In 1998 or 1999, I guess you
are going to come back. I don't know how you are going to do
that. Are you going to start all over again with somebody new?
Mr. Decker. That is a tough one.
Mr. Hobson. I don't like to ask easy ones.
Mr. Decker. No, I know you don't and that is fair. You
shouldn't ask easy ones. You should keep us on our toes.
I think the best answer I can give you on that is we ended
up late in the year with what looked like was going to be an
enormous hit on top of our budget plan to that date. And in
looking at the Army's piece of what that cut was going to be,
the decision of the Army leaders was to say if that cut happens
at that magnitude, we have got to stick with our readiness
budget we submitted and stick with our quality-of-life related
budgets, of which pay is certainly a big piece, and so the cut
was all going to come out of the modernization program.
Well, it turned out the cut wasn't quite as big as we
thought, but we still had to do some things at the end. And
when we got down to what the final bottom-line number was going
to be for the Code Alarm and Research and Development
Acquisition Account, we had to take a program out someplace. I
mean, there was no way to salami-slice it, and I don't believe
in salami-slicing.
Mr. Hobson. Is that going to be cost-effective----
Mr. Decker. No, sir.
Mr. Hobson. To go cold-turkey and then come back?
Mr. Decker. No, no. But it would have been less cost-
effective to kill some other program. And so we didn't fight
the warfighter priorities too hard. We do that a lot on the
basis of efficiencies, because from a warfighter priority view,
we are in better shape with our units that we deploy first with
the heavy trucks than we are with the others. And so we just
said we will take a break for one year so we don't have to
wreck these other programs.
Now, I don't really know if we thought about the
competitive strategy but, in reality, we always compete, but
the maker that is currently making our heavy trucks is an
excellent contractor. They deliver and stand behind their
product. They have other business, and we didn't put them in
jeopardy as a company and so they can restart. It will be
efficient for a restart. So we put all of those thoughts
together and said that is the program we will take out to fit
this budget bogey.
Mr. Hobson. You don't think they are going to be in
jeopardy?
Mr. Decker. I don't know the company is going to be in
jeopardy. It is a good company and they have another base of
business. If you put the company in jeopardy, I would be
concerned, but I don't believe we have done that.
Mr. Hobson. Let me go on and ask about some other vehicles.
Mr. Decker. But it is an inefficient decision, you are
absolutely right.
Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles
Mr. Hobson. How many Medium Tactical Vehicles are sitting
down in Texas rusting, that you haven't accepted or you won't
accept?
General Hite. Sir, I don't have the exact number that are
sitting down there rusting. We have resolved that problem with
the contractor and he has shipped those out several months ago.
We are fielding now those trucks to both Fort Campbell and Fort
Bragg.
Mr. Hobson. The rusty ones?
General Hite. Yes, sir. The ones that have been corrected.
We put them in. We made--we asked the contractor to come up
with a solution to that. The contractor did come up with a
solution to that, gave us a 10-year warranty on the cab that
was rusting and fixed those problems.
The number that was down there, when we testified last
year, was very high. It was like 1,700 or 1,800. That problem
has been resolved now and we are shipping trucks every day we
can out of Texas.
High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles
Mr. Hobson. Let me ask you another question. I want to
switch subjects for a second. The HMMWV, is it a good vehicle?
Does it work?
General Hite. Which one, sir?
Mr. Hobson. HMMWVs.
Mr. Decker. Other than a qualitative answer, but yes, as
far as I know, absolutely, it has got many variances and it has
done yeomen's work on the battlefield.
General Hite. I would add to that, I used to be the program
executive officer to that vehicle many, many years ago, also
tested it for about 5 or 6 or 8 years. It is a good vehicle,
but it is a 1970s' technology vehicle. We are at the point now
where we are starting to overload the vehicle. We are asking
more of the vehicle than it was originally designed to do in
terms of weight, power requirements. Also, the environmental
problems with the vehicle, it does not meet all those.
Mr. Hobson. The reason I asked that, and you anticipated
where I was going because in 1999, as I understand it, you are
going to come back and want to do a whole new vehicle. Based
upon our experiences with new vehicles and how they are
developed, having had some of this experience in my district--
--
General Hite. Yes, sir. I was with you.
Mr. Hobson. And Mr. Wilson who is not here had been through
it at least once or twice before that.
General Hite. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hobson. I think Mr. Murtha and Mr. McDade went through
it.
Mr. Decker. Right.
Mr. Hobson. I do not get really excited when we start
talking about great technology advancements we are going to get
with some of these new vehicles because as--I have got to tell
you, is all I see are cost-overruns, unacceptable vehicles, as
the experience we have had on the warranty problem on the FMTV,
when we begin to do these new things.
Now, one of the things that just happened yesterday, in one
of the other services, which is somewhat encouraging to me, is
that there was a $15 billion mistake, that some people got
together with the contractor and worked it out, which maybe
some people are beginning to get the message after a long, long
time.
General Hite. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hobson. That business can't be the same as before, and
we have got to write these contracts in the beginning, because
the FMTV contract was more expensive to stop than it was to
complete. And that kind of thing just, sir, can't continue on.
We can't afford that kind of stuff.
General Hite. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hobson. So I am worried about 1999. I hope I am going
to be here in 1999, and I don't want to go through this again
and I don't think anybody else does. The problem is, there is
always different program managers, everybody retires and moves
on. We still tend to live with it. So I hope you don't plan on
going through that with some radical design that isn't going to
work in 1999.
General Hite. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hobson. I hope everybody gets the message on that.
General Hite. Yes, sir.
Sir, I understand the message, but I hope you also
understand that these vehicles are getting old and we bought
about 100,000 of them and some of them are 12, 13 years old
now. We do have to upgrade the technology. If an upgraded HMMWV
is an answer to a requirement, that will be, you know, part of
the competition.
Mr. Hobson. Well, I understand. But sometimes some of
that--I have some problems with these advanced fighters. I kind
of like some of the old stuff that works every day. Some of
this stuff works every day. I hate to get into some stuff that
doesn't work, we can't fix and when the warfighters have to use
it, it isn't there.
General Hite. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hobson. But I understand, and we want to work with you.
I think we proved that in the trucks, sir.
General Hite. Sir, you have.
Mr. Hobson. Last year, Congress provided more money for the
trucks than the B-2. Now, nobody wrote about that, but you did.
And this Committee is here to help you, but you have got to
help us, too.
General Hite. Sir, you gave us $242 million last year and
we really appreciated that. That saved the life of the trucks.
Mr. Hobson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General.
Mr. McDade. The gentleman from North Carolina.
THEATER HIGH ALTITUDE AREA DEFENSE SEEKER
Mr. Hefner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would just follow up just a bit on the trucks. A few
years ago we had one of the hearings here and we discovered in
some of the proposals that they had, I don't remember the exact
number, it was like $60 or $70 million to reinvent a truck. And
we got to looking into it, and the only benefit we were going
to get out of this reinventing the truck was it was going to
get a little bit more speed over the road. It wasn't going to
get any advantage when you take it out into the field and what
have you. So now we have an upgrade of the HMMWV, I don't know
how they are doing with the Army, but a lot of folks are
getting fidgety about that, I know.
To follow up on Mr. Dicks' question, how many successes
would you have to have before you would be comfortable with
Theater High Altitude Area Defense system, that you would
really be confident that it would do the job? And the new
seeker, what does it have that the old seeker doesn't?
Mr. Decker. Let's see. Let me take the questions in reverse
order. And I don't want to get into a lot of stuff that even I
don't understand that well. But the new seeker uses a different
material in the little elements that make up the sensors, the
imager. It is like taking a picture and instead of film, you
have this stuff that is sensitive to infrared radiation but it
does form an image. The material in the new seeker is a much
better material that is been proven out. It is more sensitive
to dimmer, dimmer images, instead of bright images and those
things. So it will perform better and it is very much more
mature material.
Also, the design of the other seeker, these two halves, was
not a good way to go. I am not sure how that design was
selected originally. It may have been a derivative of an
earlier design.
So we clearly believe that the new seeker is going to be
more reliable and operate better in that environment.
Mr. Hefner. But let me interrupt. But you don't know it
that was the total problem?
Mr. Decker. No. We selected the new seeker, before we had
the first failure, on other factors. And so we felt all along
that this new seeker, the new seeker design--material was going
to be the right way to go. The old seeker was performing in its
simulations and we said we should go ahead and test with it to
prove out all the missile, and if it worked, we would hit,
until we got to the new seeker. Well, as you know, we have had
the three failures that failed to hit.
Mr. Hefner. How bad did you miss?
Mr. Decker. Do you know how far the missile was the other
day?
General Hite. I do not know about the other day.
Mr. Decker. No. The first one, where the seeker failure
wasn't a problem--we know that miss No. 2, it was a seeker
failure, that was diagnosed carefully and we know why that
seeker failed.
I think it was maybe a half a kilometer.
General Hite. Yes.
Mr. Decker. Because you are getting in to pretty close
velocities, and the last--the seeker failed and it couldn't
order the divert motors to steer it in, but at those speeds
that is fairly close. I mean, everything else on the system
worked because, if you can get it up to about a 10-kilometer
bucket, and the seeker and the divert motors work, you are
going to hit it.
Divert just means little steering rockets that steer it in.
The seeker is telling it where to steer and it steers. That
entire divert rocket, the complete rocket system failed. We
don't know the cause of that failure yet.
Mr. Hefner. How many successes would you have to have?
Mr. Decker. Now, to get to your first question, I could
probably go and do the statistical modeling to deal with our
view--the statistical confidence levels, but my judgment says,
well, certainly more than one, so at least two, probably three,
to where you would feel like you really were there.
Mr. Hefner. And three without a miss?
Mr. Decker. Yes, three hits.
Mr. Hefner. And you would feel comfortable----
Mr. Decker. If you had two hits and a failure, you would be
in a dilemma.
Mr. Hefner. If you had two we were on to something?
Mr. Decker. I would feel we were on to something. And if
you had two in a row and a third failure, and it was an
equipment failure rather than a design failure, I wouldn't feel
that badly. It is kind of a judgment call there, but don't take
that as gospel. I am giving you just a judgment view.
PATRIOT MISSILE
Mr. Hefner. I understand.
Was the Patriot which we kept alive around here for many,
many years, and it became the hero in the Gulf----
Mr. Decker. Right.
Mr. Hefner. How really effective, when you did all of your
analysis after the Persian Gulf was over, how effective was the
Patriot?
Mr. Decker. In the Persian Gulf?
Mr. Hefner. Yes.
Mr. Decker. In all honesty, Mr. Hefner, and I am not
copping out, I have never gone and looked at whatever hard data
exists. It did apparently hit one of the incoming Scuds on one
occasion. But in terms of hard data, I am going to turn it over
to General Adams. He may not know the answer, either.
I don't know if we ever had any hard data that might be
collected on a test run that says we know there were these many
missiles coming in over a period of time, and we actually hit
this many. It is a controversial subject. It clearly hit at
least one in those engagements.
Mr. Hefner. Okay. I have a couple of questions.
General Adams. There was a study, Mr. Hefner, done
immediately after the Gulf War because, as the Secretary
indicated, there was quite a bit of controversy, and so we have
some numbers. I don't recall exactly, but the documentation
that was looked at at the time, indicated we had a 70 percent
success rate.
[Clerk's note.--General Adams testified during the hearing
that ``we were 80 percent confident that we had an 80 percent
hit.'']
Mr. Hefner. You had an 80 percent hit on that one, we know,
right?
General Adams. Sir, we were 70 percent successful.
Mr. Hefner. The reason I ask, the Patriot has a very
interesting history around here. It goes back a long, long way,
as you gentlemen know.
I have a couple more questions here, and you can do this
one for the record for me.
Mr. Decker. I will answer it.
ABRAMS TANK
Mr. Hefner. The M-1 tank, there have been press reports
suggesting that the Army intends to indefinitely defer fielding
M1A2 tanks to the Second Division in Korea in favor of
providing a more modern tank to the experimental digitized
division.
What impact would this decision have on this Second
Division? And you can do that for the record, if you wish.
Mr. Decker. All right, sir.
[The information follows:]
The Army is considering a four to five year temporary diversion of
120 M1A2 tanks to the experimental digitized division. This temporary
diversion, if approved, will not affect Second Infantry Division
fielding plans. What may impact the fielding of the M1A2 to Korea is an
ongoing Army review of M1A2 requirements and affordability.
Starstreak Missile
Mr. Hefner. I have another on the Starstreak, a lot of
these systems I don't really know--I don't understand all the
intricacies of these. Congress provided funding last year for
phase 2, evaluation of the Starstreak missile on the Apache
helicopter. When will these funds be obligated and when will
phase 2 testing be completed?
Mr. Decker. Just a moment. They have been released to the
Army. They were on hold from OSD. We now have the money, so let
me ask when they will be obligated.
Do we have instructions as to that?
[The information follows:]
The fiscal year 1997 (FY97) were obligated in February 1997 to
fully fund the Phase II contract. Phase II missile firings are
scheduled for completion in October 1998, with the final report
expected in November 1998.
Background: Air-to-Air Starstreak (ATASK) is a two phase effort.
Phase I was initiated in July 1995 to assess the technical feasibility
of the air-to-air Starstreak missile through analysis of integration
design, system effectiveness, and separation test results. Phase I
testing was completed in October 1996 and concluded that the Starstreak
missile could be fired safely from an AH-64A Apache helicopter, and it
was safe to proceed to the next phase. An integrated cost analysis will
be completed as part of Phase I, the results of which are due in April
1997. The Phase II contract, awarded on 20 December 1996, is directed
at the demonstration of the ATASK integration of hardware on an Apache
helicopter, conducting airborne missile launches against aerial
targets, and demonstrating full technical feasibility of the Starstreak
missile as an Air-to-Air (ATA) self defense weapon for the Apache.
ATASK was a congressional add in FY94-FY97 as follows: FY94 (Program
Element (PE) 0203801A, $6 million) and FY95 (PE 0603003A, $3.0 million)
for ground-to-air (GTA) and ATA evaluation of Starstreak respectively
(Congress also added $8 million (PE) 0203801A) FY95 funds, which were
eventually rescinded); FY96 (PE 0603003A, $4 million); and FY97 (PE
0603003A, $15 million). Congress directed the Army to evaluate the air-
to-air missile capability of the Starstreak missile and the FY96 budget
Joint Authorization Conferees specified the AH-64 Apache helicopter as
the platform. Shorts Missile Systems Ltd. is the prime contractor and
McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Systems and Lockheed Martin are major
subcontractors.
General Hite. Phase 2 is working now.
Mr. Decker. It is underway, phase 2 is under way. Once we
got the money from OSD, we were ready to go. And I believe--
Fenner, do you know when phase 2 is scheduled?
General Adams. It began in February of 1997 and will
conclude in November of 1998.
Dr. Milton. I would like to answer that for the record. The
funding has been released and the phase 2 schedule is under
review.
General Hite. December 1998 is when we are supposed to have
all the analysis done.
Mr. Decker. We are supposed to have everything done in the
next year. The actual testing and modeling and all that will be
done ahead of time.
Mr. Hefner. Okay. I have a little three-parter here.
Mr. Decker. We will make an official answer for the record
and give you that.
Mr. Hefner. Okay. Given the availability of funding, is the
Army committed to conducting phase 3 side-by-side evaluation of
the Starstreak and the Stinger missile?
Mr. Decker. No, we are not----
Mr. Hefner. And is further work required to launch a
Stinger from Apache? If so, tell us--describe the additional
work and associated costs.
And finally, what is the projected cost of a phase 3 side-
by-side evaluation?
Mr. Decker. The only answer I know for sure is, no, we
aren't committed to phase 3, and I would appreciate it if we
could take those other costs for the record. I just don't have
them off the top of my head.
[The information follows:]
The following are estimated development costs for a Phase III side
by side evaluation:
Stinger Starstreak
Modification of the Stinger Development of Starstreak launcher for
Universal Launcher and its an Apache Longbow aircraft;
integration onto an Apache integration of the Starstreak missile
Longbow aircraft, and with the fire control radar: $8.0
modification of the existing million
Stinger Air-to-Air launcher to
ensure MIL-STD-1760
compatibility with the Stinger
Universal Launcher: $11.6
million
Launcher qualification $7.0 Launcher qualification $5.0 million
million
Total prior to Side-By- Total prior to Side-By-Side
Side Testing: $18.6 Testing: $13.0 million\1\
million
Phase III Starstreak/Stinger Side-By-Side Testing: $5.0 million
Grand Total: $36.6 million
\1\Does not include $22 million of Starstreak funding for Phases I and
II.
This side-by-side comparison testing includes targets, use of test
range, and final evaluation report. The assumption is that the Army
provides the Stinger Block I missiles and the United Kingdom provides
the Starstreak missiles.
Apart from the development costs associated with Starstreak Phases
I and II, and not even entertaining the costs associated with funding
Phase III, the Army is very concerned that the Starstreak rotorcraft
integration costs in the production phase will prove unaffordable. The
following cost drivers make the Starstreak missile retrofit more of an
affordability issue than originally envisioned: the kits which provide
for the integration of the missile's laser guidance system with the
target acquisition designation system, and missile system integration
with the fire control radar; the cost to retrofit the Longbow Apache
fleet with Starstreak missile launchers; and the replacement of at
least seven secondary structural components in order to withstand the
missile's blast/over pressure effects. On the other hand, the
production costs associated with rotorcraft integration to retrofit the
Longbow Apache fleet with Stinger Block I or II missiles appears to be
minimal: the unit production costs of $100,000 per aircraft (2
launchers), and minor modifications to the aircraft's fire control
radar. With Stinger, no change to the Apache's target acquisition
designation system is needed.
Mr. Hefner. Okay. We would appreciate that.
Mr. Decker. We will give you that. To make sure I
understand, you want to know--well, first, we are not
committed, but if we did a phase 3, what would be the cost of
bringing the Stinger or doing phase 3, really, which would be
Stinger side-by-side with Starstreak from Apache.
And then what was the other question?
Mr. Hefner. What is the projected cost of the phase 3?
Mr. Decker. Okay. That is one question. We will get you
that.
Mr. Hefner. And is further work required to launch a
Stinger from Apache?
Mr. Decker. We will get you the answer to that.
Mr. Hefner. Okay. Since you used a cliche earlier about
giving up just before you succeed----
Mr. Decker. Just before you succeed.
Mr. Hefner. There was a story I heard about the guy who
invented a soft drink, and he called it 1-Up, and when he got
to 6, he quit.
Mr. Decker. I am going to use that in my next speech.
Mr. Hefner. I thank you very much.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Decker. Thank you, sir.
[The information follows:]
To launch Stinger from an Apache, modification of the existing
Stinger Air-to-Air launcher would have to be made to ensure Military
Standard-1760 compatibility, appropriate battery cooling to the
hellfire launcher to accommodate Stinger, and associated launcher
qualification work would need to be conducted as part of a development
program. Total development costs are estimated to be $18.6 million.
After development cost investments for launcher development/
qualification, the cost to retrofit the Longbow Apache fleet would
entail unit production costs of $100,000 per aircraft (2 launchers),
and minor modifications to the aircraft's fire control radar.
Mr. McDade. The gentleman from Indiana.
AMMUNITION
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary, General, thank you very much for coming today.
I would like to talk to you about ammunition, if I could.
My understanding is that the Army's annual consumption of
training ammunition is about $900 million. My understanding of
your budget request for FY 1998 is that for training, and war
reserve, you have asked for about $694 million. As a result,
you will have to use some of your war reserve.
Is this of concern to you, and is there something we on the
Committee should be concerned about?
Mr. Decker. Sir, if I may, that is why I asked General
Arbuckle, our ammunition officer for the whole Army, to come.
He keeps track of this in great detail. There are so many
different types of ammunition, I can't run them around in my
head.
General.
General Arbuckle. Your figures are about right, sir, and
yes, in fact, the Army has been over about the past 3 or 4
years consciously going into war reserves to help offset the
training requirements.
Now, the reason we do this is twofold. One is
affordability, but we also have to note that there is quite a
bit of excess in our war reserve right now as a result of the
Cold War drawdown. So we have assumed, I think, a prudent
strategy, and we are firing some of that excess in training
rather than having to demilitarize it.
Is it of concern? Yes, but it is not a pressing issue that
we have to address right now. In fact, as we look to the
outyears, what we are going to be doing with our training
ammunition is ceasing to dip into the war reserve for those
things that we truly need for a war fight, but not the excess,
instead of going to new procurement to support training. So
this is going to come to an end over the next few years, about
the next 3 years.
Mr. Murtha. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Visclosky. Absolutely.
Mr. Murtha. I am not sure I understand. You say it is a
concern. War reserves are set aside for a specific purpose,
obviously. How serious is it? I mean, I think we need for the
record an answer so we know exactly where we are, because we
put ammunition in many times when you folks don't ask for it
because we know--you have told us there is a problem, and then
when you start using that up, that defeats the very purpose of
what we are trying to accomplish.
So I would appreciate it if you would answer this for the
record so we know exactly where we are with the sustainability
we need with war reserves.
General Arbuckle. Okay. There is a couple of ways I will
come at that, sir.
Mr. Decker. We will give a detailed answer for the record.
Mr. Murtha. Just give it to us for the record.
General Arbuckle. Okay. We will do that, sir.
Mr. Murtha. We need to get it right away. We don't need to
wait until the transcripts come out. We need to see this as we
go through our markup.
General Arbuckle. Absolutely.
Mr. Decker. We will get that information for the record.
[The information follows:]
The Army has sufficient assets (preferred plus suitable
substitutes) to support the National Military Strategy. The following
list of preferred munitions notes the ammunition item and the
approximate asset posture against the Army's stockage objective at the
end of the fiscal year 1998 funded delivery period.
Item Percentage of Stockage Objective
120mm Tank, M829A2, APFSDS-T...................................... 70
120mm Tank, M830A1, MPAT.......................................... 90
120mm Tank, STAFF................................................. \1\0
120mm Mortar, M934A1, HEMO........................................ 20
120mm Mortar, M929A1, Smoke....................................... 100
120mm Mortar, M930, Illuminating.................................. 100
120mm Mortar, M933, HEPD.......................................... 100
155mm SADARM...................................................... 5
155mm, M795, High Explosive....................................... 80
Wide Area Munition................................................ 5
VOLCANO........................................................... 20
Selectable Lightweight Attack Munition............................ 20
40mm, M430, High Explosive-Dual Purpose........................... 100
60mm Mortar, Illum, M721/M767..................................... 90
105mm Artillery, M915/916......................................... 5
105mm Artillery, M913............................................. 100
25mm, M919, APFSDS................................................ 25
25mm, M792, HEI................................................... 100
155mm, Artillery, M549, HE RAP.................................... 100
155mm, Artillery, DPICM, M483A1................................... 250
155mm, Artillery, DPICM, M864.....................................\2\100
AMMUNITION SHORTFALL
155mm, Artillery, M731, ADAM-L.................................... 100
155mm, Artillery, M692, ADAM-S.................................... 100
155mm, Artillery, M718A1, RAAM-L.................................. 100
155mm, Artillery, M741A1, RAAM-S.................................. 35
Mine Clearing Line Charge......................................... 65
2.75'' Rocket, MPSM............................................... 90
155mm, Propelling Charge..........................................\2\100
Fuze, Inductive Set Artillery.....................................\2\100
\1\No procurement planned for 120mm, Tank, STAFF.
\2\Replacements for these three preferred munitions are in the final
stages of research and development.
General Arbuckle. A key point here is, and we will put it
in the record, the majority of the war reserve drawdown we are
doing is, in fact, excess ammunition that we would not require
for the war fight. Again, it is there from the Cold War, a
large stockpile.
Mr. Murtha. Okay.
Mr. Decker. One general comment, a detail for the record.
Part of the issue, when you get into war reserve, is what is
called preferred munition versus the older generation. The
older generation is good ammunition, but it is a big debate. If
you are a CINC in the field, you want 100 percent preferred,
and so if you want to build up to that, we are efficient today.
We will explain all that.
Mr. Murtha. We need to know that. We need to know exactly
where we are.
Mr. Decker. Okay. We will have that answer for the record.
Mr. Visclosky. If I could follow up on the same theme, you
had mentioned part of the equation is affordability. I guess it
would be pretty hard to attach a percentage to that, but is
that a small part of the reason for the drawdown? Is the
majority of the reason because you want to get to 100,000 tons,
as I understand it, by, 2004?
General Arbuckle. Let me break down the ammunition budget
into four pieces to answer that, and I think it will come into
perspective that way.
First is training ammunition. We talked about that briefly.
And because training is connected directly to near term
readiness, obviously we give that priority. So with available
funds, we put that first on training ammunition. We keep it
above 90 percent. That is the way it is in this budget request,
and so that is okay.
The next category is ``demil,'' which you just talked
about, demilitarization. It is either obsolete or excess
ammunition.
Now, we plan to do about $100 million worth of that per
year, and that program has been well supported by Congress and
OSD, so we are in good shape in 1998 on that also.
The third part of the ammunition budget is modernization,
modern munitions, and the Army has been tracking 15 items we
have identified in the modernization category.
In this particular budget request, we are funding--
requesting funds for 5 of those 15.
Mr. Visclosky. Is that of concern to you?
General Arbuckle. Yes. In fact, that is in step with the
rest of the Army approach to funding priorities, i.e., emphasis
on training/readiness, but we pay the bill out of
modernization. That is what is happening with munitions.
Mr. Visclosky. And I think again, for the record, if you
could detail the 5 of the 16 munitions that you are interested
in modernization and where our shortfall is occurring, I would
appreciate that.
General Arbuckle. Absolutely.
And the fourth category is production base. Now, the Army
has ammunition plants where we actually produce ammunition.
Part of the budget goes toward the equipment there, maintaining
it, replacing it, the facilities, infrastructure, environmental
concerns and so forth. That is marginally funded in the budget.
Mr. Visclosky. Marginally, meaning underfunded?
General Arbuckle. Yes.
Mr. Visclosky. So your primary problems are not on demil or
training, it is on the last two categories?
General Arbuckle. Correct. Modern munitions and production
base.
CHEMICAL MUNITIONS DEMILITARIZATION
Mr. Visclosky. Time is short. I know we have a vote.
Mr. Secretary, General, if you could comment just generally
on the problems you are facing as far as chemical
demilitarization.
Mr. Decker. Chemical demilitarization?
Mr. Visclosky. Right.
Mr. Decker. The problems are public fear. Some of it is
legitimate. I think--I understand it. That is an oversimplified
answer. And part of that public fear is a mixed bag, sometimes
intense anti-incineration feeling in the country. There is a
generic anti-incineration feeling in the country to dispose of
any kind of waste, the clean air concerns. There are extremes
in that group that won't let you burn leaves in your backyard
if they had their own way. Others are more thoughtful, but they
would rather not have incineration.
The only proven mature technology that is operating and has
been demonstrated to be safe is the reverse assembly
incineration techniques that we use at Tooele, Utah.
But we do not have universal acceptance of that, even
though we have hard scientific evidence. So the problem is
working with the public, trying to convince them this is the
best and the fastest way to go--we have been partially
successful at that--and getting the permits.
The permits come from the States, not from the Federals in
this case. The Federal law has not seen fit--this is not a
recommendation; it is a statement of fact--to abrogate the
States' permitting responsibilities. So we have to satisfy
eight different States with many different standards to get a
permit to do our facility.
Mr. Visclosky. Let me ask you from a political standpoint,
transportation to several facilities is probably not a
practical solution, just from a monetary perspective?
Mr. Decker. I guarantee you it is not an acceptable
solution. The States that we have had good support and good
understanding and have cooperated, so they want to get rid of
this stuff, have made it very clear we understand you and we
will now trust you, please get rid of this stuff, but don't you
bring one more ounce of this stuff in here. It is just that
simple. And so I would not advocate it.
Mr. Visclosky. From your perspective then, maybe this is
just a question of frustration on my part, is there something
particular we can do? The politics I don't know how we solve.
As far as the allocation of resources to dispose of these in as
efficient a manner as we could, is there anything--I am just
very frustrated.
Mr. Decker. That is a fair and an honest question. I wish I
could give you a pat answer, but the problem really is in
reaching public acceptance of whatever method is chosen so we
can get our permits.
Most of the costs, though, the time to get permits is
taking 5 and 6 years, we estimate, because Governors don't like
to go in the face of a lot of resistance, so they will hold
excess public hearings. And I don't know how to solve that,
except to work at it hard.
The Congress has been very supportive in resources. We have
not been nickeled, but it is just a tough problem.
We have made a lot of progress in the last 3 years. We now
are permitted in Oregon. I didn't think we would ever get a
permit in Oregon, but they finally said, you know, you are
right. So we are starting work on that plan. So we have just
got to slaughter our way through it.
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
TACTICAL HIGH ENERGY LASER SYSTEM
Mr. McDade. Let me underline, if I may, the concerns about
the ammunition. I know you have and you share a lot of them. I
just want to underline my interest in the issue, and we really
want detailed answers from you.
I want to yield to Mr. Hobson in a second, but first let me
ask you about the high energy laser system.
My understanding is that there is no money in the budget to
test the unit that is scheduled, I guess, to be delivered to
the Israelis; is that right?
Mr. Decker. You are talking about the Tactical High Energy
Laser (THEL), or the laser demonstration system that we are
working on in conjunction with the Israelis.
There is a total contract budget, and the contract is in
reasonably good shape in terms of funding. TRW is the prime
contractor in conjunction with a couple of Israeli companies.
The original thoughts--this was a program that got a bit
politicized, and more was promised than could be delivered, and
we had to get that boxed in. So now the system consists of
system design and testing and integration, and it will be
demonstrated at the San Juan Capistrano range in California.
And if it works there, the contract is done. Then it is really
up to whatever the Israelis----
Mr. McDade. You say you have money in the budget to test
it?
Mr. Decker. Well, now, there was a glitch on funding
shortfall.
Mr. McDade. Yes. Mr. Skeen has a great interest, if I may
say, too.
Mr. Decker. I understand.
Mr. McDade. And the information we have is that you didn't
fund the testing.
Mr. Decker. There was a $12 million shortfall created in
1997, and I am not sure. Was that a decrement at OSD, or do you
remember?
General Hite. It was a cost growth.
Mr. Decker. No, it is not a cost growth. We have a fixed
price award fee program. There was some problems in funding
flow there, and we lost----
Mr. McDade. Well, Mr. Decker----
Mr. Decker. We are $12 million short to stay on schedule.
Mr. McDade. And the $12 million is for testing?
Mr. Decker. Well, if you look at the program schedule and
the way the funds flow to get the work done, taken on through
to testing, it is a shortfall in near term work, and if you
used all of the funds doing that, you will have none left to do
the testing.
Mr. McDade. I guess the answer is, yes.
Mr. Decker. I think it is yes, because you have got to do
the near term work, or you will never get to testing.
Mr. McDade. We are glad to hear the answer. Let me get you
on this because I----
Mr. Decker. Well, I am only talking about the testing at
San Juan. We never did commit--we finally got an agreement with
the Israelis that we--they thought we were going to do
additional testing on the side, so we are only going to test it
at San Juan Capistrano.
Mr. McDade. Whatever. The point is that you don't have
money to test the system, nor do you have any money to procure
it for you.
Mr. Decker. We never had any intention of procuring it.
Mr. McDade. Why not?
Mr. Decker. The system is too limited in what it can do
unless you spend a hell of a lot more money. It was driven by a
desire on the Israelis to put it into a fixed station
environment to protect the villages against Katyusha rockets.
Mr. McDade. I saw a tape about 2 years ago of the results
out at White Sands, where the system was knocking out Katyusha
rockets like they were deer in Pennsylvania with you behind the
gun.
Mr. Decker. You saw a tape I never had any knowledge of. I
know of one highly, highly staged demonstration with the
miracle laser that shot one Katyusha.
Mr. McDade. Well, you better look at some additional tapes,
and I will send you one.
Mr. Decker. All right.
Mr. McDade. I will tell you what has got me really
concerned. We had to add money for this program last year, and
several years ago Chairman Murtha took a delegation over to
Korea, and General Luck was there, and his biggest concern was
something popping over the mountain and he has no defense.
This system--and the Air Force is spending, as you know,
about a billion dollars on an airplane-mounted system to get
something in the boost phase, but here you guys are in the
front lines, and you have got no defense, and this system, if
that tape is accurate and what I have been told and Mr. Skeen
has investigated it as well, would be perfect for the defenses
in Korea, of the General's concern about something coming over
that mountain and stopping his activities to reinforce or
whatever the heck he has to do.
It looks to us like it ought to have a very high priority,
and I don't know why there is not more activity on it.
Mr. Decker. Because to perfect the system and make it
tactically hard in an environment that is probably 10 times
more harsh than a C--I mean, a 737 airplane is probably a
billion-dollar program.
Mr. McDade. Well, is it worth $1 billion to get security in
Korea?
Mr. Decker. I am not sure that the probability of success
is as high as our missile defense systems in any reasonable
time frame. That is a judgment call.
[The information follows:]
In support of the joint United States-Israel Nautilus
program, the United States Army Space and Strategic Defense
Command (USASSDC) conducted tracking tests on 14 March 1997.
Using the Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser (MIRACL) system
located at the High Energy Laser Systems Test Facility
(HELSTF), USASSDC conducted low power tracking tests on six
incoming inert rockets. These tests were low power tests using
the MIRACL system and not representative of the power levels or
system required for a tactical configuration. However, the
results and analysis contribute to pointer-tracker algorithm
development in support of the United States-Israel cooperative
Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration (ACTD).
The first and second rockets were launched individually to
verify the target impact point. The MIRACL system, using
developmental THEL ACTD pointer-tracker algorithms,
successfully tracked both rockets. The other four rockets were
launched sequentially, approximately 15 seconds apart. All four
targets were initially acquired with the HELSTF SeaLite Beam
Director, and three out of four were successfully tracked
during the predefined engagement window. Analysis continues in
an effort to determine the cause of an anomaly preventing
successful tracking of one of the four rockets.
Mr. McDade. Well, I will tell you, we have got a big
disconnect, and I would be very, very grateful if you would go
back and take a look and call White Sands and find out if they
tested the system against six incoming rockets and whether or
not they were successful, because the information that we have
is that they were successful.
Mr. Decker. I will certainly do that, sir. I will get you
some information for the record.
Mr. McDade. Give me a call back.
Mr. Decker. Okay.
Mr. McDade. Because it comes down to the question, we have
always been concerned about the vulnerability of the forces in
Korea to that kind of an attack.
Mr. Decker. Yes, sir.
Mr. McDade. And the system has never been in place to try
to stop it. It looks like it might be. That is why I want to
raise it with you, I want to talk to you about it, and I would
appreciate a call.
Mr. Decker. Sure. You bet.
Mr. McDade. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
PROCUREMENT FUNDING
Mr. Hobson. Very quickly, and I will try not to tie you
into this, but I am concerned about your statement that the
Comanche, if fielded; and I would also like to know where the
$50 million went that we put in it last year to help funding
move forward. I am also concerned about the Black Hawks. But we
don't have--I don't think you have time--we only have a couple
of minutes left to vote.
Mr. Decker. I will give you detail for the record, unless
you want an answer now.
Mr. McDade. For the record?
Mr. Hobson. Yes, that is fine.
Mr. McDade. Without objection, for the record, the Chair
recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
Mr. Murtha. I want to know who I am going to ask about this
seat. I understand you are retiring this summer. Who am I going
to ask about this HMMWV seat? You have been in that program for
20 years.
General Hite. Yes, sir. Sir, that is why we have the seat.
Mr. McDade. It took 20 years.
General Hite. It took 20 years.
Mr. McDade. We will have some undoubtedly additional
questions and information.
Mr. Decker. We will be happy to answer any additional
questions for the record. We will get the information on the
envelope post haste. I will put a high priority on that, but we
will get the others over expeditiously as well.
Mr. McDade. We thank you very much for your presentation.
It was, as usual, professional and excellent. We look forward
to working with you.
Mr. Decker. Thank you very much, sir. Thank you all.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Skeen and the
answers thereto follow:]
Test and Evaluation Infrastructure
Question. Mr. Decker, would you comment for the record on the
Army's budget request for Test and Evaluation (T&E) Programs? I am
particularly interested in the Army's proposals, if any, to upgrade
existing infrastructure to keep pace with military modernization
requirements.
Answer. The Army has continued to focus its T&E investment funding
on modernization of the infrastructure. This focus enables the Army to
test increasingly sophisticated weaponry, and to accomplish this
testing more efficiently, utilizing fewer operating resources, and in a
safe and environmentally acceptable manner.
A prime example of the Army's investment of the T&E infrastructure
is the ongoing Test Support Network project at White Sands Missile
Range. This network of modern, digital fiber-optic cable communications
will provide efficient data collection and remote operations through
increased bandwidth and data throughout capabilities, reduced costs to
customers, quicker turnaround time between tests, and signal security.
The Test Support Network alone represents an Army commitment of
approximately $100 million for T&E modernization. The network will
support testing of some of the highest profile weapons programs in the
Army, including the Theater Area Air Defense Program, the Multiple
Launch Rocket System, and the Army Tactical Missile System.
Sustainable instrumentation requirements average $90 million
annually across the Program Objective Memorandum versus a $30 million
annual budget. The major investment focus is the Virtual Proving
Ground, a reengineering of the Army's test capabilities to leverage
modeling, simulation, synthetic environments, high performance
computers and distributed communications in support of Acquisition
Streamlining.
Current investments in virtual test technologies are primarily
directed toward Command, Control, Communications, Computers and
Intelligence and missile testing at White Sands Missile Range and
Redstone Technical Test Center, and support for Comanche helicopter
development and ground vehicle performance modeling. These investments
are proceeding consistent with the limited funding provided.
The Military Construction, Army budget for fiscal year 1998
includes $18 million to complete the construction of a $28 million
National Range Control Center at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico.
The new center replaces an obsolete facility which poses a health and
safety health because of asbestos pollution. The new facility will
enable the Army to manage all range activities consistent with
environmental and safety parameters.
The Maintenance and Repair program for fiscal year 1998 funds $60
million of a $100 million annual requirement. An additional $10 million
is budgeted specifically to rebuild the central stream system for the
Edgewood Area of Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. The total backlog
of repair projects for the Test and Evaluation Command is $300 million.
Question. Does the Army have any unfunded requirements related to
Test and Evaluation (T&E) programs and/or infrastructure? Please
provide for the Subcommittee a listing of such requirements.
Answer. Congress was already provided a list of unfunded Army
requirements on 17 March 1997 and many of the programs and/or
infrastructure were included. The following programs represent the
unfunded requirements in the Army's T&E infrastructure.
The Mobile Automated Instrumented Suite is a mobile real-time
casualty assessment data collection instrument which needs $33.2
million in fiscal year 1998 to accelerate production into one year,
saving $20 million dollars.
The Fire Support Automated Test System is an automated test set for
fire support acquisition which needs $4.2 million in fiscal year 1998
and 1999 to upgrade along with the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical
Data System (AFATDS) software to allow operational testing without
significant test cost growth.
The Army requested an increase in technical test capability for the
U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM) to raise developmental
test operations capability from 62 percent to 80 percent of executable
workload. The request is for approximately $21.7 million and $10.2
million for fiscal years 1998 and 1999 respectively.
The Technical Test Sustainment Instrumentation program would fund
66 percent of the prototype and replacement instrumentation backlog at
the TECOM test centers. The request is for approximately $43.7 and
$45.9 million for fiscal year 1998 and 1999 respectively.
Test Range and Facility Modernization requires $10 million per year
for fiscal year 1998 and 1999 to modernize TECOM test ranges and
facilities. This will ensure TECOM's test capability, improve safety of
test operations and comply with Occupational Safety and Health
Administration guidelines.
Virtual Ground Targets needs approximately $.8 million (fiscal year
1998) and $.5 million (fiscal year 1999). This project will develop
high fidelity virtual ground targets for modeling and simulation
efforts to supplant developmental weapon system support, reducing the
amount and cost of live testing.
The Army requested $.6 million for fiscal year 1998 for the
Universal Drone Control System. These funds will be used to complete
development of a Universal Drone Control System which will eliminate
the need (and high cost) for continued development of custom designed
rotary wing target control systems.
The Army requested $3 million and $4 million for fiscal years 1998
and 1999 respectively to support the US Army Operational Test and
Evaluation Command's new consolidated evaluation mission and to fund
new requirements to evaluate Advanced Technology Demonstrations and
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations.
Finally, the Army requested approximately $6.7 million and $6.9
million in fiscal years 1998 and 1999 respectively for Survivability
Analysis, to include information warfare vulnerability assessment of
Army Information and Tactical Systems.
[Clerk's note.--End of the questions submitted by Mr.
Skeen. Questions submitted by Mr. Hobson and the answers
thereto follow:]
Comanche (RAH-66)
Question. Last year, Congress added $49 million to the Comanche
program to help level out the funding profile and to make a more
efficient development program. If Congress were to make additional
money available for the program, would it bring the number two
prototype to flying status sooner?
Answer. The acceleration of prototype #2 is dependent on the amount
of additional funding that may be provided by Congress as part of the
fiscal year 1998 (FY98) appropriation. While prototype #2 acceleration
is important, restoring the flight test program and accelerating the
reconnaissance mission equipment package design effort is more critical
at this point in the program. The Comanche Program Manager has
developed a prioritized list of areas that would be accelerated if
additional funding is available in FY98. The acceleration of prototype
#2 falls within the items listed if $100 million was added to the
budget request.
Question.Would additional money accomplish tasks that would provide
a more capable aircraft for the demonstration of the so-called EOC
``Early Operational Capability'' aircraft? Specific areas would be low
observables and enhancing communications with other elements of the
joint force.
Answer. Additional funding in FY98 would certainly allow for an
improved program to ensure the reconnaissance capability on the EOC
aircraft was fully tested and would provide the user a more
``production like'' reconnaissance capability to operate during the
field evaluation. Two of the significant areas of added capability
planned if additional funding is provided are enhanced communications
and improved low observable features or characteristics. There are
several low observable features that could be added that would provide
enhanced signature characteristics and give us an opportunity to
evaluate the maintainability and durability before production.
Additional funds would also allow increased functionality with greater
opportunity for communicating in the joint area via voice, data and
imagery. Now that a stable flying platform has been demonstrated during
the flight test program, the priority is on adding the reconnaissance
capability as soon as possible to allow sufficient time to prove out
the design prior to building the EOC aircraft.
Heavy Tactical Vehicles
Question. In your statement, you assert that the Army's tactical
wheeled vehicle program is ``essential to projecting and sustaining the
forces.'' However, your fiscal year 1998 budget request includes no
funds for heavy tactical vehicles. Your fiscal year 1998 request for
light tactical vehicles is $100 million less than your fiscal year 1997
appropriation. Although your statement addressed the need for heavy
tactical vehicles, for the second year in a row, the Army budget
includes no procurement funds for heavy tactical vehicles. General
Reimer, please explain why the Army is not requesting funds for heavy
tactical vehicles?
Answer. Affordability is the reason. The Army prioritizes programs
and, although heavy tactical vehicles are important, funding was
insufficient to cover all our requirements.
Question. Are the requirements for these vehicles fully satisfied?
Answer. The Army's requirement for heavy tactical vehicles have not
been met. The required/on-hand quantities are: (1) Palletized Load
System (PLS)-3,711/2,277, (2) PLS Trailers-2,891/1,195, (3) PLS
Flatracks-55,626/10,059, (4) Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck
(HEMTT)-13,203/12,165 (HEMTT Wreckers-2,483/1,630 and HEMTT Tankers-
4,842/4073), and (5) Heavy Equipment Transporter System-2,412/1,358.
Question. Does the Army intend to procure additional heavy tactical
trucks in the future? If so, which ones?
Answer. As stated in the fiscal year 1998 proposed President's
Budget, in the future, the Army intends to procure heavy tactical
vehicle systems consisting of the Palletized Load System (PLS), which
includes trucks, trailers, flatracks, and devices, Heavy Expanded
Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT), Heavy Equipment Transporter System
(HETS), and HEMTT Extended Service Program (ESP) as follows:
[Dollars in millions]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PLS........................... \1\9. 59.6 16.6 48.7 34.8 34.8
1
HEMTT......................... 0.0 38.3 30.7 48.7 1.0 0.0
HETS.......................... 0.0 64.7 11.8 0.0 89.2 89.4
HEMTT ESP..................... 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.8 19.9
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Flatracks and Devices Only.
Question. Does the Army TAA03 reorganization result in the need for
additional heavy tactical trucks for National Guard units? Provide for
the record a list of the units and the number of trucks per unit
involved in this reorganization.
Answer. Yes, five additional Palletized Load System (PLS) truck
companies and three additional Heavy Equipment Transporter System
(HETS) truck companies will be added to the National Guard. Each PLS
company has 48 PLS trucks and each HETS company has 96 tractor-
trailers. The companies are as follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unit designation Location Activation date
------------------------------------------------------------------------
137th (PLS).................... Olathe, Kansas.... 1 Oct 97
1462nd (PLS)................... Springfield, 1 Sep 98
Michigan.
1056th (PLS)................... Gering, Nebraska.. 1 Sep 99
TBD (PLS)...................... (\1\)............. FY01
TBD (PLS)...................... (\1\)............. FY02
TBD (HETS)..................... (\1\)............. FY02
TBD (HETS)..................... (\1\)............. FY02
TBD (HETS)..................... (\1\)............. FY03
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\To Be Determined (TBD).
Question. Provide for the record a list of priority unfunded heavy
tactical truck requirements, for both the active Army and the Reserve
Components, that could be funded in fiscal year 1998. Include a
description and justification.
Answer. Fiscal year 1998 funding for all tactical wheeled vehicles
is 52 percent less than fiscal year 1997 due to affordability and
priorities. The fiscal year 1998 Family of Heavy Tactical Vehicles
(FHTV) is funded at only 3 percent of fiscal year 1997 budget. The
funding for FHTV, which includes the Palletized Load System (PLS),
Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT), and the Heavy Equipment
Transporter System (HETS), could be increased by $95 million in fiscal
year 1998 as follows: (1) $50 million for 150 PLS trucks and 50 PLS
trailers for new units, and (2) $45 million for 96 HETS for a new unit.
Optimally, an additional $111 million would be used as follows: (1) $33
million for 109 HEMTT Wreckers to fill shortages throughout the Army,
(2) $45 million for an additional 96 HETS for a second new unit, and
(3) $33 million to procure HEMTT remanufactured vehicles earlier than
planned. (Congress increased the fiscal year 1997 R&D budget by $2
million to develop a HEMTT remanufacture program). All of these
vehicles, except the HEMTT Wreckers, would be fielded to Reserve
Components.
Light Tactical Vehicles (LTV)
Question. The fiscal year 1998 budget request includes $66 million
for High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) production. Last
year, Congress provided $162 million--$66 million over the budget
request. According to your statement, the reduced funding is a result
of fiscal restraints; however, the Committee has learned that the Army
is planning to develop a new HMMWV in fiscal year 1999. According to
the Army, the HMMWV is a ``world class vehicle''; however,
supportability is becoming a problem. What supportability problems are
you experiencing?
Answer. The HMMWV has been the world's best light tactical off road
vehicle. However, over the past 17 years since the HMMWV was designed,
significant commercial component changes, statutory requirements and
our demand for increased capability from the vehicle have significantly
reduced the reliability of the vehicle and increased the sustainment
cost. The demand for increased capacity has been a result of the new
missions and constraints placed on the Army in the areas of payload,
electrical power, configuration, and mission requirements. The
significant increase in applique equipment and use of the light fleet
vehicles for more roles has pushed the envelope with regard to the
ability to package all of the new equipment in the vehicle. This has a
major impact on the human factors of the vehicle and its ability to
effectively execute the mission as well as increasing the safety risk.
The HMMWV has a high scheduled maintenance time requirement with
increasing unscheduled maintenance. This demands that we develop a
vehicle that requires significantly less scheduled service time and
reduced unscheduled time. Finally the changing commercial components
are not easily packaged in the 17-year-old design and the cost to
reconfigure the vehicle to accommodate new components is increasing
dramatically. The Project Manager Light Tactical Vehicles is preparing
a detailed discussion and justification for this program which will be
forwarded to Congress next month. This document will fully explain the
investment strategy for the light fleet.
Question. Furthermore, the Army believes that the High Mobility
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) is only ``marginally meeting new
requirements.'' What new requirements are not met by the HMMWV?
Answer. There are standards that were objectives for the original
HMMWV that were waived during prototype phase based on cost and
complexity versus other critical mission requirements. An example of an
original requirement not met is interior noise. The interior noise
exceeds that the operation without hearing protection. The use of
hearing protection reduces the combat effectiveness of the system. To
meet the new mission demands for the light tactical vehicles we have
had to make significant changes. We have: increased the payload and
ballistic protection, redesigned the vehicle to meet new federal
standards for emissions and safety, and reconfigured the vehicle to
accommodate a plethora of new applique and integrated components. The
latter effort stemmed from the increased emphasis on Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, and Information (C4I) which are key elements
for Force XXI. In meeting these requirements we have increased the
maintenance burden on the Army in an environment of decreasing manpower
and money. The vehicle also does not meet all of the federally mandated
safety requirements and, in fact, can not be sold in the military
configuration to the general public for operation on the highway.
Question. Could those deficiencies be resolved by modifying the
current vehicle? If not why?
Answer. The Army is currently conducting a formal Analysis of
Alternatives as a normal part of an Major Defense Acquisition Program.
This analysis will identify the most cost-effective way to meet the
Army's requirements. This study will be completed before the planned
release of the solicitation later this year. Preliminary results
indicate that adapting the current vehicle is not an economically
viable alternative and would have greater risk. As a minimum, a new
body, frame, engine, electrical system and transmission will be
required to meet the user's requirements. It is probable that such
extensive changes would result in a very expensive program.
Question. What is the anticipated cost of the new light tactical
vehicle acquisition program? For the record, please provide the total
cost, per unit cost and anticipated fielding schedule.
Answer. Based on our current program assumptions and analysis, we
estimate that the prototype phase will cost $50 million and per unit
average cost will be $86 thousand. Our anticipated First Unit Equipped
(FUE) is in fiscal year 2002.
Question. Given the Army's past experience with tactical vehicle
programs, in terms of cost growth and schedule delays, do you think it
makes sense to develop a new light vehicle? Why or why not?
Answer. Yes, we and industry have learned a lot and have overcome
the pitfalls of prior programs through general and specific acquisition
actions. Application of Integrated Process Teams within the government
and industry are reducing risk in both the requirement and acquisition
arenas. We have established effective Teaming arrangements with
contractors to identify and reconcile cost, schedule and technical
performance issues quickly and amiably between the parties. These
efforts are focused on resolution of conditions that have previously
created complications in contracting for tactical vehicles.
Light and Heavy Tactical Vehicles
Question. The Army continues to stress the importance of tactical
vehicles. However, our fiscal year 1998 budget does not sustain the
light and heavy tactical vehicle manufacturing lines. What steps are
you taking to ensure that future Army requirements for tactical
vehicles can be satisfied?
Answer. Army High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV)
production will cease in fiscal year 1998. In fiscal year 2000 we will
begin production of the Light Tactical Vehicle which will replace the
HMMWV. In addition, the Army will start remanufacturing HMMWVs with the
USMC in fiscal year 1999. To ensure that platforms are available for
other Army systems during the interim when there will be no production,
we will store HMMWVs built in fiscal year 1996 and 1997. These HMMWVs
will be issued as a platform as necessary. Also, 350 HMMWVs built in
fiscal year 1997 will be armored in fiscal years 1998 and 1999. As
stated in the fiscal year 1998 proposed President's Budget, the Army
intends to procure HMMWVs and heavy tactical trucks including the
Palletized Load System (PLS), Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck
(HEMTT), Heavy Equipment Transporter System (HETS), and HEMTT Extended
Service Program (ESP) as follows:
[Dollars in millions]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HMMWV........................................................... 66.2 14.1 120.5 114.5 129.0 234.5
PLS............................................................. \1\9.1 59.6 16.6 48.7 34.8 34.8
HEMTT........................................................... 0.0 38.3 30.7 48.7 1.0 0.0
HETS............................................................ 0.0 64.7 11.8 0.0 89.2 89.4
HEMTT ESP....................................................... 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.8 19.9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Flatracks and devices only.
Question. What impact does your fiscal year budget have on the
industrial base?
Answer. The impact on the industrial base in regards to light
tactical vehicles is that the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled
Vehicle (HMMWV) plant may close if the commercial customers, direct
sales and Foreign Military Sales do not sustain the production line.
The impact to the Government if the vendor is not able to sustain
production would be the early closing of the current requirements
contract. For heavy tactical vehicles, based on a fiscal year 1998
program of $9.1 million, production stops on: (1) Palletized Load
System (PLS)--April 1998, (2) PLS trailer--December 1997, (3) Heavy
Equipment Transporter System--July 1998, and (4) Heavy Expanded
Mobility Tactical Truck--July 1998. Based on a fiscal year 1999 program
of $162.6 million, for those types of heavy trucks in which production
stops, contract awards occur in December 1998 and the production
startup is 9 months later. Reductions in the work-force at both prime
contractors and suppliers will take place including migration of
suppliers and vendors away from Defense business. Startup will most
likely necessitate requalification of vendors and suppliers and result
in approximately a 15 percent cost increase to the Army. Lastly, a
restart may require redesign to meet Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards which are exempted if production is kept constant.
Question. If the heavy and light tactical vehicles production lines
are closed in fiscal year 1998, what is the anticipated cost of
restarting the production lines at a later date?
Answer. In regards to light tactical vehicles, the Army has no
plans to restart the High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle
(HMMWV) production line. We will fund the facilities for the Light
Tactical Vehicle and the HMMWV remanufacture program as necessary. The
heavy truck prime contractor, Oskosh Truck Corporation, Oskosh,
Wisconsin, has somewhat adapted to the fiscal reality through risk
mitigation by combining their commercial and military production lines.
If a particular type of military truck production is stopped, such as
Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck, the entire line will not stop.
Startup will most likely necessitate requalification of vendors and
suppliers and result in approximately a 15 percent cost increase to the
Army. In addition, a restart may require redesign to meet Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standards which are exempted if production is kept
constant.
Heavy Tactical Vehicles Extended Service Program
Question. Congress provided $2 million in fiscal year 1997 for a
Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT) Extended Service Program
(ESP). When does the Army intend to begin this program?
Answer. The HEMTT ESP will develop enhancements by leveraging
commercial technology to significantly improve vehicle reliability and
maintainability resulting in higher fleet readiness rates. Pending
release of these funds from withhold within the Defense Department,
development of the HEMTT ESP will begin in April 1997. Procurement
could begin in fiscal year 1998, earlier than the Army originally
budgeted, if Congress provides an additional $33 million which would
buy approximately 200 trucks.
Question. HEMTT is a key vehicle for heavy and medium truck units.
It is important for recovery and tactical unit fuel support. Does the
Army have sufficient quantity of these trucks to meet these
requirements?
Answer. No. the requirements/on hand quantities of the HEMTT are
13,203/12,165 (HEMTT Wreckers--2,438/1,630 and HEMTT Tankers--4,842/
4,073).
[Clerk's note.--End of the question submitted by Mr.
Hobson. Questions submitted by Mr. Dicks and the answers
thereto follow:]
Comanche Helicopter
Question. Last year, Congress added $49 million to the Comanche
program to help level out the funding profile and to make a more
efficient development program. If Congress were to make additional
money available for the program, would it bring the number two
prototype to flying status sooner?
Answer. The acceleration of prototype #2 is dependent on the amount
of additional funding that may be provided by Congress as part of the
fiscal year 1998 (FY98) appropriation. While prototype #2 acceleration
is important, restoring the flight test program and accelerating the
reconnaissance mission equipment package design effort is more critical
at this point in the program. The Comanche Program Manager has
developed a prioritized list of areas that would be accelerated if
additional funding is available in FY98. The acceleration of prototype
#2 falls within the items listed if $100 million was added to the
budget request.
Question. Would additional money accomplish tasks that would
provide a more capable aircraft for the demonstration of the so-called
EOC ``Early Operational Capability'' aircraft? Specific areas would be
low observables and enhancing communications with other elements of the
joint force.
Answer. Additional funding in FY98 would certainly allow for an
improved program to ensure the reconnaissance capability on the EOC
aircraft was fully tested and would provide the user a more
``production like'' reconnaissance capability to operate during the
field evaluation. Two of the significant areas of added capability
planned if additional funding is provided are enhanced communications
and improved low observable features or characteristics. There are
several low observable features that could be added that would provide
enhanced signature characteristics and give us an opportunity to
evaluate the maintainability and durability before production.
Additional funds would also allow increased functionality with greater
opportunity for communicating in the joint arena via voice, data and
imagery. Now that a stable flying platform has been demonstrated during
the flight test program, the priority is on adding the reconnaissance
capability as soon as possible to allow sufficient time to prove out
the design prior to building the EOC aircraft.
Heavy Lift Aircraft Fleet
Question. Last year Congress added $17 million for an important
Army warfighter requirement, the CH-47D ICH program. However, that
funding has yet to be released. Could you please tell us the status of
this funding? Does the delay in obligation of these funds reflect a
belief by the Army that this is not an important program?
Answer. The $8.7 million of the $17.772 million ICH fiscal year
1997 (FY97) Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Congressional
add has been released to the Army. This $8.7 million will allow the ICH
Program Office to fund all programmatic requirements through the end of
FY97. The balance of the congressional add, currently on withhold in
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (ODS) must be released to the
Army at the beginning of FY98 to allow for the award of the ICH
Engineering and Manufacturing Development contract in December 1997. On
the contrary, the Army views the ICH as a critical program which will
have a significant positive impact on our warfighting capability. The
funding was not obligated because it was on withhold in OSD.
Question. Would you please provide for the record your specific
thoughts and concerns about the current and future state of the Army's
heavy lift aircraft fleet, specifically the ability to conduct another
operation such as Desert Storm and carry modern artillery?
Answer. The Army believes that the CH-47D Engine Upgrade and the
Improved Cargo helicopter (ICH) programs are absolutely necessary to
keep its only heavy-lift cargo helicopter operationally effective well
into the 21st century. A replacement cargo helicopter for use by all
services--the Joint Tactical Rotorcraft (JTR)--is projected to be
available no earlier than 2015. Specifically, the CH-47D Engine Upgrade
program will upgrade the entire CH-47D fleet of T55-L-712 engines to
the new, more powerful T55-GA-714A configuration. This engine will
allow the CH-47D to lift an additional 3,900 pounds of payload. The ICH
program, then, will extend the useful life of this aircraft an
additional 20 years. The ICH will consist of an airframe remanufacture,
airframe vibration reduction modifications, and an upgraded cockpit
featuring multi-service digital compatibility and interoperability.
These modernization efforts will result in a significant increase in
the aircraft's operational capability and effectiveness, allowing it to
bridge the gap to the procurement of the JTR.
Question. On 1 December 1996, the Army submitted a report to
Congress in response to language included in the FY97 Defense
Authorization Act. This report lists modernization priorities for the
Army Reserves. At the top of the list is a requirement for eight
additional CH-47D Chinook Helicopters. Yet, the Army's budget does not
appear to include a request for funds to procure Chinook helicopters
for the Reserves. Recognizing the increasing rule that our reserve
forces have played in military commitments around the world, why has
the Army not requested funds for its top Army Reserve modernization
requirement?
Answer. The current total Army requirement for CH-47s is 525, with
an inventory of 467, leaving a total shortage of 58 CH-47Ds. This
shortage exists primarily in the operational readiness float accounts.
Most of the warfighting requirements have been filled with certain
exceptions. The Army Reserve has a warfighting requirement of 53 CH-
47Ds, which includes five operational readiness floats. However, they
only have 45 aircraft on hand. The Army is currently planning to
partially fill this shortage in FY97 or FY98. However, when CH-47Ds are
inducted into the Improved Cargo Helicopter program beginning in FY02,
shortages will again result in the Army Reserve fleet. Current fiscal
constraints and competing priorities have prevented the Army from
procuring the necessary aircraft to fill shortages within both the Army
and the Army Reserve.
Question. If the Congress included funds for procurement of three
additional CH-47D helicopters, would the Army obligate the funds to
this purpose?
Answer. Yes. If given the approporaite level of funding, the Army
would obligate the funds to procure three additional CH-47Ds.
C-17 Aircraft
Question. I am told that the C-17 creates a wake of turbulent air
proportionally greater than those of a C-141--making it unsafe to
airdrop troops and sometimes ineffective when airdropping equipment. Is
this accurate information?
Answer. As with all large aircraft, the C-17 does create wing tip
vortexes that create air turbulence. However, the Army has recently
completed a successful personnel airdrop test with a mass tactical
personnel airdrop of 612 paratroopers from a six C-17 ship formation on
31 January 1997 at Fort Bragg. The Army and the Air Force have also
successfully demonstrated the C-17's ability to execute its heavy
equipment airdrop capability. There have been several (4) failures, but
they have not been attributed to the C-17. One was attributed to the
failure of a loadmaster to properly lock down the load and the other
three were determined to be rigger errors.
Question. Is the Air Force working with the Army to mitigate this
problem? Are you confident that a fix can be implemented that will
allow us to meet the airdrop requirements outlined in the initial C-17
program?
Answer. the C-17 meets the airdrop criteria as contained in the
current C-17 Operational Requirements Document. However, the Air Force,
Air Mobility Command, the C-17 Program Office, the Army and the Army
Operational Test and Evaluation Command, along with the contractor,
continuously strive to improve the C-17's effectiveness. On 31 January
1997, the Army successfully executed a battalion size personnel
airborne operation consisting of six C-17 aircraft with 612
paratroopers. The separation between each three ship element was 40,000
feet. No parachute/wing tip vortices interaction was experienced.
Question. How is the C-17 performing in Bosnia?
Answer. During the initial buildup of forces, the C-17 flew 26
percent of the missions and moved 44 percent of the cargo. The C-17
maintained a mission capable rate of 86.2 percent verses the
requirement of 82.2 percent. The C-17 will continue to support
Operation Joint Endeavor, when the mission requires the C-17's unique
capabilities.
Question. Is the C-17 able to meet the runway requirements outlined
in the initial C-17 program?
Answer. The C-17 has successfully demonstrated every requirement in
the current C-17 Operational Requirements Document. The Army and the
Air Forces have established a Joint Team to develop techniques, tactics
and procedures to allow routine C-17 operations into small austere
airfields.
Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
Question. The THAAD Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system recently
failed its fourth test since the initiation of the program. I am very
concerned about this development because I believe that we lack the
lack of adequate TMD is one of the critical issues facing our armed
forces right now. The concern was echoed by the Commander-in-Chief's
who testified in front of our subcommittee over the past couple of
weeks. What is the current status of the THAAD program?
Answer. The THAAD project is in the Program Definition and Risk
Reduction (PDRR) phase of the development, and has completed seven of
the eleven flights in the PDRR test flight program. The flight test
program will validate system segment designs and integrate the full
THAAD weapon system in a progressive step-wise fashion. The majority of
the weapon system objectives have been accomplished during the seven
flight tests.
THAAD flight tests results are encouraging. In the seven flight
tests conducted to date, the majority of weapon system objectives have
been successfully accomplished. The Battle Management, Command,
Control, and Communication and Intelligence (BMC\3\I) segment generated
proper engagement solutions and implemented successful launch commands
on all five tests in which it has been utilized. The launcher system
has successfully issued the launch command to the missile on all seven
flight tests. The radar has tracked the target and interceptor on four
of the five missions in which it participated. Most notably, in the
last flight test the radar performed as the primary sensor for the
first time. The vast majority of missile functions have been
successfully demonstrated in the seven flight tests. In the most recent
test at the White Sands Missile Range on 6 March 1997, three ground
segments of the THAAD weapon system (radar, BMC\3\I and launcher)
responded appropriately to a representative tactical ballistic missile
target as an integrated THAAD weapon system for the first time.
Although the flight test program has achieved major steps in weapon
system integration, unrelated missile anomalies on the four planned
intercept attempts have precluded target intercept--the final step in
achieving full system operation. The characteristics of the missile
anomalies are typical of a PDRR phase for a sophisticated system
development effort, and the THAAD team has taken steps to correct the
problems discovered in the flight test program.
THAAD near-term and far-term development schedules are being
reviewed to maintain a baseline program with acceptable risk.
Independent review teams chartered by the Ballistic Missile Defense
Office (BMDO) Director are reviewing aspects of the missile design and
flight test results as well as THAAD system requirements. They are
scheduled to report findings to an Executive Steering Group chaired by
the BMDO Director in mid-April. The THAAD Project Office and the prime
contractor (Lockheed Martin) are formulating a recovery plan in
parallel with the independent review process, and the plan is expected
to incorporate key recommendations from the review process.
The THAAD team is currently working to the next flight test in the
July-August 1997 time frame. As a result of the missed intercept on
flight seven, the decision to procure the forty missile rounds for the
User Operational Evaluation System has been delayed. In addition, the
Milestone II schedule extends approximately three to four months (to
third quarter of fiscal year 1998). The program is also reviewing First
Unit Equipped criteria to determine impacts, if any.
Question. Is the most recent test failure going to result in a
restructuring of the THAAD program?
Answer. At this time, THAAD is executing to a baseline flight test
program with the next flight test in the July-August 1997 time frame,
and with subsequent tests every two to three months. The impact of test
results from Flight Test #7 failure is uncertain. Initial findings
indicate that the THAAD missile missed the target because the missile's
Divert and Attitude Control System failed to function. A detailed
anomaly investigation was initiated to determine the root cause. Some
program schedule impacts may result from the flight seven failure
investigation and on-going government independent reviews. Several more
weeks may be required before the root cause is identified, and
corrective actions defined.
Based on the flight seven failure investigation and independent
reviews, THAAD's development program will be revisited to reduce
overall program risk, while maintaining timely delivery of THAAD to the
user. Any recommended changes to the program, especially those
impacting funding requirements or schedule will be made available to
Congress at the earliest opportunity.
Question. Is the problem with THAAD fixable in your judgment?
Answer. The judgment of the government and prime contractor team is
that the problems experienced to date are indeed fixable. Current
expectations are that the THAAD system should be performing at a
maturity level typically found in mid- to late Engineering
Manufacturing Development phase that are about ready to be fielded.
The information gathered in the seven flight tests on the THAAD
system is invaluable to the successful deployment of a robust upper-
tier missile defense system that meets the warfighter's needs. The
problems discovered on previous flight tests have been fixed and
successfully demonstrated on subsequent flights. As a result of the
flight seven failure investigation and independent government review of
the missile design, additional component and system testing may be
implemented prior to the next flight test to assure product quality and
increase the probability of intercept success.
[Clerk's note.--End of the questions submitted by Mr.
Dicks. Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the answers thereto
follow:]
Modernization Shortfalls
Question. The Army is requesting $11.2 billion for Army
modernization programs. This is $2.9 billion--about 15 percent less
that the fiscal year 1997 appropriated amount. These funds will procure
aircraft, ammunition, tracked and tactical vehicles, missiles and
combat support equipment. This funding will also be used for research
and development programs.
Mr. Decker, your statement says, ``modernization must be given
additional resources if the Army is to maintain its technological
edge.'' What major modernization requirements are not funded in the
fiscal year 1998 budget?
Answer. The Fiscal Year 1998 budget is balanced and funds our
programs at a level that permits the Army to develop and procure the
equipment which enables our soldiers to remain the best in the world.
There are however, opportunities where additional investment dollars
would permit us to secure some savings. During his testimony, the Chief
of Staff said that his first priority for any additional funding that
might be made available would be applied to information systems such as
those associated with Digitization/Force XXI activities. Programs that
could be accelerated to place key capabilities in the hands of
commanders and soldiers include: Additional funding for Information
Technology integration and digitization which includes All Source
Analysis System (ASAS), Digital Topographic Support System (DTSS),
Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control (FAAD C2), Enhanced
Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS), Aviation Radios, and Force
XXI Tactical Operation Centers; Modification and improvements to Kiowa
Warrior, Avenger, Improved Cargo Helicopter, Sentinel, Bradley,
Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), and Stinger, Firefinder, Bradley
Fire Support Vehicle, and Bradley Linebacker; Accelerated procurement
of Palletized Load System (PLS) Trucks, Family of Medium Tactical
Vehicle (FMTV) and Heavy Equipment Transporter (HET); and development
of the M1 Breacher prototype and the Comanche Flight Test.
Question. What are your top four modernization programs? Are they
fully funded in FY98? Are they optimally funded in the accompanying
fiscal years of the Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP)? If not, what are
the shortfalls?
Answer. The top Army programs are ForceXXI/Digitization, Comanche,
and Crusader. These programs are adequately funded to accomplish the
Army's program objectives for fiscal year 1998. Currently, the Comanche
program is flying one prototype aircraft to demonstrate and validate
design criteria and capabilities. Crusader has down selected to a solid
propellant to reduce program risk and has been successful at
automatically firing 2 successive rounds using solid propellant. The
resupply vehicle program is on track to field with the self propelled
howitzer. The Army's digitization program recently completed its
Brigade-Level Advanced Warfighting Experiment at the National Training
Center. The results of this experiment will enable the Army to select
the most promising technologies for the Army's first digitized
division.
In the FYDP, these programs have been optimally funded to achieve
the most capability for the available funds. While increased funding of
some programs can accelerate fielding, the cost to other programs would
result in a less than optimal mix of capabilities on the future
battlefield.
Question. Mr. Decker do you believe that your fiscal year 1998
(FY98) budget allows you to procure items at a rate that makes economic
and operational sense? Which programs concern you the most?
Answer. The FY98 budget funds our programs at a level that permits
the Army to develop and procure the equipment which enables our
soldiers to remain the best in the world. There are however,
opportunities where additional investment dollars would permit us to
secure some savings. For example, some items are purchased below the
economic quantity rate and therefore, the unit cost is higher.
Obviously, those programs with the highest per unit cost cause the
greatest concern. Whenever we can reduce the cost per item even a
fraction, the savings can be great over the life of the program. For
example, in FY96, we bought 750 Hellfire 2 missiles. This was below the
minimum sustaining rate of 1248 missiles. In FY97, the Army doubled the
amount of funding to the program and purchased more than twice the
number of missiles. The unit cost dropped from $68,000 to $46,000.
Another example is the Stinger Block 1 missile. In FY96 by adding $4.8
million to the $12.4 million in the line, we were able to drop the unit
cost by eighteen percent. The added benefit to investments such as
these is that it enables us to buy out the line earlier and get the
equipment in the hands of the soldier sooner. We are constantly looking
for ways to fund our programs to get the best quality for the least
cost. You have been a great help to us in the past and we look forward
to your continued support.
Question. According to your statement, the Army's strategy for
fiscal year 1998 (FY98) is to procure a limited number of new high pay-
off weapons and extend the lives of existing systems. What new high-
payoff systems are you procuring in fiscal year 1998? Is the funding
adequate in fiscal year 1998?
Answer. The Army is scheduled to begin full production on the Joint
Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) Common Ground Station
(CGS) in FY98. The module will provide long-range radar and other
sensor surveillance battle management and targeting data to tactical
commanders. This system is critical to achieving information dominance.
Funding in FY98 is adequate to begin procurement of CGS.
The Bradley Fire Support Team Vehicle will enter Low Rate Initial
Production in FY98. This vehicle will allow fire support teams to
decrease the response time and increase the accuracy of indirect fires
in support of maneuver combat units. This vehicle will enhance the
ability of the services to conduct precision engagement. Funding in
FY98 is adequate to ramp into full production later in the Future
Year's Defense Plan.
Additional Funding
Question. Last year, you were very candid about identifying your
top unfunded requirements to the Committee and working with us to
provide additional funding for many of them. I hope you will continue
that cooperation with us. General Hite, please describe your top
unfunded weapons system acquisition priorities and why the fiscal year
1998 budget is not sufficient in these areas.
Answer. To achieve prominence as a superior fighting force, the
Army has relied on and will continue to depend upon technology. As our
force has become smaller, we must replace aging and obsolete systems
and upgrade our capabilities, to maintain this advantage. The Fiscal
Year 1998 budget is balanced and funds our programs at a level that
permits the Army to develop and procure the equipment which enables our
soldiers to remain the best in the world. There are however,
opportunities where we can develop and buy additional required
technologies and weapon systems beyond amounts affordable in our
balanced, yet constrained budget. During his testimony, the Chief of
Staff said that his first priority for any additional funding that
might be made available would be applied to information systems such as
those associated with Digitization/Force XXI activities. Programs that
could be accelerated to place key capabilities in the hands of
commanders and soldiers include: information technology integration and
digitization systems which includes All Source Analysis System (ASAS),
Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control (FAAD C2), Enhanced
Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS), Aviation Radios, and Force
XXI Tactical Operation Centers; modification and improvements to Kiowa
Warrior, Avenger, Improved Cargo Helicopter, Sentinel, Bradley,
Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), and Stinger, Firefinder, Bradley
Fire Support Vehicle, and Bradley Linebacker; accelerated procurement
of Palletized Load System (PLS) Trucks, Family of Medium Tactical
Vehicle (FMTV) and Heavy Equipment Transporter (HET); and development
of the M1 Breacher prototype and the Comanche Flight Test.
Question. What are the potential savings if the Congress were to
provide additional funding in fiscal year (FY) 1998 for these items,
either by buying them earlier than planned or by lower production unit
costs through procurement at higher quantities? Please put the costs
and savings in the record.
Answer. The Army has developed an extensive list of unfinanced
requirements, along with potential savings derived if additional funds
were received in fiscal year 1998. These savings are not always
monetary, but reap operational impacts/benefits as well. A
representative sample of these savings/benefits follow: (a) Bradley
Fire Support Team Vehicle (BFIST), receiving a plus up of $18.6 million
in FY 98 will allow BFIST production to be completed in FY 07 instead
of FY 08. This acceleration represents a cost avoidance of $31.6
million in FY 07 and $8.2 million in FY 08. This plus up will result in
a net savings to the Army of $13.0 million (b) Family of Medium
Tactical Vehicles (FMTV), receiving $517 million more in FY 98 will
allow the Army to realize a savings of an average $6 thousand per year
per 2.5 ton truck replaced and $4 thousand per year per 5 ton truck
replaced or a total of approximately $16.6 million dollars in operation
and support class. This plus up will allow for the procurement of 3,336
more FMTV's, alleviating truck shortages and increasing equipment
readiness rates. (c) Sentinel, receiving $20.3 million in FY 98 will
allow for the procurement of 14 additional Sentinel radar systems (for
a total of 27) and decrease the fielding gap between Sentinel and FAAD
C2. This will result in a $14.3 million savings and shorten production
schedule by one year.
Question. Which of these items are on any of the Commanders-in-
Chief (CINC) integrated priority lists?
Answer. Information technologies, integration and digitization
programs (ASAS, FAAD C2, and EPLRS) compliment the capabilities
described on the CINC Integrated Priority Lists (IPL). CINC IPLs also
addressed enhancements to logistics capabilities which specifically
mentioned HETs, FMTV and aging truck fleets.
Question. Last year, the Army submitted a list which focused on
``smart investments.'' However, the list included: $24 million for
unfunded digitization requirements that required an additional $470
million in the outyears to complete; $360 million for 18 additional
Apache Longbow helicopters to ``heavy up'' the 2nd Armored Calvary
Regiment--a fielding decision that had not and still has not been made;
$500 thousand to increase the Warfighter Information Network's
capacity, which required an additional $370 million in the outyears to
sustain; and $199 million to accelerate Comanche, which required an
additional $1 billion in the outyears, which the Army stated it cannot
afford to sustain. Mr. Decker, how will you ensure that the fiscal year
1998 unfunded requirements list will focus on ``smart investments''?
Answer. The Army has gone to great lengths in an effort to ensure
that any of the high priority items included in our listing of unfunded
requirements represents a ``smart investment'' with the potential to
pay dividends in varieties of ways. Each of these requirements has been
scrutinized for its executability, and the magnitude of its
operational, functional, and/or economic payback has been carefully
weighed and evaluated in terms of dollars saved, costs avoided, and/or
capabilities enhanced. All of our high priority unfunded requirements
represent opportunities to garner significant, quantifiable benefits by
proven and effective techniques such as program accelerations;
expedited fielding; procuring at the most economic production rates
possible; through the economy-of-scale savings possible with multi-year
procurement contracts; and through implementing the improvements and
efficiencies we're pursuing as part of our acquisition streamlining and
acquisition reform initiatives.
Question. How will you ensure that the items are critical
warfighting requirements and not just ``nice to have'' items?
Answer. The Fiscal Year 1998 budget funds our programs at a level
that permits the Army to develop and procure the equipment which
enables our soldiers to remain the best in the world. Most of the
Army's procurement decisions are based on warfighting requirements.
These requirements are examined in great detail within the Army to
insure the appropriate capabilities and quantities are being developed
and procured. These requirements are validated by the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council to insure interoperability across all of
the Services. The Army also procures some items which are not directly
tied to a warfighting requirement, but are critical requirements for
the operation of the Army installation activities. Many of these items
are purchased off-the-shelf like sedans, buses, power plant equipment
and commercial air traffic control equipment. The Joint Services
Intrusion Detection System, for example, is required to ensure maximum
security of Army small arms weapons that are ordinarily secured in unit
arms rooms. This equipment is required to ensure the proper functioning
of day to day activities, the safeguarding of Army Equipment and the
protection of soldiers and their families.
With the severe funding constraints in today's budget, every
requirement is closely examined to insure only the highest priority
requirements were submitted in the President's Budget Request.
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Funding
Question. The Army is requesting $4.5 billion for Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) activities--this is $200
million higher than last year's budget request. In 1997, the Army spent
29 cents of Research and Development (R&D) for every dollar of
procurement. In this budget the Army proposes to spend 66 cents of R&D
for each procurement dollar. Your 1998 budget clearly shows that the
Army conducts much research and produces very little equipment. Mr.
Decker, what has caused this trend and why is the budget so biased
toward research rather than production?
Answer. In 1997, before the Congressional Marks, the Army budgeted
$6.32 billion in procurement and $4.32 billion in RDT&E. This equates
to approximately 68 cents of RDT&E for every dollar of procurement.
Currently the fiscal year 1998 budget is at an approximate ratio of 67
cents of RDT&E for every dollar of procurement ($6.75 billion of
procurement and $4.51 billion of RDT&E). Our RDT&E investment develops
and provides significant technical insertions in our current systems
while at the same time investing in the development of future systems
that will ensure the accomplishment of our nation's goals. It is
imperative that we maintain the Army's technological advantage on the
battlefield now and in the future. Our investments in research today
are critical to ensuring that the technologies and capabilities will be
available when needed to forge the Army After Next.
Question. Mr. Decker, you talk about a crisis in procurement. Most
of the Army's aircraft, missile, tactical vehicle and ammunition
accounts are funded below last year's budget request. However,
Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation (RDT&E) is funded at a
higher level than last year's budget request. Why are you trading off
procurement dollars for research and development activities?
Answer. In 1997, before the Congressional Marks, the Army budgeted
$6.32 billion in procurement. Currently, the fiscal year 1998 (FY98)
budget requests $6.75 billion, representing an increase of 6 percent.
The FY97 budget requested $4.32 billion for RDT&E, while the FY98
budget asks for $4.51 billion in RDT&E, only a 4 percent increase over
the previous year.
The RDT&E program in FY 98 is focused on supporting affordable
options to achieve the capabilities envisioned for Force XXI, Army
Vision 2010, and the Army After Next with emphasis on demonstrations of
promising technologies with warfighter applications. The Army continues
to maintain a strong and stable RDT&E program to ensure the timely
development and transition of technology into weapon systems and system
upgrades, and to explore alternative concepts in future global,
capabilities-based warfighting.
[Clerk's note.--Although the overall procurement funding
does increase, $349,109,000 of the increase is a result of a
transfer from the Ballistic Missile Defense Office (BMDO) for
Patriot Missile Procurement to the Army missile procurement
appropriation. Funding requested for ammunition and other
procurement are less in fiscal year 1998.]
Question. For the record, please provide a list of all ``new
start'' Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation (RDT&E)
activities in fiscal year 1998. Which ones are included in the
Commanders-in-Chief (CINC) priority list?
Answer. Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System in Engineering and
Manufacturing Development and High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled
Vehicle (HMMWV) prototype. Although these systems are not specifically
listed in a CINC's priority list they will provide Army components of
the Joint Force with the Precision Engagement and Dominant Maneuver
capabilities needed to enable Joint Vision 2010 operational concepts.
The Military Operations in Urban Terrain Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration (ACTD), although not on a CINC's priority list, began in
FY97 with Department of Defense funding. FY98 is the first year of Army
funding for this ACTD.
Heavy Tactical Vehicles
Question. The Army is requesting no funds to procure heavy tactical
vehicles in fiscal year 1998. Mr. Decker, in your statement, you stress
the importance of tactical vehicles. However, for the second year in
the row, your budget proposes no funds to procure heavy tactical
vehicles. Why?
Answer. Affordability is the reason. The Army prioritizes programs
and, although heavy tactical vehicles are important, funding was
insufficient to cover all our requirements. Heavy tactical vehicles
include the Palletized Load System (PLS), the Heavy Expanded Mobility
Tactical Truck (HEMTT), and the Heavy Equipment Transporter System
(HETS). In the Fiscal Year 1997 President's Budget, the Army budgeted
$77.4 million for PLS flatracks/devices and $86.9 million for HETS. The
Congress increased the Army's heavy tactical vehicle request by $50.0
million for PLS trucks/trailers and $30.6 million for HEMTT wreckers/
tankers. The Army is requesting $9.1 million in Fiscal Year 1998 for
PLS flatracks/devices.
Question. General Hite, what is the Army's requirement for heavy
tactical vehicles? Is the requirement satisfied? If not, what is the
shortfall?
Answer. The Army's requirement for heavy tactical vehicles have not
been met. The required/on-hand quantities are: (1) Palletized Load
System (PLS)-3,711/2,277, (2) PLS Trailers-2,891/1,195, (3) PLS
Flatracks-55,626/10,059, (4) Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck
(HEMTT)-13,203/12,165 (HEMTT Wreckers-2,483/1,630 and HEMTT Tankers-
4,842/4,073), and (5) Heavy Equipment Transporter System-2,412/1,358.
Question. What is the impact of the fiscal year 1998 budget on the
industrial base--both the prime and its suppliers?
Answer. Oshkosh Truck Corporation, Oshkosh, Wisconsin is the prime
contractor for the Palletized Load System (PLS), Heavy Expanded
Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMITT), and Heavy Equipment Transporter
System (HETS) tractors and produces these vehicles on a combined
commercial and military assembly line to keep unit costs as low as
possible. System and Electronics Incorporation, St. Louis, Missouri
produces the HETS trailer. Based on a fiscal year 1998 program ($9.1
million), production stops on: (1) PLS-April 1998, (2) PLS trailer-
December 1997, (3) HETS-July 1998, and HEMTT-July 1998. The fiscal year
1998 program (Standard Study Number DA0500) of $9.1 million buys: (1)
968 Container Roll-in/Out Plantforms-$8.1 million, and (2) 40 Container
Handling Units-$1.0 million. Based on a fiscal year 1999 program
($162.6 million) for those types of trucks in which production stops,
contract awards occur in December 1998 and the production startup is 9
months later. Reductions in the work-force at both prime contractors
and suppliers will take place including migration of suppliers and
venders away from Defense business. Startup will most likely
necessitate requalification of venders and suppliers and result in
approximately a 15 percent cost increase to the Army. Lastly, a restart
may require redesign to meet Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards
(FMVSS) which are exempted if production is kept constant.
Question. Based on your 1998 budget, you plan on spending $162
million in 1999 on heavy tactical vehicles. Since you will have a
``cold'' manufacturing line, what will be the cost of restarting the
line?
Answer. Oshkosh Truck Corporation, Oshkosh, Wisconsin is the prime
contractor for the Palletized Load System (PLS), Heavy Expanded
Mobility Tactical Truck, and Heavy Equipment Transporter System (HETS)
tractors and estimates that if a particular type of truck production is
stopped, even though the total line does not stop, then start-up costs
associated with renegotiating venders and suppliers (which represent 75
percent of the assembly process) would increase unit costs by
approximately 15 percent. In addition, a restart may require redesign
to meet Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards which are exempted if
production is kept constant. Start-up costs from System and Electronics
Incorporated, St. Louis, Missouri, which produces the HETS trailer, are
currently being developed.
Question. It is our understanding that the lead time for heavy
tactical vehicle is approximately 9 months. Does the fiscal year 1998
budget include funds to procure long lead items required for 1999
production? Why?
Answer. No, the 1998 budget does not include funding for long lead
items due to affordability.
Light Tactical Vehicles
Question. Last year, Congress appropriated $166 million for light
tactical vehicles, the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
(HMMWV). The Army is requesting $66 million in 1998 for HMMWV
production. Does the fiscal year 1998 budget satisfy Army requirements
for light vehicles? If not, what are the shortfalls?
Answer. The requested budget does not fill the remaining
requirement for light tactical vehicles in the Army inventory. The
total Army requirement for HMMWV is 119,518 vehicles. This is an
increase over prior year requirements based on the Department of the
Army decision to ``Pure Fleet'' the light tactical fleet using only the
HMMWV. We have on hand today 100,854 leaving a shortfall of 18,664. The
Army has budgeted for 774 vehicles in FY98 and of these 524 represent
new production.
Question. Does the budget request sustain the industrial base? If
not, what is the impact?
Answer. The U.S. Army can not predict the commercial, foreign
commercial/military direct and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) of the
HMMWV by the prime contractor AM General Corporation (AMG). AMG has
advised the Government that to sustain a production rate of 16.5
vehicles per day, their new minimum sustaining rate, they require the
Department of Defense to procure 10 per day (2,350 vehicles per year).
This represents Government funded procurements exclusive of any FMS
cases. Thus, the amount requested would not satisfy the contractor
identified requirement for the full year.
Question. The Army has decided to develop a new light tactical
vehicle and terminate the production of the High Mobility Multipurpose
Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) at the end of 1998. According to the Army, the
HMMWV is a ``world class vehicle''; however, supportability is becoming
a problem. What supportability problems are you experiencing?
Answer. The HMMWV has been the world's best light tactical off road
vehicle. However, over the past 17 years since the HMMWV was designed,
significant commercial component changes, statutory requirements and
our demand for increased capability from the vehicle have significantly
reduced the reliability of the vehicle and increased the sustainment
cost. The demand for increased capacity has been a result of the new
missions and constraints placed on the Army in the areas of payload,
electrical power, configuration, and mission requirements. The
significant increase in applique equipment and use of the light fleet
vehicles for more roles has pushed the envelope with regard to the
ability to package all of the new equipment in the vehicle. This has a
major impact on the human factors of the vehicle and its ability to
effectively execute the mission as well as increasing the safety risk.
The HMMWV has a high scheduled maintenance time requirement with
increasing unscheduled maintenance. This demands that we develop a
vehicle that requires significantly less scheduled service time and
reduced unscheduled time. Finally the changing commercial components
are not easily packaged in the 17-year-old design and the cost to
reconfigure the vehicle to accommodate new components is increasing
dramatically. The Project Manager Light Tactical Vehicles is preparing
a detailed discussion and justification for this program which will be
forwarded to Congress next month. This document will fully explain the
investment strategy for the light fleet.
Question. Furthermore, the Army believes that the High Mobility
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) is only ``marginally meeting new
requirements.'' What new requirements are not met by the HMMWV?
Answer. There are standards that were objectives for the original
HMMWV that were waived during prototype phase based on cost and
complexity versus other critical mission requirements. An example of an
original requirement not met is interior noise. The interior noise
exceeds that for operation without hearing protection. The use of
hearing protection reduces the combat effectiveness of the system. To
meet the new mission demands for the light tactical vehicles we have
had to make significant changes. We have: increased the payload and
ballistic protection, redesigned the vehicle to meet new federal
standards for emissions and safety, and reconfigured the vehicle to
accommodate a plethora of new applique and integrated components. The
latter effort stemmed from the increased emphasis on Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, and Information (C4I) which are key elements
for Force XXI. In meeting these requirements we have increased the
maintenance burden on the Army in an environment of decreasing manpower
and money. The vehicle also does not meet all of the federally mandated
safety requirements, and, in fact, can not be sold in the military
configuration to the general public for operation on the highway.
Question. Could those deficiencies be resolved by modifying the
current vehicle? If not why?
Answer. The Army is currently conducting a formal Analysis of
Alternatives as a normal part of an Major Defense Acquisition Program.
This analysis will identify the most cost-effective way to meet the
Army's requirements. This study will be completed before the planned
release of the solicitation later this year. Preliminary results
indicate that adapting the current vehicle is not an economically
viable alternative and would have greater risk. As a minimum, a new
body, frame, engine, electrical system and transmission will be
required to meet the user's requirements. It is probable that such
extensive changes would result in a very expensive program.
Question. What is the anticipated cost of the new light tactical
vehicle acquisition program? For the record, please provide the total
cost, per unit cost and anticipated fielding schedule.
Anwser. Based on our current program assumptions and analysis, we
estimate that the prototype phase will cost $50 million and per unit
average cost will be $86 thousand. Our anticipated First Unit Equipped
(FUE) is in fiscal year 2002.
Question. Given the Army's past experience with tactical vehicle
programs, in terms of cost growth and schedule delays, do you think it
makes sense to develop a new light vehicle? Why or why not?
Answer. Yes, we and industry have learned a lot and have overcome
the pitfalls of prior programs through general and specific acquisition
actions. Application of Integrated Process Teams within the government
and industry are reducing risk in both the requirement and acquisition
arenas. We have established effective Teaming arrangements with
contractors to identify and reconcile cost, schedule and technical
performance issues quickly and amiably between the parties. These
efforts are focused on resolution of conditions that have previously
created complications in contracting for tactical vehicles.
Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV)
Question. The Army is currently procuring the Family of Medium
Tactical Vehicles (FMTV), 2.5 and 5 ton trucks, to replace those that
have been in the fleet for over 20 years. The Army is requesting $209
million for fiscal year 1998 for FMTV. During the past year, the Army
has developed a new acquisition plan to develop a second producer. Mr.
Decker, please describe the Army's new FMTV acquisition plan.
Answer. We changed the FMTV acquisition strategy to mitigate a
break in production, to reduce Operations and Support costs, to keep
the FMTV pipeline flowing, to ensure commonality in FMTV rebuys and to
ensure continual competition in the program. We plan to award a sole
source, multiyear procurement contract to Stewart and Stevenson (S&S)
in fiscal year 1998. The following year, fiscal year 1999, we plan to
award a competitive, multiyear contract to a second source. While the
new contractor is facilitizing and becoming qualified, S&S will
continue to produce vehicles. Once the second source is qualified to
produce, they will compete with S&S for FMTV funding.
Question. Is you new acquisition plan funded in the budget?
Answer. No, as a minimum we need an additional $44 million in
fiscal year 1998 to mitigate a potential two month production gap.
Question. We understand that the economic rate of production to
maintain two Family on Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) producers would
require an annual procurement of $600 million. In the past few years,
the Army has been unable to budget that amount for its entire tactical
vehicle fleet. Given all of the modernization shortfalls you need to
``fix'' how are you going to maintain that level of funding in your
budget?
Answer. I believe that the $600 million figure came from the
Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Investment Strategy that the Department sent
to the Congress in fiscal year 1995. Initially, to maintain two
producers the Army believes that it needs $400 million per year. As you
know, our budget process is an internal trade off between our
prioritized requirements as affordability. We will do our best to fund
our highest priorities.
Question. As you know, out year projections usually do not
materialize. If this happens, would you still want to continue with a
second source?
Answer. Our planning is predicated upon certain out year funding
streams. If, at a future date those funding streams change, we will
adjust our plans accordingly.
Question. Are you satisfied with the Family of Medium Tactical
Vehicles (FMTV's) that are currently being delivered to the Army?
Answer. The Army is extremely satisfied with the FMTV. It is a
first class vehicle that is very easy to maintain.
Question. The Army is not required to compete the FMTV program or
develop a second source. If your are satisfied with the product you are
fielding, why not save the cost of the FMTV competition and award the
contract to the current producer?
Answer. The Army believes that it is in its best interest to
interject competition in its procurement awards whenever possible.
Black Hawk Multiyear Procurement
Question. Although the Army has a requirement for 500 additional
Black Hawk helicopters, the fiscal year 1998 budget proposes to procure
only a total of 36 in FY98 and FY99. The FY98 budget proposes to
terminate Black Hawk production in 2000. Last year, the Army requested
funding to begin a new multiyear contract for Black Hawk helicopters.
Furthermore, the Army identified a $243 million shortfall in FY97 for
Black Hawk procurement. The Congress provided $225 million for Black
Hawks--$64 million above the President's Budget and the authority to
proceed with a multiyear contract. This year's budget does not include
funding for a Black Hawk multiyear contract. Why does your FY98 budget
not include funds for the multiyear contract that you requested in
fiscal year 1997?
Answer. The FY98 budget reflects program budget decision (PBD) 722
which anticipates a multi-service/multiyear contract for FY97-01 at
quantities of 36, 18, 18, 18 and 18. The FY98 request reflects
requirements to procure 18 aircraft in FY98 and advance procurement for
12 aircraft in FY99. This completes the Army's portion of this
contract.
Question. Congress appropriated $65 million advanced procurement
funds in fiscal year 1997 for the production of 36 aircraft in 1998.
Since you are only procuring 18, can we rescind the money?
Answer. The $65 million FY97 advance procurement funding is
required to protect schedule, avoid breaks in production and procure
Economical Order Quantities for the production quantities in FY98 and
FY99. The budget is based on receiving $65 million in FY97. Even though
we are only procuring 18 aircraft, any reduction to this amount would
cause an increase in FY98 and FY99.
Question. When, if ever, will you procure the additional
helicopters to meet your requirements?
Answer. The Army does not anticipate having sufficient
modernization funds in the foreseeable future to enable it to procure
the remaining Black Hawk requirement.
Question. What is the operational impact of not fielding Black
Hawks after 1999?
Answer. The Army will have filled 100 percent of its active and
reserve Black Hawk warfight requirements by 1999. The Army has decided
it will accept the risks associated with Black Hawk shortages in the
sustaining accounts (training, operational floats, repair cycle floats,
and projected attrition) and the strategic reserve.
Question. Does the fiscal year 1998 (FY98) budget request sustain
the industrial base? Please explain.
Answer. Yes. The intended program from program budget decision 722
produces a multiservice/multiyear contract in FY97-01 which will
maintain the Sikorsky industrial base.
Question. If the Army decides to procure Black Hawks at a later
date, what is the cost of restarting the production line?
Answer. The cost impact of restarting the production line due to a
significant production break is estimated to cover over $50 million in
shut down and start up efforts.
Question. The unit cost for Black Hawks, based on the multiyear
procurement of 36 aircraft per year, is $8.7 million. The exact same
helicopter will cost you $11.6 million with a single year procurement
contact. The 36 aircraft you are buying in 1998 and 1999 will cost over
$104 million more than if you would have continued the multiyear. Does
this make good business sense to you? Why?
Answer. The Army decided to withdraw funding from fiscal year 1998-
2001 (FY98-01) due to affordability. No additional cost would have
occurred in FY98-99. Program budget decision 722 implemented the Deputy
Secretary of Defense decision that directed the Army to continue to buy
Black Hawk aircraft in FY 98-99.
Question. The Army Aviation Modernization Plan is the strategy for
replacing helicopters currently in the fleet. According to the plan,
all UH-1, (Huey) utility helicopters will be replaced by the Black Hawk
for both the active and reserve forces. How many UH-1 helicopters are
currently in the army inventory?
Answer. There are approximately 1000 UH-1s in the current Army
inventory. The ongoing retirement and draw down programs will reduce
the UH-1 inventory to approximately 900 aircraft by late 1999.
Question. Will you keep UH-1 helicopters in the fleet to meet
utility requirements? If not, how will those requirements be satisfied?
Answer. Yes. UH-1s will fill requirements for the light utility
helicopter mission, strategic reserve utility requirements, and
peacetime training and support requirements.
Question. What is the life expectancy of the UH-1 in the fleet?
Answer. The UH-1 life expectancy is 30 years.
Question. When will they reach their life expectancy?
Answer. The remaining UH-1 fleet will reach an average fleet age of
30 years in 2002. The Army has determined that it can safely operate
and maintain its UH-1 fleet until 2010. The key to the UH-1's
sustainability in its historical performance data and the abundant
world wide parts supply.
Question.For the record, please provide the anticipated retirement
schedule for the UF-1 based on the Black Hawk fielding schedule?
Answer. The majority of anticipated UH-1 retirements are based on
ongoing Army National Guard force reductions. The Army will procure
another 64 Black Hawks for fiscal years 1997-1999 (97=34, 98=18,
99=12). These aircraft will enable the Army to displace 12 active
component Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) UH-1's, 30 reserve component
MEDEVAC UH-1's, field 8 UH-60As for a new command aviation company in
Germany, and provide eight additional operational ready float Black
Hawks.
Question. According to the Army Modernization Plan, the UH-1 HUEY
helicopters are ``old airframes, possessing inadequate lift, speed, and
range for operations in high/hot environments.'' The Army was planning
to replace all UH-1s with the Black Hawk, ``a solid performer with
excellent deployability, sustainability, and maintainability.'' Since
it appears that the Army is going to have UH-1s in the fleet for quite
some time, are you going to improve the UH-1 to correct those
deficiencies?
Answer. These deficiencies describe the UH-1s inability to perform
assault and general support missions in a wartime environment. Since
the Army has filled 100 percent of its UH-60 wartime requirements,
there are no warfight deficiencies to correct in the UH-1.
Question. What is the estimated cost of a UH-1 upgrade program?
Answer. The Army does not have a requirement for a UH-1 upgrade
program. There has not been a cost estimate done for a UH-1 upgrade
program.
Question. Would it not be cheaper to procure new Black Haws,
instead of upgrading the UH-1? Please explain.
Answer. Since the Army has no plan to upgrade the UH-1, there is no
cost basis to compare upgrading the UH-1 against the cost of procuring
new Black Hawks.
Question. What are the operation and maintenance cost for a Black
Hawk? For a UH-1?
Answer. Operational and maintenance costs are based on the theater
in which the aircraft is operated. Current cost factors per flight hour
for aircraft in Korea are: UH-60L-$1554 per hour; UH-1-$397 per hour.
Question. The Army claims that reducing the type of helicopters in
the fleet will reduce support and logistics costs. For the record, what
would be the savings if you retired all helicopters and had only Black
Hawks in the fleet?
Answer. The Army will provide cost data at a later date. If all UH-
1s were retired, the Army would have a large number of mission
requirements that do not need a Black Hawk. The 120 aircraft light
utility helicopter mission does not require a UH-60. The Army also has
a wide variety of UH-1 peace time support missions that do not require
a UH-60.
[Clerk's note.--The cost data was not provided to the
Committee.]
Question. The Congress directed that the global positioning system
(GPS) be integrated on all service aircraft by 2000. Since you will
have more UH-1s in the fleet than you anticipated, will you meet the
deadline? If not, how many UH-1 helicopters will not have GPS by 2000?
Answer. The Army has funded the procurement of GPS to integrate
them in all remaining UH-1s by the year 2000.
Question. Since you have decided not to go forward with the Black
Hawk multiyear, it appears as if the Army will have to:
--pay $104 million more than you planned on spending for 18
helicopters;
--Pay to maintain the UH-1; and pay the higher support and logistics
costs associated with maintaining more than one type of utility
helicopter fleet.
Mr. Decker, do you still believe the Black Hawk multiyear contact is
unaffordable?
Answer. Program budget decision 722 provided sufficient funding for
an Army/Navy multiyear contract at 18 per year from fiscal years 1998-
2001 (FY98-01).
Question. Recently, we have heard testimony from several of the
Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs). All of the CINCs testified that they are
faced with critical shortfalls in areas such as equipment maintenance
and airlift. What do you think the CINCs would say about your decision
to terminate Black Hawk production?
Answer. Due to fiscal constraints, the higher priority of other war
fighting systems is more important to our soldiers.
Question. For the record, please provide, for each CINC, the number
of UH-1s that are in his area of operations.
Answer. Projected to the end of FY98: U.S. Army Europe--28; Korea--
3; U.S. Army Forces Command--81; U.S. Army Pacific--8; U.S. Army
Southern Command--0; U.S. Special Operations Command--0.
CH-47 Improved Cargo Helicopter
Question. The CH-47 is the Army's cargo helicopter which was
fielded almost 40 years ago; its useful life expires beginning in 2002.
The replacement helicopter, the National Transport Rotorcraft (NTR)
will be a joint service helicopter and will be fielded after 2015. The
Army's shortfall list in fiscal year 1997 (FY97) included funds to
accelerate the procurement of new engines for the CH-47. The Army also
identified funds to begin the development of Improved Cargo Helicopter
(ICH) program. The ICH will be a CH-47 which will undergo an airframe
overhaul and cockpit upgrade program. Congress provided the additional
funding for both unfunded requirements. What is the status of the FY97
funds?
Answer. The $8.7 million of the $17.72 million ICH FY97 Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation (RDTE) Congressional add has been
released to the Army. This $8.7 million will allow the ICH Program
Office to fund all programmatic requirements through the end of FY 97.
The balance of the congressional add, currently on withhold in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, must be released to the Army at the
beginning of FY98 to allow for the award of the ICH Engineering and
Manufacturing Development contract in December 1997.
Question. The Congress provided $17 million to begin the
development of the ICH, an airframe overhaul and cockpit upgrade
program for the CH-47. The Army is requesting $2.6 million to continue
the program in FY98. The Army plans on delivering the first ICH to the
fleet in 2003. The last ICH will be delivered in 2016. What is the
anticipated cost of the ICH program?
Answer. The current RDTE funding requirement for this program is
projected to be $103 million in then year dollars. The current
Procurement funding requirement for this program is projected to be
$3.102 billion in then year dollars.
Question. Is the ICH program adequately funded in your 1998 budget
request? If not, what is the shortfall?
Answer. The ICH program is not adequately funded in FY98 due to a
$26 million FY98 RDTE decrement in Program Budget Decision 722. While
the program remains executable, additional RDTE funds in FY98 would
``buy back'' the year delay in fielding caused by this decrement and
maintain program efficiencies during the Engineering and Manufacturing
Development phase.
Question. What is the anticipated useful life of the ICH?
Answer. Once fielded, the useful life of the ICH will be 20 years.
Question. The useful life of the CH-47 expires beginning in 2002.
The first ICH will not be delivered until 2003, the last in 2016.
Should the ICH program be accelerated? Please explain.
Answer. The initial fielding date of 2002 was established to
coincide with the end of the projected useful life of the CH-47D.
Therefore, any delays of ICH fielding beyond this date would be unwise.
Due to budget constraints during the production years, the ICH will
only be fielded at one half the rate at which the CH-47D was fielded.
Additional Procurement funding during the production years would allow
the Army to accelerate procurement and fielding, providing our war-
fighters with this critical capability early.
Question. The ICH program will be the second ``service life
extension program'' for the CH-47; the first took place 20 years ago. A
replacement helicopter, the NTR, for CH-47 will not be produced until
after 2015 almost 20 years from today. Do you believe that the ICH will
remain safe and operational until after 2015 or will not have to do
another life extension program?
Answer. Yes, the ICH will remain safe and operational for 20 years.
The first ICHs will be operational until 2023, while the last ICH
deliveries will be operational until 2036. The safety of these aircraft
will be maintained through continued safety and sustainment efforts,
much like the CH-47D fleet is today.
Question. The Marine Corps is also considering a service life
extension program for its cargo helicopters. Since both services will
procure the NTR, would it not make more sense, operationally and
economically, to accelerate the NTR instead of doing two service life
extension programs?
Answer. The ICH is intended to bridge the gap between now and the
fielding of what is now known as the Joint Tactical Rotocraft (JTR).
This is why the ICH program includes only the necessary quantities--300
of the Army's 431 CH-47Ds--to achieve this bridge. The need to sustain
the CH-47D fleet through another service life extension program in the
immediate future is critical and cannot be delayed. Delaying the ICH
program would result in an anticipated reduction in aircraft
operational availability and increased Operating and Support costs
until a replacement is fielded. Should the replacement program be
delayed, this program would continue to grow. While the Army cannot
speak for the Marine Corps, the JTR program is only in the very early
stages of Concept Exploration. Many of the anticipated technologies
required to achieve the desired performance objectives are still being
defined. The JTR is currently projected to be fielded no earlier than
2015, at which time the entire fleet of CH-47Ds will be over 20 years
old.
Apache Longbow Helicopter
Question. The Apache is the Army's attack helicopter originally
fielded in the 1980's. The Army is planning to modify 758 of the Apache
helicopters to the Apache Longbow. With its improved radar and weapon
systems, the Apache Longbow will have improved targeting, survivability
and maintainability features. Last year, the Army's shortfall list
included funds to modify the Apache Longbow with a Second Generation
Forward Looking Infrared (2nd GEN FLIR) that is being developed for the
Comanche. Since the outyear integration costs for the Apache 2nd GEN
FLIR program were not budgeted and projected to be approximately $700
million, the Committee requested that the Army provide a report with
the fiscal year 1998 budget submit outlining the risks and costs of the
program. What is the status of the report?
Answer. An interim report was approved for release on 11 March
1997. The final report cannot be prepared until results of a flight
evaluation are assessed. I the contract can be awarded by 30 June 1997
a flight demonstration could take place in the Third Quarter, FY98. A
final report will be prepared at that time.
Question. When will you provide it to Congress?
Answer. The interim report was sent the week of 24 March 1997.
Question. The Senate provided the funds to begin the 2nd GEN FLIR
program and their position prevailed in conference--the Congress
provided $5 million to begin the program. What is the status of the
FY97 funds?
Answer. The funding provided in FY97 is being withheld by the
Department of Defense Comptroller. The FY97 funding would allow the
Army to do a flight evaluation of the Comanche FLIR on Apache. The
intent of this evaluation is to provide the detailed information
necessary to fully respond to the Congressional reporting requirement.
Question. Does your FY98 budget include funds to continue the
program? If not, what is the shortfall?
Answer. Funding to support a FY98 program is not included in the
FY98 budget. A FY98 program start would require $13 million.
Question. Do you plan on providing offsets to continue the program
in FY98?
Answer. Offset decisions for FY98 have not been made yet.
Question. The Army told us last year it believed using the Comanche
2nd GEN FLIR would be cost effective because it would allow development
of a single sensor for two aircraft. However, it is our understanding
that competing contractors have told the Army they will protest ``sole
source'' award. They say it is unfair not to compete the contract. If
you must compete the contract, what is the anticipated cost of
developing a new 2nd GEN FLIR for the Apache Longbow? Are funds
included in the FY98 budget request?
Answer. The cost of developing and procuring a new 2nd GEN FLIR
would be approximately $774 million, $26 million more than the
projected cost of leveraging the work already completed on the Comanche
FLIR. Funding to support a 1998 program is not included in the 1998
budget request.
Question. It appears as if your Apache Longbow 2nd GEN FLIR program
is in trouble because you did not provide Congress with a report as
requested; the Office of the Secretary of Defense has not released your
FY97 funds; you did not provide funds in FY98 to continue the program;
and you can not award the contract without a competition. So why
shouldn't we rescind the funds?
Answer. Funding should not be rescinded because it was provided for
the express purpose of investigating the feasibility of using the
Comanche FLIR on the Apache, not necessarily to begin a Apache 2nd GEN
FLIR program. Data derived from the feasibility study and flight
demonstration will not only provide valuable information for any future
Apache 2nd GEN FLIR program, but also serves as a risk reduction to the
Comanche program. A sole source contract can be awarded for this
feasibility study because there is only one developer of the Comanche
FLIR. However, any new effort to develop and produce an Apache 2nd GEN
FLIR would be competed in accordance with the Competition in
Contracting Act.
Funding to support follow-on 2nd GEN FLIR requirements will be
addressed in the FY99-03 Mini-Program Objectives Memorandum.
Question. Last year, the Congress provided $27 million to procure
one crew trainer for the Apache Longbow. The Army identified an
unfunded requirement for two crew trainers. It is our understanding
that funds are not included in the fiscal year 1998 budget for the
second trainer. Why?
Answer. The FY98 budget request contains $81.7 million for Apache
Longbow training devices. The 1998 funding would procure the best mix
of required training devices based upon available funding. Devices to
be procured in 1998 are two Longbow Crew Trainers, two Longbow
Collective Training Systems, two Multiplex Avionics, Visionics,
Weapons, and Electrical Systems Trainers, three Airframe Engine and
Drivetrain Systems Trainers, and 45 Tactical Engagement Simulation
Systems. With an additional $28 million, the Army would procure one
additional Longbow Crew Trainer; one Multiplex Avionics, Visionics,
Weapons, and Electrical Systems Trainer; and two Airframe Engine and
Drivetrain Systems Trainers.
Question. The Army is pursuing a six year multiyear contract for
the Fire Control Radar (FCR), which is a key component of the Apache
Longbow weapon system. The FCR provides automatic target detection,
classification, and prioritization and a firer and forget capability.
The Apache Longbow airframe is a five year multiyear procurement. Why
are you requesting a six year multiyear contract for the FCR?
Answer. A six year multiyear contract is being requested because it
would complete the procurement of the remaining 207 FCRs and offer a
considerable cost avoidance. Army analysis projects a cost avoidance of
approximately $80 million.
Kiowa Warrior Helicopter
Question. The Kiowa Warrior is the Army's armed reconnaissance
helicopter. Originally fielded during the Vietnam War as the OH-58,
this helicopter will start to be replaced after 2006 by the Comanche.
The Army is requesting no funds for Kiowa Warrior production for fiscal
year 1998. What is the Army's requirement for Kiowa Warriors? How many
are in the current fleet? How many are on contract?
Answer. The Army's requirement for Kiowa Warriors is 507, and
includes all units, both Active and Reserve, that have Kiowa as part of
required equipment. There are currently 314 in the fleet. There are a
total of 398 on contract.
Question. Last year, Congress provided an additional $190 million
for Kiowa Warrior (FY97 plus up). What is the status of those funds?
Answer. $79 million of the $190 million has been released by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The $22 million will be used
to continue procurement of 10 additional aircraft. The $57 million will
be used for the Safety Enhancement Program (SEP). The remaining $111
million for procurement of aircraft above the 398 quantity is still on
withhold by at OSD.
Question. The Army has requested that $57.3 million of the 1997
funds appropriated for Kiowa Warrior production be reallocated to
correct safety problems on Kiowa Warrior helicopters in the fleet. The
funds will be used to procure and install crashworthy seats, airbags,
restraint systems and engine upgrades. Last year you told us the cost
of the program was $172 million. Has the cost of the safety enhancement
program (SEP) changed? If so, by how much and why? Is it adequately
funded in the budget? If not what is the shortfall?
Answer. The entire SEP cost as estimated last year is $189 million.
This includes a program which began in fiscal year (FY96) and continues
through FY04. In FY96, $15 million was spent on the SEP; which leaves a
remaining requirement of $174 million. The SEP is partially funded in
the FY 97-01 budget at $115 million (includes the $57.3 million from
the FY97 plus up). There is a total $59 million shortfall in FY00
through FY04.
Question. What effect will the Bell-Textron's recent contract award
for the Marine Cobra and Huey upgrade program mean to its overhead
rates? Will it lower the cost of production of Kiowa Warriors?
Answer. During the first two years of the Marine Cobra and Huey
program there will be no effect on the overhead rates. This is because
the majority of the effort during the first two years will be for non-
recurring engineering. After two years of the effect will be to reduce
the overhead rates for all programs and the cost of producing the Kiowa
Warrior.
Comanche Helicopter
Question. The Comanche is the next generation armed reconnaissance
helicopter. The Comanche will significantly expand the Army's ability
to collect reconnaissance information in all battlefield environments
because of its improved sensors and greater flexibility for deployment.
The Comanche will replace the Kiowa Warrior. The Army is requesting
$282 million in fiscal year 1998 for continued development of Comanche.
Mr. Decker, your statement says ``Comanche, if fielded,''--Is the Army
considering not fielding the Comanche? Please explain.
Answer. The Army has always expected to field this critical
warfighting asset. My statement simply recognized that we have
acquisition decision points to evaluate the operational performance
before fielding a new system. I am confident that as Comanche fully
demonstrates the capabilities it is designed to provide, it will be
procured and fielded as programmed.
Question. Last year, the Army requested an additional $199 million
to accelerate the development of Comanche. Accelerating the program
would not only field Comanche sooner, but would also save $3 billion in
acquisition costs. Congress provided an additional $50 million for
Comanche in FY97. How did the Army spend the additional $50 million?
Answer. The $50 million was released to the Army on February 28,
1997. Specific uses are additional flight testing, beginning
development of the Link 16 communication capability for Comanche,
earlier development work on the Electro-Optical Sensor System and the
Low Observable development programs, and wind tunnel tests.
Hellfire II Missile
Question. Last year, the Army's unfunded priority list included a
request for economic order quantity funding for a proposed four-year
Hellfire II multiyear contract. In this year's budget, the Army
eliminated all Hellfire II production in fiscal year 1998 and out.
Given that stability of requirement and funding are prerequisites for
multiyear contracts, why did the Army request a multiyear for Hellfire
II only to eliminate production in the FY98 and out?
Answer. The Army could not afford the continued buy of Hellfire II
missiles at less than the annual minimum economic rate and Congress did
not support the requested economic order quantity funds to initiate
multiyear procurement. In the near term, Army has over 37,000 Laser
Hellfire missiles (all tactical configurations), which fully meet all
anticipated operational requirements. The Army expects Foreign Military
Sales to sustain the Hellfire II production line through FY99, as a
minimum, and the Army will address restarting the Hellfire II (or an
improved version) production line in the FY99-03 Program Objectives
Memorandum build.
Question. How can we work with you to understand the priorities
that the Army is committed to sustaining in future budgets?
Answer. The Congress needs to continue its open dialogue with Army
Leadership to understand our priorities. In addition, the Army needs
the assistance from the Congress in stabilizing individual program
funds; minimizing the decrements to the modernization programs that
have heretofore been required to support contingency operations; and
its continued support for the Force XXI technical initiatives.
Extended Range Multiple Launch Rocket System (ER-MLRS)
Question. Last year, the Army's unfunded priority list included a
request for funds for additional ER-MLRS rockets in order to smooth
``the ramp up'' to the fiscal year 1998 buy. However, this year's
budget reduces the FY98 buy of this rocket to zero. Why did the Army
request additional quantities in FY97 only to zero the program the next
year?
Answer. Estimated Foreign Military Sales for FY98 allowed the Army
the flexibility to fund higher priorities. Funding for FY98 will be
used to help the Army execute Field Artillery redesign, allowing the
Army to modernize more of the Army National Guard with Paladin
howitzers, while maintaining combat capability in the Active Component
divisions. Additionally, Extended Range Guided (ER-Guided) Rocket
technology was successfully demonstrated in 1996 and resulted in the
Army giving the ER-Guided Rocket program a higher priority than the
Extended Range Rocket. Thus, during the FY98 budgetary process, the
Army adequately funded an Engineering, Manufacturing and Development
program for the ER-Guided Rocket beginning in FY98. The FY96 and FY97
buys of 2,826 ER-MLRS Rockets and follow-on procurements provide an
interim capability until the ER-Guided Rocket begins production.
Question. What is the Army inventory requirement for this weapon?
Answer. The requirement for the ER-MLRS Rockets is 150,000 rockets.
The Army is currently assessing the requirement for the ER-Guided
Rocket and will use the ER-MLRS Rocket as an interim capability until
the ER-Guided Rocket is fielded in FY2003.
Question. Under the current plan, when will this inventory
requirement be met?
Answer. The current plan required procurement of the ER-Guided
Rocket to continue thru FY2012.
Question. Would any of the Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) agree that
it is prudent to eliminate United States production for the ER-Rocket
in FY98?
Answer. The FY96 and FY97 procurement of 2,286 ER-MLRS Rockets
provides the CINCs an interim capability through FY98. Limited follow-
on production planned for FY99 through FY01 will further increase
quantities of the ER-MLRS Rocket available to meet contingency
requirements. The CINCs require an MLRS rocket that provides them
operational and logistical flexibility. The ER-Guided Rocket is the
objective MLRS rocket that will provide the operational and logistical
flexibility required by the CINCs. The ER-Guided Rocket is scheduled to
begin production in FY2002 with fielding in FY2003.
Question. How can we work with you to understand the priorities
that the Army is committed to sustaining in future budgets?
Answer. Maintaining an open dialogue with the Army leadership,
assisting in stabilizing funding for individual missile programs, and
continued support for the Army's Force XXI modernization initiatives
will serve to provide a better understanding of the Army's priorities
in sustaining future budgets.
Starstreak Missile
Question. Given the availability of funding, is the Army committed
to conducting Phase III side by side evaluation of the Starstreak and
Stinger missiles? If not, why not?
Answer. The FY97 Joint Appropriations Conference was specific in
their language regarding Starstreak. The language stated, ``an increase
of $15,000,000 only for continuation of the air-to-air Starstreak
evaluation. The conferees agree that side-by-side testing with other
missile candidates should not occur until after completion of Phase II
testing of Starstreak''. Phase II missile firings are scheduled for
completion in October 1998, with the final report expected in November
1998. It is very important to complete the Phase II testing and data
analysis prior to development of a launcher, and integration of the
Starstreak missile system with the fire control radar on the AH-64 D
Apache Longbow. Until Phase II is completed, the Starstreak missile's
ability to accurately track and engage airborne targets, and its
associated probability of hit for which target acquisition and tracking
are major factors, will be unknown, and will significantly increase
risk to the launcher and system integration designs for the Apache
Longbow. Accordingly, the Army initiated an analytical effort to
conduct a parallel cost and performance assessment of Stinger Block I/
II and Starstreak missiles fired from Longbow Apache and Comanche
aircraft in simulated one-on-one and few-on-few combat scenarios, which
also coincides with the Starstreak Phase II contract completion date.
The Starstreak Phase II test results will be used to validate the model
and achieve a high degree of confidence in the analytical performance
comparison between missiles. The model provides the Army and the UK a
means to evaluate the two air-to-air missiles without having to fund a
costly Phase III side-by-side comparison test. Use of modeling and
simulation, therefore, is the affordable approach to provide the
comparisons between missiles without having to fund a Phase III side-
by-side test evaluation program which is estimated to cost $36.6
million.
Question. Is further work required to launch a Stinger from Apache?
If so, please describe the additional work and the associated costs.
Answer. Modification of the existing Stinger Air-to-Air launcher to
ensure MIL-STD-1760 compatibility, appropriate battery cooling to the
hellfire launcher to accommodate Stinger, and associated launcher
qualification work would need to be conducted as part of a development
program. Total development costs are estimated to be $18.6 million.
After development cost investments for launcher development/
qualification, the cost to retrofit the Longbow Apache fleet would
entail unit production costs of $100,000 per unit aircraft (2
launchers), and minor modifications to the aircraft's fire control
radar.
Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS)
Question. The Committee understands that there may be possible
foreign sales for the Block IA extended range variant of ATACMS. What
is the status of these Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases?
Answer. The extended range ATACMS Block IA is not currently being
considered for foreign sales. However, the export version of ATACMS
Block I is being offered for FMS. Turkey and Greece have agreed to buy
72 and 41 Block I missiles, respectively. In the near term, the only
possible additional FMS case is with South Korea.
Question. Have the benefits of the additional quantities been
factored in the pricing in the fiscal year 1998 President's Budget? If
not, what savings are anticipated in FY98?
Answer. Benefits to the Army from the Turkey case are reflected in
the FY97 ATACMS Block IA budget. The contract for the Greece buy has
not been definitized, therefore further Army FY97 benefits are not yet
quantified. The Army bases savings on the increase in the production
rate from FMS. The production rate benefits are leveled across all the
missiles being procured concurrently ensuring the Army shares in the
savings. The exact amount of the savings realized is dependent upon the
contract that is negotiated, the number of additional missiles per year
procured, and the actual contractor costs incurred in the early years
of production. The Army is unable, at this time, to determine any
potential FY98 benefits from the possible South Korean case.
Abrams Tanks
Question. The 1998 budget requests $342 million to continue the
multiyear procurement of M1A2 tanks. Last year, the Army procured 120
M1A2 tanks for a unit cost of $1.8 million. For fiscal year 1998, the
Army is planning on procuring 120 tanks at $2.9 million a copy. A
Second Generation Forward Looking Infrared Radar (II GEN FLIR) and
electronic upgrades, which were not included in previous M1A2's, will
be included in the 1998 production vehicles. What is the per unit cost
to procure and integrate the II GEN FLIR on the M1A2?
Answer. First some clarification. The Army requests $622.2 million
in procurement funding to continue and support the Abrams multiyear--
$328.6 million in regular procurement for the 1998 quantity, $266.2
million in advance procurement for the 1999 quantity, $13.9 million in
initial spares and $13.4 million in system training devices. The unit
costs shown on the P-40 form only reflect ``Regular Procurement'', the
correct unit costs can be derived from the Program Summary on the P-40
form and are shown on the P-5 form. The correct unit costs for FY97 and
FY98 are $4.18 million and $4.9 million respectively. In addition, II
GEN FLIR upgrades the ``thermal sensors'' and is not a ``radar.'' The
budget documentation shows the System Enhancement Program (SEP),
including II GEN FLIR, cuts into the final 10 tanks of the 1998
quantity. As a result, the 1998 buy bears the non-recurring start-up
costs in addition to the recurring costs. We estimate $2.66 million per
tank is required to start-up and procure 10 sets worth of II GEN FLIRs.
As another point of comparison, for the first 500 tanks, our estimated
costs for II GEN FLIR are:
UNIT COST--1ST 500 UNITS
[Dollars in thousands]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY96
Const $ Esc $
------------------------------------------------------------------------
II GEN FLIR......................................... $753 $856
I GEN FLIR.......................................... 359 408
-------------------
Delta............................................... 394 448
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Constant--Const, Esc--Escalated.
Project Manager Abrams is assessing a potential delay in the M1A2
SEP development effort which may slip SEP production cut-in by two
months/10 tanks.
Question. What electronic upgrades, which were not included on
earlier M1A2's, will be integrated on the tanks produced beginning in
1998?
Answer. The following lists the improvements to be introduced in
1998:
a. 2nd Generation Forward Looking Infrared Sensors
b. Core Electronics (Digitization) Upgrades
(1) New Hull/Turret Main Processors
(2) Mass Memory Unit
(3) Task Force XXI Command and Control Software
(4) Open Architecture
(5) Upgraded Displays and Soldier Machine Interface
c. Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS) interface
d. Embedded Global Positioning System
e. Voice Synthesis
f. Under Armor Auxiliary Power Unit (APU)
g. Thermal Management System
Question. What is the per unit cost to procure and integrate the
new electronics on the M1A2?
Answer. Our estimate for the average unit cost for the first 500
units as compared to the original electronics is shown below:
ELECTRONICS UNIT COSTS--1ST 500 UNITS
[Dollars in thousands]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY96
Const $ Esc $
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under Armor APU..................................... $104 $118
Thermal Management System........................... 80 90
Other Electronics................................... 278 316
-------------------
Total Average Cost.............................. 462 524
===================
1st GEN Electronics & External APU.................. $389 $443
-------------------
Delta............................................... $73 $81
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. Will you retrofit the M1A2 tanks produced in prior years
with the II GEN FLIR and electronic upgrades?''
Answer. Yes, our current plan is to retrofit all M1A2s to the M1A2
SEP configuration.
Question. What is the cost of the retrofit program?
Answer. The estimated total cost to retrofit 617 M1A2s to the M1A2
SEP configuration is $828 million ($1.34 million each) over the period
from FY00 through FY06.
Question. What is the anticipated schedule for the retrofit
program?
Answer. The FY98 President's Budget initiates funding in FY00 for
an initial quantity of two. Based on the funding in the modification
line, the program will complete in FY07 at a total quantity of 617
M1A2s.
Question. Are funds included in the FY98 budget for the retrofit
program? if not, what is the shortfall?
Answer. Funds are included in the 1998 budget documentation to
initiate the retrofit program. Over the period from FY00 to FY03, we
plan to procure 187 M1A2 to M1A2 SEP retrofits.
Question. In Fiscal Year 1997, the Congress provided $8 million to
begin the development of the next generation tank. It is our
understanding the funds have not been released by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense Comptroller. Have you requested the funds?
Answer. No. the Army has not requested the funds. It has taken some
time to define an Army position regarding the use of the funds. In
addition, the Congressional language supporting the plus-up requires
competitive contracting. Since the Army did not anticipate this
funding, we're behind where we'd like to be in preparing contractual
documentation. Current policy is to not request release of funding
until near contract award.
Question. If the funds are released, would you use the $8 million
to begin the development of the next generation tank?
Answer. If the funding was released, we would apply it to tank
modernization in accordance with Congressional language as follows:
a. $3.5 million for two studies to (1) define a post M1A2 SEP ($1
million) program to provide target acquisition and accuracy
improvements increasing the tank's lethal range and (2) conduct Future
Combat System (FCS) concept studies ($2.5 million) to assess potential
requirements and technologies for a future tank.
b. $2.8 million for Abrams (M1A2 and M1A1) operating and support
cost reduction efforts. Specifically, $1.4 million to undertake a
project to increase track and roadwheel life and $1.4 million for a
Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Filtration system redesign. Both projects
can make a significant impact in reducing the ownership costs of the
Abrams fleet.
c. Finally, $1.5 million to assess the feasibility of M1A1 Command
and Control digitization using modified M1A2 SEP components.
Question. If so, are funds included in the budget request to
continue the effort?
Answer. The Army has included funding for an FCS in the FY98
budget. Program Element 63645, Project DQ19 (shown below) is
specifically designated for initiating a focused FCS development
effort. The FY97 piece is the result of the FY97 Congressional plus-up:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PE 63645DQ19............................................ 7.8 0 0 2.0 24.8 28.9 38.5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, there is a significant amount of work ongoing in the
Tech Base which supports the FCS. In essence, we plan to use a portion
of the 1997 plus-up to focus the Tech Base and subsequently initiate a
new start in the 2000 timeframe.
Question. Is the Army planning to procure additional M1A2 tanks
upon completion of the current multiyear contract? If so, how many?
Answer. The Army may continue M1A2 procurement after the multiyear
procurement; however, affordability will influence the annual upgrade
production rates and may influence the configuration of the tank. The
challenge is to strike the right balance among operational
requirements, affordability and industrial base considerations.
Currently, about 2,127 M1A2s are required to equip the Core Force
(Force Packages 1 and 2) and meet the requirements for the training
base and test vehicles. The current approved M1A2 program is for 1,079
vehicles--19 pilots/prototypes, 62 new production and 998 upgrades.
This quantity provides M1A2s for Force Package 1, training base and
test vehicle requirements. At this point in time, the Army is not
certain ``How many M1A2s'' it will procure. Right now, we're committed
to buying M1A2 upgrades through the end of the multiyear (786 upgrades
or 867 M1A2s).
Ammunition Programs
Question. Last year, the Congress provided $1.1 billion for the
procurement of ammunition. This represented an increase of almost $300
million to the fiscal year 1997 budget request. The additional funds
were provided to adequately modernize the ammunition inventory and
preserve the industrial base. The Army's fiscal year 1998 budget
request for ammunition is $890 million. Does the fiscal year 1998
budget request adequately fund the Army's requirement for ammunition
and sustain the capabilities of the industrial base?
Answer. Within the context of the overall Army budget, we have
built a balanced program that is suitable. We place funding priority on
readiness which means training ammunition. We then buy modern munitions
based on affordability. The fiscal year 1998 request adequately funds
our demilitarization program and marginally funds requirements for our
organic production facilities.
Question. The Army's annual consumption of training ammunition is
approximately $900 million. The fiscal year 1998 budget request for
both training and war reserve ammunition is $694 million. As a result,
the Army must use war reserve ammunition to support training
requirements. Does this concern you? Why?
Answer. The Army's use of war reserve to support training draws
down the existing war reserve for use in training. Some of these items
became excess as a result of post Cold War requirements reductions over
the last several years. The use of these munitions in training avoided
storage and eventual demilitarization costs. However, some of these
items, which are not excess, have been drawn below the total needed for
war reserve purposes and replacing them will be prioritized within our
fiscal constraints.
Question. The Army is responsible for the storage and maintenance
of all conventional ammunition. In the past, the Army has budgeted $300
million for this activity. How much is included in the fiscal year 1998
budget request for this activity?
Answer. The Army's fiscal year 1998 budget request for ammunition
management totals $369.4 million, and includes funding for both the
toxic chemical and conventional ammunition stockpile management
programs. The toxic chemical munitions program ($79.1 million) provides
for the proper storage, maintenance, and surveillance of chemical items
until demilitarization actions are complete. The conventional
ammunition stockpile management program ($290.3 million) provides for
supply management, inspection, maintenance, and surveillance for the
world-wide wholesale stockpile of conventional ammunition. This is
considered an adequate level of funding to support the Army, as well
our conventional ammunition storage mission in support of other
Services.
Question. Several contractors who operate Army ammunition plants
have made Post Retirement Benefit (PRB) claims against the Army. The
Army believes the cost of settling one of the claims, by Uniroyal,
Inc., is approximately $35 million. What is a PRB claim?
Answer. A PRB claim is a request for funds to pay post retirement
benefits for health and life insurance or other non-pension welfare
benefits to qualified retirees.
Question. Why is the government liable?
Answer. The issue of government liability has not been determined.
The Army position is that there is no legal liability under the
contracts as a direct cost. The Uniroyal request for extraordinary
relief did not include a determination of government liability. The
Army Contract Adjustment Board (ACAB) decided to grant the Uniroyal
request under Public Law 85-804, in recognition of an equitable
obligation based on how the Army historically told the contractors to
account for costs. The ACAB decision gives rise to a legal obligation
to pay in accordance with the decision.
Question. It is our understanding that the Army would like to use
expired years dollars to pay the claim. How would this be accomplished?
Answer. The use of expired year dollars may require Congressional
approval because the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Comptroller
has determined the Army must use current funds.
Question. What steps will you take to ensure that no future claims
are filed against the government?
Answer. We know of no way to ensure there are no future claims
against the government other than to encourage all contractors to
accrue the funds necessary to finance Post Retirement Benefit costs
against current customers.
