

§ 16.98

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enforcement information be continuously reexamined even where the information may have been collected from the record subject.

(8) From subsection (g) to the extent that this system is exempted from other provisions of the Act.

[Order No. 645–76, 41 FR 12640, Mar. 26, 1976]

EDITORIAL NOTE: For FEDERAL REGISTER citations affecting § 16.97, see the List of CFR Sections Affected, which appears in the Finding Aids section of the printed volume and on GPO Access.

§ 16.98 Exemption of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)—limited access.

(a) The following systems of records are exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (d):

(1) Automated Records and Consummated Orders System/Diversion Analysis and Detection System (ARCOS/DADS) (Justice/DEA–003)

(2) Controlled Substances Act Registration Records (Justice/DEA–005)

(3) Registration Status/Investigatory Records (Justice/DEA–012)

(b) These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in these systems is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2). Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because release of the disclosure accounting would enable the subject of an investigation to gain valuable information concerning the nature and scope of the investigation and seriously hamper the regulatory functions of the DEA.

(2) From subsection (d) because access to records contained in these systems may provide the subject of an investigation information that could enable him to avoid compliance with the Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (Pub. L. 91–513).

(c) Systems of records identified in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(7) below are exempted pursuant to the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a (j)(2) from subsections (c)(3) and (4); (d)(1), (2), (3) and (4); (e)(1), (2) and (3), (e)(5), (e)(8); and (g) of 5 U.S.C. 552a. In addition, systems of records identified in paragraphs (c)(1), (c)(2), (c)(3), (c)(4), (c)(5), and (c)(6) below are also exempted pursuant to the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a

(k)(1) from subsections (c)(3); (d)(1), (2), (3) and (4); and (e)(1):

(1) Air Intelligence Program (Justice/DEA–001)

(2) Clandestine Laboratory Seizure System (CLSS) (Justice/DEA–002)

(3) Investigative Reporting and Filing System (Justice/DEA–008)

(4) Planning and Inspection Division Records (Justice/DEA–010)

(5) Operation Files (Justice/DEA–011)

(6) Security Files (Justice/DEA–013)

(7) System to Retrieve Information from Drug Evidence (STRIDE/Ballistics) (Justice/DEA–014)

(d) Exemptions apply to the following systems of records only to the extent that information in the systems is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a (j)(2), (k)(1), and (k)(2): Air Intelligence Program (Justice/DEA–001); Clandestine Laboratory Seizure System (CLSS) (Justice/DEA–002); Planning and Inspection Division Records (Justice/DEA–010); and Security Files (Justice/DEA–013). Exemptions apply to the Investigative Reporting and Filing System (Justice/DEA–008) only to the extent that information in the system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j) (2) and (k)(1). Exemptions apply to the Operations Files (Justice/DEA–011) only to the extent that information in the system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) and (k)(2). Exemptions apply to the System to Retrieve Information from Drug Evidence (STRIDE/Ballistics) (Justice/DEA–014) only to the extent that information in the system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2). Exemption from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because release of disclosure accounting would provide to the subjects of an investigation significant information concerning the nature of the investigation and thus would present the same impediments to law enforcement as those enumerated in paragraph (d)(3) regarding exemption from subsection (d).

(2) From subsection (c)(4) to the extent that it is not applicable because an exemption is being claimed from subsection (d).

(3) From the access provisions of subsection (d) because access to records in

this system of records would present a serious impediment to law enforcement. Specifically, it could inform the record subject of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory investigation; of the existence of that investigation; of the nature and scope of the information and evidence obtained as to his activities; of the identity of confidential sources, witnesses, and law enforcement personnel; and of information that may enable the subject to avoid detection or apprehension. Similarly, it may alert collateral suspects yet unprosecuted in closed cases. It could prevent the successful completion of the investigation; endanger the life, health, or physical safety of confidential sources, witnesses, and law enforcement personnel, and/or lead to the improper influencing of witnesses, the destruction of evidence, or the fabrication of testimony; or it may simply reveal a sensitive investigative technique. In addition, granting access to such information could result in the disclosure of confidential/security-sensitive or other information that would constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of third parties. Finally, access to the records could result in the release of properly classified information which would compromise the national defense or disrupt foreign policy. From the amendment provisions of subsection (d) because amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations to be continuously reinvestigated.

(4) From subsection (e)(1) because the application of this provision could impair investigations and interfere with the law enforcement responsibilities of the DEA for the following reasons:

(i) It is not possible to detect relevance or necessity of specific information in the early stages of a civil, criminal or other law enforcement investigation, case, or matter, including investigations during which DEA may obtain properly classified information. Relevance and necessity are questions of judgment and timing, and it is only after the information is evaluated that the relevance and necessity of such information can be established.

(ii) During the DEA's investigative activities DEA may detect the violation of either drug-related or non-drug related laws. In the interests of effective law enforcement, it is necessary that DEA retain all information obtained because it can aid in establishing patterns of activity and provide valuable leads for Federal and other law enforcement agencies or otherwise assist such agencies in discharging their law enforcement responsibilities. Such information may include properly classified information, the retention of which could be in the interests of national defense and/or foreign policy.

