[House Hearing, 105 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
U.S. ECONOMIC AND TRADE POLICY TOWARD CUBA
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRADE
of the
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 7, 1998
__________
Serial 105-73
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Ways and Means
----------
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
55-762 CC WASHINGTON : 1999
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS
BILL ARCHER, Texas, Chairman
PHILIP M. CRANE, Illinois CHARLES B. RANGEL, New York
BILL THOMAS, California FORTNEY PETE STARK, California
E. CLAY SHAW, Jr., Florida ROBERT T. MATSUI, California
NANCY L. JOHNSON, Connecticut BARBARA B. KENNELLY, Connecticut
JIM BUNNING, Kentucky WILLIAM J. COYNE, Pennsylvania
AMO HOUGHTON, New York SANDER M. LEVIN, Michigan
WALLY HERGER, California BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
JIM McCRERY, Louisiana JIM McDERMOTT, Washington
DAVE CAMP, Michigan GERALD D. KLECZKA, Wisconsin
JIM RAMSTAD, Minnesota JOHN LEWIS, Georgia
JIM NUSSLE, Iowa RICHARD E. NEAL, Massachusetts
SAM JOHNSON, Texas MICHAEL R. McNULTY, New York
JENNIFER DUNN, Washington WILLIAM J. JEFFERSON, Louisiana
MAC COLLINS, Georgia JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio XAVIER BECERRA, California
PHILIP S. ENGLISH, Pennsylvania KAREN L. THURMAN, Florida
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
JON CHRISTENSEN, Nebraska
WES WATKINS, Oklahoma
J.D. HAYWORTH, Arizona
JERRY WELLER, Illinois
KENNY HULSHOF, Missouri
A.L. Singleton, Chief of Staff
Janice Mays, Minority Chief Counsel
______
Subcommittee on Trade
PHILIP M. CRANE, Illinois, Chairman
BILL THOMAS, California ROBERT T. MATSUI, California
E. CLAY SHAW, Jr., Florida CHARLES B. RANGEL, New York
AMO HOUGHTON, New York RICHARD E. NEAL, Massachusetts
DAVE CAMP, Michigan JIM McDERMOTT, Washington
JIM RAMSTAD, Minnesota MICHAEL R. McNULTY, New York
JENNIFER DUNN, Washington WILLIAM J. JEFFERSON, Louisiana
WALLY HERGER, California
JIM NUSSLE, Iowa
Pursuant to clause 2(e)(4) of Rule XI of the Rules of the House, public
hearing records of the Committee on Ways and Means are also published
in electronic form. The printed hearing record remains the official
version. Because electronic submissions are used to prepare both
printed and electronic versions of the hearing record, the process of
converting between various electronic formats may introduce
unintentional errors or omissions. Such occurrences are inherent in the
current publication process and should diminish as the process is
further refined.
C O N T E N T S
__________
Page
Advisory of April 21, 1998, announcing the hearing............... 2
WITNESSES
U.S. Department of State, Michael Ranneberger, Coordinator,
Cuban Affairs.................................................. 57
______
Alexis de Tocqueville Institution, Philip Peters................. 137
Americans for Humanitarian Trade With Cuba, Craig L. Fuller...... 114
Barnes, Hon. Michael, Hogan & Hartson, L.L.P. and USA Engage..... 96
Berry, Willard M., European-American Business Council........... 80
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Ernest H. Preeg.. 143
Cibrian, David J., Jenkens & Gilchrist........................... 133
Cuban Committee for Democracy, Silvia Wilhelm................... 110
Diaz-Balart, Hon. Lincoln, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Florida............................................... 21
European-American Business Council, Willard M. Berry............. 80
Fuller, Craig L., Americans for Humanitarian Trade With Cuba.... 114
Gary, W. Bradford, Medical Device Manufacturers Association..... 117
Gerdes, Dan, U.S. Wheat Associates.............................. 121
H Enterprises International, Inc., Richard E. O'Leary........... 75
Kavulich, John S. II, U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, Inc.. 90
Medical Device Manufacturers Association, W. Bradford Gary...... 117
Menendez, Hon. Robert, a Representative in Congress from the
State of New Jersey............................................ 24
Moakley, Hon. John Joseph, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Massachusetts......................................... 10
Muse & Associates, Robert L. Muse............................... 86
O'Leary, Richard E., H Enterprises International, Inc.; and U.S.
Chamber of Commerce............................................ 75
Paparian, Hon. William M., Pasadena, CA......................... 130
Peters, Philip, Alexis de Tocqueville Institution................ 137
Preeg, Ernest H., Center for Strategic and International Studies. 143
Quigley, Thomas E., United States Catholic Conference........... 104
Ros-Lehtinen, Hon. Ileana, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Florida............................................... 15
Torres, Hon. Esteban E., a Representative in Congress from the
State of California............................................ 39
United States Catholic Conference, Thomas E. Quigley............ 104
USA Engage, Hon. Michael Barnes.................................. 96
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Richard E. O'Leary.................... 75
U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, Inc., John S. Kavulich II.. 90
U.S. Wheat Associates, Dan Gerdes............................... 121
Wilhelm, Silvia, Cuban Committee for Democracy.................. 110
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
American Farm Bureau Federation, statement....................... 153
Bernstein, Ellen P., Interreligious Foundation for Community
Organization, New York, NY, joint statement.................... 180
Center for a Free Cuba, Frank Calzon, letter and attachment...... 155
Cuban American Alliance Education Fund, Inc., Delvis Fernandez
Levy, statement................................................ 158
Duke, Maria de Lourdes, Fundacion Amistad, New York, NY,
statement...................................................... 160
ForCHILDREN, Inc., Arlington, VA, Paul F. McCleary, statement.... 159
Fundacion Amistad, New York, NY, Maria de Lourdes Duke, statement 160
General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), Louisville,
KY, Clifton Kirkpatrick, letter and attachment................. 172
Global Links, Pittsburgh, PA, Brenda L. Smith, statement......... 177
Hamilton, Hon. Lee H., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Indiana, statement.................................... 178
Interreligious Foundation for Community Organization, New York,
NY, Schuyler Rhodes, Lucius Walker, Jr., and Ellen P.
Bernstein, joint statement..................................... 180
Iriondo, Sylvia G., Mothers & Women Against Repression for Cuba,
Key Biscayne, FL, letter and attachments....................... 191
Kirkpatrick, Anthony F., University of South Florida, College of
Medicine, joint statement and attachments...................... 183
Kirkpatrick, Clifton, General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church
(U.S.A.), Louisville, KY, letter and attachment................ 172
Kleczka, Hon. Gerald D., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Wisconsin, statement.................................. 189
Levy, Delvis Fernandez, Cuban American Alliance Education Fund,
Inc., statement................................................ 158
McCleary, Paul F., ForCHILDREN, Inc., Arlington, VA, statement... 159
Mississippi Black Farmers and Agriculturists Association, Yazoo
City, MS, Lloyd Moore, joint statement......................... 190
Mothers & Women Against Repression for Cuba, Key Biscayne, FL,
Sylvia G. Iriondo, letter and attachments...................... 191
Olivera, Beatriz M., Harris Kessler & Goldstein, Chicago, IL,
statement...................................................... 197
Oxfam America, statement......................................... 198
Rhodes, Schuyler, Interreligious Foundation for Community
Organization, New York, NY, joint statement.................... 180
Serrano, Hon. Jose E., a Representative in Congress from the
State of New York, statement................................... 198
Smith, Brenda L., Global Links, Pittsburgh, PA, statement........ 177
Trident South Corporation, Yazoo City, MS, Lloyd Moore, joint
statement...................................................... 190
USA Rice Federation, Arlington, VA, statement.................... 199
Vanden, Harry E., University of South Florida, Department of
Government and International Affairs, joint statement and
attachments.................................................... 183
Walker, Lucius, Jr., Interreligious Foundation for Community
Organization, New York, NY, joint statement.................... 180
U.S. ECONOMIC AND TRADE POLICY TOWARD CUBA
----------
THURSDAY, MAY 7, 1998
House of Representatives,
Committee on Ways and Means,
Subcommittee on Trade,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:05 p.m., in
room 1100, Longworth Office Building, Hon. Phillip Crane
(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
[The advisory announcing the hearing follows:]
ADVISORY
FROM THE
COMMITTEE
ON WAYS
AND
MEANS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRADE
CONTACT: (202) 225-1721
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
April 21, 1998
No. TR-25
Crane Announces Hearing on
U.S. Economic and Trade
Policy Toward Cuba
Congressman Philip M. Crane (R-IL), Chairman, Subcommittee on
Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means, today announced that the
Subcommittee will hold a hearing on U.S. economic and trade policy
toward Cuba. The hearing will take place on Thursday, May 7, 1998, in
the main Committee hearing room, 1100 Longworth House Office Building,
beginning at 1:00 p.m.
Oral testimony at this hearing will be from both invited and public
witnesses. In addition, any individual or organization not scheduled
for an oral appearance may submit a written statement for consideration
by the Committee or for inclusion in the printed record of the hearing.
BACKGROUND:
Since the early 1960's, U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted
largely of attempting to isolate the island nation through a
comprehensive economic and trade embargo. The authority for these
sanctions against Cuba was included in section 620(a) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L 87-195). In 1992, the sanctions were
strengthened with the enactment into law of the Cuban Democracy Act
(P.L. 102-484). In particular, the Act extended the prohibitions on
transactions with Cuba to subsidiaries of U.S. firms in third
countries. At the same time, the Cuban Democracy Act directs the
President to take steps to end the trade embargo and to assist a freely
and democratically elected Cuban government, should one come to power.
Another component of U.S. policy under the Act consists of support
measures for the Cuban people, including U.S. private humanitarian
donations, U.S. Government support for democracy-building efforts, and
U.S.-sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba (Radio and TV
Marti).
In 1996, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (P.L. 104-
114), often referred to as the ``Helms-Burton'' legislation, was
enacted to further strengthen U.S. sanctions against Cuba. Among other
things, Helms-Burton codified all Cuban embargo executive orders and
regulations in force on March 12, 1996. In addition, the Act allows
U.S. nationals to sue for monetary damages in U.S. Federal court those
persons who traffic property confiscated from such U.S. nationals.
Finally, it denies admission into the United States to certain aliens
involved in the confiscation or trafficking of U.S. property in Cuba.
Following the enactment of Helms-Burton, many U.S. trading
partners, including Canada, Japan, Mexico, and the European Union (EU),
strongly criticized the legislation, arguing that it constitutes an
extraterritorial application of U.S. law contrary to international
principles. On November 20, 1996, the World Trade Organization (WTO)
agreed to a request from the EU calling for the formation of a dispute
resolution panel on Helms-Burton. On April 21, 1997, the EU notified
the WTO that it was suspending the dispute panel, pursuant to an
understanding reached with the United States to develop joint
disciplines on dealings in property confiscated by Cuba and other
governments in contravention of international law. After meetings
between the United States and the EU in December 1997 and March 1998,
EU officials stated that they would resume the WTO challenge to Helms-
Burton if no permanent solution to the dispute was found. The EU has
also raised concerns about Helms-Burton and the use of extraterritorial
sanctions in the context of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment,
which is being negotiated under the auspices of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development.
The visit of Pope John Paul II to Cuba on January 21-25, 1998,
focused public attention on U.S. economic and trade sanctions against
Cuba. U.S. sanctions do not allow commercial food exports to Cuba, and
while commercial medical exports are allowed, there are several
restrictions on such exports as set forth in the Cuban Democracy Act of
1992.
On March 20, 1998, President Clinton announced four changes in U.S.
policy toward Cuba. Specifically, the President announced: (1) the
resumption of licensing for direct humanitarian charter flights to Cuba
(which had been curtailed after the February 1996 shootdown of two U.S.
civilian planes), (2) the resumption of cash remittances up to $300 per
quarter for the support of close relatives in Cuba (which had been
curtailed in August 1994 in response to the migration crisis with
Cuba), (3) the development of licensing procedures to streamline and
expedite licenses for the commercial sale of medicines and medical
supplies and equipment to Cuba, and (4) a decision to work on a
bipartisan basis with Congress on the transfer of food to the Cuban
people.
In announcing the hearing, Chairman Crane stated: ``In the wake of
the Pope's visit in January, I believe that it is an appropriate time
for the Subcommittee to review U.S. economic and trade policy toward
Cuba. I look forward to reviewing the status of our economic and trade
policy towards Cuba, particularly with respect to the humanitarian
assistance provided by U.S. citizens to the Cuban people.''
FOCUS OF THE HEARING:
The focus of the hearing is to examine: (1) U.S. economic and trade
policy toward Cuba and the impact of the U.S. embargo on the Cuban
people, (2) the prospects for future economic relations in light of the
Pope's recent visit, (3) the status of humanitarian assistance extended
to the Cuban people, and (4) how U.S.-Cuba policy, particularly the
Helms-Burton legislation, has affected relations with U.S. trading
partners.
DETAILS FOR SUBMISSIONS OF REQUESTS TO BE HEARD:
Requests to be heard at the hearing must be made by telephone to
Traci Altman or Bradley Schreiber at (202) 225-1721 no later than the
close of business, Thursday, April 30, 1998. The telephone request
should be followed by a formal written request to A.L. Singleton, Chief
of Staff, Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives,
1102 Longworth House Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20515. The staff
of the Subcommittee on Trade will notify by telephone those scheduled
to appear as soon as possible after the filing deadline. Any questions
concerning a scheduled appearance should be directed to the
Subcommittee on Trade staff at (202) 225-6649.
In view of the limited time available to hear witnesses, the
Subcommittee may not be able to accommodate all requests to be heard.
Those persons and organizations not scheduled for an oral appearance
are encouraged to submit written statements for the record of the
hearing. All persons requesting to be heard, whether they are scheduled
for oral testimony or not, will be notified as soon as possible after
the filing deadline.
Witnesses scheduled to present oral testimony are required to
summarize briefly their written statements in no more than five
minutes. THE FIVE-MINUTE RULE WILL BE STRICTLY ENFORCED. The full
written statement of each witness will be included in the printed
record, in accordance with House Rules.
In order to assure the most productive use of the limited amount of
time available to question witnesses, all witnesses scheduled to appear
before the Subcommittee are required to submit 200 copies of their
prepared statement and an IBM compatible 3.5-inch diskette in ASCII DOS
Text or WordPerfect 5.1 format, for review by Members prior to the
hearing. Testimony should arrive at the Subcommittee on Trade office,
room 1104 Longworth House Office Building, no later than Tuesday, May
5, 1998. Failure to do so may result in the witness being denied the
opportunity to testify in person.
WRITTEN STATEMENTS IN LIEU OF PERSONAL APPEARANCE:
Any person or organization wishing to submit a written statement
for the printed record of the hearing should submit at least six (6)
single-space legal-size copies of their statement, along with an IBM
compatible 3.5-inch diskette in ASCII DOS Text or WordPerfect 5.1
format only, with their name, address, and hearing date noted on a
label, by the close of business, Thursday, May 21, 1998, to A.L.
Singleton, Chief of Staff, Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of
Representatives, 1102 Longworth House Office Building, Washington, D.C.
20515. If those filing written statements wish to have their statements
distributed to the press and interested public at the hearing, they may
deliver 200 additional copies for this purpose to the Subcommittee on
Trade office, room 1104 Longworth House Office Building, at least one
hour before the hearing begins.
FORMATTING REQUIREMENTS:
Each statement presented for printing to the Committee by a
witness, any written statement or exhibit submitted for the printed
record or any written comments in response to a request for written
comments must conform to the guidelines listed below. Any statement or
exhibit not in compliance with these guidelines will not be printed,
but will be maintained in the Committee files for review and use by the
Committee.
1. All statements and any accompanying exhibits for printing must
be typed in single space on legal-size paper and may not exceed a total
of 10 pages including attachments. At the same time written statements
are submitted to the Committee, witnesses are now requested to submit
their statements on an IBM compatible 3.5-inch diskette in ASCII DOS
Text or WordPerfect 5.1 format. Witnesses are advised that the
Committee will rely on electronic submissions for printing the official
hearing record.
2. Copies of whole documents submitted as exhibit material will not
be accepted for printing. Instead, exhibit material should be
referenced and quoted or paraphrased. All exhibit material not meeting
these specifications will be maintained in the Committee files for
review and use by the Committee.
3. A witness appearing at a public hearing, or submitting a
statement for the record of a public hearing, or submitting written
comments in response to a published request for comments by the
Committee, must include on his statement or submission a list of all
clients, persons, or organizations on whose behalf the witness appears.
4. A supplemental sheet must accompany each statement listing the
name, full address, a telephone number where the witness or the
designated representative may be reached and a topical outline or
summary of the comments and recommendations in the full statement. This
supplemental sheet will not be included in the printed record.
The above restrictions and limitations apply only to material being
submitted for printing. Statements and exhibits or supplementary
material submitted solely for distribution to the Members, the press
and the public during the course of a public hearing may be submitted
in other forms.
Note: All Committee advisories and news releases are available on
the World Wide Web at `HTTP://WWW.HOUSE.GOV/WAYS__ MEANS/'.
The Committee seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons
with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations, please
call 202-225-1721 or 202-226-3411 TTD/TTY in advance of the event (four
business days notice is requested). Questions with regard to special
accommodation needs in general (including availability of Committee
materials in alternative formats) may be directed to the Committee as
noted above.
Chairman Crane [presiding]. Good afternoon. This is a
hearing before the Subcommittee on Trade.
Mr. Moakley. Hi, how are you doing?
Chairman Crane. Beg your pardon?
Mr. Moakley. Is my microphone on? I was checking to see if
the microphone was on. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Crane. OK, one, two, three, testing.
Mr. Moakley. Before I start swearing at some people, I want
to make sure it's on.
Chairman Crane. All right. This is a hearing before the
Subcommittee on Trade on the topic of U.S. trade and economic
policy toward Cuba. It's a matter of great importance to
Americans who hope that freedom and democracy will come to this
island, just 90 miles from our shores. It's also a matter of
particular importance to the thousands of Cubans who have fled
the Castro regime, many of whom have become citizens.
The visit of Pope John Paul II to Cuba in January of this
year focused public attention on U.S. policy toward Cuba and
increased general awareness of the daily plight of the Cuban
people. During the Pope's visit, he described the U.S. embargo
as something which strikes the people indiscriminately, making
it even more difficult for the weakest to enjoy the bare
essentials. The papal comments have raised questions about ways
of providing humanitarian assistance to the people of Cuba,
while continuing our efforts to move the Castro government in
the direction of freedom and democracy.
The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996,
commonly known as Helms-Burton, has affected U.S. relations
with our trading partners who view the act as an
extraterritorial application of the U.S. embargo in
contravention of international law. On this basis, the European
Union, or EU, filed a case on Helms-Burton against the United
States at the World Trade Organization. In April 1997, the EU
suspended its case pursuant to an understanding reached with
the United States to develop joint disciplines on dealings in
property confiscated by Cuba and other governments contrary to
international law.
The EU last month allowed its WTO case to expire, pending
continuing negotiations with the United States. But it made
clear that it would file another WTO case if the United States
took action against companies in EU member states, under either
Helms-Burton or the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act.
I believe it's appropriate for the Subcommittee to examine
U.S. policy toward Cuba in light of the Pope's recent visit and
the lingering problems that Helms-Burton has caused the United
States in our relations with our major trading partners. I
would like to recognize the contributions made by Mr. Rangel
and Mr. Neal in raising the issue of our Cuba policy on the
Subcommittee's agenda and look forward to hearing the testimony
of our witnesses today.
And now I'd like to yield to Mr. Rangel for an opening
statement.
Mr. Rangel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me thank you,
for always being there on issues of trade, to expose our
witnesses to the best information available in order for us to
legislate. And I want to thank Mr. Neal for his leadership in
making certain that our Committee fulfills that responsibility.
Last January, I was invited by Cardinal O'Connor, with many
of my colleagues, to travel to Cuba during the visit to the
island by Pope John Paul. After extensive discussions with a
variety of high-level Cuban officials, including President
Castro, it was made abundantly clear to me that the Cuban
Government was eager not only to have the embargo removed, but
to normalize relations with the United States.
The most frequently asked question I heard was, ``What does
the United States want?'' I made it clear over the years that,
in my view, it's time to end the U.S. trade embargo. Continued
sanctions against Cuba hurt us more than they do the Government
of Cuba, which we designed to bring down, making us the odd man
out among nations. The embargo remains a convenient tool for
scapegoating used by those in Cuba who wish to maintain the
status quo.
The embargo, especially the Helms-Burton law, has harmed
our relations with friends and allies around the world by
imposing extraterritorial restrictions on global trading
infrastructure, while limiting the ability of American
businesses to compete freely. The embargo has failed in its
goal clearly of destabilizing the Cuban Government.
Today, more and more Americans are wondering why, after 38
years, our government persists in this unilateral policy of
isolating Cuba. During these hearings we will hear from
representatives from the business sector, humanitarian groups,
the Catholic Church, the Cuban-American community, and they
will explain their reasons for supporting a change in policy.
Those of us who have opposed existing policy should certainly
be encouraged by this impressive turnout.
The Pope's visit has drawn attention to the issue and
encouraged more people to speak out. The Pope again chided the
United States for a policy that he views as inhumane,
admonished the Cubans to open their society, and improve their
record on human rights.
I commend President Clinton for the steps he has taken in
the wake of the Pope's visit to lessen the humanitarian impact
of the embargo. The health impact on Cuban children due to
shortages of food and medicine is beyond dispute. Some would
argue that the fault is with Cuba's failed Socialist system and
Castro's position, and not the U.S. embargo. Whatever the case
may be, except in times of war, it is not the American way of
doing things--to sit by and witness the suffering of innocents
while we're in a position to do something about it.
At this time, I would like to yield time to Mr. Neal in
support of having this hearing and trying to change this policy
that we have.
Mr. Neal. Thank you, Mr. Rangel.
First, let me thank Chairman Crane and Congressman Joe
Moakley for the effort that they've made today in ensuring that
this timely issue be brought once again before the Subcommittee
on Trade.
In January, I had the privilege to travel to Cuba with
Cardinal Law of Boston for the papal visit. It's a trip that I
never will forget. From my visit, I have reaffirmed my position
that we need to provide humanitarian assistance to Cuba. I'm a
cosponsor of the Cuban Humanitarian Trade Act of 1997, which
would change the terms for exporting food and medicine from the
United States to Cuba. It's my understanding that even Senator
Helms is in the process of considering legislation that would
expand humanitarian aid to Cuba.
The Cuban-American National Foundation has proposed an
initiative which would target humanitarian donations to those
most in need, especially political prisoners and their
families. This initiative requires assistance to be delivered
and distributed through internationally recognized
nongovernmental organizations. The plan would prohibit
assistance to Communist Party members and require public
assurance from the Cuban Government that they would not
interfere with the distribution of that assistance.
Since the visit of John Paul II to Cuba, attention has been
focused on humanitarian aid. A March 1997 report by the
American Association for World Health, severely criticized our
government for maintaining the embargo restrictions that have
resulted in shortages of medicines, medical equipment, and
medical information. These shortages have led to serious
nutritional deficits. The current licensing requirements are
burdensome and complex and result in delays and increased cost.
In the past Cuba largely depended upon Soviet bloc
countries for trading assistance. In 1990, the Soviets provided
$3.5 billion in economic assistance and trade subsidies to Cuba
and about $1 billion in military assistance. Since 1992 the
Russian Government no longer provides military assistance to
Cuba and since 1993 Cubans have been allowed to own U.S.
dollars and self-employment was authorized. Other market-
fronted reforms have also been obtained.
Certainly life is not easy for the Cubans. On March 20,
1998, the Clinton administration announced four changes which
should help Cuba. But these changes are not a shift in U.S.
policy. These four changes have not yet gone into effect.
Hopefully, we can learn from this hearing and build upon
the changes already announced. I think most of us can agree
that we need to improve humanitarian aid to Cuba and I hope
that this Subcommittee will once again take the lead on this
issue.
I would like to call attention if I can for 1 second, Mr.
Chairman, to an article that appeared in today's New York Times
and there's also one in the Washington Post. And while we're
also sensitive here to headlines and how they relate to the
stories that follow, the headline here is, ``Star, a Pentagon
report now belittled the menace posed by Cuba.'' The one thing
that you're struck by in a visit to Cuba is that they're not
going to be able to mount any missiles on the back of 1956
Chevrolets, because that's all they have.
And the truth is that the Pope has given us an
extraordinary opening here and I think that whether we can
argue over humanitarian assistance or lifting the embargo in
its entirety, we should take advantage of the opening the Pope
has given us, as well as Cardinals O'Connor and Law and fully
move in to fill the void that has been created. Thank you
again, Mr. Chairman, for the prompt manner in which you
scheduled this hearing.
My time.
Mr. Rangel. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to enter
the statement of Congressman Jerry Kleczka into the record.
Chairman Crane. Yes, and without objection, all Members'
written testimony will become a part of the permanent record
too.
[The opening statements follow:]
Statement of Hon. E. Clay Shaw, Jr., a Representative in Congress from
the State of Florida
Mr. Chairman, thank you for agreeing to hold a hearing on
U.S. economic and trade policy toward Cuba. Because of Cuba's
proximity to my home state of Florida, this hearing is of
special importance to my constituents.
Mr. Chairman, since the visit of His Holiness John Paul II
to Cuba, the media has been rife with stories about how unfair
and cruel our economic policy is toward Cuba. Many people
swayed by these stories have adopted Castro's self-serving
viewpoint that Cuba's miserable economic performance is due to
the U.S. trade embargo.
Unfortunately, what is being glossed over in the embargo
debate is that the root cause of the misery of the proud Cuban
people is the dictator Fidel Castro. Anti-embargo groups
consistently leave out of their arguments any mention of Castro
subjugating his own people or his disastrous economic policies.
This overlooking of the realities of Castro's regime by anti-
embargo groups unwittingly (or in some cases, purposely) gives
credibility to Castro's brutal regime. This credibility in turn
perpetuates Castro's dictatorship, which of course ensures the
continued suffering of the Cuban people.
Perhaps because Castro has been oppressing his people for
so long, many Americans seem to have forgotten that the rights
we enjoy are utterly non-existent in Cuba. For example, until
1976, Castro ruled by decree, which meant in practical
application that Castro's whims were the supreme law of the
land. In 1961, representative democracy was abolished (although
a puppet legislature was later established, falsely named the
National Assembly of Peoples Power). Political prisoners number
in the thousands.
Castro's human rights record is similarly appalling. Under
his rule, the Cuban people are denied freedom of speech,
association, assembly and movement. Religious freedom is
severely restricted, although to Castro's credit, he did allow
the celebration of Christmas for the first time in years in
anticipation of the Pope's visit.
Castro's economic record is as pathetic as his human rights
record. After the termination of aid from the Soviet Union,
Cuba's economy actually shrunk between thirty-five and fifty
percent. Shortages of basic commodities, such as food and fuel,
are commonplace in this workers' paradise. Again, the root
cause of the dismal performance of the Cuban economy is not the
embargo, but Castro's fanatical adherence to now discredited
Marxist-Leninist theories.
Castro is a walking anachronism, as outdated as the Chevys
with fins that still rumble through the streets of Havana. I
find it rich in irony that Castro, who could have gone down in
history as the liberator of Cuba, will instead be remembered as
its enslaver.
Now in the twilight of his life, Castro will soon join his
ideological soulmates Stalin, Pol Pot, Kim Il-Jung and
Ceausescu on the ash heap of history. I predict that in the
years after his demise, it will be Castro the man--not our
trade policy--that will be reviled by the Cuban people.
Statement of Hon. Jim Ramstad, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Minnesota
Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling today's hearing to
discuss U.S. economic and trade policy toward Cuba.
The recent visit of His Holiness Pope John Paul II to Cuba
certainly indicates some level of progress, but how much
improvement there has actually been for the daily life of the
Cuban people is hard to determine.
Equally difficult to determine is how best to craft U.S.
policies to help the people of Cuba while challenging the Cuban
government to respect human rights and freedoms and allow Cuban
citizens to participate in democratic elections.
I am well aware that our current policies toward Cuba have
not achieved the goals for which we strive, as quickly as we
desire. Some believe that current policies can still achieve
these goals, especially now that the Soviet Union has fallen
and no longer provides subsidies to the Cuban government.
Others believe that since the policies have not been
successful, we should replace them with a new approach.
Mr. Chairman, for those of us who are frankly undecided as
to how best to achieve our goals, this hearing will be a great
opportunity to hear the debate. We all want to do the right
thing, but it is so hard to tell how Castro will react to any
changes we make and how the Cuban people will be affected.
If we lift barriers to selling food and medical supplies to
Cuba, will the citizens get the food and supplies--or will it
further exacerbate the two-tiered economy in which the tourists
and government leadership get everything, but the people get
little? Will relaxing policies impress upon the Cubans that the
US wants to help them and is not the scapegoat for their
society's problems that Castro paints us to be--or will it
strengthen Castro's stronghold over the Cuban people since he
will claim to be their victor who stood up to the U.S.?
I don't know the answers to these difficult questions, but
I am hoping today's discussions will provide some insight into
this complicated and serious issue.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing. I
look forward to hearing from today's witnesses on what US
policies will best achieve our goal to help the Cuban people.
Statement of Hon. Jennifer Dunn, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Washington
Mr. Chairman,
Thank you for your willingness to continue this
Subcommittee's efforts to review United States trade policy
around the world. As a strong supporter of free and open
international trade, I believe that one of the most effective
ways to influence other countries' domestic policy is by
engaging their people in commerce. There is no question,
however, that some countries present very difficult challenges
when it comes to the oppression of their people, and their
stubborn allegiance to failed economic theory. Cuba is such a
place.
For over three decades, the United States has been pursuing
an economic and trade policy towards Cuba that relies on
isolation as a means of creating internal instability that
could lead to the overthrow of Fidel Castro. Over time,
incremental steps have been taken to close loopholes in our
sanction policy and tighten the noose around the leadership in
Cuba. The most recent effort, the so-called ``Helms-Burton''
legislation passed in 1996, is one that I supported as it
helped ratchet up the pressure on foreign companies that are
benefiting from assets once owned by U.S. companies, but were
stolen by Castro's regime. The objectives of free and open
elections in Cuba, the release of political prisoners, and the
legalization of political activity are as vital today as they
were thirty years ago. Every Member of Congress, as a product
of an open political process, should embrace them.
At the same time, however, we must not hesitate to step
back for a moment to review the results of our efforts. That is
why hearings such as this one are important. The people of Cuba
will either be compelled to act against their government
through frustration with a failed domestic economic policy, or
their government will be marginalized through foreign
influences brought about by open trade. What is the pace of
political change in Cuba, and how much of that can be
attributed to sanctions? Are those most capable of bringing
about change on the island fleeing to the United States? What
is the likelihood that opening up this market for U.S. goods
and investment will accelerate the pace of change? All of these
issues should continue to be evaluated and discussed.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for your willingness to hold
a hearing on this important subject. I understand that there
will be another hearing later this month that will ensure a
thorough and open debate occurs on this issue. I look forward
to hearing the many views on our nation's Cuba policy so that
we will be able to more accurately assess its successes and
failures.
Thank you.
Chairman Crane. Mr. Thomas.
Mr. Thomas. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I just would like to
refer to the portion of Mr. Neal's testimony indicated,
alluding to the hearing. I'd like to start the hearing, so I
have no prepared or opening statement.
Chairman Crane. All right. We will begin the hearing and I
would like to first though remind everyone that the hearing
record will be kept open until May 21 of this year, and invite
all interested parties who are not testifying to submit written
testimony for the record. And we have a very full schedule
today, so I must ask everyone please to monitor the light on
the dais there, and each person hold his oral comments--
testimony--to 5 minutes. All of your written testimony will
become a part of the record too.
And now our distinguished colleague, Mr. Moakley.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN JOSEPH MOAKLEY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS
Mr. Moakley. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much--you, Mr.
Rangel, Mr. Neal, Mr. Thomas, and all the other Members of the
panel, for holding this hearing today and allowing us to
testify before your Subcommittee. I commend you for holding
this hearing, to looking toward our Cuban policy, which
frankly, I believe, needs to change.
Mr. Chairman, as you probably know, I visited Cuba this
January, along with Congressman Rangel, Congressman Neal, and
many others, during the historic visit of Pope John Paul II.
Despite the media's decision to turn their coverage to other
matters, the Pope's visit has done a great deal to teach the
world about Cuba, highlight its problems, and introduce us to
its many assets and put a human face on this most mysterious
and troubling nation.
Today, many concrete changes have already occurred due to
the Pope's courageous efforts. Most visibly, Cubans are
practicing religion more freely in their homeland now, without
fear or oppression or crackdown.
During my visit, Mr. Chairman, it was tremendously moving
to stand in Revolution Square at the papal Mass and see
Catholics openly expressing their faith for the Pope and their
God. Many of them just couldn't believe that they were being
allowed to act so openly. This event was a major step forward
for Cuba.
I think it's very important to note the openness that has
been allowed to continue. We recently saw Catholics freely
celebrating Easter Sunday on the main streets of Havana and
small churches of the countryside. Beautiful religious
processions winding through the Cuban streets, without question
or comment from the government. It appears, at least for now,
that Castro's strong hand against religion has softened.
And I'm very glad that President Clinton has responded to
the openness in Cuba with several positive steps regarding the
U.S. policy. I applaud the President for his moves to allow
direct flights for humanitarian aid, to allow family
remittances, and to work to ease the licensing process for
medicines. As I've said many, many times, we aren't responsible
for the suffering of the Cuban people--Cuba is. But we also
should make it our policy to do what we can to help those in
need right now, and our policy just isn't doing that, Mr.
Chairman.
The American Association for World Health 5-year study on
Cuban health care highlighted the desperate plight of the Cuban
people. According to their expert medical opinion, ``the
embargo has dramatically harmed the health and nutrition of
large numbers of ordinary Cuban citizens.'' That's a quote from
the American Association for World Health. The report went on
to identify malnutrition, poor water quality, lack of medicines
and equipment, and the lack of medical information as the major
causes of the Cuban health care crisis.
The needs in Cuba are tremendous. New breakthrough
medicines that combat cancer and AIDS are just not available.
Doctors reuse disposable gloves until they break. Pacemakers
for heart patients are virtually impossible to find. Extreme
shortages in kidney dialysis machines keep patients from
receiving treatments. And in the children's cancer wards, they
go without suppressants for children receiving chemotherapy.
The suffering just goes on and on.
I believe the steps that President Clinton has taken will
begin to lessen some of that suffering. Now we need to do more.
Because while the administration's moves are positive,
donations will never be able to affect as many people as direct
sales of foods and medicines. Donations, while very important,
just don't include those items that are most needed. Only
through the direct sales of medicines can doctors obtain the
exact items they need for proper care.
That's why I'm proud to be a cosponsor of H.R. 1951, the
Cuban Humanitarian Trade Act. This legislation will remove U.S.
trade restrictions on the sale of food and medicine to Cuba.
I'd like to say a word about the suffering I just
mentioned. While I was in Cuba, I visited a pediatric hospital
just outside of downtown Havana. I walked along the wards and I
stopped in to visit with the sick children and their parents
who were acting as nurses. This was real life. There were no
politics there, no state symbols, no speeches. And I listened
carefully to the young mothers describing their children's
unwarranted suffering and pain. Many of the children that I
visited that day had fairly common diseases and disorders that
are easily curable using modern techniques and medicines.
In the United States we have the best medicines, the best
medical training, and the most innovative medical devices in
the world. But the sad truth is that most of those items are
just not available to these tiny Cuban children, due to the
embargo.
I vividly recall, Mr. Chairman, one child that I will
never, never forget. This particular boy had a tracheotomy, he
had a heart disorder that is widely treated by the insertion of
some plastic shunt. But that simple device, so plentiful 90
miles away in America, was not available in Cuba. So this
helpless boy spent 86 days in intensive care, nearly died, and
during the terrible ordeal, the boy lost a lung and will have
continued health problems for years to come. That young mother
told me she didn't understand why they couldn't get that piece
of plastic. She looked to me for answers, Mr. Chairman--I had
none.
I know opponents would say there's no embargo on medicine.
They will say, anything can be obtained with a license, but the
fact is that's just not happening. The process is extremely
slow and difficult, and most U.S. companies don't even try. Now
those facts are often disputed, but here, even the most
generous estimates say that we have only issued 27 licenses for
the commercial sale of medicines over the past 6 years. For a
country with the medical needs of Cuba, that's not a hell of a
lot of medicine.
There are many reasons why the licensing process doesn't
work. For one, U.S. companies don't want to go through the
difficult steps and the paperwork. And many U.S. corporations
don't even know they can sale to Cuba through a license.
Opponents will say the Cubans can go to any country in the
world and get these medicines. That's true. But the problem is
the United States is the leader in medicines, medical supplies,
medical techniques, and everything else that has the prefix med
before it. And the fact is that Cuba needs our innovative
products and ideas, because quite simply, we're the best and
we've got the corner on the market, and those other countries
know that they can't get it from America and therefore they can
charge higher and higher prices.
Furthermore, Mr. Chairman, we passed a law in 1992 that
prevents subsidiaries abroad from doing business in Cuba. And
as the economy has gotten more and more global, U.S.
pharmaceutical and medical supplies companies have increased
their share of ownership around the world. Today, U.S.-owned
subsidiaries dominate the market abroad. So when Cuba looks
abroad for medicines, they run into more roadblocks.
Mr. Chairman, the Pope's visit has created an atmosphere of
change in Cuba that hasn't been there since the revolution. And
I don't think things will go back to the way of the past. It's
very hard to put that genie back in the bottle, they say.
So we need to move forward. And I think the time has come
to lift the embargo on food, lift the embargo on medicine, and
allow the Cuban people access to the best medical and the best
food supplies that we in the United States have to offer.
We need to engage Cuba so that we can affect change now and
in the future when the political status quo is gone. Our
isolationism for the last 38 years has done nothing to change
Cuba. In fact, I believe, that's the only reason that Castro
has been able to stay in power for so long. Quite simply, our
embargo policy has given him an enemy to point to and a
superpower to blame for his poor economy.
Now a historic opportunity is upon us. We need to be part
of Cuba's changing political and social situation by engaging
in a dialog of thoughts and a dialog of ideas. We need to be
ready for the day when Castro is gone. And after Castro,
there's a giant vacuum of leadership in Cuba and nobody really
knows for sure who will fill that vacuum. Continuing our
current policy leaves us without any influence and we'll have
no say in the future political leadership of our neighboring
island.
But, Mr. Chairman, by engaging Cuba now, the United States
could have a hand in the future and could work to bring
democratic ideals to the Cuban people. Lifting restrictions on
food, lifting restrictions on medicine, is a good way to begin
that engagement.
So, Mr. Chairman, again I commend the Subcommittee for
holding the hearing and allowing me to testify. We must
remember, Mr. Chairman, that children do not understand
politics or embargoes. But children do feel suffering and
children do feel pain. And I'll say again, the Cuban people's
suffering is not our fault, but I think the United States has a
responsibility not to make things worse. We have that
responsibility all over the globe, Mr. Chairman. I've met the
Cuban people, I've sat in their homes, I've eaten with them,
I've listened to them, and I've listened to their concerns, and
I know they deserve at least that much.
So, Mr. Chairman, our Cuban policy is 38 years old and it
hasn't worked. In fact, it's a total disaster. If our policy
was a Fortune 500 company, it would have been bankrupt years
ago. No one in this room can honestly say that we're hurting
Castro--he's not starving. And I believe it's time for change.
I look forward to working with you and our colleagues in the
Congress to bring about change in Cuba and create a policy that
finally makes a difference in Cuba where it matters with the
people. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement follows:]
Statement of Hon. John Joseph Moakley, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Massachusetts
Chairman Crane, Congressman Rangel, Congressman Neal,
members of the committee, thank you for allowing me to testify
before your subcommittee today regarding the United States'
policy toward Cuba. I commend you for holding this hearing to
look into our Cuba policy, which, frankly, needs a change.
Mr. Chairman, as you know, I visited Cuba this January
during the historic visit of Pope John Paul II. Despite the
media's decision to turn their coverage to other matters, the
Pope's visit has done a great deal to teach the world about
Cuba, highlight its problems, introduce us to its many assets,
and put a human face on this most mysterious and troubling
nation.
Today, many concrete changes have already occurred due to
the Pope's courageous efforts. Most visibly, Cuban's are
practicing religion more freely in their homeland now, without
fear of oppression or crackdown.
During my visit, it was tremendously moving to stand in
Revolutionary Square, at the Papal Mass, and to see Catholics
openly expressing their faith for the Pope and their God. Many
of them couldn't believe they were being allowed to act so
openly. This event was a major step forward for Cuba.
I think that it is very important to note that the openness
has been allowed to continue. We recently saw Catholics freely
celebrating Easter Sunday in the main streets of Havana, and in
the small churches of the countryside. Beautiful religious
processions wound through the Cuban streets without question or
comment from the government. It appears, at least for now, that
Castro's strong hand against religion has weakened.
And I am very glad that President Clinton has responded to
the openness in Cuba with several positive steps regarding the
United States' policy. I applaud the Clinton administration for
its moves to allow direct flights for humanitarian aid, to
allow family remittances and to work to ease the licencing
process for medicines. As I've said many times, we aren't
responsible for the suffering of the Cuban people--Cuba is.
But, we also should make it a policy to do what we can to help
those in need. Right now, our policy isn't doing that.
The American Association for World Health's five-year study
on the Cuban health care system highlighted the desperate
plight of the Cuban people. According to their expert medical
opinion, the embargo has ``dramatically harmed the health and
nutrition of large numbers of ordinary Cuban citizens.'' The
report went on to identify malnutrition, poor water quality,
lack of medicines and equipment, and the lack of medical
information as the major causes of the Cuban health care
crisis.
The needs in Cuba are tremendous. New, breakthrough
medicines that combat cancer and AIDS are not available,
doctors re-use disposable gloves until they break, pacemakers
for heart patients are virtually impossible to find, extreme
shortages in kidney dialysis machines keep patients from
receiving treatments, and children's cancer wards go without
nausea suppressants for children receiving chemotherapy. The
suffering goes on and on.
I believe the steps that President Clinton has taken will
begin to lessen some of that suffering. Now, we need to do
more, because while the Administration's moves are positive,
donations will never be able to affect as many people as direct
sales of food and medicines. Donations, while very important,
do not always include those items that are most needed. Only
through the direct sale of medicines can doctors obtain the
exact items they need for proper care. That is why I am a proud
co-sponsor of H.R. 1951, the Cuban Humanitarian Trade Act,
legislation that will remove U.S. trade restrictions on the
sale of food and medicine to Cuba.
I want to say a word about the suffering I just mentioned.
While I was in Cuba recently, we visited a pediatric hospital,
just outside of downtown Havana. We walked along the wards, and
stopped in to visit with the sick children and their parents.
This was real life--there were no politics here, no state
symbols, no speeches. I listened carefully to the young
mothers, describing their children's unwarranted suffering and
pain.
Many of the children that I visited that day had fairly
common diseases and disorders that are easily curable using
modern techniques and medicines. In the United States we have
the best medicines, the best medical training, and the most
innovative medical devices in the world. But, the sad truth is
that most of these items are not available to these tiny Cuban
children, due to the embargo.
I vividly recall one child that I will never forget. This
particular little boy had a heart disorder that is widely
treated using the insertion of a plastic shunt. But, that
simple device is made in America, and therefore not available
in Cuba. So this helpless child spent 86 days in intensive
care--and nearly died. During that terrible ordeal, the little
boy lost a lung, and will have continued health problems for
years to come. His young mother told me she didn't understand
why they couldn't get that piece of plastic. She looked to me
for answers, Mr. Chairman--I had none.
I know opponents will say there is no embargo on medicine.
They will say anything can be obtained with a licence. But the
fact is, that's just not happening. The process is extremely
slow and difficult, and most U.S. companies don't even try.
Now, the facts are often disputed here, but even the most
generous estimates say that we have only issued 27 licenses for
the commercial sale of medicines over the last six years. For a
country with the medical needs of Cuba, that's not a lot of
medicine.
There are many reasons why the licencing process doesn't
work. For one, U.S. companies don't want to go through the
difficult steps and the paperwork. And many U.S. corporations
don't even know they can sell to Cuba through a licence.
Opponents will also say that Cuba can go to any other
country in the world to buy medicines. That is true, but the
problem is that the United States is the leader in medicines,
medical supplies, medical techniques, and everything else that
has the prefix med- before it. The fact is that Cuba needs our
innovative products and ideas, because, quite simply we're the
best and we've got the corner on the market.
Furthermore, we passed a law in 1992 that prevents
subsidiaries abroad from doing business in Cuba. As the economy
has gotten more and more global, U.S. pharmaceutical and
medical supply companies have increased their share of
ownership around the world. Today, U.S. owned subsidiaries
dominate the market abroad. So, when Cuba looks to other
countries for medicines they often run into more roadblocks.
Mr. Chairman, the Pope's visit has created an atmosphere of
change in Cuba that hasn't been seen since the revolution. And,
I don't think things will go back to the ways of the past. It's
too hard to ``put the genie back in the bottle'', as they say.
So we need to move forward. I think it is time we lift the
embargo on food and medicines and allow the Cuban people access
to the best medical and food supplies we have to offer.
We need to engage Cuba so we can effect change now, and in
the future when the political status quo is gone. Our
isolationism of the last 38 years has done nothing to change
Cuba--in fact I believe it is one reason Castro has been able
to stay in power for so long. Quite simply, our embargo policy
has given him an enemy to point to.
Now, we have a historic opportunity before us. We need to
be part of Cuba's changing political and social situation by
engaging in a dialogue of thoughts and ideas. We need to be
ready for the day when Castro is gone. After Castro, there is a
giant vacuum of leadership in Cuba. No one really knows for
sure who will fill that vacuum. Continuing our current policy
leaves us without any influence. We will have no say in the
future political leadership of our neighboring island. But, by
engaging Cuba now, the United States will have a hand in the
future, and can work to bring democratic ideals to the Cuban
people. Lifting restrictions on food and medicine is a good way
to begin that engagement.
So, again Mr. Chairman, I commend you and the Subcommittee
for holding this hearing, and allowing me to testify today. We
must remember, Mr. Chairman, that children do not understand
politics or embargoes. But children do feel suffering--they do
feel pain. I'll say again that the Cuban people's suffering is
not our fault, but I think the United States has a
responsibility not to make things worse. We have that
responsibility all over the globe. I've met the Cuban people,
sat down in their homes with them, and listened to their
concerns--I know they deserve at least that much from us.
Mr. Chairman, our Cuba policy is 38 years old and it just
hasn't worked. In fact, it's a complete failure. If our policy
was a fortune 500 company, it would have been bankrupt years
ago. No one in this room can honestly say we're hurting
Castro--he's certainly not starving. I believe it's time for a
change. I look forward to working with you and our colleagues
in the Congress to bring about change in Cuba, and to create a
policy that finally makes a difference in Cuba where it
matters--with the people.
Thank you.
Chairman Crane. Thank you, Mr. Moakley.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen.
STATEMENT OF HON. ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Chairman Crane.
Before I begin my statement, I would like to express my
regret that this hearing does not provide a balanced
presentation. It has three private panels full of individuals
who appear to advocate sanctions being lifted on Castro and
removal of U.S. pressure on Castro. There are 14 private
witnesses who appear to be against U.S. policy and 0 private
witnesses who support it.
At the last minute, two to three pro Helms-Burton witnesses
were invited to essentially serve as tokens in a titled biased
panel. They preferred not to be used as props in order to give
a semblance of fairness that is totally lacking in this
hearing. They did not want to be used and manipulated in this
way.
This hearing does not accurately reflect the views of the
majority of the U.S. Congress, nor the overwhelming majority of
the Cuban-American community. And although we are grossly
outnumbered here today, the three Members of Congress, Mr.
Diaz-Balart, Mr. Menendez, and myself, who represent a huge
Cuban-American constituency, are here to speak on behalf of
many in our districts who have a strong desire for freedom, for
human rights, for democracy in Cuba, and who support current
U.S. policy.
Mr. Chairman, there is no openness of any kind in Cuba. The
Castro regime has repeatedly stated that the revolution and his
regime will not change. Those who want to trade and engage with
Castro remind me of overeager Boy Scouts who want to help a
little old lady cross the street, where she does not want to
go.
Castro has repeatedly said that he does not want to cross
the street. He will not change. Two weeks ago, the dictator
again emphasized that, ``we are not going to change. We are
going to continue defending our cause and our socialism.''
President Clinton said yesterday in a press conference, that he
is hearing contradictory signals from Cuba. The President must
need to recharge the batteries in his hearing aid, because
Castro's signals are very loud and very clear--we will not
change.
Despite the claims of those who wish to engage with Castro,
U.S. policy is working. For example, yesterday the Pentagon
released a report that classified Cuba as a negligible military
threat to the United States. The Castro regime, however, is
still involved in the illegal narcotics trafficking, has strong
ties to guerrilla groups in Latin America, continues the
Lourdes spy station, and wants to complete a dangerous nuclear
power plant. He gives safe harbor to 90 U.S. felons.
However, if it does not pose a military threat, it is
because U.S. sanctions have crippled the Castro regime from
building its forces and arsenal. Without U.S. sanctions, Castro
would have had more cash available to maintain and strengthen
its military capabilities.
If critics of U.S. policy are not going to use this
Pentagon report to advocate a change in U.S. policy, they
should first remember that Haiti, South Africa, and Bosnia, all
countries the United States has imposed sanctions on, did not
pose a military threat to the United States. U.S. policy was
driven by a moral commitment to democracy and human rights.
U.S. policy toward Cuba is not and should not be about
money. U.S.-Cuba policy emerged from a condemnation of the
oppression, subjugation, and enslavement of the Cuban people.
The United States should not be an accomplice to the torturing,
mutilation, and execution of political prisoners.
The United States must not be a part of a system of
apartheid that the Castro regime has imposed on its people.
Yes, apartheid lives in Castro's Cuba, yet those who condemn
apartheid in South Africa, do not seem affected by its
existence in Cuba.
The Castro regime discriminates against its own people in
favor of the tourist, discriminates against the general
population in favor of high-ranking Communist Party officials.
The Castro regime does not allow Cubans to use the hotels they
build or eat in the tourist restaurants, or even use those
beaches where the hotels are located. Tourist pharmacies and
hospitals in Cuba are filled with modern medicine, but Castro
denies the Cuban people access to all of these. Medicine is
used as a form of torture by the Castro regime to force the
people into submission. Dissident doctors are arrested for
helping those left to suffer by the regime.
Those who argue that U.S. policy denies food and medicine
to the Cuban people, I say, the time has come to stop the lies.
No more distortion, no more misinformation. The Libertad Act
and previous U.S. policy, as is shown there in one of the
charts, authorizes the donation of food and medicine to Cuba.
The fact is that criticism against U.S.-Cuba policy has nothing
to do with humanitarian concerns. Some pharmaceutical companies
have told Commerce officials that they are not interested in
Cuba, because there is no demand, no market, no money to be
made.
The fact is that many of the same individuals who are
against U.S.-Cuba policy were in favor of sanctions against the
apartheid government in South Africa, or in Haiti, or in
Bosnia. Are the Cuban people any less worthy? Does their
suffering not merit punitive action against their oppressor?
How many more Cubans will have to die in Castro's jails
before the international investor sees that every dollar that
he gives to Castro is used against the Cuban people? How many
more children, like the ones who are pictured right there in
those charts, will have to die in the waters trying to flee the
dictatorship? How many more men, women, and children will have
to be killed by the Cuban Coast Guard, as was the case of the
March 13 tugboat, the youngest victim who you see pictured
there? What was their crime? They dared to leave Cuba and for
that, they were murdered. How many more American citizens will
have to be shot down by the Castro military as occurred on
February 24, 1996?
Nothing has changed in Cuba since the Pope's visit in
January. The repression has indeed intensified. Even during the
Pope's Mass in Havana, Cuban security forces arrested several
of the faithful for yelling, ``down with Fidel, and we want
justice and freedom.''
When the Canadian Prime Minister went to Cuba last week,
the New York Times reported that he obtained commitments from
Cuba to negotiate a foreign investment protection with Canada.
But, the newspaper continued, on human rights, he failed to win
any concession. Now it is being reported that the handful of
political prisoners are to be released and sent to Toronto next
week.
But let us not be fooled by cosmetics and temporary staged
shows of so-called cooperation. While the Castro regime may
release 70 prisoners today, and not all of them prisoners of
conscience, state security forces will tomorrow jail 50, 60, 70
others who've had the courage to stand up to the oppression and
exert their right as human beings.
If one looks carefully at the pattern established by Fidel
Castro, it becomes abundantly clear that Castro treats
political prisoners as trinkets, tokens to be bestowed upon
visiting dignitaries. In fact, when I hear of a VIP going to
Cuba to meet with Castro, I think, well at least a few brave
souls will leave their squalid jail cells to rejoin the 11
million who remain enslaved in the island. But before the
planes of these dignitaries reach their ground back home, a few
more innocent victims will quickly replace them in those jail
cells.
Engagement with Castro will only guarantee the continuation
of the current totalitarian regime. It will delay, rather than
accelerate, a transition to democracy and will strengthen the
security apparatus and increase the intimidation and oppression
to keep the Cuban people in line.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we must decide whether we want
to be on the side of righteousness and justice, on the side of
the Cuban people, or if we want to allow Castro's crimes
against inhumanity to go unpunished. For if by trading with
Castro, we want to provide him with the means to continue his
reign of terror, we know what the answer must be. I ask you to
please side with the Cuban people and not allow any weakening
of our sanctions against the Castro regime.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement follows:]
Statement of Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Florida
Mr. Chairman, there is no openness of any kind in Cuba. The
Castro regime has repeatedly stated that the Revolution and his
regime will not change.
Those who want to trade and ``engage'' with Castro remind
me of overeager Boy Scouts who want to help a little old lady
cross the street. But Fidel Castro has repeatedly stated he
does not want to cross the street; he does not want to change.
Two weeks ago, Castro emphasized that: ``We are not going to
change. We are going to continue defending our cause and our
socialism.''
Despite the claims of those who wish to ``engage'' with
Castro, U.S. policy is working. For example, yesterday, the
Pentagon released a report that classified Cuba as a
``negligible military threat'' to the U.S. The Castro regime is
still involved in illegal narcotics trafficking, in supporting
terrorism, in supporting the Lourdes spy station, and in the
condition of a dangerous nuclear power plant. However, if it
does not pose a military threat, it is because U.S. sanctions
crippled the Castro regime from building its forces and
arsenal. Without U.S. sanctions, Castro would have had more
cash available to maintain and strengthen its military
capabilities.
If critics of U.S. policy are now going to use this
Pentagon report to advocate a change in U.S. policy, they
should first remember that Haiti, South Africa, and Bosnia--all
countries the U.S. imposed sanctions on--did not pose a
``military'' threat. U.S. policy was driven by a moral
commitment to democracy and human rights.
U.S. policy toward Cuba is not and should not be about
money. U.S.-Cuba policy emerged from a condemnation of the
oppression, subjugation, and enslavement of the Cuban people.
The U.S. should not be an accomplice to the torturing,
mutilation, and execution of political prisoners. The U.S. must
not be a part of the system of apartheid that the Castro regime
has imposed on its people.
Yes, apartheid lives in Castro's Cuba. Yet, those who
condemned apartheid in South Africa, do not seem affected by
its existence in Cuba. The Castro regime discriminates against
its own people in favor of tourists; discriminates against the
general population, in favor of high ranking Communist party
officials.
The Castro regime does not allow Cubans to enter the hotels
they build, or eat in tourist restaurants, or even use those
beaches where the hotels are located. Tourist pharmacies and
hospitals in Cuba are filled with modern medicine, but Castro
denies the Cuban people access to all of these. Medicine is
used as a tool of torture by the Castro regime to force the
people into submission. Dissident doctors are arrested for
helping those left to suffer by the regime.
To those who argue that U.S. policy denies food and
medicine to the Cuban people, I say: the time has come to stop
the lies. No more distortion. No more misinformation.
The Libertad Act and previous U.S. policy specifically
authorizes the donation of food and medicine to Cuba. In fact,
the U.S. has authorized over $2 billion dollars in humanitarian
aid to the island. To date, the Commerce Department has
approved 463 licenses, 373 of which were donations and the
remainder were licensed medical exports. U.S. law provides for
a system of licensing and on-sight verification which ensures
that the aid is reaching the intended recipients and not being
stolen by the regime and resold in foreign markets or in
tourist pharmacies.
The fact is that criticism against U.S.-Cuba policy has
nothing to do with humanitarian concerns. Some pharmaceutical
companies have told Commerce officials that they are not
interested in Cuba because ``there is no demand; no market; no
money to be made.''
The fact is that many of the same individuals who are
against U.S.-Cuba policy were in favor of sanctions against the
apartheid government in South Africa, or in Haiti, or Bosnia.
Are the Cuban people any less worthy? Does their suffering
not merit punitive action against their oppressor? How many
more Cubans will have to die in Castro's jails before
international investors see that every dollar they give to
Castro is used against the Cuban people? How many more children
like the ones pictured here will have to die in the waters of
the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico trying to flee the
dictatorship? How many more men, women and children will have
to be killed by the Cuban Coast Guard as was the case with the
March 13th tugboat--the youngest victims pictured here? How
many more American citizens will have to be shot down by the
Castro military as occurred on February 24th, 1996?
Nothing has changed in Cuba since the Pope visited in
January. The repression has intensified. Even during the Pope's
mass in Havana, Cuban security forces arrested several of the
faithful for yelling: ``Down with Fidel'' and ``We want justice
and freedom.''
When Canadian Prime Minister Chretien went to Cuba last
week, the New York Times reported that he obtained
``Commitments from Cuba to negotiate a foreign investment
protection agreement with Canada... but on human rights, Mr.
Chretien failed to win any concession.'' Now, it is being
reported that a handful of political prisoners are to be
released and sent to Toronto on Monday of next week.
Let us not be fooled by cosmetics and temporary, staged
shows of so-called ``cooperation.'' While the Castro regime may
release 70 prisoners today (not all prisoners of conscience),
state security forces will tomorrow jail 50, 60, 70 others who
have the courage to stand up to the oppression and exert their
rights as human beings.
If one looks carefully at the pattern established by Fidel
Castro, it becomes abundantly clear that Fidel Castro treats
political prisoners as trinkets--tokens to be bestowed upon
visiting dignitaries. In fact, whenever I hear of a VIP going
to Cuba to meet with Castro, I think ``well, at least a few
brave souls will leave their squalid jail cells to rejoin the
11 million who remain enslaved in the island.'' But before the
planes of these dignitaries reach ground back home, a few other
innocent victims will quickly replace them in those jail cells.
Engagement with Castro will only guarantee the continuation
of the current totalitarian regime; will delay, rather than
accelerate, a transition to democracy; and will strengthen the
security apparatus and increase the intimidation and oppression
to keep the Cuban people ``in line.''
We must decide whether we want to be on the side of
righteousness and justice; on the side of the Cuban people; or
if we want to allow Castro's crimes against humanity to go
unpunished; if, by trading with Castro, we want to provide him
with the means to continue his reign of terror.
We know what the answer must be. I ask you to please side
with the Cuban people and not allow any weakening of our
sanctions against the Castro regime.
Chairman Crane. Thank you, Ileana.
Mr. Diaz-Balart.
Mr. Moakley. Mr. Chairman, we're meeting in Rules
Committee. Is it all right if I excuse----
Chairman Crane. Certainly.
Mr. Moakley. Thank you very much.
Mr. Thomas. May I ask the gentleman a question or two, if
he's going to be leaving?
Chairman Crane. If you could wait just 1 second.
Mr. Moakley. Sure.
Chairman Crane. Go ahead, fire away.
Mr. Thomas. I was very moved by your testimony Joe, and
obviously, knowing you as a person--the compassionate person
that you are--and it was reflected in your testimony. I guess
what I would ask you then, based upon the plea that was your
testimony, what should someone say to the family of an American
who is shot down in cold blood by Castro?
Mr. Moakley. I don't have an answer for that either.
Mr. Thomas. What do you say to someone who believes that,
if they practice their religion as a priest and that they
happen to be an American in Cuba and they deal in
antigovernment action by passing out information stressing
freedom, their visa is denied?
Mr. Moakley. I abhor that. I think that's terrible. But we
shouldn't allow the Cuban people to be sacrificial pigs because
of these things.
Mr. Thomas. I understand that.
Mr. Moakley. We should treat them like any other human
being.
Mr. Thomas. And in that regard, having visited a hospital,
did you also visit a prison while you were there?
Mr. Moakley. No, I didn't.
Mr. Thomas. You didn't visit a prison.
Mr. Moakley. No, I met with dissidents who thought the
embargo was a bad idea and I met people who served many years
in jail that felt the embargo was a bad idea. No, I didn't meet
prisoners. I was down there for 4 days and I was very busy, but
never got to a prison.
Mr. Thomas. My concern is that compassion is critical, but
compassion has to be all encompassing.
Mr. Moakley. I agree.
Mr. Thomas. I do think your testimony was compassionate,
but I thought it was pretty much one-way compassionate. And
until we understand that this problem is far more complex than
the kind of strong emotional, compassionate position that you
presented, it's going to be even more difficult in resolving
the problem. But I do share with you a concern about what's
going on down there for all Cubans.
Mr. Moakley. Well, I'll tell you, Mr. Thomas, when I walked
through that ward and saw that kid with the tracheotomy, and
his mother acting as a nurse, and the doctor telling me for the
lack of a 6-inch plastic shunt this boy was in intensive care
for 83 days, and lost his lung, there's something wrong with
the system.
Mr. Thomas. And had you gone to a prison, perhaps having
seen someone beaten for what they believed in--all they
believed----
Mr. Moakley. Absolutely. No, I agree with you.
Mr. Thomas [continuing]. Was a desire to be free. But
someone whose throat was slit because their crime or sin was
wanting to be free----
Mr. Moakley. I think that's terrible too. But I don't think
we should not----
Mr. Thomas. I'm only saying that testimony was very
compassionate, but I basically felt it was compassionate in one
direction and thought if I asked you these questions, I would
get the answers that you gave me. And I appreciate your
answers.
Mr. Moakley. Well, the only reason I geared on that
situation is because we're here talking about lifting the
embargo and food and medicine. Thank you.
Mr. Thomas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rangel. Mr. Chairman, before you leave----
Mr. Thomas. Prisoners don't need medicine?
Mr. Moakley. I didn't hear the question. I didn't hear the
question.
Mr. Thomas. I only said, prisoners don't eat, prisoners
don't need medicine?
Mr. Moakley. Sure they do. I think they should have
medicine too.
Mr. Thomas. OK.
Mr. Moakley. I'm not just saying give medicine to the
pediatric ward, but it's a good place to start.
Mr. Rangel. Mr. Moakley, as the Ranking Democrat on the
Rules Committee, you recognize that we have open trade policies
with Communist China, Communist North Vietnam, Communist North
Korea. To your knowledge, do you know whether any Members of
this panel or in the House have visited those jails and visited
with the prisoners before they supported free trade with those
Communist countries?
Mr. Moakley. Nobody's ever talked to me about it.
Mr. Rangel. Thank you.
Mr. Neal. Mr. Crane.
Chairman Crane. Yes.
Mr. Neal. Mr. Moakley, could you recount for all of us a
conversation that we had with Mr. Castro about the issue of
religious liberty?
Mr. Moakley. Well, he said to us--he said the Pope has made
a big difference for all religions. He says there's going to be
more practicing of all religions as a result of the Pope's
visit and things will never be the same.
Mr. Neal. All right. Would it also be fair to say, based
upon the conversation that we had, that none of us were
shrinking violets in our pursuit of Mr. Castro's logic on that
issue?
Mr. Moakley. Well, none of us are pro-Castro.
Mr. Neal. Right.
Mr. Moakley. We're all pro-Cuban citizens.
Mr. Neal. Thank you very much.
Chairman Crane. Are there any other questions before Mr.
Moakley departs? If not, we thank you very much for your
testimony.
And now, Mr. Diaz-Balart.
STATEMENT OF HON. LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate very
much the opportunity to testify today. I join my colleague Ms.
Ros-Lehtinen in stating my belief that the obvious lack of
fairness and balance of this hearing is very unfortunate. I
would call it an abomination. I think this is an embarrassing
and sad moment for this Subcommittee. And yet I appreciate the
opportunity to personally testify.
I would seek consent to have my written remarks included in
the record, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. That way, I'll try to keep
my verbal remarks brief.
When the Pope went to Cuba, much has been said about the
Pope. He talked about an urge that the world open up to Cuba.
Some have used that as a pretext not to open up to Cuba, but to
attempt to open up the dictatorship, to Castro's tyranny. That
is not what the Pope said. The Pope stated also Let Cuba open
up to the world. Many seem to have forgotten that the Cuban
people are part of the world. There has been no opening up of
Cuba to the Cuban people since the Pope's visit.
I would--and I'm glad, Mr. Chairman, that you are keeping
the record open, because I will submit for the record, the list
of political prisoners who have been charged since the papal
visit, as well as brochures I see my dear friend, Mr. Menendez,
has one here today, explaining in detail the luxury medical
services that are available in Cuba, as long as you have
dollars.
[The list of political prisoners had not been received at
the time of printing. The brochures are being retained in the
Committee files.]
There is no lack of medicine in Cuba if you have dollars.
But if you want to buy medicines in Cuba, you better have
dollars. If you want to buy the most essential goods, even
clothing and food, you better have dollars. There is no other
government in the world that requires its nationals to possess
a foreign currency in order to survive. And that is at the crux
of what is being faced by the Cuban people today.
The tyrant, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, has
instituted a policy, a basically dollar-only policy, where the
Cuban people are required to possess a foreign currency. And
yet, if they work even for a foreign company, it is the regime
that is paid by the foreign company, in dollars, and the
foreign worker is paid in worthless Castro pesos. Castro keeps
every single dollar. And every single dollar that is sent to
Cuba has to be spent in the dollar-only stores, where food,
medicine, and clothing can be purchased. That is the reality of
Cuba today.
So we will see, as you see from the list and my colleague
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen has mentioned, today a very long list of
witnesses to come to testify, who will come to testify about
their wish that it be legal to do business in that apartheid
economy that I've described in Cuba. I would ask, and I think
they should be put under oath, like the tobacco folks that we
see here very often when they come--the tobacco people--we see
that film, they're put under oath, and later some perjured
themselves, apparently.
I would ask these people who are here to defend the ability
to do dirty deals with Castro--many of them have apparently met
with Castro already--have you ever or do you now ask of the
Cuban dictatorship that it hold free elections in Cuba. I think
that would be an appropriate question. I do not believe that
anyone who, for example, sought to do a business deal with a
slaveowner before slavery was eliminated in the United States,
would have asked the slaveowner to free his slaves if they
wanted to ingratiate themselves with the slaveowner, do a
business deal. So I don't think that these people will ask
Castro for free elections, but I think it would be a fair
question.
As I think that another fair question would be, is it more
likely or less likely that we are contributing to a democratic
transition in Cuba by conditioning access to the U.S. market to
a democratic transition in Cuba. Is it more likely or less
likely that by conditioning our market to a democratic
transition, we are helping the democratic transition? I think
the obvious answer is yes. There has been no democratic
transition in the last 50 years without some form of external
pressure, whether it be in Spain, in the Dominican Republic, in
Chile, in South Africa, in Haiti. Every single instance of a
democratic transition has been with some sort of external
pressure.
Our sanction is a unilateral sanction. But we are
convinced--and I want to thank our friends certainly on our
side of the aisle who have stood very firmly with us on behalf
of the Cuban people, and the majority of this Congress that has
consistently stood on behalf of the Cuban people's right to
free elections.
The issue that we have to keep in mind is that our
sanction, while it is unilateral, at the time of the
transition, will be indispensable, will be a critical factor,
critical leverage, for the Cuban people to be able to recover
their sovereignty through a free election. Free elections are,
and should be, the essence of our policy. It is our goal. We
have repeated 1,000 times, Mr. Chairman, that what we seek to
do with the embargo, is to encourage, to facilitate, to grant
leverage to the Cuban people, so that they will be able to have
an election. Nothing more, but nothing less. That is why we're
so grateful to the overwhelming majority, not only of the
American people, but of their representatives here in Congress,
on a bipartisan basis, who have stood firm in demanding that in
this hemisphere there must be freedom and democracy and that
will be accomplished.
We are one dictatorship away from achieving a totally
democratic hemisphere. That's something to keep in mind. This
hemisphere is different and it will be democratic if the United
States of America remains firm and at this moment, doesn't
change its policy and provide the credits that Castro is
seeking, so that the regime may even outlive the dictator.
That is the essence of what we're talking about and I thank
you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify.
[The prepared statement follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5762.001
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5762.002
Chairman Crane. Thank you, Lincoln.
Mr. Menendez.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Mr. Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the
distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. I ask that my full
testimony be entered into the record, as well.
I'm here to debunk the myths about U.S. economic and trade
policy toward Cuba and to oppose the chorus of the blame-
America-first crowd at what I consider to be a one-sided
hearing.
Our economic embargo is not 39 years old; it's 6 years old.
Why do I say that? Because prior to that, U.S. subsidiaries
traded with Cuba. The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 closed those
loopholes; the former Soviet Union ceased to subsidize the
regime at the rate of $6 billion a year; and Helms-Burton
further tightened the noose.
What are the results of those 6 years of a real embargo?
Cuba has legalized the American dollar, the most hated symbol
of the revolution, which was previously illegal to own; Castro
has cut back significantly on the size and capability of the
Cuban military, the third largest in the Western hemisphere;
and he legalized and now pursues foreign investment. These
accomplishments are not as a result of a desire for change by
Castro, but out of a necessity to change. A necessity we have
created by the loss of the $6 billion. These are changes which
occurred as a necessity which we have created since 1992
through our policy.
After years of the Pope desiring to go to Cuba, Castro
finally agreed, only because of the Pope's opposition to
embargoes, in general. If there was no U.S. embargo, Pope John
Paul would never have been invited by Castro to visit Cuba.
``Let's engage,'' say some. Engagement will bring the walls
of tyranny tumbling down. If so, then why have the hundreds of
millions of dollars in foreign investment and the hundreds of
thousands of visits by Canadians, Spaniards, Mexicans, and
others, have not moved Castro 1 inch closer for respect for
human rights and democracy?
Canadian Prime Minister Chretien's recent visit to Cuba
underscored the inability of engagement to move Castro. To
Chretien's credit he sought the release of the four best known
political dissidents in Castro's prison, who were imprisoned
because they simply published a document entitled, ``The Nation
Belongs to Everyone: A Blueprint for Peaceful Change and
Reconciliation in Cuba.''
Castro's refusal to discuss human rights, despite Canada's
claim that it can more successfully press for change in Cuba by
engaging Castro, left Chretien dumfounded. Canada has proven
what many of us have long known--so long as Castro dictates the
terms of engagement as he does, engagement itself will not
bring change in Cuba.
The Pope's visit was a historical event. It was successful
and provided a limited opening for the Catholic Church. It was
not Poland in 1979 and regrettably, it has not translated into
political or economic change on the island. Since the Pope's
visit, 111 people have been arrested for political crimes. That
is the same number, ironically, of the number of political
prisoners released pursuant to the Pope's visit. The net result
on that score remains zero.
As for the issue of food and medicine, let me debunk those
arguments forthwith. The United States has provided Cuba over
$2 billion in humanitarian aid since 1992, yet the Castro
regime has the luxury to pour millions of dollars into their
biotechnology industry and is exporting hundreds of millions of
dollars' worth of food.
The issue is not that Castro cannot purchase medicine and
medical supplies from the United States. He can. The United
States has licensed 50 of 53 requests for sales of medicine and
medical devices to Cuba. And as for humanitarian assistance,
the United States provides annually more assistance to Cuba
than all other countries of the world combined.
The blame for the state of the Cuban economy and for any
shortage of food and medicine remains squarely on Castro and
his Socialist economic policies--the lack of money to buy. On
both accounts, food and medicine, there's ample evidence that
Castro has access to medicine, medical supplies, and food, but
that these resources are routinely diverted for export or to
Cuba's growing pleasure and medical tourism industries.