Question. The fiscal year 1998 budget proposed that the Army
procure no kinetic energy tank ammunition after 1998. Will the Army's
requirement for kinetic energy tank ammunition be satisfied with the
fiscal year 1998 procurement?
Answer. No.
Question. Last year, Congress requested a report on the industrial
base for kinetic energy tank ammunition. Briefly outline your findings
and solutions.
Answer. The report determined that the depleted uranium projectile
assembly was the critical issue (sabot and penetrator). The report
indicates a viable option to fill the void with a combination of 25
millimeter (mm) and 120mm kinetic energy rounds until the next
generation of 120mm kinetic energy round completes development, if the
Army decides to pursue the next generation.
Question. What will be the restart costs for depleted uranium
kinetic energy tank rounds if the production line closes?
Answer. If we implement the findings of the report, there are no
restart costs. If we choose to completely halt kinetic energy munitions
production, it may not be possible to reconstruct the industrial base
as currently configured. For example, the issue with the Depleted
Uranium penetrator is not restart costs but Nuclear Regulatory
Commission and state licensing over which the Army has no control.
Restart costs are cartridge and acquisition strategy dependent and will
require further study.
Question. It is our understanding that the Army has no plans to
procure Depleted Uranium (DU) in fiscal years 1998 through fiscal year
2003. There are only two DU suppliers in the United States. What impact
does this decision have on the industrial base?
Answer. The fiscal year 1998 budget includes funding for both the
120 millimeter (mm) (M829A2) and 25mm (M919) kinetic energy rounds,
both of which have DU penetrators. If there is no procurement of
kinetic energy munitions in fiscal years 1999 through 2002, the
commercial facilities which produce DU would have no Department of
Defense business. The decision to close the commercial facilities would
be a commercial decision.
Question. In the last five years, how much has the Army spent on
DU?
Answer. The Army buys cartridge which contains DU. the cartridges
are procured from systems contractors; the DU is provided to the
systems contractors by subcontract. Congress has funded the 120mm
(M829A2) in each of the last five years, with an average DU component
cost of approximately $10 million per year. The 25mm (M919) was funded
in fiscal years 1994, 1995, and 1997, with an average DU component cost
of $4.5 million per year.
Question. Do either of the DU suppliers have non-defense customers?
If so, do they have enough non-defense sales to keep them viable until
2003?
Answer. Both suppliers have multiple business activities, most of
which are defense related or connected. Neither of the suppliers
appears to have sufficient non-defense sales at this time to remain
viable through 2003.
Question. How will you ensure that DU is available after 2003?
Answer. As indicated in our report to Congress, the Army is
considering a plan to procure a combination of DU munitions until the
next generation of 120mm kinetic energy round completes development. If
this item is type classified, we would expect to procure modest
quantities.
Question. The Army demilitarizes conventional ammunition at an
annual cost of approximately $100 million. The Army believes it can
lower the cost of the demilitarization program by selling munitions to
industry, who will destroy the munitions and then sell the by-products.
What are the benefits of commercial demilitarization?
Answer. There are two major benefits of selling munitions to
industry. The first is a cost avoidance for demilitarization which can
range from $800 to $1,200 per short ton, depending on the complexity of
the to be demilitarized. The second benefit is the additional
demilitarization which could be bought by the Army with the proceeds
from these sales.
Question. What are the anticipated savings?
Answer. The actual savings would depend on the number of short tons
actually sold and the price the Army could get for these obsolete or
excess munitions.
Question. The demilitarization program's goal is to reduce the
ammunition stockpile to less than 100,000 tons by 2004. Based on
funding available, will you reach your goal using the current methods
of demilitarization?
Answer. The three major factors which will impact the Army's
ability to reach this goal are the accuracy of the forecasted
generations into the demilitarization account; annual funding levels;
and the Army's ability to minimize or reduce future cost increases. If
the Army is able to successfully manage these three factors but is not
able to increase sales of obsolete or excess munitions, then we
estimate we could have approximately 40,000 short tons in addition to
the desired inventory level of 100,000 short tons by the end of fiscal
year 2004.
Question. Would you reach your goal using the proposed method?
Answer. The Army believes that the goal can be reached or exceeded
if we have greater flexibility to sell obsolete or excess munitions
from the demilitarization account as requested in our legislative
proposal. This does not mean that we would not have to continue to
closely monitor and manage other aspects of this program, i.e., funding
levels, generations, and costs.
Question. Are there any obstacles that will not allow you to
implement your plan? If so, what are they and how can they be overcome?
Answer. The Conventional Ammunition Demilitarization Program has
received good support from both Congress and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense. The Army is intensively managing this program to
assure we have a balanced program (private industry/government and
destructive/non-destructive technologies). One of our initiatives is
the legislation allowing greater flexibility for sales from the
demilitarization account. The Army is committed to reducing the
demilitarization backlog to less than 100,000 short tons by the end of
fiscal year 2004. The legislative initiatives is one of our efforts to
assure that this goal is met.
Question. Last year, Congress appropriated $45 million for the
Armament Retooling and Manufacturing Support (ARMS) program. How do you
plan on spending the $45 million?
Answer. Approximately $5 million would be used for loan guarantees
and to support program costs. The additional $40 million will support
expansion of ARMS to four additional facilities that are not currently
participating and support additional ARMS proposals at the other eleven
eligible facilities.
Question. You are requesting $5 million for fiscal year 1998 to
continue the ARMS program, but no funds are budgeted for the outyears.
Why?
Answer. This is the maximum amount available for the Army to
allocate to this program within current fiscal constraints. The Army
will continue to assess future funding of this program as it refines
its future programs and needs.
Question. Will you terminate the ARMS program after 1998?
Answer. The ARMS program will continue after 1998; the goal is to
make it a self-sustaining operation.
Question. The fiscal year 1998 budget provides funding for only
five of the sixteen munitions required to modernize the Army's
ammunition inventory. When does the Army plan on buying the 11
munitions required to modernize its inventory?
Answer. The Army intends to procure all fifteen of the munitions to
modernize the inventory as soon as possible within its current fiscal
constraints. Of the ten munitions which are not being procured in
fiscal year 1998, three have filled the requirement, three are at or
above fifty percent of the requirement, and one is still in
development. Of the remaining three, one is programmed for procurement
in the future.
Question. What is the impact of the Army's decision not to procure
all of the munitions required to modernize its inventory?
Answer. The Army must continue to rely on the substitute munitions
previously procured and maintained in the stockpile. The Army has
chosen to accept this moderate risk in order to fully support training
and thereby support near term readiness.
Digitization
Question. The Army is creating a ``digitized battlefield'' that it
believes will give it the ability to maintain a modern, but smaller
force capable of decisive victory. Digitization is the application of
information technologies--sensors, communications, computers,
displays--to meet the needs of the battlefield commanders at all
levels, providing a common picture in near-real time, shared data among
battlefield systems and the synchronization of combat power.
The Army is requesting only $57 million for ``horizontal
battlefield digitization''. The fiscal year 1997 budget request
forecast $110 million for fiscal year 1998 horizontal battlefield
digitization. What is horizontal battlefield digitization?
Answer. Horizontal battlefield digitization is the name of a
specific program element and project in the Army's budget which funds
the development of the Applique/Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and
Below system and helps to support the overall digitization effort. That
project is managed at the department level by the Army Digitization
Office.
Question. Why do you only need half of the funds you were planning
on spending in FY98?
Answer. The Army had planned to procure prototype digitization
hardware in FY98 to outfit a heavy division for the division Advanced
Warfighting Experiment (AWE). Due to fiscal realities, the Army decided
to downsize the division AWE to a division command post exercise,
reducing the requirement. However, I do need to clarify this. Recently,
we have identified through the AWE process, other digitization related
efforts which will require additional funding, such as some applique
prototype improvements and testing.
Question. What activities were you planning in fiscal year 1997 for
fiscal year 1998 that are not funded?
Answer. Hardware upgrades for a Limited User Test, and some
improvements to software functionality.
Question. What is the impact of the reduced horizontal battlefield
digitization funding?
Answer. The Division Advanced Warfighting Equipment (AWE) has been
revised to make maximum use of simulation and will concentrate on those
initiates which show promise in the Task Force (TF) XXI AWE. This
event, as revised, will be executable. However, as the Army is still in
a learning process, in reference to digitization, we may have to
accommodate unforeseen requirements resulting from events such as the
ongoing TF XXI AWE at the National Training Center.
Question. According to the Army, schedule and cost risk of the
digitization program is medium, however, the Army rates technical risk
as high. Please define what you mean by ``medium'' and ``high'' risk.
Answer. These ratings you refer to were a snapshot in time as of
the first of December. High technical risk results when expected levels
of performance are not realized and the fixes are not identified or
sufficiently developed to overcome the problem. High cost risk results
when sufficient funding is not available within the current budget to
pay for unexpected cost increases. Medium technical risk results when
expected levels of performance are not realized and potential fixes are
identified and developed but not yet implemented. Medium cost risk
results when additional costs have been identified and may cause
reprioritization within existing program funding. The schedule risk is
greatly influenced by the technical risk and the availability of
funding.
Question. Last year, we were told by General Reimer that cost risk
was ``low'' and technical risk was ``medium''. This year you identify
cost as ``medium'' and technical as ``high'' risk. What changed?
Answer. Last year the risk assessment was based on our best
estimate since we had not yet equipped the Experimental Force. In 1996
we delivered the equipment into the hands of the soldiers in the field,
and we have been able to assess complexity and the level of technical
integration required. Based upon lessons learned during the platoon,
company, and task force train-up, additional architecture, security,
and integration work is required for the objective system, thereby
raising the technical risk and cost risk.
Question. Congress has provided over $350 million for the
digitization effort. Given the resources committed to this effort,
shouldn't the risk diminish each year? Please explain why this is not
happening.
Answer. The effort to ``digitize a division by the year 2000'' was
initially judged to be high risk. This was a qualitative judgment based
on the limited knowledge of the true complexity of digitizing the
force. The experimental process has provided the opportunity for the
Army to ``peel back the onion'' during successive experiments and
simulations. Lessons learned and insights gained have formed the basis
for updating operational requirements impacting on the technical
performance issues and have served to provide a more complete blueprint
of the digitization efforts required. The biggest technical and
schedule challenge has been the integration of various diverse systems.
Question. The Army is planning on fielding an ``interim'' digitized
division in fiscal year 2001. The Army would like to field an
``objective'' digitized division in FY06. What is an ``interim''
digitized division?
Answer. An interim digitized division is an organization:
a. Equipped with a mix of both legacy and immature (early design,
but acquisition approved) systems.
b. Able to command and control using digital methods; and able to
maintain common relevant picture, situation awareness and Combat
Service Support management throughout the unit.
c. Organized in accordance with the Table of Organization and
Equipment, but modified to compensate for lack of certain ``enabling
technologies.''
d. Trained primarily at the unit through both New Equipment
Training and unit training.
Question. What is the cost of fielding the interim digitized
division? Is it adequately funded in the budget? What is the shortfall?
Answer. The costs associated with fielding the first interim
digitized division includes not only materiel, but all the other
functional domains such as Doctrine, Training, Leadership,
Organizations and Soldiers. The first interim digitized division will
be fielded, for the most part, with systems that are in the pipeline
and are scheduled to be fielded somewhere in the Army by FY00/FY01.
Some additional funding will be required to do the architecture work,
to develop security measures for the network, to integrate the system
of systems, to develop training support packages, and to develop and
integrate the system of systems Tactical Operations Centers. Ongoing
analysis and experimentation indicate that additional FY98 and outyear
funds may be required to perform the above stated functions. It looks
like approximately $100 million in FY98.
Question. What is an ``objective'' digitized division?
Answer. An ``objective'' digitized division is an organization:
a. Equipped with mature (objective) systems.
b. Able to fully command and control using digital methods.
c. Able to maintain common relevant picture, situation awareness
and Combat Service Support status throughout the unit.
d. Organized in accordance with the Table of Organization (TOC) and
Equipment and with all currently planned ``enabling technologies.''
e. Trained primarily at Training and Doctrine Command institutions
as part of the institutionalized soldier development and training
process.
Question. What is the cost of fielding the objective digitized
division? Is it adequately funded in your budget? What is the
shortfall?
Answer. The cost associated with the objective division is much the
same as for the interim division. Since the objective division is not
required and until 06, much of the equipment will be available through
existing budgeted quantities. There may be an additional requirement
for communications capacity, as well as the architecture, security,
training, integration, and TOC costs indicated for the interim
division. The architecture development may show a need for additional
command and control workstations.
Most of the funding to equip this division is available. However,
the experimentation process is expected to demonstrate a need for
additional funding for the above functions.
We will not know the answer to this question until the results of
the Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE) are finalized.
There may be a need for more items of equipment as we learn the value
of digitization to the entire force. As we analyze the AWE we will
identify those areas that need increased funding and welcome your help
in addressing those.
Question. What will be the benefit of the digitized division in:
a. a lesser regional conflict?
b. peacekeeping operations?
c. an urban environment?
Answer. The benefit of a digitized division compared to a non-
digitized division is the achievement of information dominance and the
capability to place greater force at the decisive point in order to
destroy the Threat. It doesn't matter what type of mission is assigned;
the application of information in formulating decisions is what will
allow the division to accomplish it's mission rapidly. Combined with
his real time awareness of the disposition of his own forces, the
commander can move essential and tailored force to influence and
control events many times faster than can be done today. Thus, whether
the event is a full scale enemy assault or a humanitarian assistance
mission, the commander can stabilize the situation before it is out of
control and he can accomplish this with minimum risk to his own force.
Furthermore, the capability to deploy forces with higher efficiency
reduces the total force commitment required to effect United States
policy regardless of where it is in the spectrum of operations. The
other advantage lies not necessarily in application of the capability
that a digitized division brings to the battlefield, but rather that a
potential hostile force knows that you know what he is doing and can
bring more firepower to bear, quicker, than he can. A digitized
division allows the United States to operate from a position of
advantage decreasing the risk associated with these type operations.
Question. What is the urgency of fielding the Army's interim
digitized division by 2001? What is the perceived threat?
Answer. An interim digitized division by 2001 should not be viewed
as an urgency of fielding, but as capitalizing on windows of
opportunity by optimizing programs that have been in development for
years. For example, synchronizing their fieldings of the Army Tactical
Command and Control System battlefield automation systems and creating
a tactical internet by integrating existing communications systems
through network engineering and management provides a leap ahead in
capability to command and control. The threat today is not necessarily
a specific country but the availability and proliferation of advanced
offensive weapons capabilities available on the open market to
virtually anyone with the where-with-all to purchase it. The reduced
force structure of the Army requires the ability to rapidly respond to
a variety of threats across the spectrum of operations.
Question. Based on your own risk assessment of the digitization
effort, do you believe that fielding the first digitized division by
2001 is ambitious? Please explain.
Answer. Yes, it is ambitious for a purpose. The Army has put an
ambitious ``mark on the wall'' designed to continue with the rapid pace
of modernization and development. Maintaining that ``mark'' has helped
to maintain momentum of development.
Question. Given the Army's tight budget, what is the benefit of
fielding an interim digitized division? Why not save the dollars and
accelerate the fielding of the objective division?
Answer. The Army plans to embed, vice applique, the digitization
capability into many of the combat vehicle systems scheduled for the
objective division. The Research Development Test and Evaluation effort
required to embed digitization into the combat vehicles is underway.
Fielding of systems with embedded capability, e.g., M1A2 System
Enhancement Package and M2A3 are scheduled for the fiscal year 2000-
2005 timeframe. In order to get the digitized capability in the field
earlier than those dates it will have to be done with applique.
Fielding an interim digitized division allows the Army to make use of
technology enablers sooner, continue the learning curve for concepts
and doctrine for the force, and continue to learn and develop tactics,
techniques, and procedures as we move to the objective division.
Question. How will you offset the cost of the digitized division in
your budget? What is of lesser priority, pay, operations and
maintenance, research and development? Or procurement dollars? Please
explain.
Answer. Both the interim and objective divisions will use systems
which are either already fielded or programmed for delivery in time to
meet Army digitization objectives. However, given the experimental
underpinning of the digitization effort, additional operation and
maintenance, research and development, and procurement funds may be
required to completely link systems together and integrate them into
the divisions. Efficiencies, such as those gained through the
synchronization of fielding schedules, will help to mitigate the impact
of these incremental costs. Ultimately, though, the Army may have to
make hard choices between systems and programs to ensure that we are
able to fully realize the enhanced capability of digitization. You can
rest assured, however, that the Army remains committed to maintaining
unit readiness to support the National Military Strategy.
Question. Digitization depends on the ``Tactical Internet''. Last
year, the Army said the Tactical Internet was the ``long pole'' in the
digitization effort. This year, it continues to be the ``long pole''.
It is our understanding that the Tactical Internet provides limited
Command and Control connectivity, that voice-data contention is a
problem, and the robustness and capacity of the network has not been
fully determined. The Tactical Internet is an Enhanced Position
Locating System (EPLRS) based system. Is this the tactical internet you
will field with the ``interim'' digitized force? To the objective
digitized force? Please explain.
Answer. The architecture of the Tactical Internet is being matured
to substantially improve delivery of command and control messages.
Functionality of the EPLRS will be enhanced to provide more flexible
and adaptable services. Selected parameters of the Single Channel
Ground and Airborne Radio System System Improvement Program and the
associated internet controller will be adjusted to provide significant
improvements in combined voice-data nets. The TI provided to the
interim digitized division will be a significant step forward from that
used in Task Force XXI. The TI for the objective division will continue
to evolve from this base, while introducing improved capabilities and
functionalities as they can be matured and tested.
Question. What is the objective tactical internet?
Answer. The next increment of the tactical internet will increase
capacity through the incorporation of components of the Warfighter
Information Network such as the Future Digital Radio Block II, High
Capacity Line-of-Sight Radio and Asynchronous Transfer Mode hubs.
Question. When will you field the objective tactical internet?
Answer. There really is not an ``objective'' tactical internet. We
expect as technology moves forward the Army will adapt to those
improvements and upgrade as required. We have adopted an open systems
architecture to allow us to leverage from the commercial sector.
Question. The digitized battlefield will have high data rate
requirements. The current infrastructure can not support all of the
communication requirements of the digitized battlefield. Which Army and
other Department of Defense systems will satisfy the high data
requirements for the digitized force?
Answer. The requirements for data capacity have not yet been fully
defined. However, currently under development are some systems designed
to give increased data rates. Those include systems such as; Near-Term
Data Radio (NTDR) also called Future Digital Radio Block I.; Future
Digital Radio Block II; High Capacity Line-of-Sight Radio; Global
Broadcast Service--Battlefield Awareness Data Dissemination System. On-
going enhancements to Enhanced Position Location Reporting System
(EPLRS) and Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS)
will also provide modes data capacity improvements that will be
available near-term.
Question. Will those systems be available when you field your
``interim'' digitized division? If not, what is the impact?
Answer. The NTDR is scheduled to be available for the interim
division. Enhancements to SINCGARS and EPLRS will also be available. We
are looking for an interim capability and these systems should be able
to provide sufficient data handling capacity.
Question. The Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) is
the software for the digitized force. Currently in development, all
digitized platforms, from tanks to Apaches, will receive FBCB2. What is
the status of the FSCB2 development program?
Answer. FBCB2 is more than just software. It also includes
hardware, which is commonly referred to as the applique, and platform
interfaces. Version 1 of the FBCB2 software is currently undergoing
experimental testing with the Experimental Force at the National
Training Center. It contains sufficient functionality for
experimentation. Version 2, with increased functionality and robustness
and fixes resulting from the lessons learned thus far, is currently
under development. It should be available in mid fiscal year 1998.
Question. Initial Operational Test and Evaluation for FBCB2 is
scheduled for late 1999; fielding is scheduled for 2000. Do you believe
this is an ambitious schedule? Why?
Answer. Yes, we have always said that the schedule is aggressive.
We are following a streamlined approach to acquisition. Although the
schedule is aggressive, we have included successive iterative testing
of the hardware and software and have incorporated the users during the
development to ensure the products are useful and meets the users
needs.
Question. If FBCB2 encounters problems in development, will the
date for the ``interim'' digitized division slip? Please explain.
Answer. Not necessarily. Although we have the aggressive schedule,
we have built into that schedule time for the iterative testing of the
hardware and software. We also are building the software with a
``core'' functionality with which the division should be able to
execute its mission even if all, the desired functionality is not
there. The problems would have to be severe and it of course would
depend on the nature and criticality of the problem.
Question. The digitized force will be extremely vulnerable to
information warfare. According to the Army, information security poses
one of the greatest challenges for the digitized battlefield. The Army
is currently assessing the vulnerabilities of the digitized battlefield
systems to attack. How are you testing the vulnerability of individual
digitized systems to attack?
Answer. We are conducting vulnerability assessments both in the
field (Red Teaming) and in the laboratory so we can develop fixes and/
or mitigate the effects in support of the warfighter. The six Red Team
tasks we are conducting during Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting
Experiment (AWE) is a good example of what we are doing to test the
vulnerability of systems.
Question. How will you reduce the vulnerability of the
``digitized'' systems from attacks?
Answer. We're building a warfighter information system that will
provide the decision maker the information needed in a timely,
accurate, and secure manner.
a. A security Integrated Concept Team and Integrated Process Team
have been stood up to address the network security issues/designs for
the AWEs and the First Digital Division. Concerned with the total
spectrum of Information Warfare attacks, but focusing on Electronic
Warfare and hacker/virus attacks first.
b. We're designing the network to be as protected as possible with
the Command and Control (C2) Protect tools/devices that are available
and a ``defense in depth'' approach.
c. An external perimeter made up of Transmission Security,
Communications Security, firewalls, security guards and physical
isolation will protect our systems and the information on them from
external attack. Within the tactical environment, the Army has a
classified backbone network, which utilizes bulk encryption techniques
thereby giving us a high level of assurance.
Throughout the infrastructure, all classified information
processing is protected by the best encryption technology provided by
the National Security Agency. Security guards (Hardware/Software) and
physical access controls then isolate the network.
d. Internal subperimeters limit the access between user domains
using firewalls and/or router filtering while remaining transparent to
authorized users.
e. Workstations include individual access controls, configuration
audit capability, and C2 Protect procedures and tools to identify any
security anomalies.
f. This technologically evolving network will be overlaid with a
network management system and workstation procedures that provide real-
time security management and intrusion detection.
Question. Does the budget provide funding to implement information
security tools for the ``digitized'' systems? If not, why?
Answer. Yes, funding is available, at the system level, but not
enough. The Army is currently addressing the requirements for the First
Digital Division and Force XXI.
Question. The Maneuver Control System (MCS) is an automated Command
and Control (C2) system for the Force Level Commander. MCS will
integrate data from other C2 systems to create a common picture of the
battlefield. MCS has been in development since the mid-1980's. Riddled
with developmental problems since its inception, MCS is scheduled for
its Initial Operation Test and Evaluation in fiscal year 1998. The Army
is using MCS in the Force XXI Army Warfighting Experiment (AWE). Are
you satisfied with its performance? Please explain.
Answer. Yes. The Task Force XXI AWE at the National Training Center
indicates that the Army is on the right track for digitizing the
battlefield, and that training and leader development are key
imperatives in this effort. Based upon the excellent performance of MCS
during this experiment at the National Training Center, the Army fully
supports the fielding of common hardware II devices to the MCS training
base. Institutional training of MCS and other Army Battle Command
Systems is vital to the training and leader development imperatives of
the Army's Force XXI initiative. The Army needs to equip the schools
with MCS now to allow for the timely development of training before the
system is fielded to operational units. The risk in procuring
commercial hardware is low, and the payoff of averting the normal two
year lag between the fielding to operational units and the first
graduation of school training users is high.
Question. The Army is using Maneuver Control System--Block III in
the AWE; however, Block IV is currently under development and will be
fielded to the ``interim digitized force'' in fiscal year 2001. What is
the difference between Block III and Block IV software?
Answer. The major difference between Block III and Block IV
software is that Block IV uses the advanced Common Operation
Environment (COE) software and has additional functionalities. Block
III software contains COE 2.1 from the Defense Information Systems
Agency (DISA). Block IV software will contain COE 3.1, 4.0, and 5.0 as
it is developed. Approximately 50 percent new functionality will be
built in Block IV (upon this improved foundation) over that which
currently exists in Block III. Additional functionalities to be added
in Block IV, for example are: Engineering, Military Police, and
Aviation support software.
Question. Do you believe the Block IV program schedule is high
risk? Please explain.
Answer. No, the schedule is not high risk. However, the schedule
assumes the risk characteristics of the Defense Information
Infrastructure (DII) COE upon which it is based. Whenever DII COE
software is not delivered, Block IV will have to develop this software
independently if DISA, or not have needed functionality.
Question. If the problems with MCS are not resolved with the Block
IV upgrade, will the date for digitizing the ``interim'' division slip?
Please explain.
Answer. Developmental problems with the Block III software were
primarily limited to the Army's experience in 1993 with the Loral
contract. Since 1993, MCS has been on a progressive and planned
recovery. This recovery has exceeded expectations in III Corps and Task
Force XXI. Digitizing the ``interim'' division could occur with the
Block III software with its limited COE and functionality. However,
this is not the Army's plan. The Army wants and needs an MCS based on
COE, Army Technical Architecture, Joint Technical Architecture and the
additional functionalities Block IV provides.
Question. The Near-Term Digital Radio (NTDR) will replace the
SINCGARS and EPLRS radios. A production contract will be awarded in
1999. The Army is requesting $18.6 million to build and test the NTDR
in 1998. What is the status of the NTDR development program?
Answer. A contract for $10.7 million was awarded in January 1997 to
a team led by ITT to procure and test 110 NTDRs. NTDR is planned to
meet the Block I requirements of the Future Digital Radio (FDR) ORD as
the backbone data radio system to augment/replace the EPLRS system for
Force Package I units. The production contract for 1999 is contingent
upon successful technical/operational testing planned for early fiscal
year (FY99). The Army has $201 million in the President's Budget from
FY99 through FY06 to produce, field, and support the procurement of
4,579 radios and 23 Network Management Terminals. NTDR is a data only
radio and will not replace SINCGARS which has voice capabilities.
Contingent upon funding being made available, a competitive Research
and Development contract in FY99 will be awarded for the development of
the FDR Block II/III (programmable multi-band multi-mode radio) which
is planned to eventually replace all of the legacy radios and
potentially be a joint service program. The FDR Mission Needs Statement
is scheduled for a Joint Requirements Oversight Council decision in
June 1997.
Currently, the NTDR system is undergoing integration testing to
serve as the inter-Tactical Operations Center data hauler for the
Division XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment planned for November 1997.
Question. What is the anticipated per unit cost of the NTDR?
Answer. It is anticipated the average hardware unit cost for the
4,579 fieldable NTDRs will be around $14 thousand each.
Question. The Army believes to digitize its force, it can no longer
field weapons systems one system at a time. Since systems will be
operationally and technically interdependent they need to be fielded in
``packages.'' The Army would like to field systems based on
requirements for a particular division. Who has the responsibility for
ensuring that the future Army systems will be operationally and
technically interdependent? Will it be the program managers for each
system or will you create a new ``oversight'' office?
Answer. The Army is currently studying the entire process to
determine who and how to best perform this function. Since this is a
new way of doing business, we must ensure we have done our homework. We
suspect that an overall system integrator will be required.
Force XXI Initiatives
Question. Last year, the Army's number one unfunded requirement was
the ``Force XXI Initiative.'' The Army identified a $100 million
shortfall; Congress provided $50 million in fiscal year 1997. The Force
XXI Initiative is ``an ACTD-type approach to streamlined acquisition of
high pay off technologies.'' This year the Army is requesting $99
million to continue the Force XXI Initiative.
The Army believes that the Force XXI Initiative would provide
``funding flexibility to jump start technology programs early, without
having to wait up to two years to fund a new initiative'' during the
budget cycle. Please give us some examples of the technologies the Army
want to ``jump start.''
Answer. The largest number of ``technologies'' are in the
information dominance area and have to do with improving the way
information is transmitted, formatted, stored, retrieved, used, and
interpreted on the battlefield. Some of the systems designed to improve
information use are Army Airborne Command and Control System (A2C2S),
Aviation Tactical Operations Center (AVTOC), Maneuver Control System
Courses of Action Tools Integrator for Situational Awareness, Network
Encryption System (NES), Tactical Internet (TI) and Applique. Other
technologies involve the updating of combat systems with new
technologies or providing new systems that leverage information and
weapons technologies needed to operate in Army XXI. Some of these
technologies are incorporated in the Palletized Loading System-Enhanced
(PLS-E) which provides enhancements to reception, staging and movement
activities in addition to implementation of velocity management,
intransit visibility and battlefield distribution. Radio Frequency
Technology/Tagging provides total asset visibility and intransit
tracking capability to combat service support managers. Mortar Fire
Control System (MFCS) provides a complete, fully integrated digital on-
board fire control system for mortars and brings them in line with
capabilities on the battlefield such as the upgraded Advanced Field
Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS). Gun Laying Positioning System
(GLPS) allows faster and more accurate fires from light artillery
units. The Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder (LLDR) provides
both artillery and dismounted infantry a lightweight and portable
rangefinder that is more accurate than current capabilities.
Question. The Army is also requesting $137 million to fund Advanced
Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) which according to your
testimony last year ``give us a great opportunity to transfer
technology to the warfighter.''
ACTDs and the Force XXI Initiative appear to be mechanisms for
fielding systems outside of the acquisition and budget process. What is
the difference between ACTDs and the Force XXI Initiative?
Answer. Neither the ACTD process nor the Force XXI Initiative/
Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Process (WRAP) are done ``outside the
acquisition and budget processes''. Both methods use nontraditional
acquisition techniques such as rapid prototyping, commercial
technologies, use of available evaluation data, etc., to shorten the
time it takes to field new systems and new technology to the
warfighter. The methods are not the same. Force XXI initiatives are
potential solutions which have already undergone all or most of the
development and evaluation necessary to reach production within one to
two years. The Force XXI initiatives concentrate on providing
immediately available technology that matches future goals to the
warfighter as fast as possible and requires a funding commitment before
being accepted as a final candidate. These initiatives cover the full
spectrum of capabilities required. ACTDs are designed to match a
warfighter's requirement with a concept and technology expected to
satisfy the requirement. The nearly mature technology and concept
evolve to a residual capability at the end of the demonstration period
(assuming success). ACTDs take between two and four years to complete.
There is not a requirement to acquire technologies developed as a
result of the ACTD. Acquisition Integrated Process Teams (IPT) are
formed for each ACTD to develop proposed acquisition strategies for
ACTD ``systems'' if required by the user/sponsor (Commander-in-Chief)
and successfully competed in the service's Program Objective
Memorandum.
Question. The technologies which you will ``jump start'' are part
of the Army's Warfighting Experiment (AWE). During the AWE the Army
will test other new technologies to see how they would operate under
battle conditions. The AWE will take place at the National Training
Center (NTC) in the California desert.
Since the AWE is an experiment, will those technologies that you
wish to ``jump start'' go through additional testing?
Answer. The final evaluation from the Operational Test and
Evaluation Command (OPTEC) of the effectiveness and capabilities of the
system are probably the most significant part of the final choice of
candidates. OPTEC will provide information on success or failure (and
degree), additional testing required and effectiveness to the force
among other issues. All of the issues considered under normal
circumstances for operational test and evaluation will be considered
under the WRAP process. The difference is that WRAP uses ongoing
evaluations and other available data on usage and capability to
evaluate the system not just what is gathered from the experiment.
OPTEC is required to certify each system as having met the requirements
of operational testing as prescribed by law. Because some of the
systems must undergo additional test and evaluation at some level, any
Force XXI Initiatives funds for those systems will be used to complete
that evaluation and get the system into production.
Question. The NTC is in the desert; how will you ensure that the
technologies are operable, reliable and supportable when taken out of a
controlled warfighting experiment for example:
a. Will it operate in cold or wet weather;
b. Is it rugged enough to survive the battlefield; and
c. Is it interoperable with other Army or service systems?
Answer. OPTEC will determine what additional test and evaluation is
required based on the maturity of the system including any evaluations
necessary under other weather conditions or if the system is ruggedized
enough for the battlefield. The AWE is utilizing links to Joint STARS,
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and national intelligence assets to
receive and pass information just as would be required on a
battlefield. In addition, information has been passed through planned
nets to the Marine Corps operating out of Twenty Nine Palms. Close Air
Support (CAS) aircraft have been used in the AWE to provide strikes.
The AWE is evaluating interoperability within the evolving architecture
required by the Joint Staff for all the services. As such, all the
systems being used in the AWE should be interoperable with Army and
other service battlefield systems.
Question. The Committee understands there are 96 candidates
currently being evaluated to receive the fiscal year 1997 Force XXI
Initiative funding. One example of the type of technologies you are
evaluating is the mortar fire control radar. It is our understanding it
will cost approximately $200 million to field the mortar fire control
radar.
How will you ensure there is adequate funding in the outyears to
sustain projects funded with Force XXI Initiative dollars?
Answer. The WRAP process requires that outyear funding requirements
(funding tails) be identified for all candidate systems. If a candidate
is selected, then the sponsoring functional area must find the funding
internally before turning to the rest of the Army to fund. In any case,
no candidate will be accepted without having identified the out year
funding necessary and the offsets to pay the bill.
Question. When will you budget for outyear dollars required to
develop and field Force XXI technologies?
Answer. Army is using current input on candidates to affect the
current mini-POM actions. In addition, for candidates that could go
into production (possible low rate) in fiscal year 1998, we will be
looking at how to reprioritize within functional areas in the upcoming
budget year. For longer term funding, all programming and budgeting
documents for years after fiscal year 98 will reflect the funding lines
for the approved initiatives.
Question. Will they continue to be funded in the force XXI
Initiative account?
Answer. WRAP policy is specific in that no more than two years of
``jump start'' funding will be provided to complete ALL actions to get
to procurement. This accounts for the time it usually takes for the
system to be put into the resourcing cycle. At that time, the system
will no longer be carried by the Force XXI Initiative account. Because
we allow two years maximum, we also require the candidates to identify
two years of funding if necessary.
Question. Since you are not budgeting for the total development and
fielding costs of Force XXI initiatives, you will be forced to
reallocate funds in your budget. Will you provide offsets to the
Congress? What programs in your budget do you view as potential offsets
for Force XXI initiatives?
Answer. The Army will identify the outyear bills and give Congress
assurance that these will be funded in the next Future Years Defense
Plan (FYDP). Details of offsets must achieve concurrence through the
formal Program Object Memorandum (POM) and budget process to accomplish
this.
Question. What will be the average development and fielding
schedules for Force XXI technologies? Do you plan on fielding them at a
quicker rate than trucks or helicopters?
Answer. WRAP policy requires putting the systems into regular
programming and into production within two years of receipt of funding
(less if done later in the fiscal year). Fielding schedules are based
on the individual system and he quantity, production rate, spread
across the force, etc. If a ``buy out'' of the total Army quantity at
an inexpensive rate can be accomplished in one year and it is smart to
do so, we will make that recommendation. If it takes longer to field,
then we will look at that timeframe with reference to all the
candidates and other Force XXI issues. Systems based on commercially
available or immediately available military technologies that are
usable with little or no modification may be fielded faster than
others, the length of time to field is system dependent. The key is
that we will not spend years in development for the systems.
Question. Congress provided $50 million in fiscal year 1997 for the
Force XXI Initiative. Has the Army received the fiscal year 1997 funds?
Answer. Funds are on withhold at Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) until the Army completes the evaluation of candidate systems,
provides recommendation to Congress as required by law and receives
approval from Congress on the candidates recommended. Notification to
Congress is expected to occur during the first week of May 1997.
Question. If not, why?
Answer. Evaluation of candidate systems will not be completed until
the AWE is finished. There is no requirement to use these funds until
that evaluation is finished.
Question. When do you expect the funds to be released?
Answer. Late May to early June 1997.
Question. When do you expect to obligate the funds?
Answer. Depending on the system, between late June and late August
1997. It is a requirement of all candidates that the program office be
able to obligate the funds by the end of August this fiscal year to
receive the funds.
Question. Last year, the Congress directed that none of the Force
XXI Initiative funds may be obligated without prior notification. The
notification is to include the requirements, maturity, affordability,
and sustainability for each system. When will the Congress receive
notification for the fiscal year 1997 funds?
Answer. Notification is expected to be provided the first week of
May 1997.
Question. Will the notification include the funds required to
complete the program in fiscal year 1998?
Answer. If a candidate requires fiscal year 1998 funds from the
Force XXI Initiative account, they will be identified. If other funds
are required, those will also be identified. The Army is viewing these
funds across several years not just one year at a time.
Question. Will you provide the offsets in your fiscal year 1998
budget request to continue the activity?
Answer. If the activity requires funding from regular sources
during fiscal year 1998, offsets/billpayers will be identified for
reprioritization.
Question. This year you are requesting $100 million for the Force
XXI Initiative, $50 million more than last year's appropriated amount.
Given the shortfalls in your modernization accounts, why did you
increase the funding?
Answer. The Army requested $100 million in fiscal year 1997 but
only received $50 million. The funding request for fiscal year 1998
remains the same as for fiscal year 1997--$100 million. These funds
allow us to apply streamlined acquisition techniques to rapidly acquire
new and available technologies at lower risk and lower cost thereby
filling gaps in our modernization accounts that might otherwise not be
funded. It also allows us to bridge to the Program Object Memorandum
build for fiscal year 1997 initiatives having requirements in fiscal
year 1998.
[Clerk's note.--The fiscal year 1997 budget request
included no funding for the Force XXI initiative.]
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTD)
Question. Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) are
the Department of Defense sponsored initiatives developed to accelerate
and facilitate the application of mature technologies to solve military
problems and provide new operational capabilities to the field sooner
than the normal acquisition process.
This year the Army is requesting $137 million for ACTDs--this is 35
percent higher than last year's appropriated amount. Mr. Decker, why is
your fiscal year 1998 request for ACTDs 35 percent higher than last
year?
Answer. The amount requested by the Army for ACTDs in the FY98
President's Budget is $154 million ($137 million + $16.5 million for
Theater High Energy Laser (THEL) ACTD). In FY97, the amount
appropriated last year for Army ACTDs was $157 million. The net change
is a reduction of $3 million in FY98. THEL ACTD funding of $44.06
million was provided by the Congress in FY97. The Army request for THEL
in FY98 is $16.5 million.
Question. For the record, please provide the ACTDs planned for
FY98. Please include prior year funding, planned funding for the fiscal
year and future funding requirements. Also include any Defense-wide or
other Service Research, Development, Test and Evaluation funds which
have or will be provided for each ACTD.
Answer. Approved Army ACTD chart follows. Please note that MOUT
ACTD, the Combat ID ACTD, and the Rapid Terrain Visualization ACTD are
dependent on transfers from the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) ACTD funding line FY98.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Question. What process is in place to determine which technologies
should be fielded?
Answer. To determine which technologies should be fielded, the ACTD
selection process forces a technical evaluation to be made of the
proposed advanced capability. Successful candidates must provide
residuals (software/hardware) which are of sufficient maturity to be
available in the timeframe of the ACTD with low risk in a configuration
which troops can use. The selection process includes:
a. Technology reviews by Army Chief Scientist
b. ACTS requirements validation by Commanding General, Training and
Doctrine Command (CG, TRADOC)
c. Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) prioritization
d. Commander in Chief (CINC) sponsorship
e. Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) approved
f. CINC/field commander acceptance prior to fielding with soldiers
From an acquisition reform in action--getting technology into the
hands of soldiers quickly for evaluation, getting immediate feedback,
while providing CINCs a new operational capability. This approach is
supported in the Department of Defense (DoD) 5000 series regulations.
Question. How do you ensure that the technology will be reliable
and operable in military operations?
Answer. Prior to putting technologies in the hands of soldiers.
ACTDs go through developmental, operational and safety testing. Exit
criteria is established in coordination with users to ensure the ACTD
meets CINCs requirements. Ultimately, CINC/field commanders evaluate
test results and ACTD performance prior to deploying ACTD technology
with soldiers.
Prior to transitioning ACTD, the Army, with OSD, conducts ACTD
Transition Integrated Product Teams (TIPTs). These teams ensure that
necessary preparations are made during the formulation, execution and
residual support phase of an ACTD. The TIPTs recommend appropriate
acquisition strategies for Army consideration. Upon successful
completion of an ACTD and favorable evaluation of the leave behinds by
the user, the acquisition and fielding of the new capability will
compete against Army Program Objective Memorandum (POM) priorities in
the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) process.
Question. How do you ensure that the operating and logistics cost
for successful ACTD technologies can be supported in future budgets?
Answer. Transition Integrated Product Teams (TIPTs) also ensure
that supportability assessments of ACTDs residuals are developed. These
assessments include estimates for out year funding of leave behind
systems, assuming favorable ACTD results. Operating and logistics costs
are included in the system life cycle cost estimates which are
considered in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) prioritization
process. As an example, the Rapid Force Projection Initiative (RFPT)
ACTD TIPT is addressing four key areas related to future fielding:
requirements; acquisition; fielding and supportability; and test,
evaluation and analysis.
Question. For the record please provide a list of technologies
fielded as a result of the ACTD process. Please include testing,
fielding, and support cost for each system.
Answer. Since ACTDs began in 1995, and these are normally 3-5 year
programs, the Army has completed the demonstration phase of only one
ACTD to date, Precision/Rapid Counter-Multiple Rocket Launcher ACTD, in
October 1996, in Korea for the Commander in Chief United Nations
Command (CINCUNC). The following hardware and software (SW) items are
continuing to be evaluate in the residual phase of the ACTD:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Procurement,
testing and
Leave behind support costs
($ in
thousands)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Work Stations........................................... 5,500
Visualization SW........................................ \1\125
Weapon-Target Pairing SW................................ 3,150
---------------
Total............................................. 8,775
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\(Government furnished equipment).
The Army also supports other Service/Agency ACTDs. The highly
successful Predator ACTD provided a radar mission package called
Tactical Endurance Synthetic Aperture Radar (TESAR). TESAR is enabled
by the Army-developed aided target recognition hardware and software.
Question. What are your views as how the present ACTD program is
structured? How can it be improved?
Answer. The ACTD program is structured for evaluation of relatively
mature technologies and concepts in an operational environment. The
Army view is to use the ACTD process in complex system-of system
scenarios to solve critical military needs for the warfighter. The
success of Precision Rapid Counter Multiple Rocket Launcher ACTD in
Korea for the Commander-in-Chief United Nations Command is an
outstanding example of the value ACTDs provide to rapidly and
effectively respond to warfighter urgent needs for technology
innovation. The ACTD process could be improved by stronger commitment
from Services/Agencies to cooperate in the joint arena and by greater
stability in the Office of the Secretary of Defense funding lines.
Chemical Demilitarization
Question. The Army has the responsibility for destroying all
chemical warfare related material. The Army is currently constructing
chemical demilitarization facilities at various storage locations.
Congress mandated that the 31,493 tons of chemical munitions must be
demilitarization by 2004. To date, 1,440 tons have been destroyed. The
Army is requesting $620.7 million for chemical demilitarization in
fiscal year (FY) 1998.
The FY97 Appropriations Act included a general provision which
prohibited the obligation of funds for the construction of a baseline
incineration facility in Kentucky or Colorado until 180 days after the
Secretary of Defense submitted a report on alternative destruction
technologies. The President's FY98 budget proposes to delete the
provision. Why?
Answer. This prohibition could potentially delay the completion
date for the disposal of chemical weapons from four to ten years. The
Department's intent is not to delay the timelines to destroy the United
States' chemical weapons. The National Research Council (NRC) of the
National Academy of Sciences concluded that the greatest risk
associated with the chemical weapons stockpile results from its
continued storage. In the interest of public safety and environmental
protection, we want to get on with the chemical weapons destruction
process as quickly as possible and proceed with a concurrent program to
assess alternative technologies for the assembled chemical munitions.
This is our commitment and obligation to the citizens whose communities
surround the stockpile storage sites. The NRC also concluded that the
incineration baseline technology is currently the only mature process
which can demilitarize the complete weapon--the agent, explosives, and
decontamination of metal parts.
Question. What impact does the general provision have on the
chemical demilitarization schedule? On program costs?
Answer. The schedule and cost impacts are not known at this time as
the Program Manager for Assembled Chemical Munitions was just recently
designated (December 1996). The prohibition could potentially delay the
disposal completion date from four to seven years beyond the
Congressionally mandated date of December 2004, if a technology is
identified and demonstrated at the location where it is to be employed;
and if the technology is demonstrated at a different location from
where the technology will be used, delay could be as great as seven to
ten years. Delays to the program will result in additional cost
growth--inflation factors, storage of the stockpile, Chemical Stockpile
Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) costs, and program management
costs. The annual cost of delay for these two sites is approximately
$50 million.
Question. If the provision is repealed, do you believe that
Kentucky or Colorado will allow the Army to begin the construction of
demilitarization facilities before the alternative technologies studies
are completed? Please explain.
Answer. Repealing the prohibition would not remove all obstacles
which could jeopardize the Army meeting the operations completion date
of December 2004. There are other site-specific and public acceptance
issues which must be resolved and locally legislated mandates which may
prohibit or delay the Army obtaining the necessary environmental
permits. The Commonwealth of Kentucky has passed legislation which
requires that the technology used be fully proven in a comparable sized
facility, for a sufficient period of time, at a 99.9999 percent removal
efficiency for all substances proposed for destruction or treatment
under all operating conditions, including occurrence of malfunctions,
upsets, or unplanned shutdowns. Colorado requires a Certificate of
Designation, issued by the local county for the location, construction,
operation, and closure of a hazardous waste incinerator. This is a
lengthy process which is initiated after the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act permit is issued.
Question. With the exception of the Colorado and Kentucky
facilities, do you believe that the chemical demilitarization program
will remain on track?
Answer. Yes, the other sites are on track for completion by 31
December 2004. The greatest risk to schedule is in environmental
permitting activities. Changing community perception also impacts on
schedule attainment. Implementation of alternative technologies poses
schedule risk. Delays are anticipated awaiting investigation, pilot
demonstration and testing of technologies to achieve required levels to
validate their efficiency, maturity and effectiveness.
Question. Currently chemical munitions are demilitarized through
incineration. Congress provided $40 million in fiscal year (FY) 1997 to
identify and demonstrate no less than two alternative technologies to
the baseline incineration process for demilitarization of assembled
chemical munitions. Explain how you intend to use the $40 million
appropriated in FY 1997? Is the $40 million sufficient to conduct the
alternative technology demonstration program? If not, what are the
shortfalls? When will this program be complete?
Answer. Congress appropriated $40.0 million in FY 1997 to identify
and demonstrate alternative technologies to the baseline incineration
process to demilitarize assembled chemical munitions. In compliance
with Public Law 104-208, Dr. Paul Kaminski, the Under Secretary of
Defense (Acquisition and Technology), appointed Mr. Mike Parker as the
Program Manager for Assembled Chemical Munitions Demilitarization
Alternatives. Mr. Parker reports directly to Dr. Kaminski and not
through the Army. Answers to these questions should be addressed to the
office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology).
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Young.]
Thursday, March 6, 1997.
NAVY AND MARINE CORPS ACQUISITION PROGRAMS
WITNESSES
JOHN DOUGLASS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH,
DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION
VICE ADMIRAL DONALD L. PILLING, UNITED STATES NAVY, DEPUTY CHIEF OF
NAVAL OPERATIONS, RESOURCES, WARFARE REQUIREMENTS AND ASSESSMENTS
LIEUTENANT GENERAL JEFFREY W. OSTER, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS, DEPUTY
CHIEF OF STAFF, PROGRAMS AND RESOURCES
Introduction
Mr. Young. The Committee will come to order.
This afternoon the Committee will conduct a hearing on Navy
and Marine Corps acquisition programs, and this is an open
session. We are pleased to welcome Mr. John Douglass, Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and
Acquisition. Secretary Douglass is accompanied by Vice Admiral
Donald L. Pilling, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
Resources, Warfare Requirements, and Assessments; and by
Lieutenant General Jeffrey W. Oster, Deputy Chief of Staff for
Programs and Resources.
Admiral Pilling's biography will be placed in the record
inasmuch as this is his first appearance before this
Subcommittee in this capacity, and we are happy to make a
permanent record of that, Admiral.
The Department of Navy's fiscal year 1998 budget request
for modernization provides for only 51 new aircraft, of which
only 39 are combat aircraft, 512 missiles and 4 combatant
ships. Last year we were told that four combatant ships was the
lowest Navy ship acquisition since 1933, so we added funds for
more ships. But this year the Administration's new budget
returns us to the 1933 level. The problem isn't just in
shipbuilding. The number of tactical aircraft requested is the
lowest since 1941.
Mr. Douglass, your statement implies that the Navy's
acquisition budget supports the war fighting needs of the
theater CINCs, and their forces. When we look at the details of
the budget, we see a number of problems. For example, we
understand that under your current program for the DDG-51
destroyer program, the next 12 ships to be built will lack any
cruise missile self-defense and ballistic missile defense
capabilities.
Your statement further claims that the Navy's budget
continues an ``all-out effort'' to protect our sailors and
Marines serving aboard ships against missile attack. But the
budget zeroes out all production funds for cooperative
engagement and ship self-defense installations.
The budget proposes an overhaul of the USS NIMITZ aircraft
carrier without any new ship self-defense features, including
cooperative engagement, that were planned a year ago.
The budget terminates or delays several other important
ship self-defense programs.
We talked about this this morning with the Secretary of the
Navy and Admiral Johnson, and we were told that that is the way
it had to be, that budgetary problems were budgetary problems.
We are frankly concerned about that, and I would like to have
you get into great detail with us on the importance of building
ships without self-defense capabilities.
We are talking about systems where the R&D has already been
done, the IOC has been reached, and all we have to do is
produce and install them. Where ship self-defense is concerned,
it is particularly disturbing that programs are proposed to be
delayed or halted after billions of dollars of R&D has been
completed and the leadership of the Defense Department and the
Navy have raved about their technical performance.
So, we do have some concerns about your acquisition budget.
We agree with those from the Defense Department who have told
us there are a lot more things that you really need in order to
maintain the modernization schedule that we have been led to
believe the Administration wanted. So we would like to get into
detail with you today about some of those items. But I am
really concerned about tremendous amounts of money building
ships that aren't going to have these new self-defense features
on them.
So I would like to hear your statement and the admiral's
and the general's, and then we will have some interesting
questions for you.
Mr. Murtha, do you have an opening statement?
Mr. Murtha. Let me just add to what the Chairman said. We
started this self-defense thing, Mr. Kilian recommended it, I
don't know how many years ago. We started it 5, 6, 7 years ago.
The Navy, kicking and screaming and complaining, didn't want to
do it. Admiral Boorda recognized the importance of it. Research
was done, a lot of money was spent on research, and now we are
talking about $20 million a ship, as I understand it, this
could be implemented. I cannot believe that we are spending
money the right way when we are allowing these ships to go out
without sufficient protection.
We are limited in the amount of money that we can
distribute. You are limited by the amount of money you get. But
it just doesn't seem wise to me that you are leaving a hole,
which is so important to the security of our forces out there.
I just cannot imagine that you are letting this happen.
So I hope you will be able to explain it, and look forward
to hearing your explanation. But I hope we can resolve this
thing.
Mr. Young. Mr. Secretary, we welcome your statement and
look forward for the opportunity to discuss it in detail with
you.
[Clerk's note.--The Charts referred to by Mr. Douglas are
printed at the end of this statement. See page 180.]
Summary Statement of Mr. Douglass
Mr. Douglass. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
begin by requesting that our joint statement be entered into
the record, sir, in its entirety. What I would like to do, if
this is acceptable to you, is summarize it in a series of
charts and some videos that we think will be interesting to the
Members. We will try to get through that as quickly as we can.
All of us will participate in this briefing with the charts and
the videos, and then we will move quickly into any questions
that you may have, sir.
Mr. Young. Mr. Secretary, that is fine. I am remiss, I
should have mentioned your statement in its entirety will be
placed in the record.
Mr. Douglass. Thank you, sir.
I want to open my testimony by saying that no one is more
mindful than me, sir, of some of the comments that you and Mr.
Murtha have made about ship self-defense and other programs. I
am especially mindful that the way our system works is that you
gentleman are the representatives of the people, and these
questions that you are asking are right on target, sir. So we
hope that we can have a good dialogue with you and answer these
questions to your satisfaction. Sir, for anything we can't
answer today verbally, we are committed to working with this
committee to get you a full and complete answer for the record,
sir.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much.
Mr. Douglass. You have already beat me to the punch in
introducing my two colleagues today, both distinguished
warriors. It is a great pleasure for me to work with them.
I would just remind the Members that last year was the
first year we brought to you a fully integrated budget in which
the Navy and the Marine Corps budgets had been integrated from
the ground up. We followed that procedure again this year, and
as you pointed out, this is Don's first year. Jeff was here
last year as we went through that process. I think the process
of integration is getting better as the time goes by, sir.
Could I have the next chart.
Procurement and Research and Development
(CHART 1) This is a brief summary here of what you are
going to see. We will go into it in a lot more detail. The
budget, if you add up all the RDT&E and procurement and
National Defense Sealift Fund, NDSF, is actually up 1 percent
from where we were last year when you view the combined the
Navy and Marine Corps budget request.
As you can see, what we are trying to do, sir, is stabilize
our programs. We are mindful of the direction that this
Committee has given us regarding multiyear procurement on some
of our aircraft programs and so on, and you will see we do plan
to take that very seriously.
The Department is working hard at acquisition reform. We
will have a little bit to say about that at the end. You are
going to see, sir, as we go through this briefing, some real
concerns about the future industrial base for the maritime
forces. This is becoming an increased concern.
The systems you see on the bottom of the chart are all new
systems in which we are investing. Major systems we are
investing research and development dollars in that have not yet
gone into production. We will go very briefly into those, and
we will then be able to answer any detailed questions that the
Committee has. The next chart, please.
Budget Summaries
(CHART 2) We thought this might be helpful in placing this
$27 billion budget request in some perspective. You can see the
blues columns are where we were last year, and the reds columns
are where we are this year. All the accounts except for
shipbuilding are down slightly from last year. Shipbuilding has
increased this year, and we will discuss that in some detail.
But you are absolutely right in your opening statement. We are
back to four ships again this year, not counting our ships that
are in the Ready Reserve Fleet or going to our Prepositioned
forces. We haven't counted them in that count. But that is how
our dollars are being spent. I would also note on the right
side of the chart procurement of ammunition for the Marine
Corps and Navy is up slightly this year. The next chart,
please.
Navy Trendlines
(CHART 3) This is the dilemma. You all have been very
helpful to us in explaining this to the American people. This
is where we were in the 1980s, and many of us were in this
business in the 1980s. You can see on that chart that the level
of procurement was up there at or above $50 billion early in
the 1980s. This was pretty much sustained with a slight decline
during this time frame. There was also a very robust RDT&E
funding level back at the 1980s.
(CHART 4) The next chart is where we have been in the
1990s. This is the problem I know this Committee has been
deeply concerned with, and that is the nose-dive you see in the
procurement budget includes airplanes, ships and other systems.
There has been a gradual erosion of our research and
development base, noted by the blue line, as we have gone
across the 1990s and on into the beginning of the next century.
Mr. Murtha mentioned to me just before the hearing, he is
concerned, and we certainly share his concerns, about how are
we going to get up that slope again. That is something that we
have tried to pay some considerable attention to, Mr. Chairman.
We are very open to working with this Committee as we work out
the inevitable gives and takes on the priorities required for
our Navy and Marine Corps to get up that slope. We are
dedicated to trying to get there from here.
Shipbuilding Plan
(CHART 5) The next chart I think will be revealing in this
respect. This is our shipbuilding plan. We start here because
that is probably the defining point for our Navy. As you
correctly pointed out, there are only four ships in fiscal year
1998, but I think it is very important to tell you that we have
been able to fully fund all these ships in this program.
In our previous programs, you may recall, we had received
some policy direction from the authorization committees that
some of these ships could be shown in the budget but did not
have the money put in the budget. We had various qualifications
on our submarines, and we didn't have the carrier in until this
year. So this is the first year in recent years that we have
brought to the Congress a shipbuilding program in which all of
these ships are fully funded in our Future Year Defense
Program. That has been a very substantial effort for us to be
able to fit these ships in, and it is something we are proud
of.
We do have two block buys or multiyear buys, if you will.
We are proposing on our New Attack Submarine to buy all four of
the initial submarines on a single contract. This is new and
something different. Of course, we have the DDG-51 multiyear
buy for which the Congress gave us authority last year. The
next chart, please. We will get into individual programs in
detail.
CVN-77 AIRCRAFT CARRIER
(CHART 6) Our first priority in the ship area, of course,
is CVN-77, the last of the NIMITZ carriers. As you may recall,
Mr. Chairman, last year we only had the advanced procurement in
for this ship. This year it is fully funded, and that is a
fairly significant addition to our shipbuilding program.
We have proposed to the Congress a change in our New Attack
Submarine construction program. Right now the law requires us
to compete either the first two boats or the first four boats.
We have been working with both Newport News and Electric
Boat, the two shipbuilders that will be the builders on the New
Attack Submarine. They have made some proposals to us on how to
develop this submarine as a team instead of in a competitive
way. We estimate just in the Future Year Defense Program,
compared to last year's budget, this would save us between $450
and $600 million, by going into this teaming arrangement. We
think it is a good idea. We are proposing it to the Congress.
We are hopeful that it will be well received and we will have
permission from the Congress at the end of this legislative
cycle to go ahead with this teaming approach, because we really
can't afford the competitive program that was directed in the
law the last 2 years.
SEAWOLF SUBMARINE
As we talk about the SEAWOLF program, this is where the
videos start. SEAWOLF has been doing exceptionally well in its
sea trials so far. She is quieter and faster than we had
predicted her to be. As a matter of fact, she surprised us so
much with her speed that we had some flooding in the wide
aperture array and had to put her back in the shipyard and
batten down the array fairing. But all of the systems are
performing actually quite a bit better than we predicted. So
technically she is a wonderful success, and we just put her
back in the water again to finish the sea trials.
We have a short video. Admiral Pilling will narrate the
video.
[Clerk's note.--The Committee proceeded to view a series of
short videos.]
Admiral Pilling. The video is a 40-second clip that starts
off with the christening back in June of 1995 and ends with
some of the sea trials.
Mr. Douglass. It starts with your morning witness and his
wife breaking the champagne bottle.
Admiral Pilling. We are getting underway for the sea
trials. It was last fall, and Mr. Douglass already mentioned it
was a superb set of sea trials, with one exception, a fairing
on the aft part of the ship for the wide aperture array failed.
That whole covering has been redesigned and repaired. The ship
will continue the sea trials at the end of this month and will
be commissioned in the late spring.
Mr. Douglass. We are very proud to tell you, Mr. Chairman,
that we remain under the $7.2 billion cost cap that the
Congress has given us, and we are sure that we will be able to
finish the three submarines within those provisions.
DDG-51 DESTROYER
On the DDG-51 program, you may recall last year the
Congress gave us authority to procure the next 12 ships in a
block buy. In round numbers, this is going to result in a
savings to the taxpayer of around $1 billion. We are in the
process now of formulating the request for proposals that would
go out to the two builders. Those will go out sometime in the
weeks ahead, and we will be glad to answer any questions you
may have on that.
LPD-17
We have also awarded the lead ship contract for the LPD-17,
and we will be glad to answer any questions the Committee may
have on that. That program, as you probably know, is being
reviewed by the GAO right now. The next chart, please.
SMART SHIP
(CHART 7) I don't know if you have had the opportunity to
go to Pascagoula and see the Smart Ship Program. This is a
program started by our late CNO, Admiral Mike Boorda. It has
been an outstanding success. The idea is to use technology to
take crew members off the ships. For every crew member we can
get off the fleet, we can save $800,000 in life cycle costs.
This project has shown us a way to get the crew size down by 90
to 100 people.
I have been out on the YORKTOWN, and she is doing very
well. We have a skipper, Mr. Chairman, from the University of
Florida. He has that Gator in his wardroom just like I have in
my office. I can tell you this program is doing really well and
is a great credit to our late CNO.
ARSENAL SHIP
We are also in the business of working together with
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), to develop
an Arsenal Ship. This is a completely new kind of ship. We have
three contractor teams working on this ship now. We just down-
selected from five teams. The idea is to produce a ship with
massive firepower but very low life cycle costs. I am very
proud to tell you that the three proposals involved crew sizes
of 30, 23, and zero. One of the offerers is proposing a ship
that for all practical purposes will go into combat with no
people aboard it.
This is a demonstrator program, it is a one-of-a-kind. We
have not decided whether we are going to put it into production
or not, but we are learning enormous amounts of information,
things we really need to know as we design our new carrier and
our new surface combatant of the future.
CVX AIRCRAFT CARRIER
CV(X) 78 is our next-generation aircraft carrier. This year
we are getting underway on the research and development for
this ship. It is a tremendous challenge. We lay her keel in
2006; she goes to sea in 2013.
I have a 1-year-old son at home, just celebrated his
birthday. He will be 78 years old when that ship retires from
the fleet. So you can imagine, Mr. Chairman, we are trying to
look at where will aircraft technologies be when my little son
is 78 years old. Where we will be with computers, with
propulsion systems and so on. We are trying to design a ship
that can have the long-term technical viability to absorb all
these changes in technology that we know are coming in the
years ahead and still be an effective weapons system for the
Navy of the future.
SC-21 SURFACE COMBATANT
Our next surface combatant is SC-21. This is an enormously
innovative program. We are trying to take lessons from the
Smart Ship, from the Arsenal Ship, from the work we are doing
on our aircraft carriers, from the work we are doing on our
submarines, channel that learning about the Navy of the future
and how to build the ships of the future into our SC-21
program. Don and I have most recently looked at how we could
accelerate the schedule for this program so it fits nicely into
the back of the current DDG-51 program.
COMBAT LOGISTICS SHIPS
Finally, in our shipbuilding programs in the beginning of
the early years of the next decade, the next century, we are
going to have to build some future combat logistic ships. We
will be bringing forward legislative proposals to the Congress
about instead of buying these ships and putting them in the
Navy's inventory, how we could acquire these ships under a
build and charter concept that would allow us to avoid the
capital expenditures so we could spend our scarce capital on
other things. But it would require some legal changes on our
ability to do long-term charters. The next chart, please.
AVIATION PROGRAMS
(CHARTS 8 and 9) We will be switching to our aviation
programs. This is a snapshot of aircraft procurement. And here
again, Mr. Murtha, this is the bow wave we talked about. You
can see we are in the bottom of an even steeper valley on
airplanes than we were on ships. The bottom of that valley is
the lowest level in my time. You mentioned 1941, Mr. Chairman.
I was told the year was 1938. I think we are both in the
ballpark. It has been a long time since we were down at that
level.
We are starting up the ramp. Fiscal year 1998 is
substantially higher than where we were a couple of years ago
in fiscal year 1996, as you can see. The main thing is we are
beginning to increase the numbers of F/A-18s and V-22s that we
are purchasing for the Department. You will see that as we go
on into the next couple of charts.
Please take that chart down and let's show a quick video
first on the F/A-18E/F and then on the V-22. Don and Jeff will
narrate the video.
F-18 FIGHTER
Admiral Pilling. The F/A-18 video is about one minute long.
As you know, the first flight of the F/A-18E was in
November of 1995. This is a video of the sea trials we had in
January where we actually went out on the STENNIS in a
snowstorm. The first landing was made by a Navy Lieutenant by
the name of Frank Morley. While we were out there, we did 64
catapult launches and 64 arrested landings. No problems. The
plane is on schedule. It is under weight, which is unusual for
a plane at this stage.
Mr. Murtha. You didn't mention cost.
Admiral Pilling. It is still under the cost profile we
agreed on at the beginning.
Mr. Douglass. It is under cost.
Admiral Pilling. You can see it was a very successful sea
trial.
Mr. Douglass. Under cost in both development and
production, Mr. Murtha.
Mr. Young. Some of our colleagues suggested we would be
better off buying more C and Ds rather than going into the more
expensive E and Fs, and that we would get more airplanes for
the dollar. Can you give us an answer on that? How much more do
we get from the E and F than we do the C and D?
Admiral Pilling. For a complete answer, we would have to be
in a closed session. There are some classified aspects of this
plane. But we have growth in this airplane. There is no more
room for growth in the C and Ds. It is under weight; it has 17
cubic feet of volume that can be used for growth in the future.
Some of the capabilities being built into that airplane,
including range and increased bring-back capability to the
carrier deck, we think are well worth the investment.
Mr. Douglass. When you look at the size of the RDT&E
program, I think it has been an outstanding success. It is the
first program to win the Packard Award for Excellence from the
Department of Defense. We are very proud of the F/A-18E/F.
I am aware of a few questions from other committees
regarding engine problems. You may be interested to know that
we had a slight engine problem during the development flight
test program. It had to do with some improvements in the engine
that we were trying to make. We looked very quickly at the
parts involved, changed them slightly, and completely solved
the problem. That is the only real problem we have had in the
flight test program so far.
So I am very happy to report that the handling capabilities
are excellent, its takeoff and landing capabilities are
excellent, and this is really a success story, Mr. Chairman.
Do you want to go on into the MV-22 here?
MV-22 AIRCRAFT
General Oster. Mr. Chairman, the film clip will show some
full-scale development aircraft. The first part of the film
will show the aircraft and flight operations around and aboard
the flight decks. The V-22 is fully compatible with the LHA/LHD
class ships. This is a wingfold test with the blade folded to
show it, and then you will see it moved on the elevator. It is
fully shipboard compatible.
The next series of clips show a simulated assault landing
in rugged terrain, taking Marines into the objective area, to
be followed up by another full-scale development craft
evacuating a wounded Marine.
Next you will kind of see, you saw it real quickly, that is
the flight mode versus the helicopter mode. We are happy to say
we are now into an Engineering and Manufacturing Development,
(E&MD). Aircraft number seven was delivered. The first flight
was February 5th, with all tests successful. We have had four
other flights since then, and the next event we are looking
forward to is the flight ferry up to Pax River to finish the
testing. That will finish the exit criteria for the E&MD
models.
JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER
Mr. Douglass. If you can put the chart back up, we are
pressing on with the Joint Strike Fighter. As you probably
know, Mr. Chairman, we had a source selection this year. The
way we manage this program is we provide the program manager to
my colleague Art Money in the Air Force who is the Senior
Acquisition Executive, (SAE). Then we flip-flop the SAE when we
rotate the program manager. So it went through its transition
on into full-scale development under Art's leadership, and we
down-selected under his leadership. We are now down to two
contractors, which would carry it into the next phase. The Navy
investment this year in this program is $449 million.
Marine Corps Aircraft
The AV-8Bs are on track. We are doing really well with this
program. The Marines love it. We are buying 11 airplanes in
fiscal year 1998 for an investment of just under $300 million.
We are very happy to tell you we have gotten our 4 Bladed
November/4 Bladed Whiskey/4BN/4BW, helicopter remanufacture
program approved by the Department of Defense and are on into
the research to make that program a reality. It is $81 million
of RDT&E funds this year. The next chart, please.
ADVANCED AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT VEHICLE
(CHART 10) I will talk about that first bullet for a
second. The AAAV, Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle is
another outstanding acquisition reform success. We went through
a source selection since my last testimony here. We co-located
the program office with the contractor in Woodbridge, VA.
General Electric Land Systems is the contractor. The program is
on track and doing well. We have a short video on it that you
might like to see, if you will run the video.
General Oster. Throughout this program we have gone through
a series of technology demonstrators. In the first part of the
video you will see what we called the hydro-dynamic test rig.
The real technological concern all along was could you get it
up on plane. We demonstrated you could do that with the engine
and propulsion, and we have achieved speeds in excess of 30
knots. We have been able to demonstrate the transition from sea
to land with the hydrodynamic test rig.
But we also want it to be an infantry fighting vehicle, so
we have also gone through some tests with automotive testing.
We have involved the user from the beginning, so we have had
the Marines in and around the mock-ups. Their suggestions have
been built in.
In terms of the tests up at Aberdeen, we passed all the
tests and out-performed the M-1A1 tank on all overland
operations, which were part of the threshold capabilities of
the vehicle.
We are real proud of our AAAV technology center down in
Woodbridge. Some of your staffers have already visited. We
would like to invite any of the Members or staffers to come
down. We have a virtual design facility. We have the user and
the designer and the fabricator working together to deliver
what the Marine needs for the 21st century.
MARINE CORPS GROUND PROGRAMS
Mr. Douglass. Putting our development team right in there
with the contractor is, we think, a pretty interesting approach
to increase communication and to hold these people accountable.
We have got a great Marine Corps program manager down there,
and I am very proud of that program.
The next program is the Lightweight 155. This is an
artillery improvement program for the Marines. We had three
bidders on this program. We had a shoot-off. We are just about
to announce the source selection on this within the next week
or 10 days. The source selection authority is actually an Army
general who reports to my colleague in the Army, Gil Decker. I
will review that decision in the next week, and we should be
announcing it before the month is out.
Then, of course, we have our Medium Tactical Vehicle
Remanufacture program. This is really a success story, where
the Marines have gotten together with the Army and worked on
the vehicle remanufacture program in order to get the costs
down and be able to revitalize the Marine Corps truck fleet. We
are looking at this technique and other kinds of Marine ground
vehicles. The next chart, please.
C4I SPACE AND INFORMATION WARFARE
(CHART 11) Here we get into programs that are of vital
interest to this Committee. The are in the C4I Space and
Information Warfare area. Cooperative Engagement Capability is
one you mentioned in your opening statement, Mr. Chairman.
Technically this program is doing very well. The issue, of
course, is how quickly can we get this capability out into the
fleet. We will be glad to answer any questions that you have on
that.
THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
Regarding Theater Ballistic Missile Defense, we have a
video we would like to show you, and I would like to make a few
comments about where we are with that program. This one has an
audio on it, as I recall.
This is a dramatic picture here. That was taken from the
actual sensor in the front of the missile.
I am happy to put credit where credit is due. We wouldn't
be where we are in this program if it wasn't for the leadership
in this Committee and some of the interests of some of your
Members, Mr. Chairman. We are doing very well in the Area-Wide
program. This was our first direct hit success. I now have the
authority from Dr. Kaminski to buy all of the missiles that I
need to finish the development of this program, the engineering
development of this program, and to do what we call an initial
user capability. We are pressing ahead to do that.
In my judgment right now, getting this out into the fleet
is only limited by the time it is going to take us to build
these missiles and get them deployed. We are pretty confident
that we are going to be able to get an initial capability
during fiscal year 1999 on this program. We will have a full
unit operational capability in fiscal year 2001. So the Area-
Wide system is doing well, and a lot of the credit for its
success is due to the leadership and the support that has been
evident on this Committee.
Theater-wide, as you know, we are also----
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Secretary, I misunderstand what you are
saying. You are saying it is going to be deployed, or you are
saying it is just research?
Mr. Douglass. Admiral Pilling knows, it will be deployed.
We will have our first ability to have this out in the fleet in
fiscal year 1999, and the first full unit deployment will be in
fiscal year 2001. We are pressing on.
Mr. Murtha. I thought, though, you weren't putting it on
the ship.
Mr. Douglass. Mr. Murtha, this might be a good time to
explain that. There are kind of two things you need to do to
get this out into the fleet. You need to build the missiles
themselves, which we are doing, and which we have now got the
authority to build, and those missiles are actually under
construction today. Then you actually have to make changes to
the ships, certain technical changes in the ships, so that they
can launch them. That work is also underway.
Now, the question is how many ships do you modify to be
able to launch these missiles, and how many missiles do you
have?
Ideally you would want to keep this in balance. In other
words, you wouldn't want to spend the money to have, say, 30
ships able to shoot the missiles if you didn't have any
missiles to go on the 30 ships. You would want the
modifications to the ships and the modifications to the
missiles to be roughly in sync.
I think one of the things that your Committee has pointed
out in its analysis of our budget is that some of the ships
that are going to be converted to be able to do the Theater
Missile Defense are ships that are under construction now, and
some of those ships are ships that are out there in the fleet
already. Some of our budget documentation has indicated that of
the 12 ships in the multiyear contract we are buying, we were
not buying the capability to put the missiles in those 12
ships.
We are committed to relooking at that. That is not in
concrete. We can fix that in the outyear budgets. But we will
get ships and missiles in sync. We are committed to do that,
sir.
Mr. Murtha. That answers the question.
Mr. Douglass. On Theater Wide, the issue over the long haul
is how many resources do you put in year after year. As you
know, we get our resources from the BMDO organization. Due to
the plus-ups of this Committee last year, you have been able to
put us on the road to a very robust program. The issue for us
is how much money is going to be put into the outyears to keep
this program sustained. Frankly, how much we are able to
accomplish and when we can get an operational capability for
Upper Tier depends on that allocation of resources. But
technically that program is moving ahead.
I have to be fair and tell you that there is a lot of
debate, both in the Congress and in the Pentagon, about how
much money should go into which programs. This program has
competing programs in the Army, as you know, and sometimes we
don't all agree. But ultimately, what we do depends on how many
resources we can afford to put into it.
Basically once I know how much per year I have to work
with, I can tell you what date that I could bring this into the
fleet.
COMMUNICATIONS PROGRAMS
Regarding Global Broadcast Service, this is getting the
small TV satellite antennas where you can get 100 channels we
can all buy for our houses now, and getting those out into the
fleet. The problem has been that commercially nobody beams that
kind of traffic out to the middle of the ocean because there
are no subscribers out there.
For a very modest amount of money, we were able to get
transponders put on three satellites that we had already paid
for. We had to stick our neck out a little bit betting on the
conference for some funding. Your Committee and the other three
oversight committees worked on this with us, and we saved a lot
of money for the taxpayers.
This program is on track, and we will be moving that
capability out to the fleet. Of course, we will not just use it
to show TV movies. There will be an enormous amount of
intelligence information, weather information, status
information on weapons systems and other things that we can now
push out to the fleet.
Challenge Athena, which is our voice and imagery across the
SATCOM program provides a big boost in the quality of life for
our Sailors and Marines at sea. We started to bring you a video
on this. Every time I see it, it brings tears to my eyes
because it is a lot of videos of young Sailors talking to their
moms and dads or little kids and so on. We are moving ahead
with Challenge Athena as quickly as we can. The next chart,
please.
MINE WARFARE
(CHART 12) Mine and undersea warfare is next. This is an
area that in the past from time to time has been neglected. We
are doing our very best within our resources to support it now.
The Congress has asked us for the last couple of years for a
Mine and Undersea Warfare Plan and has asked that we certify
that it is fully funded and meets the requirements of the
Chairman of the JCS and in a joint service way.
I am happy to report to this subcommittee that again this
year, it is fully funded. Every year this is a struggle within
the Pentagon. We have to all stretch and work hard together to
get this fully funded, but we have kept it on track. It is
going to give us a good organic capability in the fleet to do
the kind of mine warfare that we need to do as we move on into
the next century.
As you can see, we have already completed conversion of the
INCHON. We have the remote minehunting system, our interim
system deployed with the KITTY HAWK last year. So that area is
reasonably well-funded.
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
Anti-Submarine Warfare is another area of great concern. We
are pressing ahead. We have made some pretty significant
accomplishments there. Some of them are listed on the chart,
not the least of which is that we are going to have on the New
Attack Submarine a dynamite C3I system that is a big leap
forward from the one we have on SEAWOLF, which is itself a
great improvement from what we have had in the past. There will
be a significant amount of commercial off-the-shelf information
and display equipment. It is just a tremendous leap forward.
There will be no periscopes anymore.
We are going to have displays on big video screens, some of
which will be three dimensional portrayals of the ocean
environment the submarine is in. We think this part of our
Anti-Submarine Warfare program is well-funded, but it is
something we are having to watch very carefully.
We also, Mr. Chairman, I would draw your attention to the
fact that we have been asked to provide both a classified and
unclassified report to the Congress on how well we are doing
here, and we are committed to getting that report over here in
a few months on time and at the proper classification level so
that you can see the whole picture.
ACQUISITION REFORM
(CHART 13) I will wrap this up very quickly with one final
chart, by telling you that we are working hard to maintain the
steam on our Acquisition Reform Program. We had a stand down
this past year in which all 43,000 Navy acquisition employees
stopped for a day and asked ourselves what can we do to improve
the way we do acquisition in the Navy and Marine Corps.
I had some 5,000 suggestions come in to me as a result of
the stand down. My staff is going through every single one of
those suggestions, and hundreds and hundreds of them are being
implemented. We are focusing on total ownership costs. That
means as we modernize the fleet, we are trying to produce
weapons systems that will take fewer and fewer Sailors into
harm's way.
By reducing the crew sizes on our ships in the outyears, we
are going to be able to bring the operations costs down very,
very dramatically. I mentioned the Smart Ship. We have already
seen a way to get 100 sailors off of a cruiser. The Arsenal
Ship is planned to have a very small crew. We think the SC21
crew size will be below 100.
So focusing on total life cycle costs, it is really going
to pay some of the bill, Mr. Murtha, to get us up that hump in
the outyears. We are also doing a lot of partnering with
industry. This year we had our second conference with the CEO's
of many of the companies that do business with the Navy. We are
listening to what they say. I give them a report at the end of
the year on how we are doing on things that the industry people
have suggested we change in Navy acquisition. We have received
many accolades during the year, far too many to list here
today.
The one I am most proud of here is the F/A-18 E/F. It won
the Packard Award this past year. We are very proud of that. We
have received now some 22 Hammer Awards from Vice President
Gore on acquisition reform, which are outstanding examples of
acquisition teams in the Department.
These range all the way from small teams of Marine Corps
personnel getting together to figure out how to bring down life
cycle costs of existing equipment, to new ideas on our
submarines and airplanes.
That is a very quick overview, Mr. Chairman, of the
multibillion-dollar program that we have proposed for your
review and approval, and we will be glad to answer any
questions you have, sir.
[The joint statement and charts of Mr. Douglass, Vice
Admiral Pilling and Lieutenant General Oster follow:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
SHIP SELF-DEFENSE
Mr. Young. Okay. Mr. Douglass, thank you very much. We
appreciate the extensive details in your presentation. I need
to go back to this issue one more time now, the issue of the
ship defense systems. You had a very good answer to the
question, but as I thought through it, the answer left out a
few things. That is, this morning one of the answers was we
will probably retrofit. But when you retrofit, that gets very
expensive, much more so than if you put the systems in as you
go.
Another problem that we haven't mentioned is--we did
mention, but there was no response--on the DDG-51's, we are
talking about a multiyear contract on 12 ships. What is that
multiyear contract going to say about ship defense systems? Is
it going to be included? Is there going to be a provision in
the multiyear? If there is no answer for that now, how can you
enter into a multiyear if you don't have the answer on what you
are going to do with the ship defense systems?
Mr. Douglass. One thing I could tell you, Mr. Chairman,
there is a misconception here. The DDG's are going to have a
significant amount of ship self-defense.
Mr. Young. But not the state of the art.
Mr. Douglass. The two items that have been contentious have
been getting them ready as we produce them for ballistic
missile defense capability, and the incorporation of CEC. As I
said earlier, we are re-looking at our plans there.
Some of these changes, as you point out, are much cheaper
if you catch them while you are building the ship. Things that
generally require mechanical changes to the ship are expensive
to retrofit. But some of these are also, Mr. Chairman, just
electronics changes where you pull out one black box and put in
another one or change the software. In that category it is
really not that much more expensive to do retrofits than it is
doing it in production.
I will tell you, it is my own hope and I will dedicate
myself to try and do this, because I feel that I am in the same
place you are, Mr. Chairman, on this issue. I would not like to
see us emerge from this congressional cycle or from our budget
development cycle for next year with that multiyear contract
not having those capabilities in the ships to the maximum
degree that we can. We are dedicated to doing that.
There is a long story about why it is not in the plan. It
is more along bureaucratic lines than it is along the intent of
what Admiral Pilling and I, the CNO, and the Secretary
intended. We are going to fix it.
Mr. Young. I am sure with all of us working together, we
will get it fixed. As you can tell, there is considerable
concern.
Admiral Pilling. There are really two issues here on CEC.
One is the forward-fit issue on the DDG's, and then there is
another issue on back-fits. I think I would like to just
address both of them fairly quickly. The DDG issue is 12 ships
in the multiyear. It was our original plan that the last four,
the third ship in 2000 and the three ships in 2001, would have
an upgrade to their radar systems.
There was some risk in that. As we put the multiyear
package together, we took the radar upgrade system out, and CEC
was part of it. We checked retro back-fit costs and forward-fit
costs for the CEC, because it would be mostly installing black
boxes and racks, there would not be much of a difference. That
is what happened with the DDG's.
On the back-fit of the other ships, it had been our plan
all along to have five carrier battle groups fully outfitted
with CEC by fiscal year 2002. We already have two outfitted.
For a variety of reasons that John alluded to in the 1998
column, we ended up not procuring, at low rate initial
production, any CEC units in fiscal year 1999, because the
OPEVAL for CEC is in fiscal year 1998. So instead of getting to
five battle groups by 2002, we are going to get to three. We
will go to full rate production in 1999.
Mr. Douglass. The bottom line though is we share your
concern and we are going to do what we can.
Mr. Young. We will work it out, right?
Mr. Douglass. Yes, sir.
V-22 Aircraft
Mr. Young. You mentioned the V-22 and you were pretty proud
of the V-22 program as we are, because it was this Committee
that kept the pressure on to keep the V-22 a viable program for
years when there were those across the river who said we
couldn't afford it.
Last year, the Committee directed that the V-22 program
achieve a production rate of 36 aircraft a year by the year
2000. In your statement, you said today we were going to
achieve a production rate of 18 aircraft per year. Tell us why
the Congress said 36 a year, and you decided on 18 a year.
Mr. Douglass. Sir, it is pretty simple. It is money. Last
year you gave us the money. You gave us $70 million for
advanced procurement for seven additional airplanes, and we do
not have the money in our budget to buy those additional seven
airplanes. So I am not trying to hide anything. I would love to
see those extra airplanes in there as an acquisition person.
We simply did not have the money to add. It is another
$700-plus million as I recall, Jeff. If you just take that and
push it on forward, we can't get up to the 36 aircraft when you
told us to.
I don't know how to say it in any other way other than I
share your concern. As soon as we can possibly get this past
low rate production, I want to see us have a multiyear contract
here. What I would hope that we could do is, have a multiyear
contract. Sometimes when we make a multiyear contract, you save
hundreds of millions of dollars, and the money tends to go
somewhere into other programs or some other place.
I would hope that any savings on this program that come
from multiyear, once we get through this low-rate production
part in the program, we would plow back, to get those numbers
up as high as we can as early as we can. We share all the
concerns. I went back and read some of the previous testimony
of this Committee about your concern about the age of our older
helicopters. It is just a financial limitation problem.
Mr. Young. Can you tell us what the unit cost would be at
18 per year versus the unit cost at 36 per year?
Mr. Douglass. I could, sir. I don't have it at the tip of
my fingers.
Mr. Young. If you could provide it. My question comes back
to this: I thought we provided 12 versus 5 advanced
procurement. I thought we already provided the money for 12.
Mr. Douglass. You provided the advanced procurement. It was
$70 million, and to give you the exact status of that, Mr.
Chairman, I am going to choose my words carefully here because
we are getting into some fighting in the building. We get every
year undistributed reductions from the Congress.
In other words, when you get down to the end game, you say,
we can't figure out how to balance the books, so here is an
undistributed reduction of so many million dollars. We get
Bosnia bills to pay. We get bills for the Small Business
Innovative Research Program. We get this and that.
It turns out on this program, those bills added up to 7 or
8 percent of the whole cost of the program. It was in the range
of 40 or 50 millions of dollars in our RDT&E program. So I have
asked the Department to forward over to the Congress a request
to reprogram this $70 million back into the research and
development program so I can keep this program as healthy as I
possibly can, so we can get the numbers up into the future. But
I regret, and I sincerely regret we could not follow through
and build those extra seven airplanes for which you gave us the
advanced procurement.
General Oster may want to add to that.
General Oster. Yes, sir. There is also a little bit of good
news. As you know, we have been operating under the billion-
dollar cap before, which was kind of an arbitrary restriction.
The best we were ever able to do in the FYDP in the last year's
budget, we thought we could get to 21. That has been lifted,
and in this particular FYDP we get up to 24 a year.
Clearly not 36, but 24 a year moves the Initial Operational
Capability (IOC) and the Full Operational Capability (FOC) up
for us. Our goal still is to get up to 36 a year. So there is
some good news in this, but it really comes down to, as the
Secretary indicated, there is the affordability issue as these
programs compete.
Mr. Douglass. Just to give you an idea, Mr. Chairman, in
this program even as it is, we have $530 million in research
and development, and I am asking that we supplement that with
the $70 million from last year that I mentioned to you. We have
$542 million to buy those five low rate production birds. That
is almost $1.1 billion. I am sure this Committee is acutely
aware of the fact that Marines stretch their bucks as far as
they can. That is a big bill for our Corps.
We are going to continue to try to get the numbers up as
high as we can. That is my commitment to this Committee as your
acquisition person, but I can't invent the money. These two
individuals more or less control the money. But I will do
everything I can as your acquisition person to get the most
airplanes for the dollars. I tell you, I have been out to the
plant twice now. I have had the contractors in, to see me when
we started getting the prices on these airplanes. They came in
with a pretty substantial price increase. General Krulak and I
personally called the CEO's of those two companies in and
looked them in the eye and said, you know, you are going to
have to show us where every penny of this price increase is.
The result was that the price increase went away. So we are
paying all the attention we can to the program. It has the
support of our Commandant, it has the support of Secretary
Dalton, and beyond that, sir, I don't know what to say to you.
FAST PATROL CRAFT PROGRAM
Mr. Young. We appreciate that. We know it is not easy. The
goals are the same, to provide the best technology and the best
equipment at the best price. Some of my colleagues who are not
members of this subcommittee have asked me to just ask one
further question.
Last year, the Committee directed that fiscal year 1996
funds appropriated for the Fast Patrol Craft Program be
released by the Office of the Secretary of Defense to the Navy
and expeditiously obligated only for that purpose. That
language was in the report.
My understanding is that has not been done and that is not
going to be done and several of my colleagues have asked me to
ask you why?
Mr. Douglass. I think the most basic reason why is that it
hasn't been released to the Navy. The Department of Defense has
never released it. That is my answer as the acquisition person.
I think beyond that, the reason why the money hasn't been
released is because, frankly, we haven't asked for it to be
released, because I don't think the requirement side of the
Navy sees a requirement for those boats.
Admiral Pilling. There is no Navy requirement. We are
trying to find out from the Special Operations Forces if they
have a requirement for such a craft.
Mr. Young. Okay. Thank you very much. I apologize to my
colleagues for taking so much of the Committee's time.
Mr. Murtha.
CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
Mr. Murtha. One of the programs that I went down to visit
last year during the Atlanta Olympics was the chemical-
biological warfare mission. We brought it up last year in the
Committee that I feel this is one of the major threats. I think
this is as important as anything we can do, is find a way to
combat that threat.
When I went down to visit, I came back and visited with the
Chairman, and we decided what had been done, with the little
bit of the Marine Corps money. The Marine Corps really handles
that money well. Nobody does it better than the Marine Corps.
They had a system, but it wasn't good enough. It wasn't near
good enough. So we put $10 million in, and it has been improved
substantially, and I understand during inauguration they
brought the unit up here.
Is this program to the point where we should have units,
say, on both coasts?
The reason I ask that question, one of the ways you
overcome biological warfare is you have to react very quickly,
and even with chemical warfare you have to act quickly. Should
we also have a unit that could deploy on the West Coast because
of the time element? Is this something we should consider? Are
we to that point where the demonstration is over and we can
adapt another unit like this? Maybe not in the Marine Corps,
but another unit like this?
General Oster. As you know, this is one of the things that
came out of the commandant's planning guide. As we looked over
the horizon of the requirements there, there wasn't an incident
response capability out there. So we set about to do that. It
was really an idea that went rapidly from concept to
deployment. We deployed it first to Atlanta, even before we
came up here.
We have always believed that with the reach-back
capability, the small amount of gear, and the rapid time lines
for deployment, that we can deploy in a very rapid time in the
United States. We considered the aspect of adding additional
forces, additional units, but as of now, we have not decided to
do that.
Mr. Murtha. How about if we prepositioned equipment?
General Oster. Certainly, if we preposition equipment in
other locations, that would make life an awful lot simpler.
Mr. Murtha. They tell me the biological response time is 4
hours. If you have a contamination, you have to respond within
4 hours. I think they are based at Camp Lejune to hustle them
together and get them any place in the West Coast would take a
lot longer obviously.
General Oster. Clearly, it is a concern with regard to the
response. We feel especially proud we have this capability out
there right now.
Mr. Douglass. Mr. Murtha, I might add to that. I think that
the fact that the Marines have that capability is testimony to
General Krulak's leadership and the support by you and others
on this Committee. I think the issue begins to go beyond the
Marines, though, in the sense that we probably should look at
that more widely across the Services.
One of the concerns that I have heard General Krulak
express when he and I have testified together is that if he has
to deploy that overseas, let's say we had another DESERT STORM,
and then we had a terrorist event back here, we would be in a
pickle. We couldn't do things like move it down to the
Olympics.
Mr. Murtha. I wish you would take a look at it and see if
we couldn't come up with a plan to cover an emergency, once you
get it up to a point where you think it is working.
One other thing I would like to mention. The Chairman
mentioned a couple Members wrote letters about releasing money.
I am not sure, Mr. Secretary, and both of you realize how
difficult it is for us to put a bill together. I mean, we don't
take these requests lightly.
When a Member comes to this Committee and makes a request,
we turn down probably, what, three for every one.
We put a bill together and there is nobody better at it
than us. We do as good a job as anybody. But then it gets stuck
because in your shop down there, both Republicans and Democrats
tell me we got problems getting stuff broken loose, because
some administrator is making a decision that this is not
important.
Well, let me tell you, to get the bill through is
important, and to get the overall bill through is important.
And I hope you will consider that as you go through this
process. It is a matter of opinion whether some of these things
are important or not important. And the Members are careful,
considerate, and usually have good recommendations. If they
aren't, we throw them out. So I would hope----
Mr. Douglass. Mr. Murtha, I couldn't agree with you more.
As you know, I spent 4 years working for Senator Nunn over on
the Senate side. I know how hard we struggled and I know what a
conference is and I know how the Members end up over here at
9:00, 10:00, 11 o'clock at night trying to hammer out these
deals.
Just suffice it to say that it is not stuck in my shop.
Where these things get stuck are in the Comptroller's shops.
They have a job to do. We have to recognize that they have to
worry about how we are going to pay for Bosnia, and this, that
and the other possible contingencies.
One of the problems we are looking at in the building today
is that year after year, what we find is in order to pay for
today's operational problems, we borrow from tomorrow's
modernization dollars. Often the first place they look, let us
all face it and be honest about it, over there in that
building, if it was added by the Congress and it hasn't been
thought up over there in the building that is the first place
they look when they have to cut.
I guess that is human nature. I don't know. So I agree with
you.
Mr. Murtha. That is a real mistake, Mr. Secretary, because
so many of the programs we have added have absolutely turned
out to be beneficial. The V-22 is a perfect example. You folks
wanted to kill it, and it went straight from the Secretary
right down. And this Committee right here with Bill Young in
the forefront trying to save the V-22.
Mr. Douglass. Mr. Murtha, I agree with you. I argued that
to the best of my ability within the constraints of my office
and there is no better example than some of the things that you
have brought up. I can think of others.
Mr. Murtha. The sealift transport ships, just on and on and
on. CEC. We have been around a couple of years. It is not as
though we haven't been around. And Manufacturing Technology,
you zeroed MANTECH out. MANTECH is a program that saves us
money, for heaven's sake. That is frustrating.
Mr. Douglass. I think the young man sitting next to you
rocking in his chair will tell you that I have bent my pick
trying to get MANTECH funded. It is another one we are going to
take a tough look at.
Mr. Murtha. Okay, thank you.
Mr. Young. I just wanted to comment that I am sure the
Florida Gators want to figure out how to solve a lot of these
problems.
Mr. Douglass. I sometimes feel like an old alligator
arguing some of these.
Mr. Young. At least you have a tough hide.
Mr. Douglass. We can always remember who has a tough hide.
Mr. Young. Mr. Cunningham.
Mr. Cunningham. Thank you.
I am not concerned that the Secretary was not enlightened
because he was appointed by the President of another party. Not
only is he a Gator, but he is Air Force.
Mr. Douglass. Sir, I was in the Navy before I was in the
Air Force. My dad was a Chief Petty Officer, and I am proud of
it.
GROUND PROXIMITY WARNING SYSTEM
Mr. Cunningham. I know that. And I would say that having
worked with Secretary Douglass, I would be proud to serve with
him because of the work that we have done.
And if you could, you know, make Duncan Hunter happy, you
have done a lot. And the Secretary is accessible, and if
everybody in the President's administration was as
straightforward, nonpolitical, get to the question and the
problem, as the Secretary, we would be much better off in this
organization. I want to thank you.
I have a program I would like to raise. The Ground
Proximity Warning System for Cargo and Troop-Carrying
Airplanes, we put about $2 million in that program last year.
Do you still consider that a viable system that is going to
save aircraft and lives, and if so, do you have any plans to
put it on other assets for Marine Corps or Navy? If you don't,
you can provide that for the record.
Mr. Douglass. I would have to provide that for the record.
I think the answer is yes, but I really don't know.
[The information follows:]
Ground Proximity Warning is an important capability to the
Navy and Marine Corps. To illustrate its potential, analysis of
CH-53E Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) mishaps over the
last 10 years shows that a Ground Proximity Warning System
(GPWS) would have provided a warning in 75% of these accidents.
The CH-53E has lost an average of 0.4 aircraft and 1.4 lives
each year due to CFIT. Implementation of the GPWS into the CH-
53E would have had the potential to save 3 aircraft and 14
lives over the last 10 years.
The Navy and Marine Corps will complete the development and
integration of a GPWS in fiscal year 1997 using the $2 million
appropriated last year. Installations into CH-53E, CH-53D, MH-
53E, CH-46E, CH-46D, UH-46D, and MH-46D will begin in fiscal
year 1998. Additionally, the Navy is defining requirements for
the potential installation of GPWS into the H-60 and UH-1
platforms.
PRIVATE/PUBLIC YARDS
Mr. Cunningham. The second thing, Mr. Secretary, we have
been working on the issues of Bosnia funding, its impact on
ship repair and the private versus public yards. This is very
important to San Diego and the West Coast and the Nation for
national security. The supplemental now looks like it will
include, as I hear, Mr. Chairman, a disaster supplemental tied
into it.
Are there plans to take the money from the supplemental and
give back the ships that we have lost in the private yards, or
are they going to take the money they have already stolen from
you, plus the supplemental, and apply it to Bosnia? Can we
expect some of those ship repairs which were scheduled for
private shipyards to come back our way?
Mr. Douglass. I am not sure I fully can predict the outcome
of that, but let me say this----
Mr. Cunningham. Say it this way, would you fight for that?
Mr. Douglass. Yes, sir. You know that I came over to talk
to you, Congressman Hunter, and Congressman Filner about this
issue. And we tried to work out an agreement, which is that we
can get as much of this backlog that is done in those private
yards as possible. We have made a commitment to you for a
certain amount for the San Diego area, and I am going to fight
like a tiger for that money.
I would also say that I am busy trying to make sure that we
balance the work load in our public yards so that we don't have
to keep moving people around. I know that is an irritant for
all of us, and I am going to do the best I can to stay on top
of that.
BUDGET PROJECTIONS
Mr. Cunningham. Mr. Secretary, knowing how professional you
are in the job, one of the things I think we all ought to be
concerned about is solving the problem. We look at things like
affordability. We don't have the dollars to do it. The
President proposes to cut $4.8 billion out of the defense
budget, so we don't have the money to do the things we really
need to do.
The Bosnia money, I am not naive. I would bet my house
against yours, and I have got a pretty nice one, that we are
going to go through another conflict in the next 4 years and we
will have to pay for it just like that. I believe it is
unrealistic and the chart you put up there that showed in the
year 2002 where our modernization takes place. Remember last
year when General Shalikashvili and all the Joints Chiefs put
their careers at risk by saying that $60 billion is what we
need for procurement, and the President said no, $35 billion.
Well, something you ought to be really concerned about, Mr.
Secretary, is the President's balanced budget cuts 98 percent
of its domestic spending during the last 2 years. And I don't
think logically there is any way that those who want to put the
money in social spending are going to allow us to make those
increases in national security spending. I mean, it is just not
logical.
You know the smoke and mirrors that goes on around here,
but it is something we ought to be taking a look at. If I would
have had my way, I got here just as Dick Cheney cancelled the
fighter the Chairman was talking about in the last hearing, and
I disagreed with it.
But my intent was to increase the dollars for the F-14, F-
14D. I went against McDonnell Douglas on this one. We got the
F-18 after I pushed a personal check, like I did with my house,
and said hey, it is going to cost us more than the $2 billion
in R&D, for the F/A-18 effort and we only get 15 percent more
in range. The radar won't see as far as the SU-27s radar, it
won't even see as far as the AA-10 or AA-11 missile we will go
up against. But we have to buy that airplane, and to fill our
decks, and I support that.
But in doing that, in looking at the out-year dollars, I
would also support the increasing procurement of the V-22 to
36. Here is an article that showed the value of a higher
procurement rate. It is one of the best articles to make the
case. It is written by Major General John Rhodes. And if you
don't have this, I will provide you copies and submit it for
the record.
I didn't provide copies in the last hearing, but the
article makes a really good case and us well written. I will
give you copies. Talks about an operation which took something
like 87 hours for a helicopter to go in, fly 480 miles, refuel
twice, put them in daylight risk. While it only took 7 hours in
the V-22. with lower risk.
But with straight-line funding, we are faced with having to
build three versions of the JSF, three completely different
ones. The R&D cost for those, in the low-procurement numbers
that are projected, are astronomical. If you want to save
money, give us a flat-line procurement, we don't have to bring
on and lay off workers. We have some idea of the spare parts
needed and those sorts of things, which we never seem to do
that.
These are things we can really do together. But the V-22, I
would increase the procurement rate, if it were up to me. I
don't know if we can or not. But last year, you said we cut
things that Congress added. But we also put in things that you
really needed, that you were short.
When the Secretary stood up and said everything is rosy, we
found out the Marine Corps has AV-8Bs that are falling out of
the sky. 50 percent of them have a interim fix because the
Department doesn't have the money in order to truly repair
them. So these are life-and-death questions, and I would hope
that you would support us for the adds that we put in. And I
know you do for the supplemental, Mr. Secretary, and the
Admiral and General here.
But I have some real concern because we push everything
into the out-years. Since I have been here, when Les Aspin was
sitting in the Chair for National Security, everything was
going to the out-years and we were always going to do it later.
We are not going to be able to do that, sir, realistically.
Mr. Douglass. We understand your concerns, Mr. Cunningham,
and we appreciate your support and we will do everything we can
to work with you.
One thing you said that I particularly agree with is this
interwar period. I think people who think that there is no
conflict going to come for the next 30, 40 years, or something
like that, just haven't read the history books.
We can't predict how these things develop. But if you look
at the history of our country--and I am pretty proud of the
fact that I read history pretty avidly and really stay on top
of it--we all know it is a dangerous world and it is cyclic.
One of the challenges we have, all of us, those on this
Committee, and the people appointed by the President to take
care of things for the Administration, is to stretch these
dollars as far as we can.
Mr. Cunningham. I have a couple of questions for the record
I would like to submit, and when I do, I will submit this for
the record.
Mr. Young. No objection, Mr. Cunningham.
Thank you very much.
[The article follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Young. Mr. Visclosky.
NEW ATTACK SUBMARINE PROGRAM COST
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I also have a number of questions for the
record, if I could have those submitted, I would appreciate
that very much.
Mr. Secretary, Admiral, General, I want to associate myself
with the remarks made earlier by the Chairman and Mr. Murtha on
the ship self defense systems. I think that there is a great
importance that we ought to all attach to that, and I would
want to associate my remarks with them.
I would like to talk to you about the submarine program, if
I could, and now that the administration has decided to do a
teaming arrangement between Electric Boat and Newport News, I
am wondering if you could compare for me the total program
costs today for that original 30-boat program compared to what
it would have looked like with the sole source.
Mr. Douglass. The original program which was made some
years ago is some $60-plus billion program, Mr. Visclosky. The
part that we of course struggle with, is the front end of the
program, how are you going to build the first four or five
boats? And as you know, the Navy's original plan was to select
Electric Boat as the designer and builder. We were going to
build submarines there and carriers down at Newport News.
For several years now, the Congress has not only urged us,
but written it into the law that we would have a competition
between the two yards. That competition added, depending on
whether you are conservative or liberal with your figures,
between $3 and $6 billion cost to the program. We figured it
was around $3 billion, the GAO figured it was closer to $6
billion.
Those costs were because instead of building one boat in
one facility with one design, you were going to have two basic
design teams, two learning curves, smaller quantity buys for
the initial procurement of the materials and so forth. We were
never able to fully come to grips with that extra cost of that
competitive program, and last year we brought forward a
recommendation to the Congress that committed us to try to do
this competition, but did not have the money for all of the
boats, those first four boats.
In the time that has gone by since our last round of
hearings on the Hill, the shipbuilders came into us and said
look, it would be to everyone's advantage to allow us to team
to build the New Attack Submarine. With regard to teaming,
there is another example, Mr. Chairman, of something that was
added by the Congress that we very much appreciate and turned
out to be fortuitous for us. Congress added a new submarine
large scale research vehicle for us, and the Congress allowed
us to get these two shipyards to team on this research vehicle.
It is a miniaturized submarine that we can use, to try on
various new techniqies.
Their teaming on that research vehicle went so well that
they came to us and made proposals to me and my staff that they
would be willing to team on the overall program on the first
four boats, provided that we could: A. Obtain Congressional
approval of their teaming concept, and B. That we could buy the
first four boats in a block buy.
Now, that has not been done before, and there is some risk
associated with that. We looked at it very carefully. My staff
has estimated that the savings in that program, not from this
competitive program but from what we had in the budget, was
going to be in the neighborhood of $450 to $600 million. That
is a lot of money that I can spend on other things. So I
recommended that proposal to the Secretary of the Navy, the
Secretary recommended it to the Secretary of Defense, he
recommend it to the President, and now all of us are
recommending to the Congress that we change the law and allow
us to move from a competitive program, which we never had the
money to fund, to one of teaming.
The bottom line of all of this is that we think the
ultimate total cost for all those 30 ships under this approach
will probably fall. But the reason why I have not given you a
30-ship number for teaming versus a 30-ship number for
competition, was that we never developed that 30-ship number
for competition. We never extrapolated it all out.
But I can tell you competition was at least $3 to $6
billion more expensive on just the first four boats alone.
Further, more and this is an important point, there was never a
point where you could say, let's have a real competition, in
the sense that we might have on an airplane. Where there are
big quantities, and you can give so many to one company and so
many to the other. For years and years, we were only going to
be building one boat a year. So it meant every year one yard
would get one, and another the other, unless you simply wanted
to say we will just go down to one builder. First, we didn't
think that was politically viable. Secondly, what would you do
with the boats built by the loser who is now out of the
submarine business? We would have what we refer to as orphan
boats, and very expensive orphan boats. So for all of those
reasons teaming began to look better and better for us, and
that is what we have proposed to the Congress.
Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Secretary, I have been on sabbatical for
the last two years on this issue, but my recollection is one of
the Committee's concerns two years ago, if not before that, was
that there would be room in your budget over the years for the
procurement on an annualized basis of a regular number of new
attack submarines. You indicated here that the estimate for
those 30 boats was $60 billion. And then you mentioned----
Mr. Douglass. Approximately.
Mr. Visclosky. Approximately.
Mr. Douglass. Yes, sir.
Mr. Visclosky. And then that the increased cost was $3 to
$6 billion. That is not over the $60 billion, as I understand
your answer, that is over the first four boats.
Mr. Douglass. But it would have been added to the $60
billion. We just never calculated it all the way out.
Mr. Visclosky. Now, I don't understand your answer. Are you
saying----
Mr. Douglass. Let's say it was $60 billion, just for
hypothetical purposes.
Mr. Visclosky. For 30 boats.
Mr. Douglass. It would have gone up to somewhere between
$63 and $66 billion.
Mr. Visclosky. With the single yard?
Mr. Douglass. No, no, with the competition. There was all
this extra cost at the beginning of the program. We saw no way
of recapturing it back.
Mr. Visclosky. Okay. So the $3 to $6 billion would be the
additional costs because of the partnering, spread over the
course of the 30-boat contract, that additional cost being
attributed to the up-front cost of testing the theory of the
partnering?
Mr. Douglass. Not partnering. That was the extra cost for
competition. Partnering allowed us to reduce the cost not back
to what it would be as a sole-source producer, but
substantially less than what it would be to have two yards
competing with each other, two design teams, two different
learning curves, et cetera.
Mr. Visclosky. Okay. So because of the competition today,
all of the things being equal, the costs for a 30-boat run
would be, ballpark, $63 to $66 billion.
Mr. Douglass. Yes, sir.
Mr. Visclosky. You mentioned savings of $450 to $600
million. Is that because of the partnering, and is that
attributable only to the first four boats or over the 30 boats?
Mr. Douglass. No, that is over just the first four boats,
and it is attributable to teaming and it is a fairly
conservative figure.
UNIT COSTS
Mr. Visclosky. What do you anticipate the unit costs of the
first four boats to be?
Mr. Douglass. I don't have an average figure, but let me
give you a figure that deals with the fifth boat, if I could.
It is pretty close to that. Let me see if I have it here in my
notes somewhere. Because I asked that same question of my staff
early this morning, and I do have it somewhere.
We had a metric that the Congress asked for in a similar
line of questioning that you are putting forward. And they
said: Tell us what you think the fifth boat would be under
these various ways. And if you did it sole source, just one
yard, original plan, back to Electric Boat, that fifth boat was
going to cost about $1.55 billion. Doing it in a competition,
the price of that boat went up to about $1.8 billion. By
teaming, we can get the price back down to $1.65 billion for
that boat.
Mr. Visclosky. Okay.
Mr. Douglass. Those are fairly rough, sir.
CONTRACT STRATEGY
Mr. Visclosky. The next question I have, as I understand
it, the contract for these first four is going to be a
multiyear contract and is not for advanced procurement. These
are actual construction dollars.
Mr. Douglass. Yes, sir, we are asking for authority to
build the first four boats in one contract. I would point out
that some people sort of opened their eyes and said: Oh, this
has never been done before. That is not true. It is done all
the time.
The only thing is we don't usually do it on submarines. We
do it all the time on airplanes. On the B-2 program, we bought
the first six B-2s, which cost almost as much as a submarine,
one big contract, that was a team between Northrop and Boeing
where Northrup was the prime contractor.
I have got other statistics here in my notes about how many
F/A-18s we bought on the first contract, how many various other
kinds of things we normally buy. We just don't normally buy
ships that way. So one of the things we are trying to do----
Mr. Visclosky. Your contract would be cost plus, I
understand?
Mr. Douglass. Yes, sir, like any development contract.
Mr. Visclosky. My recollection, and I don't have any notes
in front of me from two years ago, but that the $1.65 billion
for the fifth ship, I assume today is higher than it was two
years ago?
Mr. Douglass. Well, as I said, two years ago the figure we
had was based on a sole source.
Mr. Visclosky. And then we have the competition and then we
have the savings because--my point on this would be that I
appreciate knowing of any ship contract where the costs came in
under what we thought they were at the beginning of a program.
Mr. Douglass. I could supply that for the record. There are
some, you might be surprised to know that, but there are some.
Mr. Visclosky. My concern, to be honest with you here, is
we are starting a new shipbuilding program on a very
sophisticated piece of equipment, multi-lot contract, cost
plus. And I am very concerned on behalf of the Committee of the
obligation we are going to find ourselves in with the
tremendous pressure you face on your entire shipbuilding
program.
[The information follows:]
From Fiscal Year 1971 through Fiscal Year 1995, 402 ships were
authorized at an original Navy budget request of $173.4 billion. These
ships have been and will be delivered to the Fleet at a final budget
cost projection of $169.5 billion (2.3 percent variance).
The Naval ship acquisition and industrial construction process is
one of the most challenging and successful joint government and
industry endeavors. We have consistently delivered high quality ships
to the fleet within our estimated costs. Competitive forces have
influenced industry prices but in general the final cost outcome has
been predictable. Many hardware components of a ship cost more and take
longer to build than other weapon systems. Subsystem software, testing,
and infrastructure support costs are higher. Long production cycles
require long-range forecasting for productivity, industrial workload,
overhead structure and industrial base. Long production cycles for the
ship platform creates cost risk associated with technology changes and
obsolescence of ship components and weapons systems.
The cost of a ship evolves on a constant basis from the time of
award until its delivery. The change is driven by a wide range of
factors, including engineering changes inserted into the ship design
after award to more effectively respond to desired changes in war
fighting capability, or to implement changes in the desired number of
hulls or ship construction profile, as well as other factors, such as
changes in the inflation rate between contract award and ship
completion. As a result, the initial estimate of ship cost at the
``beginning of a program'' is not a very good metric. Point estimates
of a ship's estimated cost are done two to five years in advance of the
actual construction contract award. These estimates constantly evolve
to account for changes in proposed ship design and market conditions. A
more valuable metric is to examine the variability between Navy ship
cost estimates versus actual construction costs over a long period of
time.
The Navy has done an exceptionally credible job of accurately
estimating the total costs of ship programs over the past 15 years. The
Navy has also institutionalized an aggressive policy of both
controlling costs and improving cost estimating procedures. Based on
these factors, we have high confidence in our ability to accurately
estimate ship construction costs in the Five Year Defense Plan.
INDUSTRIAL BASE CONCERNS
Mr. Douglass. If I might add, there is another factor here
that I think is important for the Congress to take into
consideration. I don't think you were here when I showed the
ship production that our country has proposed for the next 6
years--the lowest levels since the 1970s.
There are six big private yards that can build ships for
our Navy. I cannot keep all of those yards viable with four or
five ships a year. So what we are going to see, unless I am
able to get some legislation through the Congress that will
open up American shipbuilding to the world commercial
shipbuilding market to help us build more ships for our own
domestic and commercial shipbuilding, is some form of collapse
of our shipbuilding industry.
Now, we have to ask ourselves do we, as the greatest
maritime nation in the world, want to sustain this industrial
base? The Navy came up with a sustainment plan, and it was to
build the New Attack Submarine at one builder, and the Congress
said no, no, you are not going to do that, you have to have two
builders.
All I am saying is if we are going to keep two builders in
business, the best way is to have those builders team rather
than through a competitive situation that is much more
expensive than a teaming arrangement. We recognize and agree
with you that there are significant challenges for the long-
term controlling costs on these programs, but I am pretty proud
of our record in recent years in getting costs under control on
all of our programs.
We are paying off a few bills from 4 or 5 years ago on our
Roll-on/Roll-off RO-RO sealift ships, but other than that, all
our airplane, ships, across the board, are not overrunning. The
Navy acquisition team working with our war-fighters has done a
tremendous job.
It is not my job alone. I am just the leader of the 149,600
people in the Navy acquisition commands. But we have done a
tremendous job of holding the line as numbers have gone out of
the building programs, and so on, to keep these programs from
overrunning.
I share your concern, sir, but all I am saying to you is
that I can save between $450 and $600 million on those first
four boats, and also get technology into those boats much
quicker. Because those submarine yards are not going to share
their best technology with each other if ultimately they think
we are going to pull the rug out from under one of them in some
form of competition. Then we have the problem of orphan boats,
what do we do with the loser's boats, the two or four, or
whatever they built during the competition?
Mr. Visclosky. Are you saying those yards collapse because
they don't have the capacity, or don't have the business?
Mr. Douglass. No, we don't have the business for them.
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
MULTIYEAR CONTRACTING
Mr. Young. Mr. Douglass, the questions that Mr. Visclosky
raised on the submarine, I realize that was a tough issue. We
dealt with that last year, if you recall, trying to figure out
how to handle that issue and keep both yards viable, and Mr.
Visclosky asked some important questions relative to the
submarine contract.
I want to come back to the issue of the multiyear contract
for the first four items off of a production line. And you said
that has been done before. I have asked around the table here
with the staff, and nobody remembers when that was done before.
Mr. Douglass. Not on ships has it been done, not that I
know of. It has been done on other complex programs like
airplanes and other projects.
Mr. Young. The first item?
Mr. Douglass. Sure.
Mr. Young. Give us some examples of that, for the record.
Mr. Douglass. I have a list of them here. I just didn't
want to spend too much time on the issue.
Mr. Young. Do that for us, and then go back to the fixed
price versus the cost plus. If the contractors are getting the
advantage of a multiyear contract, why do we also have to give
them a cost-plus contract?
Mr. Douglass. Well, one of the reasons that I think it is
important to not rush too quickly, we are eventually going to
get to fixed-price contracts on these. But again, I am choosing
my words carefully here because I don't want to make anybody
mad.
There has not been consensus in the Congress on this issue.
We have some Members, Mr. Chairman, who really are pushing us
hard to put more technology into those boats, and we have upped
our budget substantially. We have in the neighborhood, in
addition to all the money, which is, as I recall, over $300
million a year now for research on the New Attack Submarine
itself, we have about $100 million per year in the budget for
submarine technology.
Now, we want to take that technology, the results of that,
and insert it into our boats as quickly as we can, to improve
the boats as we go along. And indeed, to further answer the
Congressman, maintaining the submarine base is often thought to
be maintaining the shipyard workers who can build submarines.
That doesn't maintain the industrial base.
You have to keep the engineers who design the submarines
employed, or when it comes time for the next submarine you
don't have anyone who knows how to design a submarine. So we
are getting into an area where we have got to do preplanned
product improvement. So on the one hand, we are being driven
not to go down to one contractor, we are being driven to put as
much technology into the boats as we can and to allocate boats
in certain ways between these two builders. So we found sort of
the middle ground, the best compromise that we have been able
to work out is to get these yards to work together, to share
their good ideas. Now they are willing to open up all their
design secrets to each other and really team.
Now, this is a lifetime team. So people have asked, are you
just going to team on the first boats and have a competition?
No. This is it.
If the Congress gives approval to do this, these two yards
for submarines are teamed for the life of this program. That
means they have to share all their internal production secrets.
We are going to build all the front ends in one place, and all
the back ends in another place for example, so the members of
the team concentrate on their part of the program, so we don't
need two design teams for the back. We get down to one design
team in each place.
In order to do that, we have to give them some reasonable
degree of stability, and that is why I have recommended those
four boats be bought on a block contract buy. But frankly, as a
person who has been in this business for 35 years, I don't see
any difference between building the first four submarines on a
class in this kind of arrangement as in some other big program,
like bombers. I don't remember the number on B-1s. I was around
in those days, but I have forgotten the number.
I think on B-2s, we built the first six on a development
contract. In the FA-18 program, we had 8 or 9 airplanes, all
built on the first contract. These big aircraft programs or
armor contracts are essentially teaming programs. They are not
all built 100 percent at one place. They get together.
In the case of the B-2, the wings are built by Boeing,
Grumman builds the fuselage, somebody else the tail, and so on.
We have got to take that idea, which has been very, very
successful in our aerospace industry and we are still the best
aerospace country in the world. We know how to build the best
airplanes in the world. We need to get that expertise and how
to do those things into our shipbuilding industry.
Unfortunately, I am sad to tell you that our shipbuilding
industry is not the best in the world. They build the best
warships in the world, but, you know, we are losing out on the
commercial market. So somehow we have got to get those modern
construction techniques and modern management techniques into
the shipbuilding business or we are going to wake up some day
and there will be some future Assistant Secretary of the Navy
come before you with a radical idea of building a ship
overseas, instead of here.
All I am telling you is on my watch, Mr. Chairman, if there
is anything I can do, work 24 hours a day, it isn't going to
happen on my watch. I believe at the core of my soul that we
need a maritime industrial base for this country. We are a
great maritime nation. We need to build our warships, including
our submarines, here at home. That is what I am trying to do,
keep this industrial base viable so we can do that.
Mr. Young. I think we can close on that thought, because I
don't think you will find any disagreement from any Member of
this Committee certainly, by any Member of Congress. We agree
we have a great maritime nation and we must maintain our base,
there is no doubt about that, our ability to build our own
ships and submarines.
Thank you very much for an interesting hearing. We will
undoubtedly have additional questions, in fact, we have some,
and ask that you respond in writing along with those that Mr.
Cunningham and Mr. Visclosky asked for.
The Committee will adjourn now until next Tuesday, March
the 11th, when there will be an open hearing at 1:30 p.m., in
2212 Rayburn, on the Fiscal Year 1998 Air Force Budget. The
witnesses will be the Secretary of the Air Force, and the Air
Force Chief of Staff, General Fogleman.
Nothing further, the Committee is adjourned until then.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Livingston and
the answers thereto follow:]
LPD-17 Program
Question. If additional funds were provided in Fiscal Year 1998 by
Congress for the second LPD, would the Navy be able to execute the
program or a contract in FY98 for this ship?
Answer. The Navy would be able to execute the LPD 17 program if
$739.3 million were provided in Fiscal Year 1998 for LPD 18. The
current cost plus award fee contract structure provides for a lead ship
and options for two follow ships with the phased combat system. The
current budget structure provides for only a lead ship and one follow
ship with the phased combat system, before beginning the fixed price
incentive contract for the full combat system with Evolved Sea Sparrow
Missile and Vertical Launch System. Consequently, the existing cost
plus award fee option for the third ship, the first ship at the second
yard, would not be exercised in the budget as now structured.
Accelerating a follow ship into fiscal year 1998 also has a beneficial
effect on the shipbuilding industrial base workload. The estimated cost
of a fiscal year 1998 LPD 17 class ship reflecting option prices from
the Full Service Contract is $739.3 million. A ship added in fiscal
year 1998 would result in a reduction in total Shipbuilding and
Conversion, Navy program costs of approximately $50 million.
Question. In terms of unfunded requirements, is a second LPD ship
of high, medium, or low military utility?
Answer. The LPD 17 class ships have extremely high military value,
because the national strategy of forward presence through naval
expeditionary forces fundamentally depends on amphibious ships. The LPD
17 class is urgently required to accomplish the critical replacement of
the four aging and obsolescent classes in the Fleet that have been
extensively and continually deployed in fulfilling national strategic
objectives. Accordingly, the LPD 17 program will significantly improve
readiness and provide warfighting capability that has extremely high
military value in the national strategy.
LMSR Ship Program
Question. The FY 1998 budget request includes $70 million for
advance procurement of the last Large, Medium Speed, Roll-On/Roll-Off
(LMSR) ship in 1999. If Congress were to accelerate the last LMSR from
FY99 to FY98, what would be the total funding requirement for this
ship?
Answer. The Fiscal Year 1998 President's Budget requests $70
million for Advanced Procurement in Fiscal Year 1998 and $322 million
in fiscal year 1999 for the final ship. In Fiscal Year 1998, $265
million would be required to accelerate the Fiscal Year 1999 ship--this
translates to $92 million in total program savings ($35 million
reprogrammed in Fiscal Year 1997 and $2 million in Fiscal Year 1999).
Question. Would the Navy be able to execute a contract for this
ship in FY1998 if additional funds were provided by Congress?
Answer. If funds in the amount of $265 million above the
President's Budget Request of $812.9 million were provided by Congress
in Fiscal Year 1998, the Navy would be able to execute the contract
option to procure the nineteenth and final Sealift ship. In April, the
Navy ran a limited competition for the last 2 LMSRs. On May 23, 1997,
NASSCO was awarded the third Fiscal Year 1997 ship. An option for the
remaining Fiscal Year 1999 ship was established on the Avondale
contract with an Advanced Procurement option for long lead time
material in Fiscal Year 1998.
Question. What is the Navy's current plans for the award of the
last two LMSRs?
Answer. In April, the Navy ran a limited competition for the last
two LMSRs. On May 23, 1997, NASSCO was awarded the third Fiscal Year
1997 ship. An option for the remaining Fiscal Year 1999 ship was
established on the Avondale contract with an Advanced Procurement
option for long lead time material in Fiscal Year 1998.
Question. What are the Navy's plan for the construction of the
extra LMSR funded in the Fiscal Year 1997 DOD Appropriations bill? When
will an award be made?
Answer. The Navy plans for the construction of the third Fiscal
Year 1997 LMSR to be completed by NASSCO. The award was made May 23,
1997.
Question. If Congress provided additional funding in Fiscal Year
1998, what is a higher priority for the Navy, accelerating the last
LMSR or a second LPD?
Answer. Assuming that the last LMSR remains in Fiscal Year 1999,
the LPD 18 would be a higher priority, since the current program meets
strategic mobility requirements for Fiscal Year 2001.
ADC(X) Ship Program
Question. Last year's budget submission funded the first ship of
the ADC(X) class in Fiscal Year 2000. This year's submission does not
include the ADC(X) in Fiscal Year 2000 or any outyear. Is there still a
requirement for the ADC(X) ship?
Answer. There is still a requirement for ADC(X). While there is no
Fiscal Year 2000 ADC(X) reflected in this year's budget submission, the
Secretary of Defense Guidance directs the Navy to explore Charter and
Build as a procurement alternative for ADC(X).
Question. If so, what is the current time frame for this class of
ships?
Answer. If the Navy is allowed to lease these vessels through a
Charter and Build approach, the current projections for ADC(X) are:
--Contract awards for design & construction commencing in
Fiscal Year 2000.
--Two new ships would commence construction each year through
Fiscal Year 2005.
--Ship deliveries would commence in late Fiscal Year 2003.
--Two ships would deliver each year through Fiscal Year 2008.
ADC(X) Delivery Schedule
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Contact.......................................... 2 2 2 2 2 2 ..... ..... .....
Deliver.......................................... ..... ..... ..... 2 2 2 2 2 2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. How many ships are planned for this class and what is the
current price estimate for one of these ships?
Answer. Ten to twelve ships are currently planned at an estimated
average ship cost between $300 and $400 million.
Question. Describe the current characteristics and capabilities of
this class of ships. How will this ship be classified in terms of
military specifications?
Answer. The purpose of ADC(X) is to replace the current capability
of the T-AE 26, T-AFS 1, T-AFS 8 and AOE 1 Class ships. ADC(X) will
provide logistic lift from sources of supply such as friendly ports, or
at sea from specially equipped Ready Reserve Force merchant ships by
consolidation, and will transfer this cargo (ammunition; food; limited
amounts of petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL); repair parts; and
expendable supplies and material) at sea to station ships and other
ships operating with naval forces. ADC(X) may be required to act in
concert with a T-AO Class ship as an equivalent station ship. The
ADC(X) is intended to operate independently underway, but could be
escorted by Navy combatants when required for protection. The ADC(X)
will be built to commercial standards and will have few, if any,
military specifications.
Question. Is the Navy considering a ``build and charter'' approach
to the ADC(X)? If so, how would it work?
Answer. Yes, the Navy is considering a ``build and charter''
approach. The Navy would sign agreements to charter the vessels with
commercial entities, who would then design and construct the vessels to
meet the Navy's requirements. The Navy would then make lease payments
to the owners upon delivery of the vessels. The Navy's preferred
``build and charter'' approach would be a bareboat charter where the
Navy would lease the asset from a commercial entity and operate it as a
public vessel. Crewing would be provided by the Military Sealift
Command (MSC) with civilian mariners.
Question. Would the Navy contract with an operator as opposed to a
shipyard?
Answer. The contract could be with either an operator or a
shipyard. Charter arrangements are normally made through an owner. This
owner could be an operator, a shipyard, or another type of company with
marine interests.
Question. Does the Navy currently have the authority to proceed
with such a procurement approach? What changes in current law are
required?
Answer. OMB has established guidelines regarding leases of capital
assets. Depending on how OMB evaluates the proposed ADC(X) ``Build and
Charter'' program structure, legislation may be required if the program
is to be executed without the need for upfront Budget Authority and
Appropriations. However, in order to enter into a long-term charter
arrangement, statutory authority would be required. Specifically, the
Navy would need authority to charter vessels for 25 years, allowance
for termination liability to be held in reserve in current Navy O&M
accounts, and view the hire as a cost of the Navy Working Capital Fund.
Question. If Congress did not approve changes in law to allow a
``build and charter'' approach, what are the Navy's back up plans for
acquiring these ships?
Answer. If Congress does not approve any changes that might be
necessary to executive the building and chartering of ADC(X) vessels,
the Navy will have to enter into costly Service Life Extension Programs
for AOE-1s, AEs, and AFSs. If and when Budget Authority and
Appropriations become available, the Navy will replace these aging
vessels with ADC(X) ships.
Question.What is the Navy's current or past experience with ``build
and charter'' arrangements?
Answer. The Navy successfully executed long-term vessel leases in
the 1980s for the MPS and T-5 tanker programs. In addition, MSC
frequently leases vessels on a short term basis for up to five years.
Question. Has the Navy ever compared its financial experience in
the build and charter arrangement for the MPF ships versus the cost of
acquiring and operating these ships by the government? If so, what does
this comparison show?
Answer. Such an analysis was conducted prior to the procurement of
the MPF ships. A similar financial analysis based on OMB guidelines is
being conducted for the ADC(X) vessels.
LCAC Service Life Extension Program
Question. The Committee understands that a ``basic'' SLEP phase to
extend the service life of LCACs to 30 years and bring the craft up to
a common configuration will be ready for implementation in 1998.
However, this transition to production has not been programmed to start
until 2000. If so this is a departure from the LCAC SLEP plan the Navy
submitted to Congress in 1996. Why has the Navy elected not to start
the ``basic'' SLEP effort in fiscal year 1998?
Answer. On October 7, 1996, the Secretary of the Navy informed the
Honorable Bob Livingston, of the House of Representatives, that funding
limitations precluded commencement of the SLEP program in fiscal year
1998 and fiscal year 1999, and that Navy requirements could be
satisfied by commencing the program in fiscal year 2000.
Question. If Congress were to provide the additional funds for this
effort, what would be required to restore this program to the original
schedule so that it can begin in FY 1998?
Answer. The funding profile required would be ($M): fiscal year
1998, $24.1; fiscal year 1999, $24.7; Total, $48.8.
These amounts include the required integrated logistics, interim
support of equipment, technical trainer upgrades, government furnished
equipment in support of SLEP, and Department of the Navy engineering
services support in areas of testing, configuration management,
technical support and craft scheduling and transportation.
CVN-77 Aircraft Carrier
Question. It has been reported that changes in the method of
construction of the CVN 77 could reduce the cost of this ship by as
much as $600 million. What changes have the potential to reduce
acquisition costs of one ship by this amount?
Answer. Newport News Shipbuilding (NNS) has proposed a ``Smart
Buy'' approach for CVN 77 that would optimize the aircraft carrier
industrial base and improve CVN 77 affordability. NNS proposes to
accelerate the purchase of selected components and materials, detailed
design work, and construction of low risk hull sections/modules on CVN
77. These efforts would begin in Fiscal Year 1998 instead of Fiscal
Year 2002. The ship delivery date will be remain in Fiscal Year 2008.
NNS claims its ``Smart Buy'' proposal will generate potential savings
to the total ship cost of $600 million.
More specifically, the NNS ``Smart Buy'' proposal would generate
savings from three main areas:
1. Early Construction of Low Risk Hull Sections/Modules: NNS
asserts that $300 million can be saved by starting the
construction of selected low risk hull sections/modules in
Fiscal Year 1999. This would maintain critical structural
trades (welders and shipfitters) across the dip in the manning
curve at NNS and would preclude it from having to incur costs
associated with the layoff, and subsequent rehiring and
retraining of workers between CVN 76 and CVN 77.
2. Increase Advance Procurement Funding: NNS states that $150
million in savings can be obtained by purchasing additional
long lead time material and equipment starting Fiscal Year
1998, to take advantage of current contracts for CVNs 75 and
76. This would allow critical subcontractors to maintain their
production lines and keep costs down. This would be in addition
to the advance procurement of nuclear components currently
programmed in Fiscal Year 2000.
3. Escalation Savings. NNS estimates substantial escalation
savings (approximately $150 million) could be realized under
its ``Smart Buy'' proposal.
The Department of the Navy has reviewed the NNS ``Smart Buy''
proposal (which includes a $17 million RDT&E plus-up and a $345 million
SCN plus-up in Fiscal Year 1998) to determine if it is feasible and
would generate the proposed costs savings. The Navy believes the
proposal is feasible and has merit, however, cost estimators from Naval
Sea Systems Command, RAND and the Office of the Secretary of Defense/
Cost Analysis Improvement Group (OSD/CAIG) have reviewed the estimates
and the consensus is that the savings would be closer to $400 million.
Early construction/workforce savings are expected to be $220 million,
the advanced procurement savings $120 million, and escalation savings
$60 million.
Additionally, RAND has studied the cost impacts of accelerating or
delaying the start of construction of CVN 77 and various build periods
as part of its overall aircraft carrier industrial base study. They
concluded that significant savings, on the order which NNS asserts, can
be generated by starting construction of CVN 77 in Fiscal Year 2000
while holding the delivery date of the ship in Fiscal Year 2008.
Shipbuilding Industrial Base
Question. What is the Navy's assessment of the financial health of
the shipbuilding industrial base?
Answer. The major shipyards which build new Navy ships are healthy
enough today to compete for and win major U.S. Navy shipbuilding
contracts. The Navy conducts periodic reviews of the financial health
of individual shipbuilding companies and also conducts more detailed
reviews when a major shipbuilding contract is pending. Awards are not
made to financially troubled shipyards, if the Navy determines that
they lack the financial resources to complete the contract under
consideration. An assessment of the financial health of the industry
over future years will be part of the ongoing joint Department of
Defense and Navy Shipbuilding Industrial Base Study.
Question. What steps could be taken by the Navy to improve this
health?
