[House Hearing, 105 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
STATUS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS TO IDENTIFY GULF WAR
SYNDROME
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES
of the
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT
REFORM AND OVERSIGHT
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 24, 1997
__________
Serial No. 105-38
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 2002
________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512-1800
Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
J. DENNIS HASTERT, Illinois TOM LANTOS, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
CHRISTOPHER COX, California PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida GARY A. CONDIT, California
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
STEPHEN HORN, California THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin
JOHN L. MICA, Florida ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia DC
DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
Carolina JIM TURNER, Texas
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
PETE SESSIONS, Texas HAROLD E. FORD, Tennessee
MICHAEL PAPPAS, New Jersey ------
VINCE SNOWBARGER, Kansas BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
BOB BARR, Georgia (Independent)
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
Kevin Binger, Staff Director
Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
Judith McCoy, Chief Clerk
Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Human Resources
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman
VINCE SNOWBARGER, Kansas EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana TOM LANTOS, California
MICHAEL PAPPAS, New Jersey BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont (Ind.)
STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin
Ex Officio
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Lawrence J. Halloran, Staff Director and Counsel
Robert Newman, Professional Staff Member
R. Jared Carpenter, Clerk
Ron Stroman, Minority Professional Staff
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on April 24, 1997................................... 1
Statement of:
Donnelly, Michael, Major, U.S. Air Force, retired; Susan
Sumpter-Loebig, Sergeant, U.S. Army, retired; and Steven
Wood, Sergeant, U.S. Army, retired......................... 33
Rostker, Bernard, Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses,
Department of Defense; Robert Walpole, Special Assistant
for Gulf War Illnesses, Central Intelligence Agency; and
Donald Mancuso, Deputy Inspector General, Department of
Defense.................................................... 95
Tucker, Jonathan B., director, Chemical and Biological
Weapons Nonproliferation Project, Center for
Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of
International Studies; Thomas Tiedt, researcher and
neuroscientist, Longboat Key, FL; and Satu Somani,
professor of pharmocolgy and toxicology, Southern Illinois
University School of Medicine.............................. 261
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Allen, Hon. Thomas H., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Maine, prepared statement of...................... 32
Donnelly, Michael, Major, U.S. Air Force, retired, prepared
statement of............................................... 39
Mancuso, Donald, Deputy Inspector General, Department of
Defense, prepared statement of............................. 233
Rostker, Bernard, Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses,
Department of Defense:
Information concerning research that is now being done by
the DOD or VA.......................................... 250
Prepared statement of.................................... 100
Sanders, Hon. Bernard, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Vermont, prepared statement of.................... 8
Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Connecticut, prepared statement of............ 3
Somani, Satu, professor of pharmocolgy and toxicology,
Southern Illinois University School of Medicine, prepared
statement of............................................... 320
Sumpter-Loebig, Susan, Sergeant, U.S. Army, retired, prepared
statement of............................................... 64
Tiedt, Thomas, researcher and neuroscientist, Longboat Key,
FL, prepared statement of.................................. 301
Tucker, Jonathan B., director, Chemical and Biological
Weapons Nonproliferation Project, Center for
Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of
International Studies, prepared statement of............... 264
Walpole, Robert, Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses,
Central Intelligence Agency:
Information concerning chemical exposure among Iraqis and
Kuwaitis............................................... 248
Prepared statement of.................................... 129
Wood, Steven, Sergeant, U.S. Army, retired, prepared
statement of............................................... 48
STATUS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS TO IDENTIFY GULF WAR
SYNDROME
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 24, 1997
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Human Resources,
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher
Shays (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Shays, Snowbarger, Gilman, Souder,
Sanders, Kucinich, and Allen.
Staff present: Lawrence J. Halloran, staff director and
counsel; Robert Newman, professional staff member; R. Jared
Carpenter, clerk; Ronald Stroman, minority professional staff;
and Ellen Rayner, minority chief clerk.
Mr. Shays. I'd like to welcome our witnesses to this very
important hearing, and our guests, and thank everyone for their
patience.
Accurate diagnosis and effective treatment of Gulf war
veterans' illnesses requires a complete medical history of
illnesses, allergies, exposures, inoculations, and a great deal
more. For too many sick veterans, their medical history remains
incomplete.
Why? Because Gulf war records that might document toxic
exposures remain missing or classified. Because detection
reports that could fix the time and place of probable chemical
releases are lost or incomplete. Because sick call rosters and
shot records that display adverse drug reactions were
destroyed. And because virtually no effort was made to record
who took the anti-nerve agent tablets, the pyridostigmine
bromide [PB].
As a result, sick Gulf war veterans face an uncertain
medical future because they lack critical evidence from their
military past. In the absence of the records needed to
correlate toxic causes with symptomatic effect, veterans are
being misdiagnosed as stress cases and treated with ineffective
therapies. That is simply unacceptable.
Our purpose today is to access the impact of missing
records on Gulf war veterans' health. We ask what evidence is
available to corroborate veterans' recollections of toxic
exposures, and what additional information may yet be
discovered or declassified in the course of on-going Defense
Department, the DOD, and the Central Intelligence Agency, the
CIA, investigations. We also ask that the benefit or any doubt
caused by missing records goes to the veteran who needs the
benefit, as opposed to the military that lost the records and
created the doubt.
While a necessary and constructive step, it is not enough
to extend the presumptive period of service-connected benefits
eligibility for undiagnosed Gulf war veterans, too often the
presumptive diagnosis is stress, the disability compensation
rating low, and the treatment biased in favor of psychiatric
over neurobiologic. That is also unacceptable.
When it comes to matching cause to effect, diagnosis to
treatment, presumptions are no substitute for the facts that
are, or should be, in Gulf war medical, intelligence, and
operations records.
To sick veterans, the missing unit logs, chemical detection
reports, PB labeling information, and classified intelligence
analysis are not just military records of the war 6 years ago.
They are medical records vital to proper health care today.
Every surviving Gulf war record even remotely connected to
veterans' health claims must be found. The survival of many of
our veterans depends on it.
As in our past hearings, we begin with testimony from Gulf
war veterans. Theirs is the best intelligence available on the
causes and effects of the mysterious cluster of maladies
commonly called ``Gulf War Syndrome.'' We are honored by their
past service, their continued bravery, and their presence here
today. And we welcome them.
DOD and CIA witnesses will testify on the status of their
long-overdue efforts to investigate, analyze, declassify and
disclose Gulf war records relevant to the health concerns of
veterans.
Our final panel will discuss what is known about low-level
chemical exposures and PB use that can fill the gaps created by
missing Gulf war records.
We appreciate their being here, both the second and third
panel, as well, and welcome their testimony, too. At this time
I ask the gentleman, Mr. Sanders, if he has any comments he'd
like to make.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.001
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.002
Mr. Sanders. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
congratulate you for your long-standing efforts in trying to
get to the root cause of this problem, your staff members--Bob
Newman and the others--for the outstanding work that they have
done, and the very fine work done by the minority staff. This
has truly been a non-partisan issue. And I commend you for
that.
I must tell you that the whole issue of Gulf war syndrome
has preoccupied a great deal of my time and energy. We have
hired new staff--Don Edwards, a former general, National
Guard--to help us with this issue. We're holding a conference
in Vermont focusing on this issue. Mr. Chairman, let me briefly
go over some of the recent Gulf war syndrome history and tell
you the conclusions that I've reached and the recommendations
that I will be making.
As recent as 1 year ago, in April 1996, Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Health Affairs, Steven Joseph, stated that there
was ``no indication of a unique illness or a Persian Gulf war
syndrome or a single entity that would account for illness in
any large or significant fraction of these people.'' He was
wrong. For years the Defense Department and the CIA denied that
our soldiers were ever exposed to chemical warfare agents. But
there is now wide-spread acknowledgement that thousands of
soldiers were exposed to these agents at Khamisiyah. And we
will hear evidence today of far greater exposure. In other
words, the DOD and the CIA were wrong in what they were saying
for years, and may well be underestimating the problem today.
The President's Advisory Commission, relying heavily on the
Department of Defense and other Government institutions for
help, concluded, tragically in my view, that stress was the
major cause of Gulf war syndrome. Dr. Jonathan Tucker, a
chemical weapons researcher, was fired from his job with the
Presidential Advisory Commission because he chose to talk to
people outside the sphere of the Pentagon, who might have
different opinions than the Pentagon, or the CIA about possible
chemical exposures.
I think history will prove that he was moving in the right
direction, and they were wrong. In general, the attitude of the
DOD, the CIA, and the VA has been, in the very beginning--No.
1, there is no problem. It's all in the heads of the soldiers.
No. 2, as time progressed: well, there may be a problem, but it
is a stress-related problem, caused by stress. More time went
on; they said, ``Well, no. None of our soldiers were ever
exposed to chemical agents.'' Well, we're sure of that. More
time went on: ``Well, yes. Maybe there were some exposures. But
the problem is limited.'' More time went on: ``Well, maybe the
chemical exposure is not so limited, and we'll have to
investigate how many tens of thousands of our soldiers were
affected.''
Now, all of this comes from the DOD, an agency with a
budget of $250 billion. Meanwhile, some 70,000 men and women
who served in the Gulf are suffering from one or another Gulf
war symptom, some of them terribly, terribly serious.
Now, let's briefly look at some people with far more
limited resources than the Pentagon who are seriously trying to
address this horrendous problem. And I want to congratulate
you, Mr. Chairman, because your committee has done an
outstanding job in bringing some of these people to us and to
the American people.
In late January, we heard from Dr. Robert W. Haley--the
University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center. And this is
what he says. He says, ``Persian Gulf war syndrome is real. The
syndromes are due to subtle brain, spinal cord, and nerve
damage, but not stress. The damage was caused by exposure to
combinations of low level chemical nerve agents and other
chemicals, including pyridostigmine bromide in anti-nerve gas
tablets, DEET, in a highly concentrated insect repellant, and
pesticides and flea collars that some troops wore.''
Another serious researcher, Dr. Muhammad Abou-Donia and Tom
Kurt, from the Duke University Medical Center--they also have
done some outstanding work. They study chickens. And the
researchers specifically found that two pesticides--DEET and
permethrin--and the anti-nerve gas agent PB, once again--were
harmless when used alone, but when used in combination the
chemicals caused neurological deficits in the test animals
similar to those reported by some Gulf war veterans.
Doctors Garth and Nancy Nicolson, University of Texas,
concluded that some Gulf war veterans have multiple chronic
symptoms that may eventually have their diagnoses linked to
chemical exposures in the Persian Gulf such as oil spills and
fires, smoke from military operations, chemicals on clothing,
pesticides, chemoprophylactic agents, chemical weapons and
others. Dr. Claudia Miller, a good researcher from Texas, sees
a direct relationship between the problems of our Gulf war
veterans and multiple chemical sensitivity. Dr. William Ray,
also from Texas, says the same thing.
Now, let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, by saying this: for
whatever reason--and frankly I am not interested in speculating
on that now--we could spend 10 hearings in speculation--I
believe that the Department of Defense and the VA and the other
Government agencies--CIA--have not been capable in either
diagnosing or treating Persian Gulf war syndrome, or even fully
analyzing the problem. In my opinion, there is no particular
reason to believe that that is going to change.
We can bring the DOD, the VA and the CIA before us month
after month. We can criticize them. We can berate them. But I
have the sad feeling that it is not going to change, and what
we have seen in the past is going to continue into the future.
Mr. Chairman, you and this committee have done an extraordinary
job in helping to expose many of the problems that currently
exist. But I suggest to you that we must now assume an even
greater responsibility.
I believe that this committee should, within the next
several weeks, regroup, come together again, not for a hearing,
but to formulate our conclusions. And then having done that, we
should introduce a Manhattan Project type of organization which
assigns responsibility and adequately funds individuals outside
of the DOD and the VA to solve this problem. Whether those
individuals should be within the civilian sectors of our
Government, such as exists within the NIH, or whether they
should be completely outside the
Government in a major university or research facility is
something we can discuss. But I think we must reach the
fundamental conclusion that the status quo approach is just not
working. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Bernard Sanders follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.003
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.004
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.005
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.006
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.007
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.008
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.009
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.010
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.011
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.012
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.013
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.014
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.015
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.016
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.017
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.018
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.019
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.020
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.021
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.022
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.023
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.024
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman. I would thank him for his
extraordinary dedication to this issue. You spend a great deal
of time on this issue, and have been a major part of this
committee's investigation and have been a tremendous help.
Mr. Sanders. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. At this time I would call on Mr. Snowbarger, the
vice chairman of the subcommittee.
Mr. Snowbarger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really don't
have a formally prepared statement. I do want to thank you for
continuing the hearings on this process, also thank the panel
for helping us to try to find the answers to these questions
that have long plagued us. I appreciate the frustration that
you have gone through. We're frustrated, as well, in trying to
get the answers, as Mr. Sanders has indicated. And I appreciate
your being with us here today. I look forward to your testimony
and questioning period.
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Gilman, the chairman
of the Foreign Affairs Committee, as I call it.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank
you for convening this hearing this morning as part of your
series of ongoing hearings related to the Gulf war syndrome. I
believe that these hearings are important as they help keep the
Department of Defense focused on an uncomfortable issue and
remind both officials at the Pentagon and the members of the
public as well as Congress' determination to address this
unfortunate legacy of the Gulf war.
This morning's hearing is particularly important, because
it goes to the heart of the matter regarding DOD's response to
this issue. Along with, I'm sure, many of my colleagues, I've
heard numerous allegations from our constituents about the poor
initial response to our veterans' concerns from both DOD and
the VA. And yet when we in the Congress raise these issues time
and time again, our intelligence and the DOD assured Members of
both the House and Senate that there was no evidence that any
troops were exposed to any chemical weapons in the Gulf.
Moreover, the VA was eager to accept these statements. So
eager, in fact, that VA officials did not feel that any
exposure to chemical agents even merited consideration when
ascertaining the causes behind the symptoms experienced by the
affected personnel.
And then, last year, when faced with overwhelming evidence
to the contrary, officials at the Pentagon reversed themselves
and stated that 400 of our troops at the Khamisiyah
ammunitionsite were exposed to chemical agents. This figure
later grew to approximately 20,000 of our troops. Since this
initial revelation, additional distressing facts have come out
as the CIA and the DOD have engaged in finger-pointing and
blame-shifting over what was actually known at the time and
what was communicated. To me, the most shocking fact is the
revelation to this subcommittee last January, that 80 percent
of the nuclear biological chemical logs from the theater of
operations--165 pages of a total of 200--are now missing.
For one, I think I'm losing patience with the DOD in this
issue. It's troubling enough that Pentagon officials were
categorically denying troop exposure to chemical agents despite
overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Now, however, we find
out that most of the record logs that were intended to track
these incidents are classified or missing. The charges of
cover-up no longer seem so far-fetched. These facts, as they've
dribbled out over the last 6 years, point to the following
conclusion: simply put, we were not prepared to handle the
contingency of widespread chemical use by the Iraqi forces
during the Gulf war, and that it was only by the grace of God
that Saddam Hussein did not resort to the use of such weapons.
Mr. Chairman, the Congress needs and deserves straight,
honest answers from the DOD. For too long, we've been dealing
with commanders who apparently were more interested in
protecting their own careers and reputations than in looking
out for the welfare of the personnel under their command. It's
bad enough to discount the thousands upon thousands of alarms
and detections that occurred during the war. But what is far
worse is a pattern of deceit and misrepresentation that's been
waged with the Congress and the American people. If we had a
problem in addressing widespread chemical exposures during the
Gulf war, then let's admit it and move on. The hand-wringing,
double-talk, and the finger-pointing that's occurred over the
last few months is pointless and counter-productive. More
importantly, it does nothing to help our veterans, who put
their lives, both theirs and their families' health on the line
for our Nation. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman for his very fine
statement. Mr. Allen, it's nice to have you here. You have the
floor.
Mr. Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief.
First of all, I want to thank you for holding these most
important hearings, and to thank all of the panelists who are
here to testify. I would just say this: When we send the young
men and women in our armed services into harm's way, we have an
obligation to do well by them when they return, and to care for
them and to make sure that we investigate whatever may have
happened to them. The record in this, frankly, appears to be a
sorry record. And I hope that one outcome of these hearings
today is that we make sure that it doesn't happen again, that
we are able to detect illnesses from chemical warfare or
biological warfare and deal with them efficiently.
And it's not clear to me at all that that's been the
practice over the last few years. And I am here, as I believe
all of you are here, to try to understand what happened, and
make sure it doesn't happen again. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Thomas H. Allen follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.025
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Souder. What I would
like to do first is before calling my witnesses, just get some
housekeeping out of the way, and ask unanimous consent that all
members of the subcommittee be permitted to place an opening
statement in the record and that the record remain open for 3
days for that purpose. And without objection, so ordered. And I
ask further unanimous consent that all witnesses be permitted
to include their written statements in the record. And without
objection, so ordered.
At this time, the committee will convene the first panel.
The panel consists of three American heroes: Maj. Michael
Donnelly, U.S. Air Force, retired, a Persian Gulf war veteran
from South Windsor, CT. Our second panelist is Sgt. Susan
Sumpter-Loebig, U.S. Army, retired, a Persian Gulf war veteran
from Hagerstown, MD. And our third witness will be Sgt. Steven
Wood, U.S. Army, retired, a Persian Gulf war veteran who
presently resides in Germany.
Mr. Donnelly, I understand that you're in a wheel chair and
will not be able to stand, but I would ask the other two
witnesses to stand, and I'd ask all three of you to raise your
right hand. We swear our witnesses in.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Shays. Thank you. Note for the record that all three
witnesses have responded in the affirmative. And we will go
from Maj. Donnelly, and then we'll go to you, Sergeant, and
then to you, Sgt. Wood. But we'll start with you, Mr. Donnelly.
It's nice to have you here.
STATEMENTS OF MICHAEL DONNELLY, MAJOR, U.S. AIR FORCE, RETIRED;
SUSAN SUMPTER-LOEBIG, SERGEANT, U.S. ARMY, RETIRED; AND STEVEN
WOOD, SERGEANT, U.S. ARMY, RETIRED
Maj. Donnelly. Thank you, Congressman Shays and members of
the committee. I want to thank you for the opportunity to be
here today.
Mr. Shays. Maj. Donnelly, what I'm going to do--it may be a
little difficult, but I'm going to ask you to put the mic a
little closer to you.
Maj. Donnelly. Sure.
Mr. Shays. It might mean that your papers have to overlap
the--thank you.
Maj. Donnelly. OK. How's that? Better?
Mr. Shays. I think it is better. And I'm going to ask you
to lift the mic up just slightly. Thank you. That's perfect.
That's great. Thank you very much.
Maj. Donnelly. As you've already stated, my name is Maj.
Michael Donnelly. And I am not the enemy. I come to you today
to tell you that I am yet another Gulf war veteran with a
chronic illness. I was medically retired in October 1996 after
15 years and 1 month of service in the Air Force as a fighter
pilot. At the time Iraq invaded Kuwait, I was stationed at Hahn
Air Base in Germany, flying F-16s.
Mr. Shays. I'm sorry to interrupt you again. I'd like all
witnesses to just tap their microphones and make sure that
they're--it's the one on the stem. I don't think yours is on,
sir.
Maj. Donnelly. Great.
Mr. Shays. Could you check that for us? It's not really
picking up. We're going to trade microphones, then, if we can't
get it working.
Maj. Donnelly. Kind of the way things have been going for
me lately.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Donnelly, this is a good day. I started out
and lost $20. It is a good day. It's wonderful to have you
here, sir. And it is a very important day to have you
testifying. This is a good day.
Maj. Donnelly. Great.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Maj. Donnelly. And I'm happy to be here.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Maj. Donnelly. As I stated, my name is Maj. Michael
Donnelly. And I am not the enemy. I come before you today to
tell you that I am another Gulf war veteran with a chronic
illness. I was medically retired in October 1996 after 15 years
and 1 month as a fighter pilot in the U.S. Air Force. At the
time Iraq invaded Kuwait, I was stationed at Hahn Air Base in
Germany flying F-16s. My unit deployed to Abu Dhabi, which is
in the United Arab Emirates, on January 1, 1991, and redeployed
back to Germany on May 15, 1991. During the war, I flew 44
combat missions. On those missions I bombed a variety of
targets, such as strategic targets to include airfields,
production and storage facilities, and missile sites.
I also bombed tactical targets, which included troops,
battlefield equipment and pontoon bridges. I also flew combat
air support, which is troops in combat, and combat air patrol
missions. Never during any of those missions was I ever warned
of the threat of any chemical exposure from chemical or
biological weapons. Had I been warned, there were steps I could
have and would have taken to protect myself. I can tell you
that I flew throughout the entire region of Iraq, Kuwait, much
of Saudi Arabia, to include in and around the oil smoke.
Evidence now shows that chemical munitions storage areas
and production facilities that were bombed by us released
clouds of fallout that drifted over our troops through the air.
I know of other pilots who do remember a specific incident that
later caused them to become ill. Upon returning from the Gulf,
I was reassigned to McDill Air Force Base in Tampa, FL. That is
when I first started to notice that something was wrong, that I
didn't feel quite right.
By the summer of 1995, I was stationed at Shepperd Air
Force Base in Wichita Falls, TX. It was here that my current
illness started. I began to suspect that it was related to the
service in the Gulf. During the summer, I was exposed several
times to malathion, which is a fairly dilute organophosphate-
based pesticide used for mosquito control. The base's policy
there was to spray with a fogging truck throughout the base
housing area, where I lived with my family. I was exposed to
the malathion while jogging in the evenings. I would like to
point out something here that I learned later: organic
phosphate is the chemical basis for all nerve agents. It is a
poison that kills just like a pesticide does.
It was immediately after my exposure to malathion that I
started to have serious health problems. After this, every time
I ran I would get a schetoma--or blind spot--in front of my
eyes and my heart would beat erratically. I started to have
heart palpitations, night sweats, sleeplessness, trouble
concentrating on my work, trouble remembering, trouble taking a
deep breath, frequent urination, and I was extremely tired all
the time. It wasn't until December 1995, that I started to have
trouble walking. I had weakness in my right leg.
It was then that I decided to go and see the doctor. Right
after the holiday season, on January 2, 1996, I went in to the
flight surgeon at Shepperd Air Force Base. When I finished
explaining my symptoms to him I mentioned that I had been in
the Gulf war. He immediately started to talk to me about the
effects of stress and delayed stress. He told me that the other
problems--heart palpitations, breathing difficulty,
sleeplessness--all that, was most definitely stress-related,
but we needed to look into why I had weakness in my leg.
I was referred to the neurologist. During the first visit
with the neurologist, it was one of the first times that I
heard the line that I would hear throughout the entire Air
Force medical system. And that line was: ``There has never been
any conclusive evidence that there's any link between service
in the Gulf and any illnesses.'' Each time I heard this line,
it was almost as if the person was reading from a script.
How can they say that they're looking for answers when they
deny it's even possible? How can they say there's no connection
when they don't study the individuals who present themselves
with symptoms that might prove that connection. Instead, I got
the line, which proved that no one was looking to see whether
there was a problem with my connection, only to deny that it
exists. At one point a doctor at Wilford Hall Medical Center
gave me a 3-minute dissertation on how my illness absolutely
could not be linked to service in the Gulf.
One thing else I noticed at Wilford Hall during my five or
six visits was a room on the neurology labeled Gulf War
Syndrome Room. In none of my visits was the door to this room
ever open or the light on. I started to realize that because
the military medical system would not acknowledge that my
illness could be related to the Gulf war, I would not get help.
Once I realized that I began to seek help from civilian
doctors, many of whom had already made the connection between
service in the Gulf and the high incidents of unusual illnesses
among Gulf war veterans. Because the military has not
acknowledged this connection, my family and I have been forced
to spend over $40,000 of our own money on this effort.
Our search led us to people around the country with the
same illnesses who were also Gulf war veterans. In the past 12
months I've travelled all over this country and even to Germany
looking for help.
Incredible as it may seem, the Air Force medical system
initially wanted to retire me with 50 percent disability and
temporary retirement. Only after we hired a lawyer at our own
expense and went to the medical board did we get that changed
to 100 percent and permanent retirement. I chose not to fight
over whether my illness was combat-related, because I had
already seen the stonewalling that was going on, and because I
wanted to move my family back home. That was a personal
decision made at a time when I knew I had far greater battles
yet to fight.
Upon my retirement from the Air Force, I found myself
worked into the VA medical system. What alternative did I have
after 15 years of service? I guess I'm one of the lucky ones,
since I was: one, still on active duty when I got sick; and,
two, given a poor prognosis which required them to treat me and
compensate me. What alternative did they have?
The VA bureaucracy is difficult and slow at best. I'm
suffering from a fatal illness where every month matters. I
could sit here today and tell you that despite my situation,
which you would think would warrant expeditious treatment and
action, I ran into a red tape and paperwork nightmare that
continues to consume my life today. However, once I finally got
to see them, the medical personnel who have treated me have
been very kind and understanding, despite the fact there isn't
much they can do. Maybe if we hadn't had 6 years of cover-up
there would be something that they could do.
To this day, no one from the DOD or VA has contacted me
personally to involve me in any tests or studies. I, myself,
have found nine other Gulf war veterans, some who have already
come before this committee, who are also suffering from ALS, an
unusual illness that rarely strikes individuals under the age
of 50. In fact, with the 10 of us who have ALS, we are certain
there are more. We just can't find them. The incidence of ALS
already far exceeds the normal incidence, given the number of
soldiers who served in the Gulf. One thing I can tell you: this
is not stress. With every other Gulf war veteran we have found
who has ALS, the common thread has been subsequent exposure to
some kind of strong chemical or pesticide, such as malathion,
diazinon, and lindane.
Why aren't the DOD and the VA warning every one else who
served in the Gulf that they may get sick in the future, just
as I got sick 4 years after I returned from the Gulf?
How many other people out there are waiting for that one
exposure that's going to put them over the top? Why is no one
putting the word out? A warning could save the lives and health
of many individuals. I'll tell you why: because that would take
admitting that something happened in the Gulf that's making
people sick.
I wonder how many flight mishaps or accidents that have
happened since the war have involved Gulf war veterans. Those
numbers shouldn't be hard to find. The military keeps records
on all of that. In fact, I'll wager someone out there already
knows the answer to that question and hasn't shared, whether
because of a direct order not to, or because the right people
haven't asked the question.
How many pilots are still out there flying who don't feel
just quite right, just as I flew for 4 years after I returned
from the Gulf? How many other pilots fear for their livelihood
and the repercussions they know they would encounter were they
to speak up because they've been told, ``There's no conclusive
evidence that there's any link between service in the Gulf and
any illness.''
Imagine my dismay when the DOD announces $12 million to
study the Gulf war illness, and four of those studies are
centered around the effects of stress or post-traumatic stress
disorder. You would think that the DOD and the VA would have an
indepth knowledge of the effects of stress after all the wars
that this country has fought, most of them a lot more stressful
than the Gulf war. Why aren't they taking our illnesses
seriously? I'll tell you why: because that would take admitting
that something happened in the Gulf war that's making people
sick.
Part of the ongoing cover-up has been to trivialize the
illnesses the Gulf war veterans are suffering from. You hear
about skin rashes and joint aches and insomnia and fatigue, and
there's no doubt that these are real symptoms and are
debilitating in and of themselves. But what you don't hear
about is the high incidences of rare cancers and neurological
diseases and immune system disorders that are totally
debilitating. This is not stress. This is life and death.
Why is it impossible to get the right answers from the DOD
and the VA about how many veterans are sick or have sought
treatment? Why is it more important to protect high-placed
Government officials than to care for veterans who are sick?
The national defense issue now is that it's public knowledge
that the DOD mistreats the people who serve. America will have
no one else to fight its wars when people learn this.
The primary goal at this point is not to find out whose
fault all this is, although some day someone will need to
investigate that, and find out what happened and why. The
people responsible for this tragedy should be held responsible
and punished.
The top priority now is for all of us to help veterans and
their families get their health and lives back. Or at least
that should be the goal. That should be your goal. It's obvious
now that there has been a cover-up going on all this time as
more and more information gets released or discovered. It's
time for people who know something--and they do exist--to come
forward. Maybe we can save some lives.
During and after the war we proclaimed to ourselves and the
rest of the world how we learned the lessons of Vietnam and
fixed the military. We learned the lessons of Vietnam and we
did it right this time. Last week, Gen. Powell stated that we
suffered only 149 casualties in the Gulf war. I'm here to tell
you: the casualty count is still rising. Just like in Vietnam
with Agent Orange, it appears that we did not learn all the
lessons. We still mistreat veterans. This country has again
turned its back on people who fight its wars: the individuals
to whom it owes the most.
I want to thank you for what you are doing for the veterans
of this country, many of whom were squeezed out of the military
right after the war and now find themselves out on the street
fighting the very institution they fought for. Congressman
Shays, in the military, we have a tradition called the salute,
and it's used to show admiration and respect for an individual
who has earned it.
I salute you for what you are doing. You go a long way to
restoring this soldier's waning faith in a country that could
so willingly desert its own. Remember: I am not the enemy.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Maj. Donnelly follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.026
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.027
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.028
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.029
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Maj. Donnelly. Major, your testimony
is very helpful. We're going to be hearing from two other
veterans and then we'll be asking you some questions. Thank you
for honoring us with your presence. Sgt. Susan Sumpter-Loebig,
if you would testify now.
Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.
Thank you for taking the time to listen to the ongoing struggle
that I and other Gulf war veterans have been enduring since our
return. I am 29 years old and was a sergeant E-5 in the Army
Military Police Corps. My military occupational specialties
are: Victor 5 investigations, senior military customs
inspector, nuclear physical security, enemy prisoner of war
camps, canine assistant, route reconnaissance specialist. And
I've worked with CID numerous times.
