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an early, if not necessarily conclusive, resolution of those issues.


APPENDIX R TO PART 50—FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM FOR NUCLEAR POWER FACILITIES OPERATING PRIOR TO JANUARY 1, 1979

I. INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE

This appendix applies to licensed nuclear power electric generating stations that were operating prior to January 1, 1979, except to the extent set forth in §50.48(b) of this part. With respect to certain generic issues for such facilities it sets forth fire protection features required to satisfy Criterion 3 of appendix A to this part.

Criterion 3 of appendix A to this part specifies that “Structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be designed and located to minimize, consistent with other safety requirements, the probability and effect of fires and explosions.”

When considering the effects of fire, those systems associated with achieving and maintaining safe shutdown conditions assume major importance to safety because damage to them can lead to core damage resulting from loss of coolant through boiloff.

The phrases “important to safety,” or “safety-related,” will be used throughout this appendix R as applying to all safety functions. The phrase “safe shutdown” will be used throughout this appendix as applying to both hot and cold shutdown functions.

Because fire may affect safe shutdown systems and because the loss of function of systems used to mitigate the consequences of design basis accidents under postfire conditions does not per se impact public safety, the need to limit fire damage to systems required to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions is greater than the need to limit fire damage to those systems required to mitigate the consequences of design basis accidents. Three levels of fire damage limits are established according to the safety functions of the structure, system, or component.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Safety function</th>
<th>Fire damage limits</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Hot Shutdown ...</td>
<td>One train of equipment necessary to achieve hot shutdown from either the control room or emergency control station(s) must be maintained free of fire damage by a single fire, including an exposure fire.</td>
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Design Basis Accidents.

Both trains of equipment necessary for mitigation of consequences following design basis accidents may be damaged by a single exposure fire.

I Exposure Fire. An exposure fire is a fire in a given area that involves either in situ or transient combustibles and is external to any structures, systems, or components located in or adjacent to that same area. The effects of such fire (e.g., smoke, heat, or ignition) can adversely affect those structures, systems, or components important to safety. Thus, a fire involving one train of safe shutdown equipment may constitute an exposure fire for the redundant train located in the same area, and a fire involving combustibles other than either redundant train may constitute an exposure fire to both redundant trains located in the same area.

The most stringent fire damage limit shall apply for those systems that fall into more than one category. Redundant systems used to mitigate the consequences of other design basis accidents but not necessary for safe shutdown may be lost to a single exposure fire. However, protection shall be provided so that a fire within only one such system will not damage the redundant system.

II. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS

A. Fire protection program. A fire protection program shall be established at each nuclear power plant. The program shall establish the fire protection policy for the protection of structures, systems, and components important to safety at each plant and the procedures, equipment, and personnel required to implement the program at the plant site.

The fire protection program shall be under the direction of an individual who has been delegated authority commensurate with the responsibilities of the position and who has available staff personnel knowledgeable in both fire protection and nuclear safety.

The fire protection program shall extend the concept of defense-in-depth to fire protection in fire areas important to safety, with the following objectives:

• To prevent fires from starting;

• To detect rapidly, control, and extinguish promptly those fires that do occur;

• To provide protection for structures, systems, and components important to safety so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished by the fire suppression activities will not prevent the safe shutdown of the plant.

B. Fire hazards analysis. A fire hazards analysis shall be performed by qualified fire protection and reactor systems engineers to (1) consider potential in situ and transient fire hazards; (2) determine the consequences of fire in any location in the plant on the ability to safely shut down the reactor or on
the ability to minimize and control the release of radioactivity to the environment; and (3) specify measures for fire prevention, fire detection, fire suppression, and fire containment and alternative shutdown capability as required for each fire area containing structures, systems, and components important to safety in accordance with NRC guidelines and regulations.

C. Fire prevention features. Fire protection features shall meet the following general requirements for all fire areas that contain or present a fire hazard to structures, systems, or components important to safety.