Answer. All of the shipyards which conduct the bulk of their
business with the Navy are facing downturns, or, at best, no growth in
future Navy business prospects, as the last of the ships ordered in the
waning days of the Cold War are completed. This has prompted the Navy
to emphasize the potential for growth in the industry through expanded
commercial and foreign military sales. As a result of a significant
amount of work by the Congress and the Maritime Administration over the
past several years, some new commercial work has begun in shipyards
that had not recently built for the international commercial market. In
addition, American shipyards are bidding on, and winning, international
combatant shipbuilding contracts. While entering these new, highly
competitive markets may place some shipyards under short term financial
stress, the long term benefits of increased market access, increased
diversification, and improved competitive pressures may help the long
term financial health of the individual companies involved in these
projects.
In order to assess how the Department of Defense should address
these and related issues in the industry, The Office of the Secretary
of Defense and the Navy are conducting a joint study of the
shipbuilding industry. This study is a follow-on to the work done
during the Quadrennial Defense Review. One portion of this study will
include an assessment of the financial health of the industry. A
strength of this study is the emphasis on early information input by
U.S. shipyards. This should increase the veracity of the results within
the Department of Defense, with the Congress, and, most importantly,
within the American shipbuilding industry.
Question. What is the Navy's current position on the NDF (National
Defense Features) program as one method of maintaining the industrial
base?
Answer. The Navy supports a National Defense Features (NDF) program
to provide an active complement to the successful inactive Ready
Reserve Force (RRF) in time of mobilization. The follow-on surge
sealift mission is accomplished today through ships in the RRF.
Currently, a shortfall exists and is projected to continue through
fiscal year 2001. NDF ships could be used to augment the RRF and
possibly replace aging RRF assets in a more cost effective manner,
thereby transitioning some RRF capacity to an active status. Congress
provided $50 million of fiscal year 1996 funs for the National Defense
Features program. The Navy has requested proposals and is currently
evaluating them in anticipation of a late September 1997 contract
award. Depending on the lessons learned from this effort, follow-on
solicitations may be issued, if future funding is identified.
Deep Ocean Relocation
Question. Why is the Deep Ocean a viable candidate for relocation
of contaminated harbor and coastal sediments?
Answer. The potential benefits of deep ocean disposal has been
under discussion for over twenty years. Marine sediments are uniquely
qualified for ocean disposal. By law, and for scientific reasons, they
may be the only waste stream that should merit such consideration. The
principal contaminants in marine sediments are likely to remain bound
to the sediments as long as they remain in the marine environment. The
deep ocean, in particular, offers the potential for long term, reliable
isolation of relocated sediments. The deep ocean is a relatively benign
environment, characterized by low currents, relatively few living
organisms, is geologically stable, and not susceptible to inadvertent
human intervention.
Left in place, or disposed of in shallow water, which is the
current accepted practice in harbors such as New York, Boston, San
Francisco and other locations, contaminated sediments are currently
subject to resuspension by natural disturbance and can propagate
through the environment and potentially into the food web.
Relocation to the deep ocean can provide a long term dredged
disposal solution, however, the environmental benefits as well as the
economic viability must be rigorously demonstrated.
Question. Does the Navy have a role in solving the problem and, if
so, why?
Answer. Contaminated sediments are both a national and
international problem. Long term solution of the problem must answer
scientific, engineering, and regulatory questions that affect world-
wide commercial and naval operations. Like the Navy's contribution in
the TWA recovery process, there is no single agency with a broad enough
scope to address the complete problem. However, we believe the Navy
with its deep ocean technical and operational experience, can
contribute to assembling a government/industry team capable of
grappling with the total problem and prototyping potential solutions.
We believe our experience in demonstrating and validating complex
military systems can be applied to rigorously quantifying the costs,
risk, and benefits of deep ocean relocation of marine sediments.
Finally, we also believe that solving the international problem of
contaminated sediments, especially as it relates to international fresh
food and water supplies, falls within the context of preventative
defense and creative, confidence building international diplomacy in
terms of working with our allies to enhance our peace-strengthening
capabilities through increased attention to our common natural
environment in the Post Cold War World.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr.
Livingston. Questions submitted by Mr. Lewis and the answers
thereto follow:]
F/A-18 E/F Aircraft
Question. Secretary Douglass, I can't help but notice with
admiration that the F/A-18E/F program has been a stellar performer in
that it has been on schedule, under cost and under weight throughout
its development. What are your thoughts relating to the consideration
of a multi-year procurement of the F/A-18E/F?
Answer. I have tasked the F/A-18E/F program office and the Hornet
Industry Team to investigate the implementation of a multi-year
contracting approach for procurement of the F/A-18E/F as early as full
rate production. Once this Government-Industry team is able to assess
appropriate timing, resources required, strategy, and commensurate
savings, Department of Defense and the Navy will consider a prudent
application of a multi-year approach, given that the F/A-18E/F weapon
system design is sufficiently mature and stable, and there are
sufficient cost savings to be garnered.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Lewis.
Questions submitted by Mr. Nethercutt and the answers thereto
follow:]
EA-6B Prowler Aircraft
Question. This year the EA-6B will assume its role as the primary
radar jamming aircraft in the Department of Defense. Last year, the
Navy named EA-6B modernization as a priority unfunded item, and
Congress added over $100 million for this purpose. I am disappointed to
see, then, that the Navy's request for EA-6B modifications has slipped
back to about $87 million. What modifications are funded in the budget,
and what additional modifications would you like to fund this year to
ensure that the EA-6B can adequately protect our nation's aviators?
Answer. The President's Budget reflects EA-6B modernization with
$32 million for upgrading eight Block 89 aircraft to the Block 89A
configuration. Over the course of the Future Years Defense Plan, all
EA-6B aircraft will be upgraded to the Block 89A configuration. $5
million is planned for completion of the three year long safety of
flight upgrade by finishing installation of the Electronic Flight
Instrumentation System (EFIS). $33 million is planned for procurement
of 103 Universal Exciter Upgrades, and $16 million for reliability
improvements to the jammer hard back. The remainder of the Fiscal Year
1998 funding request is for miscellaneous improvements to support
equipment.
Additional modernization upgrades not funded or fully funded
include: Polarization fix to transmitters, Universal exciter upgrade,
USO-113 communications jammer, Center Wing Sections, Overhead
connectivity, and J52P408A engine blade containment efforts.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr.
Nethercutt. Questions submitted by Mr. Cunningham and the
answers thereto follow:]
F/A-18 E/F Program
Question. What will be the total RDT&E costs associated with the F/
A-18E/F program?
Answer. The following table presented in million of dollars,
illustrates the F/A-18E/F program's total RDT&E cost as reflected in
the Fiscal Year 1998/1999 President's Budget request:
[In fiscal years]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1992-1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3,836........................................... 803 343 268 129 61 55 6 6 5,507
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The above total cost is lower than the original program's total
RDT&E estimate.
Question. As you know, I have always been concerned with our
ability to give our warfighters the air assets that they need. One of
the toughest decisions that we will have to make over the next few
years is how to most efficiently plan and fund the F/A-18E/F program
and the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program. You currently plan to buy a
total of 1000 Super Hornets for the Navy and the Marine Corps. When
considering this program, has the Navy discussed or investigated the
possibility of a multi-year procurement arrangement as a cost saving/
efficiency measure?
Answer. Yes, the Navy is investigating the application of a multi-
year procurement strategy for the F/A-18E/F as early as full rate
production. The F/A-18 program office has teamed with the Hornet
Industry Team to develop a proposed multiyear approach which addresses
appropriate timing, resources required, strategy, and commensurate
savings. Upon completion of this study this effort, the Department of
Defense and the Navy will consider a prudent application of a multiyear
approach, given that the F/A-18E/F weapon system design is sufficiently
mature and stable, and there are sufficient cost savings to be
garnered.
(Point of clarification: Current plans do not include procurement
of F/A-18E/F aircraft for the Marine Corps. The current inventory
requirement for the F/A-18E/F is a total quantity of 1000 for the Navy
only, to replace the F/A-18C/Ds, F-14, and A-6E.)
The Navy is investigating the feasibility of a multi-year
procurement for the F/A-18E/F aircraft, and the potential benefits in
cost and efficiency a properly funded and administered multi-year
procurement could yield. Based on the F/A-18E/F's demonstrated
performance, technical maturity, success in flight test and significant
test hours accumulated to date, as well as the program's unprecedented
success acquisition arena, this multi-year procurement could reasonably
be initiated as early as the first lot of full rate production in
Fiscal Year 2000. In addition to the potential cost avoidance through
the term of a multi-year procurement, this could also favorably impact
the industrial base. The relative stability afforded by a multi-year
procurement allows our prime contractors (McDonnell Douglas in St.
Louis, MO, and General Electric in Lynn, MA) to enter into long term
agreements with suppliers which incentivize investment in process
improvements and workforce training, yielding long term benefit in
terms of product quality, cost, and improved competition.
The Navy has been working with its industry partners, as well as
the Department of Defense, to formulate a budget which reflects
procurement of the first five lots of full rate production (222
aircraft) into a multi-year, fixed price incentive fee contract. This
proposal will be forwarded to the Department of Defense for final
review and endorsement.
Advanced Self-Protection Jammer
Question. Last year the Congress added $50 million for Advanced
Self-Protection Jammer (ASPJ) procurement to support pilots flying in
contingency operations such as Bosnia. I am told that the responses
coming back on this technology from the operators in the field is
excellent. I also understand that, with the limited number of these
systems currently in the fleet, our operators are forced into a ``hand-
to-mouth'' situation. Are you satisfied with this type of operation
with respect to such a promising pilot survivability asset; and would
you support additional funding to buy more ASPJ systems?
Answer. The ``hand-to-mouth'' situation, called crossdecking,
always provides challenges and are a typical event in on station
reliefs (at sea or ashore); ASPJ certainly is not the only system the
Navy currently has to crossdeck. The Navy believes that the current
number of systems (to include Fiscal Year 1997 plus-up systems) are
sufficient given present deployment schedules and projections in
support of contingency operations.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr.
Cunningham. Questions submitted by Mr. Hefner and the answers
thereto follow:]
P-3C Aircraft Update III
Question. Secretary Douglass, there has been much discussion about
the benefits of COTS and NDI equipment. It is clear that more and more
benefits are being derived by all the services through the use of these
commercial systems instead of using the old mil-specs for everything.
Just the other day I learned of one instance where two companies
independently developed a COTS NDI acoustic system which can be used
for the P-3 upgrade. This product known as the ``rainbow system'' is
currently being flight tested and I understand the results have been
very impressive. Additionally the procurement cost and support cost are
significantly less than mil-spec equipment. Mr. Secretary, the Navy
should be commended for taking advantage of these opportunities when
industry provides them. Would you let me know how the Navy plans to
take advantage of this opportunity?
Answer. The Navy plans to provide industry the chance to compete
for an upgrade to a portion of the P-3C Update III common
configuration. We anticipate receiving responsive proposals using
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS ) or non-developmental item (NDI)
hardware.
The Navy has 140 P-3C in the Update III configuration. The current
Update III procurement performs a Block Modification to 25 additional
P-3C. The Navy intends to maintain a common configuration for the P-3C
Update III. If a strategy other than maintaining the common
configuration is pursued, new trainers and support infrastructure will
be required, the Tactical Mission Software will have to be modified,
and a separate software version will have to be supported.
The Navy does continue to upgrade the common Update III
configuration to account for out-of-production equipment. For these 25
aircraft, because the AN/UYS-1 Acoustic Processor is out of production,
the functionality of the AN/UYS-1 will be embedded within the AN/USQ-
78A acoustic Display and Control System using COTS or NDI hardware. The
Navy's acquisition strategy is to have a competition conducted at the
subcontractor level to embed the UYS-1 capability into the USQ-78A.
The Navy intends to contract with Lockheed Martin Tactical Defense
Systems (LMTDS) on a sole-source basis for the P-3C Update III upgrade
kit. LMTDS will be responsible for delivering a fully integrated
system. The Navy is awarding a sole-source contract to LMTDS for the P-
3C Update III upgrade kits because Lockheed Martin is the designer,
developer, and sole manufacturer of more than 65% of the total avionics
suite to be installed. LMTDS is the only source with the technical
capability, specialized expertise, experience, and technical data
necessary to perform the required effort, and maintain a common
configuration.
LMTDS will subcontract to Lockheed Martin Federal Systems (LMFS)
Manassas, the designer, developer, and sole manufacturer of the AN/USQ-
78A acoustic Display and Control System, to be the acoustic systems
integrator. LMFS will conduct a competition to incorporate the
functionality of the AN/UYS-1 in the AN/USQ-78. No Lockheed Martin
division will be allowed to compete for this upgrade. An Integrated
Product Team has been designated, with Government participation, to
oversee the competition.
Because a validated technical data package does not yet exist for
the AN/USQ-78A, a competition conducted by the Navy would put the
Government at schedule and performance risk. The Navy would have to
provide the newly competed system as Government Furnished Equipment to
LMTDS, placing system integration responsibility on the Government
without validated technical data. In addition, achieving a common
configuration would be jeopardized.
At the request of industry, the fleet Patrol Wings allowed multiple
contractors the opportunity to prototype their engineering design
models on P-3Cs for contractor conceptual demonstrations, to include
Lucent Technologies' Rainbow system. Data obtained during these
demonstrations were for the contractors' systems development purposes
only and were not reviewed by Navy procurement and acquisition
personnel due to the planned subcontractor competition. To preserve the
integrity of the contractor's acoustic processor competition, the
potentially competitive systems were not evaluated by Program Office
personnel.
The Navy's acquisition strategy reduces the integration risk
associated with this P-3C Update III upgrade to the lowest level
achievable. With this acquisition strategy, the Navy is likely to
obtain the benefits of COTS/NDI while competing that portion of the
effort that can be competed.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Hefner.
Questions submitted by Mr. Visclosky and the answers thereto
follow:]
Advanced Self Protection Jammer
Question. Are you pleased with ASPJ performance while it was
installed on F/A-18C/D and F-14D fleet aircraft flying in Bosnia and
the Persian Gulf?
Answer. Yes, While no operational data is available regarding
aircraft ``saved'' with ASPJ installed, operational evaluation testing
indicates that ASPJ provides a very robust response to a particular
threat weapon system of interest. Modifications to the ASPJ rack have
proven successful. Built In Test (BIT) problems have not been mentioned
by forward deployed squadrons. To further research this area, the
COMOPTEVFOR/DOT&E approved method for BIT reliability data collection
is being utilized by ASPJ equipped squadrons in a carrier airwing
currently on deployment.
Question. Last year the Congress added $50 million for ASPJ
procurement to support contingency requirements. It looks like that is
still not enough to cover potential hostile areas. Do you have enough
ASPJ systems to adequately protect aircraft that are currently flying
in Bosnia, the Persian Gulf and other potential hot spots?
Answer. The Fiscal Year 1997 plus-up money will yield an additional
36 systems, to include spares. This will provide a sufficient number of
assets for current deployment schedules in support of contingency
operations (Bosnia and South West Asia). The final delivery for this
buy is predicted to be complete in November 1999.
Question. We understand that with the limited number of ASPJ
systems currently in the fleet you are forced into a cross-decking
situation on a hand-to-mouth basis. Are you satisfied with this type of
operation?
Answer. While not optimal, cross decking operations are a fact of
life in a fiscally constrained environment. The number of ASPJ units
available after this year should ensure the Navy retains a robust
capability to both train and fight (if necessary) in all of our routine
environs.
Question. Would you desire for the Congress to add funding to the
budget to buy more ASPJ systems?
Answer. The Navy believes that the current number of systems (to
include Fiscal Year 1997 plus-up systems) is sufficient until IDECM
Radio Frequency Countermeasures (RFCM) sub-system reaches initial
operational capability in 2002.
Question. We understand that IDECM could be an alternative system
for the F/A-18C/D but, with initial deliveries of IDECM systems
scheduled for 2002, they won't be ready for retrofit on the F/A-18C/D
for another 6-8 years. Are you comfortable with the current F/A-18C/D
protection for several more years?
Answer. As stated above, after the Fiscal Year 1997 plus-up systems
have been fielded, a sufficient amount of ASPJ equipped aircraft would
be realized for contingency operations for this interim period. The
February 14, 1997 report to Congress cites possible candidates for
radio frequency self-protection systems for the F/A-18C/D, to include:
ASPJ
Portion of IDECM (internal IDECM RFCM components
without a towed decoy)
ALQ-126B upgrade
The only cost and operationally suitable options are ASPJ or a
portion of IDECM RFCM (minus towed decoy) mounted internally in the F/
A-18C/D. A decision will be made in FY99 regarding what path will be
taken. This decision will coincide with the IDECM LRIP decision.
Question. We understand that it may not be possible to install a
towed decoy on the F/A-18C/D. If you wait several years for IDECM for
the F/A-18C/D and the IDECM towed decoy is not installed, how will
IDECM performance compare with today's ASPJ performance?
Answer. Performance for the two systems, ASPJ or IDECM (without the
towed decoy), is comparable. There are obvious long-term logistic
benefits (fleet commonality) to a solution involving a portion of the
IDECM system.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr.
Visclosky. Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the answers
thereto follow:]
CINC Priorities
Question. Mr. Douglass, your statement says that the programs in
your budget ``reflect the priorities established by the warfighters--
the theater Commanders-in-Chief.'' Your budget proposes a 12 ship DDG-
51 multiyear contract. However, not a single ship will be delivered to
the fleet with anti-ship missile defense nor theater ballistic missile
defense capabilities installed. Is this what theater CINCs want?
Answer. ------. The option that provides the Navy the most rapid
deployment of these capabilities is via backfit. Under the current Navy
plan the first ships to receive Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defense
capability, other than the User Operational Evaluation System (UOES)
demonstration ships will be two Aegis cruisers in FY 00. Additional
cruisers will be backfit in FY 02 and FY 03. The first DDG-51 class
destroyer will be backfit in FY 03 with additional ships scheduled in
FY 04 and out. By the Secretary of the Navy and Chief Naval Operations
direction, Navy is reviewing acceleration options that could nearly
double the number of ships provided both Area TBMD and CEC capabilities
(from 15 to 28) by FY 03.
Navy considerations associated with balancing Ship Construction,
Navy funds for the entire Department and executing a fully funded DDG-
51 class ship procurement plan moved the introduction of Cooperative
Engagement Capability (CEC), and Theater Ballistic Missile Defense
(TBMD) capability in a forward fit configuration, out of the FY 98-FY
01 DDG 51 Multi-Year Procurement (MYP).
These 12 ships will be built with the combat systems and computer
software configuration base to allow rapid introduction of these
capabilities as funds become available for procurement and installation
of CEC and TBMD. The 12 ships in the DDG 51 Multi-Year Procurement will
have the greatest capability of any ships built to date, with respect
to individual anti-ship cruise missile defense. CEC, is a synergistic
enhancement to total Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) or Amphibious
Readiness Group (ARG) self defense, including those ships, in company
with Aegis ships, whose self defense systems are not as advanced. In
this manner CEC leverages the superior defense capability of Aegis
ships enhancing the entire battlegroup's defense, CEC, will also
enhance TBMD for ships operating in a group as a means for advanced
cueing.
Question. Cooperative engagement is essential to fleet situational
awareness and coordination, ship self-defense, and ballistic missile
defense. Former Secretary Perry called it ``the most significant
technological development since stealth.'' Your budget proposes to
funds for cooperative engagement installations in 1998 although the
system achieved IOC in 1996. Is this what the theater CINCs want?
Answer. CEC was designed to counter the threat posed by
increasingly capable cruise missiles and aircraft and provide greater
C4I at the tactical level through the provision of a coherent tactical
picture. ------. By FY 1999, there will be two CEC-equipped
Battlegroups in the Fleet and CEC will be installed on an additional
three Battlegroups in FY 2000. By FY03, the CEC inventory is projected
to reach 60 units.
Question. Your budget proposes to perform a nuclear refueling
overhaul on the U.S.S. Nimitz aircraft carrier. Yet the ship would be
delivered back to the fleet without: cooperative engagement, integrated
self-defense (SSDS), the advanced combat direction system, the rolling
airframe missile, the SPQ-9 navigation radar, a common high-band data
link, the battlegroup passive horizon extension system, an outboard
weapons elevator, conversion of nuclear magazines, emergency ordnance
handling, and improved propellers. Is this what the theater CINC's
want?
Answer. Navy's plan supports the currently established CINC
priorities. The following installations are currently planned for
accomplishment during the Refueling Complex Overhaul (RCOH):
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC)
Advanced Combat Direction System (ACDS)-reduced scope
Nuclear magazine conversions
Emergency Ordnance Handling-increment 1
The Outboard Weapons Elevator Engineering Change Proposal is
currently under review for potential inclusion in the RCOH. The RCOH
drydock work includes refurbishment and modifications to the ship's
existing propellers.
Following the RCOH, U.S.S. Nimitz will undergo a Post Shakedown
Availability/Selected Restricted Availability (PSA/SRA), as is typical
after an overhaul of such scope. The Navy is planning the following
installations as a part of the PSA/SRA:
Ship Self Defense System (SSDS)
Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM)
SPQ-9B navigational/fire control radar
Common High Band Data Link (CHBDL)
Battle Group Passive Horizon Extension System (BGPHES)
Upon completion of the RCOH and the PSA/SRA, U.S.S. Nimitz will
rejoin the Fleet as a modernized, recapitalized, fully capable asset
prior to her first post-RCOH deployment.
Question. Your budget proposes no funds for installation of ship
self-defense systems in 1998 that are vital for a lone ship to defend
itself from cruise missile attack. In the outyear plan, only 8 ships
are now going to get the equipment rather than 15 planned just last
year, and apparently the whole class of LHA ships to support Marine
Corps combat operations is simply gone. Is this what the theater CINCs
want?
Answer. In the case of SSDS this slipped the procurement and
installation of 1 LSD, 1 LHD and 2 shore based sets. We have
satisfactorily rescheduled those ships for installation during follow-
on availability's. In the interim those ships will be protected by the
baseline self defense systems now installed. LHAs are not currently
included in the program due to affordability issues and projected
service life. The theater CINCs fully support SSDS as a program and
would like to have this capability in the fleet as soon as possible.
Question. Our nation has already built missiles that are
essentially invisible to radars. It is only a matter of time until
other nations field advanced stealthy anti-ship missiles, and the Navy
knows it. Once a ship's radar detection becomes limited, infrared
detection becomes essential. The budget proposes no funds for
development or production of infrared (heat-sensing) sensors for Navy
ships. Is this what the theater CINCs want?
Answer. Higher program priorities in the Fiscal Year 1998 budget
submission necessitated a reduction in development funding for Infrared
Search and Track (IRST) Sensor. There is sufficient funding in place to
complete landbased prototype testing. Based on that test data,
consideration will be given to fully fund this program within fiscal
limits and against other program priorities. Theater CINCs recognize
that IRST has the potential to add capability to ship self defense but
also await test data before providing the appropriate level of support
relative to other requirements.
Question. The budget proposes insufficient funds for both the near-
term (Lower Tier) and far term (Upper Tier) theater ballistic missile
defense, and the Navy is not planning to meet any Congressional
fielding deadlines for these systems. Is this what theater CINCs want?
Answer. The Navy is very serious about developing and delivering a
sea-based theater ballistic missile defense capability to the Fleet as
soon as possible. Navy has incurred difficulties in achieving
Congressional fielding deadlines for these systems due to several
factors: the amount of time required to initiate the programs; delays
experienced in executing the Congressionally directed plus-ups; and, in
the case of Navy Theater Wide, the process leading to a program
decision from DoD. However, the Navy has made significant progress over
the past year toward delivery of an initial capability to the theater
CINC. On 24 January 1997 at the White Sands Missile Range, the Navy
conducted the first ever intercept of a TBM target with a modified SM-2
Block IV missile. Subsequently, at a Milestone II DAB on 22 February
1997, OSD approved the Navy AREA TBMD program to proceed to
Engineering, Manufacturing and Development. I have approved a plan to
designate two ships (U.S.S. Lake Erie and U.S.S. Port Royal) to serve
as focal points for TBMD system testing and evaluation, much like the
approach used to achieve early evaluation of CEC in U.S.S. Eisenhower
Battle Group, Designated by the codename ``LINEBACKER,'' (in lieu of
the term User Operational Evaluation System (UOES)) these two ships
will lead the Navy in TBMD development. They will receive the first
TBMD equipment and software modifications in Fiscal Year 1998 and begin
serving as the Navy's spearhead for both testing and tactics
development. The sailors of these two ships will provide early feedback
to the technical and tactical communities which can influence the
system design and TBMD doctrine development. Most importantly, as we
begin to deliver BLK IVA EMD missiles in fiscal year 1999, these ships
will provide the theater CINC a contingency capability in the event of
a crisis involving the threat of TBMs. We have also made some recent
progress in the Navy Theater Wide program. Our work with BMDO and OSD
over the past year has been structured to demonstrate the affordability
of our evolutionary strategy and credibility of the Navy Theater Wide
capability in order to ensure appropriate funding and priority within
the DoD Ballistic Missile Defense family of systems architecture. This
past December Dr. Kaminski designated NTW as a core BMDO program and,
in support, in January 1997 Navy added over $200 million to the Navy
Theater Wide program across the Future Years Defense Plan. Finally, to
further ensure our resources are appropriately focused, in October
1996, the Secretary of the Navy and I directed our staff conduct a
comprehensive review of Navy TBMD programs and report back with a plan
that could accelerate delivery of this capability to the Fleet. The
review is nearing completion and we will be briefed on the results. All
of these actions confirm Navy's commitment to deliver this capability
to the theater CINC as early as possible.
Question. The budget proposes no funds for production of an
improved CIWS gun (called CIWS surface mode) that allows Navy ships to
see and hit terrorist patrol boasts such as the Iranian boghammers. The
Navy's budget plan leaves LHA, LHD, FFG-7, and LSD ships unprotected.
Is this what theater CINCs want?
Answer. These ships are not unprotected. Deployers to contested or
high threat areas are routinely outfitted with 25mm chain guns.
Additionally each have 50 caliber machine gun self defense emplacements
coupled with support from other smaller caliber weapons. Additionally,
FFG 7 class has a MK 75 76mm gun and standard missile with excellent
anti-surface capabilities. All the above mentioned ships have the
flexibility to carry armed helicopters equipped with either missile
pods or automatic guns. The CIWS surface mode can provide the
capability to detect and engage terrorist patrol boats as well as
hostile attack Helos. The Navy will complete operational testing of the
system later this year and receive fleet comments before we commit to
full scale production. The fleet CINCs are very supportive of the CIWS
surface mode for ships that do not have a major caliber gun.
Question. The first new strategic sealift ship is underway, but it
has no support equipment (lighterage) for the Army to unload it during
combat operations. If no port was available, a theater CINC would have
to take support away from the Marines and give it to the Army--which of
course jeopardizes the Marine's mission. Is this what the theater CINCs
want?
Answer. The situation today is no different than it has been since
deployment of the afloat prepositioned Army War Reserve (AWR-3) package
in 1993. If no port is available, the Army must use the modular
causeway sections (MCS) onboard T-ACS GOPHER STATE and the watercraft
onboard AMERICAN CORMORANT that are part of the AWR-3 package
prepositioned in Diego Garcia to offload the ships. The Army intends to
augment this capability in Fiscal Year 1998 with an additional heavy
lift prepositioning ship, the STRONG VIRGINIAN. If additional
lighterage is required, the CINC must choose whether or not to use
lighterage from ships of the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) to
assist in the offload of these ships.
Question. In your budget, the V-22 has a 25 year production profile
which the Commandant thinks will cost $8-11 billion more than an
economic production program. Is this what the theater CINCs want?
Answer. The new production run is 24 years (based on the
President's Fiscal Year 1998 budget). With our revised economic
assumptions, we estimate that it will cost approximately $1 billion
less than the 25 year production profile.
Two of three CINCs responding (IPL List) requested that the V-22
procurement be increased over the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB)
profile. The Department in the President's fiscal year 1998 budget
increased the procurement rate over the DAB profile by 14 aircraft in
the FYDP to 24 MV-22 inn fiscal year 2003.
The Department would defer to the theater CINCs for further
comments.
Question. In your budget, funding for basic research and RDT&E
management support are increased $87 million above last year's level.
Is this what theater CINCs want?
Answer. Basic Research was appropriated last year at $352 million
(after Congressional undistributed reductions). This year's budget
request is for $382 million or $30 million more than last year.
However, the Department originally requested $35 million more last year
than was appropriated. Congress cut $20 million specifically against
Basic Research and levied another $15 million in general undistributed
reductions. These FY 1997 reductions give the false appearance of a $30
million ``increase'' over last year, when in fact, the Department's
requirements for Basic Research have basically not changed.
RDT&E Management Support was appropriated last year at $540
million. This year's budget request is for $595 million or $40 million
more than last year. In these programs, a major change in funding Test
and Evaluation programs resulted in about $5 million of the increase
(funds were transferred into a centrally managed program from other
customers in RDT&E) and $15 million was added for development of the F-
4 aircraft into targets to support test and evaluation of major
aircraft and weapons systems. However, part of this ``increase'' is
actually a reduction in FY 1997 of $22 million for specific and
undistributed Congressional reductions. Taken from this perspective,
only $15 million of the noted ``increase'' is growth and that supports
other major aircraft and weapon system.
In addition to their fundamental support of the President's Budget,
the Fleet CINCs are direct and significant players in the Navy R&D
requirements process. They develop a set of Command Technology Issues
(CTIs), which are submitted for inclusion in the Navy Science and
Technology Requirements Guidance. Coupled with Fleet representation at
every Science and Technology (S&T) Round Table and Working Group
meeting, the Fleet has multiple direct channels to request and
influence S&T support. The RDT&E management investment supports the
above activities; the 6.1 Basic Research investment is designed to
provide the scientific basis and enabling technologies to address these
issues and other Navy needs.
Question. In your budget, the Navy has deferred outyear funds for
the LCAC (Landing Craft Air Cushion) service life extension, yet the
Marines are looking for LCACs to perform more missions such as
transportation of fuel to ground combat vehicles and mine clearing. Is
that what the theater CINCs want?
Answer. Navy requirements support commencing the LCAC SLEP program
in fiscal year 2000 in consonance with fleet concerns. An affordable
LCAC SLEP program that meets CINC requirements is under review. We are
actively engaged with the CinCs to identify evolving roles and missions
for LCAC, of which fuel delivery and mine clearing are two.
Question. In your budget, funding for Advanced Technology
Transition--``demonstration projects''--is increased $18 million. Is
this what theater CINCs want? Name which CINC has included Advanced
Technology Transition as a program on his integrated priority list, and
how it ranks in terms of his priorities.
Answer. Advanced Technology Transition was appropriated last year
at $69 million (after Congressional undistributed reductions and plus
up for SLICE project). This year's budget request is for $87 million or
$18 million more than last year. However, the Department originally
requested $37.4 million more last year than was appropriated. Congress
cut $34.4 million specifically against Advanced Technology Transition
program and levied another $3 million in general undistributed
reductions. These FY 1997 reductions give the false appearance of a $18
million ``increase'' over last year, when, in fact, the Department's
requirements have declined.
Yes, without question. Although the CINCs' Integrated Priority
Lists are expressed in terms of capabilities rather than specific
programs, the Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD) Program responds
directly to those needed capabilities and ranks first in terms of CINC
S&T priorities and interests. The Fleet CINCs are an integral part of
the annual ATD proposal and evaluation process, in which CINC
priorities play a dominant role.
The Advanced Technology Transition program (PE 0603792N), which in
fiscal year 1997 includes a total of 16 active ATDs, is developed from
proposals based on the Science and Technology Requirements Guidance
(developed in part from CINC input). Fleet CINCs are represented on the
Navy Science and Technology Working Group (STWG), with the opportunity
to review the entire list (usually about 150) of ATD proposals and to
review in depth the 25 finalists as part of the ATD selection process.
The fiscal year 1997 President's Budget request of $104 million was
reduced in the appropriation to $72 million as a result, a number of
high-priority Fleet needs could not be satisfied. The $87 million
request for fiscal year 1998 level for PE 0603792N represents a modest
increase to satisfy the highest priority CINC requirements. Even at the
requested level, an additional 10% growth would be necessary to return
to the level appropriated in fiscal year 1995.
The ATDs represent the Navy S&T program with strongest CINC
engagement and support. The CINC-recommended list of ATD selections,
each with high ratings for need, transition opportunity and technical
quality always greatly exceeds the dollars available.
Question. In your budget, $150 million is included as a downpayment
towards development of an Arsenal Ship demonstrator project. Is this
what the theater CINCs want? Name which CINC has included the Arsenal
Ship program on his integrated priority list, and how it ranks in terms
of his priorities.
Answer. The Arsenal Ship is not specifically listed on the CINC
integrated priority list; however it will enhance our ability to meet
many of those requirements.
Question. In your budget, growth is requested for ``Studies and
Analysis Support'', the ``Center for Naval Analysis'', ``Management,
Technical and International Support'' and ``RDT&E Science and
Technology Management.'' Is this what theater CINCs want? Name which
CINC has included any of these programs on his integrated priority
list, and how it ranks in terms of his priorities.
Answer. Studies, Analyses and Support was appropriated last year at
$6.7 million (after Congressional undistributed reductions). This
year's budget request is for $8.8 million or $2.1 million more than
last year. This increase reflects a new study for the Large Land Based
Aircraft (LLBA) as a potential replacement to the E-6, EP-3, P-3, C-130
and C-9 aircraft.
The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) was appropriated last year at
$38.6 million (after Congressional undistributed reductions). This
year's budget request is for $43.4 million or $4.8 million more than
last year. However, 75 percent of this ``increase'' is actually a
reduction in FY 1997 of $3.6 million for undistributed Congressional
reductions.
Management, Technical and International Support was appropriated
last year at $19.7 million (after Congressional undistributed
reductions). This year's budget request is for $24.3 million or $4.6
million more than last year. This increase reflects the addition of
funds supporting Modeling and Simulation (M&S) efforts, including
support for a central M&S office which will coordinate all Navy M&S
initiatives to avid duplications among programs. It is anticipated
substantial long term cost and operational savings will accrue.
RDT&E Science and Technology Management was appropriated at $56
million (after Congressional undistributed reductions). This year's
budget request is for $57.6 million or $1.6 million more than last
year. This increase reflects the transfer of the Naval Industrial
Reserve functions to the Office of Naval Research and is a net zero
change within the total Navy budget.
To map CINC Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs) directly to management
support programs is difficult, as Fleet priorities tend to be expressed
in terms of capabilities rather than specific programs or line items.
In addition, the IPLs address predominantly O&M issues rather than S&T.
The studies, analyses and management programs listed above support the
development of technical responses to the CINCs' IPL capabilities.
Those IPL requirements which can be addressed by S&T in terms of long
term improvements are developed through direct Fleet CINC participation
in the S&T requirements process.
Ship Self-Defense
Question. Mr. Douglass, your statement says ``Bottom line: our
budget continues an all out effort to protect our Sailors and Marines
serving aboard ships against missile attack.'' Under your plan, not a
single ship from the 12 ship DDG-51 multiyear buy would be delivered to
the fleet with either cooperative engagement capability nor theater
ballistic missile defense capability. Is this ``an all our effort'' by
the Navy?
Answer. The 12 ships in the Multi-Year Procurement (MYP) will be
built with the combat systems and computer software configuration base
to allow rapid procurement and installation of Cooperative Engagement
Capability (CEC) and Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) as funds
become available. The Navy has an integrated backfit plan for
installing these capabilities and is reviewing acceleration options
that deliver these much needed capabilities to the fleet as the
technology becomes available, at the beginning of the next century.
Significant progress has been achieved over the past year.
Evaluation continues of the two CEC IOC ships, CG 68 and CG 71, in
fleet exercises, along with correction and refinement of both system
equipment configuration, software and CEC integration with the Aegis
Weapon System on those ships. On 24 January 1997 at the White Sands
Missile Range, the Navy conducted the first ever intercept of a TBM
target with a modified SM-2 Block IV missile. Subsequently, at a
Milestone II DAB on 22 February 1997, OSD approved the Navy AREA TBMD
program to proceed to Engineering, Manufacturing and Development. In
addition, efforts in working with BMDO and OSD to elevate the funding
and priority of the Navy Theater Wide (NTW) program within the DoD
Ballistic Missile Defense Architecture are beginning to pay off. This
past December, Dr. Kaminski designated NTW as a core BMDO program and,
in support, in January 1997, Navy added $207 million to the Navy
Theater Wide program across the Future Years Defense Plan. Most
importantly, in October 1996, the Secretary of the Navy and Chief of
Naval Operations directed their staffs to conduct a comprehensive
review of Navy TBMD programs and report back with a plan to accelerate
delivery of this capability to the Fleet. The acceleration plan
includes both TBMD and CEC. This plan, nearing completion, will be
briefed to the Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations in
the near-future. All of these actions confirm Navy commitment to
deliver these capabilities to the Fleet.
Question. Under your plan, the U.S.S. Nimitz would be overhauled
and sent back to the fleet without ship self-defense, cooperative
engagement, and rolling airframe missiles. Is this ``an all out
effort'' by the Navy?
Answer. Following the Refueling Complex Overhaul (RCOH), the ship
will undergo a Post Shakedown Availability/Selected Restricted
Availability (PSA/SRA) as is typical following an overhaul of this
scope. The Navy's plan is to incorporate the most critical warfighting
improvements during either the RCOH or the follow-on PSA/SRA.
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) is in the CVN-68 RCOH work
package. Ship Self Defense System (SSDS) and Rolling Airframe Missile
(RAM) are both planned for installation during the PSA/SRA.
Question. Under your plan, no funds are requested in 1998 for
cooperative engagement capability installations although the system
reached IOC in 1996. Is this ``an all out effort'' by the Navy?
Answer. The Navy views CEC as a top priority and is committed to
its implementation in both surface ships and aircraft. Given the
restraints and budgetary decisions that had to be made, Navy is
continuing procurement and production of CEC units. CEC systems to
complete a second battlegroup are currently being procured and
installed with RDT&E funds to support OPEVAL in fiscal year 1998. By
fiscal year 2003 Navy will have installed CEC into 60 ships and
aircraft. This will put CEC into 6 Carrier Battlegroups by fiscal year
2003. In addition, Navy intends to integrate CEC in the E-2C Mission
Computer Upgrade Program starting in fiscal year 1998. The airborne CEC
system will IOC in the first E-2C squadron in fiscal year 2002.
Question. Under your plan, no funds are requested in 1998 for ship
self-defense system installations, which are vital to lone ship
survivability from cruise missile attack. Is this ``an all out effort''
by the Navy?
Answer. The fiscal year 1998 budget request slipped Ship Self
Defense System (SSDS) procurement and installation of 1 LSD, 1 LHD and
2 shore based sets. We have satisfactorily rescheduled those ships for
installation during follow-on availability. In the interim those ships
will be protected by the baseline self defense systems now installed.
SSDS continues to be a high priority system that fulfilled the
Congressionally mandated Quick Reaction Combat Capability.
Question. Under your plan, no funds are requested in 1998 for
infrared sensor development or production which are essential for
detection of stealthy cruise missiles. Is this ``an all out effort'' by
the Navy?
Answer. Higher program priorities in the fiscal year 1998 budget
submission necessitated a reduction in development funding for Infrared
Search and Track (IRST) Sensor. There is sufficient funding in place to
complete landbased prototype testing in fiscal year 1998. Based on that
test data, consideration will be given to fully fund this program
within fiscal limits and against other program priorities. Theater
CINCs recognize that IRST has the potential to add capability to ship
self defense but also await test data before providing the appropriate
level of support relative to other requirements.
Question. Under your plan, no funds are requested in 1998 for
installation of surface ship CIWS guns (CIWS surface mode) which have
been a fleet requirement for many years to see and hit terrorist patrol
boats that may attack Navy ships. Is this ``an all out effort'' by the
Navy?
Answer. Post cold war maritime operational concepts have been
developed and concentrate in coastal or ``littoral'' areas. US Navy and
Coast Guard operations around Haiti and Cuba are well documented
examples of this type of maritime operation. These littoral operations
require a defense against small, high speed, very maneuverable surface
threats and low, slow air threats that are expected. The requirement
initially centered on an Advanced Minor Caliber Gun System (AMCGS) for
the US Navy. The Navy conducted an extensive COEA as well as additional
follow-on analysis, testing, and detailed review. Based on the results
of these efforts, the AMCGS requirements was planned to be best
operationally and financially satisfied by implementing the CIWS
Surface Mode. We agree that CIWS surface mode can provide the
capability to detect and engage terrorist patrol boats. To that end, we
will complete Operational Testing of the capability this year and
receive fleet comments before we commit to full scale production.
Question. Isn't the bottom-line really that in its budget the Navy
has taken care of its industrial base, its contractors, and Navy labs
rather than taking care of the theater CINCs, Sailors, and Marines?
Answer. Our nation's industrial base, contractors, and Navy labs
support the Navy and Marine men and women who form the heart of the
United States Navy, and the theater CINCs that command them.
In attempting to strike a balance between today's needs and
tomorrow's, the budget cannot completely meet all priorities. The final
budget product is by necessity a compromise and I appreciate
Congressional support and interest in fashioning the best balance
possible.
Shipbuilding Rate
Question. The Navy requests $7.4 billion for shipbuilding in fiscal
year 1998. To support a ``346 Ship Navy'' as suggested by the Bottom Up
Review, consisting of ships whose service life is about 30 years,
requires average construction of about 10 ships per year. Secretary
Douglass, what annual rate of construction does the Administration's
new budget request and accompanying future years defense plan envision?
Answer. The fiscal year 1998 President's Budget request and
accompanying future years defense program support a construction rate
of 5 to 6 ships per year. A summary of the Navy's fiscal year 1998
shipbuilding and conversion plan is attached.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Question. Admiral Pilling, given this low rate, how can you
maintain a 346 ship Navy?
Answer. Procurement rates must increase. I share the Chief of Naval
Operations' view that the greatest concern right now is focused after
the end of the current Future Years Defense Plan (1998-03) when the
lead SC-21 ship is procured in fiscal year 2003. With the SC-21, Navy
surface combatant production has to increase to help bring total SCN
new procurement quantities up to the 9-10 ship/year level necessary to
support long-term recapitalization.
The NSSN procurement rate will also have to increase following the
initial 4 ship teaming arrangement requested in the fiscal year 1998
FYDP program. The budget also supports ships refueling and service life
extensions that help maintain ship force levels in the near-term.
The ship acquisition is also a large topic with in the Quadrennial
Defense Review. Options to increase SCN funding to support higher
procurement levels are being addressed there.
Question. What is the magnitude of the Navy's ship modernization
shortfall from now until 2002?
Answer. I share the view of Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of
Naval Operations expressed earlier today. I am satisfied with the ship
procurement plan today. However, certainly the DoN needs to eventually
increase its ship building rate to about 10 ships per year once the
ships procured back in the 1980s reach the end of their service lives.
The current 5 ship per year budget is 4-5 ships per year below the
goal. The ``procurement holiday'' enjoyed in recent years must end. I
do not underestimate the immense challenges ahead to recapitalize and
invest in the Navy of tomorrow.
Question. The Navy's shipbuilding plan envisions multiyear
contracts for 12 DDG 51 destroyers and the first 4 new attack
submarines. Isn't this risky strategy, given that ``outyear budgets''
never seem to materialize at the level originally forecast by DoD?
Answer. The Navy intends to comply with the fiscal year 1997
Authorization and Appropriations Acts and execute a multiyear contract
for the 12 fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2001 DDG 51 Class ships
at a rate of three per year. The three ships planned in fiscal year
1998 are fully funded in the fiscal year 1998 President's Budget
request and the funding for the remaining nine ships are programmed in
the accompanying Future Years Defense Program. The DDG 51 Class
multiyear procurement is currently estimated to yield a total savings
of $1.2 billion dollars over four years. Final savings will not be
known until contracts are awarded in the fall of 1997.
The Navy has proposed a new acquisition strategy for the New Attack
Submarine which constructs four ships over five years under a single
contract with an Electric Boat Corporation/Newport News Shipbuilding
team. Teaming and a single contract is expected to save $450 million to
$650 million over a similar construction profile without teaming. The
single contract is an important element of this acquisition strategy
because it provides the business incentive to the two shipbuilders to
team. The first New Attack submarine is fully funded in the fiscal year
1998 President's Budget request and funding for the remaining three
ships is programmed in the accompanying Future Years Defense Program.
The benefit of using an explicitly stated single contract is that
it stabilizes the program, thus providing the opportunity for savings
for economic order quantities of material procurement and reduction of
workforce fluctuation costs. Although explicitly stated termination
liability costs for the single contract make subsequent reductions in
procurement quantity much more expensive than would normally be the
case with annual contracting, the savings opportunities override this
risk. A single contract is literally a ``win-win'' strategy for
industry and Government, so long as the Government can avoid under
funding the procurement in the outyears. We believe that the
procurement levels we are estimating for both programs over the Future
Years Defense Program are the minimum, and consequently the termination
risk is low.
Question. We have seen much industry consolidation in the aircraft
production industry (e.g. Boeing and McDonnell Douglas proposed
merger). What are your views on the need for similar consolidation in
the nation's shipbuilding industry, and how will the Navy foster it?
Answer. The reduction in defense spending has resulted in a
significant number of mergers in other industrial sectors--primarily in
those industries with shorter build times and lower backlog compared to
the shipbuilding industry. These other sectors have been forced to
rationalize their business base arrangements and many did so by
downsizing or merging.
The shipbuilding industry has also begun a similar rationalization
process with General Dynamics' purchase of Bath Iron Works, the teaming
arrangements for the LPD 17 amphibious assault ships, and most recently
the proposed teaming for New Attack Submarines. Both OSD and the Navy
view the current state of the industry with concern, and are working to
determine the best possible plan for the long term health of this
critical national industry. With the downsizing of the defense budget,
industry must continue to consolidate, reengineer itself to be
sustainable at proposed funding levels, or expand into new markets.
These new markets include both commercial shipbuilding and foreign
combatant sales. We anticipate further changes in the shipbuilding
industry and will work closely with OSD to monitor the effects of any
proposed business decisions. We will take the necessary actions to
ensure sufficient viability of the overall shipbuilding industrial base
to meet our national defense requirements.
Shipbuilding Plan
Question. During the past year, the Navy has placed great emphasis
on developing an integrated shipbuilding plan that fully funds the next
aircraft carrier, revises the New Attack Submarine Program, and buys
destroyers in a multiyear program. Secretary Douglass, please describe
the Navy's new shipbuilding plan.
Answer. The Navy's shipbuilding plans for fiscal year 1998 include
a continued, stabilized procurement of DDG 51 Aegis destroyers through
use of a 12 ship multi-year procurement to meet Congressional direction
contained in the Fiscal Year 1997 Authorization and Appropriations
Acts. In addition to requesting three DDG 51s, we are requesting
research and development funds for three new classes of surface
combatants, SC 21, the new advanced development Arsenal Ship and CV(X),
the next generation aircraft carrier. These efforts demonstrate the
Navy's intention to invest in future technologies and ship designs to
position our surface fleet for the challenges of the next century.
Submarines are very much a key element of our overall shipbuilding
plan. Our budget includes funding for the lead New Attack Submarine and
for the final incremental procurement funding for SSN 23 in fiscal year
1998. The Navy is ready to proceed with lead ship construction and has
requested $2.6 billion in fiscal year 1998 for the design and
construction of the first New Attack Submarine. The Navy has proposed
an innovative teaming arrangement for procurement of four New Attack
Submarines over the next five years from Electric Boat Corporation and
Newport News Shipbuilding. Use of a single contract for the four
submarines is a key element of the Navy plan because it provides the
business incentive for the two submarine shipbuilders to team.
Together, the contracting and teaming approaches generate substantial
cost savings over the current plan. This acquisition strategy is
affordable, executable and supports our national security requirements.
The Navy executed the contract award for the first ship in the LPD
17 Class in December 1996. No LPD 17s are planned in fiscal year 1998.
We plan on resuming procurement in fiscal year 1999, procuring an
additional nine ships between fiscal year 1999 and fiscal year 2003.
No new construction aircraft carriers are planned in fiscal year
1998; however, we still need to maintain a fleet of 12 aircraft
carriers (11 deployable and 1 reserve/training carrier). To meet this
need, the Navy is requesting funding in fiscal year 1998 for the
refueling of U.S.S. Nimitz (CVN 68) which is scheduled to begin complex
refueling overhaul in fiscal year 1998, and advance procurement funding
for the refueling of U.S.S. Eisenhower (CVN 69) which is scheduled to
begin a complex refueling overhaul in fiscal year 2000. The cornerstone
of our shipbuilding plan for the Future Years Defense Program in fiscal
year 1998 through fiscal year 2003 is full funding of the final Nimitz
class aircraft carrier, the CVN 77.
On average, we are planning to build approximately five new
construction ships per year throughout this period. Key factors used in
developing our plans for the future are the number of active ships now
in the fleet (approximately 350 ships and submarines today) and their
average age. As we right-size the Navy, we have decommissioned a large
number of older surface combatants, amphibious ships, and aircraft
carriers which has resulted in not only a smaller fleet, but a younger,
more capable one.
Question. We understand that significant changes to any
shipbuilding program within the plan, such as accelerating the funding
for the aircraft carrier into fiscal year 1998, may cause negative
impact on other programs such as DDG-51 or LPD-17 construction. Please
explain this to us.
Answer. The fiscal year 1998 ship building plan requests 1 new
attack submarine, 3 DDG-51 Arleigh Burke class destroyers, the U.S.S.
Nimitz refueling complex overhaul, and 2 sealift ships. CVN-77 is
needed in fiscal year 2008 to replace the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk (CV-63), so
fiscal year 2002 is the right time to build CVN-77. It is not needed
earlier. Accelerating SCN funding into fiscal year 1998 could
unnecessarily ``crowd out'' other shipbuilding funding dollars required
for submarines, surface combatants, the U.S.S. Nimitz refueling, and
sealift ships.
However, an addition of $17 million in RDT&E funds could be of
great use to the CVN-77 program in fiscal year 1998. This would allow
accelerating efforts that will make CVN-77 a true ``smart transition''
carrier which will introduce technology improvements to reduce life
cycle and construction costs. The Navy is currently evaluating
contracting RDT&E proposals that claim to save up to $600 million
against the final cost of CVN-77.
Question. DoD outyear budget projections usually do not materialize
as originally planned. If this happens again, what priority would the
Navy assign to its shipbuilding plan?
Answer. The shipbilding plan would receive the highest priority
possible within the constraints of reduced funding. As with all budget
submissions, a balanced plan is forged to meet Navy's requirements.
Aviation procurement and shipbuilding would be near the top of that
plan.
Question. Secretary of Defense Cohen recently announced the
formation of a Program Management Advisory Group that will conduct a
comprehensive review of the shipyards that build surface ships. Please
explain why this is necessary, why now, and what will be done. Why was
this review not conducted prior to the LPD 17 contract award?
Answer. Dr. Kaminski (USD(A&T)) and Mr. Douglas (ASNRDA)) formed
the joint Program Management Advisory Group to conduct an independent
assessment of the viability of Bath Iron Works and Ingalls Shipbuilding
as producers of surface combatants and to make recommendations for a
long term integrated approach to the surface combatant industrial base.
This was done in response to Ingalls Shipbuilding's concerns about its
long term viability. The Navy did a formal analysis of the DDG 51
industrial base in 1994 and 1995, which included several variations on
possible LPD-17 award outcomes.
MODERNIZATION SHORTFALL
Question. The Navy's fiscal year 1998 budget requests $25.7 billion
for Navy and Marine Corps procurement, shipbuilding, and R&D. This is
$.5 billion--about 2 percent--lower than the fiscal year 1997
appropriated amount. The funding provides for only 51 new aircraft (of
which only 39 are combat aircraft), 512 missiles, and 4 combatant
ships. Admiral Pilling, is the Navy's fiscal year 1998 modernization
budget adequate?
Answer. Yes. However, if additional modernization was made
available by Congress, they could be used to accelerate development and
procurement of systems in our long-range program.
Question. What is the risk to the future of readiness of the Navy
and the Marine Corps of such low procurement rates of Navy Weapons?
Navy Answer. The Navy funding contained within the fiscal year 1998
budget and that in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) contains
what we believe to be the right choices to modernize our forces while
ensuring readiness is maintained within existing resources.
It should be noted that in comparing the fiscal year 1998 budget to
fiscal year 1997, the advanced procurement funding in the fiscal year
1998 Navy aircraft procurement account was reduced by approximately
$500 million to reflect the minimum essential funding for government
and contractor furnished equipment. Navy has budgeted for advance
procurement only when it is cost-effective.
In addition to funds for 4 combatants, Navy Shipbuilding Account
includes $1.7 billion for a Refueling Complex Overhaul (RCOH) that will
enable CVN-68 to provide 25 years of additional service.
Marine Corps Answer. No, our fiscal year 1998 modernization budget
is not adequate. Maintaining current readiness levels and sustaining
the momentum of quality of life initiatives are our top priorities.
Funding these priorities within our reduced fiscal year 1998 topline--a
topline which is 4.5% less in real terms than the fiscal year 1997
level, required a shift from investment accounts, both in terms of
modernizing equipment for our ground forces (PMC and ammo) and
maintaining our bases and stations (MRP, Base Ops, and MilCon).
Although Marine Corps modernization funding begins to improve in fiscal
year 1999, the fiscal year 1998 level is at a historical low--the
lowest level since 1972. In order to reduce the risk to future
readiness, we have selectively funded our top priority ground combat
programs such as C4I equipment and Javelin. The budget request for
fiscal year 1999 and the current estimate for the outyears reflect
significant increases in funding for modernization--funding for PMC and
ammo doubles in fiscal year 1999, allowing us to capitalize on recent
investments in R&D.
Question. What major requirements are not funded in the fiscal year
1998 budget?
Navy Answer. All immediate Navy major readiness and modernization
requirements are funded in the fiscal year 1998 budget. However, the
pace with which we are outfitting our ships with integrated ship self-
defense and cooperative engagement systems is not as fast as many would
like. As pointed out in Admiral Johnson's testimony, this has been
purely an affordability budget decision, and by no way demeans Navy
commitment to ship self-defense. The Navy is dealing with finite
resources and procurement requirements compete with near-term
readiness, quality of life must be supported, and a balance must be
struck. Not all requirements can be funded.
Marine Corps Answer. The fiscal year 1998 budget is an austere,
fiscally-constrained program emphasizing Defense Planning Guidance
priorities on readiness and quality-of-life programs. With a fiscal
year 1998 topline 4.5% less than the fiscal year 1997 level, we were
forced to make difficult choices in order to fund our top priorities--
readiness and quality of life. As in past years, financing these
priorities has forced the diversion of funds from investment accounts
and precluded budgeting for investment at desired levels. My concerns
include the continued reliance on aging systems and failure to more
rapidly field readily available improved technology. Following is a
list of systems which could be accelerated if additional funds were
available:
(In Millions of Dollars)
Base Telecommunications Infrastructure............................ $42.6
Javelin........................................................... 17.0
Lightweight Tactical Vehicle Replacement.......................... 65.1
ITEMS LESS THAN $10 MILLION....................................... 18.2
Combat Vehicle Appended Trainer............................... (9.2)
ISO Beds...................................................... (6.2)
Improved Direct Air Support Center (IDASC) PIP................ (0.4)
Combat Rubber Reconnaissance Craft............................ (1.6)
LAV RAM....................................................... (.8)
Chemical Biological Incident Response Force....................... 15.1
Power Generation Equipment, Assorted.............................. 22.1
MX11620 Generation III 25mm Image Intensification Tubes........... 11.1
ITEMS LESS THAN $10 MILLION....................................... 24.3
Close Quarters Battle Weapon.................................. (.4)
M2 Flatrack................................................... (3.2)
Logistics Information Systems................................. (3.5)
Defense Message System........................................ (2.4)
Underwater Breathing Apparatus................................ (1.2)
Marine Enhancement Program.................................... (1.7)
Special Effects Small Arms Marking System..................... (1.5)
Military Motorcycle Replacement............................... (3.3)
Advanced Demolition Kit....................................... (3.0)
TERPES........................................................ (4.1)
Shop Equipment Contact Maintenance................................ 12.2
______
Total..................................................... 227.7
=================================================================
________________________________________________
(In Millions of Dollars)
RDT&E, N Account:
Commandant's Warfighting Lab...................................... 19.8
Marine Enhancement Program........................................ 0.6
Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle............................... 10.1
Light Weight 155MM Howitzer....................................... 3.6
Tactical Remote Sensor Systems.................................... 1.5
Marine Common Hardware Suite (MCHS) Development & Management...... 0.7
TERPES............................................................ 1.0
______
Total..................................................... 37.3
=================================================================
________________________________________________
Question. What are your top 4 modernization programs? Are they
fully funded in fiscal year 1998? Are they optimally funded in the
accompanying fiscal years of the Future Years Defense Plan?
Navy Answer. New procurement, and capability upgrades to current
systems and platforms, continue to be the top modernization priorities
for the Navy in the fiscal year 1998 budget. Procurement of the U.S.S.
Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, the Osprey (MV-22) tilt rotor aircraft,
the Super Hornet fighter/attack aircraft (F/A-18 E/F), and the New
Attack Submarine (NSSN) are critical components of Navy future
readiness and need continued Congressional support. These four programs
are fully funded in fiscal year 1998. CVN-77 is also a top
modernization program, a critical warfighting requirements. However,
advanced procurement funding for this national asset is not required
until fiscal year 2000.
These programs are optimally funded in the 1999-2003 fiscal years
of the Future Years Defense Program given the resources available for
modernization.
Marine Corps Answer. The Marine Corps' top four modernization
programs are AV-8B, V-22, general acceleration of ground equipment, and
the AAAV. I remain concerned about the pace of modernization for these
and other aviation and ground equipment programs.
If additional funds were available, I would like to accelerate
these important modernization programs:
I would like to maintain the fiscal year 1997 pace of
remanufacturing our AV-8Bs. The budget provides funding for
remanufacturing of 12 aircraft in fiscal year 1997 and 11 in fiscal
year 1998. The remanufacturing program, among other things, provides
for a more capable, reliable engine. Also, the current budget does not
allow for remanufacturing of our training assets--the TAV-8B. I would
like to procure improved engines for the TAV-8Bs, thus adding needed
safety and reliability improvements to an important warfighting asset.
I would accelerate procurement of the V-22. At the current level,
we will attain our procurement objective in fiscal year 2020.
Acceleration would allow us to field this needed capability to the
fleet earlier, and would provide for a more efficient rate of
production.
In the area of support to our ground forces, I would like to
accelerate the acquisition of modernized equipment to include improved
C4I equipment for our MAGTFs, the Javelin--replacement for the aging
Dragon medium antitank system, Light Tactical Vehicle Replacement
Program, combat rubber reconnaissance craft, rebuilding our light
tactical vehicles, and improving telecommunications support.
I would also accelerate the development of the AAAV. Fabrication
and testing of an additional Demonstration and Validation prototype
would allow testing activities to be safely conducted in parallel,
mitigating the impact of equipment failures.
Additional Funding
Question. Last year were very candid about identifying your top
unfunded requirements to the Committee and working with us to provide
additional funds for many of them. I hope you will continue that
cooperation with us.
Admiral Pilling and General Oster, please describe your top
unfunded priorities and why the fiscal year 1998 budget is not
sufficient in these areas?
Navy Answer. In addition to the integrated ship defense and
cooperative engagement capability concerns discussed previously,
several other programs could benefit from increased fiscal year 1998
funding, if additional resources were made available by Congress.
Priorities here are accelerating procurement of systems in our long-
range program. Navy priorities would be to accelerate procurement of
aircraft (F/A-18 E/F and E-2C), ship (DDG-51 and LPD-17), and weapons
(Navy Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defense, Tomahawk, and Joint
Standoff Weapon) systems. Navy Theater Wide TBMD, surface fire support,
CVN-77, and other high priority RDT&E investment efforts could also be
accelerated in a more cost effective manner. The attached table
summarizes these priorities.
Faster development and procurement was not possible in the fiscal
year 1998 budget request due to competing requirements to maintain
near-term readiness and to support the quality of life of all Navy
personnel.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Marine Corps Answer. The Marine Corps' fiscal year 1998 topline is
down by 4.5% from the fiscal year 1997 level in terms of real spending
power. In order to fund our top priorities, near-term readiness and
quality of life for our Marines and their families, we were forced to
shift funds from our investment accounts, both in terms of
modernization of equipment for our ground forces, and maintaining our
bases and stations.
The Marine Corps' fiscal year 1998 account for procurement of
equipment to support our ground forces is at a historical low--the
lowest since fiscal year 1972. Within this level of funding, we have
selectively funded our top priorities ground combat programs, however,
I am concerned about the pace of ground equipment modernization as well
as aviation platforms.
If additional funds were available, I would like to accelerate
procurement of several important aviation and ground weapon systems.
My first priority is safety issues. I would like to maintain the
fiscal year 1997 pace of remanufacturing our AV-8Bs. The budget
provides funding for remanufacture of 12 aircraft in fiscal year 1997
and 11 in fiscal year 1998. The remanufacturing program, among other
things, provides for a more capable, reliable engine. Also, the current
budget does not allow for remanufacturing of our training assets--the
TAV-8B. I would like to procure improved engines for the TAV-8Bs, thus
adding needed safety and reliability improvements to an important
warfighting asset.
I would accelerate procurement of the V-22. At the current level,
we will attain our procurement objective in fiscal year 2020.
Acceleration would allow us to field this needed capability to the
fleet earlier, and would provide for a more efficient rate of
production.
I would procure additional F/A-18Ds. The current inventory of F/A-
18Ds is inadequate to meet future training or Fleet squadron Primary
Aircraft Authorized requirements until replacement by the Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF). First deliveries of JSF are currently scheduled for
fiscal year 2007.
In the area of weapon systems to support our ground forces, I would
like to accelerate the acquisition of modernized equipment to include
improved C4I equipment for our MAGTFs, the Javelin--replacement for the
aging Dragon medium antitank system, Light Tactical Vehicle Replacement
Program, combat rubber reconnaissance craft, rebuilding our light
tactical vehicles, and improving telecommunications support.
I would also like to accelerate the development of several programs
which are critical to ensure we remain a viable force into the next
century. These include the Commandant's Warfighting Lab, the Advanced
Amphibious Assault Vehicle, and the Light Weight 155MM Howitzer.
Question. What are the potential savings if the Congress were to
provide additional funding in fiscal year 1998 for these items, either
by buying them earlier than now planned or by lower production unit
costs through procurement of higher quantities? Please put the costs
and savings in the record.
Navy Answer. Potential savings that may be achieved as a result of
any additional funding provided by the Congress in fiscal year 1998
will be addressed as part of the fiscal year 1999 budget process.
Marine Corps Answer. It is reasonable to assume that savings will
be generated as a result of increased production quantities in addition
to cost avoidance realized from escalation and inflation by buying
ground and aviation systems earlier than currently planned. In addition
to the savings and cost avoidance to be realized by accelerated
procurement of these systems, earlier fielding will significantly
enhance our warfighting capability.
One ground program worthy of note is the International Standards
Organization (ISO) Bed Modification program. Funding this program in
fiscal year 1998, at the current contract option prices will save
approximately $2 million over projected contract option prices in
fiscal year 1999 by investing an additional $6.2 million in fiscal year
1998.
A $7.85 million future development cost avoidance could be achieved
with an additional $3.6 million in Marine Corps ground combat RDT&E, N
funds for the Lightweight 155 Howitzer program. These funds would allow
for rapid evaluation of engineering change proposals by computer
modeling vice live fire testing; earlier integration of lessons learned
in the Commandant's Warfighting Lab experiments; as well as
acceleration of improved optical fire control systems.
There are a number of programs which will accelerate combat
capability rather than generate cost savings or avoidance. For
instance, an additional $17 million to fund acceleration of the Javelin
program would allow for attainment of 100% of the Acquisition Objective
during the FYDP and satisfy an out-year funding deficiency. The Marine
Enhancement Program (MEP) buys only a few items as budgeted, thus
minimal cost avoidance from inflation or a slightly lower unit price
would be gained from buying additional MEP items; the same is true of
Power Equipment items. Additional fiscal year 1998, funding to support
these programs would for earlier fielding, thereby enhancing our
warfighting capability.
My top aviation acquisition priority is accelerating procurement of
the V-22 aircraft. The most cost-efficient rate of procurement of the
MV-22 is 36 per year. As the Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition and
Technology) stated in his letter of 30 May 1996 to the House Committee
on Appropriations, as we increase production to 36 V-22's per year, we
will realize additional real savings of $2.7 million per aircraft
(constant fiscal year 1994 constant dollars). A production rate of 36
per year thus saves $1.2 billion in constant fiscal year 1994 dollars
over the total program, and up to $4.8 billion of inflation savings for
a combined savings of up to $6.0 billion. Multi-year procurement is
estimated to save even more since we can order materials more
economically. Increasing V-22 production rates, even without multi-year
procurement, is the most cost-effective way to modernize our aging
fleet.
Also, procurement of one additional remanufactured AV-8B in fiscal
year 1998, would result in cost savings to the total program of
approximately $1.7 million.
Question. Which of these items are on any of the CINC integrated
priority lists?
Answer. The latest set of Unified CINC Integrated Priorities Lists
(IPLs) were submitted to OSD between November 1996 and January 1997 to
support the fiscal year 1999-2003 Program Review. The Unified CINCs'
IPLs continue to stress near-term readiness, recapitalization, upgrades
of existing systems, personnel quality of life, and have added
counterterrorism and force protection.
The unfunded Navy procurement, research and development, operation
and maintenance, and manpower items identified in the answers above are
all mentioned as priority items in separate READINESS, MODERNIZATION,
RECAPITALIZATION, COMBAT FORCE STRUCTURE, THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE,
STRATEGIC LIFT, AIR COMBAT, SEA COMBAT, COMBAT IDENTIFICATION, THEATER
C41, MUNITIONS STOCKPILE, and FOLLOW-ON TACTICAL AIRCRAFT category
sections of various CINC IPLs.
Examples
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CINC IPL priority Navy program
------------------------------------------------------------------------
USACOM.......................... Near-Term Depot Maintenance
Readiness and Qol DDG-51, F/A-18 E/
Recapitalization F E-2C, Acoustic
Modernization. COTS
CENTCOM......................... Theater Missile Area and Theater
Defense Sea Wide LPD-17, ADS
Combat Combat ID. CEC
PACOM........................... Theater-wide C4ISR Info-Tech 21, DAMA
Munitions TLAM, JSOW LPD-17
Stockpile F/A-18 E/F Real
Amphibious Lift Property Maint.,
Follow-On Piers
Tactical A/C Base
Infrastructure.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Marine Corps Answer. The following items are listed on CINC
integrated priority lists:
($ in millions)
PMC........................................................... $159.1
Base Telecommunications Infrastructure.................... 42.6
Javelin Medium Antitank Weapon System..................... 17.0
Light Tactical Vehicle Replacement (LVTR) Prgm............ 65.1
Combat Rubber Reconnaissance Craft (CRRC)................. 1.6
Light Armored Vehicle-Reliability and Maintainability (LAV
RAM).................................................... 0.8
Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF)
Equipment............................................... 15.1
MX11620 Gen III 25mm Image Intens Tubes................... 11.1
Marine Enhancement Program (MEP).......................... 1.7
Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance Processing and
Evaluation System (TERPES).............................. 4.1
O&MMC......................................................... 355.9
Operating Forces O&M and Training Support................. 38.8
Base Operations........................................... 40.7
Initial Issue............................................. 20.7
Chem/Bio Incident Response Force (CBIRF) Training and
Support................................................. 4.5
Personnel Support Equipment............................... 25.4
Joint Recruiting Information Support System (JRISS)
Infrastructure.......................................... 4.8
Rigid Raider Craft (RRC) Rehab Program.................... 1.9
Maintenance of Real Property (MRP)........................ 194.1
Depot Maintenance......................................... 25.0
O&MMCR........................................................ 0.4
Maintenance of Real Property.............................. 0.4
APN........................................................... 1,424.3
AV-8B (1 A/C, 22 T-AV8B Engines, Simulators............... 236.5
V-22 (11 A/C, Spares and AP for Additional 9)............. 1,094.0
F/A-18D (2 A/C and Spares)................................ 93.8
RDT&E (AVN)................................................... 3.9
AV-8B Safety, Reliability and Operational Enhancement..... 3.9
RDT&E (GRND).................................................. 15.3
Marine Enhancement Program (MEP).......................... 0.6
Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV)................ 10.1
Light Weight 155MM Howitzer (LW155)....................... 3.6
Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance Processing and
Evaluation System (TERPES).............................. 1.0
SCN........................................................... 746.0
LPD-17.................................................... 746.0
--------------------------------------------------------------
____________________________________________________
Total......................................................... $1,280.6
==============================================================
____________________________________________________
DDG-51 Destroyers
Question. The fiscal year 1998 budget requests $2.8 billion for
construction of 3 DDG 51 destroyers. In last year's law, the Committee
provided both additional funding and legislative authority for the Navy
to pursue a 12 ship multiyear buy over 4 years. Secretary Douglass,
please explain the Navy's acquisition plan for DDG 51 destroyers.
Answer. The Navy intends to comply with the Fiscal Year 1997
Defense Authorization and Appropriations Acts and execute a multiyear
contract for the 12 fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2001 DDG 51
Class ships at a rate of three per year. We plan to issue a multiyear
Request For Proposals from Bath Iron Works and Ingalls Shipbuilding
this spring, and award a contract before October 1997.
Question. Last year, when the Navy formally requested (because it
was not a proposal in the President's budget) additional funds to
pursue a DDG 51 destroyer multiyear procurement contract, we were told
that the tradition of evenly allocating ships between the 2 shipyards
(Bath and Ingalls) would be maintained. Is that still your plan? If
not, on what basis would you allocate work to the destroyer shipyards?
Is it your intent to penalize the Bath yard in the DDG 51 program
solely because it won the competition for a different (LPD 17) class of
ships?
Why is the Navy willing to compensate the Ingalls yard with
more work (taken from Bath) when Bath was not compensated in
the DDG 51 program years ago in an identical situation (when
Ingalls received contracts to build 7 LHD ships)?
Answer. The Navy plan has been to evenly allocate ships between the
two yards unless both shipbuilders concur with some alternative
arrangement. The LPD-17 award has caused some concerns, and these
concerns are under evaluation. The Navy will be involved in discussions
with both shipbuilders on this issue, and the exact distribution of
ships will be decided before the multiyear Request For Proposals is
issued. The Navy does not intend to penalize any shipbuilder that loses
a competitive contract. The Navy, however, must always reserve the
authority to take appropriate action to preserve the defense industrial
base when required. The Navy closely monitors the overall viability of
the shipbuilding industrial base to ensure adequate sources of supply
and capabilities are maintained to support the future needs of the
Navy, and total program affordability.
Question. Admiral Pilling, please explain why it is acceptable to
the CNO, the fleet CINCs, and you that in the Navy's budget not a
single ship under the multiyear plan (1998-2001) will be delivered to
the fleet with anti-ship cruise missile defense nor ballistic defense
capabilities?
Answer. The Navy, in considerations associated with balancing Ship
Construction, Navy (SCN) funds for the entire Department and executing
a fully funded DDG-51 class ship procurement plan moved the
introduction of Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), and Theater
Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) capability in a forward fit
configuration, out of the fiscal year 1998-fiscal year 2001 DDG-51
Multi-Year Procurement (MYP). The 12 ships in the Multi-Year
Procurement (MYP) will be built with the combat systems and computer
software configuration base to allow rapid procurement and installation
of Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) and Theater Ballistic
Missile Defense (TBMD) as funds become available. The Navy has an
integrated backfit plan for installing these capabilities and is
reviewing acceleration options that deliver these much needed
capabilities to the fleet as the technology becomes available, at the
beginning of the next century.
Question. Under your current plan, when is the first year that a
DDG-51 would be delivered to a CINC's fleet with these capabilities
installed?
Answer. The option that provides the Navy the most rapid deployment
of these capabilities is via backfit. Under the current Navy plan the
first DDG-51 class destroyer will be backfit in fiscal year 2003 with
additional ships scheduled in fiscal year 2004 and out. Under the
current plan, ships appropriated in fiscal year 2002 will receive the
first forward fit configuration, in production/construction. By
Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations direction, Navy is
reviewing acceleration options that could nearly double the number of
ships provided this capability (from 15 to 28) by fiscal year 2003.
Question. Is there any technical reason why ship self-defense and
ballistic missile defense capabilities cannot be installed on DDG 51
destroyers prior to 2002 funded ships.
Answer. It is technically feasible to introduce both Cooperative
Engagement Capability (CEC) and Theater Ballistic Missile Defense
(TBMD) as part of the multiyear procurement. The Navy is developing a
plan which details the schedule and funding requirements necessary to
ensure that both computer programs and equipment will support in-line
introduction of TBMD and post-shakedown availabilities of CEC for the
multiyear ships.
Question. Mr. Douglass, we have never formally discussed the DDG 51
multiyear proposal in a hearing. What are the costs, and what are the
savings, from a multiyear strategy for 12 DDG 51 ships?
Answer. The DDG multiyear procurement will save $1.2 billion
dollars between fiscal year 1998 and fiscal year 2001. Savings that can
be attributed to procurement savings, material savings and other
factors equate to $788 million and are directly tied to the
unprecedented long term stability offered by the multiyear process. The
remaining $420 million is from increasing the number of ships purchased
from 11 to 12 and by guaranteeing long term orders to the shipbuilders
which reduce the unit cost of each ship by $35 million. In order to
reap these impressive savings, we will spend $525 million in fiscal
year 1997 and fiscal year 1998 for large economic order quantity buys
of selected shipboard equipment. These funds were appropriated in
fiscal year 1996 and fiscal year 1997 for this purpose or are included
in the fiscal year 1998 budget request.
The multiyear plan is a ``win-win'' strategy for the Congress, Navy
and industry. Industry gets the long term stability in ship acquisition
that they need to successfully plan for the future, the Navy gets an
extra ship, and Congress sees significant cost reductions for the DDG
program.
Question. For the record, show the costs by fiscal year and ship
hull number for capabilities that were dropped from DDG 51 ships
between the time the multiyear approach was presented to Congressional
committees last year and the current FYDP. Show each capability (e.g.,
CEC, TBMD, others) separately.
Answer. The Navy had planned to introduce Baseline 7 Phase II in
the Fiscal Year 2000 ships starting with DDG 97. This baseline includes
CEC, TBMD, Advanced Processing, ID Upgrade Phase 2, SM-2 Blk 3B full
integration, LAMPS Mk3 Block II, AIEWS Phase II, IRST/Precision ESM,
NSFS, and several other software and hardware upgrades. Due to fiscal
and technical concerns assessed in July and August 1996, we elected to
defer the implementation of this baseline by four ships to fiscal year
2002 (DDG 101), the first year after the multiyear. Since last July, we
have been able to resolve many of the technical issues we faced, but
the fiscal constraints remain. Deferring Baseline 7 Phase II from DDG
97, 98, 99, and 100 saved a total of $117 million across fiscal year
2000 and fiscal year 2001.
Arsenal Ship
Question. The 1998 budget requests $150 million for development of
the Arsenal Ship, which is basically a ship loaded with long range
attack missiles. While cost estimates are very sketchy at this early
stage in the program, the six ship program would cost at least $3
billion. Admiral Pilling, please explain the Arsenal Ship concept.
Answer. Arsenal Ship represents an affordable and much needed
enhancement to our existing force of carriers and land attack capable
combatants and submarines. It is not a replacement for these or for
land-base air. Instead, it is a part of the whole--just as the
Battleship was a part of the whole for nearly a century. Operating
under the control and umbrella of regularly deployed Aegis combatants,
Arsenal Ship will supply substantial firepower, early: giving unified
Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) the capability to halt or deter invasion
and, if necessary, enable the build-up of coalition land-based air and
ground forces to achieve favorable conflict resolution. With a force
totaling about six, Arsenal Ships will be stationed continuously
forward, always available for rapid movement upon receipt of even
ambiguous or limited strategic warning. Much like our maritime pre-
positioning force, they will remain on station in support of a Unified
CINC for indefinite periods without dependence on host nation support
or permission.
Question. Why do we need an Arsenal Ship, and why is it urgent to
build it now?
Answer. We need the Arsenal Ship as an affordable way to station
massive firepower continuously forward, as an enhancement to our
existing forces. The urgency to build it now falls into two areas:
operational and programmatic. Operationally, we have a need to position
massive firepower in forward areas and we need to do it affordably. We
can and do currently accomplish that; Arsenal Ship allows us to do it
cheaper. The sooner we build that capability, the sooner we can take
advantage of those economies. Programmatically, there are many
technologies that are now maturing to the point that they can be
incorporated into this ship and the timing allows the Arsenal Ship to
provide a technological bridge to the Navy's next surface combatant,
the SC-21. Also programmatically, the Arsenal Ship is the Navy's most
radical example of acquisition reform. Conducting this research and
development project under DARPA's Section 845 authority now will allow
us to learn from this effort and to incorporate the most successful
aspects of acquisition reform into subsequent acquisitions.
Question. Is the Arsenal Ship on any of the CINC integrated
priority lists of requirements?
Answer. The Arsenal Ship is not specifically listed on the CINC
IPL, however it will enhance our ability to meet many of those
requirements.
Question. Who will ``own'' the Arsenal Ship?
Answer. Arsenal Ship will operate in both peace and war as an
integral fleet unit within the chain of command under Joint Combatant
Command (COCOM). Peacetime Operational Control (OPCON) will normally be
exercised by numbered fleet commanders. Within a Joint Task Force
structure, OPCON will normally be exercised by the Joint Force Maritime
Commander. Tactical Command (TACON) will normally be assigned to a
naval commander.
Question. How will the Arsenal Ship be employed, and what will be
its mission?
Answer. With about 500 missiles and space for future extended range
gun systems, Arsenal Ships will be capable of launching many current
and planned Department of Defense weapons across the warfare spectrum.
Arsenal Ship can be positioned to destroy the enemy's critical
infrastructure at or near inception of hostilities. Using precision
guided missiles equipped with advanced penetrating warheads and sub-
munitions, this ship will serve as an additional maneuver element in
the landing force or ground force commander's plan by isolating,
immobilizing, or destroying enemy armored fighting vehicles, as well as
providing fire in direct tactical support of ground forces.
Employing the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) ``remote
magazine'' launch concept, the Arsenal Ship will provide additional
magazine capacity for Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TMBD) and air
supremacy missiles. This concept allows for remote missile selection,
on-board missile initialization and remote launch orders, and provides
remote ``missile away'' messages to the control platform.
Question. How will the Arsenal Ship contribute to the CINC's
warfighting capability?
Answer. Arsenal Ship is a firepower multiplier that, in conjunction
with other naval forces, increases decisively the options available to
the theater CINC. Arsenal Ship will be assigned to theater CINC to
provide:
Conventional Deterrence against regional aggression inimical
to U.S. interests,
Flexible response for demonstration of power independent of
diplomatic limitations,
Credible forward firepower support to joint and coalition
land forces early in a regional contingency if deterrence
fails.
The Arsenal Ship weapon loadout will be robust, flexible and
tailorable to CINC requirements in order to expand CINC options for use
of assigned joint forces.
Arsenal Ships will be fully integrated into the joint warfighting
force structure. The ships will be capable of firing a variety of
weapons in support of a land campaign, including Long Range Strike,
Invasion topping, Fire Support to Joint Ground Forces, Tactical
Ballistic Missile Defense and Air Superiority.
Arsenal Ships will be stationed, operated and supported in
forward theaters for conventional deterrence and to provide
immediate responsiveness upon onset of hostilities.
Question. Won't the Arsenal Ship be more vulnerable than other
warships in theater?
Answer. Though the Arsenal Ship will operate in any threat
environment under the protective umbrella of the joint battle force, it
must be survivable against 21st century anti-ship missiles, torpedoes,
and mines. Passive defense will capitalize on the benefits of mass
(tonnage), innovative applications of multiple hull integrity, and
signature reduction. Active self-defense, if required, will be roughly
equivalent to that of a combat logistics force ship.
Question. What size crew will man the Arsenal Ship?
Answer. Offboard integration of all but the most rudimentary C4I
and survivability achieved primarily through passive design techniques
will allow the Arsenal Ship to have a very small crew. Crew size will
not exceed 50 personnel and the design objective is to minimize crew
size to the maximum extent which is technically feasible. Reduced crew
size is a principle driver in reducing the cost of ownership i.e., life
cycle costs.
Question. What is the total estimated development cost of the
Arsenal Ship, and how was this number derived?
Answer. Total Current Estimated Then-Year Dollar Development Cost
for Arsenal Ship (in thousands of dollars)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DARPA.............................. 1,000 18,577 47,200 50,000 36,000 22,000 174,777
NAVY............................... 3,999 17,976 102,994 139,499 79,680 11,287 355,435
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total.............................. 4,999 36,553 150,194 189,499 115,680 33,287 530,212
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
During the formulation of the Arsenal Ship Program in early 1996,
rough order of magnitude (ROM) estimates were prepared for the various
elements of the program. These included concept formulation, functional
design, detailed design, the integration of various technologies,
construction and testing of the prototype ship. The Navy/DARPA funding
split was based on these ROM estimates and technology focus areas for
the Navy and DARPA was codified in the May 26, 1996 Memorandum of
Understanding between ASN(RD&A), CNO, and DARPA.
Question. What are the estimated production costs for each of the
six Arsenal Ships planned by the Navy, and upon what methodology are
these amounts derived? Explain ``learning curve'' assumptions in
detail.
Answer. To allow the industry teams the maximum flexibility in
meeting the aggressive Unit Sailaway Price (USP) goal of $450 million
per ship, they have been asked to provide their production profiles for
the construction of five Arsenal Ships and the conversion of the
Demonstrator to an Arsenal Ship. The proposed production schedule of
the one industry team selected to do detailed design of the Arsenal
Ship and construction of the Demonstrator will be known in January
1998. The Navy will use this input in developing its production profile
and supporting SCN funding stream. The cost estimate for a production
ship is unknown at this time as it is contingent on the successful
industry team's irrevocable fixed price USP based on construction of
the five ships. The USP will be strongly influenced by the production
rate and build schedule proposed by the successful Phase III industry
team. The three industry teams presently performing functional design
work under DARPA Section 845 agreements are in an aggressive
competition. Based on this competition, it is anticipated they are
closely analyzing cost as an independent variable to ensure their
concept designs can meet the government's USP goal of $450 million
($550 maximum) in fiscal year 1998 dollars.
Question. The Navy originally down-selected from five to two
contractor teams for Arsenal ship development. Please explain your
recent action, apparently in response to pressures from the Senate
related to the Ingalls LPD 17 contract award protest, to reinsert the
Ingalls team into the Arsenal ship competition after it had lost.
Answer. The Arsenal Ship Phase II Source Selection, conducted by
the joint Navy/DARPA team, determined that three, vice the previously
anticipated two, industry designs were of such maturity and offered
best value to the Government so as to be worthy of continued effort.
LPD-17 Amphibious Assault Ship
Question. The LPD 17 class of 12 ships is a competitive program
which will allow the Navy to retire 41 current ships and reduce
manpower by 7,800. Congress appropriated funds for the first ship in
fiscal year 1996, and the second ship was planned for fiscal year 1998.
However, in the new budget, no funds are requested for the second ship.
Secretary Douglass, would you please explain the Navy's acquisition
strategy and rationale for your recent selection of the winning
contractor team.
Answer. The Request for Proposals (RFP) informed industry of the
specific evaluation criteria to be used and their relative importance.
The four categories used to evaluate proposals were:
1. Detail Design, Total Ship Systems Integration, Testing,
Logistics and Life Cycle Support Planning. This was a pass/fail
category encompassing the traditional evaluation areas of management
approach, program build strategy, technical approach to detail design,
total ship engineering and integration, production approach, past
performance and configuration management. In this category, the
Offerors were also required to address the acquisition reform
initiative known as Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD),
a management approach required to be used for performance of the
contract consisting of co-located Government/Contractor personnel.
2. Integrated Product Data Environment (IPDE). Another acquisition
reform initiative implemented by the LPD 17 RFP, IPDE was defined as an
information system capability which would be implemented in phases and
which would support all phases of ship design, construction and life
cycle support. Its core is to be a central product model database which
is to serve as the single source of configuration data over the live
cycle of the ship class. Traditional support data products, such as
drawings and technical manuals, and program execution information, such
as plans, schedules and procedures are also to be integrated within the
IPDE. The RFP required that all of these previously paper-bound
products be developed, updated, and available for reuse in an
electronic form in a digital data environment.
3. Ownership Cost Reduction Approach--Offerors were required to
describe changes to existing processes and ways of doing business while
designing and constructing LPD 17 that would lead to life cycle cost
reductions during the in-service phase of all 12 ships in the class.
Additionally, Offerors were required to describe an approach to
developing tools and techniques to create a realistic baseline of life
cycle costs against which savings could be measured and validated and a
plan for integrating these tools and techniques into the IPDE.
4. Price to Government--the price evaluation consisted of
determining a realistic total evaluated estimated cost for each
Offeror's proposed technical approach, taking into consideration audit
findings with regard to each Offeror's projected labor and overhead
rates for the period of performance.
Section M of the RFP indicated that the basis for award would be
overall best value to the Government and the best value would be
determined as follows: non-price categories were significantly more
important than price, and provided an Offeror received an acceptable
score in Category 1, Category 3 was more important than Category 2.
Section M also stated that the Government was willing to pay a premium,
within budget constraints, and accept reasonable risk for the technical
approach that demonstrated the potential for greater life cycle cost
reductions.
The Navy awarded the contract to the Avondale Alliance, a team
consisting of Avondale Industries, Inc., as the prime contractor, Bath
Iron Works as a shipbuilder teammate and major subcontractor, Hughes
Aircraft Corporation as the total ship systems integrator, and
Intergraph Corporation as the IPDE integrator. Using the criteria
discussed above, a decision was made that the Avondale Alliance
proposal represented the ``best value'' to the Government.
Question. What, in your opinion, are the merits of the losing
contractor team's recent protest to the General Accounting Office?
Answer. By decision dated April 7, 1997, the General Accounting
Office upheld the Navy's decision to award Avondale Industries, Inc.,
the contract for detail design, integration, and construction of U.S.S.
San Antonio (LPD 17), with options for construction of LPD 18 and LPD
19. The General Accounting Office's decision reflects a thorough
examination of the facts related to the Navy's contract award. This
decision validates the Navy award to Avondale Industries as proper and
representing the best value to the Government and the American
taxpayer.
Question. The Navy's new shipbuilding plan proposes multiyear
contracting for both DDG 51 destroyers and new attack submarines for
many years. What is the risk to the LPD 17 program if Congress agrees
to ``lock in'' funding for these ship programs, and then outyear
budgets fail to materialize as currently projected by DoD--which by the
way is what historically always happens?
Answer. If outyear budgets fail to materialize, the production
profile of LPD 17 could be reduced if production profiles of
shipbuilding programs in multiyear contracts are held constant.
However, the outyear shipbuilding budget profile for all programs is a
balanced plan and we fully expect to fund the programs we have
reflected in this plan.
Question. How much would be required, and how much would be saved,
if Congress appropriated funds for the second LPD 17 in fiscal year
1998 rather then waiting until next year as envisioned by the
Administration's plan?
Answer. Accelerating a fellow ship into fiscal year 1998 has a
beneficial effect on the shipbuilding industrial base workload. The
estimated cost of a fiscal year 1998 LPD 17 class ship reflecting
option prices from the Full Service Contractor is $746 million. A ship
added in fiscal year 1998 would result in a reduction in total
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy program costs of approximately $50
million. Also, the current cost plus award fee contract structure
provides for a lead ship and options for two follow ships with the
phased combat system. The current budget structure provides for only a
lead ship and one follow ship with the phased combat system, before
beginning the fixed price incentive contract for the full combat system
with Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile and Vertical Launch System.
Consequently, the existing cost plus award fee option for the third
ship, the first ship at the second yard, would not be exercised in the
budget as now structured.
If a ship is added in fiscal year 1998, the following table
illustrates the delivery dates of the first, sixth and twelfth ship of
the LPD 17 class:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 1998 Plan......................... Sept 2002.............. Dec 2005............... Dec 2008
FY 1998 Add.......................... Sept 2002.............. Jun 2005............... Jun 2008
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. Will the winner of the competition be awarded all 12
ships of the class?
Answer. The approved acquisition strategy provides for establishing
a long term relationship with the selected Full Service Contractor.
Negotiated procurements with the Full Service Contractor are planned
for the remaining nine ships assuming continued successful performance
of each contract.
Question. Compare estimated delivery dates of the first, sixth, and
twelfth ships under the new budget plan compared to last year's plan.
Is the program on track or slipping?
Answer. The estimated delivery dates for the last ship of the LPD
17 class is estimated to be six months later in the fiscal year 1998
plan compared to the fiscal year 1997 plan. The following table
illustrates the delivery dates of the first, sixth, and twelfth ships
of the LPD 17 class:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 1997 Plan......................... April 2002............. June 2005.............. June 2008
FY 1998 Plan......................... Sept 2002.............. Dec 2005............... Dec 2008
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
New Attack Submarine
Question. The Administration's plan for new submarine construction
has been contentious in Congress during the past 2 years. The budget
proposes a new plan, and Secretary Douglass is the architect. Mr.
Douglass, please explain the Navy's new strategy for a teaming
arrangement between Electric Boat and Newport News to jointly build the
first 4 New Attack Submarines under a multiyear procurement contract.
Answer. The Navy originally planned to sustain nuclear ship design
and construction capabilities at Electric Boat with New Attack
Submarines and at Newport News Shipbuilding with CVN construction and
overhauls. The Fiscal Year 1996 and Fiscal Year 1997 National Defense
Authorization Acts rejected this plan and split the first four New
Attack Submarines between the two shipbuilders and directed a price
competition for the fifth and later ships. The Navy could not fund the
Congressional plan within its budget constraints.
The Secretary of Defense Report on Nuclear Attack Submarine
Procurement and Submarine Technology submitted to Congress on March 26,
1996, stated that the Department would face major near term
affordability issues in pursuing the plan directed by the Congress. The
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy, however, certified
that the Navy would compete future New Attack Submarines on the basis
of price in response to requirements in the National Defense
Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 1996 and 1997. In making this
certification, the Navy made it clear that the Navy budget did not
contain sufficient funds to execute the competition as directed by
Congress.
In addition to the funding issues mentioned above, the wording of
the competition legislation presented other problems. The legislation
directed that competition take place after allocation of two or four
submarines. If competition were conducted after allocation of two
submarines, neither submarine would be anywhere new completion at the
time of the competition. If the competition were to occur after four
submarines had been allocated, none of the four would be complete at
the time of the competition.
The legislation also called for a competition based on ``price''.
This strongly implied that the winner should be chosen on the basis of
price alone, regardless of the performance of the contractor in
constructing the allocated submarines or the quality of the
contractor's proposal. This section of the legislation also implied
that the competition would be a ``winner-take-all'' competition. After
such a competition, the Navy would be back in a sole source position
and the losing contractor would still be building one or two
submarines, leaving the future of these ships and their costs open to
question.
Finally, the fiscal year 1996 legislation contained a gap in
production in fiscal year 2002 that would have created serious problems
at one of the construction yards.
A winner-take-all competition also risks shutting down one of the
two remaining nuclear capable shipbuilders. In response to questions
from Congress in 1995, the Navy estimated that it would cost $650
million to $1.1 billion to transfer New Attack Submarine to Newport
News Shipbuilding and shut down Electric Boat Corporation (worst case
scenario). The Navy would also be faced with completing construction of
expensive orphan submarines allocated by Congress to the losing
shipbuilder and large cost impacts to the Seawolf program, should the
Seawolf contractor lose the competition.
Construction teaming will involve both shipbuilders, as Congress
directed, but at a price the Navy can afford. Predicted cost avoidance
from construction teaming ($450 million-$650 million over like
profiles) makes the four-ship plan affordable. Specifically, teaming
will:
Enable near single learning curve economies;
Avoid certain one-time costs from being incurred at both
yards (e.g., duplicate data bases, jigs, fixtures, etc.);
Take advantage of each builder's strengths;
Avoid the costly inefficiencies inherent in the restricted
communications which occur between two competing shipyards as a
result of proprietary concerns; and
Provide stability to vendors, which yields savings in
material procurement.
Competition in construction will not benefit the Government given
the anticipated low build rate for submarines because:
For effective price competition, at least two suppliers are
needed.
To sustain two suppliers, there must be a sufficient, steady
level of business. The Navy outyear budget projections do not
contain sufficient submarine production to sustain an annual
competition until well into the next century.
Loss of a builder with ongoing construction would be
extremely costly and result in a sole source submarine
supplier.
Therefore, neither the Congressional mandate to have two
builders engaged in submarine construction nor the Department
of Defense policy to sustain two nuclear capable shipbuilders
would be achieved.
The New Attack Submarine is a critical piece of a long range
shipbuilding program that satisfies two overarching objectives. First,
it meets the submarine force level requirements in the near term, as
needed to maintain readiness by providing our Sailors with the best
equipment at the most affordable price. Second, it seeks to protect to
the extent possible without limited resources, the nation's critical
maritime industrial base--shipyards, equipment suppliers, and
engineering support base--that provides us with the most modern and
war-ready Navy in the world.
To be successful in these two objectives, we had to develop an
affordable shipbuilding program that brings together all of the major
constituent interests including Congress, the Department of Defense,
the Navy research, development and acquisition communities, the
warfighters, and the shipbuilding industry. To make this program more
affordable, we had to be innovative and commit to establishing and
maintaining a consistent shipbuilding program while investing in long-
term affordability initiatives as a key objective in the face of
limited budget levels. The New Attack Submarine construction teaming
and a single contract for four ships over five years is an affordable
plan that is fully funded, executable and supports our national
security requirements.
Question. Has a Defense weapon system ever used a multiyear
contract for the first four items off a production line? What are the
risks? What are the benefits?
Answer. Multiyear contracts for the first four items off a
production have not been used by the Department of Defense. In the case
of the New Attack Submarine the program was budgeted using a teaming
approach and a single contract for production of the first four
submarines. The use of a single contract for four ships provides the
stable fiscal environment and business incentive for the two
shipbuilders to team. Additionally, use of a single contract provides
the least cost approach for maintaining both nuclear shipbuilders in
the submarine construction business.
Multiyear contracts have not been used for initial production
contracts due to the statutory requirement for a stable design, which
is usually proven out by Engineering and Manufacturing Development
(EMD) units. In the case of aircraft programs, multiple units have been
procured under a single, research and development contract for first
item testing:
The B-2 bomber program procured 6 EMD aircraft from Northrop
with Boeing as a major subcontractor. A production run of 20
aircraft were ultimately procured.
The F/A-18 E/F program is procuring 7 EMD aircraft.
McDonnell-Douglas is the prime contractor and has a major
subcontractor relationship with Northrop-Grumman. The prime
holds the production contract with the government and has
associate contracts with all subcontractors.
In the case of ships and submarines, the high unit costs make it
impractical to have unique test platforms--so every effort must be made
to reduce both risk and cost in the design, testing and production of
the initial ship. Contracts for the first unit of any new design
inherently involve a higher degree of cost uncertainty than follow-on
contracts which can be priced using return cost data. However, the New
Attack Submarine contract should present far less risk of cost growth
than prior lead ship contracts due to actions taken by the program to
mitigate risk and keep a focus on cost control.
New Attack Submarine is the first submarine application of the
design/build process, which eliminates the government as a middleman by
making the shipbuilder responsible for ensuring that communications
between designer and builder are fast, effective, and efficient.
Historically, the government has acted as a middleman between the
design agent and construction yard. A significant number of contract
disputes over the past 25 years attributed major cost overruns to
defective or late design information from separate Government design
contracts. This problem should be avoided with New Attack Submarine's
design/build approach.
Based on the demonstrated success of the design/build process,
confirmed by an OSD Design Maturity review completed in January 1997,
the New Attack Submarine design will be far more mature than other
submarine designs at the beginning of construction. For example,
Seawolf had 4.5% of ship drawings available prior to construction
contract award. New Attack Submarine plans and is on track to have 36%
of ship drawings available prior to construction contract award and 60%
available at construction start. Consequently, New Attack Submarine
drawings will be available on average 1.5-2 years prior to construction
requirements, as compared to less than a year for Seawolf. The early
availability of drawings greatly reduce the risk of design changes
during ship construction--traditionally, a major cause of cost
increases.
New Attack Submarine cost estimates are the most detailed ever
developed for a new design submarine, and are based on an order of
magnitude more cost estimating relationships than available on any
other submarine. Consequently, the contract cost negotiated should be
the most realistic ever.
The use of a single contract for the first four New Attack
Submarines will benefit the government by:
Provides the opportunity for economic order quantities of
material,
Allows for managing gaps in the production by providing a
mechanism for level loading of the manpower and workload,
Gives near term stability for the shipbuilders and their
component suppliers to commit assets to the most cost effective
capitalization plans in support of this critical program.
Question. The Committee understands that the contracts for the
first 4 ships will be ``cost-plus'' versus ``fixed price.'' Is there a
precedent in DOD for cost plus multiyear contracting?
Answer. There is no precedence in shipbuilding for using a cost-
plus multiyear contract. Recent Department of Defense Guidance requires
that a cost reimbursable contract be used for the lead ship of a class.
In order to effectively manage ship construction costs under a cost
reimbursable contract, the Navy will include incentive provisions
similar to those used in fixed price contracts where the contractor can
earn additional fee through reduction of costs.
Question. Explain the Navy's plan to seek ``advance construction''
funding rather than the traditional ``advance procurement'' funding.
Isn't this really just a euphemism for ``incremental funding''?
Answer. The Future Years Defense Program accompanying the Fiscal
Year 1998 President's Budget request identifies $767 million in fiscal
year 2000 for the New Attack Submarine Program. These funds will be
used as follows:
$295 million will be used for advanced construction of the
fiscal year 2001 submarine. These advanced construction funds
will sustain critical waterfront tradesmen during the break in
New Attack Submarine production in fiscal year 2000. During
fiscal year 2000, these trades will begin work on the fiscal
year 2001 submarines. The funds are similar to the $450 million
industrial base funds provided by Congress for SSN 23 in fiscal
year 1992.
$472 million will be used for advanced procurement of reactor
plant components for the fiscal year 2002 New Attack Submarine.
Question. What is the Navy's acquisition strategy for the remaining
boats, after the first 4 are built?
Answer. The Navy intends to team for construction of the 30 ship
New Attack Submarine class. The proposed construction teaming
arrangement for the first four ships, however, neither requires, nor
precludes, competition for subsequent submarine classes. The Navy
reserves the option to adjust its submarine acquisition strategy based
upon actual teaming experience and projected workloads in the future.
Question. Why didn't the Administration simply propose a teaming
arrangement years ago in the first place?
Answer. The teaming proposal evolved as an affordable compromise
between the Navy and Congressional New Attack Submarine construction
plans. The Navy originally planned to sustain nuclear ship design and
construction capabilities at Electric Boat with New Attack Submarines
and at Newport News Shipbuilding with carrier construction and
overhauls. This plan is affordable and retains two nuclear capable
shipbuilders, as recommended in the 1993 Bottom Up Review. The Navy's
proposal for single source New Attack Submarine construction was
rejected by Congress. The Fiscal Year 1996 and Fiscal Year 1997
National Defense Authorization Act required the Navy to allocate the
first four New Attack Submarines to two shipbuilders then compete
following ships on the basis of price.
To reduce the cost of involving both shipbuilders, Electric Boat
Corporation and Newport News Shipbuilding proposed a construction
teaming arrangement under which the work for the first four ships will
be shared by the shipbuilders. Construction teaming will allow both
shipbuilders to be involved in New Attack Submarine construction, as
Congress directed, but at a price the Navy can afford.
Strategic Sealift
Question. The program to procure 19 Large Medium Speed Roll-on/
Roll-off (LMSR) ships is well underway at a cost of $6 billion. The
1998 budget requests $813 million for LMSRs, to include $611 million
for procurement of 2 ships, $132 million for overruns on the first five
conversion ships, and $70 million for advanced procurement of the last
ship in 1999. Mr. Douglass, what is the status of the LMSR program?
Answer. The total requirement is for 19 ships of which five were
conversions of commercial ships and the remaining 14 will be new
construction. The five conversion ship contracts were awarded in July
1993. Three ships have been delivered and the remaining two will
deliver in May and November of this year. Of the 14 new construction
ships we have 10 under contract; five each at Avondale (New Orleans)
and NASSCO (San Diego). The first three new construction ships are
scheduled to deliver in fiscal year 1998. Included in the 10 ships are
two contract options for ships appropriated in fiscal year 1997 that we
exercised in December 1996. Congress appropriated funds for a third
ship in fiscal year 1997 which is not currently under contract.
Question. What is your acquisition strategy for the additional ship
added by Congress in 1997, and for the last ship remaining in fiscal
year 1999?
Answer. Our plan is to issue a two ship Request For Proposals in
April 1997, combining the third fiscal year 1997 and the fiscal year
1999 ships as a limited competition between the existing builders,
Avondale and NASSCO. Contract award is planned for this summer.
Question. How much would be required and how much would be saved,
if Congress appropriated funds for the last LMSR in fiscal year 1998,
rather that waiting until next year as envisioned by the
Administration's plan?
Answer. The fiscal year 1998 President's Budget requests $70
million for advanced procurement in fiscal year 1998 and $322 million
in fiscal year 1999 for the final ship. In fiscal year 1998, $306
million would be required to accelerate the fiscal year 1999 ship--this
translates to $51 million in total program savings. There would be no
schedule recovery as each shipbuilder will be near maximum capacity in
fiscal year 1998.
Question. Explain the need for $131 million to cover overruns on
the first 5 LMSRs, which were conversions of existing commercial ships.
Is this the entire cost growth?
Answer. The $131 million covers the portion of the cost growth for
which the government is responsible. This is the entire cost growth of
this program and remains unchanged from a year ago.
The government was responsible for an initial schedule delay of
approximately seven months for two primary causes. First, the U.S.
Coast Guard revised and significantly increased the fire fighting
system requirements to account for the hazardous cargo load. Second,
the government furnished class standard equipment detail design
information was delivered later than required by the shipbuilders. This
was caused by accelerating the ship contract awards to support Army and
JCS required delivery dates as well as strong interest in getting work
into the industrial base. There is an additional 8-15 months of
contractor responsible delay due to underestimating the complexity of
the project, inefficient production, and slow start up by both
contractors. These delays are reflected by the increased cost on the
contract sharelines which the government shares with the contractor up
to the ceiling amount.
Question. What is the cost and schedule performance of the new
construction LMSRs so far?
Answer. Based on the December 1996 Selected Acquisition Report
(SAR) and current returns on cost and schedule, all signs indicate each
contractor will deliver their ships at or slightly above target price
but within the Program Managers Estimate to which the Program is
budgeted. The ships should also deliver within the revised schedule,
which includes one or two months delivery date slippage related to
recent strikes.
Question. The Navy Comptroller revised all aircraft program advance
procurement funding to conform to a new policy starting in 1998. Is the
LMSR advance procurement following the same policy?
Answer. No, LSMR advance procurement is not following the same
policy as the aircraft program. The new policy for aircraft programs is
to reflect minimum essential funding for advance procurement and
contractor furnished equipment and budget for advance procurement only
when it is cost effective and not to protect production schedules. The
aircraft program advance procurement analysis now includes a present
value analysis comparison of the procurement profile with and without
advance procurement funding, showing cost effectiveness. In addition,
the amount of termination liability coverage provided with advance
procurement has been kept to a minimal level, covering only until the
regular funding becomes available in October of the next fiscal year.
In the past, some programs had adequate termination liability funding
to cover the first quarter.
The LMSR advance procurement reflects $70 million in fiscal year
1997 to procure Contractor Furnished Equipment (CEE) equipment such as
reduction gear, main control console, ship control console and main
diesel engine. These long lead items, have a fifteen to eighteen month
delivery schedule. In order to meet the Army load out date of fiscal
year 2001, it was necessary to accelerate the build process of the
fiscal year 1999 LMSR ship.
Question. Explain why advance procurement is needed at all for the
last ship.
Answer. Advanced procurement is required only for the fiscal year
1999 ship to support the DoD requirement to have all LMSRs delivered by
the end of Fiscal Year 2001.
Question. Was advance procurement used for the first 18 ships?
Answer. There was no advanced procurement used for the first 18
ships because there was sufficient time to build the ship after
appropriations and still meet the required delivery dates as
established in the Mobility Requirements Study.
Question. What is the cost penalty if Congress denies this request
in 1998?
Answer. Should Congress deny this request, the penalty would be an
increase in escalation and the inability of the Navy to meet the DoD
requirement to deliver all LMSRs by the end of fiscal year 2001.
Strategic Sealift Support Equipment (Lighterage)
Question. The strategic sealift (LMSR) ships being built by the
Navy are to support operations of the Army during war. Therefore, it is
the Army's responsibility to buy support equipment for the new ships
once they are delivered. Admiral Pilling, is it true that the first
LMSR is now in operation but it has no lighterage aboard it?
Answer. Yes, but Army modular causeway sections (MCS) are aboard T-
ACS GOPHER STATE and AMERICAN COMORANT also has Army watercraft assets
aboard as part of the current Army War Reserve-3 package.
Question. Are we buying $6 billion of LMSR sealift ships, yet have
no equipment to unload them during combat?
Answer. The Army is responsible for equipping and offloading the
LMSRs. I defer to the Army to answer the offloading issue.
Question. If the Army fails to buy lighterage, then a theater CINC
would have to take lighterage from the Marines (MPS ships) and give it
to the Army (LMSR ships). General Oster, would this be acceptable
generally to the Marines during wartime?
Answer. Generally, this option is acceptable upon the completion of
the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) mission. The CINC has fully
capable, self-sustaining MPF assets and any use of the MPS lighterage
to offload the Army LMSRs, prior to completion of the MPF mission, will
degrade this mission capability.
Question. Admiral Pilling, explain the CINC's requirement for ``Sea
State 3'' lighterage.
Answer. The CINCs require a sea state 3, service-interoperable
LOTS/JLOTS capability to support expeditionary and theater sustainment
logistics when ports are degraded or unavailable. In some critical
areas of operation, sea state 3 conditions exist greater than 50% of
the time. Failure to operate in sea state 3 in these situations may be
a war stopper for these CINCs, if he cannot meet his throughput
requirement to sustain the warfighting effort. A sea state 3 capable
causeway lighter is one of the key systems required to successfully
execute LOTS in a sea state 3 environment.
Question. Mr. Douglass, please explain the Navy's plan and
acquisition strategy to pursue Sea State 3 lighterage development and
procurement.
Answer. The Navy and the Army signed a Memorandum of Agreement in
August 1996 to jointly develop a sea state 3 lighterage system. We are
currently developing the Operational Requirements Document. The Navy
plans to develop this as an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration
and has submitted a proposal for a two year $43.4 million development
to OSD. The OSD approval will not be known until June 1997.
Question. Does the Navy have all the funds it needs in the fiscal
year 1998 budget for a robust development program to meet the CINC's
requirements for sea state 3 lighterage? If not, how much is needed?
Answer. No, we do not. The Navy has $4.8 million in the NDSF
sealift R&D account for this development. The Navy has requested $15.9
million from the OSD ACTD program to complete the fiscal year 1998
funding requirements. An additional $22.7 million will be required in
fiscal year 1999 to be shared by Army, Navy, and the ACTD program. As
part of the ACTD, the following funding profile was proposed:
($ in millions)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 98 FY 99 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ACTD (OSD)............................................. $15.9 $9.3 $25.2
Navy................................................... 4.8 4.3 9.1
Army................................................... 0.0 9.1 9.1
--------------------------------------------------------
Total Funding...................................... $20.7 $22.7 $43.4
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. What would be the benefits, in terms of mating lighterage
equipment to LMSR ship deliveries, of beginning the Sea State 3
lighterage program in 1998?
Answer. The proposed fiscal year 1998 ACTD would allow procurement
of sea state 3 lighterage systems to begin in fiscal year 2000. The new
systems could be loaded on the propositioned LMSRs as they return to
the United States as part of their scheduled maintenance cycle.
Question. What are the advantages during combat operations of
having Sea State 3 lighterage versus today's Sea State 2 equipment?
Answer. Advantages:
1. With existing lighterage systems, offload of sealift ships stops
as conditions approach the upper end of sea state 2. In some areas of
operation, sea state condition 3 exists greater than 50% of the time.
Having sea state 3 lighterage provides a critical element in achieving
a sea state 3 capability that will enable the CINC to continue
operations during higher sea states.
2. Reduced life cycle costs through:
O&M savings in operations and training through use of
identical systems by both services.
O&M savings by using composite materials in lighterage
construction to decrease maintenance costs resulting from
storage and operations in a salt water environment.
Economies of scale in acquisition and parts support.
LCAC Service Life Extension
Question. The Navy's ``From the Sea'' strategy needs V-22s in the
air and LCAC (Landing Craft Air Cushion) boats in the water to allow
Marine combat forces to strike at great distances. Unfortunately, the
LCAC fleet is not in good shape and the Navy has been slow to address
the problem. Admiral Pilling, in what condition is the LCAC fleet
today?
Answer. The average craft in today's LCAC fleet is in very good
condition. Today's LCACs have continued to perform well in a variety of
challenging roles and have demonstrated a high degree of reliability.
Every LCAC in the fleet currently meets or exceeds the Mission
Reliability goal of 0.94 set by the LCAC Top Level Requirements (TLR).
Although today's news is good, our concern is focused on the future
condition of the LCAC fleet. The goal of our LCAC Life Cycle
Maintenance Plan is to ensure that the current high levels of
performance and reliability will be sustained well into the future.
Question. How long can it remain viable if no Service Life
Extension is performed?
Answer. The cumulative detrimental effects of corrosion on the LCAC
hull and its components pose a threat to the attainment of a full 20
year design life. Without a major Depot Level effort to correct
corrosion damage, the service life of some craft may be reduced to
between 12 and 15 years. If a SLEP is not performed, the LCAC of the
future will be less capable, less reliable, and significantly less
affordable.
Question. Does the FYDP (Future Years Defense Plan) accompanying
the President's fiscal year 1998 budget contain an LCAC service life
extension program. Is it fully funded?
Answer. The FYDP accompanying the President's fiscal year 1998
budget does contain an LCAC SLEP program. Navy requirements support
this program commencing in fiscal year 2000. The LCAC's planned for
induction into the SLEP program are fully funded.
Question. The Committee understands that when the Navy retires its
LST ships, the Marines will have to use LCACs to deliver fuel to shore.
Do you have a sufficient number of LCACs to perform this mission?
Answer. A number of concepts are currently being explored regarding
future methods for the delivery of fuel, some of which involve the use
of LCAC. These studies have not yet been completed, therefore, it has
not been conclusively determined that fuel delivery will be a future
LCAC mission.
Fuel delivery is a follow-on assault echelon effort that could be
supported by LCACs made available as the required lane breaching and
critical landing of troops, amphibious vehicles, and HMMWVs are being
completed. Bulk fuel delivery will be performed after hostile fire has
been suppressed or eliminated around the craft landing zones.
Reconfiguration for fuel delivery should not be a problem, since LCAC
breaching and troop transporting configurations are designed for rapid
installations and removals. Existing fuel container and pump systems
can be accommodated by the LCAC. However, the exact number of LCAC
required to carry out this mission has not yet been determined.
Question. The Committee understands that a main mine-clearing
approach involves LCAC launched anti-mine explosive charges. Do you
have a sufficient number of LCACs to perform this mission?
Answer. The Navy is currently developing mine clearing systems
known as the Shallow Water Assault Breaching System (SABRE) and
Distributed Explosive Technology (DET). Both are expected to reach a
Milestone III decision in fiscal year 1998. A contingency capability is
also being developed which will utilize the currently available MK-58
Linear Demotion charge until the SABRE line charge is available in the
fleet. At present, the LCAC is envisioned as the delivery platform for
both of these systems. The number of LCAC required to perform the Lane
Breaching mission has not yet been definitized. The quantity varies
depending on a number of factors such as the tactics to be utilized,
the number of lanes to be cleared, the egress route to be followed, and
hydrography. War games and simulations are planned for the future to
help quantify the number of craft required. It will then be necessary
to determine whether or not the Lane Breaching mission requires
dedicated craft in addition to those required for the basic mission of
amphibious assault.
Question. So without fuel and the ability to clear mines, how can
the Marines perform their mission?
Answer. Current doctrine capitalizes on the speed, range, and
maneuverability of the LCAC to assault enemy beaches at locations of
our own choosing, where the mine threat is minimal or non-existent. If
this option is not available, traditional methods of mine clearance
would be utilized. Delivery of fuel would likewise be accomplished
utilizing traditional methods, whereby displacement craft and
helicopters would transport fuel to the beach until such time as an
offshore pipeline system could be put in place as part of the follow-on
Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) or the Joint Logistics over-the-
Shore (JLOTS) Systems.
Question. The LCAC fleet of today consists of 91 vehicles. Is that
enough?
Answer. The currently planned inventory level of 91 craft is
sufficient to provide the 60 craft required to perform the mission of
Amphibious Assault assuming a lift requirement of 2.5 Marine
Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) plus 12 craft for training. Craft in excess
of these requirements can be used to fulfill other missions or to cover
for those craft in extended maintenance cycles.
Question. Explain how the $37 million appropriated by Congress two
years ago for LCAC SLEP was used.
Answer. The $37 million is being used for LCAC SLEP development.
This effort includes developing engineering packages for a new skirt,
improved engine, improved corrosion control and updated electronics.
Installation of these items on LCAC 91 will be accomplished in new
construction. This is the last craft on the assembly line, scheduled
for delivery in fiscal year 1999, and it will be the test platform for
the new improvements.
Question. Explain how the $37 million appropriated by Congress two
years ago for LCAC SLEP was used.
Answer. The $37 million is being used for LCAC SLEP development.
This effort includes developing engineering packages for a new skirt,
improved engine, improved corrosion control and updated electronics.
Installation of these items on LCAC 91 will be accomplished in new
construction. This is the last craft on the assembly line, scheduled
for delivery in fiscal year 1999, and it will be the test platform for
the new improvements.
Trident Backfit
Question. The 1998 budget contains $154 million in the Other
Procurement appropriation to start in earnest the TRIDENT submarine
backfit with the D-5 missile. Secretary Douglass, is the TRIDENT
backfit on track?
Answer. Yes. The Fiscal Year 1998 President's Budget request funds
the backfit of four of the original TRIDENT I (C-4) SSBNs stationed at
Bangor, Washington, to TRIDENT II (D-5) capability under a ``split
backfit'' approach. This approach was adopted, following the Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR), as a strategy in the Navy's Fiscal Year 1996
Budget to minimize then-current FYDP costs. The second set of backfits
are funded entirely outside the FYDP. USS ALASKA (SSBN 732) and USS
NEVADA (SSBN 733) will be backfit during the non-refueling engineered
overhauls starting in fiscal year 2000 and fiscal year 2001,
respectively. USS HENRY M. JACKSON (SSBN 730) and USS ALABAMA (SSBN
731) will be backfit during refueling overhauls beginning in fiscal
year 2004 and fiscal year 2005, respectively. Since each of the
refueling overhauls is scheduled for a nominal two years, the four-ship
backfit program will complete by the beginning of fiscal year 2007. The
remaining four TRIDENT I (C-4) SSBNs are scheduled to be removed from
strategic service in accordance with the NPR--two in fiscal year 2002
and two in fiscal year 2003. All procurement actions leading to a
planned May 2000 backfit start are proceeding on schedule.
Question. In what years is the Trident Backfit program funded, and
when will it be completed?
Answer. The TRIDENT backfit schedule, as directed by the Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR), is fully funded. Four of the original C4 TRIDENTs
are planned to be backfit to D5 capability in a split schedule, the
first two in fiscal year 2001 and 2002 and the second two in fiscal
year 2004 and 2005. Other Procurement, Navy (OPN) funding for the
shipboard portion (separate from Missile Flight Hardware and Motor Set
expenditures) of the backfit program commences in fiscal year 1997 with
procurement of long-lead (three year) hardware equipment. Funding
continues through planned program completion in fiscal year 2007.
Question. The budget proposes to slip $50 million for training
equipment at the Bangor base from 1998 to fiscal year 1999. Why was
this done and what is the impact? If the backfit program itself is not
slipping compared to last year's schedule, then why would the training
equipment be slipping?
Answer. As an affordability measure within the Navy during Program
Objective Memorandum (POM) 1998, $50 million in funds to procure
equipment required to establish D-5 Strategic Weapons System training
at Bangor were moved from fiscal year 1998 to fiscal year 1999. The
funding delay of one year will have minimal, if any, impact on the
ready for training (RFT) date in Bangor, since the strict lead-away-
from-need contract date was late fourth quarter of fiscal year 1998.
The program manager (Director Strategic Systems Program) is attempting
to prevent any delay in the RFT date by offsetting a one to two month
procurement delay with a corresponding reduction in installation, test
and checkout lead time. It should be noted that the original RFT date
was set to coincide with the Pacific D5 initial operational capability
(IOC) (May of 2002), and included provisions to fly the crews of the
first two backfit units to Kings Bay for their conversion training. If
a delay in training RFT date were to occur, there would exist a need to
fly additional crews to Kings Bay for their refresher training, but no
impact on the backfit schedule would be imposed.
Question. When (and if) the START II Treaty is ratified, what are
the Navy plans for use of the 4 Trident submarines that would be
retired in 2003 not because of their service life but because of treaty
constraints? Describe the expected conditions of these boats. What
alternative uses are being considered?
Answer. The Nuclear Posture Review determined that only 14 TRIDENT
SSBNs are required for strategic service under START II, making 4
available for other uses. Once START II ratification occurs or if a
relaxation of the law prohibiting removal of these units from strategic
service prior to START II ratification were provided, the possibility
exists to convert them to a tactical role. The TRIDENT platform's
inherent stealth, mobility and endurance, and potential for offensive
armament could be put to good use in what the Navy is currently
examining as the TRIDENT SSGN concept (combined Strike/Special
Operations Forces (SOF)).
Under the concept, the TRIDENT SSGN would carry up to 132 vertical
launch missiles (Tomahawk or Navy Tactical Missile (NTACM)) and be
fitted to employ both the dual dry-deck shelter (DDS) or Advanced Seal
Delivery System (ASDS) and over 100 fully equipped SOF troops. The
extensive planned maintenance program for the TRIDENT submarines has
kept them in outstanding condition.
Aircraft Carrier R&D
Question. The budget requests $90 million for aircraft carrier
research and development for the carrier after the next one. The next
one, CVN-77, is planned for construction starting in 2002 while the
future carrier, CVX, is planned to begin construction in 2006. Total
R&D investment for CVX will be at least $650 million through 2002.
Admiral Pilling, please discuss the Navy's vision for the next 2
aircraft carriers, CVN-77 and CVX.
Answer. The total R&D investment for CVX will be at least $812
million through 2002. The Navy is fully committed to a dual track
carrier acquisition strategy that maintains the current force
structure. This strategy procures the tenth and final Nimitz class
carrier, CVN 77, in fiscal year 2002 to replace a KITTY HAWK class
carrier after completion of 47 years of active service in fiscal year
2008. The second element of the Navy's strategy is to transition to the
future with a new carrier design, CVX, to begin in fiscal year 2006 to
replace USS Enterprise (CVN 65) at the end of her service life at 52
years in fiscal year 2013.
CVN 77 will be a ``Smart Transition'' aircraft carrier that will
incorporate new technologies to improve affordability and reduce total
ownership costs for CVN 77. In addition, these technologies could be
backfit into the existing Nimitz class carriers to reduce life cycle
costs. It would also mitigate risk for selected new technologies to be
fully implemented in CVX.
The Navy's vision for CVX is to design a new class of aircraft
carrier for operations in the 21st century that will maintain the core
capabilities of naval aviation (high-volume firepower, survivability,
sustainability and mobility), to significantly reduce total ownership
costs, and to incorporate an architecture for change within the design
of the ship. Achieving this vision will require significant design
changes for a new platform. The Navy is pursuing significant
improvements in the future design, such as a new aircraft launch and
recovery system, increased sortie generation capability to match
projected fast turnaround capabilities of next-generation aircraft,
improvements in ship survivability, improvements in C4I capability,
reducing topside design congestion, and reducing manpower requirements.
Such ambitious goals require a new ship design to incorporate the
advances that are being made in technology and to incorporate
affordability initiatives.
Question. How would CVX be different from the current class of
aircraft carriers, and why is so much R&D required?
Answer. CVX will be the first new carrier designed in over 30
years. In March 1996, the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) approved the
Navy's long term aircraft carrier acquisition strategy which provided
the Navy an opportunity to fundamentally review design options from a
clean sheet of paper for the future carrier, CVX. The design review now
being conducted includes analysis of all aspects of the carriers
concept of operations, airwing types and sizes, aircraft carrier launch
and recovery development, ship type and size, and numerous other ship
systems development. CVX will be similar to our current aircraft
carriers in that it will maintain the core capabilities of naval
aviation (high-volume firepower, survivability, sustainability,
mobility, and responsiveness). CVX will be different in that it will
introduce new technologies, systems, designs, and processes that will
significantly reduce total ownership costs as compared to a Nimitz
class ship, and incorporate flexibility for change within the design of
the ship.
In the fiscal year 1998 President's Budget, there is $125.1 million
funded to start the development of key technologies for CVX and to
continue concept studies and analyses of CVX design alternatives. Some
of the efforts planned to commence in fiscal year 1998 are development
of an Advanced Technology Launcher (ATL), assessment of ski-jump
options for integration with catapults, dynamic armor and other passive
protection systems, Zonal Electric Distribution Systems, assessments of
technologies to reduce manpower requirements, and assessment of
technologies to develop an adjunct multi-function radar system to
perform control and landing guidance functions.
Question. What would be the impact of delaying the CVX R&D program
for one year?
Answer. A delay in the CVX R&D program for one year would adversely
impact development of time-critical technologies for CVX. In the Fiscal
Year 1998 President's Budget request, the time-critical technology
initiatives planned to start are propulsion systems, alternative
aircraft launchers, advanced armor systems, manning reduction, topside
design, advanced computing, aviation weapons handling, and alternative
flight deck design. All of these initiatives are intended to reduce
onboard manning, reduce required maintenance over the life of the
carrier and maintain warfighting capability into the future. Any delay
in the funding of these R&D technologies for the future carrier design
would seriously jeopardize the Navy's ability to deliver in time the
new technologies needed to improve CVX performance while at the same
time reducing life cycle costs.
Question. What would be the impact of providing only half of what
you requested in 1998 for CVX?
Answer. A reduction in the funding of these R&D technologies for
the future carrier design would seriously jeopardize the Navy's ability
to deliver in time the new technologies needed to improve CVX
performance while at the same time reducing life cycle costs. A
reduction in the CVX R&D program by one half would adversely impact
development of time-critical technologies for CVX and result in a one
year delay in the program. In the Fiscal Year 1998 President's Budget
request, the time-critical technology initiatives planned to start are
propulsion systems, alternative aircraft launchers, advanced armor
systems, manning reduction, topside design, advanced computing,
aviation weapons handling, and alternative flight deck design. All of
these initiatives are intended to reduce onboard manning, reduce
required maintenance over the life of the carrier and maintain
warfighting capability into the future.
Question. The Navy has already demonstrated its inability to fully
fund its carriers by dropping $120 million of critical features from
the Nimitz overhaul in 1998. What critical features have already been
dropped from CVN-77?
Answer. The Navy plan for USS Nimitz includes incorporation of all
critical warfighting improvements, including ship self defense
capability. Following the Refueling Complex Overhaul (RCOH), Nimitz
will undergo a Post Shakedown Availability/Selected Restricted
Availability (PSA/SRA), as is typical after an overhaul of such scope.
Critical modernization items not included in the RCOH budget are
planned for execution during the PSA/SRA. Upon completion of the RCOH
and the PSA/SRA, USS Nimitz will rejoin the Fleet as a modernized,
recapitalized, fully capable asset prior to her first post-RCOH
deployment.
CVN 77, the last Nimitz Class carrier, will replace an aging Kitty
Hawk Class carrier after 47 years of service life in fiscal year 2008,
and it will be a ``Smart Transition'' carrier that will introduce new
technologies to improve affordability and reduce life cycle costs for
CVN 77. In addition, these technologies could be backfit into the
existing Nimitz class carriers to reduce life cycle costs. It would
also mitigate risks for selected new technologies to be fully
implemented in CVX. Initial funding for CVN 77 R&D is scheduled to
begin in fiscal year 1998. The range of options on critical features
for CVN 77 remains to be evaluated.
Submarine Technology R&D
Question. In the late 1980s, the Congress insisted that the Navy
spend more on submarine technology R&D and the Navy fought it.
Eventually, the Navy saw the wisdom of this approach, but unfortunately
was so slow to act that little of the $500 million investment actually
resulted in equipment for the Seawolf or New Attack Submarine. The Navy
now claims that we should start investing in submarine technology
again. Admiral Pilling, why does the Navy now think an increased
investment in submarine technology R&D is worth making?
Answer. Historically, submarine technology development, maturation,
and transition have been performed on a cyclical base in conjunction
with building the ``next'' class of submarine. This cyclic approach was
generally successful when there was overlapping development of multiple
submarine classes and block upgrades. The current situation of low
production rate of submarines coupled with high rate of technology
turnover, dictate a more steady funding profile for technology
development, maturation and transition. Therefore, the Navy intends to
pursue a funding approach to submarine R&D to ensure technologies
continue to transition to NSSN. As NSSN moves to production phase, the
development dollars in the NSSN program are declining. The Navy has
programmed increased money into its two primary program elements for
submarine R&D-PE 0603504N (Advanced Submarine Combat Systems
Development) and PE 0603561N (Advanced Submarine Systems Development).
The increased funding in these program elements will maintain a funded
R&D program at an appropriate level to support exploration of promising
technologies and development to maturity.
Question. How much more is in the Navy's outyear budget plan for
submarine technology R&D compared to last year?
Answer. Following the lead of the $60 million congressional plus-up
in fiscal year 1997, the President's Budget for fiscal year 1998
sustains the $60 million level of increased funding through fiscal year
2000, for a total of $180 million. Funding for fiscal year 2001 and
later will be addressed in the Navy's upcoming budget review cycle.
Question. In what areas does the Navy now plan to invest, and why
are they deemed important?
Answer. The Navy's near term and long term submarine technology
investment plans are outlined in the first annual update to the
Secretary of Defense report on Nuclear Attack Submarine Procurement and
Submarine Technology. This report was forwarded to the Congress on
March 14, 1997. An excerpt from this report describing the Navy's
technology investment plans is attached.
2.1 Background
Historically, several nuclear submarine development programs
proceeded in parallel. Each new submarine program drew extensively from
the previous program, and general research and development (R&D)
programs. Technology funding was increased in the early years of a
submarine program, and reduced to a subsistence level during serial
production. This cyclic approach worked in the past because there was
an overlap of multiple submarine design, production, and modernization
programs. This approach was successful for the New Attack Submarine
(NSSN) design, which incorporates advanced technology to meet all
projected military requirements, and has the flexibility to accept
emerging technologies that will reduce life cycle costs or enhance
capabilities.
2.2 Current Submarine Technology Development
Today, extremely low submarine production rates, coupled with the
rapid pace of technological advancement, dictate a more steady funding
profile for technology development, maturation, and transition. This
approach requires a change in technology management. Accordingly, the
Department of Defense (DoD) established the Submarine Technology
Oversight Council (SUBTOC) to advise submarine technology integrated
product teams (IPTs). This increases the opportunity to identify and
select innovative technology for insertion in the NSSN to maintain its
margin of warfighting superiority. A description of this approach can
be found in the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology)
Report on Advanced Submarine Technology issued in October 1996.
Subsequently, a new flag officer position, the Office of the Director,
Submarine Technology (ODST), has been created in the Naval Sea Systems
Command to be the single point of contact for submarine R&D.
2.3 Submarine Technology Management
To help improve submarine technology management and coordination,
the Navy recently established the ODST. Accountable to Assistant
Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition)
(ASN(RDA)) and the Chief of Naval Operations, ODST is the single point
of contact for all submarine R&D programs in the Department of the
Navy, and is key to coordinating submarine technology efforts between
the NSSN Program Manager and the submarine R&D community. Specifically,
ODST's mission is to:
coordinate and integrate all submarine R&D activities among
the DoD, Navy, and industry;
identify new technologies to meet changes in warfare
requirements;
ensure that Navy technology plans support and are in
accordance with DoD and national strategies for science,
technology, and national security objectives;
articulate Navy warfare requirements to industry technology
providers;
develop technology transition plans for incorporating
improved technology into submarine hulls;
ensure submarine shipbuilders participate fully in the Navy's
submarine technology development program; and
co-chair the Flag Chaired IPT responsible for integrating
major technology providers within the Navy.
As co-chairman of the Flag Chaired IPT, the Director, Submarine
Technology oversees the activities of the working level teams in
support of the SUBTOC. The SUBTOC ensures that the efforts to advance
submarine technology from initial concept to production are coordinate
within the DoD. The SUBTOC is co-chaired by the Under Secretary of
Defense (Acquisition and Technology) and ASN(RDA). It has regularly met
to provide top-level guidance to submarine technology managers. The
major issues it has addressed include strategic areas for submarine
technology investment, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) participation in submarine technology development, insertion of
technology in NSSNs, and the development of effective dialog between
shipbuilders and the Navy on technology issues.
The Flag Chaired IPT integrates and prioritizes inputs provided by
the System Oriented IPTs (SOIPTs), and provides recommendations to
resource sponsors. The Flag Chaired IPT, in conjunction with the
SOIPTs, completed a seven-month process in February 1997 that
established the integrated submarine technology strategic goals and
plans described in Sections 2.5 and 2.6. The SOIPTs developed consensus
on technology goals, evaluated on-going projects, and developed
investment recommendations for the Flag Chaired IPT. Objectives of the
Flag Chaired IPT include improving the definition of requirements and
objectives for the technology development community, and balancing
performance, schedule, and cost for potential technology improvements.