I was released from active duty on March 18, 1997. January
through April 1991, I was assigned to mortuary escort perimeter
security at Dover Air Force Base. My job was to ensure the safe
transportation of fallen soldiers from Southwest Asia back to
the continental United States. Once processed and identified, I
then escorted the remains back to their families and stayed to
perform funeral detail. I was also to provide condolences and
return any belongings to the families. It was also my
responsibility to present the flag from the coffin to the
family members. This done, I then helped the family finish
anything they may have forgotten or left out.
I was then assigned in April to St. Louis as security for
the new helicopter prototypes being displayed at the stadium. I
was there for 3 weeks and was taken to the Air Force hospital
with intestinal bronchitis the second week. I recovered and
then returned home. Although I still felt bad, I took my annual
PT test on April 12, 1991. My scores were 20 push-ups, 53 sit-
ups, and I ran a 14:48 on my 2-mile run--a total of 232 points,
which is passing for my age bracket.
In May, I was assigned to Fort Detrick, MD for the release
of DOD police to take classes and do their training. I was
there for 1 month. My duties included patrol, desk officer,
gate duty and general police work. I had a cold most of the
time I was there, but brushed it off as the cost of traveling
that I had been doing back and forth through the country. I
returned home 2 days later and was told that I would be
returning to Southwest Asia. In June, I returned with the 164th
Direct Support Maintenance Company. We were to perform numerous
jobs in the few months we were there. We were stationed at
KKMC.
My jobs were as follows: senior customs inspector, arms
room, route reconnaissance, shotgun escort in and out of Dahran
and Kuwait City, and general military police duties. Our first
duty was to ship connex's of equipment, food, supplies, et
cetera, back to the United States. They had to be emptied,
inventoried, cleaned, inspected, packed, and sealed for
shipment back to the United States. We were never issued any
type of protective gear for this duty. In August, we received a
severely damaged connex of unknown origin. Upon opening this,
myself, Sgt. 1st Class Jattan, Staff Sgt. Henry Brown, Staff
Sgt. Bogden and Sfc. Kevin Knight were drenched in a noxious,
fuming gas that burned.
We found later that the contents was DS, CS and super-
topical bleach. The substances mixed with the water that
constantly drenched the tarmac and created this smoke. Everyone
who had been in contact was rushed to the TMC and the rack was
shut down; 2 to 3 days later it was reopened and we returned to
duty. Two weeks after that it was shut down permanently and we
were not permitted anywhere near it.
Upon returning home in December, my symptoms have been
severe headaches, nausea, peeling skin, fatigue, rashes,
unknown scarring, dry mouth, weight loss, weight gain, numbness
of the hands and feet, constant colds, the inability to heal
well, consistent bleeding of the rectum, severe acid
indigestion, sleeplessness, night sweats, vivid recurrent
memories, unusual movements in the abdominal region, hair loss,
slight memory lapses, consistent soreness of the joints and
heart palpitations. I am seriously concerned over the symptoms
and I'm heartily fed up with being told they are a figment of
my imagination, that I'm getting old, or that I'm making myself
ill, because I had been, but my mind is making my body think
that it is unwell.
I have never been anywhere near this ill in my entire life,
had so many frequent colds, or felt so run-down. These symptoms
also change from bad to worse. I get used to feeling bad and
then get worse. And then I get used to that and it changes
again. It's not getting any better, and I cannot accept that my
mind wants to make these awful things happen to me. Walter Reed
Army Medical Center claims it's somatiform disorder. The VA is
saying PTSD. I can accept PTSD, purely because I was stationed
in a combat zone. Walter Reed Army Medical Center's diagnosis
is way off-base and has no merit.
These doctors care nothing about us. They didn't even want
to hear about what my unit or I went through, or any of the
other soldiers that were stationed there. Somebody has to put a
stop to this. We cannot continue to be treated this way. I'm
sorry. We served our country loyally and without hesitation. We
all deserve better. A GAO study needs to be done on all the
facilities, and records need to be researched. How many of us
have been treated and diagnosed in the same manner? There is a
pattern here, and I'm sure that my testimony will not only help
myself but all other Gulf war veterans who are going through
the same uncalled for treatment.
The thousands of us out here who are suffering along with
our families cannot be mass-hypnotized into thinking that this
is in our heads. Something is seriously wrong, and it needs to
be investigated. I'd like to thank you for taking the time to
listen to me. And God bless you.
Mr. Shays. Your full testimony will be put in the record.
You left out a good chunk of it, didn't you?
Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig. Yes, I did.
Mr. Shays. Well, God bless you. Sgt. Wood.
Sgt. Wood. Yes, Mr. Chairman, distinguished committee
members, my name is Staff Sgt. Steven Wood. I would like to
thank you all for listening to me today. My road to sitting
before you today began some 6 years ago in the desert sands of
Iraq. Before I joined the on-line world 2 years ago, I was
alone in my search for answers. I luckily found others on the
Internet who are experiencing the same problems as I am. I
stayed in contact with Denise Nichols. Her interest in what my
German neurologist found is why I'm here today to tell you my
story and the stories of the other sick veterans. These are the
veterans who have been forced to seek medical assistance
outside this great country's borders.
These are my medical records from before I went to the
desert. And these are my military medical records from
afterwards. When I boarded the airplane in Germany that took me
to Saudi Arabia in 1990, I was in perfect health, as these
records indicate. Except for a massive infection in my left leg
caused by a burn I received in combat I came through the Gulf
war unscathed. Or so I thought. I even was awarded a bronze
star medal from a unit I was not assigned to. In the Gulf war,
my primary job was as a launcher's support team leader.
My men and I were attached to Alpha Battery 4th Battalion,
27th Field Artillery Regiment, Multiple Launch Rocket System. I
stayed with this unit my entire time in Southwest Asia until
returning to Germany a few weeks early in 1991 because of my
health. As a school-trained area nuclear biological and
chemical defense NCO, I was also the detachment NBC specialist.
My health problems started some time around the first week
of March 1991. While part of a convoy leaving Kuwait and
heading back into Iraq, my driver and I stumbled across
something that I feel changed our lives. We noticed an
artillery round that was roped off with yellow engineer tape.
Not only was this not normal, seeing as the other rounds in
the same area were not treated this way--but the round itself
appeared to be blue. Upon closer examination I saw it was a
sort of a greenish-blue in color, with green and yellow painted
bands. I remember thinking to myself how silly it was that
someone would have brought practice rounds to a shooting war.
Later that same day we arrived at our new position on what I
believe was highway 8, replacing the 82nd Airborne.
I now had time to look in my manuals for the markings I had
seen earlier on the shell. I was shocked to see it was a
perfect match for a Soviet nerve agent. Later that evening I
developed flu-like symptoms and massive diarrhea. I submitted
an NBC 1 report, but never heard anything else about the
incident.
While in this area bunkers were constantly being destroyed.
One explosion in particular was extremely large. And we were
told by our senior leadership, the engineers had just destroyed
the largest Iraqi ammunition dump. The nearest town to our
position was An Nasiriyha. When I returned to Germany, I
continued to seek answers as to why I was not getting better.
For at least 6 months straight I tried to get help and had
many, many tests performed. It was about this same time I
discovered that my medical records from shortly before the war
until then had disappeared. It was at this point I began to
suspect something might be amiss. I continued to get worse, and
was sent from doctor to doctor. I never found anyone in the
Army who was serious about helping me--or anyone else, for that
matter. I was told to suck it up and drive on.
And being a good soldier, I did. Unfortunately it got the
point where I could no longer work to the standards of the U.S.
Army. While still on active duty, I never received any real
health care. I was told to quit faking, it's all in my head,
and my all-time favorite: we do not know what's wrong with you,
but you will be better in 2 weeks.
In October 1995, I was placed on the temporary disabled
retired list at a rate of 30 percent disabled. In April 1996, I
was seen by a German civilian doctor who did more testing in 2
hours than the Army did in 5 years. He found neurological
damage during this visit. He told my wife and I, it looked to
him as if I had been poisoned, and I might have multiple
sclerosis. I took this information to an Army neurologist and
was shocked at what I heard. I was told, ``I do not like you
Gulf vets that say you're sick. I was there, and I'm not
sick.''
This doctor then proceeded to tell me she felt I had no
neurological problems before even examining me and she flatly
refused to even read the German doctor's findings. I have
stayed in Germany along with numerous other veterans for a very
good reason: free unbiased health care. The doctors may not
have been able to fix us yet, but they are at least trying to
get to the bottom of this mystery. Another very important
aspect is that we do not have to deal with actual VA doctors.
Every VA examination is done by a German civilian contractor.
The Army states it is doing all it can for us. I was
recently offered permanent retirement at 30 percent from the
Army. This follows the Army telling Sen. Strom Thurmond in a
letter that I was healthy and basically slipped through the
cracks. Nearly every military doctor I have seen has stated
they think nothing is wrong before they even examine me. The
one military doctor that tried to help me was forbidden to do
so at the last minute.
In light of the hard time I have had with the Army and
their attempts to understate what is wrong to me, I must make
one thing clear to all of you: I have been found totally
disabled by the Veterans Administration. In 5 days I have a
formal Army medical board to appeal my rating of 30 percent. I
am interested in what happens, since the Army still refuses to
acknowledge that my health problems are Gulf war-related. It
will be especially interesting since the VA has decided, ``The
veteran was seen as exposed to an unspecified chemical.''
Not only do I have to fight the Army for a fair disability
rating, they have even refused to acknowledge my service and
have withheld other awards from me. As I mentioned earlier, the
VA has rated me at 100 percent disabled. This is retroactive to
November 1, 1995. The VA currently owes me well over $20,000 in
back benefits. Since speaking with the Washington regional
office when I arrived here Monday, I have found out that
Philadelphia did not take the appropriate actions to release
this payment to me. Right now I have no idea when I will see
the money that I was supposed to have weeks ago.
I truly believe that if something had been done sooner to
help me I would not be as bad as I am today. I am a non-
commissioned officer. I always took care of my soldiers. We
need your help to take care of the others that can't get it.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Sgt. Wood follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.030
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.031
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.032
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.033
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.034
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.035
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.036
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.037
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.038
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.039
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.040
Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig. Sir, if I may, could I finish my
statement? I think it's very important.
Mr. Shays. I would be happy to have you finish your
statement.
Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig. Thank you very much. I'm very sorry
for the interruption. This is important to me and important to
the two gentlemen who are here with me and every other veteran
in the United States and anywhere else who is going through
this. This is my experience at Walter Reed Army Medical Center
in the Gulf war program. I was seen there by Col. Raymond Chung
on Ward 64--is what they call it. And I started the program in
August 1994. I felt the program hadn't helped any of the
current and past symptoms I have experienced.
Dr. Chung made the statement, ``You have to realize that
you're getting old, Sgt. Sumpter.'' This was made in the
presence of my husband. I will be 30 in July. The only answer
I've been given is an ultimatum: send in my results to a board
now and be awarded 10 to 20 percent of base pay for 1 year as a
settlement or go through a 4-week physical training program
designed to help me learn to cope with my symptoms--which they
are describing as sympathetic and mind-induced--be taught how
to be socially active with the rest of the world, learn how to
use PT to forget my mind-induced sympathetic symptoms, and be
sent back to duty.
This is regardless if the symptoms are gone or not. We will
do 1 to 2 hours of PT in the morning, then for the rest of the
day be seen by numerous psychologists, psychiatrists,
nutritionists, family counsellors, dieticians, and be placed on
a certain schedule of times. The social activation will be
trips to Washington to see the sights and learn how to interact
with people. There will not be visitors or family allowed, no
mail, and few if any phone calls. The reasoning for this, to
Dr. Chung, is that we are being caused undue stress from our
children, spouses, family, friends and strangers around us
every day.
Spouses and children will be allowed a few hours on 1 day
near the end of the program to visit the programs. There will
be only six to eight people at one time allowed through this
program. After this extensive program we are then to go back to
our units and dishonestly tell them that we are cured. When I
pointed this out I was told that I would not be lying, and that
if I believed this, the program would not work for me because I
had a poor attitude.
In January, I had been scheduled to take a psychological
test for 6 hours for Dr. Fallensby. It was a battery of
questions someone might be asked to take as a semester final in
high school. There were lots of pictures, and I was asked to
look at them and then later--5 to 10 minutes later--asked to
draw what I remembered. I was given a letter of the alphabet
and then asked to write down as many words as possible in that
time that I could think of--and other such questions of the
same nature. Based upon this test Dr. Fallensby determined that
I was severely depressed, suicidal and angry at the world. This
was all told to me by him during a session in his office during
the space of maybe 30 minutes to an hour.
This is a man I had never met and I do not know personally
or even as an acquaintance. I find Dr. Chung's and Dr.
Fallensby's comments and diagnoses degrading, unfounded,
unprofessional and totally out of line and character, as do my
family and friends, especially the rest of the world. My
religious preference all my life has been Church of God. And
the only thing that makes me angry is the fact that individuals
who don't know me are insinuating that I could possibility take
my own life when it is against my moral beliefs and
understandings.
If this was the case, why have I spent most of my life
trying to help people, bring happiness, and, most of all, have
been given a beautiful child to raise? I have dealt with my
symptoms and numerous doctors for nearly 5 years now, and have
always been patient and cooperative with everyone. Even through
all the red tape and paperwork, no one could ever claim that I
had no patience. Case in point, I recently found out that I
have never been paid for my dependent.
I have not been paid since December 1994 for monthly
incapacitation pay and received only 4 travel voucher checks
out of 20 completed and sent in August 1994. The problems all
started when Maj. Cusack from the surgeon's office at ARPERCEN
retired in February and Capt. Crisp took over his position and
was then sent on TDY for 3 months. This happened before. It's
all been caught up now. But this had happened in May. And since
his departure a woman named Denise had been working in his
place. And she is a civilian employee.
I had not spoken to any military person within that office
in that period of time. And shortly after he left for TDY, I
spoke with Maj. Block, who was the individual who found my
dependent paperwork on the bottom of my file. All military
personnel have been very cordial and helpful since I was first
enrolled in this program in January 1992. But this civilian,
Denise, has answered all calls in-going to Maj. Block since and
refuses to let me speak with them. When I have important
questions she asks what they are and sometimes asks Maj. Block
and calls back or gives her own advice.
Example: when I call to speak with Maj. Block about the
physical program settlement program option Dr. Chung was
proposing, she said she didn't understand what the problem was
in going through with the program, that her mother had to go
through a similar program and it was very helpful to her. When
I inquired whether or not her mother was a Desert Storm veteran
her reply was no, but it didn't make a difference, I should be
grateful for the program, finish it and go back to my unit and
duty, that complaining about good military doctors who knew
what they were doing was just plain silly, and to her it
sounded as if I did not want to return to work at all.
She refused to let me speak to Maj. Block about it. And
when I stated that I was not satisfied with her answers, she
replied she was only a civilian and could not or did not know
what I needed. During this phone call I was home in my home
town in my brother and sister-in-law's house with my fiance and
my other brothers present. They heard the whole conversation.
Is this what any veteran deserves? Do we mean nothing to
anyone? Are we expected to be treated like this and not be
upset with these programs? If two doctors--one civilian and one
military--have declared that something is wrong and put it in
writing, then why are their findings being dismissed by Walter
Reed? Why are we being told to go through a program that wants
us to lie to ourselves and to our unit? Why does this sound so
much like a cover-up, not wanting us to really have an answer
to any of this.
What I want out of this is the disability that I think I
deserve and so many veterans who have served in the Gulf. We
went over and put our lives on the line. We were in areas we
should have never been in. This isn't right. I would like to
give you an account of what happened to me at the physical
evaluation board at Walter Reed. And this was on January 7,
1997 of this year. On January 30, 1996, I was seen at
Martinsburg VA, West Virginia for a regional evaluation similar
to Walter Reed Army Medical Center's Gulf war clinical
evaluation. Dr. Bradley Soule, M.D., regional psychiatrist, met
me for around 2 hours. His findings stated that I did not have
somatiform disorder, that in his opinion it was quite clear
that I have post-traumatic stress disorder. His explanation for
PTSD hit close to home for me in that it finally gave me some
sort of clue as to why I'm having some of the feelings and
problems I am experiencing mentally in addition to the findings
of other physicians concerning and acknowledging my chemical
exposure without my previous admission of being exposed.
This three-page letter of diagnosis was then submitted to
Col. Carr, head of PEBLO, in January 1996 as a rebuttal of
their somatiform diagnosis. Col. Carr's reply was that it was
not admissible, and that Walter Reed Army Medical Center would
stand by their diagnosis from Dr. John Fallensby. As you can
imagine, I was shocked. Walter Reed Army Medical Center told me
to seek other opinions and then told me that they were not
acceptable.
Dr. Soule is not the only psychiatrist I have seen and been
evaluated by, either. In December 1996, I went back to the VA
in Martinsburg to seek further evidence and medical attention.
I was seen by Dr. John Haram, L.C.S.W. and Dr. Ali Asghar,
M.D., in mental hygiene. After almost 2 hours with them they
came to the same diagnosis as Dr. Soule. Their opinion was that
my PTSD was so regressed and hidden consciously that I am now
being counseled at their vet center every week. On the morning
of January 7, 1997 at the PEB at Walter Reed, I presented the
new evidence and the diagnosis of two different psychiatrists.
Counsel and I were vying for the change of diagnosis from
somatiform to PTSD.
Capt. Jinny Chen met with the board and presented my offer
to them. They declined it and told her that if I chose to be
seen before them I would be found fit for duty due to my neat
and healthy-looking appearance. One of the board members saw me
and my husband in the waiting area and made this comment to
counsel after my request had been submitted. I told counsel
that I did not care about the rating or the money involved, I
only wanted the diagnosis changed to PTSD from somatiform
because of the opinions that I heard from other physicians and
psychiatrists. Below are the two major reasons that I fought
for this change.
The definition of undifferentiated somatiform disorder is
characterized by unexplained physical complaints lasting at
least 6 months that are below the threshold for a diagnosis of
somatization disorder. Somatization disorder, historically
referred to as hysteria or Briquet's Syndrome: a poly
symptomatic disorder that begins before age 30, extends over a
period of years, and is characterized by a combination of
unknown pain, gastrointestinal, sexual, and pseudo-neurological
symptoms. Post-traumatic stress disorder, on the other hand, is
the development of characteristic symptoms following exposure
to an extreme traumatic stressor involving direct personal
experience of an event that involves actual or threatened death
or serious injury or threat to one's physical integrity or
witnessing an event that involves death, injury or a threat to
the physical integrity of another person, or learning about
unexpected or violent serious harm or threat of death or injury
experienced by a family member or other close associate. The
person's response must involve disorganized agitated behavior.
The characteristic symptoms resulting from the exposure----
Mr. Shays. I just need to interrupt you. I'm trying to
understand your point now. I'm losing your point.
Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig. OK.
Mr. Shays. I'm losing your point.
Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig. The point is that the somatiform
disorder is basically they're telling us that--well, they're
telling me that I'm a hypochondriac, that there's nothing wrong
with me, that I'm making myself sick with this somatiform
disorder. OK? And if there is anything mentally wrong with me
that has been found that I can actually believe in, it would be
PTSD, purely based on the fact that I was in a combat zone for
a year. That is the only point I was trying to make.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig. Is that OK? So I can skip the rest. As
you can see from these definitions, I am thoroughly disgusted
with Walter Reed and their poor excuse for a physical
evaluation board. They know full well that they can throw us
out and the VA will pick up where they leave off. This so-
called board is a sham, disgrace, and basically a sold-out jury
of three officers who have found an excellent loophole for the
military to escape responsibility to their used soldiers. This
physical evaluation board says that I am not fit for duty or my
civilian job title. But they aren't going to admit that there
is a problem caused by our Southwest Asia service, because we
are no longer of any use to them.
From the moment an ill soldier walks into one of these
military facilities and mentions they were in the Gulf, the
decision and diagnosis are already decided upon. To cover
themselves, they tell us to bring in other evidence to dispute
their doctor. And when we do it is dismissed as irrelevant and
non-admissible. These boards do not want to know how we are at
home, how we feel, how our families and our friends are coping
with what we're going through, what we were like before and
what we are like now. They bring down their judgment swiftly
and without any thought to our well-being.
They didn't want to hear about the incident at the wash
rack, the injections, the unfriendly fire we received, the
contaminated areas we were assigned to, or any chemical-related
incident. They also did not want to hear how their own
physicians never asked any questions pertaining to my service
in the Gulf or even with the mortuary. Fallensby didn't even
know I was a veteran. He assumed my husband was the veteran.
Something must be done to stop this. We cannot allow this to be
ignored any longer than it already has been. It isn't just the
soldier who is ill now. It's also the family members and
spouses, children, friends. For once the Government needs to
put an end to the cover-ups. After all, did we learn nothing
from the Vietnam war?
Are we going to head down the same path? Every soldier who
has fought in a war for this country has the right to be
treated like a human being and not some machine to be discarded
when it can no longer function. Again, a GAO study needs to be
done on the military hospitals, the physical evaluation
process, physical evaluation boards and members, the VA system
and members who have already been through these, and the
physicians. Again, I would like to thank you for your patience
in listening to me today.
[The prepared statement of Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.041
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.042
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.043
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.044
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.045
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.046
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.047
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.048
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.049
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.050
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.051
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.052
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much. The military hospitals took
a pretty big hit today. And we're going to be asking some
questions of all of you just to understand a bit about your
experience. We'll begin with Mr. Sanders.
Mr. Sanders. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
thank all three of our brave veterans who are here today. It's
not an easy thing to do, and we thank you for coming forward.
Let me start in reverse order with Sgt. Wood.
Sgt. Wood. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sanders. Sergeant, I would like to concentrate on
pyridostigmine bromide.
Sgt. Wood. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sanders. You indicate that you were given PB tablets--
I'm going to ask you a few questions, and then you respond
however you're feeling comfortable. And I want to know if you
were ever informed as to why you were taking the PB tablets? If
you ever received any written material that describes the side
effects of PB? Were you informed that PB had not been approved
as a protection for chemical warfare? Did anyone attempt to
monitor your medical condition after requiring you to take PB?
Were you ever asked about your medical history before requiring
you to take PB, and basically what you have learned about PB
since your experience? Do you want to talk a little bit about
that?
Sgt. Wood. Yes, sir. As a school-trained NBC NCO I was
taught that PB tablets were the treatment to take. They were
there. And it's what we had to take if we wanted to survive. In
the desert when we took the tablets, we were not told of any
side effects. No record was given of taking PB tablets even
whether we demanded that records be maintained.
Mr. Sanders. What about the dosages? Were dosages
controlled? Did people----
Sgt. Wood. Yes, sir. A formation was held before the war
started and we actually crossed into Iraq. A formation was
held, and every soldier was monitored to take the pills. Once
we crossed into Iraq during the war, every, I believe, 6 or 8
hours, a radio call was put out and everyone was ordered to
take their pills.
Mr. Sanders. What do you mean by monitored? What I'm trying
to get at, were the pills given out on a pretty strict basis?
Were some people swallowing more, perhaps, than they should
have? Was there supervision?
Sgt. Wood. There was no supervision, sir. The full dosage
was given--enough for 2 weeks, I do believe. Each soldier had
their own in their blister pack.
Mr. Sanders. Each soldier had their own?
Sgt. Wood. Each soldier was issued their own. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sanders. Might it have been possible that some were
gulping down others?
Sgt. Wood. It's highly possible that someone that was
scared could have taken more.
Mr. Sanders. And nobody really checked up on that? Do you
have that impression?
Sgt. Wood. No, sir. They did not check on it. The only
checks made were: take your pills.
Mr. Sanders. What's your conclusion? Have you learned or
been thinking about PB since?
Sgt. Wood. I've read much on PB, sir, since then, and it
scares me. It scares me. I've learned that PB is designed to
protect against one nerve agent: soman. And from the
intelligence I saw when I was in the desert, soman was not a
threat to us.
Mr. Sanders. Have you talked to any of your comrades who
might have also had problems that might be associated with PB?
Sgt. Wood. The only incident of PB from people I served
with, sir, are the people who refused to take it, and pretended
to take it, and threw it away instead of swallowing the pills.
And not one of them is sick.
Mr. Sanders. That's interesting. You know, Mr. Chairman, we
also know that--if my memory is correct--the French soldiers
did not take PB as well, as opposed to some of the other
coalition forces. And the initial readings that I found is that
they may be doing better. The chairman would like me to ask
you, what do you mean by ordered to take? Talk about that.
Sgt. Wood. Ordered to take. The pills were issued. The
commander or the 1st Sgt. of the unit would come across the
radio and say, ``Take your pills now.'' Everything that we were
given, from shots to PB tablets, were on threat of court-
martial if you did not take them.
Mr. Sanders. OK. And you are familiar now with some
research which suggests that the combination of PB combined
with exposure to other types of chemicals and pesticides might
be a cause of some of the problems some of our soldiers are
suffering?
Sgt. Wood. Yes, sir. I have read the studies that show if
you take PB tablets and are exposed to a common bug spray, that
you can actually force it across your brain membrane and cause
the damage that I have and the other veterans have.
Mr. Sanders. OK. Thank you very much. If I could very
briefly ask Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig, to the best of your knowledge,
are women who served in the Gulf coming down with particular
ailments? Have you been bumping into other women who are
suffering problems as well?
Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig. As in female problems that men can't
discuss?
Mr. Sanders. Yes. Sure.
Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig. Symptoms that the men are not having?
Mr. Sanders. Yes.
Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig. Basically, it's the hair loss and a
change in our cycles.
Mr. Sanders. Menstrual problems?
Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig. Right. The bleeding rectum part of it
I have encountered with very few males that I keep in contact
with from my unit. It's mostly the females that are having this
problem. And it's not just certain bowel movements, it's every
movement.
Mr. Sanders. Sergeant, just out of curiosity, did you take
PB as well?
Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig. We were given the pills by a staff
sergeant who just said, ``Here, take these. You're supposed to
take them. The medics gave us these to take.''
Mr. Sanders. And do you remember how people--did people
take them on a strict regimen or were they just stuffing them
in their mouths? How did that work?
Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig. He came around every so often.
Mr. Sanders. Every so often. Yes?
Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig. And just handed us four and five
pills. And said, ``Here. Here's your medication.''
Mr. Sanders. In your various treatments in the hospital,
has anyone talked to you about that or asked you if you've
taken them?
Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig. No. Never.
Mr. Sanders. OK.
Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig. The first day I went to Walter Reed
was August 30, 1994. And they took me into this nice little
waiting room. And there was all these little doctors running
around.
Mr. Sanders. I'm going to cut you off. You know why?
Because that yellow light turns red. The chairman is going to
be nice to me. But let me keep moving here.
Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig. OK. They were giving us coffee and
stuff, and they gave us this little nine-page questionnaire.
How's the treatment here? Did you take any of these pills? And
they told us not to sign it. And then we turned it in to them.
That's the first things they gave us: to see how the treatment
at Walter Reed was.
Mr. Sanders. OK. Thank you. Let me ask the major a
question. Major, did you take PB, by the way?
Maj. Donnelly. I took PB for about 3 or 4 days at the
beginning of the air war.
Mr. Sanders. Why only 3 or 4 days?
Maj. Donnelly. Well, there was some discussion about
whether the stuff was good for you or going to work or
whatever. Probably the highly skeptical pilot crew. The way
they gave it to us was, the flight surgeon just put it out in
the little bubble packs, and said, this is for our protection
against nerve agents. We took it for about 3 or 4 days. It
seemed like the thing to do at the time. It looked like the war
was going to be over fairly quickly. It was going well. There
was no evidence that he was using the chemicals. Stopped taking
it.
Mr. Sanders. OK. Let me ask you this: I am interested in
your remarks that, as I understand it, your symptoms became
worse when you were out jogging and you were exposed to
malathion?
Maj. Donnelly. Malathion, yes.
Mr. Sanders. Malathion. I'm sorry. What conclusion do you
draw from that, or do your doctors draw from that? What
happened as a result of that chemical----
Maj. Donnelly. I believe that the initial incursion that
happened to me that made me sick was something in the Gulf war.
Studies on the inoculation for botulism and the anthrax shots
we got, the PB pills, evidence now that we may have undergone
low-dose multiple chemical exposures over there, started some
problem in my system that the last rip of the paper or drop in
the bucket or whatever was this organophosphate-based
pesticide.
Mr. Sanders. So, you think that just could have triggered
off?
Maj. Donnelly. Sure.
Mr. Sanders. Yes. Now, you say something that's very
interest-
ing, and I want to know more about this. You indicate--you have
a very serious and rare illness--and you said, ``I myself have
found more than nine other Gulf War veterans, some who have
already come before you, who are also suffering from ALS.'' You
have found nine soldiers--and you're understanding, this is a
very rare disease--and you obviously do not have the resources
of DOD.
Maj. Donnelly. Right.
Mr. Sanders. Now, that is a very startling--and this is an
unusual disease for people under 50. So statistically----
Maj. Donnelly. I've been to neurologists and doctors all
over the country, and to see how many people actually fought in
the war and the number of people that have this diagnosis, the
incidence is way too high. A lot of them are very interested in
trying to find out the names and medical histories of these
people, but the only people who really know all the names
aren't letting them out. I know of--you know, I've had a doctor
from the VA system, I think, tell my parents--or whatever--that
there's 12 names on the list. But they won't give them the
names because of patient confidentiality. I don't know if I'm
on the list either. And some of them are no longer with us.
Mr. Sanders. You're guessing, though, that there's an
unusual cluster?
Maj. Donnelly. Absolutely.
Mr. Sanders. OK.
Maj. Donnelly. If we get the real data out of the DOD or
the VA, I believe that there would be some startling evidence.
Mr. Sanders. I gather--and it's the basis of your
testimony--but I'm gathering that you have no doubt in your
mind that for somebody your age, somebody who has previously
been in good health, that your condition was caused by your
experience?
Maj. Donnelly. Because of the way that it started and
because of the similarity with the other people that have this
disease from the Gulf war, yes.
Mr. Sanders. OK. Major, thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Souder.