1. In situ fire hazards shall be identified and suitable protection provided.
2. Transient fire hazards associated with normal operation, maintenance, repair, or modification activities shall be identified and eliminated where possible. Those transient fire hazards that can not be eliminated shall be controlled and suitable protection provided.
3. Fire detection systems, portable extinguishers, and standpipe and hose stations shall be installed.
4. Fire barriers or automatic suppression systems or both shall be installed as necessary to protect redundant systems or components necessary for safe shutdown.
5. A site fire brigade shall be established, trained, and equipped and shall be on site at all times.
6. Fire detection and suppression systems shall be designed, installed, maintained, and tested by personnel properly qualified by experience and training in fire protection systems.
7. Surveillance procedures shall be established to ensure that fire barriers are in place and that fire suppression systems and components are operable.

D. Alternative or dedicated shutdown capability. In areas where the fire protection features cannot ensure safe shutdown capability in the event of a fire in that area, alternative or dedicated safe shutdown capability shall be provided.

III. SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

A. Water supplies for fire suppression systems. Two separate water supplies shall be provided to furnish necessary water volume and pressure to the fire main loop.

Each supply shall consist of a storage tank, pump, piping, and appropriate isolation and control valves. Two separate redundant suctionstions from a large body of water (river, lake, etc.) will satisfy the requirement for two separated water storage tanks. These supplies shall be separated so that a failure of one supply will not result in a failure of the other supply.

Each supply of the fire water distribution system shall be capable of providing for a period of 2 hours the maximum expected water demands as determined by the fire hazards analysis for safety-related areas or other areas that present a fire exposure hazard to safety-related areas.

When storage tanks are used for combined service-water/fire-water uses the minimum volume for fire uses shall be ensured by means of dedicated tanks or by some physical means such as a vertical standpipe for other water service. Administrative controls, including locks for tank outlet valves, are unacceptable as the only means to ensure minimum water volume.

Other water systems used as one of the two fire water supplies shall be permanently connected to the fire main system and shall be capable of automatic alignment to the fire main system. Pumps, controls, and power supplies in these systems shall satisfy the requirements for the main fire pumps. The use of other water systems for fire protection shall not be incompatible with their functions required for safe plant shutdown. Failure of the other system shall not degrade the fire main system.

B. Sectional isolation valves. Sectional isolation valves such as post indicator valves or key operated valves shall be installed in the fire main loop to permit isolation of portions of the fire main loop for maintenance or repair without interrupting the entire water supply.

C. Hydrant isolation valves. Valves shall be installed to permit isolation of outside hydrants from the fire main for maintenance or repair without interrupting the water supply to automatic or manual fire suppression systems in any area containing or presenting a fire hazard to safety-related or safe shutdown equipment.

D. Manual fire suppression. Standpipe and hose systems shall be installed so that at least one effective hose stream will be able to reach any location that contains or presents an exposure fire hazard to structures, systems, or components important to safety.

Access to permit effective functioning of the fire brigade shall be provided to all areas that contain or present an exposure fire hazard to structures, systems, or components important to safety.

Standpipe and hose stations shall be inside PWR containments and BWR containments that are not inerted. Standpipe and hose stations inside containment may be connected to a high quality water supply of sufficient quantity and pressure other than the fire main loop if plant-specific features prevent extending the fire main supply inside containment. For BWR drywells, standpipe and hose stations shall be placed outside the dry well with adequate lengths of hose to reach any location inside the dry well with an effective hose stream.

E. Hydrostatic hose tests. Fire hose shall be hydrostatically tested at a pressure of 150 psi or 50 psi above maximum fire main operating...
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pressure, whichever is greater. Hose stored in outside hose houses shall be tested annually. Interior standpipe hose shall be tested every three years.

F. Automatic fire detection. Automatic fire detection systems shall be installed in all areas of the plant that contain or present an exposure fire hazard to safe shutdown or safety-related systems or components. These fire detection systems shall be capable of operating with or without offsite power.

G. Fire protection of safe shutdown capability. 1. Fire protection features shall be provided for structures, systems, and components important to safe shutdown. These features shall be capable of limiting fire damage so that:

a. One train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions from either the control room or emergency control station(s) is free of fire damage; and

b. Systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown from either the control room or emergency control station(s) can be repaired within 72 hours.

