

(iii) XYZ-Europe's research unit alters Nulon to adapt it to military specifications and develops a high-intensity marketing campaign directed at the defense industry in several European countries. Beginning with the 1995 taxable year, XYZ-Europe manufactures and sells Nulon in Europe through its marketing network under one of its brand names.

(iv) For the 1995 taxable year, XYZ has no direct expenses associated with the license of Nulon to XYZ-Europe and incurs no expenses related to the marketing of Nulon in Europe. For the 1995 taxable year, XYZ-Europe's Nulon sales and pre-royalty expenses are \$500 million and \$300 million, respectively, resulting in net pre-royalty profit of \$200 million related to the Nulon business. The operating assets employed in XYZ-Europe's Nulon business are \$200 million. Given the facts and circumstances, the district director determines under the best method rule that a residual profit split will provide the most reliable measure of an arm's length result. Based on an examination of a sample of European companies performing functions similar to those of XYZ-Europe, the district director determines that an average market return on XYZ-Europe's operating assets in the Nulon business is 10 percent, resulting in a market return of \$20 million (10% × \$200 million) for XYZ-Europe's Nulon business, and a residual profit of \$180 million.

(v) Since the first stage of the residual profit split allocated profits to XYZ-Europe's contributions other than those attributable to highly valuable intangible property, it is assumed that the residual profit of \$180 million is attributable to the valuable intangibles related to Nulon, i.e., the European brand name for Nulon and the Nulon formula (including XYZ-Europe's modifications). To estimate the relative values of these intangibles, the district director compares the ratios of the capitalized value of expenditures as of 1995 on Nulon-related research and development and marketing over the 1995 sales related to such expenditures.

(vi) Because XYZ's protective product research and development expenses support the worldwide protective product sales of the XYZ group, it is necessary to allocate such expenses among the worldwide business activities to which they relate. The district director determines that it is reasonable to allocate the value of these expenses based on worldwide protective product sales. Using information on the average useful life of its investments in protective product research and development, the district director capitalizes and amortizes XYZ's protective product research and development expenses. This analysis indicates that the capitalized research and development expenditures have a value of \$0.20 per dollar of global protective product sales in 1995.

(vii) XYZ-Europe's expenditures on Nulon research and development and marketing support only its sales in Europe. Using information on the average useful life of XYZ-Europe's investments in marketing and research and development, the district director capitalizes and amortizes XYZ-Europe's expenditures and determines that they have a value in 1995 of \$0.40 per dollar of XYZ-Europe's Nulon sales.

(viii) Thus, XYZ and XYZ-Europe together contributed \$0.60 in capitalized intangible development expenses for each dollar of XYZ-Europe's protective product sales for 1995, of which XYZ contributed one-third (or \$0.20 per dollar of sales). Accordingly, the district director determines that an arm's length royalty for the Nulon license for the 1995 taxable year is \$60 million, i.e., one-third of XYZ-Europe's \$180 million in residual Nulon profit.

(d) *Effective/applicability date*—(1) *In general.* The provisions of paragraphs (c)(2)(ii)(B)(1) and (D), (c)(3)(i)(A) and (B), and (c)(3)(ii)(D) of this section are generally applicable for taxable years beginning after July 31, 2009.

(2) *Election to apply regulation to earlier taxable years.* A person may elect to apply the provisions of paragraphs (c)(2)(ii)(B)(1) and (D), (c)(3)(i)(A) and (B), and (c)(3)(ii)(D) of this section to earlier taxable years in accordance with the rules set forth in § 1.482-9(n)(2).

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§ 1.482-7 Methods to determine taxable income in connection with a cost sharing arrangement.

(a) *In general.* The arm's length amount charged in a controlled transaction reasonably anticipated to contribute to developing intangibles pursuant to a cost sharing arrangement (CSA), as described in paragraph (b) of this section, must be determined under a method described in this section. Each method must be applied in accordance with the provisions of § 1.482-1, except as those provisions are modified in this section.

(1) *RAB share method for cost sharing transactions (CSTs).* See paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section regarding the requirement that controlled participants, as defined in section (j)(1)(i) of

this section, share intangible development costs (IDCs) in proportion to their shares of reasonably anticipated benefits (RAB shares) by entering into cost sharing transactions (CSTs).

(2) *Methods for platform contribution transactions (PCTs)*. The arm's length amount charged in a platform contribution transaction (PCT) described in paragraph (b)(1)(ii) of this section must be determined under the method or methods applicable under the other section or sections of the section 482 regulations, as supplemented by paragraph (g) of this section. See §1.482-1(b)(2)(ii) (Selection of category of method applicable to transaction), §1.482-1(b)(2)(iii) (Coordination of methods applicable to certain intangible development arrangements), and paragraph (g) of this section (Supplemental guidance on methods applicable to PCTs).

(3) *Methods for other controlled transactions*—(i) *Contribution to a CSA by a controlled taxpayer that is not a controlled participant*. If a controlled taxpayer that is not a controlled participant contributes to developing a cost shared intangible, as defined in section (j)(1)(i) of this section, it must receive consideration from the controlled participants under the rules of §1.482-4(f)(4) (Contribution to the value of an intangible owned by another). Such consideration will be treated as an intangible development cost for purposes of paragraph (d) of this section.

(ii) *Transfer of interest in a cost shared intangible*. If at any time (during the term, or upon or after the termination, of a CSA) a controlled participant transfers an interest in a cost shared intangible to another controlled taxpayer, the controlled participant must receive an arm's length amount of consideration from the transferee under the rules of §§1.482-4 through 1.482-6 as supplemented by paragraph (f)(4) of this section regarding arm's length consideration for a change in participation. For this purpose, a capability variation described in paragraph (f)(3) of this section is considered to be a controlled transfer of interests in cost shared intangibles.

(iii) *Other controlled transactions in connection with a CSA*. Controlled transactions between controlled par-

ticipants that are not PCTs or CSTs and are not described in paragraph (a)(3)(ii) of this section (for example, provision of a cross operating contribution, as defined in paragraph (j)(1)(i) of this section, or make-or-sell rights, as defined in paragraph (c)(4) of this section) require arm's length consideration under the rules of §§1.482-1 through 1.482-6, and 1.482-9 as supplemented by paragraph (g)(2)(iv) of this section.

(iv) *Controlled transactions in the absence of a CSA*. If a controlled transaction is reasonably anticipated to contribute to developing intangibles pursuant to an arrangement that is not a CSA described in paragraph (b)(1) or (5) of this section, whether the results of any such controlled transaction are consistent with an arm's length result must be determined under the applicable rules of the other sections of the regulations under section 482. For example, an arrangement for developing intangibles in which one controlled taxpayer's costs of developing the intangibles significantly exceeds its share of reasonably anticipated benefits from exploiting the developed intangibles would not in substance be a CSA, as described in paragraphs (b)(1)(i) through (iii) of this section or paragraph (b)(5)(i) of this section. In such a case, unless the rules of this section are applicable by reason of paragraph (b)(5) of this section, the arrangement must be analyzed under other applicable sections of regulations under section 482 to determine whether it achieves arm's length results, and if not, to determine any allocations by the Commissioner that are consistent with such other regulations under section 482. See §1.482-1(b)(2)(ii) (Selection of category of method applicable to transaction) and (iii) (Coordination of methods applicable to certain intangible development arrangements).

(4) *Coordination with the arm's length standard*. A CSA produces results that are consistent with an arm's length result within the meaning of §1.482-1(b)(1) if, and only if, each controlled participant's IDC share (as determined under paragraph (d)(4) of this section) equals its RAB share, each controlled participant compensates its RAB share

of the value of all platform contributions by other controlled participants, and all other requirements of this section are satisfied.

(b) *Cost sharing arrangement.* A cost sharing arrangement is an arrangement by which controlled participants share the costs and risks of developing cost shared intangibles in proportion to their RAB shares. An arrangement is a CSA if and only if the requirements of paragraphs (b)(1) through (4) of this section are met.

(1) *Substantive requirements*—(i) *CSTs.* All controlled participants must commit to, and in fact, engage in cost sharing transactions. In CSTs, the controlled participants make payments to each other (CST Payments) as appropriate, so that in each taxable year each controlled participant's IDC share is in proportion to its respective RAB share.

(ii) *PCTs.* All controlled participants must commit to, and in fact, engage in platform contributions transactions to the extent that there are platform contributions pursuant to paragraph (c) of this section. In a PCT, each other controlled participant (PCT Payor) is obligated to, and must in fact, make arm's length payments (PCT Payments) to each controlled participant (PCT Payee) that provides a platform contribution. For guidance on determining such arm's length obligation, see paragraph (g) of this section.

(iii) *Divisional interests.* Each controlled participant must receive a non-overlapping interest in the cost shared intangibles without further obligation to compensate another controlled participant for such interest.

(iv) *Examples.* The following examples illustrate the principles of this paragraph (b)(1):

Example 1. Company A and Company B, who are members of the same controlled group, execute an agreement to jointly develop vaccine X and own the exclusive rights to commercially exploit vaccine X in their respective territories, which together comprise the whole world. The agreement provides that they will share some, but not all, of the costs for developing Vaccine X in proportion to RAB share. Such agreement is not a CSA because Company A and Company B have not agreed to share all of the IDCs in proportion to their respective RAB shares.

Example 2. Company A and Company B agree to share all the costs of developing Vaccine X. The agreement also provides for employing certain resources and capabilities of Company A in this program including a skilled research team and certain research facilities, and provides for Company B to make payments to Company A in this respect. However, the agreement expressly provides that the program will not employ, and so Company B is expressly relieved of the payments in regard to, certain software developed by Company A as a medical research tool to model certain cellular processes expected to be implicated in the operation of Vaccine X even though such software would reasonably be anticipated to be relevant to developing Vaccine X and, thus, would be a platform contribution. See paragraph (c) of this section. Such agreement is not a CSA because Company A and Company B have not engaged in a necessary PCT for purposes of developing Vaccine X.

Example 3. Companies C and D, who are members of the same controlled group, enter into a CSA. In the first year of the CSA, C and D conduct the intangible development activity, as described in paragraph (d)(1) of this section. The total IDCs in regard to such activity are \$3,000,000 of which C and D pay \$2,000,000 and \$1,000,000, respectively, directly to third parties. As between C and D, however, their CSA specifies that they will share all IDCs in accordance with their RAB shares (as described in paragraph (e)(1) of this section), which are 60% for C and 40% for D. It follows that C should bear \$1,800,000 of the total IDCs (60% of total IDCs of \$3,000,000) and D should bear \$1,200,000 of the total IDCs (40% of total IDCs of \$3,000,000). D makes a CST payment to C of \$200,000, that is, the amount by which D's share of IDCs in accordance with its RAB share exceeds the amount of IDCs initially borne by D (\$1,200,000-\$1,000,000), and which also equals the amount by which the total IDCs initially borne by C exceeds its share of IDCs in accordance with its RAB share (\$2,000,000-\$1,800,000). As a result of D's CST payment to C, the IDC shares of C and D are in proportion to their respective RAB shares.

(2) *Administrative requirements.* The CSA must meet the requirements of paragraph (k) of this section.

(3) *Date of a PCT.* The controlled participants must enter into a PCT as of the earliest date on or after the CSA is entered into on which a platform contribution is reasonably anticipated to contribute to developing cost shared intangibles.

(4) *Divisional interests*—(i) *In general.* Pursuant to paragraph (b)(1)(iii) of this section, each controlled participant

must receive a non-overlapping interest in the cost shared intangibles without further obligation to compensate another controlled participant for such interest. Each controlled participant must be entitled to the perpetual and exclusive right to the profits from transactions of any member of the controlled group that includes the controlled participant with uncontrolled taxpayers to the extent that such profits are attributable to such interest in the cost shared intangibles.

(ii) *Territorial based divisional interests.* The CSA may divide all interests in cost shared intangibles on a territorial basis as follows. The entire world must be divided into two or more non-overlapping geographic territories. Each controlled participant must receive at least one such territory, and in the aggregate all the participants must receive all such territories. Each controlled participant will be assigned the perpetual and exclusive right to exploit the cost shared intangibles through the use, consumption, or disposition of property or services in its territories. Thus, compensation will be required if other members of the controlled group exploit the cost shared intangibles in such territory.

(iii) *Field of use based divisional interests.* The CSA may divide all interests in cost shared intangibles on the basis of all uses (whether or not known at the time of the division) to which cost shared intangibles are to be put as follows. All anticipated uses of cost shared intangibles must be identified. Each controlled participant must be assigned at least one such anticipated use, and in the aggregate all the participants must be assigned all such anticipated uses. Each controlled participant will be assigned the perpetual and exclusive right to exploit the cost shared intangibles through the use or uses assigned to it and one controlled participant must be assigned the exclusive and perpetual right to exploit cost shared intangibles through any unanticipated uses.

(iv) *Other divisional bases.* (A) In the event that the CSA does not divide interests in the cost shared intangibles on the basis of exclusive territories or fields of use as described in paragraphs (b)(4)(ii) and (iii) of this section, the

CSA may adopt some other basis on which to divide all interests in the cost shared intangibles among the controlled participants, provided that each of the following criteria is met:

(1) The basis clearly and unambiguously divides all interests in cost shared intangibles among the controlled participants.

(2) The consistent use of such basis for the division of all interests in the cost shared intangibles can be dependably verified from the records maintained by the controlled participants.

(3) The rights of the controlled participants to exploit cost shared intangibles are non-overlapping, exclusive, and perpetual.

(4) The resulting benefits associated with each controlled participant's interest in cost shared intangibles are predictable with reasonable reliability.

(B) See paragraph (f)(3) of this section for rules regarding the requirement of arm's length consideration for changes in participation in CSAs involving divisions of interest described in this paragraph (b)(4)(iv).

(v) *Examples.* The following examples illustrate the principles of this paragraph (b)(4):

Example 1. Companies P and S, both members of the same controlled group, enter into a CSA to develop product Z. Under the CSA, P receives the interest in product Z in the United States and S receives the interest in product Z in the rest of the world, as described in paragraph (b)(4)(ii) of this section. Both P and S have plants for manufacturing product Z located in their respective geographic territories. However, for commercial reasons, product Z is nevertheless manufactured by P in the United States for sale to customers in certain locations just outside the United States in close proximity to P's U.S. manufacturing plant. Because S owns the territorial rights outside the United States, P must compensate S to ensure that S realizes all the cost shared intangible profits from P's sales of product Z in S's territory. The pricing of such compensation must also ensure that P realizes an appropriate return for its manufacturing efforts. Benefits projected with respect to such sales will be included for purposes of estimating S's, but not P's, RAB share.

Example 2. The facts are the same as in *Example 1* except that P and S agree to divide their interest in product Z based on site of manufacturing. P will have exclusive and perpetual rights in product Z manufactured

in facilities owned by P. S will have exclusive and perpetual rights to product Z manufactured in facilities owned by S. P and S agree that neither will license manufacturing rights in product Z to any related or unrelated party. Both P and S maintain books and records that allow production at all sites to be verified. Both own facilities that will manufacture product Z and the relative capacities of these sites are known. All facilities are currently operating at near capacity and are expected to continue to operate at near capacity when product Z enters production so that it will not be feasible to shift production between P's and S's facilities. P and S have no plans to build new facilities and the lead time required to plan and build a manufacturing facility precludes the possibility that P or S will build a new facility during the period for which sales of Product Z are expected. Based on these facts, this basis for the division of interests in Product Z is a division described in paragraph (b)(4)(iv) of this section. The basis for the division of interest is unambiguous and clearly defined and its use can be dependably verified. P and S both have non-overlapping, exclusive and perpetual rights in Product Z. The division of interest results in the participant's relative benefits being predictable with reasonable reliability.

Example 3. The facts are the same as in *Example 2* except that P's and S's manufacturing facilities are not expected to operate at full capacity when product Z enters production. Production of Product Z can be shifted at any time between sites owned by P and sites owned by S, although neither P nor S intends to shift production as a result of the agreement. The division of interests in Product Z between P and S based on manufacturing site is not a division described in paragraph (b)(4)(iv) of this section because their relative shares of benefits are not predictable with reasonable reliability. The fact that neither P nor S intends to shift production is irrelevant.

(5) *Treatment of certain arrangements as CSAs*—(i) *Situation in which Commissioner must treat arrangement as a CSA.* The Commissioner must apply the rules of this section to an arrangement among controlled taxpayers if the administrative requirements of paragraph (b)(2) of this section are met with respect to such arrangement and the controlled taxpayers reasonably concluded that such arrangement was a CSA meeting the requirements of paragraphs (b)(1), (3), and (4) of this section.

(ii) *Situation in which Commissioner may treat arrangement as a CSA.* For arrangements among controlled taxpayers not described in paragraph

(b)(5)(i) of this section, the Commissioner may apply the provisions of this section if the Commissioner concludes that the administrative requirements of paragraph (b)(2) of this section are met, and, notwithstanding technical failure to meet the substantive requirements of paragraph (b)(1), (3), or (4) of this section, the rules of this section will provide the most reliable measure of an arm's length result. See § 1.482-1(c)(1) (the best method rule). For purposes of applying this paragraph (b)(5)(ii), any such arrangement shall be interpreted by reference to paragraph (k)(1)(iv) of this section.

(iii) *Examples.* The following examples illustrate the principles of this paragraph (b)(5). In the examples, assume that Companies P and S are both members of the same controlled group.

Example 1. (i) P owns the patent on a formula for a capsulated pain reliever, P-Cap. P reasonably anticipates, pending further research and experimentation, that the P-Cap formula could form the platform for a formula for P-Ves, an effervescent version of P-Cap. P also owns proprietary software that it reasonably anticipates to be critical to the research efforts. P and S execute a contract that purports to be a CSA by which they agree to proportionally share the costs and risks of developing a formula for P-Ves. The agreement reflects the various contractual requirements described in paragraph (k)(1) of this section and P and S comply with the documentation, accounting, and reporting requirements of paragraphs (k)(2) through (4) of this section. Both the patent rights for P-Cap and the software are reasonably anticipated to contribute to the development of P-Ves and therefore are platform contributions for which compensation is due from S as part of PCTs. Though P and S enter into and implement a PCT for the P-Cap patent rights that satisfies the arm's length standard, they fail to enter into a PCT for the software.

(ii) In this case, P and S have substantially complied with the contractual requirements of paragraph (k)(1) of this section and the documentation, accounting, and reporting requirements of paragraphs (k)(2) through (4) of this section and therefore have met the administrative requirements of paragraph (b)(2) of this section. However, because they did not enter into a PCT, as required under paragraphs (b)(1)(ii) and (b)(3) of this section, for the software that was reasonably anticipated to contribute to the development of P-Ves (see paragraph (c) of this section), they cannot reasonably conclude that their arrangement was a CSA. Accordingly, the

Commissioner is not required under paragraph (b)(5)(i) of this section to apply the rules of this section to their arrangement.

(iii) Nevertheless, the arrangement between P and S closely resembles a CSA. If the Commissioner concludes that the rules of this section provide the most reliable measure of an arm's length result for such arrangement, then pursuant to paragraph (b)(5)(ii) of this section, the Commissioner may apply the rules of this section and treat P and S as entering into a PCT for the software in accordance with the requirements of paragraph (b)(1)(ii) of this section, and make any appropriate allocations under paragraph (i) of this section. Alternatively, the Commissioner may conclude that the rules of this section do not provide the most reliable measure of an arm's length result. In such case, the arrangement would be analyzed under the methods under other sections of the 482 regulations to determine whether the arrangement reaches an arm's length result.

Example 2. The facts are the same as in *Example 1* except that P and S do enter into and implement a PCT for the software as required under this paragraph (b). The Commissioner determines that the PCT Payments for the software were not arm's length; nevertheless, under the facts and circumstances at the time they entered into the CSA and PCTs, P and S reasonably concluded their arrangement to be a CSA. Because P and S have met the requirements of paragraph (b)(2) of this section and reasonably concluded their arrangement is a CSA, pursuant to paragraph (b)(5)(i) of this section, the Commissioner must apply the rules of this section to their arrangement. Accordingly, the Commissioner treats the arrangement as a CSA and makes adjustments to the PCT Payments as appropriate under this section to achieve an arm's length result for the PCT for the software.

Example 3. (i) The facts are the same as in *Example 1* except that P and S do enter into a PCT for the software as required under this paragraph (b). The agreement entered into by P and S provides for a fixed consideration of \$50 million per year for four years, payable at the end of each year. This agreement satisfies the arm's length standard. However, S actually pays P consideration at the end of each year in the form of four annual royalties equal to two percent of sales. While such royalties at the time of the PCT were expected to be \$50 million per year, actual sales during the first year were less than anticipated and the first royalty payment was only \$25 million.

(ii) In this case, P and S failed to implement the terms of their agreement. Under these circumstances, P and S could not reasonably conclude that their arrangement was a CSA, as described in paragraph (b)(1) of this section. Accordingly, the Commissioner is not required under paragraph (b)(5)(i) of

this section to apply the rules of this section to their arrangement.

(iii) Nevertheless, the arrangement between P and S closely resembles a CSA. If the Commissioner concludes that the rules of this section provide the most reliable measure of an arm's length result for such arrangement, then pursuant to paragraph (b)(5)(ii) of this section, the Commissioner may apply the rules of this section and make any appropriate allocations under paragraph (i) of this section. Alternatively, the Commissioner may conclude that the rules of this section do not provide the most reliable measure of an arm's length result. In such case, the arrangement would be analyzed under the methods under other sections of the 482 regulations to determine whether the arrangement reaches an arm's length result.

Example 4. (i) The facts are the same as in *Example 1* except that P does not own proprietary software and P and S use a method for determining the arm's length amount of the PCT Payment for the P-Cap patent rights different from the method used in *Example 1*.

(ii) P and S determine that the arm's length amount of the PCT Payments for the P-Cap patent is \$10 million. However, the Commissioner determines the best method for determining the arm's length amount of the PCT Payments for the P-Cap patent rights and under such method the arm's length amount is \$100 million. To determine this \$10 million present value, P and S assumed a useful life of eight years for the platform contribution, because the P-Cap patent rights will expire after eight years. However, the P-Cap patent rights are expected to lead to benefits attributable to exploitation of the cost shared intangibles extending many years beyond the expiration of the P-Cap patent, because use of the P-Cap patent rights will let P and S bring P-Ves to market before the competition, and because P and S expect to apply for additional patents covering P-Ves, which would bar competitors from selling that product for many future years. The assumption by P and S of a useful life for the platform contribution that is less than the anticipated period of exploitation of the cost shared intangibles is contrary to paragraph (g)(2)(ii) of this section, and reduces the reliability of the method used by P and S.

(iii) The method used by P and S employs a declining royalty. The royalty starts at 8% of sales, based on an application of the CUT method in which the purported CUTs all involve licenses to manufacture and sell the current generation of P-Cap, and declines to 0% over eight years, declining by 1% each year. Such make-or-sell rights are fundamentally different from use of the P-Cap patent rights to generate a new product. This difference raises the issue of whether the make-or-sell rights are sufficiently comparable to the rights that are the subject of

the PCT Payment. See § 1.482-4(c). While a royalty rate for make-or-sell rights can form the basis for a reliable determination of an arm's length PCT Payment in the CUT-based implementation of the income method described in paragraph (g)(4) of this section, under that method such royalty rate does not decline to zero. Therefore, the use of a declining royalty rate based on an initial rate for make-or-sell rights further reduces the reliability of the method used by P and S.

(iv) Sales of the next-generation product are not anticipated until after seven years, at which point the royalty rate will have declined to 1%. The temporal mismatch between the period of the royalty rate decline and the period of exploitation raises further concerns about the method's reliability.

(v) For the reasons given in paragraphs (ii) through (iv) of this *Example 4*, the method used by P and S is so unreliable and so contrary to provisions of this section that P and S could not reasonably conclude that they had contracted to make arm's length PCT Payments as required by paragraphs (b)(1)(ii) and (b)(3) of this section, and thus could not reasonably conclude that their arrangement was a CSA. Accordingly, the Commissioner is not required under paragraph (b)(5)(i) of this section to apply the rules of this section to their arrangement.

(vi) Nevertheless, the arrangement between P and S closely resembles a CSA. If the Commissioner concludes that the rules of this section provide the most reliable measure of an arm's length result for such arrangement, then pursuant to paragraph (b)(5)(ii) of this section, the Commissioner may apply the rules of this section and make any appropriate allocations under paragraph (i) of this section. Alternatively, the Commissioner may conclude that the rules of this section do not provide the most reliable measure of an arm's length result. In such case, the arrangement would be analyzed under the methods under other section 482 regulations to determine whether the arrangement reaches an arm's length result.

(6) *Entity classification of CSAs.* See § 301.7701-1(c) of this chapter for the classification of CSAs for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code.

(c) *Platform contributions*—(1) *In general.* A platform contribution is any resource, capability, or right that a controlled participant has developed, maintained, or acquired externally to the intangible development activity (whether prior to or during the course of the CSA) that is reasonably anticipated to contribute to developing cost shared intangibles. The determination whether a resource, capability, or right

is reasonably anticipated to contribute to developing cost shared intangibles is ongoing and based on the best available information. Therefore, a resource, capability, or right reasonably determined not to be a platform contribution as of an earlier point in time, may be reasonably determined to be a platform contribution at a later point in time. The PCT obligation regarding a resource or capability or right once determined to be a platform contribution does not terminate merely because it may later be determined that such resource or capability or right has not contributed, and no longer is reasonably anticipated to contribute, to developing cost shared intangibles. Notwithstanding the other provisions of this paragraph (c), platform contributions do not include rights in land or depreciable tangible property, and do not include rights in other resources acquired by IDCs. See paragraph (d)(1) of this section.

(2) *Terms of platform contributions*—(i) *Presumed to be exclusive.* For purposes of a PCT, the PCT Payee's provision of a platform contribution is presumed to be exclusive. Thus, it is presumed that the platform resource, capability, or right is not reasonably anticipated to be committed to any business activities other than the CSA Activity, as defined in paragraph (j)(1)(i) of this section, whether carried out by the controlled participants, other controlled taxpayers, or uncontrolled taxpayers.

(ii) *Rebuttal of exclusivity.* The controlled participants may rebut the presumption set forth in paragraph (c)(2)(i) of this section to the satisfaction of the Commissioner. For example, if the platform resource is a research tool, then the controlled participants could rebut the presumption by establishing to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that, as of the date of the PCT, the tool is reasonably anticipated not only to contribute to the CSA Activity but also to be licensed to an uncontrolled taxpayer. In such case, the PCT Payments may need to be prorated as described in paragraph (c)(2)(iii) of this section.

(iii) *Proration of PCT Payments to the extent allocable to other business activities*—(A) *In general.* Some transfer pricing methods employed to determine

the arm's length amount of the PCT Payments do so by considering the overall value of the platform contributions as opposed to, for example, the value of the anticipated use of the platform contributions in the CSA Activity. Such a transfer pricing method is consistent with the presumption that the platform contribution is exclusive (that is, that the resources, capabilities or rights that are the subject of a platform contribution are reasonably anticipated to contribute only to the CSA Activity). See paragraph (c)(2)(i) (Terms of platform contributions—Presumed to be exclusive) of this section. The PCT Payments determined under such transfer pricing method may have to be prorated if the controlled participants can rebut the presumption that the platform contribution is exclusive to the satisfaction of the Commissioner as provided in paragraph (c)(2)(ii) of this section. In the case of a platform contribution that also contributes to lines of business of a PCT Payor that are not reasonably anticipated to involve exploitation of the cost shared intangibles, the need for explicit proration may in some cases be avoided through aggregation of transactions. See paragraph (g)(2)(iv) of this section (Aggregation of transactions).

(B) *Determining the proration of PCT Payments.* Proration will be done on a reasonable basis in proportion to the relative economic value, as of the date of the PCT, reasonably anticipated to be derived from the platform contribution by the CSA Activity as compared to the value reasonably anticipated to be derived from the platform contribution by other business activities. In the case of an aggregate valuation done under the principles of paragraph (g)(2)(iv) of this section that addresses payment for resources, capabilities, or rights used for business activities other than the CSA Activity (for example, the right to exploit an existing intangible without further development), the proration of the aggregate payments may have to reflect the economic value attributable to such resources, capabilities, or rights as well. For purposes of the best method rule under § 1.482-1(c), the reliability of the analysis under a method that requires proration pursuant to this paragraph is

reduced relative to the reliability of an analysis under a method that does not require proration.

(3) *Categorization of the PCT.* For purposes of § 1.482-1(b)(2)(ii) and paragraph (a)(2) of this section, a PCT must be identified by the controlled participants as a particular type of transaction (for example, a license for royalty payments). See paragraph (k)(2)(ii)(H) of this section. Such designation must be consistent with the actual conduct of the controlled participants. If the conduct is consistent with different, economically equivalent types of transactions then the controlled participants may designate the PCT as being any of such types of transactions. If the controlled participants fail to make such designation in their documentation, the Commissioner may make a designation consistent with the principles of paragraph (k)(1)(iv) of this section.

(4) *Certain make-or-sell rights excluded—(i) In general.* Any right to exploit an existing resource, capability, or right without further development of such item, such as the right to make, replicate, license, or sell existing products, does not constitute a platform contribution to a CSA (and the arm's length compensation for such rights (make-or-sell rights) does not satisfy the compensation obligation under a PCT) unless exploitation without further development of such item is reasonably anticipated to contribute to developing or further developing a cost shared intangible.

(ii) *Examples.* The following examples illustrate the principles of this paragraph (c)(4):

Example 1. P and S, which are members of the same controlled group, execute a CSA. Under the CSA, P and S will bear their RAB shares of IDCs for developing the second generation of ABC, a computer software program. Prior to that arrangement, P had incurred substantial costs and risks to develop ABC. Concurrent with entering into the arrangement, P (as the licensor) executes a license with S (as the licensee) by which S may make and sell copies of the existing ABC. Such make-or-sell rights do not constitute a platform contribution to the CSA. The rules of §§ 1.482-1 and 1.482-4 through 1.482-6 must be applied to determine the arm's length consideration in connection

with the make-or-sell licensing arrangement. In certain circumstances, this determination of the arm's length consideration may be done on an aggregate basis with the evaluation of compensation obligations pursuant to the PCTs entered into by P and S in connection with the CSA. See paragraph (g)(2)(iv) of this section.

Example 2. (i) P, a software company, has developed and currently exploits software program ABC. P and S enter into a CSA to develop future generations of ABC. The ABC source code is the platform on which future generations of ABC will be built and is therefore a platform contribution of P for which compensation is due from S pursuant to a PCT. Concurrent with entering into the CSA, P licenses to S the make-or-sell rights for the current version of ABC. P has entered into similar licenses with uncontrolled parties calling for sales-based royalty payments at a rate of 20%. The current version of ABC has an expected product life of three years. P and S enter into a contingent payment agreement to cover both the PCT Payments due from S for P's platform contribution and payments due from S for the make-or-sell license. Based on the uncontrolled make-or-sell licenses, P and S agree on a sales-based royalty rate of 20% in Year 1 that declines on a straight line basis to 0% over the 3 year product life of ABC.

(ii) The make-or-sell rights for the current version of ABC are not platform contributions, though paragraph (g)(2)(iv) of this section provides for the possibility that the most reliable determination of an arm's length charge for the platform contribution and the make-or-sell license may be one that values the two transactions in the aggregate. A contingent payment schedule based on the uncontrolled make-or-sell licenses may provide an arm's length charge for the separate make-or-sell license between P and S, provided the royalty rates in the uncontrolled licenses similarly decline, but as a measure of the aggregate PCT and licensing payments it does not account for the arm's length value of P's platform contributions which include the rights in the source code and future development rights in ABC.

Example 3. S is a controlled participant that owns Patent Q, which protects S's use of a research tool that is helpful in developing and testing new pharmaceutical compounds. The research tool, which is not itself such a compound, is used in the CSA Activity to develop such compounds. However, the CSA Activity is not anticipated to result in the further development of the research tool or in patents based on Patent Q. Although the right to use Patent Q is not anticipated to result in the further development of Patent Q or the technology that it protects, that right constitutes a platform contribution (as opposed to make-or-sell rights) because it is anticipated to contribute to the research ac-

tivity to develop cost shared intangibles relating to pharmaceutical compounds covered by the CSA.

(5) *Examples.* The following examples illustrate the principles of this paragraph (c). In each example, Companies P and S are members of the same controlled group, and execute a CSA providing that each will have the exclusive right to exploit cost shared intangibles in its own territory. See paragraph (b)(4)(ii) of this section (Territorial based divisional interests).

Example 1. Company P has developed and currently markets version 1.0 of a new software application XYZ. Company P and Company S execute a CSA under which they will share the IDCs for developing future versions of XYZ. Version 1.0 is reasonably anticipated to contribute to the development of future versions of XYZ and therefore Company P's rights in version 1.0 constitute a platform contribution from Company P that must be compensated by Company S pursuant to a PCT. Pursuant to paragraph (c)(3) of this section, the controlled participants designate the platform contribution as a transfer of intangibles that would otherwise be governed by § 1.482-4, if entered into by controlled parties. Accordingly, pursuant to paragraph (a)(2) of this section, the applicable method for determining the arm's length value of the compensation obligation under the PCT between Company P and Company S will be governed by § 1.482-4 as supplemented by paragraph (g) of this section. Absent a showing to the contrary by P and S, the platform contribution in this case is presumed to be the exclusive provision of the benefit of all rights in version 1.0, other than the rights described in paragraph (c)(4) of this section (Certain make-or-sell rights excluded). This includes the right to use version 1.0 for purposes of research and the exclusive right in S's territory to exploit any future products that incorporated the technology of version 1.0, and would cover a term extending as long as the controlled participants were to exploit future versions of XYZ or any other product based on the version 1.0 platform. The compensation obligation of Company S pursuant to the PCT will reflect the full value of the platform contribution, as limited by Company S's RAB share.