Mr. Souder. I want to say up front that not everybody in
Congress or even on this committee begins to have the knowledge
level of having gone through all the hearings like the chairman
and the ranking member. And part of the point of this is not
only to educate Members of Congress but also America as the
information gets out. And you're to be commended for coming
forth and speaking openly. Because when people know your
patriotism and your commitment to the armed forces it comes
across differently. And they can see it in your testimony than
somebody who might be trying to weaken our military or what
we're trying to do. There's an honest concern.
And on the surface, as I've heard the issue in hearing
today, it is hard to conceive, even if it isn't an established
link, why the lack of interest in pursuing it isn't immoral as
well as stupid even from a scientific standpoint. From the
military standpoint as long-term. It's hard to fathom the types
of stories you're saying, that you wouldn't immediately
respond, ``Oh, this is something really important.''
Not only is it fair for you as an individual, but to us as
a country, to understand what's on here as the times are
changing. And it's nearly unfathomable for me. It's also very
hard to ask you questions because it is so personally
devastating to you, the career you've chosen, the way you feel
about your country, the health problems you've had and so on.
But there's a couple that I want to ask. And understand that
I'm trying to learn some of what's going on. One is that I was
interested on the PB question that Sgt. Wood, you said that you
knew that those who hadn't taken the pills didn't show the
symptoms. Is there a data collection process now going on that?
Is that an informal thing that you've learned?
Sgt. Wood. No, sir. It's just the people I've talked to
over time and met with. But the people that aren't sick aren't
coming forward.
Mr. Souder. Do you have any threshold or number of that? Is
that something that--I mean, as we look at pursuing some of
this, how many cases are--when you say that you know personally
there are?
Sgt. Wood. Highly informal, sir, at least seven or eight
that I've bumped into, just from my old unit.
Mr. Souder. And several of those didn't take the pills and
they aren't showing the symptoms?
Sgt. Wood. The seven or eight that did not take the pills
have zero symptoms.
Mr. Souder. And how many who took the pills are showing
some of the symptoms?
Sgt. Wood. I've met probably three times as many as that
from my old unit.
Mr. Souder. I had a similar question for Sgt. Sumpter-
Loebig. You said there were five of you--you gave, I think,
five different names in the specific incident where there was
the spillage?
Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig. Right. The chemical spill.
Mr. Souder. Are the other four showing different symptoms?
I know different people react different ways. Some people
aren't necessarily going to be as forward, some are time
delayed. But I'm just trying to sort through, because you have
the advantage of a very specific incident. What has happened to
the others in that incident?
Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig. Sgt. Jattan is from North Carolina. He
is having bladder problems, and they're not getting any
better--the same symptoms that I'm having. Sgt. Dowell in South
Carolina has been diagnosed with cancer. He's receiving 100
percent from the VA. He's not doing well at all. Sgt. Bogden in
California cannot get any treatment from anybody, which I find
unusual. He cannot even get treatment from the VA. So, he
hasn't had any luck at all.
Mr. Souder. But he's showing symptoms, as well?
Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig. He has the same symptoms that we have.
Henry Brown is in Arizona. And his wife is now showing the
exact same symptoms that he is. Although the only different
diagnosis that she has that's different from his is, there's
something different with her blood work. I believe it's
diabetes that has suddenly shown up. But these are
individuals--we went through a 2-week medical test in Fort Dix.
We were fit, healthy, PT-tested, stamped grade-A, good to go.
And we come home and this is what we came home like. And it was
not that we went over this way. We came home like this. Because
we were perfectly healthy when we went.
But the chemical spill, I think, triggered something more
than that. We were sick when we got there. The entire unit was
down with a flu-like cold after being injected with the shots.
And that's when it started for all of us. My entire unit--the
entire 164th was sick. We had three medical people there: a
spec 4, a PFC, and a sergeant. And that is it. They took care
of us.
Mr. Souder. Maj. Donnelly, I have a similar question for
you. You flew through the oil fires and were in several
locations.
Maj. Donnelly. Right.
Mr. Souder. And you said some of the people had some of the
different pills. Have you seen other people in your particular
unit, in your area, have similar type things, different? How
could you describe some of the correlation of those who were
similarly exposed like yourself?
Maj. Donnelly. Part of the difficulty in doing that is that
my unit got back to Germany and was immediately disbanded as
part of the draw down. So, you know, 35 to 40 guys in a flying
squadron all went different ways for the most part. In my
efforts to try and track them down--one other guy in my unit
that I've found has been having problems with dizzy spells and
things like that. I have run into other Gulf war pilots who
were in other aircraft that have had the same kind of heart
palpitations, sweats, trouble concentrating, fatigue, things
like that.
Mr. Souder. Well, you being here today, hopefully will make
some others in your unit aware if they're having problems. It
would be helpful, because just from a--let me ask you another
question. Given the fact that at least two of you gave, now,
specific instances with a reasonable sample size, has anybody
in the military or in the VA or any doctor said that they've
looked at the group as a whole to look at any commonality?
Because what you tend to see in the media are a lot of
random-type things. But you've given us examples that there's
names, there's a time, there's a date, there's a number of
people, there's a pattern. You're saying you've seen, at least
informally, you've got potentially a sample size of 25-30
there. Those things--why do you think--well, we can speculate
as to why we think there hasn't been--do you have anything
other than the fear that it might look bad or monetary? It just
seems so strange that somebody wouldn't pursue this. Or, like
you say, that they have the names and nobody else can follow it
up. Anything else you want to suggest into the record as to why
that's the case, why, if you were in command, you wouldn't do
that?
Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig. I know by personal experience that,
when they sent my unit--the 164th--to the KKMC, that that city
was evacuated because it was contaminated and they knew it. And
they sent us there anyway. The water was contaminated. The area
was contaminated. Everything was stripped and gone. And they
sent us in there. Even the Saudis were not there. They were
evacuated.
Mr. Souder. Let me ask you this question--and this is a
really difficult question--but to some degree, when you go into
the military, there's going to be a certain amount of risk, and
you know that risk. And presumably, you knew there was some
risk as you were going through this because they were bringing
up the tablets and some of that. But isn't one of the presumed
things that when you take the risk, that you're going to be
covered if the risk--in other words, there are two sides to the
risk? And that's one of the scary things as a parent and as
somebody who is concerned about how we maintain a volunteer
army, is that you, in fact, knew there was some risk, because
you've already eluded to the fact that there was a question of
whether he was going to use chemical weapons, you knew they
were giving you pills, you knew that conditions weren't always
going to be sanitary. But you assumed the good faith that the
military was trying to do what they could, and if it didn't
work they'd take care of you. Is that a correct assumption?
Sgt. Wood. Yes, sir. That's true. And I'm sure I speak for
everyone. When you join the military you fully realize that
you'll go to war. And when you go to war, you're fully prepared
to give your life to do what your country asked you to do. But
we were all wounded on the battlefield and then swept under the
carpet. Not one promise was kept to take care of us. I was one
of the first participants in the comprehensive clinical
evaluation program. I was not asked one single time what I did
in the Gulf war by any member of DOD. Not once.
Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig. Then, too, they take us through basic
training, and we train completely throughout our career in the
military using mock gear, know how to use your weapons. Well,
when you get over there and you get into a war like we got
into, we didn't even get issued any protective gear. There was
none to be issued. There was nothing.
Mr. Souder. Once again, thank you for your work for our
country. And hopefully, by you coming forth you cannot only
help yourselves but others.
Mr. Shays. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Allen.
Mr. Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank all of you. Your
testimony has had an impact, I know, on me, and I'm sure on
every member of this committee, the people in the audience and
across the country. You've done a real service to your country
today. I can't help but think back to almost 20 years ago when
I was representing some people who had been sprayed, whose
homes and gardens had been sprayed with an herbicide.
And many of the symptoms that they complained about were
the same. And I have a question, but first a general comment.
What strikes me about this entire situation is that our medical
profession is able to say, if it's a virus or a bacteria or a
physical cause, we go after it. But we are not doing a good
job, certainly within the military, and perhaps, to some
extent, outside the military. We are not doing a good job
identifying the cause of some--whether it's pollution or
chemical or biological agents that cannot be easily and quickly
identified, we simply are not doing a good job about that.
And I said earlier, this is a sorry record of performance.
And it needs to be improved. And I really believe that we have
to focus on how to get to the bottom of illnesses that do not
affect each individual in exactly the same way, because they
are not caused by one virus or one bacterium. They affect
different human beings in different ways. And it strikes me
that we have failed at doing that. Maj. Donnelly, I do have a
question for you. This is a hearing about the Gulf war and what
happened there. And your testimony, for all three of you, has
been compelling on that ground.
But I was struck by the statement that you made that when
you were at Shepperd Air Force Base in Texas, it was the base's
policy to spray with a fogging truck throughout the base
housing, where you lived with your family, the chemical
malathion. I have some apple trees. I don't use malathion,
because it's bad stuff. And Mr. Chairman, I don't know if this
is appropriate, but I can't remember what the malathion label
says, but I'd like leave to go down to the hardware and get a
bottle and put the warnings on the label into this record.
Because I think that that in itself is something that
should be looked at. And, Major, I'd be interested--you said in
your testimony that in talking with other people who have ALS
and other Gulf war veterans, that there seemed to be a common
thread. And you described that common thread as some kind of
subsequent exposure to a strong chemical or pesticide. Could
you elaborate on that?
Maj. Donnelly. Sure, Maj. Randy Ebert, U.S. Marine Corps,
testified before this committee--I don't know if you remember,
his dad read his testimony, his wife was there--he came back
from the Gulf and he was doing OK until they sprayed his house
for cockroaches. He happened to be in the house and in the
garage when they sprayed it. Immediately after that he started
having the same trouble I did.
Mr. Jeff Tack testified before this committee. He came back
from the Gulf, didn't feel quite right, but wasn't having any
serious problems until they treated his whole family and
himself with lindane for head lice because the school had been
having a problem. Right after that he started having the same
symptoms, and was subsequently diagnosed with ALS.
Mr. Allen. Do you take this to be an indication that
exposure to chemical agents can sensitize human beings to
subsequent exposure, so that the kind of exposure to malathion
or some other chemical agent that for most people would not
have an effect, for some people who have been previously
exposed would set off all the alarms or cause health problems
or contribute to the accentuation of health problems that they
already have to some degree?
Maj. Donnelly. Do I feel that's true?
Mr. Allen. Yes.
Maj. Donnelly. Absolutely. What you said--your opening
statement--was right on the head. You nailed it.
Mr. Allen. OK.
Maj. Donnelly. And you're going to find that some people, I
think, are genetically predisposed. Some people have
environmental or exposures prior to, which they are not able to
detox and the body hangs on to. It's like ripping a piece of
paper or filling a bucket with water: eventually you get the
last drop, which, if you follow that line of reasoning, they
should be warning the other people who are out there to say,
``Hey, either you stay away from that kind of stuff or you're
going to get sick, too.'' Some may not ever. Some people may be
able to handle it just fine.
Mr. Allen. Right.
Maj. Donnelly. But I don't want anybody else to have to go
through this.
Mr. Allen. I don't want anyone to do that, either.
Maj. Donnelly. Right.
Mr. Allen. Thank you very much.
Mr. Sanders. Would the gentleman yield briefly for a
second?
Mr. Allen. I'd be glad to yield.
Mr. Sanders. Mr. Allen touches on almost the definition of
what is now called multiple chemical sensitivity. And that is,
the body has absorbed a significant amount of chemicals and
then exposure to something new and strong occurs; it triggers
off a reaction. And I think the point that the major is making
is of extraordinary importance. And that is, we may have
hundreds, thousands--we don't know--of walking time bombs of
young men and women who served, who, if exposed to a strong
chemical, could trigger off a serious problem. And I think your
point is an excellent point, Major, in that to the degree that
we understand that, that word should get out, that if you think
you're sick now, stay away from these things. And did you want
to elaborate on that?
Maj. Donnelly. That would be preemptively treating people.
Mr. Sanders. That's right.
Maj. Donnelly. Yes.
Mr. Sanders. That's a very important point.
Mr. Allen. I'd be glad to yield the balance of my time.
Mr. Sanders. I'm fine.
Mr. Allen. Thank you very much.
Mr. Shays. We don't have a time problem in this committee.
And, so, we can come back. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Allen. Mr.
Kucinich.
Mr. Kucinich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members
of the committee. I want to say first that Chairman Shays, I
know you've held numerous hearings on this, and I'm proud to be
on your committee, because you've done an excellent job of
bringing this issue to light. When no one else really wanted
to, you'd pursued the truth on this. And the facts that are
being extracted are crucial to understand what happened in the
Gulf, and also crucial to helping veterans who have been told
too long that their symptoms are psychological.
And as has been pointed out by Representatives Sanders and
Allen, perhaps, to provide some further caution to those who
have not yet been affected by the symptoms but could be.
There's a few things that are apparent here, Mr. Chairman. And
that is that the Department of Defense failed to properly warn
of the dangers, that the Department of Defense failed to
properly diagnose or treat the veterans, that the Department of
Defense is failing to adequately compensate the people who have
been affected, and, based on what we just heard, that they are
failing further to caution in the sense to provide preemptive
treatment.
The question I have to all of these things that are
becoming obvious with the testimony is why. Why not inform
people if they're taking PB that there could be consequences
and symptoms based on the dosage? Or why not inform people that
malathion, whether it's sprayed in an area that's safe and in
the States or in the field, could have serious effects? Why not
inform people when they're being inoculated for these various
potential disease encounters that can have side effects.
I'm wondering why--and if it is true that the CIA in fact
didn't know in 1984 that the--we're told that the CIA has
received numerous warnings starting in 1984 that chemical
weapons were stored in Iraqi munitions bunkers, but failed to
alert the United States military. You know, you, the witnesses
here, you did not fail your country, your country is failing
you. And what we need to do in order that we justify your
presence in that war, is to get the answers: what did the CIA
know; when did they know it; why didn't they communicate it to
the Department of Defense or did they communicate it to the
Department of Defense; and for some nebulous idea of national
security, nothing was said?
Your presence here cries out for justice, for you
personally, for your fellow servicemen and servicewomen. But it
gets into some deeper issues of national security which have to
do with, if we knew those dangers were out there in the first
place and that our troops could be exposed to chemical weapons
in the first place, what in the world were they doing there?
And later on you pay the price. But, you know, Mr. Chairman and
members of this committee, there are profound national security
interests that were at stake there. But was the national
security best served by sending people out into an area when
the U.S. Government was in the position of information that
there were munitions stored there?
And they were in position of information because the CIA
received warnings. That's what we have a CIA for. And they're
supposed to pass that information on so that our men and women
out in the field are not going to be hurt, so that they're
protected. Now, it's not enough for the Department of Defense
to say that they really didn't know, and for the CIA to admit
that they had received some warnings but didn't pass it on. So,
this committee, while we have an obligation to assist you who
are testifying here today in getting vindication, in getting
treatment, but not just treatment. Because from what I hear
you've all been treated and treated and treated.
But what we're not being treated to by the Department of
Defense is the truth. It is reprehensible that people who have
these multiple symptoms are just told that it's all in their
minds. I'd like to know, Major, as a high ranking officer, were
you given any indication of the numerous dangers that could lie
ahead from your superiors?
Maj. Donnelly. I knew full well what the dangers were. I
knew they had chemical weapons. I knew they had surface-to-air
missiles. I knew they had AAA. I knew what I was getting myself
into when I signed up.
Mr. Kucinich. Were you told that the chemical weapons were
stored in Iraqi munitions bunkers?
Maj. Donnelly. I knew that they had storage areas and
production facilities. I was told that the way that we bombed
them and the munitions that we used to bomb them would totally
eradicate the material and not release into the atmosphere.
Because we were worried about that, too. But the munitions we
used against those known facilities and the way that we bombed
them was supposed to wipe this stuff out.
Mr. Kucinich. But that didn't happen? Or did it?
Maj. Donnelly. Well, I think evidence shows now that it
didn't happen.
Mr. Kucinich. And what kind of bombs were you using?
Maj. Donnelly. My unit specifically?
Mr. Kucinich. Right.
Maj. Donnelly. I did not use any--I used regular high
explosive incendiary bombs, some cluster bombs, things like
that.
Mr. Kucinich. Now, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee, one of the most difficult things for our country to
assess at any time is the possibility that we may have brought
greater casualties upon ourselves than the enemy did. And the
testimony here leaves so many open questions as to what you
were told and what happened that it not only justifies this
hearing but it justifies, I think, a deeper inquiry. I was
listening to the testimony, making out my own little chart here
of exposure symptoms and exposures--and people didn't have
symptoms, and people who weren't exposed and showed symptoms,
and people who neither had exposure nor showed symptoms.
And you wonder, if I can do that in a few minutes listening
to your testimony, why hasn't some person in the Department of
Defense who has lived with this for years been able to just do
a study which I think would probably demonstrate that people
who were exposed to PB, malathion, inoculations and chemical
warfare have been demonstrating these symptoms, and that people
who were exposed and perhaps didn't have symptoms, and then
come up with an epidemiological study. Mr. Sanders.
Mr. Sanders. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Kucinich. I'll yield.
Mr. Sanders. I think you raised the question that I raised
in my opening remarks, in that what is very frustrating for
many of us who have gone to these excellent hearings put
together by the chairman and his staff, is that these same
questions come up over and over again: why not, why not, why
not? Now, the good news is that outside of the Pentagon and the
VA some very serious research is being done showing the
correlation, the problems of the synergistic effect of PB and
various other chemical exposures. Some very important findings
are taking place. They're not taking place within the defense
establishment. The conclusion that I have reached, for whatever
reason--I'm not even interested in speculating--is that it
isn't going to happen.
You know, you can knock it and knock it and knock it. But
for whatever reason, it's not going to happen. Therefore, I
think we owe something to 70,000 veterans who are sick today to
say, ``Sorry, the defense industry is not going to do it. The
Defense Department is not going--we're going to have to go
where the action is.'' And there's some very fine researchers.
And I think we should bring them together, probably either at a
university or in a non-military agency of the U.S. Government,
bring the best minds together, develop a Manhattan type
project, say we want immediate analysis, diagnosis, and
treatment therapies. I don't think it's going to--I think if we
keep going with the DOD and the VA, we're going to have this
discussion 10 years from now. And I think we've got to
recognize that.
Mr. Kucinich. I thank the gentleman for his perceptive
comments. I think we also need to pursue this to make sure that
it doesn't happen again. Because PB is still being used. Is
that--I would assume. Does anyone have information to the
contrary? You know, there's still spraying with malathion going
on. It's still--I don't think it's banned. They're still
inoculating people if they're going into areas that are
potential hazards. And we still have the threat of chemical
warfare. That issue is before the Senate right now.
So, considering that all those factors are still evident, I
guess part of the challenge here is not only to try to remedy
the horrible pain and suffering that you've been through, along
with the other service persons, but also, what can we do to
make sure that this doesn't happen again? We're clearly being
given plenty of testimony to suggest that there is a causal
relationship here. And if there is, as your hearings have
revealed, Mr. Chairman, then we certainly are in a position to
make recommendations to be certain that more service men and
women are not going to be affected the way that you have.
Because we're doubtless going to be ending up in situations
in the future that are similar. How do we stop it from
happening again? Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, members of
the committee.
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman. And it's good to have you
on the committee. I just need to clarify a few points before we
go on to the next panel. All three of you were career
servicemen and women?
Maj. Donnelly. Yes, sir.
Sgt. Wood. Yes, sir.
Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig. Yes.
Mr. Shays. Note for the record all three have responded in
the affirmative. There are many things, as committees learn.
And we're getting to the point where we'll be issuing a report
and making some recommendations as well as continuing our
hearing. One thing that is very clear is that there is no one
illness, no one symptom, no one cause. That seems fairly clear.
Another thing that is eminently clear is that all of our
soldiers who were ill were voices crying in the wilderness
literally. And your treatment with, in many cases, with
military hospitals, and with the VA, were found wanting in a
significant way. That's very clear.
It's very clear that nobody wanted to know what you did in
the service. They didn't want to know how you were exposed. And
I can't think of anything more heart wrenching when you're in
front of someone who you're seeking help from who seems very
disinterested. It's also very clear to me that the military
misuses chemicals, workplace chemicals, in ways that we would
never allow in the public sector and in the private sector back
home. That is very clear to me. And with that, I first want to
ask you, Ms. Sumpter, Sergeant, you had experiences of using
lindane? Were you involved with using lindane on the troops, or
were you just in an area where that was happening?
Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig. KKMC was the area where we were
bringing any stray enemy prisoners of war in.
Mr. Shays. Right.
Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig. And there was a containment area. And
while we were guarding this perimeter--it was nothing more than
concertina wire in three different perimeters.
Mr. Shays. Right.
Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig. OK? There was the outside perimeter.
And they had a couple of guards. And then your inside perimeter
was a little more. And then further inside it was more. And
then there was the prisoners. And that's the only way that we
could contain them. And this was out in the open all day and
all night. And, yes. They sprayed them off out there. And with
the wind. And there's no trees. And the storms. Everything blew
back right in our faces.
Mr. Shays. OK. So, you weren't administering the spray, but
you were----
Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig. We all were wet with it when we were
out in that area.
Mr. Shays. OK. And this happened for an hour or so? Or did
this happen for days?
Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig. It depended on how rapidly we were
moving the prisoners in through this containment area and then
getting them to the hospital.
Mr. Shays. So, you were basically, in a sense, managing
these--herding people into one room--escorting them, whatever--
and so this happened on a continual basis?
Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. OK. Now, let me just--you had that experience.
Lindane, in this country, would be regulated in its use.
Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig. It's supposed to be regulated.
Mr. Shays. Yes.
Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig. But it was being used. These people
were really infested with a lot of little creatures.
Mr. Shays. Yes. OK. Now, when you came to both the military
hospital and the VA and you maybe explained an experience like
that, was there any interest?
Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig. Through the VA?
Mr. Shays. Yes.
Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig. There was some interest at the VA when
I was speaking with one of the specialists who was examining
the scars that I received over there.
Mr. Shays. How about the military hospital?
Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig. No.
Mr. Shays. Did you attempt to explain to them?
Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig. Yes, I did.
Mr. Shays. Now, you had another experience with the
chemical that--the canister and so on. Would you just very
briefly describe that again to me?
Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig. The chemical wash rack experience?
Mr. Shays. Yes.
Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig. We had received a damaged connex that
was brought in. We had no clue where it was, who it belonged
to. When we opened it, these chemicals all came out and hit the
water. We had a standing pool of water like this all the time.
We had fire hoses deconning the inside of these connexes for
shipment back to the United States. Everything had to be
cleaned and packed and made sure there was no living animals,
no plants, no illegal substances in the containers.
Mr. Shays. Right. And in the process of the chemical
spilling, what happened? Was there a fog? Was there a mist? Was
there a----
Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig. It was a really, really thick--if you
want to call it a mist, a fog. It just turned into this really
thick cloud of smoke.
Mr. Shays. Now, when you attempted to explain--because that
was of concern to you, correct?
Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig. Pardon me?
Mr. Shays. That was of concern to you?
Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig. Yes. That was a great concern to me.
We were working on this wash rack. And I've been a Customs
Inspector for 10 years. And they're telling me we don't need
any chemical protective gear out there. We're using equipment
to decon these containers, but we don't need any chemical
protective gear.
Mr. Shays. Let me just have a sense, never having served in
the military. If you said, ``There is no way in hell that I am
going to do this, because I think this is dangerous,'' what
would happen?
Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig. That was brought up several times by
myself and the other NCOs that were on the wash rack. We were
told to do our jobs, that the wash rack was priority No. 1, and
that all other matters were expendable.
Mr. Shays. So, you had concern at the time and wanted to
show more caution, but you were under orders to proceed?
Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig. We were under orders to proceed. This
was priority No. 1.
Mr. Shays. There's a gentleman in Connecticut who, from New
Britain--Sgt. Dulka--whose job was to spray lindane day in and
day out on the thousands of troops that were caught in his
area. He died of pancreas cancer, I think. And he was in a
confined area. I think he was actually in a tented area with no
ventilation for days in and days out. That would never be
allowed in a civilian population. The Government would go after
whoever did that and prosecute them. In Mr. Dulka's case, he
was under orders. He would have been court-martialed if he
didn't carry out his orders.
Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig. Correct.
Mr. Shays. So, one thing is very clear to me. The workplace
of the military, and what soldiers have to do, has to be
totally examined by the Defense Department. Anyhow, Mr. Wood,
your concern is that you were--Sergeant. I'm sorry.
Sgt. Wood. That's OK.
Mr. Shays. Your concern was that you were at Khamisiyah
exposed to the plumes, et cetera, from the blowing up of the
depo, is that correct?
Sgt. Wood. No, sir. I actually was sick before that
happened.
Mr. Shays. Pardon me?
Sgt. Wood. I was sick before those explosions occurred, a
day or two before. We went through and ammunition storage area
that had been blown up by the allies. There were chemical
rounds laying on the ground that I accidentally stumbled
across. And that was the day I got sick. And that has been
attested to by my commander at the time.
Mr. Shays. Now, again, you didn't find much sympathy when
you expressed concerns. First off, were you ever required to
carry out an order that you thought was dangerous to your
health, like Sgt. Sumpter; she and her crew expressed concern
about it. But you weren't in that same kind of circumstance.
You weren't administering chemicals and so on.
Sgt. Wood. No, sir.
Mr. Shays. But was there anything--did you have protective
gear?
Sgt. Wood. Yes, sir. We have protective gear.
Mr. Shays. Did you ever go to MOPP4?
Sgt. Wood. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. OK. How many times?
Sgt. Wood. I can't even begin to count, sir.
Mr. Shays. Seriously? More times than you can think of?
Sgt. Wood. Well, I also have trouble remembering, sir.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Sgt. Wood. But it was a minimum of 10 times we went to
MOPP4 before we even went into Iraq.
Mr. Shays. OK. And in every instance, you're being told
that that was a false alarm?
Sgt. Wood. Practice.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Sgt. Wood. Practice, sir.
Mr. Shays. It was practice. It was not based on an alarm?
Sgt. Wood. No, sir.
Mr. Shays. OK. So, you never had an alarm go off that said,
you better put on your gear?
Sgt. Wood. Almost every day during the air war, sir. Almost
every day during the air war our alarms went off. And at times,
the alarms would go off, and they would say, ``It's OK. Do not
put your gear on. This is practice.'' I would get into my truck
with my men to go pick up spare parts or deliver a port that
had to be taken somewhere else. And every other unit on the way
is in MOPP4.
Mr. Shays. OK. Now, but were you also in Khamisiyah, as
well?
Sgt. Wood. We were in the area. We were near An Nasiriyha,
is what we were told. And one explosion, in particular, that I
remember, was so huge it actually shook the tent sides. You put
sand on the side of the tent to hold it down, to keep wind from
blowing through. And it knocked the sand off the tents. It was
that big of an explosion. And we were told that we were near An
Nasiriyha.
Mr. Shays. Now, is it your testimony that your--your wife
is German, is that correct?
Sgt. Wood. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. And you live in Germany today?
Sgt. Wood. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. Is your testimony that you are there as a
convenience or because you believe that you will get better
health attention there? If health was not an issue, would you
be in the United States today?
Sgt. Wood. When I was being processed out of the military
for retirement, we had to decide what we wanted to do. We could
either stay in the United States or come to Germany. And we
weighed all of the possibilities. In the United States our
money would go much further, and we could have so much more in
housing and so forth. But I could not get medical care. I could
not get insurance. In Germany, I am covered. I am covered for
free. And the doctors have zero limitations on what they can
do. I am in Germany because of health care.
Mr. Shays. OK. You're in Germany because of health care,
but not because it's free?
Sgt. Wood. It is free for me, yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. No. But it would not be free for you in the
United States as a retired medically-discharged soldier? I'm
not clear about this.
Sgt. Wood. Access to the hospital would be free. Yes, sir.
Medical care? I have never seen it.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Sgt. Wood. In a military facility.
Mr. Shays. It is also regarding--I want to be really clear
on this.
Sgt. Wood. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. And I don't want to put words in your mouth.
Sgt. Wood. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. So, what I was hearing you imply was that you're
there because you also think you get better health attention,
not just because it's free?
Sgt. Wood. Yes, sir. To make it more specific. If I walked
into a military hospital today, after speaking with you, I
would still more than likely be told, ``There's nothing wrong
with you,'' be offered no treatment. But if I go to a German
physician, he will do tests. He will try to do his best to find
out what's wrong and treat me. Yes, sir. That's what I'm
saying.
Mr. Shays. And--does the gentleman need to yield?
Mr. Sanders. No. I was just--another subject. As an
advocate of a national health care system, which Germany has, I
think that tells us something about the care. But that's
another subject.
Mr. Shays. Well, but--and we can get into that--but what I
want to get into is, I just want to know if your testimony
today as an American citizen is that, as someone who I sent
with my vote, to the Persian Gulf, because I have absolute
total conviction that your mission was extraordinary
important----
Sgt. Wood. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays [continuing]. And I believe what all three of you
did was not just for the good of the United States and Europe,
but for the entire free world. I believe that with all my heart
and soul. I just want to know if you're saying to me that you
are in Germany today because you think that doctors in Germany
will pay more attention to you and provide better diagnosis and
treatment for you, even though you aren't even a German
citizen, than you would get in the United States? And that's
what I'm trying to nail down.
Sgt. Wood. Mr. Chairman, I am American. I love my country.
And it pains me terribly. But, yes, that is what I am saying. I
must live in Germany to get the care I need.
Mr. Shays. Would the issue of the nerve pills----
Sgt. Wood. Yes, sir?
Mr. Shays. The military had to go to the FDA and have an
informed consent waiver. The pyridostigmine bromide [PB] is
used for treatment of a particular illness.
Sgt. Wood. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. And this was being used in a different way. Now,
the military was given permission--allowed to have you all take
these pills. But they were not given permission not to inform
you. In other words, the deal was, you were to be informed.