2. Except as provided for in paragraph G.3 of this section, where cables or equipment, including associated non-safety circuits that could prevent operation or cause maloperation due to hot shorts, open circuits, or shorts to ground, of redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions are located within the same fire area outside of primary containment, one of the following means of ensuring that one of the redundant trains is free of fire damage shall be provided:

a. Separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of redundant trains by a fire barrier having a 3-hour rating. Structural steel forming a part of or supporting such fire barriers shall be protected to provide fire resistance equivalent to that required of the barrier;

b. Separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of redundant trains by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening combustibles or fire hazards. In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area;

c. Enclosure of cable and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of one redundant train in a fire barrier having a 1-hour rating. In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area;

Inside nonintertwined containments one of the following fire protection means specified above or one of the following fire protection means shall be provided:

d. Separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of redundant trains by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening combustibles or fire hazards;

e. Installation of fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system in the fire area;

F. Separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of redundant trains by a noncombustible radiant energy shield.

3. Alternative of dedicated shutdown capability and its associated circuits.1 Independent of cables, systems or components in the area, room, zone under consideration should be provided:

a. Where the protection of systems whose function is required for hot shutdown does not satisfy the requirement of paragraph G.2 of this section; or

b. Where redundant trains of systems required for hot shutdown located in the same fire area may be subject to damage from fire suppression activities or from the rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems.

In addition, fire detection and a fixed fire suppression system shall be installed in the area, room, or zone under consideration.

H. Fire brigade. A site fire brigade trained and equipped for fire fighting shall be established to ensure adequate manual fire fighting capability for all areas of the plant containing structures, systems, or components important to safety. The fire brigade shall be at least five members on each shift. The brigade leader and at least two brigade members shall have sufficient training in or knowledge of plant safety-related systems to understand the effects of fire and fire suppressants on safe shutdown capability. The qualification of fire brigade members shall include an annual physical examination to determine their ability to perform strenuous fire fighting activities. The shift supervisor shall not be a member of the fire brigade. The brigade leader shall be competent to assess the potential safety consequences of a fire and advise control room personnel. Such competence by the brigade leader may be evidenced by possession of an operator's license or equivalent knowledge of plant safety-related systems.

The minimum equipment provided for the brigade shall consist of personal protective equipment such as turnout coats, boots, gloves, hard hats, emergency communications equipment, portable lights, portable ventilation equipment, and portable extinguishers. Self-contained breathing apparatus

1 Alternative shutdown capability is provided by rerouting, relocating, or modifying existing systems; dedicated shutdown capability is provided by installing new structures and systems for the function of post-fire shutdown.
using full-face positive-pressure masks approved by NIOSH (National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health—approval formerly given by the U.S. Bureau of Mines) shall be provided for fire brigade, damage control, and control room personnel. At least 10 masks shall be available for fire brigade personnel. Control room personnel may be furnished breathing air by a manifold system piped from a storage reservoir if practical. Service or rated operating life shall be a minimum of one-half hour for the self-contained units.

At least a 1-hour supply of breathing air in extra bottles shall be located on the plant site for each unit of self-contained breathing apparatus. In addition, an onsite 6-hour supply of reserve air shall be provided and arranged to permit quick and complete replenishment of exhausted air supply bottles as they are returned. If compressors are used as a source of breathing air, only units approved for breathing air shall be used and the compressors shall be operable assuming a loss of offsite power. Special care must be taken to locate the compressor in areas free of dust and contaminants.