I would like to show some of Cuba's advertisements, and I
believe that this has been passed out to the Subcommittee, in
foreign journals. Now it's in Spanish, but I'll tell you what
it says. This one is for Servimed, and it says, ``An ideal
destination for your health, the home of health tourism.'' In
the corner it says, ``In Cuba, Servimed puts at your disposal
teams of the most experienced scientists, advanced medical
technology of an international level, and modern hospital
centers.'' It goes on to say that Cuba has one of the most
developed medical systems in the entire world. Yet, average
Cubans are not allowed to enter these centers. The shunt that
my dear colleague from Massachusetts, who I believe has every
good intention, was referring to in the context of that young
boy who spent 83 days in an emergency ward, could have been
available here at Servimed.
We should also ask why Cuba touts its growing food export
industry when ordinary Cubans are standing in line with ration
cards to get basic food staples. Just read the April 27 Miami
Herald article, which suggests that Cuba is seen as a future
competitor in agrobusiness. And it quotes, ``From limes to
lobsters, Cuban agricultural exports are popping up in more
supermarkets around the world,'' and it goes on to talk about
hundreds of millions in exports of food from Cuba to other
parts of the world. And it goes on to say that, ``Our
fundamental goal is to increase exports and foreign-exchange
earnings while diversifying,'' talking about lobsters and
shrimp, talking about a whole host of other products to France,
Italy, and Japan. Wouldn't the Cuban people like to be eating
that at their homes?
I'd like to ask permission to enter some of those articles
for the record, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Crane. Without objection.
Mr. Menendez. Finally, Mr. Chairman, European, Canadian,
and Mexican investments have been unsuccessful in moving Castro
to undertake basic changes. Opening a door may increase
investment in Cuba, but it will never force Castro to hand over
the key which would unlock the door to democratic change in
Cuba.
No one more than I and my two colleagues from Florida would
like to see what you want to see--greater opportunities for the
Cuban people; less suffering for the Cuban people, including my
family, who still lives there; to see democratic and free
market changes. Our policy, however, must be more than about
making money.
And last, it is incredible to believe that all of these
enormous economic interests that have come to bear upon this
issue really care about the Cuban market. Even one of your
later witnesses will tell you, interestingly enough, how Cuba--
to quote from one of your witnesses--``the Republic of Cuba's
health system has current other countries' supplied channels
for products which in a large number of instances are less
expensive than similar products from the United States''--
referring to health care products.
This is really about USA Engage, U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
and others--this is about unilateral sanctions. Now Cuba is
perceived as the weak link. It's the Iran and Libya Sanctions
Act, it's the billions of dollars that are at stake in the
countries affected by those provisions--that is the golden
prize. And this is the vehicle to get there. They just think
that's a lot harder.
Mr. Chairman, we want to see that from Main Street to Wall
Street, democracy is good for the bottom line. It would
alleviate the suffering of the Cuban people. It would
accomplish what, I believe, is all of our mutual goals. Our
policies are making a difference. I urge you to stay the
course. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your courtesy.
[The prepared statement and attachments follow:]
Statement of Hon. Robert Menendez, a Representative in Congress from
the State of New Jersey
I am here to debunk the myths about U.S. economic and trade
policy toward Cuba and to get to the crux of what is really
happening in Cuba and who is really responsible.
Our economic embargo is not 40 years old--it is 6 years
old. Why do I say that--because prior to that U.S. subsidiaries
could trade with Cuba and they did. The Cuban Democracy Act of
1992 closed those loopholes, in 1989 the former Soviet Union
ceased to subsidize the regime at the rate of $6 billion a year
and in 1996, the Helms-Burton bill further tightened the noose.
What are the results of those six years of a real embargo?
Cuba has legalized the American dollar--previously the most
hated symbol of the revolution and which was previously illegal
to won, Castro has cut back significantly on the size and
capability of the Cuban military, previously the third largest
military in the Western hemisphere and he legalized and now
pursues foreign investment. These accomplishments were not made
out of desire for change by Castro, but out of necessity for
change--necessity created by the loss of $6 billion in
subsidies from the former Soviet Union and our policy.
In fact, Castro would not have permitted the Pope to visit
Cuba, but for his hope that he would criticize the embargo.
Change in Cuba has occurred as a result of U.S. policy, not
in spite of it.
I am extremely disappointed that this committee has chosen
to put on such a one-sided hearing. There is not a single
person on the subsequent panel which represents, what a recent
opinion poll found to be the majority view, by 72 percent,
among Americans around the nation of support for the embargo.
This isn't so much a hearing, as a pep rally for people
interested in making a buck in Cuba at the expense of the Cuban
people. How many people here today believe that USA Engage and
the US Chamber of Commerce care about the welfare of the Cuban
people. These are the same forces who fought the Reagan
Administration tooth and nail on sanctions on Russia, like the
Trans-Siberian Pipeline embargo and the grain embargo and the
same people who fought the imposition of sanctions on South
Africa under the apartheid regime. Ironically, today these same
people derive tremendous benefits from the success of those
sanctions policies.
While business may not appreciate their value as foreign
policy tools, trade and aid and the denial of trade and aid are
essential components of our limited foreign policy arsenal. The
only other tools is international opinion, to the extent that
it matters to the country in question.
If the business community is successful is restricting
Congress' ability to impose sanctions, they will have also
damaged our ability and the flexibility necessary to conduct
U.S. foreign policy. While sanctions should never be our first
policy choice, they are a necessary tool where other policy
options have failed to achieve our foreign policy goals.
In the case of Cuba, clearly public opinion is not a worthy
tool. Similarly, the engagement of the Europeans and Canadians
in Cuba has proven aid and trade to be equally faulty tools in
facilitating political and economic change in Cuba.
Facilitating peaceful change to democracy in Cuba is the goal
of U.S. foreign policy.
Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien's recent visit to
Cuba underscored the limited influence of aid and trade vis a
vis Cuba. Castro made it clear to Prime Minister Chretien
before he arrived in Cuba that while his visit was welcome,
there could be no conditions on his visit.
To Chretien's credit, he did attempt to push Castro on
democratization and he asked for the release of the four
members of the Internal Dissident Working Group. These
individuals were arrested last July for writing a document
entitled ``La Patria es de Todos,'' in English ``The Nation
Belongs to Everyone,'' a document which described the situation
in Cuba, and their plans for peaceful change.
While Chretien was successful in moving Havana to make
reparations to Canadian insurance companies and in making
progress toward an agreement on foreign investor protection, on
human rights he was stonewalled. For those of us who watch Cuba
and Castro, it was par for the course.
In the end, the visit proved rather embarrassing for
Chretien. Castro's remarks at the airport, comparing the United
States to the Nazis and his refusal to discuss human rights,
despite Canada's now repetitive and unfulfilled claims, that
they can more successfully press for change in Cuba by engaging
Castro, left Chretien between a rock and hard place. Canada is
now faced with a choice, either it abandons it efforts to press
for reforms in Cuba or it must tie future efforts to Canadian
economic interests in Cuba. In any case, Canada has proven what
many if us have long known--so long as Castro dictates the
terms of engagement, as he does, engagement itself will not
lead to change in Cuba.
I would like to address Chairman Crane's quote in the
hearing announcement which based the premise for this hearing
and on the Pope's historic visit to Cuba.
The Pope's visit was a historical event and was successful
in providing a limited opening for the Catholic Church,
however, it has not been the panacea that many hoped for. It
was not Poland in 1979, and regrettably it has not translated
into political or economic change on the island. Since the Pope
John Paul II's visit, life in Cuba has gone on as usual--Castro
has had himself ``re-elected'' to a fifth term as President,
reaffirmed his commitment to the revolution and has arrested
111 people for political crimes--that is the same number of
political prisoners he released pursuant to the Pope's visit.
In that regard, the score remains zero. Castro continues to
adhere to his antiquated beliefs professing ``Socialismo o
Muerte.'' He has done nothing to merit a ``calibrated''
response in U.S. Policy toward his regime.
As for the issue of food and medicine, let me debunk those
arguments forthwith.
The issue is not that Castro can not purchase medicine and
medical supplies from the United States, the U.S. has licensed
nearly every request for commercial sales of medicine and
medical supplies to Cuba and commercial travel to Cuba for this
purpose--to date, 50 of 53 requests. As for humanitarian
assistance, the U.S. provides annually more assistance to Cuba
than all other countries combined. In addition to the
remittances sent to the island by Cuban-American families, the
U.S. Department of Commerce has licensed over 2 billion dollars
worth of all types of humanitarian assistance since 1992.
The U.S. embargo is unilateral in nature--Castro can and
does have the ability to purchase goods from any other nation
in the world, without impediment. The blame for the state of
the Cuban economy and any shortage of food and medicine remains
squarely on Castro and his socialist economic policies. At a
recent conference hosted by Georgetown University, Peter
Bourne, Castro's biographer and the author of the notorious
American Association for World Health report which blames the
embargo for all of Cuba's woes, was forced to acknowledge that
the real reason for limited sales of medicine and medical
supply sales to Cuba, was not U.S. policy, but the inability of
the Castro regime to pay for or attain credit to pay for such
purchases.
It is time to stop questioning the embargo and start
questioning Castro. The U.S. and other nations need to look
beyond Castro's yowling about the embargo and look at what is
really happening in Cuba. On both accounts, food and medicine,
there is ample evidence that Castro not only has access to
medicine, medical supplies and food, but that these resources
are routinely diverted for export or to Cuba's growing pleasure
and medical tourism industries.
I would like to show you some of Cuba's advertisements in
foreign journals. This one for SERVIMED says, ``Un destino
ideal para su salud''--``An ideal destination for your health,
the home of health tourism.'' In the corner, it says, ``In
Cuba, Servimed puts at your disposal teams of the most
experienced scientists, advanced medical technology of an
international level, and modern hospital centers.'' It goes on
to say that Cuba has one of the most developed medical systems
in the entire world. Yet, average Cubans are not even allowed
into these touted medical health centers. So much for socialist
equality, Castro himself is engaged in a system of medical
apartheid.
Since the Torres bill deals with both with food and
medicine, we should also ask why Cuba touts its growing food
export industry when ordinary Cubans are standing in line with
ration cards to get basic food staples. Clearly, former
Chairman Gibbons didn't see the April 27 Miami Herald article
on Cuba's growing food export business before he gave his
performance on NBC last week.
The Headline said, ``Cuba seen as future competitor, or
even an ally, in agribusiness
``From limes to lobsters, Cuban agricultural exports are
popping up in more and more supermarkets around the world--
leading Florida farmers to ponder what long-term impact this
may have on their business.
Last year, for instance, Cuban seafood exports came to $180
million, up from $102 million in 1994, according to Anicia E.
Garcia Alvarez of the University of Havana.''
``Our fundamental goal is to increase exports and foreign-
exchange earnings while diversifying,'' she said. ``Until now,
our exports have been concentrated in lobsters and shrimp. But
we're trying to increase the proportion of live and whole
products mainly to France, Italy and Japan.''
I would also like to ask for permission to enter this
article and a few others into the record.
Whether or not you support sanctions, it ought to be
evident that Castro holds the key to change in Cuba. The
remaining question is this: Should the United States throw
Castro a lifeline by lifting sanctions on Cuba?
Current U.S. law does recognize and respond to the
humanitarian situation in Cuba. U.S. policy, under Section 109
of the Libertad Act permits significant assistance, including
donations of humanitarian assistance, the sale of medicine and
medical supplies and grants to organizations to promote
democracy and human rights in Cuba. Since last fall the U.S.
Agency for International Development has signed $1.5 million
dollars in grants for this purpose and $2 million since the
program first began with President Clinton's awarding of a
grant to Freedom House.
The visits of Members of Congress and the U.S. business
community and the hundreds of European, Canadian and Mexican
investments have also been unsuccessful in moving Castro to
undertake basic changes. Opening doors may increase investment
in Cuba, but it will never force Castro to handover the key
which would unlock the door to democratic change in Cuba.
Lastly, we need to recognize that Cuba is not the target
that Big Business is after, Cuba is simply the easy target for
business' looking to initiate a change in U.S. sanctions
policies around the globe. Trade with Cuba is pennies compared
to their real targets in the Middle East--Iran and Libya.
No one more than I and my two colleagues from Florida would
like anything more than to see democratic and free market
changes in Cuba. My family in Cuba, would like nothing more
than to see change in Cuba. Our policy must be more than just
about making money. From Main Street to Wall Street democracy
is good for the bottom line. Democracy is what we need for the
Cuban people.
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Casi tantos indultos como encausados este ano
LA HABANA, 20 de abril (Monike de Motas, especial para
CubaNet)--Informaciones procedentes de la Coordinadora Nacional
de Presos Politicos reportan que desde la partida de Su
Santidad hasta los primeros diez dias de abril fueron en Cuba
indultados casi tantos prisioneros como los que han sido
procesados entre enero y marzo.
Estadisticas que obran en sus archivos senalan que en los
89 dias que median en este primer cuarto de ano se condenaron a
privacion de libertad, por motivos politicos, a 59 cubanos
opositores al sistema, mientras que otros 52 se hallan en
proceso preparatorio para ser conducidos a los tribunales, lo
que completa un total de 111.
Por su parte, entre el 25 de enero y el 10 de abril, el
regimen indulto a unos 117 encarcelados, que no contemplan a
quienes resultaron desterrados a Canada, los cuales se vieron
obligados a partir directamente de la celda al avion, sin
contacto con familiares ni posibilidad de gozar de ningun tipo
de libertad en su tierra patria.
Aunque sumando la cantidad de liberados ante la solicitud
del Papa, la cifra asciende a 147, pues dos de los destinados a
Canada prefirieron seguir en prision y otros cinco resultaron
denegados por la embajada de ese pais, la correlacion de
encarcelaciones y encausamientos en tan corto periodo da la
medida de los limites de misericordia castrista y del nivel de
influencia que pudo alcanzar la peregrinacion de Juan Pablo II
en los circulos gobernantes, a pesar del respeto y la
tolerancia demostrada durante sus homilias en tierras cubanas.
Donde dije digo digo Diego
La logica indica que una amnistia, por muy pequena que sea,
deja por sentado la libertad incondicional de los beneficiados,
asi como su posibilidad de autodeterminar el curso a dar a sus
vidas con plenos derechos sociales, aun con mas razon cuando el
termino de las sanciones conmutadas es tan breve que el
individuo casi ha pagado su deuda con la sociedad.
Pero en un pais donde los conceptos se confunden al extremo
de divorciarse por completo de la significacion semantica dada,
la logica de los demas no siempre tiene que coincidir con lo
establecido universalmente. Por ello, nuestros derechos humanos
deben ser entendidos de una forma particular. La etica social
tiene sus caracteristicas propias. La moral se marca de modo
sui generis, y tambien la condonacion tiene sus limitaciones
puntuales.
Por ello, tambien la presente ``absolucion'' tiene sus
medias tintas, pues deja de serlo cuando se obliga al recluso a
partir directamente desde la celda hacia el extranjero, sin
tener siquiera el mas minimo contacto con sus familiares que,
por demas, no solo deben ignorarlo, sino que tampoco pueden
acompanarlo en su exilio forzoso.
De la cifra original de 21 que Canada accedio a recibir,
ese gobierno nego visado a cinco de los propuestos, por haber
sido sancionados por delitos de terrorismo y pirateria,
mientras que otros dos quedaron fuera de la lista al negarse a
emigrar. Ninguno de ellos fue puesto en libertad. Donde,
pues, esta el supuesto indulto que recibirian?
Pero ademas, a otros, luego de haber sido incluidos entre
los amnistiados, se les cambio la medida por la de libertad
condicional, como es el caso de Radames Garcia de la Vega, el
vicepresidente del Movimiento de Jovenes por la Democracia,
quien luego de recibir la condonacion de su sancion (a
cumplirse en noviembre proximo) y recibir refugio del gobierno
norteamericano, le fue aplicado el limitante C-8, por poseer
supuesta informacion confidencial del Centro de Informaciones
Cientificas, de donde fue expulsado hace tres anos, por lo cual
se le niega permiso de salida hasta el 2002, y por esa causa
ahora se halla en libertad condicional. Tambien el es un
indultado?
Desde mi punto de vista, la amnistia *tiene* que ser
incondicional, y cuando no es asi, deja de serlo. Por tanto, no
debe considerarse honesta una lista que incluya situaciones
como las relatadas. Seria interesante preguntar al estado
cubano cuantos, oficialmente, integran la clemencia papal.
Especulando con listas negras
En la primera decena de marzo, la CNPP tenia bajo su
control a 788 presos politicos, pero como durante el primer
trimestre han sido sancionados otros 59 disidentes en Cuba, la
cifra alcanza ya el orden de los 848.
Tal cantidad de procesados en solo 89 dias mantiene el
ritmo de condena a uno cada 36 horas. Si nos dedicamos a
especular, con tal promedio tendriamos mas de 1,300 prisioneros
por causas politicas a fin de ano.
Tomando en cuenta que a principios del presente los
controles de la organizacion civilista poseian como dato 928 de
estos reclusos podria concluirse que tal tasa de represion
activa no solo habria convertido en humo el acto de clemencia
promovido por Juan Pablo II, sino que agudizaria la situacion
actual en un 30%.
Resulta muy comodo ganar puntos en la consideracion
internacional, abogando por el desarrollo y la justicia en las
naciones mas pobres, mientras que en la propia las libertades
civiles, y en especial las de conciencia, empequenecen a pasos
agigantados hasta llegar a la nada.
Es muy facil tambien proclamar mentirosa la denuncia
publica de las violaciones de los derechos fundamentales dentro
de la isla, sobre todo cuando hay buen cuidado de borrar
cualquier posibilidad de comprobacion que pudiera ofrecerse de
modo induditable.
Sin embargo, datos como estos son los que demuestran hasta
donde llega el abismo de inconciliacion que se abre entre los
cubanos, por la ausencia de interes en la solucion de los
conflictos internos de la nacion por vias pacificas.
Chretien, Castro talk business, but no deal on rights
By ANTHONY DePALMA
New York Times Service
HAVANA--Prime Minister Jean Chretien set modest goals for
his first visit to Cuba this week: further Canada's substantial
business interests here and prod Cuba into doing something
about human rights.
After meeting for several hours with President Fidel Castro
on Monday, Chretien had a commitment from Cuba to negotiate a
foreign investment protection agreement with Canada. Havana
also agreed to pay $10 million to a Canadian insurance company
that lost its business in Cuba after the 1959 revolution.
But on human rights, Chretien failed to win any concession.
At one point during his meeting Monday with Castro at the
Palace of the Revolution, Chretien said he handed Castro a list
of political prisoners that Canada wants released. The
dissidents--Marta Beatriz Roque, Vladimiro Roca, Felix Bonne
and Rene Gomez Manzano--were detained on July 16, 1997, for the
``counterrevolutionary'' activity of calling for democratic
reforms.
``He defended his legal system,'' Chretien said, ``but he
took the list and said he was to consider it.''
Chretien refused to meet with Elizardo Sanchez, one of
Cuba's leading dissidents. But his chief foreign policy advisor
and other officials met with Sanchez and other dissidents for
more than an hour.
A delicate moment
Chretien's 41-hour visit to Havana, the first by a Canadian
prime minister since Pierre Trudeau came to skin dive with
Castro in 1976, comes at a delicate moment. Against the wishes
of some Cuban Americans and hard-line opponents to the Castro
government in the United States, the Clinton administration has
moved to ease the 36-year-old economic embargo against Cuba
slightly.
Last month President Clinton agreed to lift bans on direct
flights to Cuba and cash remittances that allow families to
send dollars to Cuba. The President also said he would make it
easier for medicine to be shipped to Cuba.
At the same time, Castro has been more bellicose than ever
in his condemnation of the United States embargo, going so far
this week as to use the occasion of Chretien's visit to compare
the embargo to ``a new version of the Holocaust,'' and suggest
that United States officials should be tried as war criminals
before an international court.
Monday the White House spokesman, Mike McCurry, called
Castro's comments ``ample evidence of what an `outlier' he is
in the world community.'' He also criticized Canada's position
toward Cuba.
``We certainly understand their desire to achieve change
through engagement,'' McCurry said. ``We do not believe there
is evidence that engagement with Cuba has produced any
change.''
Muted criticism
Until now there had been only muted criticism from
Washington about Chretien's trip, mostly from the Cuban-
American members of Congress who fiercely oppose Castro.
Chretien called Clinton two weeks ago to advise him of the
trip, and said Monday that Clinton had only asked him to bring
up the question of Cuba's record on human rights. ``The only
comment he made to me was `I hope, Jean, that you will raise
human rights,' '' Chretien told reporters. ``And it was the
first item of the presentation I made this morning.''
From the moment Chretien arrived Sunday night to dedicate a
new airport terminal in Havana that was financed, designed and
built by Canadians, it was clear that the prime minister's
modest goals for the trip would be overshadowed by Castro's
attempts to defy the United States.
While Chretien gently outlined Canada's desire to see Cuba
move more closely into ``a more dynamic, more democratic, more
prosperous hemisphere,'' Castro lambasted the United States.
``No state should pretend to have the right to starve
another people to death,'' Castro said as Chretien stood
stiffly behind him. ``That is turning a nation into a ghetto
and imposing on it a new version of the Holocaust.''
Published Tuesday, April 28, 1998, in the Miami Herald.
Cuba seen as future competitor, or even an ally, in agribusiness
By LARRY LUXNER
Special to The Herald
WASHINGTON--From limes to lobsters, Cuban agricultural
exports are popping up in more and more supermarkets around the
world--leading Florida farmers to ponder what long-term impact
this may have on their business.
Last year, for instance, Cuban seafood exports came to $180
million, up from $102 million in 1994, according to Anicia E.
Garcia Alvarez of the University of Havana.
``Our fundamental goal is to increase exports and foreign-
exchange earnings while diversifying,'' she said. ``Until now,
our exports have been concentrated in lobsters and shrimp. But
we're trying to increase the proportion of live and whole
products, mainly to France, Italy and Japan.''
Garcia was one of a dozen speakers at a recent conference
at Washington's Cosmos Club. Nearly 100 attendees listened as
experts from University of Havana and University of Florida in
Gainesville assessed the future of Cuban agribusiness.
A chief focus of the day-long conference was citrus--an
industry crucial to Florida but also one that represents strong
export earning potential for Cuba. In 1997, the Caribbean
island said it produced 808,000 metric tons of oranges,
grapefruit, limes and tangerines--the largest crop since 1991.
It currently ranks third in total grapefruit production, behind
the United States and Israel.
Largest orange grove
Cuba is also home to the world's largest orange grove under
one management, a sprawling plantation in Jaguey Grande, about
a two-hour drive east of Havana in Matanzas province. That
operation, run by Israel's BMGroup, exports Cuban fruit mainly
to the Netherlands for distribution throughout Europe,
providing Cuba with badly needed foreign exchange. Because of
the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba, BM's officials have been
banned from entering the United States.
Yet if the embargo were lifted, some say Florida could see some
business benefits.
``Florida, because of its geographic location, could become
a supplier of inputs required by the citrus and broader
agricultural sector in Cuba, as well as a source of new
technology,'' writes Tom Spreen of UF's Institute for Food and
Agricultural Sciences.
``Cuban grapefruit, because of its latitude, matures
earlier, and represents a real market if and when the embargo
is lifted. Clearly, Cuba has an opportunity to be a very strong
player,'' he adds. ``Because of land constraints in Dade
County, Florida will not reach the production levels of limes
it had before Hurricane Andrew. One could easily see an
opportunity for alliances between importers and growers of
limes in Cuba.''
Tomatoes, too
That's also the case when it comes to tropical fruits and
vegetables, such as mangoes, tomatoes, plantains, melons,
cucumbers, peppers and carrots.
``Given Cuba's location relative to the east coast of the
U.S., and its climate, it is reasonable to postulate that Cuba
could regain its prominence as a major fresh vegetable supply
region to the U.S. market,'' Spreen says. ``Some have even
speculated that Florida-based growers and shippers may form an
alliance with Cuba to compete with the California-Mexico
alliance which currently threatens their survival.''
In the case of seafood, Cuba's once-proud fishing fleet--
made possible by cheap, subsidized Soviet fuel--took a sudden
downturn in the late 1970s, when ``virtually all coastal
nations in the Americas imposed 200-mile limits for their
territorial waters in the late 1970s,'' said UF professor
Charles M. Adams. ``With few exceptions, the exclusive rights
claimed by these coastal nations excluded access by all other
countries to the fisheries resources found in their territorial
seas.''
Nearly all of the 19.7 million pounds of spiny lobster Cuba
produces annually is exported--mostly in the form of cooked
whole lobster, with lesser quantities of raw, whole lobster and
frozen tails. In terms of total value, the major markets for
Cuban spiny lobster are Japan, France, Spain, Italy and Canada.
If Washington decides to lift the embargo against Cuba, the
island nation could enjoy a sudden increase in exports of spiny
lobster, pink shrimp, snapper and other species to the U.S.
market--providing its prices are competitive with Nicaragua,
Honduras and other traditional seafood exporters, the experts
said.
Adds Bond Pace, owner of Pace Marketing Inc. in Port St.
Lucie: ``If the embargo were finally lifted, it would open up a
completely new range of imports. We'd see a lot of the major
restaurant chains and processors go flying right over to Cuba
and offer to buy all their production.''
Published Monday, April 27, 1998, in the Miami Herald.
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Chairman Crane. Thank you, Mr. Menendez.
And now, Mr. Torres.
STATEMENT OF HON. ESTEBAN E. TORRES, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Mr. Torres. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, let me
apologize for being late, but I appreciate this opportunity to
meet before your Subcommittee.
I want to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, and my
colleagues, for scheduling this hearing and for the integrity
and the focus that is being provided here. Very few policy
issues really provoke the emotion, the vehemence, the
polarization, the disagreement, the disinformation, and the
pure hostility that a discussion on U.S.-Cuba policy does.
We will undoubtedly witness this in the remarks of many of
my colleagues. I know they're upset. I know that they're the
guards of the embargo policy and whose comments have preceded
me. Sadly, it's an arena where supporters of our current
policy, which politically and economically isolates Cuba,
portray those who disagree with them in matters not only that I
think violate the decorum, the credibility of this institution,
but I think that all too often, Mr. Chairman, they accuse those
who disagree with their views as somehow lacking in patriotism,
or somehow lacking in respect for human rights, as being
duplicitous, and always as being allies or dupes of the Cuban
leaders that they so bitterly hate.
I can understand their hate, but I think it's a foreign
policy issue that does not tolerate a middle ground--not at
all. It's a policy of almost total economic embargo, with dire
and many maintain illegal effects upon the Cuban people. So, I
congratulate the Subcommittee--my colleagues on the
Subcommittee and their staffs are putting the needed focus on
the policy toward Cuba and its effect upon the Cuban people.
The Cuban people. The people Mr. Menendez and Mr. Balart talked
about.
I am the author of the Cuban Humanitarian Trade Act, H.R.
1951. And I want to show you, Mr. Chairman, that along with 121
Members of Congress, Republicans and Democrats, we are
proposing that our current total embargo on the commercial sale
of food and our current de facto embargo on the commercial sale
of medicine, medical equipment, and supplies, be lifted.
My legislative effort came after I had the opportunity to
see with my own eyes in Cuba the condition of Cuban people, and
after I had studied reports from medical authorities about the
effects of our policies. Plain and simple. I understand also
from our military experts that Cuba does not pose a significant
military threat to the United States or any countries in the
region. We saw that today in the newspaper and we read
Secretary Cohen's report. Cuba has little motivation to engage
in military activity beyond defense of its territory and
political system. As a final consideration, the United States
maintains a fully outfitted naval base right on the island.
Right there.
While there's much disagreement about the impact of our
current policies, there's no disagreement about the fact that
the Cuban people are suffering. So, Mr. Chairman, you have to
see it to believe it. Some of my colleagues who are the
principal architects and defenders of our current embargo
maintain that it's Fidel Castro who is causing the suffering,
the shortage of food, and of medicine--we heard that today--
despite the fact that they have brilliantly designed,
implemented, and maintained one of the harshest economic
embargoes in the world, save none.
I want to quote the Pope again. He said, ``it's a monstrous
act that we perpetuate.'' But my colleagues on this
Subcommittee know full well that an economic embargo is no tea
party. An economic embargo is a serious and drastic policy
option available to nations, and usually it's invoked
cautiously and in cooperation and in conjunction with other
policy options, and in full consultation and coordination with
one's allies.
But not our Cuban embargo. No. It is applied with the grace
of a sledgehammer and maintained almost boastfully in the face
of near total opposition from all of our Nations' allies. An
embargo against Cuba is a unilateral embargo, it enjoys no
support from our allies, it isolates us from our allies, it is
ridiculed by our allies, and our enemies use it to demonstrate
that the United States has lost the ability to identify genuine
threats to security. It doesn't work.
Unilateral embargoes don't work. We've had enough time to
measure its effects. What--39 years? It doesn't create the
climate for democracy. It doesn't create a movement toward a
market-oriented economy. It doesn't create the basis for free
and civil society. Instead, all it has created is deprivation
and hardship. It denies a population the basic necessities of
life. And it deliberately provokes misery and discontent.
Its authors intended that this misery and discontent would
provoke civil unrest and cause an overthrow of the Castro
government. It hasn't. But it has become Fidel Castro's ally
and it's used by him to place the blame of the suffering and
the unhappiness of the Cuban people upon the United States.
Supporters are hesitant to own up to the full effects upon the
Cuban people of their carefully crafted embargo. They choose
instead to discredit the messenger, as it happened with the
report from the American Association for World Health.
This report wasn't easily dismissed. However, it is a U.S.
committee for the World Health Organization whose honorary
chairman is no less than Jimmy Carter. Its team performed a
year-long review of the implications of our embargo which
included onsite visits to 46 treatment centers and related
facilities, 160 interviews with medical professionals and other
specialists, government officials, representatives of
nongovernmental organizations, churches, and international aid
agencies. And their 300-page report, a study by distinguished
medical experts, my fellow colleagues, concluded that, ``The
U.S. embargo of Cuba has dramatically harmed the health and
nutrition of large numbers of ordinary Cuban citizens . . . it
is our expert medical opinion that the U.S. embargo has caused
a significant rise in suffering--and even in deaths--in Cuba .
. . the U.S. trade embargo--one of the most stringent embargoes
of its kind, prohibiting the sale of food and sharply
restricting the sale of medicines and medical equipment was
further tightened by the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act.''
Defenders of our economic embargo maintain that the sale of
medicine is permitted under the embargo. Well virtually every
communication from embargo supporters states that the sale of
medicines is legal under U.S. laws. Well, it's true in fact,
except that the administration of the licensing and the
regulation hurdles that a U.S. business must comply with in
order to transact medical sales business in Cuba, have created
a de facto embargo. Which makes any real sales insignificant in
volume. It discourages also real commercial sales efforts.
Our Department of State in a fact sheet stated that
licenses to sell medicine and medical supplies are routinely
issued. In statements which were widely distributed to the U.S.
Congress, the Department of State stated that, ``Since 1992, 39
license requests have been approved for U.S. companies and
their subsidiaries for sales of medical items to Cuba. Thirty-
one licenses were for the commercial sale of medicines, medical
equipment, and related supplies to Cuba. Five licenses were
issued for travel to Cuba. Eight were provided before the Cuban
Democracy Act, and three licenses have nothing or have missing
information.'' Out of 39 licenses, you know how many made it to
Cuba? Nine. Nine. Big deal. Big sale.
I heard today from a colleague here stating that 55
licenses have been issued. That's even a bigger number. We've
analyzed the copies of those 36 routinely approved requests for
licenses to sell medicines to Cuba, Mr. Chairman. I have them
here. A copy of each of those, and their final disposition, and
I'd like permission to enter them into the record.
[The information had not been received at the time of
printing.]
Chairman Crane. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Torres. Mr. Chairman, five licenses were for travel
only. No sales here. Eleven of those licenses were not even
U.S. businesses selling to Cuba, but were international
organizations--the United Nations, which planned to donate
portions of the medicine and supplies to Cuba rather than sell
them--so there's a lot of discrepancy in this, Mr. Chairman.
My friends, there's another simple fact that the embargo
supporters will not tell you. Castro's opposition in Cuba, the
dissidents, the people that are opposed to Fidel Castro, sat
with me in the American special interest section in Havana, and
told me, to a man and woman, Mr. Congressman, lift this
horrible embargo. It is killing us. And these are Castro's
opposition. These are the men and women that had been in prison
and are out and are opposition to him. They want us to lift
this. It is killing the Cuban people.
My colleagues, as much as our U.S. policy toward Cuba is
defended and justified by misstatements, it's also shrouded in
darkness. Just look at the record. Look at the record. Covert
invasions, assassination attempts, commando activities, nuclear
threats, beatings, jailings, human rights violations, embargoes
on food, medicine, travel, alienation of our allies, all in the
name of wanting to bring democracy to the Cuban people. It
isn't working. It is immoral. And it does not bring credit to a
country that prides itself in being humane and fair in order to
bring some morality and some sanity to our Cuban policy, my
friends.
I'm here to ask you today to support efforts to remove food
and medicine from our misguided embargo against the Cuban
people.
Mr. Chairman, I have a statement much further than this and
I would like to have it included in the record. I want to thank
the Subcommittee for opening this public dialog on such an
important issue toward our policy toward Cuba. Thank you.
[The prepared statement and attachments follow. The U.S.
Department of the Treasury attachment is being retained in the
Committee files.]
Statement of Hon. Esteban E. Torres, a Representative in Congress from
the State of California
Mr. Chairman, Colleagues, Ladies and Gentlemen:
First, I wish to congratulate, the Chairman of this
Subcommittee, my esteemed Colleague, Congressman Phil Crane for
scheduling this hearing, and for the integrity of its agenda
and focus. Very few public policy issues provoke the emotion,
vehemence, polarization, disagreement, disinformation and pure
hostility that a discussion of U.S.-Cuba policy does. We will
undoubtedly witness this in the remarks of my colleagues who
are the ``guards'' of the embargo policy, and whose comments
will follow mine. Sadly, it is an arena where supporters of our
current policy, which politically and economically isolates
Cuba, portray those who disagree with them as somehow lacking
in patriotism, as somehow lacking in respect for human rights,
as being duplicitous and as being allies of the Cuban leaders
they so bitterly hate. It is a foreign policy issue that does
not tolerate a middle ground. It is a policy of almost total
economic embargo, whose dire--and many maintain, illegal--
effects upon the Cuban people are denied publicly and then made
the object of ``humanitarian'' aid strategies and programs. So,
I congratulate Chairman Crane, my colleagues on this
subcommittee and their staff for putting needed focus on our
policy towards Cuba and its effects upon the Cuban people.
Mr. Chairman, I am the author of the Cuban Humanitarian
Trade Act, H.R. 1951. Along with 121 of my colleagues, we are
proposing that our current total embargo on the commercial sale
of food, and our current defacto embargo on the commercial sale
of medicine, medical equipment and supplies, be lifted.
My legislative efforts came after I had an opportunity to
see with my own eyes, the condition of the Cuban people, and
after I studied reports from medical authorities about the
effects of our policies. I understand also from our military
experts that Cuba has no military capabilities to project
itself beyond its borders, and that its army maintains a
totally defensive posture, and of course, the Cold War ended
almost 10 years ago. As a final cap: we maintain a fully
outfitted naval base on the Island.
While there is much disagreement about the impact off our
current policies, there is no disagreement about the fact that
the Cuban people are suffering. Some of my colleagues, who are
the principal architects and defenders of our current embargo,
maintain that it is Fidel Castro who is causing the suffering,
the shortages of food and of medicine. In spite of the fact
that they have brilliantly designed, implemented and maintained
one of the harshest economic embargos in the world, they speak
as if our policies have no negative impact upon the Cuban
people. But, my colleagues on this subcommittee know full well
that an economic embargo is no tea party. An economic embargo
is a serious and drastic policy option available to nations,
and usually invoked cautiously and in cooperation and
conjunction with other policy options and in full consultation
and coordination with one's allies. But not our Cuban embargo.
It is applied with the grace of a sledgehammer and maintained,
almost boastfully, in the face of the near total opposition of
all of our nation's allies.
Embargo supporters do not want the public to know the
difference between a unilateral embargo, where one country,
alone, maintains trade prohibitions against another country,
and between a multilateral trade embargo, where multiple
countries build and maintain the embargo against the offending
nation. Our embargo against Cuba is a unilateral embargo: it
enjoys no support from our allies, it isolates us from our
allies, it is ridiculed by our allies, and our enemies use it
to demonstrate that the United States is in a period of
decline. It also doesn't work. Unilateral embargos don't work.
We have had enough time to measure its effects: it does not
create the climate for democracy, it does not create a movement
toward a market-oriented economy, it does not create the basis
for free and fair civic society. Instead, it creates
deprivation and hardships, it denies a population the basic
necessities of life, and it deliberately provokes misery and
discontent. Its authors intended that this misery and
discontent would provoke civil unrest and cause an overthrow of
the Castro government. It hasn't, but it has become Fidel
Castro's ally, and used by him to place the blame for the
suffering and unhappiness of the Cuban people upon the United
States.
In spite of profound changes in geopolitical relationships,
especially where private sector, free market dynamics are being
portrayed as the most important vehicle for building democratic
institutions, U.S.-Cuba policy remains one of almost completely
prohibiting any free market activity.
Supporters are hesitant to own up to the full effects upon
the Cuban people of their carefully crafted embargo. They
choose instead to attempt to discredit the messenger, as
happened with the report from the American Association for
World Health. They accuse all critics as dupes or allies of
Fidel Castro. The opinion of the American Association for World
Health is not easily dismissed, however. It is a U.S. Committee
for the World Health Organization whose honorary chairman is
President Jimmy Carter. Its team performed a year-long review
of the implications of embargo restrictions which included on-
site visits to 46 treatment centers and related facilities, 160
interviews with medical professionals and other specialists,
government officials, representatives of non-governmental
organizations, churches and international aid agencies. Their
300 page report, a study by distinguished medical experts,
concluded:
``The U.S. embargo of Cuba has dramatically harmed the
health and nutrition of large numbers of ordinary Cuban
citizens. . . it is our expert medical opinion that the U.S.
embargo has caused a significant rise in suffering--and even
deaths--in Cuba. . . . the U.S. trade embargo--one of the most
stringent embargoes of its kind, prohibiting the sale of food
and sharply restricting the sale of medicines and medical
equipment--was further tightened by the 1992 Cuban Democracy
Act.''
In many instances they misrepresent facts and figures to
their advantage. One of our colleagues, one of the embargo's
most vehement defenders, at a public hearing told the
subcommittee that ``fifty percent of all cocaine from South
America comes through Cuban waters.'' Not one DOD or DEA
witness would back up that misstatement because in spite of
Cuba's proximity to Florida, less than 9 percent of the South
American drug traffic tries to use Cuban waters as a cover for
their activities. One of the main reasons is that the Cuban
government has been strongly allied with U.S. anti-drug
efforts, but you won't hear about this from pro-embargo
supporters.
In another instance, defenders of our economic embargo
maintain that the sale of medicine is permitted under the
embargo. Virtually every communication from embargo supporters
states that the sale of medicine is legal under U.S. laws. True
in fact, except that the administration of the licensing and
regulation hurdles that a U.S. business must comply with in
order to transact medical sales business with Cuba have created
a defacto embargo which makes any real sales insignificant in
volume. It discourages also real commercial sales efforts.
Our Department of State in a ``Fact Sheet'' stated that
licenses to sell medicine and medical supplies are
``routinely'' issued. In statements which were widely
distributed to the U.S. Congress the Department of State
maintained:
``Since 1992, 36 of 39 license requests have been approved
for U.S. companies and their subsidiaries for sales of medical
items to Cuba. Thirty-one (31) licenses were for the commercial
sale of medicines, medical equipment, and related supplies to
Cuba. Five (5) licenses were for travel to Cuba by
representatives of American pharmaceutical companies to explore
possible sales.''
From this statement, my colleagues deduced that the sale of
medicine by U.S. businesses to Cuba was ``routine'', no
problems.
Recently, my office received and analyzed copies of these
36 ``routinely'' approved requests for licenses to sell
medicine to Cuba. Either the Department of State does not know
what a commercial sale by a U.S. company is, or, it is
misleading the U.S. Congress. Five (5) licenses were for travel
only: no sales here. Eleven (11) of the approved sales licences
were not to U.S. businesses selling to Cuba, but were to
international organizations (such as the United Nations) which
planned to donate potions of the medicine and supplies to Cuba
rather than sell them. Actually these ``donated'' sales
amounted to about 2/3 of the total U.S. medical sales to Cuba
cited by DOS. Eight remaining licenses were entered into prior
to the enactment of the Cuban Democracy Act, leaving only eight
(8) licenses for commercial sales of medicine by U.S. companies
to Cuba. I am providing copies of these license requests so
that they may be entered into this hearing record for members
of the public to determine the accuracy of our State
Departments claims.
Our total embargo on the sale of food to Cuba is not only
defenseless, it is a violation of international and moral law.
Have you ever heard the embargo architects and supporters
defend their right to deny the commercial sale of food by U.S.
businesses to Cuba? Has the Department of State issued a ``Fact
Sheet'' on this violation of the Geneva Convention? We need to
ask their spokesperson, who is here today: to name the
countries in this dangerous world against which the U.S. has a
total commercial embargo on the sale of food. I believe the
answer is, just Cuba.
My colleagues, recently a Congressional delegation visited
Cuba. In advance of their trip, they asked two stanch embargo
defenders, who are Members of Congress, to provide them with a
list of the names of Cubans who were in opposition to the
Castro government and with whom they could meet to discuss the
embargo. In Cuba, they contacted the persons on this list, and
had them invited to meet with them at our U.S. Interest
Section. At this meeting, one of the Members of Congress--who
had voted for Helms-Burton asked for a ``yes or no'' answer to
the question: ``Do you support the U.S. embargo against Cuba?''
Every one of these Cubans, opponents of the Castro government,
said ``no,'' they strongly opposed the embargo. Not one
supported the embargo. One of this group of human rights
activists, independent journalists and religious
representatives summed up the overwhelming opinion of the Cuban
people: this person told the Congressmen: ``Only a masochist
would support the embargo''
My friends, why is it that the embargo supporters will not
tell you this simple fact: Castro's opposition in Cuba
overwhelmingly oppose our embargo. The Cuban people as a whole
dream for the day when it will be lifted.
Mr. Chairman and my colleagues, as much as our U.S. policy
towards Cuba is defended and justified by misstatements, it is
also shrouded in darkness. Just look at the record: covert
invasions, assassination attempts, commando activities, nuclear
threats, beatings, jailing, human rights violations, embargos
on food, medicine, travel, alienation of our allies, all in the
name of wanting to bring democracy to the Cuban people. It
isn't working. It isn't moral and it does not bring credit to a
country that prides itself as being both humane and fair. I
would ask you to look at our embargo through the eyes of very
talented Californian, who spent a number of months on a
photojournalistic assignment in Cuba. Her name is Heidi
McGurrin and she currently has an exhibition of her Cuban
photographs in the Cannon Rotunda. These are her words:
``If you imagine many beautiful hummingbirds, multicolored
and gentle beauties, whose little necks were held by large
clumsy hateful hands, who squeezed them a little more each
chance they get, This is what the embargo reminds me of.''
As a start, towards getting these hands off of the necks of
the Cuban people, I would ask my colleagues to support efforts
to remove food and medicine from our misguided embargo against
Cuba.
I have a further statement and some documentation which I
request be entered into this hearing record along with my
remarks. I thank the Chairman and Members of the Committee for
calling this hearing and for opening this public dialogue on
the important issue of our current policy towards Cuba.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Crane, Colleagues, Ladies and Gentlemen:
I congratulate my esteemed Colleague, Chairman Phil Crane
for scheduling this hearing, and for bringing attention to the
important topic of U.S. Economic an Trade Policy Toward Cuba.
Given the attention on Cuba as a result of the recent
Pope's visit, it is vital that the U.S. appraise the impact of
its Cuba policy. Public hearings are an important aspect of
this appraisal process and I am grateful for this opportunity
to share with this Subcommittee some of my perspectives on
current U.S.-Cuba policy.
U.S.-Cuba policy has been remarkably consistent for the
past 38 years: it is a policy which seeks to isolate Cuba
politically and economically. A keystone of this policy is the
maintenance of a total economic embargo.
In my remarks today, I would like to share with you some of
the unique aspects of U.S.-Cuba policy which make our embargo
one of the harshest in the world, and one which almost totally
isolates the U.S. from all of its allies worldwide.
One characteristic of current U.S. Cuban policy is that in
spite of profound changes in geopolitical relationships, where
private sector, free market dynamics are being portrayed as the
most important vehicle for building an appreciation for, and
the practice of, democratic institutions, U.S.-Cuba policies
remain one of almost total economic embargo. A case in point:
U.S. policy towards the People's Republic of China stresses
most favored nation trading status as the core element of our
relationship, and the centerpiece of the U.S.'s efforts to
bring its belief in free market democracy to the world's
largest Communist nation. With Cuba, for some reason, this
dynamic does not apply. Instead, the U. S. does the opposite.
The U.S. policy strategy for Cuba, one of the world's smallest
socialist countries, is to implement, maintain and increasingly
tighten one of the harshest economic embargoes in the world,
all in the name of providing ``support to the people of Cuba''.
Let me identify some elements of the U.S. embargo against
Cuba which in my opinion make it the ``world's harshest''
the U.S. embargo bars any ship that docks in Cuba
from docking at any U.S. port for six months. Most
international shipping agents refuse to allow any ship that
meets the U.S. Coast Guard an Federal Maritime Certificate of
Financial Responsibility requirements to sail to Cuba. This
leaves only 12 to 15 of the worlds available tankers to call at
Cuban ports. This provision alone thwarts Cuban purchases of
food and medicine from other countries and, when ships are
willing to dock, often doubles the cost of shipments.
U.S. law stipulates on-site verification for
medical sales. This provision forces companies to assume
responsibility for end-use, a procedure that raises the
financial and potential liability costs to companies and
actively dissuades them from selling to Cuba. Efforts are
further frustrated by the fact that neither the Treasury nor
the Commerce department has published any regulations defining
how to meet the on-site verification requirement.
The U.S. embargo bans medical exports that could
be used to develop Cuba's fledgling biotechnology industry.
This provision thwarts Cuba's promising biotechnology industry,
which has been developed in part to meet food and medicine
requirements locally since the embargo thwarts the island's
ability to import basic goods. The industry has produced
several ``firsts'' including meningitis B and hepatitis
vaccines, as well as the domestically produced vaccines which
maintain Cuba's ranking as 26th in the world in infant and
child mortality, similar to the U.S.
Our policy of embargo against Cuba serves to
isolate the U.S. internationally. It enjoys virtually no
support from other nations. The U.S. embargo is roundly
denounced by the world diplomatic and medical community. The
United Nations has condemned this embargo for five years, as
have numerous other organizations. In 1996 the U.N. condemned
the embargo 137 to 3, the three being the U.S., Israel (which
has a multi-million dollar investment in Cuba's citrus
industry) an Uzbekistan.
The embargo `presumes denial' for licensed medical
sales. The Office of Foreign Assets Control (called OFAC), in
the U.S. Department of the Treasury, charged with the bulk of
licensing medical sales to Cuba, interprets the 1992 Cuban
Democracy Act (CDA) as discouraging medical sales. OFAC's
Director testified before Congress: ``In 1993 (licensed Cuban
trade with U.S. subsidiaries) was down to $1.6
million....accounted for by approximately 15 or 16 licenses
which were pre-CDA contracts....Frankly I believe the number
next year to be even less, falling ultimately to zero.'' OFAC
says 38 licenses have been issued since 1992, six for travel
only. According to its own figures then, OFAC has granted a
total of 14 licenses in five years for a dollar amount under $2
million. In 1991, the last year before CDA's enactment and time
of deep recession, Cuba purchased $719 million of mostly food
and medicine from U.S. subsidiaries, with $500 million of that
for medicines.
the U.S. embargo completely bans food sales. Like
other Caribbean nations, Cuba imports most of its food. The
free flow of medicine and food was allowed in the multi-lateral
embargoes against North Korea, Vietnam, South Africa, Chile, El
Salvador, the Soviet Union and Haiti. In recent UN-supported
embargoes against Iraq and the former Yugoslavia, the U.S.
joined the UN position that trade in both medicines and food
must be allowed to maintain the health of civilian population.
As any visitor to Cuba can plainly see, the Cuban people
are suffering. Supporters of currently U.S. policy argue that
this suffering is the fault of the Cuban leadership. Without
entering into the intricacies of this question, I believe that
U.S. policy should make sure that the misery of the Cuban
people is not in any way caused by U.S. restrictions on the
sale of foods and medicine. Clearly, the current U.S. policy
does not permit us this position.
As a matter of fact, prohibitions and restrictions on the
sale of food and medicine are fairly recent. U.S. subsidiaries
were allowed to sell food and medicine to Cuba before 1992,
until passage of the Cuban Democracy Act which, in response to
concerns voiced at the time, justified the admitted harsh
measures as `the nail in Castro's coffin'. Supporters of this
harsh action promised that within six months the people would
revolt against such deprivation and Castro would fall. The
former Chairman of the U.S. House of Representative's Ways and
Means Committee, a member of the U.S. Congress, representing a
district in the State of Florida for 34 years, remembers the
debate at that time about the health impact cutting off foods
and medicine trade would have on the Cuban people. He recalls,
and I quote: ``There was a big debate about the health impact
cutting off such sales would cause back then, but we were
assured that such harsh measures would only last six months or
so since the people would rebel against Castro and put `the
final nail in his coffin.' Well, here we are six years later
and he's still walking around. But who knows how many Cuban
people made it to coffins well ahead of their time because of
these terrible restrictions.'' President Castro's eminent
demise is constantly stated as the reason for maintaining the
U.S. embargo.
Just recently, on January 13, 1998, my Colleague from
Florida, Congressman Lincoln Diaz-Balart, one of the staunchest
advocates for our current economic policies against Cuba, again
invoked Castro's eminent demise and asked for ``more time'' for
our embargo to work when he stated that: ``Now that Castro is
ill and will soon be gone from the scene is not the time to
abandon the U.S. embargo....''.
My friends, I would maintain the opposite: now is exactly
the time to remove the ill-conceived, U.S. restrictions on
trade in foods and medicine. In May, 1997, along with twenty
bi-partisan Colleagues in the U.S. House of Representatives, I
introduced the Cuban Humanitarian Trade Act (H.R. 1951). Quite
simply, my bill would remove current restrictions on food and
medical exports to Cuba, and currently has over one hundred
cosponsors. A companion bill, with bi-partisan support, has
recently been introduced in the U.S. Senate. I am pleased to
inform you that both bills are building strong support from
across the U.S. Our bills enjoy the support of most organized
religious groups, human rights organizations, medical
practitioners, and most recently, the formal endorsement of the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the International United
Automobile Workers Union, AFL-CIO. An effort to build a
nationwide Latino consensus in support of HR 1951 was initiated
recently. Indeed, the Cuban American community has already
voted on this issue. They have voted with their pocket books
because they are the source of the largest hard cash infusion
into the Island of Cuba, when, mainly in violation of the very
laws which their Congressional allies and leaders have enacted
and fight to maintain, they pour between $800 and $1.1 billion
a year into Cuba. North Americans from different communities
with differing views on the embargo itself, are coming together
in agreement that the restrictions on food and medical products
have gone too far and should be repealed.
The Pope's visit to Cuba focused world attention on the
state of affairs in that Island. His Holiness has already
spoken out about how U.S. restrictions on food and medicine
hurt the people of Cuba.
I would urge my colleague, Chairman Phil Crane, to initiate
public hearings on my bill which has been referred to, and sits
directly in his Subcommittee. Surely a bill which is building
such broad and diverse support deserves public hearings.
Finally, I would like to leave you with some comments on this
issue from a truly distinguished American who has recently
publicly supported my bill. I will quote to you from General
John J. Sheehan (Retired) who was the U.S. Armed Forces Supreme
Allied Commander, Atlantic and Commander in Chief, Atlantic
Command, and as such supervised refugee operations at the U.S.
military base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The General was at a
press conference sponsored by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
recently when he made the following statement:
``I am here today to support the newly formed coalition
Americans for Humanitarian Trade with Cuba. For the first time,
Americans from different communities, with differing views on
the U.S. embargo, come together to support the sale of food and
medicine to Cuba. For over thirty-five years, the single most
restrictive policy in our history has resulted in increased
misery for the people of Cuba and has encouraged Cuban people
to migrate to other countries while making no substantive
change in the leadership of the Cuban government. All this for
a country that does not pose a military threat to the security
of the United States.
``Including food and medicine in the current embargo--the
only such embargo existing--runs counter to our humanitarian
tradition. We can no longer support a policy which causes
suffering of the most vulnerable--women, children and the
elderly. It is time for us to correct this policy and its
unintended effects on the innocent people of Cuba.''
My friends and colleagues, a new political wind is sweeping
across America. Its force is growing and will soon be felt
within the offices, halls and backrooms of the United States
Congress. The American people no longer believe that being a
causal factor in the poor health and nutrition of the Cuban
people is a moral, or effective, response to our political
disagreements with their leaders. They are beginning to
understand that U.S. restrictions on food and medicine trade
with Cuba does not contribute toward building the climate for
democracy on that Island. They want a policy towards Cuba which
does not isolate them from all of our allies. Cuban Americans
deserve a policy towards Cuba which does not punish their loved
ones, and which does not sow the seeds of inter-community
strife and conflict. Most importantly, it has long been known
that the American people believe passionately in fair play, and
our current policy restrictions on food and medicine trade with
Cuba is not fair to its people, does not achieve its stated
goals, and does not reflect the vision and compassion which
have long been the hallmark of U.S. foreign policy.
Helms-Burton is an unprecedented effort by one sovereign
nation to manipulate and control the political direction and
destiny of another sovereign nation. It was born not out of a
sense of fair play; it was designed to punish and to vindicate.
It permits the current Cuban government to avoid the
consequences of its policies by blaming its shortcomings on the
``colossus to the North''. It may be, ironically, the mechanism
which props up the Cuban government and insulates it from
accountability to its citizens. It was passed as a direct
response to the shooting down of Brothers-to-the-Rescue planes
by the Cuban government. It is widely believed that, but for
this incident, it would not have passed Congress nor have been
signed by the President. It does not represent a high mark in
U.S. foreign policy wisdom, and it makes me wonder who's
winning and who's losing behind this Helms-Burton. It is a bad
bill and it is time for a change.
Chairman Crane. We thank you, Mr. Torres.
Before we get into questions from Members of the Trade
Subcommittee, having listened to some of the objections about
the fairness in terms of representation here and guaranteeing
that all sides have had an opportunity to testify, let me
assure you all in the strongest possible terms that we've done
everything possible to accommodate any witness that wants to
come before this Subcommittee.
And specifically, this hearing was announced in an advisory
dated April 21, which invited any interested parties to request
to testify. This notice was released to the press, was sent by
e-mail to individuals who've requested to be notified of
Subcommittee releases, and was placed on our home page.
In an effort to hear from all sides of this issue,
Subcommittee staff sent copies of the advisory to your office,
Ileana, and yours too, Lincoln. Both of you got those. And
spoke to or faxed the notice to individuals who testified
before the Subcommittee previously on Cuba.
In response to the hearing notice and the additional
efforts of the staff to disseminate the notice, the
Subcommittee did not receive any requests at all from public
groups or individuals who support maintaining current policy.
Earlier this week, our staff asked the offices again, of
you Ileana and you too, Lincoln, if you had any names of any
such witnesses. And yesterday, Ileana, you suggested the names
of two, and we added them to the witness list. However, we were
notified yesterday evening that they can't participate in the
hearing today.
In short, this Subcommittee has tried its utmost to provide
a forum for all views. And frankly, I don't know what more we
could have done. And for some unexplained reason, however, our
efforts don't appear to have satisfied some of our colleagues
and I do not understand how they have this view.
Finally, I note that our hearing record is open for public
comment until May 21, and anyone interested in submitting a
statement for the record, should do so by that date.
And now I yield to our distinguished Ranking Minority
Member, Mr. Rangel.
Mr. Rangel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Diaz-Balart.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rangel. In your statement, you were not inferring that
the Communists had influenced the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. No, no, not the Communists, no, no. What I
was saying is the U.S. Chamber of Commerce now has taken a
position in favor of being able to make business deals with an
economy that is in essence an apartheid economy. And quite
frankly, that's not something that should be surprising,
because that same Chamber of Commerce supports that policy
toward China and other regimes that completely prohibit all
labor rights.
Mr. Rangel. They don't have any problems with businesses
dealing with communism--that's what you and I are saying.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. That's correct.
Mr. Rangel. And our government's position is that doing
business will cause these Communists to try to move toward free
markets, that's generally the underlying theory.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. That's lip service--lip service. That's
the lip service to cover and give some sort of sugarcoating to
the policy of going into a market, where workers have
absolutely no rights, and in the case of Cuba, they're not even
paid one dollar, they're paid in worthless Castro Cuban pesos,
and all the dollars are kept and split by the investor who
invests with Castro and Castro. So they sugarcoat it by saying
that they may bring--make--Castro a Democrat, but that's not
their intent.
Mr. Rangel. I see. As relates to the use of the peso and
the dollar, the fact is that in all of the food stores and the
marketplaces, at least in Havana, it is pesos. And in trying to
see its comparable value in dollars, the food, milk, the bread,
the meats--if meats are available--are very inexpensive and
they're paid for in pesos. The dollar stores, on the other
hand, are luxury stores that are overly priced and are paid for
in dollars and some theorize that the moneys that they get for
those can afford it subsidizes the peso. But I just want you to
know that, as relates to the food in the marketplace, no
dollars are there.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. No, in the dollar-only stores.
Mr. Rangel. Yes.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. And I think it's good to bring out even
the most elemental goods are sold and what has happened in the
recent past in Cuba is that items that used to be purchased in
the stores where people go with ration cards, even the most
elemental goods are now having to be purchased in the dollar-
only stores. Which originated, as you stated, with the concept
of luxury stores. But now even the most elemental goods have to
be purchased in dollars.
That's why I maintain, and I reiterate, that the only
government in the world that I know of that requires its
citizens to possess a foreign currency, in order to buy even
the most elemental of goods, is the Castro regime.
Mr. Rangel. I didn't say elemental goods--I'm saying luxury
goods.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Luxury, no, no, no--clothing, food, and
medicine. Medicines, for example, those medicines that you saw
there in the--I hope you have a copy of the brochure that Mr.
Menendez brought--those medicines can only be purchased in the
dollar-only pharmacies.
Mr. Rangel. Let's get quickly to medicine. If you were
assured that food, medicine, and medical equipment were only
going to those people who are poor, sick, and in need of these,
would you have any objections to that type of equipment and
medicine being transferred to the Cuban people?
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Current law permits and, as Mr. Menendez
stated, over $2 billion of humanitarian assistance which
includes food and medicine, has been sent by the American
people----
Mr. Rangel. Would you have any objections?
Mr. Diaz-Balart. I do not object to current law, no.
Mr. Rangel. Would you have any objection in relaxing the
licenses if you were assured that it was getting to the people
and not to the government?
Mr. Diaz-Balart. No, my point is that current law permits--
--
Mr. Rangel. I didn't say current law, because----
Mr. Diaz-Balart. It's current law.
Mr. Rangel. It's very----
Mr. Diaz-Balart. And the sale of medicine is legal and I
support the current law.
Mr. Rangel. I'm trying to frame my question that it is very
complicated for someone to sell anything as relates to current
law. I'm saying, if the objective was to make certain that the
food, the medicine, and the medical equipment really went to
those who needed it, would you support relaxing present law and
the license requirement to make certain it got there?
Mr. Diaz-Balart. It's not necessary, because current law
permits the sale of medicine and the only impediment----
Mr. Rangel. Lincoln, the answer is no. OK.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. The impediment, Charlie----
Mr. Rangel. The answer is no, so let me move to a next
question.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. No, but the impediment for the people----
Mr. Rangel. I'm just asking----
Mr. Diaz-Balart [continuing]. Not to get the food and
medicine is Castro, Charlie.
Mr. Rangel. I understand you. Everything is Castro.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. No, not everything. Tyranny is Castro.
Freedom is not Castro.
Mr. Rangel. Lincoln, give me a break, will you?
Mr. Diaz-Balart. I'll give you all the breaks you want,
Charlie.
Mr. Rangel. Thank you. Would you have any problem with
Cuban-Americans visiting their families easily, leaving
Florida, wherever, and going to Cuba and having direct flights
to do it. For us to be able to make it easier for people to see
their loved ones in Cuba. Would you have any objections to any
regulation changes----
Mr. Diaz-Balart. President Clinton announced that, and I
did not support that.
Mr. Rangel. Then you do object.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. I did not support--yes, I objected.
Mr. Rangel. For Cuban-Americans to be able to rejoin their
families in their Cuba.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. The action announced by President Clinton,
which----
Mr. Rangel. No, do you find it difficult to just answer me.
I know what Clinton has done. I'm trying to establish a dialog
with you.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Ask the question.
Mr. Rangel. Would you have any objections to Cuban-
Americans sending money to their people, to their families that
are poor, in Cuba?
Mr. Diaz-Balart. That is legal and it's done through the
current law.
Mr. Rangel. Do you object to that?
Mr. Diaz-Balart. It's done for humanitarian reasons.
Mr. Rangel. It's not done for humanity; it's done because
they want to send their mother and their grandmother some
money.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. And it's done. Exactly.
Mr. Rangel. Do you object to that?
Mr. Diaz-Balart. I----
Mr. Rangel. Forget it.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. If you want to forget it, that's fine. But
one thing that I think we should not forget and that I would
like one time for you to call for, is free elections in Cuba
and the right of the Cuban people to be free, and no more
pretexts for a 39-year-old dictatorship. That's what we
shouldn't be forgetting.
Mr. Rangel. It's easy for you to debate these things, and
me too. The people suffering are not you, they're not me, it's
not Castro, it's not Clinton, it's the people that are in Cuba.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. And that's why they need elections and
it's----
Mr. Rangel. Elections will make them well, will make them
healthy, will give them jobs, would allow them to visit their
loved ones, and to hug their children and their grandparents--
all you need is an election. Forget China, forget North
Vietnam, forget North Korea--that's accepted. But Cuba,
Florida----
Mr. Diaz-Balart. I can't stop what I consider to be an
immoral policy with regard to China. But I think that this
Congress will continue to stand with the Cuban people and
insist that they be free and that this hemisphere be free. Yes,
I think that we can make this hemisphere an exception--a
totally democratic and free hemisphere.
Mr. Rangel. I would not bet on it.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Well, you better bet on the Cuban people
being free, because they're going to be.
Mr. Rangel. They will be, but not because of this policy.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Not because of you and me--because of the
Cuban people.
Mr. Rangel. You're right, and the Cuban people in Cuba; not
in Miami.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. The Cuban people--No, no. I can see how
the salaried people finally start earning their commissions.
Let me say one thing. The Cuban people desire freedom, they
deserve freedom, and the Cuban-Americans, just like Irish-
Americans dream for peace and freedom in Ireland, they dream
for peace and freedom and democracy for their brothers in Cuba.
And I think that the discrimination and the double standards
against Cuban-Americans, which sometimes is heard by opponents
of current policy, is something that's truly unfortunate. And I
think that we should agree on that the Cuban people deserve
freedom and deserve democracy.
Chairman Crane. I would like to remind the audience that
any public displays are not permissible in the Committee room,
so please withhold your emotional reactions.
And, Mr. Thomas.
Mr. Thomas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I've often discovered
that one of the easiest ways to determine whether or not a
witness list, in terms of who it attracts and what's done, can
best be settled by an applause meter, so that when comments are
made or points are scored and you see who cheers for what,
pretty well tells you.
Frankly, I don't understand why the Cuban people are now in
Florida and in Miami. I don't know why they just don't go home.
I don't know why we don't have an open and free travel policy
with Cuba, so that when we say Cubans are going to determine
freedom, it's going to be Cubans who choose where they want to
be, who determine freedom.
Now, I find that some of the discussions leave me at a
distinct disadvantage, because frankly, all of the information
I have about Cuba is secondhand. I have never had dinner with
Castro; I've never had a brandy and a cigar with Castro; I've
never had a guided tour so that I could see the real Cuba. But
I do have some secondhand information that I've tried to glean
from a number of sources to be able to understand what goes on
in that country.
One of the things I've discovered is that there is now an
opportunity for individuals to practice free enterprise in
Cuba. That they can run a taxi or own a restaurant. And if any
statement I make is inaccurate, I would like to be corrected,
because its my understanding that if someone wants to have a
little restaurant they can. They can actually be engaged in
free enterprise. But my understanding also is that they can't
have any employees. Now you really can't grow any kind of a
business.
And what I don't understand is, when you have a bill--and I
guess Mr. Torres would be the best one to explain to me--you
describe this as a bill which would permit the commercial sale
of food and medicine. And from my information, Cuba's basically
a closed society. It's a closed system.
In fact, the discussion between my friend Lincoln and my
friend Charlie about the state stores, I am familiar with, but
it was in the Soviet Union--they were called verioskas in terms
of the hard currency stores and in fact they were prevalent in
Socialist systems as a way to get hard currency. And it's
ironic that the discussion is about an expansion of a second
government-owned system dealing in hard currency only, and
every time I see that, that clearly tells me that the system is
a Socialist system.
So if we're going to move food and medicine, whether it be
for commercial sale or even for that matter, humanitarian
purposes, what's the distribution system? The gentleman from
New York quite rightly put it--if you could get the food and
medicine into the hands of the people who really needed it
regardless of political position or influence with the
government.
What's the distribution in the system inside Cuba that
would guarantee the humanitarian distribution of food or
medicine, or how do you distribute products equitably or
inequitably in a commercial way in a closed Socialist system?
How are you going to accomplish that? Who is there, inside
Cuba, that would carry on the retail sale, distributed
reasonably, or humanitarian distribution, of food and medicine?
My assumption is the Catholic Church would be an instrument.
International Red Cross has been used in the past. Are they
going to be there in numbers?
What is it that gets us what some folks have said they
wanted. I can't figure out how you don't simply reenforce
Castro and any structure he wants to use for purposes of
maintaining control, only it's our products and goods, whether
commercially or humanitarianly, used to strengthen Castro, not
to necessarily benefit in a very equitable and reasonable way
the Cuban people? Where am I wrong in my thinking?
Mr. Torres. Mr. Thomas, you and I have traveled around the
world to many, many places, and we've seen many countries and
how they affect their economies and how they move distribution.
I would really, because I know you and because we've traveled
together, I would beseech you to try and take a trip to Cuba.
And look for yourself--see for yourself--how that system works
and how the systems work there. There are large restaurants and
little ones and medium-sized ones, with employees, with
waiters, and waitresses, and food handlers. There are co-ops,
there are farms, there are stores.
Many of the things that you probably want to see and get
answers to probably can't be done because there is no way
which--where Americans, we, those of us that are saying that we
ought to engage in these commercial endeavors, we don't have a
process of negotiating with Cuban counterparts on how to do
these things.
Mr. Thomas. What is the Cuban counterpart in terms of a
distribution system for commercial sale of medicine inside
Cuba?
Mr. Torres. Well, a drugstore.
Mr. Thomas. Who owns the drugstore.
Mr. Torres. The proprietor.
Mr. Thomas. How does the proprietor get their product?
Mr. Torres. Right now, it's smuggled in there. Right now,
it's however he can get it from another country.
Mr. Thomas. But the principal economic interaction or
intercourse is smuggling?
Mr. Torres. Many of the issues there are smuggled. People
send--you can't----
Mr. Thomas. So what you want us to do is encourage the
illegal activity inside a country?
Mr. Torres. No, no.
Mr. Thomas. By utilizing the smuggling system?
Mr. Torres. I haven't asserted that. I said--you asked me
how do these products get there, and I gave you a reason of how
they get there.
Mr. Thomas. But is the principal reason--no, but the
principal reason can't be smuggling.
Mr. Torres. Well that, and many other ways, they get there.
They get----
Mr. Thomas. Let's focus on the many other ways. Give me one
legitimate way.
Mr. Torres. Well, they buy. They buy it----
Mr. Thomas. Who do they buy it from?
Mr. Torres. They buy it from a German pharmaceutical
company.
Mr. Thomas. And the German pharmaceutical company can come
in and interact with anyone inside Cuba with no government
responsibility relationship?
Mr. Torres. That's correct. But the German pharmaceutical
can't come in if in any way it's a subsidiary of a U.S.
pharmaceutical company. Because under our current laws, they're
prohibited from doing that. But a French company--wholly owned
by France--could come in and sell a product to Cubans, get it
on the shelf, without any government intervention.
Mr. Thomas. One of the problems I have is that the brochure
I was shown, and it may be that the brochure is not accurate,
specifies the means of payment, which is dollars, which is
apparently not the currency of most folks in Cuba. I find it
difficult that there can be any kind of an open and free
distribution system in which the government determines the type
of currency and the appropriateness under which that currency
is either usable or not in the purchase of goods. That, to me,
creates a pretty bizarre economic structure----
Mr. Torres. Mr. Thomas, you should go to Havana and see----
Mr. Thomas. And somebody might--Mr. Menendez, you want to
get in----
Mr. Menendez. Mr. Thomas, I think your question is very
well put. Let me give you very simplistic answers. First, is
that there is no deal that is struck in Cuba without Fidel
Castro--read the New Republic article--and the government is
the distribution network even for the Catholic Church. The
Catholic Church does not have the vehicles to do distribution;
it's the government distribution vehicles and they take part of
the goods that the church distributes.
Second, the fact of the matter is that the Red Cross in
Cuba is the Cuban military; there is no International Red Cross
and the International Red Cross is not permitted to go in.
So the answer to your question is, in a state-controlled
economy, every aspect of the economic life of the people goes
through the central government. And that is the answer to your
distribution question.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. And if I may,----
Mr. Thomas. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Diaz-Balart [continuing]. Mr. Thomas----
Mr. Thomas. Go ahead.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Just one point--just a point of
clarification--no Cuban can own a pharmacy. I think that's
important just because it was, I think, brought out in another
way. The fact is that no Cuban can own a pharmacy. And with
regard to the restaurants it was brought out, Castro has now
allowed Cubans to run restaurants as long as it's in their own
homes and with a maximum of 12 chairs.
Mr. Thomas. Just recall the information in other closed
controlled systems and the attempt to distribute food on a
humanitarian basis, in which the dictator went so far as to
repackage the food stuff, so that they could receive goods and
not know who it came from.
What concerns me the most is that the arguments which are
quite passionate about the need to assist on a humanitarian, or
even a commercial basis--which I really have a difficult
concept in a closed system--that doesn't benefit Castro, that
Castro doesn't control for his own purposes. When in fact you
believe that you are doing something worthwhile, what you're
actually doing is strengthening the very structure that you say
you want to sometime have pass away.
It is a very difficult situation. I appreciate my
colleagues in terms of their testimony. But we aren't the ones
who closed the system and we are the ones who can open it up.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Crane. Mr. Neal.
Mr. Neal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Obviously, Castro's
personality still draws strong reactions, pro and con. But for
the panelist here, I did ask him about free elections; I did
ask him about religious liberty; I did ask him about free
markets; I did ask him about political prisoners; and, was less
than satisfied with the answers that I received.
The point here that I would like to express is simply
this--why not use the model of the Pope's intervention which
worked so well in Eastern Europe, to give us the opening that
will bring about the end of a totalitarian system and will lead
to a demand for more political reforms based upon religious
reforms.
I watched the Pope skillfully slap Castro from one end of
that island to the other with his remarks. He never once
embraced the notion of Marxist politics. He said that they had
trampled on human rights.
This is not an argument right now about Castro. What we're
attempting to do is argue about its impact on the Cuban people.
The notion of embracing some sort of humanitarian assistance is
consistent with American history. It's consistent with what
we've tried to do in other parts of the world. We can give an
opportunity here to that same model that I mentioned a moment
ago--for what the Pope did throughout Eastern Europe, which we
collectively have amnesia about when it comes to Cuba.
Mr. Menendez. Mr. Neal, I would like to address that
question--if I may. First of all, as you know, I have a great
deal of respect for the work we have mutually done on promoting
peace and justice in Northern Ireland.
Mr. Neal. Nobody in this house has done a better job than
you have, Mr. Menendez.
Mr. Menendez. I appreciate that. So I know where you're
coming from. I want to preface my remarks by that. Let me just
simply say the following: The Pope's visit, and what he sought,
is much different than the Pope's visit in 1979 to Poland and
what was done throughout Eastern Europe. Our support of
solidarity, overtly and covertly, our support of others in
Hungary and the Czech Republic is much different than what the
church--if you read the Holy Father's own book in the context
of what he did with the Reagan administration, in covert
operations in Poland. You will see a very dramatic difference.
