Department of Justice § 16.132

seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance and the accuracy of such information can only be determined in a court of law. The restrictions imposed by subsection (e)(5) would restrict the ability to collect information for law enforcement purposes, may prevent the eventual development of the necessary criminal intelligence, or otherwise impede law enforcement or delay trained law enforcement personnel from timely exercising their judgment in managing the arrestee.

(7) From subsection (e)(8) to the extent that such notice may impede, interfere with, or otherwise compromise law enforcement and security efforts.

(8) From subsection 5 U.S.C. 552a(f) to the extent that compliance with the requirement for procedures providing individual access to records, compliance could impede, compromise, or interfere with law enforcement efforts.

(9) From subsection (g) to the extent that this system is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d).


§ 16.132 Exemption of Department of Justice System—Personnel Investigation and Security Clearance Records for the Department of Justice (DOJ), DOJ-006.

(a) The following Department of Justice system of records is exempted from subsections (c)(3) and (4); (d)(1), (2), (3) and (4); (e)(1),(2),(3),(5) and (8); and (g) of the Privacy Act pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j) and (k): Personnel Investigation and Security Clearance Records for the Department of Justice (DOJ), DOJ-006. These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in a record is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j) and (k).

(b) Exemption from the particular subsections is justified for the following reasons:

(1) Subsection (c)(3). To provide the subject with an accounting of disclosures of records in this system could inform that individual of the existence, nature, or scope of an actual or potential criminal investigation, and thereby seriously impede law enforcement or counterintelligence efforts by permitting the record subject and other persons to whom he might disclose the records to avoid criminal penalties, civil remedies, or counterintelligence measures.

(2) Subsection (c)(4). This subsection is inapplicable to the extent that an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d).

(3) Subsection (d)(1). Disclosure of records in the system could reveal the identity of confidential sources and result in an unwarranted invasion of the privacy of others. Disclosure may also reveal information relating to actual or potential criminal investigations. Disclosure of classified national security information would cause damage to the national security of the United States.

(4) Subsection (d)(2). Amendment of the records could interfere with ongoing criminal or civil law enforcement proceedings and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations to be continuously re-investigated.

(5) Subsections (d)(3) and (4). These subsections are inapplicable to the extent exemption is claimed from (d)(1) and (2).

(6) Subsection (e)(1). It is often impossible to determine in advance if investigatory records contained in this system are accurate, relevant, timely and complete, but, in the interests of effective law enforcement and counterintelligence, it is necessary to retain this information to aid in establishing patterns of activity and provide investigative leads.

(7) Subsection (e)(2). To collect information from the subject individual could serve notice that he or she is the subject of a criminal investigation and thereby present a serious impediment to such investigations.

(8) Subsection (e)(3). To inform individuals as required by this subsection could reveal the existence of a criminal investigation and compromise investigative efforts.

(9) Subsection (e)(5). It is often impossible to determine in advance if investigatory records contained in this system are accurate, relevant, timely and complete, but, in the interests of effective law enforcement, it is necessary to
§ 16.133 Exemption of Department of Justice Regional Data Exchange System (RDEX), DOJ–012.

(a) The Department of Justice Regional Data Exchange System (RDEX), DOJ–012, is exempted from subsections (c)(3) and (4); (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4); (e)(1), (2), (3), (5), and (8); and (g) of the Privacy Act pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2). These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in a record is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2).

(b) This system is exempted from the following subsections for the reasons set forth below:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosures of criminal law enforcement records concerning him or her could inform that individual of the existence, nature, or scope of an investigation, or could otherwise seriously impede law enforcement efforts.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) because this system is exempt from subsections (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4).

(3) From subsection (d)(1) because disclosure of criminal law enforcement information could interfere with an investigation, reveal the identity of confidential sources, and result in an unwarranted invasion of the privacy of others.

(4) From subsection (d)(2) because amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing criminal law enforcement proceedings and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations to be continuously reinvestigated.

(5) From subsections (d)(3) and (4) because these subsections are inapplicable to the extent that exemption is claimed from subsections (d)(1) and (2).

(6) From subsection (e)(1) because it is often impossible to determine in advance if criminal law enforcement records contained in this system are relevant and necessary, but, in the interests of effective law enforcement, it is necessary to retain this information to aid in establishing patterns of activity and provide investigative leads.

(7) From subsection (e)(2) because collecting information from the subject individual could serve notice that he or she is the subject of a criminal law enforcement matter and thereby present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts. Further, because of the nature of criminal law enforcement matters, vital information about an individual frequently can be obtained only from other persons who are familiar with the individual and his or her activities and it often is not practicable to rely on information provided directly by the individual.

(8) From subsection (e)(3) because informing individuals as required by this subsection could reveal the existence of a criminal law enforcement matter and compromise criminal law enforcement efforts.

(9) From subsection (e)(5) because it is often impossible to determine in advance if criminal law enforcement records contained in this system are accurate, relevant, timely, and complete, but, in the interests of effective law enforcement, it is necessary to retain this information to aid in establishing patterns of activity and obtaining investigative leads.

(10) From subsection (e)(8) because serving notice could give persons sufficient warning to evade criminal law enforcement efforts.

(11) From subsection (g) to the extent that this system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act.


Subpart F—Public Observation of Parole Commission Meetings

SOURCE: 42 FR 14713, Mar. 16, 1977, unless otherwise noted.

§ 16.200 Definitions.

As used in this part: