- DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS FOR 1999

[House Hearing, 105 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND
RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS
FOR 1999

========================================================================

HEARINGS

BEFORE A

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION
________

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND RELATED AGENCIES
APPROPRIATIONS

FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia, Chairman

TOM DeLAY, Texas MARTIN OLAV SABO, Minnesota
RALPH REGULA, Ohio ESTEBAN EDWARD TORRES, California
HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky JOHN W. OLVER, Massachusetts
RON PACKARD, California ED PASTOR, Arizona
SONNY CALLAHAN, Alabama ROBERT E. (BUD) CRAMER, Jr., Alabama
TODD TIAHRT, Kansas
ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama

NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Livingston, as Chairman of the Full
Committee, and Mr. Obey, as Ranking Minority Member of the Full
Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees.

John T. Blazey II, Richard E. Efford, Stephanie K. Gupta, and Linda J.
Muir, Subcommittee Staff
________

PART 6
Page
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION:
Federal Aviation Administration................................ 231
RELATED AGENCY:
National Transportation Safety Board........................... 1

________

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations
________

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48-430 O WASHINGTON : 1998
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COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

BOB LIVINGSTON, Louisiana, Chairman

JOSEPH M. McDADE, Pennsylvania DAVID R. OBEY, Wisconsin
C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida SIDNEY R. YATES, Illinois
RALPH REGULA, Ohio LOUIS STOKES, Ohio
JERRY LEWIS, California JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania
JOHN EDWARD PORTER, Illinois NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington
HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky MARTIN OLAV SABO, Minnesota
JOE SKEEN, New Mexico JULIAN C. DIXON, California
FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia VIC FAZIO, California
TOM DeLAY, Texas W. G. (BILL) HEFNER, North Carolina
JIM KOLBE, Arizona STENY H. HOYER, Maryland
RON PACKARD, California ALAN B. MOLLOHAN, West Virginia
SONNY CALLAHAN, Alabama MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio
JAMES T. WALSH, New York DAVID E. SKAGGS, Colorado
CHARLES H. TAYLOR, North Carolina NANCY PELOSI, California
DAVID L. HOBSON, Ohio PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana
ERNEST J. ISTOOK, Jr., Oklahoma ESTEBAN EDWARD TORRES, California
HENRY BONILLA, Texas NITA M. LOWEY, New York
JOE KNOLLENBERG, Michigan JOSE E. SERRANO, New York
DAN MILLER, Florida ROSA L. DeLAURO, Connecticut
JAY DICKEY, Arkansas JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia
JACK KINGSTON, Georgia JOHN W. OLVER, Massachusetts
MIKE PARKER, Mississippi ED PASTOR, Arizona
RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey CARRIE P. MEEK, Florida
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina
MICHAEL P. FORBES, New York CHET EDWARDS, Texas
GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, Jr., Washington ROBERT E. (BUD) CRAMER, Jr., Alabama
MARK W. NEUMANN, Wisconsin
RANDY ``DUKE'' CUNNINGHAM, California
TODD TIAHRT, Kansas
ZACH WAMP, Tennessee
TOM LATHAM, Iowa
ANNE M. NORTHUP, Kentucky
ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama

James W. Dyer, Clerk and Staff Director

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS FOR
1999

----------

Wednesday, February 11, 1998.

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

WITNESSES

JIM HALL, CHAIRMAN
PETER GOELZ, MANAGING DIRECTOR
CRAIG E. KELLER, SR., CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
VERNON S. ELLINGSTAD, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
BERNARD S. LOEB, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF AVIATION SAFETY
JOSEPH OSTERMAN, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF HIGHWAY SAFETY
MARJORIE MURTAGH, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MARINE SAFETY
ROBERT CHIPKEVICH, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
SAFETY
ROBERT LAUBY, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF RAILROAD SAFETY
BARRY M. SWEEDLER, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS AND
ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Mr. Wolf. Why don't we begin.
I don't know how many other Members are going to be here.
Both the Republican membership and the Democratic membership
are away on a retreat. I came back early because we didn't want
to reschedule the hearing. If we had scheduled this one at a
different time, we would have had to bump all the hearings. So
we didn't do that. There may not be other Members attending.
You shouldn't go home and wonder if no one likes you anymore.
I think, in seriousness, Republicans and Democrats felt
this was a good time to go away and it is part of the official
business. That is why other Members are not here.
Do you want to begin? Your full statement will appear in
the record, and we will proceed with questions.

Opening Statement

Mr. Hall. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, Congressman Sabo, I am joined here today by
Member John Hammerschmidt and Member John Goglia; and, in
addition, seated at the table to my right is Dr. Vernon
Ellingstad, our director of research and engineering. To my
left is Peter Goelz, our managing director; and to his left,
Mr. Craig Keller, the chief financial officer of the NTSB.
Behind me are the office directors of NTSB, and I have a
vacant seat here so if we get into an appropriate subject
matter that we want them to respond to they can come to the
table and respond and identify themselves at that time.
It is a pleasure to come before you again, Mr. Chairman,
and discuss the work of the National Transportation Safety
Board over this past year and to present our proposed fiscal
year 1999 budget request. With our continued work investigating
the Nation's transportation accidents, we at the Safety Board
are once again in your debt, Mr. Chairman, and we thank you and
the committee for your continued support.
Mr. Chairman, 1997 was one of the most significant years in
the history of the NTSB. We have continued our investigation of
the tragic crash of TWA flight 800, and I will be glad to
answer any questions you might have on our work on that
accident.
In addition, as a result of the intense activity of the
last 2 years, we have taken steps to prepare the NTSB to
effectively serve the American people in the 21st century. To
elaborate on some of the steps, I will discuss three areas very
briefly where the Board has expanded to provide better service.
They are our 24-hour Communications Center, the NTSB web site
and the family assistance program.

communications center

Communications systems in today's world are, as you know,
Mr. Chairman, essential to the success of any organization.
With the advance in today's technology, it is important that
the NTSB continue to expand its ability to communicate quickly
and effectively.
The 24-hour NTSB Communications Center, which is displayed
on the screen, allows our investigators and Members to be
promptly notified of any major transportation accident in this
country and even around the world. The Comm Center plays a
major role in the launching of Go-Teams by contacting all NTSB
investigation participants and making arrangements for
investigators before and after they arrive at the accident
site. It also provides vital support for our new family
assistance responsibilities and is the nerve center during the
critical and often chaotic hours of a major launch.

safety board web site demonstration

The NTSB web site, which is www.ntsb.gov, includes general
information about the Board and its members, press releases,
speeches and testimony, the ``Most Wanted'' list of safety
issues and recommendation acceptance rates, a synopsis of over
38,000 aviation accidents, aviation accident statistics, a list
of accident reports available in all modes of transportation, a
list of current position vacancies and a copy of the Board's
Family Disaster Assistance Plan.
I would like now to show you, Mr. Chairman, and Congressman
Sabo, a demonstration of the NTSB web site and some of the
information that any World Wide Web user can find at our site.
This can show you the type of data that can be gathered on
particular aviation accidents, NTSB safety studies or
information on ongoing investigations, such as TWA 800.
Dr. Ellingstad and Ms. Donaldson, both with our Office of
Research and Engineering, will assist in the presentation. At
this time, I would like to ask Dr. Ellingstad to begin the
presentation and direct your attention to the TV monitor in
front of you.
Dr. Ellingstad. Thank you, Chairman Hall.
Chairman Wolf and Congressman Sabo, I will let Ms.
Donaldson, our web master, do the driving here, and we will
step you through some of the features of the web site, which,
as Chairman Hall indicates, is accessible by www.ntsb.gov from
any Internet capable computer.
Basically, our purpose in providing the web site is to
display the Safety Board's information in a convenient and easy
to use forum to the public, and we have got a variety of
information that we will just quickly show you.
The first of those categories of information are the
accident data that the Safety Board is responsible to collect,
and particularly the aviation accident data from our accident
database. What you are seeing Ms. Donaldson accomplish right
now is a query against our database, which is accessible on the
web site. She has just asked the database to come up with all
of the aviation accidents in the State of Virginia since
January of 1997, and the search reveals 27 records meet this
criterion. We can pick any particular record, click on it, and
we are provided with a narrative description of the accident as
well as the probable cause of that accident if it has been
determined.
Also, with respect to the aviation accident data, we
provide routinely monthly statistical summaries of all aviation
accidents, and these are usually out by the 15th ofthe month
following the month being reported on.
Every spring, we also produce a pie chart of transportation
accident statistics, and these data are also available at our
web site.
We also provide the accident reporting forms for pilots.
Another major source of information that the web site
serves to provide to the public are the publications of the
Safety Board. At the moment, we have a listing of all of the
publications, accident reports, safety studies, other
publications that have been produced by the Board.
What we are showing you are highway publications.
Within the next 2 months, available on the web will be the
full text of all of the major accident reports and safety
studies produced by the Board since January 1996. They can be
downloaded to any citizen's personal computer. That is coming
very quickly.
Another important source of information is our most wanted
list. We have this accessible either as the complete list of
most wanted safety issues or by transportation modality. What
we see here are most wanted issues in the railroad area, and we
can click on one of those and pull up all of the status
information about that safety recommendation since the time it
was issued.

safety board web site uses

We will, by the end of this calendar year, provide public
access through our web site to the entire safety
recommendations database, so that the web site will produce a
complete text of all of our recommendations and all of the
correspondence associated with those recommendations.
Other items on the web site are a description of the family
assistance program, including the full text of the disaster
assistance plan, indications of upcoming activities, et cetera.
Another important feature that we feel has been useful on a
web site is our job opportunities list of vacancies. An
indication of the success of this is we were able to locate and
hire Miss Donaldson through that kind of an advertisement, so
we believe that that has been effective.
Finally, I would like to show you another use for the web
site. We provided information to the public about the public
hearing regarding TWA flight 800 that was conducted in December
over in Baltimore.
What we provided on our web site was factual information
before the hearing started, the schedule of the hearing, as
well as all of the exhibits that were used during the hearing.
Each evening of the hearing our public affairs staff provided a
summary that was immediately posted to the web, and when the
hearing concluded we put the entire transcript of the hearing
out on the web. That is available for browsing and for
downloading for anybody that wishes to look at it.
In addition, we also added some of the computer simulations
and animations that were presented during the hearing.
This is the simulation or the reconstruction of the
accident sequence that was conducted by our performance
engineers and used during the course of the hearing, and that
again is displayed on the web site.
I might also add that the wherewithal to produce this kind
of graphic computer simulation and animation that has been very
important to our investigative activity has been possible
because of the hardware and software resources that we have
been able to procure thanks to the actions of this committee.
We can also show you another simulation. This is the
reconstructed center fuel tank, and the surrounding fuselage
structure, again using some of the computer graphics and
animation capability. Our purpose in doing this was to very
carefully account for all of the structure surrounding the tank
and rule out the possibility that there could have been an
external intrusion to the tank that would have triggered an
explosion. Again, this computer reconstruction was provided by
the software and hardware resources that we were able to
acquire with your assistance.
Finally, illustrating again the resources committed to the
TWA 800 investigation and the features of the web site, this
very short video clip is from our quarter scale explosion
testing program that was conducted in Denver by the California
Institute of Technology and the Applied Research Associates.
Again, all of this information available to any citizen with a
computer and access to the Internet.
We expect to do a similar information presentation for the
upcoming Guam KAL hearing that will be conducted in Hawaii, and
for other hearings.
That is all we have. Thank you.

family assistance program

Mr. Hall. Thank you.
Next I would like to move, Mr. Chairman, to the subject of
our family assistance program.
During the past 30 years, over 100,000 aviation accidents
have been investigated by the Safety Board; and in October of
1996 Congress gave the NTSB the additional responsibility of
coordinating the Federal effort for the families of aviation
accident victims. Since that time, we have hired a family
affairs staff of seven people; developed, in concert with
family advocacy groups and the aviation industry, a Safety
Board family assistance plan; and provided family assistance at
four accidents to date. Those are the United Express accident
in Quincy, Illinois, with 14 fatalities; the Comair accident in
Monroe, Michigan, with 29 fatalities; the Korean Airlines
accident in Guam with 228 fatalities; and the Scenic Airlines
accident in Montrose, Colorado, with nine fatalities.
Along with these accidents we have continued our work with
the families of TWA 800 victims, the ValueJet flight 592
families and those from the accident involving USAir flight
427.
The support for this program for the families has been
overwhelming, Mr. Chairman. Without the aid of your leadership
and this committee we would not have had the resources to
provide the needed and much appreciated assistance to these
family members. I know that they join me in thanking you and
this committee for that assistance.

air bag safety

Mr. Chairman, I would now like to discuss one of the many
issues addressed by the Board this year. I am just going to
select one for brief presentation, and that is the subject of
automobile air bags. While I can only summarize the work here,
I have provided for you a much more in-depth description of our
work during 1997, and the long testimony of course, has been
submitted for the record.
In March of this past year, NTSB conducted an international
public forum regarding air bag and automobile occupant
restraint use as a continuation of the Board's safety study of
child passenger protection and our accident investigations in
this area the preceding year and the recommendations that were
made. The Board brought together representatives of the
automobile industry, air bag manufacturers, insurance, safety
and consumer groups, car crash victims who were injured or
saved by the air bags and representatives from the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration to have an open and
forthright discussion on the increasing number of injuries and
fatalities due to air bag deployment and nonuse of passenger
restraint systems.
The Board also included automobile specialists from around
the world to testify before the forum on automobile safety
devices used in their countries.
I am pleased to report that a number of improvements
related to air bags have occurred as a result of the Safety
Board's public forum and safety recommendations.
As you will note on the screen, the number of children
killed by air bags declined for the first time since passenger side air
bags became available. The number of children killed dropped from 23 in
1996 to 14 in 1997 at the same time as we had a dramatic increase in
the number of passenger side air bag equipped vehicles on the road.
This decrease can be directly attributed to the Safety Board's
recommendation to improve public education through warning labels in a
nationwide media campaign.
Other actions taken as a result of our recommendations
include installation of depowered air bags, a program to allow
cut-off switch hardware that will allow owner or user
discretion in disabling air bag protection, research on
increasing air bag deployment thresholds and efforts to develop
a time schedule for the installation of advanced technology air
bags.

passenger side air bag accident

I might note, Mr. Chairman, that this is still regrettably
a current issue.
On February 5th, in Lubbock, Texas, a 6-month-old girl was
killed by a passenger side air bag that was activated in the
front seat of a Ford Explorer that was in a rear end collision
with a tractor trailer. I have a copy of the UPI story, and I
would submit that for the record as well.
Mr. Wolf. Without objection.
[The information follows:]

Texas Baby Dies From Car Air Bag

Lubbock, Texas, Feb. 6 (UPI)--A 6-month-old girl is dead a
day after the air bag in the front seat of a Ford Explorer
activated in a rear-end collision with a tractor-trailer.
Hospital officials say she was brain dead and removed her
from life support just after 9 a.m.
Lubbock Police Lt. Gordon Hoffman told United Press
International today the tiny victim suffered head injuries when
the passenger side air bag slammed into her. He said, ``We
figure the rear-end collision may have thrust the kid forward
and knocked her back.''
He said it appeared the child safety seat in which the
child rode was not fastened down, nor was the infant secured in
the safety seat.
Hoffman says the case could be referred to the district
attorney for prosecution.
Another small child was in the back seat of the Explorer,
but hospital officials say he was not injured.
The accident occurred as the 18-wheeler slowed to exit
Interstate 27. Hoffman said there were no skid marks from the
Explorer, ``so I'm assuming (the driver) just didn't see it.''
Hoffman says the collision did only moderate damage to the
Explorer.

highway safety issues

Mr. Hall. Along with this work in highway safety, NTSB
continues its efforts on examining double trailer truck
operations and training improvements, trucking company driver
selection and certification, school bus crashworthiness and the
safety of passing grade crossings at highway and train track
intersections.
This is only one example of the Safety Board's activity
during the past year. As you know, the Safety Board has
participated in two major accident investigations in recent
months involving U.S.-manufactured aircraft--the crash of a
Boeing 737 in Indonesia and the crash of a DC-9 in the
Philippines. It is the support of your committee and others
that provides us the resources to respond to these major
international events and to help find ways to ensure such
accidents don't happen again, either in our country or
worldwide, as well as helping maintain worldwide confidence in
American-manufactured products.

staff hiring

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I am happy to report that the
Safety Board has either hired or committed to hire all but
three of the 25 positions provided by the Congress for this
fiscal year.
Miss Donaldson happens to be one of the individuals that
was hired with the additional positions provided. She is a
former computer systems analyst at the Census Bureau, has a
mathematics degree from the University of North Carolina and
has done all of the work on our web site.
Mr. Chairman, I made a commitment to you that I would fill
any new positions we had by the time we met again. Of the three
remaining positions of the 25, we had two commitments from
which the applicants declined at the last minute and a third
position we were unable to obtain a list of qualified
applicants. All three of those have been re-advertised, and we
are going to fill them just as quickly as possible.
I am very proud of the quality of these new hires, Mr.
Chairman, and I have brought, for the record, a summary of some
of the biographical background. I feel the greatest legacy I
can leave to the Board, as the Chairman, is the quality of the
individuals that are hired during my Chairmanship and
leadership at the Board. So that will also, with your
permission, be provided for the record.
Mr. Wolf. Without objection.
[The information follows:]

[Pages 8 - 18--The official Committee record contains additional material here.]

Mr. Hall. Let me just say, in closing, Mr. Chairman, that I
do not know whether you saw a recent network made-for-
television drama featuring the National Transportation Safety
Board. But, in the movie, we noted an NTSB helicopter had been
featured in which the IIC, or investigator in charge, arrived
at the accident site in a black helicopter with the NTSB name
on the side. I must report to you that, after a complete
search, we have been unable to identify any helicopter in our
inventory and I want you to know the Chairman does not have a
helicopter.
With that, Mr. Chairman, that concludes my brief remarks.
Mr. Wolf. Who played you? Richard Gere?
Mr. Hall. I wish.
Mr. Wolf. Mr. Hall, thank you very much for your testimony.
[The prepared statement of Jim Hall follows:]

[Pages 20 - 65--The official Committee record contains additional material here.]

ntsb web site hits

Mr. Wolf. We have a lot of questions. As we go through the
questions if you can be very succinct but also elaborate a lot
for the record. I appreciate the good job you and your people
have done. The Committee on both sides of the aisle has been
very, very supportive of your appropriation request as, quite
frankly, we will again this year. But I do appreciate that, and
I wanted to make that clear.
Before I get into the questions, how many contacts or hits
do you have on this web site a day now?
Ms. Donaldson. We have right now about----
Mr. Hall. Why don't you please come up? Because she needs
to provide that for the record. This is Ms. Donaldson.
Ms. Donaldson. Right now, we have about 1,500 hits a day.
On the first day of the TWA hearing, we had over 26,000 in one
day. In addition, we had mirror sites at CNN Interactive and a
newspaper in Long Island, New York, that mirrored the
information; and they both said they had over 100,000 hits that
week.

most wanted list recommendations

Mr. Wolf. Well, thank you.
Mr. Hall, for several years the Safety Board has maintained
a most wanted list of safety recommendations. What
recommendations are currently on the Board's most wanted list;
and, for the record, please provide the Committee with a copy
of the list.
Mr. Hall. Mr. Chairman, we have 21 issues on our most
wanted list. In May of 1997 we removed the railroad hazardous
material tank car recommendations because regulations have been
issued to modify and achieve an acceptable level of safety.
At the same time, we added four issues--air frame
structural icing, the explosive mixture in fuel tanks on
transport category aircraft, airplane cargo compartment fires,
and automatic information recording devices.
We are planning a major review and possible reorganization
of the list this year, but I would be glad to provide a copy of
the current list for the record.
[The information follows:]

[Pages 67 - 68--The official Committee record contains additional material here.]

status of most wanted recommendations

Mr. Wolf. How many of the recommendations have been placed
on the most wanted list this year? Did you say four?
Mr. Hall. That is correct.
Mr. Wolf. Which of these recommendations is DOT making
progress in addressing and which ones have been stalled that
you are concerned with?
Mr. Hall. I would like to ask Mr. Sweedler to join me to
respond to that. He is Director of our Office of Safety
Recommendations and Accomplishments.
Mr. Sweedler. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee,
progress has been made on many of the issues, certainly flight
data recorders. While we are disappointed with the time it took
to accomplish it, the final rule is in place, and the recorders
will be installed.
The runway incursion issue is troubling to us, because
there has been a 70 percent increase since 1993 of runway
incursions, including a 13 percent increase just last year. The
FAA is on track now to install conflict alert equipment, but it
is about 5 years overdue.
Other things, such as pilot background checks, is almost
complete.
With regard to the airplane cargo compartment fire issue,
we understand that a rule will be issued shortly that will
require suppression and detection in all airplane cargo
compartments.
Tremendous work has been done on the youth driving issue,
and almost all States now have zero tolerance laws. That was an
issue that you, Mr. Chairman, supported. I am pleased that only
two States are left and----
Mr. Wolf. What are the two States?
Mr. Sweedler. Mississippi and South Carolina are the two
States that still need to pass that.
The Chairman mentioned the progress on the occupant
protection issue, the issue that you were so instrumental in
last year. More than 100,000 educational video tapes have been
distributed by Ford, in addition to the 30,000 or 40,000 NHTSA
put out. I think 50 masters were made and given to other groups
to produce, so that has been very good.

states without administrative license revocation laws

We now have 39 States that have administrative license
revocation for all drivers who drive drunk in place.
Mr. Wolf. For the record, will you list the 11 who do not
have?
Mr. Sweedler. Certainly, sir.
[The information follows:]

The 11 states that do not have administrative license
revocation laws are Kentucky, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey,
New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, and Washington.

status of most wanted recommendations

Mr. Sweedler. Some of the others we haven't gotten as much
progress on----
Mr. Hall. Let me mention, if I could, as most disconcerting
to me is human fatigue in transportation operations. We made
recommendations to the Secretary to address that subject in all
of the modes of transportation. While a great deal of research
has been conducted, none of that research has gone into
rulemaking or changed the current hours of duty and service in
all of the transportation operations. As we see the increased
sophistication of technology and dependence on technology in
transportation operations, I think that is an important issue.
You may want to comment on others.
Mr. Sweedler. The only other one I thought I would give an
example of is the positive train separation, the equipment that
would prevent many of these collisions we see in the railroad
industry but we still need a commitment from the industry to go
forward. There is a lot of testing and pilot projects. The FRA
has been quite proactive on this issue, but the industry still
has not made a firm commitment to install this equipment.

recommendation acceptance rates

Mr. Wolf. Last year, the Board testified that, although the
Department of Transportation is increasingly implementing
NTSB's recommendations, there are some modal administrations
that do not do as good a job. Specifically, the Coast Guard,
FRA and RSPA have had acceptance rates of below 80 percent for
the past 3 years, which is below the Department's average. Why
do you believe this is occurring?
Would you like to go through them first on the current
numbers?
Mr. Sweedler. Mr. Chairman, we went back and did the
average for the last 5 years just to see how each agency was
doing. As we mentioned, they are much more responsive. For
example, FAA is up to 88 percent. If we just looked at the last
5 years, the Federal Highway Administration is at 80 percent;
FRA is at 79 percent. That is up from their historic figure.
NHTSA is at 83, and RSPA is at 93, and even the Coast Guard is
up to 84 percent. So----
Mr. Wolf. What were they last year?
Mr. Sweedler. Historically, the FRA had been down in the
70s, as had the Coast Guard. So this is a big increase, and a
lot of that comes about from our very aggressive follow-up
program. I mean, we just don't make the recommendations and, as
you know, let it sit there. We work closely with them in trying
to bring about the implementation of these recommendations.

safety recommendations of concern

Mr. Wolf. Is there any particular one or two you are
particularly concerned about? Are you worried if they don't do
something, there will be bad ramifications?
Mr. Sweedler. I think there are quite a few.
Mr. Hall. There are two concerns.
The recommendations I mentioned on human fatigue, the
recommendations that are outstanding on the TWA 800 and ValuJet
accidents are of concern to us, as well as the recommendations
that had previously been made on the 737 aircraft, and the
retrofit of flight data recorder information on those existing
aircraft.
Mr. Wolf. What does it look like in time? If people had
been acting the way you thought was appropriate, how long would
they have taken to put them in effect? I mean, how late are
they? ValuJet has been----
Mr. Hall. It obviously varies from accident to accident. I
couldn't put a time frame on it, other than my biggest
disappointment has been the urgency in which these items, once
they have been identified, have been addressed.
Mr. Wolf. The TWA one, does it bother you? The fact it
hasn't been done means there could be a problem somewhere else.
Mr. Hall. It is certainly of concern to us.
I was very encouraged at the public hearing, Mr. Chairman,
that both the FAA and Boeing indicated that, based on the
information that had been previously provided to them by Mr.
Sheppard at the FAA fuels flammability conference andat our
hearing, they would work with us in a cooperative effort to try to
address the problem of fuel tank flammability on an accelerated basis.
Dr. Loeb has laid out a four-page agenda of different
programs that will be undertaken in coordination with the FAA
and with Boeing.
I have met with Mr. Harry Arnold, who is the vice president
of that area for Boeing Aircraft Company, and Jane Garvey, the
head of the FAA. Both of them have committed to me their full
support in working with us on completing the tests at Cal Tech,
and the FAA is reconsidering all of the recommendations that we
previously made. I am hopeful there will be a response
forthcoming in the near future.
Mr. Wolf. Mr. Sabo.

staff hiring problems

Mr. Sabo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome.
I noticed you indicated you had trouble filling three
positions. Are you having trouble finding qualified people for
your positions? And what is the nature of the background in job
requirement where you are having the problem?
Mr. Hall. I will let our managing director respond on this.
Let me say, first of all, Mr. Sabo, a lot of it may be that
NTSB has a lot of visibility and attention in the past 24
months, but we have not been lacking for applicants.
Mr. Sabo. So for most jobs you have a significant pool to
choose from?
Mr. Hall. Yes, very well-qualified applicants. I put an
emphasis on trying to be sure that our work force is diverse,
as well as being technically qualified. We have an emphasis in
both of those areas, to finding the very best people we can and
being sure that our work force is as representative as we can
make it of the population. I think we made a great deal of
progress in both of those areas.
Peter, you might want to comment further or Mr. Keller, my
chief financial officer, who are more involved in the day-to-
day hiring.
Mr. Sabo. Just a summary.
Mr. Goelz. We have had enormous success in recruiting good
people, which has surprised us, frankly.
Mr. Sabo. Except that, in some places, you have had
trouble. What is the nature of those jobs?
Mr. Goelz. We have had difficulty in recruiting in highly
technical areas, like fire and explosion investigation.
We had, during 1996 and 1997, only one senior fire and
explosion expert, who, frankly, was near retirement. He worked
extensively on the ValuJet accident and then was brought in to
work extensively on Long Island on TWA. In the middle of the
TWA accident we had to move him to Newburgh, New York, for a
FedEx accident, where a cargo plane caught fire and burned.
That was one of the areas we had great difficulty recruiting
because it is a very specialized area.
Mr. Sabo. Okay.
Mr. Hall. Let me say, Congressman Sabo, overall it is
challenging to be sure we are keeping technical expertise. In
the aviation area, with about 150 people, I have oversight of
FAA with 40,000 and Boeing with 200,000 employees.
I need to be sure that the engineers, the technical people,
the computer specialists, are the very best. I am constantly
trying to work with OPM and OMB to get additional SES and
higher grade positions so I can be competitive in not only
attracting new people but keeping the quality people we have.

attrition rate

Mr. Sabo. Do you have much staff turnover?
Mr. Hall. I do not have a number on that. Do you, Craig?
We can provide it for the record.
Mr. Keller. We can provide it for the record, but our
attrition rate for 1996 and 1997 has been down to 6 percent.
That is down from the previous years which were about 8
percent.
[The information follows:]

For the past two years, the Board's attrition rate has been
6 percent.

transportation of nuclear waste

Mr. Sabo. One of the very tough issues that we face is what
we do with nuclear waste in this country, and a whole host of
issues are involved. One of them that gets raised whenever we
consider it is the question of transportation and nuclear
waste. Has your agency dealt with that issue at all? Has it
come to any conclusions?
Mr. Hall. I dealt with that some in my previous life in the
Governor's office in Tennessee because of Oak Ridge. Mr.
Chipkevich, who is from Tennessee as well, is head of our
pipeline and hazardous materials office. You might want to
comment on that, Bob, and the exercise we participated in.
Mr. Chipkevich. Yes, sir.
We haven't had any accidents recently involving radioactive
materials, nuclear waste.
We did participate in an exercise last spring in
Albuquerque, New Mexico, where there was a simulated accident
involving nuclear weapons. We did, in fact, put a team together
to participate in that exercise, to interface with Department
of Energy personnel as well as Department of Defense personnel
on how we would conduct an investigation and interact with the
other groups.
Mr. Sabo. Have we had any problems currently with
transportation of nuclear waste?
Mr. Hall. I am not aware of any that we have investigated,
sir, recently.
There was one accident--and I was just asking my assistant,
Miss Smith, to try and remember that. It was an accident that
involved 500 pound bombs that we did investigate.
Mr. Sabo. Any problems?
Mr. Hall. No, sir.

aviation contract maintenance

Mr. Sabo. One other issue, if I might, Mr. Chairman.
I noticed you made some reference in some of your reports
indicating problems with contracted-out maintenance of
airplanes. How large is that problem and what is the scope of
it? And how is that related to contracting out that goes beyond
the borders of this country?
Mr. Hall. I was recently out in our Los Angeles office
speaking with one of our investigators who is conducting an
investigation where an airplane was being deiced, and the
deicing operation had been contracted out. The individual fell
out of the bucket; and that was the accident event.
We are actively investigating the supervision and oversight
of that deicing operation and the contracting out of that
deicing operation for that particular airline.
Of course, this is an issue we looked at and explored in
the ValuJet accident. Dr. Bernard Loeb is the head of our
Office of Aviation Safety, and I would like him to add more
detail on it.
Dr. Loeb. As Chairman Hall indicated, in the ValuJet Miami
accident the issue of contracted maintenance was a significant
issue. We explored it in depth.
Essentially, all of the maintenance for the ValuJet
airplanes was contracted out. We found that it puts a
significant burden on the carrier to oversee that, and it puts
an even greater burden on the FAA to oversee the carrier's
oversight of the maintenance program.
About a year before the ValuJet accident in Miami, ValuJet
had an engine failure accident that occurred at Atlanta. That
engine had been overhauled at a Turkish Airlines facility, and
purchased by ValuJet and brought into this country. There were
significant questions about the inspection and overhaul process
and raised some questions about the FAA's oversight of the
Turkish facility.
These two accidents are not the only accidents in which we
have seen issues regarding part 145 maintenance repair
facilities. The Board is, in fact, in the process of developing
a program for a safety study on part 145 maintenance
operations.

aviation maintenance

Mr. Sabo. Excuse me, what is part 145?
Dr. Loeb. I apologize for that. It is the FAA regulations
that govern maintenance operations, other than one under which,
for example, an air carrier would do its own in-house
maintenance.
Mr. Hall. As part of our ValuJet investigation, one of the
things we did is called on the FAA to review the volume and
nature of the work requirements for principal maintenance
inspectors assigned to part 145 repair stations that performed
the maintenance on major air carriers to ensure that the
inspectors have adequate time and resources to perform their
surveillance duties, as carried in our recommendation A-9-75.
We have received a response from the FAA that it is considering
policy guidance that will help resolve resource conflicts and
balance and surveillance workload.
Mr. Sabo. What is the relative percentage of maintenance
that is done by contract versus by the airline companies?
Mr. Hall. I don't know a percentage, but I am sure it is
growing.
Do you know, Dr. Loeb?
If we can find any numbers, we will provide it for the
record.
Dr. Loeb. It really depends on the type of operation.
The majority of the large carriers do their own maintenance
in-house, most of it depending on where the airplane might be.
Some of it may be done overseas for them, if the airplane is
overseas and needs it.
The majority of smaller carriers do contract out the
maintenance.
Mr. Hall. When you say smaller operations, you are talking
about 20 percent of the market, so it is not an insignificant
amount of the passenger miles.
Mr. Sabo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wolf. Mr. Pastor.

boeing 737 aircraft

Mr. Pastor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Last year, we talked about two issues. One dealt with the
737 and the problems we were having with the rudder. Since
then, the FAA has come out with a ruling, but it asked
compliance for the year 2000; and in between now and then we
are going to have 737s flying all over the place. What are we
doing to ensure that, first of all, the pilots get the training
that they assured us they are going to get; and, secondly,
where is Boeing at in replacing the rudders?
Mr. Hall. Congressman Pastor, we had concern as a result of
the 427 Aliquippa accident about the flight data recorder
because it only had 11 parameters, and the need for pilot
training for the recognition of the recovery of unusual events
that could lead to the loss of control. I am pleased to say
that most of that training is now in place, and modifications
are being made to the components of the Boeing 737 rudder
system to improve the safety of the design.
The FAA on August 4, 1997, issued an airworthiness
directive resulting in the Boeing 737 fleet of over 2,000
aircraft being modified with an improved power control unit
servovalve. On August 1, 1997, the FAA published a final rule
requiring installation of a newly designed rudder device system
by August 1, 2000. We are pleased with the action, but we were
concerned about the date of implementation.
Mr. Loeb may want to comment further. We anticipate later
this year to have a final report on our Pittsburgh accident
investigation, which is now in its third year.
Dr. Loeb. Let me first just respond to the issue of the
rudder PCU replacement program.
The Chairman is correct. There was a final rule. Boeing, by
this past summer, developed a replacement kit. About 100 units
were shipped out. They discovered there were some problems in
the rudder PCU replacement kit. They stopped the process, made
some fixes to it and began shipping them again this fall. There
are currently about 300 or 400 replacement kits for
approximately 3,000 Boeing 737s worldwide.
One of our concerns is whether they are going to be able to
meet the 2-year deadline. It is uncertain right now whether the
production capacity and the implementation of actually putting
them into the airplanes can be done in that time. We just don't
know right now.
Insofar as the training issue, a lot has been done in that
regard, as the Chairman has indicated.
One of the things we did ask for that has not been done
yet, and I don't know whether it will be done. We asked that,
in the unusual attitude training, that consideration be given
to training for events that the pilot is unlikely to expect; in
other words, what caused the upset in the first place. If it
was, in fact, a rudder hard over that caused the accident and
that is not fixed and they don't train for that event, then the
pilots are not going to receive the kind of training they need
to cope with what is happening because they haven't been
exposed to it.
So far, we have not gotten the response that we would like
from the FAA or from the industry in regard to that
recommendation.

boeing 737 aircraft

Mr. Pastor. Like you said, between now and the year 2000,
many flights by 737s--and, from what I have seen, the 737 is
becoming a very popular plane, especially for these airlines,
discount airlines, that are buying them used. As you see more
airlines doing the short flights on the 737, which is the
popular plane, you have probably more use, more frequency, and
yet we have this problem that for the next 2 years we will try
to address. So I would think that being concerned about air
safety for the passengers that we would kind of ask the FAA and
maybe you guys can encourage them to get this done faster.
Mr. Hall. Congressman Pastor, I share your concern. I met
with Administrator Garvey on December 17 of last year to
discuss our most wanted list. I might note that was done at her
request, and one of the main things we emphasized in that
meeting was our concern on the implementation of this
modification.
Mr. Pastor. Because it is very important to continue to
assist her. Because it is a safety issue that all of us are
affected by.
Mr. Hall. That is correct.

aircraft icing

Mr. Pastor. So I would encourage you to do it.
How is our icing program doing? Because I have to fly to
Chicago once in a while, like every weekend.
Mr. Hall. We are presently involved in an icing related
accident that occurred at Monroe, Michigan. Testing is under
way, and Dr. Loeb can bring you up to date, Congressman.
Mr. Loeb. We made a number of recommendations following the
ATR-72 accident at Roselawn, Indiana. The report was completed
last year. Some of those recommendations have been acted upon
favorably by the FAA; and research has been undertaken.
Then as the Chairman indicated, the accident at Monroe
occurred. It raises additional questions about icing. Some of
them are different from those that were raised at Roselawn. In
fact, some action has been taken on the particular airplane
that was involved, an Embraer-120. But research is continuing
regarding the central issues that go to the certification of
the airplanes and the conditions under which untoward events
could happen in icing.
There is a lot of research that is being done in
conjunction with the FAA, and at NASA Lewis in Cleveland.
We expect to bring our report to the Board on the Comair
accident--that will probably, undoubtedly, have a number of
additional recommendations attached to it--this spring, but
there is a lot of work left to be done. I think the FAA has
taken a number of steps, but there is more to be done.

aircraft icing research

Mr. Pastor. What time frame do you have to get from the
research and to the practical application?
Mr. Loeb. It depends, obviously, on the nature of the
research. But when it involves wind tunnel testing or ice
tunnel testing or ice tests behind a tanker, those projects
take a long time to plan, develop and implement; and so we have
been talking about this problem now for years. I hope that
within the next year or two there are going to be some
significant changes introduced by the FAA based on some of the
research.
There are rubber boots on the leading edges of wings and,
in fact, tail surfaces of a number of planes, so that you can
actually expand them and they will pop the ice that forms on
them.
The belief has been that you have to wait until you get a
quarter to half inch buildup on them before you can pop them.
Because if you don't it will build a bridge and you will never
be able to pop them and so forth.
There is now work under way to determine whether, in fact,
that is true or not. It was just a commonly accepted belief,
but no one had ever verified it, no one had ever gone into a
tunnel.
What we have learned is that when you do pop the boots, in
between the boot cycling, you can get very, very small amounts
of roughness from the icing that can create problems that had
not generally been recognized and that many of the pilots, even
those flying in the Midwest, just are not aware of.
This is a piece of information learned from the current
research. I think, as we finish the research that is going on,
lots of good things will happen.

turbulence accidents

Mr. Pastor. One more question, Mr. Chairman.
Recently--I missed your movie, but I did read Air Frame,
which will probably become a movie very quickly. In there, air
turbulence and also maintenance of parts, buying of parts in
foreign countries--and it was a very interesting book and
increased my paranoia on the whole thing on flying, especially
how we handle or are not handling air turbulence.
I know it was an issue that was recently experienced by an
airline flying over the Pacific, and I don't know if you can
blame El Nino for this, but you seem to have some turbulence
problems. Is that a phenomenon you guys are looking at?
Mr. Hall. Congressman, Air Frame is actually after the MD-
11 accident that occurred in Shemya, Alaska. Many have said the
author had used that as a sort of a prop for his book.
Between 1983 and 1997, the Board investigated 99 turbulence
accidents and incidents that resulted in two fatalities and 117
serious injuries. Of course, we are currently investigating the
turbulence event that occurred with United Airlines in the
western Pacific on December 28 of last year that resulted in
one fatality and numerous injuries. We are looking into
turbulence forecasting, flight crew training, dissemination of
information on turbulence and crew procedures in areas where
turbulence is forecast.
I might note that when you are in your seat, buckled up, we
have not had any evidence of any serious injuries.
The National Weather Center is continuing efforts on
improving clear air turbulence and mountain wave forecast
products.
Northwest Airlines has a turbulence program, a very active
turbulence program; and they have been very active in that
area. They have a very good record in terms of turbulence
events.
The FAA Weather Research Program has a product development
team addressing this program, and the National Center for
Atmospheric Research is involved in studies on turbulence and
developing software for commercial aircraft.
I spoke last week in Oklahoma City at the cabin safety
conference.
We have a cabin safety study that is presently under way.
One of the things I hope we will address is the subject of
signage and notification so that, when you are in your seat,
you have your seat belt fastened.

speed limit effect on safety

Mr. Pastor. My last question, Mr. Chairman.
In Arizona, we now have the 75-mile-an-hour speed limit;
and, Mr. Chairman, I want to say, unequivocally, I stay at that
speed limit.
Mr. Sabo. Never a mile under.
Mr. Pastor. Well, occasionally, it is a mile under it.
Usually I guess the theory is that the Highway Patrol will
let you go about five miles per hour higher than that, so it
translates into 80 and 85 miles an hour; and people are zooming
down the freeway and highways fairly fast. Are you guys
conducting any studies to see the effect of the increased speed
limit and the number of accidents, number of deaths?
Mr. Hall. Mr. Sweedler has some information in that area.
It is certainly an area we are actively interested in,
Congressman.
Mr. Sweedler. A number of studies are under way, and one
has been completed just last fall by the Insurance Institute
for Highway Safety.
They looked at the States that actually raised the speed
limit, and looked at those highways that had the speed limit
raised to at least 70 from December 1995 to early 1996. They
found that on rural and urban interstates and freeways, where
most of the speed limit changes occurred, speed limit increases
were associated with a 12 percent increase in occupant
fatalities. On other roads where the speed limits were raised
less frequently, occupant fatalities increased by only 3
percent, which they said was insignificant or nonsignificant.
On all roads combined, occupant fatalities increased by 6
percent, and it is estimated that during the last 9 months of
1996 there were 500 additional deaths in the 12 States that
raised speed limits. The National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration has a study under way they will be releasing
shortly. Using somewhat different methods, I think their early
results are quite similar to what the Insurance Institute
found.

driver age

Mr. Hall. I might add, Congressman, one of the things that
is of active concern to our Board are two issues; one, the
mismatch of automobiles and trucks on our highways; and the
other is just the demographics that are going to impact our
interstates and highways between now and 2005. We have some
numbers I will provide for the record on the growth in both the older
drivers and younger drivers.
This chart depicts the growth of young teenagers, 15 to 20,
that will occur between 1995 and 2005 on our highways. You can
see we have more and more traffic on our highways, and we are
going to be adding more and more young people driving on our
highways. That is why one of the things the Board has been
actively supporting is graduated licensing for young drivers.
This is quite a dramatic chart to me, and I will provide
that for the record with the permission of the Chairman.
Mr. Wolf. Without objection.
[The information follows:]

The National Transportatation Safety Board is providing information
on the growth in both the older driver and younger driver populations.
Individuals over age 64 made up about 10 percent of the population
in 1970. According to the US Census Bureau, in 1990, 13.8 percent of
the population was over 64. This percent will increase to almost one
quarter of the population by the year 2030. In 1994, there were about
25 million licensed drivers over the age of 64, about 14 percent of all
licensed drivers.
The high school-age population is projected to continue to grow
from almost 14 million in 1992 to over 17 million 2005. In 2010, it is
projected that the population in this age group will reach an all time
high of 17.8 million.

PROJECTED PERCENTAGE OF THE POPULATION THAT WILL BE OVER 64 YEARS OR BETWEEN 14 TO 17 YEARS OLD
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2020 2030
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Adults over 64 years............................. 13.8 14.2 14.3 14.5 15.3 18.7 22.8
Teenagers 14-17 years old........................ 5.3 5.6 5.7 5.9 5.7 5.2 5.4
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source 1990 Census

Mr. Hall. I don't have it blown up quite as well--oh, it is
on the screen. Thank you. Thanks, Vernon. I am impressed.
The older drivers are on the screen, too. I am afraid I am
in that category so I, of course, don't pay as much attention
to that.

Vehicle Mismatch

Mr. Pastor. When you talk about the mismatch, what are you
referring to?
Mr. Hall. Size in terms of trucks and the passenger
vehicles.
Mr. Pastor. You are talking about semis.
Mr. Hall. And sports utilities, yes.
Mr. Pastor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wolf. Mr. Olver.

Young Drivers

Mr. Olver. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just out of curiosity, that graph
with the pretty colors--where is the minimum of millions per
year taking on driving? What year is that?
Mr. Sweedler. This particular chart is the number of young
people in the population.
Mr. Olver. Where is the minimum in that number?
Mr. Sweedler. You mean the minimum age for driving?
Mr. Olver. No, the minimum in the number of----
Mr. Sweedler. Oh, 1993 is the year.
Mr. Olver. This is simple data as to how many people are
getting to the age of driving in every given year.
Mr. Sweedler. Yes, sir.
Mr. Olver. Is that a composite of all the driving age--a
summation of all the people driving, even though they may be
coming at different ages?
Mr. Sweedler. This is a projection of the people that will
be in that age group.

Aviation Investigation Costs

Mr. Olver. Maybe it was on the chart, and I could not read
it from a distance, so I was curious what that was. Thank you.
We will get it as part of the record somewhat later.
I wanted to ask you--I noticed the aviation investigations
that have been completed--there are a series of them--of 1996
investigations or accidents which seem to indicate that, if
things go well, it takes roughly a year to get an investigation
completed. What does it cost--what, for instance, would have
been the cost of the ValuJet airlines investigation in Miami
versus, for instance, the Aliquippa, the USAir flight, which
has not been completed, and the TWA flight 800?
Mr. Hall. We have some information on the TWA flight 800
accident because that has been such an extraordinary spending.
I would call on Mr. Keller, who is our chief financial officer,
Congressman, to respond to your question.
Mr. Keller. I have some limited information concerning
ValuJet. One of the pieces of information is Public Law 105-18,
that gave the Board authority to reimburse the State and
localities for expenses that they incurred. For NTSB's portion
of the cost, NTSB does not have a cost accounting system to
where we track our salaries and benefits related to an
accident. We look at our accident cost based on overtime and
travel.
Mr. Olver. Are those budgets invented in other places or
are they just in the NTSB's?
Mr. Keller. They are in other budgets, such as the FAA.
Mr. Olver. They are drawn from them, and do all the places
have sufficient money to deal with the kinds of investigations
here, when in some years there is not much, while in some years
there are some pretty serious things going on?
Mr. Keller. Well, sir, we have a party system, for which we
get contributions, or we share the cost in the investigation
with some of the industry, such as Boeing or the airline that
may be involved. We will get the FAA who will contribute also,
and the Board uses its emergency fund when the costs are
extraordinary.

Status of Investigations

Mr. Olver. I would be interested to know what the various
investigations, the ones that are completed in the past year, the five
of them that are listed, what the expenditures thus far are in the
older ones that are still ongoing, the 1996 and earlier.
Mr. Hall. We can provide that for the record. Let me make
clear we would just be providing our percentage of the cost,
not the FAA, or any of the other party.
[The information follows:]

The following table identifies the non-pay costs to the Safety
Board for investigations completed during FY 1997 and so far in FY
1998, and also costs to date for ongoing investigations:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Travel
Accident site Airline cost
($000)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Completed Investigations (FY 1997):
Everglades, FL................... ValuJet 592 (DC-9)..... 246
Quincy, IL....................... United Express 5925 16
(Beechcraft 1900C).
Narrows, VA...................... Airborne Express (DC-8) 10
Jamaica, NY...................... Tower Air 41 (B-747)... 3
Flushing, NY..................... Delta Airlines 554 (MD- 3
88).
Cheyenne, WY..................... Cessna (177B).......... 5
Houston, TX...................... Continental Airlines 9
1943 (DC-9).
Nashville, TN.................... ValuJet 558 (DC-9)..... 2
Carrollton, GA................... Atlantic Southeast 26
Airlines 529 (EMB-120).
East Granby, CT.................. American Airlines 1572 16
(MD-83).
Completed Investigations (FY 1998):
Pensacola, FL.................... Delta Airlines 1288 (MD- 60
88).
Ongoing Investigations:
Miami, FL........................ Fine Air 101 (DC-8).... 32
Aliquippa, PA.................... USAir 427 (B-737)...... 528
West Palm Beach, FL.............. American Airlines 903 4
(A300).
Montrose, CO..................... Scenic Airlines (Cessna 10
208).
Guam............................. Korean Airlines 801 (B- 155
747).
Newark, NJ....................... Federal Express 14 (MD- 3
11).
East Moriches, NY................ TWA 800 (B-747)........ 23,068
Ida, MI.......................... Comair 3272 (EMB-120).. 50
Newburgh, NY..................... Federal Express (DC-10) 28
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Amounts exclude claims to be paid to local jurisdictions for
extraordinary expenses incurred related to Comair 3272, ValuJet 592,
and TWA 800. Amounts also exclude costs incurred and/or shared by
parties to the investigations (e.g., the FAA, aircraft/component
manufacturers, applicable airlines, union representatives, etc.)

aviation investigations completed

Mr. Olver. Are the percentages different?
Mr. Keller. We wouldn't have knowledge of the cost for
whatever the industry may have picked up, like the airline, or
Boeing or whoever participated with cost recovery of the
accident. We wouldn't know that.
Mr. Olver. Okay. How many of the list of ongoing
investigations would you expect to be complete within the next
3 to 6 months?
Dr. Loeb. Within the next 3 to 6 months.
Mr. Olver. That is a long time.
Dr. Loeb. That is a short time. Within the next 3 to 6
months, I hope to be able to complete the Comair investigation,
the Federal Express at Newburgh, which was a cargo fire, I
expect to complete the Fine Air Miami investigation, and if we
stretch the time just slightly, to get the Pittsburgh accident
to the Board, and if I could----
Mr. Olver. Pittsburgh is listed here as Aliquippa.
Dr. Loeb. Yes, sir.
Mr. Olver. What would be holding up things like the ones in
West Palm Beach and Newark, the Federal Express in Newark?
There were no fatalities there. Does it take a great deal
longer when there are fatalities or only when there are a great
many fatalities?
Dr. Loeb. Let me try to answer your question the best way I
can. Federal Express in Newark is not proceeding rapidly simply
because of resources at this time. The agency has put a
substantial portion of its resources in the last two and a half
years into 3 major accidents, ValuJet at Miami, TWA, and the
Pittsburgh accident. The reason for that is there were
significant issues in those accidents that we believe that
absolutely needed our highest priority attention. At the same
time, we tried to address the other accidents that are ongoing,
but unfortunately in some cases we simply do not have the
number of people to be able to pursue the investigations
simultaneously and concurrently. We have a limited number of
airplane performance engineers and we have a limited number of
systems engineers.
Mr. Olver. You have made a decision in the case of a couple
where there were zero fatalities that they were not so
critical, they were not likely to be producing----
Dr. Loeb. They were not at the level at which we believed
we could take people off the other investigations to put them
on that investigation at full speed. I would like to say, a
major investigation normally takes us 9 months to a year, at
least. If there is substantial research that has to be done, as
in the case of Pittsburgh, where we have done an incredible
number of tests over the last 3\1/2\ years,the process of doing
that just simply takes time. Even if we had more people we probably
could not have pursued that faster at that time. However, while we are
doing that and pursuing accidents like TWA and ValuJet at the same
time, we do not have the redundancy we would need in some areas like
airplane performance, systems, and so forth, to do them all
simultaneously at high speed.