You will see a very dramatic difference in the statements that
are made directly about democracy.
I agree with you. The Holy Father did not embrace Fidel
Castro's policy. But the church in Cuba is different than the
church in Poland. So there are differences.
Last, with reference to your point about this not being
about Castro; but about helping the Cuban people. We, in fact,
are helping the Cuban people. Nobody ever talks about
provisions like section 109 in the Helms-Burton Act, which I
helped write. This section is, in fact, about assisting the
Cuban people. It is about providing humanitarian assistance to
the Cuban people. And it is about giving them, in a wide
variety of ways, assistance that is humanitarian and also
democracy provoking.
The point is that when we say this is not about Cuba--if we
were to lift the embargo totally tomorrow, you need hard
currency unless we're just going to give dramatic credits--
millions of dollars' worth of credits--you need hard currency
to purchase, whether it be from a U.S. company or the same
German company that my dear colleague from California
mentioned, you need the hard currency. And if you don't have
hard currency, you cannot purchase the goods that you need,
which goes back to Castro's economic reform. I'm not even
talking about political human rights, which I agree with, of
course, but talking about economic reform that would produce
the hard currency that could produce the purchases, even under
our present system.
Mr. Neal. Thank you, Mr. Menendez. And we also will refer
in the future--it's going to be Helms-Thomas---- [Laughter.]
Chairman Crane. Folks, let me interrupt for a moment here,
because I know that Mr. Shaw and Mr. Jefferson have questions
too. But, we're down to about 6 minutes; it's raining outside;
we're going to have to go underground for the vote. So, I think
we had best recess the Subcommittee and come back here----
Mr. Shaw. Mr. Chairman, could I ask that these witnesses--I
just have an observation that, I think, should be made at this
point. And I wasn't going to make this observation until I saw
the amused atmosphere of the audience in this room, and then I
looked down on the witness list--O'Leary, Berry, Muse, Kav--one
I can't even pronounce--Barnes, Quigley, Wilhelm, Fuller,
Gary--where are the Cuban-Americans? The Cuban-Americans are
the three people right there that are taking a strong position
on behalf of the Cuban people right here at our witness table.
I think, and I know, and know in the spirit of the Cuban-
American people, that if we had a second hearing on this, you
couldn't even get into the hall it would be so jammed with
members of the Cuban community just out of Dade County. No, the
Cuban future is not going to be decided in Miami; it is going
to be decided in Cuba. And that's the way it should be.
But I think that we need to be sure that we listen to the
Cuban-American people; those that have experienced the
suffering; those as Mr. Menendez says, whose family is still
living there; Mr. Diaz-Balart and Ileana--the witness that they
have given us and the emotion that they have given us shows
this is the land of their fathers and this is something that, I
think, ought to carry a definite weight.
I commend them for their statements, I commend them for
being here today, and I would like to associate with their
remarks. It's been a lot of hemorrhaging, a lot of suffering,
but let's not give it up now. We are winning now and we are
seeing that Castro is beginning to almost beg and I think it's
time for us to stand firm for democracy in Cuba.
Mr. Jefferson. Mr. Chairman, I don't expect these witnesses
to come back just to hear from me. So I suppose I might as well
say something and get that done, so they can stay away from
this Subcommittee--I suppose, what they'd like to do.
This debate--this discussion--debate--has been quite
interesting and quite enlightening. I think the great weight of
the trend in the Congress and in the country is away from the
idea of unilateral sanctions. Lee Hamilton and Gilman right now
have a bill in to study the whole issue. There have been great
pronouncements made about the cost of unilateral sanctions to
our country and the ineffectiveness of it.
I haven't been to Cuba, I haven't smoked a cigar, or had
any brandy with anybody. But I know the way things are
trending. In Iraq just recently, a country we just recently had
war with, we lifted the sanctions for humanitarian purposes--
let them sell oil for food. We, in Vietnam, a country we had
war with, we just normalized our relations with respect to
trade investment. And just done yesterday, we have a thing
called Gum Araby--we made the exception that you were leaning
on for a bill against the Sudanese which--further sanctions
against them. We made the exception, therefore--a substance
that simply makes sodas and plastics and a few other things,
which in no wise gets as high on the radar screen for human
beings as drugs, whatever.
It's a complex issue and I hope we'll have a chance to
discuss it further. I wish we could ask you questions about it,
but thank you, Mr. Chairman, for letting me speak.
Chairman Crane. Thank you. Folks, we're going to stand and
recess subject to the call of the Chair and I think we only
have about 3 minutes left.
[Recess.]
Chairman Crane. Please be seated. And our next witness is
Michael Ranneberger, Coordinator, Cuban Affairs, U.S.
Department of State. And you may proceed when ready, Mr.
Ranneberger and my understanding is you have a plane to catch
too, so if you see those little lights in front of you and the
red one goes on, try to terminate. Any printed statement will
be a part of the permanent record.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL RANNEBERGER, COORDINATOR, CUBAN AFFAIRS,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Ranneberger. OK. Mr. Chairman, Members of Congress,
good afternoon and thank you for the opportunity to speak to
you today on the subject of the U.S. economic and trade policy
toward Cuba.
I would like to make brief remarks now and then submit this
more comprehensive statement for the record and I look forward
to your questions. I do have some time.
To begin with, I want to establish the context for our Cuba
policy. In his statement of March 20, President Clinton said,
and I quote, ``The people of Cuba continue to live under a
regime which deprives them of their freedom and denies them
economic opportunity. The overarching goal of American policy
must be to promote a peaceful transition to democracy on the
island.''
Today, in Cuba, there are 400 to 500 political prisoners.
These are individuals imprisoned because of their beliefs and
their efforts to express peaceful dissent. I think when we're
talking about economic issues today, it's particularly
appropriate to mention the case of Marta Beatrice Roke, who is
a leading economist in Cuba and a founding member of the
dissident working group. Once a respected economics professor
at the University of Havana, Marta Beatrice Roke has been in
prison for at least the last 9 months because she wrote an
independent critique of government economic plans. She sought
only to express her views of the Cuban economy. She is
currently in prison and is gravely ill and has not been given
adequate medical attention. I want to take this opportunity to
reiterate in strongest terms our request that she be released.
As the President said, our goal in Cuba is to promote a
peaceful transition to democracy and respect for human rights.
We do this through four essential elements: Pressure on the
Cuban Government through the Embargo and Libertad Act;
development of a multilateral effort to promote democracy;
support for the Cuban people, consistent with the 1992 Cuban
Democracy Act and the Libertad Act; and measures to keep
migration and safe legal and orderly channels. The President
has also clearly stated that the United States would respond
reciprocally if the Cuban Government implemented fundamental
systemic change. But Cuba has not done so.
We recognize the importance of the historic visit of Pope
John Paul II to Cuba. The Pope brought a message of truth,
hope, and support for the Cuban people. His presence in Cuba
was simply electrifying. I, myself, was also at the Mass in
Revolution Square--I was there when Congressman Neal was
there--and it was truly impressive to see at least half a
million Cubans listening to, welcoming, and cheering the Pope's
message, which was a forceful direct call for freedom and human
rights.
The measures the President announced on March 20 are
designed to support the Cuban people and to assist in the
development of independent civil society. I want to emphasize,
as the Secretary of State said in announcing those measures,
``They do not reflect a change in policy toward the Cuban
Government. That policy has been, and remains, to seek a
peaceful transition to democracy.''
Before turning specifically to the Cuba issue, let me touch
briefly on U.S. sanctions policy. As Under Secretary Eizenstat
has explained, economic sanctions can be, and are, a valuable
tool for enforcing international norms and protecting our
national interest. We should, however, resort to sanctions only
after other appropriate diplomatic options have been
aggressively pursued and have failed, or would be inadequate.
Although in many instances engagement can be preferable to
isolation, in the case of some world regimes, engagement would
simply feed the regime's appetite for inappropriate and
dangerous behavior.
For three decades the fundamental premise of our policy
toward Cuba has been that the current Cuban Government will not
institute political and economic change unless it has to and it
will go only as far as it has to in order to maintain absolute
control. Therefore, if we want to see fundamental change in
Cuba, pressure is necessary.
The administration continues to believe that maintaining
pressure on the Cuban Government for fundamental change through
economic sanctions is essential. The increased penalties and
clarifications in title I of the Libertad Act helped send the
message that violations of the embargo will not be tolerated.
Since I'm running out of time, I won't comment more
extensively on the Libertad Act at this time. But let me say
that, as a result of the multilateral efforts that we have
launched pursuant to the Libertad Act, we have had dramatic
results in getting countries throughout the world to increase
pressure on the Castro regime for change. The European Union
has adopted the historic common position, and has established a
human rights working group in Cuba.
I also want to add, and there's an extensive section here
for the record, on our efforts to support the Cuban people. The
President has taken a number of steps as early as October 1995
to expand people to people contacts. And our March 20 measures,
Mr. Chairman, are intended to pursue that line. That is, to
enhance support for the Cuban people so that they can build the
kind of independent society that will be essential for a
democratic transition.
We have also--let me just add in closing--committed to work
with the Congress on bipartisan legislation to help increase
support for the Cuban people, on a bipartisan basis.
[The prepared statement follows:]
Statement of Michael Ranneberger, Coordinator, Cuban Affairs, U.S.
Department of State
Introduction
Mr. Chairman, Members of Congress. Good afternoon and thank
you for the opportunity to speak to you today on the subject of
U.S. economic and trade policy toward Cuba. I would like to
make brief remarks and submit this more comprehensive statement
for the record. I look forward to your questions.
U.S. Cuba Policy
To begin, I want to establish the context for our Cuba
policy. In his statement of March 20, President Clinton said:
``The people of Cuba continue to live under a regime which
deprives them of their freedom and denies them economic
opportunity. The overarching goal of American policy must be to
promote a peaceful transition to democracy on the island.''
The Cuban government continues to be one of the most
repressive regimes in the world. It does not listen to or
respond to the voices of its people. There is no free press or
political opposition, no private sector or independent civil
society that can publicly discuss or criticize government
policies.
Today in Cuba there are 400-500 political prisoners. These
are individuals imprisoned because of their beliefs and their
efforts to express them peacefully--actions that are legal and
normal in our free societies. In this hearing on economic
policy, I would like to draw your attention to one of these
individuals, an economist, Marta Beatriz Roque, a founding
member of the ``Dissident Working Group.''
Once a respected economics professor at the University of
Havana, Marta Beatriz Roque is imprisoned because she wrote an
independent critique of government economic plans. She sought
only to express her views of the Cuban economy, pointing out
serious problems with its central planing policies. Cuban
authorities have denied her adequate medical care and she is
seriously ill. We call on the Cuban government to release Marta
Beatriz Roque, to ensure that she receives adequate medical
care, and to allow her to carry out her peaceful activities.
As the President said, our goal in Cuba is to promote a
peaceful transition to democracy and respect for human rights.
We do this through four essential elements: pressure on the
Cuban government through the embargo and the Libertad Act;
development of a multilateral effort to promote democracy;
support for the Cuban people consistent with the 1992 Cuban
Democracy Act (CDA) and the Libertad Act; and measures to keep
migration in safe, legal, and orderly channels. We also seek,
through the Libertad Act, to protect the legitimate interests
of U.S. citizens whose property has been expropriated in Cuba.
The President has also clearly stated that the United
States would respond reciprocally if the Cuban government
implemented fundamental, systemic change. Cuba has not done so.
Papal Visit and March 20 Measures
We recognize the importance of the historic visit of Pope
John Paul II to Cuba. The Pope brought a message of truth, hope
and support for the Cuban people--his presence in Cuba was
electrifying. I attended the Mass in Revolution Square and was
deeply moved by the sight of at least half a million Cubans
listening to, welcoming, and cheering the Pope's forceful,
direct call for freedom and human rights. During those moments
the people of Cuba held the attention of all of us who care
about their struggle for freedom and justice. We must continue
to support them in their aspirations.
The measure the President announced March 20 are designed
to support the Cuban people and to assist in the development of
independent civil society. I want to emphasize, as the
Secretary said, that the measures ``do not reflect a change in
policy toward the Cuban government. That policy has been, and
remains, to seek a peaceful transition to democracy.'' I will
discuss the March 20 measures in greater detail later.
U.S. Sanctions Policy
Before turning specifically to Cuban issues, let me touch
briefly on U.S. sanctions policy. Under Secretary Stuart
Eizenstat testified on this subject before your subcommittee in
October. I will not attempt to review all of Under Secretary
Eizenstat's excellent statement, but I want to highlight a few
of the points he made that apply especially to Cuba.
As Under Secretary Eizenstat explained, economic sanctions
can be and are a valuable tool for enforcing international
norms and protecting our national interests. We should,
however, resort to sanctions only after other appropriate
diplomatic options have been aggressively pursued and have
failed, or would be inadequate. Although, in many instances,
engagement can be preferable to isolation, in the case of some
rogue regimes, engagement would simply feed the regime's
appetite for inappropriate or dangerous behavior.
As Under Secretary Eizenstat said, while there are
advantages to multilateral sanctions, there are times when
important national interests or core values are at issue that
we must be prepared to act unilaterally. There can be no ``one-
size fits all'' approach. The President must have the
flexibility to tailor our response to specific situations.
Sanctions are used for a variety of purposes, including:
--to punish a country for unacceptable behavior;
--to influence the behavior of a target country;
--to signal disapproval of a government's behavior;
--as a necessary early reaction and as a warning that
harsher measures could follow;
--to limit a target state's freedom of action;
--to deny resources or technology;
--to increase the cost of engaging in unacceptable
behavior;
--to draw international attention to unacceptable behavior;
--to challenge our allies to take more forceful action
themselves in support of common objectives;
--or at times, simply to signal that a business-as-usual
approach to a government that violates core values is not
acceptable.
As U/S Eizenstat noted, our Cuba policy is illustrative of
one of the principal goals of economic sanctions--to encourage
our friends and allies to adopt policies that can advance our
common interests. Our allies and major trading partners
disagree with our embargo of Cuba and have urged us to change
or alter the provisions of the Libertad Act.
At the same time, our allies have said they agree with us
on the key goal of encouraging democracy and human rights in
Cuba. Even when supporting Cuba's resolution at the UN General
Assembly against the U.S. embargo of Cuba, the EU made clear
its opposition to Cuba's human rights policies. In explaining
the vote of EU member in favor of Cuba's resolution,
Luxembourg, in its role of President of the European Union,
issued a strong condemnation of Cuba's human rights record,
noting concern about the ``persistent absence of progress
towards democracy,'' ``non-respect for political rights,''
``increasing violations of civil and political rights,'' and
``harassment of those who seek to bring democracy to Cuba by
peaceful means.''
The Embargo and The Cuban Economy
For three decades, a fundamental premise of our policy
toward Cuba has been that the current Cuban government will not
institute political and economic change unless it has to, and
it will go only as far as it has to in order to maintain
absolute control. Therefore, if we want to see fundamental
change in Cuba occur, pressure is necessary.
The U. S. policy of applying economic pressure originated
soon after Fidel Castro came to power in 1959. The embargo
formally began under President Kennedy, and has been supported
by all successive Presidents.
One of the major reasons for the imposition of the embargo
was the Cuban government's failure to compensate thousands of
U.S. companies and individuals whose properties, large and
small, were confiscated after the revolution. The Cuban
government specifically targeted and took properties owned by
U.S. nationals. Under the Cuba claims program in the 1960's,
the U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC) certified
5911 valid claims by U.S. nationals against the Government of
Cuba. The Castro government also took property from thousands
of Cubans, some of whom have since become U.S. citizens.
The impact of the embargo was somewhat offset during the
Cold War years by $5-6 billion annually in Soviet subsidies,
but these ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union and other
European Communist regimes in the early 1990's. Cuba suffered a
35% decline in Gross Domestic Product between 1989 and 1993,
revealing an inherently dysfunctional economy. Food shortages
and failure of basic public services led to disturbances which
threatened to challenge the regime.
These problems, coupled with the continuing embargo, forced
the Cuban government to undertake very limited economic reforms
to enable it to survive. The Cuban government in the mid-1990's
permitted Cubans to offer certain services privately under
strict government scrutiny, but in 1997 introduced heavy taxes
which forced many out of business. It appears that employment
in this sector peaked in 1996 at around 206,000 and fell in
1997 to about 170,000. In 1994, the government introduced
agricultural markets at which state and private farmers could
sell surplus products at market prices after delivering the
required quota to the state, which helped to alleviate grave
food shortages and nutritional problems.
Cuba has actively sought foreign tourism and investment,
while continuing to forbid private investment by Cuban
citizens. It succeeded in attracting a limited amount of
investment, but its overall ``investment climate'' remains
hostile to private enterprise.
In 1993, the Cuban government made it legal for its
citizens to possess and use the U.S. dollar, which has become
the major currency. Cuban failure to launch serious economic
reforms has led to the development of a large black market and
growing corruption. Those with access to dollars can purchase
imported goods at government-run dollar stores. To earn dollar
tips, many skilled doctors, teachers, engineers, and scientists
are working in restaurants or as taxi drivers.
Nevertheless, under the slogan ``socialism or death,'' the
Cuban government has resisted any credible effort to adopt
market-based policies and continues to tight state control of
its highly centralized economy. Over eighty percent of the
labor force is employed by the state.
The Embargo and The Libertad Act
Seeking to hasten a democratic transition in Cuba, Congress
passed in 1992 the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA), which tightened
the embargo by prohibiting U.S.-owned or controlled
subsidiaries located abroad from doing business with Cuba. The
Act also provided for avenues to support the Cuban people,
which, as I noted above, constitute a principal focus of our
policy.
As change continued in Eastern Europe in the 1990's, but
not in Cuba, concerned Members of Congress sought to develop
ways to both deal with the continuing expropriation problem and
apply additional pressure for peaceful change on the Cuban
government. This led to the development of the ``Cuban Liberty
and Democratic Solidarity Act,'' called the ``Libertad Act,''
and known as the Helms-Burton Act after its principal sponsors.
When in February 1996 Cuban MiGs shot down two civilian
aircraft in international air space, killing three U.S.
citizens and one resident, Congress passed this act by
overwhelming margins. The President signed it into law on March
12, 1996.
Title I of the Libertad Act, for the first time, codified
the embargo. The Act specifies conditions under which the
embargo can be lifted or suspended once a new Cuban government
begins implementing a genuine transition to democracy. The
Administration believes that until Cuba is engaged in a process
of democratization, which includes free and fair elections,
respect for human rights and due process of law, just to
mention a few elements, the embargo should be maintained.
Title I of the Act also strengthens enforcement of the
embargo by expanding the civil enforcement authority available
to the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the
Department of the Treasury, which is charged with enforcing the
restrictions on financial transactions with Cuba. The State
Department strongly supports the embargo enforcement efforts of
OFAC, the Department of Commerce, and the U.S. Customs Service.
The Administration continues to believe that maintaining
pressure on the Cuban government for fundamental change through
economic sanctions is essential. The increased penalties and
clarifications in Title I of the Libertad Act help send the
message that violations of the embargo will not be tolerated.
Equally important, we work closely with OFAC and the
Department of Commerce on license requests for humanitarian
assistance, as encouraged by the Cuban Democracy Act and the
Libertad Act.
Helms-Burton and the Multilateral Initiative
Perhaps the best known and most controversial aspects of
the Libertad Act are Titles III, which created a private cause
of action in U.S. courts, and Title IV, which prohibits visas
and entry in to the United States to those who ``traffic'' in
confiscated property claimed by a U.S. national. These
provisions prompted the European Union to initiate a complaint
against the U.S. in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Canada
and Mexico called for consultations under the provisions of
NAFTA.
The President allowed the Title III lawsuit provisions to
enter into force on August 1, 1996. At the same time, because
of the intense interest in the Act among our allies and trading
partners, he saw an opportunity to increase international
pressure for change through a U.S.-led multilateral initiative
to promote democracy in Cuba. In order to achieve this, the
President in July 1996 suspended the right to file suit under
Title III for six months, effective August 1, while calling on
our friends and allies to step up efforts to promote a
transition to democracy in Cuba. This initiative has changed
the terms of the international debate about Cuba.
We have been able to manage this serious disagreement with
close friends and trading partners and advance the President's
multilateral initiative to promote democracy in Cuba. Under
Secretary Eizenstat reached an ``Understanding'' with the EU in
April 1997 under which the EU agreed to suspend its WTO case
and step up its efforts to promote democracy in Cuba. The
parties also agreed to negotiate disciplines on property
confiscated in contravention of international law, including
property in Cuba, and principles on conflicting jurisdictions.
These discussions are in a crucial phase and, if an agreement
is reached, the administration will discuss with Congress the
possibility of obtaining authority to waive Title IV of the
Act.
The multilateral initiative to promote democracy has
resulted in several important steps to promote democracy in
Cuba. Perhaps the most important of these is the European
Union's Common Position, which links improved relations with
Cuba to fundamental democratic changes. The EU nations also
created a Human Rights Working Group among their embassies in
Havana to increase contact with dissidents, human rights
groups, and independent elements of civil society. They have
forcefully called for the Cuban government to release political
prisoners. In addition, Under Secretary Eizenstat's visit to
four Central American countries last year energized their
efforts to promote change in Cuba; leaders of these nations
have spoken out. At the United Nations General Assembly in
December 1997, more countries than ever before co-sponsored the
U.S. resolution on the human rights situation in Cuba. The Cuba
resolution at the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva this
year had 27 cosponsors, including many key EU allies,
although--tragically--it did not pass. The Department issued a
statement expressing its concern that some members of the
commission chose to turn their backs on the suffering of the
Cuban people. We believe it is unconscionable that the vote
will end the mandate of the UN Special Rapporteur in Cuba.
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are increasing their
support for peaceful, democratic change on the island. Pax
Christi, the Dutch human rights organization, is leading a
coalition of European NGO's to focus on the deplorable human
rights situation in Cuba, and has held two major conferences.
In August 1997, Amnesty International issued a special 38-page
report entitled ``Cuba: Renewed Crackdown on Peaceful
Government Critics,'' which documented the Cuban government's
campaign against those who work for human rights and democracy.
In August 1997, the American Bar Association awarded its annual
``International Human Rights Award'' to Dr. Rene Gomez Manzano
and Dr. Leonel Morejon Almagro, two members of the Dissident
Working Group in Cuba who were unable to receive the award
because they had been arrested by the Cuban government.
As a result of these efforts--the rhetoric of the Cuban
regime notwithstanding--Cuba is hearing a concerted message on
the need for fundamental, democratic, systemic change.
Title IV Enforcement
Through a special unit established in the Office of Cuban
Affairs, the Department continues to implement Title IV of the
Libertad Act based on facts and the terms of the law.
--Determinations have been made involving three companies:
Sherritt International of Canada, Grupo Domos of Mexico, and BM
Group, an Israeli-owned firm registered in Panama, and over 15
executives and their family members have been excluded from
entry into the U.S. Because Grupo Domos has presented evidence
that it is no longer involved with U.S.-claimed property in
Cuba, the company's executives are once again eligible to enter
the U.S.
--Implementation efforts have had a significant negative
impact on the Cuban economy. Since enactment of the Act,
nineteen firms from over ten countries have changed their plans
for investment in Cuba or have pulled out of investments there.
There are many indications that the investment environment in
Cuba is unstable and risky. Interest rates for projects in Cuba
have been driven to as high as 22%. The Cuban government is
finding it more difficult to obtain financing, and potential
investors face the same problem.
--As part of our investigative effort, we have contacted an
additional twelve companies from seven countries about their
activities in Cuba. Companies may provide additional
information to demonstrate that their activities are not
covered under the Act, or they can explain their plans to
discontinue activity in Cuba in order to avoid Title IV action.
Among companies contacted for additional information, as the
press has reported, have been three firms involved with
petroleum exploration. As a result, one has already ceased its
operations in Cuba.
In addition to seeking information from claimants about
their claims, we are making maximum use of the limited amount
of information available from all sources on foreign investment
in Cuba. The Cuban government claims there are over 300 joint
ventures with foreign firms, without regard to whether they are
involved with U.S.-claimed property. We believe this number is
inflated, but we are developing a database to track activities
of joint ventures and gather information on the location of
property subject to certified claims. Gathering reliable
information is a difficult and time-consuming process.
Other Aspects of Economic Policy Toward Cuba
Before I describe in more detail our efforts to provide
humanitarian assistance to the Cuban people, I want also to
touch on other aspects of economic policy, some of which are
also contained in the Libertad Act. The United States opposes
reintegration of the current Cuban government into
international financial institutions and regional economic
groupings. We are urging the European Union, for example, to
apply to Cuba the human rights and democracy standards of the
Lome Convention, under which the EU provides economic benefits
to developing nations, as it considers Cuba's application to
join the Lome Convention.
The U.S. discourages companies from other countries from
investing in Cuba. Under the current regime in Cuba, such
investment tends to increase the power and control of the Cuban
government rather than benefit the people.
We recognize, however, that some companies from other
countries are investing in Cuba. As part of the multilateral
initiative to promote democracy in Cuba, Under Secretary
Eizenstat is leading an effort to press businesses in Cuba not
involved with contacted property to recognize and promote
``best business practices.'' These are fundamental rights taken
for granted in the Western world that the Cuban government does
not acknowledge, such as free speech and association; the right
to join an independent labor union; and even the right to hire
and pay an employee directly without intervention from the
State. The Trans Atlantic Business Dialogue, the North American
Committee of the National Policy Association, and the Dutch
human rights organization, Pax Christi, have all endorsed this
concept and are encouraging companies operating in Cuba to
implement best business practices.
Support for the Cuban People
A fundamental aspect of U.S. policy toward Cuba is to
provide support for the Cuban people, without supporting the
Cuban government. This focus has been a key element of our
policy for most of this decade beginning with the Cuban
Democracy Act of 1992. These efforts were strengthened by
President Clinton's initiatives in October 1995 to encourage
human rights organizations and other non-governmental groups
and individuals in the U.S. to develop contacts on the island.
Those steps complemented earlier efforts to improve
telecommunications service between the U.S. and Cuba, and to
encourage private humanitarian donations to NGOs in Cuba. The
1995 initiatives included licensing U.S. NGOs to assist
independent Cuban NGOs; allowing sales and donations of
communications equipment to Cuban NGOs; authorizing
establishment of news bureaus; increasing academic, cultural,
and educational exchanges; and allowing under a general
Treasury license once-a-year family visits to Cuba in cases of
humanitarian emergencies.
Since the October 1995 measures were announced, the
Administration has licensed dozens of trips, programs and other
activities by NGOs and institutions in the U.S. aimed at
strengthening independent civil society. Several U.S. NGOs have
begun sharing expertise and modest resources with Cuban
partners, American students and teachers are meeting with their
peers, and U.S. professionals and researchers are establishing
contacts and cooperation with colleagues on the island.
To foster the development of independent civil society in
Cuba through support for the Cuban people, the Department works
through a program administered by the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), pursuant to Section 109 of
the Libertad Act. With valuable input from many agencies and
the Congress, since it began in the fall of 1995, $2.45 million
has been approved for U.S. NGOs under this program. Of that, $2
million has been approved in the last 12 months. An additional
$1.8 million in new project proposals is under review.
These projects are wide-ranging, promoting the free flow of
information to, from, and within Cuba. Among other activities,
they will enable independent community grassroots organizers,
professional organizations, and the private agricultural sector
to meet their counterparts in Latin America, the Caribbean and
the U.S.; facilitate contact between Cuban environmentalists
and environmental NGO's in other countries; and promote best
business practices for foreign investors not involved in
confiscated property to follow inside Cuba in order to promote
workers' rights.
The Department takes very seriously its responsibility to
assist in the provision of humanitarian assistance to the Cuban
people. We work closely with the Department of the Treasury's
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and with the Department
of Commerce to ensure appropriate licenses are issued. Since
the passage of the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) in 1992, OFAC and
the Department of Commerce have issued 50 licenses for exports
of medicines and medical equipment from U.S. companies or US-
owned subsidiaries, subject to appropriate end-use monitoring.
These licenses include 12 authorizations for travel to Cuba by
representatives of American pharmaceutical companies to explore
possible sales. Since the passage of the CDA in 1992 over $2
billion in humanitarian donations has been licensed, including
nearly $275 million for medicines and medical equipment, and
$13 million in food. The United States is the largest donor of
humanitarian assistance to Cuba.
March 20 Measures
Pope John Paul spoke eloquently on the need to respect
human rights and fundamental freedoms, to release prisoners of
conscience, and to allow the development of independent civil
society. When Secretary of State Albright met with the Pontiff
in Rome, she discussed prospects for change in Cuba. The Pope
was optimistic, speaking of the crowds who attended masses
throughout the island, culminating in the huge mass in
Revolution Square in Havana. John Paul II has publicly made
clear his hope that his visit will propel Cuba toward a process
of fundamental change, just as his first visit to Poland did.
This historic visit left us with a challenge--how to
sustain the religious opening created by the Pope's visit, how
to increase support for the Cuban people, and how to encourage
a process of fundamental change without providing resources
which will prop up Castro's regime. We believe the measures
announced March 20 will do that.
The new measures are a strong response to the Pope's visit,
and enhance support for the Cuban people in their aspiration
for a peaceful democratic transition.
As the Secretary of State said on March 20, we are taking
these steps ``to empower Cuban citizens .... (and) not because
of anything the Castro regime has done...'' In announcing his
decision on March 20, President Clinton said: ``To build
further on the impact of the Pope's visit, to support the role
of the Church and other elements of civil society in Cuba, and
to thereby help prepare the Cuban people for a democratic
transition, I have decided to take the following steps:''
1. First, the resumption of licensing direct humanitarian
charter flights to Cuba. Direct humanitarian flights under
applicable agency regulations will make it easier for Cuban-
Americans to visit family on the island, and for humanitarian
organizations to provide needed assistance more expeditiously
and at lower cost.
2. Second, establishing new licensing arrangements to
permit Cuban Americans and Cuban families living here in the
United States to send humanitarian remittances to their
families in Cuba at the level of $300 per quarter, as was
permitted until August 1994. This will enable Cuban-Americans
to provide direct support to close relatives in Cuba, while
moving the current large flow of remittances back into legal,
orderly channels.
3. Third, streamlining and expediting the issuance of
licenses for the sale of medicines and medical supplies and
equipment to Cuba. Based on experience of the past several
years, including during the Papal visit, we believe that the
end-use verification called for in the Cuban Democracy Act can
be met through simplified arrangements.
The Departments of the Treasury, Commerce, and State are
developing and will announce the new arrangements in these
areas in the coming weeks.
As you can see from my review of these measures, we have
not altered the fundamentals of U.S. policy toward Cuba. The
measures are being taken using Treasury and Commerce licensing
authorities and are fully consistent with the Cuban Democracy
Act of 1992 and the Libertad Act of 1996.
What's Next?
What does the future hold for U.S. economic policy toward
Cuba? The Castro regime is under more international pressure
than ever before to respect human rights and implement
democratic change, in part because of our multilateral
initiative. We plan to keep up that pressure on the Cuban
government.
In January 1997 the President submitted to Congress and
released publicly a major report entitled ``Support for a
Democratic Transition in Cuba,'' as mandated by Title II of the
Libertad Act. To develop the plan, an inter-agency team drew on
lessons learned from assistance programs to Latin American
countries and the former Communist countries of Eastern Europe.
The transition plan describes the many issues that will
confront a democratic transition government in Cuba, and how
the United States and other nations will be able to assist. The
report indicates that a democratic transition government can
expect to receive $4-$6 billion in private assistance, loans,
and grants from international financial institutions and other
donors over a six year period following the establishment of a
transition government. The report is an incentive to all those
in Cuba who favor a democratic transition.
We have translated the report into Spanish, and over 10,000
copies have been distributed in Cuba. Radio Marti has described
the plan to the Cuban people. The extent to which the Cuban
government fears the impact of this message was evident from
the vitriolic propaganda offensive the Cuban government
launched against it. Castro required military officers to sign
loyalty oaths specifically denouncing the transition report.
As we implement our Cuba policy, we must find creative ways
to increase support for the Cuban people while maintaining
pressure on the Cuban government for fundamental, systemic
change. We should strive to do that on the bipartisan basis
that has characterized our Cuba policy for decades. In that
way, we will maintain international leadership on this issue.
And we will send a strong, effective message to the Cuban
government, the Cuban people, and the world. Thank you.
Chairman Crane. Mr. Ranneberger, how can U.S. policy ensure
that humanitarian assistance provided to the Cuban people
reaches them, and is not intercepted by Castro to sell for his
own profit or made available only to Communist Party elites and
foreign visitors.
Mr. Ranneberger. That is a key issue, Congressman, and what
has been happening, as I think was mentioned here, there has
been over $2 billion in humanitarian assistance licensed since
1992. And what happens is that assistance is sent to Cuba by
U.S. nongovernmental groups. Most of those groups then go to
Cuba at different times to monitor how that aid is used. That's
particularly true of the church groups, so it's the World
Council of Churches or Catholic Relief Services, as well as
other nongovernmental groups. And of course, international
agencies do that as well. So there is, in fact, I think, a good
record regarding how that is used and we need to have that
continuing kind of scrutiny.
Chairman Crane. Do you believe that the opposition of our
trading partners and allies to the Helms-Burton legislation has
interfered with our ability to call for an international
consensus on dealing with other rogue regimes, like Iraq?
Mr. Ranneberger. Well, clearly, I think, the allies are
upset with our sanctions policy worldwide. And I think this is
a real important point to bear in mind. The allies are not, in
my judgment, primarily upset with the Helms-Burton legislation.
There is--keep in mind that the U.S. Government at this moment
maintains over 60 sanctioned regimes throughout the world. So,
the use of sanctions is quite pervasive as an element of
policy.
I think that's what you see U.S. allies--whether in Europe
or Latin America--concerned about. So that, yes, use of
sanctions does affect our ability to work with them.
What we have tried to do in the Cuba case, is to develop a
multilateral effort and to negotiate our differences with the
allies. And we've actually had some success on that. I think
you may be aware that Under Secretary Eizenstat has been in
close discussions with the European Union to try to reach an
agreement by which we would set aside our differences on title
IV of the Libertad Act. At the same time, the President, of
course, has suspended the title III provisions and has told the
allies if they do work to step up pressure on the Castro regime
for change, we will continue to suspend that. And we have seen
a number of steps. So, I would say that we've used the Libertad
Act, I would say, creatively and effectively to try to actually
get increased cooperation with the allies. But, resolving these
differences over title IV is crucial to that.
Chairman Crane. Thank you.
Mr. Rangel.
Mr. Rangel. The present administration should be
congratulated for relaxing some of the rules as relates to
travel and allowing Cuban-Americans to send moneys back to
Cuba. Has this caused any adverse affect at all in our foreign
policy--the President's actions?
Mr. Ranneberger. No. It has not. I think it's been welcomed
by the rest of the world community.
Mr. Rangel. Are there any other positive steps toward
normalization that we should know about?
Mr. Ranneberger. No, there are not, Congressman. I do want
to clarify here, with all due respect, this is not a step
toward normalization and I really want to emphasize that point
in the strongest terms, because----
Mr. Rangel. Does the administration oppose normalization?
Mr. Ranneberger. We don't oppose normalization if it's done
under the right conditions, and that is, that there is
democratic change underway in Cuba.
Mr. Rangel. The goal is normalization.
Mr. Ranneberger. The ultimate goal of our relationship is
normalization with a democratic Cuba, yes sir.
Mr. Rangel. And sending money there and allowing people to
travel there to visit their loved ones is not interfering with
the goal of normalization?
Mr. Ranneberger. No, and in fact, I think it supports it by
giving the Cuban people a degree of freedom from the Cuban
Government. It helps them to have greater options, how they're
going to approach those items, and that sort of thing, and
that's why we've done it.
Mr. Rangel. So that if we were to have direct flights and
to make it easier for people to visit and perhaps to have
students--to be able to have student exchange and artists to go
over--those things would not adversely affect our overall goal
of normalization, would it?
Mr. Ranneberger. Of course, everything depends--it's very
hard to respond to a general statement--everything depends on
how something is done. But let me point out that, right now, we
have an extensive exchange program with the Cuban people. Last
year alone, I think we issued over 1,200 visas to Cuban
scientists, artists, doctors, cultural figures, and the like.
I'd have to get the exact figure. So that is an ongoing process
and I would agree with you that that supports what we're trying
to do, which is encourage independence in Cuban society,
encourage people to think independently, and therefore lay the
groundwork for a democratic transition.
Mr. Rangel. So if we had legislation as we do pending that
would allow food and medicine and medical equipment to be
exempted from the embargo, that would not impede our long-range
goal toward normalization, would it?
Mr. Ranneberger. Well, that's--I really would prefer today
not to get into the specific legislation, but as you know, I
think, there are four bills either on the floor or in the
process--there's going to be--on Cuba issues. I think we'll
need to look closely at the content of those and the President
has said that he wants to work with the Congress on bipartisan
legislation. So, we are going to be looking at that. I'd prefer
not to comment on a specific detail until we start to engage
with the Congress, which will be soon, on that issue.
Mr. Rangel. Could you share what progress has been made
with our European friends as relates to relaxing the Helms-
Burton law?
Mr. Ranneberger. I can to a degree, Congressman. Those
negotiations are in what we hope will be their final stages
right now. I don't--there's no deadline to finish that--but
they're certainly moving along. And we have had a good deal of
progress. I wouldn't want to say that we're going to reach an
agreement. There's still some difficult outstanding issues. But
what we've done basically is to get close to a framework in
which there will be international investment disciplines which
would significantly deter foreign companies from investing
anywhere in the world, not just Cuba. This won't be Cuba
specific, but it will apply in a big way to Cuba, in
confiscated property. And we're close to putting that kind of
framework together. What you would have is, you would have
penalties in effect, for companies who did invest in
confiscated property.
Mr. Rangel. As a diplomat, would you describe this policy
that we've had with Cuba for the last 35 years as a successful
foreign policy?
Mr. Ranneberger. Well, I think it's been a policy that has
had significant impact on Cuba. If you define success as a
democratic Cuba, of course, I have to say it has not been
successful. I guess when I'm often asked that question, and I
am, of course, I tend to say well what is the alternative. And
this is an argument--you're not making it--but others have said
the sort of overall engagement with the Cuban Government is the
way to do--you sort of embrace them--love them to death, so to
speak.
My response to that is that that's been going on now for
3\1/2\ decades by most of the world. I mean, you've had many
world leaders who have been down there. They've spent 8, 10,
12, 14 hours talking to Castro. It has not resulted in an iota
of change in that political system. So, I think our policy has
as much chance of success as an engagement policy and I would
point out that our policy has only really had a biting impact
since the Soviet subsidies have ended. That is a very important
point.
Mr. Rangel. And you see a major difference between how we
deal with Communist Cuba and how we deal with Communist China
and Communist North Vietnam and Communist North Korea? Do you
think there's a dramatic difference in how we do these things,
as a diplomat?
Mr. Ranneberger. There are certainly tactical differences
in the way we approach it. We do have, and I think the
President has been very clearly on record, we do have the same
goals in each case. Our goals are to advance democracy and
human rights, they're to promote U.S. interest in terms of
business and commercially, and also the U.S. national security
interest.
My response to that is frankly, that we use different
tactics appropriate to a given situation. And I think it's very
clear that a unilateral embargo would have zero impact on
China, which is thousands of miles away. A unilateral embargo
on Cuba, I think clearly, demonstratively, does have an impact,
as an element of pressure. So I think there are reasons for the
differences.
Mr. Rangel. But if our President decided that he wanted to
change the policy in Cuba, you would have no problem in
adjusting to that, would you?
Mr. Ranneberger. I'm a professional diplomat. Obviously, I
would----
Mr. Rangel. Thank you.
Mr. Ranneberger [continuing]. Defend whatever policy.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Crane. Mr. Neal.
Mr. Neal. Nice to see you again. That was skillfully
stated. Mr. Ranneberger, what comes first, religious reforms,
economic reforms, or political reforms?
Mr. Ranneberger. I wouldn't want to--a lot of people who
look at changes in regimes say that economic reforms come
first, and then political reforms follow. I think there are
lots of reasons to question that logic. It hasn't happened yet
in China. It certainly hasn't happened in Vietnam. It hasn't
happened in a lot of other places.
I think that you sort of can't accept that argument. I
would say that if there are going to be economic reforms, they
should live in tandem with political reforms. So, I don't think
in all honesty that you can say one has to come first, as
opposed to another. If there were real economic reforms in
Cuba, and there haven't been, but if there were real economic
reforms in Cuba, and if they precipitated some degree of
political change, obviously that would be positive.
We think that the religious opening is a positive
development, but it has not led to any degree of political
opening. In fact, since the Pope's visit to Cuba, there have
been, and I saw some figures thrown out today, we can certainly
confirm that there have been at least 20 arrests, and of course
there are many that we don't know about. And again, certainly
the vast majority of the dissidents remain in jail. So we
haven't seen it lead to a political opening. We want to support
the religious opening and space that that might give to civil
society and that's why the President has taken these steps that
he has.
Mr. Neal. Are you satisfied that the religious opening that
has occurred, that Castro's lived up to his part of the
bargain?
Mr. Ranneberger. We, of course, don't want to get into the
middle of any discussions between the Catholic Church and the
Cuban Government. Looking at it objectively as an outsider, I
think it's been a mixed bag frankly. The Cuban Government had
committed to give the church access to the media. They have
given the church permission to have open air religious
activity. They told the church that it would be allowed to
expand publications and such. And not all of that has happened.
There have been some open air Masses and such, but it's been a
very limited thing.
So, I think it's still in the early stages. I think it's
too early to say that the Castro government has lived up
completely to its end of the bargain or hasn't. I think it has
lived up to some parts of it. I think it's early and I think
hopefully we will see an evolution of this.
Mr. Neal. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Crane. Mr. Becerra.
Mr. Becerra. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And by the way, thank
you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to sit in on this
Subcommittee hearing, since I'm not a Member of the
Subcommittee itself.
Let me see if I can focus on a couple of quick questions,
Mr. Ranneberger. I'd like to ask you a little bit about what
DOD just released recently on the potential threat of Cuba,
militarily or to our security interest, and also see if I can
get you to comment a bit on the recent changes that were
proposed by the administration with regard to liberalizing some
of its dealings with the Cuban Government.
First, if you could give me some sense as to how you or the
Department of State is interpreting the Department of Defense
report with regard to Cuba as a threat.
Mr. Ranneberger. Sure. The Department of Defense in
releasing the report yesterday has made clear that this was an
intelligence assessment. So, I'm not going to comment, of
course, in detail on intelligence information or methods. I
would like to quote though, I think, in answering your
question, Congressman.
It would be appropriate to quote from the letter that
Secretary Cohen has sent to Chairman Thurman, in which he
states, ``While the assessment notes that the direct
conventional threat by the Cuban military has decreased, I
remain concerned about the use of Cuba as a base for
intelligence activities directed against the United States, the
potential threat that Cuba may pose to neighboring islands,
Castro's continuing dictatorship that represses the Cuban
people's desire for political and economic freedom, and the
potential instability that could accompany the end of his
regime.'' And then he goes on to cite some other areas.
So, my point there being, Congressman, that we--to say that
Cuba is not a conventional military threat, which it clearly
isn't in today's world--you wouldn't want to ignore or set
aside all the other related security issues.
Mr. Becerra. So, the Department of Defense is saying and
you're agreeing with what they're saying with regard to the
issue of conventional threat, that Cuba, at least at this stage
is not a conventional weapons threat or an adversary with
regard to conventional weapons that we must worry about for our
own national security safety.
Mr. Ranneberger. With respect to a conventional threat
directed at the United States, that's true, with the caveat--
just because I want to make it, it's important--that of course,
it depends--well a lot of it depends--and I learned a lot in
reviewing this report on terminology--but certainly I wouldn't
want to set aside the fact that the government shot down the
aircraft and that kind of ability----
Mr. Becerra. Right. I want to get into that, but I want to
make sure--in terms of a conventional threat, a country that
could be hostile toward us and menace us, we no longer hold
that position as we at one point did when we thought that there
was a chance that they could cause us real problems with the
Soviet Union, having bases and missiles, and so forth. But
there are threats, and those I think Secretary Cohen does
identify. And I know some of them have to do with transshipment
of drugs, also the intelligence factor.
How do we best approach those types of threats that have
been identified by the Department of Defense? How do we best
undermine the opportunities for Cuba or any elements in Cuba to
threaten our security, whether through intelligence gathering
or through drugs transshipment?
Mr. Ranneberger. I think that you have to do that in
several ways. First of all, obviously a change in the nature of
the regime itself would affect that threat. So, there's an
overall goal of trying to get democratic change.
Mr. Becerra. Fine. Let me make sure I understand something.
So you're implying that the reason there is an intelligence
threat and a drug transshipment threat is because of the
government in place?
Mr. Ranneberger. I think that contributes to the nature of
the threat, absolutely.
Mr. Becerra. Would you say that if Mr. Castro were removed
that the problem of drug transshipments would be gone?
Mr. Ranneberger. Well, I don't think it comes down--and so
often we tend to talk about Castro--I always like to say, it's
not simply an issue of one man, it's an issue of the system.
So, I would say if there's a system change, that could--that
would--I think, likely diminish the nature of a threat, if it
were a democratic change.
Mr. Becerra. If we had a greater presence in Cuba, whether
it was through more commercial enterprise or perhaps more
direct engagement government to government, would it be easier
for us to try to diminish those intelligence or drug
transshipment threats?
Mr. Ranneberger. I'm not at all sure that it would be. As
you know, we have a fairly sizable presence. I always point out
that our interest section is, in fact, the largest diplomatic
mission in Cuba. But, I think it comes down to the nature of
the relationship, and I think, I guess, what perhaps you're
getting at--or certainly--what I would say is, if you--
obviously, if you could normalize the relationship completely,
that might be helpful. But we don't want to normalize a
relationship with the regime that is undemocratic and
repressive to its own people. Absent a full normalization like
that, which we don't want to undertake with this type of
regime, there are some things you can do.
We have the migration accords, and we do have law
enforcement cooperation on a case-by-case basis. I mean, there
have been narcotic shipments intercepted. Last year, they
intercepted 6.5 tons of cocaine with our assistance, and so
there was prosecution here. So we are doing something to combat
some of these threats.
Mr. Becerra. Mr. Chairman, if I may ask one last question.
In Guatemala, we recently learned that an archbishop was
assassinated in a very brutal way and many have indicated that
there might be ties to previous death squads and perhaps there
might be some link to the government or those elements either
in government or related to government. We also know that in
other countries, whether Latin America or abroad, we've seen
real troubles with government protecting the basic rights,
civil rights, human rights, of some of its own peoples. We
continue to maintain full normalized relations with some of
those governments--some of those that are beginning or trying
to establish democracy.
If we continue to see problems persisting in some of those
so-called democratic countries, should we maintain full
relations or should we go somewhere toward the relationship
that we have right now with Cuba, where we break relations to
try to encourage further democratization?
Mr. Ranneberger. Again, I think it depends on each
situation. I would point out that when I was Deputy Director of
Central American Affairs between 1992 and 1994, we had exactly
such a case, where the then-President Serrano of Guatemala,
initiated an auto coup, which sort of basically ended the
democratic system. There was a 2-week period in which we
basically got things back on track. But, we threatened them
with severe bilateral repercussions. There were steps taken
against Guatemala at that time and they were threatened with
suspension from the OAS if democracy hadn't been restored. And
so, that pressure got the democratic system reinstituted in
Guatemala.
In Paraguay, where the democratic system--there had been
some problems that you're aware of--we've made very clear that
we expect that system to continue. It must continue in order
for them to be a fully normal relationship. So I think we've
made these criteria fairly universal in our relations with the
Latin countries.
Mr. Becerra. Can you give any--and the final question I'll
ask, Mr. Chairman--you said a case-by-case analysis. Can you
think of any country where you would apply a more rigorous
standard where we might drop full relations or normalize
relations with a country?
Mr. Ranneberger. No, I can't. I mean, I think that with
Latin America right now, we are dealing with countries where
there is a basic democratic system in place. There are
imperfections. I mean, there are imperfections everywhere. And
clearly, one of the focuses of the Summit of the Americas, as
you know from following it, is the whole issue of
institutionalizing democracy and working to strengthen
democratic institutions. That's a major focus.
And in fact, it's because of that, that we're particularly
concerned about the situation in Cuba, because it runs counter
to the whole trend in the hemisphere. If one saw political
change, democratic change on the way in Cuba, I think that
would change the nature of the discussion. But the fact is that
we're just not seeing that.
Chairman Crane. Mr. Jefferson.
Mr. Jefferson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me ask you,
does our economic embargo have any affect for good or for ill
on our other U.S. trading partners in the Western hemisphere,
particularly on Mexico or maybe even with Canada?
Mr. Ranneberger. I don't think it has any sort of economic
impact in terms of their earnings or ability to deal with Cuba.
Again, any country can sell or trade with Cuba. Where the
Libertad Act does have an impact on Canada, Mexico, and others,
is if they are investing in Cuba. And there, of course, it's
only if they are investing in confiscated property. The
Libertad Act doesn't say you can't invest in Cuba; it says you
can't invest in confiscated U.S. property. And there have been
cases where we've taken action against Mexican and Canadian
companies for investing in confiscated property.
Mr. Jefferson. Tell me, what properties have been covered
by these actions?
Mr. Ranneberger. I'm sorry, Congressman?
Mr. Jefferson. What properties have been involved in these
actions?
Mr. Ranneberger. What properties? In the case of Mexico, it
was group called Grupo Domos, and they were investing in a
cement plant, which had been owned by Lonestar--not by
Lonestar, but by Lonestar, in fact, in Cuba, which is a U.S.
company based, I believe, in Texas. We took action against
Grupo Domos. They subsequently pulled out of the plant. They're
no longer involved in that and we've given their visas back;
right to travel to the United States.
In the case of Canada, it's Sherritt, which is using the
Moa Bay Mining Co., which is a nickel mining facility, which
was owned by the Moa Bay Mining Co., which was a U.S. company.
And we've found a number of Sherritt executives excludable from
the United States and prohibited them from coming into the
United States.
Mr. Jefferson. Haven't we had some recent problem with a
pharmaceutical company that's doing business in South Africa
that has chosen to do business also with Cuba--some triangle
issue like that, that you're aware of?
Mr. Ranneberger. Yes, there is an issue. What happened is
there was a U.S. company which had purchased the majority
interest in a South African company. It turned out that that
South African company had certain contracts in process with a
Cuban entity. And of course the U.S. company was prohibited
from carrying out those contracts under the U.S. embargo.
Mr. Jefferson. So where does that stand now?
Mr. Ranneberger. I haven't checked on it recently. I'd have
to get back to you exactly where it stands. Basically, the
company simply can't proceed with the sales to the Cubans.
[The following was subsequently received:]
On January 9, 1998, Sanachem Holdings, Inc. (``Sanachem''),
a South African subsidiary of the Dow Chemical Company
(``Dow'') applied for a license to authorize performance under
a February 1992 contract with Quimimport (Cuba), as modified in
August 1997 (the ``Contract''). Sanachem requested
authorization to deliver all further shipments to Cuba and to
complete the performance called for under the Contract.
Sanachem, at the time of license application, was owed
approximately USD $20.2 million for shipments that occurred
between 1995 and 1997 under the Contract. Dow acquired Sanachem
in December of 1997.
The Contract is property in which Cuba or a Cuban national
has an interest for purposes of Sec. 515.201 of the CACR. OFAC
declined to license any continued performance under the
Contract by Sanachem or Dow, and Dow's license application for
the same was denied.
OFAC, however, did issue a license to authorize Sanachem to
receive amounts that were due to Sanachem under the Contract
for sales to Quimimport which occurred prior to Dow's
acquisition of Sanachem.
Mr. Jefferson. Has this created a substantial problem
between our government and the South African Government?
Mr. Ranneberger. Well, I think that the South African
Government clearly is unhappy about the situation. Beyond that,
I don't think I'd want to comment here.
Mr. Jefferson. Do we run into problems like that around the
rest of the world, not just in this hemisphere, but in other
parts of the world as well?
Mr. Ranneberger. It has come up. Again, Congressman, the
issue here should be addressed more precisely by the Treasury
Department, but it comes up from time to time. I'm not aware of
a lot of cases. Since I've been in Cuban affairs the past 3
years, there have been a few cases that I'm aware of. I'm not
aware of a lot of cases.
Mr. Rangel. Would the gentleman yield on that point?
Mr. Jefferson. Yes, I'd be happy to.
Mr. Rangel. Are you aware of the press conference that
President Clinton had in South Africa with President Mandela?
Mr. Ranneberger. Generally, I'm not sure--I'm not sure what
you're referring to, Congressman.
Mr. Rangel. It was a beautiful press conference where
President Clinton said how much he loved Africa and Mandela was
saying how much he loved America. It was a great press
conference. And then someone asked him something about a trade
bill and President Mandela went off and said the United States
really doesn't pick the friends of South Africa, and he was
referring to Cuba. So, that never came to your attention--that
incident that obliquely was referred to by Mr. Jefferson, where
the whole press conference was about to blow because of remarks
that President Mandela made about Helms-Burton. He didn't say
that, but that was an American chemical company that was in
South Africa and the incident he described.
Mr. Ranneberger. No, I----
Mr. Rangel. I just wanted to know--it was a real source of
embarrassment to those of us that were over there, but I just
wondered whether your office was sensitive to that?
Mr. Ranneberger. We were sensitive to it, and I am aware of
what you're talking about, Congressman. And of course, we had
prepared briefing information on this issue. We knew it would
come up certainly, and people had been prepared. It's a very
difficult issue because of course, the embargo is law and there
are only certain ways to make exceptions.
Mr. Jefferson. Thank you. I don't have much time left. Let
me ask--has Cuba undertaken any what you might characterize as
significant economic reform in the last few years?
Mr. Ranneberger. No, I don't consider there to have been
any significant economic reforms. There have been some minor,
very limited, economic reforms and I could mention what they
are. They've got now a list--I think it's 125 or 150 areas--
where people can do so-called family enterprises. You can't
hire outside of your family. And there are things like bicycle
repair, shoe repair, and the like. They've allowed people to
open up restaurants; you can't have any more than 12 seats.
These are not systemic reforms in terms of allowing a small
private sector to develop.
They then introduced last year, or the year before, a tax
system which has very large tax requirements for these private
entrepreneurs. As a result, these private entrepreneurs had
amounted to about 250,000 people perhaps in an island of 11
million. That figure apparently is down now to about 180,000
because of their inability to pay these taxes.
So, they have done some cosmetic things in order to look
more like a modern country. They've created a central bank, and
they've got some different subsidiary banks, that sort of
thing. But there hasn't been anything that I would characterize
as systemic economic reform.
Chairman Crane. Mr. Becerra has one final question before
you run to the airport.
Mr. Ranneberger. Sure.
Mr. Becerra. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll make it brief.
And I apologize, because I was not here for the first panel,
but I understand there was a little discussion--often times,
people are asked--Cuba is a smaller country and is close to us,
but DOD says it's not a conventional threat. China, the largest
country in the world; the largest Communist country in the
world; certainly a large military; certainly the capacity--
nuclear capacity--to do some harm, not just to us, but to
others; not only do we trade with them, we offer them most-
favored-nation trade status.
What's the Department of State's response or comment--how
do you respond to opening the doors to full trade negotiations
status to China and not to a neighbor that's 90 miles away?
Mr. Ranneberger. Congressman, that actually had come up and
I want to go over it again, because it's an important question
and it comes up all the time. What I have said is that clearly
we have consistent policy goals throughout the world--promote
democracy, human rights, U.S. commercial and business interest,
and the national security per se. We apply different tactics
that are appropriate to a given situation.
Secretary Albright, and I always allude to it, because I
can't say it any better, has said that we don't have a one-
size-fits-all policy. Obviously, you can't have A to Z, and
we're going to implement A, B, and C here, and here, and here.
You choose from a menu of options.
In the case of Cuba, it's 90 miles away, a unilateral
embargo can have, and is having, a significant impact,
especially since the end of the Soviet subsidy. In China,
imposition of a unilateral embargo would have very limited
effect, and there are overriding issues there that require a
relationship. We have spoken out--clearly, I think, and
forcefully--on the human rights issue in China.
And one other point that's worth noting, is that the
economic reforms and the changes in the system in China have
been vastly more than has occurred in Cuba. There's no
comparison of those two situations. So there has been a degree
of system change. It hasn't been political change. There hasn't
been enough done--nearly enough--on human rights, and I think
we've spoken out forcefully on that.
Mr. Becerra. Thank you.
Chairman Crane. Well, Mr. Ranneberger, we want to thank you
for giving of your time and appearing before the Subcommittee
and to wish you bon voyage.
Mr. Ranneberger. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Crane. Catch your plane. Our next panel consists
of Richard O'Leary, chairman of H Enterprises International;
Willard M. Berry, president, European-American Business
Council; Robert Muse, principal, Muse & Associates; John S.
Kavulich--I think I'm hopefully pronouncing it correctly--
president, U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council; and our
distinguished former colleague, Michael Barnes, representative
of USA Engage.
Please be seated and we'll proceed in the order which I
presented you before the Subcommittee. And, again, let me
remind you that the lights here can give you an idea of the
timing, but please try and keep your oral presentations to 5
minutes. And all written statements will be made a part of the
permanent record.
And you may start, Mr. O'Leary.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD E. O'LEARY, CHAIRMAN, H ENTERPRISES
INTERNATIONAL, INC., MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA; ON BEHALF OF U.S.
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
Mr. O'Leary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
opportunity to testify on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce on U.S. economic and trade policy toward Cuba.
Over the past five decades, the Chamber has consistently
opposed the imposition of unilateral economic embargoes,
sanctions, or boycotts as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy
in the absence of a clear and overriding national security
interest. That position has been maintained through several
generations of business leaders, numerous economic cycles, and
many variations of the national political environment because
the fundamentals are constant.
Historically, for over 2,000 years, the unilateral
imposition of economic sanctions by nations has not proven to
be effective in obtaining stated objectives.
Historically, the unilateral imposition of economic
sanctions by the United States has never achieved the
sanctions' stated objectives or materially altered the target
country's objectionable behavior.
Historically, though devoid of substantive benefits,
impositions of unilateral economic sanctions by the United
States has been accompanied by high costs when measured by the
adverse effects on the quality of life on adults and children
in target companies, the loss of economic opportunities for the
American work force and business community, and the impairment
of relations with nontarget nations which generally oppose such
unilateral actions and/or disagree on the merits of specific
applications.
Historically, America's values and interests and the cause
of democracy have best been advanced by sustained involvement
in international trade that expands market economies and raises
standards of living--the crucial ingredients in nurturing
political--freemen--freedom and respect for human rights.
We submit that it should be apparent that the U.S. economic
and trade policy toward Cuba for the last four decades has
failed to remove Fidel Castro as the head of state or even
materially weaken the political control of high government;
failed to enhance the development of democratic values in Cuba;
failed to attract the meaningful support of any other nation;
impaired our relations with our most important allies and
trading partners to the point of retaliation; condemned 11
million men, women, and children 90 miles from our border to a
standard of living that features inadequate availability of
critical medical resources and substandard nutrition; and
denied American workers the benefits that would otherwise flow
from the economic opportunities that are now foreclosed to the
U.S. business community.
Mr. Chairman, the foregoing assessment underscores the
Chamber's recommendations that Congress should immediately
enact legislation to lift restrictions on the sale of medicine
and food to Cuba. Our regard for human rights is surely above
the level reflected by the punitive consequences of our current
policy. It is time to get away from the fallacious notion that
there is or has to be conflict between business and
humanitarian interests.
Second, the Congress should enact legislation to facilitate
reestablishing economic relations with Cuba. No other
authoritarian regime has been able to resist the movement
toward a more open society after engaging commerce with nations
driven by democratic values. In short, we support Congressman
Rangel's bill.
Third, Congress should enact legislation that facilitates
the building of institutions necessary for Cuban society to
engage in open relationships with the world's market economies.
We also endorse the Hamilton-Crane-Lugar standards of
accountability for imposing economic sanctions.
Mr. Chairman, as one last comment, I would like to offer
for the record, an excerpt from Forbes magazine of March 23, of
which we do not endorse the editorial comments, but it provides
a really nice single snapshot of the dramatic effect that our
unilaterally imposed embargo has had on the people of Cuba,
which has degenerated the gross domestic product of Cuba from
about $1,800 a person down to $1,300 a person over the time,
and illustrates the opportunity that's available if they just
had an open market approach, which we would encourage, which
would have had them growing from that same $1,800 to over
$4,100.
[At the time of printing, no excerpt had been received.]
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement follows:]
Statement of Richard E. O'Leary, Chairman, H Enterprises International,
Inc., Minneapolis, Minnesota; on Behalf of U.S. Chamber of Commerce
My name is Richard E. O'Leary. I am Chairman of H
Enterprises International, based in Minneapolis, Minnesota. I
am a Member of the Board of Directors of the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce and its International Policy Committee. I am also
Chairman of its Finance Subcommittee. I appreciate this
opportunity to testify on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce on U.S. Economic and Trade Policy Toward Cuba.
Over the past five decades, the Chamber has consistently
opposed the imposition of unilateral economic embargoes,
sanctions or boycotts as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy
in the absence of a clear and overriding national security
interest. That position has been maintained through several
generations of business leaders, numerous economic cycles and
many variations of the national political environment because
the fundamentals are constant:
Historically, for over 2,000 years, the unilateral
imposition of economic sanctions by nations has not proven to
be effective in obtaining stated objectives;
Historically, the unilateral imposition of
economic sanctions by the United States has never achieved the
sanctions' stated objectives or materially altered the target
countries' objectionable behavior;
Historically, though devoid of substantive
benefits, imposition of unilateral economic sanctions by the
United States has been accompanied by high costs when measured
by the adverse effects on the quality of life on adults and
children in target countries, the loss of economic
opportunities for the American work force and business
community and the impairment of relations with non-target
nations which generally oppose such unilateral actions and/or
disagree on the merits of specific applications; and
Historically, America's values and interests and
the cause of democracy have best been advanced by sustained
involvement in international trade that expands market
economies and raises standards of living--crucial ingredients
in nurturing political freedom and respect for human rights.
We submit that it should be apparent that the U.S. economic
and trade policy toward Cuba for the last four decades has:
Failed to remove Fidel Castro as the head of state
or even materially weaken the political control of his
government;
Failed to enhance the development of democratic
values in Cuba;
Failed to attract the meaningful support of any
other nation;
Impaired our relations with our most important
allies and trading partners to the point of retaliation;
Condemned eleven million men, women and children
ninety miles from our border to a standard of living that
features inadequate availability of critical medical resources
and sub-standard nutrition; and
Denied American workers the benefits that would
otherwise flow from the economic opportunities that are now
foreclosed to the business community.
Mr. Chairman, the foregoing assessment underscores the
Chamber's recommendations that:
Congress should immediately enact legislation to
lift restrictions on the sale of medicine and food to Cuba. Our
regard for human rights is surely above the level reflected by
the punitive consequences of our current policy. It is time to
get away from the fallacious notion that there is or has to be
conflict between business and humanitarian interests.
Congress should enact legislation to facilitate
reestablishing economic relations with Cuba--no other
authoritarian regime has been able to resist the movement
toward a more open society after engaging commerce with nations
driven by democratic values.
Congress should enact legislation that facilitates
the building of institutions necessary for Cuban society to
engage in open relationships with the world's market economies.
What criteria should govern U.S. economic sanctions policy?
Recent history is replete with examples of U.S. unilateral
economic actions with the stated purpose of penalizing various
other countries to advance U.S. foreign policy interests. The
widespread impact of U.S. unilateral sanctions has been
documented by several recent studies. The Institute for
International Economics recently concluded that U.S. unilateral
sanctions cost the U.S. economy 200,000-250,000 jobs in 1995
and reduced U.S. exports by $15-20 billion. A recent report by
the President's Export Council also concluded that U.S.
unilateral sanctions now threaten 75 nations representing 52%
of the world's population.
Yet, those actions failed to alter materially the target
countries' objectionable behavior. Instead, erstwhile allies
castigate U.S. foreign policy, while the regimes we target gain
support and U.S. businesses and their workers bear the burden
of market opportunities lost to Asian and/or European
competitors.
America's values and interests are best advanced by
sustained involvement in world affairs by both the public and
private sectors. The expansion of free market economies and
rising living standards are crucial ingredients of political
freedom and respect for human rights. It is difficult to
imagine circumstances which would not be better addressed in
concert with our allies and trading partners. Before proceeding
unilaterally, the U.S. government should adopt a standard of
ongoing accountability, so that unilateral foreign policy
sanctions are evaluated by:
Whether they achieve their intended results
The costs imposed upon Americans in terms of lost
jobs and reduced incomes.
The potential sacrifice of other national
interests.
The Helms-Burton Act and Cuba-U.S. Relations
The Helms-Burton Act clearly fails to comply with such a
standard of ongoing accountability. Building on earlier
executive actions and the Cuban Democracy Act, the Helms-Burton
Act codified for the first time the nearly four decades-old
U.S. embargo against Cuba. Significantly, the Act also
established a new right of action by U.S. nationals against
persons--including non-U.S. nationals--who ``traffic'' in
expropriated property to which the U.S. nationals own claims.
The Act also directs that non-U.S. nationals involved in the
confiscation of, or trafficking in, such property be denied
entry into the U.S. except for certain medical reasons or to
litigate a claim. In other words, the Helms-Burton Act
established in law a process for the imposition of a secondary
boycott against third country interests engaged in activities
proscribed under the Act (a practice which U.S. policy condemns
in Arab countries when it has been applied to third parties
doing business with Israel).
To paraphrase and summarize section 3 of the Helms-Burton
Act, its purposes include (but are not limited to): (1)
assistance to the Cuban people in regaining their freedom; (2)
strengthened international sanctions against Castro; (3)
provision for the continued U.S. national security; (4)
encouragement of free and fair elections in Cuba; (5) provision
of a ``policy framework'' to the Cuban people in response to
the formation of a transition or democratically elected Cuban
government; and (6) protection of U.S. nationals against
trafficking in expropriated property. Some of these purposes
thus provide a useful benchmark against which to measure
changes in Cuba, and changes in Cuba's relationship with the
U.S. and other countries.
First, are Cuban people freer as a result of the enactment
of the Helms-Burton law? Embargo supporters frequently look to
the removal or withdrawal of Fidel Castro from power as a
necessary precondition for greater freedom in Cuba. That may be
true. But last October, at the fifth Cuban Communist Party
Congress, Castro was reaffirmed as head of the party. And on
February 24, Castro was ``re-elected'' as President of Cuba in
the usual mechanical fashion. Moreover, there has been as yet
no change in the makeup of the Cuban governmental system that
would suggest any new departure from Castro's long-standing
mode of governance. After four decades, Castro's governmental
and security apparatus remain largely in place. Despite clear
evidence of the freedom-enhancing effects of U.S. engagement in
other authoritarian countries, no such opportunity yet exists
in Cuba.
Second, are there strengthened international sanctions in
place? On the contrary, not only are our major trading
partners/competitors not emulating U.S. policy, but some of
them--Canada, the European Union (EU), Mexico--have actually
put in place laws that make compliance with Helms-Burton
actionable if not illegal in their own countries. This
international sentiment in opposition to U.S. policy has been
demonstrated repeatedly since the recent Papal visit in ways
too numerous to detail in the limited time available for this
hearing. All of this serves to supplement long-standing,
widespread international refusal to emulate the U.S. embargo.
The U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council has noted that all of
the other large ``G-7'' industrial economies are well
represented among an estimated 4,500 non-U.S. foreign companies
commercially active in Cuba. as of December 1997, and that
announced foreign investment in Cuba since 1990 exceeds US$5.55
billion, with actually committed or delivered investment
exceeding US$1.24 billion.
Third, does Helms-Burton enhance U.S. national security?
Eminent U.S. military authorities say Cuba does not pose a
threat. On January 13, General John J. Sheehan, former Supreme
Allied Commander of Atlantic Forces who was once responsible
for the Cuban migrant camps at Guantanamo Bay, stated at a U.S.
Chamber of Commerce press conference simply that Cuba ``does
not present a military threat to the United States.'' And more
recently, on April 27 General Charles Wilhelm, Commander-In-
Chief of the U.S. Southern Command, not only gave a similar
assessment but went beyond that by saying that Cuba and the
U.S. shared some common problems--such as ``counter-
narcotics''--and that there was ``definitely a possibility''
that Cuba and the U.S. could work together on them. But despite
these assessments, the U.S. embargo against Cuba imposes harsh
restrictions in areas such as food and medical sales that are
not applied to countries--such as Iraq and North Korea--whose
regimes are no less harsh and whose agendas clearly pose a much
greater threat to vital U.S. interests.
Fourth, has Helms-Burton encouraged free and fair elections
in Cuba? As noted above, Castro's hold on power in Cuba remains
strong despite two years of Helms-Burton ``leverage'' intended
to release his grip on power. Such leverage cannot succeed
through forced unilateral isolation. Throughout the U.S. and
around the world, individual liberty and free enterprise go
hand in hand. Each fosters the other. By their very presence
and operations, American companies and expatriate communities
take second place to no one in their contributions to economic
and political freedom in their host countries. Continuing U.S.
company presence and engagement abroad are critical to the
inculcation of these values.
Fifth, does Helms-Burton provide a viable ``policy
framework'' for the formation of a transition or
democratically-elected Cuban government? Title II of Helms-
Burton spells out such a framework which, if implemented, could
justify suspension of the U.S. embargo, to the extent that such
steps would contribute to a ``stable foundation'' for a
democratically-elected government in Cuba. However, the fact is
that the unilaterally-imposed embargo has created an
environment in which these conditions cannot be realized.
Sixth, does Helms-Burton protect U.S. nationals against
trafficking in expropriated property? Such property was
expropriated as far back as the early 1960s. Shortly
thereafter, the U.S. government established a Cuban claims
program, administered by the Treasury Department. Today, four
decades later and after all other claimant countries have
settled their claims, and more than two years after Helms-
Burton's enactment, there is little or no evidence that the
statute has contributed materially to any resolution of the
U.S. claims arising from the expropriation of nearly forty
years ago.
The Helms-Burton Act and U.S.-European Relations
One of the Helms-Burton Act's purposes was to rally
international support for the imposition of change on Castro's
regime. However, in reality, Helms-Burton has clearly strained
our economic and political relations with other, far more
significant trading partners, while failing to achieve its
stated purposes.
Some are suggesting that the EU's recent decision not to
renew its WTO complaint should be construed as U.S. progress in
``bringing'' Europe around to our point of view. However, it
should be obvious that the EU is fully prepared to resume its
battle against us on this front if the U.S. starts to implement
Helms-Burton.
Negotiations conducted pursuant to a fundamentally flawed
and ineffective policy--executed, by the way, from a position
of weakness, not of strength--cannot be expected to succeed.
The cause of democracy in Cuba will be best served by allowing
Americans to travel to and do business in Cuba--and in so
doing, helping to export our democratic values to that country.
Even if the EU was not actively promoting democratic change in
Cuba, it makes no sense to impose or threaten sanctions against
the EU when our own law effectively prevents us from doing it
ourselves.
Conclusion
It is fair to say that the only material contribution
arising from the continuing unilateral U.S. embargo of Cuba--
which was codified and expanded with the 1996 enactment of the
Helms-Burton legislation--was to confer quasi-martyr status on
Castro's regime by permitting its subjects to focus on an
external enemy, namely, the United States. With the enactment
of Helms-Burton, the Cuba embargo has mutated into a secondary
boycott of a variety of Canadian, European and other
interests--thereby compelling these far more important allies
and trading partners to protect their own interests by enacting
blocking statutes and otherwise backing into an implicit
alliance with Castro's regime. If the United States hopes to
contain and eventually reverse this damage--and at the same
time enhance commercial and democracy-building opportunities
for Americans and Cubans alike--it has no real choice but to
end the embargo and work toward normal relations with a small,
non-threatening nation only ninety miles offshore.
I appreciate this opportunity to testify before this
Subcommittee. I will be happy to try to answer any questions.
Chairman Crane. Thank you.
Mr. Berry.
STATEMENT OF WILLARD M. BERRY, PRESIDENT, EUROPEAN-AMERICAN
BUSINESS COUNCIL
Mr. Berry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the
Subcommittee for this opportunity to testify.
