

(f) For fissile material package designs to be transported by air:

(1) The package must be designed and constructed, and its contents limited so that it would be subcritical, assuming reflection by 20 cm (7.9 in) of water but no water inleakage, when subjected to sequential application of:

(i) The free drop test in § 71.73(c)(1);

(ii) The crush test in § 71.73(c)(2);

(iii) A puncture test, for packages of 250 kg or more, consisting of a free drop of the specimen through a distance of 3 m (120 in) in a position for which maximum damage is expected at the conclusion of the test sequence, onto the upper end of a solid, vertical, cylindrical, mild steel probe mounted on an essentially unyielding, horizontal surface. The probe must be 20 cm (7.9 in) in diameter, with the striking end forming the frustum of a right circular cone with the dimensions of 30 cm height, 2.5 cm top diameter, and a top edge rounded to a radius of not more than 6 mm (0.25 in). For packages less than 250 kg, the puncture test must be the same, except that a 250 kg probe must be dropped onto the specimen which must be placed on the surface; and

(iv) The thermal test in § 71.73(c)(4), except that the duration of the test must be 60 minutes.

(2) The package must be designed and constructed, and its contents limited, so that it would be subcritical, assuming reflection by 20 cm (7.9 in) of water but no water inleakage, when subjected to an impact on an unyielding surface at a velocity of 90 m/s normal to the surface, at such orientation so as to result in maximum damage. A separate, undamaged specimen can be used for this evaluation.

(3) Allowance may not be made for the special design features in paragraph (c) of this section, unless water leakage into or out of void spaces is prevented following application of the tests in paragraphs (f)(1) and (f)(2) of this section, and subsequent application of the immersion test in § 71.73(c)(5).

(g) Packages containing uranium hexafluoride only are excepted from the requirements of paragraph (b) of this section provided that:

(1) Following the tests specified in § 71.73 ("Hypothetical accident conditions"), there is no physical contact between the valve body and any other component of the packaging, other than at its original point of attachment, and the valve remains leak tight;

(2) There is an adequate quality control in the manufacture, maintenance, and repair of packagings;

(3) Each package is tested to demonstrate closure before each shipment; and

(4) The uranium is enriched to not more than 5 weight percent uranium-235.

[60 FR 50264, Sept. 28, 1995; 61 FR 28724, June 6, 1996, as amended at 69 FR 3794, Jan. 26, 2004]

§ 71.57 [Reserved]

§ 71.59 Standards for arrays of fissile material packages.

(a) A fissile material package must be controlled by either the shipper or the carrier during transport to assure that an array of such packages remains subcritical. To enable this control, the designer of a fissile material package shall derive a number "N" based on all the following conditions being satisfied, assuming packages are stacked together in any arrangement and with close full reflection on all sides of the stack by water:

(1) Five times "N" undamaged packages with nothing between the packages would be subcritical;

(2) Two times "N" damaged packages, if each package were subjected to the tests specified in § 71.73 ("Hypothetical accident conditions") would be subcritical with optimum interspersed hydrogenous moderation; and

(3) The value of "N" cannot be less than 0.5.

(b) The CSI must be determined by dividing the number 50 by the value of "N" derived using the procedures specified in paragraph (a) of this section. The value of the CSI may be zero provided that an unlimited number of packages are subcritical, such that the value of "N" is effectively equal to infinity under the procedures specified in paragraph (a) of this section. Any CSI

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greater than zero must be rounded up to the first decimal place.

(c) For a fissile material package which is assigned a CSI value—

(1) Less than or equal to 50, that package may be shipped by a carrier in a nonexclusive use conveyance, provided the sum of the CSIs is limited to less than or equal to 50.

(2) Less than or equal to 50, that package may be shipped by a carrier in an exclusive use conveyance, provided the sum of the CSIs is limited to less than or equal to 100.

(3) Greater than 50, that package must be shipped by a carrier in an exclusive use conveyance, provided the sum of the CSIs is limited to less than or equal to 100.

[60 FR 50264, Sept. 23, 1995, as amended at 69 FR 3795, Jan. 26, 2004]

§ 71.61 Special requirements for Type B packages containing more than $10^5 A_2$.

A Type B package containing more than $10^5 A_2$ must be designed so that its undamaged containment system can withstand an external water pressure of 2 MPa (290 psi) for a period of not less than 1 hour without collapse, buckling, or inleakage of water.

[69 FR 3795, Jan. 26, 2004]

§ 71.63 Special requirement for plutonium shipments.

Shipments containing plutonium must be made with the contents in solid form, if the contents contain greater than 0.74 TBq (20 Ci) of plutonium.

[69 FR 3795, Jan. 26, 2004]

§ 71.64 Special requirements for plutonium air shipments.

(a) A package for the shipment of plutonium by air subject to § 71.88(a)(4), in addition to satisfying the requirements of §§ 71.41 through 71.63, as applicable, must be designed, constructed, and prepared for shipment so that under the tests specified in—

(1) Section 71.74 (“Accident conditions for air transport of plutonium”)—

(i) The containment vessel would not be ruptured in its post-tested condition, and the package must provide a sufficient degree of containment to re-

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strict accumulated loss of plutonium contents to not more than an A_2 quantity in a period of 1 week;

(ii) The external radiation level would not exceed 10 mSv/h (1 rem/h) at a distance of 1 m (40 in) from the surface of the package in its post-tested condition in air; and

(iii) A single package and an array of packages are demonstrated to be subcritical in accordance with this part, except that the damaged condition of the package must be considered to be that which results from the plutonium accident tests in § 71.74, rather than the hypothetical accident tests in § 71.73; and

(2) Section 71.74(c), there would be no detectable leakage of water into the containment vessel of the package.

(b) With respect to the package requirements of paragraph (a), there must be a demonstration or analytical assessment showing that—

(1) The results of the physical testing for package qualification would not be adversely affected to a significant extent by—

(i) The presence, during the tests, of the actual contents that will be transported in the package; and

(ii) Ambient water temperatures ranging from 0.6°C (+33°F) to 38°C (+100°F) for those qualification tests involving water, and ambient atmospheric temperatures ranging from –40°C (–40°F) to +54°C (+130°F) for the other qualification tests.

(2) The ability of the package to meet the acceptance standards prescribed for the accident condition sequential tests would not be adversely affected if one or more tests in the sequence were deleted.

§ 71.65 Additional requirements.

The Commission may, by rule, regulation, or order, impose requirements on any licensee, in addition to those established in this part, as it deems necessary or appropriate to protect public health or to minimize danger to life or property.