Sgt. Wood. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. Now, all three of you took these pills. And I'm
going to ask each of you. Were you informed that this was, in a
sense, an experimental drug and it could have negative side
effects? And I'm going to ask each of you. Sgt. Wood.
Sgt. Wood. No, sir.
Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig. No, sir.
Maj. Donnelly. I don't recall. I was never given anything
in writing. I don't recall exactly what the flight surgeon said
when he put them down. I do remember a discussion of, what is
this?
Mr. Shays. Right.
Maj. Donnelly. Some kind of mistrust of it. But nothing any
specific----
Mr. Shays. That's just because you're a pilot.
Maj. Donnelly. Yes.
Mr. Shays. You're taught to think that way. You know, and
Major, I was thinking, you flew for almost 15 years.
Maj. Donnelly. Yes.
Mr. Shays. And you're in a wheel chair today. And you want
to be healthy. And you also probably want to fly.
Maj. Donnelly. Yes.
Mr. Shays. There's the one issue of the misuse of chemicals
by the military. And all military personnel being under orders
sometimes to use chemicals that is not appropriate. But you
follow orders. That's what you're taught. And then there's the
whole issue of offensive or defensive use of chemicals. In
other words, defensive is when we blew up chemical munitions
plants and depos of the Iraqis, some by plane, some by
personnel on the ground. Maj. Donnelly, are you aware whether
any of our targets were chemical plants?
Maj. Donnelly. I don't think I bombed specifically a
chemical plant. I bombed some weapons storage areas like
Khamisiyah. When you look at it from the air, it's a huge
complex. I have video tape from my airplane of Khamisiyah. We
used to fly the combat air patrols over that area after the war
was over in the no-fly zone. So, we would check on those areas
daily. I bombed several of those. Airplanes coming and going
inside of the theater. There was an iron highway of airplanes.
There were things blown up all over the place.
Mr. Shays. Is your concern just--we're going to get to the
next panel here, because I do know that we have to move on. But
let me understand this: Is your concern that you were exposed
to chemicals in flight or at your base, or both?
Maj. Donnelly. My base was outside of the range of any
known threat like the Scuds. I landed several times at a place
called KKMC. We used to do what we called quick turns out of
there. We'd land, get more bombs and fuel, go back up there. I
found out later that KKMC was one of the areas that they found
to be contaminated. Sometimes right after an early morning Scud
strike we'd land in there and everybody would be running around
talking about, we just had a Scud come in. Nobody in MOPP gear.
Or nobody other than just excited about the fact that a Scud
came in. I don't have a specific example when I can remember of
an event that happened to me during the war.
Mr. Shays. Yes. I'll just tell you, the last thing that I,
as chairman, at least, am wrestling with, and the committee in
general is wrestling with, and that is, we have testimony from
the VA and others that medical science doesn't know how to
truly diagnose and treat chemical exposure. That's the
testimony. And it's clear to us that the VA in particular has
very few people who have any expertise in chemical exposure.
And the goal of this committee is to properly have you
diagnosed, treated, and compensated for your service. And yet,
there are only two countries in the world--Israel and the
Netherlands--that have a specialty, a school that just focuses
in on chemical exposure. And my understanding is, our medical
institutions don't really provide much training, except there
are some who are industrial hygienists and environmental
toxicologists and so on.
But this is kind of a side issue for the military and the
VA. And it's conceivable that one of our recommendations will
be that we, like the Netherlands and Israel, have to do this.
But all of you--I mean, I know Maj. Donnelly, you spent time in
Texas, I believe, with someone who was trying to get the
chemicals out of your body. Did you feel that was a
constructive exercise?
Maj. Donnelly. I learned a lot that I didn't know before
about what we deal with in our environment every day. The
organo-phosphates are not testable inside of your body after
about 48 hours. So, it was an effort to see, given the options
I had, if that would do any good.
Mr. Shays. But the bottom line is, medical science kind of
looks, scans with discredit, at some of the things that you
found yourself wanting to experiment. Is that correct?
Maj. Donnelly. Right.
Mr. Shays. I mean, one was to kind of sweat out the
chemicals from your body. And you did all those kinds of
things. Correct?
Maj. Donnelly. Right.
Mr. Shays. Do you have any comment about that?
Maj. Donnelly. How much time you got?
Mr. Shays. We don't have a lot of time.
Maj. Donnelly. My main point on that is that I've learned a
lot about our medical system with all the doctors that I've
seen. They are not open to leading edge investigation of
anything. If it's not written and published in an AMA journal
or JAMA or something, it does not exist. That's the problem
with treating Gulf war illness, is that people buy the--they
buy the misdirection. They buy the misinformation coming out of
our Government that there is not Gulf war illness. So, they
don't even look, some of them. There are some who believe there
is something there. You don't have to look hard to see. You
know, here we are. I'm not a rocket scientist, but even a pilot
can figure that one out.
Mr. Sanders. Let me interrupt you, if I might, Major,
because I think you put your finger--all of you are doing a
terrific job, and I appreciate it. You put your finger right on
the issue. I don't think that there's malice. We all believe
that the DOD and the VA want to do the right thing. But what
you're suggesting--you used the word cutting edge. The VA and
the DOD are not cutting edge. Unfortunately, if you guys were
shot, they probably are the best doctors in the world. We can
do something fantastic things for battlefield injuries. The orb
is that what you are suffering from is not conventional type of
wounds and injuries.
You are probably--you know, I'm not a doctor--but evidence
that we have heard before this committee is that you may be
suffering from a synergistic impact of different type of
chemicals combined with the drugs that you took. And you know
what? The Major is absolutely right. There's virtually no
knowledge of that within the DOD and the VA right now. The
point that I'm trying to make is that we're going to have to go
outside of the system to those cutting edge people, who may be
doing experimental things. Maybe they're not right 100 percent
of the time. But to do the same old thing when they're not
making the diagnosis or coming up with the treatment is
knocking our heads against the wall. Is that what you're
saying, Major?
Maj. Donnelly. Absolutely.
Mr. Sanders. But what's troubling is, after World War I,
the general--Dr. Joseph, when he was testifying before us,
basically made the analogy that if they weren't--and I have to
be fair to him, because I don't have the record in front of
me--but I'll tell you my interpretation. My interpretation was
that if they weren't dying on the battlefield because of
chemical exposure, there was no chemical exposure.
Maj. Donnelly. Right.
Mr. Sanders. And yet we know in this environment in the
Unit- ed States, that low-level chemical exposure leads to bad
health and ultimately death. We know that. What's hard for me
to reconcile-- and I'm saying this, Dr. Rostker, there's a
possibility that you could respond to it, who will appear in
the next panel--what is troubling me is if in World War I, we
knew that some soldiers died on the battlefield because of
nerve agents and so on, others came back home and died years
later, but prematurely because of low-level ex- posure. We know
that happened in World War II, the Korean war.
We do know that with radiation--nuclear radiation--men and
women who were--particularly men who were cleaning the planes,
and others who were exposed to nuclear radiation with Agent Or-
ange--it would seem to me that the Pentagon would have the top
experts with chemical exposures. And it seemed to me the VA
would have it. And we wouldn't just be great at dealing with a
bul- let wound or some shrapnel wound. So, that's what this
committee is wrestling with. You know, we want to have these
hearings. We want to also lead it to some conclusion.
One thing we do know--or at least we're convinced--you
wouldn't know about Khamisiyah today if it wasn't for these
hear- ings. So, we know that there's some good in that. And the
other thing we do know is that your testimony is very powerful,
is abso- lutely the core of it. You are the most important
people that will appear before us today, without any question.
And as someone who played a part in sending you there, I want
to play a part in making sure you get better. So, I thank you--
all three of you--for being here.
Sgt. Wood. Thank you.
Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig. Thank you.
Maj. Donnelly. Thank you.
Mr. Sanders. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. We will go to our next panel. And we'll just
maybe take a 2-minute break to exchange the witnesses.
[Recess.]
Mr. Shays. I'd like to begin with or second panel: Dr.
Bernard Rostker, the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses
at the Department of Defense, Mr. Robert Walpole, Special
Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses for the Central Intelligence
Agency. Mr. Walpole, is that a new position?
Dr. Walpole. Yes, it is.
Mr. Shays. And Mr. Donald Mancuso, Deputy Inspector
General, Department of Defense. I think, as you all know, we
have a tradition, we swear in all our witnesses, including
Members of Congress.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Shays. For the record, our witnesses have responded in
the affirmative. I think we're going to be able to--do any of
you have time restraints other than Mr. Rostker. I mean, I
think we won't have any--Dr. Rostker. I'm sorry. Does anyone
else have any time restraint?
Mr. Rostker. No, sir.
Mr. Shays. I appreciate the fact that you all three were
here for the testimony of our veterans. And that means a lot to
this committee that you were here for their testimony. And also
thank you for not doing what some like to do and say, ``We're
here in official capacity and would like to be first.'' So, I
also thank you for that. While I pointed out that the first
panel was the first important, it's all in degrees. And you are
a very important panel, and it's nice to have you here. And Dr.
Rostker, I think we'll start with you.
Mr. Rostker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Sanders. Thank you for your testimony. It was very
helpful.
Mr. Shays. Will you lower your mic just a bit?
STATEMENTS OF BERNARD ROSTKER, SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR GULF WAR
ILLNESSES, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; ROBERT WALPOLE, SPECIAL
ASSISTANT FOR GULF WAR ILLNESSES, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY;
AND DONALD MANCUSO, DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
Mr. Rostker. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to
appear before the subcommittee this morning. In previous
testimony presented in January, I outlined the mission of my
office and described the full extent of the commitment of the
Department of Defense. It is imperative that we find out
everything we can to determine the possible causes of illness
while providing the best possible care for those who are ill.
We also have an eye toward the future as we learn from our Gulf
experience and make the necessary changes in policy, doctrine,
technologies to protect our forces in the future.
With that as sort of my mission, I would like to comment on
this morning's testimony which I applaud the committee for, and
I personally found very useful. Three points that I think might
help you put the testimony this morning in perspective. First
of all, you know of our significant efforts to understand low-
level chemical exposure and Khamisiyah. But that's not all
we're doing. And we've stood up an environmental team which is
explicitly charged to look at issues such as pesticides.
They are of great concern to us. And we are trying to
understand how they were used in the Gulf and the possible
health consequences from their use. We've also commissioned a
medical review paper that would provide us with state-of-the-
art knowledge about what you've talked about as multiple
chemical exposures, or I like to think of the hyper-sensitivity
to chemicals, and that those issues are also part of our focus
for new research. So, we share your concerns for the issues
that we raised this morning about pesticides. An issue was
raised, also, about incident reporting. And one of the Members
made reference to the fact that there were people here and
there might be a cluster.
We might have seen a unit that had an exposure. And wasn't
anybody in the Department of Defense looking at that. In fact,
we are. We have a 800 number that is doing exactly that. And
it's highlighted in this little handout that we give out to
veterans, and has been on armed forces radio and television.
The item on the back says DOD incident reporting line. It
focuses on examining incidents which occurred during the Gulf,
the hazardous exposures that may have resulted from these
incidents, and the broader implications of such incidents.
So, we are very eager to track down the kind of clusters
that we discussed here this morning, and to try to make sense
of them within the broad pattern. So, the question of was
anybody interested in the Defense Department, the answer is,
yes. We are very interested in talking to people that have had
these kinds of experiences. As you well know, the only way
we're going to get at what happened in the Gulf is to talk with
and involve the people who served in the Gulf in our inquiries.
And that's a major focus of what we have been doing.
Finally, the issue of ALS was raised, and questions were
asked about, well, couldn't we figure out what the incidents of
ALS is. In fact, we've done that. After your hearings in
December where somebody with ALS was also a witness, I went
back and asked exactly that question. Currently, the two
combined registries--the defense registry and the VA registry--
are carrying nine veterans who have a diagnosis of ALS. The
normal rate of occurrence for ALS within the general population
under 40 per 100,000 of population is between 1.0-1.5. In other
words, for the population that served in the Gulf, we would
expect to see roughly between 7 and 11 cases of ALS. And we're
looking at nine cases of ALS.
I can provide for the record the more specific numbers and
the site for the general population if you'd like, sir. But
that doesn't take away from the tragic nature of the disease.
And our hearts go out to the Major. And we wish he and his
family the best. But those are the basic statistics as we
understand them. Having said that, let me now return and review
for you some of the significant progress we have made since I
last appeared before the subcommittee.
We have embarked on a comprehensive research program which
has resulted in many proposals being received to examine the
consequences of a number of potential causes for illnesses, but
particularly low-level chemical agents. The proposals are
undergoing internal and external non-DOD peer review. Awards
will be made. We have eliminated the backlog of calls from
veterans who contacted the 800 number that I just referred to.
Approximately 90 percent of those who have called have been
fully debriefed by a trained investigator. That's around 1,600
phone calls.
Our technique is to take the initial call, and then within
72 hours a trained investigator calls back and does a complete
debrief, ensuring that the information is passed to the right
analysis team, assuring that we maintain contact with the
veteran. These debriefs often last for well over an hour, and
some over 2 hours. In reality, it's not just debriefing on what
happened in the Gulf, but talking to the veteran and often
referrals to the VA, and other issues are raised and we try to
deal with them.
But we've accomplished over 1,600. In truth, sir, we have
more people working the telephones--the 800 number--than the
department had investigating Gulf illnesses before my group was
stood up. We have launched an outreach effort, in January
mailing surveys to approximately 20,000 Gulf war veterans who
may have been within 50 kilometers of Khamisiyah. To date, more
than 6,000 veterans have responded. Of that number,
approximately 300 commented on their illness or health, and
approximately 300 provided information on what they saw in
Khamisiyah. And all of these are in the process of receiving
phone calls and being debriefed.
The latter group receives followup calls from the
investigation to try to understand specifically what they may
or may not have seen at Khamisiyah. Our GulfLINK home page is
now interactive. Veterans now can e-mail their concerns. And
we've opened up a two-way dialog with the veterans rather than
a static home page. We've also gone to news articles on the
home page so that we can communicate to the veterans what we're
doing and what's going on rather than just posting transcripts
of hearings, although I'm sure, sir, you appreciate that the
transcripts of your hearings are outstanding.
And the veterans need to see that. But there's more that
we're doing than just testifying. We have strengthened our
relations with the veterans service organizations and the
military service organizations with monthly roundtables on such
topics as the chemical gear used in the Gulf, depleted uranium
and the like. And as you know, I kicked off a nine city town
hall tour. Last night I was at the American Legion post in
Atlanta. And tonight I'll be in Boston. These meetings are
productive, and they provide the front-line contact that is
necessary for us to fully appreciate the concerns of our
veterans.
I know the committee has been concerned about the missing
portions of the chemical and biological logs. The investigation
of the CENTCOM chem logs has been turned over to the DODIG. My
office has taken this investigation to a point where the
assignment to the DODIG is quite appropriate to provide the
additional resources that her office can provide. Our inquiry,
which will be expanded by the DODIG, indicates that the
chemical log pages that survived were extracted from a full set
of logs that survived at least until 1994.
We believe they survived because the specific pages that--
the 30-some odd pages that we still have--we believe they
survived because they were used to prepare testimony for the
defense science board. In other words, these were the pages
that were actually taken out of the larger number of pages in
the log because they carried significant chemical events. With
the exception of Khamisiyah, almost every major chemical event
we are investigating, such as the Czech-French detections, the
Marine breaching operation which was testimony here to your
committee, are carried in the chemical logs.
Moreover, we would not expect to see Khamisiyah on these
pages because it was not viewed or reported by the troops on
the scent at the time as a chemical event. It is my best
assessment that these missing pages did not contain information
about chemical exposures. In addition, we do have the core
situation reports for the 18th Airborne Corps for the specific
days around Khamisiyah. And they do not mention chemical events
at Khamisiyah. We also have the logs for the 82nd Airborne
Division, of which the 37th Engineers was a part. And they also
do not mention chemicals at Khamisiyah. They do talk about the
explosions that went on at Khamisiyah, but there was no
reporting of chemicals.
There are a number of other collateral efforts underway to
obtain more detailed information which is supportive of the
work in my office. The Army IG is also conducting an
investigation of the events at Khamisiyah. And we are providing
them with additional leads as we gain those leads. So this is
an independent effort. But we are coordinating to make sure
that their effort is fully comprehensive to our best knowledge
of any supporting events. The assistant to the Secretary of
Defense for intelligence oversight is undertaking an
independent and further investigation of what the intelligence
community, and particularly the defense intelligence community,
knew concerning Khamisiyah before and after the events at
Khamisiyah.
These investigators are well-coordinated and we welcome
their support in this action. Some of the efforts of the
investigators involved continued--we continue to search and
interview veterans who were in the Khamisiyah area at the time
of the demolitions. Working with the CIA, we are trying to
estimate what is known as the source term, or how much agent
may have been released at Khamisiyah, and then what the wind
patterns were that might have carried the agent over American
troops.
Because our position time data base is frankly so poor,
it's a bottom up data base. We are assembling this month the
division commanders and brigade commanders from the 18th
Airborne Corps who were in the Gulf. And we're using their
expertise of their military operations to try to identify any
additional troops that might not have been captured in the
official data base of time and location. And we're also
conducting an analysis of participation rates in the combined
CCEP and VA registry to see if there is any pattern of
participation in those registries that might be correlated with
time and location of Khamisiyah.
All of these efforts are directed toward a single purpose
of determining what is causing our veterans to be ill. While
doing this, we are ensuring that Gulf war veterans are
receiving the best possible care. Finally, we then must make
certain to apply the lessons learned for the Gulf to our future
deployments. You have my commitment that no effort will be
spared to determine that causes of these illnesses and respond
to the health needs of our veterans. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rostker follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.053
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.054
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.055
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.056
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.057
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.058
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.059
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.060
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.061
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.062
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.063
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.064
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.065
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.066
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.067
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.068
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.069
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.070
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.071
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.072
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.073
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.074
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.075
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.076
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.077
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Dr. Rostker. Mr. Walpole.
Mr. Walpole. Thank you, Chairman Shays, Congressman
Sanders. I appreciate the opportunity, as well, to appear
before you today to discuss CIA's and the intelligence
community's efforts on the issue of Gulf war veterans'
illnesses and possible exposure of some of those veterans to
chemical weapons agent. We know how important this issue is to
veterans, and that our intelligence is essential to
understanding what occurred during and immediately after the
war.
In fact, I would like to submit for the record a copy of
the Khamisiyah historical perspective paper and the 41
documents that we released with that, because it helps
understand what was known about Khamisiyah since 1976 on that
issue. In response to President Clinton's tasking to his
advisory committee on Gulf war veterans illnesses, and after
determining that the issue required additional resources,
George Tenet, Acting Director of Central Intelligence,
appointed me his Special Assistant. And that was on February
27.
So, from that point it was a new position. And he asked me
to have a task force running by March 3. Since that time, we
have made efforts to keep the staff of this subcommittee as
well as several other committees apprised of our efforts. The
purpose of our efforts is to help find answers as to why the
veterans are sick. And I particularly appreciate the couple of
hours spent this morning with some of those veterans. It helps
keep our focus on that purpose. We're supporting numerous
Government efforts on this issue and are searching for any
intelligence we have in our files that can help answer those
questions.
Let me turn first to our mission. Our mission is to provide
aggressive, intensive intelligence support to the numerous
efforts underway within the Government. We have 50 officers
serving on the task force from across the intelligence
community. That's from the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and the
National Imagery and Mapping Agency. We also have individuals
from Department of Defense's Office of the Special Assistant
for Gulf War Illnesses as well as the Assistant to the
Secretary for Intelligence Oversight. The task force is
managing and reviewing all intelligence aspects related to this
issue, with the goal of getting to the bottom of it.
Specifically, the task force provides intelligence support
across several fronts. On the document side, that's search,
declassification and sharing of those documents. And the 41, I
mentioned earlier, are part of that declassification effort. On
modeling support, on committees with the Department of Defense,
the President's Advisory Committee, you here on the Hill,
veterans groups, and others in the Government.
And, finally, on supportive analysis. This is the first
time that we have fully integrated an analytical component into
a task force on this issue. This gives us an opportunity to run
to ground any threat of information that we find that might be
of interest on this issue, as well as to provide papers that
provide analytical context to the documents that we release.
And the historical perspective is one example of that. Another
was released on March 18, in Salt Lake City in the hearing with
the PAC, when we prepared a one-page paper telling a little bit
about Khamisiyah and the demolition there.
And we included photographs on this to support that--was to
see if we could get any veterans to come forward that recalled
this site and could provide any further information to us. At
that time, we only had two soldiers that we were able to
interview and sort out what was going on in the pit. And there
was a lot of confusion. I'll get to that later. In fact, this
morning, when we heard Major Donnelly mention that he had a
video tape of Khamisiyah from the air. That could be helpful in
our modeling efforts. That could be helpful in determining what
happened. If the tape was either before demolition occurred or
after, it could provide significant information for us on that.
The day after we released that particular document DOD
received numerous calls on the 1-800 number. Some recalled
having been at Khamisiyah. Those kinds of efforts have been
helpful in helping this effort move along. I'm aware that this
subcommittee is interested in our modeling efforts. And let me
discuss that briefly. Several developments have occurred in
this area that I'd like to elaborate on. To begin with, in the
past we were able to model the demolition events or the
bombings at Al Muthanna, Mu-hammadiyat and Bunker 73, largely
because we had ground tests back in the 60's that let us know
what happened to an agent when it was destroying inside of a
building.
When we turned our efforts to modeling, to the pit, we
quickly realized that the uncertainties were significant,
particularly how the rocket warheads would react in a
demolition in an open pit. We're also uncertain about the
number of events that occurred. We believed in March, when I
testified in Salt Lake City, on the basis of limited and often
contradictory data, that two events were more likely than one.
These data included a military log entry indicating the March
12 demolition occurred, and then contradictory stories from two
soldiers and an UNSCOM video tape.
CIA and DOD have devised a joint plan to reduce some of
those uncertainties. This plan includes additional soldier
interviews and simulation testing. We've conducted several
other interviews. In fact, we've more than doubled the number
of soldiers that recall being in the area, and have met with
them. And one of the things that they've indicated to us was
that the log in question was completed after the fact and that
we should not rely on the March 12 date. When we learned that--
and questioning that March 12 entry--the only prudent course
was to model one event. And so we're now back to modeling one
event on March 10.
Now, if we receive further information and if the video
tape sheds light on this--that could be some of that further
information--of course we'll modify the approach. We're also
jointly developing tests with the Department of Defense to
destroy rockets containing CW agent simulants in an open pit
environment. We expect this to provide us invaluable data on
how the agent would react in that environment, similar to the
data we had on earlier testing and buildings. And then we would
plan to publish these modeling results by the end of July.
During our initial efforts on Khamisiyah, we determined
that certain intelligence documents were critical to answering
the questions: what did the intelligence community know when,
and what did we do with that information? We began briefing
these documents to the Presidential Advisory Committee and
appropriate congressional committees. We also began
simultaneous efforts to declassify key papers and to search for
other material relevant to these questions. As the work
progressed, we determined that an unclassified paper
documenting the historical perspective on this would be
valuable to anyone looking at those documents.
The paper, which was released on April 9, provides details
about the intelligence community's knowledge before, during and
after the war relative to Khamisiyah. The documents released
and the Khamisiyah paper do not change our judgment that Iraq
did not use chemical weapons during Desert Storm. Nor does it
change the fact of our warnings that Iraq would likely deploy
chemical munitions to the theater and would be prepared to use
them. Nor that they did not mark their chemical munitions.
In detailing the historical perspective, the paper and
documents illustrate warnings the intelligence community
provided to CENTCOM elements including J-2, targeting elements,
ARCENT, the U.S. Marine Corps and Air Force representatives
prior to the demolition activities in March 1991. At the same
time, however, the paper illustrates that intelligence support,
particularly in the areas of information sharing and analysis,
should have been better. The task force is preparing
recommendations to address these problems, and will continue to
assess how we ensure that they do not occur in the future.
On other document efforts, we're continuing document
searches on Iraqi CW sites as well as any intelligence related
to potential biological warfare, radiological exposure and
environmental issues. We're using the original search criteria
that previous task forces have used, but we have not augmented
those criteria by extending the timeframes and topical search
terms. Intelligence that we find that sheds light on the
veterans' illnesses and will help the Presidential Advisory
Committee, Persian Veterans Coordinating Board and others
understand these issues will be identified and declassified.
Any documents that cannot be released for reasons of
national security will be delivered to relevant U.S. Government
agencies, the President's Advisory Committee and congressional
committees that are following the issue. We also plan to write
analytical papers similar to the one I mentioned here, to help
readers put all of the information into context.
In conclusion, I want to reiterate George Tenet's
commitment, the commitment in the intelligence community and my
personal commitment to the men and women who served this
country in the Persian Gulf. We owe them a full and accurate
accounting of what happened. To that end, the intelligence
material we released on Khamisiyah gives the veterans and the
American citizens a clearer understanding of what we knew and
how we used that material. Helping relevant agencies determine
what is making some of our Gulf veterans ill is critical and
will remain our central focus. We
stand behind our contributions to national security, and are
working to enhance our support for the future. Thank you.
[Note.--The report entitled, ``Khamisiyah: A Historical
Perspective on Related Intelligence,'' can be found in
subcommittee files.]
[The prepared statement of Mr. Walpole follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.078
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.079
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.080
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.081
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.082
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.083
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.084
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.085
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.086
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.087
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.088
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.089
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.090
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.091
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.092
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.093
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.094
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.095
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.096
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.097
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.098
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.099
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.100
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.101
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.102
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.103
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.104
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.105
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.106
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.107
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.108
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.109
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.110
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.111
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.112
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.113
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.114
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.115
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.116
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.117
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.118
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.119
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.120
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.121
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.122
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.123
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.124
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.125
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.126
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.127
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.128
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.129
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.130
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.131
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.132
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.133
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.134
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.135
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.136
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.137
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.138
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.139
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.140
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.141
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.142
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.143
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.144
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.145
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.146
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.147
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.148
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.149
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.150
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.151
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.152
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.153
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.154
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.155
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.156
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.157
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.158
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.159
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.160
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.161
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.162
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.163
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.164
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.165
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.166
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.167
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.168
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.169
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.170
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.171
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.172
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.173
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.174
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.175
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.176
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.177
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.178
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.179
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.180
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much, Mr. Walpole. We'll now hear
from the Deputy Inspector General, Mr. Mancuso.
Mr. Mancuso. Thank you. Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittee, I am pleased to be here today to discuss the
effort now underway by the Office of the Inspector General to
find the logs maintained by the nuclear, biological and
chemical desk officers at the United States Central Command in
Saudi Arabia during the Gulf war.
As you are aware, the Office of the Special Assistant for
Gulf War Illnesses, in its efforts to identify the cases of a
number of illnesses being suffered by Gulf war veterans learned
that logs that might contain information of value in this work
had been kept in Central Command J-3 Operations Center in
Riyadh. An effort was begun in January 1997 by that office to
find those logs.
On March 3, 1997, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed
that the Inspector General take over the inquiry and carry it
to conclusion. Specifically, the Deputy Secretary asked that we
follow all leads that can be identified on the location of the
original log or copies in electronic or hard copy versions,
gather all originals and copies that can be located, and, if a
full copy of the log cannot be located, to explain why.
To accomplish this task, we formed a team of five senior
criminal investigators supported by a staff of four auditors
and investigative support personnel. The team's activities are
being closely directed by senior investigative managers, and is
supplemented by additional staff as needed. Initially, our
investigative approach focused on collecting and analyzing the
considerable investigative record created by the Special
Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses.
That effort included reviewing numerous detailed
transcribed interviews of officers assigned to the NBC desk
during the war, interviews of other persons who may had access
to the logs after the war, as well as many telephonic and
written requests for information from sources throughout the
Department of Defense. Based on our review and analysis, we
have identified areas where the coverage provided by the
Special Assistant was thorough, and other areas where we felt
that additional professional investigative effort would be
useful.
For example, we are interviewing every available witness
who was directly involved in the creation of the CENTCOM NBC
desk logs in Riyadh, or whom we know was in possession of the
logs or any portion of those logs at Central Command in Tampa,
after the conclusion of the Gulf war. The investigation is now
in progress, and we are receiving the full cooperation and
support of all affected elements of the Department.
As you know, we do not comment on the details of active
investigators, both to avoid jeopardizing investigative effort,
and to protect the privacy and reputation of parties involved.
I can assure you, however, that we fully recognize the
importance of this investigation. We prioritized our efforts in
order to complete the work as thoroughly and as quickly as
possible. Upon completion, the results of the investigation
will be provided to the Secretary of Defense, the Presidential
Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans Illnesses, and the
Congress. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mancuso follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.181
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.182
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.183
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much. Mr. Sanders.
Mr. Sanders. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. You know,
one of the problems with this whole issue is there are so many
aspects of it that my office is rapidly becoming overflowing
with papers in a dozen different areas. So, what I want to
begin with is by focusing on health issues. And I want to chat
with Dr. Rostker for a minute. Doctor, first of all, let me
begin by saying that since you've been on board--when did you
come on board?
Mr. Rostker. November 12 as Special Assistant.
Mr. Sanders. I appreciate your efforts in trying to open up
the process and get quick responses back to people who are
asking questions. I would suggest to the audience that there
has been a significant improvement since you've come on board.
And I appreciate that.
Mr. Rostker. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Sanders. I'm sure the veterans community does, as well.
What I would like to do, though, is to ask you some questions.
And maybe you can help me out. Because I'm starting from the
premise that throughout this country and in the veterans
community, there is a lot of cynicism, to say the least, toward
the DOD and the VA in terms of their response from day 1--well
before you were on board--to this problem. And I would just
like to ask you a few questions.
You heard today--today, after so many years, so many
articles, so much discussion--you heard some of our veterans
saying that even today when they go to speak to medical people
within the veterans system, that they're still told that the
problem was in their head. Would it be fair of me to say that
at least at the very beginning this problem was minimized by
the DOD? Is that a fair statement?
