§ 1.2104 Competitive bidding mechanisms.

(a) Sequencing. The Commission will establish the sequence in which multiple licenses will be auctioned.

(b) Grouping. In the event the Commission uses either a simulated multiple round competitive bidding design or combinatorial bidding, the

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(9) Public Safety, Industrial/Land Transportation, General and Business Radio categories above 800 MHz, including finder’s preference requests for frequencies not allocated to the SMR service (see 47 CFR 90.173), and including, until further notice of the Commission, the Automated Vehicle Monitoring Service (see 47 CFR 90.239);

(10) Private Land Mobile Radio Services between 470–512 MHz (see 47 CFR part 90, subparts B-F), including those based on finder’s preferences, (see 47 CFR 90.173);

(11) Private Land Mobile Radio Services below 470 MHz (see 47 CFR part 90, subpart T), including those based on finder’s preferences (see 47 CFR §90.173); and

(12) Private Operational Fixed Services (see 47 CFR part 94).

NOTE TO §1.2102: To determine the rules that apply to competitive bidding, specific service rules should also be consulted.

§ 1.2103 Competitive bidding design options.

(a) The Commission will choose from one or more of the following types of auction designs for services or classes of services subject to competitive bidding:

(1) Simultaneous multiple-round auctions (using remote or on-site electronic bidding);

(2) Sequential multiple round auctions (using either oral ascending or remote and/or on-site electronic bidding);

(3) Sequential or simultaneous single-round auctions (using either sealed paper or remote and/or on-site electronic bidding); and

(4) Combinatorial (package) bidding auctions.

(b) The Commission may use combinatorial bidding, which would allow bidders to submit all or nothing bids on combinations of licenses or authorizations, in addition to bids on individual licenses or authorizations. The Commission may require that to be declared the high bid, a combinatorial bid must exceed the sum of the individual bids by a specified amount. Combinatorial bidding may be used with any type of auction. The Commission may also allow bidders to submit contingent bids on individual and/or combinations of licenses.

(1) Apportioned package bid. The apportioned package bid on a license is an estimate of the price of an individual license included in a package of licenses in an auction with combinatorial (package) bidding. Apportioned package bids shall be determined by the Commission according to a methodology it establishes in advance of each auction with combinatorial bidding.

(2) Substitute for bid amount. The apportioned package bid on a license included in a package shall be used in place of the amount of an individual bid on that license when the bid amount is needed to determine the size of a designated entity bidding credit (see §1.2110(f)(1) and (f)(2)), a new entrant bidding credit (see §73.5007), a bid withdrawal or default payment obligation (see §1.2104(g)), a tribal land bidding credit limit (see §1.2110(f)(3)(iv)), or a size-based bidding credit unjust enrichment payment obligation (see §1.2111(d), (e)(2) and (e)(3)), or for any other determination required by the Commission’s rules or procedures.

(c) The Commission may use single combined auctions, which combine bidding for two or more substitutable licenses and award licenses to the highest bidders until the available licenses are exhausted. This technique may be used in conjunction with any type of auction.

(d) The Commission may use real time bidding in all electronic auction designs.