FLIGHT DATA RECORDERS

Mr. Olver. How many of our scheduled passenger air flights
are operating with the minimum number of recorders, as you make
something of the fact that the number of parameters being
recorded was at the minimum in the case of the Pittsburgh
flight, which you advised has something to do with how quickly
you are able to come up with answers?
Dr. Loeb. At this point the majority of the airplanes
flying would only be required to have----
Mr. Olver. The same requirements?
Dr. Loeb. That is correct.
Mr. Olver. Has there been a gauge point or a time at which
they must have--you say a number of them now have 100
parameters.
Dr. Loeb. That is correct.
Mr. Olver. The new airplanes. Is there some standard for
how many they must be recording that you have laid down for
capital stock that is coming on line after such and such a
year?
Dr. Loeb. We have made recommendations, as the Chairman
indicated, to the FAA. They have promulgated rules that now
require newly manufactured and older airplanes to be
retrofitted according to a schedule that goes into the year
2004. Is that correct, Vernon?
Dr. Ellingstad. 2002.
Dr. Loeb. 2002, and it is very complex. It depends on when
the airplane was originally certificated, whether it was a wide
body, a narrow body and so forth.
Mr. Olver. What is the new minimum going to be by 2002? Is
there a minimum?
Mr. Hall. Before Dr. Ellingstad responds to that, let me
say, Congressman, that is what the FAA requires. Southwest
Airlines, with an all 737 fleet, has retrofitted all of their
aircraft immediately with modern flight data recorders.
Dr. Ellingstad.
Mr. Olver. That ought to make a good sound bite.
Dr. Ellingstad. Actually, the situation is even more
complicated than Dr. Loeb implied. There are several compliance
dates and there are several standards. For aircraft newly
manufactured after August of 2002, there will be 88 parameters
required.
Mr. Olver. After 2002.
Dr. Ellingstad. After August of 2002.
Mr. Olver. Regardless of the size, there will be at least
88?
Dr. Ellingstad. This is anything regulated under Part 121.
For those manufactured after August of 2000, the requirement is
57 parameters.
Mr. Olver. Everyone will be there by 2002 retrofitted?
Dr. Ellingstad. No, these are newly manufactured, and those
requirements for the very extensive recorders come in for the
newly manufactured aircraft. For aircraft manufactured after
1991, there is a compliance date of 2001, and those aircraft
will go up to 34 parameters. So it is scaled, and we are still
going to have a lot of 11 and 22 parameter recorders in the
older fleet for a considerable amount of time.
Mr. Olver. That is interesting.
Dr. Loeb. I will say this, by the year 2002, all the planes
will be equipped to provide a significant improvement in our
ability to pursue the investigation of the accident. So it will
be a significant step forward, although not anything that we
want.

FLIGHT DATA RECORDERS

Mr. Olver. If you are making all new ones after the year
2002 have 88 factors, and I don't know how many of those
factors are so arcane that they really are very low probability
kinds of factors, why, if people are having to go through the
retrofit, why wouldn't you make planes that are coming on line
after 1991 go up to that number also, since those planes
probably have another life of 20 years or something of usage.
Dr. Loeb. Because it depends on whether they are equipped
already with a digital acquisition unit that helps them to
capture and move the data. The problem is not the recorder. I
think that needs to be understood. It is not the black box. It
is the ability of the airplane to feed the black box. You have
to have sensors on the airplane and you have to be able to get
the information from those various sensors to the black box in
the tail of airplane. If you are doing it digitally, you have
to have the units in there that do it. For some of the older
airplanes, it really is----
Mr. Olver. You virtually might as well throw them away.
Dr. Loeb. That is why the staggered approach. There is a
basic minimum set of data we need, for example, that has not
been available to us, and was not available on TWA 800, was not
available on USAir 427. So, as I said, it will be a step
forward, but not everything we want. The timing is something
that is obviously of concern to us, because that is 4 years
from now. It is a long time to live with that situation, but
that is where we are now.

TRANSIT BUS SAFETY

Mr. Olver. Let me switch, if I may, to one other thing, Mr.
Chairman. In your highway program, I noticed that the case of
the child who was killed leaving a transit bus by a utility
truck, and the comment there is that you found no mechanism in
place that documents the extent to which transit buses are
being used to transport children to and from school. It is
amazing we don't have a lot more accidents, I would think,
because there are a lot of transit buses, and, yes, up my way
you have flashing lights and stop signs that come out and so
forth, but the transit buses have none of that. But I suppose
in general usage, when you see flashing lights, a lot of people
sort of see a shadow of a stop sign as well. Has anything been
done, this is some time ago, is there anything moving on
documenting the extent to which transit buses are being used?
Mr. Hall. Yes, Congressman. I would like to call on Mr. Joe
Osterman, who is the head of our Office of Highway Safety, for
comment on that accident and the recommendations we would make.
Mr. Osterman. Sir, the bottom line is we don't know how
many fatalities or serious injuries are caused to students
using transit buses to and from school because we are simply
not able to tally those statistics. Additionally, the Board
investigated a transit bus accident in Normandy, Missouri,
which led us to a special investigation regarding the oversight
of highway transit vehicles, not only driver selection, but
maintenance, their use, the statistics that are being used to
determine their safety, and a number of other issues. We will
be holding a public hearing in St. Louis the first week in
March. We are concerned about the oversight of this industry
and the statistics and representation of its safety record.
Mr. Olver. Why, then, does this Washington incident appear
here? How does it come onto the radar screen if there are
perhaps, as you are suggesting there may be, a number of
accidents involving transit buses which haven't appeared? Why
don't they appear on the screen? What is the trigger here.
Mr. Osterman. Traditionally, transit operators have been
prohibited from exclusively transferring students to and from
school. You cannot generally use a transit bus to replace a
school bus per se. But there have been voids in the rules that
permit transit operators to conduct what they call tripper service.
Essentially what the transit operators are able to do is establish a
route that is primarily used to transport students to and from school.
The difference is that a school bus cannot stop and pick up other
passengers. The transit bus is permitted to do that and will do it, if
necessary, or if someone flags it down at a stop. In the accident you
are referring to, this was a tripper accident. The route was only
established in the morning and in the evening. It was to and from
school essentially. If an adult had been on the side of the road and
flagged down the bus, the transit operator or the bus operator would
have been required to pick them up, but in reality that did not happen.
Statistics don't capture it as students, they capture most of these
accidents as either pedestrians or occupants of transit buses. It is
very difficult to figure out. Plus we have the compounding problem of a
lot of urban school systems use transit systems as the primary
transportation mechanism.
Mr. Olver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

aviation safety issues

Mr. Wolf. I thank you, Mr. Olver. We are going to go until
5:00 and if we don't finish we are going to come back. So if
you can be prepared to stay until 6:00, we have a lot of
questions. We are going to have quick votes, but I don't want
to make you come back, so if you could clear your schedules, I
would appreciate it.
With regard to the question Mr. Sabo had and Mr. Pastor had
is really a good takeoff on this. I share their concerns. I sat
through the hearings over the years, and we have heard you say,
with regard to the FAA, there is a delay here, this has not
taken place, the turbulence issue, the black box issue has been
a problem, issues on the most wanted list. I think you all do
an excellent job of investigating the accidents that take
place, but I know you share my concern that our goal is not
only to do a good job of investigating accidents that take
place, but to prevent accidents from taking place. I think Mr.
Pastor's comments with regard to the 737s were very relevent.
They are flying all over. What I would like to do, and I am
going to be talking to Jane Garvey, and let me say this, I
think Ms. Garvey has a no nonsense approach to running the FAA
and this would, I hope, be helpful to her. I would like to see
us, and I hope you would agree to participate, do the
following. There is no way of systematically measuring the
success that Mr. Pastor talks about on the 737. The runway
incursions are dramatically up. The ValuJet issue, I think it
is fair to say the ValuJet, should have never happened.

aviation safety review group

The TWA 800, the deicing issue, the repair statistics that
Mr. Sabo mentioned, what they are doing with regard to the
spare parts. We have a hard enough time dealing with the spare
parts in River City, let alone outside the country. The human
factors issue, you mentioned the turbulence issue, the United
Airlines coming out of Hawaii. This is what I would like to see
you do and I would like to see the Safety Board participate in
it. I would like to see a group set up that would help us
measure the progress FAA has made on the issues that the
Members have raised. I have been concerned about all these
things.
We looked at the issues on the most wanted list, the flight
data recorder, FAA, wake turbulence, FAA, mode C intruder
conflict alert system, FAA, pilot background checks, FAA, air
frame structural icing, FAA, explosive mixture in fuel tanks,
transport category, FAA, airplane cargo compartment storage,
FAA, airport runway incursion. This group would be set up to
help us measure the progress that has been made.
You come before the committee each year. This committee has
given you what you have asked for. I don't think we have ever
cut your budget. In fact, I think we have added to it. But how
do you measure the progress? Can you honestly say, and I am not
asking you to say it, can you honestly say aviation is safer
today than it was 5 years ago? You have the Pittsburgh
situation, ValuJet, TWA, and the controversy surrounding that
accident. I would like to see a team set up with offices over
at the FAA made up of someone from the Safety Board, someone
from the GAO, someone from the IG, someone from Mitre
Corporation, somebody from the Flight Safety Foundation,
perhaps somebody from ALPA, and perhaps there are 2 or 3 other
groups I haven't thought about, that would go in and look at
all of these recommendations, all of your most wanted list, the
things the Members have raised to develop a measurement stick
that we can honestly see how FAA is doing on aviation safety.
As you will see sometimes, when something comes in the news,
then FAA becomes proactive on it. Then a person retires, and it
is forgotten about. So somebody needs to put together a capable
group of men and women that would develop some safety
measurement mechanism. We would do it mainly for the FAA,
because this is the major concern at this time. Perhaps it
could be broadened in the future. Perhaps their office should
be over at the FAA. We can put the funding in. I don't think
anybody should be concerned about it, we are not talking about
a major new program. Then they would put together a quarterly
report that would tell the Members what progress is being made.
Mr. Pastor can see what is the progress on the 737, or what is
the progress or lack of progress on the runway incursion.
I am going to ask that we set up this group. It would take
somebody from all 5 or 6 of these agencies. I would hope the
Safety Board would participate in that, because you all do a
wonderful job of investigating what takes place. But I think
our number one priority should be safety. It would be wonderful
if we could put you out of business, and I know you would like
to be put out of business. The ideal thing would be there would
be no accidents, any. Our hope would be we could get to that
point.
So would you, and just listening to the Members and their
questions, have the Safety Board participate in something like
this? We could fashion a group that would develop a measurement
and then on a yearly basis put out a systematic report that
everyone could look at and then a quarterly report showing the
increase or the decrease of the activity.
Mr. Hall. Certainly, Mr. Chairman, we would be glad to
participate in that. Let me just say, in my 4 years as
Chairman, my major concern with the FAA has been the lack of
urgency within the organization in addressing these accidents
as they occurred, but I respectfully suggest that the most
important member to participate in any team like that would be
a representative from the OMB. As the Gore Commission
identified in its study, one of the major problems is the issue
of cost versus safety. They recommended that in the areas of
major accident investigation, that that cost-benefit analysis
not be applied as it has been in the past by OMB.
Mr. Wolf. I think that is a great idea.
Mr. Hall. Mr. Chairman, I and the other members of this
Board are privileged to have been appointed by the President
and confirmed by this Congress to serve as safety spokesmen for
the Nation, and anything this Chairman asks us to do, we are
willing to do and participate in.

aviation safety review group

Mr. Wolf. I appreciate that. We will try to put this
together and I think your idea with regard to OMB is excellent.
I really believe this would offer Ms. Garvey a second opinion.
A group of individuals she would have a lot of confidence in,
that would not be there just to throw stones at the FAA but
there to say once and for all, here is the measurement and here
is what your annual report says and here is what your quarterly
report says, just as we do with employees. I have a position in
myoffice, every 3 months or so, we go back and review our work.
If you remember the old Ed Sullivan show where he would have a magician
on and he would spin the plates and the plates would spin and the plate
would begin to wobble and the audience would say, Ed, get the plate,
and he would then go back and get the plate and spin it. Just a group
would force the FAA and everybody in authority to make sure the plates
are being spun and that we have the safest aviation system, which I
believe that we do now in the country. But I think until you have this
group, I keep hearing the criticism of this has been delayed, that has
been delayed, this is a high priority, then somebody leaves, it drops
to a low priority and I don't think we have a systematic way. So I
appreciate your willingness to participate and we will also contact
anybody else you think would be helpful.
Mr. Hall. If I can add one brief comment. You may be aware,
Mr. Chairman, that the Air Transport Association recently
announced a new partnership effort. We have been briefed by
them on that partnership, and that is something that I am sure
your staff is aware of and might be something that might be
incorporated into your thinking.
Mr. Wolf. Would you suggest a representative of the ATA?
Mr. Hall. Certainly, sir. I must add, Mr. Chairman, that I
don't think that this effort or any effort should replace
active Congressional oversight.
Mr. Wolf. Absolutely not.
Mr. Hall. Or our independent accident investigation.
Mr. Wolf. Absolutely not. In fact, this is in addition to
Congressional and Safety Board oversight. When Mr. Pastor asked
the question, assuming we were able to get this group up, next
year he would want to have a report that says here is what the
status is on the 737s. If there were not a hearing and he were
interested in this last week, then he could look at the
progress. We could see what has taken place, if a lot of good
things have been done, or not very much has taken place, and
also, the public could see. Public accountability, I think,
forces people to do things that maybe they would do anyway but
it spurs them on. If we can prohibit anything from taking
place, preventing the pain and suffering and agony of the
families that were involved in accidents, then I think it would
be very, very positive. We will try to do that and I appreciate
the Members raising it because I think it forces this issue out
and we just don't forget about it. FAA comes up here on March
10, we move along, we mark up, we go off and then everyone
forgets and in the next year you come back. This way, every 3
months we would have it. You would have to help us develop a
measurement we can honestly and fairly measure what the
progress or lack of progress was. Based on your accident
investigations each year, the Safety Board helps focus the work
on pointing out transportation issues we can be concerned
about. What areas do you foresee may have serious safety
problems that the committee should begin to monitor? If you
want to think about it and give it for the record. But, what
one or two do you think we should be following, the staff,
everybody should really be watching?
Mr. Hall. We have discussed a couple of those this morning,
Mr. Chairman. Let me just say generally, we provided the
tremendous growth we are going to see in all modes of
transportation over the next 10 years.

aviation safety issues

Mr. Wolf. That is what troubled me. I listened to a speech
former Administrator Hinson gave and I am sure you have
probably read the same speech where he talked about if things
don't dramatically change, the number of accidents in the year
2005 or 2010 will be substantially higher. Now I don't know if
that was overly stated to get the attention, but we don't want
that to happen.
Mr. Hall. We are looking at the possibility of having
airplanes in the future with the equivalent of a double decker
747 that would carry maybe 800 or 1,000 people. I showed you
the demographics of young people and older populations and the
increased growth of 5 to 6 percent annually of automobiles on
our highways. In the marine area, we are seeing cruise ships
built that will be twice the size of the Titanic that can carry
up to 6,000 passengers at one time. We have more rail mileage
than ever, and, of course, the growth of the transport of
hazardous materials and nuclear materials in this country is
increasing as well. All of those statistics tell us that we
need to be serious about trying to improve what is a very safe
record in all of these transportation areas, and doing
everything we can to prepare for the 21st century so we don't
see an increase in accidents as a result of the growth in
transportation and the statistics staying the same.
Mr. Wolf. For the record, so I don't misquote this, do you
remember the quote Mr. Hinson made? Could you repeat it so the
other Members can hear it.
Mr. Hall. I think the speech was based on a study completed
by Boeing Corporation that indicated with the world-wide growth
in aviation, that we were looking at a major hull loss
worldwide once a week. Dr. Loeb has the exact quote.
Mr. Loeb. Basically, the Boeing study indicated that,
worldwide, by the year 2015, there would be a catastrophic hull
loss each week, worldwide, jet transport, if there are no
changes and the growth pattern continues in the way in which
the FAA and others are currently predicting it will grow.
Mr. Hall. Mr. Chairman, the interaction between man and
machine is going to be the biggest challenge we have in the
transportation area in the next 10 to 15 years. You may want
Ms. Garvey to go over this with you. The number of new pilots
that will have to be trained and be available for this growth
in aviation is an important area as well.
Mr. Wolf. The committee has put more money in human factors
every year. The FAA seems to go the other way on this issue.
This is one of the things that troubles me. Have you reviewed
the President's budget to see if there are areas that are being
adequately addressed? Are there areas that you have looked at
you think are not adequately addressed that this committee
should look at?

presidential budget request

Mr. Hall. Well, like all citizens, I saw the President's
budget was $1.7 trillion, and that is very difficult for me to
comprehend. We do not get the detailed budget that you have,
and I don't have enough detailed information to comment.
Mr. Wolf. Staff will give you a copy and ask you to
comment.
Mr. Hall. We would be glad to do that for the record, Mr.
Chairman.
[The information follows:]

4The Safety Board has yet to receive a copy of the
Department of Transportation's FY 1999 budget request. However,
we are reviewing a General Accounting Office report ``DOT's
Budget, Management and Performance Issues Facing the Department
of Fiscal Year 1999.'' Should we have concerns after our
review, we will be certain to inform the Committee.

twa flight 800

Mr. Wolf. What is the status of the TWA 800 accident? I
understand the FBI still hasn't closed the case officially. I
checked the other day. Can you give us the status quickly?
Mr. Hall. As you know, Mr. Chairman, we concluded a week
long hearing concerning TWA Flight 800 accident in December.
During the hearing we heard testimony concerning the explosion
in the airplane's center wing tank, the subsequent breakup of
the air frame and the Board's efforts to identify the ignition
source. A meeting of all the parties under Dr. Loeb's
leadership was held last week, which provided an opportunity to
lay out a plan of action for 1998 on the investigation. I will
ask Dr. Loeb if he would review that for you at this time.
Dr. Loeb. As the Chairman indicated, we held a meeting last
week with the parties, the purpose of which was threefold.
First, a number of the parties had indicated that they would
like to have access to our researchers who had done work on the
jet A fuel, that indicated that indeed the beliefs of the
industry that had been held about the explosive characteristics
of the fuel were incorrect. We had also done flight tests to
demonstrate that explosive vapors would form and you could get
the results that we saw. And so we made our researchers
available to all the parties to question them and ask them the
basis of the research and how it was done. The second purpose
was to ask them what more needs to be done for the industry and
the FAA to act on our short-term recommendations. We made a
number of recommendations for remediation, and we made some
recommendations that were for longer term action.
And finally, the third part was to develop a plan for the
remainder of the year. We had been doing that internally within
the Board, but we wanted the input of the parties. We are in
the process now of finishing the development of our plan for
what we are going to do. And as you can see, Dr. Ellingstad has
put this up on the screen. Basically, the kinds of large scale
efforts that still remain are the laboratory studies on the
fuel that will be done by Cal Tech and other organizations
throughout the world working with them. Quarter scale testing,
computer modeling that will be done by Sandia and Christian
Mickelsohn Research, they are in Scandinavia, and eventually,
full scale testing.
There are a number of reasons for this testing. First, we
would like to be able to pinpoint, if we can, and there is no
assurance we can, the location of the ignition. If we can do
that, it would help us to narrow down where it would occur and
what may have ignited the vapors. To do that, ideally, if we
could purchase maybe 100 747s and find a place we can blow them
up systematically over a 5 or 10-year period of time, that
would be a good way of doing it. That is obviously not
possible, so what we want to be able to do is develop numerical
coding, using the best resources in the world. Los Alamos was
also invited to participate in this. It turns out that Sandia
and Christian Mickelsohn Research Laboratories are the ones
that had the codes that are most ready to run to try to do
this. We are starting out with a quarter scale testing to learn
enough to tweak the codes and then validate them against the
quarter scale. Eventually we will validate them against full
scale testing. If we are fortunate, it may pinpoint the
ignition source and help us to identify it. Second, we will
learn about the dynamics of fuel tank explosions, none of which
has been known, nor has there been an attempt to previously do
this, which was surprising to us when we started the process.
We also need to do some additional ground tests, and maybe some
flight tests as a part of this program.
Finally, we have two major areas that are going on in the
ignition source area at the same time. One is to look through
every piece of wiring that exists, that we had salvaged, that
is up in Calverton, to try to determine if any of those wires
show arcing, burning, anything that would give us a hint as to
how we may have gotten the energy into the tank. And then,
finally, to continue with a number of other areas, including
static testing. This program is likely to take us through this
summer, at least. I am hopeful, and I have told the Chairman
this although I have been wrong in the past, I am hopeful we
can perhaps wrap this up and get a report to the Board by the
end of this calendar year. That is ambitious, but that is the
program we are embarked on and that is where we are right now.

twa flight 800 investigation

Mr. Wolf. Is the dredging finished?
Dr. Loeb. The dredging is finished, we cleaned the bottom.
Mr. Wolf. Have you told all the fishermen who are out there
if they come across something while they are dredging for
oysters or something, they should call you? Have there been
notifications to everybody in the region?
Dr. Loeb. The Coast Guard has put out information there.
Mr. Wolf. Did anything come in the last 2 months?
Dr. Loeb. Yes, some parts came in in the last week that
someone thought were from TWA 800 but they had nothing to do
with it.
Mr. Wolf. But that is a good sign that people are looking?
Dr. Loeb. There are people still looking.

faa response to the investigation

Mr. Wolf. Did you agree with the way the FAA approached the
issue?
Mr. Hall. Which specific issue, sir?
Mr. Wolf. Their own investigations.
Dr. Loeb. The FAA is a party to our investigation and have
participated fully with us.
Mr. Wolf. And their response to date, how do you feel about
that?
Mr. Hall. We have not been satisfied with the response.

FAA TWA INVESTIGATION

Mr. Wolf. Mr. Hall, last year the FAA conducted their own
engineering investigation into TWA 800, and there seemed to be
some tension between the two agencies over the technical
findings from your respective investigations. Under what
authority does the FAA conduct their own investigations
stemming from aviation accidents, and how does that compare to
the NTSB's authority?
[The information follows:]

The Safety Board is the lead agency for the investigation
of all civil aviation accidents, and the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) does not have the authority to investigate
commercial aviation accidents. Since the FAA is responsible for
the certification of aircraft and for monitoring the continuing
airworthiness of aircraft it certifies during the life of the
aircraft, they are a party to all of the Safety Board's
investigations, both to provide technical expertise to assist
the Safety Board, and to be able to learn first-hand
information to determine if there are any certification or
airworthiness concerns, or violations of the Federal Aviation
Regulations that need to be promptly addressed. In certain
cases, the FAA will conduct critical design reviews of
previously certified aircraft, engines, or components based
upon the information developed during the Safety Board's
investigation. In some cases, the Safety Board has recommended
that the FAA conduct such reviews.

Mr. Wolf. Did you agree with the way FAA approached this
issue? If not, why not?
[The information follows:]

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has conducted
engineering evaluations of the Boeing 747 fuel system based
upon the findings of the investigation and the Safety Board's
safety recommendations. However, the Safety Board has been
concerned that the FAA has not been aggressive in performing
research to determine the conditions that can exist in a Boeing
747 fuel tank or the properties of Jet A fuel. These are areas
that would be considered part of the FAA's certification and
continuing airworthiness responsibilities. The research into
these issues in connection with the TWA flight 800
investigation has been conducted by the Safety Board as part of
its investigation to determine probable causes and potential
corrective actions.

TWA FLIGHT 800 RECOMMENDATIONS

Mr. Wolf. Following the TWA accident, the Board issued 4
recommendations on design and operational changes that
precluded the potential of an explosive fuel air mixture in the
fuel tanks. Will you highlight briefly for the committee what
the recommendations were?
Mr. Hall. I will ask Dr. Loeb.
Mr. Wolf. And the status, and also, the activity or the
feelings of the aviation industry.
Mr. Hall. It is fair to say, Mr. Chairman, that up until
the December hearing, the attitude of the industry, as well as
the FAA in regard to our recommendations, was not what I would
describe as positive. I think, since our hearing, I believe it
is positive, and I am encouraged there will be action on the
recommendations. I will ask Dr. Loeb if he would like to
outline them briefly.
Dr. Loeb. We made 4 recommendations, two of which asked for
short-term action, and two of which asked for action that we
knew was going to be longer term. The status of the two shorter
term ones is unsatisfactory, and the status of the two longer
term ones are satisfactory for the following reasons. The
short-term recommendations asked them to review any short-term
measures, such as adding fuel to the center tank, putting in
some insulation, any short-term kinds of things that could keep
the heat down in the tank. They have taken no action in regard
to that. There was also a short-term recommendation that asked
for some information to be provided to the pilots about the
explosive characteristics, and they simply haven't done
anything in that regard either.
Now the two longer term ones had to deal with developing
longer term solutions, real design changes, and instrumentation
and so forth, that would provide help. The FAA initially
established a committee. That committee has been meeting;
however, their process is extremely slow. The committee on
flight and duty time met for years, they could not come to an
agreement, and there has never been a rulemaking in that.
However, as the Chairman indicated, since our public
hearing, the FAA has established another task force which has
very tight deadlines, and in fact is supposed to be finished by
the end of February with a report to the Administrator. So they
are taking a different tack and I believe, as the Chairman
said, it is a much more positive approach right now.

jet a fuel tests

Mr. Wolf. NTSB planned to conduct tests on the flammability
and explosive characteristics of jet fuel computer modeling to
understand the propagation of an explosion in the
multicompartment B747 fuel tank and tests to determine
potential ignition sources. What is the status of these tests?
Which ones have been completed? Which ones are ongoing? For the
record, please provide more specifics on each of these tests,
including timetables and costs.
[The information follows:]

The Jet A flammability program can be divided into 2 broad
categories, an experimental program and a computer modeling
program. The Jet A experimental program consists of 5 phases:
(1) laboratory explosion testing; (2) ignition energy testing;
(3) \1/4\ scale testing; (4) vapor pressure measurements; and
(5) flight tests. All of these programs are designed to give
the Safety Board a better understanding of the conditions and
circumstances surrounding this accident. The \1/4\ scale
testing program is coupled to two different computational fluid
dynamics (CFD) programs, one at Sandia National Laboratories
and one at Christian Mickelson Research Institute, and provides
initial experimental data for input to the computational
modeling for validation of the computer mode. The purpose of
the CFD modeling programs is to help determine the effects of
changing the conditions within the tank without having to run
an experiment for each condition or change. For example, the
effects of changing the location of the ignition source within
the center wing tank are being studied and compared to pressure
development within each compartment within the tank. Thus, the
computational modeling cuts the time and money required to
study the effects of changing various parameters in the test.
To date, approximately thirty \1/4\ scale tests have been
completed. The data reduction from these tests is on-going. The
modeling programs are using these data for validation and for
exploring the effects of changing the test conditions. The
modeling efforts are on-going, but completion is expected in
June 1998. Based on the predictive results from these model
calculations, additional \1/4\ scale testing may be necessary.
Data analyses of the flight tests are on-going. These data
are also being used to provide guidance to laboratory and \1/4\
scale testing programs.
The combined costs of the above-mentioned work, as well as
extensive Jet A flammability and ignition energy studies, has
been about $1 million over the past year. This figure does not
include the flight test.
A second series of quarter scale explosion tests will be
conducted this summer using Jet A fuel and a test fixture
pressurized to represent the 14,000 ft. altitude conditions,
and the temperature conditions of TWA flight 800. CFD modeling
will also continue to attempt to identify a probable ignition
location, and to evaluate the explosive overpressure in the
fuel tank. This computer modeling of the explosion process will
also be combined with structural modeling of the fuel tank/
aircraft response to these overpressure events. Costs have not
yet been determined for these activities.
The Safety Board expects to participate in ground tests
conducted by Boeing to characterize the temperature and heat
transfer characteristics of the Boeing 747 fuel tank and
associated air conditioning equipment under various conditions.
It is expected that these tests will be conducted in late
spring.
It is also likely that full-scale explosive tests may be
initiated in late summer. Costs for those tests are not known.

twa flight 800 recommendations

Mr. Wolf. What is the status of these recommendations? Are
the airlines and others in the aviation industry still strongly
opposed to these recommendations?
[The information follows:]

In December 1996, the Safety Board issued four safety
recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
concerning the flammability of fuel-air mixtures in fuel tanks.
In February 1997, the FAA wrote to the Board expressing its
concern that the Board's recommendations called for major
changes in fuel tank design and fuel management in transport
category airplanes. In April 1997, the FAA requested comments
from industry and interested parties regarding the Safety Board
recommendations. The closing date for comments was in August
1997. We are concerned about the length of time that has passed
since the comment period ended without any response from the
FAA about what specific actions it will take to reduce the
potential for the buildup of explosive fuel/air vapors in fuel
tanks. Although considerable information was discussed and
gathered during the Safety Board's accident investigation
hearing held in December 1997, no substantial actions have been
taken by the FAA on our earlier safety recommendations.

TWA Flight 800

Mr. Wolf. I checked with the FBI. They have not officially
closed the case, is that accurate?
Mr. Hall. My understanding from the statement made by the
FBI is the case is in an inactive status.
Mr. Wolf. But it is not closed?
Mr. Hall. That is correct, sir.

TWA Flight 800 Investigations of Missile Theory

Mr. Wolf. Even though the FBI has officially closed its
investigation and concluded that the accident was not caused by
a criminal act, suspicion over the investigation continues. For
example, recently senior military officials stated that all the
evidence points to a missile, not to fuel vapors exploding in a
central fuel tank. What is your response to this?
[The information follows:]

The examination of all recorded radar data indicates that
there are no primary radar returns that appear close in
distance and time to TWA 800 that are not attributed to known
airplanes or surface vehicles. The investigation has found no
evidence from the wreckage or the autopsies of the victims that
a missile impacted the airplane or that a bomb exploded inside
the fuselage. Additionally, detailed examination of the
wreckage has provided no evidence of a penetration that could
be associated with the detonation of a missile warhead.
Recently, persons who are not familiar with the functions
and processing of flight data recorders have made statements
that the data provides evidence of a missile impact. The flight
data recorder provides 25 flight hours of data on a continuous
loop of tape. The recorder erases data that is more than 25
flight hours old as it records new data on the tape. The data
that some people have questioned is information from a previous
flight.

Mr. Wolf. There was one senior person, a military officer,
that stated that all the evidence points to a missile, not a
fuel vapor exploding in the central tank. How do you respond to
this? We are going to get the name of the person. This is not
Pierre Sallinger.
Mr. Hall. We have ongoing correspondence with one
particular individual, a Commander Donaldson, who we have
corresponded with frequently concerning his concern that a
missile hit. Mr. Chairman, that was the purpose of the weeklong
public hearing in which we put out all the information we have
in regard to the investigation. It is the opinion of our
experts there was an explosion in the center fuel tank. We have
been looking for the ignition source, but we have found no
evidence of a bomb or a missile or an external explosion
causing this event. We will certainly not conclude our
investigation on this or any other matter until the staff
concludes its investigation and submits the report to the Board
for recommendations and probable cause.

TWA Flight 800 Investigation TimeFrame

Mr. Wolf. Do you think the Board will be able to
conclusively determine the cause of the accident or do you
think it may be possible that you may never be able to identify
the cause?
Mr. Hall. Mr. Chairman, I am certainly hopeful that we will
be able to determine the ignition source. There is certainly a
possibility we may not.
Mr. Wolf. Last year, you testified that the TWA accident
investigation would be wrapped up early in 1998. However, this
no longer appears likely. When do you anticipated completing
the fact-finding stage?
[The information follows:]

The dynamic nature of complex investigations such as the
TWA flight 800 accident make it difficult to project when the
fact-finding phase will be completed. Experience has shown that
the results of any one test can provide a solution, or they can
highlight the need for more research. Based upon the research
that is currently planned, the Safety Board's staff has
indicated that fact-finding activities should be completed in
early fiscal year 1999. However, a precise date for completion
of the investigation and issuance of a final report cannot be
stated at this time.

railroad investigations

Mr. Wolf. We will have more questions we will submit in
detail.
During the last 6 months of 1997, we had a rash of freight
railroad accidents. Prior to that, in 1996, there were a number
of tragic railroad accidents, including the Fox River Grove and
the MARC accidents. Is the Board concerned about railroad
safety and do you believe we have seen an improvement of rail
safety throughout the U.S.?
Mr. Hall. Joining me at the table is Mr. Bob Lauby, who is
the head of our Office of Railroad Safety. As you pointed out,
Mr. Chairman, we have completed major accident investigations
on accidents that occurred in Secaucus, New Jersey, one in
Silver Spring, Maryland that received a great deal of attention
in this area, and a couple accidents that occurred in Kelso,
California. We have under investigation now accidents in
Devine, Texas, Delia, Kansas, Kingman, Arizona, Garden City,
Georgia and a special investigation underway on the Union
Pacific Railroad. As you may know, Mr. Chairman, Union Pacific
Railroad is the largest railroad in the United States, with
about 26 percent of the rail industry and 32 percent of the
track miles.
Mr. Wolf. Let me interrupt you because we have a question
on Union Pacific and I am going to throw that in. Union Pacific
has had a spate of recent accidents and 10 employees have died.
According to the railroad, this is more employee deaths than
the railroad combined total from 1991 through 1996. I know you
have begun some sort of special investigation, but as you
answer, could you talk a little bit about that investigation.
Do you believe that there has been an improvement in rail
safety in the United States?
Mr. Hall. Yes, sir. Let me also have Mr. Lauby comment. Let
me say the Board, at the recommendation of staff, made a
decision to hold a public hearing on the Union Pacific
accidents. This was because the NTSB launched on 15 Union
Pacific accidents in the past year, including 7 collisions
which resulted in 7 fatalities. By comparison, during the same
time period, we launched on 5 Burlington Northern-Santa Fe
accidents, of which only one was a collision. Both of those are
approximately the same size railroad. I will ask Mr. Lauby to
be specific on your question, has rail safety improved. I think
under Administrator Molitoris there are a number of active rule
makings that have been undertaken on train devices, on
passenger safety standards, and track safety. If all of those
things were concluded, we would see a great deal of progress in
rail safety.
Mr. Wolf. Are you projecting a decrease then?
Mr. Hall. I would certainly hope so. I hope the work of our
Board always will result in a decrease. The area I mentioned
earlier that has not been addressed is the subject of fatigue
in the railroad industry.
Mr. Wolf. You said you thought--I don't want to put words
in your mouth--that there will be a decrease if the
promulgations took effect. Do you believe we have seen an
improvement in rail safety throughout the United States today?
Mr. Hall. I think with the end of train devices that have
been put in place since my term as Chairman, that we have seen
an improvement.

railroad fatalities

Mr. Wolf. In documentation you provided to the committee,
the Board projects a decrease in rail fatalities by the year
2002 even though vehicle miles traveled has been increasing
dramatically in the rail industry. In comparison, the Board
projects an increase in aviation and highway fatalities during
the same time frame. Why are you projecting a decrease in rail
fatalities but not a decrease in highway or aviation
fatalities?
[The information follows:]

The Safety Board's strategic plan plotted the fatality
counts in each of the modes from 1992 through 1996, and then
computed a linear projection to determine the fatality trend
through the year 2002. Growth in miles traveled per mode was
computed the same way. Because fatality rates in the rail area
decreased in 1994 and 1995, and 1996 stayed relatively even
with 1995, the slope of the line projecting future fatalities
was influenced by the two year decline. This influence resulted
in a trend line showing a decline in railroad fatalities over
the next five years. A limited number of accidents with a large
number of fatalities could easily change the trend line from a
downward slope to an upward one.

safety assurance and compliance program

Mr. Wolf. What is the Safety Board's opinion on the FRA's
safety assurance and compliance program? Do you think it is the
best way to eliminate safety hazards in the railroad industry?
And as you know, FRA has been working with railroad labor and
management, to identify safety hazards and develop corrective
measures to eliminate hazards before they become problems.
Union Pacific developed a safety action plan focusing on the
railroad's systematic hazards in rail facilities, rolling
stocks equipments and operations in 1995, before the figures
that I just read with regard to employee deaths. Do you believe
the FRA safety assurance compliance program is the best way to
handle this?
Mr. Hall. Obviously I think the record will speak for
itself, Mr. Chairman. I can only speak on the matter personally
and not for the Board. While I think partnerships in the safety
area are good, I don't think they replace the government
oversight responsibility and the responsibility of the
government to provide independent accident investigations.
Mr. Wolf. So you would have a little bit of a concern?
Mr. Hall. Yes, sir. And we will explore that. If you would
like, Mr. Lauby can----
Mr. Wolf. I would appreciate that.
Mr. Hall. He can go into more detail at the Union Pacific
hearing on that subject.

fra inspections

Mr. Wolf. To accommodate the FRA's new collaborative safety
initiatives, FRA has shifted some of its resources away from
site specific inspections. GAO recently reported these
inspections declined by 23 percent from 1994 to 1995, and as a
result, a greater number of railroads are not being inspected
and FRA inspectors are conducting fewer reviews of the
railroads' own inspection efforts. Are you satisfied the FRA's
safety assurance and compliance program is not compromising
rail safety?
Mr. Hall. Mr. Chairman, I will let Mr. Lauby get into more
detail.
Mr. Lauby. Certainly we have seen the safety statistics
showing the railroads overall are safer as time goes on. The
accident rates have gone down. However, the dilemma right now
is the Union Pacific Railroad. With the Union Pacific Railroad,
we have seen a spate of accidents in the last year that
indicate a problem in the way that railroad is doing business,
because the issues we are looking at on the Union Pacific are
not difficult issues. They are not things that there aren't
solutions to. They are basic fatigue, they are mistakes made by
dispatchers, they have to do with alcohol abuse in one case.
These are lessons that we have learned over the years, and we
would think that a railroad with a reputation like Union
pacific would be able to handle these.
Regarding the FRA's response, we intend to look at this
further at our public hearing scheduled for March. We do want
to take a look at the FRA oversight of Union Pacific in
particular to see what has gone on. One thing we have seen is
there has been lots of actions after the accident has occurred,
with SAC and other processes. The FRA has been very responsive
to get the situation taken care of, but we are concerned that
nobody saw this coming. The problems we have seen on Union
Pacific in the 15 accidents are very fundamental problems. We
received letters from engineers talking about fatigue problems,
we received letters from crew men talking about different
problems they have with the management, and we assume FRA has
these also. They have inspectors out in the field, and we would
have expected that we could have headed this off before we got
to this point.

railroad voice recorders

Mr. Wolf. Following a collision of the MARC train and an
Amtrak train near Silver Spring, Maryland in 1996, the Safety
Board recommended that FRA amend its regulations to require a
recording of train crew members voice communications for the
exclusive use in accident investigations. What is the status of
that recommendation and does the railroad industry support
that?
Mr. Lauby. We have very good support of that particular
issue from some labor unions. As we speak, the FRA is
establishing a group that is going to talk about some of the
challenges associated with having voice recorders on the train.
Mostly the challenge is the privacy issue.
Mr. Wolf. But this would only be used exclusively in
accident investigations. It is not like they are going to
listen to it day in and day out.
Mr. Lauby. That is true and these are some of the concerns
that have been stated.
Mr. Wolf. People were killed in these accidents.
Mr. Lauby. It needs to be protected probably in the same
way we currently protect cockpit voice recorders and other
tools we use for aviation accidents.
Mr. Wolf. But you already have the procedures for that; I
would think it would be a relatively easy thing to do. When did
you make the recommendation?
Mr. Lauby. The recommendation came, I believe, in July of
1997.
Mr. Wolf. So it has been 6 months, 7 months.
Mr. Lauby. Yes.

automatic train control

Mr. Wolf. I have one more question. The Board recommended
the installation of cab signals, automatic train stop or other
similar redundant systems prior to the installation of positive
train control on all trains where the commuter innercity
passenger rail operates and that is particularly a concern
here. We have VRE and MARC and Amtrak in this area. What is
status of that recommendation?
Mr. Lauby. That recommendation is basically tied up with
positive train separation. We don't have any specific progress
to report.
Mr. Wolf. That has been on the most wanted list for a
number of years. How many years has it been on?
Mr. Lauby. Since the list was established in 1990, positive
train separation has been on that list.
Mr. Wolf. 8 years.
Mr. Lauby. And the recommendations predate it being placed
on that list. The MARC recommendation is just the latest of a
series of recommendations.
Mr. Wolf. If the railroads installed these devices, cab
signals, automatic trains, all this kind of stuff like that, do
you believe that positive control devices would still be
needed?
Mr. Lauby. The devices that exist now have the ability,
once a signal is passed, to stop a train, but at that point,
the train is still in the danger area. With a full-fledged
positive train separation system, we would know exactly where
the train is and be able to prevent it from passing a red
signal. Steps would be taken to stop the train before it passed
a red signal. With positive train stop and some of the other
systems, the train has not always stopped before it crosses the
red signal and gets into a danger zone.

Positive Train Control

Mr. Wolf. Four class I freight railroads recently announced
that they would contribute $20 million for the development of a
positive train control project in Illinois. In the past, the
freight rail industry has expressed a number of concerns about
the cost and need for positive train control.
What is your position on this recent development?
[The information follows:]

Test programs for positive train separation (PTS) control
systems are being conducted on a number of railroads throughout
the country. At this time, almost all major railroads are
involved in some kind of PTS demonstration project. Positive
train control is an issue on the Board's ``Most Wanted'' list
and we are encouraged by the work that is being conducted. The
Safety Board feels that PTS is a way that they can achieve
higher utilization using the existing rail system by running
more trains safely over the same track.

Mr. Wolf. The administration has less than $1 million in
its fiscal year 1999 budget for positive train control, which
is a significant decrease over prior years. Would you comment
on whether or not their proposal is adequate in this area?
Mr. Hall. We would----
Mr. Wolf. Especially, too, since the railroads have
announced they are going to put $20 million of their money into
a positive train control project in Illinois.
Mr. Hall. Mr. Chairman, we would think that that is
inadequate.

Aircraft Turbulence

Mr. Wolf. Mr. Pastor asked questions on aircraft
turbulence, so we are going to submit a series of questions on
that issue for the record. Are more injuries on aircraft around
the world because of turbulence than anything else? Is that a
fair statement? I heard that somewhere.
Mr. Hall. There are probably more injuries, I would not say
more fatalities.
Mr. Wolf. Injuries. Right. Prior to the United incident,
did the Safety Board monitor and investigate turbulence-related
injuries or accidents.
Mr. Hall. Prior to that accident we had determined to
conduct a cabin safety study and we had been very actively
involved in that area. I have been very actively involved
personally, Mr. Chairman, because my very first accident when I
was a new member of the Board, was the MD-11 upset in Alaska,
with the resulting death of one individual and numerous
injuries. So we have been very active. There have been a number
of workshops and forums with the FAA in attempting to address
this issue.
Mr. Wolf. Injuries to passengers and flight attendants
caused by turbulence make up about 20 percent of all airline
accidents; however, until the recent United Airlines incident
en route from Tokyo to Hawaii where one passenger was killed,
turbulence attracted little attention because it only hurt or
fatally injured a few people at a time. Prior to the United
Airlines incident, did the Safety Board monitor and investigate
turbulence-related injuries or accidents?
[The information follows:]

The Safety Board is conducting an investigation into the
United Airlines Boeing 747 encounter with turbulence that
occurred December 28, 1997, over the Pacific Ocean. One
passenger was killed and 14 passengers and two flight
attendants sustained serious injuries. Prior to this accident,
the Safety Board had investigated 99 in-flight upsets that
caused 2 deaths and 117 serious injuries to passengers and crew
between 1983 and 1997.

Mr. Wolf. Is the Safety Board following this issue now? If
so, what type of investigation are you conducting? Is it
specifically related to the United Airlines Flight 826
fatality, or is it a broader investigation?
[The information follows:]

The Safety Board's investigation into the United Airlines
Boeing 747 turbulence encounter is continuing. Interviews of
seven passengers who were hospitalized in Tokyo found that none
of the seven had their seatbelts fastened when the turbulence
was encountered. We are continuing to gather information from
passengers to determine how many others did not have their
seatbelts fastened. We investigate several turbulance incidents
each year that involve injuries to occupants, and we are
monitoring this situation closely to determine if safety
recommendations are warranted.

Aircraft Turbulence

Mr. Wolf. I was surprised when FAA noted that, ``For years,
the number one causal factor for injuries to passengers on
commercial airlines has been clear air turbulence.'' Are there
any systems available or under development that you believe
could help pilots detect turbulence and reduce the number of
injuries?
[The information follows:]

One of the key work areas of the NASA Aviation Safety
Program is the development of forward-looking ``lidar,'' a
technology that uses laser light and weather radar technology
to detect and warn pilots of significant turbulence. The
National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) is also heavily
involved in this work. Further, NCAR is developing a system
that uses commercial aircraft to provide real-time turbulance
information to remote ground stations. Information on
turbulence from these aircraft should result in better
turbulence forecast products. However, according to information
provided to the Safety Board by NCAR, the development of an
accurate turbulence detection and warning system is probably 3
to 5 years away, if funded.

Mr. Wolf. I am going to ask you another question, and I
think you actually answered this. You are suggesting that there
is a new signing system being developed that will--I thought
you said that----
Mr. Hall. I would like to see a new signing system
developed, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wolf. Are there any systems available that are under
development that would go along the line of what you want?
Mr. Hall. I am not aware of any.
Mr. Wolf. If turbulence is the number one cause of injury,
it would seem to me that people should keep their seat belt on.
When I am on an aircraft, I keep my seat belt fastened.
We were going over the Atlantic when I was going to Bosnia
in December. One of the people I traveled with was the pilot.
Apparently you can listen in, and he said the category of
weather that we were in was just next to the worst. It was
scary. But I always keep it fastened. And when I fall asleep,
what I do is put my belt around the blanket.
I think you ought to take some leadership on this and see
if the airlines or somebody can take a look and see if there is
any other----
Mr. Hall. I would hope that Dr. Loeb's office will come to
the Board with a very good investigation. Hopefully, as a
result of that investigation, we will have some good
recommendations in this area that will provide some leadership
and direction.
Mr. Chairman, one of the things, as you pointed out in your
series of questions, while partnerships are good, one of the
problems with partnerships is the delay in forming a consensus
in order to move forward on some safety issues. That is why we
continually attempt to be sure that we are pointing out the
direction in which we think things need to be going.
Mr. Wolf. Wouldn't it be a potentially easy thing to do--to
say, when seated, keep the belt buckled?
Mr. Hall. Mr. Chairman, let me say that of course, although
the airplanes fly at 30,000 feet, we still have a problem in
this country in getting people to buckle up in their
automobiles. I can't lay all the blame on the aviation
industry. I do think that improved----
Mr. Wolf. But I think if people knew, I think that when the
light goes off----
Mr. Hall. It sends the wrong signal.
Mr. Wolf. It sends the wrong signal. Some of them do say,
although the light is off and you are free to move around the
cabin, we urge you, when you are seated, to----
Mr. Hall. But it should be a requirement, when you are
seated, you have the seat belt on. And that is not presently
the case.

air traffic control shift rotation

Mr. Wolf. We will see what you come up with there.
In the area of air traffic control, the FAA Civil
Aeromedical Institute has been conducting research into the
effects of the controllers' usual shift schedule, which is
called the 2-2-1. They have found that this schedule can result
in serious sleep loss and fatigue as the weak progresses. Have
you or your staff followed the work or do you have any comments
on it?
Mr. Hall. The Safety Board staff has reviewed the three
CAMI studies on the air traffic control shift rotation.
Although, as you pointed out, a number of shift rotation
strategies exist, a common one is the 2-2-1 schedule. Under
this schedule, controllers work two afternoon shifts, followed
by two morning shifts, and finally a midnight shift in one
workweek.
This scheduling strategy is said to rotate counterclockwise
because controllers report for duty at progressively earlier
times throughout the week. Such a schedule minimizes the number
of midnight shifts each controller works and compresses the
workweek, providing more time off between workweeks. On the
other hand, such shifts require quick turnarounds with as
little as a minimum of 8 hours off between shifts.
The CAMI studies have found that controllers working 2-2-1
shifts report more fatigue and an average of a 30-minute-per-
week sleep loss compared to controllers who work nonrotating
shifts. They have found some performance decrements in the
noncontroller research subjects on the night shift.
I might add that the Board is not aware of any accident
where a 2-2-1 shift has been identified as a factor to a
particular accident. However, I am pleased to see that CAMI is
looking at shift rotation, at the subject of fatigue, and
looking at how they might develop a program of countermeasures
to be used to assist controllers in obviously what is a very
pressure-packed and fatiguing operation.
Mr. Wolf. Are there countermeasures or different types of
shifts which could be implemented to lower the level of fatigue
and thereby raise alertness?
[The information follows:]

Operator (pilot, mechanic, air traffic controllers, etc.)
fatigue and alertness have long been of concern to the Safety
Board. Although we have never identified controller fatigue as
a cause of an aviation accident, we recognize the huge
complexities involved in scheduling air traffic control
services around the clock, and we are pleased that CAMI is
conducting scientific studies on this topic as part of its
program to develop fatigue countermeasures for air traffic
controllers. The Safety Board has reviewed studies of air
traffic controller shift rotation conducted by the several
Civil Aeromedical Institute (CAMI) in Oklahoma City. Many air
traffic controllers work rotating shifts, and one common shift
rotation schedule is called the ``two-two-one schedule.'' Under
this schedule, controllers work two afternoon shifts, followed
by two morning shifts, and finally a midnight shift in one work
week. This scheduling strategy is said to rotate
counterclockwise because controllers report for duty at
progressively earlier times throughout the week.
It is important to note that no study has determined that
any particular alternative to the 2-2-1 schedule leads to
increased controller performance. Further, because scheduling
practices vary between ATC facilities, policy makers do not
know what scheduling strategies are actually in use. The Safety
Board understands that CAMI is now conducting a survey that
will answer this question.

aviation growth

Mr. Pastor. Just one question on that, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wolf. Sure.
Mr. Pastor. In earlier testimony, I think we were talking
about how there are going to be more flights in the future;
when you get to 2025, that we may have--was it 2015?
Mr. Wolf. Yes.
Mr. Pastor. You mentioned that there will be an increase of
inexperienced pilots, the retirements, you have younger pilots
coming on. I have also been told that the air traffic
controller situation is very similar, that now you are having
more experienced controllers retiring or leaving because of
fatigue and other reasons, and that we are getting more and
more younger controllers with less experience.
Have you made any studies about that situation with the air
traffic controllers as compared with the pilots and the trend
that is occurring?
Mr. Hall. Dr. Ellingstad. Have we looked in that area?
Dr. Ellingstad. No, we haven't made any studies in that
particular area.
Mr. Pastor. Because it goes through the whole system. If
you are getting inexperienced pilots just because they are
retiring and you are getting inexperienced air traffic
controllers, the rudders aren't working, it is all
compounding--I think something that I would suggest you might
want to look at.
Mr. Hall. We will certainly take note of that, Congressman,
and see if there is a way we can address that subject.
Mr. Pastor. Thank you.

faa inspection and surveillance

Mr. Wolf. I would appreciate you doing that. Let Mr. Pastor
and the committee know.
In July 1995, you wrote the subcommittee that the FAA had a
``continuing problem in ensuring the adequacy of FAA's
inspection and surveillance of airlines.'' You wrote, ``The
Safety Board remains concerned that inspections continue to be
conducted by personnel with little or no experience in air
carrier operations or familiarity with the specific air
carriers they oversee.'' The Office of Inspector General issued
a recent report with a similar theme.
Could you tell us how serious the problem is?
Mr. Hall. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask Dr. Loeb
to comment on that. But it continues to be a concern of the
Board, but it is one that the FAA has been addressing. As I
mentioned earlier, they have indicated to us that they are
going to issue policy guidance that will help resolve some of
these resource conflicts and balance the surveillance work
load.
Mr. Wolf. When? Do we know? The budget for FAA
certification inspection has grown by double-digits for the
last few years. So the money has been there. I just wonder, do
you know when they are going to do that?
Mr. Hall. I don't personally know, Mr. Chairman. I am sure
Ms. Garvey can provide a response on that, but I don't know.
Mr. Wolf. Do you think there should be more advanced
training? I thought of developing a consortium in the
Washington, D.C., area for advanced training. Shouldn't there
be more advanced training, through the Internet, a course once
a week like at 5:30 at the Department of Transportation,
something with regard to that? Is there much advanced training?
Mr. Hall. I think the resources for people and training are
the number one challenge for my small agency which is
approximately, thanks to you, about 400 people. I am confident
it is a constant challenge for the FAA with the number of
employees that it has.
But clearly, with the increases in technology, we have got
to have an increased emphasis on training.
Mr. Wolf. It would seem to me that they could develop a
relationship with the consortium, with universities around the
country to participate on the training. Or the universities
that are up to speed on aviation could offer training through
the Internet or by interactive television.
Any thoughts you might have, if you could just kind of let
the committee know about that, we would appreciate that. And we
will ask Ms. Garvey.

national civil aviation review commission

What is your opinion of the National Civil Aviation Review
Commission's recommendations regarding aviation safety? And
what are the two or three most significant ones, if we could
implement a few of them? They talked about a deteriorating
relationship between the NTSB and the FAA.
Mr. Hall. I met with Chairman Mineta and his committee. I
did not share the concerns that they expressed in that area. I
do think that, in regard to the investments that they indicated
that were necessary in infrastructure and training, that the
committee had certainly some good recommendations.

ntsb faa relationship

Mr. Wolf. The NCARA was critical of what it called the
``deteriorated'' relationship between the FAA and the NTSB.
They said, ``This is not helping to improve aviation safety or
the public's perception of it.'' Do you agree that this
relationship has deteriorated?
[The information follows:]

The Safety Board is a watch dog agency overseeing the
effectiveness of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
carrying out its mission of ensuring the safety of the U.S.
civil aviation. In this regard, most of the Safety Board's
aviation safety recommendations are directed to the FAA. Given
the roles of the two agencies, a certain amount of tension is
to be expected. However, the Safety Board's relationship with
the FAA has always been and continues to be very professional.
Although the two agencies may not agree on every issue, we
continue to work together toward our common goal of improving
the safety of the aviation transportation system.