Example 2. Company P and Company S execute a CSA under which they will share the IDCs for developing Vaccine Z. Company P will commit to the project its research team that has successfully developed a number of other vaccines. The expertise and existing integration of the research team is a unique resource or capability of Company P which is reasonably anticipated to contribute to the development of Vaccine Z. Therefore, P's

provision of the capabilities of the research team constitute a platform contribution for which compensation is due from Company S as part of a PCT. Pursuant to paragraph (c)(3) of this section, the controlled parties designate the platform contribution as a provision of services that would otherwise be governed by §1.482-9(a) if entered into by controlled parties. Accordingly, pursuant to paragraph (a)(2) of this section, the applicable method for determining the arm's length value of the compensation obligation under the PCT between Company P and Company S will be governed by §1.482-9(a) as supplemented by paragraph (g) of this section. Absent a showing to the contrary by P and S, the platform contribution in this case is presumed to be the exclusive provision of the benefits by Company P of its research team to the development of Vaccine Z. Because the IDCs include the ongoing compensation of the researchers, the compensation obligation under the PCT is only for the value of the commitment of the research team by Company P to the CSA's development efforts net of such researcher compensation. The value of the compensation obligation of Company S for the PCT will reflect the full value of the provision of services, as limited by Company S's RAB share.

(d) *Intangible development costs*—(1) *Determining whether costs are IDCs.* Costs included in IDCs are determined by reference to the scope of the intangible development activity (IDA).

(i) *Definition and scope of the IDA.* For purposes of this section, the IDA means the activity under the CSA of developing or attempting to develop reasonably anticipated cost shared intangibles. The scope of the IDA includes all of the controlled participants' activities that could reasonably be anticipated to contribute to developing the reasonably anticipated cost shared intangibles. The IDA cannot be described merely by a list of particular resources, capabilities, or rights that will be used in the CSA, because such a list would not identify reasonably anticipated cost shared intangibles. Also, the scope of the IDA may change as the nature or identity of the reasonably anticipated cost shared intangibles changes or the nature of the activities necessary for their development become clearer. For example, the relevance of certain ongoing work to developing reasonably anticipated cost shared intangibles or the need for additional work may only become clear over time.

(ii) *Reasonably anticipated cost shared intangible.* For purposes of this section, *reasonably anticipated cost shared intangible* means any intangible, within the meaning of §1.482-4(b), that, at the applicable point in time, the controlled participants intend to develop under the CSA. Reasonably anticipated cost shared intangibles may change over the course of the CSA. The controlled participants may at any time change the reasonably anticipated cost shared intangibles but must document any such change pursuant to paragraph (k)(2)(ii)(A)(1) of this section. Removal of reasonably anticipated cost shared intangibles does not affect the controlled participants' interests in cost shared intangibles already developed under the CSA. In addition, the reasonably anticipated cost shared intangibles automatically expand to include the intended result of any further development of a cost shared intangible already developed under the CSA, or applications of such an intangible. However, the controlled participants may override this automatic expansion in a particular case if they separately remove specified further development of such intangible (or specified applications of such intangible) from the IDA, and document such separate removal pursuant to paragraph (k)(2)(ii)(A)(3) of this section.

(iii) *Costs included in IDCs.* For purposes of this section, *IDCs* mean all costs, in cash or in kind (including stock-based compensation, as described in paragraph (d)(3) of this section), but excluding acquisition costs for land or depreciable property, in the ordinary course of business after the formation of a CSA that, based on analysis of the facts and circumstances, are directly identified with, or are reasonably allocable to, the IDA. Thus, IDCs include costs incurred in attempting to develop reasonably anticipated cost shared intangibles regardless of whether such costs ultimately lead to development of those intangibles, other intangibles developed unexpectedly, or no intangibles. IDCs shall also include the arm's length rental charge for the use of any land or depreciable tangible property (as determined under §1.482-2(c) (Use of tangible property)) directly identified with, or reasonably allocable to, the

IDA. Reference to generally accepted accounting principles or Federal income tax accounting rules may provide a useful starting point but will not be conclusive regarding inclusion of costs in IDCs. IDCs do not include interest expense, foreign income taxes (as defined in § 1.901-2(a)), or domestic income taxes.

(iv) *Examples.* The following examples illustrate the principles of this paragraph (d)(1):

Example 1. A contract that purports to be a CSA provides that the IDA to which the agreement applies consists of all research and development activity conducted at laboratories A, B, and C but not at other facilities maintained by the controlled participants. The contract does not describe the reasonably anticipated cost shared intangibles with respect to which research and development is to be undertaken. The contract fails to meet the requirements set forth in paragraph (k)(1)(ii)(B) of this section because it fails to adequately describe the scope of the IDA to be undertaken.

Example 2. A contract that purports to be a CSA provides that the IDA to which the agreement applies consists of all research and development activity conducted by any of the controlled participants with the goal of developing a cure for a particular disease. Such a cure is thus a reasonably anticipated cost shared intangible. The contract also contains a provision that the IDA will exclude any activity that builds on the results of the controlled participants' prior research concerning Enzyme X even though such activity could reasonably be anticipated to contribute to developing such cure. The contract fails to meet the requirement set forth in paragraph (d)(1)(i) of this section that the scope of the IDA include all of the controlled participants' activities that could reasonably be anticipated to contribute to developing reasonably anticipated cost shared intangibles.

(2) *Allocation of costs.* If a particular cost is directly identified with, or reasonably allocable to, a function the results of which will benefit both the IDA and other business activities, the cost must be allocated on a reasonable basis between the IDA and such other business activities in proportion to the relative economic value that the IDA and such other business activities are anticipated to derive from such results.

(3) *Stock-based compensation—(i) In general.* As used in this section, the term *stock-based compensation* means any compensation provided by a con-

trolled participant to an employee or independent contractor in the form of equity instruments, options to acquire stock (stock options), or rights with respect to (or determined by reference to) equity instruments or stock options, including but not limited to property to which section 83 applies and stock options to which section 421 applies, regardless of whether ultimately settled in the form of cash, stock, or other property.

(ii) *Identification of stock-based compensation with the IDA.* The determination of whether stock-based compensation is directly identified with, or reasonably allocable to, the IDA is made as of the date that the stock-based compensation is granted. Accordingly, all stock-based compensation that is granted during the term of the CSA and, at date of grant, is directly identified with, or reasonably allocable to, the IDA is included as an IDC under paragraph (d)(1) of this section. In the case of a repricing or other modification of a stock option, the determination of whether the repricing or other modification constitutes the grant of a new stock option for purposes of this paragraph (d)(3)(ii) will be made in accordance with the rules of section 424(h) and related regulations.

(iii) *Measurement and timing of stock-based compensation IDC—(A) In general.* Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph (d)(3)(iii), the cost attributable to stock-based compensation is equal to the amount allowable to the controlled participant as a deduction for federal income tax purposes with respect to that stock-based compensation (for example, under section 83(h)) and is taken into account as an IDC under this section for the taxable year for which the deduction is allowable.

(1) *Transfers to which section 421 applies.* Solely for purposes of this paragraph (d)(3)(iii)(A), section 421 does not apply to the transfer of stock pursuant to the exercise of an option that meets the requirements of section 422(a) or 423(a).

(2) *Deductions of foreign controlled participants.* Solely for purposes of this paragraph (d)(3)(iii)(A), an amount is treated as an allowable deduction of a foreign controlled participant to the

extent that a deduction would be allowable to a United States taxpayer.

(3) *Modification of stock option.* Solely for purposes of this paragraph (d)(3)(iii)(A), if the repricing or other modification of a stock option is determined, under paragraph (d)(3)(ii) of this section, to constitute the grant of a new stock option not identified with, or reasonably allocable to, the IDA, the stock option that is repriced or otherwise modified will be treated as being exercised immediately before the modification, provided that the stock option is then exercisable and the fair market value of the underlying stock then exceeds the price at which the stock option is exercisable. Accordingly, the amount of the deduction that would be allowable (or treated as allowable under this paragraph (d)(3)(iii)(A)) to the controlled participant upon exercise of the stock option immediately before the modification must be taken into account as an IDC as of the date of the modification.

(4) *Expiration or termination of CSA.* Solely for purposes of this paragraph (d)(3)(iii)(A), if an item of stock-based compensation identified with, or reasonably allocable to, the IDA is not exercised during the term of a CSA, that item of stock-based compensation will be treated as being exercised immediately before the expiration or termination of the CSA, provided that the stock-based compensation is then exercisable and the fair market value of the underlying stock then exceeds the price at which the stock-based compensation is exercisable. Accordingly, the amount of the deduction that would be allowable (or treated as allowable under this paragraph (d)(3)(iii)(A)) to the controlled participant upon exercise of the stock-based compensation must be taken into account as an IDC as of the date of the expiration or termination of the CSA.

(B) *Election with respect to options on publicly traded stock—(1) In general.* With respect to stock-based compensation in the form of options on publicly traded stock, the controlled participants in a CSA may elect to take into account all IDCs attributable to those stock options in the same amount, and as of the same time, as the fair value of the stock options reflected as a charge

against income in audited financial statements or disclosed in footnotes to such financial statements, provided that such statements are prepared in accordance with United States generally accepted accounting principles by or on behalf of the company issuing the publicly traded stock.

(2) *Publicly traded stock.* As used in this paragraph (d)(3)(iii)(B), the term *publicly traded stock* means stock that is regularly traded on an established United States securities market and is issued by a company whose financial statements are prepared in accordance with United States generally accepted accounting principles for the taxable year.

(3) *Generally accepted accounting principles.* For purposes of this paragraph (d)(3)(iii)(B), a financial statement prepared in accordance with a comprehensive body of generally accepted accounting principles other than United States generally accepted accounting principles is considered to be prepared in accordance with United States generally accepted accounting principles provided that either—

(i) The fair value of the stock options under consideration is reflected in the reconciliation between such other accounting principles and United States generally accepted accounting principles required to be incorporated into the financial statement by the securities laws governing companies whose stock is regularly traded on United States securities markets; or

(ii) In the absence of a reconciliation between such other accounting principles and United States generally accepted accounting principles that reflects the fair value of the stock options under consideration, such other accounting principles require that the fair value of the stock options under consideration be reflected as a charge against income in audited financial statements or disclosed in footnotes to such statements.

(4) *Time and manner of making the election.* The election described in this paragraph (d)(3)(iii)(B) is made by an explicit reference to the election in the written contract required by paragraph (k)(1) of this section or in a written amendment to the CSA entered into with the consent of the Commissioner

pursuant to paragraph (d)(3)(iii)(C) of this section. In the case of a CSA in existence on August 26, 2003, the election by written amendment to the CSA may be made without the consent of the Commissioner if such amendment is entered into not later than the latest due date (with regard to extensions) of a federal income tax return of any controlled participant for the first taxable year beginning after August 26, 2003.

(C) *Consistency.* Generally, all controlled participants in a CSA taking options on publicly traded stock into account under paragraph (d)(3)(ii), (d)(3)(iii)(A), or (d)(3)(iii)(B) of this section must use that same method of identification, measurement and timing for all options on publicly traded stock with respect to that CSA. Controlled participants may change their method only with the consent of the Commissioner and only with respect to stock options granted during taxable years subsequent to the taxable year in which the Commissioner's consent is obtained. All controlled participants in the CSA must join in requests for the Commissioner's consent under this paragraph (d)(3)(iii)(C). Thus, for example, if the controlled participants make the election described in paragraph (d)(3)(iii)(B) of this section upon the formation of the CSA, the election may be revoked only with the consent of the Commissioner, and the consent will apply only to stock options granted in taxable years subsequent to the taxable year in which consent is obtained. Similarly, if controlled participants already have granted stock options that have been or will be taken into account under the general rule of paragraph (d)(3)(iii)(A) of this section, then except in cases specified in the last sentence of paragraph (d)(3)(iii)(B)(4) of this section, the controlled participants may make the election described in paragraph (d)(3)(iii)(B) of this section only with the consent of the Commissioner, and the consent will apply only to stock options granted in taxable years subsequent to the taxable year in which consent is obtained.

(4) *IDC share.* A controlled participant's IDC share for a taxable year is equal to the controlled participant's cost contribution for the taxable year, divided by the sum of all IDCs for the

taxable year. A controlled participant's cost contribution for a taxable year means all of the IDCs initially borne by the controlled participant, plus all of the CST Payments that the participant makes to other controlled participants, minus all of the CST Payments that the participant receives from other controlled participants.

(5) *Examples.* The following examples illustrate this paragraph (d):

Example 1. Foreign parent (FP) and its U.S. subsidiary (USS) enter into a CSA to develop a better mousetrap. USS and FP share the costs of FP's R&D facility that will be exclusively dedicated to this research, the salaries of the researchers at the facility, and overhead costs attributable to the project. They also share the cost of a conference facility that is at the disposal of the senior executive management of each company. Based on the facts and circumstances, the cost of the conference facility cannot be directly identified with, and is not reasonably allocable to, the IDA. In this case, the cost of the conference facility must be excluded from the amount of IDCs.

Example 2. U.S. parent (USP) and its foreign subsidiary (FS) enter into a CSA to develop intangibles for producing a new device. USP and FS share the costs of an R&D facility, the salaries of the facility's researchers, and overhead costs attributable to the project. Although USP also incurs costs related to field testing of the device, USP does not include those costs in the IDCs that USP and FS will share under the CSA. The Commissioner may determine, based on the facts and circumstances, that the costs of field testing are IDCs that the controlled participants must share.

Example 3. U.S. parent (USP) and its foreign subsidiary (FS) enter into a CSA to develop a new process patent. USP assigns certain employees to perform solely R&D to develop a new mathematical algorithm to perform certain calculations. That algorithm will be used both to develop the new process patent and to develop a new design patent the development of which is outside the scope of the CSA. During years covered by the CSA, USP compensates such employees with cash salaries, stock-based compensation, or a combination of both. USP and FS anticipate that the economic value attributable to the R&D will be derived from the process patent and the design patent in a relative proportion of 75% and 25%, respectively. Applying the principles of paragraph (d)(2) of this section, 75% of the compensation of such employees must be allocated to the development of the new process patent and, thus, treated as IDCs. With respect to the cash salary compensation, the IDC is 75% of the face value of the cash. With respect to

the stock-based compensation, the IDC is 75% of the value of the stock-based compensation as determined under paragraph (d)(3)(iii) of this section.

Example 4. Foreign parent (FP) and its U.S. subsidiary (USS) enter into a CSA to develop a new computer source code. FP has an executive officer who oversees a research facility and employees dedicated solely to the IDA. The executive officer also oversees other research facilities and employees unrelated to the IDA, and performs certain corporate overhead functions. The full amount of the costs of the research facility and employees dedicated solely to the IDA can be directly identified with the IDA and, therefore, are IDCs. In addition, based on the executive officer's records of time worked on various matters, the controlled participants reasonably allocate 20% of the executive officer's compensation to supervision of the facility and employees dedicated to the IDA, 50% of the executive officer's compensation to supervision of the facilities and employees unrelated to the IDA, and 30% of the executive officer's compensation to corporate overhead functions. The controlled participants also reasonably determine that the results of the executive officer's corporate overhead functions yield equal economic benefit to the IDA and the other business activities of FP. Applying the principles of paragraph (d)(1) of this section, the executive officer's compensation allocated to supervising the facility and employees dedicated to the IDA (amounting to 20% of the executive officer's total compensation) must be treated as IDCs. Applying the principles of paragraph (d)(2) of this section, half of the executive officer's compensation allocated to corporate overhead functions (that is, half of 30% of the executive officer's total compensation), must be treated as IDCs. Therefore, a total of 35% (20% plus 15%) of the executive officer's total compensation must be treated as IDCs.

(e) *Reasonably anticipated benefits share*—(1) *Definition*—(i) *In general.* A controlled participant's share of reasonably anticipated benefits is equal to its reasonably anticipated benefits divided by the sum of the reasonably anticipated benefits, as defined in paragraph (j)(1)(i) of this section, of all the controlled participants. RAB shares must be updated to account for changes in economic conditions, the business operations and practices of the participants, and the ongoing development of intangibles under the CSA. For purposes of determining RAB shares at any given time, reasonably anticipated benefits must be estimated over the entire period, past and future, of exploitation of the cost shared in-

tangibles, and must reflect appropriate updates to take into account the most reliable data regarding past and projected future results available at such time. RAB shares determined for a particular purpose shall not be further updated for that purpose based on information not available at the time that determination needed to be made. For example, RAB shares determined in order to determine IDC shares for a particular taxable year (as set forth in paragraphs (b)(1)(i) and (d)(4) of this section) shall not be recomputed based on information not available at that time. Similarly, RAB shares determined for the purpose of using a particular method such as the acquisition price method (as set forth in paragraph (g)(5)(ii) of this section) to evaluate the arm's length amount charged in a PCT shall not be recomputed based on information not available at the date of that PCT. However, nothing in this paragraph (e)(1)(i) shall limit the Commissioner's use of subsequently available information for purposes of its allocation determinations in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (i) (Allocations by the Commissioner in connection with a CSA) of this section.

(ii) *Reliability.* A controlled participant's RAB share must be determined by using the most reliable estimate. In determining which of two or more available estimates is most reliable, the quality of the data and assumptions used in the analysis must be taken into account, consistent with § 1.482-1(c)(2)(ii) (Data and assumptions). Thus, the reliability of an estimate will depend largely on the completeness and accuracy of the data, the soundness of the assumptions, and the relative effects of particular deficiencies in data or assumptions on different estimates. If two estimates are equally reliable, no adjustment should be made based on differences between the estimates. The following factors will be particularly relevant in determining the reliability of an estimate of RAB shares:

(A) The basis used for measuring benefits, as described in paragraph (e)(2)(ii) of this section.

(B) The projections used to estimate benefits, as described in paragraph (e)(2)(iii) of this section.

(iii) *Examples.* The following examples illustrate the principles of this paragraph (e)(1):

Example 1. (i) USP and FS plan to conduct research to develop Product Lines A and B. USP and FS reasonably anticipate respective benefits from Product Line A of 100X and 200X and respective benefits from Product Line B, respectively, of 300X and 400X. USP and FS thus reasonably anticipate combined benefits from Product Lines A and B of 400X and 600X, respectively.

(ii) USP and FS could enter into a separate CSA to develop Product Line A with respective RAB shares of 33⅓ percent and 66⅔ percent (reflecting a ratio of 100X to 200X), and into a separate CSA to develop Product Line B with respective RAB shares of 42⅔ percent and 57⅑ percent (reflecting a ratio of 300X to 400X). Alternatively, USP and FS could enter into a single CSA to develop both Product Lines A and B with respective RAB shares of 40 percent and 60 percent (in the ratio of 400X to 600X). If the separate CSAs are chosen, then any costs for activities that contribute to developing both Product Line A and Product Line B will constitute IDCs of the respective CSAs as required by paragraphs (d)(1) and (2) of this section.

Example 2. (i) USP, a US company, wholly owns foreign subsidiary, FS. USP and FS enter into a CSA at the start of Year 1. The CSA's total IDCs are \$100,000 in each year for Years 1 through 4. In Year 1, USP correctly estimates its RAB share as 50%, based on information available at the time, and therefore correctly computes \$50,000 as its cost contribution for Year 1.

(ii) In Year 4, USP correctly estimates its RAB share to be 70%, based on information available at the time and, therefore, correctly computes \$70,000 as its cost contribution for Year 4.

(iii) In Year 4, USP also files an amended return for Year 1 in which USP deducts a cost contribution of \$70,000, asserting that, for this purpose, it should revise its Year 1 estimated RAB share to 70% based on the information that is now available to it in Year 4. The Commissioner determines that USP is incorrect for two reasons. First, a RAB share determined for a particular purpose (here, to determine USP's IDC shares and thus USP's cost contributions in Year 1) should not be revised based on information not available to USP until Year 4. See paragraph (e)(1)(i) of this section. Second, more generally, USP is not permitted to file an amended return for this purpose under § 1.482-1(a)(3). Therefore, for both of these reasons, Commissioner adjusts USP's amended return for Year 1 by disallowing \$20,000 of the \$70,000 deduction.

(2) *Measure of benefits*—(i) *In general.* In order to estimate a controlled participant's RAB share, the amount of

each controlled participant's reasonably anticipated benefits must be measured on a basis that is consistent for all such participants. See paragraph (e)(2)(ii)(E) *Example 9* of this section. If a controlled participant transfers a cost shared intangible to another controlled taxpayer, other than by way of a transfer described in paragraph (f) of this section, that controlled participant's benefits from the transferred intangible must be measured by reference to the transferee's benefits, disregarding any consideration paid by the transferee to the controlled participant (such as a royalty pursuant to a license agreement). Reasonably anticipated benefits are measured either on a direct basis, by reference to estimated benefits to be generated by the use of cost shared intangibles (generally based on additional revenues plus cost savings less any additional costs incurred), or on an indirect basis, by reference to certain measurements that reasonably can be assumed to relate to benefits to be generated. Such indirect bases of measurement of anticipated benefits are described in paragraph (e)(2)(ii) of this section. A controlled participant's reasonably anticipated benefits must be measured on the basis, whether direct or indirect, that most reliably determines RAB shares. In determining which of two bases of measurement is most reliable, the factors set forth in § 1.482-1(c)(2)(ii) (Data and assumptions) must be taken into account. It normally will be expected that the basis that provided the most reliable estimate for a particular year will continue to provide the most reliable estimate in subsequent years, absent a material change in the factors that affect the reliability of the estimate. Regardless of whether a direct or indirect basis of measurement is used, adjustments may be required to account for material differences in the activities that controlled participants undertake to exploit their interests in cost shared intangibles. See *Examples 4* and *7* of paragraph (e)(2)(ii)(E) of this section.

(ii) *Indirect bases for measuring anticipated benefits.* Indirect bases for measuring anticipated benefits from participation in a CSA include the following:

(A) *Units used, produced, or sold.* Units of items used, produced, or sold by each controlled participant in the business activities in which cost shared intangibles are exploited may be used as an indirect basis for measuring its anticipated benefits. This basis of measurement will more reliably determine RAB shares to the extent that each controlled participant is expected to have a similar increase in net profit or decrease in net loss attributable to the cost shared intangibles per unit of the item or items used, produced, or sold. This circumstance is most likely to arise when the cost shared intangibles are exploited by the controlled participants in the use, production, or sale of substantially uniform items under similar economic conditions.

(B) *Sales.* Sales by each controlled participant in the business activities in which cost shared intangibles are exploited may be used as an indirect basis for measuring its anticipated benefits. This basis of measurement will more reliably determine RAB shares to the extent that each controlled participant is expected to have a similar increase in net profit or decrease in net loss attributable to cost shared intangibles per dollar of sales. This circumstance is most likely to arise if the costs of exploiting cost shared intangibles are not substantial relative to the revenues generated, or if the principal effect of using cost shared intangibles is to increase the controlled participants' revenues (for example, through a price premium on the products they sell) without affecting their costs substantially. Sales by each controlled participant are unlikely to provide a reliable basis for measuring RAB shares unless each controlled participant operates at the same market level (for example, manufacturing, distribution, etc.).

(C) *Operating profit.* Operating profit of each controlled participant from the activities in which cost shared intangibles are exploited, as determined before any expense (including amortization) on account of IDCs, may be used as an indirect basis for measuring anticipated benefits. This basis of measurement will more reliably determine RAB shares to the extent that such profit is largely attributable to the use

of cost shared intangibles, or if the share of profits attributable to the use of cost shared intangibles is expected to be similar for each controlled participant. This circumstance is most likely to arise when cost shared intangibles are closely associated with the activity that generates the profit and the activity could not be carried on or would generate little profit without use of those intangibles.

(D) *Other bases for measuring anticipated benefits.* Other bases for measuring anticipated benefits may in some circumstances be appropriate, but only to the extent that there is expected to be a reasonably identifiable relationship between the basis of measurement used and additional revenue generated or net costs saved by the use of cost shared intangibles. For example, a division of costs based on employee compensation would be considered unreliable unless there were a relationship between the amount of compensation and the expected additional revenue generated or net costs saved by the controlled participants from using the cost shared intangibles.

(E) *Examples.* The following examples illustrate this paragraph (e)(2)(ii):

Example 1. Controlled parties A and B enter into a CSA to develop product and process intangibles for already existing Product P. Without such intangibles, A and B would each reasonably anticipate revenue, in present value terms, of \$100M from sales of Product P until it becomes obsolete. With the intangibles, A and B each reasonably anticipate selling the same number of units each year, but reasonably anticipate that the price will be higher. Because the particular product intangible is more highly regarded in A's market, A reasonably anticipates an increase of \$20M in present value revenue from the product intangible, while B reasonably anticipates an increase of only \$10M in present value from the product intangible. Further, A and B each reasonably anticipate spending an additional amount equal to \$5M in present value in production costs to include the feature embodying the product intangible. Finally, A and B each reasonably anticipate saving an amount equal to \$2M in present value in production costs by using the process intangible. A and B reasonably anticipate no other economic effects from exploiting the cost shared intangibles. A's reasonably anticipated benefits from exploiting the cost shared intangibles equal its reasonably anticipated increase in

revenue (\$20M) plus its reasonably anticipated cost savings (\$2M) less its reasonably anticipated increased costs (\$5M), which equals \$17M. Similarly, B's reasonably anticipated benefits from exploiting the cost shared intangibles equal its reasonably anticipated increase in revenue (\$10M) plus its reasonably anticipated cost savings (\$2M) less its reasonably anticipated increased costs (\$5M), which equals \$7M. Thus A's reasonably anticipated benefits are \$17M and B's reasonably anticipated benefits are \$7M.

Example 2. Foreign Parent (FP) and U.S. Subsidiary (USS) both produce a feedstock for the manufacture of various high-performance plastic products. Producing the feedstock requires large amounts of electricity, which accounts for a significant portion of its production cost. FP and USS enter into a CSA to develop a new process that will reduce the amount of electricity required to produce a unit of the feedstock. FP and USS currently both incur an electricity cost of \$2 per unit of feedstock produced and rates for each are expected to remain similar in the future. The new process, if it is successful, will reduce the amount of electricity required by each company to produce a unit of the feedstock by 50%. Switching to the new process would not require FP or USS to incur significant investment or other costs. Therefore, the cost savings each company is expected to achieve after implementing the new process are \$1 per unit of feedstock produced. Under the CSA, FP and USS divide the costs of developing the new process based on the units of the feedstock each is anticipated to produce in the future. In this case, units produced is the most reliable basis for measuring RAB shares and dividing the IDCs because each controlled participant is expected to have a similar \$1 (50% of current charge of \$2) decrease in costs per unit of the feedstock produced.

Example 3. The facts are the same as in *Example 2*, except that currently USS pays \$3 per unit of feedstock produced for electricity while FP pays \$6 per unit of feedstock produced. In this case, units produced is not the most reliable basis for measuring RAB shares and dividing the IDCs because the participants do not expect to have a similar decrease in costs per unit of the feedstock produced. The Commissioner determines that the most reliable measure of RAB shares may be based on units of the feedstock produced if FP's units are weighted relative to USS's units by a factor of 2. This reflects the fact that FP pays twice as much as USS for electricity and, therefore, FP's savings of \$3 per unit of the feedstock (50% reduction of current charge of \$6) would be twice USS's savings of \$1.50 per unit of feedstock (50% reduction of current charge of \$3) from any new process eventually developed.

Example 4. The facts are the same as in *Example 3*, except that to supply the particular

needs of the U.S. market USS manufactures the feedstock with somewhat different properties than FP's feedstock. This requires USS to employ a somewhat different production process than does FP. Because of this difference, USS would incur significant construction costs in order to adopt any new process that may be developed under the cost sharing agreement. In this case, units produced is not the most reliable basis for measuring RAB shares. In order to reliably determine RAB shares, the Commissioner measures the reasonably anticipated benefits of USS and FP on a direct basis. USS's reasonably anticipated benefits are its reasonably anticipated total savings in electricity costs, less its reasonably anticipated costs of adopting the new process. FS's reasonably anticipated benefits are its reasonably anticipated total savings in electricity costs.

Example 5. U.S. Parent (USP) and Foreign Subsidiary (FS) enter into a CSA to develop new anesthetic drugs. USP obtains the right to market any resulting drugs in the United States and FS obtains the right to market any resulting drugs in the rest of the world. USP and FS determine RAB shares on the basis of their respective total anticipated operating profit from all drugs under development. USP anticipates that it will receive a much higher profit than FS per unit sold because the price of the drugs is not regulated in the United States, whereas the price of the drugs is regulated in many non-U.S. jurisdictions. In both controlled participants' territories, the anticipated operating profits are almost entirely attributable to the use of the cost shared intangibles. In this case, the controlled participants' basis for measuring RAB shares is the most reliable.

Example 6. (i) Foreign Parent (FP) and U.S. Subsidiary (USS) manufacture and sell fertilizers. They enter into a CSA to develop a new pellet form of a common agricultural fertilizer that is currently available only in powder form. Under the CSA, USS obtains the rights to produce and sell the new form of fertilizer for the U.S. market while FP obtains the rights to produce and sell the new form of fertilizer in the rest of the world. The costs of developing the new form of fertilizer are divided on the basis of the anticipated sales of fertilizer in the controlled participants' respective markets.

(ii) If the research and development is successful, the pellet form will deliver the fertilizer more efficiently to crops and less fertilizer will be required to achieve the same effect on crop growth. The pellet form of fertilizer can be expected to sell at a price premium over the powder form of fertilizer based on the savings in the amount of fertilizer that needs to be used. This price premium will be a similar premium per dollar of sales in each territory. If the research and

development is successful, the costs of producing pellet fertilizer are expected to be approximately the same as the costs of producing powder fertilizer and the same for both FP and USS. Both FP and USS operate at approximately the same market levels, selling their fertilizers largely to independent distributors.

(iii) In this case, the controlled participants' basis for measuring RAB shares is the most reliable.

Example 7. The facts are the same as in *Example 6*, except that FP distributes its fertilizers directly while USS sells to independent distributors. In this case, sales of USS and FP are not the most reliable basis for measuring RAB shares unless adjustments are made to account for the difference in market levels at which the sales occur.

Example 8. Foreign Parent (FP) and U.S. Subsidiary (USS) enter into a CSA to develop materials that will be used to train all new entry-level employees. FP and USS determine that the new materials will save approximately ten hours of training time per employee. Because their entry-level employees are paid on differing wage scales, FP and USS decide that they should not measure benefits based on the number of entry-level employees hired by each. Rather, they measure benefits based on compensation paid to the entry-level employees hired by each. In this case, the basis used for measuring RAB shares is the most reliable because there is a direct relationship between compensation paid to new entry-level employees and costs saved by FP and USS from the use of the new training materials.

Example 9. U.S. Parent (USP), Foreign Subsidiary 1 (FS1), and Foreign Subsidiary 2 (FS2) enter into a CSA to develop computer software that each will market and install on customers' computer systems. The controlled participants measure benefits on the basis of projected sales by USP, FS1, and FS2 of the software in their respective geographic areas. However, FS1 plans not only to sell but also to license the software to unrelated customers, and FS1's licensing income (which is a percentage of the licensees' sales) is not counted in the projected benefits. In this case, the basis used for measuring the benefits of each controlled participant is not the most reliable because all of the benefits received by controlled participants are not taken into account. In order to reliably determine RAB shares, FS1's projected benefits from licensing must be included in the measurement on a basis that is the same as that used to measure its own and the other controlled participants' projected benefits from sales (for example, all controlled participants might measure their benefits on the basis of operating profit).

(iii) *Projections used to estimate benefits—(A) In general.* The reliability of an

estimate of RAB shares also depends upon the reliability of projections used in making the estimate. Projections required for this purpose generally include a determination of the time period between the inception of the research and development activities under the CSA and the receipt of benefits, a projection of the time over which benefits will be received, and a projection of the benefits anticipated for each year in which it is anticipated that the cost shared intangible will generate benefits. A projection of the relevant basis for measuring anticipated benefits may require a projection of the factors that underlie it. For example, a projection of operating profits may require a projection of sales, cost of sales, operating expenses, and other factors that affect operating profits. If it is anticipated that there will be significant variation among controlled participants in the timing of their receipt of benefits, and consequently benefit shares are expected to vary significantly over the years in which benefits will be received, it normally will be necessary to use the present value of the projected benefits to reliably determine RAB shares. See paragraph (g)(2)(v) of this section for best method considerations regarding discount rates used for this purpose. If it is not anticipated that benefit shares will significantly change over time, current annual benefit shares may provide a reliable projection of RAB shares. This circumstance is most likely to occur when the CSA is a long-term arrangement, the arrangement covers a wide variety of intangibles, the composition of the cost shared intangibles is unlikely to change, the cost shared intangibles are unlikely to generate unusual profits, and each controlled participant's share of the market is stable.

