§ 1.482–7T

Methods to determine taxable income in connection with a cost sharing arrangement (temporary).

(a) through (g)(2)(v)(B)(1) [Reserved] For further guidance, see §1.482–7(a) through (g)(2)(v)(B)(1).

(2) Implied discount rates. In some circumstances, the particular discount rate or rates used for certain activities or transactions logically imply that certain other activities will have a particular discount rate or set of rates (implied discount rates). To the extent that an implied discount rate is inappropriate in light of the facts and circumstances, which may include reliable direct evidence of the appropriate discount rate applicable for such other activities, the reliability of any method is reduced where such method is based on the discount rates from which such an inappropriate implied discount rate is derived. See paragraphs (g)(4)(vi)(F)(2) and (g)(4)(vi)(F)(3), Example 8 of this section.


(2) Use of differential income stream as a consideration in assessing the best method. An analysis under the income method that uses a different discount rate for the cost sharing alternative than for the licensing alternative will be more reliable the greater the extent to which the implied discount rate for the projected present value of the differential income stream is consistent with reliable direct evidence of the appropriate discount rate applicable for activities reasonably anticipated to generate an income stream with a similar risk profile to the differential income stream. Such differential income stream is defined as the stream of the reasonably anticipated residuals of the PCT Payor's licensing payments to be made under the licensing alternative, minus the PCT Payor's cost contributions to be made under the cost sharing alternative. See, for example, Example 8 of this paragraph (g)(4)(vi).

(g)(4)(vii) through (viii) (Example 7) [Reserved] For further guidance, see §1.482–7(g)(4)(vii) through (g)(4)(viii) (Example 7).

(viii) Example 8. (i) The facts are the same as in Example 1, except that the taxpayer determines that the appropriate discount rate for the cost sharing alternative is 20%. In addition, the taxpayer determines that the appropriate discount rate for the licensing alternative is 10%. Accordingly, the taxpayer determines that the appropriate present value of the PCT Payment is $146 million.

(ii) Based on the best method analysis described in Example 2, the Commissioner determines that the taxpayer's calculation of the present value of the PCT Payments is outside of the interquartile range (as shown in the sixth column of Example 2), and thus warrants an adjustment. Furthermore, in evaluating the taxpayer's analysis, the Commissioner undertakes an analysis based on the difference in the financial projections between the cost sharing and licensing alternatives (as shown in column 11 of Example 1). This column shows the anticipated differential income stream of additional positive or negative income for PS over the duration of the CSA Activity that would result from undertaking the cost sharing alternative (before any PCT Payments) rather than the licensing alternative. This anticipated differential income stream thus reflects the anticipated incremental undiscounted profits to FS from the incremental activity of undertaking the risk of developing the cost shared intangibles and enjoying the value of its divisional interests. Taxpayer's analysis logically implies that the present value of this stream must be $146 million, since only then would FS have the same anticipated value in both the cost sharing and licensing alternatives. A present value of $146 million implies that the discount rate applicable to this stream is 34.4%. Based on a reliable calculation of discount rates applicable to the anticipated income streams of uncontrolled companies whose resources, capabilities, and
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Examples of the best method rule.

(a) Introduction. In accordance with the best method rule of §1.482–1(c), a method may be applied in a particular case only if the comparability, quality of data, and reliability of assumptions under that method make it more reliable than any other available measure of the arm’s length result. The following examples illustrate the comparative analysis required to apply this rule. As with all of the examples in these regulations, these examples are based on simplified facts, are provided solely for purposes of illustrating the type of analysis required under the relevant rule, and do not provide rules of general application. Thus, conclusions reached in these examples as to the relative reliability of methods are based on the assumed facts of the examples, and are not general conclusions concerning the relative reliability of any method.

(b) Examples.

Example 1. Preference for comparable uncontrolled price method. Company A is the U.S. distribution subsidiary of Company B, a foreign manufacturer of consumer electrical appliances. Company A purchases toaster ovens from Company B for resale in the United States market. To exploit other outlets for its toaster ovens, Company B also sells its toaster ovens to Company C, an unrelated U.S. distributor of toaster ovens. The products sold to Company A and Company C are identical in every respect and there are no material differences between the transactions. In this case application of the CUP method, using the sales of toaster ovens to Company C, generally will provide a more reliable measure of an arm’s length result for the controlled sale of toaster ovens to Company A than the application of any other method. See §§1.482–1(c)(2)(i) and –3(b)(2)(ii)(A).

Example 2. Resale price method preferred to comparable uncontrolled price method. The facts are the same as in Example 1, except that the toaster ovens sold to Company A are of substantially higher quality than those sold to Company C and the effect on price of such quality differences cannot be accurately determined. In addition, in order to round out its line of consumer appliances Company A purchases blenders from unrelated parties for resale in the United States. The blenders are resold to substantially the same customers as the toaster ovens, have a similar resale value to the toaster ovens, and are purchased under similar terms and in similar volumes. The distribution functions performed by Company A appear to be similar for toaster ovens and blenders. Given the product differences between the toaster ovens, application of the resale price method using the purchases and resales of blenders as the uncontrolled comparables is likely to provide a more reliable measure of an arm’s length result than application of the comparable uncontrolled price method using Company B’s sales of toaster ovens to Company C.

Example 3. Resale price method preferred to comparable profits method. (i) The facts are the same as in Example 2 except that Company A purchases all its products from Company B and Company B makes no uncontrolled sales into the United States. However, six uncontrolled U.S. distributors are identified that purchase a similar line of products from unrelated parties. The uncontrolled distributors purchase toaster ovens from unrelated parties, but there are significant differences in the characteristics of the toaster ovens, including the brandnames under which they are sold.

(ii) Under the facts of this case, reliable adjustments for the effect of the different rights consist primarily of software applications intangibles and research and development teams similar to USP’s platform contributions to the CSA, and which income streams, accordingly, may be reasonably anticipated to reflect a similar risk profile to the differential income stream, the Commissioner concludes that an appropriate discount rate for the anticipated income stream associated with USP’s platform contributions (that is, the additional positive or negative income over the duration of the CSA Activity that would result, before PCT Payments, from switching from the licensing alternative to the cost sharing alternative) is 16%, which is significantly less than 34.4%. This conclusion further suggests that Taxpayer’s analysis is unreliable. See paragraphs (g)(2)(v)(B)(2) and (4)(vi)(F)(i) and (2) of this section.

(iii) The Commissioner makes an adjustment of $296 million, so that the present value of the PCT Payments is $442 million (the median results as shown in column 6 of Example 2).

(g)(5) through (k) [Reserved] For further guidance, see §1.482–7(g) through (k).


(m) [Reserved] For further guidance, see §1.482–7(m).

(n) Expiration date. The applicability of this section expires on December 19, 2014.