

that a postulated fire involving associated circuits will not prevent safe shutdown.³

M. *Fire barrier cable penetration seal qualification.* Penetration seal designs must be qualified by tests that are comparable to tests used to rate fire barriers. The acceptance criteria for the test must include the following:

1. The cable fire barrier penetration seal has withstood the fire endurance test without passage of flame or ignition of cables on the unexposed side for a period of time equivalent to the fire resistance rating required of the barrier;

2. The temperature levels recorded for the unexposed side are analyzed and demonstrate that the maximum temperature is sufficiently below the cable insulation ignition temperature; and

3. The fire barrier penetration seal remains intact and does not allow projection of water beyond the unexposed surface during the hose stream test.

N. *Fire doors.* Fire doors shall be self-closing or provided with closing mechanisms and shall be inspected semiannually to verify that automatic hold-open, release, and closing mechanisms and latches are operable.

One of the following measures shall be provided to ensure they will protect the opening as required in case of fire:

1. Fire doors shall be kept closed and electrically supervised at a continuously manned location;

2. Fire doors shall be locked closed and inspected weekly to verify that the doors are in the closed position;

3. Fire doors shall be provided with automatic hold-open and release mechanisms and inspected daily to verify that doorways are free of obstructions; or

4. Fire doors shall be kept closed and inspected daily to verify that they are in the closed position.

The fire brigade leader shall have ready access to keys for any locked fire doors.

Areas protected by automatic total flooding gas suppression systems shall have electrically supervised self-closing fire doors or shall satisfy option 1 above.

O. *Oil collection system for reactor coolant pump.* The reactor coolant pump shall be equipped with an oil collection system if the containment is not inerted during normal operation. The oil collection system shall be so designed, engineered, and installed that failure will not lead to fire during normal or design basis accident conditions and that

³An acceptable method of complying with this alternative would be to meet Regulatory Guide 1.75 position 4 related to associated circuits and IEEE Std 384-1974 (Section 4.5) where trays from redundant safety divisions are so protected that postulated fires affect trays from only one safety division.

there is reasonable assurance that the system will withstand the Safe Shutdown Earthquake.⁴

Such collection systems shall be capable of collecting lube oil from all potential pressurized and unpressurized leakage sites in the reactor coolant pump lube oil systems. Leakage shall be collected and drained to a vented closed container that can hold the entire lube oil system inventory. A flame arrester is required in the vent if the flash point characteristics of the oil present the hazard of fire flashback. Leakage points to be protected shall include lift pump and piping, overflow lines, lube oil cooler, oil fill and drain lines and plugs, flanged connections on oil lines, and lube oil reservoirs where such features exist on the reactor coolant pumps. The drain line shall be large enough to accommodate the largest potential oil leak.

[45 FR 76611, Nov. 19, 1980; 46 FR 44735, Sept. 8, 1981, as amended at 53 FR 19251, May 27, 1988; 65 FR 38191, June 20, 2000]

APPENDIX S TO PART 50—EARTHQUAKE ENGINEERING CRITERIA FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

GENERAL INFORMATION

This appendix applies to applicants for a construction permit or operating license under part 50, or a design certification, combined license, design approval, or manufacturing license under part 52 of this chapter, on or after January 10, 1997. However, for either an operating license applicant or holder whose construction permit was issued before January 10, 1997, the earthquake engineering criteria in Section VI of appendix A to 10 CFR part 100 continue to apply. Paragraphs IV.a.1.i, IV.a.1.ii, IV.4.b, and IV.4.c of this appendix apply to applicants for an early site permit under part 52.

I. INTRODUCTION

(a) Each applicant for a construction permit, operating license, design certification, combined license, design approval, or manufacturing license is required by §§ 50.34(a)(12), 50.34(b)(10), or 10 CFR 52.47, 52.79, 52.137, or 52.157, and General Design Criterion 2 of appendix A to this part, to design nuclear power plant structures, systems, and components important to safety to withstand the effects of natural phenomena, such as earthquakes, without loss of capability to perform their safety functions. Also, as specified in § 50.54(ff), nuclear power plants that have implemented the earthquake engineering criteria described herein must shut down if the criteria in paragraph IV(a)(3) of this appendix are exceeded.

⁴See Regulatory Guide 1.29—“Seismic Design Classification” paragraph C.2.

(b) These criteria implement General Design Criterion 2 insofar as it requires structures, systems, and components important to safety to withstand the effects of earthquakes.

II. SCOPE

The evaluations described in this appendix are within the scope of investigations permitted by §50.10(c)(1).

III. DEFINITIONS

As used in these criteria:

Combined license means a combined construction permit and operating license with conditions for a nuclear power facility issued under subpart C of part 52 of this chapter.

Design Approval means an NRC staff approval, issued under subpart E of part 52 of this chapter, of a final standard design for a nuclear power reactor of the type described in 10 CFR 50.22.

Design Certification means a Commission approval, issued under subpart B of part 52 of this chapter, of a standard design for a nuclear power facility.

Manufacturing license means a license, issued under subpart F of part 52 of this chapter, authorizing the manufacture of nuclear power reactors but not their installation into facilities located at the sites on which the facilities are to be operated.

Operating basis earthquake ground motion (OBE) is the vibratory ground motion for which those features of the nuclear power plant necessary for continued operation without undue risk to the health and safety of the public will remain functional. The operating basis earthquake ground motion is only associated with plant shutdown and inspection unless specifically selected by the applicant as a design input.