I. Fire brigade training. The fire brigade training program shall ensure that the capability to fight potential fires is established and maintained. The program shall consist of an initial classroom instruction program followed by periodic classroom instruction, fire fighting practice, and fire drills:

1. Instruction
a. The initial classroom instruction shall include:
   (1) Indoctrination of the plant fire fighting plan with specific identification of each individual’s responsibilities.
   (2) Identification of the type and location of fire hazards and associated types of fires that could occur in the plant.
   (3) The toxic and corrosive characteristics of expected products of combustion.
   (4) Identification of the location of fire fighting equipment for each fire area and familiarization with the layout of the plant, including access and egress routes to each area.
   (5) The proper use of available fire fighting equipment and the correct method of fighting each type of fire. The types of fires covered should include fires in energized electrical equipment, fires in cables and cable trays, hydrogen fires, fires involving flammable and combustible liquids or hazardous process chemicals, fires resulting from construction or modifications (welding), and record file fires.
   (6) The proper use of communication, lighting, ventilation, and emergency breathing equipment.
   (7) The proper method for fighting fires inside buildings and confined spaces.

b. The instruction shall be provided by qualified individuals who are knowledgeable, experienced, and suitably trained in fighting the types of fires that could occur in the plant and in using the types of equipment available in the nuclear power plant.

c. Instruction shall be provided to all fire brigade members and fire brigade leaders.

d. Regular planned meetings shall be held at least every 3 months for all brigade members to review changes in the fire protection program and other subjects as necessary.

e. Periodic refresher training sessions shall be held to repeat the classroom instruction program for all brigade members over a two-year period. These sessions may be concurrent with the regular planned meetings.

2. Practice

Practice sessions shall be held for each shift fire brigade on the proper method of fighting the various types of fires that could occur in a nuclear power plant. These sessions shall provide brigade members with experience in actual fire extinguishment and the use of emergency breathing apparatus under strenuous conditions encountered in fire fighting. These practice sessions shall be provided at least once per year for each fire brigade member.

3. Drills

a. Fire brigade drills shall be performed in the plant so that the fire brigade can practice as a team.

b. Drills shall be performed at regular intervals not to exceed 3 months for each shift fire brigade. Each fire brigade member should participate in each drill, but must participate in at least two drills per year.

A sufficient number of these drills, but not less than one for each shift fire brigade per year, shall be unannounced to determine the fire fighting readiness of the plant fire brigade, brigade leader, and fire protection systems and equipment. Persons planning and authorizing an unannounced drill shall ensure that the responding shift fire brigade members are not aware that a drill is being planned until it is begun. Unannounced drills shall not be scheduled closer than four weeks.

At least one drill per year shall be performed on a “back shift” for each shift fire brigade.

c. The drills shall be preplanned to establish the training objectives of the drill and
shall be critiqued to determine how well the training objectives have been met. Unan-
nounced drills shall be planned and critiqued by members of the management staff respon-
sible for plant safety and fire protection. Performance deficiencies of a fire brigade or
of individual fire brigade members shall be remedied by scheduling additional training
for the brigade or members. Unsatisfactory drill performance shall be followed by a re-
peat drill within 30 days.

d. At 3-year intervals, a randomly selected unannounced drill must be critiqued by
qualified individuals independent of the li-
censee's staff. A copy of the written report
from these individuals must be available for
NRC review and shall be retained as a record
as specified in section III.1.4 of this appendix.
e. Drills shall as a minimum include the
following:
   (1) Assessment of fire alarm effectiveness,
time required to notify and assemble fire bri-
gade, and selection, placement and use of
equipment, and fire fighting strategies.
   (2) Assessment of each brigade member's
   knowledge of his or her role in the fire fight-
ing strategy for the area assumed to contain
the fire. Assessment of the brigade member’s
conformance with established plant fire
fighting procedures and use of fire fighting
equipment, including self-contained emer-
gency breathing apparatus, communication
equipment, and ventilation equipment, to
the extent practicable.

   (3) The simulated use of fire fighting equip-
   ment required to cope with the situation and
type of fire selected for the drill. The area
and type of fire chosen for the drill should
differ from those used in the previous drill so
that brigade members are trained in fighting
different hazards in various plant areas. The situation se-
lected should simulate the size and arrange-
ment of a fire that could reasonably occur in
the area selected, allowing for fire develop-
ment due to the time required to respond, to
obtain equipment, and organize for the fire,
assuming loss of automatic suppression cap-
ability.