2.4 Submarine Technology Investment Strategy
The NSSN is designed to provide a capable, technologically robust
warship that meets all military requirements at an affordable price. It
is important to recognize that incorporation of future technologies
into the NSSN platform will be made feasible, in large measure, due to
the innovative ``design and build'' process. The extensive use of
computer-aided design and engineering tools permitted the Navy to
incorporate state-of-the-art technologies into the baseline design,
while providing sufficient flexibility into the ship necessary to
permit the insertion of technologies that may be developed in the
future. Figure 2.1 identifies the advanced technologies that have been
incorporated into the base design of the NSSN.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The fiscal year 1998 (FY98) budget contains funds to support
insertion of advanced technologies to further enhance the stealth,
affordability, and capability reflected in the NSSN. The Congress
strongly supported this approach by providing an additional $60 million
to accelerate the insertion of selected technologies. Table 2.1
provides the spending plan for the additional $60 million of R&D funds
provided by Congress.
Table 2.1
Technology Development and Maturation Plan
FY97 Funds ($ in millions)
Insertion Opportunities:
Fiber Optic Sensors (LWWA).................................... $8.8
Advanced Hybrid Propulsor..................................... 3.2
Elastomeric Ejection System................................... 1.5
Advanced Acoustic Sensors..................................... 1.1
Advanced Acoustic Sensor Processing........................... 10.0
Core:
Rim Driven Motors............................................. 4.4
Structural Acoustics.......................................... 13.0
Hydrodynamics................................................. 5.0
Propulsion.................................................... 7.0
Design Improvement Evaluations................................ 5.0
Congressional Direction:
Doppler Sonar Velocity Log.................................... 1.0
______
Total....................................................\1\60.0
\1\Of the above, each shipbuilder received $9.4 million
In addition, the Congress redirected $50 million of FY96 funds from
the National Defense Sealift Fund to pursue design and construction of
a second Large Scale Vehicle (LSV-II). Newport News Shipbuilding (NNS)
and Electric Boat Corporation (EB) have agreed to collaborate on the
development of the LSV-II. The Navy plans to have the LSV-II under
contract in the summer of 1997. LSV-II will provide a key capability
for future technology development.
The President's Budget for FY98 sustains the $60 million level of
increased funding in submarine R&D through FY00 in order to provide
mature technologies that will be available for insertion into early
NSSNs. Additional funding to enable the insertion of these technologies
during the construction of NSSNs will be addressed as maturing
technologies are evaluated through the design improvement process
described in the accompanying report. This additional funding will be
prioritized within the DoD's program and budget review process. The $60
million provided by Congress for FY97, along with the additional
funding the Navy has committed to submarine technology, will help
enable the DoD to advance the development and maturation of submarine
technologies, and invigorate the technology pipeline.
Based on the available funding and the efforts of the management
team, technology focus areas have been established and the technology
insertion plan has been refined. These focus areas have enabled the DoD
to establish a balanced investment strategy employing a steady funding
stream to achieve substantial gains in submarine military performance
and affordability.
2.5 Submarine Technology Focus Areas
Advanced submarine technology R&D programs will focus on achieving
large step improvements in connectivity, payload (which includes power
projection), stealth, and sensors and processors. Incremental insertion
of these maturing technologies into the NSSN, as was done with the LOS
ANGLELES class, will ensure the US maintains submarine superiority.
Connectivity: Technologies that provide secure command and control
connectivity between the National Command Authorities and the on-scene
commander. Effective real-time two-way communication with the National
Command Authorities, combined with a total area situational awareness
capability is vital to submarines in support of joint warfighting
missions. As international crises change rapidly, a submarine must
provide and receive updates on tactical situations in its assigned area
to achieve maximum advantage.
Investments in rapidly developing fields of connectivity span the
entire range of information warfare and battlefield dominance
technologies. The ability to receive, transmit, and comprehend ever-
increasing volumes of data while remaining stealthy are a vital part of
this investment. Advanced displays will be developed using the best
commercial, open system architecture offered by industry, as will off-
board vehicles that will greatly expand the submarine sensor's reach.
Payloads: Technologies that enhance maritime support of land
forces, in-theater fire support, and reconnaissance capabilities. As
with the NSSN, flexibility of mission assignment is a vital attribute
for future submarines. Payloads possess the warfighting capabilities
for submarines, and a varied selection of payloads will provide maximum
flexibility to national and theater commanders, whether the mission is
reconnaissance, interdiction at sea, or strike in support of land
forces.
Advanced strike weapons such as Navy Tactical Missile System
(NTACMS) expand the range of stealthy strike options for the battle
force commander. Submarine launched and controlled Unmanned Undersea
Vehicles (UUVs) will expand the battle force horizons.
Stealth: Technologies that improve covertness and minimize
vulnerability. Since its invention, the principle military value of the
submarine has been its inherent stealth; i.e., its ability to control
an area without being detected by the enemy. The submarine has the
capability to operate in an assigned area with impunity, and conduct
intelligence and surveillance missions in advance of a battle group,
launch special operations forces, or support deployed forces ashore.
Hence, stealth is the one essential element that distinguishes
submarines from all other warfighting platforms. During the Falklands
war, for example, the threat posed by British submarines in the area
after the Belgrano was torpedoed and sunk forced the Argentinean navy
to sit in port. This had a strategic impact on the course of the
conflict since Argentinean ground forces in the Falklands were
prevented from being re-supplied.
Continued technology investment in stealth is vitally important to
the sustained advancement of submarine warfare. Stealth investments
represent efforts to become undetectable to acoustic, infra-red,
optical, radar, and electromagnetic sensors. Both SEAWOLF and NSSN
represent major advances in stealth. Past stealth investments such as
quiet nuclear reactor coolant pumps and propulsors originated from
long-term efforts, and are just now entering the fleet aboard the
SEAWOLF class submarines. In the future, electric drive propulsion and
hydrodynamic advances will be necessary to provide substantial
improvement in submarine acoustic quieting, which will be needed to
maintain our margin of superiority. These long-term efforts must be
coupled with a steady investment.
Sensors and Processors: Technologies that enhance battlefield
preparation and interdiction. Coupled with our strategy for enhancing
the military value of submarines in connectivity, payloads, and
stealth, the extraordinary flexibility of NSSN open architecture allows
for the rapid and affordable integration of industry-driven leaps in
advanced sensors and processors. These advances will be vital to
sustaining battlefield awareness and tactical control, and to meet
targeting requirements for advanced weapons.
Technologies to be pursued include high-frequency sonar imaging,
wake detection, advanced electronic countermeasures, advanced sonar
synthetic aperture processing, and the application of fiber optic
technology to sonar sensors. In particular, the advanced hull sonar
program, if successful, has the potential for substantially altering
the design of the submarine's hull by eliminating the need for a
conventional sonar sphere in the bow section.
Inherent to all focus areas is the commitment to affordability by
pursuing technologies that will reduce submarine design, construction,
and life cycle costs.
2.6 Technology Investment Plan
Near-Term Technology Insertion Opportunities: The near-term
emphasis to develop those technologies that will enhance joint force
interoperability and real-time communications, and ensure sustained
dominance of littoral (coastal) engagements. While achieving this goal
will require technologies from each of the areas discussed above, the
focus will be connectivity and payload. Near-term technologies in
connectivity that have potential for insertion include situational
awareness, data fusion, acoustic communications, and NTACMs. Near-term
technology opportunities are also driven by industry advances,
especially in the area of sensors and processing. The DoD will continue
to use methods such as rapid insertion of commercial-off-the-shelf
(COTS) equipment into NSSN open architecture systems to capture
industry advances.
Appendix A provides a list of technologies that have the potential
to enhance affordability to capability of early NSSNs. Many of these
technologies were previously reported as Category I and II
technologies.
Core Technology Development: The long-term emphasis is to assure
our continued dominance in stealth, which is the single most important
attribute for submarines operating in either the open ocean or littoral
waters. Stealth allows submarines to operate in any ocean in the world
with virtual impunity. Existing propulsion and hydrodynamic
technologies have limited potential for growth.
Many new technologies and novel approaches must be pursued. Though
many of the new concepts for achieving the necessary technological
breakthrough exist, their development will entail a moderate level of
technical risk, and an unprecedented degree of integration over a broad
range of disciplines.
Foremost among these efforts is the commitment to electric drive as
a replacement for steam turbine propulsion. Electric drive, with its
accompanying flexibility in electric plant architecture and component
design, is expected to provide the necessary acoustic growth potential
for the propulsion plant. Equally important are fundamental and
synergistic changes to submarine hydroacoustic and hydrodynamic
architectures. This includes significant changes to the sail,
propulsor, hull shape, sonar, appendages, and other items pertinent to
maneuvering and acoustics.
The wide range of core technologies being developed or evaluated
are listed in Appendix B. This reporting category includes technologies
previously reported as Core and Category III technologies.
Question. Can you assure us that this time ``we won't get burned
again,'' and that the results of this R&D will actually go into a
future Navy submarine?
Answer: Many of the technologies developed from the R&D infusion of
the 1980s (Advanced Vibration Reducer, Non-Penetrating Periscope, EM
Silencing Equipment, etc.), have transitioned to submarines at sea
today or are in use as vital development tools (Hydroacoustic/
hydrodynamic Technology Center, Intermediate Scale Measurement System).
The Secretary of Defense Report on Nuclear Attack Submarine
Procurement and Submarine Technology dated March 1997, identifies
several promising technologies for development. For those technologies
identified in the 1997 update as having the greatest potential for
insertion, the Navy has budgeted the necessary R&D funds to mature them
to the point of transition to a submarine design. At this point,
potential design improvements will be evaluated based on a variety of
criteria, including military requirements, technical feasibility, total
ship impact, risk elements, impact on the mission effectiveness, cost
impact and relative maturity of the technology. The Secretary of the
Navy Report on Shipbuilder Design Improvements for the New Attack
Submarine dated March 1997 provides a detailed description of the
formal process the Navy will use to ensure continued improvement of
submarines through insertion of technological innovations.
Question. How did the Navy use the $60 million additional funds
that Congress appropriated in 1997 for advanced submarine technology?
Answer. The Navy plans to spend the $60 million provided by
Congress in fiscal year 1997 as follows:
Insertion Opportunities: ($ in million)
Fiber Optic Sensors (LWWAA)................................... $8.8
Advanced Hybrid Propulsor..................................... 3.2
Elastomeric Ejection System................................... 1.5
Advanced Acoustic Sensors..................................... 1.1
Advanced Acoustic Sensor Processing........................... 10.0
Core:
Rim Driven Motors............................................. 4.4
Structural Acoustics.......................................... 13.0
Hydrodynamics................................................. 5.0
Propulsion.................................................... 7.0
Design Improvement Evaluations................................ 5.0
Congressional Direction:
Doppler Sonar Velocity Log.................................... $1.0
Total..................................................... $60.0
\1\Of the above, each shipbuilder received $9.4 million
In addition, the Congress redirected $50 million of fiscal year
1996 funds from the National Defense Sealift Fund to pursue design and
construction of a second Large Scale Vehicle (LSV-II). Newport News
Shipbuilding and Electric Boat Corporation have agreed to collaborate
on the development of the LSV-II. The Navy plans to have the LSV-II
under contract in the summer of 1997. LSV-II will provide a key
capability for future technology development.
Question. Has the entire $60 million, other than pro-rata fair-
share of undistributed reductions, been made available for obligation
for advanced submarine technology? If not, why would you need any
additional funds in 1998?
Answer. Yes.
Question. DARPA had a world-class operation in submarine technology
development, which apparently has been dismantled by the current DARPA
director as being a ``low priority.'' Do you agree with that approach?
Answer. Both the Navy and DARPA believe that DARPA should be
involved in high impact, revolutionary technology programs. DARPA's
role in submarine technology development is under review by the
Submarine Technology Oversight Council (SUBTOC). This Council is co-
chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology)
and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and
Acquisition) and its membership includes submarine technology
stakeholders in the Department of Defense, including the Director of
DARPA, and both submarine builders. The SUBTOC has produced encouraging
results, including the possible pursuit of a joint Navy/DARPA small,
minimally manned submersible project.
AEGIS Ship Follow-On (SC-21)
Question. The 1998 budget and accompanying outyear budget plan
envision spending at least $750 million to develop a follow-on ship to
the DDG-51 destroyer. Admiral Pilling, what is the Navy's requirement
for a follow on to the DDG-51?
Answer. DDG-51 is the most capable destroyer in the world. There
will be no requirement for a follow-on to the DDG-51 class until they
retire at the end of their service life. A follow-on is required to
replace the retiring FFG-7s and soon the DD-963s and DDG-993s. The
Mission Need Statement (MNS) for a 21st Century Surface Combatant,
signed in September 1994, provides the requirement for a follow-on for
those classes of ships. SC-21 is not a follow-on to DDG-51, but an
entirely new class being designed to perform land attack warfare, to
accommodate new capabilities through advanced technology, and to
incorporate cost reduction measures that can not be integrated on a
mature platform such as DDG-51.
Question. Why is this urgent now?
Answer. Beginning in 2008, surface combatant force levels are
projected to begin a long period of decline as the last DDG-51 is
delivered and the aging FFG-7, DD-963 and DDG-993 class ships retire. A
new class must begin delivering at that time in order to maintain
adequate force levels. Due to the long lead time required to design and
construct a major new surface combatant class, maintaining the current
development schedule is urgent.
Question. The Navy can't afford to put cooperative engagement,
infrared sensors, theater ballistic missile defense, or advanced guns
on the destroyers it is building today and for the foreseeable future.
Why is it that the Navy can't adequately equip its current ships, yet
it hungers for a new ship?
Answer. The option that provides the Navy the most rapid deployment
of Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) and Theater Ballistic
Missile capability is via backfit. Under the current Navy plan the
first ships to receive Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defense
capability in conjunction with CEC, will be two Aegis cruisers in
fiscal year 2000. Additional cruisers will be backfit in fiscal year
2002 and fiscal year 2003. The first DDG-51 class destroyer will be
backfit in fiscal year 2003 with additional ships scheduled in fiscal
year 2004 and out. Under the current plan, ships appropriated in FY
2002 will receive the first forward fit configuration, in production/
construction.
Additionally, the Navy has planned to introduce DDG-81 and follow
with the MK 62 gun in conjunction with the Extended Range Gun Munitions
(ERGM) rounds. All ships in the DDG-51 class Multi-Year Procurement
(MYP) for fiscal years 1998 through 2001 will have this gun.
What the Navy can't afford is to not attempt to capture the latest
technology and acquisition initiatives, increase warfighting
capability, increase automation, and reduce manning to thus to reduce
the cost of procuring and maintaining Surface Combatant force structure
as exemplified most recently by Operation Desert Strike. The Navy can
not afford to maintain force structure levels without building new
ships.
Question. What are the deficiencies of the DDG-51 that require the
development of a follow-on ship? Describe each in detail for the
record.
Answer. Procurement Cost: It is anticipated that the Navy and the
Nation will be little able to afford to continue procuring Surface
Combatants at a cost of $800 million to $900 million a piece, well into
the future, and at a sufficient rate to maintain Surface Combatant
force structure for the future.
Cost of Manpower: At an annual cost of between $30,000 to $75,000
per crew member, the Navy is compelled to reduce manning, while at the
same time increase levels of warfighting capability and complexity in
addressing the future threat facing its Surface Combatants. New
missions, including TBMD, CEC, and enhanced Naval Surface Fire Support
(NSFS) in conjunction with an evolving threat, are drivers for change
in ship and combat systems design.
Cost of Maintenance: The Navy is compelled, via Congressional
direction, and to technically keep pace, to go to procurement of
Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) based computing systems. We must
``break with the past'' in the costly procurement of MILSPEC equipment,
and the costs associated with upgrade and maintenance.
Question. If the Congress were to deny funds for a new ship
development, why couldn't you keep producing DDG-51s?
Answer. If the Congress were to deny funds for a new ship
development, the Navy could continue to procure DDG-51's, but given
cost, and a fiscally constrained environment, procurement would be
reduced to such an extent that Surface Combatant force structure could
not be maintained. Additionally, the Navy would miss the opportunity to
take advantage of advanced technology initiatives, and acquisition
reform, to help reduce cost of procurement, manning and maintenance.
Question. In what year does the Navy project that a potential
adversary country would field a ship as capable as today's DDG-51?
Answer. The Navy can not currently predict when any potential
adversary could possibly field a ship with the same capabilities as
today's DDG-51. But in examining recent events, the Navy can look with
some concern to the arranged sale by the Russians to the Chinese of 2
Sovremenny class DDGs with their accompanying SS-N-22 missiles ------.
While this development is of concern, it was not unanticipated. A
series of improvements to ships and weapon systems including AN/SPY-
1D(V) on ships in the Multi-Year Procurement, CEC and SM-2 Block IV,
will go a long way in keeping our Surface Forces ``pacing ahead of the
threat.''
The Navy will strive in continued improvements to DDH-15s and in
development of future Surface Combatants to maintain this goal.
Intercooled Recuperative (ICR) Gas Turbine Engine
Question. Two years ago, the Committee recommended that the
Intercooled Recuperative gas turbine engine program be terminated, but
did not prevail in conference. The fiscal year 1998 budget requests $32
million for continued development. How much have we spent on ICR
development so far?
Answer. To date we have spent or obligated $273 million in U.S.
funds plus $31 million provided by France and the United Kingdom. The
United Kingdom has also provide another $22 million in testing
services. This totals $326 million.
Question. Does it work?
Answer. The testing shows that the ICR concept does work. We have
demonstrated 21% fuel efficiency improvement and predict at least 28%
improvement for the final fully developed configuration. The
demonstrated performance is based on a variety of different tests which
total 680 hours of engine operation, including 374 hours of operation
with the redesigned recuperator (known as the Limited Operational
Unit). Two 500 hour tests and a 3000 hour endurance test remain to be
conducted. These tests will help determine the reliability and
maintainability of the ICR engine.
Question. How much more is contained in the outyear budget plan for
additional development of the engine?
Answer. $93.8 million for fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year
2001.
Question. How much more is required above the amount in your
outyear plan in order to achieve development of an engine that could
actually be installed in a ship?
Answer. The Navy estimate is that there is an additional $124
million required to complete full qualification testing, at-sea testing
and logistics support.
Question. Explain the Navy's plan to ask Britain to foot more of
the bill for this program, which is based on a British Rolls-Royce
turbine engine. What has been your success so far?
Answer. The ICR engine is a U.S. Navy program. Under a 1994
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), the UK and France have provided some
funding, testing support and services. To date, they have provided $53
million in funds or testing services, which is 16% of the obligations
thus far. The British Navy has been very interested in the development
of the ICR engine and would like it accelerated to be available as a
propulsion alternative for the Horizon Frigate, a joint project
involving the UK, France and Italy. We are discussing the possibility
of the UK providing additional funding (or in-kind services) to help
offset the estimated $124 million required to complete the full
qualification and at-sea testing. In addition, we have proposed that
they also make suitable arrangements for sharing any future cost
overruns. These discussions have just recently begun. While not
accepting these terms, the UK has indicated a willingness to pursue
further agreements, after receipt of our formal proposal. The UK
recently provided $7 million toward the $124 shortfall via an amendment
to the MOU. The French have also expressed interest in continuing the
program, and similar discussions are underway with them.
Question. Explain why, after spending $.3 billion on this program
so far, the Navy recently decided to drop the engine as a candidate for
installation on the DDG-51 destroyers?
Answer. It is not cost effective to amortize the class unique non-
recurring costs given the few remaining candidate ships in the DDG-51
class.
Question. If we agree to your plan, which will eventually costs $.5
billion, will ICR be the ``engine of choice'' for installation on new
Navy ships such as the Arsenal ship or the DDG-51 follow on ship (SC-
21)?
Are you testifying that it will be installed if it works?
Or are you testifying that it just must be one of the
candidate engines?
Answer. The ICR engine will be one of the candidate engines.
Question. Under what conditions would the Navy terminate this
program?
Answer. The Navy would recommend termination if the U.K. and French
MOU partners don't:
a. pay at least 50% of the shortfall for full engine
qualification (in cash or in kind-services)
b. make suitable arrangements for sharing future cost growth.
Question. Admiral Pilling, would you say the technology merits a
$.5 billion R&D investment in this program? Do fleet CINCs agree with
you?
Answer. This technology and others that save fuel costs are
important to the Navy. Although the ICR testing is currently on track,
earlier problems with the recuperator severely impacted the cost and
schedule of the program. As a result, key efforts to fully qualify the
engine for fleet transition (for example, shock testing, logistics
development) are no longer funded. The Navy can not affort to pay for
all these transition items, so we have entered into discussions with
the U.K. and France to see if they can share the costs.
The fleet CINCs support technologies that save fuel and support our
approach of getting the U.K. and France to share more of the costs.
Given the severe fiscal constraints that we are operating under, the
CINCs are concerned about the cost effectiveness/payback of the ICR
technology.
Question. When all costs, including $.3 billion in sunk cost are
considered, how many years will it take to reach a payback of the
taxpayer investment in this program?
Answer. The OSD Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) recently
prepared an analysis of the payback. Based on the current estimate to
complete the program, the CAIG predicted the earliest payback period
for the remaining investment (not counting sunk costs) to be on the
order of 30 years. All analyses are based on assumptions about fuel
inflation rates and the number of candidate ships. Over a range of
assumptions, the payback periods average 30 to 40 years.
New Model F-18
Question. The 1998 budget includes $2.5 billion for the F/A-18 E/F
aircraft, of which $268 million is for R&D and $2.2 billion is for
production of 20 aircraft. Mr. Douglass, your statement says that the
F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet program is on track, within cost, below weight,
and meeting all performance criteria. F/A-18 E/F aircraft cost $79
million each for a total program cost of $79.5 billion. What is the
status of the F/A-18 E/F development program?
Answer. The F/A-18E/F entered E&MD (Engineering and Manufacturing
Development) in June 1992. To date, the airframe E&MD contract with
McDonnell Douglas (St. Louis, MO) is 88.9% complete, and the engine
contract with General Electric (Lynn, MA) is 94% complete. The Super
Hornet completed Initial Sea Trials aboard the USS JOHN C. STENNIS
(CVN-74) in January 1997, successfully conducting 64 catapult launches
and arrested landings, as well as demonstrating its flight stability
during carrier approach. All seven flight test aircraft are currently
flying in support of the flight test effort, and have flown in excess
of 441 flights and nearly 713 hours to date. The first year of flight
test has cleared nearly all of the aircraft's clean (without weapons)
flight envelope. Stores separation work was initiated in February 1997.
By February 1998, a significant portion of the loads envelope will have
been flown and the test team will know a great deal about the precise
characteristics weapons exhibit as they are launched from the aircraft.
The F/A-18E/F flight test program will continue through November 1998.
Question. Please explain what difficulties have been experienced in
the test program with the F414 engine.
Answer. The F414 engine experienced failure of a compressor
component which had been recently redesigned to increase engine
efficiency and enhance already existing performance margin. The problem
was addressed by returning to the previous, proven configuration. With
only two ground tests remaining--Engine Gyroscopic Test and Fan
Containment Test, the F414 team anticipates completion of Limited
Production Qualification within the established program schedule.
Although overall impact to the flight test program was a two month
slip, all flight test assets have been reconfigured, and the team is
working to recover margin by closely managing test assets and
capitalizing on test efficiencies.
Question. Please explain what difficulties have been experienced in
the test program with the landing gear.
Answer. Generally there have been no issues with the landing gear
in flight test. The only incident noted so far was an indicator switch
miss rig that caused a planing link warning light to illuminate on one
flight. However, there were no problems with the gear itself.
Question. What problems have been discovered with the structure and
flying qualities of the aircraft?
Answer. Extensive ground test on the Static Test article and
aircraft E-3, the loads aircraft, has been conducted with test results
generally matching analysis, With regards to flying qualities, the
flight control software has remained the same since first flight and
has been praised by test pilots, especially in the powered approach
flight regime around the carrier.
Question. Aircraft weight affects range, speed, payload, and
carrier recovery payload. Although the aircraft remains below its
weight goal--which is good--aircraft weight has been steadily
increasing. Is there a weight problem when all known potential weight
increases and structural redesigns are considered?
Answer. No. Even with all potential weight increases accounted for,
aircraft weight still remains well below the specification weight
requirement. However, with three years remaining in the test program,
additional design changes will likely be identified which will require
use of some of that weight margin.
Question. What effect will McDonnell Douglas' recent loss on the
Joint Strike Fighter competition mean to its overhead, and indirectly
to the F/A-18E/F cost?
Answer. Short-Term Impact--McDonnell Douglass submits proposals
excluding potential contracts that they may be competing for, so the
effect of the loss will have little or no effect on our contracts. In
addition, the JSF work would have been extensively engineering with
little relation to our manufacturing dominated contracts.
Long-Term Impact--McDonnell Douglass will have fewer programs to
spread its overhead rates across; however, overhead cost should
stabilize/slightly increase if McDonnell Douglass optimizes its
infrastructure to meet the needs of its programs.
Joint Strike Fighter
Question. The 1998 budget requests $931 million for concept
development of the Joint Strike Fighter which could become the largest
acquisition in the history of the Department of Defense in terms of
total costs. Mr. Douglass, what is the status of the Joint Strike
Fighter development program?
Answer. The Joint Strike Fighter Program (JSF) plans to develop and
deploy a family of aircraft that affordably meets the next-generation
strike needs of the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps and allies. JSF
Program activities are centered around three distinct objectives that
provide a sound foundation for start of Engineering and Manufacturing
Development (E&MD) in 2001:
(1) facilitating the Services' development of fully
validated, affordable operational requirements;
(2) lowering risk by investing in and demonstrating key
leveraging technologies that lower the cost of development,
production and ownership; and
(3) demonstrating operational concepts.
A multiyear $2.2 billion JSF Concept Demonstration effort commenced
in November 1996 with competitive contract awards to Boeing and
Lockheed Martin for Concept Demonstration programs. These competing
contractors will build and fly concept demonstrator aircraft, conduct
concept unique ground demonstrators, and continue refinement of their
ultimate delivered weapon system concepts. Specifically, Boeing and
Lockheed Martin will demonstrate commonality and modularity, STOVL
hover and transition, and low speed handling qualities of their
respective weapon system concepts. Pratt and Whitney is providing
propulsion hardware and engineering support for both Boeing's and
Lockheed Martin's on-going JSF Concept Demonstration efforts. The JSF
Alternate Engine Program, with General Electric, continues technical
efforts related to development of an alternate engine for production in
order to reap the financial and operational benefits of competition.
Early warfighter and technologist interaction continues as an
essential aspect of the JSF requirements definition process, and is key
to achieving JSF affordability goals. To an unprecedented degree, the
JSF Program is using cost-performance trades early as an integral part
of the weapon system development process. The Service's completion of
the Joint Operational Requirements Document is planned in Fiscal Year
2000 to support the Milestone II decision in Fiscal Year 2001 for start
of E&MD.
A sizable technology effort is underway to reduce risk and life
cycle cost (LCC) through technology maturation and demonstration. The
primary emphasis is on technologies which have been identified as high
payoff contributors to affordability, supportability, survivability and
lethality. Numerous demonstrations have been accomplished and others
are in process to validate performance and LCC impact to component,
subsystem, and the total system.
Question. Last year, concern was expressed by the House National
Security Committee over the viability of the ASTOVL variant of the
aircraft for the Marines (to replace AV-8B Harriers). Please discuss
the issue and how it was resolved, and please verify for us that the
Defense Department is committed to developing an ASTOVL variant of the
aircraft.
Answer. Last year the House Authorization bill stated that no JSF
funds could be spent for ASTOVL development. Neither the House
Appropriations bills contained that language. In fact the House
Appropriations bill contained language stating that the JSF STOVL
variant must be developed ahead of or concurrently with the other
variants. Neither of the final Fiscal Year 1997 Defense Authorization
and Appropriations bills contained STOVL prohibitions. We hope that
support for ASTOVL development continues to be strong both on the
committee, and in the House.
The Defense Department is fully committed to development of a STOVL
JSF variant for the Marines. The JSF program is fully funded within the
FYDP and STOVL is an integral part of it.
As you know, we are in the Program Definition and Risk Reduction
phase (PD&RR) of JSF now. The Concept Demonstration portion of PD&RR
requires each industry team to build two flying demonstrators, one
conventional and one STOVL. Demonstration of STOVL hover and transition
is a key aspect of this phase and is required by the Single Acquisition
Management Plan. The Concept Demonstration program provides two
different STOVL approaches and aerodynamic configurations, and
maintains a competitive environment between contractors prior to E&MD.
Additionally propulsion development continues during this phase with a
byproduct of STOVL development being significant improvements in single
engine durability and reliability for all variants. In short, we feel
that we have a strong STOVL development program within JSF and we are
committed to maintaining it.
Question. Most of us remember the Air Force's ``Great Engine War,''
where a billion dollars were spent to bring a second contractor into
the fighter engine business and which resulted in better engines at
significantly lower cost. The Navy recently signed a $97 million
``alternate engine'' contract for the Joint Strike Fighter. Please
explain your strategy and your plans to use $10 million provided by
Congress for risk reduction to facilitate this effort.
Answer. During the JSF Concept Development Phase, all three
competing weapon system contractors chose the Pratt and Whitney F-119
or derivative as the primary propulsion system for the Concept
Demonstration Phase. Recognizing the financial and operational benefits
of competition, the JSF Program is pursuing the development of a
competitive engine for production.
Phase I of this effort began in fiscal year 1996 with a General
Electric study effort to determine the comparative Life Cycle Cost and
performance of the GE F110 and YF120 derivative engines in each of the
preferred weapon system concepts. Based on the study results, the
government selected the YF120 engine derivative for continued
development. Phase I initiated preliminary design risk reduction
studies, systems design/integration, cycle refinement, and component
design and associated technology maturation for the YF 120 derivative
engine. Phase II, which commenced in fiscal year 1997, will continue
detailed design and begin hardware testing of the YF120 engine,
culminating in core testing beginning in fiscal year 1999.
Conress appropriated an additional $10 million for fiscal year 1997
competitive engine efforts. This funding will be used for a variety of
risk reduction efforts including: turbine rig test and analysis, core
integration, core supportability, material characteristics, weapon
system concept integration, and diagnostics.
Question. Please discuss your plans for cooperation with other
nations in this program, and what they bring to the table in terms of
capabilities and financial contributions.
Answer. The JSF Program Office has established a framework to
accommodate international participation during the concept
demonstration phase of the program. Currently, the United Kingdom is on
board as a full collaborative partner, with emphasis on the JSF STOVL
variant. The UK is contributing $200 million to the program for this
phase. The Netherlands, Norway and Denmark will soon join the program
as associate partners, with primary interest in the JSF CTOL variant.
The total planned financial contribution for this effort is $32 million
with signature of the multilateral agreement planned in April 1997. The
Canadians have formally requested to join the program and negotiations
are expected to commence in April 1997. Numerous other countries have
received briefs on the program and are interested as well.
Benefits to be derived from international participation in the
program include a harmonization of the requirement with our allies
which will lead to improved interoperability, strengthened
international ties and lower overall program cost as a result of future
anticipated international buys of the JSF (i.e., lower unit cost).
Firm financial contributions and associated efforts are
incorporated in JSF Program plans and funding and are reflected in the
fiscal year 1998 President's Budget request.
V-22 Aircraft
Question. The 1998 budget requests $530 million in R&D and $542
million in procurement for production of 5 V-22 aircraft. Mr. Douglass,
your statement says that MV-22 is the highest priority for Marine Corps
aviation and that the current acquisition profile for the MV-22 will
complete the projected aircraft procurement in 25 years. At this rate,
V-22 cost $87 million each for a total program of $45.5 billion Last
year, the Committee directed that the V-22 program achieve a production
rate of 36 aircraft per year by the year 2000. Why did the Navy ignore
us?
Answer. We have increased the procurement of V-22s by 16 aircraft
over the request from last year, increasing to 24 aircraft per year by
the end of the FYDP. We fully recognize the need to get the rate up and
to replace the current fleet of medium lift helicopters. In the final
analysis, we had to take a hard look at balancing all of the
Department's requirements with the available resources.
Question. Last year, all 4 Committees in the Defense budget process
provided advance procurement funds for 12 aircraft in 1998. Yet, only 5
aircraft are now budgeted. Why did you not take advantage of this
opportunity?
Answer. We share the Committees' commitment to increasing the
production rate of the V-22, and we have made significant progress with
the current request. In reviewing the additional funds required to
procure the additional 7 aircraft, we simply were not in a position to
pursue it this year. Since the Conference Report made provisions for us
to request reprogramming of the $70 million, we have made that request
and ask for your prompt approval.
Question. Is a 25 year production profile acceptable to the
Commandant or the theater CINCS?
Answer. I cannot speak for the CINCS, but for the Commandant, based
on the Fiscal Year 1998 President's Budget, a 22 year procurement
profile is not desirable. The last MV-22 aircraft would be received in
fiscal year 2000. Given the current MV-22 procurement profile, our CH-
46s will be approaching 50 years of age at retirement. I would much
prefer a higher production ramp to 36 MV-22's per year that would
replace our aging CH-46E fleet aircraft 5 years earlier while providing
a significant savings of up to $6 billion.
Question. So, how do we get out of this dilemma?
Navy Answer. In this declining DoD budget era, equipment must be
procured at less than optimum rates in order to achieve a balance that
supports total Department of the Navy warfighting requirements. The
only way to modernize more quickly is to obtain additional fiscal
resources, either from another program or from a Congressional
Enhancement.
Marine Corps Answer. In this declining DoD budget era, equipment
must be procured at less than optimum rates in order to achieve a
balance that supports total Department of the Navy warfighting
requirements. The only way to modernize more quickly is to obtain
additional fiscal resources, either from another high priority program
or from a Congressional Enhancement.
Question. Mr. Douglass, please explain the new plan to pursue a
Special Operations Forces variant of the V-22 aircraft. What are the
costs and what are the benefits?
Answer. A major contract modification was awarded in December 1996
to develop the SOF variant. The plan includes the modification of E&MD
aircraft #8 to integrate the terrain following/terrain avoidance radar
and avionics equipment and the remanufacture of E&MD aircraft #9 to a
full CV-22 configuration. The RDT&E costs are approximately $560
million and procurement costs are about $4.3 billion. The benefits will
be a unique aircraft that will accomplish the long range SOF mission
with the minimum of assets. The 50 CF-22 aircraft to be procured will
replace approximately 100 H-53, H-60 and C-130 aircraft currently being
used by USSOCOM.
Navy Helicopters
Question. The Navy's helicopter master plan consolidates missions
and reduces the types of helicopters used by the Navy. The Navy will
reduce the types of helicopters from seven to two. The plan, which will
be complete by 2012 is aimed at reducing manpower and logistics support
costs. Based on the plan, the Navy will procure a Blackhawk derivative,
the CH-60, to replace current logistics and combat helicopters;
remanufacture SH-60B/SH-60F/HH-60H helicopters to a multi-mission
helicopter, the SH-60R; and outscore military sealift requirements to a
private contractor.
The Navy plans to retire its logistics and cargo helicopters and
replace them with a Blackhawk derivative, the CH-60. In fiscal year
1997, Congress provided an additional $7.5 million to begin the CH-60
program. This year the Navy is requesting $31 million for the CH-60.
The Navy will begin procuring the CH-60 in fiscal year 1999.
During the fiscal year 1998 budget build, DoD accelerated the
schedule and increased the procurement quantities of the CH-60. What
was the rationale for accelerating the CH-60 program? Do you believe
that this is an ambitious schedule? Why or why not?
Answer. The schedule was accelerated for two reasons. First, to
replace the combat logistics aircraft as rapidly as possible to
minimize the investment in components required to keep these aircraft
safely flying. Second, to minimize the potential increased costs
associated with allowing the production line of Sikorsky aircraft to
``go cold'' prior to the initiation of the previously planned CH-60
production. The program acceleration is currently executable, without
incurring unnecessary risks.
Question. What is the program cost and schedule?
Answer. The CH-60 program is currently scheduled to enter full-rate
production in fiscal year 2000, with a production rate of a minimum of
18 aircraft per year through completion of minimum of 134 aircraft in
fiscal year 2006 to support the combat logistics and combat SAR
requirements. The Navy is reviewing potential revisions to the rotary
wing infrastructure which may adjust the total number of required
aircraft upwards. The total procurement cost of the program, as
currently planned, is $2.6 billion in instant fiscal year 1997 dollars.
Question. It is our understanding that the fiscal year 1998 budget
request does not include advance procurement funds. Are advance
procurement funds required in fiscal year 1998 in order to begin
production in fiscal year 1999? If so, how can you begin production in
1999?
Answer. Advance procurement (AP) for the CH-60 program was removed
from the fiscal year 1998 budget by the Navy, in response to the
interpretation of OSD direction to remove AP when not required or
economically justified. The CH-60 had planned to benefit by the pricing
provided by the contractor in the current Army H-60 contract. The lack
of Navy H-60 production or advance procurement funding in fiscal year
1998 will result in a production break of approximately nine months at
the contractor's facility, with a resulting increase in ``production
start-up costs'' and a requirement to enter into a new and distinct
contract. The program office has recognized and briefed that without
advance procurement the production schedule will increase from the
currently planned 12 to 18 months, to between 21 and 27 months. There
will be no change in production start (manufacturing of components),
but there will be a 9-month delay in production completion of fully
assembled aircraft.
Question. Last year, the Army requested funds and the authorization
for a Blackhawk multi-year contract for fiscal years 1997 through 2001.
In the fiscal year 1998 budget request, the Army has reduced the
funding and production schedule of Blackhawks. What is the impact on
the Navy CH-60 program, in terms of per unit and total program cost, by
the Army's decision not to go forward with the multi-year contract?
Answer. The current program pricing is based upon commitment by
Sikorsky aircraft to maintain the previously provided pricing for a
sustained rate of 36 per year as long as the Navy maintains a minimum
production rate of 18 aircraft per year. As a result, the Navy does not
expect a change in per unit or total program cost.
Question. It is our understanding that DoD has released the fiscal
year 1997 funds for the CH-60 program; however, the Army has not
provided the Blackhawk helicopter for CH-60 development and testing.
Could you explain what the problem is? When will it be resolved?
Answer. The requisite Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the
Army and Navy for transfer of a UH-60L to the Navy for demonstration of
the CH-60 capabilities in fiscal year 1997 has been signed. The MOA was
delayed as both Components' counsel ensured it to be in accordance with
Congressional direction and law. (Congressional support (i.e., waiver
of statute) is believed to be required to allow the Navy to replace the
UH-60L ``in-kind'' from the production line in fiscal year 1999). The
UH-60L is at Sikorsky, and the CH-60 modification effort has begun.
Question. To reduce costs and infrastructure associated with its
anti-submarine and surface warfare platforms, the Navy will
remanufacture Seahawk (SH-60B/SH-60F/HH-60H) helicopters to a multi-
mission helicopter, the SH-60R. For fiscal year 1998, the Navy is
requesting $71 million for the SH-60R development program. What is the
acquisition strategy for the SH-60R? What is the cost of the
acquisition program?
Answer. The Navy is using cost-type contracts to conduct
Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD). Fixed price contracts
will be used for production phases of the SH-60R program. Total
procurement is expected to be $4.7 billion (FY93$).
Question. According to the Navy, flight hours for Seahawk
helicopters are exceeding planned operational usage--H-60s are wearing
out faster than anticipated. Given the increased optempo of the
Seahawk, are you satisfied with the delivery schedule of the SH-60R?
Why or why not?
Answer. The current SH-60R schedule will satisfy the Navy's
requirement. The increasing operational demands on the HSL community
caused by the introduction of additional LAMPS MK III capable surface
combatants makes the number of available HSL aircraft in the fiscal
year 2001 through fiscal year 2004 critical. Bureau number by bureau
number management of aircraft undergoing re-manufacture as well as
those undergoing standard depot level maintenance will be used to
mitigate impacts to the operational forces.
Question. Although it is called a ``remanufacture'' program, the
SH-60R is really an integration of improved sensor and system
improvements to ensure the viability of the helicopter for the next 20
years. Last year, the Navy was considering a service life extension
program that would increase the life of the platform from 10,000 to
20,000 hours. Are you still planning to do a service life extension
program? If so, is the program funded in your budget--what is the cost
and schedule? If not, why?
Answer. A SLEP, extending the useful aircraft service lives from
10,000 flight hours to 20,000 flight hours, remains part of the
remanufacture program. The Service Life Assessment Program (SLAP, which
identifies the SLEP requirements) has not been completed. However,
preliminary assessment indicates an approximate labor and material cost
of $5 million per aircraft. This amount is included in the existing
funding request.
Question. The Navy believes it will reduce logistics and
infrastructure costs by developing identical avionics and cockpits for
the SH-60R and the CH-60. The CH-60, which is primarily a transport
helicopter, will receive the same sophisticated avionics required by
the multi-mission SH-60R helicopter. The SH-60R will perform anti-
submarine and -surface warfare. The unit cost for the CH-60 could
increase as a result of commonality; however, the Navy believes that
the life cycle cost savings will outweigh production costs. Which
components will have an increased unit cost as a result of commonality?
What is the estimated increase?
Answer. The Navy Helo Master Plan resolves the Navy's entire
current and anticipated rotary-wing needs in a well formulated and
thought-out plan, with consideration for minimizing the future
procurement, support and infrastructure costs. Within this plan, the
CH-60 directly addresses the near-critical availability, age, and cost
of ownership of the CH-46 Combat Logistics Support aircraft, and the
requirements for air-station, amphibious, and Combat Search and Rescue
(SAR) aircraft. Additionally, because the CH-60 replaces HH-60H that
will be remanufactured into SH-60R, the CH-60 helps address the
identified shortfall of available Light Anti-Submarine Warfare
Helicopter (HSL) assets to support existing and future surface
combatants, and the need to update the reserve HSL components with
capability equivalent to the active forces.
The CH-60 and SH-60R are intended to include nearly-identical
cockpit and flight avionics, but not sensors and mission avionics, to
reduce supply requirements, maintenance costs, and operator training
costs. The common cockpit for these platforms is still in design.
However, the two prime contractors have been given guidance that the
entire cockpit and flight avionics suite is not to exceed $1 million
per aircraft. The flight avionics for the last lot of HH-60H aircraft
cost approximately $635 thousand; the maximum expected procurement cost
increase to support commonality approximates $250 thousand per
aircraft. Components that may increase in procurement costs to support
the benefits of commonality are: programmable keysets vs. Control/
Display Navigation Units (CDNUs), 6 x 8 inch flat panel flight displays
vs. 4\1/4\ x 4\1/4\ inch situational displays, and inertial navigation
vs. doppler based navigation. Each of these changes would still be
required as ``kits'' for those CH-60 performing the Combat SAR mission
if not already provided in the baseline aircraft.
Question. What is the estimated life cycle cost savings as a result
of commonality? When will the Navy realize those savings?
Answer. While the total anticipated life cycle cost reduction to
the Navy is the ``cornerstone'' of the Navy Helo Master Plan, any
numbers presented now would be incomplete. We continue to identify and
refine projected cost reductions using the model developed by US
AIRWAYS to support their decision to reduce type/model/series aircraft
across their organization in order to increase their profits. Although
final organizational performance measures are different for the Navy
(e.g. readiness vs. profits), the areas for reducing expenses are
strongly similar. The Navy will realize the anticipated cost reductions
as type/model/series helicopters are removed from the active Naval
inventory.
Question. Many of the avionics components for the SH-60R are
currently in development. Integrating these new components may result
in a schedule slip and increased cost for the CH-60 program. Which
components are currently under development? When will those components
be available for integration on the CH-60? Which components are most
likely to cause a schedule slip?
Answer. The design of SH-60R flight avionics is under revision, due
to the potential reduction in cost of ownership through use of
available commercial technology. All major components for revised
flight avionics are existing commercial or ``ruggedized'' commercial
components. While the potential always exists for a schedule slip, the
plan to reduce dependence on technology development by using hardware
and software available in the open market leads the program office to
believe there will be no schedule slip for either aircraft. The costs
of flight avionics designs have been predominantly allocated to the SH-
60R program, so the integration costs to the CH-60 revolve around
wiring modification, drawings, and generation of installation technical
directives; the estimated cost to the CH-60 program is approximately
$6.5 million. No further cost growth is anticipated. Both the SH-60R
and the CH-60 programs will need the designs completed, and hardware
flight qualified and available by first quarter fiscal year 1998; this
is achievable, with low to moderate risk. The components or activities
most likely to cause a schedule slip would be the integration of cards,
``cardsets'', backplane and the operating system that would make up the
scaleable mission computer.
Question. The Navy is conducting a demonstration for outsourcing
military sealift requirements. The Navy believes it may be more
operationally and economically effective to allow commercial helicopter
operators to transport equipment from shore to ship. When will this
demonstration be completed?
Answer. The demonstration of outsourcing of MSC requirements is
expected to be completed in mid September 1997.
Question. When will the Navy make a decision on outsourcing?
Answer. The Navy will make a decision after demonstration
completion, and submission of the associated report to the Smith
Appropriations Committee (about third quarter Fiscal Year 1998).
Question. If the Navy decides that outsourcing is not operationally
and economically feasible, how will you satisfy your helicopter
military sealift requirements? Will this require an increased
procurement of helicopters? If so, how many helicopters will be needed
and what is the estimated cost of such a procurement?
Answer. If the Navy decides that outsourcing is not operationally
and economically feasible, the helicopter MSC requirements will be
reviewed. Additional procurement of helicopters may be required.
Marine Corps Helicopters
Question. The helicopters in the Marine Corps fleet were fielded in
the mid 1980's. The Marine Corps developed a ``Rotary Wing
Modernization Plan'' as the guideline to modernize its current
helicopter fleet. According to the plan, the Marine Corps will replace
heavy and medium assault support helicopters with the MV-22 and upgrade
Huey utility and Cobra attack helicopters. In fiscal year 1998, the
Marine Corps is requesting $529 million to procure MV-22's and $80
million to begin a Huey/Cobra helicopter upgrade program. Is the Marine
Corps ``Rotary Wing Modernization Strategy'' adequately funded in the
budget? If not, what are the shortfalls?
Answer. The Marine Corps is adequately funded within the
constraints of the Department of the Navy's budget. Additional funding
would allow an accelerated replacement of our aging aircraft with
modern, technologically advanced, and Joint Strategy Review/National
Military Strategy aircraft.
The helicopters in the Marine Corps fleet were fielded in the mid
1980's. The Marine Corps developed a ``Rotary Wing Modernization Plan''
as the guideline to modernize its current helicopter fleet. Accordingly
to the plan, the Marine Corps will replace heavy and medium assault
support helicopters with the MV-22 and upgrade Huey utility and Cobra
attack helicopters. In fiscal year 1998, the Marine Corps is requesting
$529 million to procure MV-22's and $80 million to begin a UH-1N Heuy/
AH-1W Cobra helicopter upgrade program (4BN/4BW).
Question. The Marine Corps ``Rotary Wing Modernization Strategy''
outlines a plan for replacing helicopters currently in the fleet. Some
of the aircraft will be over 40 years old when they are retired. Is the
``Rotary Wing Modernization Stragey'' based on fiscal restraints or
operational requirements? Are you comfortable with the helicopter
replacement schedule--should it be accelerated? Why or why not?
Answer. Our modernization program is based on our long standing
neckdown strategy of: the V-22, the 4BN/4BW and the CH-53E. We are
concerned with the paced of this modernization effort; however, fiscal
constraints prevent the Marine Corps from modernizing at a faster rate.
Question. The MV-22 will replace the CH-46E and CH-53A/D
helicopters. The CH-46E provides medium assault support; the CH53A/D
provides heavy assault support. Based on the Marine Corps budget, it
will take 29 years to replace the CH-46E and CH-53A/D with the MV-22.
What is the anticipated structural life expectancy for the CH46E and
CH-53A/D?
Answer. In February 1996, Naval Air Systems Command extended the
structural life of the CH-46 to 15,000 hours. The estimated airframe
fatigue life limit for the CH-53D is 10,000 hours. The CH-53A is no
longer in service.
Question. When will the CH-46E and CH-53A/D reach their anticipated
structural life expectancy? How many of each type of helicopter will be
in the inventory at that time?
Answer. The first CH-46E will reach the 15,000 hour service life
limit in fiscal year 2010. Based on the current MV-22 acquisition plan,
the estimated CH-46E inventory in fiscal year 2010 will be 43 aircraft.
Based on an estimated airframe fatigue life limit of 10,000 hours,
operational CH-53Ds begin to reach their fatigue life limit in fiscal
year 2000 with an inventory of 46 aircraft. The CH-53D will require a
Service Life Assessment Program (SLAP) to determine future life
extension requirements. The CH-53A is no longer in service.
Question. Are the actual operational hours exceeding the planned
hours for the CH-46E and CH-53A/D? If so, please explain.
Answer. Actual utilization is not exceeding budgeted utilization.
Budgeted versus actual utilization is shown for the CH-46E and the CH-
53D. The CH-53A is no longer in service.
Utilization
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CH-46E\1\
-------------------
Budgeted Actual
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 95............................................... 25.5 24.3
FY 96............................................... 25.6 21.9
FY 97*.............................................. 25.4 18.2
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CH-53D\1\
-------------------
Budgeted Actual
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 95............................................... 21.5 19.3
FY 96............................................... 22.4 18.0
FY 97*.............................................. 22.3 11.1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Reflect 3 months of reporting.
CH-53D transition to Hawaii prevented achievement of budgeted
utilization during FY 95/96.
Question. For the record, please provide the planned retirement
schedule for the CH-46E and the CH-53A/D based on the current MV-22
acquisition plan.
Answer. The lengthy 24-year ``procurement-to-delivery'' profile of
the MV-22 prevents a rapid transition and retirement of the aging CH-
46E and CH-53D fleet. Current plans call for a ``one-for-one''
transition of our CH-46E and CH-53D aircraft. Based upon current
delivery schedules, we will initiate the transition of our first CH-46E
Squadron during fiscal year 2001 and transition the last Medium Lift
Squadron during fiscal year 2015.
Question. The fiscal year 1998 budget request includes funds to
improve the CH-46E and the CH-53D. The upgrades include installing the
global positioning system and new radios on the helicopters. For the
record, please provide a list of the budgeted improvements/upgrades for
the CH-46E and CH-53A/D. Do you believe making only those improvements,
which are currently funded, will make the CH-46E and CH-53A/D
operationally safe until after the year 2015? Why?
Answer. These aircraft will be safe to operate. The Marine Corps'
modernization program ensures that medium helicopters will be safe to
operate until planned replacement by the MV-22.
The CH-46 fleet is undergoing a Dynamic Component Upgrade Program
which replaces rotor heads, critical components in the flight control
system, and certain drive train and transmission components. This
upgrade will remove all the burdensome operating limitations now in
place on the CH-46.
The CH-53D will undergo a service life assessment to determine
future life extension requirements. Accelerating the V-22 procurement
will help us to avoid a Service Life Extension Program on either the
CH-46 or the CH-53D.
Budgeted improvements/upgrades for the CH-46E and CH-53D are as
follows:
CH-46E
Global Positioning System
AN/ARC-210 SINCGARS capable radios
Dynamic Component Upgrade
Night Vision Goggle Head Up Display (NVG HUD)
CH-53D
Global Positioning System
AN/ARC-210 SINCGARS capable radios
Night Vision Goggle Head Up Display (NVG HUD)
Night Vision Goggle Compatible Exterior Lighting
Question. The CH-53E is a heavy cargo helicopter. Originally
fielded in the mid-1980's, the CH-53E will remain the Marine Corps
inventory until after 2015. The CH-53E will be replaced with the
``National Rotorcraft Transport.'' What is the anticipated structural
life expectancy of the CH-53E?
Answer. The H-53E Service Life Assessment Program (SLAP) interim
report determined that the H-53E airframe fatigue life is 6,750 hours.
The SLAP is scheduled for completion in May 1997 at which time Sikorsky
will release the final report.
Question. When will the CH-53E reach its anticipated structural
life expectancy?
Answer. At the current utilization rate, the first CH-53E will
reach the 6,750 hour airframe fatigue life limit in the fiscal year
2000 timeframe with the last CH-53 planned to reach its fatigue life
limit in the fiscal year 2017 timeframe.
Question. Are the actual operational hours (of CH-53E) exceeding
the planned operational hours? If so, by how much?
Answer. Recent execution in our tactical heavy lift squadrons have
not exceeded our budgeted hours. Actual utilization versus budgeted
utilization since fiscal year 1995 is as follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Utilization
-------------------------------------
Budget Actual
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY95.............................. 20.5 21.8
FY96.............................. 20.6 16.6
FY97\1\........................... 20.4 13.8
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Based upon 3 months of reporting.
The fiscal year 1996/1997 decline in utilization can be directly
attributed to our swashplate maintenance problem. This problem is being
corrected and we should see a utilization increase in the future.
Question. The Marine Corps ``Rotary Wing Modernization Plan''
proposes a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) for the CH-53E
beginning in 2000. For the record, please describe the proposed SLEP--
include the anticipated cost, schedule, and proposed upgrades. Also
include the new structural life expectancy of the SLEP CH-53E.
Answer. As presently funded, the proposed SLEP for the H-53E will
correct critical airframe structure components identified in the
interim Service Life Assessment Program (SLAP) report. Correction or
modification of these critical areas will extend the service life out
to 12,000 hours. Within the Future Years Defense Plan, $38 million is
applied to the H-53E SLEP. The SLAP is scheduled for completion in May
1997. At that time, the SLAP report will be reviewed in order to
determine program content. Subsequently a firm schedule and funding
profile will be developed.
Question. The ``National Rotorcraft Transport'' (NRT) will replace
all of the services heavy cargo helicopters sometime after 2015. To
date, no funds have been requested to begin the development of the NRT.
Since the Marine Corps and the Army's heavy lift cargo helicopters are
aging, both services are planning service life extension programs. What
is the anticipated cost of the NRT program? Would it make more
economical and operational sense to accelerate the NRT rather than
extend the life of the Marine Corps' CH-53E and the Army's cargo
helicopter? Why or why not?
Answer. Estimated costs for the NRT are unknown at this time since
the program is still in the requirements definition phase. However,
acceleration of the NRT would not affect the Marine Corps' requirement
to extend the service life of the CH-53E. Based on historical program
development, any economical delivery of the NRT would occur after the
first CH-53E reaches its airframe structural limit of 6,750 hours in
fiscal year 2000.
Question. The fiscal year 1998 budget request includes $80 million
to begin an upgrade program for the Marine Corps Cobra Attack and Huey
Utility helicopters. In October 1996, the GAO issued a report stating
the Marine Corps program to upgrade HUEY utility aircraft may not be
cost effective. The report stated that greater savings may be achieved
if the Marine Corps replaced HUEY's in the fleet with new Black Hawk
helicopters. DoD is assessing the Marine Corps HUEY upgrade program and
will issue a report later this month. It is our understanding that the
DoD requested that all of the services attempt to use common
helicopters. The Navy, Air Force, and Army all use Black Hawk
derivatives. The Marine Corps evaluated using Black Hawk for its
utility mission but decided it would be too costly to buy and support.
Therefore, the Marine Corps has decided to upgrade 100 HUEY utility
helicopters. What are the unique Marine Corps requirements that can not
be met with the Black Hawk?
Answer. Although both the UH-1N and the Blackhawk meet our
operational requirements, the Blackhawk costs more to procure, costs
more to operate over the life of the program, requires more manpower to
support, and has a significantly larger logistics footprint. The larger
logistics footprint and manpower requirements would have a negative
impact on our ability to deploy aboard amphibious ships and move our
squadrons via strategic airlift.
Question. What is the coast of the HUEY upgrade program? Is it
adequately funded? If not, what are the shortfalls?
Answer. The UH-1N upgrade program recently singed an Engineering,
Manufacturing, and Design (EMD) contract for $134 million and
anticipates the procurement cost to be $1003.1 million for 100 upgraded
aircraft. The program is fully funded.
Funding
(Then Year $ Million)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
H-1 upgrade FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 To complete Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RDT&E......................... 70 80.7 90.3 152 108.3 51 20 12.6 584.9
APN........................... 0 0 0 0 0 73.7 216.3 2,595.5 2,885.5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. What is the current procurement schedule for the HUEY
upgrade program?
Answer.
Delivery Schedule
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4BN#...................................... 5 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 11 .....
4BW#...................................... 0 5 12 24 24 24 24 24 24 19
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. What is the per unit cost of the HUEY upgrade? What are
the estimated operating and support costs?
Answer. The UH-1N upgrade program recently signed an Engineering,
Manufacturing and Design (EMD) contract for $134 million and
anticipates the procurement cost to be $1003.1 million for 100 upgraded
aircraft. According to the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) the
operating and support costs for the UH-1N are $2.375 billion over 28
years. The per unit cost for the upgraded UH-1N is $10.49 million (OSD
PA&E report dated September 16, 1996.
Question. What was the estimated unit cost of a Black Hawk? Is the
estimated cost based on a multiyear contract or single year? What are
the estimated operating and support costs?
Answer. The estimated unit cost of the Blackhawk is $14.04 million
(OSD PA&E report dated September 16, 1996. This cost was based on a 5
year multiyear contract with a procurement schedule of 36 aircraft per
year. According to the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) the
operating and support costs for the Blackhawk are $3.018 billion over
28 years. This compares with a $2.375 billion cost for the 4BN.
Question. What is the anticipated structural life expectancy of the
upgraded Huey? What is the anticipated structural life expectancy of
the Blackhawk?
Answer. The anticipated structural life expectancy of the upgraded
Huey will be 10,000 flight hours. The anticipated structural life
expectancy of the Blackhawk is 10,000 flight hours.
Question. For the record, please provide the logistic support costs
and manpower requirements for the HUEY and the Black Hawk.
Answer. The Institute for Defense Analysis, in the conduct of the
DOD Helicopter Commonality Study, estimated the operations and support
(O&S) costs for the upgraded UH-1N to be $2.375 billion as compared to
$3.018 billion for the Blackhawk. The Naval Air Systems Command's
HARDMAN maintenance manpower requirements model estimates an additional
288 Marines are required to maintain the UH-60/AH-1W combination over
the requirement for the upgraded UH-1N/AH-1W mix. The O&S costs include
manpower and logistics costs and are calculated using fiscal year 1996
constant dollars for the period of fiscal years 2004 to 2032.
Question. What is the cost impact on the Cobra upgrade program if
the Huey upgrade program is canceled?
Answer. The cost of the Cobra upgrade program will increase by $90
million in procurement costs if the Huey upgrade is canceled.
Marine Corps Ground Systems Research and Development
Question. The Marine Corps fiscal year 1998 budget request for
ground systems research and development is $230 million. This is $43
million--or 18% less than last year's appropriated amount. These funds
are used to develop and test countermine systems, assault vehicles, and
command, control and communications system. Marine Corps Advance
Concept Technology Demonstrations are also funded in this account.
General Oster, is the Marine Corps ground systems research and
development program adequately funded? If not, what is the risk to
future readiness?
Answer. No, our research and development account is not adequately
funded. With our fiscal year 1998 topline down by 4.5% from fiscal year
1997 in terms of real spending power, striking a balance was no easy
task. In order to fund our top priorities--maintaining near-term
readiness and sustaining momentum of quality of life initiatives, we
were forced to shift funds from investment accounts. In order to ensure
the future readiness of the Corps, however, we must adequately fund the
timely development of combat capabilities. If additional funds were
available, I would accelerate the development of the following
programs:
$ in Millions
Program:
Commandant's Warfighting Lab.................................. $19.8
Marine Enhancement Program.................................... 0.6
Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle........................... 10.1
Light Weight 155MM Howitzer................................... 3.6
Tactical Remote Sensor Systems................................ 1.5
Marine Common Hardware Suite Mgmt & Development............... 0.7
Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance Processing & Evaluation
System...................................................... 1.0
Question. Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTD) and DoD
sponsored initiatives developed to accelerate and facilitate the
application of mature advanced technologies to solve military problems
and provide new operational capabilities to the filed sooner than the
normal acquisition process. For the record, please provide the ACTD's
planned for fiscal year 1998. Please include prior year funding,
planned funding for fiscal year 1998, and future funding requirements.
Also include any Defense-wide Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation funds which have or will be provided for each ACTD.
Answer. The only Marine Corps funded ACTD is Extending the Littoral
Battlespace (ELB ACTD). This ACTD is jointly sponsored by the USMC and
the USN. Marine Corps funding is contained in RDT&E, N, PE 0603640M,
Advanced Technology Demonstrations, Project C2223, Advanced Technology
Demonstrations. Funding for this ACTD is as follows: fiscal year 1997,
$5M; fiscal year 98, $10M; fiscal year 99, $10M; fiscal year 00, $10M;
fiscal year 01, $10M; fiscal year 02, $1M; fiscal year 03, $1M.
The Marine Corps participates generically in the Joint Countermine
ACTD. The total cost of this ACTD includes direct funding from OSD as
well as generic support from the Army, Navy and Marine Corps RDT&E
accounts. This ACTD ends in fiscal year 1998. USN funding is as
follows: fiscal year 1997 $0.9 million, fiscal year 1998 $0.8 million.
Question. What process is in place to determine which ACTD
technologies should be fielded? How do you ensure that the technology
will be reliable and operable in military operations?
Answer. ACTD's have a User Sponsor assigned as part of the
management structure. The User Sponsor is responsible for assigning an
Operational Manager who is charged, in conjunction with the
Demonstration Manager, with the execution of the System Demonstration.
Additionally, the User Sponsor is responsible for identification of the
ACTD's Measure's of Effectiveness (MOE's) and ultimately the evaluation
of the technology's military utility and suitability.
ACTD's are chartered to look at both mature and emerging
technologies that can contribute to significant new operational
concepts. Thus, ACTD's are as operationally oriented as they are
technology oriented. Technologies selected for demonstration are
evaluated for their potential contribution to the concept and will
still go through a series of limited objective demonstrations in order
to assess their maturity, interoperability, safety, and reliability,
availability and maintainability with the objective of a major system
demo as a culminating event.
The User Sponsor will incorporate Operational Test activity
personnel as part of his evaluation team. After the major system demo,
successful technologies will be transitioned to the formal acquisition
process for procurement and other further development.
Question. How do you ensure that operating and logistics costs for
successful ACTD technologies can be supported in the budget?
Answer. After a successful ACTD, technologies determined to have
military utility will be left with the operating forces as residuals.
The ACTD office has budgeted for the support of residuals for two years
until the formal acquisition process can assume management
responsibility for these items. Transition planning must be started
early in the ACTD to ensure that necessary funds are programmed and
budgeted for operating and logistics costs. Once budgeted and upon
transition to Milestone III, Approval for Production, systems which
commenced development as Advanced Technology Demonstrations are funded
individually in the Operation & Maintenance, Marine Corps and
Procurement Marine Corps appropriations budget requests.
Question. For the record, please provide a list of the technologies
fielded as a result of the ACTD process. Please include testing,
fielding and support costs for each system.
Answer. The Marine Corps has not had any technologies fielded as a
result of the ACTD process. The only ACTD to which the Marine Corps has
committed fiscal year 1998 funding is the Extending the Littoral
Battlespace (ELB) ACTD. The ELB ACTD is tied closely to the Marine
Corps' Commandant's Warfighting Laboratory and the Navy's Fleet Battle
Experiments. This ACTD process for the Marine Corps began in January
and technologies and concepts demonstrating military utility and
suitability will be transitioned into acquisition.
Question. What are your views as to how the present ACTD program is
structured? How can it be improved?
Answer. The ACTD program is managed by the Deputy Under Secretary
for Defense (Acquisition and Technology) ((DUSD (AT)). The program
provides the Services and the Commanders in Chief (CINCs) with an
alternative approach to streamline the acquisition cycle while
concurrently demonstrating new operational concepts for enhanced
warfighting. The ACTD process allows for more informed acquisition
decisions based upon greater user community involvement early in the
process. ACTD's provide much greater understanding for technology and
concepts prior to a committed acquisition program.
The Extending the Littoral Battlespace (ELB) ACTD has been underway
for approximately 2 months. Due to inexperience in this area over a
reasonable length of time, the Marine Corps can not adequately assess
the ACTD process or structure. As the ELB/ACTD program evolves and
matures, there will be numerous lessons learned which will be applied
to future ACTD programs.
Question. The Marine Enhancement Program (MEP) is an initiative
which provides non-developmental, commercially available equipment
which can be quickly tested, evaluated and fielded for the Marine
Infantryman. The Marine Corps is requesting $4 million for MEP in
fiscal year 1998; $2.5 million for research and development and $1.5
million for procurement. What is the average acquisition timeline for
programs funded in MEP?
Answer. The goal of the MEP acquisition cycle is to take advantage
of procurement reform legislation and initiatives to field meaningful
and important items in shorter than normal timeframes. The average goal
is comprised of one to two years for research, development, testing,
and evaluation and one to three years for procurement. Of additional
importance is the occasional opportunity to test and procure items in
the same year funds are appropriated.
Question. What MEP systems will be tested and evaluated in fiscal
year 1998? When will those systems be fielded?
Answer. The MEP systems to be tested and evaluated in fiscal year
1998 are as follows: Improved Extreme Cold Weather Clothing System;
Improved Medium Pack with Assault Pack; Family of Body Armor; Rifle
Combat Optics; Hardened Day/Night Sight; Lightweight Helmet; Improved
Sun/Wind Goggles; Fire Fly Marking System; Assault Snow Shoe; Cold
Weather Sled; Multi-Purpose Cart; and, Expedient Portable Shower Bag.
These systems will be fielded in the fiscal year 1999-2003 timeframe.
Question. The Army has a similar initiative, the Soldier
Enhancement Program. What process is in place to ensure that there is
no unnecessary duplication between the two programs?
Answer. A Memorandum of Agreement delineates Army and Marine Corps
responsibilities. Also, Marine Corps personnel just attended a Joint
Conference with the Army during March 3-6, 1997. Further, continual
coordination exists between the Marine Corps and Army personnel to
ensure unnecessary duplication does not occur.
High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
Question. The High Mobility, Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV)
is the light tactical vehicle for all of the services. The HMMWV has
been in production since the 1980s. The Army is planning a service life
extension program (SLEP) for the HMMWV. Does the Marine Corps have a
requirement for a HMMWV SLEP? If so, please provide the anticipated
acquisition cost of the program and optimal fielding schedule for the
Marine Corps HMMWV SLEP?
Answer. We have not yet determined whether we will remanufacture
our existing fleet or buy new HMMWVs. However, in order to make a fully
informed decision, we recently completed (January, 1997) a Life Cycle
Cost Estimate (LCCE) for a HMMWV remanufacture (SLEP). The LCCE
estimated the SLEP cost for 17,626 USMC HMMWVs to be $642 million in
fiscal year 1998 constant budget dollars. Optimal remanufacture and
fielding quantities are 10% to 15% of the USMC HMMWV fleet each year
(1,763 to 2,644 vehicles per year).
Question. Would it be more cost effective to procure new, rather
than remanufacture old HMMWV'S? Please explain.
Answer. Based on the current life cycle cost estimate, the
remanufacture of the existing fleet appears to be the most cost
effective acquisition approach to meet the needs of the Marine Corps.
The decision to either buy new HMMWV's or remanufacture existing
HMMWV's will be based on responses to the U.S. Army's future ``Request
for Proposal'' (due to be published during fiscal year 1997) for HMMWV
remanufacture. Based on the costs bid in these future proposals, a
fully informed procurement decision can be made regarding the overall
cost effectiveness of either ``remanufacturing or buying new.''
Question. What is the economic life expectancy of a remanufactured
HMMWV? Of a new HMMWV?
Answer. The service life expectancy of both a remanufactured HMMWV
and a new HMMWV is 14 years.
Question. The Army plans on terminating HMMWV production in fiscal
year 1999. According to Army officials, the HMMWV is a ``world class
off road vehicle''; however, ``supportability'' is becoming an issue.
Furthermore, the Army believes that the HMMWV is ``only marginally
meeting new requirements.'' Do you agree with the Army's assessment of
the HMMWV program? If so, what supportability issues are you
experiencing?
Answer. The existing HMMWV meets the current and projected Marine
Corps requirements for the ``Light Tactical Vehicle Fleet.'' It is our
understanding that the Army has a heavier payload requirement for its
light fleet than the Marine Corps does. This may explain the statement,
``only marginally meeting requirements.'' Parts and logistics support
for USMC HMMWV fleet are considered adequate.
Question. What new requirements will not be met by the current
HMMWV? Could those deficiencies be resolved by modifying the current
vehicle? If not, why?
Answer. No new requirements will be unfilled by the current HMMWV.
Question. Given the cost and development schedule of other tactical
vehicles program, do you think it makes sense to develop a new HMMWV?
Why or why not?
Answer. The USMC does not have a current or projected requirement
for a newly developed HMMWV.
Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle
Question. The Marine Corps is developing the Advanced Amphibious
Assault Vehicle (AAAV). The AAAV will replace the Amphibious Assault
Vehicle which was fielded in the 1970's The AAAV will transport Marines
from a ship to the beach and will also used as a land fighting vehicle.
Mr. Douglass, last year you identified the AAAV as a program that could
be accelerated by one year if additional funds were made available.
According to your testimony, the accelerated program required
increasing the budget request by $20 million in fiscal year 1997 and
$23 million from 1998 to 2002. Congress provided the additional $20
million in fiscal year 1997. The fiscal year 1998 program schedule
shows a Milestone II decision in 2001, a low rate production decision
in 2004, and an initial operating capability in 2006. Ironically, this
is the same schedule you included with your fiscal year 1997 budget
request. Last year you testified that each one of these events would
occur one year earlier if the additional funds were provided. Why is
there no change in the AAAV schedule?
Answer. In our Fiscal year 1997 Report to Congress on AAAV we
provided the funding required to accelerate development one year and
restore the program to its original funding level. The report
identified the need for $20 million in fiscal year 1997 which would
contribute four months of the 12 month acceleration. This is now being
accomplished. The remaining funds displayed would be required to
achieve the additional eight months.
Since the submission of the fiscal year 1997 report, the AAAV prime
contractor has been selected and as such, has afforded us an
opportunity to relook at other ways to accelerate AAAV.
Question. The fiscal year 1998 schedule does show that Full
Operational Capability has been accelerated by one year, from 2014 to
2013. Since the Future Years Defense Plan includes budgets for only
five years when will the accelerated program take place, after 2003?
What is the anticipated cost of the ``accelerated'' AAAV program from
2004 to 2013?
Answer. In April of this year we will submit to Congress a revised
plan and its associated costs.
Question. Since the Navy did not provide the additional funds
required to accelerate the AAAV, what impact, if any, did the
congressional add have on the AAAV program?
Answer. All acceleration plans deal with the AAAV's development
schedule leaving production resources beyond fiscal year 2004
unaltered.
Question. As discussed earlier, the AAAV will replace the
Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV) which was fielded in the 1970's. Based
on the AAAV procurement schedule which ends in 2030, some AAV's will be
almost 60 years old when they are retired. What is the anticipated
economic life for the AAV?
Answer. Current plans call for an AAAV Initial Operational
Capability (IOC) in fiscal year 2006 and Full Operational Capability
(FOC) in 2013. The hull life of the AAV was designed for 50 years which
would indicate a useful life until approximately calendar year 2022. A
depot inspection to repair only as necessary is scheduled for each AAV
every four to five years. With the exception of some normal surface
cracking, which is quickly and easily repaired, no structural defects
have yet been detected and the AAV hull life will likely exceed its 50
year design parameter.
The cost to repair in the field and during scheduled depot
inspections is increasing, but adequately funded at this time. Studies
have been conducted to reduce the expected cost growth with age
(vehicle rebuilding and component replacement). These efforts should
maintain AAV affordability until replacement by the AAAV begins in
fiscal year 2006. Through a combination of continuing improved
reliability and maintainability changes and cost reduction efforts
within the depot, the economic life of the AAV should reliably extend
through the final fielding of the AAAV.
Question. When will the AAV reach its anticipated economic life?
Answer. The cost of maintaining the AAV is increasing with its age.
Projections indicate that by the time the replacement AAAV reaches Full
Operational Capability (FOC) in fiscal year 2013, we will spend over a
billion dollars maintaining the current AAV fleet through cyclical
repairs in the depot. Yet, this maintenance solution remains less
expensive than buying replacement AAVs. The marine Corps systems
Command and marine Corps Logistics Base in Albany, GA have jointly
investigated a number of ways which would reduce the cost of ownership
from between 20% to 40% and ensure the affordability of the AAV until
it is completely retired.
Question. Since it was fielded, what upgrades have been made to the
AAV?
Answer. The procurement schedule for the production of 1013 AAAV's
ends 2012, with FOC in 2013. Additional procurement appropriation
funding is required beyond 2012 to sustain the AAAV through its
remaining life cycle. Since fielded the following upgrades have been
made to the AAV:
Service Life Extension Program (1984-86)
Replaced Engine
Added P-900 Armor
Incorporated Electric Drive Gun Turret
Enhanced Applique Armor
UpGunned Weapons Station
Automatic Fire Sensing and Suppression System
Rotary Bow Plane
Improve Reliable and Maintainable Transmission
Improved Radiator
SINCGARS Radios
Question. Has the AAV gone through a service life extension
program? If so, when and was the vehicle ``remanufactured'' or were
just specific components replaced? Please explain.
Answer. Yes. The service life extension program (SLEP) was
conducted from 1984-1986. The vehicle was stripped down to the hull.
Hull modifications were made to the AAV to improve water dynamics and
to incorporate a new engine. All other components were removed and
either new or rebuilt replacements were installed. The procurement
schedule for the production of 1013 AAAV's ends in 2012, with FOC in
2013. Additional procurement appropriation funding is required beyond
2012 to sustain the AAAV through its remaining life cycle.
Question. The Marine Corps is not considering a service life
extension program for the AAV. Last year the committee was told there
are no anticipated cost estimates for such a program and you believe
that the AAV can remain operational over the next few decades. What are
the potential problems that may arise when using a 30, 40, or 50 year
old amphibious assault vehicle?
Answer. The Marine Corps is not considering a service life
extension program (SLEP) for the AAV. To address the increasing cost to
maintain the aging AAV fleet, a study has been completed for rebuilding
the AAV and applying reliability and maintainability modifications. The
Marine Corps is evaluating the results of that investigation for
affordability.
Some problems associated with the aging AAV asset are as follows:
the diminishing manufacturing resources for parts, normal wear and
fatigue on mechanical and electrical components, compliance with
changing environmental constraints, old technology not easily
compatible with latest innovations, and many years exposure to the
harsh climatic elements in which the Marine Corps normally operates.
The procurement schedule for the production of 1013 AAV's ends in
2012, with FOC in 2013. Additional procurement appropriation funding is
required beyond 2012 to sustain the AAAV through its remaining life
cycle.
Marine Corps Ammunition
Question. The Marine Corps is requesting, $98.8 million for
ammunition. Last year, the Congress provided $132.1 million. Does the
fiscal year 1998 President's budget adequately fund the marine Corps'
requirement for ammunition and sustain the capabilities of the
industrial base? If not, what are the shortfalls?
Answer. The fiscal year 1996 Marine Corps ammunition requirements
study significantly lowered Marine Corps War Reserve (WR) Requirements.
This reduction in the WR has allowed the Marine Corps to prudently
shift assets that had previously been earmarked for WR to training. The
Fiscal Year 1998 President's Budget for ammunition funds the annual
training requirement and funds the combat requirement in the program
years. The residual readiness requirement and strategic readiness
requirement are not completely funded for some ammunition items. The
status and impact of the Fiscal Year 1998 President's Budget on the
industrial base can only be determined by the US Army Industrial
Operations Command (IOC).
Question. Does the fiscal year 1998 budget request fully fund the
Marine Corps combat training requirements for ammunition? If not, what
is the shortfall and what is the impact on your war reserve?
Answer. The Fiscal Year 1998 President's Budget adequately funds
the Marine Corps ammunition requirements. The budget funds the annual
training requirement and meets the combat requirement in the program
years. It reflects an acceptable balance between ammunition
requirements and other high priority Marine Corps requirements.
Nonetheless, some ammunition shortfalls do exist. These can be caused
by adjustments in geographical positioning, production delays, new
training items and changes in training requirements, or when large
quantities of ammunition are relegated to an unserviceable condition
code. At this time the Marine Corps has identified the following
shortfalls:
a. Ctg, 40mm practice Linked M918 (DODIC B584) will be at 16% of
the Approved Acquisition Objective (AAO) at the end of fiscal year 1998
Funded Delivery Period (FDP).
b. Charge, Demolition Assembly M183 (DODIC M757) will be at 33% of
the AAO by the end of the fiscal year 1998 FDP.
c. Ctg, 5.56mm Training Rounds M200 (DODIC A080) will be at 42% of
the AAO at the end of the fiscal year 1998 FDP.
d. Ctg, 5.56mm Training Rounds M200 Linked (DODIC A075 will be at
32% of the AAO at the end of the fiscal year 1998 FDP.
War reserve ammunition is used to satisfy training requirements
only in isolated situations where procurement deliveries are not
keeping up with training demands and the item has such high training
priority that a case-by-case decision is made to support limited
training with war Reserve ammunition.
The fiscal year 1996 ammunition requirements study significantly
lowered Marine Corps War Reserve requirements. This has allowed the
Marine Corps to shift assets that had previously been earmarked for War
Reserve to training. These former war Reserve assets are not considered
as excess since they support training. This drawdown of the former War
Reserve supports near term readiness. When these assets are drawndown,
ammunition procurement levels will have to be increased to support the
long term readiness requirement.
As stated above, the Marine Corps does drawdown War Reserve to meet
training, but only in isolated cases. This affects short term readiness
since the assets are replaced as soon as possible (typically when
delivery of ordered ammunitions occurs).
Question. In fiscal year 1998, the Marine Corps conducted a study
to reevaluate ammunition requirements. The result of the study was a
$1.4 billion drop in war reserve requirements. Based on the study, the
Marine Corps determined that $621 million budgeted for war reserve
ammunition could be applied toward training ammunition. Briefly
describe the Marine Corps ammunition study. What were the assumptions,
the methodology and the conclusions.
Answer. The decrease in the War Reserve Requirement was based on
improvements to the Marine Corps' ammunition model and scenario
changes. In fiscal year 1996, the model looked at 2 near simultaneous
Major Regional Contingencies (MRCs), lasting approximately 90 days each
as per the Defense Planning Guidance. Marine Forces were based on Joint
Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) allocation. Input to the study was
provided by Marine Battalion Commanders, Executive Officers, Operations
Officers, and by the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity. Direct study
oversight was provided by a Marine Corps study group with periodic
briefings to a General Officer Steering Group for recommendations and
concurrence. The study input was run through two computer models, which
were improved to better represent the way Marines fight. The model
incorporated superior integration of the effects of Naval Surface Fire
Support and Naval Aviation into our methodology, and provided more
realistic attrition algorithms. The Scenario changes involved smaller
enemy forces and a shorter combat time frame. The study concluded with
the War Reserve Requirement for POM 98.
Question. The ammunition study resulted in a drastic change in the
ammunition requirements for the Marine Corps. It is our understanding
that the change in requirements was based on a change in Marine Corps
doctrine. Please explain the changes in Marine Corps doctrine.
Answer. The decrease in the War Reserve Requirement was based on
improvements to the ammunition modelling capability and scenario
changes rather than doctrinal changes. The model improvements better
represent the way we fight. They incorporate superior integration of
the effects of Naval Surface Fire Support and Naval Aviation into our
methodology, and provide more realistic attrition algorithms. The
scenario changes involved smaller red forces allocated to the Marine
Corps ground forces and a shorter combat time frame.
Question. The study determined that $833 million of artillery war
reserve requirements were not necessary based on current inventory
levels. For the record please provide a break-out of the type of
artillery round, the acquisition requirement type, and the current
inventory levels for artillery rounds currently in the inventory.
Answer.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sept. 30,
DODIC Nomenclatuore TM/AAO 1996
Inventory
------------------------------------------------------------------------
D003......................... Charge, 6,935 72,236
Spotting
Projectile.
D501......................... PROJ, 155MM 5,971 27,697
APERS ADAM-L.
D502......................... PROJ, 155MM 20,502 56,045
APERS ADAM-S.
D505......................... PROJ, 155MM 13,697 196,142
ILLUM.
D510......................... PROJ, 155MM 1,827 2,474
COPPERHEAD.
D514......................... PROJ, 155MM 15,653 62,758
RAAM-S.
D515......................... PROJ, 155MM 5,189 30,245
RAAM-L.
D528......................... PROJ, 155MM 13,497 1089,362
SMOKE WP.
D532......................... CHG, PROP 155MM 247,461 306,675
RED BAG.
D533......................... CHG, PROP 155MM 101,326 586,916
WHITE BAG.
D539......................... CHG, PROP 155MM 3 123
DUMMY.
D540......................... CHG, PROP 155MM 76,701 592,425
GREEN BAG.
D541......................... CHG, PROP 288,904 865,476
15L5MM WHITE
BAG.
D544......................... PROJ, 155MM HE. 234,161 698,440
D550......................... PROJ, 155MM 28,657 60,689
SMOKE WP.
D563......................... PROJ, 155MM 70,676 909,022
HEDP (ICM).
D579......................... PROJ, 155MM 157,041 12,729
HERA.
D864......................... PROJ, 155MM DP- 65,421 171,424
ICM BASEBLEED.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. The Marine Corps ammunition study did not define
industrial base issues. When will you evaluate the impact of the
ammunition study recommendations on the industrial base?
Answer. The Office of the Secretary of Defense has not defined how
regeneration of the industrial base is to be addressed in the budget
process for items which can not be produced within the Defense Planning
Guidance timeframe. Industrial base regeneration requirements following
a major regional conflict have been provided to the US Army Industrial
Operations Command for use in accurately sizing the munitions
industrial base.
Question. Did the ammunition study aggregate old munition
quantities with modern munitions quantities to determine the levels of
ammunition on hand? If so, which modern munitions would need to be
procured to replace old munitions?
Answer. The Marine Corps ammunition study established the War
Reserve Requirement for Preferred Munitions only. The Marine Corps
ammunitions. Older munitions are drawn down as substitutes for training
where applicable. This process ensures Preferred Munitions are
available for combat, while making efficient use of current assets for
training.
Question. Last year, the Committee requested that the Marine Corps
submit a report regarding the type and acquisition objective for
kinetic energy tank rounds. What is the status of the report?
Answer. Information regarding the type and acquisition objective
for kinetic energy tank rounds was submitted in the response to a
Congressional Data Request (CDR). That CDR included the following
statements:
Based upon Congressional direction, the Marine Corps has reviewed
the requirement for kinetic energy tank ammunition and made the
following determinations:
a. The current War Materiel Requirement (WMR) for 120mm kinetic
energy rounds for the M1A1 main battle tank is 15,481 model M829A1
rounds (DODIC C380). The model M829A2 round is not included in this
requirement nor is there a specific Marine Corps requirement for the
M829A2.
b. The currently fielded M829A1 is capable of defeating the
majority of targets. The added capability of the M829A2 does not
provide enough of a performance advantage over the M829A1 to justify
making the M829A2 the preferred munition.
c. The Marine Corps believes that there is a greater cost benefit
in waiting for the significant performance improvements expected to be
offered by the M829A3 (currently undergoing testing).
Question. It is our understanding that there has been a significant
increase in the cost of explosives manufactured at the Holston
Ammunition Plant--up to a 500% increase. Last year, Congress provided
funds to procure items which use explosive material manufactured at
Holston. Briefly describe the situation at the Holston Ammunition
Plant. How does the Marine Corps proposed to resolve the issue?
Answer. The ammunition item prices for explosives produced at
Holston were significantly increased based upon the new anti-terrorist
legal requirement to ``tag'' the explosive material portion of the
ammunition called C4. Exact technical explanations are available from
the U.S. Army Industrial Operations Command. Re-utilization of old C-4
components by melting and inserting ``tags'' is one alternative to
reduce the increase in price. Additionally, the Marine Corps will begin
to search for competitively priced off-shore tagged C4 and ammunition
sources.
Question. Will you use fiscal year 1997 funds to procure the items
which require explosives manufactured at Holston? If not, will you
reprogram the dollars?
Answer. Yes. The Marine Corps intends to procure items requiring
explosives manufactured at Holston. Some funds will be used to tag and
reutilize the existing C-4 explosive material in order to lower the
cost of the Mine Clearing Line Charges and the Demolition Charges.
Question. For the record, please provide a listing of the items
which require explosive material manufactured at Holston. Please
include the amount appropriated for each item.
Answer. The amounts appropriated in fiscal year 1997 for items
which require explosive materials manufactured at Holston are as
follow:
M183 Demolition Charges, $19. 6 million
M59A1 Mine Clearing Line Charges, $16.7 million
M58A4 Mine Clearing Line Charges, $8.0 million
M830A1 120mm HEAT-MP-AA Cartridges, $6.9 million
Question. The DoD established the Conventional Ammunition Working
Fund (CAWF), a working capital fund, to standardize ammunition
procurement. Since a large number of conventional ammunition items
share common components and materials, DoD believed that it made
economical sense to have a single manager buy the conventional
ammunition for the all services. The initial order it funded by the
CAWF; upon receipt of the ammunition the service reimburses the CAWF.
It is our understanding that the CAWF will be eliminated in fiscal year
1999. What do you believe will be the impact of that decision?
Answer. The Marine Corps cannot yet ascertain the impact of closing
the CAWCF in fiscal year 1999. The replacement procedures have not yet
been approved by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The potential
loss of fixed standard pricing for ammunition concerns the Marine
Corps. This loss could result in increased price changes during the
execution of the budget which would cause a lower quantity of rounds to
be procured. In practice, orders are not processed within the CAWCF
until funding is received from the Service requiring the ammunition.
Question. What are your views of the CAWF? How can it be improved?
Answer. The Marine Corps has supported the CAWCF with proposed
improvements in financial tracking, discipline and control over support
costs. These support costs are commonly referred to as surcharges,
i.e., engineering, industrial stocks, and quality assurance. The Marine
Corps also supported the CAWCF in acquisition reform to reduce lead
times and to better determine actual costs of ammunition.
Question. DoD has not made a decision on what acquisition process
should replace the CAWCF. What is the Marine Corps position?
Answer. The Marine Corps is an active member of the Ammunition
Process Improvement Team (APIT) that has joint Service membership. The
APIT is chaired by OSD and tasked with proposing the follow-on funds
and procedures for ammunition procurement after the CAWCF is closed. A
final recommendation has not been forwarded for review.
Chemical Biological Incident Response Force
Question. Last year Congress provided $10 million to establish the
Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF). This year, the
Marine Corps is requesting $1 million to continue the effort. The
CBIRF's mission is to respond to terrorist chemical and biological and
toxic industrial chemical incidents. What did the fiscal year 1997
funds provide?
Answer. Purchase of certified commercial off the shelf state of the
art equipment for detection, decontamination, force protection,
medical, communications and general support. Fiscal year 1997 funds
will provide the following to CBIRF: Level ``A'' Suits, Level ``A''
(Durable) Suits, Level ``A'' Gloves, Protective Sleeves, Level ``B''
Suits/Coveralls, Self Contained Breathing Apparatus, Portable Air
Compressor, Multi Gas Monitor, Personal Gas Detectors, PH Tester,
Autovent System, Automatic Chemical Agent Director Alarm, Biological
Detector, Photoionization Tester, Air/Liquid Detector Tube System,
Handheld Pulse Oximeter, and Portable Defibrillator. In addition, over
200 other items authorized in the Table of Authorized Material will be
procured during fiscal year 1997.
Question. For fiscal year 1998 you are requesting $1 million for
CBIRF research and development activities. Please explain what
initiatives are funded in fiscal year 1998.
Answer. Technologies being looked at include the following: Phase
Change Cooling Garment, Hand-washing Portable Decontamination System,
Advanced Handheld Chemical/Industrial Hazard Detector Plume modeling,
Bio-Sensors, Chem/Bio Mass Spectrometer. Additionally, live agent and
testing on commercial equipment to ensure acceptability for CBRIF
mission will be performed.
Question. According to your budget documents the CBRIF will be
equipped with off-the shelf equipment, yet your budget includes no
procurement dollars until 2000. What research and development
initiatives are in your future year defense plan? Does your budget
include adequate funds to field those systems you will be developing?
If not, what is the shortfall?
Answer. Last year's funds were used to procure those end items
deemed urgent in providing a reasonable CBIRF response capability. If
an additional $15 million were provided, the remaining ``off-the-
shelf'' end items would be procured, thereby completing the outfitting
of CBIRF.
The CBIRF R&D budget supports the following technology capabilities
that will be developed and tested in the fiscal year 1999-2003
timeframe: Bio Samplers with Ultra Violet Long Wave Lamps, Gas
Chromatographer, Spill Control Systems, Decontamination Apparatus
(Trailers, Shelters, and Vehicles), Field Deployable Labs, Chemical/
Biological Protective Shelters, Medical Microscopic Isolator, Tele-
medicine Capability (Mini Camera, Mobile Video Tele-Conferencing), and
Fiber Optic Wave Guide Biological Detectors (Testing), Lightweight
Portable Decontamination System, and an ability to interface with Joint
Warning And Reporting Network Communication links.
Accordingly, the procurement dollars budgeted in fiscal year 2000-
2003 represent purchase of the above items as they transition out of
development and into production.
Question. Given their mission, it is essential to provide the CBIRF
with equipment that provides protection from chemical and biological
weapons and toxic industrial chemicals. To date, what equipment have
you provided to the CBIRF? What equipment is still required? Is funding
for that equipment provided in the budget? If so, please provide the
type of equipment, acquisition schedule, and cost.
Answer. Protection procured to date for CBIRF includes: Level ``A''
Suits, Level ``A'' Boots, Self Contained Breathing Apparatus, Portable
Air Compressor, Level ``B'' Suits, Level ``A'' (Durable) Suite, Level
``A'' Gloves, Protective Sleeves.
The following items have not yet been procured: Saratoga Suits,
Quick Donning Masks, Bio Hazard Suits, additional C2 Canisters,
Toxicological Agent Protective Aprons, Skin Decon Kits, Chemical
Footwear Covers, Chemical Protective Gloves, Chem-Bio Protective Mask
(M40) helmet covers, and First Aid Kits. Funding for these items is not
included in the FY98 Budget due to topine constraints. However, if an
additional $15 million was provided, these remaining CBIRF procurement
items would be procured.
Question. The proposed unit strength for the CBIRF will be 350 to
400 marines. What is the current strength? When will you achieve your
planned unit strength?
Answer. The current strength for CBIRF is 345. A total manpower
strength of 374 is scheduled to be achieved during fiscal year 1998.
Mine Warfare
Question. Mine warfare was identified as a major deficiency during
Operation Desert Storm. Mr. Douglass, please describe the Navy's mine
warfare strategy.
Answer. Navy has developed a mine warfare strategy based on
progressive introduction of mine countermeasures (MCM) capabilities
developed to become an integral element of fleet operations. The vision
is to provide MCM functionality to the commander with a mix of
dedicated and organic capability, rather than relying solely on our
current force of dedicated MCM assets. The immediate focus is defined
by a Near-term Campaign Plan which encompassed 1996 and 1997 programs
and initiatives. This plan identified shortfalls in mine warfare
capabilities and programs which could resolve these deficiencies in the
shortest period of time with the greatest increase in capability. The
next element, the Mid-term Campaign Plan, is defined by the budget
years, fiscal years 1998 to 2003. This Plan continues the initiatives
and expands on the programs of the Near-term Plan. These investments
stress the steady improvement of mine countermeasures readiness and
sustainability, and progressive funding of initiatives to eliminate
capability gaps and integration of MCM into the fleet. The final
element, the Far-term Campaign Plan, focuses beyond the current budget
with an emphasis on those science and technology developments which
have the most promise for solving capability shortfalls. The Navy's
mine warfare strategy is an evolutionary effort that has demonstrated
over the past two years stability in its planning and commitment for
its successful execution.
Question. What major mine warfare programs are in your budget, and
are they fully funded?
Answer. Most mine warfare programs do not fall within the ``major''
acquisition program category. Mine warfare capabilities are being
developed as many minor acquisition efforts managed by the Program
Executive Office for Mine Warfare. The largest mine warfare acquisition
program we have, the mine countermeasures ships (MCM and MHC classes)
are nearing completion with only three MHCs remaining to be delivered
within the next year.
Funding for mine warfare programs receives attention at the highest
levels of Navy, the Joint Staff and OSD. In accordance with Public Law
102-190 Section 216, both Navy and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
determine that the programs contained in the Mine Countermeasures
master plan have sufficient funds in the President's Budget. The
Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) also reviews the
plan before certifying to Congress that Navy has sufficient resources
for its execution.
Question. What mine warfare funding shortfalls remain?
Answer. In the formulation of the fiscal year 1997 Mine Warfare
Plan, the resource sponsor for Mine Warfare, Director, Expeditionary
Warfare Division (N85) identified some funding shortfalls that required
resolution to execute initiatives in the Near-term Campaign Plan. As
part of the fiscal year 1997 budget submission, offsets were identified
for the RDT&E and OPN shortfalls. The only remaining funds to be
resolved are $6.155 million of OMN for the Near-term Campaign Plan
initiatives of: readiness and substainability; route survey and
database development; and the Mine Warfare Readiness/Effectiveness
Measuring (MIREM) Program. Since OMN is one year money, this shortfall
is being addressed in the on-going mid-year budget review.
With regard to the fiscal year 1997 budget, there are ongoing
efforts to coordinate the release of Congressional plus-up funds for
fiscal year 1997 for specific mine warfare programs. These funds are
intended to accelerate the delivery and development of our more
promising programs such as the Integrated Combat Weapons System (ICWS)
and the field evaluation of Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD) 111
and Magic Lantern® for the Airborne Laser Mine Detection System
(ALMDS).
Question. Under current plans, when will modern mine warfare
equipment actually be delivered to the field?
Answer. Our Mine Countermeasures ships (MCM and MHC classes) are
among the most modern in the world. We have completed the MCM class
construction program and have only three MHC class ships remaining to
be delivered.
As an indication of our vision to transition MCM capabilities to
the fleet, the Remote Mine-hunting System (RMS) is being developed to
provide our surface conbatants the capability to conduct independent
mine hunting operations. RMSs is progressing towards accelerated fleet
introduction. The prototype unit, RMS(V)2, completed an at-sea exercise
with the Kitty Hawk Battle group in the Persian Gulf in January 1997.
The low rate initial production (LRIP) version, RMS(V)3 will be
introduced in Fiscal Year 1999 with the final operational version,
RMS(V)4, reaching initial operational capability IOC) in fiscal year
2003.
From the airborne MCM perspective, we have provided a contingency
airborne Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) capability to detect
floating and moored mines in the near surface region using the Magic
Lantern (Deployment Contingency) (ML(DC)) system. The Reserves received
the first of three ML(DC)) units this past December. A restart of
Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS) is being planned for the
1999 budget.
The submarine force is actively pursuing an MCM role through the
development of a clandestine mine reconnaissance system with tethered
Near-term Mine Reconnaissance System (NMRS). This system is on schedule
for a limited capability introduction 1998. The operational autonomous
version, the Long-term Mine Reconnaissance System (LMRS), is planned
for IOC in 2003.
Other programs, such as the Distributed Explosive Technology (DET)
and the Shallow Water Assault breaching System (SABRE) are on schedule
to provide our amphibious forces the capability to counter landing zone
mines ``in stride.'' Both of these systems passed Milestone II this
past year, and will achieve Milestone III in 1999.
Manufacturing Technology
Question. The Navy's manufacturing technology program provides
funding to improve the way in which Navy weapon systems are
manufactured, thereby lowering their cost. The Congress has added
between $30 to $50 million to the Navy's manufacturing technology
budgets in each of the last three fiscal years. It would not have been
hard for the Navy to guess that this is a Congressional interest item.
Mr. Douglass, is the Navy's manufacturing technology program a good
program?
Answer. Yes, Manufacturing Technology (MANTECH) is the only process
technology development program we have. MANTECH has historically
provided a significant return on investment, (average of about 20:1).
Question. Why does the Navy traditionally underfund it each year in
budgets to Congress?
Answer. Few programs get all the money they believe is necessary.
Process technology does not compete well against product technology,
especially in a declining budget scenario. Process technology is
perceived to benefit industry rather than weapons systems--a
misconception.
Question. Please explain why there are no funds requested for
manufacturing technology in your 1998 budget, and whether you
personally believe this is wise.
Answer. Historically, the Congress has appropriated funds in excess
of the President's Budget request, and such was the case in fiscal
yearr 1997. While the Department does support a robust MANTECH program
linked to our acquisition program, fiscal realities have required that
difficult choices be made to balance competing valid requirements. This
was the basis for using $36 million of the fiscal year 1997
appropriations to ``forward fund'' MANTECH in fiscal year 1998. During
the coming year, we will be conducting an assessment to determine just
what the most appropriate sustainable funding level for MANTECH should
be for fiscal year 1990 and following years.
Question. The Committee understands that industry has submitted
about $300 million of proposals to the Navy for manufacturing
technology projects that may offer high payback to the Navy. How would
you implement these proposals if there are no funds in the budget?
Answer. MANTECH issues come from both industry and the Navy. Our
data base currently contains over $300 million in issues (not
proposals).
Our Executive Steering Committee has prioritized these issues and
found that just over $100 million have truly significant impact in
terms of return on investment on the affordability of our weapon
systems.
The forward funding strategy would provide $36 million for
execution in fiscal year 1998. Funding levels for fiscal year 1999 and
future years will be reappraised during the coming year.
University Research
Question. The Navy is the Defense Department's executive agent for
university research. The Office of Naval Research (ONR) negotiates and
administers DOD research contracts with universities. A few years ago,
abusive overhead charges to government contracts (for example, at
Stanford) was a major issue. Mr. Douglass, where do we stand today on
the issue of reform of the Defense Department's university research
contracts?
Answer. The problem was not with the awarding of research
contracts, but with the indirect costs that were charged to these
contracts. The Navy revised its indirect cost rate setting procedures
by consolidating the negotiation function at its headquarters and
establishing an expert negotiation staff.
Question. How many DoD contracts with academic institutions still
have unresolved, prior-year overhead rate issues?
Answer. Over the last three years, DoD has resolved over 125 open
prior-year overhead rate issues and is current at all our cognizant
universities, except for one.
Question. What is being done to simplify the procedures used to
determine indirect overhead rates charged to government contracts?
Answer. The Navy is using more predetermined rates, on a multi-year
basis, where business conditions permit.
Use of multi-year predetermined rates reduces the overall audit and
negotiation costs to both the Government and universities. DoD's policy
to rely on A-133 audits, prepared by independent public accountants,
will also reduce the Government's auditing costs.
Question. What is being done to streamline the number of government
personnel who negotiate, administer, and audit our currently cumbersome
systen?
Answer. The Navy has six people assigned to the negotiation of
indirect cost rates and audit resolution matters at universities. These
functions were previously handled by 14 Field Offices.
Question. How much is contained in the Navy's fiscal year 1998
budget for contracts with universities for any purpose, and how does it
compare to the 1997 level?
Answer. Within the total Fiscal Year 1998 RDT&E, Navy Budget
request, we plan to spend approximately $365 million at educational
institutions, of which approximately $132 million will go to UARCs
(APLs/ARLs). This is approximately $16 million lower than fiscal year
1997, with UARCs being approximately $22 million lower.
Question. Admiral Pilling, we discussed with you today many severe
shortfalls in equipment for Navy combat ships. You are head of Navy
requirements. What is the Navy's requirement for this level of annual
spending with universities?
Answer. The Navy long-term strategy has relied on maintaining a
technological superiority over potential adversaries. This is even more
important as we reduce and modernize our fleet assets. New enabling
technologies for developing superior warfighting systems are dependent
upon new knowledge and concepts produced by basic research, largely
conducted in universities. Basic research in the initial and
fundamental step in the process of scientific discovery and has a
considerable impact on the development cycle time and operational
capability of a broad range of military systems. The maintenance of our
technological superiority in the long term is directly dependent on our
sustaining a robust program of basic research focused on naval relevant
issues.
A-12 Litigation
Question. DOD terminated the A-12 aircraft (a fighter-sized B-2
shaped aircraft) years ago, and has been in court with its contractors
ever since. Mr. Douglass, what is the status of A-12 litigation?
Answer. We expect that a judgment in the amount of approximately
$1.1 billion plus interest will be entered against the United States in
the near future, which will then provide the opportunity for appellate
review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
Question. What legal decisions were made last year, and what do
they mean to the Navy?
Answer. On June 12, 1996, the Court of Federal Claims ruled: 1)
that only incurred costs remain to be determined in deciding the amount
of plaintiffs' termination for convenience recover, and 2) that in
determining the monetary relief for the plaintiffs, the Court will not
consider a loss adjustment, or plaintiffs' entitlement to equitable
adjustments, or profit. On December 13, 1996, the Court issued an
opinion elaborating upon the June 12, 1996, Order. It said that the
issues under ``2)'' above will not be considered because one party or
the other would be unfairly prejudiced due to limitations on discovery
by the Executive for national security reasons, and that plaintiffs'
damages will be limited to incurred costs with certain adjustments. On
February 5, 1997, the parties stipulated that allowable incurred costs
for purpose of any judgment will be $3.749 billion, with various
adjustments resulting in a net judgment to be entered in the amount of
$1,071,365,444.
Question. What events lie ahead?
Answer. A judgment will probably be entered in the near future and
the case will be appealed by both parties to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
Question. When do you expect court proceedings to end?
Answer. We expect a final judgment to be issued by the Court of
Federal Claims in the near future, and we expect that appeals will be
filed by both parties. It will probably be at least a year before the
Court of Appeals issues an opinion. We expect that the case will then
be remanded to the Court of Federal Claims for further proceedings in
accordance with the decision of the Court of Appeals. It is difficult
to speculate when all court proceedings will end.
Question. Should a judgment be made against the government, what is
the range of likely dollar values involved and how would these be paid?
Answer. A judgment will likely be entered against the United States
in the near future in the amount of approximately $1.1 billion plus
interest as computed under the Contract Disputes Act. When the
accumulated interest through March 31, 1997 is added to the principal
amount of the judgment, the total will be approximately $1.49 billion.
The government is not required to pay a judgment until after all
judicial proceedings have been completed, including further proceedings
in the Court of Federal Claims after any remand. We expect that the
judgment will be reversed on appeal.
In general, a judgment under the Contact Disputes Act involving a
Navy contract is paid in the first instance from the judgment fund,
which is administered by the Department of the Treasury. Treasury then
seeks reimbursement from the Navy. Any reimbursement must be made from
funds currently available for obligation at the time of the judgment or
from funds appropriated by Congress in the future. No judgment in this
case will be paid until all judicial proceedings are completed.
Question. What would be the effect on Navy modernization budgets if
a court judgment were rendered and upheld against the Navy?
Answer. We do not know when a court judgment would be rendered or
upheld against the Navy. Therefore, it is too speculative to determine
what effect, if any, such a judgment would have on Navy modernization
budgets.
TSSAM Lawsuit
Question. The government terminated the A-12 contract for
``default'', but terminated the TSSAM (Tri-Service Standoff Attack
Missile) for ``the convenience of the government''. Both programs
suffered similar problems in terms of cost, schedule, and poor
performance after expenditure of billions of dollars each. Termination-
for-default means that the contractor is held liable for overruns,
while under a termination-for-convenience the contractor is not
penalized for its poor performance. Secretary Douglass, the Committee
is surprised to learn that the TSSAM contractor (Northrop-Grumman) has
filed suit against the government to recover $750 million of
``uncompensated performance costs, investments, and a reasonable
profit'' on this terminated program. What are your views on the merit
of this lawsuit?
When the contract was originally terminated for convenience, didn't
the government and the contractor reach agreement on a fair settlement
cost? If so, what has changed now?
How do you characterize the contractor's performance on the Navy
portion of the program?
Did the government get its money's worth from the $3 billion
investment made in this program?
How much could the government have to spend to defend itself in
court against this lawsuit?
Answer. While the Department of the Navy (Navy) is a participant in
the TSSAM program, TSSAM contract administration is a matter under the
cognizance of the Air Force. With respect to the litigation, the
Department of Justice, working with the Air Force, represents the
United States in this case.
Accordingly, although the Navy will cooperate in any way possible
to assist the Air Force and Department of Justice with this matter, I
must defer to the Air Force and Department of Justice with respect to
answers to these questions.
Question. Where would the Navy get its share of $750 million if it
had to pay additional TSSAM costs under a court penalty? Would it
likely come from weapons modernization funding?
Answer. Generally, a court judgment against the United States is
paid from the judgment fund, and an agency is required to reimburse the
judgment fund from its available funds or by obtaining additional
appropriations.
UNFUNDED REQUIREMENTS
Question. What are the top ten unfunded requirements in each R&D
and procurement account in your service?
Navy Answer. Navy's fiscal year 1998 budget, in my view, reflects
our commitment to sufficiently fund critical long-term recapitalizaiton
programs while protecting the near-term readiness of our forces. I
remain concerned, however, about overall procurement levels.
Accelerating procurement of certain platforms and systems would be
desirable if we are to maintain a ready force into the next century. We
also recognize that we must continue to decrease our maintenance
backlogs in ships, aircraft and real property. Additional funds
provided by you last year enabled us to do just that.
This year, in addition to our maintenance backlog, a number of
long-range programs would benefit from increased funding, should such
resources be made available. Along with the Integrated Ship Self-
defense and Cooperative Engagement Capability Programs discussed in my
previous answer, I would like to accelerate procurement of ships (DDG-
51 and LPD-17), aircraft (F/A-18 E/F and E-2C), and weapons systems
(Navy Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defense, Tomahawk, and Joint
Standoff Weapon). High-priority RDT&E investments such as CVN-77, Navy
Theater-Wide TBMD, Naval Surface Fire Support, and MANTECH could also
benefit. A prioritized list detailing how we would use any additional
funds is attached.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Marine Corps Answer.
(Note: In some cases Official Marine Corps Unfunded Lists include
less than ten items.)
The top unfunded requirements in R&DT&E (Ground) in millions of
dollars are:
$19.8--Commandant's Warfighting Lab.
$0.6--Marine Enhancement Program.
$10.1--Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle.
$3.6--Light Weight 155MM Howitzer.
$1.5--Tactical Remote Sensor Systems.
$0.7--Marine Common Hardware Suite Development & Management.
$1.0--Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance Processing &
Evaluation Syst.
The top unfunded requirement in RDT&E (Aviation) are:
$3.9--AV-8B Safety, Reliability and Operational Enhancement.
The top unfunded requirements in Procurement, Marine Corps are:
$42.6--Base Telecommunications Infrastructure.
$17.0--Javelin Medium Antitank Weapon System.
$65.1--Light Tactical Vehicle Replacement Program.
$18.2--Items Less Than $10 Million.
$(9.2)--Combat Vehicle Appended Trainer.
$(6.2)--International Standards Organization Bed.
$(0.4)--Improved Direct Air Support Center PIP.
$(1.6)--Combat Rubber Reconnaissance Craft.
$(0.8)--Light Armored Vehicle--Reliability & Maintainability.
$15.1--Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force Equipment.
$22.1--Power Equipment, Assorted.
$11.1--MX 11620 Generation III 25 mm Image Intensification
Tubes.
$24.3--Items Less Than $10 Million.
$(0.4)--Close Quarters Battle Weapon.
$(3.2)--M2 Flatrack.
$(3.5)--Logistics Information Systems.
$(2.4)--Defense Message System.
$(1.2)--Underwater Breathing Apparatus.
$(1.7)--Marine Enhancement Program.
$(1.5)--Special Effects Small Arms Marking System.
$(3.3)--Military Motorcycle Replacement.
$(3.0)--Advanced Demolition Kit.
$(4.1)--Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance Processing &
Evaluation Syst.
$12.2--Shop Equipment Contact Maintenance.
The top unfunded requirements in Procurement of Ammunition, Marine
Corps are:
$5.0--Ctg, 40mm practice Linked M918 (DODIC B584).
$15.0--Charge, Demolition Assembly M183 (DODIC M757).
$2.0--Ctg, 5.5mm Training Rounds M200 (DODIC A080).
$1.0--Ctg, 5.56mm Training Rounds M200 Linked (DODIC A075).
Question. Identify all production programs for which funds are
included in the fiscal year 1998 budget request where fiscal
constraints have prevented acquisition of sufficient quantities in
either fiscal year 1998 and/or the accompanying FYDP to meet validated
military requirements/inventory objectives.
Navy Answer. These procurement items are listed in the previous
copy of the CNO's Priorities List for fiscal year 1998 Additional
Congressional R&D and Procurement Program list.
Marine Corps Answer. FY 1998 fiscally constrained procurement
programs (PMC, PANMC and APN) which could benefit from additional
funding (to procure additional quantities to meet validated military
requirements/inventory objectives) are listed below. All items are in
the FYDP which accompanies the FY 1998/1999 President's Budget.
Procurement Marine Corps:
($ in Millions)
Base Telecommunications Infrastructure.................... 42.6
Javelin Medium Antitank Weapon Systems.................... 17.0
Light Tactical Vehicle Replacement Program................ 65.1
Combat Vehicle Appended Trainer........................... 9.2
International Standards Organization Bed.................. 6.2
Improved Direct Air Support Center Pip.................... 0.4
Combat Rubber Reconnaissance Craft........................ 1.6
Light Armored Vehicle-Reliability/Maintainability......... 0.8
Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force............... 15.1
Power Equipment Assorted.................................. 22.1
MX 11620 Gen III 25mm Image Intensification Tubes......... 11.1
Close Quarters Battle Weapon.............................. 0.4
M2 Flatrack............................................... 3.2
Logistics Information Systems............................. 3.5
Defense Message System.................................... 2.4
Underwater Breathing Apparatus (UBA)...................... 1.2
Marine Enhancement Program................................ 1.7
Special Effects Small Arms Marking System (SEASAMS)....... 1.5
Military Motorcycle Replacement........................... 3.3
Advanced Demolition Kit................................... 3.0
Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance Processing and
Evaluation System (TERPES).............................. 4.1
Shop Equipment Contact Maintenance (SECM)................. 12.2
Procurement Ammunition, Navy and Marine Corps:
Ctg. 40mm Practice Linked M918 (DODIC B584)............... 5.0
Charge, Demolition Assembly M183 (DODIC B584)............. 15.0
56mm Ctg. 5.56mm Trng Rounds M200 (DODIC A080)............ 2.0
Ctg. 5.56mm Training Rounds M200 Linked (DODIC A075)...... 1.0
Aviation:
AV-8B (1 A/C, 22 T-AV8B Engines, Simulators).............. 236.5
V-22 (11 A/C, Spares and AP for Additional 9)............. 1,094.0
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy:
LPD 17 (1 Ship)........................................... 746.0
Question. What initiatives are currently approved in an outyear POM
which could either be done cheaply and/or be fielded earlier by
initiating them in fiscal year 1998?
Indicate program by appropriation account along with an estimated
funding stream for each of the five subsequent fiscal years (assuming a
fiscal year 1998 start) along with potential savings that could be
achieved.
Navy Answer. The previous copy of the CNO Priorities List contains
the top Navy investment areas where additional fiscal Year 1998 funding
would be of benefit, to both accelerate the pace of new equipment
purchases, and to save money in the outyears of the fiscal year 1998-
2003 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). Savings would accrue in fiscal
years 1999-2003 years because of increased acquisition quantities,
higher learning curves, or earlier completion of total program buys.
Specific funding streams for each fiscal year depend, however, on such
things as contract re-negotiations, adjustments in research &
development and procurement profiles, and other decisions that would
have to be worked as part of the fiscal year 1999 Program Review this
summer and fall
Marine Corps Answer. There are many items, both ground and
aviation, that could be fielded earlier. These items are listed in the
table below. The second column of the table represents the amount of
the program that can be accelerated into fiscal year 1998. Columns
three through seven represent the current funding stream of each
program. The items that could be fielded more quickly are as follows:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PMC Enh. Amt FY 99 FY 00 FY 01 FY 02 FY 03
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Base Telecom Infrastructure....... 42.6 16.8 16.7 17.3 17.5 0.0
Javelin Medium Antitank Weapon.... 17.0 83.4 81.7 28.8 0.0 0.0
Lt. Tac. Veh. Replacement......... 65.1 0.0 57.4 56.6 65.0 80.9
CVAT.............................. 9.2 0.0 13.0 13.8 21.8 30.1
ISO Beds.......................... 6.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
IDASC PIP......................... 0.4 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6
Combat Rubber Reconn Craft........ 1.6 2.6 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1
LAV-RAM........................... .8 1.4 1.7 1.3 1.7 2.0
CBIRF............................. 15.1 0.0 1.0 1.6 1.4 1.0
Power Equipment, Assorted......... 22.1 4.1 4.3 4.6 4.7 4.9
MX11620 Gen III Tubes............. 11.1 10.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Close Qtrs Battle Weapon.......... .4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
M2 Flatrack....................... 3.2 3.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Logistics Info System............. 3.5 5.9 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.1
Defense Message System............ 2.4 4.6 7.7 3.4 0.0 0.0
Underwater Breathing App.......... 1.2 1.1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Marine Enhancement Program........ 1.7 2.1 1.8 11.3 11.6 1.8
Sp. Effects Small Arms Mk......... 1.5 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Military Motorcycle............... 3.3 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Advanced Demolition Kit........... 3.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
TERPES............................ 4.1 0.0 4.0 0.0 3.0 0.0
Shop Equip Contact Maint.......... 12.2 11.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
PANMC
Ctg. 40mm Prac. Linked (B584)..... 5.0 9.7 9.7 6.7 6.7 7.8
Ctg. Demo Assembly (M757)......... 15.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0
Ctg. 5.56mm Trng Round (A080)..... 2.0 7.7 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3
Ctg. 5.56mm Trng Lnkd (A075)...... 1.0 4.6 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
APN
AV-8B (1 A/C, 22 T-AV8B Engines, 236.5 ........... ........... ........... ........... ...........
Simulators)......................
V-22 (11 A/C, Spares & AP for 1,094.0 676.1 739.5 976.2 1,302.3 1,561.5
(additional 9)\1\................
VH-3/60 Simulators................ 10.0 ........... ........... ........... ........... ...........
F/A-18D (2 A/C and Spares)........ 93.8 ........... ........... ........... ........... ...........
RDT&E (AVN)
AV-8B Safety, Reliability and 3.9 ........... ........... ........... ........... ...........
(Operational Enhancement)........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\The additional funds added in Fiscal Year 1998 for the V-22 would accelerate the program more rapidly towards
the most efficient production rate of 36 aircraft per year. This rate would save the total program
approximately $1.2 billion (a unit cost savings of $2.7 million per aircraft) and, combined with estimated
inflation savings of $4.8 billion, would enable the program to save approximately $6 billion.
Question. Provide a list of R&D or production programs or projects
for which funding is included in the fiscal year 1998 budget that are
stretched out beyond technically attainable schedules primarily due to
lack of funding in fiscal year 1998 and/or the outyears.
Navy Answer. The R&D and procurement programs included in the
President's Fiscal Year 1998 Budget request are adequately funded to
meet current schedule goals.
Marine Corps Answer. There are no Marine Corps systems acquisition
programs stretched out beyond ``technically attainable schedules''
primarily due to a lack of funding in the Fiscal Year 1998 budget and/
or the outyears. However, many programs are budgeted at minimum
sustaining rates or are budgeted in subsequent years due to fiscal
constraints. Programs which could benefit, if additional fiscal year
1998 funds were provided are as follows:
PMC: ($M)
Base Telecommunications....................................... 42.6
Javelin Medium Antitank Weapon................................ 17.0
Light tactical Vehicle Program................................ 65.1
Combat vehicle Appended Trainer (CVAT)........................ 9.2
International Std Organization (ISO) Bed...................... 6.2
Improved Direct Air Support Center (IDASC) PIP................ 0.4
Combat Rubber reconnaissance Craft (CRRC)..................... 1.6
Light Armored Vehicle--LAW-RAM................................ 0.8
Chemical/Biological Incidence Response ForcePower Equipment,
Assorted.................................................... 22.1
MX 11620 Gen III 25MM Image Intensification Tubes............. 11.1
Close Qtrs Battle Weapon...................................... 0.4
M2 Flattrack.................................................. 3.2
Logistic Information System................................... 3.5
Defense Messaging System...................................... 2.4
Underwater Breathing Apparatus (UBA).......................... 1.2
Marine Enhancement Program (MEP).............................. 1.7
Special Effects Small Arms Marking System (SESAMS)............ 1.5
Military Motorcycle Replacement............................... 3.3
Advanced Demolition Kit....................................... 3.0
Tactical Electronics Reconnaissance Processing and Evaluation
(TERPES).................................................... 4.1
Shop equipment Contract Maintenance (SECM).................... 12.2
PANMC:
Ctg. 40 mm practice Linked M918............................... 5.0
Charge Demolition Assembly M183............................... 15.0
Ctg. 5.5mm Training Rounds M200............................... 2.0
Ctg. 5.56mm Training Rounds M200 Linked....................... 1.0
R&D (GRND):
Commandant's Warfighting Lab (CWL)............................ 19.8
Marine enhancement Program (MEP).............................. 0.6
Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV).................... 10.1
Light Weight 155 MM Howitzer (LW155).......................... 3.6
Tactical remote Sensor System (TRSS).......................... 1.5
Marine Comman Hardware Suite (MCHS) Development and Management 0.7
TERPES........................................................ 1.0
APN:
AV-8B (1 A/C, 22 T-AV-8B Engines, Simulators)................. 236.5
V-22 (11 A/C, Spares, and AP for Additional 9)...............1,094.0
VH-3/60 Simulators............................................ 10.0
F/A-18D (2 A/C and Spares).................................... 93.8
R&DT&E (AVN):
AV-8B Safety, Reliability & Operational Enhancement........... 3.9
SCN:
LPD-17........................................................ 746.0
Question. Indicate all programs for which procurement funding is
included in your fiscal year 1998 budget that would be good candidates
for multiyear procurement funding, assuming additional funding were to
be available in fiscal year 1998 and the outyears. Provide for these
programs a comparison of the current acquisition funding stream
compared to a potential multiyear profile (assuming a fiscal year 1998
start), along with the additional up-front investment that would be
required and the potential savings that would be likely.
Navy Answer. At this time, the Department of the Navy has no
candidates for multiyear procurement funding. However, we are
continually evaluating programs to assess potential benefits of a
multiyear procurement strategy and may propose candidates in future
years.
Marine Corps Answer. There are no ground equipment programs for
which procurement funding is included in the fiscal year 1998 budget
that would be good candidates for multiyear procurement (MYP) funding
assuming additional funding were to be available in fiscal year 1998
and the outyears.
For my aviation programs, the most likely candidates for MYP
contracts are the MV-22 and the AV-8B.
The ideal time to begin multiyear procurement for the MV-22 is with
the first full rate production lot (fiscal year 2001). OPEVAL completes
in the first quarter of fiscal year 2000 which would allow initiation
of MYP in fiscal year 2001 in a fully evaluated, stable configuration.
Initiation prior to fiscal year 2001 could result in subsequent
significant configuration changes, based on OPEVAL results.
MYP for the MV-22 is expected to save between 4-10% of the cost of
the aircraft. This could be in addition to the 23% savings already
realized and the $2.7 million savings (fiscal year 1994 constant
dollars) per aircraft we will realize with an increase to a more
economic rate of 36 MV-22s per year.
Annual
[$ in millions]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Quantity...................................... 18 24 24 24 24 114
Gross P-1..................................... 1279.8 1587.3 1689.3 1609.3 1528.8 7694.5
Less AP....................................... -99.2 -121.6 -115.8 -148.4 -145.8 -630.8
Advance Procurement........................... 121.6 115.8 148.4 145.8 144.6 676.2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Total Annual............................ 1302.3 1561.5 1721.9 1606.6 1527.6 7719.9
Multiyear
Quantity...................................... 18 24 24 24 24 114
Gross P-1..................................... 1279.8 1523.6 1647.8 1569.0 1489.4 7509.6
Less AP....................................... -99.2 -154.3 -270.1 -270.1 -77.2 -870.9
Advance Procurement........................... 154.3 270.1 270.1 77.2 175.8 947.5
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Total Annual............................ 1335.0 1639.3 1647.8 1376.1 1588.0 7586.2
=================================================================
MYP SAVINGS............................. -32.7 -77.8 74.1 230.5 -60.4 133.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the AV-8B Remanufacture contract is an eight percent cost
savings. The AV-8B current and multiyear profiles are:
Annual
[$ in millions]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Quantity................................................. 11 12 12 9 44
Airframe/CFE............................................. 192.4 210.2 214.1 173.1 789.8
Gross P-1................................................ 300.1 334.4 322.8 297.6 1254.9
Less AP.................................................. -22.4 -18.9 -19.4 -15.0 -75.8
Adv Procurement.......................................... 18.9 19.4 15.0 0.0 53.3
------------------------------------------------------
Total annual....................................... 296.6 334.9 318.4 282.6 1232.5
Multiyear
Quantity................................................. 11 12 12 9 44
Airframe/CFE............................................. 177.0 193.4 197.0 159.2 726.6
Gross P-1................................................ 284.1 316.9 304.1 282.6 1187.7
Less AP.................................................. -22.4 -37.3 -52.7 -43.6 -156.0
Adv Procurement.......................................... 62.2 53.6 17.8 0.0 133.6
------------------------------------------------------
Total Annual....................................... 323.8 333.2 269.2 239.0 1165.2
======================================================
MYP SAVINGS........................................ -27.3 1.7 49.2 43.6 67.3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The AV-8B Multiyear option will require Congressional approval to
enter into a contract with an unfunded liability which may result if
the program is either prematurely canceled or the Navy is otherwise
unable to meet its contractual obligations.
Question. Identify any procurement programs in the fiscal year 1998
budget where provision of additional procurement funds in fiscal year
1998 would have a very favorable impact on production unit prices.
Navy Answer. Provision of additional procurement funds in fiscal
year would have a favorable production unit price impact on the
following programs:
F/A-18E&F
E-2C
DDG-51
Tomahawk
Info Technology-21
Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion
Marine Corps Answer. The Marine Corps can identify no ground
equipment programs where additional fiscal year 1998 procurement funds
would have a significant impact on budgeted production unit prices.
However, in the case of the Javelin program, the additional $17 million
contained in the fiscal year 1998 Budget Enhancement List provides a
significant capability enhancement. These funds procure 186 missiles
for six Marine battalions earlier than scheduled in the fiscal year
1998 President's Budget. No additional cost savings are realized in the
Javelin multi-year contract containing three years of level pricing.
In the area of aviation support, additional funds in FY 1998 for
the V-22 would allow for acceleration of the program more rapidly
towards the most efficient production rate of 36 aircraft per year.
This rate would result in total program savings of approximately $6
billion ($1.2 billion as a result of unit cost savings of $2.7 million
per aircraft, and $4.8 billion in estimated inflation savings).
Question. Identify each production program in the fiscal year 1998
budget whose main rationale is to sustain a minimal industrial base.
Navy Answer. The Navy has no production programs in the fiscal year
1998 budget whose main rationale is to sustain a minimal industrial
base.
Marine Corps Answer. There are no Marine Corps procurement programs
in fiscal year 1998 whose main rationale is to sustain a minimal
industrial base.
Question. Please indicate in total and for the top 20 largest
weapon systems both the peacetime operating requirement (separately)
for spare parts funded either as initial spares in procurement accounts
or as consumable spares in NWCF, and the percentage of requirement met
through the fiscal year 1998 budgeted level of funding. Project how
this would change by the end of the FYDP.
Navy Answer. Peacetime Operating Stocks and War Reserve material
for operating forces are managed in the wholesale supply system and
carried in the Navy Working Capital Fund (NWCF). The spares requirement
for fiscal year 1997 associated with the Navy's top 20 weapon systems,
expressed by obligation, are listed below. Table values are in millions
of dollars.
SYSTEM: FY 1997
F/A-18.................................................... 550.4
Helos (H-46, H-53, H-60, AH1W) (Considered as 4 systems).. 393.2
F-14...................................................... 188.2
Avionics RADARS--common (Considered as 2 systems)......... 153.9
P-3....................................................... 137.2
AV-8B..................................................... 119.0
E2/D2 (considered as 2 systems)........................... 112.5
S-3....................................................... 77.5
CASS (Consolidated Aviation Support System................ 75.4
MK 15 Close-In Weapon System.............................. 39.3
General Purpose Test Equipment............................ 36.3
Carrier Planned Equipment Replacement (CARPER)............ 34.6
AEGIS..................................................... 22.2
Elec Suspended Gyro Navigation............................ 13.9
LM2500 Engine............................................. 8.0
(Source: Fiscal Year 1998/1999 President's Budget, Exhibit 3B)
Supply System Inventory Requirement:
War Reserve............................................... $369.0
Total Wholesale Inventory Requirement................. 11,212.9
Source: (SSIR, 30 Sep 96)
Navy combines peacetime operating support and war reserve
requirements for these and all installed equipment/components into
onboard spare parts allowances termed Consolidated Shipboard Allowance
Lists (COSAL) for ships and submarines, and Aviation Consolidated
Allowance Lists (AVCAL) for aircraft embarked on air-capable ships.
Allowances discussed above provide demand or readiness-based parts
support with insurance items to support a set endurance period,
nominally 90 days, without resupply. The wholesale systems stocks
material to support the consumption and replenishment of allowance
material and other anticipated maintenance requirements. The Supply
System Inventory Requirement represents the total wholesale supply
system requirement in support of the Navy and includes $369 million for
war reserve material.
Financed as part of the Navy Working Capital Fund (NWCF) account,
the wholesale supply system provides outfitting and replenishment
spares to support Navy customers. This investment account fully funds
program requirements and is balanced to Navy's overall requirement.
Maintenance of weapon systems and stock replenishment of parts used by
operating forces are supported in the OM&N appropriation through the
Flying Hour/Steaming Hour Programs which are similarly balanced to the
overall requirement.
Initial spares to support new weapon systems or upgrades to
existing systems being introduced into the operating forces are
budgeted and funded as initial spares in Navy's three investment
accounts. Through fiscal year 1998, these accounts are fully funded.
Marine Corps Answer. The fiscal year 1998 funding contained in the
President's Budget for the Procurement Marine Corps budget line item
titled ``Spares and Repair Parts'' is sufficient to meet peacetime
operating requirements.
Question. Please indicate any potential FMS sales that are being
discussed that could influence production unit prices once consummated,
not including those whose impact is already factored into the
production unit prices portrayed to Congress in the fiscal year 1998
budget.
Navy Answer. Sales are projected for the below listed weapon
systems:
Harpoon; Standard Missile; P-3 Upgrade; MK-41 (VLS); MK-48 (GVL);
CIWS; AEGIS; E-2C Upgrade; F/A-18 C & D; LAC (AAV); LAV (Variant Kits);
Predator; AH-1W; SH-60B; AEWC; ASPJ; MK-46 Torpedo; AIM-7M; HARM; AIM-
9L/M/S.
Marine Corps Answer. Currently the United States Marine Corps
(USMC) has 103 foreign military sales (FMS) agreements with twenty two
(22) countries. To the extent that the USMC was aware of FMS, for these
efforts, the associated unit cost impacts are reflected in the fiscal
year 1998 President's Budget. There will continue to be opportunities
for additional FMS agreements in the future but there are no potential
sales known over those included in our budget.
Question. Please indicate what policy your service uses for major
R&D and production programs, such as ``budget to contract target cost''
or ``budget to ceiling contract cost'' or ``budget to most likely
cost'', and identify which of your major programs in the fiscal year
1998 budget deviate from this policy and the attendant rationale.
Navy Answer. The Department of the Navy budgeting policy for major
R&D and production programs is to budget to the most likely cost. This
budget quality estimate is developed through detailed review and
analysis of costs of the engineering characteristics and requirements
associated with the item under development or production. There are no
programs which deviate from this policy.
Marine Corps Answer. When budgeting for a program for which a
contract has been awarded, the maximum liability, including award/
incentive fees, is initially budgeted. Adjustments are made as
appropriate throughout the life of the contract. For a program where a
contract has not been awarded, a ``most likely cost'' approach is
generally used.
Question. Please indicate what your service uses to provide a
budget within R&D and production programs for unknown allowances and/or
economic change orders, and identify any programs in the fiscal year
1998 budget which deviate from this policy and the attendant rational.
Navy Answer. The Department of the Navy budgeting policy for major
R&D and production programs relative to unknown allowances and/or
allowances for engineering change orders is directly related to the
maturity of the program in the acquisition process. Maturing
productions are afforded a small allowance for emergent engineering
change orders based upon the specific historical acquisition and
engineering analysis experience of that program. New start endeavors
for which this experience is absent but for which a reasonable estimate
can be determined based upon the acquisition history of similar
programs are afforded a somewhat larger allowance incorporating lessons
learned. The fiscal year 1998 budget was prepared in accordance with
this policy.
Marine Corps Answer: Marine Corps acquisition programs are managed
to an Acquisition Program Baseline Agreement (APBA) with objective and
threshold values which permit limited cost/program growth. Changes in
excess of the established thresholds require reporting and action by
the Milestone Decision Authority. Tradeoffs within the program
consistent with the principles of Cost as An Independent Variable
(CAIV) are further used to reduce risk and manage cost. Engineering
Change Orders (ECOs) or any other cost elements are budgeted at levels
consistent with the most likely values indicated by the program life
cycle cost estimate or other documents. A limited number of recurring,
level-of-effort programs such as power generation equipment and
environmental control equipment are currently being baselined to also
conform to the APBA approach to program management. Additionally, minor
modification budget lines used primarily to address emergent readiness
and safety issues are not amenable to baselining.
Question. Please identify any R&D or production program which as a
contract for which all or a portion is budgeted in fiscal year 1998 for
a contract award fee larger than $10 million. Provide amount budgeted
for the award fee, the basis on which the amount was calculated (e.g.
100% fee based on the contract), and the historical performance of the
contractor in terms of percentage of award fee awarded during prior
award fee periods under the same contract.
Navy Answer. The following programs have contracts in which all or
a portion is budgeted in fiscal year 1998 for a contract award fee
larger than $10 million.