I'm Willard Berry, president of the European-American
Business Council. We're an organization of U.S.- and European-
owned companies. We provide actionable information on policy
developments and work with officials on both sides of the
Atlantic to secure a more open trade and investment
environment.
Today, I would like to focus on the impact that U.S. policy
toward Cuba has had on business and on relations with our
allies. I hope that my testimony today will make one point
clear and that's that our economic policy toward Cuba has a
cost.
The cost to the U.S. economy goes beyond the business
opportunities lost because we do not trade or invest with Cuba.
We also must suffer through disputes with our allies who object
to the extraterritorial application of U.S. law and the costs
to their companies. U.S. subsidiaries abroad suffer because
they become caught between conflicting requirements, unable to
obey both U.S. sanctions laws and foreign blocking statutes.
Local U.S. economies bear part of the cost also when foreign
investment goes elsewhere to avoid becoming entangled in
sanctions.
As this Subcommittee is well aware, the extraterritorial
application of our embargo against Cuba has been one of, if not
the, most important economic dispute between the United States
and Europe over the last 2 years. When Helms-Burton was passed
in 1996, the Council said that it would disrupt relations with
Europe and get in the way of other important initiatives.
There are many examples. One occurred just last week. The
United States and the European Union have been discussing a
broad trade initiative that might be launched at their
bilateral summit on May 18. EU member states, most of whom are
supportive of this idea, announced last week that any
discussion of further bilateral liberalization will be put on
hold if the United States and the European Union cannot settle
the dispute over Helms-Burton.
The European Commission estimates that the broad impact of
that agreement would boost both economies by approximately 1
percent of GDP annually.
The Multilateral Agreement on Investment provides another
example. Global investment is growing three times faster than
trade. We have rules now, under the Uruguay Round Agreement,
for trade but we have no global disciplines on investment.
That's why the MAI is so important. The MAI, however, cannot be
concluded without a resolution of the dispute over Helms-
Burton.
Then there is the WTO. The WTO is likely to launch a new
round of trade negotiations in 2000. Helms-Burton poses a major
problem in the WTO for a number of things: Negotiation of
investment rules under the WTO; broad U.S. and EU cooperation
across a range of trade issues. Also Helms-Burton threatens the
WTO more directly because of the potential for a dispute
settlement case, which could undermine the credibility of the
institution.
Insofar as the impact on companies, the most immediate, of
course, is that companies are denied trade and investment
opportunities in Cuba. The U.S. extraterritorial laws, such as
Helms-Burton, also, as I mentioned, create conflicting
requirements. In response to the extraterritorial reach of U.S.
policy toward Cuba, blocking legislation has been established
in the European Union, Canada, and Mexico. An example: Wal-
Mart's Canadian subsidiary was caught by conflicting laws when
it discovered it was selling Cuban-made pajamas.
Last year, the Council conducted a study of the impact of
sanctions on U.S. and European companies. We surveyed 42
companies that, together, employ nearly 750,000 workers in the
United States and 3 million worldwide. They average about $5
billion in annual U.S. sales.
Twenty-six percent of these companies said that they had
been harmed by the type of conflicting requirements that have
risen because of Helms-Burton. Helms-Burton itself had harmed
64 percent of the companies surveyed, even though it had only
been applied under limited circumstances.
Our study documents the effects of sanctions. We know that
when companies are hit by sanctions laws, they must reduce
employment; they sometimes close plants and relocate operation.
The costs of this policy seem particularly high considering
the fact that unilateral economic sanctions have an abysmal
record of effectiveness.
Thanks again, Mr. Chairman and Members of this Subcommittee
for the opportunity to testify.
[The prepared statement follows:]
Statement of Willard M. Berry, President, European-American Business
Council
Introduction
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for
the opportunity to testify. I am Willard M. Berry, President of
the European-American Business Council. The Council is the one
transatlantic organization that provides actionable information
on policy developments and works with officials in both the US
and Europe to secure a more open trade and investment climate.
Our 80 member companies include US- and European-owned firms--
therefore our work on trade, tax and investment issues is
devoted to improving the business environment on both sides of
the Atlantic. We are active on our own and through the
Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) in strengthening the
economic relationship between the US and Europe, heading off
trade disputes, and increasing US-EU cooperation in the World
Trade Organization (WTO) and other multilateral fora. We aim to
be the definitive source of knowledge and leading business
advocate on US and European political activity affecting
transatlantic companies.
Today I would like to focus on the impact that US policy
toward Cuba has had on business and on relations with our
allies. I will leave it to the other experts here today to
discuss the status of humanitarian efforts in Cuba and the
effectiveness of the embargo we have maintained for almost 40
years. I hope that my testimony today will make one point
clear: that our economic policy toward Cuba has a cost. Fidel
Castro bears part of the cost, the Cuban people bear part of
the cost, the US economy bears part of the cost and, thanks to
the extraterritorial nature of that policy, foreign companies
including US subsidiaries bear part of the cost. The cost to
the US economy goes beyond the business opportunities lost
because we do not trade with Cuba and we do not allow our
companies to invest in Cuba. We also must suffer through
disputes with our allies, who object to the extraterritorial
application of US law and the costs to their companies. US
subsidiaries abroad suffer because they become caught between
conflicting requirements, unable to obey both the US sanctions
law and foreign blocking statutes. Local US economies bear part
of the cost also when foreign investment goes elsewhere to
avoid becoming entangled in sanctions.
Impact on US-European Relations
As this subcommittee is well aware, the extraterritorial
application of our embargo against Cuba has been one of, if not
the most important, economic dispute between the US and Europe
over the last two years. While Europeans were strongly opposed
to the Cuba Democracy Act of 1992 and enacted blocking
legislation to prevent its application to US subsidiaries in
Europe, the Helms-Burton Act has brought tensions to much
higher levels. When Helms-Burton was passed in 1996, the EABC
said that it would disrupt relations with Europe and get in the
way of other important initiatives. Well, just last week we saw
a concrete example. The US and the European Union have been
discussing a broad trade initiative that might be launched at
their bilateral summit on May 18. EU Member States, most of
whom are supportive of this idea, announced last week that any
discussion of further bilateral liberalization will be put on
hold if the US and EU cannot work out an agreement to settle
the dispute over Helms-Burton. The European Commission has
estimated that a broad trade agreement between the US and EU
would boost both economies by an amount roughly equal to the
impact of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs
& Trade. But before we can hope to capitalize on those gains,
we must get by the problems caused by Helms-Burton.
The proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) is
similarly held hostage to Helms-Burton. Although, the MAI, like
the proposed transatlantic trade agreement, faces a number of
significant obstacles, it cannot be concluded without a
resolution of the dispute over Helms-Burton. Hopefully, this
can be achieved by the time MAI negotiations resume next Fall,
or else we may see another direct cost of our economic policy
toward Cuba. If the MAI can be concluded, it will offer
immediate benefits. Recent investment liberalization in the US
and other countries will be locked in, providing important
certainty to business. Companies will be able to protect
themselves from discriminatory actions by governments. The MAI
will also establish protection for almost all kinds of
investment, including facilities, inventory, financial assets
and intellectual property. In addition, with OECD members such
as Korea and Mexico signing on and a number of observer
countries such as Hong Kong, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and
Slovakia considering signing on immediately, the MAI will put
pressure on other advanced developing countries to guarantee
fair treatment in order to attract and retain investment.
These initiatives are not likely to be the only ones
disrupted if current US policy is maintained. The WTO is likely
to launch a new round of trade negotiations in the year 2000.
Helms-Burton, if maintained in its current form, would likely
jeopardize any chance of negotiating global investment rules in
the WTO and would also impair broader US-EU cooperation across
the entire spectrum of trade issues. Helms-Burton also
threatens the WTO more directly because of the potential for a
dispute settlement case. The EU filed such a case last year,
but agreed not to pursue it while negotiations are underway on
an agreement on expropriated property and secondary boycotts.
Such a case, if reinstated because of failure in those talks or
because an EU company is sanctioned under Helms-Burton, could
deal a serious blow to the WTO. The US has said it would claim
a national security exemption for Helms-Burton, which would
undermine the credibility of the multilateral dispute
settlement system by suggesting that all manner of WTO-
inconsistent measures could be justified on similar grounds.
The dispute between the US and EU caused by Helms-Burton
has had very real consequences and will continue to disrupt
important cooperative efforts unless the extraterritorial
effects can be eliminated.
The Impact on Companies
The most immediate impact that US Cuba policy has on
companies is to deny them trade and investment opportunities in
Cuba. Foreign companies, whose governments believe that the
best way to bring about change in Cuba is through engagement,
are taking advantage of these opportunities, just as US
companies take advantage of the US policy of engagement with
China and a number of other nations with questionable human
rights practices. Some advocates of US Cuba policy have argued
that when democracy eventually is established in Cuba, US
companies will be welcomed because they stayed out during the
Castro regime. I think it is more likely that the companies
already established in Cuba will be in a much better position
to benefit.
US extraterritorial laws such as Helms-Burton also create
conflicting requirements, which is a serious problem for
business. Even when the company is not directly affected, the
uncertainty created by conflicting laws makes it more difficult
to conduct commerce effectively. In response to the
extraterritorial reach of US policy toward Cuba, blocking
legislation has been established in the European Union, Canada
and Mexico.
We have already seen real examples of companies caught by
conflicting requirements. Wal-Mart's Canadian subsidiary was
caught by conflicting laws when it discovered it was selling
Cuban-made pajamas. In order to comply with US extraterritorial
law, the company stopped selling the pajamas, only to become
the target of an investigation under Canadian blocking
legislation. The company decided to comply with local law and
resume selling the pajamas and is at risk of penalties under
the Cuba Democracy Act of 1992.
EABC Sanctions Study
Last year, the EABC conducted a study of the impact of
sanctions on US and European companies. We surveyed 42
companies that together employ nearly 750,000 workers in the US
and 3 million workers worldwide, and which each average about
$5 billion per year in US sales. This study confirmed that US
sanctions have had strong negative impacts on companies in the
US and abroad and that the majority of multinational companies
have lost business because of sanctions.
Twenty-six percent of these companies said that they had
been harmed by the type of conflicting requirements that have
arisen because of Helms-Burton and the Cuba Democracy Act of
1992. Helms-Burton itself had directly or indirectly harmed 64
percent of the companies, even though it has only been applied
under limited circumstances. Our survey demonstrates that even
when companies are not directly affected, they are seen as
unreliable suppliers and poor joint venture partners, making
them less competitive because they are less able to form
business relationships. Furthermore, foreign companies are less
likely to invest in the US when they know their investments
might make them subject to US sanctions. My written testimony
includes the section of our studying analyzing the impact of
Helms-Burton.
We have found some people whose reaction to our study is
that sanctions must be working if companies are being affected.
To those people I would point out that the goal of these
policies, I hope, is not to impair international business. US
Cuba policy should not be deemed a success because US and
European companies are being denied business opportunities. It
is ironic that while all levels of government in this country
are working hard to promote exports and attract investment in
order to create jobs for their constituents, they are often
counteracting these policies by enacting unilateral sanctions,
such as Helms-Burton.
What is at Stake?
It would be hard to overstate the benefits the US enjoys
because of its economic relationship with Europe. When the US
enacts extraterritorial economic sanctions, such as the Helms-
Burton Act, it disrupts trade and investment flows between the
US and Europe and puts at risk millions of jobs on both sides
of the Atlantic. Please allow me to cite a few statistics that
demonstrate just what is at stake.
Two-way trade between the US and the European
Union in 1997 reached almost $300 billion--almost one billion
dollars per day.
That trade is nearly balanced--the US exported
$141 billion to the EU, the EU exported $157 billion to the US.
That trade is increasing rapidly--in 1987, two-way
trade was about $140 billion, so it has more than doubled in
the last ten years.
Foreign investment between the US and Europe is equally
robust.
The US and Europe have an $800 billion stock in
cross investment, with $416 billion of European investment in
the US and $384 billion in US investment in Europe.
Almost 42 percent of US foreign direct investment
goes to Europe, and 56 percent of all European FDI goes to the
US.
European companies account for the largest share
of foreign investment in 42 US states, and the second largest
share in the remaining eight states.
Conclusion
I hope that my testimony has made clear that our embargo of
Cuba and, in particular, the extraterritorial extension of that
embargo, imposes many costs on US companies, US workers and the
US economy. Those costs are imposed because the US has decided
that despite the fact that unilateral economic sanctions have
an abysmal record of effectiveness, they are likely to achieve
positive change in Cuba. This policy is maintained despite the
fact that the US has decided that for many other countries that
we hope to influence engagement is the best course.
Thank you once again, Mr. Chairman and Members of the
Subcommittee, for the opportunity to testify today. I would be
happy to answer any questions.
Secondary Trade and Investment Embargoes
US secondary boycotts, which attempt to force foreign
companies to choose between the US market or that of a target
regime, were adopted in 1996 in the form of the Helms-Burton
Act and the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act. Despite long-standing
US and international opposition to the principle of secondary
boycotts, these laws were enacted to restrict foreign company
trade and investment in Cuba, Iran and Libya. The laws threaten
multiple sanctions against companies outside the US in an
attempt to make them comply with US foreign policy.
Not surprisingly, the US secondary boycotts continue to
invoke strong negative reactions from US allies and the
international business community. The EU, in response to both
laws, enacted blocking legislation to prevent European
companies from complying with them, and began a WTO dispute
settlement case against Helms-Burton. In addition, Canada
strengthened and Mexico enacted blocking statutes and are
considering action under the North American Free Trade
Agreement. The US suffered criticism in many international fora
and from the international business community. The US business
community also has strongly opposed both measures.
The Cuban Liberty And Democratic Solidarity Act
On March 12, 1996, President Clinton signed the Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, or the Helms-
Burton Act. The law tightens the 35-year-old US embargo on Cuba
by penalizing foreign firms for investing in former US-owned
properties expropriated in the 1959 Cuban Revolution.
The Helms-Burton Act applies two sanctions against non-US
firms. First, US nationals are allowed a private right of
action in US courts against companies investing in the
expropriated US properties in Cuba, even if the US national was
a Cuban citizen at the time of the expropriation. Second, the
law requires the US State Department to deny US entry visas to
the executives of foreign firms deemed to be ``trafficking'' in
the properties. President Clinton has thus far waived the
provision allowing a private right of action and is expected to
do so throughout his term, citing positive steps taken by the
EU countries with respect to Cuba. The provision denying US
entry visas cannot be waived and remains in effect.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5762.010
The Helms-Burton Act already negatively impacts a large
majority of companies operating in the US. Over 64 percent of
survey respondents say that Helms-Burton affects their
existing, planned or potential business operations. And
although the law has only been applied under limited
circumstances, it impacts the third largest share of companies
of any of the sanction laws examined by the study. The effect
is spread evenly among both US and European companies.
RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH HELMS-BURTON SANCTIONS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Helms-Burton Sanction Most Common Effect
------------------------------------------------------------------------
DENIAL OF US ENTRY VISAS FOR FOREIGN FEWER JOINT VENTURES
EXECUTIVES.
ALLOW PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION IN US COURTS LESS INVESTMENT IN THE US
AGAINST OVERSEAS INVESTMENTS.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
EABC asked companies what effects would result if the sanctions in the
Helms-Burton Act were applied to them. These are the effects cited by
the largest number of companies.
Denying US entry visas as authorized by the Helms-Burton
Act threatens jobs and investment in the US. If denied US entry
visas, nearly 48 percent of the companies surveyed say that
they would be forced to reduce their US workforce. Over 40
percent say this sanction would force them to reduce their
investment in the US. Fifty-five percent of the companies say
their joint venture opportunities would be threatened by visa
restrictions, thus harming their competitiveness.
Allowing lawsuits against overseas investments also would
threaten US jobs and investment. Nearly a third of the
companies surveyed say that this sanction would force them to
reduce jobs and investment in the US. Nearly half of the
European owned companies say that they would reduce their
investment in the US if subjected to such suits.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5762.011
Automotive, high technology and telecommunications sectors
report the greatest effect from Helms-Burton. In fact, every
automotive company surveyed said that the law's existence has
negatively affected its business operations. High technology
sectors are also substantially impacted.
International retaliation against Helms-Burton can pose
additional difficulties for companies, trapping them between
conflicting requirements. Nearly 20 percent of companies report
being caught between the requirements of US extraterritorial
sanctions laws and foreign blocking legislation. Because Helms-
Burton spurred European, Canadian, and Mexican countermeasures,
US- and European-owned companies can be caught in the middle of
a foreign policy dispute, facing serious penalties and
sanctions regardless of whether a particular investment is
maintained or withdrawn from Cuba.
Chairman Crane. Thank you.
Mr. Muse.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT L. MUSE, MUSE & ASSOCIATES
Mr. Muse. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Rangel,
Members of the Subcommittee for allowing me to testify.
There are two facets to my remarks. I want to comment
briefly on the increasingly adverse effect on U.S. trade of our
foreign policy toward Cuba, as that policy is set out in the
Helms-Burton Act. The second part of my remarks will address
the issue of the claims certified, against Cuba, by the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission on behalf of U.S. companies.
I will attempt to place the issue of resolution of those
corporate claims in the context of future U.S.-Cuba relations.
The costs to the United States of our foreign policy toward
Cuba is becoming ever greater. That policy is, of course,
embedded in the Helms-Burton Act, and it is in fundamental
conflict with the interests of the United States and its
citizens in expanding and strengthening a rules-governed,
stable world trade and investment order. What Mr. Berry pointed
out a moment ago requires a reiteration.
On April 27 at a meeting in Luxembourg, the European
Union's Foreign Ministers rejected the request of the European
Commission to launch a new round of discussions with the United
States on trade liberalization. Among those proposals were: The
elimination of tariffs on industrial goods; the opening up of
trade and services; the removal of technical barriers to trade;
and finally, the liberalization of investment and government-
tendering rules.
It's important to ask why such an important project was
derailed. The answer lies, in significant part, in U.S. foreign
policy toward Cuba. On April 27, the European Ministers made
clear in their communique that a resolution of the dispute with
the United States over the extraterritorial provisions of
Helms-Burton was ``a condition to the further development of
trans-Atlantic trade.''
I think many U.S. policymakers have been somewhat confused
and baffled by the strength of European opposition to laws like
Helms-Burton. It's not so much a dispute over policy. In large
part, the U.S. policy of keeping the U.S. private sector out of
Cuba has not been disadvantageous to the Europeans. They felt
that they were able to trade with Cuba without U.S.
competition. The real dispute is therefore jurisprudential.
It's a rule of law dispute. What are the limits on
extraterritorial legislation? The problem is not going to go
away easily because it is a dispute rooted in principles.
The second part of my remarks concerns U.S.-certified
corporate claimants against Cuba. The first thing to say about
those claimants is that there are several hundred of them, with
a total of $1.6 billion in certified claims. But the claims
themselves are clustered among the largest 10 claimants. The
value of their losses in Cuba was approximately $1 billion of
the $1.6 billion in certified corporate claims.
I make that point in order to say if a resolution could be
found with the largest corporate claims, the problem of the
remaining claims against Cuba becomes manageable. The issue of
these claims is going to matter a great deal as we proceed
toward eventual normalization of trade relations with Cuba. The
courts have been clear we must resolve the outstanding
expropriation claims of U.S. nationals before relations with
the expropriating nation may be normalized.
I would propose, given the current state of Cuba's economy,
that all parties to such a resolution are going to have to be
innovative and creative in the approach they take to the
resolution of those claims.
There are two final points I want to make about the
certified claims registered against Cuba. Those claims have
legal standing in the international law rules that protect
foreign investment. It's not a trivial matter--there are
increasing U.S. investments abroad every year that find
protection in international law.
The Helms-Burton Act, by impermissibly extending the
protection of the United States to non-U.S. nationals at time
of injury, has undermined that rule of law that protects U.S.
investments. We can't effectively claim that other countries
adhere to that law when we're in violation of it.
My second point is how cavalierly the certified claimants
were treated when Helms-Burton was passed. They were vocal and
specific in their objections to that statute. Their objections
were ignored. The statute was passed. The question is where do
we go from here.
As a first step, the United States should alter Helms-
Burton to bring this country back into conformity with
international law.
Second, the U.S. Government should promote a resolution of
the claims of U.S. citizens against Cuba. Considering the
circumstances and consequences of the enactment of Helms-
Burton, it's the least that the government can do at this time.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement follows:]
Statement of Robert L. Muse, Muse & Associates
Mr. Chairman, Congressman Rangel, thank you for inviting me
to today's hearing on the subject of U.S. economic and trade
policy toward Cuba. There are two facets to my remarks. First,
I will comment briefly on the increasingly adverse effect on
U.S. trade of this country's policy toward Cuba, as that policy
is set out and, indeed, at present is controlled by the Helms-
Burton Act. The second part of my remarks will address the
issue of the claims certified against Cuba, by the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission, on behalf of U.S. companies. I
will attempt to place the issue of resolution of those claims
within a context of future U.S./Cuba relations.
The Effect on U.S. Trade of the Helms-Burton Act
The subject of this hearing could hardly be more timely.
The cost to the United States in terms of global trade and
investment, of our foreign policy toward Cuba is becoming ever
greater. That policy is at present embedded in the Helms-Burton
Act, and it is in fundamental conflict with the interests of
the United States and its citizens in a stable world trade and
investment order.
In considering one point of focus of today's hearing, that
is, the effects of U.S. Cuba policy on relations with U.S.
trading partners, we might begin with the recent date of April
27, where, at a meeting in Luxembourg, the European Union's
foreign ministers rejected the request of the European
Commission to place an ambitious set of proposals for
transatlantic trade liberalization on the agenda of the EU's
May 18 summit with President Clinton. (Among the proposals for
negotiation between the U.S. and the EU were the not
insignificant matters of; (i) elimination of tariffs on
industrial goods; (ii) the opening up of trade in services;
(iii) the removal of technical barriers to trade and (iv) the
liberalization of investment and government tendering rules).
Why, it ought to be asked with some urgency, did the ``New
Transatlantic Marketplace'' (``NTM'') proposed by the European
Commission encounter resistance from European Union member
states? After all, the EU and the U.S. are each other's single
largest trading partner (taking goods and services together)
and they are each other's most important source of foreign
direct investment.\1\ Therefore the elimination of impediments
to free trade and investment between the EU and the U.S. is
something of incontestable value on both sides of the Atlantic.
Why, then, was such an important project derailed? The answer
lies in significant part in U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba. On
April 27, the EU foreign ministers made it clear that a
resolution of the dispute with the U.S. over the
extraterritorial provisions of the Helms-Burton Act was a
``condition'' to the further ``development of transatlantic
trade.'' \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See the European Commission's paper The New Transatlantic
Marketplace, March 11, 1998.
\2\ See communique of European Council, April 27, 1998. In addition
to Helms-Burton, the EU foreign ministers also included resolution of
the dispute with the U.S. over the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (``ILSA'')
as a condition ``for developing transatlantic trade.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The strength and duration of foreign anger over the Helms-
Burton Act--of which the action of the European Council of
Ministers is merely the latest example--has surprised many U.S.
policymakers. Why, exactly, is the world so obstinately
indignant about Helms-Burton? Other countries' anger arises
from the fact that the statute seeks a foreign policy objective
in Cuba through means that violate international law. At its
heart, foreign opposition to the Helms-Burton Act rests far
more upon jurisprudential principles than differences over
policy.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Europe has long viewed U.S. policy toward Cuba as ineffectual
and perhaps even counterproductive. However, as long as U.S.-Cuba
policy was not applied coercively to our European trading partners they
had little reason to be indignant about that policy. Indeed, the
central tenet of U.S. policy (i.e. the prohibition on American
corporations trading or investing in Cuba) was advantageous to European
enterprises with commercial interests in Cuba insofar as that policy
served to preclude competition from the United States' private sector.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
How Does the Helms-Burton Act Violate International Law
The end sought in Cuba by the Helms-Burton Act is the
transformation of Cuba along the economic, political and even
social lines set out in Title II of the Act. The means to this
intended end are Titles III and IV of the statute. Those
provisions of the Act are meant to foreclose investment in Cuba
by placing off-limits to foreign enterprises virtually every
property on the island.\4\ The way the Act achieves this
coerced moratorium on foreign investment in Cuba is through
extending U.S. support--in the form of lawsuit rights and
denial of entry into the U.S. of certain foreign executives--to
the claims of non-U.S. nationals at the time of their property
losses in Cuba. By doing this the U.S. violated the nationality
of claims principle of public international law, a principle
which holds that a nation may not support, vis-a-vis another
nation, the claims for redress of injury of anyone but those
holding its citizenship at the time of injury.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Approximately 600,000 Cubans emigrated to the U.S. in the years
1960-1964. This represented 10% of Cuba's total population. However, it
was the 10% of the population that owned just about everything of value
on the island. The descendants of those emigrants--most of whom live in
South Florida--are capable of asserting Helms-Burton Act claims against
virtually every foreign investor in Cuba.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Position of the Certified Corporate Claimants
The certified corporate claimants are U.S. companies that
hold claims certified against Cuba by the Foreign Claims
Settlement Act of 1964.\5\ Of the $1.8 billion in principal
property losses certified against Cuba, $1.6 billion were U.S.
corporate property losses.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Non-U.S. nationals' claims (i.e. the claims of Cuban citizens)
were not certified because U.S. nationality at the time of property
loss was a requirement for filing a claim with the Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission. This requirement has been consistently applied
by the Commission, for example in claims against the People's Republic
of China, Vietnam, Eastern European countries, etc. In point of fact,
the U.S. had never given retroactive rights of U.S. citizenship to
anyone, until it enacted the Helms-Burton Act.
\6\ It is worth remark that few of these certified claims are,
standing alone, of significant value. For example, the properties of
only ten corporate claimants including electric and phone companies,
two oil refineries, one nickel mine and five sugar producers--were
ultimately certified to be worth a little over $1 billion out of the
$1.6 billion in total corporate claims. My point is this, a resolution
of the largest corporate claims against Cuba would effectively
eliminate the claims issue as a potentially impeding factor in any
future normalization of relations between Cuba and the U.S.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Certified corporate claimants opposed Helms-Burton because;
(i) it violated and therefore undermined international law;
(ii) it was injurious to the interests of U.S. nationals
holding claims against Cuba that are actually recognized by
international law (i.e., the claims of U.S. nationals at the
time of their property losses); (iii) it would produce serious
conflicts with U.S. trading partners and impede progress on
bilateral and multilateral agreements the U.S. seeks in
international trade; (iv) it could create a major future
impediment to normalized commercial relations between Cuba and
the U.S. in the course of any rapprochement between the two
countries; and, (v) it would have the distinct potential of
rendering the U.S. government liable for the claims of Cuban
Americans against Cuba, at a cost to the American taxpayer of
tens of billions of dollars.
Restrictions of time prevent the development of any of
these points in great detail.\7\ I will therefore conclude by
offering a few general thoughts about U.S. corporate claims
against Cuba. First, those claims possess legal standing under
the international law rules that protect foreign investment.
The protection of this investment can only grow in importance
as U.S. companies invest ever greater sums abroad. Yet the
Helms-Burton Act erodes the international rule of law that
serves to protect those investments. It is an obvious point--
but one that bears emphasis--the United States will not be able
to long successfully invoke international law on behalf of its
citizens if it is itself in violation of an established tenet
of that system of law, in this case the nationality of claims
principle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ For those who are interested, a detailed examination of the
manyimplications for the U.S. of the Helms-Burton Act may be found in a
recent article I have written, A Public International Law Critique of
the Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the Helms-Burton Act, (Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996). 30 THE
GEORGE WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, at pgs.
207-270.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
My second point concerning U.S. corporate claims against
Cuba is how cavalierly those claimants were treated when Helms-
Burton was enacted. The certified claimants were vocal and
exact in their reasons for opposition to that legislation. It
made no difference--it was enacted over their protests and
warnings. It must be said that, regrettably, certain proponents
of Helms-Burton used, with no legal foundation, the issue of
property claims as a pretext for the advancement of a set of
foreign policy objectives involving Cuba.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ In other words, the argument that the legislation protected
Cuban American ``claims'' to properties in Cuba served as a pretext for
the creation of an effective blockade of foreign investment in Cuba, in
order to collapse that country's economy and refashion its society. The
real reason for extending, via Helms-Burton, U.S. protection to the
claims of non-U.S. nationals at the time of property losses in Cuba was
given by a Senate witness in 1995. According to that witness certified
claimants ``represent at most 5 percent of the productive properties in
Cuba.'' He went on to say; ``Including the Cuban Americans provides a
much greater coverage of property and therefore creates a more limited
pool of potential investments in Cuba. By limiting the scope of the
properties available for investment, this bill would discourage foreign
investment in Cuba. By limiting foreign investment in Cuba, the bill
detrimentally impacts upon the regime's chances to prolong its stay in
power and therefore the foreign policy objective is accomplished''
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. On Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs of the Senate
Comm. On Foreign Relations, 104th Cong. 128 (1995) (statement of
Ignacio Sanchez). (Emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Two years after enactment it is clear that Helms-Burton has
not achieved its foreign policy objectives in Cuba. It is
equally clear that the Act's cost to the United States, in
terms of its relations with other countries, will prove
considerable and have only begun to be realized. The question
is, where do we go from here? As a first step the U.S. should
alter the Helms-Burton Act to bring this country back into
conformity with international law. Nothing less than the
national interest requires that this be done.
I will conclude by saying that it is time that the U.S.
government begin to promote a resolution with Cuba of the
claims of U.S. citizens that are recognized in international
law. Considering the circumstances and consequences of the
enactment of Helms-Burton, it may be the least it should do
with respect to the certified claimants.
Chairman Crane. Thank you.
And our next witness is, and correct me if I'm
mispronouncing, ``Kavoolech?''
STATEMENT OF JOHN S. KAVULICH II, PRESIDENT, U.S.-CUBA TRADE
AND ECONOMIC COUNCIL, INC.
Mr. Kavulich. Kavulich.
Chairman Crane. Kavulich.
Mr. Kavulich. In October, you were correct.
Chairman Crane. All right just checking because that's
Serbian, right?
Mr. Kavulich. Czechoslovakian.
Chairman Crane. Oh. I was told that pronouncing that ``ch''
was Croatian.
Mr. Kavulich [continuing]. It depends on where you are. But
thank you, sir----
Chairman Crane. In the case of the Serbian. Please go
forward.
Mr. Kavulich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Rangel, Members
of the Subcommittee.
In 1994, an estimated 500 U.S. business executives visited
Cuba. This year, an estimated 2,500 will visit, many from
Illinois, California, New York, and Massachusetts. Expected to
visit Cuba this year, are 100,000 individuals subject to U.S.
law, 20,000 of which are expected to visit without
reauthorization from the Treasury Department, an increase of 18
percent from 1997.
Within weeks of Helms-Burton becoming law, small- and
medium-sized companies changed from seeking to conduct
commercial activities to gathering information. Large companies
changed from gathering information to seeking to conduct
commercial activities. Since the visit of the Pope, there has
been an exponential increase in the number of U.S. companies
requesting information about Cuba.
The United States and Cuba are triangulating with the
business community, taking unilateral actions, then creating
value from the resultant bilateral effects of those unilateral
actions. During the visit of the Pope, members of the U.S.-Cuba
Trade and Economic Council provided approximately $100,000 in
products and services--from aircraft to communications
equipment, to carpeting. The Treasury Department issued
licenses quickly, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba
was efficient with their logistical support. The result was
reported as positive in Washington, DC, and in Havana.
During the last 2 years, the Clinton administration has
taken initiatives and responded to external pressures,
resulting in expanded opportunities for U.S. companies,
including the authorization of representatives of health care
product companies to visit and to transport samples of their
products; and the authorization for a company to organize a
trade exhibition in Havana to promote the sale of medical
equipment, medical instruments, medical supplies, medicated
products, pharmaceuticals, and health care informational
materials. The Cuban Government has agreed to hold this
exhibition in January 1999.
Reportedly, there is an unannounced agreement with respect
to overflights of the U.S. territory by Cuban air carriers.
Cuba already permits overflights of its territory by U.S. air
carriers. The Clinton administration has considered
reactivation of direct mail service. Direct mail service,
including package delivery services such as those provided by
United Parcel Service and other companies, would reduce costs
associated with transactions, sales, and donations currently
authorized.
The Clinton administration has considered the authorization
of regularly scheduled direct charter flights beginning next
month in Newark, New Jersey, as well as from Miami, Florida,
and perhaps other cities.
Last week, the Prensa Latina News Agency published a story
that began with the words ``Thanks to the Interests section in
Havana.'' Unfiltered commercial information from Cuba is being
provided on a more timely basis by an ever-increasing variety
of sources. No longer is a company surprised to receive a
facsimile or e-mail directly from Cuba. A member of the U.S.-
Cuban Trade and Economic Council recently received an order,
via facsimile, worth more than $100,000 for medical devices.
During the biannual meetings to discuss immigration issues,
the Cuban delegation includes an immigration attorney who is
also the negotiator for the asset claim settlements between
Cuba and Canada, France, Spain, and other countries. Why, I
asked an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and I was
told just in case the United States wishes to discuss the issue
of decertified claimants, we are ready.
There remain, however, divisions amongst those who
determine policy and those who implement policy, both in
Washington, DC, and in Havana. Only during the last 8 months
has there been a visible effort by the Departments of State,
Treasury, and Commerce, which has made considerable progress,
to make more accessible, more accurate, and more timely
information and guidance regarding authorized commercial
transactions.
The policy of the Clinton administration continues to shift
from seeking a reason to say no to seeking a reason to say yes.
Some Cuban Communist Party officials, military officers,
government officials, and company managers seem to prefer an
incremental change in the commercial and economic relationship
with the United States. These individuals would view
substantial and immediate change in the overall commercial and
economic relationship to be an effort by the United States to
undermine the commercial and economic structures that currently
exist within Cuba. One result could be Cuba erecting immediate
barriers.
Cubans have one of the highest levels of awareness and
preferences of U.S. product and service brand names, making
Cuba an attractive export market of 11 million consumers,
almost the same as the State of Illinois. The value of
unrestricted United States-Cuba trade has been estimated to
range from $3 to $7 billion. U.S. companies in the bulk food
commodity sectors would find substantial opportunities in the
short term, medium term, and long term. Cuba currently imports
powdered milk, soy, corn, rice, wheat, cooking oil, and
poultry, among other products. In 1997, Cuba's bulk food
commodity imports totaled approximately $800 million.
U.S. health care companies would have marginal short-term
opportunities due to the fact that Cuba currently has limited
resources to import products, has existing product supply
channels, which are often less expensive than similar products
from the United States, and considerable resources have been
spent during the last 6 years to develop domestic production
capabilities, especially in pharmaceutical and limited-function
medical equipment.
In the long term, Cuba's health care sector is a potential
annual market of $500 million to $1 billion.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement follows:]
Statement of John S. Kavulich II, President, U.S.-Cuba Trade and
Economic Council, Inc.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Rangel, and members of the Subcommittee,
thank you for the opportunity to appear before this hearing on
``U.S. Economic and Trade Policy Toward Cuba.''
In 1994, an estimated 500 United States business executives
and representatives visited the Republic of Cuba. In 1995, an
estimated 1,300 United States business executives and
representatives visited the Republic of Cuba. In 1996, an
estimated 1,500 United States business executives and
representatives visited the Republic of Cuba. In 1997, an
estimated 2,000 United States business executives and
representatives visited the Republic of Cuba. In 1998, an
estimated 2,500 United States business executives and
representatives will visit the Republic of Cuba.
In total, perhaps 100,000 individuals subject to United
States law will visit the Republic of Cuba in 1998--both with
authorization and without authorization from the Office of
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department
of the Treasury. Most of these individuals will be of Cuban
descent who reside within the United States and who are
visiting relatives within the Republic of Cuba. An estimated
20,000 individuals subject to United States law are expected to
visit the Republic of Cuba in 1998 without authorization.
Prior to ``Helms-Burton'' becoming law, interest toward the
Republic of Cuba was primarily the domain of small and medium-
sized United States companies who sent executives and
representatives to the Republic of Cuba to obtain information
and to learn what authorized commercial activities could be
conducted immediately. Large United States companies gathered
information about the Republic of Cuba, but generally did not
seek to conduct commercial activities--even those authorized by
the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United
States Department of the Treasury and by the Bureau of Export
Administration (BXA) of the United States Department of
Commerce.
Since March 1996, when President Clinton signed the
``Helms-Burton'' legislation into law, there have been two
substantive changes with respect to the manner by which the
interest of the United States business community toward the
Republic of Cuba has been manifested.
Within weeks of ``Helms-Burton'' becoming law, small and
medium-sized United States companies changed from seeking to
conduct commercial activities to gathering information and
large United States companies changed from gathering
information to seeking to conduct commercial activities. Small
and medium-sized companies believed that they would not be able
to access the Republic of Cuba marketplace, without
restriction, in the immediate future, so they refocused their
limited resources. ``Helms-Burton'' caused large companies to
believe that they would be able to access the Republic of Cuba
marketplace, without restriction, in the immediate future.
``Helms-Burton'' created for large companies a justification to
discuss publicly their interest toward the Republic of Cuba
while simultaneously discussing their concerns about the use
and effect of unilateral trade sanctions.
The basis of the justification was primarily due to
provisions within the ``Helms-Burton'' law that were perceived
by United States companies to be potentially harmful to their
ability to operate in other countries and 1) no United States
company with a claim certified by the Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission in Washington, D.C., publicly lobbied on behalf of
the ``Helms-Burton'' legislation 2) no United States company
with a certified claim announced that it would seek to use
remedies provided by the ``Helms-Burton'' law 3) United States
company executives, including Mr. Dwayne Andreas of Archer
Daniels Midland Company, Mr. Oscar Wyatt of The Coastal
Corporation, Mr. Curtis Carlson of Carlson Companies, Mr. Ted
Turner of Time Warmer, Mr. Donald Fites of Caterpillar, and Mr.
James Perrella of Ingersoll-Rand among many others, permitted
themselves to be quoted about their interest toward the
Republic of Cuba; visited or had executives of their companies
visit the Republic of Cuba; met with H.E. Dr. Fidel Castro Ruz,
President of the Republic of Cuba; and provided funds to
partisan and nonpartisan organizations focusing upon the
Republic of Cuba 4) national business organizations opposed to
the ``Helms-Burton'' law 5) the media opposed the ``Helms-
Burton'' law and 6) President Clinton, although he signed the
``Helms-Burton'' legislation into law, was widely viewed,
correctly as time would confirm, that he would implement
provisions of the law with constraint instead of expansively.
Since the visit of the Pope to the Republic of Cuba in
January 1998, there has been an exponential increase in the
number of United States companies requesting information about
the Republic of Cuba. The U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council
has not witnessed such a sustained increase in interest since
the period June 1995 to February 1996. The U.S.-Cuba Trade and
Economic Council has sustained a higher percentage increase in
annual membership since ``Helms-Burton'' became law than during
each of the previous two years.
The government of the United States and the government of
the Republic of Cuba continue to triangulate with the United
States business community. Each government is taking unilateral
actions toward the United States business community, then
creating value from the resultant bilateral effects of their
unilateral actions. A recent example was the participation of
the United States business community with the visit of the Pope
to the Republic of Cuba in January 1998. Members of the U.S.-
Cuba Trade and Economic Council provided approximately
US$100,000.00 in products and services--from aircraft to
communications equipment to carpeting. The Office of Foreign
Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the
Treasury issued licences quickly and the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Republic of Cuba was efficient with their
logistical support. The result was reported as positive in
Washington, D.C., and in Havana.
During the last two years, the Clinton Administration has
both taken initiatives and responded to external pressures,
resulting in expanded opportunities for United States
companies--in terms of what can be done within the Republic of
Cuba and the means by which to conduct transactions within the
Republic of Cuba. The two most substantive changes have been 1)
to authorize representatives of United States health care
product companies to visit the Republic of Cuba and to
transport, if desired, samples of their products. Members of
the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council received the first of
these licenses. 2) The authorization for a Connecticut-based
company, which is a member of the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic
Council, to organize a trade exhibition to be held in the
Republic of Cuba, the purpose of which is to promote the sale
of medical equipment, medical instruments, medical supplies,
medicated products, pharmaceuticals, and healthcare
informational materials. The government of the Republic of Cuba
has agreed to hold this exhibition from 26 January 1999 to 30
January 1999. No earlier dates were available at locations
within the city of Havana with the required quantity of space.
Reportedly, an agreement between the government of the
Republic of Cuba and the government of the United States is
expected to be announced soon with respect to overflights of
United States territory by Republic of Cuba air carriers. The
Republic of Cuba permits overflights of its territory by United
States air carriers.
Reportedly, the Clinton Administration is considering the
reactivation of direct mail service between the United States
and the Republic of Cuba. Direct mail service, including
package delivery services such as those provided by United
Parcel Service and Federal Express, could reduce costs
associated with commercial transactions (export sales and
import sales of products and donations of products) currently
authorized by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of
the United States Department of the Treasury and the Bureau of
Export Administration (BXA) of the United States Department of
Commerce between United States companies and Republic of Cuba
entities.
On 29 April 1998, the Republic of Cuba government-operated
Prensa Latina News Agency, published a story that began with
the words ``Thanks to the United States Interests Section in
Havana . . .'' The occasion was the screening of the motion
picture Amistad. California-based DreamWorks SKG had provided
the motion picture to United States diplomatic missions in many
countries. This was the first time in more than thirty-five
years that the Republic of Cuba government-operated Cuban
Institute of Art and Cinematography (ICAIC) and the United
States Interests Section held a jointly-sponsored cultural
event. The screening for Republic of Cuba nationals was at the
Charlie Chaplin Theater in the city of Havana.
Commercial information from the Republic of Cuba requested
by United States companies is being provided on a more timely
basis by an ever-increasing variety of sources. No longer is a
United States company surprised to receive a facsimile or E-
mail directly from a Republic of Cuba government-operated
company, joint venture, economic association, or non-Republic
of Cuba-headquarterd company with an office within the Republic
of Cuba.
A member of the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council
recently received an order worth more than US$100,000.00 for
medical devices. In November 1997, the company delivered
product brochures. Executives of the company have received a
license from the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the
United States Department of the Treasury to visit the Republic
of Cuba.
Washington, D.C.-based diplomats from the Cuban Interests
Section are now traveling throughout the United States to meet
with United States business executives with such frequency that
they can benefit from membership in various United States
airline frequent flyer programs.
The government of the Republic of Cuba's increased focus on
commerce with English-speaking countries such as Canada and the
United Kingdom, benefits United States companies. English-
language publications include the ETECSA Telephone Directory,
newspapers such as Negocios en Cuba and Opciones, magazines
such as Business TIPS on Cuba and Acuarela de los Habanos, and
the 302-page Directorio Turistico de Cuba.
When the government of the Republic of Cuba and the
government of the United States have bi-annual meetings to
discuss immigration issues, the Cuban delegation includes an
attorney who, besides handling immigration, was the negotiator
of the asset claim settlements between the Republic of Cuba and
Canada, Spain, France, and other countries. Why does a dual-use
attorney attend these meetings I asked an official of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba, ``Just in
case,'' I was told, ``the United States wishes to discuss the
issue of the certified claimants. We are ready.'' In a
subsequent letter to me, the United States Department of State
wrote that the United States government will negotiate the
issue of the certified claims when the Cuban government makes a
``serious'' proposal. When asked to define ``serious,'' the
United States Department of State declined to provide such a
definition because, I was informed, it might provide value to
the Cuban government.
There remain, however, divisions amongst those who
determine policy and those who implement policy--both in
Washington, D.C., and in Havana.
Only during the last eight months has there been a visible
effort by the United States Department of State, United States
Department of the Treasury, and the United States Department of
Commerce (which has made considerable progress) to make more
accessible, more accurate, and more timely, the information and
guidance provided to United States companies regarding
authorized commercial transactions relating to the Republic of
Cuba. The policy of the Clinton Administration continues to
shift from seeking a reason to say ``no'' to seeking a reason
to say ``yes.''
Discussions with Republic of Cuba Communist Party
officials, officers in the military, government officials, and
with government-operated company managers present a preference
for an incremental change in the commercial and economic
relationship with the United States. Some of these individuals
would view substantial and immediate change in the overall
commercial and economic relationship between the United States
and the Republic of Cuba to be an effort by the United States
to undermine the commercial and economic structures that
currently exist within the Republic of Cuba. Any sudden and
substantial change in the commercial and economic policies of
the United States toward the Republic of Cuba could result in
the Republic of Cuba erecting immediate barriers.
If the United States could not defeat the revolution in the
1960's with military action, if the United States could not
defeat the revolution in the 1970's and 1980's with
international pressure, if the United States could not defeat
the revolution in the 1990's with laws, now the United States
would be using business and tourism as weapons.
Why are small, medium, and large United States companies
interested in the Republic of Cuba market? Because the Republic
of Cuba has 11 million citizens. If the Republic of Cuba were a
state within the United States, it would rank 7th in
population--after the State of Illinois.
The Republic of Cuba is the largest Caribbean Sea-area
country, larger than nearly all of the islands within the
Caribbean Sea-area combined, and with nearly one-third of the
combined populations. Nearly as large as the State of
Pennsylvania and approximately as long as the State of Florida.
As of May 1998, the estimated value of announced
investments within the Republic of Cuba by private sector
companies and government-controlled companies from twenty-five
countries is US$5.636 billion, of which US$1.756 billion is
estimated to have been committed and/or delivered.
The citizens of the Republic of Cuba have one of the
highest levels of awareness of United States product and
service brand names of any non-English speaking country. The
citizens of the Republic of Cuba have one of the highest levels
of preferences for United States product and service brand
names of any non-English speaking country. For a company to
develop a new market, or redevelop a previous market, the two
greatest cost components are a) the creation of brand awareness
and b) the creation of brand preference. In the Republic of
Cuba, these two significant cost components are reduced, thus
making the Republic of Cuba an immensely attractive export
market.
The value of unrestricted annual United States-Republic of
Cuba trade has been estimated to range from US$3 billion to
US$7 billion--with, perhaps, 70%, or US$2.1 billion to US$4.9
billion being exports from the United States to the Republic of
Cuba.
According to the United States Department of Commerce, for
each US$1 billion in United States exports, 20,000 new
employment opportunities can be created. United States-Republic
of Cuba trade could be responsible for creating perhaps 100,000
or more new jobs for United States citizens.
Unrestricted access of United States companies to the
Republic of Cuba market would result, in less than four years
time, of, perhaps, 80% or more of the Republic of Cuba's Gross
Domestic Product resulting from its bilateral trade, financial
services flow, and tourism with the United States. The Republic
of Cuba will most certainly be the recipient of a Puerto Rico-
type of favorable production and tax/tariff relationship with
the United States. The Republic of Cuba's already established
Free Trade Zones will become more attractive as their
infrastructure develops and operational restrictions lessen.
United States companies, especially those who seek relatively
skilled labor for assembly operations, may find the Republic of
Cuba to be a cost-effective production base. United States
companies will not, however, find that the Republic of Cuba
will have a low-cost labor force in the future. Today, The
Republic of Cuba has an under-employment problem and as this
situation is resolved, Republic of Cuba nationals will demand
to be paid at a rate in comparison with the value of the
product or service that they are employed to produce or
provide. Republic of Cuba nationals are seeking and receiving
U.S. Dollar bonuses from Republic of Cuba government-operated
companies as inducements to increase production.
United States companies in the bulk food commodity sectors
would find substantive opportunities in the short term, medium
term, and long term. The Republic of Cuba currently imports
powered milk, soy, rice, wheat, cooking oil, and poultry among
other products. In 1997, Republic of Cuba bulk food commodity
imports totaled approximately US$800 million.
United States health care companies (medical equipment,
medical instruments, medical supplies, medicated products,
pharmaceuticals, and informational materials) would have
marginal short term opportunities. This is due to 1) the
Republic of Cuba's health care system has limited resources to
import products on a cash-and-carry basis, if United States-
based financing were available for such imported products,
sales opportunities could be increased 2) the Republic of
Cuba's health care system has current other country supply
channels for products which, in a large number of instances,
are less expensive than similar products from the United States
3) the Republic of Cuba's health care system has spent
considerable resources during the last six years developing
production capabilities, especially in pharmaceuticals and
limited function medical equipment. In the long term, the
Republic of Cuba's health care sector is a potential annual
market of US$500 million to US$1 billion.
Thank you for this opportunity to appear before the
Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means of the
United States House of Representatives.
Chairman Crane. Thank you.
And our last distinguished witness is our former colleague,
Michael Barnes.
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL BARNES, PARTNER, HOGAN & HARTSON,
L.L.P., AND FORMER MEMBER OF CONGRESS, ON BEHALF OF USA ENGAGE
Mr. Barnes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I'm a partner in the law firm of Hogan and Hartson, and our
firm has the privilege of serving as counsel to an organization
called USA Engage. USA Engage is a group of business
organizations and companies, now about 670 members, including
the National Foreign Trade Council, the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, Grocery Manufacturers of America, the American Farm
Bureau Federation, the National Association of Manufacturers,
the National Grange, and, as I say, approximately 670 others
that are involved in this organization.
Last year, Mr. Chairman, I had the privilege of
participating in a delegation to Cuba organized by the U.S.
Association of Former Members of Congress. Six of us went,
three Republicans, three Democrats--a very wide spectrum of
ideology. And I think we came back with a total consensus, a
view, that U.S. policy with respect to Cuba needs to be
reassessed and that we are likely--more likely to achieve the
objectives of American policy, which is the democratization of
Cuba, through engagement rather than continuing the 39-year
effort to isolate Cuba.
We were struck by the tragic situation of the people of
Cuba--their political persecution, the economic deprivation,
the terrible social situation in that country. We were also
quite surprised when we met with Cuban dissidents, the
opposition to Castro, many of whom had spent many, many years
in prison to learn from them that they felt that U.S. policy
was counterproductive. A number of them referred to the Helms-
Burton law as Helms-Burton-Castro because they argue that it
facilitates Castro's objective to remain in power and to
continue the repression of the people of that country. And they
urged us, as former, and at that time two current sitting
Members of the House and one former Senator, to come back to
Washington and urge a reassessment of American policy in order
to promote more contact with the Cuban people and more
engagement between the United States and Cuba.
Last week, I participated in a conference of the Inter-
American Dialogue, and we heard a speech by Cardinal Bernard
Law, from Boston, who accompanied the Pope on his historic
visit to Cuba. Cardinal Law said in his remarks last weekend:
``If there is going to be a significant change in Cuba, there
must be a significant change in U.S. policy.'' And he went on
to say that we should lift the ban on the export of food and
medicine from the United States to Cuba and also that we
should--and I quote him--``encourage travel to Cuba.''
USA Engage believes that we are more likely as a nation to
achieve our foreign policy objectives in Cuba by following the
advice of the Pope, the advice of Cardinal Law, and the advice
that I, as a former Member with five of our colleagues heard
from the Cuban opposition when I was there last year, and that
is to change our policy to promote interchange between the
United States and Cuba, both on the commercial level and
generally through the visits of American citizens. So I'm here
today to encourage lifting the ban on the export of food and
medicine to Cuba and also lifting the ban on travel by American
citizens to Cuba.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement follows:]
Statement of Hon. Michael Barnes, Partner, Hogan & Hartson, L.L.P., and
Former Member of Congress, on Behalf of USA Engage
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear
before this Subcommittee to discuss U.S. economic and trade
policy toward Cuba. I am here today on behalf of USA Engage, a
coalition of 670 small and large businesses, agriculture
groups, and trade associations working to seek alternatives to
the proliferation of unilateral U.S. foreign policy sanctions
and to promote the benefits of U.S. engagement abroad.
The time has come for serious reconsideration of U.S.
policy toward Cuba. Our unilateral trade embargo is an outdated
relic of the Cold War. In almost 40 years, the embargo has
failed to bring about positive change in Cuba: the Castro
regime remains brutally repressive and solidly in control. Our
policies--particularly the Helms-Burton law--have given Castro
a convenient excuse for the effects of his own failed economic
policies. They have put America at odds with our closest
allies. And in recent months, the U.S has been criticized by
some of the leading international voices for human rights. That
includes Pope John Paul II, who condemned the embargo as
``unjust and ethically unjustifiable'' during his recent visit
to Cuba.
Cuba is rapidly approaching a crossroads. Castro cannot
live forever, and a new government will take the reins in the
near future. America has a vital interest in promoting a
peaceful transition to freedom, democracy, and the rule of law.
The problem is that the current embargo blocks off all avenues
of American influence. To be ready when the inevitable change
in government comes, we must now reopen the flow of American
ideals and values into Cuba. We should start by reaching out
directly to the Cuban people. The pending legislation to allow
humanitarian sales of food and medicine is a good example. We
can build on that by easing travel restrictions and allowing
cultural, academic, and scientific exchange. Our best chance to
help Cuba rejoin the international community is engagement at
every level: political, diplomatic, economic, charitable,
religious, educational, and cultural.
I would like to spend a few moments discussing the reasons
that the time is right to re-evaluate our policy toward Cuba
and then turn to the steps that we should take now.
First, the world has changed dramatically since we first
imposed the embargo. Thirty-eight years ago, America had good
reasons to try to isolate and contain Cuba. Soviet economic and
military backing posed a direct threat to our national
security. Cuba was a foothold for communism in the Western
Hemisphere. We feared that it would succeed in exporting
Marxist ideals throughout the region. Strategic considerations
virtually necessitated the embargo. Today, those considerations
no longer exist. Within the past ten years, the Berlin Wall has
come down and the Soviet Union has crumbled. Cuba no longer
benefits from a massive Soviet subsidy. During the last twenty
years, democracy has taken root in Latin America and South
America. Cuba is politically isolated and economically ruined;
it no longer poses a threat to our security or our neighbors.
In short, we won the Cold War, and it is time to adjust our
policies to a new era of international relations.
Second, Cuba itself is ripe for change. In December 1996, I
was privileged to visit Cuba as member of a bipartisan
delegation of current and former members of Congress. We met
with Cuban citizens from every walk of life: ministers,
bureaucrats, farmers, dissidents, church leaders, and rising
young political leaders. The view from the ground lead us to
make a unanimous recommendation that the United States should
re-examine its Cuba policy.
That conclusion is even stronger in the wake of Pope John
Paul II's visit to Cuba this year. The crowds that met him at
every stop showed that the Cuban people are open to the outside
world. They are ready to embrace new people, ideas, and
information. The visit also sent a signal that the Cuban
government--Castro himself--may be looking for a way to bring
Cuba back within the community of nations. It remains to be
seen whether Castro bends to Pope John Paul's call for an end
to his repressive practices. Either way, the Pope's visit
touched the Cuban people and may be a catalyst for change at
the grass roots.
Third, the embargo simply has not worked. Cuba would appear
to be an ideal case for unilateral sanctions. It is a
vulnerable target: a small island country just 90 miles from
our shores Yet after 38 years, it still appears that Castro
will remain in power until death or infirmity removes him.
Ironically, far from removing or reforming the Castro
government, the embargo has served as a convenient scapegoat.
Year after year, the Cuban government has blamed the U.S.
embargo for the poverty and depravation caused by its own
failed policies. During the 1996 visit of former and current
members of Congress, we were struck by the success of this
ploy. It has instilled a defiant nationalism in the Cuban
people. There is unmistakable pride among the ruling class in
the country's ability to withstand the U.S. embargo. Ordinary
Cubans share that pride, and even the dissident community does
not support our policies. As the delegation's report stated:
A policy to resist U.S. domination resonates in Cuba,
although there is little ill will toward the United States,
rather a general puzzlement about current policy toward Cuba.
This attitude, articulated by officials, provincial workers,
farmers, university students and others, is shared to an extent
by the independent democrats and dissidents.
Fourth, the Castro Government successfully has exploited
Helms-Burton to rally public opinion. One of the most striking
features of Cuba's attitude toward the United States is the
public reaction to Helms-Burton. We were impressed that the law
is well known among ordinary Cuban citizens; far more so than
in the United States. The high level of public awareness comes
from a concerted propaganda campaign. Castro orchestrated
public demonstrations against the law and staged national
meetings to discuss its impact on the country. Of course,
Helms-Burton is cited as proof that the U.S. wants to destroy
Cuba. It has become an effective rallying point for the Cuban
government. The exploitation of Helms-Burton has been so
successful that several political dissidents we met referred to
it as the ``Helms-Burton-Castro Act.''
Fifth, there are signs that international opinion is
turning against the United States. From the beginning, the
United States has stood alone on the embargo of Cuba. At first,
that was necessary and appropriate. Today, we face an increased
risk of isolating ourselves and losing our leadership role in
the international community. Some of our closest friends and
allies are moving toward increased engagement of Cuba. The
Pope's visit and his direct appeal to the Cuban people is one
example. The April visit of Canadian Prime Minister Jean
Chretien is another. Castro effectively exploited both visits
to show himself aligned with respected world leaders and to
paint the United States as outside the international consensus.
Friction with our closest allies over issues like Helms-Burton
has been an equal boon to Castro. As you know, we narrowly
avoided a WTO showdown with the European Union over that issue.
There also are signs that some human rights leaders are
beginning to take a negative view of the embargo. This year,
for the first time since 1992, the United Nations Human Rights
Commission failed to pass a resolution condemning Cuba's human
rights practices. Diplomats who reported to the Commission
acknowledged the brutality of the Cuban regime. At the same
time, however, they criticized the U.S. embargo as contributing
to intolerable conditions there. The Pope's criticism of the
embargo is another example. If we are going to have any success
in promoting democracy and freedom in Cuba, we need the support
of our allies and the entire international community. As it
stands, we are running the risk of losing that support and our
leadership role.
Even within Cuba, democratic opponents of Castro question
U.S. policies. The delegation of former and current members of
Congress met with a group of political dissidents in Havana.
The majority strongly opposed Helms-Burton. Many also
questioned the utility of the embargo today. In contrast, the
dissidents praised the European approach of both exploring
economic opportunities and supporting the democratic movement.
The Cuban dissidents called for an economic opening as the best
catalyst for political change in Cuba.
For all of these reasons, the time has come for a more
nuanced U.S. policy toward Cuba. To advance peace and freedom
during the inevitable changes ahead, America must begin now to
open channels of influence with the Cuban people. The report of
the delegation of former members of congress put it this way:
The time is ripe to look for opportunities to open up the
country to people, ideas, and information. We need to play
cards that will open the avenues to a peaceful transition. In
the likelihood of a nomeklatura takeover after Castro, lacking
the mystique of Castro, they will have to demonstrate their
success in economic terms. As soon as the economy starts to
move forward, the people will begin to become ``economically
enfranchised'' and supply and demand pulls will start to shape
domestic policy. The engagement by non-American Western
investors, tourists and students will begin a process which
could lead to the establishment of a civil society and a
peaceful transition to not only an economic but also a
political open society. This may take ten years, but it is an
option than can be achieved with limited, if any, violence.
How do we restore the lines of communication? President
Clinton's decision to allow increased family-to-family support
and renewed direct charter flights to Cuba was a good first
step. It restores an important link in the chain of physical
and moral support between Cubans in this country and in Cuba.
We should not underestimate the role that the Cuban-American
community can play in helping to bring about peaceful change
when Castro finally leaves power. Cubans in this country are
the best messengers of American ideals to their friends and
family members in Cuba. We should promote exchange between the
two sides as much as possible. The President's earlier actions
should now be followed by lifting the prohibition on travel by
U.S. citizens to Cuba.
Allowing sales of food and medicines is an important second
step. Congress should move quickly to pass the legislation
proposed last year to allow humanitarian sales into Cuba. That
simple change would undercut Castro's efforts to paint the U.S.
as the root cause of Cuba's economic plight and point the blame
back toward the Cuban government. It also will go far to
restore our leadership standing on human rights in Cuba and
establish closer alignment with internationally respected
proponents of engagement including Pope John Paul II.
And we should consider future steps to facilitate a
dialogue with the Cuban people. Encouraging academic and
scientific exchanges would help foster direct communication. So
would increased support for academic and scholarship programs.
We also should begin to identify areas in which we have shared
interests with Cuba. We then can explore the possibility of
cooperation and collaboration. That has been the approach of
the Inter-American Dialogue's Task Force on Cuba. Focusing on
issues like the environment, the Task Force encourages changes
that are necessary for Cuba to return to the inter-American
community.
This past weekend I had the privilege of participating in a
meeting of the Inter-American Dialogue. At that conference we
heard from Cardinal Bernard Law of Boston who accompanied Pope
John Paul II on his historic visit to Cuba. Cardinal Law said
in his remarks: ``If there is going to be a significant change
in Cuba, there must be a significant change in U.S. policy.''
The Cardinal noted that the Catholic Bishops of Cuba after the
visit of the Pope issued a formal statement that the Pope's
visit ``must not be an isolated event.'' He went on to say ``we
should lift the ban on food and medicine'' and ``we should
encourage travel to Cuba.''
Let me close by reiterating that it is in the interest of
promoting change in Cuba that we should lift the ban on travel
to Cuba. The American people are a powerful voice for the
blessings of freedom and democracy. By allowing travel to Cuba,
we would allow their message to reach the Cuban people and lay
the foundation for future relations.
Mr. Chairman, I will happily respond to any questions you
may have.
Chairman Crane. Thank you.
I have a couple of questions here I'd like to throw out to
the panel, and as many of you as wish, please respond.
First of all, what impact does Helms-Burton have on the
willingness of foreign firms to establish U.S. subsidiaries,
and thereby employ U.S. workers? Anybody have any thoughts?
Mr. Berry. Could you repeat the question?
Chairman Crane. Right. What impact does Helms-Burton have
on the willingness of foreign firms to establish U.S.
subsidiaries, and thereby employ U.S. workers?
Mr. Berry. Well, Mr. Chairman, we did--in the study that we
completed last fall. What we found in the survey of 42
companies was that--and it looked at specific sanctions
measures, let's say, like title IV or title III or the export
control laws or whatever--is that sanctions--what would happen
is that the United States became a less attractive investment
destination. And, therefore--and also we found that some of
them rather than establishing new investments of new operations
in the United States might do it in one of the NAFTA partner
states. The--and the impact of specific sanctions, the first
thing for foreign subsidiaries was that they would cut jobs.
The second was that they would probably close existing
operations. And the third is that they would relocate existing
investment.
Chairman Crane. What's been the experience of subsidiaries
of U.S. firms overseas who are required, under U.S. law, to
comply with the U.S. embargo on Cuba as well as blocking
legislation enacted by our major trading partners which
prohibit them from doing so?
Mr. Berry. I'll take that question too if no one else does.
What we--I had mentioned in my testimony the example of Wal-
Mart and what happened in that case where the subsidiary was in
the middle between both the U.S. Helms-Burton law and the
Canadian blocking statute is they ended up abiding by Canadian
law. That is a common practice, but it is really hard to know
how most companies would line up on this because they don't
want to talk about it.
Chairman Crane. Do you believe that the enactment of the
Helms-Burton legislation has succeeded in increasing the
pressure on Castro's regime or do you believe that it has
focused attention primarily on U.S. disputes with our major
trading partners over sanctions policy?
Mr. O'Leary. I think that question can be answered very
straightforwardly. The results of Helms-Burton has simply been
to deteriorate our relationships with our trading partners, and
it has had no beneficial effect that can be measured in any
substantive way.
Mr. Barnes. I would just add, Mr. Chairman, that what we
see at USA Engage is the isolation of the United States. The
objective of Helms-Burton was to isolate Cuba. But, in fact, it
has rallied many in the international community to Cuba's
defense, unfortunately. The objective of Helms-Burton was a
good one: To remove the repressive regime in Cuba. But it seems
unfortunately to have had the opposite effect. Part of the
problem is that it's a unilateral sanction. We're all alone
here. If there were--as the sanctions were on South Africa or
Haiti or in some other instances--global sanctions, enacted by
the United Nations and everybody got together and participated
it would be a very, very different situation. But the United
States is acting alone in this situation, and, in fact, pushing
some of our friends in the international community into the
Cuban orbit in a way that was never intended, clearly.
Mr. Kavulich. Mr. Chairman, the Helms-Burton legislation or
law has had an effect upon Cuba. It has increased their cost of
borrowing. It has also caused some companies that were looking
to do business there, whether it be import-export investor
provider services, to reconsider. So it has had some effect.
The Cuban Government has said it has. The question, though,
remains has it had the effect that those who supported the
Helms-Burton law said that it was intended to have. And at the
end of the day, if memory serves me, those people who initially
supported the Helms-Burton legislation said that its primary
goal was to help resolve the issue of the certified claimants.
And so, in answer to that question, I think my colleagues up
here would agree that we haven't seen much movement there.
Mr. Muse. I'm not sure I agree--that it was a rationale for
the law to solve certified claims. We were vigorously opposed
to it. And I don't want to disagree with my copanelist, but I
don't recall that ever having been one of the bases of the law.
In fact, what it did was elevate a group of non-U.S.
nationals to claimant status in order to try to create a
blockade on foreign investment into Cuba to accomplish a set of
foreign goals with respect to that island. But in doing so, it
diminished American standing in the world by violating
international law.
Mr. Kavulich. Yes, I didn't mean to suggest that that was
what it--what the people intended. I was saying that that's
what the people who were supporting it said. I mean, that's
what they were going around saying that this was for the
benefit of the claimants. The claimants didn't support it.
Mr. O'Leary. Mr. Chairman, in our statement that's been
submitted for the record, we have undertaken a detailed
analysis of the stated objectives of Helms-Burton and our
observed consequences thereof, which would invite your
attention. I won't bore you with repeating it.
Chairman Crane. Thank you very much.
Mr. Neal.
Mr. Neal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Members of the panel, I think you were all here to hear the
first panelists, including the Members of the House. How do you
respond to the argument that they offered today that this isn't
about economics, it's about human rights?
Mr. O'Leary. Mr. Neal, in the first instance, we would
fully agree. It is about human rights. And we are frankly
embarrassed by the conduct of the United States in the punitive
measures that we've imposed on 11 million people without having
made one substantive step forward in what we say our goal is.
Mr. Neal. The other panelists?
Mr. Barnes. I would agree with that. I think that we've
tried for 39 years to--we've tried a certain policy for 39
years, to isolate Cuba, to impose an embargo. It's time to
consider a different approach, one that, in the judgment of the
670 members of USA Engage, has more likelihood of success. I
once heard Lek Walensza, the successful anticommunity freedom
fighter in Poland, when he was asked what advice he would give
to open up Cuba, and he said, ``open up.'' He said a Communist
regime cannot withstand openness. And if large numbers of
American citizens--students, businesspeople, clergy, labor
workers--all kinds of people were visiting a regime that's only
90 miles away, it would be very difficult for that Communist
regime to keep the lid on.
We asked that very question--our congressional delegation--
former Members asked that very question of the dissidents.
Would the Castro regime be able to withstand a total influx of,
you know, millions of Americans? It's only 90 miles away. It
would be pretty easy to get there. They said it wouldn't last 6
months.
Mr. Muse. I don't think the invocation of the phrase human
rights ought to shield U.S. policy toward Cuba from an inquiry
as to what its costs are to the nation at large, that is, to
all U.S. citizens. What are the costs to the United States and
the world, in terms of our relations with other nations? I
don't think anyone disagrees that human rights is a goal worth
pursuit. But it's the means whereby we pursue that goal that
ought to be a subject of discussion.
Mr. O'Leary. Mr. Neal, I would just add that in the years
I've spent in business, it would be fair to say the American
business community rarely has a single view on any subject. We
are as diverse and divided, if you will, in opinions. On this
particular subject, we just know of no substantive objection by
any part of the business community to the position the Chamber
has advanced on these issues. We have a failed policy. And we
should get on with things which are in the interest of the
Cuban and in the interest of the American economy.
Mr. Neal. Mr. Barnes, based upon your visit and your
experience, would you disagree with Mr. Menendez that the
Pope's entree is similar in fact to what happened in Eastern
Europe since you quoted Walensza?
Mr. Barnes. I wasn't there for the Pope's visit, but I've
talked to a lot of people who were. And I heard last weekend
from Cardinal Law, who was there with him, that the Pope's
visit was an extraordinary experience for the hundreds and
hundreds of thousands of Cubans who went out to hear him. The
Cuban bishops issued a statement some weeks after the Pope's
visit, saying that the Pope's visit should not be an isolated
incident; that there needs to be an ongoing approach of other
people coming to Cuba. They're clearly calling for engagement
by the international community with Cuba to follow up on the
extraordinary visit, the historic visit of the Pope.
Mr. Neal. Thank you. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Crane. Do you have questions?
Mr. Rangel. Yes.
What do you think we can do to organize the business
community to speak out? I don't ever recall where so few people
can support such a broad general foreign policy, as has
happened with Helms-Burton. I was so glad to see the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce come out at least partially. But there's
something wrong when we don't hear on a regular basis American
businessmen speaking out against something that is so un-
American and so antibusiness.
Mr. O'Leary. Well, Mr. Rangel, I accept your criticism,
except I don't share your view. We have consistently pressed
this case. We undertook every effort we could to demonstrate to
the Congress that Helms-Burton was bad policy. It was misguided
and it was counterproductive. I will be frank to say that 4 or
5 years ago, when we addressed ourselves with a comprehensive
effort on these questions, a number of my business colleagues
were unwilling to subject themselves to the sort of emotional
allegations, which we observed earlier in this session. And
quite frankly, what I now sense is--the conclusion is, enough
is enough. Let's get on with it.
Mr. Barnes. Mr. Rangel, I have here a copy of a full-page
ad that appeared in the Wall Street Journal just a few weeks
ago, taken out by this organization, USA Engage--670 business
organizations and companies. I won't read the whole thing, but
I'll read just one little bit of it: ``We believe the time is
right to explore new initiatives to promote freedom in Cuba. As
a first step, we urge that you publicly commit''--this is an
open letter to President Clinton, Speaker Gingrich, and
Majority Leader Lott--``that you publicly commit in the State
of the Union Address and the Republican response to end the ban
on the export of U.S. food as well as lift the restrictions on
the sale of medical products. We would hope that this opening
will produce further opportunities for improved relations.
Leadership is something all Americans respect. We stand ready
to support you in a new policy of engagement with Cuba.
Sincerely.''--and then the list of the principal organizations.
So they're trying, and this kind of thing will continue from
the business community.
Mr. Rangel. Well, let me thank all of you for your
continued engagement, and let's hope that the group gets
stronger and more effective.
Chairman Crane. I want to express appreciation to you all
too for coming and testifying today. And with that, we shall
introduce our next panel: Thomas Quigley, policy advisor,
United States Catholic Conference; Silvia Wilhelm, executive
director, Cuban Committee for Democracy; Craig Fuller,
cochairman, Americans for Humanitarian Trade with Cuba; Brad
Gary, member, board of directors, Medical Device Manufacturers
Association; and Dan Gerdes, chairman of U.S. Wheat Associates.
And we will proceed in the order that I introduced you.
Mr. Quigley.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS E. QUIGLEY, POLICY ADVISOR, LATIN AMERICAN
AND CARIBBEAN AFFAIRS, UNITED STATES CATHOLIC CONFERENCE
Mr. Quigley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My testimony will focus largely on the role and status of
the Catholic Church in Cuba and the stated views of that church
as they relate to the themes of these hearings. The prepared
testimony reviews some of the recent history of that church,
which may help provide a context for discussion of the
sanctions policy.
Coming to the present, those who witnessed the tremendous
outpouring of enthusiasm and active participation by hundreds
of thousands of Cubans in the papal Masses might be excused for
thinking that this is a strong, vibrant, confident community
that has history clearly on its side. And they would be right
up to a point. But it would be wrong to imagine that this
community or its leadership could think of asserting the kind
of independent action, even dissident activity, even if it were
so inclined, that some here seem to think it should.
The potential for the Catholic Church in Cuba to further
accelerate the already existing process of positive change is
limited by at least two factors: The statistical reality of
that church, that is, the very limited number of pastoral
workers, whether clerical, religious, or lay, who are able to
play a more active role in the larger society; and second, the
inadequate degree of solid formation in the life and teachings
of the church, especially with respect to its social teachings.
The Catholic Church in Cuba today is the largest single
institution in that country completely free of control by the
party; the religious body that has probably suffered the
greatest persecution by the state over the past three decades;
a church that is presently enjoying a high degree of cohesion,
self confidence, and hope for the future; and yet a church that
is largely deinstitutionalized and resource poor, especially in
terms of personnel. The active church is a relatively small
group of bishops. There are 13 at present. Priests--some 290 or
so. Religious sisters--something over 530, and committed
laypersons, some of whom who have lived through these nearly 40
years, but most who have known only the present government.