   (4) Assessment of brigade leader’s direction
   of the fire fighting effort as to thoroughness,
accuracy, and effectiveness.

4. Records

   Individual records of training provided to
each fire brigade member, including drill cri-
tiques, shall be maintained for at least 3
years to ensure that each member receives
training in all parts of the training program.
These records of training shall be available
for NRC review. Retraining or broadened
training for fire fighting within buildings
shall be scheduled for all those brigade mem-
bers whose performance records show defi-
ciencies.

J. Emergency lighting. Emergency lighting
units with at least an 8-hour battery power
supply shall be provided in all areas needed
for operation of safe shutdown equipment
and in access and egress routes thereto.

K. Administrative controls. Administrative
controls shall be established to minimize fire
hazards in areas containing structures, sys-
tems, and components important to safety.
These controls shall establish procedures to:

1. Govern the handling and limitation of the use of ordinary combustible materials,
     combustible and flammable gases and liq-
     uids, high efficiency particulate air and
     charcoal filters, dry ion exchange resins, or
     other combustible supplies in safety-related
     areas.

2. Prohibit the storage of combustibles in
     safety-related areas or establish designated
     storage areas with appropriate fire protec-
tion.

3. Govern the handling of and limit tran-
sient fire loads such as combustible and
     flammable liquids, wood and plastic prod-
ucts, or other combustible materials in
     buildings containing safety-related systems
     or equipment during all phases of operating,
     and especially during maintenance, modi-
     fication, or refueling operations.

4. Designate the onsite staff member re-
     sponsible for the implant fire protection re-
     view of proposed work activities to identify
     potential transient fire hazards and specify
     required additional fire protection in the
     work activity procedure.

5. Govern the use of ignition sources by use
     of a flame permit system to control welding,
     flame cutting, brazing, or soldering oper-
     ations. A separate permit shall be issued for
     each area where work is to be done. If work
     continues over more than one shift, the per-
     mit shall be valid for not more than 24 hours
     when the plant is operating or for the dura-
     tion of a particular job during plant shut-
down.

6. Control the removal from the area of all
     waste, debris, scrap, oil spills, or other com-
     bustibles resulting from the work activity
     immediately following completion of the ac-
     tivity, or at the end of each work shift, whichever comes first.

7. Maintain the periodic housekeeping in-
spections to ensure continued compliance
with these administrative controls.

8. Control the use of specific combustibles
     in safety-related areas. All wood used in
     safety-related areas during maintenance,
     modification, or refueling operations (such
     as lay-down blocks or scaffolding) shall be
     treated with a flame retardant. Equipment
     or supplies (such as new fuel) shipped in un-
     treated combustible packing containers may
     be unpacked in safety-related areas if re-
     quired for valid operating reasons. However,
     all combustible materials shall be removed
     from the area immediately following the un-
     packing. Such transient combustible mate-
     rial, unless stored in approved containers,
     shall not be left unattended during lunch

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breaks, shift changes, or other similar periods. Loose combustible packing material such as wood or paper excelsior, or polyethylene sheeting shall be placed in metal containers with tight-fitting self-closing metal covers.

9. Control actions to be taken by an individual discovering a fire, for example, notification of control room, attempt to extinguish fire, and actuation of local fire suppression systems.

10. Control actions to be taken by the control room operator to determine the need for brigade assistance upon report of a fire or receipt of alarm on control room annunciator panel, for example, announcing location of fire over PA system, sounding fire alarms, and notifying the shift supervisor and the fire brigade leader of the type, size, and location of the fire.

11. Control actions to be taken by the fire brigade after notification by the control room operator of a fire, for example, assembling in a designated location, receiving directions from the fire brigade leader, and discharging specific fire fighting responsibilities including selection and transportation of fire fighting equipment to fire location, selection of protective equipment, operating instructions for use of fire suppression systems, and use of preplanned strategies for fighting fires in specific areas.