(B) *Examples.* The following examples illustrate the principles of this paragraph (e)(2)(iii):

Example 1. (i) Foreign Parent (FP) and U.S. Subsidiary (USS) enter into a CSA to develop a new car model. The controlled participants plan to spend four years developing the new model and four years producing and selling the new model. USS and FP project total sales of \$4 billion and \$2 billion, respectively, over the planned four years of exploitation of the new model. The controlled participants determine RAB shares for each

year of 66% for USS and 33½% for FP, based on projected total sales.

(i) USS typically begins producing and selling new car models a year after FP begins producing and selling new car models. In order to reflect USS's one-year lag in introducing new car models, a more reliable projection of each participant's RAB share would be based on a projection of all four years of sales for each participant, discounted to present value.

Example 2. U.S. Parent (USP) and Foreign Subsidiary (FS) enter into a CSA to develop new and improved household cleaning products. Both controlled participants have sold household cleaning products for many years and have stable worldwide market shares. The products under development are unlikely to produce unusual profits for either controlled participant. The controlled participants determine RAB shares on the basis of each controlled participant's current sales of household cleaning products. In this case, the controlled participants' RAB shares are reliably projected by current sales of cleaning products.

Example 3. The facts are the same as in *Example 2*, except that FS's market share is rapidly expanding because of the business failure of a competitor in its geographic area. The controlled participants' RAB shares are not reliably projected by current sales of cleaning products. FS's benefit projections should take into account its growth in market share.

Example 4. Foreign Parent (FP) and U.S. Subsidiary (USS) enter into a CSA to develop synthetic fertilizers and insecticides. FP and USS share costs on the basis of each controlled participant's current sales of fertilizers and insecticides. The market shares of the controlled participants have been stable for fertilizers, but FP's market share for insecticides has been expanding. The controlled participants' projections of RAB shares are reliable with regard to fertilizers, but not reliable with regard to insecticides; a more reliable projection of RAB shares would take into account the expanding market share for insecticides.

(f) *Changes in participation under a CSA—(1) In general.* A change in participation under a CSA occurs when there is either a controlled transfer of interests or a capability variation. A change in participation requires arm's length consideration under paragraph (a)(3)(ii) of this section, and as more fully described in this paragraph (f).

(2) *Controlled transfer of interests.* A controlled transfer of interests occurs when a participant in a CSA transfers all or part of its interests in cost shared intangibles under the CSA in a

controlled transaction, and the transferee assumes the associated obligations under the CSA. For example, a change in the territorial based divisional interests or field of use based divisional interests, as described in paragraph (b)(4), is a controlled transfer of interests. After the controlled transfer of interests occurs, the CSA will still exist if at least two controlled participants still have interests in the cost shared intangibles. In such a case, the transferee will be treated as succeeding to the transferor's prior history under the CSA as pertains to the transferred interests, including the transferor's cost contributions, benefits derived, and PCT Payments attributable to such rights or obligations. A transfer that would otherwise constitute a controlled transfer of interests for purposes of this paragraph (f)(2) shall not constitute a controlled transfer of interests if it also constitutes a capability variation for purposes of paragraph (f)(3) of this section.

(3) *Capability variation.* A capability variation occurs when, in a CSA in which interests in cost shared intangibles are divided as described in paragraph (b)(4)(iv) of this section, the controlled participants' division of interests or their relative capabilities or capacities to benefit from the cost shared intangibles are materially altered. For purposes of paragraph (a)(3)(ii) of this section, a capability variation is considered to be a controlled transfer of interests in cost shared intangibles, in which any controlled participant whose RAB share decreases as a result of the capability variation is a transferor, and any controlled participant whose RAB share thus increases is the transferee of the interests in cost shared intangibles.

(4) *Arm's length consideration for a change in participation.* In the event of a change in participation, the arm's length amount of consideration from the transferee, under the rules of §§ 1.482-1 and 1.482-4 through 1.482-6 and paragraph (a)(3)(ii) of this section, will be determined consistent with the reasonably anticipated incremental change in the returns to the transferee and transferor resulting from such change in participation. Such changes in returns will themselves depend on

the reasonably anticipated incremental changes in the benefits from exploiting the cost shared intangibles, IDCs borne, and PCT Payments (if any). However, any arm's length consideration required under this paragraph (f)(4) with respect to a capability variation shall be reduced as necessary to prevent duplication of an adjustment already performed under paragraph (i)(2)(ii)(A) of this section that resulted from the same capability variation. If an adjustment has been performed already under this paragraph (f)(4) with respect to a capability variation, then for purposes of any adjustment to be performed under paragraph (i)(2)(ii)(A) of this section, the controlled participants' projected benefit shares referred to in paragraph (i)(2)(ii)(A) of this section shall be considered to be the controlled participants' respective RAB shares after the capability variation occurred.

(5) *Examples.* The following examples illustrate the principles of this paragraph (f):

Example 1. X, Y, and Z are the only controlled participants in a CSA. The CSA divides interests in cost shared intangibles on a territorial basis as described in paragraph (b)(4)(ii) of this section. X is assigned the territories of the Americas, Y is assigned the territory of the UK and Australia, and Z is assigned the rest of the world. When the CSA is formed, X has a platform contribution T. Under the PCTs for T, Y and Z are each obligated to pay X royalties equal to five percent of their respective sales. Aside from T, there are no platform contributions. Two years after the formation of the CSA, Y transfers to Z its interest in cost shared intangibles relating to the UK territory, and the associated obligations, in a controlled transfer of interests described in paragraph (f)(2) of this section. At that time the reasonably anticipated benefits from exploiting cost shared intangibles in the UK have a present value of \$11M, the reasonably anticipated IDCs to be borne relating to the UK territory have a present value of \$3M, and the reasonably anticipated PCT Payments to be made to X relating to sales in the UK territory have a present value of \$2M. As arm's length consideration for the change in participation due to the controlled transfer of interests, Z must pay Y compensation with an anticipated present value of \$11M, less \$3M, less \$2M, which equals \$6M.

Example 2. As in *Example 2* of paragraph (b)(4)(v) of this section, companies P and S, both members of the same controlled group, enter into a CSA to develop product Z. P and

S agree to divide their interest in product Z based on site of manufacturing. P will have exclusive and perpetual rights in product Z manufactured in facilities owned by P. S will have exclusive and perpetual rights to product Z manufactured in facilities owned by S. P and S agree that neither will license manufacturing rights in product Z to any related or unrelated party. Both P and S maintain books and records that allow production at all sites to be verified. Both own facilities that will manufacture product Z and the relative capacities of these sites are known. All facilities are currently operating at near capacity and are expected to continue to operate at near capacity when product Z enters production so that it will not be feasible to shift production between P's and S's facilities. P and S have no plans to build new facilities and the lead time required to plan and build a manufacturing facility precludes the possibility that P or S will build a new facility during the period for which sales of Product Z are expected. When the CSA is formed, P has a platform contribution T. Under the PCT for T, S is obligated to pay P sales-based royalties according to a certain formula. Aside from T, there are no other platform contributions. Two years after the formation of the CSA, owing to a change in plans not reasonably foreseeable at the time the CSA was entered into, S acquires additional facilities F for the manufacture of Product Z. Such acquisition constitutes a capability variation described in paragraph (f)(3) of this section. Under this capability variation, S's RAB share increases from 50% to 60%. Accordingly, there is a compensable change in participation under paragraph (f)(3) of this section.

(g) *Supplemental guidance on methods applicable to PCTs—(1) In general.* This paragraph (g) provides supplemental guidance on applying the methods listed in this paragraph (g)(1) for purposes of evaluating the arm's length amount charged in a PCT. Each method will yield a value for the compensation obligation of each PCT Payor consistent with the product of the combined pretax value to all controlled participants of the platform contribution that is the subject of the PCT and the PCT Payor's RAB share. Each method must yield results consistent with measuring the value of a platform contribution by reference to the future income anticipated to be generated by the resulting cost shared intangibles. The methods are—

(i) The comparable uncontrolled transaction method described in §1.482-4(c), or the comparable uncontrolled

services price method described in § 1.482-9(c), as further described in paragraph (g)(3) of this section;

(ii) The income method, described in paragraph (g)(4) of this section;

(iii) The acquisition price method, described in paragraph (g)(5) of this section;

(iv) The market capitalization method, described in paragraph (g)(6) of this section;

(v) The residual profit split method, described in paragraph (g)(7) of this section; and

(vi) Unspecified methods, described in paragraph (g)(8) of this section.

(2) *Best method analysis applicable for evaluation of a PCT pursuant to a CSA—*

(i) *In general.* Each method must be applied in accordance with the provisions of § 1.482-1, including the best method rule of § 1.482-1(c), the comparability analysis of § 1.482-1(d), and the arm's length range of § 1.482-1(e), except as those provisions are modified in this paragraph (g).

(ii) *Consistency with upfront contractual terms and risk allocation—the investor model—(A) In general.* Although all of the factors entering into a best method analysis described in § 1.482-1(c) and (d) must be considered, specific factors may be particularly relevant in the context of a CSA. In particular, the relative reliability of an application of any method depends on the degree of consistency of the analysis with the applicable contractual terms and allocation of risk under the CSA and this section among the controlled participants as of the date of the PCT, unless a change in such terms or allocation has been made in return for arm's length consideration. In this regard, a CSA involves an upfront division of the risks as to both reasonably anticipated obligations and reasonably anticipated benefits over the reasonably anticipated term of the CSA Activity. Accordingly, the relative reliability of an application of a method also depends on the degree of consistency of the analysis with the assumption that, as of the date of the PCT, each controlled participant's aggregate net investment in the CSA Activity (including platform contributions, operating contributions, as such term is defined in paragraph (j)(1)(i) of this section, oper-

ating cost contributions, as such term is defined in paragraph (j)(1)(i) of this section, and cost contributions) is reasonably anticipated to earn a rate of return (which might be reflected in a discount rate used in applying a method) appropriate to the riskiness of the controlled participant's CSA Activity over the entire period of such CSA Activity. If the cost shared intangibles themselves are reasonably anticipated to contribute to developing other intangibles, then the period described in the preceding sentence includes the period, reasonably anticipated as of the date of the PCT, of developing and exploiting such indirectly benefited intangibles.

(B) *Example.* The following example illustrates the principles of this paragraph (g)(2)(ii):

Example. (i) P, a U.S. corporation, has developed a software program, DEF, which applies certain algorithms to reconstruct complete DNA sequences from partially-observed DNA sequences. S is a wholly-owned foreign subsidiary of P. On the first day of Year 1, P and S enter into a CSA to develop a new generation of genetic tests, GHI, based in part on the use of DEF. DEF is therefore a platform contribution of P for which compensation is due from S pursuant to a PCT. S makes no platform contributions to the CSA. Sales of GHI are projected to commence two years after the inception of the CSA and then to continue for eight more years. Based on industry experience, P and S are confident that GHI will be replaced by a new type of genetic testing based on technology unrelated to DEF or GHI and that, at that point, GHI will have no further value. P and S project that that replacement will occur at the end of Year 10.

(ii) For purposes of valuing the PCT for P's platform contribution of DEF to the CSA, P and S apply a type of residual profit split method that is not described in paragraph (g)(7) of this section and which, accordingly, constitutes an unspecified method. See paragraph (g)(7)(i) (last sentence) of this section. The principles of this paragraph (g)(2) apply to any method for valuing a PCT, including the unspecified method used by P and S.

(iii) Under the method employed by P and S, in each year, a portion of the income from sales of GHI in S's territory is allocated to certain routine contributions made by S. The residual of the profit or loss from GHI sales in S's territory after the routine allocation step is divided between P and S pro rata to their capital stocks allocable to S's

territory. Each controlled participant's capital stock is computed by capitalizing, applying a capital growth factor to, and amortizing its historical expenditures regarding DEF allocable to S's territory (in the case of P), or its ongoing cost contributions towards developing GHI (in the case of S). The amortization of the capital stocks is effected on a straight-line basis over an assumed four-year life for the relevant expenditures. The capital stocks are grown using an assumed growth factor that P and S consider to be appropriate.

(iv) The assumption that all expenditures amortize on a straight-line basis over four years does not appropriately reflect the principle that as of the date of the PCT regarding DEF, every contribution to the development of GHI, including DEF, is reasonably anticipated to have value throughout the entire period of exploitation of GHI which is projected to continue through Year 10. Under this method as applied by P and S, the share of the residual profit in S's territory that is allocated to P as a PCT Payment from S will decrease every year. After Year 4, P's capital stock in DEF will necessarily be \$0, so that P will receive none of the residual profit or loss from GHI sales in S's territory after Year 4 as a PCT Payment.

(v) As a result of this limitation of the PCT Payments to be made by S, the anticipated return to S's aggregate investment in the CSA, over the whole period of S's CSA Activity, is at a rate that is significantly higher than the appropriate rate of return for S's CSA Activity (as determined by a reliable method). This discrepancy is not consistent with the investor model principle that S should anticipate a rate of return to its aggregate investment in the CSA, over the whole period of its CSA Activity, appropriate for the riskiness of its CSA Activity. The inconsistency of the method with the investor model materially lessens its reliability for purposes of a best method analysis. See § 1.482-1(c)(2)(ii)(B).

(iii) *Consistency of evaluation with realistic alternatives*—(A) *In general*. The relative reliability of an application of a method also depends on the degree of consistency of the analysis with the assumption that uncontrolled taxpayers dealing at arm's length would have evaluated the terms of the transaction, and only entered into such transaction, if no alternative is preferable. This condition is not met, therefore, where for any controlled participant the total anticipated present value of its income attributable to its entering into the CSA, as of the date of the PCT, is less than the total anticipated present value of its income that could be

achieved through an alternative arrangement realistically available to that controlled participant. In principle, this comparison is made on a post-tax basis but, in many cases, a comparison made on a pre-tax basis will yield equivalent results. See also paragraph (g)(2)(v)(B)(I) of this section (Discount rate variation between realistic alternatives).

(B) *Examples*. The following examples illustrate the principles of this paragraph (g)(2)(iii):

Example 1. (i) P, a corporation, and S, a wholly-owned subsidiary of P, enter into a CSA to develop a personal transportation device (the product). Under the arrangement, P will undertake all of the R&D, and manufacture and market the product in Country X. S will make CST Payments to P for its appropriate share of P's R&D costs, and manufacture and market the product in the rest of the world. P owns existing patents and trade secrets that are reasonably anticipated to contribute to the development of the product. Therefore the rights in the patents and trade secrets are platform contributions for which compensation is due from S as part of a PCT.

(ii) S's manufacturing and distribution activities under the CSA will be routine in nature, and identical to the activities it would undertake if it alternatively licensed the product from P.

(iii) Reasonably reliable estimates indicate that P could develop the product without assistance from S and license the product outside of Country X for a royalty of 20% of sales. Based on reliable financial projections that include all future development costs and licensing revenue that are allocable to the non-Country X market, and using a discount rate appropriate for the riskiness of P's role as a licensor (see paragraph (g)(2)(v) of this section), the post-tax present value of this licensing alternative to P for the non-Country X market (measured as of the date of the PCT) would be \$500 million. Thus, based on this realistic alternative, the anticipated post-tax present value under the CSA to P in the non-Country X market (measured as of the date of the PCT), taking into account anticipated development costs allocable to the non-Country X market, and anticipated CST Payments and PCT Payments from S, and using a discount rate appropriate for the riskiness of P's role as a participant in the CSA, should not be less than \$500 million.

Example 2. (i) The facts are the same as in *Example 1*, except that there are no reliable estimates of the value to P from the licensing alternative to the CSA. Further, reasonably reliable estimates indicate that an

arm's length return for S's routine manufacturing and distribution activities is a 10% mark-up on total costs of goods sold plus operating expenses related to those activities. Finally, the Commissioner determines that the respective activities undertaken by P and S (other than licensing payments, cost contributions, and PCT Payments) would be identical regardless of whether the arrangement was undertaken as a CSA (cost sharing alternative) or as a long-term licensing arrangement (licensing alternative). In particular, in both alternatives, P would perform all research activities and S would undertake routine manufacturing and distribution activities associated with its territory.

(ii) P undertakes an economic analysis that derives S's cost contributions under the CSA, based on reliable financial projections. Based on this and further economic analysis, P determines S's PCT Payment as a certain lump sum amount to be paid as of the date of the PCT (Date D).

(iii) Based on reliable financial projections that include S's cost contributions and that incorporate S's PCT Payment, as computed by P, and using a discount rate appropriate for the riskiness of S's role as a CSA participant (see paragraphs (g)(2)(v) and (4)(vi)(F) of this section), the anticipated post-tax net present value to S in the cost sharing alternative (measured as of Date D) is \$800 million. Further, based on these same reliable projections (but incorporating S's licensing payments instead of S's cost contributions and PCT Payment), and using a discount rate appropriate for the riskiness of S's role as a long-term licensee, the anticipated post-tax net present value to S in the licensing alternative (measured as of Date D) is \$100 million. Thus, S's anticipated post-tax net present value is \$700 million greater in the cost sharing alternative than in the licensing alternative. This result suggests that P's anticipated post-tax present value must be significantly less under the cost sharing alternative than under the licensing alternative. This means that the reliability of P's analysis as described in paragraph (ii) of this *Example 2* is reduced, because P would not be expected to enter into a CSA if its alternative of being a long-term licensor is preferable.

Example 3. (i) The facts are the same as in paragraphs (i) and (ii) of *Example 2*. In addition, based on reliable financial projections that include S's cost contributions and S's PCT Payment, and using a discount rate appropriate for the riskiness of S's role as a CSA participant, the anticipated post-tax net present value to S under the CSA (measured as of the date of the PCT) is \$50 million. Also, instead of entering the CSA, S has the realistic alternative of manufacturing and distributing product Z unrelated to the personal transportation device, with the same anticipated 10% mark-up on total costs that

it would anticipate for its routine activities in *Example 2*. Under its realistic alternative, at a discount rate appropriate for the riskiness of S's role with respect to product Z, S anticipates a present value of \$100 million.

(ii) Because the lump sum PCT Payment made by S results in S having a considerably lower anticipated net present value than S could achieve through an alternative arrangement realistically available to it, the reliability of P's calculation of the lump sum PCT Payment is reduced.

(iv) *Aggregation of transactions.* The combined effect of multiple contemporaneous transactions, consisting either of multiple PCTs, or of one or more PCT and one or more other transactions in connection with a CSA that are not governed by this section (such as transactions involving cross operating contributions or make-or-sell rights), may require evaluation in accordance with the principles of aggregation described in § 1.482-1(f)(2)(i). In such cases, it may be that the multiple transactions are reasonably anticipated, as of the date of the PCT(s), to be so interrelated that the method that provides the most reliable measure of an arm's length charge is a method under this section applied on an aggregate basis for the PCT(s) and other transactions. A section 482 adjustment may be made by comparing the aggregate arm's length charge so determined to the aggregate payments actually made for the multiple transactions. In such a case, it generally will not be necessary to allocate separately the aggregate arm's length charge as between various PCTs or as between PCTs and such other transactions. However, such an allocation may be necessary for other purposes, such as applying paragraph (i)(6) (Periodic adjustments) of this section. An aggregate determination of the arm's length charge for multiple transactions will often yield a payment for a controlled participant that is equal to the aggregate value of the platform contributions and other resources, capabilities, and rights covered by the multiple transactions multiplied by that controlled participant's RAB share. Because RAB shares only include benefits from cost shared intangibles, the reliability of an aggregate determination of payments for multiple transactions may be reduced to the extent that it

includes transactions covering resources, capabilities, and rights for which the controlled participants' expected benefit shares differ substantially from their RAB shares.

(v) *Discount rate*—(A) *In general.* The best method analysis in connection with certain methods or forms of payment may depend on a rate or rates of return used to convert projected results of transactions to present value, or to otherwise convert monetary amounts at one or more points in time to equivalent amounts at a different point or points in time. For this purpose, a discount rate or rates should be used that most reliably reflect the market-correlated risks of activities or transactions and should be applied to the best estimates of the relevant projected results, based on all the information potentially available at the time for which the present value calculation is to be performed. Depending on the particular facts and circumstances, the market-correlated risk involved and thus, the discount rate, may differ among a company's various activities or transactions. Normally, discount rates are most reliably determined by reference to market information.

(B) *Considerations in best method analysis of discount rate*—(1) *Discount rate variation between realistic alternatives.* Realistic alternatives may involve varying risk exposure and, thus, may be more reliably evaluated using different discount rates. See paragraphs (g)(4)(i)(F) and (vi)(F) of this section. In some circumstances, a party may have less risk as a licensee of intangibles needed in its operations, and so require a lower discount rate, than it would have by entering into a CSA to develop such intangibles, which may involve the party's assumption of additional risk in funding its cost contributions to the IDA. Similarly, self-development of intangibles and licensing out may be riskier for the licensor, and so require a higher discount rate, than entering into a CSA to develop such intangibles, which would relieve the licensor of the obligation to fund a portion of the IDCs of the IDA.

(2) *Implied discount rates.* In some circumstances, the particular discount rate or rates used for certain activities

or transactions logically imply that certain other activities will have a particular discount rate or set of rates (implied discount rates). To the extent that an implied discount rate is inappropriate in light of the facts and circumstances, which may include reliable direct evidence of the appropriate discount rate applicable for such other activities, the reliability of any method is reduced where such method is based on the discount rates from which such an inappropriate implied discount rate is derived. See paragraphs (g)(4)(vi)(F)(2) and (g)(4)(viii), *Example 8* of this section.

(3) *Discount rate variation between forms of payment.* Certain forms of payment may involve different risks than others. For example, ordinarily a royalty computed on a profits base would be more volatile, and so require a higher discount rate to discount projected payments to present value, than a royalty computed on a sales base.

(4) *Post-tax rate.* In general, discount rate estimates that may be inferred from the operations of the capital markets are post-tax discount rates. Therefore, an analysis would in principle apply post-tax discount rates to income net of expense items including taxes (post-tax income). However, in certain circumstances the result of applying a post-tax discount rate to post-tax income is equivalent to the product of the result of applying a post-tax discount rate to income net of expense items other than taxes (pre-tax income), and the difference of one minus the tax rate (as defined in paragraph (j)(1)(i) of this section). Therefore, in such circumstances, calculation of pre-tax income, rather than post-tax income, may be sufficient. See, for example, paragraph (g)(4)(i)(G) of this section.

(C) *Example.* The following example illustrates the principles of this paragraph (g)(2)(v):

Example. (i) P and S form a CSA to develop intangible X, which will be used in product Y. P will develop X, and S will make CST Payments as its cost contributions. At the start of the CSA, P has a platform contribution, for which S commits to make a PCT Payment of 5% of its sales of product Y. As part of the evaluation of whether that PCT Payment is arm's length, the Commissioner

considers whether P had a more favorable realistic alternative (see paragraph (g)(2)(iii) of this section). Specifically, the Commissioner compares P's anticipated post-tax discounted present value of the financial projections under the CSA (taking into account S's PCT payment of 5% of its sale of product Y) with P's anticipated post-tax discounted present value of the financial projections under a reasonably available licensing alternative that consists of developing intangible X on its own and then licensing X to S or to an uncontrolled party similar to S. In undertaking the analysis, the Commissioner determines that, because it would be funding the entire development of the intangible, P undertakes greater risks in the licensing alternative than in the cost sharing alternative (in the cost sharing alternative P would be funding only part of the development of the intangible).

(i) The Commissioner determines that, as between the two scenarios, all of the components of P's anticipated financial flows are identical, except for the CST and PCT Payments under the CSA, compared to the licensing payments under the licensing alternative. Accordingly, the Commissioner concludes that the differences in market-correlated risks between the two scenarios, and therefore the differences in discount rates between the two scenarios, relate to the differences in these components of the financial projections.

(vi) *Financial projections.* The reliability of an estimate of the value of a platform or operating contribution in connection with a PCT will often depend upon the reliability of projections used in making the estimate. Such projections should reflect the best estimates of the items projected (normally reflecting a probability weighted average of possible outcomes and thus also reflecting non-market-correlated risk). Projections necessary for this purpose may include a projection of sales, IDCs, costs of developing operating contributions, routine operating expenses, and costs of sales. Some method applications directly estimate projections of items attributable to separate development and exploitation by the controlled participants within their respective divisions. Other method applications indirectly estimate projections of items from the perspective of the controlled group as a whole, rather than from the perspective of a particular participant, and then apportion the items so estimated on some assumed basis. For example, in some applications, sales might be directly pro-

jected by division, but worldwide projections of other items such as operating expenses might be apportioned among divisions in the same ratio as the divisions' respective sales. Which approach is more reliable depends on which provides the most reliable measure of an arm's length result, considering the competing perspectives under the facts and circumstances in light of the completeness and accuracy of the underlying data, the reliability of the assumptions, and the sensitivity of the results to possible deficiencies in the data and assumptions. For these purposes, projections that have been prepared for non-tax purposes are generally more reliable than projections that have been prepared solely for purposes of meeting the requirements in this paragraph (g).

(vii) *Accounting principles—(A) In general.* Allocations or other valuations done for accounting purposes may provide a useful starting point but will not be conclusive for purposes of the best method analysis in evaluating the arm's length charge in a PCT, particularly where the accounting treatment of an asset is inconsistent with its economic value.

(B) *Examples.* The following examples illustrate the principles of this paragraph (g)(2)(vii):

Example 1. (i) USP, a U.S. corporation and FSub, a wholly-owned foreign subsidiary of USP, enter into a CSA in Year 1 to develop software programs with application in the medical field. Company X is an uncontrolled software company located in the United States that is engaged in developing software programs that could significantly enhance the programs being developed by USP and FSub. Company X is still in a startup phase, so it has no currently exploitable products or marketing intangibles and its workforce consists of a team of software developers. Company X has negligible liabilities and tangible property. In Year 2, USP purchases Company X as part of an uncontrolled transaction in order to acquire its in-process technology and workforce for purposes of the development activities of the CSA. USP files a consolidated return that includes Company X. For accounting purposes, \$50 million of the \$100 million acquisition price is allocated to the in-process technology and workforce, and the residual \$50 million is allocated to goodwill.

(ii) The in-process technology and workforce of Company X acquired by USP are reasonably anticipated to contribute to developing cost shared intangibles and therefore the rights in the in-process technology and workforce of Company X are platform contributions for which FSub must compensate USP as part of a PCT. In determining whether to apply the acquisition price or another method for purposes of evaluating the arm's length charge in the PCT, relevant best method analysis considerations must be weighed in light of the general principles of paragraph (g)(2) of this section. The allocation for accounting purposes raises an issue as to the reliability of using the acquisition price method in this case because it suggests that a significant portion of the value of Company X's nonroutine contributions to USP's business activities is allocable to goodwill, which is often difficult to value reliably and which, depending on the facts and circumstances, might not be attributable to platform contributions that are to be compensated by PCTs. See paragraph (g)(5)(iv)(A) of this section.

(iii) Paragraph (g)(2)(vii)(A) of this section provides that accounting treatment may be a starting point, but is not determinative for purposes of assessing or applying methods to evaluate the arm's length charge in a PCT. The facts here reveal that Company X has nothing of economic value aside from its in-process technology and assembled workforce. The \$50 million of the acquisition price allocated to goodwill for accounting purposes, therefore, is economically attributable to either of, or both, the in-process technology and the workforce. That moots the potential issue under the acquisition price method of the reliability of valuation of assets not to be compensated by PCTs, since there are no such assets. Assuming the acquisition price method is otherwise the most reliable method, the aggregate value of Company X's in-process technology and workforce is the full acquisition price of \$100 million. Accordingly, the aggregate value of the arm's length PCT Payments due from FSub to USP for the platform contributions consisting of the rights in Company X's in-process technology and workforce will equal \$100 million multiplied by FSub's RAB share.

Example 2. (i) The facts are the same as in *Example 1*, except that Company X is a mature software business in the United States with a successful current generation of software that it markets under a recognized trademark, in addition to having the research team and new generation software in process that could significantly enhance the programs being developed under USP's and FSub's CSA. USP continues Company X's existing business and integrates the research team and the in-process technology into the efforts under its CSA with FSub. For accounting purposes, the \$100 million price for

acquiring Company X is allocated \$50 million to existing software and trademark, \$25 million to in-process technology and research workforce, and the residual \$25 million to goodwill and going concern value.

(ii) In this case an analysis of the facts indicates a likelihood that, consistent with the allocation under the accounting treatment (although not necessarily in the same amount), a significant amount of the nonroutine contributions to the USP's business activities consist of goodwill and going concern value economically attributable to the existing U.S. software business rather than to the platform contributions consisting of the rights in the in-process technology and research workforce. In addition, an analysis of the facts indicates that a significant amount of the nonroutine contributions to USP's business activities consist of the make-or-sell rights under the existing software and trademark, which are not platform contributions and might be difficult to value. Accordingly, further consideration must be given to the extent to which these circumstances reduce the relative reliability of the acquisition price method in comparison to other potentially applicable methods for evaluating the PCT Payment.

Example 3. (i) USP, a U.S. corporation, and FSub, a wholly-owned foreign subsidiary of USP, enter into a CSA in Year 1 to develop Product A. Company Y is an uncontrolled corporation that owns Technology X, which is critical to the development of Product A. Company Y currently markets Product B, which is dependent on Technology X. USP is solely interested in acquiring Technology X, but is only able to do so through the acquisition of Company Y in its entirety for \$200 million in an uncontrolled transaction in Year 2. For accounting purposes, the acquisition price is allocated as follows: \$120 million to Product B and the underlying Technology X, \$30 million to trademark and other marketing intangibles, and the residual \$50 million to goodwill and going concern value. After the acquisition of Company Y, Technology X is used to develop Product A. No other part of Company Y is used in any manner. Immediately after the acquisition, product B is discontinued, and, therefore, the accompanying marketing intangibles become worthless. None of the previous employees of Company Y is retained.

(ii) The Technology X of Company Y acquired by USP is reasonably anticipated to contribute to developing cost shared intangibles and is therefore a platform contribution for which FSub must compensate USP as part of a PCT. Although for accounting purposes a significant portion of the acquisition price of Company Y was allocated to items other than Technology X, the facts demonstrate that USP had no intention of using and therefore placed no economic value on

any part of Company Y other than Technology X. If USP was willing to pay \$200 million for Company Y solely for purposes of acquiring Technology X, then assuming the acquisition price method is otherwise the most reliable method, the value of Technology X is the full \$200 million acquisition price. Accordingly, the value of the arm's length PCT Payment due from FSub to USP for the platform contribution consisting of the rights in Technology X will equal the product of \$200 million and FSub's RAB share.

(viii) *Valuations of subsequent PCTs—*

(A) *Date of subsequent PCT.* The date of a PCT may occur subsequent to the inception of the CSA. For example, an intangible initially developed outside the IDA may only subsequently become a platform contribution because that later time is the earliest date on which it is reasonably anticipated to contribute to developing cost shared intangibles within the IDA. In such case, the date of the PCT, and the analysis of the arm's length amount charged in the subsequent PCT, is as of such later time.

(B) *Best method analysis for subsequent PCT.* In cases where PCTs occur on different dates, the determination of the arm's length amount charged, respectively, in the prior and subsequent PCTs must be coordinated in a manner that provides the most reliable measure of an arm's length result. In some circumstances, a subsequent PCT may be reliably evaluated independently of other PCTs, as may be possible for example, under the acquisition price method. In other circumstances, the results of prior and subsequent PCTs may be interrelated and so a subsequent PCT may be most reliably evaluated under the residual profit split method of paragraph (g)(7) of this section. In those cases, for purposes of allocating the present value of nonroutine residual divisional profit or loss, and so determining the present value of the subsequent PCT Payments, in accordance with paragraph (g)(7)(iii)(C) of this section, the PCT Payor's interest in cost shared intangibles, both already developed and in process, are treated as additional PCT Payor operating contributions as of the date of the subsequent PCT.

(ix) *Arm's length range—(A) In general.* The guidance in §1.482-1(e) regarding determination of an arm's length

range, as modified by this section, applies in evaluating the arm's length amount charged in a PCT under a transfer pricing method provided in this section (applicable method). Section 1.482-1(e)(2)(i) provides that the arm's length range is ordinarily determined by applying a single pricing method selected under the best method rule to two or more uncontrolled transactions of similar comparability and reliability although use of more than one method may be appropriate for the purposes described in §1.482-1(c)(2)(iii). The rules provided in §1.482-1(e) and this section for determining an arm's length range shall not override the rules provided in paragraph (i)(6) of this section for periodic adjustments by the Commissioner. The provisions in paragraphs (g)(2)(ix)(C) and (D) of this section apply only to applicable methods that are based on two or more input parameters as described in paragraph (g)(2)(ix)(B) of this section. For an example of how the rules of this section for determining an arm's length range of PCT Payments are applied, see paragraph (g)(4)(viii) of this section.

(B) *Methods based on two or more input parameters.* An applicable method may determine PCT Payments based on calculations involving two or more parameters whose values depend on the facts and circumstances of the case (input parameters). For some input parameters (market-based input parameters), the value is most reliably determined by reference to data that derives from uncontrolled transactions (market data). For example, the value of the return to a controlled participant's routine contributions, as such term is defined in paragraph (j)(1)(i) of this section, to the CSA Activity (which value is used as an input parameter in the income method described in paragraph (g)(4) of this section) may in some cases be most reliably determined by reference to the profit level of a company with rights, resources, and capabilities comparable to those routine contributions. See §1.482-5. As another example, the value for the discount rate that reflects the riskiness of a controlled participant's role in the CSA (which value is used as an input

parameter in the income method described in paragraph (g)(4) of this section) may in some cases be most reliably determined by reference to the stock beta of a company whose overall risk is comparable to the riskiness of the controlled participant's role in the CSA.