These and the other numbers represent a great increase when one
considers that, for most of the past three decades, there were,
at any given time, about 200 priests and 200 religious sisters
as contrasted with the roughly 800 priests and well over 2,000
sisters at the time of the revolution. But still a woefully
inadequate number of church professionals, for over 4 million
Catholics, never mind the 11 million-strong Cuban population.
In addition to the limited numbers, the debilitating
effects of three decades of oppression and marginalization
should not be ignored. In reading the recent social documents
of the Cuban church, one is struck by the strong emphasis given
the great need for formation of the church's social teaching.
The concern for the human rights and dignity of every person,
especially the poorest, is a recurring theme. In no way,
however, should the growing numbers of Christian social
activists be confused with the explicitly political dissidents
who are the focus of attention of international human rights
groups. And it would be a mistake to interpret the church's
strong defense of human rights activists as an endorsement of
widespread dissidence or a call for active opposition to the
present regime. It would not only be a mistake, but a very
dangerous misinterpretation of how the church views its role in
today's society.
The written testimony speaks of the church's view of this,
including its mission to provide material assistance to the
poor and needy and of the work of Caritas, the church's
development and relief agency. Some in this country would
apparently like to see Caritas assume a larger task in Cuba,
such as overseeing the distribution of much greater amounts of
donated food stuffs and medicines, or serving as end-use
monitor for U.S. authorized sales of such. Caritas will do all
it can to alleviate the very real sufferings experienced by
many in Cuba today. But it has made clear that it will not and
can not be harnessed to a political program, whether in support
of or in opposition to the present government. And it has also
made clear that its own institutional limitations make any
rapid increase in its workload problematic.
Among other conditions, sanctions should be applied only
after less coercive measures have been tried and failed. The
harm caused by them should be proportionate to the goals
sought. They should be temporary in nature, targeted against
the aggressor and not directly against innocent civilians and
should always be a part of a larger political and diplomatic
effort to seek a peaceful resolution to the conflict.
Few will argue today that the U.S.-imposed embargo against
Cuba meets these or other criteria. They have been in effect
for an inordinately long time and apparently have achieved
little of their intended effect and have almost certainly
contributed to the worsening of the standard of living of the
average Cuban citizen. What they have done, according to many
analysts, is provide convenient cover for the regime by
enabling every shortage of food, medicine, and other basic
commodities to be blamed on the U.S. embargo.
In 1992, the Cuban bishops said that embargoes that affect
the flow of products essential for the people, including food
and medicines, ``are morally unacceptable, are generally in
violation of the principles of international law, and are
always contrary to the values of the Gospel.''
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the United States Catholic
Conference urges Congress to take steps to end the present
restrictions at least on the sale of food and medicines. Cuban
people need access to such commodities without excessive
prohibitions and restrictions. As Archbishop McCarrick said
last January, ``The present sociopolitical system, privileging
those with power and ready access to hard currency but leaving
great numbers of the poor with inadequate access to food and
medicine, will not be changed overnight. The demands of
elementary social justice, however, call upon us to do what we
can to alleviate the suffering of the Cuban people, especially
the poorest and most vulnerable. Ending the restrictions on the
sale of food and medicines, as legislation currently in both
Houses of Congress calls for, would be, in our view, a noble
and needed humanitarian gesture and an expression of wise
statesmanship on the part of our elected leaders.''
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement follows:]
Statement of Thomas E. Quigley, Policy Advisor, Latin American and
Caribbean Affairs, United States Catholic Conference
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity of presenting
testimony on behalf of the United States Catholic Conference.
My testimony will focus largely on the role and status of the
Catholic Church in Cuba and the expressed views of that church
as they relate to the themes of these hearings. Of the four
focus points for the hearings listed in the Committee advisory,
I will confine my comments to just two: the question of the
impact on the Cuban people of the present United States policy,
and the matter of humanitarian assistance to the Cuban people.
To do this, I would like first to relate to the current
debate on U.S. sanctions and U.S. policy toward Cuba by noting
something of the recent history of the Catholic Church in Cuba,
a history that has seen its most dramatic moment in the visit
of Pope John Paul II to the island nation last January. Some
observations about that Church both before and following the
Castro revolution may help to provide a context for this
discussion.
The Church in Pre-Revolutionary Cuba
In the years just prior to the 1959 accession to power of
Fidel Castro, the Catholic Church had both great strengths and
considerable weaknesses. Although the vast majority of the
population was at least nominally Catholic, the number of
clergy and religious ministering to the people was severely
limited and, as in many other Latin American countries of the
time, heavily dependent on personnel from abroad. However, by
the early '50s, the various religious orders in the country
were outstanding for their educational and social service
activities. They not only conducted several hundred schools
throughout the country but staffed over 250 charitable
institutions, including 52 homes for the elderly, orphanages
and hospitals.
Despite the strong participation of many active Catholics,
including clergy and religious, in the efforts to overthrow the
Batista dictatorship--bishops had called on Batista to resign
and had initially welcomed what they hoped would be the re-
establishment of democratic rule of law--relations between the
Church and the new regime deteriorated very rapidly. The
bishops early on protested the brutality of the hurried show
trials and the immediate execution of many accused of criminal
behavior during the Batista years, and increasingly found
themselves forced to criticize, and eventually denounce, the
excesses of certain laws imposed by the state as well as the
growing influence of the communist party.
In May of 1961, just 37 years ago, following the disastrous
Bay of Pigs invasion the previous month (during which Catholic
schools, convents and rectories were occupied), all private
schools in the country were definitively shut down and their
properties expropriated. In September of that year, 131 priests
and religious, including the auxiliary bishop of Havana, Mons.
Eduardo Boza Masvidal, were rounded up and summarily expelled
on the Spanish liner Covadonga. Much of the Catholic Church in
Cuba was effectively shut down, and it was completely shut out
of any participation in the life of the larger society. The
Church was ostracized, denounced, ridiculed; media campaigns
against the Church, and religion in general, became common. So-
called scientific materialism, atheism, became part of the
state-imposed curriculum in all the schools. To attend Mass, to
have one's children baptized or confirmed, to have any open
contact with the Church became dangerous, and consequently only
small numbers of the most dedicated or courageous Catholics did
so. Hundreds, then hundreds of thousands, left, taking with
them much of the Church's most active membership. The Catholic
Church was reduced to a shadow of its former self.
The Church in Cuba Today
Those who, last January, witnessed the tremendous
outpouring of enthusiasm by hundreds of thousands of Cubans and
their full-throated participation in the public Masses
celebrated by the Holy Father, might be excused for thinking
that this is a strong, vibrant, confident community that has
history clearly on its side. And they would be right, up to a
point. But it would be wrong to imagine that this community, or
its leadership, could think of asserting the kind of
independent action and even dissident activity--even if it were
inclined to do so--that some in the United States seem to
believe it should. As U.S. policy makers contemplate the
potential for this community, the Catholic Church in Cuba, to
greatly accelerate the already existing process of positive
change in Cuba, two factors should be kept in mind. One is the
statistical reality of that church; i.e., the very limited
number of pastoral workers, whether clerical, religious or lay,
who are able to play the more active role in the larger society
that some here seem to be calling for; the second is the
inadequate degree of solid formation in the life and teachings
of the Church that most of today's Catholic Cubans yet possess.
This is especially true with respect to the social doctrine of
the Church.
Profile of the Church in Cuba
What exactly do we understand by the Catholic Church in
Cuba? It is, at one and the same time, the largest single
institution in the country that is not under the control of the
Communist Party; it is the religious institution that, with the
possible exception of the much smaller Jehovah's Witnesses, has
suffered the greatest persecution by the State and its
officially sanctioned atheist ideology over the past three
decades; it is a church that is presently enjoying--due in good
measure to the papal visit--an unprecedented sense of cohesion,
of self-confidence, of hope for the future; and yet it is a
church that is largely de-institutionalized and relatively
resource-poor, especially in terms of personnel. The active
Church of Cuba is a relatively small group of bishops, priests,
religious and committed laypersons, the last numbering at most
some few hundreds of thousands, some of whom have lived through
these nearly forty years, but most who have known only the
present government, yet yearn as strongly as their elders for a
different society.
These are the Cubans we are talking about when we ask if
the Church can be a force for social change in Cuba. According
to the generally accepted figures, some four million of Cuba's
eleven million citizens may be considered at least nominal
Catholics today. But this reasonably large number of what might
be called cultural Catholics, while certainly disaffected by
much of what has taken place under the present regime, confine
their religious expression largely to the private sphere, to
their devotion to God as represented, for example, in the image
of the Sacred Heart of Jesus, which formed such a dramatic
backdrop for the papal Mass in Havana, and to his mother under
the essentially Cuban title of Our Lady of Charity of Cobre.
Popular religiosity, a widespread phenomenon throughout most of
Latin America, is not to be dismissed as unimportant to the
ethos of a people, but neither is it easily harnessed in the
cause of any particular social or political goal.
Within the eleven dioceses that make up the Church in Cuba,
there are thirteen bishops, some 291 priests, divided roughly
equally between diocesan clergy (144) and members of religious
orders (147). (These figures are from January and so some of
the new visas granted to foreign clergy and religious in the
light of the papal visit may be now have pushed the figure over
the 300 mark--the first time since 1961.) There are some 33
deacons, that is, members of the clergy but not priests; most
if not all are married men. There are 26 religious brothers,
non-ordained members of religious congregations or orders, and
24 members of secular institutes. And, of great importance,
there are now some 538 religious sisters. This totals 925
``official'' personnel of the Church in Cuba.
Quite an increase when one considers that for most of the
past three decades, there were at any given time about 200
priests and 200 sisters, as contrasted with the roughly 800
priests and 2,000 sisters at the time of the revolution. But
still a woefully inadequate number of church ``professionals''
for over four million Catholics, never mind the now eleven
million-strong Cuban population.
Besides the numbers, country of origin is also a relevant
factor, especially in today's Cuba. Of this total of 925 full-
time church personnel, only 381--less than 40 %--are Cuban-
born. For the clergy, the ratio is more equal, as virtually all
of the diocesan priests (144) are Cuban-born, as are several of
the religious priests (147), and recent years have seen a
fairly dramatic up-tick in ordinations of Cuban seminarians,
somewhat greater than the numbers lost to death or retirement.
The foreign-born pastoral workers, coming from 33
countries, representing the universal charity of the Church,
are a great sign of international solidarity and provide--as
they have done for generations--an immeasurably important
service to the people of Cuba. But their ``non-Cubanness,''
especially given the hyper-nationalism of the present regime,
could potentially represent a problem. The recent decision of
the Cuban government not to renew the visa of the American
Capuchin, Fr. Patrick Sullivan, obliging him to leave the
country at Eastertime, offers a telling illustration. No
charges were, or could be, brought against him; but because his
behavior was considered as not conforming sufficiently to what
is tolerable for foreigners, he was invited to leave.
Formation of the Cuban Laity
In addition to the limited personnel resources of the
Church, the debilitating effects of three decades of oppression
and marginalization cannot be ignored. The reforms and renewal
in the Catholic Church effected by the Second Vatican Council
(1962-65), and the extraordinary meetings of the Latin American
episcopates in Medellin (1968) and Puebla (1979), were slow in
penetrating the protective covering the Cuban authorities had
thrown up around their island.
Cuba's bishops, priests and religious, of course, were
fully attuned to these developments but their ability to convey
them to the masses of the faithful was severely limited.
After the 1979 Third General Assembly of the Latin American
Episcopates in Puebla, Mexico, the Cuban bishops determined to
set in motion a process of ecclesial reflection and analysis
that would result in a kind of ``Puebla meeting'' for the
Church in Cuba. This event, called ENEC, the Cuban National
Church Gathering (Encuentro Nacional Eclesial Cubano), took
place in 1986. It was the first major church event of its kind
since the Catholic Congress of 1961 and has been followed, most
notably, by three national ``social weeks,'' convened by the
Cuban Justice and Peace Commission. The documents from these
meetings offer an important window onto the social and
political thinking of some of the most active members of the
Church in Cuba.
One is struck, in reading them, of the strong emphasis
given to the task of formation in the Church's social
teachings, of the need to continue strengthening the work of
formation at the level of the Christian base communities, of
formation in solidarity, of building up the Christian
community. The concern for the human rights and dignity of
every person, especially for what are termed the ``new poor,
which exist in every society'' is a recurring theme In no way,
however, should these Christian activists be confused with the
explicitly political dissident activists who are the focus of
attention of international human rights groups.
Dissidents and the Church
Church leaders with whom I have spoken have the greatest
respect for these individuals, many of whom have served long
sentences in Cuba's jails for their dissident activity, often
confined solely to their expressed opinions. These are the
people the Pope spoke for in his moving remarks on the ``world
of suffering'' at the leprosarium of San Lazaro: ``These
prisoners of conscience suffer an isolation and a penalty for
something for which their own conscience does not condemn them.
What they want is to participate actively in life with the
opportunity to speak their mind with respect and tolerance. I
encourage efforts to reinsert prisoners into society.'' It
would be a mistake, however, to interpret the Church's strong
defense of Cuba's human rights activists as an endorsement of
widespread dissidence or a call for active opposition to the
present regime. It would not only be a mistake but a very
dangerous misinterpretation of how the Church views its role in
today's society.
Since the mid-80s, the Church (as well as other sectors of
the society) has enjoyed an increased freedom and ability to
function more openly than in the previous decades. Except for
the brief set-back in the early 90s, following the events in
Eastern Europe, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the
subsequent ``special period'' of economic hardship, the
``space'' available to the Church has continued to widen. Large
numbers of people throughout the island have been re-
discovering their religious roots or approaching the churches
for the first time--this is true for all religious bodies in
Cuba--and it is once again acceptable for people to express
their faith commitments openly.
The Role of Caritas
The Catholic Church repeatedly refers to its threefold
mission in society: its liturgical function, that is, the
freedom to worship God freely and openly; its charitable
function, the right to provide material assistance to the poor
and needy; and its prophetic function, that of proclaiming the
Gospel in all its dimensions, including the denunciation of
evil, including evil for which the state is responsible.
Throughout the revolutionary period, the Church has enjoyed a
relative freedom of worship; public processions and other
religious expressions have been proscribed, but most of the
churches have remained open. The once outstanding role of the
Church in providing help to the poor and infirm had been
greatly reduced until the early 1990s when the state welcomed
the development of the Caritas offices in each of the nation's
provinces. Caritas is the Church's development and relief
agency and is part of a worldwide network of such agencies,
many of which provide donations of food, medicine, building and
other materials to Caritas Cubana, thus enabling the Church in
Cuba to resume more of its traditional role in providing direct
help to the needy. It is arguably the largest, completely
independent non-governmental organization in Cuba today.
Some in this country would like to see Caritas assume a
much greater role, perhaps oversee the distribution of large
amounts of privately donated foodstuffs and medicines, or serve
as an accepted end--use monitor for U.S. authorized sales of
such items. Caritas is prepared to do what it can to alleviate
the very real sufferings experienced by many in Cuba today, but
it has made clear that it will not and cannot be harnessed to a
political program, whether in support of or in opposition to
the present government. And it has also made clear that its own
institutional limitations (there are barely 30 full-time
Caritas workers throughout the island at present) make any
rapid increase in its workload unlikely.
The Church and Economic Sanctions
It is well known that the Church supports the imposition of
sweeping embargoes only under very strict conditions. As
aggressive acts, embargoes are required, in Catholic social
teaching, to meet stringent requirements. Among other
conditions, they should be applied only after less coercive
measures have been tried and failed; the harm caused by
sanctions should be proportionate to the goals sought; they
should be temporary in nature, targeted against the aggressor
and not directly against innocent civilians, and should always
be part of a larger political and diplomatic effort to seek a
peaceful resolution to the conflict.
Few will argue today that the U.S.-imposed embargo against
Cuba meet these or other criteria. They have been in effect for
an inordinately long time, they have apparently achieved little
of their intended effect, and have almost certainly contributed
to the worsening of the standard of living of the average Cuban
citizen. What they have done, according to many analysts, is
provide convenient cover for the regime by enabling every
shortage of food, medicine and other basic commodities to be
attributed to the United States ``blockade.''
In 1992, the Cuban bishops wrote: ``Total embargoes that
affect the flow of products essential for the people, including
foods and medicines, indispensable for the population, are
morally unacceptable, are generally in violation of the
principles of international law, and are always contrary to the
values of the Gospel.'' While the U.S. embargo may not qualify
as a ``total'' embargo, its deleterious effect on the flow of
goods essential for the people seems undeniable.
In their major pastoral letter of 1993, the bishops
deplored ``the sad experience of foreign interventions in our
national affairs,'' both that of the Soviet bloc, the end of
whose subsidies had by then become the major source of the
``special period'' of austerity, and that of the United States,
whose ``embargo, trade restrictions, isolation, threats and the
like'' continue to disadvantage the average Cuban. ``We bishops
of Cuba,'' they went on, ``reject any kind of measure that, in
order to punish the Cuban government, serves rather to
aggravate the problems of our people.'' And following the
passage of the 1996 ``Libertad'' Act (Helms-Burton), the
bishops expressed their concern that the law runs the risk of
``making even more difficult the likelihood of finding peaceful
means to lead to the reconciliation of all Cubans.''
Finally, as we know, the Holy Father twice made reference
to economic sanctions during his visit to Cuba in January. Both
instances placed equal if not greater criticism on similar
limitations on people's freedom imposed by the Cuban
government, but the sharp criticism of the U.S. sanctions was
unmistakable. The Cuban bishops highlighted the point in their
post-visit assessment: ``In the same line of his social
teaching, in referring to the restrictive economic measures
imposed on Cuba from outside, [the Pope] called them clearly
unjust and ethically unacceptable.''
Conclusion
The U.S. Catholic Conference urges the Congress to take
appropriate steps to end the present restrictions at least on
the sale of food and medicines to Cuba. The Cuban people, as
Archbishop Theodore McCarrick said in his January 30, 1998
``Statement on Cuba in the Light of the Papal Visit,'' need
access to such commodities as food and medicine from abroad
without excessive prohibitions and restrictions. ``The present
socio-political system,'' he wrote, ``privileging those with
power and ready access to hard currency but leaving great
numbers of the poor with inadequate access to food and
medicine, will not be changed overnight. The demands of
elementary social justice, however, call upon us to do what we
can to alleviate the suffering of the Cuban people, especially
the poorest and most vulnerable. Ending the restrictions on the
sale of food and medicines, as legislation currently in both
Houses of the U.S. Congress calls for would be, in our view, a
noble and needed humanitarian gesture and an expression of wise
statesmanship on the part of our elected leaders.''
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Crane. Thank you, Mr. Quigley.
Ms. Wilhelm.
STATEMENT OF SILVIA WILHELM, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CUBAN
COMMITTEE FOR DEMOCRACY, MIAMI, FLORIDA
Ms. Wilhelm. Before starting my remarks, I need to make a
small but I think significant correction to a statement made by
a Member of the Subcommittee a little while ago that there was
no Cuban-American representation on the panel. Wilhelm, my last
name, is nothing more than a result of 26 years of a wonderful
marriage to a third-generation German-American. I am a Cuban-
American from Miami and the executive director of the Miami and
Washington-based Cuban Committee for Democracy.
First of all, I want to thank the Members of this
Subcommittee for giving me the opportunity to speak not only on
behalf of the organization I represent but also on behalf of
thousands of Cuban-Americans who believe that a reevaluation of
U.S. economic policy toward Cuba is long overdue.
The Cuban Committee for Democracy is a nonprofit
organization that opposes the Castro government and believes
that a peaceful, negotiated transition to democracy in Cuba
could be better accomplished through constructive engagements
rather than fruitless isolation that contributes to the misery
of the Cuban people. We also believe that the major blame for
the disastrous situation that Cuba faces today is a result of a
failed internal economic and social policy. Yet, U.S. policy
has provided the excuse that the Cuban Government has used to
blame their problems on such an embargo. Isn't it time to make
them accountable? However, the U.S. embargo of food and the de
facto embargo of medicine is causing further deterioration and
misery and should not continue to be enforced.
I left Cuba in January 1961; smuggled out of the country at
the inception of the Pedro Pan Program which eventually
provided escape for over 20,000 Cuban children whose parents
believed that it was in their children's best interest to leave
Cuba rather than to be raised under a Communist system. As most
Cuban-Americans of my generation, I was supportive of the
isolation policy of the United States toward Cuba and
specifically the trade embargo on the island. But in 1994, I
made a very difficult decision to visit relatives who had
remained in Cuba and were experiencing tremendous economic
hardship. My experience from that trip dramatically changed my
opinion of U.S. policy and helped make my decision to actively
work to modify such policy. Specifically, a policy that places
restrictions on the sale of food and medicine to the Cuban
people. I was haunted by the lack of proper nutrition; lack of
basic vitamins and medicines; and the presence of significant
parasite infection in the population which were affecting many
of the people I met including members of my family.
My physician-husband accompanied me on my second trip to
Cuba in 1996. We took the time to visit hospitals and witness
the scarcity of medicines in Cuba. My uncle, an American
trained physician who lives in Cuba, contracted cancer and
shared with us the trouble he was having getting access to
American-made x-ray film and high-tech drugs to treat his
deteriorating condition. Other American physicians who have
visited the island have come back with similar observations.
I returned to Cuba last January as a member of a group of
pilgrims led by a Cuban-American priest from Tampa to witness,
along with the people of Cuba, the historic visit of His
Holiness, John Paul II. Also traveling with the group was the
president of the Cuban Committee for Democracy, Dr. Eliceo
Perez Stable. We listened as he asked the Cuban Government to
continue opening much needed spaces within Cuba so that human
rights can be a reality. We heard him denounce the U.S.
economic sanctions against Cuba as unethical and immoral and
asked all Cubans in and out of Cuba to find ways of
reconciliation. We witnessed a world religious leader, champion
of human rights and a staunch anti-Communist crusader who
recognizes that the best way to pave the way for a peaceful
transition to democracy in Cuba is the way of engagement by
responding to the slow movement of the Castro regime.
Following the Pope's admonition, open discussions within
the Miami community as to how to bring about much needed
reconciliation between the people of Cuba and those of the
Diaspora have started to take place. The once accepted rhetoric
of revenge is now giving way to a rhetoric of reconciliation. A
day doesn't go by in Miami that I'm not approached by Cuban-
American friends of mine who have disagreed with my views
toward dealing with the Cuban dilemma and are now telling me
they are planning their trip to Cuba this summer, this fall,
next spring. The longstanding U.S. policy of economic sanctions
against Cuba which at the time of inception was viewed as the
most effective way to deal with the Communist threat posed by
the Castro government has not brought about its original intent
which was the overthrow of such government. The embargo has not
worked.
The embargo of food and the de facto embargo of medicine
are the only ones of its kind. Even current embargoes against
Iran, Libya, and Iraq do not ban the sale of foods to those
countries. Politics should never interfere with health and
nutrition especially when the people are the most vulnerable.
They are the ones who bear the brunt of such sanctions.
The United States has a longstanding record of supporting
humanitarian causes. This record should continue in its
dealings with Cuba. We wholeheartedly support the President's
recent initiatives, but humanitarian support is not enough.
Humanitarian aid addresses the few and not the many. It
increases dependency in an era of market-driven forces. Cubans
must learn the value of capitalistic trade and business
practices and should not be dependent on the charity of the
United States or their relatives abroad. This policy needs to
be evaluated now.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement follows:]
Statement of Silvia Wilhelm, Executive Director, Cuban Committee for
Democracy, Miami, Florida
To the Honorable members of the Subcommittee on Trade of
the Committee on Ways and Means, members of the press and
general public gathered here today:
My name is Silvia Wilhelm. I am a Cuban American resident
of Miami and the Executive Director of the Cuban Committee for
Democracy. It is indeed an honor to have been invited to appear
in front of you today as a witness on a hearing that will re-
evaluate U.S. economic and trade policy toward Cuba. The Cuban
Committee for Democracy, founded in 1993, is a non-profit
organization of Cuban-Americans of all walks of life, including
professionals, academics and entrepreneurs. We are opponents of
the Castro government who believe in a peaceful, negotiated
transition to democracy in Cuba. Like many Cuban Americans, we
have had to confront the issue of the U.S. economic embargo.
Our position has been and remains one that believes that the
goal of promoting a democratic Cuba would be better served by
constructive engagement rather than by fruitless isolation that
contributes to the misery of the Cuba people.
In addition to representing the Cuban Committee for
Democracy as its Executive Director, I am here to speak as a
representative for the thousands of Cuban American exiles who
make up the ``silent'' majority and who believe that a peaceful
transition to democracy in Cuba is the appropriate resolution
to the Cuban dilemma.
I left Cuba as a child in January of 1961 smuggled out of
the country at the inception of the Pedro Pan program which
eventually provided escape for over 20,000 Cuban children whose
parents believed that for them to leave their country of birth
was more important than their staying and living under a
communist regime. As most Cuban-Americans of my generation, we
left behind everything we owned but most important we left
behind everything we loved. The next 33 years of my life were
spent as an American citizen getting an education, marrying a
native-born American physician, raising a family and becoming a
business woman running my own company in the Miami area. Not
unlike most Cuban Americans during this time I was supportive
of the isolation policy of the United States towards Cuba.
In 1994, I made the very difficult decision to visit
relatives in Cuba returning for the first time since 1961. My
relatives had communicated their hardships and I wanted to
witness them first-hand and help in whatever way was possible.
What I experienced on that first visit changed dramatically my
opinion of U.S. policy and helped make my decision to actively
work to modify such policy, specifically a policy that places
restrictions on the sale of food and medicines to the Cuban
people. On this first of my three trips to Cuba, I was haunted
by the lack of nutrition, lack of commonly available vitamins
and medicines, and the presence of significant parasite
infection in the population, conditions that were affecting
even members of my family.
My nephews, who live in Centro Habana, a densely populated
area of old Habana, with extremely poor water systems and
dilapidated housing, all had contracted intestinal parasites. I
had to bring with me the appropriate drugs from Miami to help
them take care of the situation. One of their children, three
years old at the time, was suffering not only from parasites
but from vitamin deficiency and malnutrition. As I am sure all
of you are aware, there are countless reports from agencies
like the World Health Organization, the Pan American Health
Organization, the New England Journal of Medicine and other
scientific organizations that link the effects of the long-
standing U.S. trade embargo to these conditions of
malnutrition, vitamin deficiency and water bourne diseases due
to severe water contamination in Cuba. I am not qualified to
speak on that but I have witnessed these conditions in members
of my family still remaining in Cuba.
I returned to Cuba in 1996 accompanied by my physician
husband. Among other reasons, I returned to visit an uncle who
is an American trained physician and who had elected to
practice medicine in Cuba and now was suffering from cancer.
During this visit my husband and I were able to experience
first hand the scarcity of medicines and technology in Cuba.
During a visit to a primary care facility in Pinar del Rio we
noticed that due to the lack of appropriate medicines, herbal
therapy was the main stay of treatment. Observations made
during the treatment of my uncle for cancer showed that
American technology, such as X-ray films, high-tech drugs and
procedures were not available. Spare parts for American made
medical equipment was nowhere to be found. The lack of these
many times leads to less than optimal medical outcomes. My
uncle had no qualms in blaming the U.S. embargo for the lack of
these available drugs, technology and very needed equipment. In
conversations with other American physicians who have also had
an opportunity to visit Cuba similar observations have been
made with confirmation of the negative impact on medical
outcome. It was obvious to myself, my husband and my physician
uncle that the ``de facto'' embargo of U.S. technology and high
tech drugs was having a negative impact on the health of the
Cuban people.
As part of a group of Cuban Americans led by a Cuban
American priest from the Tampa Bay Area, I returned last
January to Cuba to witness along with the people of Cuba the
historic visit of his Holiness Pope John Paul II. I listened to
him as he exhorted all Cubans in and out of the island not to
be afraid--afraid of changes currently occurring in the island
for those inside it and afraid of engaging Cuba for those
outside. I listened to him as he exhorted the Cuban government
to continue opening spaces within Cuba so individual rights
could be guaranteed, so that freedom of expression could be
heard, so that freedom of association could one day become a
reality. I heard him denounce the U.S. economic sanctions
against the island as unethical and immoral. I witnessed the
people of Cuba as they rejoiced with his visit and for one
brief moment regained a long-lost sense of hope for the
possibility of a better future. I witnessed a world religious
leader, champion of human rights, anti-Communist crusader who
recognized that the best way to pave the way for a peaceful
transition to democracy in Cuba is the way of engagement by
responding to the slow movements of the Castro regime. Who
better than him to encourage such a policy? A man who witnessed
his beloved Poland's reality at its time of change and now
tries to understand the Cuban reality and impact it
brilliantly.
On returning to Miami it was obvious that the Pope's
historic visit to Cuba had raised questions within the Cuban
American community as to whether a continued policy of
isolation towards Cuba should still apply. It also stimulated
open discussions within this community as to how to bring about
much needed reconciliation between the people of Cuba and those
in the Cuban Diaspora. Prior to the Pope's visit, a Florida
International University poll had shown that 56 percent of
Cuban Americans polled favored allowing companies to sell
medicines to the island while 44 percent favored the sale of
food. Yet a poll conducted by Univision following the recent
measures of the Clinton administration to ease some of the
sanctions, like streamlining procedures for the sale of
medicine and medical supplies to Cuba, the approval of direct
humanitarian flights to the island and the legalization of
limited remittances from Cuban Americans to relatives in Cuba,
88% of Cuban Americans polled favored such measures. This is a
direct indication that the Cuban American community is looking
for other initiatives to deal with Cuba and that the once
acceptable rhetoric of revenge is now a rhetoric of
reconciliation. A day doesn't go by in Miami that I am not
approached by Cuban American friends of mine who had disagreed
with my views towards dealing with the Cuban dilemma and are
now telling me they are planning their trip to Cuba this
summer, this fall, next Spring. To use an unusual statement,
``The Pope made it Kosher''
The U.S. policy of economic sanctions against Cuba, which
at the time of inception was viewed as the most effective way
for the United States to retaliate against Castro's
totalitarian government and the threat this posed to the
national security of this country in the context of cold war
tactics has not brought about its desired goal which was the
overthrow of the Cuban government even after 37 years after it
was initiated. The embargo of food and the ``de facto'' embargo
of medicine against Cuba are the only one of its kind, even
current embargoes against Iran, Libya and Iraq do not ban the
sale of food to those countries. There are nutritional deficits
among the Cuban population which in the past have contributed
to significant illnesses; water-bourned diseases abound hurting
those most vulnerable, like the Cuban children. The lack of
high powered drugs to combat cancer, lack of replacement parts
for U.S. manufactured medical equipment, making medical
diagnosis and treatment almost impossible, and the lack of
films for X-ray machines are just a few of the U.S. patented
products items Cubans lack. Even though we believe that the
major blame for the disastrous situation that Cuba faces today
is directly related to a failed economic and political system,
there are serious questions as to the extent of the impact that
the U.S. embargo places on an already beleaguered and suffering
people.
Politics should never interfere with the health and
nutrition of a people especially when the innocent are already
subjected to the abuses of a totalitarian regime. These
sanctions constitute in fact a war against a people not against
a government. The people of Cuba are the ones that bear the
brunt of the economic burden that these policies were designed
to inflict. In addition, this policy has provided the excuse
that the Cuban government has brilliantly used to blame all of
Cuba's problems on the U.S. embargo of the island. Isn't it
time to make them accountable? Isn't it time for them to have
to recognize that the economic and social disasters they now
face are on the most part manifestations of internal problems?
The United States has a long-standing record of supporting
humanitarian causes. This record should continue and we
wholeheartedly support the President's recent initiatives
towards Cuba in this direction. But humanitarian support is not
enough. Humanitarian aid addresses the few and not the many.
Humanitarian aid increases dependency in an era of market
driven forces. Cubans must learn the value of capitalistic
trade and business practices and not be dependent on the
charity of the United States or their relatives abroad. The
words of a Hindu proverb say it best, ``If you ever see me
hungry at the edge of a river, do not hand me a fish, teach me
how to fish.'' Trade and aid will pave the way for the eventual
democratization of Cuba. These changes have to occur now. The
continued deterioration of Cuba's economic and social order
will make the transition to democracy much harder and could
leave the nation in a serious state of confusion and chaos in
case of an abrupt change in leadership.
H.R. 1951, The Cuban Humanitarian Trade Act, gives Congress
the opportunity to take the first steps in opening certain
trade policies still in place and this change can help the
Cuban people develop skills that will help them get ready to
face a much needed Democracy, which in my opinion is
inevitable. This is the way of the world as it approaches the
21st Century. Cuba must be inserted into this system and should
not continue to be isolated by the most powerful and richest
nation in the world.
Chairman Crane. Thank you.
Mr. Fuller.
STATEMENT OF CRAIG L. FULLER, COCHAIRMAN, AMERICANS FOR
HUMANITARIAN TRADE WITH CUBA
Mr. Fuller. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I've
submitted my statement for the record, and much of it has been
touched upon, and I thought I might just speak a bit more
informally with you for a few minutes.
It was my great privilege to spend 8 years in the White
House with President Reagan and as Chief of Staff to Vice
President Bush. During that time, we traveled, I think, if my
count is right, to some 60 different countries. Many of those
countries did not have a leader elected as we know ``elected
leaders.'' Many of those countries engaged in policies that
were in conflict with our own human rights standards, but all
of those countries including the Soviet Union which President
Reagan called the evil empire, including China which had
violated many principles of human rights and democracy that
George Bush knew so well. All of those countries we engaged
with, and through our engagement, both economic and diplomatic,
we've seen changes occur that for those of us who came to this
town in 1981 we would never have imagined in this hemisphere.
I come before you today, now, as a private citizen.
Somebody asked me when I told them I'd be testifying before the
Subcommittee, ``Who's your client?'' I said, ``I have no client
on this issue.'' Others said, ``Well, then, what's your
business interest?'' And I said, ``I'm an executive recruiter
now. I have no conceivable business interest in this.'' I
really come before you for sort of that old-fashioned reason: I
simply believe what I'm advocating. I believe it's wrong for us
to use, as a great Nation, food and medical supplies as tools
to pursue a foreign policy change in Cuba, and what I
discovered in the last several months, a year or so, is a great
many other people share that view; people who have served in
Republican administrations and esteemed Members of Congress in
both the Republican and Democratic side: Frank Carluchi, Carla
Hills, Malcom Wallop on part of our Americans for Humanitarian
Trade with Cuba. Our cochairman is your esteemed former
colleague Sam Gibbons from Florida who shares this view, and
the view is shared by a much wider group, many of whom you've
heard today, but it is a compelling case. It brings together
people from a variety of sides on this a fundamental issue that
it's time to cease denying Cubans food and medical supplies
from this country which they would like to purchase in order to
pursue foreign policy objectives.
Now, I think we probably all share a common view of what
we'd like to see happen in Cuba; that really is not the issue.
If you do nothing, change is likely to occur, but it's likely
to take a great deal of time. Sam Gibbons and I were in Cuba
just a few months ago on a fully hosted visit, and if we had
conviction before we went--and this was our first visit--our
conviction was multiplied several times by visiting a
children's hospital. Mr. Thomas, I guess, was asking earlier
about the distribution system, and it's a fair question. The
children's hospital is part of a state-owned entity and a
state-owned complex, but the physicians there are very brave
and courageous individuals who are fighting to save lives
everyday, but it is shocking; it's embarrassing to go there and
hear that they fight to keep leukemia patients alive because
they can't get the medicines we have here to treat those
patients or to go to the ward where the premature babies are in
incubators and learn that of those incubators six are being
cannibalized to keep the other six working so that they can
save the lives of children. Why? Because they can't get a ready
supply of parts from America to keep those incubators working,
and if they get the parts, they get them through a third
country at an extraordinarily high price. To be sure, the
distribution system is not our system; it's not what we would
ideally want, but, in fact, medical services are given to Cuban
people free of charge. They don't have to pay dollars for
medicine. They don't have to pay for medicine. The problem is
if you're a child with asthma and you enter that hospital
wheezing and having difficulty breathing, you may not be able
to get the medication we could sell them from America because
we simply won't allow it to be sold, and if they do get it, it,
again, comes through a third country at a very, very high
price.
We do hope that you'll address this one issue. I know
there's many complicated issues facing Cuba, but we do hope
that you will lend your support as so many of your colleagues
to legislation that would relieve us of this embargo of food
and medical supplies. Americans for Humanitarian Trade with
Cuba is an organization that's growing everyday and is growing
around the country everyday, and to Mr. Rangel's point, we
certainly will continue to raise our voices in support of the
legislation and in support of this policy.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement follows:]
Statement of Craig L. Fuller, Cochairman, Americans for Humanitarian
Trade with Cuba
Chairman Crane and members of the Committee, thank you for
this opportunity to present the views of a broad based,
bipartisan citizens group called Americans for Humanitarian
Trade with Cuba.
As a group, we support the immediate lifting of the US
embargo on the sales of food and medicine to Cuba, as outlined
in the legislation. We commend the committee for reviewing a
wide range of issues concerning economic and trade relations
with Cuba; however, my objective is to discuss the one vital
element of our relationship with Cuba which Americans for
Humanitarian Trade with Cuba was formed to address.
You will surely hear from people having considerably more
experience with US policy towards Cuba. My involvement has been
a recent phenomenon sparked by a straightforward conviction
that whatever rationale our policy of denying Cubans the
opportunity to engage in trade with the United States for
desperately needed food and medical supplies once had, that
rationale simply does not exist any longer following the fall
of the Soviet Union.
My conviction is based on the fundamental belief that we
can gain far more through constructive engagement with Cuba,
especially engagement that brings necessary food and medical
supplies to those most in need. The fact that we deny children
in Cuba the asthma medication they need for treatment or heart
patients with pacemakers cannot be acceptable to fair minded
rationale Americans. Thus, while a legitimate debate takes
place over larger trade and economic policy questions between
the United States and Cuba, I and the members of Americans for
Humanitarian Trade with Cuba hope you will agree on the need to
advance legislation lifting the embargo on trading food and
medical supplies with Cuba.
Without going into a deep historical analysis, it is
important to understand a few key points that seem to have been
forgotten in recent debates about the sales of food and
medicine to Cuba. Cuba's problem procuring food and medicine
really began after 1992, when the Cuban Democracy Act cut off
all trade between Cuba and US subsidiaries located in third
countries. In 1991, that trade amounted to $719 million, 90% of
which was food and medical products. The Cuban Democracy Act
also mandated a shipping ban that meant any vessel that docked
in Cuba, even ships delivering food and medicine, were banned
from calling at a U.S. port for six moths. Many of you will
remember that there was deep concern expressed here in Congress
about the possible negative health impact such previously
untested restrictions would imply. But the bill's co-sponsors
argued that such admittedly draconian measures would be short-
lived. They said that the then recent fall of the Soviet Union
justified the toughest of measures, that the Cuban people would
rise up against Castro and the regime would topple within six
months. Six years later, we are still waiting. The point is,
these inhumane measures, in the words of their own authors,
were never meant to last this long.
You will find wide acceptance for this position. Among the
groups supporting the lifting of the embargo against food and
medical supplies are: the Catholic church; the National Council
of Churches; Jewish leaders; the United Auto Workers; the
National Health & Human Services Employees Union; the
agricultural community; the US Chamber of Commerce and many
individual organizations. Perhaps the members of our group we
are most proud to have with us are Cuban Americans. More than
20,000 Cuban Americans from Miami alone have signed a petition
supporting the legislation, and much more support is gathering
nationwide everyday. Also significant is major human rights
groups' endorsement of the food and medicine legislation, such
as Human Rights Watch. These groups argue that the U.S. cannot
justify calling for respect for human rights in Cuba while
violating international human right accords itself by
prohibiting the sale of food and medical products to Cuba.
Attachments provide a list of our members and support groups.
And, significantly, the legislation is supported by Cubans
(still living in Cuba)--the head of Caritas, the Catholic
church's aid arm in Cuba, supports the legislation as do all of
the Cuban Bishops. And even in official meetings in Cuba
arranged by the U.S. interest section in Havana, political
dissidents across the board express little enthusiasm for the
embargo but deep support for measures that would free the sale
of food and medicine to the island.
I firmly believe the reason for such widespread support is
the recognition that continuing to deny the Cuban people the
ability to purchase US medical supplies and food is doing
nothing to further the foreign policy objectives of the United
States.
It was my privilege to travel to over 60 countries while
serving as a member of the White House staff during the Reagan
Administration, including the four years I served as chief of
staff to Vice President Bush. During that time, while I rarely
saw embargoes work, I never saw a situation where we denied
people the opportunity to purchase food and medical supplies.
To take this virtually unprecedented step with a country just
90 miles from our shores is certainly, at the present time,
wholly unwarranted.
My concerns and those of my co-chairman of Americans for
Humanitarian Trade, former Congressman Sam Gibbons, are not
just based on philosophical grounds. Earlier this year we
traveled together to Cuba. We met with the physicians in a
children's hospital in Havana. We learned that the hospital has
hundreds of emergencies each week--the majority of the cases
involve children with asthma. The tragedy is that medication is
readily available in the United States that can virtually
eliminate the life threatening symptoms of asthma. However, the
hospitals medical staff cannot get a reliable supply of the
medications. Often, when they are available, they come at
highly inflated prices through third countries.
At this same hospital we visited the ward where the
premature infants are cared for. While there are modern
incubators in the ward to care for these most vulnerable of
infants, nearly half of the units are being cannibalized to
keep the rest of the equipment working since spare parts are
difficult to acquire.
I also was told of situations where Cubans awaiting heart
surgery to receive a pacemaker had their surgeries postponed
when American companies acquired the foreign manufacturer of
the pacemaker and the life sustaining pacemaker and service
arrangements were terminated with Cuba by the ``new owner,'' an
American company.
Since Americans for Humanitarian Trade with Cuba was
launched, I have been encouraged by the wide support from a
variety of people. Still, some people object, saying that Cuba
only has Castro to blame for these conditions. We don't
disagree, but putting children at risk in Cuba hardly seems to
be a policy acceptable to Americans.
Some people suggest that humanitarian aid, not trade, is
the desirable alternative. If we recognize the need for aid,
why object to engaging in trade?
This view is supported by all major humanitarian aid groups
currently sending donations to Cuba, such as Catholic Relief
Services and Global Links of Philadelphia, all of whom support
the sales of food and medicine. And, it is pointed out that
companies can trade in medical supplies with permission from
the State Department. However, this is at best an inefficient
means of meeting the demands of 11 million people. But the
reality is as described in the recent report by the
Congressional Research Service finding that there really have
been no significant sales to Cuba since the passage of the
Cuban Democracy Act in 1992.
The passage of legislation allowing Americans to engage in
the trade of food and medical supplies with Cuba, would show
the Cuban people our humanity. Why not show the Cuban people we
do care for those in their society who are most vulnerable.
Maybe, just maybe, this may be the greatest challenge we could
offer Fidel Castro.
Thank you for the opportunity to share my views.
Chairman Crane. Thank you, Mr. Fuller.
Brad.
STATEMENT OF W. BRADFORD GARY, MEMBER, BOARD OF DIRECTORS,
MEDICAL DEVICE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION
Mr. Gary. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Rangel, my name is Brad Gary. I
appear before you this afternoon as a member of the board of
directors of the Medical Device Manufacturers Association.
Joining me here is Steve Northrup, our executive director.
MDMA is a national trade association created in 1992 by a
group of medical device company executives who believed that
the innovators and entrepreneurs in the medical device industry
did not have a distinct voice in Washington. The smaller
companies in our industry, 80 percent of which have fewer than
50 employees, are the companies that oftentimes develop the
most significant breakthroughs in medical device technology.
Our domestic medical device industry is the world leader in
advanced medical technology. We produced equipment worth $65
billion in 1997. Of that, we exported nearly 14 billion
dollars' worth of medical products and supplies to other
countries. The largest companies in our industry have overseas
manufacturing plants and international distribution networks.
This enables those companies to do business with hospitals and
health professionals worldwide.
On the other hand, there are smaller companies, less than
$10 million in annual sales, that do not have the resources to
compete on a global scale with these international
conglomerates. Therefore, the possibility of expanded trade
with Cuba, a nation of 11 million citizens just 90 miles
offshore, intrigues the smaller companies of our industry.
On behalf of our association, I joined a delegation of
business executives in March; we visited Cuba; met with a
number of Ministers of Health and the Government Central
Procurement Agency of MediCuba. This is the bureau that's
actually responsible for acquiring medical products for
hospitals, clinics, and physicians. Now, as you've heard from
several witnesses today, Cuban health care facilities face a
shortage of medical equipment and supplies. Although in our
judgment, Cuban physicians are well trained by any
international standard, they do not have the modern medical
equipment and supplies necessary to treat effectively many
disease states. Although the European equipment we saw in Cuba
appeared to be of recent vintage, the U.S. medical equipment
that we saw dated back to the fifties; truly museum quality.
Cuban health care professionals are often forced to reuse
common medical supplies, believe it or not, including surgical
instruments and surgical gloves.
With few exceptions, the vast majority of Cuban people have
not benefited, in our view, from the last four decades of
American advances in therapeutic and diagnostic products.
Although the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 does permit export of
medical products to Cuba, the act's requirements for special
export licenses and the onsite verification of product use have
essentially rendered this permission meaningless. In addition,
the provision of the act that extended general prohibition on
trade with Cuba to offshore subsidiaries of U.S. firms has
given foreign firms--and by foreign firms, I mean especially
European companies--a significant advantage in this important
regional market. With regard to medical technology, our current
trade policies toward Cuba are confused, contradictory, and
hurt U.S. business interests in the region.
Now, our association commends President Clinton and the
administration for announcing last month they will develop
procedures to simplify and expedite licenses for the sale of
medicines and medical equipment to Cuba. We eagerly await the
details from the Department of Commerce and the Bureau of
Export Administration. We hope that the process will be both
simple and transparent for our members, most of which I have
mentioned are truly small companies that do not have the
resources to hire lawyers and lobbyists to press their cases in
the halls of Congress or the Department of Commerce.
We recently tested the BXA system, and our conclusion is
that the bureau needs to adopt a more user-friendly approach to
smaller U.S. medical exporters. We called BXA and asked if a
certain general class of product could receive an export
license. We were told by BXA that we had to submit a full
application before BXA could judge whether the product was
eligible for licensure. The BXA staff either could not or would
not judge the probable export status of the particular class of
medical products. As the Department of Commerce and BXA develop
guidelines for expedited licensure, MDMA encourages Commerce
and BXA to produce a clear outline of the requirements and
restrictions on trade with Cuba. BXA should establish telephone
contact numbers that will provide small business with real-time
guidance on export licensure for this market.
In concluding our testimony, I want to suggest that U.S.
trade with Cuba may also spark the struggling economies of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the independent countries
throughout the Caribbean, a matter to which this Subcommittee
has devoted substantial attention. The Subcommittee knows well
the economic difficulties in the Antilles region, particularly
in the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica.
Puerto Rico, for example, is facing an economic slowdown
with the phaseout and eventual termination of section 936, a
tax incentive often reviewed by this Committee. We have high
unemployment in Puerto Rico, over 20 percent in the west of the
island. The Puerto Rico ``Twin Plant'' proposal, so
thoughtfully crafted by this Committee a number of years ago,
unfortunately has fallen short of our hopes and expectations
for a true regional linkage.
A limited medical market opening in Cuba might begin a
positive, new economic force in the Caribbean region. At least,
we should all analyze how a medical market opening will
advantage our citizens and medical manufacturing capacity in
Puerto Rico where we have so many medical products plants that
are running at half capacity. Perhaps, the day will come when
products manufactured in San Juan or Armagueros will make the
short trip across the Windward Passage to the new medical
market of Cuba.
Relaxation of the trade embargo against Cuba, a country
with a population about the same as the State of Illinois,
would truly encourage the renewal of the Puerto Rican economy.
The effects of a revitalized Puerto Rico, in turn, could ripple
through the economies of the Caribbean neighbors to the benefit
of all.
On behalf of the Medical Device Manufacturers Association,
I thank you for the opportunity to testify on our support for
relaxing the restrictions on trade of medical technology.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Rangel.
[The prepared statement follows:]
Statement of W. Bradford Gary, Member, Board of Directors, Medical
Device Manufacturers Association
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittee, and thank you for the opportunity to testify on
behalf of the Medical Device Manufacturers Association (MDMA)
at today's hearing on U.S. economic and trade policy toward
Cuba. I am Bradford Gary, a member of the board of directors of
MDMA. I am also a member of the Potomac Research Group and a
trustee of Caribbean Latin American Action. Joining me at the
witness table is Stephen Northrup, executive director of MDMA.
I appear before you today to represent the views of the 130
members of MDMA. MDMA is a national trade association that was
created in 1992 by a group of medical device company executives
who believed that the innovators and entrepreneurs in the
medical device industry needed a distinct voice in Washington.
As you may know, the smaller companies in this industry, 80
percent of which have fewer than 50 employees, develop most of
the significant breakthroughs in device technology. MDMA works
to improve the quality of patient care by advocating policies
that foster an environment in which these innovative companies
can flourish and grow.
Our domestic medical device industry is the world leader in
advanced medical technology, producing equipment worth $65
billion in 1997 and exporting nearly $14 billion worth of
medical products and supplies to other countries. The largest
companies in the industry have overseas manufacturing plants
and international distribution networks that enable these
companies to do business with hospitals and health
professionals worldwide. On the other hand, MDMA member
companies, the majority of which have less than $10 million in
annual sales, do not have the same resources to compete on a
global scale with these international conglomerates. Therefore,
the possibility of expanded trade with Cuba, a nation of 11
million citizens just 40 miles from the shores of Florida,
intrigues the smaller companies in our industry.
On behalf of MDMA, I joined a delegation of business
executives who were invited by the Cuban government to visit
Cuba and meet with President Fidel Castro and his top
ministers. During our visit, we toured Cuban health care
facilities and met with officials of the Ministry of Health and
of MediCuba, the government bureau responsible for acquiring
medical products for Cuban hospitals, clinics, and physicians.
We found that Cuban health care facilities face a severe
shortage of medical equipment and supplies. Although Cuban
physicians are well trained by international standards, they do
not have the modern medical equipment and supplies necessary to
treat effectively many diseases and conditions. Although the
European equipment we saw on our tour seemed to be of recent
vintage, the U.S. medical equipment dated back to the 1950s.
Cuban health professionals are forced to re-use common medical
supplies, including surgical gloves. With a few exceptions, the
vast majority of the Cuban people have not benefited from the
last four decades of American advances in therapeutic and
diagnostic products.
Although the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 permits exports of
medical products to Cuba, the Act's requirements for special
export licenses and the onsite verification of the products'
use have essentially rendered this permission meaningless. In
addition, the provision of the Act that extended the general
prohibitions on trade with Cuba to offshore subsidiaries of
U.S. firms has given foreign firms--primarily European
companies--a significant advantage in this important regional
market. With regard to medical technology, our current trade
policies toward Cuba are confused and contradictory, which
hurts U.S. business interests in the region.
MDMA commends President Clinton for announcing last month
that his administration will develop procedures to simplify and
expedite licenses for the sale of medicines and medical
equipment to Cuba. We eagerly await the details from the
Department of Commerce and its Bureau of Export Administration
(BXA).
We hope that the process will be both simple and
transparent for MDMA members, most of which, as I have
mentioned, are small companies without the resources to hire
lawyers and lobbyists to press their cases in the halls of
Congress or the federal bureaucracies. Our recent ``test'' of
the BXA system, however, suggests that the bureau needs to
adopt a more ``user-friendly'' approach to smaller U.S.
exporters.
We recently called BXA and asked if a certain general class
of product could receive an export license. We were told by BXA
that we had to submit a full application before BXA could judge
whether the product was eligible for licensure. The BXA staff
either could not or would not judge the probable export status
of this particular class of medical products.
As the Department of Commerce and the BXA develop
guidelines for an expedited licensure process for trade with
Cuba, MDMA encourages Commerce and BXA to produce a clear
outline of the requirements and restrictions on trade with
Cuba. Commerce and BXA should also establish telephone contacts
that will provide small businesses with ``real-time'' guidance
on export licensure for this market.
In concluding our testimony, I want to suggest that U.S.
trade with Cuba may also serve to spark the struggling
economies of the commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the
independent countries throughout the Caribbean. This
subcommittee knows well the economic difficulties in the
Antilles region, particularly in the Dominican Republic, Haiti,
and Jamaica. Puerto Rico is facing high unemployment and an
economic slowdown that is exacerbated by the phase-out and
termination of the Section 936 tax incentive for businesses
with manufacturing facilities on the island.
The relaxation of the trade embargo against Cuba, a country
with a population nearly equal to that of Illinois, could
encourage the renewal of the Puerto Rican economy. The effects
of a revitalized Puerto Rico, in turn, could ripple through the
economies of its Caribbean neighbors, to the benefit of both
the Caribbean people and U.S. business.
On behalf of the Medical Device Manufacturers Association,
I thank you for this opportunity to testify to our support for
a relaxation of the restrictions on trade of medical
technology, equipment and supplies with Cuba. We also commend
you, Mr. Chairman, and your subcommittee for engaging in this
thoughtful reconsideration of U.S. trade policy and its effects
on both the Cuban people and U.S. business. I would be pleased
to answer any questions you might have.
Chairman Crane. Thank you, Brad.
Now, correct me if I'm mispronouncing it, Gerdes?
Mr. Gerdes. Gerdes is correct.
Chairman Crane. Gerdes. All right, Mr. Gerdes.
STATEMENT OF DAN GERDES, CHAIRMAN, U.S. WHEAT ASSOCIATES,
NEMAHA COUNTY, NEBRASKA
Mr. Gerdes. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee,
I, too, want to thank you for the opportunity to appear today.
My name is Dan Gerdes, and I am a farmer. I operate a grain and
livestock farm in southeast Nebraska where I farm 1,400 acres
of wheat, corn, and soybeans. I also am the current chairman of
the U.S. Wheat Associates, an organization that works to
develop export markets on behalf of U.S. wheat farmers.
U.S. agriculture exports produce a large, favorable trade
balance to the U.S. economy. In fiscal year 1997, the United
States exported nearly $60 billion of agriculture goods which
not only benefited agriculture producers but also the rest of
the U.S. economy. Each year, the U.S. exports about half of the
wheat grown in this country making the export market imperative
for U.S. wheat farmers. Among the largest barriers to trade
U.S. wheat farmers face today are the economic trade sanctions
imposed by our government including that with Cuba which shuts
U.S. wheat producers out of a strong potential market right in
our own backyard.
According to the President's Export Council Report of
January 1997, the United States maintains sanctions on 75
countries representing roughly 52 percent of the world's
population. Unfortunately, these sanctions are proliferating.
The United States has imposed sanctions for foreign policy
purposes 100 times since World War II, and more than 60 of
these have been imposed since 1993 at a time when the United
States and the rest of the world have been touting a freer
trading environment.
Several growing markets are closed to U.S. commercial wheat
exports including Cuba, Iran, Libya, and North Korea. Wheat
imports by these countries are expected to reach well over 7
million tons in the market year 1997/1998 representing 7
percent of our global wheat market. Adding Iraq--where our
wheat is currently allowed only through the Oil for Food
Program--to this list results in shutting the United States out
of nearly 11 percent of the world wheat market, the largest
percentage of global trade from which the United States has
restricted itself since the 1980 wheat embargo with the Soviet
Union.
Not only do sanctions keep wheat farmers out of important
markets, but they also allow competitors to charge higher
prices in these markets. They then use these higher margins to
undercut us in other markets making it difficult for the United
States to compete in countries even where we can freely trade.
Our steady customers also begin to wonder anew whether they
can rely on the United States as a reliable supplier of their
food needs. Cuba which has no commercial wheat production
expects the import of approximately 900,000 tons of wheat in
the 1997/1998 year, primarily from the EU, Canada, and
Argentina. This figure would likely be up to 1.5 tons if Cuba
did not ration bread. By conservative estimates in the last 10
years alone, the United States lost out on wheat sales to Cuba
of 3.5 million tons, valued at well over $500 million, and this
is the real conservative estimate. Our exports could well have
been much higher due to the tremendous freight advantage the
United States has with Cuba.
The sanctions have been a disaster for U.S. wheat and for
other agriculture exports while providing Castro with a ready
excuse and a scapegoat for Cuba's economic problems. It is time
to take another look at our Nation's flawed and failed
unilateral sanctions policy. We understand the State Department
is undertaking a review of U.S. sanctions policy and its value
versus its cost. We would welcome a national dialog on the
sanctions policy and its limits. We urge the administration to
include plans for an automatic review of existing sanctions and
their impact; a sunset clause for existing and future
sanctions, and an annual report along the lines of the National
Trade Estimates Report which outlines the cost of sanctions to
the U.S. economy.
Wheat producers are as patriotic as any other Americans,
but we do not want to needlessly sacrifice the opportunity to
export our product. Time after time, our producers have been
denied access to an export market, and the competition has
stepped in to fill the gap. The embargo has not kept Cuba from
the world marketplace. It has simply turned what logically
should be a U.S. market over to the Canadians, the Europeans,
and the Argentines. The denial of U.S. food exports has never
changed a single country's behavior. Cuba is a perfect example
of this reality.
In summary, history has shown us that the unilateral trade
sanctions uniformly failed to achieve the desired results and
instead hurt American businesses and farmers. For U.S. wheat
farmers, the U.S. trade embargo with Cuba has meant hundreds of
millions of dollars in lost sales opportunities. Meanwhile,
Castro remains in place, our long-term embargo having done
nothing to help a truly elected Cuban Government to come to
power.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement follows:]
Statement of Dan Gerdes, Chairman, U.S. Wheat Associates, Nemaha
County, Nebraska
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the
subcommittee today to speak about U.S. economic and trade
policy toward Cuba. My name is Dan Gerdes, and I am a wheat
farmer from Nebraska. I operate a grain and livestock farm in
southeast Nebraska in Nemaha county, where I farm 1,400 acres
of wheat, corn and soybeans. I also am the current chairman of
U.S. Wheat Associates, an organization that works to develop
export markets on behalf of U.S. wheat farmers.
The U.S. exports a substantial variety and volume of
agricultural products, and our agricultural exports produce a
large favorable trade balance to the U.S. economy. In fiscal
year 1997, the U.S. exported nearly $60 billion of agricultural
goods, which not only benefited agricultural producers, but
also the rest of the U.S. economy. Each year, the U.S. exports
about half of the wheat grown in this country, making the
export market imperative for U.S. wheat farmers.
U.S. wheat producers face a variety of trade obstacles in
the international marketplace. Changes in U.S. legislation and
in the world marketplace in recent years, including agreements
among trading nations to reduce export subsidies and eliminate
trade barriers, have helped to reduce some of these obstacles.
Given this environment, it is surprising and disturbing that
among the largest barriers to trade U.S. wheat farmers face
today are the economic trade sanctions imposed by our own
government, including that with Cuba, which shuts U.S. wheat
producers out of a strong potential market right in our own
backyard.
According to the President's Export Council Report of
January 1997, the U.S. maintains sanctions on 75 countries
representing 52 percent of the worlds population.
Unfortunately, these sanctions are proliferating. The U.S. has
imposed sanctions for foreign policy purposes 100 times since
World War II, and more than 60 of these sanctions have been
imposed since 1993, at a time when the U.S. and the rest of the
world have been touting a freer trading environment. With this
proliferation, there is an equally strong sense that the U.S.
economic costs of sanctions are significant. This is
particularly true for wheat producers.
While the global import demand for wheat is expected to
increase in 1997/98, U.S. export prospects have not improved by
a commensurate amount because several growing markets are
closed to commercial wheat exports, including Cuba, Iran, Libya
and North Korea. Wheat imports by these countries are expected
to reach 7.15 million tons in marketing year 1997/98,
representing seven percent of the global wheat market. Adding
Iraq, where our wheat is currently allowed only through the Oil
for Food Program, to this list results in shutting the U.S. out
of nearly 11 percent of the world wheat market, representing
the largest percentage of global trade from which the U.S. has
been restricted due to self-imposed trade restrictions since
the 1980 wheat embargo with the Soviet Union. Not only do
sanctions keep wheat farmers out of important markets, but they
also allow our competitors to charge higher prices in these
markets, using those higher margins to undercut us in other
markets, making it difficult for the U.S. to compete in
countries even where we can freely trade. Our steady customers
also begin to wonder anew whether they can rely on the United
States to be a reliable supplier of their food needs.
Cuba, which has no commercial wheat production, expects to
import approximately 900,000 tons of wheat in 1997-98,
primarily from the European Union, Canada and Argentina. This
figure would likely be higher, up to 1.5 million tons, if Cuba
did not ration bread, which it does due to a shortage of cash
to pay for wheat imports.
Although the U.S. embargo with Cuba prohibits commercial
food sales, it does allow for some limited donations for
humanitarian reasons. In February of this year, U.S. Wheat
Associates and the Kansas Wheat Commission donated 22,000
pounds of flour through a division of a Catholic Church
humanitarian relief organization. The donated wheat flour was
used for a variety of charitable purposes, including making
bread for residents of a retirement home.
This relatively small donation is a drop in the bucket
compared to the amount of wheat the U.S. could have sold to
Cuba had the embargo not been in place. Estimating exact sales
amounts is somewhat difficult. However, by conservative
estimates in the last 10 years alone the U.S. lost out on wheat
sales to Cuba of 3.5 million tons, valued at more than $500
million dollars. Our exports could well have been higher due to
the tremendous freight advantage the U.S. has with Cuba.
Of course, none of these sales have been realized due to
the continued trade embargo with Cuba, an embargo that was
designed to try to bring about changes in Communist Cuba.
Instead, Fidel Castro has ruled the country for nearly 40
years. Meanwhile, the sanctions have been a disaster for U.S.
wheat and other agricultural exports, while providing Castro
with a ready excuse and scapegoat for Cubas economic problems.
It is our understanding that the State Department is
undertaking a review of U.S. sanctions policy and its value
versus its costs. We have not seen any results of this
analysis, but we welcome a national dialog on unilateral
sanctions policy and its limits. We urge the administration to
include plans in its sanctions analysis for an automatic review
of existing sanctions and their impact, a sunset clause for
existing and future sanctions, and an annual report along the
lines of the National Trade Estimates Report, which outlines
the costs to the U.S. economy of sanctions against certain
countries.
Mr. Chairman, the Pope's recent visit to Cuba provides the
opportunity and impetus to take another look at our Nation's
flawed and failed unilateral sanctions policy.
Wheat producers are as patriotic as any other Americans,
but we do not want to needlessly sacrifice the opportunity to
export our product. Time after time our producers have been
denied access to an export market, and the competition has
stepped in to fill the gap. The embargo has not kept Cuba from
the world marketplace; it has simply turned what logically
should be a U.S. market over to the Canadians, the Europeans,
the Argentines and the Aussies. The denial of U.S. wheat
exports has not changed a single countrys behavior, and Cuba is
a perfect example of this reality.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5762.012
In summary, history has shown us that unilateral trade
sanctions uniformly fail to achieve the desired results, and
instead hurt American businesses and farmers. For U.S. wheat
farmers, the U.S. trade embargo with Cuba has meant hundreds of
millions of dollars in lost sales, and also has hurt our
ability to compete in other markets. Meanwhile, Castro remains
in power, our long-term embargo having done nothing to help a
freely-elected Cuban government come to power.
I appreciate the opportunity to address you today, and
would be happy to answer any questions.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5762.013
Chairman Crane. Thank you. How can we ensure that if U.S.
policies change to allow the sale of food and medicine to Cuba
without license from the U.S. Government, that it would not be
intercepted by Castro and used for his own purposes by being
sold or made available only to Communist Party elites and
foreign visitors? Anyone?
Mr. Fuller. I'll take one crack at it. I think that's a
very valid question. I guess when you go there and you see the
commitment of the state-owned enterprises to providing health
care to 11 million people on an island that's as long as
California, you come away with the feeling that if they had the
medical supplies and equipment and spare parts that we talked
about, they would use them on behalf of their own people.
I don't know that you can make the decision on whether
lifting the embargo of food and medical supplies has to require
an assurance as to how Castro and his government would use
this. We do not make that requirement of Saddam Hussein and we
do some $700 million of trade with Iraq in food. I think the
issue is to change a policy that is unprecedented, in my own
view, inhumane; provide food and medical supplies for sale, and
if the behavior is such after a period of time that we feel
it's not warranted to continue it, change the policy, but I
think withholding it is so unprecedented as a means of
conducting foreign policy that it is time, after 38 or 39
years, to invest in a slightly different approach.
Chairman Crane. So, if U.S. policies change to lift the
embargo on the commercial sales of food and lift the
restrictions on the sale of medicine and medical products, to
what extent do Cubans have the resources to purchase these
products?
Mr. Fuller. Mr. Chairman, I may not be the most experienced
in this area, but my travels for 4 or 5 days, along with Sam
Gibbons for some of that time, to a children's hospital; to
medical clinics; talking to the Minister of Health, convinced
me that the commitment on the part of the Cuban system is to
provide free medical care to people whether they're in Havana;
whether they're in the mountains; whether they're in the
tourist areas, and while it's quite evident that there are ways
for people to purchase--there always will be; those who can
afford to pay some amount of money will get access to certain
kinds of products--it would be the Cuban state system that
would purchase the medical supplies and the food and make that
available to the Cuban people. Again, I think that's something
you'd have to monitor closely. Others here have had more
experience with that.
Mr. Quigley. Mr. Chairman, if I could go back to the
previous question, I agree with Craig that it's a good one, and
there is no way of assuring that absolutely nothing gets
diverted to either military uses or health tourism or those
other things that are said to be the major beneficiaries of aid
coming in. But at least from the experience of the humanitarian
aid that has been given specifically to Caritas through
international church organizations around the world,
particularly Catholic Relief Services here in this country,
that has been fully monitored. There is not only end-use
monitoring but monitoring all the way through; not to the last
pill going down somebody's gullet, that's impossible, but there
is assurance that all of the medicines and medical equipment
that has been given, designated for this particular clinic or
that hospital, has, indeed, gone to those places. And it's 100
percent; not this myth that seems to be abroad about 80 percent
being siphoned off by the government. In the case of the
humanitarian aid provided to Caritas, 100 percent goes to the
designated recipient.
Mr. Fuller. If I might just make a quick followup, before
the restrictions were put in place by the Cuban Democracy Act
in 1992, Cuba did purchase some $720 million, almost three-
quarters of a billion dollars, from the United States; most of
that, 90 percent of that, had to do with food and medical
supplies, and I think it's important to think about the order
of magnitude. We've heard from people who have a different view
than those of us here. When they added up everything they could
add up over 6 years, they said it amounted to $2 billion of
humanitarian aid. Well, I think if you do the math, it's less
than $2 a person of the 11 million per month over the 6 years.
I think what we're suggesting is not that we stop humanitarian
aid; the fact is the people that are providing the humanitarian
aid and distributing it are supporting this legislation that
would allow the sale of food and medical supplies. I think what
we have to do is step up the order of magnitude several times
in order to make sure we are reaching the Cuban people with the
food and medical supplies they need.
Ms. Wilhelm. Mr. Chairman, if I may continue along those
lines. If, by lifting food and medicine, the Cuban people do
not get access to food and medicine and if they are not able to
buy because of the disastrous economic situation facing the
country, I think you bring forward to the world the failures of
the Castro government and prevent them from continuing the
excuse of the embargo as the reason for all their failures. I
think it is in the best interests of the United States.
Chairman Crane. Good point.
Mr. Rangel.
Mr. Rangel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Fuller,
notwithstanding the high positions that you held in the
executive branches of government recently, I gather that you
didn't have too much input in our foreign policy, especially as
it relates to Cuba.
Mr. Fuller. I think that's fair. My job was, in the first 4
years of the administration, the Assistant for Cabinet Affairs,
although we did discuss Caribbean Basin Initiatives and various
trade issues there; second 4 years was as Chief of Staff to
Vice President Bush, but my principal responsibility was not
related to the conduct of foreign policy as it pertains to
Cuba.
I might also add that during the time, of course, the
Soviet Union had not yet fallen, so the circumstances were
quite different than what we have now.
Mr. Rangel. I have followed this policy since I've been in
Congress, and I have convinced myself that the embargo has been
based more on Floridian domestic politics than trade and
foreign policy. What are your impressions?
Mr. Fuller. Well, Mr. Rangel, I was involved in politics,
and I have been to Florida a number of times on behalf of
people seeking the Presidency, and I have had the chance to
meet a great many Floridians, most recently, was the short
Presidential campaign of Governor Pete Wilson in Florida where
we met with Cuban-Americans and heard their vehement objection
to some of the kinds of things we've discussed here. My
impression--and I'm sorry Mr. Shaw's not here to share with
him--I think about a third of our executive committee on this
coalition are Cuban-Americans. Some 20,000--as I think you were
told earlier--Cuban-Americans have signed petitions supporting
this legislation. As you also heard earlier by some other
witnesses, the dissidents in Cuba, so-called dissidents,
support this legislation. I fully respect the Chairman's
comments about the efforts that were made to bring as many
people together here, and I commend you for that. I think that
we're seeing a change in Florida, a political change. I think
Cuban-Americans of all generations, particularly the younger
generation, are beginning to ask what this policy has
accomplished and achieved, and why are we forced to adhere to
it?
Mr. Rangel. But you would agree that Miami had more
influence on us than Havana.
Mr. Fuller. I think that's fair.
Mr. Rangel. And was Bernie Aaronson the Assistant Secretary
of State when you were there?
Mr. Fuller. During some of the time, yes.
Mr. Rangel. Would you believe he asked me to support the
administration in fighting Torricelli on the floor?
Mr. Fuller. Well, this is an unusual issue, I guess, in
that regard.
Mr. Rangel. And then candidate Clinton changed his mind and
supported Torricelli in Miami, and then all of a sudden Bush
supported Torricelli in Washington; strange. But, anyway--who's
the cochair of your group, because I was so proud to be with
them when they had their press conference with General Shannon
and Sam Gibbons and so many outstanding Americans, nuns and
priests? Who cochairs this group?
Mr. Fuller. It is former Congressman Sam Gibbons from
Florida.
Mr. Rangel. He's the cochair?
Mr. Fuller. Yes.
Mr. Rangel. And are you based in Washington?
Mr. Fuller. We are based in Washington, yes. And, actually,
supported and housed in the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
Mr. Rangel. Where?
Mr. Fuller. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
Mr. Rangel. Very good. Ms. Wilhelm, what group was that?
The Cuban-American----
Ms. Wilhelm. Cuban Committee for Democracy.
Mr. Rangel. No, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no. It was a
group that Jorge MasConosa headed when he was alive, the Cuban-
American----
Ms. Wilhelm. National Foundation.
Mr. Rangel. National Foundation. Since he's left us, is
that foundation as strong politically, in your opinion, in
Miami as it was before?
Ms. Wilhelm. Well, Jorge MasConosa was an incredible
leader, and when he died he left an incredible vacuum as most
incredible leaders do, and no, I would say that the foundation
is nowhere as powerful and as noticeable as they were in the
past.
Mr. Rangel. It seemed like every time he visited the White
House for a matter with the President, the embargo became
stronger. I don't know what message he brought from Miami, but
he was a very influential man.
Ms. Wilhelm. He obviously brought a very convincing
message.
Mr. Rangel. And whoever was in office, it seemed like they
could almost depend on political support coming out of Miami.
Ms. Wilhelm. Could you repeat the question, I'm sorry.
Mr. Rangel. I said, no matter who the President was, after
a visit with Jorge MasConosa, it would seem like they could
always depend on the Cuban-American National Foundation for
strong political support.
Ms. Wilhelm. I'm sure they could.
Mr. Rangel. Mr. Quigley, you're counsel to my church, so
maybe I won't get involved in any sinful trouble, because you
can't pray against me like Cardinal O'Connor can, so----
Mr. Quigley. But he could absolve you and I can't.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Rangel. Yes, well, I'm waiting for that day to come,
but I tell you, having been with him in Cuba with the Pope and
seeing the excitement of the Roman Catholic Church from bishops
and priests and nuns, I don't think in life I will see anything
closer to a religious crusade where people who, whether they
were Catholic or Protestant or nonbelievers, because even the
Communist driver that we had said that he believed in something
he couldn't describe, were just taken up by what has happened.