Mr. Rostker. Yes.
Mr. Sanders. OK. Is it a fair statement to say that the DOD
minimized the problems of chemical exposure, that the DOD
position until not so long ago was, ``Hey, our soldiers were
not exposed to chemicals?'' Is that a fair statement?
Mr. Rostker. Yes.
Mr. Sanders. OK. Is it a fair statement--well, let me ask
you this question, as you know, a few months ago, the
President's Advisory Commission did a whole lot of work, and
they relied on the DOD and the CIA and other Government
agencies for a lot of their information, and they came to the
conclusion that while there were a number of other areas that
yet remained to be explored, that they thought that stress was
perhaps the major cause of Persian Gulf syndrome. Am I
characterizing them fairly?
Mr. Rostker. I believe they drew that conclusion on their
own. I would not characterize--they drew that on their own.
Mr. Sanders. I didn't mean to be so hard on you. We haven't
even begun this yet.
Mr. Rostker. And they relied on their own witnesses. We
have--we treat stress and all of the other potential causes in
an open way. My office has drawn no conclusion on any of the
potential causes.
Mr. Sanders. Right. And I'm not for a moment suggesting
that stress is probably not a factor. But my point was--you're
suggest- ing that they were independent. But on the other hand,
we knew that they fired Dr. Jonathan Tucker--and I know that's
not your thing--but he went outside of the usual channels to
try to get some information. Now let me ask you this, if I
might: Dr. Robert Haley----
Mr. Rostker. Yes.
Mr. Sanders [continuing]. Is a researcher at the
Southwestern Medical Center at the University of Texas. And he
suggests, based on his studies, that ``the syndromes are due to
subtle brain, spinal cord and nerve damage, but not stress. The
damage was caused by exposure to combinations of low-level
chemical nerve agents and other chemicals including
pyridostigmine bromide in anti-nerve gas tablets, DEET in a
highly concentrated insect repellent and pesticides in flea
collars that some troops wore.'' What do you think?
Mr. Rostker. Dr. Haley's work was published with an unusual
editorial that accompanied it by the, I believe, the New
England Journal of Medicine, and it was the subject of a number
of further editorials and comments. I believe his research is
suggestive. But the tenor of those comments are that the
conclusions are a bit strong based upon the research. Now, I
believe Dr. Haley intends to extend that research. And I'm sure
we support the extension of that research.
But that actual reports and the actual research are a bit
toned down from the stark conclusions that Dr. Haley has
brought forward. And that was the judgment in the editorials
that, in the New England Journal, that accompanied the research
at the same time. I would also point out that Dr. Haley's
research, as best I understand it--and I am not a physician--
did not carry with it suggestions for treatment. And that's one
of the major concerns that we have.
Mr. Sanders. OK. But quoting Maj. Donnelly before--he made
a very important point--you see, and here's the problem, and I
want to stay on it for a while. Multiple chemical sensitivity
today, to the best of my knowledge, is not an allowable
diagnosis according the American Medical Association.
Mr. Rostker. You're in an area that I'm not----
Mr. Sanders. OK. And you may not know. I may be wrong. But
I believe that that is a case. In other words, it's a
controversial diagnosis. OK? That's true. Controversial. Some
doctors believe it, some doctors don't. And the chairman tells
me it's true. All right.
Mr. Shays. That is one thing we can agree on.
Mr. Sanders. OK. Controversial. But here is the problem.
And this is exactly what the problem is and concerns me very
much. If we have 70,000 people who are hurting--is that a fair
number? Is that a good number? It's the number I've heard.
Mr. Rostker. We can split the registries into different
ways. But there are about 70,000 or more who have actually been
examined. The vast majority of those people have real
diagnoses. And I think the residual with unknown diagnoses are
substantially smaller than that.
Mr. Sanders. OK.
Mr. Rostker. And we can provide that for the record.
Mr. Sanders. But hold on. Here's the problem, you see: the
AMA does not have a diagnosis, the VA does not have a
diagnosis, the DOD does not have a diagnosis. But then when
people come forward--and I'm a layman, I'm not a medical
specialist--with work that makes some of us believe that
they're moving in the right direction, then people say, ``Hey,
you know, where is the peer review? Give us more.'' And this is
the dilemma that the major, I think, correctly put his finger
on. You are not succeeding. In other words, if we were--we're
politicians. If we kept running for office every time we kept
losing and getting 2 percent of the vote, we'd have to re-
evaluate. The general consensus is, you're failing. You are not
solving the problem. And that we should be looking to more, to
quote the Major, cutting edge type research.
Mr. Rostker. And I absolutely agree with you. That's why,
in the construct of my office, we are not just focusing on the
possibility of chemical exposures. That's why we have gone out
and commissioned an outside review of the issues of pesticides
and multiple chemical exposures.
Mr. Sanders. Who have you gone to? Who have you gone to
that knows these subjects?
Mr. Rostker. To pull it together, we've gone the RAND
Corporation, and they, through their health program, are
bringing in people who have expertise.
Mr. Sanders. What kind of expertise? Do they have expertise
on multiple chemical synergy?
Mr. Rostker. Yes.
Mr. Sanders. Really?
Mr. Rostker. Yes.
Mr. Sanders. OK. You will furnish us those names?
Mr. Rostker. I will, sir.
Mr. Sanders. OK. Because this is the problem. And it's not
a personal criticism of you. You have within the medical
community strong philosophical differences about the validity
of multiple chemical sensitivity. And we can bring the best
experts in this country on multiple chemical sensitivity to
most doctors, and you know what they'll say: charlatans,
quacks, we don't want to hear this stuff. And this is my
concern. I don't know that the people that you're going to can
peer review the work that others are doing.
Mr. Rostker. I can only say I share all of your concerns.
That's why within the construct of what my charter is, we have
not drawn a conclusion. We have thrown it open. We are
explicitly looking at that. We are prepared to, within the
dollars allocated for medical research this year, to carry on
research in this whole area. I happen to agree with your
concerns.
Mr. Sanders. All right. Let me go on.
Mr. Rostker. But we have to go forward in a structured,
reasonable way. And that's what we're trying to do.
Mr. Sanders. I've heard that for years. OK. All right. Let
me just ask you another question. Doctors Muhammad Abou-Donia--
I'm probably mispronouncing the name--and Dr. Tom Kurt, Duke
University Medical Center. They used chickens because, I
gather, that the chickens respond similarly to how humans
respond. And they found that two pesticides--DEET and
hermathrine--and the anti-nerve gas agent, PB, were harmless
when used alone, but when in used with combination the
chemicals caused neurological problems similar to those
reported by some Gulf war veterans. How does the DOD feel about
that research?
Mr. Rostker. It goes all into the review we're making of PB
and the medical aspects of PB.
Mr. Sanders. Who is making? You see, I'm going to be hard
on you here. Because that's not a good enough answer.
Mr. Rostker. OK.
Mr. Sanders. I don't know that you--so, in other words--not
a personal criticism, but I think if, for example, as the
chairman was mentioning before, if your soldiers, God forbid,
get injured in the field of battle, in many, many ways you guys
are probably the best in the world in putting people back
together. And I suspect you perform miracles. I think in this
area you're not doing well.
Mr. Rostker. Well, I can only say that we have an ongoing
program to extend our frontiers of medical knowledge. I'm sure
you would agree that's the appropriate thing to do. We're eager
to learn more about the issues of pesticides, the issues of PB
in combination. We have not drawn a conclusion.
Mr. Sanders. All right. But here's the point: we're going
to hear testimony in a few minutes after you're through, about
people who are going to tell us about PB. And what they're
going to say--at least one of the gentleman--it's going to be
pretty frightening stuff. You are interested in learning. Well,
we're all interested in learning. But we have tens of thousands
of people who are hurting. Why are we--tell me what the DOD is
doing with regard to PB?
Mr. Rostker. Well, as I've indicated, we have the existing
research. We're trying to extend the research to better inform
ourselves about it. Your hearings here and the information
available to us is important. But we have not yet drawn a
conclusion about PB.
Mr. Sanders. All right. Here's my question: you have a
budget, not you personally, I'm sure, of $250 billion. Why does
it take two researchers at Duke University to work with
chickens and come up with their conclusion about the
synergistic effect?
Mr. Rostker. I have no answer, sir.
Mr. Sanders. But this is--why should we have confidence in
the DOD when we're seeing people at Duke with limited budgets
making what some of us think are significant breakthroughs?
Mr. Rostker. I have no comment.
Mr. Sanders. Do you have comments on the work done by Dr.
Nicolson at the University of Texas? They have, among other
things, suggested that some of the multiple chronic symptoms
may eventually have their diagnoses linked to chemical
exposures in the Persian Gulf, et cetera. In some cases, such
exposure may have resulted in multiple chemical sensitivity.
Are we working with those people?
Mr. Rostker. Yes. I believe we are.
Mr. Sanders. All right. Claudia Miller had applied, as I
understand it, for a grant from the DOD, and somewhere along
the line it was killed. You want to tell me about that?
Mr. Rostker. I will be happy to look into it. I don't know
the specifics of the case.
Mr. Sanders. Claudia Miller is one of the experts in
multiple chemical sensitivity in the country. She is, in fact,
in a book that is soon to come out, has an entire page, Mr.
Chairman--I'll probably get sued for copyright violation, the
book is not out yet--but it's comparing the symptoms of
veterans with symptoms experienced by multiple chemical
sensitive people. See? She has a direct correlation.
This is my point. And Mr. Chairman, this is the point where
I think we finally have got to say, ``Thank you. Continue your
research. We don't have a lot of confidence in you. We're going
elsewhere, as well.'' We owe that to the tens of thousands of
veterans.
There is, getting back to the Major, who made a very
profound statement, we need cutting edge research. I have the
sad feeling, Mr. Chairman, that in 5 years from now, if I'm
still here, Dr. Rostker--we'll be still having it. They're
interested in the issue. They're going to explore the issue.
They're going to go to the same conservative doctors that are
going to tell the same things. We need new ideas. And my
experience is that the DOD is not bringing forth those ideas.
And I'll yield back to you. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman. Let me just start off
with you, Mr. Walpole. We had testimony previous, from the
CIA--Ms. Sylvia Copeland, who was trying to respond as best she
could to our concerns. And I asked you to look over her
testimony and what she submitted, and response to our
questions. Is there anything that you would qualify in her
testimony that would be helpful to us? Is there anything that
you add to her testimony that might be helpful to us?
Mr. Walpole. Congressman, I read the question session of
that testimony while I was preparing my own opening remarks, to
look for any questions that you might have had that we were not
able to answer at the time. And one that stood out to me was
the working relationship with the Department of Defense. And I
wanted to make sure I underscored that throughout my opening
remarks. In fact, we have a very close working relationship
there.
As you know, I started on February 27. And I have tried to
look forward from that point as what we could do. I was
completely fresh to this issue. But in looking back over the
remarks that you had asked me to look at this morning, what
really comes to mind is that since that time, we have
declassified a lot more material, particularly in the area of
Khamisiyah. And we prepared this paper. More information has
been discovered. More information was released than at the
point of that testimony.
I have not evaluated that testimony for some of the
questions you've asked. If you'd like us to take that for the
record I can. But I do know that a lot more information is in
the Khamisiyah historical paper than at the time of that
testimony.
Mr. Shays. That's it? That's your response? Anything else
you would add to that? Was there any information that was
possibly incorrect or that you would qualify that was
submitted, some written document?
Mr. Walpole. I honestly did not evaluate it for that
purpose. Now, part of the submission for the record was the
paper on the modeling of the pit, Al Muthanna, Muhammadiyat,
and the reiteration that we did not see any evidence that the
Iraqis used chemical weapons against us in the war.
Mr. Shays. Right.
Mr. Walpole. Those judgments still stand.
Mr. Shays. In her testimony she said that U.S. troops were
not interviewed by the CIA, that the CIA depended on the
Pentagon. Your testimony today suggests that you are now
talking with U.S. troops. Is that correct?
Mr. Walpole. Absolutely.
Mr. Shays. The basis for that is what?
Mr. Walpole. The basis for talking with the troops? In
trying to do the modeling, for example, we have talked to the
soldiers who were there to try to sort out how to put together
a model of what might have been released when those rockets
were destroyed.
Mr. Shays. Would we not also be turning to our soldiers to
see if they've identified any other sources? Wouldn't the CIA
speaking to our soldiers to gain information--let me just
interrupt myself by saying it blew my mind that the CIA seemed
to depend on foreign sources and the DOD's position instead of
speaking to the people who were there: our own soldiers. I lost
a lot of respect, frankly, for the CIA. I thought who better to
speak to than the people who were there: our own soldiers. My
gosh, we'd speak to someone who wasn't our own soldiers, but,
you know. So, is this a change in policy?
Mr. Walpole. We have two approaches that I'm aware of at
this point for talking with the soldiers. When we put together
the announcement that I mentioned earlier we released in Salt
Lake City, with the photographs of Khamisiyah, we did that in
conjunction with the Department of Defense and included their
1-800 number at the bottom, so that the information could get
into that system, they would relay the information to us, and
we would work that.
When I released the historical perspective paper, before we
released in the press briefing, we took it to the veterans
organizations. And I think 21 organizations were represented
there. Veterans Affairs set that up for us. So they got a pre-
briefing. And during that briefing we gave them our public
affairs number, that if any of them or anybody in their
organizations, any veterans they became aware of, had any
information or questions for us on this or other issues from an
intelligence perspective, call that number and we would get
back to them. I have a public affairs person on my task force
for that purpose.
Mr. Shays. I think that's a healthy change in practice. Let
me ask you, if I'm to ask you a question that you can't answer
because it's still classified, is your response to me going to
be that this information is going to be--what is your response
on any information?
Mr. Walpole. I would answer that the information is still
classified. I was asked that last week and said that same
thing.
Mr. Shays. OK. That's the response I would like rather than
to suggest that we don't have a problem or something. So, the
answer will be--from my understanding--I'll either get a
straight answer or I'll get an answer that says it's
classified?
Mr. Walpole. That is correct.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Mr. Walpole. And if I don't know an answer, I'll certainly
tell you that.
Mr. Shays. When we did studies--excuse me. When the CIA--I
believe it was the CIA--contracted an outside company that had
formerly the CIA Director, Mr. Deutch, and former Defense
Secretary, Mr. Perry, on its board--what was the name of the
company? SAIC. Their job was to make an analysis through
modeling of what would happen when we blew up certain chemical
plants and other sites, where the plumes would go, and would
our troops be affected or not. Obviously, a very important
question. Mr. Rostker, this is something you're familiar with
as well. My first question is, we know where the plumes went,
correct? Before it was a model of what would happen. Now we
know. Is that not correct?
Mr. Walpole. We know--on which site are we talking about,
the pit?
Mr. Shays. Any site. We have the pictures. We have the
weather. It's in effect--it's an occurrence that's happened. We
know where the winds went, et cetera.
Mr. Walpole. In all cases, we did not know where the winds
went. When we were doing Muhammadiyat and Al Muthanna----
Mr. Shays. Now, let me be clear on this.
Mr. Walpole. OK.
Mr. Shays. What I'm asking is, we did modeling to
anticipate where the winds would take the chemical fallout.
Mr. Walpole. OK. I'm with you. You're talking about before
the war?
Mr. Shays. Right. That's a model. Now we have reality.
Reality is what actually happened. Isn't it true that we can
determine what happen, and have determined where those
prevailing winds went?
Mr. Walpole. In the case of the pit, which is the one we're
modeling right now, just with the weather, the winds, depending
on how long you run the plume extension--and that depends, of
course, on how much agent is released--that's why we're doing
the ground testing--the wind changed direction.
Mr. Shays. But we monitored the weather 24 hours a day,
correct? Mr. Rostker, you want to jump in here a second.
Mr. Rostker. Umm.
Mr. Shays. Doctor. Believe me, I'm sorry.
Mr. Rostker. That's OK.
Mr. Shays. If you went to the trouble to get your
doctorate, then you'll be called a doctor.
Mr. Rostker. I appreciate that, sir. The wind information
is very imprecise. At one point, the CIA was making
calculations where the nearest wind observation was 200 miles
away.
Mr. Shays. Are you talking modeling or the fact?
Mr. Rostker. Fact.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Mr. Rostker. The fact. When Deputy Secretary White asked
the Institute for Defense Analysis to stand up an expert panel,
it was largely on the meteorological aspects and the weather.
And subsequent to the initial CIA attempt to model the pit,
additional weather observations have become available from
classified satellite reports, from the Saudis who had withheld
weather information because it might have been used by the
Iraqis, and from classified Navy reports, so that the pure data
that we have today on the pits has grown exponentially since
last November when CIA was initially working on this.
IDA used two different models to look at how one could
bring the weather information to bear. And the CIA has a third
model. Where we are today is not so much worrying about the
weather, but worrying about what was actually released. There's
great uncertainty. In fact, the CIA came to us and asked us to
do tests. We're blowing up captured 122 millimeter rockets,
because there is tremendous uncertainty of what actually
happened.
Mr. Shays. Let me just interrupt you, Doctor, just so I'm
clear and you don't use me. Is your testimony before this
committee that while we know the weather we don't know how much
chemical was released in these sites? Is that the real issue?
Mr. Rostker. Right now that's what we are focusing on, the
uncertainty.
Mr. Shays. Isn't it true we know pretty much where the
plumes went based on the actual fact of what the conditions
were?
Mr. Rostker. No, sir. Not until you know how much was
released into the atmosphere.
Mr. Shays. I'm not asking that. That's not what I'm asking.
I'm asking if we know the direction of where the plumes went.
I'm not asking what level of concentration of chemicals were in
the plumes.
Mr. Rostker. But we have meteorological weather, today.
Isn't that right, Bob?
Mr. Walpole. Yes.
Mr. Shays. I'd like a short version answer, not a----
Mr. Walpole. Yes. Let me give you a short one. Modeling,
theoretically, is in some senses easier than modeling what
you're referring to as the fact. Because theoretically you
choose your inputs.
Mr. Shays. Right.
Mr. Walpole. We're trying to determine what the facts are.
The winds changed direction. I don't remember exactly how many
hours after the event it changed direction. But it changed
direction. That's why Dr. Rostker is saying the amount of agent
in the air at the time the wind changed direction makes a
difference as to where that plume went. And we don't that.
Mr. Shays. OK. Your testimony is that while you have data,
you don't have all the data, you're getting the data, and that
you still may never have enough data?
Mr. Walpole. We will never have all of the data. We will
never know exactly how many rockets were in each of that
stacks.
Mr. Shays. I'm not asking about concentration. I'm just
talking weather. The reason I'm getting a little impatient is
we're going to be here a long time if----
Mr. Rostker. We believe we have a set that will accurately
allow us to do the plume analysis.
Mr. Shays. OK. And so you're just basically waiting to
determine the concentration of chemicals?
Mr. Rostker. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Mr. Sanders. Can I just--on this thing?
Mr. Shays. Yes.
Mr. Sanders. Let me just pick up where the chairman was--
and help me out here. In terms of Khamisiyah, my memory is that
originally the authorities, the DOD, claimed that several
hundred people were perhaps exposed. And that number went up to
as many as 20,000?
Mr. Rostker. The first accountings were how many were near
the Bunker 73. We then started to focus on the pit. And we
extended the potential area to 50 kilometers. We were always
working with the same data base. But the original CIA analysis
that was made public last summer had a smaller event. And
that's what the numbers were that we published then.
Mr. Sanders. What is your best guess today in terms of the
number of American soldiers that were exposed?
Mr. Rostker. Given the data that we have on position and
location at the 50 kilometer range, it is 20,000.
Mr. Sanders. Might that be revised?
Mr. Rostker. Absolutely, as we gain more insight.
Mr. Sanders. What you're saying is, now--I don't want to
put words in your mouth--that the 20,000 may be a conservative
number. And, in fact, based on more evidence, it is possible
that the number could multiply significantly?
Mr. Rostker. That's correct. The 20,000 also was 360
degrees around Khamisiyah. So, depending upon where the wind
took it, it might even not have blown over troops. We just have
to wait and see.
Mr. Sanders. OK.
Mr. Shays. We're going to try to get you out, Doctor, by 15
of. And Mr. Mancuso, I'm going to just kind of wait. I just
have a few questions for you. But I want to make sure that I am
able to deal with the CIA and the DOD. Do we have any
indication that Iraqi citizens are feeling the effects of
chemical exposure, Mr. Walpole?
Mr. Walpole. I'm not aware of any information on that. I
don't know the answer.
Mr. Shays. That seems kind of surprising to me. Because it
would strike me that if we want to know how our troops were
impacted, that we would want to know how Iraqi citizens were
impacted. And if they were in certain areas, large
concentrations, it would be helpful to us. So, I'm a little
more than disappointed with your response. It just doesn't even
seem logical to me.
Mr. Walpole. The wind direction from the pit was away from
Iraq.
Mr. Shays. My view--and help me out--it either went toward
the soldiers or went toward civilians. And you're saying
there's another option? It didn't go toward civilians either?
It didn't go toward the troops. It didn't go toward civilians.
So, it went----
Mr. Walpole. No. It went, I think it's south. I don't know
if it was directly south. But it did go away from Iraq.
Mr. Rostker. Moreover, without knowing how much agent was
released, we would have no basis for knowing who may have been
exposed.
Mr. Shays. No. But we're not even talking about Khamisiyah
now. We're talking about--I'm sorry, Doctor, but mine was a
general question. Do we have any record of Iraqi citizens
feeling the effects of chemical exposure? And it boggles my
mind if we don't. One, I would make assumptions that they were
affected, and, two, that we would know it. We have no
intelligence information that says that some Iraqi soldiers may
be affected by chemical exposure?
Mr. Walpole. I'm not going to pretend to know all the
answers. I'm not even going to pretend to know all the
questions. If we have information on that. And I will check if
we do, then that would obviously be knowable, and I can get
that for you.
Mr. Shays. The reason why I started out my questioning
about whether you would tell me if it was classified
information--is your response because it's classified or is
your response----
Mr. Walpole. No. My response is because I do not know.
Mr. Shays. OK. I would like to know the answer to that
question. If you would get back.
Mr. Walpole. Sure.
Mr. Shays. And that's something that we need to followup
with. Isn't it logical, though, that we would want to know if
Iraqi citizens were affected?
Mr. Walpole. Absolutely. If the direction of wind was such
that anybody in the path could have supplied information on
that, absolutely.
Mr. Shays. Let me ask you this, isn't it true that some of
these munitions plants were in urban areas that we blew up by
air?
Mr. Walpole. The only facility that we have identified
where we have a potential chemical release on the information
to date is Khamisiyah.
Mr. Shays. No----
Mr. Walpole. Now, some of the sites--yes. The answer to
your question is, yes. Many of the sites are.
Mr. Shays. I've made an assumption. Dr. Rostker, help me
out here. I made an assumption that we blew up some munitions/
chemical munitions plants. I make that assumption based on also
what was news accounts. And my recollection was that that was
the case. Is that your testimony? We didn't blow up any
chemical plants? I'm asking both of you.
Mr. Walpole. No. That's not----
Mr. Shays. I want both of you to respond to this question.
Dr. Rostker, did we blow up----
Mr. Rostker. We obviously did. Of course we did.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Mr. Walpole. Yes.
Mr. Shays. Now, my question is, do we have any intelligence
information--and I'll first make sure that we're clear--Dr.
Rostker, do we have any intelligence information that Iraqi
citizens were impacted by any chemical exposure?
Mr. Rostker. There are numerous accounts in the closing
days of the war--I shouldn't say the war--during the rebellion
of the Shi'ites--that Saddam Hussein had used chemicals on the
Shi'ites.
Mr. Shays. Well, we know he used them against Iran.
Mr. Rostker. Yes.
Mr. Shays. I'm not talking about Iran.
Mr. Rostker. I'm not either, sir.
Mr. Shays. I'm talking about what--so we have no
information? I want to be clear that I'm asking the right
question so I know how to evaluate your answer.
Mr. Rostker. The only accounts that I have seen of Iraqi
citizens complaining of being exposed to chemical agents come
in a number of reports where they presented themselves to
United States personnel during the short-lived occupation of
Iraq. And they claim direct exposure to mustard gas from Iraqi
forces. And that is well documented in the military logs of the
18th Airborne Corps.
Mr. Shays. Let me just explain why I want to be a little
more precise. When Mr. Deutch appeared before CBS, he was very
clear to say that there was no offensive use of chemical
weapons. And then, shortly after, which was defensive exposure
took place. He clearly had to know that he was using a very
precise work so he would be safe. So, I just need to know if
we're in this kind of level. When you say, Dr. Rostker--have
you heard?
Mr. Rostker. No, sir.
Mr. Shays. So, your testimony before this committee is that
you are not aware of civilian troops being exposed to chemicals
by potentially the blowing up, the destruction of any of the
chemical munitions plants in Iraq?
Mr. Rostker. That is correct. I've seen no reports to that
effect.
Mr. Shays. Or heard any?
Mr. Rostker. Or heard.
Mr. Shays. Or aware of any?
Mr. Rostker. Or aware of any.
Mr. Shays. Doctor----
Mr. Walpole. OK. I thought initially you were talking about
Khamisiyah. I do not know the answer to your question. I will
go back and make sure that we check every site that chemicals
were possibly at, and when they were destroyed either by
bombing or by demolition, and see if there's any intelligence
that relates to Iraqis indicating effects.
Mr. Shays. OK. Sure.
Mr. Sanders. Mr. Chairman, let me just pursue your line of
questioning. Mr. Walpole, one of the things that we're knocking
our brains out here is to try to figure out to what degree
American troops were exposed to chemical agents. And what the
chairman asked you is--and it seems to be a pretty logical
question--is, if American troops may or may not have been
exposed, then what about the people in the immediate area? What
about the Kuwaitis? What about the Iraqis, themselves? If we
bombed, as Dr. Rostker has told us, and we all knew, chemical
plants, chemical weapon plants in Baghdad or wherever they
were, were people in Iraq affected, or people in Kuwait or
wherever? It would seem to me that the CIA would be in the
midst of that investigation.
Mr. Walpole. Yes.
Mr. Sanders. Are you suggesting that they are not?
Mr. Walpole. I'm saying that I personally do not know. I
might well go back and have the people on my task force that
are experts on this field say, ``Well, Bob, yes. We looked at
that quite a while ago. And here's the answer.'' And then, of
course, I'll feel that I should have known the answer. But it's
a very logical question.
Mr. Sanders. Will you tell us the answer then?
Mr. Walpole. And when I find out the answer to the
question, we'll make sure you get it.
Mr. Sanders. My question is, has the CIA investigated
chemical exposure among Iraqis and Kuwaitis and other peoples
in that region?
Mr. Walpole. Yes. And it's a legitimate question. If that
was part of the overall question of exposures, then the answer
would be yes. But I don't know that for certain, and I don't
want to mislead you.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.184
Mr. Shays. Doctor, thank you. And we will followup on that.
Dr. Rostker, tell me how you react and if you want to correct
my understanding that the Pentagon went to the FDA to have an
informed consent in regards to PB so that it could be
administered to our troops. One, did that happen? Two, do you
agree with the testimony that has been fairly consistent in our
committee with all of the veterans who appeared that they were
not warned for the most part--I say for the most, there may
have been one or two. We know with the Major that there may be
something to this. But is it a fair conclusion on our part that
our troops were not warned about the use of PB?
Mr. Rostker. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Shays. OK. So, what is the Pentagon's position knowing
that?
Mr. Rostker. The new supply of PB--and let me say there is
not definitive statement that we would use it or not use it. It
would have to depend upon the circumstances. But a new supply
of PB, obviously, has been procured. And it comes with a
warning and a statement of side effects.
Mr. Shays. Is there any new protocol that's been issued by
the Secretary instructing a different practice in the future?
Mr. Rostker. I don't know of any. But I would say, as part
of my inquiry on procedures and policy and doctrine, we
certainly will cover this. The testimony that you heard today
we hear all the time on our 800 numbers. There was not adequate
warning despite of the assurances of the FDA. There was poor
quality control in terms of the regimen of PB. In some units it
was careful. In other units it was not careful. We don't have
records that would definitively establish who had PB. It was
not done that way any of us would have liked to have seen it
done. There's no question about that.
Mr. Sanders. In your judgment, was the use of PB a mistake?
Mr. Rostker. I'm not prepared to say that. There was a
concern that there was a potential for the Iraqis to have
soman, which is a particular type of nerve gas. The normal
procedures that we had for providing our troops protection
would not have worked against soman. It would have been deadly.
And the judgment was made at the time that this was consistent
with the testing that had been done at the time, an appropriate
prophylactic. It was the only procedure we had, the only
medicine we had that would have provided any protection to a
soman attack.
Mr. Sanders. Can you tell us again, briefly, exactly the
research that is now being done by the DOD or VA about the
synergistic impact of----
Mr. Rostker. I'd have to provide that for the record. And I
will.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.185
Mr. Sanders. Do you consider that to be a major issue?
Mr. Rostker. Absolutely. Let me just say, I hate to be
vague on this, but when my office was set up we maintained the
primacy of the assistant secretary of health affairs on the
medical aspects of this. And while I have maintained an ongoing
interest in oversight, and we coordinate, I or my office are
not the prime people responsible for the health program. And
so, if I'm a little vague on an answer, it's because I'll have
to get that for you for the record.
Mr. Sanders. You may be vague on this one, as well. But
answer me this: Maj. Donnelly made a very interesting point. He
suggested that he was made ill by exposure to malathion. Is
that how it's pronounced?
Mr. Rostker. Malathion.
Mr. Sanders. And he suggested that other people may have
had similar problems. He raised a very interesting point.
Mr. Rostker. And I absolutely agree. And there are examples
in civilian literature of people getting very sick on
malathion.
Mr. Sanders. Exactly.
Mr. Rostker. Congressman Allen said, ``Nasty stuff. I
wouldn't use it.''
Mr. Sanders. That's right.