(C) *Variable input parameters.* For some market-based input parameters (variable input parameters), the parameter's value is most reliably determined by considering two or more observations of market data that have, or with adjustment can be brought to, a similar reliability and comparability, as described in §1.482-1(e)(2)(ii) (for example, profit levels or stock betas of two or more companies). See paragraph (g)(2)(ix)(B) of this section.

(D) *Determination of arm's length PCT Payment.* For purposes of applying this paragraph (g)(2)(ix), each input parameter is assigned a single most reliable value, unless it is a variable input parameter as described in paragraph (g)(2)(ix)(C) of this section. The determination of the arm's length payment depends on the number of variable input parameters.

(1) *No variable input parameters.* If there are no variable input parameters, the arm's length PCT Payment is a single value determined by using the single most reliable value determined for each input parameter.

(2) *One variable input parameter.* If there is exactly one variable input parameter, then under the applicable method, the arm's length range of PCT Payments is the interquartile range, as described in §1.482-1(e)(2)(iii)(C), of the set of PCT Payment values calculated by selecting—

(i) Iteratively, the value of the variable input parameter that is based on each observation as described in paragraph (g)(2)(ix)(C) of this section; and

(ii) The single most reliable values for each other input parameter.

(3) *More than one variable input parameter.* If there are two or more variable input parameters, then under the applicable method, the arm's length range of PCT Payments is the interquartile range, as described in §1.482-1(e)(2)(iii)(C), of the set of PCT Payment values calculated iteratively using every possible combination of

permitted choices of values for the input parameters. For input parameters other than a variable input parameter, the only such permitted choice is the single most reliable value. For variable input parameters, such permitted choices include any value that is—

(i) Based on one of the observations described in paragraph (g)(2)(ix)(C) of this section; and

(ii) Within the interquartile range (as described in §1.482-1(e)(2)(iii)(C)) of the set of all values so based.

(E) *Adjustments.* Section 1.482-1(e)(3), applied as modified by this paragraph (g)(2)(ix), determines when the Commissioner may make an adjustment to a PCT Payment due to the taxpayer's results being outside the arm's length range. Adjustment will be to the median, as defined in §1.482-1(e)(3). Thus, the Commissioner is not required to establish an arm's length range prior to making an allocation under section 482.

(x) *Valuation undertaken on a pre-tax basis.* PCT Payments in general may increase the PCT Payee's tax liability and decrease the PCT Payor's tax liability. The arm's length amount of a PCT Payment determined under the methods in this paragraph (g) is the value of the PCT Payment itself, without regard to such tax effects. Therefore, the methods under this section must be applied, with suitable adjustments if needed, to determine the PCT Payments on a pre-tax basis. See paragraphs (g)(2)(v)(B) and (4)(i)(G) of this section.

(3) *Comparable uncontrolled transaction method.* The comparable uncontrolled transaction (CUT) method described in §1.482-4(c), and the comparable uncontrolled services price (CUSP) method described in §1.482-9(c), may be applied to evaluate whether the amount charged in a PCT is arm's length by reference to the amount charged in a comparable uncontrolled transaction. Although all of the factors entering into a best method analysis described in §1.482-1(c) and (d) must be considered, comparability and reliability under this method are particularly dependent on similarity of contractual terms, degree to which allocation of risks is proportional to reasonably anticipated benefits from exploiting the

results of intangible development, similar period of commitment as to the sharing of intangible development risks, and similar scope, uncertainty, and profit potential of the subject intangible development, including a similar allocation of the risks of any existing resources, capabilities, or rights, as well as of the risks of developing other resources, capabilities, or rights that would be reasonably anticipated to contribute to exploitation within the parties' divisions, that is consistent with the actual allocation of risks between the controlled participants as provided in the CSA in accordance with this section. When applied in the manner described in § 1.482-4(c) or 1.482-9(c), the CUT or CUSP method will typically yield an arm's length total value for the platform contribution that is the subject of the PCT. That value must then be multiplied by each PCT Payor's respective RAB share in order to determine the arm's length PCT Payment due from each PCT Payor. The reliability of a CUT or CUSP that yields a value for the platform contribution only in the PCT Payor's division will be reduced to the extent that value is not consistent with the total worldwide value of the platform contribution multiplied by the PCT Payor's RAB share.

(4) *Income method*—(i) *In general*—(A) *Equating cost sharing and licensing alternatives.* The income method evaluates whether the amount charged in a PCT is arm's length by reference to a controlled participant's best realistic alternative to entering into a CSA. Under this method, the arm's length charge for a PCT Payment will be an amount such that a controlled participant's present value, as of the date of the PCT, of its cost sharing alternative of entering into a CSA equals the present value of its best realistic alternative. In general, the best realistic alternative of the PCT Payor to entering into the CSA would be to license intangibles to be developed by an uncontrolled licensor that undertakes the commitment to bear the entire risk of intangible development that would otherwise have been shared under the CSA. Similarly, the best realistic alternative of the PCT Payee to entering into the CSA would be to undertake

the commitment to bear the entire risk of intangible development that would otherwise have been shared under the CSA and license the resulting intangibles to an uncontrolled licensee. Paragraphs (g)(4)(i)(B) through (vi) of this section describe specific applications of the income method, but do not exclude other possible applications of this method.

(B) *Cost sharing alternative.* The PCT Payor's cost sharing alternative corresponds to the actual CSA in accordance with this section, with the PCT Payor's obligation to make the PCT Payments to be determined and its commitment for the duration of the IDA to bear cost contributions.

(C) *Licensing alternative.* The licensing alternative is derived on the basis of a functional and risk analysis of the cost sharing alternative, but with a shift of the risk of cost contributions to the licensor. Accordingly, the PCT Payor's licensing alternative consists of entering into a license with an uncontrolled party, for a term extending for what would be the duration of the CSA Activity, to license the make-or-sell rights in to-be-developed resources, capabilities, or rights of the licensor. Under such license, the licensor would undertake the commitment to bear the entire risk of intangible development that would otherwise have been shared under the CSA. Apart from any difference in the allocation of the risks of the IDA, the licensing alternative should assume contractual provisions with regard to non-overlapping divisional intangible interests, and with regard to allocations of other risks, that are consistent with the actual CSA in accordance with this section. For example, the analysis under the licensing alternative should assume a similar allocation of the risks of any existing resources, capabilities, or rights, as well as of the risks of developing other resources, capabilities, or rights that would be reasonably anticipated to contribute to exploitation within the parties' divisions, that is consistent with the actual allocation of risks between the controlled participants as provided in the CSA in accordance with this section. Accordingly, the financial projections associated

with the licensing and cost sharing alternatives are necessarily the same except for the licensing payments to be made under the licensing alternative and the cost contributions and PCT Payments to be made under the CSA.

(D) *Only one controlled participant with nonroutine platform contributions.* This method involves only one of the controlled participants providing nonroutine platform contributions as the PCT Payee. For a method under which more than one controlled participant may be a PCT Payee, see the application of the residual profit method pursuant to paragraph (g)(7) of this section.

(E) *Income method payment forms.* The income method may be applied to determine PCT Payments in any form of payment (for example, lump sum, royalty on sales, or royalty on divisional profit). For converting to another form of payment, see generally paragraph (h) (Form of payment rules) of this section.

(F) *Discount rates appropriate to cost sharing and licensing alternatives.* The present value of the cost sharing and licensing alternatives, respectively, should be determined using the appropriate discount rates in accordance with paragraphs (g)(2)(v) and (g)(4)(vi)(F) of this section. See, for example, § 1.482-7(g)(2)(v)(B)(1) (Discount rate variation between realistic alternatives). In circumstances where the market-correlated risks as between the cost sharing and licensing alternatives are not materially different, a reliable analysis may be possible by using the same discount rate with respect to both alternatives.

(G) *The effect of taxation on determining the arm's length amount.* (1) In principle, the present values of the cost sharing and licensing alternatives should be determined by applying post-tax discount rates to post-tax income (including the post-tax value to the controlled participant of the PCT Payments). If such approach is adopted, then the post-tax value of the PCT Payments must be appropriately adjusted in order to determine the arm's length amount of the PCT Payments on a pre-tax basis. See paragraph (g)(2)(x) of this section.

(2) In certain circumstances, post-tax income may be derived as the product of the result of applying a post-tax discount rate to pre-tax income, and a factor equal to one minus the tax rate (as defined in (j)(1)(i)). See paragraph (g)(2)(v)(B) of this section.

(3) To the extent that a controlled participant's tax rate is not materially affected by whether it enters into the cost sharing or licensing alternative (or reliable adjustments may be made for varying tax rates), the factor (that is, one minus the tax rate) may be cancelled from both sides of the equation of the cost sharing and licensing alternative present values. Accordingly, in such circumstance it is sufficient to apply post-tax discount rates to projections of pre-tax income for the purpose of equating the cost sharing and licensing alternatives. The specific applications of the income method described in paragraphs (g)(4)(ii) through (iv) of this section and the examples set forth in paragraph (g)(4)(viii) of this section assume that a controlled participant's tax rate is not materially affected by whether it enters into the cost sharing or licensing alternative.

(ii) *Evaluation of PCT Payor's cost sharing alternative.* The present value of the PCT Payor's cost sharing alternative is the present value of the stream of the reasonably anticipated residuals over the duration of the CSA Activity of divisional profits or losses, minus operating cost contributions, minus cost contributions, minus PCT Payments.

(iii) *Evaluation of PCT Payor's licensing alternative—(A) Evaluation based on CUT.* The present value of the PCT Payor's licensing alternative may be determined using the comparable uncontrolled transaction method, as described in § 1.482-4(c)(1) and (2). In this case, the present value of the PCT Payor's licensing alternative is the present value of the stream, over what would be the duration of the CSA Activity under the cost sharing alternative, of the reasonably anticipated residuals of the divisional profits or losses that would be achieved under the cost sharing alternative, minus operating cost contributions that would be made under the cost sharing alternative, minus the licensing payments

as determined under the comparable uncontrolled transaction method.

(B) *Evaluation based on CPM.* The present value of the PCT Payor's licensing alternative may be determined using the comparable profits method, as described in §1.482-5. In this case, the present value of the licensing alternative is determined as in paragraph (g)(4)(iii)(A) of this section, except that the PCT Payor's licensing payments, as defined in paragraph (j)(1)(i) of this section, are determined in each period to equal the reasonably anticipated residuals of the divisional profits or losses that would be achieved under the cost sharing alternative, minus operating cost contributions that would be made under the cost sharing alternative, minus market returns for routine contributions, as defined in paragraph (j)(1)(i) of this section. However, treatment of net operating contributions as operating cost contributions shall be coordinated with the treatment of other routine contributions pursuant to this paragraph so as to avoid duplicative market returns to such contributions.

(iv) *Lump sum payment form.* Where the form of PCT Payment is a lump sum as of the date of the PCT, then, based on paragraphs (g)(4)(i) through (iii) of this section, the PCT Payment equals the difference between—

(A) The present value, using the discount rate appropriate for the cost sharing alternative, of the stream of the reasonably anticipated residuals over the duration of the CSA Activity of divisional profits or losses, minus cost contributions and operating cost contributions; and

(B) The present value of the licensing alternative.

(v) *Application of income method using differential income stream.* In some cases, the present value of an arm's length PCT Payment may be determined as the present value, discounted at the appropriate rate, of the PCT Payor's reasonably anticipated stream of additional positive or negative income over the duration of the CSA Activity that would result (before PCT Payments) from undertaking the cost sharing alternative rather than the licensing alternative (differential in-

come stream). See *Example 9* of paragraph (g)(4)(viii) of this section.

(vi) *Best method analysis considerations.* (A) *Coordination with §1.482-1(c).* Whether results derived from this method are the most reliable measure of an arm's length result is determined using the factors described under the best method rule in §1.482-1(c). Thus, comparability and the quality of data, the reliability of the assumptions, and the sensitivity of the results to possible deficiencies in the data and assumptions, must be considered in determining whether this method provides the most reliable measure of an arm's length result.

(B) *Assumptions Concerning Tax Rates.* This method will be more reliable to the extent that the controlled participants' respective tax rates are not materially affected by whether they enter into the cost sharing or licensing alternative. Even if this assumption of invariant tax rates across alternatives does not hold, this method may still be reliable to the extent that reliable adjustments can be made to reflect the variation in tax rates.

(C) *Coordination with §1.482-4(c)(2).* If the licensing alternative is evaluated using the comparable uncontrolled transactions method, as described in paragraph (g)(4)(iii)(A) of this section, any additional comparability and reliability considerations stated in §1.482-4(c)(2) may apply.

(D) *Coordination with §1.482-5(c).* If the licensing alternative is evaluated using the comparable profits method, as described in paragraph (g)(4)(iii)(B) of this section, any additional comparability and reliability considerations stated in §1.482-5(c) may apply.

(E) *Certain Circumstances Concerning PCT Payor.* This method may be used even if the PCT Payor furnishes significant operating contributions, or commits to assume the risk of significant operating cost contributions, to the PCT Payor's division. However, in such a case, any comparable uncontrolled transactions described in paragraph (g)(4)(iii)(A) of this section, and any comparable transactions used under §1.482-5(c) as described in paragraphs (g)(4)(iii)(B) of this section, should be consistent with such contributions (or

reliable adjustments must be made for material differences).

(F) *Discount rates—(1) Reflection of similar risk profiles of cost sharing alternative and licensing alternative.* Because the financial projections associated with the licensing and cost sharing alternatives are the same, except for the licensing payments to be made under the licensing alternative and the cost contributions and PCT Payments to be made under the cost sharing alternative, the analysis of the risk profile and financial projections for a realistic alternative to the cost sharing alternative must be closely associated with the risk profile and financial projections associated with the cost sharing alternative, differing only in the treatment of licensing payments, cost contributions, and PCT Payments. When using discount rates in applying the income method, this means that even if different discount rates are warranted for the two alternatives, the risk profiles for the two discount rates are closely related to each other because the discount rate for the licensing alternative and the discount rate for the cost sharing alternative are both derived from the single probability-weighted financial projections associated with the CSA Activity. The difference, if any, in market-correlated risks between the licensing and cost sharing alternatives is due solely to the different effects on risks of the PCT Payor making licensing payments under the licensing alternative, on the one hand, and the PCT Payor making cost contributions and PCT Payments under the cost sharing alternative, on the other hand. That is, the difference in the risk profile between the two scenarios solely reflects the incremental risk, if any, associated with the cost contributions taken on by the PCT Payor in developing the cost shared intangible under the cost sharing alternative, and the difference, if any, in risk associated with the particular payment forms of the licensing payments and the PCT Payments, in light of the fact that the licensing payments in the licensing alternative are partially replaced by cost contributions and partially replaced by PCT Payments in the cost sharing alternative, each with its own payment form. An

analysis under the income method that uses a different discount rate for the cost sharing alternative than for the licensing alternative will be more reliable the greater the extent to which the difference, if any, between the two discount rates reflects solely these differences in the risk profiles of these two alternatives. See, for example, paragraph (g)(2)(iii), *Example 2* of this section.

(2) *Use of differential income stream as a consideration in assessing the best method.* An analysis under the income method that uses a different discount rate for the cost sharing alternative than for the licensing alternative will be more reliable the greater the extent to which the implied discount rate for the projected present value of the differential income stream is consistent with reliable direct evidence of the appropriate discount rate applicable for activities reasonably anticipated to generate an income stream with a similar risk profile to the differential income stream. Such differential income stream is defined as the stream of the reasonably anticipated residuals of the PCT Payor's licensing payments to be made under the licensing alternative, minus the PCT Payor's cost contributions to be made under the cost sharing alternative. See *Example 8* of paragraph (g)(4)(viii) of this section.

(vii) *Routine platform and operating contributions.* For purposes of this paragraph (g)(4), any routine contributions that are platform or operating contributions, the valuation and PCT Payments for which are determined and made independently of the income method, are treated similarly to cost contributions and operating cost contributions, respectively. Accordingly, wherever used in this paragraph (g)(4), the term "routine contributions" shall not include routine platform or operating contributions, and wherever the terms "cost contributions" and "operating cost contributions" appear in this paragraph, they shall include net routine platform contributions and net routine operating contributions, respectively. Net routine platform contributions are the value of a controlled participant's total reasonably anticipated routine platform contributions, plus its reasonably anticipated PCT

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Payments to other controlled participants in respect of their routine platform contributions, minus the reasonably anticipated PCT Payments it is to receive from other controlled participants in respect of its routine platform contributions. Net routine operating contributions are the value of a controlled participant's total reasonably anticipated routine operating contributions, plus its reasonably anticipated arm's length compensation to other controlled participants in respect of their routine operating contributions, minus the reasonably anticipated arm's length compensation it is to receive from other controlled participants in respect of its routine operating contributions.

(viii) *Examples.* The following examples illustrate the principles of this paragraph (g)(4):

Example 1. (i) For simplicity of calculation in this *Example 1*, all financial flows are assumed to occur at the beginning of each pe-

riod. USP, a software company, has developed version 1.0 of a new software application that it is currently marketing. In Year 1 USP enters into a CSA with its wholly-owned foreign subsidiary, FS, to develop future versions of the software application. Under the CSA, USP will have the rights to exploit the future versions in the United States, and FS will have the rights to exploit them in the rest of the world. The future rights in version 1.0, and USP's development team, are reasonably anticipated to contribute to the development of future versions and therefore the rights in version 1.0 and the research and development team are platform contributions for which compensation is due from FS as part of a PCT. USP does not transfer the current exploitation rights in version 1.0 to FS. FS will not perform any research or development activities and does not furnish any platform contributions nor does it control any operating intangibles at the inception of the CSA that would be relevant to the exploitation of version 1.0 or future versions of the software.

(ii) FS undertakes financial projections in its territory of the CSA:

(1) Year	(2) Sales	(3) Operating costs	(4) Cost contributions	(5) Operating income under cost sharing alternative (excluding PCT)
1	0	0	50	-50
2	0	0	50	-50
3	200	100	50	50
4	400	200	50	150
5	600	300	60	240
6	650	325	65	260
7	700	350	70	280
8	750	375	75	300
9	750	375	75	300
10	675	338	68	269
11	608	304	61	243
12	547	273	55	219
13	410	205	41	164
14	308	154	31	123
15	231	115	23	93

FS anticipates that activity on this application will cease after Year 15. The application was derived from software developed by Company Q, an uncontrolled party. FS has a license under Company Q's copyright, but that license expires after Year 15 and will not be renewed.

(iii) In evaluating the cost sharing alternative, FS concludes that the cost sharing alternative represents a riskier alternative for FS than the licensing alternative because, in cost sharing, FS will take on the additional risks associated with cost contributions. Taking this difference into account, FS concludes that the appropriate

discount rate to apply in assessing the licensing alternative, based on discount rates of comparable uncontrolled companies undertaking comparable licensing transactions, would be 13% per year, whereas the appropriate discount rate to apply in assessing the cost sharing alternative would be 15% per year. FS determines that the arm's length rate USP would have charged an uncontrolled licensee for a license of future versions of the software (if USP had further developed version 1.0 on its own) is 35% of the sales price, as determined under the CUT method in § 1.482-4(c). FS also determines that the tax rate applicable to it will be the

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same in the licensing alternative as in the CSA. Accordingly, the financial projections associated with the licensing alternative are:

(6) Year	(7) Sales	(8) Operating costs	(9) Licensing payments	(10) Operating income under licensing alternative	(11) Operating income under cost sharing alternative minus operating income under licensing alternative
1	0	0	0	0	-50
2	0	0	0	0	-50
3	200	100	70	30	20
4	400	200	140	60	90
5	600	300	210	90	150
6	650	325	228	97	163
7	700	350	245	105	175
8	750	375	263	112	188
9	750	375	263	112	188
10	675	338	236	101	168
11	608	304	213	91	152
12	547	273	191	83	136
13	410	205	144	61	103
14	308	154	108	46	77
15	231	115	81	35	58

(iv) Based on these projections and applying the appropriate discount rate, FS determines that under the cost sharing alternative, the present value of the stream of residuals of its anticipated divisional profits, reduced by the anticipated operating cost contributions and cost contributions, but not reduced by any PCT Payments (that is, the stream of anticipated operating income as shown in column 5) would be \$889 million. Under the licensing alternative, the present value of the stream of residuals of its anticipated divisional profits and losses minus the operating cost contributions (that is, the stream of anticipated operating income before licensing payments, which is the present value of column 7 reduced by column 8) would be \$1.419 billion, and the present value of the licensing payments would be \$994 million. Therefore, the total value of the licensing alternative would be \$425 million. In order for the present value of the cost sharing alternative to equal the present value of the licensing alternative, the present value of the PCT Payments must equal \$464 million. Therefore, the taxpayer makes and reports PCT Payments with a present value of \$464 million.

Example 2. Arm's length range. (i) The facts are the same as in *Example 1*. The Commissioner accepts the financial projections undertaken by FS. Further, the Commissioner determines that the licensing discount rate and the CUT licensing rate are most reliably determined by reference to comparable uncontrolled discount rates and license rates, respectively. The observations that are in

the interquartile range of the respective input parameters (see paragraph (g)(2)(ix) of this section) are as follows:

Observations that are within interquartile range	Comparable uncontrolled discount rate
1	11%
2	12
3 (Median)	13
4	15
5	17

Observations that are within interquartile range	Comparable uncontrolled licensing rate
1	30%
2	32
3 (Median)	35
4	37
5	40

(ii) Following the principles of paragraph (g)(2)(ix) of this section, the Commissioner undertakes 25 different applications of the income method, using each combination of the discount rate and licensing rate parameters. In undertaking this analysis, the Commissioner assumes that the ratio of the median discount rate for the cost sharing alternative to the median discount rate for the licensing alternative (that is, 15% to 13%) is maintained. The results of the 25 applications of the income method, sorted in ascending order of calculated present value of the PCT Payment, are as follows:

INCOME METHOD APPLICATION NUMBER::	Comparable uncontrolled licensing discount rate	Comparable uncontrolled CSA discount rate	Comparable uncontrolled licensing rate	Calculated lump sum PCT payment	Interquartile range of PCT payments
1	17%	19.6%	30%	217	
2	17	19.6	32	263	
3	15	17.3	30	264	
4	15	17.3	32	315	
5	13	15	30	321	
6	17	19.6	35	331	
7	12	13.8	30	354	LQ = 354
8	17	19.6	37	376	
9	13	15	32	378	
10	11	12.7	30	391	
11	15	17.3	35	391	
12	12	13.8	32	415	
13	15	17.3	37	442	Median = 442
14	17	19.6	40	444	
15	11	12.7	32	455	
16	13	15	35	464	
17	12	13.8	35	505	
18	15	17.3	40	517	
19	13	15	37	520	UQ = 520
20	11	12.7	35	551	
21	12	13.8	37	566	
22	13	15	40	605	
23	11	12.7	37	615	
24	12	13.8	40	655	
25	11	12.7	40	710	

(iii) Accordingly, the Commissioner determines that a taxpayer will not be subject to adjustment if its initial (ex ante) determination of the present value of PCT Payments is between \$354 million and \$520 million (the lower and upper quartile results as shown in the last column). Because FS's determination of the present value of the PCT Payments, \$464 million, is within the interquartile range, no adjustments are warranted.

Example 3. (i) For simplicity of calculation in this *Example 3*, all financial flows are assumed to occur at the beginning of each period. USP, a U.S. software company, has developed version 1.0 of a new software application, employed to store and retrieve complex data sets in certain types of storage media. Version 1.0 is currently being marketed. In Year 1, USP enters into a CSA with its wholly-owned foreign subsidiary, FS, to develop future versions of the software application. Under the CSA, USP will have the exclusive rights to exploit the future versions in the U.S., and FS will have the exclusive rights to exploit them in the rest of the world. USP's rights in version 1.0, and its development team, are reasonably anticipated to contribute to the development of future versions of the software application and, therefore, the rights in version 1.0 are platform contributions for which compensation is due from FS as part of a PCT. USP also transfers the current exploitation rights in version 1.0 to FS and the arm's length amount of the compensation for such transfer is determined in the aggregate with the arm's length PCT Payments in this *Example 3*. FS does not furnish any platform contributions to the CSA

nor does it control any operating intangibles at the inception of the CSA that would be relevant to the exploitation of version 1.0 or future versions of the software. It is reasonably anticipated that FS will have gross sales of \$1000X in its territory for 5 years attributable to its exploitation of version 1.0 and the cost shared intangibles, after which time the software application will be rendered obsolete and unmarketable by the obsolescence of the storage medium technology to which it relates. FS's costs reasonably attributable to the CSA, other than cost contributions and operating cost contributions, are anticipated to be \$250X per year. Certain operating cost contributions that will be borne by FS are reasonably anticipated to equal \$200X per annum for 5 years. In addition, FS is reasonably anticipated to pay cost contributions of \$200X per year as a controlled participant in the CSA.

(ii) FS concludes that its realistic alternative would be to license software from an uncontrolled licensor that would undertake the commitment to bear the entire risk of software development. Applying CPM using the profit levels experienced by uncontrolled licensees with contractual provisions and allocations of risk that are comparable to those of FS's licensing alternative, FS determines that it could, as a licensee, reasonably expect a (pre-tax) routine return equal to 14% of gross sales or \$140X per year for 5 years. The remaining net revenue would be paid to the uncontrolled licensor as a license fee of \$410X per year. FS determines that the discount rate that would be applied to determine the present value of income and costs

attributable to its participation in the licensing alternative would be 12.5% as compared to the 15% discount rate that would be applicable in determining the present value of the net income attributable to its participation in the CSA (reflecting the increased risk borne by FS in bearing a share of the R & D costs in the cost sharing alternative). FS also determines that the tax rate applicable to it will be the same in the licensing alternative as in the CSA.

(iii) On these facts, the present value to FS of entering into the cost sharing alternative equals the present value of the annual divisional profits (\$1,000X minus \$250X) minus operating cost contributions (\$200X) minus cost contributions (\$200X) minus PCT Payments, determined over 5 years by discounting at a discount rate of 15%. Thus, the present value of the residuals, prior to subtracting the present value of the PCT Payments, is \$1349X.

(iv) On these facts, the present value to FS of entering into the licensing alternative would be \$561X determined by discounting, over 5 years, annual divisional profits (\$1,000X minus \$250X) minus operating cost contributions (\$200X) and licensing payments (\$410X) at a discount rate of 12.5% per annum. The present value of the cost sharing alternative must also equal \$561X but equals \$1349X prior to subtracting the present value of the PCT Payments. Consequently, the PCT Payments must have a present value of \$788X.

Example 4. Pre-tax PCT Payment derived from post-tax information. (i) For simplicity of calculation in this *Example 4*, it is assumed that all payments are made at the end of each year. Domestic controlled participant USP has developed a technology, Z, that it would like to exploit for three years in a CSA. USP enters into a CSA with its wholly-owned foreign subsidiary, FS, that provides for PCT Payments from FS to USP with respect to USP's platform contribution to the CSA of Z in the form of three annual installment payments due from FS to USP on the last day of each of the first three years of the CSA. FS makes no platform contributions to the CSA. Prior to entering into the CSA, FS considers that it has the realistic alternative available to it of licensing Z from USP rather than entering into a CSA with USP to further develop Z for three years.

(ii) FS undertakes financial projections for both the licensing and cost sharing alternatives for exploitation of Z in its territory of the CSA. These projections are set forth in the following tables. The example assumes that there is a reasonably anticipated effective tax rate of 25% in each of years 1 through 3 under both the licensing and cost sharing alternatives. FS determines that the appropriate post-tax discount rate under the licensing alternative is 12.5%, and that the appropriate post-tax discount rate under the cost sharing alternative is 15%.

Licensing alternative	Present value (12.5% DR)	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3
(1) Sales		\$1000	\$1100	\$1210
(2) License Fee		400	440	484
(3) Operating costs		500	550	605
(4) Operating Income	\$261	100	110	121
(5) Tax (25%)		25	28	30
(6) Post-tax income	\$196	\$75	\$82	\$91
Cost sharing alternative	Present value (15% DR)	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3
(7) Sales		\$1000	\$1100	\$1210
(8) Cost Contributions		200	220	242
(9) PCT Payments	D	A	B	C
(10) Operating costs		500	550	605
(11) Operating income excluding PCT	\$749	300	330	363
(12) Operating income	H	E	F	G
(13) Tax				
(14) Post-tax income excluding PCT	\$562	\$225	\$248	\$272
(15) Post-tax income	L	I	J	K

(iii) Under paragraph (g)(4) of this section, the arm's length charge for a PCT Payment will be an amount such that a controlled participant's present value, as of the date of the PCT of its cost sharing alternative of entering into a CSA equals the present value of its best realistic alternative. This requires that L, the present value of the post-tax income under the CSA, equals the present

value of the post-tax income under the licensing alternative, or \$196.

(iv) FS determines that PCT Payments for Z should be \$196 in Year 1 (A), \$215 in Year 2 (B), and \$236 in Year 3 (C). By using these amounts for A, B, and C in the table above, FS is able to derive the values of E, F, G, I, J, and K in the table above. Based on these PCT Payments for Z, the post-tax income

will be \$78 in Year 1 (I), \$86 in Year 2 (J), and \$95 in Year 3 (K). When this post-tax income stream is discounted at the appropriate rate for the cost sharing alternative (15%), the net present value is \$196 (L). The present value of the PCT Payments, when discounted at the appropriate post-tax rate, is \$488 (D).

(v) The Commissioner undertakes an audit of the PCT Payments made by FS to USP for Z in Years 1 through 3. The Commissioner concludes that the PCT Payments for Z are arm's length in accordance with this paragraph (g)(4).

Example 5. Pre-tax PCT Payment derived from post-tax information. (i) The facts are the same as in paragraphs (i) and (ii) of *Example 4*. In addition, under this paragraph (g)(4), the arm's length charge for a PCT Payment will be an amount such that a controlled participant's present value, as of the date of the PCT of its cost sharing alternative equals the present value of its best realistic alternative. This requires that L, the present value of the post-tax income under the CSA, equals the present value of the post-tax income under the licensing alternative, or \$196.

(ii) FS determines that the post-tax present value of the cost sharing alternative (excluding PCT Payments) is \$562. The post-tax present value of the licensing alternative is \$196. Accordingly, payments with a post-tax present value of \$366 are required.

(iii) The Commissioner undertakes an audit of the PCT Payments made by FS to USP for Z in Years 1 through 3. In correspondence to the Commissioner, USP maintains that the arm's length PCT Payment for Z should have a present value of \$366 (D).

(iv) The Commissioner considers that if FS makes PCT Payments for Z with a present value of \$366, then the post-tax present value under the CSA (considering the deductibility of the PCT Payments) will be \$287, substantially higher than the post-tax present value of the licensing arrangement, \$196. The Commissioner determines that, under the specific facts and assumptions of this example, the present value of the post-tax payments may be grossed up by a factor of (one minus the tax rate), resulting in a present value of pre-tax payments of \$488. Accordingly, FS must make yearly PCT Payments (A, B, and C) such that the present value of the Payments is \$488 (D). (When FS's post-tax income after these PCT Payments for Z is discounted at the appropriate rate for the cost sharing alternative (15%), the net present value is \$196 (L), which is equal to the present value of post-tax income under the licensing alternative.) The Commissioner concludes that the calculations that it has made for the PCT Payments for Z are arm's length in accordance with this paragraph (g)(4) and, accordingly, makes the appropriate adjustments to USP's income tax re-

turn to account for the gross-up required by paragraph (g)(2)(x) of this section.

Example 6. Pre-tax PCT Payment derived from pre-tax information. (i) The facts are the same as in paragraphs (i) and (ii) of *Example 4*. In addition, under paragraph (g)(4) of this section, the arm's length charge for a PCT Payment will be an amount such that a controlled participant's present value, as of the date of the PCT of its cost sharing alternative of entering into a CSA equals the present value of its best realistic alternative. This requires that "L," the present value of the post-tax income under the CSA, equals the present value of the post-tax income under the licensing alternative, or \$196.

(ii) Under the specific facts and assumptions of this *Example 6* (see paragraph (g)(4)(i)(G) of this section), and using the same (post-tax) discount rates as in *Example 4*, the present value of pre-tax income under the licensing alternative (that is, the operating income) is \$261, and the present value of pre-tax income under the cost sharing alternative (excluding PCT Payments) is \$749. Accordingly, FS determines that its PCT Payments for Z should have a present value equal to the difference between the two, or \$488 (D). Such PCT Payments for Z result in a present value of post-tax income under the cost sharing alternative of \$196 (L), which is equal to the present value of post-tax income under the licensing alternative.

(iii) The Commissioner undertakes an audit of the PCT Payments for Z made by FS to USP in Years 1 through 3. The Commissioner concludes that the PCT Payments for Z are arm's length in accordance with this paragraph (g)(4).