Mr. Wolf. In the last year, how often have you met with the
FAA Administrator?
Mr. Hall. I have met with the FAA Administrator as recently
as this week. Ms. Garvey and I have probably met since she has
been in office over--something between five to seven times.
Mr. Wolf. That is good, because she has been on about 6
months.
Mr. Hall. I am very impressed with her. As I pointed out,
Mr. Chairman, she requested that we come up and discuss the
Most Wanted List with her in December. She has a tremendous
challenge. She has in many ways one of the most difficult jobs
in this city. Any way I can support and help her, I have
committed to her I am going to try and do.

accident investigation process

Mr. Wolf. She does. I know she is reaching out. She is
very, very open.
I think it is good that you meet with her. I think it is
good that Mitre Corporation is coming in and helping and some
of the others. The commission suggested that the accident
investigation process could be improved by increasing the use
of outside experts in the analytical process. What do you feel
about that
Mr. Hall. I could let Dr. Loeb comment on that. Let me say
that we routinely use outside experts where we think it is
appropriate. It is clear that the taxpayers have benefited in
the past by the dependence that the Safety Board has used on
the industry to assist us in many of the tests that we have
after an investigation.
Dr. Loeb?
Dr. Loeb. Mr. Chairman, I think you are aware that our
accident investigations use the party process, where all of the
parties that have an interest in and can contribute,
technically or in other ways, to the investigation are made
parties to the investigation, like the airframe manufacturer,
the carrier, the air carrier, the engine manufacturer, the
unions, ALPA or ATA. So there is outside participation in the
fact-gathering portions of our investigations always.
In addition, whenever we believe that we can get help from
researchers, academia, laboratories, any of the various
facilities, especially the Federal Government facilities, we
make use of them extensively in our accident investigation
programs. Of course, TWA 800 is an example.
What the commission was suggesting and what some of the
parties would like, although not all of them, is the ability to
have access to our analysis of the reports that we send to the
Board.
All of the parties get all of the facts that we gather.
Before the staff provides its report to the Board for its
deliberations, the parties have the opportunity to submit a
submission, which would comment on what they believe is an
appropriate analysis, to draw conclusions and to reach
recommendations.
Prior to that, we hold what is known as a technical review,
and that is where we gather all the parties together, go over
all the facts that we have gathered, ask if there is a need for
additional fact gathering. In fact, it is one of the things
that has contributed to the length of the 427 investigation,
because we have used outside consultants and panels of expert
witnesses and so forth. The parties asked for a number of
additional tests. We continued to do them until they were
satisfied we had done everything.
At this technical review, we determine whether there is any
need for additional fact gathering or whether any of our facts
are in error. And then the parties have the opportunity to
provide a submission to the Board so that when our draft report
goes to the Board for its deliberations, they also have in
front of them the submissions from the outside world.
So we think the system works really well.
Mr. Hall. Let me just add, Mr. Chairman, I am committed to
undertaking a review of the party system. We have heard from
the Mineta Commission being sure that the industry and
representatives of the operators are involved in the analysis
process.
A task force was chaired by myself and Secretary Slater on
family issues. Their concern, of course, is the involvement of
the industry in the process. My main interest is that we
continue to conduct, as I believe the Board has in the past,
for the past 30 years, independent investigations that the
American people can put credibility in. If there is a better
way that we can do that in the future, we are going to look at
it and improve the way we are doing our work.

repair stations

Mr. Wolf. I appreciate your openness and nondefensiveness
about that. I think that is the best way.
On the repair stations, we are going to have a series of
questions for the record, but just to bring it all together,
the GAO said about half of the maintenance work performed--and
Mr. Sabo referred a little bit to this--on commercial aircraft
owned by U.S. airlines is now outsourced to independent repair
stations. They cite four aviation accidents--including ValuJet,
as a matter of fact--over the past 3 years involving aircraft
maintained by contract repair stations and found a number of
deficiencies in FAA safety oversight--obviously, something we
should be concerned about, based on your answer that you gave
earlier.
We also understand that U.S. airlines are performing more
of this work in other countries. We talked about the Turkish
operation, obviously, because they believe it is cheaper and
not better.
Is there a difference in the FAA's oversight of U.S. repair
stations and that work performed by a repair station overseas?
Mr. Hall. I could only speak from personal experience. I
have made some trips overseas for the purpose of trying to
understand as much as I can, because I think aviation is such
an international operation and the Board's responsibilities are
international. I would say that the oversight conducted
overseas, in my personal experience, is not as adequate as the
oversight that is conducted here.

aircraft maintenance--contract repair stations

Mr. Wolf. According to the GAO, about half of the
maintenance work performed on commercial aircraft owned by U.S.
airlines is now ``outsourced'' to independent repair stations.
They cite four aviation accidents, including ValuJet, over the
past 3 years involving aircraft maintained by contract repair
stations and found a number of deficiencies in FAA's safety
oversight of these stations. Would you comment on the GAO's
report?
[The information follows:]

GAO Report GAO/RCED-98-21, October 1997, addressed FAA
oversight of repair stations operating under Title 14 C.F.R.
Part 145. This report addressed Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) oversight, documentation of that oversight, and follow-up
activities to address deficiencies found in its oversight of
domestic and foreign Part 145 repair stations. The report
concluded that the FAA was meeting its goal of conducting at
least annual surveillance of these repair stations, but that
most surveillance is conducted by individual inspectors rather
than team inspections, which can more effectively identify
deficiencies. The GAO found that follow-up corrective actions
were routinely documented following (team) inspections of
foreign repair stations, which are re-certified every 2 years,
but that follow-up corrective actions were not well documented
following inspections of domestic repair stations. It is our
understanding that the FAA intends to update the regulations
that address the operation of Part 145 repair stations, but
this update is overdue. The FAA is also increasing its
inspector workforce, which should allow improvement in repair
station surveillance in the future. The GAO report notes that
FAA inspectors who perform surveillance of repair stations are
not given clear and consistent guidance as to what they should
document and how that documentation should be conducted.
The GAO report does not explore the qualification and
training of the inspectors, including their knowledge of audit
procedures, which the Safety Board has found lacking in some
accident investigations. The report also does not address how
inspectors should alter their inspection methodology to obtain
meaningful data that might identify trends that might be used
to prevent future accidents.
Based upon the Safety Board's experience in investigating
repair stations that were implicated in accident and incident
investigations, the GAO findings appear to be accurate and
their recommendations seem appropriate, but the Safety Board
has not yet conducted its own study of Part 145 repair
stations. The Safety Board will begin such a study in FY 1998.
In the meantime, we intend to investigate these issues in any
accident that might involve the effectiveness of Part 145
repair stations.

Mr. Wolf. Is this something we should be concerned about?
[The information follows:]

If there is adequate oversight to ensure that repair
stations are staffed by properly qualified personnel and that
they are performing at the level expected by air carriers, then
there should be no concern. Recent ValuJet accidents showed
that a carrier that outsources its maintenance cannot delegate
its responsibility to provide guidance and oversight. More
effective surveillance is also needed by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), however remote that repair station may be
from the parent airline. Additional FAA staffing and improved
inspection methods may be needed to ensure that safety is not
compromised when maintenance is outsourced.

aircraft maintenance recommendations

Mr. Wolf. It would seem that you should make some
recommendations, because if it is being done better in the
United States--and that appears to be what you were telling Mr.
Sabo--and perhaps less is being done in one of these countries
that we are not sure about, you would almost think the logic
would say that we would at least want to do the same inspection
outside the country and maybe even more, as in the United
States.
Does the Board have any suggestions, or can you make any
recommendations?
Mr. Hall. We are doing a safety study on that issue and we
hope to have recommendations in that area.
Mr. Wolf. We would like to see them.
Does the Safety Board have any initiatives under way to
encourage improvements in oversight of repair stations?
[The information follows:]

The Safety Board is planning to begin a study this year on
FAA and Air Carrier Oversight of Part 145 Repair Operations.
The Board will conduct site visits of several Part 145 repair
shops, FAA FSDO's, and Part 121 airlines. Information
concerning FAA's distribution of resources and training will be
analyzed. Air carrier maintenance plans will be reviewed, with
particular interest in quality control procedures and oversight
of outsourced maintenance. The study will also draw on analyses
of previous accidents, and if available, an in depth
investigation of a Part 145 maintenance-related accident. The
study will examine current FAA regulations and procedures for
both Part 145 repair stations and Part 121 operations to assess
their adequacy. Finally, the study will examine the progress of
proposed FAA changes to certification and oversight, such as
those suggested in the recent FAA 90 Day Safety Review. Staff
will propose recommendations to improve the oversight of Part
145 repair operations to ensure that organizational changes
designed to increase efficiency and manpower utilization are
balanced with a strong focus on safety.

foreign air carrier oversight

Mr. Wolf. One of the issues that the Board is investigating
is FAA's oversight of foreign air carriers to ensure an
acceptable level of safety during operations in the United
States. Could you elaborate on this issue?
[The information follows:]

The Safety Board monitors the Federal Aviation
Administration's (FAA) oversight of foreign airworthiness
authorities and foreign air carriers through our investigations
of incidents and accidents involving foreign airlines.
Additionally, the Safety Board receives considerable
information on the effectiveness of FAA's program from our
overseas contacts. Moreover, the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) has begun a safety assessment program for
countries that request and pay for such an assessment. The
Safety Board supports this initiative and has kept abreast of
the developments with the ICAO staff. Lastly, the European
Civil Aviation Convention (ECAC), which represents the
interests of 36 European countries, has begun a safety
assessment program of inspecting foreign airlines operating
into Europe. Again, this program has led to some initial
findings and positive results. The Safety Board will continue
to support and monitor the effectiveness of these assessment
programs as they develop, and we will also support further
development of the ICAO program on a worldwide basis.

Mr. Wolf. Mr. Pastor.

FOREIGN REPAIR STATIONS

Mr. Pastor. On that issue, will this study you are
undertaking also bring consideration to the replacement of
parts in terms that the manufacturer may require a certain
quality? And in terms of the airplane being repaired in a
foreign country, the part that is being replaced, being
replaced by one of lower quality, that may end up causing
problems in the future. Is that something that is going to be
part of your study?
Dr. Loeb. We will be looking at all aspects of the repair
and maintenance operations done both here and, to the extent
that we are able to, overseas. That will include any
information that we can gather on the use of improper parts and
how that process works.
I would just like to add one point. I don't think it would
be fair to say that all overseas repair stations----
Mr. Wolf. We are not saying that now.
Dr. Loeb. Because there are clearly some, and especially in
some of the Western countries, in which they really do a fine
job.
Mr. Wolf. Sure. We are not saying that.
Dr. Loeb. But there are certainly places that we would have
concerns about. That is one of the reasons for doing the study.
Mr. Wolf. I would urge you to do what Mr. Pastor said,
because we have a hard enough problem here, let alone over
there.
Was there a similar problem of a repair job--do you
remember the aircraft that crashed down off of Central America
and your people were involved 2 years ago? It was German
passengers mainly. The plane was substituted from there. Was
there anything like that involved in that?
Dr. Loeb. You are talking about off the Dominican Republic,
the Bergen Air?
Mr. Wolf. Yes.
Dr. Loeb. There was a substitution, but we did not see any
evidence at that time that there were any specific improper
parts issues.
Mr. Hall. I do think, Mr. Chairman, it is correct to point
out what you said. On these issues, the Government, neither the
NTSB nor the FAA, should be defensive. This issue has been
raised in articles, in books, as you were mentioning, in
novels. We need to take it head on. That is one of the things
we are going to do. If there is a problem, I am sure that Ms.
Garvey and the men and women of the FAA will be as committed to
addressing that as the Safety Board is.

FOREIGN AIR CARRIER OVERSIGHT

Mr. Wolf. I think so. And they should.
Do you think that we should publish on the Internet--and
maybe we now do this--the safety records of airlines operating
in foreign countries, such as China and some of those places?
I was on a plane that went from Moscow to Chechnya. It was
really scary. Should we know the safety record before? That was
the only one going down, so I didn't have a lot of choice.
Shouldn't we now publish the safety records, particularly
with the number of people that are traveling to China and going
off into the far, far regions? Shouldn't we publish that in a
way that everyone, if they want to find out, can find out
without calling the State Department for a travel advisory?
Mr. Hall. Mr. Chairman, I don't think the Board has taken a
policy or made recommendations in that area, so I could only
speak as an individual. My personal feeling is that any
information that is paid for with public dollars should be made
available to the public, and particularly if it is safety
information. And if we collect it, it should be organized in a
responsible fashion and disseminated to the general public. We
have, as we have demonstrated here, through the Internet the
opportunity to do that, and we certainly do that in other areas
of American life.
I don't know about the international treaties or diplomatic
nuances that the State Department might have involved, but as a
general philosophy I think that if any information is available
to any representative of the Government concerning the safety
of flights overseas, it should be made available to every
citizen in the United States.
Mr. Wolf. There were American citizens on the 737 that
crashed in Indonesia, were there not?
Mr. Hall. It is very rare that we don't have American
citizens aboard a flight.
Mr. Wolf. We are going to ask the FAA to do that. I would
like you to take a look at that.
The Pan Am accident, if you will recall, what was available
to the FAA was not available to the people that were flying.
So if you could look at that.
Mr. Hall. We live in a worldwide community now. My children
have both traveled overseas. I never traveled overseas until my
country sent me to Vietnam. They have been overseas numerous
times.

CHINESE AVIATION PRODUCTS

Mr. Wolf. Were any of the tail sections for the 737 made in
China?
Mr. Hall. The Silk Air 737? The information that has been
presented to me was that they were made in Wichita, Kansas.
Mr. Wolf. Did we also look at the Chinese assembly plant? I
know we went out to Wichita, but did we----
Mr. Hall. Have we looked at them? No sir, we have not been
to China.
Mr. Wolf. How many tail parts are made in China?
Dr. Loeb. I don't know. We would have to get that for the
record.
Mr. Wolf. Could you get it for the record and see because
maybe we should be looking at China.
Dr. Loeb. Sure.
[The information follows:]

Boeing representatives have stated that the ``build
sheets'' for the Silk Air airplane indicate that none of the
components of the horizontal stabilizer or vertical fin were
produced in China.

kal flight 801

Mr. Wolf. The Guam accident, involving Korean Airlines
flight 801, will you just briefly tell us the status of the
investigation?
Mr. Hall. Yes. Let me just say two things, Mr. Chairman. I
mentioned these to you because I know you are interested.
On the Guam accident, I had three individuals from our
Family Assistance Office. As you know, only eight of the
citizens on that plane were U.S. nationals. Our Family
Assistance staff went over there, and it was the largest
accident we had had since that office was created. They did an
outstanding job in providing services and assistance in that
U.S. territory to the Korean citizens that had been involved
and to the families that had been impacted by that accident.
I was also very proud, too, of our investigators on the
Silk Air accident who missed Christmas at home. One of them who
had just gotten married, missed his first Christmas at home to
go and respond to this accident. So I am very proud of the
dedication of our employees.
On the Guam accident, the issues, of course, that have been
raised are the FAA oversight of the NAV aids and the ATC
minimum safe altitude or warning system, or the M cell system,
pilot training procedures and oversight of operations by the
airline and the Government, the control flight and terrain
accident prevention measures for the world's airlines, the
advance ground proximity warning system development,
installation and operations, and the search and rescue
operations.
As you Know, 228 of the 250 people on board the flight were
killed when the plane was conducting an ILS approach with the
glide slope out of service when it struck high terrain about
3.3 miles from the airport.

foreign air carrier oversight

Mr. Wolf. Do you have any suggestions as to how this
activity could be prevented?
[The information follows:]

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has been working
with the foreign certification and airworthiness authorities to
improve their surveillance and oversight of their operators.
The intent of the FAA program is for the foreign authorities to
establish an effective infrastructure in order to ensure that
all of their operators comply with the standards and
recommended practices of the Convention on International Civil
Aviation and the requirements for operations in the U.S. It is
hoped that, once other governments improve their oversight
effectiveness, that foreign operators will comply with ICAO
standards and safety will be improved. If the ICAO oversight
program is eventually successful, and other countries meet the
international standards, the FAA program will no longer be
needed.

transportation of hazardous materials by air

Mr. Wolf. Following ValuJet, you issued emergency
recommendations on transport of hazardous materials and later
followed it with recommendations to the FAA, the Postal
Service, and ATA on, ``the need to educate passengers,
shippers, and postal customers about the dangers of
transporting undeclared hazardous materials aboard aircraft and
the need to properly identify and package hazardous materials
before offering them for air transportation''. I want to ask
you how that has been implemented.
Following the ValuJet accident, the FAA tightened its
hazardous materials rules. However, we understand the FAA has
recently found that airlines and air couriers have an
unacceptably low knowledge of the rules for transporting
dangerous materials. Almost a fourth of the airlines and 10
percent of the courier companies the FAA inspected last year
did not follow the rules and were accepting dangerous cargo,
such as pesticides, that can sicken passengers, explosive
chemicals, and industrial strength corrosives.
Is the Board aware of any accidents that were caused by the
courier transporting hazardous or explosive materials? Are you
investigating any? And how have the regulations been
implemented?
Mr. Hall. I am going to ask Mr. Chipkevich. We have a very
small Office of Pipeline and Hazardous Materials which Mr.
Chipkevich heads. But thanks to your assistance last year, we
were able to add personnel to that office. In addition, of
course, the FAA has now added some 127 investigators on
hazardous materials that are at work at the FAA since the
ValuJet accident.
I will ask Mr. Chipkevich if he would respond to the
question, please.
Mr. Chipkevich. The ValuJet accident certainly involved
undeclared hazardous materials which initiated the fire on
board the aircraft and then, without fire detection or
suppression systems, did not allow the aircraft to get back
down.
The Safety Board has for some time identified undeclared
hazardous materials as a significant problem and a threat to
aircraft.
Back in 1988, on board an American Airlines flight to
Nashville, TN, there was a fire. Fortunately, when that fire
got going in the cargo compartment, the airplane was on
approach for landing in Nashville and they were able to make a
safe landing.
Mr. Hall. The Board has asked, and it is part of our
ValuJet recommendations, for the ATA and the Postal Service to
work with the FAA to develop programs to address this issue.
Hazardous materials continue to show up in the system, and
undeclared hazardous materials aboard aircraft are being
carried in the system.
Mr. Wolf. And you have made recommendations on how to
prevent that?
Mr. Hall. We have asked the ATA and the Postal Service to
work with the FAA to come up with regulations to tighten the
system.

runway incursions

Mr. Wolf. The Safety Board has previously been very
interested in new technologies to reduce runway incursions such
as the ASDE radar. According to testimony offered last fall by
the DOT Inspector General, runway incursions are on the rise
and the figure is very high. I don't have the exact figure in
front me. The FAA has been ineffective in addressing the trend.
Have you seen the IG's testimony, and do you agree with his
findings?
Mr. Hall. We certainly have seen the testimony. In fact, I
have personally discussed that issue with the Department of
Transportation Inspector General in a meeting where we covered
a number of concern interests and common issues. This issue is
on our Most Wanted List.
Of course, our ultimate goal is to provide safer control of
the aircraft on the ground. To date, Mr. Chairman, the FAA has
issued requirements for air traffic controllers to obtain
readbacks from pilots for all hold short clearances. They have
completed a one-time examination of all U.S. tower controlled
airports to determine the existence of any restrictions to
visibility from the control tower to the runways or other
movement areas. They have sent letters to all flight instructor
refresher clinic sponsors requesting emphasis on the issue.
They have sent letters to all flight standard divisions
requesting that information on this subject be provided to all
public schools. They have published an article on stop, look,
and listen.
I went out to San Francisco recently to look at the recent
AMAS installation. When I was at Boeing recently, this is one
of the three issues that Boeing has identified that are the top
three safety issues in the United States. It was interesting to
note that it is not really a safety issue in other parts of the
world, which indicates that we need to make some improvements
in this area.
Dr. Loeb may want to add other comments.
Mr. Wolf. That raises a couple of questions: One, what are
one or two things the Congress could do? Two, if all these
letters are going out to inform people and yet runway
incursions are up, what happened?
Mr. Hall. Two things. Congress, with the assistance of the
Board, had a hearing on this area. The Congress in previous
appropriation hearings has put an emphasis on this issue. As
you know, the AMAS system had been put on the back burner by
the FAA, and, as a result of Congressional attention and
emphasis, the program is now back on track and on schedule.
Mr. Wolf. Do you know what the runway incursion level is
that is up?
Dr. Loeb. As of this month, there have been 318 this year.
In 1993, there were 186; in 1994, there were 204; in 1995,
there were 242; and in 1996, there were 287. We have seen about
300 for 1997, 318 for 1997. That is a preliminary number.
Mr. Wolf. It doesn't seem that it has really helped.
Dr. Loeb. The answer, as the Chairman said, is in the AMAS
and in the ASDE.
The ASDE 3 radar system was to go out to about 40 airports,
give or take. That is upgraded surface radar detection
equipment. But the radar, in and of itself, is not sufficient.
There is a program called AMAS, which is a software system
that gives warnings in conjunction with the ASDE 3 radar. This
program was to have been in place a while by now.
Mr. Wolf. When was it to be in place?
Mr. Hall. 4 years ago.
Dr. Loeb. Thank you.
In 1993 or in 1994, I guess it was. By that time, it should
have been in place. Now, what has happened, they have activated
the program and there are now 34 ASDE radars out there. Twenty-
nine of them have been commissioned; the remainder are on their
way.
Mr. Wolf. Are they working?
Dr. Loeb. They are. But in the case of AMAS, what we have
right now is the one system that the Chairman saw in San
Francisco which was the developmental system, and there are
none that I know of that are in place and working. There has
been one installed in Detroit. St. Louis is getting theirs now.
I think Atlanta gets theirs in the early spring. That is a slow
process. The funding has now been given, but until those are in
place, I think we are going to continue to see problems,
because that is the real answer.
That, by the way, is at 40 of the largest, busiest
airports. The next question is, what happens at the other
airports? At one point, there was going to be an attempt to
develop something for the ASDE 2 radars that are out there.
They are disappearing from the scene, and a new program is
being developed and we hope there will be a low-cost
replacement at the smaller airports.
Mr. Wolf. Is there an overlap between where the incursions
have taken place, the increase, and where the airports are that
are going to get it?
Dr. Loeb. Many of them are taking place at the places where
the AMAS sub broke.
Mr. Hall. There was a lot of attention earlier in newspaper
articles at the Cleveland Airport, and we did send some
individuals out there to work with the FAA on that specific
airport facility.
Mr. Wolf. In your opinion, what are one or two things
Congress should insist upon to help reduce runway incursions?
[The information follows:]

The Safety Board is aware of five recent reports that specifically
address the issue of runway incursions. They are the Federal Aviation
Administration's (FAA) RE&D report of 1992, two reports by the Mitre
Corporation completed in 1994 and 1996, a report by the Department of
Transportation's Inspector General in 1997, and a more recent 1998
report by the FAA's RE&D Subcommittee on Runway Incursions. Of note,
all of the recommendations from the 1998 report are common to the
previous reports, such as:
Standardized air carrier cockpit procedures for surface movement;
improving airport layout charts; simplify and standardize ground
communications and require readback of certain control instructions;
expand the development of standard taxi routes; training and education
of new pilots on surface operations; conspicuity of aircraft; standards
for repainting of airport surfaces; development/installation of low
cost ASDE radar; equipment, method of procedure for advising pilots
when they are clear of an active runways; and expand human factors
research on the cause of runway incursions.
Because of the number of common recommendations from the various
reports, we believe that the FAA should be strongly encouraged to move
forward and implement those recommendations.
Secondly, the FAA should expedite the development, installation,
deployment and commissioning of the Airport Movement Area Safety System
(AMASS) for those airports that currently have the ASDE-3 surface radar
system.

AVIATION LANGUAGE CONCERNS

Mr. Wolf. I think we will be able to finish in time.
English language difficulty has been raised in other
hearings. The International Civil Aviation Organization, have
they done anything to address the problem? You remember the
Colombian airline. Is there anything that has been done, or has
the FAA supported any activity in that area?
Mr. Hall. Mr. Chairman, as you know, as a result of our
participation in the Government of Colombia's investigation of
that accident, we issued a recommendation to the FAA that they
develop, with air traffic authorities of member states and
ICAO, a program to enhance controllers's fluency in common
English language phrases and interaction skills sufficient to
assist pilots in obtaining situational awareness about critical
features of the airspace, particularly in nonradar
environments.
Mr. Wolf. Have there ever been any accidents based on that
problem?
Dr. Loeb. Totally on the English language?
Mr. Wolf. Anywhere in the world?
Dr. Loeb. We have had concerns. Clearly, there were some
concerns raised in the Cali, Colombia, accident. Clearly, there
were concerns raised in the Avianca accident at JFK. And, in
fact, we have had concerns raised in others, Independent Air in
the Azores, where there have been misunderstandings. The
biggest of them all was Tenerife--where there have been
misunderstandings on the part of either the pilots or the
controllers, either way.

AVIATION WEATHER RESEARCH

Mr. Wolf. Just a couple more questions. The committee has
encouraged the FAA to do more research addressing aviation
weather, given the high percentage of accidents and incidents
which are weather-related. For the past several years, the FAA
has proposed reductions in weather research which would have
cut out research funding in such areas as de-icing techniques,
which Mr. Pastor mentioned; clear air turbulence, again, Mr.
Pastor mentioned. Could you comment on whether or not the FAA's
fiscal year 1999 budget proposal is adequate in this area?
Mr. Hall. Mr. Chairman, I would have to look at that and
provide an answer for the record. Clearly, it is an area that
we will be looking at as part of the Embraer accident. I am
pleased to note that we had expressed a concern about the FAA
weather folks at the centers. We had several meetings with the
FAA expressing our concerns on that particular issue, and we
have just received a letter from Mr. Belger telling me that
they were going to maintain those weather folks in the centers
as FAA employees--the weather folks in the center; I correct
myself on that.
But it is an issue we will continue to look at, to answer
your specific question for the record. I have to do that
because I am not familiar with their budget.
[The information follows:]

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is pursuing
several programs addressing the aviation weather hazards of in-
flight icing, turbulence, ground icing, and convective weather.
Many of these programs were initiated as the result of Safety
Board investigations and safety recommendations. It is
essential that the FAA remain focused and continue the progress
on these issues. Consequently, the FAA budget should provide
adequate resources to address these and other aviation weather
related research issues.

supplemental (fy 1998) request

Mr. Wolf. The Safety Board has requested a $6,500,000
supplemental for 1998. We saw what you said in your request,
but can you for the record tell us what specifically the money
will be used for?
Also, your request further notes that, based on claims
submitted, approximately $9 million was obligated in fiscal
year 1997 for outlay in fiscal year 1998. However,
approximately $6 million of the amounts claimed does not meet
the intent of Congress for incremental expense incurred or
funded by other sources. How will you deal with these? How will
these outlays be recovered?
Mr. Hall. I would like to ask Mr. Keller, if he could, to
respond to that, and then I will follow up.
Mr. Keller. As you are aware, the OMB will be submitting
shortly the supplemental request for $5.4 million. That is
directly related to the Calverton facility that warehouses the
TWA 800 wreckage.
In regards to the $9 million in the outlays projected for
1998, that relates to the public law 105-18 that gave authority
to reimburse the States of Florida, Michigan, and New York.
Part of that legislation placed a requirement on the Safety
Board to do a review of those claims for appropriateness as far
as being extraordinary or incremental cost only.
In that regard, we contracted with the Defense Contract
Audit Administration to perform those reviews. They have
completed the one for Dade County, Florida for which the claim
from Dade County was $3.4 million. The appropriation allowed
for a maximum reimbursement of $3.1 million. The report from
the DCAA recommended an initial reimbursement of $2.2 million.
Mr. Wolf. What about Michigan and the New York one?
Mr. Keller. Michigan I just received today. I have the
draft of that, which I am analyzing.
Mr. Wolf. What about the New York one?
Mr. Keller. In New York, they are to begin the review, at
the request of New York, beginning February 23.
Mr. Wolf. When that comes in, you will submit that?
Mr. Keller. Yes, sir.

local reimbursements

Mr. Wolf. In your request, you note that, ``Most of the
additional $6,500,000 in Safety Board outlays for fiscal year
1998 will be offset by a reduction in outlays resulting from
the Board's review of claims received from the State of New
York and local counties (TWA Flight 800), Dade County, Florida
(ValuJet Flight 592) and Monroe County, Michigan (COMAIR Flight
3272) for incremental costs incurred by these localities as a
result of these accidents.'' Please explain what you mean by
this statement.
[The information follows:]

During fiscal year 1997, the Board obligated the full $9
million provided by the Congress to reimburse the State of New
York and local counties (TWA Flight 800), Dade County, Florida
(ValuJet Flight 592) and Monroe County, Michigan (Comair Flight
3272). As a result of the reviews being conducted by the
Defense Contract Audit Agency, anticipated outlays for these
claims, which had been projected to be made during fiscal year
1998, will be substantially less.

Mr. Wolf. Your supplemental request letter further notes
that, ``Based on claims submitted, approximately $9,000,000 was
obligated in fiscal year 1997 for outlay in fiscal year 1998. .
.however, approximately $6,000,000 of the amounts claimed
either does not meet the intent of Congress for incremental
expenses incurred or has been funded by other sources.'' How
will these outlays be recovered?
[The information follows:]

There is no need to recover these outlays, since there had
been no actual outlay of funds. There had only been a projected
outlay of funds in FY 1998 based on the anticipated timing of
the payment of these claims.

user fees

Mr. Wolf. Before I recognize Mr. Pastor for any other
questions, I'd like to discuss user fees. The President's
budget will request $6 million in new user fees that will be
deposited in an account for aviation accident investigations.
They will augment NTSB salaries and expenses. How will the fees
be collected?
Mr. Hall. We do not support that position, Mr. Chairman. I
am not exactly sure how they think they would do that.
Mr. Keller. We do not have a mechanism in place at the
current time for such a collection system, and I really don't
know what the magnitude of a collection system like that would
be.
Mr. Wolf. Why would the airlines be paying exclusively for
this service when NTSB investigates other modes, such as bus
and rail?
Mr. Keller. That is actually a question that the Chairman
himself has asked the OMB.
Mr. Wolf. And you have answered the last question about
your opinion.
Mr. Pastor.
Mr. Pastor. When Congressman Olver was questioning you on
the budget--when you do investigation and the length of the
investigation and the conclusion of it, how much was paid by
your board--you came back and said the FAA does a share, you do
a share, and I think you also said that the airlines themselves
do a share.
Mr. Hall. No, maybe I did not make myself clear. We are
responsible for the investigation. We, however, do the
investigations, Congressman, under what is called a party
process. There will be other government agencies such as TWA,
the FRA; depending on the accident, other regulatory agencies
will have people that will participate in the accident
investigation with us, which is obviously, a cost of the
investigation that we would not be aware of.
For example, Boeing was a party to the TWA accident; TWA
was a party to that accident; the airline pilots association
was a party to that accident; Pratt and Whitney, they had the
power plants on the plane, they were a party to that accident.
All of those entities have people they pay that participate in
that investigation. If you wanted to find out the total cost of
the investigation, you would probably want to collect all of
that information in order to say what is the total cost of the
investigation.
We are aware only of the cost that we have on a particular
investigation. All of the tests that we do, of course, are
funded through the Board. There are many times that we will do
outside tests which we, if an outside test is done, the Board
funds.
Mr. Pastor. So then in the investigation, just
hypothetically, the tank, the gas tank, you investigated it,
the manufacturer investigated it; just a hypothetical, they
would investigate it----
Mr. Hall. No. We would all investigate it. We would lead
the investigation of it through the party process.
Dr. Loeb. When an investigation begins of an accident and
we send our go team, we have an in investigator in charge. Then
we have group chairmen; group chairman, that is a person in
charge of structure, a person in charge of systems, a person in
charge of human performance, operations, et cetera.
On each one of those groups, there will be parties with
their representatives if they have the technical expertise to
help us. So if we are looking at the fire and explosions aspect
of the fuel tank, there will be a group that does that, led by
a Safety Board investigator, and the parties--Pratt and Whitney
or Boeing or Rolls Royce or whoever--would have representatives
on it. But they would be doing it under us. We do the planning.
It is all one investigation. They are not doing independent,
separate investigation; it is one investigation with a number
of people helping.
Mr. Hall. All of this, Congressman, interestingly enough,
historically came out of a 1935 accident involving a Senator
Codding from New Mexico who was in an aviation accident in
Missouri on a Trans World Aviation accident in which it ended
up with the regulator, the airline, and then eventually
Congress, all conducting an investigation of the same accident.
Out of that came the creation by Congress of the responsibility
of an independent accident investigation board under the Civil
Aviation Bureau, which then in 1967 became the National
Transportation Safety Board with independent investigation
responsibility in all modes of transportation.
Mr. Pastor. That is interesting, Mr. Chairman. You bring
out the frustration I guess some of us expressed in terms that
you have this Board that investigates a particular accident,
comes out with a finding, and says, these are the causes of the
accident and we need to repair a particular part or we need
more training. It goes to another agency. That other agency can
follow through or not.
We are talking about, where is this system while we are 4
years behind? When are we going to correct this problem? Eight
years from now? It becomes very frustrating, at least for me
now, because I have to tell you, I would hope that the
objective of all the different agencies would be to make
whatever particular travel the safest possible, because we are
talking about our citizens, we are talking about our
constituents.
Mr. Hall. Because of the need for a cost-benefit analysis,
many times changes recommended by the Board have not gotten
through OMB in terms of changing rules and regulations.
Many times, of course, we have had the industry,
unfortunately, as we had recently, tell the public they are
going to perform something without a timetable on when it is
going to be performed because it is covering a number of
airlines' particular aircraft and it obviously is going to take
some time to take them out of service and perform it.
But the responsible thing to do if you are going to make an
announcement like that is to say how they are going to do it. I
am no advocate for Southwest Airlines, but I think when
somebody steps forward in the safety area to address a problem
that has been identified by the Board and moves ahead of the
Government and ahead of the industry to do the job, the public
should be aware of it.

Cost Benefit Analysis

Mr. Pastor. Just one more question. We will go in at 5:00.
Mr. Wolf. We are okay.
Mr. Pastor. The cost-benefit ratio that you talked about
just a few minutes ago, would you explain it to me--I am not
familiar with it--that OMB requires?
Mr. Hall. Mr. Keller is more of an expert in that area.
Mr. Keller. OMB has a regulation with any new programs
where funding is concerned, there has to be a cost-benefit
analysis to make a determination or a recommendation as to the
viability of funding that program. What they are actually
looking for in that regard is offsets: Where can money be found
in order to fund the program, and is it viable to do the
program? A cost analysis.
Mr. Pastor. How would this affect replacement of rudders on
737's, when you are talking about potentially 100 people going
down and killing themselves?
Mr. Keller. Again, if it is looking at doing replacements
versus doing repairs, there is a formula, or a calculation, and
it is my personal opinion that it is arbitrary. It is a
mathematician's nightmare as far as just trying to place
numbers into something to justify it. In the area of safety for
us, sometimes those rules just don't apply.
Mr. Hall. I guess the most obvious example would be the
American Airlines accident that has been referred to, in
Nashville, Tennessee, that occurred with a fire in the cargo
hold. The Board recommended fire suppression and detection
equipment be retrofitted on the aircraft, which would have
required a rule change. The FAA did a cost-benefit analysis--
which of course is, to bluntly put it, trying to put a value on
human life--and determined that it was not cost effective and,
therefore, did not move forward.
Dr. Loeb. However, if the FAA determines that there is a
clear airworthiness issue and the airplane is simply unsafe to
fly as it is, then they do not need to defend it on a cost-
benefit basis and they can do it. And certainly the 737 rudder
package could fit that example.
What happens is, if they come back and believe that there
are alternative ways of handling things or if the airplane
basically is safe even if there is a fire--which is, by the
way, one of the arguments, that the way the class C cargo
compartment was designed, that it would never got out and in
fact ValuJet would never happen--once it did happen, the FAA
was no longer arguing that point, and therefore something was
going to be done one way or the other.
So the cost-benefit goes out the window when there is
absolute evidence that the airworthiness of the airplane can be
compromised and a catastrophic accident can result.

Hazardous Material Transportation

Mr. Pastor. The rule that says that an airline should not
carry hazardous material, it would seem pretty simple to say--
--
Dr. Loeb. Air carriers can carry hazardous materials, but
there are regulations that speak to the packaging, the
quantities, how they are carried on board, and so forth. If you
really want to get into that----
Mr. Pastor. I just want to know how OMB would look at that
or the FAA and come out with a simple rule to say you either
have to label them or somebody has to be aware they are on and
we shouldn't carry it because you have too many people in
there.
Dr. Loeb. There are rules. They are not simple.
Dr. Pastor. They are not simple?
Dr. Loeb. They are not simple, no, sir.
The biggest issue is not so much the legal carriage of
hazardous materials, it is the carriage of undeclared hazardous
materials.
The accident that Bob Chipkevich referred to earlier, the
American Airlines accident in Nashville, was an accident in
which materials actually for tie dying--that is not the word--
using jeans, stone washing them, making them look old.
Mr. Pastor. ``Tie dye'' is more my term.
Mr. Loeb. Right. I am showing my age.
The materials were packaged improperly, were not labeled as
hazardous materials, and got together. That is the issue that
is really paramount, the undeclared hazardous materials. The
FAA has been working on it through educational programs and so
forth, but it still remains an issue.
Mr. Hall. Fireworks were in a personal suitcase that
someone put on the plane that went off and caused a fire in the
cargo hold while the plane was on the ground. There was no
problem. But that is why you need inspectors and you need to
have the fire suppression and detection systems for.
Mr. Pastor. So undeclared hazardous materials, that is the
issue.
Mr. Hall. Yes, sir.
Mr. Pastor. To find a solution, to solve that problem, how
would the cost-benefit ratio involve itself?
Dr. Loeb. In many cases, that has been a problem. That was
the problem in the class C cargo compartment.
Mr. Hall. You would need to probably look at how OMB does
it. It would simply say they factor in the cost of not doing
the fix versus the fix and they use the cost of a potential
loss of life versus the cost of fix in making the determination
whether it is cost effective.
Mr. Loeb. They calculate the predicted losses against the
predicted cost.
Mr. Hall. Let me also say, Congressman, to add to your
education in this area, that once they agreed to do the
retrofit, the cost of the actual retrofit came in far less than
the cost that had been used for the purposes of the cost-
benefit analysis.
Mr. Pastor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wolf. Thank you, Mr. Pastor.
I appreciate your time, Mr. Hall, and your staff. We thank
you very much. We will have a series of questions, too, for the
record. I do appreciate your commitment to participate in this
group to deal with these issues on a continuing basis. It will
be an operation long after all of us who serve on this
committee are even on this committee. But something like that,
I think we do need it.
If you have any thoughts, on any people, or groups that you
think your might contact the Subcommittee Staff with regard to
that. We would like to do that.

Transportation safety issues

Mr. Wolf. Are these areas that there have not been any
accidents?
[The information follows:]

[Pages 120 - 122--The official Committee record contains additional material here.]

Mr. Hall. Mr. Chairman, if I could just make one brief
closing comment, I would be remiss if I did not thank you and
the committee for your support but also to thank the excellent
staff that serves this committee and the cooperation and
assistance that we have received on an ongoing basis from your
staff. They stay very knowledgeable and very aware of our
accident investigations and are very actively interested in the
process of the Board. We really appreciate that. We are very
proud that we receive oversight from this committee.
Mr. Wolf. Thank you very much.
If there are no questions, the hearing is adjourned.

[Pages 124 - 230--The official Committee record contains additional material here.]

Tuesday, March 10, 1998.

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (FAA)

WITNESSES

HON. JANE F. GARVEY, ADMINISTRATOR, FAA
MONTE BELGER, ACTING DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, FAA
DENNIS DEGAETANO, DEPUTY ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR RESEARCH AND
ACQUISITION, FAA
GUY GARDNER, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR REGULATION AND CERTIFICATION,
FAA
CATHAL ``IRISH'' L. FLYNN, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR CIVIL AVIATION
SECURITY, FAA

Opening Remarks

Mr. Wolf. Good morning. The subcommittee will come to
order.
This morning, we will receive testimony on the $9.7 billion
request of the Federal Aviation Administration for fiscal year
1999.
We welcome the FAA administrator, Ms. Jane Garvey, before
the subcommittee. Ms. Garvey testified last year before the
subcommittee, then as Acting Administrator of the Federal
Highway Administration. She had a much easier job then.
[Laughter].
I want to extend a warm welcome to Ms. Garvey, and I want
everyone to know that any criticism of the FAA this morning is
not criticism of Jane Garvey. She has been at the agency only a
little over 6 months now. I see many good changes taking place
at the FAA, and I am hopeful that she has the skills and
leadership and ability to make a real difference. However, the
longer you stay, the problems of the FAA will become yours. But
you have been there for such a short time and you have done a
number of, I think, very positive things.
I do want to set the stage for this hearing by stating
publicly that I am concerned about the continuing problems I
see at the agency. The FAA performs some of the most critical
of all services provided by the Federal Government. They help
ensure the public safety by inspecting and certifying aircraft,
airlines and pilots. They maintain safe separation and
distances between aircraft as they fly over our country and
provide detailed instructions to help pilots take off and land
safely. They work internationally to promote safe aviation
practices even in the poorest nations of the world. They
provide systems which help pilots and airline dispatchers see
and avoid hazardous weather. They conduct research in such
areas as cabin fire safety in order to find new and better ways
to protect the public.
Yet the agency has historically been beset with huge
internal problems of culture, management and labor relations,
which I believe undermine the public safety and cause fear and
anxiety in some air travelers.
The former DOT inspector general said, quote, ``there was a
troubling culture at the agency where managers are not held
accountable for their errors.''
The GAO said that the FAA's culture is focused more on its
own bureaucratic interests than on furthering the agency's
mission.
And, in last year's report, the Appropriations Committee
decried an FAA culture which is, and I quote, ``secretive,
rather than open; self-interested, rather than public-spirited;
and highly resistent to change.''
Over the past year, serious planning and management
problems became evident in two of the FAA's largest acquisition
programs, STARS and GPS. The agency, even by its own admission,
got a very late start in analyzing the year 2000 problem. Air
traffic controllers are restive about delays in implementing a
new classification and compensation system. The maintenance
worker's union says FAA is only staffing at 70 percent of what
is required. Courts have recently thrown out both FAA's over-
flight user fee plan and the entire contract tower program,
which creates chaos in the agency's operating budget.
Now you might think the problems are caused by severe
financial pressure, and there are some who want us all to
believe that, and certainly there are budget pressures within
individual programs and activities at the agency. Yet, overall,
the FAA received a hefty 9.5 percent budget increase in fiscal
year 1998; and they request a 7 percent increase for fiscal
year 1999. This is well beyond the increases in air traffic
measures, which are going up on the order of 1 to 3 percent.
It seems to me the agency has serious deficiencies not in
overall funding, but resource management and planning; and,
although we might disagree about the funding levels for a
specific program, it is hard to believe that, overall, the
agency doesn't have enough money.
So I want to explore these serious issues today with the
new FAA Administrator and hope she can provide evidence the
agency is more focused, organized, and will hold people more
accountable than has been the case in the past.
As we said in last year's report, the committee believes it
is imperative for the new administrator to place a high
priority in gaining effective control of the agency and
restoring morale, openness, and overall credibility to the
Congress and to the traveling public.
I might also say one other thing. It is my own growing
feeling that perhaps it may be a good idea to have an
independent FAA, one outside of the Department of
Transportation. Now I know you have a good relationship with
Secretary Slater, and I think that is an advantage, but there
have been times where that has not been the case. The fact that
the year 2000 thing, under the previous secretary, went on for
such a long period of time and was not focused on is an
indication that maybe it would be better to have a strong
administrator, like yourself, with an 8- to 10-year term, if
you will, totally independent, where that person could be the
advocate and not have to go through the political process.
Having said that, let me just recognize Mr. Sabo for any
comments that he might make.
Mr. Sabo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome, Ms. Garvey.
Ms. Garvey. Thank you.
Mr. Sabo. We appreciate having you appear before us. We
congratulate you on accepting the challenge of your current
position. Clearly, FAA has had lots of problems, and it
continues to have problems. We are confident that you are going
to be able to deal with them, and we look forward to hearing
from you.
Ms. Garvey. Thank you very much.

