compelling circumstances. Neither unfavorable market conditions, nor the possibility that the company may incur some loss, should alone be viewed as constituting such circumstances—particularly if the company has failed to take earlier steps to accomplish a divestiture under more favorable circumstances. Normally, a request for an extension will not be considered unless the company has established that it has made substantial and continued good faith efforts to accomplish the divestiture within the prescribed period. Furthermore, requests for extensions of divestiture periods must be made sufficiently in advance of the expiration of the prescribed period both to enable the Board to consider the request in an orderly manner and to enable the company to effect a timely divestiture in the event the request for extension is denied. Companies subject to divestiture requirements should be aware that a failure to accomplish a divestiture within the prescribed period may in and of itself be viewed as a separate violation of the Act.

5) Use of trustees. In appropriate cases a company subject to a divestiture requirement may be required to place the assets subject to divestiture with an independent trustee under instructions to accomplish a sale by a specified date, by public auction if necessary. Such a trustee may be given the responsibility for exercising the voting rights with respect to shares being divested. The use of such a trustee may be particularly appropriate where the divestiture is intended to terminate a control relationship established or maintained in violation of law, or where the divesting company has demonstrated an inability or unwillingness to take timely steps to effect a divestiture.

6) Presumptions of control. Bank holding companies contemplating a divestiture should be mindful of section 2(g)(3) of the Bank Holding Company Act, which creates a presumption of continued control over the transferred assets where the transferee is indebted to the transferor, or where certain interlocks exist, as well as §225.2 of Regulation Y, which sets forth certain additional control presumptions. Where one of these presumptions has arisen with respect to divested assets, the divestiture will not be considered as complete until the presumption has been overcome. It should be understood that the inquiry into the termination of control relationships is not limited by the statutory and regulatory presumptions of control, and that the Board may conclude that a control relationship still exists even though the presumptions do not apply.

7) Role of the Reserve Banks. The Reserve Banks have a responsibility for supervising and enforcing divestitures. Specifically, in coordination with Board staff they should review divestiture plans to assure that proposed divestitures will result in the termination of control relationships and will not create unsafe or unsound conditions in any bank or bank holding company; they should monitor periodic progress reports to assure that timely steps are being taken to effect divestitures; and they should prompt companies to take such steps when it appears that progress is not being made. Where Reserve Banks have delegated authority to extend divestiture periods, that authority should be exercised consistently with this policy statement.

[42 FR 10969, Feb. 25, 1977]

§ 225.139 Presumption of continued control under section 2(g)(3) of the Bank Holding Company Act.

(a) Section 2(g)(3) of the Bank Holding Company Act (the “Act”) establishes a statutory presumption that where certain specified relationships exist between a transferor and transferee of shares, the transferor (if it is a bank holding company, or a company that would be such but for the transfer) continues to own or control indirectly the transferred shares. This presumption arises by operation of law, as of the date of the transfer, without the need for any order or determination by the Board. Operation of the presumption may be terminated only by the issuance of a Board determination.

The presumption arises where the transferee “is indebted to the transferor, or has one or more officers, directors, trustees, or beneficiaries in common with or subject to control by the transferor.”
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(a) The purpose of section 2(g)(3) is to provide the Board an opportunity to assess the effectiveness of divestitures in certain situations in which there may be a risk that the divestiture will not result in the complete termination of a control relationship. By presuming control to continue as a matter of law, section 2(g)(3) allows the Board to conduct an opportunity for hearing, “that the transferor is not in fact capable of controlling the transferee.”

(b) The purpose of section 2(g)(3) is to provide the Board an opportunity to assess the effectiveness of divestitures in certain situations in which there may be a risk that the divestiture will not result in the complete termination of a control relationship. By presuming control to continue as a matter of law, section 2(g)(3) operates to allow the effectiveness of the divestiture to be assessed before the divesting company is permitted to act on the assumption that the divestiture is complete. Thus, for example, if a holding company divests its banking interest under circumstances where the presumption of continued control arises, the divesting company must continue to consider itself bound by the Act until an appropriate order is entered by the Board dispelling the presumption. Section 2(g)(3) does not establish a substantive rule that invalidates transfers to which it applies, and in a great many cases the Board has acted favorably on applications to have the presumption dispelled. It merely provides a procedural opportunity for Board consideration of the effect of such transfers in advance of their being deemed effective. Whether or not the statutory presumption arises, the substantive test for assessing the effectiveness of a divestiture is the same—that is, the Board must be assured that all control relationships between the transferor and the transferred property have been terminated and will not be reestablished.

2The Board has delegated to its General Counsel the authority to issue such determinations, 12 CFR 265.2(b)(1).

3It should be noted, however, that the Board will require termination of any interlocking management relationships between the divesting company and the transferee or the divested company as a precondition of finding that a divestiture is complete. Similarly, the retention of an economic interest in the divested company that would create an incentive for the divesting company to attempt to influence the management of the divested company will preclude a finding that the divestiture is complete. (See the Board’s Order in the matter of “International Bank”, 1977 Federal Reserve Bulletin 1100, 1113.)