Example 7. Application of income method with a terminal value calculation. (i) For simplicity of calculation in this *Example 7*, all financial flows are assumed to occur at the beginning of each period. USP's research and development team, Q, has developed a technology, Z, for which it has several applications on the market now and several planned for release at future dates. In Year 1, USP, enters into a CSA with its wholly-owned subsidiary, FS, to develop future applications of Z. Under the CSA, USP will have the rights to further develop and exploit the future applications of Z in the United States, and FS will have the rights to further develop and exploit the future applications of Z in the rest of the world. Both Q and the rights to further develop and exploit future applications of Z are reasonably anticipated to contribute to the development of future applications of Z. Therefore, both Q and the rights to further develop and exploit the future applications of Z are platform contributions for which compensation is due from FS to USP as part of a PCT. USP does not transfer the current exploitation rights for current applications of Z to FS. FS will not perform any research or development activities on Z and does not

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furnish any platform contributions to the CSA, nor does it control any operating intangibles at the inception of the CSA that would be relevant to the exploitation of either current or future applications of Z.

(ii) At the outset of the CSA, FS undertakes an analysis of the PCTs involving Q and the rights with respect to Z in order to determine the arm's length PCT Payments owing from FS to USP under the CSA. In that evaluation, FS concludes that the cost sharing alternative represents a riskier alternative for FS than the licensing alternative. FS further concludes that the appropriate discount rate to apply in assessing the licensing alternative, based on discount rates of comparable uncontrolled companies undertaking comparable licensing transactions, would be 13% per annum, whereas the appropriate discount rate to apply in assessing the cost sharing alternative would be 14% per annum. FS undertakes financial projections and anticipates making \$100 million in sales during the first two years of the CSA in its territory with sales in Years 3 through 8 increasing to \$200 million, \$400 million, \$600 million, \$650 million, \$700 million, and \$750 million, respectively. After Year 8, FS expects its sales of all products based upon exploitation of Z in the rest of the world to grow at 3% per annum for the future. FS and USP do not anticipate cessation of the CSA Activity with respect to Z at any determinable date. FS anticipates that its manufacturing and distribution costs for exploiting Z (including its operating cost contributions), will equal 60% of gross sales of Z from Year 1 onwards, and anticipates its cost contributions will equal \$25 million per annum for Years 1 and 2, \$50 million per annum for Years 3 and 4, and 10% of gross sales per annum thereafter.

(iii) Based on this analysis, FS determines that the arm's length royalty rate that USP would have charged an uncontrolled licensee for a license of future applications of Z if USP had further developed future applications of Z on its own is 30% of the sales price of the Z-based product, as determined under the comparable uncontrolled transaction method in §1.482-4(c). In light of the expected sales growth and anticipation that the CSA Activity will not cease as of any determinable date, FS's determination includes a terminal value calculation. FS further determines that under the cost sharing alternative, the present value of FS's divisional profits, reduced by the present values of the anticipated operating cost contributions and cost contributions, would be \$1,361 million. Under the licensing alternative, the present value of the operating divisional profits and losses, reduced by the operating cost contributions, would be \$2,113 million, and the present value of the licensing payments would be \$1,585 million. Therefore, the total value of the licensing alternative would be \$528 million. In order for the present value of the cost sharing alternative to equal the present value of the licensing alternative, the present value of the PCT Payments must equal \$833 million. Accordingly, FS pays USP a lump sum PCT Payment of \$833 million in Year 1 for USP's platform contributions of Z and Q.

(iv) The Commissioner undertakes an audit of the PCTs and concludes, based on his own analysis, that this lump sum PCT Payment is within the interquartile range of arm's length results for these platform contributions. The calculations made by FS in determining the PCT Payment in this Example 7 are set forth in the following tables:

COST SHARING ALTERNATIVE

Time Period (Y = Year, TV = Terminal Value).	Y1	Y2	Y3	Y4	Y5	Y6	Y7	Y8	TV
Discount Period	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	7
Items of Income/Expense at Beginning of Year:									
1 Sales	100	100	200	400	600	650	700	750	(3% annual growth in each year from previous year).
2 Routine Cost and Operating Cost Contributions (60% of sales amount in row 1 of relevant year).	60	60	120	240	360	390	420	450	(60% of annual sales in row 1 for each year).
3 Cost Contributions (10% of sales amount in row 1 for relevant year after Year 5).	25	25	50	50	60	65	70	75	(10% of annual sales in row 1 for each year).
4 Profit = amount in row 1 reduced by amounts in rows 2 and 3.	15	15	30	110	180	195	210	225	(row 1 minus rows 2 and 3 for each year).
5 PV (using 14% discount rate).	15	13.2	23.1	74.2	107	101	95.7	89.9	842.

6 TOTAL PV of Cost Sharing Alternative = Sum of all PV amounts in Row 5 for all Time Periods = \$1,361 million.

LICENSING ALTERNATIVE

Time Period (Y = Year, TV = Terminal Value).	Y1	Y2	Y3	Y4	Y5	Y6	Y7	Y8	TV
Discount Period	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	7
Items of Income/Expense at Beginning of Year:									
7 Sales	100	100	200	400	600	650	700	750	(3% annual growth in each year from previous year).
8 Routine Cost and Operating Cost Contributions (60% of sales amount in row 7 of relevant year).	60	60	120	240	360	390	420	450	(60% of annual sales in row 7 for each year).
9 Operating Profit = amount in Row 7 reduced by amount in Row 8.	40	40	80	160	240	260	280	300	(Row 7 minus row 8 for each year).
10 PV of row 9 (using 13% discount rate).	40	35.4	62.7	111	147	141	135	128	1313.
11 TOTAL PV FOR ALL AMOUNTS IN ROW 10 = \$2,112.7 million									
12 Licensing Payments (30% of sales amount in row 7).	30	30	60	120	180	195	210	225	(30% of amount in row 7 for each year).
13 PV of amount in row 12 (using 13% discount rate).	30	26.5	47	83.2	110	106	101	95.6	985.
14 TOTAL PV FOR ALL AMOUNTS IN ROW 13 = \$1,584.5 million.									
15 TOTAL PV of Licensing Alternative = Row 11 minus Row 14 = \$528 million.									

CALCULATION OF PCT PAYMENT

16	TOTAL PV OF COST SHARING ALTERNATIVE (FROM ROW 6 ABOVE) = ...	\$1,361 million.
17	TOTAL PV OF LICENSING ALTERNATIVE (FROM ROW 15 ABOVE) =	\$528 million.
18	LUMP SUM PCT PAYMENT = ROW 16 – ROW 17 =	\$833 million.

Example 8. (i) The facts are the same as in Example 1, except that the taxpayer determines that the appropriate discount rate for the cost sharing alternative is 20%. In addition, the taxpayer determines that the appropriate discount rate for the licensing alternative is 10%. Accordingly, the taxpayer determines that the appropriate present value of the PCT Payment is \$146 million.

(ii) Based on the best method analysis described in Example 2, the Commissioner determines that the taxpayer's calculation of the present value of the PCT Payments is outside of the interquartile range (as shown in the sixth column of Example 2), and thus warrants an adjustment. Furthermore, in evaluating the taxpayer's analysis, the Commissioner undertakes an analysis based on the difference in the financial projections between the cost sharing and licensing alternatives (as shown in column 11 of Example 1). This column shows the anticipated differential income stream of additional positive or negative income for FS over the duration of the CSA Activity that would result from undertaking the cost sharing alternative (before any PCT Payments) rather than the licensing alternative. This anticipated differential income stream thus reflects the an-

ticulated incremental undiscounted profits to FS from the incremental activity of undertaking the risk of developing the cost shared intangibles and enjoying the value of its divisional interests. Taxpayer's analysis logically implies that the present value of this stream must be \$146 million, since only then would FS have the same anticipated value in both the cost sharing and licensing alternatives. A present value of \$146 million implies that the discount rate applicable to this stream is 34.4%. Based on a reliable calculation of discount rates applicable to the anticipated income streams of uncontrolled companies whose resources, capabilities, and rights consist primarily of software applications intangibles and research and development teams similar to USP's platform contributions to the CSA, and which income streams, accordingly, may be reasonably anticipated to reflect a similar risk profile to the differential income stream, the Commissioner concludes that an appropriate discount rate for the anticipated income stream associated with USP's platform contributions (that is, the additional positive or negative income over the duration of the CSA

Activity that would result, before PCT Payments, from switching from the licensing alternative to the cost sharing alternative) is 16%, which is significantly less than 34.4%. This conclusion further suggests that Taxpayer's analysis is unreliable. See paragraphs (g)(2)(v)(B)(2) and (g)(4)(vi)(F)(1) and (2) of this section.

(iii) The Commissioner makes an adjustment of \$296 million, so that the present value of the PCT Payments is \$442 million (the median results as shown in column 6 of *Example 2*).

Example 9. The facts are the same as in *Example 1*, except that additional data on discount rates are available that were not available in *Example 1*. The Commissioner determines the arm's length charge for the PCT Payment by discounting at an appropriate rate the differential income stream associated with the rights contributed by USP in the PCT (that is, the stream of income in column (11) of *Example 1*). Based on an analysis of a set of public companies whose resources, capabilities, and rights consist primarily of resources, capabilities, and rights similar to those contributed by USP in the PCT, the Commissioner determines that 15% to 17% is an appropriate range of discount rates to use to assess the value of the differential income stream associated with the rights contributed by USP in the PCT. The Commissioner determines that applying a discount rate of 17% to the differential income stream associated with the rights contributed by USP in the PCT yields a present value of \$446 million, while applying a discount rate of 15% to the differential income stream associated with the rights contributed by USP in the PCT yields a present value of \$510 million. Because the taxpayer's result, \$464 million, is within the interquartile range determined by the Commissioner, no adjustments are warranted. See paragraphs (g)(2)(v)(B)(2), (g)(4)(v), and (g)(4)(vi)(F)(1) of this section.

(5) *Acquisition price method*—(i) *In general.* The acquisition price method applies the comparable uncontrolled transaction method of §1.482-4(c), or the comparable uncontrolled services price method described in §1.482-9(c), to evaluate whether the amount charged in a PCT, or group of PCTs, is arm's length by reference to the amount charged (the acquisition price) for the stock or asset purchase of an entire organization or portion thereof (the target) in an uncontrolled transaction. The acquisition price method is ordinarily used where substantially all the target's nonroutine contributions, as such term is defined in paragraph (j)(1)(i) of this section, made to the

PCT Payee's business activities are covered by a PCT or group of PCTs.

(ii) *Determination of arm's length charge.* Under this method, the arm's length charge for a PCT or group of PCTs covering resources, capabilities, and rights of the target is equal to the adjusted acquisition price, as divided among the controlled participants according to their respective RAB shares.

(iii) *Adjusted acquisition price.* The adjusted acquisition price is the acquisition price of the target increased by the value of the target's liabilities on the date of the acquisition, other than liabilities not assumed in the case of an asset purchase, and decreased by the value of the target's tangible property on that date and by the value on that date of any other resources, capabilities, and rights not covered by a PCT or group of PCTs.

(iv) *Best method analysis considerations.* The comparability and reliability considerations stated in §1.482-4(c)(2) apply. Consistent with those considerations, the reliability of applying the acquisition price method as a measure of the arm's length charge for the PCT Payment normally is reduced if—

(A) A substantial portion of the target's nonroutine contributions to the PCT Payee's business activities is not required to be covered by a PCT or group of PCTs, and that portion of the nonroutine contributions cannot reliably be valued;

(B) A substantial portion of the target's assets consists of tangible property that cannot reliably be valued; or

(C) The date on which the target is acquired and the date of the PCT are not contemporaneous.

(v) *Example.* The following example illustrates the principles of this paragraph (g)(5):

Example. USP, a U.S. corporation, and its newly incorporated, wholly-owned foreign subsidiary (FS) enter into a CSA at the start of Year 1 to develop Group Z products. Under the CSA, USP and FS will have the exclusive rights to exploit the Group Z products in the U.S. and the rest of the world, respectively. At the start of Year 2, USP acquires Company X for cash consideration worth \$110 million. At this time USP's RAB share is 60%, and FS's RAB share is 40% and is not reasonably anticipated to change as a result of this acquisition. Company X joins in the

filing of a U.S. consolidated income tax return with USP. Under paragraph (j)(2)(i) of this section, Company X and USP are treated as one taxpayer for purposes of this section. Accordingly, the rights in any of Company X's resources and capabilities that are reasonably anticipated to contribute to the development activities of the CSA will be considered platform contributions furnished by USP. Company X's resources and capabilities consist of its workforce, certain technology intangibles, \$15 million of tangible property and other assets and \$5 million in liabilities. The technology intangibles, as well as Company X's workforce, are reasonably anticipated to contribute to the development of the Group Z products under the CSA and, therefore, the rights in the technology intangibles and the workforce are platform contributions for which FS must make a PCT Payment to USP. None of Company X's existing intangible assets or any of its workforce are anticipated to contribute to activities outside the CSA. For purposes of this example, it is assumed that no additional adjustment on account of tax liabilities is needed. Applying the acquisition price method, the value of USP's platform contributions is the adjusted acquisition price of \$100 million (\$110 million acquisition price plus \$5 million liabilities less \$15 million tangible property and other assets). FS must make a PCT Payment to USP for these platform contributions with a reasonably anticipated present value of \$40 million, which is the product of \$100 million (the value of the platform contributions) and 40% (FS's RAB share).

(6) *Market capitalization method*—(i) *In general.* The market capitalization method applies the comparable uncontrolled transaction method of § 1.482-4(c), or the comparable uncontrolled services price method described in § 1.482-9(c), to evaluate whether the amount charged in a PCT, or group of PCTs, is arm's length by reference to the average market capitalization of a controlled participant (PCT Payee) whose stock is regularly traded on an established securities market. The market capitalization method is ordinarily used where substantially all of the PCT Payee's nonroutine contributions to the PCT Payee's business are covered by a PCT or group of PCTs.

(ii) *Determination of arm's length charge.* Under the market capitalization method, the arm's length charge for a PCT or group of PCTs covering resources, capabilities, and rights of the PCT Payee is equal to the adjusted average market capitalization, as divided

among the controlled participants according to their respective RAB shares.

(iii) *Average market capitalization.* The average market capitalization is the average of the daily market capitalizations of the PCT Payee over a period of time beginning 60 days before the date of the PCT and ending on the date of the PCT. The daily market capitalization of the PCT Payee is calculated on each day its stock is actively traded as the total number of shares outstanding multiplied by the adjusted closing price of the stock on that day. The adjusted closing price is the daily closing price of the stock, after adjustments for stock-based transactions (dividends and stock splits) and other pending corporate (combination and spin-off) restructuring transactions for which reliable arm's length adjustments can be made.

(iv) *Adjusted average market capitalization.* The adjusted average market capitalization is the average market capitalization of the PCT Payee increased by the value of the PCT Payee's liabilities on the date of the PCT and decreased by the value on such date of the PCT Payee's tangible property and of any other resources, capabilities, or rights of the PCT Payee not covered by a PCT or group of PCTs.

(v) *Best method analysis considerations.* The comparability and reliability considerations stated in § 1.482-4(c)(2) apply. Consistent with those considerations, the reliability of applying the comparable uncontrolled transaction method using the adjusted market capitalization of a company as a measure of the arm's length charge for the PCT Payment normally is reduced if—

(A) A substantial portion of the PCT Payee's nonroutine contributions to its business activities is not required to be covered by a PCT or group of PCTs, and that portion of the nonroutine contributions cannot reliably be valued;

(B) A substantial portion of the PCT Payee's assets consists of tangible property that cannot reliably be valued; or

(C) Facts and circumstances demonstrate the likelihood of a material divergence between the average market capitalization of the PCT Payee

and the value of its resources, capabilities, and rights for which reliable adjustments cannot be made.

(vi) *Examples.* The following examples illustrate the principles of this paragraph (g)(6):

Example 1. (i) USP, a publicly traded U.S. company, and its newly incorporated wholly-owned foreign subsidiary (FS) enter into a CSA on Date 1 to develop software. At that time USP has in-process software but has no software ready for the market. Under the CSA, USP and FS will have the exclusive rights to exploit the software developed under the CSA in the United States and the rest of the world, respectively. On Date 1, USP's RAB share is 70% and FS's RAB share is 30%. USP's assembled team of researchers and its in-process software are reasonably anticipated to contribute to the development of the software under the CSA. Therefore, the rights in the research team and in-process software are platform contributions for which compensation is due from FS. Further, these rights are not reasonably anticipated to contribute to any business activity other than the CSA Activity.

(ii) On Date 1, USP had an average market capitalization of \$205 million, tangible property and other assets that can be reliably valued worth \$5 million, and no liabilities. Aside from those assets, USP had no assets other than its research team and in-process software. Applying the market capitalization method, the value of USP's platform contributions is \$200 million (\$205 million average market capitalization of USP less \$5 million of tangible property and other assets). The arm's length value of the PCT Payments FS must make to USP for the platform contributions, before any adjustment on account of tax liability as described in paragraph (g)(2)(ii) of this section, is \$60 million, which is the product of \$200 million (the value of the platform contributions) and 30% (FS's RAB share on Date 1).

Example 2. Aggregation with make-or-sell rights. (i) The facts are the same as in *Example 1*, except that on Date 1 USP also has existing software ready for the market. USP separately enters into a license agreement with FS for make-or-sell rights for all existing software outside the United States. No marketing has occurred, and USP has no marketing intangibles. This license of current make-or-sell rights is a transaction governed by § 1.482-4. However, after analysis, it is determined that the arm's length PCT Payments and the arm's length payments for the make-or-sell license may be most reliably determined in the aggregate using the market capitalization method, under principles described in paragraph (g)(2)(iv) of this section, and it is further determined that those principles are most reliably imple-

mented by computing the aggregate arm's length charge as the product of the aggregate value of the existing and in-process software and FS's RAB share on Date 1.

(ii) Applying the market capitalization method, the aggregate value of USP's platform contributions and the make-or-sell rights in its existing software is \$250 million (\$255 million average market capitalization of USP less \$5 million of tangible property and other assets). The total arm's length value of the PCT Payments and licensing payments FS must make to USP for the platform contributions and current make-or-sell rights, before any adjustment on account of tax liability, if any, is \$75 million, which is the product of \$250 million (the value of the platform contributions and the make-or-sell rights) and 30% (FS's RAB share on Date 1).

Example 3. Reduced reliability. The facts are the same as in *Example 1* except that USP also has significant nonroutine assets that will be used solely in a nascent business division that is unrelated to the subject of the CSA and that cannot themselves be reliably valued. Those nonroutine contributions are not platform contributions and accordingly are not required to be covered by a PCT. The reliability of using the market capitalization method to determine the value of USP's platform contributions to the CSA is significantly reduced in this case because that method would require adjusting USP's average market capitalization to account for the significant nonroutine contributions that are not required to be covered by a PCT.

(7) *Residual profit split method—(i) In general.* The residual profit split method evaluates whether the allocation of combined operating profit or loss attributable to one or more platform contributions subject to a PCT is arm's length by reference to the relative value of each controlled participant's contribution to that combined operating profit or loss. The combined operating profit or loss must be derived from the most narrowly identifiable business activity (relevant business activity) of the controlled participants for which data are available that include the CSA Activity. The residual profit split method may not be used where only one controlled participant makes significant nonroutine contributions (including platform or operating contributions) to the CSA Activity. The provisions of § 1.482-6 shall apply to CSAs only to the extent provided and as modified in this paragraph (g)(7). Any other application to a CSA of a residual profit method not described in

paragraphs (g)(7)(ii) and (iii) of this section will constitute an unspecified method for purposes of sections 482 and 6662(e) and the regulations under those sections.

(ii) *Appropriate share of profits and losses.* The relative value of each controlled participant's contribution to the success of the relevant business activity must be determined in a manner that reflects the functions performed, risks assumed, and resources employed by each participant in the relevant business activity, consistent with the best method analysis described in § 1.482-1(c) and (d). Such an allocation is intended to correspond to the division of profit or loss that would result from an arrangement between uncontrolled taxpayers, each performing functions similar to those of the various controlled participants engaged in the relevant business activity. The profit allocated to any particular controlled participant is not necessarily limited to the total operating profit of the group from the relevant business activity. For example, in a given year, one controlled participant may earn a profit while another controlled participant incurs a loss. In addition, it may not be assumed that the combined operating profit or loss from the relevant business activity should be shared equally, or in any other arbitrary proportion.

(iii) *Profit split—(A) In general.* Under the residual profit split method, the present value of each controlled participant's residual divisional profit or loss attributable to nonroutine contributions (nonroutine residual divisional profit or loss) is allocated between the controlled participants that each furnish significant nonroutine contributions (including platform or operating contributions) to the relevant business activity in that division.

(B) *Determine nonroutine residual divisional profit or loss.* The present value of each controlled participant's nonroutine residual divisional profit or loss must be determined to reflect the most reliable measure of an arm's length result. The present value of nonroutine residual divisional profit or loss equals the present value of the stream of the reasonably anticipated residuals over

the duration of the CSA Activity of divisional profit or loss, minus market returns for routine contributions, minus operating cost contributions, minus cost contributions, using a discount rate appropriate to such residuals in accordance with paragraph (g)(2)(v) of this section. As used in this paragraph (g)(7), the phrase "market returns for routine contributions" includes market returns for operating cost contributions and excludes market returns for cost contributions.

(C) *Allocate nonroutine residual divisional profit or loss—(1) In general.* The present value of nonroutine residual divisional profit or loss in each controlled participant's division must be allocated among all of the controlled participants based upon the relative values, determined as of the date of the PCTs, of the PCT Payor's as compared to the PCT Payee's nonroutine contributions to the PCT Payor's division. For this purpose, the PCT Payor's nonroutine contribution consists of the sum of the PCT Payor's nonroutine operating contributions and the PCT Payor's RAB share of the PCT Payor's nonroutine platform contributions. For this purpose, the PCT Payee's nonroutine contribution consists of the PCT Payor's RAB share of the PCT Payee's nonroutine platform contributions.

(2) *Relative value determination.* The relative values of the controlled participants' nonroutine contributions must be determined so as to reflect the most reliable measure of an arm's length result. Relative values may be measured by external market benchmarks that reflect the fair market value of such nonroutine contributions. Alternatively, the relative value of nonroutine contributions may be estimated by the capitalized cost of developing the nonroutine contributions and updates, as appropriately grown or discounted so that all contributions may be valued on a comparable dollar basis as of the same date. If the nonroutine contributions by a controlled participant are also used in other business activities (such as the exploitation of

make-or-sell rights described in paragraph (c)(4) of this section), an allocation of the value of the nonroutine contributions must be made on a reasonable basis among all the business activities in which they are used in proportion to the relative economic value that the relevant business activity and such other business activities are anticipated to derive over time as the result of such nonroutine contributions.

(3) *Determination of PCT Payments.* Any amount of the present value of a controlled participant's nonroutine residual divisional profit or loss that is allocated to another controlled participant represents the present value of the PCT Payments due to that other controlled participant for its platform contributions to the relevant business activity in the relevant division. For purposes of paragraph (j)(3)(ii) of this section, the present value of a PCT Payor's PCT Payments under this paragraph shall be deemed reduced to the extent of the present value of any PCT Payments owed to it from other controlled participants under this paragraph (g)(7). The resulting remainder may be converted to a fixed or contingent form of payment in accordance with paragraph (h) (Form of payment rules) of this section.

(4) *Routine platform and operating contributions.* For purposes of this paragraph (g)(7), any routine platform or operating contributions, the valuation and PCT Payments for which are determined and made independently of the residual profit split method, are treated similarly to cost contributions and operating cost contributions, respectively. Accordingly, wherever used in this paragraph (g)(7), the term "routine contributions" shall not include routine platform or operating contributions, and wherever the terms "cost contributions" and "operating cost contributions" appear in this paragraph (g)(7), they shall include net routine platform contributions and net routine operating contributions, respectively, as defined in paragraph (g)(4)(vii) of this section. However, treatment of net operating contributions as operating cost contributions shall be coordinated with the treatment of other routine contributions pursuant to paragraphs (g)(4)(iii)(B)

and (7)(iii)(B) of this section so as to avoid duplicative market returns to such contributions.

(iv) *Best method analysis considerations—(A) In general.* Whether results derived from this method are the most reliable measure of the arm's length result is determined using the factors described under the best method rule in §1.482-1(c). Thus, comparability and quality of data, reliability of assumptions, and sensitivity of results to possible deficiencies in the data and assumptions, must be considered in determining whether this method provides the most reliable measure of an arm's length result. The application of these factors to the residual profit split in the context of the relevant business activity of developing and exploiting cost shared intangibles is discussed in paragraphs (g)(7)(iv)(B) through (D) of this section.

(B) *Comparability.* The derivation of the present value of nonroutine residual divisional profit or loss includes a carveout on account of market returns for routine contributions. Thus, the comparability considerations that are relevant for that purpose include those that are relevant for the methods that are used to determine market returns for the routine contributions.

(C) *Data and assumptions.* The reliability of the results derived from the residual profit split is affected by the quality of the data and assumptions used to apply this method. In particular, the following factors must be considered:

(1) The reliability of the allocation of costs, income, and assets between the relevant business activity and the controlled participants' other activities that will affect the reliability of the determination of the divisional profit or loss and its allocation among the controlled participants. See §1.482-6(c)(2)(ii)(C)(1).

(2) The degree of consistency between the controlled participants and uncontrolled taxpayers in accounting practices that materially affect the items that determine the amount and allocation of operating profit or loss affects the reliability of the result. See §1.482-6(c)(2)(ii)(C)(2).

(3) The reliability of the data used and the assumptions made in estimating the relative value of the nonroutine contributions by the controlled participants. In particular, if capitalized costs of development are used to estimate the relative value of nonroutine contributions, the reliability of the results is reduced relative to the reliability of other methods that do not require such an estimate. This is because, in any given case, the costs of developing a nonroutine contribution may not be related to its market value and because the calculation of the capitalized costs of development may require the allocation of indirect costs between the relevant business activity and the controlled participant's other activities, which may affect the reliability of the analysis.

(D) *Other factors affecting reliability.* Like the methods described in §§1.482-3 through 1.482-5 and §1.482-9(c), the carveout on account of market returns for routine contributions relies exclusively on external market benchmarks. As indicated in §1.482-1(c)(2)(i), as the degree of comparability between the controlled participants and uncontrolled transactions increases, the relative weight accorded the analysis under this method will increase. In addition, to the extent the allocation of nonroutine residual divisional profit or loss is not based on external market benchmarks, the reliability of the analysis will be decreased in relation to an analysis under a method that relies on market benchmarks. Finally, the reliability of the analysis under this method may be enhanced by the fact that all the controlled participants are evaluated under the residual profit split. However, the reliability of the results of an analysis based on information from all the controlled participants is affected by the reliability of the data and the assumptions pertaining to each controlled participant. Thus, if the data and assumptions are significantly more reliable with respect to one of the controlled participants than with respect to the others, a different method, focusing solely on the results of that party, may yield more reliable results.

(v) *Examples.* The following examples illustrate the principles of this paragraph (g)(7):

Example 1. (i) For simplicity of calculation in this *Example 1*, all financial flows are assumed to occur at the beginning of each period. USP, a U.S. electronic data storage company, has partially developed technology for a type of extremely small compact storage devices (nanodisks) which are expected to provide a significant increase in data storage capacity in various types of portable devices such as cell phones, MP3 players, laptop computers and digital cameras. At the same time, USP's wholly-owned subsidiary, FS, has developed significant marketing intangibles outside the United States in the form of customer lists, ongoing relations with various OEMs, and trademarks that are well recognized by consumers due to a long history of marketing successful data storage devices and other hardware used in various types of consumer electronics. At the beginning of Year 1, USP enters into a CSA with FS to develop nanodisk technologies for eventual commercial exploitation. Under the CSA, USP will have the right to exploit nanodisks in the United States, while FS will have the right to exploit nanodisks in the rest of the world. The partially developed nanodisk technologies owned by USP are reasonably anticipated to contribute to the development of commercially exploitable nanodisks and therefore the rights in the nanodisk technologies constitute platform contributions of USP for which compensation is due under PCTs. FS does not have any platform contributions for the CSA. Due to the fact that nanodisk technologies have yet to be incorporated into any commercially available product, neither USP nor FS transfers rights to make or sell current products in conjunction with the CSA.

(ii) Because only in FS's territory do both controlled participants make significant nonroutine contributions, USP and FS determine that they need to determine the relative value of their respective contributions to residual divisional profit or loss attributable to the CSA Activity only in FS's territory. FS anticipates making no nanodisk sales during the first year of the CSA in its territory with revenues in Year 2 reaching \$200 million. Revenues through Year 5 are reasonably anticipated to increase by 50% per year. The annual growth rate for revenues is then expected to decline to 30% per annum in Years 6 and 7, 20% per annum in Years 8 and 9 and 10% per annum in Year 10. Revenues are then expected to decline 10% in Year 11 and 5% per annum, thereafter. The routine costs (defined here as costs other than cost contributions, routine platform and operating contributions, and nonroutine

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contributions) that are allocable to this revenue in calculating FS's divisional profit or loss, are anticipated to equal \$40 million for the first year of the CSA and \$130 for the second year and \$200 and \$250 million in Years 3 and 4. Total operating expenses attributable to product exploitation (including operating cost contributions) equal 52% of sales per year. FS undertakes routine distribution activities in its markets that constitute routine contributions to the relevant business activity of exploiting nanodisk technologies. USP and FS estimate that the total market return on these routine contributions will amount to 6% of the routine costs. FS expects its cost contributions to be \$60 million in Year 1, rise to \$100 million in Years 2 and 3, and then decline again to \$60 million in Year 4. Thereafter, FS's cost contributions are expected to equal 10% of revenues.

(iii) USP and FS determine the present value of the stream of the reasonably anticipated residuals in FS's territory over the duration of the CSA Activity of the divisional

profit or loss (revenues minus routine costs), minus the market returns for routine contributions, the operating cost contributions, and the cost contributions. USP and FS determine, based on the considerations discussed in paragraph (g)(2)(v) of this section, that the appropriate discount rate is 17.5% per annum. Therefore, the present value of the nonroutine residual divisional profit is \$1,395 million.

(iv) After analysis, USP and FS determine that the relative value of the nanodisk technologies contributed by USP to CSA (giving effect only to its value in FS's territory) is roughly 150% of the value of FS's marketing intangibles (which only have value in FS's territory). Consequently, 60% of the nonroutine residual divisional profit is attributable to USP's platform contribution. Therefore, FS's PCT Payments should have an expected present value equal to \$837 million ($.6 \times \$1,395$ million).

(v) The calculations for this *Example 1* are displayed in the following table:

Time Period (Y = Year) (TV = Terminal Value)	Y1	Y2	Y3	Y4	Y5	Y6	Y7	Y8	Y9	Y10	Y11	TV
Discount Period	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	10
[1] Sales	0	200	300	450	675	878	1141	1369	1643	1807	1626	
[2] Growth Rate			50%	50%	50%	30%	30%	20%	20%	10%	-10%	
[3] Exploitation Costs and Operating Cost Contributions (52% of Sales [1])	40	130	200	250	351	456	593	712	854	940	846	
[4] Return on [3] (6% of [3])	2.4	8	12	15	21	27	36	43	51	56	51	
[5] Cost Contributions (10% of Sales [1] after Year 5)	60	100	100	60	68	88	114	137	164	181	163	
[6] Residual Profit = [1] minus {[3] + [4] + [5]}	-102	-38	-12	125	235	306	398	477	573	630	567	2395
[7] Residual Profit [6] Discounted at 17.5% discount rate	-102	-32	-9	77	124	137	151	154	158	148	113	477
[8] Sum of all amounts in [7] for all time periods = \$1,395 million												
[9] Relative value in FS's division of USP's nanotechnology to FS's marketing intangibles = 150%												
[10] Profit Split (USP)												
[11] Profit Split (FS)												
[12] FS's PCT Payments												

60% = 1.5 x [11]

40%

[8] x [10] = \$1,395 million x 60% = \$837 million

Example 2. (i) For simplicity of calculation in this *Example 2*, all financial flows are assumed to occur at the beginning of each period. USP is a U.S. automobile manufacturing company that has completed significant research on the development of diesel-electric hybrid engines that, if they could be successfully manufactured, would result in providing a significant increased fuel economy for a wide variety of motor vehicles. Successful commercialization of the diesel-electric hybrid engine will require the development of a new class of advanced battery that will be light, relatively cheap to manufacture and yet capable of holding a substantial electric charge. FS, a foreign subsidiary of USP, has completed significant research on developing lithium-ion batteries that appear likely to have the requisite characteristics. At the beginning of Year 1, USP enters into a CSA with FS to further develop diesel-electric hybrid engines and lithium-ion battery technologies for eventual commercial exploitation. Under the CSA, USP will have the right to exploit the diesel-electric hybrid engine and lithium-ion battery technologies in the United States, while FS will have the right to exploit such technologies in the rest of the world. The partially developed diesel-electric hybrid engine and lithium-ion battery technologies owned by USP and FS, respectively, are reasonably anticipated to contribute to the development of commercially exploitable automobile engines and therefore the rights in both these technologies constitute platform contributions of USP and of FS for which compensation is due under PCTs. At the time of inception of the CSA, USP owns operating intangibles in the form of self-developed marketing intangibles which have significant value in the United States, but not in the rest of the world, and that are relevant to exploiting the cost shared intangibles. Similarly, FS owns self-developed marketing intangibles which have significant value in the rest of the world, but not in the United States, and that are relevant to exploiting the cost shared intangibles. Although the new class of diesel-electric hybrid engine using lithium-ion batteries is not yet ready for commercial exploitation, components based on this technology are beginning to be incorporated in current-generation gasoline-electric hybrid engines and the rights to make and sell such products are transferred from USP to FS and vice-versa in conjunction with the inception of the CSA, following the same territorial division as in the CSA.