Mr. Rostker. ``My wife won't let me use it.'' But, sir, it
is still an approved chemical from----
Mr. Sanders. I know that. But here's my point. It may be
possible--and, again, I may be over my head, I'm not a
scientist--but it is possible that we have thousands of men and
women who are working around as walking time bombs. Might we at
least get the word out to them to be at least careful, get out
some information to them?
Mr. Rostker. I don't know the cause and effect. The Major
was talking about maybe some exposure in the Gulf has a
triggering event.
Mr. Sanders. Or PB?
Mr. Rostker. Or PB. But maybe his trip to the golf course 2
weeks earlier was a triggering event. I just don't know. This
is nasty stuff. And that's why I've made a special effort in my
inquiry to make sure we highlight pesticides and insecticides,
that we do a full inquiry. Because I'm as concerned as you are.
Mr. Sanders. I understand that. But the issue here is that
you may have folks who already have a whole lot of crap in
their systems, who might be particularly sensitive. Isn't it
worth while at least exploring some of the----
Mr. Rostker. I would have to leave that to the doctors.
It's a hypothesis. I just can't draw a conclusion whether, at
this point, it warrants that. And, again, just taking the
Major's testimony. He had a whole life of exposures to
chemicals. I have no idea why he believes he had a triggering
event. And we have no linking between ALS and even chemical
exposures. Those are things we have to research.
Mr. Sanders. My last question on this round. You've been
very patient for allowing me to interrupt you.
Mr. Shays. No. That's fine. I'm just going to followup----
Mr. Sanders. We're going to hear in a few minutes from
Jonathan Tucker. And he's going to tell us, quoting from a
statement he has presented us, ``DOD has called the Khamisiyah
incident a `watershed' in it's investigation of chemical
exposures. At the same time, however, the Pentagon has
discounted dozens of other chemical exposure incidents reported
by Gulf war veterans or mentioned in declassified operational
logs. These low-level exposures to chemical weapons appears to
have resulted from three sources--'' He goes through them.
``Chemical fallout from aerial bombardment, explosive
demolitions of munitions bunkers, sporadic and uncoordinated
Iraqi use of chemical weapons.'' My question is, what do you
think about what he is saying, and are you telling us today
that Khamisiyah is all that we should expect to hear about in
terms of chemical exposure, or do you think that tomorrow or
next week or next year we're going to hear about other
facilities or other situations that have resulted?
Mr. Rostker. You'll hear others from us. We've provided the
committee with a matrix of our first-round primary inquiries.
And there is a whole range of potential chemical exposures,
plus some cross-cutting papers that we're producing on FOX
vehicles and other things that cut across. You're aware that
there are concerns about positive 256 test kit readings and FOX
vehicle readings. Many of those appear in journals. We don't
have the specifics of people who are associated with that.
We've developed a post card campaign. We'll go to everyone in
the unit and ask people if they can provide information about a
specific incident that occurred on a specific day.
Mr. Sanders. Bottom line is that it may end up that there
were more chemical exposures?
Mr. Rostker. It may well. Because we are looking intensely
at all of the named exposures. And every time we see an
exposure or we get to the point where there's enough credible
evidence to create a case like we heard today, we will create a
case and run that to ground.
Mr. Sanders. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman. He may not be a
scientist, but he looks like one. My sense to what a scientist
looks like. No offense to the scientists out there. Doctor, I'm
not letting you go quite this second here, but you're getting
close.
Mr. Rostker. That's OK.
Mr. Shays. You're going up to Boston? Is that correct?
Mr. Rostker. We're going to Boston for a town hall meeting
with veterans. And I really appreciate the committee's
indulgence. But reaching out to the veterans and talking to
them, I think, is an important activity.
Mr. Shays. It's absolutely essential. And I was going to
complement you on that.
Mr. Rostker. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Shays. Just as you are fairly clear on the whole issue
informed consent and with the troops and PB, is it possible
that you would recommend a protocol that would make clear that
it is a tremendous violation of a soldier's duty to not warn
another soldier of a case like this. In other words, that that
would be part of a protocol that you would suggest. But I'd
also like to know, would the protocol allow a soldier, if this
was a harmful chemical, that they would say, ``Sir, I
respectfully decline to take that chemical''?
Mr. Rostker. I think we have to come to grips with that. We
have had incidents recently in terms of vaccinations that we
need to establish what our policy is.
Mr. Shays. What the policy is informing and what the policy
is for a soldier under orders to say, ``I have the right to
exercise my own judgment on my own body'' and decline.
Mr. Rostker. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. And that's going to be looked into?
Mr. Rostker. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. It also relates to, you said, referring to the
chemical that Mr. Allen was referring to, you paraphrased him
perfectly. The bottom line there is are you going to be looking
at protocol and the use of industrial chemicals in the
military? Because we may find that this is a very big problem.
Mr. Rostker. Absolutely. And it goes hand-in-hand. And
everything we are trying to do in my organization--there are
two parts--I need to understand what the science is. As
imperfect as it is, I still need to understand that. And then I
have to understand the practices. And it's putting those two
pieces of information together which will help us understand
what policies and procedures we have to change for the future.
And, as I said, I'm very concerned about these issues. I take
Congressman Sanders' concerns very much to heart.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. Some of our military leaders during
the war responded by saying, in essence we didn't see evidence
of chemical exposure because no one was falling on the
battlefield, which related to testimony that Dr. Joseph made as
it regards to Khamisiyah. And I'm going to be quoting in a
second. I just want to get your reaction. I'm not asking that
you repeal the statement. But I want a reaction to it. He said,
``To date there has been no evidence found that soldiers
located in this area (talking about Khamisiyah) complained of
or presented any symptoms characteristic to acute exposure to
chemical agents. However, we are still searching for additional
information.'' And then he further said, ``Now, the most
important thing that I really have to say about this is that
the current accepted medical knowledge is that chronic symptoms
or physical manifestations do not later develop among persons
exposed to low levels of chemical nerve agents into--did not
first exhibit acute symptoms of toxicity.'' And then he said,
``However, this avenue is also being furthered explored by the
department, both looking back at the situation story and
research.'' Now, my sense is, from the work that you're doing,
is that this is not a show-stopper. In other words, that you
are, regardless of what so-called established medicine has
determined, you're taking a big look at this issue?
Mr. Rostker. Absolutely. And as you will remember, sir, in
concert with your staff, we removed from our GulfLINK site a
definitive paper on low-level chem, because it was inconsistent
with us then turning around and fostering research, sponsoring
research, to address that very issue. So, I think it has to be
up. I would also say, in terms of the first part of what Dr.
Joseph said, that we have been engaged in a contemporary
analysis of participation rates in the two registries. And we
find no correlation with Khamisiyah. We're working on the final
draft of that. And as soon as it's ready I'll make it available
to the committee. But certainly the preliminary indications are
that those units that are around Khamisiyah have not
experienced a higher participation rate in the two registries
than other units in the Gulf.
Mr. Shays. Yes. I just want to make the point, while he
said further research, this to me was a show-stopper in terms
of the VA, that there was an attitude that basically said, just
like our generals felt. And it was a mindset that I think
carried through both the DOD and the VA, with all due respect
to both organizations. That hearing, when he testified--this
was June 25, 1996. So, a lot has happened since then.
Mr. Rostker. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. You had a comment. And then I'm going to let you
get on your way.
Mr. Sanders. I know that you have to leave. And let me just
say this. As I indicated earlier, I think that since you have
come on, things are happening better. And I think many people
are appreciative of that. I think the basic concern that I have
is that what many of our troops may be exposed to is a new type
of problem. And I think doing things the same old way and going
to the same old guys, who have not come up with the solutions,
is the problem. And I believe we're going to have to go outside
of the DOD and the VA. Even RAND. I mean, RAND has been working
with the DOD for a million years, right? They're your right-
hand private sector guys.
Mr. Rostker. But I made sure their charter is to make sure
they are tapping the full range of medical opinion.
Mr. Sanders. Well----
Mr. Rostker. And RAND tends to be a very independent type
organization, as many of its research products have shown.
Mr. Shays. One last question of you, Dr. Rostker. The whole
process of declassification--are you aware of any information
that you will be declassified that will be considered
significant?
Mr. Rostker. I have a rule that if I see a piece of
information that I feel is significant, before the sun is down
I ask for it to be declassified. And I tell the PAC, the only
two pieces that we are now working on for declassification
which I think you will find useful or the complete set of logs
for the 18th Airborne Corps and the complete set of logs that
we have for the 82nd Division so that you can judge the full
context. And it helps explain--I think it helps explain what
was going on on the days that there are no logs for the CENTCOM
chem logs. So I've asked that those full sets of logs be
declassified for you.
Mr. Shays. And I would just make this request to you and
then you're on your way, that when you are aware of the
declassification that goes on the Internet, that you notify our
committee that this information will be on-line so we don't
discover it 3 days later or 4 days later?
Mr. Rostker. We'd be happy to do that. We're also on----
Mr. Shays. I'd like that to be a general practice.
Mr. Rostker. Yes, sir. Absolutely.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Rostker. And we're also changing our search engines on
GulfLINK so that they are more user-friendly so that you and
your staff and veterans, in general, will have an easier time
plowing through the 38,000 pages that we have on GulfLINK.
Mr. Shays. I thank you for being here for so long. Travel
safe.
Mr. Rostker. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Walpole, thank you. And also, Mr. Mancuso,
do you have any comments? And thank you for your patience
sitting here so long and not being--you're happy not to talk?
OK. Do you have any comment about the issue of
declassification?
Mr. Mancuso. No. It has not been a problem in our area at
all. The Deputy Secretary made it perfectly clear that we had
wide berth in the department and that anything that could be
viewed as constructive to us or in any area that someone could
be helpful to us, we would get through that. And, in fact,
where we've needed access we've been able to gain access
virtually immediately.
Mr. Shays. Let me ask you, if you were to discover
something that you had access to that was classified that you
thought was important for the veterans to know for their
health, what would be your response in the course of doing your
work? How would you respond to that information?
Mr. Mancuso. We would seek to immediately make it known to
the--certainly to Dr. Rostker's office. And if we did not feel
that we had a satisfactory response there, we would seek to go
higher than that.
Mr. Shays. So, the bottom line is, you would, if you saw
classified information that you thought would be helpful to the
health of the veterans, you would recommend to Dr. Rostker that
he seek to have this declassified?
Mr. Mancuso. Most definitely. Again, though, Mr. Chairman,
our focus for our investigation as defined by the Deputy
Secretary is quite narrow. It is to find the missing logs.
Mr. Shays. I know that.
Mr. Mancuso. Had we found anything else or had we found any
aspect of a document that would be helpful in the search for
what's wrong with the veterans we certainly would have done
whatever was needed to be done to make that known.
Mr. Shays. Yes. I think we're seeing it the same way. I
realize you have a very limited issue here.
Mr. Mancuso. Mm-hmm.
Mr. Shays. A very important one, but limited. But in the
course of doing your work--we're trying to develop a culture
and encourage a culture within the CIA and the VA and the DOD
that says, this is information. And even if it isn't someone's
primary responsibility. But if it's information that's helpful,
we want them to be a proactive person. Not to release something
that's classified, go through the channel, but work hard to
have that done.
Mr. Mancuso. Mm-hmm.
Mr. Shays. Would you like to--do you have a question?
Mr. Sanders. Yes. I do. I just wanted to explore--revisit
an issue we talked about a few minutes ago. Is it your
judgment, Mr. Walpole, that when the United States bombed the
chemical factories in Iraq that there was no release of
chemical agents that might have impacted civilians or our own
troops?
Mr. Walpole. In fact, I was just looking at that in the
paper that was released--in the testimony we discussed earlier
in December. In the section under Muhammadiyat and Al Muthanna,
there is the statement, ``Finally we have found no information
to suggest that casualties occurred inside Iraq as a result of
this bombing, probably because they are in remote locations.''
I have to, from that, assume that the question we discussed
earlier was indeed looked at for those two sites. So, the
answer for those two sites, at least, is no. There were no
casualties. And since I'm assuming they looked at everything
else, no indication because of the remoteness of those two
facilities.
Mr. Sanders. We're familiar with what happened at
Khamisiyah. Do you have any evidence that--from the CIA's
perspective--any similar type occurrences occurred in other
munitions depos?
Mr. Walpole. No. In fact, we're doing a search of any
potential site. We have found no other site. But we're--just
like Dr. Rostker--we're leaving an open mind for other sites
that we may find intelligence on that would help.
Mr. Sanders. So your position is the same as Dr. Rostker's?
Mr. Walpole. Yes.
Mr. Sanders. Is that at this point you cannot tell us of
any other sites or occurrences of situations that may have
exposed our soldiers to chemical agents?
Mr. Walpole. Yes. We have found no others. But we're going
to address it with an open mind.
Mr. Sanders. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Walpole, the working group that was 24-hour
continuous operation seemed to be a new discovery for those of
us outside the CIA. That wasn't something that was volunteered
to us when your organization came before us the first time.
Explain to me a little bit about the role of that organization
again.
Mr. Walpole. Yes. In fact I have seen it mentioned in
former testimonies. And I could pull out exactly which ones
there are. We have----
Mr. Shays. Former testimonies where?
Mr. Walpole. Before committees. I don't know if it exactly
was your committee. But it was--it was in----
Mr. Shays. You have the testimony of our--you've seen it?
Mr. Walpole. Yes. The September one. And as I recall it
might have been mentioned in November testimony. I don't
remember where that was. It's also mentioned on the first page
of our Khamisiyah historical perspective paper. Now what it was
was a group of seven analysts that were chemical and biological
warfare analysts at CIA--had decided that they wanted to run a
24-hour operation. Basically, alternate their schedules so that
they weren't working 15 and 18-hour days.
They, in order to communicate with each other, would enter
a computer file--each of them on their own machine--and then
type in what kinds of things occurred at certain times of the
day that they would pass on to someone else. They titled that a
log. And, in fact, the two entries that related to Khamisiyah
were released as part of this package. It didn't mention the
name Khamisiyah. In fact, there was a confusion with An
Nasiriyha. But we recognized that, and thought that should be
released. We have all of those. And we are going through those
for any information that is pertinent to this issue that can be
released.
As you can imagine, in notes from one analyst talking to
the next, there's a lot of completely extraneous information
talking about, no, really we're not asleep and we got a chance
to eat and things like that. But as we go through that, if
there's information that is relevant to the veterans' illnesses
that indeed will be released.
Mr. Shays. So all seven of those individuals have been
interviewed by you?
Mr. Walpole. Yes.
Mr. Shays. By you?
Mr. Walpole. By me.
Mr. Shays. Yes.
Mr. Walpole. Three of them are currently on the task force.
Five of them are involved in activities along the way over the
years related to this issue. But I have talked to all seven of
them.
Mr. Shays. I would have made an assumption that there were
chemical sites throughout Iraq based on the briefings that were
provided to me as a Member of Congress. So it's somewhat
surprising to me that the CIA wouldn't have really been very
clear about where these chemicals were and that they would have
been on a wall during the war. I have to tell you--I don't have
to tell, I want to tell you that I've lost some respect for the
CIA in the sense that, if I were there, knowing what I had even
been briefed before the war started, I would have on the wall
and in my computer a clear sense of where all those chemicals
were located. And it surprises me that we wouldn't have known
up front that Khamisiyah had chemicals. Doesn't it surprise
you?
Mr. Walpole. Well, I have the value of 20/20 hindsight. Do
you want me to walk through what we knew and didn't know about
Khamisiyah? It will take a couple of--30 seconds.
Mr. Shays. Yes, I do.
Mr. Walpole. OK. And it's in this paper. That's why I
thought you might want to include that in the record. In 1977,
Khamisiyah was identified under construction as a conventional
ammunition storage depo. In 1986, we had information--and it
was very good information--it was an official Iraqi document
translated--that at the end of the document--it was on their
chemical weapon production plant--indicated that a certain
number of Mustard rounds were stored--a large number, over
3,000--stored at Khamisiyah. Now, when you have an official
Iraqi document you know you've got firm evidence for a chemical
connection. Later, in 1986, analysts began to look at that, and
they determined that S-shaped bunkers appeared to be the future
for forward deployed storage.
Mr. Shays. Of chemicals.
Mr. Walpole. Of chemicals. Because that's how Khamisiyah
was viewed from that 1986 report. It indicated that chemical
weapons were stored there during the Iran-Iraq war,
specifically in 1984 and 1985. Analysts began to focus on S-
shaped bunkers as the future forward deployed storage
locations. Khamisiyah did not have one of those bunkers. In
1988, we received a report with the same reliability, same
confidence in the report, that indicated that chemical weapons
were stored either at Samarra or Muhammadiyat. And then it
mentioned also that there was a temporary storage at Kirkuk
Airfield, which also had an S-shaped bunker. The bottom line
was, in 1988, the same reliability intelligence suggested that
Khamisiyah wasn't used any more for a storage site.
The focus was on S-shaped bunkers. So, just prior to the
war, Khamisiyah was not on, in the analytical thinking, it
wasn't on our list of sites, the sites that were included. And
they were all suspect. We didn't know a lot of things about the
storage sites. We knew where things were produced. We didn't
know the storage sites. So, it wasn't on that list. The
warnings I talked about in my opening statement occurred just
before the ground war, not before the air war. So, that's how
it was missed.
Mr. Shays. OK. It's still surprising to me. I just felt
that we would have informants that would be able to track--
chemicals are something that we consider quite a significant
weapon. And it's just surprising to me that we did not have
inside sources that would have been able to provide that. I'm
just going to express that.
Mr. Walpole. Yes. Well, the 1988 information seemed to
shift us away from that. Now, the 20/20 hindsight I referred
to--my thinking on this would have been, if they stored
chemical munitions there during the Iran-Iraq war, we should
have included it on the list as a possible site even with the
caveat that we don't know that anything is there.
Mr. Shays. And we didn't know that they had taken them away
from there. So, it seemed to me that the last time we knew,
they were there.
Mr. Walpole. Well, the 1988 report seemed to imply that
they did.
Mr. Shays. OK. Let me, Mr. Mancuso. This is an issue that
was very narrow. And your statement was so much on target you
didn't leave a lot of questions in our minds. But what I don't
quite understand is how you go about determining where these
logs are with any kind of certainty. Because--do you have
access--do you first know everyone who potentially would have
handled these logs?
Mr. Mancuso. We believe we do, yes.
Mr. Shays. And some are active and some are not active?
Mr. Mancuso. That is correct.
Mr. Shays. And you are seeking out both active and non-
active and questioning them?
Mr. Mancuso. That is correct.
Mr. Shays. You question them under oath, or is there no
reason to?
Mr. Mancuso. They've been questioned under different
circumstances depending on the interview. I can tell you that
we've conducted in the 7 weeks since we took over this
investigation approximately 70 interviews. About half of which
were re-interviews, more detailed interviews of people who had
been approached during the review conducted by Dr. Rostker.
Mr. Shays. Is it against military protocol to have
destroyed these documents? Was someone authorized to? Was there
certain protocol how you would handle documents like this?
Mr. Mancuso. The documents we're speaking about were not
technically required to even have been used.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Mr. Mancuso. In practice they were useful and they were
something you would expect from good staff work.
Mr. Shays. It's not like the log on a ship?
Mr. Mancuso. No.
Mr. Shays. No.
Mr. Mancuso. We're talking about documents that good staff
people would normally maintain. What we're trying to do is
track those documents through the system, again, in all media
they may have been in, and to move through the process very
deliberately and determine who actually handled those
documents--again, different copies, different medias at
different times--in a best effort following every available
lead to locate them.
Mr. Shays. So, one hope is to obviously find out what was
in them even if we can't locate them. In other words, you're
asking them what they recall seeing in the documents, correct?
And the other is to actually locate the documents.
Mr. Mancuso. That's----
Mr. Shays. Is there hope that the documents still exist
somewhere?
Mr. Mancuso. That's why we're continuing. We will continue
until we believe that we've either located everything we need
to locate or exhausted all conceivable leads in that regard.
Mr. Shays. But maybe I'm making an assumption I shouldn't.
Are you trying to reconstruct the documents even if you don't
have them? In other words, are you asking people what they saw,
what they put on them, what others who read it saw?
Mr. Mancuso. I'd prefer not to go into the interviews, but
it is accurate. As Dr. Rostker said, there are other larger
separate records.
Mr. Shays. I just don't understand why you would prefer not
to. I don't see why. Was there something significant about--are
you saying that in the process of doing this, you don't want to
disclose to someone else what you might have asked someone
else?
Mr. Mancuso. That is correct.
Mr. Shays. OK. I understand that. Is there anything you
want to add, any point, question that you wished we would have
asked you?
Mr. Mancuso. I would just add, to follow on on a point you
made about the Inspector General's office taking on the
investigation, and would we in fact, for instance, act on, for
instance, classified information. I just point out that as an
Inspector General's office we are, although we are technically
a part of the Department, we're set up independently by the
Inspector General Act, and, have dual reporting to the Congress
and the Secretary. And as in many, many other matters that
we've investigated, we've shown ourselves to be independent and
not--occasionally not in line with the Department's preferred
thinking.
Mr. Shays. I have a sense you're independent. I just want
to know if you think that's part of your mandate. And part of
your mandate, it seems to me, if you came across something--and
I think you agree.
Mr. Mancuso. Absolutely.
Mr. Shays. I had hoped that the case. I'm happy it is the
case. And I'm happy it's on the public record.
Mr. Mancuso. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Walpole, is there anything you wish we had
asked you that we didn't?
Mr. Walpole. I can't think of anything.
Mr. Shays. OK. Is there anything I wish I had asked you
that you are happy I didn't?
Mr. Walpole. I would imagine if you had thought of it you
would have asked it.
Mr. Shays. Now, I want to be clear. Now, the question you
wished I had asked you is the question you're happy I didn't
ask that I wish that I had asked you that I want you to tell
me.
Mr. Walpole. No. I think we've covered everything.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Mr. Walpole. If you do get a chance to read the historical
perspective, it gives you a good feel for the pluses and the
minuses on this. It was a very honest effort to lay this all
out. And one of the reasons we did it was so the veterans would
have something in hand when they want to try to remind
themselves of what might have occurred, or talk to DOD people
on the phone about this. It's now unclassified, and there are
no bars to talking about it.
Mr. Shays. OK. Great. One last question, I guess, that my
staff wants me to ask is, is there some classified information
left in the drawer that will be coming out in the near future
or that won't be coming out that should?
Mr. Walpole. Everything classified that we discover, which,
of course, is what we have, we're ensuring that all the
Government agencies that are cleared, including the Hill, have
that. We're also working to declassify any and all information
that's pertinent to this issue. At this point I know of no
major surprises.
Mr. Shays. Dr. Rostker would have access, and you would be
making sure he sees classified information. And based on his
pledge to this committee, and frankly what I think his conduct
has been, he would certainly be a voice in asking that it be
declassified. So, if you had some doubts, you're still going to
be sharing it with Dr. Rostker?
Mr. Walpole. Absolutely. And with Walt Jacko, as well. In
fact, I think when--you'll find some interesting DOD documents
in our package here that came to light just as we were getting
ready to go to print. And Dr. Rostker said, ``Let's include
these in that package,'' and so on. So, there's a very close
working relationship there.
Mr. Shays. I'm just thinking of one last question. The
process of declassifying means, who do you go to? Who has the
ability to declassify, in the Dr. Rostker's case and your case?
Mr. Walpole. Well, it depends on the information.
Obviously, George Tenet has the ultimate authority on many of
these. But if it's foreign source information, then we have to
go back to the owner of that information, the foreign country,
and say, ``Can we use this information.'' If it's national
technical means derived information then there are certain
legal requirements we have to go through.
Mr. Shays. OK. Thank you both very much. And we'll get our
third panel up here.
Mr. Sanders. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. Let me invite our third panel, which is Dr.
Jonathan Tucker, director, Chemical and Biological Weapons
Nonproliferation, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey
Institute of International Studies. A rough place to live,
Doctor, I've been there. And Dr. Tiedt, a research and
neuroscientist, Longboat Key, FL. So far, we've got two lovely
places to live. And Dr. Satu Somani, Professor of Pharmacology
and Toxicology, Southern Illinois University School of
Medicine.
It's nice to have all three of you here. I'm getting a
little giddy, so we better get on with it here. We'll start in
the order that I called. We'll just go down the row here. And
Dr. Tucker, you'll start. I need you to rise and I need to
swear you in.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Shays. And we'll note for the record that all three of
our witnesses have responded in the affirmative. Again, Dr.
Tucker, we'll start with you.
STATEMENTS OF JONATHAN B. TUCKER, DIRECTOR, CHEMICAL AND
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS NONPROLIFERATION PROJECT, CENTER FOR
NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES, MONTEREY INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES; THOMAS TIEDT, RESEARCHER AND NEUROSCIENTIST, LONGBOAT
KEY, FL; AND SATU SOMANI, PROFESSOR OF PHARMOCOLGY AND
TOXICOLOGY, SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE
Mr. Tucker. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Sanders, I appreciate
the opportunity to appear before you today. I direct the
Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project at the
Monterey Institute of International Studies. Formerly I was
senior policy analyst of the staff of the Presidential Advisory
Committee on Gulf War Veterans Illnesses. Before that I was a
chemical weapons specialist at the United States Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, and served as a biological weapons
inspector in Iraq with the U.N. Special Commission.
Mr. Chairman, the evidence shows that there were multiple
chemical weapons detection and exposure incidents during the
Gulf war that the U.S. Government has not officially
acknowledged. Much attention has been given to the March 1991,
incident at Khamisiyah in which United States combat engineers
blew up a munitions bunker containing 8.5 metric tons of nerve
agent. The Department of Defense has called Khamisiyah a
watershed in its investigation of chemical weapons exposures.
At the same time, however, the Pentagon has discounted
dozens of other exposure incidents reported by Gulf war
veterans or mentioned in declassified operations logs. These
exposures appear to have resulted from three sources. First,
chemical fallout from the bombing of Iraqi munitions depots in
the war zone. Second, fallout from the explosive demolition of
Iraqi munitions bunkers by United States troops during and
after the ground war. And third, the sporadic and uncoordinated
Iraqi use of chemical weapons. In short, the evidence
demonstrates that Khamisiyah was just the tip of the iceberg.
The Department of Defense has stated that Iraq never
deployed large numbers of chemical weapons into the war zone
and that the storage sites in central Iraq were too far away
for toxic fallout from their destruction to have reached United
States troops. Yet this position ignores dozens of declassified
military intelligence reports that refer to Iraqi chemical
weapons in Kuwait. The Pentagon has disavowed these
intelligence reports, claiming they were never substantiated.
But the sheer number and detail of the reports suggests that
Iraqi chemical weapons were indeed present in Kuwait before the
Gulf war.
The CIA, for its part, claims that Iraq deployed chemical
weapons into Kuwait during the summer and fall of 1990, but
then withdrew them before the start of the air war in January
1991. Yet it is not logical that Iraq would renounce a potent
weapon in the face of a major ground invasion, and then tie up
its logistics moving thousands of chemical munitions out of
Kuwait. No evidence in the public domain indicates that such a
withdrawal took place. On the contrary, according the Charles
Duelfer, deputy chairman of the U.N. Special Commission, Iraq
transported more than 2,000 rockets filled with nerve gas from
the production plant at Al Muthanna in central Iraq to the
bunker complex at Khamisiyah during the second week of January
1991. In other words, Iraq was moving chemical weapons into the
war zone right up to the beginning of hostilities.
Based on the thus-far declassified record, former CIA
analyst Pat Eddington has identified 12 likely Iraqi chemical
weapon storage sites in southeastern Iraq and Kuwait. Many Gulf
war veterans say they encountered Iraqi chemical munitions on
the battlefield during and after the ground war. An official
Marine Corps survey of more than 1,600 chemical defense
specialists found that 13 percent reported some contact with or
detection of Iraqi chemical weapons. The investigator, Capt.
T.F. Manley, concluded, ``There are too many stated encounters
to categorically dismiss the presence of agents and chemical
agent munitions in the Marine Corps sector.''
With respect to Iraqi use of chemical weapons, the
declassified operations logs corroborate numerous veteran
reports of detecting low levels of chemical warfare agents
during the ground war, including sarin, lewisite, and mustard
gas. Many of these detections were made with analytical methods
that are highly reliable and have a low false alarm rate. Thus,
while adverse weather conditions and the speed of the coalition
advance precluded the large scale use of Iraqi chemical
weapons, there is strong evidence for sporadic, uncoordinated
use.
In conclusion, evidence in the public domain indicates a
larger number of credible chemical weapons detection and
exposure incidents during the Gulf war than either the Pentagon
or the CIA have acknowledged. The implication is that many more
American troops were exposed to low levels of chemical weapons
than the estimated 20,000 at Khamisiyah. While medical experts
will need to make the ultimate judgment about the relationship
between low-level chemical exposures and Gulf war illnesses,
such a link cannot
be dismissed on the basis of the available evidence. I would be
happy to answer your questions on these and other matters,
including my dismissal from the staff of the Presidential
Advisory Committee and my recommendations to the subcommittee
for further action. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Tucker follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.186
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.187
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.188
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.189
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.190
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.191
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.192
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.193
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.194
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.195
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.196
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.197
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.198
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.199
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.200
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.201
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.202
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.203
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.204
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.205
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.206
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.207
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.208
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.209
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.210
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.211
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.212
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.213
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.214
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.215
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.216
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.217
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.218
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.219
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Doctor. I just want you to note: Dan
Miller is a good friend of mine. And I believe your Congressman
just alerted me that you would be coming, and was very happy
that you would be testifying. And I work closely with him on
this and some other issues. So, it's very nice to have you
here.
Mr. Tiedt. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman and members of
the subcommittee, there is a 30-year record of scientific
evidence addressing Gulf war syndrome. In view of the two
panels previously, I must emphasize it is not as bleak as we
were led to believe.
Mr. Shays. Doctor, I'm going to have you pull the mic a
little toward you now.
Mr. Sanders. Closer.