Response spectrum is a plot of the maximum responses (acceleration, velocity, or displacement) of idealized single-degree-of-freedom oscillators as a function of the natural frequencies of the oscillators for a given damping value. The response spectrum is calculated for a specified vibratory motion input at the oscillators' supports.

Safe-shutdown earthquake ground motion (SSE) is the vibratory ground motion for which certain structures, systems, and components must be designed to remain functional.

Structures, systems, and components required to withstand the effects of the safe-shutdown earthquake ground motion or surface deformation are those necessary to assure:

- (1) The integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary;
- (2) The capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe-shutdown condition; or
- (3) The capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could re-

sult in potential offsite exposures comparable to the guideline exposures of §50.34(a)(1).

Surface deformation is distortion of geologic strata at or near the ground surface by the processes of folding or faulting as a result of various earth forces. Tectonic surface deformation is associated with earthquake processes.

IV. APPLICATION TO ENGINEERING DESIGN

The following are pursuant to the seismic and geologic design basis requirements of §100.23 of this chapter:

(a) *Vibratory Ground Motion*. (1) *Safe Shutdown Earthquake Ground Motion*. (i) The Safe Shutdown Earthquake Ground Motion must be characterized by free-field ground motion response spectra at the free ground surface. In view of the limited data available on vibratory ground motions of strong earthquakes, it usually will be appropriate that the design response spectra be smoothed spectra. The horizontal component of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake Ground Motion in the free-field at the foundation level of the structures must be an appropriate response spectrum with a peak ground acceleration of at least 0.1g.

(ii) The nuclear power plant must be designed so that, if the Safe Shutdown Earthquake Ground Motion occurs, certain structures, systems, and components will remain functional and within applicable stress, strain, and deformation limits. In addition to seismic loads, applicable concurrent normal operating, functional, and accident-induced loads must be taken into account in the design of these safety-related structures, systems, and components. The design of the nuclear power plant must also take into account the possible effects of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake Ground Motion on the facility foundations by ground disruption, such as fissuring, lateral spreads, differential settlement, liquefaction, and landsliding, as required in §100.23 of this chapter.

(iii) The required safety functions of structures, systems, and components must be assured during and after the vibratory ground motion associated with the Safe Shutdown Earthquake Ground Motion through design, testing, or qualification methods.

(iv) The evaluation must take into account soil-structure interaction effects and the expected duration of vibratory motion. It is permissible to design for strain limits in excess of yield strain in some of these safety-related structures, systems, and components during the Safe Shutdown Earthquake Ground Motion and under the postulated concurrent loads, provided the necessary safety functions are maintained.

(2) *Operating Basis Earthquake Ground Motion*. (i) The Operating Basis Earthquake Ground Motion must be characterized by response spectra. The value of the Operating

Basis Earthquake Ground Motion must be set to one of the following choices:

(A) One-third or less of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake Ground Motion design response spectra. The requirements associated with this Operating Basis Earthquake Ground Motion in Paragraph (a)(2)(i)(B)(I) can be satisfied without the applicant performing explicit response or design analyses, or

(B) A value greater than one-third of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake Ground Motion design response spectra. Analysis and design must be performed to demonstrate that the requirements associated with this Operating Basis Earthquake Ground Motion in Paragraph (a)(2)(i)(B)(I) are satisfied. The design must take into account soil-structure interaction effects and the duration of vibratory ground motion.

(I) When subjected to the effects of the Operating Basis Earthquake Ground Motion in combination with normal operating loads, all structures, systems, and components of the nuclear power plant necessary for continued operation without undue risk to the health and safety of the public must remain functional and within applicable stress, strain, and deformation limits.

(3) *Required Plant Shutdown.* If vibratory ground motion exceeding that of the Operating Basis Earthquake Ground Motion or if significant plant damage occurs, the licensee must shut down the nuclear power plant. If systems, structures, or components necessary for the safe shutdown of the nuclear power plant are not available after the occurrence of the Operating Basis Earthquake Ground Motion, the licensee must consult with the Commission and must propose a plan for the timely, safe shutdown of the nuclear power plant. Prior to resuming operations, the licensee must demonstrate to the

Commission that no functional damage has occurred to those features necessary for continued operation without undue risk to the health and safety of the public and the licensing basis is maintained.

(4) *Required Seismic Instrumentation.* Suitable instrumentation must be provided so that the seismic response of nuclear power plant features important to safety can be evaluated promptly after an earthquake.

(b) *Surface Deformation.* The potential for surface deformation must be taken into account in the design of the nuclear power plant by providing reasonable assurance that in the event of deformation, certain structures, systems, and components will remain functional. In addition to surface deformation induced loads, the design of safety features must take into account seismic loads and applicable concurrent functional and accident-induced loads. The design provisions for surface deformation must be based on its postulated occurrence in any direction and azimuth and under any part of the nuclear power plant, unless evidence indicates this assumption is not appropriate, and must take into account the estimated rate at which the surface deformation may occur.

(c) *Seismically Induced Floods and Water Waves and Other Design Conditions.* Seismically induced floods and water waves from either locally or distantly generated seismic activity and other design conditions determined pursuant to §100.23 of this chapter must be taken into account in the design of the nuclear power plant so as to prevent undue risk to the health and safety of the public.

[61 FR 65173, Dec. 11, 1996, as amended at 72 FR 49508, Aug. 28, 2007]