(ii) USP's estimated RAB share is 66.7%. During Year 1, it is anticipated that sales in USP's territory will be \$1000X in Year 1. Sales in FS's territory are anticipated to be \$500X. Thereafter, as revenue from the use of components in gasoline-electric hybrids is supplemented by revenues from the production of complete diesel-electric hybrid en-

gines using lithium-ion battery technology, anticipated sales in both territories will increase rapidly at a rate of 50% per annum through Year 4. Anticipated sales are then anticipated to increase at a rate of 40% per annum for another 4 years. Sales are then anticipated to increase at a rate of 30% per annum through Year 10. Thereafter, sales are anticipated to decrease at a rate of 5% per annum for the foreseeable future as new automotive drivetrain technologies displace diesel-electric hybrid engines and lithium-ion batteries. Total operating expenses attributable to product exploitation (including operating cost contributions) equal 40% of sales per year for both USP and FS. USP and FS estimate that the total market return on these routine contributions to the CSA will amount to 6% of these operating expenses. USP is expected to bear $\frac{2}{3}$ of the total cost contributions for the foreseeable future. Cost contributions are expected to total \$375X in Year 1 (of which \$250X are borne by USP) and increase at a rate of 25% per annum through Year 6. In Years 7 through 10, cost contributions are expected to increase 10% a year. Thereafter, cost contributions are expected to decrease by 5% a year for the foreseeable future.

(iii) USP and FS determine the present value of the stream of FS's reasonably anticipated residual divisional profit, which is the stream of FS's reasonably anticipated divisional profit or loss, minus the market returns for routine contributions, minus operating cost contributions, minus cost contributions. USP and FS determine, based on the considerations discussed in paragraph (g)(2)(v) of this section, that the appropriate discount rate is 12% per year. Therefore, the present value of the nonroutine residual divisional profit in USP's territory is \$41,727X and in CFC's territory is \$20,864X.

(iv) After analysis, USP and FS determine that, in the United States the relative value of the technologies contributed by USP and FS to the CSA and of the operating intangibles used by USP in the exploitation of the cost shared intangibles (reported as equaling 100 in total), equals: USP's platform contribution (59.5); FS's platform contribution (25.5); and USP's operating intangibles (15). Consequently, the present value of the arm's length amount of the PCT Payments that USP should pay to FS for FS's platform contribution is \$10,640X ($.255 \times \$41,727X$). Similarly, USP and FS determine that, in the rest of the world, the relative value of the technologies contributed by USP and FS to the CSA and of the operating intangibles used by FS in the exploitation of the cost shared intangibles can be divided as follows: USP's platform contribution (63); FS's platform contribution (27); and FS's operating intangibles (10). Consequently, the present value of the arm's length amount of the PCT Payments that FS should pay to USP for

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USP's platform contribution is \$13,144X (.63 × \$20,864X). Therefore, FS is required to make a net payment to USP with a present value of \$2,504X (\$13,144X - 10,640X).

(v) The calculations for this *Example 2* are displayed in the following tables:

CALCULATION OF USP'S PCT PAYMENT TO FS

Time Period (Y = Year) (TV = Terminal Value)	Y1	Y2	Y3	Y4	Y5	Y6	Y7	Y8	Y9	Y10	TV
Discount Period	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	9
[1] Sales	1000	1500	2250	3375	4725	6615	9261	12965	16855	21912	
[2] Growth Rate		50%	50%	50%	40%	40%	40%	40%	30%	30%	
[3] Exploitation Costs and Operating Cost Contributions (40% of Sales [1])	400	600	900	1350	1890	2646	3704	5186	6742	8765	
[4] Return on [3] = 6% of [3]	24	36	54	81	113	159	222	311	405	526	
[5] Cost Contributions ..	250	313	391	488	610	763	839	923	1015	1117	
[6] Residual Profit = [1] minus {[3] + [4] + [5]}	326	552	905	1456	2111	3047	4495	6545	8693	11504	64287
[7] Residual Profit [6] Discounted at 12% discount rate	326	492	722	1036	1342	1729	2277	2961	3511	4148	23183

[8] Sum of all amounts in [7] for all time periods = \$41,727X

Profit Split for Calculation of USP's PCT Payment to FS: [Total of US contributions = 74.5%]

[9] USP's Platform Contribution = 59.5%

[10] FS's Platform Contribution = 25.5%

[11] USP's Operating Intangibles = 15%

[12] USP's PCT Payment to FS = [8] × [10] = \$41,727X multiplied by 25.5% = \$10,640X

CALCULATION OF FS'S NET PCT PAYMENT TO USP

Time Period (Y = Year) (TV = Terminal Value)	Y1	Y2	Y3	Y4	Y5	Y6	Y7	Y8	Y9	Y10	TV
Discount Period	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	9
[13] Sales	500	750	1125	1688	2363	3308	4631	6483	8428	10956	
[14] Growth Rate		50%	50%	50%	40%	40%	40%	40%	30%	30%	
[15] Exploitation Costs and Operating Cost Contributions (40% of Sales [13])	200	300	450	675	945	1323	1852	2593	3371	4382	
[16] Return on [15] = 6% of [15]	12	18	27	41	57	79	111	156	202	263	
[17] Cost Contributions	125	156	195	244	305	381	420	462	508	559	
[18] Residual Profit = [13] minus {[15] + [16] + [17]}	163	276	453	728	1056	1524	2248	3272	4347	5752	32144
[19] Residual Profit [18] Discounted at 12% discount rate	163	246	361	518	671	865	1139	1480	1755	2074	11591

[20] Sum of all amounts in [19] for all time periods = \$20,864X

Profit Split for Calculation of FS's PCT Payment to USP: [Total of FS's contributions = 37%]

[21] USP's Platform Contribution = 63%

[22] FS's Platform Contribution = 27%

[23] FS's Operating Intangibles = 10%

CALCULATION OF FS'S NET PCT PAYMENT TO USP—Continued

[24] FS's PCT Payment to USP = [20] × [21] = \$20,864X multiplied by 63% = \$13,144X

[25] FS's Net PCT Payment to USP = [24] minus [12] = \$13,144X minus \$10,640X = \$2,504X

(8) *Unspecified methods.* Methods not specified in paragraphs (g)(3) through (7) of this section may be used to evaluate whether the amount charged for a PCT is arm's length. Any method used under this paragraph (g)(8) must be applied in accordance with the provisions of §1.482-1 and of paragraph (g)(2) of this section. Consistent with the specified methods, an unspecified method should take into account the general principle that uncontrolled taxpayers evaluate the terms of a transaction by considering the realistic alternatives to that transaction, and only enter into a particular transaction if none of the alternatives is preferable to it. Therefore, in establishing whether a PCT achieved an arm's length result, an unspecified method should provide information on the prices or profits that the controlled participant could have realized by choosing a realistic alternative to the CSA. See paragraph (k)(2)(ii)(J) of this section. As with any method, an unspecified method will not be applied unless it provides the most reliable measure of an arm's length result under the principles of the best method rule. See §1.482-1(c) (Best method rule). In accordance with §1.482-1(d) (Comparability), to the extent that an unspecified method relies on internal data rather than uncontrolled comparables, its reliability will be reduced. Similarly, the reliability of a method will be affected by the reliability of the data and assumptions used to apply the method, including any projections used.

(h) *Form of payment rules—(1) CST Payments.* CST Payments may not be paid in shares of stock in the payor (or stock in any member of the controlled group that includes the controlled participants).

(2) *PCT Payments—(i) In general.* The consideration under a PCT for a platform contribution may take one or a combination of both of the following forms:

(A) Payments of a fixed amount (fixed payments), either paid in a lump sum payment or in installment payments spread over a specified period, with interest calculated in accordance with §1.482-2(a) (Loans or advances).

(B) Payments contingent on the exploitation of cost shared intangibles by the PCT Payor (contingent payments). Accordingly, controlled participants have flexibility to adopt a form and period of payment, provided that such form and period of payment are consistent with an arm's length charge as of the date of the PCT. See also paragraphs (h)(2)(iv) and (3) of this section.

(ii) *No PCT Payor Stock.* PCT Payments may not be paid in shares of stock in the PCT Payor (or stock in any member of the controlled group that includes the controlled participants).

(iii) *Specified form of payment—(A) In general.* The form of payment selected (subject to the rules of this paragraph (h)) for any PCT, including, in the case of contingent payments, the contingent base and structure of the payments as set forth in paragraph (h)(2)(iii)(B) of this section, must be specified no later than the due date of the applicable tax return (including extensions) for the later of the taxable year of the PCT Payor or PCT Payee that includes the date of that PCT.

(B) *Contingent payments.* In accordance with paragraph (k)(1)(iv)(A) of this section, a provision of a written contract described in paragraph (k)(1) of this section, or of the additional documentation described in paragraph (k)(2) of this section, that provides for payments for a PCT (or group of PCTs) to be contingent on the exploitation of cost shared intangibles will be respected as consistent with economic substance only if the allocation between the controlled participants of the risks attendant on such form of payment is determinable before the outcomes of such allocation that would

have materially affected the PCT pricing are known or reasonably knowable. A contingent payment provision must clearly and unambiguously specify the basis on which the contingent payment obligations are to be determined. In particular, the contingent payment provision must clearly and unambiguously specify the events that give rise to an obligation to make PCT Payments, the royalty base (such as sales or revenues), and the computation used to determine the PCT Payments. The royalty base specified must be one that permits verification of its proper use by reference to books and records maintained by the controlled participants in the normal course of business (for example, books and records maintained for financial accounting or business management purposes).

(C) *Examples.* The following examples illustrate the principles of this paragraph (h)(2).

Example 1. A CSA provides that PCT Payments with respect to a particular platform contribution shall be contingent payments equal to 15% of the revenues from sales of products that incorporate cost shared intangibles. The terms further permit (but do not require) the controlled participants to adjust such contingent payments in accordance with a formula set forth in the arrangement so that the 15% rate is subject to adjustment by the controlled participants at their discretion on an after-the-fact, uncompensated basis. The Commissioner may impute payment terms that are consistent with economic substance with respect to the platform contribution because the contingent payment provision does not specify the computation used to determine the PCT Payments.

Example 2. Taxpayer, an automobile manufacturer, is a controlled participant in a CSA that involves research and development to perfect certain manufacturing techniques necessary to the actual manufacture of a state-of-the-art, hybrid fuel injection system known as DRL337. The arrangement involves the platform contribution of a design patent covering DRL337. Pursuant to paragraph (h)(2)(iii)(B) of this section, the CSA provides for PCT Payments with respect to the platform contribution of the patent in the form of royalties contingent on sales of automobiles that contain the DRL337 system. However, Taxpayer's system of book- and record-keeping does not enable Taxpayer to track which automobile sales involve automobiles that contain the DRL337 system. Because Taxpayer has not complied with paragraph (h)(2)(iii)(B) of this section, the Com-

missioner may impute payment terms that are consistent with economic substance and susceptible to verification by the Commissioner.

Example 3. (i) Controlled participants A and B enter into a CSA that provides for PCT Payments from A to B with respect to B's platform contribution, Z, in the form of three annual installment payments due from A to B on the last day of each of the first three years of the CSA.

(ii) On audit, based on all the facts and circumstances, the Commissioner determines that the installment PCT Payments are consistent with an arm's length charge as of the date of the PCT. Accordingly, the Commissioner does not make an adjustment with respect to the PCT Payments in any year.

Example 4. (i) The facts are the same as in *Example 3* except that the CSA contains an additional term with respect to the PCT Payments. Under this provision, A and B further agreed that, if the present value (as of the CSA Start Date) of A's actual divisional operating profit or loss during the three-year period is less than the present value (as of the CSA Start Date) of the divisional operating profit or loss that the parties projected for A upon formation of the CSA for that period, then the third installment payment shall be subject to a compensating adjustment in the amount necessary to reduce the present value (as of the CSA Start Date) of the aggregate PCT Payments for those three years to the amount that would have been calculated if the actual results had been used for the calculation instead of the projected results.

(ii) This provision further specifies that A will pay B an additional amount, \$Q, in the first year of the CSA to compensate B for taking on additional downside risk through the contingent payment term described in paragraph (i) of this *Example 4*.

(iii) During the first two years, A pays B installment payments as agreed, as well as the additional amount, \$Q. In the third year, A and B determine that the present value (as of the CSA Start Date) of A's actual divisional operating profit or loss during the three-year period is less than the present value (as of the CSA Start Date) of the divisional operating profit or loss that the parties projected for A upon formation of the CSA for that period. A reduces the PCT Payment to B in the third year in the amount necessary to reduce the present value (as of the CSA Start Date) of the aggregate PCT Payments for those three years to the amount that would have been calculated if the actual results had been used for the calculation instead of the projected results.

(iv) On audit, based on all the facts and circumstances, the Commissioner determines that the installment PCT Payments agreed to be paid by A to B were consistent with an arm's length charge as of the date of the

PCT. The Commissioner further determines that the contingency was sufficiently specified such that its occurrence or nonoccurrence was unambiguous and determinable; that the projections were reliable; and that the contingency did, in fact, occur. Finally, the Commissioner determines, based on all the facts and circumstances, that \$Q was within the arm's length range for the additional allocation of risk to B. Accordingly, no adjustment is made with respect to the installment PCT Payments, or the additional PCT Payment for the contingent payment term, in any year.

Example 5. (i) The facts are the same as in *Example 4* except that the CSA states the amount that A will pay B for the contingent payment term is \$X, an amount that is less than \$Q, and A pays B \$X in the first year of the CSA.

(ii) On audit, based on all the facts and circumstances, the Commissioner determines that the installment PCT Payments agreed to be paid by A to B were consistent with an arm's length charge as of the date of the PCT. The Commissioner further determines that the contingency was sufficiently specified such that its occurrence or nonoccurrence was unambiguous and determinable; that the projections were reliable; and that the contingency did, in fact, occur. However, the Commissioner also determines, based on all the facts and circumstances, that the additional PCT Payment of \$X from A to B for the contingent payment term was not an arm's length charge for the additional allocation of risk as of the CSA Start Date in connection with the contingent payment term. Accordingly, the Commissioner makes an adjustment to B's results equal to the difference between \$X and the median of the arm's length range of charges for the contingent payment term.

Example 6. (i) The facts are the same as in *Example 3* except that A and B further agreed that, if the present value (as of the CSA Start Date) of A's actual divisional operating profit or loss during the three-year period is either less or greater than the present value (as of the CSA Start Date) of the divisional operating profit or loss that the parties projected for A upon formation of the CSA for that period, then A may make a compensating adjustment to the third installment payment in the amount necessary to reduce (if actual divisional operating profit or loss is less than the projections) or increase (if actual divisional operating profit or loss exceeds the projections) the present value (as of the CSA Start Date) of the aggregate PCT Payments for those three years to the amount that would have been calculated if the actual results had been used for the calculation instead of the projected results.

(ii) On audit, the Commissioner determines that the contingent payment term lacks eco-

nomonic substance under §§ 1.482-1(d)(3)(iii)(B) and 1.482-7(h)(2)(iii)(B). It lacks economic substance because the allocation of the risks between A and B was indeterminate as of the CSA Start Date due to the elective nature of the potential compensating adjustments. Specifically, the parties agreed upfront only that A might make compensating adjustments to the installment payments. By the terms of the agreement, A could decide whether to make such adjustments after the outcome of the risks was known or reasonably knowable. Even though the contingency and potential compensating adjustments were clearly defined in the CSA, no compensating adjustments were required by the CSA regardless of the occurrence or nonoccurrence of the contingency. As a result, the contingent payment terms did not clearly and unambiguously specify the events that give rise to an obligation to make PCT Payments, and, accordingly, the obligation to make compensating adjustments pursuant to the contingency was indeterminate. The contingent payment term allows the taxpayer to make adjustments that are favorable to its overall tax position in those years where the agreement allows it to make such adjustments, but decline to exercise its right to make any adjustment in those years in which such an adjustment would be unfavorable to its overall tax position. Such terms do not reflect a substantive upfront allocation of risk. In addition, the vagueness of the agreement makes it impossible to determine whether such contingent payment term warrants an additional arm's length charge and, if so, how much.

(iii) Accordingly, the Commissioner may disregard the contingent payment term under §§ 1.482-1(d)(3)(ii)(B)(I) and 1.482-7(k)(1)(iv) and may impute other contractual terms in its place consistent with the economic substance of the CSA.

Example 7. (i) The facts are the same as in *Example 6* except that the contingent payment term provides that, if the present value (as of the CSA Start Date) of A's actual divisional operating profit or loss during the three-year period is either less or greater than the present value (as of the CSA Start Date) of the divisional operating profit or loss that the parties projected for A upon formation of the CSA for that period, then A will make a compensating adjustment to the third installment payment. The CSA does not specify the amount of (or a formula for) any such compensating adjustments.

(ii) On audit, the Commissioner determines that the contingent payment term lacks economic substance under §§ 1.482-1(d)(3)(iii)(B) and 1.482-7(h)(2)(iii)(B). It lacks economic substance because the allocation of the risks between A and B was indeterminate as of the CSA Start Date due to the failure to specify the amount of (or a formula for) the compensating adjustments that must be made if a

contingency occurs. The basis on which the compensating adjustments were to be determined was neither clear nor unambiguous. Even though the contingency was clearly defined in the CSA and the requirement of a compensating adjustment in the event of a contingency was clearly specified in the CSA, the parties had no agreement regarding the amount of such compensating adjustments. As a result, the computation used to determine the PCT Payments was indeterminate. The parties could choose to make a small positive compensating adjustment if the actual results turned out to be much greater than the projections, and could choose to make a significant negative compensating adjustment if the actual results turned out to be less than the projections. Such terms do not reflect a substantive up-front allocation of risk. In addition, the vagueness of the agreement makes it impossible to determine whether such contingent payment term warrants an additional arm's length charge and, if so, how much.

(iii) Accordingly, the Commissioner may disregard the contingent price term under §§ 1.482-1(d)(3)(ii)(B)(1) and 1.482-7(k)(1)(iv) and may impute other contractual terms in its place consistent with economic substance of the CSA.

(iv) *Conversion from fixed to contingent form of payment.* With regard to a conversion of a fixed present value to a contingent form of payment, see paragraphs (g)(2)(v) (Discount rate) and (vi) (Financial projections) of this section.

(3) *Coordination of best method rule and form of payment.* A method described in paragraph (g)(1) of this section evaluates the arm's length amount charged in a PCT in terms of a form of payment (method payment form). For example, the method payment form for the acquisition price method described in paragraph (g)(5) of this section, and for the market capitalization method described in paragraph (g)(6) of this section, is fixed payment. Applications of the income method provide different method payment forms. See paragraphs (g)(4)(i)(E) and (iv) of this section. The method payment form may not necessarily correspond to the form of payment specified pursuant to paragraphs (h)(2)(iii) and (k)(2)(ii)(1) of this section (specified payment form). The determination under § 1.482-1(c) of the method that provides the most reliable measure of an arm's length result is to be made without regard to whether the respective method payment forms under the

competing methods correspond to the specified payment form. If the method payment form of the method determined under § 1.482-1(c) to provide the most reliable measure of an arm's length result differs from the specified payment form, then the conversion from such method payment form to such specified payment form will be made to the satisfaction of the Commissioner.

(i) *Allocations by the Commissioner in connection with a CSA—(1) In general.* The Commissioner may make allocations to adjust the results of a controlled transaction in connection with a CSA so that the results are consistent with an arm's length result, in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph (i).

(2) *CST allocations—(i) In general.* The Commissioner may make allocations to adjust the results of a CST so that the results are consistent with an arm's length result, including any allocations to make each controlled participant's IDC share, as determined under paragraph (d)(4) of this section, equal to that participant's RAB share, as determined under paragraph (e)(1) of this section. Such allocations may result from, for purposes of CST determinations, adjustments to—

(A) Redetermine IDCs by adding any costs (or cost categories) that are directly identified with, or are reasonably allocable to, the IDA, or by removing any costs (or cost categories) that are not IDCs;

(B) Reallocate costs between the IDA and other business activities;

(C) Improve the reliability of the selection or application of the basis used for measuring benefits for purposes of estimating a controlled participant's RAB share;

(D) Improve the reliability of the projections used to estimate RAB shares, including adjustments described in paragraph (i)(2)(ii) of this section; and

(E) Allocate among the controlled participants any unallocated interests in cost shared intangibles.

(ii) *Adjustments to improve the reliability of projections used to estimate RAB shares—(A) Unreliable projections.* A significant divergence between projected benefit shares and benefit shares

adjusted to take into account any available actual benefits to date (adjusted benefit shares) may indicate that the projections were not reliable for purposes of estimating RAB shares. In such a case, the Commissioner may use adjusted benefit shares as the most reliable measure of RAB shares and adjust IDC shares accordingly. The projected benefit shares will not be considered unreliable, as applied in a given taxable year, based on a divergence from adjusted benefit shares for every controlled participant that is less than or equal to 20% of the participant's projected benefits share. Further, the Commissioner will not make an allocation based on such divergence if the difference is due to an extraordinary event, beyond the control of the controlled participants, which could not reasonably have been anticipated at the time that costs were shared. The Commissioner generally may adjust projections of benefits used to calculate benefit shares in accordance with the provisions of § 1.482-1. In particular, if benefits are projected over a period of years, and the projections for initial years of the period prove to be unreliable, this may indicate that the projections for the remaining years of the period are also unreliable and thus should be adjusted. For purposes of this paragraph (i)(2)(ii)(A), all controlled participants that are not U.S. persons are treated as a single controlled participant. Therefore, an adjustment based on an unreliable projection of RAB shares will be made to the IDC shares of foreign controlled participants only if there is a matching adjustment to the IDC shares of controlled participants that are U.S. persons. Nothing in this paragraph (i)(2)(ii)(A) prevents the Commissioner from making an allocation if a taxpayer did not use the most reliable basis for measuring anticipated benefits. For example, if the taxpayer measures its anticipated benefits based on units sold, and the Commissioner determines that another basis is more reliable for measuring anticipated benefits, then the fact that actual units sold were within 20% of the projected unit sales will not preclude an allocation under this section.

(B) *Foreign-to-foreign adjustments.* Adjustments to IDC shares based on an unreliable projection also may be made among foreign controlled participants if the variation between actual and projected benefits has the effect of substantially reducing U.S. tax.

(C) *Correlative adjustments to PCTs.* Correlative adjustments will be made to any PCT Payments of a fixed amount that were determined based on RAB shares that are subsequently adjusted on a finding that they were based on unreliable projections. No correlative adjustments will be made to contingent PCT Payments regardless of whether RAB shares were used as a parameter in the valuation of those payments.

(D) *Examples.* The following examples illustrate the principles of this paragraph (i)(2)(ii):

Example 1. U.S. Parent (USP) and Foreign Subsidiary (FS) enter into a CSA to develop new food products, dividing costs on the basis of projected sales two years in the future. In Year 1, USP and FS project that their sales in Year 3 will be equal, and they divide costs accordingly. In Year 3, the Commissioner examines the controlled participants' method for dividing costs. USP and FS actually accounted for 42% and 58% of total sales, respectively. The Commissioner agrees that sales two years in the future provide a reliable basis for estimating benefit shares. Because the differences between USP's and FS's adjusted and projected benefit shares are less than 20% of their projected benefit shares, the projection of future benefits for Year 3 is reliable.

Example 2. The facts are the same as in *Example 1*, except that in Year 3 USP and FS actually accounted for 35% and 65% of total sales, respectively. The divergence between USP's projected and adjusted benefit shares is greater than 20% of USP's projected benefit share and is not due to an extraordinary event beyond the control of the controlled participants. The Commissioner concludes that the projected benefit shares were unreliable, and uses adjusted benefit shares as the basis for an adjustment to the cost shares borne by USP and FS.

Example 3. U.S. Parent (USP), a U.S. corporation, and its foreign subsidiary (FS) enter into a CSA in Year 1. They project that they will begin to receive benefits from cost shared intangibles in Years 4 through 6, and that USP will receive 60% of total benefits and FS 40% of total benefits. In Years 4 through 6, USP and FS actually receive 50% each of the total benefits. In evaluating the reliability of the controlled participants'

projections, the Commissioner compares the adjusted benefit shares to the projected benefit shares. Although USP's adjusted benefit share (50%) is within 20% of its projected benefit share (60%), FS's adjusted benefit share (50%) is not within 20% of its projected benefit share (40%). Based on this discrepancy, the Commissioner may conclude that the controlled participants' projections were unreliable and may use adjusted benefit shares as the basis for an adjustment to the cost shares borne by USP and FS.

Example 4. Three controlled taxpayers, USP, FS1, and FS2 enter into a CSA. FS1 and FS2 are foreign. USP is a domestic corporation that controls all the stock of FS1 and FS2. The controlled participants project that they will share the total benefits of the cost shared intangibles in the following percentages: USP 50%; FS1 30%; and FS2 20%. Adjusted benefit shares are as follows: USP 45%; FS1 25%; and FS2 30%. In evaluating the reliability of the controlled participants' projections, the Commissioner compares these adjusted benefit shares to the projected benefit shares. For this purpose, FS1 and FS2 are treated as a single controlled participant. The adjusted benefit share received by USP (45%) is within 20% of its projected benefit share (50%). In addition, the non-US controlled participant's adjusted benefit share (55%) is also within 20% of their projected benefit share (50%). Therefore, the Commissioner concludes that the controlled participant's projections of future benefits were reliable, despite the fact that FS2's adjusted benefit share (30%) is not within 20% of its projected benefit share (20%).

Example 5. The facts are the same as in *Example 4*. In addition, the Commissioner determines that FS2 has significant operating losses and has no earnings and profits, and that FS1 is profitable and has earnings and profits. Based on all the evidence, the Commissioner concludes that the controlled participants arranged that FS1 would bear a larger cost share than appropriate in order to reduce FS1's earnings and profits and thereby reduce inclusions USP otherwise would be deemed to have on account of FS1 under subpart F. Pursuant to paragraph (i)(2)(ii)(B) of this section, the Commissioner may make an adjustment solely to the cost shares borne by FS1 and FS2 because FS2's projection of future benefits was unreliable and the variation between adjusted and projected benefits had the effect of substantially reducing USP's U.S. income tax liability (on account of FS1 subpart F income).

Example 6. (i)(A) Foreign Parent (FP) and U.S. Subsidiary (USS) enter into a CSA in 1996 to develop a new treatment for baldness. USS's interest in any treatment developed is the right to produce and sell the treatment in the U.S. market while FP retains rights to produce and sell the treatment in the rest

of the world. USS and FP measure their anticipated benefits from the CSA based on their respective projected future sales of the baldness treatment. The following sales projections are used:

SALES
[In millions of dollars]

Year	USS	FP
1	5	10
2	20	20
3	30	30
4	40	40
5	40	40
6	40	40
7	40	40
8	20	20
9	10	10
10	5	5

(B) In Year 1, the first year of sales, USS is projected to have lower sales than FP due to lags in U.S. regulatory approval for the baldness treatment. In each subsequent year, USS and FP are projected to have equal sales. Sales are projected to build over the first three years of the period, level off for several years, and then decline over the final years of the period as new and improved baldness treatments reach the market.

(ii) To account for USS's lag in sales in the Year 1, the present discounted value of sales over the period is used as the basis for measuring benefits. Based on the risk associated with this venture, a discount rate of 10 percent is selected. The present discounted value of projected sales is determined to be approximately \$154.4 million for USS and \$158.9 million for FP. On this basis USS and FP are projected to obtain approximately 49.3% and 50.7% of the benefit, respectively, and the costs of developing the baldness treatment are shared accordingly.

(iii)(A) In Year 6, the Commissioner examines the CSA. USS and FP have obtained the following sales results through Year 5:

SALES
[In millions of dollars]

Year	USS	FP
1	0	17
2	17	35
3	25	35
4	38	41
5	39	41

(B) USS's sales initially grew more slowly than projected while FP's sales grew more quickly. In each of the first three years of the period, the share of total sales of at least one of the parties diverged by over 20% from its projected share of sales. However, by Year 5 both parties' sales had leveled off at approximately their projected values. Taking into account this leveling off of sales and

all the facts and circumstances, the Commissioner determines that it is appropriate to use the original projections for the remaining years of sales. Combining the actual results through Year 5 with the projections for subsequent years, and using a discount rate of 10%, the present discounted value of sales is approximately \$141.6 million for USS and \$187.3 million for FP. This result implies that USS and FP obtain approximately 43.1% and 56.9%, respectively, of the anticipated benefits from the baldness treatment. Because these adjusted benefit shares are within 20% of the benefit shares calculated based on the original sales projections, the Commissioner determines that, based on the difference between adjusted and projected benefit shares, the original projections were not unreliable. No adjustment is made based on the difference between adjusted and projected benefit shares.

Example 7. (i) The facts are the same as in *Example 6*, except that the actual sales results through Year 5 are as follows:

SALES		
[In millions of dollars]		
Year	USS	FP
1	0	17
2	17	35
3	25	44
4	34	54
5	36	55

(ii) Based on the discrepancy between the projections and the actual results and on consideration of all the facts, the Commissioner determines that for the remaining years the following sales projections are more reliable than the original projections:

SALES		
[In millions of dollars]		
Year	USS	FP
6	36	55
7	36	55
8	18	28
9	9	14
10	4.5	7

(iii) Combining the actual results through Year 5 with the projections for subsequent years, and using a discount rate of 10%, the present discounted value of sales is approximately \$131.2 million for USS and \$229.4 million for FP. This result implies that USS and FP obtain approximately 35.4% and 63.6%, respectively, of the anticipated benefits from the baldness treatment. These adjusted benefit shares diverge by greater than 20% from the benefit shares calculated based on the original sales projections, and the Commissioner determines that, based on the difference between adjusted and projected benefit shares, the original projections were un-

reliable. The Commissioner adjusts cost shares for each of the taxable years under examination to conform them to the recalculated shares of anticipated benefits.

(iii) *Timing of CST allocations.* If the Commissioner makes an allocation to adjust the results of a CST, the allocation must be reflected for tax purposes in the year in which the IDCs were incurred. When a CST payment is owed by one controlled participant to another controlled participant, the Commissioner may make appropriate allocations to reflect an arm's length rate of interest for the time value of money, consistent with the provisions of § 1.482-2(a) (Loans or advances).

(3) *PCT allocations.* The Commissioner may make allocations to adjust the results of a PCT so that the results are consistent with an arm's length result in accordance with the provisions of the applicable sections of the regulations under section 482, as determined pursuant to paragraph (a)(2) of this section.

(4) *Allocations regarding changes in participation under a CSA.* The Commissioner may make allocations to adjust the results of any controlled transaction described in paragraph (f) of this section if the controlled participants do not reflect arm's length results in relation to any such transaction.

(5) *Allocations when CSTs are consistently and materially disproportionate to RAB shares.* If a controlled participant bears IDC shares that are consistently and materially greater or lesser than its RAB share, then the Commissioner may conclude that the economic substance of the arrangement between the controlled participants is inconsistent with the terms of the CSA. In such a case, the Commissioner may disregard such terms and impute an agreement that is consistent with the controlled participants' course of conduct, under which a controlled participant that bore a disproportionately greater IDC share received additional interests in the cost shared intangibles. See §§ 1.482-1(d)(3)(ii)(B) (Identifying contractual terms) and 1.482-4(f)(3)(ii) (Identification of owner). Such additional interests will consist of partial undivided interests in the other controlled participant's interest in the cost shared intangible. Accordingly,

that controlled participant must receive arm's length consideration from any controlled participant whose IDC share is less than its RAB share over time, under the provisions of §§ 1.482-1 and 1.482-4 through 1.482-6 to provide compensation for the latter controlled participants' use of such partial undivided interest.

(6) *Periodic adjustments*—(i) *In general.* Subject to the exceptions in paragraph (i)(6)(vi) of this section, the Commissioner may make periodic adjustments for an open taxable year (the Adjustment Year) and for all subsequent taxable years for the duration of the CSA Activity with respect to all PCT Payments, if the Commissioner determines that, for a particular PCT (the Trigger PCT), a particular controlled participant that owes or owed a PCT Payment relating to that PCT (such controlled participant being referred to as the PCT Payor for purposes of this paragraph (i)(6)) has realized an Actually Experienced Return Ratio (AERR) that is outside the Periodic Return Ratio Range (PRRR). The satisfaction of the condition stated in the preceding sentence is referred to as a Periodic Trigger. See paragraphs (i)(6)(ii) through (vi) of this section regarding the PRRR, the AERR, and periodic adjustments. In determining whether to make such adjustments, the Commissioner may consider whether the outcome as adjusted more reliably reflects an arm's length result under all the relevant facts and circumstances, including any information known as of the Determination Date. The Determination Date is the date of the relevant determination by the Commissioner. The failure of the Commissioner to determine for an earlier taxable year that a PCT Payment was not arm's length will not preclude the Commissioner from making a periodic adjustment for a subsequent year. A periodic adjustment under this paragraph (i)(6) may be made without regard to whether the taxable year of the Trigger PCT or any other PCT remains open for statute of limitations purposes or whether a periodic adjustment has previously been made with respect to any PCT Payment.