FAA Opening Remarks

Mr. Wolf. You may proceed as you see fit. Your full
statement will appear in the record, but you can read the full
statement or summarize.
Ms. Garvey. I would like to summarize if I could, Mr.
Chairman; and, first of all, thank you very much for welcoming
me today.
I want to say at the outset that I take very seriously the
issues that you have raised in your opening statement and
members of this committee have raised to me individually; and I
hope that, through the course of this morning's discussion, I
can answer some of the questions that have been raised in your
statement.
I would, however, like to begin by discussing the FAA's
1999 budget request in the context of three areas, and that is
safety, security, and system efficiency. These are the areas
where I have directed the agency to focus its attention. These
are the areas I think the American people will judge us by: Is
the system safe? Is it secure? Is it efficient?

safety

Safety is clearly our number one priority. It is the
Department's priority. It is, in many ways, the heart and soul
of the FAA's mission. When I first arrived at the agency, I
asked how many safety recommendations we had on our plate. I
was told we had about a thousand, and that even if you
eliminate the duplication, we have a number around 450. That is
way too many for any agency or any organization to manage
effectively. So over the last several months, we have spent a
good deal of time developing and shaping a safety strategic
plan. We are in the final process of developing what I believe
is a very focused, a very doable agenda. An agenda based on
safety data, and I think that is very important.
One of the fundamental principles, as we begin to talk
about the agenda, is we had to target our resources, where we
could make the greatest difference, where we had the greatest
potential benefits; and we really are looking at quantifiable
safety data in order to shape that agenda.
We also know that part of implementing an agenda
effectively is also recognizing that these are very complicated
and very difficult issues. They will not be solved by
government acting in isolation. In the last 6 months I have met
with stakeholders. I have met with partners, and I have asked
them to join us in an alliance, in a partnership to reduce the
accident rate. We know we can't do it alone. We know that
industry can't do it alone.
I want to be very clear, though, when I say that. It
doesn't mean we are giving up our oversight responsibilities.
We take that seriously. We must take that seriously. It does
mean, however, though, there is a great deal that can be gained
from collaboration, and I want to give two very quick examples.
Recently, just about 6 weeks ago, the Secretary and I
joined members of Air Transport Association (ATA) in announcing
that airlines were voluntarily installing enhanced ground
proximity warning systems on aircraft. We are proceeding with a
rule because we know from the safety data that kind of
equipment makes a difference. But even though we are proceeding
with the rule, industry said they are going to step forward;
they are going to move forward on this action. A second example
is the work we have been doing with the General Aviation (GA)
community over the last several months, again, working
together, focusing on a safety agenda that works for them and
for us. I think those kinds of partnerships really represent
good news for the American people, and the American people
deserve no less.

security enhancement

A second priority for us is improving aviation security.
The White House Commission gave us, a couple years ago, a very
comprehensive blueprint for enhancing security; and, in fact,
several improvements have already been made. They include the
installation of significantly improved security equipment as
well as enhanced procedures and methods for implementing the
equipment throughout the system.
We got a very aggressive implementation timetable. I have
stopped at airports and talked with airport directors about how
it is working, about improvements they would like to see. By
September 1, 1998, we will have more than 500 pieces of
explosive detection equipment at U.S. airports. Again, I think
that is good news.

system efficiency upgrade

Another priority, and the final priority for us, is system
efficiency. A significant amount of work has been done by the
FAA and industry to modernize the air traffic control system.
In 1997, for example, thanks to the strong financial support
from this committee, the FAA installed more than 1,500 pieces
of new equipment--ranging from very basic equipment, such as
radios and distance measuring equipment, to systems that are
much more complex, such as the voice switching and control
system and the long-range enroute radar. We are in the midst of
major acquisitions to replace computer systems at all enroute
and airport terminal facilities. In addition to upgrading
existing systems, these computers will provide the platforms
for future enhancement; and I think that is very important.
When we talk about STARS and DSR, this really is the
platform for the automation tools of the future. It is
important we get them in place. We know, and I know this
committee knows, the issue of modernization is one of the
greatest challenges that we face.
As I have said, a significant amount of work has already
been done, including the development of an architecture, which
I think is a really significant piece of work. But, really, to
build on this work, I asked a group of aviation experts,
including, by the way, the unions, because I think it is very,
very important, as we talk about modernization and as we talk
about the equipment of the future, that we have the unions at
the table with us. They are the ones who will be operating the
equipment, the ones who will be using it. I asked the task
force to really focus on two areas. First of all, take a good
look at the architecture, and that is really what the system
will look like. But, secondly and perhaps, in some ways, even
more important, examine the when and the how of implementing
the system: When should we do it; and how should we do it? And
I was very pleased that, over the last couple months, we are
seeing a growing consensus among the entire aviation community.
Again, we have met with general aviation, with the
commercial airline industry as well as the unions; and RTCA is
coming forward and has come forward with free flight phase-I
where there really does seem to be a growing consensus. This
really is a system of automation and decision-making tools we
can introduce into the system incrementally. I think that is
very important. Very often, the FAA has focused on a long-term
vision--not just the FAA, very often this happens in the
government--and you lose sight of what we can put in place now
and what we can do incrementally. RTCA is giving us some very
good direction in that area.
I think what is really key to the consensus is the
acknowledgment that the new system is more than acquiring new
technology. One of the messages we heard loud and clear at the
off site that the task force was engaged in--we heard this from
the unions in particular. We really need to train our work
forces in a new way. We have to think about the human factors.
We have to think about how people will be trained to use the
tools for the future. I think all of that is getting folded
into our modernization plan as we move forward, and those are
very important issues.

year 2000 (y2k) challenge

With respect to the Y2K issue, the question on everyone's
mind is: Will the FAA meet the challenges as the countdown to
January 1st, 2000, continues? My answer is, ``Yes, we will meet
the challenges.'' Last month, I appointed a new FAA Y2K
manager. I think he is terrific. His name is Ray Long. He has a
very dedicated staff working with him. We have a business
partner in Coopers and Lybrand, and they are at the table with
us. We have a command center at Tysons Corner where people are
working round the clock on just this issue. We developed time
lines and benchmarks to ensure our computer systems are Y2K
compliant before the turnof the century. We worked with the
Inspector General (IG) to move up the dates.
Mr. Chairman, I thought your comments last week that
November was not an acceptable date is one we agree with. We
have moved it up to June. But our Secretary has asked us to
examine the dates even further, take another look at them and
see if we can move them up more. I want to be realistic as I
lay out the agenda. I know we can meet the June deadline; and
we will look for ways to move it up even further.
I know this is a tough issue. Because at the same time we
are making all of the systems Y2K compliance we are also
bringing on new technologies. So we are moving in many
different directions, and I know it is going to take
commitment. I know it is going to take vigilance. But I believe
we are on the right track, and I believe we have brought the
right resources to bear.

fy 1999 president's budget request

Mr. Chairman, let me say I believe the President's budget
request allows us to move ahead on each of the priorities I
have mentioned. It gives us an increase in Operations, which
recognizes the need to hire more controllers, maintenance
technicians, safety inspectors and certification personnel. It
includes a request for grants-in-aid for airports at $1.7
billion, recognizing the capital needs of our Nation's
airports. It includes an increase in the facilities and
equipment appropriation, allowing us to move ahead on
modernization. It contains a strong request for research,
engineering and development, in providing us the tools to
better explore and understand the challenges associated with
deploying major communications, navigations and surveillance
systems on a much broader scale. So I think it is a good,
strong, sound budget.
Let me just add one personal note in closing. I had a
wonderful meeting a few weeks ago with the former FAA
administrators. One of them said at the time that the greatest
gift you can receive is the gift of responsibility. I know how
very responsible this position is and how awesome those
responsibilities seem at times. I am prepared to meet the
challenges. I appreciate very deeply the kind of commitment and
support I have received from this committee, and from other
Members of Congress as well, and from members of the industry.
And while there are days when I am awed by the challenges, I am
ready to take them on.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Wolf. Thank you, Ms. Garvey.
[The prepared statement and biography of Jane Garvey
follows:]

[Pages 237 - 243--The official Committee record contains additional material here.]

safety task force

Mr. Wolf. We were hoping to put together a group, and we
have asked the Secretary about this. We have asked Jim Hall and
the IG, a group located in DOT made up of representatives of
the Safety Board, of the GAO, and John Anderson has agreed, the
IG, and Ken Mead has agreed, and NASA and perhaps several other
groups, to develop an alternative group you could go to, the
public could go to, the Congress could go to, to develop a
measurement as to the safety and as to procurement. What are
your feelings about that?
Ms. Garvey. We would, Mr. Chairman, embrace that
enthusiastically. I think in some ways we have done it
informally with all of the entities you have mentioned. I spent
a great deal of time with Mr. Mead and with Mr. Hall, and I met
with Dan Goldin at NASA to talk about ways we could work
together. But I think formalizing that is a very good idea, and
I think it would be very helpful to us.
The whole issue of safety metrics is an interesting one and
a difficult one. We have had some wonderful experts from
academia. There is a fellow by the name of Arnie Bernet from
MIT in Boston who has worked with us. There are some real
challenges there. So I think having that kind of expertise, a
group we could talk with about our safety agenda, would be
extraordinarily helpful. We look forward to that.

user fees vs. aviation taxes

Mr. Wolf. The administration's budget proposes to, over the
next 5 years, finance a majority of the FAA's operations
through new user fees. However, the budget does not scale down
the aviation taxes proportionately, resulting in total new
revenues over the next 5 years of about $6 billion. Ways and
Means Committee Chairman Archer has called this proposal ``an
old-fashioned tax hike'', and he opposes it. Can you explain
why the administration proposes to collect this additional
revenue?
Ms. Garvey. First of all, let me say we are aware of those
concerns, and we have heard those. Yesterday, I met with OMB to
talk about this issue. We know we need to work closely with
Congress on this. I think the way we envisioned it is phasing
in the user fees and phasing out, if you will, the taxes. But
we know we have to work closely with you, and we are not there
yet. We have work to do in that area. OMB was very supportive
yesterday about trying to figure out a way to work with us on
this issue. So phasing out, though, I think is really the key.

coopers and lybrand--productivity savings

Mr. Wolf. A little over a year ago, Coopers and Lybrand,
who you said you are working closely with on the year 2000
program, submitted their final assessment on FAA's long-term
financial picture, as required by the FAA Reauthorization Act
of 1996. Coopers said that a status quo environment was
unacceptable at the FAA because there were significant
operational savings which the agency should focus on.
They said: ``There are no significant productivity
improvements in FAA's 6-year numbers; savings from procurement
and personnel reform are not assumed; no savings are assumed
from reduction of services or products; and no significant
administrative savings are assumed.''
Last year, in our committee report, we called on the FAA to
address this by ``aggressively eliminating inefficiencies and
waste, by streamlining and consolidating its organizational
structure, and by improving productivity.'' What are you doing
to address the operational efficiencies and cost savings
recommended in the Coopers report?
Ms. Garvey. The FAA has taken a number of steps in response
to the Coopers report.
I think, for example, some of the efficiencies we have
gained from the changes in the Airway Facilities--the AF branch
of the FAA, I think, has been very helpful. We have been able
to derive some cost avoidance from the contract tower program
that we have. I had a good meeting on that the other day.
There are other areas, I think, though, in productivity,
where we are talking to the unions, both through negotiations
and more informally with the unions, beyond the negotiating
table. I think there are some more we could do in the area of
productivity to really get some of the benefits. We have
implemented a number of the recommendations from Coopers.

Mr. Wolf. Regarding productivity, Coopers said ``we were unable to
find any significant, widespread productivity improvements between
fiscal years 1997 and 2002 that were included in FAA's estimates . . .
The FAA would benefit from a mandate created by the administrator that
addresses specific expectations''. Have you issued such a mandate to
establish specific productivity improvements during your tenure?
[The information follows:]
The agency has been directing its attention to the development of a
focused safety agenda, a comprehensive plan for security enhancements,
and laying out a clear road map for systems modernization.
It is important, however, to recognize that the FAA has already
accomplished a lot in terms of downsizing, contracting out, and
restructing. Among other actions, the agency has decreased its FTE by
almost 6,000 for total cost avoidance of over $1 billion and these
decreases have been accomplished while the safety work forces have been
growing.

regional office consolidation

Mr. Wolf. The FAA used to have a Productivity Working Group
which, by December of 1996, had identified as the number one
area for potential improvement, the consolidation and
elimination of regional offices. You know the concern of the
Federal Highway Administration, who just came up last week to
tell us their plans.
The head of that group said the following about this in
last year's hearing: ``I have worked for the FAA for 24 years
now and for all of those years it has been clear to me that
there are enormous efficiencies that we could gain through
looking at our regional structure. That is going to be
presented to the new administrator, and I would hope that [she]
and the other folks on the Hill would help us make the right
decisions in the next year or so.''
The Coast Guard has closed two regional offices and, as I
mentioned last week, the new administrator of Federal Highways
came up to say what their proposal is.
Do you have a proposal regarding consolidation of the
regional offices?
Ms. Garvey. Let me say, I know of your interest in
particular on the issue of regional consolidation. I will tell
you very honestly, in the first 6 months I have really focused
my attention on the safety agenda, modernization and the issue
of security. I know the issue of regional consolidation is
something, though, I need to come to grips with and plan to do
that within the next several months. I have talked to people in
the regions about this as well as some folks in headquarters. I
know there are a number of proposals on the table, and I would
like to look at all of them. But I will make that commitment to
you that that will be certainly among the top priorities for me
in the upcoming months.
Mr. Wolf. You might want to talk to the Coast Guard, and
you might want to talk to----
Ms. Garvey. That is a good suggestion.
Mr. Wolf [continuing]. The Federal Highway Administration
to see what they are doing. I think it can be done in a way
that is very compassionate and sensitive to the employees, and
without having RIFs and major changes, to signal that over the
next couple years. But, if you can do that, I would appreciate
that.

FIELD OFFICE CONSOLIDATION

Mr. Wolf. Is the FAA planning any consolidation of its field
offices in the next few years, such as Airport District Offices or
Flight Standards District Offices?
[The information follows:]
The FAA is just beginning to formulate ideas about the various ways
we might be able to increase administrative and operational
efficiencies through organizational restructuring at headquarters and
in the field. However, recent consolidations included combining 77
Airway Facility Sector Offices into 33 System Management Offices, which
was completed in 1996; and final implementation of the planned
conversion and consolidation of Flight Service Stations into Automated
Flight Service Stations, which were completed in 1997.

COST SAVINGS

Mr. Wolf. Coopers said a ``focused re-engineering effort''
supported at the highest level of the FAA could have a ``monumental
impact'' on the delivery of services. On a broader level than just
consolidation of field offices, do you have a plan for achieving
savings through ``focused reengineering'' of the agency, as Coopers &
Lybrand suggested?
[The information follows:]
As part of its annual budget formulation and execution processes,
the FAA continually considers possible productivity savings to its
budget, including those put forth by Coopers & Lybrand.

Mr. Wolf. Mr. Sabo.

year 2000 compliance

Mr. Sabo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
How confident are you of your ability to address the year
2000 problem?
Ms. Garvey. Well, let me say I am confident that we will
meet it. I think we have put the resources that we need to it.
I think it was a very significant step to take Ray Long and
put him in that key management position. He sits on
ourmanagement board. I see him every week. He reports every week as to
what our schedule is. We have some very clear benchmarks, deliverables.
Our next major deliverable is September 30, when all the systems need
to be renovated.
Mr. Sabo. Of this year.
Ms. Garvey. Of this year. But, even before that time, I
have asked Mr. Long to report back to the management board on
some benchmarks between now and September 30. So we are keeping
very close track of our progress.
We have a dedicated team. This is all they are doing. They
have come from around the country are working only on Y2K.
Every line of business has someone who is responsible for
getting the information to Ray, and he really has a lot of
authority to act on my behalf and on making sure he gets it
done. So I think we have got the resources.
As the Chairman mentioned, we got a late start, and that is
always the concern. But I think we have an aggressive schedule.
We are getting enormous help from the IG's office and the
General Accounting Office (GAO) in sort of working with us and
flagging some issues they think are important. That has been
very helpful.
So while I would love to say there is no risk to this, I
guess there is nothing in life where you can say that. I do
think we have the resources we need, and we brought them to
bear. All of us, collectively, as a management team and agency,
are very focused on it. It is very visible. We know that if we
don't succeed, it is going to be quite evident we haven't
succeeded. So, we want to work very hard on it.

y2k contingency plans

Mr. Sabo. Do you also develop contingency plans, like let's
hope for the best but----
Ms. Garvey. That is an excellent question, because I have
been asked that by GAO. We do have contingency plans, and I
will tell you that GAO has raised questions about them, whether
they are sufficient enough.
One of the points they made is: This is such an integrated
system and sometimes some of the contingency plans we have may
be more system dependent as opposed to really integrated. So we
have told him--and that is one of the issues that Mr. Long is
working on--we are taking a very hard look at our contingency
plans to make sure they will be adequate.

controller staffing requirements

Mr. Sabo. One other question, Mr. Chairman, at this point.
Historically, when I have looked at projections by FAA for
its need for air traffic controllers, I have never had great
confidence in the planning process that produced the numbers--
sometimes too low, sometimes too high. Sometimes the agency has
seemed oblivious to the fact that it had lots of controllers
are nearing retirement.
Ms. Garvey. I would say I have a good degree of confidence
in the numbers. They are based on staffing plans that people
have worked on in the agency. They are based on discussions
with the union as well. I think it is something that we need to
constantly evaluate, and I think it is a fair question. We
will--you know, we have a target of hiring about 800 additional
controllers this year. We are doing it sort of systematically
by quarter. But I think it is a fair question, and we need to
probably constantly look at that.
In fact, I think the issue of staffing is one we need to
constantly reevaluate. We are not doing it just with the air
traffic controllers but airways facilities as well. I think,
again, as we start thinking about what the work force needs to
look like as we move forward--new training, different skills--
that all affects the numbers we arrive at as well. We will
continue to look at that issue of staffing.
Mr. Sabo. Thank you.
Mr. Wolf. Before I recognize Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Callahan
wanted to be recognized. Mr. Callahan.

airline pricing

Mr. Callahan. I just have a short statement. Thank you. I
have another committee hearing so I have to go to. I just want
to fire a shot over the bow; and, hopefully, Madam
Administrator, you will be riding on our ship, shooting at
another ship.
My concern is that the airline predator pricing problem is
growing more and more severe. The unfairness of the disparities
of the rates for the same mileage traveled from an airport that
only has one airline is getting out of control. I don't want to
go back to price controls, but, unless something is done, we
are going to have to, with the help of your office, put some
controls on these predator pricings.
This is a serious problem, and your distribution of the
monies revolves around the number of landings. So an airline
will go into Pensacola, Florida, for example, and cut the rates
down 25 percent of Mobile, Alabama. Yet, more landings compound
the problem.
So, just to tell you there is a very serious concern in
Congress about the unfairness of the rate structure of the
airlines in captive areas such as Mobile, Alabama, has got to
be corrected. You can respond later. I just wanted to say that
before I went to my other meeting.
But, it is a very serious problem that a lot of Members of
Congress are interested in. We have to find some relief for
these captive markets.
Ms. Garvey. Thank you very much, Mr. Congressman. I will
mention that the Secretary, I know, has heard this from members
of the committee and also on the Senate side as well. I know
they are working very hard on a competition policy that will, I
hope, address many of the issues you have raised. I know the
Secretary raised this with all of us earlier this week as
something he is concerned about and heard a great deal about.
Thank you for your comments.
Mr. Callahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wolf. Mr. Tiahrt.

trip to wichita, kansas

Mr. Tiahrt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Ms. Garvey. I
was pleased to hear you were in the air capital of the world,
Wichita, Kansas.
Ms. Garvey. I had a terrific visit.
Mr. Tiahrt. I am sorry I was not able to be there with
you.
Ms. Garvey. You had a wonderful staff representative.
Mr. Tiahrt. We are very proud of the general aviation
industry with Boeing, Beech, Cessna and Learjet all there.
Boeing now considers them part of the general aviation
manufacturers with their new business jet, so we have a very
well-rounded community when it comes to--as far as aircraft is
concerned, I should say.
I got a lot of positive reports from your visit, and they
feel like you are probably the person to get the job done with
the FAA, and I want you to know my office and myself would like
to help you accomplish those purposes. I have some concerns and
maybe some philosophical differences, and I am going to submit
some questions for the record, Mr. Chairman.

user fees and kansas airports

Mr. Tiahrt. I first want to talk to you about user fees. In
your budget it looks like by 2003 you would like to fully be
funded by user fees, and I think this would be devastating to
general aviation. Some of the people who fly--and we have a lot
in Wichita, and many of them are marginally able to afford to
fly--and if you have a landing fee of a hundred dollars, it
will take a lot of people out of general aviation, and I don't
think that is good for the industry.
I think that most people in aviation would rather see
something in a fuel tax, rather than a user fee, and I wish the
administration would strongly consider that. I am afraid we
would move so many people out of the market it would slow down
the progress we are making in general aviation, and so I hope
you would consider that.
The other thing that I would like to talk to you about is
the airport improvements program. I see from your book here
that you have increased the amount of money there, and I am
very pleased with that. Congress increased the amount of money
by 70 percent last year, and you matched that this year. I
think that is good progress, and we need to, at some time,
think about another boost.
I have been to small airports in Kansas where the runway is
very rough. I mean, it would be difficult to ride a motorcycle
down it because you couldn't keep your balance; and when you
land a tail dragger, I am sure the people are sweating. You
know how difficult it is to land a tail dragger.
I think there are a lot of small and medium airports
neglected over the years, and many of the communities are now
trading internationally through NAFTA and GATT. We have open
markets overseas.
In Kingman, Kansas, for example, there is a gentleman who
trades with Asia; and he both brings products in and sells
products to Asia. Some of the people who are involved in these
larger corporations he does business with try to land their
business jets on this rough runway. Because there is so much
loose materials, he can't get them to come in; and it is
actually hampering him from creating jobs in these rural
communities.
So I think we need to think about that, as far as a
stronger economy in rural areas, especially. So I would like to
see us take a hard look at increasing the amount of funding
available for the airport improvement program, and I want to be
more specific to Kansas.
Hays, Kansas is not in my district. It is in Jerry Moran's
district, and he sits on the Transportation and Infrastructure
Subcommittee, so you will probably get pressure from more than
one person.
But last year we wanted to get an ILS into Hays. Mr.
Valentine told me by the end of 1998 the WAAS system would be
fully in place, but it is not in place now. I was told it was
supposed to be in place, and it was a matter of one by one
designing the approaches for each airport in the Nation, and
Hays was going to be up higher in the priority. So I was hoping
you could give me the same guarantee by the end of this year,
we would be able to get an ILS on line in Hays, Kansas.
Ms. Garvey. Let me check. I don't want to make a commitment
until I understand the issue more. But I certainly would like
to try to honor that.
Mr. Tiahrt. I would like you to comment on user fees. I am
very much concerned about that because, by the year 2000, your
budget is around $10 billion, and that is a big number on user
fees, and I would like your comments on the Airport Improvement
Program, and then please help me with Hays.
Ms. Garvey. Let me start with the airport improvement
program. Because the issues you raised are the same issues we
have been talking about internally. We are discussing the
reauthorization of the AIP program, and we spent a couple hours
yesterday talking about how do we deal with the smaller
airports.
It is becoming clearer and clearer, as you think about a
system, the small- and medium-sized airports are becoming
increasingly important. We were looking at ways we might be
able to boost the money that is needed or could go to the
smaller and regional airports. So we are very much aware of
what--we are looking at a couple options, and we would be happy
to sit down and talk with your staff about some of the options
we are looking at.
The issue of user fees is one I heard a great deal about.
In fact, I heard a lot when I was in Wichita, and I know the
concerns the general aviation community has. We have tried to
structure in a way that keeps the general aviation community
out of the user fee structure because of the issue that you
have raised, the impact that it would have, and that is the way
our proposal would be. I know that, in talking with Ed Bolen
and others, that is still a source of concern, and I respect
that and understand that. We are going to try to work with
members of the industry to deal with it. But I think the way
our proposal is set up now, we do respect and honor the sort of
distinct contribution and issues that GA has, and I expect we
will stay that course.
Mr. Tiahrt. Okay. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wolf. Thank you.
Mr. Olver.

amherst, ma visit

Mr. Olver. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Administrator Garvey, glad to have you here. Among your
visits to various places, Wichita and others, I hope you will
put a visit into Amherst, Massachusetts, sometime.
Ms. Garvey. My family would be delighted if I would do
that.
Mr. Olver. I actually have no questions right now. I will
listen for a while and see where we get to.

user fee proposal

Mr. Wolf. Mr. Packard.
Mr. Packard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Garvey. Good morning. Nice to see you again.
Mr. Packard. Let me pursue the user fee.
The National Civil Aviation Review Commission stated the
FAA should be partially funded by general tax revenue, in part
because the aviation system is beneficial to all society and
not just to users. Yet the administration proposes to replace
the general fund contributions to aviation with $1.7 billion in
new aviation taxes, beginning in the year 2000. Generally
speaking, which segments of aviation do you plan on taxing and
what nonaviation programs would receive the diverted funds?
Ms. Garvey. Mr. Packard, some of the details will be
flushed out more in our reauthorization, but let me talk about
the principles and the approach we are taking.
We read the NCARC proposal very, very carefully. We
recognize their distinction with the GA community, and we are
trying to honor that as we work through our proposal for
reauthorization as well.
Secondly, as we are thinking about user fees, we are very
focused on the air traffic control side. We think that is an
area where, as we begin to think about and as we are developing
our cost accounting system, we are really targeting on the air
traffic control piece because those are services we think we
can get our arms around a little easier. So we are really
focusing on that piece.
The NCARC proposal calls for a performance-based
organization that would be funded by user fees with a sort of
separate budget treatment, and that is the sort of model that
we are looking at as we are moving forward with our proposal.

transportation fund for america

Mr. Packard. Thank you.
What is the Transportation Fund for America?
Ms. Garvey. That is a concept that has been proposed in the
President's budget. It is really a concept that could be used
for--could be a vehicle, if you will, for revenues from user
fees, a place to deposit those additional revenues. I, frankly,
was encouraged to see that in the President's budget because I
think it may suggest a way that we might be able to use user
fees or to use additional resources that could be collected.
I think it is sort of a recognition--and I know that John
Ball is here, and I think it is a recognition from the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) we need to think differently as
we are looking at some of the trust funds like aviation or the
surface side as well.

host computer replacement

Mr. Packard. I think perhaps my greatest concern--and I had
a series of questions, but it has been asked--relative to the
computer--the year 2000 thing. That is of great concern I think
to this committee and, of course, I think to the country, and
certainly I am sure it is to you.
IBM has recommended against relying on the existing system.
They feel that the lack of parts generation--it is old
equipment--lack of test tools and available skills to analyze,
change existing microcodes were referenced in their concerns.
If the original equipment manufacturer, IBM, doesn't really
recommend the system to be used for FAA's application, how does
the FAA plan to guarantee the systems will work in the next
century?
Ms. Garvey. That is an honest concern; and it is one, by
the way, that we have talked about a lot with IBM. I have
actually met and spoken with the vice president several times
on this very issue, and they raise a very important question.
They say, with the host computer, the age and the
sustainability is such that we are not sure, as you have
suggested, that we can fix it. So we are really taking a two-
pronged approach, and I think this is important. It is an
approach IBM supports, the IG supports. It is an approach the
GA supports. So it is not a decision we made in isolation. It
was well thought out.
It is a two-pronged approach. First of all, we are going to
aggressively try to replace the host computer by the year 2000.
So we have an aggressive replacement schedule. Secondly, we are
also going to renovate what we have in place. It is really a
belt and suspenders, as Ken Mead likes to describe it. Because
it really says, if we are not successful in getting the host
computer, if we get down to the last couple months and we find
we are short in a couple of centers, key centers, then we want
to have the system that we currently have renovated and usable.
So we are taking the two-tracked approach. We are working very,
very closely with IBM. In fact, we have asked for any
additional expertise that they may have to help us in the
process. So we are taking the two-tracked approach, and I think
that is a prudent way to approach that issue.

year 2000 compliance date

Mr. Packard. In a previous hearing--and I can't remember
who the witness was, at the present time--but it seems I recall
where it would go up to November--it was scheduled to go to
November of 1999, which was just 2 months, a month and a half
or so before the deadline, that the solution was scheduled to
be resolved. That is a very, very thin time line; and if, in
fact, there are glitches and problems that are unforeseen, at
this time, you could be up against a deadline that would not be
achievable.
Ms. Garvey. That is right.
Congressman, in response to questions raised by this
committee and also in response to questions raised by OMB and
the IG, we have moved those dates forward. We are right now at
June. The Secretary and OMB have asked us to reexamine that and
see if we can move it forward even more, and we are doing that.
I want to be realistic about what our timetable is. We have
an enormous number of systems we are renovating and making Y2K
compliant, so I want to be realistic. But, at the same time, I
want to be as aggressive as we can. So we have moved it from
November to June, and we are examining with OMB and the IG to
see if we can move it even further.
Mr. Packard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wolf. Mr. Pastor.
Ms. Garvey. Good morning, Mr. Pastor.

sky harbor air traffic control tower

Mr. Pastor. As you fly out west and you go through Kansas--
I guess it is now probably under snow--I would encourage you to
visit us in Phoenix. The temperature is 75 degrees. And you
will probably see Sky Harbor International, the need for a new
tower. You have a request for a tower from both of our Senators
in Arizona and I support their request. So you are welcome, and
I would suggest you come visit us while the weather is still
warm and get out of this cold weather.
Ms. Garvey. We are well aware of the request, and I believe
we are responding appropriately for you.

explosive detection system (eds) deployment

Mr. Pastor. I basically have three questions. And the first
one, in the 1996 Aviation Reauthorization Act and the Gore
Commission, both suggest the FAA deploy EDS systems in a
scatter-shot approach. That means trying out new systems,
whether they are certified or not.
Most recently, I received a letter from the Air
Transportation Association supporting that approach. By
contrast, they say continuing to purchase more of the same,
when competition and better technology are just around the
corner, is at odds with that thoughtful approach. They believe
it will shortchange the flying public and send a signal to
manufacturers the innovation is neither expected nor rewarded.
Would you respond to the ATA concerns?
Ms. Garvey. Let me try; and if I am not getting to the
heart of your question, I will ask Irish Flynn, who is here, to
respond as well. There are really a couple issues. First of
all, as you suggested, it is deploying the new technology; and
I think we are doing that. And, in some cases, I think the
airports have made suggestions to us to improve the equipment.
They have talked to the manufacturers. We have as well.
As you suggested, a lot of this is very new technology; and
so, while we have certified equipment, we also know it is
important to test some of the equipment as it is coming along.
We are doing that.
I think, over the next year, there are several pieces of
new equipment that will receive FAA certification. There is one
that will be coming on line again this spring. There is one
that will be coming on line in the summer and again this fall.
So I think while we are deploying technology and getting new
equipment out there, we are also, encouraging the kinds of
market-driven innovation that will make these products even
more viable. So I think we are on track with that.
I think there were some questions raised last year about
were we doing enough to really bring on some of the new
technology. We worked hard with the new firms to make sure they
can be and will be certified.

eds reprogramming request

Mr. Pastor. More specifically, your February 13
reprogramming request, which is pending before the committee,
includes $25.1 million for explosive detection equipment. The
request states that funding is needed to purchase and install
certified EDS machines for screening checked baggage. If other
manufacturers are close to certification approval, do you
intend to defer obligation of the funds in order for them to
compete?
Ms. Garvey. What we tried to do with the reprogramming is
to establish the performance standards. So we said, here are
our standards. Can the manufacturers meet those standards? And
by doing that, we have been able to distribute the money among
three manufacturers--I think it is at least three
manufacturers. So I think we are still dealing with
manufacturers that are able to meet those performances. I
believe a couple may not yet be fully certified, is that right,
Irish? I was so hoping to get through this whole hearing
without having to turn to anyone. Keep it short, Irish.
Mr. Flynn. The FAA has given grants totalling $20 million
in R&D to forward explosive detection systems to be developed
for screening checked baggage. As the Administrator says, we
had hoped the products from that development would be certified
this year. As the products are certified, the Integrated
Product Team (IPT) will be making decisions to buy them. It is
important that we maintain the level of detection that
certification implies.
Mr. Pastor. Let me--your request, as I understand it,
states, funding is needed to purchase and install certified EDS
equipment.
Ms. Garvey. Some may not be.

eds certification

Mr. Pastor. It is my understanding very shortly, in a
matter of weeks, you are about to certify the new generation.
That may be better than the old generation that has been
certified. You know, if we are that close--my question is, if
we are that close to the next generation of equipment thatwill
detect even better, is it better to have a little patience and say,
well, let's get that certification done so that we can get the best in
place, rather than just stay with the certified and stay with an older
generation of detection equipment? That is basically my point.
Ms. Garvey. I understand the question now. So you are
saying, if we are that close, if we are talking about the
springtime or summer, let's take another look at that. Let me
get back to you on that.
Thanks, Irish.
Mr. Pastor. Because I would--since I am probably one of
your best clients in terms of going through the airports, I
would suggest to you that, if you are reasonably close to
certifying the next generation, maybe it would be reasonable to
wait so that you get the best product, rather than bringing the
$25 million in the old certified system and you may not get the
best product.
I guess I followed with the lead question, in that the Gore
Commission, the AF--excuse me, the ATA, everybody saying maybe
you ought to look at this scatter-shot approach because that
way you may get the best technology quicker into the system,
rather than just staying with the certified equipment, which
may be obsolete at this point.
Ms. Garvey. Thank you very much. Let's follow up on that
and get back to you with a fuller discussion on it.
[Additional information follows:]

With the reprogrammed funding, the FAA will purchase and install
only FAA-certified EDS equipment for screening checked baggage. Trace
detection equipment will also be purchased and deployed to assist in
alarm resolution.

Mr. Pastor. I only have one request. You get back to me
before the $25 million is given out or that the--that you stay
with the request and only certified equipment gets installed.
Thank you.

controller staffing--coopers' findings

Mr. Wolf. Following up on what Mr. Sabo asked, in the
Coopers report, they concluded that the FAA has consistently
overestimated future aviation activity in its forecasting.
Because of this, Coopers believed there was a high likelihood
that future FAA workload was also being overestimated, meaning
that your controller staffing requirements, which Mr. Sabo
referred to, and associated budget requests might be too high.
Have you made any adjustments in light of Coopers' finding or
do you disagree with them?
Ms. Garvey. There were some adjustments, Mr. Chairman,
made, as a result of Coopers' finding. The staffing study that
was done, I believe, last year--I will double-check on the
time--really dealt with and took into account some of the early
findings that Coopers had included.
In talking with staff yesterday about the issue of
staffing, I think one of the points one of the associates made
was that the whole issue of staffing is one you have to
constantly keep looking at. We have to constantly reevaluate.
Even though we have a staffing study that may have been done in
1997, it is something that has to constantly be evaluated, and
I think it needs to be evaluated with the unions. Frankly, it
is discussions we are having even as we are in the midst of the
contract negotiations.
One of the issues that I have talked to some of the NATCA
leadership about is, are there more productivity gains we need
to take a look at? I know NATCA has raised an issue about the
ratio of supervisors. Fair questions, and I think we have also
raised some issues about how can we derive and get some future
productivity gains. But I think we need to constantly look at
it, and I am not sure we hit it out of the park yet. I think we
did take into account the Coopers findings. I will go back and
take another look at it to see if we have done everything we
possibly can in that area.

lack of financial management--coopers

Mr. Wolf. We were concerned to read the following statement
in the report: ``A related issue facing the FAA is that many of
its own executives have told us, quote, `it can't manage
money'. The FAA's core program managers have not demonstrated
an understanding of financial management. One of the real
issues associated with the lack of financial management is the
lack of accountability in terms of what was projected versus
what actually happened.'' Do you agree with this statement and
are you doing anything to deal with the financial management at
the FAA?
Ms. Garvey. First of all, I think the cost accounting
system is going to be extraordinarily helpful to us. In some of
the early discussions we have had with Arthur Andersen, for
example, there are some patterns that are emerging. Places
where control centers or centers where there is great
difference among cost and, you know, where you sort of have to
ask yourself the management question: Why is the difference so
great and what we can do about it? What changes can we make? So
I think the cost accounting system would be a wonderful tool
for management in managing the money.
I talked with GAO the other day about the problems we often
have at the FAA, just in terms of even giving the cost of
projects; and I said, what suggestions would you have for us?
One of the suggestions that Mr. Dillingham made, which I
thought was a good one and one we have talked about a little
internally, is: we often lock ourselves into a number. We would
be better off, because often these projects are so complicated,
to suggest a range and to think in terms of a range. To
identify very early on what the risks are associated with the
contract, and how answering the risks in a certain way that
might affect the bottom line, might affect the number. So, that
is something we are talking about as we are managing projects:
Are we locking ourselves in too early on numbers that may be
unrealistic?
I think some of the other discussions and some of the
things acquisition reform has given us is an ability also,
though, to put up front the life-cycle cost. That is often
something that was not included in the past--as least as I have
understood it--in past discussions.
So do I think we need to manage better on finances? Yes. Do
I think we need to manage our projects more tightly? Yes. And I
think there are tools, such as the cost accounting, that will
be very effective in helping us do that.

[Page 257--The official Committee record contains additional material here.]

user fees--cost accounting system

Mr. Wolf. Both the House and Senate Appropriations
Committees are on record as opposing whole-scale conversion of
the FAA funding to user fees. Mr. Packard asked the question
and I think Mr. Tiahrt also. How does the new accounting system
fit into this issue of user fees?
Ms. Garvey. First of all, I think it is critical we have a
cost accounting system in place; and we are working hard to do
that. Before we move to user fees, the industry has said we
need to know how much the services cost; and that is a fair
question. We are trying to focus FAA, with the help of, Arthur
Andersen on the cost of the air traffic control system. That is
really our first priority. That is the area where it is the
operations--where understanding what the costs of the services
are I think is absolutely critical. So we are focused, first
and foremost, on the air traffic control.
I do want to say that I understand how difficult the issue
of user fee is, and I think it is one that is going to take a
great deal of discussion with Congress. We certainly will be
putting forth a proposal--my guess is it is a proposal that is
a good proposal--to begin the debate and begin the discussion.
So I think it is going to not be an easy issue, and it is one
that I think is going to take a lot of discussion, both with
Congress and with industry as well.
One of the issues that industry has raised with me, and I
think it is a fair question, what are the assumptions that you
are going to use as you start thinking about cost pricing? The
cost accounting is the first step, and understanding it as a
management tool is the first step. That is what I am eager to
have, the cost accounting system in place as a management tool.
The second is, when you start thinking about pricing and cost
pricing, what are the assumptions you are going to use? And
that is going to take some very hard and frank discussions with
industry and, again, I think with Congress as well.

cost accounting system cost estimate

Mr. Wolf. The cost accounting system was going to cost
anywhere from $2.9 to $3.7 million. What is the cost going to
be?
Ms. Garvey. Let me get back to you with the exact cost,
because I am not sure what the exact number is. We just made an
adjustment to the contract. I want to be sure I am giving an
accurate number.
[The information follows:]

Last year we reported that the fiscal year 1997 cost to
develop the cost accounting system was estimated to be $3.6
million. We estimated the total cost to develop and implement
the system to be $6.63 million. The total estimated cost was
provided before we had fully identified our detailed functional
requirements. Our current estimate, based on fully known user
requirements, is $8.03 million.

Mr. Wolf. Despite the FAA's statement regarding its
importance, the Coopers team found over 50 percent of the cost
system was unfunded. So the question is, is it fully funded at
this point?
Ms. Garvey. Because we are focused on the air traffic
control, I asked yesterday whether we were comfortable with the
budget. People are still feeling comfortable with the budget,
because we focused in on the air traffic control.
Mr. Wolf. It will be implemented when?
Ms. Garvey. The air traffic control, the piece we feel we
really need in order to understand the cost, will be by October
1st, of this year.

Mr. Wolf. It was expected to be fully implemented by the
end of this year. Is that your current schedule?
[The information follows:]
FAA plans to have the framework in place to support an
operational cost accounting system. However, current emphasis
is being placed on completing those portions of the system
which support user fees. This may necessitate implementing any
remaining portions of the system during FY 1999.
COST ACCOUNTING SYSTEM
Mr. Wolf. The Coopers and Lybrand study said ``at least two
separate people referred to (financial) data produced by the FAA as
`terrible.' Two other independent groups referred to `dueling data,' or
data that can be manipulated to represent any viewpoint.'' Will the new
cost accounting system be the single source of financial data from FAA,
so that we can count on it?
[The information follows:]
The cost accounting system is not being designed to replace the
Departmental Accounting and Financial Information System (DAFIS), which
is the Department's core accounting system. The cost accounting system
will receive financial data from DAFIS and the Consolidated Uniform
Payroll System, (CUPS), tie the cost data to data from various
operational systems, perform allocations of overhead and general and
administrative costs, and report the fully allocated cost of end-user
services. It will be the single source of cost accounting data.
Arthur Andersen, the contractor assisting the FAA in developing the
cost accounting system, has validated the CAS design extensively, and
benchmarked the CAS development program with similar successful
programs it has conducted with private sector organizations. Arthur
Andersen further indicated that the progress to date reflects an
efficient, fully defensible approach to enterprise system development.

year 2000 target date

Mr. Wolf. It is important--I agree with what Mr. Packard
said on the year 2000--but I think, for credibility, it is
important to set targets that really can be met and not just
throw something out that really can't be met. Then people say
there they go again. So when you do all of this, it is good to
keep to them, even if you have to go a month or two.
Ms. Garvey. That is, frankly, in the year 2000 why we have
June right now. We will try very hard to move it up, but I,
again, want to be realistic about what we can deliver.
Mr. Wolf. OMB's date was March. Are there any other
agencies asking for longer than that, not only in DOT but
across the board?
Ms. Garvey. I am not aware of any, and I know Mr. Koskinen
has just joined the Administration to honcho the effort. He
started on Monday, and I think his first call was from the FAA.
So we are going to sit down and talk with him about that.

personnel reform

Mr. Wolf. The 1999 budget document calls it a ``priority
management objective'' of the administration to implement,
within the FAA, ``a personnel system that, without increasing
cost, empowers managers to effectively hire, reward, promote,
discipline and remove employees while at the same time
protecting employee rights''. How much progress has been made
so far, and what is your schedule over the coming year in this
priority management area?
Ms. Garvey. In the coming, year, in fact very soon, we will
be implementing a pilot program. It is a complicated issue. It
is a difficult issue. We are asking people to make some
significant changes in personnel. As you suggested, it is
moving much to a performance based, to incentives rather than
automatic steps. It is not an unusual system for the private
sector, but it is a new system for those of us in the public
sector. And the suggestion made by the team that is working on
it is to begin it as a pilot program. We are looking right now
within the agency and research and development is one area
where there is an interest to be a pilot program. There are a
couple of other offices that have said they would like to step
forward and be a pilot program as well. We think by
implementing a pilot program, we can give the employees an
opportunity to check in every other month to make sure that we
are understanding how it is going and answer the questions that
develop. It is a really enormous task and I will say, even in
talking with the unions, I know people have worked hard on it,
but it is a complicated issue.
Mr. Wolf. Most Federal agencies would give anything to have
the personnel and procurement flexibility that you have.
Ms. Garvey. That is right, yes.

reform implementation

Mr. Wolf. How much have you used that since it was passed?
Ms. Garvey. I think we have done much better on the
acquisition side. I think we have made some great, great
progress with the acquisition piece. We have cut contract time
almost in half. I have talked with contractors who say that the
cost of doing business with the FAA and preparing for it is
less because it is so much more streamlined. I think----
Mr. Wolf. Could you submit some of those examples for us?
[The information follows:]

[Page 261--The official Committee record contains additional material here.]

Ms. Garvey. Yes, we will. I would be happy to do that, Mr.
Chairman. We have a contract resolution office, dispute
resolution office, which is in place, that if issues arise
during the life of a contract we can deal with it quickly and
expeditiously.
On the personnel side, I think we have made good progress.
We have cut the time, when somebody is identified, from about 6
months to 6 weeks to hire someone. We have reduced the time.

new hires under reform

Mr. Wolf. How many people have been hired under that
system?
Ms. Garvey. I would have to get back with the number, but I
know we have hired about 27 specialist technicians--
approximately 21 to 27. I have to double-check on that, but
they are sort of outside the cap with bonuses and different
pays and so forth. Let me check on the other number, though,
and get you a more accurate number.
I do think, though, as you have suggested, the real
breakthrough with personnel reform, where you really take it
over the top, will be with the new compensation program. That
is why I do think that that is so important.
[The information follows:]

Since April 1, 1996, the FAA has hired 5,098 people as of February
28, 1998. That number includes 684 temporary employees.
Mr. Wolf. I notice that in the acquisition area, you are
considering an approach which prioritizes some systems for faster near-
term implementation, and saving other projects for phase two. Yet in
the personnel reform area, I've heard the approach is ``all or
nothing''. Executive pay, travel reform, PCS reform, and bargaining
unit compensation are all being considered collectively. Is there any
merit in ``rolling out'' personnel reform initiatives on a phased
basis, instead or waiting until there is agreement (and buy-in with all
the unions) on issues across the entire workforce?
[The information follows:]
Yes, there is merit to a phased approach for reform and some of our
initiatives are expected to be implemented in phases. FAA has already
implemented many new initiatives under personnel reform. Some of these
initiatives include: streamlined hiring processes that have reduced the
time to fill positions from 6 months to 6 weeks; implemented automated
systems to distribute vacancy announcements and referral lists, and
develop position descriptions, reducing processing times from a week or
more to one day; modified premium pay rules to pay only for time
actually worked; and modified our grievance and appeals process to
reduce the average time to resolve complaints from 1 year to 3 months.
We are continuing to develop additional initiatives to take
advantage of the flexibilities under personnel reform, some of which
may be implemented for nonbargaining unit employees in advance of
completion of union negotiations. In addition to these already
implemented initiatives, we are developing comprehensive and complex
changes such as a new compensation system, which will likely be
implemented in phases as various FAA organizations can complete the
necessary communications training within their work force, or complete
negotiations with their affected labor unions.

ig audit of contract tower program

Mr. Wolf. One of the reasons, as you know, for reform was
to allow the FAA flexibility to move employees to understaffed,
hard-to-fill locations. The contract tower program continues to
provide experienced controllers for possible transfer to
understaffed facilities, and personnel reform allows you to do
so. However, the IG found that the FAA reassigned over half of
the controllers to overstaffed facilities. Why does the agency
send employees to overstaffed facilities when they are needed
in other locations, even if the personnel reforms give you
unprecedented flexibility?
Ms. Garvey. I am aware of that report that the IG did.
Obviously, we should be putting the personnel where they are
needed. I understand that there have been some union issues on
that, but the IG has asked us to take a very hard look at that.
And we are doing that. The classification program that we are
developing with the union will also, I believe, help us address
that issue a little more specifically.
I do want to speak just a minute about that IG report
because it was one of the first ones that occurred when I was
Administrator, and again I think is a testimony to Mr. Mead and
his staff. What they did with that report, I hope, is a model
for lots of reports to come. They met with us in the middle of
the report, and gave us some sort of heads-up on several issues
that they were concerned with. This gave us the opportunity,
before the report was completed, to begin making some
management changes and management decisions that I think helped
improve the process. So it was a good model, and I think a
model for many other reports in working with the IG.
Mr. Wolf. I want to say that I appreciate your attitude,
and your answer to that. I have found it kind of remarkable.
Since you have taken over, I have not seen a defensive attitude
at all; whereas, in the past it would seem that every time--and
I know there was animosity between the former IG and certain
agencies, to say the least, the FAA being probably the prime,
prime one, even leading to a book, I guess, but--you could see
the body just kind of tensing up, and nobody wanted to take any
criticism. And I do think it has been very healthy. Nobody
likes to be criticized, I guess, Members up here or in any
other job. But I do want to publicly acknowledge that I do
appreciate your openness. And you have never lashed back and
said, well, that person doesn't understand what they are
talking about.
I don't know what is in your mind, but your attitude and
your body language----
Ms. Garvey. It is very positive, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wolf [continuing]. Has been--it has been very
refreshing, having watched it over the years. And I think that
is a good sign of leadership, being willing to listen to other
people. It doesn't mean you have to do everything that everyone
says, but not be defensive about it. Your answer with regard to
the IG and Mr. Mead, I think, was very positive.
Ms. Garvey. Thank you.
Mr. Wolf. Mr. Olver, if you have any questions?

ig audit of contract tower program

Mr. Olver. Well, if I may just follow-up, Mr. Chairman, on
that one. There's the IG's report, as Ms. Garvey has pointed
out, it was just about to come in as she was taking over, but
the point that they made about the FAA's reassigning over half
the people that they were reassigning to overstaffed
facilities, is that--has that been addressed in a positive way?
Ms. Garvey. I think it has been addressed----
Mr. Olver. Positively?
Ms. Garvey. Partly. Monte, do you want to add anything to
that?
Mr. Belger. Yes, sir, I think we have addressed it. I think
we have done a better job in the past several years in
assigning folks to the more critical facilities than we did in
the first couple years of the contract tower program. We tried
to do this in a way that is consistent with an agreement that
we reached with the unions in order to be able to continue on
with the contract tower program, which as of today is going to
save the taxpayers roughly $30 million a year. So we are trying
to do the best we can, working with the unions and being fair
to our employees.
Mr. Olver. How long has the contract tower program been in
operation?
Mr. Belger. It started back in 1994, probably.
Mr. Olver. Okay. Well, actually, I was counting up the
years, the first couple of years, and the most recent several
years, and thinking, oh, how far back did that go, since the
IG's report is a year old and they are saying that half--more
than half of the reassignments went to overstaffed facilities?
So I think that at least--at least for what is in--well,
history starts with when I came on the committee. Pre-history,
I don't really care that much about, but the history of it, to
me, is what has happened in the last year. And if the
assignments are--if the IG were to go back, what would the IG
say about the assignments of personnel in this--under this
program?
Mr. Belger. I think they would----
Mr. Olver. And the assignments in the last year?
Mr. Belger. I think they would say that we have done a
better job of assigning controllers who choose to stay with the
FAA to the more critical facilities than we did in the first
couple of years.
Mr. Olver. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wolf. Mr. Sabo.
Mr. Sabo. Nothing.

national civil aviation review commission report

Mr. Wolf. The National Civil Aviation Review Commission
submitted its final report to you and Secretary Slater in
December. What is the department's schedule for making formal
proposals to the Congress based on it?
Ms. Garvey. Mr. Chairman, we are in the final stages. As a
matter of fact, we met with OMB yesterday about some of the
elements of the proposals. So we expect to get that up to the
Hill within the next few weeks. We are a little bit dependent
on some of the discussions, obviously, within the
administration with OMB, but we were very encouraged by their
response yesterday. Our staffs are meeting, both from DOT and
OMB, for them to understand some of the elements in a little
more detail.
I will tell you that one of the recommendations that came
out of NCARC that I am particularly pleased about is the
focused safety agenda. They encouraged us to take a hard look
at all of those 450 recommendations, and we are very close to
unveiling a safety agenda that I think will be very responsive
to the work that that Commission did.
Mr. Wolf. When will that be?
Ms. Garvey. We are hoping in the first week in April. To be
very honest, it is just about ready and we are trying to work
people's schedules to make sure that we can have the right
people there. But again, it is a very close collaboration with
people in the general aviation community. We have talked with
our colleagues at NTSB, though we recognize their independence
in all of this, but wanting them to understand how we are
thinking about the agenda and the approach we are taking.
We have taken advantage of some of the data that Boeing has
available, the safety data that is available, and we have made
some very strategic decisions. We are really saying, let's take
our resources and let's put them where they will produce the
greatest benefits.
The other challenge for us, and what we have not quite
finalized but we will in the next couple of weeks, is what do
we need to do internally as an organization to manage this
implementation well? Do we need to restructure ourselves? I
don't mean massive reorganizations, but within the regulations
office, for example, within the certification office, do we
need to think differently? Do we need to create something
similar to Ray Long with the Y2K program, you know, a
streamlined team with somebody who is clearly, you know,
accountable and in charge?
So we are asking ourselves some organizational questions,
but I think we have made some very good progress that really
responds to what NCARC is suggesting.
Mr. Wolf. I think the more you make one person
accountable----
Ms. Garvey. Right.
Mr. Wolf [continuing]. Because nothing fits into one
category anymore.
Ms. Garvey. Right.
Mr. Wolf. The formal processes are no longer valid just
about anywhere. Every time there is an issue up here, members
from all different committees come together into task force to
resolve things, because nothing fits into any one jurisdiction.
I would urge the more you can make one person accountable--
--
Ms. Garvey. Good advice.
Mr. Wolf [continuing]. With a name and a face, I think that
is certainly preferable.
Secondly, I would urge you to make this announcement as
quickly as you can and not wait for everyone's schedule. This
is so important that you ought to probably do it by the end of
the month, hopefully before Congress adjourns for the Easter
break.
Ms. Garvey. Good advice.
Mr. Wolf. I think it would be good if it were done when the
Congress is here so we could see it quickly and call you.
Ms. Garvey. Very good.

