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(2) From subsections (d)(1), (2), (3) and (4) (record subject’s right to access and amend records) because these provisions concern individual access to and amendment of counterterrorism, investigatory and intelligence records. Affording access and amendment rights could alert the record subject to the fact and nature of an investigation or the investigative interest of intelligence or law enforcement agencies; permit the subject to frustrate such investigation, surveillance or potential prosecution; compromise sensitive information classified in the interest of national security; identify a confidential source or disclose information which would reveal a sensitive investigative or intelligence technique; and endanger the health or safety of law enforcement personnel, confidential informants, and witnesses. In addition, affording subjects access and amendment rights would impose an impossible administrative burden to continuously reexamine investigations, analyses, and reports.

(3) From subsection (e)(1) (maintain only relevant and necessary records) because it is not always possible to know in advance what information will be relevant to evaluate and mitigate damage to the national security. Relevance and necessity are questions of judgment and timing, and only after information is evaluated can relevance and necessity be established. In addition, information in the system of records may relate to matters under the investigative jurisdiction of another agency, and may not readily be segregated. Furthermore, information in these systems of records, over time, aid in establishing patterns of criminal activity that can provide leads for other law enforcement agencies.

(4) From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (H) (publication of procedures for notifying subjects to the existence of records about them and how they may access records and contest contents) because the system is exempted from subsection (d) provisions regarding access and amendment of records by record subjects. Nevertheless, the ODNI has published agency rules concerning notification of a subject in response to his request if any system of records named by the subject contains a record pertaining to him and procedures by which the subject may access or amend the records. Notwithstanding exemption, the ODNI may determine it appropriate to satisfy a record subject’s access request.

§ 1701.23 Exemption of Office of Inspector General (OIG) systems of records.

(a) The ODNI exempts the following systems of records from the requirements of subsections (c)(3); (d)(1), (2), (3) and (4); (e)(1); (e)(4)(G), (H), (I); and (f) of the Privacy Act to the extent that information in the system is subject to exemption pursuant subsections (k)(1) and (k)(5) of the Act:

(1) OIG Human Resources Records (ODNI/OIG–001).

(2) OIG Experts Contact Records (ODNI/OIG–002).

(b) Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:
(1) From subsection (c)(3) (accounting of disclosures) because an accounting of disclosures from records concerning the record subject would specifically reveal an investigative interest on the part of the ODNI or recipient agency and could result in release of properly classified national security or foreign policy information.

(2) From subsections (d)(1), (2), (3) and (4) (record subject’s right to access and amend records) because affording access and amendment rights could alert the record subject to the investigative interest of intelligence or law enforcement agencies or compromise sensitive information classified in the interest of national security. In the absence of a national security basis for exemption under subsection (k)(1), records in this system may be exempted from access and amendment pursuant to subsection (k)(5) to the extent necessary to honor promises of confidentiality to persons providing information concerning a candidate for position. Inability to maintain such confidentiality would restrict the free flow of information vital to a determination of a candidate’s qualifications and suitability.

(3) From subsection (e)(1) (maintaining only relevant and necessary records) because it is not always possible to establish relevance and necessity before all information is considered and evaluated in relation to an intelligence concern. In the absence of a national security basis for exemption under subsection (k)(1), records in this system may be exempted from the relevance requirement pursuant to subsection (k)(5) because it is not always possible to determine in advance what exact information may assist in determining the qualifications and suitability of a candidate for position. Seemingly irrelevant details, when combined with other data, can provide a useful composite for determining whether a candidate should be appointed.

(4) From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (H) (publication of procedures for notifying subjects of the existence of records about them and how they may access and contest contents) because the system is exempted from subsection (d) provisions regarding access and amendment and from the section (f) requirement to promulgate agency rules. Nevertheless, the ODNI has published such a notice concerning notification, access, and contest procedures because it may in certain circumstances determine it appropriate to provide subjects access to all or a portion of the records about them in a system of records.

(5) From subsection (e)(4)(I) (identifying sources of records in the system of records) because identifying sources could result in disclosure of properly classified national defense or foreign policy information, intelligence sources and methods and investigatory techniques and procedures. Notwithstanding its proposed exemption from this requirement, ODNI identifies record sources in broad categories sufficient to provide general notice of the origins of the information it maintains in its systems of records.

(6) From subsection (f) (agency rules for notifying subjects to the existence of records about them, for accessing and amending records and for assessing fees) because the system is exempt from subsection (d) provisions regarding access and amendment of records by record subjects. Nevertheless, the ODNI has published agency rules concerning notification of a subject in response to his request if any system of records named by the subject contains a record pertaining to him and procedures by which the subject may access or amend the records. Notwithstanding exemption, the ODNI may determine it appropriate to satisfy a record subject’s access request.

(c) The ODNI exempts the following system of records from the requirements of subsections (c)(3) and (4); (d)(1), (2), (3), (4); (e)(1), (2), (3), (5), (8) and (12); and (g) of the Privacy Act, to the extent that information in the system is subject to exemption pursuant to subsection (j)(2) of the Act. In addition, the following system of records is exempted from the requirements of subsections (c)(3); (d)(1), (2), (3) and (4); (e)(1); (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I); and (f) of the Privacy Act, to the extent that information in the system is subject to exemption pursuant to subsections (k)(1) and (k)(2) of the Act.