12. Define the strategies for fighting fires in all safety-related areas and areas presenting a hazard to safety-related equipment. These strategies shall designate:

a. Fire hazards in each area covered by the specific prefire plans.

b. The fire extinguishants best suited for controlling the fires associated with the fire hazards in that area and the nearest location of these extinguishants.

c. Most favorable direction from which to attack a fire in each area in view of the ventilation direction, access hallways, stairs, and doors that are most likely to be free of fire, and the best station or elevation for fighting the fire. All access and egress routes that involve locked doors should be specifically identified in the procedure with the appropriate precautions and methods for access specified.

d. Plant systems that should be managed to reduce the damage potential during a local fire and the location of local and remote controls for such management (e.g., any hydraulic or electrical systems in the zone covered by the specific fire fighting procedure that could increase the hazards in the area because of overpressurization or electrical hazards).

e. Vital heat-sensitive system components that need to be kept cool while fighting a local fire. Particularly hazardous combustibles that need cooling should be designated.

f. Organization of fire fighting brigades and the assignment of special duties according to job title so that all fire fighting functions are covered by any complete shift personnel complement. These duties include command control of the brigade, transporting fire suppression and support equipment to the fire scenes, applying the extinguishant to the fire, communicating with the control room, and coordination with outside fire departments.

g. Potential radiological and toxic hazards in fire zones.

h. Ventilation system operation that ensures desired plant air distribution when the ventilation flow is modified for fire containment or smoke clearing operations.

i. Operations requiring control room and shift engineer coordination or authorization.

j. Instructions for plant operators and general plant personnel during fire.

1. Alternative and dedicated shutdown capability. 1. Alternative or dedicated shutdown capability provided for a specific fire area shall be able to (a) achieve and maintain subcritical reactivity conditions in the reactor; (b) maintain reactor coolant inventory; (c) achieve and maintain hot standby2 conditions for a PWR (hot shutdown2 for a BWR); (d) achieve cold shutdown conditions within 72 hours; and (e) maintain cold shutdown conditions thereafter. During the postfire shutdown, the reactor coolant system process variables shall be maintained within those predicted for a loss of normal a.c. power, and the fission product boundary integrity shall not be affected; i.e., there shall be no fuel clad damage, rupture of any primary coolant boundary, or rupture of the containment boundary.

2. The performance goals for the shutdown functions shall be:

a. The reactivity control function shall be capable of achieving and maintaining cold shutdown reactivity conditions.

b. The reactor coolant makeup function shall be capable of maintaining the reactor coolant level above the top of the core for BWRs and be within the level indication in the pressurizer for PWRs.

c. The reactor heat removal function shall be capable of achieving and maintaining decay heat removal.

d. The process monitoring function shall be capable of providing direct readings of the process variables necessary to perform and control the above functions.

e. The supporting functions shall be capable of providing the process cooling, lubrication, etc., necessary to permit the operation of the equipment used for safe shutdown functions.

3. The shutdown capability for specific fire areas may be unique for each such area, or it may be one unique combination of systems.

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2 As defined in the Standard Technical Specifications.
for all such areas. In either case, the alternative shutdown capability shall be independent of the specific fire area(s) and shall accommodate postfire conditions where off-site power is available and where off-site power is not available for 72 hours. Procedures shall be in effect to implement this capability.

4. If the capability to achieve and maintain cold shutdown will not be available because of fire damage, the equipment and systems comprising the means to achieve and maintain the hot standby or hot shutdown condition shall be capable of maintaining such conditions until cold shutdown can be achieved. If such equipment and systems will not be capable of being powered by both onsite and offsite electric power systems because of fire damage, an independent onsite power system shall be provided. The number of operating shift personnel, exclusive of fire brigade members, required to operate such equipment and systems shall be on site at all times.

5. Equipment and systems comprising the means to achieve and maintain cold shutdown conditions shall not be damaged by fire; or the fire damage to such equipment and systems shall be limited so that the systems can be made operable and cold shutdown can be achieved within 72 hours. Materials for such repairs shall be readily available on site and procedures shall be in effect to implement such repairs. If such equipment and systems used prior to 72 hours after the fire will not be capable of being powered by both onsite and offsite electric power systems because of fire damage, an independent onsite power system shall be provided. Equipment and systems used after 72 hours may be powered by offsite power only.