I always knew that the National Council of Bishops had that
position against the embargo, and the Catholic Conference would
have that position, and I suspected that Cardinal O'Connor did,
and then it became abundantly clear that His Holiness had
spoken on this issue. How does that work in the local parish et
al.? How does that message ever get down there, because we get
quite a few political messages on a variety of legislative and
foreign policy subjects here from our priest, and they are
welcome, but on this, I just didn't know, after the Pope
speaks--I know when the National Council of Bishops speaks,
that doesn't necessarily speak for the church locally, right?
Mr. Quigley. It speaks for the bishops, and the bishops are
the basic teachers in the church, but not every Catholic,
obviously, follows everything that the bishops say. When
Archbishop McCarrick, for example, current chairman of the
Committee for International Policy, issues a statement for the
conference, he is representing the entire Episcopal Conference;
that is to say, the bishops' structure. How it gets translated
to the local parish is with great difficulty. As you well know,
there's no simple button to push to help things get down there,
so it's a question of a lot of effort to communicate in various
ways: Through the media, and so forth. Rarely, though, will one
hear a homily during the Sunday Mass on a foreign policy issue.
That just isn't the function of the homily in Catholic worship.
So, it's a matter of just simply trying to affect public
opinion wherever one can.
Mr. Rangel. But when the Cardinal speaks, isn't that more a
mandate to the local priests whether we deal with Haiti's
foreign policy, as opposed to when the National Council of
Catholic Bishops speaks? Would not the Cardinal's message be
more of a mandate?
Mr. Quigley. I don't know about a mandate, Mr. Rangel. The
Cardinal, Cardinal O'Connor speaks for the Archdiocese of New
York, and he is----
Mr. Rangel. I meant for the priests within the archdiocese.
Mr. Quigley. Within the archdiocese but also the bishop of
a much smaller, less important diocese speaks similarly for
that diocese. Obviously, Cardinal O'Connor, Cardinal Law, and
other very prominent churchpersons have a higher visibility,
and so their voices may carry much further than that of other
local bishops. But at all times, mentioning those two
distinguished prelates, there has been a consistent coherence
with the policy of the Bishop's Conference, especially on the
Cuba issue, as on other issues as well. Cardinal O'Connor was
formerly chairman of the same committee that Archbishop
McCarrick presently chairs.
Mr. Rangel. Well, we rely heavily on the thoughts of the
National Council of Bishops and, of course, on old, moral, and
social grounds, the nuns really have provided a lot of
leadership for the church historically, and they seem even to
be more excited about this issue. Today was a great day for all
of us that had the privilege to have been with the Pope and the
Cardinal, and we thank you for the great work that you've done,
and we just have to continue to fight, and maybe after
November, we'll be able to take another look at this.
Thank you.
Chairman Crane. And I want to thank all of you witnesses
for your testimony. We appreciate it. And that concludes this
panel, and, now, I would like to invite up our final panel for
the day: Hon. William Paparian, city council member, Pasadena,
California; David Cibrian, partner, Jenkens & Gilchrist; Philip
Peters, senior fellow, Alexis de Tocqueville Institution, and
Ernest Preeg, William M. Scholl Chair in International
Business, Center for Strategic and International Studies.
All right. We will proceed in the order I introduced you.
Mr. Paparian.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. PAPARIAN, COUNCIL MEMBER,
PASADENA, CALIFORNIA
Mr. Paparian. Mr. Chairman, I am the immediate past mayor
of Pasadena, California and a current council member. I've
traveled to Cuba six times since July 1996, and I returned from
my most recent trip on April 17. Most of these trips were for
the purpose of coordinating the Cuba Relief Project of
Operation USA, an 18-year-old international relief agency which
was preparing the first of many shipments to Cuba of medical
supplies and equipment. During my trips, I was provided with
extensive briefings on the current status of humanitarian
assistance from the United States to Cuba. In February, I
toured the three pediatric hospitals in Havana which will be
the recipients of the Operation USA shipments and met with
their directors and medical staff.
My comments today are not on behalf of the city of Pasadena
nor on behalf of Operation USA but rather express the outrage
of one American citizen over the use of food and medicine as an
instrument of foreign policy. The embargo on Cuba is
counterproductive and immoral. It's time to lift it. Solid
medical studies, as you heard earlier today, that were released
in 1997, demonstrate, clearly, that a health crisis is
deepening in Cuba and explain how the U.S. embargo contributes
to the situation.
The religious community has long decried the embargo's
effect on the health, welfare, and, indeed, the individual
freedoms of Cubans, particularly, since the denial of food and
medicine violates many of the international human rights
covenants to which our country is a party. These groups have
long contended that the embargo, which is an act under
international norms considered one of war, exacerbates
political oppression in Cuba by keeping the government in a
constant national security alert.
Now, opponents say, as you've heard, won't the Cuban
Government just divert food and medicine to so-called medical
tourism? How can we be sure that these goods will really get to
the Cuban people? That argument is patently absurd. As long as
the embargo on food and the de facto embargo on medicines is
around, the finger of blame for the growing health crisis in
Cuba will continue to point at the United States. If we sell
food and medicine to Cuba and then the Cuban Government diverts
those goods away from the Cuban people, then the Cuban
Government, and not the United States, will deserve the blame.
We cannot control what the Cuban Government does, but we can
act with moral decency ourselves.
The State Department says, ``What about all the
humanitarian aid the United States sends, apparently more than
any other country? Doesn't that show support for the Cuban
people?'' Mr. Chairman, charity is no substitute for trade. I
believe that life-sustaining U.S. goods, particularly patented
U.S. medical products should be available for purchase to any
country that needs them.
The embargo on Cuba plays absolutely no foreign policy
role. It is a relic of the cold war that reflects solely
domestic policy concerns. For some years now, the embargo has
been nothing but a political bone thrown to the most extremist
factions of the Florida community. There can be no moral
justification for this obsolete, misguided, and illegal policy
that denies Cuban citizens basic needs.
For our country to continue to deny this one group of
people the food and medicines that are needed to sustain life
achieves nothing. Forty years of the strongest embargo in our
history has resulted in an increase in the suffering of the
people of Cuba while making no change whatsoever in the
political makeup of the Cuban Government. The American people
can no longer support a policy carried out in our name which
causes suffering of the most vulnerable: Women, children, and
the elderly. That is why I support any and all efforts to lift
the restrictions on the sale of food, medicines, and medical
supplies to Cuba.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement follows:]
Statement of Hon. William M. Paparian, Council Member, Pasadena,
California
I am the immediate past Mayor of Pasadena, California and a
current Councilmember. I have traveled to Cuba six times since
July of 1996 and returned from my most recent trip on April
17th. Most of these trips were for the purpose of coordinating
the Cuba Relief Project of Operation U.S.A., an 18 year old
international relief agency which is preparing the first of
many shipments to Cuba of medical supplies and equipment.
During my trips I was provided with extensive briefings on
the current status of humanitarian assistance from the U.S. to
Cuba in meetings with Enrique Commendario Hernandez, First
Deputy Minister of the Cuban Health Ministry; Dagmar Gonzalez
Grau, Director of Aid and Development Assistance for the Cuban
Ministry of External Assistance and Economic Cooperation; and
Dr. Noemi Gorrin Castellanos, Medical Coordinator of the Cuban
Council of Churches who coordinates all Protestant churches'
reception of medical aid.
In February I toured the three pediatric hospitals in
Havana which will be the recipients of the Operation U.S.A.
shipments and met with their directors and medical staff. The
three pediatric hospitals are Juan Manuel Marquez Pediatric
Hospital; William Soler Provincial Teaching Pediatric Hospital;
and Pediatric Teaching Hospital of Central Havana.
The U.S. unilateral embargo on Cuba is counterproductive
and immoral. It is time to lift the embargo against Cuba. As
practiced, the U.S. unilateral embargo on Cuba contradicts our
country's stated policy to ``support the Cuban people'' by
denying them sales of U.S. produced food and medical supplies.
Solid medical studies released in 1997 demonstrate that a
health crisis is deepening in Cuba and explain how the U.S.
embargo contributes to the situation.
Americans who are aware of the crisis are calling for a
change of policy in the spirit of the Pope's recent trip to
Cuba. The Senate and Congress have recently responded to these
calls by introducing bipartisan legislation allowing sales of
U.S. produced food and medical products to Cuba.
The U.S. embargo on Cuba has long concerned a variety of
groups that approach the topic from different points of view.
The humanitarian / religious community has long decried the
U.S. unilateral embargo's effect on the health, welfare and,
indeed, the individual freedoms of Cubans, particularly since
the denial of food and medicine violates many of the
international human rights covenants to which the U.S. is a
party. These groups contend that the embargo, an act under
international norms considered an act of war, exacerbates
political oppression in Cuba by keeping the government in a
national security alert. These views are supported by former
political prisoners and dissidents in Cuba.
Opponents say, won't the Cuban government just divert food
and medicine to so-called medical tourism? How can we be sure
these goods will really get to the Cuban people? That argument
is patently absurd. As long as the embargo on food and de-facto
embargo on medicines is around, the finger of blame for the
growing health crisis in Cuba can point at the u.s. If the u.s.
sells food and medicine to Cuba and the Cuban government
diverts those basic goods away from the Cuban people, then the
Cuban government and not the u.s. deserves the blame. We can't
control what the Cuban government does, but we can act with
moral decency ourselves.
The State Department says: What about all the humanitarian
aid the u.s. sends, apparently more than any other country.
Doesn't that show support for the Cuban people?
Charity is no substitute for trade. I believe that life
sustaining u.s. goods, particularly patented U.S. medical
products, should be available for purchase to any country that
needs them.
We must make it clear that the Cuban embargo plays
absolutely no foreign policy role. It is an ossified relic of
the cold war that reflects solely domestic policy concerns. For
some years now the embargo has been nothing but a political
bone thrown to the political right and to the most extremist
factions of the Florida community. There can be no moral
justification for this obsolete, misguided and illegal policy
that denies Cuban citizens basic needs.
For our country to continue to deny this one group of
people the food and medicines that are needed to sustain life
achieves nothing. Forty years of the strongest embargo in our
history has resulted in an increase in suffering of the people
of Cuba while making no change whatsoever in the political
makeup of the Cuban government. We can no longer support a
policy carried out in our name which causes suffering of the
most vulnerable--women, children and the elderly. That is why I
support any and all efforts to lift the restrictions on the
sale of food, medicines and medical supplies to Cuba.
Chairman Crane. Thank you.
Mr. Cibrian? Am I pronouncing that right?
Mr. Cibrian. Yes, you are, Mr. Chairman.
STATEMENT OF DAVID J. CIBRIAN, PARTNER, JENKENS & GILCHRIST,
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
Mr. Cibrian. Thank you very much. I am a partner with the
Dallas, Texas-based law firm of Jenkens & Gilchrist where I
specialize in international matters. I had the pleasure of
being before this Subcommittee in March 1994 to discuss U.S.
policy toward Cuba, and I appreciate having the opportunity to
be with you again today.
To, likewise, respond to the concerns voiced earlier about
where are the Cuban-Americans, I am pleased to say that we are
here; we oppose current policy toward Cuba, and we support the
sale of food and medicine for the Cuban people and the Cuban
Humanitarian Trade Act, H.R. 1951.
I am the Miami-born son and grandson of Cuban immigrants
who fled their country in 1961. The engineers of centralized
economic planning took everything my family owned. My relatives
came to this country with nothing but the clothes on their
back, but they also came with a fierce determination to
succeed. Once here, they worked 14-hour days washing dishes and
cleaning hotel rooms. They were exhausted; penniless; unable to
speak the new language of their new country, and longing for
the family members and home that they had left behind.
In Cuba, my grandfather was arrested for the crime of
owning his own business. He was threatened with execution and
intimidated with promises that his daughter's safety hung in
the balance. There has not been a single day in 36 years that
he has not remembered his Cuba, but the proudest day of his
life came last year when, at the age of 76, he was sworn in as
a citizen of the United States.
The Cuba of today, however, is vastly different than the
Cuba my grandfather knew and left behind. Unlike the majority
of Cuban-Americans, I know the Cuba of today because I have
witnessed it first hand, having traveled there seven times in
as many years. I have been accompanied on these trips by
representatives of domestic and international corporations
interested in doing business in that country. My observations
today are a result of experiences in Cuba with Cubans. Cubans
of every walk of life, from the most senior foreign investment
decisionmaker to the former surgeon who drives a cab because
the pay is better.
For 36 years, U.S. policy has had one simple objective: The
ouster of the Castro brothers from power. The longstanding
embargo and its progeny, the Cuban Democracy Act and Helms-
Burton law have failed to achieve their objectives. When I came
before this Subcommittee in 1994, the Cuban embargo was in
force; the Cuban economy was weak, and Fidel Castro had seen
better days. Today, more than 4 years later, the Cuban embargo
is strong; the Cuban economy is stronger, and Fidel Castro is
stronger. Are we not headed in the wrong direction?
Our policy toward Cuba needs to be formulated in a manner
which is commensurate with sound foreign policy judgments; in a
manner which clearly defines obtainable objectives; defines
those objectives based on the fact of current circumstances,
and results in a policy which is not recalcitrant to calibrated
adjustments as changes in circumstances warrant. This approach
has been absent from Cuba policymaking since almost its
inception.
This is the time when we should be rethinking the efficacy
of our embargo philosophy toward Cuba. Recent congressional
initiatives, such as H.R. 1951, would bring us closer to dialog
with Cuba. This bill would provide economic benefits to U.S.
business and alleviate the suffering of the Cuban people
without further burdening the U.S. taxpayer or our foreign aid
programs.
U.S. business has already missed substantial economic
opportunities and the ability to serve as engines of change. In
my home State of Texas, it is estimated that exports to Cuba
could range from $200 to $300 million in the first year of
normalized relations. Texas' estimated 15-percent share of U.S.
exports to Cuba would be in line with the State's pattern of
trade with Latin America. The greatest export potential for
Texas would be in agricultural products; products of the type
that Cuba once imported from the United States. The Port of
Houston currently handles more foreign tonnage than any port in
the United States. Texas business favors trade relations with
Cuba. For example, American Rice, one of the largest rice
producers in the country with headquarters in Houston, supports
H.R. 1951.
I support the return of democracy to Cuba and so does U.S.
business, however, our current economic and trade policy
neither returns democracy to the Cuban people nor permits our
U.S. businesspersons to serve as catalysts for change as they
so often have been throughout the world. H.R. 1951 would
provide the U.S. food and medicine private sectors the
opportunity to bring change to the needy Cuban people.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Rangel, I appreciate the opportunity to
be heard. Thank you.
[The prepared statement follows:]
Statement of David J. Cibrian, Partner, Jenkens & Gilchrist, San
Antonio, Texas
Mr. Chairman and Distinguished Members of the Subcommittee:
My name is David J. Cibrian. I am a partner with the
Dallas, Texas-based law firm of Jenkens & Gilchrist, where I
specialize in international matters, specifically doing
business in and with Latin American countries.
I had the pleasure of being before this Subcommittee in
March of 1994 for the purpose of discussing U.S. policy towards
Cuba and I appreciate having the opportunity to be with you
again today.
Personal Nexus with Cuba
I am a Miami-born Cuban-American and the son and grandson
of Cuban immigrants who fled their country in 1961. Our story
exemplifies a tragic moment in the history of Cuba. The
engineers of centralized economic planning took everything my
family owned. My relatives came to this country with nothing
but the clothes on their backs and their hearts in their hands.
But they also came with a fierce determination to succeed and
the pride which that entails.
Once in the United States, they worked 14-hour days washing
dishes and cleaning hotel rooms in Miami Beach for little or no
pay. They cried secretly at night, exhausted, penniless, unable
to speak the new language of their new country and longing for
the family members and home they had left behind.
In Cuba, my grandfather was arrested for the crime of
owning his own business. He was threatened with execution and
intimidated with promises that his only daughter's safety hung
in the balance. There has not been a single day in the last 36
years that he has not remembered his Cuba, but the proudest day
of his life came just last year when, at the age of 76, he was
sworn in as a citizen of the United States.
The Cuba of today, however, is vastly different than the
Cuba my grandfather knew and left behind.
Professional Experience in Cuba
Unlike the majority of Cuban immigrants and Cuban-
Americans, I know the Cuba of today because I have witnessed it
first hand on several occasions. I have traveled there seven
times in as many years, always legally and pursuant to travel
restriction exemptions. I have been accompanied on these trips
by representatives of U.S. and non-U.S. corporations and
organizations interested in investment in Cuba. Therefore, my
observations today are a result of such first-hand experiences
in Cuba with Cubans. Cubans of every walk of life, from the
most senior foreign investment ministry decision maker to the
former surgeon who drives a cab because the pay is better.
Prospects for Future Economic Relations
Impact to the U.S.
Cuba's 11 million people are in need of all forms of
goods. As a result, studies have concluded that during the
first year of normalized U.S./Cuba relations, trade between the
two countries could reach from US$2 to 3 billion. Total trade
could surpass $7.0 billion in the few years thereafter.
Impact to Texas.
In my home state of Texas, it is estimated that exports to
Cuba could range from US$200 to 300 million in the first year
of normalized relations. Texas' estimated 15% share of U.S.
exports to Cuba would be in line with the state's patterns of
trade with most other Latin American nations.
The greatest export potential for Texas would be in rice,
cotton, herbicides, industrial machinery, computer equipment,
petroleum products and technology, and transportation
equipment, to name a few. Many of these products are of the
type that Cuba once imported from the U.S. Texas is well suited
to do significant trade with Cuba due to its proximity to, and
trading experience with, other Latin American countries. The
Port of Houston currently handles more foreign tonnage than any
port in the United States.
Impact to Cuba.
No sector of the Cuban economy provides greater potential
for U.S. business and has received greater amounts of foreign
investment to date than has tourism. This is an industry which
has provided much needed hard currency to the troubled Cuban
economy. Feasibility studies and historical data indicate that
tourism resulted in 1990 total revenues of US$243 million, and
is expected to result in US$3.12 billion by the year 2000. This
data does not take into account the U.S. tourist. The impact of
U.S. tourist travel to Cuba post-embargo is projected by some
in the travel industry to reach a level as high as 10 million
visitors annually.
Given the trade potential which I have just highlighted and
recent events in and with Cuba, the level of interest among the
U.S. business community for investment in Cuba has not been
this significant in many years. Although suffering from the
uncertainties which passage of the Helms-Burton legislation
brought in March of 1996, U.S. business interest has clearly
rebounded since Pope John Paul II's visit to Cuba this January.
In the weeks following the Pope's visit, I have discussed with
numerous U.S. companies opportunities in a post-embargo Cuba.
Some of these now have applications pending before the Treasury
Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control for ventures
which they are hopeful might be approved in spite of current
restrictions.
Our Trading Partners
U.S. business has already missed substantial opportunities which,
instead, have gone to Canadian, French, Spanish, British and other U.S.
trading partners.
Within just the last week, French and Chilean corporations have
announced substantial additional investments in Cuba. Chile's Ingelco,
S.A., inaugurated a new milk production unit in central Cuba which was
the result of an initial US$2.6 million investment. Foreign investors
committing hard currency to milk production in 1998 is an ironic twist
given that Cuba nay-sayers predicted in 1990 that Cuba would be so hard
hit by the Soviet collapse that it would not be able to provide milk
for its own children.
France.
With regards to France, French officials are expecting a 30 percent
rise in 1998 Franco-Cuban trade. This follows an increase in French
exports to Cuba of 28 percent in 1997 (approximately US$211 million).
Total French investment in Cuba is estimated at US$100 million.
Canada.
Canada is Cuba's largest trade partner with a total investment of
US$427 million. Two-way trade between the countries has been estimated
at more than US$490 million in 1997. Of the more than 300 foreign
investment transactions as of the end of 1997, 40 were with Canadian
firms. Spain had more deals--60, but their value was only US$100
million, compared to Canada's US$427 million.
Other.
The commitment of foreign investors continues to grow. Spain has
committed millions of dollars to the tourism, agriculture, and real
estate sectors. Spanish companies are also commercializing Cuban
tobacco products and recording artists. The British government is
providing financing and the British private sector is investing in a
variety of industries.
Helms-Burton's Impact on U.S. Trade Relations
Not surprisingly, Cuba's major trade partners are also the U.S.'
major trading partners; partners who have been vocal in their
opposition to the extraterritorial impact of Helms-Burton. On the eve
of a European Union/U.S. economic summit, this trade dispute goes
unresolved. The European Union's efforts to adopt a Multilateral
Agreement on Investment have been damaged because of France's
insistence on a Helms-Burton ban. Canada and Mexico have each adopted
their own versions of Helms-Burton ``antidote legislation'' which puts
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies who attempt to comply with both
sets of laws in an impossible position. The international community,
long critics of our Cuban trade embargo, have rallied around opposition
to Helms-Burton like no other issue in U.S.-Cuba relations.
Current U.S. Policy Toward Cuba Is Ineffective
For the last 36 years U.S. policy towards Cuba has had one simple
objective--the ouster of the Castro brothers from power. The long-
standing trade embargo and its progeny the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992
and the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (``Helms/
Burton'') have failed to achieve their objective.
When I came before this subcommittee in 1994 the Cuban embargo was
in force, the Cuban economy was weak and Fidel Castro was strong.
Today, more than four years later, the Cuban embargo is stronger, the
Cuban economy is stronger and Fidel Castro is stronger. Are we not
headed in the wrong direction?
Needed Changes in Cuba Policy
At some point, our policy towards Cuba will need to be formulated
in a manner which is commensurate with sound foreign policy judgments.
In a manner which:
clearly defines attainable objectives;
defines those objectives based on the facts of current
circumstances; and
results in a policy which is not recalcitrant to
``calibrated'' adjustments as changes in circumstances warrant.
This three-pronged approach has been absent from Cuba policy making
since almost its inception. This is the time when we should be
rethinking the efficacy of our embargo philosophy towards Cuba. The
current embargo and Helms-Burton in specific have taken us farther away
from dialogue with Cuba and, therefore, the attainment of clearly
defined and attainable foreign policy objectives. Recent initiatives
such as the Cuban Humanitarian Act (H.R.1951) would bring us closer to
dialogue.
Conclusion
I support the return of democracy and free market economic
principles to Cuba and so do the many U.S. business interests which
want to do business in Cuba. However, our current economic and trade
policy neither returns democracy to the Cuban people, nor permits our
U.S. entrepreneurs and business persons to serve as catalysts for
change, as they have so often been throughout the world.
Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to be heard.
Chairman Crane. Thank you, Mr. Cibrian, and our next
witness, Mr. Peters.
STATEMENT OF PHILIP PETERS, SENIOR FELLOW, ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE INSTITUTION, ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA
Mr. Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr.
Rangel. I worked in the Reagan and the Bush administrations in
the State Department in the Latin America Bureau. I first
traveled to Cuba in 1991 as a State Department official. Since
then, I went to Cuba in 1996 and just in March of this year to
conduct economic research there. Earlier in my career I worked
for quite a number of years for Jim Courter, your former
colleague, and I hope that that training gave me an ability to
get right to the point when speaking to Members of Congress, so
I'll try to be as brief as I can.
The main point I'd like to make to you is that Cuba's
economy is changing, and markets are starting to function
there, and rather than express this in jargon, let me just talk
to you about three people that I've met in Cuba. They're not
typical because most people are still in the state economy, but
these people show you the kind of change that's taking place.
Take Roberto, a man who's 35 years old; he's a sales
representative for a European company that functions in Cuba,
and he spends his time trying to make sales. He travels around
the island; the company's an equipment manufacturer. For his
work,he earns about five times what a doctor makes in Cuba, and
he's learning the skills of marketing and how to make sales and
how to assess what's needed in different places, and he's
basically working in the international economy, and he's paid,
by the way, as are many people who work in the foreign
investment sector in Cuba, both in pesos and in dollars, so
that's what accounts for the fact that his salary is so high.
Take a man named Luis, a small farmer. There's an
agricultural reform going on in Cuba, and he recently tried his
hand selling his surplus produce in a farmers' market; there's
about 20 of them in Havana. It didn't work out, so now he's
going to concentrate all his energy on making as much surplus
production as he can on his farm to sell, according to the laws
of supply of demand, in those markets.
And, last--and this is where I spend most of my time, in
the small business sector--I'll tell you about a guy named
Daniel who for the past 2 years has been working as a
locksmith. There are 160,000 Cubans like him who quit
government jobs or got laid off, and set up a small business.
He doesn't particularly make a lot of money. He doesn't really
make a whole lot more than he used to, but when you talk to
him, he likes the independence he has. I asked him, ``What's
the challenge in your job?'' He says, ``Well, I have to learn
accounting. I have to learn how to track my costs and pay taxes
and also how to deal with difficult customers.'' He says,
``These are things that I don't know about and none of them
mattered when I worked for the state.''
You sum all this up and what is happening in Cuba is that
elements of capitalism are starting to function there; the
beginnings of market activity, and especially in the case of
small business, there's some economic freedom for the
individual. In sum, it used to be that where there was nothing
but the state's planned economy and the black market, now, that
is not so.
I want to be very careful and put this in perspective for
you because the changes or the adjustment or the reforms that
are going on are small compared to the market economies that
surround Cuba. The pace of these changes is slow and the
restrictions on the people that I just talked to you about are
many, but when you see these things from inside Cuba and when
you assess the impact it has on people's lives, the
significance is much more than what we can imagine from afar.
I'll just give you one example. A colleague and I had an
opportunity in March to talk with about 150 of these
entrepreneurs, and they earn, on average, 70 percent more than
a Cuban doctor earns. So, you can talk about the restrictions;
you can talk about the taxes and the fact that there's only 12
seats in a restaurant and all that, but, in the end, those
people are learning entrepreneurship and making a difference in
their lives.
These are not just isolated changes. A hotel maid who earns
some tips in dollars, she may pay a seamstress who has a home
business. A miner who gets a pay supplement in dollars probably
goes to the farmers' market and supports, thereby, the
development of private agriculture in Cuba. A retiree who may
get some donations from his relatives abroad may save it and
give it to his son to start a small business. There are
multiplier effects in Cuba's economy just as there are here.
How should we react to this? In my view, we've got profound
political differences with Cuba, and we should always express
them forcefully and unequivocally. But we ought to be able to
have a policy that expresses our political disagreement and, at
the same time, tries to exercise American influence where some
positive things are going on.
And I would respectfully suggest a few measures. First of
all, to promote change. Until 2 years ago, U.S. policy, as set
forth in the law that the Congress passed, was to encourage the
changing of sanctions ``in carefully calibrated ways''--as the
law said--``in response to positive developments in Cuba.''
Today, our law freezes our sanctions in place until Cuba's
Government no longer includes Fidel or Raul Castro, and it
directs the President to appoint new officials and committees
to ``promote market-based development in Cuba'' but only when a
total political change has occurred. I would argue that the
previous law was a more useful foreign policy tool. It would
allow sanctions to be modified as conditions change in Cuba. I
think that's the essence of a practical diplomacy.
Two other thoughts for you: Right now, Cuban-Americans have
the right to travel to Cuba. Why not extend that right to all
Americans? Cuban-Americans have the right to make donations to
Cubans. Why not extend that right to all Americans? If we would
do that, we would help the small business sector which in part
feeds off of contact from outside, and then that would have
multiplier effects throughout the rest of the small business
sector. We would be providing humanitarian assistance. And we
would create thousands of people-to-people contacts. That is
something that our law and the administration have tried, but
we haven't succeeded through a government program of people-to-
people contact. I think the way to do that is to just free the
American people to travel to Cuba. It's a simple and certainly
less bureaucratic way to do it.
And this final comment: I deeply respect those who have a
different view of this situation and who oppose any measure
that might lift the controls on American contact with Cuba or
that might permit dollars to flow to Cuba. And I acknowledge
that many of these folks believe that the value of engagement
might be outweighed by some perception that contacts with Cuba
by Americans is somehow going to imply endorsement of the
Government in Cuba.
I respectfully disagree, and I'll just tell you that in my
hundreds of conversations in Cuba, I've never met a single
Cuban in Cuba who wants his or her country's economy to
deteriorate, or who expects economic hardship to bring
political change to Cuba, or who views travel or investment
from abroad as political statements in support of Cuba's
Government.
So, I raise those few ideas deliberately to give you a
sense of some of the things that could be done without touching
the core issue of the embargo. I endorse a lot of the comments
that have been made today, that engagement will do much more to
promote our values and our interests in Cuba than the policy
we're pursuing now.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement follows:]
Statement of Philip Peters, Senior Fellow, Alexis de Tocqueville
Institution, Arlington, Virginia
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:
I welcome the opportunity to join you as you review the
situation in Cuba and American economic and trade policy toward
Cuba. I run research projects on Cuba and other topics at the
Alexis de Tocqueville Institution, but the views I express here
are my own.
I'll summarize my statement as follows: Cuba's economy has
survived the shock inflicted by the end of the Soviet Union,
and it has begun to recover; one means of recovery has been to
change its economic policies, including the introduction of
market-oriented reforms; these reforms offer clear benefits to
the Cuban people, and they create opportunities for the United
States to encourage further reform; to seize those
opportunities, the United States would have to move from a
policy that promotes the isolation of Americans and Cubans from
each other to a policy that accepts some degree of engagement
as a means of promoting American values.
Surviving the post-Soviet shock
I'll begin by offering some perspectives on the Cuban
economy based on my research and travel there.
The end of the Soviet bloc deprived Cuba of subsidies
equaling one fourth of its GDP, and it broke trading
relationships with the USSR and Eastern Europe that accounted
for over two thirds of Cuba's foreign commerce. As a result,
the economy was at a near-standstill by 1992-1993, when GDP had
contracted by over a third, international credit and reserves
were collapsing, and Havana's streets were often devoid of
vehicular traffic.
Today, Cuba is no economic paradise; many goods are scarce,
peso salaries provide weak purchasing power, and infrastructure
is in need of renewal across the board. But there has been
improvement: growth has been restored (7.8% 1996, 2.5% 1997),
and the currency has been stable at about twenty pesos to the
dollar for over a year.
In Havana, there are traffic jams, and one sees some
construction projects in progress. Perhaps the most unique
feature of Cuba's economy is its duality; two economies work
side by side, one in pesos, one in dollars, and many Cubans
operate in both.
A number of factors account for Cuba's recuperation,
including austerity, remittances from abroad, and policy
changes that are generating new sources of income and
employment.
Some of these policy changes adapt the current system
without changing it fundamentally. State enterprises are not
being privatized, but they are being forced to meet financial
targets, and their subsidies are being phased out. Ministries
and state enterprises have laid off workers. The military has
been downsized by about half, and a report from Havana last
week indicates that about half Cuba's military personnel are
engaged in agriculture or other civilian production. (That may
be one reason why the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Southern
Command, General Wilhelm, noted in an interview last week that
Cuba no longer poses a military threat to the United States.)
Market-oriented reforms
But other reforms are more significant because they are
introducing elements of capitalism to Cuba's socialist economy.
I want to be careful to place these reforms in context.
Cuba is surrounded by market economies, and for the past decade
and more, many of these Caribbean and Latin American nations
have worked to make their economies more open to competition
and investment, both domestically and internationally. Compared
to policies in place in these neighboring countries--indeed,
compared to the liberalizing policies that many of us would
argue would best bring prosperity to Cuba--Cuba's reforms to
date are carefully limited and their pace is very measured.
But seen from inside Cuba, the changes brought by these
reforms are far more significant than they appear from here,
and their impact on the lives of individual Cubans is far more
important than we can imagine from afar.
Foreign investment is one example. Total foreign investment
in Cuba is relatively small--one analyst, Maria Werlau,
estimates that total inward investment between 1990 and 1995
was less than half Chile's investment in Argentina during that
period. Because of Cuba's legal and regulatory environment and
other factors, in most areas Cuba is not a strong competitor
for inward investment in the Caribbean basin.
But after a three-decade drought, the impact of new
investment on the economy and on the workforce is significant.
A growing tourism sector has attracted, according to official
data, over a million tourists annually for the past two years.
As a result, hotels, restaurants, and retail shops are being
built. Tourist spending is sustaining some small businesses,
and contributing to the restoration of Old Havana. Foreign
investment has boosted mineral production. It has improved
telecommunications for the average Cuban and for Cuba's
international business community, providing better service,
modernizing infrastructure, and diversifying services.
These investments take the form of joint ventures with
state entities, so they do not represent a devolution of
decision-making to a private sector. Cuban government plans
dictate which kinds of projects are pursued, and which joint
ventures are brought to fruition.
But in many ways, these investment projects, or ``mixed
enterprises,'' as they are called in Cuba, are bringing parts
of the Cuban workforce into a more capitalist world. Many
receive training, whether in international business practices,
customer service in hotels, or mining methods and safety. They
also receive better pay than Cubans working for the state,
because in addition to their standard peso salary, many receive
pay supplements, either in dollars or in kind. Significantly,
some of these supplements come in the form of monthly bonuses
tied to production levels.
For example, I met a 35-year-old Cuban sales representative
for a European manufacturer of industrial equipment who is paid
250 pesos plus $100 per month--for a total of five times a
Cuban doctor's salary. This man loves his work; he travels from
province to province building sales leads, taking orders,
learning how to work in a multinational company as he helps to
modernize his country's industry.
Agricultural reform is also having an impact. Management
structures are changing on Cuban state farms and cooperatives,
and more significantly, some market mechanisms are being
introduced.
On some cooperatives, farmers who work individually or
collectively are no longer working exclusively for the state.
They still receive their seeds, equipment, fertilizer, and fuel
from the state, and in return they fulfill a production quota
for delivery to the state. However, once the quota is
fulfilled, they grow crops of their own choice, either for
their own consumption or for sale on the market.
This quasi-private surplus production is the source of
supply for the farmer's markets that operate throughout Cuba,
about twenty in Havana alone. At these markets, prices are high
for Cubans earning pesos only (a pound of pork costs five
percent of a doctor's monthly salary, about fifteen percent of
a worker's pension), but they bustle with customers, and they
are competitive. A local economist measured a six percent drop
during 1997 in the cost of a basic market basket of goods.
From our point of view, and surely from the point of view
of many Cubans, these reforms have a long way to go. To take
just one example, all agricultural inputs are procured, held,
and distributed by the state. But for the first time in over a
decade, Cuba is decentralizing decision-making in agriculture,
some farmers are having a greater say in their work and gaining
the opportunity to profit from their surplus, that surplus has
generated a network of markets that operate by supply and
demand, and those markets are generating private employment for
producers, truckers, and vendors.
Small business has made a start in Cuba. Among Cuba's
reforms, this one represents the most significant grant of
autonomy to individuals. Simply put, it was illegal five years
ago for a Cuban citizen to quit a job and set up shop as a
carpenter, food vendor, locksmith, restauranteur, or mechanic.
Today it is legal, and over 150,000 Cubans have business
licenses, and are working entrepreneurs.
I'll hasten to add that this is not a small business
economy of the kind that you or I would set up if we were
writing the rules. Most are one-person businesses, prohibited
from hiring employees. Restaurants are limited to twelve seats.
For most, there is no wholesale supply market. Cuban officials
say that future policy changes may address these issues, but it
is not clear when these changes will be debated, or when they
would take effect.
I was in Cuba in March, following up on research I did on
Cuba's small businesses in December 1996. This time, I was
joined by Professor Joseph Scarpaci of Virginia Tech, and
together we had the opportunity to interview 152 entrepreneurs.
Many chafe at the limitations imposed on their business
activity, and they openly complain. They do not like paying
income taxes, which were re-instituted in Cuba two years ago
after being abolished for 36 years. They dislike regulations,
some dread inspectors, and some tell stories of arbitrary
decisions by inspectors enforcing regulations.
Still, they take advantage of the opportunity before them.
And many succeed. On average, after taxes and business expenses
are paid, they take home seventy percent more than doctors, who
are very high in the peso salary structure. (That is an
underestimation, I believe, because some work only part time,
and many probably understated their earnings to us.) They like
their autonomy; ``Here, I am the boss,'' they say, like
entrepreneurs everywhere. They are re-learning the arts of
entrepreneurship and service, giving new vitality to cities and
towns that were devoid of commerce just five years ago. And
they have created a clear example that an economic reform of
this type can succeed.
``Self-employment,'' as they call this small business
activity, is a new path for recent graduates, retirees, laid-
off state workers, mid-career people who opt for independence.
About four percent of the labor force is in small business,
many more if unlicensed businesses are counted. For some, it's
a part-time endeavor to supplement pension income, but for
many, it's the way they support their families, and it's a very
conscious step into a new, unplanned economy.
Implications for U.S. Policy
``New economy'' may seem too strong a description when one
considers that socialism still reigns in Cuba. But consider
that whereas a decade ago Cuba had nothing but the state's
economic apparatus and the black market, today a legal, private
economy is emerging, much of it denominated in dollars and
working according to market incentives.
In my view, while Cuba's economic reforms are limited, but
they have a positive impact on many thousands of individual
Cubans and their families, and the United States could adopt
policies that would spur growth of the new economy, while
encouraging further reforms.
However, this would require a significant change in our
political approach to Cuba.
Current U.S. policy aims to deny hard currency to the Cuban
government, and seeks to limit or block dollars flowing to Cuba
through remittances, investment, or tourism. Many of these
funds clearly do reach the government, through taxes or
receipts in the state's retail enterprises. Some are kept in
dollar savings accounts, generating capital for small-scale
investment projects.
But these funds also sustain Cuba's new economy. The hotel
maid who earns dollar tips may pay a seamstress who has a home
business. A miner may spend his dollar pay supplement in a
farmer's market, supporting the non-state side of Cuban
agriculture. A retiree may save his relatives' remittances and
gives his son seed capital to start a mechanic's shop. I
recently received a report from Cuba that a hotel joint
venture, seeking to replace imports, is contracting with a
private farmers' cooperative to supply produce. So in Cuba as
elsewhere, private economic activity has multiplier effects.
How could U.S. policy react to these developments?
Clearly, Americans agree that our foreign policy should
reflect our values, and as long as Cuba maintains its current
political system, we should express our disagreement with that
system.
But it is not clear to me that the principal means we have
chosen to express that disagreement--a policy that isolates the
Cuban and American people from each other, and that clearly
seeks to bring political change by harming Cuba's economy--is
the best way to achieve that goal. It is not a policy we
pursued toward other communist countries, even at the height of
the Cold War. And our policy is not welcomed by those it is
intended to benefit. Cuba's bishops long ago called it
``cruel,'' Cuba's dissidents disagree with it, and Cubans one
meets on the street, even those who criticize their government
always seem to ask when relations will normalize.
In my view, we should be able to craft a policy that
continues to express our fundamental political differences, but
does not block broad contacts between America and Cuba, and
that recognizes and encourages any positive developments
occurring on the island.
I would respectfully suggest a few measures that meet those
criteria. They represent a shift from a policy of isolation to
one of engagement. They would begin to supply an element that
is missing from current policy: a sense of confidence that
greater contact between American and Cuban societies would
transmit American values and advance American interests.
Promoting change.
Until two years ago, U.S. law encouraged sanctions in
carefully calibrated ways in response to positive developments
in Cuba. Today, current law freezes U.S. economic sanctions
until Cuba's government ``does not include Fidel Castro or Raul
Castro.'' It directs the President to name new U.S. officials
and committees to promote ``market-based development in
Cuba''--only after Cuba's political system has undergone
systemic change.
I would argue that we would do better to encourage positive
economic change even in the absence of political reforms. In
that sense, the previous law was a more useful foreign policy
tool--it would allow sanctions to be modified as conditions
change in Cuba. It thus made sanctions a tool to promote
change, and it gave that tool practical value not just in a
situation where Cuba changes radically, but also in scenarios
where there are positive, gradual changes that we want to
encourage.
Travel.
Instead of limiting travel to Cuba to a few categories
licensed by the Treasury Department (journalists, researchers,
family visits by Cuban-Americans), all Americans should be
permitted to travel to Cuba.
One immediate and visible impact would be growth of Cuba's
small business sector, as I described earlier.
In addition, it would create thousands of people-to-people
to contacts. In the past, Congress and the Administration have
attempted to achieve this goal through a government program
that screens Americans who wish to visit Cuba, and grants
licenses to some. This program is as cumbersome to the citizens
who experience it as it is to the federal employees who
administer it.
In fact, we do not need this government program. We should
simply free the American people to travel to Cuba.
Some Americans would make one-time visits as individuals,
just to learn about Cuba. There will be increased interest
among academic, cultural, and other private organizations. Some
will seek to establish ongoing contacts; some will succeed,
others will fail. But freed of government restrictions, private
American contacts with Cuba would be broader, more spontaneous,
more diverse, and more numerous--in fact, more reflective of
America itself--than those that result from a government
program.
Regarding travel by Cubans to the United States, we should
also permit a greater degree of freedom. To take one example,
two months ago Cuba's economy minister was denied a visa to
attend a conference at Harvard. It is not clear to me that we
accomplish any foreign policy purpose by denying Americans the
opportunity to hear--and to challenge--a senior Cuban official.
It is true that American officials seldom have opportunities to
address audiences in Cuba, and we should seek to change that.
But we should not use Cuban restrictions on the free flow of
information to impose restrictions of our own. Our argument for
broader U.S. official access to Cuban audiences will be
stronger, and we will stop needlessly denying Americans access
to information that they seek, if we simply relax our
restrictions.
Donations.
Cuban-Americans are permitted to donate up to $1200 per
year to their families in Cuba. All Americans should have that
privilege, and we should consider raising or eliminating the
$1200 limit. This will increase humanitarian assistance to
Cuba. It will provide seed capital for small business, and it
will have other positive effects on the new economy I described
above.
These are but three of many constructive policy options. I
realize that Congress is debating certain aspects of the U.S.
trade embargo, but I deliberately avoid that issue here, so as
to illustrate the range of available options that do not touch
on that core issue.
I recognize that many in the United States are inclined to
oppose any measure that might lift the controls on American
contact with Cuba, or that might permit dollars to flow more
easily to Cuba, even for humanitarian purposes. I also
acknowledge that many believe that the benefits of engagement
would be far outweighed by the perception that contacts may
imply approval of Cuba's government.
I respectfully disagree. In my hundreds of conversations in
Cuba, I have never met a single Cuban who wants his or her
country's economy to deteriorate, or who expects economic
hardship to bring political change, or who views travel or
investment from abroad as political statements in support of
Cuba's government.
In March, a Havana priest told me that ``governments always
find a way to survive'' economic sanctions. Referring to United
States policy, he said, ``There is nothing positive in
isolating a people.''
Mr. Chairman, as Cuba's government prepares to celebrate
forty years in power at the end of this year, this is a good
time to question the assumptions that have long guided our
approach to Cuba. We should summon the confidence that this
priest and many other Cubans already have in us--that in Cuba
as elsewhere, Americans will do more for our own values as
protagonists rather than as spectators.
Thank you.
Chairman Crane. Thank you, Mr. Peters.
Mr. Preeg.
STATEMENT OF ERNEST H. PREEG, WILLIAM M. SCHOLL CHAIR IN
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES
Mr. Preeg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Rangel. It's an
honor to be here; and a special honor to serve as anchorperson
on this long distinguished list of witnesses. In that context,
let me just say, for the record, approximately one-half of 1
percent of the American population are Cuban-Americans, and I
count 5 out of 20 witnesses, or 25 percent Cuban-Americans, so
I don't agree that they're underrepresented in this particular
hearing.
I'd like to comment just briefly on the four issues that
you listed to focus the discussion today. First, what is the
adverse impact of the U.S. embargo on the Cuban people? My
estimate is that the Cuban economy loses $1 to $2 billion a
year from the embargo. That compares with total Cuban imports
of $4.2 billion in 1996; quite substantial. This adverse
impact, though, comes mainly from the prohibition on U.S.
exports and U.S. travel to Cuba, tourism most of all. Cuba
loses, probably, at least $1 billion a year from the
prohibition on travel. Also, Cuba could export to the United
States fruits, vegetables, cigars, rum, shrimp, and so forth,
another substantial loss.
In contrast, the prohibition on U.S. exports to and
investment in Cuba, is having little adverse impact on Cuba.
Others can export instead of U.S. exporters. On the investment
side, my assessment is that Helms-Burton has had very little
impact on reducing investment. There's not that much investment
that's good investment now, but hotels are not covered, not
expropriated property. For nickel, Sherritt International, a
Canadian company, goes ahead and ignores the law, and the
buyout of the important big domestic telephone system by an
Italian-led consortium has avoided Helms-Burton by making a
private settlement with the U.S. claimant.
As to the Pope's visit, second point, it certainly
strengthens the Catholic Church within Cuba as a vehicle for
positive change, social, economic, and political, but, in
addition, it has highlighted, as we've heard today, the
suffering of the Cuban people from the embargo; from what is
going on in Cuba, and it has caused a much more important
visible debate in this country, including today. One specific
policy result is growing support within the Congress for the
proposed legislation to raise the embargo on exports of food
and medicines. To me, that's a win-win proposal. It takes away
from Castro the unjustified propaganda argument that it is this
export embargo that is causing the shortages there. It doesn't
give Castro any significant additional dollars; and it would be
a very visible humanitarian gesture for the United States to do
this, so I would hope that some time--maybe this year, maybe
next year--that this can be brought to a vote with a majority
favorable bipartisan support.
The third issue you raised, the humanitarian assistance to
Cuban people, we've heard a lot about today. There's been a
broad reaction. Most of this support comes from the United
States. The Catholic Church organization, Caritas, is out front
in getting food to the people, but this amount of nongovernment
organization aid is small compared with the very rapid growth
over the last 3 years in remittance payments--dollars from the
Cuban Diaspora, mostly Cuban-Americans, back to Cuba. This has
been estimated at $600 to $800 million a year by two sources.
This is a very large amount of money. It equates to more, in
terms of net dollar inflow, than either tourism or sugar
exports in terms of the impact on the Cuban economy and on the
Cuban people. However, at the same time, it creates a dilemma
for Cuban-Americans, for those who, on the one hand, strongly
support an embargo whose only intent is to cause economic pain
on the Cuban economy, on the Cuban people, while, at the same
time, they're sending money there that offsets and undermines
the very impact that they claim they want to have.
And, finally, the fourth point, what is the impact on U.S.
relations with trading partners? There are two effects,
somewhat in contradiction. The first one is what they do. Third
country competitors simply displace U.S. exports in the Cuban
market. I estimate that the embargo causes in the order of
export loss $3 to $4 billion a year compared with trade
relationships in other countries in the Caribbean Basin where
we are the dominant trading partner. That's the relationship
compared with a normal relationship. The investment loss is
harder to quantify, but, obviously, if an American company had
gotten that contract on the internal telephone system, it would
be a big payoff over many years with U.S. technologies instead
of European.
The second impact on our trade relations is the conflict we
have with other countries who officially oppose the embargo;
who have raised disputes over Helms-Burton in the World Trade
Organization, which has reduced U.S. influence and leadership
in that important organization, and has also reduced U.S.
public support in our country for our longstanding liberal
trade policy. In fact--my final comment--the failure of
President Clinton to obtain fast track legislation last year
reflected a public opinion that has turned against the
longstanding U.S. liberal trade policy, and the many attacks by
Helms-Burton supporters on the WTO as undermining U.S.
sovereignty has contributed significantly to that failure.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Rangel.
[The prepared statement follows:]
Statement of Ernest H. Preeg, William M. Scholl Chair in International
Business, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to appear
before the Subcommittee on Trade and to state my views about
U.S. economic and trade policy toward Cuba. I hold the William
M. Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies in Washington, where my
work is heavily involved with trade policy and the Cuba
relationship, including my works, Cuba and the New Caribbean
Economic Order (1993), and From Here to Free Trade: Essays in
Post-Uruguay Round Trade Strategy (1998). I am currently
engaged in a CSIS project on unilateral economic sanctions, for
which I am doing several country case studies, including Cuba.
This hearing is especially timely because circumstances
influencing U.S. Cuba policy have changed substantially over
the past year, both in Cuba and in the United States, and I
believe a fundamental reappraisal of U.S. Cuba policy is in
order. You have highlighted four issues as the focus for this
hearing, which I will address in turn.
1. The Impact of the U.S. Embargo on the Cuban People.
The U.S. embargo had little impact on the Cuban people for
the first 28 years through 1989 because the Soviet Union
provided massive economic aid to Cuba, in the order of $6
billion per year in the late 1980s, while the Cuban economy was
isolated from trade with the West. The abrupt cutoff of this
aid beginning in 1990, however, led the Cuban economy into
financial crisis and a sharp decline in its gross domestic
product by half or more, by my assessment, although the Castro
government claims the reduction was only 35 percent. Widespread
shortages of food, medicines, and other consumer goods caused
much suffering for the Cuban people, and although the Cuban
economy bottomed out in 1993 and shortages have eased somewhat
since then, the economic deprivation continues for most Cubans.
Moreover, the prospect is for slow or no growth in coming years
as the Cuban industrial base gradually crumbles from the lack
of job-creating investment--gross investment in 1996 was at the
incredibly low level of seven percent of GDP.
The issue is how much of this poor economic performance in
the 1990s--and the related suffering of the Cuban people--is
caused by the U.S. embargo and how much by the failed
centrally-planned economy of the communist government. My
assessment is that the failed Cuban policies are principally to
blame, but that the U.S. embargo deprives the Cuban economy of
$1-2 billion per year of hard currency, which is substantial
compared with total Cuban imports of goods and services in 1996
of $4.2 billion.
This $1-2 billion adverse impact on the Cuban economy from
the U.S. embargo comes principally from the prohibition on U.S.
imports from Cuba and travel to Cuba by U.S. citizens. The
tourism sector is hardest hit. Based on a 60 percent U.S. share
of tourists in other Caribbean island nations, the lifting of
travel restrictions should increase Cuban tourism revenues by
more than $1 billion per year within a few years. A lifting of
the import embargo would also permit significant Cuban exports
to the United States of fruits, vegetables, cigars, rum, and
other consumer products.
In contrast, the embargo on U.S. exports to and investment
in Cuba is having relatively little adverse impact on the Cuban
economy. Cuba imports freely from all other countries rather
than the United States, at only slightly higher prices, and
this includes food and medicine imports addressed further
below.
As for foreign direct investment, at this time Cuba is
generally not an attractive country in which to invest. Labor
costs are extremely high because of a two thousand percent tax
on labor levied through regulated wage payments in pesos rather
than dollars. In those sectors where investment has been
attractive--hotels, nickel, and the domestic telephone system--
non-U.S. companies have been quick to invest and the Helms-
Burton legislation of 1996 has not significantly deterred such
viable foreign investments. The hotels are not on expropriated
U.S. properties and therefore Helms-Burton does not apply. The
Canadian company Sherrit International has invested in nickel
production while ignoring Helms-Burton. And the Italian-led
investment consortium in the Cuban telephone system avoided
Helms-Burton by reaching a private settlement with the U.S.
claimant. Only a few relatively small investments in other
sectors may have been deterred by Helms-Burton.
Thus the Cuban economy suffers adverse impact from the U.S.
embargo through a loss of tourism revenues and potential
exports to the United States, which in turn is causing economic
pain principally on the Cuban people. Dollars flowing into Cuba
are fungible, the Cuban government sets the priorities for
their use, and imports of consumer goods have a low priority.
2. Future Prospects in Light of the Pope's Visit.
The Pope's visit will strengthen the position of the
Catholic Church as a vehicle for social, economic, and
political change within Cuba, but the strengthening will be
incremental. A broader result of the visit was to highlight the
economic suffering of the Cuban people and to question the
adverse impact on them from the U.S. embargo. The Pope has long
opposed all economic sanctions--multilateral and unilateral--as
having little impact on the behavior of authoritarian
governments while causing economic pain to the people, and
often the greatest pain to the poorest people. The media
reporting during and after the trip focused on this inherent
dilemma for economic sanctions policy, which has led to more
intense international debate about the purpose and effects of
the U.S. Cuba embargo.
This debate is most important within the United States
because all other countries agree with the Pope and officially
oppose the U.S. Cuba embargo. Within the Cuban-American
community, which has been a forceful advocate for tightening
the sanctions, an open split has emerged, although the pro-
embargo faction remains in the majority. The U.S. private
sector has become more organized and forceful in its opposition
to unilateral sanctions and editorial comments run more heavily
against the Cuba embargo in the wake of the Papal visit.
Two specific policy developments in the United States since
the Pope's visit are President Clinton's actions in March to
ease restrictions on travel and humanitarian assistance and
growing support for legislative proposals in both houses of the
Congress to unilaterally raise the embargo on exports of food
and medicines to Cuba. Of the President's actions, the most
significant is the renewal of direct flights from Miami to
Havana for Americans legally permitted to travel to Cuba,
principally Cuban-Americans. Reports are that scheduled flights
are fully booked and that there will be many more flights than
there were before they were suspended two years ago. Moreover,
Cuban-Americans traveling to Cuba now are less intimidated by
the pro-embargo majority, and include younger generation Cuban-
Americans questioning the longstanding embargo policy.
The legislative proposal to lift the embargo on food and
medicine exports is a win-win proposition for the United
States. As noted earlier, it would not provide significant
additional dollars to the Castro government while taking away
Castro's unjustified propaganda argument that the embargo on
these products is a cause of food and medicine shortages in
Cuba. It would also be a symbolic gesture of understanding for
the pressing humanitarian needs of the Cuban people. The
proposals have well over a hundred co-sponsors in the House and
more than twenty in the Senate. A significant number of these
have signed on in light of the Pope's visit. I would urge an
early hearing and vote on this legislation, and hope that a
bipartisan majority will vote in favor.
3. Humanitarian Assistance Extended to the Cuban People.
The financial crisis and economic suffering in Cuba during
the 1990s have evoked a strong response from abroad to provide
humanitarian assistance to the Cuban people. A principal
difficulty in doing this is to assure that such assistance gets
directly to the people and is not simply acquired by the
government for its own purposes. Church groups and other non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) are appropriate channels, but
it can be a slow and difficult process to get established in
Cuba. The Catholic Church humanitarian assistance agency,
Caritas, is the largest and most successful NGO conduit by far.
As to the source of such NGO support, U.S. assistance is far
larger than all other country contributions combined.
This church and other NGO humanitarian assistance, however,
is relatively small by comparison with the surge of remittance
payments of dollars to Cuban families from the Cuban diaspora,
principally Cuban-Americans. Such remittances increased from
the order of $100 million per year in the early 1990s to an
estimated $600-800 million per year in 1995-97. The U.N.
Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean
estimates the remittance level at $600 million in 1995 and $800
million in 1996, based largely on an otherwise unexplained
increase in the Cuban current account deficit of more than $1
billion per year. The Cuban government estimates up to a $700
million level in 1997 related to sales in ``dollar only''
stores, which were established in 1994 in large part to attract
such dollar remittance flows into Cuba.
A qualitative advantage of this humanitarian dollar inflow
is that all the dollars stay in the country to buy basic
necessities whereas, in contrast, more than half of gross
tourist receipts are used to pay for tourist-related imports.
When taking account of this ``gross-net'' differential, the
estimated remittance payments provide more dollars to the Cuban
economy than either the tourism sector or sugar exports.
Remittance payments from the Cuban diaspora are at least
several times larger than church and other NGO humanitarian
assistance combined, and as such present a dilemma for the
Cuban-American community in particular. Many Cuban-Americans
strongly support the embargo, which is designed to inflict
economic pain on the Cuban economy, while providing large
amounts of humanitarian-based remittance payments which negate
the economic impact of the embargo policy. In effect, the
remittance payments are a response to the Pope's message that
economic sanctions hurt the people. Comparing the size of the
remittance payments to the Caritas program in Cuba, Cuban-
Americans are indeed more Catholic than the Pope!
4. The Impact on Relations with U.S. Trading Partners.
The impact of the U.S. embargo on U.S. trading partners
consists of two elements that are in basic conflict. It is a
matter of what they do and what they say. The larger impact by
far is that the unilateral embargo precludes U.S. exporters and
investors from the Cuban market, while leaving it open to the
benefit of all competitors. This did not mean much before 1990,
when the Cuban economy was integrated with the Soviet Bloc, but
the adverse impact on U.S. commercial interests has since
become substantial. The United States is the natural market for
Cuban trade and investment as it is for economies throughout
the Caribbean Basin, and with normal commercial relations, the
United States could expect a 60 percent or more share of the
Cuban market. In 1996, Cuban imports were $4.2 billion, and in
the absence of the embargo, such imports would rise to $5-6
billion (from dollar inflows from increased tourist receipts
and Cuban exports to the United States as explained above). On
this basis, U.S. export losses would be in the order of $3-4
billion per year compared with trade relationships elsewhere in
the Caribbean basin. This market would not be obtained
immediately for U.S. exports upon the lifting of the embargo,
but it is a potential target level in a market now totally
abandoned to third-country competitors.
The gains to other countries in the area of investment is
more difficult to quantify. A five-star hotel on a prime beach
location can involve a $30 million investment (based on a 50
percent equity share), but the returns over ten or twenty years
can be far larger. Similarly, the moderate initial investment
to rebuild the domestic Cuban telephone system, utilizing
European rather than U.S. technologies, can have a multiple
future return.
The second, largely conflicting element of the impact on
trading partners concerns their stated official opposition to
the embargo and to the extraterritorial dimension of the Helms-
Burton Act, in particular, which attempts to restrict third-
country investment in properties with outstanding U.S.
expropriation claims. This has caused bitter disputes
bilaterally and within the World Trade Organization (WTO). The
EU called for a WTO dispute panel and the United States
protested on grounds that the Helms-Burton measures are about
foreign policy not trade policy, and that if the EU pressed its
case the United States would claim a ``national security''
exemption under Article XXI of the GATT. On both counts, the
U.S. position is without merit and tends to undermine U.S.
support within the WTO. Many trade policy measures are related
to foreign policy but this in itself is not grounds to violate
WTO commitments. As for GATT Article XXI, the national security
exemption is only permitted under the narrowly defined
circumstances of ``war or other emergency in international
relations,'' and the United States, as the preeminent global
power, would look foolish and be juridically vulnerable to
claim such a current relationship with the small, withering
communist regime in Cuba.
The United States and the EU are attempting a negotiated
resolution of the WTO dispute over Helms-Burton and the outcome
is uncertain. In any event, U.S. leadership within the WTO has
suffered, as has public support in the United States for the
WTO, which has been continually criticized by strident
supporters of Helms-Burton. The failure of President Clinton to
obtain ``fast track'' legislation last year reflected a public
opinion that has turned against the longstanding U.S. liberal
trade policy, and the many attacks on the WTO as undermining
U.S. sovereignty by Helms-Burton supporters contributed
significantly to this failure.
Bringing these two elements of impact on trade relations
with others together, there is finally the question of whether
our trading partners--and Fidel Castro--really want the United
States to lift the Cuba embargo as they say they do. Foreign
business interests clearly enjoy an inside and now exclusive
track in a growing market that normally would be dominated by
the United States. Trade missions to Cuba are actively promoted
by European governments. The CEO of Sherrit International is
outspoken in public condemnation of Helms-Burton, but his
private preference reportedly is for the embargo to continue as
long as possible in order to broaden investment interests in
Cuba in the absence of American competitors.
As for Fidel Castro, my personal assessment, based on
decades of his highly successful nationalist, anti-U.S.
posturing, is that the last thing he would want to see is a
lifting of the U.S. embargo. And if this assessment is correct,
the entire rationale for current U.S. economic and trade policy
toward Cuba is open to serious question.
Chairman Crane. Thank you, Mr. Preeg.
Mr. Paparian, what's been your experience under the
administration's current process to receive a license to
provide humanitarian assistance to the Cuban people? Has this
process been cumbersome?
Mr. Paparian. Well, we're about to find out. The license
was finally submitted last week, because we had to, first,
assemble the medical equipment and supplies that are going to
be shipped to Cuba and itemize exactly what the items were, so
until we'd assembled all the items and categorized them in the
warehouse in San Pedro near Long Beach, California, we weren't
able to submit the license. We're told that the license process
takes approximately 5 weeks; that approximately 99 percent of
the license applications are approved.
But I do want to point out one thing and that is there
seems to be a gap between what the U.S. Government is saying is
going to Cuba and what humanitarian relief agencies are aware
is going and what the Cuban Health Ministry says is going. The
last year that we have information on is the year 1996, and
during that year, the Republic of Cuba received $87 million in
U.S. dollars of humanitarian assistance from all over the
world. Of that total, $87 million, only $6 million was from the
United States. That's according to Cuban Health Ministry
sources. It might be worthwhile for this Subcommittee in its
work to take a look, take a hard look, at what the numbers
really are showing on the total of humanitarian assistance
coming from the United States.
Chairman Crane. Mr. Peters, how does the compensation
earned by Cubans working in joint ventures with foreign firms
compare to the compensation earned by workers in exclusively
state-owned firms?
Mr. Peters. Well, I have not collected systematic data on
that, but, in general, it's higher. I know from talking to a
lot of people who work in those joint ventures and to Cuban
economists and others that, in general, those firms, those in
the joint venture sector, pay a Cuban peso salary--rather, the
workers receive a Cuban peso salary directly from the agency
that employs them, because the foreign company can't hire the
Cubans directly; they're hired through an agency. So, the
agency gives them some pesos, but the company also gives them
some dollars or gives them some payment in kind, and more
interesting than that, is that in some cases--I know in the
mining sector and in other sectors too--some of the workers are
starting to get paid according to production. So, if the mine
does well in a certain month, they get a higher monthly bonus.
You asked about workers that work exclusively for the state.
They get paid in pesos, although, I understand that in some
cases now, some get payments in kind that are in addition to
the peso salary. In some ways, this is a response to the higher
pay that is beginning to be earned in the market-based sector
of the Cuban economy.
Chairman Crane. And my next question's for any or all of
you. Several commentators have described limited market-
oriented reforms underway in Cuba. What has the Castro regime
said about these policies, and why do you think these reforms
have been implemented?
Mr. Preeg. With the abrupt cutoff of the huge Soviet aid,
$6 billion a year, Castro was forced to take these reforms in
order to avoid economic collapse in 1992, although by 1993 the
economy was bottoming out. He was forced to do it to get
dollars in; tourism, the nickel production--those are the two
largest sectors affected in the external accounts, and
internally he gave price incentives to farmers; to farmers'
markets; to the small businesses that are now in the order of
100,000, family businesses to provide basic services to the
people.
Now, he's trying to hold back the reforms because he knows
the more this market economy expands, the more difficult it is
for him to control it, and that's really the big game going on.
The problem, though, for him is that the market share of the
economy is growing, and he admits that now 50 percent of the
people have dollars and are into the market economy, much of it
in a black market, a gray market; and all the incentives, all
the imbalances between the peso economy and the dollar economy,
create pressure to move to the dollar.
The best example, if you want an enjoyable exposure for 2
hours rather than listening to the likes of us, is to go see
the film ``Guantanamara.'' It was made and shown in Cuba; it is
a hilarious story, but it shows from start to finish the way
the dollar economy is undermining all of the state-controlled
relationships and the bureaucracy that are still trying to
control the Cuban economy.
Mr. Cibrian. If I could expand on that, Mr. Chairman. I
agree that the economic reforms we have seen to date, and
having met with the Foreign Investment Ministry Officials
there, that they have been implemented out of necessity, but
they certainly have not gone far enough. Earlier, I believe it
was Congressman Jefferson who alluded to the question of what
comes first, economic, religious, or political reforms? And I
think a clear benefit of engagement between U.S. business and
Cuba would be to help them learn and help motivate them for
further economic reforms, and once that occurs, I think it is
very difficult for political reform not to follow suit; not too
dissimilar as to what we're seeing happening in Mexico with
their political process right now.
Mr. Paparian. Mr. Chairman, let me give you another
perspective on your question. I was in Cuba in January, and I
heard the Pope's call for the world to open up to Cuba and for
Cuba to open up to the world, but the real question for us this
afternoon, how will Cuba open up to the United States, and how
will the United States open up to Cuba? Most Americans are
under the false impression that hostilities between the United
States and Cuba, military hostilities, ended with the Bay of
Pigs debacle.
I would commend for this Subcommittee and for your staff a
book that was written by Jane Franklin which is a chronology of
the relationship between the United States and Cuba, going back
and looking at the newspaper and magazine archives. In fact,
the hostilities continued on covertly under code names like
Operation Mongoose.
The Government of Cuba still has a sense of being under
siege from the United States. Just last year, there were a
series of bombings that occurred in tourist hotels, and there
was the tragedy of an Italian businessman who lost his life.
The Cuban police apprehended someone who confessed that he'd
been trained in the United States at a military base and that
he received assistance from the United States. Just a couple of
days ago, the New York Times carried the story of what happened
when a boat was seized by the U.S. Coast Guard; traced back to
the United States of people on their way to Venezuela to
assassinate President Castro.
Most Americans aren't aware of how the Cubans view the
relationship, and it would be important, I think, for the
Subcommittee staffers to take a look at this chronology and to
trace the history. You'll get a sense, then, of how there is
the resistance to opening up to market reforms when there's a
sense of being continually under siege. The hostilities from
the cold war between the United States and Cuba are not over
yet.
Chairman Crane. Mr. Peters.
Mr. Peters. We can't be under any illusions; it's a
Socialist economy, and the way they put it is that they are
incorporating some elements of capitalism into their Socialist
economy. Certainly, the foreign investment is one part; the
incentive-based parts of agriculture are part of it; the small
business is another. In the case of small business, one Cuban
official said to me, ``We decided that we no longer needed to
plan how every service in the economy would be provided.'' So,
they allowed Cubans to decide to open small businesses, and
they provide a lot of services as a result.
Mr. Ranneberger from the State Department mentioned the
taxes that have gone on to the small businesses, and they
certainly have imposed taxes. It would probably be fascinating
for you, as members of the taxwriting committee, to go and see
a place where there was no income tax for 36 years, and then
talk to people who now have paid their first income tax for 2
years. They're paying them, and one reason it was put on--a lot
of people interpret it as punitive, and, frankly, the rates are
higher than you or I would probably prefer, but this is a
sector of the economy that was prospering and paying no tax,
and so the government put the taxes on so as to avoid income
inequality and to be able to say, ``Yes, these people are
prospering, but those of you who aren't making as much money--
at least they're paying a tax to contribute.''
There are some ideas under consideration that might allow
the small business sector to expand--such as the creation of
small- and medium-size businesses, to allow some of these sole
proprietors to have partnerships or employees, or to establish
wholesale markets so that they have access to wholesale
supplies. I would hope that the fact that they have now put a
tax system into place and they see the people are paying taxes
and they're collecting a lot of money from it, might make some
of these officials comfortable enough to allow some of these
other measures to allow the small business sector to expand.
Chairman Crane. Thank you.
Mr. Rangel.
Mr. Rangel. Mr. Cibrian, I get the impression that for
those who support the embargo and, indeed, love Cuba, hoping
that we will cause so much economic pain that the Cuban people
on the island would somehow overthrow the government, is that
basically the objective as you discussed this with those who
support the embargo?
Mr. Cibrian. As I mentioned, Mr. Rangel, I've had the
opportunity to travel there over a span of 7 years now, and I
have met with Cubans of all walks of life, and that is not the
case, and it is not an attainable objective.
Mr. Rangel. No, but I'm asking for those who support the
embargo, I mean, they just don't want to cause pain to their
people in Cuba. They just don't want to be mean-spirited, and
it's not just an anti-Communist thing, don't they explain that
they would want the Cuban people to uprise against the
Communist government? Is that basically----
Mr. Cibrian. That is one of the rationalizations used for
their support of the policy, yes.
Mr. Rangel. Because I can't get clear answers, and I
thought maybe they might be a little more honest with you being
Cuban-American. How do they intend to overthrow the Army that's
down there? I mean, the poor Cubans may get annoyed, but even
if they did want to get rid of Castro, how do they share that
they're ready to do that when Castro has one of the stronger
armies in the region?
Mr. Cibrian. Well, I can assure you, Mr. Rangel, that many
of the proembargo Cubans have been very honest with me about
their views given mine. I think it's just very difficult for
them to reconcile how you can achieve that goal, that uprising.
Unfortunately, unlike the situation in Czechoslovakia or
Poland, there is currently no Vaclev Havel in Cuba. Many of
those Cubans left in 1961.
If we were to be able to adopt a policy of engagement of
being able to teach them about economic reforms and economic
change, we would be able to achieve that. Currently, there is
an absence of that in Cuba, in the country. So, I don't
understand how they can get to an uprising of the Cuban people
by inflicting the pain which is a byproduct of this policy
whether it's intentional or not, but the fact of the matter is
that it is what is occurring to the Cuban people.
Mr. Rangel. And, so when my colleague had difficulty
supporting liberalizing Cuban-American's travel to Cuba or
Cuban-Americans sending dollars back to Cuba, all of this is a
part of trying to create a frustration that is supposed to
cause the Cuban people to be sicker, more poor, more
frustrated, then move on to the revolution against President
Castro.
Mr. Cibrian. That's a correct assessment, but let me tell
you, time and time again, my conversations in Cuba with Cubans
have made it clear that the Cuban nationals are not blaming
Fidel Castro for their situation; they are blaming the Cuban-
American National Foundation, the Cuban exile community for
keeping this policy in place.
Mr. Rangel. Now, because we have to really work with people
who all want the same objectives: An open and free market in
Cuba and democracy as they would enjoy it, and a more friendly
relationship and cultural and social economic exchange, what
would drive a person to use this method of pain and misery in
order to say that they love Cuba more than someone else? Where
is the common sense involved in proceeding in a policy that
clearly has not given us any hope that it could possibly be
effective?
Mr. Cibrian. I agree that it's nonsensical, and it's
illogical and doesn't comport with foreign policy that we have
in other countries. Unfortunately, it's a very emotional issue;
a very passionate issue for those who had to leave their
country, but I think, unfortunately, there is a silent majority
of Cuban-Americans in this country who until recently have not
had an opportunity to speak out either because they were afraid
to speak out or just did not feel that they would be able to
have an impact.
I'll tell you, when I was before the Subcommittee in 1994
and you were at the time chairman, Mr. Rangel, my father and I
share the same name. He is fairly moderate in his views about
our policy toward Cuba. Shortly after I testified here, my name
was on the Miami media. He received both correspondence and
phone calls threatening him and my family which lived in Miami.
I can assure you that his views toward the Cuban exiles that
adopt that view and his moderation toward policy toward Cuba
was significantly helped by that; it backfired. He was
threatened for something he didn't even do; I was the one who
testified. So, there's been a lot of scare tactics, a lot of
threatening that has gone on. It has affected my family as a
result of my position on this issue and before this
Subcommittee in the past.
Mr. Rangel. That's a new twist on dissent of the son,
falling on the father. There's something, too, Mr. Chairman,
that occurred to me last year. A young fellow came up to me and
said that he admired my legislative positions except as they
related to Cuba, and I asked him what was it that I was doing
as relates to Cuba that annoyed him, and he said it was not
supporting the embargo, and I said, ``Well, what's wrong with
it? Why do you object to that?'' He says, ``Well, my
grandparents had a lot of property in Cuba and when the
revolution came, Castro took everything.'' I said, ``Well, what
did he take?'' And he looked at me and he stared. He said,
``You know, nobody's ever asked me that before.'' He said,
``And I don't know whether there was anything really for him to
take, but you're not going to take away my legacy.'' And so,
sometimes, I think that it may be popular just to be against
Castro, and I wish we can find some way to be against Castro
and at the same time remove the pain that we're causing the
people.
I want to thank you for your courage, because I've been in
Miami and seen people taking video pictures of those people
that were meeting with me, so I know sometimes it takes a lot
of courage just to exercise your freedom of speech on some of
those subjects, but I understand that that is changing
dramatically in Miami, and I'm glad to hear it.
And for all of you that are involved in just doing the
right thing, I guess you have to be patient with us, and maybe
we'll change the way we read the electoral college in Florida.
That would have a tremendous impact, I think, on not only
Presidents, but candidates for President. It's sad to see our
foreign and trade policy driven like that, but our great
Republic has survived more than just this, and I'm confident we
will overcome this as well. Thank you so much for your patience
today and your testimony.
Chairman Crane. And, I, too, want to express appreciation
to all of you. It's been a long day and I want to remind my
good friend Charlie Rangel that all Democrats are potentially
salvageable. [Laughter.]
And, with that, let me remind everyone else that our
hearing record is open for public comment until May 21. Anyone
interested in submitting a statement for our records should do
so by that date, and, with that, the Subcommittee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:40 p.m., the hearing was adjourned subject
to the call of the Chair.]