off-budget treatment for faa

Mr. Wolf. But I would not wait too long for schedules.
In August of 1993, the final report of the commission to
ensure strong, competitive airline industry, I think the
Baliles Commission, said the FAA was severely limited by the
ebbs and flows of the Federal budget process. They said the
Federal budget process cannot be relied on to provide adequate
continuing funds for FAA's operations or capital programs. They
recommended an off-budget ATC Corporation to solve this
problem.
Similarly, the Review Commission said the federal budget
process is crippling the agency and calls for an off-budget
performance based organization, PBO. If Congress didn't agree
in 1993, and there was a bipartisan opposition to the ATC
Corporation, how is the PBO concept sufficient to overcome that
opposition now?
Ms. Garvey. That is a question we are asking ourselves, and
we know that concept really faces an uphill battle. I must
confess that I am not as familiar with the Baliles Commission
Report as I am the NCARC, but I would make one distinction. The
move towards user fees and a good, sound cost accounting system
gets to how important that management tool is. If we can really
understand what the services cost, we may be able to make a
better case that user fees might allow us to have the kind of
special budget treatment, removing ourselves from the budget
caps that we have talked about.
I know how difficult it is. I know when our colleagues at
OMB look at the budget they have to look at all the
discretionary programs. Every time you do something different
for aviation or something different for surface, it has an
impact to the rest of the budget. We are aware of that. We are
looking at ways that we can keep it deficit neutral, which is,
I know, of great concern to the Congress and great concern to
the Administration. We have some ideas but that is really what
we have to flesh out over the next few weeks. But, again, I
expect this is going to not be an easy debate. It is one where
I think we have to all put our best ideas forward and then talk
them out fully and see where we end up.
I will say, the issue of flexibility within the budget is
one that I struggle a little bit with. We had the National
Airport issue and we thought we wanted to try to move up the
STARS program here at National. The difficulty sometimes in
moving some of the budget numbers, we get great help from you
and from your staff in sort of helping us through that maze but
sometimes those are the challenges in terms of flexibility that
make it a little more challenging.
Mr. Wolf. Well, I personally favor giving you more
flexibility any way we can. We have some questions with regard
to the National STARS. But as we can, if you have any thoughts,
I think the administrator needs flexibility.
Ms. Garvey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wolf. You can't be pigeonholed into one category.
Do you believe the appropriations process has not been able
to provide adequate and reliable funding for FAA?
Ms. Garvey. I think this committee has been extraordinarily
generous and Congress has been generous. I think the one issue
might be to work a little bit more with you on the flexibility
issue. I would welcome doing that.
Mr. Wolf. Okay. We have a number of others on that which we
will ask for the record.
[The information follows:]
PERFORMANCE BASED ORGANIZATION (PBO)
Mr. Wolf. Last year's budget proposed 9 new PBO's. How many of
these were enacted by Congress?
[The information follows:]
To date there have been no PBO's approved by Congress.
Mr. Wolf. How many new PBO's are formally included in the
President's budget for fiscal year 1999?
[The information follows:]
The Administration is seeking to establish the following PBO's:
Retirement Benefit Management Services (Federal Retirement and
Insurance Service, Office of Personnel Management), Intellectual
Property Rights (Patent and Trademark Office, Department of Commerce),
Defense Commissary Services (Defense Commissary Agency, Department of
Defense), U.S. Mint (Treasury), St. Lawrence Seaway Development
Corporation (Department of Transportation), Seafood Inspection
(National Ocean Service), Technical Information Dissemination (National
Technical Information Service, Commerce), Mortgage Insurance Services
(Government National Mortgage Association, Department of Housing and
Urban Development), Mortgage Insurance Services (Federal Housing
Administration, Department of Housing and Urban Development), and the
Rural Telephone Bank (Department of Agriculture). The Administration is
currently considering several other possible PBO candidates as well.
COMPARING FAA'S GROWTH WITH INDUSTRY GROWTH
Mr. Wolf. This view that we're heading toward ``gridlock'' because
the Federal budget process cannot provide enough money for the FAA
seems to miss some important facts. In fiscal year 1998, Congress
provided an overall budget increase of 9.5 percent for the FAA (from
$8.2 billion to $9.0 billion), yet by the FAA's own statistics, air
traffic workload at your centers and towers is only going up between 1
and 2 percent. If we approve your 1999 funding request, we will be
providing another 6.9 percent increase, even though air traffic
workload is only expected to grow by 1 or 2 percent. Is there any other
element of the aviation industry where rates of budget growth far
exceed the growth in workload, yet the experts still project disaster
or ``gridlock''?
[The information follows:]
The comparison between growth in the FAA's budget and growth in
center and tower activity is not a complete comparison since it
excludes other cost drivers, both external and internal.
Externally, for example, the comparison excludes our deferred
capital investments in both airport improvements and in more modern,
more efficient national airspace system equipment, both of which
increase our funding requirements. In both cases, these investments, if
we were a private company, would be expensed and depreciated over the
life of the investment and not just in any one specific year. The
comparison also excludes funding increases required to address the
heightened security threat facing U.S. aviation, the public's desire to
strengthen our regulatory and certification oversight, and the general
globalization of aviation.
Internally, the comparison fails to take into account mandatory
Federal pay and retirement costs, both of which, given our large number
of required staff, are quite expensive, easily exceeding the 1 to 2
percent growth cited in the question.

aviation workload budget impact

Mr. Wolf. Sometimes we hear that because the aviation
business is doing well and more people are traveling, the FAA
needs more money to keep up. But often these people are
referring to the number of new passengers and new trips, which
has little direct bearing on FAA's workload. As Mr. Belger and
others have pointed out in past years, the FAA doesn't really
move passengers; it assists in the movement of aircraft.
As we review the FAA's workload estimates, wouldn't it be
more accurate to look at the rate of growth, in aircraft
operation, rather than just the number of passengers?
Ms. Garvey. I think that is a fair question. I think some
of that has been touched on by the modernization task force.
And I know when some of the folks at the off-site kept
reminding us that what we need to think about is the number of
aircraft moved, number of operations. I think that is really
the direction that we need--we need to head. I think that is a
fair comment.
Mr. Wolf. One FAA program is directly affected by increases
in the number of airline passengers, and that is the AIP
program, which Mr. Tiahrt mentioned, which funds grants for
airports. The service requirements of the airports, and
especially hub and connecting airports, are more closely
related to the number of passengers, because each passenger
uses those services individually. And yet the budget increases
FAA funding in every program except airport grants. The
operating account, F&E and RE&D all go up, but AIP remains
flat. Why was that the case?
Ms. Garvey. Again, I think it reflects the kinds of
discussions that occur within the Administration when you are
trying to balance a number of priorities. We felt the $1.7
billion was a good, strong program. We know that there are
certainly those that would like to see it higher. But, I think
given the budget constraints and given the budget priorities,
we were pleased. And I have to say, I believe the Secretary
worked very hard within the Administration to make sure that
that number stayed at that level.
Mr. Wolf. And the committee----
Ms. Garvey. It is not always easy.
Mr. Wolf. The committee, as you know, went up from $1
billion last year to $1.7.
Ms. Garvey. We appreciate that, yes.
NCARC REPORT
Mr. Wolf. NCARC was especially critical of the way the
Appropriations Committees place a priority on funding for FAA
operations instead of capital programs. They accurately note that F&E
funding has declined in the 1990's. However, the four year decline
between fiscal year 1993 and 1996 has all but stopped, and your 1999
request represents a large increase of 13 percent--a rate not seen
since 1992. This request you submitted is part of the ``federal budget
process'' so criticized by NCARC. Do you believe a budget process
leading to a 13 percent increase is really unable to provide the FAA's
modernization needs?
[The information follows:]
While the President's Budget requests a 13 percent increase in
funding for modernization, that request has not yet been enacted by
Congress. However, the FAA interprets NCARC's commentary as relating to
two larger questions: (1) can the current system provide adequate
funding each year to five, ten or more years, and (2) should funding
for airspace modernization be subject to the political vagaries
associated with the current federal budgetary process or instead should
be subject to market and business forces whereby the users of the
system determine what is needed, when it is needed, and how best to pay
for it.
Mr. Wolf. The NCARC report says ``the money problem that faces the
FAA is an inability to access the revenues collected for its use.'' But
this ignores the fact that the general fund is contributing more to
finance FAA operations than it should. Isn't this similar to the
situation in highways, where those who claim the highway trust fund
cash balance is subsidizing other programs turn a blind eye to the
substantial contribution to highways from the general fund?
[The information follows:]
No. The NCARC report explicitly recognized the general fund
contribution and recommended its continuation. It is our belief that
the NCARC's statement on access to revenues collected for aviation use
relates to amounts in addition to the general fund contribution.
TRUST FUND PENALTY CLAUSE
Mr. Wolf. Last year, this committee recommended taking more money
from the trust fund for FAA operations, but the Chairman of the
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee stripped those funds out on
the House floor, requiring us to use general fund money instead. Isn't
it true that we would have significantly more access to aviation
revenues if the legislation cap on the trust fund share of FAA's
operations--the so-called ``penalty clause''--were lifted?
[The information follows:]
Yes, it is true that there would be increased access to the trust
fund revenues if the ``penalty clause'' was lifted. This by itself will
not provide the FAA with the financial flexibility that NCARC
recommended, and the FAA believes is necessary to move the agency into
the 21st century.
TRUST FUND CAP
Mr. Wolf. Lifting this cap to allow at least 80 percent of the
FAA's operating budget to be derived from the trust fund would open up
access to the trust fund and spend down more of the fund balance. It
would also show aviation users that the government did not impose
billions in new taxes last year just to watch them build up in the
trust fund. Such a move has been supported by FAA and DOT in past
years. And it would appear to address one of the NCARC's criticisms. Is
the administration prepared to make that recommendation?
[The information follows:]
The Administration has proposed in its 1999 budget, that by FY
2000, all FAA programs receive funding from the trust fund.

AIP FUNDING FOR SMALL OR MID-SIZED AIRPORTS

Mr. Wolf. Have you looked at directing more AIP funding
toward small or mid-sized airports versus the large ones, which
have PFC's.
Ms. Garvey. We have. We actually spent a good deal of time
yesterday, because we are looking at the AIP. I just actually
stopped a couple of the folks from the airports organization as
we were coming in, saying: I would like to talk with you a
little bit about some of the ideas. I mean, our goal is, how
can we perhaps give more to the small and medium sized
airports?
I know that the Secretary talks about aviation as kind of
the mass transit of the 21st century. When you think of it in
those terms and when I listen to someone like Linda Barker, who
was on the NCARC, who comes from, a Midwestern state, then we
really do understand how important those small and regional
airports are. We are looking at ways that we might be able to
give a little boost to them. I want to talk through some ideas
with some of the airports people, hope we are heading in the
right direction.
Mr. Wolf. They are happy with the direction that they think
you are moving in?
Ms. Garvey. We need to talk with them a little bit more. We
have just really begun those conversations in earnest with
them. Some of them are their ideas, though, so I hope they will
like them.
Mr. Wolf. They will like them?
Ms. Garvey. Yes, sir.
Mr. Wolf. We will ask other questions for the record.

PERFORMANCE-BASED ORGANIZATION (PBO)

Mr. Wolf. In last year's budget, PBO's are described as
``discrete units of a department that commit to clear
management objectives, measurable goals, customer service
standards, and specific targets for improved performance. Once
designated, they would have greater personnel and procurement
flexibility and competitively-hired CEO's.'' With the exception
of the CEO position, which elements of this could the FAA not
implement on its own without becoming a PBO, based on the
flexibility we gave you 2 years ago? What is stopping you?
Ms. Garvey. Actually, there is a great deal that we can do
and the cost accounting system will be a good tool to help us
in that direction. The one thing the legislation might offer us
is the flexibility on the budget side. And I think that is
really the piece that enhances the program, if you will, but
you are absolutely right. Short of that, personnel reform,
acquisition reform, the ability to set up performance standards
is something that we can do and we will do. We will definitely
be moving towards that, even as we are discussing legislation.
Mr. Wolf. The Aviation Commission recommended that as part
of the PBO concept the FAA be able to hire a chief operating
officer. This officer would be the top managerial officer in
the air traffic side of the agency, would be nonpolitical--you
are nonpolitical, aren't you? [Laughter].
Ms. Garvey. That is--absolutely.
Mr. Wolf. All right. That official could be paid as much as
$199,000, with bonuses. Given the broad flexibility provided in
personnel reforms, is there any legal authority preventing the
FAA from doing that today?
Ms. Garvey. There is not. We could do that. We have
actually talked about that idea. I will tell you that we are
very focused right now on this sort of early phase of
modernization. How should we organize internally--recognizing,
as you have said, that many of these issues cut across a number
of lines of business, how should we organize for a Free Flight
Phase 1? I want to do that first, but I think the issue about
whether or not we have a COO for the air traffic control
operation is one that we will be looking at and we will
discuss.

PBO CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER

Mr. Wolf. The PBO concept would have a chief operating
officer which reports to a newly-created governing board of the
organization. The individual would oversee the day to day
operation of activities encompassing about three-quarters of
the FAA staff and three-quarters of its budget. They would be
paid one-third more than the FAA Administrator. On the other
hand, you would still have an FAA Administrator reporting
directly to the Secretary of Transportation on policy and
budget matters.
Does this type of structure raise the possibility of
divided leadership and a power struggle at an agency?
Ms. Garvey. Well, that is certainly a--that certainly would
not be the desired outcome and that certainly is a fair
question.
We have looked at the issue about the board that the NCARC
has suggested. We are still thinking that through. I have to
say, there is a division of opinion within the administration
as to whether or not creating a board with a COO, even though
you still have the Administrator. I think NCARC does suggest
that the Administrator also serves as the chairman of the board
and that may reinforce the position of the Administrator. I
think you could have a chief operating officer. I think, again,
so much of this depends on who are the personalities, who are
the people in those positions. As you said earlier, I have a
good relationship with the Secretary. That may not always be
the case.
Mr. Wolf. Well, that is the problem. That may not always be
the case, and it really hasn't always been the case. If you
believe some former Administrators who have come up, that has
not been the case. They have seen things and they have wanted
to do them, but they have had a very difficult time because it
has all been involved in a political realm.
Ms. Garvey. Yes.
Mr. Wolf. And while your job technically, I think, is more
or less political, it is a political job but much less so, the
Secretary's job is very much political. And having worked for a
cabinet officer, I know they spend a lot of time going out and
making speeches and representing the administration.
Ms. Garvey. The administration.
Mr. Wolf. That is why my own sense is it would be better to
have an independent FAA. You have a great relationship, but the
next Administrator may not.
Ms. Garvey. Yes.
Mr. Wolf. I think, institutionally, you have to prepare for
that.
Ms. Garvey. I do think, if you established a charter that
was very clear on what the responsibilities of the COO were,
what the responsibilities of the board were, and that they did
report to the Administrator, it would deal with the issue that
you said, which is creating too much of a balkanized situation.
There is a wonderful challenge at the FAA that is so large and
the issues are so complex, that you want to have the right
management team. You also want to have clear responsibility.
You want to have clear leadership structure. So I understand
the dilemma and I understand what you are saying. I think the
challenge would be to make sure that it is very clear in the
charter that sets up what the responsibilities of each of the
entities would be.
REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE LINKAGES
Mr. Wolf. NCARC makes the point that there should be a direct
linkage between funds paid for use of the system and the service
provided to those users. This would presumably create ``prices'' for
aviation services similar to a free market environment. However, the
NCARC didn't apply the same standard to government users of the
aviation system, for their legislation proposes a $600 million
mandatory appropriation every year, out of the general fund, to cover
government use of the aviation system. This payment is made regardless
of the government's use of the system. Given the business-like, ``user
pays'' principle that NCARC was trying to encourage, do you know why
they suggested this fixed, mandatory appropriation?
[The information follows:]
NCARC's recommendation to establish a direct link between funds
paid for use of the system and the service provided to the users, is a
mechanism to allow users to pay for only those services that they use.
Fees would be set to recover only the cost of providing the service.
Such a system would mimic the economic efficiencies of a free market
and ensure that users pay only for the cost of providing the service
that they actually consume. Aviation users and the FAA would benefit
from a more efficient air traffic control system. The mandatory
appropriation of $600 million was a projection based on data available
at the time of the actual annual cost of providing air traffic control
services to government use operations. Under the NCARC recommendation,
future year adjustments could be made in appropriation requests to
reflect the actual cost of providing these services to the government.
GOVERNMENT USE OF AVIATION SYSTEM
Mr. Wolf. Since government use of the aviation system is obviously
a discretionary activity, is there any reason why such an appropriation
should be mandatory?
[The information follows:]
Under the NCARC proposal, this mandatory payment for government use
of the air traffic control system would be in lieu of a user fee.
Presumably the NCARC believed that, in a user fee-financing
environment, there would need to be a direct link between the costs
that government aircraft impose on the FAA and the amount of funding
provided to the FAA to cover those costs. The absence of such a direct
link would run the risk that the FAA would either under-recover of
over-recover its costs in any given year. A mandatory payment is one
way to ensure that funding equals costs.
SAFETY AGENDA
Mr. Wolf. On the safety side, NCARC said a prioritized safety
agenda is needed. What are you doing to develop such an agenda, and
will it be specific enough to track performance?
[The information follows:]
The FAA Administrator, in October 1997, made a commitment to
develop a safety agenda for the next five years that would concentrate
the agency's efforts on accident prevention.
The safety agenda is being developed in cooperation with the
various elements of the aviation community. This is consistent with the
NCARC report, which concluded that the currently high level of aviation
safety and the ``maturity'' of safety issues require a new relationship
between the FAA and the aviation community. The new relationship must
accelerate and build on government/industry partnerships in which
government and industry jointly dedicate resources to analyze new and
shared data, and then jointly identify top safety issues.
Specific initiatives will be identified for each element of the
agenda. Each initiative will be supported by a business plan that
includes measurable milestones and other performance indicators to
permit the agency to track accomplishments. As progress is achieved on
various initiatives and as additional analyses identify new issues, the
agenda can be changed leading ultimately to measurable progress toward
NCARC's goal of a five-fold reduction in the fatal accident rate.
Safety Task Force
Mr. Wolf. They also recommend that FAA's safety programs become
more performance oriented, with measures of performance developed and
used to hold the safety organizations accountable. This is similar to
an idea I wrote you about recently--creating a Safety Task Force to
develop a measuring ``yardstick'' for your safety programs. What do you
think of that idea?
[The information follows:]
The FAA enthusiastically embraces your idea. In fact, we have done
this informally with the NTSB, GAO, OIG, and several other groups to
promote ways we could work together. Formalizing this idea of safety
metrics would be very helpful yet very challenging. It would be
extraordinarily helpful for the FAA to be able to talk to a group with
the expertise of a ``safety task force'' and FAA would work closely
together with these entities to accomplish this goal.

airline safety records

Mr. Wolf. The commission said the FAA's international
safety activity should be expanded because, as they point out,
the accident rate in Eastern Europe, Russia, Asia, Latin
America and Africa are many times greater than in the U.S. and
Western Europe. What specific activities can be expanded to
meet the goal? And would it not be a good idea to publish the
safety records of foreign air carriers? The number of Americans
who are flying around the world is increasing, whether it be in
Azerbaijan, Armenia, the former Soviet republics, or Asia. If
you noticed the Indonesia aircraft--I think there were four or
five Americans on that plane when it went down. Would it not be
a good idea to publish the safety records of the international
air carriers, particularly in countries where their standards
may not be up to ours, China for instance, so that individuals
who are going to that country would know the potential risk?
If you recall during the Pan Am situation, there was an FAA
notice, but it was only available to employees.
Ms. Garvey. That is right.
Mr. Wolf. That was not made available to the traveling
public. Should we not publish that, perhaps on the internet,
that everyone could access? If your son or daughter was
traveling to a remote region of the world, or if you were going
there on a business trip, you would be able to know what the
safety record of a particular airline was.
Ms. Garvey. Well, let me start with what we are doing with
ICAO and then go to the second part of the question that you
raised. The issue about the the safety standards with the
international community is a very serious issue. When you look
at some of the data, for example, that Boeing has, it is rather
chilling to see where the accidents will be and where they will
occur. And it is clearly less of an issue here than it is in
some of the foreign countries.
We have worked very, very hard with ICAO. I spent a good
deal of time at a meeting in Montreal last month with all of my
counterparts from around the world, and the whole focus of the
conference in Montreal was safety oversight. It was an
exploration both of what we do internationally, with our teams
going in to do assessments. It was also a very strong clarion
call, if you will, for ICAO to get even more actively involved
in this, for ICAO as an organization to go in and work with the
international countries. And really I found that the leaders of
those countries wanted the help. They want to have the right
kind of safety record. So it really seems, to us, to be a
combination of both the teams that we have in place, that we
send out there to do assessments. Then also, ICAO is building
up its own forces, I know that is one of the issues that the
Secretary has talked briefly and informally to World Bank and
other organizations. They have done wonderful work on the
surface side, but he has raised the issue about whether or not
there is more that they could do, and we could do together, on
the aviation side to particularly focus on the safety issue.
The second part of your question--and by the way, we are
having another meeting in the fall, in Montreal, with the same
leaders of each country. The agenda will be broader than safety
but the issue of safety and a follow-up to the March
conference, will be very much discussed and very much part of
the conference.
The second part of your question concerns the internet. As
a principle, I think the more information that we can give
consumers, the better off we are and the better off the
consumer is. I know the issue of how we rate them and what kind
of information we put on the internet, can be complicated. Let
me get back to you with something a little more specific. I
think that is a fair question and one we ought to be able to
give you a good answer on. I will tell you my one hesitation is
that I know I have been working on this same issue on the
Senate side of the Congress, and there have been difficulties
in trying to rate airlines, for example, because it becomes
much more complicated when you actually get the information up
there. We have been looking at other ways to do it.
For example, most airlines have a very high ranking safety
officer in the airlines. One of the thoughts we had yesterday
is what about putting that information on the Internet, letting
folks know which of the airlines has a very high ranking safety
officer that have a very well thought out safety program, more
of a positive kind of approach. So let me get back to you on
the international. I know we have done some of that by the
Secretary's notices that I have often seen about places where
you should not fly because of security issues. Let me see what
we have done on the safety side and see if there is more we
should be doing there.
[The information follows:]

We are working with all the member nations of the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to attempt to greatly expand the
volume, quality and public disclosure of safety oversight inspections
and reports around the globe. Essentially, we are attempting to get
ICAO to do on a worldwide scale the same kind of safety assessments
that the FAA currently does in those countries whose air carriers
serve, or seek to serve, destinations in the United States.
Until recently, however, the concept behind ICAO's program has been
that it should be purely voluntary (i.e., member states are inspected
only if they request it), and confidential (i.e., the final report of
the assessment is provided only to the state that was inspected, with
no useful information ever disclosed to other states or to the public).
In addition, the timeliness of reporting and of developing corrective
action plans has been uneven. The program remains totally dependent for
funding from member states' voluntary contributions.
In November of last year, FAA participated in a worldwide
conference of all directors General of Civil Aviation (DCCA) at ICAO
Headquarters in Montreal to address the single issue of how to make
this program more effective. We hope that the result will be an ICAO
inspection program that is mandatory; open to disclosure of meaningful
inspection results to all member States and thence to the public;
timely in its reporting mechanisms and in development of corrective
action plans; and supported by stable funding within the Organization's
regular budget. In conjunction with ICAO, we are also exploring the
potential to expand this concept of enhanced, international assessment
programs to the areas of air traffic control and security. We will
aggressively pursue these areas once it is demonstrated that a model
safety assessment program with stable funding can be effectively
implemented by the organization.
In addition to expanding the scope of international safety
assessments, we are also working on a variety of other safety
initiatives with global impact. For example, the FAA has been leading
in the international development of the Global Analysis and Information
Network (GAIN), a worldwide infrastructure to collect, analyze, and
disseminate aviation safety information. Careful analysis and sharing
of such data may help identify key incidents, factors and trends, and
could thereby aid in preventing accidents before they occur. We are
also supporting the increased carriage of airborne collision avoidance
equipment; the implementation of satellite-based approach procedures to
provide better and safer terminal navigation; and we are involved in a
research project to determine ways to improve English language
proficiency among the world's air traffic controller force. These are
only a few of the areas in which we are attempting to expand our safety
activities.
FAA currently provides, via the Internet, accident/incident data,
near mid-air collision reports and other safety information for foreign
air carriers where those events occur in US airspace. Information on
FAA's safety assessments of foreign civil aviation authorities,
including their ability to provide effective safety oversight of their
national air carriers, is also provided via the internet. The
information can be viewed under the heading ``Aviation Safety
Information'' on the FAA's homepage (www.faa.gov).
More specific accident/incident and other safety data on foreign
air carriers are not consistently available and are not sufficiently
comprehensive for meaningful analysis. In addition, reporting systems
in some states are not precise, and normalizing data (hours flown,
departures, etc.) needed to make instructive comparisons are often not
available. As a result, determinations about the level of safety of any
particular air carrier based on the information and sources currently
available would be suspect.

spare parts--airline safety

Mr. Wolf. Well, we have had trouble in this country on
spare parts.
Ms. Garvey. Yes.
Mr. Wolf. You have a suspected unapproved parts office out
at Dulles Airport, which I have visited. Domestically we have
had problems. Clearly there are problems in other nations, and
I don't think it is asking too much. We don't have any
regulatory control--and I am avoiding commenting on a whole
series of countries. We don't have regulatory control in this
country, but to provide the American taxpayer----
Ms. Garvey. It is an issue.
Mr. Wolf [continuing]. The opportunity to know what their
safety record is, I would venture to guess, and I have no way
of proving this, but I suppose there are FAA employees who are
taking trips around the world that may joke ``Well, I am going
to X country and the safety record is very''--and joking about
it, because I have had different FAA employees comment about
it.
If they know information that in certain parts of China or
certain parts of whatever country that there is a potential
safety problem, we cannot prohibit, nor should we, Americans
from flying there--and I give a lot of credit to American
government employees who many, many times have to fly to places
like that. If you recall, the American Ambassador in Russia,
Mr. Pickering, who is now the Under Secretary of State, put out
a travel ban----
Ms. Garvey. That is right.
Mr. Wolf [continuing]. For American employees in the
American embassy in Moscow with regard to flying some of the
airlines outside of Moscow. I think for a while there was a
total ban. Well, if there was a total ban for American
employees in Moscow, I think at the least we owe it to the
American citizen, who is going to go to that country, going
down to Chechnya, or going down to Azerbaijan, or going to
wherever, to know what the safety record of the airline going
there is. Then he or she can make that choice, can make that
judgment.
Many are going there for business and have to go, but
others might be able to perhaps change. If you were flying to a
certain country, maybe Lufthansa also goes in there 3 days a
week, so you can adjust your schedule to go in that time. Maybe
Delta is going in 2 days a week where the domestic airline is
going in 7 days a week. But I really think we have to provide
that information to the American taxpayer. They deserve to have
the same information that the people at the FAA have.
So ICAO is good, and I think the more we can encourage, the
better. But in some countries, the level of corruption is very,
very high. They may say let's take this unapproved spare part,
let's just put it in, let's just see what happens, and I think
if you could assemble for the committee a record of foreign
airlines and their safety record, just so we could distribute
it to the other Members to have, it would be helpful.
Ms. Garvey. Okay.

english language proficiency

Mr. Wolf. One element of the expansion with regard to
safety might be to improve English language proficiency around
the world. We saw in the Cali, Colombia, crash how it can
contribute to an accident. The Acting Administrator told us
last year that inadequate proficiency in English was a ``great
concern of ours.'' And FAA's representative to the
International Civil Aviation Organization wrote last year ``the
FAA feels that fluency in the English language is a significant
aviation safety issue''. Because of this, the committee added
$500,000 last year for FAA to address this issue in an urgent,
focused way. Yet I understand these funds still have not been
obligated and the plan to do so is mostly a long-term research
in the U.S. rather than outreach overseas. Could you explain
the FAA's plans with regard to this money?
Ms. Garvey. Mr. Chairman, I think when the FAA first
started on this undertaking the emphasis was much more as you
suggested on research. In talking with your staff and in
reevaluating it ourselves, we understand very clearly that the
real need for this is in field testing; let's get something in
place that can be used. So we have shifted our focus, and I
think rightly shifted our focus, to be much more field driven.
Working again with ICAO and working also with the NTSB, we are
developing standards right now. We are developing a training
program that could be used with our international counterparts
and also could be something that the NTSB has expressed an
interest in as well.
Mr. Wolf. How many aviation accidents were there,
fatalities involved, that we believe took place because of
language problems?
Ms. Garvey. I don't know, Mr. Chairman, but I will find
out. I would expect it is a number that would surprise me.
[The information follows:]

[Page 277--The official Committee record contains additional material here.]

Mr. Wolf. And yet there are no funds in the budget this
year for that.
Ms. Garvey. My understanding is we are going to use the
$500,000. I see what you mean in the '99 budget, that is fair.
Mr. Wolf. This year. I can still remember seeing the
recording of the Avianca flight coming in to Kennedy, with
regard to the fuel, and that was a language problem. Those
people should still be alive today.
Ms. Garvey. Right. I will double-check on this. I would
believe anyway that as part of our safety agenda, one of our
key pieces is going to be the whole human factors issue. It
would seem to me that we might be able to fold this into our
human factors element of the agenda, but let me find out to see
if there is a way. Even though we don't have specific funds in,
using the monies that we have and shaping the agenda that we
have, can we use it that way? And I will follow-up on that.
[The information follows:]

We have worked diligently with the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) and ICAO in addressing foreign language misunderstandings.
This past week I received a letter from Mr. Jim Hall, Chairman, NTSB,
thanking us for our response to a 1996 NTSB recommendation on this very
subject. The NTSB had recommended that we develop, along with air
traffic authorities of the member states of the ICAO, a program to
enhance a controller's fluency in common English language phrases and
interaction skills sufficient to assist pilots in obtaining situational
awareness about critical features of the airspace, particularly in non-
radar environments.
We worked closely with the Secretary General of ICAO to develop
such a plan and in November 1997 the Air Navigation Bureau (ICAO)
issued a draft task statement that set forth a plan for ICAO to carry
out a program to complete a comprehensive review of the existing
provisions concerning all aspects of air-ground and ground-ground voice
communications in international civil aviation, aimed at the
identification of deficiencies and shortcomings. We continue to work
with ICAO regional planning groups to accomplish these tasks.

strategic goals

Mr. Wolf. Fine. Mr. Olver, Mr. Sabo? Okay.
Mr. Olver. Mr. Chairman, I would, if you would allow me.
Mr. Wolf. Certainly. Yes.
Mr. Olver. I have a couple of things. I am curious, Mrs.
Garvey, how nonpolitical could you be if your pay were to
increase to $199,000?
Ms. Garvey. Well, let me just say, Congressman, when I am
in Amherst, I will be political but that could be pretty
compelling.
Mr. Olver. This discussion along these lines, by the time
you have gone through for a while, we range over so many
different issues of the FAA's operations that I lose track of
what really the--this performance based organization, what its
real goals are. And clearly, the Department of Transportation--
has a strategic performance plan and believes in having each of
its agencies having a set of goals, and I wonder if you could
give me just what your sense is of the goals for this year for
the FAA, so that I can come back and make a list of them and
then be able, as we are going through this, to at least
categorize things of what is really important. I mean, not that
anything that we are talking about is not important, but rather
to see where they fit with what you are really trying to
achieve here in this year.
Ms. Garvey. Congressman, let me say at the outset that when
I first came to the FAA we had 9 strategic goals and we talked
a lot about that. And I really urged and encouraged people to
scale that down so that we have no more than three to five. We
have three major strategic goals, three areas that we are
really focused on. It's safety, it's security and it's system
efficiency. And in each one----
Mr. Olver. And modernization then falls under?
Ms. Garvey. System efficiency.
Mr. Olver. Okay. So those really are, as in your testimony,
in giving--I missed the earlier testimony but I have in the
meantime managed to read it and I wondered if that was what you
would say, and so I should guide that then by whatever you said
if we are talking about modernization or that is part of the
efficiency aspect?
Ms. Garvey. That is right, Congressman. And so all of the
action items that we have developed with ourselves within our
own strategic plan and then forwarded to the Department can be
categorized under each one of those areas.
Mr. Olver. So your commitment as you put it--the emphatic
yes to the Y2K process and this issue of June, that is part of
the efficiency aspect and so virtually everything then related
to that and STARS, and so forth, falls in that category?
Ms. Garvey. That is right, Congressman. STARS and DSR
really are the foundation for all of the automation tools that
will follow. The building blocks that we have talked about with
industry for modernization, that is all system efficiency. When
we talk about rulemaking and ground proximity, enhanced ground
proximity, when we talk about taking on some of the human
factors issues and developing some of the training programs
that are needed, that falls under the safety agenda. When we
talk about the explosive detections and the canine teams that
are at the airports, that is under the security issue. I am
trying very hard because in a public arena it is always more
difficult to keep your agenda focused. There always are things
and pulls that you are not anticipating. We have to be flexible
and ready for that. I think at the heart of what we do we have
got to be very focused and very clear about what we expect to
accomplish.

year 2000

Mr. Olver. I must say in several of the earlier periods--
hearings that we have had thus far this year, we have talked on
several occasions about the K----
Ms. Garvey. Y2K?
Mr. Olver [continuing]. The Y2K problem, and I have been
very skeptical about whether that could really be done. And I
must say I have some better feeling about that process by--the
way you put it and the way you have--approached this----
Ms. Garvey. Thank you.
Mr. Olver [continuing]. Problem, and the way you approach
your whole administration.
Ms. Garvey. Thank you, Congressman. I hope we will not
disappoint you.

pay and benefits

Mr. Wolf. On pay, pay and benefits, the Coopers & Lybrand
study said, ``Perhaps most important, the FAA's single most
significant cost element, pay and related costs, continues to
grow at significant rates . . . This area needs significant
attention . . . As the FAA begins to implement personnel reform
as well as negotiations with its unions . . . there must be
substantial reform.''
Do you expect that your labor negotiations will result in
containing these costs, as Coopers said?
Ms. Garvey. I hope it will. I think the labor negotiations
are going very well. I mean, I have heard that from both the
labor side and the union side. We really have everything on the
table. I think every idea that the unions have put forward are
being fully discussed by the management team. I know that every
idea that the management team is putting forward, the union has
said they will discuss and look at very carefully.
Our position is that it must be budget neutral, so we
really have to find the efficiencies in other places. And it is
a challenge, but I hope that it will have the right kind of
results and the productive kind of results and what is good for
our employees as well.
One of the points I have made with the unions, and--I will
say, the opening day of the union negotiations, the Secretary
joined me in meeting with both teams in saying how very
important this is. This is really a critical thing we are
asking people to do and they are giving up a lot of personal
time. But it is very, very important that we treat our
employees fairly and we treat them well. One of the challenges
for management is that while we are dealing with the unions, we
also have to deal with all of the other employees that may not
be part of the unions as well. So it is an enormous challenge
to balance all of those interests.
[Additional information follows:]

Yes. We have stated that we expect the labor negotiations
to be budget neutral. We are actively engaged in discussions
with the unions on productivity issues and are optimistic that
we will be able to achieve productivity gains in a number of
areas.

Mr. Wolf. When do you hope to conclude the pay
negotiations?
Ms. Garvey. I am not sure when it will conclude. They are
finishing up a second week and they have gotten through a vast
number, I think it is about 50 or 60 of the articles, many more
than they thought they would. Clearly the ones that are going
to be the toughest will be the pay ones and we all keep hoping
that it will be this spring. I have been told that in the past
it can go on for years. But I think a lot is going to depend on
how well these two weeks go. Iknow they will take a break for a
period and then come back again after--I believe it is after Easter.

air traffic staffyear costs

Mr. Wolf. Is it true, as Coopers said, that air traffic
average staffyear costs rose 18 percent, to $84,341, between
1993 and 1996?
Ms. Garvey. I am not sure about those exact numbers and I
would like to check. My guess is it is probably right. Monte is
suggesting that it is.
Mr. Wolf. Okay. The next we will just do for the record,
and we have a whole series with regard to the negotiations.
[The information follows:]

We cannot determine how Coopers and Lybrand arrived at the
staffyear cost of $84,341 or the 18 percent increase. While the exact
figures depend on what costs are included in the staff year cost, the
increase from 1993 to 1996 is approximately 16 percent.
FTE COSTS
Mr. Wolf. According to FAA data provided last year, the average
staff year cost at the agency is estimated at $85,300 for fiscal year
1998 (p. 423). This is the approximate cost for a Coast Guard or Navy
captain or an Air Force Lieutenant colonel--senior military officers.
Yet most of your workforce is performing non-executive, non-managerial
duties. Is your agency-wide FTE cost appropriate, compared to other
federal workers?
[The information follows:]
Yes. To date, in determining pay for our employees, we have used
classification standards published by the Office of Personnel
Management and we believe our FTE costs are appropriate for the mission
our agency is charged with carrying out. FAA employees are highly
skilled, well trained, and perform very exacting and demanding work in
furtherance of aviation safety and the movement of airplanes throughout
the country. Much of the work is performed in a real-time environment,
where there is little margin for error.
BUDGET NEUTRAL COMPENSATION SYSTEM
Mr. Wolf. In a question for the record of last year's hearing, the
FAA states ``it is one of our primary objectives of the new
[compensation] system that it will ensure fiscal responsibility and be
budget neutral for the FAA as a whole.'' (p. 339). Since I understand
there are no funds in the fiscal year 1999 budget for a new
compensation system, can I assume it is the FAA's current position that
the new compensation system will not only be budget neutral for the
agency as a whole, but offset within the operating account?
[The information follows:]
Yes. Fiscal responsibility is a basic tenet of the new compensation
system.
PAY NEGOTIATIONS
Mr. Wolf. What is the status of the pay negotiations, and when do
you hope to conclude them?
[The information follows:]
The agency is actively engaged in discussions on new pay systems
with our two largest unions, National Air Traffic Controllers
Association (NATCA) and Professional Airways Systems Specialists
(PASS). These negotiations are integrally related to the larger
negotiations of new, comprehensive collective bargaining agreements. We
anticipate completion of the negotiations with NATCA to occur in the
next several months. PASS negotiations should be concluded in late FY
1998 or early FY 1999.
National Association of Air Traffic Specialists and National
Association of Government Employees accepted our January 1998 pay
increase offer, which mirrored the one established by the President for
other Federal employees. Neither union has submitted any compensation
proposals to the agency.

union negotiations on compensation

Mr. Wolf. The 1996 reauthorization laid out specific
procedures for FAA to follow in mediating this agreement, if
you get to that point. On what date would you intend to submit
outstanding compensation articles to the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service for assistance, or later to the Federal
Service Impasse Panel, should that become necessary?
Ms. Garvey. I would have to talk a little bit more with the
negotiating team to see what the date is. I think we are hoping
that we will not have to reach that point. I think our goal is
to try to resolve them with our management and union teams.
Mr. Wolf. Well, we hope that is the case. The act requires
that if all else fails, and I am sure hopeful that it won't,
you are to submit your proposal, along with union objections,
to the Congress. While Congress is not required to act on the
proposal, you are prohibited from implementing your proposal
until 60 days after it is submitted to Congress. Obviously, if
it comes to that, there would be a lot of pressure for Congress
to get involved. With the situation as it stands today, what do
you think is the probability that this will be sent to Congress
for resolution? Do you think it will be very low?
Ms. Garvey. I would say today it is low. I mean, I think
really the kind of cooperation on both sides, I think, has been
very promising. So I would still remain optimistic that that
will not be the case.
PAY AND BENEFITS
Mr. Wolf. The controllers union estimates that their compensation
proposal would cost the agency approximately $300 million a year more
than the current system. Could you give us the details of their
proposal, and tell us whether you agree with the estimated impact of
$300 million?
[The information follows:]
The National Air Traffic Controllers Association's compensation
proposal stated that the proposal's cost estimate was $400 million,
with a projected $100 million offset through cost savings, that would
result in a net increase to the FAA for bargaining unit employees of
$300 million. We expect that the cost to the agency could be
significantly higher, if adopted, because of differences in potential
cost savings, variability in costing assumptions, and costs impacts
associated with related supervisors, staff, and managers.
Mr. Wolf. Have you received cost-increasing proposals from your
other unions as well, such as the maintenance union (PASS)?
[The information follows:]
Yes, we received a proposal from PASS for an increase of 6.66
percent each year for all bargaining unit employees during the period
of the FAA and PASS Agreement. This would provide a 20 percent net
increase during the 3 year period that the contract is in effect. Their
proposal kept intact all incentive pay provisions.

Mr. Wolf. There was a rumor that the controllers union was
seeking a change in the process to submit binding outside
arbitration results to Congressional review rather than a third
party mediation, as is currently the case. Would you explain
that proposal, and do you support it?
Ms. Garvey. I am sorry. I am not fully aware of that issue.
Mr. Wolf. Can you look into it?
Ms. Garvey. I certainly will. I certainly will,
Congressman.

benefits

Mr. Wolf. The next series deal with those issues. We will
just submit them for the record, the whole series with regard
to the benefits and different things like that.
[The information follows:]

Under the union's proposal, all impasses over matters covered by
personnel reform, including pay, would be submitted to the Federal
Services Impasses Panel for binding resolution. Generally speaking,
binding arbitration is a widely used method for resolving bargaining
impasses. However, the use of arbitration creates potential budgetary
conflicts from a decision that exceeds the agency's appropriation.
In informal discussions, NATCA has indicated that it is not its
intention for pay issues to be submitted to arbitration. However, the
language of the proposed amendment does not support such an
interpretation.
COST OF OFFICIAL TIME FOR UNIONS
Mr. Wolf. The IG recently issued an audit of FAA's labor agreements
which found the FAA granting far more time for union activities than
necessary. The report says ``Managers routinely granted more time for
union activities than required by the national agreement, even though
the loss of controllers affected their ability to meet operational
staffing requirements''. Do you plan to limit union time to those
levels specified in the union agreement? If not, why not?
[The information follows:]
Yes. To the extent there may have been excesses in the use of such
time due to inadequate management controls as reported by the Inspector
General, the FAA has already put in place more systematic tracking and
accounting systems for documenting the use and cost of official time by
our unions. We are also addressing this issue in our ongoing contract
negotiations with our national unions.
UNION TIME
Mr. Wolf. FAA estimates that its managers granted 516,000 hours for
union activities in fiscal year 1996--the equivalent of 248 full-time
controllers (or 1,414 hours each day). When the IG compared you to
other federal agencies, they found that you grant more time for union
activities than the other agencies, even though you have fewer
employees represented. You also have more union representatives,
expressed as a percentage of total bargaining unit employees. Is the
FAA a little out of line here, compared to other agencies, and if so,
are there adequate reasons for that situation?
[The information follows:]
The FAA has long supported partnership with our labor unions and
these activities and the partnership process have required the
investment of additional time and resources. The Inspector General's
numerical comparisons to other agencies may show the FAA to be higher.
However, we do not believe we are ``out of line'' if one takes into
account the significantly larger number of separate facilities we
operate in many diverse locations as well as the significant resources
we have put into partnership with our unions.
To the extent there may have been specific excesses in the use of
such time due to inadequate management controls, the FAA has already
put in place a more systematic tracking and accounting systems for
documenting the use and cost of official time by our unions.
Mr. Wolf. The IG found that some facilities were not effectively
managing this situation. For example, at the New York en route center,
they found that in addition to a full-time principal facility
representative, FAA managers allowed 16 other union positions including
an assistant facility representative, a secretary, a treasurer, 6 area
representatives, a safety representative, a legislative representative,
and a union training coordinator. Over 9,000 hours of additional time
was granted even though the New York center incurred over $2 million in
overtime costs during that year to meet operational staffing
requirements. Do you agree, based on the findings of this audit, that
FAA needs to track and manage these staff hours more effectively?
[The information follows:]
Yes. To the extent there may have been excesses in the use of such
time due to inadequate management controls as reported by the OIG, the
FAA has already put in place more systematic tracking and accounting
systems for documenting the use and cost of official time by our
unions. We are also addressing this issue in our ongoing contract
negotiations with our national unions.
Mr. Wolf. The IG's review found that private sector labor
agreements required greater documentation and management control over
the use of official time for union activities. For example, Boeing's
agreement with the IAM stipulates that each union steward must notify
and obtain permission from their supervisor before leaving work and
performing union business. FAA generally does not. Will you implement
these seemingly common sense improvements to the management of official
time?
[The information follows:]
To the extent there may have been excesses in the use of such time
due to inadequate management controls, the FAA has already put in place
more systematic tracking and accounting systems for documenting the use
and cost of official time in both the air traffic controller's union
and our other unions as well. In addition, we are addressing the issue
of better controls and limits on the amounts and use of official time
in our ongoing contract negotiations with our national unions.
Mr. Wolf. The audit found FAA managers routinely calling in or
scheduling controllers on overtime to replace controllers performing
union activities. Isn't it possible to schedule union activities in
less busy times, so that overtime is not necessary?
[The information follows:]
Official time requests that are authorized at the local level are
subject to operational requirements. These obligations can be
effectively managed along with other resource demands, such as training
and annual leave, and rarely result in overtime. Even when union
representation itself does not cause overtime, it can be a contributing
factor. By reducing overall available staffing, facilities become
increasingly vulnerable to variations in operational demand and sick
leave.
Most of the overtime used to accommodate union activities occurs
when the approval of official time is beyond the control of facility
managers. Union representatives are often required to attend meetings
or hearings that are scheduled by other organizations, without regard
for operational impact. Air Traffic is working with various
organizational elements to improve the mechanism for scheduling
activities involving bargaining unit employees, in order to ensure
adequate time for planning and resource management.
Mr. Wolf. They also found that some facilities called in people on
overtime when controllers were being trained on new equipment rather
than using supervisors, staff specialists, or NATCA representatives who
were in the building and qualified to control traffic. Isn't this a
waste of money?
[The information follows:]
We make every attempt to minimize the use of overtime, but at times
it is the only option available to us. Training requirements for new
equipment impose additional demands on all operational personnel,
including support staff and union representatives. Non-bargaining unit
employees are frequently used to supplement controller staffing in
order to accommodate training or other operational needs. However,
these activities can interfere with the individual's primary duties and
responsibilities which directly or indirectly support the air traffic
operation.
CREDIT HOURS
Mr. Wolf. Another finding was that some FAA managers were granting
``credit hours'' to controllers, and not managing them well. In one
example, they found three sites where employees were granted over
52,000 credit hours (the equivalent of 25 full-time controllers) even
though 2 of the 3 facilities were already overstaffed. What are
``credit hours'', and what FAA directives govern their use?
[The information follows:]
Credit hours are extra hours employees work in excess of their
scheduled tour of duty. Accrued credit hours are then used to account
for subsequent periods of time not worked during an employee's
scheduled tour. Accrual and use of credit hours are governed by OPM
guidelines which FAA voluntarily follows, by headquarters and regional
directives, and in some cases by labor agreements.
TIME OFF AWARDS
Mr. Wolf. They also found that, at some facilities, managerial
signed agreements which allowed controllers to receive ``time off
awards'' for simply coming to work. Time off awards are normally
granted on the basis of a suggestion, cost savings improvement, or
other accomplishment. But in the FAA, some employees were allowed time
off for simply showing up. For example, at two facilities, employees
were given a 10 hour time-off award for each 5 consecutive days they
worked during the transition to new facilities. Is the FAA planning to
put stronger guidelines in place for time off awards?
[The information follows:]
The FAA has already taken steps to ensure that time-off awards are
only given in recognition of the types of accomplishments for which
they are intended. We have also strengthened our documentation and
approval processes. The Director of Air Traffic rescinded delegated
approval authority for time-off awards until he approved regional
management plans for addressing problems identified with the
administration of the program. We are presently discussing changes in
the time-off awards program with the unions. It is our expectation that
the problems identified in the past with this program have been
eliminated.
Mr. Wolf. Have any FAA managers been held accountable for such lax,
wasteful practices--especially those that exceeded national agreements
or guidelines already in place?
[The information follows:]
To date, no manager or employee has received a written or verbal
reprimand or disciplinary action regarding improper granting or use of
time off awards. However, we are continuing to research past practices
in granting and use of time off awards, and we will take appropriate
steps to hold managers and employees accountable if situations are
identified that warrant such action.

CONTROLLER PRODUCTIVITY

Mr. Wolf. In last year's hearing we had a lot of discussion
about air traffic controller productivity. Mr. Belger stated,
``Oh, productivity absolutely needs to be investigated. There
is no question of that. Are there things we can do in the
future? Absolutely there are.''
Have you followed up on this with Mr. Belger and can you
tell us whether the FAA is going to propose any initiatives in
this area?
Ms. Garvey. We will be proposing some initiatives, again as
part of the modernization effort. In the discussions that we
had with the modernization task force, again with the unions
very much at the table, the issue of productivity was raised.
As we are thinking about the new tools that we are bringing on-
line, thinking about productivity issues, thinking about
training issues, new kinds of training, are issues that are
going to be part of the process as we move forward.
We have a lot of work to do in that area. But I want to
link it, and I think it should be linked, to the modernization
effort, so that it is real and it makes sense to people and we
are all moving in the same direction. That is really the goal.
Mr. Wolf. The Coopers study notes that FAA's staffing
standards for air traffic control facilities resulted in
``significant excess coverage'' in most facilities during slow
periods of the day and suggested that if controller
productivity were improved by only 10 percent, the annual
savings would amount to $21 million. As they point out,
Congress, OMB, the DOT IG and GAO have all suggested to the FAA
that the agency needs to improve controller productivity.
However, they were critical of FAA's lack of initiatives in
this area.
Do you want to comment a bit more on that? Have you talked
to them?
Ms. Garvey. To the unions?
Mr. Wolf. No.
Ms. Garvey. I am sorry.
Mr. Wolf. Have you talked to the IG and the GAO?
Ms. Garvey. I have talked to, particularly to the IG, not
to the GAO. I have talked to Ken Mead about that and actually
he was part of the task force on modernization, so he was part
of that discussion.
I think we need to do more. I mean, we have recognized it
as an issue. We have laid down some possible areas within the
modernization efforts, where we think some productivity gains
could be made. The union seems very interested in it. They have
got some ideas themselves, I think we just have to work it as
we work through the modernization.
As we are moving forward in this, one of the keys for us is
to find the right sites where we are going to deploy some of
the early modernization efforts. And as we think about that, I
think working with the controllers at those very specific sites
on very specific productivity issues will be the way we can
really get at it, sort of site specific and automation tool
specific, if you will.

CONTROLLER STAFFING STANDARD

Mr. Wolf. Last year the GAO took issue with your controller
staffing standard as well, claiming it results in an
overestimate of your annual needs for new controllers. Have you
made any changes--the changes recommended by the GAO?
Ms. Garvey. As I testified earlier, we have made great
progress and we have made progress in this area. I bet if we
went back to the GAO, and we will, and the IG, they may say
more needs to be done. We have to just keep working on that
issue. I think we have made some progress. It is a fair
question to ask whether we can make more.
[Additional information follows:]

On page 17 of the GAO report, the GAO defers comments on the
staffing standards because the National Research Council (NAS) was
looking at the standards. We have reviewed the NAS Report and are
implementing its recommendations.
GAO, however, does address concerns with attrition and retirement
data used in the staffing standards. We acknowledged that the
consolidated personnel management information system (CPMIS) did not
provide us with adequate data to better predict retirement eligibility
by counting controller ``good time.'' A computer program was developed
last June and underwent a labor intensive verification process that
compared system data to manually computed retirement eligibility dates.
The testing has been completed and we are in the process of resolving
discrepancies between manual and software data. We anticipate the final
version of the software to be available this summer. That new data will
be incorporated into the staffing standards where applicable. With
better data, the FAA will then be able to make better assumptions to
forecast controller hiring for future budgets.