(ii) *PRRR.* Except as provided in the next sentence, the PRRR will consist of

return ratios that are not less than .667 nor more than 1.5. Alternatively, if the controlled participants have not substantially complied with the documentation requirements referenced in paragraph (k) of this section, as modified, if applicable, by paragraphs (m)(2) and (3) of this section, the PRRR will consist of return ratios that are not less than .8 nor more than 1.25.

(iii) *AERR*—(A) *In general.* The AERR is the present value of total profits (PVTP) divided by the present value of investment (PVI). In computing PVTP and PVI, present values are computed using the applicable discount rate (ADR), and all information available as of the Determination Date is taken into account.

(B) *PVTP.* The PVTP is the present value, as of the CSA Start Date, as defined in section (j)(1)(i) of this section, of the PCT Payor's actually experienced divisional profits or losses from the CSA Start Date through the end of the Adjustment Year.

(C) *PVI.* The PVI is the present value, as of the CSA Start Date, of the PCT Payor's investment associated with the CSA Activity, defined as the sum of its cost contributions and its PCT Payments, from the CSA Start Date through the end of the Adjustment Year. For purposes of computing the PVI, PCT Payments means all PCT Payments due from a PCT Payor before netting against PCT Payments due from other controlled participants pursuant to paragraph (j)(3)(ii) of this section.

(iv) *ADR*—(A) *In general.* Except as provided in paragraph (i)(6)(iv)(B) of this section, the ADR is the discount rate pursuant to paragraph (g)(2)(v) of this section, subject to such adjustments as the Commissioner determines appropriate.

(B) *Publicly traded companies.* If the PCT Payor meets the conditions of paragraph (i)(6)(iv)(C) of this section, the ADR is the PCT Payor WACC as of the date of the Trigger PCT. However, if the Commissioner determines, or the controlled participants establish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner, that a discount rate other than the PCT Payor WACC better reflects the degree of risk of the CSA Activity as of such

date, the ADR is such other discount rate.

(C) *Publicly traded.* A PCT Payor meets the conditions of this paragraph (i)(6)(iv)(C) if—

(1) Stock of the PCT Payor is publicly traded; or

(2) Stock of the PCT Payor is not publicly traded, provided the PCT Payor is included in a group of companies for which consolidated financial statements are prepared; and a publicly traded company in such group owns, directly or indirectly, stock in PCT Payor. Stock of a company is publicly traded within the meaning of this paragraph (i)(6)(iv)(C) if such stock is regularly traded on an established United States securities market and the company issues financial statements prepared in accordance with United States generally accepted accounting principles for the taxable year.

(D) *PCT Payor WACC.* The *PCT Payor WACC* is the WACC, as defined in paragraph (j)(1)(i) of this section, of the PCT Payor or the publicly traded company described in paragraph (i)(6)(iv)(C)(2)(ii) of this section, as the case may be.

(E) *Generally accepted accounting principles.* For purposes of paragraph (i)(6)(iv)(C) of this section, a financial statement prepared in accordance with a comprehensive body of generally accepted accounting principles other than United States generally accepted accounting principles is considered to be prepared in accordance with United States generally accepted accounting principles provided that the amounts of debt, equity, and interest expense are reflected in any reconciliation between such other accounting principles and United States generally accepted accounting principles required to be incorporated into the financial statement by the securities laws governing companies whose stock is regularly traded on United States securities markets.

(v) *Determination of periodic adjustments.* In the event of a Periodic Trigger, subject to paragraph (i)(6)(vi) of this section, the Commissioner may make periodic adjustments with respect to all PCT Payments between all PCT Payors and PCT Payees for the Adjustment Year and all subsequent

years for the duration of the CSA Activity pursuant to the residual profit split method as provided in paragraph (g)(7) of this section, subject to the further modifications in this paragraph (i)(6)(v). A periodic adjustment may be made for a particular taxable year without regard to whether the taxable years of the Trigger PCT or other PCTs remain open for statute of limitation purposes.

(A) *In general.* Periodic adjustments are determined by the following steps:

(1) First, determine the present value, as of the date of the Trigger PCT, of the PCT Payments under paragraph (g)(7)(iii)(C)(3) of this section pursuant to the Adjusted RPSM as defined in paragraph (i)(6)(v)(B) of this section (first step result).

(2) Second, convert the first step result into a stream of contingent payments on a base of reasonably anticipated divisional profits or losses over the entire duration of the CSA Activity, using a level royalty rate (second step rate). See paragraph (h)(2)(iv) of this section (Conversion from fixed to contingent form of payment). This conversion is made based on all information known as of the Determination Date.

(3) Third, apply the second step rate to the actual divisional profit or loss for taxable years preceding and including the Adjustment Year to yield a stream of contingent payments for such years, and convert such stream to a present value as of the CSA Start Date under the principles of paragraph (g)(2)(v) of this section (third step result). For this purpose, the second step rate applied to a loss for a particular year will yield a negative contingent payment for that year.

(4) Fourth, convert any actual PCT Payments up through the Adjustment Year to a present value as of the CSA Start Date under the principles of paragraph (g)(2)(v) of this section. Then subtract such amount from the third step result. Determine the nominal amount in the Adjustment Year that would have a present value as of the CSA Start Date equal to the present value determined in the previous sentence to determine the periodic adjustment in the Adjustment Year.

(5) Fifth, apply the second step rate to the actual divisional profit or loss for each taxable year after the Adjustment Year up to and including the taxable year that includes the Determination Date to yield a stream of contingent payments for such years. For this purpose, the second step rate applied to a loss will yield a negative contingent payment for that year. Then subtract from each such payment any actual PCT Payment made for the same year to determine the periodic adjustment for such taxable year.

(6) For each taxable year subsequent to the year that includes the Determination Date, the periodic adjustment for such taxable year (which is in lieu of any PCT Payment that would otherwise be payable for that year under the taxpayer's position) equals the second step rate applied to the actual divisional profit or loss for that year. For this purpose, the second step rate applied to a loss for a particular year will yield a negative contingent payment for that year.

(7) If the periodic adjustment for any taxable year is a positive amount, then it is an additional PCT Payment owed from the PCT Payor to the PCT Payee for such year. If the periodic adjustment for any taxable year is a negative amount, then it is an additional PCT Payment owed by the PCT Payee to the PCT Payor for such year.

(B) *Adjusted RPSM as of Determination Date.* The Adjusted RPSM is the residual profit split method pursuant to paragraph (g)(7) of this section applied to determine the present value, as of the date of the Trigger PCT, of the PCT Payments under paragraph (g)(7)(iii)(C)(3) of this section, with the following modifications.

(1) Actual results up through the Determination Date shall be substituted for what otherwise were the projected results over such period, as reasonably anticipated as of the date of the Trigger PCT.

(2) Projected results for the balance of the CSA Activity after the Determination Date, as reasonably anticipated as of the Determination Date, shall be substituted for what otherwise were the projected results over such period, as reasonably anticipated as of the date of the Trigger PCT.

(3) The requirement in paragraph (g)(7)(i) of this section, that at least two controlled participants make significant nonroutine contributions, does not apply.

(vi) *Exceptions to periodic adjustments—(A) Controlled participants establish periodic adjustment not warranted.* No periodic adjustment will be made under paragraphs (i)(6)(i) and (v) of this section if the controlled participants establish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that all the conditions described in one of paragraphs (i)(6)(vi)(A)(1) through (4) of this section apply with respect to the Trigger PCT.

(1) *Transactions involving the same platform contribution as in the Trigger PCT.*

(i) The same platform contribution is furnished to an uncontrolled taxpayer under substantially the same circumstances as those of the relevant Trigger PCT and with a similar form of payment as the Trigger PCT;

(ii) This transaction serves as the basis for the application of the comparable uncontrolled transaction method described in paragraph (g)(3) of this section, in the first year and all subsequent years in which substantial PCT Payments relating to the Trigger PCT were required to be paid; and

(iii) The amount of those PCT Payments in that first year was arm's length.

(2) *Results not reasonably anticipated.* The differential between the AERR and the nearest bound of the PRRR is due to extraordinary events beyond the control of the controlled participants that could not reasonably have been anticipated as of the date of the Trigger PCT.

(3) *Reduced AERR does not cause Periodic Trigger.* The Periodic Trigger would not have occurred had the PCT Payor's divisional profits or losses used to calculate its PVTP both taken into account expenses on account of operating cost contributions and routine platform contributions, and excluded those profits or losses attributable to the PCT Payor's routine contributions to its exploitation of cost shared intangibles, nonroutine contributions to the

CSA Activity, operating cost contributions, and routine platform contributions.

(4) *Increased AERR does not cause Periodic Trigger*—(i) The Periodic Trigger would not have occurred had the divisional profits or losses of the PCT Payor used to calculate its PVTP included its reasonably anticipated divisional profits or losses after the Adjustment Year from the CSA Activity, including from its routine contributions, its operating cost contributions, and its nonroutine contributions to that activity, and had the cost contributions and PCT Payments of the PCT Payor used to calculate its PVI included its reasonably anticipated cost contributions and PCT Payments after the Adjustment Year. The reasonably anticipated amounts in the previous sentence are determined based on all information available as of the Determination Date.

(ii) For purposes of this paragraph (i)(6)(vi)(A)(4), the controlled participants may, if they wish, assume that the average yearly divisional profits or losses for all taxable years prior to and including the Adjustment Year, in which there has been substantial exploitation of cost shared intangibles resulting from the CSA (exploitation years), will continue to be earned in each year over a period of years equal to 15 minus the number of exploitation years prior to and including the Determination Date.

(B) *Circumstances in which Periodic Trigger deemed not to occur.* No Periodic Trigger will be deemed to have occurred at the times and in the circumstances described in paragraph (i)(6)(vi)(B)(1) or (2) of this section.

(1) *10-year period.* In any year subsequent to the 10-year period beginning with the first taxable year in which there is substantial exploitation of cost shared intangibles resulting from the CSA, if the AERR determined is within

the PRRR for each year of such 10-year period.

(2) *5-year period.* In any year of the 5-year period beginning with the first taxable year in which there is substantial exploitation of cost shared intangibles resulting from the CSA, if the AERR falls below the lower bound of the PRRR.

(vii) *Examples.* The following examples illustrate the rules of this paragraph (i)(6):

Example 1. (i) For simplicity of calculation in this *Example 1*, all financial flows are assumed to occur at the beginning of the year. At the beginning of Year 1, USP, a publicly traded U.S. company, and FS, its wholly-owned foreign subsidiary, enter into a CSA to develop new technology for cell phones. USP has a platform contribution, the rights for an in-process technology that when developed will improve the clarity of calls, for which compensation is due from FS. FS has no platform contributions to the CSA, no operating contributions, and no operating cost contributions. USP and FS agree to fixed PCT payments of \$40 million in Year 1 and \$10 million per year for Years 2 through 10. At the beginning of Year 1, the weighted average cost of capital of the controlled group that includes USP and FS is 15%. In Year 9, the Commissioner audits Years 5 through 7 of the CSA and considers whether any periodic adjustments should be made. USP and FS have substantially complied with the documentation requirements of paragraph (k) of this section.

(ii) FS experiences the results reported in the following table from its participation in the CSA through Year 7. In the table, all present values (PV) are reported as of the CSA Start Date, which is the same as the date of the PCT (and reflect a 15% discount rate as discussed in paragraph (iii) of this *Example 1*). Thus, in any year the present value of the cumulative investment is PVI and of the cumulative divisional profit or loss is PVTP. All amounts in this table and the tables that follow are reported in millions of dollars and cost contributions are referred to as “CCs” (for simplicity of calculation in this *Example 1*, all financial flows are assumed to occur at the beginning of the year).

a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h
Year	Sales	Non CC costs	CCs	PCT payments	Investment (d + e)	Divisional profit or loss (b-c)	AERR (PVTP/PVI) (g/f)
1	0	0	15	40	55	0	
2	0	0	17	10	27	0	
3	0	0	18	10	28	0	
4	705	662	20	10	30	46	
5	886	718	22	10	32	168	

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a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h
Year	Sales	Non CC costs	CCs	PCT payments	Investment (d + e)	Divisional profit or loss (b-c)	AERR (PVTP/PVI) (g/f)
6	1,113	680	24	10	34	433	
7	1,179	747	27	10	37	432	
PV through Year 5	970	846	69	69	138	124	0.90
PV through Year 6	1,523	1,184	81	74	155	340	2.20
PV through Year 7	2,033	1,507	93	78	171	526	3.09

(iii) Because USP is publicly traded in the United States and is a member of the controlled group to which FS (the PCT Payor) belongs, for purposes of calculating the AERR for FS, the present values of its PVTP and PVI are determined using an ADR of 15%, the weighted average cost of capital of the controlled group. (It is assumed that no other rate was determined or established, under paragraph (i)(6)(iv)(B) of this section, to better reflect the relevant degree of risk.) At a 15% discount rate, the PVTP, calculated as of Year 1, and based on actual profits realized by FS through Year 7 from exploiting the new cell phone technology developed by the CSA, is \$526 million. The PVI, based on FS's cost contributions and its PCT Payments, is \$171 million. The AERR for FS is equal to its PVTP divided by its PVI, \$526 million/\$171 million, or 3.09. There is a Periodic Trigger because FS's AERR of 3.09 falls outside the PRRR of .67 to 1.5, the applicable PRRR for controlled participants complying with the documentation requirements of this section.

(iv) At the time of the Determination Date, it is determined that the first Adjustment Year in which a Periodic Trigger oc-

curred was Year 6, when the AERR of FS was determined to be 2.20. It is also determined that for Year 6 none of the exceptions to periodic adjustments described in paragraph (i)(6)(vi) of this section applies. The Commissioner exercises its discretion under paragraph (i)(6)(i) of this section to make periodic adjustments using Year 6 as the Adjustment Year. Therefore, the arm's length PCT Payments from FS to USP shall be determined for each taxable year using the adjusted residual profit split method described in paragraphs (g)(7) and (i)(6)(v)(B) of this section. Periodic adjustments will be made for each year to the extent the PCT Payments actually made by FS differ from the PCT Payment calculation under the adjusted residual profit split method.

(v) It is determined, as of the Determination Date, that the cost shared intangibles will be exploited through Year 10. FS's return for routine contributions (determined by the Commissioner, based on the return for comparable functions undertaken by comparable uncontrolled companies, to be 8% of non-CC costs), and its actual and projected results, are described in the following table.

a	b	c	d	e	f	g
Year	Sales	Non-CC costs	Divisional profit or loss (b-c)	CCs	Routing return	Residual profit (d-e-f)
1	0	0	0	15	0	-15
2	0	0	0	17	0	-17
3	0	0	0	18	0	-18
4	705	662	43	20	53	-30
5	886	718	168	22	57	89
6	1,113	680	433	24	54	355
7	1,179	747	432	27	60	345
8	1,238	822	416	29	66	321
9	1,300	894	406	32	72	302
10	1,365	974	391	35	78	278
Cumulative PV through Year 10 as of CSA Start Date	3,312	2,385	927	124	191	612

(vi) The periodic adjustments are calculated in a series of steps set out in paragraph (i)(6)(v)(A) of this section. First, a lump sum for the PCT Payment is determined using the adjusted residual profit split method. Under the method, based on the con-

siderations discussed in paragraph (g)(2)(v) of this section, the appropriate discount rate is 15% per year. The nonroutine residual divisional profit or loss described in paragraph (g)(7)(iii)(B) of this section is \$612 million. Further, under paragraph (g)(7)(iii)(C) of this

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section, the entire nonroutine residual divisional profit constitutes the PCT Payment because only USP has nonroutine contributions.

(vii) In step two, the first step result (\$612 million) is converted into a level royalty rate based on the reasonably anticipated divisional profit or losses of the CSA Activity, the PV of which is reported in the table above (net PV of divisional profit or loss for Years 1 through 10 is \$927 million). Consequently, the step two result is a level royalty rate of 66.0% (\$612/\$927) of the divisional profit in Years 1 through 10.

(viii) In step three, the Commissioner calculates the PCT Payments due through Year 6 by applying the step two royalty rate to the actual divisional profits for each year

and then determines the aggregate PV of these PCT Payments as of the CSA Start Date (\$224 million as reported in the following table). In step four, the PCT Payments actually made through Year 6 are similarly converted to PV as of the CSA Start Date (\$74 million) and subtracted from the amount determined in step three (\$224 million—\$74 million = \$150 million). That difference of \$150 million, representing a net PV as of the CSA Start Date, is then converted to a nominal amount, as of the Adjustment Year, of equivalent present value (again using a discount rate of 15%). That nominal amount is \$302 million (not shown in the table), and is the periodic adjustment in Year 6.

a	b	c	d	e
Year	Divisional profit	Royalty rate	Nominal royalty due under adjusted RPSM (b*c)	Nominal payments made
Year 1	0	66.0	\$0	\$40
Year 2	0	66.0	0	10
Year 3	0	66.0	0	10
Year 4	43	66.0	28	10
Year 5	168	66.0	111	10
Year 6	433	66.0	286	10
Cumulative PV as of Year 1			224	74

(ix) Under step five, the royalties due from FS to USP for Year 7 (the year after the Adjustment Year) through Year 9 (the year including the Determination Date) are determined. (These determinations are made for Years 8 and 9 after the divisional profit for those years becomes available.) For each year, the periodic adjustment is a PCT Payment due in addition to the \$10 million PCT

Payment that must otherwise be paid under the CSA as described in paragraph (i) of this Example 1. That periodic adjustment is calculated as the product of the step two royalty rate and the divisional profit, minus the \$10 million that was otherwise paid for that year. The calculations are shown in the following table:

a	b	c	d	e	f
Year	Divisional profit	Royalty rate	Royalty due (b*c)	PCT Payments otherwise paid	Periodic adjustment d-e
7	432	66.0%	\$285	\$10	\$275
8	416	66.0	275	10	265
9	406	66.0	268	10	258

(x) Under step six, the periodic adjustment for Year 10 (the only exploitation year after the year containing the Determination Date) will be determined by applying the step two royalty rate to the divisional profit. This periodic adjustment is a PCT Payment pay-

able from FS to USP, and is in lieu of the \$10 payment otherwise due. The calculations are shown in the following table, based on a divisional profit of \$391 million. USP and FS experienced the following results in Year 10.

Year	Divisional profit	Royalty rate	Royalty due	PCT payment called for under original agreement but not made	Periodic adjustment
10	391	66.0%	\$258	\$10 (not paid)	\$258

Example 2. The facts are the same as in paragraphs (i) through (iii) of *Example 1*. At the time of the Determination Date, it is determined that the first Adjustment Year in which a Periodic Trigger occurred was Year 6, when the AERR of FS was determined to be 2.73. Upon further investigation as to what may have caused the high return in FS's market, the Commissioner learns that, in Years 4 through 6, USP's leading competitors experienced severe, unforeseen disruptions in their supply chains resulting in a significant increase in USP's and FS's market share for cell phones. Further analysis determines that without this unforeseen occurrence the Periodic Trigger would not have occurred. Based on paragraph (i)(6)(v)(A)(2) of this section, the Commissioner determines to his satisfaction that no adjustments are warranted.

Example 3. (i) USP, a U.S. corporation, and its wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries FS1, FS2, and FS3 enter into a CSA at the start of Year 1 to develop version 2.0 of a computer program. USP makes a platform contribution, version 1.0 of the program (upon which version 2.0 will be based), for which compensation is due from FS1, FS2, and FS3. None of the foreign subsidiaries makes any platform contributions.

(ii) In Year 6, the Commissioner audits Years 3 through 5 of the CSA and considers whether any periodic adjustments should be made. At the time of the Determination

Date, the Commissioner determines that the first Adjustment Year in which a Periodic Trigger occurred was Year 3, and further determines that none of the exceptions to periodic adjustments described in paragraph (i)(6)(vi) of this section applies. The Commissioner exercises his discretion under paragraph (i)(6)(i) of this section to make periodic adjustments using Year 3 as the Adjustment Year. Therefore, the arm's length PCT Payments from FS1, FS2, and FS3 to USP shall be determined using the adjusted residual profit split method described in paragraphs (g)(7)(v)(B) and (i)(6)(v)(B) of this section. Periodic adjustments will be made for each year to the extent the PCT Payments actually made by FS1, FS2, and FS3 differ from the PCT Payment calculation under the adjusted residual profit split method.

(iii) The periodic adjustments are calculated in a series of steps set out in paragraph (i)(6)(v)(A) of this section. First, a lump sum for the PCT Payments is determined using the adjusted residual profit split method. The following results are calculated (based on actual results for years for which actual results are available and projected results for all years thereafter) in order to apply the adjusted residual profit split method (it is determined that the cost shared intangibles will be exploited through Year 7, so the results reported in the following table are cumulative values through Year 7):

Participant	Divisional profits (cumulative PV through year 7 as of the CSA start date)	Residual profits (cumulative PV through year 7 as of the CSA start date)
FS1	\$667	\$314
FS2	271	159
FS3	592	295

Because only USP had nonroutine contributions, under paragraph (g)(7)(iii)(C) of this section, the entire nonroutine residual divisional profit constitutes the PCT Payment owed to USP. Therefore, the present values (as of the CSA Start Date) of the PCT Payments owed are as follows:

PCT Payment owed from FS1 to USP: \$314 million

PCT Payment owed from FS2 to USP: \$159 million

PCT Payment owed from FS3 to USP: \$295 million

Pursuant to paragraph (i)(6)(v)(A) of this section, the steps in paragraphs (i)(6)(v)(A)(2) through (7) of this section are performed separately for the PCT Payments that are owed to USP by each of FS1, FS2, and FS3.

(iv) First, the steps are performed with respect to FS1. In step two, the first step result (\$314 million) is converted into a level royalty rate based on FS1's reasonably anticipated divisional profits or losses through

Year 7 (the PV of which is \$667 million). Consequently, the step two result is a level royalty rate of 47.1% (\$314/\$667) of the divisional profits in Years 1 through 7. In step three, the Commissioner calculates the PCT Payments due through Year 3 (the Adjustment Year) by applying the step two royalty rate (47.1%) to FS1's actual divisional profits for each year up to and including Year 3 and then determining the aggregate PV of these PCT Payments as of Year 3. In step four, the PCT Payments actually made by FS1 to USP through Year 3 are similarly converted to a PV as of Year 3 and subtracted from the amount determined in step three. That difference is the periodic adjustment in Year 3 with respect to the PCT Payments made for Years 1 through 3 from FS1 to USP. Under step five, the royalties due from FS1 to USP for Year 4 (the year after the Adjustment Year) through Year 6 (the year including the Determination Date) are determined. The

periodic adjustment for each of these years is calculated as the product of the step two royalty rate and the divisional profit for that year, minus any actual PCT Payment made by FS1 to USP in that year. The periodic adjustment for each such year is a PCT Payment due in addition to the PCT Payment from FS1 to USP that was already made under the CSA. Under step six, the periodic adjustment for Year 7 (the only exploitation year after the year containing the Determination Date) will be determined by applying the step two royalty rate to FS1's divisional profit for that year. This periodic adjustment for Year 7 is a PCT Payment payable from FS1 to USP and is in lieu of any PCT Payment from FS1 to USP otherwise due.

(v) Next, the steps in paragraphs (i)(6)(v)(A)(2) through (7) of this section are performed with respect to FS2. In step two, the first step result (\$159 million) is converted into a level royalty rate based on FS2's reasonably anticipated divisional profits or losses through Year 7 (the PV of which is \$271 million). Consequently, the step two result is a level royalty rate of 58.7% (\$159/\$271) of the divisional profits in Years 1 through 7. In step three, the Commissioner calculates the PCT Payments due through Year 3 (the Adjustment Year) by applying the step two royalty rate (58.7%) to FS2's actual divisional profits for each year up to and including Year 3 and then determining the aggregate PV of these PCT Payments as of Year 3. In step four, the PCT Payments actually made by FS2 to USP through Year 3 are similarly converted to a PV as of Year 3 and subtracted from the amount determined in step three. That difference is the periodic adjustment in Year 3 with respect to the PCT Payments made for Years 1 through 3 from FS2 to USP. Under step five, the royalties due from FS2 to USP for Year 4 (the year after the Adjustment Year) through Year 6 (the year including the Determination Date) are determined. The periodic adjustment for each of these years is calculated as the product of the step two royalty rate and the divisional profit for that year, minus any actual PCT Payment made by FS2 to USP in that year. The periodic adjustment for each such year is a PCT Payment due in addition to the PCT Payment from FS2 to USP that was already made under the CSA. Under step six, the periodic adjustment for Year 7 (the only exploitation year after the year con-

taining the Determination Date) will be determined by applying the step two royalty rate to FS2's divisional profit for that year. This periodic adjustment for Year 7 is a PCT Payment payable from FS2 to USP and is in lieu of any PCT Payment from FS2 to USP otherwise due.

(vi) Finally, the steps in paragraphs (i)(6)(v)(A)(2) through (7) of this section are performed with respect to FS3. In step two, the first step result (\$295 million) is converted into a level royalty rate based on FS3's reasonably anticipated divisional profits or losses through Year 7 (the PV of which is \$592 million). Consequently, the step two result is a level royalty rate of 49.8% (\$295/\$592) of the divisional profits in Years 1 through 7. In step three, the Commissioner calculates the PCT Payments due through Year 3 (the Adjustment Year) by applying the step two royalty rate (49.8%) to FS3's actual divisional profits for each year up to and including Year 3 and then determining the aggregate PV of these PCT Payments as of Year 3. In step four, the PCT Payments actually made by FS3 to USP through Year 3 are similarly converted to a PV as of Year 3 and subtracted from the amount determined in step three. That difference is the periodic adjustment in Year 3 with respect to the PCT Payments made for Years 1 through 3 from FS3 to USP. Under step five, the royalties due from FS3 to USP for Year 4 (the year after the Adjustment Year) through Year 6 (the year including the Determination Date) are determined. The periodic adjustment for each of these years is calculated as the product of the step two royalty rate and the divisional profit for that year, minus any actual PCT Payment made by FS3 to USP in that year. The periodic adjustment for each such year is a PCT Payment due in addition to the PCT Payment from FS3 to USP that was already made under the CSA. Under step six, the periodic adjustment for Year 7 (the only exploitation year after the year containing the Determination Date) will be determined by applying the step two royalty rate to FS3's divisional profit for that year. This periodic adjustment for Year 7 is a PCT Payment payable from FS3 to USP and is in lieu of any PCT Payment from FS3 to USP otherwise due.

(j) *Definitions and special rules—(1) Definitions—(i) In general.* For purposes of this section—

Term	Definition	Main cross references
Acquisition price	§ 1.482-7(g)(5)(i).
Adjusted acquisition price	§ 1.482-7(g)(5)(iii).
Adjusted average market capitalization	§ 1.482-7(g)(6)(iv).
Adjusted benefit shares	§ 1.482-7(i)(2)(ii)(A).
Adjusted RPSM	§ 1.482-7(i)(6)(v)(B).
Adjustment Year	§ 1.482-7(i)(6)(i).
ADR	§ 1.482-7(i)(6)(iv).
AERR	§ 1.482-7(i)(6)(iii).

Term	Definition	Main cross references
Applicable Method	§ 1.482-7(g)(2)(ix)(A).
Average market capitalization	§ 1.482-7(g)(6)(iii).
Benefits	<i>Benefits</i> mean the sum of additional revenue generated, plus cost savings, minus any cost increases from exploiting cost shared intangibles.	§ 1.482-7(e)(1)(i).
Capability variation	§ 1.482-7(f)(3).
Change in participation under a CSA	§ 1.482-7(f).
Consolidated group	§ 1.482-7(j)(2)(i).
Contingent payments	§ 1.482-7(h)(2)(i)(B).
Controlled participant	<i>Controlled participant</i> means a controlled taxpayer, as defined under § 1.482-1(i)(5), that is a party to the contractual agreement that underlies the CSA, and that reasonably anticipates that it will derive benefits, as defined in paragraph (e)(1)(i) of this section, from exploiting one or more cost shared intangibles.	§ 1.482-7(a)(1).
Controlled transfer of interests	§ 1.482-7(f)(2).
Cost contribution	§ 1.482-7(d)(4).
Cost shared intangible	<i>Cost shared intangible</i> means any intangible, within the meaning of § 1.482-4(b), that is developed by the IDA, including any portion of such intangible that reflects a platform contribution. Therefore, an intangible developed by the IDA is a cost shared intangible even though the intangible was not always or was never a reasonably anticipated cost shared intangible.	§ 1.482-7(b).
Cost sharing alternative	§ 1.482-7(g)(4)(i)(B).
Cost sharing arrangement or CSA	§ 1.482-7(a), (b).
Cost sharing transactions or CSTs	§ 1.482-7(a)(1), (b)(1)(i).
Cross operating contributions	A cross operating contribution is any resource or capability or right, other than a platform contribution, that a controlled participant has developed, maintained, or acquired prior to the CSA Start Date, or subsequent to the CSA start date by means other than operating cost contributions or cost contributions, that is reasonably anticipated to contribute to the CSA Activity within another controlled participant's division.	§ 1.482-7(a)(3)(iii), (g)(2)(iv).
CSA Activity	<i>CSA Activity</i> is the activity of developing and exploiting cost shared intangibles.	§ 1.482-7(c)(2)(i).
CSA Start Date	The <i>CSA Start Date</i> is the earlier of the date of the CSA contract or the first occurrence of any IDC to which the CSA applies, in accordance with § 1.482-7(k)(1)(iii).	§ 1.482-7(i)(6)(iii)(B) and (k)(1)(ii) and (iii).
CST Payments	§ 1.482-7(b)(1).
Date of PCT	§ 1.482-7(b)(3).
Determination Date	§ 1.482-7(i)(6)(i).
Differential income stream	§ 1.482-7(g)(4)(vi)(F)(2).
Division	<i>Division</i> means the territory or other division that serves as the basis of the division of interests under the CSA in the cost shared intangibles pursuant to § 1.482-7(b)(4).	See definitions of divisional profit or loss, operating contribution, and operating cost contribution.
Divisional interest	§ 1.482-7(b)(1)(iii), (b)(4).
Divisional profit or loss	<i>Divisional profit or loss</i> means the operating profit or loss as separately earned by each controlled participant in its division from the CSA Activity, determined before any expense (including amortization) on account of cost contributions, operating cost contributions, routine platform and operating contributions, nonroutine contributions (including platform and operating contributions), and tax.	§ 1.482-7(g)(4)(iii).

Term	Definition	Main cross references
Fixed payments	§ 1.482-7(h)(2)(i)(A).
Implied discount rate	§ 1.482-7(g)(2)(v)(B)(2).
IDC share	§ 1.482-7(d)(4).
Input parameters	§ 1.482-7(g)(2)(ix)(B).
Intangible development activity or IDA	§ 1.482-7(d)(1).
Intangible development costs or IDCs	§ 1.482-7(a)(1), (d)(1).
Licensing alternative	§ 1.482-7(g)(4)(i)(C).
Licensing payments	<i>Licensing payments</i> means payments pursuant to the licensing obligations under the licensing alternative.	§ 1.482-7(g)(4)(iii).
Make-or-sell rights	§ 1.482-7(c)(4), (g)(2)(iv).
Market-based input parameter	§ 1.482-7(g)(2)(ix)(B).
Market returns for routine contributions	<i>Market returns for routine contributions</i> means returns determined by reference to the returns achieved by uncontrolled taxpayers engaged in activities similar to the relevant business activity in the controlled participant's division, consistent with the methods described in §§ 1.482-3, 1.482-4, 1.482-5, or § 1.482-9(c).	§ 1.482-7(g)(4), (g)(7).
Method payment form	§ 1.482-7(h)(3).
Nonroutine contributions	<i>Nonroutine contributions</i> means a controlled participant's contributions to the relevant business activities that are not routine contributions. Nonroutine contributions ordinarily include both nonroutine platform contributions and nonroutine operating contributions used by controlled participants in the commercial exploitation of their interests in the cost shared intangibles (for example, marketing intangibles used by a controlled participant in its division to sell products that are based on the cost shared intangible).	§ 1.482-7(g).
Nonroutine residual divisional profit or loss.	§ 1.482-7(g)(7)(iii).
Operating contributions	An <i>operating contribution</i> is any resource or capability or right, other than a platform contribution, that a controlled participant has developed, maintained, or acquired prior to the CSA Start Date, or subsequent to the CSA Start Date by means other than operating cost contributions or cost contributions, that is reasonably anticipated to contribute to the CSA Activity within the controlled participant's division.	§ 1.482-7(g)(2)(ii), (g)(4)(vi)(E), (g)(7)(iii)(A) and (C).
Operating cost contributions	<i>Operating cost contributions</i> means all costs in the ordinary course of business on or after the CSA Start Date that, based on analysis of the facts and circumstances, are directly identified with, or are reasonably allocable to, developing resources, capabilities, or rights (other than reasonably anticipated cost shared intangibles) that are reasonably anticipated to contribute to the CSA Activity within the controlled participant's division.	§ 1.482-7(g)(2)(ii), (g)(4)(iii), (g)(7)(iii)(B).
PCT Payee	§ 1.482-7(b)(1)(ii).
PCT Payment	§ 1.482-7(b)(1)(ii).
PCT Payor	§ 1.482-7(b)(1)(ii), (i)(6)(i).
PCT Payor WACC	§ 1.482-7(i)(6)(iv)(D).
Periodic adjustments	§ 1.482-7(i)(6)(i).
Periodic Trigger	§ 1.482-7(i)(6)(i).
Platform contribution transaction or PCT	§ 1.482-7(a)(2), (b)(1)(ii).
Platform contributions	§ 1.482-7(c)(1).
Post-tax income	§ 1.482-7(g)(2)(v)(B)(4), (g)(4)(i)(G).
Pre-tax income	§ 1.482-7(g)(2)(v)(B)(4), (g)(4)(i)(G).
Projected benefit shares	§ 1.482-7(i)(2)(ii)(A).
PRRR	§ 1.482-7(i)(6)(ii).