6. Shutdown systems installed to ensure postfire shutdown capability need not be designed to meet seismic Category I criteria, single failure criteria, or other design basis accident criteria, except where required for other reasons, e.g., because of interface with or impact on existing safety systems, or because of adverse valve actions due to fire damage.

7. The safe shutdown equipment and systems for each fire area shall be isolated from associated non-safety circuits in the fire area so that hot shorts, open circuits, or shorts to ground in the associated circuits will not prevent operation of the safe shutdown equipment. The separation and barriers between trays and conduits containing associated circuits of one safe shutdown division and trays and conduits containing associated circuits or safe shutdown cables from the redundant division, or the isolation of these associated circuits from the safe shutdown equipment, shall be such that a postulated fire involving associated circuits will not prevent safe shutdown.  

M. Fire barrier cable penetration seal qualification. Penetration seal designs must be qualified by tests that are comparable to tests used to rate fire barriers. The acceptance criteria for the test must include the following:

1. The cable fire barrier penetration seal has withstood the fire endurance test without passage of flame or ignition of cables on the unexposed side for a period of time equivalent to the fire resistance rating required of the barrier;

2. The temperature levels recorded for the unexposed side are analyzed and demonstrate that the maximum temperature is sufficiently below the cable insulation ignition temperature; and

3. The fire barrier penetration seal remains intact and does not allow projection of water beyond the unexposed surface during the hose stream test.

N. Fire doors. Fire doors shall be self-closing or provided with closing mechanisms and shall be inspected semiannually to verify that automatic hold-open, release, and closing mechanisms and latches are operable. One of the following measures shall be provided to ensure they will protect the opening as required in case of fire:

1. Fire doors shall be kept closed and electrically supervised at a continuously manned location;

2. Fire doors shall be locked closed and inspected weekly to verify that the doors are in the closed position;

3. Fire doors shall be provided with automatic hold-open and release mechanisms and inspected daily to verify that doorways are free of obstructions;

4. Fire doors shall be kept closed and inspected daily to verify that they are in the closed position.

The fire brigade leader shall have ready access to keys for any locked fire doors.

Areas protected by automatic total flooding gas suppression systems shall have electrically supervised self-closing fire doors or shall satisfy option 1 above.

O. Oil collection system for reactor coolant pump. The reactor coolant pump shall be equipped with an oil collection system if the containment is not inerted during normal operation. The oil collection system shall be so designed, engineered, and installed that failure will not lead to fire during normal or design basis accident conditions and that

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3 An acceptable method of complying with this alternative would be to meet Regulatory Guide 1.75 position 4 related to associated circuits and IEEE Std 384-1974 (Section 4.5) where trays from redundant safety divisions are so protected that postulated fires affect trays from only one safety division.
there is reasonable assurance that the system will withstand the Safe Shutdown Earthquake.\footnote{See Regulatory Guide 1.29—"Seismic Design Classification" paragraph C.2.}

Such collection systems shall be capable of collecting lube oil from all potential pressurized and unpressurized leakage sites in the reactor coolant pump lube oil systems. Leakage shall be collected and drained to a vented closed container that can hold the entire lube oil system inventory. A flame arrester is required in the vent if the flash point characteristics of the oil present the hazard of fire flashback. Leakage points to be protected shall include lift pump and piping, overflow lines, lube oil cooler, oil fill and drain lines and plugs, flanged connections on oil lines, and lube oil reservoirs where such features exist on the reactor coolant pumps. The drain line shall be large enough to accommodate the largest potential oil leak.

\[45 \text{ FR} \ 7611, \text{ Nov. } 19, \ 1980; \ 46 \text{ FR} \ 44735, \text{ Sept. } 8, \ 1981, \text{ as amended at } 53 \text{ FR} \ 19251, \text{ May } 27, \ 1988; 65 \text{ FR} \ 36191, \text{ June } 20, \ 2000\]

APPENDIX S TO PART 50—EARTHQUAKE ENGINEERING CRITERIA FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

GENERAL INFORMATION

This appendix applies to applicants for a construction permit or operating license under part 50, or a design certification, combined license, design approval, or manufacturing license under part 52 of this chapter, on or after January 10, 1997. However, for either an operating license applicant or holder whose construction permit was issued before January 10, 1997, the earthquake engineering criteria in Section VI of appendix A to 10 CFR part 100 continue to apply. Paragraphs IV.a.1.i, IV.a.1.ii, IV.a.4.b, and IV.a.4.c of this appendix apply to applicants for an early site permit under part 52.

