Subpart E—Exemption of Records Systems Under the Privacy Act

§ 16.70 Exemption of the Office of the Attorney General System—limited access.

(a) The following system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4); (d); (e) (1), (2) and (3), (e)(4) (G) and (H), (e)(5); and (g):


These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in the system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a (j)(2), (k)(1), (k)(2), and (k)(5).

(b) Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosures from records concerning him/her would reveal investigative interest on the part of the Department of Justice as well as the recipient agency. This would permit record subjects to impede the investigation, e.g., destroy evidence, intimidate potential witnesses, or flee the area to avoid inquiries or apprehension by law enforcement personnel.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) because this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d) pursuant to subsections (j) and (k) of the Privacy Act.

(3) From subsection (d) because the records contained in this system relate to official Federal investigations. Individual access to these records might compromise ongoing investigations, reveal confidential informants or constitute unwarranted invasions of the personal privacy of third parties who are involved in a certain investigation. Amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing criminal law enforcement proceedings and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring criminal investigations to be continuously reinvestigated.

(4) From subsections (e) (1) and (5) because in the course of law enforcement investigations, information may occasionally be obtained or introduced the accuracy of which is unclear or which is not strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of criminal activity. Moreover, it would impede the specific investigative process if it were necessary to assure the relevance, accuracy, timeliness and completeness of all information obtained.

(5) From subsection (e)(2) because in a law enforcement investigation the requirement that information be collected to the greatest extent possible from the subject individual would present a serious impediment to law enforcement in that the subject of the investigation would be informed of the existence of the investigation and would therefore be able to avoid detection, apprehension, or legal obligations of duties.

(6) From subsection (e)(3) because to comply with the requirements of this subsection during the course of an investigation could impede the information gathering process, thus hampering the investigation.

(7) From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (H) because this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d) pursuant to subsections (j) and (k) of the Privacy Act.

(8) From subsection (g) because in the court system is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d) pursuant to subsections (j) and (k) of the Privacy Act.

[Order No. 31–85, 51 FR 751, Jan. 8, 1986]

§ 16.71 Exemption of the Office of the Deputy Attorney General System—limited access.

(a) The following systems of records and exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(1) and (e)(1):

(1) Presidential Appointee Candidate Records System (JUSTICE/DAG–006).

(2) Presidential Appointee Records System (JUSTICE/DAG–007).

(3) Special Candidates for Presidential Appointments Records System (JUSTICE/DAG–008).

These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in these systems is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5).

(b) Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (d)(1) because many persons are contacted who, without an assurance of anonymity, refuse to provide information concerning a candidate for a Presidential appointee or Department attorney position. Access could reveal the identity of the source of the information and constitute a breach of the promise of confidentiality on the part of the Department of Justice. Such breaches ultimately would restrict the free flow of information vital to a determination of a candidate’s qualifications and suitability.

(2) From subsection (e)(1) because in the collection of information for investigative and evaluative purposes, it is impossible to determine in advance what exact information may be of assistance in determining the qualifications and suitability of a candidate. Information which may appear irrelevant, when combined with other seemingly irrelevant information, can on occasion provide a composite picture of a candidate for a position which assists in determining whether that candidate should be nominated for appointment.

(c) The following systems of records are exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4); (d); (e)(1), (2), (3) and (5); and (g):


(d) In addition, the Drug Enforcement Task Force Evaluation and Reporting System is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4)(G) and (H). The exemptions for the Drug Enforcement Task Force Evaluation and Reporting System apply only to the extent that information is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) and (K)(2). The exemptions for the General Files System apply only to the extent that information is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), (k)(1), (k)(2) and (k)(5).

(e) Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosures from records concerning him/her could reveal investigative interest on the part of the Department of Justice, as well as the recipient agency. This would permit record subjects to impede the investigation, e.g., destroy evidence, intimidate potential witnesses, or flee the area to avoid inquiries or apprehension by law enforcement personnel. Further, making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosures could reveal the identity of a confidential source. In addition, release of an accounting of disclosures from the General Files System may reveal information that is properly classified pursuant to Executive Order 12335, and thereby cause damage to the national security.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) because these systems are exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d) pursuant to subsections (j) and (k) of the Privacy Act.

(3) From subsection (d) because the records contained in these systems relate to official Federal investigations. Individual access to these records could compromise ongoing investigations, reveal confidential informants and/or sensitive investigative techniques used in particular investigations, or constitute unwarranted invasions of the personal privacy of third parties who are involved in a certain investigation. In addition, release of records from the General Files System may reveal information that is properly classified pursuant to Executive Order 12335, and thereby cause damage to the national security. Amendment of the records in either of these systems would interfere with ongoing law enforcement proceedings and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring law enforcement investigations to be continuously reinvestigated.

(4) From subsections (e)(1) and (e)(5) because in the course of law enforcement investigations information may occasionally be obtained or introduced the accuracy of which is unclear or
which is not strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of criminal activity. Moreover, it would impede any investigative process, whether civil or criminal, if it were necessary to assure the relevance, accuracy, timeliness and completeness of all information obtained.

(5) From subsection (e)(2) because in a law enforcement investigation the requirement that information be collected to the greatest extent possible from the subject individual would present a serious impediment to law enforcement in that the subject of the investigation would be informed of the existence of the investigation and may therefore be able to avoid detection, apprehension, or legal obligations or duties.

(6) From subsection (e)(3) because to comply with the requirements of this subsection during the course of an investigation could impede the information gathering process, thus hampering the investigation.

(7) From subsections (e)(4) (G) and (H) because no access to these records is available under subsection (d) of the Privacy Act. (This exemption applies only to the Drug Enforcement Task Force Evaluation and Reporting System.)

(8) From subsection (g) because these systems of records are exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d) pursuant to subsections (j) and (k) of the Privacy Act.

[Order No. 57–91, 56 FR 58305, Nov. 19, 1991]

§ 16.72 Exemption of Office of the Associate Attorney General System—limited access.

(a) The following system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c) (3) and (4); (d); (e)(1), (2), (3) and (5); and (g):


These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in the system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), (k)(1), (k)(2) and (k)(5).

(b) Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosures from records concerning him/her could reveal investigative interest on the part of the Department of Justice, as well as the recipient agency. This would permit record subjects to impede the investigation, e.g., destroy evidence, intimidate potential witnesses, or flee the area to avoid inquiries or apprehension by law enforcement personnel. Further, making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosures could reveal the identity of a confidential source. In addition, release of an accounting of disclosures may reveal information that is properly classified pursuant to Executive Order 12356, and thereby cause damage to the national security.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) because this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d) pursuant to subsections (j)(2), (k)(1), (k)(2) and (k)(5) of the Privacy Act.

(3) From subsection (d) because the records contained in this system relate to official Federal investigations. Individual access to these records could compromise ongoing investigations, reveal confidential informants and/or sensitive investigative techniques used in particular investigations, or constitute unwarranted invasions of the personal privacy of third parties who are involved in a certain investigation. In addition, release of these records may reveal information that is properly classified pursuant to Executive Order 12356, and thereby cause damage to the national security. Amendment of the records in this system would interfere with ongoing law enforcement proceedings and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring law enforcement investigations to be continuously reinvestigated.

(4) From subsections (e)(1) and (e)(5) because in the course of law enforcement investigations information may occasionally be obtained or introduced the accuracy of which is unclear or which is not strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In