(5) From subsection (e)(2) because, in some instances, the application of this provision would present a serious impediment to law enforcement for the following reasons:

(i) The subject of an investigation would be placed on notice as to the existence of an investigation and would therefore be able to avoid detection or apprehension, to improperly influence witnesses, to destroy evidence, or to fabricate testimony.

(ii) In certain circumstances the subject of an investigation cannot be required to provide information to investigators, and information relating to a subject's illegal acts must be obtained from other sources.

(iii) In any investigation it is necessary to obtain evidence from a variety of sources other than the subject of the investigation in order to verify the evidence necessary for successful prosecution.

(6) From subsection (e)(3) because the requirements thereof would constitute a serious impediment to law enforcement in that they could compromise the existence of an actual or potential confidential investigation and/or permit the record subject to speculate on the identity of a potential confidential source, and endanger the life, health or physical safety or either actual or potential confidential informants and witnesses, and of investigators/law enforcement personnel. In addition, the notification requirement of subsection (e)(3) could impede collection of that information from the record subject, making it necessary to collect the information solely from third party

sources and thereby inhibiting law enforcement efforts.

(7) From subsection (e)(5) because in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance as further investigation brings new details to light and the accuracy of such information can only be determined in a court of law. The restrictions imposed by subsection (e)(5) would restrict the ability of trained investigators and intelligence analysts to exercise their judgment in reporting on investigations and impede the development of criminal intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement.

(8) From subsection (e)(8) because the application of this provision could prematurely reveal an ongoing criminal investigation to the subject of the investigation, and could reveal investigative techniques, procedures, or evidence.

(9) From subsection (g) to the extent that this system is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d) pursuant to subsections (j)(2), (k)(1) and (k)(2) of the Privacy Act.

(e) The following systems of records are exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a (d)(1) and (e)(1):

(1) Grants of Confidentiality Files (GCF) (Justice/DEA–017), and

(2) DEA Applicant Investigations (Justice/DEA–018).

(f) These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in these systems is subject to exception pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5). Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (d)(1) because many persons are contacted who, without an assurance of anonymity, refuse to provide information concerning an applicant for a grant of confidentiality with DEA. By permitting access to information which may reveal the identity of the source of that information—after a promise of confidentiality has been given—DEA would breach the promised confidentiality. Ultimately, such breaches would restrict the free

flow of information which is vital to a determination of an applicant's qualifications for a grant.

(2) From subsection (e)(1) because in the collection of information for investigative and evaluation purposes, it is impossible to determine in advance what exact information may be of assistance in determining the qualifications and suitability of a candidate. Information which may appear irrelevant, when combined with other apparently irrelevant information, can on occasion provide a composite picture of an applicant which assists in determining whether a grant of confidentiality is warranted.

(g) The following system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a (c)(3) and (4); (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4); (e)(1), (2), (3), (5), and (8); and (g): El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) Seizure System (ESS) (JUSTICE/DEA–022). These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a (j)(2), (k)(1), and (k)(2). Where compliance would not appear to interfere with or adversely affect the law enforcement and counter-drug purposes of this system, and the overall law enforcement process, the applicable exemption may be waived by the DEA in its sole discretion.

(h) Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosures from records concerning him/her would potentially reveal any investigative interest in the individual. Revealing this information would permit the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to determine whether he is the subject of investigation, or to obtain valuable information concerning the nature of that investigation, and the information obtained, or the identity of witnesses and informants. Similarly, disclosing this information could reasonably be expected to compromise ongoing investigatory efforts by notifying the record subject that he/she is under investigation. This information could also permit the record subject to

take measures to impede the investigation, e.g., destroy evidence, intimidate potential witnesses, or flee the area to avoid or impede the investigation.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) because this system is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d).

(3) From subsections (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4) because these provisions concern individual access to and amendment of records contained in this system, which consists of counter-drug and criminal investigatory records. Compliance with these provisions could alert the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation of the existence of that investigation, of the nature and scope of the information and evidence obtained as to his activities, of the identity of witnesses and informants, or would provide information that could enable the subject to avoid detection or apprehension. These factors would present a serious impediment to effective law enforcement because they could prevent the successful completion of the investigation; endanger the physical safety of witnesses or informants; or lead to the improper influencing of witnesses, the destruction of evidence, or the fabrication of testimony.

(4) From subsection (e)(1) because it is not always possible to know in advance what information is relevant and necessary to complete an identity comparison between the individual being screened and a known or suspected criminal or terrorist. Also, it may not always be known what information will be relevant to law enforcement for the purpose of conducting an operational response or on-going investigation.