The budget for the Joint Strike Fighter Program includes $24.2
million in fiscal year 1998 for award fee under the Concept
Demonstration Program contract with Pratt and Whitney. The available
award fee amount for each period of the contract was determined as a
percentage of the total available award fee, based on the amount and
importance of work to be performed in each period. The key events for
the fiscal year 1998 award fee determinations are first engine to test
and first lift system and nozzle to test. This is a new contract and no
award fee payments have been made yet.
A portion of the fiscal year 1998 RDT&E budgeted amount for the F/
A-18E/F program is for contract award fees larger than $10 million.
Award fee amounts are budgeted in fiscal year 1998 for both the F/A-
18E/F airframe and engine engineering and manufacturing development
contracts in the amount of $21.7 million and $22.8 million,
respectively. Pursuant to contractual obligations, the budgeted amounts
are based upon 100 percent of the available contract award fee pool
which is due to be paid in fiscal year 1998. The following table
illustrates the percentages of award fee awarded under each contract
thus far.
[In percent]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Airframe Engine
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lowest percentage............................. 85 84
Highest percentage............................ 97 96
Cumulative Average to Date.................... 94 90
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The V-22 program's airframe engineering and manufacturing
development contract is a cost plus award fee contract. The program
budgets for 100 percent of the award fee liability incurred each year.
In fiscal year 1998 the award fee liability is $29 million over two
award fee periods. Historically, the contractor has been awarded
approximately 85-100 percent of the award fee available pool.
Marine Corps Answer. There are no fiscal year 1998 Marine Corps
ground allocation of RDT&E,N or Procurement Marine Corps programs which
have a contract award fee larger than $10 million.
Question. Please identify all R&D and production programs/projects
for which Congress appropriated funds in fiscal year 1997 which since
the Appropriations Act was enacted have been either terminated or
significantly down-scoped. For each, indicate the status of the fiscal
year 1997 and any earlier active fiscal year funds where funds have
been diverted to another purpose.
Navy Answer. There has not been any significant downscoping of
budgeted programs or new program terminations since submission of the
Fiscal Year 1997 President's Budget in March 1996. Program adjustments
reflected in our current estimates are due to rebalancing of resources
consistent with rephrasing of requirements and revision of production
and delivery schedules. Accordingly, since so terminations or
significant downsizings have occurred, no prior year funds have been
diverted.
Marine Corps Answer. The only Fiscal Year 1997 program that has
been terminated since the Fiscal Year 1997 Appropriations Act is the
Marine's Off-Route Smart Mine Clearing System (ORSMC). This action was
taken due to fiscal constraints. This adjustment is in line with
briefings provided to your staff subsequent to this action as well as
submission of the Fiscal Year 1998 President's Budget.
Question. Identify all ACTD funding in the RDT&E, Navy
appropriation account in each fiscal year 1997 through the FYDP.
Indicate total cost of each listed ACTD and whether other service
appropriations are contributing funds for it.
Navy Answer. The Department of the Navy has RDT&E funding related
to three ACTD's, the Precision Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) Targeting
System (PSTS); the Joint Countermine ACTD, and Extending the Littoral
Battlespace ACTD.
Precision Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) Targeting ACTD--(funding in
thousands)
FY 97--12,299;
FY 98--7,467;
FY 99-03--4,766.
The total cost of this ACTD and related core funding is
$24,532,000. No funds from other services or DOD are included in this
total cost.
Joint Countermine ACTD--(funding in thousands)
FY 97--90,738;
FY 98--76,810;
FY 99-03--ACTD ends in FY98.
The total cost of this ACTD includes direct funding from OSD as
well as generic supporting ``core funding'' from Army, Navy and Marine
Corps RDT&E accounts.
OSD........................................................... 68,900
Military services............................................. 585,330
--------------------------------------------------------------
____________________________________________________
654,238
Extending the Littoral Battlespace ACTD--(funding in thousands)
There is no funding in the current Navy FYDP for this ACTD. A
program plan and funding levels for future years is being developed.
The Marine Corps has funding in the FYDP as follows:
FY 97--5,000;
FY 98--To be determined;
FY 99-03--To be determined;
Total cost projections for the ACTD are pending development.
Marine Corps Answer. The only Marine Corps funded ACTD is Extending
the Littoral Battlespace (ELB ACTD). This ACTD is jointly sponsored by
the USMC and the USN. Marine Corps funding is contained in RDT&E,N, PE
0603640M, Advanced Technology Demonstrations, Project C2223, Advanced
Technology Demonstrations. Funding for this ACTD is as follows:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ELB ACTD........................... $5M $10M $10M $10M $10M $1M $1M
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Marine Corps participates generically in the Joint Countermine
ACTD. The total cost of this ACTD includes direct funding from OSD as
well as generic support from the Army, Navy and Marine Corps RDT&E
accounts. This ACTD ends in Fiscal year 1998. U.S. Navy funding is as
follows: fiscal year 1997 $0.9 million, fiscal year 98 $0.8 million.
The one program where extra investment could provide the highest
payback is additional dollars for the V-22.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Young.]
Wednesday, March 12, 1997.
AIR FORCE ACQUISITION PROGRAMS
WITNESSES
ARTHUR L. MONEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION
LT. GENERAL GEORGE K. MUELLNER, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
THE AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION, U.S. AIR FORCE
Introduction
Mr. Young. The Committee will come to order.
We are pleased to welcome Mr. Arthur Money, the Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, and Lt. General
George Muellner, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the
Air Force for Acquisition.
Gentlemen we thank you for being with us today and we
appreciate all the good testimony that you have given us over
the years.
Yesterday I made a fairly lengthy opening statement at the
hearing with Secretary Widnall and General Fogleman. I am not
going to repeat that this morning, but I think you basically
know what it was about.
We are concerned about our aviation programs. We are
concerned about the fact that we are not really making as much
of an investment in new tactical airplanes as maybe we should.
And so you know that and I am not going to bore you with that
statement all over again.
[Chairman Young's prepared statement follows:]
This morning we are pleased to welcome Mr. Arthur L. Money, the
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, and General
George K. Muellner, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Acquisition. Gentlemen, thank you for coming today.
The Air Force's fiscal year 1998 budget continues the trend of
emphasizing near-term readiness to carry out contingency missions, but
unfortunately at the price of delayed modernization of Air Force weapon
systems. The Air Force's 1998 budget requests $29.8 billion for
procurement and R&D. Though this is $600 million higher than fiscal
year 1997, when inflation is taken in to account it is once again lower
than last year's appropriated amount. In fact, from fiscal year 1990 to
1998, the Air Force modernization accounts have declined 51% in real
terms. And as we have noted for some time, we are concerned that
continued delayed modernization of your weapon systems will lead to a
long-term readiness problem, potentially resulting in unnecessary
casualties in some future conflict.
The decline in Air Force modernization leads to some starting
observations about your budget:
The 1998 Air Force budget funds only 3 tactical aircraft,
the lowest quantity in the 50 year history of the Air Force.
The Air Force budget allocates less for aircraft
procurement than the Navy--for the second year in a row!
And we see that already inefficient production rates have
been reduced further: For example, the budget proposes a cut in JSTARS
production from 2 aircraft per year to just 1 in fiscal year 1998.
Even the Air Force's highest priority, the F-22 stealth fighter,
does not escape reductions. F-22 production over the FYDP has been cut
approximately in half compared to last year's plan.
The Committee is also interested in hearing about programs that are
new in this budget, or that are just now taking shape. For example,
starting in 1998, the Air Force and Army budgets include $318 million
over a two year period to provide upfront US funding for a NATO JSTARS
program. The Committee is concerned that NATO has not yet decided to
buy JSTARS and that the program could be underfunded by as much as a
billion dollars. Also, this program comes at a time in which the Air
Force has cut the US JSTARS program.
The Committee would also like to hear more about the Airborne Laser
program. Though the Air Force was still working out the scope of the
program last year, we went ahead and provided funds to begin
development. This year we learn that it will cost $11 billion to
develop, procure, and operate 7 aircraft.
Finally, the Committee is very interested in hearing about the
reported cost growth to the F-22 program. The R&D program has increased
by $2 billion and as I already mentioned, production quantities have
been cut approximately in half over the Future Year Defense Plan. We
know the Air Force is working hard to eliminate a potential $13 billion
cost growth in production, and we look forward to hearing how that will
be accomplished.
So, I have outlined the issues we need to discuss today. As I have
said too often since becoming Chairman, it appears that we are on the
road to a severe long term readiness problem in the Air Force.
Hopefully, you can convince us that the situation is better off than
your acquisition budget would indicate. We want to work with you to
identify and remedy the most pressing shortfalls, and to eliminate
programs in your budget where budget growth is not needed.
Mr. Young. Mr. Murtha, do you have any opening commitments?
Then what we would like for you to do is proceed any way that
you would like. Your statements in their entirety will be
placed in the record, and just feel free to summarize them any
way you wish, and then we will have some questions for you.
Summary Statement of Mr. Money
Mr. Money. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Murtha and committee
staff, General Muellner and I are in fact delighted to be here
with you again to speak about the Air Force Modernization
Program. We welcome this opportunity to continue the frank and
open discussion that we have had over the past years concerning
the Air Force program.
As you are keenly aware, the Air Force RDT&E and
procurement program is an important part of the fiscal year
1998 budget request. It consists of a time-phased approach that
is coupled with aggressive acquisition reform initiatives, all
designed to ensure that the Air Force is properly postured to
provide the Nation a global engagement capability at an
affordable price as we move into the 21st Century.
Today we plan to provide you a thorough review of the
overall program, highlight key activities and events, and
discuss, explain, and clarify any issues and concerns you may
have.
As we did last year, General Muellner will walk and, in
fact, talk you through the presentation using the poster boards
here, and together he and I will answer any questions and
discuss any key issues that you may have.
We will talk about the TACAIR modernization and highlight
the importance of this program to the Nation and to the Joint
Force Commanders. We will explain how the F-22 and the Joint
Strike Fighter both fit as crucial pieces into this plan, and
will address the affordability issues.
In addition, we will include a discussion on the F-22 Joint
Estimate Team, the JET review results, the program
restructuring, and explain how this proactive initiative is
patterned after a similar review, one we used to pull out the
C-17 program. However, I might point out here that these issues
on the F-22 are being addressed much earlier in time than they
were on the C-17 program.
We will talk about our space superiority program and show
you how we will continue to modernize in these areas. We will
discuss the bomber force and highlight our efforts and
enhancements in this area. We will include a discussion on the
precision weapon program and we will address for you the
timelines for integrating these systems on the weapons program.
On those weapons platforms, excuse me. We will discuss our
Information Superiority Program and show what efforts we have
under way to ensure that the joint team is ready to achieve
dominant information awareness.
We will also discuss our Global Mobility programs, address
the S&T, science and technology investments and show you how we
are expanding our acquisition reform efforts moving beyond the
Air Force Lightning Bolts all designed to help us move into the
21st Century. It is our intent to spend as much time as you may
desire in these areas and to ensure you are fully comfortable
with these issues.
We truly feel that the budget request balances investments
across this entire range of combat and support capabilities
while sustaining the technology base. We are committed to
provide the Joint Force Commanders with the best capabilities
possible in the shortest time practical at the most affordable
price, providing effective weapons systems and services in the
most efficient process.
This overall plan provides the warfighters the entire
spectrum of combat capabilities and at the same time maintains
and sustains the critical technology base. Working together,
partnering with you in Congress, the warfighter, industry, the
administration, as we execute this plan, we can and will
proceed into moving the Air Force and this Nation into the 21st
Century.
So, Mr. Chairman, that is all I wanted to say at the
beginning, we will proceed with the plan.
Please ask questions as we go.
Mr. Young. Okay. Thank you very much.
Mr. Young. General, we will be happy to hear from you.
[Clerk's note.--The charts referred to by General Muellner
are printed on page 340.]
Summary Statement of General Muellner
General Muellner. My intent is again to lead you through
the program, and I encourage any questions you might have.
MEETING THE WARFIGHTERS' NEEDS
(CHART 2) The focus of my discussion today will be on what
we call our Air Force core competencies, these are the
capabilities or abilities that we provide to the joint
warfighting elements to execute our National Strategy as
captured in Joint Vision 2010 and as mentioned in the Air Force
piece of that, which is global engagement.
I point these out only in that we will be talking to each
of these areas and our programs all fall within them.
They are fed, as Mr. Money just defined, an acquisition
program that is based upon a time-phased modernization. What
that means is that we are right now fielding C-17s, airlift
capability, finishing up the bomber modernization efforts and
then we will be starting our TACAIR modernization phase. So
these are time-phased in the budget process.
Nurturing this is a streamlined acquisition approach and we
are driving for ever-increased efficiency in our
infrastructure. Same is true, as I will point out, in providing
additional agility to our sustainment operations so that we can
operate more expeditionary and do so in a more efficient
manner. The end result of this, as Mr. Money just pointed out,
is that we believe this time-phasing, along with the
streamlined acquisition and sustainment, is what gives us an
affordable program.
AIR SUPERIORITY
(CHARTS 3 AND 4) Let me start with the Air and Space
Superiority side. Air Superiority, and you all have seen this
chart before, obviously, we assemble one of the most important
elements and it is the first thing that the Joint Force
Commander asked us to provide. When you have it, you can have
freedom of action on the battlefield and prosecute the campaign
as you want it. When you don't have it, then you are at the
mercy of your adversary. So clearly we believe air superiority
is something that is very, very important to this Nation or as
Secretary Perry coined, air dominance, something that we really
like to have, and clearly we are focused on keeping that record
alive.
As we look at our Air Superiority Programs, the two that I
am going to spend most of the time talking about will be the F-
22 program and the Airborne Laser. Just on the relationships
side we have two key programs that will persist into the
outyears, the Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile, AMRAAM,
program is executing very well. It is meeting or exceeding all
of the warfighter's requirements, in some cases, by significant
amounts, and the cost itself continues to come down.
Just this year we had a down-select for our next-generation
infrared, IR, missile, a joint program under Navy helm. That
contract was won by Hughes and that program is in execution. So
we will have two frontline missiles on our force in the
outyears, as will the Navy.
What I would like to do now is address the F-22 program,
please.
F-22 Aircraft
(CHART 5) As you know, this is a revolutionary step forward
in that it combines the first highly maneuverable low-
observable platform, one that can operate at high supersonic
speeds on the battlefield efficiently for the first time and
has an integrated avionics suite that really brings all the
off-board and on-board information to the decisionmaker, which
is the operator. This provides them dominant battlefield
awareness.
Right now we are in the engineering and manufacturing
development phase of that program. And we are ahead of schedule
for first flight, which will occur in the last part of May of
this year. The official rollout of that airplane is on the 9th
of April, and we would certainly encourage your attendance at
that in Marietta. That airplane is actually in the fuel barn as
we speak. So that program is executing out very well and all
performance parameters are exceeding the warfighter's
requirements.
F-22 RESTRUCTURE
(CHART 6) As a result of the importance of this program, we
put together a Joint Estimating Team to go out and look not
only at the EMD program to ensure that we had confidence that
we could execute it, that we understood the various risk areas
and we have adequately resourced it, but also to look ahead at
the production program to ensure that we understood the
production costs and what the cost drivers were. And we have
used this very effectively, as Mr. Money pointed out, on the C-
17, also on the Joint STARS program, and so we put it in place
here. And an issue came about a year ago at this time when we
started that particular program.
C-17 AND F-22 SOFTWARE PROBLEMS
Mr. Murtha. Have you had the software problems with the F-
22 that you had with the C-17?
General Muellner. With the C-17?
Mr. Murtha. Yes.
General Muellner. We have not seen any of the software
problems to date. We are still growing the software. The flight
control software for the first flight airplane has actually
been flown already in the Vista F-16. We are still, at the
most, 30 percent through the entire software build for the
entire weapons system. But first flights off, we are actually
ahead of schedule, sir.
Mr. Murtha. What is the difference between the way you did
this and the way you did the C-17 that will eliminate that
problem?
General Muellner. We did this the way we ended up doing the
C-17, which was in a very structured standpoint of A-level, B-
level, C-level specs and flow-down and such.
Mr. Murtha. You remember in the C-17, you had one
contractor that only had a few people working on it? You had to
fire that contractor and hire a new one, so you have a
flowchart that recognizes that problem and you solved it.
General Muellner. Yes, sir, and I will tell you one of the
stressing elements in this program and one of the areas that we
managed very closely and in all of the programs is the access
to software programmers. They are a shortfall across the
industry. And these companies and the government manages those
assets very, very carefully.
Mr. Money. Let me just add to that, Congressman Murtha, and
foot-stomp two things here. We are obviously learning from one
program to another. Having all the flight control software
tested already on an F-16 Vista, so all the software needed for
the first flight and, in fact, for the first three vehicles, is
already done, been tested. The next major step, if you will, in
software, the General will talk about in a minute, is in the
avionics area. That doesn't enter until aircraft 4, and that is
a major issue, and we are putting all the heat we can, all the
attention we can into that area. But it is a significant issue,
about 1.6 million lines of code.
Mr. Murtha. But if you change any way you do the
procurement--we visited a couple of times with McDonnell-
Douglas on the C-17, and they said part of the problem is we
have to go clear back to the Pentagon in order to get changes
made. It was really an unbelievable paperwork problem. Is that
all eliminated?
General Muellner. Yes, sir, I guarantee you our office in
the Pentagon is the last place we have them come to for changes
on their software. We have a structure in the field that
incorporates those changes. We have a very extensive test
process, as indicated with the Vista F-16, to wring those out,
and there is an Independent Review Team that reviews all of
these actions prior to first flight and every successive
milestone. There are people separate from the program office
and separate from the contractors that are doing this.
Mr. Murtha. These cost estimates ought to be fairly
realistic at this point because you have taken care of the
problems early on, is that what you are saying?
General Muellner. You are absolutely right.
Mr. Murtha. Unless the numbers that you asked for go down.
General Muellner. Certainly rate and quantity will affect
the unit costs, but we have more definitions of these costs now
at the early stage in the program than we ever had in the past.
Mr. Money. Lockheed is the prime contractor and we hold
them responsible and accountable for all of that, so the paper
trail doesn't need to come to the Pentagon. We do review that
periodically, monthly, in fact, with Lockheed.
The second point is regardless of the quantity, the
software isn't changing. That same amount of software is
required if we have 100 units or 400 units.
F-22 JOINT ESTIMATING TEAM RECOMMENDATIONS
(CHART 7) General Muellner. Sir, the JET team came back
with several recommendations, and one is they looked at the EMD
program and their recommendation was that we needed to add
additional resources to that EMD program to assure that we had
the risk under control before we stepped forward in the
production.
The second part of that--and they focused on the avionics
as we have been talking about. This is the first aircraft where
we have had an integrated avionics suite rather than individual
federated things. So in this case they focused additional
attention to how we integrated avionics.
As a result of this, we added a total to the EMD program,
of about $2.1 billion. That was made up of two elements. We
added a $1.45 billion transfer by slowing the production ramp,
moving some of that money out of the total program top line
back into the development side. And at the same time, we
restructured our test program which freed up $706 million. So
the end result is that we had to add to the EMD program that
amount of money significantly reducing the risk from the
standpoint of getting the production side of the airplane ready
to go before we set forward into production.
Contractors and the government sat down and looked at
production cost estimates. The production cost estimates said
that if we did not effectively manage those production costs,
there could be upwards of a $13 billion increase in cost.
As a result of that, the contractors and government sat
down, put a plan in place. And that plan which was agreed to by
Norm Augustine, Karl Kropek, are the two primary CEOs,
definitizes how they took that cost out of the program. And on
the next chart I will give you some examples of that.
Mr. Money. So by doing this restructuring now, I believe we
have a much more executable program. We are putting in money
early to lower those production costs later. So I think you
will see that it makes more sense than what we had planned a
year or so ago.
F-22 COST SAVING INITIATIVES
(CHART 8) Mr. Young. General, as you go through that chart,
will you point out realistically what are the paper savings and
what are the real savings?
General Muellner. I would offer to you on this chart, as
well as in our production cost estimate, of course they were
all paper at this point because we are talking about something
in the 2004-2005 time frame that we are dealing with. But in
reality everything on this chart in both columns are
initiatives that have been put in place in other programs and
implemented. So from that standpoint, they are not conjecture.
They are issues that we have hard data on.
In fact, Alan Mulally, who is the new President of Boeing
Military, when he sat in our CEO meeting here the other day he
said we have all of these things in place right now in the 777.
So they are not indeed conjecture; they are proven techniques
that we have used in other programs, that is why we brought
them into this program, sir.
Specifically, the ones that we already have well-
definitized is specific process improvements and the insertion
of technologies to deal with obsolescence of parts and things
of that nature on the production line and in the production
vehicles. A multiyear approach similar to what we use in the F-
16, and by that is that the contractor does not go out and ask
for his subtier vendors to price a lot of 6 airplanes or 12
airplanes, but rather they look ahead and try to get economies
of scale in the way they do that, the way to deal with the
warranties. It turned out that we were overbooking what we were
requiring for warranties because of the way we were supporting
the weapons system during its initial fielding, and the same is
true on the subcontracts and material management.
For instance, across the entire Lockheed company now they
are able to buy as a company as opposed to one division. As a
result of that, they get much better economies of scale in
their material management programs. Those things have now been
incorporated in the program.
As we look at as other activities out here, again looking
at the F-16, the F-16 average, a 10 percent savings by using a
rotating 3-year, multiyear approach from the standpoint of
buying stock and programming ahead.
Lean Enterprise, we just consummated a Lean Aircraft
Initiative. It is similar to what the auto industry had and MIT
has been leading with the aerospace industry. We have
incorporated those benchmarking procedures into this particular
program.
And the last part of it is that we have rolled in the
acquisition reform techniques that we have been nurturing and
developing in other programs like JDAM, where we go to
performance-based contracting and we get out of the business of
telling the contractor how to do something and just tell them
what it is we want them to do. The end result of this gives us
very, very high confidence that what the contractors committed
to with the government, that is that there would be no
production cost increase, indeed is realizable, and that is
what we expect out of the program.
Mr. Dicks. Mr. Augustine signed this, correct?
General Muellner. That is correct.
Mr. Young. I want to have that chart placed in the record
to go along with your commentary so that we will have a record
of the chart.
Mr. Money. Let me just foot-stomp and give the General a
chance to grab a little drink here. Two things when we met with
the CEOs on the 19th of December and reviewed the JET team
output, the production costs at that time, if no actions were
taken, if business as usual, was going to be in the $60 billion
area. We said this is totally unacceptable. We need to work
this back to the original budget, the $48 billion production
number.
The work that has gone on between December and now--we just
this Monday had a 5-hour meeting with the CEOs that the General
referred to. What has come out of that is we in fact have plans
in place with meat on the bones to get that cost back down to
$48 billion.
Now, you undoubtedly hear a lot of things that are going on
in the Pentagon, a group in the Pentagon called the Cost
Analysis Improvement Group, CAIG, is still at the $60 billion
number. My answer to why there is a difference is that they are
looking at historical models of what has happened in the past.
Clearly we are looking forward to what can be done, and this
comment that Mr. Mulally made came out of the commercial side
of Boeing: My God, there is nothing new here, we have been
doing this on the commercial side.
This is good government. We have taken the initiative to
get the costs down and have meat on the bones and plans. Those
plans obviously have to be executed, and you can watch that
over the next 20 years. But I am very confident here, sitting
here saying with clear conscience that the most probable cost
for the production cost of this aircraft will in fact be $48
billion, and we are not stopping there, we are continuing to
drive efficiencies into the program.
Mr. Dicks. On that point, isn't it true that when you
compare the C-17 and the F-22, there is a universe in
difference. In fact, one of the things we had to do in the C-17
program was go back and insert technology.
As I understand it, we are using commercial practice. CAD/
CAM or Computer Aided Design/Computer Aided Manufacturing, all
of this is part of this program from the inception. So it is
really very different than the problems we faced with C-17, in
my judgment.
Mr. Money. Absolutely right. And all the things that we are
talking about, the difference between the 60 number and getting
back to 48, is well beyond the normal learning curves. These
are new initiatives, new practices, modern technology being
applied and so forth.
Mr. Murtha. I hope that you will get a better savings than
we got on the C-17. An awful lot of us thought that the savings
that you folks were so anxious to get the ball here that you
caved. I hope you worked the pencil. All the services want to
get a multiyear, that they--we got a little bit better with
ours, but we still--I think you could have gotten better.
Mr. Money. Yes, sir, I hear you, and thank you for your
help on C-17. And we will do a better job on this before we
come to you for the multiyear. We won't come to you for the
multiyear until this design is stable and we have a good
program. We have a lot of work to do yet, so we are a year or
two away from talking to you about that.
Mr. Hobson. I am not sure, I have a lot of respect for you
guys, I think you do a good job, but I don't understand all of
this at this point.
I have one question on this particular problem. As I
understand it, people talked about a $15 billion cost overrun.
Does that take you from the $48 to the $60 billion?
Now, I understood that about half of that was due to
expected inflation rates. And the problem I have is that you
never find out where all of this came from and how it got
started. Everybody gets promoted and retired and are gone and
we all live with it. I want to know you are telling me things
that are going to be put in so it doesn't happen again, or it
didn't happen that way, or there are other savings out there?
So you are going to work this back in? You are still going to
have $8 no matter what you do--$8 billion.
Mr. Money. No, sir.
Mr. Hobson. What you are telling us on paper, anyway, and
there is a commitment being made. I want to go through this
again. I hope to be here a little longer.
You have taken the action that you guys are comfortable
with. And as I say, you have a lot of integrity with me. That
all of this stuff is handled--I mean, if Baxter understands it
is handled, and you guys understand that it is handled, you
still have some problems with your other people down in your
shop getting them to agree that that is where you are. Is that
what is being said here today?
General Muellner. Yes, sir, indeed.
Let me explain the inflation issue for you. The $15 billion
that you described, about $8 of that--$8 billion of the $13
billion on the production side and on the EMD side, $743
million of the $2.1 billion was due to the fact that we in the
government program inflation about 2.2, now 2.1 percent.
This segment of industry is experiencing an inflation rate
up in the order of about 3.2 percent. When the cost-estimating
team went out and looked at what the projected costs were based
upon forward cost projections based on labor contracts,
material costs and everything else, they used the 3.2 percent
number. As a result of that, that gave you the delta between
what we in the government can program based upon the OMB-
provided rates.
The commitment by the contractors that Kropek and Norm
Augustine signed was to take the cost out of the program to
account for that inflation difference also. So the answer is
that $15 billion, $13 of that $15 billion has been taken out of
the program by those cost-saving initiatives you saw on the
previous chart that is correct.
Mr. Hobson. Okay.
Mr. Money. We had very candid discussions with the
contractors and said we cannot handle a cost growth due to
inflation if there is a different rate here. That is all
incorporated, so we talk about then year dollars here.
Mr. Hobson. I assume they do; these are smart people. They
cannot come back here and say, folks, you know, this is a
different ball game. I think you all have to remember that the
other way they get you on this is the same old way in building
contracts. That is if you all change the specs and what you
want this airplane to do and not do, they got you.
General Muellner. Yes.
Mr. Hobson. And that is what happens every time we do this,
the gotcha's get you.
General Muellner. Sir, our warfighters understand that
well, and those are the ones that generally have the
requirements creep. They are very sensitive to that. And,
indeed, they have been willing to trade to ensure that we
preserve the affordability of the program.
Mr. Money. Let me just add one thing just to emphasize what
General Muellner--just at that time, General Hawley, the
Commander of Air Combat Command, ACC and General Hawley, the
Director of Requirements, have been involved with every step we
have taken here. So the warfighter is totally on board with
this. We have a stable requirement. We have a stable program,
so we are going forth with that--and let's finish this here--
but all of those things have been taken into consideration so
we won't come back to Congress and say we need more money. $48
billion is what is needed to produce 438 airplanes, and that is
where the program is.
Mr. Young. General, why don't you proceed with your charts
and presentation, and then we will come back to more questions.
F-22 UNIT COSTS
(CHART 9) General Muellner. When you aggregate that all
together, and to agree with the point that Congressman Hobson
just made, is the commitment of this airplane--this is a chart
similar to the one that we showed you last year, and that is
the reason I used it again--this is indeed the flyaway cost in
constant-year dollars similar to what we showed you last year.
This is indeed the unit procurement cost in then year dollars,
again similar and what you see is some very, very small changes
up and down here. But the bottom line is that they have
remained constant, consistent with what we just said.
AIRBORNE LASER PROGRAM
(CHART 10) Now, sir, let me move on to the other element in
the Air Superiority that I think is a new and important
capability, and that is the issue of the Airborne Laser. The
Airborne Laser is again a revolutionary way of dealing with
theater ballistic missiles. All the other approaches we have
got are what we call catcher's-mitt approaches, where we try to
shoot them down in the incoming phase.
The important thing here is to try to shoot them down when
they are in the launch phase, the boost phase. When you do
shoot them down, if they have warheads that have either
chemical, biological or nuclear content, that warhead then
falls on the enemy rather than on us.
What the Airborne Laser gives us is the ability to reach
out with a speed-of-light weapon, intercept these things in the
boost phase. These capabilities have been maturing for years.
This is the first program where we have really tried to
field these on an airplane. The airplane, as you can see, is a
747-400 aircraft. We had a source selection earlier this year
to select between two contractors, Boeing won that contract and
they are indeed the integrator to integrate this laser on that
airplane.
We are in a phase of the program right now called Program
Definition and Risk Reduction. This will result in an airborne
demonstration against a boosting missile out in the 2002 time
frame. Eventually resulting in a seven-aircraft fleet; Interim
Operational Capability, IOC of about 2006.
Again, several important technologies have come along, not
only the laser technology, but even more important than that,
the ability for adaptive optics and atmospheric compensation to
ensure that we do indeed get a good energy on the target. An
event-driven, milestone-driven program. And we have exceeded
every one of our demonstration milestones along the way, so we
have a lot of confidence in this program, and right now, as I
said, it has entered the demonstration phase.
SPACE SUPERIORITY
(CHART 11) Sir, if I could, I would like to now move into
the Space Superiority side, and I would like to talk about the
key programs. There are a lot of other success stories here,
and we are making good progress, not the least of which is that
we are using acquisition reform to save upwards of $500 million
over the five year defense program in the last block of GPS
satellites we put on contract.
The two programs I would like to talk about are keystones,
one of them is the Space-Based Infrared Program. This is a
keystone not only for continuing our threat-warning
capabilities that the Defense Support Program now provides, but
also a significant underpinning in the outyears to theater and
national missile defense. I will talk about this more.
And then I would like to talk about where we are going in
launch vehicles, because we have to drive down the cost per
pound of getting things into orbit, and that is the keystone
for doing that.
SPACE BASED INFRARED SYSTEM
(CHART 12) The Space Based Infrared System SBIRS program,
constitutes two major elements: A high element composed of
geosynchronous and high-earth orbiting, six of those in that
constellation, and then what has been referred to as the space
and missile tracking system, or the SBIRS low concept is a low
constellation of satellites which provides increased tracking
coverage and accuracy.
So if you look at these high ones as providing threat-
warning intelligence characterization, these are the low ones
that really constitute what you need to intercept theater
ballistic or ballistic missiles launched at the CONUS.
The key part of this program is we are in the engineering,
manufacturing development phase for the high constellation.
With help from the Hill, we have accelerated the SMTS or SBIRS
low portion and are in the program definition and risk
reduction phase. It was originally going to have capability up
in 2006. We have accelerated that to 2004. That program remains
technically and from a schedule standpoint, high risk, and the
reason is we have accelerated that technology, and some of the
sensors technology in particular, is going to need that length
of time to play out. So we do have a 2004 capability on the
books right now. We laid the money into the budget to
accelerate that program and we are off executing it right now.
EVOLVED EXPENDABLE LAUNCH VEHICLE
(CHART 13) On the EELV side, again we just finished a
competition. We went from four contractors competing for this
very important mission area, down to two that are now remaining
in the competition. As you can see, they are McDonnell Douglas
and Lockheed Martin. The important part of their concepts, they
are a family of systems, if you will, that give us full
coverage up from the small-medium category, all the way up to
the heavy-lift capability. And if we look at our mission models
all the way out in the outyears, we need to have capability
across that whole range of potential lift, and orbit placement
capabilities.
The key focus of this program is to decrease the cost to
orbit by anywhere from 25 to 50 percent, depending on what
orbit and what payload you are talking about. A significant
reduction in what it is going to cost us as we expand in the
case of the Air Force, from an air-and-space force to a space-
and-air force as we see ourselves doing in the future. And,
again, this program is now in the competition between these two
contractor teams.
GLOBAL ATTACK
(CHART 14) Sir, if I could I would like to move into the
Global Attack area here. In this particular area I am going to
focus on the fact that in our fighter force we are necking down
in the outyears the primary fighters and the attack aircraft
that we will be using will be the F-22 and the JSF. But also,
of course, the bomber force. And I will describe for you what
we are doing in both the case of the B-1 and the B-2, in many
cases with your help, to accelerate the conventional capability
on those platforms.
B-1 Bomber
(CHART 15) Sir, in the case of the B-1, again with your
help, we have accelerated a Joint Direct Attack Munition, JDAM
capability coupled with an ALE-50 towed decoy. We will have
eight airplanes that have moved up a year and a half, into the
first quarter of 1999, to get that capability fielded on the
airplane. So we will have those eight airplanes that will be
capable of carrying Joint Direct Attack Missions with the ALE-
50.
They already have improvements to the on-board 161 program,
so these airplanes now have reasonably good survivability. Not
as good as they will have downstream when we get the defensive
systems upgrade, but they can go out and prosecute attacks
within most of our theaters with some packaging help.
The other key capabilities that we are bringing on board
brings along the whole family of attack weapons systems that
use GPS-aided information; the Joint Standoff Weapon, JSOW,
which is a Navy program which now gives us 40 to 50 mile
standoff; the wind-corrected munitions dispenser, which allows
us to drop at medium and high altitude, again, with high
accuracy and not worry about winds and other issues like that.
And finally, the Joint Standoff Missile. This is a very,
very important one because it is a highly survivable long-range
standoff weapon that allows us to go after precision targets
with a thousand-pound penetrating warhead. These capabilities
are all programmed for fielding on the airplane. We see no
technical risk in doing that.
Probably the most significant technical challenge, and it
is an integration challenge as opposed to a technology itself,
is the Defensive Systems Upgrade Program. This program, the
content of it will be two major elements: One of them will be
the IDECM, the Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasure
program, the Navy-developed program that is going on a wide
range of platforms. That coupled with the ALR-56, which is a
very proven radar homing and warning system which we have on a
lot of our systems now, an upgraded version of it, will
constitute this Defensive Systems Upgrade Program. That is the
program that is structured to go on the B-1, and we are off in
the process of executing that right now.
Mr. Young. General, I am interested in the ribbon at the
bottom that says B-1 is the backbone of the bomber force. Tell
us how many combat missions the B-1 has flown?
General Muellner. It hasn't flown any yet, sir.
Mr. Young. That is what I thought. When I came to this
Congress in 1971, the B-1 was a big issue. I was one of the
very strong supporters of the B-1. And I have always wondered
why we talk about the B-1 but we have never done anything with
it, I am sure this is not in your shop or in your area of
jurisdiction, but you tell a very positive story here--but the
B-1 has never been used in a combat role, strategic or
conventional.
General Muellner. Sir, when I was Director of Requirements
at Air Combat Command when we stood up that command and we
brought the bomber force in from then Strategic Air Command
into Tactical Air Command, and merged the two together, we put
heavy focus on making the B-1 a strong conventional player,
because it has really good capability if you can get the
weapons on board in support of conventional warfighting.
It was an airplane that prior to that had been focused on
the strategic aspect of delivering nuclear weapons. We have
spent the time since then, and we used to say the airplane was
in the penalty box for a long time. We weren't able to do some
of the things necessary to it because of its previous history.
Since then we have brought weapons on board and upgraded
the computer systems and upgraded defensive systems so that it
can be an active participant in theater warfighting and
conventional warfighting, and I think we are on a good track to
do that.
Mr. Young. How old is the oldest airframe?
General Muellner. Sir, we will have to take that one for
the record. I do not know offhand. I do know when I was at
Edwards in the late 1970s and the 1980s--of course, we were
testing the airplane then, so obviously----
Mr. Dicks. It has got to be early 1980s.
General Muellner. Yes, sir, that is my guess.
Mr. Dicks. Early 1980s is when we started getting the B-1.
[The information follows:]
No B-1A airframes are flying nor were any converted to B-
1Bs. The oldest operational B-1B was delivered to the Air Force
at Dyess AFB in June 1985.
Mr. Young. Just one second, I just wanted to say that I
still remain a strong supporter of the B-1, and I hope that all
of these good stories that we hear about the B-1 happen some
day.
General Muellner. Sir, they are happening, as we speak, in
exercises. You know, I think you have seen some of the
exercises, two B-1s launches out of Dyess, refuel en route,
join up with the carrier battle group in the Med, and drop on
Corsica, and then return to Dyess. Those sorts of global power
missions are being flown. They are flown as part of Green Flags
and Red Flags, the things you need to normalize this capability
in conventional warfighting.
Mr. Dicks. Just on this point, many of us in this Committee
and on the Armed Services Committee have been very concerned
about the pace of getting these weapons on the B-1s and the B-
2s. Could you put in the record for us when we are going to get
these weapons on all of the B-1s, and all of the B-2s, so we
can have a real clear picture of what the plan is, how much
money is in there?
General Muellner. Absolutely, sir.
[The information follows:]
The B-1 present and future weapons capability is as follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Weapon Carriage RAA FOC
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mk-82.......................... 84 Current....... Current.
Mk-62 Naval mine............... 84 Current....... Current.
CBU-87/89/97................... 30 Current....... Current.
JDAM........................... 24 FY99.......... FY01.
WCMD........................... 30 FY02.......... FY04.
JSOW........................... 12 FY02.......... FY06.
JASSM.......................... 24 FY02.......... FY06.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
RAA--Required Assets Available (3 aircraft plus support infrastructure).
FOC--Full Operational Capability (all 95 B-1s modified).
The total cost to integrate CBUs, JDAM, WCMD, JSOW and JASSM on the
B-1 is $1.65 billion. Included in this cost is upgrade of the mission
planning system, simulators, and upgrade to the aircraft infrastructure
necessary to integrate and employ GPS-aided and other future weapons.
The infrastructure upgrade includes GPS, secure communications, 1760
smart data bus, and a new computer suite. The computer suite upgrade
will enable the B-1 to employ multiple types of smart weapons on a
single sortie and provide for future growth. The computer upgrade will
also improve the cost of ownership of the B-1 by reducing the annual
sustainment cost of the system by $40 million a year after FOC.
An additional $0.94 billion is funded to improve the survivability
of the B-1. These upgrades are essential for the B-1 to employ weapons
in the low to medium threat environment. The ALE-50 towed decoy
provides interim protection against certain threats. The Defensive
System Upgrade Program (DSUP) reuses components of the ALE-50 system,
but will provide a more robust self-protection capability against a
multitude of threats. DSUP will also improve the cost of B-1 ownership
through a sustainment savings of $60 million a year after FOC. The
fielding dates of the survivability enhancements are:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
RAA FOC
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ALE-50 Towed Decoy................ FY99............. FY03.
DSUP.............................. FY02............. FY08.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The B-2 present and future weapons capability is as follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Weapon Carriage LOC FOC
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mk-84 (2000 lb)................ 16 Current....... FY99.
GAM............................ 16 Current....... N/A.
GAM-113 (4700 lb).............. 8 FY98.......... FY99.
Mk-82 (500 lb)................. 80 FY98.......... FY99.
Mk-62 Naval mine............... 80 FY98.......... FY99.
CBU-87/89/97................... 34 FY98.......... FY99.
M-117 (740 lb)................. 36 FY98.......... FY99.
JDAM........................... 16 FY98.......... FY99.
JSOW........................... 16 FY99.......... FY99.
JASSM.......................... 16 FY03.......... FY03.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LOC--Limited Operational Capability (initial capability).
FOC--Full Operational Capability.
The total cost to integrate GAM-113 and JSOW on the B-2 is $13
million and $72 million respectively. These funds were part of the FY
97 Congressional plus-up. Cost to integrate JASSM is estimated at $137
million. Included in this cost is upgrade of the mission planning
system, simulators, and upgrade to the aircraft infrastructure
necessary to integrate and employee these weapons. The B-2 is also
developing a generic weapon interface system in conjunction with JSOW
integration to facilitate integrating future weapons. the remaining
weapons are part of the B-2 baseline program.
Mr. Dicks. We have added money in the past because of our
concern. But you have this platform that has been around since
the early to middle 1980s and it is now going to be 2002 before
we get real capability on the airplane. And I worry that by the
time we get there, the plane is going to be pretty darn old.
PGM OVERVIEW
(CHART 15a) General Muellner. Sir, you have this chart in
your backups, if you would like to look at it closely. What
this shows you is the fielding schedule on these weapons on
each of the weapons systems that you see here.
In some cases that fielding schedule is driven by
capabilities of the airplane that are needed. For example, a
new computer, a new database. In some cases it is driven by
availability of the weapon. The JASSM program and the JSOW
program are still in development; those weapons have not been
fielded yet. And some of the early capability will go on the
bomber force, in the case of the JASSM in particular. And we
will add to that the costs associated with each one of them.
They are not on those charts.
Mr. Dicks. I think one of the revolutionary aspects of this
weapon is the cost. For example, JDAM is $13,000 a weapon
compared to Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile, CALCM at
$3 million, or Tomahawk at $1.2 million. Even though these
platforms are expensive and have had difficulties, you have
still got the potential of putting them together with smart
weapons at a lower cost than standoff weapons, and they are
much more effective. You have got the ability to go against
fixed targets, mobile targets, advancing armor and relocatables
and underground targets. That is pretty impressive.
How many B-1s are we going to do this on? Is it 70 you are
talking about?
General Muellner. Yes, sir, we are going to modify the
whole fleet. We have 95 total aircraft available; 95 B-1s.
Mr. Dicks. Do we plan to keep 91 B-1s in the inventory?
General Muellner. Ninety-five Total Active Inventory, TAI.
I am not sure what the primary weapons code will be. We will
have to find that out for you. But it is something less than
that.
We always have attrition reserves in that built-in. But 95
total aircraft is what the inventory is for that, and our
intent is to modify the entire inventory so we have attrition
reserve and TAI airplanes built in. We will find out what the
exact number is.
[The information follows:]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
B-1B........................................................ 98-1 98-2 98-3 98-4
PTAI........................................................ 16 16 16 16
PMAI........................................................ 51 52 53 54
BAI......................................................... 7 7 7 7
AR.......................................................... 19 18 17 16
TEST........................................................ 2 2 2 2
---------------------------------------------------
TOTAL................................................. 95 95 95 95
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Dicks. One show-stopper was the necessity of getting a
certain kind of bomb racks authorized. Are the bomb racks part
of this program now?
General Muellner. When we talk about capability, that means
everything is on the airplane, including the software, which we
were talking about early, the racks, the necessary support
equipment so you have combat capability there. It is not just
the availability of a weapon and an airplane. That is combat
capability which is reflected on these charts.
Mr. Hobson. When would you have the capability if the
President called you tomorrow and said we have got to go to
war, you are not going to take B-1s now; you are going to take
B-52s first?
General Muellner. No, sir, it would depend on what the
President asked for. In the case of the ALE-50, we just tested
that and demonstrated it. The B-1 can drop hard bombs and drop
Cluster Bomb Units, CBUs and can penetrate in doing that. But
the answer is we would use a mix, depending on what the
specific targets are.
Mr. Dicks. But are there no smart weapons on the B-1B as of
today? The B-2 has smart weapons with the Global Positioning
System Aided Targeting System/Global Positioning System Aided
Munitions, GATS/GAM, which have been tested and certified to
drop.
Mr. Murtha. This wasn't all the Air Force's fault. Remember
the deal was we put a limitation of $20.5 billion, which I was
against, I knew we should have improved it as we were building
it. And instead, we stuck with the $20.5 billion, and many of
the improvements that would have added cost, but were
eliminated because of this cost limitation.
General Muellner. Yes, sir, that was one of the great
benefits we had at Air Combat Command. About the same time we
took over the airplanes, the folk on the conventional side, we
came out of that penalty box that you just described for us.
Mr. Dicks. I think the other point is as frustrated as a
lot of us are about the pace of getting the smart conventional
weapons on the B-1 and the B-2, the reality is that these
weapons are just coming into the inventory. So they have been
in development. The marriage of the platform is now occurring
because we are now getting these weapons. It isn't like we had
these weapons sitting around and JDAMs and JSOW just appeared.
General Muellner. We are going to start our first initial
production on JSOWs this year. We are--JSOW is in the same
state and JASSM is downstream. The Wind-Corrected Munitions
Dispenser is a brand-new contract, we just had a down-select
recently and, in fact, under protest now. We haven't been able
to kick that off, but these weapons, as the Congressman pointed
out, are just coming on board. So we are moving rapidly in this
area to be able to exploit both the global range and the
ability to range the battlefield all-weather that the bomber
force gives us. These are all-weather munitions, as opposed to
laser-guided bombs, which require favorable weather conditions.
Mr. Money. The defensive systems were not there with the
ALE-50. And it was just tested in the last week; we have a
better defensive system that will enable the operational folks
to use that if needed, and that we are continuing to upgrade
the defensive system. Just one more point. The chief of staff
called both General Muellner and I in and said this needs to be
fixed. This is high on our list, and we are fixing it.
B-2 AIRCRAFT
(CHART 16) General Muellner. Moving on to the B-2, what you
see is just one of the B-2 GAM/GATS tests. As was pointed out,
the B-2 has near-precision capability on it with the GAM/GATS,
which is the GPS-aided munition, and a special targeting scheme
that allows it to improve over just the basic JDAM-like
capability.
Mr. Lewis. General, could I interrupt you for just a
moment. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. I have to chair a Committee
down the hall, so I won't be able to be here. I would almost
like to yield my time to Mr. Dicks. I was watching C-SPAN the
other night, and there were those Members of Congress making a
presentation regarding the fact that the Department of Defense,
the greatest pool of discretionary money we have, continues to
spend three times more on the procurement side than any
potential enemy is spending. There is quite an elaborate
display that lays the foundation for what is going to be
arguments presented to us on the Floor regarding whatever we
propose. I suggest all of us review that tape that must be
available, just because it provides interesting information.
Having said that, there are those of us who would suggest
that there is a different window out in front of us presently.
That window involves Russia being in very, very serious
economic difficulty. While she continues to spend huge portions
of her total available capital on defense, a very, very
significant piece of that is going just to try to meet the
payroll of their personnel that they have in such large numbers
around the country.
It is suggested that as we look to the new millennia that
China is the big target in terms of our interest that we are
concerned about concerning peace. But there is a window of
opportunity perhaps.
The question that swirls in my mind, is do we have an
opportunity here for a shifting of gears that would cause us,
to move forward with conventionality of B-1, but, more
importantly, to move more quickly towards that aircraft with
such a tremendous reach that is so important to us?
Conventional capability of the B-2 is what I am suggesting.
Are you internally thinking through the feasibility of a
major shift in gears that might say, you know, if this window
is really here, if our intelligence, and I don't know what they
say, indeed, should we be pushing the B-2 button harder and in
terms of results, more effectively than we have?
General Muellner. Sir, we have indeed taken a hard look at
that. I think you have heard the Chief and the Secretary talk
about our long-range planning activities that we are just in
the later stage of that. It has been going on for the last year
and a half. As a part of that, we look at varied options for
the future, and, as a result of that, backed that down into
what our force structure needs.
If you look at all those options for the future, though,
regarding whether it is a China as a peer competitor or some of
the other potential coalitions that could pose that sort of
threat, you still end up with a major regional contingency
focus and a lot of these lesser regional contingencies.
There are still out in the future, as we see it, a lot of
potential engagements similar to what we had to go through with
Iraq here back in the early 1990s time frame. So as a result of
that, we need a balanced force structure that gives us not only
the enablers, which is certainly what the B-2 is, we need some
of those enablers to be able to go in and rip apart the
integrated air defense system. We also need a more affordable
element of the force structure in larger numbers, which is
going to allow us to deliver the mass of weapons that we need
across the whole range of the battlefield.
Mr. Lewis. You talk about 95 aircraft, all conventional
over time, rethinking what we do with the last 35 of those,
whether there is reprogramming potential. It is that sort of
question that I don't know if you are prepared to answer in
some other forum.
General Muellner. Well, sir, we would be glad to sit down
and discuss with you how we went through our rationale and what
our force structure demands were driven by those various
options in the future. QDR is obviously looking at that issue,
and General Ralston probably highlighted that or will when he
comes over. That is exactly the focus, to look at the range of
options for the future and see where we have headroom to move
in other areas.
Mr. Money. Secretary Cohen is also with his new team at the
Pentagon addressing the issues, and the strategy of what will
come out of that--being quick, decisive and flexible--what will
come out of that will be more apparent over time. We will match
the force with that.
Mr. Dicks. We just received a letter from the President
again reassuring us that they will in the Deep Attack Weapons
Mix Study and in the quadrennial review look at all these
comparisons between various capabilities, B-2 versus other
capabilities. I have been reassured again that that is going to
be done before the quadrennial defense review is completed. So
we are finally going to get the kind of analysis that I think
all of us on this Committee at least feel we ought to do.
General Muellner. One comment about the B-2, an interesting
weapon, I will point this out again later, is that the GPS
munition I talked about earlier, they found a very effective
way to take that same guidance kit and put it on the BLU-113
weapon. This is the 4,700 pound weapon developed for Desert
Storm, a high-penetrator weapon. It is the one that grew out of
the artillery tube. It turns out that that same GPS-guidance
capability will give us the ability in the case of the B-2 to
carry eight of these weapons internally and go after high-value
hard targets.
We are well along the way. In fact, we are using the
additional funds you all helped us with this last year to bring
that capability on board and that weapon is in development. In
fact, we have done our first separation tests already.
JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER
(CHART 17) If I could just briefly comment on the Joint
Strike Fighter. From the Air Force's standpoint, this is the
low end of the infamous hi-lo mix, like the F-16 is to us. It
is the truck, if you will, of the fighter force in the out
years. There is competition now head to head between Lockheed
Martin, and Boeing. It is a tri-service program, of course, the
U.S. services, with a variant of this airplane satisfying the
Air Force, the U.S. Navy, and the U.S. Marine Corps' needs.
This program is in the concept definition phase right now
where each of these contractor teams will build flying
demonstrators of their variants of the airplane. Those will fly
just prior to the turn of the century. It is very, very
important to this airplane from the U.S. Air Force's standpoint
not only for it to be effective on the 2010 battlefield, but
also for it to be affordable. So there is heavy emphasis on
that, not only from the Air Force, but from all three of the
services.
I might add right now the United Kingdom, the Royal Navy is
already part of this program. There are three other of our NATO
allies that have indicated intent in bringing money to the
table to join the program also. Canada is expected to join here
within the next couple of weeks.
RAPID GLOBAL MOBILITY
(CHART 18) We talk about global mobility. Obviously, the
mainstay of our focus in global mobility is indeed the C-17
program. I will give you a quick update on that program as it
is, indeed, executing out very, very well.
C-17 AIRCRAFT
(CHART 19) Indeed, with your help, we did indeed get the
multiyear. That multiyear saved us in excess of $1 billion when
you look at the airplane and the engine. The airplane has been
performing very, very well. We have 30 aircraft operational out
in force. It is just finishing and is waiting for final
certification for its necessary airdrop certification.
The program right now is hard at work with the new
requirement that the Army brought forward to be able to operate
and deliver Army armor in the semi-prepared fields and what
have you. We expect to have certification to be able to do that
by the mid-summertime frame.
Mr. Money. I might point out here, Mr. Chairman, that the
last 17 C-17s have all been delivered early and with great
quality, excellent quality. So this program, albeit it has had
a hell of a start, is now clicking on all cylinders, and we are
meeting every milestone. I appreciate Congressman Murtha's
comment about the multiyear, but clearly the program is on a
great path.
Relating this back to the F-22, we see the F-22 emulating
this in a general sense, but we have addressed the F-22 issues
much earlier in the program.
PRECISION WEAPONS PLAN
(CHARTS 20, 21, and 22) General Muellner. To look at the
weapons themselves, and we have already talked about a lot of
these, so I can step through them quickly, we are still
procuring and fielding our laser family of weapons. The GBU-28
is that big 5,000 pound weapon I just described. There is a GPS
version called the GAM-113. This will be a B-2 weapon only
initially because it is primarily focused on the GAM/GATS
capability and the ability to carry it internally is important
for signature control. Obviously Mavericks persist and we have
just upgraded those for improved reliability.
JASSM is improved and will be our primary standoff weapon
in the future. That, coupled with the JDAM and the wind-
corrected munitions dispenser, that allows us the direct attack
that we have talked about, which is a very effective way to
prosecute attack, especially with things like the Wind
Corrected Munitions Dispenser, WCMD against advancing armor
formations and things of that nature, where you have to deal
with a large array of armor or other vehicles on the
battlefield.
Of course, with the Navy we are participating with the
Joint Standoff Weapon. That will be an important weapon
specifically for our bomber force. It gives it that 40-50 mile
stand off with a wide array of munitions, both anti-armor and
anti-personnel type weapons.
Mr. Dicks. Could I ask one question on that point. Does
JASSM give you enough range to deal with the SA-10 problem?
General Muellner. Yes, it does. If you look at the
signature of something like say, the B-2, it clearly does. With
most of our other high-value weapons systems, you can get in
within the 40 to 50 miles. You can't, for instance, though,
against a SA-10 take a conventional airplane in an SA-10 netted
environment. You still need some stealth to get into that
range, because the SA-10C is a very effective air defense
system.
Mr. Dicks. So initially you need some standoff.
General Muellner. Yes, sir, you need an enabler like the B-
2 and the F-22 to take down the defense to now where you can
deal on it with a one-on-one basis.
Mr. Money. Or go to a JASSM.
Mr. Dicks. Which is better once we get it.
General Muellner. Again, the GPS has been a great success
story for the contractor-government team in that they have put
this program together very, very rapidly. Indeed, it has
demonstrated really good capability in the initial test to
date.
We will have some demonstration capability within the next
several months of actually dropping a live weapon against a
target that we have used the entire system to metric against.
JASSM competition again is ongoing. The two contractors
that are in that heated competition are McDonnell-Douglas, who
builds the JDAM, by the way, and Lockheed Martin here, who
builds at least one wind-corrected munitions dispenser
contract. They are both focusing on this area.
I might add, both of them are highly leveraged in
commercial content, Global Positioning System/Inertial
Navigation System (GPS/INS), and so are straight out of the
commercial production line to keep the price down on these
systems.
They are in a competition right now. The initial fielding
of this will be on the B-52 just because we are going to use
that for a test aircraft, and then the rest of the bombers flow
according to the plan you saw on the previous chart.
I might add one thing on the cost of that. Right now the
estimated cost of that is under $400,000 a round. At the time
of cancellation, the Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile,
TSSAM, the program it replaced, the estimate was up around $1.3
million a round. So that is what commercial focus, commercial
content, and getting rid of all those mil specs and mil
standards does for you.
JOINT DIRECT ATTACK MUNITION (JDAM)
(CHART 23) JDAM, of course, is probably the best success
story. It is indeed $14,000 a round, as we talked about.
Mr. Dicks. That is cost growth. It is up from $13,000 to
$14,000.
General Muellner. It depends on what round you are talking
about.
Mr. Money. When we get to round 84,000, it will be at
$13,000.
General Muellner. It depends on which round you are talking
about. The end result of this is they brought in a lot of
commercial content and they have made this program work.
The one problem they are having with it right now is they
are about 60 days behind just because we have accelerated the
program so rapidly. Some of the second tier vendors are having
difficulty delivering the GPS Inertial Measurement Units, IMUs,
as rapidly as they can. Other than that, the accuracy has
exceeded all of our requirements on all of the tests, and we
have a very large database here already.
PGM CAPABILITIES
(CHART 24) Mr. Money. Congressman Dicks, here was your
favorite chart from last year.
Mr. Dicks. Good.
General Muellner. Again, what this chart just shows you is
from the Air Force perspective what our family of weapons is
going to be in the outyears and they reflect that same thing.
This is a function of standoff formation. This is as a function
of either a submunition all the way up to precision accuracy.
The next chart, please.
Mr. Young. Gentlemen, we have a vote now. Mr. Hobson will
chair the Committee until we get back. It won't take us long.
Mr. Hobson. Why don't you continue on, General.
INFORMATION SUPERIORITY
(CHART 25) General Muellner. We are going to get into the
information superiority area. I would comment that what we show
on here are primarily platforms, but I would like to preface
this comment with the fact that we are also working those
information superiority issues very, very hard that do not
involve platforms, and that is protection of our databases from
a standpoint of a defensive standpoint, and also building
offensive capability to use information warfare. It is an
effective warfighting tool.
There is heavy emphasis on protection of our weapons system
databases and systems primarily focused by Electronic Systems
Center up at Hanscom, where they go through every weapons
system and provide a vulnerability assessment back to the
program office, and a detailed definition of what has to be
done to indeed have robust Information Warfare, IW
capabilities.
We look at the platform, the primary contributors to
situational awareness are, of course, the Airborne Warning and
Control System, AWACS and Joint STARS aircraft from an air and
ground surveillance standpoint.
------. What you see here and will see in the program I
described are efforts to maintain and improve these
capabilities on these weapons systems, but also a new focus of
moving into the world of unmanned aerial vehicles to pick up
some of these loads, especially in areas where we want to have
persistent long-standing surveillance over a portion of the
battlefield.
You see the Predator which we currently have fielded, and I
will describe it in a little more detail. We have the Global
Hawk and the Dark Star, both of which will fly again this year.
JOINT STARS AIRCRAFT
(CHART 26) First I will talk a little about the Joint
STARS. We have two production aircraft on the ramp. They are
being employed on a daily basis. As you know, they employed
again in Joint Endeavor. They performed as well there,
performed very well there, as they had in Desert Storm. So the
warfighters love this weapons system.
Right now we are in the midst of negotiations with our NATO
allies. There is a program called NATO AGS, or alliance ground
surveillance, over there, where they are evaluating the Joint
STARS to make a decision this fall in the November time frame
as to whether to start up a Joint STARS program in NATO similar
to the AWACS program that they have in NATO.
We are moving to a fleet of 19 aircraft. In this last year,
we have put major investment in the program to get commercial
content on board to ease the transition of technologies,
commercial work stations, commercial computers, and, as a
result of that, that helps us deal with the out year issues of
obsolescence of key parts and so on.
Mr. Money. General Muellner can speak with firsthand
knowledge, flying 50 sorties of JSTARS in the desert.
PREDATOR UAV
(CHART 27) General Muellner. Sir, on the Predator, we are
operating that today in Hungary. It is providing good support
of the warfighter. We have had challenges doing that in the bad
weather months, because the system was not capable of flying
under icing conditions and also because of the low ceiling.
We are working on the icing problem. We have an aircraft
that is up, either is or today or will be flying in the next
week or so, up in Duluth, Minnesota, doing the icing test in
order to certify the deicing mod and new engine on the airplane
that will give it the ability to operate.
The training and sustainment operations are set up at
Indian Springs outside of Las Vegas, and it is currently
supporting these deployments.
Mr. Money. I might point out here Secretary Perry moved the
operation and maintenance of the Predator to the Air Force
starting 1 July, and subsequent to that the program has an Air
Force officer in charge reporting through a Navy Program
Executive Office, PEO, but directly to me. So all the high
altitude, long-enduring Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, UAVs are
within one spot within the Air Force.
Mr. Hobson. I might say I was there, and that was their
real problem with it. They liked it when they could use it, but
they couldn't use it when they should be using it.
General Muellner. Unfortunately, that program, of course,
is an Advance Concept Technology Development, ACTD, part of the
initial ACTD all-weather support operations, and were not part
of what demonstrated. As we transition that from an ACTD to a
long-standing combat capability, we had to build in that
capability and also build in the procedures to be able to
operate it under lower weather conditions and also to give it
the capability to climb through weather to get out to its
target area. That was the big problem.
Mr. Money. We have gone to school on that in that the other
two high altitude, long enduring, Dark Star and Global Hawk,
are still in ACTD. But we stood up a System Program Office, SPO
at Wright Patterson, 2 years in advance of that program
transferring to the Air Force so we can alleviate transition
problems from an ACTD into an operation.
AGILE COMBAT SUPPORT
(CHART 28) General Muellner. To talk about the last of the
core competence, I would like to talk a minute about what we
are doing in the combat support area because this is a
different way of doing business from our standpoint.
We are focused on really getting down our deployment tail
for our weapons systems. By that I mean that when we deploy an
F-15 squadron somewhere, it takes upwards of 17 C-141s to get
those 24 airplanes, necessary people, and equipment to where
they can operate.
Mr. Dicks. How long does that take, General?
General Muellner. A normal squadron will move out--our
squadrons are on a one, two, three basis. So the first wing, as
you know, was deployed to Dhahran. Within 24 hours they were on
the ground. So we have mobility commitments that would move
those folks out over a 3-day period.
Mr. Dicks. If you had to move 1,000 airplanes from CONUS
out to the Gulf, just roughly how long would it take? A month?
A month and a half?
General Muellner. The TPFD, which is the time-phased force
deployment staff, which the Joint Staff puts together, has for
each theater an integrated plan to do that. Under a different
forum we could run through that with you. But it is a long
time. Not for the air side. We tend to be fairly ready to go
immediately.
Mr. Dicks. You have to get all the equipment out there,
don't you, in order to fight?
General Muellner. Absolutely. But remember, when I said the
17 C-141s, that took that 24 aircraft squadron and put them on
the ramp at Dhahran ready to fight. Now, they had missiles when
they got there and there were other missiles brought in. There
were the people and support.
Mr. Dicks. That is 24 airplanes.
General Muellner. Twenty-four airplanes for the 17 C-141s.
In the case of the F-22 and the JSF, we are talking about
bringing that from 17 141s to 8 141s. We have cut the airlift
requirement in half, and it is going to go down even more in
the case of the JSF.
Mr. Young. Let me ask, General, basically on management of
our time here, how many more charts do you have and how much
more time do you have in that presentation?
General Muellner. We have six more, and they are pretty
quick.
Mr. Young. Okay. Because I want to give Mr. Nethercutt
time. He has not had any opportunities at all today. Why don't
we go ahead and proceed with the charts, and then let Mr.
Nethercutt have the first round of questioning.
General Muellner. The other key elements of this obviously
are modernizing our loaders to support the airlift operation,
and of course the C-17 is a key part of that. The other key
part of it is improving our transportation and information
systems so we can track spare parts. This is the Federal
Express, call up, know exactly where your part is at approach.
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
(CHART 29) Well, sir, underpinning this whole thing is our
science and technology, S&T program. That total program in the
1998 budget is about $1.2 billion. As you can see, it is pretty
well balanced against the 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 areas, with the
heavy focus in the 6.2 area, but still a significant amount out
in the 6.3.
These are the transitional technologies starting to take
place, mostly contracted out, which has been the focus of our
Air Force operations. We are continuing to do this while we are
continuing to draw down our work force to the tune of about 30
percent.
These are the key focus areas in the President's 1998
budget. You can see the shifting focus of where we think we
need to invest in the future and also dealing with some things
with aging aircraft. We clearly have and will have aging
aircraft which is also a big problem for the conventional
airline industry in the civil end of it.
On the S&T, these are major focus areas in the future that
you see.
ACQUISITION REFORM
(CHART 30) Acquisition reform continues to do well. I have
given you a couple of examples already. Right now just from the
Air Force perspective, we have freed up $17 billion that would
have had to be invested in other things, that is either savings
or cost avoidance, as a result of things like JDAM, like the
multiyear and C-17 and so on. So that is money we can invest to
keep from having a modernization bow wave.
A key part of that also is we are doing that and a key part
of that is we are also drawing down our work force. This is the
efficiency part that Mr. Money talked about of efficiently
producing effective weapons systems.
WIND CORRECTED MUNITIONS DISPENSER
(CHART 31) Here is a good example. This is a contract that
was just recently won. I might add it is in protest right now,
so I can't go into a lot of detail about it. It was won by
Lockheed Martin. It is for the wind-corrected munitions
dispenser. This is the tail kit that goes on the munition. That
was expected to cost upwards of $25,000 a round. The actual bid
price that they came in with is just under $9,000. So, again,
streamlining, commercial content, which there is a lot of in
here, really pays off. Getting rid of those mil specs and
standards and letting the contractor go off and figure how to
do it, not us telling him how to do it, $850 million saved
across the expanse of that program.
Mr. Money. Actually I think the money is greater than that
in that we have a 20-year warranty on that so the depot and
those issues are not going to be there. We go back to the
manufacturer with that warranty.
SUMMARY
General Muellner. Bumper to bumper. If it breaks, they take
it back and give us a new one.
(CHART 32) In summary, the bottom line is, one, we are
keeping a high focus on modernization. We believe it is our
future and we have to do that for our warfighters. We are
trying to do that by freeing up investment through acquisition
streamlining and also at the same time our warfighters
understand it is important to keep those weapons systems
affordable, so they are learning how to understand the cost of
their requirements and they are factoring that into their
decisions. Thus far, we have been successful in using the
combination of those things to keep our key programs on track.
Sir, that completes all the charts. I would be glad to take
any other questions, sir, that you might have.
[The joint statement and Charts of Mr. Money and Lt.
General Muellner follow:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Young. Okay. Thank you very much for a very interesting
presentation this morning.
I would like to yield now to Mr. Nethercutt, who has not
had an opportunity to ask any questions.
AIRBORNE LASER PROGRAM
Mr. Nethercutt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the
Committee. Welcome, General, and Secretary Money. I was at
another hearing, I am sorry, that is the story of our lives
around here. I apologize for missing your presentation. I was
glad to hear a little of it and I look forward to reading the
materials.
To the extent you have talked about the airborne laser
already, I apologize. Let me just follow with a question, if
you could, please answer, either or both.
I think this is a good program. I am supportive of the
development of ballistic missile defense generally, and I think
this is a good component of the Pentagon's missile defense
architecture.
I sense, at least my understanding is, that the airborne
laser is funded and managed by the Air Force. The other missile
programs are managed by the Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization, BMDO. What is the reason for that and why was the
program transferred?
General Muellner. Well, sir, the reason it was initially
transferred out of BMDO is on the advice and recommendation of
the Congress. In 1992, the Congress directed that those
programs that were more than 10 years out from a transition
standpoint should be transitioned back to the services. That
was done, and the Air Force picked up that responsibility, and
the BMDO transferred an amount of money when that occurred.
Post-Desert Storm, as we looked at the need to deal with
the ballistic missiles, the one area that was not being covered
was the boost phase.
There was at that time one approach that surfaced, which
was to use a kinetic kill, an Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air
Missile, AMRAAM, if you will. What we found when we looked at
doing that, we were going to have to have so many orbiting
interceptors so close to where the missile was launched that
you needed very good intelligence. The reason was because of
the time of flight of the missile. You had to get your airplane
pointed, detect the launch, launch this AMRAAM, and then it had
to close very rapidly, because you had an accelerating missile.
As we looked at that, it became obvious that wasn't a
viable solution. We couldn't get enough velocity out of the
missiles.
What had matured in previous demonstrations and was coming
along rapidly was a speed-of-light weapon. So, indeed, we
solved the velocity issue and at the same time came up with a
solution that allowed us to stand off and not have to put all
those airplanes orbiting in enemy territory.
As a result of those key technologies that make it up, the
laser technology, the adaptive optics, the atmospheric
compensation, we put together demonstration milestones which
they successfully completed that allowed us to go through this
phase of the program.
Mr. Money. I was just out on the West Coast last Friday. We
had a program review and that program is off to a great start.
We are past the physics. The physics in this are proven. It is
a packaging job, an engineering job of getting it on an
airplane. With time, we will get there. Ultimately, then we
will have a weapon that, as the General said, reacts at the
speed of light and roughly $1,000 a round. It gets the missile
while it is up and it will fall on whoever launched it. For all
those reasons, I think we have a winner here, and it is just a
matter of getting through the program and to the engineer.
JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER
Mr. Nethercutt. I think you are right, it is a winner. I
was briefed this week and informed it has had great success,
and there are exciting developments to come. So I encourage you
to keep going.
General, I noted in your testimony when I was here a little
while ago that the Joint Strike Fighter appeared to be
affordable, I wrote down your words. I think that is a great
testament to this idea that we need to initiate serious
procurement reforms, certainly in the Air Force and the other
services, and this Joint Strike Fighter is really a good
example of that.
I am wondering if after the reform legislation in 1994 and
1995, you have any other recommendations about what Congress
can do to streamline the procurement process and make it more
efficient? Are there any regulations that are holding you back
that are unnecessary that we should pay attention to? If you
can answer either now or for the record, I would be grateful.
General Muellner. I think we will take that for the record
for you.
I would just offer to you, I had the opportunity to start
the Joint Strike Fighter program and work that hard. I can tell
you that the vast majority of the encumbrances we had before
have already been removed. Our problems really right now are
the institutionalizing of that and the behavior of the service
acquisition folks, and even with the contractors. The
contractors really need to change the way they accommodate and
do business. We are seeing that change.
The comment I made earlier from Alan Mulally from Boeing
that says what we are doing, everything we have been doing in
the commercial field we are now bringing into the defense
world. That is an important issue which I think we are now
incorporating. We will be happy to provide you additional
information.
[The information follows:]
The legislative relief Congress provided in 1994 and 1995
has improved our flexibility to streamline the Air Force
procurement process. We believe that the previously provided
legislative relief is adequate for now. Our challenge is to
change the acquisition culture, and to institutionalize the
increased flexibility.
However, there are still areas for which legislative change
is necessary to improve the efficiency of the process. For
example; The Davis-Bacon Act, which was enacted in 1931, is
applicable to construction type (construction, alteration/
repair) contracts in excess of $2,000. What this means is that
the Contracting Officer is required to do labor checks to
ensure the applicable minimum wages/benefits are being paid by
the contractor. This imposes a significant administrative
burden on Contracting personnel. Congress, through FASA,
provides for acquisitions to be made via commercial procedures;
yet for construction type contracts, the Davis-Bacon Act still
applies. Therefore, true efficiency has not been achieved.
There are other laws, such as the Service Contract Act, Walsh-
Healy Act, and Copeland Act, which, like the Davis-Bacon Act,
are still applicable to commercial item contracts. Therefore,
we would recommend that commercial item contracts be exempt
from these Acts.
As part of our ongoing Lightning Bolt initiatives, we
recently had a team look at reducing the cycle time between
requirements identification and contract award. The team's
final report was just published in February 1997. The final
report listed 63 proposed best practices and suggested 14
possible areas for legislative relief. We are currently
reviewing these suggestions to determine if they should be
included in any future requests for legislative relief.
Mr. Money. The only other thing I would just add to that,
Congressman, is funding stability is paramount. We are in this
phase now over the next 4 years of two contractors building two
models, one model each that will be tested in two
configurations, and then we will down select. The more stable
that program is now and in the early parts of production, will
pay off great benefits.
On F-22, when we disrupted that program, for every dollar
we took out, we had to put three back in. So funding stability
is very, very important.
Mr. Nethercutt. We are trying up here.
Mr. Money. You bet. We appreciate that.
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE
Mr. Nethercutt. I just have one final question, if I may. I
had the chance to go to California last August and look at
Global Hawk, as it was being constructed. I missed your formal
presentation, but I think unmanned aerial vehicles have great
potential. To the extent you can in this hearing, give us some
idea of what you see as the future of UAVs, either by design or
capability, and what your view is from the Air Force
standpoint?
General Muellner. We certainly endorse your views, not only
on Global Hawk but that whole family. There are a lot of these
persistent surveillance missions, Inverse Synthetic Aperture
Radar (ISAR) type missions, where a persistent UAV is an ideal
solution for it. Clearly as Global Hawk matures, as Dark Star
matures, which gives us better survivability deep and so on,
they can pick up a big segment of what we have to do with
manned flights, or cover an area where we are unable to do
anything right now.
We are going beyond that in our focus. We had a summer
study last year from the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board
that has recommended other areas to focus UAVs. One of the ones
that seems to jump out at you is the area to deal with a
persistent suppression of enemy air defenses, to be able to put
a platform up over the enemy air defenses so that if you come
up on the net, we are going to kill you right now. And right
now we are off working a program with Defense Advanced Research
Project Agency, DARPA, put together a demonstration program, to
stem off aggressively in that program.
Another area is the area of com relays. Right now we are
moving to where we are going to depend totally on satellites
for an awful lot of our--even in theater bandwidth
requirements. It is not clear why you can't take a Milstar-like
package and rather than putting it on a bus up in space, put it
on a Global Hawk and put it up at high altitude over the
battlefield to give the commanders on the battlefield that same
sort of connectivity.
We are moving off in that direction with a joint
demonstration, again with DARPA and the Army to go off and
demonstrate that potential. So we see a lot of benefit in the
UAV field opening up.
Mr. Money. I will add to that and put the chart up to
remind us we are very much enthused about that. That manifests
itself in the Air Force a couple ways. I mentioned earlier we
stood up a SPO in Wright Patterson to handle Global Hawk and
Dark Star 2 years before they transferred to the Air Force.
The Air Force is also initiating a battle lab down in
Eglin, and the main reason for that is how to incorporate
CONOPS, concept of operations, deconfliction, those types of
things, so we can integrate UAVs into the force.
In the long term, we too see, especially in the long
enduring mode, we will far exceed what a man can do, and
probably overtime, but it is way too early, this Global Hawk
might be an U-2 replacement. But I just want to caution people,
we need to prove this, have that technology mature so maybe 10
years from now we can be addressing that issue.
[Chart follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Nethercutt. You mentioned the issue of satellite
vulnerability--you may have seen the report last week about the
revelations regarding satellite vulnerability. So to the extent
that Global Hawk is consistent with trying to reduce these
vulnerabilities, I think it is well worth doing.
General Muellner. It opens up the envelope to give us much
more robust and probably more affordable solutions.
Mr. Money. I don't see one replacing the other in toto. It
is a combination, then, of getting the maximum optimizing the
mix, if you will.
Mr. Nethercutt. I understand. Thank you for your work and
thank you for your testimony.
Mr. Young. Has Global Hawk flown yet?
General Muellner. No, sir.
Mr. Young. You had the roll-out of the vehicle?
General Muellner. The roll-out was several weeks ago out in
San Diego. Both it and Dark Star after its accident will fly
this summer and fall time frame.
Mr. Money. August.
Mr. Young. Where do you plan to fly it?
General Muellner. Global Hawk I think is flown out of--will
be flown out of Edwards. Dark Star is also flown out of
Edwards. It is being jointly managed by NASA, Dryden and the
contractors; and the Global Hawk is Air Force Flight Test
Center and the contractor teams.
ACQUISITION REFORM
Mr. Young. As we proceeded throughout your presentation
today, for those of us that have been following these issues
for a long time, we detect some improvement in the way that we
are approaching some of these acquisitions. It looks like you
are getting a little more for the money because of the changes
in the way you are letting the contracts.
A person in the Pentagon who is quite important when it
comes to the area of money and purchasing, et cetera, and I
will not identify the person, said that there are a lot of
other improvements that could be made in acquisition. One
improvement deals with very small contracts that could actually
be purchased with a credit card rather than going through the
whole contracting procedure, which in some cases he said
actually costs more than the product that you were purchasing.
What can we do about that? What can we do to be able to do
a smart approach to this type of acquisition reform that would
let us eliminate the bureaucracy that really isn't necessary
and that is costing more than the product?
General Muellner. Sir, I will give you an example as an
answer. What it shows is the problem is culture; it is not
regulation right now.
A couple of months back I gave an award to an outstanding
young scientist in the Air Force, a Ph.D. out at Edwards who
just invented a new high-temperature plastic. In talking to him
and his wife at lunch, I asked him what his greatest challenge
was. I thought he was going to give me some exotic technical
issue. He said, I can't get chemicals.
This plastic compound he invented was with off-the-shelf
chemicals. You can buy it in almost any store. I said, why
don't you use your credit card to go buy them, your
International Merchants Purchase Authority Card, (IMPAC) Card?
He said, well, they won't let me use it. This is a Ph.D.
inventing this new high-temperature plastic for rocket motors.
So when we ran the audit trail, somebody up the chain of
command made the decision, well, we can't entrust this
individual out there in the field with these credit cards. So
now that individual has a credit card. He literally drives into
Lancaster and buys the chemicals he needs or sends somebody in
to get them when he needs them.
The ability to do that is out there right now. It is
difficult in some cases to get over many, many years of writing
out purchase orders, getting them validated and stamped by four
or five levels, which in reality added little value to the
whole process and certainly added cost. So I think we have made
a lot of progress.
John Hamre has been pushing that really hard down at the
services. The services I think are responding very positively
to that approach.
Mr. Money. I might add, the IMPAC Card has made an impact.
I don't know off the top of my head, but I think we are in
the--30,000, 40,000 people are using them. I was over in Europe
this last June. It hadn't got there. It is there now. There are
some problems with paying the bills and all that kind of stuff,
but it is being fought through. If you would like for the
record I can get you back the magnitude of purchases that are
now ongoing, and we are working through the culture and the new
way of doing business.
[The information follows:]
Approximately 78% of micropurchases (actions under $2,500)
are now being done using IMPAC in the Air Force. The statistics
for fiscal year 1997 as of the end of February, show 352,699
actions valued at about $119 million have been procured by the
Air Force. Currently, the Air Force has 23,724 cardholders.
Mr. Money. I might add, Mr. Chairman, that I have been here
confirmed in this job a little over a year now, and what I have
seen just in the last year has been remarkable. But we are not
there yet. It is clearly a cultural shift. I am still asked the
questions about, well, do you want me to do my job or do you
want me to do this acquisition reform stuff. When we get that
being that is my job, we will be there. We have a ways to go.
Every day I see a positive sign.
This wind-corrected munition, there are examples coming in
every day. I don't hear that this is an all uphill--we have
some negatives to work through as well. But I think back to
what Goldwater-Nichols, the thought and the insight Congress
had back there, put in an acquisition executive with industrial
experience in place, but then augmenting that with a general
here like General Muellner that has 8 years of test, Purple
Heart, been around, fought wars and so forth, bringing that
together. Then with a person like Darleen Druyun, a
professional, been in the business a long time. That
combination of events is clicking on all cylinders.
I appreciate you saying that, and we keep trying every day
to improve the system. I am really serious about the warfighter
sets the requirements. That ensures the effectiveness of the
weapons system. My job, our job, then is to ensure the
efficiency of the process, the getting there. This whole thing
about better, faster, cheaper, and smoother, we live every day.
So I appreciate that comment.
INTERNATIONAL MERCHANTS PURCHASE AUTHORIZATION CARD (IMPAC)
Mr. Young. Mr. Money, tell us about the IMPAC Card. Is that
a credit card through a commercial bank, much like a Visa or
MasterCard, or is it like an American Express card, or is it a
government institution of one type or another?
Mr. Money. It is in fact a credit card. I am going to fall
off real quick.
General Muellner. It is a credit card. I think it is a
commercial bank, if my recollection is correct. I think it is
one in Denver. We will find out the specifics for you.
[The information follows:]
Since January 1989, the General Services Administration
(GSA) has been contracting for purchase cards for Federal
agencies. The government-wide purchase card is called the
International Merchants Purchase Authorization Card (IMPAC),
which is a VISA charge card program managed by Rocky Mountain
Bank Card System, Inc. (RMBCS) through contract with GSA.
General Muellner. The intent was to get out of the business
of managing those accounts, get the government out of that
business. So it is indeed a commercial application that is used
and the entire tracking and auditing system that is used with
it is commercial in nature also, i.e., not done by the
government.
Mr. Young. Give us a summary, if you would for the record,
we won't take the time to do it now, as to how many of these
credit cards have been issued, what type of person in the
process is authorized to use it, what kind of audit trail there
is to make sure that there are no abuses. We would like to know
more about that, and any suggestions that you might have as to
whether it should be expanded or where it might be used to save
additional money.
The Speaker has challenged me as Chairman of this
subcommittee to find a way to turn the Pentagon into a
triangle. That indicates to me you take two legs out of five.
That is 40 percent. I don't know if we can do 40 percent. But
we do have that challenge, to find ways to get more for the
dollar. A lot of the cost in the Pentagon is bureaucratic.
We were told at a hearing just recently that there are more
shoppers in the Pentagon than there are soldiers in the entire
United States Marine Corps. I don't know if that is true or
not, but the source that came up with that information I think
is a very reliable source.
One of our witnesses said maybe we can make it a square,
maybe not a triangle. But anyway, the idea is to try to squeeze
out the additional bureaucracy that we really don't need. I
think this IMPAC Card is an example of the fact that it can be
done if we look hard enough and work hard enough to do it.
Mr. Money. I apologize again for not having those numbers
off the top of my head. We will get those to you.
[The information follows:]
Currently, the Air Force has authorized 23,724 IMPAC
cardholders to procure goods and services under $2,500 directly
from vendors. The cardholders can be anyone in a given
functional area appointed by an Approving Official which is
usually a supervisor who is in the same chain of command. When
appointed, the cardholder is trained in IMPAC procedures by the
Installation IMPAC Program Coordinator who is a contracting
expert. Purchase activities are monitored and verified that the
transactions are valid. Various oversight mechanisms to include
Installation Program Coordinators, Inspector Generals, and
Auditors are active at all levels in the Air Force to ensure
integrity in the system is maintained. Management reports are
issued by RMBCS to assist program management officials in
tracking and monitoring card usage. Various internal reviews
and audits have indicated there are no significant deficiencies
or abuses of the Air Force's management of the IMPAC Card
Program. We do support expanded use of the credit card.
Currently, we focus on the legislatively established micro-
purchase limit of $2,500.
Mr. Money. In fact, let me just chain on to what you said.
We have, in fact, brought down the acquisition work force 28
percent. We are getting closer to the 30, the commitment
mandate of getting to 35. We are getting there. We have limited
the size of SPOs to roughly 50 people. There are a few still
above that, but they are coming down. So all that, we are
marching to, and as you eliminate people and so forth and
fewer, there is less mischief in my mind that can be created,
less low or no-value added work going on. So we are approaching
that. We still have a ways to go. I appreciate that comment.
INDUSTRY MERGERS
Mr. Young. Let me ask another question along the same line
of streamlining, modernizing and acquisition. This might appear
to be a negative, but we are seeing an awful lot of mergers in
industry. What is that going to do in the long run to the
competitive nature of the business, the availability, the
maintaining of the industrial force? What are these mergers
doing now and what do you see them doing in the future?
Mr. Money. Up until now I frankly think the mergers have
been good. We are still overcapacity in a lot of areas and by
bringing down the industry that sorts that out for itself,
albeit up until now we still have two competitors in every
general field. We are rapidly approaching that with the
tentative Raytheon-Hughes-TI. That could bring down the U.S. to
one air-to-air missile maker. Frankly, that is not going to
disturb us for roughly 10-plus years.
AMRAAM, we have already worked those against Hughes and
Raytheon together and gotten from $1.87 million per copy down
to roughly $292,000 per AMRAAM. So, so far it hasn't been an
issue.
We are still overcapacity in a lot of areas, so in this
sense the marketplace is sorting itself out and predetermining
or determining where it ought to be. So a long-winded answer
that it hasn't been a problem yet, although when we get down to
only one U.S. manufacturer in a particular area, then to have a
competition obviously, you open it up to overseas. Then we
haven't had to address that issue yet.
General Muellner. One additional comment, if I could, in
that area.
When we look at industrial base, we tend to focus on
manufacturing capability. I would offer to you that the
technological edge that we have on the battlefield is not only
based upon manufacturing but the ability to innovate original
designs, develop them and field them. We had reached a stage,
at least in the basic aircraft industry, we had so many
competitors, and there were so few new starts that that initial
design capability was atrophying out.
So in a lot of respects, necking down of the industry to
two main competitors now in this area or three main competitors
is productive for maintaining those design capabilities,
because we probably have starts, enough demonstrators to keep
those design teams intact, keep them productively employed
doing what they do best.
Mr. Young. But you have got to keep enough competition in
the industrial base to have an incentive to think ahead and
create these new designs. If you don't have the competition,
then, why hire a big expensive design team or team of creators
to go out there when there is nobody competing with you anyway?
I think I tend to agree that the mergers have been good to
this point, but I am concerned about what the future might be
in eliminating the competition that has been really very good
for the industry and very good for the national defense effort.
Mr. Money. Absolutely. Secretary Perry mentioned several
years ago that we are overcapacity and in fact encouraged
industry to downsize. That is happening.
As you just pointed out and we talked about, when it gets
down to only one in the U.S., then we have a different issue
and we have to work through that. We are about to have to
address that issue.
Mr. Young. Mr. Dicks, do you have further questions?
Remarks of Mr. Dicks
Mr. Dicks. The only point I would say on this question is
that when you do merge these companies, you do get rid of a
substantial amount of overhead, which does help make this work.
If you have Boeing and McDonnell Douglas and Lockheed Martin,
you have two very strong competitors in most areas, as we have
seen by the charts you put up.
One of the reasons that I have been so strongly committed
to the B-2 is because of the charts you put up earlier today.
Those charts demonstrate the capability you get once all these
smart weapons are on this long-range aircraft.
The thing that really drives this home in my mind is this
question, and General Peay of CENTCOM, alluded to this at
breakfast this morning, that one of the crucial detriments in
getting forces equipment or TACAIR into the theater of
operations in the event of hostilities was the availability of
overflight access through the airspace of several countries, or
the loss of overflight permission or the loss of use of even
one en route base--all of which could drastically affect his
ability to introduce TACAIR and troops to the Gulf region.
So, again, we are always premising our strategy here on
being able to immediately move men and weapons and airlift into
an area. What if the country says, we don't want you to come
in, like the Saudis did recently when we had the problem in
Iraq and we had to negotiate with them for some time frame?
That is why some of us believe that a long-range stealthy
bomber with all these smart weapons gives you a revolutionary
capability. What we worry about is that the studies that have
been done by RAND and Jasper Welch and others that indicate
that 21 B-2's simply don't allow you the sortie rate necessary
to really take maximum use of the potential.
What I worry about from your perspective is this is a big
industrial base issue now. There are a lot of people who are
not nearly as sanguine about our ability to go back and start a
new stealthy bomber at some point in the future. Now, if you
keep this industrial base open, this line we have keeps the
costs down, and you can continue to get a number of these B-2s
over the next several years and improve your capability,
especially in the early going.
This is where I think people are not really looking at the
potential of this bomber. If you can leave Whiteman Air Force
Base and with one aerial refueling, with wind-corrected
munition dispenser and sensor fuzed weapon, and attack Saddam,
moving from Iraq into Kuwait, that is a revolutionary
capability. You can't do that with TACAIR, in my judgment. You
will not have enough normally in theater. You have some in
theater. If you have to move 1,000 airplanes, that, as you
suggested, that is going to take a considerable period of time.
In the early going, the first 14 days, especially when you have
zero warning, as we did in World War II, in Korea, and in the
Gulf War, we had zero actionable warning time, having a long-
range bomber with these capabilities seems to me to be exactly
what you would want to have.
And what I worry about is that we seem to have missed this.
General Fogleman and I talked about this yesterday. Even
without lockout, even if you don't worry about chemical or
biological weapons contaminating these fields, you have still
got the political problem of are you going to have these fields
accessible or is the conflict going to be in an area where you
even have fields available to you.
So there is this potential of time delay. It seems to me
that is where there is a period here in the first several weeks
of any of these engagements where long-range stealthy bombers
that can operate autonomously would have enormous importance.
That is why we keep bringing this issue up. It isn't that we
don't like the Air Force. We love the Air Force. But this is
just one area where we think you guys need to take another look
at this.
ENHANCED GROUND PROXIMITY WARNING SYSTEM
Since my time is limited, I want to get one question on
another subject, and that is the safety of our people. I am
told if Secretary Brown had the enhanced ground proximity
warning system on this plane, the plane would not have flown
into a mountain.
Now, the Secretary of Defense has ordered the Air Force to
go out and procure this equipment. We wouldn't have the lost C-
130, and if American Airlines had the enhanced ground proximity
warning system on it, it wouldn't have flown into the mountain
down in South America.
To me, the fact that American Airlines on all 7,000 of its
airplanes is going to put the system on, says something.
I was under the impression you were going to put $264
million in this budget to carry out the recommendations under
phase one, including flight data recorders, cockpit recorders,
ground point warning system, emergency locator, transmitter on
the 89th Air Wing, for the distinguished visitor and
operational support aircraft.
Has that happened? Is that in this budget? Nobody can seem
to find it.
General Muellner. Yes, sir. Navigation safety upgrades,
which are the ones you are talking about, are indeed in this
budget. We added that in last year. As you recall, we came in
for some reprogramming authority to get that started.
Mr. Dicks. Could you help my staff by locating that for us?
General Muellner. We have got the numbers now. I don't know
what the exact number is.
[The information follows:]
Yes, funds for Phase One of the Navigation & Safety
Equipment Baseline were included in the budget request. The Air
Force requested approximately $10 million to accelerate GPS
integrations and $31 million for safety equipment. This funding
was an increase from the FY97 President's Budget. No single
line item exists for these funds. The funds are requested in
the individual weapon systems and are included in the aircraft
procurement modification requests for those weapon systems. The
$264 million figure was composed of $59 million in FY95/FY96
reprogrammings, $10 million FY97 Chief of Staff Plus-Up
request, and $65 million added to the FY98 President's Budget
(FY98-03). Congress approved the reprogramming request and
appropriated $82 million of the FY97 Plus-Up request. The $57.3
million FY97 shortfall was accommodated through force structure
changes, revised acquisition strategies/cost estimates and
safety program content revisions.
Mr. Dicks. I have a few questions here, just to give us a
sense of how you are going to deal with this problem which I
will place in the record. Because to me, if we can just save
one airplane, one crew, I am told these systems are $50,000
apiece, and it seems to me we need to get them on the airplane.
It is obvious that these systems work, and I am kind of
curious. Is there some resistance or is it budgetary problems?
General Muellner. No, sir. It clearly has been a budgetary
issue in the past. The focus has been putting those systems on
the airplanes that have the highest ground contact issue, and,
i.e., those have tended to be in some cases fighters. Some of
the fighters have had those. The Fourth Generation Ground
Collision Avoidance System (GCAS), which is what American
Airlines is putting on--as you know, the American Airlines did
have GCAS on it. It wasn't predictive, though. It was a
reactive GCAS and gave them a pull-up too late to respond to
it. The Fourth Generation GCAS is indeed what we are putting on
all of our airplanes. Indeed, we have an investment account
that goes out to the FYDP to put those on all the airplanes.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you. The gentleman has been very
reasonable.
Mr. Young. Mr. Hobson.
LAB CONSOLIDATION
Mr. Hobson. I have a couple questions to ask you, one about
lab consolidation. You are developing this long-range Vision 21
plan to reorganize labs and test evaluation centers in the next
century. You have got an option consolidating the four Air
Force labs and the Office of Scientific Research in this single
lab. It is not due until 1998. Are there going to be any lab
changes between now and then?
Mr. Money. Congressman Hobson, the whole idea here of going
to a single laboratory does not have in it relocation
geographically. The idea is much like Congressman Dicks
mentioned a moment ago, when you are merging companies, you
scrape off some of the overhead that is duplicative. That is
what we are trying to do there. We see a fair amount of
savings. Probably you are talking about a few tens of people
moving, primarily in the planning function, to centralize that
in Dayton, bringing that out of each of the other labs. But
overall, we believe that will make a much more efficient
operation.
We are not disturbing the scientists and the engineers, if
you will, but just the duplicative overhead functions, mostly
centered around planning.
We are not moving the labs. They are staying where they are
geographically. As I said, there may be a few tens of people
being relocated. We think it is the right thing to do. Frankly,
it helps in the drawdown in the Dorn amendment and so forth. We
are working on it. It is about to be started to be implemented
in the next couple of months.
CONTRACT PROTESTS
Mr. Hobson. It is going to be implemented. Okay. All right.
I would like to talk to you sometime a little more about that.
The other thing, just a comment, one area that I see as a
potential problem, the increased cost and everything, is this
protest system you have got. Somebody needs to look at that
protest system. We don't have a lot of time here, but I just
think if you look at that at some point.
Mr. Money. I will be glad to get you back some more data on
that. Actually the number of protests are going down. They are
dropping roughly 100 a year from several hundred, albeit there
are a few. I believe part of the reason for the reduction in
that is that we do a much better job debriefing both the
winners and the losers of why they won or lost.
Mr. Hobson. Probably only hear from the guys that won.
Mr. Money. The ones we hear about are the big ticket items
and so forth.
Mr. Young. As we have more mergers, there are less
companies out there to make the protests.
[The information follows:]
Data on number of General Accounting Office (GAO) protests received
against Air Force procurements for the last five years:
FY92.............................................................. 440
FY93.............................................................. 493
FY94.............................................................. 358
FY95.............................................................. 331
FY96.............................................................. 246
The Air Force attributes the downward trend in protests to more
meaningful debriefings given to unsuccessful offerors. Debriefings
conducted by the contracting officer explain to a contractor the
strengths and weaknesses of its proposal. The contracting officer may
also comment on the technical evaluation and overall strengths and
weaknesses of the winning proposal.
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
Mr. Hobson. In the information technology, Air Force
Materiel Command, AFMC is considering some restructuring and
development management technology stuff. You spent a lot of
time talking to me about that. Is that stabilized now or what
are we looking at?
General Muellner. Yes, sir. If you are talking about the
relationship between MSG, SSG, down at Gunter and Hanscom, I
think that has stabilized. As we talked to you before, the work
load doesn't change. That was just a case of how the management
operation would proceed to MSG from Hanscom.
AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT
Mr. Hobson. Okay. I guess the last thing, Mr. Chairman, is
that with all these three airplanes that you are looking at out
there, we are talking about a combined cost of about $350
billion, I think, someplace in there. Are you giving any
thought to purchasing two airplanes, cancelling one of the
three, or moving forward?
General Muellner. Sir, I think from the Air Force
perspective, we have taken a hard look, as you saw I think from
the earlier chart, we are necking down from a large number of
airplanes down to two. We will have in the outyears an F-22,
and a variant of it, and a Joint Strike Fighter, JSF, and a
variant of that, as the only airplanes on the ramp.
We have focused on the affordability. We don't have a bow-
wave problem in the Air Force dealing with this. The reason is
that our C-17 airlift funding is ending before we start this
procurement. Our bomber force modernization will have occurred,
and so we have time-phased this activity. And basically it is
the fighter force's turn to be modernized to move away from
what was bought and procured in the late-1970s and early 1980s
and is now aging out and will be replaced. So this time-phased
activity will make us have an affordable solution.
Mr. Hobson. These two professionals here have been very,
very refreshing and very refreshing to work with, and I
appreciate their activity.
Mr. Young. Mr. Hobson, I certainly would concur with the
statement you have just made.
And thank you for your interesting questions.
Mr. Nethercutt.
Mr. Nethercutt. No further questions.
Mr. Young. With no further questions--we have reached our
time limit. We do have additional questions that we would like
to submit to you in writing and ask you to respond for the
record, if you would.
The Committee will be adjourned now until 10 o'clock
tomorrow morning, when we will meet in an open hearing in Room
2226, the Rayburn building, on the fiscal year 1998 budget
request with the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff
of the Army. And then tomorrow afternoon, another open hearing
in this room, H-140, on Army Acquisition Programs.
And with nothing further, the Committee is adjourned.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the
answers thereto follow:]
F-22 Aircraft
Question. Mr. Secretary, the FY 1998 budget includes several
changes to the Air Force's high priority F-22 stealth fighter program.
The development program has increased in cost by $2 billion and has
been stretched 9 months. Last year, the Air Force planned to procure
128 aircraft including 4 pre-production vehicles during the period FY
1998 to FY 2003. The current budget reduces this quantity by 58, almost
a 50% reduction over the same period. Secretary Money, your statement
touches on the cost growth of the program, but can you tell us more
about what caused the program growth and changes to the program as a
result?
Answer. The Joint Estimate Team (JET) recommended a program
restructure which added time and funding to the EMD program to ensure
the achievement of a producible, affordable design prior to entering
production. This resulted in the addition of $2.2 billion to the EMD
program and an extension of nine months. This funding requirement was
offset by eliminating three test aircraft ($706 million) and slowing
the production ramp ($1.45 billion). The additional funding is
contained within the F-22 total program budget through the FYDP. The
primary drivers of the cost growth in EMD include better information on
touch labor (actuals from the first EMD aircraft builds versus
parametrics); additional flight test time based on historical rates
from other programs; and a projection that more time will be required
to complete avionics integration.
For the production phase, the JET identified the possibility of a
$13 billion costs growth, $8 billion of which is due to the
identification of an industry unique rate of inflation in this high
technology segment of the economy. The remainder of this potential cost
growth is due to higher than expected touch labor and material costs.
The CEOs and senior Air Force leaders signed a formal memorandum of
agreement (MOA) in December 1996 committing the government/contractor
team to, at a minimum, remain within the current production budget.
Currently the contractor and government teams are implementing plans to
maintain production unit cost at or below current levels.
Despite the changes to the program, the warfighter will continue to
receive the F-22's revolutionary capabilities on time at an affordable
cost.
Question. Secretary Money, the Air Force now plans to buy only two
aircraft in the first year of production. Please compare using then
year dollars flyaway cost of these first aircraft to that estimated
last year for the first production aircraft.
Answer. The FY98 President's Budget reflects an average unit
flyaway cost for the first 2 production aircraft (Lot 1) of $392
million compared to the FY97 President's Budget estimate of $149
million for the first 4 production aircraft (Lot 1). The FY98
President's Budget average unit flyaway would become $313 million if 4
aircraft were bought in Lot 1 versus 2 aircraft.
As documented by the Joint Estimate Team, the early production
program is more costly than previously envisioned. The total potential
production cost growth of $13 billion has been eliminated by the
implementation of a number of cost avoidance initiatives. Payback from
these initiatives begins in small increments in 2000, but significant
payback does not occur until 2004.
Question. Is two aircraft an efficient quantity to buy in the first
year? Would it be smarter to buy more in the first year?
Answer. Two aircraft is an efficient quantity to buy in the first
year of production. This approach balances the higher early production
program estimate with the production funds available. Purchasing more
in the first year would contradict our plan to increase system maturity
relative to the production ramp rate (6 fewer production aircraft at
EMD end in the restructured program).
Question. Please compare in then year dollars the flyaway cost of
the first 128 aircraft in last year's budget plan compared to this
year.
Answer. The flyaway cost of the first 128 aircraft in last year's
budget plan was $13.5 billion compared to this year's $16 billion. As
documented by the Joint Estimate Team, the early production program is
more costly than previously envisioned. Total potential production cost
growth of $13 billion has been eliminated by the implementation of a
number of cost avoidance initiatives. Payback from these initiatives
begins in small increments in 2000, but significant payback does not
occur until 2004.
The Air Force/contractor team has high confidence that, at a
minimum, production cost growth will be zero because: (1) team
commitment to long-term affordability is documented in a formal
memorandum of agreement signed by the Chief Executive Officers of
Lockheed-Martin (Mr. Norm Augustine) and Pratt & Whitney (Mr. Karl
Krapek); and (2) Lockheed-Martin, Boeing, and Pratt & Whitney are
incentivized to improve efficiencies due to the Joint Strike Fighter
competition.
Question. The GAO reports that there was some disagreement within
DOD about inflation indices and that as a result the current F-22
budget could be significantly understated. Can you explain this issue
to the Committee?
Answer. There is no disagreement within DOD about inflation
indices. The OSD Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM), issued 11
February 1997 after the DAB review, directed the F-22 progrma to use
OMB rates but take account of existing forward pricing agreements. The
Air Force applied Forward Pricing Rate Agreements rates, which had
already been negotiated, through FY01 and applied OSD rates in FY02 and
beyond. These rates have been incorporated into the FY98 President's
Budget.
Question. How much could the F-22 production cost be understated
from FY 1998 to FY 2003?
Answer. F-22 production costs are not understated from FY 1998 to
FY 2003. Beyond the FYDP, the potential for a difference in industry
inflation projections versus DOD projections has been accounted for in
the implementation of cost avoidance initiatives which maintain
production costs at or below current levels. Of the potential $13
billion in production cost growth, $8 billion is attributed to this
potential difference in inflation projections.
Question. Last year, the Committee appropriated $81 million for
long lead components for 4 pre-production vehicles. The Air Force has
eliminated the pre-production vehicles from the budget and now proposes
to use the $81 million in FY 1997 to buy-out obsolete parts. Given that
the F-22 is the most advanced aircraft ever developed and is still 7
years from being operationally fielded, why does the Air Force need to
buy obsolete parts before the aircraft even goes into production?
Answer. Obsolete parts are an electronics industry fact of life,
where parts availability life is approximately 2 to 5 years vice the F-
22 production duration of 13 years. The Out of Production Parts (OPP)
issue is one affecting programs throughout the aerospace industry.
However, the F-22 program has a plan to properly manage this potential
cost and schedule driver.
F-22 OPP funding requirements for FY97 and throughout production
have been identified. No additional funding will be needed but the
program requires congressional approval for use of FY97 appropriated
funds for OPP. FY97 OPP requirements include: (1) cost for partial
redesign, primarily avionics; (2) cost to procure parts for production
aircraft when schedule is insufficient to redesign or to avoid multiple
redesign costs. By allowing for redesign and incorporating a more open
system architecture, the program will achieve greater reliability due
to the incorporation of more modern, up-to-date technologies while
making future obsolescence easier to correct.
Loss of FY97 funding forces a one year slip in the production
program. Avionics hardware would not be available for production when
needed and the inflation effect alone equates to approximately $1
billion.
Question. Please tell the Committee what you see as the biggest
risk areas remaining for the F-22.
Answer. The biggest risk areas remaining for the F-22 are
production cost containment and integrated avionics capability.
Regarding production cost containment, the Joint Estimate Team
identified the potential for $13 billion in cost growth. However,
effective implementation of our Production Cost Reduction Business Plan
will keep the cost of the F-22 at or below our current production
budget of $48.3 billion.
With respect to avionics, the F-22 will feature a capability not
previously achieved in a fighter weapon system, the integration of
numerous sensor inputs to provide the pilot a complete, unambiguous
picture of the surrounding environment. The major development risks for
F-22 avionics are well understood. In fact, the recent program
restructure added development time, expanded ground test facilities,
and added flight test time due to the anticipated complexity of the
avionics effort.
Question. Why is there no money budgeted for Engineering Change
Orders in the First year of F-22 Production?
Answer. The F-22 program has money budgeted for Engineering Change
Orders (ECOs) in FY99, the first year of production. Approximately
$51.3 million is allocated for the Air Vehicle ECOs and $8.2 million is
allocated for Engine ECOs.
The F-22 program used Air Force historical percentages to estimate
overall ECO values, with Airframe totaling 4%, Avionics totaling 8%,
and Engines totaling 3%. F-22 ECO data was unintentionally omitted from
the FY98 President's Budget procurement documentation due to format
changes from the coordination process.
Modernization Shortfall
Question. The Air Force fiscal year 1998 budget requests $29.8
billion for procurement and R&D. Though this is $600 million higher
than FY 1997, in real terms it is once again lower than the fiscal year
1997 appropriated amount. The funding provides for only 61 new aircraft
though 75% are for Civil Air Patrol and pilot training. Only 3 are
tactical aircraft. Secretary Widnall and General Fogleman, is the Air
Force's fiscal year 1998 modernization budget adequate?
Answer. The Air Force's FY98 modernization budget is adequate,
though barely. The program the Air Force submitted reflects a very
careful balance between sustaining our readiness for operations over
the near term and building our forces for the demands we will face in
the decades to come. The Air Force uses a time-phased modernization
plan that synchronizes the size and timing of multiple programs to fit
in the available budget authority. Consequently, there may be years
when we wouldn't buy any tactical aircraft or we'd buy only a few, as
we're buying other needed items.
The FY98 modernization budget reflects this philosophy. In the 70s,
we developed and built first the F-15, then the F-16. Today, after
downsizing the number of wings as a result of the end of the Cold War,
we're fully manned to our Primary Aircraft Authorization (PAA). The
three F-15s we're buying fulfill a requirement for tactical attrition
reserve aircraft, and they're the only tactical aircraft we're buying
this year. Our continued ability, though, to provide command of air and
space depends on maintaining our current course for the F-22. In FY98,
we're funding development efforts for both F-22 and Joint Strike
Fighter, and we begin buying F-22s in FY99. Though we're only buying
three tactical airframes in FY98, we are making a strong commitment in
this budget to preserve our tactical force.
We are buying 18 Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS)
aircraft and 27 general aviation aircraft for Civil Air Patrol search
and rescue, which comprise the vast majority of the airframes we're
purchasing. They, however, represent only 1% of aircraft procurement
funding. The rest goes to buy other high priority needs in our
modernization plan. We're buying nine C-17s for $2.3B (40% of aircraft
procurement funding) to fill our highest near-term priority, airlift.
We're also buying two large VC-X aircraft (Boeing 757s designated the
C-32A), one E-8C JSTARS, and one C-130J--aircraft which help fulfill
our balance program. We must also balance across other areas, such as
munitions and space to fulfill our Global Engagement requirements. This
mix of purchases reflects the best value for the Air Force needs,
balances the funding between readiness and modernization, and meets the
requirements for a time-phased modernization plan.
Question. What is the risk to the future readiness of the Air Force
of such low procurement rates of weapons?
Answer. There is some risk to future readiness caused by low
current procurement. The Air Force will face higher Operations and
Support costs as the aircraft fleet ages which, to some extent, takes
resources away from readiness. However, the relatively low procurement
rates in fiscal year 1998 reflect the cyclical nature of tactical
aircraft procurement and a fiscal year 1998 ``snapshot'' is a poor
indicator of overall future readiness. Principally, it doesn't capture
our time-phased modernization program which balances current readiness
with future readiness (modernization) goals.
In recent years, we've been able to take a ``break'' in
procurement, especially with tactical combat aircraft. This is a direct
result of the strong buildup of forces in the early to mid-eighties and
the subsequent drawdown in forces in the early nineties after the end
of the cold war. We were able to retire our oldest systems as part of
the drawdown leaving ourselves a fairly young force. Now this ``break''
is over and we recognize we don't have the ability to build all the new
systems we need at once. Consequently, we set out a time-phased
modernization program that began by first addressing the most pressing
near-term requirements, then the midterm, and finally the far-term
needs. This sequenced modernization schedule avoids large overlaps in
funding requirements between major procurement programs. The result is
that we can modernize all parts of the force within a fairly constant
investment share of our total budget authority. However, any delays in
procuring aircraft per our modernization plan (e.g. F-22, Joint Strike
Fighter) would have significant readiness impacts.
Question. What major requirements are not funded in the fiscal year
1998 budget?
Answer. The budget the Air Force submitted is a balanced budget,
fully supporting National Military Strategy requirements. We have fully
funded all areas required to maintain and improve our capabilities.
There exist, however, areas where we could realize cost savings and
efficiencies by accelerating the procurement or increasing the quantity
of some of our modernization/improvement programs. To this end, the Air
Force has created a list of our FY98 Unfunded Priorities. This list is
rank ordered by relative importance, with the number 1 item being our
most critical issue. This 34 item list was provided to the House
Appropriations Committee in the first part of March 1997. An additional
copy is provided here for your review.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Question. What are your top four modernization programs? Are they
fully funded in fiscal year 1998? Are they optimally funded in the
accompanying fiscal years of the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP)?
Answer. The Air Force uses a time-phased modernization plan that
synchronizes the size and timing of multiple programs to fit in the
available budget authority. Our modernization programs are divided into
four major areas: near-term, near mid-term, later mid-term, and long-
term priorities. Near-term top priority is the procurement of the C-17
Globemaster III airlifter. This program funds a multi-year procurement
contract for desperately needed inter- and intra-theather airlift
capability. Our near mid-term priority is Bomber Conventional Upgrades.
This funds airframe modifications and procurement of Precision Guided
Munitions that enhance reliability and capability of our current
conventional bomber forces. Our later mid-term priority is air and
space technology. This priority funds the Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicle (EELV), Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS), and Airborne Laser
(ABL). Our long-term priority is air superiority. This funds the
Engineering Manufacturing Development (EMD) for F-22 and Joint Strike
Fighter.
All of these programs are fully funded in FY98. We do list a line
item for Precision Guided Munitions on the FY98 Unfunded Priority List.
This, however, reflects a desire to accelerate the procurement of these
munitions and their integration rather than a shortfall in the existing
program. By implementing the time phased modernization plan outlined
above, we are able to include all these priorities within the available
FYDP budget. We are able to achieve our modernization objectives
without creating ``bow waves'' in out-year budgets. This plan ensures
that the Air Force continues to provide global capabilities to meet
National Military Strategy requirements.
Additional Funding
Question. Last year, you were very candid about identifying your
top unfunded requirements to the Committee and working with us to
provide additional funding for many of them. I hope you will continue
that cooperation with us. Would you please describe your top unfunded
priorities and why the fiscal year 1998 budget is not sufficient in
these areas?
Answer. Our top unfunded priorities are described in the FY98 Air
Force Unfunded Priorities List. The Air Force annually reviews all
programs and priorities based on the available Air Force budget. Given
current financial constraints, were could not afford the items on the
FY98 Unfunded Priorities List and stay within the Air Force topline. As
you can see, the FY98 Unfunded Priorities List accelerates critical
modernization, readiness, and people programs.
Question. What are the potential savings if the Congress were to
provide additional funding in fiscal year 1998 for these items, either
by buying them earlier than now planned or by lower production unit
costs through procurement at higher quantities? Please put the costs
and savings in the record.
Answer. Our list of unfunded requirements is based principally on
meeting modernization, readiness, and people requirements, not on
potential savings. For example, Sensor to Shooter accelerates our
ability to share digital data among combat platforms. If additional
dollars are provided, we would fund item on the FY 1998 Unfunded
Priorities List which may not result in direct financial savings.
Purchasing these items earlier does afford some cost savings associated
with inflation. In general, however, the emphasis was on capability
rather than cost avoidance.
Question. What are your highest unfunded O&M or personnel
requirements?
Answer. The Air Force FY98 Unfunded Priorities List is a
combination of modernization, readiness, and people programs. Our
highest O&M and personnel requirements on the list include:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
O&M Personnel
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Force Protection.......................... Community Support.
KC-135 Depot Maintenance.................. Dormitory Housing.
Real Property Maintenance................. Family Housing.
Recruit Advertising.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. Which of these items are on any of the CINC Integrated
Priority Lists?
Answer. For the FY98-03 Integrated Priority Lists, four CINCs
(STRATCOM, PACOM, EUCOM, and SOCOM) listed Quality of Life as IPL
requirements. Issue #9 (Community Support), issue #12 (RPM) and issue
#21 (Housing O&M/Construction) on the FY98 Unfunded Priority List
support these Quality of Life Initiatives.
The Number 1 items on the FY98 Unfunded Priority List is Force
Protection. Due to the bombing of Khobar Towers in June 1996, this
issue was identified by 7 of the 10 warfighting CINCs on their FY99-03
Integrated Priority Lists. Recognizing this recently arisen critical
need, the Air Force has fully funded this requirement in the FY99-03
APOM. CINC EUCOM has publicly stated that Quality of Life Improvements
remain his Number 1 priority, both on and off his Integrated Priority
List. EUCOM is the only remaining CINC (of the original four) to carry
forward Quality of Life from the FY98-03 IPL to the FY99-03 IPL. The
Air Force is diligently working to fund those programs which support
this requirement.
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
Question. Secretary Money, last year you provided the Committee
with a list of priorities for additional funds. On that list, the Air
Force's number one priority was the procurement of an additional JSTARS
aircraft. Ms. Secretary, your fiscal year 1998 budget cuts the JSTARS
program from 2 aircraft to only 1. We now understand that the Air Force
made this reduction in May of last year at the same time your priority
list was circulating in Congress. Why did you ask Congress for
additional funds for a program you were in the process of cutting?
Answer. If you look at the single year of FY 1998, it appears we
cut the program. However, a review of our actions across the Future
Years Defense Program (FYDP) during the same period shows we took
action to strengthen the program. Due to higher priority requirements
and fiscal constraints the Air Force decreased FY 1998 procurement
quantity from 2 aircraft to 1. However, the Air Force also fixed JSTARS
outyear funding shortfalls caused by procurement cost increases in the
FYDP as a whole. During FY 1998 Program Objectives Memorandum (POM),
the Air Force decreased the FY 1998 procurement quantity from 2
aircraft to 1 and funded all 19 aircraft in the FYDP. During FY 1998
Budget Estimate Submission (BES), the Air Force de-funded the
nineteenth aircraft in FY 2003 in anticipation of FY 1997 Congressional
plus-up. During FY 1998 President's Budget, in consultation with the
Air Force, OSD re-funded the nineteenth aircraft in FY 1999.
Question. Would you describe a procurement rate of one as
``efficient''?
Answer. The Air Force realizes it is more efficient to buy more
than one aircraft per year; however, budget constraints precluded that
in FY 1998. The FY 1998 flyaway cost for one aircraft is $313 million
and the FY 1999 average flyaway cost for two aircraft is $265 million.
The average flyaway cost for the JSTARS fleet of 19 aircraft is $261
million. Current contractor facilities support aircraft induction every
five months.
Question. For this coming year, how can we work with you to
understand the priorities you are committed to sustaining in future
budgets?
Answer. Communication is the key to increased understanding of the
Air Force's commitment to providing the most capable Air Force, both
today as well as in the future, while operating within a constrained
budgetary environment. The Air Force has always balanced its
modernization versus readiness requirements, providing current and
future capability to deter aggression. We are committed to maintaining
and increasing our capabilities while minimizing the risk associated
with modifying program funding profiles. Your awareness of this ``risk
versus requirement'' dilemma will allow us the flexibility to continue
to provide the most capable Air Force both now and in the future.
NATO JSTARS
Question. The FY 1998 budget proposes a new start program to
provide NATO with its own JSTARS aircraft. Since NATO has not decided
it wants JSTARS, the administration decided to budget for much of the
US cost share up front to keep the program on a fast track. Please
explain the benefits of the NATO JSTARS program.
Answer. Employment of Joint STARS to satisfy NATO's Alliance Ground
Surveillance (AGS) requirements provides several political and military
advantages. Politically, it provides a cooperative development
opportunity, reinforcing Alliance solidarity, at a time when common
military goals and defense needs in Europe are at a critical junction.
Militarily, it provides NATO with a common ground surveillance
capability building on US combat experience and concepts of operation.
It reduces taskings on US force structure to operate in NATO areas of
responsibility (AORs), such as Bosnia. At the same time, NATO's core
capability would be interoperable with reinforcing US elements in a
broader crisis. In addition to the political and military advantages,
cooperative development of system improvements reduces the cost of
upgrades to the US fleet.
Question. Estimates of the US share for NATO JSTARS range from $800
million to $1.3 billion. Secretary Money, what is your best guess of
the final US share?
Answer. US estimates will vary relative to number of NATO nations
that participate in the program. The minimum cost estimate of $800
million reflects the maximum number of participating NATO nations (16).
The maximum cost estimates of $1.3 billion is based on the
participation of approximately 12 NATO nations. Until a decision is
made, we have no better estimate.
Question. Why does the budget plan include only $318 million for
the program, less than half of even the low estimate of the US share?
Answer. The out-year US budget will be determined in the FY00
Program Objective Memorandum (POM) after actual cost shares and program
scope are determined. The Conference of National Armaments Directors
(CNAD) will decide on the procurement of a fixed wing core capability
in November 1997
The US has budgeted the cost necessary to keep the Alliance Ground
Surveillance (AGS) program on the ``fast track'' schedule to deliver
NATO an AGS capability by 2000. The $318 million (Air Force and Army)
in the US budget pays for all but $100 million of the total program
effort in FY 1998 and 1999. We expect NATO to fund the remaining $100
million in FY 1999. The $318 million the US invests up front would be
credited to the total US contribution.
Question. What are your plans to budget for the balance of the
funding requirement?
Answer. The Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) will
decide on the procurement of a fixed wing core capability in November
1997. The out year US budget will be determined in the FY00 Program
Objective Memorandum (POM) after actual cost shares and program scope
are determined.
Question. Are the efforts funded in FY 1998 unique to NATO
requirements, or could they benefit the US JSTARS program?
Answer. The $32.6 million of Air Force RDT&E funding is for NATO
unique requirements with $3.5 million of that among for system program
office operations. The FY 1998 efforts are focused on modifications to
facilitate operations in NATO. These funds will benefit the US program
indirectly by improving its interoperability with the NATO Command and
Control System.
Question. Is it prudent to initiate this costly NATO program at the
expense of other modernization priorities, including the US JSTARS
program?
Answer. Initiation of this program benefits the US program because
the cooperative development effort includes some radar upgrade work
planned, but not funded in the US program. Reduced Operations Tempo
(OPTEMPO) and Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO) demands on US forces and
systems also provide cost avoidance.
Airborne Laser Program
Question. Last year, the Air Force requested funds to initiate a
program that will integrate a high power laser into 747 aircraft with
the mission to destroy tactical ballistic missiles in the boost phase.
The program will develop, procure, and operate 7 aircraft at a cost of
$11 billion. Mr. Secretary and General Muellner, one of the major areas
of risk on this program is taking existing laser technology and
reducing its weight sufficiently for aircraft use. What is the current
weight of the existing ground laser demonstrator?
Answer. The weight of this ground demonstrator is 5,535 pounds.
This was a ``non-flightweighted'' prototype laser module designed to
demonstrate the Contractor's ability to meet power and chemical
efficiency requirements.
Question. What is the weight requirement for the laser module that
will go on the aircraft? What are the Air Force weight reduction
proposals for meeting this requirement?
Answer. The flightweighted laser module weight requirement is 2,920
pounds. The laser module design successfully met its weight requirement
at the Critical Design Review an dis being manufactured now using
composite, plastic, and milled-out metal components.
Question. Another area of risk on the program is our lack of
detailed understanding of atmospheric conditions in the regions of the
world where we would expect to use the laser. How much does the
atmospheric conditions affect the operation of the laser? How would you
characterize our understanding of these conditions?
Answer. Atmosphere does affect the Airborne Laser's (ABL) lethal
laser range and laser dwell time performance. As atmospheric conditions
worsen, the dwell time required to destroy theater ballistic missiles
increases and additional laser fuel is consumed. The ABL will
predominantly engage missile at co-equal or higher altitude, well above
most of the earth's atmosphere. Therefore, a large majority of the
potential atmospheric impact is eliminated by flying and engaging
missiles at a high altitude. Currently, a wide range of ``real world''
atmospheric conditions are included in our models, simulations, and
tests. Results of these efforts show ABL will meet the user's
operational requirements with margin.
We are confident we understand the environment and have collected
sufficient atmospheric data to establish the ABL design point. To
increase our knowledge of the atmosphere's variability, we will
continue to expand the existing database by collecting atmospheric
measurements worldwide.
Question. Please outline the other areas of risk for this program
and how you plan to manage these risks?
Answer. Risk management is an integral component of the Airborne
Laser (ABL) systems engineering process and documented in the
Integrated Task and Management Plan. In addition to the risk management
of issues associated with aircraft weight and the atmosphere, other
risk areas identified include beam control and software development.
The government/contractor team is mitigating beam control risk by
performing: (1) scaled beam control tests at Phillips Lab and MIT's
Lincoln Lab; (2) functional tests on the contractor's beam control
brassboard; (3) active illuminator laser tracking of boosting missiles
at White Sands Missile Range; and (4) integrated weapon system beam
control tests at low and high power.
The ABL team is mitigating software development risk by: (1) using
best commercial practices; (2) emphasizing commercial and government
off the shelf software reuse; (3) focusing on open systems
architecture; (4) identifying software development as award fee
criteria; (5) early rapid prototyping in the software integration lab;
and (6) establishing an outside software risk reduction team for
independent oversight.
Question. The Ballistic Missile Defense Office is charged with the
mission of prioritizing and funding tactical missile defense. yet, the
Air Force has chosen to fund the Airborne Laser program internally
independently of BMDO. Why is the Air Force committed to funding this
ambitious program even at the expense of other Air Force priorities?
Answer. In 1992, as a result of HR 5006, Congress directed all SDIO
(now BMDO) programs that would not be fielded within 10 years be
transferred to the appropriate service. The Airborne Laser (ABL) was
subsequently transferred to the Air Force. The Air Force then fully
funded the ABL in the FY98 Program Objective Memorandum.
The Air Force is committed to the ABL program because it is a key
element of the Air Force's 21st Century architecture and Join Vision
2010. It is a truly revolutionary system which contributes directly to
each of the Air Force's core competencies: air superiority; global
attack; rapid, global mobility; precision engagement; information
superiority' and agile combat support. ABL's maximum potential as a
multi-role platform is still to be determined and, as a result, the Air
Force is conducting studies to fully exploit its capabilities. These
potential additional missions include cruise missile defense,
suppression of enemy air defense, imaging surveillance, and high value
airborne asset protection which includes self-defense.
Question. As you are aware, DoD is pursuing several programs to
counter the tactical ballistic missile threat. How do you respond to
the concern that the next available missile defense dollar should go
towards reducing the risk on these core systems rather than towards a
new system?
Answer. Funding Airborne Laser (ABL) will greatly enhance the Joint
Theater Missile Defense (TMD) architecture. Although not designated one
of the original core programs, ABL is now a fundamental component of
the multi-layered TMD architecture and will provide many unique
capabilities to the theater commander. By destroying missiles early in
their boost phase of flight, ABL will become the first layer of active
defense and will enhance the overall effectiveness of the
architecture's ``system-of-systems.'' Destroying missiles early in
their flight is an enormous deterrent against weapons of mass
destruction as the theater ballistic missiles will potentially fall
back on the enemy's own territory. ABL also provides the architecture a
more robust capability against potential TMD countermeasures like early
release of missile submunitions, decoys, and well coordinated mass
raids. In addition, the ABL can self-deploy within hours to anywhere in
the world, rapidly providing a force projection capability for our
deploying forces.
Question. Please discuss the other missions that could be performed
with the Airborne Laser and which of these you are already committed to
incorporating into the baseline system.
Answer. The Airborne Laser (ABL) is currently being designed for
the primary mission of Theater Missile Defense; however, the Air Force
envisions the ABL will mature into a multi-role platform due to the
inherent capabilities of the high energy laser. To maximize ABL's
revolutionary capabilities, the Air Force is studying adjunct missions
during the Program Definition and Risk Reduction (PDRR) phase for
possible inclusion into the ABL baseline in the Engineering and
Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase. The adjunct missions are imaging
surveillance, cruise missile defense, suppression of enemy air defenses
and high value airborne asset protection which includes self-
protection.
Formal studies will evaluate weapon system modification risks,
costs, and benefits of performing the adjunct missions. Modest efforts
were begun on these studies in FY97; however, the bulk of the study
efforts will be performed in FY98/FY99. The studies will be completed
prior to PDRR Critical Design Review in 1999. Decisions will be made at
the time for inclusion of any of the adjunct missions into the EMD
baseline.
Acquisition Cycle vs. Technology Cycle
Question. We are all too familiar with the accelerated pace of
technological change these days. A home computer we buy today can be
outdated in as little as 15 months. In some cases, software can be
outdated in just 6 months. For the military, the problem is especially
acute because of the years required to develop and field new weapon
systems. Secretary Money, what is the Air Force doing to address this
serious issue, especially in the area of computers that permeate our
aircraft, missiles, and command and control systems?
Answer. We are implementing Open Systems. The Open Systems approach
encourages the use, where applicable, of commercial products,
processes, specifications, and standards. By relying more on commercial
products and standards, we expand the industrial base for acquisition
and sustainment and we are better positioned to deal with obsolescence
and the need to incorporate new technology.
A key thrust of Open Systems is ``performance-based requirements.''
Emphasis on performance relies on the idea that we can reduce costs by
eliminating government ``how to'' requirements up front in weapon
systems acquisition. Management of performance at the interface level
instead of detailed parts encourages the use of components across a
wide range of systems and, when necessary, facilitates replacement with
state-of-the-art (commercial) technologies.
In addition, we are striving through various acquisition reform
efforts to drive the acquisition cycle inside/within the technology
cycle of computers, software and deploy thus enabling the Air Force to
deliver equipment/capability in the same technology generation as it
was conceived.
Question. Your statement talks about fitting he acquisition cycle
within the technology cycle. How do you propose to do this, especially
with large and complex weapon systems?
Answer. One of the primary tenets of acquisition reform has been
cycle time reduction. Systems bound by over regulation and inefficient
processes simply cannot get ``rubber on the ramp'' before the newly
fielded equipment is technologically (or possibly operationally)
obsolete. This past year, I announced ``Lightning Bolt #10,'' a reform
initiative chartered to examine the acquisition cycle and look for
innovative, ``out-of-the-box'' ways to reduce the time it takes to get
from a defined need to fielded hardware. The Lightning Bolt #10 team
focused on the critical time between receipt of a warfighter
requirement and contract award. Their final report identified 63 best
practices and 14 recommendations for statutory and regulatory relief
that, when implemented, could reduce the time it takes to get on
contract by as much as half. And this is only the beginning. Our
strategic goals incorporate our desire to achieve cycle time reductions
throughout all phases of a system's life. We are just beginning to get
our hands around the crucial processes and practices that drive cycle
time. Re-engineering these practices is our long-term goal.
Let me illustrate with a specific example. Air Force Materiel
Command's Electronic Systems Center (EXC), located at Hanscom AFB,
Massachusetts, is rapidly moving forward in its implementation of a
``spiral development process,'' a revolutionary concept in the
acquisition of computer hardware and software. Spiral development is
unique in that it is designed to respond to user requirements within
the context of the commercial computer industry, where hardware can
become obsolescent in less than two years. It became apparent to the
managers and engineers at ESC that the standard, conservative way of
doing business was ensuring that old hardware ended up in the
warfighter's hands--better machines and software could be purchased on
the open market. EXC is constructing a process which will move new
equipment to the user in 18 months--a real-life example of ``fitting
the acquisition cycle inside the technology cycle.''
Question. Is it true that the F-22 will become operational in FY
2004 with so-called ``486'' processors that are at least two
generations older than the ``Pentium Pro'' processors available today
for our kids to use at home?
Answer. The F-22 does not use the 486 processor--the F-22 main
processor is the Intel 80960, a 32 bit superscaler device more
comparable to a Pentium processor than the 486. The current processor
will meet the warfighters' needs at the lowest cost with acceptable
technical risk when the F-22 becomes operational in FY 2005 (November
2004). However, the F-22 plans to upgrade to a faster processor and
decrease the number of processors in production Lot 6 (FY04) with a
decrease in recurring cost. Significant nonrecurring cost is required
to ``chase'' the latest technology, our mandate is to meet the
warfighters' needs at the lowest total cost.
Question. Is there some way we can field our most modern and
sophisticated aircraft with modern computer technology?
Answer. To minimize concurrency and avoid multiple redesign costs,
a technology baseline must be established prior to critical design
review. Moreover, significant nonrecurring cost is required to
``chase'' the latest technology. The F-22 plans to upgrade to newer
technology in an incremental fashion by grouping lot buys. The goal is
to make all hardware within a group identical. Hardware across groups
may not be identical, but will be form, fit, function and interface
compatible and transparent to the warfighter. The F-22 mandate is to
achieve a producible design that meets the operational need at the
lowest cost with acceptable technical risk.
Making the Air Force More Expeditionary
Question. The Air Force is increasing its emphasis on expeditionary
forces, able to deploy from the United States in a matter of days or
even hours. Improving this capability requires changes in the way we
organize, equip, and support our forces. Secretary Money, can you tell
us what you are doing on the acquisition side to become more
expeditionary?
Answer. The acquisition community enhances the USAF's ability to
become more expeditionary by addressing the first three components of
the Air Force's four element modernization plan--time phased
modernization, managing programs effectively, and revolutionizing
current business practices. The warfighter depends on us to conduct
fast-paced acquisitions which can seize upon developing technologies,
enabling our forces to respond in near real-time to the exigencies of
the moment. Our success or failure will be measured by our ability to
re-create business practices that can respond quickly, flexibly, and
cost effectively, and which can leverage the commercial marketplace for
new technology to apply to both new and existing systems. Air Force
acquisition's ability to bring tools to the warfighter ``faster,
cheaper, and better,'' has already contributed significantly to this
nation's ability to employ expeditionary air forces. Allow me to
illustrate with three examples.
The advanced concept technology demonstrators are one means of
accelerating the technology development process and fielding
applications more expeditiously. Predator UAV use in Bosnia is one good
example of this approach.
Our weapons' development programs are remarkable success stories in
our quest for cost control through acquisition streamlining. The recent
contractor downselect of the Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser (WCMD)
highlights this potential for cost avoidance. Originally projected to
come in at $25,000 per tailkit, both competing contractors submitted
proposals for under $10,000 unit cost, reflecting a total program
savings of over $850M--money which could be used to support additional
needs of the AEF.
The F-22 will provide the battlefield air dominance prerequisite
for successful joint expeditionary warfare in the 21st century. It is
incumbent on the Air Force acquisition community to bring this
revolutionary capability into the inventory on cost, on schedule.
All that having been said, however, we must not lose sight of the
fact that for an AEF to be effective, it must deploy rapidly--
minimizing airlift requirements is a key enabler of this capability.
The Air Force has recently ``stood up'' an AEF Battle Lab at Mountain
Home, who's charter includes exploring ways to reduce the logistics
``footprint'' of all deployable weapons systems--new, as well as
fielded. Acquisition's greatest air expeditionary impact will be felt
by delivering products tailored to reduce deployment requirements. Here
are several examples.
Our newest platform development programs, the Airborne Laser (ABL),
the F-22, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), and the CV-22 are all
designed with supportability in mind. The ABL is a self-deployable
weapons system which can arrive worldwide within 24 hours, providing
ballistic missile defense for both-in-place and deploying allied
forces. In the fighter arena, the F-22 and the JSF are both committed
to reducing, by over half, the current number of aircraft C-141
equivalents required to deploy a squadron of comparable earlier
generation fighters. In support of special operations, the CV-22 will
eventually replace 88 rotary and fixed wing aircraft of various types,
simultaneously increasing capability as well as reducing the deployment
logistics burden currently imposed by an aging and diverse fleet.