Mr. Shays. And move it up just a little bit. That's great.
Thank you.
Mr. Tiedt. Everyone had hoped that the White House
Presidential Advisory Committee would have examined the
scientific evidence. But most of the critical evidence was
absent from the report that was issued in January of this year.
This scientific evidence shows that Gulf war syndrome was
easily predictable. The symptoms of Gulf war syndrome match the
toxic effects of PB, sarin and pesticides, all toxic enzyme
inhibitors. The symptoms are diverse because the affected
enzymes have distribution all over the body in our central
nervous system and around our periphery. Chemical inhibition of
the most studied of these enzymes causes stunning nerve and
muscle degeneration moments after a single dose, as well as an
array of hormonal, cardiac and development abnormalities.
Extensive research from various points of view shows that
this toxicity is worsened by activity and stress. One look at
the electron microscope pictures would shock anyone. Not all
the damage is reversible. My team's research at the University
of Maryland during the mid-1970's was comprehensive. We
concluded that enzyme inhibitors are toxic, even in patients
with myasthenia gravis. These patients are less susceptible
than healthy and active individuals to the toxic effects of
these agents.
Our work was followed by an explosion of research by DOD
during the 1980's, the most relevant of which was produced by
my co-authors and colleagues still at the University of
Maryland and at the Aberdeen Chemical Warfare R&D Center. We
have a very active R&D apparatus throughout the United States.
I know of at least 12 very active DOD laboratories. DOD
established by the early 1980's that PB causes persisting
``counterproductive consequences'' and that PB is worthless by
itself as a chemical warfare protectant. Moreover, PB reduces
the protection provided by effective protective agents.
DOD research also found that at sublethal dosage PB is more
dangerous and more toxic than sarin nerve gas. Hundreds of
thousands of soldiers were ordered to take PB. Most of them had
acute side effects. There was no benefit to balance the certain
and substantial risk. If the goal was to protect our soldiers,
DOD used the wrong drug.
Last year, research added important new findings to the
already large data base: One, stress makes the blood brain
barrier leaky to PB and enhances PB's central nervous system
toxicity. Two, behavioral changes begin weeks after PB
treatment ends. And three, Gulf war veterans display objective
signs of nerve damage.
PB's use in the Gulf war was a senseless violation of the
Nuremburg code. So was FDA's waiver of informed consent for our
soldiers. Not supplying our soldiers with the required
brochures describing PB's side effects was a violation of FDA's
waiver. The PB experiment adds to the already long record by
the military to conduct involuntary, meritless and hazardous
experiments on our soldiers.
Extensive scientific evidence also exists about
organophosphate-induced neurotoxicity, explaining why EPA and
most States have strict standards for our homes and workplaces.
Mr. Chairman, I hear you touch that point all the time. It's a
very significant point. In the real world we know these
chemicals are very hazardous. Sarin and pesticides are
organophosphates.
Exposure to the nerve gas sarin is sufficiently confirmed.
I believe there are tens of thousands of chemical alarms. I
believe we should also replay the press conference by Dr.
Rostker last December 5, wherein he testifies at the press
conference that at Khamisiyah there was extensive recognition
of chemical warfare sarin-containing warheads, including the
drilling of holes within those warheads, taking a sample,
measuring it, determining and confirming that it was sarin gas
prior to destruction. Of course, we must ask where are those
records.
We know that long-term and delayed onset neurotoxicity can
result from exposures not producing acute symptoms. There is
extensive DOD research on that. We know our soldiers were
exposed to repeated doses of pesticides and unique high-dose
insect repellents. Some pesticides--malathion comes to mind--
are converted to even more dangerous chemicals by heat in air,
just the conditions in the Gulf war. We know that repeated
clothes launderings fails to prevent poisoning from
contaminated clothes.
We also know that co-exposure to PB, sarin, pesticides and
insect repellents make each other more dangerous, more toxic.
Since many soldiers reported acute symptoms from these
exposures, the probabilities of long-lasting neurotoxicity and
its higher prevalence are greater.
Several epidemiologic studies of Gulf war veterans confirm
what was easily predicted. A wide range of symptoms are
significantly more prevalent in Gulf war veterans. The three
studies in the Journal of the American Medical Association 3
months ago by Dr. Robert Haley and his team are very, very
important.
They're also great work. The factor analysis is something
to behold. These studies found neuropathy in Gulf war veterans
and its association with exposure to nerve enzyme inhibitors.
Psychological illnesses were ruled out for the observed brain
and nerve dysfunction. The authors also noted a 1983 warning
that PB would increase the likelihood of occurrence of
chemical-induced neuropathy. This information presented the
Presidential Advisory Committee in
September 1995 was also absent from the Presidential Advisory
Committee's report.
There is no doubt that enzyme inhibitors caused toxicity to
our troops. No other explanation has as much relevant and
mainstream evidence or explains as many cases. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Tiedt follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.220
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.221
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.222
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.223
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.224
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.225
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.226
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.227
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.228
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.229
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.230
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.231
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.232
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.233
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.234
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.235
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Dr. Tiedt. Dr. Somani.
Mr. Somani. Mr. Chairman Shays.
Mr. Shays. Dr. Somani, I'm going to ask you--I'm sorry, I
keep interrupting. We really want to hear you out. I keep
interrupting everyone here. But if you would lower your mic I
think it would help. Lower this mic. Bring it down. Thank you.
That's great. Can you still see your page?
Mr. Somani. Oh, yes.
Mr. Shays. OK. Thank you. Good to have you here.
Mr. Somani. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. And, again, I should thank all three of you
because you've been here since before 10 a.m. And it's very
appreciated you would sit through this entire hearing. And your
testimony is very valued. Thank you.
Mr. Somani. Mr. Chairman Shays and Congressman Sanders, I
thank you for giving me an opportunity to testify before you. I
request you to include the entire written testimony for the
record.
Mr. Shays. That will happen.
Mr. Somani. My testimony is based on the premise that the
Gulf war veterans were taking pyridostigmine as a precautionary
measure against potential exposure to nerve agents--for
example, sarin--and they were exposed to insecticides and other
harmful chemicals, and that they were also under physical
stress which can modify the effects of such exposure.
The literature suggests that sarin can be responsible for
delayed neurotoxic effects which may not appear until years
after a low level of exposure. Although pyridostigmine is not
normally taken up by the brain, it crosses blood brain barrier
under conditions of physical stress and causes central nervous
system effects. Insecticides, insect repellents and other
chemicals can also contribute to neurotoxic effects of nerve
agents as sarin, soman, tabun and Vx and they are important
weapons of chemical warfare. Sarin has been used as a chemical
warfare agent since World War II. More recently, it was used
during the Iran-iraq conflict. Sarin was also used by
terrorists as a weapon in Japan.
Reports from the Defense Science Board and Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs indicate that the Desert
Storm veterans might have been exposed to a low level of sarin.
If that's the case, then the veterans may suffer from the
delayed neurotoxic effects of the low level of sarin. Although
we have a treatment for a single dose toxicity, there is no
treatment, however, for the delayed neurotoxicity. Delayed
neurotoxicity was first reported in the 1950's.
German personnel exposed to nerve agents during World War
II suffered from neurological problems even 5 to 10 years after
their last exposure. Long-term abnormal neurological and
psychiatric symptoms have also been seen in personnel exposed
to sarin in sarin manufacturing factories. The symptoms of the
delayed neurotoxicity include impaired concentration and
memory, depression, fatigue, irritability in those working in
factories where nerve agents were manufactured.
The chronic delayed neurotoxic effects are seen in animal
experiments after administration of organophosphates such as
sarin. These effects are difficulty in walking and paralysis.
These are due to organophosphate-induced delayed neurotoxicity,
what we call OPIDN. And this OPIDN was attributed to the
inhibition of the enzyme, neurotoxic esterase in the nervous
system, and also the degeneration of the axon. That means, the
message pathway from nerve cell to nerve cell is impaired.
Recently, Haley could explain the mild impairment of the
nervous system functions in the Gulf war veterans based on
their epidemiological studies.
Mr. Shays. He's done what? I'm sorry. Speak a little more
slowly. I'm just missing some of your words. What was the last
point you made?
Mr. Somani. Based on their epidemiological studies, they
attribute the number of veterans. Similarly, a British study
also reported neurological dysfunction in veterans. I wish to
take a moment to speak about the pre-treatment drug,
pyridostigmine. I did my Ph.D. on pyridostigmine and sister
drug neostigmine. Recently, I also worked on another drug,
physostigmine. These are all the same sort of drugs, which work
in the central nervous system and the peripheral nervous
system.
Pyridostigmine is a charged compound. This is a positively
charged drug which does not enter into the brain. This has been
used for more than 50 years in the treatment of myasthenia
gravis disease. Pyridostigmine is used as a pre-treatment drug
against nerve agents such as sarin. The protective effect is
attributed to the capacity to form a reversible complex with a
portion of the enzyme acetylcholinesterase, thereby preventing
the inhibition of this enzyme by the nerve agent.
Pyridostigmine is metabolized to another charged compound. And
both of these are excreted in the urine.
However, both the drug and its metabolites seems to
accumulate in the muscle and in the cartilage--cartilage
tissues, which are present in the ears and nose and the soft
tissues. Since exercise--as we take exercise, our cardiac
output increases, the blood flow to the muscle mass increases
10 times, and the blood flow to the liver increases. And these
drugs are metabolized, are degraded in the liver. For example,
the sister drug, like physostigmine on which we worked, the
half-life of that increased--half-life is the amount of the
time the drug stays in the body--and the clearance--the drug
has to be cleared from the body--the clearance has decreased,
indicating that the drug and its metabolites stay in the body
for a longer time, thereby causing more effect.
Recently, Friedman gave doses of pyridostigmine to mice,
and they were subjected to forced swim. That means that the
mice were under stress. This positively charged drug entered
the brain and inhibited acetylcholinesterase, causing more
toxicity. This drug, which is a peripheral drug, has become a
central drug, acting under the central nervous system. In
another study, rats were administered with pyridostigmine for
14 days. The rats were also given physical exercise. The
combination of physical exercise and pyridostigmine caused
muscular damage.
In conclusion, based on the recent experimental evidence
and the similarities of the symptoms of the delayed
neurotoxicity reported by workers in the organophosphate
industry and also by Desert Storm veterans, I'm inclined to
suggest that the Gulf war syndrome may be due to low-level
exposure to sarin.
Mr. Shays. Low-level exposure to what? Sarin. OK.
Mr. Somani. Yes. By sarin. The symptoms are due to low-
level exposure to sarin. Pyridostigmine in combination with
physical exercise can contribute to neurotoxic effects.
Finally, the simultaneous exposure to insecticides and other
chemicals under physical stress may have initiated the
neurotoxicity.
Mr. Shays. Your testimony--are you done?
Mr. Somani. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Somani follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.236
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.237
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.238
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.239
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.240
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.241
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.242
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.243
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.244
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.245
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.246
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.247
Mr. Shays. Thank you. I didn't want to interrupt you. Your
testimony is extraordinary. The bottom line to you both, Dr.
Tiedt and Dr. Somani, is that we basically poisoned our troops.
In essence, that's what you're saying. We poisoned our troops.
We basically gave them a chemical agent, did not warn them of
the potential harm of this agent; we ordered them to take it.
And many did, obviously. And some were poisoned because of it.
That's your testimony. And your point about stress was that
that just magnified the problem. I noticed Dr. Somani and Dr.
Tiedt, you were both nodding as the other spoke; as best I can
understand, they seem to be very compatible. Dr. Tiedt, do you
disagree with any point that was made by Dr. Somani? Do you
want to qualify it any way?
Mr. Tiedt. I guess I think the major thing to emphasize is
that the data base is very, very, very extensive. My testimony
has simply 115 of hundreds of references that are directly
relevant to Gulf war syndrome.
You know, if Gulf war syndrome was a positive event, we
would be giving the Nobel Prize to the Department of Defense
for the work that they published during the early 1980's. It
was very clear.
If it was a positive outcome, you know, like for example, I
was very active in the role of aspirin in stroke and heart
attack, that was a positive outcome, and those folks that did
that work down at the University of Texas, et cetera, are
hailed as, you know, very strong scientists now.
The connection with Gulf war syndrome, with inhibitors of
enzymes, nerve enzymes, acetylcholinesterase simply being the
best studied, is much tighter. The evidence story is extremely
tight. And the troubling thing is it all really came out of
about a dozen of the DOD and DVA laboratories during the early
1980's.
Mr. Shays. What is troubling to me is that your testimony
basically, from your standpoint, it doesn't take a rocket
scientist to know what the problem is.
Yet, Dr. Joseph's standpoint--and that there's no current
accepted medical knowledge--is that chronic symptoms or
physical manifestations are not later developed among persons
exposed to low levels of chemical nerve agents.
Mr. Tiedt. It's simply false. The Pentagon published, in
1993, one of my co-authors from my 1970's work--actually, a
chairman of the department where I did my post-doctoral
fellowship at the University of Maryland--did an amazing study
and spends a great deal of time in the introduction and
discussion relating a chronic organophosphate-induced
neurotoxicity, single or just a few exposures, that cause no
acute symptoms but, years later--we all know that--I'm a pilot
myself. I've been around cropdusters for 20 years.
We all know that cropduster pilots develop some problems,
and there's literature on that that goes back to the 1960's.
It's really tight, the story between nerve enzyme inhibitors.
Really, if you want to know it in a nutshell, what we have
in our bodies, we have protective mechanisms called enzymes,
and we have circulating pools of two enzymes, in particular.
When you take a PB or get exposed to low levels under a
repeated basis, or even a single basis, to sarin or malathion
or DEET, et cetera, you start soaking up that capacity of
protection, and then that makes the nerve endings--we're
talking about a 100 million points of toxicity that our bodies,
the cholinergic nerve endings. It is so tight.
That is why the idea of chemical sensitivity comes into
play. That is why some of these things can take a long time. It
is well-known that an enzyme called NTE--neuropathy target
esterase--takes a long time to age, and it can take years to
display a neurotoxicity from an exposure to any chemical that
inhibits that. Pesticides and organophosphates are well-known
inhibitors.
Mr. Shays. Would you disagree with testimony before this
committee that we do not know how to properly diagnose or treat
chemical exposure?
Mr. Tiedt. I sure do, and I just ask everybody to look at
the package insert for PB. Actually, look at any textbook of
pharmacology and therapeutics, and just simply--if you're
interested, I've already done it for you--just write down the
list of side effects from PB, sarin, DFP--I'll give you a long
list--and write down the symptoms of Gulf war syndrome. It is a
fingerprint match.
It does not take a rocket scientist. It only takes a
biomedical scientist.
Mr. Shays. You have a right to be frustrated.
Dr. Somani, is that your response to the same question?
Would you take issue with testimony before this committee,
first, about the issue, if it wasn't acute, that you're not
going to see it happen? If you don't see acute symptoms, then
you don't have a problem?
Mr. Somani. Yes.
Mr. Shays. Second, that we don't know how to diagnose
chemical exposure and, therefore, we don't know how to treat
it, either?
Mr. Somani. Yes. You don't see the acute symptoms with this
low level. The continuous exposure, you have to wait 10 years,
you can say, because the sarin or organophosphates, they
alkylate or phosphorylate like the enzyme and they also bind to
the NTE--neurotoxic esterase--enzyme.
What happens within this delayed period, we still don't
know.
Mr. Shays. Do we know how to diagnose? I mean, can you
diagnose a patient that has this low-level exposure?
Mr. Somani. They cannot be, because there is a delay period
they don't have the symptoms during that period, and all of a
sudden, they get the symptoms, after some time.
Mr. Shays. I need to be clear. I thought maybe you were
disagreeing with earlier testimony. So, Dr. Tiedt, you would
say it's also difficult to diagnose?
Mr. Tiedt. Certain kinds of this toxicity go through an
acute incident that may or may not be symptomatic, and then
followed by a period of months or years of totally asymptomatic
period, that is without symptoms, by definition, you can't see
a symptom, and only to be exposed by itself, by a delayed
neurotoxicity, or an exposure to another incident, like going
back to your barracks and they're spraying the place with
malathion.
Mr. Shays. You were talking with your hands, and your voice
was coming out. Dr. Somani was also talking with his hands, but
he wasn't saying anything. You were his voice.
Mr. Tiedt. Ventriloquism.
Mr. Shays. I'm going to get you into this, but I want to
call on Mr. Sanders. But do you have anything to comment on
what we've asked so far? I'm going to get into some points you
raised, but I did want to make sure. Is there any comment you
want to make in regards to these questions?
Mr. Tucker. I would not, not being a medical expert, I
would not comment. It sounds plausible to me. The emphasis of
my testimony is that there were multiple low-level chemical
exposures which, in combination with other types of chemicals,
could have led to a synergistic effect.
Mr. Shays. You have total conviction that there was lots of
different troops who were exposed to lots of different
chemicals, something I also agree with, and then we have the
evidence of what happened. Dr.--Mr. Sanders.
Mr. Sanders. No, I'm not a doctor.
Mr. Shays. I should have said, he looks like a scientist.
He looks like a mad scientist. [Laughter.]
Mr. Sanders. I take that as a compliment.
This is a fascinating panel, and each of you are making a
very important contribution. And, Dr. Tucker, be patient. We
will get to you, because I think you have a whole lot to say.
But let me get to the physical scientists, if I might, first.
The chairman asked you, I think, an appropriate question,
and let me go over it again and maybe ask you, Dr. Somani, Dr.
Tiedt makes a statement, and I quote, from the paper that you
gave us:
``DOD established by the early 1980's that, one, PB would
be harmful in healthy individuals; two, PB was worthless, even
counterproductive, as a protectant against chemical warfare;
three, PB was more toxic than sublethal doses of chemical
warfare agents; and, four, higher levels of baseline nerve
activity produced more toxicity than lower levels of baseline
nerve activities. There was no demonstrated benefit to balance
the certain and substantial risk.''
Dr. Somani, do you agree with that?
Mr. Somani. That time, they didn't think that the risk was
there, because this drug has been in use for myasthenia gravis
for 50 years.
Mr. Sanders. Right.
Mr. Somani. I do not see any literature that this drug
could act as a central acting drug, that it can get into the
brain. Pyridostigmine is a positively charged drug, and it
doesn't get into the brain.
What they were thinking of when the pyridostigmine is
given, it inhibits up to 20 to 30 percent blood enzyme as to
cholinesterase enzyme, and that would protect against the
sarin. But they didn't realize that the pyridostigmine, under
stress conditions, can get into the brain. That information was
not available.
I also want to make a point here. I don't know. I wonder as
to how come they didn't try to use another drug, physostigmine,
which was a centrally acting drug, which I considered was a
very good drug, and that will give us central protection,
because that's what our goal is, to protect the brain.
Mr. Sanders. All right. There is a lot to discuss. But
basically, then, you are in agreement with what Dr. Tiedt said?
You are basically in agreement with Dr. Tiedt's statement?
Mr. Somani. Yes.
Mr. Sanders. OK. If this was 1990, or just before the war,
a month before the war, and the Pentagon came to you and said,
``We're concerned about our soldiers being exposed to chemical
agents, and we're thinking of using PB,'' now, Dr. Tiedt is
saying, ``Hey, you would be crazy. That would be the worst
thing in the world. You would be poisoning our soldiers.''
What would you have said? Would you have said the same
thing?
Mr. Somani. No. I tell you, what are our choices? We need a
drug. Right? And we have to use something there to protect our
soldiers. So what are our alternatives? The pyridostigmine is a
peripherally acting, and they felt this was the best under
those conditions. They could have considered physostigmine, but
they did not.
Now, what they did not know at that time, that the
pyridostigmine, under stress conditions, will cross the blood-
brain barrier and get into the brain.
Mr. Sanders. If you're going to war, it doesn't take a
genius to figure out, if I'm sending you to war and I'm giving
you a drug which is going to have a negative impact under
stress, war is stress. Right? Am I missing something here? War
is stress.
Mr. Somani. Yes.
Mr. Sanders. So anybody who is going into war is going to
be living under stress. Right?
Mr. Somani. Yes. But they should have studied that before,
but that work was not done in 1990.
Mr. Sanders. This is what I'm confused about.
Mr. Somani. Yes.
Mr. Sanders. What I'm confused about is, Dr. Tiedt--and
I'll give it to you now--you're telling us that the literature
was pretty clear on this, are you not?
Mr. Tiedt. Yes. There is extensive literature, and it
really begins, unfortunately, with my research, published in
the Journal of Pharmacology and Experimental Therapeutics, in
1978. Again, keep in mind where it came from. It came from the
primary laboratory of acetylcholinesterase inhibitor toxicity
in the world.
We concluded, in our 1978 paper, that treatment of
myasthenia gravis, the actual drugs used to treat these
patients, contributes somewhat to the pathophysiology of the
disease. If you compare the electronic microscope pictures
between myasthenia and PB, you'll see such similarities.
That was then extended in much more depth by the Pentagon,
and many studies, several studies published in the early
1980's, that PB, all by itself, is extremely toxic in healthy--
--
Mr. Sanders. OK, but here's my question. My question is a
simple question. Why didn't they read their own research? What
you're suggesting is, they themselves demonstrated the
potential danger of this drug. They, themselves, did that, and
you're suggesting to us that they ignored their own research.
Is that what you're saying?
Mr. Tiedt. I think that's a generous way of putting it,
yes.
Mr. Sanders. Let me ask you this question.
Mr. Tiedt. See, if you read their--you have to realize, the
publication--this is a very critical point about scientific
research. A publication is not published in some sort of
abstract thing--we had nothing to do this weekend, so we wrote
a paper.
We first have to apply for a grant. These grants were
applied for, to the DOD, for funding. In any grant application,
you outline, review the relevance, the meaning, the impact, the
ramifications of your research. I assure you that the effect of
PB as a nerve chemical warfare agent was completely spelled out
in these research grants prior to the work even being
initiated.
Then the work is done. Then the work is eventually
published. I just ask anyone to read any of the papers in my
references, and look at the introduction and the discussion,
and you will see conclusions by the DOD scientists that PB was
very toxic.
Mr. Sanders. Let me ask you this. You are a trained
pharmacologist; is that your area?
Mr. Tiedt. I received my Ph.D., in pharmacology and
therapeutics.
Mr. Sanders. If we had a dozen pharmacologists up here,
well-trained, would they agree with you?
Mr. Tiedt. If they're aware of the same literature. If we
all started on the same page, simply lay out the same
literature, yes, we would come with agreement.
Mr. Sanders. You're not giving us some--not to say that we
don't respect all points of view. But you're giving us a
mainstream opinion, do you think?
Mr. Tiedt. I'm describing what the literature says, and
anyone that looks at the literature, be it yourselves as
nonscientists or scientists would come to the same conclusion.
Anybody that reads the book chapters written by the DOD
laboratories that did this work, it's obvious. There's really
no debate here.
One has to be aware of the literature. I am very sensitive
to the idea that PB is used in myasthenia gravis. I want to say
right up front that PB should be used in myasthenia gravis, as
well as other similar drugs. But that's not to say that, in
healthy individuals, it does not have toxicity.
Mr. Sanders. Dr. Somani, did you want to jump in, in this
discussion?
Mr. Somani. Yes. We have used for myasthenia gravis this
drug. We gave about 1,080 milligrams of this drug per day to a
patient, and we didn't see any adverse effect of this drug in
the patient. So the question is, in normal people, maybe it
will affect more than the myasthenic patients.
Now, the question which you are raising really is the use
of the pyridostigmine as a pretreatment drug. If I understand,
the British, they claim they want to use pyridostigmine, and
then we followed them the same way, because the British are
using, so we also use this. That's my understanding. Because
the question was, to use between pyridostigmine and
physostigmine.
But the British were using because this drug is a tested
drug for the last 50 years, not knowing the effect of the
exercise, physical stress, and what happens to the crossing of
the blood-brain barrier. That information, I don't think, was
available in 1990. It came out later on, last two----
Mr. Shays. Is physostigmine an approved drug? Would they
have been able to get the same waiver from the FDA?
Mr. Somani. Physostigmine is an approved drug not for as a
pretreatment drug against organophosphate.
Mr. Shays. What is it for?
Mr. Somani. It is for the eye treatment for some eye
diseases. See, every drug has to be used for particular
symptoms.
Mr. Shays. Would it have been the same process? Would the
FDA, they would have gone through the same----
Mr. Tiedt. I know why they used PB. The reason they used PB
is, in 1984, they submitted an IND. In the United States, you
can only market a drug or use a drug for an indication approved
by FDA. If you want to use a drug for an indication beyond an
FDA approved labeling, you must get an IND.
The DOD had an IND filed in 1984 for PB. They never filed
one, to my knowledge, on any other drug.
Now, scientifically--let's take the regulatory thing out of
it--scientifically, they could have used physostigmine and, in
fact, the evidence for physostigmine being a protective agent
is far superior. Physostigmine is a superior protective agent.
First of all, we must realize, PB is not protective, it's
actually harmful. Physostigmine is protective, for two primary
reasons. One, it has better access to the brain. Two, it has a
self-limiting toxicity, because it desensitizes the
acetylcholine receptors, and so it kind of self limits its own
toxicity. Those are two big hits why physostigmine would have
been a much better use.
Both of these, any of these drugs, actually, the only
literature that shows any of these drugs really work are in
combination with atropine and 2-PAM. So we really needed a
cocktail like that, not the way it was used.
Mr. Shays. What we're going to do, if you don't mind--do
you have any time restraint, or would you be willing to let us
vote and come back?
Mr. Sanders. Let me ask Dr. Tiedt this question. What
you're saying is fairly mindblowing, frankly.
Mr. Tiedt. Yes, it is. That's why, when I first heard this
whole issue--I was watching the Rockefeller hearings on May 6--
I could not believe, watching the folks raise their right hand
and say--and it really astonished me, and I walked about 20
miles for 2 days, when they said PB has no known toxicity. Read
the package insert, if you don't want to read the scientific
literature.
It's really disturbing, when a scientific study is
published, it's no good anymore. You know, what's going on
today is, we're spending over $100 million more for scientific
studies to answer all the questions that were answered 15 years
ago.
Mr. Sanders. Mr. Chairman, correct me if I'm wrong, but you
know as much about this as anybody. We have not heard a whole
lot about this, have we?
Mr. Shays. Not a lot.
Mr. Sanders. No, we have not heard a whole lot about this.
And this can be a very important factor and, I think, this
whole discussion. I'm hearing that you are in agreement with
the studies that Haley and others have done which talk about
the synergistic effect and the increased impact of stress and
exercise and all of this.
We'll be back. We're going to vote and we're going to come
back, because this is important.
Do you have confidence, Dr. Tiedt, given what you have said
today--two questions--that the DOD will do the right thing in
terms of coming up with some of the conclusions to what you
have indicated?
Mr. Tiedt. As a scientist, I have to go by the evidence,
and the evidence, the answer is absolutely not.
Mr. Sanders. Tell us a little about your surprise that
information like this did not make it to the Presidential
Advisory Commission.
Mr. Tiedt. I'm very surprised. I was called by the White
House in April 1995, asking if I would be interested in being a
member--not a member of the staff, but actually a member--of
the Advisory Panel. Presumably because I'm a mere adjunct
professor at a local community college these days, you know,
it's not right up there in the fast lane.
So I didn't hear again, in any serious way, until January
1996. But I can tell you, in April 1995, I submitted extensive
documentation, along with my CV and my interest in
participating.
On January 16, I got an emergency phone call from the White
House, asking me what else I knew about PB toxicity. I asked
that person who called me, I said, ``Did you ever do a
literature search?''
Simply go to any library--we happen to be in a city that
has the best libraries. Go to those libraries and just type in
the word ``pyridostigmine'' and watch the couple hundred
references that come out, and then go read those references,
and find out who did all those studies, or most of those
studies.
It is shocking. It is shocking. I submitted that four-page
bibliography on January 17, 1996. I was asked to send it to
Philip Landrigan, the same day. I did. On October 4, the
Presidential Advisory Panel called me, told me they didn't even
know who Philip Landrigan was. They told me they never received
my four-page bibliography. So I sent it again.
I went to the Advisory Panel meeting in Tampa, asking to
testify. I was refused testimony. They said they still did not
know of any of my research.
By some strange coincidence, I was permitted to testify on
November 13. Once again, I submitted all of that--all of that--
--
Mr. Sanders. Your testimony was similar to what you have
stated today?
Mr. Tiedt. Yes. I submitted, you know, my bibliographies
again. None of my articles in the bibliographies--not my
articles, the DOD studies--there's no DOD study in the
Presidential Advisory Panel from the published peer review
literature.
I got an interesting letter 1 month ago from the
Presidential Advisory Panel. I asked about input from another
scientist to this panel. They sent me back a two-page
bibliography of the DOD studies that this person was a coauthor
of--coauthor of my studies, by the way, and my name is in those
papers--23 published studies and two private contract studies
with the U.S. Army, all done in the 1980's. None of those
studies appear in the Presidential Panel Report.
They have actually eliminated any studies that document
Gulf war syndrome. If you read Dr. Haley's fine print in his
JAMA article, he says he presented this information to the
Presidential Advisory Panel.
If you go to the Presidential Advisory Panel, No. 1, not
only do you not see any references of Dr. Haley; No. 2, he
doesn't even appear on the page-and-a-half of names of people
who supplied input. I think it's serious. It's very, very
serious.
Mr. Shays. It is serious. And we're going to go vote in 1
second. But, Dr. Tucker--this is a good segue, in one sense--
knowing of the commission, describe why that event may have
happened, these events. Maybe you can't see a relationship.
I mean, as he was talking, he was saying, ``I'm not
surprised.'' Were you?
Mr. Tucker. Well, I can only discuss my personal experience
on the committee staff, which I would be happy to do, and
perhaps you could extrapolate from my experience some more
general conclusions. But I was only on the committee staff for
4 months.
Mr. Shays. OK. What we'll do is, we'll come back and we'll
do that.
Mr. Tucker. OK.
