 § 33.72 Hydraulic actuating systems.

Each hydraulic actuating system must function properly under all conditions in which the engine is expected to operate. Each filter or screen must be accessible for servicing and each tank must meet the design criteria of §33.71.

§ 33.73 Power or thrust response.

The design and construction of the engine must enable an increase—

(a) From minimum to rated takeoff power or thrust with the maximum bleed air and power extraction to be
§ 33.75 Safety analysis.

(a) (1) The applicant must analyze the engine, including the control system, to assess the likely consequences of all failures that can reasonably be expected to occur. This analysis will take into account, if applicable:

(i) Aircraft-level devices and procedures assumed to be associated with a typical installation. Such assumptions must be stated in the analysis.

(ii) Consequential secondary failures and latent failures.

(iii) Multiple failures referred to in paragraph (d) of this section or that result in the hazardous engine effects defined in paragraph (g)(2) of this section.

(b) The applicant must summarize those failures that could result in major engine effects or hazardous engine effects, as defined in paragraph (g) of this section, and estimate the probability of occurrence of those effects. Any engine part the failure of which could reasonably result in a hazardous engine effect must be clearly identified in this summary.

(3) The applicant must show that hazardous engine effects are predicted to occur at a rate not in excess of that defined as extremely remote (probability range of 10⁻⁷ to 10⁻⁹ per engine flight hour). Since the estimated probability for individual failures may be insufficiently precise to enable the applicant to assess the total rate for hazardous engine effects, compliance may be shown by demonstrating that the probability of a hazardous engine effect arising from an individual failure can be predicted to be not greater than 10⁻⁸ per engine flight hour. In dealing with probabilities of this low order of magnitude, absolute proof is not possible, and compliance may be shown by reliance on engineering judgment and previous experience combined with sound design and test philosophies.

(4) The applicant must show that major engine effects are predicted to occur at a rate not in excess of that defined as remote (probability range of 10⁻⁵ to 10⁻⁷ per engine flight hour).

(b) The FAA may require that any assumption as to the effects of failures and likely combination of failures be verified by test.

(c) The primary failure of certain single elements cannot be sensibly estimated in numerical terms. If the failure of such elements is likely to result in hazardous engine effects, then compliance may be shown by reliance on the prescribed integrity requirements of §§33.15, 33.27, and 33.70 as applicable. These instances must be stated in the safety analysis.

(d) If reliance is placed on a safety system to prevent a failure from progressing to hazardous engine effects, the possibility of a safety system failure in combination with a basic engine failure must be included in the analysis. Such a safety system may include safety devices, instrumentation, early warning devices, maintenance checks,