(1) OIG Investigation and Interview Records (ODNI/OIG–003).
(2) [Reserved]

(d) Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) (accounting of disclosures) because an accounting of disclosures from records concerning the record subject would specifically reveal an investigative interest on the part of the ODNI as well as the recipient agency and could: result in release of properly classified national security or foreign policy information; compromise ongoing efforts to investigate a known or suspected terrorist; reveal sensitive investigative or surveillance techniques; or identify a confidential source. With this information, the record subject could frustrate counterintelligence measures; impede an investigation by destroying evidence or intimidating potential witnesses; endanger the physical safety of sources, witnesses, and law enforcement and intelligence personnel and their families; or evade apprehension or prosecution by law enforcement personnel.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) (notice of amendment to record recipients) because the system is exempted from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d).

(3) From subsections (d)(1), (2), (3) and (4) (record subject’s right to access and amend records) because these provisions concern individual access to and amendment of counterterrorism, investigatory and intelligence records. Affording access and amendment rights could alert the record subject to the fact and nature of an investigation or the investigative interest of intelligence or law enforcement agencies; permit the subject to frustrate such investigation, surveillance or potential prosecution; compromise sensitive information classified in the interest of national security; identify a confidential source or disclose information which would reveal a sensitive investigative or intelligence technique; and endanger the health or safety of law enforcement personnel, confidential informants, and witnesses. In addition, affording subjects access and amendment rights would impose an impossible administrative burden to continuously reexamine investigations, analyses, and reports.

(4) From subsection (e)(1) (maintain only relevant and necessary records) because it is not always possible to know in advance what information will be relevant for the purpose of conducting an investigation. Relevance and necessity are questions of judgment and timing, and only after information is evaluated can relevance and necessity be established. In addition, information in the system of records may relate to matters under the investigative jurisdiction of another agency, and may not readily be segregated. Furthermore, information in these systems of records, over time, aid in establishing patterns of criminal activity that can provide leads for other law enforcement agencies.

(5) From subsection (e)(2) (collection directly from the individual) because application of this provision would alert the subject of a counterterrorism investigation, study or analysis to that fact, permitting the subject to frustrate or impede the activity. Counterterrorism investigations necessarily rely on information obtained from third parties rather than information furnished by subjects themselves.

(6) From subsection (e)(3) (provide Privacy Act Statement to subjects furnishing information) because the system is exempted from the (e)(2) requirement to collect information directly from the subject.

(7) From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (H) (publication of procedures for notifying subjects of the existence of records about them and how they may access records and contest contents) because the system is exempted from subsection (d) provisions regarding access and amendment and from the subsection (f) requirement to promulgate agency rules. Nevertheless, the ODNI has published notice concerning notification, access, and contest procedures because it may in certain circumstances determine it appropriate to provide subjects access to all or a portion of the records about them in a system of records.

(8) From subsection (e)(4)(I) (identifying sources of records in the system of records) because identifying sources could result in disclosure of properly
classified national defense or foreign policy information. Additionally, exemption from this provision is necessary to protect the privacy and safety of witnesses and sources of information, including intelligence sources and methods and investigatory techniques and procedures. Notwithstanding its proposed exemption from this requirement, ODNI identifies record sources in broad categories sufficient to provide general notice of the origins of the information it maintains in its systems of records.

(9) From subsection (e)(5) (maintain timely, accurate, complete and up-to-date records) because many of the records in the system are derived from other domestic and foreign agency record systems over which ODNI exercises no control. In addition, in collecting information for counterterrorism, intelligence, and law enforcement purposes, it is not possible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. With the passage of time and the development of additional facts and circumstances, seemingly irrelevant or dated information may acquire significance. The restrictions imposed by (e)(5) would limit the ability of intelligence analysts to exercise judgment in conducting investigations and impede development of intelligence necessary for effective counterterrorism and law enforcement efforts.

(10) From subsection (e)(6) (notice of compelled disclosure) because requiring individual notice of legally compelled disclosure poses an impossible administrative burden and could alert subjects of counterterrorism, law enforcement, or intelligence investigations to the previously unknown fact of those investigations.

(11) From subsection (e)(12) (public notice of matching activity) because, to the extent such activities are not otherwise excluded from the matching requirements of the Privacy Act, publishing advance notice in the FEDERAL REGISTER would frustrate the ability of intelligence analysts to act quickly in furtherance of analytical efforts.

(12) From subsection (f) (agency rules for notifying subjects to the existence of records about them, for accessing and amending records and for assessing fees) because the system is exempt from the subsection (d) provisions regarding access and amendment of records by record subjects. Nevertheless, the ODNI has published agency rules concerning notification of a subject in response to his request if any system of records named by the subject contains a record pertaining to him and procedures by which the subject may access or amend the records. Notwithstanding exemption, the ODNI may determine it appropriate to satisfy a record subject’s access request.

(13) From subsection (g) (civil remedies) to the extent that the civil remedies relate to provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a from which this rule exempts the system.

Subpart C—Routine Uses Applicable to More Than One ODNI System of Records

§1701.30 Policy and applicability.

(a) ODNI proposes the following general routine uses to foster simplicity and economy and to avoid redundancy or error by duplication in multiple ODNI systems of records and in systems of records established hereafter by ODNI or by one of its components.

(b) These general routine uses may apply to every Privacy Act system of records maintained by ODNI and its components, unless specifically stated otherwise in the System of Records Notice for a particular system. Additional general routine uses may be identified as notices of systems of records are published.

(c) Routine uses specific to a particular System of Records are identified in the System of Records Notice for that system.

§1701.31 General routine uses.

(a) Except as noted on Standard Forms 85 and 86 and supplemental forms thereto (questionnaires for employment in, respectively, “non-sensitive” and “national security” positions within the Federal government), a record that on its face or in conjunction with other information indicates or relates to a violation or potential violation of law, whether civil, criminal, administrative or regulatory in nature, and whether arising by general