For our fielded fighters, there are several notable examples of the
progress being made in reducing ground support equipment. In both the
F-15 and F-16 the Avionics Intermediate Shop (AIS) will soon by
replaced by a more capable and consolidated array of avionics test
equipment, resulting in an airlift-required reduction of over 2 C-141
equivalents per squadron deployed. The F-16 is also migrating to an on-
board oxygen generating system (OBOGS) staring in 2001, which will
entirely eliminate the current liquid oxygen (LOX) squadron deployment
requirement and free up another one-half of a C-141 equivalent.
The Conventional Mission Upgrade Program (CMUP), which is an
ongoing effort to increase B-1 combat capability through lethality,
survivability, and supportability, will make its logistics mark through
a significant improvement in the defensive countermeasures system it
upgrades. The current 17.5 hour mean-time-between-failure (MTBF) ALQ-
161 system of 120 line replacement units (LRUs), weighting over 5000
lbs, will be supersedes by a more capable installation of only 34 LRUs,
weighting 1000 lbs, with a MTBF of 112 hours--dramatically reducing the
deployment requirements of this backbone of the bomber fleet.
As you are well aware, the acquisition community was instrumental
in facilitating multi-year procurement of the evolving core of our air
expeditionary airlift capability, the C-17. This aircraft, with its
high launch reliability, ease of maintenance, as well as its superb
ground maneuverability and rapid onloading/offloading capability, can
globally transport more people and equipment into austere or
constrained airfields than any other airlifter.
Finally, current weapons' developments are engaged in a two-pronged
attack on deployment footprints. First, given the inherent adverse
weather capability and improved accuracy of our newest Precision Guided
Munitions, the number of aircraft sorties necessary, as well as the
number of bombs expended, to destroy a given target will dramatically
decrease. Depending on the CINC's campaign plan, this factor will allow
him the flexibility to shift some of the airlift normally reserved for
large quantities of (dumb) munitions to other priorities. Second,
several in-development miniaturized munitions, such as the ``small
smart bomb,'' have the potential to be as lethal as currently fielded
counterparts 2 to 4 times their size. Such munitions could permit the
Air Force to carry more weapons per platform, as well as significantly
reduce the logistics footprint of the total number of weapons deployed
to a given theater.
Question. Are there areas that require further attention in your
view?
Answer. The acquisition community must continue to be proactive in
sponsoring the supportability upgrades which contribute to the overall
health and deployability of our maturing fleet. Even though initial
fielding of our newest developmental weapons systems--those which have
a reduced logistics footprint designed in--will commence in the not too
distant future, we must remain conscious of the fact that a viable AEF
will depend on our current aircraft inventory for a number of years to
come.
Question. Your statement mentions ``Agile Combat Support'' and
``Focused Logistics''. Please explain these concepts as they relate to
the Air Force.
Answer. Agile Combat Support will improve transportation and
information systems to allow time-definite resupply, reduce the lift
requirement to get materials and troops to the field, and streamline
the infrastructure providing parts and supplies to reduce cycle times.
Agile Combat Support will yield the revolution in combat support
discussed in Joint Vision 2010's tenet of Focused Logistics.
Focused Logistics will be the fusion of information, logistics, and
transportation technologies to provide rapid crisis response, to track
and shift assets even while enroute, and to deliver tailored logistics
packages and sustainment directly at the strategic, operational, and
tactical level of operations. The operational concept of Focused
Logistics will provide the Joint Force Commander with an Air Force that
is more mobile, responsive, efficient, and significantly more potent.
Future Air Force logistics will maximize both technology and resource
management reinvention techniques to achieve and provide unparalleled
combat power to the joint warfighter.
B-2 Bomber Program
Question. Gentlemen, last year the Congress added funding to
accelerate integration of advanced precision weapons on the B-2. Does
the FY98 budget continue this integration at the accelerated pace?
Answer. The accelerated weapons programs funded with the FY97 $116
million Congressional Add are fully funded and require no additional
funds in FY98. The Air Force will use the FY97 Congressional Plus-up to
integrate:
GPS Aided Munition (GAM) 113: Very Hard Target Kill
Capability;
Joint Stand-Off Weapon (JSOW); and
Generic Weapons Integration System (GWIS): Reduces
Cost and Schedule to Integrate Additional Weapons.
Question. Compare the IOC for each advanced precision weapon on the
B-2 between last year's Air Force budget plan this year's.
Answer.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Precision weapon FY97 PB FY98 PB
------------------------------------------------------------------------
GAM (2000-POUND)................... FY96............. FY96
JDAM (2000-POUND).................. FY98............. FY98
GAM-113 (4700-POUND)*.............. N/A.............. FY98
JSOW (1000-POUND)*................. N/A.............. FY99
JASSM.............................. FY02............. FY03
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Funded with FY97 $116 million RDT&E Congressional Plus-up.
Question. Your budget plan this year cut $212 million from the B-2
in fiscal year 1999 as compared to last year's plan. Please explain
what was cut and why.
Answer. Air Force reduced B-2 fiscal year 1999 RDT&E funding by
$212 million during fiscal year 1998 PB deliberations to resolve Air
Force funding shortfall. Impacts of this reduction:
Eliminates Block 30 Upgrade of two EMD test
aircraft, and
Delays JASSM IOC one year to FY03.
Partial restoration of funding shorfall currently being worked in
Air Force POM process:
Accepts one Block 30 aircraft delivery on time, one
nine months late, and
Accepts JASSM IOC of FY03.
Question. Secretary Money, what is the Air Force's cost estimate to
procure nine additional B-2 aircraft starting in FY 1998? For the
record, please provide a funding profile, by year, reflecting the Air
Force cost estimate.
Answer. The Air Force has no government estimate since we have no
requirement. We have never requested the Program Office to prepare an
estimate. Such a detailed estimate would require in excess of 120 days
(150 days and several million dollars).
Question. From an acquisition standpoint, what are the pros and
cons of buying additional B-2s starting this year?
Answer. The Air Force does not plan to buy more than 21 operational
B-2s:
Funding for more B-2s is not practical within
current Air Force budget and force structure, and
Additional B-2s would contribute significantly to US
combat capability--however, issue is affordability, not
capability.
C-17 Aircraft
Question. Mr. Money, can you update the Committee on the status of
the C-17 multiyear contract?
Answer. The C-17 multiyear contract is on track, and will save
$1.025 billion over seven years. The airframe contract was signed on 1
Jun 96 for the last 80 C-17s. The associated engine multiyear contract
option was awarded in December 96. It provides for 320 Pratt & Whitney
engines, which are derivatives of the commercial Boeing 757 engine. The
first multiyear contract aircraft is the P-41, which will be delivered
summer of 1998.
Question. The Committee is aware of concerns from the Army
regarding the suitability of the C-17 for airdropping soldiers and
equipment and landing on semi-prepared runways. Can you explain these
issues and the status of their resolution?
Answer. The C-17 airdrop issues are resolved. On 31 Jan 97, six C-
17s in formation airdropped 612 paratroopers, successfully completing
the Air Force/Army formation personnel airdrop test effort. This effort
validated the formation spacing required to prevent paratroopers from
interacting with aircraft wake vortices.
The Air Force will work with the Army to procure and field a
universal static line and continue follow-on operational testing to
further develop airdrop tactics. There is no issue with equipment
airdrop--C-17s are routinely performing this mission. Minor
modifications to airdrop systems and some changes to airdrop procedures
resulted from operational experience.
Joint test effort exists to characterize the C-17's capability to
operate routinely on semi-prepared runways. Testing involves numerous
measurements of semi-prepared surfaces to quantify their effect on C-17
performance. This information is then input into the C-17 mission
computer so the aircrew can predict aircraft performance. Testing also
helps identify expeditionary runway design criteria, construction
procedures, equipment requirements, and maintenance criteria. Data
collection was accelerated. Planned capability release in the Summer of
1997.
Question. As you know, one of the criteria for multiyear
contracting is stability in design. The budget this year includes
additional funding for several configuration changes to the aircraft
that were not planned last year including precision approach
modifications, a new radio, dual row airdrop, and a CINC communications
program called Silver Bullet. From FY 1998 to 2003, the same period as
the multiyear, the Air Force plans to spend $882 million in research
and development for the C-17. Gentlemen, is the C-17 configuration
stable during the multiyear?
Answer. The C-17 configuration is stable under the multiyear
strategy, but a changing world and the aircraft's computer-intensive
design result in new requirements and the need for upgrades. The
environment in which the C-17 operates is not stable. Evolving
requirements of the International Civil Aviation Organization and the
Federal Aviation Administration concerning future air traffic control
systems and air navigation system are forcing major avionics changes
Air Force-wide. The Air Force is developing Global Access, Navigation &
Safety roadmaps.
CINCTRANS has identified the requirement for a precision approach
capability for rapid deployment to austere airfields, based on
operational limitations experienced in deploying to Bosnia last year. A
modification is being developed to meet that requirement.
Question. Why do we need to spend another $822 million in research
and development on this aircraft?
Answer. Operational experience continues to highlight areas for
improvement as occurs with any new aircraft. R&D investment sustains
computer-intensive aircraft (like F-15 and F-16) and integrates new
required capabilities. Changes in avionics and tactics drive software
changes. Software changes in one computer affect software in other
computers because of the high degree of integration in the aircraft.
All enhancements are retrofitted into delivered aircraft and
incorporated in the production line to ensure the user a homogeneous
fleet of aircraft.
Mission Planning Systems
Question. The Air Force and Navy have developed separate aircraft
mission planning systems that perform almost identical functions. To
operate the two systems--the Air Force Mission Support System (AFMSS)
and the Navy Tactical Aircraft Mission Planning System (TAMPS)--draw
information from various databases including digital map databases,
weather databases, threat databases, etc. Unfortunately, the Navy and
Air Force use separate databases at tremendously added cost. Mr. Money,
how much money is the Air Force spending on its mission planning system
in FY 1998, including all funding from individual aircraft and weapon
program?
Answer. The Air Force is spending approximately $136.4 million in
FY 1998 to support mission planning. Of that amount, $56.4 million
funds the Air Force mission planning system core software and hardware
in support of the AFMSS and sustainment of several legacy mission
planning systems. This reflects continuation of new software
development and procurement of ground and portable workstations, and
hardware retrofit. It continues over 50 Aircraft/Weapons/Electronics
(A/W/E) integration efforts, interoperability with Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence Systems and major data base producers,
and research and development for Global Command and Control System
migration. This also includes annual operating and maintenance costs.
Most of the dollars, nearly $80 million, funds over 50 A/W/Es which
there is little overlap between USAF and USN. These A/W/Es are service
unique, platform specific, require specialized system software, and
discrete digital Transfer Devices. They are programmed in the
individual aircraft and weapons system program elements.
Question. Mr. Money, in your opinion, does it make sense for the
two services to develop incompatible mission planning systems?
Answer. The services recognize the value of a common mission
planner. Since the 1993 initiation of the Interservice Mission Planning
Working Group, the Air Force and Navy have pursued joint efforts to
achieve compatibility. To date, joint efforts with proven success
include: standard data for fuel planning, current development of stores
planning/weaponeering application, shared Precision Guided Missile
target sets, and a common data base for imagery and digital maps
provided by the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. The Air Force and
Navy are finalizing a memorandum of agreement which addresses a joint
migration strategy to pursue a Defense Information Infrastructure,
Common Operating Environment. The objective is to field a Global
Command and Control System complaint, interoperable mission planning
system which meets the requirements of each service.
Question. Is there a plan in DOD to eventfully migrate the Air
Force and Navy systems towards common modules and databases? If so, can
you discuss the schedule? Can the schedule be accelerated? At what
cost?
Answer. The Air Force and Navy are currently developing a plan and
acquisition strategy to jointly pursue Air Force and Navy mission
planning system migration to the Global Command and Control System
(GCCS). Our objective is to field a GCCS complaint mission system which
meets the requirements of each service by 2002. The migration plan will
focus on evolutionary development to a Defense Information
Infrastructure, Common Operating Environment. A Joint Integrated
Process Team was chartered to produce an acquisition strategy to
develop common mission planning components. Discussions on schedule,
costs, and programmatics started on 6 Mar 1997. It is too early in the
migration process to establish a firm schedule and cost figures. Most
importantly, planned migration efforts can not distract from our first
priority, which is to keep the current Air Force and Navy programs on
track to deliver an operational system that satisfies the users'
current operational requirements.
Question. Please characterize the amount of savings you would
expect if these mission planning systems become more common?
Answer. The migration plan and acquisition strategy currently under
development will address the cost savings potential. Currently, it is
premature at this stage in our migration study efforts to estimate cost
savings. Our objective is to seek savings in software engineering and
development, hardware procurement, and operations and maintenance.
F-16 and F-15 Aircraft
Question. The FY 1998 budget includes just 3 tactical combat
aircraft--all F-15E Strike Eagles. The budget includes no funds for
additional F-16's. What is your total requirement for F-16's?
Answer. Beginning with the FY 1998 budget, the Air Force
requirement for F-16C aircraft is 1340. This number includes combat
coded, test, training, backup, and attrition reserve. The Air Force has
funded 1312 F-16C aircraft through FY 1997. There is no procurement of
F-16C aircraft funded in the FY 98 President's Budget, leaving the Air
Force 28 aircraft short of its requirement.
Question. What is the funded inventory through FY 1997?
Answer. The Air Force has funded 1312 F-16C aircraft through FY
1997. There is no procurement of F-16C aircraft funded in the FY 98
President's Budget, leaving the Air Force 28 aircraft short of its
requirement.
Question. Why didn't the Air Force budget for additional F-16s in
FY 1998?
Answer. The Air Force procured twelve F-16C aircraft in the FY 1996
and FY 1997 budgets. In FY 1998, continued severe funding constraints
forced the Air Force to fund other higher priority programs.
Question. What is the current status of the media reported Saudi
FMS interest in the F-16?
Answer. There has been no formal request from the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia (KSA) for the purchase of F-16 aircraft. The Saudi Arabian
Minister of Defense and Aviation announced publicly that he did not
intend to discuss an aircraft sale when he visited Washington in
February, and the issue was not discussed in his talks with the
Administration, including Secretary of Defense Cohen.
Question. What is the funded backlog of F-16s, including FMS?
Answer. Please see the attached delivery schedule, representing the
delivery of currently funded USAF and FMS F-16 aircraft orders. While
the chart depicts expected deliveries of the FY97 USAF F-16 buy of six
aircraft, please note all funding for the FY97 buy ($154.9 million) is
currently on OSD withhold.
[Chart follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Question. What is the total F-15E requirement?
Answer. Beginning with the FY 1997 budget, the total requirement
for F-15E aircraft is 219. This number includes all combat coded, test,
training, backup, and attrition reserve. The funded inventory of F-15E
aircraft through FY 1997 is 213. There is funding for the procurement
of three additional F-15E aircraft in the FY 98 President's Budget,
leaving the Air Force three aircraft short of its requirement.
Question. What is the funded inventory through FY 1997?
Answer. The funded inventory of F-15E aircraft through FY 1997 is
213. There is funding for the procurement of three additional F-15E
aircraft in the FY 98 President's Budget, leaving the Air Force three
aircraft short of its requirement.
F-16 and F-15 Engines
Question. Defense Daily reported that General Hawley, head of Air
Combat Command and General Donald Sheppard, head of the Air National
Guard, have complained of constant, costly problems with thousands of
F-15 and F-16 engines. Can you tell Congress about the problems with
these engines?
Answer. Statistically the F100 and F110 series engines have been
the safest fighter engines in USAF history, but safety and maintenance
problems continue during operations. The biggest concern is related to
vibrational stresses in the fan area and high thermal and mechanical
stresses in the turbines. Other parts of the engines have also had
problems, but their impact has not been as serious. Corrective action
plan are developed and executed as new failure modes are encountered.
Root causes for all these problems have been identified, field risk
management procedures are in-place, and corrective actions are being
developed and implemented. Some hardware redesigns are being developed
under the Component Improvement Program (CIP) and these changes are
aggressively being qualified and incorporated. Until fixes are
implemented, operational units are performing more frequent inspections
and failure-prone parts are being replaced more often.
Question. The (20 Feb Defense Daily) article suggested that engine
components were not being installed in a timely manner because of
budget problems. How do you respond to this?
Answer. The budget is adequate to fix all engines safety problems,
however, additional funding could be used to address reliability and
maintainability (R&M) problems. The solutions to the majority of
current safety problems require hardware redesigns and retrofits. All
identified safety redesigns have been completed or are well on their
way to completion. MAJCOMs have committed to the incorporation of these
redesigned/improved parts by identifying funds required to retrofit
their fleets. The strategy and pace for each hardware retrofit program
represents a balance of risk, hardware availability, maintenance
workload, readiness and funding. The impact of safety issues on scarce
Component Improvement Program (CIP) and MAJCOM modification and
operations and maintenance (O&M) funding is significant though, and
severely limits our ability to fix non-safety R&M problems. Additional
funding for the CIP program to support reliability and maintainability
upgrades is currently #7 on the Chief of Staff of the Air Forces' FY98
unfunded priority list.
Question. Last year, the Congress added funds for the F-15C/D
engine upgrade. The Committee was pleased to see that the Air Force
continued this program in the FY 1998 budget. Will this upgrade program
address the problems experienced by ACC and the Air National Guard?
What else can be done to address this problem?
Answer. The F-15 C/D engine upgrade is not currently planned for
ACC or the Air National Guard. The engine upgrade program converts
existing F100-PW-100 engines to the F100-PW-220E configuration on F-15
C/D aircraft overseas (at PACAF and USAFE) where there is the highest
payback. Meanwhile, every effort is being made to incorporate fixes for
all F100-PW-100 safety issues. The Component Improvement Program (CIP)
is used to fix safety and reliability and maintainability problems on
existing engines. CIP is adequately funded to support all known safety
problems, however, funding for non-safety reliability and
maintainability is limited. Additional funding for the CIP program to
support reliability and maintainability upgrade is currently #7 on the
Chief of Staff of the Air Forces' unfunded priority list.
Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile
Question. JASSM is a highly accurate stealthy cruise missile that
will be launched from Air Force and Navy strike aircraft and Air Force
long range bombers. Please update the Committee on the status of the
JASSM program.
Answer. JASSM is finishing up the 9th month of the 25.5 month
Program Definition and Risk Reduction phase. Both Lockheed Martin and
McDonnell Douglas have completed their preliminary design and have
entered the critical design phase on hardware and software items. In
addition, both contractors are well into air vehicle development--to
include extensive modeling and simulation efforts as well as wind
tunnel testing on threshold aircraft (B-52H, F-16C/D, F/A-18E/F). The
Air Force is generally satisfied with the contractors' progress on
JASSM.
Question. Now that the development contracts have been awarded,
what is the total development cost currently projected? What is the
total procurement cost?
Answer. The total development cost currently projected for JASSM is
$716.8 million of which $648.5 million is funded by the Air Force and
$68.3 million is funded by the Navy. The Air Force funding for
development includes the Program Definition and Risk Reduction (PDRR)
contracts awarded to Lockheed Martin and McDonnell Douglas in June
1996, the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) contract to
one of those two contractors in July 1998, integration of JASSM on the
Air Force threshold aircraft (F-16 Blk 50 and B-52H), all required test
support (flight test, live fire test, aircraft modifications, target
construction, etc), and associated program and mission support costs.
The Navy funding for development includes integration on the Navy
threshold aircraft (F/A-18E/F) and testing unique to the Navy
requirement. The Air Force missile procurement budget is $1,793.4
million for the programmed buy of 2400 weapons. The Air Force's
requirement for production funding begins in FY00 for low rate initial
production. The Navy currently has no funds in the FYDP for JASSM
procurement.
Question. What are the major areas of risk on the program?
Answer. The Joint Program Office has identified the following two
areas as potential schedule risks for the overall JASSM development
effort:
a. F-16 aircraft integration (moderate risk). The F-16 Operational
Flight Program (OFP) which adds JASSM capability is scheduled for
fielding in December 2003. January 2004 is the Acquisition Program
Baseline threshold date for F-16/JASSM Required Assets Available (RAA).
Thus the OFP tape is the primary schedule risk area for F-16 threshold
aircraft integration. Developmental test tapes will be produced to
support JASSM PDRR and EMD flight test to mitigate F-16 integration
risk.
b. Mission planning (moderate risk). The mission planning for a
seeker is not easy and could pose a schedule risk. Mission planning
performance is a critical component to the total system performance.
Mission planning elements considered by the JASSM contractors include
acquisition of target ``signature'' data, database preparation and
distribution, integration of products into existing structure,
weaponeering and aircraft sortie generation, and the final preparation
of mission planning products. Additionally, the mission planning must
be compatible with the air tasking order (ATO) cycle. The system must
take advantage of existing Air Force and Navy intelligence, C41, and
mission planning systems (Air Force Mission Support System (AFMSS) and
Tactical Aircraft Mission Planning System (TAMPS)). A JASSM mission
planning module will be incorporated into both the AFMSS and TAMPS.
Question. What is the Air Force doing to manage these risks?
Answer. F-16 Aircraft Integration: The JASSM Joint Program Office
(JPO) chartered a Joint Interface Control Working Group (JICWG) to
manage risk associated with missile/aircraft integration, including the
F-16. The JICWG includes the JASSM JPO, host aircraft System Program
Offices (SPOs)/Program Management Agencies, JASSM prime contractors,
aircraft prime contractors, and other involved Government agencies. The
JICWG along with Memoranda of Agreement (MOAs) and Associate Contractor
Agreements (ACAs) among government agencies and contractors will be
used to reduce risk during the Program Definition and Risk Reduction
phase. In addition, developmental test tapes will be produced to
support JASSM PDRR and EMD flight test to mitigate aircraft integration
risk.
Mission Planning: The JASSM mission planning effort, including risk
reduction, is managed through the JASSM mission planning Intelligence
Support Working Group (ISWG). The ISWG includes the JASSM JPO, the
AFMSS SPO, TAMPS JPO, JASSM prime contractors, and Government
intelligence and mission planning agencies. Formal agreements between
participating organizations include: (1) Interface impact assessment,
interface problem and integration resolution through the ISWG; (2)
Documentation to establish, define, and control interface requirements;
and (3) Higher level interface management under the purview of the
Interface Control Steering Group and the Interface Management Board.
MOAs are being established between appropriate organizations, and ACAs
will be required between the mission planning, aircraft, and weapon
contractors.
Large Aircraft Reengine Programs
Question. In the past several years, there has been a lot of
interest in both industry and the Pentagon in replacing old engines in
many of the Air Force's large aircraft with modern, fuel efficient,
highly reliable commercial engines. Congress has already funded
reengine programs for the KC-135 tanker and the RC-135 Rivet Joint.
Reengine programs for AWACS, B-52, and JSTARS are also under
consideration. Secretary Widnall, has the Air Force developed a
comprehensive strategy for dealing with the need to reengine these
aircraft? If so, can you outline this strategy to the Committee?
Answer. A study is being initiated to look at feasibility of a
comprehensive program. The potential operational benefits are longer
effective time on station, higher altitudes, higher reliability,
improved fuel efficiency, and reduced noise. Cost analysis studies show
independent reengining of aircraft types are not cost effective,
however, a comprehensive reengining program could offer potential
sayings from economy of large numbers; cheaper, more reliable engines;
and new/innovative ideas.
Question. Last year, reengining the AWACS was the sixth priority on
the Air Force unfunded priority list and Congress provided funding to
initiative the program. We now understand the Air Force completed a
study in August 1996 and concluded that such a program might not be
cost effective and so the Air Force did not fund the program in FY 1998
and out. What is the basis of the study's conclusion that reengining
AWACS is not cost effective? Why didn't the Air Force inform the
Committee of this conclusion in August prior to the Appropriation
Conference in September?
Answer. The study found that the reduced operations and support
costs for a re-engined AWACS fleet (increased fuel efficiency,
decreased maintenance, etc.) did not recoup the large investment costs
required for re-engining. There was no cost payback in O&S in either
the lease or buy scenario for operations of the fleet through the
expected life of the system (2025). A summary of the study findings
will be submitted to Congress by 1 April 1997 per the FY 1997
Appropriations Conference Language.
The cost study results presented in late August 1996 showed there
was no cost benefit to re-engine AWACS for operations through 2025. Re-
engining does, however, provide operational benefits such as increased
surveillance volumes, improved time on station, and reduced noise. It
was not until late CY 1996 (after the Conference actions closed) that
the Air Force made the final decision not to pursue re-engining in the
FY 1998 President's Budget.
Question. Last year, the Congress asked the Air Force to evaluate a
proposed B-52 engine lease program. Now that you have had a chance to
evaluate the proposal, what are the pros and cons of such a lease
program?
Answer. The Air Force has completed its report on B-52 re-engining
and will forward the report to Congress in the near future.
The PROS of the new Allison/Rolls Royce RB211 engines include
improved operational capability and improved maintainability. Some
examples: solves the JP-8 cold start problem with the current TF33
engine, reduces takeoff fuel loads for training; reduces scheduled
engine removal rate, makes engine design more robust and resistant to
foreign object damage, and provides an engine which is 33% more fuel
efficient.
The CONS include affordability, high termination liability,
statutory issues and unknown future force structure. The estimated
additional cost is over $1.3 billion. There is high termination
liability; over $2 billion in FY08. the Air Force would need statutory
relief to permit a contracting officer to lease ``equipment'' long-
term. Anti-Deficiency Act. 31 U.S.C. section 1341 prohibits obligations
in advance or in excess of appropriations by Congress. A long-term
lease would obligate the government to support the aircraft fleet as
currently projected, not allowing for force structure changes which may
occur from QDR or subsequent realignments.
Question. How does the Air Force propose to proceed with respect to
B-52 engines?
Answer. Based on studies to date, the Air Force currently does not
have plans to make any major changes to B-52 engines (TF33s).
Information Warfare
Question. Information Warfare involves the disruption of an
adversary's information systems. For example, instead of using a smart
bomb to destroy a command and control center, we could instead use a
computer virus to achieve the same end. The good news is that the
United States, being on the forefront of information technologies, is
in an excellent position to develop offensive capabilities. The bad
news is that we are more dependent on information systems, and
therefore, more vulnerable to disruption of these systems. John Deutch,
as director of the CIA, assessed computer-based ``cyber'' attacks as a
threat second only to nuclear arms and other weapons of mass
destruction. There are numerous computers in our aircraft, our
missiles, and our command and control systems. What are you doing to
ensure the systems you are procuring for the Air Force will be safe
from such ``cyber'' attacks?
Answer. Efforts are underway within the Air Force Material Command
(AFMC) to institutionalize an Information Warfare Vulnerability
Assessment and Risk Management (IW VA/RM) process for all procurements
as part of each Program Protection Plan. IW VA/RM addresses system
security from program concept phase through the system procurement life
cycle in risks versus system vulnerabilities, threat, vulnerability
countermeasures, and cost benefit analysis. Current weapon systems that
have been evaluated utilizing Vulnerability Assessment and Risk
Management process with systems assessments are Joint STARS, F-15E, and
the Theater Battle Management System.
Question. Do you feel the Air Force is currently ahead or behind
the threat as it relates to defending our systems from ``cyber''
attack?
Answer. We are aggressively defending our systems from ``cyber''
attacks, but the threat is increasing. The Air Force is beginning to
field the Base Information Protection (BIP) portion of the Combat
Information Transport System (CITS) to address the following areas:
Boundary Protection which prevents unauthorized external
access of data and systems.
Intrusion Detection which detects near-real-time security
anomalies in computer network activity.
Internal Control which prohibits mis-use of systems and
data through posture reporting.
Recovery Systems which recovers from damage caused by
breach in network security.
Denial of Service Attacks which protects from structured
attacks inhibiting network services.
The Air Force has a research and development program in place to
address technology advances and keep ahead of future threats.
Question. What are your suggestions for how we may best add
resources to reduce our vulnerability to such attacks:
Answer. The Air Force fully supports the funding for Information
Warfare (IW) in the Presidents' budget as the minimum set of measures
to protect and defend Air Force information systems against IW attack
and to manage the risks associated with such attacks. The Air Force
must, however, also address our vulnerabilities to evolving IW threats.
We may best add resources to reduce our vulnerabilities to IW
attacks as follows:
Increase education and training in threat awareness and
information system administration and protection.
Implement the formal IW Risk Management and Vulnerability
Assessment Program that the Air Force developed to provide programs
with the skills and tools to conduct their own IW vulnerability
assessment and support risk management decisions.
Provide the capability to integrate IW protection across
Air Force weapons and information programs and systems to ensure that
critical mission functions are not interrupted.
The Air Force would use added resources to emphasize support tools
to IW warfighting units to monitor systems for IW attacks, and to
provide IW situational awareness, C2 decision aids, and damage
assessment/recovery. These tools are essential for counter information
modernizing planning and requirements development. To achieve these
objectives, the Air Force estimates that $2.0 million would be needed
each year (FY99 to FY03) for a total of $10.0 million. The Air Force is
examining ways to fund this offset through a realignment of internal
Air Force resources.
Question. How is the military's growing interdependence with
civilian information infrastructure going to impact the vulnerability
of the Air Force now and in the future?
Answer. Air Force systems vulnerability will need to be evaluated
due to their dependence on the civilian information infrastructure.
Systems evaluations will need to address this dependence and ensure
that they are protected and can contain damage and ensure that mission
critical functions continue. This vulnerability impact is being studied
by the Presidential Commission on Critical Information Protection
(CIP). The DOD has a CIP working group with a sub-group for Information
Assurance to address these issues.
Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile Lawsuit
Question. The government terminated the A-12 contract for
``default'', but terminated the TSSAM (Tri-Service Standoff Attack
Missile) for ``the convenience of the government''. Both programs
suffered similar problems in terms of cost, schedule, and poor
performance after expenditure of billions of dollars each. Termination-
for-default means that the contractor is held liable for overruns,
while under a termination-for-convenience the contractor is not
penalized for its poor performance. Secretary Money, the Committee is
surprised to learn that the TSSAM contractor (Northrop-Grumman) has
filed suit against the government to recover $750 million of
``uncompensated performance costs, investments and a reasonable
profit'' on this terminated program. What are your views on the merit
of this lawsuit?
Answer. The TSSAM contractor filed a lawsuit against the United
States in the United States Court of Federal Claims on 2 December 1996.
The United States is being represented in the lawsuit by the Department
of Justice. Because the matter is in litigation, I am not able to
answer questions about this lawsuit.
Question. When the contract was originally terminated for
convenience, didn't the government and the contractor reach agreement
on a fair settlement cost? If so, what has changed?
Answer. There was no agreement at that time.
Question. How do you characterize the contractor's performance on
this program?
Answer. I cannot comment since this matter is in litigation.
Question. Did the government get its money's worth from the $3
billion investment made in this program?
Answer. I cannot comment since this matter is in litigation.
Question. How much could the government have to spend to defend
itself in court against this lawsuit?
Answer. The Department of Justice is defending the United States in
this case. I cannot comment since this matter is in litigation.
Question. Where would the Air Force get its share of $750 million
if it had to pay additional TSSAM costs under a court penalty?
Answer. Generally, a court judgment against the United States is
paid from the judgment fund, and an agency is required to reimburse the
judgment fund from its available funds or by obtaining additional
appropriations.
Question. Would it likely come from weapons modernization funding?
Answer. Generally, a court judgment against the United States is
paid from the judgment fund, and an agency is required to reimburse the
judgment fund from its available funds or by obtaining additional
appropriations. It is my understanding that cases of this size may last
for several years, and I cannot project into the future from what
particular sources any ultimate judgment against the United States
might be paid.
Joint Strike Fighter Program
Question. The 1998 budget requests $931 million for concept
development of the Joint Strike Fighter which would become the largest
acquisition in the history of the Department of Defense in terms of
total cost. Mr. Money, what is the status of the Joint Strike Fighter
development program?
Answer. The Joint Strike Fighter Program (JSF) plans to develop and
deploy a family of aircraft that affordably meets the next-generation
strike needs of the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps and allies. JSF
Program activities are centered around three distinct objectives that
provide a sound foundation for start of Engineering and Manufacturing
Development (E&MD) in 2001:
(1) facilitating the Services' development of fully
validated, affordable operationally requirements;
(2) lowering risk by investing in and demonstration key
leveraging technologies that lower the cost of development,
production and ownership; and
(3) demonstrating operational concepts.
A multi-year $2.2 billion JSF Concept Demonstration effort
commenced in November 1996 with competitive contract awards to Boeing
and Lockheed Martin for Concept Demonstration Programs. These competing
contractors will build and fly concept demonstrator aircraft, conduct
concept unique ground demonstrators, and continue refinement of their
ultimate delivered weapon system concepts. Specifically, Boeing and
Lockheed Martin will demonstrate commonability and modularity, STOVL
hover and transition, and low speed handling qualities of their
respective weapon system concepts. Pratt and Whitney is providing
propulsion hardware and engineering support for both Boeing's and
Lockheed Martin's on-going JSF Concept Demonstration efforts. The JSF
Alternate Engine Program, with General Electric, continues technical
efforts related to development of an alternate engine for production in
order to reap the financial and operational benefits of competition.
Early warfighter and technologies interaction continues as an
essential aspect of the JSF requirements definition process, and is key
to achieving JSF affordability goals. To an unprecedented degree, the
JSF Program is using cost-performance trades early as an integral part
of the weapon system development process. The Services' completion of
the Joint Operational Requirements Document is planned in FY 2000 to
support the Milestone II decision in FY 2001 for start of E&MD.
A sizable technology maturation effort is underway to reduce risk
and life cycle cost (LCC) through technology maturation and
demonstration. The primary emphasis is on technologies which have been
identified as high payoff contributors to affordability,
supportability, survivability and lethality. Numerous demonstrations
have been accomplished and others are in process to validate
performance and LCC impact to component, subsystem, and the total
system.
Question. Last year, concern was expressed by the House National
Security Committee over the viability of the ASTOVL variant of the
aircraft for the Marines (to replace AV-8B Harriers). Please discuss
the issue and how it was resolved, and please verify for us that the
Defense Department is committed to developing an ASTOVL variant of the
aircraft.
Answer. Last year the House Authorization bill stated that no JSF
funds could be spent for Advanced Short Take-Off/Vertical Landing
(ASTOVL) development. Neither the House Appropriations bill nor the
Senate Authorization and Appropriations bills contained that language.
In fact the House Appropriations bill contained language stating that
the JSF STOVL variant must be developed ahead of or concurrently with
the other variants. Neither of the final FY97 Defense Authorization of
Appropriations bills contained STOVL prohibitions. We believe that
support for ASTOVL development to be strong both on the committee and
in the House.
The Defense Department is fully committed to development of a STOVL
JSF variant for the Marines. The JSF program is fully funded within the
FYDP and STOVL is an integral part of it.
As you know we are in the Program Definition and Risk Reduction
phase (PH&RR) of JSF now. The Concept Demonstration portion of PH&RR
requires each industry team to build two flying demonstrators, one
conventional and one STOVL. Demonstration of STOVL hover and transition
is a key aspect of this phase and is required by the Single Acquisition
Management Plan. The Concept Demonstration program provide two
different STOVL approaches and aerodynamic configurations, and
maintains a competitive environment between contractors prior to
Engineering and Manufacturing Development (E&MD). Additionally
propulsion development continues during this phase with a byproduct of
STOVL development being significant improvements in single engine
durability and reliability for all variants. In short, we feel that we
have a strong STOVL development program within JSF and we are committed
to maintaining it.
Question. Most of us remember the Air Force's ``Great Engine War'',
where a billion dollars were spent to bring second contractor into the
fighter engine business and which resulted in better engines at
significantly lower cost. DoD recently signed a $97 million ``alternate
engine'' contract for the Joint Strike Fighter. Please explain your
strategy and your plan to use $10 million provided by Congress for risk
reduction to facilitate this effort.
Answer. During the JSF Concept Development Phase, all three
competing weapon system contractors chose the Pratt and Whitney F-119
or derivative as the primary propulsion system for the Concept
Demonstration Phase. Recognizing the financial and operational benefits
of competition, the JSF Program is pursuing the development of a
competitive engine for production.
Phase I of this effort began in FY 1996 with a General Electric
study effort to determine the comparative Life Cycle Cost and
performance of the GE F110 and YF120 derivative engines in each of the
preferred weapon system concepts. Based on the study results, the
government selected the YF120 engine derivative for continued
development. Phase I initiated preliminary design risk reduction
studies, systems design/integration, cycle refinement, and component
design and associated technology maturation for the YF120 derivative
engine. Phase II, which commenced in FY 1997, will continue detailed
design and begin hardware testing of the YF120 engine, culminating in
core testing beginning in FY 1999. The JSF Engineering and
Manufacturing Development program will continue development of an
alternate engine, with production competition currently planned
effective with Production Lot 5.
Congress appropriated an additional $10 million for FY 1997
competitive engine efforts. This funding will be used for a variety of
risk reduction efforts including the following: turbine rig test and
analysis, core integration, core supportability, material
characteristics, weapon system concept integration, and diagnostics.
Question. Please discuss your plans for cooperation with other
nations in this program, and what they bring to the table in terms of
capabilities and financial contributions.
Answer. The JSF Program Office has established a framework to
accommodate international participation during the concept
demonstration phase of the program. Currently, the United Kingdom is on
board as a full collaborative partner, with emphasis on the JSF STOVL
(Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing) variant. The UK is contributing
$200 million to the program for this phase. The Netherlands, Norway and
Denmark will soon join the program as associate partners, with primary
interest in the JSF CTOL (Conventional Take-Off and Landing) variant.
The total planned financial contribution for this effort is $32
million; signature of the multilateral agreement is planned in April
1997. The Canadians have formally requested to join the program and
negotiations are expected to commence in April 1997. Numerous other
countries have received briefs on the program and are interested as
well.
Benefits to be derived from international participation in the
program include a harmonization of the requirement with our allies
which will lead to improved interoperability, strengthened
international ties and lower overall program cost as a result of future
anticipated international buys of the JSF (i.e., lower unit cost).
Firm financial contributions and associated efforts are
incorporated in JSF Program plans and funding and are reflected in FY
1998 President's Budget requests.
Cheyenne Mountain Upgrades
Question. Cheyenne Mountain is the Nation's strategic facility for
warning of an incoming nuclear attack on our country. During the last
two decades, the Air Force has had great difficulty effectively
modernizing the computers within the facility. Mr. Money, what is the
status of the computer upgrades at Cheyenne Mountain?
Answer. To improve resource management and implement the remaining
portions of the CMU program in an incremental acquisition, a four-
phased replan of the remaining CMU program were proposed and approved
by the user community, SAF/AQ, and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense's Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I)
Systems Committee in August 1994.
The first phase was scheduled for completion of basic Air, Space
and Missile Warning efforts by 30 November 1995. This effort was
successfully completed, installed, and operationally accepted by the
User on 13 Sept 1995. A second (Missile Warning Mission) phase, closely
integrated with the Space Command's Integrated TW/AA software releases,
was to be completed by an objective date of June 1996. This effort was
successfully completed, installed, and tested by AFOTEC by 16 August
1996, and fully operationally accepted by CINCSPACE on 11 Oct 1996. A
third (Air Warning Mission) phase, also closely integrated with the
Space Command's Integrated TW/AA software releases, was to be completed
by an objective date of June 1997. This effort was successfully
completed, installed, and completed Operational Assessment on 28 Feb
1997. Air Mission Operationally Acceptance and Approval is on schedule.
A fourth (Space Warning Mission) phase is scheduled for completion by
an objective date of June 1998. This effort is on schedule. An
integrated system IOT&E will follow phase four and is scheduled for
completion by March 1999. This effort is on schedule.
Overall Status: The Cheyenne Mountain Upgrade Program is on
schedule to be completed, installed and fully operational by 31 March
1999.
Question. What actions has the acquisition community taken to
strengthen the management of these programs, and what success have you
had?
Answer. The Integrated TW/AA Community, including the acquisition
community has taken a number of actions to strengthen the overall
Cheyenne Mountain program. Many of these actions were taken as part of
the 1994 replan of the Cheyenne Mountain Upgrade (CMU) program and have
previously been reported to the Congress.
Cooperative approach to CMU Implementation. The key, and most
critical action has been the establishment of a mutually cooperative
approach among the acquisition, user, and test communities in the
completion, installation and test of the CMU program. The actions noted
in our 1995 report to the Congress, and our successful actions since
then are a result of all elements of the various communities working
together.
Integrated Tactical Warning/Attack Assessment System Program
Office. To more effectively manage the support of the Integrated TW/AA
network and the Cheyenne Mountain Complex, AFMC, and SAF/AQ established
an Integrated TW/AA SPO under the Air Force Program Executive Office
for Command, Control, and Communications. The SPO contains the CMU,
Missile Warning and Space Surveillance Systems (MWSSS), and CINC Mobile
Alternate Headquarters (CMAH) programs. This IWSM SPO is now
responsible for the Integrated TW/AA C4, the Integrated TW/AA ground
based missile warning and space surveillance sensors, and the mobile
command centers. The Integrated TW/AA SPD is located in Colorado
Springs and provides direct response and support for the NORAD/Space
Command Users.
Systems Engineering, Integration and Text (SEIT) Team. The
establishment of an integrated team of experts from Electronic Systems
Center (ESC), AFSPC, the CMU contractors, and the testers to identify
and solve, on-site, CMU problems has been critical to the
implementation of the replan. This team, working with the users,
testers, and the contractors, ensures that the scheduled CMU work is
understood, that all critical deficiencies have been corrected, and
that the system is ready for testing. If problems are identified, the
SEIT team priorities the solution effort with an action plan involving
all stakeholders including the user and test communities, and expedites
the solutions. The team also identifies and resolves Integrated TW/AA
issues which must be worked with NORAD, USSPACECOM, AFSPC and other
Integrated TW/AA organizations. The SEIT is also responsible for all
CMU integration activities, including integrated test scheduling.
Integrated Planning and Scheduling. The close integration of all
the schedules for the contractors, System Program Office (SPO), and
user events in Cheyenne Mountain has been key to deconflicting the
development, test and operational work in the SWSC and Cheyenne
Mountain. With CMOC in the lead, test accountability has been
established through metrics and mandatory weekly/monthly updates. The
Integrated Scheduling team now has a clear understanding of what time
and resources are available, and what the user, developer and testers
needs are for the system in any Phase. With this understanding, the
scheduling team, the SEIT, the SWSC, and AFSPC can now rapidly respond
to and reliably schedule corrective actions and testing.
Test Management And Training. The SPO assigned a top-level test
manager (senior O-5) to the CMU effort to provide senior on-site
oversight and decision making of all development testing. As part of
this enhancement of the CMU test capability the SPO also provided
training to hundreds of SPO, contractor and user test managers, test
monitors and test directors. This significantly expanded the number of
people available to conduct development tests and resolves one of the
major test resource contention problems.
Interface Control Document (ICD) Development. Inadequate interface
descriptions for the Integrated TW/AA programs and interfaces has been
a continuing problem. While CMU is only a small part of this Integrated
TW/AA system problem, ESC, Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC), the Space
System Support Group (SSSG), and AFSPC have been working since 1992 to
identify the interfaces and build a joint Integrated TW/AA ICD database
containing the interface descriptions and data. Approximately 167
interfaces in 68 Integrated TW/AA subsystems have been identified to
date with system documentation on-going.
AFMC Integrated TW/AA System of Systems Management. To improve
overall Integrated TW/AA system management and engineering, AFMC has
established a General Officer Broad Area Review (BAR) group to oversee
the management of the entire Integrated TW/AA system. Under this group,
AFMC has also established a Colonel level action group (O-6 AG) to
provide a single AFMC Integrated TW/AA point of contact to address
issues that cut across Integrated TW/AA systems. The group, chaired by
the Integrated TW/AA System Program Director (SPD), is responsible for
development and sustainment, from an interoperability perspective, of
Air Force systems that are part of the Integrated TW/AA network.
Membership is from Integrated TW/AA SPO (CMU, Missile Warning and Space
Surveillance Systems (MWSSS) and CINC Mobile Alternate Headquarters
(CMAH)), Atmospheric Early Warning Systems (AEWS), Space Based Infrared
System (SBIRS), and NUDET Detection Systems (NDS) system program
offices.
SWSC Integration Into AFMC. We have completed the integration of
the SWSC into the Cheyenne Mountain Complex program within the
Integrated TW/AA SPO. This action puts all the software development and
support capability for Cheyenne Mountain under the integrated direction
of the Cheyenne Mountain Complex Integrated Weapon System Management
(IWSM) program manager to more effectively respond to the operational
needs of AFSPC.
Oversight. SAF/AQ has continued a regular cycle of management
reviews in Colorado Springs. These process reviews are jointly held
with AFSPC and provide senior (SAD/AQ, AFSPC/CV, ESC/CC, AFOTEC/CC,
AFPEO/C3 and CMOC/CC) review and assessment of the progress of the CMU
effort. These reviews have been held about every four months. The next
review is scheduled for 23 May 1997.
Question. How much is in the 1998 budget for Cheyenne Mountain
upgrades, by project and in total?
Answer. R&D funding for Program Element 0305906F NCMC-TW/AA Systems
in FY98 totals $7.362 million, broken out by project as follows:
Project 3880 Cheyenne Mountain Upgrade $0.603 million, Project 3881
Integrated TW/AA $5,132 million; and Project 4409 Legacy Interfaces
$1.627 million. Procurement funding in the Cheyenne Mountain Complex P-
1 line totals $0.737 million, none of which is for the Cheyenne
Mountain Upgrade. In the Comm-Electronics Modifications P-1 line,
$5,261 million is allotted to Cheyenne Mountain Complex modifications,
broken out as follows: Mod#S529382 Tech Control (Bytex) $4.000 million;
#S604622 Electronic Warfare Workstation $0.575 million; and S604622
Miscellaneous Low Cost Mods $0.686 million.
Question. What is the current cost estimate of each of the projects
within the Cheyenne Mountain Upgrade in then year dollars, and how does
this compare to the last program funding baseline?
Answer. The Acquisition Cost in the Acquisition Program Baseline
for the Cheyenne Mountain Upgrade program has not changed from $1663.0
million in change 2 to the APB, dated 09/03/92. The APB is not broken
out by project, only by R&D ($1294.0 million) and Procurement ($369.0
million). The current cost estimate (from the Cheyenne Mountain Upgrade
31 Dec 96 SAR) is $1750.6 million, $1407.3 million in R&D and $343.3
million in Procurement. The current estimate is $87.6 million or 5.3%
higher than the 1992 APB estimate. By project, the R&D funds are:
Project 3880 CMU $1297.1 million; Project 3881 Integrated TW/AA $62.7
million; and Project 4409 Legacy Interfaces $47.5 million. The
Procurement funds ($343.3 million) are all CMU. The Acquisition Cost
Estimate in the SAR does not include post-CMU R&D funding in the
Integrated TW/AA project (3881) from FY00 to FY03, totaling $16.1
million, nor any of the Comm-Electronics Mod funding for the Cheyenne
Mountain Complex, totaling $54.7 million from FY98 through FY03.
Question. When will all the upgrades be completed, installed and
fully operational?
Answer. All the modifications to Cheyenne Mountain planned as part
of the Cheyenne Mountain Upgrade Program will be completed, installed
and fully operational by 31 March 1999.
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV)
Question. The Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) is being
developed to replace the current fleet of medium and heavy lift class
launch vehicles with a more affordable family of space launch vehicles.
The fiscal year 1997 budget request for EELV is $63.3 million to
support pre-EMD work prior to one contractor for development and
production in June of 1998. What are the major goals of the EELV
program in this year and in fiscal year 1998?
Answer. The EELV Pre-Engineering, Manufacturing, and Development
(Pre-EMD) contract was awarded in Dec 96. The Air Force goal during
this fiscal year is the continued contractor development of the system
design, demonstrate key technologies, update Life Cycle Cost estimates,
and support of the Environmental Impact Analysis Process (EIAP). In
FY98, the goal is to complete the Pre-EMD contract and downselect to
one EMD contractor in Jun 98. The Pre-EMD contracts will mature the
design and produce the EELV developmental, product, and interface
control specifications. To award the EMD contract and downselect to one
contractor, we will issue a Request For Proposal (RFP), conduct a
Downselect Design Review (DDR), and seek Milestone II approval to enter
EMD.
Question. What are the current cost reduction goals for the EELV
program vice the costs of the Titan, Atlas, and Delta launch programs?
Answer. The EELV program goal is a cost reduction of 25-50% in Life
Cycle Cost over current systems. This equates to approximately $5-10
billion (constant FY95 dollars) in savings from 2002-2020.
Question. Describe the Air Force's acquisition strategy for EELV
after the downselect.
Answer. After the downselect in approximately Jun 98, the Air Force
will have one contractor execute the EMD phase of the program. At this
time, the government anticipates a $1.6 billion, Cost Plus Award Fee
contract, with a period of performance of 6 years. The winning
contractor will conduct a tailored critical design review not later
than Dec 98. The contractor will conduct two system test flights to
collect payload environmental data, validate manufacturing processes,
modify and activate launch facilities and support systems, and obtain
the necessary environmental and operating permits. After the system
test flight of the medium lift variant in FY01, and six medium
operational launches in FY02, DoD will hold Milestone III review in
FY03, where OSD will review progress and decide whether to approve the
system for full rate production. In FY03, the Air Force will fly the
test flight of the EELV heavy lift variant.
Question. What percentage of total EELV development costs are
related to the heavy lift variant?
Answer. EELV is being developed as a system and each of the two
contractor concepts satisfies a variety of payload requirements with
different family configurations built around the common core and common
upper stages. There is no clear distinction, other than perhaps a
fairing unique to a heavy variant and the cost associated with the
heavy test flight. Therefore, there is no separate, distinguishable
amount related to development of the heavy capability.
Question. Have there been any revisions to the national mission
model being used by the Air Force to compute EELV program savings since
last year? If so, what are they?
Answer. Yes. The projected savings for the EELV program was based
was on the Jan 96 National Mission Model (NMM) and in Dec 96, the NMM
was updated. The launch vehicle quantities remained the same, however,
some mission launch dates moved slightly to the right. These launch
schedule changes had a negligible effect on the projected $5-10 billion
cost savings for the EELV program.
Question. Is it still economical for the government to develop the
heavy lift variant of EELV given the extremely limited number of heavy
launches assumed in the national mission model?
Answer. Yes. Due to the high cost of the Titan IV program, the
small marginal cost of developing the EELV heavy lift variant, and the
estimated 25-50% cost reduction for heavy lift, it is still economical
to develop the heavy lift variant of EELV.
Spaced Based Infrared System (SBIRS)
Question. The Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) is being
developed as the follow on to the Defense Support Program (DSP) to
provide initial warning of a ballistic missile attack on the United
States, its deployed forces or its allies. The system will consist of
satellites in geosynchronous, highly elliptical and low earth orbits.
The low earth portion of SBIRS, the space missile tracking system
(SMTS), will support theater missile defense requirements. Describe the
present acquisition strategy for SMTS.
Answer. SBIRS Low (formerly SMTS) supports all four mission areas
of the overall SBIRS program: missile warning, ballistic missile
defense, technical intelligence and battle space characterization.
SBIRS Low contributes the unique capability of post boost mid-course
track to both theater and national missile defense missions. SBIRS Low
will enter a full and open competition for Pre-EMD in 2Qtr FY99. Two
contractors will be selected and will complete a System Design Review
and a System Functional Review with a down select to one EMD contractor
in 2Qtr FY01. First launch is scheduled for 3Qtr FY04.
Question. Why did the Air Force find it necessary to compete the
SMTS flight demonstration system?
Answer. To foster competition and to have technical alternatives
given the high risk involved and relative immaturity of the system
concepts.
Question. Describe the results of the SMTS critical design review
earlier this year.
Answer. The TRW Flight Demonstration System contract conducted a
successful CDR in December of 1996. All of the CDR entry and exit
criteria were satisfactorily dispositioned. A complete FDS system
design concept was presented. Based on simulations, analyses and
measured component level data, the design's projected capability
exceeds all threshold FDS key performance measures. Similarly, all
lower level technical performance measures are being met or exceeded.
The design is mature, but there are still significant challenges in
fabrication, assembly and test. A payload pathfinder and spacecraft
electrical mock-up will be put through rigorous ground tests to
validate system interfaces and functional capability before completing
fabrication and delivery of flight hardware and software. The planned
on-orbit test program is designed to provide the data most critical to
making a deployment decision in the first year of FDS test operations.
The second year of on-orbit test will expand the demonstrated
performance envelope and build confidence in the SBIRS Low concept. The
ground system fabrication has begun and a demonstration of some of the
expected control screen displays was provided.
Question. What would you characterize as the principal technical
and producibility risks for SMTS at this time?
Answer. The primary technical risks include:
--Long wave infrared sensors and cryocooler technologies to
support stressing cold-body targets;
--Integration into an overall system;
--Autonomous on-board processing and operations; and
--Real-time command/control in support of multiple mission
areas.
The main producibility risks include:
--Obtaining the level of radiation hardening required at an
affordable price;
--Production build up for rates required to support FY04
deployment; and
--Achieving long-life and stressing capabilities at an
affordable price.
Question. It is the Committee's understanding that the fiscal year
1998 budget request for SBIRS supports a 2004 launch date for the first
operational SMTS satellite. Is this accurate? Is any additional funding
required to maintain this schedule?
Answer. The FY1998 budget request did include the estimated funding
required to support an FY04 first launch. The projected funding is
based on a cost assessment conducted in early FY97. This is the best
estimate available at this point in time. This estimate will be updated
at a SBIRS FY97 DAB and again refined in FY99 during the SBIRS Low Pre-
EMD.
Acquisition Program Issues
Question. Should extra funds be made available for the Defense
Department this year, the Committee would like to know where some
investments can be made which would have a potentially high payback.
What are the top ten unfunded requirements in each R&D and procurement
account in the Air Force?
Answer.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
R&D Procurement
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Sensor to Shooter...................... 1. Force Protection.
2. Engine Component Improvement Program... 2. Global Air Traffic
Management.
3. Aging Aircraft......................... 3. Navigation Safety Phase
II.
4. Precision Guided Munitions............. 4. Base Information
Protection.
5. Range Standardization & Automation..... 5. Sensor to Shooter.
6. Global Command & Control System........ 6. Bomber Modernization.
7. AWACS Extend Sentry.................... 7. F-15C/D PW-220E Engine.
8. Spacetrack............................. 8. Precision Guided
Munitions.
9. Nuclear Command and Control............ 9. Range Standardization &
Automation.
10. Threat System Modeling Vehicles....... 10. Mission Operations.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Sensor to Shooter, Precision Guided Munitions, and Range
Standardization & Automation are on both lists because they require
both R&D and procurement appropriations.
Question. Identify all production programs for which funds are
included in the fiscal year 1998 budget request where fiscal
constraints have prevented acquisition of sufficient quantities in
either fiscal year 1998 and/or accompanying FYDP to meet validated
military requirements/inventory objectives.
Answer.
AIR SUPERIORITY
Sensor to Shooter: Additional fiscal year 1998 procurement funds is
ranked number five on the CSAF's FY98 Unfunded Priorities List. This
initiative accelerates the ability to share digital data among combat
platforms and ground control stations using Link 16, a standard
datalink message format and waveform. The initiative requires $24.0
million for Link 16 procurement on the B-1, $5.2 million for Link 16
procurement on the F-15C/D, and $7.5 million for Link 16 procurement
for Ground Tactical Control Stations (GTACS).
Bomber Modernization: The B-52 modernization program includes an
Electro-optical Viewing System (EVS) Reliability and Maintainability
(R&M) upgrade. This program consolidates electronic hardware increasing
Mean Time Between Failure Rates. Additional fiscal year 1998
procurement funds ($2.9 million) will accelerate this upgrade to
increase maintainability of aging equipment. It is number 10 on CSAF's
Unfunded Priorities List.
F-15C/D PW-220E Engine: The PW-220E engine modification provides
improved safety, performance, reliability, and operability, reduced
maintenance and logistics support and reduced life cycle cost. Funding
an additional $73.2 million in fiscal year 1998 will accelerate the
upgrade of 1.5 squadrons (27 PAA) and will result in a savings of
approximately $28.3 million across the life cycle of the weapons
system. This initiative is number 13 on CSAF's Unfunded Priorities
List.
Precision Guided Munitions: Current inventories of GBU-28 and CALCM
weapons are below established requirements. These weapons are force
multipliers, allowing better mission effectiveness while reducing
attrition, sorties required, conflict duration, and collateral damage.
An additional $35.6 million in fiscal year 1998 will accelerate
procurement of these weapons and IOC dates of each by one year. This
initiative is number 14 on CSAF's Unfunded Priorities List.
HH-60G FLIR: There are currently tow different FLIR systems for the
HH-60G in the Air Force inventory. The Q-16 Forward Looking Infrared
(FLIR) is designed for full HH-60 integration. The Q-22 is a less
expensive and less capable substitute purchased with drug enforcement
funds by the Reserve Component. Additional funds in fiscal year 1998
will allow procurement of the remaining 43 Q-16 sets to equip the total
force HH-60 fleet planned for acquisition in FY04-05. The current
Hughes assembly line is scheduled to close in FY98. Acquisition in
fiscal year 1998 will avoid line shutdown/startup costs in FY04. These
additional FLIRs will also preclude having to transfer existing FLIRs
between units and aircraft to meet current operational requirements.
Because the HH-60s have already been wired for accepting this FLIR, no
additional installation costs are required. This initiative is number
18 on CSAF's Unfunded Priorities List.
F-15E Attrition Reserve Aircraft: The F-15E is the sole platform
which can employ the GBU-15/AGM-130 data-link weapons and GBU-28
hardened/buried target weapons. It also maintains air-to-air
capabilities. The current Air Force planned inventory is three aircraft
short of the requirement. An accelerated buy of these three aircraft in
fiscal year 1998 ($100.8 million) will result in a savings of $165
million in fiscal year 1999. This initiative is number 26 on CSAF's
Unfunded Priorities List.
F-16 Support Equipment: The Avionics Intermediate Shop (AIS) is
used for test, repair, reprogramming, and modification of F-16 avionics
LRU's. Older systems are no longer transportable and will have parts
obsolescence problems within three years. The Air Force has procured 32
Improved Avionics Intermediate Shops (IAIS) with several multi-year
contracts, with a requirement to procure 17 additional IAIS sets. An
additional $31.5 million in fiscal year 1998 will fund 7 Improved
Avionics Intermediate Shops. This initiative is number 28 on CSAF's
Unfunded Priorities List.
MOBILITY
GATM: New start, only funds previously identified include $8.5
million in FY98 for VC-25 initial capabilities. FY98 request includes
$67.7 million for initial funding of Global Air Traffic Management
(GATM) as mandated by ICAO/FAA.
Nav Safety Phase II: The FY98 request includes $126.3 million in
funding for SECDEF directed aircraft safety modifications. Equipment
procurement for Phase II includes Global Positioning System (GPS),
Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS), Emergency Locator
Transmitter (ELT), Flight Data Recorder/Cockpit Voice Recorder (FDR/
CVR), and Terminal Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) for mobility
aircraft not currently equipped. The phase II Nav/Safety request
initiates installation of fourth generation Enhanced Ground Proximity
Warning Systems on all passenger aircraft and starts the installation
of safety components on other than DV/OSA passenger aircraft. The Air
Force is updating program requirements, executability, costs, and
identifying aircraft retirements to more accurately define the cost.
Air Force will provide Congressional notification of SECAF waiver for
aircraft retiring within 5 years prior to obligation of funds.
KC-135 DPEM: No procurement funding is tied to this issue. DPEM is
funded from O&M accounts (3400). The FY98 request for $54.6 million
funds the short fall of KC-135 Depot Maintenance.
C-130 Support: The FY98 request includes $48.0 million for C-130J
interim contractor support (ICS), support equipment and spares which
were not fully funded by FY96 and FY97 Congressional adds of C/EC/WC-
130Js. This initiative is ranked number 22 on CSAF's FY98 Unfunded
Priority List.
SPACE/NUCLEAR
Range Standardization and Automation (RSA) Program: Fiscal
constraints prevent timely development and acquisition of key
components of the integrated Spacelift Range System. These fiscal
constraints delay attainment of improved operational capabilities and
defer operations and maintenance savings essential to the continuing
viability of the Air Force space program.
SCAMP terminals: Due to fiscal constraints on military satellite
communications (MILSATCOM) terminals program, the FY98 budget request
does not include the $9.5 million required for the installation and
integration of 14 Extremely High Frequency (EHF) Single-Channel Anti-
jam Man-Portable (SCAMP) satellite communication terminals to provide
Milstar connectivity to the tanker bases (6.0 million) and electro-
magetic pulse (EMP) hardened input/output devices (laptops and
printers) for 87 EHF SCAMP terminals for CINCSTRAT ($3.5 million). The
SCAMP terminals will provide Milstar connectivity to the tanker bases
for secure, survivable Emergency Action Message (EAM) dissemination to
ensure survivable force direction and reportback to strategic airborne
assets.
MEECN: Due to fiscal constraints on the Minimum Essential Emergency
Communications Network (MEECN) Defense Improved Emergency Messaging
Automated Transmission System (IEMATS) Replacement Command and Control
Terminals (DIRECT) program, the FY98 PB request does not include $8.5
million in procurements costs. DIRECT has a validated requirements to
be fielded no later than 2Q FY 99 to match the scheduled AUTODIN
closure. The FY98 PB delivers two (2) of the required eight (8) suites
by 2Q FY99 and the remaining six by 2QFY00, one year late. By funding
$8.5 million of procurement funds in FY98, all eight DIRECT systems can
be delivered in FY99.
LOGISTICS
Vehicular Equipment: The Vehicular Equipment procurement account in
the Other Procurement, Air Force (3080) Appropriation has a requirement
to replace over 40,000 vehicles; the fiscal year 1998 budget request
asks for funds to buy only 2,370. An additional $95 million would be
readily executable in fiscal year 1998 and would permit much needed
modernization by funding procurement of an additional 3,000 vehicles.
Among other vehicles, $95 million would buy over 300 flight line
tractors, 150 forklifts, 90 construction vehicles, and 80 law
enforcement vehicles; all critical to day-to-day Air Force operations.
Deployable Radioscopic X-ray Devices: The FY98 budget includes $0.2
million for nine X-ray devices for use by Explosive Ordnance Disposal
(EOD) teams during contigency operations. Another 51 X-ray devices at
$1.1 million are required and are unfunded in FY98. These unites
provide a more reliable, real-time analysis of unexploded ordnance
devices and, therefore, reduced risk to EOD personnel.
M16A2 Modification Kits: Fielding of the improved M16A2
modification kits for M16 rifles can be accomplished earlier and
potentially cheaper if funds are provided in FY98.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY98
Appropriation 3011* ------------------
Millions Kits
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current Program...................................... $6.0 22,414
Unfunded Requirement................................. 2.0 7,242
Total Requirement.................................... 8.0 29,656
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Appropriation 3011 is munitions.
The kits modify existing equipment to fire steel-jacked bullets
with greater accuracy, range and penetration; they provide three-shot
burst firing (vice full-automatic), modern sights, new handguards and
stock.
COMMUNICATIONS
National Airspace System: Additional fiscal year 1998 procurement
funds in the amount of $7.0 million has been ranked a number two
priority on the Air Force's FY98 unfunded priority accelerated list.
This effort to procure an additional 9 digital voice switches will
accelerate replacement of analog voice switches. This acceleration will
improve availability and reliability of air traffic control operations.
Additional procurement funds are required in the FYDP to meet
validated military requirements/inventory.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current FYDP...................................................... 54.6 56.3 58.9 66.6 51.5
Plus Up........................................................... 32.78 44.9 42.3 66.9 39.4
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This plug up would allow the Air Force portion of the NAS
modernization program to complete approximately 54 unfunded sites
located in the CONUS and Europe. This equipment will provide complete
interoperability between the FAA and all CONUS and European sites.
These procurements can be accomplished with existing contracts. In
addition, this equipment will have a positive impact on the cost of
maintaining the existing air traffic control equipment currently in
use.
Question. What initiatives are currently approved in an outyear POM
which could either be done more cheaply and/or be fielded earlier by
initiating them in fiscal year 1998? Indicate program by appropriation
account along with an estimated funding stream for each of the five
subsequent fiscal years (assuming a fiscal year 1998 start) along with
the potential savings that could be achieved?
Answer.
AIR SUPERIORITY
Sensor to Shooter: This initiative accelerates the ability to share
digital data among combat platforms and ground control stations using
Link 16, a standard datalink message format and waveform. Required
procurement funding for FY 98 and beyond is ($ in millions):
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title APPN FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F-15C/D (160)........................... 3010 5.2 17.1 33.6 1.3 0.0 0.0 57.2
B-1 (6)................................. 3010 24.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 24.0
GTACS (20).............................. 3080 7.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.5
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Total............................. ....... 36.7 17.1 33.6 1.3 0.0 0.0 88.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This initiative accelerates a much needed combat capability, and
therefore may not reflect specific cost savings in procurement,
however, the force enhancement provided by Link 16 will create a
synergistic effect which will result in higher combat effectiveness and
shorter combat duration.
Bomber Modernization: The B-52 modernization program includes an
Electro-optical Viewing System (EVS) Reliability and Maintainability
(R&M) upgrade. This program consolidates electronic hardware increasing
Mean Time Between Failure Rates. Required procurement funding for FY98
and beyond is ($ in millions):
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title APPN FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
B-52 EVS R&M............................ 3010 2.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This initiative will result in potential savings of $42.5 million
over a 40 year life cycle of the weapons system.
F-15C/D PW-220E Engine: The PW-220E engine modification provides
improved safety, performance, reliability, and operability; while
reducing maintenance and logistics support. Required procurement
funding for FY 98 and beyond is ($ in millions):
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title APPN FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F-15A/B/C/D............................. 3010 73.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 73.2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This additional funding in fiscal year 1998 will accelerate the
upgrade of 1.5 squadrons (27 PAA) and will result in a savings of
approximately $28.3 Million across the life cycle of the weapons
system.
Precision Guided Munitions: The GBU-28 and CALCM weapons are force
multipliers, allowing better mission effectiveness while reducing
attrition, sorties required, conflict duration, and collateral damage.
Additional funding in fiscal year 1998 will accelerate procurement of
GBU-28 and 10 CALCM Block II penetrator missile kits. Required
procurement funding in FY98 and beyond is ($ in millions):
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title APPN FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CALCM (10).............................. 3020 18.8 25.4 25.0 30.0 0.0 0.0 99.2
GBU-28 (152)............................ 3011 16.8 150.0 150.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 316.8
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additional funding of $18.8 million in fiscal year 1998 will
accelerate CALCM Block II IOC by one year, and an additional $16.8
Million will accelerate procurement of the GBU-28, which is well below
its required inventory.
HH-60G FLIR: Additional funds in fiscal year 1998 will allow
procurement of the remaining 43 Q-16 sets to equip the total force HH-
60 fleet planned for acquisition in FY04-05. Required procurement
funding in FY98 and beyond is ($ in millions):
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title APPN FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HH-60 FLIR (43)......................... 3010 33.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
These additional FLIRs will preclude having to transfer existing
FLIRs between units and aircraft to meet current operational
requirements. Because the HH-60s have already been wired for accepting
this FLIR, no additional installation costs are required. Acquisition
in fiscal year 1998 will avoid line shutdown/startup costs in FY04.
F-15E Attrition Reserve Aircraft: The Air Force is currently three
short of the F-15E requirement. Unfortunately, fiscal constraints
prevented funding of these aircraft in the FY98 budget. Required
procurement funding in FY98 and beyond is ($ in millions):
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title APPN FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F-15E................................. 3010 100.8 -165.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.8
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This initiative will result in approximately $65 million cost
savings in economy of scale, and also avoids approximately $25 million
in shutdown/overhead costs due to concurrent production with Saudi F-
15s.
F-16 Support Equipment: The Avionics Intermediate Shop (AIS) is
used for test, repair, reprogramming, and modification of F-16 avionics
LRU's. Older systems are no longer transportable and will have parts
obsolescence problems within three years. The Air Force has procured 35
Improved Avionics Intermediate Shops (IAIS) with several multi-year
contracts, with a requirement to procure 14 additional IAIS sets.
Required procurement funding for these sets is ($ in millions):
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title APPN FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F-16.................................... 3010 31.5 36.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 76.5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This initiative will result in significant decreases in shipping/
depot costs and will also significantly reduce the deployment
requirements of F-16 units. Deployment savings have been confirmed at
approximately $2 million per year for every 12 aircraft that deploy.
Manpower requirement have decreased from 18 to 8 for the Improved AIS
kits, and airlift requirements have decreased from over 30 pallets down
to just 2.
INFORMATION SUPERIORITY
AWACS Extend Sentry: The effort (PE 27417F), currently #22 on the
CSAF FY98 Plus-Up Priorities List, is a candidate for earlier and
cheaper ``fielding''. Extend Sentry is an aggressive sustainment effort
which takes the AWACS program into the 21st century, decreases air
aborts, and addresses Reliability, Maintainability, and Availability
(RM&A) issues. Extend Sentry is not a program per se, but a
comprehensive list of individual projects with a common goal of
increasing aircraft availability through reduced maintenance/depot
downtime and addressing long-standing operational deficiencies.
The additional funding requested (by appropriation) is as follows:
FY98
3600.............................................................. 28.1
3010.............................................................. 27.0
3400.............................................................. 4.1
______
Total......................................................... 59.2
These funds will be used to fund several currently unfunded Extend
Sentry projects. Savings achieved will be in reduced maintenance man-
hours, reduced on-equipment maintenance hours, reduced number of
aborts, and reduced Programmed Depot Maintenance (PDM) flow days, thus
increasing overall RM&A of the AWACS fleet.
It is important to note that, as a collection of individual
projects, Extend Sentry can be implemented on an incremental basis
consistent with available funding, thus any increase in funding will
allow the incremental achievement of program objectives at an earlier
date.
MOBILITY
GATM: NA--GATM is not currently funded.
Nav Safety Phase II: NA--Nav Safety Phase II is not currently
funded.
KC-135 DPEM: NA--DPEM is not an acquisition program.
C-130 Support: NA--This unfunded priority is not an acceleration,
but fixes unfunded ICS, support equipment, and spares for aircraft
already in the USAF program. The concepts of fielding the weapon system
cheaper or earlier do not apply.
SPACE/NUCLEAR COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2)
Range Standardization and Automation (RSA) program: The upgraded
communications, range safety, remote control, status display, and
mobile telemetry systems could be fielded earlier and more cheaply by
adding $36.8 million of RDT&E and procurement funding in FY 1998 to
accelerate the program to the original schedule. The added RDT&E and
procurement funding would increase the estimated FY 1998 RDT&E and
procurement funding total to $157.7 million. The estimated RDT&E and
procurement funding stream for FY 1999 through FY 2003 averages $140.2
million per year. This estimate includes potential RDT&E and
procurement savings averaging $14.0 million per year in FY 2000 through
FY 2002. Beginning in FY 2003, the estimate includes operations and
maintenance savings of $20.0 million per year.
Spacetrack: Providing an additional $39.1 million for program
activities saves $7.5 million over the FYDP. Given the additional $39.1
million, the outyear funding required, by appropriation, is as follows.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RDAF Adjustment..................................... +22.6 ........ ........ ........ ........ ........
Total RDAF Required................................. 51.2 14.1 12.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
OPAF Adjustment..................................... +1.3 ........ ........ ........ ........ ........
Total OPAF Required................................. 8.7 1.5 1.3 4.0 4.0 4.0
OMAF Adjustment..................................... +15.2 ........ ........ ........ ........ ........
Total OMAF Required................................. 59.0 48.0 50.1 60.6 57.3 62.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Global Positioning System (GPS) Accuracy Improvement: Initiative is
currently projected to provide a 32% increase in accuracy for our
warfighters in April 2000. The requested FY98 funding increase ($6
million) would allow us to accelerate delivery of this dramatic
improvement to provide a majority of the capability (18-28% accuracy
improvement) by November 1998.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RDAF Adjustment..................................... +6.0 ........ ........ ........ ........ ........
Total RDAF Required................................. 12.3 2.6 ........ ........ ........ ........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MEECN: The FY98 PB starts procurement of the Minimum Essential
Emergency Communications Network (MEECN) Extremely High Frequency (EHF)
capability for the ICBM Launch Control Centers in FY99. By adding $1.5
million for Request for Proposal (RFP) package development, the RFP
package could be developed and released in FY98 allowing contract award
to occur at the beginning of FY99 avoiding approximately six months of
RDT&E schedule delay.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RDAF Adjustment..................................... +1.5 ........ ........ ........ ........ ........
Total RDAF Required................................. 1.5 12.5 23.6 12.0 0.0 0.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCAMP: The Extremely High Frequency (EHF) Single-Channel Anti-jam
Man-Portable (SCAMP) satellite communication terminals outyear funding
is currently being addressed in the FY99 APOM. Decisions on the funding
are not yet complete. The SCAMP terminals will provide secure,
survivable Milstar connectivity to strategic forces.
$9.5 million in FY98 would procure for CINCSTRAT (a) installation
and integration of 14 SCAMP terminals and (b) electro-magnetic pulse
(EMP) hardened input/output devices for 87 SCAMP terminals. The input/
output devices will be utilized at tanker bases and with bomber
dispersal terms to insure survivable force direction and reportback.
Cost savings and earlier fielding could be achieved if $9.5 million in
Other Procurement was provided in FY 98. $0.3 million would be saved
due to inflationary costs and discontinuing the current communications
system (the Ground Wave Emergency Network (GWEN)) would result in $20
million of operations and maintenance cost avoidance.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY98
Start FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
OPAF Adjustment..................................... +9.5 ........ ........ ........ ........ ........
Total OPAR required................................. 9.5 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nuclear-detonation Detection System (NDS): Outyear funding is
currently being addressed in the budget process. Decisions on the
funding are not yet complete.
FY98 program start funding profile:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY98 Start FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RDAF Required............................. 1.4 2.8 3.4 3.6 4.0 4.3 19.5
OPAF Required............................. 1.8 1.3 2.2 2.5 3.8 10.6 22.2
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Total............................... 3.2 4.1 5.6 6.1 7.8 14.9 41.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Funding profile for FY99 program start:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY99 Start FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RDAF Required............................. ........ 3.8 5.1 5.8 7.5 13.2 35.4
OPAF Required............................. ........ 1.5 2.0 2.2 2.9 5.0 13.6
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Total............................... ........ 5.3 7.1 8.0 10.4 18.2 49.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Funding profile for FY00 program start:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY00 Start FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RDAF Required............................. ........ ........ 8.4 9.8 12.2 14.8 45.2
OPAF Required............................. ........ ........ 3.3 3.8 4.0 5.9 17.0
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Total............................... ........ ........ 11.7 13.6 16.2 20.7 62.2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The potential savings to the program (assuming FY98 Start) are $7.3
million over an FY99 program start and $20.5 million over a FY00
program start.
LOGISTICS
The POMM approved a 12-year modernization program (fiscal year 1999
through fiscal year 2010) for the Vehicular Equipment procurement
account (Budget Program 82) in the Other Procurement, Air Force (3080)
Appropriation. An additonal $95 million in fiscal year 1998 would start
the modernization program one year earlier and result in outyear
(fiscal year 2010) savings of $127.1 million. Current POM funding
stream: FY99--$203.6 million; FY00--$261.4 million; FY01--$226.2
million; FY02--$234.8 million; FY03--$269.8 million.
Fielding of the improved M1642 modification kits for M16 rifles can
be done earlier and potentially cheaper if funds are provided in FY98.
The total funded FYDP requirement of almost 51,400 kits can be procured
in FY98. The kits modify existing equipment to fire steel-jacketed
bullets with greater accuracy, range and penetration; they provide
three-shot burst firing (vice full-automatic) modern sights, new
handguards and stock.
Appropriation 3011*
Total Current Program:
FY98.......................................................... 6.0
FY99.......................................................... 2.8
FY00.......................................................... 2.0
FY01.......................................................... 4.0
FY02.......................................................... 0
FY03.......................................................... 0
______
Total....................................................... 14.8
*Appropriation 3011 is munitions.
Exact savings are difficult to quantify, but at the minimum, we can
save approximately $.4 million in inflation costs.
Question. Provide a list of R&D of production programs or projects
for which funding is included in the fiscal year 1998 budget that are
stretched out beyond technically attainable schedule primarily due to
lack of funding in either fiscal year 1998 and/or the outyears.
Answer. The following programs would fall under this category:
Spacetrack; Eastern Ranges; the Minimum Essential Emergency
Communications Network (MEECN) projects for Modified Miniature Receive
Terminals (MMRT) and Defense Improved Emergency Messaging Automated
Transmission System (IEMATS) Replacement Command and Control Terminals
(DIRECT); Military Satellite Communications (MILSATCOM) terminals; the
Global Command Support System-Air Force (GCSS-AF); the B1B Conventional
Mission Upgrade Program (CMUP) Block D Simulator; and the B-1B CMUP
Defensive System Upgrade Program (DSUP) Low Rate Initial Production
(LRIP).
Question. Indicate all programs for which procurement funding is
included in your fiscal year 1998 budget that would be good candidates
for multiyear procurement funding, assuming additional funding were
available in fiscal year 1998 and the outyears. Provide for these
programs a comparison of the current acquisition funding stream
compared to a potential multiyear profile (assuming a fiscal year 1998
start), along with the additional up-front investment that would be
required and the potential savings that would be likely.
Answer. There are no additional programs that would be good
candidates for multi-year procurement except those that are currently
funded with multi-year procurement.
Question: Identify any procurement programs in the fiscal year 1998
budget where provision of additional procurement funds in fiscal year
1998 would have a very favorable impact on production unit prices?
Answer.
air superiority
F-15E Attrition Reserve Aircraft: To meet the 20 Fighter Wing
Equivalents (FWE) force requirement, the Air Force needs to procure 3
F-15E attrition reserve aircraft in addition to the 3 which are
currently in the fiscal year 1998 budget. These aircraft must be
procured no later than FY98 to take advantage of current foreign
military sales (FMS) to Saudi Arabia. Buying these additional
quantities in concert with FMS sales saves between $32 million and $38
million per aircraft.
SPACE
Range Standardization and Automation (RSA): This is an
infrastructure program developing instrumentation, communications, and
control & display systems for a wide rang of functions at two
geographically separate locations. A major program objective is
equipment standardization to save acquisition and support costs.
Consequently, large quantities of communications and computer equipment
will be procured. Due to fiscal constraints, large quantity purchases
planned for fiscal year 1998 are being broken up into smaller buys,
increasing overall program cost. $36.8 million additional funds in
fiscal year 1998 will alleviate this situation and allow the program to
resume the plan for the large quantity buys. Accordingly, the unit
costs will be reduced by the economies of scale possible with increased
procurement funds.
LOGISTICS
Vehicular Equipment: Most of the budget lines in the Vehicular
Equipment procurement account (Budget Program 82 in the Other
Procurement, Air Force (3080) Appropriation) would realize unit price
savings by buying substantially higher quantities. Many of the vehicles
are procured through GSA, whose contracts in most cases call for lower
unit prices for increased quantities or contain clauses which allow the
Air Force to negotiate directly with contractors for lower prices for
higher quantities. In addition, inflation costs would be saved by
buying the vehicles in fiscal year 1998 rather than in a later fiscal
year.
PERSONNEL
Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS): The planned JPATS
acquisition profile meets military requirements; however, savings and
decreased beddown times would be realized for each training based with
a more efficient profile. Aircraft Procurement funds are in program
element 84740F, New AEFC Aircraft. The current FY98 President's Budget
FYDP profile is:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(TY$M) FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aircraft Procurement, AF............................ 65.4 92.5 92.4 123.0 181.7 256.3
Quantity............................................ 18 12 18 34 43 43
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The increases required for a more efficient production rate are:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(TY$M) FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aircraft Procurement, AF............................ +12.2 +27.0 +24.6 -0.5 +51.0 +69.5
Quantity............................................ +4 +10 +10 +/-0 +17 +17
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The accelerated profile will decrease JPATS unit cost, result in a
program savings of $59.4 million decreased beddown time from 3 to 2
years per base.
Question. Identify each production program in the fiscal year 1998
budget whose main rationale is to sustain a minimal industrial base.
Answer. The Air Force has not budgeted any FY 1998 funds for
programs whose main rationale would be to sustain a minimal industrial
base.
Question. Please indicate in total and for the top 20 largest
weapon systems both the peacetime operating requirement (separately)
for spare parts funded either as initial spares in procurement accounts
or as consumable spares in DBOF, and the percentage of requirement met
through the fiscal year 1998 budgeted level of funding. Project how
this would change by the end of the FYDP.
Answer. Beginning in FY 1998, replenishment spares are funded in
O&M. The table below identifies what percent of known initial spares
requirements by weapon system for the top twenty weapon systems is
funded in the FY 1998 procurement accounts and what percent will be
funded by the end of the FYDP.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percent of
Percent of requirement
Ranking and weapon system FY98 requirement funded by
funded in the end of
FY98 the FYDP
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 C-17 Aircraft.................. 89.652 7 96
2 B-2 Squadrons.................. 67.924 18 91
3 JOINT STARS.................... 35.139 7 90
4 F-15E Squadrons................ 22.870 28 100
5 Manned Reconnaissance System... 17.781 5 72
6 KC-135S........................ 10.470 30 100
7 B-1B Squadrons................. 9.938 5 39
8 F-16 Squadrons................. 8.692 3 53
9 F-15 A/B/C/D Squadrons......... 7.231 6 92
10 Airborne Warning & Control 7.117 6 74
System..........................
11 C-130 Airlift Squadrons....... 3.690 2 58
12 F-117A Squadrons.............. 2.404 15 100
13 A-10 Squadrons................ 1.560 19 100
14 C-141 Airlift Squadrons....... 1.193 16 100
14 B-52 Squadrons................ .837 6 65
16 Advance Communication System.. .823 29 100
17 Tactical Cryptologic Units .782 22 100
(ANG)...........................
18 Depot Maintenance (NON-IF).... .559 10 100
19 MILSTAR Satellite Comm System .513 19 100
(SPACE).........................
20 Logistics Operations (NON- .428 5 100
DBOF)...........................
Other Requirements.............. .287 ........... ...........
Total Initial Spares: 289.89.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. Please indicate any potential FMS sales that are being
discussed that could influence production unit prices once consummated,
not including those whose impact is already factored into the
production unit prices portrayed to Congress in fiscal year 1998
budget.
Answer. There are two potential system sales that are currently
being discussed that could impact the FY98 budget.
Discussions are ongoing with the United Arab Emirates and Norway
for F-16 Fighter Aircraft purchases. If consummated soon these sales
would have an impact on the FY98 budget. How much of an impact can not
be determined at this time, as the impact would be dependent on the
size of the buy.
We are aware of direct commercial sales negotiations between
McDonell Douglas and the United Kingdom for the lease or purchase of C-
17 Cargo Aircraft. This sale could result in savings to the US in the
FY98 budget due to the company's increased business base. Exact dollar
figures have yet to be finalized.
Question. Please indicate what policy your service uses for major
R&D and production programs, such as a ``budget to contract target
cost'' or ``budget to ceiling contract costs'' or ``budget to most
likely cost'' and identify which of your major programs in the fiscal
year 1998 budget deviate from this policy and the attendant rationale.
Answer. It is the practice of the Air Force to ``budget to most
likely cost''. Responsibility for determining funding levels is left to
the individual program manager, subject to review in the programming
and budgeting cycles. While indeed there may be some programs with
budgets equating to target or ceiling cost, the Air Force has
determined that this is indeed the most likely cost for the budget.
Question. Please indicate what policy your service uses to provide
a budget within R&D and production programs for unknown allowances and/
or economic change orders, and identify any programs in the fiscal year
1998 budget deviate from this policy and the attendant rationale.
Answer. Determination of the amount of reserve budgeted for in
modernization programs is based on the judgment of the individual
program managers. These estimates are based upon the technical
complexity and schedule risk associated with each program. These
estimates are then reviewed during the programming and budgeting
process for reasonableness.
Question. Please identify any R&D or production program which has a
contract for which all or a portion is budgeted in fiscal year 1998 for
a contract award fee larger than $10 million. Provide the amount
budgeted for the award fee, the basis on which the amount was
calculated (e.g. 100% fee base don the contract), and the historical
performance of the contractor in terms of percentage of award fee
awarded during prior award fee periods under the same contract.
Answer. F-22: $88,293,426 award fee for LMAS, 0006 Contract;
$10,288,291 award fee for Pratt & Whitney, 0007 Contract.
For both contracts the basis of the award fee amount is the
estimated contract cost for that particular fiscal year. If the
contractor meets all of the requirements during a given award fee
period, the contractor will receive 100% of that period's award fee
pool. Beginning with period 9 (1 Apr-30 Sep 95), any unearned portion
of the award fee pool is available for rollover to incentivize high
priority topics. Specific criteria are established for these topics. If
the contractor meets the criteria, he will be awarded 100% of the
rollover. Below are the historical performance of the contractors in
terms of percentage of award fee earned during the prior award fee
periods.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percent of Percent of
LMAS P&W Fiscal year
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Period 1......................... 93 97 1991
Period 2......................... 91 96 1992
Period 3......................... 84 97 1992
Period 4......................... 91 89 1993
Period 5......................... 87 82 1993
Period 6......................... 88 81 1994
Period 7......................... 82 85 1994
Period 8......................... 84 80 1995
Period 9......................... 83 85 1995
Period 10........................ 83 79 1996
Period 11........................ 79 81 1996
------------------------------------------------------------------------
JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER (JSF)
The budget for the Joint Strike Fighter Program includes $24.2
million in FY 1998 for award fee under the Concept Demonstration
Program contract with Pratt and Whitney. The available award fee amount
for each period of the contract was determined as a percentage of the
total available award fee, based on the amount and importance of work
to be performed in each period. The key events for the FY 1998 award
fee determinations are first engine to test and first lift system and
nozzle to test. This is a new contract and no award fee payments have
been made to date.
AIRBORNE LASER
ABL's award fee pool in FY98 is $10,960,136.
Award fee basis is 12% of the cost line items on contract
for that period.
No historical award fee performance on the contract.
First PDRR award fee period ends 31 March 97.
B-1B
No single B-1B Conventional Mission Upgrade Program (CMUP) contract
has more than $10 million for award fee in FY98. The total budgeted
award fee pool in FY98 for all B-1B CMUP contracts (100% of fee based
on actual contract or best estimate) is approximately $16.5 million (3
different contracts for 4 programs). The percentage range previously
awarded under these various CMUP contracts was 94% to 100%.
TITAN
Titan Space Launch Vehicles has two such contracts. The launch
operations contract, F0471-95-C-0012, has an award fee of $12.5 million
budgeted for FY98. The award fee is based on contract cost and up to
100% of the $12.5 million may be awarded. For the past few years, the
contractor has received between 95 and 100% of the award fee. The
production contract, F0471-95-C-0001, has an award fee of $17.3 million
budgeted for FY98. This is also based on contract cost and the award is
also up to 100% of the $17.3 million. For the past few years, the
contractor has earned between 95 and 100% of the award fee.
MILSTAR
Milstar production contract (F04701-92-C-0049) for the BLOCK II
satellites has an FY98 award fee of $62.9 million. The amount of the
fee is based on contract cost. Up to 100% of the $62.9 million may be
awarded. To date, Lockheed Martin Missiles and Space has been awarded
94% of the award fee. There is a contract clause that enables the
program office to roll forward unearned award fee from the previous
contract period as additional incentives to the contractor.
SPACE BASED INFRARED SYSTEM (SBIRS)
Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) HIGH EMD Contract (F04701-95-C-
0017) has an FY98 award fee of $37 million. The amount is 100% fee
based on contract cost. Due to recent award of contract (8 Nov 96), the
first award fee period has not completed and no fee yet awarded. There
is a contract clause that enables the program office to roll forward
certain unused portions of the award fee pool to the next award fee
period.
Question. Please identify all R&D and production programs/projects
for which Congress appropriated funds in fiscal year 1997 which since
the Appropriations Act was enacted have been either terminated or
significantly down-scoped. For each, indicate the status of the fiscal
year 1997 and any earlier active fiscal year funds where funds have
been diverted to another purpose.
Answer. Congress appropriated $81.3 million in FY97 funds for
advance procurement of F-22 Pre-Production Vehicles (PPVs). The Air
Force has since terminated this project.
The Air Force intends to use FY97 F-22 Aircraft Procurement Advance
Procurement funding, which was appropriated for Pre-Production
Verification (PPV) aircraft, for Out-of-Production Parts (OPP). The
Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) approved an F-22 program restructure,
thereby requiring a change in use of the FY97 funds. The Air Force is
forwarding notification letters to the Congressional Defense Committees
that will explain our purposed use of these funds.
As documented in the FY96 President's Budget (PB), the original use
for the FY97 Aircraft Procurement Advance Procurement funding was to
support long lead funding requirements for PPV aircraft, with a lot buy
to occur in FY98. The FY97 President's Budget submission moved all PPV
funding for Aircraft Procurement to the RDT&E appropriation. The Air
Force's interpretation of the FY97 Appropriation Conference position
was that the Aircraft Procurement line ($81.3 million) was for PPV long
lead buy usage. The DAB approved the F-22 program restructure which
eliminated the PPV aircraft requirement and used for long lead funds
for OPP.
The use of FY97 Aircraft Procurement Advance Procurement funds for
OPP will support the cost of partial redesign and the purchase of
parts. Both of these efforts support production Losts 1-5. Funds to
begin the redesign effort are required by May 97 to support forecasted
contract award in June 97. In order to complete the redesign effort,
additional funding has been budgeted on an incremental basis in Advance
Procurement funding starting in FY98 through FY02. Loss of FY97 OPP
funding forces a one year slip in production resulting in cost
increases due to inflation, overhead, and breaks in production.
Question. Identify all ACTD funding in the RDT&E, Air Force
appropriation account in each fiscal year 1997 through the FYDP.
Indicate total cost of each listed. ACTD and whether other service
appropriations are contributing funds for it.
Answer. The Air Force is using RDT&E funds in two active ACTDs,
Combat Identification and Navigation Warfare. Funding is as follows, in
thousands of dollars:
COMBAT IDENTIFICATION
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air Force........................................ 3,600 2,992 0 0 0 0 6,592
Army............................................. 6,824 6,929 0 0 0 0 13,753
OSD.............................................. 17,459 15,268 4,000 4,000 0 0 40,727
--------------------------------------------------------------
Total...................................... 27,883 25,189 4,000 4,000 0 0 61,072
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAVIGATION WARFARE
(Note: Totals include FY95 funds, not shown.)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air Force........................................ 10,450 18,902 7,263 939 1,300 0 42,029
OSD.............................................. 6,669 4,500 3,900 300 0 0 15,369
--------------------------------------------------------------
Total...................................... 17,119 23,402 11,163 1,239 1,300 0 57,398
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Young.]
Wednesday, April 16, 1997.
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM
WITNESS
LIEUTENANT GENERAL LESTER L. LYLES, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, DIRECTOR,
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE ORGANIZATION
Introduction
Mr. Young. The Committee will come to order.
General, let me explain to you that some of our
subcommittee members are marking up their portions of the
supplemental, so our attendance might not be too good this
afternoon. Also I wanted to tell you that I had a really great,
exciting opening statement to make, but I am going to wait and
talk to you about that later, because I want to recognize
Chairman Livingston for any statement that he would like to
make and questions that he would like to ask before he moves on
to some of the markups.
If that is okay with you, General, we will turn it over to
Chairman Livingston.
[The statement of Mr. Young follows:]
Today, the Committee will conduct a hearing on the Department of
Defense's programs in the area of Ballistic Missile Defense. Our
witness is Lieutenant General Lester L. Lyles, the Director of the
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO). We welcome you on your
first visit to the Committee General Lyles, and look forward to your
testimony.
This Committee has paid close attention to our nation's Ballistic
Missile Defense programs. In part, this is because we remember the
single SCUD attack which took the lives of 28 Americans during Desert
Storm. Yet our concern is not focused on the past, it is focused on the
future protection of our troops and our citizens.
The proliferation of ballistic missiles has increased dramatically.
The number of nuclear states has more than doubled over the last 20
years. In addition to these 13 nuclear states, there are about 30 non-
NATO countries who collectively possess thousands of theater ballistic
missiles. About 16 developing nations have chemical weapons programs
and 11 others have biological weapons research programs.
In light of this threat, and out of a desire to protect our troops
and our citizens, this Committee added $800 million to the 1997 budget
request for missile defense. We hoped that the same emphasis on missile
defense would be reflected in this year's budget. Unfortunately, the
President's Budget for 1998 is much less than we expected. The budget
request for Ballistic Missile Defense is $2.9 billion, almost $700
million below the 1997 appropriation of $3.6 billion.
Although the President's budget plan is discouraging, there is some
good news to report. There have been several successful flight tests
over the last several months--in large part due to the additional
resources provided by Congress to BMDO over the past two years.
In January, the Navy Lower Tier system intercepted a Lance target
missile and is now proceeding to the Engineering and Manufacturing
Development phase of the acquisition process.
In March, a SCUD missile was shot down by an upgraded guidance
enhanced Patriot missile.
And, on March 11, the Arrow missile had a partial failure but still
destroyed its target, with a body-to-body kill.
In addition, programs that were lacking direction a year or so ago
now have been given new focus. The Navy Theater Wide program has been
designated as a ``core'' theater missile defense program by the
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology. And, the
National Missile Defense (NMD) program has been designated as a
``Deployment Readiness'' program.
Unfortunately, there have also been some failures. Most notably, on
March 6, the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile failed
to intercept its target. This was a difficult setback--particularly
since this was THAAD's fourth consecutive failure.
While there are certainly technical reasons for this failure, the
Administration's erratic policy and budget approach to ballistic
missile defense has certainly not helped in the management or execution
of this program.
General Lyles, this Committee would like to work with you to bring
some stability into ballistic missile defense programs. A rational
strategy and stable funding are critical factors for the proper
management and execution of these programs. I know you will want to
address these issues in your testimony and so I will not go into
further detail at this time.
Mr. Young. Mr. Livingston.
Mr. Livingston. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Rather than preempt your statement, let me simply ask
unanimous consent, which I hope to get, which would put my
exchange with General Lyles after your opening statement.
Mr. Young. We can do that.
Helsinki Agreement
Mr. Livingston. All right. General, we are glad to have you
here. I appreciated your comments off the record just as we
were standing there chatting, but I thought it was important to
put a couple of comments of my own on the record.
As you know, the administration has just worked out an
agreement with the Russians, and I think three former states of
the old Soviet Union, to put some degree of limits on our
ability to intercept missiles from abroad. At the same time,
the Russians, signatories to that agreement, we read, are
selling, actively selling, some of their missile technology to
the Iranians, who are not signatories to that agreement.
It strikes me as a little strange why we are, on the one
hand, negotiating to slow down our defenses and limit our
ability to intercept incoming missiles, when the cosignatories
or coparticipants to that agreement are selling highly
technical capabilities to people who will not, even if they
were signatories, abide by it, and certainly will not so long
as they are not signatories.
So I am very, very concerned about the wisdom of all of
this, especially in light of the most recent revelations in the
newspapers. But I accept your earlier assurances that currently
the negotiations and agreements with the Russians would not
limit our ability to deploy Theater High Altitude Area
Defense--THAAD or Navy Upper Tier or some of the other systems
that are on the books as being developed--unfortunately, not
deployed, but developed.
I am gratified by that, and I certainly would hope that,
likewise, those agreements wouldn't preclude us in the future
from adopting space-based systems.
But I guess my one big question that I would like you to
address on the record is specifically why we are slowing down
our defenses, agreeing with the Russians to slow down our
defenses, when in fact adversaries who are not parties to this
agreement may develop faster systems, faster offensive weapons,
which will take faster defenses, and because of this, we would
have to go to the Russians and those other countries to get
permission to upgrade our defenses before we could deal with
them. Why is that?
General Lyles. Congressman Livingston, I can't comment
exactly on what stimulated some of those discussions and the
rationale for all the words that are there. I can assure you,
however, that the agreement that was struck at Helsinki in no
way dumbs down, slows down or affects our current theater
missile defense systems. Nor does it affect any system that we
currently have planned in the theater missile defense arena.
In fact, the demarcation limits specifically impact the
types of targets that we can test against, targets that
potentially could replicate an strategic intercontinental
ballistic missile, or ICBM--I am sure that is the primary
concern of the Russians--to 5 kilometers per second, 3,500
nautical mile range. Those are essentially the limits in terms
of the types of targets that we could test against with our
current Theater Missile Defense or TMD systems.
The part that impacts speed for our particular intercepts
as referred to in the language of the Helsinki agreement is
that we currently have no plans for systems that have a speed
greater than the numbers that are quoted in the Helsinki
agreement. Our interpretation, the interpretation of our policy
people is, since the words say ``planned for,'' if we saw a
need to actually develop something that has a higher velocity,
yes, under the agreement we would have to notify the Russians.
But I don't think that would in any way constrain us if we
thought the threat required that we have a system with certain
capabilities.
The words were carefully construed to ensure that for those
systems that maybe require higher velocities, that they would
be put in a planned-for stage, and not forbidden stage. We are
not forbidden from having systems with certain speeds.
Mr. Livingston. Just for the sake of argument, suppose the
Iranians or Chinese or North Koreans or Libyans or somebody
else were to develop two types of missiles, say, missile A and
missile B, and missile A could be easily intercepted by a
countermeasure traveling 5,000 kilometers per second or slower,
but missile B took a countermeasure traveling at least 6,000
kilometers per second.
Why would we logically, under any circumstances, wish to
limit the speed of our ability to defend against such a weapon?
General Lyles. Congressman, I think, again, the rationale
was to ensure that we had some confidence-building measures
relative to dealing with the Russians, to assure them that our
theater systems, theater missile defense systems--I remind you,
we are not talking about national missile defense systems, but
theater--would not have the capability to be used to counter
their strategic ICBMs.
If we saw, however, a threat out there that had the speed,
say, of a strategic ICBM, it was much, much higher and we
required something with higher speeds for our interceptor, I am
sure, again, the way the words are worded, that we can go ahead
and develop that. We would have to notify the Russians, though,
according to the Helsinki agreement. But the words do not
require us to actually stop it. It doesn't say you cannot do
that.
Mr. Livingston. I can only judge from the press reports,
but the press reports indicate to me that we have to gain their
consent because we have mutually agreed with them not to
develop these systems; and it would seem, if we want to develop
faster systems, that we have to gain their consent.
Now, we have agreed the Chinese are selling to the
Iranians, the Russians are selling to the Iranians, the
Iranians are not signatories to this thing. Presumably the
Russians are not making a distinction between whether they are
a theater or national defense system or offensive weapons. They
are just selling missile technology. I don't see why we should
make that distinction.
Frankly, this entire set of issues is not only mind-
boggling to me, but I think to 98 percent of the American
people. We have made a distinction without a difference. We
have proclaimed to be for arms control without any gain to the
American people, and if anything, I think we have jeopardized
the American people.
Suppose our intelligence is not up to snuff, and one day we
find out there is not only a threat, but that a potential
attack is imminent within a week. Are we going to say to our
striped trousers folks to go out and negotiate an agreement
with the Russians so we can defend ourselves against getting
New York blown up?
General Lyles. I am obviously not the right one to answer
that question, but my personal view is, given a threat of that
particular nature, I am sure we will do what is right to
protect our troops and our resources analysis, et cetera, and
not go back and beg for forgiveness, if you will, in a scenario
like that.
Mr. Livingston. General, you are answering me, as well you
should. You are an outstanding, not only public servant, but a
representative of the armed forces; and I am sure the Air Force
is proud of you, and you can't criticize current policy. But
the current policy, as negotiated between this administration
and the Russians, doesn't make sense when you compare it to the
potential threat from the Iranians, the Libyans, the Chinese,
the North Koreans, or any other asinine group out of there that
doesn't give a whit about what we have signed our names to.
Moreover, we are sitting here discussing whether or not we
should develop systems in the distant future, and there is not
one single word in any of this discussion about deployment of
antimissile systems. I think that we ought to stop dithering
about developing and start deploying, and I mean start
deploying as quickly as we possibly can. Because the people
that wish to eliminate hundreds or thousands or perhaps
millions of our people in one fell swoop aren't going to sit
around and worry about our agreement with the Russians, and
they are not going to sit around and worry about whether or not
we are developing an antimissile system.
If they know we don't have an antimissile system, that is
the time they are going to want to strike.
General Lyles. Yes, sir.
Mr. Livingston. Thank you very much. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I know you
have an extremely busy schedule today, with all of the
subcommittee markups, so we appreciate your being here.
Mr. Murtha, do you have any opening comments?
Mr. Murtha. No.
Mr. Young. General Lyles, you have the floor, sir. Your
entire statement will be placed in the record and you can
summarize any way you like.
Summary Statement of General Lyles
General Lyles. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that.
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, it really is a
pleasure to be here to testify before you about a very
important set of programs, our missile defense programs for the
United States. I do have a formal statement that I will submit
for the record, but if you don't mind, I would like to take
just a couple of minutes to run through a very, very short
statement and run through a few charts to illustrate exactly
some the concerns of where we are today with our missile
defense programs.
I hope Congressman Livingston got a copy of the charts,
because some of them are intended to illustrate some of his
concerns about deploying and executing and getting programs out
on the field to protect our resources.
[Clerk's note.--The charts referred to by General Lyles are
printed after his prepared statement. See page 468.]
Mr. Chairman, when I was nominated to be the Director of
the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization--BMDO, last year,
last summer, I was charged by Dr. Kaminski and our Deputy
Secretary of Defense, Dr. White, to bring my now 28 years of
acquisition experience to all the issues that we are dealing
with in the area of missile defense.
There are two critical issues that they asked me to
address. One is to ensure that our acquisition programs, all of
our programs, are executable, that we are not just in an
research, development and demonstration phase, but we are
clearly trying to get systems out and capabilities out to the
field; and also to ensure that our requisite technology
programs, which have been the heart and soul of the old
Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, SDIO, the early
incarnation of BMDO, that those programs have an acquisition
focus, that they are intended to help supplement and support
both our current acquisition programs and even the future
programs that we may have to take on in the near term.
I consider this to be my personal charter, a charter for
the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Defense, and
obviously Dr. Kaminski. And the one keyword that I used with
our people to illustrate exactly our key focus, it is the word
``execution,'' to make sure we are doing things that have
executable programs.
My report to you today is along those lines, to show you
where we are today, what we have accomplished, what some of our
challenges are, and the things that we are trying to address in
the very near future, and obviously, for the far term.
I realize that this particular Committee has been very,
very supportive of all of our missile defense programs,
particularly our theater missile defense programs; and in that
light, I am very pleased to report to you, Mr. Chairman and
members, that we are aggressively moving on towards protecting
our forward deployed forces, protecting our allies, protecting
our assets, and improving our Theater Missile Defense--TMD
systems and national systems to provide protection for the
homeland in addition to our forward forces.
I will give you a couple of examples of where we are today
with some of the charts, but I also want to just illustrate we
are complying, I think, with the National Missile Defense Act
of 1991, 1993 and 1995 in trying to provide those capabilities
as rapidly as possible.
Patriot System
As an example, the Patriot system, the air and missile
defense system we are fielding today, is much, much more
capable than the system used during the Gulf War. We recently,
as an example, completed fielding the first of three
improvements that are part of the Patriot Advanced Capability 3
or PAC-3 system. We are scheduled to field the final phase
which consists of the full configuration PAC-3 in fiscal year
1999, about a year and a half from now. This will include the
very critical hit-to-kill capability that we think is
absolutely necessary to be able to counter the threat out
there, particularly the threat against weapons of mass
destruction, whether they be nuclear, chemical or biological.
The full-up system, which is very similar to the Extended
Range Interceptor--ERINT, which this Committee has long
championed from the technology development early on and the
SDIO through the integration with the Patriot system, that full
system will be tested and undergoing tests starting this
summer.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to call your attention and the
attention of the members to the charts in front of you, if you
will, and very quickly walk through those to illustrate exactly
the kinds of things that we are accomplishing today.
The TMD family of Systems
The first chart illustrates the total family of systems in
the theater missile defense arena. There are a wide variety of
weapons systems there, battle management command and control
systems, sensor systems from space, ground-based systems. You
see even the airborne laser program reflected there.
Though this is not a BMDO program, it is managed and funded
fully by the United States Air Force. It is part of our theater
missile defense architecture, so we do consider it an integral
part of our family of theater missile defense systems. It
represents the tiered capabilities, the layered capabilities of
defense that we feel that we have to have in order to protect
our resources; and they all very, very complimentary in terms
of the battlespace they are intended to protect, the assets
they are intended to protect and how they would work together.
They are also intended to be and will be interoperable,
sharing information and also providing backup to each other.
TMD Capability of Growth
If I can call your attention to the next chart, a key point
that I think has been in the minds of the Congress for some
time, since the Missile Defense Acts of 1991, and again 1993
and 1995 and beyond, is to ensure that we are providing a
robust set of capabilities for missile defense. What you see
there, with the time lines at the bottom, are the kinds of
improvements we have made since Desert Storm in our current
missile defense posture, and the systems and capabilities that
we are going to provide to increase that improvement so that we
can really say we have an effective family of systems, a robust
family of systems, to provide missile defense protection.
You see up until today leading up to the top blue bar that
says PAC-3, configuration 2, that is where we are as of today.
Those capabilities are significantly greater than what we had
in Desert Storm, as illustrated by the star to the far left-
hand side of the chart. We made changes in weapons systems and
also made changes in some of our battle management command and
control, and those are primarily shown in the blue bars here.
We have made improvements, but we still have a long way to go.
Patriot System
The next two charts give a better illustration relative to
where we are today and where we will be very shortly with
Patriot versus the Patriot system we had in Desert Storm. What
you see illustrated on the first chart is the Patriot system
performance versus a 500-kilometer theater ballistic missile
threat, the kind of threat we saw during Desert Storm.
The white space that you see, the white tear-shaped space
you see on the left-hand side of the chart, is the capability
in terms of battlespace, et cetera, that Patriot was able to
provide for protection during Desert Storm.
The green space is where we are today, significant
improvement in terms of capability.
The blue space is where we will be with the full-up PAC-3
missile in the next year and a half or so.
The second part of the chart to the right-hand side shows
sort of a perspective of range capabilities. The numbers for
the actual ranges are classified. I can provide those for the
record. But the baseline is that we have essentially an 800
percent increase in volume of protection with the Patriot
system for 500-kilometer theater ballistic missile threats.
Patriot System Performance
The next chart, if I can call your attention to that, shows
the same Patriot system performance versus a 1,000-kilometer
ballistic missile threat, a much longer threat than we saw
during Desert Storm. You don't see a white space there
representing what we had in Desert Storm, because we
essentially had no capability with the Patriot for this sort of
range of theater ballistic missile threat.
The green is where we are today, and you see a tremendous
improvement with PAC-3 when we get that hit-to-kill capability.
That is where we are going with the PAC-3 system.
Willow Dune
I would like to call your attention to an illustration of
where we have dramatically shown what PAC-3 can do with the
next chart. It is labeled Willow Dune. We have had over the
last couple of months a series of tests that we code named
Willow Dune. They were tests of the Patriot system against an
actual SCUD. A couple of months ago, I could not have said that
in an unclassified forum. The information is now unclassified.
We tested the Patriot system in the Kwajalein and Pacific
missile range against actual SCUDs. The type of SCUD is still
classified, and where we got the SCUDs from is classified, and
I will be very happy to provide that for the record or provide
that outside of this particular forum.
We tested in early February, and then again in early March,
the Patriot system against a SCUD missile fired from some 360
kilometers away. In the first test, in February, we used both a
Guidance Enhanced Missile, GEM and a PAC-2 missile firing from
a Patriot battery. We were very, very successful.
We fired two missiles. The first one hit the target, hit
the SCUD, and intercepted it perfectly. The second one was
absolutely not necessary, but we had fired it anyway to
demonstrate this salvo capability.
We repeated the same test in March, in early March, again
with another SCUD from our assets, again with a Patriot system.
This time we used the Guidance Enhanced Missile, the GEM
missile, fired from a Patriot battery. Once again, it was very,
very successful.
This test illustrated to us that with the threats that
exist out there today, the SCUD missile threats and its various
applications or variants that are in the hands of potential
adversaries, that we can, even with the current Patriot 2 and
the enhanced missile for the Patriot system, we can intercept
it and have a very successful way to protect our resources.
Also illustrated on that Willow Dune chart you see the list
of assets at the very top. We not only tested the Patriot
system against the SCUD, we had other sensors that were on
board and being checked out to see how they worked in the
interoperability sets, and a whole wide variety of various
instruments that we had, both airborne and ground, to collect
data, to make sure we fully understood exactly what a Patriot
looks like when it is being fired as a threat system and
exactly what kind of intercept we would accomplish.
The tests were extremely successful. I would be happy to
provide for you, or for any of the members or their staff, more
details about both of the tests that we had.
[The information follows:]
In the first WILLOW DUNE test, the PATRIOT Fire unit
acquired the Willow Dune target, and determined that a PAC-2
missile could successfully engage and destroy the target. A GEM
missile also was available and was launched immediately after
the PAC-2 missile as part of the salvo firing doctrine against
Theater Ballistic Missiles--TBMs and to additionally support
the engagement if the PAC-2 did not successfully destroy the
target.
Data show the PAC-2 missile properly acquiring and fuzing
its warhead at the intended intercept point against the target
and that, after warhead detonati9on, the Willow Dune target was
destroyed. The GEM missile following the PAC-2 missile could
only identify target debris when it reached its intended
intercept point. Additionally, ground sensors did not identify
any ``large'' pieces of the target hitting the water under or
near the intercept point. A THAAD radar tracking the engagement
identified only target debris after the detonation of the PAC-2
warhead.
In the second WILLOW DUNE test, the target was engaged with
a PATRIOT GEM missile. The missile had good Track Via Missile
guidance and fuzed and detonated on the target (initial data
data indicate detonation was at 5 meters or less from the
target). The target telemetry package continued to provide data
after detonation, however, the datastream did not continue from
the previous Willow Dune engagement (this is indicative that
more fragments were directed toward the target warhead,
illustrating the differences between the GEM and PAC-2
missiles).
NAVY AREA DEFENSE TEST
General Lyles. If I can call your attention to the next
chart, we not only have had successes with our Patriot system
and the Army system and the Navy area program, we have also had
successful intercepts very recently to demonstrate the
capabilities there.
The chart you are looking at is one that is very, very
dramatic, particularly for those of us in the technology and
acquisition realm. Much of what you see on the left-hand side
of that chart is the last infrared image taken from the seeker
of the Navy area system, the Navy area missile, just before it
intercepted a Lance target. That particular target was a
replicate of a SCUD; it was not an actual SCUD, but a replicate
of a SCUD, and we had a very successful body-to-body intercept.
Again, you can see the dramatic picture just from the
seeker prior to the actual intercept itself. The right-hand
side just shows the obvious explosion when the interception did
take place. This test was on the 24th of January. It was a
milestone test, and allowed us to proceed with the next phase
of the Navy Area Defense Program.
SYSTEM INTEGRATION TEST
The next chart illustrates another part of our
responsibility within BMDO. It is not just to develop
individual weapon systems, but to ensure that all of those
systems are interoperable, that they can play together. We have
been doing a series of what we call systems integration tests,
really trying to check out and test the interoperability of all
of the systems, all of the intercept systems, their radar
systems, their battle management command and control, their
sensor systems.
We have done a series of tests involving the subsystems
that you see listed in this chart to see how they play
together, how we pass information from one system to another,
and each one of them has also been very, very successful. We
have done a series of those since last summer up until about
the last month or so, and we will continue some of those tests
starting this coming summer.
I talked about the successes. I obviously can't go without
talking about some of our failures. As you know, Mr. Chairman,
we have not been very successful recently in our planned
intercept test for our showcase high altitude program, the
Theater High Altitude Area Defense Program, or THAAD.
THAAD SYSTEM ACCOMPLISHMENTS
What you see illustrated on the next chart are really a
compilation of all the tests we have done with the THAAD
program. The last four tests were intended to be intercept
tests. They were to show that we could really pull together all
the different elements, all the capabilities of THAAD, and
actually have a body-to-body intercept.
It is a major, major milestone in our program, not just to
demonstrate the capability, but also to allow us to proceed
into the next phase of the program.
We have not been successful in accomplishing that
intercept. What we do illustrate on this chart, or try to
illustrate to you, is that we have been successful in
demonstrating a lot of the other things that are necessary to
develop and provide a viable weapons system.
I won't talk to all the details on that chart, but each one
of our tests, including the ones where we did not have a
successful intercept, provided us some success relative to
developing an integrated total weapons system. But we will not
try to fool ourselves. The key is to ensure that we do have a
successful intercept, and we have yet to do that.
I will be happy to address any of your questions later
about where we are in regards to our THAAD program.
I will mention to you that as a result of the most recent
failure, I have chartered a very, very detailed scrub of the
THAAD program. We are doing a review of the recent failures and
what occurred. We are reviewing the design of the program. We
are reviewing the margins associated with the program. We are
reviewing the management on the part of the contractor and
contractor team. We are looking at the requirements of the
program. It is a complete end-to-end scrub of the entire THAAD
program to ensure we know not only what happened, but where do
we go next with this program and do we have confidence it is
the kind of thing we need to invest our time, energy and money
in.
Mr. Chairman, I can tell you that my initial opinion is
that I am still very, very confident that THAAD is going to be
a successful program. Each one of the tests, anomalies we have
had, the test failures we have had, have occurred during the
end game. Every other aspect of the total weapons system,
including the radar, the battle management command and control,
work very, very, very well. We failed in the very last few
seconds in the actual intercept.
Something is happening there relative to design margins,
and we are going to get to the bottom line to ensure we can fix
it and provide an adequate capability.
TEST RESULTS
If I could draw your attention to the next chart, we like
to show this chart to illustrate some of the challenges we have
relative particularly to THAAD and even for our future Navy
Upper Tier program, and that is how difficult hit-to-kill is.
As you know, that is essentially the kill mechanism, the
mechanism we are planning for THAAD and some of our other
systems in the future.
What you see illustrated on this chart goes back and shows
history of what we have done, and more importantly, what we
have not done relative to hit-to-kill intercept tests, attempts
and successes over the years. We go all the way back to 1982
and some of the SDIO programs.
What you see listed there, the charts or the parameters
were zeros there, are plan intercepts where we missed a target.
Those that are darkened in are the plan intercepts where we hit
the target. Unfortunately, you can see a lot more open zeros
than closed zeros.
This a very, very challenging problem we are trying to
address. We think we know how to do this in terms of
technology; I have no doubt in that regard. We are doing some
basic systems engineering, and engineering issues we are trying
to grapple with to ensure we cannot only do this one time, but
do it in a stressing environment and do it every time, to
provide the kind of capability we need. That is the challenge
we have ahead of us relevant particularly to the THAAD program.
NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM ELEMENTS
Mr. Chairman, I would like to move very quickly to our
National Missile Defense Program. What you see illustrated on
the next chart are the system elements, the key elements of the
National Missile Defense System we are trying to provide.
We are now up and running. We now have a formal joint
program office established as of the 1st of April to work
together with all of the various elements required, all the
program offices, all the various systems, to provide an
integrated capability for national missile defense.
What you see listed on the chart are the various elements
of a National Missile Defense System, and they comprise not
only Army systems, but Air Force systems, BMDO systems. This is
not just the purview of one service, it is the purview of a
national perspective, and we are trying to manage and develop
an integrated capability along those lines.
NMD SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
The next chart gives you just a picture of a notional
systems architecture for a National Missile Defense System.
This particular illustration is from a single-site National
Missile Defense System.
We are looking at the various alternatives to try to
understand what capabilities do we really need. Is a single
site going to be sufficient to provide us protection against
our territories, or do we need to have multiple sites? We are
examining all options that might be available to ensure we get
not only the best capability, the most effective capability,
but also the most affordable capability.
NMD DEPLOYMENT READINESS
The next chart is one that is probably very familiar to
you, Mr. Chairman and the other committee members. It is just a
notional cartoon to illustrate our 3+3 Program. We are still
aggressively pursuing our 3+3 strategy; that is, trying to
rapidly develop as much as we possibly can a capability within
the next 3 years for a National Missile Defense System to test
in an integrated sense all of those different elements and, if
that test is successful, review the threat to see what the
threat looks like, and if a decision is made we need to deploy
something, be able to deploy that in another 3 years. That is
our 3+3 strategy.
Mr. Chairman, as I have told you personally, and I would
have told other members, and will always tell this to the
Congress, I intend to be very, very honest with you. I will
tell you, this is a very, very difficult task. It is very, very
high risk relative to the schedule that we are trying to meet.
Nevertheless, the urgency of this problem, the urgency of
the issue of protecting our homeland, is such that we are
aggressively pursuing this, and this is still the strategy we
are trying to embark upon, our 3+3 strategy.
THE JOINT PROGRAM OFFICE
The next chart goes back to a point I mentioned earlier,
Mr. Chairman. As of the first of April, we stood up a formal
joint program office for our National Missile Defense System.
That joint program office is now managed by Army Brigadier
General Joe Cosumano, who is sitting behind me over my right-
hand shoulder. He has now been chartered to bring together all
the different elements to ensure we have an integrated
capability and the right kind of talent to develop a National
Missile Defense System.
His program office is one we call sort of a federated
approach, very similar to one of the acquisition streamlining
initiatives we have taken from the Joint Strike Fighter
Program.
General Cosumano has a very small office here in the
Washington area reporting to him, and he in turn reports to me.
We will have no more than about 60 people in this program
office here in the Washington area, and they will draw upon the
expertise of the talents where the various elements are to
actually manage and help us develop the total system.
We will take advantage of the expertise down at Huntsville,
we will take advantage of the expertise in the space sensors
out at the Air Force's space organization in Los Angeles, we
will take advantage of the Ground-Based Battle Management
Command and control capability up at Hanscom Air Force Base in
Boston, and we will take advantage of our own national test
facility out at Colorado Springs that I think you have visited
last year.
This is, I think, an appropriate centralized approach to
managing the program but decentralized execution relative to
the various elements and bringing in its right expertise.
FEDERATED ORGANIZATION
The next chart of the United States shows you the various
elements and where they are. We think this is the right way to
manage this program, and we are now aggressively marching
forward in that particular manner.
TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS
Mr. Chairman, to try to wrap up very quickly, let me just
hit the last part of our responsibilities in BMDO. It is our
very, very important technology programs. We have had great
success over the years since the original SDIO program in
developing unique and innovative technologies to help provide
missile defense capabilities for the United States. I can tell
you that we would not be where we are today with our various
systems or success-systems were it not for the technology
programs that went back all the way to the SDIO days.
CLEMENTINE SATELLITE
We are still working aggressively on a technology program,
looking at various components and also looking at advanced
capabilities. As an illustration of one reason that I am very
concerned to make sure that we never forget about our
technology is your next chart which talks about the Clementine.
All of you are very familiar with the announcement made
last December about the discovery of the possibility of water
on the moon. What most people, certainly most Americans, are
not aware of was that the satellite that made that discovery
was the Clementine 1 satellite, an SDIO-sponsored satellite. We
had support obviously from NASA, from the National
Reconnaissance Organization, and other agencies, but it was
primarily an SDIO and BMDO innovative satellite technology
program that allowed the mapping of the back side of the moon
and made that discovery.
My baseline concern in the technology realm is, if we don't
keep up a robust technology program, we will not be able to
brag about these kinds of successes 5 or 10 years from now and
we will not be able to ensure we have the kind of capabilities
to add to our missile defense systems that we will need for the
future. So we try to make sure we still continue a very robust
technology program.
Midcourse Space Experiment
One illustration of how we are using technology and how it
plays into our existing capabilities is on the next chart, the
last chart in front of you in your package. It talks about the
Midcourse Space Experiment. This is another BMDO experiment
that was launched almost exactly a year ago, last April 1996.
This satellite is intended to measure and provide information
about sensing targets in space in the midcourse realm: What
happens after they are passed their boost phase? We know we can
detect the launch of a theater missile or even a satellite
system, a space system, or an ICBM with the current systems we
have in space. What we do not know for sure is, can we measure
what happens after the boost phase, after the booster is cut
off? This is vital information for our theater missile and
national missile defense systems. We need to be able to
identify, characterize, and discriminate what is an actual
target and what is a decoy. The Midcourse Space Experiment--MSX
is helping us to do that, and we have had great success since
we made that launch last April.
The picture on your left-hand side may look to some people
like a photograph of little pin points. What you are actually
seeing are from 2,000-plus kilometers away decoys and an actual
Re-entry Vehicle--RV from a dedicated launch where we use the
MSX to try to determine can we discriminate between the RV and
decoys or surrogates that might be launched in an adversary's
threat missile system. We were able to do that.
Those little points you see, some of those are as small as
a football, and we were able to not only detect them but to
characterize them and to discriminate them with the Midcourse
Space Experiment.
The right-hand side of the photo in that particular chart
shows a similar sort of concern, what happens if you are trying
to detect an RV or decoy against a background of the earth. The
earth limb, if you will, where you have a contrast between the
warmer atmosphere and the cold background of space, we were
able to show with our various test that we can, with the MSX
system, discriminate and determine what are actual RV's and
what are decoys.
All of this information is now being provided to our
various sensor systems, and particularly provided to our space
and missile tracking system--SMTS to ensure that we have a
robust capability.
Those are the kind of technologies we want to continue over
the next few years to ensure that we are protecting our ability
to provide a robust missile defense system both in the theater
realm and in the national realm.
Summary
Mr. Chairman, I would like to close my statement there. I
probably talked a little bit too much, but I wanted to give you
some illustration of things that we have actually done and what
some of our challenges are and where we are going.
I would be happy to take any of your questions, but I
wanted to be sure you were fully dedicated as you have asked us
to be to all of our missile defense programs, and we really
appreciate the strong support we have received from you and all
the other Committee members personally in ensuring that we have
been able to get to where we are today.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
[The statement and unclassified charts of General Lyles
follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Unfunded Requirements
Mr. Young. General, thank you very much for an outstanding
statement and presentation of where we are and where we are
going. I would like to ask you just a couple of quick questions
about the budget.
This budget request is about $700 million less than the
actual appropriations for fiscal year 1997. Are there any
unfunded requirements in the Theater Missile Defense Program
that are not included in the President's budget?
General Lyles. I think the best way to answer that is sort
of twofold: One, to explain the difference between the budget
and what was appropriated. The numbers that are reflected in
the budget, the fiscal year 1998 budget, are actually about
$100 million higher than what we initially went in for last
year for fiscal year 1997.
As you know, thanks to you and the Congress, we got a
significant plus-up in our fiscal year 1997 budget for missile
defense systems. We ended up getting about a $855 million plus-
up across the board in all of our various areas, national
theater missile defense and technologies.
What we tried to do is to go back and ensure that, based on
last year's original budget that we were able to address some
of our shortfalls, and we did provide a 1998 budget that is
about $100 million higher than last year's original input,
though it is less, if you will, if you look at it in terms of
the plus-ups we got for 1997.
To answer the question about unfunded requirements, as I
look at trying to provide executable programs and I look at the
risks we have for all of our theater missile defense systems,
and even for our National Missile Defense System, I would have
to say yes, I am concerned that we have some unfunded
requirements relative to things that could help reduce the
risk. Additional test assets as an example, additional test
capabilities in our infrastructure, things of that nature,
areas where I consider we have some unfunded requirements that
probably need to be addressed to help us to ensure that we can
do the job and do it with as low a risk as possible.
We have accepted the current risk, but, as an acquisition
expert, I would always like to see a low-risk program as much
as possible, and from that context I would have to say yes,
there probably are some unfunded requirements that could help
us to address the risk area.
Mr. Young. You might think about those and provide some
more specific examples for the record, if you don't mind.
General Lyles. I would be very happy to do that, Mr.
Chairman. We could do that very quickly.
Mr. Young. Okay. We would like to take a look at some of
the things you think should have been funded.
[The information follows:]
The Fiscal Year 1998 President's budget could be augmented with the
following prioritized list. Funding the items on this list will
minimize outyear tails and assist in solving immediate pressures. First
priority goes to risk reduction programs for the Major Defense
Acquisition Programs (MDAPs); second, joint interoperability risk
reduction issues with MDAP enhancements, third, improvements to our
Advance Technology base, and finally, procurement of weapon systems not
funded by BMDO.
Navy Area Defense (Lower Tier) ($44 million RDT&E)--for risk
mitigation efforts associated with EMD testing that were not in the
previous program baseline.
($35 million)--for upgrades to the Pacific Missile Range
Facility (PMRF) to meet Congressionally mandated use of PMRF and
Multiple Simultaneous Engagement (MSE) testing. Funding would avoid
offsets from other ballistic missile defense activities.
($9 million)--for targets, target support and range
support due to new requirement for UOES characterization testing.
Joint Theater Missile Defense (JTMD) ($94 million RDT&E)
($50 million)--to ensure sufficient fiscal year 1998
Family Of System (FoS) testing and activities for joint
interoperability testing, system exerciser simulations, hardware-in-
the-loop, CINC exercises, and system integration tests (SITs). Although
the MDAPs' activity level has been increased by plus ups, JTMD has not
received an additional TOA for interoperability support in step with
activity levels. Outyear funding for JTMD through fiscal year 2003 in
the areas PMRF, FoS Strategic Targets (STARS) and MEADS will be
addressed in the POM update.
($22 million)--Attack Operations. To make an investment in
definition and development of joint attack operations: The required
investment is comprised of four major activities: (1) perform field
tests, exercises, and training that focus on Attack Operations, (2)
develop a joint attack operations operational requirements document,
(3) formulate an integrated investment strategy, and (4) define the
payoff to other mission areas from investments/improved performance in
Attack Operations.
($12 million)--Cruise Missile Defense. To execute new role
as Integration Systems Architect for Theater Air and Missile Defense,
incorporating analysis, modeling and simulation for Cruise Missile
Defense.
($10 million)--Israeli Cooperative Projects--to foster
system interoperability between Israeli Arrow system and US TMD
systems.
PATRIOT ($15 million RDT&E Defense Wide)--additional funding would
support unanticipated range and hardware funding requirements needed
during the ongoing Engineering and Manufacturing Development flight
test program without changing the number of flight tests or reducing
other risk mitigation activities.
Navy Theater (Upper) (not to exceed $80 million RDT&E)--to increase
risk reduction activities by increasing the number of pre-EMD flight
tests and ship and missile system engineering to support early entry
into EMD. Consistent with current program approach.
PATRIOT PAC-3 (($14.7 million) Although Army procurement is not
funded by BMDO, we are the BMD managers.
($10.5 million Weapons Procurement, Army) Additional
missile procurement funding. Addition to funds would restore eight
missiles to the production schedule, deferred to beyond the Future
Years Defense Program in order to solve an immediate fiscal year 1998)
$10.5 million RDT&E missile target underfunded requirement. Workaround
in place does not impact the publicized 4th quarter fiscal year 1999
First Unit Equipped (FUE), but does delay deployment of the second
PATRIOT PAC-3 battalion.
($4.2 million Weapons Procurement, Army) Radar kit
procurement funds. Additional funds would allow PATRIOT to restore one
radar kit, deleted following receipt of undistributed cuts in fiscal
year 1996, ensuring timely fielding of the second PATRIOT battalion.
Procurement of Missile Defense Systems
Mr. Young. The President's budget proposes to shift
procurement of missile defense systems to the services in
fiscal year 1998. Do you have any concern about this from your
vantage point at BMDO?
General Lyles. Mr. Chairman, again, in all honesty, we did
have some concerns. We understand the rationale for the
decision made back last December by Dr. Perry and the leaders
within the Pentagon. The decision primarily was in some
respects to try to provide additional ownership on the part of
the services relative to our missile defense systems and all
the other things that are trying to be done within the
Department of Defense.
In some respects, to use a vernacular that Dr. Kaminski, my
boss, likes to say, the services before him have had sort of a
free lunch, if you will. They can concentrate their service
budgets on planes, boats, trucks, et cetera, and not have to
worry about missile defense because they knew that was under
the purview of BMDO.
The decision was made to provide procurement ownership to
the services and in part to get their ownership and make some
tough decisions in the out years relative to whether or not
they need to provide money for missile defense systems or money
for other priorities within the services. The concern that
causes us obviously is, is there a chance that the services--as
an example, the Army or the Air Force or the Navy--may they
take some of the money that is planned for our missile defense
system and use it to buy trucks or airplanes or boats? So we do
have a concern that we have lost a little bit of control in
that regard.
I might mention, Mr. Chairman, that to help alleviate that
situation a little bit, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Dr.
White, sent a memo out shortly after that decision was made to
all the service chiefs and all the service secretaries to
reinforce the role and responsibilities of BMDO and indeed my
particular role as the acquisition executive for the missile
defense systems.
The bottom line of that memo was to tell them that our
charter responsibility to provide integrated capability has not
changed, and it also gave us the leeway to have at least a
voice all the way up to the Secretary of Defense if it turns
out that somebody does want to take some of our missile defense
money and use it for other things. That is not quite the same
as being totally in control, but it does provide us a little
bit of an out and at least gives us a voice up through the
Secretary of Defense if anybody does try to make a move of that
nature.
Mr. Young. You explained the position on that very well,
but now what do we gain by having the services deal with this
procurement as opposed to your office?
General Lyles. Again, Mr. Chairman, the only thing that I
think we really gain from that is a sense of ownership, if I
can use that terminology on the part of the services, that they
are going to have to make some tough choices. And, by the way,
we are looking at some of those in the Quadrennial Defense
Review right now. The services are agonizing over those, not
just because of missile defense programs, but they have to make
tough choices, sometimes between our vital need for missile
defense capabilities and some of the other needs that they have
within their service purview. So that sense of ownership is the
primary gain, and in all honesty the primary rationale for
making that decision.
Arrow Testing
Mr. Young. General, this Committee has always been very
excited about THAAD and supportive, but the news on that
program isn't all that good right now. Tell us about ARROW. We
understand that some of the ARROW testing is doing very well.