Mr. Shays. You both don't mind waiting?
Mr. Tucker. No.
Mr. Shays. We have one vote. I don't think we have another.
It will probably be about 15 to 20 minutes. The committee
stands at recess.
[Recess.]
Mr. Shays. I call this hearing to order. I don't think
we're going to be going too much longer, but I did want to tie
up some loose ends.
Dr. Tucker, I would be interested to know--you were working
on the Presidential Advisory Committee--why you think you left,
so we can put that on the record.
Mr. Tucker. I would be happy to. From August to December
1995, I served on the staff of the Presidential Advisory
Committee as the senior policy analyst responsible for
investigating chemical and biological weapons exposures.
During my tenure, I received briefings from CIA, the
Defense Intelligence Agency, the Army Chemical School, and the
Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command. In each case, I
heard categorical denials that Iraqi chemical weapons were
present in the war zone, that United States troops were exposed
to fallout from bombed chemical weapons bunkers, or that Iraq
used chemical weapons.
I was puzzled by the fact that the United States
Government's position on all these issues was at odds with the
eyewitness testimony of Gulf war veterans, as well as
detections by Czech chemical defense units in northern Saudi
Arabia of low levels of chemical weapons, which the Pentagon
acknowledged were valid. So there seemed to be a disconnect.
To address these discrepancies, I decided to investigate a
wide range of views, both within and outside Government,
including the leaders of Gulf war veteran advocacy groups and
Pat and Robin Eddington, the CIA analysts, who differed
strongly with the position of their agency that chemical
weapons had not been used in the Gulf war.
I believed that only by obtaining information from the full
range of informed sources could the committee come to a
reasoned judgment about the incidence of exposures. I also
believed that we had the moral and professional responsibility
to obtain all such relevant information and that it was
unethical, as well as unscientific, to ignore it.
Shortly after I began this effort, however, certain
committee senior staff ordered me verbally and by e-mail not to
seek documents or unofficial briefings from so-called
``unofficial'' sources.
I became concerned that the Presidential Advisory
Committee's dependence on the people and institutions it was
investigating was creating problems for my investigation. The
committee lacked subpoena power and relied for information on
the voluntary cooperation of the Pentagon, the CIA, and the VA,
whose activities it was supposed to oversee.
Mr. Shays. Excuse me. Just to clarify, the Presidential
Advisory Committee does not have the ability to subpoena?
Mr. Tucker. That's correct. I feared that certain committee
senior staff wished to avoid alienating agency officials by
being complicit in the suppression of dissenting views. I
personally refused to accept these constraints on my
investigation, believing they would prevent me from fulfilling
the President's mandate to leave no stone unturned in exploring
possible causes of Gulf war illness, and would violate our
ethical, scientific, and legal responsibilities.
On December 1, 1995, without prior warning, I was dismissed
from the committee staff and given 1 hour to clean out my desk
and leave the building. Before that time, I had never received
a negative performance review. Despite repeated requests, I was
never given grounds for my termination.
In response to press inquiries, the Advisory Committee
spokesman has stated repeatedly and falsely that I resigned
voluntarily. I received, in fact, a formal termination memo, a
copy of which is appended to my written testimony.
The credibility of a committee like the Presidential
Advisory Committee on large matters, such as whether Gulf war
illness was caused or linked to chemical exposures, suffers
when its spokesman lies about small matters, such as my
termination.
Thank you.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. My understanding is that the
gentleman who replaced you--what is his name?
Mr. Tucker. James Turner. I do not know him personally.
Mr. Shays. But my understanding is that he is--the
implication was that you were reaching out beyond--you suspect
you were terminated because?
Mr. Tucker. I am speculating about the possible reason for
my termination. Despite repeated requests, I was not given
grounds for my termination.
Mr. Shays. You're allowed to speculate, if you haven't been
given grounds. So what is your speculation?
Mr. Tucker. As I said, I believe that the reason was that I
was pursuing my investigation too aggressively, and that senior
Committee staff--and perhaps members of the panel itself, I
just don't know--were concerned that this would jeopardize the
Committee's access to information voluntarily provided by the
agencies we were investigating.
Mr. Shays. Your point is that the Committee itself, it
needs the cooperation of the very people it's investigating?
Mr. Tucker. That is correct.
Mr. Shays. Without that cooperation, the willingness to
provide information, they don't get the information?
Mr. Tucker. That's correct, they don't have subpoena power.
Mr. Shays. Dr. Tiedt, I would like to be clear as to what
hearing you were watching when you found yourself ethically
upset with the fact that people were testifying in a way that
you wondered how they could--that's a long question.
The bottom line is, you felt people at what hearing were
testifying and testifying falsely?
Mr. Tiedt. I believe it was--I know it was May 6, and I
believe it was a Senate Veterans' Affairs Committee hearing
by----
Mr. Shays. What year?
Mr. Tiedt. 1994.
Mr. Shays. 1994. OK. We're going back a ways. 1994, you
recall a hearing where people testified about PB?
Mr. Tiedt. That's right.
Mr. Shays. And said it was not toxic?
Mr. Tiedt. There was no known toxic effects from PB.
Mr. Shays. OK. What I would like to do--and then, Bernie,
we'll come back to your line, as well, of questioning--I need
to clarify the fine points of difference. I thought, when you
were testifying, Dr. Tiedt, that you were agreeing with Dr.
Somani. And then later, I'm seeing some differences, and they
may be subtle differences, although they may be significant. I
need to know that.
The testimony I think I'm hearing from you, Dr. Tiedt, is
that basically our troops were given what, in essence, is a
drug, an experimental drug that caused more harm than good. In
fact, not more harm than good--it caused harm, period. That's
your testimony. And the imagery I have is that we were
basically poisoning our troops.
Mr. Tiedt. That's correct.
Mr. Shays. And you feel pretty comfortable with that
statement. I got the sense, Dr. Somani, that you were nodding
your head, but you wanted to qualify that. Do you disagree with
that, or agree with it with qualifications?
Mr. Somani. I need to give a little explanation.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Mr. Somani. If you are giving pyridostigmine, it will cause
the acute effects right away. We know those effects are
diarrhea, hypersalivation, nausea, abdominal pain, muscle
weakness, fatigue, blurred vision, all of those, urinary
problems--we know those.
But my question comes, then, they are taking the drug now;
2 years, 3 years, 4 or 5 years, will those--those effects are
still causing some problems?
Mr. Shays. Yes.
Mr. Somani. I don't think so. That's all my point is. The
effects of the Gulf war syndrome, everything, it's because of
the organophosphates. Because we know that caused the delayed
neurotoxicity, but I don't know whether pyridostigmine causes
the delayed neurotoxicity.
And another thing. There are some troops, like
Czechoslovakian troops, they didn't take pyridostigmine, still
they have the same symptoms. How and why?
Mr. Shays. What is your response to that, Dr. Tiedt?
Mr. Tiedt. What, about the Czech Republic troops?
Mr. Shays. Just his response. How do you react to what Dr.
Somani said?
Mr. Tiedt. I can only report what the studies have found.
The studies have found that a few exposures to cholinesterase
inhibitors--like PB, like physostigmine, like neostigmine, et
cetera--cause ultrastructural and electrophysical effects that
last months. I don't have any evidence that anything lasts
years, in terms of a controlled scientific study. However, if
you look at the effects that are lasting months, and the
exquisite physiology that's at play here, it's not hard to
predict.
I do agree with one thing that Dr. Somani is saying, and
that is that organophosphate co-exposures can be very, very
important.
The thing to emphasize here is that PB can shift. Let's say
you've given a dose of PB, and then subsequently given a dose
of sarin. You will be blocking the binding sites for sarin, and
shift those to the central nervous system in a preferential
fashion.
That is all very well explained and described by Dr.
Haley's reports.
Mr. Sanders. If you were listening to my line of
questioning to Dr. Rostker, what I was concerned about is that
conventional medicine is not looking at the synergistic
approach that might, in fact, be affecting many of our troops.
Let me ask you this question, and that's for either Dr. Somani
or Dr. Tiedt.
That is, is there a standard diagnostic code for delayed
neurotoxicity, or delayed neuropathy? Is the diagnosis accepted
and recognized widely in clinical practice?
Mr. Tiedt. I believe the OPIDP essentially is. Now, when
you say ``in clinical practice,'' we are a large country with a
couple hundred thousand physicians. Many physicians probably
are not tuned in to the scientific literature, and I have no
doubt that those physicians have no idea about all of this.
Mr. Sanders. But, for example, are you familiar with the
diagnosis of multiple chemical sensitivity?
Mr. Tiedt. Somewhat.
Mr. Sanders. I mean, that is a diagnosis among which, to
the best of my knowledge, the AMA does not agree. Some
physicians believe it very strongly, some do not. The concern
that I had with the DOD is, we're going to keep going around in
circles, because many of their doctors just may not believe
this. Is that a reasonable ground for concern?
Mr. Tiedt. Yes, it is.
Mr. Sanders. Do you believe it?
Mr. Shays. Do you believe in multiple chemical sensitivity
as a concept, and would you describe, how it fits into
mainstream science?
Mr. Tiedt. You know, I think Representative Sanders
outlined basically the pathophysiology of MCS so eloquently,
and how can anyone not buy into that? That's exactly what is at
play here. You are sensitizing to future events.
We know that, in the real world, we know that, from an EPA
point of view.
Mr. Shays. The workplace.
Mr. Tiedt. Workplace, and home place. Look what is
happening in Mississippi.
Right now, as we speak, a couple of folks in a pesticide
company used excessive pesticide levels in motels, in homes,
and they have all been condemned and closed down, and they're
about ready, if it hasn't been done already, to be bulldozed
over, simply like another Love Canal. Dioxin. Isn't that Love
Canal? Isn't that an inhibitor of these same enzymes?
We know that. We know there's chemical sensitivity in life.
But just because I say that sentence, it's also true that our
standards of medical practice and scientific research, in every
single borough and country and city in this country is not the
same.
That is a problem, getting the word out. Unfortunately, you
know, it must be said. I know it makes it a long sentence. But
it must be said that we live in a world that we're barraged
with information.
We have a real technology problem of what information is
the highest priority stuff to know. It's a problem.
Mr. Sanders. Dr. Somani, did you want to comment?
Mr. Somani. Yes. I do believe in multiple chemical
sensitivity, because it does cause the effect, and the effect
prolongs for a longer time.
Mr. Sanders. Do you believe that Persian Gulf syndrome is
connected to multiple chemical sensitivity?
Mr. Somani. Yes, definitely. It has exaggerated more. A
single component caused it, but, in the presence of others, it
has amplified or potentiated the effects.
Mr. Sanders. What we heard from Maj. Donnelly earlier today
would be a classic situation?
Mr. Somani. Yes. But primarily, that is due to
organophosphates, insecticides, and those.
Mr. Sanders. Was I wrong in suggesting that, if we have
hundreds of thousands of young men and women walking around
perhaps with a lot of stuff, nasty stuff, in their bodies, that
they might be more sensitive when somebody sprays their home
for cockroaches, and that could trigger off a problem with
them? Is that a legitimate concern?
Dr. Somani, why don't you start?
Mr. Somani. That is a concern. But we also have a good
enzymatic system in the body to get rid of that. Otherwise, we
will be really----
Mr. Shays. Doctor, I'm sorry. I couldn't understand your
words. Just say it a little more slowly, because I value what
you're saying here.
Mr. Somani. OK. See, our body is capable of getting rid of
those compounds. Even though we are exposed every day--you and
me are eating about 1.5 milligrams of insecticides, OK, which
are sprayed; through a lifespan of time, they can accumulate in
the body--but we have a good enzymatic system in the body,
which can detoxify these compounds.
Mr. Sanders. But you would agree that, for some people, it
may be better than for other people?
Mr. Somani. Yes. Yes. That is the genetic effects, OK? That
is where the environmental factor plays the role. But they can
be more sensitized. Some people are more sensitive, some people
are less sensitive.
Mr. Sanders. Right.
Mr. Somani. In a situation like Gulf war syndrome, that is
not the one factor; it is a combination of the factors.
Mr. Sanders. Is it fair to say that, understanding people
are different in genetic composition----
Mr. Somani. Yes.
Mr. Sanders [continuing]. But that we would have reason to
believe that, for the men and women who were over there, they
have come back and are in a condition that we might say
somebody who worked in a pesticide company or somebody who was
spraying, that they have been exposed; is that a fair
statement?
Mr. Somani. If they are exposed, they will be more
sensitive.
Mr. Sanders. Yes, that's my only point.
Mr. Somani. Yes.
Mr. Tiedt. And that's what you mean by MCS, isn't it?
Mr. Sanders. Yes, that is what I mean.
I'm interested, Dr. Tiedt, again, I was disappointed, to be
frank with you, in the Presidential Advisory Commission. Some
of hoped for a little bit more. The emphasis on stress, I
thought, was unfortunate.
Do you want to elaborate a little bit on why you think that
more evidence concerning the chemical factors was not included
in that report? That's what you've said. Anything more that you
want to add to that?
Mr. Tiedt. Certainly, let me just restate it, so at least I
can start with something solid there. That's how you left your
question.
The fact exists that hundreds of relevant studies--directly
relevant, not by some stretch of an imagination--done prior to
the Gulf war, were not included in the Presidential Panel Final
Report, ``final,'' because some of us prevailed a little bit,
and they were asked to go back to work for a little bit, so
we'll get a Final No. 2.
That's a fact; and they knew it. It's not like, well, they
didn't go to the literature and do it. They certainly had it
from me and many others, it turns out, submitted to them on
many, many occasions, and it's simply not there.
The issue is the motivation. Why would they not include it?
Mr. Sanders. Let me take that one. I'll ask that to you and
to Dr. Tucker. Do you think that there was a built-in bias of
wanting to conclude that it was more stress-related than
chemical-related?
Mr. Tiedt. Yes, I do. Yes I do. The reason is that I think
that has been a catch-all, and don't we all know that it's been
a catch-all, for years. Quite frankly, Dr. Joseph, he blamed
Gulf war syndrome--he has had three different explanations.
His first explanation was on psychosomatic freeloaders. His
second explanation was on stress. That changed last December
when Dr. Friedman's study came out. Of course, anybody would
have known that stress was a major factor, if you just read the
literature from the 1960's and 1970's.
Then, finally, about 3 weeks ago, when he announced his
resignation, and traveling around the world in a boat called
the Moonraker, he said, no, now he blames Gulf war syndrome on
society. It's something with the fabric of our consciousness,
that we are just susceptible to hearing, you know, that the
Government is to blame for things.
That's basically his three answers to Gulf war syndrome. So
I basically have to disagree, because the evidence prior to the
Gulf war shows that it was at least predictable.
Mr. Sanders. And, Dr. Tucker, you were interested from
another point of view in pursuing the possible chemical
exposures. You got fired? I mean, do you think that there was a
built-in bias there, that they didn't want to look at this
stuff?
Mr. Tucker. All I can say is that information within the
Presidential Advisory Committee staff was extremely tightly
held. The senior staff controlled the flow of information not
only to the outside world and to the panel, but to the members
of the staff itself who were working on this issue. So we were
working under very tight constraints.
The reasons for those constraints, as I speculated earlier,
may have been related to concern about access to information
from the agencies that were supposed to supply it to the
committee.
Mr. Sanders. That you might have, by going outside it,
upset some of the people in the DOD or the VA?
Mr. Tucker. Right, particularly dealing directly with
whistleblowers or dissenters within those agencies.
Mr. Sanders. OK. Your bottom line is that you believe that
there has been more chemical exposure than we have been led to
believe?
Mr. Tucker. That's correct.
Mr. Sanders. A lot of what you say makes sense in terms of
Iraq having a history of using these weapons, the unlikeliness
of them in the midst of a terrible defeat, after they had
brought these weapons to the theater, then taking them away,
right?
Mr. Tucker. Right. Well, the CIA has testified, in
particular, Dr. Gordon Oehler from the Non-Proliferation Center
testified before Congress that CIA had assessed that Iraq had
deployed chemical munitions into the Kuwait Theater of
Operations in the summer and fall 1990, before the beginning of
the air war, and then had withdrawn them shortly before the war
began on January 16, 1991.
But the CIA did not provide any information to substantiate
the theory that the weapons had been withdrawn. There is
considerable evidence on GulfLINK and in documents released
under the Freedom of Information Act, many produced by the
Defense Intelligence Agency, as well as CIA, that refer to the
presence of chemical munitions in the Kuwait Theater of
Operations, right up to the beginning of hostilities.
Mr. Sanders. You believe, as I understand it, that one of
the possible areas of exposure was when these bunkers were
blown up, that it was not just Khamisiyah, but other bunkers,
as well?
Mr. Tucker. Right. I believe that Khamisiyah was one of
many incidents in which bunkers were explosively demolished,
releasing low levels of chemical agent.
Mr. Sanders. And your judgment about whether or not the
Iraqis, from an offensive point of view, used chemical or
biological weapons?
Mr. Tucker. Those are based on reports of detections, for
example, during the breaching operations by the Marine Corps,
during the invasion of Kuwait. There were detections with FOX
reconnaissance vehicles, which have a very reliable detection
system called a gas chromatograph mass spectrometer.
There were multiple detections with the so-called M256 kit,
which is a highly reliable way of confirming initial chemical
alarms. There was also a device called a RASCAL, which can
detect clouds of chemical agent at a distance.
All of these systems detected a number of different
chemical agents during the ground war, including lewisite and
mustard, which are blister agents, and sarin, which is a nerve
agent.
Mr. Sanders. So your conclusion, as I recall from your
testimony, is that there was not a massive attack?
Mr. Tucker. Clearly, people were not falling like flies,
which one would expect from a massive use of chemical agent.
But, for example, there may have been chemical mines. There may
have been occasional use of artillery shells.
I believe what happened is that there was some delegation
of authority from Iraqi senior command levels to front-line
units to actually use these weapons, and that there was some
uncoordinated use. But because of the speed of the war and the
fact that the weather conditions were adverse, there was no
coordinated use, no effective use of chemical weapons.
Mr. Sanders. Am I hearing you correctly? Obviously, one has
to know what is true and what is not true, and we can speculate
all we want. But, in terms of speculation, they have a history
of using it. They used it right after the war. You're
suggesting that the stuff was there?
Mr. Tucker. Yes.
Mr. Sanders. And you're suggesting that maybe permission
was given to some of their front-line people to use it, and
you're arguing, given all of that, it shouldn't shock you that
some of that was used?
Mr. Tucker. Because, for example, there are communications
intercepts, where we intercepted Iraqi military communications,
and there were indicators that they had issued an order, that
senior command levels had issued an order to front-line troops
to use the weapons if needed against Coalition forces.
Mr. Sanders. Do you also suggest that, in terms of the
burning oil wells, that that might have been an area where
some----
Mr. Tucker. Well, there's one document that is suggestive
of the possibility. When a number of Iraqi units were ordered
to sabotage the Kuwaiti oil wells, they were also ordered to--I
forget the exact term, but there was a reference to ``chemical
preparations.'' The troops themselves were ordered to wear
chemical protective gear and to set up decontaminationsites. So
that is suggestive.
I'm not saying this is conclusive evidence by any means,
but it is suggestive of the possibility that some of the oil
well fires were deliberately contaminated with chemical
weapons.
Mr. Sanders. I mean, the bottom line of what you're saying
is, given all of these factors, you would be surprised if our
troops were not exposed to more than Khamisiyah?
Mr. Tucker. Right. I think the CIA and the Pentagon have
made an effort to fence in the problem by focusing on
Khamisiyah, while ignoring a number of other incidents of this
type.
Mr. Sanders. Are you confident, when Dr. Rostker tells that
they are now exploring a whole lot of other areas? Do you think
we may see something?
Mr. Tucker. I was encouraged to hear that they have an open
mind that there may have been other incidents of this type.
When I was on the committee staff, they were completely
categorical that there had been no exposures. So there has been
a kind of paradigm shift since Khamisiyah and now they are more
open to the possibility.
Mr. Sanders. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Mr. Shays. We're ready to close up here. I just need to
have a sense of direct dose versus low level.
First, I'm just going to say to you that one of the things
that has troubled me throughout our hearings, and this is the
eighth hearing we've had, as a State legislator, I got involved
in environmental issues and safety in the workplace and, for
me, it was like lesson No. 1, certain chemicals in the
workplace cause harm, illness, and potential death.
It seems to me like the Army hasn't learned that lesson
yet. It does surprise me that people that have your views
somehow aren't at the VA and aren't at the DOD. I would like to
understand, just appreciate that a little bit more. Is the kind
of science that you're in, and your expertise, not the kind of
science that doctors get into in terms of financial
remuneration?
What got you into this field, and why aren't there more
people in your field? Why am I not seeing more people of your
expertise in the VA? When we had one member from the VA
testify, they really couldn't think of people that had your
expertise, except for one or two, really a handful.
Mr. Tiedt. I'd rather not even speculate on that. Let me
give you the realities. Simply consult my reference list, look
at all the authors, and look at their affiliations. The DOD and
the DVA have lots of scientists that know lots about low-level
nerve gas, organo-phosphate exposures, and the toxicities of PB
and like chemicals.
Matter of fact, that's where most of the funding and the
research comes from--the DOD-funded laboratories.
Mr. Shays. I thought you were a little unfair to Dr.
Joseph, because I'm not sure that he would have publicly
stated--it may have been your sense of his three levels of what
he--the growth of his sense of what Gulf war syndrome was.
Therefore, because I thought you were a little unfair, I
was trying to find the exact quote that I recalled. The sense I
had from it was that there have been very few low-level studies
of exposure to chemicals, that basically, his view, high-level
exposure, acute illness, we know we have a problem; low-level,
we don't really have any proof that this is a health care
problem.
Yet you seem to be implying that there are a number of
studies that may, in fact, even be low-level studies. There
certainly are, in the private sector, in the workplace.
Are you aware that there are DOD studies that can verify
and could have alerted the DOD to the seriousness of low-level
exposure to chemicals?
Mr. Tiedt. Yes, I am. I mean, for example, one of the best
DOD studies out, I think it was published in 1985, the lead
author is Meshul--M-e-s-h-u-l.
He finds that he was able to give a dose of sarin, that it
caused no acute toxicity, none. But then he goes in and pulls
the muscles out, and he finds all kinds of, you know,
neuromuscular junction problems, and it's going to be long-
lasting neuromuscular junction problems.
That's not even tapping into the NTE, the other enzyme,
which is more of a long-term, you know, delayed neuropathy sort
of thing.
Certainly, there is evidence out there, and before and
after the Gulf war. It's not bleak. It is simply not bleak. I
just ask folks to really look at the reference list. It's not
my interpretation. It's really the DOD determinations.
Keep in mind some of the procedures about things. I'm not
sure if anybody has published a study. When you publish a study
and it's paid for by somebody, quite often you have to get
endorsement. For example, that just recently came out on
generic Synthroid. They had to get an endorsement.
Being a pharmaceutical executive in clinical research, I am
aware of the confidentiality agreements that I've asked a
variety of investigators to sign.
I believe it's a certainty that any study that is going to
be postured in the scientific literature as a DOD-funded study,
done by DOD employees, particularly at the Aberdeen Chemical
Warfare R&D facility, is going to be approved up the chain of
command and finally get an endorsement to get out into the
published literature.
Now, these studies are not done by low-level scientists
running amok up in Aberdeen.
Mr. Shays. Well, your testimony raises whole levels of new
inquiry for us. I had accepted as reality that, as foolish as
it seemed to me to be, the DOD wasn't into doing much work in
low-level exposure and, as a result, I was critical of them,
because I couldn't justify it in my own mind.
You're saying--and we're going to go back and examine the
record--you're saying that's not so. You've also basically
testified that people under oath in 1994, in your judgment,
were really contradicting a scientific fact.
Mr. Tiedt. DOD and the FDA said, May 6--I didn't bring the
testimony with me.
Mr. Shays. It's right here.
Mr. Tiedt. 1994.
Mr. Shays. Right.
Mr. Tiedt. That was the context. And, you know, actually,
said, you know, ``We agreed to keep medical records; we agreed
to give folks PB brochures outlining the side effects and the
things to be cautious of. We agreed to do that.'' Well, they
didn't do it.
Mr. Shays. We are going to be having a hearing on May 8,
1997, whose topic is going to be bioethics and informed
consent, so we're going to be getting into that whole issue.
Your testimony has been really quite excellent. It has been
a very interesting day.
Dr. Tucker, we didn't get as much into your area, but we
have in the past. Is there anything that you would want to
close with?
Mr. Tucker. OK. I would like to make a remark relevant to
the topic we were just discussing.
Historically, U.S. chemical defense doctrine has----
Mr. Shays. Let me interrupt you and say that I also
understand you have some recommendations to make?
Mr. Tucker. Yes, that's right.
Mr. Shays. OK. Why don't you do that, as well?
Mr. Tucker. OK. Thank you.
Historically, U.S. chemical defense doctrine has discounted
the possibility of harm from doses of chemical warfare agents
that are too low to produce immediate acute effects.
Much of the research on low-dose exposures has dealt with
occupational exposures--for example, people who work at Army
depots where chemical agents are stored and who work day in and
day out with very low level, whole-body exposures. I think
there has been a disconnect between the chemical defense
doctrine for the battlefield and the development of
occupational safety and health measures for depot workers. That
might be part of the explanation.
In general, the goal of chemical-defense doctrine has been
to minimize the impact of an enemy's use of chemical weapons on
the tempo and effectiveness of U.S. military operations. They
have done this by setting up the so-called MOPP scale--mission-
oriented protective posture--which refers to the ensemble of
protective gear that U.S. troops wear--gas mask, poncho, and
protective garments.
The idea is to calibrate the level of protection to the
assessed chemical threat, because when people are in MOPP-4,
the full ensemble, they are almost incapacitated. They cannot
fight efficiently, particularly under hot weather conditions.
They have poor vision. They can't communicate well. They are
under a higher level of stress.
To deal with this problem, the Army has sought to minimize
the level of protection that troops wear in combat, and
calibrate it to the assessed level of threat.
As a result, there has been a kind of all-or-nothing
mindset that has viewed chemical weapons exposures as either
severe if they produce acute effects or, if they're sub-acute,
they're just discounted, they're viewed as harmless.
Commanders during the Gulf war generally disregarded
reports of low-level chemical detections and exposures because
of this all-or-nothing mindset. I believe that, later on, after
the war, when large numbers of troops began getting sick, the
same commanders wished to avoid accountability for serious
errors of judgment, such as blowing up bunkers that may have
contained chemical weapons. They refused to acknowledge the
problem, hoping it would simply go away.
In my view, regardless of who was at fault--that's really
no longer important--the critical issue is to get to the truth,
so that we can make sure that future soldiers are better
protected against these low-level threats and better treated by
their Government if they are exposed.
In terms of my recommendations, I strongly believe that the
executive branch's failure to deal forthrightly with this issue
from the beginning has seriously eroded public confidence, not
only in the Department of Defense but in Government in general.
I think only a full disclosure of the facts and acceptance of
official responsibility where it is due can restore the
relationship of trust between Government and the people that is
the essence of our democracy.
To this end, I would offer two recommendations.
First, a crucial untapped source of information about
possible toxic exposures during the Gulf war is the large
volume of environmental and biomedical samples that U.S.
technical intelligence teams collected throughout the war zone
during and after Desert Storm. A memo describing this sampling
operation in detail is attached to my written testimony. It was
coordinated by a rather shadowy unit called the JCMEC, based on
Dhahran.
Despite requests under the Freedom of Information Act, the
results of these analyses have never been made public. I would,
therefore, urge the subcommittee to request these records from
the Department of Defense and, if the request is denied, to
issue a subpoena for their release.
Second, I would agree with Mr. Sanders that the Pentagon
has suffered a significant loss of credibility and that the
future investigation of chemical exposure incident should be
entrusted to an objective and disinterested body that can
regain the confidence of the American people.
My suggestion would be for Congress to establish a
bipartisan select committee of both houses to conduct an
independent investigation of the exposures issue. This
committee should have full subpoena power and access to the
full range of classified information on the Gulf war.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. Dr. Tiedt or Dr. Somani, do you have
any closing comments?
Mr. Tiedt. I would add, regarding the recommendation to get
additional information, I'm aware, because I've received a
couple copies, of unpublished DOD studies that are internally
completed and have signoffs, but they simply did not, you know,
fit the need to get published.
It seems to me that, undoubtedly, there are many, many
others--unpublished studies, finished, but just not ready for
prime time publication--and I would recommend that those get
requested, as well.
Mr. Shays. OK. Dr. Somani.
Mr. Somani. Yes. My recommendation would be that, as Dr.
Rostker already pointed out, that they have announced about the
grants for the low-level studies, and hopefully, they will
continue that, because the future problem is with the low-level
studies.
Mr. Shays. One problem with studies for me right now is
that I'm not prepared to recommend that we have a lot more
studies. I'm not prepared to recommend we have a lot more
studies. I feel like we're all studied out, and I want to see
some action.
Obviously, we need to continue studies, but I don't want to
wait for action.
Mr. Somani. Effective of a low level of the
organophosphate, the nerve agents. OK.
No. 2 will be, we know that there should be other
pretreatment drugs besides pyridostigmine, like physostigmine,
and I'm sure they should be looking into it. In fact, in the
last symposium, they did say that they will be looking into
physostigmine as a pre-treatment drug.
Mr. Shays. I would like to thank you gentlemen. The third
panel has the most difficult job, because we've been here a
while. You were very stimulating and informative, all three of
you.
This was a day well spent. I'm very grateful to all of you.
I thank those of you who have stayed to listen to the testimony
of our witnesses, and I thank the Department of Veterans'
Affairs, because I do know we have officials from there who
have been here--most of the day, or all of the day? All of the
day. For the record, that is very appreciated. Thank you very
much.
[Whereupon, the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[Additional information submitted for the hearing record
follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.248
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.249
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.250
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.251
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.252
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.253
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.254
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.255
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.256
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3668.257