[Submissions for the record follow:]
Statement of American Farm Bureau Federation
Thank you for this opportunity to comment on resumed trade
with Cuba and sending humanitarian aid to that country.
The American Farm Bureau Federation represents 4.8 million
member families in the United States and Puerto Rico. Our
members produce every type of farm commodity grown in America
and depend on sales to the export market for over one third of
our production sales.
Agriculture, including the wide variety of industries
involved in farm inputs and outputs constitutes one of the
largest sectors of the U.S. economy. In 1997 the food and fiber
industries, which include producers of farming equipment and
suppliers, processors transporters, manufacturers, retailers
and the financial and insurance service industries that serve
them comprised 16-17 percent of the gross national product.
The agriculture industry is our nation's largest direct and
indirect employer and for the past several years agricultural
exports have provided the only positive return to the national
trade balance. These accomplishments can only be sustained if
our international markets remain open and new markets are
created. It has been well documented that unilateral trade
sanctions are sanctions against U.S. markets and destroy our
reputation as reliable suppliers.
Farm Bureau strongly opposes all artificial trade
constraints such as unilateral sanctions. We believe that
opening trading systems around the world and engagement through
trade are the most effective means of reaching international
harmony, social and economic stability.
The American Farm Bureau Federation believes that all
agricultural products should be exempt from all embargoes
except in case of armed conflicts. This statement holds true
for U.S. wheat exports to Iran, as well for importation of
Cuban cigars to the United States, or for trade in any market
around the world. The only entities that gain from U.S.
embargoes are our competitors as they take over what should be
U.S. market share.
Prior to the shift of Cuban alliances to the Soviet Union
in the late 1950's, the United States was the key trading
partner for Cuba. Before the 1959 Cuban revolution, 68 percent
of Cuban trade was with the United States and 40 percent of all
investment came from the United States.
Cuba's abrupt shift to dependance on the Soviet Union ended
in 1990 with the collapse of the former Soviet Union. Since
then, Cuba has lost its ``sugar for petroleum'' program and the
economy has plummeted. The Cuban economy has contracted by over
40 percent since the demise of the Soviet Union, including a 70
percent loss in imports. Thus, stiff economic hardship prevails
throughout the country. Opening of trade with the United States
would provide critically needed resources and allow for the
beginning of a rebuilding process between neighbors.
Cuba appears to have recognized that another shift needs to
be made to a more open ``market-based'' system, and is slowly
doing so. Cuba has indicated a willingness to abide by the
rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in international
trade. But, to become a full fledged member of the world
community many changes are needed. These changes can be
promoted by engagement in commerce.
On March 31, 1998, a conference was held in Washington,
D.C., on ``The Role of the Agricultural Sector in Cuba's
Integration into the Global Economy and its Future Economic
Structures: Implications for Florida and U.S. Agriculture.''
This symposium, co-hosted by the University of Florida and the
University of Havana, provided much food for thought and
summarized over four years of collaborative research. In
summary, if the Cuban economy is opened for trade with the
United States, bi-lateral agricultural sales could run as high
as $1-2 billion annually after 5-7 years of ongoing relations.
As expected, some agricultural sectors would have
``challenges'' and others would see ``opportunities.''
Following are details by commodity sector:
1) Citrus: Concerning oranges, the United States' chief
competitor is currently Brazil. Cuba would rank only 15th on
this list and pose no real threat. Grapefruit would be slightly
higher, with Cuba ranking 4th worldwide. The biggest challenge
would come from Cuban limes and they could challenge Mexico as
a provider of product to the United States. Cuba is in dire
need of technology to help this sector of their economy grow.
2) Vegetables: Cuba will compete with the United States,
especially in tomatoes, cucumbers and peppers, and especially
with Florida. A key will be the disposition of methyl bromide.
Cuba cannot afford many chemicals or pesticides and has to
currently rely on mostly organic growing conditions. (Without
pesticides, Cuban production is down 40 percent from its peak.)
The question concerning Cuba as a competitor becomes, what will
happen if investment is made in Cuba and production rises by 40
percent?
3) Fishing: Cuba is an important source for 135 species and
is ranked third in the world in ``catch diversity.'' Current
focus is on low volume but high value, including spiny lobster,
snapper, sponge and pink shrimp. Production is still under
government control but competition with Florida would be
expected.
4) Sugar: The potential for Cuba to compete in the world
market is tremendous. From 1980-1989, 80 percent of Cuban
exports were in sugar. Productivity and technology were lost
during the collapse of the former Soviet Union, and production
plummeted from 7.5 million tons in 1992 to 4.25 million tons
today. Their goal is to return to 7 million tons per year.
Cuban sugar could not enter the United States without a
negotiated sugar quota.
There is room for U.S. exports to Cuba of beans, rice,
oils, dairy, wheat and lard. There is also room for U.S.
investment and exports of fertilizers, herbicides, pesticides
and tractors.
Competition will exist with the United States, but
opportunities will also be at hand. Given that we are not in an
armed conflict with Cuba, trade should resume. At a bare
minimum, the United States should resume humanitarian
distribution of food products to Cuba.
U.S. economic sanctions on Cuba clearly have not brought
the intended social or political changes. Engagement through
open commerce must be resumed if social and economic conditions
are to improve.
The American Farm Bureau Federation strongly supports
passage of H. R. 2708, the Enhancement of Trade, Security, and
Human Rights through Sanctions Reform Act. This legislation
will help prevent future embargoes such as the ongoing Cuban
situation by requiring a reasonable evaluation of the
consequences of imposing unilateral sanctions before they are
imposed.
The administration and Congress should take steps to
protect the economic stability of American agriculture as well
as for the nation by beginning the process of removing current
sanctions and prevent future unilateral trade sanctions.
Thank you for allowing us to present our views.
Center for a Free Cuba
Washington, DC 20036
May 7, 1998
The Honorable Philip Crane
US House of Representatives
233 Cannon House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515To
Dear Representative Crane:
I learned the day before yesterday about the hearings on Cuba to be
held by the Subcommittee on Trade this afternoon. At the Center for a
Free Cuba we welcome the Committee's interest in the Cuban situation. I
am writing, however, to express my disappointment with the effort to
manipulate the witness list at today's hearing. To present 14 witnesses
on one side of any issue without adequately presenting dissenting views
does a disservice not only to the issue of Cuba but also to the
credibility of the Committee.
Many of today's witnesses have in recent weeks expressed a concern
for the plight of the Cuban people. The Castro regime, however, has
been in place for almost 40 years. The Subcommittee might want to ask
the witnesses to provide copies of their appeals and other efforts to
Castro to respect human rights, to stop the practice of interning sane
dissidents in psychiatric hospitals, and to end the rapid deployment
brigades (groups of thugs organized by the regime to beat dissidents
and their families).
The principled policy of the President has benefited by having been
the object of considerable Congressional debate in recent years. The
Congress has reaffirmed by large margins its support for a policy of
sanctions.
Much of the campaign against the lifting of the sanctions against
Castro is also somewhat dishonest because, for some, the real target is
the lifting of sanctions against Saddam Hussein and Mu'ammar Qadhafi;
sanctions that, if lifted, would impact US efforts to promote democracy
in the Middle East and the security of Israel.
Enclosed is a recent letter by Major General Donald L. Kerrick, the
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs,
confirming the President's commitment to a policy of sanctions ``as
long as [the Castro] regime denies the Cuban people their basic human
rights.''
Those who urge a different policy towards Cuba are not calling for
consistency, but rather for an exception to U.S. policy in the
hemisphere. The United States supports representative democracy and
human rights from the Rio Grande to Chile, in Central America and the
Caribbean, where American lives and treasures where put at risk to re-
establish civilian democratic rule in Haiti. As a matter of fact, one
of your witnesses this afternoon played a major role in convincing the
Administration to invade Haiti.
Lifting sanctions against Castro without significant improvement in
the human rights situation in Cuba will deny the President a peaceful
tool to influence events and will increase the likelihood of U.S.
reliance on military force. The policy of sanctions also has the
support of the overwhelming majority of the American people.
The President's policy can only be defeated by ignoring the facts
of Cuba's medical apartheid, where thousands of dollar-paying foreign
patients receive the medical attention which Castro denies to the Cuban
people.
The President's policy can only be defeated if the anti-embargo
network, funded to the tune of more than 1 million dollars a year for
the last 3-4 years, is able to repeat today's congressional spectacle
of 14 private witnesses in favor of one issue while not allowing other
voices to be heard.
I would like to thank you in advance for anything you can do in the
future to ensure that the flow of information to the Committee is as
free and unencumbered as possible.
Sincerely,
Frank Calzon
Executive Director
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5762.014
Statement of Delvis Fernandez Levy, Ph.D., President, Cuban American
Alliance Education Fund, Inc.
U.S.-Cuba Policy Also Affects Families
The essential regulations embodied in the U.S. economic and
trade embargo toward Cuba, built over a period of almost 40
years and spanning the tenure of 9 U.S. presidents, have had a
profound negative impact on Cuban Americans and their families
and friends in Cuba.
Unlike other U.S. imposed embargoes, the Cuban embargo
completely bans food sales between the U.S. and Cuba. The free
flow of medicines and food was allowed in embargoes against
North Korea, Vietnam, South Africa, Chile, El Salvador, the
Soviet Union, and Haiti. In recent UN-supported embargoes
against Iraq and the former Yugoslavia, the UN upheld the
principle that medicines and food must be allowed to serve the
basic needs of the civilian population.
The embargo severely hinders Cuba's import of food staples
and basic medicines from other nations, due to the fact that
ships that dock in Cuba are prevented from docking at U.S.
ports for a period of six months. Moreover, the requirement for
``on-site verification'' and complicated U.S.-licensing
procedures discourage U.S. pharmaceutical companies, their
overseas subsidiaries, and any foreign company using U.S.
patents from selling medicine and medical equipment to Cuba.
The trade embargo penalizes American investors. While Cuba
is opening to investors from all over the world, Americans are
not allowed to engage in commerce with new generations of
Cubans and take advantage of business opportunities in
agriculture and pharmaceuticals, i.e., life-sustaining food and
life-saving vaccine, medicine and medical equipment.
The U.S. embargo creates a state of siege in the Cuban
population, thus handing the Cuban Government a ready excuse
for any failed economic policy. And as an added consequence, it
closes doors and possibilities for Cuban Americans in the U.S.
to address issues of common interest for the good of the Cuban
nation.
From a human perspective it causes pain and suffering to
innocent human beings in Cuba and in the U.S.
Due to travel restrictions, we are not allowed to
be with our mothers, brothers or sisters for normal family
activities--simple gatherings to share our love. These
restrictions clearly destabilize and injure our loved ones in
Cuba and in the United States.
Although President Clinton recently relaxed the
remittance restrictions in response to the Pope's condemnation
of the U.S. embargo on his recent visit to Cuba, we, as Cuban
Americans, are still severely restricted on what help we can
and cannot give to our families and friends.
Those of us who migrated to the U.S. strive to assist in
the support of our relatives back home. The assistance money,
on which we have paid U.S. taxes, often represents meager
earnings obtained by the sweat of our brow in jobs shunned by
the rest of society. This assistance is sent to our loved
ones--the family and friends who nourished our lives and made
us the men and women we are today.
We must not be deprived of our God given right to provide
assistance to our loved ones. An injury to one family is an
injury to our entire nation. For what is a nation or a people
without the protection of our most basic unit of civilization--
the family?
And finally, in what might be the most egregious violation
of human rights directed towards the entire Cuban people, here
and in Cuba, we Cuban Americans and Americans in general, are
prohibited from selling life-sustaining food, and are virtually
banned from selling medicine, and much-needed medical equipment
to people in Cuba. Restrictions on medical commerce and the
denial of life-saving medicines to ordinary citizens violate
the most basic international charters and conventions governing
human rights, including the United Nations Charter, the Charter
of the Organization of American States, and the articles of the
Geneva Convention governing the treatment of civilians during
wartime.
Subsequent to Pope John Paul II's pilgrimage to Cuba, in
which he condemned the embargo as unjust and ethically
unacceptable, we join religious, business, disabled, medical,
and human rights organizations to press for family rights--
rights that include the lifting of restrictions on humanitarian
trade with Cuba. There is a rising tide of indignation in the
Cuban American community, and many of us are saying enough is
enough--Basta! Stop using us and our families to fight a Cold
War relic.
Statement of Paul F. McCleary, Director, ForCHILDREN, Inc., Arlington,
Virginia
By way of introduction, my name is Paul F. McCleary. I am
President of a humanitarian organization known as ForCHILDREN,
Inc. My interest in and knowledge of Cuba stems from some
eighteen visits to Cuba since 1975. As a clergyperson, fluent
in Spanish, involvement in humanitarian organizations has
afforded me an opportunity for direct contact with the people
of Cuba and with the entities which provide them with social
services. I feel my qualifications to speak on the issue stems
from this long, continuous contact over 22 years with the Cuban
people.
This contact has compelled me, as well as many others who
work in the field of children's health and welfare, to support
the sale of U.S.-produced food and medical supplies to Cuba. We
advocate this change because we know from firsthand experience
that, despite the Cuban government's dedication to healthcare
for children, it is these young lives that are most devastated
by the utter lack of food and medicine from the U.S.
We have seen too many Cuban children suffer terribly,
simply because some drugs and medical equipment are unavailable
to them due to the embargo.
The government of Cuba has demonstrated a commitment to
provide medical services to all ages, in the most isolated
areas and on the lowest end of the economic scale. In order to
fulfill this commitment, the government has developed a medical
infrastructure capable of responding to these medical needs.
Cuba established a system of rural hospitals with
outpatient clinics and facilities to care for a small number of
short-stay patients. A referral system to large hospitals
provides services beyond those available in rural hospitals.
A network of family doctors serves 100 to 120 families over
an area stretching from one end of the island to the other.
This network puts health care within the reach of every
individual.
The academic system has been geared to provide technical
and medical personnel to make these networks operational.
Medical education is available to those who wish to enter the
profession. A program of continuing education for medical
personnel is maintained by the Ministry of Health.
The government of Cuba has developed, as well, special
programs to meet health care needs. In order to reduce a
previously high infant mortality rate, the program of UNICEF
known as ``Baby Friendly Hospitals'' was introduced in over 40
participating hospitals. One of the major causes of infant
mortality was identified as ``preemie babies,'' babies born
prematurely due to their mothers' suffering from malnutrition.
The government responded with a network of Maternity Homes to
which underweight expectant mothers are brought until they
reflect appropriate weight and health factors. This year, Cuba
reports its lowest ever infant mortality rate of 7.2 per 1000
live births. This is a decline from 60-65 per 1000 live births
in 1960, and puts Cuba on a par with most of the so-called
``First World'' countries as well as making it number one in
all of Latin America for the lowest infant mortality rate.
In the area of children with special health problems,
similar efforts have been made to respond to these conditions.
Children and youth who suffer from diabetic and respiratory
problems whose condition has been identified by his/her doctor
are enrolled in programs offering special care and medication.
During the 20 years I have visited Cuba, as a clergyperson
involved in humanitarian services, it has been heartening to
see this commitment to the well-being of its citizenry being
played out in concrete programs of health care for all.
On the other hand, it has been deeply disturbing to me to
see the erosion of the services this infrastructure can provide
due to the strangulation of the embargo, a situation that has
been greatly exacerbated by the
In the area of maternal and child health, the food embargo
has caused an increase in maternal malnutrition. The number of
expectant mothers needing internment in the Maternity Homes has
greatly increased in the last five years, and there has been a
marked increase in the incidence of low-birth-weight babies.
In terms of healthcare, babies born prematurely are
especially vulnerable. For example, the American Association
for World Health Report states: ``Cuba received 25 Preemicare
Model 105-4 Neonatal Respirators as a donation, but the embargo
prohibits sale of spare parts, accessories and provision of
services to train specialists in their use.''; thus these
donated respirators are in effect unusable.
Immunization for childhood diseases is a global goal
established by the World Health Organization in its program
``Health For All'' and by UNICEF in its Plan of Action of the
World Summit for Children. Cuba's immunization program includes
11 infectious diseases. However, its program of immunization
suffers from fuel shortages to transport vaccines and power
outages which cut refrigeration. Though Cuba produces all of
its own vaccines except for polio, domestic production remains
vulnerable to embargo-related shifts in suppliers. Since 1992,
mergers of U.S. companies with third-country companies have
resulted in sudden cancellation of contracts for vaccine
production inputs.
In the Family Doctor centers I visited in the Sierra
Maestra, on the Eastern end of the island, dedicated doctors
manned centers equipped with examining table, refrigerator and
other equipment, but with only a handful of medicines on almost
empty shelves. The contrast was sharp--the knowledge is present
but the ability to make meaningful use of it is lacking.
Children suffering from asthma are in a similar situation.
Cuba has one of the highest incidences of children with asthma,
with over 14% of the children showing some degree of the
problem. Cuba has made an effort to produce medicines for
asthma. But it cannot provide certain types of medication that
function only with a respirator which must be imported.
Children with diabetes have benefitted from large donations of
insulin from the U.S. and other sources. But dependence on
donations is an insecure lifeline.
On every front, humanitarian aid alone is unequal to the
task of meeting the need for pharmaceuticals in Cuba.
Also of concern to many of us is the psychological impact
of hunger on children.
It is well documented that the physical aspects of hunger,
while important, are not the only consequences of prolonged
hunger. Studies done during periods of famine, such as those
experienced in Ireland in the 1840s and in Russia in 1917-18,
clearly demonstrate that prolonged hunger has a psychological
impact which leaves a lasting impression on the human psyche.
Cuba has compensated for the shortage of certain foods by
rationing and targeting of what food it does have to special
age groups. Children have been designated as primary recipients
of such foods as milk. A retired U.S. Marine Corps general, in
an article in the Washington Post on Saturday, May 2, says, ``I
talked with mothers who wondered what will happen to their
children when they reach the age of seven and the family loses
its milk allotment.'' This comment only begins to reveal the
stress and dilemma suffered within family units due to food
shortages.
In conclusion, it is inhumane for a democracy such as the
United States to apply an instrument such as an embargo which
universally and adversely impacts the civil population of a
country.
Steps should be taken now to identify with the Cuban people
and to demonstrate to them the values which Franklin Roosevelt
claimed as the basic rights of all peoples--freedom from want,
freedom from fear, freedom of religion and freedom of speech.
We cannot promote these four freedoms for the people of Cuba
when we participate in the denial of their most basic needs.
Statement of Maria de Lourdes Duke, President, Fundacion Amistad, New
York, New York
In my role as President of Fundacion Amistad, and as an
officer, supporter and long time consultant with The Harbor for
Boys and Girls of East Harlem, it was extremely interesting for
me to see on a first-hand basis the services offered to women
and children in Cuba. It was also of great personal
satisfaction to me to bring together an outstanding group of
individuals, eight women and one man, to add their own
professional opinions and expertise to the visit.
The delegation had three main purposes:
1. To provide a report on its findings that can be widely
distributed.
2. To provide meaningful input to U.S. government officials
and Members of Congress in support of humanitarian relief for
Cuban women and children.
3. To use its collective networks with other NGO's and
nonprofits to collaborate on additional seminars, visits,
relief services, and other identified needs. These will be, in
part, coordinated through Fundacion Amistad.
The delegation to Cuba, March 8-15, l998, began an
assessment of the condition of a representative sample of Cuban
women and children, in the areas of health care, education,
social services, and the status of women. In addition,
identifying the mental health needs of children and adolescents
was also a high priority. Finally, the role of several non-
governmental organizations were observed.
Our timing was intended to occur after the historic visit
of the Pope, to see if the enormous press coverage and actual
changes brought about in Cuba for his visit would provide the
promise of more lasting and substantive changes in the way of
humanitarian concerns.
Throughout our visit, we observed Cuban pride, its sense of
its own rich cultural history, and a deep concern for women and
children. However, the absence or lack of up-to-date equipment
and supplies struck us all as being a problem to efficient
handling of the needs of the women and children of Cuba.
Despite the remarkable emphasis of the Cuban government on the
needs of young children, the lack of supplies is harmful.
The children themselves were alert and displayed all kinds
of abilities, and quickly took advantage of the small gifts and
supplies we brought to the centers. The teachers were deeply
appreciative and literally begged our group ``not to forget
us--your visit gives us strength'' and to send along additional
needed items such as children's Tylenol.
This kind of personal contact at such a professional level
can only enhance good will and practical relationships between
groups from the United States and Cuba. The negative
stereotypes between both groups are ameliorated by such
personal visits, and particularly by those visitors who bring
vitally needed materials at this critical time in Cuba.
Delegation Summary:
Cuba has an extraordinary system of free and available education
and health care. In a population of 11 million, there are 60,000
doctors, or one doctor for every 150 people. Even today, the small
island nation compares favorably in these areas to most developed
countries. The infant mortality rate is low, literacy rates
impressively high and the maladies that effect both the developing and
developed nations, (death by curable disease, extreme poverty, crime,
and drug abuse) remain diminished.
In Cuba today, reduced resources now make it impossible for a Cuban
citizen to live from a month's supply of government rationed food. In
order for the average person to survive, extras must now be procured
with American dollars. The peso now hovers at around 25 to the
dollar,and the average professor's wage is about $10 a month. Aside
from those fortunate enough to work in Cuba's tourism industry
(waitresses, bell hops, cleaners, taxi drivers etc.), everyone we met
who was willing to discuss the issue had been forced to take on a
second job. Hence university professors become cake bakers by evening,
research scientists become taxi drivers; and almost everyone with a
room big enough--film makers, teachers, engineers and scientists--
become amateur restaurateurs.
With the recognition of the American dollar as legitimate currency,
monies sent from family members and friends of native Cubans in the
United States have helped to ameliorate the sinking standard of living
of the average Cuban citizen. It is even suggested that such personal
subsidies provided the single largest block of hard currency to the
Cuban government with estimates ranging up to $800 million per annum.
As a professor-turned-baker with no foreign based relatives told us one
afternoon: ``The American money helps not just the families who receive
it, but all of us. When I bake a cake, I sell it only for dollars. Most
often the cake is bought by families with money from the states. I then
spend that money in exchange for soap or cooking oil. In this way the
money passes from hand to hand and helps many more people to live than
the initial relatives themselves.''
However, the scarcity of basic items such as food, medicines,
clothing, paper and cleaning materials means that prices remain almost
unattainably high to the average Cuban citizen. One eighty nine year
old woman told us that she couldn't remember the last time she had seen
a piece of fruit. Then she quickly corrected herself and added: ``Well,
I have seen them of course, but I have not been able to eat them
because of the price. Dollars are very expensive.''
Lack of basic materials is dramatically inflicting damage to Cuba's
social, medical, and academic infrastructure. Though it is still
illegal to be unemployed in Cuba, guaranteed employment is a thing of
the past, and as the Cuban people are left increasingly to fend for
themselves, so the once vaunted advances in education, and health care
are visibly beginning to deteriorate. Already many university
professors, doctors and scientists have left the country. Others are
leaving their jobs for the more profitable tourist oriented trades.
University places are shrinking, medical facilities are crumbling, and
the once grand general educational system--whose students are now
forced to share long out of date text books and scraps of recovered
paper--is in danger, quite literally, of disintegrating. It is our
opinion that the current, well educated, Cuban work force can not last
much beyond a generation under the present circumstances. Cuba's highly
skilled work force is a genuine and legitimate national resource, and
we feel strongly urge that changes occur to prevent further
disintegration.
Conclusions and Recommendations:
The delegation observed a devastating lack of supplies and a
weakened infrastructure in the areas of health care, day care, and
education. The delegation recommends the American Embargo on Trade to
Cuba be lifted. The delegation also recommends increased cooperation
between NGOs to deliver necessary supplies to Cuba.
Over the part five years the average caloric intake in Cuba has
fallen from 3100 calories per adult per day to 1800. Meat, fish or
other protein sources are scarce and preventable disease, including,
for example, the outbreak of Neuropathy with resulting temporary
blindness in 50,000 adults, was documented between 1992-93 due to lack
of B vitamins and sulfur containing amino acids.
General and wide spread shortages of medicines, especially
children's Tylenol, vitamins, antibiotics, steroids,
chemotherapeuticals and technological equipment have greatly reduced
the effectiveness of the medical system.
Lack of basic necessities such as paper, disinfectants and bed
linens are undermining effective hospitalization, and access to up to
date medical information is also hampering effective medical treatment
of Cuban citizens.
Lack of paper, pens, crayons, linens, bandages, toys, and cleaning
materials (detergents, soap etc.) have seriously impacted the state of
child care and education in Cuba.
In schools, shortages of building materials have led to overcrowded
classrooms in substandard conditions. There is a dramatic shortage of
paper, pens, chalk, copying equipment and other materials. Computers
are rarely seen. Out of date textbooks are shared by as many ten
students at a time, even at Cuba's most elite schools and a lack of
sufficient food supplies mean many children arrive at school without
having eaten breakfast.
The delegation observed the need and desire for more interaction
between American and Cuban professionals in the fields of education and
medicine. The delegation urgently recommends that the United States
government increase educational and professional exchanges between the
United States and Cuba.
Cuban physicians, though well trained, lack access to the latest
research and techniques in their fields. Greater interaction with US
colleagues would expand knowledge in the medical communities of both
countries.
Cuban mental health professionals espouse a sophisticated,
multifaceted approach to the treatment of children and adolescents, yet
lack necessary supplies. An exchange of research and aid would be
beneficial to both countries.
Education/Child Care in Cuba
Day Care
Children are of utmost importance in Cuban society. They
are considered national treasures and are given priorities
throughout their young lives. Child care is one of those
priorities. There currently exists a three tier system for the
delivery of child care services in Cuba: Formal; Informal; and
Familial. There are tremendous variations in the quality of
care in each of these systems. We visited four formal ``circulo
infantile'' child care centers, three just to walk through and
one for a more comprehensive visit.
History
In the early 60's, the State began to build facilities with
a capacity of 120 young children and no infants. These centers
are still operating; while we were told there were perhaps 200
centers like this built, the actual number was just a guess.
During the mid 70's, the State built an additional 200 centers
for approximately 200 children each, this time including
infants. In 1989, an additional 50 new child care centers were
constructed, for infants through preschoolers. While all of the
other centers were of similar physical construction, each of
these centers were unique in terms of size and shape but they
were all large (175-200) capacity.
Current Situation
There are approximately 135,000-150,000 births a year in
Cuba. Since all family members now must work, about 500,000
child care slots are needed. There is an extreme shortage of
slots in the State-run formal system; some say only 20% of
actual needed space exists. This shortage forced a change in
the system: child care services used to be provided from age
three months to six years. Now care starts at six months.
Mothers get up to one year maternity leave but only three
months is paid leaving a gap of three months for all parents,
whether in formal or in informal settings--to find care for
their children. Anecdotal evidence suggests such a severe
shortage that it is now necessary for both parents to bring
letters to the circulo infantile stating that they are working
and specifically that the mother is working in an education or
health related field.
It is anticipated that there will be a decrease in the
already low (less than 1%) birth rate. This is a very highly
educated population with total access to birth control that is
faced with harsh economic circumstances and severe housing
shortages. This group will postpone beginning or increasing
families' size for as long as possible in anticipation of some
change. Most families live in multi-generational settings with
women retiring early to take care of their grandchildren so
that their daughters and/or daughters-in-law can continue to
work. This system will work for this generation, but probably
not after that since the women in question will be at the
height of their careers and the leaders in their fields when
their children need child care.
Overall Summary:
Formal System.--There currently exists an outstanding
infrastructure within the formal network of child care centers.
The staff was extremely well educated and undergoes continual
training. The class room supervisory ratios were extraordinary,
and there exists age appropriate groupings of children in warm,
friendly environments. The health practices were excellent with
both doctors and nurses on site; this health care is integrated
into the local primary health care system. Hearing, eye, and
dental exams were overseen by the medical staff at the child
care center site. There were outstanding classroom health
practices: including, individual toothbrushes, individual
personal towels, individual potties, showers in the bathroom
areas. The center provides clothing for all of the children;
they change into these clothes upon arrival and all clothes
worn by the children in the center were washed every day. Meals
were served in family style.
There were, however, some very severe problems including a
lack of very basic materials--both sanitary and program
related. There was no toothpaste, no hand-washing soap, no
toilet paper, no mops, sponges, etc. There was very limited
food, even though the children get priorities. They were
totally without any teaching materials: books, paper, pencils,
paints, toys, etc. The teachers hold up old flash cards in
front of the classroom to teach colors and shapes. The physical
plant was deteriorating. There were no light bulbs and
overcrowded rooms. Despite a strong on-site medical presence,
there was no sick child care.
This fee for this type care is based on income and ranges
from 40 pesos per month (about $1.50), which is what most
people pay, to a maximum of 80 pesos a month. The fee was
standard regardless of the age of the child, and includes food
and diapers.
Informal System.--This system resembles an unlicensed
version of our family day care system in that several children
were cared for by a woman in her home. There was no regulation
or licensing by the State (which was, in and of itself, amazing
since everything else was totally regulated). The homes were
usually much too small to accommodate any additional children
as several generations of one family were usually already
crowded into a few small rooms. In general, there was no
specialized equipment or educational materials. Since there was
no regulation by the State, this becomes the parents' problem.
This type of care costs approximately 80-100 pesos a month,
plus food and diapers, for each child.
Since there was no licensing, the provider pays no taxes
and is able to keep all of the money which is a real incentive
to keep this system unregulated. However, in an effort to
upgrade the quality of care provided in these type settings,
the nearest circulo infantile often sends a team of teachers
and health care professionals to these homes to provide some
training materials and basic guidance to the parent in charge.
This is done on an informal basis.
Familial.--This system was exactly what it implies--a
relative or close friend or neighbor watches the child while
the parent works. It may or may not involve some form of
payment. There was a facility within each community for use as
a resource for these care givers. This facility has a playroom
and some professional staff who can offer advise and
assistance.
Details of Visit.--What follows is a summary of our visit
to the Circulo Infantil los Ninos, ``Suenos del Che,''
established in 1989. The Director was Rodolfina Varna. The
center serves 193 children from six months to six years and was
open from 6a.m. to 6p.m. five days a week. There were 24
teachers and educators; 15 support staff (cleaning staff,
laundresses, cooks); 1 doctor and 2 nurses. The Director has 28
years experience, 9 in this center. Each classroom was headed
by a teacher with a university degree who earns 300 pesos a
month. The assistant teachers earn 150 pesos monthly. The
Director earns a little more than the head teachers. Secondary
school students who were interested in pursuing degrees in
early childhood education can intern in a center for a full
month during their last year as well as part of each school
week. There were no male teachers working in any child care
center in Cuba. (There were male primary school teachers,
however.)
The State provides two snacks and lunch each day. The
Director claims they were short of protein but on the day we
visited, they seem only to be missing animal protein, which
Cubans believe is essential. There were outstanding medical
health records on site and a total integration of the school
and family health system.
The age groupings of the children were: 6 months to 1 year;
12-24 months; 2, 3, 4, and 5 years. Immediately on arrival,
each child changed into clothing owned by the center and back
into their own clothes when they left. The center's clothing
was washed every day. This system may not still exist in all
centers as there was now an extreme shortage of clothing. Cloth
diapers were provided and washed on site as well.
The bathrooms were old but very well laid out, with each
including two small showering areas for the children. In
addition to pediatric toilets, each child had a personal potty
for toilet training, as well as a clearly identified toothbrush
and towel. For those children who were too young to read,
easily recognizable symbols or pictures were used. There were
few toys and they were clearly inadequate for the number of
children and many were broken or missing parts.
The classrooms were sparsely furnished and the furniture
that was there was well worn and occasionally broken. The walls
had some commercial pictures up, but no projects made by the
children were visible. The physical layout was problematic with
possible head entrapment area in the rooftop outdoor play yard
fencing. Termites had eaten the large wooden doors that covered
entire sides of the classrooms and so the rooms were open onto
an indoor play area and therefore quite noisy. There were no
play structures inside or out and cement floors throughout the
entire area. There were no soft areas anywhere.
Despite the fact that there were severe shortages of all
consumable goods:(no paper, pens, crayons, linens, bandages,
soaps, etc). the staff was highly motivated and doing an
excellent job without any materials. The children seemed
engaged and friendly and there was an outstanding teacher to
child ratio. At times it was amazing how many adults were in
each classroom. Students on work-study made up many of the
personnel. This compensated somewhat for the physical
limitations of the facility and the lack of materials in the
classrooms as well as contributing to the positive interactions
in the classrooms.
Primary and Secondary Education:
Our delegation visited several education centers, including
one of the most selective and demanding secondary schools in
the country.
Children in a child care setting get a good start on their
elementary school education both from the socialization that
exists for young children and from the professionals under
whose care they are included. The songs they learn, the group
activities, and the sharing of even the limited number of toys
and learning tools have already helped them for future
learning.
Primary School.--The primary school that was visited--
Hermanas Giral--was in a building that had been a magnificent
private home before the revolution. Now there were 392 children
in this school in 13 classrooms. Primary school children wear
red pants or skirts, white blouses or at least white collars,
and a blue scarf. Children between the ages of 5 and 15 were
called Pioneers. The 1st grade classroom in which we spent much
of our time had 36 children and only one teacher. She had their
total attention, and though they were crowded into this
classroom (ideal circumstances would have held no more than 18
children), there was no problem of discipline or learning. All
these children can read by the middle of their first year. A
look at their writing and writing books showed that their
letters were clearer than most 3rd grade students in this
country. They were fully focused on their work. If any child
was having problems with writing, the classroom teacher worked
with that student individually after school.
At the request of the child psychologist in our group, each
child was asked to draw what he or she wanted to be as a grown-
up. The response was instant. Each child began drawing with
fervor. Ballerinas, baseball players, astronauts, and teachers
were the favorite occupations with very imaginative drawings.
Children told what their mothers didC mostly professionals such
as doctors, dentists and teachers. The children loved the
drawing project, particularly when left with additional paper
and crayons and pens for their own uses.
There was an active Parents Council at the school and one
of the mothers chairs the Council. It meets monthly. There were
health professionals at the school and a dentist comes on a
regular basis. The students begin learning English at this
school in the 5th and 6th grades, the last two years of
elementary schooling. Other schools now start English earlier.
Until the breakdown of the Soviet Union, Russian was the other
language taught. The phonic method for reading was the one
recommended, but teachers were allowed to use any method that
works for them and the children. They learn to read first and
then to write. There are no standardized tests in the school
until the 6th grade when students are tested in Math and
Language for placement in their new schools.
One of the interesting teaching philosophies, at least at
this school, was that the same teacher stays with a class from
kindergarten through the fourth grade. This may explain why the
children seem so comfortable with their teachers and also why
they were reading and writing so well at an early age. As more
specialized subjects are introduced in the 5th and 6th grades,
children are less likely to have the same teachers at that
point in their development.
Classes begin at 8:10a.m. and were 45 minutes long. If
mothers are at home, children go home for lunch. If mothers are
working, children stay at school and are given lunch. They all
bring snacks. For working mothers, there was someone at the
school every day from 7:00a.m. until 7:00p.m. Evening hours
were spent playing and in group activities. Every two months
there was a parent-teacher conference. Hermanas Giral school
has only four computers (very old ones using ancient television
sets as monitors), and computer classes don't start until the
5th grade.
The library was pitiful. It has almost no books, and those
it has were very old. The children, nonetheless, love to come
and check the books out. They were encouraged to do this but
could be much more so if more books were available. The staff
at the school seemed excellent, thoroughly professional, proud
of the school and their students, and happy to be working in a
school.
Secondary School.--We also visited the Lenin School for
Science and Technology, a 3 year boarding school for extremely
advanced students. It was a highly selective school which takes
only the brightest and best from the Havana district. Entrance
was based on tests in Language and Math and on prior school
records. Only one in three applicants makes the cutoff. There
were 3048 students currently, 300 teachers and 600 staff. The
students were bussed to and from the school every week. One
week they were there from Monday morning to Friday night and
the next week until Saturday night. There were two girls for
every boy in the school, and the main subjects taught were
math, chemistry, biology and physics. There is one school like
this in each of the 14 provinces, but the Lenin school was the
most prestigious, although the students are also from the most
privileged families. Most of the students go on to universities
and many into professional life. The school year starts on
September 1 and goes till the end of June. If a student fails a
class, it is made up in July. There was a hospital close to the
campus with 6 doctors and psychologists available to the
students. There was an 86% retention rate, with a goal to
improve this figure. Students get up at 6:00a.m and lights are
out at 10p.m. As at the elementary school, parents were active
and meet with teachers every two months. Half the day for
students was spent in the classroom, and an equal amount of
time was spent working and doing chores. We observed a group of
students painting cabinets for an exhibit in their natural
history library. The chores vary from cleaning to working in
the fields surrounding the school and students rotate their
chores.
In the past 24 years, the Lenin School has had over 20,000
students. Of the medical students in Cuba, 85 to 90% come from
here. Some of the graduates have come back to teach and many
come back to visit. We met with two leaders of the Student
Council. These boys were very impressive. We asked one if he
would consider politics and he adamantly said ``no.'' We found
this interesting, later, when we discovered he was the son of a
high ranking government official. The boys described the
Student Federation which has three units, one for each grade.
When asked what they liked best about their school, they
mentioned their teachers, the quality of their education,
living with the other students, and the challenges of the work.
When asked what they liked least, they missed homes and
families, disliked the food, and said there were some behavior
problems with students. There was an enormous amount of
pressure their final year in terms of testing for the
university level, but the school helps prepare them all
semester, so it was easier when they finally take the tests.
There were only a few very old computers at the school. In
spite of this, the Lenin team has won at the Computer Olympics.
Each student was given one pencil a month and textbooks have to
be shared among ten students. There were usually 33 students in
a class. While athletic teams for both sexes were very popular,
sports equipment was very scarce, and there was an enormous
need for baseballs, bats, and soccer balls.
As in the elementary school, the motivation and dedication
of administrators, faculty and students seemed superb. The
principal of the school has been there many years and was proud
of his students and his faculty, and very willing and candid to
answer questions.
Comments and Recommendations:
It was clear that the educational system was outstanding,
given the lack of equipment and supplies. No one has paper, so
even if there were Xerox machines, there would not be the
possibility of copying anything. We learned that there were
special schools for other subject areas, but it did seem that
science and math were the most competitive areas of the
schools. Others outside the schools talked about their own
educational experiences and that of their children. Though the
classes we saw were mostly teacher led from the front of the
classroom, we were told that cooperative learning exists and
was very much part of the learning scheme.
In order to make any recommendations on educational
philosophy and pedagogy, one would have to spend much more time
in a school than we had during our visit. We have no
recommendations to make on a philosophical level. We do feel
that these teachers and students need to have adequate
materials with which to work. We believe that this country
should contribute and coordinate efforts through an
international organization to get supplies and textbooks to
Cuba.
Though class sizes were large, they were not any larger
than in many schools in other countries. The delegation
congratulates the Ministry of Education on the rate of literacy
in the country (over 95%) and on the ability of teachers to
teach and students to learn in far from ideal situations.
Child Health/Mental Health in Cuba
``Cubans in their first year of life get medical treatment
like those in the First World. Those older, like 20-year-olds,
are treated as if they live in the Fourth World.''
--An anonymous physician
Medical Health
History.--Cuban health care is a system of free and
accessible medical attention for every citizen. Since 1992 the
quality of their health care delivery has been severely
compromised by the fall of the Soviet Union, the Cuba Democracy
Act (CDA) and the Helms-Burton Act. The CDA provides for the
sale of food and medicines to Cuba, but under conditions so
strict as to de facto prohibit them. The Helms Burton Act
prohibits U.S. suppliers from attempting to trade medical
equipment with Cuba.
The country is still able to report some of the best
indices of health in a setting where obtaining the most basic
medicines can be a challenge. The Cuban government has made
health care a nationwide priority by increasing its spending
from 10% of the GNP to 15%, according to the Ministry of
Health, since the reduction in Soviet aid. Despite efforts to
ration precious resources to the populations most in need, Cuba
suffers from a lack of food, medicines and access to medical
information. A unique dichotomy exists between a well designed
health care system, and a miserable scarcity of resources. The
situation demands a reevaluation of the economic forces that
are compromising the health of the Cuban people.
Current Situation.--Despite an excellent infrastructure in
place to provide health care, which includes a surplus of
educated doctors and accessible providers, Cuban doctors have
few pharmaceutical options for treatment of diseases. State
officials claim that they can access medicines in moments of
dire need. All the doctors, however, to whom we spoke cited
shortages of antibiotics, steroids (basic treatment for
asthma), chemotherapeuticals (for cancer), and technological
equipment. Because of the embargo, we were told, medicines cost
300-500% more than they would if they were directly traded with
US companies due to increased licensing and transportation
costs. For example, a drug called prostaglandin, a life-saving
drug for newborn infants with heart disease, costs about $50
per dose in the US, but $250 in Cuba. Thus the government is
not able to afford to keep newborns with these conditions
alive. The government demonstrates interest to buy the
medicines, but over 90% of all medicines available worldwide
are manufactured in the US, and the Cuban economy cannot afford
these costs. To control costs, Cuba has learned to make its own
medicines, and they are able to manufacture 92% of the
medicines available within Cuba. Despite this, they cannot make
sufficient quantities, especially since they can no longer
obtain the raw materials from the Soviets.
Because pharmacies are bare, patients and doctors turn to
humanitarian donations for support, but this is a fluctuating
and unreliable source. One week a simple urinary tract
infection may be cured by outpatient management with
antibiotics, whereas the same disease a week later may be
fatal. Likewise, the Helms Burton Act prohibits the country
from obtaining medical supplies and parts for equipment. Some
intensive care units are well stocked with many ventilators,
but they lack critical parts that cannot be replaced. Children
and adults cannot maintain adequate health in a setting that
cannot provide basic medicines. Cuba has many highly educated
doctors who want to help, but they are unable to practice the
medicine that they were trained to do. One doctor lamented ``we
are able to diagnose most problems, but are powerless to
provide the simple medicine to help cure.''
Nutrition is another aspect of health that has been
dramatically affected by the Cuban Democracy Act. The Cuban
government, unable to trade with old allies or nearby
neighbors, has responded to this crisis by preferentially
providing better quality food to those with the highest need.
For example, only pregnant women,breast feeding mothers, and
children under seven can get milk. Likewise, sources of protein
and iron are scarce, as their ration cards afford no red meat
or leafy vegetables, and contain little soy. According to
OXFAM, the average caloric intake has fallen from 3100 calories
per day to 1800 over the past five years. Furthermore, an
epidemic of neuropathy, with resulting temporary blindness, in
50,000 adults was documented between 1992-3 that was due to a
lack of B vitamins and sulfur-containing amino acids. As Dr.
Francisco Valdes Lazo, the Director of Maternal and Child
Health, bluntly stated, Athe country is starving.
Maintenance of a clean water supply has become a major
problem. The equipment used to chlorinate and purify drinking
water is breaking down for lack of spare parts which can only
be obtained in the US. The result is a marked increase in water
borne diseases, dysentery, parasitic disease and hepatitis.
Information is another scarce resource. Because of the
profound lack of supplies and its political isolation, Cuba
cannot exchange critical medical knowledge with the rest of the
medical world. Internet access, a standard of care in modern
medical facilities, is just being introduced in a few hospitals
and polyclinics. Distribution of internet access may be slowed
by both dollar and political reasons. Confounding the problem,
Cuba lacks a fundamental product--paper--to print or photocopy
materials. One doctor showed a torn and faded document on
Pediatric Intensive Care that he claims doctors around the
country beg him to borrow for one hour. The doctors are
isolated from new advances and experimental therapies.
Conversely, the US and the rest of the world cannot benefit
from the knowledge and research the Cuban doctors perform. For
example, almost all Cuban babies are born in hospitals, and the
placentas are then used in experiments for therapies and
medicines for skin diseases, a technique not used in this
country. This could provide the medical world with valuable
information. Also, at least 15,000 children from the Ukraine,
exposed to radiation from Chernobyl, have flown to Cuba to
receive treatments for diseases ranging from leukemia to
vitilligo. The Cuban doctors have not been able to publish any
of this critical data, again because of a lack of resources.
Child and Adolescent Mental Health:
The delegation visited the Adolescent Mental Health Clinic
in Havana, for children and teens. This self-standing facility
established in l975 is unique in Cuba, as mental health
services are usually attached to the pediatric/adolescent wings
of provincial hospitals. A plan for proliferating the
Adolescent Mental Health Clinic model in every province has not
been realized due to a lack of funds. The Clinic is an
inpatient and outpatient facility, taking cases from Havana and
its immediate environs as well as difficult cases that cannot
be handled at the local level. While we learned a great deal
about the Cuban psychiatric system from the doctors at the
clinic, it should be made clear that we did not visit any other
facilities or investigate adult psychiatric care.
Although there is a deep knowledge and respect for Freud
and other prominent theorists, the philosophy informing child
and adolescent mental health is largely practical, eclectic,
and quite sophisticated in its varied approaches. The Cuban
system, as we saw it and heard it discussed, can be described
as community psychiatry at its best. The Mental Health Clinic
we saw is inventive and adaptive with the treatment it offers.
Both individual and group therapy, as well as drug therapy, are
used. In addition, academic tutoring and parent counseling are
generally included in each protocol. The Clinic is highly
attuned to learning disabilities and sees a child's mental
health as closely tied with how he or she performs in school.
The Clinic cultivates a comfortable and caring atmosphere.
Children's artwork is hung on the walls. Music and sports
programs supplement treatment. There are no locks on the doors.
Staff, parents, and patients show kindness and respect to one
another. The three professionals we met, Drs. Frank, Resell and
Gutierrez were open, intelligent, and clearly devoted to their
work. Visits to schools and inclusions of other community
support systems are common.
In the inpatient facility, there are twenty-four beds and
twenty-four day beds. Fifty patients can be accommodated during
the day, but only twenty-two at night. Parents sleep in rocking
chairs next to a child's bed. The average inpatient stay is 45
days. There is a comprehensive 24-hour intake process, with a
professional on site at all times.
With outpatients, the staff of the clinic works in teams,
assigning a doctor, a social worker, and teachers to a case. A
team approaches a case multilaterally, combining nursing,
occupational and rehabilitation therapy, neurophysical
examination and treatment, alternative medicines, and speech
therapy, when needed.
Throughout the Cuban system, work with parents is deemed
critical and is a core treatment support. The doctors we spoke
with were quick to cite a recent research project in which
three treatment methods were studied: working with a child in
isolation, working with parents in isolation, and working with
parents and children together. The final group had the greatest
rate of success. At the clinic, parents are required to
accompany their child through the outpatient and inpatient
process. (It should be noted that any parent of a hospitalized
child is paid the his/her employer to take time from work to be
with the youngster.) Social workers also work with patients
beyond the walls of the clinic. They travel to a patient's
home, school, neighborhood, and to the work center of the
patient's parents. These outreach efforts on behalf of families
and treatment providers form deep connections between them,
which is extremely beneficial to the child under their care.
Knowledge of psychopharmacological treatment is very
sophisticated among the clinic's staff. Everyone, however, we
spoke to was frustrated by the devastating lack of access to
medications and current research. There are no medicines such
as Prozac or Zoloft. Ritalin, Dexedrin, injectable valium, and
anti-psychotics are unavailable.
Everyone we spoke with at the clinic felt that the stress
of the economic situation in Cuba was contributing to greater
familial stress and more mental health problems among children,
adolescents and families. Low salaries, poor living conditions,
and difficulty of transportation all put pressure on parents
that is easily projected onto their children. Divorce and
alcoholism, both associated with economic stress, directly
affect the mental health of children and teenagers, and are on
the rise.
Many types of pathology seen at the clinic are indicative
of the economic hardships faced in the country. Depression,
conduct problems, prostitution, and teenage alcoholism are all
on the increase. These social disorders are treated with a
community approach, involving a patient's parents, school, and
neighborhood, but one can see the beginning of a crumbling of
the community/family as the economic pressures increase.
Comments and Recommendations
The professionals met at the Adolescent Mental Health
clinic were highly motivated, intelligent and dedicated
individuals who espouse a multifaceted, sophisticated approach
to child and adolescent mental health. Unfortunately, the
economic conditions have made it extremely difficult to
implement the mental health system to its potential. A lack of
access to medication, research, and basic materials like paper
and bed sheets, as well as exceedingly low pay for
professionals have all been damaging. There are many ways
mental health professionals in our country can support the
Cuban mental health community and much that our mental health
professionals can learn from their Cuban counterparts.
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's) In Cuba
We were interested in visiting non-governmental
organizations, both indigenous to Cuba and those whose funding
comes from outside Cuba, to assess the type of services
available to women and children. Our delegation met with the
following NGO'S:
The Federation of Women
One of the oldest Cuban NGO's is the Federation of Women,
founded in l960 to involve women in the revolutions funded by
the State. It is the channel to have women considered at the
highest levels for economic and political considerations. We
were told that the Women's Federation was the voice for the
struggle for women's equality.
``Women comprise 40% of the labor force in Cuba, 27% of
parliament, 30% of the leadership in labor, and 65% of the
skilled labor force,'' said the director of foreign relations
at the Federation. Women are charged $.25 per month to belong
to the Federation. In addition to its political role, the
Federation helps women with family and social problems.
In 1990 the Federation began a series of community centers,
called Houses of Guidance for Women and Children. They provide
legal and social services for women and training, but are not
battered women's facilities, which don't exist. They are
staffed largely by volunteers in the community. A visit to one
found the disconnect surprising between what the expressed
philosophy is behind the centers, and the reality of the
situation. All teaching is theoretical, for example, and done
without supplies. Computer skills are learned not on computers,
but from instructions written on blackboards.
The delegation was told that a group of young women had
come to learn better grooming and hair-dressing skills for
their own edification. The women, however, told us they were
really there to learn to do hair-dressing and fixing nails from
their own homes as quiet and small businesses.
Caritas Cuba
Caritas Cuba is one of the most influential and effective
of the local NGO's. It exists in 3000 communities with as many
volunteers from its Catholic Bishops Dioceses, and has a
working staff of 30 full-time personnel. It distributes $4-6
million a year in humanitarian aid which comes from Catholic
Relief Services in other countries, particularly the US.
Caritas works carefully through the Ministry of Public Health
which warehouses its donated supplies, doesn't tax them, and
delivers them where Caritas instructs.
Caritas helps rebuild houses damaged during hurricane
emergencies, and helps rehabilitate farm lands. Caritas also
develops services for the elderly, and collaborated with
government programs for a ``Slips and Bloomers'' program to
provide undergarments, a program which can be used to assess
other needs of the elderly.
Because of crowded living conditions, children are often
left to the streets to play and socialize. Caritas has started
after-school programs for 5-12 year olds. They also work with
women on sewing projects, despite a pitiful lack of supplies.
Caritas was proud to report that it will receive 72 boxes of
baseball equipment from the Baltimore Orioles, but will have to
negotiate with the ministry for distribution of this much
needed equipment.
``For NGO's to be successful in Cuba,'' said Rolando
Suarez, the director, ``they must make decisions based on a
knowledge of Cuba.''
MEDICC
A new NGO, MEDICC, Medical Education Cooperation with Cuba,
is a program of the American Association for World Health. As
of April, l998, Medicc has begun to offer US medical students
the opportunity to team up with Cuban health professionals in
direct contact with patients. Courses are also offered for
graduate students in Public Health and Midwife Practitioners.
OXFAM US, Canada and UK has a presence in Cuba with support
to Cuban groups actively engaged in organic methods of food
production. It also promotes urban rehabilitation and
development through community initiatives and the use of
sustainable and ecological approaches to food production. One
sees lovely urban gardens flourishing throughout Havana and
many of these have been funded by OXFAM's efforts.
UNICEF cooperates with existing governmental programs. It
is heavily involved with water purification projects, which is
also a high priority of the Ministry of Public Health. Two
thousand rural communities have either obsolete or non-existent
water systems, and water is delivered by the State in trucks.
UNICEF has partnered with the State to develop a National
Hydraulic Institute which provides a simple technological
system of PVC pipes to get underground water at low cost. An
installation for more than a thousand people costs only $8-9
thousand for a complete water system. UNICEF also provided two
desalination programs in Guantanamo and Bayamo.
In addition UNICEF created a major program to encourage
breast-feeding and is also a major supplier of the twelve
required vaccines for infants and children. UNICEF is also
trying to expand the internet system called Infomed to outlying
areas for much better communication by and training of medical
personnel.
``A strategic target of all UNICEF's,'' said its director,
Luis Zuniga, ``is not to be only around with material things,
but with ideas.''
Comments and Recommendations
NGO's are an effective and efficient source of supplies,
training and a link for Cuba for grassroots development
methodologies. In order to continue to help the people of Cuba
in their daily struggle, effective NGO's such as Caritas,
UNICEF, and the new work of the Fundacion Amistad must be
supported and funded.
Links need to be made between NGO's to streamline
efficiency and increase communication about findings to develop
new programs and enhance existing ones. Simple gatherings of
like-minded NGO's to exchange information would be a first
step.
The Status of Women in Cuba
Observations on the status of women in Cuba were provided
by members of the delegation and by a New York University law
student, Tanya Southerland.* The NYU law students' objectives
were to build professional relationships between the law
students of the two countries for future dialogue and
cooperation on business and legal matters, and to study a
socialist civil law jurisprudential system.
Introduction:
Because Cuba is a socialist country, women's equal access
to educational and employment opportunities outside the home
has translated into a workforce in which women represent 42% of
all workers, 51% of all doctors, and 46% of all scientists.
Such positive educational and employment opportunities has
meant that for about fifteen years now, the better prepared
workers in Cuba are women.
Women's representation in politics, however, remains low.
For example there was only one woman on the executive board (of
five people) of the student bar association at the University
of Havana Law School, in spite of the fact that the majority of
law students are women. Dr. Marta Nunez, a professor in the
sociology department attributes this phenomenon to women's
personal choices. Political positions entail more
responsibility, but no more pay. Women who still carry
disproportionate domestic responsibilities, do not want the
extra work burden of political life.
A professor in the law school stated that while equality
for women outside the household is understood as a given,
inside the home, fewer strides toward equality have been made.
And this in turn restricts women's ability to undertake time
consuming ``third careers,'' such as political positions.
The Cuban government has attempted to address this
disparity through the Cuban Family Code of l975, The Family
Code established equal inheritance rights between children born
in and out of wedlock, and it formally denounced ``machismo''
and encouraged men to share domestic duties, including actively
rearing children.
In 1975 when the Code was passed, men spent only thirty-
eight minutes per week on household chores. More than twenty
years later, the time spent has increased some, but not
remarkably, experts say.
Education
Philosophically there is no priority given to either boys
or girls in the classroom. Boys and girls were evenly
represented throughout the classes we witnessed (in one high
achievers high school, one elementary school, one pre school,
and one day care center).
Boys and girls at the high school level in the school we
visited, enjoyed academic success (and failure) at rates
proportionate to their matriculations--a nearly 2:1 female to
male ratio. Though girls held leadership positions, it was not
in proportion to their dominant numbers.
At the university level, girls and boys appear to continue
to enjoy parallel success and failure. Women's Studies is an
accepted part of the curriculum and women are integrated into
every subject matter. Women major in science and math subjects
at the same--if not higher--rate than men. In fact, two years
ago affirmative action for men applying to medical school was
instituted to balance the nearly 80% women medical residents.
The economic difficulty of the times, however, is forcing
women and girls back into their more traditional roles such as
caring for the young, sick and elderly, despite the benefits of
free education.
Women's Reproductive Health
Access to contraceptive care is free and, due to the large
number of family doctors, theoretically accessible. If they
were available at all, the entire range of barrier methods,
hormonal contraceptives (including implants, injections, and
pills) and surgical devices are available to all Cuban women,
Recently availability has been sporadic at best. Condoms (the
only method of pregnancy prevention that also protects against
HIV infection) are exceptionally difficult to obtain and the
IUD and sterilization are the most popular forms.
Abortion is also a popular form of contraception.
Termination is available until the 10th week of pregnancy and
is free of charge. Minors (girls under 18) need the permission
of a parent, but this is rarely enforced. The National Center
on Sexuality has undertaken a carefully orchestrated,
thoughtful, and widely visible campaign to lower the number of
abortions by such efforts as increasing awareness of birth
control methods. Abortions constitute 62% (2.9 million) of the
number of live births (4.7 million) in statistics reported from
1968-1992. The majority are performed on the age group 15-19.
Women's experiences in childbirth are overwhelmingly
positive and healthy. The Cesarean rate is an internationally
recommended 16%, the vast majority of women breast feed, and
new mothers can remain in the hospital for several days. (Women
giving birth, however, are asked to bring with them the most
fundamental of supplies, such as light bulbs, sheets, and pans
in which to bathe.)
Women in the Sex Tourism Trade
The vast majority of the skilled labor force is composed of
women (65%). In addition to traditional service oriented jobs
such as chambermaid and secretary, women are doctors,
professors and administrators.
With the increase of tourism to the island, sex tourism has
become an issue in Cuba. Prostitutes, however, rarely operate
professionally. Most are young women who hold regular jobs
during the day, and who desire visits to nightclubs, gifts of
clothes, drinks, food and access to restaurants, which
otherwise are inaccessible to Cuban citizens, male or female.
Many of the prostitutes are under sixteen. Some are encouraged
by their families in their pursuits, even to marry foreigners.
Such marriages must be made with the assistance of the state
which charges a fee for each ceremony performed. Prostitution
is not illegal in Cuba through recently, pimping as well as
less formal encouragements to prostitution have been made
illegal.
Recommendations
With the increase in tourism to Cuba, there will be more of
an opportunity for small, women-owned businesses to produce and
sell products and services with great success. Enterprises such
as hairdressing and baking not only require few resources and
elementary training, but they are also occupations well suited
to women of all ages and various family responsibilities.
Supplies should be made as widely available as possible.
The importance of sports to develop girls as confident,
healthy, equal members of society is well known in the US. Many
people in Cuba explained that there is a lack of organized
activity for children beyond the school day. While baseball is
the national sport, it is predominantly for boys, as is soccer.
There are many ``girls'' sports which require little space
and equipment such as double-dutch jump roping, cheerleading,
dancing and running. Such sports have a beginning, middle and
end each year and require little in the way of resources. Local
NGO's already initiating such programs should be supported.
There is an intellectual isolation in Cuba due to a lack of
books and paper with which to publish. Libraries have hourly
lending limitations. Only one or two copies of a particular
book exist in the entire country. The delegation urges a
greater supply of books and journals to be sent through the
University of Havana.
Create a Journal of Cuban Women's issues. Follow the US law
journal format, where students apply and are selected to become
part of the journal staff. Cooperating universities could
select student articles (from a pool submitted by both Cuban
and non-Cuban women), assist in the editing and fact-checking
process, publish and market the journal.
Next Steps for Fundacion Amistad:
As a result of the delegation's observations on its trip,
the Fundacion Amistad recommends the following as opportunities
for additional support of the women and children of Cuba.
1. The United States government increase educational and
professional exchanges between the United States and Cuba.
A symposium in Cuba with day care directors,
providers and other educators in early childhood education.
A symposium of elementary and secondary school
teachers and administrators with a particular emphasis on
literacy and successful teaching methodologies in each country
Meetings between child and adolescent
psychologists and educators to exchange research and techniques
for community involvement.
2. Private entities in the US create links between Cuban
and US organizations designed to foster greater understanding
and appreciation of each country, and to provide humanitarian
aid.
Find and encourage organizations to provide basic
necessities for Cuban day care programs such as books, crayons,
clothing, developmental teaching aides, and children's
medicines.
Develop programs with private schools and
organizations to ``adopt'' individual day care centers, primary
and elementary schools for close, one-to-one links to do book
drives, special supplies fundraising, and other needed tasks,
as requested by the Cuban individual schools and centers. The
could be a model program for many cities throughout the US to
adopt with rural areas of Cuba, as well as Havana.
Support increased levels of humanitarian
contributions of medicines for hospitals and policlinics for
greater accessibility by family doctors. This will also
minimize the unpredictability of medicines needed by supplying
those that are basic and in constant demand.
Develop a program with William Soler Pediatric
Hospital to support its creation of a pediatric neonatal
intensive care unit. And link organizations to this hospital to
provide basic necessities for children: bedding and pajamas.
Create a ``Sabanas Y Pajamas'' program.
Continue to encourage, support and recommend
increased financial support to those many effective
nongovernmental working in Cuba such as CARITAS, UNICEF, OXFAM,
MEDICC and others.
Create additional Study Abroad programs with US
Universities.
Create exchanges of art exhibits, seminars about
the arts, dance, music and literature
Delegation Participants' List:
Maria de Lourdes Duke (Luly): President of Fundacion Amistad, a
nonprofit designed to increase US awareness of Cuban history, culture
and society, and to facilitate programs to improve life in Cuba. Also
Vice President of The Harbor for Boys and Girls in New York City, an
inner-city comprehensive model school and afterschool program.
Gail Furman, Ph.D: child psychologist. Chair of the Children's Task
Force of the Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children.
Clinical Professor of Child Psychology, Child Study Center, New York
University Medical School. Member of several boards focusing on
educational/emotional needs of children.
Ruth Frazier: educational consultant in community organizing.
Former President of Futures for Children, a nonprofit in New Mexico
doing community work with American Indians; established independent
community educational organizations in Colombia, Honduras, Costa Rica
and Mexico.
Nancy Lublin: founder and President of Dress for Success in New
York City providing clothing and training for women returning to work
force. Author of Pandora's Box: A History of Women's Reproductive
Rights. Active in women's issues.
Cristina Rathbone: journalist specializing in youth issues, urban
poverty, and education. Author of On the Outside Looking In: A Year at
an Inner City High School.
Eileen Stern: Director of the National Child Care Program for the
United States Federal Government General Services Administration,
oversees all federal day care programs.
Mary Ann Schwalbe: consultant to the International Rescue Committee
and Save the Children, US. Former director and current Board member of
Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children. Extensive work in
secondary and post-secondary education.
Clifford Tepper, MD: pediatrician, Professor of Pediatrics, Albany
Medical College. Chief of Allergy Division, Ellis Hospital. Co-Founder
of Physicians for Social Responsibility.
Lindsay Thompson, MD: pediatrics resident at Dartmouth Hitchcock
Medical Center in New Hampshire. Extensive work with homeless
adolescents in NYC
Tanya Sutherland: New York University Law Student; Root-Tilden
Scholar.
General Assembly of the
Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.)
Louisville, Kentucky 40202-1396
The Honorable Philip M. Crane, Chairman
House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade
1104 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515-6354
Dear Chairman Crane:
As Stated Clerk, and on behalf of the General Assembly of the
Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), the largest and most broadly
representative deliberative body of our Church, I want to thank the
members of the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade for the
opportunity to provide testimony for the record concerning the issue of
trade with Cuba.
The Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) has a relationship with the Cuban
people that goes back more than a hundred years. It has resulted in
close ties to the active and growing Presbyterian Reformed Church of
Cuba. I mention this at the outset merely to indicate that the concerns
our Church has about trade are not political or economic abstractions
but result from continuing contact with responsible people who share
our faith convictions. They help us understand in very concrete ways
the damaging effects on the lives of ordinary citizens of our
government's policies toward Cuba.
It is out of this relationship that the General Assembly of the
Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) has on numerous occasions called for a
lifting of the economic, travel and trade sanctions imposed by our
government on Cuba and a normalizing of relationships between our
peoples and governments. Whatever justification may once have existed
in the minds of some for seeking to isolate Cuba from contact with the
United States and the larger world community has long since ended. It
is time to move onto a new, more just, practical and fruitful
relationship with the people of this very near neighbor.
The Cuban Humanitarian Trade Act, H.R. 1951, falls short of that
ultimate goal, but it is an important step from a moral perspective. It
is a blot upon our national character that we continue to use food and
medicine as weapons in seeking to enforce a questionable political
policy rooted in a Cold War logic.
Last year's statement of our General Assembly on Cuba specifically
called for ``ensuring the access of Cuba to medicines, medical
equipment, and major food requirements.'' I submit herewith the full
text of that resolution for the record of the Subcommittee and urge
support for H.R. 1951 which would help to fulfill that modest but
important humanitarian goal.
The Reverend Clifton Kirkpatrick
Stated Clerk
Statement of The Reverend Clifton Kirkpatrick, Stated Clerk of the
Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.)
Precis
For more than thirty years, the United States has pursued
policies designed to bring about the overthrow of the Cuban
government. This policy has had heavy consequences for the
Cuban people, while strengthening the resolve of the Cuban
government to resist what it believes are unjust and vindictive
practices by the United States, under heavy influence by its
Cuban exile community. Recent legislation by the United States
Congress has increased economic pressure on Cuba, at the same
time drawing protests from friendly governments as well as the
United Nations. While acknowledging that the cold war is over,
the United States has continued to pursue a cold war stance
against Cuba, in marked contrast to its policies toward some
other countries, for example, the People's Republic of China.
Presbyterian General Assemblies have repeatedly called upon the
United States to pursue a policy of reconciliation and
negotiation with the Cuban government. The hostility between
the two governments has also limited relations between
Presbyterians in the United States and those in Cuba,
disrupting the close historical bounds between the two
churches. After years of restriction, there is a new openness
for the role of religion in Cuban society and churches are
growing rapidly, presenting new opportunities for Presbyterians
in the United States to relate to and support their Cuban
brothers and sisters in Christ.
Resolution
Whereas, the Confession of 1967 has reminded us that
``God's reconciliation in Jesus Christ is the ground of the
peace, justice, and freedom among nations which all powers of
government are called to serve and defend . . .'' (Book of
Confessions, 9.45); and
Whereas, the Confession of 1967 has reminded us that
. . . The church, in its own life, is called to practice the
forgiveness of enemies and to commend to the nations as
practical politics the search for cooperation and peace. This
search requires that the nations pursue fresh and responsible
relations across every line of conflict, even at risk to
national security, to reduce areas of strife and to broaden
international understanding. . . . (Book of Confessions, 9.45);
and
Whereas, Peacemaking: The Believers' Calling calls upon the
church and Presbyterians as individuals to be actively engaged
in the pursuit of peace and reconciliation; and
Whereas, recent openness to religion in Cuban society has
resulted in great growth in membership for all churches,
including the Presbyterian Reformed Church in Cuba, presenting
new opportunities for partnership and support for the life and
work of our Presbyterian sisters and brothers in Cuba, bound to
us by historic ties of faith and mission; and
Whereas, United States efforts to bring about political
change in Cuba through punitive economic sanctions have largely
failed and resulted in both hardship for the Cuban people and
resentment among numerous friendly governments around the
world; and
Whereas, calls by the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) to lift
the U.S. embargo and normalize relations over the years (1969,
1972, 1977, 1982, 1990, 1993) have gone unheeded; and
Whereas, developments since 1993, including the Cuban
Democracy Act and the Helms-Burton Act, have set back the
efforts for change in Cuba and the normalization of
relationship; and
Whereas, unilateral United States sanctions against Cuba do
not enjoy the support of the world community in dealing with
Cuba and its leaders, either in terms of their legality under
international law, or in their effectiveness, or in the
propriety of the coercive aspects as related to the sovereignty
of other countries;
Therefore, the 209th General Assembly (1997) of the
Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.):
a. Calls upon the United States Congress to rescind the
Cuban Democracy Act and the Helms-Burton Act.
b. Renews the call upon the United States government to
initiate negotiations with the Cuban government toward the end
of reestablishing full diplomatic relations.
c. Renews the call to develop cooperative efforts on radio
and television transmissions, detection and interdiction of
narcotic traffic, air and sea traffic, environmental
protections and nuclear safety issues, improving postal
service, eliminating travel and currency restrictions, and
ensuring the access of Cuba to medicines, medical equipment,
and major food requirements.
d. Calls upon the United States and Cuban governments to
facilitate the mediation of the nationalized properties.
e. Renews the call on the United States government to end
the economic sanctions that it has imposed on Cuba and to
respect the opinion of the world community in this matter.
f. Calls upon the government of Cuba to ensure the
political, civil, and religious rights of its people, just as
the Cuban government seeks to provide for their economic and
social needs.
g. Calls upon the United States to encourage economic
investment in Cuba for assisting the Cuban people's efforts to
build a just society, and to do so in ways that respect the
dignity of the Cuban people and their right to self-government.
h. Encourages presbyteries and Presbyterians to seek to be
peacemakers by building relations with Cuba through visits,
church-to-church exchanges, provision of humanitarian needs,
study, and advocacy of the positions recommended by the General
Assembly.
i. Urges congregations and individual Presbyterians to
provide financial support for the life and mission of the
growing Presbyterian Reformed Church in Cuba through
contributions to the Extra Commitment Opportunities established
by the Worldwide Ministries Division.
j. Calls upon the United States government to permit the
Board of Pensions of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) to pay
full retirement, survivor, and death benefits directly to the
eligible retired church servants and their families living in
Cuba.
k. Directs the Stated Clerk of the General Assembly to
communicate this resolution to the President of the United
States, the Secretary of State, every member of Congress, the
President and the Foreign Minister of Cuba, and the President
and the General Secretary of the Presbyterian Reformed Church
in Cuba.
Background
With the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the
ending of the U.S.S.R., Cuba fell into what its government
calls ``the special period'' in 1989. It lost most of its
trade, its subsidies from former allies disappeared, and its
economy fell into severe contraction and depression from which
it is just now beginning to emerge. The bitterness evoked by
the cold war and memories of the 1962 missile crisis still
influence United States-Cuba relations even though socialist
Cuba is no longer a political threat to its giant neighbor to
the north. Revenge, ideological resistance to socialism, and a
variety of economic interests still fuel this bitterness.
However, Americans who believe deeply in the core value of
national independence should understand the depth of the
political pride of Cuba and its people, independent and free
from external domination for the first time in five hundred
years. Cuba is now faced with necessary changes in its internal
and external relations; but neither its government, nor the
majority of its eleven million people will accept compromises
to their sovereignty or dignity.
Many United States Presbyterians will reject aspects of the
Cuban revolution of 1959: one-party government, dictatorship,
suppression or dissent, imitations of Eastern European
socialism, and the like. But neither a ``yes'' nor a ``no'' to
the Cuban revolution gives the United States a right to destroy
the Cuban experiment, or to deny or ignore the gains of the
revolution in education, health care, food distribution, and
other tangible alleviations of poverty.
I. Recent Punitive Actions of the United States
The Cuban Democracy Act (1992) called for a tightening of
the United States economic sanctions against Cuba. The bill
asked for sanctions against countries doing business with Cuba,
prohibiting trade by United States subsidiaries operating in
other countries, and prohibiting ships that have docked in Cuba
from coming to United States' ports for a period of 180 days.
While its economic sanctions are unilateral in character, this
legislation was an effort to pressure other governments into
supporting the United States in its anti-Castro efforts.
The United Nations General Assembly for five years has
voted to urge the United States to end its economic sanctions,
thus denying any international legal or moral endorsement for
United States action. In the 51st General Assembly, 1996, the
vote was 138 to 3, with 24 abstentions. Canada and all European
Union countries voted against the United States.
The Helms-Burton Act, passed by Congress in 1996, allows
Americans to sue foreign corporations that are using property
claimed by United States citizens or companies, but
nationalized by the Cuban government in 1959. Thus far, the
president has delayed application of that portion of the
legislation. It is opposed, even to the point of formal legal
protests, by Canada, Mexico, the European community, and others
as an unwarranted effort to extend the jurisdiction of the
United States law over the sovereign affairs of other
countries, and as a violation of free trade agreements under
the world Trade Organization. The legislation thereby hampers
the appropriate conduct of United States foreign policy.
II. Recent U.S. Complaints Against Castro
A. Human Rights.--Human rights conditions in Cuba receive
considerable focus in the United States. Amnesty International
suggests that Cuba holds as many as six-hundred persons as
political prisoners, always a difficult matter to define and
document. Recent activity seems to be focused on a curtailment
of freedom of expression, association, assembly, and movement.
Cuban Concilium, a coalition of around 140 unofficial groups,
has been denied legitimacy and several of its leaders
imprisoned. The organizational efforts of lawyers and reporters
have been thwarted. Agromontist Union, an independent lawyer's
group, and the Cuban Association of Independent Journalists are
among the groups that have run afoul of state authorities. Fair
trials are difficult because lawyers defending Cubans accused
of political crimes are restricted in their access to their
clients, to the evidence, and are limited in their capacity to
cross-examine or produce witness. Journalists are threatened
with arrest for writing materials that could be interpreted as
undermining the authority of the state.