Term	Definition	Main cross references
PVI	§ 1.482-7(i)(6)(iii)(C).
PVTP	§ 1.482-7(i)(6)(iii)(B).
Reasonably anticipated benefits	A controlled participant's <i>reasonably anticipated benefits</i> mean the benefits that reasonably may be anticipated to be derived from exploiting cost shared intangibles. For purposes of this definition, benefits mean the sum of additional revenue generated, plus cost savings, minus any cost increases from exploiting cost shared intangibles.	§ 1.482-7(e)(1).
Reasonably anticipated benefits or RAB shares	§ 1.482-7(a)(1), (e)(1).
Reasonably anticipated cost shared intangible	§ 1.482-7(d)(1)(ii).
Relevant business activity	§ 1.482-7(g)(7)(i).
Routine contributions	<i>Routine contributions</i> means a controlled participant's contributions to the relevant business activities that are of the same or similar kind to those made by uncontrolled taxpayers involved in similar business activities for which it is possible to identify market returns. Routine contributions ordinarily include contributions of tangible property, services and intangibles that are generally owned by uncontrolled taxpayers engaged in similar activities. A functional analysis is required to identify these contributions according to the functions performed, risks assumed, and resources employed by each of the controlled participants.	§ 1.482-7(g)(4), (g)(7).
Routine platform and operating contributions, and net routine platform and operating contributions	§ 1.482-7(g)(4)(vii), 7(g)(7)(iii)(C)(4). 1.482-
Specified payment form	§ 1.482-7(h)(3).
Stock-based compensation	§ 1.482-7(d)(3).
Stock options	§ 1.482-7(d)(3)(i).
Subsequent PCT	§ 1.482-7(g)(2)(viii).
Target	§ 1.482-7(g)(5)(i).
Tax rate	Reasonably anticipated effective tax rate with respect to the pre-tax income to which the tax rate is being applied. For example, under the income method, this rate would be the reasonably anticipated effective tax rate of the PCT Payor or PCT Payee under the cost sharing alternative or the licensing alternative, as appropriate.	§ 1.482-7(g)(2)(v)(B)(4)(ii), (g)(4)(i)(G).
Trigger PCT	§ 1.482-7(i)(6)(i).
Variable input parameter	§ 1.482-7(g)(2)(ix)(C).
WACC	WACC means weighted average cost of capital.	§ 1.482-7(i)(6)(iv)(D).

(ii) *Examples.* The following examples illustrate certain definitions in paragraph (j)(1)(i) of this section:

Example 1. Controlled participant. Foreign Parent (FP) is a foreign corporation engaged in the extraction of a natural resource. FP has a U.S. subsidiary (USS) to which FP sells supplies of this resource for sale in the United States. FP enters into a CSA with USS to develop a new machine to extract the natural resource. The machine uses a new extraction process that will be patented in

the United States and in other countries. The CSA provides that USS will receive the rights to exploit the machine in the extraction of the natural resource in the United States, and FP will receive the rights in the rest of the world. This resource does not, however, exist in the United States. Despite the fact that USS has received the right to exploit this process in the United States, USS is not a controlled participant because it will not derive a benefit from exploiting the intangible developed under the CSA.

Example 2. Controlled participants. (i) U.S. Parent (USP), one foreign subsidiary (FS), and a second foreign subsidiary constituting the group's research arm (R + D) enter into a CSA to develop manufacturing intangibles for a new product line A. USP and FS are assigned the exclusive rights to exploit the intangibles respectively in the United States and the rest of the world, where each presently manufactures and sells various existing product lines. R + D is not assigned any rights to exploit the intangibles. R + D's activity consists solely in carrying out research for the group. It is reliably projected that the RAB shares of USP and FS will be 66% and 33%, respectively, and the parties' agreement provides that USP and FS will reimburse 66% and 33%, respectively, of the IDCs incurred by R + D with respect to the new intangible.

(ii) R + D does not qualify as a controlled participant within the meaning of paragraph (j)(1)(i) of this section, because it will not derive any benefits from exploiting cost shared intangibles. Therefore, R + D is treated as a service provider for purposes of this section and must receive arm's length consideration for the assistance it is deemed to provide to USP and FS, under the rules of paragraph (a)(3) of this section and §§ 1.482-4(f)(3)(iii) and (4), and 1.482-9, as appropriate. Such consideration must be treated as IDCs incurred by USP and FS in proportion to their RAB shares (that is, 66% and 33%, respectively). R + D will not be considered to bear any share of the IDCs under the arrangement.

Example 3. Cost shared intangible, reasonably anticipated cost shared intangible. U.S. Parent (USP) has developed and currently exploits an antihistamine, XY, which is manufactured in tablet form. USP enters into a CSA with its wholly-owned foreign subsidiary (FS) to develop XYZ, a new improved version of XY that will be manufactured as a nasal spray. Work under the CSA is fully devoted to developing XYZ, and XYZ is developed. During the development period, XYZ is a reasonably anticipated cost shared intangible under the CSA. Once developed, XYZ is a cost shared intangible under the CSA.

Example 4. Cost shared intangible. The facts are the same as in *Example 3*, except that in the course of developing XYZ, the controlled participants by accident discover ABC, a cure for disease D. ABC is a cost shared intangible under the CSA.

Example 5. Reasonably anticipated benefits. Controlled parties A and B enter into a cost sharing arrangement to develop product and process intangibles for an already existing Product P. Without such intangibles, A and B would each reasonably anticipate revenue, in present value terms, of \$100M from sales of Product P until it became obsolete. With the intangibles, A and B each reasonably anticipate selling the same number of units each

year, but reasonably anticipate that the price will be higher. Because the particular product intangible is more highly regarded in A's market, A reasonably anticipates an increase of \$20M in present value revenue from the product intangible, while B reasonably anticipates only an increase of \$10M. Further, A and B each reasonably anticipate spending an extra \$5M present value in production costs to include the feature embodying the product intangible. Finally, A and B each reasonably anticipate saving \$2M present value in production costs by using the process intangible. A and B reasonably anticipate no other economic effects from exploiting the cost shared intangibles. A's reasonably anticipated benefits from exploiting the cost shared intangibles equal its reasonably anticipated increase in revenue (\$20M) plus its reasonably anticipated cost savings (\$2M) minus its reasonably anticipated increased costs (\$5M), which equals \$17M. Similarly, B's reasonably anticipated benefits from exploiting the cost shared intangibles equal its reasonably anticipated increase in revenue (\$10M) plus its reasonably anticipated cost savings (\$2M) minus its reasonably anticipated increased costs (\$5M), which equals \$7M. Thus A's reasonably anticipated benefits are \$17M and B's reasonably anticipated benefits are \$7M.

(2) *Special rules*—(i) *Consolidated group.* For purposes of this section, all members of the same consolidated group shall be treated as one taxpayer. For these purposes, the term *consolidated group* means all members of a group of controlled entities created or organized within a single country and subjected to an income tax by such country on the basis of their combined income.

(ii) *Trade or business.* A participant that is a foreign corporation or non-resident alien individual will not be treated as engaged in a trade or business within the United States solely by reason of its participation in a CSA. See generally § 1.864-2(a).

(iii) *Partnership.* A CSA, or an arrangement to which the Commissioner applies the rules of this section, will not be treated as a partnership to which the rules of subchapter K of the Internal Revenue Code apply. See § 301.7701-1(c) of this chapter.

(3) *Character*—(i) *CST Payments.* CST Payments generally will be considered

the payor's costs of developing intangibles at the location where such development is conducted. For these purposes, IDCs borne directly by a controlled participant that are deductible are deemed to be reduced to the extent of any CST Payments owed to it by other controlled participants pursuant to the CSA. Each cost sharing payment received by a payee will be treated as coming pro rata from payments made by all payors and will be applied pro rata against the deductions for the taxable year that the payee is allowed in connection with the IDCs. Payments received in excess of such deductions will be treated as in consideration for use of the land and tangible property furnished for purposes of the CSA by the payee. For purposes of the research credit determined under section 41, CST Payments among controlled participants will be treated as provided for intra-group transactions in §1.41-6(i). Any payment made or received by a taxpayer pursuant to an arrangement that the Commissioner determines not to be a CSA will be subject to the provisions of §§1.482-1 through 1.482-6 and 1.482-9. Any payment that in substance constitutes a cost sharing payment will be treated as such for purposes of this section, regardless of its characterization under foreign law.

(ii) *PCT Payments.* A PCT Payor's payment required under paragraph (b)(1)(ii) of this section is deemed to be reduced to the extent of any payments owed to it under such paragraph from other controlled participants. Each PCT Payment received by a PCT Payee will be treated as coming pro rata out of payments made by all PCT Payors. PCT Payments will be characterized consistently with the designation of the type of transaction pursuant to paragraphs (c)(3) and (k)(2)(ii)(H) of this section. Depending on such designation, such payments will be treated as either consideration for a transfer of an interest in intangible property or for services.

(iii) *Examples.* The following examples illustrate this paragraph (j)(3):

Example 1. U.S. Parent (USP) and its wholly owned Foreign Subsidiary (FS) form a CSA to develop a miniature widget, the Small R. Based on RAB shares, USP agrees to bear 40% and FS to bear 60% of the costs

incurred during the term of the agreement. The principal IDCs are operating costs incurred by FS in Country Z of 100X annually, and costs incurred by USP in the United States also of 100X annually. Of the total costs of 200X, USP's share is 80X and FS's share is 120X so that FS must make a payment to USP of 20X. The payment will be treated as a reimbursement of 20X of USP's costs in the United States. Accordingly, USP's Form 1120 will reflect an 80X deduction on account of activities performed in the United States for purposes of allocation and apportionment of the deduction to source. The Form 5471 "Information Return of U.S. Persons With Respect to Certain Foreign Corporations" for FS will reflect a 100X deduction on account of activities performed in Country Z and a 20X deduction on account of activities performed in the United States.

Example 2. The facts are the same as in *Example 1*, except that the 100X of costs borne by USP consist of 5X of costs incurred by USP in the United States and 95X of arm's length rental charge, as described in paragraph (d)(1)(iii) of this section, for the use of a facility in the United States. The depreciation deduction attributable to the U.S. facility is 7X. The 20X net payment by FS to USP will first be applied in reduction pro rata of the 5X deduction for costs and the 7X depreciation deduction attributable to the U.S. facility. The 8X remainder will be treated as rent for the U.S. facility.

Example 3. (i) Four members (A, B, C, and D) of a controlled group form a CSA to develop the next generation technology for their business. Based on RAB shares, the participants agree to bear shares of the costs incurred during the term of the agreement in the following percentages: A 40%; B 15%; C 25%; and D 20%. The arm's length values of the platform contributions they respectively own are in the following amounts for the taxable year: A 80X; B 40X; C 30X; and D 30X. The provisional (before offsets) and final PCT Payments among A, B, C, and D are shown in the table as follows:

(All amounts stated in X's)

	A	B	C	D
Payments	<40>	<21>	<37.5>	<30>
Receipts	48	34	22.5	24
Final	8	13	<15>	<6>

(ii) The first row/first column shows A's provisional PCT Payment equal to the product of 100X (sum of 40X, 30X, and 30X) and A's RAB share of 40%. The second row/first column shows A's provisional PCT receipts equal to the sum of the products of 80X and B's, C's, and D's RAB shares (15%, 25%, and 20%, respectively). The other entries in the first two rows of the table are similarly computed. The last row shows the final PCT receipts/payments after offsets. Thus, for the

taxable year, A and B are treated as receiving the 8X and 13X, respectively, pro rata out of payments by C and D of 15X and 6X, respectively.

(k) *CSA administrative requirements.* A controlled participant meets the requirements of this paragraph if it substantially complies, respectively, with the CSA contractual, documentation, accounting, and reporting requirements of paragraphs (k)(1) through (4) of this section.

(1) *CSA contractual requirements—(i) In general.* A CSA must be recorded in writing in a contract that is contemporaneous with the formation (and any revision) of the CSA and that includes the contractual provisions described in this paragraph (k)(1).

(ii) *Contractual provisions.* The written contract described in this paragraph (k)(1) must include provisions that—

(A) List the controlled participants and any other members of the controlled group that are reasonably anticipated to benefit from the use of the cost shared intangibles, including the address of each domestic entity and the country of organization of each foreign entity;

(B) Describe the scope of the IDA to be undertaken and each reasonably anticipated cost shared intangible or class of reasonably anticipated cost shared intangibles;

(C) Specify the functions and risks that each controlled participant will undertake in connection with the CSA;

(D) Divide among the controlled participants all divisional interests in cost shared intangibles and specify each controlled participant's divisional interest in the cost shared intangibles, as described in paragraphs (b)(1)(iii) and (4) of this section, that it will own and exploit without any further obligation to compensate any other controlled participant for such interest;

(E) Provide a method to calculate the controlled participants' RAB shares, based on factors that can reasonably be expected to reflect the participants' shares of anticipated benefits, and require that such RAB shares must be updated, as described in paragraph (e)(1) of this section (see also paragraph (k)(2)(ii)(F) of this section);

(F) Enumerate all categories of IDCs to be shared under the CSA;

(G) Specify that the controlled participant must use a consistent method of accounting to determine IDCs and RAB shares, as described in paragraphs (d) and (e) of this section, respectively, and must translate foreign currencies on a consistent basis;

(H) Require the controlled participant to enter into CSTs covering all IDCs, as described in paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section, in connection with the CSA;

(I) Require the controlled participants to enter into PCTs covering all platform contributions, as described in paragraph (b)(1)(ii) of this section, in connection with the CSA;

(J) Specify the form of payment due under each PCT (or group of PCTs) in existence at the formation (and any revision) of the CSA, including information and explanation that reasonably supports an analysis of applicable provisions of paragraph (h) of this section; and

(K) Specify the date on which the CSA is entered into (CSA Start Date) and the duration of the CSA, the conditions under which the CSA may be modified or terminated, and the consequences of a modification or termination (including consequences described under the rules of paragraph (f) of this section).

(iii) *Meaning of contemporaneous—(A) In general.* For purposes of this paragraph (k)(1), a written contractual agreement is contemporaneous with the formation (or revision) of a CSA if, and only if, the controlled participants record the CSA, in its entirety, in a document that they sign and date no later than 60 days after the first occurrence of any IDC described in paragraph (d) of this section to which such agreement (or revision) is to apply.

(B) *Example.* The following example illustrates the principles of this paragraph (k)(1)(iii):

Example. Companies A and B, both of which are members of the same controlled group, commence an IDA on March 1, Year 1. Company A pays the first IDCs in relation to the IDA, as cash salaries to A's research staff, for the staff's work during the first week of March, Year 1. A and B, however, do not sign and date any written contractual agreement

until August 1, Year 1, whereupon they execute a “Cost Sharing Agreement” that purports to be “effective as of” March 1 of Year 1. The arrangement fails the requirement that the participants record their arrangement in a written contractual agreement that is contemporaneous with the formation of a CSA. The arrangement has failed to meet the requirements set forth in paragraph (b)(2) of this section and, pursuant to paragraph (b) of this section, cannot be a CSA.

(iv) *Interpretation of contractual provisions—(A) In general.* The provisions of a written contract described in this paragraph (k)(1) and of the additional documentation described in paragraph (k)(2) of this section must be clear and unambiguous. The provisions will be interpreted by reference to the economic substance of the transaction and the actual conduct of the controlled participants. See § 1.482-1(d)(3)(ii)(B) (Identifying contractual terms). Accordingly, the Commissioner may impute contractual terms in a CSA consistent with the economic substance of the CSA and may disregard contractual terms that lack economic substance. An allocation of risk between controlled participants after the outcome of such risk is known or reasonably knowable lacks economic substance. See § 1.482-1(d)(3)(iii)(B) (Identification of taxpayer that bears risk). A contractual term that is disregarded due to a lack of economic substance does not satisfy a contractual requirement set forth in this paragraph (k)(1) or documentation requirement set forth in paragraph (k)(2) of this section. See paragraph (b)(5) of this section for the treatment of an arrangement among controlled taxpayers that fails to comply with the requirements of this section.

(B) *Examples.* The following examples illustrate the principles of this paragraph (k)(1)(iv). In each example, it is assumed that the Commissioner will exercise the discretion granted pursuant to paragraph (b)(5)(ii) of this section to apply the provisions of this section to the arrangement that purports to be a CSA.

Example 1. The contractual provisions recorded upon formation of an arrangement that purports to be a CSA provide that PCT Payments with respect to a particular platform contribution will consist of payments

contingent on sales. Contrary to the contractual provisions, the PCT Payments actually made are contingent on profits. Because the controlled participants’ actual conduct is different from the contractual terms, the Commissioner may determine, based on the facts and circumstances, that—

(i) The actual payments have economic substance and, therefore, impute payment terms in the CSA consistent with the actual payments; or

(ii) The contract terms reflect the economic substance of the arrangement and, therefore, the actual payments must be adjusted to conform to the terms.

Example 2. An arrangement that purports to be a CSA provides that PCT Payments with respect to a particular platform contribution shall be contingent payments equal to 10% of sales of products that incorporate cost shared intangibles. The contract terms further provide that the controlled participants must adjust such contingent payments in accordance with a formula set forth in the terms. During the first three years of the arrangement, the controlled participants fail to make the adjustments required by the terms with respect to the PCT Payments. The Commissioner may determine, based on the facts and circumstances, that—

(i) The contingent payment terms with respect to the platform contribution do not have economic substance because the controlled participants did not act in accordance with their upfront risk allocation; or

(ii) The contract terms reflect the economic substance of the arrangement and, therefore, the actual payments must be adjusted to conform to the terms.

(2) *CSA documentation requirements—*

(i) *In general.* The controlled participants must timely update and maintain sufficient documentation to establish that the participants have met the CSA contractual requirements of paragraph (k)(1) of this section and the additional CSA documentation requirements of this paragraph (k)(2).

(ii) *Additional CSA documentation requirements.* The controlled participants to a CSA must timely update and maintain documentation sufficient to—

(A) Describe the current scope of the IDA and identify—

(1) Any additions or subtractions from the list of reasonably anticipated cost shared intangibles reported pursuant to paragraph (k)(1)(ii)(B) of this section;

(2) Any cost shared intangible, together with each controlled participant’s interest therein; and

(3) Any further development of intangibles already developed under the CSA or of specified applications of such intangible which has been removed from the IDA (see paragraphs (d)(1)(ii) and (j)(1)(i) of this section for the definitions of reasonably anticipated cost shared intangible and cost shared intangible) and the steps (including any accounting classifications and allocations) taken to implement such removal;

(B) Establish that each controlled participant reasonably anticipates that it will derive benefits from exploiting cost shared intangibles;

(C) Describe the functions and risks that each controlled participant has undertaken during the term of the CSA;

(D) Provide an overview of each controlled participant's business segments, including an analysis of the economic and legal factors that affect CST and PCT pricing;

(E) Establish the amount of each controlled participant's IDCs for each taxable year under the CSA, including all IDCs attributable to stock-based compensation, as described in paragraph (d)(3) of this section (including the method of measurement and timing used in determining such IDCs, and the data, as of the date of grant, used to identify stock-based compensation with the IDA);

(F) Describe the method used to estimate each controlled participant's RAB share for each year during the course of the CSA, including—

(1) All projections used to estimate benefits;

(2) All updates of the RAB shares in accordance with paragraph (e)(1) of this section; and

(3) An explanation of why that method was selected and why the method provides the most reliable measure for estimating RAB shares;

(G) Describe all platform contributions;

(H) Designate the type of transaction involved for each PCT or group of PCTs;

(I) Specify, within the time period provided in paragraph (h)(2)(iii) of this section, the form of payment due under each PCT or group of PCTs, including information and explanation that rea-

sonably supports an analysis of applicable provisions of paragraph (h) of this section;

(J) Describe and explain the method selected to determine the arm's length payment due under each PCT, including—

(1) An explanation of why the method selected constitutes the best method, as described in §1.482-1(c)(2), for measuring an arm's length result;

(2) The economic analyses, data, and projections relied upon in developing and selecting the best method, including the source of the data and projections used;

(3) Each alternative method that was considered, and the reason or reasons that the alternative method was not selected;

(4) Any data that the controlled participant obtains, after the CSA takes effect, that would help determine if the controlled participant's method selected has been applied in a reasonable manner;

(5) The discount rate or rates, where applicable, used for purposes of evaluating PCT Payments, including information and explanation that reasonably supports an analysis of applicable provisions of paragraph (g)(2)(v) of this section;

(6) The estimated arm's length values of any platform contributions as of the dates of the relevant PCTs, in accordance with paragraph (g)(2)(ii) of this section;

(7) A discussion, where applicable, of why transactions were or were not aggregated under the principles of paragraph (g)(2)(iv) of this section;

(8) The method payment form and any conversion made from the method payment form to the specified payment form, as described in paragraph (h)(3) of this section; and

(9) If applicable under paragraph (i)(6)(iv) of this section, the WACC of the parent of the controlled group that includes the controlled participants.

(iii) *Coordination rules and production of documents*—(A) *Coordination with penalty regulations.* See §1.6662-6(d)(2)(iii)(D) regarding coordination of the rules of this paragraph (k) with the documentation requirements for purposes of the accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(e) and (h).

(B) *Production of documentation.* Each controlled participant must provide to the Commissioner, within 30 days of a request, the items described in this paragraph (k)(2) and paragraph (k)(3) of this section. The time for compliance described in this paragraph (k)(2)(iii)(B) may be extended at the discretion of the Commissioner.

(3) *CSA accounting requirements—(i) In general.* The controlled participants must maintain books and records (and related or underlying data and information) that are sufficient to—

(A) Establish that the controlled participants have used (and are using) a consistent method of accounting to measure costs and benefits;

(B) Permit verification that the amount of any contingent PCT Payments due have been (and are being) properly determined;

(C) Translate foreign currencies on a consistent basis; and

(D) To the extent that the method of accounting used materially differs from U.S. generally accepted accounting principles, explain any such material differences.

(ii) *Reliance on financial accounting.* For purposes of this section, the controlled participants may not rely solely upon financial accounting to establish satisfaction of the accounting requirements of this paragraph (k)(3). Rather, the method of accounting must clearly reflect income. *Thor Power Tools Co. v. Commissioner*, 439 U.S. 522 (1979).

(4) *CSA reporting requirements—(i) CSA Statement.* Each controlled participant must file with the Internal Revenue Service, in the manner described in this paragraph (k)(4), a “Statement of Controlled Participant to §1.482-7 Cost Sharing Arrangement” (CSA Statement) that complies with the requirements of this paragraph (k)(4).

(ii) *Content of CSA Statement.* The CSA Statement of each controlled participant must—

(A) State that the participant is a controlled participant in a CSA;

(B) Provide the controlled participant’s taxpayer identification number;

(C) List the other controlled participants in the CSA, the country of organization of each such participant, and

the taxpayer identification number of each such participant;

(D) Specify the earliest date that any IDC described in paragraph (d)(1) of this section occurred; and

(E) Indicate the date on which the controlled participants formed (or revised) the CSA and, if different from such date, the date on which the controlled participants recorded the CSA (or any revision) contemporaneously in accordance with paragraphs (k)(1)(i) and (iii) of this section.

(iii) *Time for filing CSA Statement—(A) 90-day rule.* Each controlled participant must file its original CSA Statement with the Internal Revenue Service Ogden Campus (addressed as follows: “Attn: CSA Statements, Mail Stop 4912, Internal Revenue Service, 1973 North Rulon White Blvd., Ogden, Utah 84404-0040”), no later than 90 days after the first occurrence of an IDC to which the newly-formed CSA applies, as described in paragraph (k)(1)(iii)(A) of this section, or, in the case of a taxpayer that became a controlled participant after the formation of the CSA, no later than 90 days after such taxpayer became a controlled participant. A CSA Statement filed in accordance with this paragraph (k)(4)(iii)(A) must be dated and signed, under penalties of perjury, by an officer of the controlled participant who is duly authorized (under local law) to sign the statement on behalf of the controlled participant.

(B) *Annual return requirement—(1) In general.* Each controlled participant must attach to its U.S. income tax return, for each taxable year for the duration of the CSA, a copy of the original CSA Statement that the controlled participant filed in accordance with the 90-day rule of paragraph (k)(4)(iii)(A) of this section. In addition, the controlled participant must update the information reflected on the original CSA Statement annually by attaching a schedule that documents changes in such information over time.

(2) *Special filing rule for annual return requirement.* If a controlled participant is not required to file a U.S. income tax return, the participant must ensure that the copy or copies of the CSA Statement and any updates are attached to Schedule M of any Form 5471, any Form 5472 “Information Return of

a Foreign Owned Corporation,” or any Form 8865 “Return of U.S. Persons With Respect to Certain Foreign Partnerships,” filed with respect to that participant.

(iv) *Examples.* The following examples illustrate this paragraph (k)(4). In each example, Companies A and B are members of the same controlled group.

Example 1. A and B, both of which file U.S. tax returns, agree to share the costs of developing a new chemical formula in accordance with the provisions of this section. On March 30, Year 1, A and B record their agreement in a written contract styled, “Cost Sharing Agreement.” The contract applies by its terms to IDCs occurring after March 1, Year 1. The first IDCs to which the CSA applies occurred on March 15, Year 1. To comply with paragraph (k)(4)(iii)(A) of this section, A and B individually must file separate CSA Statements no later than 90 days after March 15, Year 1 (June 13, Year 1). Further, to comply with paragraph (k)(4)(iii)(B) of this section, A and B must attach copies of their respective CSA Statements to their respective Year 1 U.S. income tax returns.

Example 2. The facts are the same as in *Example 1*, except that a year has passed and C, which files a U.S. tax return, joined the CSA on May 9, Year 2. To comply with the annual filing requirement described in paragraph (k)(4)(iii)(B) of this section, A and B must each attach copies of their respective CSA Statements (as filed for Year 1) to their respective Year 2 income tax returns, along with a schedule updated appropriately to reflect the changes in information described in paragraph (k)(4)(ii) of this section resulting from the addition of C to the CSA. To comply with both the 90-day rule described in paragraph (k)(4)(iii)(A) of this section and the annual filing requirement described in paragraph (k)(4)(iii)(B) of this section, C must file a CSA Statement no later than 90 days after May 9, Year 2 (August 7, Year 2), and must attach a copy of such CSA Statement to its Year 2 income tax return.

(1) *Effective/applicability dates.* Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph (1), this section applies on December 16, 2011. Paragraphs (g)(2)(v)(B)(2), (g)(4)(vi)(F)(2), and (g)(4)(viii), *Example 8* of this section apply to taxable years beginning on or after December 19, 2011. Paragraphs (g)(4)(v) and (g)(4)(viii), *Example 9* apply to taxable years beginning on or after August 27, 2013.

(m) *Transition rule—(1) In general.* An arrangement in existence on January 5, 2009, will be considered a CSA, as described under paragraph (b) of this sec-

tion, if, prior to such date, it was a qualified cost sharing arrangement under the provisions of §1.482-7 (as contained in the 26 CFR part 1 edition revised as of January 1, 1996, hereafter referred to as “former §1.482-7”), but only if the written contract, as described in paragraph (k)(1) of this section, is amended, if necessary, to conform with, and only if the activities of the controlled participants substantially comply with, the provisions of this section, as modified by paragraphs (m)(2) and (m)(3) of this section, by July 6, 2009.

(2) *Transitional modification of applicable provisions.* For purposes of this paragraph (m), conformity and substantial compliance with the provisions of this section shall be determined with the following modifications:

(i) CSTs and PCTs occurring prior to January 5, 2009, shall be subject to the provisions of former §1.482-7 rather than this section.

(ii) Except to the extent provided in paragraph (m)(3) of this section, PCTs that occur under a CSA that was a qualified cost sharing arrangement under the provisions of former §1.482-7 and remained in effect on January 5, 2009, shall be subject to the periodic adjustment rules of §1.482-4(f)(2) rather than the rules of paragraph (i)(6) of this section.

(iii) Paragraphs (b)(1)(iii) and (b)(4) of this section shall not apply.

(iv) Paragraph (k)(1)(ii)(D) of this section shall not apply.

(v) Paragraphs (k)(1)(ii)(H) and (I) of this section shall be construed as applying only to transactions entered into on or after January 5, 2009.

(vi) The deadline for recordation of the revised written contractual agreement pursuant to paragraph (k)(1)(iii) of this section shall be no later than July 6, 2009.

(vii) Paragraphs (k)(2)(ii)(G) through (J) of this section shall be construed as applying only with reference to PCTs entered into on or after January 5, 2009.

(viii) Paragraph (k)(4)(iii)(A) of this section shall be construed as requiring a CSA Statement with respect to the revised written contractual agreement described in paragraph (m)(2)(vi) of this section no later than September 2, 2009.

(ix) Paragraph (k)(4)(iii)(B) of this section shall be construed as only applying for taxable years ending after the filing of the CSA Statement described in paragraph (m)(2)(viii) of this section.

(3) *Special rule for certain periodic adjustments.* The periodic adjustment rules in paragraph (i)(6) of this section (rather than the rules of § 1.482-4(f)(2)) shall apply to PCTs that occur on or after the date of a material change in the scope of the CSA from its scope as of January 5, 2009. A material change in scope would include a material expansion of the activities undertaken beyond the scope of the intangible development area, as described in former § 1.482-7(b)(4)(iv). For this purpose, a contraction of the scope of a CSA, absent a material expansion into one or more lines of research and development beyond the scope of the intangible development area, does not constitute a material change in scope of the CSA. Whether a material change in scope has occurred is determined on a cumulative basis. Therefore, a series of expansions, any one of which is not a material expansion by itself, may collectively constitute a material expansion.

[T.D. 9568, 76 FR 80090, Dec. 22, 2011, as amended by T.D. 9569, 76 FR 80250, Dec. 23, 2011; 77 FR 3606, Jan. 25, 2012, 77 FR 8814, Feb. 14, 2012; T.D. 9630, 78 FR 52855, Aug. 27, 2013; 78 FR 62426, Oct. 22, 2013]

§ 1.482-8 Examples of the best method rule.

(a) *Introduction.* In accordance with the best method rule of § 1.482-1(c), a method may be applied in a particular case only if the comparability, quality of data, and reliability of assumptions under that method make it more reliable than any other available measure of the arm's length result. The following examples illustrate the comparative analysis required to apply this rule. As with all of the examples in these regulations, these examples are based on simplified facts, are provided solely for purposes of illustrating the type of analysis required under the relevant rule, and do not provide rules of general application. Thus, conclusions reached in these examples as to the relative reliability of methods are based on the assumed facts of the examples,

and are not general conclusions concerning the relative reliability of any method.

(b) *Examples.*

Example 1. Preference for comparable uncontrolled price method. Company A is the U.S. distribution subsidiary of Company B, a foreign manufacturer of consumer electrical appliances. Company A purchases toaster ovens from Company B for resale in the U.S. market. To exploit other outlets for its toaster ovens, Company B also sells its toaster ovens to Company C, an unrelated U.S. distributor of toaster ovens. The products sold to Company A and Company C are identical in every respect and there are no material differences between the transactions. In this case application of the CUP method, using the sales of toaster ovens to Company C, generally will provide a more reliable measure of an arm's length result for the controlled sale of toaster ovens to Company A than the application of any other method. See §§ 1.482-1(c)(2)(i) and -3(b)(2)(ii)(A).

Example 2. Resale price method preferred to comparable uncontrolled price method. The facts are the same as in Example 1, except that the toaster ovens sold to Company A are of substantially higher quality than those sold to Company C and the effect on price of such quality differences cannot be accurately determined. In addition, in order to round out its line of consumer appliances Company A purchases blenders from unrelated parties for resale in the United States. The blenders are resold to substantially the same customers as the toaster ovens, have a similar resale value to the toaster ovens, and are purchased under similar terms and in similar volumes. The distribution functions performed by Company A appear to be similar for toaster ovens and blenders. Given the product differences between the toaster ovens, application of the resale price method using the purchases and resales of blenders as the uncontrolled comparables is likely to provide a more reliable measure of an arm's length result than application of the comparable uncontrolled price method using Company B's sales of toaster ovens to Company C.

Example 3. Resale price method preferred to comparable profits method. (i) The facts are the same as in Example 2 except that Company A purchases all its products from Company B and Company B makes no uncontrolled sales into the United States. However, six uncontrolled U.S. distributors are identified that purchase a similar line of products from unrelated parties. The uncontrolled distributors purchase toaster ovens from unrelated parties, but there are significant differences in the characteristics of the toaster ovens, including the brandnames under which they are sold.