§ 35.4 Instructions for Continued Airworthiness.

The applicant must prepare Instructions for Continued Airworthiness in accordance with appendix A to this part that are acceptable to the Administrator. The instructions may be incomplete at type certification if a program exists to ensure their completion prior to delivery of the first aircraft with the propeller installed, or upon issuance of a standard certificate of airworthiness for an aircraft with the propeller installed, whichever occurs later.

[Amdt. 35–5, 45 FR 60381, Sept. 11, 1980]

§ 35.5 Propeller ratings and operating limitations.

(a) Propeller ratings and operating limitations must:
   (1) Be established by the applicant and approved by the Administrator.
   (2) Be included directly or by reference in the propeller type certificate data sheet, as specified in §21.41 of this chapter.
   (3) Be based on the operating conditions demonstrated during the tests required by this part as well as any other information the Administrator requires as necessary for the safe operation of the propeller.

(b) Propeller ratings and operating limitations must be established for the following, as applicable:
   (1) Power and rotational speed:
      (i) For takeoff.
      (ii) For maximum continuous.
   (iii) If requested by the applicant, other ratings may also be established.
   (2) Overspeed and overtorque limits.

[Amdt. 35–8, 73 FR 63346, Oct. 24, 2008]
flight hour). Since the estimated probability for individual failures may be insufficiently precise to enable the applicant to assess the total rate for hazardous propeller effects, compliance may be shown by demonstrating that the probability of a hazardous propeller effect arising from an individual failure can be predicted to be not greater than $10^{-8}$ per propeller flight hour. In dealing with probabilities of this low order of magnitude, absolute proof is not possible and reliance must be placed on engineering judgment and previous experience combined with sound design and test philosophies.

(b) If significant doubt exists as to the effects of failures or likely combination of failures, the Administrator may require assumptions used in the analysis to be verified by test.

(c) The primary failures of certain single elements (for example, blades) cannot be sensibly estimated in numerical terms. If the failure of such elements is likely to result in hazardous propeller effects, then compliance may be shown by reliance on the prescribed integrity requirements of this part. These instances must be stated in the safety analysis.

(d) If reliance is placed on a safety system to prevent a failure progressing to hazardous propeller effects, the possibility of a safety system failure in combination with a basic propeller failure must be included in the analysis. Such a safety system may include safety devices, instrumentation, early warning devices, maintenance checks, and other similar equipment or procedures. If items of the safety system are outside the control of the propeller manufacturer, the assumptions of the safety analysis with respect to the reliability of these parts must be clearly stated in the analysis and identified in the propeller installation and operation instructions required under §35.3.

(e) If the safety analysis depends on one or more of the following items, those items must be identified in the analysis and appropriately substantiated.

1. Maintenance actions being carried out at stated intervals. This includes verifying that items that could fail in a latent manner are functioning properly. When necessary to prevent hazardous propeller effects, these maintenance actions and intervals must be published in the instructions for continued airworthiness required under §35.4. Additionally, if errors in maintenance of the propeller system could lead to hazardous propeller effects, the appropriate maintenance procedures must be included in the relevant propeller manuals.

2. Verification of the satisfactory functioning of safety or other devices at pre-flight or other stated periods. The details of this satisfactory functioning must be published in the appropriate manual.

3. The provision of specific instrumentation not otherwise required. Such instrumentation must be published in the appropriate documentation.


(f) If applicable, the safety analysis must include, but not be limited to, assessment of indicating equipment, manual and automatic controls, governors and propeller control systems, synchrophasers, synchronizers, and propeller thrust reversal systems.

(g) Unless otherwise approved by the Administrator and stated in the safety analysis, the following failure definitions apply to compliance with this part.

1. The following are regarded as hazardous propeller effects:
   (i) The development of excessive drag.
   (ii) A significant thrust in the opposite direction to that commanded by the pilot.
   (iii) The release of the propeller or any major portion of the propeller.
   (iv) A failure that results in excessive unbalance.

2. The following are regarded as major propeller effects for variable pitch propellers:
   (i) An inability to feather the propeller for feathering propellers.
   (ii) An inability to change propeller pitch when commanded.
   (iii) A significant uncommanded change in pitch.
   (iv) A significant uncontrollable torque or speed fluctuation.

[Amdt. 35–8, 73 FR 63346, Oct. 24, 2008]