(5) From subsection (e)(2) because application of this provision could present a serious impediment to law enforcement and counter-drug efforts in that it would put the subject of an investigation, study or analysis on notice of that fact, thereby permitting the subject to engage in conduct designed to frustrate or impede that activity. The nature of counter-drug investigations is such that vital information about an individual frequently can be obtained only from other persons who are familiar with such individual

and his/her activities. In such investigations it is not feasible to rely upon information furnished by the individual concerning his own activities.

(6) From subsection (e)(3) because the requirements thereof would constitute a serious impediment to law enforcement in that they could compromise the existence of an actual or potential confidential investigation and/or permit the record subject to speculate on the identity of a potential confidential source, and endanger the life, health or physical safety of either actual or potential confidential informants and witnesses, and of investigators/law enforcement personnel. In addition, the notification requirement of subsection (e)(3) could impede collection of that information from the record subject, making it necessary to collect the information solely from third party sources and thereby inhibiting law enforcement efforts.

(7) From subsection (e)(5) because many of the records in this system are derived from other domestic record systems and therefore it is not possible for the DEA and EPIC to vouch for their compliance with this provision. In addition, EPIC supports but does not conduct investigations; therefore, it must be able to collect information related to illegal drug and other criminal activities and encounters for distribution to law enforcement and intelligence agencies that do conduct counter-drug investigations. In the collection of information for law enforcement and counter-drug purposes, it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance as further investigation brings new details to light. The restrictions imposed by (e)(5) would limit the ability of those agencies' trained investigators and intelligence analysts to exercise their judgment in conducting investigations and impede the development of intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement and counter-terrorism efforts. EPIC has, however, implemented internal quality assurance procedures to ensure that ESS data is as thorough, accurate, and current as possible. ESS is also exempt

from the requirements of subsection (e)(5) in order to prevent the use of a challenge under subsection (e)(5) as a collateral means to obtain access to records in the ESS. ESS records are exempt from the access and amendment requirements of subsection (d) of the Privacy Act in order to protect the integrity of investigations. Exempting ESS from subsection (e)(5) serves to prevent the assertion of challenges to a record's accuracy, timeliness, completeness, and/or relevance under subsection (e)(5) to circumvent the exemption claimed from subsection (d).

(8) From subsection (e)(8) because to require individual notice of disclosure of information due to compulsory legal process would pose an impossible administrative burden on the DEA and EPIC and could alert the subjects of counter-drug, counterterrorism, law enforcement, or intelligence investigations to the fact of those investigations when not previously known. Additionally, compliance could present a serious impediment to law enforcement as this could interfere with the ability to issue warrants or subpoenas and could reveal investigative techniques, procedures, or evidence.

(9) From subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act.

[Order No. 88-94, 59 FR 29717, June 9, 1994, as amended by Order No. 127-97, 62 FR 2903, Jan. 21, 1997; Order No. 009-2003, 68 FR 14140, Mar. 24, 2003; 72 FR 54825, Sept. 27, 2007]

§ 16.99 Exemption of the Immigration and Naturalization Service Systems-limited access.

(a) The following systems of records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service are exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a (c) (3) and (4), (d), (e) (1), (2) and (3), (e) (4)(G) and (H), (e) (5) and (8), and (g):

(1) The Immigration and Naturalization Service Alien File (A-File) and Central Index System (CIS), JUSTICE/INS-001A.

(2) The Immigration and Naturalization Service Index System, JUSTICE/INS-001 which consists of the following subsystems:

- (i) Agency Information Control Record Index.
- (ii) Alien Enemy Index.
- (iii) Congressional Mail Unit Index.

- (iv) Air Detail Office Index.
- (v) Anti-smuggling Index (general).
- (vi) Anti-smuggling Information Centers Systems for Canadian and Mexican Borders.
- (vii) Border Patrol Sectors General Index System.
- (viii) Contact Index.
- (ix) Criminal, Narcotic, Racketeer and Subversive Indexes.
- (x) Enforcement Correspondence Control Index System.
- (xi) Document Vendors and Alterers Index.
- (xii) Informant Index.
- (xiii) Suspect Third Party Index.
- (xiv) Examination Correspondence Control Index.
- (xv) Extension Training Enrollee Index.
- (xvi) Intelligence Index.
- (xvii) Naturalization and Citizenship Indexes.
- (xviii) Personnel Investigations Unit Indexes.
- (xix) Service Look-Out Subsystem.
- (xx) White House and Attorney General Correspondence Control Index.
- (xxi) Fraudulent Document Center Index.
- (xxii) Emergency Reassignment Index.
- (xxiii) Alien Documentation, Identification, and Telecommunication (ADIT) System.

The exemptions apply to the extent that information in these subsystems is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a (j)(2) and (k)(2).

(3) The Immigration and Naturalization Service "National Automated Immigration Lookout System (NAILS) JUSTICE/INS-032." The exemptions apply only to the extent that records in the system are subject to exemptions pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) and (k)(2).

(b) Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because the release of the disclosure accounting for disclosure pursuant to the routine uses published for these subsystems would permit the subject of a criminal or civil investigation to obtain valuable information concerning the nature of that investigation and present a serious impediment to law enforcement.