General Lyles. Sir, the ARROW program, which, as you know,
is a joint program that we are working jointly with the
Israelis. The ARROW program recently has been very successful.
They have had two intercept tests planned over the last 6
months, one last August and one last month. Both of those
intercept tests were very successful. There was a slight
anomaly I might mention for the last test, intercept test.
The warhead itself did not go off, but they had an actual
body-to-body intercept, so they did manage to kill the specific
target they were going after.
This is a joint program. We are working it cooperatively
with the Israelis. There is some sharing of technology relative
to ARROW. There are some capabilities like the focal plane
array that they use in the ARROW system, which is made of
materials similar to the focal plane array we will be using in
the THAAD. So we are gaining some information and knowledge
about some of the things that we will need and plan to have
within our own systems, missile defense systems. It is also
intended, obviously, that this be an interoperable program, so
whatever we do with the ARROW system, working with the
Israelis, we intend for it to be interoperable with our Patriot
system, eventually our THAAD system and our Navy systems. So we
are very happy that that program has been very successful.
But I am always very careful to point out that that system
is unique to the Israeli requirements. It does not meet our
requirements, so it is not something that we can look to and
point to their success and say we should consider bringing it
into our inventory. It does not meet our requirements at all.
Mr. Young. General, thank you very much. I have some
additional questions when I get a second chance. Now, I would
like to recognize Mr. Murtha.
Theater High Altitude Area Defense Testing
Mr. Murtha. General, what is the problem with THAAD
specifically?
General Lyles. Congressman Murtha, the problems we have had
on the intercepts have all been in the critical end game, as I
like to define it. We have had, unfortunately, a different
failure mechanism in each one of the four anomalies we have
had. The system in terms of the total system, the radar, the
battle management command and control, the rocket motor, all
seem to work very well. But when we have gotten to the critical
intercept, the ability to actually hit-to-kill the actual
target, in each case we have had a different failure mechanism
and it has been a different thing. We would repair or figure
out what it was in one test, we fix that, and the next test it
would be something else.
From my experience, what that brings to mind is a question
about systems engineering, a question about quality control on
the part of the contractor. Those are the kind of things we are
looking at very aggressively in this scrub we are doing.
Mr. Murtha. That is the impression I got. This was a
quality control, because there are things you didn't
anticipate. The areas that you anticipate you may have a
problem, you didn't have a problem.
General Lyles. None whatsoever, Mr. Congressman.
National Missile Defense Program
Mr. Murtha. So does that translate into being able to solve
the national ballistic missile defense problem, for instance? I
know you are early on, but four failures here, since this is
the centerpiece of your system, does that translate at all into
problems down the road in the bigger system?
General Lyles. Congressman Murtha, it doesn't translate
directly in terms of technical problems. What it does do,
however, is make us very, very conscious and be very careful,
as you know from all the experience you have had in DoD
programs, to ensure we have the best acquisition strategy, the
best test strategy, and a realistic schedule relative to our
programs.
Right now, the reason I stated about our National Missile
Defense Program being very high risk, is because we structured
it specifically because of the urgency of time in trying to do
the 3+3 element. We structured it with a minimum of tests. We
have structured it with a minimum of time. I think THAAD is a
perfect example of the old Murphy factor, if you will, that we
need to look very carefully as to how we have structured our
National Missile Defense Program and provided the kind of
assets and resources, including dollars, to provide back-up
spares in case we have a failure, those kind of things, so that
they don't provide a link-up to us.
Mr. Murtha. Are you saying that 2003 is at best an estimate
of when you can deploy the system?
General Lyles. Right now, Congressman Murtha, I would say
that is at best, yes. But once again, I am not hesitant in
saying that it is very high risk in our ability to do that.
That 2003 is based on absolutely everything being perfect,
working everything perfectly, no failure, no THAAD-like
anomalies.
My experience tells me that is probably not realistic, but
we laid it out that way because of the urgency.
Mr. Murtha. In fact, we have never had a system where we
went perfectly the whole way through I am familiar with. Maybe
there have been some, but I am not familiar with them.
General Lyles. None that I am familiar with, Congressman.
We have seen a lot of different programs, obviously, including
some of our black programs that have gone in a short time
frame. They have had a lot of anomalies, too, usually not well
known by people, but they have had anomalies.
Mr. Murtha. We appreciate the problem you are taking on,
because the district I represent lots more people in the Gulf
War than any other district because of the SCUD missile and the
fact that that missile happened to go through a slot that
wasn't protected by the missiles. I know there has been a lot
of controversy about it, but it looks like the PAC-3 and the
ERINT are coming along, and THAAD, it sounds like they are
controllable problems and we are going to get there in the end
with that system.
General Lyles. Congressman, I think that is a correct
statement. I might just mention for you and the Chairman and
the other committee members, we are within the next week or so
going to get the out briefing back to me of the detailed
analysis and scrub we have done on the THAAD program, looking
at all the requirements, looking at the issues, and looking at
where we go from here. I would be very, very happy to provide
that information back to you and your staff after that is
completed.
Mr. Murtha. I appreciate it. Thank you very much.
Mr. Young. Mr. Dicks.
Theater High Altitude Area Defense
Mr. Dicks. General, I am sorry I missed part of your
statement, but I, too, am concerned about the THAAD program.
Obviously, it is a great disappointment to have this fourth
consecutive failure. Can you tell us, maybe in a little more
detail what you think the problem is?
General Lyles. Congressman Dicks, for the most recent
failure, what happened is what we call the divert in attitude
control system, the sort of roll control, the vector control
system for the missile, failed to operate properly. We got an
initial signal, we think, from the guidance systems, from the
computers, to turn on that roll control, turn on those
thrusters on the system, but, for some reason, it failed to
operate.
Obviously, without roll control, without divert control,
even though we got within the basket of the actual intercept,
we actually have a photo that shows the target coming in and
the intercept missile all within the same frame, there was no
way we could divert to actually make the body-to-body
intercept. That was the most recent failure, and that is what
we are concentrating on there.
As I mentioned with Congressman Murtha, there has been a
different failure mechanism for each of the previous three
failures.
Mr. Dicks. That can be even more worrisome than if you had
the same problem. At least you can fix one. It sounds as if you
have some kind of a management problem here. We have had this
on other weapons systems. I can remember one of the cruise
missile problems, we continued to have, it was always something
different. I think finally we had to cancel it. Now, do you
believe in the technical viability of the current missile
design?
General Lyles. Congressman Dicks, I do believe in the
technical viability of that design. However, I want to qualify
and tell you that is one of the key questions I have asked this
independent team to look at and scrub very, very thoroughly.
Mr. Dicks. When is the independent team going to come back
and give its report?
General Lyles. They will be reporting back within the next
week or so to me and I will in turn be reporting to Dr.
Kaminski and eventually to the Secretary of Defense within the
very near future.
Mr. Dicks. Dr. Kaminski has suggested the THAAD program
will probably require some sort of restructuring. What does he
mean? Will the program be delayed further? What will be the
impact on resources? Or are we going to have to wait for this
independent group to get back before we can make a judgment?
General Lyles. It is definite in detail, Congressman Dicks.
We probably need to wait to see what the report is back to me
relative to the total program. I think what Dr. Kaminski was
referring to, and I wholeheartedly agree, we know just because
of the anomalies and failures that we have had in the last four
tests that we have not been able to meet our current
milestones.
We were hoping to have proceeded into the engineering, the
manufacturing and design phase for the program, to have
actually made the decision to go on contract for our UOES
capability, our User Operational Evaluation Systems capability.
We have not done that because a key milestone criteria, exit
criteria to allow us to do that, was an actual intercept. So
there has been a slip within the program.
What I am waiting for in terms of the details from the
review teams is what is the nature of the problem, what kind of
fixes do we have to do, and how does that translate to more
schedule concerns, if necessary.
Airborne Laser Program
Mr. Dicks. Can you tell me what you see as the primary role
of the airborne laser ABL system?
General Lyles. Yes, sir. The airborne laser system, as I
showed in one of my earlier charts, is an integral part of our
family of systems with theater missile defense. It provides
what I consider to be a very, very key air joint that we
absolutely must have in our capabilities, and that is to boost
phase intercept, to be able to intercept and kill theater
missile system while they are in the critical boost phase. This
adds several benefits.
One is that it destroys the target. Two it has a deterrence
element to it, particularly if you consider the possibility
that some of those threats may have weapons of mass destruction
in the warheads, chemical or biological or, God forbid, nuclear
warheads. The fact that we, if we have this capability and we
hold that threat over an adversary and he knows there is a high
probability that his systems could get shot down and fall down
in his territory, there is an element of deterrence there that
we think the boost phase intercept system can provide us. ABL
right now is our primary boost phase intercept program.
Mr. Dicks. What can you tell the committee about the status
and progress of the ABL program?
General Lyles. Sir, the ABL program proceeded as of last
November into its first phase. It is a program definition
phase, an early concept definition phase. As you are well
aware, the Air Force down-selected to a single contractor team,
to manage this particular effort. It involves Boeing, TRW, and
several other contractors who are working together to provide
the capability. I have great confidence that the program in
this new revolutionary technology is going to be very, very
successful. They are still in the early phase in that program
and leading up to some initial tests of the laser system
itself, design tests of the laser systems, and some surrogate
intercept tests they would do on the ground about this time
next year.
As far as everything I have seen in my latest review, the
program is on track and seems to be proceeding as successfully
as the Air Force and the contractors would hope it to.
THEATER HIGH ALTITUDE AREA DEFENSE
Mr. Dicks. Mr. Chairman, just a little indulgence. On going
back to THAAD now, is the contractor giving you the best effort
here to try to deal with this problem? Are you getting good
management attention on this?
General Lyles. Congressman Dicks, I can assure you we are.
Notwithstanding my earlier concern about quality control, I
can tell you that I have great confidence in Lockheed Martin
and their efforts to do the job. Norm Augustine, their CEO, and
I and his other people in the senior office have been not only
corresponding but talking very, very aggressively together and
working together to ensure that they understand our concerns
about their management attention and the right team to do the
job and looking at it with all the best talent they can muster
literally in the United States, not just Lockheed's talent, but
anybody that is necessary to address the issues associated with
THAAD.
I know I have the attention of Mr. Augustine. I know I have
the attention of the senior management within Lockheed Martin
headquarters here in Bethesda. I feel also we have the
attention of the people who are managing the effort in their
Sunnyvale plant out in California. I visited them to ensure
they understand our concerns and personally to look to ensure
they are putting the right attention to that.
Mr. Dicks. All right. One final thing. How about the cost
on this program? Is the cost staying within the bounds of what
you had anticipated or have there been escalations in the cost
of this program?
General Lyles. Congressman, there have been some
escalations, and we had a recent--what we call an over-target
baseline for the program, to increase the baseline--program
baseline--above what was originally approved or last approved--
within the last year.
Currently, however, we think we can do all of this and
manage these things within the current budget we have for
THAAD. It is above the baseline we established for the program
director and the program office; but we think that, right now,
we can operate currently within the current budget that we have
for the THAAD program.
Mr. Dicks. Is there any technical alternative? Is there any
other program that can do the high altitude piece of theater
missile defense?
General Lyles. No, sir, there is not, not to do that
particular part of the mission.
We, obviously, have two upper-tier programs. THAAD is one
for our ground systems, if you will. The Navy Upper Tier
program, which is far less mature, further along relative to
THAAD and anything else we have, the Navy Upper Tier will
provide us an additional Upper Tier program. Navy Theater Wide
is another name we call that. That program does not meet all
the requirements that we have for THAAD. It is a complimentary
program and is not intended to be a substitute for the THAAD
program.
Mr. Dicks. All I can say is when we cancel these things,
you have to start over, and it costs billions and billions of
dollars. My instinct is it is always better to try to fix a
system if you can and keep the program going.
General Lyles. Congressman Dicks, I can assure you I agree
with that wholeheartedly; and I am sure we can address the
question.
Mr. Young. Mr. Visclosky.
NAVY LOWER TIER
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, General.
General, I would like to talk to you about the Navy Lower
Tier program. My understanding is that the Navy has designated
from your testimony the USS Lake Erie and the USS Port Royal as
the cruisers to support the system, and that would be in the
year 2002. Do you think the Navy is fully committed to this
system and having it installed on those ships in the year 2002?
General Lyles. Congressman Visclosky, I think they are
absolutely committed to it; and I reaffirmed that in recent
months with the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), with the
Secretary of the Navy, in addition to the program office and my
own visits to actual operational units of Navy systems down at
Norfolk. They are fully committed to the program.
Mr. Visclosky. My understanding is in this year's budget
the Navy has not asked for any money for these two ships in
preparation for the installation of this system. When will we
see those monies in the Navy's request?
General Lyles. I have to take that for the record. I am not
sure when they actually need the dollars for that, but I will
provide that information for the record, Congressman.
[The information follows:]
Office of the Secretary of Defense--OSD Program Budget
Decision of December 1996 transferred BMDO TMD procurement
funds (SM2 Block IVA and AEGIS) to the Navy, specifically to
the Weapons Procurement, Navy (WPN) Standard Missile SM-2
(12FE) account. Recognizing a misalignment of funds, the Navy
set aside, within the PB98 WPN, Standard Missile SM-2 (12FE)
account, funds necessary to conduct the AEGIS TBMD
modifications. The Navy will realign these funds to Other
Procurement, Navy (OPN) during Off-Year POM to modify and equip
AEGIS ships for the TMD mission.
Mr. Visclosky. If the ships are not operational, what
impact would that have on the system? What would that do to our
cost?
General Lyles. As I understand it, those two specific ships
have been designated to have the initial capability for the
Navy Area system. As I know, the Navy is committed to ensuring
that that capability is there. They are working to ensure the
ships are prepared by that time period----
Mr. Visclosky. By the year 2002.
General Lyles. We are obviously working to ensure the
missile systems and the battle management command and control
are there also to support the integrated weapons system that we
need.
Mr. Visclosky. I am concerned about both parts. I am
particularly concerned because, again, my understanding of the
budget this year is there is no money in the Navy's budget to
begin any modifications of equipment of these ships, that there
is a coincidence of both being ready in the same year. If you
could comment on that for the record, I would appreciate that.
General Lyles. I would do that, Congressman. It was my
understanding one of the primary reasons there were no dollars
this year is because they didn't need to have those dollars
this year. I will go back and verify that.
Mr. Visclosky. That may very well be the case.
[The information follows:]
The two User Operational Evaluation System (UOES) AEGIS
cruisers, USS Lake Erie and USS Port Royal, will be configured
to support the UOES beginning in fiscal year 1998 with the
installation of the UOES computer program. At sea testing of
the UOES will commence in fiscal year 2000 as the first UOES
SM-2 Block IVA missiles are delivered. Equipment to support the
UOES installation aboard these two cruisers was procured with
BMDO procurement funds in fiscal years 1996 and 1997. This
procurement supports a fiscal year 1998 fielding of the AEGIS
TBMD UOES computer program. The Navy Area program is currently
scheduled to achieve First Unit Equipped (FUE) in fiscal year
2002.
ARROW FUNDING
Mr. Visclosky. On the ARROW program, it is my understanding
the administration recently announced that they would provide
additional funding for the program. Do you know what that
amount of money is?
General Lyles. Yes, sir. We, as a result of a meeting a
couple of weeks ago with Minister of Defense Mordechai and the
Secretary of Defense, Secretary Cohen, an agreement was made we
would look to see ways we could help them with the ARROW system
and help the Israelis, who would like to provide additional
capabilities for their forces, additional ARROW capabilities
for their forces.
We have an agreement, however, that we are not responsible
for nor are we going to procure additional ARROW systems for
them, ARROW missiles. Our responsibility is to help them
develop the system and specifically to ensure we have an
interoperable capability.
We have--in this recent agreement, we have reached an
accord where we think that we can provide an additional $48
million over the next four years and use that money to offset
some of the interoperability needs of the ARROW program and
allow the Israelis to take some of their development money and
align it to their procurement needs for their additional
systems.
So what we are going to use that money for is to support
what we are chartered to do--to help do, and that is work the
issue of interoperability and development. We are not using the
money to buy systems for them. That would violate our agreement
with the Israelis. It is $48 million over the next four years.
Mr. Visclosky. So we are in it for the development
knowledge and not the procurement?
General Lyles. Yes, sir.
Mr. Visclosky. The range, as far as procurement, was
anywhere from $2 to 10 billion, as I understand it. Is there a
narrower figure or range now? For the ARROW system?
General Lyles. I have to provide that for the record in
terms of where we are today.
The only reason I am hesitating on that is because of the
current desire on the part of the Israeli defense system to
procure an additional battery, additional missiles, over and
above, beyond what we were originally working towards even a
few months ago. So that number has changed a little bit, and I
need to verify that, and I will provide that for the record.
[The information follows:]
The cost estimate of Arrow at program inception in 1994 of
approximately $1.2 billion remains valid today. Phase I (Arrow
I) of the program cost $158 million, Phase II (Arrow II) costs
$330 million, and Phase III (Arrow Deployability Program) costs
$556 million. These costs do not include $42 million in
infrastructure costs and $252 million for Arrow Weapons System
components (Radar, Launcher, Fire Control) both of which were
funded entirely by the Israelis.
Mr. Visclosky. We are not obligated for any of the
production costs?
General Lyles. That is not our responsibility, to worry
about the production costs.
Mr. Visclosky. If this program was in your budget, would
you give it more money?
General Lyles. In terms of our agreement, I have sort of
answered that question in part by our R&D area. In terms of
working research and development, working interoperability,
this additional $48 million, I and my people in my organization
agreed that was a fair sum to consider adding to the ARROW
program. Anything beyond that--anything beyond that $48 million
or anything that even smacks of production is not our
responsibility, and we would not fund that at all.
Mr. Visclosky. General, thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
MEDIUM EXTENDED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM (MEADS)
Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Visclosky.
General, I would like to ask you about MEADS. This started
out as a U.S. program and because of the expense we went into a
multinational, basically a NATO program. Now France has dropped
out, which I expect will increase our share of the cost. I
would like for you to tell us why France dropped out and also
why we need to do MEADS at all?
General Lyles. Congressman, as I understand it, the French
dropped out primarily because of budget considerations of their
own, their own internal needs. We have restructured the program
between us and our two allies, Germany and Italy, the two
cooperative partners, in terms of their and our share of the
program, both the dollars and potential work share for the
future.
MEADS is a vital program, just like the original Corps Sam
that you alluded to, because of the specific requirement to
provide maneuver force protection for our troops and our
assets. We do not have that in the sense that we really need it
with today's Patriot system or even the THAAD system. They do
not have the maneuver capability that we really need.
They also provide defense against multiple and simultaneous
attacks of both short- and medium-range ballistic missiles,
cruise missiles and air breathing threats. So there is a wide
compendium of capability that we will get with the MEAD system
we don't have today, particularly in the aggregate of all those
potential threats. We don't have those today with THAAD and
with the Patriot system. Maneuver force and cruise missile
defense, air breathing defense, multiple engagement defense
capability is a primary requirement for MEADS.
Mr. Young. The budget request for 1998 is $48 million.
Where will that take us?
General Lyles. That $48 million, plus I think an additional
$9 million in fiscal year 1999, are essentially going to take
us through the program definition phase for MEADS. It will
allow us to, in working with our partners, working with the two
international contractor teams that have been established to
define the concepts, the valid concepts for a MEAD system, to
try to down-select, if you will, to the appropriate concept for
the design for the MEAD system, and that is as far as it will
go.
The obvious question is, what do we do from there and how
do we proceed on? I think probably the best way to answer that
is to tell you that this is a very, very tough decision that is
currently being addressed in the Quadrennial Defense Review.
Even as late as last night, that issue was being discussed
within QDR; and sometime within the next week or two we are
going to present options to the Secretary of Defense and make a
decision from there what is going to happen with the MEAD
program.
QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW (QDR)
Mr. Young. The Secretary of Defense has been complaining
that the QDR has not been quite as aggressively approached as
he would like it to be. Are we getting near the end of the QDR
process?
General Lyles. As I understand it, Congressman Young, the
Secretary has mandated and he is going to report to Congress on
time; and I think you can see that with the scurry of activity
that is happening within the building and all the QDR meetings
that are taking place.
The ones I have been involved in recently, particularly as
late as yesterday at the senior steering group level with the
deputy secretary and the vice chiefs of the various services
and the vice chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, there are
some very, very tough issues and alternatives and very, very
tough decisions that are being laid out. And everything I saw
showed it is being done very aggressively, but there are no
easy answers there as to how we are going to address some of
our needs.
HELSINKI AGREEMENT
Mr. Young. General, Mr. Livingston at the beginning of our
session this afternoon asked you about the Helsinki agreement.
You and I had discussed this previously, and I wanted to have
you answer for the record your role in reaching the actual
agreements and the wording in the Helsinki agreement. Because
we have come upon a few instances where the actual user, the
commander that was involved in a particular issue, was not
consulted when certain decisions were made.
Were you consulted and were you part of the decision making
as to the Helsinki agreement?
General Lyles. Congressman, it would be probably unfair to
say we are part of the decision making; but we definitely were
part of the consultation process. Let me explain exactly what
took place.
Literally over the last year, even before I came on board
and certainly as I have seen it since the end of August, the
activities that have taken place, all the previous--the
preliminary discussions with the Russians prior to the Helsinki
agreement for the most part had been done through the Standing
Consultive Committee and some other bodies, primarily in
Geneva. And for each one of those sessions we did have a
technical representative from BMDO who was part of the
consultation body and part of the advisory body to the United
States representatives at that particular forum.
Each time there was a meeting, a senior level meeting
involving senior leadership from the Pentagon, be they Office
of the Secretary of Defense, OSD, civilians or military people
from the joint staff, each time prior to one of those meetings
I was consulted, my senior staff and I were consulted, and our
issues, our concerns were provided to those who were
representing the United States. And our views--clearly our
views and the views as we understood it from the warfighters,
from the CINCs were clearly presented to them so that they
could proceed with caution in all of the discussions.
I admit I consider my view to be sort of a minority one
relative to the bigger view that was provided to each one of
those forums, and that is the view of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili, in short. Prior to each
one of those meetings, one key mandate was there, and that was
we do nothing to impact the ability to protect our forces for
the future.
So from the position of consultation, we were an integral
part of the activities, both prior to the meetings, as people
prepared for them here, and even at the meetings with our
technical representatives there. It would be unfair to say we
were part of the decision-making process; but I feel very, very
comfortable that we did have a say-so as far as consultation.
Mr. Young. Well, let's jump over the decision part and go
to the end product. Do you feel that the end product reflected
to a large extent or a small extent the views of your
technicians and your consultants that were involved or
consulted?
General Lyles. For the most part, Mr. Chairman, I think
that was the case.
Obviously, we are still looking at questions relative to
future systems, particularly the words in the agreement that
talk about theater missile defense by other physical properties
other than OPP, as they refer to it, space-based primarily, to
ensure that what we think that means--and when I say we, not
just BMDO but our representatives for the United States and the
Russians are exactly the same thing.
But as far as the other issues, the demarcation limits, the
limits on the types of speed and range for the targets, our
concerns were aired properly there and our issues were
represented relative to the final statement.
ACQUISITION PROCESS
Mr. Young. General, thank you very much.
Now the easiest question that I have for you. We have
talked with you about acquisition reform, and you have a very
strong record in acquisition reform. Tell us some things that
you think ought to be done or at least considered in the area
of reforming the acquisition process.
General Lyles. Mr. Chairman, as we mentioned just briefly
yesterday, we are trying to do as much as we can to embrace
acquisition reform in all of our programs. I think as I look at
it back in my experience with other programs, one of the key
things we want to ensure that we do is to, as much as possible,
give free rein to our program directors to make decisions
without being encumbered with lots of layers of somebody
checking or double-checking what he is trying to do.
A key way of trying to address that is to ensure that we
work as integrated teams. So integrated product teams, IPTs as
we refer to it in the vernacular, is the way we are trying to
manage all of our programs.
What we like to do is bring all of the stakeholders
together and help them to help us make decisions and
recommendations for our programs so we don't have somebody
second-guessing or, worse, still coming in at the last minute
and disagreeing with a decision in terms of how we acquire a
program, our strategy for a program, our contract strategy or
any decision that we might make.
General Cosumano behind me, General Dan Montgomery over on
my left behind me, are also working as part of their activities
in both the national missile arena and the theater missile
arena to ensure we use Integrated Product Teams to manage each
one of our efforts. That is a major, major breakthrough I think
in terms of the way we manage programs; and it really provides
streamlining in terms of decision making and coming to the
right conclusion as to what we want to do.
The other thing I think we are trying to ensure we do is to
minimize the paperwork in the bureaucracy associated with each
one of our programs. We are trying to manage each one of our
efforts very, very aggressively to use electronic means for
communicating information, to use the minimum amount of
documentation.
You may be familiar with the term we call the Systems
Acquisition Management Plan, SAMP, a document only about 2 or 3
inches thick, to define what it is we are trying to do with our
program as opposed to the reams and reams and literally table
full of documentation that our program officers have had to
provide in the past to define our programs. We are using that
mechanism to streamline not only in time but in dollars what it
is we are trying to do, and that is another thing that we are
embracing totally.
I might mention for our national missile defense program
one key area of acquisition reform that I think is really sort
of a breakthrough is one we have used successfully in other
programs, and that is to go as much as we possibly can to an
electronic means of communication. It is a paperless
environment as much as we can possibly embrace it.
The request for the proposal that we have for bringing in a
prime contractor for NMD was sent out electronically to
industry. All the updates to that request for proposal were
done electronically with industry; and industry, in turn,
provided us their proposals that we are currently evaluating
through electronic means. There are no big documents, no big
mailings of paper that they had to submit to us. All of this
was done electronically.
We are also doing the evaluation of the proposal in an
electronic mechanism, and we will eventually make a
determination and decision on that program through electronic
means so we can give quick feedback to industry as to what we
are trying to do.
There are lots of other things like that, Mr. Chairman,
that we are trying to do.
Perhaps to better answer your question, what I would like
to offer to you is the opportunity to come back to talk to you
or any one of the Committee Members and tell you specifically
how acquisition reform is being applied to each one of our
programs and then, more importantly, what I think the payoff is
going to be for each one of those examples.
Mr. Young. Well, General, thank you very much for that
offer. We will take you up on that, because we are extremely
concerned and interested in acquisition reform and getting more
for the dollar as the dollar continues to shrink and the budget
requests seem to get smaller and smaller.
Thank you very much, General.
Mr. Murtha.
DEMARCATION LIMITS
Mr. Murtha. Let me ask you, is the demarcation agreement
between tactical and strategic weapons in the Helsinki Accord
under development in any of the six TMD systems currently under
way?
General Lyles. Congressman, none of the six systems we
currently have under way are impacted by that. They all fit
very well within the Helsinki agreement.
Mr. Murtha. Does it hinder in any way your ability to
develop theater systems to protect our troops?
General Lyles. Currently, no, sir. It does not hinder our
ability to do that.
Mr. Murtha. Thank you.
Mr. Young. Mr. Dicks.
Mr. Dicks. Was it not a fact, as I recall--and I can speak
directly on this. Wasn't there a bill that Congress passed, the
defense authorization bill in fiscal year 1995, that codified
the 5 kilometers a second or 3,500-kilometer range?
General Lyles. I think that was the case, Congressman
Dicks.
Mr. Dicks. So all the administration basically did was
agree to something the Congress had already enacted into law?
General Lyles. Well, that is one of the key reasons why we
are not currently impacted with our current programs. I am not
exactly sure what was in the law for the 1995 act relative to
the demarcation limits, but we have been talking about the 5
kilometer per second speed of a target and 3,500-nautical-mile
range for some time, and we felt very, very comfortable with
that agreement would not impact any of our current programs.
Mr. Dicks. Is it true that nothing was limited in terms of
space-based systems that isn't already part of the ABM
agreement?
General Lyles. Congressman Dicks, I think that is the one
area that we have a little bit of a concern about. The
statement relative to space-based theater missile defense
systems or directed energy systems is one that could impact--
and we are trying to verify this--could impact our current
space-based laser program.
We think the current interpretation of the Helsinki
agreement, that is, we can still do a space-based laser program
as long as it is couched in the area of research and SBL. And
we are not trying to deploy a limited capability. We think our
current space-based laser program can still proceed.
However, I am in the process of defining exactly what it is
we need to do in space-based laser, run that by Secretary
Cohen, get his concurrence on that, so we can make sure we
aren't doing anything that violates the agreement.
Mr. Dicks. Would the airborne laser have a similar problem?
General Lyles. No, sir. One of the key things--going back
to answer an earlier question from the Chairman, one of the key
things that we were very careful about relative to the
discussions at Helsinki was to ensure that nothing was in the
language that would impact the airborne laser.
There were some discussions, to be honest with you, of some
words that could have impacted ABL. They were taken off the
table thanks to the people who listened to our concerns, and
airborne laser is not impacted by the Helsinki agreement.
Mr. Dicks. So you are saying--and do you think it is
compliant with the ABM agreement?
General Lyles. I did not say that. I mentioned the Helsinki
agreement. We still have to go through the formal process. I
say we--I mean the Air Force, working with us at BMDO, have to
go through the formal process of the compliance review group
assessment of ABL, when it is ready to go through that. We
still have to do that to get formal compliance certification.
But nothing happened relative to the Helsinki agreements that
would impact the current ABL program.
Mr. Dicks. And nothing happened there on national missile
defense either?
General Lyles. No, sir. They specifically were looking at
theater missile systems, so nothing happened relative to NMD
programs.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Visclosky.
Mr. Visclosky. No further questions, thank you.
COOPERATIVE ENGAGEMENT CAPABILITY
Mr. Young. General, let me ask you just a few more
questions on the Navy Lower Tier. We are being asked to approve
a multiyear procurement for the DDG 51s. Most of us are
concerned, I think all of us are concerned, with the fact that
this budget does not provide funding for any missile defense,
theater missile defense on those ships. Cooperative engagement
capability, or CEC, which has been a big item with this
committee, is not going to be on any of those ships.
Given that it takes three to five years in construction
time to build a ship, the earliest that the Navy could field
theater ballistic missile defense is 2005. I am wondering why
BMDO--why did you state that Navy Lower Tier will be deployed
in 2002? There seems to be a difference of opinion on the dates
here by three years.
General Lyles. Congressman Young, Mr. Chairman, we and the
Navy are still dedicated to providing that capability by the
year 2002. I would like to take for the record and provide some
specific answers as to why the Navy doesn't reflect that kind
of money for CEC and the ship improvement in their current
multiyear.
[The information follows:]
The Navy Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD)
program will add TBMD capability to the AEGIS computer program
under development by the Navy. This Navy-developed computer
program, AEGIS Baseline 6 Phase I, includes Cooperative
Engagement Capability (CEC). The TBMD Tactical computer program
(AEGIS Baseline 6 Phase 1T) is scheduled for delivery in Fiscal
Year 2000 and will be retrofitted to previously built AEGIS CGs
and DDGs and will be forward fitted to DDGs as they are being
built.
Because the Department decision to transfer all procurement
funds to the Services starting in Fiscal Year 1998 was made
relatively late in the budget submission process, all Navy TBMD
procurement funds, including AEGIS TMD upgrade funds, were
placed in the Standard Missile procurement line (Project 12FE,
Flight Hardware--SM AEGIS improvement, totaling over $360
million between Fiscal Year 1998 and Fiscal Year 2003). During
this Summer's budget cycle, the procurement funds will be
realigned from Standard Missile to the appropriate AEGIS TMD
Weapon system procurement line, as specified in the Cost
Analysis Requirements Description (CARD). The CARD identifies
DDG AEGIS Weapon System acquisitions beginning in Fiscal Year
2000 (for installation if Fiscal Year 2003), and AEGIS cruiser
TMD retrofit schedules beginning in Fiscal Year 1998 (for
installation in Fiscal Year 2000).
General Lyles. As far as I know, as I answered Congressman
Visclosky, the Navy is fully dedicated to not only providing
the Navy Lower Tier and Navy Area Defense capabilities but also
getting CEC in as many of their ships as possible. What that
tells me is, at least for this next fiscal year, they didn't
think that the money was necessary, but I will go back and
verify that and find out exactly how this is being handled.
Mr. Young. I would appreciate that.
We have been asking this question of a lot of witnesses.
Does it make sense to build the ships without the ability to
defend themselves or be part of the theater missile defense
program? So we would appreciate your answer.
I want to thank you very much for the dynamic way you have
responded to our questions.
Mr. Murtha.
Mr. Murtha. Isn't CEC absolutely essential to the
deployment of these ship self-defense systems?
General Lyles. I wouldn't say it is absolutely essential.
It does provide you an enhanced capability, because you can net
information from one ship to another. You can provide advanced
sensor information. You can provide fire control information.
It is not absolutely essential, the way you stated it. The
ships can be autonomous, but you get a greatly enhanced
capability. You get a greatly force multiplier capability with
something like CEC, and that is why the Navy is very much
interested in it, and we are very interested in assuring we
have CEC-like capability for our ground systems and eventually
for any air systems like ABL, connectivity for that.
SHIP SELF DEFENSE
Mr. Murtha. As the Chairman pointed out, we have had a
terrible problem with the Navy. For instance, five or six years
ago, we put money into--at the suggestion of one of the staff,
because the fleet was saying we don't have good self-defense
for individual ships. So we put money in. They resisted it,
reprogrammed it. Finally, they said, it is now a priority. Then
they don't put the money in again.
I can't understand with the incidents we have had with low-
flying cruise missiles that the Navy is having such a problem
getting this through their head or we have had such a problem
convincing them this is something that needs to be done. I know
once they get it developed they will take full credit and say
they developed this whole system and this is all our idea and
we were way ahead of everybody else, as they have done in many
other systems that this Committee has suggested to them.
I wish you would take a look at that and let us know what
you think of their spending pattern.
General Lyles. Congressman Murtha and Mr. Chairman, I am a
little bit embarrassed, because I thought for sure that that
capability was something that the Navy was fully embracing. You
and Congressman Visclosky have raised something I was not aware
of, and I feel so bound to make sure that we get an answer. I
would like to bring Admiral Rod Rempt, who is the Navy Theater
Missile Defense Program Executive Officer, with me and come
back literally in the next week or two and give you an answer
to that.
Mr. Murtha. Well, if the Navy comptroller is still there
when we get done with the bill, then you might bring the
comptroller up also.
General Lyles. I will ask him to join me, yes, sir.
Mr. Young. Incidentally, we have asked the Secretary of
Defense, the Secretary of the Navy and the Chiefs on that same
issue, so if you can bring the comptroller, that might help.
Maybe he will get us an answer.
General Lyles. Yes, sir. I will do that.
Mr. Young. Mr. Dicks.
Mr. Dicks. No further questions.
Mr. Visclosky. One follow-up on the Chairman's remarks on
the three to five discrepancy. The USS Lake Erie and USS Port
Royal are, I assume, existing ships.
General Lyles. Yes, sir.
Mr. Visclosky. That may be part of the differential. I do
think it would be important for you to follow-up with the
Committee.
General Lyles. I just got an update from my deputy, Admiral
West behind me. It mentions the initial capability is upgrades
to current ships and initially those two specific cruisers.
I think, again, that is the rationale as to why they didn't
feel that a lot of money needed to go into that particular
effort. These are upgrades. I failed to mention that earlier.
It is not like we are building ships from scratch in order to
provide this capability.
Mr. Visclosky. I would still have a concern.
General Lyles. Yes, sir, I agree. I am very anxious to get
the answer and very anxious to bring it back to you.
Mr. Young. General, thank you very much for a really
outstanding hearing. We appreciate the way you have responded
to our questions. We look forward to working with you on the
issues we agreed to follow up on.
If there is nothing further, the Committee will stand
adjourned.
General Lyles. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Skeen and the
answers thereto follow:]
Over Land Testing
Question. General Lyles, we've had several discussions about the
THAAD missile testing program today, and I appreciate your comments on
the future of this important program.
One of my major concerns is that the program to date has justified
the need for over-land missile testing. We've had four failures of the
THAAD to date, but because the tests were conducted over land, we've
been able to find the missile after each test, do an autopsy, and make
a conclusive finding as to the reasons for each test failure, and
provide this information to Congress, the Department of Defense and the
program managers.
Would you comment on the need for continued over-land testing of
BMDO missile programs and your experiences at the White Sands Missile
Range?
Answer. As noted in your question, our experience with THAAD has
benefited from our ability to recover test hardware in support of post-
flight failure investigation. THAAD will continue its Program
Definition and Risk Reduction (PD&RR) flight testing at WSMR;
currently, 6 flight tests remain. The choice of where to conduct a
system's test program, however, is directly related to its stage of
development, level of design maturity, and the specific test
objectives. In the case of THAAD, the goal of PD&RR is to resolve key
system integration and technology issues, which will allow the program
to then move into the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD)
phase. While WSMR has proven adequate for THAAD to work out these
technical issues during PD&RR, our flight test scenarios have been
constrained by WSMR's boundaries. During EMD, the more mature system
design will require target trajectories more representative of the full
range of threats the system will face when fielded. This is true for
not only for THAAD, but for our other missile defense systems that must
engage the longer range targets. Overland ranges limit our ability to
engage long range targets--we simply lack protected real estate of
sufficient are to safely launch these targets, drop their boosters,
fire interceptors to engage them, and contain the debris within
restricted boundaries.
Space Based Laser (SBL)
Question. Would you please update us on the status of the Space
Based Laser Program and your plans for the future of this program?
Answer. The Space Based Laser (SBL) technology program has
demonstrated key laser system components, including the laser, the
large lightweight optics, beam control, tracking and pointing, and
structural isolation. These components have shown performance close to
what is needed for a demonstration/ validation flight experiment. With
the recent alpha Lamp Integration high-power test, we have increased
our confidence that these components will work together in the presence
of megawatt-class laser radiation.
The approved SBL program, which is funded at $30 million per year
in fiscal year 98 and the Future Years Defense Program, is still a
technology development program.
Question. Is the Air Force going to become a partner in this
program?
Answer. Because of increased Congressional interest, and Air Force
interest in this program, I am considering transferring the SBL
Readiness Demonstrator (SBLRD) program execution to the Air Force while
maintaining overall Directed Energy Program management and funding
authority here in the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization.
Question. We've been hearing a lot lately about a Spaced Based
Laser demonstrator. Would you please tell the Committee your plans for
a demonstrator?
Answer. The SBL Technology Readiness Demonstrator, currently in
concept design, would test in space the components required for an
operational missile defense platform but at reduced scale. Successful
completion of this readiness demonstration would establish the
feasibility of this approach to defending against hostile ballistic
missiles during their boosting phase.
I recently appointed an Independent Review Team, chaired by retired
General Larry Welch, to review the SBL technology readiness to support
a research and development proof-of-concept flight and to recommend a
program among several options presented to his team. In their report,
they observed that the technology is mature enough to support an SBL
sub-scale flight experiment with medium risk by 2005. This would be an
important step in demonstrating the feasibility of Space-Based Lasers
as an option for future defense against ballistic missiles.
The next step is to investigate and document the cost, technical
feasibility, and treaty compliance of completing an integrated ground
demonstration and a flight demonstration, and present program options
for prioritization in the fiscal year 00 Program Objectives Memorandum.
[Clerk's note. End of questions submitted by Mr. Skeen.
Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the answers thereto
follow:]
Fiscal Year 1998 Budget Request
Question. The Administration's 1998 budget request is $2.9 million.
This is almost $700 million less than the 1997 appropriation of $3.6
billion. The budget also proposes to fund all BMD procurement within
Service accounts, not under the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
(BMDO). General Lyles, the 1998 budget request is significantly less
than the 1997 appropriation. Does the budget contain a sufficient level
of funding to continue to develop and deploy the core Theater Ballistic
Missile Defense programs?
Answer. a. Yes--the fiscal year 1998 budget for Ballistic Missile
Defense does contain a sufficient level of funding to continue to
develop and deploy the core Theater Ballistic Missile Defense programs.
FY97 AND FY98 PLUS-UP COMPARISON
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY97 in FY97 FY98 in FY98 in
FY97 PB Appn FY97 PB FY98 PB
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BMDO managed programs:
PROCUREMENT
THAAD System................ 0.0 0.0 0.0 \1\0.0
HAWK........................ 19.4 19.4 0.0 \1\0.0
TMD-BMC3.................... 19.3 19.3 20.2 \1\20.1
PAC3........................ 215.4 215.4 361.4 \1\349.1
Navy Area Wide.............. 9.2 9.2 15.5 \1\15.4
---------------------------------------
Total Procurement....... 263.2 263.2 397.1 384.6
RDT&E:
Support Tech................ 226.3 366.3 244.1 249.5
THAAD System................ 481.8 621.8 481.5 556.1
Navy Theater Wide........... 58.2 304.2 96.2 194.9
CORPS SAM/MEADS............. 56.2 30.0 48.1 48.0
BPI-DEM/VAL................. 0.0 24.3 0.0 12.9
NMD......................... 508.4 833.4 511.5 504.1
Joint TMD................... 520.1 525.5 557.0 542.6
PAC3-EMD.................... 381.5 381.5 195.3 206.1
Navy Area Wide.............. 301.6 301.6 268.5 267.8
---------------------------------------
Total RDT&E............. 2,534.2 3,388.7 2,402.2 2,582.0
MILCON:
NMD......................... 0 0 0.0 0.5
Joint TMD................... 1.4 1.4 2.0 2.0
THAAD System................ 0 0 4.6 4.6
---------------------------------------
Total MILCON............ 1.4 1.4 6.6 7.1
Total BMDO Program.. 2,798.8 3,651.8 2,805.9 2,973.7
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Procurement Funding has been transferred to the services.
These figures are displayed here for information only.
Question. Do you have any unfunded requirements in theater missile
defense?
Answer. The fiscal year 1998 President's budget could be augmented
with the following prioritized list. Funding the items on this list
will minimized outyear tails and assist in solving immediate pressures.
First priority goes to risk reduction programs for the Major Defense
Acquisition Programs (MDAPs); second, joint interoperability risk
reduction issues with MDAP enhancements, third improvements to our
Advance Technology base, and finally, procurement of weapon systems not
funded by BMDO.
Navy Area Defense (Lower Tier) ($44 million RDT&E)--for risk
mitigation efforts associated with EMD testing that were not in the
previous program baseline.
($35 million)--for upgrades to the Pacific Missile Range
Facility (PMRF) to meet Congressionally mandated use of PMRF and
Multiple Simultaneous Engagement (MSE) testing. Funding would avoid
offsets from other ballistic missile defense activities.
($9 million)--for targets, target support and range
support due to new equipment for UOES characterization testing.
Joint Theater Missile Defense (JTMD) ($92 million RDT&E)
($50 million)--to ensure sufficient fiscal year 1998
Family Of Systems (FoS) testing and activities for joint
interoperability testing, system exerciser simulations, hardware-in-
the-loop, CINC exercises, and system integration tests (SITs). MDAPs
have been accelerated, but JTMD has not received any additional TOA for
interoperability support in step with program schedules. Outyear
funding for JTMD through fiscal year 03 in the areas of PMRF, FoS
Strategic Targets (STARS) and MEADS will be addressed in the POM
update.
($22 million)--to make an investment in definition and
development of joint attack operations. The required investment is
comprised of four major activities: (1) perform field tests, exercises,
and training that focus on Attack Operations, (2) develop a joint
attack operations operational requirements document, (3) formulate an
integrated investment strategy, and (4) define the payoff to other
mission areas from investments/improved performance in Attack
Operations.
($10 million)--JTAMDO. accelerate system engineering and
modeling and simulation and complete the Technical Requirements
Document.
($10 million)--Israeli Cooperative Projects--to foster
system interoperability between Israeli Arrow system and US TMD
systems.
PATRIOT ($15 million RDT&E Defense-Wide)--additional funding would
support unanticipated range and hardware funding requirements needed
during the ongoing Engineering and Manufacturing Development flight
test program without changing the number of flight tests or reducing
other risk mitigation activities.
Navy Theater (Upper) (not to exceed $70 million RDT&E)--to increase
risk reduction activities by increasing the number of pre-EMD flight
tests and ship and missile system engineering to support early entry
into EMD. Consistent with current program approach.
Question. Is the funding in the budget sufficient to continue to
develop and deploy the National Missile Defense (NMD) program?
Answer. No. As part of the acquisition review process, the
Department has revised its estimates of the costs for the current 3
plus 3 program. We now estimate that another $2.3 billion will be
required across the Fiscal Year 1998 through 2003 Future Years Defense
Program (FYDP) to maintain the currently defined program and schedule.
The Department established during the Quadrennial Defense Review that
the program cannot meet the 3 plus 3 schedule with currently programmed
funds.
The Department felt the funding programmed for the 3 plus 3 NMD
program was adequate at the time the Fiscal Year 1998 President's
Budget was prepared and submitted to Congress. But during the past year
NMD program maturity was increasing as a result of DoD--and
Congressional--focus, review, and definition. Before accurate or even
reasonable cost estimates can be defined for the NMD system, we must
define what ``it'' is.
Early last year the Department designated the NMD program a major
defense acquisition program. While the NMD technologies continue to
mature, the NMD program itself is still composed of multiple concepts
common to early acquisition programs. Thus, the requirements, designs
and resulting cost estimates to date have been, of necessity, coarse.
All of these estimates will be refined as the program proceeds through
the acquisition process.
During the definition period, the warfighting community prepares
and submits mission needs statements and capstone operational
requirements documents. In August 1996, the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC) approved a National Missile Defense Capstone
Requirements Document (CRD) specifying the preliminary operational
requirements that the NMD system would need to meet. On March 10, 1997,
the JROC validated the Key Performance Parameters of Joint Operational
Requirements Document (ORD).
The NMD program has undergone a formal review process, called the
Systems Requirements Review (SRR). This process began last August and
concluded on April 4, 1997. This greatly increased our understanding of
the NMD system's requirements, as well as its projected cost, schedule
and performance. This activity ensures we inject realism and rigor into
both the planning and execution of the NMD program. When the SRR
concluded--in the middle of the QDR process--the final result was a set
of NMD System and Element requirements and a baseline architecture that
would meet all the NMD Capstone Requirements Document objectives,
namely protecting all 50 states against a small number of
unsophisticated ballistic missile threats.
The NMD development program is at an early stage of program
maturity. This has led to a situation in which our previous cost
estimates were based on rough order of magnitude costs, grounded in
parametrics, lab tests, and simulations. The Department's cost
estimating process was further complicated by delays in forming the NMD
Joint Program Office--which limited the number of people who could help
manage these issues--and in the awarding of the Lead System Integrator
contract.
The recent completion of the Systems Requirements Review will lead
to increasing system definition and stability in cost estimates. Our
systems engineering and cost analyses provide us a better understanding
of the RDT&E funding required to develop an NMD system on a highly
compressed schedule.
Question. Do you have any unfunded requirements in National Missile
Defense?
Answer. Based on the NMD life-cycle cost estimate supporting the
QDR process, the NMD program will require an additional $474 million in
fiscal year 98 RDT&E funds to execute the 3 plus 3 schedule and
program. These additional resources would be roughly spent on:
Program shortfalls ($100 million). Delays and hardware
(additional target) associated with Integrated Flight Test 1 failure;
delays in transferring the THAAD dem/val radar to the GBR-P; BMC3
development as a result of contract negotiations; EKV communications
development as a result of contractor estimates; and radar
discrimination algorithms.
Previously deferred program content ($85 million). EKV
telemetry unit development; EKV hardness and lethality testing; and
Forward-based X-band Radar and UWER development under the LSI
contractor.
Cost Risk Reduction ($74 million). Additional funding to
all elements (in line with established cost estimates) to allow for
development/test unknowns without sacrificing program content.
Schedule risk reduction ($110 million). Accelerate
procurement of and add hardware (such as targets and boosters) to
mitigate test delays or failures (most items are lead-time away and
still unavailable until fiscal year 99 timeframe); accelerate Hardware-
in-the-loop model and hardware procurements; and improve test launch
capabilities.
Technical risk reduction ($105 million). Increase Systems
Engineering to include development of high fidelity system simulator
for performance verification; continued EKV competition through first
intercept flights; long-lead procurement of hardware for added test
flights beginning in fiscal year 00; and explore alternative
technologies, such as radar transit/receive modules, to maintain
program flexibility and to reduce procurement costs.
Question. The budget proposes to shift procurement of missile
defense systems to the Services in 1998. Do you have any concerns about
this? Will you continue to have adequate management control over these
systems once the funds have been transferred?
Answer. In February memorandum to Department's senior leadership,
Deputy Secretary of Defense White affirmed BMDO's role as central
planner, manager, and integrator for the BMD mission, and in
particular, the role of the Director of BMDO as the BMD Acquisition
Executive (BMDAE). As such, the Director will continue to serve on the
Defense Resources Board (DRB) when BMD programs and issues are
discussed and, thereby, will be able to influence the allocation of
funds to programs and DoD components. As the BMDAE, the Director will
have the opportunity to concur or non-concur with Service funding
proposals that impact BMD programs. Third, the DoD Comptroller will
provide BMDO the opportunity to review any transfer proposed by a
Service. Should BMDO and the Service be unable to reach an agreement,
the issue will be evaluated to the DRB level where the Director will
work with the Service and the Department's senior leadership to ensure
BMD programs are appropriately funded.
However, despite these three venues for managing BMD procurement
funding, there remain significant challenges to doing so.
First, BMDO will not be able to affect BMD procurement funding
directly. New procedures for BMDO to influence BMD procurement funding
levels, on a program-by-program basis will have to be established.
These could prove to be cumbersome and less efficient.
Second, it is inevitable that the Military Services will attempt to
budget for BMD programs in the context of total Service requirements.
To the extent that BMD programs are not a Service's top priority, there
could be attempts to move BMD funding into other accounts, or to offer
BMD funding as a bill payer when Congress or the Department issues non-
specific reductions to the DoD budget.
Third, each service will tend to favor its own BMD programs over
those of the other Services, and to resist a BMDO plan which, while
optimizing performance and/or response to the total threat, favors one
particular Service's system at the expense of another Service's system.
Fourth, in the past, BMDO has tended to produce system cost
estimates that substantially exceeded cost estimates generated by the
Services for the same system. While in full control of the funds, BMDO
has typically budgeted at the higher number to minimize risk. Should
the Services continue to produce lower cost estimates and insist on
budgeting at those lower levels, the risk of not meeting schedules or
having to reduce system performance could increase substantially.
Navy Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (Navy Lower Tier)
Question. The Navy Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (Navy
Lower Tier) system detects, tracks, and engages short and medium range
theater ballistic missiles. In January, the Navy Lower Tier
successfully intercepted a Lance missile at White Sands Missile Range.
Subsequent to that test the program entered into the Engineering
Manufacturing and Design (EMD) phase of acquisition. The budget request
for 1998 is about $268 million.
General Lyles, last year when this Committee met, the Navy Lower
Tier program had some delays and setbacks. However, we understand that
a recent flight test was successful and that a Lance missile was
intercepted. Will you please tell the Committee about that test? What
were the objectives of that test?
Answer. The Standard Missile Block IVA (SM-2 Blk IVA) Developmental
Test Round (DTR-1A) intercept was accomplished on January 24, 1997. The
objectives of the test were to intercept a TBM-like target utilizing
infrared (IR) guidance, to demonstrate dome cover removal and dome
cooling, to demonstrate IR acquisition, track, handover, and guidance,
to demonstrate IR aero-optical performance, and to place a warhead
fragment on target. We successfully demonstrated these test objectives
and Dr. Kaminiski approved the program's proceeding to EMD.
Question. Did the Navy Lower Tier system meet all the objectives of
that test?
Answer. Yes, all test objectives were met.
Question. The Congress directed that a User Operational Evaluation
System (UOES) be deployed by 1997 and provided full funding for Navy
Lower Tier to ensure the earliest possible deployment of that system.
The President's Budget projects a UOES capability by 2000. Please
explain why the Navy requires an additional three years to deploy this
system. Are there technical problems? Are there resource problems?
Answer. There were programmatic and technical issues that have
delayed the UOES and deployment dates. Those issues have now been
resolved and the program has left the ``Preliminary Design and Risk
Reduction'' phase and entered the Engineering and Manufacturing
Development (EMD) phase.
Prior to the Navy Area TBMD program entering EMD, a 1994 OSD
Acquisition Decision Memorandum required the Navy to obtain OSD
concurrence on an acquisition strategy and for the program to conduct
specific Risk Reduction Flight Demonstration (RRFD) activities,
including demonstration of Infra-Red (IR) seeker performance. Delays in
this process included the following:
Approval of the acquisition strategy involved getting
permission from the Department of Justice to combine two competing
contractors (Raytheon and Hughes) into a single company that could then
leverage the best of competing design concepts. Delays in obtaining
required approvals, and then accomplishing this unique strategy,
contributed to approximately a six month schedule slip.
Problems integrating an IR seeker into the missile's
existing Radio Frequency guidance section, and then adequately testing
it prior to flight, took almost a full year longer than originally
planned.
The first Environmental Test Flight failed when the
missile booster malfunctioned. Although the booster was not a new
design, to confirm the reason for the failure and prepare another
missile for that specific test required approximately 5 additional
months.
Finally, the first intercept test flight was a ``no-test''
when the interceptor could not be launched due to problems confirming
target telemetry at the test site. The interceptor had to be
refurbished after this no-test to replace batteries.
Following the successful intercept on January 24, 1997, a Defense
Acquisition Board Readiness Meeting was conducted on February 19, and
permission to enter EMD was granted on February 22. On March 14 the
Navy completed Critical Design Review (CDR) of the UOES computer
program. The first AEGIS cruiser is scheduled to receive the TBMD UOES
computer upgrade in Fiscal year 1998 and the UOES missiles are
scheduled to begin delivery in Fiscal year 1999. UOES at-sea testing is
now scheduled for Fiscal Year 2000.
Question. In the absence of a Phase II agreement, will compliance
determinations still remain a ``national responsibility''? In other
words, will it still be up to the U.S. to decide whether or not a TBM
system is compliant?
Answer. Yes, if the negotiators in Geneva fail to reach a Part II
agreement, the United States will continue to make its own compliance
determinations regarding TMD systems.
Question. If we are capable of deciding what is compliant or not on
our own now, what is the need for the demarcation agreement? What do we
gain by signing this agreement? Doesn't the agreement just tie our
hands in terms of future TBMD systems?
Answer. The demarcation agreement has two parts. Part I says that
TMD systems with interceptor missiles having velocities of 3 km/sec or
less are compliant with the ABM Treaty, provided they are not tested
against ballistic target missiles with velocities greater than 5 km/sec
or ranges greater than 3,500 km. Thus, as long as these parameters are
not exceeded, lower-velocity TMD systems--Patriot, THAAD, and Navy
Area--will no longer require time-consuming national compliance
determinations, even when the configurations of these systems change.
Although Part II will still require national compliance determinations
for higher-velocity TMD systems, such compliance determinations will
less likely be challenged by the Russian Government so long as the U.S.
adheres to the target limitations of the Part II agreement. Both
agreements continue to evolve the cooperative, non-threatening,
strategic relationship between the U.S. and Russia. Regarding the
impact of the Helsinski Agreement on future TMD systems, it does not
affect any aspect of TMD systems that are currently planned for future
deployment.
Question. How many ships and how many missiles will be used in the
UOES system?
Answer. UOES is comprised of two AEGIS cruisers and thirty-five
missiles.
Question. The President's Budget also projects that the First Unit
Equipped (FUE) for Navy Lower Tier will be 2002. Are your fairly
confident with this projected date?
Answer. Yes.
Question. All told, how many ships will be equipped with Navy Lower
Tier?
Answer. Seventy-nine (79) ships (22 cruisers and 57 destroyers)
will be equipped with the Navy Area TBMD system.
Question. Do you have any unfunded requirements?
Answer. The fiscal year 1998 President's budget could be augmented
with the following prioritized list. Funding the items on this list
will minimize outyear tails and assist in solving immediate pressures.
First priority goes to risk reduction programs for the Major Defense
Acquisition Programs (MDAPs); second, joint interoperability risk
reduction issues with MDAP enhancements, third, improvements to our
Advance Technology base, and finally, procurement of weapon systems not
funded by BMDO.
($44 million RDT&E)--for risk mitigation efforts
associated with EMD testing that were not in the previous program
baseline.
$35 million)--for upgrades to the Pacific Missile Range
Facility (PMRF) to meet Congressionally mandated use of PMRF and
Multiple Simultaneous Engagement (MSE) testing. Funding would avoid
offsets from other ballistic missile defense activities.
($9 million)--for targets, target support and range
support due to new requirement for UOES characterization testing.
Question. The Navy Lower Tier system on AEGIS ships is comprised
of: a modified Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) capable Navy
Standard Missile and an improved SPY-1 radar. The Navy's new DDG--51
shipbuilding plan drops funds for theater ballistic missile defense
from all new DDG-51 ships funded through the year 2001. BMDO plans to
deploy Navy Lower Tier by 2002.
Given the 3 to 5 year construction time to build a ship, the
earliest that the Navy could field theater ballistic missile defense is
2005. Why does BMDO state that Navy Lower Tier will be deployed in
2002? Who is wrong, BMDO or the Navy?
Answer. The Navy has not stated Navy Lower Tier will be deployed in
2005. They do not have new construction ships with TBMD upgrades funded
until 2001. However, the Navy Area TBMD First Unit Equipped (FUE) will
be an already commissioned AEGIS cruiser that will be upgraded to
accommodate TBMD. This upgrade consists of installing adjunct processor
software and firmware modifications (a TBMD ship set) to the ship's
combat systems during a planned maintenance availability period. These
TBMD upgrades will begin in late 1998. The Navy has over $300 million
budgeted for TBMD upgrades between 1998 and 2003. The first TBMD
missiles (SM-2 BLK IVA) will be available for TBMD retrofitted ships in
fiscal year 2002. This will allow deployment of the Navy Area TBMD
``Navy Lower Tier'' in 2002. After 2001, TBMD ship sets will be
installed on the DDG-51 class (AEGIS) destroyers as they are being
constructed while retrofit of AEGIS cruisers (22 total) and all
previously commissioned DDG-51 class destroyers continues.
Question. Do you believe that the Navy is fully on board with the
Navy Lower Tier program?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Does the Navy agree with the First Unit Equipped date of
2002?
Answer. The Department's position for the Navy Area program FUE is
2002.
Question. If the Navy is fully committed to the Navy Lower Tier
system, is there a reason why funds were not included in the budget to
modify planned AEGIS ships to accommodate theater ballistic missile
defense systems?
Answer. The Department's fiscal year 1998 President's Budget submit
included the transfer of BMDO TMD procurement funds (missile and AEGIS)
to the Navy, specifically to the Weapons Procurement Navy (WPN),
Standard Missile SM-2 (12E) account. The Navy set aside funds within
the FY 1998 President's Budget, WPN Standard Missile SM-2 (12E)
account, necessary to conduct the AEGIS TMD modifications. The navy
will realign these funds to Other Procurement, Navy (OPN) to modify and
equip AEGIS ships for the TMD mission.
Question. What would the impact be to theater ballistic missile
defense systems if the Navy does not modify these ships as they are
built?
Answer. The Navy is fully committed to fielding theater ballistic
missile defense systems across the AEGIS fleet. Indeed, every effort is
being made by both the BMDO and the Navy to accelerate the fielding of
these systems and provide the nation with this critical defensive
capability.
Question. Is there potential for added cost and delay in the
deployment of the sea-based theater ballistic missile defense systems?
Answer. Barring any unforeseen problems, the Navy Area TBMD program
is assessed as being low to medium risk for both cost and schedule.
Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3)
Question. The Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) missile defense
system is comprised of four basic elements: a radar, an engagement
control station, a launching station and interceptors. PAC-3 will
engage and destroy short and medium range theater ballistic missile and
cruise missiles within the atmosphere. Development is being done in
stages: configuration 1 upgrades the guidance system; configuration 2
enhances the radar; configuration 3 includes the PAC-3 hit-to-kill
missile (formerly known as Extended Range Interceptor, ERINT). The
budget request for 1998 is $556.1 million ($206.1 million in R&D, $350
million in Service procurement.). The PAC-3 missile defense system is
being developed incrementally. General Lyles, will you please explain
the differences between the various development stages and
configurations?
Answer. Based on the lessons learned from Operations Desert Shield
and Desert Storm, the Army initiated a new development program that
improved the PATRIOT systems' performance. This new development program
planned to extend the PATRIOT units' battlespace while enhancing
lethality of the system against TBMs. The first improvements were near-
term upgrades fielded in 1992-1993 to the PAC-2 system that: (1)
provided for rapid, accurate fire unit emplacement through the use of
the Global Positioning System and a North Finding Seeker; (2) improved
the defended area of the fire unit by remoting missile launchers up to
12 km from the ground radar set; and (3) provided ground radar
enhancements that improved TBM detection and increase system
survivability.
More substantial improvements to the PAC-2/QRP system were
initiated under the Army's new PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3)
program. To more rapidly field improvements and modifications to the
PATRIOT system as they were developed, the PAC-3 program was separated
into three separate configurations.
Configuration 1 modifications include: the Guidance Enhanced
Missile (GEM), a new pulse Doppler process for the ground radar, and
new processing and data storage upgrades to the Expanded Weapons
Control Computer (EWCC). The new EWCC provides four times the
throughput of the current WCC and eight times the memory. This
expansion in memory is critical to allow PATRIOT the ability to
continue to grow in its performance capabilities with advanced software
techniques since the current WCC cannot support any substantial
increase in lines of software code. The new pulse Doppler processor
improves the ground radar dwell time for the pulse Doppler waveforms
and well as improving the performance of the radar against targets in
clutter. The GEM missile provides improved system effectiveness and
lethality against high speed TBMs and reduced radar cross section (RCS)
air breathing targets (ABTs). All of these modifications have completed
development and were fielded starting in 1995, with the last of the 10
PATRIOT Battalions modified in spring 1997.
Configuration 2 modifications included: (1) communications upgrades
through the use of the JTIDS terminals at the Battalion level for
interfacing on the Joint arena net; (2) ground radar enhancements that
improves detection of lower cross section targets at a greater
distance; (3) an improved defensive capability against Anti Radiation
Missiles; (4) provides for the first phase of Classification,
Discrimination, and Identification (CDI), an upgrade which correlates
target tracks received from external sources to a fire units tracks
generated by the ground radar; and (5) PDB-4 software, which maximizes
the capability of all previous hardware improvements and additionally
has TBM message capability. These upgrades have completed operational
testing and the first tactical unit was fielded with these improvements
in December 1996. Two of the ten PATRIOT Battalions have received these
modifications, with the remaining receiving the modifications through
1998.
Configuration 3 modifications include: (1) the new PAC-3 hit-to-
kill missile which provides improved lethality against TBMs: (2)
improved defended area of the fire unit by remoting missile launchers
up to 30 kms from the ground radar set; (3) CDI Phase III modifications
to improve identification and classification and discrimination of
TBMs; (4) adding several improvements to the ground radar that
significantly increases its detection range while at the same time
increases its reliability; (5) communications upgrade that provides
JTIDS terminals at the Fire Unit level; and (6) adding PDB-5 software
upgrades which will maximize the capabilities of the previous
improvements to the PATRIOT system. These upgrades are currently in
either engineering and manufacturing development or production and will
be fielded as a complete system in 4th Quarter, fiscal year 1999.
Question. The Army recently conducted two tests of the PAC-3
configuration. What were the results of those tests? Did the system
meet all of the objectives of the tests?
Answer. The PATRIOT program recently conducted extensive testing
and two missile firings at Kwajalein Missile Range. The PATRIOT program
participated in a tri-fold event which included Willow Dune, TMD
Critical Measurements Program (TCMP) and System Integration Test (SIT)-
97.
During the Willow Dune engagement, the objectives for the PATRIOT
Missile System were to search, detect, track, engage, guide to and fuze
on the target. A tactical PATRIOT Fire Unit with Configuration 2
modifications was used during this exercise. The tactical PATRIOT Fire
Unit met or exceeded its test objects and engaged and intercepted the
SCUD targets with both a PAC-2 and GEM missile.
During the TCMP exercise (non-engagement), the objectives for the
exercise were to characterize the capabilities of both the
Configuration 2 and Configuration 3 ground radars against a medium
range target. During the TCMP exercise, both radars demonstrated the
ability to detect and track medium range targets.
During SIT-97, the PATRIOT Configuration 2 modified Fire Unit test
objectives were to demonstrate current interoperability capability,
although full interoperability is not expected or achieved until the
units receive Configuration 3 modifications. However, the Configuration
2 modified Fire Unit did demonstrate a limited interoperability
capability.
Question. How will the PAC-3 Configuration 3 system benefit from
these tests? What lessons have we learned?
Answer. The direct benefit of such testing clearly demonstrates
that the PATRIOT missile system can counter the current TBM threat.
Furthermore, these tests enable the PATRIOT program to collect and
analyze the performance data from actual threat targets and thus
utilize that data during the development of the Configuration 3
modifications.
Additionally, the testing demonstrated that the PAC-2 and GEM
missiles can successfully intercept a Scud target, and that the GEM
missile can provide more fragments to the target warhead. The testing
also demonstrated that the Configuration 2 ground radar provides a
significant improvement over the PATRIOT ground radar used in Operation
Desert Storm, and that the Configuration 2 ground radar. Finally, we
demonstrated that the Configuration 3 CDI III Wide Range Resolution
waveforms can provided warhead debris discrimination based on length,
radar cross section (RCS) and drag measurements.
Question. The Army has fielded that PAC-3 configuration 1 and has
begun to field configuration 2. When will the PAC-3 missile be tested?
Answer. Initial missile integration and Hardware-in-the-Loop
testing has begun on the PAC-3 missile at the contractors facility. The
first Controlled Test Flight of the PAC-3 missile is scheduled for late
Summer 1997 at White Sands Missile Range, NM.
Question. How many flight tests will be conducted with the PAC-3
(ERINT) missile before the a decision to procure is made?
Answer. Three flights tests will be conducted before a Low Rate
Initial Production (LRIP) procurement decision is made. The first two
flight tests are controlled test flights and the third is a guided test
flight. The difference between the two are the first two missions are
not intended to intercept targets while the third mission is designate
as an intercept mission.
Question. When will the PAC-3 configuration-3 be fielded?
Answer. Configuration 3 is scheduled to be fielded in the 4th
quarter of fiscal year 99. This configuration is the last in the series
of three incremental improvements to the PARTIOT Missile Defense
program.
Question. What will the advantages of the PAC-3 configuration 3 be
compared with the current PATRIOT System?
Answer. The most significant advantage of the PAC-3 Configuration 3
modifications is the combined effects of improvements to the ground
systems coupled with the new hit-to-kill PAC-3 missile. The
Configuration 3 system can detect a target at a greater range, better
identify target type and will have a greater missile inventory.
Furthermore, the PAC-3 missile has a significantly capability against
more stressing threats, such as chemical submunition warheads.
Additionally, the Configuration 3 system will have an eight fold
increase in defended area and a 100% increase in lethality against
stressing threats, over the Configuration 2 system. The Configuration 2
system has an 8 fold increase in defended area coverage and a 50%
increase in lethality, over the Desert Storm PATRIOT system.
Question. What is the total acquisition cost of the PAC-3?
Answer. The PATRIOT program then year (TY$) cost for the PAC-3
program (Configuration 1 through Configuration 3) is $2.9 billion in
development and $4.3 billion in procurement. The total acquisition cost
is $7.2 billion.
Question. Do you have any unfunded requirements?
Answer. The fiscal year 1998 President's budget could be augmented
with the following prioritized list. Funding the items on this list
will minimize outyear tails and assist in solving immediate pressures.
First priority goes to risk reduction programs for the Major Defense
Acquisition Programs (MDAPs); second, joint interoperability risk
reduction issues with MDAP enhancements, third, improvements to our
Advance Technology base, and finally, procurement of weapon systems not
funded by BMDO.
($15 million RDT&E Defense Wide)--additional funding would
support unanticipated range and hardware funding requirements needed
during the ongoing Engineering and Manufacturing Development flight
test program without changing the number of flight tests or reducing
other risk mitigation activities.
Question. The budget includes $350 million in Army procurement for
the PAC-3. What will be procured with these funds?
Answer. Fiscal year 1998 is the first year of low rate initial
production for the new PAC-3 hit-to-kill missile. Approximately $115
million of the $350 million requested in fiscal year 1998 is
specifically tied to procurement of these 52 missiles. The balance of
the funding is for ground support equipment and the accompanying
engineering support for Configuration 3 radar improvements,
classification, discrimination and identification upgrades, and
improvements to the remote launch capability. Other ground improvements
include the enhanced launcher electronics system, allowing the existing
PATRIOT launcher to fire either pre-RAC-3 missiles or the new PAC-3
missile.
Question. Do you have any concerns about being able to manage the
BMD programs if the Services, in this case the Army, manage their own
procurement funds?
Answer. Subsequent to the notification of the transition of
procurement funds to the Services in fiscal year 98, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense sent a Memorandum to the Services validating the
Acquisition Executive role of BMDO and mission to oversee the
coordination and submission of all Ballistic Missile Defense efforts.
The implementation of this memorandum is still underway. I remain
confident that the Services will continue to support critical Ballistic
Missile Defense programs.
Question. What assurance do you have that funds programmed in other
Service accounts for ballistic missile defense will be spent for these
purposes and not programmed for other Service priority?
Answer. The implementation of the Deputy Secretary of Defense
Memorandum, dated February 12, 1997, will provide a test case on the
Service's continued support to ballistic missile defense. To date, I
have not observed any attempt by the Services to downplay the need or
priority of ballistic missile defense programs. In fact, the Army is
working hard to resolve an internal problem tied to PATRIOT
interoperability via the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System
to ensure success of the program. However, a true measure of the effect
of the transition of procurement funds to the Services will become
clear during the Summer and Fall review cycles of the Fiscal Year 1999
President's Budget development.
Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
Question. The Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile
defense system provides protection against short and long range theater
ballistic missiles by intercepting them both in and out of the
atmosphere (endo and exoatmosphere). THAAD consists of four components:
truck mounted launchers, interceptors, a radar, and battle management
command, control and communications (BM/C3I) systems. The THAAD program
is in its fourth year of demonstration and validation. To date, seven
flight tests have been conducted. The first three were to test the
propulsion, controls and the seeker. The fourth and following flight
tests were to intercept a target. Each of the four interception tests
failed. The budget request for 1998 is $560.7 million. General Lyles,
the THAAD missile system has experienced a series of failures. The most
recent failure was extremely disappointing because it was the fourth
consecutive failure. What exactly happened? What components worked and
what did not work?
Answer. The THAAD missile program conducted its seventh flight test
at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico on March 6, 1997. This most
recent failure was caused by anomalous behavior of the Divert and
Attitude Control System (DACS). The DACS receives guidance and
navigation control commands from the missile's in-flight computer and
provides the divert and attitude control required to guide the THAAD
kinetic kill vehicle toward intercept of its target. The DACS has
performed nominally on all six prior flight tests. Although THAAD did
not achieve an intercept, the radar, launcher, the battle management/
command, control, and communications all performed nominally.
Corrective actions based on results of the flight test failure analysis
are underway.
Question. What do you intend to do to ensure that the next test
will be a success? When is that test scheduled? Will there be a delay?
How long of a delay?
Answer. The date for the next THAAD flight test is still to be
determined. As a result of this most recent failure, I chartered two
independent review teams. One of those teams evaluated the design of
the THAAD missile to determine if there are sufficient design margins
to ensure reliability on future flight tests. The second team performed
an evaluation of the total program concept and requirements to
determine the developmental risk involved in executing the program. The
teams' findings validated the THAAD concept of a hit-to-kill, endo/
exoatmospheric interceptor. Additionally, it was determined that the
current THAAD design is capable of performing the intended mission.
Numerous recommendations were made to rectify subsystem reliability,
test, and quality assurance shortfalls. Recommended changes are being
assessed by BMDO and the Army for implementation. The most immediate
impact will be a delay in conducting the next flight test, previously
planned for July 97, to allow implementation of the recommendations and
corrective actions.
Question. Last year the President's Budget proposed to severely cut
the funds for the THAAD program and to delay its deployment to 2006.
General O'Neill testified that the THAAD program could be deployed
sooner if the proper resources were committed. He also said that the
delay was due solely to budget cuts not technical problems. It was on
that basis that this Committee decided to restore $140 million to the
program. General Lyles, do you believe General O'Neill was mistaken?
Does this program have serious technical problems?
Answer. I do not believe Lt Gen O'Neill was mistaken. The problems
that THAAD has encountered during flight testing have primarily been
problems with subsystem reliability, verification, and quality control.
This assertion was confirmed by the two independent review teams. In
December, the Department of Defense added $722 million in Future Years
Defense Program to accelerate the program to achieve a First Unit
Equipped (FUE) in fiscal year 04. Although BMDO and the Army continue
to assess the details of the impact of the flight test program on the
FUE schedule, the Quadrennial Defense review (QDR) has restructured
THAAD in light of the test difficulties and the Independent Review Team
findings for an FUE of fiscal year 06.
Question. Do you believe the THAAD program has been too aggressive
in terms of schedule and resources? Did the Administration's decision
last year to cut the program back and our subsequent reversal of that
decision have an effect on the program?
Answer. It is generally understood, that the threat from the
theater ballistic missiles has warranted an aggressive schedule for the
THAAD program. The decision to remove funding from the program in 1996
effectively delayed the program from an fiscal year 02 to fiscal year
06. The Department's decision to add funding back to the program has
accelerated the program by 17 months to achieve an FUE in late fiscal
year 04. However, the recent flight test setback and implementation of
the review teams' recommendations will delay the FUE. The Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR) has subsequently restructured THAAD--in light of
the test difficulties and the Independent Review Team findings--for an
FUE of fiscal year 06. However, my staff is aggressively looking at the
schedules and options available to meet the FUE as soon as
programmatically possible.
Question. How would a stable funding profile help the management of
the program?
Answer. Stable funding is critical to the successful execution of
any program. The technical complexity associated with the THAAD
development makes a stable funding profile all that more critical.
Stable funding allows the project manager to optimize the development
and test schedule and lay out the contractual efforts accordingly.
Funding instability, specifically reductions, are particularly
detrimental to a successful acquisition program.
Question. Should the Congress continue to aggressively fund this
program? Or should we reevaluate this program given its recent
technical problems?
Answer. The THAAD program is adequately funded to execute the
program the BMDO and the Army are developing. It would be premature for
me to suggest that the program be aggressively funded until I've had an
opportunity to review, and the Department to approve, the
aforementioned program options.
Question. Do you believe in the technical viability of the current
missile design?
Answer. The technical viability of the missile is a concern which
generated my desire to have an independent team look at the missile
design. The team's findings validated the THAAD concept of a hit-to-
kill, endo/exoatmospheric interceptor. In spite of the failed
intercepts, it was determined that the THAAD design is capable of
performing the intended mission. The problems have been with the
program subsystem reliability and verification, and in quality
assurance.
Question. Dr. Kaminski suggested that the THAAD program will
probably require some sort of ``restructuring.'' What does he mean?
Will the program be delayed further? What will the impact on resources
be?
Answer. Any restructure of the program would seek to lower the
cost, schedule, and performance risk in executing the program.
Additionally, a restructure would reestablish a THAAD program with
achievable milestones, acceptable developmental risk, and within
available resources when balanced against the TBM threat. The QDR, in
fact, has done exactly that--restructure the program, with an FUE date
of 2006.
Question. Will the review include a look at other potential
contractors? Have you made a mistake in putting all your eggs in one
basket?
Answer. The independent review teams I chartered are focusing their
efforts on the program and its prime contractor. Seeking an alternate
contractor for development of the THAAD system is an option, but not
one we are currently pursuing. Seeking an alternate contractor to
perform the remaining development on the program would be costly and
likely delay completion of the program by several years. However, we
are considering duel sourcing certain high risk subsystems and
components. With respect to a single source acquisition strategy for
THADD, I do not think we have erred. The urgency for the earliest
possible development of an upper tier system drove the decision to
limit the program to a single contractor.
Question. Is the contractor applying enough rigor to reviewing its
THAAD program?
Answer. I am concerned about the contractor's performance with the
THAAD development. I have expressed this concern to them on a number of
occasions and believe that they are making an earnest effort to put the
program back on a successful track. We, clearly, have the attention of
the senior management at Lockheed Martin to make THAAD a successful
program.
Question. Given the urgent requirement for an upper tier missile
defense system and the problems that THAAD is now experiencing do you
think we should seek alternative systems?
Answer. The THAAD design has been developed and improved for more
than 5 years. The test program is performing its role of uncovering
areas where changes must be made to ensure that the risks have been
addressed and can be mitigated. This most recent flight test, while not
successful in getting its primary intercept objective, was the first
time that the entire THAAD system was used and demonstrates the
progress that the program continues to make. I am convinced that the
reliability and quality assurance problems can be overcome and that the
system will work as intended.
Question. What does the recent failure do to the current schedule?
Will the User Operational Evaluation System (UOES) be deployed in 1999?
Answer. THAAD is, and has been, developed on an event based
schedule. Flight test failures have been investigated and design
changes made consistent with a program in the Demonstration/Validation
(prototype) stage of development. The UOES, minus the missiles, has
already been successfully integrated into system level testing.
Software increments will continue to be added for increasing
capability. The UOES missiles will not be brought until at least one
successful intercept has been made. Right now those UOES missile
deliveries will begin in 1999, and be completed in 2000.
Question. Is the Army planning to commit funds early for the 40
UOES missiles? Has the Army reconsidered its position?
Answer. The Army position is that THAAD is a vitally needed
defensive capability. It is that urgency of need that calls for a
balance between comprehensive testing and the production of 40 UOES
missiles. An intercept of a representative target along with the
extensive ground testing done and planned provides us the minimum
confidence that the missile design is well understood and modeled, and
that the ground testing is sufficiently rigid.
Question. The General Accounting Office (GAO) recently issued a
report criticizing the Army for planning to base a procurement decision
for the 40 UOES missiles upon a single test. It seems that with the
failure of flight 7, GAO's specific criticism is now moot. However, do
you think that GAO's overall concerns about concurrency are valid?
Answer. The Army position is that THAAD is a vitally needed
defensive capability. It is that urgency of need that calls for a
balance between comprehensive testing and the production of 40 UOES
missiles. An intercept of a representative target along with the
extensive ground testing done and planned provides us the minimum
confidence that the missile design is well understood and modeled, and
that the ground testing is sufficiently rigid.
Question. What are you doing to assure that the Army's procurement
plans are sound and executable?
Answer. BMDO is reviewing the production schedules and costs to
ensure that based on our lessons learned to date, and the changes
planned, that the hardware and software can be delivered and that cost
controls are in place. I review these plans regularly to make sure that
we understand and control the process and provide assistance to the
program where needed.
Question. How can you enforce management decisions if the Army
controls the procurement funds for THAAD in the future?
Answer. Despite the transfer of BMDO procurement funds to the
Services, several mechanisms exist which will allow BMDO to work with
the Services and manage the funds. In a February 1997 memorandum to the
Department's senior leadership, Deputy Secretary of Defense White
affirmed BMDO's role as central planner, manager, and integrator for
the BMD mission, and in particular, the role of the Director of BMDO as
the BMD Acquisition Executive (BMDAE). As such, I will continue to
serve on the Defense Resources Board (DRB) when BMD programs and issues
are discussed and, thereby, will be able to influence the allocation of
funds to programs and DoD components. Second, as the BMDAE, I will have
the opportunity to concur or non-concur with Service funding proposals
that impact BMD programs. Third, the DoD Comptroller will provide BMDO
the opportunity to review any transfer proposed by a Service. Should
BMDO and the Service be unable to reach an agreement, the issue will be
elevated to the DRB level where I will work with the Service and the
Department's senior leadership to ensure BMD programs are appropriately
funded.
Question. What is the exit criteria for Demonstration and
Validation?
Answer. The primary exit criteria for THAAD to proceed to
Engineering and Manufacturing (EMD) is three body-to-body intercepts of
threat representative targets within an accepted aim point.
Question. When will the next THAAD flight take place?
Answer. At this time, I am assessing the recommendations received
from my review panels, the Air and Missile Defense Program Executive
Officer, and the THAAD Project Manager. I plan to implement some
changes, as necessary, to maximize our changes of success of the next
intercept attempt. The next flight will not take place until I am
satisfied that we have done all that is reasonable and prudent to
ensure its success.
Question. What is your present estimate as to how soon this system
will be able to be fully deployed? Is 2004 still a reasonable date?
Answer. While BMDO and the Army continue to assess the details of
the impact of the flight test program on the FUE schedule, the QDR has
restructured THAAD in light of the test difficulties and the
Independent Review Team findings for an FUE of fiscal year 2006.
Certainly, we need to get a couple of flight test intercepts to give us
real confidence in when a First Unit Equipped date can be met.
Navy Theater Wide Ballastic Missile Defense (Navy Upper Tier)
Question. The Navy Theater-Wide program will intercept ballistic
missiles in their ascent, apogee and descent phases. As with the Lower
Tier system, Navy Upper Tier will use the extant capabilities of the
Aegis weapon system. A Standard Missile with a kinetic (hit-to-kill)
vehicle will provide exoatmospheric intercept capability. The budget
request for 1998 is $194.9 million. Is this finding at a level
sufficient to deploy Navy Theater Wide? Is the program a deployment
program?
Answer. Navy Theater Wide is currently transitioning from a
technology program to a Major Defense Acquisition Program which will
focus on developing and eventually deploying a viable, effective
system. Our current program for Navy Theater Wide is consistent with
the direction of last year's Ballistic Missile Defense Program Review.
This program consists of three parallel efforts. The first of these is
a kinetic warhead technology assessment. In parallel with the
technology review, we are proceeding to a system level intercept,
called the NTW Flight Demonstration program (FDP) or AEGIS LEAP
Intercept (ALI). The third portion of our Navy Theater Wide program is
risk reduction activities. These activities will examine the critical
risk areas for NTW engineering and develop solutions that will allow
BMDO and the Navy, at the appropriate time, to make a more informed
decisions to enter the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase.
The Department has neither approved an acquisition strategy nor
validated an operational requirement for Navy Theater Wide.
Additionally, the program office has not prepared a program manager's
life cycle cost estimate for the program nor has the Cost Analysis
Improvement Group performed an Independent Cost Estimate. Until these
actions are complete the Department can determine neither what the Navy
Theater Wide program entails nor the required resources, including
funding, required for deployment. Currently, we expect to have these
actions complete for the fiscal year 1998 Defense Acquisition Board
review of Navy Theater Wide. However, the program is fully funded
through the completion of the Flight Demonstration program / AEGIS LEAP
Intercept (FDP/ALI).
Question. The Navy Theater Wide system has been through five major
reviews which have all reaffirmed the requirement for a Navy Theater
Wide system. In addition, the CINCs repeatedly testify that theater
missile defense is their number one priority. Why is it then, that the
Administration has not requested the necessary funds to deploy the Navy
Theater Wide System?
Answer. Funding is only one portion of program execution. prudent
execution for this program (or any program) requires completing the
program one phase at a time and not commencing a large number of
parallel activities. This means retiring risk in an orderly, logical
sequence, fully defining the program requirement based on warfighter
needs, which ensures that public funds are not placed at risk to
procure a system until the system is proven to meet a valid
requirement.
In the case of NTW, the next steps to retire risk are:
completing the Flight Demonstration Program/AEGIS LEAP
Intercept (FDP/ALI) to demonstrate that the LEAP vehicle can
achieve an exo-atmospheric intercept,
validating the warfighters requirement for a Navy
upper-tier system, and,
confirming that LEAP is the proper solution for the
Navy upper-tier mission.
Until the intercept is achieved and the Department of Defense
confirms the material solution, there is significant risk in proceeding
to engineer a tactical system based on LEAP.
The Navy Theater Wide program is fully funded through the
completion of the FDP/ALI. Additional funds may allow for additional
risk reduction in specific areas. However, additional funds will allow
only marginal acceleration in the initial intercept, currently
anticipated in the second quarter of fiscal year 2000.
Question. How much more would be required to fund a program that
would actually deploy Navy Theater Wide?
Answer. The Department has neither approved an acquisition strategy
nor validated an operational requirement for Navy Theater Wide.
Additionally, the program office has not prepared a program manager's
life cycle cost estimate for the program nor has the Cost Analysis
Improvement Group performed an Independent Cost Estimate. Until these
actions are complete the Department can determine neither what the Navy
Theater Wide program entails nor the required resources, including
funding, required for deployment. Currently, we expect to have these
actions complete for the fiscal year 1998 Defense Acquisition Board
review of Navy Theater Wide. However, the program is fully funded
through the completion of the Flight Demonstration Program/AEGIS LEAP
Intercept (FDP/ALI).
Question. What is the total acquisition cost of Navy Theater Wide?
Answer. The Department has neither approved an acquisition strategy
nor validated an operational requirement for Navy Theater Wide.
Additionally, the program office has not prepared a program manager's
life cycle cost estimate for the program nor has the Cost Analysis
Improvement Group performed an Independent Cost Estimate. Until these
actions are complete the Department can determine neither what the Navy
Theater Wide program entails nor the required resources, including
funding, required for deployment. Currently, we expect to have these
actions complete for the fiscal year 1998 Defense Acquisition Board
review of Navy Theater Wide.
Question. The total acquisition cost for THAAD is expected to be
approximately $13 billion. (The newspapers have said between $16 and
$17 billion.) The Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) is
expected to cost the U.S. $11 billion or more--even with our allies
sharing the cost. The Airborne Laser will also cost $11 billion. The
total acquisition cost for Navy Upper Tier is estimated to be about $7
billion. General Lyles, given its substantial capabilities doesn't the
Navy Upper Tier seem to be a ``better deal'' compared to these other
systems?
Answer. The relative costs of TMD systems is an important factor to
consider when making decisions regarding whether a system should be
built. However, it is not the only factor, and more importantly not the
most critical. The most critical factor is the ability to intercept
missiles and provide an effective multilayered missile defense. The
importance of a multilayered and multiservice missile defense system is
the benefit of combining each individual system's capabilities,
increasing the complete defense against any theater ballistic missile.
There is no one single ``best'' form of active defense for stopping
missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction. For example, PAC-3 and
Navy Area Defense are terminal defense systems which have a multi-
mission capability against both ballistic and cruise missiles. MEADS is
designed to be highly mobile and remain at the forward edge of the
battle field providing protection against very short range TBM systems
in addition to aircraft and cruise missiles. However, MEADS, PAC-3 and
Navy Area are relatively short ranged, and less effective against long
range missiles with high closing velocities. The THAAD and Navy Theater
Wide systems greatly expand the warfighter's engagement battlespace,
allow multiple shot opportunities and significantly increase our
capability to defeat faster and longer range ballistic missiles. The
Airborne Laser will offer further expansion of the battlespace, more
shot opportunities, added capability against longer ranged missiles,
and the prospect of causing collateral damage from intercept debris to
occur over the aggressor's own territory. Boost Phase Intercept (BPI)
has a high potential payoff as a BMD mission capability, but concepts
to perform high performane BPI against TMD and NMD threats are
generally less mature and therefore somewhat higher risk than terminal
defense systems.
The BMDO has adopted a prudent acquisition and development strategy
that balances warfighter needs, system capabilities, and technological
maturity against the threat. Adjustments to the strategy can be made if
warranted by circumstances. BMDO's strategy is to develop an integrated
and interoperable TMD Family of Systems (FoS) architecture. The
elements of which can be tailored by the warfighting CINC for the
specific conditions and threats which will be faced.
Question. General Lyles, why has the Administration repeatedly
decided to hold back on Navy Upper Tier in favor of other more risky
and more expensive systems like the Airborne Laser?
Answer. Although Airborne Laser is a member of the ``family of
systems'' it is not a BMDO program. It is an Air Force Major Defense
Acquisition Program (MDAP) and resources are allocated based on its
designation (MDAP) and priority in the Air Force. Navy Theater Wide
(NTW), a program for which BMDO is the resource sponsor, is designated
as a ``core program'' and was declared a pre-MDAP in October 1996.
Although NTW is not yet an MDAP, BMDO and the Navy have tentatively
scheduled a Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) review for NTW in February,
1998.
Airborne Laser (ABL)
Question. The Airborne Laser is not technically part of the
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) program. It is being
funded within the Air Force's budget. Last year, the Air Force
requested funds to integrate a high power chemical laser into a 747
aircraft with the mission to destroy theater ballistic missiles in the
boost phase. The program will develop, procure, and operate 7 aircraft
an approximate cost of $11 billion. The budget request for 1998 is
$157.9 million. General Lyles, your office is charged with the
responsibility for setting priorities for Ballistic Missile Defense.
Support for a moment that additional funding was available was
available to your office and that the Air Force had not funded the
Airborne Laser program. What would be your highest priority for use of
the additional funds: to reduce risk on your current programs, to
develop the Airborne Laser program, or to fund some other program?
Answer. There is a definite need for a boost phase intercept
capability in the architecture which could be filled by the Airborne
Laser. Current priorities for the BMDO program provide for allocating
additional funding: first priority for MDAP risk reduction efforts;
second priority to joint interoperability risk reduction issues with
MDAP enhancements, and finally improvements to Advanced Technology
programs. Depending on the quantity of funds provided, BMDO would
seriously consider maintaining the Airborne Laser Program (ABL) at a
modest level to ensure contractor team stability and continued level of
efforts pending our ability to fit a more substantial program in our
top line. BMDO funding could not provide for a more aggressive ABL
program until PAC-3, Navy Area, THAAD and Navy Theater Wide are well
into the production phase.
Question. The Administration recently decided to amend the ABM
Treaty by agreeing to demarcation limitations. The Joint Statement also
indicated that development and deployment of the Space-Based Laser was
off the table. Are the Russians also concerned about the ABL? Is the
ABL Treaty compliant?
Answer. The Air Force's ABL is designed to be a theater missile
defense system. When deployed, the system should not pose a realistic
threat to the strategies nuclear forces of Russia (or any other
successors to the ABM Treaty). The Air Force is pursuing the ABL in a
manner fully consistent with all provisions of the 1972 ABM Treaty. The
Russians have not offered any substantive comment on the Airborne Laser
to date. During the Helsinki Summit, the Presidents developed an
approach to concluding an agreement to higher velocity theater missile
defense system which would not limit the Airborne Laser.
Question. A recent study was done by the office of net assessment
that suggested that there are operational limitations to the ABL. What
are those limitations? How well did the ABL do in comparison to the
Space-Based Laser? How will did the ABL do in comparison to other
missile defense systems?
Answer. The objective of these studies is to develop innovative
concepts of operations for Space-Based Laser and to expose the ware
game ``players'' to the challenges of integrating the various systems
into the Joint Theater Ballistic Missile Defense Architecture systems.
In the scenario that was analyzed, severe operational constraints were
placed on the ABL which limited its effectiveness. The scenario was
against a peer competitor with sophisticated anti-aircraft weapons. The
``players'' preferred to establish air superiority before directly
targeting the peer competitor or forward basing the ABL. In post-game
analysis, however, it was concluded that this may have been too
conservative an employment of the ABL.
Question. What is the maximum range of the Airborne Laser?
Answer. The Airborne Laser's (ABL) maximum range is dependent upon
several factors including atmospheric conditions (e.g., optical
turbulence, cloud height), location of the target relative to the
aircraft, and type of missile (hardness and boost time). Thus a single
maximum range value cannot be provided; however, the current estimated
ranges for various types of missiles under nominal conditions are as
follows. ------.
Question. In circumstances where the ABL cannot reach a target due
to the laser's range limitations, overflight would be necessary. Has
the Air Force given ample consideration to this limiting factor? How
would ABL work with other BMD systems?
Answer. The ABL will be a highly flexible standoff weapon system.
The theater commander will have the ability to place the ABL Combat Air
Patrols (CAP) where he deems most effective (including locations over
enemy territory) based on current intelligence, theater threats, level
of air superiority, coverage requirements and optimal deterrence/
engagement potential. ABL will share AWACS and JSTARS escort. In
addition, a defense suite will protect against surface-to-air and air-
to-air threats.
The ABL will work with the remaining Ballistic Missile Defense
systems using the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (Link
16) as an integrated member of the TMD architecture. Through this
network, the ABL will provide early missile, track, launch and impact
point predictions and kill assessments.
Question. Can ABL perform its mission in all weather?
Answer. Yes. The ABL is being designed to operate ``above'' the
weather (notionally 40,000 ft.). Even with complete cloud cover, the
ABL can detect, track and destroy theater missiles.
Question. What are the fuel requirements for ABL? How many shots
can the laser shoot with the allotted fuel aboard? What if a potential
adversary were to fire more than 30 missiles? Wouldn't that defeat the
ABL?
Answer. ------. The number of TBMs which can be killed typically
varies between 20 and 40 depending on the specific engagement geometry,
target type, and atmospheric conditions.
ABL will detect all 30 missile launches, prioritize and engage as
many missiles as possible following the specific mission's rules-of-
engagement (e.g., the ABL may be directed to engage all missiles
launched from certain regions due to their high probability of carrying
weapons of mass destruction). In addition, track data will be passed to
the joint missile defense architecture via Link 16 enhancing the
overall architecture's effectiveness.
No. Typically, there will be two ABLs on Combat Air Patrol (CAP)
with overlapping coverage and the ability to deconflict engagements. In
salvo launches, the ABL is not designed to defeat all missiles; rather
it is designed to thin the threat, provide warning and tracking data,
and to significantly enhance the effectiveness of the other missile
defense systems.
Question. What has been done to solve the problem of beam
attenuation? Are you confident that you will be able to counteract the
effects of the atmosphere and turbulence on the ABL?
Answer. Atmospheric attenuation has a negligible effect on ABL's
performance. The atmosphere at ABL's operational altitudes (nominally
40,000 ft) is so thin that 90 percent or more of the weapon laser
energy is transmitted.
Therefore, we are highly confident ABL will meet the JROC-validated
range requirements. To achieve these requirements, ABL will employ
active and passive tilt jitter correction and atmospheric compensation
subsystems to overcome the negative effects of the atmosphere and
turbulence. Critical components and algorithms have been proven in a
number of airborne, brass board, and field tests. The data from all
tests conducted to date match detailed ABL simulation results and
indicate ABL will exceed its range requirements.
Question. The chemical laser must be reduced to meet certain size
requirements of the aircraft. How does the Air Force plan to do this?
Answer. The laser module design meets all performance, size and
weight goals for the Program Definition and Risk Reduction (PDRR)
system. A prototype laser module recently passed its Critical Design
Review and is now being manufactured using proven lightweighting
techniques such as composites, titanium and milled-out structural
components.
Arrow Missile System
Question. The ARROW is a U.S./Israeli cooperative program to track
and destroy theater ballistic missiles. The Committee seriously
considered terminating the ARROW program in 1995 because of extremely
poor technical performance and the substantial level of past and future
U.S. financial commitments for the program. The Administration has
acted to shore up the program and last year signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) which limited future U.S. funding to approximately
$35 million a year from 1997 to 2001 ($175 million). The Administration
has recently announced plans to commit additional funds to the program.
General Lyles, you are aware that this committee has in the past had
concerns regarding the performance and cost of the ARROW missile
system. Will you please give us an update? How is the ARROW doing in
its flight test?
Answer. The ARROW missile is doing quite well. Of two intercept
tests (August 20, 1996 and March 11, 1997), the missile has scored two
direct hits, destroying the target.
Question. the Administration has recently announced that it will
provide additional funding for the Israeli ARROW program. What exactly
has the Administration agreed to provide? How much funding? For what
period of time?
Answer. The Secretary of Defense has agreed to provide $48 million
over a 4 year period beginning in FY 1998.
Question. Is the Israeli government still committed to production
of this system?
Answer. The Israeli government has identified the Arrow program as
its highest national priority and is fully committed to the program.
Question. When we last discussed this issue, the total acquisition
cost estimates for ARROW varied and ranged anywhere from $2 to $10
billion. What is the latest, most accurate cost estimate?
Answer. The cost estimate of Arrow at program inception in 1994 of
approximately $1.2 billion remains valid today. Phase I (Arrow I) of
the program cost $158 million, Phase II (Arrow II) costs $330 million
and Phase III (Arrow Deployability Program) costs $556 million. These
costs do not include $42 million in infrastructure costs and $252
million for Arrow Weapon System components (Radar, Launcher, Fire
Control) both of which were funded entirely by the Israelis.
Question. Has the U.S. committed to fund any amount of that
production? Does the Administration intend to do so?
Answer. A portion of the $48 million the United States has agreed
to provide the Israelis will be used to accelerate the production of
the User Operational Evaluation System (UOES).
Question. Why should the U.S. continue to fund this program? Have
we learned anything about our missile defense system based on our
cooperation with the Israelis? What about the seeker?
Answer. The U.S. has, and continues to, receive technical data,
risk reduction, and lessons learned from the Arrow missile development
efforts which are used in development of U.S. ballistic missile defense
efforts. With respect to the seeker, the focal plan array in the Arrow
is the same as that used in the THAAD. Moreover, we look to ensure
interoperability between U.S. and Israel's missile defense to systems.
Question. Would you find this program in your budget if you were
given no additional funds to do so?
Answer. No. We could not because we have no operational requirement
for the Arrow missile. Arrow is not a mobile, transportable TMD system
such as our warfighters require. Instead, it meets Israeli military
requirements.
Question. Where is the ARROW on your priority list?
Answer. While low on the list in fulfilling DoD operational
requirements, the technical benefits of Arrow development efforts are
very useful and place it at a higher relative priority. In addition,
the development and deployment of air missile defense capability by a
key friend is a high priority.
Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS)
Question. MEADS is a mobile missile defense system that would
protect maneuvering forces from short range ballistic missiles. The
program was initially an Army program (Corps SAM) but was made an
international cooperative program in order to defray the cost of
developing the system. Originally, the U.S. agreed to provide 50% of
the cost and work. Germany was to provide 20%, France was to provide
20% and Italy was to provide 10%. However, France dropped out of the
program last year leaving U.S. with 60% of the cost and work share. The
budget request for 1998 is $48 million. DoD officials concluded during
the Bottom-up Review, that the unilateral Army program, Corps SAM, was
not affordable. However, shortly thereafter, the program was
reestablished as MEADS, a multilateral program. Do you believe the
multi-lateral MEADS program is affordable?
Answer. MEADS funding has been constrained by affordability
considerations and DoD examined this issue closely during the
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The QDR agreed to continue the MEADS
program but only provided $35 million additional funding in fiscal year
99, bringing the total fiscal year 99 funding to $45 million. DoD is
proceeding with negotiations for the design and development phase of
the program.
Question. What is the current agreement between the U.S. and its
partners on this program? What is the current cost share?
Answer. The current cost share/work share agreement for the Project
Definition-Validation (PD-V) phase is the U.S. 60%, Germany 25% and
Italy 15%.
Question. The total cost of MEADS is expected to be about $11
billion for the U.S. How does this compare with the total acquisition
costs of other theater ballistic missile defense systems?
Answer. In perspective, the cost of MEADS is comparable to other
air and missile defense programs. In conjunction with on-going PAC-3
upgrades (ground equipment modifications and a new missile) and past
Army procurement efforts, the Department is spending $7.2 billion
(fiscal year 97) to acquire and field ten PAC-3 battalions. The two
THAAD battalions are anticipated to cost $10.6 billion (fiscal year
97). The expected U.S. cost to acquire and field six MEADS battalions
is approximately $11.0 billion (fiscal year 97).
Question. According to BMDO, the total acquisition costs of THAAD,
PAC-3, Navy Lower Tier, HAWK, MEADS and Navy Upper Tier could be about
$43 billion. General Lyles, do you believe that we can afford MEADS?
Answer. I have conducted an independent review of the MEADS program
to address affordability. We have examined with the Army several
methods to rephase and restructure the program to continue to support
the warfighter and our international partners while addressing
modernization. The results of that study were fed into the Quadrennial
Review (QDR). The QDR agreed to continue the MEADS program but only
provided $35 million additional funding in fiscal year 99, bringing the
total fiscal year 99 funding to $45 million. DoD is proceeding with
negotiations for the design and development phase of the program.
Question. Has MEADS been reviewed in the Quadrennial Review? What
has been the outcome of those discussions?
Answer. MEADS has been reviewed by the QDR. The QDR agreed to
continue the MEADS program but only provided $35 million additional
funding in fiscal year 99, bringing the total fiscal year 99 funding to
$45 million. DoD is proceeding with negotiations for the design and
development phase of the program.
National Missile Defense
Question. The National Missile Defense (NMD) system will provide
protection against long range ballistic missile threats using ``hit-to-
kill'' technology. The Administration's ``three plus three'' deployment
readiness plan would allow for the deployment of a minimal NMD
capability in 2003 if the threat warrants. This plan is ABM Treaty
compliant. The budget request for 1998 is $504 million, $324.7 million
less than the 1997 appropriation. General Lyles, if you were required
to deploy a NMD system by the year 2003 would be 1998 budget request be
sufficient?
Answer. No. Based on the NMD life-cycle cost estimate supporting
the QDR process, the NMD program will require an additional $2.3
billion over the Future Year Defense Program, starting with $474
million in fiscal year 98 RDT&E funds to execute the 3 plus 3 schedule
and program. These additional resources would be roughly spent on:
Program shortfalls ($100 million). Delays and hardware
(additional target) associated with Integrated Flight Test 1 failure;
delays in transferring the THAAD dem/val radar to the GBR-P; BMC3
development as a result of contract negotiations; EKV communications
development as a result of contractor estimates; and radar
discrimination algorithms.
Previously deferred program content ($85 million). EKV
telemetry unit development; EKV hardness and lethality testing; and
Forward-based X-band Radar and UWER development under the LSI
contractor.
Cost Risk Reduction ($74 million). Additional funding to
all elements (in line with established cost estimates) to allow for
development/test unknowns without sacrificing program content.
Schedule risk reduction ($110 million). Accelerate
procurement of and add hardware (such as targets and boosters) to
mitigate test delays or failures (most items are lead-time away and
still unavailable until fiscal year 99 timeframe); accelerate Hardware-
in-the-loop model and hardware procurements; and improve test launch
capabilities.
Technical risk reduction ($105 million). Increase Systems
Engineering to include development of high fidelity system simulator
for performance verification; continued EKV competition through first
intercept flights; long-lead procurement of hardware for added test
flights beginning in fiscal year 00; and explore alternative
technologies. e.g., radar transmit/receive modules, to maintain program
flexibility and to reduce procurement costs.
Question. Do you have any budget shortfall?
Answer. Yes. Due to our flight test failure in January, we have at
least a $60 million shortfall in fiscal year 98. Based on the NMD life-
cycle cost estimate supporting the QDR process, the NMD program will
require an additonal $2.3 billion over the Future Year Defense Program
starting with $474 million in fiscal year 98 RDT&E funds to execute the
3 plus 3 schedule and program. These additional resources would be
roughly spent on:
Program shortfalls ($100 million). Delays and hardware
(additional target) associated with Integrated Flight Test 1 failure;
delays in transferring the THAAD dem/val radar to the GBR-P; BMC3
development as a result of contract negotiations; EKV communications
development as a result of contractor estimates; and radar
discrimination algorithms.
Previously deferred program content ($85 million). EKV
telemetry unit development; EKV hardness and lethality testing; and
Forward-based X-band Radar and UWER development under the LSI
contractor.
Cost Risk Reduction ($74 million). Additional funding to
all elements (in line with established cost estimates) to allow for
development/test unknowns without sacrificing program content.
Schedule risk reduction ($110 million). Accelerate
procurement of and add hardware (such as targets and boosters) to
mitigate test delays or failures (most items are lead-time away and
still unavailable until fiscal year 99 timeframe); accelerate Hardware-
in-the-loop model and hardware procurements; and improve test launch
capabilities.
Technical risk reduction ($105 million). Increase Systems
Engineering to include development of high fidelity system simulator
for performance verification; contained EKV competition through first
intercept flights; long-lead procurement of hardware for added test
flights beginning in fiscal year 00; and explore alternative
technologies, such as radar transmit/receive modules, to maintain
program flexibility and to reduce procurement costs.
Question. General Lyles, the NMD program has recently had a few
delays not the least of which was a delay which we agreed in conference
last year affecting the establishment of the Joint Program Office. I
understand that this had more of severe impact than we expected at the
time. Will you please explain the status of the Joint Program Office?
Answer. We officially stood up the JPO on 1 April with Brigadier
General Joe Cosumano in the lead. We're now finalizing organizational
relationships between BMDO and the Services and staffing up to do the
NMD mission. This has delayed our execution of the NMD program.
Question. What is the importance of having a Lead System
Integrator? What is the benefit to the government of having a
contractor versus a Service manage this program?
Answer. The JPO, which consists of BMDO and Service organizations,
is managing the program. The Lead System Integrator serves only as a
prime contractor for the end NMD product and assumes much of the risk
associated with developing this complex system. The government
historically has not excelled as a system integrator.
Question. What has been done lately to get the program moving? What
can we do to ensure no further delay in the program?
Answer. We have officially stood up our JPO and are staffing up to
do the NMD mission. We're also ready to award Lead System Integrator
concept development studies to move us forward and help make decisions
on various architecture solutions. Your support of these endeavors, in
particular support for a Lead System Integrator, and stable program
resources will ensure we move steadily forward.
Question. In January, a planned test of the Exoatmospheric Kill
Vehicle (EKV) failed. In your statement you suggest that the problem
has been traced to a ``human procedural error and corrective procedures
have been implemented.'' General Lyles, can you explain exactly what
happened?
Answer. During the countdown for the booster used to launch the
EKV sensor payload, external power was disconnected but internal power
did not come on. Investigation showed the booster's ground support
equipment power supply had been improperly configured for 1.5 ampres
instead of 15 amperes. Nine months before the test, a test engineer
correctly set the power supply and a quality engineer verified the
setting. However, the test engineer erroneously used the power supply's
``multiply by one-tenth'' range selector switch, reducing the current
to 1.5 amperes. Neither the test engineer nor the quality engineer was
aware of the wrong setting, and subsequent testing did not check for
correct current. As a result, the power supply delivered insufficient
current to start the booster's internal batteries and the booster
failed to launch.
Question. What corrective procedures have been implemented?
Answer. A team of Army, Air Force, and Lockheed-Martin (booster
contractor) personnel reviewed the Payload Launch Vehicle (PLV) program
and investigated the launch failure. The team reviewed 121 internal PLV
procedures and found 30 which required change before the next flight
text. The most significant changes would make laboratory testing
exactly match flight hardware testing. To address the cause of the
failure, the power supply circuit was modified to verify the minimum
current for battery activation. Also, critical PLV system checks were
added to the countdown prior to target launch to avoid wasting future
targets.
Question. What are the cost and schedule impacts of this failed
test?
Answer. We have to replace the target vehicle that was launched
from Vandenberg AFB and continue to fund our competing Exoatmospheric
Kill Vehicle contractors longer than planned. This will cost us about
$60 million in fiscal year 98. We will repeat the test in July with the
target intended for our second test. The second contractor will be
unable to fly until January 1998, about an eight month slip in
schedule.
Question. How much additional funding would be required to make up
for the loss associated with the payload launch vehicle?
Answer. The payload launch vehicle is the booster used with the
EKV. We did not lose this but we did expend a target vehicle which
consists of the Multi-Service Launch System booster and target suite.
The target vehicle will cost us about $20 million. Another $40 million
is associated with the resulting delays to the test program.
Question. As you have pointed out, this schedule has a high level
of risk because you do not have backup test hardware. What would be
required to reduce risk?
Answer. With the funding Congress provided last year, we moved to
procure additional test hardware to mitigate schedule delays. However,
the long lead time to acquire these assets does not make them readily
available and we continue to incur delays such as recent experienced
with our first sensor flight test. Continuing to procure additional
test assets, ground hardware and spares will mitigate schedule risks ad
we move forward.
Question. The NMD program was designated as a Major Defense
Acquisition Program (MDAP). What are the benefits of this designation?
Does this designation give the program more focus? Is it an indicator
of the seriousness of a potential threat?
Answer. The MDAP designation is warranted by the amount of the
investment involved and commitment the Department has to the NMD
program. It portrays a seriousness to development efforts that ensures
a more thorough involvement by the user, OSD, and the Services that
aids in fleshing out and addressing all issues. The designation causes
a focus on meeting user requirements which is based on projected
threats.
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
Question. At the Helsinki summit in March, President Clinton and
President Yeltsin reaffirmed their commitment to the ABM treaty. They
agreed not to deploy Theater Ballistic Missile (TBM) systems that pose
a threat to the strategic nuclear force of the other side or to test
TBM systems against strategic targets. General Lyles, which BMD systems
have been judged to be ABM Treaty Compliant?
Answer. The following BMDO sponsored systems currently under
development have been certified treaty compliant as currently
configured: PATRIOT, THAAD, Navy Area, and Navy Theater Wide. As these
systems continue to develop and acquire greater capabilities, DoD's
Compliance Review Group (CRG) will continue to review them for
compliance.
Question. What about Airborne Laser? Has the Treaty Compliance
Review group assessed that system? Will you submit that?
Answer. The Air Force has not yet determined when the ABL should be
formally submitted to the CRG for review. When the ABL is sufficiently
developed for a treaty compliance determination, I expect the Air Force
will approach the CRG in accordance with DoD Directive 2060.1--
Implementation of, and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements.
Question. How does the Joint Statement affect our current core
programs?
Answer. The Joint Statement will have no effect on our current core
programs. Upon entry into force, Part I of the so-called demarcation
agreement reached at the last meeting of the Standing Consultative
Commission will remove PATRIOT, THAAD, and Navy Area-Wide from coverage
by the ABM Treaty. The Part II agreement being finalized in Geneva
pursuant to the agreed Joint Statement will not affect the U.S.
Government's ability to make unilateral ABM Treaty compliance
determinations in the future for the Navy Theater-Wide system.
Question. In responding to questions for the record last year, BMDO
indicated that the only system that would be a problem under the
demarcation agreement would be the Navy Upper Tier program. However,
there have been statements in the press which suggest that
administration officials now do not believe Navy Upper Tier will be a
problem. Why is this so?
Answer. Prior to the March 1997 Helsinki Agreement, the U.S. and
Russia had only reached agreement that TMD systems with interceptor
missiles having velocities of 3 km/sec or less are compliant with the
ABM Treaty, provided they are not tested against ballistic target
missiles with velocities greater than 5 km/sec or ranges greater than
3,500 km. The Helsinki Agreement provides the elements for a Part II of
the demarcation agreement covering TMD systems with higher interceptor
velocities such as Navy Theater Wide. Pursuant to that agreement, the
U.S. will still be required to make national compliance determinations.
However, that agreement establishes restrictions on the testing of
higher velocity interceptors that won't impact the Navy Theater Wide
development and test program, thus reducing the potential issues to be
addressed in future U.S. Navy Theater Wide compliance determinations.
Question. Are you deliberately limitation or ``dumbing down'' the
capability of our TBM systems to squeeze into the tight framework of
this agreement? Are the designs of our TBM systems being determined by
the threat, by the requirements, or by the arms control negotiators?
Answer. DoD is not ``dumbing down'' its TMD systems. TMD systems
are designed to meet military operationally requirements established by
the Joint Staff and those requirements are determined by the military
threat.
Question. General Ron Fogelman, Air Force Chief of Staff, recently
was quoted saying. ``All the chiefs have great concerns about this
[agreement], . . . I would hate to see us negotiate away any kind of
advantage we might have in space-based sensors, or in the airborne
laser or anything like that.'' General Lyles, do you have any concerns
about the development of future ballistic missile defense technologies
under this agreement?
Answer. The Helsinki Joint Statement does not address the two
issues previously raised by General Fogelman, nor does it address
components or technologies that are necessary for our foreseeable TMD
systems.
Question. Does this agreement limit the advanced technology
program?
Answer. No it does not. Research activities up to the point of
field testing a prototype system are not prohibited by the Helsinki
joint statement.
Question. The agreement specifically prohibits the development,
test or deployment of space-based interceptor missiles or ``. . .
components based on other physical principles.'' General Lyles, this
agreement seems to require that the Space-Based Laser program be shut
down. What is your understanding as to how this agreement affects SBL?
Do you have plans to close down the program?
Answer. No, we do not plan to close down the SBL program. The
Helsinki agreement does not affect our plans for that program because
our research plans for SBL fall short of any development, testing, and
deployment that could violate either the proposed Part II agreement or
the ABM Treaty.
Question. Are there provisions for opening up discussions with the
Russians should higher velocity systems and future capabilities be
required due to a future threat?
Answer. Yes, there are such provisions in the ABM Treaty. Any party
to the ABM Treaty can raise questions or concerns through the Standing
Consultative Committee (SCC), which was created for that very purpose.
Question. Last year, the demarcation discussions included a Phase I
(for lower velocity systems) and a Phase II (for higher velocity
systems, e.g. Navy Upper Tier). Have the Russians agreed to discuss
higher velocity systems?
Answer. Yes, the Russians have agreed to discuss higher velocity
systems. The Russians are participants in the ongoing Phase II
negotiations, the purpose of which is to discuss such systems.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submited by Mr. Young.]
Wednesday, June 11, 1997.
FUTURE BOMBERS/DEEP ATTACK CAPABILITIES
WITNESSES
JOHN J. HAMRE, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, COMPTROLLER GENERAL EUGENE
HABIGER, USAF, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND
GENERAL RICHARD E. HAWLEY, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR COMBAT COMMAND
LIEUTENANT GENERAL DAVID McCLOUD, USAF, DIRECTOR FOR FORCE STRUCTURE,
RESOURCES AND ASSESSMENT
Introduction
Mr. Young. The Committee will come to order. Gentlemen,
please be seated.
This hearing is closed. I would say to everyone we are
cleared to the top secret level today. If we should get to the
point there is any compartmentalized or special access
information that you would like to present or that we would
like to ask about, then we would clear the room for those not
cleared at that level.
This morning we are going to be discussing one of several
major issues that face the Committee this year, and that is the
Nation's overall deep attack and strike capabilities and
specifically the future direction of the U.S. bomber program.
This is a critical period for our Nation's air power, and
the decisions we make this year will have a lasting impact on
our ability to field an appropriately balanced mix of forces
for the next century.
So we take this very seriously, and that is the reason that
we invited you specifically to be here, because you have a
major, major role in this whole effort, and you are, as far as
we can tell, the best witnesses we could have to help us make
our decisions as to what we will do this year, because what we
do this year, I think, is going to affect where we are 20 years
from now, to be honest with you.
We have as witnesses the Honorable John Hamre, well known
to the Committee, Under Secretary of Defense/Comptroller;
General Eugene Habiger, Commander in Chief, United States
Strategic Command; General Richard Hawley, Commander, Air
Combat Command; and Lieutenant General David McCloud, director
for force structure, resources and assessment.
Many of the members of this Committee have been here from
the inception of the B-2 program when it was developed in the
black world. As we all know, initially the Department planned
on procuring 132 B-2s. Then the threat changed, and the
Department thought it needed 75 B-2s. Then that number changed
to 20. Last year it became 21 through a manipulation of some of
the funding.
The question we face today is, do we need more B-2 bombers?
Can we afford to buy more B-2 bombers? These questions can't be
addressed in a vacuum. Instead, they must be addressed in the
context of all the other force structure and modernization
needs facing the U.S. military.
The B-2 provides our CINCs with a powerful tool, the
ability to accurately deliver large payloads at long ranges
against heavily defended targets. Under current plans and with
funds provided in prior years, the Air Force will have 21
operational aircraft, enough to outfit two squadrons.
This year we have been asked by several members to consider
beginning the process of buying an additional 9 B-2s, bringing
the total force to 30 aircraft, enough to outfit three
squadrons. So today we are here, in part, to assess the need
and cost of such an expanded B-2 bomber force.
During the course of the hearing, there are several
questions that need to be addressed: What are the missions we
expect to assign B-2s in the future? What are the missions we
expect to assign B-2s in the future? Are more B-2s required to
adequately conduct these missions? Are there alternative means
of accomplishing these missions? What is the cost of an
expanded B-2 program? What might we have to give up to fund an
expanded B-2 program, and are the trade-offs worthwhile?
Another element of this equation is the B-1 program. The
committee has supported the B-1 and the mods that have been
made to it. It is an impressive platform, but we are often
asked by our colleagues, if the B-1 is such a great aircraft,
why don't we ever use it? We would like to hear how you respond
to questions like those and how the B-1 fits into the overall
heavy bomber force mix.
Finally, the issue does not just involve bombers. If we go
to war, there are many other assets to consider, such as
carriers and their air wings, tactical fighters and fighter
bombers, as well as a variety of smart and dumb munitions.
As I mentioned earlier, this year may well be critical,
because we are also being asked to make an important decision
on the next generation of tactical aircraft, the F-22, the F/A-
18E/F, and the Joint Strike Fighter.
All of these programs, as well as the B-2, were reviewed in
the context of the recently completed Quadrennial Defense
Review. The QDR concluded we should not go ahead with
additional B-2 production, but it also recommends cutting back
on the F-22 and the F/A-18E/F. As Secretary Cohen has pointed
out, the QDR is just a proposal and it is largely up to the
Congress to decide what elements of the QDR are turned into
reality.
So these are very important issues, and this committee
takes them extremely seriously. We want to explore them
thoroughly.
Because of the time constraints we all face, we will have
to adhere to the 5-minute rule, with each of our members having
5 minutes of questioning in the first round, and we will have
as many rounds as we possibly can in the time available. I also
urge each witness to be as brief as possible with the answers
so we can delve into more and more issues.
Again, I thank you all for coming. I apologize for the
length of my opening statement, but as chairman of this
Committee, I have to be responsible for what I recommend not
only today, for fiscal year 1998, but for fiscal year 1999, and
the balance of the payments in 2000, 2010 and 2020.
We have some very serious decisions to make, and we
appreciate your being here to help us with those decisions.
Dr. Hamre. you are recognized, sir.
Summary Statement of Mr. Hamre
Mr. Hamre. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and thanks to
all of the members for letting us come up to this hearing. I
personally am very pleased to be here this morning.
When Mr. Dicks came in, he said, ``I have got nothing to
say about you, Hamre,'' and I said, ``Well, that is the highest
compliment a comptroller ever gets.'' I am not kidding when I
say the patron saint of all comptrollers is Judas Iscariot.
This is high praise indeed.
Mr. Young. We are going to give Mr. Dicks a chance to
respond to that later on.
Mr. Hamre. We really are glad to be here.
I must say on a very personal level, these last 5 days have
been pretty tough in Washington for those of us in the
Department, and all of us personally lost working with a very
good friend, with what happened to Joe Ralston. And when I see
this cacophony going on outside, this Committee is holding a
serious hearing about one of the most important subjects we are
facing, and I thank you for it. This is exactly what
congressional oversight is about, and so I personally am very
grateful.
I am grateful for, again, this Committee bringing back the
Congress to the fundamental, what is it about? I think I really
do applaud you for doing that.
When I was coming in the door, I got hit by one of the
press types that are out there on a stakeout, you know, and
again there are those that would like to characterize this
hearing in a very cheap way, that this is just about narrow
interests and parochial interests, and that is absolutely not
the case. This is about a very important thing for the future,
what is the best way we are going to protect this country. This
is not about narrow interests at all.
So we are glad that we can be here. We appreciate very much
having a change to be invited to come and address, because I
think everybody in this room is dedicated to exactly the same
thing, how do we get a stronger defense in the long run?
Here I think this Committee, unlike probably everybody else
in Washington, this Committee is the only Committee--well, your
counterpart Committees--are the only people that have the same
job that the Secretary of Defense has, and that is, you have
got to bring together an integrated defense program, not just,
am I for this little project or that little project, but you,
like the Secretary, have to put together a composite program
and say this is what we need to defend the country in the
future.
The Secretary has a little bit harder job in the sense that
he has to build that over a 5-year period, but, frankly, you do
too. The decisions that you are going to be making in this
Committee really are going to dictate the composition of our
program over the next 5 years, and we know you understand that,
and that is very much the frame of reference that we come today
to this hearing with.
BOMBER QUESTIONS
I think that there are five questions, not to be
presumptuous, but I think there are five questions that you are
going to be, in your minds, asking about us today. Maybe they
aren't the questions you ask, but it is in the back of your
minds.
You are going to first say, did we honestly look at the B-2
during the QDR, or was it just a sham? Did we just do a make-
work job to come to a preconceived conclusion that we already
had, or did we really look at it fairly? I think that is the
first question in your mind.
Second, I think if we did look at the B-2, did we look at
it properly? Did we evaluate it in the right context? Did we
use the right tools? Or did we not use the right tools and
therefore didn't give a fair evaluation to the B-2? I think
that is probably the second question.
I think the third question in your minds is, why cannot we
afford the B-2? I mean, even when it gets to its full run, it
is $1.5 billion a year, and that is only about a half of 1
percent of the DOD budget. Why in the world can't we afford
that? Why did you guys decide you couldn't afford that? I think
that is a very important and fair question.
I think a fourth question in your minds may be, was this
just a political deal? Was this just something that Secretary
Cohen had in his mind and he wanted to shove it down
everybody's throats? And is there dissention in the Department
over this, or is this a decision that we all came to reach
together? And you need to look at that.
Finally, I think probably the most important question is,
can we defend America with only 21 B-2s? Would it be a better
program if we had to change other things and give them up in
order to have more B-2s? Would that be a better defense
program?
I think those are the questions really that shape what is
on your minds. Maybe they are not the questions you will ask
us, but I know that is the backdrop, and I hope that in this
hearing today that we can go through all of that. We ought to
absolutely ask those questions in that way, and hopefully we
can answer them.
But ultimately you are going to reach a conclusion. All of
you have the responsibility to decide in your own minds on
behalf not only of your constituents but the entire Congress
what is the best defense program for the future.
We honestly feel we have brought it to you, but I have
never seen a defense program we ever delivered that was not
improved by Congress, and I fully expect this to go through a
rough tumble, and that is what this hearing is about, and the
fact you would invite us here, I think, again, is a testament
to how important this issue is and how important this committee
considers these decisions. So we thank you for being here.
Back in 1883, Mark Twain and Rudyard Kipling were on the
stage together, and Mark Twain said, ``Well, between Rudyard
Kipling and I, we know everything in the world. He knows
everything that is important, and I know the rest.'' And that
is really the way I am today.
I don't know anything of importance about the B-2, but I am
joined by three people who do, and I am very delighted that
they are here as the real experts at this hearing, and then I
would like to answer at the very end, any resource questions
that you might want to ask me.
Thank you.
Mr. Young. General Habiger, are you going to be next?
Summary Statement of General Habiger
General Habiger. Yes, sir. I look forward to the
opportunity to express my views today.
I would like to point out, I have spent most of my adult
life as a bomber crew member, commander, squadron and wing
level. I have over 3,000 hours in the airplane, 75 combat
missions in bombers as a colonel. I was involved in the start-
up beginning of the B-2 program while assigned to Air Force
plans and policies back in the early eighties and now, as
Commander in Chief of Strategic Command, I am intimately
involved with all three legs of the triad, to include the
bombers, and I look forward to expressing my observations,
views, and professional judgments today.
Thank you.
Mr. Young. General Hawley.
Summary Statement of General Hawley
General Hawley. Like my colleagues here, Mr. Chairman,
members of the Committee, I am delighted to be here to talk
about an important issue.
As I think most of you know, I am a force provider to a
number of CINCs, to include General Habiger on my right. I
provide the bomber leg of the nuclear forces. Of course, we
provide fighter assets, bombers, C41SR capabilities, and search
and rescue capabilities to all of the warfighting CINCs.
Our forces are very heavily tasked today. Perhaps the most
difficult issue that we deal with in air combat command on a
day-to-day basis is our operational tempo, because the tasking
levels of our forces are very high.
Therefore, as we go through this discussion on the B-2, I
think one issue we need to keep at the forefront is the need
for a balanced set of capabilities in our national defense
establishment, because that is what my customers, the
warfighting CINCs, ask me to deliver, is a balanced set of
forces that can cover the whole spectrum of responsibilities
that we have given them to deal with our national security
interests around the world. Today I think we do that. We have a
pretty good balance in the force, and we need to make sure we
maintain it.
Thank you.
[The statement of General Hawley follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Young. General McCloud.
Summary Statement of General McCloud
General McCloud. Sir, if you think it is appropriate, I
would like to read a very short statement, about 3 to 3\1/2\
minutes long.
As director of force structure, resources, and director for
the past year, I have cochaired one of the most comprehensive
studies of our Nation's deep attack capabilities ever
undertaken. The Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study, or DAWMS has
been an extraordinary, unprecedented effort, conducted by top
experts from OSD, the Joint Staff, services, and the CINC
staffs. Hundreds of operators and analysts dedicated hundreds
of thousands of hours to develop insights on weapons and
operational concepts that will enable us to win conflicts
decisively with minimum loss of life.
This effort draws from joint doctrine, analysis, military
judgment, and is founded in our National Military Strategy. We
strove to provide a balanced force, capable of executing our
strategy in the face of an uncertain, ambiguous world.
DAWNS employed a campaign level model called TACWAR and an
optimization model called WORRM. I don't like the acronym, I
didn't name it, but we used it for the primary analysis. These
models were available and familiar to all participants. We
understood their strengths; we understood their weaknesses.
To overcome their shortfalls, we initiated nine parallel
studies to ensure that DAWMS' effort was bounded and all issues
considered. As individual issues arose, if we could agree,
changes were made; if we could not, we ran sensitivities to
encompass the extremes and articulate the impact.
If you will refer to your tabletop slide that I have put on
all of your desks, it is a little bit complex, you will see the
scope of the nine supporting studies and many organizations
that participated in them. We can return to this topic later,
if you wish.
[Chart follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Young. General McCloud.
Summary Statement of General McCloud
General McCloud. We have completed more than 1,500
sensitivities to ensure we have captured each issue. Instead of
pointed solutions, DAWMS, The Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study,
has given us a range of valuable insights. We applied military
judgment at every step of the way.
Another key to the study's success was the openness to all
participating parties. We had nothing to hide, no preordained
outcomes.
As we did in the QDR, DAWMS sought to balance the needs and
risks of today with the ambiguities of tomorrow. The key was to
understand how force changes impact our overall capability to
support our National Military Strategy. In part 1, we
determined an optimized mix of deep attack weapons the CINCs
will need to cover a broad range of conditions. While the
programmed weapons budget is sufficient, modest adjustments to
the mix of next-generation munitions will ensure our forces
retain their superior engagement capability.
For example, investing in additional precision standoff
munitions and smart antiarmor submunitions will increase force
survivability and lethality. We also determined that our
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance architecture
will increasingly provide the leverage needed to maintain our
advantage over future enemies.
Insights gained during the first part of DAWMS established
the foundation for our follow-on trade-off analysis in part 2.
In DAWMS part 2, we assessed a broad range of bomber, land,
and sea-based TACAIR force options across a variety of two
major theater war scenarios. We ran excursions that restricted
force access during the halt phase of a major theater war. To
further investigate the issues, DAWMS explored a wide range of
factors, including stealth capabilities, CINC goals, strategic
airlift availability, and potential budget changes.
The procurement and infrastructure costs of the force
options we assessed were based on a 20-year weapons system life
cycle. Over a 20-year period, savings from retiring forces are
used to fund a cost equivalent number of B-2s. Our estimates
include about $2 billion in modifications to maximize the
conventional capabilities of existing and additional B-2s.
Our force comparison focused on four main areas:
Warfighting capability, risk caused by changes to the force
mix, savings and costs, and support of the National Military
Strategy.
Based on extensive analysis, we determined additional B-2s
can deploy quickly and improve our capability to halt an
adversary's advance during the opening stages of a major
theater war, especially when access is limited or warning times
are reduced. However, this advantage diminishes after the first
weeks of combat as the full weight of U.S. air power arrives
and enemy air defenses are suppressed.
To maximize savings, we assume the trade-off force
structure retires immediately. Since it requires several years
for the first B-2 delivery and 10 to 14 years for the final
aircraft to become operational, the end result is a capability
gap of a decade or more. Additionally, the savings generated by
retiring current forces only partially offset the up-front B-2
procurement costs, requiring additional unprogrammed funding
for a decade or more before annual savings exceeds costs.
Finally, we determined that reducing current force
structure to pay for B-2s will have a negative impact on other
mission areas. For example, assuming we do not change our
current level of global commitments, retiring fighter wings or
carriers increases personnel and operational tempos, increasing
presence gaps in the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean, and
further stresses the forces that remain engaged globally.
Mr. Chairman, based on this comprehensive analysis, we have
concluded that while there are advantages to procuring
additional B-2s, they do not provide a sufficient range of
capabilities to shape and respond to the full spectrum of
national military strategy.
I would like to conclude by saying the insights we have
gained from DAWMS will pay substantial dividends in the future.
The study has been a means for all participants to increase
their knowledge of existing and emerging capabilities. DAWMS
has been, and remains, a catalyst for increased competition
between deep attack capabilities we will filed. While the
process is sometimes painful, this competition is good for the
warfighter and the American taxpayer.
Finally, the comprehensive efforts like DAWMS and the
insights they provide will ensure we fight the next war, and
not the last one.
I thank you, and would be glad to take your questions.
[The statement of General McCloud follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Young. General, thank you very much.
I assume that all of you have seen the DAWMS and explored
it fairly thoroughly. Is that a safe assumption?
DAWMS Analysis
General Hawley. In my case, I have seen a briefing on the
DAWMS study but have not had an opportunity to review the study
or the background or analysis that went into it.
Mr. Young. That is basically my exposure to the DAWMS. I
haven't digested every page of it. I have had the overview.
Does anyone disagree with the analysis that came out of the
DAWMS?
General McCloud. Lots of people disagree with it, sir.
Mr. Young. I am talking about any of the four of you.
General Habiger. No, sir.
B-2 Strategic mission
Mr. Young. Now, were there any scenarios involving
strategic use of the B-2 or strategic use of any of the other
aircraft? I understood you did a lot of various scenarios while
going through the DAWMS.
General McCloud. Sir, we did not go into the nuclear role
of the bombers. We covered various options on the tactical
side.
Mr. Young. Could we go into that at this level, just
briefly? I spent a lot of time with Admiral Jones in your shop,
and he gave us a number of BB-2s that he thought would required
for your strategic mission. I think the number he said was 14
would be the number that----
General Habiger. 16, sir.
Mr. Young. 16.
General Habiger. Yes, sir. Would you like me to elaborate
on that?
Mr. Young. Please.
General Habiger. The way we apply weapons in the single
integrated operational plan is a matter of looking at the
target base that we have and looking at a targets base in the
year 2002-2003 ------ it is articulated in the national
security decision directive--that would be targeted to deter
the Russians.
If we look at the forces available today and the forces
available under a START II agreement, we have a balance of
bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and sea launch
ballistic missiles coming off our Ohio class Trident submarine.
The B-2 is part of the bomber triad leg, along with the B-52s
and the cruise missiles that would be carried by the B-52s.
Today, sir, with the B-1 also in our nuclear war plan, the
end of this fiscal year, the B-1 becomes completely a
conventional carrier, it will no longer be part of our war
planning, although I will tell you, though we are looking at
out in the out years, and perhaps, will use the B-1 in a
conventional role to support our single integrated operational
plan. The utility there is that the B-1 will no longer be
counted under the arms control agreements of START II and
beyond ------.
Mr. Young. General, in order to have 16 B-2s available for
your mission, how many B-2s do we have to have in the
inventory?
General Habiger. Sir, my force provider, General Hawley on
my left, will give you perhaps a little longer answer. I go
into the system with a requirement for 16 B-2s to do my job.
then as a force provider, he will then look at what is required
to give me those 16.
So, sir?
General Hawley. As you know, Mr. Chairman, when we
structure an aircraft fleet, we include aircraft for a number
of purposes, our PMAI, Primary Mission Aircraft Inventory,
which in this case is 16, and then we need some backup aircraft
inventory to support other needs.
Sometimes in a large fleet we will break those additional
aircraft into categories to include BAI, Back-up Aircraft
Inventory, depot support, tests and training. So we will have
five airplanes when we take delivery of the 21st airplane, and
we will use that to satisfy all those requirements.
This unit, of course, only has experienced pilots, so all
pilots come to this program with experience, and we train them
in the unit using those 16 primary assigned aircraft. So we
don't have any tests or training.
There will be continued tests, of course, and we will use
both the operational airplanes and those designated as BAI. You
can't tell the difference on a day-to-day basis, by the way.
And we will just use out of that inventory airplanes that we
need to go do continuing follow-on tests for the system. They
will also serve our needs for attrition reserve.
As we look at all of those requirements, that is why we
structured the program as we did. Twenty-one, as you know,
wasn't our number. We got issued 21 airplanes, and we
concluded, out of 21, we could support an operational fleet of
16, and that is what we will plan and equip for.
Mr. Young. You raised an excellent point that makes me very
curious, but my 5 minutes has expired. I want to come back to
that point. I am going to adhere to the 5-minute rule so
everybody else won't think I am sneaking up on their time.
Mr. Dicks, 5 minutes.
DEEP ATTACK WEAPONS MIX STUDY
Mr. Dicks. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I want to welcome
all the witnesses here today. I believe that what the Deep
Attack Weapons Mix Study shows, is that we can stop an enemy in
the halt phase with the B-2. The problem is, we don't have
enough B-2s. The studies that have been done by Rand, and by
General Jasper Welch, all conclude that 21 B-2s is not
adequate.
I think the analysis done in the Deep Attack Weapons Mix
Study demonstrates that if you have a lockout situation, if you
can't get TACAIR in, you can't get those aircraft carriers in,
and this study again puts the carriers in the play right away.
They have two carriers, I think, in the Persian Gulf within 150
miles of the assault, again, so that they can make a TACAIR
look good. But if you don't have that and the enemy invades,
like Saddam did, you can't stop him unless you have an adequate
bomber force that can come in from outside. That is what this
study shows.
It also shows that bombers in the halt phase can play an
enormously effective role. With stealth bombers, you can come
in and stop the enemy before he gets to his target. And if you
can continue to use them and then make usable the B-1s, the B-
52s, TACAIR, et cetera, it is a force enabler.
Now, every one of the Joint Chiefs, I asked them at a
hearing a week ago, do they think these models that we used are
fair and accurate? They said no. They all said that these
models are no good, that they should be replaced, that there
are force-on-force models that simply do not look at the
effectiveness of the forces that we have today. So I think it
is flawed.
On the integrity question that Mr. Hamre raised here
initially, I asked the President of the United States to give
us a fair, objective study. I don't think we got it.
I want to read to you just a couple things from a person
who is intimately involved in this. Let me just tell you what
he says right up front. ``Outcome has been predetermined. No
more B-2s. PA&E officials stated study conclusions before
analysis conducted. OSD has been party to irresponsible
modeling and subjective support inputs.'' And basically they
say that the Tactical Warfare war model and WORRM simply do not
give you a fair look at the effectiveness of these weapons.
This deeply bothers me, because the President of the United
States, the Commander in Chief, promised us a fair, objective
study, and by using these models, I am afraid that study was
inherently flawed. All of the Joint Chiefs, each one of them,
said we ought to have new models, a new way to do this in the
future, so we can effectively look at all these weapons.
Now, what I am concerned about here, frankly, is the
question of balance. How can you say we have a balanced tour
when we are going to spend $350 billion on TACAIR and not spend
a nickel on bombers? That is no balance. That is just going
with the existing programs that the services want. It is rice
bowl protection at its worst, and it is a failure on the part
of this administration to make hard priority decisions on this
issue. It is just, we are going to do it our way, and the hell
with everybody else. And I think it is terrible, I think it is
irresponsible, and here is why I think it is so outrageous.
It is because the halt phase is the most important phase.
If you can stop the enemy before he achieves his objectives and
destroy him in the field, then you don't have to spend $70
billion going over there and fighting the war, $10 billion to
deploy your forces, $60 billion to fight the war with us and
our allies. If you can stop him before he gets there, because
you have got an adequate bomber force, then you can save
American lives and save American dollars.
And that is why I am so upset, again. And I must tell you,
I am deeply, deeply disappointed in the Department for, one, I
think failing to do a good study, and, two, failing to make the
hard priority decisions. And the idea, it is the position of
this administration that we are never going to build another
bomber----
HALT PHASE
Mr. Lewis. If the gentleman will yield, I hope the panel
will ask the question about the halt phase. That is a very,
very fundamental question here. I think you were asking that
question.
Mr. Young. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Dicks. The Minority wasn't given an opportunity to make
an opening statement, and I made the opening statement for the
Minority.
Mr. McDade. Mr. Chairman, I would like to yield some time,
if I may, of my time to the panel, to answer, because I think
the dialogue is excellent. I think we should hear it.
Mr. Young. Mr. McDade, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
You may yield your time any way you like.
Mr. McDade. Go ahead, John.
Mr. Hamre. I would just like to start by framing a brief
response and then turn it over to my colleagues.
First of all, I think the DAWMS study showed exactly what
Mr. Dicks said, that there is no question that the B-2 is very
important to the halt phase, and it clearly demonstrates that.
That is one of the reasons why we consider it such an important
asset.
The DAWMS study went beyond it to say would we get more
benefit if we had more of them, and if we were to do that, what
would we give up and how much would be lose in doing that? I
think that becomes this analytic issue, where we will have some
dispute.
Now, Mr. Dicks----
FORCE MIX
Mr. McDade. He asked you a very specific question about
TACAIR and bombers. He gave you numbers. Respond to that. Are
you claiming you have a balanced program?
Mr. Hamre. Sir, first of all, we did in this analysis--and
Dave McCloud led it--I think they did 1,500 runs on the best
models we have. Are they perfect? Heck, no. Should they be
better? Yes, absolutely.
Mr. McDade. You gentleman are responsible for the resource
allocation, and the gentleman from Washington asked you, what
was the number, $350 billion?
Mr. Dicks. That is about what it was. Maybe with the cuts
in the F-22, it is going to be less. But there is zero in
bombers, I hope some in weapons. We have to weaponize the
bombers. We are buying no additional bombers. There is no
bomber program for the future. We are investing all in TACAIR.
Mr. McDade. Let me reclaim my time so I can ask a question.
You all agree that the number $350 billion is the number in
the ball park for TACAIR?
Mr. Hamre. It is down to about $290 billion now because of
changes we made in the QDR.
Mr. McDade. What would you describe the bomber?
Mr. Hamre. The investment for the bombers is for upgrades
for the existing fleets.
Mr. McDade. $290, $300 billion in TACAIR?
Mr. Hamre. Yes.
Mr. Dicks. And zero for bombers.
General Hawley. You have to look at the balance over a
period of time. If you look at investments in other systems and
bombers in the eighties and nineties, you will find the
predominance of our investment has gone into bombers and
airlift within the Air Force. That is when we equipped the
bomber force. We bought the B-1, we bought the B-2. We invested
large sums in modernizing those and bringing them from the
nuclear era into an era where they can provide the robust
capabilities we need from the bomber force.
Beginning around the turn of the century, we will begin
reinvesting in the fighter force. That is why there appears to
be an imbalance, if you just take one slice of time. I think
you have to look at this over the decades that it takes to
build and shape a force.
Mr. McDade. That is a look back. We are trying to look
forward. The purpose the hearing is to say, what are we
supposed to do tomorrow?
And while looking back, General, I agree and appreciate
what you said, because I was here when all those programs came
through. But what the gentleman from Washington is saying is,
we look forward and see a ramp-up in TACAIR and a flat or
perhaps ramp down, whatever.
General Hawley. It might be interesting to correlate that
ramp-up with the age of the weapons system in the inventory and
being replaced.
Mr. McDade. You define the comparison any way you want. I
don't want to go back and hear about what we did 20 years ago.
I wanted to talk about what we are going to do in the next 10
years.
Would you describe it that way? What is the allocation of
recourses that makes you comfortable that we are spending the
right amount of money on the bombers compared to TACAIR for the
next 10 years out?
General Hawley. I think studies like DAWMS highlight that
this produces a balanced force structure. Certainly as I try to
do my job in supporting the needs of the CINCs, responding to
their requests for support, this looks like a balanced force
structure to me.
If we said we want less fighter force in order to support a
larger bomber force, I would have to say no to the CINCs for
their request today. I am not in a position today where I have
to say no to the CINCs on any bomber issues. So I think from
the CINCs' perspective, at least as I see their demand for
forces, we have a balanced force that satisfies those
requirements today, and this program will sustain that balance.
Mr. McDade. Does anybody disagree with that?
Mr. Hamre. May I add, sir, that I think Mr. Dicks is right,
that bombers, long-range bombers, are enormously helpful in
that halt phase, as are all aviation assets, frankly. But there
are other things that tactical aircraft do that bombers cannot
do. It was a much richer mix of requirements that the generals
are facing and why it leads them to their conclusion.
Mr. Young. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from California now has 5 minutes, and he may
use it to continue this discussion.
CHALLENGES TO THE UNITED STATES
Mr. Lewis. General Hawley, when you talked about our not
spending money on the fighter force and we are building up the
bomber force, during that very time we were moving forward with
the F-15 and the F-117, so I wonder about that. Clearly, there
were expenditures there. And Norm is saying there is zero in
terms of bomber focus looking forward.
I might remind you that the building did not want to go
forward with the numbers of F-117s that eventually we procurred
to. It was Senator Nunn who drug you all, kicking and screaming
down the halls, and following our experience in the Gulf with
the F-117, the halls couldn't be happier about the numbers of
aircraft.
It is of great concern to me that we try to use that sort
of background perspective as we look forward.
The halt phase is critical, in my mind's eye. If you think
it is critical, what kinds of wars are we likely to fight in
the coming two decades, and is that halt phase likely to be
required in a very short time of notice? And, if so, then it is
fundamental.
So tell me, what are we going to face? What is the real
challenge from? If you can't answer that, why are we here?
General Hawley. We have some scenarios in DAWMS that would
be enlightening.
General McCloud. DAWMS did look at various options in major
theater wars in northeast Asia and southwest Asia. We did
excursions to try to address the issues that Congressman Dicks
alluded to. We did lock out various forces from a theater to
see the role that the bomber would play and how it would play
best. We locked out naval tactical air. We locked out Air Force
tactical air. We locked out the combination of the two at
various levels from 10 percent all the way up to 90 percent. So
we got a good feel for where the bombers played.
He is absolutely right, the bomber plays heavily in the
early halt phase, and it is a critical phase to play. It comes
with the stealth precision.
Mr. Lewis. I know you have all kinds of scenarios. But in
terms of the real challenge to us in the next 2 decades, what
is likely in terms of our needs? We are not going to have the
wonderful notice that we got in the Middle East last time. A
lot of people observed all that, I can tell you.
So assuming that the first 2 weeks are not automatically
available to move troops, et cetera, et cetera, how important?
What priority is this? Should we shift the priority, assuming
that?
General McCloud. Sir. I think it gets back to balance. We
have to be prepared for that; we have to be prepared for the
options of short warning. We don't think that will happen, but
if it does, we ought to be prepared for it. The bombers play a
central role in that.
Mr. Dicks. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Lewis. Just a moment. Let me just kind of interrupt you
myself. There is little question within the building as you
talk about a ``balanced force,'' if you move in the direction
of saying we need more B-2 stealth assets, that has an impact.
The National Training Center for the Army is in my
district. I know how they get excited about discussion like
that. We are talking about peace maybe in our time or not
having peace in our time. What is the priority and what is the
likely reality of serious confrontation ahead of us?
Let me add to that, General Hawley, 2 years ago we had a
panel like this. About that time, I was red hot for the B-2 at
that point, and I began backing off. The panel sat there and
said we don't need any more B-2s. The only guy who said we
needed more was sitting in your chair, General Loh, the force
provider. He said we need more. Why did he say it and the rest
didn't then?
General Hawley. I think General Loh and I would probably
look at this through very similar eyes.
Mr. Lewis. I beg your pardon?
General Hawley. General Loh and I would look at this issue
through similar eyes, because we face the identical problem.
Mr. Lewis. Let me back you off one more time. Yesterday I
was having a discussion with another colleague of mine on
another Committee. The subject was F-18E/F or C/D. The
discussion was, if we back off of the E/F, it will save us $18
billion and that will get us to the Joint Strike Fighter
faster.
Friends, we are in this together. We need advice and
counsel that reflects your best judgments, not balanced force
to keep one portion of the force happy. I am concerned we are
getting a lot of that.
Mr. Young. The gentleman's time has expired for this turn.
Why don't you go ahead and somebody respond to the issue
Mr. Lewis raised.
General. Hawley. I will try. I think the analysis and
studies we keep doing over and over keep yielding a similar
result.
You referred to General Loh's support for the B-2. Believe
me, I support the B-2. I think the B-2 is a marvelous weapons
system that fills a very important role within the ACC force
structure we provide to our fighting CINCs. The issue is not,
would I like more B-2. I would love to have more B-2s. I would
love to have a bomber force that is all B-2s. But I don't have
enough budget authority to buy a bomber force of all B-2s.
Therefore, we have developed a mix that includes 21 B-2s,
95 B-1s, 71 B-52s in the out years that will satisfy our
overall requirement within the constraints that we face in
terms of our obligation authority for the budget. We think that
is the right balance.
Congressman Dicks pointed out this is a great enabler. It
is an enabler. That is how we will use it. It will be used to
leverage all of the other capabilities that we bring to the
fight. it will allow our B-1s to get in and do that heavy
lifting that the B-1 is so good at.
Mr. Chairman, you commented on the B-1 in your opening
statement. ------. And that capability will be leveraged by the
B-2, which will be able to go in and take out command and
control structures and take down defenses and open the door for
that heavy lifter, the B-1.
Meanwhile, the B-52, which will initially do standoff work
with its CALCM capabilities and its HAVE NAP, then it will get
in. After we have taken down those defenses, using the B-2 and
our other high end weapons systems, it will be able to get in
and do that heavy bombardment mission which will be so crucial
in the halt phase.
But we will also need air superiority and need to provide
that over the battlefield, because non of these weapons
systems, to include the B-2, can be used with impunity in a
high threat environment. So we have got to be able to control
that airspace. We will need to be able to deliver sustained
firepower against a whole array of targets. That is what the
fighter force will do as it comes in and is able to generate
those high sortie rates of two to three sorties per day per
airplane, be able to attack that broad array of targets that we
really can't get out of the bombers.
So this balance that we have created within the fiscal
constraints that we have been given, frankly, is about right,
and it will produce a modern bomber force, it will by 2010 or
2015 produce a modern fighter force.
We have already begun to modernize the airlift force so we
will have the mobility assets that we need with the C-17 and
with our sealift capabilities to get these people to the fight
in a prompt and timely way and we will be able to get our job
done. While we are doing those opening days, we will be able to
launch bombers from the States and deliver that long-range
combat firepower to the theater. But that comes at great cost.
------. This is tough work, we do, and it requires a balanced
and a flexible force that can satisfy a broad array of
contingency requirements.
As we have gone through and used tools like those imperfect
models that the DAWMS study used and that have been sued in
other ways, but they do provide insight, though they are not
perfect and you can't just take the results on a spreadsheet
after analysis like that and say, there is my force structure,
you have to apply judgment to it.
That is, I think, what you pay us to do, is to bring our
judgment to the table and the judgment of people like Dr. Hamre
who have been involved in this business for a long time, as
well as your own judgment. And out of that, collectively, we
produce a force for this country. I think the one that has been
proposed is a balanced force that will do a pretty good job of
satisfying our national security requirement.
Am I a bomber advocate? You bet I am. I am not a fighter
general, I am an airpower general, and my job is to deliver
combat airpower for our warfighting CINCs. I am supposed to
make sure that that force is well trained, well equipped, well
organized, and capable of responding to those needs on short
notice, and that is what they can do today.
And they do it because over the years, together, between
various administrations and this Congress, we have delivered a
very capable set of airpower forces for the country. They are
ready to go to war today and fight effectively, and the B-2
will be a tremendous addition to that. It is now committed to
the SIOP. It is now available to the CINCs. I made that
available on the first of January. ------. A tremendous
capability. And we will be able to use that as an enabler to
help leverage all of our other investments.
Mr. Dicks. I just want to point out, we had to provide that
GATS/GAM over Air Force objections.
Mr. Young. Thank you for that excellent response.
Mr. Skeen, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
B-2 and Halt Phase
Mr. Skeen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will not use all of
my time.
I was very interested and engaged with the treatise that
General Charles Horner came out with a few days ago in which he
analyzed our experiences in that Desert Storm operation and
what we didn't learn, and I was very impressed, with having
known him well. I think the crucial point that he made was the
time limit for the halt phase, and his summary was that the
only kind of response we had that would be adequate would be
the use of B-2s.
I know we need the DAWMS study. The critical thing is, how
much time do we have for the next go abound in these situations
to respond? ------ which becomes more and more tackier day by
day. When you are talking about that. ------. You folks have
done a great job, and I know you do your job well or you
wouldn't be where you are today, but there is a lot to be said
for the allocation to the kinds of Air Force resources. So put
us down as second-base umpires. We are not the greatest, but we
are concerned. We appreciate the dialogue that you have given
us today.
Thank you.
Mr. Young. Mr. Hobson.
Cost of Bomber Aircraft
Mr. Hobson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have some concerns about how we pay for things, since I
sit on the Budget Committee as well as this Committee. I also
have some district concerns because we do a lot of stuff at
Wright-Patterson in may district. And I remember General Loh
when General Loh was at Wright-Patterson, and he inherited
that.
What bothers me is this configuration that we have got
ourselves into. You have the B-1 that we are going to spend all
the money on. I am worried not about the next 10 years alone, I
am worried further out, because you aren't going to have B-52s
around. Well, you have them longer than I think we all thought
we would have them. That is going to go by the board.
You have the Navy that doesn't have any stealthy aircraft
now, that I know of. And excuse me, Duke, for talking about the
Navy. you have a lot of assets there that have a certain need
for a lot of money.
We have got all these airplanes, all these fighter
airplanes we are building, I understand we want to have it all,
but I am worried. I don't have quite the passion that Mr. Dicks
has, but have four grandchildren that I am worried about out in
the future of this threat and of not having the capability to
stop that early threat.
I want to figure out how we can pay. If I had my druthers,
I would like to see us reconfigure circumstances and
reconfigure so we have that ability to stop that initial threat
better long-term. I think you can do it today. I think you
probably have got the capability that you can do that today.
but I am worried when you don't have some of this stuff out
there. And I want to ask, can't we reconfigure so we can pay to
keep this line open and to keep this technology moving forward?
The other question, sir, I would ask is, was he right? We
always get blamed for forcing people to buy things. Was he
right? If it did work in buying that system, over the objection
of the Air Force, why are we being forced to second-guess the
Air Force in how we pay for this stuff?
General Hawley. It is true the Air Force was not on board
buying GATS/GAM and it was issued to us. the reason was because
the air Force, I think, viewed it as an interim capability and
our judgment was that we would prefer to take a risk for a few
years not having that precision capability, given that JDAM was
going to be delivered this year, and we were willing to do
without that capability for the 2 years that the GAM gives use
a B-2 precision capability.
There was a difference in judgment, and the wisdom of the
Congress said we think we need it sooner. So we took it, we
have implemented it, we have it on the airplane today, and we
have committed it to the warfighting CINCs. So we honor that
judgment. It is now available to the CINCs. As I said, I made
it available to the CINCs on the first of January.
Mr. Hobson. Where is----
General Hawley. Joint Direct Attack Munition is essentially
the same weapon as the GAM. It will be procured in much larger
quantities and be much cheaper, and therefore GAM will be
phased out beginning this year as we begin to take delivery of
block 30s which begin this summer, and those will be delivering
JDAMs, while the block 20 deliver GAMS. So we will have a
period of time where we will have a unique capability that we
wouldn't have had it the Congress hadn't directed us to buy the
GAM.
The difference in opinion really lies in the area of risk.
Our assessment was, I think, that we should tolerate the risk
and save the money, and the Congress' judgment ran counter to
that, so we incorporated it, trained our crews to it, and
demonstrated it very effectively.
B-52 Aircraft
Mr. Hobson. Answer my other question, sir. How do we long-
term reconfigure when we don't have the B-52? You are going to
have B-1s that people don't really fly very much to do things
with when we have had past engagements, which may or may not be
there. What do you have? You have 21 B-2s. That is all you have
in the future to cover the world out. You don't have anything,
as far as I know, on the drawing board to replace the B-2s.
General Hawley. Okay, I think I can answer that. Number
one, the B-52 will be around a long time. I am not sure that
there is a retirement date for the B-52. It is a very well
constructed airplane and will fly for a long time, and we have
no projections to retire it. So it will be a significant part
of our bomber force structure for the next 3 decades.
BOMBER WEAPONS CAPABILITIES
The B-1, although it has not been employed in combat to
date, that is because it didn't have conventional capabilities
that were valued by the CINCs. Now it has that capability to
deliver sensor fused munitions. We just delivered that
capability this year. It will soon have the capability to
deliver JDAMs, just like the B-2 did last October.
So it will have that capability, and in fact for most
munitions in that new family of near precision capable
munitions, the B-1 will carry significantly more than any of
our other bombers. I call it our heavy lifter. That is because
it has the largest payload of any of our bombers. Once you can
enable its access to the theater with systems like the B-2,
then the B-1 what can really bring firepower to bear. I could
give you some examples.
The B-1 will deliver 24 JDAMs, the B-2 delivers 16, and the
B-52 12; the B-1 delivers 12 JSOWs, the B-2 will deliver 16,
and the B-52 will deliver 12. The B-1 will deliver 24 JASSMs,
the B-2 16, and the B-52 12.
So this family of weapons systems gives us a very effective
balance between that high-end system that can open the door,
the high-speed penetrator that can deal with medium threats,
the B-1, and then the standoff weapon system, the B-52, that
can eventually be rolled into the fight.
Mr. Hobson. Don't you have to have a whole lot of other
weapons out there to protect the B-1 and the B-52 that you
don't have to have with the B-2?
General Hawley. Our tactics for employing these weapons, we
would employ the B-2 against that family of targets that are
heavily defended and that the B-1 can't get access to.
There is another whole class of targets that are less well
defended that the B-1 can deal with. So we will use the B-1 to
deal with those, and then other targets once the systems like
the B-2 have taken down the defenses.
Then the B-52 is a standoff weapon initially, and we will
use it from outside the threat envelope and launch standoff
munitions. Once the defenses are beat down, then it will be
able to go in.
So this is an array of threats and an array of targets both
geographically and in the dimension of threats and over time,
because over time, the complex of the threat will change as we
defeat some of those systems and take down both of the command
and control structure that supports them and the weapon
systems.
Mr. Hobson. I will ask a last question, and that is, when
Secretary Perry was here, I thought he gave us a much shorter
date on the B-52 than you are giving us.
Mr. Young. Mr. Hefner.
REMARKS OF MR. HEFNER
Mr. Hefner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I feel inadequate, I don't feel the passion that I have
heard here, but there are some things that bother me. I
remember many years ago we sat in this room and we were told we
can have the B-1 and we can also have the B-2, and going ahead
with the B-1, it will not delay the production of the B-2; we
don't have to skimp on either one of them; we can have them
both; we can have a full contingent of everything.
We were sold on that concept, and we did the B-1s, and I
have been to some places, and the B-1, to my knowledge, has not
taken part in any significant programs that we have had in the
Persian Gulf or anywhere else.
If I understand you right, you said, the B-1 is going to be
downgraded to where it won't be counted in the agreements we
make with the Russians?
General Hawley. Right.
Mr. Hefner. So we spent billions of dollars to fix the
thing, and now we have downgraded it where it won't be counted.
Talk about the long-range plans. One of the things that has
always bothered me is, I don't have any manufacturing
facilities in my district, per se, but it is a lot more sexy to
talk about ships and planes and things like that. But we have
got a real problem as far as quality of life for our men and
women that are manning these systems. We have got a shortfall
that goes 50 years out into the future.
It seems the argument changes every few years. I remember
back in the beginning, if you weren't for the B-1, you weren't
for God and country and apple pie. That was the thing, the B-1:
We have to have the B-1, and don't give away the canal. That
was on everybody's political mind.
I just wanted to make one other point--somebody, Norm,
talked about the halt phase, and that is very important. I
understand that. But I don't foresee that we would have a real
threat in the future that would have to deal with the halt
phase.
But just say we did. The overall plan that you have put
into effect, I feel sure, dealt with the halt phase, but you
have got to have some other stuff to back up after you first
initiate the halt phase. If you go too far the other way, would
that take away some of the effectiveness of the overall
operation?
Does that make any sense?
General Hawley. I think that is my argument for balance,
sir. We do need that balance, so you can deal with the halt
phase, and then you can have a sustained capability to engage a
determined foe after that.
As to the B-1, I quibble with the word ``downgrade.'' We
rerolled it.
Mr. Hefner. I was oversimplifying it.
General Hawley. In fact, we have significantly upgraded the
capabilities of the B-1 in the conventional area in order to
give the CINCs that tool they need during the halt phase to put
a lot of firepower on target quickly, which it will do along
with the B-2 and B-52. So I would quibble with that a little
bit. And it has been in the fight. It is just that it was
unseen.
During the Gulf War, we took a number of B-52s off alert
and the nuclear commitment in order to make them available to
do conventional work in the theater, and we put the B-1 on
alert to back them up. At that time, that is what it was best
at, the nuclear mission. So it freed up other forces.
Mr. Hefner. It never flew any missions.
General Hawley. It didn't fly any missions.
Mr. Hefner. I guess I am not knowledgeable enough about the
strategic planning for future wars, but one of my big concerns,
having been on Military Construction for all these years, my
big focus has been on quality of life for our guys that man
these sophisticated weapons. and I guess people get tired of
hearing it, but to me, it is a little bit ridiculous when we
talk about the most sophisticated weapons that man could
conceive and you have still got guys living in conditions that
they have to walk across an unpaved parking lot to take a
shower and living in facilities that were, some of them, around
in World War II.
To me, that is just about as critical as all the other
stuff. If you don't have retention and you don't have morale,
then it is not going to make that much difference; people are
not going to be that committed.
I don't have an argument with your--I don't know about your
models or what you have used or what-have-you. Norm is our
expert here. But I am concerned that we should know where we
are going, because our money is so limited, it is about dollars
any more, and we have got to make sure that we spend them in a
prudent manner in my view.
Mr. Hamre. May I just very briefly say I think it is very
important you bring that up. This is not a decision about
spending $300,000 in fiscal year 1998. This is really about,
are we prepared to enter into a $20 billion commitment over the
next 15 years, and what is it that you have to give up if you
want to go into that, because we feel our top line is
constrained.
We just have gone through the budget negotiations that
clearly indicate we have a constrained top line. Therein lies
that very painful choice. There isn't a person sitting in this
room that doesn't want exactly the same thing. In the next
conflict, we want our people walking off the airplane carrying
a flag, and not carried off an airplane under a flag. Everybody
wants that. But that means we have to go through that very
painful process of looking at all of the things that the
Department needs and deciding what is an appropriate balance.
This was a hard decision. It didn't come easy. We would
much rather have more B-2s, much rather have barracks. We still
have guys living in deplorable conditions in Korea, and it is a
shame, it is a real shame. That is all of the things that we
had to struggle with. That is why we didn't come to this with
any joy. This was a hard decision.
Mr. Hefner. I am glad you mentioned Korea.
Just one second. General Ladd, who was at Fort Bragg and
Korea, came before this Committee and begged and pleaded, and
we gave $40 million to upgrade the living conditions in Korea.
That was atrocious, expecting these people to be on the front
lines. And we can talk about all the sophisticated weapons, but
there is a human element out there. They are counting on us to
look after them.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Young. Mr. Bonilla.
QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW
Mr. Bonilla. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would just like to start out by concurring with your
opening statement, Dr. Hamre. I am proud this Committee is
dealing with a serious issue here rather than some of the
things reported on the evening news each night. I am convinced
that a lot of that initiative results from people who are,
frankly, regularly trying to make a mockery of the military,
and I find it disgusting. I am delighted that this Committee
has chosen to discuss this very important issue.
It also ties into what I believe philosophically overall.
There are a lot of other agencies in Washington who, quite
frankly, waste and squander billions of dollars. No one is out
there asking for a comparable QDR for the Commerce Department
or the Energy Department or for the bureaucracy of the
Education Department. I wonder why we don't have a call out
there for comparable QDRs on some of these agencies.
It seems like the agendas that the Dan Rathers of the world
each night have are to constantly hammer the Defense Department
and constantly hammer one other area, and that is the
Agriculture Department. But no one will go in and do comparable
reporting on HUD or Energy or Commerce or some of these others.
So that bothers me, frankly, not just as a Member of Congress,
but as a citizen of this country.
Unfortunatley, we are faced with having to make decisions
within the Defense Department as to what we are going to pay
for in the future.
The chairman asked a good question in his opening statement
that I would like to have elaborated on, if I could, and Dr.
Hamre almost started to answer this a minute ago. But what
might we have to give up to fund an expanded B-2 program, and
are the trade-offs worthwhile? What are we talking specifically
about--I am talking about a hypothetical reality that we may
face here.
Are we talking about eliminating, cutting back on, another
aircraft like the F-22 or the joint strike fighter, or is there
something else with a comparable pricetag that we could look at
if we choose not to go with the recommendations of the QDR?
Mr. Hamre. May I just make a very general comment, and then
I would ask Dave McCloud to speak to what we did in the
analysis that led to the recommendation in the QDR.
The easiest money in town is other people's money. It is
always easy to say I would like somebody else, the Air Force
would love to have two fewer Army divisions so they could have
more F-22s, or the Army would love to get rid of TACAIR so they
could have more divisions.
We all ride our hobby horse around a little bit, but you
have to get off it and sit down and say how does it all land
because I have to pay for what is important for me. And when it
goes beyond the resources I can take care of myself, I have to
come in front of everybody else and make a good case for it.
You are absolutely in no different situation that was the
Secretary when he had to look at all of this.
Could we find room in the budget for the B-2? Of course we
could. The problem is giving things up for it. And all those
other shortfalls we have got, and we have got them all over the
place. We really did look at alternatives. Let me ask Dave to
talk about it, because the most important thing, as I say, is
you have to look at the opportunity costs. That is what led to
us.
David, General McCloud, if you would speak to that.
General McCloud. We looked at major force structure as we
went through the study, and we started out with, if you take
fighter wing equivalents, roughly 1,800 airplanes for example,
we looked at one, we looked at two, we looked at four. We
looked at carriers: Take out a carrier and its associated air
wing, take out two carriers and its associated air wing. We
looked at B-1s: Take out all of the B-1s, and that is an apples
to apples trade, so you could get an understanding.
In each case what we did, as I say, if we take out that
force structure today to pay for additional B-2s, what
happened? The general trend continued through all of those
looks. One was, as you take it out, as you free up monies to
pay for the B-2, you lose that capability. Each of those assets
I talked about--wings, carriers, bombers--has different
characteristics and capabilities, but when you take it out, you
lose that for a period of time. In general, that was a decade
or more.
So if you retired all the B-1s tomorrow, freed up the money
to pay for additional B-2s, by the time you get the B-2s on
line to take up that capability gap, it will have been roughly
10 to 14 years, depending on which of the comparisons you are
talking about.
Mr. Dicks. Will the gentleman yield to me out of my own
time, out of my next round of time?
Mr. Young. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Bonilla. I have no time.
Mr. Dicks. Could I just ask one question on this point?
Mr. Young. Go ahead. We will deduct it from your next
allocation.
PAYING FOR THE B-2
Mr. Dicks. This will be very brief.
That isn't how I see this. What you would say is, maybe we
won't buy something out there; instead, we will buy this. Why
couldn't you do it that way? Why do you have to say instead of
taking something out of the force structure right now, that you
already got--and F-16s would be the top of my list, by the way,
if you wanted to look at something that didn't have a
significant rule in the Gulf War--why not just say we are not
going to buy something that is nonstealthy that can't penetrate
and we are going to buy something that is stealthy and will
work? Why didn't you do it that way?
Mr. Hamre. I think it really is a cash flow problem, sir.
We have got to pay for $1.5 billion every year for the next 8
years in order to buy the B-2, and I can't simply use future
weapons systems not in the budget now to pay for that. I have
to pay for it right now. The only way to pay for it right now
is with force structure, frankly.
Mr. Dicks. We are talking about $1.5 billion over 6 years.
It isn't like a lot of money, John. That isn't how you do it,
John. You take it out of lower priority stuff and make room for
it.
Mr. Young. I would have to say we are barely touching the
surface of a lot of issues members are going to get to. We have
to stick to the 5-minute rule.
Mr. Dicks. Take that out of my time. This is a crucial
point, and I wanted to get to it.
Mr. Young. Mr. Nethercutt.
Mr. Nethercutt. Mr. Chairman, I came late. I know Mr.
Cunningham and Mr. Istook were ahead of me. Let me come back
after they finish.
Mr. Young. That is fine with me.
Mr. Istook.
B-2 Delivery Dates
Mr. Istook. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I wanted to ask really about two particular points. One
relates to this trade-off issue that you are discussing, and
that was in your testimony, General McCloud. If you could
quantify for us the current plan to finish off the purchase of
the B-2s, what are the delivery dates and operational dates,
because you thought it was a crucial factor. How long would it
be before additional bombers were delivered or operational? I
would like to have that information fleshed out.
Also I realize that sometimes that is a variable, but I
realize it is not as variable when you are building bombers as
when you are building fighters.
The second point to which I would like to get a response:
We are talking about the capabilities of 16 operational B-2s
out of 21 total, but I haven't heard anything mentioned about
what happens when a system has that few aircraft. If you lose
one bomber, that is 6 percent of your operational capability.
I haven't heard how that was accounted for in your study.
When you place assets at risk, even though this particular one
is designed for risk, I don't know if the word is defend
itself, but how do you make it less susceptible to being lost?
Nevertheless, I haven't heard anything that factors in what
happens when you have such a small number when you have any
losses whatsoever. Doesn't that really expand a lot of your
risk and therefore diminish a lot of the potential capability
that you are going to have?
I would like to hear those two things accounted for on the
delivery and operational dates and potential losses.
General McCloud. In the delivery and operational dates,
basically let me take an example. I think that will help
outline it.
If we retired all the B-1s tomorrow and we started freeing
up the money to pay for additional B-2 production, those monies
freed up immediately would mean the first airplane delivery
would be roughly 2003.
Mr. Istook. First additional airplane.
General McCloud. The first additional bomber, 2003.
Could Northrop do a different profile? They probably could.
We believed this was a reasonable profile to do. So part of
that, the up front cost there is associated with essentially
putting the production line back together, gearing up, getting
the work force in place, starting that process. It takes time
to build these very complex airplanes.
Mr. Istook. Of the 21, when is the last delivery date on
the current profile?
General McCloud. What I was describing for you was B-1s
versus B-2s. In this case, the worth of the B-1 frees up enough
money to buy 16 B-2s. One fighter wing equivalent frees up
enough money to buy a certain number of B-2s. We have 21 B-2s
in place today.
Mr. Istook. 21 have not been delivered?
General McCloud. Correct.
Mr. Istook. When is the last delivery date?
General Hawley. As you know, they are going through an
upgrade program. In the year 2000, we will have all the
airplanes.
Mr. Istook. And as far as the issue I raised about what
happens when you lose even a single one, much less if you have
multiple losses?
General Hawley. That is essentially what the five BAI
airplanes will have to cover. I am not the expert here, but I
have a note passed to me that says ------ DAWMS, during the
halt phase, ------. If we fought a major conflict and used this
conflict, and if the models are right--and I am not here to
defend models, but they are the best we have got ------ you
would have two left to support your tests and your depot
program and so on and so forth.
Typically in most of our force structure, we program 10
percent addition for BAI, so you would still have 10 percent
left at the end of that campaign.
Mr. Istook. That is modeling one major engagement ------.
If, for example, you had a scenario where there are two
engagements----
General Hawley. That was two, sir.
Mr. Istook. That had two engagements, different parts of
the globe, using the B-2 for halt in both of those?
General Hawley. Right.
Mr. Istook. ------?
General Hawley. ------.
Mr. Istook. Thank you.
Mr. Young. Mr. Sabo.
B-2 MAINTAINABILITY
Mr. Sabo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome. I have a question that doesn't relate to the
question of whether we should have more or not, but I am very
serious about General Hawley's testimony on the operations of
the B-2 which says in effect, if I understand it right, that
they can only be used once a week? So it true that the
maintenance after a flight requires so much time, so they are
only used once a week?
General Hawley. Yes, sir. The way we are operating the
airplane today is, we will fly two or three times a day for
training, and then we stand it down for as long as necessary.
As it turns out, necessary is about six days to make sure that
we sustain the stealthy characteristics of the airplane to the
levels that are required to support our commitments of General
Habiger.
Mr. Sabo. The turnaround is seven days. What is it for a B-
52 or B-1?
General Hawley. We don't have that problem with the
nonstealthy airplanes. This is a function of the materials used
to deliver the stealthy characteristics of the airplane. Many
of those have significant cure times. We have some material on
the B-2 that must cure for up to three days. If a blemish
occurs, and they occur on every flight, what we try to do is go
in and try to restore the finish, if you will, of the airplane
to like new conditions so that it retains the fullest measure
of stealth that we can deliver to the CINC in the event that he
should need it.
General Habiger. If I could add, my requirement for the
nuclear was plan is to have ------.
That is what General Hawley referring to. In order to get
------, he has to go through this maintenance program on the
composites in the wing and that sort of thing.
Mr. Sabo. What is the time required for the F-117?
General Hawley. The F-117 has similar materials. It is a
much smaller airplane, of course, and it has a different nature
of material. We use a lot of what we call putty on the F-117s.
When it comes back from a flight, a crew chief can actually
repair the F-117 using this putty and get it back in the air
pretty quickly, so we don't have the same kind of standdown
requirement. But it is a whole different generation of
material.
One of the things we are trying to do with the B-2 is
upgrade those materials, and in fact we are migrating much of
the materials technology out of the F-22 program and the joint
strike fighter program in order to gradually upgrade the
materials so we can reduce this need for long standdowns after
flight.
Mr. Sabo. What is the projected turnaround on the F-22
versus our current fighters?
General Hawley. The requirement for the F-22 is to be able
to sustain on the order of a 3.0 sortie rate per day. It is not
supposed to degrade in this day. That is why it is nice to
migrate those materials into the B-2 program so over time we
can upgrade the surface finish on the airplane to be more
durable.
Mr. Sabo. Is the material on the F-117 better than the B-2?
General Hawley. Different. I think you are talking
different generations of stealth technology. The F-117, of
course, was essentially our first stealthy airplane, so in fact
there are five different kinds of 117s. If you really went out
and looked at them, you would find five different sets of
materials on that fleet of barely 40 airplanes.
So you have got--as that technology matured, we changed the
surfaces on the F-117. The B-2 was delivered with a next
generation technology, and then, of course, as we have invested
in further stealth technologies in both our technology
programs, the F-22 and JSF, we will further improve the
technologies.
Another thing we use is a tester. One of the difficulties
we have is, it is hard to tell whether a blemish is, in fact, a
serious problem for the airplane. You may have after a flight
20 blemishes.
If I were to use an analogy, any of us who fly airplanes,
we look at what we call the 781, the airplane forms, before we
fly. On the back page of the 781 is a list of discrepancies on
the airplane. They have little red dashes next to them which
indicate it is okay to fly with them.
Our problem today is, when we send a crew chief out to look
at the B-2 after it lands, he really doesn't have any way, he
or she, to tell whether a blemish is a red dash, which you can
fly with, or a red X, which is grounding and has to be
repaired.
So our policy, in order to make sure that we have the most
stealthy aircraft that we can provide to the warfighter, is to
fix them all and fix them all immediately after flight. So that
is what has generated this kind of fly one, maintain six.
F-117 Production
Mr. Sabo. When was the last F-117 produced?
General Hawley. I would have to get back to you with that
answer. It was in the early eighties.
Mr. Sabo. That was before most of the B-2s were built.
General Hawley. Correct. The B-2 was in development.
Mr. Sabo. If the material for the F-117 was better, why
wasn't that used in the B-2?
General Hawyley. It is not that it is better, it is
different. It is an earlier generation, and it is designed
against a slightly different problem. The B-2 was developed, of
course, as a nuclear bomber, and it was designed to have a more
balanced signature reduction than the 117. The 117 was
primarily designed ------. The B-2 is designed to have a more
balanced signature ------. So it requires a different set of
materials, different kinds of technology in order to produce
it.
Mr. Young. The gentlemen's time has expired.
Mr. Cunningham.
Quadrennial Defense Review
Mr. Cunningham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You have stated
that the DAWMS is based on balance, but yet it is disputed as
not effective. If I was a lawyer, I think I would tear apart
your argument.
I looked at the QDR. The QDR was based not on what is the
real need and the real shortfall in dollars, but was based on
fiscal constraints, what bang can we get for the dollars that
we have. I think that is wrong.
I also know that the QDR is nothing like what went to the
White House. I know the board members and I talked to them
individually, and we are going to have hearings on that to show
the disparity of the preconceived analysis that came out of
QDR.
I would take a look and say what is the real problem? First
of all, why are we in this constraint? Why do we have to phase
in the difficult decisions that you are making right now?
First of all, the White House has had a propensity to cut
defense. Second, BRAC, including the proposed additional BRAC
rounds cost lots of money upfront. Third, ``defense
conversion'' is the cry of the left and the way to take DOD
dollars. Peacekeeping, I even read in the wire service that the
Southern Command is going to go down and protect endangered
species in South America.
Then we take a look at the contingencies in the OPTEMPO and
the equipment use. And then, last of all, those that want to
decrease the defense spending have always said we are going to
do it in the out years, just like the President. We are going
to do it in the out years. Trust me, we will build it up in the
out years. But they know good and well there is no way in the
out years you are going to be able to afford the things that
you need because of the deficit that you created. And that is
what the QDR does. It takes and causes the military to cut out
of its own bone marrow to make up the deficiencies of defense
spending in the past. And that is upsetting.
You say it yourself, the fiscal constraints we have, we
have to operate under. But why do we have those fiscal
constraints? I think that is the important thing that we are
not really attacking. What do we do when we have two babies and
we can only feed one? We kill one baby. That is not very good,
in my opinion.
The QDR, you know that Captain O'Grady wasn't even ACM-
trained when he got shot down because you didn't have the
assets to train him? You take a look at your adversary program,
it is deficient across the board. You said readiness. These
kind of things that we need to take a look at and say what is
the threat and what do we need and identify the dollars versus
this is what we have got. This is a direction that is totally
wrong in my opinion.
When most of us served in the military, we always assumed
the enemy had more than we thought he did, and that way we
didn't get caught with our pants down. Now, we are saying that
the Cold War is over, we are not going to need these assets.
Well, what if we do? ------. Why? How about the three
Typhoon-class nuclear submarines that they just dropped and the
three deep submersibles going down to the bottom of the
Atlantic using welded and molded titanium? How about the SU-27,
35 and 37 that is going to be at the Paris Air Show that
doesn't even give parity to our F-15 and F-14 with the A-10 and
the advancements we can't even talk about here?
I mean, we are saying what if. In the meantime, who is
going to pay for it? You talk about retention, because we can't
take care of the kids back home. It is not just the airlines
that are hiring that causes retention problems. You may say
before a hearing it is okay.
I go out into the street like you do, and you know who is
against this study and you know who is against the QDR? The
flag officers retired, not under the tentacles of the White
House. They are laughing. They say they cannot believe these
studies and what they are doing to the national security
forces. Instead of doing it the other way. I mean, we are
talking Air Force, we are talking Navy, I talked to ANA, I
talked to Marine Corps folks, and I guarantee you, General
Krulak, when he made statements like that in the hearings, I
was walking out, he had phone calls with OSD and the White
House before he got out of the building for saying what was
really needed. So did Admiral Boorda when he was alive.
I think that is the real concern in these things, we are
not meeting the threat. We are not talking about what do we
really need. Rather, we are talking here are the dollars we
have available. Live with it I think we need to identify what
are the dollar shortfalls so that we can have the B-2 like the
Air Force wanted it in the first place, and the B-1, instead of
getting our kids killed, which is, in my opinion, happening. We
are not going to have them come back with flags. They are going
to come back in body bags.
Mr. Young. The gentleman's time has expired.
Budget Shortfalls
Mr. Hamre. May I make one point. Sir, I missed probably
half of the last sessions on the QDR because I was spending my
time up here trying to get a budget negotiation to support the
President's budget level, and, indeed, we were modestly
successful, but we failed in the year 2003 budget numbers. I am
short $6 billion with the budget agreement that was negotiated.
I would love to have more money. There isn't anybody that
doesn't feel we couldn't give you a stronger Defense Department
if we had more money. And the criticism that you lodge, we all
feel very intently. We are now going to have a defense program
that will consume 2.9 percent of our GNP. I think that is
pretty cheap insurance. But I don't think, because we were
wrestling with it ourselves, there isn't support for more money
up here on the hill.
In fact, we have a problem. We spent late into the night
trying to avoid another $6 billion cut to our budget, and,
thankfully, all of you were with us, and we won that by only
two votes.
Mr. Cunningham. I agree. All I am asking is the White House
and you and my blue-belly friends here--I say that with
respect, they know that--but would identify that it is the
dollar shortfall, not that we have to cut out of bone marrow.
That is not the issue going out before us.
Mr. Young. Let me make one brief announcement. Our guests
have agreed that they could come back at 1 o'clock for a one-
hour continuation of this very interesting hearing, so from
1:00 to 2:00 we will continue. We will continue now until
12:00. Most of you indicated you could be back at 1 o'clock.
The other Members that have already left, we are polling them.
So that will be our plan, so go now until 12:00, and then be
back here at 1:00 for another concentrated hour on this issue.
I would like to yield to Mr. Visclosky for his 5 minutes.
B-2 Maintainability
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Hawley, if I could get back to Mr. Sabo's line of
questioning, I understand the concept that there are different
stealth materials involved, and that some are better than
others and that there are different purposes.
What I am having a hard time understanding is if you have a
sophisticated aircraft such as the B-2 and it is used three
times, that potentially it is then on the ground for 6 days.
General Hawley. We adopted that profile because the
airplane is not as durable as it was supposed to be when
delivered. Frankly, our requirement was for an airplane that we
could fly, turn and fly again, and we did not get that kind of
durability on the airplanes as they are currently delivered. --
----.
So we fly the airplane multiple times for training in one
day. Every time the airplane flies, defects occur. We have bird
strikes, at low altitude we have a lot of turbulence. The
turbulence has tape backs. Believe it or not, there is tape on
the surface of this airplane. Other defects occur. So after it
recovers from all that training activity, some of which is
tough, and do landings which are tough on the airplane, all of
the training requirements for the pilots, then it has some
defects.
One of our shortcomings with the B-2 and with the F-117
today is that we don't have a tool that I can give to my crew
chiefs so they can assess the importance of those defects. So
they really have to assume that every defect must be repaired
in order to assure the signature of the airplane for the
mission. So we go repair them all. And it takes us about 6
days.
It doesn't take 6 days of steady work. They go repair a
piece of the airplane and it requires the application of new
tape or new sealant or whatever, and then it has to cure for
some period of time. In some cases, it takes as much as 72
hours, like a new windshield in a car. You take your car down
and get a windshield put in, it takes some time, because it has
to cure, the sealant around the windshield. These fixtures have
to cure for, in some cases, up to 3 days in order to complete
the fix. And it has to stay in a climate-controlled hangar
during that period of time.
So on average, it is taking us about 6 days to get the
signature of the airplane fully restored after we fly it about
three times in one day.
Mr. Dicks. Would my colleague yield for a brief question?
Mr. Visclosky. No. On the fighter you said you had five
other variants of the stealth material. We have 21 B-2s. Are
there variations, and if there are on the B-2, have they
improved? Then my follow-up question, and I will then yield to
the gentleman. We are talking about potentially purchasing more
of these aircraft. I do find it amazing that you would have
them parked that long. If we are going to invest in additional
aircraft----
General Hawley. There are two kinds of B-2s on the flight
line. We have block 20. The block 30 is the fully upgraded
airplane that has the final configuration to include the most
stealthy configuration of the fleet. And that is what we will
be converting all of the B-2s to, so by the year 2000, when
they have all either been delivered as block 30's or
retrofitted to the block 30 configuration, they will all look
alike.
Mr. Visclosky. Will maintenance be simplified? Will the
period of time be shortened?
General Hawley. We are making progress every day as we
improve the materials, migrate technology from other weapons
programs onto this airplane. So I think it will be better. But
we have to invest some money in that, and that is kind of what
we have to work on within the Air Force, is identifying those
upgrades and trying to improve that durability of the
signature. We don't have a fix today for that. We still have to
invent it.
Mr. Visclosky. I yield.
F-117 IN GULF WAR
Mr. Dicks. In the Gulf War, the F-117 in the first two
weeks of the war, with two percent of the assets, took out
something like 38 percent of the targets, and not one was shot
down. So it appears to me whatever little defects they had, it
certainly didn't slow down General Horner's utilization of this
aircraft during the Gulf War.
General Hawley. That is true.
Mr. Dicks. So, I mean, in wartime you are going to use this
airplane, you are going to go out there and stop the enemy with
it. If you have a flaw or defect, you might lose a couple
airplanes. In fact, I think it makes a major argument for
making sure you buy additional B-2s so you can get a fix on
this thing so you have a more survivable airplane.
Thank you.
General McCloud. Can I comment on that very briefly? The F-
117 in the early days literally had radar-absorbant coatings
that were glued on to the airplane, top of the wings, bottom of
the wings. In those early days of flying the machine, which we
did at the Tonopah test range in the desert, it was not unusual
to come back from a mission and have a 4-foot section peeled
off the bottom of your airplane. We went from there, invested
some money with the contractor, Lockheed, and they developed
through the auto industry a robotic spraying technique to put
the same type of materials on, but through very precision
spraying.
That dramatically changed the equation in stealth
technology. Those types of advancements are being made all the
time. That is why we have high confidence that an airplane like
the F-22, when you sit it on the ramp outside at Langley Air
Force Base, will last and be very durable. But it has taken 15
years to get to this stage.
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you very much.
STEALTH CAPABILITIES
Mr. Istook. Mr. Chairman, one point that hasn't been
mentioned that I would like to make certain of from General
Hawley. When you are talking about this layover period of time
for the plane, you are only talking about assuring the stealth
capabilities. This doesn't affect airworthiness?
General Hawley. That is correct. The time is strictly
required to maintain the signature characteristics of the
airplane. It is done to make sure that for its nuclear mission
it is ready, and the nuclear mission is the most demanding,
because it has not other support. It is going to go in alone.
It is going to go into a potentially very heavily defended
environment, and we want to make sure that we provide the air
crew with the most survivable airplane that we can. So we are
taking these measures in order to do that. It has nothing to do
with airworthiness, with the avionics on the airplane. They are
all very good. In fact, I reviewed the status of this airplane
twice a wee, and our supply stats have been getting better at a
dramatic rate. It flies well. It is a good airplane.
Mr. Young. Mr. Cunningham for 10 seconds.
Mr. Cunningham. I support the B-2, but I don't want to
fight on false assumptions. If we had not had air superiority,
air dominance in Desert Storm, we would have lost 117's. That
is why the balance is needed over the target, because I can
shoot down F-15s with A-4 Skyhawks by putting a picket out
there, with no radar. It is important to have a balance in air
superiority.
B-2 ACQUISITION COSTS
Mr. Young. Mr. Cunningham makes an excellent point. I want
to change the subject just a little in the last few minutes
remaining.
The proposal to buy nine additional B-2s, 1, 2, 3 and then
3, the fly-away cost estimated by the contractor is $9.3
billion over the life of the program. The DAWMS estimate is
$20.8 billion for the same program, but DAWMS includes some
military construction for the forward operating locations,
upgrades of $1.7 billion, O&S and indirect costs of $4.7
billion, coming to a total of $20.8 billion. That is more than
twice as much as the contractor is estimating.
John, where do we really stand on the actual cost of this
and the requirements that go along with the procurement of the
additional nine airplanes?
[Chart follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Hamre. Yes, sir. We prepared a little handout to try to
give a crosswalk that would explain the relationship between
these. As you see, there are three items that were not in the
contractor's estimate, but you wouldn't criticize them for it.
It wouldn't be their responsibility to do that. For example,
the military construction, the upgrades, which we really
probably want to do with the existing fleet anyway, and the O&S
and indirect support costs. So you wouldn't criticize Northrop
for not having those costs.
Mr. Dicks. This is a 20-year ownership package, not just
flying the airplane.
Mr. Hamre. The real difference is it is a $9.3 billion
investment program compared to our estimate, which is $13.8
billion. Both of them are large amounts of money, and both of
them are spent over the next 4 to 5 years. This is an enormous
near-term cost commitment that we would have to finance inside
our top line that has been frozen through the budget
negotiations. So it is going to displace $13.8 billion worth of
program content. That is why it became a very difficult thing
for us in the QDR.
Mr. Young. I wanted to get this information on the record,
because there was this great difference. What you are saying is
that the $9.3 billion would be the fly away cost of the
airplane.
Mr. Hamre. Just the airplane. Our estimate is it is $12.4
billion. We think there are some----
Mr. Young. Your estimate is $12.4 billion, right. You show
$1.4 billion for support----
Mr. Hamre. Support, gear, things of that nature.
Mr. Young. The point is that the nine aircraft aren't
really usable unless you have the additional----
Mr. Hamre. That is right.
Mr. Young. The upgrades, the MILCON, the indirect costs, et
cetera.
Mr. Hamre. The head-to-head comparison is $9.3 or $13.8
billion, but it still represents a $20 billion commitment that
we would be making here.
Mr. Young. For the record, let's quickly indicate the
amount of money that the nine additional aircraft would cost in
the fiscal year 1998 appropriations. How much would have to be
appropriated?
Mr. Hamre. My understanding is it is approximately $300,
$350 million, something like that, which is to get it started.
Mr. Young. What would be the fiscal year 1999 requirement?
Mr. Hamre. I think that is like $1.1 billion. I don't have
that number right in front of me or in my mind. I think it is
like $1.1 billion. Then it goes to $1.5 billion per year.
Mr. Dicks. That is right.
Mr. Hamre. That is the contractor's number.
Mr. Young. I am looking at a paper that says $1.8 billion.
Mr. Hamre. Maybe it is $1.8 billion.
Mr. Young. And $1.8 billion in 2000, $1.7 billion in 2001,
$1.9 billion in 2002.
Mr. Hamre. Those are probably right.
Mr. Young. These are the contractor's figures.
Mr. Hamre. Then we would have some extra costs probably on
top of that, sir.
Mr. Dicks. Do you have another copy of those, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Hamre. We would be glad to go over and validate any of
this. But I think, sir, you are raising a very important point.
The decision to add $300 million this year, $350 million this
year, simply presumes we are going to add the $1.6 billion next
year, and we are not. We don't have the money for it.
Mr. Young. Let's assume that the contractor's numbers are
accurate, the $1.8 billion for next year. How much would you
have to add to that for support, spare parts, MRSP, production
costs, upgrades, indirect costs, et cetera?
Mr. Hamre. I will get you an answer for the record. My
suspicion is that will lag a couple of years. You don't need to
have the support gear, because it is a shorter production
cycle, so you probably don't need that much more immediately in
fiscal year 1999.
Mr. Young. When will you estimate that you would need that?
Mr. Hamre. Permit me to come back to you. We will get you a
very prompt response. I will do that promptly.
Mr. Young. I expect that you all have noticed that this
Committee is full of supporters of the B-2. I think that
General Hawley spoke to it very effectively, that he would like
to have a lot more that he could provide to the CINCs when they
call on him for bombers. But we also have the problem of--
suppose we can afford the down payment this year--are we
responsible if we make the down payment this year, but can't
afford the payments in the out years? That is what we have to
wrestle with.
Mr. Hamre. Sir, we wrestle with that, too. If you were to
put in the $300 million, we just don't have the money to do the
follow-through. We would confront this very same problem next
year and it would be much larger, because we just don't have
the resources.
B-2 Capabilities
Mr. Dicks. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make just a couple
comments on this point. First of all, you know, as General
Horner says, and I believe this, you must look at the value.
Mr. Hamre is very good at giving us numbers, but you have got
to look at what you are buying and what you get for it compared
to all the other things you are buying and what you get for it.
I would argue that you get a lot more with the B-2 and the
smart conventional weapons than with any other conventional
system.
As we go to START II or START III, as you downgrade your
strategic forces, you have fewer strategic forces. A bomber
that can go both ways, that can be used in the nuclear role and
used in the conventional role, I believe, becomes much more
valuable.
The third point, the industrial base is there and alive
now. If we don't do this now, then the industrial base goes
away and we have to spend $25 billion to get back to where we
are producing a new bomber. So if you are ever going to do
this, this is the time to do it, because you have the line
open, it will be least expensive now, than if you start 15
years from now or 10 years from now.
Again, the idea that this is the last bomber we are ever
going to build, I must tell you makes my stomach turn. The fact
that this administration, as Secretary White said, this is the
last bomber we are going to build, I can't believe this is the
policy of this administration. Again, I look forward to the
afternoon session.
Mr. Young. I appreciate very much the fact you are willing
to come back at 1 o'clock. I wish we could just continue on,
but a number of Members have commitments right now. We will
concentrate the balance of the hearing from 1:00 to 2:00.
John, you wanted to say something and I cut you off.
Mr. Hamre. I was just going to say I am a budget geek. I
don't pretend that I can speak to military value. That is, I
look to see those people who have spent their careers in the
military, and there is not dissent among the senior people in
the Department. Every chief and every CINC has said they agree
with this recommendation. It isn't just a finance weeny that
decided this.
PAYING FOR THE B-2
Mr. Young. I wanted to ask any one of you who would like to
respond, if we were to move ahead with the B-2 program, I know
that in the DAWNS you have exercised various options on how to
pay for it. Could one of you give us an example of maybe three
or four of the top options for paying for the B-2 program?
Mr. Hamre. Why don't I begin, and then I would welcome
anyone else to join in. I think this is a very hard question to
answer, because it gets to the core of how we build budgets in
the Department. It is rarely a case where you put in one thing
and you take out one thing. It tends to be in the mix. But,
unfortunately, as we are building things up, everybody that
comes to the table comes with shortfalls.
I look at the shortfalls, frankly, that are in our 1998
budget request. We didn't get into our 1998 budget request.
Frankly, I think we have written several letters to you. We
were short on our medical program this year. We were short by
$550 million, I think, growing to $650 million on our flying
hours for the flight force for the Navy and Air Force, things
that will affect readiness if we can't get additional funds in
1998. We have gone through a number of discussions and I have
with Mr. Dicks about some special intelligence capabilities,
enormously important programs.
Mr. Young. I don't think you satisfied him on that
conversation.
Mr. Hamre. He is not satisfied on that. I have broken his
heart on that one, too. So there are a number of things that
really come to the table with just this year. We probably have
$1 billion of things that we need you to help us with this
year, and things that we want in the Department. Then, of
course, there are things that others want intensely for us up
here on the Hill. We have got destroyers that people think we
need fairly badly, and we have got just a whole range of things
that people are anxious for us to have.
My experience has been there isn't anybody up here that is
asking us to support something they want that we genuinely
don't need. It is a question of priorities, how high a priority
it is. So coming to answer the question that you have posed,
Mr. Chairman, which is what would we give up or what two or
three things would we consider?
First of all, the actual truth is we wouldn't do it even if
you put in some money this year, because we don't have things
that we would take out to take out next year, so we would be
coming back to you again a year from now, but in this case a
year from now it is not a $300 million problem, it is going to
be a $1.8 billion problem. And unlike this year, where you have
$2.8 billion or $3 billion to add, next year we are going to be
submitting a budget resolution number, and you now have to
displace $1.8 billion worth of program next year to make room
for this.
You will be confronting next year exactly the condition
that the Secretary found himself in this year, where he was
saying I have to knock things out.
When you sit down with the chiefs, when you sit down with
the CINCs, everybody is coming to the table with things they
really need, and it is really a balancing process. There is no
algorithm or no computer program we have that says on the
margin, how would you want to spend another $1 billion or how
would you like to spend $1 billion less if you had to cut it
out.
As I said, there is a tendency for everyone to look to
somebody else's service to offer the money. The Navy would love
to have the Army be smaller and use the money for aircraft
carriers, and the Air Force would love to take fewer carrier
battler groups or something. When you get down to it, the true
requirements in our business is what are you prepared to pay
for; what do you think is so important for warfighting you are
prepared to pay for it?
This is where the trade-offs then become in aviation, and
in TACAIR, and with the terrible dilemma that the Air Force and
the Navy and these CINCs have when they are looking at, as I
say, I have to worry about a broad spectrum of things, not just
the halt phase, although the halt phase is very important. I
have to worry about all kinds of things. So it really has to go
into that process.
That is what led us to say we don't have the 300 million
this year, we don't have the $1.8 billion next year, we don't
have the $20 billion over the next 5 years for this. We do very
much want to keep the B-1 fleet we have, and to upgrade it, and
that becomes our first priority.
Mr. Young. Dr. Hamre, thank you very much.
Would any of the generals like to respond to that?
General Habiger. Mr. Chairman, just to make one comment,
sir. In addition to the issues that Dr. Hamre just discussed,
in an arms control environment, I would have to give up
something for those nine additional airplanes, because they
would count against the force structure I have got today. I
have got a good balance today between bombers, missiles, and
submarines. So there is another price to pay in terms of giving
something up, and I, at this particular point, wouldn't
particularly want to give up anything in that regard.
Mr. Young. Mr. Dicks.
Halt Phase
Mr. Dicks. Well, Mr. Chairman, on this issue, this is a
very important issue, and I can say, sitting on this Committee
for 19 years, that I have watched this Committee every single
year go through that budget that many comptrollers have
submitted up here, and we cut money out of that budget. Every
single year we find items that for one reason or another are
low priority items and in a $250 billion budget, you can find
$1.5 billion if you want to.
I could go through that R&D section of the budget and I
could get you $1.5 billion without any sweat.
In fact, you and I have had a conversation where I said to
you what about cutting 5 percent across. Do it. And maybe we
could do it that way. An that is, as far as I am concerned, the
way to do this.
It gets back to judgment and military value. General
McCloud, your notion that we are going to have warning troubles
me, we have never had a war in which we had warning. We had two
days of actionable warning at the time of the Gulf. In World
War II, surprise attack, zero actionable warning time. Very
little in Korea. I mean, it is in that situation when thousands
and thousand of American lives are at stake.
John, frankly, the halt phase is the most important phase
when it comes to losing lives and whether we are going to be
able to stop a war quickly and bring it to a quick end and save
the taxpayers' money and lives.
So having capability in the halt phase, in my judgment, is
crucially important. And one of the things we haven't talked
about, in the National Performance Review, it was very critical
of this, I said however, U.S. forces' long-term access to
foward bases, to include air bases, ports and logistical
facilities, can't be assumed.
You can't assume we are going to have carriers and be able
to fly TACIAR in the theater. Access may be granted or denied
for any number of political or military reasons. Moreover, U.S.
forces may find themselves called upon to project power in
areas where no substantial base structure exists. Perhaps more
important, with the proliferation of cruise and ballistic
missile technology, weapons of mass destruction and access to
space, the capability to hold at risk large soft targets, i.e.
carriers, at great range, will likely accrue to even regional
rogue states.
The QDR, in our in view, accorded insufficient attention to
our ability to project power under these circumstances. And
that is where the bombers come to play. And your own studies
show dramatically that you don't have enough bombers now if you
are locked out. If you can't get carriers into place and you
can't TACAIR there, then you have got nothing to rely on but
the bombers. Isn't that correct, General McCloud?
General McCloud. The study does show basically what you
said. If you were locked out and we ran problems with access,
we locked out the TACIAR, it shows that the bombers are very
effective in that halt phase.
STUDY FINDINGS
Mr. Dicks. It also shows have an insufficient bomber force
in every scenario, insufficient stealth bombers in every
scenario, isn't that correct?
Generall McCloud. It said the overall bomber force we could
get there is adequate.
Mr. Dicks. The new you can use initially, the enablers, the
B-2s. In each of the scenarios, it says you need additional
bombers in every situation, or you can lose. If you don't have
then, you can lose the war, isn't that correct?
General McCloud. What is says is that you need adequate
force in 2014 to take on that halt phase, and if you have the
extreme scenarios----
Mr. Dicks. Look at the scenarios we faced, World War II,
Korea and Desert Storm. We don't even get one that is easy like
you guys draw up on the board over there, 14 of preparation
time, under the kaminski study. Tell me when we got one like
that?
General McCloud. We ran excursions to make sure we
bracketed the problem. We did exactly what you said. That was
the purpose of the study, to look at the options----
Mr. Dicks. Didn't do it in the first bomber study, by the
way.
General McCloud. We did it in this one.
Mr. Dicks. It showed you in every situation, you need
additional bombers.
Mr. Hamre. It also said we need additional aircraft
carriers in the QDR and additional divisions. We are accepting
risk in every warfighting area.
Mr. Dicks. In this case, we have something that you know
will work, that gives you the potential to come from outside
the theater, that stops this lock-out potential. It trumps the
enemy's ability to use chemical and biological weapons on the
airfields and lock you out. It trumps that. And that is why I
see this tremendous value in having enough of it, and you can
still use it.
General Horner said he used the F-117's throughout the
entire war. It wasn't just at the front. You guys down play
this, but if you cant get TACAIR into Korea, and General Estes
worries about when he was the Air Force General over there an
told me about it, if you can't get that Air Force in there
because you are getting locked out, then our kids are going to
die. We are going to take more losses because of that.
Aircraft Carriers
With all due respect to the aircraft carriers, and I have
great respect for aircraft carriers, from Bremerton,
Washington, those planes can't do what the B-2 can do, because
they can't penetrate initially. The have to go in packages. And
the numbers you used, by the way, in this study, completely
overstate what the carriers can do or did do in the Gulf War.
You have them at 100 sorties a day, at some number like that,
when only 17 was achieved in the Gulf War.
They didn't perform very effectively, and you still don't
have a stealthy airplane coming off of there. So you have made
the comparisons even more favorable to nonstealthy airplanes
than, in fact is realistic, according to the people who have
looked at this study and know something about it and say that
you have had all kinds of assumptions in there about carriers
that are positive and not substantiated by the facts.
General McCloud. Let me respond to that briefly. In the
Gulf War, the carriers were launching somewhere between 50 and
60 sorties per day, of which about half of those were strike
sorties. The Nimitz off the cost of Washington just recently
ran 3-day exercise where they were launching between 170 and
180 sorties per day. The difference is that in those surge
rates, with airplanes that can generate more sorties, the newer
airplanes, in the year 2014, we think that is a reasonable
thing to do.
The question becomes what percentage of those go to strike,
what percentage of those go to air defense. As you evolve the
AEGIS class cruisers and destroyers and they become a principal
supporting force for the carriers, that air defense load is
going to be picked up by the long-range shooters, the surface-
to-air missiles. We don't have that capability today.
We will have it in that time period. So it will be a lower
demand for the air defense aircraft in that time period than we
see today. So a much bigger potion of the 170 sorties per day
can go to strike.
So all I am saying is what we put in the study, we
bracketed, we raise it up and down, but that 170 per day or 174
average that we used is reasonable----
Mr. Dicks. But you don't do much for self-defense. You have
to defend these things against Cruise Missiles and other
threats that are being built up. There are a whole series of
other things that affect the carrier's ability to operate, that
were not taken into account, I am told.
Mr. McCloud. Sir, that was taken into account.
Mr. Dicks. By some of your colleagues.
General McCloud. It was done by parametrically looking at
the problem and saying a portion of that force would be used
for the other missions that the Navy has to do to maintain a
balance. So we think we bracketed that problem. You can
disagree with the results, but we think we gave that a fair
sake.
Mr. Dicks. But you will admit that the attack rates, the
sorties rates for attack purposes, are dramatically higher in
the studies than they were during the Gulf War.
General McCloud. Absolutely correct.
Mr. Dicks. See, what bothers me here is you are still not
going to have a stealthy plane until you get the joint strike
fighter, and I am worried about that in terms of whether you in
actuality can do this. You have to have a number of carriers
operating together in order to do this, at least that was the
experience during the Gulf War.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Lewis. We are going to have to vote. We will
carry your time over until after the vote.
BUDGET ESTIMATES
Mr. Lewis. We could have a series of votes which could blow
this whole meeting. In that meantime, I want you all to know in
spite of our enthusiasm, Norm and I and the Chairman and others
are very appreciative of the work you are doing and it is very,
very important work. I sometimes scratch my head, though, for I
have difficulty understanding how numbers come out of the
building.
I note with interest that we got a chart yesterday, last
night, that showed this difference in cost between the
contractor and the DoD, and yet you have been working closely
with Northrop for a couple of years. So I am wondering about
that.
I am reminded of the fact that when I first got an analysis
of the air facility just off Fort Irwin, the Army gave me a
figure for developing it and so on. It was $30 million. The
next time they weren't sure they want it, the figure as $200
million. I see that happening a lot and it is of great concern
to me. When we went through the supplemental process, $4.8
billion, it has to be offset within the Department, $2.8
billion of that was specific, and then go find another $2
billion somewhere.
Having said that, I think we in our Committees have got to
be looking well into the 21st Century, 2025. You look beyond
the problems of terrorism and otherwise that we must deal with.
The challenges lie with China and the developing world, very,
very real questions of war and peace and freedom. It seems to
me the decisions we are making now are going to dramatically
impact that. And that is why I suddenly find myself going back
in the direction of stealth and the selection of the assets
that are critical to our ability to be successful in that new
environment.
So, a couple of questions. I would first like to know where
you are about developing and recommending a policy that would
move us towards this kind of feasibility of acquisition and the
trade-off beinging cutting back the number of personnel. There
is not any question the driving cost behind all of this
involves personnel, and that load over time.
I have got the National Training Center for the Army in my
district, the Marine Corps has Twenty-Nine Palms in my
district. I am concerned about the foot soldier. But, one way
or another we have to make sure we don't kill them before they
have a chance to fight.
Where is your recommendation regarding that aspect? Should
we be moving in the direction of shifting dollars away from
personnel, perhaps strengthening the Army Reserve, of a quality
and nature we see in the Air Force Reserve and cutting back? Do
you have a recommendation? General, I am asking you.
General Hawley. I don't participate in that.
Mr. Lewis. Shall we close the door and go off the record?
General Hawley. I will tell you in ACC our personnel are
stretched very thinly. So within my purview, the command I
oversee, I would be hard-pressed to say we could give up any
people in order to accommodate more force structure. It takes
people to run force structure. Ten percent of my own budget
goes to support the B-2.
Mr. Lewis. I am being very specific about the Army.
Mr. Hamre. May I speak to this?
General Hawley. Maybe somebody with a broader look than I
have.
Mr. Hamre. General Hawley has been in previous assignments
where he has these kind of broader responsibilities. He is not
in one now. He is perfectly capable to offer his own view, and
he should if you want him to.
The QDR that we are recommending already has us cutting out
200,000 people. We would be cutting out 80,000 civilians. We
will be cutting out 60,000 active duty personnel and 60,000
Reservists, already.
Mr. Lewis. No. Let me read a paragraph from something else
that says the same thing in a different way. If colonels ran
the Pentagon, the QDR might recommend the U.S. military shelf
the 2-war strategy, cut three Navy aircraft carriers, three
Army divisions, and six Air Force fighter wings, and use the
savings to invest heavily and radical new systems.
There are different views here. We have got to be looking
towards that view.
Mr. Hamre. Sir, we actually looked at that. That was one of
the paths that we explored in looking at the QDR. We didn't go
that route for a couple of reasons. One is that certainly is a
long-term view. That is a view to say I don't perceive that we
have a near peer threat my time in the next 15 years, and we
ought to be thinking out 15 years to be ready for that.
What it discounts in our mind is being ready to take on
real world challenges that could occur in the next 5 years.
Three times in the last 4 years, the Secretary of Defense has
two nearly simultaneous emergencies. Just a year ago, at the
very time we were sending the fleet to the Formosan Straits, we
were sending a reinforced brigade to Kuwait.
Deciding now you are not going to do that means that we, as
a Department, have to choose which of the--if we have two
contingencies, which are we prepared to abandon?
VIABILITY OF STEALTH
Mr. Lewis. John, I understand that. ------. There is
another question that I don't know the answer to that concerns
me a lot as we go down this pathway, which is can you tell me
what your best information is relative to the lifetime of the
value of stealth? When are we going to get to the point where
stealth isn't stealth? Have you done that sort of analysis?
General Hawley. I will take that one. Yes, we have. We have
Read Teamed Stealth, and the answer keeps coming back that we
have a very durable capability in stealth. There are no systems
on the horizon that can neutralize the advantage that we have
gained through the development of stealth technology, and our
lead in stealth technology exceeds that in most other areas of
technology. We have a huge lead in this area over the rest of
the world, which is one reason we are so anxious to protect it.
Mr. Lewis. Mr. Chairman, I think we need to learn a lot
about that subject.
Mr. Young. You still have 2 minutes left in your time
allotment. Why don't we catch two votes, it will take us maybe
3 minutes, and we will be back.
Mr. Dicks. Could I ask a couple of questions? You go ahead.
I will wait for you.
Mr. Young. Wait for us. You have a second vote coming right
away.
Mr. Dicks. I would like to proceed.
Mr. Young. Go right ahead.
Mr. Dicks. Let's go back to the subject, now that I know
what the answers are going to be. That is why I was on the
phone.
Mr. Young. Rephrase your question.
B-2 MAINTAINABILITY
Mr. Dicks. These were not asked on the record. Now we are
going to fulfill the record here.
That is one thing I learned in law school, don't ask
questions you don't know the answers for. Even I screw that up.
Let's go back to the question of the materials, General
Hawley. In terms of usability, if we were in a wartime
situation, based on what you know now, we would still use the
B-2. We don't know anything now that any of these blemishes
degrade the signature to such a point that you would feel
uncomfortable in using it, isn't that correct?
General Hawley. All of the evidence we have to date
indicates the kind of blemishes you usually experience as a
result of a flight, do not significantly degrade the signature
capability of the aircraft.
Mr. Dicks. You tested that?
General Hawley. We have tested that. We have taken
airplanes across the range that have been degraded as a result
of flights and the signature has not been significantly
degraded.
Mr. Dicks. As I understand it, we don't know anything yet
that tells us that we have got all these problems solved for
the F-22 either. So it is still an issue for the F-22, as well,
I think?
General Hawley. It is certainly to be proven in the F-22.
The SPO and the contractor say they are going to deliver a very
durable airplane.
Mr. Dicks. Is there anything we could do to fix or improve
the B-2 with the planes that are still being built to try to
take lessons learned from what we supposedly are learning in
the F-22 and incorporate it in improving the B-2?
General Hawley. In fact, we are doing that. We recently
changed out one material, a tape as it happens, that required a
72-hour cure time. We brought material in from the F-22 program
that requires a 3-hour cure time. So we got rid of 69 hours of
cure time on the fixtures to which that material is applied.
Mr. Dicks. So if, in fact, the Congress, in its wisdom,
decides to go forward, we could incorporate these improvements
and have a better plane and maybe retrofit the older ones in
order to get as much durability and to take advantage of
lessons learned, if we did go ahead with additional B-2s, is
that not correct?
General Hawley. In fact, I think that accounts for part of
the difference in the cost estimate between Northrop's estimate
and the government's estimate is to incorporate those kinds of
enhancements.
Mr. Dicks. You would recommend that?
General Hawley. I certainly would. And some others as well.
B-2 PRODUCTION
Mr. Dicks. Again, nobody would dispute if we are going to
buy additional bombers, buying them when the line is open would
be the best decision for the taxpayers. Rather than coming back
and doing a 25 to $40 billion until R&D before we could get
into production of additional airplanes. If you wee going to
buy them, isn't the time to buy them now while the line is
open?
General Hawley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hamre. Although there is still a fair amount of
nonrecurring that has to be spent in order to get it up and
running again, because a fair amount of the subcontractor
structure is gone away.
Mr. Dicks. John, you would have to agree, 15 years from
now, if you said we have to build another stealth bomber, we
are going to have to spend at least, I would say, the last
program was $22 billion, I would say you would have to do at
least 30.
Mr. Hamre. Sir, the premise of your argument is right, it
is better to do it earlier while you still have some of the
capability than to do it later when you have none of the
capability. I think it is important to note though one of the
reasons there is a price differential is we think there are a
fair amount of started up costs not captured in the Northrop
program.
Mr. Dicks. Is it true it is the Air Force plan to destroy
the tools for the B-2?
Mr. Hamre. No, sir. I believe we are using some of the
tools for its ongoing maintenance of the maintenance at depot.
Mr. Dicks. I would love for you to check on that, because I
think you are going to find it is in your plan. I plan on
stopping that if I can get the committee to agree with me. I
think they would be foolish, to get rid of the tooling for the
B-2. I understand currently that is your plan, to do away with
it. That doesn't make any sense to me at all. I hope we can
work together on that.
Mr. Young. If the gentleman would yield, what would be the
cost to close down the B-2 line?
Mr. Hamre. Sir, the cost is already embedded in our
program. I will find out what it is we are spending to shut
down the line, to orderly close out the dismantlement of tools,
if we are dismantling tools, the shipping of tools to the depot
for ongoing support where you do have a need for them. I will
find that out. That is already included in our budget.
Mr. Young. Then also, John, if you don't mind, find out
what it would cost to start up again if for some reason a
decision was made to start the B-2 program again. And for
anyone that thinks that sounds a little strange, we did exactly
that on the B-1.
Mr. Hamre. And, sir, we did that with the C-5s, and we
thought that would be cheap to start up the C-5 line again, and
it didn't turn out to be as cheap. We basically built tooling
again. We will check and find out.
B-2 STRATEGIC MISSION
Mr. Young. ------?
General Habiger. I would characterize my forces that I
would employ, if deterrence were to fail, into three
categories, three kinds of bullets, if you will. I have got
ICBM bullets which are very prompt, not very survivable. I have
the submarine bullets which are rapid reacting, but not nearly
as reactive as ICBM's, but much more survivable and accurate,
and I have bomber bullets that are, whether cruise missiles or
B-2 kind of delivered weapons, that get to the targets in a
relatively slow manner, are relatively accurate, and I can
recall them and use the resources again. ------.
I look in the overall equation, and it provides the target
coverage I need, whether it is today, 5 years from now, or 10
years from now, and, again, as I look out 10 years from now, I
don't know what the arms control environment is going to be,
but ------ will do the job. ------.
B-2 MODIFICATIONS
Mr. Young. General Hawley, do you agree with the DAWMS
study that the B-2 requires another $2 billion of investment in
modifications that are currently not programmed in order for it
to participate fully in the halt phase of a conventional
conflict?
General Hawley. I don't think I would agree that it needs
that much modification in order to participated fully I would
agree that on our list of mods that we would like to do to the
airplane, there are somewhere around $2 billion worth of mods
we would like to do to the current fleet to make it more
capable. But it can do a great job in halt phase just the way
we are getting it.
Mr. Young. So if you didn't spend the $2 billion, it would
still be an effective force in the halt phase?
General Hawley. B-2 is by far our most effective bomber,
that is right.
Mr. Young. Which would be a higher priority of investment,
the $2 billion for the modifications or the procuring of
additional B-2 aircraft?
General Hawley. In my view, we would get a greater return
on our investment by upgrading the current fleet than by adding
to the current fleet.
B-2 BASING
Mr. Young. Would there by any plan to forward base the B-2
in any of the scenarios?
General Hawley. That is our intent, is to be able to
forward deploy the airplane and operate it on a forward deploy
status. You really need to do that in order to get the number
of sorties from the airplane you would like.
Mr. Young. From what we have learned today, the B-2
requires certain types of climate control hangars to protect
it, to keep the temperatures, the moisture levels, et cetera,
proper. Are those programmed in this year's budget, John?
Mr. Hamre. Sir, the resources we have are programmed for
the existing fleet of 21. I can't say that they are actually
the 1998 budget. They are probably programmed through the
period. We don't have, of course, anything budgeted for any
extension beyond the current fleet.
Mr. Dicks. If the gentleman would yield, I don't think you
are planning on any forward deployment, money for forward
deployed B-2s at this juncture.
Mr. Hamre. Not right now.
Mr. Dicks. There is nothing in the budget for that nor
expected.
Mr. Young. The GAO says that Air Force officials said it is
unlikely that the aircraft's sensitivity to moisture and
climates or its need for controlled environment to fix LO will
ever be fully resolved, even with improved materials and repair
processes. Therefore, some form of aircraft sheltering at a
forward operating location will become a requirement in the
future if B-2s are to be deployed.
How does that fit in with what we are talking about?
General McCloud. If I could take a cut at that very
quickly, sir. In 2014, the focus of this study, we did, in
fact, put in the bomber costs, the B-2 costs in this. My set-
aside to do just what you said, to forward base it, to have the
right hangars in place to do that, so that we could closer,
generate higher sortie rates, so that was included in that, But
that is a long look out to 2014.
Mr. Dicks. Just let me raise one other point.
Mr. Young. We are down to 57 seconds left to vote. Take one
other point, I would say about a minute. Then, I think we will
cut off the hearing.
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES
Mr. Dicks. The National Defense Panel says, strategic
nuclear forces remain an essential element of our national
security strategy. Our strategic forces have been scaled back
significantly over the past decade. We believe that to move to
START II force levels should proceed even if the Duma fails to
act on START II this year. This is not the DOD issue.
Now, what they are raising here is a very significant
question. You didn't even look at nuclear weapons. With all due
respect, General, 18 Tridents, and I have eight of them right
near my district, didn't stop Saddam from coming south, nor did
the MX missile, which I was the strongest supporter of in the
United States Congress.
Mr. Young. Saddam never saw a B-2. Once he sees that, he is
really going to think twice.
Mr. Dicks. That is the point. The point is those strategic
weapons cannot be used, will not be used, unless the national
security of the country is directly threatened. So a
conventional bomber that has smart conventional weapons, that
can be utilized if deterrence fails, I think is a much greater
deterrent.
So I think we should have looked at nuclear forces in this
as well. I could put together a little package for Mr. Hamre of
where we can save some money in reducing strategic nuclear
forces that will never be used. Dr. Kissinger is completely
correct, they are there only for deterrence, and if deterrence
fails, we will not use them. And they weren't used against
Saddam.
So it is usability that seems to me to be at the highest
order. If you have to make trade-offs, you could certainly make
some reductions in nuclear weapons, as the National Defense
Panel said they may well recommend, in order to finance a
conventional weapon that can be used if deterrence fails. That
was another major selling point for the B-2 that I don't think
you have fully analyzed.
Mr. Young. We are totally out of time now. The vote is on
the floor. We will likely miss this vote if we don't hurry.
Thank you very much for coming today. We really appreciate it.
I think it has been the best hearing we have had all year, and
certainly very, very instructive and informative for all of us.
We do have some additional questions that we would like to
submit to you in writing and ask if you would respond.
As I think you all know, we will do the very best we can to
provide you with the best tools we can for you to do your jobs.
Again, thank you very much.
The Committee is adjourned.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Hefner and the
answers thereto follow:]
B-52 Aircraft
Question. Recognizing the significant combat capability of
the B-2, have you considered other alternatives to enhance the
existing bomber force? Specifically, are you looking at any
improvements to the venerable B-52 that increase capability,
extends service life and/or reduces long term operating costs?
Answer. The Air Force continues to upgrade its long-range
bomber force with conversion of the B-1 to a conventional role
and Block 30 upgrades to the B-2 bombers. With respect to the
B-52, modernization efforts are in the works to improve
communications capabilities and weapons interface improvements
that will allow utilizing future families of GPS-guided
weapons. Modifications to sustain avionics systems include
Electronic Countermeasures, Electro-optical Viewing System and
GPS Tacan improvements. The Aircraft Structural Integrity
Program (ASIP) has certified the B-52 aircraft airframe through
the year 2040.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Hefner.
Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the answers thereto
follow:]
B-2 Strategic Capabilities and Missions
Question. DOD originally justified the requirement for the B-2
solely in terms of its contribution to the strategic nuclear mission.
Today we primarily focus on modifications that make the B-2 a more
potent conventional bomber, although the aircraft nevertheless
continues to be an important part of the strategic nuclear triad. Are
the B-2s assigned to the nuclear mission at all times, or are they
assigned other missions until a threat situation requires them to chop
to you?
Answer. B-2 aircraft are tasked to support both nuclear and
conventional plans. Day-to-day operational control of B-2 aircraft is
assigned to United States Atlantic Command. When a nuclear generation
is directed by the National Command Authorities, operational control of
the B-2 is transferred from United States Atlantic Command to United
States Strategic Command.
Question. What kinds of nuclear weapons are carried by the B-2 and
how many of each can it carry?
Answer. The B-2 can carry 16 B-61-7, 16 B-83 or ------ weapons.
Question. What kinds of targets are best attacked with the B-2?
Answer. The B-2 is uniquely capable of holding hard and deeply
buried targets at risk as well as other high priority targets ------.
Question. The B-52 is the only bomber that will carry nuclear
tipped cruise missiles including the Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM)
and the Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM). General Habiger, compare and
contrast the capability of the B-2 with gravity nuclear weapons with a
B-52 with stand-off weapons. Is having to fly over each target
sequentially a limitation compared to launching multiple weapons at
multiple targets quickly from stand-off ranges?
Answer. The B-52 and B-2 each have a specific role to play in the
bomber leg of the Triad. A penetrating bomber, the B-2 with gravity
weapons is uniquely capable of holding at risk hard and deeply buried
targets. ------. They can get the job done right, the first time.
In contrast, the B-52 is essentially a truck. Its standoff
capability allows the aircraft to stay out of harms way ------.
Question. DOE is developing a glide variant of the B-61 bomb for
use on the B-2. Do you have a requirement for such a weapon? If so, how
has this requirement been documented?
Answer. The glide bomb program is an in-house DOE effort to develop
options to increase flexibility and survivability of stockpile bombs
while advancing and sustaining their technology base. ------.
B-2 Conventional Capabilities and Missions
Question. Increasingly, the B-2 is being viewed as a major
contributor to conventional missions. General Hawley, what types of
weapons can the B-2 carry now and in the future?
Answer. Our present Block 20 B-2 fleet has the USAF's only adverse
weather, near-precision weapon using the GBU-36B, GPS-Aided Munition
(GAM). The B-2 can also carry the Mk-84, and the B-61 and B-83 nuclear
weapons. When the Block 30 B-2 is delivered this summer it will be
capable of employing the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM); Mk-84,
Mk-82, and M-117 General Purpose Bombs; M-62 Sea Mines; Tactical
Munition Dispensers (TMD) capable of dispensing (CBU-87, 89, or 97
Cluster Bomb Units (CBU); and B61 and mod 7 and mod 11 and B-83 nuclear
weapons. Additionally, we are integrating BLU-113, a 5000 pound deep
penetrating weapon, with a GPS Aided Munition (GAM) tail kit. This
weapon should be available in the spring of 1998. We plan to put the
Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) and the Joint Air to Surface Standoff
Missile (JASSM) on the B-2 with JSOW capability in mid 1999 and JASSM
in mid 2003.
Question. Please characterize the types of targets and threat
situations in which you recommend using a B-2 rather than other weapons
systems, including for example B-52 launched CALCM, ship launched
Tomahawk, or tactical aircraft launched munitions?
Answer. The B-2 provides a unique combination of stealth, long
range, near precision strike, hard target kill capability, and large
payload. Other systems have some of these characteristics, but none
share them all. Selection of the B-2 rather than another weapon system
would depend on the overall situation, mix of available forces, and
target set. The B-2 is optimized for deep attack on hard targets in
heavily defended enemy airspace with line or no support. The B-2 and
cruise missiles can attack targets well behind enemy lines and are very
difficult to defend against, but CALCM and ship launched Tomahawk
weapons do not provide hard target kill capability and are
significantly more expensive than the munitions used by the B-2.
Additionally, the B-2 crew will be able to identify targets that may
have moved while they are enroute. So the B-2 would be preferred
against hard or imprecisely located targets, and cruise missiles would
be used when defenses are too heavy for even the B-2 to penetrate.
Other heavy bombers closely match the B-2 in range and payload, but the
B-2 would be used when defenses are too heavy for the B-1 or B-52.
Conventional tactical aircraft are capable of attacking targets in less
heavily defended areas with precision weapons but are less survivable
than the B-2 in the heavy threat environment. Tactical aircraft do not
provide the range and large payload carried by the B-2 but generate
higher sortie rates. Additionally, tactical aircraft other than the F-
117 and F-22 would not be able to service deep targets without
considerable support and risk to that additional support.
Question. What is the Air Force doing to remedy these apparent
deficiencies?
Answer. Each year we look at our current and future shortfalls in
all mission areas and identify solutions to meet these shortfalls.
DAWMS identified potential areas that we are looking at to upgrade the
B-2 not only to enhance its effectiveness during the halt phase, but to
ensure its effectiveness in all its mission areas and to ensure the it
remains effective within our overall force structure. We will invest in
B-2 enhancements when they provide the best overall combat capability
improvement for the amount of money available. We pursue those
solutions which most effectively solve our most pressing needs.
Question. What do you see as limitations, if any, of the B-2
aircraft relative to other forces?
Answer. With the B-2 we have been able to wrap the characteristics
of stealth, long range, large payload capacity, and the capability to
deliver near precision munitions in all weather into a total package.
However, this is the first time stealth has been applied to such a
large airframe. With any relatively new technology, there are unique
problems that have to be overcome. The primary limitation of the B-2 is
the heavy Low Observable (LO) maintenance required for this aircraft's
skin. Other conventional ``aluminum'' aircraft do not face this
limitation. As noted in my testimony, the B-2 is currently limited to
flying each aircraft one out of seven days. It was not until we began
measuring the adequacy of our operational LO repair capability in mid
1996 that we identified and understood the amount of work required to
maintain an acceptable signature. At the same time, we identified
procedures, training, facilities, manning, and materials as areas that
if improved could help to alleviate some of our LO maintenance
difficulties.
Question. Please elaborate on the maintenance issues that are
currently limiting B-2 operations to flying each aircraft one day out
of seven.
What is being done to improve them? At what cost?
Answer. As stated before, we assessed the entire LO maintenance
issue last year as we prepared the B-2 fleet for initial operational
capability. We instituted several initiatives, to include contract LO
technicians, direct procurement of LO materials from Northrop-Grumman,
additive Air Force LO technicians, and the ``fly one, sit six''
philosophy, that have already improved the B-2 mission capable rate
significantly. In addition, we identified facility shortages for LO
maintenance and have a new facility and upgrades to current facilities
programmed. Improved LO materials and processes are paramount for the
B-2 and are therefore a high priority. The B-2 System Support Manager
formed a dedicated team last September to pursue improved LO materials
and processes. The team has produced several successes to date,
including reducing the cure time for one of the most commonly used LO
materials from 72 hours to just 3 hours. Many of the LO material
advances funded in the F-22 program are now being transferred to the B-
2. We have also applied LO lessons learned on the B-2 to the F-22 and
several LO initiatives have estimated completion dates between now and
1999 and will be funded consistent with availability of sustaining
engineering funds.
Question. What are the benefits of a 3 squadron B-2 force compared
to a 2 squadron force?
Answer. Any plus up on B-2 force structure would be additive to the
existing 2 squadrons allowing more aircraft per squadron and some cost
and manpower efficiencies. More aircraft would provide greater
flexibility and capability. However, ACC believes the current
programmed force structure provides the best possible mix of bombers
and fighters when considering the postulated future threat and
projected budget constraints.
Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study
Question. The DAWM study was a two year effort analyzing over 1500
scenarios with 1 million variables each. Additional B-2s were compared
to a host of alternative force structures. General McCloud, there have
been a number of studies over the years involving the B-2. Can you
summarize the results of these studies, their shortcomings, and how in
your view the DAWM study has better addressed these short-comings?
Answer. Our review of studies identified nine relatively recent
force-level studies related to the B-2 to include; analysis authorized
by Maj Gen (Ret) Jasper Welch, Brig Gen (Ret) Leon Goodson, RAND, the
CORM, the Deep Attack issue team of the CORM, three studies sponsored
by Northrup Grumman and the FY-95 Heavy Bomber Force Study.
These studies resulted in a variety of conclusions. Three
recommended buying more B-2s with general supporting rational. Four
recommended buying more B-2s to improve our capability to stop an
invading army in a short-warning scenario (all assume very few U.S.
fighter assets are available in the critical early stages). The other
two studies recognized the effectiveness of the B-2 but concluded that
our current program was more cost effective.
The DAWM study is the most up-to-date with respect to U.S. and
Allied force structure. It includes modern rotary wing aircraft (RAH-66
Comanche), Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) with Brilliant Anti-
Tank munition (BAT) and modern stealth assets (F-22, Joint Strike
Fighter) in a two Major Theater War (MTW) scenario set in 2014. It is
the first study to include a proper characterization of all future
stealth assets and planned onboard electronic countermeasure upgrades
to conventional aircraft. It is also the first study to adjust the
weapons mix to fit alternative force configurations and include C4ISR
as a major input to force effectiveness. It is one of only two studies
to consider a robust mix of force tradeoffs and one of four studies to
consider force acquisition and operations and support (O&S) costs (six
of the earlier studies did not explicitly include costs in their
analysis). Its comprehensive analysis of four scenarios; 2-Major
Theater Wars, short-warning, Near Peer, and limited access is also a
first. The data base contained extensive target, threat, and weapons
effectiveness data and the tactics and concept of operations that were
used in the scenarios were approved by all services. Finally,
throughout every phase of the study, DAWMS had the active participation
of OSD, the CINCs, JCS, and the four Services.
Question. The DAWM Study shows that the B-2 is a valuable asset
during the halt phase of a conflict, assuming that $2 billion is
invested to better optimize the aircraft for this mission. General
McCloud, if we fail to make these investments which are currently
unfunded, what then is the capability of a B-2 in the halt phase?
Answer. The Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study modeled both the funded
Block 30-configured B-2 and an enhanced B-2. The latter included
unfunded upgrades for improved maintenance, communications, cockpit
controls and displays; the 1760 data bus interface and modified bomb
racks to allow expanded weapons carriage; and a Moving Target
Indicator/Moving Target Tracker for autonomous targeting of moving
targets. Including flight testing, these upgrades cost $2 billion for
the first 20 aircraft and $460 million for an additional 20 aircraft.
Several sensitivities focused on the added value of a partial set of
these upgrades, measured in terms of the B-2's contribution to the
warfight.
Improved maintainability is reflected in higher daily sortie rates.
We modeled B-2 sortie rates both above and below the reference values
to capture this improvement and other operational factors that affect
sortie generation. In general, lower sortie rates reduce the
contribution of the B-2, and basing has more of an impact on sortie
rate than does the $220 million improved maintenance upgrade.
The impact of improved communications and cockpit controls was not
examined since this was beyond the fidelity of our models.
------. A Moving Target Indicator/Moving Target Tracker capability
improves the accuracy of delivering these new weapons against maneuver
targets.
------. However, neither of these weapons benefit from the planned
weapons rack and targeting radar upgrades. Rather, the upgrades
improved the B-2s ability to more accurately deliver the Wind Corrected
Munitions Dispenser which is normally used for attacking maneuver
targets and can be delivered by many other platforms. Given the
priority and lack of alternatives for attacking heavily defended,
hardened infrastructure targets in the Halt phase when the air defense
threat is greatest, most B-2 sorties are used to deliver the Global
Positioning System Aided Munition-Penetrator and the Joint Direct
Attack Munitions against these targets, rather than attacking maneuver
targets with the Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser or small Joint
Direct Attack Munitions. In summary, the impact of failing to invest
the $2 billion to upgrade the B-2's weapon system will have minimal
impact on the Halt Phase of the warfight.
Question. Even after the Halt phase in a conflict, there will
continue to be targets and circumstances in which long range stealth
will be required. For example, going against targets in downtown
Baghdad. General McCloud, to what extent did the Deep Attack Weapons
Mix Study address these missions, and how did the B-2 perform relative
to alternative force packages?
Answer. There are three characteristics that describe ``missions to
downtown Baghdad,'' they are; long distances to the target, the
presence of heavy air defenses such as the SA-10C, and striking
infrastructure targets such as buildings or bunkers. The Deep Attack
Weapons Mix Study took a careful look at the requirement to perform
this type of mission.
In the baseline scenario for Iraq, with normal warning time, Allied
forces destroy over ------ targets of all kinds across all phases.
Within this target set there are about ------, infrastructure targets
that were located 80-180 nautical miles from the Iraqi-Kuwait border
and were protected by heavy air defenses. It's easiest to capture both
the difficulty of these missions and the continued value of the B-2
after the Halt phase if we address how these specific targets were
attacked by phase. ------. This heavy reliance on long range standoff
munitions and stealth platforms in the early days is similar to our
strategy in Operation Desert Storm, where the initial attacks used
stealth and long range standoff to cripple the Iraqui Integrated air
defense system. ------. There is very little use of long range standoff
during this phase since the strategic air defense threat is much lower.
------. By the start of the Counter-offensive phase, air superiority is
well established and the need for long range stealth or standoff
diminishes greatly. In this phase, payload and flexibility are most
important and become the greater factors in determining how the
remaining targets are distributed amongst the strike assets. ------. We
did not do a direct comparison of the deep strike alternatives for
targets and circumstances requiring long range stealth. Rather, we
examined force structure alternatives within the context of the entire
target set in a two Major Theater War scenario. What we found is that,
the B-7 has a major role to play in the ``mission to Baghdad'' subset
of targets but, we also found that there are a variety of alternatives,
including both stealth platforms and standoff weapons, that were used
during the first 60 days of the war to attack heavily defended targets.
This variance in the mixture over time demonstrates the inherent need
for flexibility within our munitions inventories and platform
capabilities.
Question. Briefly discuss some of the noteworthy observations and
conclusions resulting from the study with regard to the various
precision guided munitions currently in the inventory and in the
acquisition pipeline.
Answer. The Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study determined that the
current munitions programs, with modest adjustments, will provide the
capability to defeat potential aggressors in the years ahead. The next
generation of munitions will give our forces superior precision
engagement capability against projected threats. The fielding of
unitary and cluster bombs that can be delivered accurately from
altitudes above the effective range of enemy anti-aircraft artillery
and manportable surface-to-air missiles, standoff weapons that avoid
dense concentrations of air defenses, and highly effective precision
munitions will increase the survivability and lethality of our forces
in future conflicts as called for in Joint Vision 2010.
For the ``deep battle,'' the Wind-Corrected Munitions Dispenser
carrying Combined Effects Bomblets or the ``brilliant'' Skeet anti-
armor submunitions, the Army tactical Missile System with Brilliant
Anti-Armor Submunitions (ATACMS BAT/BAT Pre-Planned Product Improvement
(P3I), the product improved version of the Sensor-Fused Weapon, and the
Joint Stand-Off Weapon with a unitary warhead should be procured in
accordance with existing plans. In addition, we recommend the Services
review the acquisition objectives of the Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW)
variants carrying Combined Effects Bomblets (CEB) and Skeet for reduced
procurement; the Joint Air-to-Surface Stand-off Missile (JASSM) for
increased procurement; and the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) for
appropriate variant mix. We also recommend continuing Hellfire II
production as well as follow-on analysis to identify the appropriate
mix of Hellfire II and Hellfire Longbow missiles. GBU-24/27 Laser
Guided Bombs are required to destroy hard targets, therefore, current
production should continue for a minimum of one year. Finally, GBU-28
Laser Guided Bombs or other appropriate munitions for hard and deeply
buried targets are required and we must continue to identify
specialized weapons required for targeting WMD storage, production and
launch sites.
B-2 Costs
Questions. The nation has invested $45 billion already on the 21
aircraft B-2 program. The discussion this year has mainly focused on
expanding this force by 9 additional aircraft. What is the current
status of the B-2 production base and what is/are the projected costs
to reconstitute it to produce additional aircraft?
Answer. The Air Force has no requirement for additional B-2s. For
this reason, the Air Force has not requested a detailed cost estimate
from the B-2 Program Office to determine the required funding to
procure additional B-2 aircraft. Thus far, 19 of the 21 aircraft
purchased have been delivered and delivery of the last production
aircraft is expected in FY98. The last 2 production aircraft will be
delivered as Block 30s. Upgrades to modify the first 19 aircraft to the
Block 30 configuration began in 1995 and will continue into 2000.
Although the Air Force has not developed a detailed cost estimate,
the contractor has presented its own (unsolicited) figures for non-
recurring and recurring costs of $1.6B (FY 96 $s) for re-establishing
the production line for 9 additional aircraft.
Question. What is the Department's best estimate of the total
weapon system cost for 9 additional aircraft in real (then-year)
taxpayer dollars? For the record, please provide a breakdown of this
estimate including recurring, nonrecurring, support, etc. by fiscal
year.
Answer. The Air Force has no requirement for additional B-2s. For
this reason, the Air Force has not requested a detailed cost estimate
from the B-2 Program Office to determine the required funding to
procure additional B-2 aircraft. Thus far, 19 of the 21 aircraft
purchased have been delivered and delivery of the last production
aircraft is expected in FY98. The last 2 production aircraft will be
delivered as Block 30s. Upgrades to modify the first 19 aircraft to the
Block 30 configuration began in 1995 and will continue into 2000.
Question. Do these costs include any of the conventional
modifications assumed in DAWMS?
Answer. Not applicable. Since the Air Force has not developed a
detailed cost estimate, the costs of the conventional modifications
assumed in DAWMS have not been addressed.
Question. Are further facilities required at Whiteman Air Force
Base to accommodate 9 more aircraft? What is the cost of these
additional facilities?
Answer. The Air Force has no government estimate since we have no
requirement. We have never requested the Program Office prepare an
estimate. Such a detailed estimate would require in excess of 120 days
to prepare (150 days and several million dollars).
Although additional B-2s would add to our combat capabilities, they
are unaffordable in today's fiscal environment. The funds required to
procure more would be better spent on higher priority initiatives.
Question. What would be the yearly operation and support cost for 9
additional B-2s?
Answer. Because there is not a documented requirement for
additional B-2s, the Air Force has not completed a budget level cost
estimate, including operations and support cost, for additional B-2s. A
budget level estimate would require several months to complete after
Northrup was put on contract to help the Air Force complete the
estimate.
Question. Because of its stealth, the B-2 is less reliant on
expensive stand-off weapons to ensure aircraft survivability. This
means that a B-2 can drop inexpensive weapons whereas less stealthy
forces must use more expensive stand-off weapons. What analysis has
been conducted to determine the relative cost effectiveness of an
expensive platform such as the B-2 that carries cheap weapons compared
to a less expensive platform such as a tactical aircraft that carries
more expensive standoff weapons?
Answer. No recent analysis has specifically compared, in isolation,
the value of B-2 with direct attack munitions verses non-stealth forces
with standoff. However, all Air Force munitions modeling annually take
these factors into account when munitions requirements are calculated.
Several issues must be addressed in order to adequately answer this
question: (1) While direct attack weapons normally are less expensive,
standoff weapons cost (CALCM, JASSM, and JSOW) are essentially equal to
or cheaper than some direct attack munitions (SFW): (2) ------. (3)
Non-stealth platforms employ the vast majority of direct attack
munitions throughout the conflict; (4) The limited number of B-2s (even
with an increase to the B-2 inventory) and associated sortie generation
capability, when compared to the large number of available tactical
aircraft, limits the B-2s contribution to the war once stealth is not
required (due to sortie generation rate capabilities, operational
flexibility which multiple platforms provide the CINC, etc.). ------.
Additional B-2s, at the expense of standoff munitions programs,
severely limit the Air Force's ability to prosecute a conflict. The
current B-2 inventory fills a vital niche in the Air Force combat
arsenal and provides a synergistic enhancement of all our weapons
delivery platforms.
B-1 Bomber
Question. The Air Force is describing the B-1 as the ``backbone''
of the conventional bomber force. General Hawley, the B-1 has been
plagued in the past by operational and supportability concerns. This
Committee has taken the lead in trying to address these issues. In your
view, have we turned the corner on the B-1 program, and can we expect
to see this aircraft used more heavily in future conflicts.
Answer. Absolutely. I'm comfortable we have been and are continuing
to do the right things to ensure the B-1 plays a key role in fighting
and winning our nation's next conflict. Operationally, in 1997 we added
our latest technology cluster munitions to the B-1's arsenal, provided
a much better capability to hold invading armies at risk. We still need
to add precision weapons and enhanced defensive capabilities to
increase the number of targets we can attack. In terms of
supportability, we demonstrated we can achieve the ACC goal of 75%
mission capable rate during the June-November 1994 operational
readiness assessment, provided we receive adequate funding. This
committee has supported our efforts to field continued growth in B-1
warfighting capability. Still, we must remain vigilant against creating
long-term support equipment shortages due to accelerated buy-back of
reconstitution reserve, a vanishing vendor base, the expansion from 3
main operating bases to 5, and the long team times (2 to 5 years) t
deliver equipment already ordered. Given them, I believe we turned the
corner and theater commanders will be satisfied with what the B-1
brings to the fight.
Question. There are several survivability upgrades unded for the B-
1. General Hawley, briefly describe these upgrades and indicate
whether, in your view, they will make the B-1 a more survivable
platform than the B-52?
Answer. With the fielding of Block C in Oct 1997, we brought the B-
1 to the point where it has similar electronic countermeasures
capabilities to the B-52. With the ALE-50/Towed Decoy upgrade in late
98, and more significantly the fielding of the Defensive System Upgrade
Program (DSUP) in early 2002, we greatly enhance the B-1's ability to
penetrate and survive not only low to medium threat areas, but some
high threat areas as well. The approved architecture for DSUP is an
ALR-56M providing situational awareness and an integrated Defensive
Electronic Countermeasures (IDECM) system, providing protection against
a wide variety of radar threats. The primary jamming source is an off-
board towed decoy developed in conjunction with the Navy. The projected
capability against all threat systems considered a threat to the B-1 is
excellent. In short, DSUP gives the CINCs more flexibility on how and
when to use the B-1 in a conflict. The B-52 remains a survivable
platform under certain conditions, but will be mroe restrict than the
B-1 in its employment once DSUP is oeprational. However, we anticipate
each aircraft will be equally survivable in the roles and missions we
expect to use them. The B-52 will primarily launch standoff weapons and
only overfly selected medium to low threat areas. The B-1 will overfly
targets within low, medium and some selected high threat environments
using newly fielded standoff weapons like JSOW and JASSM, fighting its
way into certain target areas, and making way for other aircraft to
follow:
Question. General McCloud, how would you characterize the
performance of the B-1 in the wargame scenarios analyzed in the DAWM
Study? Would you agree with the characterization of the aircraft as the
backbone of the conventional bomber force?
Answer. The Air Force characterization of the B-1 as the backbone
of the conventional bomber force is based on the greater number of B-1s
in the conventional bomber force, its larger payload and its higher
speed. A comparison of the operational capabilities of the three Air
Force bombers supports this claim. The performance of the B-1 in our
Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study validates the importance of these
capabilities to the conventional battle.
The B-1 is the only bomber that will have a purely conventional
role. ------. Thus, in sheer numbers alone, there are more B-1s in our
conventional bomber force than any other type of bomber.
Conventional bombers will be tasked to deliver a wide array of
munitions to include: general purpose and cluster bombs, laser guided
and precision standoff weapons, and naval mines. In the general purpose
bomb category, the B-1 can carry more 500 lb bombs than any other
bomber. For cluster bombs, the B-1's greater payload for Wind Corrected
Munitions Dispensers and Combined Effects Bomblets offsets is payload
disadvantage relative to the B-52 in less effective cluster munitions.
The B-52 is the only bomber capable of delivering laser guided bombs.
The B-2 is the only bomber capable of delivering the Global Positioning
System Aided Munition-Penetrator. But, the B-1 can carry 30-50% more of
the other advanced unitary weapons like the Joint Standoff Weapon, and
the Joint Air-to-Surface Missile. It can also carry more naval mines
and, with the exception of laser guided bombs, can carry more of the
advanced conventional weapons than either of the other two bombers.
While the B-2 will be used to penetrate the most sophisticated
enemy defenses, the B-1 will be used to strike critical targets in the
medium threat environment. Because of its superior speed and electronic
countermeasures relative to the B-52 and its ability to fly nap-of-the-
earth, the B-1 can be integrated with composite strike packages of
fighters and defense suppression aircraft. The Air Force currently has
two B-1 squadrons deployed to Fairford England that are proving this
capability as part of an Air Expeditionary Force.
The Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study modeled the bomber force using
the platform-specific characteristics outlined above. ------. Its
ability to deliver Wind Corrected Munitions Dispensers and Joint Direct
Attack Munition proved indispensable in attacking maneuver units and
their logistics tail. These results are consistent with the Air Force's
assessment of the B-1 as the backbone of the conventional bomber force.
Question. It has come to the Committee's attention that expansion
of the number of B-1 bases to five has led to shortages in support
equipment. How are these shortages impacting the readiness of the B-1
force, and what is the Air Force doing to address them?
Answer. Expanding the B-1B to six operating locations, to include
Edwards AFB, has stretched support equipment (SE) resources to their
limits. B-1B fleetwide SE shortages result from a combination of
factors to include accelerated standups, re-activations, buy-back
schedules, under funded requirements and procurement lead times.
Specifics impacts are:
--Existing workarounds of borrowing SE from other units is
disruptive to operational missions of the loaning units and receiving
units.
--Workarounds will become less effective as accelerated buy-back
and force re-structuring efforts continue.
--Problem is acute for Air National Guard units requiring SE
capability for autonomous operations. Daily operations/Initial
Operational Capability is jeopardized by SE shortages.
--Accelerated unit standups/reactivations and historic funding
constraints coupled with 3 year procurement lead times severely
restrict our ability to support mission requirements.
In summary, the Air Force is requesting funding to help alleviate
the SE problem, along with putting together an IPT to come up with more
solutions. Unit readiness has decreased, but can undertake most wartime
missions for which it is designed. The lack of SE may cause isolated
decreases in flexibility but will not increase vulnerability of the
unit under most envisioned operational scenarios. The units will
require little, if any, compensation for deficiencies in SE.
Costs Involved With B-2 Program
Question. In the course of this hearing, I want to make sure we
have a full understanding of the costs involved with the B-2 program.
The contractor has provided an estimate of $9.3 billion for 9 aircraft,
but this does not include many of the costs associated with fielding
the aircraft including spares and support equipment. The DAWMS estimate
for the 9 aircraft is $16 billion including military construction and
various upgrades. Dr. Hamre, does the $16 billion estimate include the
additional $2 billion identified in the DAWM Study to optimize the
aircraft for the halt phase?
Answer. Yes, the $16 billion estimate for 9 additional B-2 aircraft
does include the $2 billion for all the aircraft improvements that the
B-2 was configured with throughout the conduct of the Deep Attack
Weapons Mix Study.
Question. Does your estimate include the additional funds required
to improve the LO maintenance problems recently identified on the
aircraft?
Answer. No, the $16 billion estimate does not include any costs
associated with the recently identified LO maintenance problems.
Question. Does the estimate include any shelters, or other major
support requirements associated with forward deployments?
Answer. Yes, the estimate for the 9 additional aircraft include
estimates for the costs associated with; new hangar construction,
maintenance docks, fuel storage tanks, munition facilities, and
security.
Question. Please elaborate on the $3 billion difference between the
Northrop and DAWMS estimates for flyaway costs.
Answer. The $3 billion difference between Northrop and DAWMS
flyaway cost estimates is due to differences in the costs associated
with; engineering change orders, sustaining engineering, liability,
warranty, and learning curve. Northrop's estimate includes recurring
flyaway, government furnished equipment, and non-recurring production
line restart costs but does not include costs for initial support and
spares, military facilities in Guam and Diego Garcia, and other minor
elements of non-flyaway cost which were included in the DAWMS
estimates. Additionally, Northrop assumes a rate of cost reduction
(learning curve) that is greater than B-2 history warrants, they
include a ``management challenge'' or reduction in the estimate not
attached to specific measures that would be used to achieve the
reduction, and finally, they assume the aircraft's configuration will
remain the same through the production period and therefore omitted
cost estimates for engineering change orders. The DAWMS estimates
include a more conservative learning curve, did not allow for a
``management challenge,'' and include costs for engineering change
orders.
Question. GAO recently identified an $89 million shortfall
associated with bringing the last 2 B-2 aircraft to the full block 30
configuration. General Hawley, how did this problem come about and what
is being done to address it?
Answer. During the fiscal year 1998 President's Budget process, the
Air Force removed $212 million from the fiscal year 1999 B-2 RDT&E line
to fund other more pressing needs. The Air Force is committed to the
schedule and content of the B-2 baseline program and is working the
funding issue in the fiscal year 1999 budget process.
Question. I am concerned about the problems we've been reading
about with regard to maintaining the aircraft's low observable
characteristics and how there problems might impact our ability to
deploy the aircraft. Given the need for extensive LO maintenance, can
we reasonably operate the aircraft from forward locations now? What
would be required to operate from forward deployed locations in the
future?
Answer. We cannot reasonably operate the B-2 from austere forward
locations now. The durability of the LO materials used on the B-2
require maintenance after every flight to repair blemishes that, if
allowed to add up, would cause degradation of the B-2's radar cross
section. These same materials require a temperature and humidity
controlled environment to cure properly, and the cure times are
lengthy. There is an aggressive effort focused on developing more
durable low observable materials and improved repair processes. This
effort has paid off in the short term, and we expect other successes in
the next two years. However, operating the B-2 from a forward location
would require an environmentally controlled enclosure or hangar until
these low observable maintenance issues are resolved.
Question. What are the missions we expect to assign B-2s in the
future?
Answer. During the early stages of the conflict, the B-2 will first
attack critical elements of an adversaries Integrated Air Defense
System (IADS). The elements include selected Early Warning (EW) Radar
sites, Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) facilities, Sector Operations
Centers (SOC), and critical nodes of the communications system. The
destruction of the critical elements of an adversaries IADS will allow
non stealthy bomber and fighter aircraft to be employed in support of
the combat commander's campaign plan. While attacking the critical
nodes of the IADS, the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) will
commit B-2s against deep, strategic targets. Strategic Interdiction
targets include critical choke points--bridges and tunnels;
transportation targets--rail lines, truck parks, marshaling yards, and
supporting maintenance facilities; the power grid--power generation
facilities, switching stations, and transmission lines; war supporting
industrial facilities--military hardware production sites, munitions
plants, and machine tool production facilities; petroleum facilities--
refineries, storage tanks, pumping stations, and pipe lines; enemy
command centers; and enemy troop concentrations prior to making contact
with US or allied forces. The JFAAC will also assign the B-2 to
offensive counter air mission. The B-2s will attack aircraft, aircraft
shelters, runways, maintenance facilities, munitions storage bunkers,
and petroleum storage tanks using gravity and standoff weapons. The
combat commander will also use the B-2 counter Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD, attacking storage areas and missile launchers in pre-
identified locations. The B-2 can also swing to a second theater should
another aggressor decide to take advantage of the commitment to the
first theater.
Question. Are more B-2s required to adequately conduct these
missions?
Answer. Force structure analysis conducted during several studies
indicates that the current B-2 force structure, 21 aircraft, is
adequate to meet campaign objectives included in two Major Theater Wars
(MTW).
Question. Are there alternative means of accomplishing these
missions?
Answer. Yes, the flexibility of air power allows the
characteristics of different aircraft to be packaged in many different
combinations to achieve campaign objectives. For example, non stealthy
aircraft could attack heavily defended targets assigned to the B-2
using standoff munitions or precision gravity weapons after the
defenses were eliminated by Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD)
assets. The objective of any campaign planner is to efficiently employ
assigned aircraft to achieve operational objectives while holding
attrition to acceptable levels.
Question. What is the cost of an expanded B-2 program?
Answer. The Air Force has no requirement for additional B-2s. For
this reason, the Air Force has not requested a detailed cost estimate
from the B-2 Program Office to determine the required funding to
procure additional B-2 aircraft. Such an estimate would require in
excess of 120 days (150 days) and several million dollars.
Question. What might we have to give up to fund an expanded B-2
program and are the tradeoffs worthwhile?
Answer. The Air Force believes the B-2 to be an extraordinary
bomber-especially valuable in deterring and defeating distant armed
aggression. Unfortunately, funding for additional B-2s within the Air
Force topline would unbalance the Air Force and deprive future Joint
Future Commanders of other needed capabilities. The Air Force would not
expect to fund additional B-2s at the expense of other Air Force
programs.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Young.]
W I T N E S S E S
----------
Page
Decker, G. F..................................................... 1
Douglass, John................................................... 131
Guenther, Lt. Gen. O. J.......................................... 1
Habiger, Gen. Eugene............................................. 527
Hamre, Dr. J. J.................................................. 525
Hawley, Gen. R. E................................................ 525
Hite, Lt. Gen. R. V.............................................. 1
Lyles, Lt. Gen. L. L............................................. 425
McCloud, Lt. Gen. David.......................................... 525
Money, A. L...................................................... 297
Muellner, Lt. Gen. G. K.......................................... 297
Oster, Lt. Gen. Jeffrey.......................................... 131
Pilling, Vice Adm. Donald........................................ 131
I N D E X
----------
AIR FORCE ACQUISITION PROGRAMS
Page
Acquisition Cycle vs. Technology Cycle........................... 396
Acquisition Program Issues....................................... 413
Acquisition Reform............................................... 377
Additional Funding............................................... 392
Airborne Laser Program (ABL)...................................372, 394
Aircraft Procurement............................................. 385
B-2 Bomber Program............................................... 398
C-17 Aircraft.................................................... 399
Cheyenne Mountain Upgrades....................................... 409
Contract Protests................................................ 384
Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System......................... 382
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV)......................... 411
F-16 and F-15 Aircraft.........................................401, 403
F-22 Aircraft.................................................... 385
Industry Mergers................................................. 380
Information Technology........................................... 384
Information Warfare.............................................. 405
International Merchants Purchase Authorization Card (IMPAC)...... 379
Introduction..................................................... 297
Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM).................... 403
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).....................................373, 407
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) Aircraft.. 393
NATO JSTARS Aircraft......................................... 393
Lab Consolidation................................................ 383
Making the Air Force More Expeditionary.......................... 397
Mission Planning Systems......................................... 400
Modernization Shortfall.......................................... 387
Reengine Programs, Large Aircraft................................ 404
Remarks of Mr. Dicks............................................. 381
Spaced Based Infrared System (SBIRS)............................. 412
Statement of Arthur L. Money and Lt. General George K. Muellner,
the Joint...................................................... 323
Summary Statement of General Muellner............................ 299
Acquisition Reform........................................... 321
Agile Combat Support......................................... 320
Airborne Laser Program (ABL)................................. 307
Air Superiority.............................................. 300
B-1 Bomber................................................... 309
B-2 Aircraft................................................. 313
C-17 and F-22 Software Problems............................301, 316
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV)..................... 318
F-22 Aircraft................................................ 300
Cost Saving Initiatives.................................. 303
Joint Estimating Team Recommendations.................... 302
Restructure.............................................. 301
Unit Costs............................................... 306
Global Attack................................................ 308
Information Superiority...................................... 318
Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM).......................... 317
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)................................... 315
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS)
Aircraft................................................... 318
Meeting the Warfighter's Needs............................... 299
Precision Guided Munitions (PGM)......................311, 316, 318
Precision Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)...................... 319
Rapid Global Mobility........................................ 316
Science and Technology....................................... 321
Spaced Based Infrared System (SBIRS)......................... 308
Space Superiority............................................ 307
Summary...................................................... 322
Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser (WCMD).................... 321
Summary Statement of Mr. Money................................... 298
Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile (TSSAM) Lawsuit.............. 407
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV).................................... 374
ARMY ACQUISITION PROGRAMS
Abrams Tanks..................................................... 112
Additional Funding............................................... 100
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTD)................ 125
Ammunition Programs, Army.......................................83, 114
Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS)............................ 112
C-17 Aircraft.................................................... 97
Chemical Munitions Demilitarization.............................86, 129
Command and Control Vehicle...................................... 67
Crusader Program................................................. 68
Digitization..................................................... 117
Extended Range Multiple Launch Rocket System (ER-MLRS)........... 111
Family of Heavy Tactical Vehicles (FHTV)............75, 92, 94, 95, 102
Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV).......................76, 104
Force XXI Initiatives............................................4, 123
Helicopter Programs:
Apache Longbow Helicopter.................................... 108
Black Hawk Multiyear Procurement............................. 105
CH-47 Improved Cargo Helicopter.............................96, 107
Comanche Helicopter (RAH-66)........................68, 91, 95, 110
Kiowa Warrior Helicopter (OH-58)............................. 109
Hellfire II Missile.............................................. 110
High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV)...............66, 77,
93, 94, 103
Individual Soldier Equipment..................................... 67
Introduction..................................................... 1
Landwarrior Program.............................................. 64
Modernization Shortfalls......................................... 98
Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) Missile......................72, 80
Procurement Funding.............................................. 89
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Funding............... 101
Reserve Component Automation System (RCAS)....................... 65
Starstreak Missile..............................................81, 111
Statement of Gilbert F. Decker and Lt. General Ronald V. Hite.... 7
Summary Statement of Mr. Decker.................................. 2
Fiscal Year 1998 Budget Request.............................. 3
Force XXI and Army-After-Next................................ 4
Modernization Programs....................................... 5
Tactical High Energy Laser System (THEL)......................... 87
Test and Evaluation Infrastructure............................... 90
Theater High Altitude Area Defense System (THAAD)............69, 78, 97
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM
Acquisition Process.............................................. 498
Airborne Laser (ABL) Program...................................492, 517
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.............................. 523
Arrow Missile Program:
Funding....................................................495, 519
Testing...................................................... 488
Budget Request, Fiscal Year 1998................................. 505
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC).......................... 501
Helsinki Agreement.............................................426, 497
Demarcation Limits........................................... 500
Introduction..................................................... 425
Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS).....................496, 520
Missile Defense Systems, Procurement of.......................... 487
National Missile Defense (NMD) Program.........................489, 521
Navy Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (Navy Lower Tier).... 493,
508
Navy Theater Wide Ballistic Missile Defense (Navy Upper Tier).... 515
Over Land Testing................................................ 503
Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) Missile...................... 510
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)................................. 497
Ship Self Defense................................................ 502
Space Based Laser (SBL).......................................... 504
Statement of Lt. General Lester L. Lyles......................... 439
Summary Statement of General Lyles............................... 429
Clementine Satellite......................................... 436
Federated Organization....................................... 436
Midcourse Space Experiment................................... 437
National Missile Defense (NMD):
Deployment Readiness..................................... 435
Joint Program Office, The................................ 436
System Architecture...................................... 435
System Elements.......................................... 435
Navy Area Defense Test....................................... 433
Patriot Missile System.....................................430, 431
System Performance....................................... 431
Willow Dune Tests........................................ 431
Summary...................................................... 438
System Integration Test...................................... 433
Technology Programs.......................................... 436
Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD):
System Accomplishments................................... 433
Test Results............................................. 434
Theater Missile Defense (TMD):
Capability of Growth..................................... 430
Family of Systems........................................ 430
Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Testing...489, 491, 492, 512
Unfunded Requirements............................................ 486
FUTURE BOMBERS/DEEP ATTACK CAPABILITIES
Aircraft Carriers................................................ 580
B-1 Bomber Program............................................... 593
B-2 Bomber Program:
Acquisition Costs.....................................573, 592, 594
Basing....................................................... 586
Capabilities................................................. 576
Conventional Capabilities and Missions....................... 588
Delivery Dates............................................... 566
Maintainability.......................................567, 571, 583
Modifications................................................ 586
Paying for the B-2 Aircraft................................565, 577
Production................................................... 584
Stealth Capabilities......................................... 573
Strategic Capabilities and Missions...................551, 585, 588
B-52 Aircraft..................................................560, 588
Bomber Aircraft, Cost of......................................... 559
Bomber Weapons Capabilities...................................... 560
Budget Estimates................................................. 581
Budget Shortfalls................................................ 570
Challenges to the United States.................................. 555
Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study..................................552, 590
Study Findings............................................... 579
F-117 Aircraft:
F-117 in the Gulf War........................................ 572
Production................................................... 568
Force Mix........................................................ 554
Half Phase................................................553, 558, 578
Introduction..................................................... 525
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)...............................563, 569
Remarks of Mr. Hefner............................................ 561
Statement of General David J. McCloud............................ 542
Statement of General Richard E. Hawley........................... 530
Stealth, Viability of............................................ 583
Strategic Nuclear Forces......................................... 587
Summary Statement of General Habiger............................. 529
Summary Statement of General Hawley.............................. 529
Summary Statement of General McCloud............................. 540
Summary Statement of Mr. Hamre................................... 527
Bomber Questions............................................. 528
NAVY AND MARINE CORPS ACQUISITION PROGRAMS
ADC(X) Ship Program.............................................. 216
Additional Funding............................................... 235
Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV)....................... 275
Advanced Self-Protection Jammer (ASPJ).........................221, 222
Aegis Ship Follow-On (SC-21)..................................... 260
Aircraft Programs:
A-12 Aircraft Litigation..................................... 283
EA-6B Prowler Aircraft....................................... 219
F/A-18 E/F Aircraft...................................219, 220, 262
Helicopter, Navy............................................. 266
Helicopters, Marine Corps.................................... 268
V-22 Aircraft..........................................194, 265
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)................................... 263
P-3C Aircraft Update III..................................... 221
Ammunition, Marine Corps......................................... 276
Arsenal Ship..................................................... 240
Budget Projections............................................... 200
Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF).............. 279
Chemical/Biological Warfare...................................... 196
Commander in Chief (CINC) Priorities............................. 223
CVN-77 Aircraft Carrier.......................................... 217
Research and Development (R&D)............................... 252
DDG-51 Destroyers................................................ 239
Deep Ocean Relocation............................................ 219
Fast Patrol Craft Program........................................ 196
Ground Proximity Warning System.................................. 199
Ground Systems Research and Development (R&D), Marine Corps...... 272
High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV)............... 274
Industrial Base Concerns.......................................212, 218
Intercooled Recuperative (ICR) Gas Turbine Engine................ 261
Introduction..................................................... 131
Large, Medium Speed, Roll-On/Roll-Off (LMSR) Ship Program........ 215
Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) Service Life Extension Program
(SLEP).......................................................217, 250
LPD-17 Amphibious Assault Ship Program.........................215, 242
Manuafacturing Technology........................................ 282
Mine Warfare..................................................... 280
Modernization Shortfall.......................................... 233
Multiyear Contracting............................................ 212
New Attack Submarine............................................. 244
Program Cost................................................. 208
Contact Strategy............................................. 210
Unit Costs................................................... 210
Private/Public Yards............................................. 199
Shipbuilding Plan................................................ 232
Shipbuilding Rate................................................ 229
Ship Self Defense..............................................193, 227
Statement of John W. Douglass, Vice Admiral Donald L. Pilling,
and Lt. General Jeffrey W. Oster, The Joint.................... 145
Strategic Sealift................................................ 247
Support Equipment (Lighterage)............................... 248
Submarine Technology Research and Development (R&D).............. 254
Summary Statement of Mr. Douglass................................ 132
Acquisition Reform........................................... 143
Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle.......................... 139
Anti-Submarine Warfare....................................... 143
Arsenal Ship................................................. 136
Aviation Programs............................................ 137
Budget Summaries............................................. 134
C4I Space and Information Warfare............................ 140
Combat Logistics Ships....................................... 137
Communications Programs...................................... 142
CVN-77 Aircraft Carrier...................................... 135
CVX Aircraft Carrier......................................... 137
DDG-51 Destroyer............................................. 136
F/A-18 Fighter Aircraft...................................... 138
Joint Strike Fighter......................................... 139
LPD-17....................................................... 136
Marine Corps Aircraft........................................ 139
Marine Corps Ground Programs................................. 140
MV-22 Aircraft............................................... 139
Mine Warfare................................................. 143
Navy Trendlines.............................................. 134
Procurement and Research and Development..................... 133
Seawolf Submarine Program.................................... 135
SC-21 Surface Combatant...................................... 137
Shipbuilding Plan............................................ 134
Smart Ship Program........................................... 136
Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TMD)...................... 141
Trident Submarine Backlift....................................... 251
Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile (TSSAM) Lawsuit.............. 284
Unfunded Requirements............................................ 284
University Research.............................................. 282