I. INTRODUCTION

(a) Each applicant for a construction permit, operating license, design certification, combined license, design approval, or manufacturing license is required by §§50.34(a)(12), 50.34(b)(10), or 10 CFR 52.47, 52.79, 52.137, or 52.157, and General Design Criterion 2 of appendix A to this part, to design nuclear power plant structures, systems, and components important to safety to withstand the effects of natural phenomena, such as earthquakes, without loss of capability to perform their safety functions. Also, as specified in §50.54(f), nuclear power plants that have implemented the earthquake engineering criteria described herein must shut down if the criteria in paragraph IV(a)(3) of this appendix are exceeded.

(b) These criteria implement General Design Criterion 2 insofar as it requires structures, systems, and components important to the health and safety of the public will remain functional. The operating basis earthquake ground motion is only associated with plant shutdown and inspection unless specifically selected by the applicant as a design input.

Response spectrum is a plot of the maximum responses (acceleration, velocity, or displacement) of idealized single-degree-of-freedom oscillators as a function of the natural frequencies of the oscillators for a given damping value. The response spectrum is calculated for a specified vibratory motion input at the oscillators’ supports.

Safe-shutdown earthquake ground motion (SSG) is the vibratory ground motion for which those features of the nuclear power plant necessary for continued operation without undue risk to the health and safety of the public will remain functional. The operating basis earthquake ground motion is only associated with plant shutdown and inspection unless specifically selected by the applicant as a design input.

II. SCOPE

The evaluations described in this appendix are within the scope of investigations permitted by §50.10(c)(1).

III. DEFINITIONS

As used in these criteria:

Combined license means a combined construction permit and operating license with conditions for a nuclear power facility issued under subpart C of part 52 of this chapter.

Design Approval means an NRC staff approval, issued under subpart E of part 52 of this chapter, of a final standard design for a nuclear power reactor of the type described in 10 CFR 50.22.

Design Certification means a Commission approval, issued under subpart B of part 52 of this chapter, of a standard design for a nuclear power facility.

Manufacturing license means a license, issued under subpart F of part 52 of this chapter, authorizing the manufacture of nuclear power reactors but not their installation into facilities located at the sites on which the facilities are to be operated.

Operating basis earthquake ground motion (OBE) is the vibratory ground motion for which those features of the nuclear power plant necessary for continued operation without undue risk to the health and safety of the public will remain functional. The operating basis earthquake ground motion is only associated with plant shutdown and inspection unless specifically selected by the applicant as a design input.

Response spectrum is a plot of the maximum responses (acceleration, velocity, or displacement) of idealized single-degree-of-freedom oscillators as a function of the natural frequencies of the oscillators for a given damping value. The response spectrum is calculated for a specified vibratory motion input at the oscillators’ supports.

Safe-shutdown earthquake ground motion (SSG) is the vibratory ground motion for which those features of the nuclear power plant necessary for continued operation without undue risk to the health and safety of the public will remain functional. The operating basis earthquake ground motion is only associated with plant shutdown and inspection unless specifically selected by the applicant as a design input.

1. The integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary;
2. The capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe-shutdown condition; or

\[45 \text{ FR} \ 7061, \text{ Nov. } 19, \ 1980; 46 \text{ FR} \ 44735, \text{ Sept. } 8, \ 1981, \text{ as amended at } 53 \text{ FR} \ 19251, \text{ May } 27, \ 1988; 65 \text{ FR} \ 36191, \text{ June } 20, \ 2000\]