Mr. Wolf. We will have a number of others for the record.
[The information follows:]
ATC STAFFING STANDARDS COOPERS AND LYBRAND REPORT
Mr. Wolf. They [Coopers & Lybrand] were also critical of the
staffing standards process itself--the process which generates your
budget requirements for air traffic controllers. They said ``there is
no design or attempt to consider improving or significantly changing
the observed work processes and activities to achieve savings through
productivity or work process changes. This is a significant failing, we
believe.'' Do you agree with Coopers that the staffing standards
process is inadequate?
[The information follows:]
No. FAA does not agree that the staffing standards process is
inadequate. A subsequent review by the National Academy of Sciences/
National Research Council affirmed the value of the agency's staffing
standards when used for their intended purposes as stated above.
We use staffing standards to develop national air traffic staffing
requirements for budget requests, to allocate staffing among our
regions in an equitable manner, and to measure the impact of proposed
changes in the NAS system, such as changes in procedures or equipment.
It is not now, and never has been, the prerogative of FAA's air traffic
staffing standards program to improve or change the ``work processes
and activities'' of the air traffic controller or the air traffic
control system. This has always been the prerogative of the air traffic
service and air traffic systems development which have significant
resources dedicated to improving the air traffic system, by improving
both safety and productivity. Our air traffic staffing standards models
reflect current air traffic control practices and procedures, thereby
automatically incorporating all safety and productivity improvements as
they are implemented.
CONTROLLER RETIREMENTS
Mr. Wolf. At the time of their report, the GAO estimated your
fiscal year 1999 controller attrition at 214, about 40 percent below
your estimate at that time of 360. This has significant implications
for your 1999 compensation and training budget, because it drives your
need for new hires. How does your current estimate of attrition compare
to that given by GAO last year?
[The information follows:]
Last year, the GAO estimated that the FY 1997 controller
retirements would be approximately 198 compared to 240 estimated by the
FAA; actual retirements were 273 controllers. For FY 1998, we now
estimate 270 retirements compared to GAO's 211; in the first 5 months
of FY 1998, 184 controllers have already retired. The FY 1999 FAA
budget request now reflects a lower retirement estimate of 270, rather
than the prior estimate of 360.

Mr. Wolf. Let me ask you this one. In its response to the
GAO report, the FAA wrote ``because of the potential for
creating delays in the air traffic control system, the FAA
considers the potential problems associated with
underestimating retirements to be greater than overestimating
retirements.''
Doesn't this minimize the problem that occurs when funding
for FAA modernization, AIP and other programs are reduced to
give FAA a margin of error in controller new hires?
Ms. Garvey. I am not sure I understood the question. I am
sorry, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wolf. If you overestimate or underestimate?
Ms. Garvey. Right.
Mr. Wolf. Do you overestimate more or underestimate more?
Ms. Garvey. I would suspect that we probably overestimate
more. And I think part of it, again, is working with the unions
to make sure that we are also in sync with their views of where
the needs are as well. I mean, we do it in a way that is in
partnership with them.
[Additional information follows:]

No, the FAA has an end-of-year (EOY) controller work force
(CWF) authorized on-board (AOB) goal every fiscal year that is
based on staffing standards which are updated yearly to reflect
current requirements. As a part of meeting that goal, we make
an initial estimate of attrition and plan hiring to meet that
EOY goal. However once the fiscal year begins we monitor actual
attrition and adjust our estimated attrition and hiring plan
accordingly to meet the EOY AOB goal. For example, last year we
started the year with a plan to hire 500 controllers, based on
an estimated attrition rate of 300, to meet an EOY CWF goal of
17,300. However, as the year progressed we saw that our
attrition was running higher than the original estimate so we
adjusted our hiring and ended up hiring 671 new air traffic
control specialists to be assured we would meet our EOY goal.
This year we estimated attrition to be 300 and planned to hire
800 to meet our EOY CWF AOB goal of 17,800. Already this year
we see that attrition is running higher than planned but we
have not yet adjusted our hiring plan. As the year progresses
we will continue to monitor attrition, the budget situation,
and hiring rates and make adjustments as necessary based on
budget constraints.
In summary, although we start our each year with estimates
of attrition and hiring based on current needs, we make
adjustments to reflect real time events. This real time process
has no direct relationship to the other funding programs you
mentioned.

Mr. Wolf. Well, what has been the track record for the last
3 or 4 years with regard to that?
Ms. Garvey. With regard to that? Monte, do you want to
respond to that? Thank you.
Mr. Belger. We will provide some specifics, Mr. Chairman.
In general, last year, attrition was a little bit higher than
we thought, and this year it looks like it might be a little
bit higher than we thought.
[The information follows:]

In fiscal year 1997, we anticipated a controller work force
(CWF) attrition rate of 250. The actual attrition rate was 364.
In fiscal year 1998, we anticipate a CWF attrition rate of 300,
but this number may be as high as 400.

Mr. Wolf. Because of the economy or because of the age,
because of----
Mr. Belger. Well, I think it would be more just the age. In
other words, folks who are eligible retire perhaps, you know,
taking that option, or taking other jobs in the FAA that take
them out of the controller workforce, means that we have to
fill behind them. But we have specific numbers that I can
provide to you that perhaps would be good if we could show the
GAO's estimate for last year and this year and then the actuals
for last year and this year, and we can compare all three.
Mr. Wolf. Sure. That would be fine.
Mr. Belger. GAO estimate, our estimate and then the actual.
Mr. Wolf. Who was closer to being accurate?
Mr. Belger. Well, I think last year and this year the FAA
will be more accurate, but the numbers will tell that for
certain.
Ms. Garvey. So we have not overestimated?
Mr. Belger. I don't think we have, in the past couple of
years, and, of course, your question for the future is right
on. We need to be as precise as we possibly can for the future,
so that we appropriate the right amount of money for the people
that we need to hire. And we are monitoring that very closely.
They did give us some good recommendations to help us perhaps
be more precise, and we are implementing those.

cwf workplace simulator

Mr. Wolf. In 1996, the Washington Consulting Group and a
consultant named Dr. Thomas Culliname recommended that FAA fund
the development of a physical simulator or laboratory model of
the air traffic controller workplace, in order to measure
productivity and test cost-saving improvements. Was this
recommendation carried out?
Ms. Garvey. I believe that recommendation was not carried
out. There were a series of recommendations that Dr. Culliname
put forward, and I believe the judgment of the agency was that
they were perhaps more academic or more--I don't want to say
less practical, but that is what I keep thinking perhaps, less
practical. We have done some additional studies since then with
the National Science Foundation. Those recommendations seem, at
least in our evaluation or our judgment, to be recommendations
that we would like to look at ways to fund, fit into the
priorities that we have. They may apparently, from what I
understand, and I need to be better briefed on this, they are
more practical, a little bit easier for us to implement, within
the budgets that we have and also within the resources that we
have.
Mr. Wolf. Could you elaborate for the record and tell us
where you are on it?
Ms. Garvey. I will, yes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The information follows:]

A large part of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
missions is to define the future National Airspace System
(NAS). This mission includes the assessment, modification, and
integration of NAS components and their operational impact. In
1988, Congress recognized the role of simulation and modeling
in the research development process and expressed that
recognition through legislation. The Aviation Safety Research
Act of 1988 required the FAA ``to . . . undertake . . . a
research program to develop dynamic simulation models of the
air traffic control system . . . which will provide analytical
technology for predicting airport and air traffic control
safety and capacity problems, for evaluating planned research
projects . . .'' The National Simulation Capability (NSC)
program was established in response to that congressional
mandate. The NSC is a large scale, distributed, simulation
network comprising various air traffic-related simulators and
skilled personnel. The NSC is used to facilitate the
development of the NAS by providing an integrated
representation of the NAS through the interconnection of
various simulation facilities and laboratories internal and
external to the Federal Government. The NSC Program is based at
the FAA William J. Hughes (WJH) Technical Center.
In addition to the NSC, the FAA's WJH Technical Center and
Civil Aeromedical Institute (CAMI) currently support the
research, development, test, and evaluation activities required
for concept exploration and development of future ATM/CNS
concepts and technologies. The WJH Technical Center houses
current operational systems and proposed future systems in the
enroute, terminal, oceanic, flight deck, and communication,
navigation, and surveillance domains. CAMI's Advanced Air
Traffic Control Research Simulator will soon provide additional
capabilities to evaluate alternative ATC system design
concepts.
Fast time and real time modeling and simulation tools are
available to support analysis of procedures, concepts,
technologies, and architectures for the NAS. Several modeling
tools are available to support cost-benefits and safety
assessments of operational concepts. These fast time simulation
and analysis tools are used to forecast capacity and aircraft
delay changes associated with the implementation of major
airport infrastructure changes and/or terminal airspace
procedural changes. These tools also forecast the effects on
the National Airspace System of possible future system-wide
changes to infrastructure, aircraft fleet mix, CNS technology,
and procedures.
Human factors measurement tools are available to accurately
determine the system impact and the effect on the human
operator. Extensive research has already been conducted at the
FAA's research facilities to develop performance measures,
design guidelines, and investigate human performance, workload
and other issues associated with anticipated changes in
controller operations based on alternative NAS concepts of
operation.
PRODUCTIVITY
Mr. Wolf. FAA data provided last year indicated that first line
supervisors represent approximately 13 percent of the total controller
workforce, which would indicate an employee-to-supervisor ratio of 6.8
to 1. Isn't one of the goals of the national performance review (NPR)
to raise supervisory ratios to around 15 to 1, and if so, shouldn't FAA
convert some of these supervisors positions to ``hands on'' positions?
[The information follows:]
In the Transforming Organizational Structure section of the NPR,
increasing the ``span of control from seven workers per supervisor to
15:1'' is listed as an action item. The FAA had originally planned to
increase the first-line supervisor ratio; however, where this effort
was initiated, we found it to be operationally disruptive. There are
between 120 to 130 lower-level ATC facilities which are staffed with
less than 10 air traffic control specialists (ATCS), but require a
minimum of two supervisors; (one air traffic manager and one
supervisor). Due to the safety nature of the air traffic profession and
the operational involvement of air traffic supervisors, watch coverage
requirements would not be met with supervisory ratios of 15:1. The FAA
is, however, pursuing increases in the supervisory ratios in other than
controller work force areas where system safety is not adversely
impacted.
By position description, the first-line supervisor position at an
air traffic facility is a ``hands on'' position. Supervisors are
required to work a minimum of eight hours per month on operational
positions, and they frequently provide real-time operational assistance
to controllers during peak demand periods.
Mr. Wolf. Operational currency requirements specify that air
traffic supervisors work a minimum of 8 hours per month on operational
positions. If the FAA raised this figure, would it produce cost
savings?
[The information follows:]
The currency requirement for air traffic supervisors, which is the
same for anyone maintaining operational currency, is designed to assure
that first-line supervisors maintain operational efficiency which is
necessary for managing the operation. The requirement is not designed
to augment staffing. Although this operational currency requirement is
typically met during off-peak air traffic periods, supervisors
frequently provide real-time operational assistance to controllers
during peak demand periods.
In order to incorporate the air traffic supervisor operational
currency requirement into the air traffic control specialist (ATCS)
staffing standard, first-line supervisors would need to be available
for ATCS staffing during peak air traffic periods. It is precisely
during peak air traffic periods that the need for first-line
supervision is most crucial. Therefore, increasing the operational
currency requirement for air traffic supervisors to enhance ATCS
staffing would not yield a practical cost saving.

currency for cwf supervisors

Mr. Wolf. In a hearing last fall, a controller testified
that some supervisors game the system by working their 8-hour
operational shift on the midnight shift or other time when
traffic is low. If so, it wouldn't give us much confidence that
these people are, in fact, remaining current in their job
skills. To what extent does FAA monitor when supervisors take
their currency shifts?
Ms. Garvey. NATCA has raised with us some concerns about
the supervisors, both the ratio and some of the activities, and
that is something we monitor very carefully. That is something
we take very seriously. The issue about ratio is something that
is again being raised in the contract negotiations or in the
discussions we are having with the unions. And so it is
something we take very seriously. I mean, those are serious
allegations. I suspect that like every large organization, we
have breaches sometimes but it is the management's
responsibility to make sure we are dealing with those.

abestos contamination at leesburg center

Mr. Wolf. All right. Yesterday a number of air traffic
controllers came by to see me from my district. As you know,
the Washington Center is out in Leesburg. The first question,
and I understand that Rich has spoken to the FAA about it maybe
this morning, is about the asbestos contamination, which
continues to be a problem, they say, at Leesburg Center. In
December of 1996 they said an independent arbiter assigned to
hear a grievance on the issue concluded and I quote, ``the
evidence is compelling that the use of asbestos-containing
material to insulate the attic of the facility when it was
built continues to present a serious asbestos hazard to those
employees who work in the areas below the ceiling. There is no
need here to recite all of the conditions which lead to the
conclusion that a definite asbestos hazard exists. It seems the
most workable near-term solution recommended by the contractor
is to build a tent-like structure.''
What has the FAA done about the situation and, in
particular, has the agency put a tent structure in place to
protect the employees at the facility, or do you plan on doing
that?
Ms. Garvey. Let me answer, Mr. Chairman, this way: First of
all, it is a new issue--was a new issue to me this morning.
Mr. Wolf. It was a new issue to me, too. It came in
yesterday.
Ms. Garvey. Apparently, from what I understand, we have
looked at it. We have some serious concerns about creating a
tent. I guess some of our scientists have suggested that
creating a tent or constructing a tent will create even more
difficulties and more problems. So we are going back to the
arbitrator and to NATCA and to the union to talk about it, to
at least let them know what some of the scientists that we have
talked to have raised. The issues that they have raised sound
very serious.
Mr. Wolf. Do you know the date of the arbiter's decision?
Ms. Garvey. I don't, Mr. Chairman. We will find out.
Mr. Wolf. December of 1996. That is a while.
Ms. Garvey. Ouch.
Mr. Wolf. Yeah.
Ms. Garvey. Yes.
Mr. Wolf. And they live in my district, too, so I am
interested.
Ms. Garvey. Double ouch. Excuse me. I will be leaving
immediately to look into it. [Laughter].
[The information follows:]

The FAA has instituted a number of engineering controls to minimize
the risk of asbestos exposure within the control room. Weekly
inspections of the roof, attic, and mechanical systems are performed to
ensure that the asbestos containing fireproofing is not deteriorating.
All personnel conducting inspections are adequately trained and every
effort is made to prevent possible disturbance of asbestos during these
inspections. Air monitoring has been conducted in the facility for the
past year with no recorded asbestos releases. We are doing everything
possible, and have been quite successful, in protecting our employees
at this facility.
The FAA is pursing several different options for containing and
removing asbestos in conjunction with the installation of Display
System Replacement (DSR) equipment. We are continuing our dialogue with
facility union representatives and will work with them to ensure the
safety of our employees while we complete this project.

reassignment of glen reffner

Mr. Wolf. They also brought another problem to our
attention. They said the FAA's planned reassignment of air
traffic controller Glen Reffner, the FAA hired this individual
on March 30, 1997 fully aware that he was 31 years old.
However, 5 months later the FAA Office of Human Resources
directed that Mr. Reffner be reassigned because if violates the
personnel regulations set by the agency, which says that a new
controller cannot be above 30 years of age.
How can you fairly disallow this individual from
controlling air traffic, which he has done as a DOD controller
for many years, when you are hiring hundreds of former PATCO
controllers with an average age of 59? If he is 31, why--well,
how would you justify 31 versus 59?
Ms. Garvey. Again, a very new issue, but let us get back to
you on that. It was not one that staff here were familiar with
either. Let us get back to you on that. It certainly does sound
on the face of it to be, you know, not quite right.
[The information follows:]

[Pages 292 - 293--The official Committee record contains additional material here.]

controller age limits

Mr. Wolf. Does the law mandate or give you the ability to
set age standards?
Ms. Garvey. I believe we have a little more flexibility,
and I believe we set the standards on that.
Mr. Wolf. You set the standards. Because in the letter to
the FAA, Mr. Reffner wrote, ``the actions of the agency in
hiring me with full knowledge of disclosure of my age
constitutes a constructive waiver of the age requirement. I am
not going to ask you if you agree or disagree but my sense----
Ms. Garvey. I will take a look at it.
Mr. Wolf. My sense is really--and 31 is a mere child.
[Laughter.]
Ms. Garvey. It certainly is, Mr. Chairman. This could be a
tough discussion back at the FAA.
Mr. Wolf. We have some other questions on that area but we
will just talk to you about it.
Ms. Garvey. Thank you.
[The information follows:]

Title 5 of the United States Code, section 3307, paragraph (b)
permits the Secretary of Transportation to establish a maximum entry
age for original appointment as an air traffic controller. The
Secretary's authority continues under FAA Personnel Reform.
The language of the maximum entry age states: ``A maximum age of 30
years is established for entry into air traffic control positions
covered by Public Law (P.L.) 92-297 (May 16, 1972). Persons who have
reached their 31st birthdays may not be originally appointed to these
positions.'' Thus, FAA controllers may not receive their initial
appointment to terminal or en route positions on or after reaching
their 31st birthdays.
The FAA General Counsel determined that the phrasing of the
Department of Transportation maximum entry age rule precludes waivers.
For this reason, we are not allowed to use a DOD age waiver to hire
someone from DOD who was appointed there after reaching age 31. In
contrast, we are allowed to employ DOD civilian controllers if they
received their civilian controller appointments from the DOD.

PATCO Controllers

Mr. Wolf. There have been some concerns, which fit in with
that, which were discussed last year about the additional cost
of hiring former PATCO controllers. In 1996, about 75 percent
of FAA's new controller hires were from the PATCO ranks. Your
plans were to hire 60 percent of new hires in fiscal year 1997,
300 out of 500 from former PATCO rolls. What was the final
percentage?
Ms. Garvey. That was the final percentage. Those were the
final numbers. This year of the 800, we are looking at a number
of about 300 and we have not yet had any determination for 1999
so we still need to discuss that.
Mr. Wolf. How many made it and didn't make it? How many
washed out or didn't wash out?
Ms. Garvey. Let me get back to you on the specific numbers.
I thought they were actually doing pretty well, but let me get
back to you with the numbers.
[The information follows:]

We hired 300 former PATCO controllers in FY 1997. This
represents 60 percent of our planned new controller hires.
Out of the total 300 former PATCO controllers hired in FY
1997, one resigned, and the other 299 were enrolled in training
either at the FAA Academy or facility level.

patco controller success

Mr. Wolf. Some left, though, did they not?
Ms. Garvey. Go ahead. You may want to stay here.
Mr. Belger. Okay. Through February of this year, we had
hired 475 former controllers. Only 7 of those have resigned or
retired. A small number, it is a dozen or so, I believe, didn't
make it through the training in the facility that they went
back to but we were able to reassign them to a lower level
facility. And in balance, they are doing quite well.
Mr. Wolf. Okay. Great. Would you tell us where the problem
areas were?
Mr. Belger. Yes, sir. We can provide that.
Mr. Wolf. Was it in a particular location?
Mr. Belger. No. I don't think there was any particular
trend. It was generally--well, let me not speculate, but we can
tell you precisely where those were.
[The information follows:]

[Page 296--The official Committee record contains additional material here.]

REHIRED PATCO CONTROLLERS

Mr. Wolf. Is it a good policy to continue hiring large
numbers of former PATCO controllers? Why?
[The information follows:]

Former PATCO members that the agency has hired are valuable
additions to the agency's work force. These individuals bring a wealth
of experience to their jobs. They have filled vacancies that needed to
be staffed. They are doing their part to make the NAS safe and
responsive.

cwf labor/management relationship

Mr. Wolf. Okay.
All right. In 1991, FAA administrator Mr. Busey told us,
``I do not have any uneasy feelings about management/labor
relationships * * * I do not feel uneasy today that we have a
looming problem of management-labor relations out there.''
Contrast this with a document distributed by NATCA in
December of 1997 which said, and I quote, ``In 1997,
campaigners for NATCA's leadership positions visited over 200
of nearly 400 facilities nationwide and find employee morale at
an all time low * * * The workforce, only 16 years after the
strike, is talking job actions and hate for FAA management * *
* History is repeating itself.''
The tone and the rhetoric of FAA's labor-management
relationships, and let me just stress that this is basically
referring to times before you came in, has appeared to get a
little more sour in the last couple of years. Certainly when I
bump into controllers in the supermarket or somewhere people
will come up and say something. Would you comment on the state
of relations between the FAA and the controllers now?
Ms. Garvey. Well, let me start, and Monte may want to add
to this as well. Let me say first of all, it is something I am
concerned about. I think the relationship between management
and labor and union is absolutely critical if we are going to
succeed. It has to be productive, it has got to be a
relationship based on trust. It has got to be a relationship
that says we are in this together. You know, these issues are
too complicated, they are too difficult for us not to be in it
together.
So it is something that is really a top priority for me and
it is a top priority, I know, for Monte as well. We have spent
a lot of time talking with the management team that is doing
the labor negotiations for us. We meet with them at the end of
every week, assess how things are going, look for problem
areas, and there will be and there are problem areas. I have
spent a good deal of time with Mr. McNally and with his board.
I have met with all of the NATCA representatives that were in
town last week. I think there were about 300 of them, and I
spoke with them and answered questions.
I have offered to Mr. McNally, and he has said he would
love to do this, to visit centers with him, to visit the towers
with him. I think it is very important that we keep those lines
of communication open. I e-mail the employees every week. I let
them know what is going on. I hear back from lots of employees.
I hear back.
Mr. Wolf. They have the ability to e-mail directly back to
you?
Ms. Garvey. Yes, oh, yes. It works well. So I think itis
very important. I don't think we are always going to agree, and that is
the nature of management and labor relations. I expect that there will
be times when they will be disappointed and there will be times that I
will be disappointed, but I think the issues are so important that we
absolutely must work on it together. And I have also said to Mr.
McNally--and also, by the way, to Mr. Fanfallone at PASS as well, let's
look for some opportunities where we can work together, that is outside
of the bargaining unit, if you will, or outside--away from the
bargaining table. I think modernization is a perfect example. One of
the action items that came out of the task force was an assessment of
our workforce. What do we need as we move forward? What do we need in
the year 2000? And that is an action item that we are undertaking with
the unions together, to say, what is it we want? How do we prepare our
workforce? How do we move out together?
Monte is visiting Canada in a couple of weeks to look at
some possible solutions to some technology that they have, and
we talked yesterday about bringing the union with him on that
trip. So that we are in it together, we are looking at it
together, we are moving out together. But I am concerned. I
think it is not an overstatement to say that there is a strong
history of distrust probably on both sides. It is going to take
movement on both sides for it to be more productive.

family friendly policies

Mr. Wolf. Well, I appreciate it. In October 1997, NATCA
national leaders sent a letter to all union members saying ``if
this agency thinks we have catapulted to the forefront of the
public's mind before, it hasn't seen anything yet.'' And I
think it is important to treat people with dignity and respect,
to be talking to people, to be listening to people.

NATCA AND THE MEDIA

Mr. Wolf. In October 1997, NATCA national leaders sent a
letter to all union members saying ``If this agency thinks we
have catapulted to the forefront of the public's mind before,
it hasn't seen anything yet . . . Media will be an important
NATCA tool''. Do you have any understanding with NATCA about
what is ``fair game'' about approaching the media?
[The information follows:]
The FAA is working very closely with NATCA on communicating
a unified message regarding the agency's future direction.

Family friendly policies

Mr. Wolf. Which leads me to another area. Congressman Hoyer
and I, over the years, on another Appropriations Subcommittee,
have offered a whole series of what we call ``family friendly''
policies.
I wonder how successful the FAA has been? Do you have flex-
time?
Ms. Garvey. We do have flex-time and employees have told me
that they like that very much.
Mr. Wolf. Do you have leave sharing?
Ms. Garvey. Do we have leave sharing?
Mr. Belger. Yes.
Ms. Garvey. We do have it. Monte is here and he will----

leave sharing

Mr. Wolf. How many people are participating in leave
sharing in the last several years?
Mr. Belger. We have that information. I don't have that in
my head, but it is available throughout the agency.
[The information follows:]

We don't maintain summary records of the exchange of leave.
However, it's estimated that approximately 1,400 FAA employees
were eligible for leave donations over the last several years.

job sharing

Mr. Wolf. Do you have job sharing? I see some people
shaking their head.
Mr. Belger. I am not sure.
Mr. Wolf. Job sharing is where you and the administrator
could--not as administrator obviously, but two people could
share----
Ms. Garvey. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wolf. Could share a job. One may want to take care of a
father who is dying. Another may want to go back and get a
Master's Degree.
Mr. Belger. I stand to be corrected, but I don't think we
have really implemented that in any broad scale yet.
Mr. Wolf. That is the law, though, and if this
administration maintains it is so interested, there are new
proposals with regard to child care, most people are looking
for choices, for options, to be in control of their own life.
No one size fits all, but I think the opportunity at the FAA
for two people to share a job for 2 or 3 years, maybe if you
did have a parent who was going through a very difficult time
and you wanted the opportunity to spend more time with them, or
whatever the case may be, but I think job sharing, particularly
in this modern time, is--and therefore somebody maintains their
work experience with whoever they are working for, but at a
reduced level and if two people are sharing the same job you
generally find you are getting from both actually more time
because they are very appreciative of having this opportunity,
and that is the law.
Mr. Hoyer and I sent a letter to OPM last week asking them
to do an audit of all of the agencies, as to how successful
they are. And I would urge you to go back--do you do any
telecommuting?
Mr. Belger. Yes.

telecommuting

Mr. Wolf. How many employees do you have doing
telecommuting?
Mr. Belger. Again, we can provide that for you. We have
encouraged that quite a bit.
[The information follows:]

As of November 1997, the FAA had 280 participants in the
telecommuting program, or approximately 1.6 percent of employees in
position suitable for telecommuting and 0.6 percent of our total
employee population. There are 105 telecommuters at our Washington
headquarters, and 175 in regional offices or field facilities.

Mr. Wolf. Telecommunicating from a telecommunications
center or from their own home?
Mr. Belger. From a center, primarily. We might have some
from home, too. But we tried to focus on the telecommunicating
centers.
Mr. Wolf. But you may have employees in an area where there
is no telecommunications center.
Mr. Belger. Right. One of the things we have done, and this
is more appropriate in our safety work force where our
inspectors are on the road so much. I think we are giving them
much more flexibility to work out of their home and channel
from the home without having to go into the office and wasting
the time of having to go into the office where they could, by
computer or by phone, do the same work from home before they go
on the road to do their inspections.
Mr. Wolf. I think that is a good idea. Bell Atlantic
learned that a number of years ago. They used to make the
people come in, pick up their equipment, and then go out. Now
they just take their equipment home. And there is nothing magic
about strapping yourself into a car and driving 35 or 40 miles
to come in and begin the day and then go out. So I think the
more you can give people----
Mr. Belger. Right.
Mr. Wolf. And I think if you find it is abused, you can
certainly deal with that. But most people, the studies show, do
not abuse it. They actually are so appreciative, particularly
with where they are in life, that it gives them more options
and choices. So deal with flextime, flexplace, job sharing and
leave sharing in telecommunications and give us some sense of
how the FAA is doing.

user fees--court ruling

Mr. Wolf. User fees. The issue came up before, but the D.C.
circuit court of appeals recently struck down the FAA's
overflight user fees. Do you agree with the rationale of the
Court? Are you going to appeal it?
Ms. Garvey. We have, Mr. Chairman, until March 16, so we
have another week before we have to make a decision on whether
we ask for a hearing or appeal the case. We are still looking
at the options and talking with Justice; obviously Justice
plays a role in this, so we are still looking at the options.
We were disappointed. There was much about the Court
decision that I thought was positive for some of the actions of
the FAA, but clearly, how we had structured the pricing, using
the Ramsey pricing was really the critical issue. So we will
decide before March 16 whether we will appeal it or ask for a
hearing. I guess you can ask for a hearing separate from the
appeal.
Mr. Wolf. That is a couple days?
Ms. Garvey. Yes, a couple of days. I was glad this was
today, so we have a little bit of time to think, but not much
though.
Mr. Wolf. How much of a shortfall does this give you, your
operating budget in fiscal year 1998, and what are you planning
to do to deal with that shortfall?
Ms. Garvey. Well, as you know, Mr. Chairman, we had
anticipated getting about $100 million from that I think we
collected about $49 million to date, and it is going to----
[Additional information follows:]

The reduction in anticipated user fees results in a shortfall of
$84 million. We are currently considering our options to address this
shortfall. No decision has yet been made.

Mr. Wolf. Do you have to refund that?
Ms. Garvey. We believe we do, yes; so it is going to have
quite an impact. So we are looking at those options as well
and, quite honestly, talking very seriously with OMB about what
are some potentials, options open to us.

user fees for rural airports program

Mr. Wolf. The authorizing legislation assumed that the
overflight fees, which would be used to finance $50 million
each year for the Office of Secretary's rural airports program,
formerly the essential air service program, and the balance
could be used by the FAA for agency operations. The law was
technically drafted in a way which requires the FAA to send $50
million to the rural airports program, even if those fees
aren't collected; is that right.
Ms. Garvey. That is correct, Mr. Chairman, and we are
following the letter of the law. We knew that going intothis
year's activities. We have found a way to fund it, I understand.
Mr. Wolf. You are not asking for a change then.
Ms. Garvey. We are not, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wolf. But if you had to make a difference between
safety and essential air service, what would you do?
Ms. Garvey. Safety is clearly our priority, but I guess our
goal would be to try to respect the letter of the law and find
a way to make sure our safety program is not affected.
Mr. Wolf. You will be subsidizing EAS out of your budget by
$50 million?
Ms. Garvey. We will, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wolf. Does that sound very logical, though, if you were
sitting up at Amherst?
Ms. Garvey. Well, it certainly seemed logical when we were
thinking in terms of user fees because that was a vehicle by
which we could do it. It certainly makes it much more
challenging now.
Mr. Wolf. Well, I mean, if you get to the two points, that
they are in conflict, and you find this is a safety problem, I
think you ought to----
Ms. Garvey. We certainly can't compromise on safety.

technical training

Mr. Wolf. On training, there has been a lot of concern over
the past few years about the adequacy of FAA's resources in
technical training. Controllers say they are not getting enough
training, and GAO and the IG say safety inspectors are not
getting enough training. The Coopers and Lybrand study
indicated FAA invests less in training than technically-
oriented private businesses they look at. Does your fiscal 1999
budget request an increase in technical training for
controllers, inspectors, and other elements of the safety work
force particularly?
Ms. Garvey. I am not sure it specifically calls out those
areas. I am going to ask for clarification.
Mr. Wolf. Go ahead.
Ms. Garvey. They are leaving me here.
Mr. Belger. The 1999 request, Mr. Chairman, does include an
increase for technical training for air traffic controllers and
it does include an increase in technical training for airways
facilities technicians and engineers.
Mr. Wolf. Of how much?
Mr. Belger. The increase for controller training, I think,
is about $2 million. That is primarily for the contract for the
training of air traffic controllers in the facilities. The
increase for airways facilities technicians and engineers is in
the NAS hand-off area. We can provide the specific dollar
amount to you.
Mr. Gardner. In the safety work force side, sir, the 1998
budget, you gave us a large increase in the training budget
which we are using for that purpose this year and that
continues on as part of our base throughout--in 1999 and on.

[Page 303--The official Committee record contains additional material here.]

consortium for training

Mr. Wolf. Would it make any sense to develop a relationship
with a consortium of universities, around the country, to
develop a training program that could be--you could do it by
teleconferencing one day a week, on a Monday from 5 to 6:30, or
whatever the case may be, to really aggressively--because I
have seen statements from some of the flight service people and
different safety occupations, inferring there was not a lot of
training. And obviously the job is so complex that what the
private sector is doing, you spend a lot of time on training.
In my office we spend a lot of time on training, in new
computers, and new this and new that. Would it not make sense
to develop a relationship with a consortium of universities
scattered around the country?
Ms. Garvey. I think that is an excellent suggestion, one we
ought to take an action on and take a good hard look at.
Because, I think the benefit of something like that is you
really get to take advantage of the most up-to-date training
that is available. And I think that kind of constant refreshing
of what is out there and constantly having that kind of
training available would be a real benefit to us. And certainly
I think your point about using the video teleconferencing that
we can do so readily now is a way to deal with the large work
force that we have.
Mr. Wolf. Mr. Sabo.

marc program in minnesota

Mr. Sabo. Just one question at this point. One program that
has been of ongoing interest to me is the MARC program in
Minnesota. We have some problems with OMB, but my question is,
does MARC continue to do good work?
Ms. Garvey. They continue to do very good work. It is a
good outfit.
Mr. Sabo. I thank you.
Mr. Wolf. You made the record.
Ms. Garvey. If it is for the record, excellent work.
Mr. Wolf. We have a number of questions more. I tell you
what I thought we would do; go until about 1 o'clock and give
you an opportunity to take a break and get a sandwich and maybe
come back at 1:30.
Ms. Garvey. That is just fine. That is great.
Mr. Wolf. Wouldn't you rather keep moving than break for a
long 2-hour period?
Ms. Garvey. Absolutely, if those are the options. Is there
a third option that we could just break? [Laughter]. Don't push
it, I know.

maintenance issues

Mr. Wolf. With regard to maintenance, the maintenance union
testified before the subcommittee a few weeks ago that the
National Airspace System is experiencing increased maintenance
problems. They said the time to restore equipment has increased
from 7 hours in fiscal year 1983, to 27.5 in 1997. Unscheduled
outage time has gone from 210,000 hours in 1983 to over 600,000
in 1997. Aircraft delays caused by equipment have increased
from 5,000 in 1991 to 6,500 in 1996.
Is the NAS experiencing a deterioration of service due to
inadequate maintenance, as PASS suggested during the hearing?
Ms. Garvey. Mr. Fanfallone and I have talked a great deal
about this. This is an absolutely critical and important issue.
I mean we certainly bear some responsibility in making sure we
get the equipment in place they need, the up-to-date equipment
that is easier to maintain.
As he has pointed out, we also bear some responsibility in
providing the right kind of training for the personnel that are
working on these issues. We have invited PASS and Mr.
Fanfallone has been very generous: in giving his time on this
issue to be with us as we are thinking and developing the
training programs, as we move forward; also to be part of the
kind of task force that we have that are looking at the
staffing issues; and in looking at ways that we can make some
improvements. He has brought to my attention some very specific
issues around some of the equipment we have, where we really
need to make some changes in order to make the maintenance work
a little bit better. He has brought those issues to our
attention. I think we are very much aware of them and working
closely with PASS to address them.
I don't know if Monte wanted to add anything.
Mr. Belger. No.

field maintenance technician staffing

Mr. Wolf. He also said the work force is currently staffed
at 71 percent of staffing, and even if FAA officials agree that
the level needs to be maintained at a minimum of 80 percent of
the standard, which would result in 575 current vacant
positions being filled. Do you agree that at least 80 percent
of the staffing standards should be filled?
Mr. Belger. Yes, sir. And I think our hiring plans will get
us to that level. We continue to look at the validity and the
appropriateness of the airways facilities staffing standards.
As the Administrator mentioned, we have an effort underway
right now with both of the major unions, PASS and NATCA, to
look at our needs for the future in terms of skills, knowledge,
abilities, training, and numbers of people, so I continue to be
concerned about our airway facilities staffing standards.

Mr. Wolf. PASS says that, in addition to the current workload, the
workload of FAA maintenance specialists will increase over the next
five years because they will have to operate both the old and new
systems in parallel during the transition period. Is this accurate, and
if so, do your 1999 and out year staffing estimates reflect this
workload?
[The information follows:]
Yes, this is accurate. We expect to be maintaining both the
existing NAS infrastructure, as well as new systems coming on line. The
Staffing Standards Analysis System takes this into account, and
generates outyear staffing requirements based on the expected
inventory. This growth in the total number of facilities is the main
driver behind FAA's request for an additional 150 field maintenance
staff in FY 1999.

Mr. Wolf. They also say that an average attrition rate of
about 660, along with 1,200 to 1,500 specialists who are
typically in a developmental status, means that on any given
day, over 25 percent of the field maintenance work force is
either waiting for the FAA to provide essential training or
preparing for retirement. Do you think those figures are
accurate?
Mr. Belger. We can provide very accurate figures. I think
the 600 number for retirement is quite high. We do have
employees, obviously, in developmental positions, being trained
to the full performance level, and that is why we need the
technical training dollars to provide the training for those
folks.
Mr. Wolf. Do you have enough in the budget that you asked
for?
Mr. Belger. I think we made a lot of progress on technical
training. If you look at the trends for technical training in
airways facilities, there has been a significant increase in
technical training dollars since 1994. So I am much more
confident that we do now than we did several years ago.

Mr. Wolf. PASS claims that the 1994 Airways Facilities Realignment
Plan, signed by FAA and the union, agreed to fund a nationwide business
process engineering (BPE) effort, to streamline the work procedures
that would have enabled more employees to work efficiently with fewer
supervisors. The FAA envisioned that 1,100 supervisory personnel would
be placed into hands-on, safety-related positions, and BPE would
streamline the processes. However, the union claims that a majority of
these supervisors instead took a buyout in 1995 and the hands-on
positions were never filled. In addition, the BPE was never funded by
the agency, leaving many people working harder than ever before. Is
this accurate?
[The information follows:]
Yes, there were large reductions in supervisory and administrative
staffs as result of employment targets set by the National Performance
Review (NPR). Many of these employees left as the result of the buyout
and early out authorities.

COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS--AF CONTRACTING OUT

Mr. Wolf. PASS advised the Committee that FAA does not typically
conduct a cost-benefit analysis before contracting out the maintenance
of a new system. Is that accurate? If so, why?
[The information follows:]
These types of analyses are required as part of the FAA Acquisition
Management System (AMS). During the investment analysis phase of an
acquisition, the airway facilities directorates and users working with
the air traffic systems requirements service establishes initial
requirements and participates in an alternative analysis process to
fulfill those requirements. As part of the alternative analysis
process, maintenance strategies are evaluated and life-cycle costs are
determined for each likely alternative.
The FAA must also follow the Office of Management and Budget,
Circular No. A-76, ``Performance of Commercial Activities'', March
1996, which establishes Federal policy for the performance of recurring
commercial activities. This circular provides the procedures for
determining whether recurring commercial activities, such as equipment
maintenance, should be placed under contract with commercial sources of
performed in-house using government facilities and personnel.

contract maintenance criteria

Mr. Wolf. What guidelines does the FAA use when determining
whether to perform maintenance in house with government
employees or contracting it out?
Mr. Belger. The basic guideline is two criteria. Number
one, there obviously has to be no decrease in the safety level;
and number two, it really boils down to how can the work be
performed, more efficiently, or more cheaply, for the taxpayer.
There are certain circumstances and situations where
thecontractor can provide the services more quickly and at a lower cost
than we can in-house. Many times, though, it is much more efficient and
cheaper for us to do the work in-house. If that is the case, then we
should do the work in house.
Mr. Wolf. I agree. But do you have standards?
Mr. Belger. Yes, sir; we have published criteria.
Mr. Wolf. That are understandable to everybody?
Mr. Belger. I think they are pretty straightforward, just
like I said. It really boils down to how can we provide the
best service for the users of the system.
Mr. Wolf. In most, if not all cases, it is the airlines
and, obviously, the passengers that suffer when your NAS
systems are down for maintenance because they suffer the delays
and the passengers suffer inconvenience. PASS offers several
examples in their testimony where it appeared that contractors
were not as responsive as government employees might have been,
causing the system to be out of operation longer than
necessary. Are the airlines involved in this maintenance, too?
Mr. Belger. They are not involved in the maintenance.
Mr. Wolf. In the decisions?
Mr. Belger. They are obviously impacted.
Mr. Wolf. Are they involved in the maintenance decisions?
Mr. Belger. Oh, yes, sir. As a matter of fact, we have
significantly increased the dialogue.
Mr. Wolf. Whether to use in-house or out?
Mr. Belger. They, quite frankly, want it fixed. You know,
now, regardless of whether it is done in-house or by the
contractor. So their pressure on me and on us is, you know, get
it fixed now, and however we can best do that is what we ought
to be doing.
Mr. Wolf. What has been the trend, say, in the last year?
Have you gone outside more?
Mr. Belger. I think the trend in the past couple years is
we brought more in-house. We actually made decisions on pieces
of equipment like ASOS and some of the other equipment in the
centers where, because we have been able to show it is cheaper
to do it in-house, we have brought it in-house. My challenge to
the union and to our airway facilities organization is, you
know, show us how it can be done more cheaply in-house and that
is what I will support.

Enforcement Actions

Mr. Wolf. They have recommended we fund an independent
review of how FAA legal staffs respond to and enforce the
recommendations coming from inspectors in the field. Their
testimony says inspectors are concerned that enforcement
actions are not undertaken quickly enough to ensure public
safety.
Ms. Garvey. Let me make a couple comments about it, and I
don't know if Mr. Gardner wants to add anything, but that is a
very serious issue. It is one I have talked with people
internally about. And I will tell you I have talked with some
inspectors about it. I think we have had even a recent example
where some of our inspectors, early on in the process,
uncovered some issues they thought were of great concern. We
brought an additional national team in--again, by the way,
working with the IG to take a very hard look at it.
One of the changes that we have made, which I think is very
important, is when we produce a report. Recently we just
produced a report that I think illustrates this quite nicely.
The issues that have been raised in the course of the
investigation are laid out and the responses laid out, so that
if an inspector finds something and it is something that he
believes is serious, but if upon further investigation, further
evaluation, that issue is disposed of adequately, we say that
in the report. So, there is a full understanding and there is
not the appearance or reality of trying to sweep something
under the rug.
I think that is a very good step forward because it really
does say: Look. You can find things early on in the process and
you should--that is what the inspector should be doing,
throwing up some red flags for us. If you go back in and learn
more about it, some may be disposed of, some may not. Some may
be just as serious as the inspector first thought.
So I think part of what we need to do is be very clear to
the public--your point earlier. The American public really
needs to know these things. We need to be clear to the public
and our own work force that we are taking this seriously and
here is the answer.

Regional Coordination

Mr. Wolf. We seem to be seeing an increasing number of
reports which show inadequate coordination of FAA's field
activities. The IG went out to your regional offices and found
that different offices had their own definition of what
constitutes a runway incursion, making measurement of this
important safety problem difficult. PASS claims that there is
an inconsistency among your regions in their pursuit and
enforcement of safety regulations. How does FAA coordinate the
work of its regional field offices to ensure consistency,
fairness, and aggressive enforcement? And obviously the
standards should be the same, I would imagine, for safety in
every region.
Ms. Garvey. Absolutely. And it really originates in the
lines of business. In other words, the lines of business
establish the policies. I will tell you, though, that is a
criticism I have heard almost across the board, that in
different regions there are different interpretations sometimes
of the airport's rules or sometimes of some of the safety rules
and so forth. One of the efforts that is currently underway,
and I know in the regulation field they are working very hard
on this, is first of all to make sure the policies are clear. I
think sometimes it is an interpretation issue. And so making
sure that the policies are first and foremost very clear. The
policies that we are issuing, and regulations, are going
through all of the policies that we have and making great
progress and making sure there is first and foremost a clarity.
The second step is going to be to make sure we do
additional training so that we are all interpreting it in the
same way. And I think there is also, sometimes, a disconnect,
as I understand it, between what the inspector sees and what
some of our lawyers--and I think that may be referenced in your
question--but some of our lawyers see as well. One of the
activities that our Chief Counsel has talked about and is
undertaking as part of his performance plan for this year, is
to bring together both the legal people that he deals with,
with some of the inspection folks that Guy Gardner deals with,
in certain locations throughout the country. Let's do some case
studies and let's look at how we are interpreting some of the
laws that we have.
I think this is a very real issue and I think it is an
issue that is going to take us sometime to make sure we are
getting at all aspects. I think, when Mr. Hinson talked about
the lines of business, one of the reasons he really wanted to
do that was to make sure that within the lines of business they
were establishing clear policies. But we need to take it even a
step further and make sure it is being implemented consistently
across the country.
Mr. Wolf. So all of them would come together at the same
time.
Ms. Garvey. Right. Everyone could hear the same message.

Tampa ASR-9 Radar

Mr. Wolf. Congressman Young asked if we would raise this
issue with you. He has written about the problems with the
reliability of the ASR-9 radar in Tampa. Do you know anything
about these problems and can you tell me if FAA has done
anything to fix them, is doing anything to fix them, or when
the problem will be resolved? What can we tell Mr. Young?
Ms. Garvey. The good news is we are on schedule. I am going
to let Monte explain the details, but I like to at least
deliver the good news.
Mr. Belger. There have been problems with the ASR-9, which
is a terminal radar in Tampa. Most have been related to a power
conditioning system, and we have had that problem throughout
the country with the ASR-9 radars. We are installing a state-
of-the-art power conditioning system, which does the same
function as you would use on your computer to condition and
purify the power that goes to the radar. We are on schedule to
do that by the end of this year.

New York TDWR

Mr. Wolf. We will tell Mr. Young that, and maybe you could
give us a letter we could give to Mr. Young.
What is the status of the doppler radar up in New York, I
know there has been opposition to it and we have put report
language in, I think, on several occasions urging them to move
ahead because that is probably the busiest area--what is the
status of that?
Ms. Garvey. Go ahead.
Mr. Belger. As you know, there has been a lot of
controversy around the siting of that radar. We are currently
doing an environmental assessment. I believe the schedule for
the completion and the schedule for record of decision is in
the late summer of this year.
Ms. Garvey. Early fall, yes.
Mr. Wolf. Rich said the Coast Guard is closing the station
where you hoped to put the radar. Is that good for you or bad
for you?
Mr. Belger. I think that the land either has been or will
be turned over to us, so I don't see that as a negative at all.
Mr. Wolf. So, this summer you will make a decision?
Ms. Garvey. I believe it is closer, actually, to September.
This is the environmental work going on now, and there are a
number of environmental issues being raised by neighbors and
community folks. I know people in New York are meeting with
them and there have been a number of public forums for people
to voice the concerns that they have.
Mr. Wolf. Do you agree that that is a major safety problem?
Ms. Garvey. We know it is an issue we have to deal with and
come to grips with. Absolutely.
Mr. Wolf. How long will it take once you make a decision--
say, Labor Day--how long will it take until it is up and
running and moving, roughly, and if you can elaborate a little
bit more for the record?
Mr. Belger. We will do that for the record.
[The information follows:]

The Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) process for Terminal
Doppler Weather Radar (TDWR) to serve John F. Kennedy International
JFK) and LaGuardia airports is well underway. A draft EIS was
distributed to over 500 members of the public and government agencies
in August 1997. The FAA accepted comments on the draft EIS through
November 1997 and held 5 public hearings in Brooklyn and Queens during
the comment period. A large number of verbal and written comments were
received. These comments are currently under review by the FAA. An
analysis of alternatives suggested by the public is being prepared for
inclusion in the final EIS. The FAA expects to complete the EIS process
by issuing a Final EIS by August with a record of decision by late
fall.
A commissioning date will be determined pending the results of the
EIS process. If any site other than the current preferred site is
selected, additional public hearings would be required.
Assuming approval of funding in Fiscal Year 1999, construction
would commence 2 months after the record of decision. The TDWR would be
commissioned 12 months later.

Mr. Wolf. But I would like to get some sense of this,
because I think there is going to be opposition.
Mr. Belger. That is what I was going to say.
Mr. Wolf. But if you are bold and forthright and say this
is a major safety issue and this is the fundamental problem for
anyone flying into New York, I think----
Ms. Garvey. Yes, we would support that.
Mr. Wolf. Yes, you would support that. How long if you move
normally?
Mr. Belger. If we are not sidetracked by other appeals or
obstacles, it is just a matter of the installation of the
radar. I will correct this if I am wrong and too optimistic,
but probably a year or less for the actual installation and
commissioning of the radar.
Mr. Wolf. By the end of 1999.
Mr. Belger. I would hope. Hopefully we don't run into other
obstacles.

Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS)

Mr. Wolf. On the issue of STARS, in our last hearing last
October on STARS, the FAA said that human factors-related
design changes could affect the program's cost and schedule.
You said these changes might be more clear in April of 1998,
next month's time frame. Do you have a better handle today on
the cost and the schedule impact?
Ms. Garvey. We have somewhat of a handle and we are going
to have a better one in April, as indicated. Let me say, first
of all, I think this committee did a wonderful thing in really
acting as a catalyst to get the right group of people together
to work on this issue. I am not overstating it when I say great
progress has been made. The model we are establishing with
STARS, a way to deal with human factors and to deal with them
early on in the process, would be an excellent model as we move
forward with other automation tools and with other new
technology. I think both PASS and NATCA have felt very
encouraged by the progress to date.
I have been encouraged and I have been very appreciative,
of the work that the union members have put into it, that the
FAA management team has and that, frankly, Mitre and the IG as
well, who have been active participants in this. We are in a
very critical period now. We have dealt with, I think, most of
the issues on the controller's side, we have a good process
underway with PASS. We have gotten a little further behind, but
I think we can close the gap quickly on dealing with the issues
that PASS has raised. In 1998, I believe, we are down to about
11 issues with NATCA, and a slightly larger number with PASS.
But I talked to Mr. McNally and Mr. Fanfallone last week and
said the next few weeks for our folks is going to be very, very
important because we want to do this right. At the same time,
we want to be mindful of a schedule and a budget and we want to
make sure we are prioritizing the issues correctly.
So we have agreed to meet either March 31st or early April,
depending again when people's schedules allow, the first couple
days in April; and the top folks, myself and Fanfallone and
Mike McNally and the IG and so forth, and say all right, where
are we, how much progress have we made and what needs to be
resolved, and really take a look at it ourselves. So I am very
encouraged. But I also, as Ken Mead said last week in one of
the testimonies, it is also important we bring it to a
conclusion, it not be an endless process. We must figure out a
way to have a good strong exit criteria.
Mr. Wolf. You are going to bring everybody together, the
unions, everybody, and say this is it, put a bow on it.
Ms. Garvey. Let's try to put a bow on it and let's try to
move forward. It is really at that time we will have a better
sense of what the cost implications are.

Stars Reprogramming

Mr. Wolf. That is what I was going to ask you. What about
the additional $28.9 million?
Ms. Garvey. That is actually part of the reprogramming that
we put in, even before we had these issues on the table; that
that reprogramming allows us to deal with some of the software
issues and also to advance the National piece. We are not sure
yet whether that $28 million will deal with the human factors
issues. Again, we will know more after our staffs are working
it. We know Raytheon is working very hard to make sure they can
address it, and trying to give us some budget numbers as well.