4It has been suggested that the words in common with in section 2(g)(3) evidence an intent to make the presumption applicable only where the transferee is a company having an interlock with the transferor. Such an interpretation would, in the Board’s view, create an unwarranted gap in the coverage of section 2(g)(3). Furthermore, because the presumption clearly arises where the transferee is an individual who is indebted to the
transfer takes the form of a pro-rata distribution, or spin-off, of shares to a company’s shareholders, officers and directors of the transferor company are likely to receive a portion of such shares. The presumption of continued control would, of course, attach to any shares transferred to officers and directors of the divesting company, whether by spinoff or outright sale. However, the presumption will be of legal significance—and will thus require an application under section 2(g)(3)—only where the total number of shares subject to the presumption exceeds one of the applicable thresholds in the Act. For example, where officers and directors of a one-bank holding company receive in the aggregate 25 percent or more of the stock of a bank subsidiary being divested by the holding company, the holding company would be presumed to continue to control the divested bank. In such a case it would be necessary for the divesting company to demonstrate that it no longer controls either the divested bank or the officer/director transferees. However, if officers and directors were to receive in the aggregate less than 25 percent of the bank’s stock (and no other shares were subject to the presumption), section 2(g)(3) would not have the legal effect of presuming continued control of the bank. In the case of a divestiture of nonbank shares, an application under section 2(g)(3) would be required whenever officers and directors of the divesting company received in the aggregate more than 5 percent of the shares of the company being divested.

(3) Although section 2(g)(3) refers to transfers of shares it is not, in the Board’s view, limited to disposition of corporate stock. General or limited partnership interests, for example, are included within the term shares. Furthermore, the transfer of all or substantially all of the assets of a company, or the transfer of such a significant volume of assets that the transfer may in effect constitute the disposition of a separate activity of the company, is deemed by the Board to involve a transfer of shares of that company.

(4) The term indebtedness giving rise to the presumption of continued control under section 2(g)(3) of the Act is not limited to debt incurred in connection with the transfer; it includes any debt outstanding at the time of transfer from the transferee to the transferor or its subsidiaries. However, the Board believes that not every kind of indebtedness was within the contemplation of the Congress when section 2(g)(3) was adopted. Routine business credit of limited amounts and loans for personal or household purposes are generally not the kinds of indebtedness that, standing alone, support a presumption that the creditor is able to control the debtor. Accordingly, the Board does not regard the presumption of section 2(g)(3) as applicable to the following categories of credit, provided the extensions of credit are not secured by the transferred property and are made in the ordinary course of business of the transferor (or its subsidiary) that is regularly engaged in the business of extending credit:

(i) Consumer credit extended for personal or household use to an individual transferee; (ii) student loans made for the education of the individual transferee or a spouse or child of the transferee; (iii) a home mortgage loan made to an individual transferee for the purchase of a residence for the individual’s personal use and secured by the residence; and (iv) loans made to companies (as defined in section 2(b) of the Act) in an aggregate amount not exceeding ten percent of the total purchase price (or if not sold, the fair market value) of the transferred property. The amounts and terms of the preceding categories of credit should not differ substantially from similar credit extended in comparable circumstances to others who are not transferees. It should be understood that, while the statutory presumption in situations involving these categories of credit may not apply, the Board is not precluded in any case from examining the facts of a particular transfer and finding that

5 Of course, the fact that section 2(g)(3) would not operate to presume continued control would not necessarily mean that control had in fact been terminated if control could be exercised through other means.
§ 225.140 Disposition of property acquired in satisfaction of debts previously contracted.

(a) The Board recently considered the permissibility, under section 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act, of a subsidiary of a bank holding company acquiring and holding assets acquired in satisfaction of a debt previously contracted in good faith (a “dpc” acquisition). In the situation presented, a lending subsidiary of a bank holding company made a “dpc” acquisition of assets and transferred them to a wholly-owned subsidiary of the bank holding company for the purpose of effecting an orderly divestiture. The question presented was whether such “dpc” assets could be held indefinitely by a bank holding company subsidiary as incidental to its permissible lending activity.

(b) While the Board believes that “dpc” acquisitions may be regarded as normal, necessary and incidental to the business of lending, the Board does not believe that the holding of assets acquired “dpc” without any time restrictions is appropriate from the standpoint of prudent banking and in light of the prohibitions in section 4 of the Act against engaging in nonbank activities. If a nonbanking subsidiary of a bank holding company were permitted, either directly or through a subsidiary, to hold “dpc” assets of substantial amount over an extended period of time, the holding of such property could result in an unsafe or unsound banking practice or in the holding company engaging in an impermissible activity in connection with the assets, rather than liquidating them.

(c) The Board notes that section 4(c)(2) of the Bank Holding Company Act provides an exemption from the prohibitions of section 4 of the Act for bank holding company subsidiaries to acquire shares “dpc”. It also provides that such “dpc” shares may be held for a period of two years, subject to the Board’s authority to grant three one-year extensions up to a maximum of five years. Viewed in light of the Congressional policy evidenced by section

66It should be noted that in the event a third party should take exception to a Board order under section 2(g)(3) finding that control has been terminated, any rights such party might have would not be prejudiced by the order. If such party brought facts to the Board’s attention indicating that control had not been terminated the Board would have ample authority to revoke its order and take necessary remedial action.

Orders issued under section 2(g)(3) are published in the Federal Reserve “Bulletin.”