B. The Property Issue.--The United States has not disputed
the right of a government to nationalize property. In dispute
since 1959 have been the terms of compensation. Terms offered
by the Cuban government in the early sixties were not accepted
and negotiations were ended. Determining the value of
properties nationalized more than thirty-five years ago will be
complex, especially in light of the chief complaint behind the
Helms-Burton bill: that non-Cuban corporations are now using
some of the assets left by American companies after 1959. But
it is fair to ask if the legal confrontations authorized in the
bill, and even international arbitration, are hopeful routes
toward a settlement of the dispute. The opening of direct
negotiations among all the corporations, businesses, and
governments who have a stake in the matter would seem to offer
a more practical approach.
C. The 1996 Plane Incident.--In February 1996, two Cessna
planes belonging to a Miami-based, Cuban-American group called
``Brothers to the Rescue'' were shot down by Cuban military
planes, not only adding strain to United States-Cuban
relations, but derailing some steps the Clinton administration
had been taking toward improvement of relations. Warned in 1995
that continued intrusions of Cuban airspace would lead to
attack, the U.S. State Department in turn warned ``Brothers to
the Rescue'' that it could not help them if trespassing
occurred.
The right of a country to defend itself is one of the
claims of sovereignty and an accepted part of international
law. Tragedy of this sort is the more likely when a government
like Cuba's lives under the constant pressure of a stronger
government that seeks its downfall. As long as that state of
relations continues, tragic results can occur from illegal
civilian initiatives.
D. The Failures of the Cuban Economy.--Many Cubans will
admit that the government's economic planning has not always
been wise, and imitation of Eastern European state models has
not led to notable economic success. Nonetheless, in face of
the thirty-five-year U.S. embargo, and since the departure of
the Soviets in the early 1990's, Cubans and their government
have endured their ``special period'' of hardship with
remarkable commitment to the sharing of that hardship. They
have continued to provide food, medical care, and education for
basic survival needs for virtually every citizen. Moreover, in
the past five years its socialist government has begun to
negotiate new connections with the market economies of Canada,
Europe, and other Latin American countries, and to open
economic opportunity for private initiative by Cuban citizens
in several areas of the economy. These steps have led to recent
economic growth and it seems even mroe unlikely than before
that the U.S. embargo will cause the collapse of Cuban
socialism. In any event, Christians should be deeply disturbed
about the morality of a policy intentionally based on the
continued economic misery and punitive pressure on the daily
lives of almost all of Cuba's eleven million people.
III. Religious Developments
Even though Fidel Castro had been educated in Jesuit
schools and a number of Christian leaders had supported the
revolution, in the early 1960s the schools operated by both
Roman Catholic and Protestant bodies, along with some other
properties, were nationalized. Following the declaration of the
socialist character of the revolutioon, all churches labored
under many restrictions as the government pursued an active
campaiagn against religion. These restrictions began to ease in
the late 1980s, particularly after an intensive dialogue
between Castro and Protestant leaders in 1990 that was
broadcast on Cuban television. This greater openness to
religion was symbolized in changes in the Cuban constitution in
1992, prohibiting religious discrimination in education,
employment, and other social relations, and removing the bar to
membership in the Communist Party by Christians. These changes
have led to remarkable growth in religion in Cuba among both
Roman Catholic and Protestant bodies.
A. The Roman Catholic Church.--Cuba, like other Latin
American countries, was predominantly RomanCatholic. The loss
of their extensive schools and properties was a great blow, and
the allegiance of the church to the papacy increased tension
with the revolutionary regime.
In Rome in November 1996, for the World Food Conference,
President Castro met privately with Pope John Paul II. The
visit brought confirmation of an invitation and acceptance for
a papal visit to Cuba in early 1998. The private meeting had
been preceded by the Cuban visit of senior Vatican diplomat,
Archbishop Jean-Louis Tauran the preceding month. His five-day
visit concentrated on church-government relations and on the
details of the potential papal visit.
Roman Catholic policy toward the Cuban government is not
yet clear and the bishops of the Cuban Catholic church have
recently published criticisms of government policy--an action
that assumes some increase in religious liberty in the society.
At the same time, Vatican representatives have joined in
criticisms of U.S. policy toward Cuba.
It remains to be seen what impact the forthcoming papal
visit will have on Vatican-Cuban relations and the general
religious climate in Cuba, whether it will weaken or strengthen
Castro's leadership, and whether it will make any difference in
U.S. treatment of Cuba.
B. The Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) and the Presbyterian
Reformed Church in Cuba.--United States Presbyterians have had
a long relationship with Cuban Presbyterianism. Missionary
activity began late in the nineteenth century. Until 1967, the
Presbytery of Cuba was part of the Synod of New Jersey. Retired
church workers and their families in Cuba from that period are
entitled to vested pension and death benefits under the
church's Benefits Plan. Following the establishment of an
independent Presbyterian church by action of the 1966 General
Assembly of the UPCUSA (Minutes, UPCUSA, 1966, Part I, p. 233),
the PC(USA) has been in continuous ecumenical relations with
that body. These relations have been made difficult by
restrictions imposed by the Cuban government on religious
activities and those imposed by the U.S. government limiting
travel, refusing to license the Board of Pensions to pay the
full benefits due to the retired church workers and their
families, and greatly restricting the transfer of general funds
to support the Presbyterian Reformed Church in Cuba. The
PC(USA) has given support as legally permitted, sending and
receiving representatives and sending medical and educational
materails.
Since 1990, the Presbyterian Church in Cuba has experienced
steady and remarkable growth, bringing new requirements for
resources to renovate and open churches closed for years,
establish new congregations, train new leaders, produce new
educational resources, and prepare new pastors. Those resources
must come largely from Christians outside Cuba and the Cuban
church has forged partnerships with churches in Canada and
Europe, as well as with presbyteries of the PC(USA). The
PC(USA) has obtained a license to send more funds to the
Presbyterian Church in Cuba if those funds are made available
by congregations, opening the opportunity to renew the historic
bonds between two churches.
IV. Conclusion
The 202nd General Assembly (1990) of the Presbyterian
Church (U.S.A.) concluded its major study on Cuba with the
following words:
Presbyterians are inheritors of an explicit and consistent
record of General Assembly public policy positions in support
of the normalization of U.S. relations with Cuba. This
consistent position is the expression of a theological
tradition that sees reformation as an ongoing process of
setting things right. . . . We also treasure that theological
insight which is at the heart of the whole Judeo-Christian
tradition: God's ever-present promise of a new beginning for
those who repent.
In his ministry, Jesus affirmed life over those institutional
forces of death which, in his contemporary Jewish society, had
come to be justified in religious terms. The crucifixion and
resurrection of Jesus Christ confront and unmask the powers of
death, those false divinities, such as the idolatry of power
and empire, by which we demonize the adversary of the moment
and make gods of prudential and national security calculations
. . . . (Minutes, 1990, part I, pp. 615-16)
Statement of Brenda L. Smith, President, global links
Summary:
I urge the committee, on humanitarian grounds, to support
the bills H.R.1951 and S.1391 which lift restrictions on Cuba's
ability to purchase food and medicine from the United States.
Despite the success of our Cuba Medical Aid Program, the
committee must understand that such programs only partially
offset the deleterious health impact of existing restrictions.
Moreover, the transparency and accountability of our donation
program over the last four years suggest that satisfactory
mechanisms for the sale of food and medicine could likewise be
established. Finally, the amount of assistance that global
links can afford to offer is limited by those restrictions
which force us to ship via Canada, making nearby Cuba an
unnecessarily expensive destination.
global links is a non-profit organization based in
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, which specializes in recycling
surplus medical supplies and equipment to facilities treating
the poor in developing countries. Since 1990 global links has
worked in cooperation with the Pan American Health
Organization/World Health Organization (PAHO/WHO) to deliver
medical supplies, biomedical equipment, pharmaceuticals, and
hospital furnishings to countries in the region including
Nicaragua, El Salvador, Jamaica and Guyana.
Since 1994, global links has donated 30 ocean containers
(tractor-trailer loads) of medical aid to Cuba worth over $25
million. No other charity in the U.S. has sent more. As with
all global links programs, this is a humanitarian effort
undertaken without regard to political considerations. global
links has applied for and received all required licenses from
the U.S. government for the shipments.
Careful records are kept regarding the distribution and use
of all goods shipped. PAHO is the consignee for our shipments
to Cuba, and oversees the distribution of the materials to
public hospitals, health centers, libraries and pharmacies. We
have receipts, signed and dated, from each facility for every
item delivered. Members of global links' staff and Board of
Directors make regular visits to Cuba to verify the
distribution and use of our donations. This information has
allowed global links to maintain high standards of quality and
accountability for our donated medical supplies. We see no
reason why quality and accountability could not also be
guaranteed for purchases of similar materials.
Despite the success of our Cuba Medical Aid Program, our
experience has made it clear to us that no country's health
system can be run on donations alone. First of all, many
medicines are simply never made available for donation.
Moreover, even when a crucial medicine is available, the
unpredictability of future supply can limit the benefit of the
donation or even have harmful effects on the population.
In 1994, for example, global links donated 1.25 million
tablets of Doxycycline, enabling Cuban health authorities to
launch a very successful program to combat Leptospiroses. When
we were approached the following year for an additional
contribution of Doxycycline, however, we were unable to obtain
any and the program had to be discontinued.
This unpredictability of supply is especially problematic
for situations where partial treatment is worse than no
treatment at all--the treatment of AIDS and high blood
pressure, or hypertension, are two examples. In these cases, a
seemingly valuable donation can be of little use or even
harmful because of the inconsistency of supply. global links is
periodically offered quantities of expensive protease
inhibitors used in the treatment of AIDS. However, for these to
be used as part of a long term treatment program future supply
would somehow have to be assured. To start and then stop the
treatment would simply ``teach'' the AIDS virus how to combat
the drug.
Furthermore, there are at least 60 drugs that can be used
to treat high blood pressure. Not all of them work for every
patient and switching from one drug to another can be harmful.
Therefore when the patient finds the one that works they need
to continue with it. We are concerned that those patients who
are seeing positive results with the U.S. manufactured anti-
hypertension drugs that we have been able to obtain will have
to change treatments unnecessarily when the current supply is
exhausted.
Finally, restrictions on shipping to Cuba from U.S. ports
hamper our charitable mission by adding at least $1000 to our
shipping expenses for each tractor-trailer load of supplies we
ship. Overall, these restrictions have cost global links at
least $30,000. With those funds, global links could have
delivered an additional $2 million worth of medical assistance
to the people of Cuba.
In conclusion, it is global links' mission to work for the
improvement of health around the world regardless of political
considerations. However, we feel obligated to testify that the
passage of H.R. 1951 and S. 1391 would do as much for the
health of the Cuban people as all of our shipments put
together. Furthermore, it would also enable global links to
increase the impact of our Medical Aid Donation Program.
Statement of Hon. Lee H. Hamilton, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Indiana
Chairman Crane and Ranking Member Matsui, I appreciate the
opportunity to submit a statement for the record of your
hearing today on US policy toward Cuba. This hearing is timely,
and I commend you for your leadership on this important issue.
The US National Interest and Policy Choices
The US national interest in Cuba is in a peaceful
democratic transition. We are confronted in that country with a
Communist government that is hostile to international norms on
freedom and human rights, let alone a peaceful transition to
democracy. We learned in the Cold War that the best way to move
such a country toward freedom is not through isolation but
through intensified and broad engagement with its people.
Through trade, travel and extensive educational and cultural
exchange we influenced a generation of eastern Europeans.
Trade exposes otherwise isolated people to US ideas and
values, strengthening sectors other than the government to
address the needs of the people. It is no coincidence that
those countries most isolated are also those most unwilling to
recognize basic international standards on human rights and
freedom. Trade also offers citizens in repressive societies the
opportunity to interact with American executives and employees,
exposing them to new ideas about the principles of the free
market and to positive US business practices.
Our policy toward Cuba ignores the historical record on
engagement and trade. Our policy escalates economic pressure,
with the goal of forcing the Cuban government to capitulate or
inducing a desperate people to overthrow the Castro regime.
This policy harms the Cuban people and increases the likelihood
that change, when it comes, will be violent.
The Impact of US Policy
No country supports the US policy of isolating the Cuban
people. Pope John Paul II and Canadian Prime Minister Jean
Chretien are just the latest in a steady flow of western
leaders to visit the island. Our Caribbean neighbors are
pushing for Cuba's inclusion in their community of nations,
CARICOM, and our Latin American neighbors are pushing for
Cuba's accession to the Organization of American States.
Our insistence on pursuing a policy toward Cuba based on
historical animosity instead of prudent foreign policy
calculations leaves us isolated in the international community.
Our policy leaves us with few supporters, even when we push for
meritorious measures to criticize Cuba, as was the case just
last month at the United Nations Human Rights Commission in
Geneva.
Our policy of pressure reduces the likelihood that any
transition in Cuba will be peaceful. If economic sanctions
create sufficient hardship to cause social unrest, the most
likely consequence would be widespread political violence. This
would be a tragedy for Cuba and a disaster for the United
States. Civil strife would generate a tidal wave of refugees
and would generate intense domestic political pressure for US
military intervention.
Castro's repression and his catastrophic economic policies
are no doubt the main cause of suffering in Cuba, but we cannot
escape responsibility for our own policy. US law prohibits food
sales to the island and greatly complicates the sale of
medicine. The Helms-Burton law has driven up the cost of
money--interest rates--so much as to create a cost of living
crunch that hurts average Cubans.
Current US policy lets Castro dictate the pace of change in
Cuba. US regulations on travel artificially limit the number of
Americans--sources of information and support for the Cuban
people--who visit the island. An arbitrary cap on cash
remittances from the U.S. slows the main source of capital for
Cuba's independent entrepeneurs. Our insistence on isolating
the Cuban people gives the regime a convenient excuse for its
many failures.
Toward a New Policy
The United States should open the door for a positive,
rather than punitive, influence on Cuba's future by expanding
contact with the Cuban people.
First, the US should abolish restrictions on travel to
Cuba. Interaction with US citizens, business and humanitarian
leaders will broaden access to ideas and information within
Cuba, breaking Castro's monopoly on ideas and easing fear of
change within Cuba.
Second, the US should abolish the arbitrary cap on cash
remittances to the island. Evidence suggests that remittances
from the US provide the capital investments that Cuban
entrepreneurs need to start independent businesses. There is no
doubt that these businesses erode the control that the
government exercises on the Cuban economy and give more and
more Cubans independent sources of income.
Third, the Administration should endorse, and Congress
should approve, proposals to lift the embargo on the export of
food and streamline the regulations on the export of medicine
to Cuba. Such a change will permit Cubans access to advanced US
medicines and will open Cuba to the positive influences of US
business.
Finally, the US should move step-by-step to lift the
overall embargo. An influx of US business leaders will expose
the Cuban people to new ideas about free markets and human
freedom and will challenge the regime's absolute control on the
island. It is openness, not isolation, that Castro fears. It is
an invasion of US people, information, and ideas that poses the
greatest threat to Castro, and offers the greatest hope for a
peaceful transition to democracy.
Statement of Interreligious Foundation for Community Organization
The Interreligious Foundation for Community Organization
(IFCO) is a 30-year-old national ecumenical agency which has
been working for reconciliation in the area of US/Cuba
relations since 1991. In these last seven years, we have taken
dozens of delegations and humanitarian aid missions to Cuba. We
have visited Cuba with diverse groups of concerned US
citizens--including clergy and diocesan delegations, Rotarians,
health care professionals, and Congressional staff. We have
seen with our own eyes the many ways in which the archaic US
trade sanctions have had a brutal impact on the people of
Cuba--particularly on Cuban children and families, on the
infirm and the elderly, on the most vulnerable Cuban citizens.
We have also cultivated close working relations with the
religious sector in Cuba, specifically with the evangelical/
Protestant churches which have grown so extensively in the last
10 years. We would like to share some of what we have learned
from them regarding the distribution of humanitarian aid, food
and medicines in Cuba. We are grateful for the opportunity to
present this testimony to the Subcommittee on Trade of the
House Ways and Means Committee.
For a more comprehensive look at ``The Impact of the US
Embargo on Health and Nutrition in Cuba,'' we would refer you
to the 300-page report of the American Association for World
Health (AAWH), and to a number of other articles and reports
(by the American Public Health Association, OXFAM, Kirkpatrick
and Vanden, Garfield and Santana, Washington Office on Latin
America, and others). Our main intention in this statement,
however, is to share with you some eyewitness accounts of how
we have seen people living in Cuba's ``special period,'' since
the fall of the Soviet bloc and the tightening of US economic
sanctions. Let us share with you these pictures of the things
we have seen in Cuba:
households functioning without lightbulbs and
batteries
parents who don't have syringes to give insulin to
their diabetic child
a widow caring at home for her elderly mother with
Alzheimer's disease--and facing the constant challenge of
maintaining the health and hygiene of the disoriented,
incontinent mother, when soap and detergent are unavailable for
months at a time, and there are no extra sheets or towels, not
to mention medications
a 40-year-old telephone system, many lines still
above-ground, where, on a rainy day, it can take an hour or
more to place a call from one Havana neighborhood to another
no spare parts for ambulances, for automobiles,
for elevators, for medical equipment
a communal playroom for elementary school kids who
have no other access to toys
a chemistry teacher in Havana's most selective
science high school trying to design oral exams for her
advanced chemistry students, because there's not enough paper
to give written tests
a beloved Baptist pastor who died after a kidney
transplant [and in how many developing nations would the pastor
of a poor urban church have access to an organ transplant free
of charge?] without the cyclosporin needed to sustain her new
kidney
a family doctor boiling the leaves of the orange
tree which grows in the clinic yard, to make cough medicine for
her patients with bronchitis
another family doctor who tells us that she relies
on donations of paper from her patients in order to maintain
their medical records
women who have had to make do for years without
sanitary napkins or tampons (and who waited for months to talk
with us about this because they found it so humiliating)
children on a pediatric cancer ward vomiting 20
times a day because the anti-nausea drugs which suppress the
side effects of their chemotherapy are not available
a hospital with 50 bicycles parked in front,
because there is no fuel for automobiles--and in the empty
parking lot, a field of aloe has been planted to treat burn
victims
dozens of Cubans lined up at the doorsteps of
churches on the days that donation shipments arrive, each one
of them clutching prescriptions: ``my father needs pills for
his ulcer''; ``my daughter needs an asthma inhaler''; ``my
grandmother has an infection and needs penicillin'' (and the
pastors inside the church explaining that all those medicines
used to be readily available at any Cuban pharmacy--``but in
these last few years, the churches have to be pharmacies
too...'')
heart patients who can't get pacemakers--not since
the division of Siemens which used to sell pacemakers to Cuba
was acquired by a corporation based in St. Paul, Minnesota
a woman who walked three miles to the church where
we were staying, to thank us for the donation of a wheelchair:
she explained that, until they received that chair, her adult
son with full-blown cerebral palsy had not been able to leave
their house since he'd gotten too big to carry
a father of two young girls who explained, ``I
used to wear size 32 jeans, and now I wear size 27; it's
because what food there is, we give first to our daughters.''
These eyewitness examples illustrate some of the direct
effects of US economic sanctions--effects which strike us as
petty, meanspirited, counterproductive, and essentially
immoral.
Cuba's critics here in the US would like to blame all these
shortages on the Cuban government. But we have found that the
Cuban people hold a very different view. They weren't suffering
all these dire shortages before 1991. When goods were available
in Cuba, they were distributed equitably by the very same Cuban
government now in power. The basic needs of eleven million
people were met for many years. And the US embargo had only a
marginal impact, because 85% of Cuba's economy was tied to the
Soviet bloc. With the Soviet collapse and the end of the `cold
war,' Cuba would have been an easy new market for the US. As
the Cuban people understand it, our government passed up a
golden opportunity to open a new era in US/Cuba trade
relations, and chose instead to implement the so-called Cuban
Democracy Act (CDA) and tighten the stranglehold of its archaic
economic sanctions.
We would contend that, if we want the Cuban people to grow
in their respect for the United States as a neighbor nation and
a potential ally and trading partner, then we must stop
contributing so directly to all this petty suffering which has
had its most direct impact on Cuba's most vulnerable--the
children, the elderly, the disabled and the infirm.
Distribution of humanitarian aid, food and medicines. Cuba
has been accused of all sorts of gross violations--virtually
all of them unsubstantiated--with regard to the distribution of
humanitarian aid, the use of medical aid for torture, etc. We
find it ironic that these particular accusations continue to be
made against a nation that offers universal vaccinations,
exemplary primary and maternal care, health care which is
universal and free of charge. In fact, Cuba has a model health-
care delivery system which has been internationally recognized
as one of the world's best. As Rep. Charles A. Rangel (D-NY)
said in a press conference last June, ``Of all the complaints
that one might have against Cuba, health care delivery is
certainly not one of them.''
Cuba has also been loudly criticized for practicing
``medical tourism''--for offering some of its innovative
treatments for skin disorders, retinitis pigmentosa, radiation
sickness, and other intractable diseases to foreign patients on
a fee-for-service basis. But we would challenge you to name
another nation which doesn't charge fees to some patients who
can afford to pay, in order to subsidize the treatment of
others who cannot. Then we'll ask you to remember that, by
these means, Cuba is trying to subsidize the treatment of 11
million of its own citizens, plus many poor patients from other
developing nations, at no cost to them. (And then we'll ask you
to show us where in our own country a poor patient might go to
get prescription medicines for free--as any citizen of Cuba was
able to do, in any Cuban neighborhood, before the enactment of
the CDA.)
In response to the common claim that aid sent to Cuba all
ends up in the hands of ``tourists and the Communist elite,''
we would contend that it is only because of Cuba's equitable
and broad-based distribution system that we did not see
wholesale death by starvation in Cuba after the collapse of the
Soviet bloc--the sort of large-scale starvation that we have
seen recently in North Korea or in Iraq. It is only because of
Cuba's thorough distribution of donated vitamins and
nutritional supplements (and their willingness to work
cooperatively with international health agencies) that
thousands of Cubans were not permanently blinded in the optic
neuropathy epidemic of several years ago. It is only because
Cuba has worked so hard to distribute what little medicine it
had (and to invent substitutes for what it didn't have) that we
haven't seen more people dying there for lack of a simple
antibiotic.
Regarding the licensing of medical sales and donations to
Cuba: We have heard members of Congress claim that there is no
blockade on food and medicines to Cuba. We have heard
Congressional staff say that ``any US corporation that wants to
can get a Commerce license to sell medicines to Cuba.'' An
analysis of all of the Treasury and Commerce Department
licenses granted since the enactment of the CDA was recently
conducted by Kirkpatrick and Vanden [and has been submitted as
separate testimony to this hearing; we urge you to study it],
and was reviewed by the Congressional Research Service. Of 36
licenses actually approved, five were for travel, not for
sales. Of the remaining 31 licenses, many were for items that
were never in fact sold to Cuba--but rather were sold to
international relief agencies such as the United Nations for
donation to Cuba. The total dollar value of actual licensed
medical sales to Cuba (including, again, the items actually
donated) is given at approximately $1.67 million. And what does
that total include? A half-million dollars' worth of
contraceptives (IUDs and Provera); several big pieces of
specialized medical equipment; and not very much else. ($1.67
million does not buy very much medical merchandise in the
economy of the 1990s.)
Knowing the US market economy as we do, if it were really
easy for US corporations and their subsidiaries to sell to
Cuba, wouldn't they all be doing it by now?
This points to one of our most serious objections to the
practice of US government licensing of aid and trade to Cuba.
The existence of a small amount of licensed aid and trade is
being used here to help put a pretty face on a brutal set of
sanctions--the same sanctions which have been creating the
sorts of daily hardships we have described above. When
distinguished members of Congress write ``dear colleague''
letters which say ``Don't be fooled--the United States is
already allowing large-scale humanitarian donations and sales
of medicines and medical supplies to Cuba,'' they quote
inflated figures about licensed aid and trade, and they are
hoping that we won't notice the following--
that a powerful embargo on medical trade to Cuba
does in fact exist: that US-based pharmaceutical and medical
supply companies have found the Treasury/ Commerce regulations
so onerous that they have not sold more than a miniscule amount
of medical goods to Cuba since the enactment of the CDA.
that no national health care system (especially
one as advanced as Cuba's) should be made to run solely on
donations. Comprehensive treatment planning cannot be totally
dependent on waiting to see which medicines happen to show up
with which church aid shipment, or when a spare part to fix an
X-ray machine might arrive.
that our government's policy toward Cuba has not
been one of generosity or charity, but rather one of
deprivation, starvation and denial. Even if the total dollar
values of US medical aid and trade claimed by State and
Commerce were correct [and other testimony to this hearing will
demonstrate that those figures are seriously inflated], that
aid and trade would not come close to meeting Cuba's annual
budgeted health care needs. Even if the US had licensed $227
million in medicines and medical supplies to Cuba, that would
amount to a multi-million-dollar Band-Aid which our government
seems eager to place on the multi-billion-dollar injury which
US sanctions have already (and perhaps inadvertently) inflicted
on the Cuban people.
that the emphasis on ``US humanitarian assistance
to Cuba'' is also essentially misleading; Cuba wants trade, not
aid. Cuba is not seeking alms from the US or asking to become a
charity state; and we must not encourage that sort of
dependency.
We should not set the conditions for unneeded Cuban
dependence on US tax dollars by stepping up charity aid to
Cuba--not even if a serious need for that aid has been created
by our own government's sanctions. We believe that both the US
and Cuba would be better served--on economic as well as on
moral grounds--by opening trade relations with Cuba. This
should begin immediately, and at the very least, in the area of
food and medicines, and should extend as soon as possible to
other aspects of commerce.
We urge the members of the Ways and Means Committee to move
decisively toward a new and more humane era in US/Cuba trade
relations, and to end this current era of meanspirited and
misinformed trade policy.
Rev. Schuyler Rhodes
President
Rev. Lucius Walker, Jr.
Executive Director
Ellen P. Bernstein
Grants Administrator
Statement of Anthony F. Kirkpatrick, M.D., Ph.D., University of South
Florida, College of Medicine and Harry E. Vanden, Ph.D., University of
South Florida, Department of Government and International Affairs
Abstract
Health care in Cuba used to be the envy of Latin America.
In the last decade the loss of preferential trade with the
Soviet bloc plunged Cuba into a severe economic crisis and
brought Cuban health care to the brink of catastrophe. It was
at that moment in time that the United States implemented the
1992 Cuban Democracy Act which banned the sale of food and
severely impeded the delivery of medicines to the island
nation. In fact, five months after the passage of the Act, this
century's worst epidemic of neurological disease due to a food
shortage became widespread in Cuba. This report documents in
detail how the US State Department launched a series of ``fact
sheets'' that grossly misrepresented the facts about
humanitarian trade with Cuba in an effort to defend the US
policy of restricting the island's access to food and medicine.
Statements made by the State Department suggest a deliberate
intent to cover-up and deceive the public. Until the US
Government lives up to the commitment it made to international
humanitarian law when it ratified documents like the Fourth
Geneva Convention, it will continue to do grave harm to the
civilian population of Cuba through its obstruction of the
delivery of food and medicine. The Convention states that the
parties agree not to impede the flow of food and medicine to
the civilian population of a nation, even in time of war.
Tightening of the US Embargo in 1992:
The 1992 Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) tightened control over
the shipment of the basic necessities of life to the Cuban
people. (1) The Act banned the sale of food from the United
States and US foreign subsidiaries but permitted sales and
donations of medicines and medical supplies to Cuba providing
the exporter was issued a special US export license. The
license is issued with the agreement that there is no
reasonable likelihood that the medical items would be diverted
to the Cuban military, used in acts of torture or other human
rights abuses, or re-exported or used in the production of
biotechnology products. If the product is purchased by the
Cuban health system, which is operated by the Cuban Government,
the company is subject to a more onerous requirement. It must
make arrangements to carry out ``onsite inspections'' in Cuba
by a non-governmental organization (NGO). The company is
required to ``certify'' within a specified period (usually 6
months) that the medicine was ``used for the purposes for which
it was intended and only for the use and benefit of the Cuban
people.'' Through the plain language of the Act, if the
medicine is diverted and used to treat a military person or a
foreign tourist visiting Cuba (albeit someone dying in agony
from spinal meningitis) that would be a technical violation of
the embargo. If certain procedures are not followed, the
manufacturers could be subject to fines up to $1 million per
violation for corporations and prison terms up to 10 years for
individuals. However, this onerous burden of end-use monitoring
in Cuba does not apply to a company with a US-approved export
license to donate (or sell) a shipment of its medical supplies
to a US-approved NGO (e.g. the United Nations, Catholic Church)
who intends to donate the medical products to the Cuban people.
Misrepresenting The Facts about Commercial Medical Sales:
In the wake of disturbing scientific reports showing the
devastating effect of the US embargo on the health of the Cuban
people (2-4), legislation has been introduced in the US
Congress to allow Cubans the ability to purchase food and
medicine from American companies. (5-7) In a sweeping six-page
``Fact Sheet'' titled ``Myth Versus Reality,'' published on May
14, 1997, the US State Department rejected the entire basis of
the reports. (8) In its ``Fact Sheet'' the State Department
declared that there is no embargo on the commercial sale of
medicine and medical supplies to Cuba because the 1992 CDA
``permits'' the U.S. Government to ``routinely'' issue licenses
to sell medicine and medical equipment to Cuba. In further
support of their claim, the State Department stated that 36 of
38 license requests were approved for US companies and their
subsidiaries to carry out ``commercial sale'' of medicine and
medical equipment to Cuba. The fact sheet states that ``the
only requirement'' for a U.S. company to carry out such sales
is to arrange for end-use monitoring in Cuba. (8)
However, careful review of the export licensing regulations
reveals an effort by the State Department to inflate medical
sales to Cuba. For example, the State Department wants us to
focus on the number of licenses approved rather than the number
of companies doing medical business with Cuba. Using just the
numbers of licenses will give an inflated picture because each
shipment to Cuba requires a special license. Separate licenses
are also required for each clinic, hospital or organization in
Cuba buying medicine. The approval of a US export license is
like a fishing license: you are authorized to fish, but you are
not required to go fishing. Also, the application for a license
does not mean that the product will be shipped in a timely
manner. For example, in the case of the sale of a drug
(fluspirlene) used to treat a potentially life-threatening
condition, schizophrenia, the US Government delayed the
approval for one year. (2, 9)
Statements made by the State Department reveal more than
just twisting the truth: there is a pattern of deliberate
deception and cover-ups. On July 29, 1997, we wrote a letter to
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright pointing out that the
claim of 36 medical sales was a gross overstatement. (10) In
response, the State Department, quoted in the Los Angeles
Times, said, ``If there is an error, we'll correct it.'' (11)
On August 5, the State Department published a second ``revised
and updated'' fact sheet. (12) The number of licenses approved
was reduced from 36 to 31 for commercial sale of medicines to
Cuba and the State Department acknowledged that it had failed
to report that an additional license had been denied. Five of
the 36 licenses approved were solely to allow medical company
executives to travel to Cuba and explore possible sales. To
actually sell their products, the companies must apply for
another license. (8,12,13) Again, on September 5, 1997, we
informed Secretary Albright that the numbers were still grossly
inaccurate. (14) Responding on the behalf of Secretary
Albright, Michael Ranneberger, Coordinator of Cuban Affairs,
wrote, ``I take great exception to your assertion that the
facts presented in the August 5 fact sheet are `inaccurate,'
`false,' and `misleading'. The fact sheet was carefully
prepared in the most accurate possible way, based on the latest
information available, and we stand by the facts as
presented.'' (15) Again seeking clarification, we filed a
request with the Department of State requesting the
documentation that would support their conclusions. Our request
was denied. (16)
The State Department said its revised and updated fact
sheet was based on records at the Departments of Treasury and
Commerce. Recently, the lead author was able to obtain records
from these US agencies under a Freedom of Information Act
request. The table shows that only 8 licenses were issued for
the commercial sale of medical supplies to Cuba, not the 31
adamantly claimed by the State Department. All 3 of these
companies were required, as stipulated by the CDA, to make
arrangements for onsite inspections in Cuba for end-use
certification that the medicine was ``used for the purposes for
which it was intended and only for the use and benefit of the
Cuban people.'' Obviously, requiring companies to police the
distribution of their goods will scare most away from trading
with Cuba. It is our understanding based on discussions with
staff members at the World Health Organization (WHO) that some
medical companies refuse to quote prices to the WHO for sale of
their products to Cuba for fear of reprisals by the US
government.
Fourteen export licenses were issued as ``donations'' to
the Cuban people as defined by the CDA. Therefore, none of
these medical companies were required to meet the onerous
requirement noted by the State Department fact sheet for
commercial sales, that is, they were not required to arrange
for end-use monitoring of their products in Cuba. Further,
according to correspondence we received from the Commerce
Department, three of these 14 licenses for donations were
issued by Commerce as commercial ``exports'' and this agency
did not compile a record of the actual shipment of these
medical products to Cuba. Without such documentation, these
licenses qualify as donations, not sales, to Cuba as stipulated
by the CDA (see below). Nine export licenses listed as
commercial sales by the State Department and claimed to be
``permitted'' by the CDA were actually pre-CDA sales and,
therefore, did not have to meet the stringent requirements of
the CDA. Only 3 of the world's U.S. related medical companies
have attempted to brave US regulations since the enactment of
the CDA. The number of companies granted US licenses for
commercial sales to Cuba has fallen to less than 4% of pre-CDA
levels. (2)
There is no record of any commercial medical sale from a US
company selling US-made products. All 8 commercial medical sale
licenses listed in the table were issued by the Treasury
Department to US foreign subsidiaries. The Administration's
chief administrator of the US embargo, Richard Newcomb, reports
that the Treasury Department retains the responsibility for
licensing exports of medicines and medical supplies from US
foreign subsidiaries while the Commerce Department licenses US
companies selling US-produced products. (17) According to
Newcomb, all post-CDA ``commercial sales'' to Cuba require
documentation that the licensed medical supplies were actually
shipped to Cuba. But the Commerce Department reports that it
does not carry out such documentation, nor is it ``charged'' to
do so. (18) Therefore, the US Government has not established a
mechanism for commercial medical sales to Cuba from US
companies selling US-made products even though the CDA has
permitted such sales for over 5 years. In January 1998, the
Tampa Tribune reported on the difficulties encountered by
American companies attempting to sell medical products to Cuba.
Commerce's Director of export licensing for Cuba is quoted as
saying ``few American companies even apply for a license,
either because they are unaware medical sales are legal or they
doubt Cuba has the means to pay.'' (13)
Similarly, the State Department misrepresented the facts to
Congressman Esteban Torres (D-Calif), the leading architect of
pending legislation aimed at permitting the sale of food and
medicine to Cuba. In a letter, Torres asked the State
Department how many of the licenses claimed as commercial
sales, under the CDA, were actually pre-CDA licenses. He was
informed there were only 3 when, in fact, there were 9. (17,19)
Further, the US Government, for its part, seems to make a
concerted effort to intimidate medical companies. For example,
the largest pharmaceutical company in the United States, Merck,
was prosecuted for what the US Government called an
``inadvertent and technical'' violation of the embargo. As a
result, Merck announced it will never do business with Cuba
until the embargo is lifted. (2) Similarly, in Miami the US
government promoted a hotline to engage the public in reporting
suspected illegal shipments of medications to Cuba. This
adverse publicity intimidates and further deters other medical
companies that might wish to sell their products to Cuba. (2,9)
Misrepresenting the World Health Organization:
Cuba's shortage of medicines and medical supplies,
according to the State Department's fact sheets, is not the
result of US policy but rather of the Cuban government's
``continued adherence to a discredited communist economic
model,'' which requires a deliberate emphasis on military
spending at the expense of other priorities such as health
care. (8,12) In further support of its claim, the State
Department attributes the following to the Pan American Health
Organization (the regional office of the World Health
Organization). ``According to the Pan American Health
Organization [PAHO], the Cuban Government currently devotes a
smaller percentage of its budget for healthcare than such
regional countries as Jamaica, Costa Rica and the Dominican
Republic.'' (8,12) When PAHO was notified of this claim
attributed to them, they rejected ownership. Furthermore, PAHO
responded by issuing a report that refuted the State
Department's claim that Cuba spends less on health care than
the countries named by the State Department. (20) Indeed, Cuban
governmental expenditures on health as a share of GDP are
higher than for any other country in Latin America and are some
34% higher than the United States.(9) On July 29, 1997,
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was informed of PAHO's
report. The State Department did not bother to set the record
straight in its revised fact sheet of August 5 and has not done
so since.
Congressman Torres wrote to Secretary Albright asking for a
reference for the data State Department attributed to PAHO.
Neither of the two sources cited by the State Department
compared all four countries for the relevant health economics.
(21,22) In fact, one of the references cited by the State
Department states that ``health has been a priority of the
(Cuban) Government for three decades.'' (21)
Recently, the American Public Health Association reported,
``Even in the worst economic times, Cuba has consistently made
health a top priority and has allocated the funds necessary to
maintain the health system. While other countries throughout
the world responded to global recession by cutting back on
resources dedicated to health, Cuba has sustained its
investment in health.'' Fidel Castro's concern for public
health has been recognized by the World Health Organization.
(9,23)
Aside from a country's commitment of financial resources to
health care, medical outcomes and the efficiency of the overall
healthcare system are important. The indicator most often used
by the United Nations to assess a country's overall health
status is the under-age-five mortality rate. Cuba compares to
the US for this health indicator, ahead of all other Latin
American countries. Cuba has a per capita Gross Domestic
Product lower than any of the other Latin American countries
named by the State Department and less than one-twentieth of
the United States. The figure shows that Cuba has achieved a
remarkable position in the world for health care of its
children.
However, the US embargo has a direct impact on the life
expectancy of the people in Cuba. As Jose Teruel, a physician
who monitors Cuba for the World Health Organization, has
remarked, ``You're probably talking about a shortening of lives
through the embargo, denying people medicines and care who
would have better care in a normal situation.'' (24) Indeed, a
recent report has noted an increase in the number of deaths in
the elderly Cuban population. (25) Preferential distribution of
scarce goods and priority programs for children and women will
continue to increase the vulnerability of elderly people.
Other Consequences of the Embargo:
In 1992, the U.S. government ignored a warning of the
American Public Health Association that tightening the embargo
would lead to an abrupt cessation of supplies of food and
medicine to Cuba resulting in widespread ``famines.'' In fact,
five months after the passage of the Act, this century's worst
epidemic of neurological disease due to a food shortage became
widespread in Cuba. More than 50,000 of the 11 million
inhabitants were suffering from optic neuropathy, deafness,
loss of sensation and pain in the extremities, and spinal
disorder that impaired walking and bladder control. (2) In
1995, the Human Rights Commission of the Organization of
American States (OAS) wrote Washington that the provisions of
the U.S. embargo aimed at restricting Cuba's access to medical
products create such bureaucratic and other requirements as to
render these products ``virtually unattainable'' in Cuba.
Further, the OAS wrote that the United States government was
violating international law and universally recognized human
rights by denying food and medicine to the Cuban people. The
commission asked the United States to take immediate steps to
lift the embargo on food and medicine. To date, the U.S.
government has not responded to the letter. (2)
Recently, the Clinton Administration took a small step
toward improving shipment of food and medicine to Cuba by
proposing the restoration of direct charter flights for
humanitarian purposes between Miami and Havana. Global Links is
one of the largest U.S. donors of medical aid to Cuba. Since
1994, it has donated 29 ocean containers (tractor-trailor
loads) of medical aid to Cuba worth over $24.5 million. Yet,
the difficulties and expenses of shipping from the U.S. are
enormous. Consequently, this donor of medical aid to Cuba will
continue to ship US-origin medical supplies from Canadian ports
to avoid difficulty and the prohibitive cost of airfreight.
(Smith B, Global Links, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; personal
communication). The CDA prohibits ships that have landed in
Cuba from docking in the U.S. for 6 months, which impedes the
delivery of humanitarian donations to Cuba. Yet State
Department fact sheets claim that the CDA ``encourages the
donation of humanitarian supplies to the people of Cuba,
including medicine, food, and clothing.''
Conclusion
The State Department has the obligation to defend US
Policy. But it does not have the obligation to purposely
misrepresent the facts, especially if the misrepresentations
and distortions are used to defend a policy of blocking a
civilian population's access to the basic necessities of life
(food and medicine) in the midst of a severe economic crisis.
Since July 19, 1997, the State Department has been confronted
on numerous occasions with the errors contained in its ``Fact
Sheets.'' Their pattern of never admitting their errors and
only making partial corrections when confronted with documents
which clearly refute their claims suggests a deliberate intent
to cover-up and deceive the public if not the U.S. Congress.
Our research indicates both the distortion of data from the
World Health Organization and significant discrepancies between
the amount of medicine actually authorized for delivery to Cuba
by the Departments of Treasury and Commerce and the amount
claimed by the State Department. It is time to set the record
straight. We believe it would be most appropriate for the U.S.
Congress to investigate what has become a de facto policy of
denying medicine to the Cuban people.
References
N.B. For all references cited, the source documents are on file
with the Committee on Ways and Means of the U.S. House of
Representatives
1. Cuban Democracy Act appears at title XVII 1993 National Defense
Authorization Act, Oct. 23, 1992
2. Kirkpatrick AF. Role of the USA in shortage of food and medicine
in Cuba. Lancet 1996; 348: 1489-91
3. The Lancet (Editorial). Sanctions on health in Cuba. Lancet
1996; 348: 1461
4. American Association for World Health. Impact of US embargo on
health and nutrition in Cuba. Washington DC: American Association for
World Health, 1997
5. US House of Representatives. Cuban Humanitarian Trade Act of
1997, H.R. 1951, Washington DC, June 18, 1997.
6. US Senate. Cuban Women and Children Humanitarian Relief Act, S.
1391, Washington DC, Nov. 6, 1997.
7. US House of Representatives. Free Trade with Cuba Act, H.R.
3173, Washington DC, Feb. 5, 1998
8. US Department of State. Fact Sheet; The US Embargo and Health
Care in Cuba: Myth Versus Reality. Washington DC, May 14, 1997.
9. Kirkpatrick AF, Vanden HE. The US embargo and health care in
Cuba: Assessing the May 1997 State Department Report. Latin American
Studies Association Forum 1997; 28: 6-10
10. US Department of State. Freedom of Information Act Request,
Office of IRMPS. Letter to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright.
Washington DC, July 29, 1997.
11. Monmaney T. Study criticizes medical embargo against Havana.
Los Angeles Times. July 24, 1997
12. US Department of State. Fact Sheet; The US Embargo and Health
Care in Cuba: Myth Versus Reality. Revised and updated. Washington DC,
Aug. 5, 1997.
13. Willon P. Cuba policy affects medical shipments. Tampa Tribune.
Jan. 27, 1998
14. US Department of State. Freedom of Information Act Request,
Office of IRMPS. Letter to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright.
Washington DC, Sept. 5, 1997.
15. US Department of State. Freedom of Information Act Request,
Office of IRMPS. Letter from Michael Ranneberger. Washington DC, Sept.
15, 1997.
16. US Department of State. Freedom of Information Act Request,
Office of IRMPS. Letter from Rochelle Zail. Washington DC, Oct. 15,
1997.
17. US Department of Treasury. Freedom of Information Act Request,
Treasury Disclosure Office. Letter from Richard Newcomb. Washington DC,
Mar. 24, 1998
18. US Department of Commerce. Freedom of Information Act Request,
Commerce FOIA Office. Letter from James Lewis. Washington DC, Jan. 12,
1998
19. US Department of State. Freedom of Information Act Request,
Office of IRMPS. Letter from Barbara Larkin. Washington DC, Jan. 16,
1998
20. Pan American Health Organization. General Health Expenditures
in Cuba. PAHO Public Policies and Health Program, Ref. HDP-HDD-C/63/1
USA (097-97). May 22, 1997
21. Pan American Health Organization. Health Conditions in the
Americas. Pan American Health Organization, Washington DC. 1994, pp.
166 and 276.
22. World Development Report, 1993: Oxford University Press, New
York pp.258
23. Kirkpatrick AF. The US attack on Cuba's health. Can Med Assoc J
1997; 157: 281-84
24. Collie T. Doctor attacks Cuba embargo. Tampa Tribune. Nov. 29,
1996
25. Garfield R, Santana S. The impact of the economic crisis and
the US embargo in Cuba. Am J Public Health 1997; 87:15-20
Table. LICENSES FOR EXPORT TO CUBA EFFECTIVE AUGUST 5, 1997
------------------------------------------------------------------------
# # ONSITE
TYPE OF LICENSE LICENSES COMPANIES INSPECTION
------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMERCIAL SALES...................... 8 3 YES
DONATIONS............................. 14 ? NO
PRE-CDA COMMERCIAL SALES.............. 9 2 NO
---------------------------------
TOTAL EXPORT LICENSES............. 31
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Data from documents obtained through a Freedom of Information Act
request to the Office of Foreign Asset Control the U.S. Department of
Treasury, March 24, 1998, and the Bureau of Export Administration the
U.S. Department of Commerce, January 12, 1998. As noted in text, all
sales to Cuba's public health system require onsite inspections. This
requirement does not apply to U.S. companies who donate or sell to US-
approved non-government organizations (NGOs) intending to donate the
medical supplies to the Cuban people. ``Pre-CDA Commercial Sales'' are
defined by the Treasury Department as licenses that were exempt from
the requirements of the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act because they were
contracts negotiated prior to the implementation of the Act. The
Commerce Department will not allow independent verification of the
recipient of its ``exported'' medical products. Therefore, the total
number of medical companies licensed by Commerce to export donations
to Cuba is not known.
The authors wish to acknowledge the assistance of Jane Franklin
in preparing an earlier draft of this research and to thank Dr.
Hans Rosling for assembling the data and preparing the Global
Health Chart that is found at the end of this report.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5762.023
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5762.024
Statement of Hon. Gerald D. Kleczka, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Wisconsin
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your holding this important
hearing on the United States' economic and trade policy toward
Cuba. In the wake of the Pope's recent visit to Cuba, this
hearing will provide a timely and important review of these
important policies.
In previous Congresses, I have cosponsored legislation to
repeal the embargo of U.S. trade with Cuba and the Cuban
Democracy Act of 1992 which further tightened trade sanctions.
I have also cosponsored legislation to exclude food, medicine,
and medical equipment from the embargo.
The embargo against Cuba in not only inhumane and unfair to
the Cuban people, it is also hurting our nation. Banning the
import of food and medicine only makes the Cuban people
innocent pawns in a long and fruitless political standoff. As
the Los Angeles Times wrote, ``In Castro's long reign, the
people of Cuba have suffered under an obsolete economic and
political system that has deprived them of their most
elementary freedoms. Their plight has been exacerbated by the
embargo which has made life more painful while failing to
rewrite political realities.''
The misguided embargo has cost Americans jobs and missed
economic opportunities because it has prevented American
businesses from entering the Cuban market. While more than 100
nations are encouraging investment and commercial development
in Cuba, American businesses are forced to stand on the
sidelines. Despite the potential for economic gain, the
Department of Treasury still clings to the belief that to
``isolate Cuba and deprive it of U.S. dollars'' is the best way
to bring about change in that nation. Desperate for access to
Cuban markets, American businesses are entering into agreements
with foreign companies.
In recent months, we have seen a few rays of hope the
embargo might be lifted. The Pope's visit highlighted the
plight of the Cuban people. On March 24, 1998, President
Clinton announced four changes in U.S. policy that will help
direct more humanitarian aid to Cuba.
Mr. Chairman, I hope this hearing will again stress the
need to lift the U.S. embargo against Cuba. After more than
three decades, the U.S. embargo has done little besides punish
the Cuban people and deepen their resentment against the United
States. Cuba has not changed its political system and Fidel
Castro's resolve has shown little sign of weakening.
It is in the best interest of no one to continue the
current policy against Cuba. At the very least, Congress should
work to remove the embargo against food and medicine. Allowing
food and medicine into Cuba would be a good first step in
restoring relations with the Cuban people and developing a
sensible economic policy between the United States and Cuba.
Statement of Lloyd Moore, Executive Director, Trident South
Corporation, Yazoo City, Mississippi and Executive Director,
Mississippi Black Farmers and Agriculturists Association
My name is Lloyd Moore. I am Executive Vice President of
Trident South Corporation in Yazoo City, Mississippi and
Executive Director of the Mississippi Black Farmers and
Agriculturists Association. I am also the co-chair, along with
Hayes Dent, legislative aide to Mississippi's Governor Fordice,
of the Mississippi State Council of the National Americans For
Humanitarian Trade With Cuba coalition.
We are working hard with this coalition because we believe
that people in Cuba who need the life-sustaining food we
produce in the Mississippi Delta should have the right to buy
it. We also believe our small farmers should have the right to
sell products to our natural market.
Cuba is a market that some people in other parts of the
country might say is insignificant. But to farmers in
Mississippi, Cuba represents a real economic opportunity that
could raise the quality of life significantly for Mississippi
Delta families.
In our community, we grow lots of rice. Recently,
competition for markets has become absolutely fierce. Times
have been tough. Times could get a lot tougher. The recent Fair
96 law will cut agriculture consumer subsidies by the year
2002. We are being asked to change with the times, and we are.
That is why, in the Misssissippi Delta, our new philosophy is
`rooted locally, working globally.' To keep our loyal and hard-
working labor force going, we must continue to explore new
market opportunities worldwide.
The freedom to sell our rice to Cuba could mean millions in
annual exports for Mississippi at a time when our farmers badly
need such sales. According to international estimates, Cuba
currently annually imports $500 million in raw foodstuffs and
another $200 million in processed food. Trade with Cuba would
improve the quality of life for our communities by giving us
the economic ability to educate our children and make a better
future for ourselves.
The human need that exists in Cuba can help us fulfill the
economic needs not only of rice farmers in Mississippi, but
struggling farms in Arkansas, Alabama, Louisiana, and up the
Mississippi River. Since so many Americans would benefit from
such trade with Cuba, we have to ask ourselves how is it that a
small but very wealthy community in Miami can dictate a policy
that 40 years has thwarted our communities' ability to prosper
and grow.
Those who seek to prevent U.S. farmers and businesses from
selling food to Cuba say there is no problem in Cuba, while at
the same time they recognize there is a problem by trying to
devise ways to send more charity to Cuba. Aid is not the
answer. Trade is the answer. Using taxpayer dollars to send
more aid to Cuba when the Cubans stand ready to pay an honest
price is an affront to our communities. We should not be taking
U.S. citizens off welfare and trying to put Cubans on. We
shouldn't be taking subsidies away from American farmers and be
talking about subsidizing the Cubans.
We applaud President Clinton's recent actions that
recognize there is a humanitarian need to be fulfilled in Cuba,
and his recent statements in support of food and medical sales
to Cuba. We feel that it is high time for the representatives
and senators who we elected to represent our interests pass a
law that will allow such sales to occur. Not just because it
would make a big difference for our noble communities, but
because it is the right thing for us to do as Americans.
As a representative of thousands of Mississippi Delta
farmers, I make an appeal based on good Christian principles
and good common sense: let's stop wasting everyone's time
adding more bureaucratic layers to an already faltering system.
Let's sell Cubans the food and medicine they need for their own
good, and for our own.
Madres y Mujeres Anti-Represion Por Cuba (M.A.R. POR CUBA)
Key Biscayne, Florida 33149
May 18, 1998
The Hon. Philip M. Crane, Chairman
Trade Subcommittee
Ways and Means
1102 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Chairman Crane:
It is unfortunate that the voiceless in Cuba, as well as the Cuban
exile community were not present at your May 8th hearing on Cuba's
trade policies. However, we appreciate this opportunity to write to you
on behalf of the most vulnerable victims of repression in our island,
such as political prisoners and their families; members of the internal
opposition movement; dissidents; human rights' activists and
independent journalists.
As a group of Cuban exile mothers and women, we are greatly
concerned, among other critical issues, with the situation of Cuban
women political prisoners in our homeland, and we are committed--
together with many exile organizations as well as opposition and human
rights' groups inside the island--to continue an international
solidarity campaign on their behalf, and to serve as a voice for these
Cuban women whose voices can not be heard.
These women are subjected to deplorable and inhumane conditions;
they are systematically separated from their family nucleus when
transferred to prisons in provinces far from their homes; their
families suffer constant harassment by the repressive forces of
Castro's regime; they lack critical medical attention; and they are
unjustly and arbitrarily condemned to lengthy sentences and extensive
periods of time without seeing their children.
An example of this is Marta Beatriz Roque Cabello, one of the
authors of ``The Homeland Belongs to All,'' a document written in
response to Cuba's V Communist Party Congress' Manifest, who is still
in the women's prison of Manto Negro presumably charged with ``enemy
propagada'' and has yet to be tried. Beatriz is extremely sick, and is
denied the medical attention she desperately needs. As in the case of
Sebastian Arcos, who recently died of cancer in exile because he was
medically not treated while a political prisoner in Cuba's jail, time
is running out for Beatriz. Although it may be the difference between
life and death, she courageously refuses to leave Cuba as a condition
for her release. Unfortunately, Marta Beatriz was not heard at the May
8th hearing.
We are witnessing a monumental campaign undertaken by interests
other than the interests to achieve democracy in Cuba. These interests
would lead us to believe that their concerns are ``humanitarian'' in
nature. All too sadly, the ``humanitarian aid'' legislative proposal
known as the Dodd-Torres bill will unlikely reach the most vulnerable
victims of repression, such as Marta Beatriz Roque Cabello. While these
individuals and groups are actively promoting the unilateral lifting of
economic sanctions--purportedly to ease the suffering of the Cuban
people--they remain conspicuously blind to the crimes being perpetrated
against men, women and children, and silent to demand fundamental
liberties and denounce the human rights violations committed by
Castro's regime against our people.
U.S. current law exists to promote a genuine democratic transition
in Cuba. The embargo that needs to be lifted and the one that we
advocate to lift, is the one imposed by Castro upon the Cuban people.
As it is painfully evident, ``Cuba is open to the world'' courtesy of
Castro and his regime, which have assured that it is opened up to all
those who come to exploit its slave labor, its apartheid, its fertile
soil, its confiscated properties, its sexual tourism, its women and its
children. Foreigners with dollars have access to anything and
everything, while Cubans are systematically discriminated against. What
needs to be demanded is that Castro ``opens Cuba to the Cuban people.''
Only then should the economic sanctions be lifted. To do otherwise
would only prolong Castro's tyranny and deny Cuba's right to
sovereignty.
We are submitting for the record of the May 8th hearing a copy of
the letter that Marta Beatriz wrote from within prison on toilet paper,
as well as the transcript of the tape recorded by Vicky Ruiz Labrit,
who heads one of the womens' opposition groups in Cuba.
We respectfully request that the voices of opposition within the
island as well as Cuban-Americans be included in any future
Subcommittee hearings concerning Cuba.
We thank you for your attention, and remain,
Sincerely,
M.A.R. POR CUBA
Sylvia G. Iriondo
President
SGI:gf
encs.
`Each Cuban has a built-in policeman'
FROM A CUBAN PRISON--To describe \1\ how one spends the day
in this penitentiary is easy: Everything becomes routine. A
change in the schedule is practically an event. Each of the
women prisoners (about 700) constantly asks herself: How long
will I be here?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Article which appeared Wednesday, April 15, 1998 on page 17A,
in The Miami Herald by Martha Beatriz Roque Cabello, one of the authors
of ``The Homeland Belongs to All.'' Martha Beatriz Roque Cabello, an
economist, is a leader of the Domestic Dissidents Working Group, a
federation representing 14 of the largest dissident groups in Cuba. She
was arrested on July 16, 1997, charged with ``counterrevolutionary
activity,'' and still awaits trial. Her letter, handwritten in prison
on toilet paper, is reprinted from El Nuevo Herald.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Only 15 days ago I was transferred to the wing for hardened
criminals, although it would have been logical to have kept me
in the preventive-detention wing.
The answer to my question ``Why the change?'' was simple:
``You're closer to the infirmary; these are people who behave
(i.e. on good behaviour); and it's an order.''
I'm supposed to go to the infirmary to get magnetotherapy
for my breasts, but the truth is that they don't take me, even
though I've complained to everyone willing to listen. The
doctor recommended 20 sessions--I've had only nine, and it has
been a hassle.
I'm a political prisoner, but because that status is not
acknowledged here, I'm called a ``CR''--a counterrevolutionary.
My cell sisters are common prisoners, five in all: three are
serving time for murder (25, 18, and 15 years, respectively),
one for attempted murder and battery (14 years), and another
for fraud (five years, four months).
A simple analysis of their situation would lead you to
think that they'd do anything to shorten their long term of
imprisonment or gain some sort of benefit. For example, as a
reward for their recent participation in a political meeting
about the Pope's visit to Cuba, they got an additional family
visit.
Compare this with people on the outside who--to hold on to
their jobs--cling to their membership in organizations for the
masses, careful to maintain their political participation and
to submit to the slogans and goals set by the government. Only
doing this will they be rewarded with a job that gives access
to hard currency, a bag of toiletries, or just any job.
Those who don't live in Cuba find it difficult to
understand that the system maintains its political control
principally through self-repression. Each Cuban has a built-in
policeman. This complex mechanism whereby one assumes the
conscience of a hunted person has been developed and perfected
for almost 40 years. To those who see it from afar, it's almost
imperceptible.
I had never been in prison before, but the past eight
months have given me access to this small world and to
firsthand knowledge of the violation of human rights and
legality. If this documents finds its way out of this prison,
it will be proof that there are those here who dissent.
The re-educator assigned to me--a woman officer with the
rank of major, age 50, brown-skinned, with a face that
proclaims her humble peasant origin--warned me that I was
forbidden to talk about political subjects, that my ideas had
to remain in my head, as confined as I am. You oppositionists
are just five or six, she said, as opposed to 11 million Cubans
who don't want to change their flag, an allusion to the yanquis
who can't stop reaching out to those who want democratic
transformation in this country. The end of her speech was
devoted to a suggestion that we leave the island: ``What you
need to do is go away and not waste your life in prison.''
If that is so, a question arises: If we mean nothing to the
political stability of the system, why then are we repressed?
Why are we jailed? Why should we emigrate if we're so
outnumbered by the people? Why is it necessary to imprison our
ideas?
After the daily schedule--prisoner count, inspection,
breakfast (tea or cereal), unsavory meals, sitting in the sun,
and girl-inmate talk--we have ``free'' time for reflection.
I can't write every day. The few times that I have written,
there have been unpleasant conserquences not only for me, who
chose the path of struggle, but also for my family, my closest
collaborators, and even my defense attorney.
Today is a day like any other. Yet, inside my cell, my
independent thought accompanies me. It matters not that they
shut it in, that they repress it. As long as it can be infused
onto paper, it will try to find an exit, even if the spaces of
time are lengthened.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5762.025
Statement of Vicky Ruiz Labrit, Havana, Cuba, Recorded on March 8, 1998
``To the international public opinion:
The voices of the Cuban sisters in exile are the faithful
echo of the cry that women in Cuba fighting for human rights
elevate. With it, we launch to the world this petition of
support for the salvation of women prisoners of conscience that
suffer within the prisons of Fidel Castro. Women that being
daughters, wives, sisters or mothers, without fear to pain,
have stood firm to uphold a homeland that suffers because it
has no liberty, because it yearns for harmony and peace,
because it can no longer endure the hunger for dignity and
rights.
Free citizens of the world, listen to this uprising clamor
and unite your voices so that torture does not continue in this
Cuban land. In every woman that suffers an unjust sentence
there is a piece of this homeland; in every beating,
humiliation or death is the martyrdom and affliction of our
people.
This month, dedicated internationally to women, should be a
month where no one is left without joining efforts against so
much ignominy. May this petition for help be heard throughout
the world so that these Cuban women be freed from their unjust
sentences.
These noble women need no pity, but liberty.
Thank you, I am Vicky Ruiz Labrit, on behalf of all the
organizations and groups that signed this Declaration, from the
Republic of Cuba.''
Urgent Petition \1\ to the International Organizations for Human
Rights, Cuban Exile Community and All Women
Cuban Women To Join Efforts to Petition Support for Women Political
Prisoners of Conscience that Have Not Been Released
It is not an act of clemency or good will the ``pardons''
that the government of Fidel Castro has instrumented in the
last few months as an attempt to obtain the good graces of
heads of state, a common practice of the Cuban government with
its hostages: the political prisoners of conscience.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ English Translation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is an outrage that within two years of the next
millennium Cuba maintains in its prisons more than one hundred
thousand prisoners and another significant number of detainees
at adjacent interrogation facilities. In proportion, the penal
population on the island is one of the largest in Latin
America, even more criminal still is the harassment that is
suffered by political prisoners, especially women.
Very few women have been released during the last days, and
a significant numer of women still remain serving unjust
sentences. In light of so much injustice and infamy, we join
our voices of opposition so that the world may know the
spiteful and undignified manner in which Cuban political
prisoners are treated.
We call on all free citizens of the world to join in
support of these women who suffer.
Signed Within Cuba:
Organizations Within Cuba:
Alianza Democratica Popular (ADEPO)
Asociacion Humanitaria Seguidores de Cristo Rey
Asociacion Pro Democracia Constitucional
Asociacion de Lucha Frente a la Injusticia (ALFIN)
Comite Cubano de Opositores Pacificos
Centro de Estudios de la Familia
Colegio Medico Independiente
Corriente Liberal Cubana
Foro Feminista
Frente Democratico Oriental
Frente Femenino Humanitario Cubano
Movimiento de Madres por la Solidaridad
Movimiento Democratico Accion Nacionalista
Movimiento Pro Derechos Humanos Golfo de Guacanayabo
Movimiento Solidaridad y Paz
Organizacion de Cristianos Sociales de las Provincias Orientales para
la Atencion de la Mujer
Organizacion Feminista Independiente (OFI)
Periodista Independiente de CUBA PRESS: Ana Luisa Lopez Baeza
Organizations in Exile:
Agenda: Cuba
Alianza de Jovenes Cubanos
Coalicion de Mujeres Cubanoamericanas
Coordinadora Internacional de Prisioneros Politicos Cubanos
Cuba Independiente y Democratica (C.I.D.)
Directorio Revolucionario Democratico Cubano
Ex-Club (Asociacion de Ex-Prisioneros y Combatientes Politicos Cubanos)
Ex-Confinados Politicos de la U.M.A.P.
Federacion Mundial de Presos Politicos Cubanos
Frente Nacional Presidio Politico Cubano
Grupo de Trabajo de la Disidencia Interna
M.A.R. Por Cuba (Madres y Mujeres Anti-Represion por Cuba)
Movimiento Democracia
Mujer Cubana
Mujeres Luchadoras por la Democracia
Presidio Politico Historico Cubano-Casa del Preso
Sociedad Internacional de Derechos Humanos
and ex-political prisoners, organizations, support groups and activists
who are joining this urgent petition...
Fundamental Objectives of the International Campaign of Solidarity with
the Women Political Prisoners within Castro's Prisons during the
International Month for Women
Considering that the Cuban political prisoners are serving
arbitrary and unjust sentences simply for dissenting from the
official policy of the regime which rules the Island of Cuba,
we aspire with this campaign to:
To denounce the deplorable and inhumane conditions
that women political prisoners are subjected to in Cuba.
To denounce the manner in which women political
prisoners (mothers, wives, daughters, sisters) are
systematically separated from their family nucleus when they
are transferred to prisons in provinces far from their homes.
To inform as to the precarious circumstances
suffered by the families of these women political prisoners and
the constant harassment they endure by the repressive forces of
the regime.
To denounce the lack of medical attention suffered
by women political prisoners with health problems.
To denounce the efforts to irritate and enrage the
women political prisoners with small children, condemning them
to lengthy sentences in prisons and extensive time periods
without seeing their children.
As women, on the island and in exile, we are committed to
continue this international campaign and to serve as a voice
for these Cuban women whose voices cannot be heard.
Statement of Beatriz M. Olivera, Harris Kessler & Goldstein, in Support
of H.R. 1951
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5762.026
Statement of Oxfam America
Oxfam America calls on U.S. legislators to lift the ban on food and
medicine sales to Cuba
Oxfam America supports the self-help efforts of poor and
marginalized people--landless peasants, indigenous peoples,
women, refugees and survivors of war and natural disasters--
striving to better their lives. Since 1970 Oxfam America has
disbursed more than $100 million in grants and technical
support to hundreds of partner organizations in Africa, Asia,
the Caribbean and the Americas, including the United States.
In Cuba, Oxfam America seeks to promote long term
development by supporting the work of community organizations
attempting to develop sustainable organic methods of
agricultural production in rural and urban areas. Since the
onset of the economic crisis of 1990, Cuba has effectively
joined the ranks of the most food insecure countries of the
world. Studies have shown that:
the contraction of the Cuban economy has lessened
Cuba's capacity to import the fuel, repair parts, intermediate
goods, raw materials and consumer goods necessary to produce
food domestically and thereby adequately meet the nutritional
needs of the Cuban population;
national food availability in Cuba fell by about
one third between 1989 and 1995 as high transportation costs
and the limited availability of hard currency has restricted
Cuba's ability to obtain food from non-US suppliers;
food shortages compounded by the trade embargo
contributed to the deterioration of the Cuban population's
nutritional intake, with drops in daily caloric intake of 33
percent and in protein levels by 39 percent during the same
period;
the decline in food availability has contributed
to serious vitamin deficiencies, maternal malnutrition,
increased low birth weights and a recent neurological epidemic.
The U.S. trade embargo--by imposing higher production and
import costs, limiting the availability of hard currency and
discouraging trade with third countries--has the unintended
consequence of exacerbating the current food security crisis in
Cuba, thereby hurting the Cuban people. While lifting the ban
on US food imports to Cuba does not offer a long term solution,
it is a step toward alleviating the impact of the current food
crisis.
The Cuban people should not bear the costs of differences
in US-Cuba relations. In the humanitarian interest of
supporting the health and well-being of ordinary citizens,
Oxfam America calls on legislators to support the Cuban
Humanitarian Trade Act (HR 1951) and the Cuban Women and
Children Humanitarian Relief Act (S. 1392) and lift the ban on
U.S. sales of food and medicine to Cuba.
Statement of Hon. Jose E. Serrano, a Representative in Congress from
the State of New York
Thank you for giving me this opportunity to testify today
on U.S. Economic and Trade Policy Toward Cuba.
It should come as no surprise to anyone in this room that I
am opposed to the economic and trade embargo that has dominated
our government's relationship with Cuba for the past forty
years. While we continue to encourage trade with China,
Vietnam, and North Korea, we pursue a closed policy with
respect to Cuba. The result has been criticism from and a
weakening of our relationships with Canada, Japan, Mexico, and
the European Union. Why? Logical reasons for this antiquated
policy do not exist.
However, we are now finally seeing movement towards a new,
more enlightened policy. I applaud these efforts. In January,
Pope John Paul II visited Cuba and publicly criticized our
country's embargo. In March, President Clinton announced four
positive changes to help ease some of the restrictive aspects
of our policy towards Cuba. Most recently, the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights for the first time voted against a
United States resolution criticizing Cuba for human rights
violations. What is significant is that several countries that
abstained from the vote last year voted to reject the
resolution this year. The United States is becoming
increasingly isolated as it struggles to preserve a policy that
the international community condemns.
At the start of the 105th Congress, I introduced H.R. 284,
the ``Cuba Reconciliation Act,'' to repeal both the Cuban
Democracy Act of 1992 and the Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
Act of l996, otherwise known as ``Helms-Burton.'' It is time
for Congress to pass this important legislation, which would
move the United States to its rightful place, leading the world
with a moral and just foreign policy. It is inhumane to attempt
to starve the Cuban people, punishing them with a trade embargo
designed to bend their government to our political will.
Instead, it is time for us to work towards reconciliation.
We need to start today, at this hearing, to look at our
current relationship with Cuba and to find the courage and
flexibility to envision a different future. The Cuban embargo
has not worked in over 40 years, and it is time to consider
measures to change our relationship with one of our closest
neighbors. A good first step is passage of H.R. 1951,
legislation that I have cosponsored, to end the embargo on the
sale of foods and medicine to Cuba. This is the ultimate
humanitarian legislation, because its beneficiaries are the
Cuban people. The United States manages, and rightfully so, to
sell food to China. Our country, which has long prided itself
on its humanitarian policies, should immediately make this
change in our trade policy towards Cuba.
My position has been consistent. We must end this embargo,
which has caused enormous suffering to the Cuban people.
Beginning today, as this topic of trading with Cuba is
discussed, I hope the Congress can move in this direction and
accept this historic challenge. Change our dialogue from one of
hostility to one of openness, and our policy from a strict
embargo to free trade. Cuba is our neighbor and it is time to
follow the lead of the Pope and the international community and
establish a new relationship and a new policy towards Cuba.
This is the moral and right thing to do.
Statement of USA Rice Federation
The USA Rice Federation is the national trade association
of the U.S. rice industry and works to advance the common
interests of this country's rice producers, millers, marketers
and allied industry segments. The Federation is composed of
three charter members--the U.S. Rice Producers Group, the USA
Rice Council and the Rice Millers' Association.
U.S. Rice Exports
Trade has historically been, and will continue to be,
critical to the U.S. rice industry. The United States exports
approximately half of the rice it produces, and consistently
ranks as the second or third leading rice exporter in the
world. The U.S. share of world rice trade has ranged from 12
percent to 28 percent. The U.S. industry's largest global
competitor is Thailand, which maintains an average market share
of about 30 percent. Today, U.S. rice is sold in over 100
countries around the world and is widely recognized for
quality. The United States is also considered a reliable,
diversified supplier, exporting long, medium and short grain
varieties of rice with a wide range of processing options.
Current major export destinations for U.S. rice include the
European Union (EU), Mexico, Japan, Turkey, Canada, Haiti, and
South Africa. In addition, the U.S. rice industry is working to
develop markets in other countries that have provided greater
market access under the Uruguay Round agreement.
The U.S. Rice Industry and Global Trade Issues
Of all grains exported by the United States, rice has been
hit particularly hard by unilateral trade sanctions. For
example, before President Clinton's executive order on the U.S.
trade embargo with Iran in 1995, that country was emerging as
one of the largest markets for high quality U.S. rice.
Similarly, the largest importer of U.S. rice in 1989 was Iraq,
which was closed to U.S. rice exporters by executive order in
1990. Trade restrictions imposed by the U.S. government,
however well justified, do impact U.S. rice exporters and
consequently the entire rice sector in this country. Despite
occasional exemptions, such as ``general license'' programs,
trade restrictions currently in force effectively reduce the
size of the world rice market available to U.S. commercial rice
exports.
U.S. and Cuba Rice Trade
The recent scenarios in the Middle East have their
counterpart in the Cuba of 1960. At that time, Cuba was the
largest single importer of U.S. rice, preferring to buy the
U.S. product on a commercial basis because of quality,
proximity and reliable supply. In 1951, Cuba imported a peak
volume of approximately 250,000 metric tons of U.S. rice which
represented about half of total U.S. exports at the time. In
1996, a 250,000 metric ton market for U.S. rice would have
accounted for approximately 10 percent of total exports.
Cuba's share of total U.S. exports varied considerably from
year-to-year, ranging from 17 to 51 percent in the ten-year-
period prior to the embargo in 1963. Since the embargo, Cuba's
annual imports have averaged around 300,000 metric tons, with
primary import origins of Thailand, China and Vietnam.
The type of rice purchased by Cuba from the U.S. was a high
quality U.S. long grain product. In the years since the
embargo, Cuba has imported a lower grade product, both long and
medium grain.
The U.S. rice industry believes that once the U.S.
government has lifted the embargo, Cuba will again become a
significant market for U.S. rice. Because of the structural
changes that have occurred in Cuba and changing food
consumption patterns, it is possible that a post-embargo Cuba
may not immediately be in a position to import commercially the
same high quality U.S. rice it had in the past. However, the
U.S. rice industry views the Cuban market as one of great
potential.
Once the embargo is no longer in place, the U.S. industry
will expect to re-enter the Cuban market and will work closely
with the U.S. government to make use of any government programs
which may assist in maximizing potential gains in this
important market.
Conclusion
The U.S. trade sanctions currently in force for Cuba are
allowing other rice exporting nations such as Thailand and
Vietnam to gain major competitive advantages over the U.S. rice
industry. Furthermore, USDA estimates that more than 13 percent
of projected global rice import demand will be subject to
unilateral trade sanctions in the 1997/1998 crop marketing
year. This represents a significant degree of lost marketing
opportunities for the U.S. rice industry.
-