[Page 312--The official Committee record contains additional material here.]

stars accelerated deployment

Mr. Wolf. Looking at it locally here, last year you agreed
to accelerate the deployment of STARS for National Airport. In
your reprogramming request, I see you are also planning to
accelerate deployments for New York and Dallas-Fort Worth. Will
you explain why the list of early deployment sites is
expanding, and is this the final list, and what is the status
of early deployment of STARS at National Airport, when do you
think it will be at National Airport, bring us up to date?
Ms. Garvey. Our contractor is still optimistic but, quite
honestly, the human factors issues and software issues will
impact Washington National as well. We will know better when we
meet with everyone in April.

stars at national airport

Mr. Wolf. What was the target for National?
Ms. Garvey. It was at the end of the summer, early fall.
Mr. Wolf. Do you think that is going to slip?
Ms. Garvey. I think it may slip a little bit, but again we
will know more after we meet with folks, because the human
factors issues we are dealing with also, obviously, affects
National. In fact, we are focusing on the National piece.
Mr. Wolf. At the time you announced it would, would you be
able to say it will be in National on this date?
Ms. Garvey. That is our goal, that once we see how we do
with our meeting with the union people and with Mitre, that we
can collectively, as a group, say this is what our schedule is.
I mean, we talked a little bit last week that, look, if this
schedule slips by a few months but we have gotten what we need,
which is the human factors dealt with in a way that will be a
model for future deployments, then I think all of us can be
comfortable. My great concern is if we are not able to
prioritize some of the human factor issues, or if the list is
really much more complicated than we thought, then the impact
may be greater. That is really what we need to understand and
certainly be back to you with that information.
Mr. Wolf. So you really can't say when it will be.
Ms. Garvey. Not at this point, until we explore the human
factors issue a little bit more.

oversight of repair stations

Mr. Wolf. Currently nearly half of the maintenance
renovation and repair of commercial aircraft owned by U.S.
airlines is conducted by independent repair stations rather
than by air carriers themselves. They are located worldwide and
use has grown significantly in recent years. In a recent audit
of repair station oversight, GAO found the FAA was not
deploying its staff efficiently to oversee these stations and
that the FAA had no standards on what documentation should be
kept by your inspectors. What is your overall response to the
GAO findings?
Ms. Garvey. We actually agree with the findings and the
recommendations the GAO made in that report. We think they made
some excellent recommendations and we implemented many of them,
including the idea of using teams to take a look at the repair
stations and focusing those resources in a team effort. We also
looked at the documentation issues they raised, and so we are
well on our way in terms of implementing those recommendations.
That was one that I thought, where again having GAO weigh in
with some specific recommendations and giving us an opportunity
to respond in a timely fashion, I think was important.
Mr. Wolf. Maybe you answered this, maybe not. If the FAA
doesn't specify what documentation is to be kept on safety
deficiencies, how will inspectors know when they conduct the
followup inspection that the problems have been corrected?
Ms. Garvey. I think that is quite honestly the fair issue
that GAO raised for us. The documentation that we have in place
now is much more specific and is something that you could use
as a followup.
Mr. Wolf. The report also notes GAO and IG have been
reporting on FAA shortcomings and documenting inspection
activities as far back as 1987. And I know you were in high
school then. [Laughter].
Ms. Garvey. I was, Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Wolf. That is just an indication; 1997, 1998.
Ms. Garvey. I hope, by the way, the laughter was not coming
from anyone who works at the FAA.
Mr. Wolf. The report also expresses concern over the,
quote, ``relatively limited amount of oversight FAA gives
repair stations compared with the oversight it gives air
carriers.'' Each was to have a minimum of one facility
inspection, while each air carrier was required to have many
more. So you really have different standards and you are much
more aggressive, which I think is appropriate. Probably on ones
who have less of a problem in the areas where there might be a
greater problem, there is less aggressive activity.
The GAO interviews of FAA inspectors at European field
offices found that in Europe, your inspectors spent 80 percent
of their time on surveillance and the oversight of repair
stations, whereas in the U.S., they spent only 30 percent of
their time on surveillance, and this includes all types of
facilities, not just repair stations. Why the difference?
Ms. Garvey. I am not sure I can answer why the difference,
except to say that the recommendations--we have made the
modifications, based on GAO's report. But let me ask Guy if
there is anything more you would like to add to that, Mr.
Gardner.
Mr. Gardner. No. We are addressing those issues. I don't
have the response to the 80/30 percent, other than we are
methodically working to equate foreign repair station oversight
with domestic repair oversight.
Mr. Wolf. The report went on to say FAA field inspectors
who worked domestically and overseas want to extend the annual
certificate renewal to domestic repair facilities. However,
inspectors based in the U.S., it said, are more suspicious
because they fear an increase in their workload. The least
amount of support came from FAA management, and I think that is
important. You have read the report?
Ms. Garvey. Yes, I have studied the report and also been
briefed by staff. Again I want to say this is one where--in the
briefing I have had, people have embraced those recommendations
enthusiastically and said this is really something we need to
do. It is part of our action plan.

inspection regulations

Mr. Wolf. Are the regulations being totally overhauled or
will new regulations come out? When will they come out, just
roughly?
Ms. Garvey. Actually, a new part 145 NPRM is in the works
right now. It is in executive review, ironing out some of the
specific details of it, but we hope to have it out on the
street very shortly.
Mr. Wolf. Rich said it has been in the works about 8 years.
Mr. Gardner. Yes, sir, it has.
Mr. Wolf. That is a long time. When do you think it will
actually be in effect? What is the problem? Maybe I am missing
something here.
Mr. Gardner. It is up at OST right now, sir. They had some
changes they wanted us to make. We are making the changes and
should be back there within a month.
Mr. Wolf. Is there somebody lobbying against it? Is that
part of the problem?
Mr. Gardner. It is a very complicated rule, it covers a lot
of things, and the specific difficulties of it I am not
completely up to speed on. I will have to provide that for the
record.
[The information follows:]

The oversight of the domestic and foreign stations is
consistent with the certification basis of each station. For
example, foreign repair stations have an initial and biannual
recertification requirement, whereas domestic stations once
certificated are not required to go through a recertification,
and their certificates are valid until revoked or surrendered.
All other aspects of oversight are identical.

Ms. Garvey. I will mention there are a couple of key rules
that we are very concerned about and working closely with OST's
legal counsel to make sure we get them out. They have made some
good suggestions and I think will make the rules we have been
concerned about even better, but we need to move it out. We
will follow up with the Chief Counsel's Office on that.

aviation safety inspectors

Mr. Wolf. Eight years is too long, obviously. Eight months
is too long.
Congress has funded a 41.8 percent increase in the number
of aviation safety inspectors, that is 984 inspectors, between
1994 and 1998, and additional increases are proposed for 1999,
45. The GAO report indicates that the FAA may waste these
additional resources by not deploying them efficiently in
teams. Is that one of the implementation--do you plan on
following the GAO recommendations?
Mr. Gardner. Yes, sir. Actually, as a result of the safety
review done following the ValuJet accident, there is a
tremendous renovation in both how we do inspection and how we
prioritize our inspection resources, including the national
certification team that is just now up to speed and starting
their process. We are particularly looking at the new entrant
carriers, but looking more at a national basis to address
several of the issues you brought up here today, not only the
issue of how do we focus and prioritize our resources but also
to accomplish a better standardization of our inspectors across
the spectrum of the United States and the world.

inspector training

Mr. Wolf. In the GAO survey, safety inspectors also said--
80 percent of them believe that more training was needed on
inspection skills, and almost half said that inadequate
training undercut their ability to ensure compliance with
existing safety regs. Is that in the budget this year, more
training?
Mr. Gardner. Yes, sir. As I mentioned, you gave it to us in
the 1998 budget.
Mr. Wolf. But in this coming year, too?
Mr. Gardner. Yes, sir. That continues on in 1999 and on.
Ms. Garvey. Mr. Chairman, I want to mention the 90-day
report Mr. Gardner referred to. The IG and the FAA initiated
very early in September a review of that. How well have we
done? Have we implemented all of the recommendations that came
out of a 90-day review? That review was just completed and sent
up to the Secretary and we would be happy to provide a copy to
you. I think it is a very positive report. It says that the FAA
has made progress in some areas. It has pointed out some areas
where perhaps originally the schedule we outlined may have been
a little ambitious, but says we are on track. It made a couple
other additional recommendations, including reporting to the
Administrator on a quarterly basis. So I think it is, again,
another example of a good cooperative working effort with the
FAA. Both of our teams, the FAA and the IG, went down to
Atlanta, spent time, really met with inspectors and teams. It
was a very good effort and I am encouraged by the progress that
we are making and will continue to make in that area.
Mr. Wolf. How often do you meet with Mr. Mead and Mr.
Anderson?
Ms. Garvey. Mr. Anderson, less so, because Mr. Mead is part
of the Department and I see him at the Secretary's staff
meetings. I would bet we meet a couple times a week. We
certainly talk at least two times a week, but we probably meet
a couple times a week. He was a very active participant in the
Task Force on Modernization and it was very helpful to have
that perspective of somebody who has watched this through the
years.

REGULATION AND CERTIFICATION STAFFING

Mr. Wolf. Your fiscal year 1999 request for regulation and
certification includes funding to raise end-of-year employment by 45
during the fiscal year. The comparable increases in the two prior years
were 632 and 372. Would you explain why the rate of staffing growth has
slowed in this activity?
[The information follows:]
The rate of staffing growth has slowed in FY 1999 because the
requirements which drove relatively large staffing increases in FY 1997
and FY 1998 have been satisfied. Specifically, the FY 1997 and FY 1998
increases were designed to increase staffing commensurate with staffing
standards and with the 90 Day Safety Review. Having achieved these
increases, the FY 1999 requested increase is based solely on projected
growth using the current staffing models.
A new integrated staffing model is being developed that will
include essential elements of the existing flight standards staffing
models, additional staffing identified as a result of the 90 day safety
review, and other changes in work requirements, workload drivers and
performance measures. With the planned completion of the model in the
summer of 1999, it will be used to project future staffing
requirements.

runway incursions

Mr. Wolf. I give the Secretary a lot of credit for
appointing him. I think it is one of the better appointments.
We were disturbed over something Mr. Mead said, speaking of
Mr. Mead again--what would we do without Mr. Mead and Mr.
Anderson we don't know, we would have to rely on just one
person--but Mr. Mead's testimony said that runway incursions
are increasing. He said the FAA must focus like a laser on
reducing runway incursions.
What are your plans for dealing with this safety issue?
And, again, they found out the FAA's regional offices did not
focus their efforts on airports with the most runway
incursions, they did not have a person designated to identify
the causes of incursions or periodically analyze runway
incursion data. Are you planning to make specific improvements
at the field level? What are you planning with regard to this
issue?
Ms. Garvey. Mr. Chairman, on the issue of runway
incursions, there were 10 recommendations that came out of the
GAO report. They were also the same recommendations that came
out of RTCA. We have embraced those.
Mr. Wolf. RTCA. What is that?
Mr. DeGaetano. It no longer stands for anything. It used to
be Radio Telecommunications Administration.
Ms. Garvey. I just deliver the message. This is the
industry branch that takes a look at some of the
recommendations as well. They have come up with the same. All
10 are in our strategic plan, they are part of our action plan.
We have actually implemented some of them having to do with
procedures.
The issue that you mentioned is one that we have talked
about internally and Ken has raised as well, which is how can
we get the air traffic operation and the airports people to
sort of come together on this issue. Susan Kurland has been
working with Monte to really appoint the right people in the
region so we have communication and we have coordination
between the airports office and air traffic control, but the 10
recommendations that came out of GAO are very much a part of
our strategic plans.
Mr. Wolf. Are they the same 10 recommendations that came
out of Mitre in 1994?
Ms. Garvey. I would bet they are very similar. I am not as
familiar with the Mitre report, but we talked with Mitre about
runway incursion.
Mr. Wolf. Are you going to ask they follow up with this?
Mr. Belger. Mitre is helping us. Mitre has already
conducted a survey of pilots and is in the process of
completing a survey of air traffic controllers, specifically on
the question of runway incursions. These are all being
incorporated into our new runway incursion action plan which we
will publish in June. That will incorporate all the
recommendations from the IG, from the advisory committee, and
some other recommendations that we are coming up with on our
own. Specifically, one of the actions will be to establish, in
fact we are already doing it, runway incursion action teams in
each of the regions. That will be a specific action that we
will follow through on. In fact, some of the teams have been
out and visited airports and some of the fixes that we have put
in place, like in Cleveland, which was mentioned as one of the
airports with the highest occurrence of runway incursions, have
already shown results. And so we are optimistic that we will
stay on top of it this time.
Mr. Wolf. Why did it take the IG, though, to have to do
this?
Mr. Belger. I think it was a question of, quite frankly,
just a question of priorities, and we perhaps didn't put enough
emphasis on the runway incursion program over the past 2 or 3
years. I think that is probably the most straightforward
answer.

trend in runway incursions

Mr. Wolf. For the record, maybe you can tell me if you have
it, how many runway incursions have there been, say, in 1997,
1996 and 1995? They are up. Can you tell us a little bit, so
this will be complete for the record?
Mr. Belger. We will provide the specific numbers for the
record, but the trend in runway incursions are increasing.
[The information follows:]

[Pages 319 - 322--The official Committee record contains additional material here.]

RUNWAY INCURSIONS--MITRE REPORT

Mr. Wolf. In 1994, Mitre issued a report on the runway incursion
problem and recommended 10 areas for improvement. To what extent has
FAA resolved those 10 areas, and what further progress is needed.
[The information follows:]
The following describes the status of the recommendations,
including those recommendations that are under consideration.

[Page 324--The official Committee record contains additional material here.]

Mr. Wolf. Are you planning to have Mitre follow up this year on
that earlier report?
[The information follows:]
MITRE issued two reports on Airports Surface Operations in the
1994-1995 timeframe. The first, Part 1, identified problems and
proposed solutions for Surface Navigation and Communications, and was
issued in May 1994. Those recommendations, in part, were included in
the FAA's 1995 Action Plan.
The second, Part 2, identified problems and proposed solutions for
Surface Operational Procedures and Factors Affecting Pilot Performance.
Both Part 1 and 2 were reviewed by the Runway Incursion
Subcommittee of the RE&D Subcommittee last year. Their report was
issued January 1998, and incorporated MITRE's issues, when appropriate.
The FAA is currently preparing the 1998 Airport Surface Operations
Safety Action Plan. The approach in this preparation is to create
specific and measurable goals and objectives based on past
recommendations. This plan will be completed by June 30, 1998.
MITRE is assisting the FAA with an air traffic controller survey,
which will be similar to the efforts MITRE conducted in 1994 for
pilots. Their work is scheduled to be completed in September 1998. If
necessary, the FAA will revise their action plan in response to this
survey.
MITRE is also conducting a review of the Airport Movement Area
Safety System (AMASS). This work should be completed this fall.

runway incursions

Mr. Wolf. By?
Mr. Belger. It is significant, let me put it that way. It
is enough for us to be concerned and to make it a major part of
the strategic plan and a major part of the Administrator's
initiatives for this year.
Mr. Wolf. Any fatalities?
Mr. Belger. There have been fatalities as a result of
accidents, yes. We categorize runway incursions into three
categories: those caused by errors and mistakes made by air
traffic controllers; those caused by errors or mistakes made by
pilots; and those caused by people inadvertently, whether
employee or pedestrian, getting on the runway where they
shouldn't be, or vehicles on the return way that shouldn't be
there.
The single biggest area where we have seen an increase in
runway incursions is in the area of pilot deviations or pilot
errors in the general aviation community. That is the area
where the increase has been the most dramatic, and that is
where we are really going to focus our efforts, in the areas of
education, in the areas of visual aids on the airports to help
the pilots. Whatever we can do to make the airport easier for
the pilot to use decreases the likelihood that a mistake will
be made.
Ms. Garvey. Mr. Chairman, just as an anecdote, I am just
remembering Mr. Morgan last week brought to our senior staff
meeting a letter following on some of the activities from the
teams that Monte has talked about, where a particular airport
that talked with the FAA about the importance of this. An
airport director noticed that there had been a violation and
got right out with a letter to the pilot, citing the concern of
the FAA that the FAA had raised around incursions, and
mentioned that this is an important issue and you really have
to pay attention. So I thought it showed the level of
consciousness for some of the airports, too, it was raising on
this issue.

near mid-air collisions/pilot deviations

Mr. Wolf. I also think this is an opportunity for the bully
pulpit, too, when you see some of these issues. As Mr. Belger
seemed to say, it just kind of got away from you. It is almost
like--and I have used this example before in the hearings--when
you were a little kid, you watched the Ed Sullivan Show, and
the magician came on and he would spin the plates, and after he
would turn around he would talk to the audience and the
audience would holler that the plate is ready to fall and he
would quickly spin it again. I think it is a question of going
back and spinning the plates, and I think speaking out about it
verbally in communications, giving speeches on it, I think
sensitizes people.
On another safety issue, near mid-air collisions were up
22.5 percent last year, from 195 to 239, and pilot deviations
were up 18.1 percent, from 1,288 to 1,521. Is this something
else we should be worried about or something we should be doing
something about; is this part of your program?
Mr. Belger. I think we should. We are concerned about any
increases in those trends. Each one of those pilot deviations
and near mid-air collision reports is investigated, and we are
looking for trends in areas we can really focus on, if there
are any trends.
Mr. Wolf. Is there a trend?
Mr. Belger. I am not aware of any particular trends coming
out of that increase, but we continue to look at each one of
them.

acquisition reform savings

Mr. Wolf. The Civil Aviation Review Commission expressed
the opinion--this is on the funding issue--that FAA's
modernization program needed additional resources, and its true
funding in this area has been reduced over the past few years.
Yet, as we noted in our committee report last year, the FAA
told us acquisition reform would save as much as 20 percent of
the cost of the new systems, allowing you to buy more with the
money you have. Two years into acquisition reform, there really
haven't been the significant savings. Do you have any comments
about that?
Ms. Garvey. Let me make a couple comments.
Mr. Wolf. Do you think it will produce the savings?
Ms. Garvey. I think it will produce the savings, and I will
provide this for the record. Some of the contractors have told
us there are savings just in doing the early phases, just in
getting the contracts in. I think a lot of what acquisition
reform will produce still needs to be measured. It is still
very early on in the process, and even determining some of the
metrics, I think, is something we are focused on. How do you
determine the metrics of whether it has been successful or not?
For me, the key to modernization is putting in place those
early building blocks so you can really have something to show
for it, that I think we are going to be able to drive. At least
in listening to industry and people like Mitre who spent time
on it and listening to people within the FAA, that if we are
able to put in place the early deployments, we will get the
results we want, that we need. Some have suggested we will get
them even at cost savings.
I am not sure about that, and I think those are numbers we
need to run and we are running those numbers presently. But I
think acquisition reform is still very much in its infancy.
There still are some benefits that can be derived.

Based on the FAA's internal assessment and the independent
assessment of the first year (April 1996--March 1997) under acquisition
reform, we have found significant reductions in the time required to
award contracts. This reduction in time translates to better
utilization of resources and reduced expenses associated with contract
awards. We are currently performing our assessments of the second year
which ends March 30, 1998.
Based on the independent assessment of the FAA's first year under
the Acquisition Management System, we found a reduction in the time to
award an average contract of 53 percent. This equates to a reduction in
the number of days to award an average contract from 380 days to 178
days, a savings of an average of 202 days. We also found a reduction of
time from announcement of contract award of over 30 percent. This time
savings ultimately translates to significant dollar savings.
Concerning small procurements, we estimate the savings from
increased use of credit cards as a procurement medium to be $1.4M.
Finally we have increased our emphasis on the use of commercial off
the shelf and non developmental items (COTS & NDI) throughout the
agency. This tends to result in significant cost savings.
We are currently tracking all major procurements which have been
approved since the inception of acquisition reform. We will compare
these programs with projects awarded under the old system and will be
able to quantify savings in future years.

Mr. Wolf. And this is not meant as a joke, but you will be
around to see these.
Ms. Garvey. I will.
Mr. Wolf. Because you have 5 years.
Ms. Garvey. Four years, 6 months, 22 days and 16 hours.
[Laughter]. Although I was interested, Mr. Chairman, that you
were considering an 8 to 10 year term that you mentioned
earlier.
Mr. Wolf. I hope we can say if they took your picture 6
months ago and take it 5 years from now----
Ms. Garvey. That is what I am the most worried about, if
you really want to know the truth.
Mr. Wolf. I remember seeing the pictures of President
Carter after 4 years, and he didn't have nearly as tough a job
as you have. It will be interesting to watch. Can we get a
camera in here? [Laughter].
Ms. Garvey. Before and after.

facilities and equipment request

Mr. Wolf. Your F&E budget requests $2.1 billion, a 13.6
percent increase over the previous year. If this is approved,
it will represent the highest level of modernization funding in
6 years; yet some in the aviation community say this is far
from adequate, and we hear calls for a level of $2.4 billion.
Is your F&E request adequate for next year?
Ms. Garvey. I think it is adequate for next year, Mr.
Chairman. It does grow from $2.1 to $3 billion over a 5 year
period, (1999-2003) for the early building blocks for Free
Flight Phase 1 that RTCA and the Task Force have put forward.
We are looking at that carefully in light of the President's
budget.
I was encouraged by the early comments we got back from the
budget people. They are feeling reasonably optimistic. But we
do have more analysis to do on that. Part will be determined by
how many sites we deploy some of the activities on, and that
will affect the budget a little bit. I feel reasonably
confident right now and very good about the President's budget
with the Free Flight Phase 1, and will certainly be in close
communication with Members of Congress as we move forward. And
also, by the way, with OMB. They have been very supportive in
our discussion yesterday with Michael Deich. He was encouraged
by the consensus that seems to be growing in industry, and
said, ``Look, let us know, if you have the consensus and can
move out more this year. Let us know that.''
Mr. Wolf. Is he your OMB examiner?
Ms. Garvey. He is actually higher even than the examiner. I
think the examiner is John Ball right here. John has left.
Whew, I can relax. [Laughter].

F&E PRIORITIES & MODERNIZATION OFF-SITE

Mr. Wolf. As I understand it, you have been working with outside
groups such as the RTCA Free Flight Select Committee and the
Modernization Off-Site Task Force to determine whether the
modernization plan can be phased in a more focused way, to get improved
services and equipment into the field sooner. I know you were trying to
have some decisions made in this area by the date of this hearing
today. Can you share with us any decisions you have made?
[The information follows:]
A proposal was made at the January 23 meeting of the NAS
Modernization Task Force for a revised approach to NAS Modernization
which outlined a Free Flight Phase I concept. Drawing on the draft NAS
Architecture version 3.0, this approach was proposed with the purpose
of minimizing risks, providing user commitment, and advancing
capabilities that would assure early user benefits within budget by the
year 2002. Research and Acquisition, Air Traffic Services, and
Regulation and Certification organizations are directed to give this
proposal their top priority. We will then provide this assessment and
data to the RTCA Free Flight Select Committee and work with them to
come up with the best possible approach, along with a plan for how we
can successfully implement Free Flight Phase I.
The plan is to reach agreement with industry at the April meeting
of the Government/Industry Free Flight Steering Committee. We need the
consensus and commitment of both Government and industry if we are to
be successful.
Mr. Wolf. Does all this recent activity indicate that many of your
1999 budget requests for individual programs are no longer valid--that
some will need more money, and others less?
[The information follows:]
Some adjustments to FAA's 1999 budget will have to be made to
accommodate the recommendations of the NAS Modernization Task Force and
the RTCA Free Flight Select Committee. We are in the process of
finalizing the analysis. Some of those programs associated with Free
Flight Phase I will require additional funding in FY 1999, and others
will have to be adjusted downward. The adjustments will be zero sum and
the reductions will have to come from lower priority programs that will
have to be delayed into the out years.
Mr. Wolf. If so, when will you be able to submit an update to the
budget requests for your specific programs?
[The information follows:]
The FAA will know what adjustments must be made to the 1999 budget
in the April-May time frame.

hartsfield international airport

Mr. Wolf. Last year's committee report stated that the FAA
should continue its responsibility for financing navigation
systems and landing aids, and should not shift those
responsibilities to airports. Why then did the FAA Southern
Region notify the Atlanta Hartsfield International Airport in
January of this year that the city of Atlanta would be
responsible for funding the ILS, runway visual range and the
lighting system for the new runway?
Ms. Garvey. Let me say that is an issue we have revisited
that is going to be part of the year 2000 budget. We looked at
the schedule for Atlanta. The runway is scheduled to be on line
in the year 2002, so we think the year 2000 will be the
appropriate time. The whole issue of lighting is one that has
been debated within the agency and also with some of our
stakeholders. I believe it is more appropriate for this to be
part of our budget in 2000.
Mr. Wolf. So we can tell the Members from that area.
Ms. Garvey. Yes.
Mr. Wolf. Did Denver Airport pay for the navigational aids
and lighting systems and the radars?
Ms. Garvey. I believe they did not, but I would want to
verify that for the record and, Monte, you may remember.
Mr. Belger. The navigational aids, the radars, would have
been installed by the FAA under Facilities and Equipment costs.
[Additional information follows:]

No, Denver did not pay for the navigational aids, lighting systems
radars, and control tower, in the Facilities and Equipment budget.
The New Denver Airport Project was a special F&E project for a new
airport, submitted through the Capital Investment Plan (CIP) process
and funded under a separate F&E budget line item.
The Atlanta project is an AIP project for an additional runway to
an existing airport. The FAA F&E projects do not normally procure
equipment for AIP projects. In this case, however, the FAA will submit
a project in FY2000 to fund the equipment procedures.
Mr. Wolf. The letter from Southern Region said ``at the present
time, the FAA does not plan on funding any future ILS's.'' Isn't it
likely that you will need additional ILS systems, given the need for a
backup system for GPS?
[The information follows:]
The Federal Aviation Administration expects Global Position Systems
(GPS), to reduce the need for many of the current land-based radio
navigation systems, including Instrument Landing Systems (ILS) which
support Category I operations. We are in the process of determining if
a backup system (such as Loran-C) for GPS is necessary. We have not
identified a requirement for additional ILS's as a backup for GPS.

Mr. Wolf. Was Atlanta Hartsfield treated differently than
the new Denver airport?
Mr. Belger. As you referred to, about a year ago I guess,
or maybe more, we were thinking about the possibility of
transferring some of these costs, for lights particularly, and
for some instrument landing systems and certain categories over
to the AIP program. We never followed through with that, so I
think there might be some communication.
Mr. Wolf. Do you think they were treated fairly, if an
objective person came in and looked at Denver?
Mr. Belger. Yes, sir. It is appropriate for the FAA to
install the navigational aids and radars, as we do at all other
airports.

NAVIGATION AND LANDING SYSTEMS AT HARTSFIELD INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

Mr. Wolf. The FAA's airports' office recently signed a $75 million
letter of intent in support of Atlanta's new runway. Yet the regional
office and acquisition executives will not pay for the FAA equipment
necessary for the new runway to open. Can you see how this sends mixed
signals to communities like Atlanta about the steadfastness of FAA's
support?
[The information follows:]
The expansion of the Hartsfield International Airport is a priority
for the FAA. The FAA will fund a new runway and equipment for a new
tower. This will allow sufficient time to procure and install the
equipment to meet the proposed commissioning date of the new runway in
2002.
Mr. Wolf. Until this Committee stepped in and added funds to the
budget, FAA officials had been telling Atlanta that they would have to
pay the costs of a new consolidated radar facility in order to achieve
airspace efficiencies. Then they told the city they would have to pay
for their new control tower. After this, the agency advised Atlanta
that, although they had reserved a precision runway monitor for the
airport, the City would have to pay the FAA to install it; and now they
say Atlanta will have to find money for navigation aids and lighting
systems for the new runway to open. Is there some reason why Atlanta is
being asked to pay so many costs which have almost always been paid by
the FAA?
[The information follows:]
The FAA is funding the cost of the new consolidated radar facility.
It is currently scheduled for commissioning in July 2000. The FAA will
fund the installation of the precision runway monitor, the navigation
aids and lighting system.

year 2000

Mr. Wolf. Maybe we can just continue, if you don't mind.
That way we won't even have to take a break and we can just
finish. There are a number of other questions, but we will
submit them for the record. I think we covered the year 2000
issue. I would like to go out----
Ms. Garvey. We would love to have you.
Mr. Wolf. Maybe we can pick a Friday or something.
Ms. Garvey. I think I mentioned I spent New Year's Eve with
the Deputy Secretary at the command center.
Mr. Wolf. How big is the command center?
Ms. Garvey. Not big enough. No, it is actually several
offices. But we are right with Coopers, so that we have our
business partner with us as we are looking at the issues. Ray
Long now has both an office in headquarters and at the command
center.
Mr. Wolf. We will submit most of these for the record. I
think we have covered a large number of them.

HOST COMPUTER SYSTEM

Mr. Wolf. What is the total cost to pursue a parallel repair-and-
replace strategy for the HOST computer system, and how much funding is
included in your fiscal year 1998 budget and 1999 request to address
the HOST problem?
[The information follows:]
The total amount requested to pursue a parallel repair-and-replace
strategy for the HOST computer system is $149.3 million in FY 1998-
1999. Of that amount, $2 million is included in the FY 1998 Y2K
reprogramming request to renovate software and microcode; $75.3 million
was proposed for FY 1998 reprogramming to replace the HOST; and $72
million is contained in the FY 1999 President's budget.

YEAR 2000 PROBLEM

Mr. Wolf. What is your total estimated cost to analyze and fix the
Y2K problem at FAA, and what confidence do you have in that number?
[The information follows:]
The total estimated cost (FY97-01) to analyze and fix the Y2K
problem at the FAA is currently $156.1 million.
These cost estimates are the result of completed assessments of all
430 agency mission critical systems. Of the 784 total FAA systems, 684
of those have been assessed. The remaining 100 non-mission critical
assessments will be completed by April 15, 1998.
We are currently assessing the impact of a five month schedule
acceleration on our cost estimates.
Mr. Wolf. What is your fiscal year 1999 request and in which
appropriations is that funding located?
[The information follows:]
FY 1999: $36 million (F&E appropriation).
Mr. Wolf. I understand you have set aside about $50 million in the
1998 operating budget for Y2K work. Which Y2K activities are funded
with operating funds and which are funded with capital dollars?
[The information follows:]
The only set aside in Operations in fiscal year 1998 is within Air
Traffic Services; and the amount is $15.8 million versus $50 million.
The majority of Y2K renovation will be funded with capital (F&E)
dollars; $18 million was appropriated in fiscal year 1998 in F&E for
Y2K, plus $37.7 million in the FY 98 reprogramming package. F&E funds
are being used for both operational air traffic systems and those in
development.
Mr. Wolf. What activities are being deferred or eliminated during
fiscal year 1998 because of the need to dedicate $50 million to Y2K?
[The information follows:]
Based on our January 30, 1998, cost figure, we estimated that
approximately $25.3 million will be absorbed by Operations. This number
may change when new cost estimates are provided at the end of April
consistent with plans to accelerate the Y2K implementation schedule.
Some of the activities that may be reduced to absorb estimated costs
include telecommunications and stock and stores.

Host Replacement and/or Repair

Mr. Wolf. Do you consider the HOST repair and replacement project
as part of the Y2K problem? Why or why not?
[The information follows:]
The FAA is proceeding with an accelerated acquisition for HOST &
Oceanic replacement systems primarily due to supportability issues and
potential Y2K risk. The current systems' hardware supportability is
questionable due to parts and repair skills availability. While this is
the major driver for the hardware replacement, replacement is one of
the two parallel approaches being pursued to mitigate potential Y2K
risks for the HOST. Renovation of the FAA software and machine
microcode is also being aggressively pursued in parallel, the original
equipment manufacturer will not certify that the HOST & Oceanic
computers are Y2K compliant.
Mr. Wolf. What is the total cost to pursue a parallel repair-and-
replace strategy for the HOST computer system, and how much funding is
included in your fiscal year 1998 budget and 1999 request to address
the HOST problem?
[The information follows:]
The total amount requested to pursue a parallel repair-and-replace
strategy for the HOST computer system is $149.3 million in FY 1998-
1999. Of that amount, $2 million is included in the FY 1998 Y2K
reprogramming request to renovate software and microcode; $75.3 million
was proposed for FY 1998 reprogramming to replace the HOST; and $72
million is contained in the FY 1999 President's budget.
Mr. Wolf. When will you decide whether this parallel strategy
(suggested by the IG) is necessary?
[The information follows:]
In her testimony to this subcommittee on February 4, Administrator
Garvey indicated that she agreed with DOT Inspector General Mead's
recommendation of a parallel approach, and directed the FAA to proceed
accordingly.
Mr. Wolf. The FAA's original cost projections estimated it would
cost $1.50 per software line of code to fix air traffic control
systems. Especially since much of this software is written in the older
Ada and Jovial programming languages, it is conceivable that cost could
be much higher than that. What are your current estimates?
[The information follows;]
Certain industry experts estimate the cost of code replacement at
between $1.50 and $4.00 per line of code.
The FAA is using estimates up to $8.00 per line of code, contingent
on system complexity, for air traffic control systems.
For administrative and non-ATC systems, the FAA is using estimates
between $3.00 and $4.00 per line of code.

Year 2000 Problem

Mr. Wolf. Do you have a published contingency plan that could be
immediately implemented should significant Y2K problems appear, and has
that been properly coordinated with airlines, manufacturers, general
aviation groups, and others?
[The information follows;]
We have non-Y2K specific contingency plans in place for every
deployed system in the National Airspace System (NAS), that can be
implemented in the event of system outages.
In addition, a Y2K contingency plan exists for each NAS system. The
FAA Year 2000 Program Office is in the process of determining the
status of non-NAS (administrative systems) contingency planning.
An agency-wide Y2K contingency plan has been mandated by the FAA
Y2K Program Office, and is currently being developed. This plan will be
broadly coordinated with airlines, manufactures, general aviation
groups, and others with a need to know.
Mr. Wolf. The PASS maintenance workers union suggests that
additional funding is needed to fiscal year 1998 and 1999 to train
Airway Facilities System Specialists on new computers being installed
to address the Year 2000 problem, especially if you replace the HOST
computer. Could you address the adequacy of your budget for such
training?
[The information follows;]
The replacement of the Host of Oceanic computer hardware is one of
our top priority efforts. We submitted a Facilities and Equipment (F&E)
reprogramming request to Congress for $75.3 million in FY 1998, which
includes training for Airway Facilities technicians. Our FY 1999 F&E
budget requests funding to continue the effort.

explosive detection systems (eds)

Mr. Wolf. Mr. Pastor raised a couple of issues we were
going to raise. The FAA's capital appropriation is generally
considered to be for establishment and modernization of the air
traffic control system; the airports grant program, known as
AIP, is for airport development and planning, including grants
for enhanced airport safety and security.
Given the purposes of these appropriations, why is funding
for acquisition and installation and new explosive detection
systems at airports more appropriately an expense of the F&E
account rather than the AIP account?
Ms. Garvey. That is an issue we have talked about with OMB
and within the administration, and because the Gore Commission
came out so firmly establishing security as a National Goal or
a National interest, if you will, we felt it was more
appropriate to be part of the F&E account. I think as airports
become more familiar with some of this equipment, and as it
becomes more institutionalized, if you will, it may be an issue
that will be raised again and discussed in that context.
Mr. Wolf. Didn't Congress make security systems eligible
for AIP?
Ms. Garvey. I did not think it was eligible for AIP. Let me
go back and check, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Flynn. There is language in the authorization
permitting the expenditures of AIP for explosive detection.
Whether that is equipment that can be used by the airlines,
fulfilling their regulatory responsibility, versus the
airports, is among the issues that we need to work through in
the process the Administrator was mentioning.
Mr. Wolf. How are you doing that--are you doing that with
your lawyers, or what are you doing?
Mr. Flynn. It is a matter of lawyers looking at the law, of
appropriate precedents.
Mr. Wolf. How long has that been in question?
Mr. Flynn. It only came to my attention within the last
month or so.
Mr. Wolf. When do you think it would be resolved? Fairly
soon?
Mr. Flynn. I wouldn't give an estimate of that now. If we
could look into it and provide an answer for the record.
[The information follows:]

In 1997 the White House Commission established aviation
security as a national interest and the Congress supported the
initiative by providing additional funds in the Facilities and
Equipment (F&E) account to begin procuring advanced security
equipment for airports. During the FY 1999 budget formulation
process, we discussed alternatives for continued security
funding, including the use of AIP. We concluded that funding
security equipment in the F&E account is appropriate,
considering the integral part that aviation security is to the
entire safe, efficient operation of the National Airspace
System.

eds certification

Mr. Wolf. Okay. Mr. Pastor raised the question about other
competitors being certified. Did you want to tell us a little
bit more? I wasn't quite clear if you were going to wait for
the certification or if you were moving ahead aggressively.
Mr. Flynn. The certification standard is important. In the
1997 Supplemental Appropriations Act, we were also directed to
buy some uncertified equipment, so the division is 54 certified
equipment.
Mr. Wolf. Is what?
Mr. Flynn. Fifty-four units of the certified equipment and
22 machines--also for screening checked baggage--that were not
certified, that we would use as high-speed surrogates for
eventual high-speed certified equipment. In the request for
fiscal year 1998, the request is for certified equipment. It is
for 20 machines, which will be--the only certified ones now are
the CTX 5000 made by InVision. We expect the one made by L3
Communications will come for certification testing in April.
Mr. Wolf. Next month?
Mr. Flynn. Next April. Now, we have had some problems
there. It first came for certification testing in January and
has missed a couple of dates since, so we are not certain that
it will pass certification testing in April. Then there are two
other machines, one made by InVision and one made by Vivid
Technologies, that will be coming for certification testing
later this year. If they pass certification testing, and we
have reasonable expectations that they will, we would fund
their initial procurements in 1999 because they will be right
up against the end of 1998 when they are certified.
Mr. Wolf. Are they all three American companies?
Mr. Flynn. Yes, they are all American companies.
Mr. Wolf. What are the foreign companies doing in this
area?
Mr. Flynn. They don't have anything quite in the same
league. Heimann makes one of the uncertified----
Mr. Wolf. Excuse me. Rich was saying there is one foreign
company.
Mr. Flynn. Yes, Heimann is a manufacturer of X-rays, and we
have bought two of their machines because they seem to be
particularly appropriate in combination with another
technology.
Mr. Wolf. When will these be deployed?
Mr. Flynn. They are being deployed right now.
Mr. Wolf. How many are deployed?
Mr. Flynn. We have 13 deployed now.

1998 REPROGRAMMING REQUEST FOR EDS

Mr. Wolf. Your February 13th reprogramming request includes $25.1
million for explosives detection equipment. Can you give us an idea of
how this would be distributed among the various types of equipment and
manufacturers?
[The information follows:]
The breakdown of the planned purchases is:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Est. cost
Vendor Equipment ($000)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
InVision Technologies............ 16--CTX-5000SP........... $14,400
Vendor(s) TBD.................... Four--2nd Generation EDS. 3,600
Raytheon Service Co.............. Integration Services..... 3,500
Lockheed Martin.................. Integration Services..... 2,500
Vendor(s) TBD.................... 20--Explosives Trace 1,100
Detection Devices.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

EXPLOSIVE DETECTION SYSTEMS

Mr. Wolf. Last year, this Committee recommended funding to prevent
a shutdown of the manufacturing line at InVision. The administration
did not support this, and used prior year funding to buy other,
uncertified systems rather than keep the InVision production line going
at a healthy rate. Yet, now you are concerned about the InVision
production line. Why the change of heart?
[The information follows:]
The FAA purchased a limited number of automated x-ray and quadruple
resonance checked baggage screening systems consistent with the Federal
Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, the Omnibus Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 1997 and the recommendations of the White House
Commission on Aviation Safety and Security. These 22 devices were
purchased from funds provided in the Omnibus Consolidated
Appropriations Act along with the purchase of 54 certified systems.
The InVision CTX-5000, a computed tomography (CT) based machine, is
currently the only device to meet the stringent national EDS
performance standards required for certification. During 1998, FAA
expects several candidates for testing. L3 Communications' second-
generation CT based EDS is currently undergoing certification testing.
InVision's second-generation CT system, the CTX 6000, is expected to be
ready for certification testing this fall. VIVID Technologies' multi-
view automated x-ray system's certification testing is expected late
this summer. The goal is to achieve the high level of certified
performance while offering improved operational characteristics,
especially throughput, false alarm rate, and cost.
The continued viability of the only available source of
FAA-certified EDS equipment was an important consideration. If the L3
is certified in April, it will take 90 to 120 days to produce a limited
quantity of systems to be deployed in airports for operational testing
and take 6 to 9 months to manufacture full production units with all
support capability in place for major acquisition. Even after FAA
laboratory technical performance criteria are met for certification,
the following support requirements must be met for widespread
operational deployment:
Test Procedures for Factory, Site, and Operational
Acceptance.
Image Quality Test Bag--Provides capability for daily
calibration.
Training Program for Screeners and Ground Security
Coordinators.
Threat Image Projection--Provides capability to monitor
on-line performance of screeners.
Field Data Reporting--Provides capability to monitor
operational system performance.
Five CTX-5000SP units were initially procured and deployed for over
a year, before a contract was awarded in December 1996 to procure 54
additional units. From lessons learned, the time required from
certification to producing an operational production model with all
support features will be reduced to 6-9 months. This will allow major
acquisition and deployment to occur in FY 1999.

Mr. Wolf. Does it take any particular skill to operate
them?
Mr. Flynn. Yes. These are similar to hospital CAT scans.
Mr. Wolf. What is the salary they are paying the people
that are operating them?
Mr. Flynn. It is around $6, $6.50 an hour.
Mr. Wolf. We have seen reports, and they may or may not be
true, of people leaving and going to work at McDonald's, or
going to work at other restaurants. Are those stories accurate
or is that just an exaggeration?
Mr. Flynn. I don't think it is an exaggeration. I am sure
that has happened. However, there are some things; the
performance of screeners at screening checkpoints has improved
in our testing. We intend to have a regulation which will
cause, will require, improved performance. We want to have ways
of measuring that accurately, the performance, in detecting
difficult-to-detect things such as improvised explosive
devices, that is to say bombs. With those requirements on the
screening companies, it will be necessary to retain employees
longer; consequently, it will be necessary to compensate them.
Mr. Wolf. What is the turnover rate?
Mr. Flynn. As we discussed last year, it is unacceptably
high. The statistics that we provided for that last year showed
a range from 30 percent--which is barely acceptable for the
kind of work that might be used in using a CT machine--to 400
percent.
Mr. Wolf. Four hundred percent?
Mr. Flynn. In some airports.
Mr. Wolf. Why would the swing be so great?
Mr. Flynn. It depends on the local market, the size of the
airport.
Mr. Wolf. Harder to retain someone in a high-tech area
where there are plenty of jobs.
Mr. Flynn. And also the conditions. It can be quite a
stressful job, screening at a very busy center, and indeed
there are more jobs at those airports.
Mr. Wolf. And that person's salary is paid for by the
airport?
Mr. Flynn. No, sir; no, Mr. Chairman. It is paid, in the
first instance, by a screening security company which is under
contract to an airline.
Mr. Wolf. How would it work at Dulles, for example? You are
coming out through the main system; I mean, it is several
different airlines you are servicing. Do they pool that?
Mr. Flynn. Yes, they do and we regulate through a joint
screening checkpoint that is screening for several airlines,
and then the actual operator there, for example, is Argenbright
Security, and they are under contract to the airlines
concerned.
Mr. Wolf. If you find one not doing well, do you make a
recommendation to the airlines that they change?
Mr. Flynn. We make strong recommendations to them that the
performance should improve, and sometimes that can lead to the
airlines having a change of contractors; yes.
Mr. Wolf. Okay. Well, if you could for the record update us
on this. I mean, at times I just didn't have a lot of
confidence, and other times I did. I know it is a very, very
stressful and tough job, and we should have a lot of respect
for the people doing it. My sense is the salaries ought to be
higher. I mean, you can't get a high school kid to come cut
your grass for that--and I think it is just too low. They are
not treating people fairly. It is a very important job.
Ms. Garvey. This is an issue the airlines have raised with
us and they are very concerned about it as well. And I know in
discussions with them a couple months ago, a couple of airlines
said they really wanted to get together with their colleagues
and see if there was a way to approach the concern about the
retention issue, the training issue and then the salary issue
as well. So we would certainly welcome any suggestions that
they would have or any thoughts they would have in this as
well. I know it is an issue they are concerned about.

[Page 337--The official Committee record contains additional material here.]

foreign security screeners

Mr. Wolf. Rich was saying about EL AL. How do they pay
compared to the others?
Mr. Flynn. It is an entirely different system and aspects
of it, if I may--I know them because we have been told about
them on a classified basis by the government of Israel, and I
would like to----
Mr. Wolf. I am not suggesting that you do that.
Mr. Flynn. They are paid more.
Mr. Wolf. Significantly more?
Mr. Flynn. Significantly more.
Mr. Wolf. For instance?
Mr. Flynn. It is quite a different system, sir, and it
involves incentives such as scholarships for school. It is
quite an involved process; the overall compensation. And it is
also the question of national service, sir.
Mr. Wolf. Rich was saying he thought they did better on the
FAA test. Do they?
Mr. Flynn. Well, we don't----
Mr. Wolf. You do test.
Mr. Flynn. Yes.
Mr. Wolf. If you were to test them----
Mr. Flynn. When EL AL has identical equipment to the U.S.,
we will have a basis for a test. And we also have a basis for
examining test results among various airlines, including some
in the United States who compensate their screeners at a
considerably higher rate than I mentioned. There are very few
who do that.
Mr. Wolf. What is the range? Who compensates at the highest
level?
Mr. Flynn. My guess is Tower Airlines compensates more
heavily than others.

security data

Mr. Wolf. There have been a number of cases over the past
few years where FAA's ability to protect public safety and
security is compromised by the agency's inability to protect
sensitive information from public disclosure. Data collected by
the safety performance analysis system and flight operations
quality assurance programs are having this problem, as well as
certain activities in the airport security area.
The committee report last year encouraged the
administration to explicitly recognize those cases where civil
aviation security information falls within the definition of
national security for the purpose of security classification.
Have you made any headway over the past year in being able to
appropriately protect this information?
Mr. Flynn. Yes. There are certain aggregations of data that
are classified with regard to the performance of systems. We
protect the others under a rule, the sensitive security
information rule, that gives substantial protection to data on
vulnerabilities and performance of systems.

security profiling

Mr. Wolf. How are you doing in dealing with the problem of
people being stopped and searched, who are American citizens,
who have complained they have been singled out?
Mr. Flynn. We have done----
Mr. Wolf. That came up, as you recall, last year.
Mr. Flynn. There has been considerable progress in that. We
have automated systems, we have provided better equipment at
the screening checkpoints, and the complaints are much fewer
than there were at this time last year.
Mr. Wolf. Can you just supply the number for the record--
complaints this year versus last?
Mr. Flynn. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
[The information follows:]

Neither the Department of Transportation (DOT) nor the FAA
maintains a tracking system of general complaints to the air carriers
or to FAA regarding security measures. However, DOT carefully tracks
complaints it receives of possible discriminatory actions that may have
occurred under the guise of security measures. DOT received 78
complaints in the last six months of 1997, and only two complaints so
far in 1998. The decline in complaints may be the result of the
November 1997 implementation of alternatives to manual search
procedures. The implementation of Computer Assisted Passenger Screening
(CAPS) may lead to a further reduction in discrimination complaints.

UNION NEGOTIATIONS ON COMMISSIONING OF NEW SYSTEMS

Mr. Wolf. In a recent audit, the IG found that the FAA allows its
individual facilities to negotiate their own impact and implementation
(I&I) agreements deciding when controllers will allow new technology to
be implemented in their facility, even though there is already a
national agreement in place. At the Chicago and New York en route
centers--two of our busiest facilities--commissioning dates for the new
communications system VSCS were delayed for 5 or 6 months while FAA
negotiated with the local chapter of the union. The agency incurred
with $600,000 to lease the current system while that was going on. Why
does the agency allow these local agreements, in addition to an
agreement with the union nationally?
[The information follows:]
While it is usually in the agency's interest to negotiate
comprehensive agreements at the national level, some unique conditions
exist which are appropriate to address at the local facility level.
Since the majority of en route sites are configured somewhat
differently, the voice switching and control system (VSCS) national
agreement could not possibly address the individual locations as a
group. For example, equipment placements and certain procedures
surrounding the implementation of the VSCS equipment, needed to be
negotiated at the facility level as only the local sites have the
information necessary to bargain on those issues.
In addition, although both parties may bring issues to the
bargaining table, neither is compelled to reach agreement at the
national level. The union may choose to pursue a more acceptable
agreement at the facility level. In such a case, the agency is
prevented from unilaterally implementing changes by the Federal Labor
Management Relations Statute and the party's collective bargaining
agreement.

flight 2000 demonstration program

Mr. Wolf. Flight 2000.
Your budget requests $90 million to initiate a flight 2000
demonstration program. Why was this included in your research
budget rather than your engineering development, test, and
evaluation budget? Does this indicate a focus more on long-term
research than a demonstration of practical applications of new
technology? Earlier today, you were talking about the next
couple years versus the long term.
Ms. Garvey. We think Flight 2000 will give us an
opportunity to really test some of the risks associated with
the communication, navigation, and surveillance. We made the
judgment call that since it is deployment, that we could put it
in the RE&D account. I think that Flight 2000, as we talk even
more with RTCA and understand some of the implications of free
flight phase.
[Additional information follows:]

The FAA has a combined Research, Engineering and Development
(R,E&D) Budget, comprised of roughly 15% long-term research, and the
remainder consisting of near-term engineering and development efforts.
Testing and evaluation is typically funded as a part of each individual
program in the R,E&D account, or in the Facilities and Equipment (F&E)
account.
Flight 2000 is a limited real-world demonstration and validation of
advanced operational capabilities. It is an R,E&D program focused on
integrating technologies, developing procedures, and mitigating risks
prior to a full-scale National Airspace System (NAS) deployment. As
such, Flight 2000 is a key near-term learning effort in applying new
communications, navigation, and surveillance (CNS) technology to the
operational NAS.

Mr. Wolf. RTCA?
Ms. Garvey. It is the industry group. Am I giving that the
right--
Mr. Belger. Standing advisory.
Ms. Garvey. I apologize for not knowing what all the
letters stand for. But as they move forward and as we
understand some of the Free Flight Phase 1 building blocks they
have presented to us, we may refine Flight 2000 a little bit.
We may make some modifications and changes to it, but we really
want to use it as a way to understand what the risks are, how
we might mitigate some of those risks to some of the early
deployments that we have.
Mr. Wolf. The FAA's research budget, as you know, is
authorized by the Science Committee. Last year the Chairman of
the committee wrote us and specifically requested that we not
appropriate any money for this program. Have you succeeded in
gaining the support and approval of the authorization committee
for the Flight 2000 project at this point?
Ms. Garvey. Let me just give you my informal observations.
Dennis, did you testify yesterday?
Mr. DeGaetano. No.
Ms. Garvey. I guess he testifies later this week and he
will have a better handle on that.
In talking about the Modernization Task Force efforts and
some of the work that has come out, I have talked with members
of the committee about fine-tuning Free Flight--or Flight 2000
and whether or not there might be some modifications. They seem
open to that. They understand the need to test some of the
deployments. They understand the need to better come to grips
with the risks. And we will continue those discussions with
them.
[Additional information follows:]

The committee has not yet approved the program. The staff
of the House Authorization Committee has been briefed and
provided full budget information on the Flight 2000 Program.
Members of the Authorization Committee were briefed on the
program at a hearing, March 12, 1998. FAA responded to a broad
range of questions leading up to this hearing. While the
committee was receptive to the discussion that took place on
Flight 2000, no clear support or opposition to the program has
been noted thus far.

