§ 11.16 10 CFR Ch. I (1–1–14 Edition)

(4) Certain applications from individuals having current Federal access authorizations may be processed expeditiously at no cost to the licensee because the Commission, at its discretion, may decide to accept the certification of access authorizations and investigative data from other Federal government agencies that grant personnel access authorizations.

(f)(1) Any Federal employee, employee of a contractor of a Federal agency, licensee, or other person visiting an affected facility for the purpose of conducting official business, who possesses an active NRC or DOE-Q access authorization or an equivalent Federal security clearance granted by another Federal agency ("Top Secret") based on a comparable single scope background investigation may be permitted, in accordance with § 11.11, the same level of unescorted access that an NRC-U special nuclear material access authorization would afford.

(2) Any Federal employee, employee of a contractor of a Federal agency, licensee, or other person visiting an affected facility for the purpose of conducting official business, who possesses an active NRC or DOE-L access authorization or an equivalent security clearance granted by another Federal agency ("Secret") based on a comparable or greater background investigation consisting of a national agency check with law and credit may be permitted, in accordance with § 11.11, the same level of unescorted access that an NRC-R special nuclear material access authorization would afford. An NRC or DOE-L access authorization or an equivalent security clearance ("Secret"), based on a background investigation or national agency check with credit granted or being processed by another Federal agency before January 1, 1998, is acceptable to meet this requirement.

§ 11.21 Application of the criteria.

(a) The decision to grant or deny special nuclear material access authorization is a comprehensive, common-sense judgment, made after consideration of all the relevant information, favorable or unfavorable, that to grant or deny special nuclear material access authorization is or is not inimical to the common defense and security and is or is not clearly consistent with the national interest.

(b) To assist in making these determinations, on the basis of all the information in a particular case, there are set forth in § 10.11 of this chapter a number of specific types of derogatory information. These criteria are not exhaustive but contain the principal types of derogatory information which in the opinion of the Commission create a question as to the individual’s eligibility for special nuclear material access authorization. These criteria are subject to continuing review and may be revised from time to time as experience and circumstances may make desirable.

(c) When the reports of an investigation of an individual contain information reasonably falling within one or more of the classes of derogatory information listed in § 10.11, it creates a