Mr. Wolf. Can you give us an idea how much would be for
bending metal or buying and installing electronics versus paper
studies and administration?
Ms. Garvey. I would have to get back to you, Mr. Chairman,
on the breakdown on that.
[The information follows:]

Since the purpose of Flight 2000 is to demonstrate and
validate advanced flight systems technology in a real
operational environment, the vast majority of funding will be
spent installing the equipment necessary to conduct the
demonstration. Roughly 44 percent of the total cost will go to
equipping as many as 2000 aircraft with next generation
avionics for the demonstration. Another 44 percent will be
spent acquiring and installing the necessary ground systems to
support Flight 2000 operations. The Flight 2000 demonstration
is comprised of a cross-section of aircraft operators using
advanced equipment to carry out their normal operations.
Validation of Flight 2000 procedures will essentially be a by-
product of these operations, and less than 10 percent of FAA
funds for Flight 2000 will go to administrate the
demonstration. Data collected will be analyzed, and the results
reported to support future NAS modernization decisions. Other
than these reports, no paper studies are envisioned as Flight
2000 products.

Mr. Wolf. Some have said Flight 2000 is very risky, because
if it fails, it will be a very public failure and undermine
support for many key technologies needed to modernize the NAS.
If we can't successfully integrate the technologies in a
demonstration project, there is less confidence in nationwide
implementation. How are you working to ensure Flight 2000
doesn't become gold-plated and is designed in a manner that can
be successful?
Ms. Garvey. The building block approach we are taking on
getting out the early deployment on the automation tools is one
way to get some tools in place pretty quickly, that provides
some real benefits. I think in defining Flight 2000, we are
using it to test the communication, navigation and surveillance
aspects of modernization and have it tightly defined, working
closely with Mitre, working closely with the industry.
Mr. Wolf. What about the controllers? Will they be
involved?
Ms. Garvey. They are with us every step of the way, and a
key part of it.
[Additional information follows:]

Controller expertise has been involved in developing the
concept for Flight 2000 from the beginning. Since Flight 2000
is an operational demonstration, controllers are an integral
part of demonstrating and validating systems, and developing
acceptable procedures.
Mr. Wolf. Last year, we prohibited FAA from starting this
program because many of the facts were not clear. Can you give
us a better idea of the total cost of Flight 2000 for both the
government and industry, and some specifics as to demonstration
sites and how they were chosen?
[The information follows:]
The Flight 2000 Program will be accomplished through
Partnership Agreement(s) with industry partners whose future
company goals are tied to successful accomplishment of Flight
2000 goals and objectives. An avionics integrator will be
utilized for acquiring, certifying, installing, and maintaining
Flight 2000 avionics. To mitigate costs, the FAA is encouraging
teaming arrangements by ground services providers, and avoinics
producers or installers. All parties will share the costs of
accomplishing the common goal of demonstrating operational
Flight 2000 technology and procedures. Total Government costs
for Flight 2000 are estimated to be $388 million over five
years. Since the FAA will be furnishing Flight 2000 avionics,
participating aircraft operator expenses will be revenue lost
while an aircraft is out of service for installation of the
avionics, crew training time, and possibly some minor
maintenance costs during operation.
Hawaii and Alaska have been selected as operational
demonstration sites because they offer a manageable fleet size
and mix of aircraft that can be equipped affordably. At these
locations, Flight 2000 can readily involve all classes of
airspace users, in all phases of flight operations and surface
movement, over a wide range of weather and terrain conditions.
The adjoining oceanic airspace managed by the Oakland Air Route
Traffic Control Center, simultaneously provides a great
opportunity for assessment of enroute and international
procedures supported by Flight 2000 technologies.

weather research

Mr. Wolf. For many years, the committee strongly urged the
FAA to submit a budget request which more effectively addresses
safety hazards of adverse weather. Every year we go through
this--I don't know what you want to call it--where FAA takes
money out of the weather program and puts it into other
research programs, and we cut the programs and put it back into
weather. I almost want to say I know they are going to put this
in and we are going to take it out and put it here, because I
know the committee over the years has put this in. And if it is
not said, I am sure some people think it. This, you know, is a
problem.
This year you are proposing a big cut in weather research,
almost 20 percent. However, you have plenty of money to
increase the FAA's laboratory facilities, assistance planning
money, and you have the new $90 million we talked about for
Flight 2000.
Why does the FAA give weather such a low priority? With
turbulence, we saw the flight coming out of Hawaii 2 or 3
months ago.
Ms. Garvey. Let me start, and then have Monte step in as
well, who has more of a history here. I know the issue is one
that has been raised with me, particularly by members of the GA
community, who like to see us put more money into it. I think
trying to balance out budget priorities sometimes makes it more
difficult.
I think some of the information we are getting out of
collaborative decision-making, dealing with some of the weather
information that I know--for example, Northwest has a very good
program on turbulence and we are usingcollaborative decision-
making and that process to share information among the airlines. But,
Monte, do you want to talk on that a little bit more?
Mr. Belger. Briefly. Weather is one of our priorities. It
is a major cause of accidents and it is something we are trying
to focus on. We created within the last 2 years a Weather
Requirements Office so we can centralize and focus on FAA's
requirements. One of our initiatives for this year, coming out
of the office, is to look at everything we can do to provide
better weather information to the pilot, particularly in
general aviation environments. That is where our focus is.
Mr. Wolf. Is there a cut this year, though, on weather
research?
Mr. Belger. I will have to ask Dennis or check for the
record to see why, if we did cut it--I mean, what I just said
the priorities are reflected in the budget.

BUDGET CUTS IN WEATHER RESEARCH

Mr. Wolf. Is there a cut this year, though, on weather
research?
[The information follows:]
Our request for funding is $3 million less than the enacted
funding level of 1998. This reduction is equal to the amount
dedicated in 1998 to a feasibility study of a particular
technology called SOCRATES. While the benefits of this
technology in detecting clear air turbulence and wind shear
would be very valuable, there is uncertainty in whether the
capability is possible and if possible how much funding and
time would be required to get to a prototype or production
system.

regulations on mandatory seat belt use

Mr. Wolf. If you can do that and elaborate, because I think
the funding is down.
Do you plan on doing anything with regard to any
regulations on mandatory seat belt use at all times? I know the
pilot comes on and says when you are walking around the cabin,
fine; but when you sit down, use the seatbelt. But a lot of
people aren't in their seat belts. Do you plan on doing
anything?
Ms. Garvey. I think you will see this in more detail when
we talk about the safety agenda. But there are three elements
of the safety agenda: a commercial side; a general aviation
side; and something we are calling cabin safety, and that
includes a number of activities that may or may not lead to
regulations. It is in part, as you suggested earlier, using the
bully pulpit. We are working very closely with the Pilots'
Association, and with the flight attendants.
Turbulence and seat belt uses are one of the issues. Right
now we are taking the approach that rather than doing it by
regulation, let's figure out a way with industry, through the
bully pulpit, we can make this even more an issue in the
public's mind.
Mr. Wolf. Wouldn't the industry almost like you to say that
you should stay in your seat belts?
Ms. Garvey. You mean through regulation?
Mr. Wolf. Yes, I guess so.
Ms. Garvey. At this point, I think they are very willing to
work with us. We had a very successful public service campaign
a couple years ago on turbulence and it was actually an award-
winning campaign and received a National award. We are looking
at that again and seeing if we can update it and bring it back
into the forefront, again, working with industry in ways we can
deliver that message more effectively. We had a safety
conference a couple weeks ago in Richmond. We had a number of
professionals and people from the community there, and that was
one of the issues that we talked about.

fatalities from air turbulence

Mr. Wolf. How many deaths have there been from air
turbulence over the last several years?
Ms. Garvey. We can get you the number for the record, but I
can tell you it is a number that can absolutely be avoided.
[The information follows:]

A review of all accidents since 1978 shows 3 fatalities
associated with turbulence: 1987 (Skyworld); 1990 (Eastern
Airlines); and 1997 (United Airlines). In the first two cases,
the injured passengers were moving about the aircraft despite
aural warnings to be seated due to turbulence. The most recent
case is still being investigated.

Mr. Wolf. Right, it can.
Ms. Garvey. What I found striking is wearing the seat belt
made the difference.
Mr. Wolf. There was one in the Hawaii flight.
Ms. Garvey. That is right; there was one there.

injuries from air turbulence

Mr. Wolf. Can you tell us the number of injuries?
Ms. Garvey. We will get that for the record. Obviously the
injuries would be more than the fatalities.
[The information follows:]

During the period from 1993 through 1997, Part 121
turbulence accidents resulted in 1 fatality, 58 serious
injuries and 183 minor injuries.

mandatory seat belt use

Mr. Wolf. Would most be prevented by continuing to sit in
your seat with your seat belts buckled?
Ms. Garvey. It is one of the few times you can say, almost
absolutely, those are injuries that would be prevented with the
use of the seat belt, and that is pretty compelling.
Mr. Wolf. It just would seem to me, and I don't know, I
haven't talked to the industry about it, that they would
welcome--I know no industry welcomes regulations, but I think
most agree and I think this committee did a good thing when it
supported Mr. Durbin several years ago in stopping smoking on
airplanes.
I come from Virginia, which is a tobacco state, and I was
very glad to cast my vote for it. I would think the same thing
would hold true here, that by mandating that--because many
people don't know, particularly people who may not fly as often
as others, particularly young people, perhaps going on a class
trip the first time to Washington or something like that--if it
were a mandatory requirement, that unless you are walking
around the cabin to use the restroom or whatever, that you
should stay in your seat belt.
If you could just have your people look and see, if that
had been in effect for the decade of the nineties, how many
lives would have been saved and how many injuries would have
been prevented.
Ms. Garvey. We will provide that for the record.
[The information follows:]

Based on a FAA review of turbulence related injuries, all but 2 of
150 persons seriously injured in turbulence accidents from 1980 through
March 1997 were moving about the aircraft or seated but not secured. A
significant number of the 150 serious injuries would have been avoided
if the individuals had been properly secured by their seat belts.
Evidence points to the fact that the majority of injuries occur
during turbulence when the seat belt sign is illuminated. Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR)
contain requirements regarding seat belt usage. Specifically: FAR, Part
121, Section 317(d) mandates there be a placard visible to passengers
that reads ``Fasten Seat Belt While Seated'', Section 317(f) requires
passengers to be seated with their seat belts fastened when the seat
belt sign is illuminated, and Section 571(a)(2) requires, after each
takeoff and immediately before or after turning off the seat belt sign
that an announcement be made stating that passengers should keep their
seat belts fastened while seated.
In June of 1980, FAA withdrew rulemaking which would have required
passengers to keep their seat belts fastened at all times while seated
and allowing them to leave their seats only for physiological needs or
when authorized by the crewmember. The majority of the commenters
strongly opposed what they considered unnecessary regulatory
restrictions on passengers.
Currently, as part of the Partners in Cabin Safety, the FAA has
formed a government/industry team to address these issues. The team
proposes to develop additional information for passengers to emphasize
the importance of proper seat belt usage and their responsibility.

Mr. Wolf. Are there any flying carriers that require that?
Ms. Garvey. I don't believe it is regulated, but we will
provide the numbers for the record.

mitre

Mr. Wolf. Your budget request for Mitre's Center for
Advanced Aviation Systems Development, considering both F&E and
R&D funds, would be reduced by 1 percent, $544,000 in 1999.
Given the extra work they have been doing for you over the past
several months, should you be cutting them, or should you at
least be giving them enough to cover their increases based on
the rate of inflation?
Ms. Garvey. Again, we try and work within the budget
constraints and arrived at that number. We have rearranged some
priorities in discussing it with Mitre. Your point about how
helpful they are is well taken. It is certainly a group we work
very closely with.
Mr. Wolf. You mentioned them several times today.
Ms. Garvey. I have, yes.

denver international airport

Mr. Wolf. And somehow I think to be reducing them now, it
seems a little bit out of order.
Denver. As you know, the Committee has maintained a
prohibition on construction of a sixth runway at Denver
International Airport. What are your views on the progress they
are making with regard to the noise problem out there at
Denver? If you recall, Senator Allard and Congressman Hefley
have been concerned. Last year we put some language in,
allowing them to move ahead with regard to the noise studies.
What progress have they made?
Ms. Garvey. I understand, I think, last September I spoke
with the Congressional delegation about this. At that point
there was still a number of issues. They asked for more
involvement from the FAA in the regional office to work with
some of the neighbors on the noise issues. We were happy to
provide that. I suspect it is still a difficult issue. Noise
continues to be one of the issues we wrestle within communities
and neighborhoods.
Mr. Wolf. Do you know when the report will be ready?
Ms. Garvey. We will have to provide you that for the
record. I am not sure exactly when it will be completed.
Mr. Wolf. Well, if you could try to do that, just to get
some sense of it.
[The information follows:]

The Denver International Denver Study Coordination Group,
Inc. released ``A Study of the Noise Impact of Aircraft
Operations in the Denver, Colorado Area'' the week of March 16.
The study was sponsored by local communities surrounding Denver
International Airport and was to determine whether the FAA is
maximizing its flexibility to minimize current noise impact and
impacts resulting from construction of a sixth runway.

revenue diversion

Mr. Wolf. Has Denver resolved the issues of revenue
diversion which came up a couple of years ago?
Ms. Garvey. The revenue diversion issues have all been
resolved. In fact, we have a report from the IG that I must say
I have not reviewed in detail but I have certainly talked with
the IG about it He feels all the outstanding issues on revenue
diversion have been resolved.
Mr. Wolf. At all of the airports?
Ms. Garvey. Yes, Mr. Chairman, including Denver and LAX.
That one was resolved, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wolf. How was that resolved?
Ms. Garvey. It is before my time, but I believe they paid
back a significant amount of money to the airport and they were
able to resolve it that way.
Mr. Wolf. So there are no outstanding issues?
Ms. Garvey. There are no outstanding ones to date and it is
something, by the way, we are monitoring very carefully.

northwest arkansas airport

Mr. Wolf. On the AIP formula, are you familiar with the
airport in Arkansas that apparently has been receiving funding
from the FAA that apparently is not well thought of by certain
people; can you tell me?
Ms. Garvey. I am not familiar with that issue.
Mr. Wolf. Northwest Arkansas.
Ms. Garvey. I can tell you I do remember it being discussed
in the department when I was at the Federal Highway
Administration, but I must confess I didn't pay as much
attention to it, but I will look into how much money has gone
into it.
Mr. Wolf. If you can.
Ms. Garvey. Thank you.
[The information follows:]

The airport in question is the Northwest Arkansas Regional Airport,
located near Fayetteville. It is currently under construction. Airport
Improvement Program funds totaling $40.0 million have been granted to
this airport to date. The grants began with a master plan study in
1991. A letter of intent was approved in 1997. The scheduled payments
through 2002 total $29.5 million, bringing the total AIP to $69.5
million.
The construction is on schedule and under budget, and the new
airport is scheduled for opening in late 1998. It will provide this
growing area with the capability of accommodating full instrument
operations and commercial jet passenger service, which cannot be
accommodated at other airports servicing the region. On March 11,
American Eagle announced that it would begin servicing Northwest
Arkansas Regional Airport when the new airport opens. American Eagle
has filed with the Department of Transportation for slots to operate
three daily roundtrips between Chicago O'Hare and Northwest Arkansas
using new Embraer regional jets.
The opening will be the culmination of a dedicated community effort
and bipartisan congressional support which began in the early 1980s
when the limitations of other airports for expansion to meet the long
term needs of the area became apparent. A countywide vote in the early
1990s overwhelmingly endorsed the new airport concept.

aip funding for noise

Mr. Wolf. At the request last year of the Senate, we agreed
to a provision in conference which capped formula funding for
the noise and military airport programs, and in fact switched
those funds to provide capacity, safety and security
enhancements. The 1996 reauthorization act changed the AIP
formula in a way which provides huge increases for the noise
program at the expense of safety and capacity. I understand
your support for growth in these programs, as certainly I do,
and I think everybody else on the committee does, but we are
talking about a relative balance. Even with a cap, the noise
program increased almost 40 percent in fiscal year 1998. Your
budget proposes we drop the cap in 1999. Why?
Ms. Garvey. I know we are looking at the issue as we are
developing a reauthorization proposal and whether or not the
cap should exist. That is going to be part of what we will be
putting forward with the AIP proposal. I am not exactly sure
what is in the budget for next year. I believe it is a
reflection of what we know to be the noise request or balancing
it out again with the noise request for next year. I believe it
keeps up with most of the requests that we have, but let me get
back to you.
[The information follows:]

The Administration's budget proposal includes $1.7 billion for
grants under the AIP, not less than $200 million of which would be
available for noise mitigation and planning. There is no reference to a
cap on funding for any area within the AIP, nor to any mechanisms that
would affect the distribution of AIP funds. The Administration's AIP
reauthorization proposal will address the issues of balance among all
areas of the grant program, taking into account the first priority of
ensuring adequate funds for airport safety and security requirements
and, second, the needs of smaller airports, noise mitigation and
capacity enhancement.
Mr. Wolf. Given the administration's priority on safety
improvements at airports, and security equipment like explosive
detection systems--all of which would be impacted by lifting the cap--
wouldn't it make more sense instead to provide balanced increases
across each of these areas?
[The information follows:]
The Administration's budget proposal includes $1.7 billion for
grants under the AIP, not less than $200 million of which would be
available for noise mitigation and planning. There is no reference to a
cap on funding for any area within the AIP, nor to any mechanisms that
would affect the distribution of AIP funds. The Administration's AIP
reauthorization proposal will address the issues of balance among all
areas of the grant program, taking into account the first priority of
ensuring adequate funds for airport safety and security requirements
and, second, the needs of smaller airports, noise mitigation and
capacity enhancement.

REAUTHORIZATION OF AIP

Mr. Wolf. The AIP program is up for reauthorization this year. When
do you intend to submit the reauthorization proposal, and can you give
us a preview of any new initiatives?
[The information follows:]
Consistent with the President's commitment to strengthen investment
in our nation's transportation infrastructure, the FAA will seek
authorization of $1.7 billion annually. Other financing options, such
as a consensual increase to passenger facility charges, are under
review in an effort to provide airports more ways to increase capital
investment.

ntsb ``most wanted'' list

Mr. Wolf. A couple of last questions. On the most wanted
list, how many FAA concerns are on there?
Ms. Garvey. We are doing very well. We had a good meeting
with Jim Hall in the NTSB about a month ago. We identified a
couple of areas where we wanted to go back and work on it
together. We have a final report that is due in May. The latest
update from staff about a month ago is we were making some very
good progress, which I believe was consistent with what Mr.
Hall was hearing from his staff as well. We have the final
report in May, and I expect Chairman Hall and I will meet
before the report becomes finalized, just to make sure we are
all in the same place. There were really just a couple issues
where there was some professional disagreement. People were
going back to look at it again and work at those issues again.

airline medical kits

Mr. Wolf. There was a ``Dear Colleague'' letter, and the
issue I think is in the authorizing committee, with regard to
the cardiac device used to revive victims on airliners, and I
think Mr. Duncan has a piece of legislation. What is the FAA's
position on this issue of requiring that this equipment be
carried on the airlines?
Ms. Garvey. I know Mr. Duncan is working on legislation. I
met with our chief physician about 2 weeks ago, and he has done
a lot of work and analysis about what should be in medical
kits. It seemed fairly straightforward to me. He raised a
number of issues about what is appropriate in the medical kits.
They are very close to coming back to the Management Board and
to myself with a recommendation of a rulemaking or action we
could take on what should be included in the medical kits.
In the meantime, I think it is very good news that there
are at least three airlines that have voluntarily stepped
forward with the defibrillators. The issue for us is what
should be in the kit, what should be included? As usual and as
often happens, there are legal issues that need to be resolved.
He said he thought we were very close to resolving them.
Mr. Wolf. Who is he working with? Is he working with the
Medical Association?
Ms. Garvey. There is an advisory group he works with and a
number of people in the medical profession that have been very
instrumental in helping with the analysis and offering some
very sound medical judgments and opinions.
Mr. Wolf. So you are basically pretty supportive of doing
this?
Ms. Garvey. I am, Mr. Chairman.

medical personnel on flights

Mr. Wolf. Do they do an inventory at the beginning of a
boarding where they notify the airline whether or not you are a
doctor or not, where when an airline is flying it knows there
are several doctors on board, one on flight 9A, seat 13B or
something; is there any mechanism? Obviously it would have to
be on a voluntary basis. Some doctors may not want to do it.
Ms. Garvey. I think that is a good suggestion. I think it
is only evident if it is in the manifest, if somebody indicates
it by the title.
Mr. Wolf. But that could be a Doctor of Philosophy.
Would there be a mechanism whereby it could be notified at
a time, or somehow whereby the airlines would ask, one, are
there any medical doctors on board; are you a medical doctor;
and, if so, would you agree to treat a patient if an emergency
developed? Because there has been a case where they would say,
is there a doctor around, and no one knows. And in a large
aircraft, you may be sitting up in business class and the
activity is taking place back in coach, or you may be sitting
in coach when the activity is taking place in business class.
So has there been any requirement to ask the airlines to
inventory the passengers?
Ms. Garvey. It is certainly not something that has come to
my attention, but I think that is a good suggestion and we
certainly have very constant communications with ATA, with
Carol Hallet and the CEOs that are part of that, and that will
be something we will raise with Ms. Hallet.

liability for physicians onboard

Mr. Wolf. What is the liability of a doctor on an aircraft,
and would there be any need for a Good Samaritan law to be
passed, exempting a doctor from suit?
Ms. Garvey. Let me find the answer to that. I don't know,
and that is something I would want to ask the lawyers. But,
again, in talking with a physician a couple weeks ago, I know
the liability issues were at the forefront and issues I know
the lawyers were working on.
[Additional information follows:]

Generally speaking, tort liability is determined in accordance with
state law. Even when the government is sued, its liability is
determined in accordance with the law of the state where the alleged
negligence occurred. In the case of a physician coming to the aid of an
airline passenger in distress, the question of what state law applies
is not necessarily easy to answer. The easy case is where the event
occurs while the aircraft is on the ground; but even there the result
is not certain. Moreover, if the aircraft is in flight there is a range
of possibilities as to what state law would apply. It could be the law
of 1) the state where the flight originated, 2) the destination state,
3) the state where the airline is incorporated, 4) the home state of
the injured passenger, or 5) the state (airspace) where the alleged
negligence took place. The actual law to be applied would also depend
on the state where the plaintiff chose to file suit as, in the end, it
is a question of that state's conflicts of laws application.
In order to ensure that a physician is immune from liability for
coming to the aid of a passenger in distress, and avoid the
uncertainties of state law, it will be necessary to pass Federal
legislation that preempts any state law that would otherwise apply.
FAA does not take a position on whether such legislation is
necessary, but notes this is an area in which many states have laws
providing such protection. Further, such legislation is pending in
Congress. H.R. 2843, the Aviation Medical Assistance Act of 1997, would
hold ``medically qualified individuals'' harmless from liability for
their acts or omissions in providing or attempting to provide
assistance in the case of an inflight medical emergency in the absence
of gross negligence or willful misconduct. The term ``medically
qualified individual'' includes nurses, physician assistants,
paramedics, and emergency medical technicals, as well as doctors.

diversity program

Mr. Wolf. Okay. I think the last question is one I have
spoken to you about. I received a letter from a gentleman who
is not a constituent of mine, but he said, ``Dear Congressman,
I am writing to you as a member of the Federal Aviation
Administration family.'' He works at the FAA. He says, ``I feel
compelled to defend my faith in what I believe is an ongoing
concerted effort within the FAA to minimize and indeed
ostracize Christian men and women.'' He went on to talk about
this magazine, ``Managing Diversity.'' He said some of the
diversity materials include magazines or newsletters to which
the FAA subscribes for half of its employees. One of those
publications is the monthly newsletter, ``Managing Diversity.''
``My office, System Architecture and Investment Analysis
receives 200 of ``Managing Diversity'' each month at a cost of
approximately $1,951 annually. Over time, I noticed what I
considered a subtle anti-Christian bias in the newsletter. Any
doubt was quickly removed in the October of 1996 issue of
`Managing Diversity' in the article `What are the Values of
White People,' '' and he goes on to explain this article. He
said that employee opinions on what are the values of white
people varies.
``I am told by the Diversity Council that some people liked
the article and support the `Managing Diversity' newsletter.
Yet when my branch conducted a poll of its employees as to
whether `Managing Diversity' ought to be continued or
cancelled, we found 70 percent wanted the newsletter cancelled,
15 percent wanted it to stay, and 15 percent did not care one
way or another. I believe once any publication breaches FAA
employee trust, it is no longer a valid tool to promote
understanding and healing and it ought to go.''
Then he submits a series of the articles, along with an
article which was in one of the local newspapers here. I share
the concern. I think the greatness of our country is we are
diverse. As I told you, I come from an immigrant family that
came from another country. And in the old days when I was a
staffer up here on Capitol Hill, they used to vote by voice and
it took 45 minutes, then it took 45 minutes. Now we vote by
cards, but once or twice a session, a voting machine will break
down and they will call the roll and it is a nice sound to hear
names from all over the world, they come together, and the
reason is we have taken the best from every other country and
blended it together, so diversity is really who we are. But
when we have a newsletter that is creating that sort of
feeling, then I think it ought to be reevaluated.
He also sent me a magazine called ``Next Step: Coping With
Change,'' about diversity that looks like it is a very good
magazine, and something that would bring people together in
reconciliation and healing and letting people know the
differences and how we are diverse and that is our strength,
rather than something that inflames people and creates a
problem.
He then showed me this brochure, which I won't read all of
it, put out by the Department of Transportation, FAA. He said
diversity is an extremely broad term people use to refer to us.
I really think this almost begins to smack of Gregory May, and
we have gone through this before and this committee held
hearings on it, and hopefully that has been eradicated from the
FAA.
I really think you ought to look at this. I will share it
with you. The gentleman was willing to sign his name. I offered
that I would do it, you know, without him signing his name. He
said he was perfectly prepared. I think it is good to emphasize
and to deal with diversity, but in a way that brings people
together and not in a way that creates problems. And if the
survey was accurate, that really creates a problem. So I would
urge you, and if you want to make a comment, I would love to
hear your comment about it.
Ms. Garvey. First of all, I think your point is one that I
would share, and I think I speak for all of the management
team. The issue of diversity is important in encouraging people
to work together. It is a sense of honoring both their heritage
and the uniqueness of each of us. And so we certainly want to
foster that, and I think what I find, particularly, I guess
disturbing, would be the statistics that you quoted--the quote
there that there may be 70 percent of employees that feel they
are not being well served by the magazine. It is something we
obviously have to take a hard look at.
I like the fact another alternative was suggested, because
I think the idea of talking about diversity in the workplace
can be positive and should be productive, so I would appreciate
taking a look at it. I actually did talk with some of my staff
folks last night when I got home and I called them at home and
asked them to begin to take a look at the issue. So, thank you.
Mr. Wolf. I would appreciate it, and then I will just give
you the whole packet. I don't see any need of going into it
further. But if you could, to have something that says what are
the values of white people and some of the inflammatory things.
I will give you this magazine. You might want to just take a
look at it.
Ms. Garvey. Thank you.
[Additional information follows:]

The FAA subscribes to many publications in the course of
its operations, both for technical and general information
germane to its mission.

Closing Remarks

Mr. Wolf. Anyway, I think that covers all of the questions.
There will be others to submit for the record, and if any other
Members have any. I want to thank you for your openness and for
your willingness not to be so sensitive if there is criticism.
Just because there is criticism doesn't mean it is necessarily
right either. The Congress may think something is one way and
you may have the good judgment to think it is the opposite, and
I respect that, and I think there will be those cases.
I personally will do everything I can to work with you to
see that we give you the necessary resources to do what you
want to do, and I respect the fact you have taken this job.
This is a tough, tough job, and you will see people run for
cover when the mud gets thick, and that is why I think it is
important you bring in good people around you, that you have
confidence in, that you trust, because there will be difficult
times. And it is very easy for the Congress to sit up here and
pick on that one point and pick on that one point, but you have
the responsibility.
So I want you to know we will do everything we can to work
with you, to give you the resources, to give you the
flexibility whereby if you see something, you don't have to
wait and go through this long drawn-out process, to move
quickly, and just stand ready to work with you in every way
possible. You have a lot of good people in the FAA, a lot of
very capable people, so any way we can help, let us know.
The hearing is adjourned.
Ms. Garvey. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[Pages 352 - 806--The official Committee record contains additional material here.]

W I T N E S S E S

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Belger, Monte.................................................... 231
Chipkevich, Robert............................................... 1
Degaetano, Dennis................................................ 231
Ellingstad, V. S................................................. 1
Flynn, C. ``Irish'' L............................................ 231
Gardner, Guy..................................................... 231
Garvey, J. F..................................................... 231
Goelz, Peter..................................................... 1
Hall, Jim........................................................ 1
Keller, C. E..................................................... 1
Lauby, Robert.................................................... 1
Loeb, B. S....................................................... 1
Murtagh, Marjorie................................................ 1
Osterman, Joseph................................................. 1
Sweedler, B. M................................................... 1

I N D E X

----------

Federal Aviation Administration

Page
Acquisition:
Acquisition Process.......................................... 705
Acquisition Reform Savings................................... 326
Acquisition Workforce End of Year Employment................. 595
Addressing the Fiscal Year 1998 Shortfall........................ 361
Administrative Services Franchise Fund........................... 594
Advisory Committees.............................................. 399
Aeronautical Charting..........................................426, 524
Aeronautical Data Link........................................... 631
Aging Aircraft Program........................................... 553
Air Traffic Controller Work Force Hiring Summary................. 503
Air Traffic Services:
Air Traffic Staffing......................................... 482
Air Traffic Staffyear Costs.................................. 280
Commissioned Facilities....................................532, 536
Contract Maintenance..................................304, 306, 530
Cost Benefit Analysis--AF Contracting Out.................... 306
Currency for CWF Supervisors................................. 290
Operational Errors.........................................507, 513
Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS)....................... 547
Airline Medical Kits............................................. 348
Airline Pricing.................................................. 248
Airline Safety Records........................................... 272
Airport Improvement Program (AIP)................................ 800
Funding for Noise............................................ 346
Funding for Small-Mid-Sized Airports......................... 269
Program Data................................................. 757
Reauthorization.............................................. 347
Airport Movement Area Safety System (AMASS)...................... 670
Airport Movement Area Safety Systems by Site..................... 671
Airport Surface Detection Systems..............................633, 779
Allowance for Off-Position Time.................................. 486
Annual Leave..................................................... 474
ARA Performance Based Organization............................... 705
Asbestos Contamination at Leesburg Center........................ 290
ATC Staffing Standards Cooper and Lybrand Report................. 286
Automated Surface Observing System............................... 799
Aviation Regulation and Certification:
Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS)................... 547
Airline Medical Kits......................................... 348
Aviation Safety Inspectors................................... 315
Oversight of Repair Stations................................. 313
Staffing..................................................... 316
Aviation Weather Research..................342, 707, 709, 712, 714, 718
Aviation Workload Budget Impact.................................. 267
Aviation:
Accident and Fatality Rates.................................. 400
Aviation Weather Research..............342, 707, 709, 712, 714, 718
Growth Compared to Budget Growth............................. 394
Workload Budget Impact....................................... 267
Awards:
SES Bonus Awards............................................. 382
Time Off Awards............................................284, 485
Baggage Screener Turnover Rate................................... 337
Benefits......................................................... 282
Annual Leave................................................. 474
Enrollees in FAA's Transit Benefit Program................... 453
Sick Leave................................................... 475
Transit Subsidy Benefit Program.............................. 453
Biographical Summary of Jane F. Garvey........................... 243
Budget Requests to OST and OMB................................... 458
Business Information and Consultation............................ 575
Center for Management Development................................ 591
Central Florida Metroplex........................................ 677
Certification.................................................... 552
Civil Aviation Security.......................................... 565
Aviation Security Measures................................... 797
Baggage Screener Turnover Rate............................... 337
Fiscal Year 1997 Appropriation............................... 569
Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA)................ 555
Explosive Detection System.......................253, 254, 332, 333
Foreign Security Screeners................................... 338
Screener Proficiency Evaluation and Reporting System (SPEARS) 567
Security Data................................................ 338
Security Enhancement......................................... 234
Security Profiling........................................... 339
Civil Service Retirement Pension, Average........................ 520
Closing Remarks.................................................. 351
Commercial Space Transportation................................596, 609
Commissioned Facilities........................................532, 536
Comparing FAA's Growth With Industry Growth...................... 267
Compensation System, Budget Neutral.............................. 281
Congressional Review Act (CRA)................................... 730
Consortium for Training.......................................... 304
Contract Maintenance......................................304, 306, 530
Contract Towers.................................................. 505
Controllers:
Age Limits................................................... 294
Controller Work Force Vs. Contractor Staffing at FAA Contract
Tower (EOY)................................................ 498
Controller Work Force (CWF) Workplace Simulator.............. 288
Controller Work Force Labor/Management Relationship.......... 297
Currency for CWF Supervisors................................. 290
Details...................................................... 478
Productivity...............................................285, 488
Retirements.................................................. 286
Staffing Requirements........................................ 247
Staffing Standard............................................ 286
Staffing--Coopers' Findings.................................. 255
Training..................................................... 485
Work Force--Employment Data...........................494, 495, 496
Coopers and Lybrand (C&L):
ATC Staffing Standards....................................... 286
Lack of Financial Management................................. 255
Productivity Savings......................................... 244
Coping with a Potential Loss of $93 Million in Fiscal Year 1999.. 360
Cost Accounting System..........................257, 258, 259, 582, 746
Cost Benefit Analysis--AF Contracting Out........................ 306
Cost of Official Time for Unions................................. 283
Cost Savings..................................................... 246
Cost-Benefit Determinations Prohibited by Law.................... 736
Credit Hours..................................................... 284
Denver International Airport..................................... 345
Depot Space Funding Requests..................................... 528
Deregulatory and Reinventing Government Rules.................... 737
Display System Replacement....................................... 661
Diversity Program................................................ 349
Economic Impact Analyses Availability of.......................736, 737
Employee Separations............................................. 363
Enforcement Actions.............................................. 307
English Language Proficiency..................................... 275
Equipping U.S. Aircraft with LAAS and WAAS Avionics............686, 786
Executive Staff.................................................. 577
Explosive Detection System.....................................332, 334
Certification................................................ 254
Development.................................................. 253
Reprogramming Request........................................ 254
FAA 3083 Replacement Effort....................................744, 745
FAA Environmental Staffing Shortages............................. 790
FAA Opening Remarks.............................................. 233
FAA Personnel Stationed Overseas................................. 417
Facilities and Equipment:
Obligations.................................................. 630
Outlays...................................................... 628
Priorities and Modernization Off-Site........................ 328
Reprogramming................................................ 745
Request...................................................... 327
Termination of Cost Growth................................... 626
Family Friendly Policies......................................... 298
Job Sharing.................................................. 299
Leave Sharing................................................ 299
Telecommuting................................................ 299
Fatalities from Air Turbulence................................... 343
Field Maintenance:
Employment................................................... 537
Other Object Costs........................................... 536
Technician Staffing.......................................... 305
Travel....................................................... 537
Field Office Consolidation....................................... 246
Financial Assessments by OST..................................... 454
Financial Obligation if Limitation Lifted........................ 481
Flight 2000...................................................... 724
Demonstration Program........................................ 339
Demonstration Sites and Total Cost........................... 729
FY 1999 Budget............................................... 725
Flight Inspection Aircraft....................................... 697
Flight Inspection Requirements................................... 699
Flight Standards Staffing Standards.............................. 551
Foreign Security Screeners....................................... 338
Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) Costs................................. 281
FY 1999 President's Budget Request............................... 236
General Aviation Accident Rate Chart............................. 415
General Aviation Instrument Operations........................... 416
Glenn Reffner, Reassignment of................................... 291
Government Use of Aviation System................................ 271
Ground-Based Navaids, Decision to Shut Down...................... 782
Hartsfield International Airport...............................328, 329
Hayes, Kansas, Instrument Landing System......................... 781
Health Benefits................................................361, 362
Hiring Plan, Six Year............................................ 546
Host Computer:
Host Computer Replacement.................................... 251
Host Computer System......................................... 330
Host Replacement and/or Repair.............................331, 669
Human Factors Research........................................... 723
Human Intervention and Motivation Study.......................... 423
Human Resources.................................................. 585
ILS Equipment.................................................... 781
Injuries from Air Turbulence..................................... 344
Inspection Regulations........................................... 315
Inspector General Audit of Contract Tower Program..............262, 263
Inspector Training............................................... 316
Janitorial and Guard Services.................................... 467
Job Sharing...................................................... 299
Korean Airlines Accident in Guam...............................685, 785
Lack of Financial Management--Coopers............................ 255
Leased Telecommunications......................................543, 544
Leasing Versus Buying Satellites................................. 692
Leave Sharing.................................................... 299
Liability for Physicians......................................... 349
Local Area Augmentation System................................... 546
Logistics Center--Operations and Maintenance Costs............... 526
LORAN-C.......................................................... 695
Low Flying Aircraft Over Whittier................................ 796
Maintenance:
Aircraft..................................................... 538
Issues....................................................... 304
Overtime..................................................... 538
Training..................................................... 529
Management Efficiencies.......................................... 584
MARC Program in Minnesota........................................ 304
Medical Personnel on Flights..................................... 348
Minneapolis/St. Paul International Airport.....................789, 790
MITRE..........................................................345, 657
NAS Infrastructure Management Systems (NIMS)..................... 701
NATCA:
NATCA and the Media.......................................... 298
Human Factors Resolution Status.............................. 668
Letter to Air Traffic Services on DSR Suitability............ 666
Letter to Inspector General on DSR Suitability............... 662
Representation............................................... 487
National Civil Aviation Review Commission (NCARC).........264, 268, 422
National Reconnaissance Office................................... 691
Near Mid-Air Collisions/Pilot Deviations......................... 326
New Austin Airport............................................... 793
New Hires Under Reform........................................... 262
New York TDWR.................................................... 309
Next Generation Landing System..................678, 685, 687, 783, 787
Non-Pay Inflation Increase....................................... 483
Northwest Arkansas Airport....................................... 346
Notification in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulations........ 739
NTSB ``Most Wanted'' List........................................ 347
NTSB Safety Recommendations on Aircraft Icing.................... 720
Obligation Plan Versus--Fiscal Year 1997......................... 365
Off-Budget Treatment for FAA..................................... 265
Office of Administrator and Deputy Administrator................. 611
Office of Policy, Planning, and International Aviation........... 619
Office of System Safety Hiring Plan.............................. 615
Office of System Safety.......................................... 613
Office of System Staffing Target................................. 614
Omega............................................................ 652
Opening Remarks:
Chairman Wolf................................................ 231
Jane F. Garvey, Federal Aviation Administrator.............233, 237
Mr. Olver.................................................... 250
Operational Errors.............................................507, 513
Operations:
Assessment by OST............................................ 454
Average Civil Service Retirement Pension..................... 520
Final Operating Plan for FY 1997............................. 478
Obligation Plan Versus Actual--Fiscal Year 1997.............. 365
Travel--Operations Funded.................................... 428
Overseas Travel.................................................. 433
Oversight of Repair Stations..................................... 313
Overtime--Air Traffic............................................ 484
Part 121 Departure Accident Rate Chart........................... 414
Passenger Screening Results...................................... 554
PATCO:
Controllers.................................................. 294
Controller Success........................................... 295
Rehires....................................................297, 503
Pay and Benefits...............................................280, 282
Pay Negotiations................................................. 281
Payroll Costs..................................................361, 363
Performance Based Organization (PBO)...........................266, 269
Chief Operating Officer...................................... 270
Performance Plan:
Delay Measures............................................... 617
Safety Measures.............................................. 616
Personnel Reform................................................. 259
Positions by Office, Distribution of............................. 369
Positions:
Business Information and Consultation........................ 575
Office of Administrator and Deputy Administrator............. 611
Office of Policy, Planning, and International Aviation....... 619
Office of System Safety Hiring Plan.......................... 615
Office of System Safety...................................... 613
Office of System Staffing Target............................. 614
Positions and Employment Summary...........................387, 391
Public Affairs............................................... 592
Potomac Metroplex..............................................674, 677
Precision Approach Location System (PALS) Surface Weather
Observation System............................................. 674
Procurement/Small Business....................................... 794
Productivity..................................................... 289
Public Affairs................................................... 592
Realistic Testing................................................ 566
Reauthorization of AIP........................................... 347
Reform Implementation............................................ 260
Regional Coordination............................................ 308
Regional Office Consolidation.................................... 245
Regulations on Mandatory Seat Belt Use........................... 343
Regulatory Policies Critical to Achieving Agency's Strategic
Goals and Objectives........................................... 731
Relocation Contract.............................................. 424
Reprogramming Request for EDS, FY 1998........................... 334
Reprogramming Request, FY 1998 Tower Replacement................. 651
Reprogramming, FY 1998.........................................254, 651
Research and Acquisitions........................................ 595
Research, Engineering and Development Budget Table............... 721
Revenue and Expenditure Linkages................................. 271
Revenue Diversion................................................ 345
Revitalization Pay (AF).......................................... 543
Rulemaking....................................................... 552
Budget Resources for......................................... 732
Decision to Abort............................................ 741
Determination of Rule Necessity.............................. 730
Determining Priorities for Rules............................. 741
Discretionary, Statutory, and Judicial Rules................. 732
Notification in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulation..... 739
Originating from Lawsuits.................................... 735
Procedures to Evaluate Success of............................ 742
Producing New Paperwork Requirements......................... 738
Routine and Administrative................................... 735
Submitted to the Office of Management and Budget............. 740
Runway Incursion.....................................317, 325, 779, 786
MITRE Report................................................. 323
Safety........................................................... 233
Safety Agenda.................................................... 272
Safety Task Force..............................................244, 272
SAIC Report Cost Estimates....................................... 694
Screener Proficiency Evaluation and Reporting System (SPEARS).... 567
Seat Belt Use, Mandatory......................................... 344
Security Baseline Working Group.................................. 569
Security:
Data......................................................... 338
Enhancement.................................................. 234
Profiling.................................................... 339
SES Bonus Awards................................................. 382
SES Positions.................................................... 375
Sick Leave....................................................... 475
Sky Harbor Air Traffic Control Tower............................. 253
Spare Parts--Airline Safety...................................... 274
SPEARS Fiscal Year 1999 Activities............................... 568
Special Pay...................................................... 468
Staff Year Discrepancy........................................... 467
Staffing Standards............................................... 537
STARS......................................310, 312, 653, 792, 802, 804
Accelerated Deployment....................................... 313
Computer-Human Interface Issues.............................. 655
Deployment Sites............................................. 656
Full System Capability....................................... 654
Funding Profile.............................................. 653
National Airport............................................. 313
Reprogramming................................................ 311
State of the Nation's Airports................................... 801
Strategic Goals.................................................. 278
Streamlined Enforcement Test and Evaluation Program (STEP)....... 556
Sunday Premium Pay.............................................427, 481
System Assessment................................................ 784
System Efficiency Upgrade........................................ 234
Systems Management Offices....................................... 539
Tampa ASR-9 Radar................................................ 309
Technical Training............................................... 301
Telecommuting.................................................... 229
Time Off Awards................................................284, 485
Timeframe for Developing Rules in Response to Lawsuits........... 736
Tower Replacements........................................635, 637, 651
Trace Detection Equipment......................................557, 570
Training......................................................... 303
Transit Subsidy Benefit Program.................................. 453
Transportation Fund for America................................251, 743
Travel--Operations............................................... 428
Travel--Operations Funded........................................ 429
Trend in Runway Incursions....................................... 318
Trip to Wichita, Kansas.......................................... 248
Trust Fund....................................................... 358
Cash Outlays from............................................ 353
Status....................................................... 352
Trust Fund Cap............................................... 269
Trust Fund Penalty Clause.................................... 268
Trust Fund Revenues.......................................... 353
Use of for the Office of Commercial Space Transportation..... 426
Turbulence Accidents and Incidents............................... 715
Turbulence Data.................................................. 717
Unions:
Negotiations on Commissioning of New Systems................. 339
Negotiations on Compensation................................. 281
Union Time................................................... 283
Universal Access System.......................................... 568
University-Based Training Programs............................... 589
User Fees:
Proposal..................................................... 251
User Fees.................................................... 360
Kansas Airports.............................................. 249
Rural Airports Program....................................... 301
Versus Aviation Taxes........................................ 244
Cost Accounting System....................................... 258
Court Ruling................................................. 300
Voice Switches................................................... 791
Vulnerability Assessments........................................ 565
Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS)............................. 545
Critical Design Review....................................... 690
Financial and Programmatic Assessment........................ 693
Joint Resources Council...................................... 690
Satellite Leases............................................. 692
Wind Shear Detection...........................................672, 674
Windsor Locks TRACON............................................. 652
Work Load Measures and Industry Trends........................... 397
Workers Compensation:
Costs......................................................518, 520
Distribution................................................. 519
Year 2000 (Y2K)................................................279, 330
Challenge.................................................... 235
Compliance................................................... 246
Compliance Date.............................................. 252
Contingency Plans............................................ 247
Problem...............................................330, 331, 743
Target Date.................................................. 259

National Transportation Safety Board

Administrative Law Judges........................................ 218
Authorized Funding Level......................................... 159
Aviation:
Accident Investigations Completed............................ 80
Air Traffic Control Shift Rotation........................... 100
Airborne Express/Narrows, VA................................. 27
American Airlines/Palm Beach, FL............................. 32
American Corp. Aviation/Houston.............................. 34
Aviation Growth.............................................. 101
Aviation Investigation Costs................................. 79
Aviation Safety Issues....................................... 87
Aviation Review Group........................................85, 86
Boeing 737 Aircraft..........................................74, 75
Chinese Aviation Products.................................... 108
Comair/Monroe, MI............................................ 31
Delta Air Lines/LaGuardia.................................... 26
Delta Air Lines/Pensacola.................................... 25
Emergency Evacuations........................................ 34
FAA Inspection and Surveillance.............................. 102
Federal Express/Newburgh, NY................................. 31
Federal Express/Newark, NJ................................... 32
Fine Air/Miami, FL........................................... 33
Flight Data Recorders........................................81, 83
Foreign Accident Investigations.............................. 34
Foreign Air Carrier Oversight.........................106, 107, 109
Foreign Repair Stations...................................... 107
Hazardous Materials by Air................................... 109
Icing........................................................75, 76
Investigation Process........................................ 103
Jet A Fuel Tests............................................. 92
Language Difficulties........................................ 112
Korean Airlines/Guam......................................... 33
Maintenance.......................................73, 105, 106, 229
Midair Collisions............................................ 186
National Civil Aviation Review Commission.................... 102
NTSB/FAA Relationship........................................ 103
Quincy, II. Runway Collision................................. 26
Repair Stations............................................104, 105
Runway Incursions............................................ 110
Safety Issues................................................ 84
TWA/East Moriches, NY....................29, 88, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94
Turbulence...............................................76, 98, 99
USAir/Pittsburgh............................................. 28
ValuJet/Miami................................................ 24
Weather Research............................................. 113
Windsor Locks Aviation Accident.............................. 24
Corporate Culture................................................ 43
Cost Benefit Analysis............................................ 116
Emergency Fund................................................... 153
Family Affairs/Disaster Assistance Airline Plans........4, 60, 156, 182
Hazardous Materials Transportation............................... 117
Highway:
Administrative License Revocation............................ 69
Air Bags...................................................5, 6, 38
Alabama Highway 78........................................... 225
Child Passager Protection.................................... 226
Cosmopolis, WA Accident...................................... 37
Driver Age................................................... 78
Easton, MD Accident.......................................... 42
Franklin, NC Accident........................................ 41
Grade Crossing Safety........................................ 42
Intrastate Trucking.......................................... 43
Jackson, MO Accident......................................... 40
Normandy, MO Accident........................................ 40
Plymouth Meeting, PA Acc..................................... 37
Slinger, WI Accident......................................... 39
Speed Limit.................................................. 77
Stony Creek, VA Accident..................................... 41
Transit Bus Safety........................................... 83
Vehicle Mismatch............................................. 79
Young Drivers................................................ 79
Local Reimbursements......................................114, 144, 152
Marine:
BRIGHT FIELD Accident........................................ 46
Fishing Vessel Safety........................................ 50
JULIE N Accident............................................. 48
MALLARD/GEERD TIDE Acc....................................... 49
Marine Investigations........................................ 44
PATRIOT Accident............................................. 46
Personal Watercraft Safety................................... 50
ROYAL MAJESTY Accident....................................... 44
Rhode Island Oil Spill....................................... 47
STAR PRINCESS Accident....................................... 45
UNIVERSE EXPLORER Accident................................... 48
VISTAFJORD Accident.......................................... 49
Most Wanted.............................................21, 66, 69, 124
NTSB:
Attrition.................................................... 72
Authorized Funding Level..................................... 159
Budget Request..........................................64, 88, 159
Communications Center.........................................2, 63
Computer Replacements........................................ 181
Conferences and Seminars..................................... 190
Financial Management System.................................. 179
Reports Timeliness........................................... 201
Reorganization............................................... 189
Staffing.................................................7, 71, 131
Supplemental Appropriations................................113, 143
Training..................................................... 193
Travel....................................................... 189
Web Site...................................................2, 3, 62
Nuclear Waste Transportation..................................... 72
Pipeline:
Excavation Damage Prevention................................. 51
Fork Shoals, SC Accident..................................... 53
Gramercy, LA Accident........................................ 52
Indianapolis, IN Accident.................................... 54
Koch Industries Gas Pipeline................................. 221
Lively, TX Accident.......................................... 52
San Juan Gas Explosion....................................... 51
Tiger Pass, LA Accident.....................................53, 186
Railroad:
Accidents...........................................54, 57, 94, 185
Automatic Train Control...................................... 97
Delia, KS Accident........................................... 58
Devine, TX Accident.......................................... 58
Fatalities................................................... 95
FRA Inspections.............................................. 96
Garden City, GA Accident..................................... 59
Kelso, CA Accident........................................... 57
Kingman, AZ Accident......................................... 59
Positive Train Control....................................... 98
Railroad Voice Recorders..................................... 96
Safety Assurance and Compliance Program...................... 95
Secaucus, NJ Accident........................................55, 56
Silver Spring, MD Accident................................... 55
Transit...................................................... 187
Union Pacific Railroad....................................... 59
Recommendations.............................................70, 126
Acceptance Rate.............................................. 70
Aircraft Maintenance Recomm................................106, 229
Most Wanted.........................................21, 66, 69, 124
TWA Flight 800 Recomm........................................ 92
Safety Studies................................................... 210
Strategic Plan................................................... 219
Transportation Fatalities........................................ 184
Transportation Safety Issues..................................... 119
User Fees......................................................115, 178